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# THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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## ARTICLE I.

### JOHN KNOX AS THE ENGLISH AND AS THE SCOTTISH REFORMER.

In connexion with a notice of Dr. Lorimer's monograph on the "Knox Papers," recently discovered in the Williams Library, it was proposed in our number for July last to present the character of John Knox as a Reformer in the new light thrown upon it by the discovery of these papers. And as the best method of presenting this character, it was proposed to exhibit him, first, in the light of the newly discovered papers, as the English Reformer; then, with the key to his character thus furnished, to reëxamine the current conception of Knox as the fierce, implacable, narrow, iron-sided Reformer of the Church of Scotland.

It has been shown from the "Knox Papers" that in his career as a Reformer of the Church of England under Edward VI., and among the English exiles on the Continent, embracing nearly the first half of his public life, Knox exhibited little of the fierceness and harshness of character which is popularly attributed to him; and therefore the presumption is that any fierceness and harshness exhibited by him during his career as the Scottish Reformer may not have been from the inherent tendencies of the man's mind and heart, but because the circumstances that surrounded him and the work which he was called upon to do, forced upon him as the leader of reform the exercise of harsh and seem-

ingly fierce treatment of his adversaries. The purpose of the present writing in continuation will be, by a brief examination of some peculiarities of the Reformation in Scotland, to show that whatever of fierceness, harshness, and apparent narrowness and bigotry may seem to have marked the public conduct of Knox, came not from any change of the nature, spirit, and character in Knox, the English Reformer, but from the necessities of his new position as a Reformer in Scotland.

It is very commonly said that the difference between the Reformations of England and Scotland was that in England the Reformation was accomplished by the king, whereas in Scotland it was a Reformation accomplished *by the people*. The true statement of the case is, as may be seen by a careful study of the details, that while in England the Reformation was indeed monarchical, in Scotland it was *baronial*. And this difference was most important in this, that, while in England the monarch was practically omnipotent at the era of the Reformation and did reform the Church at pleasure, in Scotland the principles and spirit of the feudal system still prevailed to such a degree that the barons were fully a match for the throne, not only when the throne was occupied by a woman or a child, but even when a vigorous man might be seated upon it. It was these barons who first began the conflict with Popery. Even before the death of James V., Cardinal Beaton is said to have presented to that monarch a list of 360 landed proprietors suspected of heresy. Wishart, anterior to 1546, had preached the gospel under protection of the powerful barons; and when he was murdered, a conspiracy of barons avenged his death.

But while many of these barons were, no doubt, true Christian men and sincere Protestants, many of them, on the other hand, were avaricious, self-seeking, treacherous politicians, who were ready enough to run with the Reformation and overthrow Popery, not chiefly because Popery had trod under foot their liberties, but because Popery had immense estates and offered a rich spoil. For at the period of the Reformation it is estimated that fully one-half of the whole property of the kingdom of Scotland was held by the Church. It is no railing accusation of the clergy

that these barons were avaricious beyond degree. It was the testimony of one of their own number. For even so early as 1543, the Regent Arran is represented to have said that unless the sin of covetousness made them reformers he did not see how a reformation could ever be effected. Nor was the propensity to plunder confined to barons on the Protestant side after the overthrow of Popery. The revenues of the crown in Scotland were very meagre, and when it came to providing means for the support of Queen Mary with all her French ideas of the grandeur and display suitable to the dignity of a queen, nothing was more natural than that she should look to these confiscated estates of the Church. Having been already wrested from the Church, no scruples of sacrilege hindered her from seizing them—nay rather of claiming them as part of the patrimony of the crown. The Protestant Reformer who assumed that these estates and revenues which had originally been consecrated to religion were still a sacred trust, to be devoted to the religious interests of the people, must necessarily, therefore, find himself in the position of an agent intrusted with treasure, between two hostile bands of freebooters, with no option, however amiable, if a brave and honest man, but to fight and to fight fiercely. The application of these suggestions to the case of Knox will be seen farther on.

It will be remembered that the overthrow of Popery as the religion of the kingdom of Scotland had already been practically effected by the barons and gentlemen combining under the title of "Lords of the Congregation," who represented such bodies of the people as had refused longer to attend upon the service of the mass, and were accustomed to gather in private houses for a separate worship. The document known as the "First Covenant" was signed by such powerful nobles as Argyle, Glencairne, Morton, John Erskine of Dun, and others, so early as Dec. 3d, 1557, nearly two years before the return of Knox from the Continent. This Covenant declares: "We do promise before the majesty of God and his congregation that we by his grace shall with all diligence continually apply our whole power, substance, and our very lives, to maintain, set forward, and establish the most blessed word of God and his congregation. and shall labor

at one possibility to have faithful ministers truly and properly to minister Christ's gospel and sacraments to his people." This bond had already knit these Protestants into one body and pledged them to a definite line of conduct.

In the following year we find these Protestants boldly petitioning the Queen for reformation in what Calderwood styles "*The first Oration and Petition of the Professors to the Queene Regent in the beginning of the yeere 1558.*" In this petition they crave protection "against the most unjust tyrannie used against your graces subjects by those that be called the estates ecclesiastical," and ask for these five things—

"*Furst*, humblie we aske, that as we have, by the lawes of this realme, after long debate, obtained libertie to reade the holie bookes of the Old and New Testament in our commoun tongue, as spirituall foode to our soules, so from hencefurth, it may be lawfull that we may meete, publickly or privatly, to the commoun prayers in our vulgar tongue, &c.

"*Secundly*, if it sall happin in our said meetings, anie hard place of Scripture to be read, of the which no profite ariseth to the hearers, it sall be lawfull to anie persons qualifeid with knowledge, being present, to interpret and open up the said hard places, to God's glorie and the profite of the auditorie, &c.

"*Thirddie*, that the holie sacrament of Baptism may be used in the vulgar tongue, that the godfathers and the godmothers and the witnesses may not onlie understand the points of the league and the contract made, &c.

"*Fourthly*, we desire that the holie sacrament of the Lord's Supper, or of his blessed bodie and blood, may likewise be ministred to us in the vulgar tongue, and in both kindes, according to the plaine institution of our Saviour Jesus Christ.

"*Lastly*, we most humblie require that the wicked, slaunders, and most detestable life of the Prelats, and of the state ecclesiasticall, may be reformed, that the people by them have not to occasioun (as of manie dayes they have had) to contemne their ministerie and preaching of the Word, whereof they sould be messingers," &c.\*

And Calderwood relates how notwithstanding "in the moneth of Aprile this yeere, 1558, that mercilesse tyranne, the Bishop of Sanct Andrewes, apprehended and putt to death most cruellie Walter Mills;" and notwithstanding "the Queen Regent's double-dealing with the professours," still "the gospel flourished;"

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\*Calderwood's History, Vol. I., p. 335.

how the old Earl of Argyle took the protection of John Dowglas, caused him to preach publicly in his house, and reformed many things according "to his counsel;" and how "the congregation" struggled on against the Queen and the French through 1558 and 1559, until 21st October, 1559, when the lords, barons, and burgesses gathered in the Tolbooth of Edinburgh, did after consultation and hearing an argument from Scripture on the lawfulness of deposing sovereigns, from John Willocke, the preacher of Edinburgh, did declare "An Act of Suspension of the Queen's regiment." So that everything was ripe for the great act of Parliament of August, 1560, which abolished Popery and established Protestantism, before John Knox stepped upon the public stage in Scotland on the 2d day of May, 1559.

And as it was not Knox who raised the storm in Scotland, so neither did he rush unbidden into the conflict as a volunteer warrior impelled by the love of conflict and battle. He had indeed kept up earnest communication with the Lords of Congregation. He had in October, 1557, written those letters from Dieppe which had so immediate and powerful an effect in rousing the languishing zeal of the reforming barons, and which probably caused the framing of the first covenant already referred to. But those letters, be it remembered, were occasioned by their having invited and urged him to come to Scotland and then themselves failing in faith. For the letters refer to sacrifices which they had caused him to make to no purpose—even the giving up his beloved flock at Geneva, the leave-taking that caused so many brave men to weep, the tearing himself away from his unprotected family, etc. The point of these letters is not that he is eager for the conflict, but that they should have disturbed his peace at Geneva and induced him to come to Dieppe, on his way to Scotland, there to learn that they had abandoned the enterprise in which they had implored his help.

It is true also that in 1558 he published "The Appellation of John Knox from the cruell and most unjust sentence pronounced against him by the false bishops and cleargie of Scotland; with his supplication and exhortation to the nobilitie, estates, and commonaltie of the same realme." But surely it is not to be



regarded as evidence of a fierce and warlike spirit that a man should assail indignantly a decree of death pronounced against him because in a visit to Scotland in 1556 he had preached the doctrine of justification by faith alone, of which he gives this account :

“This doctrine I did beleve to be so conformable to God’s holie Scriptures that I thought no creature could have beene so impudent as to have damned anie point or article of the same. Yitt neverthelesse, me as an hereticke, and this doctrine as hereticall, have your false bishops and ungodlie clergie damned, pronouncing against me a sentence of death, in testificatioun whereof they have burnt a picture.”\*

No doubt the vigorous and masterly argument into which this “Appellation” extends produced a profound impression in Scotland, and did much toward bringing about the uprising against Queen Mary and her French. But no one will say that a man whom ecclesiastical tyrants are endeavoring to disgrace before his countrymen by a sentence of death and burning in effigy, exhibits any special fierceness and malignity of spirit in making defence in no measured terms against such antagonists.

After turning back from Dieppe, discouraged and mortified, to his quiet studies and communion with Calvin in Geneva, it may well be supposed that Knox would not go back as a volunteer to the ecclesiastical battle that came to its crisis in 1560. It was only at the most earnest entreaties of the “Lords of the Congregation,” with expressions of sorrow for the previous failure of courage in 1557, the news of which stopped him on his journey to Scotland and turned him back at Dieppe, that he was induced to come. He came both because of the urgent appeals from Scotland, backed by appeals hardly less earnest from Calvin and the leading spirits of the Reformation.

It is sufficiently evident from the brief allusions already made to the condition of things in Scotland, that on Knox’s arrival it was too late for the most moderate and strife-hating man to preach peace and reconciliation. And indeed he must have been more than man if after his long exile all the energies of his nature had not been roused in preaching the gospel to his long oppressed

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\*Calderwood’s History, Vol. I., p. 348.

and benighted countrymen, now thirsting for the word of life. In a letter to Mrs. Anne Locke from Leith, May 3d, 1559, the day after his landing in Scotland, he says:

“I am uncertane as yitt what God sall further worke in this countrie, except that I see that the battell sall be great, for Satan rageth even to the uttermost, and I am come, I praise my God, in the brunt of the battell.”

And in another of his letters when as yet he had not been six weeks in the country, he bursts forth in this strain:

“O that my heart could be thankfull for the superexcellent benefite of my God! The long thirst of my wretched heart is satisfeid in abundance that is above my expectatioun: for now fortie dayes and moe, hath my God used my tongue in my native countrie to the manifestatioun of his glorie. Whatsoever now sall follow as tuiching my owne carcase, His holie name be praised! The thirst of the poore people here, as weill as of the nobilitie, is woundrous great, which putteth me in comfort that Christ Jesus sall triumphe for a space heere, in the north and the extreme parts of the earth. We feare that the tyrannie of France sall, under cloke of religioun, seeke a plaine conqueist of us. But God is potent,” &c.\*

Here is the very spirit as yet of Knox, the English Reformer. The effects of his preaching is described by all contemporary writers as very marvellous. No doubt the main design of the Lords of Congregation in calling Knox to Scotland was that he might by his preaching rally the masses to sustain the work of Reformation now thoroughly begun. But he spoke no less freely and plainly to noble than to peasant. Even before the Parliament of 1560 had risen, he had preached that series of discourses on Haggai, the spirit of the whole of which is fairly represented by his bold appeal to the nobles against their selfish greed after the spoils—applying to them the words of the prophet and demanding of them—“Is it a time for you, O ye, to dwell in your ceiled houses and this house lie waste?” It was this appeal that roused Lord Maitland to anger and drew from him the sneer, “We may now forget ourselves and bare the barrow to build the house of God.” It was soon apparent that many of the Lords of the Congregation were ready to cast off Knox as soon as he had served their purpose.

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\*Calderwood's History, Vol. I., p. 470.

The great theme of the revilers of Knox as a preacher has been the popular rising against the priests and monks and the destruction of ecclesiastical buildings and ornaments, which followed immediately upon his itinerant labors as a preacher immediately upon his arrival. But it is very questionable whether Knox is to be held responsible for the consequences of outbreaks of popular fury, which were evidently beyond his control. Row,\* indeed, speaking of the arrival of Knox and his powerful preaching, accepts as probably authentic the simile of the crows which tradition attributes to the Reformer, and justifies its wisdom:

“So the Reformation,” says he, “passed forward daylie; needles kirks and idolatrous, prophan, sumptuous buildings, were demolished; and I think it wes true that Mr. Knox said, ‘Doun with those crow nests, else the crowes will big in them againe.’ And was there any wrong there? I will not justifie all particulare things done at that tyme, in easting doune some kirks which had been usefull for God’s service; in taking away bells, and ruggin doun such ornaments as might make the doers of that great commoditie worldlie (riche); for can any think that in such a great alteration in a kingdome everie man did everie thing rightlie?”

But Calderwood, in reciting the details of these riots of the Reformation, shows how again and again, as at the burning of Skoone, Mr. Knox and the lords endeavored to save ecclesiastical property from the hands of violence. And he makes it evident that the inciting cause to most of these devastations was not Knox’s preaching, but the sense of outrage suffered from the ecclesiastics by the masses. Thus he recites how at Skoone, as the destruction of the Abbey was going forward,

“A poore aged matron, seeing the flamme of fire ascending and perceaving manie offended [that is the lords and Knox’s friends who had dissuaded], said in sober maner, ‘Now I see God’s judgements are just, and no man is able to save (alluding to Knox) when He will punishe. According to my remembrance this place hath beene nothing elles but a denne of whoormongers. It is almost incredible to beleave how manie wives have beene defyled, and virgins deflowred, by these filthie beasts which have beene fostered in this denne, but speciallic by that wicked man, the bishop. If all men knew as mucche as I, they would praise God, and no man would be offended.’†

\*Row’s History of Kirk of Scotland, p. 12.

†Calderwood’s History, Vol. I., p. 472.

So in the case of the destruction at Perth. The riot grew out of the circumstance, that, as after Knox's sermon against idolatry a priest undertook in contempt to celebrate mass, a boy who stood near the altar cried out against it; then, as Calderwood proceeds to narrate—

“The preest gave the boy a great blow; the boy in great anger taketh up a stone, and throwing it at the preest, hitt the tabernacle, and brake doun an image. Immediatlíe after, the whole multitude cast stones, and dispatched the tabernacle and other monuments of idolatrie, before the tenth man within the toun was advertised of it. When the noise of this went through the toun, a great multitude, not of gentlemen or zealous professors, but of rascalls and the inferiour sort of people, assembled to that church. When they found that nothing was further to be done there, they runne without deliberatioun to the Grey and Blacke friers. . . . The spoile was permitted to the poore. The preachers had before threatened all men that for covetousnesse' sake sould putt their hand to suche reformatioun. . . . Men's consciences were so beaten with the Word, that they had no respect to their own particular profite.”\*

To the same purpose is Knox's own account (Knox Hist. of Ref. in Scotland, Vol. I., p. 318-19) of his arrival in Scotland and his relation to the Perth or Sanct Johnstown affair:

“The secound of Maij, 1559, arryved Johne Knox from France, who ludging two nyctis onlie in Edinburgh, hearing the day appointed to his brethren (to appear before the Queen) repared to Dundee, whare he earnestlie requyred thame, ‘That he myght be permitted to assist his brethren, and to geve confessioun of his faith with thame;’ which granted to him, he departed to Sanct Johnestoun with thame; whare he began to exhorte, according to the grace given unto him. . . . The Lard of Dun, cuming to Sanct Johnestoun, expounded the caise evin as it was (the Queen's order to ‘put the preachers to the horn, prohibiting all men to give aid and comfort to them’), whiche understand, the multitud was so enflammed, that *neyther could the exhortatioun of the preacheare, nor the commandiment of the magistrat, stay thame from distroying the places of idolatrie.*”

There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that Knox had any further responsibility for the destruction of the monasteries and other ecclesiastical property than have the public men immediately concerned for the destruction of property by infuriated mobs, which so often occurs even in the most enlightened and loyal States of what is claimed to be “the best government the

\*Calderwood's History, Vol. I., p. 441-42.

world ever saw." And even assuming that it was his powerful appeals that excited the multitude, it was not unnatural that even a moderate and amiable man, under the sentence of death passed upon him by tyrants in contempt of all law, and speaking on the question of life or death to himself, should speak a little violently.

The historians and critics hostile to Knox, however, are wont to assail both him and his co-laborers in the ministry at a point further back, and to ring the charges upon the incongruity of a minister of the gospel of peace making use of his sacred position for assailing the political men and measures of the time at all. The obvious fallacy underlying this criticism is its anachronism in applying to the men of a revolutionary age, struggling against a despotism that recognised no such rights as either civil liberty or liberty of conscience, the measure of conduct proper to be applied to the ministry in the 19th century, under constitutional governments.

Mr. Froude suggests with excellent judgment and discrimination—

"The power of passing censure upon the conduct of public men in the name of right and wrong is one which in one form or other has existed and ought to exist in every well ordered community; and the pulpit critiques of the age grew out of the necessities of the case, since there was no press, as now, to canvass proceedings of the Parliament and the government."\*

And Dr. McCrie, before him, had made, with still more point, a like suggestion:

"The pulpit was in fact the only organ by which public opinion was or could be expressed; and the ecclesiastical courts were the only assemblies in the nation which possessed anything that was entitled to the name of liberty or independence. Parliament had its business prepared to its hand and laid before it in the shape of acts, which required only its assent. Discussions and freedom of speech were unknown in its meetings. The courts of justice were dependent on the will of the sovereign, and frequently had their proceedings dictated by letters and messengers from the throne. It was the preachers who first taught the people to express an opinion; and the assemblies of the Church set the earliest examples of a regular and firm opposition to the arbi-

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\*Froude's *History of England*, chap. 29.

trary and unconstitutional measures of the court. This is a fact which has been overlooked by most modern writers, who instead of presenting accurate and liberal views of the state of society at that period, have too often amused their readers by pointing sarcasm or turning elegant periods on the arrogant pretensions and dangerous encroachments of a Presbyterian hierarchy."\*

This statement of the case leaves nothing more to be said on this point.

So much, then, for the first movements of John Knox as a Scottish Reformer. There is nothing in his conduct at the opening of his career which, when properly considered, militates with the view of his spirit and conduct as an earnest but moderate Christian minister when laboring under the auspices of Edward VI. as a Reformer in England. Nor if we now proceed to consider the views of a reformation of religion upon which he proceeded, will there be found any evidence of want of moderation in the measures which he proposed to execute.

In his letter of exhortation to England, January 12, 1559, Knox develops the germinal principles of his scheme of Reformation. After declaring that Popish priests should not be allowed to direct the flock, that a plurality of benefices to one man should not be permitted, but the pastoral charges be given each to a single minister who shall be required to discharge fully the office of preaching Christ crucified, he proceeds to say—

“Lett none that be appointed to labour in Christ's vineyarde be entangled with civil affaires, and as yee call them the affaires of the realme. . . . For, as touching their yeerlie coming to Parliament for maters of religion, it sall be superfluous and vaine, if God's true religion be once so established, that after it never be called in controversie. . . . So that the ministers, albeit they lacke the glorious title of lords, and the divelish pompe which before appeared in proud prelats, yitt must they be so stout and bold, in God's cause, that if the king himself would usurpe anie other authoritie in God's religion than becometh a member of Christ's bodie, that first he be admonished according to God's Word, and after, if he contemne the same, be subject to the yoke of discipline. . . . Now last, for the preservatioun of religion, it is most expedient that schooles be universallie erected in citeis and all cheefe touns, the oversight whereof to be committed to the magistrats and godlie learned men, that of the

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\*McCrie's *Life of Melville*, Vol. I., p. 213.

youth, godlie instructed among them, a seede may be reserved and continued, for the profite of Christ's kirk in all ages."\*

Here, then, we have the germinal ideas of Knox's programme of reformation, which will be found to be the key to all his subsequent conflicts in Scotland—an unsecularised ministry of one order only preaching Christ crucified, a spiritual free Church under Christ as its only Head, and education for not only the masses of the people, but education of the higher order, to secure an intelligent ministry. This last, if anything could be called such, may be termed "John Knox's hobby." And to his brave struggles and labors in that behalf, under God, has Scotland been indebted for the singular intelligence and intellectual superiority both of her people and her ministry for three hundred years past.

The limits of a single article are too restricted to allow us to follow the reform through the subsequent twelve years of his labors in Scotland, and prove that, in every important battle waged by him, it may be shown that his unyielding sternness and unsparing blows came not so much from any harshness or lack of calmness and moderation in the spirit of the man, but rather from the very nature of the issues involved and the peculiar circumstances of danger which continually surrounded him and the cause which he represented. These rendered it imperative upon him to keep up a perpetual battle for life or death. Referring now briefly to some of the more prominent causes of conflict in the attempt to carry out Knox's programme, it will be found that these may be comprehended under three general items: his struggles against the insincere and treacherous barons as soon as they found that he could not be used for their ends; his struggles with the remnants of the partially destroyed prelacy of Scotland; and his struggles against the usurpations of the crown.

It has been already intimated that the great peril to the Reformation in Scotland was the scramble for the spoils of the old Church, a prize so great as to cover one-half or more of all the property of the kingdom. Knox perceived at a glance on his arrival that the Church, though purged of her idolatry, was at the same time to be stripped of her possessions and turned a beg-

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Calderwood's History, Vol. I., pp. 429, 430.

gar into the streets. True, the cause of Christ may, under ordinary circumstances, trust securely to the enlightened faith and piety of Christ's people for support, when that piety has become properly enlightened, and has a far richer fund in the liberality of its earnest members who consecrate themselves and their possessions to the Master's service, than in the coffers of the State or rich endowments. But at that period the great doctrine of the Christian oblation had not yet been developed. Knox and his compeers had not yet seen that great truth. And what wonder when so large a portion of Christian Scotland does not yet see this truth in all its fulness?

He therefore at once set up the claim, to the disgust of many even of the Lords of Congregation, that the estates and revenues of the Church, having been consecrated originally to religious purposes, should now be applied, in conformity with their sacred character, to the purposes of the Reformed Church, for the sustentation of the ministry, the feeding of the poor, and particularly to the education of the people. Therefore in the First Book of Discipline—the first Reformed Church constitution—provision is made for dividing the Church patrimony in accordance with the general purposes for which it had originally been given, to be distributed under the direction of deacons, into three portions: one for the support of preachers of the gospel among the people; one for the poor; and one for the support of schools for the Church and kingdom. Maitland truly represented a large number of the barons in pronouncing, from the first, the whole revenue “a devout imagination.” Knox found to his sorrow and surprise that barons might be zealous for religion without being themselves religious; or though they may have professed and thought themselves religious, yet their religion was no bar to their selfishness and greed. His experience at that early day was the experience of many a mistaken servant of God since, who has imagined that true religion may be promoted by alliance with kings or presidents, lords or senators, parliaments or congresses. He was never allowed to carry out the scheme of the First Book of Discipline by reason of the greed of these reforming barons; and even for so much as was gained, he was obliged to be in perpetual



conflict with the treacherous leaders of the state and fight his way foot by foot.

John Cunningham's *History*, page 356, with equal force and beauty remarks of the *First Book of Discipline*:

"No document could possibly throw more light upon the opinion of the Reformers. It is in fact the plan of the temple which they designed to rear. If in anything in our Church as it now stands differs from 'The Book of Discipline'—if it has not the breadth of foundation, or length of pinnaele, or richness of ornament there indicated, it is because the after execution has fallen short of the original plan—it is because the builders who raised the fabric had not the same views as the architects who designed it."

It cannot indeed be denied that Knox denounced "in the vernacular" this greed of the secular leaders; yet as is so often the case, the villainy of treacherous Judases is so astounding that if an honest man endeavors to characterise it even in the most moderate terms, he seems to the world at large, unacquainted with the facts, to speak in a harsh spirit and to be pouring forth the mere vituperation of passion.

Knox's own account of the difficulty of getting his "*First Book of Discipline*" accepted by the lords is indeed given in not very mellifluous terms. After relating how, at the request of the nobility, he himself and five other ministers prepared the Book, he proceeds:

"Which thei did and presented to the nobilitie, who did peruse it many days. Some approved it, and willed the saym have bene sett furth be a law. Otheris, perceaving their earnall libertie and worldlie commoditie somewhat to be impaired thairby grudged, insomueche that the name of the Booke of Discipline became odious unto thame. Everie thing that repugned to their corrupt affectionis, was termed in thair mockage 'devote imaginationis.' The caus we have befoir declaired; some had greadelie gripped to the possessionis of the kirk; and otheris thought thei wald nott laek thair part of Christis coat; yea, and that befoir that ever he was hanged, as by the Preachearis thei war oft rebuked. The cheaf great man that had professed Christ Jesus and refusied to subscribe the Book of Discipline was the Lord Erskyn; and no wonder, for he besydis that he has a veray Jesabell to his wyffe, yf the poore, the schooles, and the ministerie of the kirk had their awin, his keching (kitchen) wald laek two parttis and more, of that whiche he injustlie now possesses. Assuredlye some of us have woudered how men that professe godlynes could of so

long continewance hear the threatnyngis of God against theavis and against thair housses, and knowing thame selfis guyltie in suche thingis, as war openlie rebucked, and that thei never had remorse of conscience, neather yitt intended to restore any thingis of that, whiche long thei had stollen and reft. Thair was none within the Realme more unmercyfull to the poore ministeris then war thei whiche had greatest rentis of the churches. But in that we have perceaved the old proverbe to be true—'Nothing can suffice a wreche;' and agane, 'The bellie hes none earis!' Yitt the same Book of Discipline was subscribed by a greate parte of the Nobilitie; to witt, the Duckis Grace, the Erle of Arrane," etc.\*

In a subsequent portion of his History, referring to the miserable compromise to which the Assembly had to submit, viz., to allow the Queen and the avaricious nobles two-thirds of the Church revenues, leaving one-third only to the support of the Church, and that transferred with conditions and restrictions, he remarks, with still more sharpness, "The first two parts are *freely given* to the devil, and the third must be divided between God and the devil: and the devil *will soon get three parts of the third.*" Nor was he without grounds for such anticipation, as may be inferred from what subsequently became matter of grave historical record. It is affirmed that the Earl of Cassilis was negotiating with the Abbot of Glenlucé for the *feu* of his Abbey (for the Lords of the Congregation had generously agreed to leave incumbents in possession of their estates during life), when, pending negotiations, the Abbot died. The Earl bribed a monk to forge the necessary papers for the dead Abbot. He then employed one of his retainers to assassinate the monk lest he should reveal the forgery—on the principle that "dead men tell no tales"—and then, last of all, caused his uncle to hang the retainer lest he should reveal the murder! Moreover, this Earl, when another Abbot refused to recognise a contract with the preceding not ratified by the crown at the time of his assassination, roasted the recreant Abbot before a slow fire until he was induced to ratify the papers giving the Earl the *feu* of the abbey, though with a hand that could scarcely hold the pen. This Abbot brought his complaint before the Council: but the Earl was too powerful to be punished, and the matter was compromised by a

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\*Knox's History of the Reformation in Scotland, Vol. II., p. 128.

small pension paid by the noble tormentor to his victim, who was a cripple through life from the roasting.

Surely the man called to stand in his lot, defending the Church of God from such robbers, and rebuking sin in high places and low places in such a generation, should not be expected to mince words, to act with gentleness and contrive smooth and glossy compromises! The meekest and holiest of men must have become in such circumstances a man of war. And when it is remembered that these conflicts were not with the minions of Popery, but with men who were pretending to act with them as reformers of Popery, it must magnify one's conceptions of the marvellous courage of the man.

It will perhaps be said, however, that Knox betrayed the same harshness of spirit in his ecclesiastical controversies as well where the issue was not between him as an honest man and faithful servant of the Church and a den of thieves, but between one form of church government and another. But a little examination of the question will show that really the issues, as between Presbytery and Prelacy intrinsically, were hardly involved at all in the conflict between Knox and the secular Prelates in Scotland. It was chiefly because these nominal Prelates furnished the opportunity to the avaricious barons to carry on their stealings, and set before the Popish court an open door to enter and practise its strategies against the Reformed Church, that Knox and his friends had constant occasion for strife with them.

It has been already intimated that at the overthrow of Popery the Lords of the Congregation, partly perhaps from generosity, but also for political reasons, agreed not to disturb the incumbents of prelatial and other benefices during the lifetime of those then in possession, while at the same time prelacy was set aside and presbytery established in 1560, so far as concerned *spiritual jurisdiction*. Neither by the General Assembly nor the masses of the people was the jurisdiction of the prelates recognised thereafter in the Church. But for political reasons, in order to keep up the ecclesiastical branch of the Parliament, the sees seem to have remained undisturbed. The explanation of this anomaly of establishing Protestantism in 1560, and yet leaving the old

spiritual estate as it existed under the Papacy still existing as one of the estates of the realm, and in possession of a large part of the land of the country, is to be found in the indisposition of the Scotch to political changes and revolutions. The argument would be—Is it wise to let the spiritual estate come to nought, which heretofore has been the first estate in the realm? Shall none but barons and burgesses hereafter sit in Parliament? Shall the checks and balances of the constitution be destroyed? Will the throne and the aristocracy be safe against this rising power of the burghs without the aid of the clergy? What will become of the College of Justice if its eight ecclesiastical senators are taken away? So even though the thieving barons pounce upon the Church's estates, yet some way must be contrived to preserve at least the shadow of incumbency by ecclesiastics to fill the needful places in Parliament and in the Judiciary. Here, therefore, in the political necessities of the case, and not from any zeal for Episcopacy, are we to look for the explanation of the fact that side by side with Presbytery established are found Popish bishops in possession of their secular rights and dignities as appointees of the Pope, while all spiritual functions were taken away from them and all authority and exercise of jurisdiction in the Church was forbidden them. Superficial Episcopal writers have made use of this singular arrangement, as they have also of the arrangement for superintendents in the "First Book of Discipline," to show that the succession of the episcopal line was not broken, and that the ideas of Knox were somewhat prelatical. It was beyond doubt an unwise experiment for the Scottish Reformers. Taking advantage of it, the court and the avaricious nobles sought to make a permanent right out of what was at first a mere temporary concession. The court resisted the abolition of these mere political sees, because they counted just so many more votes for the court party in Parliament; the greedy barons, because it opened to them an opportunity of pocketing part of the revenues as a fee for protecting the bishops in them. Hence the singular anomaly of bishops without authority to exercise any of the functions which pertain to the bishop's office in the Church. Episcopacy is welcome to whatever advantage may accrue to the

argument in favor of Prelacy from the existence in Scotland of bishops, who, instead of watching over flocks "over which the Holy Ghost made them overseers," had no function but to vote with the court party in Parliament and perpetuate the title by "apostolic succession" to certain revenues for greedy nobles to prey upon. And this fact that the sees with their revenues were not abolished, though every sort of spiritual and ecclesiastical authority was taken away, is just all that can be claimed. It is the sheerest nonsense to say that the three classes of ministers provided for in the First Book of Discipline—superintendents, local pastors, and readers—was a conformity to Episcopacy, when the Book itself shows that the superintendent had none of the functions pertaining to a prelate, except those common to a bishop and an evangelist. Nor was the reason for the appointment of superintendents any other than simply the emergency of a Church without a sufficient number of ministers, which was therefore obliged to improvise readers, lay exhorters, under the oversight of superintending evangelists. To appoint superintendents and to give authority to them on the one hand, and to appoint Scripture readers under the direction of the evangelists on the other, was at the greatest possible remove from Prelacy. For the First Book of Discipline, under the head of Superintendents, expressly declares—

"We consider that if the ministers should be appointed to several places there to make their residence, that then the greatest part of the realm should be destitute of all doctrine: and *therefore* we have thought it a thing most expedient for this time, that from the whole number of godly men be selected ten or twelve to whom charge should be given to plant and erect kirks, to set in order and appoint ministers."

It was not, however, the fault of Knox and his co-reformers that this anomaly of bishops, having no spiritual functions, was allowed in Scotland. They seem indeed to have submitted in silence to the arrangement of the politicians, at first, so far as to allow the bishops then in office to enjoy their revenues during life, and indeed some of these bishops joined them as ministers in the General Assembly. But when in the course of time the sees became vacant by death, and the prospect was that the spiritual branch of the legislature should become extinct and the court

lose one of its powerful auxiliaries, there was evinced a determination to fill these vacancies. This of course was opposed by the Church, which was now organised and established as Presbyterian. The attempt to revive Episcopacy by the court was regarded as a virtual subversion of the spiritual powers of the Reformed Church, and Knox and his co-workers were obliged to take firm ground. It was a battle for life, and indeed was the beginning of the grand struggle between Presbytery and Prelacy, which continued with various success for the next one hundred and twenty years.

When the Parliament at Stirling in 1571, in spite of the General Assembly, appointed bishops to the vacant sees, Knox and his friends declared they would die rather than submit to such an exercise of the secular power in the Church and such an invasion of her liberties. And when the compromise was proposed at the Convention of Leith in 1572, that political bishops should be appointed to hold these secular sees only until the king's majority, as before the Reformation—that these dignities should be conferred on ministers only, that these bishops should be subject to the General Assembly in spiritual matters and to the king in temporals—though Erskine of Dun fell into the trap thus set by Lennox, Mar, and Regent Morton—Knox, now broken down age and infirmity, exerted all his remaining strength to extinguish this germ of Episcopacy thus attempted to be planted in the Presbyterian Church of Scotland under the deceitful plea of preserving unity. Both in his private correspondence, in the General Assembly, and in a public letter, with his characteristic firmness and courage he exposed this fraud of political bishops without pastoral office. The result was that the people derided them as "Tulchan Bishops"—stuffed calves, to deceive the cow and induce her to let down her milk freely. The true ministers refused to accept the office, and the Assembly—even though these "Tulchan Bishops" were subjected to the power of its superintendents and had not the sole power of ordination and jurisdiction over a whole diocese as prelates—never recognised the arrangement beyond merely the registration of the act, nor ceased to contend against it till the very shadow as

well as the power was removed. Still this stratagem afterwards furnished the enemies of Presbytery a *pou sto* for their machinations, and put such creatures as Boyd, Archbishop of Glasgow, into position to vex the Church.

That Knox was profoundly impressed with the conviction that Prelacy is contrary to the order which Christ established in his Church, is evident enough from the fact that he had refused a bishopric in England when not only it was pressed upon him, but when he was seriously called to account for refusing it. Still in England he worked as a reformer in perfect harmony with prelates. That he warred against and would make no compromise with Prelacy in Scotland implies no change of his views or of his catholic spirit after leaving England. For the issues in Scotland were not at all the intrinsic merits of Episcopacy as against Presbytery, but whether he would consent to the continuance of a political agency outside the Church which had been established to serve as an instrumentality to the crown and the nobles to plunder the Church's revenues and endanger the liberties of Presbyterianism.

But the contests of Knox with the royal authority, particularly with the famous Mary Queen of Scots, have furnished the chief ground for the indictment brought against him of harshness and narrowness, yea, even of savage ferocity. There is no space here to go into that large subject which has furnished material for hundreds of poets, romance writers, sentimental historians, and anti-Presbyterian essay writers, to say nothing of the thousand eloquent effusions of debating society orators. That Knox in all this conflict spoke and wrote harshly is freely admitted. The Fourth Book of his own History of the Reformation in Scotland furnishes abundant evidence that with a very rough hand he was wont to tear off the masks of the traitors who disgraced the Protestant religion which they professed by their plunderings, their conspiracies, their feuds, and their assassinations.

Cunningham,\* while conceding to Knox qualities seldom found in such stormy periods of civil convulsion—describing him as

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\*Church History of Scotland, pages 406-7.

unselfish, sincere, consistent, unswerving, and firm amid continual vicissitudes; with hands clean of bribes and never enriched by the spoils—yet condemns him as guilty of coarse, virulent, and dictatorial conduct towards persons whose position commanded respect; of a fanatical fierceness towards Mary and her mother simply because they were Papists; and a cruelty which pursued them through life with a rancor rooted in religion. But that his rough denunciations of the queen did not come from his hatred of her as a Papist simply, but his hatred of her treachery and her despotic notions, is manifest from the fact that he dealt with the Protestant nobles just as roughly when they exhibited treachery and hypocrisy. Witness his account of what the preachers (no doubt meaning himself) uttered in the way of denunciation of the nobles in the winter of 1562 in Edinburgh, and in view of the recent death of the Earl Huntley in a fray, whose death Mary is said to have regretted, even though brought about by her own partisans:

“The winter after the death of the Erle Huntley the Court remaned for the maist part in Edinburgh. The preacheouris war wondrous vehement in reprehension of all manner of vice which then began to abound, and especially avarice, oppression of the poor, excess, ryotouse chear, banketting, immoderat dancing, and hurdome, that thair of ensues. Whairat the Courteouris began to storme and began to pyck querrallis against the preacheouris, alledging that all their preaching was turned to raylling. Whairunto one of them [no doubt Knox himself] gave answer as followeth: ‘It cumis to our earis that we are called raillaris, whair of albeit we wonder, yitt we are not eschamed, seeing that the most worthie servandis of God that befor us have travailled in this vocation have so been steiled. But unto you do I say, that the same God who from the begynning has punished the contempt of his word, and hes poured furth his vengeance upon such proud mockeris, shall not spair you; yea, he shall not spair you befor the eyes of this same wicked generation for the pleasur whair of ye despyse all holesome admonitionis. Have ye not sein one greater than any of you [meaning Huntley] sitting whair presentlie ye sitt, pyck his nails and pull down his bonnett over his eyes, when idolatrie, witchcraft, murther, oppression, and such vices, war rebuked? Was not his common talk, When the knaffis have railed their fill, then will thei hold their peace? Have ye not heard it affirmed to his owin face that God should revenge that his blasphemy even in the eyes of such as war witnesses? Then was the Erle Huntley accused by you as the manteaner of idolatrie and only hinderar of good order. Him has God



punished even according to the threatenings your ears heard; and by your hands hath God executed his judgments. But what amendment in any cause can be espied in you? Idolatry was never in greater rest; vertew and vertewouse men war never in more contempt; and vice was never more bold nor less feared punishment. And yet who gauds the queen and court? Who but the Protestantis? O horrible slanderaris of God, and of his holy evangell. Better it war in you plainelie to renounce Christ Jesus than thus to expone his blessed evangell to mockage. Yf God punishes not you that this same aige shall see and behold your punishment, the Spirit of rycheous judgment guideth me not.'

"This vehemence provoked the hatterent, not onlie of the courteouris, but also of divers others against the speaker: for such as be in credyte never lack flatteraris. (They said) 'their brethren of the court war irreverentlie handled. Thei did what they myght: such speaking would cause them do less.' And this was the frute the preacheris gathered of their just reprehensions.'\*

In his roughest speeches to Queen Mary, the Reformer never exceeded the plainness of this denunciation of the treacheries and chicanery of the men of the Protestant party. It was not only, or even chiefly, as a Papist that Knox denounced Queen Mary; but because he evidently conceived her pretended convictions in favor of Popery to be worn as a cloak by her to hide her schemes for the overthrow of the liberties of Church and State.

The rudeness charged upon Knox in the case of the Queen is the more readily made to appear more blameworthy because it was harshness toward a fascinating young woman, whom gallantry should have caused a man of high instinct to treat with courteous consideration. But when the woman, however fascinating personally, becomes the agent and representative of the most dangerous despotism, scheming again to fasten the shackles of the cruelest slavery upon a free people who have just broken the shackles; nay, of a fanatical despotism, that with power in its hands, as recent experience in England and subsequent experience in France showed, would not hesitate a moment to *extirpate* any Protestant people, it was no time for playing the courtier. Knox was obliged to speak and act towards this seductive siren of Popery and prerogative, not as his native gallantry and courtesy would prompt him, but in a style that suited the people of

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\*Knox's History of the Reformation, Book IV., pp. 361-3.

that day, and which would enable them to perceive the snares laid for them. The selfish nobles, under the fascinations of royalty having, in Knox's figure, "received a baptism with the holy water of the court," played false to the people, and thereby laid upon Knox almost the whole burden of keeping them roused to a sense of their danger, which he could do only by the use of a language that suited their taste.

After all that the apologists of Mary may say in her behalf, these facts seem established beyond question: That she came from France to take the crown of Scotland in 1561, with a full knowledge of the overthrow of Popery and the establishment of Protestantism by formal law of the realm, and that law heartily sustained by the great body of the people; and came with deliberate purpose to overthrow the Reformation. That most imprudently she obtruded her Popery, and under the guise of private scruples of conscience sought to ensnare the nobility and withdraw them from the support of the Protestant cause by claiming their protection and support in her personal rights of conscience as a Papist; and then into a conspiracy with her to seize upon the ecclesiastical property as the patrimony of the crown. That she introduced among a plain and frugal people French courtiers and French debaucheries that filled all virtuous men with horror and alarm. That from the very first her insincerity and treachery, and contempt for all covenant engagements, made it impossible for the people to trust her even when she may have intended to keep her promise. That in a country which had established constitutional liberty and rights of conscience, she planted herself upon the monstrous old dogma, of the duty of the subject to obey the prince as the lord of the conscience. That she set at defiance all the established proprieties and decencies of good society in the amours and debaucheries of her court—herself setting the example of scandalous intrigues and being the occasion of murders and assassinations among rivals for her attentions, if not accessory to them. It is unnecessary to add, as might readily be done, to this list of the errors and the crimes of this woman, the fact that she signed, with others of the French royal family, the decree for the extermination of the French Pro-

testants. We had selected passages in abundant confirmation of this general statement from the contemporary records in the "Book of the Universal Kirk," and from the histories of Knox, Row, and Calderwood, and the Autobiography and Diary of James Melville, but space fails for further citations.

It may be confidently submitted to the judgment of candid and intelligent men whether it was not rather to the honor than to the reproach of John Knox, that when the barons and other political leaders of the people succumbed to the flatteries, the fascinations, and the intrigues of the queen, he sternly stood out against all the allurements whereby she sought to cast her toils over him also, and silence his testimony for the truth of Christ and the liberty of his people; that he stood out as a faithful tribune of the people contending earnestly for the faith. That in fulfilling his mission as a Reformer, he was stern, harsh, and uncompromising, is to be attributed to the circumstances that surrounded him in a great life-and-death struggle, rather than to any fierceness of nature, any fanaticism in his religion. His career as an English Reformer shows that he was neither fierce nor fanatical. He was indeed a man of genius, with a ready wit and a lively imagination, and his discourses and writing, sparkle everywhere with the flashings of his keen Damascus blade. It may be shown indeed—nay, he himself tells us—that sometimes his own brethren deprecated his uncompromising spirit, his bold measures, and his unsparing denunciations of villainy in high places. But what witness for the truth ever fought and won the battle for liberty in any great civil and religious convulsion, who had not precisely the same experience? His very success has come from a far-sightedness, a breadth of view, and strong convictions that ordinary men cannot enter into. A large part, if not a majority, even of good men, at such a time are men of feeble convictions or no convictions touching the great truths involved in the controversy. Their timidity, self-ease, and self-interest take upon them the guise of zeal for "the peace of the Church." The wily enemies of liberty and truth understand the strategy of assailing this weak point of the Church with the cry, "Let us have peace," and of sending away the ships of the Greeks, in order

to induce the voluntary breaking down of the impregnable wall and receiving within the fatal horse filled with enemies. Our own recent civil and ecclesiastical convulsions have abundantly illustrated, and are still illustrating, how men of broader views and stronger convictions, no matter how averse to strife, when compelled to witness for the truth and denounce its enemies, seem to the men of feebler convictions—and especially men of feeble brain as well as feeble convictions—to be “troublers of Israel.” And there is a certain cast of piety which prevails more or less in every generation which, forgetting the apostle’s admonition, “Add to your faith virtue,” (*ἀρετήν*, manly energy,) is piping ever its pusillanimous note of “peace, peace,” even when “the enemy are coming in like a flood.” We offer this general fact as sufficient offset to the showing that some of Knox’s friends deprecated his sternness and bold denunciations.

This article has extended far beyond the original purpose of the author. But we cannot forbear citing, as the last proof of Knox’s true nobility of nature, the beautiful picture of him in his old age and in his death, from James Melville:

“Bot of all the benefits I haid that yeir was the cuming of that maist notable profat and apostle of our nation, Mr. Jhone Knox, to St. Androis. \* \* I hard him ther teache the prophecie of Daniel that simmer and the wintar following. I haid my pen and my little book and tuk away sic things as I could comprehend. In the opening upe of his text he was moderate the space of an halft houre; but when he enterit to application he maad me sa to grew (shudder) and tremble that I could nocht hald a pen to wryt. \* \* Mr. Knox wald sumtimes cum in and repose him in our colleage yeard, and call us scholars unto him and bless us, and exhort us to knaw God and his work in our country, and stand be the guid cause; to use our time weill and lern the guid instructionis and follow the guid example of our maisters. Our haill college, maisters and scholars, war sound and zelus for the guid cause. The uther twa colleges nocht so. \* \* I saw him everie day of his doctrine go hulie and fear with a furring of matriks about his neck, as taff in ane hand, and guid godlie Richart Bulenden his servant halding upe the other oxtar, from the abbey to the paroche kirk: and be the said Richard and another servant was lifted upe to the pulpit whar he behovit to lean at his first entrie; bot or he had done with his sermont he was sa active and vigorous that he was lyk to ding that pulpit in blads and flye out of it! Sa soon after his coming to Edinbruche he becam unable to preatche; and sa instituting in his room

be the ordinar calling of the kirk and congregation Mr. James Lansome, he tuk him to his chamber, and most happilie and comfortable departed this lyff."\*

The man of whose last days the memories of a college student were such as these, could have been stern and harsh only for the same reason that Elijah was. And indeed the life and character of John Knox bears a striking resemblance to that of the great prophet reformer of Israel.

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ARTICLE II.

THE ONE VISIBLE CHURCH AND THE MANY DENOMINATIONS.

When we speak of a local church convening in one place for the worship of God, there is no danger of being misunderstood. When the apostle Paul declares that "the care of all the churches" rests upon him, we easily apprehend his meaning. The churches of Macedonia or of Asia have a distinctness in our minds that requires no illustration to render the terms more expressive, or their signification more palpable. But when we undertake to define the Church in a more comprehensive sense, whether provincial, national, or universal, a difficulty is at once experienced that demands for its solution much thoughtful consideration, and a careful analysis. What do we mean by the "Church of England," the "Methodist Church," or the "Lutheran Church?" What exact idea is conveyed to our minds by "the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth?" It is obvious that, in such cases, definition is as difficult as it is important. Its importance cannot be overestimated. As to the task, its arduous nature becomes more and more apparent as we advance in the effort to accomplish it. Whether it is possible to attain the end, in any degree satisfactory to the conscientious reader, is the object of the present inquiry.

\*Mr. James Melville's Diary, pp. 26 and 33.

The first step we propose is to ascertain, as far as possible, the relation of the parts to the whole. The Church is certainly an organism, not a mere concretion. Its parts are not like counties delineated upon a map. Nothing would be easier, if such were the case, than to trace its limits and lines of sub-division. But this is plainly impossible in describing the Church. Its parts overlap one another, and are interlaced in endless ramifications. And besides, we are aiming at a definition of an organised object, a complex, living, moving, thinking body. The relation of parts, in the geographical example, is easy and simple. It is fearfully complicated in the other. For we are not considering the local churches to which allusion was first made. These are evidently connected with one another in the simple relations of number and space. But, on the one hand, they are not the ultimate result of analysis; and, on the other, they are not so complex as to defy definition. The chief difficulty is presented by the vast aggregates they form under various denominational designations. In these bodies, the visible Church most obtrusively manifests itself to the superficial observer, and the mind of an inquirer is painfully embarrassed by the variety of aspects they assume, and the conflicting claims which they press upon the attention of the world. To discover the organic principle that connects these parts or their elements with the true catholic Church, and to reach the ideal of that sacred unity which belongs to the body of Christ, is neither an easy nor an unimportant undertaking. Yet it must be admitted that there is most valuable truth somewhere within the range of our research. To deny the possibility of solution, would be equivalent to an abandonment of visible Christianity itself.

If the Church is a true organism, its parts must be connected by an organic principle. This union will vary with the view in which it is observed. The parts vitally connected, differ in position, office, and importance. A living tree is a unit, composed of a multitude of constituent elements and members, sustaining an organic relation to the whole and to one another. The root, the trunk, the branches, the leaves, have different local positions. They differ also in respect to form, function, and relative influ-

ence upon the tree itself. Again, a transverse section of the trunk will exhibit to the eye in a certain order, the bark, the nutritive system, the fibre, and the heart. These, too, are mutually related in respect to their vital influence upon the whole structure. The Church may be compared with a living object of this kind. It will be found here, also, that the parts have a vital union, presenting a complex variety of relations extremely difficult to analyse, describe, and classify. If we were now observing it in this light, we might be confident of ultimate success. But the different denominations composing the Church are not organs in themselves. They assume to be complete Churches, independent of one another. In this view, they would each be regarded as an epitome or type of the whole. The Church would be a collection or combination of churches. But this is not the fact, according to our present premises. We assume, on positive scriptural grounds, a Church of Jesus Christ, one body, of which he is the Head. The denominations are not its organs, by their own confession; and they differ so much among themselves, that they cannot represent it as types of the whole. What, then, are their relations to the Church at large?

We must enter a little more minutely into their ecclesiastical character. The organs of a living body have different functions. The offices of the brain, the lungs, and the heart, are entirely distinct. They never invade one another. The brain does not digest, the liver does not respire. But the different denominations of Christians undertake all the functions of a complete Church. They ordain, baptize, and administer the Supper, independently. Each one assumes, and perhaps correctly, that if no other denomination existed, all the promises and privileges of the Church would belong to its own organisation. The different bodies are not, therefore, organs of the one Church of Christ. They make no such claims; and if made, it would be absurd. We say also, with equal confidence, that they are not so many complete churches associated together to form one universal Church. For if it is a living organism, it cannot be a cluster of independent bodies. In that case, the organic unity would be in the constituent members, and not in the composite whole. The

visible Church would be a convenient phrase, denoting the coëxistence and juxtaposition of a certain number of organisations. However close the connexion, the union of the original elements of each body would be still more complete. The life of the Church is one; and two or more lives cannot, by any artificial process, be so blended as to lose their individuality. The Bible nowhere recognises a plurality of organisms, except in a local sense. According to this supreme authority, the Church has always been one. It can no more be divisible than Christ himself. It cannot be represented as a composition of several bodies originally separate and independent. If one now, it must have been so from the beginning. Otherwise, it would be a monstrosity, like the Siamese twins. The Scriptures speak of it as one body from the first. "On this rock I will build *my Church*, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it." This Church is a unit, not only in space, but in time. It existed long before the manifestation of its Divine Head in the flesh. The apostle Paul clearly indicates its historical unity in the eleventh chapter of Romans, where the Gentile converts are represented as engrafted upon the original stock. Its origin was the true Israel, traced back to Abraham himself. And this primitive Church was not constituted by the association of organised elements, but was itself the source from which the materials were derived. The unity generated the parts. It is evident, therefore, that sects or denominations do not now constitute the one Church of Christ, in any such sense that its existence and permanence are derivative from them. The Church antedated them all. Its unity preceded its diversity, as one seed originates a boundless variety of leaves and flowers.

All known ecclesiastical bodies combined cannot constitute the one true Church of Christ. And the principle of unity equally excludes the thought that any smaller number associated together could claim that sacred character. A Church constructed of pre-existent churches, would be a violation of scriptural premises, and of every just conception of vital integrity. The inference is unavoidable, that none of the denominations bearing the Christian name can be a part of the catholic Church, in the sense to



which we refer. Even a vital union, if it were conceivable in such a case, could not bind several churches originally independent, into that historical unity of which the apostle speaks. In the order of nature, one living principle always aggregates and controls the materials essential to growth. There must be presupposed a generating power concerned in the organisation of every living thing. All assimilation is due to it. Without it, unity would be a mere fancy. It could not be wanting in a plant or animal; much less in the Christian Church, which is not a monster with one head and many bodies, but a glorious, complete, and heaven-born system.

These observations equally militate against the notion that the denominations are so many *sections* of the Church. Division of the vital parts of an organism implies its death. The union of its parts is of such a nature that separation cannot be effected without fatal invasion of its essential integrity. We cannot believe that, at the Reformation, the one true Church was divided into many Churches which still retained in themselves the qualities and powers of the original. If popular ideas were correct, such must have been the nature of that event. There may be schism *in* the body, but there is no possibility of successful schism *from* the body. The separated parts cannot become living churches without destruction of unity. We are involved at once in that plurality of visible Churches which has been shown to be unscriptural and irrational.

In view of the difficulties standing in the way of every theory of sectarian division, High Churchmen, everywhere, resort to the opposite doctrine, that some *one* denomination must inherit the legitimate titles and prerogatives of the Church. The Greek, the Romish, the Anglican, and certain other smaller sects, make bold pretensions, in their public symbols, or in the spirit of their current history, to this divine monopoly. They either condemn or refuse to recognise the ecclesiastical legitimacy of every other body. These are invited and urged to return, as individual Christians, into the one true fold, as the only one completely representing the primitive apostolical model.

How do such pretensions accord with the vital unity of the

Church? A great difference in the degree of earnestness with which these claims are presented, is observed in different quarters. According to some, there is no salvation outside of the one recognised fold. According to others, the separate state does not necessarily destroy, although it to some extent endangers the spiritual safety of the individual. Between these two extremes, a wide margin of doubt and suspicion—a border land of casuistry and controversy—remains undefined upon the map of the Church. But in all these exclusive claims, the assumption remains, subject to all its logical consequences, that outside of the recognised boundary lines, the Church does not exist. The existence of Christianity may not be denied, but it is supposed to be in a kind of *nebular* state. Our proposed examination of these pretensions need not, therefore, be affected by such a concession. For we are not in search of nebular Christianity. The Scriptures give us no information concerning it. So far as visible religion is or can be known, we maintain that there is no such state. There may be faith without an external expression. But the man who exercises it belongs evidently to the invisible Church. The exclusive theory takes no account of this class of persons. It simply assumes the identity of its creed with that of the Church. Its language is, "The temple of the Lord are we."

What does this assumption imply? As we have shown, the degree of earnestness and consistency with which it is held has nothing to do with our inquiry; but it is important only in proportion to its practical exclusiveness. A comparatively numerous body, covering vast portions of the globe, and boldly proclaiming that salvation is ordinarily impossible to any but its own members, may be odious and terrible, but cannot be despised. The relative proportion of the Christian elements within and without its borders, does not suggest contempt or warrant indifference. On the other hand, a comparatively small sect, claiming to be the only true Church, necessarily exposes itself to derision. Admitting that far more of nominal Christianity may be found outside of its limits than within them, it yet insists that the Church is confined to these narrow bounds. A certain feeling of contempt is the natural effect of such as-

surance. We are disposed in general to regard exclusiveness with interest according to the numbers, area, and power by which it is sustained. When Lilliput aims at universal empire, and mentions Brobdignag among its outlying provinces, we are compelled to laugh in spite of decorum. With a view to more serious consideration, we must turn our attention to the claims of more dangerous and more consistent parties. Whatever we shall say of the more formidable organisations, will apply with yet greater force to the insignificant pretenders who follow their example. The main issue is the same for all. Whether the claim to universality sits well or ill upon the claimants, is a question of taste, not of logic. We only inquire for truth. Are such pretensions in any case credible? Our answer to the question must be according to facts. A denial *a priori* would be a confession that visible unity is impossible. Let us therefore refer to the most imposing example known to the world, and endeavor to discover whether the Romish Church can meet the requirements of such a claim.

In the first place, we lay it down as a postulate that the one true Church must be actually universal, or so thoroughly adapted to this condition, that the entire responsibility for separation must rest upon the recusant parties. If this great body falls short of either of these conditions, her claim must be rejected. "There is one fold and one Shepherd." This fold must contain, or be capable of containing, the entire flock. The Church of Rome affirms of herself both of these conditions. She not only claims to be adapted to embrace all Christendom under her sway, but boldly declares that all Christianity lies within her bounds. If we can show that these pretensions are false—that in point of fact she does not embrace the whole number of Christ's disciples, and is so constituted that many conscientious Christians are excluded from her communion, her assumption of catholicity must appear impious and absurd.

The Church is the body of Christ. How far does the vital blood circulate? The body cannot be perfectly complete if any member is separated from it. We maintain that the visible Church is coextensive with visible Christianity—that if one

member may be excluded, millions may be also. Can no professed disciple of Christ be found outside of the Romish communion? She opens her doors and invites all others to enter. But as a matter of fact, do all so enter? We are almost ashamed to propound such questions, but they are necessary to our inquiry. An answer is not expected. The burthen of proof is evidently devolved upon the shoulders of the Church of Rome. Whenever she can demonstrate that her communion embraces all the visible elements of the Christian Church, her pretensions will be admitted promptly. To make the absurdity of her claim palpable, without waiting for a satisfactory demonstration of her legitimacy, let us see what such a claim amounts to. What are the scriptural terms of admission to a nominal connexion with the Church of Christ? We dare not deny that the eunuch whom Philip the Evangelist baptized in the desert, was a true and declared Christian, and thereafter a member of the true catholic Church. He was admitted to this membership on the open confession of his faith in Jesus Christ. Multitudes of converts, at the present day, make the same confession, and are admitted to communion in Protestant Churches on account of it. But the Romish Church refuses to recognise them. Not because the required confession is not made, but because it is not made to her own priesthood. Here then it is obvious that she does not actually embrace all who make the nominal confession of Christ. That profession would be all-sufficient, if repeated at her altars. She virtually acknowledges the very fact which she formally denies. She is driven, before the battle begins, from this her first entrenchment, and compelled to fall back upon the second—her alleged adaptation to universality.

Of the church organisations known to mankind, that of Rome ostensibly presents the most plausible claim to this distinction. Those very characteristics which render her most obnoxious to condemnation from the Scriptures, are those which most eminently fit her for universal dominion. Her infallible head; her banded, trained, and servile priesthood; her elastic creed; her flexible worship; her facility in adopting as her own the popular superstitions of various countries—all these features of her pro-

tean system combine to give her an advantage over her rivals which cannot be avoided or counteracted. But leaving out of view all scriptural objections to this system, we may easily discover certain fatal difficulties which even Rome cannot conquer. That any one Church shall be qualified for universal dominion, it is essential that there shall be nothing in her creed or her practice which must exclude any conscientious Christian from her communion. The one fold must be so constructed that none of the sheep shall be repelled from entering. The shorter the creed, the wider will be the door. True catholicity demands that none but fundamental and necessary articles of faith shall be required as terms of communion. The platform must be wide and comprehensive, to accommodate the endless variations of human opinion. There is a minimum of faith as well as of vision, which practical Christianity is bound to recognise, and beyond which reduction cannot be carried. What that minimum is, we do not presume to determine. But it is evident that a universal Church, claiming a present adaptation to the whole world, must adopt that standard, if she expects to realise her designs. Now, the true creed of a Church is found in her practice. The Romish Church is no exception. And practically she makes no allowance for differences of opinion. Whatever may be the private thoughts of her votaries, they are all compelled, as her subjects, to approve of, adopt, and scrupulously follow, with closed eyes and chained minds, whatever she may dictate. What she dictates is not so much a creed as a system of religious observances, which her members must rigorously obey. Her position is that there is no salvation for those who reject this system. All are required, on pain of perdition, to conform to her peculiar ritual, and submit to her exactions. But this requirement of abject submission is the narrowest of all creeds, the most unrelenting form of spiritual despotism. It cannot become universal, as that Church is well aware, without adequate physical force. It is her policy, throughout the world, to secure the strong arm of the civil power, and employ it for the suppression of dissent and the enforcement of her arbitrary purposes. Wherever her numbers are sufficient, at this hour, she is using the temporal government

to compel mankind to submit to her demands. She cannot therefore become universal without acquiring a paramount control of all civil government. The supremacy of the Pope must first be established, not only in ecclesiastical but in civil affairs, in every nation; and he must be recognised as the absolute sovereign of the inhabited globe. This Church therefore requires of its subjects the practical adoption of a creed embracing all her observances and superstitions and political assumptions. No allowance is made for the exercise of opinion. All differences are interdicted by the dogma of infallibility. It surpasses all other denominations in the efficiency of the means employed to secure an apparent uniformity. But this very fact fatally disqualifies it for the mission of a universal Church. Protestantism has had its martyrs, and will have them again. There will always be sincere confessors of Jesus Christ who cannot be compelled to embrace what they regard as the shocking impieties of the Church of Rome. This must be conceded, unless it can be maintained that a refusal to submit to her authority is incompatible with sincerity of faith. But this is impossible. The dungeon, the rack, the stake, attesting the depth of conviction, furnish evidence of its genuineness which such a test can never impair. The fold of the Church of Rome is so constructed that some at least of Christ's sheep will always be excluded. It is not, therefore, the one fold of which he is the Shepherd.

So much for the pretended visible uniformity of Rome. But if her uniformity is impossible, what must we say of her unity? Can any sane man believe that the unity of the body of Christ is a *compulsory* submission of all nominal Christians to one ritual system? If such a submission were ever secured by the combined forces of the world, would it be the bond of perfectness and peace which St. Paul describes? We will not insult the reader with the suggestion of such a thought.

If the Church of Rome fails to establish her claim of true catholicity, all other exclusive Churches must go down with her. The unavoidable conclusion is, that such an ecclesiastical body does not exist under any denominational form. Unity is not a formal condition. The Church is like water, shapeless and color-

less, yet distinctly visible. It exists and manifests itself to the observer, like her Lord after his resurrection, in a manner somewhat independent of ordinary appearances, and partially veiled from carnal eyes. No denomination perfectly represents it. It cannot be verbally portrayed. We have reached certain negative attributes; but her positive, visible unity is as yet undefined. We can say this much and no more, that no one nominal Church, and no combination of known sects, can establish a claim to exclusive enjoyment of the promises.

Since no Church organisation now known could maintain a visible unity over a converted world, we must look for unity of a different kind. It cannot depend upon local intercourse, or even upon constant correspondence. Both conditions are impossible. An organised universal Church cannot exist without a common bond pervading the whole body. Now what is this bond? There are two classes of promises left by the Redeemer for the comfort of his people—one to individuals, the other to the Church. Among the latter, none seems to us more closely connected with the present question than that which assures us of his social presence: "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." The presence of Jesus Christ is elsewhere promised to each of his disciples. But here is a special and more emphatic assurance of that presence to those who meet in social worship in his name. When several Christians are thus assembled, there is a principle that unites them, the principle of religious association. The common purpose of their meeting, and the common exercises in which they engage, constitute the visible tie that distinguishes their social from their individual state. We are far from inclining to a mystical interpretation of the Scriptures, but cannot avoid the impression that as the Head is invisibly present on such an occasion, the body of Christ also is virtually there. Its authority and sanction cannot be wanting when the living Head is present. But it is only in a spiritual sense that this can be true of either. Neither Christ nor the invisible Church is visibly at that point. But the essential conditions of a true Church are presented. Those conditions are not local communication with one another, but community of

principle and purpose in the worshippers. But this community may exist among all Christians; and all, in their associate capacity, constitute the body of Christ. The tie that connects the persons who are met in one place, is the same that binds the most distant members together. The more simple it is, the more easily is it adapted to universal extension. Whatever the *name* of Christ implies in this promise, is the connecting link, the cementing material, by which the elements of the Church are held together. His name gives unity to the smallest body associated for his worship, and is the sacred bond that organises into one the whole number of his disciples. In the words of St. Paul, there is "one Lord, one faith, one baptism." The true elements of this body are evidently the professed members of Christ, without distinction of office or order. The Romish and Anglican idea that the clergy are the Church, receives no countenance whatever from the Scriptures. Every kind of ministry is a gift to the Church for its edification and spiritual benefit. The Church itself is the entire number of those who adopt as their guide in faith and practice the fundamental truths which are essential to salvation. This unity is not a thing of the future, but of the present. It has existed from the foundation of the Church. It cannot be destroyed. The present question does not so much concern its reality, but the sense in which it is visibly one. To the careless observer, the elements are separated by a thousand differences of name, creed, worship, and national boundaries. The unity, if acknowledged, is supposed to be latent, as a purely spiritual principle animating the body with common hopes and purposes.

It cannot be denied that the principle of union is spiritual and invisible. But the effect of this principle is an outward thing that may be made evident to the candid inquirer. All vital powers are beyond the reach of the senses. But we may, nevertheless, discover a certain order of arrangement, and a certain correspondence of action in the living structure, which justifies us in ascribing to it a visible unity. It is the same with the Church. It visibly confesses a common Lord. It openly embraces a common faith. It applies to its members, as parties to a covenant, the common seal of its sacramental ordinances.



To what extent the validity of these expressions of unity should be recognised, is a subordinate question that does not affect the general proposition. They are variously interpreted. Great differences of opinion prevail in regard to the articles of faith that are necessary to salvation. And others, equally familiar, have reference to the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, and the orders and prerogatives of church officers. We cannot here discuss them, except so far as they relate to the recognition or exclusion of professed disciples of Christ. It has already been shown that so far as doctrine is concerned, the visible Church cannot be more exclusive than the invisible. Whoever may be recognised as a Christian indeed, should be recognised also as a member of Christ's visible body. But we must admit that, among the necessary evidences of Christian character which Church authorities must demand, a readiness to obey the known requirements of Christ occupies an important place. A refusal to submit to Baptism, or to partake of the Eucharist, would, under all ordinary circumstances, be regarded as a positive bar to membership in the Church. The one baptism is therefore essential to the existence of the visible Church.

This article cannot be burthened with an inquiry whether baptism by sprinkling is according to the command. We simply say that immersion is not plainly required as the only valid mode of performing the rite, because such a proposition involves consequences evidently inconsistent with the integrity of the Church. If all those who reject immersion are to be regarded as outside of the fold, being placed thus by their own choice, they must exhibit insufficient evidence of Christian character, and should not be considered Christians at all. For a true Christian will obey any plain command. Exclusive immersionists are, therefore, driven to one or the other of two alternatives: they must either maintain that other evangelical Christians are wanting in satisfactory evidence of piety, or that immersion is *not* obviously commanded in the word of God. If they choose the latter, they cannot continue to make their mode of baptism a test of communion. If they adopt the former, they make their own denomination the only true Church, and consign all others to fatal

unbelief. We know very well that almost all immersionists are disposed to escape from this dilemma. But the more intelligent must see that escape is impossible. In the meantime, the disciples of Christ who are not involved in this difficulty, will readily perceive that the "one baptism" of the Church does not mean one mode of baptism, but one signification of the rite.

Another question bearing upon our definition of the Church is that of the subjects of baptism. To insist upon the exclusive validity of believers' baptism, would probably reduce the number of members more than one half, and undermine the legal ordination of an equal proportion of Christian ministers. The gravity of the question is obvious. What, then, is the scriptural status of the infant children of Christian parents? Have they no connexion with the visible Church? The apostle Paul declares that such children are *holy*, where but one parent is a professed believer. Holiness is used in the Bible in two senses—that of spiritual purity, and that of consecration. It is not pretended, on either side, that children are sanctified in the former sense; and we are compelled to infer that the apostle employs the term in the latter. Children of believers have, therefore, some sort of Christian character or relation to the Church, which does not belong to others. To deny it were the height of presumption. The connexion is clearly recognised, however difficult it may be to describe it. This relation is attributed to the natural connexion of the parent and child. It is plain that if the Scriptures point it out, the Church should recognise it. The position is impregnable. And another collateral truth is equally at hand. The Head of the Church invites parents to bring their little children to him, that he may bless them. For the *coming* of infants must be conveyance in the arms of others. Infants, therefore, as well as adults, may in some sense comply with the invitation of the Saviour, and come to him, with hope, on the part of those who bring them, that they may receive some kind of spiritual benefit. We generalise the terms with a purpose. These two undeniable truths certainly establish an important connexion between such children and Christ and his visible Church. It is unnecessary to define this relation. We are only concerned with

its existence, and with the obvious inference that the Church should recognise it. Let it be also observed, that no exercise of personal faith, or profession of faith, is expected in such cases. The holiness of the children is not dependent upon such conditions, and the blessing of Christ, conferred upon them, is not predicated upon conscious obedience to his commands. Faith and obedience on their part would be impossible. Yet faith and obedience are indispensable. There is no acceptable approach to Christ without them. There is but one solution possible. The faith of the parent, which unites him to Christ, also brings his child into this new relation to him. It is due to the fact that the parent is a *believer*. Now baptism is an official recognition of the profession of faith; and if this profession in any sense relates to the child, the act of recognition should also be extended to him. He should share in the baptismal rite, because he has an interest in the faith which that rite approves and seals. With such considerations before us, we can understand the repeated statement in the Acts of the Apostles of the baptism of entire households. And the subsequent history of the Church conclusively confirms our interpretation. Well may the learned Calvin declare, concerning the antiquity of infant baptism, that "there is no Christian writer who does not refer its origin, as a matter of certainty, to the age of the apostles."

The visible Church embraces all persons who profess the true religion, with their children. This conclusion is not only scriptural, but in harmony with nature and reason; for the adoption of any religion must, if sincere, be not only for one's personal benefit, but for those most closely connected with him. The parent not only engages himself as a disciple of Christ, but pledges himself to impart a Christian education to his offspring. In every kingdom, the children of legitimate subjects have a certain relation with it. The naturalisation of foreigners always extends to them. This does not imply full citizenship or complete responsibility. It only expresses the prompt understanding of common sense, that the assumption of new duties and privileges by the parent, must bring his offspring into a new relative position. In no case could this obvious proposition be denied on

the ground that the child is unconscious of the change. Children become members of the family and the commonwealth, without their own knowledge or agency. The lambs always belong to the fold, and are never excluded from the care of the shepherd because they are incapable of enjoying the provision made for others. The Scriptures do not destroy natural relations. They recognise and sanctify them. The children of Christian parents are, therefore, considered holy, or dedicated to God. As everything connected with the Jewish temple was sanctified by it, so the children of the Church are sanctified by their natural union with its members.

We have endeavored, so far, to exhibit the evidence of a true visible unity pervading the Christian Church throughout the world. It consists, in our judgment, in an avowed community of saving doctrine and sacramental conformity to the will of Jesus Christ. It exists under his guardianship, even when it is denied, contradicted, or rejected. We are now better prepared to point out the duty of the members of this body towards one another, in reference to this connecting link by which they are cemented into one. Negatively speaking, we can discover no obligation resting upon them to become one in any other sense. Diversity in unity seems to be the true doctrine of Christian liberty. The apostles never required Jewish converts to abandon circumcision, or Gentile Christians to submit to it. In all matters of inferior moment, in all observances that did not conflict with fundamental principles, the human mind was left to work out its honest convictions from the word of God. A common faith implies a common standard of authority. But beyond the limits therein laid down, the private judgment of interpretation is the only guide. Hence we believe that uniformity of Christian worship and government is not contemplated in the scheme of a universal Church. Whether it is desirable, is an open question which we decline to discuss. We simply insist that the spirit of the New Testament does not require all the members of the visible Church to be one in opinion, taste, or habit. All efforts to reduce them to a dead uniformity, are vain and impracticable. The enjoyment of our own conscientious convictions and preferences need not conflict with

the preferences of others. As far as it is possible to approximate the standard of primitive practice, it is our obvious duty to conform to it. But no portion of the Church has a right to dictate to another what that standard is. And until we are assured of perfect conformity on our own part, it is presumptuous in the extreme to censure the nonconformity of others.

We are thus brought naturally to reflect upon the war of various denominations upon the unity of the Church. What constitutes the sin of schism? Not separation from the true Church; for this is apostasy. Schism is an evil prevalent *within* the body of Christ. It does not consist in local separation, or in separation by mutual consent to worship and labor in different spheres. The word itself implies, in a living body, a harsh and painful division of parts that ought to remain united. As unity is adherence to the same faith and institutions, it is violated whenever one part of the Church refuses to recognise another. There is then a painful antagonism between vital parts. Sin may be committed on both sides, but the sin of schism rests upon those who have caused the rupture.

It requires very little sagacity to perceive that the spirit of unity should correspond with its actual existence. All the professed people of Christ should be acknowledged as such. Even grave errors and offences do not justify expulsion, in the judgment of the apostle. Nothing but a total abandonment of Christian doctrine and principle can furnish ground for excommunication. But the war of sects is a perpetual invasion of the integrity of the Church. It violates the spirit of union, and tends to destroy the ties formed by divine wisdom for its perpetuity. There is something of this error in the conduct of all sectarian bodies. But it is time for the Church to know that the most odious form of schism is chargeable to those who assume an exclusive attitude toward their brethren. The charge is often brought against those who separate themselves and seek new associations. But mere change of position in the Church is not schism. No division that is not dangerous to the vital organism, can be so regarded. But, on the other hand, the spirit that represents an allowable separation, and treats the receding party as

apostates, refusing to recognise their rights in the Church of God, cannot be defended against the imputation of schism. Yet many of the denominations into which Christendom is distributed, are arrayed against one another in an attitude of distrust and hostility. Comparatively few recognise a comity of Churches. By some, the ministers of other Christian bodies are excluded from their pulpits and churches, and their members debarred from their communion, with a rigor as unrelenting as the ban of Mahomet. They refuse to recognise as Christians those whose Christian character they know to be as good as their own. Tested by the faith they profess, and the fruit they bear, they cannot pretend to any better evidence of true membership in the Church than that of their brethren whom they condemn. But they nevertheless refuse to recognise them. They deal with them as they would with the heathen or the publican. We insist, therefore, that if schism is to be denounced as a pernicious error in the Church, the charge should be directed against those denominations which exhibit before the world the most exclusive attitude towards others. Such bodies have an especial reason to pray for deliverance "from all false doctrine, heresy, and schism."

But this deplorable spirit does not confine itself to the scornful airs of High Church assumption. It manifests itself in other ways, and among other parties. Churches may recognise one another, and yet indulge in the most bitter accusations. To say nothing of their inconsistency, it is not possible to rescue them from a fearful responsibility. Such denunciations are at war with the unity of the Church—not with its integrity, but that sacred reverence all should entertain for the principle. Unity cannot be destroyed, but its spirit can be sadly impaired.

On a sober review of the whole subject, the various Christian denominations stand in need of a faithful monitor, who shall remind them that they are not churches in any scriptural sense. They are different forms which the one true Church has taken. We do not question the validity of their ministry or ordinances. Validity attends the Church wherever it is found. But the catholic Church is a system to which they belong. In the centre is the true ideal model of a perfect Church, and these several

bodies revolve around it at various distances. It is a profitable reflection, tending to promote a becoming humility, that the distance between the actual organisations and the divine model, is vastly greater than that which separates them from one another. It will be time enough for mutual reproaches when they find themselves free from error. A body of Christians is as much bound as an individual to cultivate humility, and should abase themselves if they would be exalted. An arrogant spirit is contrary to the gospel, and none the less so when manifested by a large society of Christians. The first lesson all these bodies have to learn, if they desire to realise the unity of the Church, is the extent of their own imperfections and their want of conformity to the perfect standard.

The next step we beg leave to suggest is an abatement of those abuses which have created so many barriers between the members of the Church of Christ. Although, according to St. Paul, "he hath broken down the middle wall of partition" between Jews and Gentiles, it is sadly true that, in the modern Church exclusive parties have been organised, which have busily employed themselves in again erecting similar barriers between his professed followers. Rival denominations are seemingly engaged in active competition for popularity and success. Scorn, denunciation, and spoliation, have marked their history, and the scandal of repeated appeals to secular courts has left a disgraceful stain upon their records. *Reform* should be the motto of the Church as well as of the State. But all true reform must begin with repentance. This is the solemn call of the Spirit in the Book of Revelation, addressed to the angels of the several churches. A new spirit must be cultivated, a different demeanor must be manifested between the various bodies. Without this, the unity of the Church must remain obscured and hidden from the eyes of mankind. The world will never be converted so long as the reproach of irreparable division and permanent strife casts its hideous shadow upon the character of the Church.

Again, and finally, in seeking to promote the unity of the Church, it should be remembered that these efforts should be directed to the spirit rather than the form. The fact of union is

already established. The Church has always been one. Why waste our energies in endeavoring to give it a unity which it now possesses? To recognise and realise this fact, is the true object of pursuit. The general diffusion of a fraternal spirit would make the union more and more distinctly visible. The true experience of such a feeling would soon banish from our sectarian system every rule or provision that is incompatible with it. Offensive action lying on the records of the past, would be promptly repudiated. Insults and accusations, conceived in jealousy or hate, would be acknowledged, deplored, forgiven, and forgotten. As expressions of judgment or preference, the lines that are necessary to distinguish one body from another might continue as visible and permanent as ever; but they would no longer convey the thought of alienation, or represent to the world the bitter antagonisms of hostile parties. The fraternity of which we speak need never express itself in the deceptive guise of formal correspondence. The language of mutual confidence and regard will not seek to embody itself in gushing speeches, flattering resolutions, or the interchange of commissioners who are expected to be profuse in diplomatic eloquence. Such formalities have proved unsatisfactory and vain. They are liable to degenerate into a hollow mockery, that seeks to hide the wounds it cannot heal. True unity, like true love, cannot be formulated. The language of compliment has no place in its spontaneous intercourse. It manifests itself in incidental expressions and unpremeditated signs of confidence and love. The brotherhood of Churches, like that of individuals, is natural and unconstrained, and will be exhibited in a thousand ways unknown to the world's diplomacy. Especially will it display itself in action. Coöperation in the work of converting the world must take the place of a counteractive policy, if the Church desires to give to mankind an impressive exhibition of its unity. In this there can be no sham. Action is too earnest for deception. It is seen as well as heard. It is substantial and permanent in its beneficent results. The life of the Church can be, and ought to be, one, like that of its divine Master. Spiritual unity consists chiefly in common motives and aims. The more all the Churches become absorbed



in the service and glory of the Redeemer, the more they will realise and enjoy the truth of his precious promise, to be with them always, even to the end of the world. Then also will be fulfilled the spiritual import of his prayer, "That they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us; that the world may believe that thou hast sent me."

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ARTICLE III.

PERFECT SANCTIFICATION.

The subject of personal holiness is one of deepest interest to the theologian, the pastor, and the Christian. Sanctification as a doctrine is so thoroughly interwoven into the fabric of revealed truth that each one's views of it give form, color, and general effect not only to the system as a whole, but to each prominent feature. They necessarily shape the creed, the experience, and the practice. They determine the whole religious character and the prevailing spirit and influence of members and churches. Hence, the intelligent and faithful pastor, who is studying and toiling to train his flock for the highest results of divine truth, is deeply concerned to investigate most thoroughly the gracious process by which God develops the piety of his people. He longs to understand it in its real aims, its workings, its instrumentalities, its history, in fine, in every aspect of it which may throw light upon his own path as he pursues this grand purpose of his ministry. He looks forward with inexpressible joy to the time when the glorified Shepherd will present before God these members of his great flock "holy and unblameable and unproveable" in his sight. Hence, like Paul, he longs so to preach Christ, and so to warn every man, and to teach every man, that he may present every man perfect in Christ Jesus: whereunto he also labors, striving according to Christ's working which worketh in him mightily.

With all this anxiety and effort every true Christian is in full sympathy. We will not say his interest in this is next to his

interest in salvation; because he regards it as an integral part of his salvation—its most important and precious part, the ultimate end of God in giving and his own chief end in accepting the gospel. The most delightful feature of his experience of conversion is that he found Christ a Saviour *from* sin; the consciousness that the “old man” of his native depravity was fatally wounded and really began to die; and that he was made a new creature. Conformity to the image of Christ became at once the absorbing object of thought and desire; and whilst in his subsequent experience he has been baffled, disappointed, and mortified by his repeated failures, his slow growth, and his many declensions, this desire abides as the permanent feeling of his soul. It is *the* sign of his spiritual life.

When therefore the subject of sanctification comes before the mind of the Church with the claim of greater clearness and power, and with the promise of speedily realising the fond desire of which we have spoken, viz., the highest attainments in personal holiness, it is not surprising that it should arrest attention and awaken a new interest on the part of all these classes. We do not pause to consider the influence upon hypocrites, to whom the highest professions are the most attractive; nor upon fanatics, who rush with greatest eagerness into whatever system builds the most extravagant doctrines on the most fanciful foundation. We recognise the fact that the most spiritually-minded are naturally the most eager to learn how they may quicken their own growth in grace and acquire a more complete ascendancy over the remains of sin. Then there are many in the Church who are weary of the protracted and seemingly fruitless conflict, who are almost ready, without examination, to accept any theory which promises a speedy and triumphant termination of the struggle. We deeply sympathise with all such persons, and are far from condemning their weakness and impatience. We are almost ready to pardon their haste and indiscretion in permitting themselves to adopt views, which, though without real scriptural warrant, seem to favor the highest objects of scriptural truth as well as the purest aspirations of the heart. We do not think it right to dismiss all such views with a general denunciation, or to refuse them a

careful and patient examination. Neither do we think it wise or justifiable to let the whole matter alone because of the professed or seeming *pious tendency* of the doctrines in question.

The Canon of Scripture is complete, and the truths of revelation admit of no increase since the pen of inspiration has been laid aside. But it does not follow that the Church possesses a full and infallible knowledge of those truths. A more searching and accurate criticism, and a profounder, more spiritual and prayerful study of the sacred oracles, and especially of the relations of doctrines to each other and to experience, which have, in the past, gradually enlarged, corrected, and matured the creed of the Church, may continue to yield still more like precious fruit. The real friends of the truth have no fears for its integrity and purity, from such sources; and whilst they carefully abstain from giving encouragement to novelties and vain speculations, they are willing to subject every doctrine of their faith to renewed examination in the light of the divine word.

It is impossible to overestimate the importance of the gracious work of sanctification; and we are far from complaining that it has been unduly exalted even by those who make it their specialty. It occupies a central place in Christianity, close alongside of "Christ and him crucified." The water is as if mingled with the blood. It is an essential part of salvation. It is one of the chief benefits of redemption, and indispensable to every other. It is an unspeakable privilege. It is the leading duty of the Christian, at the same time that it is the peculiar and most glorious gift of God. It will constitute the brightest feature of the believer's glorification. Its full attainment will complete man's restoration to God and to the lost blessedness of Paradise; for it will raise him to the sweeter paradise of heaven, and to a perfect holiness from which he can never fall.

Nor can we keep too prominently before us the fact that sanctification formed an integral part of God's eternal purpose of salvation. When he determined to save, he determined to sanctify; and necessarily, for there is no real salvation without holiness. It is deliverance as well from the pollution as from the penalty of sin. As sin brought the curse, deranged all man's

nature, defiled his soul, spread moral poison through his whole being, and unfitted him either to serve or enjoy God; from the very nature of the case, a true redemption must secure the removal of the taint of sin and the overthrow of its power and dominion. But we are not left to inference on this point. The Scriptures expressly make sanctification a part of the purpose of salvation. "According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy, and without blame before him in love." "For we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them." "Because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth."

Hence there can be no doubt that this purpose of God toward his people will be accomplished. Their sanctification is as certain as their regeneration and justification. There is no dispute as to this. But the question has been forced upon us, When are we to expect the accomplishment of this work—not its beginning, but its completion? The accepted faith of the Church is that, though all believers "are renewed in the whole man after the image of God," it is "at their death" that they "are made perfect in holiness"—that this sanctification is "imperfect in this life," that "there abideth still some remnants of corruption in every part, whence ariseth a continual and irreconcilable war, the flesh lusting against the Spirit and the Spirit against the flesh." On the contrary, it is held and industriously taught that this doctrine just stated is false, unscriptural, discouraging, and pernicious, and that it is God's purpose and plan to raise believers now, in this life, to a state of sinless perfection, and hence that it is the privilege of all to reach this condition. Now this element of *time* may seem to some to have very small significance, exerting only a trifling influence in this discussion. But a brief examination will show it to be vital, involving the whole subject and developing radical differences as to the standard of holiness and the nature, process, and means of sanctification itself. In order to make out this claim—and the history of the dogma and any fair analysis of it show this clearly—we must have another law and

another experience and another method of operation than those which the great mass of God's people have learned from his word and Spirit; and when these views are carried out to their legitimate consequences, we see developed an entirely new gospel. And yet we find their advocates claiming not only an extraordinary zeal for vital piety and success in its promotion, but also peculiar fidelity to the teachings of Scripture.

It is a remarkable phenomenon that this dogma has been engrafted upon theological systems so unlike and indeed diametrically opposed to each other. We find it in the Antinomianism which discards all necessity for good works, and in the Pelagianism which makes good works the corner-stone of salvation. It is taught by a Socinianism which deifies reason, and also by Romanism which tramples all reason under the feet of a blind faith. It appears in a creed which denies the fall and ruin of man, and also in the system which, while it admits the fall, degrades holiness to the standard of fallen human nature. Some ascribe this pretended perfection to nature, others to grace—all illustrating the general fact that truth is one and error is multiform: truth is always consistent with itself; each true doctrine harmonizes with every other true doctrine; whilst each error raises its Ishmaelitic hand against every truth in the whole system of revelation.

Accordingly this dogma is always changing form. Like the chameleon, it adapts its color to its surroundings. It has appeared and reappeared at various periods, under modified aspects, generally affecting novelty, claiming the honor and right of discovery, and rebuking the conservatism which it vainly tries to invade. At no previous time has it exhibited more pretentiousness than in our day. It claims to have all the piety and all the light. It has trumped up new interpretations of Scripture and new ideas of the whole work of Christ. It affects to treat the piety of the Church with pity or with doubt, and its learning and orthodoxy with contempt. It has shown also of late more of an aggressive spirit than ever before, having appropriated not a little of the enthusiasm which characterises modern revivalism and lay-evangelism. It is busy in publishing and circulating its peculiar literature; and it is the sad fact, that some in our own communion

have been beguiled with its subtlety, which leads us now to present the theme to our readers.

Underlying all these various forms, it is easy to detect the same prevailing spirit and the same fundamental principles. It is to these rather than to the incidental modifications we should direct our inquiries. It is in this way alone we can arrive at any satisfactory or even definite results. We only weary ourselves when we attempt to dissect the Protean forms of this error. And yet we must have a definition. What is this entire sanctification which is held to be attainable and attained in this life? We mention a variety of answers; not to engage in the fruitless task of analysing and exposing them in detail, but to give this dogma the advantage of a full presentation, and also to show the general drift of the whole system. One tells us, "It is a full and perfect discharge of our entire duty, of all existing obligations to God and all other beings. It is perfect obedience to the moral law." Another tells us, "To fallen humanity, though renewed by grace, perfect obedience to the moral law is impracticable during the present probationary state, and consequently Christian perfection does not imply perfect obedience to the moral law," but that "it is perfect faith and perfect love." Another, "That it is a perfection proportioned to the powers of each individual." Another, that "it is obedience to a modified law or rule of action." One makes it to consist in entire submission to the divine will; another in entire trust; another in accepting all the terms of the gospel; and still another, in a full consecration to Christ.

The diversity between these definitions is more apparent than real. The terms used, though not new, are in many instances used in an unusual sense, and are therefore delusive. What is presented to us under the exalted name of Perfection, when examined, turns out to be no perfection after all; and what seems to be an extraordinary attainment, when stripped of ambiguous and pretentious phraseology, appears, at the best, nothing more than what we have always regarded as genuine in distinction from spurious piety. But this is not a mere error in language. It is a grave and comprehensive offence against God and his truth, and is full of the most mischievous tendencies. It

tampers with the law and the very character of God. It reverses the teachings of his word. It changes the standard of right and wrong. It fosters a spirit wholly contrary to that of the gospel. And it is fatal to that very holiness of heart and life which it professes to exalt and promote in a peculiar degree. It therefore demands a protest and exposure.

A primary and conclusive objection to the system of Perfectionism, in all its varied forms, is that it is built on a grossly false view of the very principle of moral obligation: assuming, as it has always done, and in many instances boldly teaching, that "ability is the measure of obligation"—and by ability is meant, not that which man possessed when he sprang at first pure and strong from the hand of his Maker, nor those natural faculties which all agree to be essential in a moral agent, but whatever capacity for God's service each one may happen to have, and which is made up of the moral dispositions to which the commands of God address their claims. The doctrine is that it would be unjust to require more than such ability can render. It is admitted that this ability has been diminished by the fall and also by each man's failures to improve the time, the light, and the other advantages enjoyed—and hence that it consists now in each man's blunted and perverted moral sense, in his weakened capability of serving God, and in fine in those moral infirmities to which he has been reduced. We need say little more than to state this doctrine, which we think we have fairly done. It would be difficult to conceive a sentiment that more effectually cuts up all morality by the roots or more completely destroys all moral distinctions. Obligation resting on such a basis is no obligation at all. Not that it gives us a variable rule, one that adapts its requirements to each individual; it takes away all rule and abolishes all requirements, and leaves all men absolutely free from the bonds of duty. It destroys the very idea of right and wrong. According to this principle, the most debauched and degraded of men who, by indulgence have weakened, to the last degree, every moral instinct of their being, and are now utterly lost to every sentiment of virtue; yea, the most abominable and wretched devils in hell, are as innocent as the unfallen angels.

If this doctrine were true, all a man has to do in order to escape all fault is, by some means, to debase his moral nature to the level of the brute: and thus we reach the paradox that, the worst men are the best. According to this theory, sinless perfection is not only possible but easy, we had almost said unavoidable; because those precisely who have reached the minimum of ability are the most likely to comply with all their obligations. And yet it is held by all or nearly all who advocate Perfectionism.

But whilst they flatter themselves that all the exigencies of their system are met by assuming this popular though false theory of obligation, as a mere abstract principle, they find much more difficulty in dealing with the law of God as an articulate rule of duty, made up of specific requirements, and which being framed upon the basis of God's immaculately holy character, presents a standard of true spiritual perfection. When they contemplate that law, as given and expounded by him, its profound spirituality, its comprehensiveness, its purity, its holy and exalted requirements, they at once feel and confess, "It is high, we cannot attain unto it." Though many of their general arguments urged to prove the attainableness of sinless holiness in this life, if sound, would prove the possibility of reaching this standard just as well as any lower one, yet when they are forced to substantiate their doctrine by facts, they at once see that the standard itself must be lowered. Hence all Perfectionists have deliberately undertaken this unhallowed work. All sorts of theories have been devised to justify the doctrine that God has modified his law. It is said that God's law adjusts its demands to the present moral condition of man; that it brings them down to the level of his deteriorated ability; that Christ having fulfilled the law, it has ceased, in its original form, to be our rule of duty; that sincere obedience is now accepted in lieu of perfect conformity; that at least the law is brought within the reach, if not of unassisted human nature, yet of nature aided by grace. These are specimens of the crude, inconsistent, unscriptural, and demoralizing views by which it is attempted to get the moral law out of the way or to bend it to a purpose. If they could succeed in this



it would be all they need. But they do need to succeed in this in order to make out their claim.

Is there the slightest foundation for this assumption? There were three codes of law given to the Jews: the judicial, the ceremonial, and the moral. The first was intended to define the duties of citizenship, and could have force only during their national existence. The second had force only as foreshadowing the events, institutions, and truths of the Christian dispensation. They were typical and prophetic, and hence necessarily disappeared when the type came and the prophecy was fulfilled. In one sense indeed, the ceremonial law is immutable and immortal. It still lives in Christ and his cross, in the great fact and doctrine of purification from sin; and it is obeyed, in spirit, by every act of faith in the great Sacrifice, the lamb slain from the foundation of the world, and by every act and emotion of holiness—a holiness so clearly enjoined in that code. But, in the strictest sense, the moral law was made for all people and all times, and is of everlasting and immutable obligation. God's own immutability makes this certain. He summed up and virtually described his law when he gave the general command, "Be ye holy, for I am holy." And our Saviour echoed the same truth when, after expounding the moral law, he said, "Be ye therefore perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect." The Decalogue is a practical setting forth of that holiness and perfection. It shows in what respects we are to attempt resemblance to God's moral character. Then, God made man at first in his own image and likeness: that is, he stamped his own moral character on the heart of man. So long as he remained thus, he did not need an external law—God's law was written within. But when he had fallen, he did need an external law, in which all the features of that holy and divine likeness were put in the form of commands. Now, as God's moral image is the same, yesterday, to-day, and forever, these commands must be equally unchangeable.

It is true the Decalogue was framed with reference to man's nature, and to his relations and circumstances. But it was his nature *as a man*—not as a Jew—not as belonging to any particular period—a nature which is common to the race and to all

times. It is just as applicable to one nation as to another. There is nothing national, nothing sectional, about it. It is general in its provisions and universal in its applications to the human family. It belongs to no one class, but equally to all classes. Hence, the subversion of the particular nation to which it was originally given had no effect to end its obligation. So also, it embraces man's permanent relations to God, to worship, to rest, to his neighbor, to his parents, to his associates, in all the interests and duties of life. It covers them all, and contains no more. Hence, change of circumstances can never end, nor even alter, this law. Man has never been placed in a position to which this law does not apply; and no progress of society, no possible development of human nature, no advance in knowledge and cultivation, can ever place him beyond its pale, or render its promulgation and enforcement unnecessary or out of place.

Nor has the introduction of a new dispensation, the gospel, done away with this law, or changed it in any particular. The moral law is not a means of salvation; but neither was it such at the time of its promulgation. By the deeds of no law, since the fall, has it been possible for any flesh to be justified. The Decalogue was given as a rule of life, as well as a means of conviction, and as a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ; and it is just as really and exclusively the rule of life now as when it was spoken on Sinai, and just as binding, in all its precepts, as when it was written by God's finger on the tables of stone. There is no foundation for the idea so common amongst men, and which underlies this theory of Perfectionism, that the moral law belongs to a now exploded system of legalism or salvation by works. It is, on the contrary, an essential element in the covenant of grace. So far from being overturned thereby, it stands on a firmer basis and has even greater sanctity in consequence of the coming, teachings, and death of Christ. Says Paul in the 3d of Romans: "Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid; yea, we establish the law." The necessity for his atonement grew directly out of the immutability and sacredness of that law; for it was that which his redeemed people violated, and whose penalty he suffered in their stead. If God could have set that

law aside, consistently with his own character, surely he would have preferred to do that rather than to give his Son to die. Christ then evidently came, not to destroy, but to establish the law, to vindicate all its high claims, to honor it, and to seal its obligation with his own blood, and thus to make it irrevocable. Is it possible, then, to conceive a greater perversion than to assert that the effect of his mission was to abolish this rule of duty?

It seems well for this generation that he had occasion to meet this error, and to condemn it so emphatically. It was, in the lips of the Jews, an open slander against Christianity. In the lips of modern Perfectionists, it is a slander equally gross, and far more dangerous, because it professes to be an exposition of the gospel, and in the interest of gospel holiness. He could not have expressed a more pointed condemnation of the error in its modern form than he did when he said, "Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. For, verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law till all be fulfilled." He recognised the fact that a vast change was then in progress in God's method of dealing with men; that a new economy was coming in,—a revolution so great that it would startle the minds of all, and hence, that there was great danger that men would conclude that he came to blot out every vestige of the old law. Hence he was so careful to assure both Jewish and Gentile Antinomians that no change ever could set aside the moral law, or modify it, in the smallest particular: that before that could be, heaven itself, from which that law proceeded, must pass away, and this earth, to which that law was given, must also perish; in other words, there must be no true and righteous God to rule, and no men to be ruled. No language could be framed that could more effectually settle this great question.

Consider, also, the expositions of the law with which Christ followed this general declaration. That he expounded it at all was a renewed testimony to its perpetuity; and the character of his expositions is the clearest and most solemn protest against the

idea that he has lowered its demands. He indeed condemned the unauthorised additions and the gross perversions of which the Pharisees were guilty. He condemned their superstitious observance of the mere circumstantials of the law. But he did not diminish, by a single shade, its spirituality, its holiness, its extensive demands, nor any of those features which come into most direct contact with the weakness and ungodliness of human nature. He made no concession to the requirement, now so much insisted on, that he must adapt his law to the frailties and infirmities of men. He pronounced the unchaste look to be adultery and hatred to be murder. Could he demand more than that we must love the Lord our God with all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength, and our neighbor as ourselves? Could he give us a higher standard than when he commanded us to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect? And surely he did not give us a modified or an easier rule when he insisted that we must take up our cross and deny ourselves in following him, and when he said we must forsake father and mother, and brother and sister, and houses and lands, and our own lives also. We can see no signs in all this of that lenient system of religion which men would father upon him and call it Christianity. No indeed! Christ did not lower the law. On the contrary, he tore down all the machinery of false doctrine by which men have attempted to lower it, he lifted it to a higher elevation of glory by unveiling all its purity and strictness, and placed it on a more solid basis of obligation. He is the minister of holiness, not of sin. His cross is the firmest pillar of the law of God in its original and unchanged perfection. Christianity holds up the purest and highest moral standard ever revealed, presents the most powerful motives to obedience, and secures a higher type and tone of piety than could exist apart from its provisions, truths, and influences.

This idea, that Christ has brought in a rule of life essentially different from the moral law, requiring far less, more lenient, and accommodated more to the tastes and inclinations of men, is very rife in the world. It is called liberal Christianity; and it exults in getting rid of what is regarded the burdensomeness, the un-

reasonable restrictions, the rigid justice, the strict holiness, and almost unhuman harshness, of the ancient law. You read it in the popular books, magazines, and newspapers of the day; you hear it in daily conversation; you see it in the current practices of society. This is a sore evil under the sun. But how is it aggravated when you find it gravely propounded and defended as a tenet of theology, and, especially, as a leading principle in a system of "*holiness!*" The advocates of this doctrine claim to be Christians of the first order. The Master says, however, "Whosoever, therefore, shall break one of these least commandments, and *shall teach men so*, shall be called *the least* in the kingdom of heaven," which was only a mild way of denouncing them as destitute of the first principles of his kingdom, which is one of law, not of lawlessness.

It is claimed by the advocates of this doctrine that they are preëminently the promoters of personal piety. They affect the style of "*holiness people.*" They make this their specialty; write, talk, and preach copiously and continuously on the subject; assume to be the peculiar guardians and patrons of this department of Christianity; and bitterly denounce all who question their orthodoxy, or disallow their pretensions. And yet it requires only a careful examination of their principles to see that their whole system is in direct antagonism to genuine Christian holiness, and that, practically, they are its most dangerous enemies. They assail vital godliness in its vital part. If their views were to be accepted by the Church at large, the inevitable and speedy result would be the decay of all real piety, as well as the abandonment of scriptural truth. Nor is this mere conjecture, nor mere inference, from theoretical principles. The history of Perfectionism fully sanctions the assertion.

But this system undermines the interests of true piety, not only by destroying the only lawful standard, but also by encouraging false hopes. When you examine the peculiar marks of this "*higher life,*" especially as presented by its more recent advocates, you will find that they amount to nothing "*higher*" than what the Scriptures lay down as the essential characteristics of the true Christian. Yet they admit that we may lack one or

more of these, and yet be regenerate persons. They urge them as belonging to an advanced stage of religious progress, or rather as the fixed stage of full attainment that admits no progress. The practical effect of this view on a large class must be to reconcile them to the absence of one or more, if not all, of these features of a state which, however desirable, is not necessary to salvation. They can be saved without being perfectly sanctified in this life; and as they are taught that perfect sanctification is made up of what are really the essentials of conversion, they almost certainly omit these essentials and adopt false, because insufficient, grounds of hope.

For example, one element of this higher light, we are told, is "an entire consecration of ourselves to God,—that consecration, of course, including body, soul, life, talents, and everything." Is anything less than this required and included in every case of true conversion? The gospel plainly demands all this from every one who would be Christ's disciple, and the Church has always taught the same. By what right have the Perfectionists claimed this as peculiar to a special class of Christians? If a man makes any reservation, "keeps back any part of the price," he certainly secures rejection from the Master, and would from the Church also, if he avowed it. Are there two classes of real Christians?—one who have given all to Christ, and another who have given only a fraction? What doctrine could be contrived to fill the Church with hypocrites more effectually than this? It exerts, indeed, the double influence of lowering the standard and inducing self deception.

But we are told, that in conversion we offer our dead powers to God, but that when we offer ourselves a "living sacrifice," our powers being then "permeated with the new life of regeneration," then we "experience entire sanctification." Now, it is constantly affirmed that there are multitudes who have made the first, but not the second, consecration, and have remained in this attitude for years. But were not their powers "permeated with the new life of regeneration" at the first moment of their conversion? What do such persons do with these living powers, from that time until this second consecration? Do they allow them to lie

dormant? Do they consecrate them to the world, or use them in sin? Surely this is a strange spiritual condition that is here supposed. And yet those who are in it, and remain in it all their lives, will be saved. Thus, Perfectionism creates an immense home in the spiritual kingdom on earth for virtually dead Christians, and encourages them to hope for an equally immense mansion in heaven.

But an attempt is made to explain the difference between these two consecrations. The first, it is said, is general, the second is particular. "When we dedicate ourselves to God at conversion, we *massed our offering.*" But it turns out that our general did not contain any particulars, and now we are called on to itemize, viz., "hands, feet, understanding, judgment, memory, imagination, conscience, will, and affections." Here, again, is the door wide open for spurious professions, and false hopes, and inadequate views of what constitutes real piety.

Again, it is held that the application of "some peculiarly trying test of obedience" is necessary to this wonderful attainment. But does not every genuine conversion, even of the lowest order, include this? In each case there is something to test the reality of repentance, faith, and submission to Christ. The darling sin is given up, the painful sacrifice is made, the hard duty is undertaken, the mortification of pride, lust, covetousness, or some other leading passion, is endured, or there is no real conversion. And, in fact, it is easy to see, in this system, clearly betrayed, a characteristically low and inadequate view of what is essential to a true conversion.

But the most palpable and radical form of this error consists in the idea that in accepting Jesus Christ a man may separate between his most important offices, *i. e.*, may accept him as a deliverer from hell, and fail, even for a long period, to accept him as a deliverer from sin; that he may come to him for pardon alone and secure it, and then, after an indefinite interval, may come to him for sanctification! Such an idea is preposterous. It is contrary to the purpose of God in giving his Son, contrary to the nature of faith, and subversive of all the teachings of the Bible on the subject of regeneration. If the new birth means anything,

it means the transformation of man into a holy being. If the new creature desires anything it is sanctification. That he is satisfied with pardon, and willing to wait indefinitely for an increase of holiness, is not according to God's description of the regenerated man. It would be more reasonable to suppose that he comes first for holiness and then for pardon. The fact is, that as Christ himself is not divided,—as his work is one,—so a saving faith always seeks and accepts a whole Christ in all his offices and benefits. He is made to every believer wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. He that believeth *hath* eternal life—which is not only future blessedness, but the principle of holiness, which has its germ in regeneration, its growth in progressive sanctification, and its full fruitage in the perfection of heavenly glory.

The grand error of this view then is, not that it urges this entire, particular, and hearty consecration, but that it fails to insist upon it as necessary to salvation, and to condemn all claims to real piety which fall short of this. It thus becomes the nurse of false religion. So clear is this to one class of Perfectionists, that to escape this position they have boldly taken the ground that all genuine Christians are perfectly sanctified; that when the new man is born, the old man literally dies; and that there can be no mixture of good and evil in the heart of man. We readily admit that no Christian in this life carries out fully and faithfully the terms of this consecration, because there are, in all, remains of selfishness, worldliness, and other forms of sin. But it remains true that every genuine Christian does sincerely dedicate himself, without reserve, unto God.

There is certainly great obscurity and confusion of ideas, and, we believe, serious error in the representations, which abound in the writings of modern Perfectionists, as to the relation between the atonement of Christ and the sanctification of believers. They make all the passages of Scripture, which teach the cleansing power of the blood of Christ, to refer to sanctification, and thus seem to array a large amount of testimony on behalf of their doctrine, affirming that, inasmuch as that blood is applied in this life, and cleanses from all sin, so it produces instantaneous per-



fection. And they claim wonderful originality and superiority to the long established and accepted interpretation of these Scriptures. Texts, which refer to our cleansing from the guilt of sin, they apply to our cleansing from its power and its pollution. Thus they confound justification and sanctification as really, though in a different way, as do the Romanists. Undoubtedly Christ is "made sanctification" to the Christian, and his death exerts a mighty power in the subjugation of his sinful nature. But surely not in the sense, nor in the same way, as that in which he saves from the penalty. He is the source of our sanctification—not directly, but indirectly—and that in two important respects. He is the vine and we are the branches. But the spiritual life which he imparts to us is the Holy Spirit, and his death was essential to the gift of the Spirit. Then having been renewed by that Spirit, we are enabled so to apprehend his death for our sins, by faith, that we recognise in it the wickedness of sin, as we could not even if we saw the infliction of the penalty on the sinner; and we see in it, and feel, the most powerful motive for avoiding all sin. If there be any other way in which the blood of Christ sanctifies the believer, we confess we could never gather any definite idea of it from the Scriptures. The practical effect of this error is to induce men to expect the blessing of a completed sanctification to be conferred precisely in the same way as that in which a completed justification is conferred,—leaving nothing to be attained, and nothing to be done,—a result certainly contrary to that which the word of God clearly contemplates.

Another proof that Perfectionism is inimical to true scriptural sanctification, is found in the assumption that the process by which "sinless holiness" is attained is an instantaneous change analogous to regeneration. No one doubts that the Omnipotent Spirit is the agent in this work, nor that He can complete it in an instant! Nor do we deny that there are spiritual junctures in the experience of many of God's people, in which they make sudden and rapid progress. It does occur that in times of powerful revival, in seasons of deep affliction, and in seasons of special nearness to God in the closet, a Christian will attain a signal victory over

sin, a peculiarly near and delightful view of the love of God, and the excellency of Christ, and a refreshingly clear sense of acceptance, in which he will renew his consecration to Christ with peculiar earnestness, and will thus grow more in a few short hours than perhaps he had done for years previous. But there is no analogy between this experience and regeneration, either as to the extent or the suddenness of the change. It only conforms to the ordinary law of spiritual growth. It is like the bursting forth of the trees in spring, or the new verdure, and vigorous growth of plants after rain, or deep tillage,—but it is not like the first development of the germ in the seed.

Were we to read of this sudden transition of real Christians from a lower to a “higher life” anywhere in God’s word, we should have no difficulty in believing and expecting it. But we find nothing of it there; and therefore we are more than doubtful of the dogma that teaches, and the experience which claims it. The Divine word, indeed, is full of this subject of sanctification, but its representations are all essentially different from this. It invariably describes it as a gradual and as generally a slow process; not as a second birth, but the development of that which was born in the first spiritual birth; not as a transformation, but as a growth; not as a short and sudden victory, but as a life-long struggle; not as the one stride that measures the entire track, but as the successive steps by which the toiling racer gradually reaches the goal.

And here we think we have one explanation of the popularity of this dogma of instantaneous sanctification with a certain class of minds. They have no liking for this toilsome work, no patience with its protracted duration. They want a shorter and an easier method; and now, with this “new light” shining upon them, they think to end this great work in a moment, and accept any sort of reasoning, and any possible interpretation of Scripture, which will enable them to believe that this short route exists. It is easy to see what the practical effect of this doctrine must be on those who adopt it. They will be sure to abandon all effort, avoid all struggle, and omit all the appointed means of growing in grace, and rely on this instantaneous and direct work of the

bar. And when Christ shall present his Church as a chaste virgin and his own bride,—a glorious Church, not having spot, nor wrinkle, nor any such thing,—it will be at his second coming, when he shall come to be admired of all them that believe.

And this is in perfect analogy with all of God's proceedings. He did not create everything at once. In the production of this earth, he followed an order of regular development which required a succession of periods. His plan of providence covers the whole range of history. The scheme of redemption began far back in eternity, was faintly revealed in Paradise after the fall, more fully in the ritual of the Mosaic dispensation, and with gradually increasing clearness as he took step after step in its glorious accomplishment. He has a plan in dealing with his people. He does not do everything for them at once. He does not give them everything at once. His plan covers their whole history, and the whole progress of their salvation in time and in eternity. It has many parts. It passes through many stages, in due order and regular succession. We are prone to be impatient. We would hurry his work. We long for the harvest, and we begin our longing as soon as the seed is put into the ground. We cannot understand why he takes so long when he could end all in a moment. But God takes his own time, and will show us eventually that he does all this in wisdom. This is manifestly true of our sanctification. He creates in us a principle of holiness which desires increase, and the very nature of which is to grow; and yet it has to *grow*—to expand—by degrees. It is like human life. It has its birth, its infancy, its youth, its early manhood, its maturity, its full years, its old age. It is like grain—first the corn, then the blade, then the full corn in the ear. It is like the day-light, which begins with the gray dawn, but shines more and more unto the perfect day. But sanctification goes on, through teaching, through effort, through prayer, through discipline,—and it will be accomplished. All these things point forward to a glorious consummation. The process is destined to completion. Every sin will be subdued and extirpated. The heart will be cleansed from all defilement. Every grace will mature in full stature, beauty, symmetry, and strength. The ransomed sinner will

attain perfect likeness to his God and Saviour. Every power of his being will act in harmony with the divine will; every affection of his heart will be fixed with supreme devotion upon the perfections of God, and his whole existence will be filled up with the experience of God's blessedness. How grand this event! How delightful this prospect! How worthy an end, not only of man's efforts, but of the divine purposes and operations! Now, is there nothing in all this to fire the spiritual ambition of the true Christian? Must the fact, that the consummation is reserved till death, discourage him, unnerve his soul, and make him indifferent to all efforts to grow in grace? Has the believer *such* a love for holiness that, unless he can have it in its perfection now, he will have none of it at all? Strange sentiment, indeed, for a regenerate man! Why, then, shall a man try to learn anything when he knows he cannot learn all things? Why seek wealth when he cannot gain the whole world? Why seek strength when he cannot be omnipotent? This will not do. If we really hunger and thirst after righteousness, we will value even the smallest fragments or the feeblest beginnings of it. Such has ever been the feeling of the true saints of God in all ages. It was certainly the sentiment of Paul; and in his recorded experience we see the most abundant evidence that there is nothing in the doctrine of progressive sanctification to repress, but everything to incite, the real Christian to make every effort to grow in likeness to God. Hypocrites, enthusiasts, and all unbelievers, will pervert it; but Paul was a genuine, though humble, believer; and surely we may rely on what he stated in his inspired writings as to the influence of this doctrine on a regenerate person.

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Spirit. Thus they will lose the reality, and grasp only a shadow. It is very true that means and efforts have no efficiency in themselves; but it is also true that we have no scriptural warrant for expecting a supernatural work in our hearts, while we neglect the means and efforts which the Divine Author of that work has required. It is also true that sanctification is the free gift of Christ, and that it is our privilege to seek it directly and by faith from him; but he puts us in possession of this grace in a process which involves, not only the operation of his Spirit, but also our resistance of temptation, our self-denial, our bearing the cross, our cutting off a right hand, and plucking out a right eye, that offends, a striving and agonising to enter in, our taking the kingdom of heaven by force. God works in us to will and to do of his good pleasure, but it is that we may be prompted and enabled to work out our salvation. The specific effect of the Holy Spirit's work in the soul, is to awaken it to the great effort, to mortify the flesh, to resist the remains of sin in the heart, to grow in grace, to add to our faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance, patience, godliness, etc., and to give diligence to make our calling and election sure. It is therefore a fatal error to adopt any view of this work which encourages us to attempt any departures from the method which the Holy Ghost has himself established. When, therefore, we see persons, as we have seen them, turn away from the tedious and toilsome struggle to grow in grace, which the Scriptures demand, and sit or kneel at an altar, waiting for the gift of a completed sanctification to come in the twinkling of an eye, we have not been surprised to see their professed attainment of this gift followed first by the neglect of the appointed means of grace, and then by sad falls into grievous sins. It is, then, in the interest of a true and permanent godliness, that we protest against this vain and superstitious imagination as a bad tree, bringing forth bad fruit.

It is very confidently urged in support of this system, that the ample provision which God has made for this perfect sanctification proves that it may be reached, and if it may be, there is nothing to discredit the assertion, that it is reached in this life.

No one doubts the sufficiency of the provision, nor of the power which must apply it. The Spirit of God can, in an instant, in this instant, amidst our present surroundings, and by means of existing provision, change each and every one of us, and all His people, and, indeed, all mankind, into perfectly holy beings. But how very few even claim to be thus changed! The argument then proves nothing, or else it proves too much. We admit that if the means provided, the truth, the sacraments, the Church, the ministry, and the dealings of Providence, exerted their legitimate power, were received, cultivated, and improved to the fullest extent, they would issue in immediate and complete sanctification, because this would involve the exercise of the Spirit's agency effectual to this extent. But we do not see this done. No one learns and feels *all* the truth by which men are sanctified, nor appropriates all the promises, nor exercises all faith in prayer, nor improves faithfully all chastisements, nor even seeks with all due diligence the influences of the Spirit of Christ. The question, then, does not turn on the adequacy of either the divine power or provision. The difficulty, therefore, is, by this plea, only transferred, not removed.

But it is urged that God commands entire holiness, and therefore we may attain it, and therefore, again, some do attain it. God could command no less without approving sin. He must place before us the right standard. But, as we have seen, that by no means proves that we can reach it, and, still less, that any do. Then, He commands *all men* to be perfect. This argument also proves either too much, or nothing at all.

The weakness of all the arguments presented in favor of this theory lies in the absence of all proof that it is God's purpose to complete the sanctification of his people in this life. In all the instances in which the circumstance of time is introduced in his promises or other indications of his purpose in this matter, he points to our future and eternal state. "I shall be satisfied when I awake in thy likeness,"—evidently referring to an awakening that follows death. "We shall be like him when we shall see him as he is;"—Paul expected to present his people perfect in Christ Jesus, plainly at the last day when they shall meet before God's

bar. And when Christ shall present his Church as a chaste virgin and his own bride,—a glorious Church, not having spot, nor wrinkle, nor any such thing,—it will be at his second coming, when he shall come to be admired of all them that believe.

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attain perfect likeness to his God and Saviour. Every power of his being will act in harmony with the divine will; every affection of his heart will be fixed with supreme devotion upon the perfections of God, and his whole existence will be filled up with the experience of God's blessedness. How grand this event! How delightful this prospect! How worthy an end, not only of man's efforts, but of the divine purposes and operations! Now, is there nothing in all this to fire the spiritual ambition of the true Christian? Must the fact, that the consummation is reserved till death, discourage him, unnerve his soul, and make him indifferent to all efforts to grow in grace? Has the believer *such* a love for holiness that, unless he can have it in its perfection now, he will have none of it at all? Strange sentiment, indeed, for a regenerate man! Why, then, shall a man try to learn anything when he knows he cannot learn all things? Why seek wealth when he cannot gain the whole world? Why seek strength when he cannot be omnipotent? This will not do. If we really hunger and thirst after righteousness, we will value even the smallest fragments or the feeblest beginnings of it. Such has ever been the feeling of the true saints of God in all ages. It was certainly the sentiment of Paul; and in his recorded experience we see the most abundant evidence that there is nothing in the doctrine of progressive sanctification to repress, but everything to incite, the real Christian to make every effort to grow in likeness to God. Hypocrites, enthusiasts, and all unbelievers, will pervert it; but Paul was a genuine, though humble, believer; and surely we may rely on what he stated in his inspired writings as to the influence of this doctrine on a regenerate person.

Paul was certainly a largely developed Christian. He had reached a very elevated mark. His piety had attained a very vigorous growth. He had left far behind him the mere rudiments of personal religion. He had acquired manly strength, knowledge, and experience, and he stands before us a splendid and encouraging illustration of what divine grace can accomplish, and of the utility of study, of effort, of vigilance, of prayer and of all the appointed means of sanctification. And yet he had not



attained "that for which he was apprehended of Christ Jesus." He was not perfectly sanctified. He still had important progress to make before he could reach the mark and gain the prize of his high calling. He expressed all this, and he felt it deeply. But we do not believe that he justified himself or excused himself for this deficiency. He recognised his obligation to obey the whole law perfectly, to conform entirely to God's character, and to avoid all sin, even in thought. And, no doubt, every instance in which he failed gave him pain, and caused him to reproach himself. He made no attempt to bring the law down to his own infirmities so as to enable him to claim perfection. On the contrary, he confessed the remains of sin in his heart; that he did not do the good he ought and desired to have done, and often did the evil he ought and desired not to do; that evil was present with him, and that there was a law in his members warring against his better convictions, so as to make him at times a wretched man. He, no doubt, blamed himself for his anger against Barnabas, when, in a contention, he parted from Mark. He was a penitent all his life, and just in proportion as he grew in knowledge and in holiness did he become more sensitive to the least approaches of sin, better acquainted with his own defects, and more humble in view of them. The nearer he drew to God, the more vivid was the conscious disparity between his own imperfections and divine purity. And if his experience was like that of Isaiah, when, after a glorious vision of Jehovah, and of the Seraphim crying, "Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of hosts," he exclaimed, "Woe is me, for I am undone, for I am a man of unclean lips," then his vision of the third heaven, with its unutterable scenes, must have been followed by the most overwhelming impressions of his own sinfulness, for then he must have seen more clearly than ever how much he lacked of that perfect holiness which God requires. There is the widest difference conceivable between the spirit of Paul and the spirit of those who claim sinless perfection. Some of them, in fact, rank themselves far above him in piety.

But neither was Paul *disheartened* by the fact that, after all God had done for him, and after all his own watchfulness, prayers,

and exertions, he remained still so far below the mark. For he knew of no instance in which any one had reached it this side of heaven. He had read of Noah as a man "perfect in his generations," and yet he had read farther on of that really godly man being overcome and falling into the dreadful sin of intoxication. He had read of Moses as the holy servant of God, and meeker than all other men, and yet he read of the sinful anger of Moses. He had read of "the man after God's own heart," only to be the more amazed at the record of David's adultery and murder. He had read of Job as the most perfect specimen of patience, but he had to read also his expressions of a rebellious spirit when he was sorely afflicted. So, too, he had read of the unbelief and murmuring of Elijah, the folly of Solomon, the pride of Hezekiah, the repining of Jeremiah, the disobedience of Jonah, and so on to the end. In all the galaxy of Old Testament piety he found no star undimmed, no sun without a spot, no saint without sin. Then, as he looked around on his fellow disciples who had enjoyed the clearer light and the richer grace, the diviner companionship, and the more spiritual influence of the gospel dispensation, it was only to see the lofty courage and zeal of Peter marred by a timid denial of Christ, and the martyr spirit of Thomas clouded by sinful unbelief, and even the lovelier traits of the beloved disciple dimmed by an exhibition of bigotry and intolerance. It was only in Jesus he saw real full-orbed perfection; a life absolutely without sin; a spirit free from all taint; a character in which each godly virtue was developed into full maturity without excess, and without weakening a sister grace; in which love to God and love to man were both perfect and most accurately adjusted; and in which all the varied hues of piety were blended in the white light of a divine holiness. And the more clearly he contemplated that light, the more vividly did he see the shortcomings of himself and all his brethren. And yet he saw that all these were real Christians, and did not hesitate to apply the epithet of *perfect* to all of them, in the sense of genuineness and sincerity—just as it was applied to Noah and to Job.

Another fact, which prevented his imperfections from discouraging him, was that God's own word so clearly teaches that no one reaches spiritual perfection on earth in the sense of entire freedom from all sin. Solomon declared "There is no man that sinneth not." "Who can say, I have made my heart clean, I am pure from my sin?" "For there is not a just man upon earth that doeth good and sinneth not." David, too, had written, "If thou, Lord, shouldst mark iniquities, O Lord, who shall stand? Enter not into judgment with thy servant; for in thy sight shall no man living be justified." These are clear and strong. And if the Apostle John had then written his Epistles, Paul would have had his inspired testimony to the same truth. "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." "If we say that we have not sinned, we make Him a liar, and His word is not in us." And thus he would have seen a perfect correspondence between the biographies and the doctrinal statements of the Bible on this subject.

Least of all was the Apostle led by this doctrine, or this experience, to be satisfied with his present status, or to give up effort to grow in grace. On the contrary, in the very passage in which he avows his own imperfection, he expresses the most intense desire, not only to be a holier man, but to be entirely holy. "I follow after;" "I forget those things which are behind; I reach forth to those which are before; I press toward the mark." What language could express more deep-seated and eager thirst after holiness? The language is evidently taken from that which described the racer in the Isthmian games, whose whole soul was on fire, whose every nerve was strained, whose utmost energy was put forth in the race. Nor was this only a temporary or occasional feeling with him. "One thing I do." He had made it the grand business of his Christian life. And now, after years of desire and effort, though he found that he had not yet attained the mark, he held it up as steadily before his view, and pursued it with as intense earnestness as he did at the beginning. He undoubtedly made constant progress, and he valued every inch of ground he won. He loved holiness for its own sake. He felt that it was a necessity of his being. He

could not do other than desire and seek it, as the hart panteth after the water brook. It was the master spiritual passion of his soul; and he was never satisfied until he waked in heaven in the likeness of God. Such we understand to be the true sentiment of the Christian heart; the sentiment which has ever characterised, not the lower, but the highest grades of real piety which have ever adorned the Church. It loves and honors God's perfect law as the only standard; it seeks the highest possible attainments in real piety; it eschews all spiritual pride and pretension and fanaticism, and walks humbly before God.

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ARTICLE IV.

REASON AND UNDERSTANDING.

The next movement of mental philosophy will probably be a more thorough discussion and settlement of the question, whether man has two faculties of intelligence, reason and understanding; or whether there is really but one faculty. The contribution which we now attempt to this discussion, proceeds on the recognition of two doctrines, in which all seem to concur. One is, that the mind is a *monad*, a being of entire unity, and that the faculties are therefore not separate entities or members, but only modes of function, in which the unit-power, spirit, acts. The other is, that among the multitude of mental modifications known in consciousness, there are true agreements and differences, grounding a systematic classification. Says Hamilton: "On this doctrine, a *faculty* is nothing more than a general term for the casualty the mind has of originating a certain class of energies: a *capacity*, only a general term for the susceptibility the mind has of being affected by a particular class of emotions." He makes the special faculties of knowledge the following:

1. The Presentative Faculty, with its external form, perception; and its internal, self-consciousness.
2. The Conservative Faculty, memory.

3. The Reproductive Faculty: involuntary, or suggestion; and voluntary, reminiscence.

4. The Representative Faculty, imagination.

5. The Elaborative Faculty, or logical understanding.

6. The Regulative Faculty, or reason.

This division is usually followed by Hamilton's American imitators, as Dr. Porter. Kant presented a similar one as to the last two heads, in his well known distinction between the *Reiner Vernunft*, or pure reason, and the *Verstand*, or understanding. Hamilton supposes that the Scotch school of philosophers intended the reason, or regulative faculty, by their term "*common sense*." Spinoza, followed by a multitude of transcendentalists, made the distinction still wider; assigning to the understanding only empirical and deductive functions, and to the reason all ontological notions and intuitive, primary judgments. In the hands of him and the various schools of Pantheists, this distinction was most widened, and also bore its worst fruits.

The history of the progress of philosophy in modern times shows a plausible plea for this division of the faculties. The first influence of the Baconian impulse, upon the students of mental science, was to incline them to exclusive empirical methods. It was, to Locke and his followers, a fascinating idea that they should take nothing upon trust, but deduce everything from actual observation. The miserable results of empiricism in the hands of French and British sensationalists could not but produce a revulsion. Philosophers were obliged to see that the same rule of reducing everything to the test of sensible observation, which was proper for the study of the external world, could not be applied to the observing subject itself, without some restriction; that there must be some rational notions *a priori* to observed facts, in order that they might construe the observations themselves; that unless some primary judgments are allowed to begin with, there can be no beginning of thought at all; that in order to prove anything to be understanding, there must be some premises whose authority is prior to that of proof. Now then, the question became pressing: "Since it is the understanding which sees deduced truths, by what faculty are these *a priori* notions

and primitive judgments seen? Must there not be a higher, a more immediate faculty to perform these supreme functions? Let it then be distinguished as the pure reason, or the intuitional reason. And let its characteristic be, that its vision is immediate, while that of the mere understanding is mediate; that however an empirical perception may be the *occasion* of the rise of its *a priori* abstractions, these have no *cause* before them; and that its primitive judgments of truth are independent of all premises. Does not this characteristic mark it as a distinct faculty?" This was plausible.

The fruits of all the transcendental schools, from Spinoza's down, have taught us the danger of this concession: it has encouraged them to claim an emancipation from logical obligations. The result has been a frightful license in dogmatizing. Does an honest logician object to them, that the first principles of their systems do not appear true? Does he array logical objections? The answer is, that these objections rest only on the authority of an inferior faculty, the plodding, logical understanding; and it is irrational to call down the higher faculty to the bar of the lower. Do we reply: "But we have no such intuitions as these which they assert"? They reply: This may very well be, because the pure reason is so much less developed in us than in them. If this supreme visive faculty is keener in them, it is the most natural thing in the world that they should see farther, and include in their circle of intuition objects not visible to the dimmer reason. For instance: here are two men in a field. The one says: "Do you see yonder bird sitting on the dead branch of the distant tree"? The other answers: "I see none, and I do not believe there is one there." Now suppose the first man to rejoin: "But I do see it that it is there; and this discrepancy shows that you are near-sighted." If there is no umpire with them, how shall the man thus charged silence the one who asserts for himself this intuitive evidence of a sharper vision? This illustration defines exactly the attitude of the debate between us and the transcendentalists, so long as we grant to them this distinction between the understanding and the reason. How shall we enforce any restraints upon the most licentious and destructive dogmatizings?

Thus, Spinoza constructed his system of Pantheism, with geometric rigor, upon a few principles, which he advanced as intuitions of the pure reason. One of these was the proposition, that all true being must be self-existent, and so, eternal. Another was, that attributes of extension and attributes of thought may be modes of subsistence of one and the same necessary being. It was in vain that sober reasoners protested that the first was not intuitively true; and that to their reason the notion of a true being, originated in time, while mysterious, was not impossible. It was in vain that they declared, to their intuition the reference of the antagonistic modes of extension and thought to the same being was impossible. The followers of Spinoza had a short answer: If these men could not see what the great master had seen intuitively, it was only because their development of the reason was inferior to his. And what is there strange in the ascription of different degrees of faculty to different men? It would seem that this difficulty had its influence in forcing *Plato* and *Cousin* to their doctrine of the impersonal unity of the pure reason. How else, admitting its distinct and superior rank as a faculty, have we any uniform, authoritative standard of truths left? Assign the reason this supreme, intuitive function, and also individualize it in each man, and we seem to have no defence against this absurd result: that each man may have his own code of truths intuitively valid to himself, yet contradicting his fellows' equally (to them) valid codes.

It would also seem that Kant and Sir Wm. Hamilton seek to escape the same destructive result, by stripping the pure reason of all positive power as a source of cognitions. The former says that it contributes nothing to the matter or substance of our knowledge, but only furnishes the conditions of its cognition. The latter says "it is not probably a faculty; that is, it is not an active power at all." It gives us only "the primary conditions of intelligence." It should be said here, that the language of the author in other parts of his lectures and notes on Reid leave us in doubt whether he designed to discriminate the two faculties or not. The statement of his scheme, on our first page and on this, although given almost in his own words, must be taken with this

explanation. This mode of escaping the *dilemma* seems vain, because the position that the faculty of intuitions is not a true faculty, and contributes nothing positive to cognition, is untrue. Hamilton confesses that it is not merely a "capacity." Primitive judgments are as truly cognitions, as derivative ones; and they are the most important ones we possess. Kant would represent our *a priori* notions of time, space, relation, as mere empty *matrices*, into which perception places the whole substance of knowledge. The conception is false. Hamilton himself cannot avoid calling the regulative forms of our cognitions by the same name, "necessary cognitions." Another difficulty arises in the way of our availing ourselves of that escape. Psychologists now concede that the informations of self-consciousness and of perception are as truly intuitions as our primitive judgments. And the concession is right; for these have all the distinguishing traits, self-evidence, immediateness, and necessity. But now, can Kant and Hamilton say that self-consciousness and perception are not positive faculties, and make no substantive contributions to our cognition? Surely not. The latter expressly calls them "the acquisitive faculty." Both regard them as the all-contributing faculties.

Let us prepare the way for the *thesis* we wish to sustain, by some further remarks upon the method in which our perceptions become true cognitions. That thesis is, that *understanding and reason are the same faculty*. Our argument here will be of the following character. Kant and Hamilton assign the cognitive or intellective part of the processes of perception to the understanding, as they classify the faculties. We shall show that this part, the action, namely, by which sensation becomes perception, clearly involves the function of the reason. If this be so, then so far as the method of this acquisitive faculty, at least, is concerned, we shall have removed all ground of distinction between the understanding and the reason. The argument of the Idealist is, that nothing is known to the mind except that which is in consciousness; but in any sensation nothing is in consciousness except the subjective affection itself: whence we are not authorised to suppose any objective reality, as truly perceived. How



can this process be refuted? The method suggested by the best psychologists is, to show that *every perception involves a judgment*, in which the relation between subjective sensation and objective source is intuitively affirmed. Let us grant this. We then ask, *what is the relation* affirmed in this perceptive judgment? No other than that of *cause and effect*. Let the perception be, for instance a visual one, the sight of a house. Of this, all that self-consciousness feels subjectively, is, that it is affected with a modification called visual sensation. Now the very point of the Idealist's plea is, that the mind has no right to step outside of the charmed circle of its own subjective consciousness, and to suppose, what is not by sensation in consciousness, an objective reality, house. It is apparently to meet this difficulty that Hamilton advances the inadmissible statement, that the mind is literally and immediately *conscious of the house!* This is his way of escaping pure idealism! The proposition is utterly irreconcilable with the nature of consciousness, as a faculty strictly subjective. And our common sense tells us that the thing of which we are conscious is, not the house, but our seeing of the house. How, then, is idealism to be escaped? We answer, that our immediate self-consciousness of the subjective part of the sensation is also attended with another intimate consciousness equally immediate, viz., *that we do not affect ourselves* with that subjective modification. We are intuitively conscious that it was not self-caused; that, in it, self has been not agent, but merely subject. But now, this twin consciousness arises always under the interpretative light of that great first truth, *No effect without its cause*. Hence it is, that the inevitable reference is made in the intelligence, connecting the subjective sensation with its necessary and real objective source, the house. Does any one object that we are not distinctly conscious, in every sense-perception, of this rational process, of thinking this intuitive premise to our perceptive judgment? Our answer is, that the brevity, the facility, the necessity, the exceeding frequency of the process, have so familiarised the consciousness to its elements, that we take no conscious, remembered note of them. The same solution must be resorted to to explain how the rapid reader spells the

syllables whose letters he seems to himself not to note. The same solution must be resorted to to explain how the practical man, unconsciously, interprets the elements of visual sensation so as to judge relative distance and shape. Bishop Berkeley himself, the great modern Idealist, demonstrated that we do not really see relative magnitudes and distances, but infer them; and yet we do not consciously note our inference. The solution applies with equal fairness to our theory of perception.

Now then, our argument is, that we find, after all, one of the highest intuitions of the pure reason involved in every act of objective perception. But this our opponents deem the most ordinary and plodding function of the understanding. So far, then, as the analysis of perception goes, understanding is reason, and reason is understanding.

But Kant, if we comprehend him aright, names the intuition, "Every effect must have its cause," as a judgment of the understanding, and not of the pure reason. Possibly he does so in order to avoid the very refutation given above. But in assigning it to a faculty other than, and lower than, the reason, he is obviously in error. He, himself, declares that it is a judgment *a priori* in source, immediate, and necessary. Add another trait, which Kant would be the last to deny, that it is universal, and we have every character by which the judgments of the reason can be distinguished. So that the true analysis of perception shows us a rational element at the root of every act of this acquisitive faculty, usually classed under the understanding.

It may be objected, that since brutes have perception, this argument would also prove them to be rational. We reply, that the real nature of the brutes' faculties is so obscure to us that he would be a rash man who should found any very certain conclusion on the assertion of the presence or absence of a given power in them. Suppose it be admitted that they have some reason? Many have admitted this on plausible grounds. But it is more probable that sensation in them is a mere sensibility, that the responsive use which they make of their sensations is instinctive, as opposed to rational; and that they lack the intelligence for construing rationally their own perceptions, as reasoning

man does. For instance: the horse sees the green herbage in an adjoining field. He has a species of animal spontaneity, and he moves towards it. This act does not necessarily prove that the horse has construed its sensation to itself rationally, by consciously referring it to its objective source. Does one ask, How came it, then, to move towards the grass? We answer, This may be the prompting of a mere instinct, which the animal does not rationally construe nor comprehend at all,—like that which prompts the young chicken to peck, and the young quadruped to walk, without any experience. Sir William Hamilton, if we understand him aright, believes that man sees just as the animal does. This is the extent to which he carries his theory of immediate perception! The “Hamiltonian” at least, then, cannot pronounce our theory of animal perception absurd when applied to animals. What we assert is, that it is incorrect when applied to rational man.

But the most characteristic function of the understanding, as distinguished from the reason, is supposed to be logical deduction. Here, they suppose, the method of intellection is clearly diverse; because, in judgments of the pure reason, the mind has no premises, while in the logical judgment, it only sees by premises; because the former kind of judgments are self-evident, the latter illative; because the former kind are necessary, the latter often uncertain, held by some and disputed by others; and because the former are universal, and the latter are not. But here, in the citadel of their strength, we take issue with them, and assert that in every *valid* illation, the logical judgment must be immediate, necessary, and intuitive. Every sound deduction virtually resumes the force of a primary judgment, and hence the whole of its validity.

The simple and sufficient proof of this view of the logical function is in these questions: What is the human intelligence but a faculty of seeing truth? But, as the eye only sees by looking, and all looking must be immediate, how else can the mind see than by mental looking, or rational intuition? Whether the object of bodily eye-sight be immediate or reflected, an object or its *spectrum*, it is still equally true that the eye sees only

by looking, and looking directly; only, in the latter case, the *spectrum* is its immediate object. So the mind, which only sees by looking, can only look directly; its look is immediate, or it is naught. One of the earliest English philosophers, Locke, concurs with one of the greatest of the recent Americans, McGuffey, in adopting this view. We find it also asserted in a late work of great originality and boldness, "Metaphysics the Science of Perception," by the Rev. John Miller, D.D. The thesis of this book is, that perception, emotion, and volition, are all one. This is an extreme; but its identification of the logical and the rational faculty confirms our position. Locke's proof that every valid logical judgment is intuitive, seems as simple as it is conclusive. He argues, (Book IV., chapter 2, §§ 1 to 7,) that, in a primary and immediate judgment, the agreement of ideas between subject and predicate is directly seen, because the mind has the two together before it. In a deduced judgment, the mind's decision cannot be thus immediate, because the terms are not brought immediately into juxtaposition in the mind. It is for this reason that their agreement cannot be immediately seen. Hence, we adopt the expedient of interposing a middle term, which can be immediately compared with first one and then the other of the former terms. By seeing the entire agreement of the first term with the middle, and then of the middle with the third, we are convinced of the agreement of the first with the third. But, in both these mediating comparisons, the view of the mind is direct; the two terms compared are in immediate juxtaposition in the mind, and their agreement immediately inspected. He argues, that if our perception of a valid relation between a proposition and its next premise were not immediate, then there must be, between the two, some term to mediate our view of it. But, between a proposition and its *next premise*, no other term can be interposed. So, we conclude, that the mind only sees truths in any proposition by looking; but, as with the external, so with the internal eye—the *looking must be immediate in order to be one's own.* •

To this view, objections will probably be opposed, and by those who are no friends to transcendentalism in any form. It may be

said that a truth which is seen only by its dependence on premises, is not a primitive judgment. It is the function of the pure reason to make primitive judgments. We admit that of course a dependent truth is not seen by such a judgment, in the sense of having no premises. But the essential thing is, that it is seen immediately and intuitively. The objector seems to suppose that the sight of the deduced truth cannot be immediate, because it is a truth of relation; seen only in relation to premises. But we remind him that sundry of our primary judgments are also truths of relation, and are intuitively seen only as such. "The whole is greater than either of its parts;" "If two magnitudes are each equal to a third, they must be equal to each other;" "Every effect must have its cause:"—these are all truths of relation. The fact, then, that a truth is only seen by a relation to premises, does not make its sight less immediate and intuitive.

This may be pushed, indeed, much farther. Is any truth at all, whether primary or deduced, ever seen in the mind, which is not so far a truth of relation as to affirm a relation of predicate to subject in a proposition? In this sense, every truth in the realm of mind is a truth of relation. And judging (which Kant and Hamilton would make the most characteristic function of the logical understanding,) is nothing but the intuition of a self-evident agreement between a predicate and a subject. Now, our opponents would describe a primitive judgment, which is a function of the pure reason, if anything is, as one seen in relation to no other proposition as premise. That is to say, this primitive judgment is nothing but an intuition of a self-evident relation between a given predicate and its subject. On this unavoidable concession we have two remarks: First, a multitude of judgments which our opponents refer to the "lower faculty" of understanding, do precisely the same thing, see intuitively the relation of a predicate to its subject; and second, the intuitive discernment of a relation of agreement between two propositions (what is done in the syllogism,) is surely not a lower function of the intelligence, than between two terms in the same proposition. What ground is left, then, to separate the logical understanding

from the reason, and call the former a "lower faculty," or a "dependent faculty"?

Another test of rational intuitions is, that they are necessary; and hence a second objection, that deductions are not seen as necessary truths. In one sense, we reply, they are not. The necessary truth of a deduction is not seen so long as it is not connected with some necessary truth by its premise. But we assert that when once that connexion is validly instituted, the deduction does become necessary. Let a syllogism be made which is correct in form. Let the terms of enunciation be clearly and fully apprehended by the student, without a shade of ambiguity, and with full attention. Let the premises be seen to be indubitably true. Then, we insist, the truth of the illation will be seen as inevitably, as necessarily, as in any first truth; and that by every mind.

The last words suggest a third objection: that it is the prerogative of the pure reason to discern universal truths. Her *dicta* are and must be admitted by every sane mind the world over, as soon as their enunciation is understood. But they say, logical deductions are held by some men and disputed by others; and the understandings of different ages and races, not to say persons, exhibit the widest discrepancies about them. To this we reply, that propositions called axioms have not always commanded universal agreement. We do not now regard as self-evident, or as true, that "nature abhors a vacuum," that "no substance can act in space except where it is present;" that "*ex nihilo nihil fit*," in the Platonic sense of no creation without eternal matter. But the days have been when these were regarded as axioms. Today many regard it as an ethical axiom, that "all slave-holding is sin." But all who truly reverence the Bible, believe that this proposition is false. Now how shall the credit of the pure reason be saved and its certainty defended? Only by saying that these propositions called axioms are not real axioms; that misapprehension of terms, or ignorance of relations expressed in the statements, or haste, or inattention, has led to this mistake. Well, the same plea avails for us. Statements have been mistaken for syllogisms which were not syllogisms, and from similar

causes. If prejudice or carelessness exists, the mistake was easier and more probable, because the syllogism contains three propositions and three terms, by which the danger of fallacy is multiplied. Again, first truths are few in number; and they are perpetually resumed by the mind in its processes; but deduced truths are numberless and varied, and many of them novel to any one man. If there has been some error and dispute touching first truths, it is just what we have to expect, that there will be much error touching derived truths. Yet the mind's sight of the latter may be as intuitive as of the former.

We conclude, then, that there is no generic difference between the action of the reason in the intuition of the two cases. It was with accurate insight that the people named the deductive process "reasoning." It is, in fact, but another exercise of the same reason, the same faculty, which discerned the first truths. Logical understanding and reason are one, not two. One gain which we win by this demonstration, is the simplifying of logic and a juster view of its processes. A more important one is, that we make an end of the license of dogmatizing claimed hitherto by transcendentalists. They can no longer refuse to be amenable to logical processes, and claim for their assumed postulates the authority of a superior faculty; for the rational and the logical faculties are one. In the one exercise it is as authoritative as in the other.

## ARTICLE V.

## THE COLORED MAN IN THE SOUTH.

Pritchard says that the physical attributes among the African nations, have an evident relation to their moral and social condition, and to the different degrees of barbarism and civilisation in which they live.

“Tribes in which the negro type is developed in a high degree, are uniformly in the lowest grade of human society: they are either ferocious savages, or stupid, sensual, and indolent creatures, scarcely elevated above animal life—as, for instance, the nude hordes upon the coast of West Guinea, where the slave trade has been carried on to the greatest extent.”

The Rev. Mr. Bowen, a Baptist missionary in Central Africa, says (writing in 1850):

“The true or typical negro, as every one knows, is distinguished by his low organism. His jaws are prognathous, or monkey-shaped; his forehead retreating; his face larger than his hairy scalp; his feet broad and flat; his heels long, and his legs almost without calves. His intellect, and especially his reasoning faculties, are weak; his moral perceptions low, and his animal feelings strong. He appears to be a stranger to modesty, doing and allowing things with brutal apathy, which other races cannot tolerate. I doubt whether any negro of this class has ever felt disgust, or ever will. They are naturally incapable of religious feelings.”

Every reader of the works of Sir Samuel Baker about the Nile tributaries, Albert N'Yanza and Ismalia, knows how minutely these general traits are verified in his volumes, and some of them graphically presented to the eye by illustrations, photographically and otherwise taken on the spot. These negroes, with their unmitigated characteristics, were first introduced a little more than two hundred years ago into our Southern States. The legal importation of them continued until 1808, and not a few were introduced surreptitiously up to a later date. Of these negroes, our present colored people are the lineal descendants, and no inconsiderable portion of them would trace to Africa their ancestors of only a few removes.

Having given the statement by various African travellers, of



the actual condition of the African, we may offer their opinion as of experts, upon the question of his improvability. Mr. Bowen, with genuine Christian faith, holds that the gospel has power to convert the barbarous negro of Africa. But the following sentence from his chapter on this topic, must be weighed :

“We desire to establish the gospel in the hearts and minds and social life of the people. . . . This cannot be done without civilisation. . . . Suppose, now, that all the people of Africa were converted to-day, and left to-morrow to perpetuate their Christianity, without foreign assistance. In a few generations they would sink to a level with the Christians of Abbyssinia, as unconverted, as superstitious, and as vicious as the very heathen themselves. . . . It has, indeed, an appearance of simple, energetic faith, to affirm that the gospel alone is sufficient to evangelise the barbarous nations. . . . Yet without food and clothing and several branches of secular knowledge, the Bible and the gospel cannot exist in any country.”

Sir Samuel Baker gives us the following extract from his journal, though not without notice that he had received unusual provocation :

“(1872.) The treachery of the negro is beyond belief. He has not a moral human instinct, and is below the brute. How is it possible to improve such abject animals? They are not worth the trouble, and they are only fit for slaves, to which position their race appears to have been condemned. I believe I have wasted my time and energy, and have uselessly encountered difficulties and made enemies, by my attempt to suppress the slave trade, and thus improve the condition of the natives.”

From an earlier journal, (1863) we copy the following :

“I wish the black sympathisers in England could see Africa’s inmost heart as I do: much of their sympathy would subside. Human nature, viewed in its crude state, as pictured among African savages, is quite on a level with that of the brute, and not to be compared with the noble character of the dog. There is neither gratitude, pity, love, nor self-denial; no idea of duty; no religion; but covetousness, ingratitude, selfishness, and cruelty. All are thieves, idle, vicious, and ready to plunder and enslave their weaker neighbors.”

Sir Samuel has no hope from missionary labors in Africa at present. He says :

“It is my opinion that the time has not arrived for missionary enterprise in these countries. . . . The Austrian mission has failed, and

their stations have been forsaken ; their pious labor was useless, and the devoted priests died upon their barren field."

Thus we have exhibited to us, by testimony that cannot be gainsaid, the actual, degraded, hideous condition of the negro as at present found in Africa, with strong doubt expressed as to his capability of improvement.

Look now at what this same race is at this moment in the Southern States. Instead of dealing with general statistics, and deducing results from them, we shall content ourselves with two concrete examples, the truthfulness of which we vouch for. The first is presented by the following extracts from a communication furnished to a Northern journal by the writer of this article :

" . . . The Colored Baptist Association of Virginia met in Lexington, Virginia, last August. I attended one of its sessions with the express purpose of comparing it with like ecclesiastical bodies of white people. My surprise at what I witnessed was no less than my gratification. I found a very large assembly of colored delegates going through the usual routine of business in an orderly manner, under the control of a Moderator more efficient than many a presiding officer that I have seen in the chair at conventions of whites. The debates were spirited, sensible, and practical. The desire to speak was so great that the gavel had to be used very vigorously. The topics for consideration were identical with those met with in a Presbytery—reports from individual churches, ministerial support, foreign and domestic missions, education, and temperance. . . . I was present at the reading of the report on Education, and was much struck by the earnestness of the speakers, and interested in observing the gradual development of the subject by the pressure of discussion. The first speakers dwelt upon the necessity that those who undertook to teach should themselves possess knowledge. (Some of the illustrations were original and sharp.) Then came on others, who said that it was vain to attempt to educate the old ministers. The next thought presented was, that the young men in the ministry should strive to educate themselves ; and finally, that this must be done *systematically*, (that was the very word used,) by the *combined efforts of the Church*. Here was the scheme of education of young men for the ministry by the Church—an Education Society—worked out by the good sense of these colored Christians. Of course I am not to be understood as saying that the speeches were as good in thought, arrangement, or diction, as are those of white ministers ; but I do say that they were in all these particulars highly creditable, and, under the circumstances, very surprising. Most of the prominent speakers had white blood in their veins, but the

most impressive was a pure African. This Association has, according to its minutes, ninety-six churches in connexion with it; and the amount contributed for the support of their ministers is surprising, as exhibited by the financial column. The church of Lexington pays a salary of \$600; another gives \$450, and so on down the scale. These facts, to which I might add many similar ones, illustrate the condition of the colored Baptists in the Valley of Virginia. I have reason to know that that of the colored Methodists is altogether as good. I will add, in order to show that I am acquainted with the general subject upon which I am writing, that I am the senior Superintendent of a colored Sabbath-school, which, for the character of the instruction and discipline, and in the progress of the pupils, will compare favorably with any white school with which I am acquainted.

- “Three motives have prompted this communication. 1. . . . 3. I wish to say that the colored people of the Valley of Virginia were brought up to the condition I have described, under the influence of *slavery*—a slavery, in the main, the most equitable, generous, and civilising, the world ever saw. These people have undoubtedly improved in the particulars mentioned, since their emancipation. But let it not be forgotten—it cannot be denied—that Southern slavery brought the barbarous African up to the position which made any advance practicable.”

The other example which we shall give is that of the African Church of Richmond, Virginia. Of this church we take the following account, condensed from the columns of the *Richmond Dispatch*. In 1841, the colored members of the First Baptist church of Richmond, Virginia, were set apart as a separate church; and to them was assigned the building in which, up to that time, the white and colored people had been worshipping together. At the time of the separate organisation, the colored members numbered 1,670. For more than twenty years, Dr. Ryland, at that time President of Richmond College, was their faithful and effective and successful minister. His fostering care of the interests of the Baptist denomination, his ministerial fidelity towards the African race, his simplicity of manner, kindness of heart, his benevolence and total lack of ostentation, will cause him long to be remembered. Since that time, there has been a steady increase of members, until now there are 3,700 communicants, with 30 deacons, and 800 Sabbath-school scholars, and the annual contributions for all purposes amount to \$5,000. The old building has been taken down, and the congregation is now

erecting a new one, which will cost, when completed, \$40,000, and will be furnished with a fine organ.

As both of the examples given above have reference only to the present religious condition of the negro in the Southern States, let us now, in order to emphasise the difference, show what, in this respect, the negro is in Africa.

Mr. Bowen says, in his work heretofore referred to :

“In addition to their other idols, the Yorubas worship Satan himself. He is not worshipped like the idols, as a mediator, nor yet because they suppose he will hereafter attain to power and dominion ; but simply as a malignant being, whom they think it best to conciliate. His altar is a rough conglomerate stone of clay and pebbles, cemented with iron, upon which they pour oil, as if to mollify the devil’s evil disposition.”

Sir Samuel gives us this picture :

“Kamrasi and his magicians were occupied with daily sacrifices, deducing prognostications of coming events from the appearance of the entrails of the birds slain. The king was surrounded by sorcerers, both men and women. These people were distinguished from others by witch-like chaplets of various dried roots worn upon their heads. Some of them had dried lizards, crocodiles’ teeth, lions’ claws, minute tortoise shells, etc., added to their collection of charms. . . . In such witches and wizards Kamrasi and his people believed implicitly. . . . These people, although far superior to the tribes on the north of the Nile, in general intelligence, had no idea of a Supreme Being, nor any object of worship, their faith resting upon a simple belief in magic, like that of the natives of Madi and Obbo.”

To realise the difference which these contrasted pictures signalise, we have only to suppose that Sir Samuel Baker was describing what he had witnessed in Lexington, Virginia, and that the Baptist Association had been in session at Kisoona, in Central Africa, with Kamrasi as Moderator !

The difference here exhibited in the religious condition of the African negro and the negro of the Southern States, so obviously carries with it the whole question of comparative civilisation, that we may spare ourselves the trouble of referring in the case of each, to intelligence, morality, and domestic and social life.

And now we are ready for the important proposition to which all that has gone before has been tending : *Slavery* accomplished this wonderful, beneficent work. This proposition is not of im-

portance as being new. It has again and again been announced and established. But it is important because of its relation to existing questions, the right solution of which is vital to this country.

The whole truth, however, is not expressed by the proposition that slavery has made for the negro the difference between civilisation and barbarism; it needs to be expanded negatively, by adding—and nothing else could have effected it. This, however, we shall leave as a bare assertion, for which we offer no proof.

Slavery has been the civiliser, the great benefactor, of the negro. But not *all slavery*. In every part of Africa, slavery has always existed. Where master and slave were alike uncivilised, in the nature of the case no good could be germinated. But some parts of Africa possessed the earliest known civilisation on the globe. Notably, Egypt; and Egypt has ever been slaveholding. But Egyptian slavery had in it nothing beneficent. Bayard Taylor says:

“Those friends of the African race who point to Egypt as a proof of what that race has accomplished, are wholly mistaken. The only negro features represented in Egyptian sculpture, are those of slaves and captives taken in the Ethiopian wars of the Pharaohs. . . . There is no evidence in all the Valley of the Nile, that the negro race ever attained a higher degree of civilisation than is at present exhibited in Congo and Ashantee.”

Dr. Livingstone says that “the only art the natives of Africa have acquired from their five hundred years’ acquaintance with the Portuguese, has been the art of distilling spirits by means of a gun-barrel.”

Without any attempt at detailed verification, the remark may be made, that no Oriental slavery ever benefited the negro race.

Let us glance at our own continent in these modern times. In Spanish Cuba, the African, though less imbruted than in his native land, was but slightly elevated. The same is true, though perhaps not to the same extent, of the slave population of the West Indies, in possession of the Portuguese, the French, and the Dutch, respectively. In English Jamaica it was better. The Anglo-Saxon race, itself the best product of Christian civilisation, is more than any other race beneficent to all who are

brought into close relations with itself. But English influences were in this instance greatly weakened, if not nullified, by the distance from England at which they operated. Only in the United States, (including the colonial period,) did the negro enjoy, under the most favorable conditions, the slavery which was his only hope. Here a good Providence put his destiny into the hands of Anglo-Saxon Christian masters at home, and here began a gracious future for him. But even here with a difference. The dealings of historic providence are gradual. The Jews were brought circuitously into the land of promise. The negro was introduced in Northern ships to our Northern borders; but Northern men were not, except initially, his benefactors. The earliest notions of the relation of master and slave were pretty much the same in all countries into which the negro had been introduced. These were the notions which prevailed in Africa. They had been imported thence and along with the slave. In Africa, in the West Indies, and in New England, the negro slave was regarded as stock. Society had not taken him under its protection, and as yet the conscience of the master had not been awakened in his behalf. Owing to the character of the Puritans and the climate of New England, he was worse off in Massachusetts than he was in Africa or in the West Indies. Slavery can never develop its beneficent influences until the slave becomes a *quasi* member of the family; and this, again, can never be until he becomes profitable in the social system. This never came to pass in New England; and thus the only historical connexion which New England has with the advancement of the negro race, is her active maintenance of the slave trade as long as it existed.

In the Southern States, however, the negro found his predestined home. The climate was propitious, the soil exuberant, the staples peculiar and precious; so that the moderate labor of the slave enriched the master to the degree that made him careless of small gains and rendered exaction unnecessary. We might say something about the greater geniality of the Southerner compared with the New Englander, but it is not necessary to press this point. The fact is enough. The negro could not live in the North. In the South he not only lived, but multiplied, and

made in civilisation an advance even more rapid than in population. In the North, the negro was always an alien. In the South, he became a true member of the social system—the coarse selvage, it may be, but still a part of the web. The early slave laws of New England reveal bitterness as well as contempt toward the race. In the South, though degraded, the negro never was hated. And so there grew up that anomalous but solid and excellent state of society, so well understood by us, but utterly unrealisable by those who never lived in the midst of it. It had its serious drawbacks and positive evils to both races, but it conferred at the same time, though in a different way, benefits upon both. For the negro, the gain was so great that we almost lose sight of the evils. It is scarcely worth while to remember the hardships incidental to the progress from African barbarism to Christian civilisation.

Now we are not claiming for the South the merit of having foreseen and intended this beneficence, any more than we suppose that the slave trade of the North had its origin in love or righteousness. Slavery, in its results, has proved itself too large for human foresight. Let us reverently refer it to the great Ruler of the universe, in whose purposes the mysteries of the world's history have their unrevealed explanation. Only this we can see, and this we may say: four millions of human beings owe their civilisation and all that it actually represents now, and all that it makes possible for them hereafter, to slavery under Southern masters. The work intrusted to these masters as instruments, might have been better done, undeniably. Slavery might have borne richer and more abundant fruits, and borne them earlier, had the masters been better men. Alas, for the evil that has been done, and the good that has been hindered by sin! But still it remains that Southern slavery has done in the way of good to the negro race, what never was before done, or even begun to be done, for them, by any other nation, or by any other influence. And this, for a great historic work, in a comparatively brief period—mainly within a hundred years. For although slavery has existed on this continent for more than twice that period, it has been exclusively in Southern hands less than a century. The

slave trade existed legally until 1808, and, without the sanction of law, was partially continued for some years later. Thus the North interfered with the social assimilation of the African race, by the constant infusion of crude material. Let us say, then, that African civilisation in the South was the work of a century.

At the great Centennial Exposition at Philadelphia, the South was not represented by costly buildings erected at State expense, nor by State days, on which her Governors received with rich and glad pomp, by tens of thousands, their prosperous citizens. Nor did she vie in huge machinery or varied and skilful fabrics. Not even were the treasures of her soil and her mines present in abundant and rich specimens. In many respects she could not vie with the North; and even where nature had assured her the superiority, she could not come into competition with equal conditions. She was too poor; and while not ashamed of her poverty, she was too well aware of its disadvantages to attempt what was beyond her reach. But could her slavery record have been presented—could a vast panorama have exhibited truly the negro in Africa, degraded, sensual, ferocious, superstitious, and beastly, and then the negro as he is this day in the South—the noblest Centennial award would have been a tribute—not to steam, to the electric telegraph, or to manufactures, which are the results of civilisation—but to the act itself of civilising; not to the constructing of marvellous machines from crude materials, but to the converting of hopeless barbarians into citizens.

Again, let us abnegate the claim for the South of super-heroic powers, or super-human virtue, by which it was enabled or inclined to do a work so vast in its proportions and so beneficent in its results that it deserves to be signalised as one of the grand results of one of the most fruitful centuries of history. Without the conditions existing at the South, the work could not have been accomplished; but it is truth speaking, and not arrogance, to say, that with a different people in the South, the conditions would have been unavailing.

It may be worth while here to notice the opinions of some writers of authority upon the difficult problem of the civilisation of the negro race.



Sir Samuel Baker says :

"I believe that if it were possible to convert the greater portion of African savages into disciplined soldiers, it would be the most rapid stride toward their future civilisation. The fact of obedience being enforced, and the necessity of order, industry, and discipline, together with clothing and cleanliness, is all that is absolutely required to bring a savage within the bounds of good management. A savage who has led a wild and uncontrolled life, must first learn to obey authority, before any great improvement can be expected. A soldier must obey, and he learns to respect his officers as his superiors. Thus, a savage who has learned all that he knows from his officers, whom he admits as his superiors, will quickly adopt their religion, as he has been obliged to adopt their military rule."

Sir Samuel's idea, then, for the civilisation of the negro, would be to make him a soldier. A very good plan, it may be granted, for a limited number of individuals, but impossible of application to a nation, as his opening sentence suggests. But the principle involved is undoubtedly true and indispensable in any scheme that succeeds. There must be discipline more or less like that of the army.

Sir Archibald Alison, the distinguished historian, in his able and philosophical treatment of the account of slavery in Jamaica, and the abolition of it, says :

"Such is the invariable aversion of savage man to continuous and severe labor, that this repugnance has never been overcome in any part of the world but by the introduction and long continuance of forced labor. . . . As the forced labor of slaves is thus essential for thousands of years, to the existence and progress of the species, so, in the circumstances in which it is required, it is the greatest possible blessing even to those whom in ignorance we pity for being subjected to its severities."

Let us hear the missionary, Mr. Bowen, once more :

"The barbarous negro of Africa and the enlightened white man of America are endowed with a common human nature . . . It follows, then, that the gospel is adapted to both. . . . No Christian will deny that men may be converted without civilisation, or that whole communities of barbarians might become at least nominally Christian, like the civilised nations of Europe and America."

We have seen, in a previous quotation, how important Mr.

Bowen esteems it that other influences should coöperate with the power of the gospel.

Let us now bring together the three prerequisites deemed prime by the above quoted authors respectively. There must be discipline, securing unquestioning obedience, (Baker); enforced labor, long continued, (Alison); religion, (Bowen). We will venture to add as a condition—the civilisation of the superior race must be of a character at once strong and generous.

Now it is obvious to remark, but we think very striking to observe, that these several characteristics belong to the system of slavery in the South in a degree never found elsewhere. As in the army so in slavery, the authority was within certain limits despotic and vested in a single hand, and those of subordinates appointed by the chief. Obedience must be unquestioning, subordination absolute, and deportment deferential. Supervision was minute, judgment for faults prompt and sometimes unjust, but always without appeal. Punishments were corporal, arbitrary, and in some instances cruel, and favoritism modified everything at its caprice. In all this we see the strength of military organisation; and not a few serious faults were found in the system of slavery, unknown in modern military service.

Upon the labor feature we need not enlarge. Whatever advantage was to be derived from this kind of training, the slave received to the full. The main object and the essential characteristic of slavery, is enforced labor. As soon as the negro child was capable of labor he was put to it, and kept at it early and late, until released by the decrepitude of age. But in a climate suited to his constitution, at work, which, if continuous, was for the most part light, and under masters careless and unexacting; so that the negro population increased with a rapidity unparalleled elsewhere, and for a time exceeded that of the whites. Combined with discipline and labor, the religious element in various phases was always more or less present; though, it must be confessed, often with a feebleness that was sinful. The Sabbath was recognised, the church was attended by the family, and sittings were provided for the slave; the Bible was known as a holy Book; while marriages, baptisms, and funerals were reli-

gious offices. All this and more of the form and presence of religion was exhibited in every part of the Slave States; and in quite as large a proportion of families as in any other part of the land, the spirit and power of religion was manifested. Add, in general, the morals and habits of civilisation regarded as something distinct from religion, and it is apparent that negro slavery in the South existed under conditions more favorable than it had ever met with before; and thus was enabled to accomplish what never was accomplished heretofore, and could not have been accomplished elsewhere or otherwise.

But slavery with its functions exists no more. The fate of the negro is now connected with a new agent—emancipation. Have we sufficient grounds for the hope that, at the end of another century, it will be able to render as good an account of the advanced work assumed by it, as slavery does of the preliminary work which it now lays down? The past is ascertained. Supported by slavery, the negro in the South has walked steadily and with surprising progress up to his present grade of civilisation. Now that this support has been withdrawn, whether without it he will be able to make further advance, or even to maintain his present condition, or whether he is to retrograde, is as yet speculation; but speculation upon a question of the deepest interest to two races, to two continents, to religion, and it may be to the world.

In the consideration of this question, we are first confronted with the well ascertained historic fact, that a superior and an inferior race have never coexisted in large numbers in the same territory without one of three following results: 1. Continued subjection (slavery) of the inferior race. 2. Amalgamation of the two races. 3. Extinction of the inferior race. Of these three results, two in the present inquiry may be set aside as out of view. The negro cannot be again enslaved, and amalgamation is impossible. There remains, therefore, if the history of this subject in the past is to be its history in the future, but the other alternative—extinction of the negro race. But no one is authorised to say, that what has heretofore been invariable under the circumstances existing heretofore, must be repeated

hereafter under changed conditions. It is enough to say, that the advance in civilisation, and the power of the Christian religion, have so far changed the conditions of the present experiment, as to leave the question of the result open and undecided by what history teaches of the past. Neither, on the other hand, are we in a condition to pronounce with positiveness, that the existing circumstances are so manifestly in favor of the negro, that the extinction of this race is impossible. Not because of the large population to which it has attained, for we have reason to suppose, that at one time, the number of Indians in North America, either of the present tribes, or of a people of higher civilisation, was quite as great. Nor will the striking instances we have given in the first part of this article, of the surprising religious improvement exhibited in some localities, by the negro, settle this question. The same may be shown to be the case among the Indians. Here, for example, is a paragraph which may be taken as authentic.

“The Society of Friends in the United States has under its charge 20,000 Indians. The 7th Annual Report of their Executive Committee states that, at Rossville, Kansas, the Pottawattomies have ninety-five farms, a boarding-school and a school-farm. The Kickapoos, in Kansas, have also a boarding-school and a school-farm. Many of the children are advanced in arithmetic, grammar, and history. The Modocs have 200 acres enclosed, have log houses built by themselves, and are well disposed. The Friends are confident that the Indians can be both Christianised and civilised.”

And yet, we suppose, that there are few persons who do not believe that the Indians in the United States are doomed to extinction.

Nor, finally, would any but a rash man venture to interpret dogmatically the providence of God connected with this subject. When we see how much good has already been accomplished for the negro race, under God's ruling, by slavery, and when we think we can foresee how much greater good might yet flow from it; when we look upon four millions of beings, who, though differing in color and in race, are still our fellow-men, and now our fellow-citizens, who belong to our soil, our history, our society, and whose civilisation is our peculiar

achievement, and for whom we feel a sympathy and an attachment such as they never awakened elsewhere; when we remember that they were our nurses in infancy, and our playmates in boyhood, that they served us cheerfully in former days and in a time just gone by, when encouraged by occasion, and stimulated by wicked men, they might have risen against us in our sore trouble, they did us no harm—when we call to mind these things, our wishes, our hopes, and our prayers go in one direction; and we are unwilling to entertain the thought, that after all, they are to become extinct; that after having brought them through the Red Sea, God will allow them to perish in the wilderness. Still, we are not allowed presumptuously to declare the future by the interpretation of providences beyond the scope of our intelligence. Nations nobler, greater, and of more promise than the negro race, have perished, leaving only a name in history, and some only a nameless trace on the shores of time. Notwithstanding all it is at present, and all that we may hope for it, the negro race may have already fulfilled its destiny, and may even now be following the drear trail of the Indian in the dismal career of silent decay; that is, to leave this country to the sole occupation of a superior race. Nor is this supposition one which we must allow as a possibility only because of our ignorance. There are some reasons for dreading it.

And first, as bearing directly upon this question, would be an examination of the population statistics of the negro, as indicating the probable future numerical increase, permanence, or decline of the race. Such an estimate could be of value only when based upon statistics at once more extended than this article would have room for, and more accurate than any to which we have access, if indeed such exist. The general outlook cannot be said to be favorable to the permanence of the negro. Not a few persons whose opinion is worthy of the highest consideration, hold that a fearful decrease has set in; that the population series is being decimated at both ends—at the beginning by a decrease of births of colored children, and at the end by an increasing number of deaths. The reports of the authorities of the city of Charleston seem to corroborate this fear. In that city, the aver-

age mortality rate for seven years, from 1869 to 1875 inclusive, was, for the whites, 1 in 39, and for the colored, 1 in 25. In 1875, the deaths of children under five years, of whites, were 250; colored, 671. In the same year, the still-born births were, whites, 35; colored, 138. The total population of the city being 56,540: whites, 24,528; colored, 32,012. Without pressing the weight of these figures, we must admit that they awaken alarm.

We have showed, that what has been done hitherto for the negro, has been done by slavery; what remains, must be done by emancipation. Some think that emancipation was premature, and that the agents in it have, by their precipitation, interfered with the course of things, (we Christians say, with God's providence,) and thus retarded and damaged what, without them, would have come to pass later, but more maturely and with better fruits. We do not hold this opinion, and without staying to offer our reasons, express the belief that the time for emancipation had come, if it ever was to take place. Slavery had done all for the negro race that it could do. As a system, it could not be more humane, equitable, and beneficent. Its training appliances were exhausted. It had made the African savage docile, industrious, and subordinate, and had prepared him to receive the influences of civilisation and Christianity, and had given these influences full access to him. In fact, its power for good had been materially impaired. The abolition movement arrested the amelioration of the system of slavery, by exciting well-grounded fears of terrible disaster, by enraging the South against fanatical intruders, and by chilling the kindness and deadening the sensibilities of the masters. As a slave, the negro had reached his maximum. If he was to be advanced, it must be by emancipation. But it would be an experiment. The emancipation of the negro in the West Indies was of a date too recent to settle the question whether it would ultimately prove a blessing or the reverse, and the conditions of the two experiments would not be the same. Further, it was held by not a few, that the negro, though capable of improvement, could not, because of his inferior race, advance beyond a low degree of civilisation. Thus it was an experiment, whether, when the support of slavery, by which he had hitherto

been upheld, was removed, the black man could advance or even stand. Still, if the experiment was to be made, he was, in our judgment, as ready for it as he would ever be. But it is obvious that the change ought to have been made with deliberation, caution, and with the accompaniment of every supplemental aid that could be devised. That it was not so made, we all know. The times did not allow of it, even had the prime agents been wise enough to understand the exigencies of the case, or had they a care for the results. Thus emancipation emerged with initial disadvantages.

But in another act appears the cause of the greatest alarm to the well-wishers of the negro. Emancipation nascent, doubtful, weak, struggling, was burdened cruelly with enfranchisement. It remains to be seen whether a nation, always free, can bear the load of universal suffrage. That it was enough to crush the newly-made freedman, ought to have been plain to the most moderate intelligence. For see how ruinously it reversed all the good influences which during its slavery had developed the black race. The negro had hitherto lived as the only possible condition of well-being, under the power of another. Now, he becomes his own master. This great change will tax all his powers; but, in addition, is assigned to him his share (in some of the States, the controlling share) of governing others. In his state of pupillage, his instruction was less by direct tuition than by kindly though subordinate association with those whom he was proud to imitate. Now, as a voter, he antagonises his former models and falls back upon himself. His labor-training was his best inheritance; and now he is enticed to idleness by fallacious expectations that he can in some way vote himself into the possession of property. At the very time when his fitness for freedom was to be determined by the test of self-reliance, he is taught to depend upon supposed friends at the North and the Federal Government.

Finally, a great cause of the advance of the negro race was their free intermingling with the whites, as belonging to the same social system, though occupying different positions in it. Now, as far as it is possible for an act of Government to break up abruptly what has been the work of generations, the blacks have

been separated in the same society, by a color line drawn by enfranchisement.

It would seem to require no great degree of intelligence to foresee these and other like disastrous results from giving the right of voting to a newly-emancipated population. It is certain that some of the most prominent Northern statesmen had a clear view of the situation. Governor Andrew, of Massachusetts, says:

"It may be asked, Why not demand the suffrage for the colored man in season for their vote in the business of reorganisation? My answer is . . . It would be idle to reorganise those States by the colored vote. If the popular vote of the white race is not to be had in favor of guaranties justly required, then I am in favor of holding on where we are now."

And Senator Morton, of Indiana, says more fully and pointedly:

"I believe that in the case of four millions of slaves just freed from bondage, there should be a period of probation and preparation before they are brought to the exercise of political power. . . . What is their condition? Perhaps not one in five hundred—I might say, one in a thousand, can read; and perhaps not one in five hundred is worth five dollars of property of any kind. . . . Can you conceive that a body of men, white or black, who have been in this condition, and their ancestors before them, are qualified to be immediately lifted from their present state into the full exercise of political power, not only to govern themselves and their neighbors, but to take part in the government of the United States? . . . To say that such men, just emerged from slavery, are qualified for the exercise of political power, is to make the strongest pro-slavery argument I ever heard. It is to pay the highest compliment to the institution of slavery."

It would be indeed a compliment that slavery does not deserve, to say that it had educated the savage African into a competent voter. Southern slavery does not seek for compliments; it is enough to grant it the merit of simple truth, by showing that it has done what never was done before—that it has civilised and Christianised four millions of the negro race. Emancipation was made to carry the burden of enfranchisement. Whether it will be crushed by it or not remains to be seen. Thereby is justified a doubt as to the permanence of the American negro.

We must not pass by the possibility of an internecine war be-



tween the races. Such a war would be fatal to the black man; and, should it occur, will be due to enfranchisement. Let us, however, dismiss foreboding, notwithstanding the grave doubts belonging to the question, and, assuming that the negro race is to be a permanent element of the Southern social system, ask, What is likely to be its future status? The length to which this paper has already extended, allows us only to state propositions, with scarcely any explication, proof, or illustration.

1. The race may deteriorate. But any constant causes which would bring about present deterioration, would finally result in extinction. This aspect of the case we have agreed to eliminate.

2. Without important change either for the better or worse, the negro may maintain his present actual and relative position. By the natural, irreversible order of things, there must be in every social system a place for a large proportion of the population who gain their livelihood by the labor of their hands, little aided by any capital of their own. In the East, they make up the lower castes in their several gradations. In Europe, they are the peasantry; and essentially they are the same in the United States. In this country, the white laboring class has the great advantage, that it is not a fixed class, as it is absolutely in the East, and nearly to the same extent virtually so in Europe. The day-laborers of one generation, with us, may be the progenitors of children ranking high in society. This is due to the newness of our country, the exuberance of our resources, our free institutions, and the prevalence of education. This hope cannot cheer the negro race, if it only maintains its present relative position. But without it, the colored man may secure comfort, independence, and respect, as a laborer, mechanic, seaman, or soldier. For a limited number the army would afford an eligible position, and under proper discipline negroes might make an efficient force. This view of the case only secures to the race the blessings already imparted to it by slavery, with the added advantages of emancipation.

3. The black man, in freedom, may advance in the social system. He can never equal the white man. All science, all philosophy, all history, establishes this proposition. It is not at

present controverted by any authority worthy of consideration. But it may be, that the providential purpose in emancipation is, and the result of it may be, a lessening of the difference between the two races, to produce more homogeneity in the structure of society. To this end our prayers and efforts should go forth, and this view our hope leads us to adopt.

If space allowed, we think we could offer for this hope reasons which would be acknowledged substantial, though they might not be accepted as conclusive. We must content ourselves with some intimations.

And first: There is nothing in the past to prevent it. The whole subject has connected with it nothing more momentous than the fact, that, in the late war, our slaves did not take up arms against us. There is no blood-feud (as yet) between the races. Thus there is nothing to make the white man hate the black, or the black man refuse the aid of the white. The mutual kindness which so surprisingly characterised slavery, if impaired, has not been destroyed by emancipation, nor, as yet, even by enfranchisement.

Again, as hopeful signs of a positive significance may be noted, the willingness of the negro to work, compared with what was predicted, and compared with the habits of the West India freedmen. Also his comparative freedom from intemperance, his desire for education, and his success in mastering the elements of it. Here, also, we may augur good from the liberality of the South in providing free schools for the race, and from the success which has so far marked these schools.

Another good sign is the passion the negroes have for display, and the eagerness with which they copy, to the utmost of their means, the expensive habits and fashions of the whites. The dress of the women; the parades of the men, civic and political; their funerals, their fairs, their suppers, and their pleasure dining and driving—all show that they are laying hold of a higher social life. Even so much is good; but it is much better for them and for us that these things are expensive pleasures, and they must be taught that they must earn their cake before they

eat it—that they must work for their money before they spend it. And thus their enjoyment results in our profit.

Finally, is it either fanatical, superstitious, or presumptuous, to hold that it was God who brought this people from the arid land of their nativity, to a land of Christian light and privilege; who gave them the beneficent training of slavery; turned the hearts of their masters to a defenceless race; protected and fostered them; and in spite of the short-comings of masters and the sins and blunders of outside interference, cherished them, and vouchsafed to them such advance as never had been known to history? Is it fanatical to see the hand of God in connecting emancipation with the issue of a war belonging to the wide destiny of a mighty nation? If not, then it is reasonable to entertain the hope, that all this progressive providential work is not to come now to an abrupt and fruitless end; but that it all is preliminary to something further, equally beneficent and of enlarged proportions.

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ARTICLE VI.

THE RECENT ORIGIN OF MAN.

*The Recent Origin of Man, as Illustrated by Geology, and the Modern Science of Pre-historic Archæology.* By JAMES C. SOUTHALL. Illustrated. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. London: Trübner & Co. 1875. 1 Vol., royal octavo, pp. 582.

Had Mr. Southall written a book in the interests of unbelief, presenting half the research and ability discoverable in this work, the world would have accorded to him an enviable fame. Nothing in our day so conduces to celebrity as a volume of scientific observations and comments, containing occasional remarks indicative of freedom from religious restraints. A little by-play with the faith of serious readers, is an evidence of philosophical independence, and a dash of irreverence secures for the writer a degree of attention and respect which genius and learning would

fail to inspire. This is evident from the currency given to the bare conjectures of certain recent observers concerning human remains discovered in obscure localities, and made known to the world on the testimony of different explorers. These skeletons have been paraded by the secular press in floating paragraphs, under the startling caption of *pre-historic man*, as if with the hope of scaring the religious world from its propriety. And the general reader has been impressed with the belief that they *of course* belonged, in the opinion of great authorities, to ages long preceding the received date of creation.

This method of indirect assault upon the Mosaic revelation, has been a favorite strategy with the enemies of truth for a period comparatively brief. Geology had previously baffled them; but the anxiety to discover human bones in the older formations, increased with the difficulties it presented. Within our own recollection, announcements began to be made that such remains had at last been found, and the alleged facts were circulated with a zeal worthy of a better cause. The evidence was very meagre, and the instances at first so few that little or no weight should have been attached to them in scientific circles. But the anxious explorers did not relax their efforts. The cases began to be multiplied, and sceptical writers began to assume a tone of triumph and defiance, as if the authority of Moses was forever destroyed. The exultation was great, and the advanced thinkers gave themselves up to a wild enthusiasm, as they expatiated in imagination over a boundless antiquity. Moses became a *modern*, and the origin of our race was pushed back, cycle after cycle, until the reader became bewildered with the maze of immensities that resulted from the various range of inexhaustible speculation. There seemed to be no end to the capabilities of figures, and calculations varied by millions of ages, as to the possible date of the appearance of man. Then came upon the stage the master spirit of evolution, and modestly suggested an antiquity beyond the reach even of conjecture. For it is obvious that, if evolution is too slow to become apparent in six thousand years, it must have required an almost infinite series of ages to have transmuted the first protoplasmic cell into the human form. The boast of con-

temporary scientists, that human remains had been discovered much older than the Mosaic date of creation, derived all its significance from their true human character. No specific difference is attributed to them. They are represented as skeletons of the race to which we belong. If the steadiness of nature is to be relied upon, the slightest visible change in the anatomical structure would require a much longer period than six thousand years. According to the authorities, these remains, *identical with man*, indicate, by their local associations, an antiquity many times more remote. We must take stride after stride, of six thousand years *each*, to reach their probable date. But even then no difference in the organism is to be found. Let this infinitesimal difference be multiplied by an infinite number, and we shall have the satisfaction of ascertaining the time required for the evolution of man from the monkey! We say, therefore, that Darwin achieved the climax of all such computations; and the only question left for his friends to determine, was the true antiquity of the *pre-historic* man so often exhumed by the zealous explorer. All inquiries into the remote or recent origin of the race are to be conducted under this limitation. They must treat of man as *man*, and not as *monkey*; and Mr. Southall no doubt kept this line in view when he undertook to sift the evidence upon which the Mosaic history has been assailed. The nature of his work can be easily understood from the preliminary statement we have now ventured to give of the alleged discoveries tending to invalidate the scriptural record. Everywhere save in his own land, Mr. Southall's work has been received with deserved respect. The notices of it in the leading scientific journals of England, France, and Germany, assign it the highest rank for learning, fairness, and masterly ability. Even the *Westminster Review*, which may almost be called the organ of the opponents, is no exception. It is in America only that the critical notices are slight and slighting. Our author, however, may have the consolation of observing that they show the critics to be possessed neither of the industry to read, nor the learning to comprehend his argument.

A fair examination of this attractive volume must have refer-

ence to its purpose, method, and execution. The object of the writer was obvious from the first. He had no original theory to maintain. He proposed to himself nothing positively new. His simple aim was to investigate the evidence accumulated by certain recent explorers, and manipulated in the hands of sceptical writers into apparent conflict with sacred history. He does not conceal the fact that he accepts the authority of the Scriptures; but he takes no unfair advantage from it. He sets out with a firm resolve to let *facts* speak for themselves. He betrays no unworthy apprehension that Nature and Revelation may be found in serious conflict. His example is a lesson of moderation and faith that other scientific authors would do well to follow. A true philosophical spirit would lead them to investigate the various departments of truth, independently and impartially, and to accept facts wherever found. Had the clique of advanced thinkers whose sportive liberties with the faith of Christians betray so much unbecoming levity on serious themes and so much contempt for the labors of Christian authors, examined with a candid spirit the facts to which they appeal, the world would have been less entertained, but more obviously benefited by them. We seriously doubt if any one of these irreverent celebrities has ever subjected Christian evidences to a calm examination, such as Mr. Southall has made of *their* productions.

His purpose, so far as it may be inferred from the treatment of his subject, was eminently judicial. No jurist upon the bench could more effectually restrain the leanings of his own mind in an important cause whilst the examination is proceeding. On other occasions, in other parts of the book, his interest comes out. But he seems determined that, at all hazards, the issue shall be fairly tried. His equanimity is admirable. His good temper never forsakes him. He seems seldom to smile or to frown, but to maintain a grave and unimpassioned dignity in the midst of the most tantalizing circumstances. The susceptibility of the primitive protoplasm does not belong to him. He is happily insensible to the influence of his "environment," and sustains an independence and isolation that adapt him peculiarly to the work of such an investigation.

The main issue is limited to one plain question of fact, whether it has been demonstrated by recent explorers that any of the *human* remains discovered by them are older than the date of creation recorded in the book of Genesis. The antiquity of the lower animals is, of course, closely associated with that of man; but inasmuch as the length of the days of creation has received different interpretations among evangelical Christians, the time of their origin is one of subordinate interest and importance. The affirmative of the principal proposition is maintained by a number of names deservedly influential in the field of archæology. It is worthy of notice, however, that the diversity of their opinions is almost as great as the number of their publications. They not only disagree among themselves, but frequently change their views, and sometimes involve themselves in gross contradictions. Their explorations and reports are usually of a character that withdraws them from popular scrutiny, and they are comparatively safe from hostile criticism, so long as their brief bulletins of success are found agreeable to the itching ears of an expectant world.

It is another merit of Mr. Southall, that he has abstained from any illiberal freedom with the testimony he has undertaken to examine. He pays all proper respect to the eminent authorities whose opinions are the subjects of his comments. There is no disposition evinced in these pages to impute intentional imposture to the marvellous statements so often propagated on the veracity of various individuals, whatever may have been their prejudices, or however untrustworthy their observations, from ignorance, impulse, or a prurient imagination. The inspired writers would have been fortunate if they had never fallen into more uncharitable hands.

We venture to suggest that Mr. Southall carries courtesy too far. Why should all this mass of testimony from so many unknown sources, be received as worthy of a respectful hearing? It is no more entitled to a presumption of truth than the telegraphic reports of election returns in an excited canvass. No doubt many honorable men are engaged in scientific observations. But an infidel in pursuit of discoveries to overthrow the Bible, is no

more to be trusted than a political partisan reporting for the press. Human nature is the same in every calling; and those engaged in deciphering the darker pages of subterranean lore, are as apt to be influenced by fancy or passion, as their brethren of the upper world.

So much for the purpose and spirit of the writer under review. His method or order may be easily comprehended. It is altogether simple and natural. Method, indeed, seems to be wanting, and he follows the order obviously suggested by the topics presented for consideration. The field of inquiry is so extensive that the discussion becomes desultory by a law of its own development. The laborious research, the patient diligence, and imperturbable pertinacity with which it proceeds, have led to a degree of prolixity calculated to deter an impatient reader from its perusal. It is far otherwise with those who feel a proper interest in the theme. Those familiar with the leading points of the controversy pending between the friends and assailants of inspiration, will not fail to appreciate the character of the work, or, if their bosoms pulsate with kindred sentiments, to thank the author for his eminent success.

The execution of the task is the principal feature we desire to illustrate. The great merit of this volume lies not only in its spirit and its plan, but in the *thoroughness* with which an immense mass of reputed facts, of various importance and relevancy, has been sifted, sorted, discriminated, and passed through the crucible of a mind admirably adapted to deal with such materials. The conduct of the investigation, in many parts of the book, reminds us of the proceedings of some august tribunal, at whose impartial bar great interests and mighty influences contend for mastery, whilst the Court presides in all the serenity of authoritative power. The contest passes through many a weary stage of doubt and difficulty, but ends at last in a decision that commands the approval of every candid observer. Such we believe will be the impression of every fair-minded reader who patiently follows our author through the successive steps with which he pursues the shadowy traces of *pre-historic man*.

So far as the composition is concerned, there is much wit and



sarcasm pungently employed, but no intentional display of learning, no fine writing, no attempt at brilliancy of diction, no laborious argument or syllogistic demonstration, in these unpretentious pages. The interest belongs altogether to the constantly accumulating force of negative truth. Fact after fact loses its credibility or significance; opinion after opinion of distinguished scientists is weighed in the balance and found wanting. It is like the demolition of a fortress, which crumbles away piece-meal, and finally topples, a shapeless ruin, into the ditch. It is hard to say which is more apparent, the *power* of the assault, or the *weakness* of the position. Most readers will probably be inclined to give the author less credit than he deserves, in view of the miserable shams he has so completely unmasked. The inconsistency, incoherence, obscurity, and fragmentary character of the evidence raked together by different parties, in order to assail the Bible in the rear, under cover of its rubbish, exhibit the enemy in so feeble a plight, that too little merit will be attributed to him who has exposed and demolished the scheme. He has, however, entitled himself to great respect for the high mental and moral qualities revealed in the conduct and success of his undertaking. In influential scientific circles at home and abroad, his book is appreciated; and it would be shameful in the extreme if our Christian public, especially in the South, should fail to acknowledge the singular merits of one of our own laymen who has, solitary and alone, like Samson among the Philistines, entered the vaunted stronghold of modern unbelief, and struck its confiding occupants with confusion and dismay. We have seen no effort to refute him. His book remains, after two years of publication, unanswered and unanswerable.

Enough has now been said of the author, and we beg leave to conduct the reader to a brief examination of the book itself, that it may be clearly seen in the light of actual observation, whether or not the foregoing estimate is just. The examination shall be continued only so far as to excite, if possible, a general desire to see and know its contents. Full justice cannot be done without trespassing unreasonably upon the time and attention of

others, and occupying too much space in the present number of this REVIEW.

This book is a copious volume of 575 pages, freely illustrated, and divided into thirty-seven chapters. Of these, the first two are strictly introductory. The third, on the "Antiquity of Man," opens with a formidable list of distinguished scientists who have adopted the new doctrine, among whom appears the name of Chevalier Bunsen, as distinguished for his piety as he was for philological learning, the friend of Arnold, and one of the luminaries of German Protestantism. Mr. Southall here gives us the different estimates of some of these *savans* of the probable age of the human race. Bunsen put it at 20,000 years B. C.; Jukes, 100,000; Fuhlrott, at 200,000 or 300,000; Hunt, 9,000,000; and Huxley at more than 100,000,000. The fourth chapter is a continuation of the history of these opinions. The fifth is devoted to the "Fickleness of Science," and is an amusing Comedy of Errors. The discrepancies and contradictions of these gentlemen of magnificent estimates is fully exhibited. On the subject of the unity of mankind, they seem to have been pretty evenly divided on purely scientific *data*. Formerly, the permanence of species was a cardinal doctrine as against the theologians; and now the indefinite multiplication of species is fashionable in the retinue of Dr. Darwin. Sir Charles Lyell is so unfortunate as to furnish a mortifying illustration of the fluctuation of opinion. The needle of his mind seems to have been subject to continual variations, which he has the candor to reveal with his own pen. He opposed and favored the theory of Lamarck, and the theory of Hutton, and signally changed his views on the glacial period of the earth's crust. He is at issue, on many points, with other high authorities, as well as with himself, maintaining the continuity of present vegetable species with those of the pliocene period, against M. D'Orbigny and Professor Hitchcock, and combating the igneous fluidity of the earth's nucleus against Professor Dana. So also with others. Dr. Bastian affirms *Spontaneous Generation*, which Professor Huxley denies. Some limit marine life to three hundred fathoms, and others extend it to *three miles*. From beginning to end of the

chapter, we have an unbroken exposure of the want of permanence in scientific theories, and the mercurial instability of individual opinions, which are a peculiar feature of the times, well calculated to warn us against a credulous acceptance of new and unsubstantiated doctrines.

Chapter sixth treats of the "Conflicts of Christianity." The following extract, beginning on page 63, is a fair specimen of the manner in which the writer deals with the slippery antagonists he is forced to encounter. It will serve to show that, if the nature of his investigation allowed of dialectical display, Mr. Southall might measure swords with the most adroit champions of unbelief. Now and then the flash of his scimitar is like that of Saladin. And his bosom seems to burn with a noble scorn for the efforts made by some of the parties to shun the issue of candid inquiry. We here present an extract ;

"It seems to give many scientific men particular pleasure to strike a covert blow at Christianity in decorous and fair-spoken words. It is believed by many of them that a demonstration of the 'antiquity of man' will overturn the whole Biblical structure. The spirit of the prevailing science of the present time is remarkable in one particular: its proclivity to theorise on a limited number of facts. Avowedly inadequate, unless future discoveries shall supply what has never yet been procured, Mr. Darwin erects his immense edifice of 'natural selection;' and the surprising part of the matter is, that the scientific world seems to cry out, That is exactly the thing! The explanation of such a loose and wild speculation receiving so much favor, is due to the fact, we think, that a large proportion of our scientists are determined to ignore the supernatural altogether; and to escape a creative act, they are compelled to require matter to manipulate itself. We thus have 'spontaneous generation,' by Mr. Bastian; protoplasm, by Mr. Huxley; evolution, by Mr. Spencer; and natural selection, by Mr. Darwin. The question still remains, even in a case of spontaneous generation, Where did the original dead matter which generates come from? But this is disposed of by saying, We deal only with facts; we never speculate. Does not Mr. Darwin 'speculate'? It is the most extensive speculation of any age—not excepting the Hindoo cosmogonists. Does not Mr. Huxley speculate when he contends that a living intelligent being is nothing but a chemical mixture of so many parts of three or four gases? 'It rejects inquiries into first causes as unphilosophical, and deals only with phenomena.' So speaks the votary of Buddha; and so speaks the modern man of 'science,' when you press him with the main question in this inquiry. 'He rejects

inquiries into *first* causes.' As many secondary causes as you choose; that is all 'philosophical;' that is 'science;' beyond that we get out of the pale of science, and are classed with the old women and the priests. We look up into the blue vault of heaven, and see it filled with systems and worlds, moving in intricate and harmonious orbits; we see the glory of the sun by day, the peerless rule of the moon by night; we see the earth with its waving forests and verdant meadows; we see highly organised animals, like the lion and tiger and leopard; beautiful and musical birds; we see human society, and its cities and towns, its laws, its government, its schools, its affections, its religion; and we are told by scientific men that it is 'unscientific' to ask whether all these are more than self-perpetuating and self-originated phenomena. We must ask no questions back of what we see. That would be theological or metaphysical. It is perfectly legitimate to reason that, by a process of 'natural selection,' Napoleon Bonaparte was evolved from a Corsican crab; but we travel beyond the range of observed phenomena if we refer his organisation to an intelligent and self-conscious Creator. How the scientific mind, as represented by Mr. Huxley, Sir Charles Lyell, and Mr. Spencer, is constituted, we cannot say: it is able to observe, to record, and to classify physical phenomena, but it seems to be deficient in the logical faculty; and it is really difficult to deal with it. To say that it is perfectly legitimate to observe a man strike a ball with a billiard-cue; and that it is perfectly legitimate to observe that ball strike against another; and that it is perfectly legitimate to refer the motion of the second ball to the blow administered by the first; and that it is perfectly legitimate to refer the activity of the first to its being struck by the cue; and that it is perfectly legitimate to ascribe the motion of the cue to the arm of the billiard-player; but that it is *illegitimate* to ask, Where did the arm of the billiard-player come from?—this we simply do not understand; a comparison of views, under such circumstances, is impossible." Pp. 63-5.

Chapter 7th presents to the reader a number of illustrations of "Premature Announcements of Science." Much noise was made early in the present century by Prof. Playfair and others, concerning certain astronomical tables found at Tirvalore in India, which were claimed, on internal evidence, to be 3,100 years older than the Christian era. These claims were subsequently exploded, and the tables demonstrated to be of much later date, and it was shown that Mr. Playfair had committed a grave blunder in the calculations. Afterwards, certain zodiacs were brought to Paris from Dendera and Esne in Egypt, by which it was proclaimed that the great antiquity of man was put beyond a doubt.

Champollion destroyed the illusion by discovering associated with these zodiacs the names of several Roman emperors. The chapter is filled with similar instances of discoveries greedily seized upon with the hope of invalidating the written records of the Scriptures, and exposed almost before the ink was dry with which their announcements were printed.

In Chapter eighth, the author takes the first direct step towards his main object. "The evidence," he says, "for the antiquity of man, is marshalled under various heads, the principal of which are: 1. The Megalithic Monuments of Europe, Africa, Asia, America; 2. The Swiss Lake Dwellings; 3. The Danish Shell-Mounds; 4. The Peat Bogs of Denmark, Ireland, and France; 5. The Bone Caverns of Europe and America; 6. The River Gravel or "Drift" of England and France. . . . We are told that man began on this earth as a *savage*, and that he passed through four successive ages before he became fully civilised, namely, the Palæolithic or Primitive Stone Age; the Neolithic Age, or Age of Polished Stone Implements; the Bronze Age; and the Iron Age. The *Dolmens* and *Tumuli* of Europe, and the Swiss Lake Dwellings, are assigned to the Neolithic, the Bronze, and the Iron Ages; the Danish Kjökken-möddings are considered still older, intermediate between the first Lake Dwellings and the Cave-Men. The older Bone-Caves belong to the Palæolithic Age, but are regarded by some as possibly not quite so ancient as the remains found in the river gravel of the Somme and the Thames valleys. What are the facts?"

The next two chapters (nine and ten) contain a learned examination of the whole field of Megalithic Monuments and Tumuli extended through the world. It is now the fashion among scientists to represent these monuments as bearing the marks of an immense antiquity, carrying us back beyond the Pyramids. Yet they are neolithic, more modern than other remains of a different character. In these chapters Mr. Southall calmly examines the evidence, and behold, the result from the entire mass is, that such monuments belong, in many instances, to our own era, and seldom reach back more than a few centuries before its commencement. As a specimen of the pretensions frequently made,

and of the ease with which they are overthrown, we refer to the celebrated group of Stonehenge in England, which some writers insist belongs to a date anterior to the Great Pyramid. It appears that Geoffrey of Monmouth, in his History of Britain in the twelfth century, tells us that Stonehenge was erected as a monument to three hundred British nobles treacherously slain by Hengist about A. D. 462. Such was the tradition of his times. Now listen to the statement of discoveries made among and under these stones, as furnished us by the industry of Mr. Southall, in the following extract. What are the claims of a more than Egyptian antiquity worth in the face of such significant facts, which give almost a positive confirmation to the tradition referred to?

“Let us, however, ascertain whether we find anything in the way of relics here to correspond with the Roman coins and the objects of iron found at Avebury. We are told by Aubrey, that in 1620 the Duke of Buckingham, ‘when King James was at Wilton, did cause the middle of Stonehenge to be digged, and this underdigging was the cause of the falling down and recumbencie of the great stone there.’ This was at the great central trilithon. What did they obtain here? ‘They found,’ we are told, ‘a great many bones of staggas and oxen, charcoal, batter dashes, *heads of arrows, and some pieces of armor eaten out with rust.*’ These arrow-heads and pieces of armor which were ‘eaten out with rust,’ must have been of *iron*. Sir R. Colt Hoare also dug here, and remarks: ‘We have found, in digging, several fragments of Roman as well as coarse British pottery, parts of the head and horns of deer and other animals, and *a large barbed arrow-head of iron.*’ Mr. Cunnington also found ‘near the altar,’ at the depth of about three feet, some Roman pottery. Soon after the fall of the great trilithon, in 1797, he dug out some of the earth that had fallen into the excavation, and ‘found fragments of fine black Roman pottery, and since then, another piece on the same spot.’ This is precisely similar to the finding of ‘the bit of iron’ under one of the great stones at Avebury. When this evidence is combined with the accounts of Geoffrey of Monmouth and Giraldus Cambrensis, and with the manner in which the stones are cut, and mortised, and fitted, it leaves an impression that cannot be removed by vague theories about the Stone or the Bronze Age. And this is greatly strengthened by the finding of exactly similar relics at Avebury.” P. 97.

One of the most important results of this laborious inquiry is a thorough refutation of the fancy indulged by so many of the

archæologists, that the Stone, Bronze, and Iron Ages were *successive*. The reader of the facts here so fully presented, will be astonished at the confusion they introduce into this highly poetical scheme, so much the reverse of that prevailing in the times of Greek and Roman mythology. For the ages degenerated, according to the Greeks; whilst the modern scientists arrange them on an ascending scale. The Age of Gold is yet to come. In the light of the naked facts, we find them, however, *overlapping*, from the most ancient to the most modern times, so that the Stone Age is now in progress in India, and the Iron Age goes back into the remotest past.

This is evident from the explorations among the *dolmens* and *tumuli* on the continent of Europe, where iron implements are found associated with those of stone in so many of these obscure constructions of unknown races.

In Chapter eleven we have an examination of the evidence furnished by the famous Lake Dwellings of Switzerland, discovered in 1853. They are not regarded as belonging to the oldest Age, but Morlot and Figuier fix the *minimum* of their date at 6,000 or 7,000 years. Agassiz, commenting on the revelations of these Lake Dwellings, exclaims with apparent fervor: "Humanity is now connected with geological phenomena." But all this exultation was premature. The facts, as stated by Mr. Southall, give no encouragement whatever to the extravagant conclusions drawn so hastily from them. He says :

"When we find at Wangen and Moosseedorf, and the other 'Stone Age' dwellings, the remains of the horse, the ox, the goat, the sheep, the dog; wheat precisely like that now in use; two kinds of barley and two of millet; bread in the form of cakes, and roasted grains stored up in jars, precisely as is now done in Germany and Switzerland; apples cut up and dried, and stored away for winter use; stones of the wild plum, and seeds of the raspberry and blackberry and strawberry; peas; shells of the hazel-nut and bech-nut; pottery; matting; twine; leather; ropes; cloth; spinning-wheels; corn-crushers; all this shows us that even the Stone Age people of the Swiss lakes are very nearly related to us in their ways and customs, and not very far off in point of time."

We agree with him fully. Here are the facts, *against* the conjectures of fanciful dreamers, whose opinions in favor of so many

thousand years, more or less, are simply ridiculous. Let it be remembered continually, that these enormous figures are arrived at by hard *guessing*, as interested politicians sometimes foot up their own wished-for majorities. In matters of fact, what are they worth? What business have such guessers with *scientific* research? In the name of science, we protest against the introduction of such an element into her calculations.

We pass over the account in Chapter twelve, of the "Shell Mounds" of Denmark, because it will save time and space to proceed to the "Bone Caves" in Chapters thirteen and fourteen, which are considered older and more significant. In the latter chapter, we find a summary of the results derived from the cave-dwellings of Europe, concluding with the following paragraph:

"The sum of the matter is, that we find in the ancient cave-dwellers a race of men in almost precisely the condition of the modern Esquimaux—and there is considerable probability that the Arctic races of Europe and America are their descendants. It was the first race that reached Western Europe from Western Asia, and the Celts subsequently pushed them farther north."

Mr. Southall adds that they may have been in some instances cannibals; but this does not suggest antiquity, or a very backward civilisation, as the Irish were cannibals since the Christian era, and the Fijians down to a recent date, and yet exhibited many marks of advanced culture in their customs and polity.

He disposes of one of the recent scientific sensations connected with these caves, in the following manner:

"A good deal has been said about some of the human skulls which have been found in the caves, or under circumstances which associate them with that period. The Neanderthal skull was some years ago the subject of much criticism and much extravagant theorising. This famous 'fossil' was found in 1857, in a cave situated in that part of the valley of the Dussel, near Dusseldorf, which is called the Neanderthal. This spot is a deep ravine, about seventy miles northeast of the region of the Liege caves. The fissure occurs in the precipitous southern side of the winding ravine, about sixty feet above the stream, and one hundred feet below the top of the cliff.

"This skull Prof. Huxley described to Sir C. Lyell as 'the most ape-like skull he has ever beheld.' And Prof. Schaaffhausen and Mr. Busk characterised it as 'the most brutal of all known human skulls, resem-



bling those of the apes, not only in the prodigious development of the superciliary prominences and the forward extension of the orbits, but still more in the depressed form of the brain-case, in the straightness of the squamosal suture, and in the complete retreat of the occiput forward and upward, from the superior occipital ridges.'

"The discovery of this skull occasioned the greatest flutter in the anthropological world. Prof. Schaaffhausen gave an account of it, in 1857, before the Lower Rhine Medical and Natural History Society at Bonn. Prof. Fuhlrott published a book on the subject. Prof. Huxley devoted a number of pages to it in 'Man's Place in Nature.' Prof. Schaaffhausen pronounced it 'the most ancient memorial of the early inhabitants of Europe.' Prof. Huxley adjudged that it possessed 'a very high antiquity.' Prof. Fuhlrott, in his book, determined its age to be from two hundred thousand to three hundred thousand years. Prof. William King read a paper before the British Association, in which he referred it to the Glacial Period.

"All of this was without the shadow of warrant from the actual facts. The Neanderthal skull was not found in association with any of the remains of the extinct animals, nor in the glacial drift; it was simply under five feet of mud.

"The degraded type of the skull does not prove anything with regard to its age. In fact, its minimum cranial capacity is estimated by Prof. Huxley at seventy-five cubic inches. The most capacious healthy European skull yet measured, (and we hope the ladies will make a note of it,) was that of a female, and had a capacity of one hundred and fifteen cubic inches, and weighed one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two grammes. Next to this came the brain of Cuvier, which weighed one thousand eight hundred and sixty-one grammes; then that of Byron, one thousand eight hundred and seven grammes. Huxley states that he knows of no case of a human (male or adult) cranium with a less cubical capacity than sixty-two cubic inches; while on the other hand the most capacious Gorilla skull yet measured, has a content of not more than thirty-four and one-half cubic inches.

"The cranial capacity of the Neanderthal skull is more than double that of the most capacious gorilla skull known. It is, assuming the average European cranial capacity at eighty or eighty-five, not very far below this average. Tiedemann states the cranial contents in the negro at forty, thirty-eight, and thirty-five ounces of millet seed. The capacity of the Malay skulls equalled thirty-six and thirty-three ounces. The Neanderthal specimen equalled thirty-seven ounces of millet seed; in other words, it is nearly equal to the negro skull, and above the Malay.

"The Neanderthal skull is thus, in point of capacity, a fair average skull, and (as Prof. Huxley observes,) 'very far above the pithecoïd maximum.'" Pp. 235, 236.

So ends a most wearisome discussion among the *savans* about one poor skull, from which some of them hoped they might learn something favorable to their theory of human antiquity. We should judge it quite equal in capacity to that of some of its commentators.

In Chapter fifteen, Mr. Southall delves through a mass of indeterminate materials drawn from a hill at the village of Solutré in France, and finds himself, at the end of his labors, just as wise a man as at the beginning. The most admirable of all the high qualities that fit him for his work, is his unparalleled *patience*. If he is not patient, Job was not. The pursuit of knowledge under difficulties is a mark of moral heroism. But the pursuit of the same among the bone caves of Europe is sublime indeed.

What are these facts that so profoundly interested the antiquarian world, and formed the staple of so much learned discussion at the International Congress of Pre-historic Archæology? The hill at Solutré was found full of polished flints, bones, and hearth-stones. The bones were those of reindeer, horses, elephants, and human beings. The reindeer were wild; the horses, estimated at *thirty or forty thousand*, or more, were evidently domesticated. Their skeletons were complete. So were those of man. Question for debate: What was the probable age of the latter? A few thousand years, or hundreds of thousands? Probable conclusion, that they belonged to a nomadic tribe of Tartars from Western Asia, who were the progenitors of the Basques and Esquimaux, and who, as the Tartars now do, sacrificed multitudes of horses at the funerals of their chiefs. Not a single fact has been produced that encourages the inference that they were pre-historic men. The horse was not domesticated in Egypt in the time of Abraham. The reindeer and the elephant, in a wild state, may have been objects of chase to the barbarous inhabitants of Europe, long after the days of the patriarchs. And, as to the circumstance that these people sometimes inhabited caves, it appears that true *troglydites* are found in France at the present day. What, then, is the historical significance of Solutré? It certainly is not suggestive of any very astonishing an-

tiquity, but rather the contrary, if we consider the evidence it affords of habits nearly related to our own times. The implements discovered there indicate some advance in the arts; they buried their dead with much care, and must have owned vast numbers of horses. Similar remains in other parts of France, of apparently the same degree of advancement, go far to show that these people were, in some respects, partly civilised. In one place, an *aqueduct* was found in the midst of surroundings of the same general character. Among the remains are those of the elephant and the rhinoceros. The inhabitants could not have been extremely *primitive*, if they were capable of being so construed at all. The reasoning of the *savans* in favor of a great antiquity, are easily and naturally reversed, so as to indicate a strong probability that the elephant existed in Europe at a comparatively recent date. But on this line we must enter, for the sake of the dear reader, a *nolumus ultra prosequi*.

In Chapter sixteen we have an investigation of a very different kind, into the proofs of antiquity attributed by geologists to the river gravel of France and England. It is one more worthy of rational criticism, because the alleged facts have given rise to something akin to argumentation—a commodity very rare among the bones of Solutré. The opinions of several eminent authorities are brought under review, and we are disposed to congratulate a man of Mr. Southall's ability, on his fortune in encountering logic more worthy of his pen than the vague conjectures met with in the past.

Certain gravel beds bordering the valley of the Somme, were found to contain human remains associated with the bones of extinct pachyderms of different genera, at an elevation of one hundred feet above the stream; whilst, at a lower level, other gravel deposits, of a more recent date, are covered by a formation of peat some twenty-seven feet deep. High authorities, such as Lyell, Lubbock, Evans, and others, attribute to the upper gravels an age of several hundred thousand years. These estimates are founded upon the assumption that they were formed by the Somme slowly through ages cutting down the valley with its present current. The peat, which was a still later deposit, required,

according to French geologists, several thousand years more than received history allows. Lyell maintains his impression of a slow formation by plausible arguments. M. Boucher de Perthes, a distinguished French geologist, contends for the antiquity of the peat with equal zeal. In opposition to these, Mr. Southall cites an able argument from Prof. Andrews of Chicago, in which he maintains the opinion that the gravel beds were the result of a cataclysm, in which the volume of water was a thousand times greater than the present river. The reasoning of Prof. Andrews, if not conclusive, is at least powerfully antagonistic to the views he assails. According to him, the Somme, spread out over the valley at the level of the higher gravel, would be about *half an inch deep*, and altogether inadequate to the deposits in question, including stones sometimes larger than a man's head, and boulders weighing more than a ton. He shows, moreover, that, in all probability, the deposits were made to include masses of gravel and ice combined, and laid down before the ice had time to melt, as is evident from occasional breaks in the formation, when the superincumbent materials have afterwards fallen into the spaces created by the melting ice. If his views may be admitted, the time required for the gravel deposits must be far less than that attributed to them by the European geologists. His criticisms upon their opinions concerning the peat, are so impressive that we venture to lay a few paragraphs before our readers, premising that an American scientist possesses advantages of no small value over those of old countries for forming a judgment concerning processes of nature peculiar to periods where the continents were but partially reclaimed. Dr. Andrews makes an efficient use of western observation, in reducing the estimates of European authorities founded upon the present aspect of those regions with which they are most familiar.

It is obviously absurd to extend a method of calculation appropriate to a country under general cultivation, and denuded of its primitive forests, to ages when those forests were almost unbroken. The distinction between forest peat and that formed from moss is of the greatest importance, and yet the distinguished Frenchman seems to have overlooked it altogether. This is not

the first instance in which American common sense has corrected the wild generalisations of transatlantic theorists, on questions of the greatest scientific interest. Mr. Southall introduces Prof. Andrews thus:

“Near Amiens, (proceeds Dr. Andrews, whose article we are condensing,) he observed evidence that at the time the deposit was formed, blocks of ice, or of mixed ice and frozen gravel, three or four feet in diameter, were laid down in the strata, and that these blocks were completely covered and had other strata laid above them, before they had time to melt. There is also proof that the river which did this work had a volume of not less than one thousand times that of the ordinary summer stream of the Somme. The facts are these: the mass of the upper gravels consists of chalk flints mixed with angular fragments, powder of crushed chalk, and rolled chalk pebbles, the whole being of a light gray tint. Above this there is a stratum of gravelly clay, of a blackish-brown color, a few inches in thickness. Over this is gravel of a lighter brown; and above that, next to the soil, there is about eighteen inches of a brown clay used for making brick. In the gray gravel there are places where the upper strata have sunk down as if into a cavity, filling it with material belonging higher up. The uppermost strata of all are undisturbed in position, as though the sinking had occurred and the surface been washed level again, before the latter were laid down. One of the best examples was on the south side of the upper gravel-pit above Amiens, where the perpendicular bank showed a fine section of the strata. At this place the stratum of gray gravel was missing for a horizontal distance of about four feet, the space being filled with confused materials from the dark-colored stratum above. The sides of the interrupted space were nearly perpendicular, and the dark stratum had evidently stretched across the void space, and had settled and broken in the centre, the parts falling in against the sides of the open space, and hanging perpendicularly, the material from above then falling in. The conclusion is plain that this void space was once filled by a block of ice, (containing probably gravel,) which melted and left the space unoccupied for a season. On this ice the dark stratum was deposited before the ice melted, and therefore with great rapidity. An examination of the gray gravel adjacent confirms the idea of ice-action. It consists of chalk flints, mixed with broken chalk of every size. Many of the fragments, which are exceedingly soft, have preserved perfectly the sharp edges which they had at the time they were broken from the cretaceous strata. It does not seem possible they could have been rolled a hundred feet in the bed of the stream, without losing this sharpness. It follows that much of this material was either dropped from floating ice, or deposited by the mechanical action of ice-fields floating down the an-

cient river, which crushed the edges of chalk strata abutting on the valley, and pushed the debris along, to be left wherever the irregularities of the channel permitted. The agency of ice is also emphatically indicated by the presence of large boulders of sandstone in the gravel, some of which weigh a ton. These must have been transported from far up the stream, as the rocks in the vicinity are exclusively chalk. It will be remembered that Sir John Lubbock contends that the valley of the Somme was excavated by the gentle action of the river through thousands of years, with about the present volume of water. Dr. Andrews remarks on this, that the valley is a mile and a half wide at the top—the present river being about fifty feet in breadth. The present stream spread over the valley would have a depth of about half an inch—making allowance for spring floods. This is entirely and obviously inadequate to the production of gravel-beds containing pebbles larger than a man's head, and boulders weighing a ton. The valley presents none of the characteristics of one widened by the fluctuations of an irregular stream, now eroding this bank and now that. 'It is broad, level-floored, and parallel-banked.' The stream that excavated it, filled it from bluff to bluff. The marginal gravel-banks are often fifteen or twenty feet thick, and have horizontal strata. It follows that when the upper strata were laid down, the stream, during its floods, was a mile and a half wide, and not less than twenty feet deep. The conclusions which Dr. Andrews draws from these facts are :

"1. That the ancient river, and consequently the ancient annual rainfall, were for a time, respectively, immensely larger and greater than at present.

"2. The rapidity of the gravel deposit was, at least in some places, very great, and the time required for it proportionately short.

"Dr. Andrews next directs his attention to the peat (which, he says, is about twenty-six feet in thickness). M. Boucher de Perthes estimates that this was formed at the rate of about one and a half or two inches in a century, which would give an age of from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand years for the whole bed. Sir John Lubbock, we have seen, finds it at fifteen feet below the surface representative of the neolithic period, and 'of no slight antiquity.' Dr. Andrews says: 'Mr. Boucher de Perthes has with praiseworthy care sought to determine the age of this bed; but, as he was probably unacquainted with the phenomena of forest peats in process of actual formation, he has very excusably overlooked some of the most important data.' 'Such an error,' he says, 'is not to be blamed in Europe; because, where few trees are allowed to grow, and none to decay, the study of such phenomena is impossible.' Boucher de Perthes states that he has found, deep in the peats of the Somme, numerous trunks of trees standing erect where they grew, generally birches or alders. These trunks were sometimes a metre (39.14

inches) in height, but generally less. On this Dr. Andrews remarks, that as stumps of trees do not stand long uncovered in the damp air of a swamp without decay, it follows that all which are found standing erect in the peat must have been covered to their present summits before they had time to rot away. Applying M. Bourcher de Perthes's estimate of one and a half or two inches in a century for the growth of the peat, the above-mentioned stump must have stood uncovered without decay from one thousand nine hundred and fifty to two thousand six hundred years! Now, one hundred years is a long lifetime for an oak-stump under such circumstances, and every trace of almost every other tree would disappear in fifty years. Birch-stumps are especially perishable. There were prostrate trunks of oak in the peat, four feet in diameter, and so sound that they were manufactured into furniture. They must have been covered by the peat in a hundred years. The rest of the calculation is easily made." Pp. 268-70.

The river gravels are subsequently discussed in a most elaborate way in several chapters; and we cannot present even a short summary of the examination and argument. for want of space. All we add upon the subject is, that Mr. Southall successfully cuts down even the moderate estimates of Prof. Andrews, and furnishes abundant proof that the gravel beds and peat of the Somme were formed in *historical times*. Many works of art, of the Roman period, were found in the older beds, and *a boat loaded with bricks* far down in the peat. The facts are simply overwhelming.

Geologists lay great stress upon the association of human remains with those of extinct animals. The important question is, When did the latter disappear? They *assume* a very remote date, but the assumption is perfectly gratuitous. The reindeer, the mammoth, the rhinoceros, have not been so long extinct as to warrant any of their extravagant conclusions. The *Bos primigenius* was living in England during the occupation of the Romans, and in Germany in the twelfth century; the aurochs existed in Prussia a century ago; reindeer lingered in Scotland until the twelfth century, and the great Irish elk in Germany nearly as late. These animals were the contemporaries of the mammoth and the woolly rhinoceros. "Would it be strange," says Mr. Southall, "if they too lingered down to a more recent period than we have been taught to believe?" That gigantic

bird, the *moa*, has become extinct in New Zealand very recently. Its bones remain in immense profusion, usually accompanied by native implements of stone, some of which are of great perfection of finish. Here we have in the nineteenth century, the union and juxtaposition of extinct animals and flint implements. Carcasses of elephants are now frequently found in Siberia, in an almost perfect state of preservation. Why assume thousands of years for their disappearance from Europe?

This twentieth Chapter, on the Mammoth, contains a multitude of details of the deepest interest to the antiquarian, and we close our notice of it with an invitation to the reader to examine the narrative of explorers in Siberia, by whom a full account is given of one of these carcasses, so long and yet so completely preserved by the ice.

Nearly half of this remarkable volume yet remains; but we cannot refer to its contents at length. The new world is as rich in materials as the old, and the author leaves no stone unturned in his thorough investigation. The recent discoveries of three cities in succession among the ruins of Troy, furnish him with facts that completely overthrow the principal theory of the Stone, Bronze, and Iron Ages.

In his Chapter twenty-second, on the Recent Changes in the Physical Geography of the Earth, a multitude of details of observation is presented, which cannot fail to impress us with the absurdity of requiring the vast cycles of time claimed by geologists for the changes they record.

Chapters thirty-two and thirty-three reveal an immense body of evidence going to show that what is called the Glacial Age is not separated from our own by an extraordinary antiquity. The simple fact that palæolithic remains are not found in Northern Europe, speaks volumes against such a theory. The observations of Prof. Andrews and others, upon the lake-shores of the United States, furnish important data for counter calculations, and enable us to approximate a trustworthy estimate of the time requisite for the formation of their bluffs and beaches. And, in fact, the mathematical process which determines their origin within historical times, amounts almost to demonstration. The author also



subjects the famous mounds of our country to a most thorough review, and places in our hands abundant reasons to believe that their ancient character has been greatly exaggerated. The trees growing upon them cannot be many centuries old. In their interior, the implements found are just such as belonged to the older races of the aborigines not yet extinguished. The arguments built upon these structures, in support of a fabulous antiquity, are the frail inventions of over-zealous scientists, anxious to signalise their independence of scriptural authority.

Mr. Southall, in his concluding chapters, devotes considerable space to the kindred subjects of philology and ethnology, and draws similar conclusions from them. In the whole domain of archæology, he can discover no proof of a necessity to extend our chronology further than is warranted by sacred history. Against Moses and the corresponding traditions of the ancient world, science is dumb, notwithstanding all the efforts that have been made to secure her testimony.

A brief but interesting portion of the volume exhibits the evidence furnished by Cæsar, Tacitus, St. Jerome, and others, concerning the condition of the population of Europe in their own times. It appears from numerous citations that, whilst within the circle of Roman influence, society was considerably advanced, the state of the barbarians of the North was little better than that of savages. The Germans were rude in the extreme, wretchedly clothed, wintering in subterranean dwellings, and using very little iron, even for purposes of war. According to Jerome, a tribe in Scotland were cannibals of the lowest type in his day; and from reliable authorities, some of the Irish, down to the tenth century, were little above the American Indians. Among these northern nations, in the first centuries of our era, the use of metals was so rare that the "Stone Age" could not have been long past. Why, then, should it be thought necessary to extend the period of their occupation to hundreds of thousands of years? In fact, the savage state comes down to our own times in some parts of the world, and in others seems never to have existed. The civilisations of Egypt and Assyria go back to the beginning of their history. The true Stone Age of the

racés of the Nile was that in which the Pyramid of Cheops and the Temple of Karnak were produced, and their Iron Age belongs to the present degraded condition in which their successors prolong their miserable existence.

Mr. Southall justly complains of the difficulty of dealing with the class of minds whose opinions he is compelled to examine. They work like beavers in accumulating details of observation, but, in the matter of construction, their faculties are apparently at fault. What generalisation has any of them accomplished that has met with acceptance from the scientific world? Their theories are constantly losing all shape from mutual attrition. Like Pharaoh's kine, they devour their own species, and seem to gain nothing by the process. The wave of opinion rises and falls incessantly; and its only contribution to the world is a useless waste of sand upon a barren shore.

And now what has become of *pre-historic man*? A more unsubstantial fiction was never imposed upon human credulity. The faith of scientists throws into shade the grossest superstitions of mankind. These gentlemen seem to vie with one another in their passion for magnificent conjectures, and deal with immense numbers as their whims suggest. They are the *millionaires* of science, and are constantly accumulating their treasures. As it is all guess-work, they might as well abandon computation, and assume, for once and all, the old woman's theory, that all fossils were created as they are found, or the equally rational theory of evolution, which regards numbers less than infinite with sovereign contempt. If evolution is true, man is pre-historic in a sufficient degree to satisfy the most ravenous appetite for the archæological sublime.

The chief danger to be apprehended by the friends of truth is not from general information on scientific subjects, but from the disposition of cursory readers to seize, without investigation, upon the published opinions of nominal philosophers, as established verities, merely because they have acquired a certain degree of celebrity. The views of statesmen and theologians are apt to be weighed and criticised with freedom; but the *dicta* of a naturalist, whose fields of inquiry are entirely removed from

popular observation, are often received with implicit confidence, for no better reason than their connexion with his name. The Pope is not more infallible with his spiritual subjects, than Darwin, Spencer, Huxley, and Tyndall, with many persons of our day, who never take the trouble to inquire into the grounds of their faith.

Mr. Southall has rendered a great service, not only to the Church, but to science, by boldly arraigning these high authorities, and subjecting their opinions to the test of facts and reason. The candid inquirer after truth will find his pages replete, not only with interest, but with most valuable information that puts the reader abreast of the great issues now pending between the two great antagonistic powers of Christianity and Unbelief.

The present article has nothing to do with the future developments of true science. It may be asked, What will theologians have to say, if further and more satisfactory proofs of pre-historic man should be produced? It will be time enough to answer that question when the evidence is forthcoming. But we can say, with the utmost confidence, that, judging the future by the past, nothing is more improbable. The deposit in which such remains are found, must be indubitably such as to exclude a historic date, and it must also be shown that they were contemporaneous with it. The mere association with materials, themselves doubtful, is no proof whatever.

But we have another warning for the over-confident antiquarian. According to the prevailing opinion, man has been a regular development from the savage to the civilised state. Natural Selection and Evolution both encourage this view. If, therefore, future exploration should bring to light certain anthropoid remains unquestionably older than the Mosaic chronology, it would be necessary to prove them to be the remains of *men*, and not of some species closely approximating man. Development is by insensible degrees. The precise point in progressive organisation where the lower species terminates and the higher begins, would be difficult to determine, and yet essential to the demonstration. Suppose the Neanderthal skull could be demonstrated to be twenty or thirty thousand years old; it must

have belonged to man, or to a species inferior to man. The speculative naturalist would have to settle that question satisfactorily before proceeding to discuss the question of chronology. In whichever way it could be solved, the conclusion must be disastrous to some fashionable theory. If human, it would go far to show the *permanence* of our species. If not human, it would prove nothing in favor of our antiquity.

It should be borne in mind by the careful inquirer, that a certain kind of development in nature is not inconsistent with orthodox views. The plan of Providence may have its successive stages, and species may be supposed to approximate, without running into one another. It is not for us to say to Divine Power, Thus far and no farther. The highest species of the Simian family may approach very near our own in external organisation, and yet be very far removed from us in respect to certain qualities not indicated by it. There are many examples of such assimilation in nature. It is by no means absurd to suppose that the faunas and floras of some of the planets have perished in the course of ages, and have been approximately repeated in subsequent creations. And even on our own, it may be theoretically suggested that such a catastrophe occurred, and was followed by a new creation, embracing many of the former types. An anthropoid form, not easily distinguished from man, might *possibly* have existed before the date of the Mosaic cosmogony, without any connexion with man whatever. How, then, could it be possible for science, by such remains, to disprove the testimony of the Bible?

This speculation is suggested, merely to show that there are logical difficulties of an enormous magnitude, lying in the way of those who seek by mere inference to invalidate the Scriptures. Similarity is not identity, analogy is not affinity, and the discovery of animal remains imbedded in *granite*, however much they might resemble existing species, would not prove the descent of the latter from the former.

But, in point of fact, the accumulation of the essential facts has not even begun. The existence of human remains in any geological formation necessarily older than our chronology, re-

mains undiscovered, and the discussion of such phenomena is no more admissible in science than in theology. It is the boast of those devoted to the investigation of nature, that they are mere observers—that they do not speculate. Let them therefore confine themselves strictly to their calling, and not go out of their way to assail the objects of faith. And surely those whose hopes repose upon a higher principle, should remember that truth is never in danger. That which is established by one species of proof, cannot be overthrown by another. Convictions that lie as deep as our self-consciousness, will never be eradicated by evidences of an inferior nature. True science will be found, in the future as in the past, marching hand in hand with true faith in its upward path towards the presence of God.

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ARTICLE VII.

THE IMPECCABILITY OF CHRIST.

*The Christian Doctrine of Sin.* By Dr. JULIUS MULLER, Prof. of Theology in the University of Halle. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

*History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ.* By J. A. DORNER, Prof. of Theology in the University of Berlin. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

*The Sinlessness of Jesus.* By CARL ULLMAN, D. D. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

*The Person of Christ the Miracle of History.* By PHILIP SCHAFF, D. D. New York: Scribner.

*Systematic Theology.* By CHARLES HODGE, D. D. Scribner & Company.

*The Person and Sinless Character of our Lord Jesus Christ.* By WM. S. PLUMER. Presbyterian Committee of Publication, Richmond, Va.

“Without controversy, great is the mystery of godliness: God was manifest in the flesh.” Before this “mystery” our spirits

bow with silent reverence. We would not seek to penetrate the inscrutable; but the fact of the Incarnation, as the great central truth of Christianity, is many-sided, and in every aspect of it, is of vital importance in its relations to all other truth. Carefully to study all that the Scriptures teach concerning it, and to gather what light we may from the labors and conflicts of the past, is therefore both our privilege and duty. The discussion of questions pertaining to the deepest mysteries of our faith, if conducted in a reverent spirit, and not transcending the limit of "things which are revealed," can never prove injurious to the interests of truth and godliness. From such discussions we ought not to be deterred by the authority of great names, or the dicta of self-constituted judges of controversy. An author like Prof. Farrar only compromises himself and detracts from the influence of so able a work as his "Life of Christ," when he uses such language as the following: "The question as to whether Christ was or was not *capable* of sin—to express it in the language of that scholastic and theological region in which it originated, the question as to the peccability or impeccability of his human nature—is one which would never occur to a simple and reverent mind." It might be a "reverent," but it certainly would be a "simple mind," that identifies these two statements of the question. But in either form he denounces its discussion as impertinent. "We believe and know that our blessed Lord was sinless—the Lamb of God without blemish and without spot. What can be the possible edification or advantage in the discussion as to whether the sinlessness sprang from a *posse non peccare*, or a *non posse peccare*?" And then, in the true dogmatic spirit, he propounds his own very decided opinion on this prohibited question, and introduces it by modestly ascribing "a zeal at once intemperate and ignorant" to all who hold an opposite view. ("Life of Christ," pp. 123, 124.)

Now, at the risk of incurring the above imputations, and others yet more grievous, we propose to reopen the question of the impeccability of Christ; and, in what may seem to Prof. Farrar and others of like views, the result of intemperate zeal, and the ignorance which is commonly its parent, we propose to

defend the doctrine of the absolute impeccability of Christ as at once the doctrine of Scripture and of the Church. Perhaps we cannot, in any better way, get the true state of the question before us, than by a detailed statement, in their own words, of representative men, who oppose our doctrine.

As the doctrine of the peccability of Christ is evidently an importation, and one of those speculations which are the more fashionable because they are foreign, we begin our citations with an extract from Dr. Julius Müller, Prof. of Theology in the University of Halle. In his voluminous work "On the Christian Doctrine of Sin," Vol. II., B. 3, Pt. 1, Chap. 4, Clark's Edinburgh Edition, pp. 166, 167, he says :

"It is clear, from the principles which we have developed, that Christ may have been perfectly pure and free from sin, and yet have possessed that consciousness of the possibility of sinning, without which temptation would have been to him perfectly meaningless; without which, indeed, his development would not have been truly human. The three expressions by which the older theologians negatively describe the various aspects of Christ's holiness—'*peccare non potuit*,' '*potuit non peccare*,' '*non peccavit*'—are each of them correct. The truth of the last is primary and general; it is a simple matter of fact. The second, whose contrary clearly is *potuit peccare*, is (if the third be granted) a correct expression in reference to the *commencement* and progressive development of Christ's earthly life. The first denotes the *completion* of this life, the result of his development as conditioned by self-determination."

Müller distinguishes between *formal* and *real* freedom. The former as involving an original *equilibrium* of the will, as between good and evil. The latter as that measure of liberty which actually exists, and is the foundation for conscious guilt. But this latter is a self-acquired character, and is marked by a universal tendency to sin, a controlling disposition to evil, and an inability to good. But as this could not be acquired in time, because its universality implies an inborn proclivity to sin, he is driven to the oriental dream of a preëxisting state, in which each individual had a probation in the use of his *formal freedom*, and conditioned his present state by its abuse. In perfect consistency with this theory, he supposed Christ, as the second Adam, to have had an original *formal freedom*, his will being *in equilibrio*,

and the "*potuit peccare*," to have been a necessary condition of his "self-determining development," until he reached the completion of his earthly life. We do not stop to controvert this theory. It is enough for the present to have traced the genesis of Müller's view of the peccability of Christ to his ultra-pelagian notion of freedom, and its necessary outcome in the doctrine of Origen, concerning a præexistent state, as determining the moral condition of the race.

To those who, according to a prevailing fashion, are accustomed to regard everything German as necessarily profound, it may not be amiss to utter a gentle reminder, that the most approved and evangelical theology of Germany, at the present day, is a *reaction* against that recently dominant Rationalism which threatened to rob us of an authoritative rule of faith, a personal Saviour, and a vicarious atonement. But in every *reaction* there are ordinarily, and perhaps necessarily, large concessions to the prevailing philosophy. We ought not to be surprised, therefore, if some who have done good service towards the restoration of belief, have yet come far short of our standard of orthodoxy. We may give them all credit for their progress; but we are not obliged to adopt their sometimes fatal concessions.

Dr. J. A. Dorner, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin, is ranked by Professor Philip Schaff, among those of "the right or conservative wing of the Hegelian school, who sought to reconcile this philosophical system with the faith of the Bible and the Church." The result of such an attempt may be readily conceived. The philosophy dominates the theology. "It must be confessed," says Schaff, "that in so doing, they often too much spiritualised the articles of faith, and unwittingly did them more or less violence by their logic, resolving them pretty much into unsubstantial notions and metaphysical abstractions. Their case was even worse than that of Origen, in whom Platonism, instead of always bending to Christianity, sometimes gained the mastery over it." Freely conceding to Dr. Dorner the credit of good service, as against the extreme wing of the Hegelians, yet it must be confessed that his Christology is scarcely less in antagonism with the received faith of the Church. The funda-



mental principle of the Hegelian philosophy, in which all its sections, right, left, and centre, agree, is the pantheistic doctrine of "the essential unity of the divine and human." Dorner, whom Schaff classes on the extreme "right or conservative wing," claims it as Hegel's special honor, that he "showed, in particular, the untruth of the old determinations of the antagonism between the finite and the infinite, between God and the world, in a manner appreciable by every one who thinks; and thus made the essential unity of the two a matter of universal conviction." The corollary which even the most Theistical of this school derive from this principle, is expressed in their favorite formula, "*humana natura capax naturæ divinæ*," which, however true, in a spiritual sense, as partakers of the divine holiness, through sanctification of the Spirit, as the apostle teaches in 2 Pet. i. 4, is, in the sense taken by these writers, nothing less than Pantheism. It is upon this pantheistic sense of the formula, nevertheless, that Dorner's Christology is founded. There is a complete identification of the human and divine in the person of Christ. But it is not the union of two natures in one person; it is the identification of two personalities, by the gradual absorption, or, as a Hegelian would express it, the "*becoming*" of one into the other. Dr. Hodge has expressed the view as clearly as it well can be, and it is not easy to eliminate it from the word-clouds in which its author has enveloped it. "According to Dorner, there is a human soul to begin with, to which the Eternal Logos, without subjecting himself to any change, from time to time communicates his divinity as the human becomes more and more capable of receiving the perfections of God, until at last it becomes completely divine." In this Christology, the Church doctrine of the union and distinction of the two natures in the one person of Christ is emphatically repudiated as the "old dualism," which the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel had effectually overthrown. And in the place of it we have the development, the "*becoming*" of humanity into divinity, in the person of Christ, in the first instance, and in Christ, of humanity in general, by the indwelling of Christ in the Church.

But, as pertinent to the subject in hand, this Christology, in

all its forms, recognises not only a natural growth and development of the man Christ Jesus, but it insists upon an ethical development. This, as a matter of fact, was a sinless development. But Christ had to contend with all the infirmities of our nature, as his people do, and he was liable to sin, until he had reached the "absolute goal," at which his humanity was completed in the full consciousness of his divinity. This view is the necessary result of this doctrine of the Incarnation. That miracle was not accomplished at once, but gradually. It did not take place at the birth of the son of Mary; "the Word was" not then "made flesh." The *ἅγιον*, or "holy thing," that was born, could be "called the Son of God" only potentially. In the beginning, it was only distinguished from any other birth by the miraculous conception. There was no divinity united with it; and only progressively, in the measure of its growth and development, did it receive communications of divinity. It was not the *Theanthropos*, then, that was "born of the Virgin Mary," "made of a woman," and who, because his brethren were "partakers of flesh and blood, himself also took part of the same." It was only a sinless humanity that was born, after all, and it became divine-human by subsequent communications.

Surely the Hegelian philosophy has not improved upon the received Christology of the Church. But this notion of an *ethical*, as distinguished from a *natural* development, plays so important a part in the discussions of those who deny the absolute impeccability of Christ, that it deserves a passing notice. This word "*development*" is a word to juggle with, for it may mean one thing here, and another thing there. When formally stated, as by Ullman, in his really valuable work on "The Sinlessness of Jesus," we find it to be nothing more than normal growth in the humanity of Christ, incident to ripening years and enlarged experience. It is assumed that he was in a state of moral perfection at every stage of his earthly life. And the words of Irenæus are quoted with approval, as illustrative of the thought:

"Ideo (Christus) per omnem venit ætatem, et infantibus infans factus, sanctificans infantes; in parvulis parvulus, sanctificans hanc ipsam habentes ætatem; in juvenibus juvenis," etc.

It is even distinctly asserted that "growth and increase do not necessarily assume transition from a state of deficiency to one of sufficiency—do not presuppose an inner antagonism of sin, or an overcoming of the religious and moral error connected therewith." (P. 110.) Nothing less than this was necessary to maintain the actual sinlessness of Christ at every stage of his earthly life. But when the impeccability of Christ is in question, *presto change!* development then demands as its postulate, the "*potuit peccare.*" Ullman declines the discussion as beside his purpose. But he gives us his *dictum* notwithstanding: "*Anamartesia* does not in itself exclude the possibility of sinning. On the contrary, it is only where this possibility is in some manner presupposed that sinlessness, properly so called, can be conceived." "Wherever there is human nature, and consequent liability to temptation, there is also, by reason of this very nature, the possibility of sin." And then, in a foot-note, he adds: "The fact of sinlessness involves not only the '*potuit non peccare,*' and the '*non peccavit,*' but also demands, at least as the postulate of the whole moral development, the '*potuit peccare.*' Without this, the temptation of Christ would be devoid of reality." Now, whence does it appear that the "development" of Christ, as he had before represented it, involves this "postulate?" He tells us (p. 110): "The idea of development does not of itself involve the passing through antagonisms and conflicts, or (quoting Julius Müller,) 'that at every step in advance, the hindrances universally presented by evil have to be surmounted, and some one of its disturbing elements to be reduced to inactivity.' This is only true of the development of individuals, and of mankind, when evil has already gained power over them." But as this was not the case with Christ, of course his development does not involve this "antagonism and conflict," or this "surmounting of any of the disturbing elements of evil." How, then, does it necessitate "the postulate of '*potuit peccare?*'" The only answer which we can find to this question, among all the writers who maintain the peccability of Christ, is that of Müller, already quoted: "Without this, his development *would not have been truly human.*" This, in various forms of expression, is the

answer of them all. And to this they all agree in adding, as if conscious that by itself it was not sufficient, "Without this his temptation would have been unreal."

Not to multiply quotations, and to bring the whole question at once to the issue upon the two points upon which it is made to turn by the writers whose doctrine we are controverting, we will add to the foregoing two other representative names, well known on this side of the Atlantic.

Dr. Philip Schaff, Professor in the Union Theological Seminary, New York, in his interesting and instructive book on "The Person of Christ, the Miracle of History," holds this language :

"His sinlessness was at first only the *relative* sinlessness of Adam before the fall; which implies the necessity of trial and temptation, and the peccability or the possibility of the fall. Had he been endowed with absolute impeccability from the start, he could not be a true man, nor our model for imitation. His holiness, instead of being his own self-acquired act and inherent merit, would be an accidental or outward gift, and his temptation an unreal show. As a true man, Christ must have been a free and responsible moral agent. Freedom implies the power of choice between good and evil, and the power of disobedience as well as obedience to the law of God." "Christ's *relative* sinlessness became more and more *absolute* sinlessness by his own moral act. . . . In other words, Christ's original *possibility of not sinning*, which includes the possibility of sinning, but excludes the actuality of sin, was unfolded into the *impossibility of sinning*, which *can not sin* because it *will not*." (Pp. 51, 52.)

This statement is somewhat peculiar, and we must be permitted to examine it. Here the "ethical development" culminates in *absolute sinlessness*. But what is that? It is the "*can not sin* because it *will not*." Does this destroy the true manhood of Christ or his freedom, as implying "the power of choice between good and evil?" If so, then, when, by his own act, he reached the goal of impeccability, he ceased to be "a true man" and a free moral agent. But if it did *not* destroy his true manhood, or his freedom, then the difference between his "*absolute*" and his "*relative* sinlessness" is, that in the former he "*can not* because he *will not*;" and in the latter he *can*, because he *will not*. Dr. Schaff may take his choice between these alternatives; and when he has settled that point, perhaps he can tell us at

what period in the life of a perfectly sinless Christ, the "will not sin" was wanting, and at what particular point of his earthly history, the "*can*" was lost in the "*can not, because he will not.*" In common with the others already quoted, Dr. Schaff insists upon a period of moral development, during which period Christ was liable to fall. He did not fall, because in the exercise of his freedom, which "implies the power of choice between good and evil," and the power of obedience or disobedience, he, by his own self-determining act, maintained his sinlessness. Was this an act of his *will*—was it a "*will not?*" If so, then what was the nature of that transition through which his development culminated at last into that "highest stage of freedom where it becomes identical with moral necessity," where "the impossibility of sinning" is that "which *can not* because it *will not?*" And this "power of choice between good and evil, and power of disobedience as well as of obedience"—are we to understand it as implying a state of moral indifference; or will Dr. Schaff admit the presence of a determining element, or, as he chooses to express it, "such an extraordinary indwelling of God" (p. 60) in the person of Christ, as infallibly determined his will? Was his perfect sinlessness secured and certain by anything in the constitution of his person; or was it dependent alone upon the self-determining acts of a human will, sinless like that of Adam before his fall, but like that also, liable to fall? This involves the whole question in debate. For, if the former is granted, as Dr. H. Martensen, in his *Christian Dogmatic* (p. 255) grants it, "This was guaranteed, in virtue of the indissoluble union of the divine and human nature in him (Christ)," why, then, everything is conceded, and the absolute impeccability of Christ is the necessary conclusion. But if the latter is the doctrine, we shudder at the "perilous edge" upon which our salvation was suspended for an indefinite period of "moral development" until the "*can*" because he will not, culminated in the "*can not* because he will not."

But Dr. Schaff and our readers must pardon us if we call attention to another question, upon which his language seems to whave thron some doubt. Speaking of this goal which Christ

had reached, at which his *can* not sin is because he *will* not, he says: "This is the freedom of God." (P. 53.) Is the absolute holiness of God founded in the divine nature, or in the free acts of his will? This question is obviously pertinent to the subject in hand. For if the holiness of God is grounded in his nature, and yet the freedom of God is consistent with that infinitely holy nature, to which sin is as impossible as it is to be and not to be at the same time, then the freedom of Christ is also consistent with his possessing that nature in the hypostatical union, by reason of which sin was to him at every stage of his development as impossible as it is for God to deny himself. If, on the other hand, there can be no freedom without "a power of disobedience as well as of obedience," and we understand the word "power" as taken in a moral and not physical sense, then we have that often exploded theory of liberty which makes moral indifference an *equilibrium* of the will essential to freedom. This is Müller's idea of what he calls "*formal*" freedom, and which drove him to the dream of a preëxistent state in order to find it. But even this cannot be predicated of Christ, unless, with Dorner, we suppose that the son of Mary was not the Son of God, until, by successive communications of the Logos, he awoke at length to a divine consciousness—a Christology which gives us, "at the start," nothing but humanity in the person of Christ—a humanity just like that of Adam before his fall—and at the end takes away humanity altogether, by its perfect identification with divinity. Thus we are brought back again to the ground of the two distinguished German Professors with whose views we commenced this article. Will Dr. Schaff explicitly avow his agreement with these views?

It is not without disappointment and regret that we find among the advocates of this doctrine of the peccability of Christ, so distinguished a representative of the old theology as the venerable Princeton Professor. Dr. Hodge differs very widely from the views above mentioned, as to the nature of moral freedom and the doctrine of the Incarnation. And yet, strangely enough, he bases his doctrine of Christ's peccability upon substantially the same arguments. (Vol. II., p. 457.) "The sinlessness of

our Lord does not amount to absolute impeccability. It was not a '*non potest peccare.*' If he was a true man, he must have been capable of sinning. . . . Temptation implies the possibility of sin. If, from the constitution of his person, it was impossible for Christ to sin, then his temptation was unreal and without effect, and he cannot sympathise with his people."

It does not appear from this that our Saviour ever reached the point of Dr. Schaff's "moral necessity, or absolute and unchangeable self-determination for goodness and holiness." As long as he remained "a true man, he must have been capable of sinning." Does Dr. Hodge mean to say that liability to sin is *essential* to humanity, and under no conditions can it become impeccable? Is there no such thing possible for our poor humanity as confirmation in holiness—an impeccability founded on the purpose of God, and secured by the efficacy of his grace? Or have the saints who have gone to heaven been so divorced from humanity as to be no longer conscious of their identity? What, then, is the significance or the use of the resurrection of the body? Nay! did Christ leave his humanity behind him when he ascended to heaven, or is he still "the Lamb in the midst of the throne?" If it should be said that this is carrying the question beyond the sphere of earthly life, to which the case in hand is limited, this would be no answer; for the argument is, that if human nature, under any conceivable conditions, can become impeccable, then this possibility was realised by the indissoluble union of divinity with humanity in the person of Christ. Can we conceive of any conditions which would so surely exempt a true human nature, holy in its origin, from the possibility of sin, as that hypostatical union in which not a *human person* but a *human nature* is united with the divine nature, in the personality of the divine Logos? Dr. Hodge expresses the Church doctrine when he says (Vol. II., p. 391): "The Son of God did not unite himself with a human person, but with a human nature. The proof of this is, that Christ is but one person." And yet it is of this One Person that he predicates the possibility of sin.

We cannot see how this predicate is to be reconciled with this doctrine of the person of Christ. Any attempt at reconciliation

must be founded upon the communion of attributes, which Dr. Hodge expresses by saying "that the person is the partaker of the attributes of both natures; so that whatever may be affirmed of either nature may be affirmed of the person." The Confession of Faith, Chap. VIII. Sec. 7, expresses this somewhat more guardedly: "By reason of the unity of the person, that which is *proper* to one nature. is *sometimes*, in Scripture, attributed to the person denominated by the other nature." And we are disposed to agree with Dr. Cunningham when he says: "We ought to make no such attributions of what is proper to one nature to the person denominated by the other, except only when the Scripture has gone before us and sanctioned it." At any rate, it is quite certain that the formula, as broadly stated by Dr. Hodge, needs to be limited by what was no doubt in his own mind, namely, that the predicates, in regard to either nature, can be affirmed of the person only as that nature is found *in Christ*. We cannot affirm of Christ "whatever" can be affirmed of human nature by itself. It must be of *his human nature*, if we affirm it of his person. It will not do to say, therefore, that as human nature is peccable, and Christ had a human nature, so we may ascribe peccability to Christ. The question is as to *his human nature*; and following the Confession and Dr. Cunningham, we say the Scriptures never attribute peccability to that. Contemplated as in the hypostatical union, nothing is or can be predicated of the human nature of Christ, or of Christ himself, which contradicts or is inconsistent with his true and proper divinity. This by no means contradicts the doctrine of the Bible and the Confession, that "He did take upon him man's nature, with all the *essential* properties and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin." He could hunger and be weary, he could suffer and die; "the Lord of glory was crucified." None of these things are inconsistent with his proper divinity; nor are they spoken of his humanity alone. "He acted according to both natures; by each nature doing that which is proper to itself;" and yet the person acting was the eternal Son of God. To this end he became incarnate, and the Incarnate Son of God could die. But for him to have sinned would have contradicted not



only the purpose of his incarnation, it would have been unspeakably opposite to and contradictory of his essential divinity.

Men sometimes talk of the divinity and the humanity of Christ, and of what is proper to each nature, as if the two could be separated and considered as acting apart. We can indeed contemplate the properties of each nature by itself; but we cannot, even in thought, separate them and yet retain the person of Christ. It is idle, therefore, to predicate anything as possible for the humanity alone, if we are yet assuming to speak of the human nature of Christ. If, therefore, we should admit that liability to sin is essential to human nature taken by itself, which we do not admit, yet this would not be necessarily true, or true at all, of the human nature of Christ. For it is precisely its union with divinity in his person which distinguishes it, and this hypostatical union precludes all possibility of sin in the Theanthropos.

But the supplementary argument, which yet is the chief one insisted upon by Dr. Hodge, in common with all who hold to the peccability of Christ, is based upon his temptation. "Temptation implies the possibility of sin. If, from the constitution of his person, it was impossible for Christ to sin, then his temptation was unreal and without effect, and he cannot sympathise with his people." This argument, both in its general statement and its particular application, derives all of its plausibility from a one-sided conception of the nature of temptation. Temptation is here evidently conceived of in its relation to fallen humanity—or, at best, to a humanity left to itself and to its own resources, as was that of Adam before his fall, and therefore liable to fall. To us, as fallen creatures, temptation involves two distinct things: (1) An intellectual perception of the evil suggested, with all its inducements; and (2) a natural appetency to it, pleading for indulgence. In our experience, these two are so inseparable that it is difficult for us to eliminate the latter from the very idea of "temptation." But as there was no such appetency to evil in Adam before his fall, we find ourselves obliged, in order to account for the success of the temptation in his case, to suppose it to have been addressed, in the first instance, to those

appetencies of his holy nature, the excessive or forbidden indulgence of which would be sin, and thus an appetency to evil, to have been excited through that which in itself was good. And as Adam, by his constitution, was fallible, we think we gain some light upon the fact that with an original holy nature he did fall. But now, if we turn to Christ and say that his holy human nature was also tempted by being addressed through that in him which was good, but by its excessive or forbidden indulgence would have been sin, and *therefore* he also was liable to fall, we forget two things: (1) that this is not strictly true of all his temptations; and (2) that his human nature was never left to itself or to its own resources, but by the hypotastical union it was always and everywhere precluded from the possibility of yielding to the tempter, even to the extent of the first movements of concupiscence. Either we must admit this, or else we must admit the Pelagian doctrine that concupiscence is no sin until it ripens into volition. When it is further urged, that "if from the constitution of his person it was impossible for Christ to sin, then his temptation was unreal and without effect," we ask, how does this appear? Was not the suggested evil, with all of its inducements, really presented to his mind? Or must we suppose that, besides an intellectual apprehension of it, there must be also an incipient inclination to it, in order to its reality? There was no such inclination in Adam until the temptation had already taken effect. And if it ever existed in the human nature of Christ, he was no longer sinless.

What Dr. Hodge means by its being also "*without effect*," we can understand only of its uses, as rendering him our example, and as capable, by his own experience, of sympathising with his people. But would the example of stern resistance of evil have been any more effective by the fact or the possibility of his yielding to it? The certainty that he would not and could not yield, does not make his resistance any the less his free act, or the less worthy of our imitation. Nor is it necessary that his experience should in every respect coincide with ours, in order to his understanding and sympathising with our trials. For, be it remembered, he never sympathises with our sins or our sinful inclina-

tions. It is from these latter that temptation gains its chief power over us. And Christ could understand this power, not from his own experience of moral frailty, but from his divine knowledge of "what was in man," in all the secret workings of the human heart. We are assured of his sympathy, "in that he suffered being tempted." But this was not to inform his understanding or to prompt his love; but in the fulfilment of his offices to give us warrant that in all our trials he is both able and willing to succor us. Calvin says:

"Non quia opus talibus rudimentis habuerit Filius Dei, sed quia nos aliter, quam de salute nostra curam gerit mente, apprehendere non possumus."

Thus having traced the modern origin and examined the foundations of the doctrine which denies the impeccability of Christ, we have accomplished all that was intended in this article. The conclusion to which we are led is that it is a doctrine begotten of a false philosophy, which finds its strongest support in a Pelagian theory of freedom, and which is subversive of the whole received theology of the Reformed Churches. It subverts the doctrine of the incarnation. It mystifies the doctrine of the person of Christ. It is inconsistent with his covenant relations. It makes the purpose of God to be contingent upon the self-determinations of a human will, and thus renders precarious all the prophecies and promises of God, and leaves no room, or object, for the faith of the Old Testament saints.

The Church is under lasting obligations to Dr. Plumer for so distinctly calling its attention to this doctrine and its far-reaching consequences, in his admirable little book on "The Sinless Character of Christ."

## CRITICAL NOTICES.

*Religion as affected by Modern Materialism : An Address delivered in Manchester New College, London, at the opening of its eighty-ninth Session, on Tuesday, October 6, 1874.* By JAMES MARTINEAU, LL.D., with an Introduction by the Rev. HENRY W. BELLOWS, D. D. New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons, Fourth Avenue and Twenty-third Street, 1875. 12mo., pp. 68.

We are not sufficiently acquainted with either the scientific or religious views of Dr. Martineau, to be perfectly sure that we are prepared to render him full justice in the criticisms we are disposed to make upon this production. He is evidently, to some extent, an Evolutionist, but to what extent does not entirely appear. He seems to reject the doctrine that the material system is either eternal or self-originated, and explicitly avows his belief in an intelligent Creator of the Universe, who is perpetually present with it in all its parts, and in all the laws which control its phenomena. He insists on the broad distinction between mind and matter, holding that it is inconceivable that any evolution of mere matter could culminate in consciousness, mental or moral. What, then, is his theory of Evolution? Does it relate to the material system only, or also include the intellectual? So far as this address answers, we cannot tell with certainty. But there are passages in which, if he be not personating other views than his own, he expresses his opposition to the doctrine of the fall and its deteriorating effects upon the race, and a denial of the need of redemption through vicarious atonement and supernatural grace; and so far forth advocates a moral development of man upward and not downward. But while this appears to be his theory, his pathetic and eloquent descriptions of the actual facts of the case reveal a profound conviction that it is not practically realised. But whatever may be the author's views upon this point, he clearly separates between the material system on the one hand, and the intellectual and moral on the other; and we

cannot but admire the honesty and ability with which he vindicates the great disjunction. He is not prepared to admit that mental energies are nothing but refined material forces, and that conscience and will are simply the last results of molecular combinations.

We are not able, from this address, to estimate the scope of Dr. Martineau's theological opinions. The orthodox theology he scouts, it being apparently enough that any nominally Christian Church should hold a system to identify it with ecclesiastical tyranny. Between Protestantism and Romanism he does not stop to indicate a difference. He cites, for example, the conference of Old Catholics at Bonn as a representative of the creed of Christendom, and ridicules the grotesque appearance of a symbolic Christianity under the light which modern science sheds upon the hemisphere of religious thought. His religion seems to be simply that which is supplied by a pure natural theology. We do not mean by that to say that it is natural religion in all its extent. The theology of natural religion is not coincident with natural theology. In the former there are two distinct elements—a natural and a supernatural—the first including only the elements of man's internal constitution and external nature; the second consisting of an extraordinary revelation of the covenant of works. Natural theology, according to the accepted signification of the terms, is confined to the first of these—it is the scientific reduction of the facts and phenomena of internal and external nature, of man and the universe. Of course, Dr. Martineau rejects a federal theology; and as he equally denies atonement and supernatural grace, the distinctive elements of redemption, he must be ranked as a natural theologian. He does not tell us in this address what his conception is of the office of Christianity, but so far as appears, he must hold it to be simply a republication of the truths of natural theology. The fundamental "assumptions" of his religion are, "that the universe which includes us and folds us round, is the life-dwelling of an Eternal Mind; that the world of our abode is the scene of a moral government, incipient but not yet complete; and that the upper zones of human affection, above the clouds of self and passion, take us into the sphere of a divine

communion." (P. 16.) The "essence of religion," he says, is "summed up" in these "three assumptions." (P. 18.) Of these grand principles of religion, he affirms that they are "independent of any possible results of the natural sciences, and stand fast through the various readings of the genesis of things." (P. 18.) This is the scheme of religion between which and the Materialistic hypothesis of Evolution Dr. Martineau has shown that there is an irreconcilable antagonism. He has eloquently and triumphantly proved that the slightest analysis of our mental and moral constitution evinces the impossibility of that hypothesis.

There are two things which have impressed us in the reading of this address. In the first place, the ease with which, even in a fragmentary and incomplete discussion like that exhibited in this work, the materialistic theory of the universe may be demolished by an appeal to the simplest elements of natural religion. Dr. Martineau presents an irresistibly convincing picture of the utter disharmony between the instinctive principles of compassion, forgetfulness of self in love for others, and the sense of duty, and such a heartless system of iron necessity and savage butchery as that upon which the Materialist contends that the world is conducted. We wish we had room to give some specimens of the eloquent and affecting manner in which he has treated these themes. We must content ourselves with a passage in which the natural impulse in the human constitution to relieve distress and the demands of a Materialistic Evolution are contrasted:

"Nature, it is customary to say, is *pitiless*, and while ever moving on, makes no step but by crushing a thousandfold more sentient life than she ultimately sets up, and sets up none which does not devour what is already there. The battle of existence rages through all time and in every field; and its rule is to give no quarter—to despatch the maimed, to overtake the halt, to trip up the blind, and drive the fugitive host over the precipice into the sea. Nature is fond of the mighty and kicks the feeble; and while forever multiplying wretchedness, has no patience with it when it looks up and moans. And so all-pervading is this rule, that evil, we are told, cannot really be put down, but only masked and diverted; if you suppress it here, it will break out there; the fire of anguish still rolls below, and has alternate vents; when you stop up *Ætna*, it will blot out Sodom and Gomorrah, and bury the cities of the plain. Who can deny that such teachings as these set the outer universe

and our inner nature at its best at hopeless variance with each other? Do they not depress the moral power to which we owe the most humanising features of our civilisation? We have not to go far for a practical answer. Within a few weeks the question has been raised, whether the recent flow of commiseration towards the famine-stricken districts of India does not offend against the law of nature for reducing a superfluous population; and whether there were not advantages in the old method of taking no notice of these things, and letting Death pass freely over his threshing-floor, and bury the chaff quietly out of the way. Moral enthusiasm makes many a mischievous mistake in its haste and blindness, and greatly needs the guidance of wiser thought; but this tone of moral scepticism, which disparages the very springs of generous labor, and treats them as follies laughed at by the cynicism of Nature, is a thousandfold more desolating; for it carries poison to the very roots of good. It is as the bursting out of salt-springs in the valley of fruits; it soaks through the prolific soil of all the virtues, and turns the promise of Eden into a Dead Sea shore."

In uttering this testimony, arising from the reason itself, Dr. Martineau is afraid that he may be regarded as being "in the wrong camp." (Preface.) He needed not to indulge any such apprehension. It ought to have been sufficient for him to know that he was contending for truth. What mattered it to him who held that truth besides himself? Could its sacred intrinsic claims be prejudiced by the fact that it is acknowledged by evangelical Christians? The fact is that the camp is a very spacious one, for it includes Anaxagoras, Socrates, and Cicero, as well as Prophets and Apostles, Reformers and Puritans. He only did battle for the fundamental principles of all religion. He could hardly be mistaken for a Christian. The essential truths of natural religion, it is true, are absorbed by Christianity, but it is specifically something very different from man's first religion. It professes to be a religion for sinners, and not for holy beings: for sinners needing atonement and redeeming mercy. Christians do not suppose that Dr. Martineau has compounded with their principles by his defence of truths, for which Pagan sages have contended; but they are not disposed to disparage his argument because it is not distinctively Christian. They are not ashamed to fight side by side with him for the very foundations of religion. Would God that one so gifted as he could see eye to eye with them! He would not be ashamed to go forth with them without

the camp of natural reason, and to bear with them their own and their Master's reproach.

In the second place, notwithstanding the facility with which the truths of natural religion can be employed as resistless weapons in the conflict with an Atheistic Materialism, as evinced in this book, we have been also impressed with the fact which the author himself unveils, that his system furnishes him no assured confidence and abiding peace. He is agitated by fears for the future, growing out of the development of materialising tendencies. He talks of the possibility of the thinkers of his school having to disband, and paints the pathetic picture of a despairing religion waging a losing warfare with the hordes of atheistic influences swarming around her and pulling her down. We admire the courage which leads him to say that even in the face of this dark and stormy prospect, he will yet pledge his loyalty to ideal truth and exclaim, "I will follow thee whithersoever thou goest." But, alas! Dr. Martineau, whither will Natural Religion go? She affirms, *te judice*, the moral government of a just God, begun but not completed here. You are a sinner, and with that principle as her baton of office, she must lead you to a judgment bar; and then—whither? There is a spot to which her thunders warn the guilty to repair—the only spot in the universe where a just and holy God will meet the despairing child of sin and grief, and lift him with merciful arms to the bosom of forgiving love. It is the spot which was moistened with atoning blood. And he who has once felt the witness in his own breast of reconciliation with God through Jesus Christ, can never again talk of quitting the field of conflict with error, or of despairing in the presence of his foes. Let science, falsely so-called, shake the earth and hurl the mountains into the foaming sea, his faith stands firm. Notwithstanding Dr. Martineau's flings at orthodox Christianity, he has disclosed in this address gifts which challenge our admiration, and uttered sentiments which evoke our deepest sympathy; and we take our leave of him with the prayer that God may reveal in him His Son, and that he may know the calm and delightful rest of spirit which springs from trust in his atoning blood!



*Cartoons.* By MARGARET J. PRESTON. Boston: Roberts Brothers. 1875.

The modest title of this little volume of poems is not fitted to excite great expectations, and hence the appreciative reader is agreeably disappointed to find so much intellectual vigor, depth of feeling, and exquisite beauty, condensed in these unpretending "Sketches." Where, in ignorance of the gifted writer, we might look for old images remodelled in crayon or water colors, we find a genuine artist delighting us with original designs painted in oil—fresh thoughts beautifully enamelled. Indeed, the dignity of her theme, the loftiness of her diction, with its bold, clear cut chiselling, often reminds us of the sculptor's art.

The outlines are so skilfully drawn that a few masterly touches surprise the imagination with a complete picture. The poet seizes upon a single suggestive incident in the eventful "life of the old masters," or some ancient legend; detects, with "the vision and faculty divine," the hidden element of beauty or sublimity. With magnetic sympathy the imagination catches the inspiration, and with creative energy supplies the stage the scenery and the costume for these ethereal spirits evoked from the hoary past. When the poem is cast in the form of a dialogue, it sometimes exhibits a dramatic skill and power that would compare favorably with the writings of Miss Mitford or Joanna Baillie. There is a wide difference between this order of poetry and a metrical array of words, arranged with mechanical ingenuity to please the ear, or a pyrotechnic display of brilliant metaphors to captivate the fancy.

Mrs. Preston writes with a masculine vigor, scholarly finish, and disciplined taste, that lays a tax upon the intellect and culture of the reader; but everywhere and always we feel the beating of the heart, the throbbing of the pulse, the "divine afflatus" of the poet. We quote the following from the "Life of the Old Masters," as a fair specimen of the affluence of her imagination, combined with elegance and energy of expression. It is taken from the dialogue in the Sistine Chapel. Raffaele himself need not be ashamed of the noble defence of the Great Master which the poet puts in his mouth:

“RAFFAELLE.

Peace! It hurts

That you should wrong him so! Think how remote  
His isolate world from ours. Companionless—  
Renouncing even his self-humanity—  
He dwells apart on Art's Olympian top,  
In brotherhood with gods, curtained about  
With tragic mists that blot our common ways  
Out of his knowledge. And when he descends,  
'Tis as the gossips chatter of his work  
On this grand ceiling—how through lengthened gaze  
Upward the power of earthward glance was lost:  
And therefore (blame him not) he overlooks  
Us lesser mortals who but haunt the slope.

GIULIO.

'Lesser,' i' faith! Good Master! I lose patience!

RAFFAELLE.

Content you, we'll say *happier*, then. We, rich  
In miracle of sunset and of dawn—  
In wonderments of blue, ethereal air—  
In yellowing cornfields and sheep-dotted dells,  
And interspaces flaked with flooding light,  
And all the maddening sweetnesses his eyes—  
Poor, blinded eyes!—had never vision for!  
We, over-rich through maiden's solacings,  
And childhood's mirth, and wonted fellowships,  
And the keen joyance of this summer land:  
O happier thus a thousandfold than he—  
He, midst his chilling clouds upraised too high  
For human needs—too high to be aught else  
Than numbed and frost-pinched, and so doomed to miss  
The fervid meltings of a foolish love  
Trickling about his heart! I, overblest  
Through its sufficingness—I, garmented  
So silently in Art's delightsomeness,  
So warmed by the felicities of life—  
I needs must nurse a grievous ache to think  
On Michael's cold, white, statued loneliness.”

Omitting much that follows in the same elevated strain, let us hear Giulio's beautiful tribute to Raffaelle, with which the dialogue closes:

“And let him teach disdain  
Of life's soft graciousness? Why, he would make

Us infidels to love and all sweet passions !  
 Save that kind heaven has set our Raffaele here  
 A crowning antidote to prove that not  
 Colossal Force nor Form can rule the realm  
 Of Art or Nature with such sovran power  
 As a fair woman's face. And so the smile  
 You've left on Mary-Mother's lips, though touched  
 With trouble of tears, will keep within men's souls  
 The purer worship ; so the shine above  
 Your Holy Child will seem a miracle  
 Wherewith to seal the world's true faith forever !"

With all her lyric fire and manly energy, our poet often exhibits a subtle imagination and great delicacy of feeling. The following are examples :

"The sunbeam's finger pointing hushingly  
 Along the frescoed wall."

"Reverenced, whose crystal sheen was never blurred  
 By faintest film of over-breathing doubt."

"And lifting mine eyes to thine alway,  
 As artist-wise thou hadst willed, there grew,  
 Unconscious as grow the buds of May,  
 A blossoming love betwixt us two,  
 Unwatered by a spoken word."

The "Cartoons from the Life of To-Day" are characterised by the same boldness of imagination, of intensity of feeling, and scholarly diction. These minor pieces were doubtless intended to be more adapted to the popular ear, though Mrs. Preston never caters to popular taste. But is not the style generally too elaborate for any but a cultivated taste? One might be inclined to ask, in the strong language addressed "*In the Sistine*" to Angelo :

"What is all life to him—its men, its women,  
 The tumult and the processes of its loves,  
 Its hates, its strifes—what but a quarry whence  
 To hew and shape his wrestling thoughts?  
 ——— who ever dreams to find  
 A nesting here for dove-eyed charities?"

The answer you will find in such poems as "Agnes" and the "Little Watcher," so full of tender pathos and plaintive sweetness :

"Ah, can we live and bear to miss  
 Out of our lives this life so rare?  
 Tender, so tender! an angel's kiss  
 Hallowed it daily, unaware:  
 Gracious as sunshine, sweet as dew  
 Shut in a lily's golden core;  
 Fragrant with goodness through and through;  
 Pure as the spikenard Mary bore;  
 Holy as twilight, soft as dawn—  
 Agnes has gone!"

The answer is to be found again in the "nestings for dove-eyed charities," which our poet builds amid the grandest architecture of her thoughts. Every poem has a moral purpose, images of beauty and loveliness, a lesson of virtue and truth. "Woman's Art;" "The Reapers of Landisfarne;" "The Legend of the Woodpecker;" "The Count's Sowing;" "The Royallest Gift," etc., etc., elevate the soul and inspire it with pure and lofty emotions and purposes.

Where a writer possesses so much independence of mind and individuality of character, combined with learning and culture of a high order, we may naturally expect to see her personality strongly impressed upon her writings. Her poetry will partake largely of the subjective element. The occurrence of unusual language, the stately procession of her numbers, the picturesque imagery, should not be construed into pedantry and bombast. Mrs. Preston has been suspected of imitating Mrs. Browning. It would be paying a high compliment to her genius to say that her poems strongly remind us of "the greatest female poet that England has ever produced;" not in the infelicity and obscurity of style, but in the grandeur of imagination, the intensity of feeling and passion, the deep and tender sympathy with humanity. We cannot rise from the perusal of these poems without rejoicing that Mrs. Preston has not yielded to the apprehensions which disturbed her muse in the introductory poem, "The Good of it," and that she has not heeded the voice of the tempter:

"So, keep thy song unwritten; spare  
 To spill thy music on the air;  
 Let go the stainless canvass bare."

We could not afford to "spill" such music as this, or "let go the canvass" which transfigures so much of the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. The purpose of the poet will doubtless be realised a thousandfold—"to soothe one aching heart; to feed a starving soul; to brighten some spirit's dull decline." Beyond mere personal benefits, we feel that Mrs. Preston has conferred a national blessing and reflected honor upon Southern literature. If "a nation lives only through its literature, and only its mental life is immortal," then those whom God has gifted with genius and talent are the divinely constituted guardians of a nation's life, and they should feel their sacred obligations to embalm in poetry, art, and literature, all that is valuable and precious in their history, laws, customs, and scenery of their native land. The South furnishes abundant materials for poetry. Much that has hitherto been peculiar and characteristic in her social life and history is rapidly passing away. Now is the time to catch the fleeting images of beauty and sublimity, and embody them in immortal form and expression. We trust that Mrs. Preston may live to favor us with another volume of poems, entitled "*Cartoons from the Life of the South.*"

*Memoir of Norman Macleod, D. D., Minister of Barony Parish, Glasgow—one of Her Majesty's Chaplains, etc., etc.* By his Brother, Rev. DONALD MACLEOD, B. A.—one of Her Majesty's Chaplains, Editor of *Good Words*, etc. Two Volumes 8vo., pp. 362, 432. Scribner, Armstrong & Co., New York, 1876.

This Memoir is in two thick octavo volumes, of firm paper, large print, and wide margins, and encased in rather better muslin binding than sometimes encloses as good and better books. We have some exceedingly good matter, some not so very excellent, and some which the compiler would have done better to have left in the mass of notes and *rerum indigestarum* which accumulate in every minister's study in the course of thirty-five years. We admire the method of the biographer—the first and one of the best specimens of which appeared long years ago, "*Sidney's Life of Miss Hannah More*"—by which the life of the subject is

very much what he has written himself, and about himself, his thoughts, words, and actions. A dead man cannot be an egotist, and *malgre* the many autobiographies and journals "not designed for publication" which have appeared, filled with disgusting self-conceit, Phariseism, and religious twaddle or unmeaning sentiment, with interjectory and exclamatory words and sentences enough to exhaust an ordinary printer's supply of notes of exclamation, it is still true that a man's biography, written, unconsciously of course, by himself, and the necompiled by another, is the best style of such composition. That an affectionate brother, by reason of his intimate relations, will make a good compiler. is, *prima facie*, to be accepted; that he succeeds, can only be ascertained when his work shall have been completed. Mr. Macleod has thrown together, with proper connecting links, an exceedingly charming series of pen sketches, graphically delineating the life and work of a busy man, for a period of sixty years. His birth, family, lineage, early rearing, home life as a child, student's life at home, in school, in college, in Divinity Hall and a foreign University, entrance on pastoral life, in the parish of the Established Church, Loudoun, Ayrshire, transfer, after five years, with a sore heart, to Dalkeith, where he remained till 1859, (making a tour in North America and one in Prussia and Silesia,) and then final settlement in the Barony church, Glasgow, where he remained till death—including in this period a visit to India, to look after the Scotch Church missions—may be accepted as the outline of the outward life of this busy minister. The picture is a pleasing one, indeed, in many respects, encouraging and edifying. Dr. Macleod was naturally genial, large-hearted, honest, courageous, full of vivacity and rich humor. But his humor was not mischievous, and involved no inconsistencies as a Christian man or minister. True, his biographer has rather exceeded the requisition on a faithful chronicler, in marring the beauty of his pages with a great abundance of amusing caricatured pen-lined sketches of persons, faces, etc., grotesque and *outré*, and well enough in the letters where they were drawn, but unbecoming a grave volume. The *fac simile* letter fronting the title page of Volume II., was enough as a specimen.

His labors in each of his charges were abundant and abundantly successful. This was specially true in his last and longest charge, in the Barony church. Our younger ministers would find great instruction in studying, and great benefit in imitating, his method of work, and leading others to work. Blessed with a *physique* of remarkable strength as well as elegance, he was enabled to accomplish most Herculean labor, and perhaps fell a victim, at last, to his enthusiastic service in his work in India, and his journey overland to his home.

Of his participation in the great Disruption in 1843, and the excellent, pious temper he displayed through it all; his bold advocacy of what he believed right, and his courageous efforts to repair the evils of the Disruption to the Establishment, we should like to speak. It would also, we believe, be but a proper tribute to truth and justice to give a right view of his position in the celebrated Sabbath controversy. His speech, poorly and very defectively reported, gave a wrong aspect of his principles, by reason of which he was exposed to much misrepresentation and obloquy. But when he had found time for a full exposition of his views, all this seemed to die away. He did not, indeed, retract anything, but successfully righted himself as a true advocate for a spiritual keeping of the Lord's day. We think his exclusion, in effect, of the Fourth Commandment from its fundamental position, was a great error. But he designed to place the obligation of the Sabbath on a ground where it would not be successfully impugned as a Jewish institution. His own example and the vein of genuine piety which pervades his journal, his letters and published writings, and the abundant success which crowned his pastoral work, constitute the best evidences of the rectitude of his intentions and purity of his piety.

It would also be not out of place to account for his seeming Broad Church tendencies. He was an earnest, decided Calvinist. But whether in the apartments of the Queen and her family, or the cottages of the meanest peasants, it was his delight to expatiate on the words and work of Christ. It does seem to us that his Calvinism was the Calvinism of the cross; and if love for Christ led him to an excess of charity and too great

tolerance of other faiths, in the usual course of his ministry, it was not that he loved his Church less, but Christ Jesus more.

It is with unaffected pain we call attention to his words on p. 180, Vol. II. Would, for his sake, and that of all who admire him, that his compiler had used better discretion than to print from his journal: "Heard of Lincoln's death. It will, under God, be a blessing to the North, and be the ending of the cursed South. . . . This sympathy with the South is an inscrutable mystery to me. . . . I have never swerved in my sympathy with the North. I believe the day is not far off when we shall hardly believe that Britain's sympathy was with the South. Oh my country! oh Christian Churches! Repent in dust and ashes!" How could this large-hearted, charitable man, utter such language? How traduce and slander a whole people without any proper knowledge of them? The explanation is in the normal effect of the Abolition creed. It is an infidel, Bible-despising Phariseism, and the very essence of malignity is the temper it engenders. A Scotch minister sent to represent the Scotch Church, so full of Abolition temper—that he could not even extend his visit far enough to see the South for himself, remarked to a Christian minister at a dining party, "What wretched *whiskey* they have at your railroad station." He could disgrace himself with tippling, but could not recognise a slaveholder as a Christian brother! Gladly would we know that Dr. Macleod lived to repent of his harsh, uncharitable language. Of all such we can only pray, "Father, forgive them; they know not what they" say.

This is the spirit which now rules this land, and with its malignant intolerance would see the South in ashes and blood to gratify its intense hatred of a people who have never done those who exercise this temper any greater harm than contribute to their overgrown wealth, and a pride "which goeth before a fall."



*History of the Reformation in Europe in the time of Calvin.*  
By the Rev. J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D. D. Translated  
by W. L. R. CATES. Vol. VII. Geneva, Denmark, Sweden,  
Norway, Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, the Netherlands. New  
York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1877.  
Pp.576, 12mo.

In our notice, one year ago, of the 6th Volume of this work, we stated that two other volumes were to follow that one, and we spoke of two editors as engaged in verifying quotations, and in like other ways preparing the author's manuscripts for the press. One of these was M. Adolphe Duchemin, (whom the printer called Duchenu,) a pastor at Lyons, and the son-in-law of D'Aubigné; the other was a Professor Binder, of the Theological College of Geneva.

It appears that this present volume has had for its sole editor the pastor Duchemin, who pleads the pressure of his official work in excuse for the delay of a whole year in the appearance of this volume. He informs the reader that one more and the concluding volume may be expected immediately.

This seventh Volume consists of three Books: one relating to Calvin at Geneva; a second to the Reformation amongst the Scandinavian nations, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway; and a third to its progress in Hungary, Poland, Bohemia, and the Netherlands. The last two are full of interest, but it is to the first we turn with especial eagerness. It contains six chapters, which treat of Calvin's recall to Geneva; Calvin at Ratisbon; Calvin's return to Geneva; The Ecclesiastical Ordinances; Calvin's Preaching; and Calvin's activity.

In the first three we have found little that is new. The fourth chapter gives a minute and very valuable account of Calvin's share in the establishment of the Ecclesiastical Ordinances of Geneva. He was one of a commission appointed by the Council to prepare such a scheme, and had the help of Viret in it, and six laymen were associated with him. Their task was completed in fourteen days, and the work submitted to the Little Council. They worked on it nearly three weeks, accepting many things, but rejecting others. Then Calvin and his commission was con-

sulted again, and yielded some non-essential points. In about another fortnight it is submitted by the Little Council to the Council of the Two Hundred, who adopted it after one or two unimportant amendments. Then it was read to the General Council, and passed by a very large majority.

And yet some of the people, some of the leading citizens, and some of the ministers, were secretly opposed to the whole plan. But Calvin, from first to last, exhibited the most wondrous patience, gentleness, and moderation, and so he gradually overcame all difficulties.

The model on which Calvin sought to frame this Church Government at Geneva, was that of the apostolic Church. The word of God was the rule in everything. And yet he did not get everything arranged according to the word. For example, the ruling elders were elected, not by the Church, but the Little Council, a political body; and these ruling elders were substantially magistrates. Still they were spiritual functionaries as well, and met as a consistory every Thursday morning, to carry out Church oversight and discipline. They protected women against the bad treatment of their husbands, and took note of the duties done by parents and children, masters and servants, brought up before them such matters as extravagance in dress, licentious or irreligious songs, usury, frequenting of taverns and gaming houses, drunkenness, debauchery, and other like offences. They were zealous against all monopolies and all forestallers of food. In truth, the ordinances were quite severe, and men and women were summoned on grounds which would now be thought very trivial. But as the Syndic Auguste Cramer, a magistrate of our own times, has well said, "Without this transformation of morals, the Reformation at Geneva would have been nothing more than a change in the forms of worship." And then the consistory had nothing to do, or only indirectly, with political affairs. Nor was the presidency of the consistory vested in Calvin, but in one of the syndics, although he was really the soul of it. He was indeed called to introduce order in the midst of great confusion; and he had the moderation, and yet the firmness, to accomplish that mission. If it be said he was a *theocrat* at Geneva, our

author well maintains, on the contrary, that at Geneva the State ruled the Church, regulating the hour and the number of the sermons, and allowing no minister to be absent for a few days, or to publish any book, without their leave. At the same time, much depended on the relations, for the time being, in which Calvin stood to the Council. If they were not on good terms with him, they would rigorously impose their authority. Thus it happened, that in the affair of Servetus, Calvin could not, in spite of reiterated demands, induce the magistrate to soften the punishment of the unhappy Spaniard. But when his relations to the Council were agreeable, he had undoubtedly a powerful influence.

Our author exposes the error of those who imagine that Calvin's doctrines were of extreme and intolerant character, while in fact they were marked by eminent moderation. He stood between various extremes.

We can only add, that the chapters which set forth Calvin as *a preacher*, and Calvin's activity, are such as will well repay the reader's attention.

*The Development Hypothesis.* By JAMES McCOSH, D. D., LL.D. 12mo., pp. 104. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York. 1876.

- This work is a collection of several of Dr. McCosh's fugitive pieces upon the Evolution Hypothesis, viz.: An introductory essay furnished to "Wood's Bible Animals;" a lecture of 1873, before the Evangelical Alliance in New York; and some newspaper articles evoked by Professor Huxley's visit to New York.

The author is a Presbyterian minister, a Doctor of Divinity, and president of a Christian College. We therefore regret the impression which his work will make, as of a defeat and retreat of the friends of the Bible before this audacious, infidel theory. Indeed, by many he will be regarded as having virtually proposed to sell out "the stock and good will" of the old Christian doctrine to Darwin & Co. It is necessary that the friends of truth, who do not mean to be sold out to its enemies, shall record their demurrer. This we now do; and this is really all the notice

that this mischievous work deserves. It is remored that the author and his neighbor, the veteran Professor of Theology in Princeton Seminary, have had words about this defection of the former, more emphatic than conciliatory.

But Dr. Hodge is now an old man; and the author, who seems to desire the credit of wearing "a young head on old shoulders," is inclined to account for the former's obdurate attachment to the Bible doctrine of a creation, by the theory now current, as it seems, with "Young America," that the minds of the old men have gotten too much crusted with prejudice to let in the light. So, we are told, no man over forty years of age would adopt Dr. Harvey's theory of the circulation of the blood, until a new generation of physicians arose. So, we are informed, (p. 75) all the *young* "scientists" now go with Darwin, including all of Agassiz's pupils, and even his own son! in spite of Agassiz's pronounced opposition. Those of us who are *old* enough to remember our Bibles, are reminded of another instance of development backwards. The wise Solomon had a son named Rehoboam. And we are still a little comforted by the Bible doctrine, that age usually increases wisdom.

Dr. McCosh finds the young men so fascinated with the Evolution theory, that he is afraid, if we tell them it is inconsistent with Bible truth, (p. 74,) we shall drive them off into infidelity. But we submit, that a creed which thus interprets a pretended Bible is no better than infidelity. It is of little use to preserve the ark after the Shekinah of divinity is lost from it. But this emasculated respect for the Bible, which is left after Evolutionism is established, Dr. McCosh proposes to retain by the following device: He proposes to admit the Evolution hypothesis as to the origin of species, but yet to assert the providential agency of God (after surrendering his creative agency) in the sustentation and direction of the laws of second causes by which evolution works. In this providential operation, he hopes to find the evidence of final cause, which will prove the being and attributes of God. It is to be feared that his "young" scientists will find his device flimsy in this respect: that when God's creative work is once given up, we have no proof left that he exists. We must

first prove *that there is a God*, before we can advance to the doctrine of his providence. And he who has learned to account for all the seeming final causes of creation, by the blind forces of "heredity" and "survival of the fittest," will be very sure to think he finds, in the same blind causes, a sufficient solution of the lesser appearances of design in providence. If we do not know God as Creator, we know him not at all by natural theology.

Dr. McCosh's teachings in this little work are deplorably ambiguous and also contradictory. The reader is left in doubt how much of the false reasoning put by him into the mouths of Evolutionists, he accepts. If we understand him, he seems to admit (p. 74) that the young scientists are justified in thinking the Evolution theory proved by "the gradation of fossils," observed by them in cabinets. But men of real science no more regard this fact, that palæontologic life presented many stages, from the rudest to the more complicated and perfect forms, as proving Evolution, than they believe that the many gradations between existing snails and mammalia prove that the existing species of horses and oxen have been evolved from the existing species of snails. The Bible doctrine of a creation by a wise sovereign Creator, accounts for that gradation, in both ancient and modern organisms, perfectly. Dr. McCosh says, p. 6: "The Scriptures teach a doctrine of evolution." He mentions, as specimens of it, the growth of the animal from the germ, and of the plant from the seed. But every scientific man knows that this is not evolution, but generation—wholly another matter. Of course, we all understand that the Bible teaches us God created the first of each organisms to reproduce "after its kind." But evolution teaches that the first individuals of each species were generated from different kinds. On p. 7 he says: "All but Atheists admit that matter has been created by God." (Neither Plato, nor Pythagoras, nor Aristotle, nor Spinoza, admitted any such thing; but they were not Atheists; and the apostle Paul seemed to think that no Theists even, admitted it, save such as had been taught by faith. Heb. xi. 3) But the author then contradicts himself, p. 4, by teaching that the matter of every thing on earth preëxisted in some other form, and by seeming to adopt,

p. 36, the nebular hypothesis of the Atheist La Place. On p. 13 he points out the obvious and fatal defect of Evolution: that it *rests on no facts*; that no Darwin has ever seen a new species evolved from a different one. On p. 22, he retracts this sound logic, and argues preposterously that such verification is needless. He adds (p. 23): "Evolutionists will have established their hypothesis when they can show that it meets the observed facts." No. They will have established their hypothesis only when they have shown that *it alone meets the observed facts*. And this is wholly another matter! When Huxley claimed that the discovery of some bones of the "Orohippus" in America, an animal nearer in the structure of its skeleton to our horse than quadrupeds previously known, proved his evolution doctrine as thoroughly as Newton proved the Copernican system, every sound mind saw the extravagance. Granting his facts, the utmost they inferred was, that if there is any evolution, the horse *may have been* evolved through the *orohippus*. But between this "may be" and a "must be," there is a mighty chasm. And this can only be bridged by a verification of actual, observed facts; such as those facts of the planetary motions and gibbous phases, by which Galileo and Newton demonstrated the theory of orbital circulations.

But enough. We conclude that this last emission will add as little to the author's reputation as to the cause of truth. Its only significance is in the mischief which his position enables it to effect.

*Presbyterians and the Revolution.* By the Rev. WM. P. BREED, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 205, 12mo.

We admit the duty of patriotism in ministers; but all sinking of preacher or pastor in the partisan or the politician is surely to be deprecated. Nay, when a gospel minister merges in any degree his high vocation in even the statesman's pursuits, it is surely just such a coming down from his great work as Nehemiah the prophet felt to be unworthy of him. We hesitate, therefore, to accord to Dr. John Witherspoon the adulation this work be-

stows. Nor can we go into spasms of ecstatic delight over "the cause of American liberty," and "the heroes of 1776," and the "inalienable rights of man," which the little book appears to be intended to glorify. The truth is, we set little value on the rights of man, but a very high value on the rights of Englishmen and Americans. And we have precisely one and the same standard by which to measure our heroes of 1776 in all these States, and our heroes of 1861-5 in these Southern States, viz.: what it was they fought for, which we take to have been in both cases alike, the sacred cause of constitutional freedom and regulated liberty. As for "the cause of American liberty," since all true American liberty is only British liberty a little more developed, we must understand this little book as designed to be a "hurrah for American *Independence*;" and we are unable to see wherein the *independence* of these States could be so glorious a thing in 1776, and yet so horrible a thing as asserted by the South in 1861. In fact, we cannot reconcile the zeal of our Northern brethren in setting forth the cause of American liberty in 1776, with their cold and cruel indifference to the prostrate and oppressed condition in 1876 of one, and a chief one, of those very thirteen States which inaugurated and established the glorious Revolution now just one century old; nay, we cannot comprehend how, in 1876, any true patriot can boast of "American liberty," when it is the Government of the United States itself which alone is now trampling under foot poor prostrate South Carolina.

Where, we may well ask, is all the love our Presbyterian brethren of the North have been so loudly professing for us in all their overtures about Fraternal Relations, that they have no word of remonstrance to utter in primary assemblies of the people against the iron heel of military power being employed by the Government at Washington to crush out our liberties?

The little work which is the subject of this notice aims at the self-laudation of Presbyterians. It is a small business, and the book does it, we must say, in a small and shallow way. It is evidently a Philadelphia endeavor to make capital for Presbyterianism out of the Centennial. How *malapropos*, from the

political point of view, while several of the States of this Union are trodden under foot, and the whole fabric threatens to topple to its fall. One short century, what havoc it has wrought of the hopes and aspirations which our fathers reasonably cherished! We remember what Mr. Seward said a few years before the war: "The North has assumed and will keep the Government;" and also what Senator Hammond replied: "Very well; we of the South turn the Government over to you, the grandest political fabric in the world; and let the world see what you will do with it!" And what has the North done, and what is she now doing, with it!

And what of this Philadelphia effort at the self-laudation of Presbyterians, from the religious point of view? Let it be admitted that Presbyterians are the elect amongst God's elect on the earth; and then which most becomes them, self-glorying, or the deepest self-abasement before God? A people who, with such a doctrine and such a polity, have allowed both the Methodists and the Roman Catholics to outstrip them!—a people who starve their ministers at home, and let their Foreign Missions run them into debt! But let us drop the curtain and say no more on this point.

We have spoken of this little book as a very shallow exhibition of what it undertakes to set forth. In proof, let any reader examine Chapter II., which attempts to exhibit Presbyterianism as a "*representative republican form of government.*" That is a very fine subject, and Dr. Breed should have put forth his strength upon it. He should have expounded the republican form of government, so that his readers might understand what are the principles that constitute it. He should have set forth the simplicity and majesty, the beauty and the power, which characterise representative government; and he should have showed us how Presbyterianism makes the Church to be a free commonwealth, and how the very notion of representative government was first revealed in the Scriptures as well of the Old as of the New Testament. He has attempted nothing of this sort. His whole treatment of this grand theme is to parade a few petty quotations from Barnes, Bancroft, Hallam, Horsley,



Macaulay, Isaac Taylor, and Archbishop Hughes, whose comparison of the Presbyterian General Assembly to the American Congress evidently tickles our author almost beyond his power of enjoyment. Then come two very inadequate and incomplete as well as brief statements of what are the principles of Presbyterianism. The chapter concludes with a very faulty, and indeed a false, parallel of our Church government with that of the States, separately and united; and Dr. Breed's happiness appears to be complete, as he rapturously exclaims: "It is obvious, therefore, that our Church government is in singular harmony with the spirit and form of government in both the state and nation."

Alas, is this all that the Presbyterian Board of Publication could find to say of the divinely revealed government of the Church by her own chosen rulers!

*Christ the Teacher of Men.* By Rev. A. W. PITZER, author of "Ecce Deus Homo." Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1877. Pp. 219, 12mo., \$1.50.

"My object is not controversial, but to state the truth according to the written word, in its positive and didactic form.

"For that truth I have no apologies to make; for anything not therein revealed, I have no explanation to offer."

The above paragraphs from the author's brief preface have been quoted, because they are so characteristic of his treatment of the subject. This book is fitted to do a good work. Whilst it will instruct the most intelligent divine, it will also be comprehended by the humblest believer. This is one of its striking excellences; it is simple, clear, scriptural, cogent, conclusive. No one familiar with his Bible need fear to fail in comprehending and so following out the line of thought.

Its contents are embraced under eleven distinct chapters: 1. The Spirit of the Learner. 2. The Prophetic Office of Christ. 3. The Extent of Christ's Teachings. 4. Christ the Covenant Prophet. 5. Christ Teaching through the Holy Ghost. 6. Christ Teaching by Miracles. 7. Christ Teaching by Types. 8. Personal Peculiarities of Christ as Teacher of

Men. 9. Christ, the Revealer of God. 10. The Credentials of Christ. 11. The Temptation of Christ.

It would have afforded us pleasure to have given a brief sketch of each chapter, and a few quotations under each division of the subject, but both space and time forbid. We must content ourselves with a point here and there. The general principle developed and illustrated in the first chapter—"Spirit of the Learner"—is announced in the following proposition: "The kind and degree of enjoyment of every created thing is conditioned upon its nature and capacity." P. 10. . . . "Enjoyment of every sort does not depend so much upon external conditions as upon internal capacities." P. 12. "To be in sympathy with God is necessary to hearing and receiving his words." "As the instinct of the animal is needful to understand the things of the animal world, as the rational mind is needful to understand the things of the rational world, so the spiritual mind is needful to understand the things of the spiritual world." P. 14. "The best cure for infidelity, in all its forms and phases, is the frequent and faithful study of the character, work, and words of the Lord Jesus Christ." "The very truthfulness of Christ is the reason why men, in love with lies, reject him." P. 16. Attentiveness and teachableness—qualities requisite in all other learners—are unspeakably more important in him who would learn the lesson of Eternal Life from this great Teacher of men.

Under the head of the "Prophetical Office of Christ"—Chap. 2—the author administers much needed rebuke to fortune-tellers, spiritualists, etc., and to those who countenance them. It is an attempt on the part of the former to usurp the prophetical office of Christ; on the part of the latter, to uphold and sustain these usurpers. In the one, it is to assume the place of God; in the other, it is to render idolatrous worship. In both parties it is daring impiety. Admitting (as the author does) "that there are many well-attested cases of power exercised by" these impostors, and of "knowledge imparted by them," which cannot easily be explained on the ground of "grossest frauds and deceptions," he makes bold to declare that they can and should be explained on the theory "of Satanic and diabolical agency." We say "he

makes bold to declare" it, because it requires no little courage for any one to avouch, in this age so full of scepticism in the Church and out of it, his belief in Satanic agency in these matters, and to intimate his belief in a personal devil. This old-fashioned Scripture truth—the personality of the devil—our author believes and teaches. The thought crops out continually, and is a part of the very groundwork of his treatment of the subject; we have noted this thought on pages 25, 34, 103, 173, 197, 199, and 203—thus it permeates the entire book. If for no other reason than to revive in the minds of the rising generation a vivid conception of this Bible truth, it would be well to place this book in the hands of all our youth of both sexes. Especially during the Christmas and New Year festivities do we wish our young people could realise that the devil may be a guest in every ball-room and a partner in every set.

Christ is presented in this chapter as a "complete" Teacher; and under this head Romanists and Rationalists receive a share of the author's attention. Christ "teaches with absolute *certainty*," with "authority," and with "infallibility." High Church pretensions are briefly rebuked, and the "inalienable right and paramount duty of every human being to hear the voice of this Teacher," forcibly asserted and argued.

In the third chapter, the extent of Christ's teachings is asserted to be the whole Bible. This is divided into "facts," "doctrines," and "duties;" thus presenting us with an exhaustive classification of the Bible. In this chapter the author discusses the "sins of the saints in the Old Testament," and "the imprecatory portions of the Scripture." This discussion would give relief to many pious humble minds amongst our private church members, and would greatly aid our ministers in expounding the word of God in reference to these subjects.

The author not only encourages but insists upon doctrinal preaching. "There is no such thing as profitable 'practical' preaching apart from doctrinal preaching. Christ and the apostles were eminently doctrinal preachers." P. 63. He distinguishes between doctrinal and polemical preaching. P. 61. We are not sure, but the impression made upon us is, that the

author intends to discourage polemics in the pulpit. If so, we must demur. It is oftentimes difficult, and sometimes impossible, to preach doctrines without preaching polemically. It is neither becoming nor necessary to lose your temper because you are preaching a polemical discourse. We must contend earnestly for the faith, pull down the strongholds of error, as well as build up the walls of truth. Truth is often most clearly presented in contrast with its opposing error. Christ was a polemic—no one more so; so was Paul. The Sermon on the Mount, as well as many of the Epistles, are models, not only of doctrinal but also of polemical discourses. If it become the fashion to decry polemics, then doctrines will not long hold their place. We must fight—sometimes defensively, again offensively, but always courteously. Be ye wise as serpents, harmless as doves.

In the fourth chapter—Christ the Covenant Prophet—there is one point (incidental, it is true,) which we wish to notice. The author, in illustrating the “power” which “an unwavering belief that he is called and commissioned of God” gives a preacher over his fellow-men, illustrates his position by Luther, Whitefield, and Moody. We have no objection to the first two, but we protest against ranking Mr. Moody in the same list with them. To us it seems incontrovertible that there is danger ahead, when “self-appointed” men assume the functions of the gospel ministry. This example seems all the more out of place in this chapter, which teaches “that Jesus Christ was not a *self-appointed* teacher.” “So, a very proper question to be asked concerning Jesus Christ is, Does he come from God as an *authorised* teacher.” Pp. 72 and 73. Now, if this be “a very proper question concerning Jesus Christ,” is it not *a fortiori* “a very proper question concerning” all others? Here is the exact difficulty to our mind: How can Mr. Moody give a satisfactory answer to this “very proper question,” ignoring the functions of the Church, as he does, so far forth at least as his own call is concerned? How can he have that “unwavering belief that he is called and commissioned of God?” Three elements are necessary to make out the call and produce an unwavering belief: the testimony of the Spirit of Christ in the man’s own soul, the tes-

timony of the people of Christ, and the testimony of the *Church of Christ speaking through her judicatories*. Let the Church beware! *Obsta principiis*. (See article on "Lay Preaching," in this REVIEW, April, 1876.)

This chapter leaves no doubt of the author's strict Calvinism. The covenant is "between Father, Son, and Holy Ghost." "To reveal the covenant, the God of the covenant and the grace of the covenant, is the sum and the substance of his prophetic instructions." P. 76. "Christ, as Prophet of the covenant, comes to unfold the divine plan eternally formed. Apart from that covenant there is no salvation, and therefore no Prophet to reveal any will of God unto any human salvation." P. 77. "If called upon for the proof of any such covenant, the answer is obvious: *the whole Bible is filled with this doctrine*. Christ is everywhere set forth as the Mediator of this covenant, as the executor of its provisions. The crowning ordinance of the kingdom, gathered by him through the truth, is, *This cup is the new covenant in my blood*. Priest of the covenant, he seals it with his own precious blood; King of the covenant, he receives his Bride, the Church, as a covenant gift from his heavenly Father; Prophet of the covenant, he reveals its truth to the salvation of his elect people. Outside of this covenant he is neither Priest, nor King, nor Prophet; and apart from this, he has neither worshippers, nor subjects, nor disciples." P. 78.

In the fourth chapter—Christ Teaching through the Holy Ghost—the questions, "What is inspiration?" and "How can the one Spirit of Christ speak thus through Moses, David, Isaiah, Malachi, Matthew, Paul, and John, and yet each writer preserve his own personal characteristics and peculiarities?"—are discussed in a clear and masterly manner. Let the private Christian, who has long puzzled his mind over these and kindred questions, purchase the book and read and enjoy it for himself, and then make it a present to his pastor.

There is much we intended to say on each of the remaining chapters, especially the sixth—"Christ Teaching by Miracles"; the seventh—"Teaching by Types"; and tenth—"Credentials of Christ"; but we must forbear.

The last chapter—"The Temptation of Christ"—is orthodox, according to the ancient type of orthodoxy on this subject. The "Reality of the Temptation," no less than the "Sinless Perfection" of Christ, is maintained faithfully, presented scripturally, and enforced practically. The beauty of this chapter is, that it seems to gather up all that has preceded, and throw the concentrated rays upon this subject for its illumination. No one should read the last chapter till he has read all the preceding.

"When Satan tempted the woman, she yielded to his evil suggestion, her will consented, and thus she sinned and fell. Joseph was tempted by Potiphar's wife to commit adultery, but he repelled the thought, his will resisted the evil, and he fled from the temptation. In the one instance there was sin; in the other no sin, only temptation." P. 201.

*The Ministry of the Word.* By WM. M. TAYLOR, D. D., Minister of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York City. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Company. 1876. Pp. 318, 12mo.

"The Lyman Beecher Lectureship" of Yale College, to which we are primarily indebted for this excellent volume, is likely to give us a number of treatises on the functions of the gospel ministry. And if these "Lectures for 1876" be a specimen of the style of lectures which shall be annually sent forth, we shall certainly not object to receiving them. The fact that the persons chosen to deliver them are themselves eminent preachers, actively and successfully engaged in the work of the ministry, will no doubt tend to make their productions more practical and valuable, and render them more interesting and acceptable to the class of readers who would seek such books.

The volume before us does not claim to be, the author tells us in the Preface, "a treatise on homiletics. Neither is it a ministerial autobiography. But it is an attempt to give to my younger brethren in the pulpit, and to those who are preparing for the ministry, some practical hints which I should have been thankful to have received twenty years ago, and which have been suggested to me as much by the blunders as by the successes of my public life." And right well has he fulfilled the task which he

laid out for himself. The book, full of "practical hints" on important matters pertaining to the actual work of the minister, is just such a one as we would have been glad to have had ourselves in beginning the ministerial work, and such as we would like now to put into the hands of every young minister.

The twelve lectures embraced in this volume are upon the following topics:

- I. The Nature and Design of the Christian Ministry.
- II. and III. The Preparation of the Preacher.
- IV. The Theme and Range of the Pulpit.
- V. The Qualities of Effective Preaching—in the Sermon.
- VI. The Qualities of Effective Preaching—in the Preacher.
- VII. Expository Preaching.
- VIII. On the Use of Illustrations in Preaching.
- IX. The Conduct of Public Worship—Reading of the Scriptures.
- X. The Conduct of Public Worship—Praise and Prayer.
- XI. The Pastorate and Pastoral Visitation.
- XII. The Relation of the Pulpit to Present Questions.

We suppose that there is always a peculiar charm to ministers in everything bearing directly upon the great work of preaching the gospel, in which, however earnestly and successfully employed, they always feel very deeply their own deficiencies, and are ever reaching after higher attainments. It was therefore with a keen appetite for what was before us that we scanned this table of contents, and with a genuine relish that we entered upon the discussion of them as contained in the book. And we must confess that we were not disappointed. Of course we did not expect much that was new upon a subject which has been so often and so fully discussed before. But we found many good though familiar things well said; and it was pleasant to have our memories refreshed by them. And our interest increased as we advanced. The lectures upon Expository Preaching and the Use of Illustrations in Preaching, struck us as particularly good; while those upon the Conduct of Public Worship and the Pastorate and Pastoral Visitation are also excellent. We would heartily commend the careful perusal of all these to our brethren

of the ministry. And the whole volume will be found to be full of safe and valuable counsel to any minister of the Word.

As specimens of the timely and judicious advice which is given to young ministers upon points in which they are most likely to err, we note one or two passages selected from different parts of the volume. The first that we quote bears upon the regard for the spiritual nourishment and culture of believers—especially young Christians—in the ministrations of the pulpit. Our author says (pp. 95, 96):

“It has come to be taken for granted in many quarters that the success of a ministry is to be gauged simply by the number of conversions which have occurred in its course; and this has led many churches to bend all their energies toward the securing of such accessions to their membership, as if that were the sole end to be attained. Pastor, Sabbath-school teachers, office-bearers, members, labor and pray in public, and exhort in private, in order that they may lead men to Christ, and to a public confession of him; and then, when they have got their names on the communion roll, they leave them to take care of themselves, and they go and look after others. But, in reality, this is only the beginning with them, and to leave them thus untended, is the greatest possible mistake.

“We cry out against the heedlessness of those parents who so neglect their offspring as to leave them an easy prey to the diseases which make such havoc on little children. But ‘*infant mortality*’ is by no means unknown in our churches, any more than in our cities; and I fear that the disappearance of many who were once written down as ‘*hopefully converted*,’ is due to the fact that so many of our ministers and their coadjutors never concern themselves with any other topic than conversion. Now this is unquestionably a most important theme, and the direction of inquirers is an interesting and intensely exciting department of ministerial labor; but it is not the whole work of the pastor,” etc., etc.

The next that we quote relates to the general work of the pastorate (pp. 261, 262):

“And first, in reference to parish matters, or things pertaining to the management of congregational affairs, let me advise you not to attempt to do too much at the outset of your ministry. Your earliest impulse, as soon as you discover how matters are, will be to set everything right in a moment; and as the young house-maid, in her attempts to clean a room, generally ends by making the confusion greater than it was when she began, the probability is that you will only increase the difficulties by your efforts to overcome them. Make haste slowly. The first thing



you have to do is to attain ease in the preparation of your discourses. . . . And in order to do that thoroughly, you must resist the temptations that will be put before you to induce you to do a great many more things at the same time. These may be very important in their places; but the other is the most important, and they can wait. As John Bright once said, 'You can't drive six omnibuses abreast through Temple Bar.' Neither can you carry on a great number of different enterprises in the first year or two of your pastorate. Robert Hall was in the habit of saying, that when the devil saw that a young minister was in earnest, he got on his back and rode him to death, in order that he might be the sooner rid of him; and I believe statistics show that the greatest mortality among young ministers is during the first three years after settlement. Now one at least of the causes of that is, that most young men put 'too many irons into the fire' at first. Without stopping until their pulpit preparations have become easy to them, they set up a Bible class, a cottage meeting, a mission station, and so on, and go into each of them with all the fervor of juvenile enthusiasm, until warned by failing health, when it is too late, they abandon some, or may have to look for another sphere. Now you will not understand that I am an advocate of laziness, when I say that such a course as that is very bad economy indeed. The sixth commandment is, 'Thou shalt not kill,' and it forbids suicide equally with murder. Therefore, in your pastorate, as in the ascent of a hill, take it leisurely at first; for if you run yourself out of breath in the early stages of your life journey, you will have no strength remaining for the later.'

*Elijah the Prophet.* By the Rev. WILLIAM M. TAYLOR, D. D., Minister of the Broadway Tabernacle, New York City, author of "David, King of Israel." New York: Harper & Bros. 1876. Pp. 209, 12mo.

It was certainly somewhat of a venture to thrust before the reading public another claimant for popular favor upon Elijah, when the excellent work of Krummacher, "Elijah the Tishbite," and the charming volume of Macduff, "The Prophet of Fire," have been so extensively read and are to be found in nearly every library in the land. But the never-failing interest of the subject, and the common thirst for new books, may avail to secure ready readers for this volume also. And the inculcation, by such means, of the lofty principles and stern virtues of the grand old Reformer of the corrupt reign of Ahab, may be opportune in a day like the present in our own land.

This book we take to be a series of the author's Sabbath even-

ing discourses, prepared upon the plan which he admirably sets forth in his lecture on "Expository Preaching" in his volume on "The Ministry of the Word." And they are certainly noble specimens of that style of pulpit eloquence. The history is brought out clearly and beautifully in each case; and then the lessons to be learned from it are enforced in a plain practical manner. The style is simple, perspicuous, and vigorous; without redundancy of words or prolixity of description. The imagery is clear and striking; and the whole matter practical and valuable. We have read the volume with much interest and pleasure, and heartily commend it to the perusal of all who desire an entertaining and instructive book upon an important period of Old Testament history.

*Lectures on the Books of the Bible. Third series, from Romans to Revelation.* By DONALD FRASER, D. D. American Edition. Robert Carter & Brothers.

With only an opportunity to glance *around* this book, rather than *through* it, we have formed a most favorable opinion of it. Traversing so large a field of historical inquiry as that involved in the authorship, style, times, etc., of the books of the Bible, these "Lectures" are very much condensed, and must be so. Yet this is one of the virtues of the book. The reader is burdened with the smallest amount of common-places and accepted historical matter. The argument of order, authorship, time, canonicity, is exceedingly compact, yet not less racy. The argument of matter, powerfully synoptical, binding a whole book into a fascicle of thought; sometimes into a single key, which opens to you its varied treasures. Thus, *δικη*—the leading element of righteous-ness, justice, judgment, law, etc., unlocks Paul's argument in the Epistle to the Romans. The reader who makes himself master of this idea, in its judicial and moral relations, in its diversities of presentation, may comprehend the Epistle to the Romans. Difficulties, moral, exegetical, doctrinal, vanish before it. In this light Dr. Fraser's Lectures are a timely and valuable addition to Biblical science. Both as to the cover and the contents of the best of books, they meet

another state of things. The habit widely prevails of taking the Bible in unconnected parcels and bits, in paragraphs and isolated sentences, without observing what influence the scope, circumstances, and times may throw over them. It is in this way, too, that sceptics distort our holy writings, a fashion of criticism by which any book may be torn to pieces. It is thus precisely that Papal writers have educed most of their futile dogmas from the sacred writings. Thus, in giving a passing notice to James v. 14, 15, the author shows that in the absence of any well-defined system of medical practice, the "anointing with oil" was the chief curative resource of the Orientals in sickness, and Christians are exhorted to employ their own Christian "presbyters" rather than the physicians coming from a heathen priesthood around them. How preposterous, the author remarks, is the citation of this passage as a scriptural warrant for what is called in the Papal Church "extreme unction"—a sacrament supposed to convey grace to the *dying: sacramentum exeuntium*. The precept that elders, while anointing, (a word which virtually covers all sound medical prescriptions,) should pray over them with a view to *their recovery*, is changed into a direction that a priest should come in when recovery is *hopeless*.

While we are speaking of this passing stroke upon Romanism, we may notice how he in fact demolishes the whole historical basis of the Papacy, the Primacy of Peter. The sixteenth of Romans is a catalogue of names and salutations at once tender and beautiful, in which Phebe, Priscilla, Aquila, and others are mentioned as "*saints*," real living men and women, to whom messages could be sent; not departed personages, canonised by authority and appealed to in prayer. Again, no priest, monks, nuns, are mentioned or alluded to in this catalogue of addresses; but *family life* is more than once alluded to as that which becometh saints. But what is still more remarkable and even inexplicable on the theory of the Primacy, no allusion is made in all this list of saints to Peter or the See of Rome.

Something after the plan of Dean Alford, each Book or Epistle is opened with an explanatory prologue, entering with more than usual historical interest into the circumstances and causes

of its writing, and entering largely into the explanation of its scope and of particular passages. Thus the Corinthian church was mainly a Gentile one, just converted from idolatry and emerging from the corruption of heathen life. The Epistle to the Corinthians was therefore meant largely to correct manners and the social life. It was more *casuistical*, in the good sense of that term. The Epistle to the Romans more *theological*, as addressed to Hellenists in Rome, whose minds had been opened to the world of trade, literature, and government around them, and could appreciate a systematic and argumentative presentation of the great religion based upon the great principle which runs through it.

The book is clear, strong, fair, manly, learned, without a particle of bombast or display of exegetical lore. It gives you the results rather than the travails of exegesis. It is transfused, more than all, with soundness of doctrine and glowing piety. Even in their present condensed form, the Lectures conclude with a brief apologue of benevolent interest in the reader—a short but intellectual application.

We have not an unfavorable criticism to make. The book is a fine adaptation to the state of religious thought in the present age; pertinent, direct, instructive, interspersed with a large amount of the findings of learning, some exhumed from a fossilised state.

*Memories of Familiar Books.* By the Hon. WM. B. REED of Pennsylvania; with a brief Memoir, by MANTON MARBLE, Esq. New York: E. J. Hale & Son. 1876. 12mo., pp. 270.

Many things commend this book to our readers. The first of these is solid merit, grounded on thorough scholarship, elegant tastes, and ennobling sentiments. Among the accessory claims to our readers' favor, we account the honored names of the publishers, the Hales, once ornaments of Fayetteville, N. C.; the career of the author as a professional and public man of liberal and just spirit, crowned with many of the highest honors of his country in its better days, and his unswerving support, amidst

obloquy, neglect, and calamity, of the rights of the South and of constitutional government.

Mr. Reed contributed to the *New York World*, in his last years, brief literary sketches, presenting a rapid but just estimate of favorite books. The number is twenty-one. They were afterwards collected into this volume. They include such authors as Swift, Bolingbroke, Junius, *The Prayer Book*, "Sermons—Barrow to Manning," the *Napiers*, *Novels*, Defoe to Thackeray, Walter Scott, and a touching tribute to his brother, Professor Henry Reed, lost with "the Arctic." To some of the critic's sentimental partiality for prelacy and its forms of prayer, we are constrained to demur. But the pleasure we have derived from his vigorous and powerful support of other of our literary conclusions, pleads with us to condone that extravagance. The reader will find cause, we think, to thank Mr. Reed especially for the comparison in which he exalts Thackeray over Dickens, and evinces the purity, moral elevation, catholic sympathies, and truth of the former, over the affectations, clap-trap, unbelief, and essential vulgarity of the latter. To us, the furor of admiration for the pinchbeck splendors of Boz, especially among Americans, has always been a grievance. Perhaps we deserve little credit for the more correct judgment which we claim to have exercised about him. For, in truth, it was due more to an early caution received from an admired instructor, himself one of the most elegant scholars Europe has produced, in the youthful day when we were beguiled, in common with the crowd, by the humor and pathos of "Sam Weller" and "Little Nell." It was then that this enlightened critic astounded us, in the midst of our ill-judged enthusiasm, by showing us that Dickens was, after all, successful only in the lowest sphere of art. You can but rank him, said he, when compared with the splendors of Scott's historical romances, as the Dutch school of "kitchen art" rank beside a Raphael or an Angelo. The kitchen school could amuse you by the perverse accuracy with which they delineated what was unworthy of permanent delineation—a cabbage-head upon a kitchen table, a fish preparing for the frying pan, the cat attempting to steal the lobster and "catching a tartar," the Dutch

*frau* with her short pipe and multitudinous skirts. Such is the height of Dickens's range. He can describe a Cockney or an old-clothes' man to the life. But all his gentlemen are chilling abortions. Christianity is always painted, with a relentless malice and treachery, as false and repulsive. And the author, while waging continual war against "religious cant," is ever involved in the cant of a pseudo-philanthropy, at least as false and hollow as that of the meanest Pharisee. Thackeray, too, can satirise hypocrisy. And his touch is as much finer than Dickens's as the edge of the Damascus blade than that of the oyster-knife. But it is only hypocrisy wearing the mask of Christianity or virtue to which Thackeray applies the lash. After chastising the impudent pretence, he never fails to make you bow with him in reverent homage to the holy reality. Where has true godliness ever found more honorable treatment than in the portraiture of Mrs. Pendennis and Colonel Newcome? We thank Mr. Reed that he holds the scales so justly between these two authors, exalting the one who makes Christian virtue and catholic sympathies venerable, and depreciating the literary hypocrite who would teach us to traffic in pathos and sectional prejudices alike.

Mr. Reed's long and brilliant career closed, like that of so many of the Southern gentlemen who shared his generous sympathies, in poverty and calamity. His household circle was broken and scattered by bereavement. The earnings of an honorable and laborious life were totally swept away. His last days were spent in personal toils to keep the "wolf from the door" of the few that were left for him to love. But all this could not damp his geniality of soul, his delight in the higher walks of literature, or his courage for truth and right. The reader will find in these sketches just that restful and soothing discussion, neither trivial nor profound, which closes the sterner labors of the day with the evening's repose. His book is one for the fireside, the easy-chair, and the dressing-gown and slippers.

*Lectures on the Gospels. For the Sundays and Chief Festivals of the Church Year.* By JOSEPH A. SEISS, D. D., Pastor of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Holy Communion, Philadelphia, Pa. Complete in two Volumes. Pp. 1160, 8vo. Philadelphia: Lutheran Book Store, Smith, English & Co. 1876.

These Lectures on the Gospels are replete with interest, both from the easy and classical style in which they are written, and the fine specimens they furnish of popular pulpit exposition. The Lutheran Church did not carry the Reformation in all respects as far as the Presbyterian Churches of Switzerland, France, Holland, Scotland, Ireland, and even the Reformed of Germany, and the English Dissenters did, especially in the observance of holy and festival days. Their book of worship is arranged in accordance with these. The Advent, celebrating Christ's coming to Jerusalem; Christmas, celebrating his birth; New Year, celebrating his circumcision; the Epiphany, or his manifestation to the Gentiles, coinciding with the visit of the wise men to the infant Jesus; Lent, celebrating the forty days' fasting of our blessed Redeemer; Holy Thursday, the beginning of Passion week; Good Friday, the crucifixion; Easter, Ascension Day, Whitsunday, or Pentecost; Trinity Sunday—from these several festivals, the various Sundays of the year are counted, and the pericopes or lessons from the Gospels and Epistles, to be read as a part of worship, are arranged in accordance with them. It is pleaded for these appointments, that they cannot be classed with the ordinary Saints' days of the Church of Rome; that they are commemorative of the great events of our Saviour's life, and draw the minds of the people towards the only name given under heaven whereby they may be saved. It is, however, the doctrine of the Westminster Confession, that "there is no day commanded in Scripture to be kept holy under the gospel but the Lord's day, which is the Christian Sabbath. Festival days, vulgarly called *holy days*, having no warrant in the word of God, are not to be continued." (Directory for Worship.) These days had been so abused to the purposes of superstition, (and especially when occurring on other days than the Sabbath,) of indolence,

voluptuousness, and excess, that they had for these reasons fallen greatly into disrepute, and came to be regarded as an abomination by the people of God. These uncommanded seasons, too, were held to be an unlawful encroachment upon the authority of Christ, and a revival of those Galatian observances of "days and months and times and years" which made Paul "afraid" of that early Church, "lest he had bestowed labor upon them in vain." It may be prejudice, but we do not like to see such words in any Church calendar as the First Sunday in Advent; the Second, Third, etc., Sunday in Advent; Christmas; Sunday after Christmas; Epiphany; Holy Innocents; First Sunday after Epiphany; etc., Septuagesima Sunday, Sexagesima, Quinquagesima, etc., First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth Sunday in Lent; Holy Thursday; Holy Thursday Night; Good Friday; Easter Sunday; Easter Monday; First, Second, Third, etc., Sunday after Easter; Ascension Day; Sunday after Ascension; Whitsunday; Trinity Sunday; First, Second, and so on, to the Twenty-Sixth Sunday after Trinity. The observance of holidays was one of the "five articles of Perth," imposed upon the Scotch people on "*Black Saturday*," August 4, 1671, a day "black with man's guilt and with the frowns of heaven." We have no Church Calendar. We have only the Christian Sabbaths, appointed by the Creator himself, regularly recurring by the ordinance of him who rules in the world of nature; and yet we would remember ever that wondrous history of the incarnation, consecration, ministry, agony, death, resurrection, and ascension of our Lord, which these greater festivals of the Church were meant to commemorate. These remarks, we confess, have nothing to do with the merits of the volume before us.

It is difficult, as all who have tried it know, to excel in expository discourses. One may be too minute, too dry, too diffuse. Yet it was the method adopted by those ancient preachers, Chrysostom, Augustine, and others. Of this method, these lectures of Dr. Seiss are admirable specimens. The main thoughts of the passage are dwelt upon, minute criticism avoided, the great pregnant truths brought forth and pressed upon the heart. His own travels in the country trod by our Saviour's



feet, enabled him to appreciate the circumstances which surrounded that divine Teacher in his childhood, youth, and public ministry. The scenery around Nazareth, the Sea of Galilee, and Jerusalem, often assist him in his graphic descriptions, and his unaffected yet polished and flowing style, not infrequently rises into real and impassioned eloquence. He is indeed earnest too, in pressing home the lessons of his text on the consciences of his hearers.

We suppose Dr. Seiss to be a believer in the premillennial advent of our Lord Jesus Christ. A second advent of our Redeemer we all expect. That it will be pre-millennial, some of our most earnest brethren believe, though this persuasion is not the current sentiment of our Church. We quote the following passage, not as the finest specimen of the style, but as expressive, we suppose, of this opinion. In one part of it, however, he cuts around with the rough broad-sword of the soldier, rather than with the careful dissecting knife of the surgeon.

“Did Jerusalem’s day of judgment come on in a seemingly natural course of things? So also will it be with the coming of the great day. It will have much less of the immediately supernatural to herald it than many are counting. It is when men are saying, Peace and safety, that the mighty destruction will break in. Things will move on much in their ordinary way. The times will gradually alter from what they once were, but it will be taken as the result of progress and enlarged ideas—the herald of a better order. The common works of men will be as usual, only that the world will move faster. Expeditions will be planned, armies mustered, contests waged, battles fought, sieges pressed and endured, tyrannies established, and human passions set in action, all with the usual motives, only the more intensified. Some startling portents shall appear, noted and heeded by some, by the most disregarded, or explained away as freaks of nature, signifying nothing. The intimations are that scarcely any will at all suspect what is at hand, or whither things are drifting, till the last fires burst forth, and all is over.

“Were those last days of the old economy, days of abounding falsehood and deception, when men were lured with false lights, encouraged with false hopes, and betrayed by pseudo-saviours and lying prophets? The same is to occur again. The plain word is, ‘There shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders, in-somuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect.’ Satan will get possession of men, and hallucinate them with strange be-

liefs that they are sent of God, and impersonations of his power and wisdom, for the direction and salvation of mankind. I have had two such come to me within the past few years, the one claiming that he was the great prophet Elijah; and the other, that he was the prince of God and the future King of Israel; who left me the benefit of their amiable curses when I refused to credit their blasphemous pretensions, or to help them in their miserable schemes. Plenty of new lights, with their Lo! here is Christ, and Lo there, are coming up every day, leaping about over Christendom like the frogs of Egypt, each with his party of wondering admirers, and all in zealous activity, spoiling the truth of God, and deluding and ruining the souls of men. And so it will go on, the success and fame of one emboldening and paving the way for another, till the great body of Christendom shall be loosed from its moorings, betrayed into the devil's hands, and ripened for the calamities of the judgment, which shall come upon it as a snare upon an unsuspecting animal.

"The zealots in the days of Jerusalem's trouble would by no means believe what was before them, or what wickednesses they were enacting in the name of truth. To them the thought that God was about to surrender them to destruction, was the worst of treason. How could it be! Were they not the seed of faithful Abraham, the heirs to the covenants and promises! Were not all the prophets of their blood! Were not their calling and all their distinctive laws from heaven! Were not their very lands apportioned to them by lines drawn by Jehovah! Was not Jerusalem God's own chosen dwelling-place, and its temple the only one on earth devoted to his Name! And how could the Almighty so contradict himself, and dishonor his own works and words, as to give them up a prey to the destroyer! Thus they encouraged and persuaded themselves by the most sacred of appeals, and huddled by thousands into the temple, confident in their own piety, and expecting certain deliverance and victory, up to the last instant, when the Romans broke in upon them, and all their hopes went out in blood and darkness!

"And so it will be again. The drapery of the scene will be different, but the substance of it will be the same. And we can already trace it. Some there be who discern the signs of the times, and are awake and watching day and night. God's eye also is on them, and not one of them shall perish. But the most of our modern Christians will not allow it possible that the day of judgment can be at hand. The world must be converted first. They will not so dishonor Christ and his institutes as to admit the nearness of the end, while yet so much remains to be achieved. They are infinitely indignant, and all their feelings are inflamed with holy resentment, at thought of the gospel being a failure, which they say it must needs be if Christ were soon to come. And when we speak of the evident marks of the nearing of the great day of God Almighty, they sneer

at us as Adventists, and post us as fanatics, and have a hundred conclusive reasons why we should not be listened to, even though we have for witness the plain and explicit words of Christ and his apostles. They say we quench the spirit of missions and Christian enterprise; that we depreciate Christianity's power; that we dishonor the Holy Ghost and the virtue of God's truth; that we undermine the faith, betray the Christian cause, dampen people's enjoyment of their religion, cut off all hope from the efforts of men and the progress of things, and play the part of croakers, religious cowards, and theological imbeciles, too insipid and diseased to be considered right Christians! Their idea is that men of genuine metal must stand fast in the hope of better times, looking and working in Church and State for a grand triumph and glorious millennium in this world yet before the day of judgment. The only trouble they see is, that the old ways of doing things are superannuated and effete. What they call for is simply a new departure. Only let the old churchism be abandoned! Let the laymen have a chance! Let the women preach! Open prayer-meetings in the theatres! Give the helm to men of 'snap' in place of consecrated drones! Cast off creeds, and isms, and sacraments! Let there be liberty, equality, fraternity, and all join shoulder to shoulder for one grand conflict with the aliens, shouting the watchwords 'God and Victory,' deaf to everything beside! And they are sure the world, from one end to the other, shall soon ring out the jubilee of gospel triumph and millennial glory! Such is the spirit and such the popular belief and inculcation of those who call themselves advanced Christians. And so it will continue, the spirit of the Jewish zealots re-enacting itself in the great city of Christendom, the blasphemous conceit and apostasy increasing every day till the consummation comes and blots the base fraud from the face of the earth.

"But, although such is the prospect before us, and although it would seem as if we had verily fallen on the times foretold as those in which the great day of judgment is to come, we are not therefore left without hope, or without consolation. There was an elect who escaped the destruction when Jerusalem fell. They felt the tremor which shook the land, but, heeding the words and forewarnings of their Lord, they were safely out of reach when the great crash came. They were told to watch, and wait, and endure, and pray, and not suffer themselves to be turned aside for anything, however specious, till God should give the signal, and thus transport them beyond the scene of the dread disaster; and they obeyed, and they were saved. And so there will be an elect of God, and witnesses for God, and children of his who sigh and who cry for the abominations that are done, and waiting and watching ones, who will not be overlooked or forgotten of Heaven, however despised and contemned on earth, as the last dread catastrophe draws on. Jesus knows them, and how they cry day and night unto him, and will see that they

are not left to perish with the wicked world. They have no lights, no oracles, no guides, but those accessible to all ; but they see, and hear, and read them differently. They take their faith from the books, in place of reading their own thoughts and imaginings into those books. They take God at his word, and have no further questionings or hopes. They do not pretend to know everything, but are satisfied that God does, and needs no helping out with man's reasonings or fancies. They are not afraid to read what is 'spoken of by Daniel the prophet,' and, reading, to believe that he means what he says. They are content to accept the divine prophecies as something more than a sternlight, to be seen only when the vessel has gone by ; and on those prophecies they are willing to venture their faith and hope respecting all that is to come. They sit loosely in their present habitations, free as possible from all earthly entanglements, that they may be in momentary readiness to answer the signals of their Lord, sure that there is no remedy for this world against the destruction that has been decreed concerning it and all the works that are in it. Other Christs may present themselves, with their new gospels, their fresh oracles, their better hopes, their mighty demonstrations, their signs, their wonders, their convincing proofs, and what may perfectly satisfy the shallow credulity of those who know better than God and his Christ ; but, like Lebanon against the sea, these stand fast on the old foundations, never once moved or shaken by all the turbulence of the dashing waves, calmly waiting till God himself shall signal to them from the skies, and say : 'Come up hither !' And when the wicked perish, they shall see it ; see it from the solid fastnesses of their everlasting security with that Jesus whose glorious coming they so anxiously await. And our privilege it is, my brethren and friends, to be among them."

We cannot but commend the two volumes to our young brethren as excellent models of the Expository Lecture.

*Revelation Explained.* "Breve et punctatim." "Et multum in parvo." "Et simpliciter." By Rev. J. M. CONNELLY. Houston, Texas : E. H. Cushing. 1876. Pp. 217, 18mo.

The Apocalypse of John has been the subject of commentary from the days of Victorinus, A. D. 303, down to our own times. Some of its expounders have been found in the Church of Rome, but more in the several branches of the Protestant Church. Of these last, Joseph Mede, Campegius, Vitringa, and J. Albert Bengel, were the most famous in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In the nineteenth century, the names of scholars have not been few who have employed their talents and scholarship

upon the elucidation of this book, so replete with prophetic mysteries. Much of it is easy to understand, and a blessing is pronounced upon him "that readeth, and they that hear the words of this prophecy, and keep the things that are written therein." But there is much that will always remain veiled, with the covering wrapped by the divine hand around it, till the developments of the future shall reveal it, when the fulfilment will add new testimony to the divine origin of these and other Scriptures.

The author of this little book seems to have followed the views of Newton, Faber, Scott, and Fleming, and believes the opinions he has adopted are right, as indeed they are worthy of thought, and though not claimed as original, should be well pondered. They were doubtless edifying and instructive to those before whom they were delivered. We notice some colloquialisms in style not drawn from the pure "well of English undefiled;" some errors of the type in certain foreign words, which should have been corrected. Whether the praise bestowed on Calvin by Joseph Scaliger, so often quoted, was itself wise, when he says, "*Calvinus sapit, quod in Apocalypsin non scripsit,*" we would not undertake to say. The great Reformer had his hands full of other labors.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

Our readers will welcome the seventh volume of D'Aubigné's great work on the (1) Reformation in the Time of Calvin, which is put forth by Robert Carter & Brothers. The same thoroughly safe house issue (2) "The Judgment of Jerusalem," and (3) "The True Man, and Other Practical Sermons." Those who remember Dr. Macduff's former work on "The Footsteps of St. Paul," will be gratified to have (4) the companion volume on the wanderings of another great apostle; whilst the admirers of Dr. Bonar will be at once piqued and interested by (5) the new and voluminous poem which is his latest venture.

It is refreshing to find that the racy shrewdness and humor of (6) old Thomas Fuller are still valued by some who wish others to partake of the quaint banquet with them. A new volume of the (7) Hulsean Lectures needs no other recommendation than its own title. It may be worth while to compare the present treatise on sin with the standard work of Julius Müller, as well as the discussion of three of our Lord's miracles that is given us by so attractive a writer as (8) Dr. Macmillan, with the earlier treat-

1. The History of the Reformation in the Time of Calvin, Vol. VII. J. H. Merle D'Aubigne, D. D. 12mo., 640 pp., cloth, \$2. Robert Carter & Brothers.

2. The Judgment of Jerusalem. By William Patton, D. D. 12mo., 240 pp., cloth, \$2.25. *Ibid.*

3. The True Man, and Other Practical Sermons. By Samuel S. Mitchell, D. D. 12mo., 216 pp., cloth, 75 cts. *Ibid.*

4. The Footsteps of St. Peter. By John R. Macduff, D. D., with thirty Illustrations. 12mo., 648 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

5. My Old Letters: A Poem. By Horatius Bonar. 12mo., 352 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

6. Fuller's Good Thoughts in Bad Times, and other Papers. By Thomas Fuller, D. D.; with Steel Portrait. 16mo., 415 pp., \$1.50. E. P. Dutton & Co.

7. Sin, as set forth in Holy Scripture. The Hulsean Lectures for 1875. By the Rev. George M. Straffen, M. A. 12mo., cloth. *Ibid.*

8. Our Lord's Three Raisings from the Dead. By the Rev. Hugh Macmillan, LL.D. 12mo., \$1.50. *Ibid.*

ment of the same subject by Trench. Harper & Brothers bring out a (1) new edition of Richard the Second. Great light is shed upon a considerable period of English History by (2) the autobiographical Memoirs of Lord Albemarle. It belongs to the same general class of books with those of Clarendon and St. Simon, and to some extent also that of Greville. Those who like "Anthologies," may hope to find the cream of (3) Carlyle and (4) Milton offered them through Henry Holt & Co., who also bring out an old and delightful book of (5) Lockhart's, and a new one of (6) Thackeray's, not included in his collected works. The English ballads of Scott's son-in-law are often more spirited than the original Spanish.

It is to be hoped that Mr. Lanier's (7) Poems are more intelligible than his Centennial Ode; nor is this to be doubted, for he had already proved himself capable of better things. In these days of Archæological research, every contribution especially to American antiquities, has a *prima facie* claim upon our attention. The new edition of Mr. (8) Heckewelder on the Pennsylvania Indians, we understand to be a book for the people, as

1. Shakspeare's Tragedy of Richard the Second. Edited, with notes, by William J. Rolfe, A. M., formerly Head Master of the High School, Cambridge, Mass. Uniform with Rolfe's English Classics. Illustrated. Square 16mo., cloth, 90 cts. Harper & Bros.

2. Fifty Years of My Life. By Lord Albemarle. Large 12mo. 420 pp., \$2.50. Henry Holt & Co.

3. The Carlyle Anthology. Selected by Edward Barrett, with the author's sanction. 12mo, 386 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

4. The Milton Anthology. 12mo. 486 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

5. Ancient Spanish Ballads. By J. G. Lockhart. In Library of Foreign Poetry. 12mo., 150 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

6. Early and Late Papers. By W. M. Thackeray. In Leisure Hour series. 12mo., 408 pp., cloth. \$1.25. *Ibid.*

7. Poems. By Sidney Lanier. 12mo., cloth, extra, \$1. J. B. Lippincott & Co.

8. History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations who once Inhabited Pennsylvania and the Neighboring States. By the Rev. John Heckewelder of Bethlehem, Pa. New and revised edition; with an Introduction and Notes, by the Rev. William C. Reichel. Large 8vo., cloth, \$3.50. *Ibid.*

well as ethnographers. The eleventh volume of (1) President Adams's Diary is of no small value to the student of American history. The (2) Memoir of the naval Penn will be likely to interest the lovers of sea fights, as well as others who have a relish for the literature of the deck and the round-top. (3) Emerson is a gifted writer on subjects which he can handle better than he does politics, philosophy, and theology. Robert Browning's new (4) Poem exhibits something of his acknowledged force and much of his perverse weakness. We rejoice in every creditable addition to our (5) Hymnology. It is a superb exploit that has collected and cheapened the pictures of the (6) Musicians. Lowell's (7) poetry is hardly equal to his prose; but it is about the strongest in New England. If had at all, it had best be had in the library edition. (8) "Dottings Round the Circle" is said to be a fascinating book of travels.

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2. Sir William Penn, Knight, Admiral, and General at Sea, Great Captain Commander in the Fleet: A Memoir. By P. S. P. Conner. 8vo., large paper, paper, \$1. *Ibid.*

3. Letters and Social Aims. By Ralph Waldo Emerson. 18mo, 285 pp., \$1.50. "Little Classic" series. J. R. Osgood & Co.

4. Pacchiarotto, and How he Worked in Distemper, and Other Poems. By Robert Browning. 12mo, 180 pp., \$1.50. *Ibid.*

5. Hymns of the Ages. With steel Frontispiece, after Turner. New Edition. Three volumes, 16mo. xiii., 317; vii., 336; and vi., 331 pp., \$1.50 each. *Ibid.*

6. Gallery of Great Composers: including Heliotype Portraits and Sketches of Bach, Handel, Gluck, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Von Weber, Mendelssohn, Schumann, Meyerbeer, and Wagner. New and smaller edition, 103 pp., 4to., \$5. *Ibid.*

7. The Complete Poetical Works of James Russell Lowell. The Library Lowell, tinted paper, red line border, and thirty-two full page illustrations. 8vo., xi.; 406 pp., cloth, full gilt, \$5; morocco antique, \$10. *Ibid.*

8. Dottings Round the Circle: A Journey Round the World, by Japan, China, Siam, India, Suez Canal, Mediterranean Sea, France, and England. By Benjamin Robbins Curtis. Illustrated with Heliotypes from Photographs collected in the East by the Author. 8vo., x., 329 pp., \$2.50. *Ibid.*



(1) Whittier, like Lowell, manages to unite an ignorant fanaticism with good temper and admirable rhymes. Far different is it with the hermit of (2) Faringford, who is not only the most famous singer, but one of the most accurate botanists and most subtle politicians of his era. The (3) work of Dr. Mahan revives the theory of an odic force, to which he refers the phenomena of table-tipping. The subject is one which repays a thorough examination, and the treatise of Gasparin is growing somewhat obsolete. We are persuaded that a large part of the so-called phenomena are fictitious, and the greater part of the remainder due to fraud or jugglery; although many of the facts have been shown by Faraday and Carpenter to be physiologically explicable on the principle of "expectant attention." (4) John the Baptist furnishes the theme of the Congregational Union Lecture, by Dr. Reynolds.

Two treatises are announced on Sound; the (5) one by Professor Pietro Blaserna of the Royal University of Rome; and the other (6) the well-known work of Tyndall, in new type. (7) Bryant has for many years sunk the poet too much in the editor; and even his sweet early tone is marred by the romantic

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4. John the Baptist: A Contribution to the Christian Evidences, Congregational Union Lecture. By H. R. Reynolds, D. D. 8vo., 548 pp., cloth, \$4. *Ibid.*

5. The Theory of Sound, in its Relation to Music. By Professor Pietro Blaserna, of the Royal University of Rome. International. 12mo., cloth, many woodcuts. \$1.50. D. Appleton & Co.

6. Sound. By Tyndall. New edition, with plates. 12mo., cloth, 448 pp., \$2. *Ibid.*

7. Bryant's Poetical Works. A new illustrated edition, with one hundred illustrations by Birket Foster, Harry Fern, Fredericks, and others. Small 4to., cloth, gilt edges, \$4; morocco, extra, \$8. *Ibid.*

abolitionism that has for long infected the whole writing of Massachusetts and its colonies, and that is so deplorably wanting in historic and moral as well as æsthetic justification. Bryant, however, is not a chief sinner in this respect, and his stanzas are models of good English and of gentle scholarship. St. George Mivart's (1) *Essay on Evolution*, we take to be the substance of his fine articles in the *Quarterly* and *Contemporary*. He is a Romanist, and argues with almost ludicrous earnestness for the Romish interpretation of Aristotle as the true cure for Darwinism. Dr. John Lord can write, as few others can, (2) *Ancient History*. The (3) *Lore of Finger-Rings* is a topic of curious and surprising investigation. (4) *The Moon* is a subject fitted to the capacities and experience of a Fellow of the Royal Astronomical Society. Goldsmith's (5) (6), Gray's (7), and Milton's (8) (9), have never been more cheaply presented than by two contemporary English scholars.

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11. *Roman History. The Early Empire, from the Assassination of*

Oosterzee is the most versatile of the theologians of Holland. Though unequal sometimes to his better self, and though not sound on all points, he is a man of unquestionable learning, genius, and piety, and in (1) Christian Dogmatics displays all his strength. The work of ex-Consul General Schuyler on (2) Turkistan, has created a sensation in England that is certainly not due entirely to the state of English feeling on the Eastern question. The Early Phœnician Voyages are amusingly described under the awakening name of (3) Captain Mago.

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A new critic of literature has sprung up, who is thought by English judges to have outdone most of his coevals, and who now gives the world some (5) Essays. "French (6) and Spanish Painters" is a promising title from Mr. Stothert. Perhaps the first of living English historians is Mr. Edward A. Freeman, who, having acquainted us with the Norman Conquest, now tells us of the

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rise and (1) Conquests of the Saracens. Landor's (2) Imaginary Conversations is *caviare* to the general reader, but is become a classic with those who love the past. We think we recognise in (3) "H. H." the cunning hand of Mrs. Hunt, who gave us "Bits of Travel." We happen to know that Mrs. Hunt had unusual opportunities of knowledge when abroad. Dr. Bruce discusses that most grave and important subject, (4) "The Humiliation." The (5) Principles of New Testament Quotations *need* to be established and applied to Biblical science, which is attempted by the Rev. James Scott. An attractive theme is offered in (6) Messianic Prophecy.

The old books on London now form a library. A new one is (7) just appearing, of which it is only the 4th Volume that is now issued. The first Volume of (8) Grant's History of India is favorably spoken of in Great Britain. George D. Prentice has (9) written verses, some of which have a more than ephemeral

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1. The History and Conquests of the Saracens. Six Lectures, delivered before the Edinburgh Philosophical Institution. By Edward A. Freeman, D. C. L., LL.D. Cloth, \$1.50. Macmillan & Co., New York.

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4. The Humiliation of Christ, in its Physical, Ethical, and Official Aspects. By the Rev. Alex'r B. Bruce, D. D. Cunningham Lectures, 1875. 8vo., 516 pp., cloth, \$6. N. Tidball & Sons.

5. Principles of New Testament Quotation. Established and Applied to Biblical Science. By Rev. James Scott. 12mo., 168 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

6. Messianic Prophecy. Its Origin, Historical Character, and Relation to New Testament Fulfilments. 12mo., 368 pp., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

7. Old and New London, Vol. IV. By Edward Walford. With Illustrations, Maps, etc. Extra crown 4to., 576 pp., cloth, \$5. Cassell, Petter & Galpin.

8. History of India, Vol. I. By James Grant, Extra crown 4to., 576 pp., cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

9. The Poems of George D. Prentice. By John J. Platt. With a Biographical Sketch and Steel Portrait. New edition, revised and enlarged. 12mo., 240 pp., cloth, gilt. \$2.50; morocco, \$5. Robert Clarke & Co.

interest. The Icelandic (1) Viking Tales are in the hands of competent Scandinavian scholars, whatever they may be as English artists. The first volume of a (2) History of French Literature is the earliest instalment of what we hope is going to prove an answer to a long-standing expectation. The two volumes by (3) Mr. Leslie Stephens are likely to prove a sort of solid counterpart to the lighter but masterly touches of a recent English humorist and lecturer.

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1. Viking Tales of North. The Sagas of Thorstein, Viking's Son, and Fridthjof the Bold. Translated from the Icelandic, by Erasmus B. Anderson, A. M., Professor in the Scandinavian Languages in the University of Wisconsin, and Honorary Member of the Icelandic Literary Society and Jon Bjarnason. Also, Tegner's Fridthjof's Saga, translated into English by George Stephens. xviii., 370 pp., cloth, \$2. S. C. Griggs & Co.

2. The History of French Literature, Vol. I. By Henry Van Laun. Three Vols., 8vo., 342 pp., cloth, \$2.50. G. P. Putnam's Sons.

3. English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. By Leslie Stephen. Two Vols., large 8vo., 466, 469 pp., cloth, extra, \$8. *Ibid.*

# THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXVIII.—NO. 2.

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APRIL, MDCCLXXVII.

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ARTICLE I.

THE SABBATH.

“THE SABBATH WAS MADE FOR MAN.”

Philosophers tell us that all the forces of nature are indestructible. They may go from one form to another, and thus seem to pass out of existence; but, in reality, they are imperishable. The first ray of heat which came to the earth from the sun, though it may have been millions of years ago, exists to-day, somewhere, in some one of its Protean forms.

While physical force is thus, in the divine providence, immortal, it nevertheless wearies and grows tired. Illustrations, which are proofs of this, are easily given. Razors lose the power of acquiring an edge after they have been in constant use for a long time. In such cases, it is necessary simply to allow them to rest a while, and they are again ready for service. As a matter of actual observation, it has been found that the iron or steel of a railway track becomes brittle and liable to dangerous breakage, if it is subjected to the constant pressure and jar of passing trains. If there are suitable intervals of repose, the same number and weight of trains may pass over the track without serious injury. The same fact is observed with regard to cannon; and is, indeed, a truth of universal observation.

A more familiar illustration may better serve our purpose. Moses commanded that the seventh should be a year of rest for the land. There was an economic reason for this, which every

farmer of the present day can appreciate. Even in the rich soils of the Mississippi Valley, it is found that he is the prudent husbandman who, by a judicious rotation of crops, allows each of his fields a stated jubilee of rest.

But not only when physical force allies itself with vegetable life, does it find a periodic season of rest essential to its highest efficiency; but also when it appears as the servant of animal volition. No man, who owns a splendid horse, will suffer the noble animal to exert himself to the utmost of his power, from day to day, without an interval of rest. Put to a daily stress of unremitting toil, he might serve his master, we may say, for three hundred days. If allowed to rest at proper seasons, he would be efficient for the labor of three times three hundred days.

The necessity for a Sabbath to inanimate nature and to the lower animals, proceeds entirely from their relations to man. No metal would ever need molecular rest but for its use in the service of man. So it is with our fields. In their natural condition, they enjoy an almost perpetual rest. It is only when they are brought under cultivation, and made to yield their harvests to the reaper, that they require a jubilee of repose. So also with the animals. The horse, the donkey, the ox, on their native plains, know nothing of the labors of the yoke or the collar, and therefore need no day of respite from their toils. But when man harnesses them to his service, their weary muscles beg for a regular time of rest. Thus, in this lowest sense, we see that "the Sabbath was made for man."

Man is made of the dust of the earth. This statement of Moses is confirmed not only by chemical analysis, and by the food which he eats, but also by the heap of dust which he becomes in the grave. The same iron of which our razors are made, the same earths, acids, and alkalies which form our soil, are found in these bodies of ours, which are so curiously and wonderfully made. The same animal life which flashes forth from the eye of the war-horse, is found, in a higher and more refined form, in the warrior that bestrides him. Man's body is material, and the home of the ordinary physical and vital forces which we see in nature all around us.

These bodily powers are definite and limited. They can accomplish so much, and no more. When they become exhausted, they must rest, or ruin is the result, sooner or later. For this reason night comes upon the earth, and claims half of the hours of the year as her own. This is nature's call from the daily toil of physical labor. As the shadows lengthen and the sun hides himself behind the western hills, the woodman lays his axe upon his shoulder and the reaper his scythe, the carpenter puts up his hammer and saw, and the mason his trowel; and they all hie homeward to eat their evening meal and to commit themselves to the arms of "balmy sleep, tired nature's sweet restorer." What could the laboring man do, were there no night and no sleep to respite him from his daily toil!

This nightly rest, sweet and gracious as it is, is not enough for the man of faithful industry. The soil which we cultivate has its yearly winter rest, when it goes to sleep in its bed of sheeted snow. It awakens in the spring, with its energies renewed for another summer's harvest. But it finds itself not so strong this year as it was last; nor last year as it was the year before. It is becoming enfeebled by its annual efforts to produce. It begs for rest, not only during the hush and chill of winter, but also while it may enjoy undisturbed the vernal showers and the summer's invigorating sun. So it is with man. He rises with each morning's freshness, and undertakes anew the duties of the day. For a few days he fails to realise an abatement of his vigor; but ere long he finds that he is not so strong now as he was ten or fifteen or twenty days ago. He finds that he is becoming wearied, that he needs a *day* of rest. His nightly repose is not sufficient for him. He wants a respite when the free sun can shine upon him; when he can *realise* that he is not the slave of toil; when he can be conscious that he has laid aside the harness of the struggle for his daily bread.

Thus it is that the Sabbath comes in to relax the tense muscles of man and beast. The pampered favorite of the stall may be indifferent to such a day. He is brought into service for only an hour or two each day, that he may give his lordly owners an evening airing. But the faithful animal whose neck feels



the collar from early morning to dewy eve, finds the day of weekly rest all that he ever knows or dreams of heaven. So the human idler, who fails to realise that "life is real, life is earnest;" whose hardest toil is to devise ways for killing time, may care not for the weekly Sabbath. But the industrious, sun-browned mechanic, the toiling accountant, the man of busy brain—the men who make this world a place worth the living in—these "heroes of the strife" can sing with hearty emphasis,

"Welcome, sweet day of rest."

For every man and for every animal that fill their sphere in life, the Sabbath is not only a delight, a luxury; it is an indispensable necessity. Man is so made that he must have it, or his body is materially fatally injured. Again we say, "The Sabbath was made for man."

But man is not only an animal, he is a *mind*. Work of muscle and rest of muscle do not tell all of human history. This mind of his wants to know. Indeed it aspires to be fed, with as ardent an appetite as that which urges him to his daily toil for bread. If he gives his days to labor and his nights to sleep, when shall he attend to the cravings of his mind, that begs for light? When can he pursue that search for knowledge which is one of the inborn, insatiable cravings of his nature? Is he no more than a brute? The lessons of the world's history in the past; the wonders of the heavens above him; the equal wonders of the earth, and air, and sea around him; the mysteries of his own curiously constructed body; the mightier mysteries of his own immaterial mind—when shall he learn these, if he is to be the chained galley-slave to a life of incessant toil? During the week, he may seem but little more than the horse, at whose side he performs his daily task. On the Sunday, the horse eats and sleeps and rolls and runs. But his master sits down to read, and walks around to think, and his mind opens and grows and matures, and rejoices in the acquisition of new stores of truth. Truly may we again say, "The Sabbath was made for man."

We have not yet exhausted the important facts of human nature. Man not only has body and mind; he has what is more

valuable than either—spirit or *soul*. This spirit or soul of his has crying needs. It is its misfortune, however, to be too often put into the background. Man's physical wants press upon him with an urgency which will admit of no denial. It is a constant struggle for bread with the poor; with the rich it is an equally constant struggle for money. The poor may make their daily bread; the rich may heap up their golden treasures. But is this all? Is there nothing more for which to live? Suppose there were no eternity, no living beyond the grave; would the purposes of life all be reached when we gain our bread and hoard our gold? The soul cries indignantly, No! No, indeed, no, we cry into the dull ear of a materialistic age. Man's soul must and will assert itself. Its social instincts, revealing a vast network of relationships by which it is connected with all other souls, clamor for recognition. The man is a father, a husband, a son, a brother, a citizen, a friend, a neighbor. If he be a father, solemn duties arise out of this relationship. When shall he consider them? When shall he question himself as to the fulfilment of these duties? When shall he incite himself to a more faithful discharge of them? During all the week, the claims of business press so heavily and so steadily upon him, that these sacred duties are hushed into silence. He must have time to give to their consideration.

Man has other moral interests that claim his attention. Indeed, we are here brought face to face with the most solemn questions of his being. This soul of his, what is it? Whence came it? Whither goeth it? Truth, right, duty—what are they, and what claims have they upon the soul of man? The truth—has it been spoken? The right—has it been loved? Duty—has it been done? Sin—what is it? Its reality forces itself upon the conscious experience of the soul. Yes, the soul knows that it has sinned. This is an awful fact; shall it be blinked, forgotten, denied? Shall the soul have no time to look this question full in the face, and consider the nature and the consequences of its sinfulness? Shall there be given to it no rest, no quiet hour in the hurly-burly of life, when it may realise its depraved condition and seek for some measure of relief?

Duty and sin gain an infinite intensity of meaning when they lead the soul to the brink of time, and bid it peer into the mysteries of *eternity*. Is it possible that man may live forever? Is it probable that he will live forever? Nay, is it certain that he must live forever? If so, what interests of time can compare with the enduring realities of eternity? Day by day, hour by hour, man's energies are stretched almost to their utmost tension by the pressing occupations of this life. Must he thus go on, month after month, year after year, until, without a moment's thought, his bark is suddenly launched upon the shoreless sea of eternity? There must be eddies in the river of life; harbors of quiet, in which he may look to the condition of his boat, and see whether it is ready for that voyage, on which no repairs can be made, and from which no traveller has ever returned.

There is another word, small indeed, but with which man has an infinite concern. How the thoughts leap from the brain at the mention of the name of GOD, the infinitely holy, the infinitely good, the infinitely great! Man's relationships to God are the highest and holiest which he sustains. God is our Creator: his hand hath made us, and not we ourselves. God is our father: he takes care of us; we are the sheep of his pasture and the people of his hand, and his dependent children. God is our Saviour: he knows that we are sinners, wicked sinners; miserable sinners: he knows that we deserve death; but he takes no pleasure in the death of him that dieth. He loves our souls; he wants us to live, and to live with him forever. So earnest is his desire for our salvation, that he has given his Son to die for us. God is our judge; he will bring every thought and word and deed into judgment. If his mercy we refuse, his justice we shall not despise.

Is this God, in himself and in his relations to us, worthy of our attention? Shall we give ourselves up to worldly cares, to selfish interests, to human concerns, and have no time in which we may consider what we owe to him? Every grateful, every true heart will spurn the thought, and say, Let us think of him in the freshness of the morning hour, in the heat of the noonday strife, in the quiet weariness of darkening twilight, and

in the hush of spirit as sleep comes slowly stealing o'er the senses. But lest he should be forgotten, as he too often is, amid the pressing cares of our daily struggles, let us set apart some holy hours as sacredly his own, which we will give wholly up to thoughts of him, of the soul, of duty, of sin, of salvation, of eternity. Once more we say, emphatically, "The Sabbath was made for man."

Let us stop a while now and gather these thoughts together. They are all one. Man's body needs a day of rest. It must have it, or seriously suffer. Man's mind needs a day for special culture. It must have it, or be dwarfed for the want of it. Man's soul, especially, needs a day that it may call its own: a day when the world, and flesh, and sense shall all be held in obedience, and when the concerns of the soul shall have first attention. Man's hopes and fears, his sorrows and joys, his desires and affections, all demand this. His duties and his sins unite in the claim; while his relations to his God make it solemnly imperative. In the very necessities of man's condition there must be for him a Sabbath.

This is no mere matter of policy or expediency. It reaches far beyond this. It is one of the essentials of human nature. Is the rudder indispensable to a ship? The ship might sail a few days or weeks without one. But it would be at the mercy of every gale and the plaything of every storm, and liable, at any moment, to find its coffin in the trough of the sea, or its grave in the treacherous quicksands. So man may live upon the earth without a Sabbath; but it would be a life fraught with peril to the dearest interests which he should cherish.

Were man an unfallen being, his healthy soul, pure in its every thought and heavenly in its every aspiration, would ask for one day of furlough from the service of the flesh, that the Spirit might commune with God, and feast itself upon the pleasures of the soul. But man is now a wreck in body, mind, and spirit. The necessities of the Sabbath are immeasurably increased by his fallen condition. Look especially at the soul. It is consciously sinful; and, as a result, it is consciously guilty. These are terrific thoughts, if they be rightly seen. Sin and

guilt constitute the very essence of hell. We said that man was conscious of them both. This is true to a limited degree. But it is the culmination of man's woful condition in the fall, that he is, to so large a degree, insensible of the awful evils which he has brought upon himself. His daily pursuits serve to increase this spiritual deadness. He must be aroused, or he is lost. If there be nothing but the humdrum of his daily life, his thoughts will never be stirred to look within at the lurking demon in his own heart; or ahead, to see the Nemesis whose glaring eyes confront him in the future. If he would be saved from this hell within him, he must be stirred and brought to think. For the welfare, for the very life, of his immortal soul, in danger of sinking down to an eternal death, he must have a time when he can look within, and see his danger; can look without, and find his Calvary; can look above, and behold his heaven.

The Sabbath is thus the poor man's friend, the toiler's rest, the teacher of the ignorant, and the saviour of the fallen. It is the golden ladder of heaven, resting upon the rocky pathways of earth, on whose angel-travelled rounds the soul may mount upward to the skies. "*The Sabbath was made for man.*"

"THE SEVENTH DAY IS THE SABBATH OF THE LORD THY GOD."

Thus far we have discussed this question from a human standpoint. We have laid more stress upon this part of the discussion, because we think that it is a feature of the subject to which sufficient importance is not usually attached. We feel justified in saying, that, in a very important sense, the Sabbath is man's Day—in that it is to him the most needful, and the most fraught with blessings, of all the seven. We have the highest authority for saying that "the Sabbath was made for man."

This fact, however, does not exhaust its nature or its purposes. It is also the *Lord's Day*. It is "the day which the Lord hath made." It is "the Sabbath of the Lord our God."

God's relations to this holy day are very simple and easily stated. All creatures are his; and yet he keeps the angels as the ministers of his immediate presence. All men are his children; and yet among them there is the sacramental host of

his elect. All the tribes of Israel were his people, and yet he took Levi as the tribe of his inheritance. All Christians are his servants, and yet there are those whom he makes, in a peculiar sense, the ministers of his sanctuary. The silver and the gold are his, and the cattle upon a thousand hills; and yet he claimed the special sanctification of the tithe. All the days are his, for he makes the outgoing and incoming of every morning and evening to rejoice; and yet there is one day which he crowns with peculiar glory, which he calls by his own name, and which he claims as specially his own.

God's regard for this day is shown in several ways. In the drama of creation, the first six acts represent the Deity as active, producing, and garnishing the worlds. In the seventh, the work is done, and the Infinite rests from his labors. Six days he worked, on the seventh he rested. Not that his omnipotence was weary, much less exhausted, but that he might teach, by example, a lesson to his intelligent children.

He does not confine himself to silent example. "He rested on the seventh day from all his work which he had made. And God blessed the seventh day and sanctified it." He blessed the day; he made it a happy day. He sanctified it; he made it a holy day. This is the statement of the oldest record of which man has a knowledge. It may be even an Eden record. The first chapter of Genesis, with the first three verses of the second, may possibly have been written by Adam himself. This, however, cannot be told, and is not necessary to our thought. Suffice it to say, that this is the first record of human history. It is enough for us to know that the very next recorded act of God, after the creation of man, was the blessing and sanctification of a Sabbath for his benefit. From the introduction of man upon the earth, the seventh day is made by the Divine Lawgiver to bear a character peculiar to itself; it is solemnly set apart for the very purpose for which we have already found a natural necessity in man himself. God had so made man that he needed such a day; and so, from the very first, he exempted it from the ordinary cares and duties of life, and sanctified it to all the high and holy purposes of a Sabbath.

Adam was the first natural head of the race. Noah was the second. In his life we find proofs, somewhat dim to be sure, of the continuance of the Sabbath law. Moses was not, indeed, a third great head of the family of man; but what he wrote has moulded the religious character of the world of God's people for more than fifteen centuries. So then, no mortal man of any age has exerted such an extended influence over the human mind as he. He was the patriarch of the race in a higher meaning than was Adam or Noah. To him we may look for positive and authentic indications of God's will to man. Of all mere men that ever lived he deserves, by unmistakable preëminence, the title of the divine lawgiver.

God himself descends to the top of Sinai, and so awful is his presence that neither man nor beast can pass beyond the sacred limit. He calls Moses, however, to the very top of the smoking mount; and there, for forty days and nights, he holds him in face to face communion with himself. He not only speaks his will to him on many questions, but upon all the fundamental, permanent, universal relations of man, he expresses himself with peculiar force. On them he does not content himself with the spoken word; but "with his own finger," upon the granite of the everlasting hills, he writes those laws which he knows are as broad as humanity and as universal as the relations of man. In the very midst of these, preceded by those which lie at the basis of man's relations to his Maker, and followed by those which tell his natural and unchangeable duties to his fellow-men, God wrote on the enduring stone, "*Remember the Sabbath Day to keep it holy.*" Could he have shown his will in a more solemn way than this?

"When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman." So "the Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." In him dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead bodily; so that he was to man the manifestation of the Deity in flesh. To his life on earth may we look for clear and definite light as to the divinity of the Sabbath. If he, by precept and by example, disregards the day, then we

may consider it a mere question of expediency, whether we shall observe it or not. But if, on the other hand, he constantly hallowed the day, using it only for those purposes for which it was specially sacred, then we have the clearest possible testimony that, in God's estimation, it is a holy day. To state these alternatives is to answer them; for no one has ever read the fourfold history of the life of the Son of God on earth whose mind has been left in doubt on this question. No word or act of the blessed Saviour can be construed into a disrespect or even carelessness as to the Sabbath; but on the contrary, while avoiding a Pharisaical extreme, he never failed to honor its holy hours.

It may be well to notice a strong, though indirect, proof of this. When the Messiah came, he gathered about him the choicest spirits of the Jewish theocracy,—humble, and even sinful, though they were when he found them. Among the number was a small band of women, remarkable for the pure, unselfish, devoted, love which they gave him. These listened to his teachings, and watched his life through the whole period of his earthly ministry. To please him was their highest joy. When he was finally betrayed, condemned, and crucified, they still clung to him with an undying love. He was taken from the cross late on Friday afternoon,—too late for embalming before burial. These women were anxious to pay to his body this last tribute of respect. Now let us read the story as told by Luke: “That day was the preparation, and the Sabbath drew on. And the women also, which came with him from Galilee, followed after, and beheld the sepulchre, and how his body was laid. And they returned, and prepared spices and ointments, and *rested the Sabbath Day according to the commandment*. Now, upon the first day of the week, very early in the morning, they came unto the sepulchre, bringing the spices which they had prepared.” These women were so eager to do their holy work for the Saviour's body that they went to the sepulchre very early in the morning after the Jewish Sabbath was past. Yet they had learned, from the instructions and example of our Lord, to regard the Sabbath with so much veneration as to consider it a desecration of the day to prepare upon it his body for its final burial.



So far we have sought to learn God's will as to the observance of the Sabbath. We are now to inquire into the special relations which the day bears to Him. For man, we have seen that it is a day of rest and spiritual exercise. But it is also called the Lord's Day, the Sabbath of the Lord our God. It is so styled not only because it was ordained by him, but also because he claims its hours as sacred to himself. The wife gives up her husband to his daily task, and loves him for his labors on her behalf, while she is bereft of the pleasures of his company. But when the evening meal has been eaten and the lamps are lit, she expects him to sit with her and the children around the family fireside. This is the holy family hour, and it must be held sacred for the joys and duties of the hearthstone. So the Lord says to us, "Six days shalt thou labor and do all thy work; but the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord thy God." It belongs to him and is to be devoted to his service.

The assertion of this claim to the day by God would seem to be sufficient; indeed, it is sufficient. But even if he had not preferred the claim, it would have been none the less valid. The setting apart of a portion of our time as sacred to the worship of God, is a duty, whose obligation will press itself upon every enlightened conscience, as growing out of the natural relations of man to his Creator. If man be a dependent being, he should acknowledge that dependence. If he be indebted for life, for health, for food, for all his daily comforts, to the assiduous providence of one Strong Arm, one Omniscient Eye, and one Loving Heart, it is surely becoming in him to make a suitable return of gratitude. If he be a sinner, he should confess his sin. If, despite the daily goodness of his God, he is a daily transgressor of his law, ungrateful for that goodness and disobedient to divine authority; then surely he should have some hour for penitence, in which to acknowledge his wrong and to ask forgiveness from his offended Father. If, beyond all this, he be a saved sinner, rescued from the awful consequences of his guilt by the sovereign grace of his God; saved from the death of his soul by the death of his Saviour, God's only and well beloved Son; then, who can, for a moment, question his obligation to praise and adore our

God of such infinite compassion and love? For all these things there must be time; not only time, but a set time. The engrossing pursuits of this world and the depraved tendencies of his nature, all make it necessary that some certain season be consecrated for these holy purposes. Otherwise they would certainly be neglected.

The necessity for this fixed day of worship is not only individual, it is also social. Were men isolated beings, then might each man choose a Sabbath for himself. But man is born into society. He is born one of a family, one of a civil society, one of a church. Not only as an individual does he need to thank God for his providence, confess his sins, and praise him for his salvation; but the same duties are also involved in his social relations. God is the Lord of the family, of the community, of the Church. When shall the people meet to confess their common sins, to offer their common praises, to supplicate for common blessings, to thank for common mercies, if there is no time fixed for the purpose?

#### THE SABBATH A COMMON AND NOT A STATUTE LAW.

What has been said so far has all been designed to converge to the establishment of one point, which is the fundamental one in the idea of the Sabbath. It is the settlement of the question, Whether the Sabbath is a moral or a positive institution.

To settle this question, we must have clear ideas as to the distinction between a moral and a positive law. These terms, as here used, are technical, and employed in a peculiar sense. In the common use of the words, a moral law may be positive, and a positive law may be moral. But, as employed in this discussion, they are mutually exclusive of each other.

A moral law is, 1. One which arises from the natural and essential relations of the beings which it governs. Obedience to parents on the part of their children is thus a natural or moral law. 2. A moral law requires no formal enactment to make it obligatory. If God had never commanded children to obey their parents, it would nevertheless be their duty to do so. A moral law may, however, be commanded; and they all are in the Book

of books. 3. A moral law is universal; that is, it is obligatory on all who sustain the natural relations out of which it arises. It is the natural duty of all children, Jewish or Gentile, Christian or heathen, to obey their parents. 4. A moral law is perpetual; that is, it must continue so long as the natural relations which produce it continue. It was the duty of Cain and Abel to obey their parents. It is the duty of every child now living to do the same. It will always be the duty of every child to obey its parents. Corresponding to this natural duty of children is the duty of their parents to love them. The love of parents to their offspring is also a natural law. A moral law, thus, is *natural, self-authenticating, universal, and perpetual.*

A positive law, on the other hand, is, 1. One which grows out of the accidental relations of those whom it governs. The duty of Abraham to sacrifice Isaac was certainly not a natural one. It arose out of that accident in his life, in which God wished to make a trial of his faith. 2. A positive law requires the enactment of competent authority to make it obligatory. Had not Abraham been commanded to slay Isaac, or had he been commanded by improper authority, his act would have been an attempt to murder. 3. A positive law is limited to the individual or the class who are specially commanded to obey it. The duty of Abraham to sacrifice his son, by no means makes it imperative on any other father to attempt the same. 4. A positive law may be temporary. The command to slay Isaac was binding upon Abraham for some three or four days. It ceased the moment that God said, "Lay not thine hand upon the lad." If Abraham had persisted, he would have been a murderer. The offering of sacrifices, circumcision, baptism, and the Lord's Supper, are all instances of positive institutions.

Is the Sabbath law a natural, self-evident, universal, and perpetual law? Or, is it merely accidental, partial, temporary, and positive? The Sabbath is a *natural* law; that is, it is founded upon the natural and essential relations of men. This has already been shown to our complete satisfaction. Man bears relations to all his fellow creatures and to his Creator; natural relations, which make the Sabbath a necessity. We have seen that the

very iron of our railroad tracks needs a periodical rest. The producing fields of our farms need it. Our beasts of burden need it. Our servants and employees need it. We ourselves need it, for our bodies, for our minds, for our souls. Man's relations to his Creator demand the observance of a Sabbath for worship. It is thus apparent that the Sabbath is not a mere convenient expedient, found desirable under certain conditions. It is a necessity for man, growing out of the most important facts in his own constitution and in his relations to others. This first point decides all the rest. If the necessity for the Sabbath, as founded upon man's natural relations, is once perceived, then we see that it requires no direct and formal commandment to make it obligatory; that it is a law, which must bind all men, at all times.

We declare then, again, that the Sabbath is a *self-authenticating* law. We are aware that we are putting forth a very high claim, when we make this assertion. The whole question of principles, whether in matter, mind, or morals, is one of the most interesting of the present day. The whole tendency of advancing knowledge is to lessen the number of elements in every department of inquiry. Nevertheless, we assert, that, as oxygen is a first principle in matter, and a belief in consciousness is a first truth in mind; so the obligation to keep a Sabbath is a fundamental, regulative law in morals. There may not be more than half a score of these first truths in ethics, but we maintain that the Sabbath is one of them.

When it is asserted that it is a self-evident obligation, we state exactly what we mean. As soon as any rational man perceives that his animals, his servants, his body, his mind, his soul, his relations to God, all require a Sabbath, he at once feels the obligation, without any argument to convince him. Every enlightened mind knows that the Sabbath is demanded by all the facts just stated; so that its natural obligation is immediately apparent upon the bare statement of the facts concerning it. That the propriety of the Sabbath may be seen, that its obligation as a moral law may be felt, it is not needful that any authority, human or divine, should command its observance. The fact that it

has been commanded does not disprove this, any more than the command not to steal proves that honesty is not a natural, moral obligation. Indeed, all of the fundamental moral obligations are directly enjoined in God's holy word.

Again, the Sabbath is a *universal* law; a law for all men, everywhere. It is a law for the savage and the civilised; for the American, the European, the Asian, the African; for the seaman and the landsman; for the farmer, the merchant, the miner, the manufacturer; for the rich and the poor; for the servant and his master; for the learned and the ignorant; for the professional man and the artisan; for the saint and the sinner. There are none so low that it does not come down to them with its cornucopia of blessing; there are none so high that it does not reach them with its voice of authority. It is a law for man as man.

Finally, the Sabbath is a *perpetual* law. There is nothing in it of a temporary character. There is no reason why one age should need it and another should dispense with it. Founded as it is in the very essentials of man's nature, it began with his creation; belonged to him in his Eden purity; went with him in his banishment from the garden; crossed with him in the ark, that pontoon bridge, from the old to the new world; went with him in the dispersion from Babel; and now, after six thousand years of human history, is as young and fresh as when it first began its march as the companion and benefactor of man. There has never been a period in the past when it was not needed. We cannot conceive of one in the future when it will be obsolete.

#### THE SABBATH, WHAT IS IT?

##### *Its Essential Features.*

The answer to this question has underlain the whole of the previous discussion. The special object which we now have in view is to distinguish between its essential and unessential features.

The Sabbath is an institution designed to meet certain felt wants of man's nature. The first of these is the need of REST.

This is a want of the body and of the mind. They who gain their bread by the honest and manly toil of daily labor with their hands, need the day to rest their wearied muscles; they whose sphere in life is to work with busy brain, not only from rosy morn to twilight eve, but until the noon of night, find that they need a time of rest.

The Sabbath is, for the soul of man, a day of WORSHIP. This does not express the whole truth, but may, to every thoughtful mind, suggest it. Indeed the Sabbath is preëminently the SOUL'S DAY. The other days are appropriated to the activities and special wants of mind and body. The Sabbath is the day for the soul; the day when its interests shall be uppermost; when its energies shall be exercised; when its needs shall be supplied. It is the day for soul-examination, for soul-confession, for soul-thankfulness, for soul-nourishment, for soul-culture. It is also, considering the chiefest of the soul's duties and pleasures, the day for soul-worship of the great Jehovah.

These are the two essential facts of the Sabbath—rest for mind and body, and worshipful activity for the soul. A day which combines these is a Sabbath, no matter when it may come, no matter what else it may have or may not have. A day which lacks both or either of these, cannot properly be called a Sabbath.

At first view these might seem rather incongruous elements. At any rate, it might seem that one was not essential to the other. This, however, is a mistake. The rest of the body is essential to the proper activity of the soul, peculiar to this day. In fact, the body rests on this day, not only for its own sake, but also that it may allow, by its quietness, a due attention to be given to the interests of the soul. The rest is thus not only an independent end, but is also a means in order to an even higher end, the culture and worship of the soul. To the brute, the Sabbath is simply a day of rest; to man, it is a day of rest and worship.

#### *Its Unessential Elements.*

There are several of these. 1. Its *memorial* character. From the creation of man to the institution of the Passover, it com-

memorated the completion of God's creative work. This is true, whether the six days of Genesis be measured by twenty-four hours, or by an immense creative cycle. The first Sabbath celebrated the close and consummation of the work; and so it continued to do, week by week, for twenty-five hundred years. At that time, it did not lose this first memorial feature; but simply, for a select portion of the human family, combined with it another. It became to the Jew, from the time of the Passover, a memorial of his wonderful deliverance, by God's help, from the slavery of Egypt. It was to him what the Fourth of July is to us, the anniversary of his independence.

We will observe that neither of these ideas is inconsistent with the essential conception of the Sabbath. They are rather helpful to it. The first memorial truth, the resting of God from his creative work, suggests the rest of man from his daily toil; the second, enkindling the gratitude of the Jew for his escape from Egyptian bondage, would well give zest to the day as a time of thankful worship to his divine Deliverer.

For four thousand years, one or both of these two great facts were commemorated by the weekly Sabbath; and they were worthy of such commemoration. But now a more important event, by far, than either of these occurs; an event in which both body and soul of every man, Jew and Gentile, have an infinite interest. The first creation is a wreck; there is a new, a re-creation, which shall never fail. The first deliverance is a shadow; there is a new redemption, more costly, more glorious, from a bondage of soul worse than that of the Nile. If the first creation and the first deliverance were worthy of celebration, how much more so are these? So the Christian heart has felt; and now, for more than eighteen centuries, the Sabbath has been the perpetuating memorial of that day when the Son of God completed the regeneration, and ordained the new Passover for the sacramental host of his elect.

We see that this is right. The memorial idea is no essential part of the Sabbath; for we can easily conceive a day perfectly fitted for both rest and worship, which would nevertheless commemorate no event in human history. It is an accidental ele-

ment. As such it is helpful; but as such, it may be changed for good reasons; and may, if thought best by the Lawgiver, be dispensed with altogether.

2. The *proportion* of our time which we should give to the Sabbath is another unessential fact. There is nothing in the nature of things, prior to the teaching of experience, by which we can tell whether the Sabbath should be every third, every fifth, every seventh, every tenth, or every fifteenth day. This is a point upon which we must have positive instruction, or else wait until we can learn from actual trial how much of rest we need for our bodies, and how much of culture and worship we require for our souls. God has settled this question for us authoritatively, wisely. He knows exactly how much of our time we need for daily duties, and how much for those of the Sabbath; and he has accordingly fixed and designated every *seventh* day as the proper Sabbath for man. Had he seen that one-fifth of our days was needed for this purpose, he would have so directed; had he thought one-tenth sufficient, he would have so ordained.

A positive law, when enacted, is morally obligatory upon all to whom it applies. Still, by its very nature, it is subject to modification or repeal. So that, should the divine Lawgiver ever find reason to change the proportion of sacred to secular time, he could do so without any violation of the essential law of the Sabbath. Had our Saviour done so when he was upon the earth, or through his apostles after his ascension, it would have been entirely proper, and would have left the original Sabbath idea substantially unchanged.

Uninspired man, however, has no right to modify or nullify the laws of God. If he says that the seventh day is holy, we are rebels against his authority if we say, No, the fifth or the tenth day is the proper Sabbath. Infidel France, as we know, attempted this to her sorrow and shame. Her tenth day Sabbath bore bitter fruits for her.

We are sure that God has not selected the seventh day capriciously. It may amuse our fancy to recall to mind the several facts which seem to reveal on his part a partiality for the



number seven. There were seven cycles of creation; seven years and seven times seven years as the periods of Jewish husbandry; seven weeks from the Passover to Pentecost; seven holy sprinklings of the Levitical law; seventy years of the Babylonish captivity; and seventy weeks of the Messianic prophecy of Daniel. In the Apocalypse, the number seven is of repeated mention: seven churches, seven thunders, the dragon with seven heads and seven crowns, seven plagues, seven angels, and seven golden vials. A lunar phase is seven days; a solar ray has seven colors; we are said to have seven senses; and many diseases have morbid periods of seven days, or multiples of seven. These facts, we say, may amuse us; but they are hardly of a character to throw any positive light on this discussion. In his wisdom, our heavenly Father has told us that every seventh day is to be to us a Sabbath. For this he had a sufficient reason.

3. The *particular day of the week* on which the Sabbath shall fall is, in itself, unessential. Outside of the divine ordinance, it would matter not whether we keep the first, second, third, or any other day of the week, as sacred for rest and worship. Thus, we are told that the ancient pagan Greeks observed Monday; the Persians, Tuesday; the Assyrians, Wednesday; the Egyptians, Thursday; the Mohammedans, Friday; the Jews, Saturday; while Christians regard Sunday as the Sabbath. Indeed, were we to start on a journey around the world, our Sabbath day would be constantly changing with the daily change of our meridian. If every congregation of Christians on the earth, as they now belt its circumference, were to unite in the worship of God at noon on Sunday, to spend an hour in his praise, no two of them, fifteen degrees apart, would be engaged in the solemn service at the same time. It is not the special twenty-four hours of Sunday, at the meridian of Jerusalem, that are the holy day of this earth. It is every seventh day at each spot, where a weary body and a grateful penitent soul may be found.

That seventh day, for four thousand years, was the last day of the week. Since the resurrection morn, the Christian heart, guided by the inspired impulses of the early disciples, has recog-

nised the divine will as setting apart the first day of the seven as holy to himself. For this a full and sufficient reason is suggested to every soul that gratefully remembers Calvary, and that rejoices in the vacant tomb of Joseph of Arimathea.

In addition and subordinate to this grand reason for the change, it may be that our Father would teach us by it another useful lesson. The old Sabbath taught the Jew that one day in seven was holy. As it came after a week of toil, it may have suggested to his mind that its principal purpose was to give him rest. The new Sabbath is the first day of the week, and suggests the higher thought, that in the enjoyment and faithful use of its sacred privileges, we will be better fitted for the duties, temptations, and trials of the coming days of labor. Beyond that, it teaches us that we are to give our first thoughts to our souls, our first time to God. If there is to be but one day in our last week on earth, let that day be a precious Sabbath.

Just here we may recall to our recollection the fact that the early Christians, amongst whom the Jews predominated, celebrated both the last day and the first day of the week. The last day they commonly called the Sabbath, while the first was gratefully named the Lord's day. As the Jewish element grew proportionately smaller, the observance of the old Sabbath gradually became obsolete, and the Lord's day was joyfully and lovingly substituted for it.

“On the seventh day reposing, lo! the great Creator stood,  
Saw the glorious work accomplished—saw and felt that it was good;  
Heaven, earth, man, and beast have being, day and night their courses  
run—

First creation—infant manhood—earliest Sabbath—it is done.

On the seventh day reposing, Jesus filled his sainted tomb,  
From his spirit's toil retreating, while he broke man's fatal doom;  
'Twas a new creation bursting, brighter than the primal one—  
'Tis fulfilment—reconcilement—'tis redemption—it is done.”

*Da Costa.*

#### THE FOURTH COMMANDMENT.

The whole of the Sacred Scriptures is God's word to man. As such, every page, and verse, and line, and word is significant.

Some portions, however, are relatively more important than others. Leaving out the direct utterances of him who spake as never man spake, there is no passage in all the volume of superior interest to that which records the ten commandments. The circumstances under which they were given, were of the most solemn character. They were written, not upon papyrus or parchment,—still less were they simply spoken,—they were written upon the enduring stone, the symbol of the everlasting. They were written, not by Moses at God's dictation, but, as we are expressly told, by the finger of God himself. When examined, their importance fully justifies the solemnity of their utterance. They are found to contain, as the Westminster Catechisms say, a summary of the moral law. Our duty to God and to man is all found comprehended in these few but momentous words.

The fourth commandment occupies a peculiarly significant place in this divine collection. It is manifest that the first of these commands have reference to our duty to God, while the last as plainly relate to our human obligations. To which of these two classes does the fourth belong? It is commonly said, as our *Catechism for Young Children* teaches, that the first four commandments teach our duty to God, and the last six our duty to our fellow-men. These statements are true, and yet they do not express the full truth.

It is true that the fourth teaches us a part of our duty to God. It tells us that the seventh day is the Sabbath of the Lord our God; that he rested upon that day, and that we must, for this reason, keep it holy. One of the chief objects of the day is to bring God, in all of his relations, before the human soul, and to remind us of our obligations to him. In the hurry and bustle of a busy, selfish world, we are so apt to forget him, and to neglect our duty to him, that we need the holy Sabbath to bring us to his footstool, and to teach us the sweetness of a constant dwelling near his mercy-seat.

So much is undoubtedly true. But is this all of the Sabbath? Is it exhausted in its direct relations to the Deity? Manifestly not. There are other and important duties peculiar to the law of the Sabbath, which have direct reference to our duties to the

lower animals, to our fellow-men, and to ourselves. We are solemnly enjoined to make it a Sabbath to our man-servant, to our maid-servant, to our cattle, and to the stranger that is within our gates, as well as to ourselves.

Indeed it is the striking peculiarity of this commandment, that it has reference to the *entire circle of our relations*: beginning with the brutes, and ending with our God. The Sabbath is thus the universal law. It is this for three reasons: 1. All are expected to obey it. God himself, as he tells us, reverences the day; and he requires all of his earthly children to do the same. 2. It concerns all the relations which man sustains. He owes Sabbath duties to the animals, to his fellows, to himself, and to his God. 3. It is *the conservator of all the other commandments*. As it is the great duty-day of the soul, it brings all of the obligations of man to the bar of his conscience, that he may question himself as to them all. For this reason a Sabbath-loving man is a God-fearing and a man-regarding soul. For this reason a Sabbath-keeping community is always not only a religious, but a moral, just, and humane society.

In the light of these facts, the position of the fourth commandment is deeply significant. It is not placed in the midst of those relating directly to our divine duties, nor in the midst of those referring immediately to our human obligations. It is by the side of both, and between the two classes—God having placed it there, as though it were the **KEYSTONE OF THE GREAT ARCH OF HUMAN DUTY**. Such indeed it is; and he who removes it from this God-given place, must not be surprised if he finds all the other commandments fall to ruin with it.

#### HOW IS THE SABBATH TO BE SANCTIFIED?

This is the practical point of the discussion; and yet a very few words upon it will be sufficient to guide every honest, intelligent mind. When we learn the purpose of the day, we know how it should be observed. A work-day should be spent in work; a sport-day in sport; a fast-day in fasting. The Sabbath is a rest-worship day, and should therefore be passed in restful worship, and in worshipful rest.

It is a REST day. "In it thou shalt not do any work." This is the letter of the law. It has been unfolded and interpreted for us by the infallible Lawgiver himself. He tells us plainly what we may do with propriety on this day.

1. Works of *necessity*. Matthew xii. 1-4. The disciples satisfied their hunger, on their way to the synagogue, by rubbing the grain from the heads of wheat, which they plucked by the wayside. Our Saviour justifies this by the example of David eating the shew-bread. Here we learn that what is needful to the support of life may be done upon the Sabbath. But does this justify travelling, supervising our farms, social visiting, and extensive cooking upon this day? It certainly does not. If this rule were kept in its spirit, it would be found that there is very little physical labor which is necessary to be done upon this day.

A conscientious regard for the day will lead us to anticipate the enjoyment of its rest, by seeking to do all that is possible to be done on the day preceding the Sabbath. For example, if we are travelling, we can arrange our journey in such a way that the close of Saturday will find us either at home, or at some place appropriate for the Lord's day. If we are housekeepers, we will prepare, by extra labor upon Saturday, to save ourselves and others all unnecessary work upon the day of rest.

Here it is proper for us to remember that there is a peculiar temptation to violate the rights of others. We may enjoy the Sabbath of rest for ourselves, and we may suffer nothing but an inevitable necessity to deprive us of it; but are we equally careful that our horses and cattle, our servants and employés, shall have the same privileges undisturbed? We may like an elaborate meal upon Sunday; and for us there may be no labor in its preparation. But does that justify us in expecting or even allowing our industrious wives, or our faithful servants, to spend most of the day of rest in thus ministering to our enjoyment? It is too often the case, that they who most need a respite from labor are thoughtlessly or wickedly deprived of it.

It may be asked, Does the running of ferries, of steamers, of railroads, and of furnaces, come under the law of necessary work? To this, it may be answered in brief, that neither the running of

ferries, of railroads, nor of iron furnaces, can be properly regarded as a work of necessity, suitable for the Sabbath. Their operation on this day is not essential to life or to its reasonable comforts. In case it should be, then it would be lawful. The running of steamers on our rivers or inland lakes is not necessary upon the Lord's day. Upon the high seas, where more than six days is necessarily consumed in making the voyage, there is no violation of the Sabbath law. In iron furnaces it is necessary to keep up the blast, but beyond this nothing more need or should be done. In all such cases, where there is a sincere desire to do right, but few mistakes will be made. Too often, however, the love of money overcomes our sense of right.

2. The Master tells us, (Matthew xii. 10-13,) that there is another class of deeds appropriate for this day. He heals a man with a withered arm. This is a typical act: for by it he means to teach us that all acts of *mercy* are suited to the Sabbath. "It is lawful to do well on the Sabbath days." This does not mean that we are to devote the whole of its sacred hours (except in rare emergencies) to labors of compassion. This would deprive us of the rest that we need. It does mean, however, that in visiting the sick and in relieving distress, we are not violating the proprieties of the day.

3. There is still a third class of labor which is suited to the sanctity of the Lord's Day. Our Saviour, Matthew xii. 5, says, that the Jewish priests, in the offering of the temple sacrifices on the Sabbath, though it involved much labor, were guilty of no wrong. Indeed, the ministers of religion of every age have been compelled, by the very nature of the case, to do some of their hardest work upon the Sabbath. The sexton must take care of the sanctuary, and see that it is comfortable for the worshippers. Mothers must make their children ready for the Sunday-school, and for the hour of public worship. Teachers must give one hour's earnest, honest labor to the pupils of their class at the Sabbath-school. Parents must teach their children and servants the truths of God's word. All of these may and must be done upon the Lord's Day; and all of these involve work. In country districts, there is the additional labor of harnessing a conveyance

to carry us to the house of praise. All this is needful, and all this is right. Such labors may be classed as works of *worship*.

It may be well, however, even here to guard ourselves against possible error. If we work our horses all the week, we should not use them on the Sabbath—not even to carry us to church. This may be easily avoided, even by the poor. Let the faithful animal rest upon Saturday afternoon; and then we may use him half of the Lord's Day.

Again, it is possible to run into a ruinous extreme in the religious labors of the Sabbath. There are those who teach in a morning Sunday-school, attend the regular forenoon service, teach another class in an afternoon school, and join the congregation in the evening worship. Some would insist that one Sabbath-school and one public service is enough for the great majority; indeed, is enough for all men. One of the evils of our religious life is that it is too public. We need more of meditative, private, closet piety.

The rest of the Sabbath is not violated by works of necessity, of mercy, or of worship. But let us be careful that we do not mistake the nature of its rest. Is the day to be spent in sleep? Is idleness the rest which it enjoins? Are its hours to be passed in frivolous dissipation? Do we need a beer-garden, or a pleasure promenade or drive, to enable us to rest properly on this day? If we were brutes, then these things might be so. Man needs sleep, he needs quiet, he needs relaxation. But upon the Lord's day he can secure all these, and yet be well employed during all of its sunlit hours.

Here we are naturally led to remember that the Sabbath is not for rest alone. It is a day for WORSHIP; for the culture of the soul. For man, this is its highest, most needed purpose. The whole of the Sabbath is to be devoted, as far as possible, to this object. When we consider the necessary interruptions which the most earnest soul cannot avoid, it will be found that there will not be more than ten or twelve hours left to the solemnly important duties of the soul. Three or four of these will be occupied in the exercises of public worship. These, every heart that appreciates the day will greatly enjoy. It will say

weekly, "I was glad when they said unto me, Let us go unto the house of the Lord." "A day in thy courts is better than a thousand." "One thing have I desired of the Lord, that will I seek after; that I may dwell in the house of the Lord all the days of my life, to behold the beauty of the Lord, and to inquire in his temple."

"Beyond my brightest joy,  
I prize her heavenly ways,  
Her sweet communion, solemn vows,  
Her hymns of love and praise."

Some six or eight hours we may have every Lord's Day for our private religious duties. If we are parents, one-half of this time we must give to our children. No part of our life can be more solemnly interesting than this. Outside of a daily example, no influence which we exert upon children equals the work of Sunday training. If we neglect it altogether, then, of course, we raise our children, measurably, as though they were heathen. If we give but a few hurried moments to it, we will teach them that religion is of such trivial importance that it may be properly despised. If we make it a task to ourselves and to them; if we impress them with the idea that their Sunday training, their reading of the Bible, their study of the Catechism, their religious conversation, is a kind of punishment; then they will soon learn to hate it all. If, however, with love for them, love for the work, and love for our Saviour, we seek to make it a serious but pleasant service, we shall find that, by God's blessing, they will regard it as the Eden hour of the week; and that it will mould their young hearts into a sincere faith and earnest love to the Redeemer.

A few hours we can claim exclusively for our own souls. These can and will be happily and profitably spent in the study of God's word, in prayer for his grace, in meditation upon his goodness, in self-examination, in communings with the Saviour, in storing the mind with religious knowledge, and in plannings for future usefulness. Thus shall we grow in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord Jesus Christ. Thus shall we bring



heaven down to our own hearts, and realise the richest blessings of the Lord's Day.

“How sweet a Sabbath thus to spend,  
In hope of one that ne'er shall end!”

The Sabbath is a day of rest and worship. On it, let us rest as worshippers; and let us worship as resting. Rightly understood, its rest is worship; and its worship is rest.

While the Sabbath is the religious day of the week, no truly pious heart will limit his religion to its holy hours. If we spend the Lord's Day aright, it should leave such a savor of holiness within our hearts as to sanctify them for all the week. Piety which shows itself upon the Sabbath alone, is of a very suspicious character.

Our use and our enjoyment of the Lord's Day are an excellent practical test of our Christian character. If we make it a real Sabbath, and enjoy it as such, welcoming its regular return as the feast-day of the soul, then we may thank God that he has thus renewed our hearts, and given to us a true spiritual appetite. If, however, we make it a day of carnal pleasure, and neglect or despise its spiritual privileges, we have reason to fear that our heart is not right in the sight of God, and our soul is not meet for the inheritance of the saints in light.

#### THE SABBATH AND CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

Without undertaking an elaborate discussion of this point, we shall endeavor to give, in a few words, the true relations of the Sabbath to the civil government.

1. The State should not command the discharge of a religious duty. The reason of this is that it is outside of the sphere of the State's authority; as the lawyers say, it is *ultra vires*. A physician, as such, cannot prescribe to one of his patients as to how he shall conduct his farming. This is no part of his legitimate professional business. So the State has no authority in religious matters; and a uniform experience has proven that all intrusion by it into this sphere has been unwise and hurtful in its consequences.

2. The State commands no act whose influences affect the

agent only. For this reason, there are no penal statutes against the attempt to commit suicide. This is the highest offence which one can commit against himself. Yet the laws of the commonwealth are silent with regard to it. It is not an answer to say that it bears its own punishment; that the self-murderer is his own executioner. This would be true, if every attempt at suicide were successful. Let a man make an effort to destroy himself, and fail; there is no penal law by which he can be indicted for an assault with intent to kill. Let a man destroy his own property without injuring that of his neighbor, and there is no civil law to condemn him. The reason of all this is, that the State is essentially a social institution, and is designed for the administration of our social, secular relations.

3. It is the province of the State to prevent any of its subjects trespassing upon the rights of others.

Applying these principles to the case before us, we are prepared to say:

1. That the State cannot properly require its subjects to observe any day of religious worship. It would not be proper for the State to enact a law declaring Sunday to be the Lord's day, and commanding all persons to observe it by reading the Bible and attending upon the services of the sanctuary. The State has no authority in such matters.

2. The civil government cannot require any individual to refrain from work and to rest on the Lord's day, unless his working interferes with the rest or worship of his neighbor. The State cannot punish a man for making shoes or cutting wood upon Sunday. However wrong these things may be, they are individual acts, involving the actors alone, and therefore the State cannot interfere.

3. The State may and should forbid any man to require either his animals, his servants, or his employees, to work upon the day of rest. This statement is founded upon the truth that the Sabbath, as a day of weekly rest, is a need, and therefore the natural right of every working man and working beast. It is their right, just as life and liberty, and the possession of their honestly

acquired property, and just and humane treatment, are their rights. As such, it must be enforced by the State.

Just here, another point may be made. One day of the week would, of itself, suit the State for a Sabbath of rest as well as another. It is important, however, nay, it is essential, that in every community there should be some *one* day recognised as the weekly rest. How shall the State fix that day? As a civil institution, it can properly be done only by its legitimate sovereign legislative power. In this Republic of ours the people are sovereign, and, through their State and National Legislatures, can determine which shall be the day of rest. As nine-tenths of our people are Christians, and, as such, observe Sunday as the religious Sabbath, it is the duty of the State authorities, as has been done, to declare the same day the civil Sabbath of the land.

4. The State is bound to protect its citizens in the enjoyment of their religious rights. The great mass of our people are Christians. As a conscientious duty they assemble on the Sabbath for the social worship of God. In this they are exercising a natural right, and are interfering with the rights of none others. They deserve the protection of the State in the unmolested enjoyment of this right; and no blare of trumpets, nor beating of drums, no hammering of iron nor rumbling of wagons along the stony streets, should be allowed to disturb them.

5. The State has no right to violate its own Sabbath. For wise reasons, it has made Sunday the civil Sabbath; has declared it a legal holiday; refuses to sanction the legality of business done on that day, except in emergencies; and yet the National Government of this country openly and persistently nullifies its own law, by requiring the carrying and distribution of the mails on its own appointed day of rest. How can its postal employees enjoy the Sabbath, when it requires them to work on that day?

6. In this, the State does a double wrong: it wrongs those whom it employs, and it wrongs those whom it does not. It wrongs its employees by depriving them of the rest of the Sabbath; but it deeply wrongs every Christian citizen of the country.

The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in this country has, more than once, forbidden its members to assist in this desecration of the Sabbath by acting as postmasters. In this it has done right. In fact, how could it do otherwise? If it be not wrong to work in the postal service on the Sabbath, then it is not wrong to work elsewhere. By no possibility can this be made a work of necessity; still less one of mercy or of worship.

We turn aside here, just a moment, to say that those Christians who attend upon the post-office on the Lord's day to get their mail, (and many of whom spend a large portion of its holy hours in reading their secular newspapers,) are guilty of aiding in this national violation of the Sabbath.

But the point which we are now making is this: no Christian can habitually desecrate the Lord's day; his conscience forbids it. No Christian, therefore, can properly enter the postal service of our country, where he is required to work regularly upon the Sabbath. This violation of the civil and religious Sabbath by our National Government, cuts off a large portion of its best citizens from a participation in a large measure of the civil service of the country. The Christian citizen has a right to be a postmaster; but the Government, by violating its own Sabbath, deprives him of that right.

#### THE SABBATH A PROPHECY OF THE MILLENNIUM AND OF HEAVEN.

Each recurring Lord's Day is a glorious privilege in itself. They are the pearls strung upon the thread of time; the oases in the desert of trial; the pleasant camping-places in the journey of life. All the precious things we know are associated with the Sabbath. Home, father, mother, brothers, sisters, wife, husband, children—all belong to it; for it is the home-day of the hearthstone. Bible, sanctuary, mercy-seat, the cross—all are linked in hallowed union with it. Tears, holy tears, belong to it; penitent tears, grateful tears, believing tears, hopeful tears.

Yes, hopeful tears. Its pleasures are not simply of the past, or of the present. The soul's vision grows keen in its pure and translucent atmosphere. It looks beyond the struggling and sometimes disheartening conflict of the present. It peers through

the clouds, the smoke, the mist, and sees the glory-lighted plains of victory in the distance. Those far-off table-lands come near; and there the soul sees the sword beaten into a ploughshare, the spear into a pruning-hook. The nations have forgotten the diabolism of war, and have learned the arts of peace. Knowledge has increased in the earth. Ignorance and superstition, error and fanaticism, are gone. Justice now waves her golden wand, and righteousness sits upon the throne, while earth and all its inhabitants "keep jubilee a thousand years." As each week has had its Lord's Day of rest and worship, so the centuries shall finally enjoy their millennial Sabbath.

But under the inspiration of the quiet twilight hour of the Lord's Day, the soul looks even beyond the millennial glory of earth. It reads, "There remaineth therefore a rest, a Sabbath-keeping, to the people of God." This truth gives wings to its faith, and it mounts up above the earth and beyond the stars; and in that "city, which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God," it finds that there is a Sabbath of pure rest and holy worship; not for a few hours between a rising and a setting sun; not even for a brief millennial day; but forever and forever, in the presence of God and in the company of Jesus; a Lord's Day that shall never know a sorrow, and never know an end.

## ARTICLE II.

## THE DIVORCE OF EDUCATION AND RELIGION.

By a host of writers in this age, it is assumed as a sort of self-evident truth, that knowledge is the power by which the improvement of the human race is to be effected. Unquestionably there is a sense in which this proposition may be accepted as true. Knowledge is the instrument or lever by which men are elevated in the scale of being. But this is not the sense intended by those who so confidently present knowledge as the redeemer of the race. They reproduce, in all its length and breadth, that dominant error which ascribes all the maladies of the body politic to external causes, and which proposes to remedy them by external means. According to this new gospel, the panacea for "the heart-ache and the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to," is a cultivated understanding. This assumption forms the basis of half the platform speeches with which the ears of the American people are regaled; it is the corner-stone upon which the huge fabric of government common-and-high-school-education rests. It is itself a deduction from another assumption, which asserts that sin is an error of the intellect, and not depravity of the heart and will. Hence it is concluded: Let the mind be illuminated, and the heart will be changed; the principles of political economy are sufficient, if understood, to secure public virtue; knowledge of hygiene will compel obedience to the laws of health; the drunkard, having seen the inflamed tissues of the brain, will flee his cups; the thief, advised that in stealing, he violates the fundamental principles upon which the social fabric is constructed, will steal no more. In a word, knowledge, education, though it be restricted to the curriculum of the three "R's," is, in the opinion of the apostles of the new gospel, the power which is destined to redeem the masses from the thralldom of sin and dirt, and to elevate them to the estate of the sons of God.

As a result of these views, the cry for the schoolmaster becomes universal, while the desire for the gospel of Christ and the

ministers of religion is but feebly expressed. There yet remain not a few who desire religion first, education next; and who believe that both together are essential to the country's welfare. But there is an ever-increasing multitude who, while willing to tolerate religion, and to have its precepts inculcated, if perchance any one will undertake the task, concern themselves only about secular knowledge, who insist that there should be a total separation of mental and spiritual training, and who propose to rest satisfied if only the masses are "educated." In this country, especially, in addition to the motives suggested by benevolence, there are others impelling to universal education which are even more imperative. The masses are the masters; and as Mr. Lowe of England has said, not without a touch of sarcasm: "We must educate our masters." Whether the knowledge they are likely to acquire from the schoolmaster of the state will enable them to rule more wisely, remains to be seen. One thing at least should be well understood by both rulers and ruled—knowledge, unattended by the motives and sanctions of a vital religious faith, is no magician armed with power to convert vice into virtue, or sin into holiness.

On the contrary, it may be asserted, and it is the object of this article to demonstrate, that the general progress of knowledge and mere intellectual training in the case of individuals, when divorced from the constraining influence of active piety, increase and intensify (they do not ameliorate) the evils and miseries incident to human life.

It is obvious, that if this proposition be true, the complete secularisation of education, could it be accomplished, would be fraught with the direst consequences to men in their temporal interests, no less than in those which are regarded as spiritual and eternal. In other words, education without religion would be a curse instead of a blessing. It is also evident that every step towards the accomplishment of this result, everything which tends to exalt "culture" above piety, would be prejudicial to man's welfare. Another and very practical inference would be this: if religion is to be wholly ignored in secular schools, public and private; if, during that period in life when the mind is peculiarly

susceptible to every impression, those who are intrusted with the mental training of youth are, to be debarred from exerting a distinct religious influence, and from inculcating religious faith and duty, then surely the Church and Christian families which compose it, should be aroused to a sense of the importance of filling up the frightful gap which will be made in the moral culture of children, and should put forth heroic efforts to supply the tremendous deficiency.

The first and negative part of the proposition submitted for discussion may be verified at once by an appeal to daily experience. In nothing are the best and most beneficent effects of the general advance of knowledge more apparent (discounting for the present those which are distinctively religious) than in those discoveries and inventions of science, which are supposed to contribute directly to man's material welfare, and thus to his individual and social happiness. The blessings accruing from the utilisation of steam and electricity, for example, are signalised on all occasions. And yet it cannot be affirmed that the steam engine and the telegraph have alleviated the cares and anxieties of men engaged in commerce, wiped one drop of sweat from the brow of the mechanic, or lightened in any special degree the burdens of their daily life. Money is not "easier," nor does trade flow in smoother waters, because New York is in hourly communication with London, and the transactions of the Liverpool Cotton Exchange daily reported to New Orleans. On the contrary, the exactions of business are more onerous, the worry and anxieties of trade more incessant. Mechanical inventions have not diminished the sum total of the misery attendant upon toil; nor do they enable the masses to earn an honest living with a less expenditure of sweat, either of brow or brain. If this be denied, the denier will find it difficult to specify particulars on the one side which are not offset by those on the other, which counteract their effect. Hood's "Song of the Shirt" is no longer sung. But the clatter of the sewing machine and the whirl of the spindles accompany a song which is not less mournful. The fact is, that with the steam engine and plough, with the cotton gin, telegraph, and sewing machine, have sprung up a thousand



additional wants and cares. These have multiplied faster than the means to secure the gratification of the former or to relieve the burden of the latter. Now, more than ever, men, from the highest to the lowest, are engaged in the mad rush for wealth or pleasure in order to gratify desires of which their fathers were ignorant. If it were not that there is a religious view of this matter, if Christianity had not utilised these inventions to spread abroad the doctrines of the cross, to teach men sympathy and love, to band men together by the ties of a common brotherhood, it might be truthfully asserted that, on the whole, Watt, Stephenson, and Morse, with those who have realised the ideas they suggested, have added nothing to the sum total of human happiness.

It is to be remarked, also, that the general progress of knowledge does not appear to make men better; nor do the wonderful mechanical inventions of the age in any degree tend to lessen the motives and opportunities for crime and vice. Instead of impelling men more surely along the paths of honesty, they cause them to seek more extended pleasures and to press to their attainment, regardless of lawful means. The general advance in intellectual attainment produces no marked change as to the rightful division of the proceeds of labor. Not more than in the past are profits justly divided according to the measure of each man's industry. The fact is, that to-day, as well as when "might" confessedly made "right," and the sword decided all questions of ownership, one man works and another enjoys the proceeds. The Knights of St. John and of the Temple have been superseded by the knights of the "Ring," who employ the telegraph instead of the sword for their own selfish aggrandisement: These modern representatives of chivalry (?) so exasperate the persons whom they fleece, and who are powerless to counteract their combinations, that the defrauded and helpless victims resort to every species of villainy to protect themselves.

But it is desirable to examine into the effect of the increase of knowledge on the individual. It is a trite remark, that knowledge is power; but it must be remembered that, like physical power, it takes its moral complexion from the character of the being who possesses it. Knowledge increases capacity for action

and passion. This is its sole function, so far as it regards the person who possesses it. There is no charm in it to renew the will or to transform the heart. Just here is to be found the fundamental error of all the false theories on this subject. Intellectual training simply enlarges intellectual power; it makes men neither better nor worse. Knowledge is a gleaming sword; whether it defend the right or uphold the wrong, depends entirely upon the will of him who wields it.

The proof of the important principle just stated is to be sought partly, *a priori*, in the nature of man, as that nature is affected by sin; partly, *a posteriori*, in the actual effects of education as observed in the history of individuals and races. It will be sufficient to refer those who accept the Bible as the word of God, to that venerable authority for the proof that man needs something more for his real improvement than education, whether it be wholly secular or wholly religious, or a mixture of both. Truth, though it be divine, apprehended merely by the intellect, is insufficient to convert the soul. But it is desirable, for the sake of those who proclaim the new gospel, to show by an appeal to facts, both particular and general, that "culture" alone has signally failed to secure moral improvement; which undoubtedly it could and would have done, were it able to renew the will or purify the heart. These facts will be presented below, as confirmatory of this whole argument. They serve abundantly to confirm the point now under discussion, viz., that it is not within the province of intellectual training directly to make men either good or bad. Its function is to enlarge their capacity for doing and suffering good and evil.

The question, then, is: Are men good or bad? Here, also, the facts, with a fatal iteration, assure the honest inquirer that "the heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil." Indeed, men admit, whatever they may claim for themselves, that others, and especially the huge, teeming multitudes, are bad. When, therefore, intellectual training alone is conferred upon them, their capacity for evil is increased. If the moral restraints of an active piety are not at the same time imparted, the probability that this increased power will be harmfully employed, be-

comes almost, if not altogether, a certainty. A pugilist, trained for a contest in the prize-ring, is none the less a brutal brawler than when he lay sick and debilitated by excess. He is a more powerful and a more dangerous foe, to be more than ever dreaded, because of his training. Similarly, if men receive never so much mental training, and yet be untouched by the power of the gospel of Christ, they will become more desperate and dangerous, because more powerful.

It is not by any means to be concluded that mankind is to be left in ignorance. The correct conclusion to be drawn from the truths presented, will be signalled at the close of this article. The point under consideration is, that mental culture alone is not sufficient to secure the moral improvement of the race.

But it will be said that men are not wholly bad; that there is an admixture of some good with the bad in all, even in the worst; consequently, that any increase by means of education of capacity to do or suffer evil, is counterbalanced by a corresponding increase of capacity to do or enjoy good. It may be admitted, for argument sake, that men are partly good and partly bad, and yet be successfully maintained that increase of knowledge is accompanied with increase of sorrow, and that such increase tends to intensify rather than to ameliorate the misery of men.

This will appear by a consideration of the effect of sympathy. It is a curious fact, that our sympathy with sorrow, when it is removed from our direct cognisance, is much more easily excited than our sympathy with joy under similar circumstances. We have, for example, some pleasure when we learn that the past season has been one of unexampled prosperity in England; we are filled with profound grief when we learn that the mother country has been visited with unprecedented calamities. On this account, even were it possible for men to be informed in equal measure of the world's joys and miseries, as the world now exists, and as it will continue to exist if religion should be banished, increase of knowledge would tend to intensify sorrow rather than happiness. But this supposition is a violent one. It is a fact singularly confirmative of what has been said of the depravity of men, that increase and diffusion of knowledge secure our

acquaintance with their woes rather than their blessings. Their happiness men keep for themselves and for those immediately connected with them ; their calamities are trumpeted abroad. It is a sad commentary on social life, that the woes of men constitute the bulk of that news which is daily found in the morning papers, and which is read and discussed in drawing-room and cellar. In the nature of the case, it is impossible for current literature to reveal those sweet domestic joys which form the greater part of human happiness. The prints which reach the hands of the people, teem with accounts of domestic infelicities, as well as of devastations wrought by the forces of nature. Thus men are brought in contact, not with the joys, but with the miseries of the world. This tends to increase unhappiness, directly, through the operation of sympathy, and also indirectly, through a hardening process, which issues in a larger measure of vice and crime. Familiarity with misery, which we will not or cannot relieve, makes men not only callous, but careless. The former result would seem to offset the effect of the operation of sympathy, as in fact it partly does ; but it is much more than counterbalanced by the latter result. When sympathy with suffering ceases to be easily excited, it becomes easy to inflict pain on others. The only safeguard here, and the only remedy for this evil, are to be sought in the sanctions and motives of an earnest practical religion, under the auspices of which sympathy for others is expressed by active self-denying efforts to relieve their suffering. If these sanctions and motives be wanting, the knowledge men acquire of each other's troubles is a curse rather than a blessing.

The divorce of education and religion is fraught with another consequence, even more disastrous to human happiness. The goal to be reached by a complete secularisation of education, is practical atheism. The more advanced of the apostles of the new faith do not hesitate to present this in all its naked deformity. There is no God ; or if a God, he is either unable or unwilling to afford material assistance to men. They have only to do with Nature. She (or it) is blind and remorseless, animated with savage cruelty ; armed with terrific machinery of destruction, which she wields

inexorably, without morals and without heart. Such knowledge as this cannot, it may be asserted with confidence, make men happier or better.

The affirmative part of the proposition presented for discussion requires, however, a more careful consideration. Reason and observation concur to prove that the knowledge imparted by the schoolmaster, and, indeed, the only knowledge which a merely secular education can be expected to afford, has a tendency to increase vice and crime. In a word, if religion and education are to be divorced, if we are to abandon Christianity, the instruction given by the schoolmaster will be a curse and not a blessing to the people. This is a startling proposition; so startling that many are prepared to scout it as absurd. It contains the great vital, practical issue presented to the American people at this time. The preachers of the new gospel claim that secular education is all sufficient to secure the welfare of the body politic. They have a large following who hold to the old gospel as the best thing, but who believe that education without Christianity is able of itself to do much in the way of elevating the taste and improving the morals of the country. They, therefore, join hand in hand on this subject with the atheists and infidels, who discard the Bible, the Prayer Book, and Catechism. These Christian followers of scientific infidels are moving heaven and earth to secure a complete secularisation of education, whether it be afforded by public or private teachers. Professors in colleges, instructors in seminaries and schools of all grades, are to be selected with reference solely to their qualifications to teach the branches assigned them. If, in this regard, they attain the required standard, it matters not whether they believe in Moses and the prophets, in Christ and the apostles, or not. It is the principle upon which this conduct is based that this article is designed to prove false.

To resume the discussion, it is remarked:

*First.* That mental training and increase of knowledge augment responsibility, and the consciousness of it. The first part of this statement is so obviously true that it calls for no elaborate argument. Increase of power of any sort augments responsibility. A little re-

lection will serve to show that the second part also of the statement is true. Money is power; social position is power. It is possible, but not likely, that a man might have these elements of power and yet be hardly conscious of it. But that power which comes from mental endowments belongs to a different category. It is so purely subjective—as distinguished from other sources of power—that a consciousness of it is involved necessarily in its possession. Now, then, while with mental culture there comes augmentation of responsibility, which is duly appreciated, there is no power in this culture to direct the will or to improve the heart. Men laboring under this increased weight of responsibility, find in it no higher motives impelling them to the right use of their power. The inevitable result is more callousness in feeling, more recklessness in purpose: a result injurious alike to themselves and others.

Examples of this may be seen on every hand. Ministers of the gospel are familiar with a class commonly denominated gospel-hardened. This unfortunate class consists of men who have been instructed in the principles of religion, but who have not submitted themselves to its claims. Their intellectual appreciation of the requirements of the gospel is great, their sense of responsibility in the premises is keen, but their hearts have not been touched, nor their wills persuaded. Even knowledge about religion may be a savor of death. The same is true of general culture. A signal example is furnished in the person of Nana Sahib, the leader of the Sepoy Rebellion. This celebrated Indian chieftain was a man of genius, and of high intellectual attainments. He was an elegant gentleman, adorned with the polite culture of the East and of the West. And yet he was a fiend incarnate. These examples illustrate the truth, that those who “drink deep,” as well as those who moisten their lips at the Pierian Spring, need to quench their thirst in—

“Siloa’s brook that flowed  
Fast by the oracles of God.”

*Secondly.* In connexion with this, another effect of a mere increase of knowledge is to be remarked. It makes the masses of men dissatisfied with their condition, while it affords them

neither opportunity nor power to better themselves. Motives for idleness, beggary and crime are thereby engendered. In this country a certain odium attaches to those who dare to promulgate it, but nevertheless it remains a stern fact, that five out of six must work with their hands for a living, if they get it honestly. Now, then, the knowledge which these five are likely to acquire from the schoolmaster simply makes them dissatisfied with their condition, and gives no power to improve it. Men learn that the world is large, and contains a great many nice things for those who can get them. Drudgery on the farm is too irksome for educated (?) youth; toil in workshop and loom is too slow a method of equalising the balances of fortune. These people, therefore, become the easy prey of villains who are always on the watch to catch dissatisfied, self-conceited folk. The literature which the art of reading makes available is filled with tempting bait; the readers accept as gospel the latest popular notion on the most momentous questions, and are ready to follow any leader who preaches the last absurdity. Meantime, the knowledge acquired is of little or no avail in the stern battle of life. Be the years few or many spent in conning books, the pupil is just as impotent at the end of the course as at the beginning to earn an honest living by an acquirement he has secured from them. This is the case with the five out of six who must work with their hands.

The bearing of these facts on the general subject under discussion is apparent. Book knowledge alone renders the masses dissatisfied and ill at ease, while it confers no ability to relieve their distress. The virtues of patience and contentment do not come with "culture." Impatience and dissatisfaction increase unhappiness, and so foster motives for crime. It becomes easy to beg, if men are not ashamed; to steal, if men are not afraid. Shame and fear are not supplied by mental training. These deterring principles must come from other sources.

*Thirdly.* There is another fact which bears on the question of motive, as well as directly on the main proposition. The knowledge afforded by the art of reading and the steam printing-press, gives the masses access to a literature which is much worse than "light;" a literature which familiarises them with vice and crime

under the most alluring forms, which teaches, under the garb of adventure, the methods employed by criminals to defraud others and to escape justice; which, therefore, tends not only to remove shame and fear, but also offers inducements to enter upon a career of infamy. No one who has had any occasion to look into this matter can have failed to see the effect of this literature on the young. It throws the glamour of adventure and success over vice, so that it is well nigh impossible for the imaginative and ardent mind of the young to resist the temptation to indulge in sinful practices. The quiet humdrum life of home becomes tame in comparison with the experiences of "Ben, the Luggage Boy," and others of his class, who abandon their father's house for a life of adventure.

Of course, the picture here is not altogether dark. The same art which enables a boy to read the *Day's Doings* and the *Police Gazette* will enable him to read the Bible and the religious tract. But to which of these kinds of literature do boys and men naturally incline? It is notorious that the dime novel is preferred to the Bible, and the police reports to the tract. If there be any doubt on this subject, the sceptic can have his doubts resolved by looking over the shelves of newsdealers and booksellers, or by examining the bundles of trash hawked through the railroad trains.

There is also a deeper depth in this direction. There are books and papers which no respectable dealer will touch. These are scattered by the million over the land; the sons and daughters of the people read them. Each is a fire-brand lighted at the flames of hell; every one is a festering sore, spreading like gangrene through society; all are seeds of death and damnation, dropped from the loathsome wings of the angel of pestilence. The presses of the Bible Society, the Tract Society, of all the religious publishing houses in the land, do not match in extent the work done by these presses of the devil, worked by fiends who might have been vomited forth from the bottomless pit. With the Bible excluded from the public schools, as it will and must be, with religion ignored in every department of secular education, with Christianity discarded, as it will be, if the views



combated prevail, what will mental culture do for the masses, what benefit will the "three R's" confer on them? There can be but one answer. Under such circumstances, knowledge will be not a blessing but a curse.

*Fourthly.* There is, as there should be, a final appeal to the facts. It will be said, that while the arguments presented are plausible, they are based on a false analysis of human nature, and that the actual results are different from those which the argument would lead us to expect. This is the popular opinion, but it is not sustained. Indeed, so inveterate is the belief that "culture" is the all powerful principle which is to redeem the world, that the facts in the case have been usually overlooked, and a vicious argument employed to sustain it. The argument thus proceeds: It is notorious that the criminal class is ignorant, and that the more criminal the more ignorant. It is, therefore, intuitively obvious that the ignorant are the criminal, and that the more ignorant the more criminal.

Now, it is true that criminals are generally (by no means universally) ignorant, but it is not to be concluded therefrom that the ignorant are generally criminal. A proposition may be true, and yet its converse be false. Here is the logical error of the apostles of the new gospel. Statistics prove that the vast body of criminals cannot read and write. It is at once concluded that the vast body of illiterate are criminals, and that it is only necessary to educate them in order to convert them into industrious, law-abiding citizens. What say the facts to this plausible argument?

Before the days of the steam printing-press, it was practically impossible for the masses to be taught the arts of reading and writing. The bulk of the Athenians, therefore, in the age of Socrates and his successors were illiterate, but they were by far the best educated people, in the true secular sense of that word, which the world had ever seen. They were daily taught by the master minds of the earth; they were, comparatively, a race of thinkers; the average intelligence and diffusion of knowledge were very great. Of practical religion they had little or none. A viler, a more debauched set never breathed. On the other

hand, the peasantry of France are in this age profoundly ignorant. They have little or no culture, but their industry, sobriety, honesty, and patriotism, are the stay of their country. They sit at the feet of priests, who teach them what Protestants are accustomed to regard as an exploded superstition; but from these ministers of an effete religion, they learn to fear God, and to do justice and right. These are the people who have upheld France in the hour of her sore trial. If the men of letters, if the more intelligent and cultivated citizens of Paris and the large towns, had been as honest, as self-denying, as patriotic, as the ignorant inhabitants of the provinces, a different story would have been recorded at Sedan. Glory, if not victory, would have crowned the banners of the empire.

Americans, however, will admit no examples but those taken from among themselves. The following facts, therefore, gathered from United States census returns for 1870, are submitted:

Of the whole school population at that time in Georgia, 1 in 2.5, or 40 per cent., were illiterate; in New York, 1 in 19, or 5 per cent., were illiterate. Of the native white population in Georgia, 1 in 5, or 20 per cent., were illiterate; in New York, 1 in 53, or 2 per cent., were illiterate. That is, common school education was among native whites ten times more extended in New York than in Georgia; whereas, of the same class, in Georgia, 1 in 4,987 were in prison; in New York, 1 in 1,374 were in prison. That is, crime was about two and one-half times more extended in New York than in Georgia.

Again: Of the whole school population in Virginia, 1 in 2.7, or 40 per cent., were illiterate; in Massachusetts, 1 in 14, or 7 per cent., were illiterate. Of the native white population in Virginia, 1 in 5.7, or 18 per cent., were illiterate; in Massachusetts, 1 in 173, or  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., were illiterate. That is, common school education among native whites was thirty times more extended in Massachusetts than in Virginia; whereas, among the same class in Virginia, 1 in 2,110 were in prison; in Massachusetts, 1 in 946 were in prison. That is, there was more than twice as much crime in Massachusetts as in Virginia!

Again: At that time, of the entire population in Georgia, 1 in

652 was supported by charity; in New York, 1 in 310 was supported by charity. A difference in favor of Georgia. Of the native white population in Georgia, 1 in 409 was supported by charity; in New York, 1 in 603 was supported by charity. A difference in favor of New York; to be accounted for by the fact that Sherman's army had not pillaged the latter State. Of the whole population in Virginia, 1 in 373 was supported by charity; in Massachusetts, 1 in 228 was supported by charity. Of native whites in Virginia, 1 in 365 was supported by charity; in Massachusetts, 1 in 205 was supported by charity. In both comparisons the difference is in favor of Virginia.

Surely this is a marvellous exhibit. Notwithstanding that common school education is far more extensive in New York and Massachusetts than in Virginia and Georgia; notwithstanding that these latter States have been desolated by war, robbed of millions of property, crime and poverty are less prevalent among them than among the people of the former States. It is not asserted that these facts show that education is the *cause* of the difference, but only that education is, by itself, impotent to *prevent* the difference.

The force of these statistics cannot be impaired by the assertion that collegiate education is more prevalent in Virginia than in the northern States. This is probably true, but the fact in no wise affects this argument, for it is not pretended that collegiate education can be afforded to all. It is, moreover, notorious that in the colleges of Virginia, with the exception of the University and Military Institute, there have always been put forth most earnest efforts to teach religion, and to inculcate the principles of practical piety. Even in the two institutions which have been endowed by the State, for many years a high standard of morality has been inculcated, and an earnest religious sentiment has been maintained by the personal efforts of professors and students.

A more plausible attempt to meet the force of such facts as have been presented, is this: It is alleged that, in those sections where crime is more prevalent, the fact is to be accounted for by the influx of a foreign population, consisting of the vile from every nation under heaven, and by the greater density of the

population. It is claimed that crime increases, in proportion, more rapidly than population.

In regard to these statements, it is to be remarked that the facts are no less significant where the comparison is instituted between the native white populations, and that it is one of the effects of education and of the general advance of knowledge to produce effects analogous to those which result from increased density of population. If it be true that crime increases more rapidly than numbers, it is because men are bad, and by intimate association with one another, familiarise each other with crime, and band together for its accomplishment. Of course, pauperism, which is a result in part of surplus population, contributes to the same end. But, while education is impotent to prevent pauperism, its effects are to bring men, practically, more closely together. The families of the sparsely settled and remote sections are in easy reach of the printing-presses of New York and Boston. The bad men of those cities can sit in their offices and familiarise the girls and boys of the country with vice and crime just as effectively as they can the people with whom they daily associate. This in fact is done to the temporal and eternal ruin of countless multitudes. The wonderful mechanical inventions, the general progress of knowledge, the art of reading, produce *quo ad hoc* the same results as increase of population.

All the facts in the case, therefore, when correctly estimated, confirm the conclusion heretofore reached. Secular knowledge, intellectual culture, divorced from the sanctions of an earnest, practical, religious faith, increase the sense of moral responsibility without augmenting moral power; as to the masses of men, render them dissatisfied with their condition in life, without affording the means of supplying their increased wants, or relieving their distresses; tend to familiarise them with vice and crime, and to remove the sense of shame; offer inducements and opportunities for entering upon a sinful career, and so promote rather than prevent beggary and lawlessness.

This, surely, is a startling conclusion. But it is sustained by both reason and experience. What then? are men to remain ignorant? By no means; the instincts of humanity forbid; God

forbids. As has been remarked already, education is not the efficient cause of that increase of crime and vice which sometimes attends it. It has been admitted that education may be as powerful for good as it sometimes is for evil. The proper conclusion is, that men must be educated wisely; that education and religion are not to be divorced; that if religion is to be abolished, *then* it were better to leave men ignorant.

It is not considered necessary, in connexion with these things, to say anything in favor of education, of secular education, of the education of the masses. It would be surely out of place for THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW to publish an article which was designed to put a stop to, or to cast impediments in the way of, popular education. Such an article would be as silly and useless, as it would be in violation of the principles of that Church which this REVIEW aims to uphold and to make known. The practical end sought to be attained by this article, owes no little of its importance to the fact that education—the education of the masses—ought to be, and, as we hope, will be, accomplished. In order to stimulate the Church and God's people to more earnest efforts, to extend the religion of Christ, we have endeavored to show that popular education divorced from Christianity will never secure the moral elevation of the masses, but, on the contrary, will tend to their misery and ruin. While, therefore, we must educate, let it be remembered that we are putting improved weapons into the hands of men. Care must be taken that they get the motives and the power to use them well.

*First.* This may be done, but subordinately, by giving industrial training. It is not necessary, or even desirable, to enter fully upon this wide and important subject. It is mentioned, because of its general bearing on the discussion, and its relation to religious training. Miss Nightingale, the distinguished philanthropist, has well said: "The three R's, without industrial training, is likely to lead to a fourth, the R of rascality." Children must be taught handicrafts. When this is done, they are enabled to earn a living, and are materially helped on the road to independence. The motives and inducements for crime

are in this way partly removed, and the task of the religious teacher is made easier.

The relation of the State to education is a subject outside the scope of this article; nor is it necessary that it be herein discussed. If it be a sound doctrine that the State must educate, then it follows that the State should give industrial training. If it be urged that the State has no right to compel a boy to learn a trade, then by an argument *a fortiori*, it may be shown that it has no right to compel him to learn arithmetic. The former without the latter will make the pupil a more useful citizen than the latter without the former. Possibly it will be alleged that the principles here laid down must be applied to religion. This is not denied, nor is it, in connexion with this, affirmed. Those who feel called upon to support the public school system are the persons to meet the difficulties of their position, growing out of the relations of the State to personal liberty, the rights of parents, and the privileges of all, under our laws, to worship God according to their own consciences. We are concerned to show that a vital, active piety is essential to the welfare and perpetuity of a free State; and reference has been made to industrial training only because it is one of the first practical requirements of a true religion, that men be taught to work for a livelihood, and to walk honestly before God and their fellows.

*Secondly.* Whatever may be the theories and wishes of the people on this subject, as a matter of fact it has been settled that we are to have a universal public school system. This means, so far, divorce of secular and religious instruction. Even should the attempt be made by the State to teach religion, such attempt will be practically futile. It can only inculcate the bare bones of theology and the outlines of a religious system. The power and opportunity to teach and to enforce the sanctions of an earnest religious faith, must remain where God has placed them, in the hands of the family and the Church. It may be, therefore, accepted as a stern and stubborn fact, that public education will be and must be wholly secular. It is necessary, therefore, for the Church and the family to appreciate the importance of doing their part to secure the religious education of the people. In

order to prevent that complete secularisation of education which is contemplated by a universal public school system, in order to stop, before the court has pronounced sentence, the issuing of the divorce of education and religion—the two which God has joined in holy matrimony—the Christian families which compose the Church, the officers and people of God's house, must awake to the responsibility which rests upon them. It becomes their imperative duty to supply what the State will withhold. Something more is needed in free America than culture; something more must be furnished to the masses than intellectual and industrial training. The obligations of truth and duty must be enforced by the sanctions of a vital, practical religion. Without the Ten Commandments, and the power of God enabling men to keep them; without the sense of pardon for sin and acceptance by God; without his grace to exercise self-control and to obey the calls of duty, all knowledge is vanity and vexation of spirit.

Goethe—himself an intellectual giant—says: Intellectual emancipation, if it does not give us at the same time control over ourselves, is poisonous. We have seen that intellectual culture fails to give this self-control. *That* must come from another and a higher source.

It is the function of religion to teach men and to enable men to fear God; to be honest; to subdue their passions; to be self-denying, patient, and industrious. Let men be educated as they will, it can avail little or nothing without vital piety. Throughout this article, we have emphasised the idea that religion must be real, earnest, practical. Even the truths of the gospel, without its power, is "a savor of death." They constitute the form without the spirit; they are a lifeless corpse adorned with flowers. It is not sufficient to cleanse the stream while the fountain remains impure, or to graft new branches on the trunk when the tree is dried up at the roots. Because man is depraved, because sin, like a fatal disease, infests his vitals, something more is needed for his regeneration than secular knowledge, than bright examples of heroism, than external appliances, be these the best ever invented by human wit. This is furnished by the gospel of Jesus Christ. Because, in God's gracious providence, this gos-

pel was given to our ancestors, our civilisation is by odds the best the world has ever known. Under the benign influences of this religion, we have emerged from the barbarism of the German forests, during the time when the people of Arabia, without it, have sunk from the highest pinnacle of learning and power, into comparative worthlessness and woe. It is a striking commentary on all that is contained in this article, to note that Bagdad was the Athens of the world when Europe, under the guidance of the Day Star from on High, began to emerge from barbaric night.

Sin is the great and all-important element in the causes which have secured man's degradation. Man wants, therefore, a Saviour from sin. Jesus Christ is such a Saviour. The end of man's destiny, as proposed by this Saviour, is freedom. This involves deliverance of his intellect from the dominion of error. Hence the gospel ever uses knowledge as a handmaid. Gospel freedom involves also deliverance of man's heart from the reign of bad passions and base desires, the emancipation of his will from the tyranny of evil habits and low pursuits, the soul from the bondage to the fear of death and the judgment. To accomplish this sublime mission, the gospel instructs. It exhibits God not as a dim abstraction; not as being unable or unwilling to help the fallen and wretched; but as a personal God, the common heritage of all, an ever-present reality and power,

"Who gives its lustre to the insect's wing,  
And wheels his throne upon the rolling worlds."

The gospel vouches for the doctrine of immortality, and gives assurance that the cup of life which has been pressed to our lips shall remain to cheer us forever. It teaches the importance of the individual man, against all the false theories of the Commune. It therefore cultivates a sturdy personal independence, which is the foundation of true manhood. It represents man a solid unit in society. He is not simply a leaf in the forest, or a single brick in a wall, but a living factor in the problem of life. Hence the gospel keeps ever before men the idea of personal accountability, and presses upon each an ever-present sense of duty.



With this individualism is coördinated another and not less important principle—that of family government. According to the gospel, the entire social fabric rests upon the family. Man is born in and under government. The authority of parents to instruct and to control their offspring, is of divine right. The gospel teaches, therefore, the great doctrine of subordination, viz., that cheerful and willing obedience to lawfully constituted authority is the only true liberty.

But more: the gospel provides a remedy for guilt, and supplies the power which frees from the tyranny of sin. While it awakens a deep sense of guilt and of natural alienation from God, it reveals Jesus, the desire of all nations, a great Redeemer from sin, who reconciles men to God by the blood of his cross. Thus it creates that perfect love which casteth out fear, and supplies at once the motive and the power of our salvation. *Jesus Christ crucified, reconciling the world unto himself*, is the cause; he is the Power which is to regenerate the world.

The progress of Christianity, therefore, and that alone, has been the true progress of man. Under the transforming power of the gospel of Christ, under the inspiration and guidance of God's Spirit, this progress has been grand in the past, and gives promise of a glorious issue. By it the true dignity of man is maintained and his true destiny realised. His pathway through his earthly life is illuminated by light from the Sun of Righteousness, and in the world to come will be forever bright in the radiance of the divine glory.

If the people of America desire to lend a helping hand in this majestic progress; if they would contribute to the realisation of this destiny; if as individuals they wish to gaze on that immortal splendor, they must become citizens of the kingdom of God's dear Son; they must come into personal relations with the King himself, who administers the affairs of his empire with matchless wisdom and almighty power. If they desire to increase the number of those who shall share this destiny, and who shall enter upon the glory which awaits the humblest citizen of this kingdom, they must spread abroad the knowledge of this gospel among the masses. In order to hasten the dawn of that day

when the wilderness shall rejoice, when the ignorant shall be truly wise and the guilty clean, when crime shall be abolished and sorrow shall flee away, when peace and plenty shall abound, when every man shall sit safely under his own vine and fig-tree, with none to molest or to make him afraid, the glorious "gospel of the blessed God" must be carried to every house, its truths treasured in every heart, and practised in every life.

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ARTICLE III.

BROAD CHURCHISM.

*True Unity of Christ's Church.* S. S. SCHMUÖKER, D. D.  
A. D. F. Randolph, New York. Pp. 262, 12mo. 1870.

*Doctrinal Consensus of Evangelical Christendom.* PH. SCHAFF,  
D. D.

*Scriptural Idea of the Visible Church Catholic, as composed of  
Denominations of Christians.* R. L. DABNEY, D. D. 1874.

*The Church of Canada (Future).* Rev. G. M. GRANT. Halifax,  
Nova Scotia. 1874.

It will hardly be denied by the careful observer of the prevailing state of religious sentiment, that there exist, in the Christian world at the present day, strong latitudinarian tendencies. In books, pamphlets, and papers, as well as in ecclesiastical assemblies, we notice frequent manifestations of the Broad Church spirit. Many learned and good men, actuated by a pious zeal for securing closer outward unity among Protestant Churches, have been led to propose expedients which we must believe to be fraught with peril. The Broad Churchism of the day involves the spurious theory of Church unity, which has found no small number of advocates. We hail it as a favorable omen, that the Christian world seems more fully alive to the importance of bringing God's people more closely together, and of encouraging among the various denominations the exercise of fraternal and kindly feelings. Every true follower of the Saviour must deplore

the bitter controversies which have often been waged by Protestant Churches, and must lament the *opprobrium* brought upon the Christian name by sectarian asperities. It is also much to be lamented, that very small and trifling differences have sometimes given rise to new divisions and separate organisations. We long for the time when all the branches of the Christian Church will learn to regard each other, not in the light of antagonists or rivals, but as brethren, as members of one great family, and co-workers in the broad field of the world. But at the same time, we should beware of that mistaken, ill-guided zeal, which is ready to overleap the metes and bounds necessary for the preservation and sanctity of the truth. It appears to be a difficult matter, particularly in America, to keep within proper and legitimate limits any general movement for the good of the Church arising from a conscious want. The statement made by a distinguished member of the Dominion Evangelical Alliance, held in Montreal in 1874, was not very far from the truth: "As the word Reform was in every one's mouth a century before the Reformation, so unity has been the cry of Christian souls all through this nineteenth century." That this prevailing enthusiasm is leading even to extreme Broad Churchism, may be clearly seen from some facts which have been developed in the recent endeavors to bring about a closer union of the different branches of the Protestant Church. At a meeting of the Evangelical Alliance, held in New York a few years ago, a distinguished divine, the Secretary of the British Alliance, expressed the opinion that denominationalism should be "weeded out of our Christianity." At the first meeting of the Dominion Evangelical Alliance, held in Canada about two years ago, we find the following sentiments expressed by a minister, we suppose, of some eminence:

"We must be consistent: do we or do we not acknowledge one another as Christian Churches—different branches of the one Church? If so, we have no right to require uniformity of doctrine or ritual within any of our borders. We are bound to recognise all the variety in our own churches that we recognise in others. Why, for instance, should not a Presbyterian minister preach Arminian doctrine if he believes it, and a Methodist preach Calvinism if he finds it in the Bible? As a matter of fact, both these things are done often enough, but the Churches

do not yet recognise the right. . . . This liberty should apply to ritual as well as doctrine. Why should not varieties of both be allowed at once within the same polity? Such comprehensiveness seems to spring from the very idea that the Church is the Bride of Christ. What have we to do with the disgraceful titles of Remonstrants, Contra-Remonstrants, Calvinists, Arminians, etc., etc.?"

We might make references, *ad nauseam*, to show the prevalence of this Broad Church spirit. Dr. Schmucker, of the Gettysburg Lutheran Seminary, in his little work, entitled "The True Unity of Christ's Church," (a book written in a most excellent and admirable spirit, and in many respects very valuable,) in proposing a remedy for the evils resulting from the divisions of Christendom, advocates the idea that a minister should be retained within the pale of his denomination, without censure or discipline, if his doctrinal code corresponds with that which is believed by any acknowledged orthodox denomination. (*Vide* "True Unity of Christ's Church," pp. 172-6.) The recent performances of the Presbytery of Cincinnati betray a state of opinion which may be regarded with some degree of alarm by the lovers of truth. Several members of this Presbytery, including a Moderator of the Northern General Assembly, assisted in the organisation of a Church, and the installation of a minister, on a most singular platform. Mr. McCune holds that all existing Church organisations are absolutely sinful, that no evangelical Church has a right to testify in favor of any peculiar doctrine of its system, that there should be no creed, embodying any system of doctrine, worship, or government. He asserts that under his system, he would admit into the Church believers denying the outward rites of baptism and the Lord's Supper. He denies infant church membership, and any advantage of baptized over unbaptized children. When Dr. Skinner endeavored, last spring in Presbytery, to make a speech condemning the practice of organising churches and installing ministers under such circumstances, he was ruled out of order, and a committee was appointed to report on the case at the next meeting. While the committee did not approve of Mr. McCune's views, they reported that in his relations with the Church there was nothing disloyal to Presbyterianism; and that the council installing him did not intend to do

anything hostile to existing evangelical denominations. They stated that he was led into these opinions by his devotion to organic Church unity. After a prolonged attempt to devise some sort of compromise, Dr. Skinner arose to express his views, and although it was decided by the Moderator that he was in order, he was utterly silenced by an embittered opposition, so that he was compelled to appeal to Synod, and then to the Assembly, to protect his right to a hearing.

There has been a variety of opinions among the advocates of outward unity, as to the exact manner in which it is to be secured and manifested. Some are in favor of merging all Protestant denominations into one, upon the very broad basis of *no creed* except the Bible or the Apostles' Creed. Others advocate what we might term a Compromise Creed, or one which would involve the surrender of certain points by all denominations. We should thus have a sort of Eclectic Creed, patched up in such a way as to harmonise differences of opinion. There are others still, a little less extreme, who would have all those denominations whose doctrine and polity are not so widely different, merged into one organisation. Thus the number of denominations would be very much diminished.

The postulates which underlie all these schemes appear to be the following; That a visible, organic unity ought to be the characteristic of the visible Church catholic, as of the invisible; that it is the will of our Lord, that his visible Church shall attain this; that when he prayed (Jno. xvii. 21) that all his people "might be one in us, that the world may believe that thou hast sent me," he prayed for this visible, organic unity; and that hence, the distinction and separation of denominations in the Church catholic is a state of disobedience, indefensible and to be repented of and forsaken by all who honor their Saviour's command. The advocates of "comprehension" also claim many advantages for their system: That the *odium* cast upon the Church by its divisions and strifes would be removed; that the chief argument of infidels would be refuted; that unity of effort in disseminating the gospel would husband resources now wasted, and win splendid gains to Christ; that thus the world would be

more speedily evangelised; that harmony and affection between God's people would be greatly promoted.

Now such results must commend themselves to every pious heart, if attainable. But they must not be sought, if in fact utopian, and if the proposed mode of pursuit introduces principles destructive to the interests of truth and the rights of conscience. We of course do not assert denominations to be unmingled blessings. We do not claim that the working of Protestantism under them is perfect. What work committed to human hands is perfect? But we assert that the development of the visible Church catholic into denominations, instead of being a rebellion against Christ's command and prayer, is the inevitable, the designed, and the legitimate result of the new dispensation, man being what he is. Our sin is not in the fact that denominations are perpetuated so long as honest differences of religious belief exist; but in the facts that denominations do not charitably recognise each other's rights, and that they contend uncharitably.

It is assumed that the unity for which Christ prayed is that of his visible churches, and that is a oneness of government and name. We assert, on the contrary, that it is of the spiritual and invisible Church he spake; and that the unity he sought and commanded is one of principles, morals, affections, and mutual good offices; a spiritual unity of a spiritual body. Let it be remembered that the higher and truer meaning of the word church, in the New Testament, is the Church invisible, the secret company of the regenerate, united to Christ in the mystical union. The *ἐκκλησία* is the body of the *κλητοί*: it is the *ἐκλεκτοί*. It is the body to which Christ is united as Head. Eph. v. 29, 30; Col. i. 24. He is not united to dead souls. It is the living temple of God. 1 Peter ii. 4, 5. It is the Bride and Spouse of Christ. Eph. v. 21. This Bride is brought to her Husband, "clad in fine linen, clean and white." Rev. xix. 7, 8. Christ has established a visible society, and to its parts the same name, in the plural, "churches," is given in the New Testament; while the invisible body is "the Church." These societies are the outward shell, which the true kernel is to occupy during its con-

tinuance on earth. With these scriptural facts before us, we ask: What species of oneness had our Lord in view, and of which body does he require it? Again we answer: a spiritual oneness of a spiritual body. This appears from the very fact that the Holy Spirit, while it calls the spiritual body a *church*, calls the visible, *churches*; that Christ's own providence separates Christian people in this world by geographical barriers, by nationalities, by civil governments, by languages, by inbred peculiarities of habit, associations, and modes of thought; that his Spirit, even while producing true piety, does not produce unanimity of belief on doctrines and church usages not essential to salvation; that yet he has made it every Christian's duty to speak out fully his own honest convictions of truth. We are the more confirmed in this proposition, by noting that the hideous results of Popery were logically reached, in the history of the patristic churches, by arguing from this false premise, precisely as these advocates of unity now argue. Disregard the distinction of the invisible from the visible Church, as the founders of Popery did; remember that the Church is catholic, holy, indefectible, according to the Scripture itself; and we have these corollaries: a visible unity, an earthly infallibility, separation the damning sin of schism; and no salvation outside the one visible Church. The reader may see this ancient logic well illustrated by Neander's History of the Donatist Controversy. The same mistake will bear the same fruits again.

In the fourth chapter of the Epistle to the Ephesians, we have the nature and grounds of unity explained. This unity rests on the following facts: There is "one body"—not one ecclesiastical organisation, but one spiritual body, of which Christ is the Head. Just as the several parts of the human body have the same principle of life, have different functions to perform, and are mutually dependent and sympathetic, constituting but one body, so all believers are members of the one mystical body of Christ, and are animated by the same spiritual life. "We, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another." There is one Holy Spirit dwelling in this body. "By one Spirit are we all baptized into one body, whether we be Jew or Gen-

tile." The unity of Christ's people is further illustrated by the unity of the *hope* in which they are called. They cherish the same hope of heavenly glory which is born of the Holy Spirit. Again, "There is one Lord," who is the Head of the one body, the Church, the invisible company of the elect. There is "one faith"—faith in Jesus Christ, as the Son of God and the Saviour of the world. There is "one baptism," one outward badge of profession. There is "one God and Father of all, who is over all, and through all, and in all."

The relations which Christians sustain to each other, and the duties growing out of these relations, are very clearly and correctly stated in our Confession. "All saints that are united to Jesus Christ, their Head, by his Spirit, have fellowship with him in his graces, etc. And being united to one another in love, they have communion in each other's gifts and graces and are obliged to the performance of such duties, public and private, as do conduce to their mutual good, both in the inward and outward man. Saints by profession are bound to maintain an holy fellowship and communion in the worship of God, and in performing such other spiritual services as tend to their mutual edification," etc.

In full accordance with the teachings and spirit of God's word, we are taught here that the union between Christ's people arises from their union with him. And from this union with each other, there arise the communion of saints and obligations to mutual duties, some of which are public, as between different churches, and some are private. According to this scriptural view, the Church is still one; one in the eternal purpose and electing love of God; one in subjection to a common divine influence; one in the possession of a common inheritance.

Let us, in the next place, turn our attention to the early history of the Church, and examine, first, the relations which the churches of the apostolical period sustained towards each other. We do not find that a complete organic unity and sameness of order were established between the churches in the different provinces and cities. They were one in faith and Christian fellowship; but the idea of a compact ecclesiastical organisation and



supreme Broad Church judicatory evidently had not arisen at all. The apostles exercised, conjointly, a general supervision over the churches, no one of them claiming any preëminence over the other. They resolved themselves into a body of elders, and each one acted in association with the apostolical college. Peter calls himself a fellow-elder. 1 Pet. v. 11. The unity of the apostolical churches has its most perfect outward representation in the Council of Jerusalem. This body consisted of apostles, elders, and brethren, who consulted together concerning the best methods of adjusting the differences between Jewish and Gentile Christianity. We have no *ex cathedra* message or bull from Peter; we have nothing that smacks of Broad Churchism; but only a circular letter, issued in the name of the brethren collected together from neighboring churches. It is a remarkable fact, that, though the apostles were called by Christ in person, and made the infallible bearers of God's revelation and founders of the Church, yet they never undertook to dictate or enforce any measure bearing upon the ecclesiastical relations of the different churches. This would not have been the case, had they been taught by the Saviour the necessity of organic unity.

This instance of the apostolic history, as recorded in Acts xv., and illustrated in the Epistles, gives us valuable confirmation. Differences of rite, usage, and belief, are here recognised and allowed by the apostles, which must have resulted in distinctions resembling those now called denominational, and in partial separations of worship; yet we hear of no rebuke from the apostles for any schism therein. Christians of Jewish extraction were expressly permitted to circumcise their infants, to observe the Hebrew festivals, to abjure pork, to keep the seventh day as still a Sabbath. They were forbidden to impose these observances on the Gentile Christians. There must have been, hence, different worshipping assemblies, at least to a certain extent, at different times and places, and a difference of ritual and worship. These Jewish and these Gentile Christians at Antioch must have been outwardly related to each other marvellously like the Presbyterians and Lutherans in the city of Charleston! But the

inspired apostles did not arrest nor even rebuke this state of things.

We examine next the history of the post-apostolical churches. The information which we have concerning their state after the time of the apostles, is meagre. At the same time, history furnishes us with facts which are sufficient to show that the churches did not act towards each other on the principles of organic unity. We find friendly correspondence and intercourse between the churches of the different provinces, but no grand ecclesiastical organisation. When the Church, in course of time, abandoned the scriptural principles which we have explained, it glided very gradually but very naturally into Papacy. There can be no doubt about the statement that even after the metropolitan system had been established, the provincial Synods remained independent of each other for some time. Let us look at the relations which the churches sustained to each other from the earliest period after the apostles. Communities belonging to the same province were bound together by closer bonds of union. Members of these contiguous communities frequently met together to deliberate respecting disputed matters of doctrine and discipline. The earliest Councils of which we have any account were those assembled towards the close of the second century, for the purpose of settling the controversy respecting Montanism and the time of Easter. But these were not Œcumenical Courts of the whole Church. The independence of the churches may be clearly seen from the action taken by them in regard to Montanism after it had spread through many of the provinces. It seems that the controversy waxed hottest first in Asia Minor. Synods were then held to inquire into the matter, and their proceedings were sent to the more distant churches.\* According to Eusebius, the habit of holding regular Councils or Synods was first formed in Greece, because the political constitution of Greece was especially favorable to the existence of representative religious assemblies.†

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\*Neander's History of the Christian Religion; chap. vi., pp. 5, 23-25, Torrey's Translation.

† It must not be supposed that by quoting this opinion from Eusebius, it is designed in the least to intimate that the apostolic writings them-

From thence it passed into Syria and Palestine, and towards the close of the third century became universal. At this period we find Synods held at the same time in places as distant from each other as North Africa and Cappadocia. From the best authorities we gather that these Synods were held in different districts to consider any matters of interest which might arise. At first they made no attempt to force any ecclesiastical measure, or to interfere with each other's rights. Though differing often, they regarded each other as true churches of Christ, and cultivated fraternal feelings. Presbyters, confessors, and laymen generally took part in the deliberations. We read of Synods in North Africa, in Syria, in Spain, in Arabia, which were constituted of bishops, presbyters, confessors, and laymen.\* Some light may be thrown upon the relations existing between the Synods, by the fact that when a Council was convened to settle any controversy, the parties at variance often sought the moral support of the other churches. We have an instance of this in the Novatian Schism. Both Cornelius and Novatian sought the recognition of the churches abroad.†

When Christians passed from one province to another, they carried certificates from their bishops, which guaranteed a welcome from any church to which they might go. These "*epistolae formatae*," as they were called, furnish us with evidence of the independence of the Synods, and at the same time of the friendly relations existing between the provincial churches. Even after the doctrine of outward unity had gained considerable ground, and was bringing about consolidation, we find some of the churches asserting their independence. The churches of North Africa and Britain, and some of the Eastern churches, declined entering into any grand confederation, and insisted upon

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selves did not provide for representative assemblies, whether larger or smaller. Presbyterians base their doctrine of ecclesiastical courts, whether called Sessions, Presbyteries, Synods, General Assemblies, or Ecumenical Councils, not on Eusebius or any of "the Fathers," but on the Scriptures.—EDITORS SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

\* Schaff's History of the Christian Church, Vol. I., § 112.

† Neander, Vol. I., pp. 240-4. Schaff, Vol. I., § 115.

their liberty for some time.\* The North African Church, in a Council held A. D. 393, protested against the title of patriarch. Notwithstanding the fact that the germs of the Papal system were introduced into the Church at a very early period, a long time elapsed before the simple principles taught by the apostles were entirely abandoned. We can trace the development of the doctrine of organic unity, and can mark its influence in gradually changing the whole constitution of the primitive Church. It is true that the idea of a special priesthood, which had gradually stolen into the Church through the medium of Jewish Christianity, the personal ambition of bishops, and the ideas of government deduced from existing political constitutions, all tended towards the building of the Papal structure; still we find the spurious theory of Church unity underlying all those changes through which the simple system of the apostolic Church passed, until it lost almost every vestige of its original nature.

Ignatius, one of the earliest of the fathers, the head of the Church at Antioch, was probably the first to introduce the germinal principles of the hierarchical system. He had no idea, however, of the results to which his principles would lead. There is no hint of a primacy in his writings, and no distinction of order among bishops. The bishop appears only as head of a single congregation. According to this father, the bishop is the centre of unity and the vicar of Christ for the single congregation. Disobedience to him is schism and rebellion. Ignatius's doctrine of the episcopate *grew out of his notion of outward unity*. If unity is necessary, then the means of promoting it must be devised.

Every bishop thus becomes a personal centre of ecclesiastical unity, and a visible representative of Christ. It is a curious fact, that this so-called immediate successor of the apostles derived his notion of the necessity of catholic unity from false and materialistic conceptions of the Incarnation of Christ, and of the Church as represented under the figure of the body of Christ.

Irenæus went a step farther than Ignatius. Beginning with

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\* Coleman's Apostolical and Prim. Church, chap. iii. Neander, Vol. II., pp. 163-5.

the idea of outward unity, he advanced the doctrine that the blessings and gifts of the Holy Spirit were mediated only through the outward determinate organism of the Church. Instead of the Church's being derived from the Holy Ghost, the Holy Ghost was derived from the Church. To be separated from the Church was to be cut off from the communion of the Holy Spirit. Irenæus made no distinction between the visible and invisible Church, and utterly confused these ideas.

Cyprian, the great churchman of the third century, went still farther, and gave something like completeness to the system. He held that the episcopate was *one*, and that each bishop held *a part of the episcopate for the whole*. The Church was one from the beginning, and must remain one in unbroken episcopal succession. There are no salvation and no grace *extra ecclesiam*. Christ communicated the Holy Spirit to the apostles, the apostles to the bishops, and through a regular succession of bishops the power of the Spirit is transmitted. It is not a difficult matter to see how this outward conception of the Church gradually subverted the primitive system. In single congregations the pastor represented the unity of the Church. When several congregations were represented in Presbytery, the permanent moderator very soon acquired preëminence over the other presbyters, and became the centre of unity for the presbytery. Thus a prelatical bishop grew out of the Presbyterian system by superinducing these false notions of outward unity. The metropolitan bishop became the centre of unity for a province. Cyprian only saw his theory carried out in the metropolitan system. But his doctrine could not be complete without a visible supreme head of the Church.

The only determinate point at which the representation of this outward unity could find a complete realisation, was one officer holding the keys of the kingdom of heaven. The state of the case, then, is very plain. The gradual abandonment of those principles of unity taught by the apostles led to the despotism and corruption of the Papacy. We refer the reader to Schaff's and Neander's Church Histories for the facts which we have stated.

This authentic history has brought us to a point of view from

which the argument becomes exceedingly impressive. We are taught by it, that *the only condition for organic unity in the visible Church is the presence of an earthly infallibility*. Did not the blunder of confounding the invisible with the visible Church, and the organic with the spiritual unity, lead historically to the development of the papal claim to infallibility? This we have just shown. Does not the Pope expressly ground his demand for universal allegiance of Christians, and outward oneness, upon his pretended infallibility? A connected view of a few plain propositions, the statement of which is, to any Protestant mind, their proof, will show how natural and necessary the result was; and will be again, if the same false premises be adopted by the Church. One of these is, that the visible Church is ordained by Christ to be *a witnessing body*,—"the pillar and ground of the truth." 1 Tim. iii. 15. "Out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem." Isaiah ii. 3. Paul's commission, Acts xx. 24, was, "to testify the gospel of the grace of God." The words of the Church's Lord apply with all the force to her which is consistent with her inferiority: "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, *that I should bear witness unto THE TRUTH*." John xviii. 37. *Secondly*. The rights of private judgment are inalienable. *Thirdly*. Each witness is bound in conscience to testify "the whole counsel of God." Acts xx. 26, 27. Only thus can he clear himself from the blood of all his hearers. *Fourthly*. If the rights of private judgment are to be respected, each man's honest understanding of God's truth must be binding on himself. To each man, his own sincere understanding of the Bible must be practically his Bible. *Fifthly*. The truths of redemption are, some of them, fundamental to salvation, and some non-fundamental; but the latter are revealed by the Holy Spirit, and are edifying although not essential, and are so connected logically with the essential doctrines, that in the case of any soul, the denial of a point not essential may involve a liability to the rejection of what is fundamental, and so, to perdition. *Lastly*. The Holy Spirit, in applying truth to the sinful soul, does not so work as to produce entire uniformity of belief in details, and we

have no warrant to expect that he will. When we consider that true Christians always have differed; when we remember the different languages, races, states of society, governments, modes of education, grades of civilisation, from which the Spirit calls them into the visible Church; when we reflect that, the truths of redemption being moral, men's apprehension of them must be tinged by the remains of indwelling sin which are in all, we see that the hope of entire harmony of opinion among Christians is little short of moon-struck madness. Here, then, we have the conditions under which *Providence ordains* the visible Church to be constructed and to operate. Let common sense compare them, and it becomes manifest that *the only construction which is possible under them* is this: a visible Church, one in fundamental beliefs and in spiritual affections, but separated as to non-essential details into "denominations," in which those Christians shall associate themselves together in the honest exercise of spiritual liberty, in the maintenance of the phases of testimony in which they are severally agreed. This result we claim to be, according to the mind of Christ, *legitimated*, and not *illegitimate*; a result not to be repented of and forsaken as sin, but to be used and perfected, and continually approximated towards harmony, so far as unavoidable human infirmities allow. Do we claim that it is a perfect result? No. That differences, even in non-essentials, are good *per se*? No. But is any actual civil government perfect? No; yet is the commonwealth God's ordinance; and the Christian is commanded to honor it, even though imperfect. In this sense we say that a visible Church composed of "denominations," not fused into one ecclesiastical whole by a mechanical unity, is the ordinance of Christ for us: in that it is the only practicable result of existing conditions, conditions which cannot be removed without miracles, under which he commands us to construct and operate a visible Church.

The only practicable result—*unless we can have among us a visible infallibility*. Under the Old Testament the visible Church could maintain an organic unity, because *it had* such an earthly infallibility—the oracle and the line of prophets. Under the

rule of the apostles, the Church had such an earthly infallibility in the common inspiration of the Twelve; and yet it is exceedingly instructive, that even then they did not provide for an organic unity, as we have seen. The Papacy professes to offer such an earthly infallibility; and in this it has its consistent ground for enforcing the outward unity.

If the arrogant dogma of Rome, that the Holy Spirit makes the Pope this infallible organ, be false, as we believe it to be, then this theory of organic unity forces us to the other alternative of doctrinal infidelity. For outward unity on a grand scale cannot be realised, if God's ministers are faithful in the investigation of the whole truth, and in the proclamation of their sincere convictions. The suppression of the truth, and the binding of the conscience, are necessary consequences of every attempt to realise organic unity. To prevent differences of opinion from existing, we must stop men from thinking. And to prevent the formation of parties, we must prohibit the expression of their views. No parliamentary enactments nor ecclesiastical discipline can make men think and feel alike.

They may be forced to shut their mouths and lay down their pens. And what is this but a grinding despotism, completely destructive of all liberty of conscience? Bishop Reinkens, who has been so prominent among the Old Catholics, spoke the truth when he said: "The real reason why Rome forbids the reading of the Bible is, that it may thus keep the unity of the Church. So long as the laity may not read, the unity of despotism is preserved; but when they read the unity is broken." That is a beautiful unity indeed, thus brought about and maintained!

Surely those cannot be true principles of unity which lead to tyranny, persecution, and a denial of the right of private judgment! If Rome's theory of outward unity be true, we cannot escape the logical result, that persecution is a duty. In the light of the actual illustration given by the history of Rome, the reader may see how regularly this consequence follows. Let the attributes of the visible and invisible Churches be confounded; let the organic unity be substituted for the spiritual: then the old inference will follow, that any separation is the sin of schism.



Again, let the prerogatives and promises of the invisible Church be ascribed to the visible, and by the same mode of reasoning the dogma of infallibility will virtually reappear; not, indeed, in the form of a Protestant Pope, but in that form in which it so long inhered in Rome, and was held to our own day by the Gallican Church, of infallibility in the ecumenical body. And then "the right of dissent" will be judged precisely as it was in the days of Augustine and the Donatist controversy. Persecution for separation is no more opposed to the popular creed of our day than it was to the principles and declarations of that pious Father; yet his premises compelled him to embark in defence of the despotic work. The same premises will bear the same fruits again, in due time.

But the advocates of "comprehension" demur; asserting that on their scheme all the advantages of spiritual liberty may be reconciled with unity, while the doctrinal testimony may be as free and clear as ever, and Christianity may perform its witnessing function as fully as now. Let our church-covenants, say they, be discharged of all points except the fundamental, for our rulers and teachers, as well as for our laity. Let each recognised form of doctrine which retains enough saving truth to deliver a soul, assert itself freely in the bosom of the same denomination. Let the Calvinistic brother be as free to assert Calvinism and refute Arminianism as he now is, but in the spirit of love, and without making any separation in the body of Christ.

The discussion of this plea will bring us more expressly in contact with the Broad Church theory. We assert that it can be clearly shown that neither the interests of truth nor of unity will be advanced by any such scheme. No careful student of Church History can fail to mark the bitter controversies which have been carried on by parties in the same Church—controversies which can hardly find a parallel in any denominational strifes. We recall the long quarrels between Franciscans and Dominicans, between Jansenists and Jesuits, within the bosom of the Church of Rome. Look at the struggle between the Old Catholic party and the Ultramontanists, which has resulted in the secession of the former from Rome. Within the pale of the Church of Eng-

land we find Evangelicals and Tractarians disputing about as warmly as any denominations have ever done. We see within this Church two contending parties, differing perhaps more widely than any Protestant denominations: the one teaching the doctrine of justification by the sacraments, the other that of justification by faith; the one contending sharply for priests, and altars, and sacrifices in the Church, the other holding fast to the truth that Christ is the only Priest, and altar, and sacrifice; the one holding that no man has a right to preach unless there has been a distillation of grace upon his head from the fingers of a bishop who is in the regular line of the apostles; the other willing to recognise as Christian brethren the ministers of the various branches of the Protestant Church. So far as *real* unity is concerned, these parties are no more united than the different denominations are. The attempt to tie them both to a common broad platform can only prove the occasion of continued controversy and unhappy confusion.

We now proceed to a more particular consideration of the latitudinarian tendency of Broad Churchism. We have very grave charges to bring against this theory. It tends to produce doctrinal error and indifference to truth, a loose and imperfect system of discipline, and a lower tone of practical morals. It is adverse to the edification of souls. It forsakes the great witnessing duty of the Church, by giving equal countenance to the lower and the higher doctrine, the true and the erroneous. It is fated to contradict itself always, by extending a misplaced charity to some damning error, while it denies a proper forbearance to some non-essential infirmity. It does not require any deep insight to discover that the principles of Broad Churchism contain the germ of these deplorable results. But let us look at the stern, inexorable logic of facts. We need not go far back in the history of the Church to find illustrations exactly in point. The history of the Campbellite Church is full of solemn warnings. This Church began by making war upon all creeds, and set out to reëstablish what its founder deemed the primitive system of doctrine, government, and worship, upon the basis of the "Ancient Gospel." Mr. Campbell bitterly denounced all Confessions and Symbols as

fruitful sources of discord and mischief. Hostility to creeds, whether orthodox or heterodox, was the peculiarity of this reformation. He termed the various denominations of Christians, with their voluminous Confessions and ecclesiastical constitutions, "not churches of Jesus Christ, but the legitimate daughters of that mother of harlots, the Church of Rome." Mr. Campbell's indiscriminate onslaught on all creeds gave him a large measure of that influence and strength which he first gained. He proposed a remedy for sectarian disorders, which would issue in a certain and speedy deliverance from the existing evils so deeply lamented. Only two things were necessary to abolish sectarianism and establish union among all Christians, viz., belief in the one fact that Jesus Christ is the Messiah, and, secondly, immersion for the remission of sins. Observe the workings of this scheme of Christian union. In a short time this Church of "the Ancient Gospel" had within its pale, and under its fostering care, Universalist, Unitarian, and Arian preachers! Sharp and bitter controversies inevitably followed. Rev. Barton Stone, an Arian preacher from Kentucky, engaged in a dispute with Mr. Campbell. Dr. Thomas of Virginia, who held most monstrous and soul-destroying errors, was a prominent preacher for some time in this "Church of the Apostles." Without retracting any of his views, he became reconciled temporarily to Mr. Campbell, and was permitted by the latter to remain in the Church for fear of creating divisions. The principles upon which Mr. Campbell founded his Church worked out their logical results in a short time. Within its broad and capacious bosom, this Church had a heterogeneous multitude of every variety of creed. Mr. Campbell himself was forced to say that in his Church "all sorts of doctrine have been proclaimed by all sorts of preachers." This was the inevitable consequence of the principles of church-organisation as set forth by this Reformer. Consistently with his creed, he taught that Unitarians and Universalists might be received into the Church, on condition that they would not propagate their opinions. As might have been expected, discipline was pretty well abandoned, and suffered equally with doctrine. This reformed Church, whose boasted peculiarity was freedom from

sectarianism, soon became more intensely sectarian and intolerant than any of "the daughters of Rome." Mr. Campbell's Church has far surpassed any of the denominations in the use of caustic and scathing epithets. It would be difficult to find a stronger argument in favor of distinctive creeds than that furnished by the history of this Church, whose great cry was, "No creed." The theological beliefs of the congregations which compose this Church may be briefly defined as being those of the last preacher they hear. They are consequently "carried about by every wind of doctrine."

Again, we find in the Church of England a great diversity of religious opinion, as we have already shown, a good deal of infidelity, and a sad neglect of church discipline. A strict discipline would tend to rend the Church and create divisions. Hence its lamentable neglect.

Again, since the union of the Old and New School Presbyterians in the North, we observe a falling off in discipline, particularly discipline for opinion. We find in this Church, ministers of Unitarian and Rationalistic proclivities. If the union of these two branches of the Presbyterian Church, whose differences did not appear so great, has brought about this result, the argument becomes very strong against forming a union when the differences are much greater. We do not think it would be far from the truth to state, that the broader the basis of union, the more lax and imperfect becomes the system of discipline and of doctrine. This position seems to be substantiated by the history of the different Churches. Let the reader examine for himself.

Since theory and practice, or doctrine and life, are very closely connected, it is not difficult to see how Broad Churchism militates against the great end for which the Church was established, namely, the production of holiness of life. Man's life is determined by his principles. It is a matter of first importance what principles we adopt. For principles will be active. They are the moving causes which lie at the very source of conduct. Even the affections of the soul are determined in a great measure by imbibed principles. They have something to do, it is true, in determining principles, but they are also acted on by th

principles. It is also unquestionably true, that indifference to right in any particular tends to *weaken right principles*. And that which tends to weaken right principles tends also to the injury of practical morals. When we swerve in a greater or less degree from conscientious convictions, whether in the way of open violation or suppression, we soon find ourselves becoming indifferent to the claims of right. This is one of the ways in which Broad Churchism tends to bring down the Christian life to a lower plane.

From the argument just made, it appears to us that if it is wrong to discipline a minister for holding and preaching erroneous doctrines, it is also wrong to discipline him for erroneous conduct, particularly when that wrong conduct is the result of adopted opinions. To hold that it is wrong to administer even spiritual discipline for doctrinal error, is to maintain a principle which borders very closely upon that infidelity which denies the criminality of the sin of unbelief. Wrong beliefs on all important moral questions have a criminal cause, the voluntary powers of the soul, which enter in so largely. These are not matters, therefore, which come within the sphere of pure intellection. The Broad Church theory appears all the more objectionable, when we consider the great importance of a good and regular system of discipline. Surely the great witnessing body which Christ has set up in the world to be a shining light, a consecrated priesthood, a repository of the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, a living exemplification of the holy and beautiful principles of Christianity, should exhibit purity in life and doctrine, and fidelity in duty. Is it not one of the sacred duties Christ has imposed upon his ministry, to guard with holy care the doors of the Church, and save the honor of his name? It is often said with truth, that the inconsistencies of professors of religion have done more to injure the Church than the united ranks of infidelity. Broad Churchism thus disparages one of the divinely appointed means for keeping the Church pure, and for preventing Christ's name from being dishonored before the world.

Look again at the inextricable and terrible confusion which is likely to arise in the minds of the masses under the workings of

this false system. A plain man would be most uncomfortably bewildered by a succession of preachers: some preaching Pelagianism most vigorously, and others maintaining that man is by nature utterly depraved and guilty, and unable, in his own strength, to do anything to please God, or to accomplish his own salvation; some teaching that Christ made no penal satisfaction for sin, others that his sufferings were vicarious; some holding that Christ's death was only a moral expedient to which the Almighty resorted, while others hold that he was our real and necessary substitute. If wide latitude in doctrinal preaching be allowed, we are unable to see how this confusion can be avoided. We hardly know of anything better calculated to prejudice the mind of a plain, uncultivated man against Christianity than constant contradictions and inconsistencies exhibited in the exposition of God's word.

The unfaithfulness of the Broad Church scheme to truth, receives a pungent illustration from the fatality which seems to impel it always to violate its own theory. No Broad Church is consistently broad. Each one, as though to betray the fact that it is animated more by lust for latitudinarian license than by zeal for charity, has repelled Christian brethren differing from itself in some most trivial particular, while embracing the most soul-destroying error. Thus, Campbellism strains out the gnat and swallows the camel. It swallows without difficulty the Arian, the Pelagian, the Unitarian, and even the Universalist; but should the best Christian, after adopting its two dogmas of Christ's Messiahship and immersion for the remission of sins, ask leave to indulge his parental piety in the harmless rite of baptizing his infant children, (even by immersion,) it would sternly reject him. The Anglican Church nourishes in its capacious bosom Calvinists and Arminians, Arians and Pelagians, Sacramentarians and virtual Papists. But should one of us, who does not admit the absolute necessity of prelatic ordination, seek to enter it, he would be thrust out as "a heathen man and a publican." Worse than this: for a long time this Church, while almost all-embracing of serious and vital error, was so nice and critical as to exclude her own prelatic daughter of America,

on the pretext of some trivial irregularity in deriving her orders. The Northern Presbyterian Church, a few years ago, was willing to include all the semi-Pelagianism it had excluded in 1837, but was too scrupulous to admit one who dissented from her Jacobinical political theory of civil rights.

Our last objection to the Broad Church theory is that it is inconsistent with the faithful performance of the Church's witnessing duty. This, we saw, is her prime function. The advocates of "comprehension" plead that if the different schools of theology be left free to preach, each one, its conscientious beliefs, but all in the same communion, what we deem orthodoxy will have precisely as many advocates as it has now, and the opposite doctrines will have no more, while the unity of the Church will be saved. This is delusive. The whole value of the orthodox testimony would be neutralised by this unnatural alliance. In supporting this reply, we refer first to the homely adage: "An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure." How weak is this plan of campaign, which brings the foe into our own citadel, and arms him from our own resources, and then proposes to contend with him! Again: the friends of truth have found to their cost that as one cannot fight his adversary until he gets him at arm's length, so an effective testimony against error cannot be borne until the supporters of truth and falsehood separate themselves. Either the internal contest must move directly towards that result, or it is futile. Witness the abortive struggles of the evangelicals in the Anglican Church. They have had numbers, learning, orthodoxy, zeal, honesty of purpose; but they began on the understanding that the "glorious comprehension and unity" of their Church must not be rent for the sake of dogma. Consequently their loud and earnest testimony has gone mainly for nothing. Their adversaries advance steadily Rome-ward, regarding their protests as mere impertinences, and carrying a regular stream of "perverts" with them. So in Scotland, the only testimony which did anything effectual against "Moderatism" and "patronage," was that of the Gillespies, Erskines, and Chalmers, who did their work *by seceding!* The reasons of this are plain. In a "broad" communion, the orthodox witness

against looser doctrine is repressed by the practical consciousness that he cannot attack his own equals and comrades freely. The cry is raised that he "disturbs the peace of the Church." According to its constitution, the laxer creed is as fully authorised as is his own. The testimony for the lower theology is as much the Church's testimony as his is. The world, which is Pelagian by birth and inheritance, always finds the lower testimony the more palatable. Hence, the higher doctrine, if it does not separate itself, is unavoidably suppressed, and the teaching of the whole Church becomes negative. No fortress is stronger than its weakest bastion. So, the doctrinal weight of a church never counts for more than that of the lowest doctrine which is openly tolerated within it. Witness, again, the Anglican body. It has a Calvinistic creed, and many Calvinistic ministers, and much Calvinistic literature. But every intelligent observer sees that her weight in Christendom is virtually on the side of Arminianism, which she tolerates. Once more: it must be remembered that the parts of the visible Church are organised bodies, not groups of separate persons; and that their divine Head has given them organic as well as individual functions. We ask, with emphasis, Has not a Christian denomination, then, an organic, a concerted testimony to bear for Christ's truth, his whole truth? And how can she bear this, if not by her organs, her ministry? Her trumpet must not give an uncertain sound. In a word, we see not how we who are clothed by Christ's appointment with the authority of presbyters, to "hold fast the form of sound words," and "to commit to faithful men, who shall be able (*ικανοί*) to teach others in their turn the things which we received" of the Holy Ghost among many witnesses, can, without moral obliquity, prostitute that sacred authority to empower erroneous men, with our ecclesiastical authority, to teach what we honestly believe false and dangerous. Thus again (as on page 264,) does the "Broad Church" theory evince its corrupt tendencies.

Peace is sacred and lovely; but Truth is also holy and beautiful. "We love not Cæsar less, but Rome more." We claim that order of primacy, given us by an inspired apostle: "first pure,



then peaceable." (James iii. 17.) We seek peace through truth, which is the emanation of God's omniscience, his own instrument of sanctification, the stewardship of his ministry, the trust committed to his Church. Saith Milton, in his *Areopagitica*: "Truth indeed came into the world with her divine Master, and was a perfect shape, most glorious to behold. But when he ascended, and his apostles after him were laid asleep, then strait arose a wicked race of deceivers, who—as that story goes of the Egyptian Typhon, with his conspirators, how they dealt with the good Osiris—took the virgin Truth, hewed her lovely form into a thousand pieces, and scattered them to the four winds." Broad Churchism would fain teach that it is the advocates of orthodoxy who have been the conspirators with Typhon, and that she is the Isis to gather into one the scattered members of her Lord Osiris. Nay, this reverend office must belong to those who hold the murdered at dearer price than to connive with Typhon and his conspirators. She is not the faithful Isis who doth that! The sacred and mourning spouse must abhor them by so much as she reveres her dismembered Lord; nor can she be content until she has found all his sundered limbs, and has seen his form as perfect as it shall be at her Master's second coming.

Let us hear Milton again, a little farther on:

"We stumble and are offended at the least dividing of one visible congregation from another, though it be not in fundamentals; and through our forwardness to suppress, and over-backwardness to recover any enthralled piece of Truth out of the gripe of Custom, we care not to keep Truth separated from Truth, which is the fiercest rent and disunion of all. We do not see, that while we affect by all means a rigid and external formality, we may soon fall again into a gross conforming stupidity, a stark and dead congealment of wood and hay and stubble, forced and frozen together; which is more to the sudden degenerating of a Church than many subdichotomies of petty schisms."

We close with an application of this discussion to a question now claiming the attention of our Church. Is an Ecumenical Presbyterial Court essential to realising the scriptural unity of all Presbyterian churches? The principles we have established answer, No. It is not the existence of denominations, nor of national Churches, as dictated by necessity, which rends the

unity of Christ's spiritual body ; but it is heresy of doctrine, hatred, false accusations, and worldly conformities. We have seen that it was not through Ecumenical Church Courts that the primitive Church sought to realise outward unity. We find no such court in existence until the fourth century. If an Ecumenical Court is essential to our system, then it does not correspond with that of the primitive Church, and we ought to change our theory. We have already examined the relations which existed between the Churches of the apostolic and post-apostolic period, and we failed to find them bound together by close ecclesiastical ties. Yet, do we not hold that they were all Presbyterian ? Their respective geographical positions had much to do in determining the extent of their organisations. In deciding the extent to which we must endeavor outwardly to realise unity, several important questions must be considered. We must inquire whether the interests of truth and sound doctrine would be advanced ; whether our resources would be more rapidly and advantageously developed ; whether geographical barriers might not prevent that association which is necessary between bodies united in one compact organisation.

These views were maintained by Dr. Thornwell, in his defence of the action of the Southern Church in forming an independent organisation. We quote from his Works, Vol. IV., pp. 452-3 :

"The unity of the Church does not require a formal bond of union among all congregations of believers throughout the earth. It does not demand a vast imperial monarchy like that of Rome, nor a strictly universal Council like that to which the complete development of Presbyterianism would naturally give rise. The Church catholic is one in Christ ; but it is not necessarily one visible, all-absorbing organisation. There is no schism where there is no breach of charity. Churches may be *perfectly at one* in every principle of faith and order, and yet *geographically distinct* and *mutually independent*. . . . In all Protestant countries, church-organisations have followed national lines. The Calvinistic Churches of Switzerland are distinct from the Reformed Church of France. The Presbyterians of Ireland belong to a different Church from the Presbyterians of Scotland."

One of the grounds upon which Dr. Thornwell justifies our withdrawing from the Northern Church is, that the principles of

our fathers may "have a richer, freer, fuller development among us." This answers precisely to our position, that entire ecclesiastical independence may be most consistent with our duty and our system. Then it cannot be true, that an Ecumenical Court is necessary to the integrity of our system. Who can doubt that cases might very probably exist in which geographical and linguistic obstacles, differences of race, secular customs, and resultant modes of thought, with obstinate misunderstandings of the wants and rights of brethren in those distant lands, might render it simply impossible for the latter to submit their ecclesiastical interests to that foreign court? To hold such a court as essential to the integrity of the visible Church, is to make a necessity out of an impossibility.

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ARTICLE IV.

SPIRITUALISM.

*The Phenomena of Spiritualism Scientifically Explained and Exposed.* By the Rev. ASA MAHAN, D. D., First President of Oberlin College. A. S. Barnes & Co., New York, Chicago, and New Orleans. 1876.

*Principles of Mental Physiology, with their Application to the Training and Discipline of the Mind, and the Study of its Morbid Conditions.* By WILLIAM B. CARPENTER, M. D., LL. D., F. R. S., F. G. S., etc., etc. New York. D. Appleton & Co. 1876.

The term *spiritualism* has long been used to designate that system, (the opposite of materialism,) according to which all real existence is spirit; but it is now used almost exclusively to express the doctrine that the spirits of the dead hold communications with mankind. These spiritual communications are given only through certain persons called *mediums*, who are said to be more easily influenced and controlled by the spirits, owing to their

peculiarly sensitive organisation. The revelations, thus obtained through the mediums, are claimed to be the most trustworthy sources of information about all that concerns man's eternal welfare; and "The New Harmonial Philosophy," which is based upon them, is expected to supersede the gospel of Christ. It is not easy to ascertain to what extent these views are held, but they have undoubtedly made great progress in some parts of our country and of Europe. According to an article in the New Encyclopedia just published by D. Appleton & Co., there were published in the year 1875 sixty periodicals, which were devoted to the propagation of spiritualistic ideas. The subject then is one not only full of interest to scientific inquirers, but worthy of the attention of the Church of God.

The aim of the present article will be to set forth the phenomena of spiritualism, and to discuss the different theories of explanation, having special reference to the two books whose titles have been given.

The phenomena of spiritualism fall naturally into three groups: (1.) Table turnings and table rappings, with other manifestations of physical force. (2.) Writing mediums, who use Planchette or some other mechanical contrivance to express their ideas. (3.) Mesmeric mediums or clairvoyants.

Of these, table turnings are perhaps the most common and familiar. A number of persons sit together round a table with the palms of their hands upon it, and soon (as is alleged) the table begins to heave and throb in token that a strange power is present. After this, questions are asked, and the answers are received by means of raps. The inquirer slowly calls out the letters of the alphabet, or else points at the letters which are spread out before him, and when the right one is reached, the table tilts up and raps upon the floor with one leg. The same process must then be gone through for the next letter, and the next, until the whole answer is spelled out. Evidently this is a slow and tedious way of getting information.

Planchette furnishes a much more expeditious and satisfactory mode of holding communication with the spirits. It is, as its name signifies, a little plank, and consists of a small board, only

large enough for the hands to rest upon, so mounted upon rollers as to move easily in any direction. A pencil is attached to one end of the instrument, and the hands are spread out upon it; and then, if the proper spiritual influences are present, it writes answers to questions of itself, without being consciously influenced by the will of the operator. Indeed, it is claimed that no person can succeed in writing intelligibly, if he attempts to direct the movements of the instrument.

The phenomena of clairvoyance are very wonderful. The mediums, either while under mesmeric influence, or while in a state of self-induced abstraction, become themselves the medium of communication, and convey to the world, by writing or by speaking, the truths that are "borne in upon them from the spirits." Thus Dr. Sheffield says in the preface to "Angel's Messages," that Mrs. Ward, the medium through whom the messages were delivered, "at each sitting went into a trance, at which time her own individuality was completely lost, and she became a passive instrument moved by the will of another." And similarly whole volumes are published by Andrew Jackson Davis, Mrs. Conant, Lizzie Doten, and many others, the real authorship of which is ascribed to the spirits. From this source is derived the great bulk of the spiritualistic literature. The *Banner of Light* and *The Spiritual Magazine* publish regularly communications from Washington, Jackson, Bacon, Hancock, Sumner, etc., upon all the important topics of the day.

Besides these three ordinary methods of receiving information from *the summer land*, there is one other which is unusual. This is called "Materialisation," and is regarded as the crowning glory of a medium. It is never accomplished except by very powerful mediums, and under peculiarly favorable circumstances. But when all the elements are right, certain mediums can (they say) cause the spirit to take a material form so as to be seen and heard, and handled. Only a short while ago Gen. George Washington "materialised" in Chicago, and we insert from *The Religio-Philosophical Journal* of that place the following account of it:

"In accordance with the promptings of the spirit of Gen. George

Washington, Mrs. Lewis, a medium of Cincinnati, whom Gen. George Washington has for a long time controlled, came to Chicago for the purpose of aiding him in materialising at several of Bastian and Taylor's public seances.

"The second, third, and fourth evenings that Mrs. Lewis was present, the materialisations were very good. Many spirit friends of people in the audience materialised and were recognised. Two sons of a lady present, who died after reaching the age of manhood, came out, one dressed in a regular dress suit and the other in pure white robes; each spoke to their mother in audible voices, and kissed her with a smack to be heard all over the room. Several spirits dematerialised in the presence of the audience, some of whom sank feet foremost down through the floor, so that the last that was seen was the top of the head.

"As before stated, General Washington did not materialise until the second seance; he then presented himself six times in plain view of the audience. He was of that majestic mien, and his wearing apparel and features being identical with that in which he is represented in his best portraits, that no one present could doubt his identity.

"He stood fully six feet and two inches in height, and was well proportioned. He saluted the audience most gracefully, raising his hat and showing his bare head, looking as majestic as when in mortal life. He in the presence of the audience called Mrs. Lewis up to the cabinet and thanked her for her devotion to the cause of Spiritualism, and especially for her generous sacrifices in going from her home at his request, so often to visit materialising mediums, to aid him in his work of materialising for the benefit of the glorious cause of Spiritualism.

"Three evenings General Washington appeared in a similar manner, we believe, to the admiration of all present."

Another very interesting case of materialisation is published in the *Spiritual Magazine* for December, 1876, on the testimony of a Mrs. Shindler of Memphis:

"She said she had visited last year mediums in New York and Boston, and the Eddys, with whom she spent twenty-three days. She had seen her spirit husband (who was an Episcopal clergyman) seven times at their seances; but had seen him more satisfactorily a few evenings since than ever before. She went up to him and talked to him freely, he kissing her. He was in the habit of lifting her up in his earth life; this he did that evening, her toes barely touching the floor. She told him he could not do as he used to; he replied he could soon do it.

"The lady who related this to a large company at the Assembly Hall in this city, is the daughter of a minister and a double cousin of the most prominent Presbyterian minister in the South. Pretty good Presbyterian

and Episcopal testimony that loved ones do come through this medium to comfort their relatives in a manner which admits of no doubt.

“ Since the above was in type we have seen Mrs. Shindler, who informs us that at a subsequent seance her husband raised her some distance from the floor, and her sister took a seat in her lap.”

Such manifestations are, as we have said, unusual; but at all the *dark seances* the presence of the spirits is attested by mysterious touchings and strange noises.

Now, in regard to the above claims of spiritualism, our first thought is that the whole matter is nothing but humbug and trickery; and certainly a very large part of it has been proved to be fraud. But even after the deductions that are necessary on this account, there remains a considerable residuum of real facts. It may be well, therefore, to consider first of all what Dr. Mahan calls the “Humbug Theory of Explanation,” and, while we notice the numerous exposures of different mediums, eliminate from our discussion all that is shown to be mere imposture.

With regard to the materialisation of spirits, the numerous instances in which the mediums have been exposed, are sufficient utterly to discredit the whole matter. The most celebrated case of materialisation was perhaps that of Katie King. Katie was an English girl who died in the times of Queen Elizabeth, and her spirit, which appeared constantly at the seances of Mr. and Mrs. Holmes, became almost an object of worship with spiritualists. She is described as exceedingly handsome, about nineteen years of age, and with a sweet low voice. She would come through walls of solid masonry, and in the very presence of the spectators she would fade away into viewless air. Such was the enthusiastic adoration of the heavenly visitor, that ladies took off their jewels, and men brought costly presents to offer her as keepsakes; all of which she took away with her to her heavenly home. But, unfortunately for Katie, a gentleman met upon the street a young woman who seemed to him the very image of the spirit girl, and he watched her. After discovering that she was in constant intercourse with Mr. and Mrs. Holmes, he sought an introduction, and cultivated the acquaintance, until he was able to identify some of the jewelry she wore as the same that he had

given to Katie. When first charged with the imposture she denied it stoutly, but when the proof was presented she confessed all, and restored the jewelry to those who had given it. Her confession and her explanation of the various deceptions were published in the New York papers, but nevertheless the spiritualistic papers coolly continue to advertise the photograph of Katie King as that of a *bona fide* spirit.

Some light is thrown upon the manner in which the mysterious spirit-touching is produced, at the *dark seances*, by the following narrative, which is condensed from Dr. Mahan's work (pp. 64-69): A young man living near Boston, who was an accomplished performer of the tricks of legerdemain, went with some spiritualistic friends to the seances of Mrs. Hardy. After three visits, he declared that he was master of the whole subject, and offered to hold a *dark seance* of his own. Accordingly, a company of seventeen persons gathered at his home, and were arranged in the usual way for a spiritual circle. The same conditions were imposed upon the company as were exacted by the professionals, and the amateur medium took his seat in the centre of the circle. The feet of one of the visitors were placed upon his own to make sure that he did not move them, and his (the medium's) hands were patted together with a distinctly audible sound, to shew that they were not employed in producing the manifestations. The lights were then turned down, and, although the sound of patting was heard without intermission, strange embraces were felt from bare arms, a fan was taken from one person and the faces of all in the circle were fanned, the ringing of bells and other noises were heard, and all the usual manifestations were produced with great power. To show how it was done, the next seance was held with the gas burning. The continuous rapping was produced by striking with one hand upon the chair, while he slipped off his coat, leaving his arms bare to the shoulder. Next, first with one hand, and then the other, he touched the faces of the persons in the circle, and performed the other wonders. In like manner the coat was put on, one arm at a time, and the rapping kept up with the hand that was disengaged. The medium,



furnished with loose sleeves and a bit of elastic, was not even obliged to take off an outer garment.

There have been many such exposures of late years, but we can find room for only one more: the case of Dr. Slade. Dr. Slade is a man of influence and acknowledged position among spiritualists. He is a great writing medium. Quite recently he travelled to London, and held seances there with great success. So superhuman seemed his performances, that they were alluded to in the British Association, where Professor Barret said that they were evidences of a new power in nature, and Dr. Carpenter admitted that they greatly astonished him. The exposure of Slade as an impostor came very soon afterwards, and the following account of it is condensed from Prof. Lankester's letter to the *London Times* of September 16th, 1876:

Mr. Lankester's friend, Mr. Serjeant Cox, begged him to go to see the medium, Slade; and informed him that so distinguished a man of science as Dr. Carpenter had confessed himself very much shaken by what he had seen in Slade's presence. Accordingly Mr. Lankester wrote to the medium and obtained an appointment. Dr. Slade's chief manifestation consisted in receiving communications written upon a slate held up close underneath the table. The pencil was laid upon the slate, which was then held tightly to the table. Soon scratching as of writing was heard, and on removing the slate writing was found upon the upper side. Simulating considerable agitation, Mr. Lankester observed keenly, and noticed that a delay always occurred between the question and the answer, and that during this delay the medium did and said things to divert attention. Then directing his attention to Slade's elbow, which was visible around the corner of the table, he perceived a slight motion as of a man writing. The slate was concealed from view by the table, as it lay in the medium's lap. Suspecting that the answer was written on the slate during this delay, he made another appointment for the next day, when he returned, accompanied by his friend, Dr. Donkin, a physician. Watching their opportunity, they seized the slate before the spirit-writing occurred, and found, as they had expected, that the answer was already written upon it. A

small piece of slate fixed under the finger-nail enabled Slade to write in his lap without taking up a pencil. On the testimony of these two gentlemen, Slade was convicted as a vagrant before the police court, and sentenced to a fine, with imprisonment at hard labor.

At all this *The Spiritual Magazine* is greatly distressed, and in the number for last December, the editor says:

“Paul and Silas and Peter were arrested by the Roman authorities for fraud and trickery, and stirring up sedition. . . . The angels delivered them from their prison walls, vindicating the truth of the doctrine they preached, and so will the angels deliver Slade, and vindicate the truth that they do communicate with their friends through his mediumship.”

Besides such exposures of the mediums, which are *constantly occurring*, we find a good explanation of many of the wonders of spiritualism in the fact that similar things are done by the sleight of hand and cunning of jugglers. If the limits of this article allowed, we could show from the autobiography of the celebrated conjurer, Robert Houdin, that as wonder-workers the alleged spiritual powers pale before the power of human genius.

But it is time to notice some of the real facts of spiritualism; for, underlying all this falsehood and trickery, there are strange phenomena which are genuine. *In the first place*, it is true that in table-turning and planchette writing, there is oftentimes *no muscular force consciously exerted*. This is established by good evidence. It is also established by good authority that the mediums are sometimes able to give correct information about matters of which they were previously ignorant. They frequently give with accuracy the names and ages of persons entirely unknown to them. As an instance of the possession of this power, the following experience of Mr. Godfrey is recorded in Carpenter's *Mental-Physiology*, (p. 306):

“I procured an alphabet on a board, such as is used in a national school; this board I laid down upon the floor at some little distance from the table, and I lay down on the ground beside it. I then requested one of the three persons at the table to command it to spell the Christian names of Mr. L., of B., by lifting up the leg next him as I pointed to the letters of the alphabet in succession. He did so, and I began to point, keeping the pointer about three seconds on each letter in succession. I

must say that neither of the three persons at the table had ever heard of Mr. L., and B. is 150 miles from this place. When I arrived at G they said, 'That's it; the table is lifting its leg.' When I came to E it rose again; and in this way it spelt 'George Peter,' which was quite correct."

And more surprising still is the power of correctly answering *mental questions*, several authentic instances of which will be adduced further on.

Again, the phenomena of clairvoyance are not all fictitious: for it is proved that persons under mesmeric influence lose the power of self-direction, and are controlled in their ideas, feelings, and actions by another. The testimony of several gentlemen of Albermarle County, Va., given before the County Court of Albermarle, (September 8th, 1870,) in the case of the Commonwealth vs. G. S. Ayres, (who killed a man who was a mesmerist,) has been preserved by Judge Robertson, counsel for the defendant; and the following extracts from it are selected, not because they affirm any unusual mesmeric phenomena, but because they have been solemnly sworn to. These men had been mesmerised by a person named Hale. Mr. Wingfield testified:

"Hale put me under influence, by making passes over my eyes. It caused a deadened feeling. He could make me do whatever he wanted. He kept me under his power all night, though he was not with me. I went to California and made \$75,000, I thought; and I intended to stop work."

Mr. J. R. Abell testified that while under mesmeric influence, he had no control over his actions and thoughts. He was made to believe that a piece of blank paper was a check for a large sum of money, and remained under this impression until relieved by Hale, although the officers of the bank, to whom he presented it next day, tried to convince him of his delusion.

With reference to such phenomena of spiritualism, Dr. Carpenter says (p. 611):

"It is impossible to go into any kind of society, without finding a large proportion of intelligent and truthful persons, such as would be regarded as trustworthy on all other subjects, who affirm that they have been themselves the actors in some or other of the performances in question, and that however strange the phenomena may seem, they are nevertheless genuine."

Since the theory of humbug does not apply to all the phenomena, what theory of explanation shall we adopt? The mediums explain everything by reference to the power of departed spirits; and by their followers this is regarded as the only possible solution of the strange facts. This theory we shall take up next. It rests upon two supports, which are: (1) the positive assertions of the mediums that they are influenced and controlled by human spirits who have departed this life; and (2) the satisfactory solution thus offered of all the mysterious phenomena. Now, without attempting to overthrow the first support, which hereafter will be shown to have no strength, we can, from a consideration of the second, show conclusively that this theory is absurd. The communications given by or through the mediums are of such a nature as to make it plain that they do not come from departed spirits.

(1) The communications reveal a fatal ignorance of many things that departed spirits must know. They give no satisfactory account of things beyond the grave, and become confused and contradictory whenever they treat of things that lie beyond the range of earthly observation.

(2) The communications are not such as would be prompted by the feelings of departed spirits. For instance, the loving spirit of a virtuous mother is watching over her child, and rejoices in the opportunity of sending messages of love and counsel; yet her words are never of any value. The influences of evil associations may be ruining a son, or the seducer may be tempting a daughter to sin and shame; but there is never one word of warning from her whose heart would be full of bitter agony unless she could save and cherish. The silly, insipid messages so often offered from departed relatives should be rejected as a foul insult to their memories.

(3) The communications are contradictory, and apparently take their forms from the sentiments of the mediums through whom they are uttered. Says Dr. Mahan:

“In China, the spirits—for they have spirit-circles there—are all followers of Confucius. In Siam, they are equally devoted Buddhists. In Christendom, they are Catholic or Protestant, Christian or Infidel, orthodox or heterodox, of all opinions and of no opinions, just accord-

ing to the peculiar complexion of the circles in which they appear. This is true not only of different classes of spirits, but equally of the same identical spirits."

A striking illustration of this is found in *Carpenter's Work* (p. 195): In the town of Madison, Geauga County, Ohio, during a revival of religion, the minister became a spiritualist, and an orthodox circle was formed and used as a means of grace. The spirit of Deacon Branch, who had died in the esteem and confidence of the whole community, was called upon; and he affirmed, for the warning of all sinners, that hell was a far more terrible place than it was ever represented, and none could escape it except through the Lord Jesus Christ. The Universalists for a while were silent; but soon they set up a circle of their own, at which this same Deacon Branch not only declared his former communications to be false, but denied that he had ever said such things to the orthodox circle.

Another illustration is found in the fact that the spirits, in their communications to Dr. Sheffield, all teach his Unitarian views, and, as he is a man of pure life, strongly condemn the doctrine of free-love;\* whilst to many others they declare that the whole Bible is false, and teach free-love in its filthiest form.

(4) The intellectual character of the communications renders the spiritualistic theory utterly absurd. There is a standard work, entitled "Love and Wisdom from the Spirit World," from which Dr. Mahan makes (p. 212) the two following extracts:

"At the head of a forty-page address from General Washington, which is remarkable for the silliness of its platitudes, is his likeness. And underneath are these appropriate lines, composed by Washington himself, for the express purpose of accompanying this portrait:

'When the Likeness of this portrait you see,  
Remember that it is to represent the likeness of me;  
But the spirit in its brightness you cannot see,  
For that is far above the likeness of thee.

*G. Washington.'*"

In the same book is a picture of Franklin, which stands at the head of a long essay from him, on "Progression of the Mineral,

\* See "Angels' Messages." Nashville, Tenn.: Wheeler, Marshall & Bruce. 1876.

Vegetable, Animal, and Spiritual Kingdoms ;” and beneath are these lines, composed by that great mind in his angels’ home :

“The likeness of this portrait is to represent  
The likeness of man when he dwelt here below ;  
But the likeness of the spirit you would like to know,  
And this would be no more than I would like to show :  
But the mind is not prepared the likeness for to see,  
Of the spirit in his angels’ home, as bright as we.

*B. Franklin.”*

But it would be unfair not to admit that occasional communications show more genius than the above, which are chosen because of their absurdity. For, in a late number of the *Banner of Light*, there is a long speech from Charles Summer, which is not only sensible, but is written in his peculiar style. Perhaps this is due to the fact that he has not been in that “summer land” as long as Washington and Franklin ; or can it be due to the superior ability of the medium ?

The following poem indicates more talent than any other spiritual effusion we have seen, and on this account a few verses are inserted. It was delivered, through a woman, by the spirit of Edgar A. Poe, and reminds one forcibly of “The Raven :”

“From the throne of life eternal,  
From the home of love supernal,  
Where the angels’ feet make music  
Over all the starry floor ;  
Mortals, I have come to meet you,  
Come with words of love to greet you,  
And to tell you of the glory  
That is mine forevermore.

“As one heart yearns for another—  
As a child turns to its mother—  
From the golden gates of glory  
Turn I to the earth once more :  
Where I drained the cup of sadness,  
Where my soul was stung to madness,  
And life’s bitter, burning billows  
Swept my burdened being o’er.”

And the last verse is—

“Oh ! my mortal friends and brothers,  
We are each and all another’s,

And the soul that gives most freely  
From its treasure, hath the more.  
Would you lose your life, you find it,  
And in giving love you bind it,  
Like an amulet of safety,  
To your heart forevermore."

But the fact that, in the hands of a sprightly medium, the spirits of the departed show more intellect, is of itself enough to reveal the real source of the communications. We therefore dismiss the theory of departed spirits as being disproved by the very nature of the communications.

There is another theory of explanation, which attributes all the phenomena we have been noticing to the *agency of the devil*. And this is held by many sensible and pious persons. The idea is, that Satan and his evil angels perform all the wonders which are not impostures, and answer all the questions; but to further their own wicked ends, and obtain more influence over mankind, they falsely declare themselves to be departed spirits. It is claimed that the word of God gives support to this theory. The little that we know about the world of spirits, is derived from the brief but vivid glimpses given in the Bible. And therein we find, spread over the whole work, frequent allusions to spiritual beings, both good and bad, who exert an influence over the affairs of men. Glorious spirits shouted together for joy when the foundations of the earth were laid, and burst into songs of praise when God's love was manifested in the birth of Christ. Spirits have ministered to many of God's saints in time of trouble, and it is written of the angels: "Are they not all ministering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation?" And with regard to the influence of evil spirits, the Bible is fully as explicit. Satan first tempted man to sin, and ever since has endeavored to do him harm. It is said that "he deceiveth the whole world," and "is the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience." His evil angels have had power over the minds and bodies of men, and have even entered into human beings and possessed them, making the human members their instruments to do their deeds and speak their words.

According to the word of God, there is nothing incredible in

the theory that evil spirits communicate with mankind; but it is evident that the argument used to disprove the departed spirits theory applies with equal force to this. The communications are not such as would come from evil spirits, but *show every mark of human origin*. Moreover, the Satanic theory is not needed; for most of the phenomena can be explained by laws of physical and mental action, and further investigation will doubtless bring to light the darkest mysteries, without having recourse to any superhuman power.

In one sense, spiritualism is undoubtedly the work of the devil, for it is a thing of evil. But to make Satan directly responsible for the teachings of the "Harmonial Philosophy," and for all the communications of the mediums, is a reflection upon his intelligence. He who is the head and leader of the hosts of darkness—who dares to set up a kingdom in opposition to the Almighty God—is a fool, as the Scriptures use the word; but he is not weak and silly. Were he permitted to deceive men in this way, the revelations would far transcend in knowledge and wisdom the efforts of human genius, instead of revealing ignorance and folly.

Having rejected the two theories involving supernatural power, it now remains for us to examine the explanations that science has offered. The phenomena are now rigorously investigated by scientific men, and several books have been recently published upon the subject; but there is still some difference of opinion, and much remains to be done. The theory of animal magnetism, or odic, or odylic force, has been adopted by some; and Dr. Mahan's book on spiritualism is written with the avowed object of proving that all the phenomena are due to this. On the other hand, Dr. Carpenter says in his new work, that he finds no evidence whatever of this force, and undertakes to explain the phenomena by certain strange but well known laws of mental action. These two authors, whose views we shall now proceed to compare, present a marked contrast to one another in style, exactness, and logical arrangement. For Dr. Mahan is verbose, and wanting in clearness; and his mind is so prepossessed in favor of his own theory, that his decisions must be accepted with caution. If evi-



dence supports his theory, he is not very careful to sift it; and where stubborn facts conflict with it, he quietly neglects to recognise them. It may be added that the many interesting and valuable facts he has collected together in his book, lose much of their force for the want of logical arrangement.

It will be difficult to give, in a short space, a clear and satisfactory account of the argument in favor of *odylic* force; for as Dr. Mahan states it, it occupies over two hundred pages, and consists almost entirely of the statement and proof of phenomena. But the following outline touches upon every essential point.

He first mentions instances in which this force was found existing in the physical organism of individuals. This was the case with Angelique Cottin, a girl of La Perrière, in France. While she was weaving silk gloves in an oaken frame, the frame began to jerk, and continued to do so as long as she was near. Not only did her influence over the frame increase, but many articles of furniture would be repelled from her person, and those standing near her would feel sudden electric shocks. Angelique was carried to Paris, and examined by M. Arago, who reported her case to the Paris Academy of Sciences.

A somewhat similar case occurred in the family of Mr. Joseph Barron of Woodbridge, N. J., in 1834. Loud thumpings were heard, apparently against the sides of the house, and were found to be in some manner connected with the movements of a servant girl in the family. And once while she was passing a window on the stairs, a sudden jar, accompanied with an explosive sound, broke a pane of glass; and the girl, at the same time, was seized with a violent spasm. The noises continued for some time, and were investigated by many persons. Says Dr. Mahan (p. 118): "The force which produces these effects is called the *odylic*, or *odic*, and sometimes the *psychic* force. Its properties have been most carefully investigated by such philosophers as Reichenbach, Matteuci, Thilorier, Lafontaine, and Ashburner, in Europe; and the validity of their experiments has been endorsed by the highest authorities of both continents."

The next manifestations of this force are found in table-turning and planchette writing. And in this connexion most wonder-

ful phenomena are adduced. Over the signatures of Prof. David A. Wells of Cambridge, Mass., and three other gentlemen, it is asserted that at the house of Rufus Elmer, (Hume, the medium, being present,) a table was moved with great force when they could not perceive any cause of motion. And that in two instances, while the hands of all the members of the circle were placed on the top of the table, and while no visible power was employed to raise the table, or otherwise move it from its position, it was seen to rise clear of the floor, and to float in the atmosphere for several seconds, as if sustained by a denser medium than the air.

Also in a report of the Committee of the London Dialectical Society, it is stated that a large dining-table moved four times without being touched at all.

After this testimony, the author writes (p. 131): "If anything can be discovered by experiment, and verified by testimony, the existence of the odylic force is a verified truth of science."

That the force which moved the tables is the same with that which, produced the singular magnetic power in Angelique Cottin, is taken for granted; and the next step is to show that this force is identical with the force that causes all the phenomena of spiritualism and clairvoyance. This he argues under two propositions; and, as they furnish a good illustration of the author's reasoning powers, we will state one of them in his own words:

*"The odylic force identical with that which is the immediate cause of the spirit manifestations. This we argue from the following considerations:*

"(1) The relation of these causes to certain specific localities is a very decisive proof, in connexion with other facts, of their absolute identity. In Boston, for example, the centre of the phenomena of witchcraft, and where the odylic phenomena have ever manifested themselves, mediums were developed as soon as the circles were constituted. In Philadelphia, on the other hand, months elapsed before any of the so-called spirit manifestations appeared.

"(2) The absolute identity of the physical phenomena of these two forces as physical causes, presents in their action upon surrounding objects the most decisive proof of their identity.

"(3) A similar identity of effects upon the physical organism on the one hand, and upon the mental powers upon the other, argues with equal absoluteness the perfect identity of these two causes. Every mental and

physical phenomenon, which characterises the manifestations of the one power, is equally characteristic of those of the other.

“(4) There is a peculiar effect, which individuals often experience on approaching mediums, on the one hand, and those who are under the influence of the odylic force, on the other.” (Here he alludes to the electric shock.) “It would be a violation of all the laws of science not to admit an identity of cause, in the presence of effects bearing such undeniable characteristics of absolute similarity.” P. 131.

“2. *The immediate cause of these manifestations identical with that from which result all the phenomena of mesmerism and clairvoyance.*” “The truth of this,” he says, “is rendered undeniably evident from the following facts and considerations.”

And then he mentions at considerable length the similarity of the phenomena resulting from the forces, and argues, as before, from the likeness of some of the effects, to the perfect identity of the causes.

Now, whatever doubts with regard to odylic force may still remain in the mind of the reader, Dr. Mahan is fully convinced that he has not only shown its existence, but has also proved it to be the real cause of what is called *Spiritualism*. Accordingly, as this “truth of science” needs no further discussion, he employs himself in finding other manifestations of the wonderful force. By means of odylic force, he accounts for remarkable dreams, in which the sleepers have visions of scenes far removed from them, or perhaps have wonderful premonitions of coming events. His simple explanation is, “that the brain of the sleeper was in odylic rapport with the scenes referred to ;” or in cases of premonition, “that the brain of the sleeper came into rapport with the brain of a person, to whom the impending danger was known.” In the working of this force, “distance of locality makes no difference whatever.” Thus, by his intimate acquaintance with the workings of this strange power, he is able to throw light into many dark places. He explains away the tales of ghosts and haunted houses, and gives us the actual truth with regard to fortune-telling and witchcraft. And above all, he undertakes to relieve the minds of doubting Christians, by showing how, through this mysterious force, God is able, in spite of the scientists, to answer prayer. There is also a very interesting

fact about the drowning of witches, which, as it relieves his ancestors from an unjust load of opprobrium, ought to be quoted:

"This test will be found not so deserving of ridicule as has been supposed; for the bodies of witches, that is, of those in whom the odylie force was to a certain extent developed, would float upon the water. The body of Frederica Hauffe would float like a cork, and it was difficult to get it beneath the surface." P. 397.

And now does it not give us a shock when, after all this, Dr. Wm. B. Carpenter, M. D., LL.D., F. R. S., F. G. S., etc., etc., *denies that there is any such force in nature?* With regard to table-turning, Dr. Carpenter says:

"The demonstration that the table is really moved by the hands placed upon it, notwithstanding the positive conviction of the performers to the contrary, was first afforded by the very ingenious 'indicator' devised by Professor Faraday, which is as follows: A couple of boards of the size of a quarto sheet of paper, a couple of small rulers or cedar-pencils, a couple of india-rubber bands, a couple of pins, and a strip of light wood or card-board eight or ten inches long, constituted its materials. The rulers being laid on one of the boards, each at a little distance from one of its sides and parallel to it, the other board was laid upon the rulers, so that it would roll on them from side to side; and its movements were restrained, without being prevented, by stretching the india-rubber bands over both boards, so as to pass above and beneath the rulers. One of the pins was fixed upright into the lower board, close to the middle of its farther edge, the corresponding part of the upper being cut away at that part, so that the pin should not bear against it; the second pin was fixed into the upper board, about an inch back from the first; and the strip of wood or card-board was so fixed on the pins as to constitute a lever of which the pin on the lower board was the fulcrum, while motion was imparted to the short arm of it by the pin on the upper board. Any lateral motion given to the upper board by the hands laid upon it, would thus cause the index-point of the long arm of the lever to move through a long arc in the opposite direction; the amount of that motion being dependent on the ratio between the long and short arms of the lever.

"The first point tested by Faraday was whether the interposition of his 'indicator,' between the hands of the operators and the table, in any way interfered with the movements of the latter; and he found, by tying the boards together, and taking off the index, that no such interference was observable, the table then going round as before. When, however, the upper board was free to move, and each performer fixed his (or her) eyes upon the index, so as to be made cognisant by its movement, of the

slightest lateral pressure of the hands, any communication of motion to the table was usually kept in check; but if the table did go round under this condition, its motion was always preceded by a very decided movement of the index in the opposite direction. And thus it may be considered as demonstrated, that as the table never went round unless the 'indicator' showed that lateral muscular pressure had been exerted in the direction of its movement; and as it always did go round when the 'indicator' showed that such lateral pressure was adequately exerted, *its motion was solely due to the unconscious muscular action of the performers.*" P. 293.

In proof that the writing of planchette is produced by the muscular action of the performer, Dr. Carpenter adduces the fact that unless previously trained to do so, no medium can write intelligibly without the guidance of vision. He quotes the following from the *Quarterly Review*, October, 1871:

"On another occasion, we happened to be on a visit at a house at which two ladies were staying, who worked the *planchette* on the original method, and our long previous knowledge of whom placed them beyond all suspicion of anything but *self*-deception. One of them was a firm believer in the reality of her intercourse with the spirit-world; and her planchette was continually at work beneath her hands, its index pointing to successive letters and figures on the card before it, just as if it had been that of a telegraph-dial acted on by galvanic communication. After having watched the operation for some time, and assured ourselves that the answers she obtained to the questions she put to her spiritual visitants were just what her own simple and devout nature would suggest, we addressed her thus: '*You* believe that your replies are dictated to you by your spiritual friends, and that your hands are the passive vehicles of the spiritual agency by which the planchette is directed in spelling them out. *We* believe, on the other hand, that the answers are products of your own brain, and that the planchette is moved by your own muscles. Now we can test, by a very simple experiment, whether *your* view or *ours* is the correct one. Will you be kind enough to *shut your eyes* when you ask your question, and let *us* watch what the planchette spells out? If the spirits guide it, there is no reason why they should not do so as well when your eyes are shut as when they are open. If the table is moved by your own hands it will not give definite replies, except under the guidance of your own vision.' To this appeal our friend replied that she could not think of making such an experiment, as 'it would show a want of faith;' and all our arguments and persuasions could only bring her to the point of *asking the spirits* whether she *might* comply with our request. The reply was, 'No.'

She then, at our continued urgency, asked, 'Why not?' The reply was, 'Want of faith.' Putting a still stronger pressure upon her, we induced her to ask, 'Faith in what?' The reply was, 'In God.' Of course any further appeal in that quarter would have been useless; and we consequently addressed ourselves to our other fair friend, whose high culture and great general intelligence had prepared her for our own rationalistic explanation of marvels which had seriously perplexed her. For having been engaged a short time before in promoting a public movement which had brought her into contact with a number of persons who had previously been strangers to her, she had asked questions respecting them, which elicited replies that were in many instances such as she declared to be quite unexpected by herself—especially tending to inculcate some of her coadjutors as influenced by unworthy motives. After a little questioning, however, she admitted to us that she had previously entertained lurking suspicions on this point, which she had scarcely even acknowledged to herself, far less made known to others; and was much relieved when we pointed out that the planchette merely revealed what was going on in the under-stratum of her own mind. Her conversion to our view was complete, when, on her trying the working of the planchette with her eyes shut, its pointers *went astray altogether.*"

The fact that ordinary mediums cannot work planchette in the dark, shows that the force producing the writing is guided by the vision of the operator, and unconsciously controlled by his will.

"But" (say the various operators) "we care not what was deduced from Faraday's test, for *we know that we do not move the table or the planchette.* Not only are we not conscious of putting forth any effort, but we purposely and carefully refrain from doing so. And now, if we honestly keep from exerting any muscular force, it is plain that whatever movements may occur must be produced not by our hands, but by some other force." This argument is of course unanswerable, if we hold that consciousness is cognisant of every mental and muscular change; but it amounts to nothing, in view of the fact that many mental processes and muscular movements are performed by every one unconsciously. In reading aloud, or talking, or writing, or playing on a musical instrument, complex muscular movements are executed without any conscious effort on our parts; and in cases of emotional excitement, or of great mental concentration, many muscular movements escape our consciousness, which at other times would attract

notice. One of the points established by Faraday's test is, that in table-turning muscular force is put forth, although the human consciousness does not attest it.

The nature of such unconscious muscular movements is clearly determined by the dominant idea in the mind. Says Dr. Carpenter (p. 282):

"Much attention has recently been given to a set of involuntary movements, which, however diverse the circumstances under which they occur, all have their source in one and the same mental condition—that of *expectant attention*—the whole mind being 'possessed' with the idea that a certain action will take place, and being eagerly directed (generally with more or less emotional excitement) towards the indications of its occurrence. This is a very curious subject of inquiry, and one on which adequate scrutiny has scarcely yet been bestowed; the phenomena which are referable to the principle of action here enunciated, having been very commonly explained by the agency of some other hypothetical force. Thus, if a button or ring be suspended from the end of the finger or thumb, in such a position that when slightly oscillating, it shall strike against a glass tumbler, it has been affirmed by many who have made the experiment, that the button continues to swing with great regularity, striking the glass at tolerably regular intervals, until it has sounded the hour of the day, after which it ceases to swing far enough to make another stroke. This comes to pass, in many instances, without any intention on the part of the performer, who may be really doing all in his power to keep his hand perfectly stationary. Now it is impossible, by any voluntary effort, to keep the hand absolutely still for any length of time, in the position required. An involuntary tremulousness is always observable in the suspended body; and if the *attention* be fixed upon the part with the *expectation* that the vibrations will take a determinate direction, they are very likely to do so. Their persistence in this direction, however, *only takes place so long as they are, guided by the visual sensations*: a fact which at once points to the real spring of their performance."

These oscillations were regarded as manifestations of odylie force; and for some time many scientific men were employed in swinging buttons from their fingers' ends, and making observations upon the results. Dr. Herbert Mayo, after many experiments, found that the oscillations differed for different substances, and even for different persons; and gradually he established a series of definite laws, to which he found the phenomena always

subject. And about the same time (1850), a Mr. Rutter of Brighton invented a metallic frame, with a ball suspended from it, which was so sensitive that it not only gave different movements for different persons, but the vibrations were altered by substances held in the hand of the operator and not touching the frame, merely one finger of the operator being laid upon the metal frame. That the phenomena were due to expectant attention, was discovered by a homœopathic physician, who undertook to test his medicines in this manner. For a time he was delighted, finding that everything was as he had expected; and he recorded longitudinal movements for one drug, elliptical for another, etc.; but when he tried the experiments, without himself knowing what drug was being tested, there was no uniformity in the results. He now discovered that the vibrations were always such as he expected them to be, and were connected not with the drug which was being tested, but with his mental impression. It was also seen that when a new subject placed his hand upon the frame who had no expectant idea, the vibrations were not uniform.

Dr. Carpenter shows very clearly that in these cases the real cause of the vibrations was the *unconscious rhythmical motion of the hand*; and that the expectation of the result was sufficient to determine—without any voluntary effort, and even in opposition to the will—the muscular movements by which they were produced.

This same physiological principle furnishes an explanation of table-turning, of planchette, and of the divining rod. In all these cases, expectant attention (with more or less emotional excitement) is sufficient to account for the unconscious muscular movement.

But some of the mental phenomena are as mysterious and interesting as the physical. Whilst in most cases the answers given by mediums express ideas that are consciously present to their minds, sometimes true answers are given to questions when the operator is either in ignorance of the facts stated, or even disbelieves the truth that he is uttering. The following example of this is selected from Dr. Carpenter's work, merely to show what is meant:



“Mr. Dibbin stated that the question being put, in the house of a tailor, ‘How many men are at work in the shop below?’ the table replied by striking *three* and giving *two* gentle rises; on which the employer, who was one of the party, said, ‘There are *four* men and *two* boys, so three is a mistake;’ but he afterwards remembered that one of the young men was out of town.” P. 524.

All such cases are explained by *unconscious cerebration*, which is the physiological expression of Sir Wm. Hamilton’s “Latent Mental Modification.” Just as Hamilton maintains that “there are mental activities and passivities of which we are unconscious, but which manifest their existence by effects of which we are conscious,” so the physiologist affirms that “the cerebrum may act upon impressions transmitted to it, and may elaborate intellectual results, such as we might have attained by the intentional direction of our minds to the subject, without any consciousness on our own parts.” That this is the true explanation of the phenomena in question, seems evident from the examples cited. The following affords very strong evidence:

“A gentleman who was at the time a believer in the ‘spiritual’ agency of his table, assured Mr. Dibbin that he had raised the spirit of Edward Young, the poet. The ‘spirit’ having been desired to prove his identity by citing a line of his poetry, the table spelled out, ‘Man was not made to question, but adore.’ ‘Is that in your Night Thoughts?’ was then asked. ‘No, in J-O-B.’ Not being familiar with Young’s poems, the questioner did not know what this meant; but the next day he bought a copy of them, and at the end he found a paraphrase of the Book of Job, the last line of which was the sentence given by the table. After a while, however, he remembered that he had the book in the house all the time, and *had read it before*. His own opinion was, that the table merely brought out a latent impression.” P. 525.

Intimately connected with this part of our subject, is the wonderful exaltation of the powers of the mind in certain abnormal states. Hamilton has shown, (Metaphysics, Sect. XVIII.,) that there is often a great quickening of the memory in cases of fever, of catalepsy, and of somnambulism; and that in madness, and other abnormal states, the mind betrays capacities, and whole systems of knowledge, of which before it was unconscious. By this doctrine we may explain those rare cases, (if there be any such,) in which true answers are given, though none of the parties

present have any knowledge of the facts involved. For, as impressions of which we were once conscious, but have entirely forgotten, may recur to us and control our thoughts and actions in delirium and dreaming, and even in deep reverie, in like manner past impressions that have faded out of consciousness, may, when the mind is in a state of expectant attention, or of emotional excitement, reveal themselves through our unconscious muscular movements.

By this principle of Ideo-motor action, revealing itself in "movements of expression," Dr. Carpenter explains most cases of apparent mind-reading:

"There are many persons who cannot, by the strongest exercise of volitional control, refrain from showing what is the letter or figure they expect, when the pointer comes to it. Still more is this likely to be the case, when the questioner is not on his guard against this source of fallacy; so that, unless a screen be interposed between the 'medium' and the person to whom the answer is known, there is no proof whatever of its being derived from any other source than *his* mind." (P. 307.)

"It was uniformly found that those whose questions had been most accurately answered, were persons of excitable temperament and demonstrative habits. . . . On the other hand, those to whom the spirits would give no information, were persons of comparatively imperturbable nature, possessing considerable command over their muscles, and habitually yielding very little to those influences which so strongly manifest themselves in individuals of the opposite temperament."

As illustrating this, the following interview with Foster is mentioned:

"We were not introduced to him by name, and we do not think that he could have had any opportunity of knowing our person. Nevertheless, he not only answered, in a variety of modes, the questions we put to him respecting the time and cause of the death of several of our departed friends and relatives, whose names we had written down on slips of paper, which had been folded up and crumpled into pellets before being placed in his hands, but he brought out names and dates correctly, in large red letters, on his bare arm, the redness being produced by the turgescence of the minute vessels of the skin, and passing away after a few minutes like a blush. We must own to have been strongly impressed at the time by this performance: but on subsequently thinking it over, we thought we could see that Mr. Foster's divining power was partly derived from his having acquired the faculty of interpreting the movements of the *top* of a pen or pencil, though the

*point* and what was written by it was hid from his sight; and partly from a very keen observation of the indications unconsciously given by ourselves of the answer we expected. . . . We purposely followed *his* lead, as on our first interview, and everything went on as successfully as on that occasion; until, whilst the name of a relative we had recently lost was being spelled out on our alphabet-card, the raps suddenly ceased on the interposition of a large music-box, which was set up at a preconcerted signal so as to hide the *top* as well as the bottom of our pointer from Mr. Foster's eyes. Nothing could more conclusively prove that Mr. Foster's knowledge was derived from observation of the movements of the pointer, although he could only see the portion of it not hidden by the card, which was so held as to conceal the lower part of it; and nothing could be a better illustration of the principle of 'unconscious ideo-motor action' than the fact that whilst we were most carefully abstaining from any pause or look from which he might derive guidance, we had enabled him to divine the answer we expected. The trick by which the red letters were produced was discovered by the inquiries of our medical friends." (P. 310.)

It now remains for us to notice, as briefly as the subject will admit of, the spiritualistic phenomena connected with *mesmerism*. Much light has been thrown upon these by the researches of Mr. Braid on the state of artificial somnambulism called *hypnotism*, which is produced by the maintenance of a fixed gaze, for several minutes, upon a bright object, held above the eyes, so near as to produce a sense of pain. This condition is so nearly identical with that of the mesmerised person as to afford valuable assistance in the explanation of the latter. Mr. Braid's experiments proved that the hypnotised subject lost entirely the power of self-direction over his feelings and thoughts, and became subject to the will of another. And moreover, he found the clue to this strange condition in the principle of *suggestion*, and followed it up with great zeal and intelligence. He found that the mind of the subject was entirely dormant until aroused to activity by some suggestion to which it responded as automatically as a ship obeys the movements of its rudder. By this means the whole course of the subject's thought, feeling, and action, were completely under external direction.

"He is, indeed, for the time, a mere *thinking automaton*. His mind is entirely given up to the domination of any idea that may transiently possess it; and of that idea his conversation and action are the exponents.

He has no power of judging of the consistency of his idea with actual facts, because he cannot determinately bring it into comparison with them. He cannot, of himself, turn the current of his thoughts; and thus he may be played on, like a musical instrument, by those around him: thinking, feeling, speaking, acting, just as *they will* that he should think, feel, speak, or act. But this is not, as has been represented, because his will has been brought into direct subjection to theirs, but because, his will being in abeyance, all his mental operations are directed by such suggestions as they may choose to impress on his consciousness." (Carpenter, p. 553.)

Thus the mesmeriser is able to control the sensations of the "subject" by means of the ideas he may suggest. It has for a long time been known that sense-perceptions may be excited in the mind by ideas with as much vividness as by the corresponding organs of sense. Witness the sensations of pain or pleasure produced in dreams, or the disagreeable creeping-sensation that comes upon one in the night at the mere *idea* of those bed-infesting bugs. Now, when the "subject" has the idea of bodily pain suggested to him, he is at once possessed with it, and in his mind suffers as acutely as though his impressions were derived through the regular organs of sense. So, when he is made to drink a glass of water under the impression that it is hot coffee or wine, he experiences the sensations that would be produced by these substances. The impressions from his senses do not correct the erroneous suggestion given him, because they are in abeyance from the concentration upon one idea; and in controlling his belief, the mesmeriser controls also his sensations.

In like manner, ideas can be suggested by sensations. And on this subject, we take from Dr. Carpenter (p. 602) the following extract:

"This is the case especially in regard to emotional states, which are aroused with the greatest facility, and which can be governed by a word, or even by a tone, or (as Mr. Braid discovered) by the subject's own muscular sense, which suggests to his mind ideas or feelings corresponding to the attitude or gesture into which he may be brought by the operator. Thus, if the hand be placed upon the top of the head, the somnambulist will frequently, of his accord, draw his body up to its fullest height, and throw his head slightly back; his countenance then assumes an expression of the most lofty pride, and his whole mind is obviously possessed by that feeling. Where the first action does not of itself call forth the

rest, it is sufficient for the operator to straighten the legs and spine, and to throw the head somewhat back, to arouse that feeling and the correspondent expression to its fullest intensity. Let the head be bent forward; and the body and limbs gently flexed, and the most profound humility then instantaneously takes its place. These phenomena are most graphically described by Dr. Garth Wilkinson in the following extract:

“ ‘Another curious study, is the influence of the patient’s postures on his mind in this state; double his fist and pull up his arms, if you dare, for you will have the strength of your ribs rudely tested. Put him on his knees, and clasp his hands, and the saints and devotees of the artists will pale before the trueness of his devout actings. Raise his head while in prayer, and his lips pour forth exulting glorifications; then in a moment depress the head, and he is in dust and ashes, an unworthy sinner with the pit of hell yawning at his feet. Or compress the forehead, so as to wrinkle it vertically, and thorny-toothed clouds contract in from the very horizon. . . . Raise the head next, and ask (if it be a young lady) whether she or some other is the prettier, and observe the inexpressible hauteur and the puff sneers let off the lips, which indicate a conclusion too certain to need utterance. Depress the head, and repeat the question, and mark the self-abasement with which she now says, ‘*she is,*’ as hardly worthy to make the comparison. In this state, whatever posture of any passion is induced, the passion comes into it at once, and dramatises the body accordingly.’ ”

The various methods of the mesmerist are employed to produce the monotony of impression, and the fixation of attention necessary to the state of abstraction. That there is no magnetic or odylie force exercised, is proved by the fact that the mesmeric state cannot be produced when the “subject” is unconscious that the attempt to mesmerise is making.

“It has been repeatedly found that mesmerisers, who had no hesitation in asserting that they could send certain individuals to sleep, or affect them in other ways by an effort of ‘silent will,’ have altogether failed to do so *when the subjects were carefully kept from any suspicion that such will was exercised; whilst, on the other hand, sensitive subjects have repeatedly gone to sleep under the impression that they were mesmerised from a distance, when the supposed mesmeriser was not even thinking of them.*” (P. 619.)

Very interesting experiments are given showing how this fact was established.

It is constantly alleged, that the communications of trance-mediums reveal culture and knowledge, that the mediums do not

possess in their normal states. Now, judging merely from the low grade of spiritualistic literature, we might think this too severe a reflection upon the mediums; but there is reason to believe that, in some cases, it is to a limited extent true. And this is just what we should expect, from the facts already established with regard to the exaltation of the mental powers in abnormal states.

The exaltation of the subject's muscular strength is often adduced as a proof of odyllic force. Persons under mesmeric influence can lift with ease weights much heavier than they can ordinarily raise; and an unusual degree of power may be thrown into any set of muscles. This at once suggests the wonderful activity of sleep-walkers—who can clamber upon high roofs, or traverse firmly narrow planks,—and the unnatural strength of madmen. Did space permit, very interesting facts could be stated on this subject; but we can only indicate the solution, which is found in the fact, that there is, in every organism, a *reserve force*, which is not called out by the volitional contraction of the muscles, but is exhibited only in special emergencies.

With regard to clairvoyance, Dr. Carpenter writes as follows:

“Some of the writer's own experiences have led him to suspect that a power of intuitively perceiving what is passing in the mind of another, which has been designated as ‘thought-reading,’ may, like certain forms of sense-perception, be extraordinarily exalted by that entire concentration of the attention which is characteristic of the states we have been considering. There can be no question that this divining power is naturally possessed in a very remarkable degree by certain individuals, and that it may be greatly improved by cultivation. So far, however, as we are acquainted with the conditions of its exercise, it seems to depend upon the unconscious interpretation of indications (many of them undefinable) furnished by the expression of the countenance, by style of conversation, and by various involuntary movements; that interpretation, however, going, in many instances, far beyond what can have been learned by experience as to the *meaning* of such indications.”

The superstition of spiritualism has had its great influence, because it made tributary to itself these strange and little-known laws of nature. It is now evident that it will soon be banished, by the researches of scientific men, to its proper place—with witchcraft and sorcery. And as every opportunity is taken to

notice the supposed conflict between religion and science, let us take this opportunity gratefully to acknowledge our indebtedness to science for its exposure of wickedness and error.

The thought with which we close, is at once the saddest and the most obvious. Be the explanation of spiritualism what it may,—let all the claims of its adepts be granted,—it is none the less *necromancy*. If its artists are impostors or self-deceivers, the deception they attempt is impious. The *animus* of the impious act is as fully there as though the power were present. If their claims are real, then the actual crime and guilt are there. That crime is as sternly and as distinctly prohibited by the Scriptures as idolatry or murder. It is ranked, indeed, along with the former in its dishonor to God, and its degradation to man. The readiness with which the people of a Christian country countenance this wickedness, often in professed sport or scepticism, gives a deplorable view of the practical irreverence felt for God's law. Let spiritualism be known by its fruits. It is usually a system of infidelity, of Bible-despising, of imposture, of uncleanness, of all iniquity.

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ARTICLE V.

THE EVANGELIST AND THE PRESBYTERY.

In the year 1874, there was present at our Assembly at Columbus, Mississippi, a beloved missionary from China, the Rev. Mr. Stuart. His brethren of the Assembly admitted him by courtesy to a seat in their body, first having undertaken to organise a Presbytery in China out of five missionaries there and one Chinese elder, giving to it the name of "*the Presbytery of Hangchow.*" Next year these missionaries overtured the Assembly—met in St. Louis—to dissolve this Presbytery and restore them to their former relations. This overture from China raised the question of the constitutional power of the General Assembly

to establish or dissolve Presbyteries on foreign soil; and also the important practical inquiry, whether our missionaries abroad should become associated with natives in the composition of Presbyteries, or whether holding their membership in the home Presbyteries they should, as evangelists, sustain a catholic relation to the foreign field. The Assembly at St. Louis referred this question to a committee, which reported its answer to the Assembly at Savannah.

This report was read to the Assembly and docketed for consideration; printed copies of it being meanwhile placed in the hands of all the commissioners. Subsequently a paper was adopted, approving the report, and declaring that the Assembly has no authority to organise Presbyteries on foreign soil. The next day, on a motion that the Treasurer should pay for the printing of the report, objection was raised to the doctrine it contains, that the extraordinary powers of the evangelist may not be wielded by any man within the settled church-state. Some discussion ensuing, on motion of the chairman of the committee, the vote approving the report was reconsidered, with a view to its being referred to the next Assembly, when there might be time for fuller discussion. But after debate, the Assembly again adopted the declaration that it has no power to organise a Presbytery, leaving out this time the qualifying phrase, "on foreign grounds," and then referred the report to the consideration of the next Assembly.

The Minutes of the Assembly give us the resolution adopted as in this form:

"In reference to the constitutional question, the Assembly adopts the following resolution: *Resolved*, That the General Assembly has no constitutional power to establish or dissolve Presbyteries; and accordingly, that the brethren of whom the Assembly of 1874 proposed to constitute the Presbytery of Hangchow are now, and have been, *de jure* members of the same Presbyteries to which they belonged at the time of such action."

We have not been able to find in the Minutes any record of the vote referring this report, or any portion of its contents, to the next Assembly, although our recollection is perfect of its having been in general so referred. The Minutes being, however,



the *official record*, what they may chance to omit will, of course, we suppose, not come up for consideration at New Orleans.

The subject being, however, of great interest, we have thought it might be well to present our readers with a brief statement of the positions assumed in this report, and some observations respecting its doctrine of the evangelist in particular.

I. The first question discussed is, whether the Assembly has constitutional power to establish or dissolve Presbyteries on foreign soil. The committee say that they did not find this question to be altogether devoid of difficulty. But after full conference, and giving to the subject their best consideration, they hold that it must be answered in the negative, and for the following amongst other reasons:

1. Our Assembly is that of "the Presbyterian Church in the United States," and can only "represent in one body all the particular churches of this denomination." In the nature of representative government, it cannot superintend any other. Its business is defined generally as "the promotion of charity, truth, and holiness through all the churches under its care." It cannot have *under its care* any churches in foreign countries, except in so far as those churches, through Presbyteries legitimately established over them, are entitled to send commissioners chosen by themselves, to represent them in its deliberations. And then, of course, these commissioners would have the very same right to *take care* of our American churches, as the commissioners belonging to this country would have to *take care* of the churches abroad. No inherent or extra-constitutional rights which may possibly be ascribed to it, will warrant our Assembly's undertaking to control or *take care* of the churches of any Presbyteries which are not its own constituents.

2. A Presbytery, likewise, is a representative body, and cannot be set up by any outside power where there are no churches. Where churches exist in a foreign land, these must associate themselves together in a classical Presbytery through the joint action of their respective sessions, and out of these Presbyteries may then grow the higher courts.

3. Our Constitution makes it the Synod's business to erect.

unite, and divide Presbyteries. If the Assembly cannot make a Presbytery at home, where, undeniably, it has a sphere of constitutional right, *a fortiori* it cannot erect one abroad where it represents no churches, and can claim no representative powers. It cannot ordain a foreign missionary; how, then, can it establish a foreign Presbytery?

Now this is a strict and narrow view of the Assembly's powers and of the nature of our courts generally; but every fact of our Church's history and every lesson of its past experience commits it to *strict construction*.

But it may be said that our present Book does not contemplate foreign missions at all, and it is not fair to press strict construction here; that some latitude of interpretation must be allowed, and that new applications of old principles must be made in meeting the new circumstances that rise around us from time to time. True; and hence the necessity for revising our formularies of government and discipline at times; but never are we to make any such new applications of our principles as will contradict that fundamental doctrine touching the representative character of all our courts.

From these arguments the conclusion is drawn, that if the Assembly had no constitutional power to establish a "Presbytery of Hangchow," there exists no such Presbytery for it to dissolve.

But there is a fourth objection of a different sort to our Assembly's setting up a Presbytery of its own in a foreign country, viz., that we ought not to seek to propagate our own distinctive Presbyterian body in various parts of the world, but rather to disseminate simply the principles and doctrines which we hold. Instead of new branches of every different Presbyterian church planted in China for example, thus establishing there so many various denominations, all Presbyterian, would it not be better for all the Chinese Presbyterians to form one Presbyterian Church?

It will be alleged that all this gives the General Assembly no part in spreading abroad the divine system of Church government. But that system provides for its own spread in foreign lands, in a way more self-consistent and more efficient than the

way of direct intervention by the Assembly. It sends forth *evangelists* or *missionaries* endowed with extraordinary powers. They are sent to found new churches, and ordain over them pastors and teachers. All these churches are free-born, and have the inherent right of self-government through rulers whom the Lord authorises them to elect. It is neither lawful nor needful for any Assembly of the churches in another land to establish a Presbytery amongst them. As soon as the evangelist ordains elders in every church of any foreign land, these, of inherent right and necessary duty, must affiliate together in parochial and classical Presbyteries, and the higher courts will grow out of these by a natural development.

Here emerges the question, What are the powers of the true evangelist, and what his relations to the courts of the Church?

The committee answer that this is a new question, and difficult because new. Foreign missions—modern Protestant missions, the glory of this age—were not yet born when our present Form of Government was drawn up. It contains, therefore, no adequate statement of the duties and powers of the evangelist, and in fact makes very slight allusion to such an officer. So, in older Presbyterian formularies, there is little or nothing on the subject of missions. Our fathers during the Reformation, and long after, were absorbed with defensive operations, and could do little in evangelistic work. We must therefore betake ourselves to the Scriptures directly, must consider what the fundamental principles of the Church-government, therein revealed, involve, and what the examples of apostolic missionary work authorise; and so, in the new circumstances of her modern aggressive warfare, the Church of to-day is to work out for herself, from the Word of God alone, an answer to the question, Who and what, ecclesiastically speaking, is the evangelist or missionary?

To this question the committee's answer is, that according to the best judgment they have been able to form, the evangelist is a minister of the Word, commissioned by the Presbytery to go into foreign or frontier parts with powers which he could not be allowed to wield within the settled church-state. He is invested not merely with the "several power" of the Word and Sacra-

ments which belongs to every teaching elder, but he also carries in his single hand what belongs to no minister at home, but only to the courts of the Church. He has what George Gillespie calls "the power of jurisdiction," being commissioned by his Presbytery to organise churches, to ordain church officers, to admit, suspend, and excommunicate, and to receive again, church members. He is not an apostle—the primitive evangelists were not apostles. The modern missionary gives none of the signs of an apostle. On the other hand, he is not a prelatial bishop, for he is "in the regions beyond," where there are no churches or Presbyteries to dominate over with his illegitimate one-man power; where there is, perhaps, not a single brother to aid him, so that he must act alone, or what is needful to be done, by and for the Church, remain undone. The revealed Church government possesses all needful elasticity. Church courts are of the settled Church-state, but the solitary evangelist precedes the elderships. He founds and plants. He organises churches, each with its necessary plurality of rulers, and then he must go again outside the established Church,—must move on with his one-man power, scripturally conferred on him, to regions still further beyond.

But while he thus goes abroad and beyond, he is still a member of the Presbytery which commissions him, and is still amenable to it. He retains thus his hold upon the Church at home, and it retains thus its hold on him. And the Presbytery can recall him should he become heretical or immoral, or be guilty of irregular proceedings, and after trial and conviction, it can depose him or inflict some lesser censure.

In like manner the General Assembly has a control over the evangelist abroad through its executive committee which appoints him. But, necessarily, this control is of a more general character. They can require him to abandon or amend any scheme involving expenditure of their funds which they may deem to be unwise. They may call on him to leave one region and go to another, or quit the foreign work and return home. They cannot tell him when and whom to baptize, where and of whom to organise a church, where or whom to ordain for deacons, rulers, or teachers;

neither can they instruct him what or how he is to preach, because neither from the Executive Committee nor yet the General Assembly did he derive either the "several power" of the preacher or that "power of jurisdiction" committed to him as an evangelist. Yet, if guilty of serious irregularity in baptizing, organising, or ordaining; if he fall into heresy or immorality, it would be for the Assembly, through its Committee, to remonstrate and even to withdraw their appointment and his support; and also to report him to his Presbytery for it to deal with him in the way of discipline.

The committee then draws the conclusion, that, as the Assembly may not intrude into the sphere of the Synod at home, nor violate the rights of the native churches abroad, so far as to set up a Presbytery by its own act in any foreign land; so it may not, by the same kind of action, interfere with the proper functions of the evangelist, sole founder of those native churches, thereto commissioned and authorised by his Presbytery under direct responsibility to it. And, accordingly, the answer of the committee to the first question is, that any such step by the Assembly as is under consideration, must be held to be unconstitutional and unscriptural, and therefore void.

II. The second question is, Whether missionaries should be associated with native pastors in the composition of Presbyteries.

Here again the answer is negative, because,—

(1.) The missionary or evangelistic office cannot be conjoined in any strict sense with the pastorate. The one founds, the other builds; the one is temporary, the other permanent; the one is ordinary, the other extraordinary; the one belongs to the regular Church-state, the other precedes and introduces it. If the missionary becomes a pastor, he must settle down to the work of edifying, and cease to give himself to the work of founding. If he become associated with native pastors in a Presbytery, his evangelistic office comes, necessarily, to an end. He ceases to work outside the settled Church-state, is no longer an extraordinary office-bearer, and rules thenceforward jointly with other brethren, instead of exercising severally, as heretofore, his proper evangelistic powers.

(2.) The best development of native church resources calls for the system which puts native pastors forward as shepherds of the flock. A Christian community emerging from heathenism must learn to *govern itself*; and until it learns this there can be little stability, either of personal or ecclesiastical character. So long as the foreign missionary, however, holds the office of pastor, it will naturally acquiesce in his ruling,—can never learn the art of self-government, and must continue always to be a mere nursling.

But *self-support* must be learned by the native church as well as self-government. And it can support a native, but not a foreign ministry, whose habits are and must needs be so much more expensive.

But *self-propagation* is a third thing the native church must needs learn. No heathen land can be thoroughly evangelised except through the agency of its own people. The men must be raised upon the soil who shall carry on the work which the foreign evangelist can only begin. What the Church has to do for the nations, is not to raise in this country a supply for them of the bread of life, but simply to carry to all parts of the world the *seed corn*, and let the nations raise the bread for themselves. The foreign missionary enterprise is not *Quixotic*, but sober, and, with the divine blessing, perfectly practicable. But no native Christian Church will ever do much to extend the gospel all over its native country, unless trained to self-government and self-supporting efforts for the gospel in its own bounds.

The conclusion drawn by the committee from these considerations is, that the missionary—the true and proper evangelist—is simply to plant the gospel, while natives are to be raised up for the permanent and settled pastorate. This accords with the plan and example of the Apostle to the Gentiles, and also with the principles of our divine system of Church Government. And this tends to the most rapid as well as the fullest development of the Church in heathen lands; and this prevents all necessity for a hurtful variety of Presbyterian organisations amongst the converts gained by missionaries from various Presbyterian bodies in Europe and the United States.

Such is the doctrine set forth by the Assembly's Committee. It will be observed that they regard the office of the evangelist in its fullest and highest modern form, (that is, in the missionary to the heathen,) as by no means of unlimited authority. The Assembly, through its Committee, controls this evangelist of chiefest note in some of the relations of his office; the Presbytery controls him in others. He can do some things which no minister at home is authorised to attempt by himself; and yet he is not independent of the authority of his brethren, the rulers of the church. It would be strange if he were. He is not an apostle. But even the apostles put forward continually, as much as possible, the "pastors and teachers;" and as speedily as they could, they rolled off all ecclesiastical authority from their own shoulders upon those of the ordinary office-bearers.

It is the office of the evangelist to go before and prepare the way for "pastors and teachers;" that is, for ruling elders and teaching elders, who are to have charge of the settled church state. He goes before them, and he must keep on going before them; and as they overtake him from time to time, he must move on to regions beyond.

In one aspect, his office is permanent; for the Church will always need such an aggressive agency until the whole world shall be subjugated for Christ. But in another aspect, the evangelist is a temporary officer, performing a work which is introductory to another that follows after his.

We call him, and rightly, an *extraordinary officer*; one of three such—the other two being apostles and prophets. But these other two were both inspired, while inspiration does not form any necessary feature of the evangelist's office. One may be a true and proper evangelist, as much so as those who lived at the beginning, with no such gift as inspiration. To be an evangelist in the strictest sense of the name, is just to go found the Church where it does not yet exist; to go plant the seed in some new soil where yet it does not grow; to go work for the Church outside her established limits; to go where there are no "pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of the ministry, for the edifying of the body of Christ;" and there, in

those frontier or foreign parts, to get things ready for these other and permanent workmen of the Church. The evangelist, therefore, is *extra*, that is, *outside and beyond*, the ordinary church state; but he constantly works to the establishment of the ordinary church state, and the consequent cessation of his own office and work at each successive point where he labors. For, as soon as he converts a few persons, he organises them into a church, they choosing their own rulers, and he ordaining these over them; and then his extraordinary rule must give way to the ordinary rule of the courts of the Church. These ordinary rulers, whether they teach as well as rule, or rule only, become his equals in ruling as soon as he ordains them, and thenceforward he can neither rule over them nor over the church committed now to their care.

There may be found at a given point in some frontier or foreign region, one evangelist or several; but each of them is an individual, and acts on his separate responsibility. They cannot, under our Constitution, be held to be an ecclesiastical court. The Assembly cannot make them a Presbytery. The Synod cannot do it. They cannot make themselves to be a Presbytery. But when the evangelist or evangelists shall have organised churches, each one with a plurality of elders, these churches, through their respective elderships, may, nay must, associate themselves, and, assembling by delegates, become a *classis* or Presbytery. It is churches, then, and churches electing to be represented in an assembly of rulers, which are the essential thing in the constitution of a Presbytery.

But how is it with the evangelist as he is found working within the bounds of an established Presbytery? In answer to this question, it may be observed:

(1) That in general, such a minister is not strictly or properly an evangelist. He is called, in a popular sense, by that name, but ordinarily he has not the powers constitutive of that office. Perhaps of all who bear that honorable name amongst all our Presbyteries, there is not one who can be said to be precisely or fully what that name imports. The Presbyterial evangelist is commonly more preacher than ruler. He supplies vacant and feeble



churches and destitute settlements with the Word and Sacraments, but he does not generally carry with him in his single hand the "power of jurisdiction." He is not allowed to found churches at his discretion, nor receive, suspend, and excommunicate members, nor license and ordain ministers.

(2) If there is any Presbytery whose bounds cover so much truly missionary territory that it really cannot itself superintend and control the whole, it would seem that it must be admitted to be as justly competent for it to confer extraordinary powers upon one minister to go found and plant all over those waste and desert parts as to send a minister with such powers into some foreign and heathen land. For if there be a Presbytery having territory which it is impossible for itself to reach, then of course its relations to such territory are not and cannot be of a strictly Presbyterian character. Such territory really belongs not to it; for, to belong to a Presbytery, is to be under its rule and government, which the case supposed does not admit of. And then, moreover, Presbyterian rule, from the very nature of the case, must always be by cheerful consent; whereas, in the case under consideration, there are no Presbyterian churches or people in the supposed territory to give consent to the Presbytery's rule. The peculiar relations of any one Presbytery to such a territory, arise simply from contiguity. Such a territory does not come within its proper limits which it can rule over and supervise, but lies beyond them. A church session cannot rule outside the sphere in which it lives and moves and has its being. It consists of the pastor or pastors and ruling elders of a particular congregation, and its business is to "maintain the spiritual government of the congregation," and to "concert measures for promoting the spiritual interests of that congregation," which, of course, however, may include missionary efforts in quarters contiguous to it. In like manner, a Presbytery consists of all the ministers and one ruling elder from each congregation within a certain district; and it has to order whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare of the churches under its care, which, of course, includes efforts to fertilise and improve the whole of its bounds, and, as far as possible, to send out the truth beyond its bounds. So, then, wherever there are

wide-spread, destitute, inaccessible regions in the nominal bounds of a Presbytery which it is not able to *oversee*, in the full and complete sense of that term—regions which cannot, in any strict and proper sense, be said to belong to that Presbytery, and in which it cannot itself superintend and carry on the Church's work—it ought to be acknowledged that there the true and proper evangelist, with all his extraordinary powers, must be employed, so that the Church's work may there be thoroughly accomplished.

This is in accordance with our Book, which says, "It is sometimes important and desirable" to ordain "an evangelist to preach the gospel, administer sealing ordinances, and organise churches in frontier and destitute settlements." Here is a very brief but still a pregnant description of the real and true evangelist; for, of course, to organise churches, is to ordain rulers over them; and whoever can ordain rulers, can ordain teachers also; and in fine, can do everything which belongs to a Presbytery, or to a solitary missionary on a foreign shore.

But it is important to emphasize the word "sometimes." In the full sense of the description here given, such a course of proceedings is not oftentimes necessary. There cannot be many, if there be any, Presbyteries in the condition we have been considering; and if there be any such Presbytery, it will be, and it ought to be, very jealous of sending forth, through its proper bounds, such a one-man power. And if it is according to our Book, and according to the genius of our system, to employ the evangelist, in the highest sense of the title, wherever indispensable to the doing of the Church's work, it is also according to the Book and the genius of our system that a Presbytery be organised in the legitimate way as soon as possible, so that the one-man power may pass on to its proper place. It is and it must be understood to be *extra* the ordinary, and to be working always to the introduction and establishment of the ordinary, and to the cessation of the extraordinary at any given point.

The report of the Committee, therefore, says well, as we believe, that "the evangelist is a minister of the Word, commissioned by the Presbytery to go into foreign or frontier parts, with powers which *he could not be allowed to wield within the settled*

*church state.*" His extraordinary powers are conferred on him by Presbytery, and to Presbytery he is responsible. He has no independent or absolute authority anywhere, not even in his far-off foreign field. Presbytery can bring him back from thence, and take away all his powers. And whenever he comes within the sphere of a Presbytery, his extraordinary powers must lie in abeyance. And whenever the Church's growth and spread causes him to be overtaken by the rule of its ordinary office-bearers, his extraordinary authority must come to an end, unless he will move still further out into the spiritual wilderness. For the Scriptures set forth a government of the Church by her representatives; and to organise and set up a Church to be thus governed, the evangelist is just a pioneer, constantly going on before.

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ARTICLE VI.

A NEW "TESTIMONY OF THE ROCKS;" OR THE CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS AND BIBLICAL HISTORY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

1. *Ancient Fragments of the Phœnician, Chaldean, Egyptian, Tyrian, Carthaginian, Indian, Persian, and other Writers.* By ISAAC PRESTON CORY, Esq. Second edition. London: William Pickering. 1832.
2. *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.* 1834-1874. London.
3. *Nineveh and its Remains.* By A. H. LAYARD. 2 Vols. New York. 1849.
4. *Discoveries among the Ruins of Babylon and Nineveh.* By A. H. LAYARD. G. P. Putnam & Co.: New York. 1853.
5. *Historical Researches into the Politics, Intercourse, and Trade of the Principal Nations of Antiquity—Asiatic Nations, Persians, Phœnicians, Babylonians, Scythians, and Indians.* By A. H. HEEREN. Translated from the German. 2 Vols. H. G. Bohn: London. 1846.
6. *Nineveh and its Palaces. The Discoveries of Layard and Botta, applied to the Elucidation of Holy Writ.* By JOSEPH BONOMI, F. R. S. L. London.

7. *Travels and Researches in Chaldœa and Susianna in 1849-52.* By WILLIAM KENNETT LOFTUS, F. G. S. London. 1857.
8. *The History of Herodotus: a New English Version, edited, with copious Notes and Appendices, . . . and embodying the chief results, Historical and Ethnographical, which have been obtained in the progress of Cuneiform and Hieroglyphical Discovery.* By GEORGE RAWLINSON, M. A., assisted by Col. Sir HENRY RAWLINSON, K. C. B., and Sir J. G. WILKINSON, F. R. S. Four volumes. London. 1858.
9. *Expedition Scientifique en Mesopotamie, executee par ordre du Gouvernement de 1851 a 1854, PAR MM. FRESNEL, THOMAS, ET OPPERT.* Publiée par Jules Oppert. Tome II. Paris. 1858.
10. *A Selection from the Historical Inscriptions of Chaldœa, Assyria, and Babylonia.* Prepared for publication by Maj. Gen. Sir H. C. RAWLINSON, K. C. B., assisted by EDWIN NORRIS, Sec. R. A. Soc. Vols. I., II., III. London. 1861.
11. *Classification des Caracteres Cuneiformes Babyloniens et Ninivites.* Ed. DE CHOSSAT. Paris.
12. *Grande Inscription du Palais de Khorsabad.* Publiée et commentée par MM. J. OPPERT et J. MENANT. Paris. 1863.
13. *Les Fastes de Sargon, Roi d'Assyrie (721 a 703 avant J. C.)* Traduits et publiés d'après le texte Assyrien de la grande Inscription des Salles du Palais de Khorsabad. Par MM. J. OPPERT ET J. MENANT. Paris. 1863.
14. *Inscriptions des revers des Plaques du Palais de Khorsabad.* Traduites sur le texte Assyrien. Par M. JOACHIM MENANT. Paris. 1865.
15. *Progres des Etudes relatives a l'Egypte et l'Orient.* Publication faite sous les auspices du Ministère de l'Instruction Publique. Paris. 1867.
16. *Expose des Elements de la Grammaire Assyrienne.* Par JOACHIM MENANT. Paris. 1868.
17. *An Elementary Grammar, with full Syllabary and progressive Reading Book of the Assyrian Language, in the cuneiform type.* By Rev. A. H. SAYCE, M. A. London: Bagster & Sons.
18. *Les Inscriptions de Dour-Sarkayan (Khorsabad), provenant des fouilles de M. Victor Place.* Déchiffrées et interprétés par JULES OPPERT. Paris. 1870.
19. *The Phonetic Values of the Cuneiform Characters.* By GEORGE SMITH, of the Department of Oriental Antiquities, British Museum, London. 1871.
20. *Die Keilinschriften und das Alte Testament.* Von EBERHARD SCHRADER. Giessen: 1872.

21. *The Assyrian Eponym Canon*: Containing Translations of the Documents, and an account of the Evidence, on the comparative Chronology of the Assyrian and Jewish Kingdoms, from the death of Solomon to Nebuchadnezzar. By GEORGE SMITH. London: Bagster & Sons.
22. *Annales des Rois d'Assyrie*. Traduites et mises en ordre sur le texte Assyrien. Par JOACHIM MENANT. Paris. 1874.
23. *Les Premières Civilisations. Etudes d'Histoire et d'Archeologie*. Par FRANÇOIS LENORMANT. Tome second. Chaldée et Assyrie, etc. Paris. 1874.
24. *Chaldean Account of the Deluge, from Terra Cotta Tablets found at Nineveh, with Translation and Text*. By GEORGE SMITH, of the British Museum. London: Mansel & Co. 1874.
25. *Babylone et la Chaldée*. Par M. JOACHIM MENANT. Paris. 1875.
26. *Records of the Past*. 4 Vols. Bagster & Sons: London. [Vols. I. and III. Assyrian, and Vols. II. and IV. Egyptian Texts. All edited by Mr. BIRCH.]
27. *Assyrian Discoveries on the site of Nineveh in 1873-74*. By GEORGE SMITH. London. 1875.
28. *The Chaldean Account of Genesis*, containing a Description of Creation, the Fall of Man, the Deluge, the Tower of Babel, the Times of the Patriarchs, etc. By GEORGE SMITH. London. 1876.

The unusual length of the above list, as a heading, requires explanation. Though not holding, with the celebrated clerical wit and reviewer, Rev. Sydney Smith, that books should be reviewed and then read, if ever, we do not profess that very many of those above named have been fully or carefully perused. For we propose no detailed nor summary criticism of the works, and neither commendation nor condemnation of the writers. The list is not exhaustive, but only illustrative of a kind and amount of literature which has grown into notice within this century. With one exception, (the first named volume,) these works, some wholly, and some in part larger or smaller, present the enterprises of investigation and discovery made during the last seventy-five, and more especially, the last forty years, in the antiquities of the oldest nations of Western Asia. The results thus far obtained, besides valuable contributions to ancient history, constitute for the Biblical student, important contributions to the

illustration and confirmation of Biblical history. This list may serve as a compendious syllabus of the whole subject, and while exciting the attention of the general reader, as specimens of a novel kind of literature, may furnish some guide, at least better than none, to those desiring to procure books in aid of prosecuting their inquiries in a subject so new and interesting.

The first named work, "Cory's Fragments" consists of a collection of extracts from Eusebius, Josephus, Diodorus Siculus, Pliny, Seneca, and Cicero, embodying fragments of several ancient writers. The first named is Sanchoniatho, a Phœnician, and esteemed the most ancient of heathen writers. It is not known in what age he wrote, (though some suppose about the close of the Trojan war,) but his writings were translated by Philo Byblius, a Greek writer, A. D. 117-130. Next in order is Berosus, a Babylonian, of the age of Alexander the Great. Then follow Abydenus and Alexander Polyhistor, and others of less note, all before the Christian era. These contributions of Cory, with others, some well founded, and some apocryphal, have been long before the world, in apologetic literature. They claim this notice, because they may be said to constitute an introduction to those contributions to our knowledge of the Assyrian and Babylonian empires derived from the sources to which our attention is now more specially directed. It will also be seen that the results of discovery in the antiquities of these long buried nations very strongly confirm the statements contained in Cory's collections.

The works following Cory, for convenience of reference, in the order of prosecuting investigations on the whole subject, may be classified as follows:

Nos. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18, and 21-28, inclusive, present the discoveries made in the ruins of Eastern empires, Persian, Assyrian, and Babylonian, with specimens of inscriptions, and representations of monuments, bas reliefs, and other illustrations of the customs and life of those nations, both in peace and war. A large number of these inscriptions, translated literally, are presented in the English, French, and German languages.

No. 2, "Journal of the Asiatic Society," gives from year to year, records of studies, discoveries, linguistic and other investigations, touching all Asiatic people and countries, many numbers containing articles specially relating to the nations of Western Asia, and the antiquities of those nations.

No. 15 presents the progress of French studies and discoveries in the same sphere.

Nos. 5, 9, 11, 19, contain accounts of the deciphering and translation of the inscriptions; the process by which the nature and meaning of the characters was discovered, and in the main at last satisfactorily settled; and then the methods by which the language, when expressed in Roman letters, (or Hebrew, or Greek,) may be correctly rendered into English, French, or German.

Nos. 16, 17, present us formulated principles of Assyrian Grammar, in Etymology and Syntax, and paradigms of nouns, pronouns, and verbs.

No. 20 is entirely devoted to the application of the historical notices obtained from the "Records of the past," so far as brought to light, in the illustration and confirmation of the history presented in the Old Testament. Of course, in this classification, nearly every work indicated as belonging to any one class contains other matter, and in one or two cases, as No. 5 and 9, a very small part of the volume or volumes belongs to the subject under which the works are classed. The design of giving this classification is, at once to aid those who purpose making the subject before us a study, and also to present in this article a more clear and orderly exposition of the subject as it lies before us.

I. *The Deciphering of Cuneiform Inscriptions.* The existence of inscriptions in many localities, especially the western and southwestern parts of Persia, at Behistun, Persepolis, Van, Hamadan, and elsewhere, placed on native rocks, portals of palaces and other public buildings, slabs, tombs, etc., has been known for a long time. The attention of the public was called to these inscriptions by Carreri and Tavernier in the latter part of the 17th century. Inscriptions in the languages of many Eastern nations

had been long known, and some deciphered and translated. The discovery, decipherment, and translation of the Rosetta stone, and the successful labors of Champollion and others in opening to the world the reading of the Egyptian Hieroglyphics, had greatly excited the inquiries of learned and enterprising travellers in Eastern lands. But the inscriptions mentioned above were not made in Hieroglyphics, nor in the characters or alphabets of any known language; nor, indeed, had any one succeeded in satisfying himself or Oriental scholars, whether the characters were phonetic or ideographic. Besides, many of these inscriptions were engraved on places apparently inaccessible, as that of Behistun, 300 feet above the base of an almost perpendicular rock, or others on pillars, to which no available means of access existed which would render the characters visible to the naked eye.

The celebrated traveller Niebuhr introduced into Europe, in 1798, the first exact copies of this kind of inscriptions. Various terms have been used to describe them, of which *cuneatic* or *cuneiform* have obtained most general acceptance or use—the last named being the more common of the two. These names are both derived from the most distinct feature of the characters, the form of a wedge. This, however, is rather an isosceles triangle than a wedge, in its most usual form. The angle made at the apex by the equilateral sides, as presented in the *fac similes*, varies from thirty to sixty degrees, sometimes being nearly a right angle. Of course the two base angles will vary inversely, being wider as that at the apex is narrower. A Greek delta,  $\Delta$ , (the open space filled) gives a good representation. This *wedge* is the elementary character appearing in inscriptions, in various positions, as *horizontally*, with the base to the left; or *obliquely*, the base in the same direction; or *perpendicularly*, with it at the top. Occasionally, when two are united at their apices, one of course has the base to the right or at the bottom of the character thus formed.

This elementary character is most extensively modified by a line extending from the apex, the distance of the apex from the base, or twice that distance; and the base is curved inwardly, so



sharply as to give the appearance of the *notch of an arrow*. Hence these characters are often called *arrow-headed*. A great variety of combinations of the elementary and of the elongated forms, serve to express different sounds, whether phonetic or ideographic. Thus they are found, two or more, side by side, vertically, horizontally, or obliquely. Such are sometimes crossed by one or more, or the apices of three wedge-shaped forms rest on the base of one, the bases of all being upward; or the apex, simple or elongated, rests on the base of another, and that on the base of a third, and so on. Often the positions are so adjusted as to form, by these modes of contact, a square, parallelogram, or rude polygon, within which other forms are set, the whole constituting one character. But it would be tedious and useless to give more details. In the various inscriptions, differences appear, due to the different skill of engravers or copyists. What has been said will, perhaps, convey to the reader some intelligible view of this singular mode of expressing sounds, syllables, and words, adequately indicative of thoughts.

To the time of Niebuhr's introduction of copies of cuneiform inscriptions into Europe, no successful efforts at deciphering them had been made. As the monuments of a people existing on our continent prior to the race found on its discovery, and greatly in advance of their civilisation, still remain the uninterpreted but silent and mysterious witnesses of the existence of their authors in centuries gone by; so these singularly unique characters remained, shrouding in an impenetrable veil, which none had been able to remove, the silent records of empires, which had risen and flourished and perished before credible profane history began: and of others, whose earlier memorials had formed the material of mingled legend and fact in the incipient efforts of the muse of history. It was especially by means of inscriptions, first surmised and then proved to relate to the least ancient of the Eastern empires, the Persian, that success in deciphering was attained. But this was slowly accomplished.

In the seventeenth century, Tavernier and Carreri had copied a few lines of an inscription in Persepolis, but without attempts at any explanation. Subsequently, the travellers Pietro Della

Valle and Figueroa expressed the opinion that the inscriptions should be read from left to right, with which it might seem Chardin coincided, but with the additional suggestion that they were to be read *perpendicularly*, as Chinese. This much, however, was generally agreed, that these characters represented some kind of language, whether ideographic or phonetic. For the inscriptions were often accompanied by sculptured figures of persons, by dress, and other circumstances, representing kings, warriors, conquerors, and captains. It was fair to presume the writings gave some account of the scenes depicted. Those on other monumental structures were properly supposed to give names and other memorial tributes to the mighty dead whose remains had occupied the tomb, or whose fame had been commemorated on the portals, pillars, or limestone and marble statues, of palaces now in ruins, which they inhabited while living. Still the most learned Oriental linguists were all confounded; and conjectures, theories, and speculations, however plausible and ingenious, for several years failed to furnish a clew by which the meaning of this strange language might be discovered. Tychsen wrote, "*De Cuneatis Inscriptionibus Persepolitans Lucubratio.*" Rostock, 1798. S. S. Witte discussed form and origin of the characters in a work, "*Ueber die Bildung der Schriftsprache und den Ursprung der keilförmigen Inschriften zu Persepolis.*" Rostock, 1799. Dr. Fr. Münter prepared a "*Versuch ueber die keilförmigen Inschriften zu Persepolis.*" Kopenhagen, 1802. Hager gave (in *Monthly Magazine*, 1801) a "Dissertation on the Newly Discovered Babylonian Inscriptions." Tychsen and Münter *thought* they had ascertained the characters were alphabetical and to be read from right to left! Hager undertook to show that they were monograms; and a few years later, Lichtenstein took ground that in the combinations of characters, only one was essential, the rest being arbitrarily added, and they must be read from right to left. This illustrative notice of works on the subject is given, rather to serve as memorials of incipient labors, than for any conclusive view presented by them. Tychsen and Münter did, indeed, announce a surmise, which ultimately proved correct, that a particular sign was employed to

denote the separation of words. This account of unsatisfactory labors of the most learned men must also impress us with the fact that, in whatever light the final alleged results of more successful efforts are to be regarded, the incipient steps of the enterprise were taken with great deliberation and caution. Hence the satisfaction with which such men receive the conclusions of others, raises a strong presumption in favor of the correctness of those conclusions.

Mr. (afterwards Professor) G. F. Grotefend, a young student of Bonn, without the advantages of Oriental scholarship, boldly essayed to extract the meaning of one of the inscriptions of Persepolis, copied and brought to Europe by Niebuhr. "He led the gallery into these treasuries of antiquity." Men of the first intellect and learning had recently succeeded, after protracted labor, in finding a key to interpret the hieroglyphics of Egypt. "But the Rosetta stone contained a Greek version of the hieroglyphic sentences. Plutarch had dissected the Pantheon, and given the names of the gods; and Manetho had classified the dynasties and transmitted the names of the kings. Without these helps, probably the meaning of the Egyptian signs would have been still a mystery." Mr. Grotefend, on the contrary, had only the *bas-relief* figures and the cuneiform writing presumed to explain them. Had he possessed a translation, it would have served but little purpose in aiding him to assign phonetic values to these characters. Even supposing that they were originally hieroglyphics, which had acquired corresponding phonetic significations, as many are now believed to have been, they had "no voice or sound" by which to indicate their parentage. Besides, a careful examination had satisfied those best able to judge, that the copy before him presented a triplicated inscription; but whether trilingual or *triliterated*, was so uncertain that an eminent scholar expressed, along with a belief they were triliterated, his opinion that "the Persian kings had taken great pains to immortalise themselves in choosing three different *alphabets* to narrate their exploits." Mr. Grotefend decided that they were trilingual, subsequently ascertained to be the fact, in the inscriptions of that region, generally; but he was still with-

out any means of ascertaining what the languages were. Presuming that one might be ancient Persian, as the inscription was found in Persepolis, and most probably related to one of the Achæmenian dynasty—a royal personage being prominent among the figures—he endeavored to ascertain what known name of a king might correspond with certain combinations of characters making one word. Tychsen and Münter had detected a certain word frequently recurring, which they vainly endeavored thus to identify. Mr. Grotefend surmised that that word might itself be the word for *king*, and, as an appellative, would supply no help unless he understood the language. But he also presumed, very properly, it might follow a proper name—that of a king. Now, proper names are rarely translated, but only transliterated; and allowing for some variations of orthography, a cuneiform word would be, substantially, phonetically correspondent with that of some known king, as spelled in Hebrew or Greek letters. He selected a cuneiform word which seemed to consist of seven characters. For this, *Cyrus*, however spelled, was not correspondent. He then tried *Darius*. The correspondence being sufficiently exact, by the knowledge of the Persian pronunciation as given by Strabo, he was satisfied the characters in that word were correctly deciphered, and the phonetic values were thus obtained. By a similar process, he identified Hystaspes and Xerxes. The reading of the last name was confirmed, about the same time, by two inscriptions, one hieroglyphic, and the other cuneiform, on a vase, in a cabinet of medallions in Paris. That in hieroglyphics was known to contain the name Xerxes, and the cuneiform word corresponding was identical in its characters with that which Grotefend had so read. The word following the names of Darius and Xerxes contained characters, the phonetic values of which, ascertained from their occurrence in the proper names, now read, gave a word which corresponded, with a very slight orthographic variation, to that in the Zend language, meaning *king*. Grotefend had thus acquired the phonetic values of thirteen characters, which subsequent and more accurate criticism, by himself and others, confirmed to be substantially correct as to all, but

literally correct as to most. In his work, he was encouraged and aided somewhat by a literary friend, M. Fiorillo, but the discovery was really his own. He read a memoir on the result of his labors, before the Royal Society of Göttingen, in the year 1802, and his discovery was then announced, but not published, in the *Göttingeschen Gelehrten Anzeigen*. In that journal he gave some account of his work in 1805, which, however, did not appear to present as favorable a view as his memoir had done. In 1814-15, he published several papers in the "*Mines de l'Orient*," and in 1815, a full narrative of his process of discovery, in Appendix II. to Heeren's work. [No. V. at the head of this article.] This was republished, somewhat modified, in later editions of that work. His attention was mainly occupied, during many years, in considering how to obtain proper phonetic values for the cuneiform characters, of which he had at first discovered about one-third. His work for some time did not receive the appreciation it deserved. Baron de Sacy gave a favorable review of his labors before 1815. But it was not until 1820-22 that European scholars indicated a disposition to coöperate. Then Saint Martin added the values of a few more characters, and Professor Rask those representing M and N. In 1836, MM. Burnouf and Jacquet and Prof. Lassen and Dr. Beer brought the results of long critical labor and attainment to increase both the extent and accuracy of the science, in the foundation of which, however, with one consent, Grotefend must be regarded as the leader.

While European scholars were employed in their quiet studies, and about the period when their conclusions were awakening a wider-spread attention, (1830-35,) a young officer of the East India Company's army, stationed in Persia, Major (afterwards Col. Sir) Henry C. Rawlinson, was examining the Persepolitan and other inscriptions. His first moderately successful efforts in deciphering were displayed on some tablets obtained in Hamadan. They proved of the most favorable character, in all Persia, for resolving difficulties. Having very infrequent and imperfect information of the progress of study on the part of European scholars, he had little more than occasional hints of the discovery

of Grotefend, or the process by which he reached his results. But these perhaps encouraged, if they did not aid, him in his investigations. Before the facts, for several years known in Europe, had come to his knowledge in his distant residence, he had made a successful beginning in deciphering, and, by a singular coincidence, had identified the same names, and thus obtained phonetic values of the same characters which Grotefend had done. Indeed, by the time (1836) when he became acquainted with Grotefend's labors, he had obtained the phonetic values of eighteen characters. By the aid of powerful telescopes, Col. Rawlinson secured a copy (after several successive attempts) of the celebrated Behistun inscription. During the years 1835-6-7, he also succeeded in deciphering it, and in making a partial translation. This was completed in 1846, and published in the *Journal of the Royal Academy Society*. He gracefully acknowledged the aid he had derived from European scholars (especially giving full credit to Prof. Grotefend) in deciphering, and to Prof. Lassen and Mr. Westergaard, in translating.

For this latter work, Col. Rawlinson possessed some greater facilities than those enjoyed by his European colaborers. He could copy the inscriptions himself, or have them copied under his personal superintendence. In translating the old Persian, a knowledge of the Sanscrit was essential; and forty years ago that had not progressed in the West as it has since done. But he resided in a region which contained scholars of some fair attainments in that language, and was conversant with people in whose dialects its vestiges were abundant.

His success in translating the Persian text of the Behistun inscription, paved the way for more rapid progress in his labors on the other two; one of which may be called the Scythic, and the other the Assyrian or the Babylonian.\* He had found the

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\* We adopt a nomenclature which is employed by Col. Rawlinson to designate these texts in the *Royal Academy Journal*, Vol. X., 1847; XIV., Part I., 1851; and XV., Part I., 1853. In the title of the work published in 1857, he calls the text Babylonian, and in the "Memoir" he treats the alphabet as Assyrian. He gives in his *Essay*, in Vol. X., other distinctions. But those used above are sufficient, and our space

phonetic values of the characters occurring in about ninety proper names, found in all three texts to be the same. Every acquisition of the phonetic value of a character facilitated progress; so that by the year 1854, he had deciphered and translated all three languages of the Behistun inscription, and published full accounts of his work. No one could be more fully aware of imperfections in that work than he was. Yet he avers his confidence in the correctness of deciphering and translation of historical records. The general correctness of the deciphering was evinced, at an early period of his labors, by the remarkable coincidence in results obtained by scholars of different nations, separated by long distances and laboring independently. Col. Rawlinson's alphabet varied in but one character from that perfected by Prof. Lassen, on the basis of Grotefend's discovery. In 1863, says Col. Rawlinson, "the first critical body in the world, the Institute of France, conferred on M. Jules Oppert its biennial prize of 20,000 francs (about \$4,000) for his Assyrian decipherings, thereby guaranteeing in the face of Europe the authenticity and value of our labors, and putting to shame the continued scepticism of England."

In view of this same scepticism, the Royal Academy Society, in 1857, on the suggestion of Mr. H. Fox Talbot, who had sent, in a sealed envelope, a translation of the first lithographed cuneiform inscription, (that of Tiglath-Pileser I.,) appointed Col. Rawlinson, Dr. Hincks of Ireland, and M. Oppert of Paris, to make each a translation of the same. A committee of the best Orientalists was also appointed to examine and compare these translations. It was, of course, stipulated that each translator should make a translation without having any communication with the others. The work was performed, and received from the Committee a careful scrutiny. Dr. Hincks having failed to receive a copy of the text in time to make a translation of the whole, sent only about half; M. Oppert had a defective text, and also failed to make a translation of the whole, and this being in the English of a Frenchman, prevented as full a comparison as does not allow a critical exposition; which, indeed, would add little, if anything, to the reader's apprehension.

was desirable ; Mr. Talbot and Col. Rawlinson, with few omissions, translated the whole. The judgment of the committee was decidedly favorable. Having noticed occasional discrepancies, they yet found that the similarity "was equal to what it would be in the translation of an ordinary historical inscription written in Egyptian hieroglyphics made under the same circumstances." They further expressed a conviction that this test established the general correctness of the valuation of the *characters* of these inscriptions. This report was made in 1860. It has been already stated that in 1854 Col. Rawlinson admitted the existence of many difficulties, which hindered entire confidence in the values of some characters, especially in other than plain historical composition. In the course of nearly twenty-five years, many of these difficulties have vanished. For some time the question of classification was very variously answered ; but it is now pretty well established, both by the extensive use of words, common in root or form, or both, to the Assyrian and Hebrew, and by the close resemblance of its paradigms of nouns and verbs and pronouns, that it is decidedly a branch of the Semitic stem. Doubtless there are many words in its vocabulary of Turanian and of Arian origin. This would be supposed, when we bear in mind that in the course of ten or fifteen centuries, the nations of the Mesopotamia must have received immigrants, or introduced, by the fortunes of war, large numbers of people from nations to the northeast and north, the southwest and west. Doubtless, also, in this as other tongues, there are words pronounced very differently from the manner required by the ordinary phonetic value of their elements. Many, too, as in our words, "viz." = "to wit," "etc." = "and so forth," "A. D." = "year of our Lord," might retain a foreign spelling, or the abbreviation of it, presenting, to the Assyrian, the meaning in that language. Still much difficulty exists in deciphering and in translating, owing to the existence of characters which are in one case ideographic and in another phonetic, called polyphones ; and there are *variant* readings and *variant* forms of the same root. The phonology of the probable inventors of the cuneiform characters and the Assyrian phonology differ. Hence there exist several



sounds for the same character, as *hu* and *u*; *d*, *dhi*, and *t*; *g*, *c*, and *k*; *m* and *v*, are respectively represented by the same character. Critical study, and the comparison of various texts, with extensive practice, have overcome, to a great degree, these difficulties; and now that the elementary books are prepared, and increasing numbers are devoting attention to the study, doubtless in time the language will be acquired with no greater difficulty than that which attends the acquisition of the Chinese. It is now over seventy-five years since the inscriptions of the Rosetta stone were brought to the attention of the learned, yet the study of the ancient Egyptian language has hardly passed through a stage of cultivation greater than that of the Assyrian. But much as has been effected, the field is constantly opening, and more complete discoveries await diligent investigation.

In this sketch, there has been opportunity to give no more than incidental notices of the work of French and German scholars. In fact, up to 1845, they had been foremost in the work of discussion, experiment, and discovery, in relation to cuneiform writing. Col. R. says at that time "the English had been content to leave these investigations almost entirely to continental scholars," and "interpretations which would satisfy the criticism of France and Germany might be received with suspicion in London." Dr. Hincks and Mr. E. Norris, subsequently so prominent, were then only beginning to be known, and Mr. George Smith had not commenced his noble career, recently closed, so sadly for the interests of learning, by his death. But from the point of view we occupy, we cannot but look with satisfaction on the past, and hopes for the future. The progress in discovery and invention is slow. Many failures, many difficulties, involve repeated efforts, and require unwavering and persistent assiduity. The discovery of only one island rewarded the first voyage of Columbus, notwithstanding all his trials, disappointments, and risks; but a continent sprang up before an amazed world as the final result. The "stool on which erst king Alfred sat," was father to the luxurious "sofa" of which Cowper sang; and the dim, uncertain daguerreotype, failing of expression and wanting in shading, would hardly be recognised

as the prototype of the splendid portraits and pictures which filled the Photographic Hall at the Centennial Exhibition.

II. Another department of discoveries now calls for proper mention. The knowledge of some, even imperfect, method for deciphering and translating the cuneiform inscriptions gave great impulse to enterprises of Eastern travel, and occasional specimens of inscriptions found in the ruins of the cities of Mesopotamia gave special direction to such enterprises, with a view to searching those ruins for whatever relics they might contain. It had been long known that Herodotus, LIV., LXXXVII., had mentioned, that Darius caused to be engraved on two white marble pillars, an account of his expedition in Scythia and crossing of the Bosphorus; and the engraving was in *γράμματα Ἀσσύρια*; and Strabo, LXIV-V., and XV., III., distinguished these from the *γράμματα περσικά*. The inference was, that the Assyrian letters were cuneiform inscriptions.

Besides, nearly coincident with the publication of Grotefend's discovery and the interest awakened in it,—about 1815-22—Niebuhr and J. C. Rich had engaged in partial, but not fruitless, explorations among the ruins on the Tigris and Euphrates. So fully had "Time's effacing fingers," and the sands of over 2,000 years, obliterated certain traces of the site of Nineveh, that the best informed travellers were in doubt whether it was on the eastern or western bank of the Tigris. Mr. Rich brought to the attention of European antiquarians more specific knowledge of the remarkable mounds both on the east bank of the Tigris and near the supposed site of Babylon on the Euphrates. One of the mounds on the Tigris, opposite Mosul, measured 178 feet in height, 1,850 in length, and 1150 in breadth. Partial openings had been made in some mounds, and stones for building the bridge of Mosul and other purposes obtained. Similar excavations in the mounds on the Euphrates had brought to light cylinders and bricks. He had also succeeded in purchasing a few relics from the natives, to add to the small stock in European museums, which had been limited to a few seals and cylinders with mythological emblems, an inscription on a stone sent to

London by Sir Harford Jones, a circular-headed tablet, and some other unimportant fragments.

But Mr. Rich's reports, together with the awakened interest above mentioned, produced marked effect. The French Government in 1842 appointed M. Botta, nephew of the historian, consular agent at Mosul. If done, as believed, with a view to scientific research, this was a wise step, by reason of his long residence in Egypt and the East, and his known enterprise and indomitable perseverance in scientific pursuits. His first efforts in a mound called Kouyunjik, a little north of a village called Niniouah, supposed by the natives to mark, at least in part, the site of the ancient city, proved unsuccessful. In a few months he moved to Khorsabad, still further north, led by having had two bricks with inscriptions brought to him from that place. Here he was soon called by his workmen to see the revelation of a new world of antiquities. Gradually these were laid open. Among them was an immense monument, in richness and ornament comparable to the most sumptuous productions of Egypt. This was the great palace of Khorsabad. By aid of the French Government and the services of an eminent artist, M. Flandin, notwithstanding vexations, delays, and opposition of the local authorities and the Turkish Government, in about two years the whole palace was laid bare, measured, the rooms examined, and a large variety of relics obtained: such as a bronze lion, winged bull, tablets with inscriptions and *bas-reliefs*, representing the various scenes of ancient life, and other choice specimens of Assyrian sculpture. Many of the larger specimens were very heavy, weighing each two or three tons. With great difficulty and after numerous delays, these treasures of antiquity were safely launched on the Tigris, landed at Bagdad, and in December, 1846, this first collection of Assyrian antiquities ever brought to Europe was placed on the wharves of Havre, and thence deposited in the Louvre in Paris.

The awakened interest in Eastern discoveries extended to England. True, the Government was slow to feel it; but one enterprising traveller, sustained by private enterprise at first, and subsequently by the authorities of the British Museum, was

not far behind M. Botta in entering on the work of exploration; and proved his equal, if not his superior, in successful effort. Mr. A. H. Layard made his first visit to western Asia as a private traveller in 1839, engaged in the investigation of archæological and geographical questions. On this tour he, with a large party, paused a short time at Mosul, and passed on, exploring portions of the Mesopotamia, and extending his journey eastward into Persia, stopped a short time investigating the ruins of Susa, seeking inscriptions, such as had been found in Persepolis, Nakhsh-i-Rustam, and other places.

In 1842 he visited Mosul again, and joined M. Botta while at Kouyunjik, one of the mounds east of that place and part of the ruins of Nineveh. He was unable, earlier than 1845, to follow in the steps of Botta as a discoverer. It was at that time that Sir Stratford Canning was British minister in Constantinople, celebrated for his liberal and enlightened views, and especially for his protection of English and American missionaries. By his munificence, Mr. Layard was enabled to commence his career. Khorsabad is the most northern of a series of mounds, generally the locality for villages, which extend along the eastern banks of the Tigris the distance of about twenty miles to Nimroud. Within this distance and nearly opposite Mosul, which is west of the river, are the mounds known as Kouyunjik and Nebbi Younis, the traditional place of the grave of Jonah.

Mr. Layard commenced his excavations at Nimroud. He met with the usual obstacles due to Turkish prejudices, suspicions, and stupidity, but soon succeeded in obtaining many relics, such as Botta procured. On his discovering a large sculptured human head, the Arabs averred it was that of Nimrod, and he was ordered to desist. He removed to Kouyunjik, when he speedily brought to light a rich collection of sculptures in excellent preservation, such as representations of kings, priests, and symbolic trees. He also found an obelisk of black marble, a large winged bull and winged lion; with representations in sculpture of battles, sieges, victories, processions, sacrifices, and banquetings. He made his first contributions to the British Museum in 1847, and, after a short trip of recreation to England,

resumed his work in 1848, increasing the collections with which that museum now abounds.

Did our limits allow, it would be interesting to notice the labors of Ainsworth and other contemporaries and more immediate successors of Botta and Layard. But we must content ourselves with a bare notice of discoveries during the last twenty years. Extensive excavations, both on the site of Nineveh and its suburbs, and of Babylon, have opened to view increasing numbers of monuments of the departed glory, the wealth, the arts, the power, and the pomp of those empires. Col. Rawlinson estimated the number of such, including many fragments, as high as 20,000 in the palaces of Kouyunjik. It is thought that rooms were appropriated as libraries, and the tablets arranged according to the subjects of their inscriptions. There were probably upper rooms, and in the destruction of the buildings their contents fell to the places where they are now discovered, many very much damaged; though the smaller articles, as cylinders from an inch to three inches long, and of diameters from three-fourths of an inch to one and a half, are in better preservation. Contributions from these discoveries have enriched the European museums to an indefinite extent. Our readers are referred to the works of Layard, Botta, and Bonomi, and the more recent volumes of Mr. George Smith, for fuller details. We now propose a brief summary of—

III. *The Results of the Discoveries which have been sketched.* The two departments of labor, one for the collection of material and the other for deciphering and translating inscriptions copied from rocks, pillars and slabs of marble, terra cotta tablets, cylinders, stone obelisks, seals of agate, chalcedony, onyx, and rock crystal, have gone on, hand in hand, for more than thirty years. Three folio volumes, containing lithographed copies of more than three hundred inscriptions, have been published. The language in which they were written, and which, with the nations who employed it to record their histories, had died from the thoughts and knowledge of men for twenty-three centuries, has been disinterred, quickened and formulated in grammars, elucidated in lexicons and translated into the tongues of the leading

civilised nations of the world. Besides many of these translations made, experimentally, over twenty years since, a systematic plan has been set on foot for giving to English-speaking people full accounts of these ancient nations. Two volumes, containing twenty-five or thirty of these inscriptions translated, are before us, the work of five most eminent Assyriologists. Others will follow from time to time. The publication of the lithographed inscriptions is accompanied by brief notices of their contents, by which, together with the translations already in our hands, we learn most interesting facts respecting these celebrated nations of the ancient world. Of this knowledge, we have space to give only brief illustrations. The history of Assyria and Babylon is presented in outline, from a period 2,000 years B. C., or 1,200 before our earliest existing historical records. We have given the names and titles of twenty-five Chaldean monarchs preceding the rise of the Assyrian *Empire*, thirty of Assyrian monarchs of the kingdom and empire, from the 13th to the 6th century B. C., and five of Babylonian kings, from the fall of Nineveh to that of Babylon. We learn the special histories of the leading monarchs, their wars, conquests, and administrations of their governments, such as Tiglath-pileser I. in the 12th century, Assurdanipal, (Sardanapalus of the Greeks,) Tiglath-pileser II., Shalmaneser I. and II., Sargon, Sennacherib, Esarhaddon, and Nebuchadnezzar, with many others. There are inscriptions both bilingual and trilingual, (mostly of the former, in Proto-Babylonian and Assyrian,) containing lists of the names of quadrupeds, birds, and other animals; of stones, countries, towns, cities, and other geographical facts; of parts of a house, and of vessels, with their tonnage stated in numbers, parts of the human body, and of wooden objects. Then we have lists of verbal roots and forms, grammatical phrases and their construction. Family and other proper names, synonyms for kings, and their titles, are given. There are presented also the names and attributes of the gods, their temples, with forms of invocation, hymns, and prayers. Besides special histories of several reigns, we are informed of the synchronous history of Babylon and Assyria of a period as early as the 12th century B. C. Then there has been obtained and

translated a chronology of Assyria from B. C. 893 to B. C. 666. A most interesting feature of these documents is the record of contracts, deeds of sale of houses, lands, and slaves, male and female, and of loans of money. In science we have written evidence of the cultivation of astronomy, in reports of eclipses, equinoxes, and changes of the moon. But astrology was a more favorite pursuit, and works on this subject are very numerous, setting forth the portents of the moon, Jupiter, Venus, the sun, and other heavenly bodies, and of the clouds; also rules for the division of the year into twelve months of thirty days each; and tables for the three divisions of the night, and for knowing the favorable and unfavorable months for military operations.

The inscriptions presenting historical, biographical, and religious subjects, are generally accompanied by sculptured representations of their statements. In some cases they merely give brief notices, as on symbolic figures, of their character; on tombs, of their occupants, etc. The rooms of the palaces were paved and lined with slabs, marble or terra cotta, and under or over most of them are sculptures in bas-relief, picturing monarchs in royal attire, or going forth to battle, or seated on the throne deciding causes; especially ordering the disposition of captives, who are represented in just such dress as set forth their nationalities, and sometimes receiving, at once, the prescribed punishment, flaying alive, or other cruelty, such as having the eyes put out, and this done by the king himself. Then there are armies on the march, sieges, battles of the field, or conflicts of besiegers and besieged; the vanquished fleeing, pursued, and trampled under the horses feet and chariots of the conquering monarch and his forces. There are triumphal processions, followed by captive kings and the gods of the vanquished nation. The spears, slings, bows, and quivers, swords and lances, the *bommereng*, and also war engines or battering rams, occur in connexion with the scenes depicted, as also in hunting scenes. The small arms evince great skill in carving, engraving, and decorating the handles. There have also been brought to light the dress, both of men and women, of kings, princes, captains, and soldiers; and though the country being interior, we have but few specimens

of large sailing vessels, yet there are many of boats, and the methods of propelling them; and of rafts, and modes of crossing streams in willow circular boats covered with skins, or by inflated skins supporting the swimmers.

Illustrations of wealth, elegance, and luxury are not so frequent or full, as the ruin of these cities was by the spoilations of war; and articles of the sort such illustrations would demand are not to be expected. Still we find representations of pleasure houses, gardens, feasts, and banquets, and of elegantly constructed and fancifully shaped articles in bronze, as bells with iron tongues, bowls, cups, flagons, wine strainers, dishes, plates, and spoons. There are also found remains of bronze ornaments of the throne and larger articles. Studs and buttons of ivory and mother-of-pearl have come to light, and figures of bracelets, ear-rings, amulets, wristbands, and men's finger-rings; while specimens of glass, and of the earliest known sun-glass, with indications of a knowledge of embossing, engraving, and painting by enamel, evince great progress in the arts of ornamenting. We have agricultural implements, ploughs, picks, saws, etc., figured in bas-relief, and fragments found in the ruins.

To these illustrative notices of the contributions to our knowledge of these ancient nations made by discoveries which have been sketched, our limited space only allows us to add, in a few concluding pages, some brief illustrations and confirmations of profane and sacred history furnished from the same source.

The cuneiform mode of writing appears, on the best investigations, to have originated in Babylon, and so passed into Assyria; the language used being adapted to both, and thence later was adopted in Persia. There are monuments of its existence from nearly 2,000 years B. C. to about 300 B. C., or from the calling of Abraham to a date of the era of Seleucus and Antiochus. This period includes that of the Old Testament writers from Moses to Malachi. The last century and a half of it touches that of the earliest profane historians known to us. The Scriptures state, Gen. x. 10, of Nimrod, a grandson of Ham, "the beginning of his kingdom was Babel, (Babylon,) and Erech, and Calneh, in the land of Shinar." Of Asshur, the son of Shem, in verse 11, it is



said, "Out of that land (Babylon) went Asshur, and builded Nineveh, and the city Rehoboth, (or the streets of the city,) and Calah." Cush was the oldest son of Ham, and Nimrod the oldest son of Cush, while Asshur was Shem's second son. It is believed Shem was Noah's oldest, as Ham was his youngest son. Gen. ix. 24. Thus Nimrod and Asshur were not so far from being contemporaries as to create any suspicion of inaccuracy by Moses, especially as the building of Nineveh may have been Asshur's ultimate enterprise; the inscriptions showing that *El-assur*, the town of Assur, (the *Ellasar* of Gen. xiv. 1,) was in earlier times the capital of the kingdom. They also confirm Moses' account in the constant recognition of Nimrod, and especially of Asshur, as founders of the kingdoms of Babylon and Assyria. And further, Erech, Accad, Calneh, Calah, Resen, Ellasar, and Ur, formerly untraceable, except in brief mention in Genesis, now, by the bricks and stones of Mesopotamia, have their position, relations, and importance, all revealed, and their mention by Moses in connexion with Babylon and Nineveh explained, and his historical character vindicated.

The fragments of Berosus and other writers of the era just before Christ presented long since much of the legendary and mythical period of the history of our race, as given by Assyrio-Babylonian writers. The period 2234 B. C. by various chronological schemes, based on the data of inscriptions, has been accepted as that of the rise of these two leading nations of Western Asia, and harmonises with the numbers of Berosus. Of the antecedent period, including that before the flood, we have no contemporary records; and the immense number of years, varying from thirty-four thousand to several hundred thousand, are only elements of those boastful and exaggerated accounts of their ancestry, in which, in common with the Chinese and the Hindoos, the writers of these nations indulged. No facts and no monuments sustain them.

We have not space to consider the theories and speculations respecting the descendants of Shem and Ham—the contests of the rival tribes and those of the kingdoms of Assyria and Babylon for long centuries, from the mention in the inscriptions

of their earlier monarchs, to the rise of the Assyrian empire in the thirteenth century, say 1273 B. C.

During this period, of about seven hundred years, we have mention of Cherdorlaomer king of Elam, Amraphel of Shinar, both Babylonian, and Arioch of Ellasar, (El-Assur,) Assyrian, and Tidal of Goim, (e. v. nations,) which elsewhere, in ancient monuments, is a proper name. The *Kudur-mapula* of the inscriptions is believed to contain, in the word *kudur*, [represented by equipollent consonants in כַּדֻּר] a name, common to the kings or chiefs of Elam, as Pharaoh to those of Egypt; and in *laomer* of the Hebrew and *mabuk* of the Babylonian, the equivalent for *mapula*, specially distinctive. In the inscriptions he is noted by a term meaning "Ravager of the West." We have thus an illustrative evidence of the credibility of Gen. xiv. 1, 9.

Mr. George Smith's last publication presents us the legendary and mythical accounts of the Creation, Fall, Flood, and notices of the building and destruction of the Tower of Babel. His translation is from tablets of the age of Assurbanipal, an Assyrian monarch of the early part of the seventh century, say 670 B. C. These tablets purport to be copies of ancient Babylonian records, which had been composed not earlier than 2,000 nor later than 1,550 years B. C. Of course documents which are full of the elements of Babylonian mythology and intrinsically devoid of real historic value, are not *in themselves* confirmatory of the scriptural accounts. But they are as evidently not copies, nor designed forgeries in the interest of revelation. Still they are *confirmations* in this respect, that the salient facts of the inspired narrative are the staple, so to speak, of these myths. (1) Of the Creation, we are informed that the gods were generated from a *chaos* of watery matter, called Tiamat, the *Thalath* or Talassa of Berossus' legend, the first corresponding to Hebrew Tehom—deep, or abyss—the latter to the Greek θάλασσα—(Attic θάλαττα). Then follows the *creation* of constellations of stars, two other bands of stars, to point out the year; the moon to give light till the dawn of day, and its phases are described; and the sun, by the regularity of its orbit, the type of a judge, to regulate the world. Next we are told of the *creation*,

not *evolution*, of "strong monsters" of the sea, then "living creatures and creeping things" of the land, cattle and beasts of the field. Next comes the *creation*, not *evolution*, of man and woman, or two beings to be with the other animals, described as "beloved of the gods," "noble" and "good." They are addressed and reminded of their relation and other duties. This address is by one called simply GOD, not one of the deities. The geography of man's birth-place provides four rivers, the Tigris, Euphrates, Surappi, and Uhni, and the place is called Gan-duni, reminding us of the *Gan-Eden* (Hebrew) or Garden of Eden, Gen. ii. 15, and the man is called *Admi* or *Adami*, as a name of the race. There is no mention of a "tree of life" or "knowledge of good and evil," but the tablets are mutilated; and these may have been mentioned, since there are found on gems or seals and the walls of palaces, sculptures of a tree, with two figures, one on each side, holding out their hands to the fruit, and in the back-ground a serpent appears; and also of another tree, guarded by two cherubim. (2) The Fall is stated to have been produced by some agency of a dragon, the figure representing which has the eagle's head, a scaly body, claws for feet and wings on the back, resembling the griffin, a symbolical creature known in heraldry. The dragon is cursed with the man for the sin of the latter, who is denounced as subject to all the evils which afflict mankind, as family quarrels, tyranny, disappointment, deprivation, injury by his wisdom, and trouble of mind and body. (3) The Chaldæan account of the Flood is an extended myth, bringing to view some striking points identical with Noah's flood:

1. Command to build the ark, . . . . .	ch. vi. 14.	col. i. l. 21.
2. Sin of the world, . . . . .	" vi. 5.	" i. l. 22.
3. Threat to destroy it, . . . . .	" vi. 7.	" i. l. 22.
4. Seed of life to be saved, . . . . .	" vi. 19.	" i. l. 23.
5. Size of the ark, . . . . .	" vi. 15.	" i. l. 25, 26.
6. Animals to enter the ark, . . . . .	" vi. 20.	" i. l. 43.
7. Building the ark, . . . . .	" vi. 22.	" ii. l. 1-9.
8. Lined within and without with bitumen, " . . . . .	vi. 14.	" ii. l. 10, 11.
9. Food taken in the ark, . . . . .	" vi. 21.	" ii. l. 19."

Without further tabulating the correspondence, we add the

remaining summary: "Coming of the flood; destruction of the people; duration of the deluge (*time* different); end of deluge; opening a window; ark rests on a mountain; birds sent forth—dove, then swallow; returned; then raven, never returned; building the altar and offering sacrifice; its savor; deluge not to come again; covenant and blessing; and translation of the patriarch (confounded with Enoch)."

We have not space to state the difference in details, of measures, times, place of mountain, etc. The correspondence is wonderful, and shows a common origin in this and many other legends and that origin, the facts stated by Moses. The same remark holds good of the many legends of the creation.

4. The notices of the tower of Babel are few. Near the site of Babylon is a vast mound, one hundred and fifty feet high, originally pyramidal, but, by the abrasion of the corners, now conical. This mass is formed by the ruins of a structure which, by the best authorities, is regarded as a temple of the seven planets. From inscribed cylinders obtained in the ruins, Sir Henry Rawlinson discovered a narrative by Nebuchadnezzar, declaring that the structure had been partially built by a former king, but had, in its unfinished condition, fallen into decay, and he had now repaired and completed it. On the top of the ruins is a mass of vitrified brick, which many travellers, from Benjamin of Tudela to our day, recognise as the mark of lightning employed by God to destroy what they regard as originally the Tower of Babel. Mr. Smith found inscriptions from the same locality, in a fragmentary condition, which contains such expressions as "He (the father of all gods) confounded their speech;" "their counsel was confused;" "their strong place all the day they founded; to their strong place in the night, he entirely made an end." These are certainly striking passages. It may be, as supposed, that the original structure was the tower, though the mass of vitrified brick may not have been the effect of lightning, and the proud monarch probably repaired and devoted to the purpose of a temple, such as the ruins now attest, the wreck of the edifice which had, sixteen hundred years or more previously, been destined for the purpose described by Moses.

Passing to the period when the relations of Israel and Judah with Assyria began, we find several important confirmations of the Scripture history.

A few preliminary remarks will introduce these. Formerly Ctesias was regarded as authentic, and on his testimony it was believed the Assyrian history was entirely contradictory of the sacred. But the inscriptions of the "rocks" have established the contrary view. The chronology of Assyria, gathered from these sources by Rawlinson, sustains accurately that of Demetrius the Jew; and while our chronology (Usher's) is thus shown to be incorrect by twenty or twenty-five years, the sequence of events is undisturbed, and our confidence in the credibility of the Scripture record remains unshaken. Again, this confirmation is not peculiar to this record. The third book of Herodotus finds a running commentary in the Behistun inscriptions, even in some *minutiæ*, in this case sustaining the judgment of that historian pronounced by Rawlinson, viz., that while liable to be led astray by a temperament inclining him to exaggeration in the poetical and marvellous, he is fully trustworthy, to the extent of his opportunities, on dates, names, and actual results, as facts, irrespective of the modes by which they were accomplished.

Further, the inscriptions have, by their full disclosures of the prowess and power of the kings of Assyria and Babylon, fully justified the accounts given in Scripture. The ruins of palaces measuring 600x600 and 300x360 feet, and 45 high, and the immense stones used in their erection, leave no room for incredulity as to the size or materials of Solomon's buildings; and the elegant architecture of the later buildings, as Nebuchadnezzar's palace, present a confirming comment on the history of his deputation of artisans from Judæa. Of special confirmations of the sacred record, we select a few specimens out of a mass sufficient to fill this entire article.

1. In 1 Kings xx. and xxii. chapters, we read of the war by Ben-hadad of Syria against Ahab; that he led thirty-two subject or confederate kings; after losing one hundred and twenty-seven thousand men in this campaign, he was yet able to continue the

war three years, and finally fights a decisive battle against Judah and Israel, in which Ahab was slain. Though no trustworthy Syrian records are before us, we find in the Assyrian inscription, known as the black obelisk, notices of the power of Ben-hadad—his numerous feudal kings and great armies—which fully sustain this apparently exaggerated narrative.

2. The same record sustains the accuracy of the Book of Kings, by mentioning Hazael as Ben-hadad's successor, 2 K. viii. 7, 15; and Jehu is named in the record as one who submitted to the Assyrian king and paid tribute of silver, gold, and other costly articles.

3. The next mention of Israel in the inscriptions is connected with Pul. Though there is some doubt as to the orthography of the name, we learn he took tribute from the country of Khumri, *i. e.*, *Beth-khumri*, in Hebrew, Omri, which is Samaria (so called because he founded the city. 1 K. xvi. 24).

4. Tiglath-pileser follows Pul in the list of Assyrian wars. He is represented as taking tribute from Menahem; but the Scripture says it was Pekah with whom he warred. Menahem, however, had been dead but a short time, and it is a fair supposition that the engraver of the inscription only made what is called a clerical error. See 2 K. xvi. 7, in which mention is made of a tribute voluntarily paid by Ahaz to this king, who mentions him especially as a tributary.

5. Shalmaneser is, in Scripture, the name of an Assyrian king, who, 2 K. xvii. 3-5, came against Samaria to chastise Hoshea for failing to pay tribute, and for seeking aid in his obstinacy from Egypt. Such appears at first sight to be the scope. But in verse 3 it is said that, as the result of the invasion, Hoshea became his servant, and rendered to him tribute. In verse 4, instead of "Shalmaneser," we have "the king of Assyria" simply, to whom Hoshea refused tribute, etc.; and who successfully besieged and after three years took Samaria, carrying the people captive into Assyria and distributing them in various places. No Assyrian record satisfactorily authorises us to assign this conquest to Shalmaneser. On the contrary, it is assigned to Sargon, in his extensive annals found

in his palace at Khorsabad. In Isaiah xx. 1, we read of Tartan sent by Sargon, King of Assyria, who fought against Ashdod and took it. Interpreters have been long puzzled by this passage. Dr. J. A. Alexander rightly surmised as the most probable solution of the puzzle, that Sargon was not another name for any to whom it had been proposed to assign it, but was that of *another* king. The affairs of the Assyrian Empire appear to have been complicated, by the statements of the monuments of Shalmaneser. It is, then, with a probability of the nature of a moral certainty, that Sargon succeeded Shalmaneser, in some revolutionary manner. In all his inscriptions, departing from the usual style of preface, he never mentions ancestors, and his lineal successors never trace their genealogies beyond him. In his annals he not only claims the subjugation of Samaria, and captivity and deportation of the people, but also relates his importations of people from his provinces, and their settlement in Palestine. Among those provinces, by the by, he names one of Arabia. This explains the presence of Geshem the *Arabian*, among Nehemiah's opponents in his pious labors. Nehemiah vi. 1. We have thus not only a confirmation, but an explanation and a supplement of the sacred text.

But we have so far miscalculated the space the matter of this article would require, that we feel compelled here rather abruptly to close. There remain the more striking and full coincidences of sacred and Assyrian history in the account of the wars of Sennacherib, and pages may be filled with confirmatory illustrations of historical and other passages of Scripture. It is abundantly evident that both from mythical story and trustworthy annals, there come valuable contributions to the credibility of sacred history. Exhumed carved and sculptured monuments of limestone and marble; gigantic figures of men and beasts, and symbolical creatures; pillars, tombs, portals, slabs, statues, and seals; the pavements and walls of palaces and temples with baked clay bricks; tablets, vases, and cylinders, have brought to us a new "testimony of the rocks;" not to impair, but to sustain, the inspired records. The inscriptions they bear, or by which they are explained, after more than twenty centuries of silence,

speak in language, not in theories and speculations, and echo the voices of Moses, Samuel, Ezra, Nehemiah, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Daniel. speaking on the pages of the Bible.

To our generation it has been given to "know but in part," and, as to much, to "see as in a glass darkly." One palace alone covers with its ruins one hundred acres of ground, of which only a very small portion has been thoroughly examined. Mounds of as great or of less extent are thickly scattered over the regions adjoining the sites of Nineveh and Babylon. Meanwhile, as discovery opens new treasures, the study of the Assyrian language is constantly receiving new votaries; and increased accuracy of decipherment and of translation promise results for the future, of which the present, intrinsically valuable as they are, may prove but the first-fruits in the great harvest of historical truth and confirmation and illustration of the venerable documents of the Scriptures of the Old Testament.

Whether we shall feel justified in calling the attention of our readers to this subject again, depends on circumstances. We greatly desire its prosecution by some one: and for the present, take our leave, in the words of Francis Thynne, an old critic, by asking "credit for diligence in breaking the yce and givinge lighte to others, who may moore easely perfecte than begynne."



## ARTICLE VII.

## MARCUS AURELIUS.

*The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus.* Translated by  
GEORGE LONG. London. Bell & Daldy.

*Selectctions from the Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius.* Roberts  
Bros., Boston.

A most fit hand for its given work was found when Professor Long undertook the translation of the Thoughts of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. The Greek of the Emperor is not classical, and his "Meditations were for the most part entries jotted down from day to day, amid the business of the city or the fatigues of the camp, without the slightest attempt at style, with no care even for correct writing." Add to this the corruption of the text, and we are ready to accept Prof. Long's statement, that the original is sometimes very difficult to understand, and still more difficult to translate. By Prof. Long, if any one, we might hope that these formidable difficulties would be successfully encountered. Selected at the age of twenty-four by Mr. Jefferson as Professor of Ancient Languages in the University of Virginia, he was two years afterwards recalled to London to become Professor of the Greek Language and Literature in the London University; and while filling this post first, and subsequently that of Professor of Classical literature at Brighton College, he gave to the public the fruits of his devotion to ancient learning, in editions of several classical authors and translations of others. His thorough appreciation of the Stoic philosophy enables him to explicate what is sententious, illustrate what is obscure, and connect what is fragmentary in Marcus Aurelius.

We suppose, also, that the Professor's sympathy warms his learning. He says that he made this translation for his own benefit, after having used the work for many years. One would be led to think that after having relished the original as he was capable of doing, he would never have resorted to any translation, even his own, for private use. Was not the impulse rather a desire of propagandism? Without being acquainted with his ecclesiastical affinities, we are strongly inclined to put him into

the Church of the Stoics. It was not the Church of his early patron, Mr. Jefferson, but perhaps it is as good a one.

However this may be, Prof. Long's conspectus of the philosophy of Aurelius is very interesting, and at the same time valuable, as a clear, learned, and (so far) authoritative exposition of the Stoic philosophy as held at that period of the Empire. What is very striking, is his absolute independence of thought and frankness of utterance. His boldness has sometimes a touch of audacity, when handling such abstruse notions as time, space, cause and effect, matter and absolute existence, or the vexed problems of creation, God's providence, the laws of Nature, and the origin of evil. For example, he says: "A creation of all things at a certain time, followed by a quiescence of the first cause, and an abandonment of all sequences of phenomena to the laws of Nature, or to any other words that people may use, is absolutely absurd." Whether a Stoic or not, our translator is certainly not a Darwinian. Indeed, with such acerb dogmatism does he express his opinions about philosophies and those who hold them, that it is evident he is not without a relish for the Cynics. He is not always reverential toward even his hero. For example: "There is much in Antoninus that is hard to understand, and it might be said that he did not fully comprehend all that he wrote, which would be in no way remarkable, for it happens now that a man may write what neither he nor anybody can understand."

It is not a little surprising that two of the authors quoted most frequently and with most respect by Prof. Long, are Swedenborg and Bishop Butler. That system must be of an unusual order of architecture, of which the characteristic columns bear these two names!

In a prefatory note, he impales the American editor who pirated the first edition of his translation, and dedicated it to an American, (Gen. Grant, we suppose,) and takes occasion to utter the following words:

"I have never dedicated a book to any man, and if I dedicated this, I should choose the man whose name seemed to me most worthy to be joined to that of the Roman Emperor and philosopher. . . . If I dedicate this little book to any man, I would dedicate it to him who led the

Confederate armies against the powerful invader, and retired from an unequal contest defeated, but not dishonored: to the noble Virginian soldier whose talents and whose virtues place him by the side of the best and wisest man who sat on the throne of the Imperial Cæsars."

This is true philosophy, issuing from whatever school. And yet, perhaps, it is not the highest eulogy to liken, without discrimination, the leader of the Confederate armies to the Emperor of Rome.

The last paragraph of Prof. Long's notice of the life of Aurelius, is an encomium upon Captain John Smith, the savior of the infant colony of Virginia. Prof. Long lived in sight of the Virginia mountains, enjoying familiar converse with Thomas Jefferson only two years. It was a short time, but long enough to inspire him with these noble sentiments, which, after the lapse of half a century, he has the courage to utter.

But passing from the translator, let us take up the work of the royal author. In his *History of the Romans under the Empire*, Mr. Merivale says:

"Of all the Cæsars whose names are enshrined in the page of history, or whose features are preserved to us in the representations of art, one alone seems to haunt us in the Eternal City, in the place and posture most familiar to him in life. In the equestrian statue of Marcus Aurelius, which crowns the platform of the Campidoglio, Imperial Rome lives again. Of all her consecrated sites, it is to this that the classical pilgrim should most devoutly repair: this, of all the monuments of antiquity, most justly challenges his veneration. . . . Such special prominence is well deserved amid the wreck of ages, for him whom historians combine to honor as the worthiest of the Roman people."

Other writers, historians, and essayists, heathen and Christian, do not, in their praise, fall below this eulogium. Had Aurelius been nothing more than such an emperor as he was, so high a niche in the temple of fame would not have been, by this common consent, awarded to him. He was a good man,—preëminently so, and consistently; not less virtuous as an emperor than in his domestic life;—and goodness always commands respect, and seen in men of high station awakens admiration because of its rarity. Especially conspicuous is a virtuous Roman emperor: Aurelius is not, however, the only nor the first specimen of this kind pre-

sented to our view. His immediate predecessor, Antoninus Pius, may fairly vie with him; and Hadrian and Trajan, if not irreproachable, could not be censured as vicious. But virtue alone cannot constitute a great man. He must have strength. In this preëminent element Aurelius was not equal to his immediate predecessors. It would be unfair to call him weak. He took his place courageously enough at the head of his armies; and the greater part of his life was spent in camps away in Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt, Greece, but especially in the countries on the Danube, where he was occupied in beating back the barbarians pressing on the frontier. He gained several victories, and celebrated some triumphs, but he scarcely retarded the impending fate of the empire. Perhaps nothing more could have been done, but the career of a stronger man would have exhibited wider views and more heroic efforts. Likewise in the internal management of the Empire, he was blameless, diligent, the slave of duty, and a conscientious ruler, laboring for the welfare of his subjects. He conciliated the people, and paid great deference to the Senate. Especially was he noted for his wise choice of good and able ministers. But we look in vain for any evidences of breadth of view in his estimate of his functions, and we are pained by the want of personal vigor in his administration. He was not equal to the requirements of his position, and he was too candid to suppress his estimate of himself.

“He cast himself on the advice of his officers, and even of his nobles, and was wont to pretend that it better became him to follow the course of many than to compel all to submit to his sole direction. His contemporaries sometimes carped at him for being too little of an emperor.

“*M. Antoninus philosophatur, et querit de clementia et de animis et de honesto et justo; nec sentit pro republica.*”

Quoting the above, Mr. Merivale says:

“His gentle nature was harrowed by the misery around him. The weight of empire was too heavy a burden for the sensitive student. . . . When he could steal an hour from affairs for study and meditation, he still patiently reviewed the dogmas of philosophy, or examined his own heart and conscience by abstract and eternal principles.”

Still, we repeat, that it would be unfair to call him a *weak* emperor. Matthew Arnold, in an essay more amiable than care-

ful or critical, uses a word which nicely grades this deficiency. Speaking of Aurelius, he says: "In his character, beautiful as it is, there is something melancholy, circumscribed, and *ineffectual*." To be ineffectual is not the worst fault that a ruler can have, but it is sufficient to dispose of his claim to the first rank. Nor would this position ever have been assigned to Aurelius, were he regarded merely as an emperor. But he was also, and most conspicuously, an exemplar and a teacher of morals. Many admirers have pronounced him far superior in virtue to any other uninspired man, and some have not hesitated to say, that in completeness his system of morals does not fall short of the Christian.

Whether such a statement is true, is a question of far more importance and present interest than the question, What was he as an emperor? The effects of his acts as emperor, not very important at the time, have ceased to be appreciable for at least a millennium and a half. But his ethical maxims have never been out of sight since they were first penned, are circulated at the present day in fresh editions in almost every language of Europe, and are connected with the discussion of some fundamental questions touching that religion which he only knew as a pestilent faction that ought to be crushed out.

That he has been over-estimated as a moral teacher, as really as he has been over-praised as an emperor, can be, it seems to us, satisfactorily shown. The combination of his functions as emperor and as moralist, makes it difficult to contemplate steadily his character in either separate aspect without being confused by the side light thrown from the other. As his high position is adorned by his virtue, so his virtue is rendered more imposing by his exalted position. This double view gives us, however, one advantage. It enables us to perceive more clearly that the aspect of weakness already pointed out as clinging to his administration, vitiates also his philosophy.

Before we set ourselves to examine the system of a moralist or religionist, we naturally start a preliminary inquiry as to his private life—reasonably supposing that his practice will illustrate his principles. This test Aurelius can well sustain. He was just, benevolent, self-denying, and pious; his private life was pure

and his public one as good, perhaps, as he could make it. He not only lived up to the maxims of his philosophy, but went beyond them: he lived "better than he knew," and by his example put to shame the majority of his fellow-Stoics. Compared with Seneca, he illustrates the difference between a moral man and a moraliser. Nevertheless, it is easy to point to some of his acts which cannot be defended upon sound principles of morality. He associated with him on the throne, from motives of weak kindness, a worthless kinsman. He tolerated during her life, and deified after her death, a wife whom he ought to have banished; and he committed to his vicious, cruel, and illiterate son, Commodus, the command of a world-wide empire. Mr. Arnold defends him (superfluously it would seem) against the charge of being the father of such a son. He says that excellent fathers may have, without any fault of theirs, sons very different from themselves. This is undoubtedly true, and in a certain way as clearly illustrated by the two Arnolds, father and son, as by the case before us. Finally, Aurelius persecuted the Christians, whom Antoninus had indulged, and Hadrian more than tolerated. It will not be easy to reconcile, upon any principle of morality, his own disbelief in the gods, and his putting to death those who refused to worship them.

His death was conformable to his life. As the one had been virtuous, so the other was calm. And as his life had lacked the vigor of enthusiasm, so his death was not illumined by the hope of immortality.

As we regard the man and his career, we all feel for him admiration, affection, sympathy, and pity. We are quite ready to adopt the tender words of the closing paragraph of Matthew Arnold's Essay: "We see him wise, just, self-governed, thankful, blameless; yet with all this, agitated, stretching out his arms for something beyond,—

"——tendentemque manus ripæ ulterioris amore."

But what have we to say of the philosophy or system of morality which made Aurelius what he was? Did his philosophy, in fact, make him a virtuous man, or did his virtue determine

his philosophy? When he was eleven years old,—certainly too young to exercise philosophical discrimination—he attached himself to the sect of the Stoics. But from early childhood to mature age, his training was most careful, and his instruction in the hands of the wisest and purest men of the period. Also, he had constantly before him rare models of excellence: first in his mother, and in later life his adoptive father, Antoninus Pius. We must not, however, attribute too much efficacy to this favorable training. His cousin and co-partner of the imperial purple, Verus, enjoyed the same advantage, and not less pains were bestowed upon his own son, Commodus; and what they became, we all know. We must recognise in him the possession of what Cicero calls *indoles virtutis*—a virtuously disposed nature. Nor is the expression, though from a heathen source, inconsistent with the doctrines of a high theology. That the Stoic philosophy cannot appropriate the credit of the virtuous life of Aurelius, is clear from the fact that it never accomplished as much for any one else of its numerous disciples; and the further fact, that not a few of the most eminent professors of this philosophy were positively very foul men. Moreover, Aurelius was not a profound Stoic, not being, in fact, profound in anything. It is matter of doubt whether he comprehended the subtle reasonings of some of his predecessors; certainly he does not emulate them in this respect.

Logic was one of the main tripartite divisions of the Stoic philosophy, but Aurelius seems not to have cultivated it. We think it must be allowed that as he had undoubtedly a more virtuous character, so he had a less vigorous intellect than the masters of his school. His philosophical position is analogous to his military one. He felt himself unable to advance an empire, and spent his efforts in painful struggles to maintain its boundaries. On the other hand, as the Stoics may not glorify themselves by claiming the lustre of Aurelius, so neither must he be weighted down by the burden of their errors, whether of theory or practice. He does not proclaim fatalistic absurdities, nor justify suicide, nor exhibit arrogance nor intolerance,—the case of Christians excepted.

Mr. Arnold, in one of his Essays, says: "To be great, a philosopher must have something in him which can influence character, which is edifying: he must, in short, have a noble and lofty character himself—a character *in the grand style*." If, as before quoted, Mr. Arnold has with precision characterised Aurelius positively by the epithet *ineffectual*, with equal justice in this sentence he presents us with a picture of what he was not, and fully bears us out in withholding from the Roman philosopher the title of Great.

Having disembarrassed our subject from the further explicit consideration, first, of the personal character of Aurelius, and second, of Stoic philosophy in general, let us inquire into the truth and the value of the moral maxims found in the *Meditations*.

The truth of a system of morals is not the equivalent of its value. If untrue in whole or in part, it is so far valueless, even if not pernicious—if such a thing can be. But the dogmatic precepts may be true, yet if from triviality, inapplicability, want of sufficient sanction, or other cause, they are *ineffectual* as rules of conduct, the system is without value. And even another distinction is called for. Moral maxims, when adopted by one already acting upon virtuous principles, may be corroborative and so far serviceable; but if they do not so commend themselves to the reason, conscience, and highest interests of all men, so as to attract attention and carry with them a certain weight, the system is of comparatively little value.

It may be allowed that no specific act contrary to good morals is advocated by anything found in the *Meditations*, and but little in theory which can be perverted extensively to the injury of society. This is saying much for the author; but more than this is his due. Rising from a continuous perusal of the famous little book, (four hours of leisurely reading will accomplish its one-hundred-and-fifty pages,) we are aware that we have been exhorted with tedious reiteration to be wise, reasonable, just, benevolent, and temperate, and never under any circumstances to allow ourselves to lose our tranquillity. Every good man acknowledges the truth of these utterances—the last with proper modification; but his regard for them will hardly be made stronger by anything



he will have found said in their support. On the other hand, the author sometimes assigns for a true proposition reasons so unsatisfactory, and even so unsound, that he raises in the mind a doubt as to the proposition itself. Perhaps few persons have ever troubled themselves with the question, whether there could be found room enough in another state of being for all the souls which have existed from all eternity? But who would not be in doubt, if the only solution is that given by the imperial philosopher? "The souls which are removed into the air, after subsisting for some time, are transmuted and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way make room for the fresh souls which come to dwell there." (IV., 21.)

How important is the following question, and how incomplete is the answer, and how unsatisfactory to any earnest soul seeking the truth!

"—What, then, is able to conduct a man? One thing, and one only—Philosophy. But this consists in keeping the demon within a man free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and pleasures; doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely, nor with hypocrisy; not feeling the need of another man's doing, or not doing anything; and besides, accepting all that happens, and all that is allotted as coming from thence, wherever it is, whence he himself came; and finally, waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else than a dissolution of the elements of which every human body is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements themselves, in each continually changing into another, why should a man have any apprehension about the change and dissolution of all the elements? For it is according to Nature, and nothing is evil which is according to Nature." (II., 17.)

Aurelius says justly, though with needless repetition and variation, that the soul ought not to do violence to itself. If we would know what, in a practical way, we are to understand by this, we may gather what information we can from the following paragraph:

"The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes an abscess, and, as it were, a tumor in the universe, so far as it can. For to be vexed at anything which happens, is a separation of ourselves from Nature, in some part of which the natures of all other things are contained."

Who that has been really injured by another, would tolerate such advice as follows?

"Take away thine opinion, and then is taken away the complaint. I have been harmed: take away the complaint, 'I have been harmed,' and the harm is taken away."

If we are affronted at this sentiment, offered as advice, we feel contempt for the proposition presented argumentatively, as here:

"If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing that disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it; and it is in thy power to wipe out this judgment now. But if anything in thy own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders thee from correcting thy opinion?"

Or again—for the good Marcus is so fond of this bit of nonsense that we suspect he believed himself its inventor, and so is never weary of repeating it (This example is partly unintelligible as well as wholly false):

"Pain is either an evil to the body—then let the body say what it thinks about it; or to the soul: but it is in the power of the soul to maintain its own serenity and tranquillity, and not to think that pain is an evil."

How shall we put into practice the following sententious advice, and would it avail us much if we did?

"Retire into thyself. The natural principle which rules has this nature, that it is content with itself when it does what is just, and so secures tranquillity. Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings. Confine thyself to the present. Understand well what happens to thee or to another. Divide and distribute every object into the causal and the natural. Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by a man stay there where the wrong was done."

Many examples of like futility in reasoning might be extracted from the *Meditations*, dissatisfying the reader who does not deny his conclusions, and awakening something more than distrust in the breast of the sceptic. Nothing but the well known virtue of the life of Aurelius relieves the mind that studies these maxims from the impression that he has before him the theatrical display of a sentimental moraliser. And the question is fairly opened, and is left unsolved, Did the Emperor's philosophy secure his

virtue, or his virtue determine his philosophy? If the former, then we may doubt if it ever accomplished the same for any one of his contemporaries, or any one of subsequent times. The epithet of the essayist to whom we have more than once alluded, continually returns upon us—*ineffectual*. Want of power is a defect as really congenital in this system of morality as it was in the man. And this brings our article, in closing, to the topic of most importance belonging to the subject.

The moral system of Marcus Aurelius, and of every other system except the Christian, is necessarily ineffectual for want of sufficient sanction. We are bidden to be good, virtuous, upright—using these words as equivalent; and the several philosophers explicate for us, with more or less completeness, what these terms are meant to imply—Aurelius, so well, that we would except to little that he has said, and would not care to add much to his enumeration. But if we ask him, Why should I be temperate, just, and benevolent? his answer, not formally stated, but easily gathered from his writings, is twofold: Because thus you will be acting in accordance with the constitution of your nature, and so will promote your own happiness. But suppose it is replied, “I think that by acting contrary to what you understand as the constitution of my nature, I shall increase my happiness”—the moralist has exhausted his function as such. He may proceed to argue the point, but he cannot determine it authoritatively. In fact the Stoics, by their analysis, reduce virtue to what was scarcely anything more than right reason. But virtue is something more than reason, and ethics is something more than philosophy. Ethics is, of its nature, imperative. Philosophy never can command; it advises, and at the utmost can only induce. True ethics must be based on duty; and the original concept of duty cannot be attained without the just concept, at the same time, of its correlative, obligation. This man can never teach, until his thought carries him outside of himself and of his fellow-men, and brings him into the presence of God. Then he understands the meaning of *obligation*; then duty becomes commanding; then, morality has a solid basis. God’s will is necessarily supreme, and as necessarily benevolent.

Now we see that to follow the constitution of our nature, as he has ordained it, is at once the path of duty and of happiness. This is true Ethics, and it thus is the highest Philosophy; yet it is not the peculiar possession of philosophers, secured by subtle dialectics, but a part of that light "that lighteth every man that cometh into the world."

In this view of our subject, we can readily understand why the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius, regarded as a system of morality, are ineffectual; an unsteady support even in the hands of the few good men who accepted it, and utterly powerless to make any impression upon the multitude.

In common with his philosophical contemporaries, the Emperor had a very weak apprehension of the immortality of the soul, if indeed he could be said to have any belief on the subject. M. Denis, quoted by Merivale, says: "Epictète, Marc-Aurèle et Sénèque ne parlent qu' incidemment, et non pas même sans réserve, de l' immortalité. Jamais ils n' en font le but, et l' encouragement de la vertu."

Hence the necessity they are under, when recommending virtue, of maintaining that it secures its full reward in the present life: and that since, from his very nature, God must favor virtue, his providence is always on the side of the good and against the wicked—a doctrine absolutely contradicted by common experience, and which, to be maintained, requires such an interpretation, either of providence or of virtue, as would confound all the most settled notions of men. Allowing that the assurance of happiness is a sufficient basis for a system of morals, this assurance does not belong to any system which confines its view to the present life. But even the Stoics refused to give the name of virtue to any action prompted merely by a desire of happiness. In this they were right. The instinct of our nature impels us to seek our own happiness; but it is conscience that pronounces upon the moral character of actions; and its verdict does not turn upon the question of self-enjoyment, but of duty; and duty, as we have seen, can have no solid basis until it is made to rest finally upon the will of God.

This, then, is the proposition which expresses the result we

have reached: *True morality cannot be separated from true religion.*

This accounts for the errors of parts of the ethical philosophy of Aurelius, and the ineffectualness of the whole. And this explains the sadness which colored the life of the Emperor, and pervades his Meditations, awaking our compassion, while we admire his virtues.

To reassert at this time the necessary dependence of true morality upon true religion, is not superfluous. Nor is it inappropriate to do this in connexion with a notice of a new edition of the writings of Marcus Aurelius. For there is a manifest disposition on the part of certain modern writers, and some of them of commanding ability, to assign an independent basis to morality; and perhaps some extol unduly the Meditations, not simply out of admiration for them, but because of a secret willingness to depreciate the prerogative of Revealed Religion.

To enter into this argument fully is not our purpose. To do so would require us to show the necessity for an infallible standard of morality, as well as an authoritative sanction for it; to bring to view the controlling fact in man's history and present condition, so sorely felt, yet so dimly recognised by those who, like Aurelius, are groping in the dark after the truth, that man is a fallen being, corrupt by nature, disinclined to virtue, and of himself unable to do good, even if he would; and thus establish the conclusion that no philosophy can do him good that does not provide what only revelation can announce, the intervention of a renewing, supporting, sanctifying, gracious, Divine Spirit.

Let us content ourselves with having endeavored to illustrate, by the example of the melancholy Meditations of Aurelius, how futile is the effort to try to teach men to live soberly and righteously, without at the same time announcing to them that they *must* live *godly* in this present evil world. This is strikingly expressed in an apothegm found in the writings of Maurice de Guerin: "True wisdom is the science of the will of the gods."

## ARTICLE VIII.

## THE THREE CREEDS.

*The Nicene and Apostles' Creeds: Their Literary History; together with an account of the growth and reception of the Sermon on the Faith, commonly called "The Creed of St. Athanasius."* By C. A. SWAINSON, D. D. Pp. 542. London. 1875.

The preference which Sir Walter Scott shewed for Episcopacy over Presbyterianism did not rest on a very sound or intelligent basis, if Lockhart is correct in the account he gives of it. "He took up," says his son-in-law, "early in life a repugnance to the mode in which public worship is conducted in the Scottish Establishment, and adhered to the sister Church, whose system of government and discipline he believed to be the fairest form of the primitive polity, and whose litanies and collects he revered as having been transmitted to us from the age immediately succeeding that of the apostles." How far the Anglican system of government and discipline, nominally administered by State-made prelates, but in reality by the Houses of Parliament, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the Court of Arches, and the recently appointed Judge of Appeal, is now, or ever was, a fair copy of the polity which inspired men established among the scattered congregations of Syria, Asia Minor, and eastern Europe, may be fairly left to the consideration of any man who reads, without prejudice, the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of Paul. Should some competent scholar take the trouble to do for the litanies and collects what the book before us has done for the creeds, and institute a searching inquiry into their origin, and lay open the sources from which they were derived; the result will come with all the freshness of a revelation to those who innocently believe that the litanies and collects were "transmitted to us from the age immediately succeeding that of the apostles." What would be said, should it appear that the only antiquity that most of them can claim is to be translations of the forms in the Roman missals and breviaries used in England before the Refor-

mation? What would be said, if, in the Book of Common Prayer, we should fail to find half-a-dozen collects, or a single litany, which could be traced to any earlier period than the fifth century after Christ? The age immediately succeeding the apostles was the second century, and to it we venture to affirm not one of these ritualistic forms could be followed up. But the simple acts of Presbyterian worship, prayer, praise, reading the Scriptures, preaching the gospel, and the administration of baptism and the Lord's Supper, have their precedents and authority in the first century of Christianity; they claim higher sanction than that of the Fathers; they derive their warrant from the practice of Christ and his apostles. No church ritual is as old as the New Testament. It is the apostolic form alone which has the true antiquity in its favor. The human is never so old as the divine.

Hitherto it was generally supposed that the Three Creeds occupied, in respect of age, the next place to the extracts from Scripture in the Book of Common Prayer. For one of them an origin no less than apostolic was once claimed: the most recent of them was supposed to date from the fourth century. For upwards of two hundred years, however, scholars have been aware that of both of these claims, truth requires considerable abatement to be made; but to what extent was not exactly understood. Canon Swainson, Norrisian Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, has, in the work before us, pointed this out with a clearness and force of evidence that the reader feels to be irresistible. He has instituted a searching inquiry into the history and structure of these venerable documents, and with laudable industry has followed out to its conclusion the path of investigation in which Vossius and Ussher, Muratori and Waterland, Heurtley and Ffoulkes, have toiled before him. None of his predecessors has equalled him in the research and thoroughness which he has brought to bear upon the elucidation of his subject. The result is a work of solid and enduring value, not indeed very attractive to ordinary readers, owing to its minute criticism of obscure manuscripts, and its manifold citations from ancient and modern writers, but destined perhaps for many a year to be high authority on the interesting theme which it proposes to discuss and illustrate.

Apart altogether from questions of their origin, there is, indeed, a peculiar interest attaching to these ancient documents. Prior to the Reformation, they were the common symbols of all western Christians; and although in most of the great Reformed Churches they do not hold the place of honor which they once did, yet by none of them have they ever been condemned or disavowed. The Romish Church uses all three in her public services; so does the Anglican; and most of the Presbyterian Churches have either expressly approved them, or have wrought up their substance into separate confessions of their own. The Nicene Creed, with one or two variations hereafter to be explained, is the one symbol of faith common alike to the three great divisions of Christianity—Greek, Roman, and Teutonic. No Church, with any pretensions to be historical and national, has ever repudiated the Apostles' Creed. Though Swainson tells us "it is adopted by all the Reformed Churches, except the Presbyterian"—an expression nearly synonymous with saying, *it is adopted by no Reformed Church except the Anglican*—we find it allowed in the fifth Article of the Reformed Gallican Church, which we had supposed was Presbyterian; the Heidelberg Catechism, and the Confession of Knox's congregation at Geneva, both followed the order of the Apostles' Creed; and even the Assembly of Divines at Westminster says of it, that "it is a brief sum of the Christian faith, agreeable to the word of God, and anciently received in the churches of Christ."\* The Athanasian Creed, though not formally accepted as a document by any except the Roman and Anglican communions, states, nevertheless, the most assured belief of nearly all Greek and Protestant Christians. Next, therefore, to the inspired Scriptures, to which all sections of Christianity in the last resort carry their appeals, and to the Psalms of David, which all, without exception, use as songs of praise, the Three Creeds are a possession common alike to all the great historical churches.

By a creed, as distinguished from an individual profession of belief, we understand the form of words, admitted by a council

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\*See Hall's *Harmony of the Protestant Confessions*, p. 9; Irving's *Confessions*, Appendix; *Note to the Creed* appended to the Shorter Catechism.



or by some ecclesiastical organisation, to contain a true statement of its opinions, and which is consequently appealed to publicly as the distinctive symbol of its faith. Being thus the embodiment, in human language, of doctrines which men hold to be divine, and its object being to explain the sense in which the contents of divine revelation are understood, it must, in the very nature of things, be an uninspired document. Thus human in its structure and expression, it is always open to the charge of imperfection. The possibility of error may always be assumed. Any formula, which is the product of an intelligent and honest attempt to embody the condensed teaching of holy Scripture on this or the other subject, may always be expected to contain a very large proportion of truth; but other elements of a disturbing character often interpose to modify the result, so that, to the pure eye of Omniscience, the most perfect creed ever produced by man may appear either defective or erroneous. Even an imperfect creed may bind firmly, when men voluntarily adopt it as the exponent of their belief, and commit themselves to what it contains; but in so far as the document is an accurate expression of divine revelation, it is binding upon men by the authority of God.

Though individual declarations of faith were abundant enough in the second and third centuries, we reach the fourth before we find any document which was admitted generally to contain the main principles of the Christian system. When the first makes its appearance, it owes its existence to the presence and prevalence of error. The immediate cause of error is the weakness and perversity of human nature, and creeds were the remedies judged to be most effective for checking the growth and counteracting the influence of those intellectual aberrations, which the majority regarded as both false in themselves, and destructive to the spiritual interests of men. Hence the old name for creed was a *symbolum*; that is, a sign or password, by which the Christian soldier could distinguish his friends from his foes, whether heretic or pagan. The fact is the very opposite of what has been sometimes represented; the creed did not produce the error, but error in the course of time called out the creed. As heresy grew

strong, it put the friends of truth on their defence, and compelled them, in self-protection, to enunciate their belief in concise and well-considered terms. Almost every clause in one of these ancient documents is a protest against heresy—the fossil memorial of a controversy long since dead and forgotten. Often when error presented itself under some new phase, it was met by inserting some new clause into an old creed. Some of the new clauses crept into general use; others of them fell into disuse, and perished. Among these competing clauses there was usually at work a kind of natural selection—a survival of the fittest—of which the documents as they now stand are the embodiment and result. No creed can be regarded as complete till it has admitted its last clause, and has thus arrived at the distinct form, which it retains unaltered till the present time.

#### THE NICENE CREED.

This oldest and most generally accepted of all the symbols, took origin at the Council of Nice, which assembled in 325 to pronounce upon the great Arian controversy. The first draft of it was submitted to that meeting by Eusebius of Cesarea, who thought it a form of belief in which both parties might be persuaded to agree. The document was indeed so cautiously worded, that both parties might have accepted it as a compromise, each understanding it in his own way. But Athanasius and his friends took strong exception to it, on the ground that it settled nothing, that it bore no distinct testimony to the truth, did not condemn error in terms sufficiently decided, and gave a sound so uncertain, that the Arian and the orthodox could both allege, with some plausibility, that the decision of the great council was in his own favor. The majority of the bishops saw the force of this, and agreed that the *homo-ousion*, that is, the consubstantiality of the Son with the Father, should be inserted, and that a strong sentence of condemnation against all who did not receive the doctrine should be annexed. The proposal was carried, and the draft of Eusebius, with these amendments inserted, became the original Nicene Creed.\* The design of its authors was to state therein,

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\*This creed is given by Eusebius in his *Letter to the Church of Cesarea*,

in clear and definite terms, what they believed to be the truth on the subject before them, and to throw their statement into such a form that the adherents of Arius could not honestly subscribe it. Its original design was to be a test of orthodoxy, not to be a form of ritual for use in public worship.

The orthodox symbol thus agreed upon by the three hundred and eighteen Fathers of Nice, is not the symbol as it now stands in the Greek, Roman, and Anglican services. Considerable changes were made subsequently. These changes, it is generally understood, were effected by the Second General Council, as it is usual to call the Synod of one hundred and fifty Greek bishops, who, at the summons of the Emperor Theodosius, met at Constantinople in the year 381. There is, however, good reason to doubt whether this statement, though often repeated, is in reality a historical fact. The Fathers of Constantinople, in the letter which they addressed to the Emperor at the close of the Council, profess to have proclaimed and ratified in brief terms the faith of the Fathers at Nice, but do not inform him that they ventured to make any additions to it. Their alleged revision is not given by Socrates, Sozomen, or Theodoret, the latter of whom especially was fond of quoting documents, and could scarcely have overlooked one of so great importance. It is recorded by no contemporary writer whatever, though the writings of many such exist, especially of Cyril of Jerusalem and the two Gregories, who all three were members of the Council. Stranger still, the Council of Ephesus, in 431, makes constant reference to the creed of Nice, but none to the alleged revision of Constantinople. The only ground for believing that such a revision was made at all, is, that at the General Council of Chalcedon, held in 451, Aetius the deacon stated, and the bishops assembled accepted his statement, that the form of creed containing the additions was the form approved by the Fathers of Constantinople seventy years before. Besides, it deepens the mystery to know that nearly all the additions, and something more besides, are found in a creed

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in Theodoret *H. E.*, i. 12. English versions of it are common; one may be seen in Wall's *History of Infant Baptism*, Vol. I. p. 611; and another in Goode's *Divine Rule*, second ed., Vol. I. p. 131.

contained in the *Ancoratus* of Epiphanius\*—a work on the Trinity, written at the request of some clergy in Pamphylia, in the year 374, that is, seven years before the Council met on which these additions have been fathered. Is it possible that Aetius made the mistake of ascribing to the Second Council the creed of Epiphanius, and that the Fathers of Chalcedon did not discover the error? It is not easy to believe even this, though on the whole the more likely solution. Be it as it may, the amended creed received at Chalcedon has ever since been ascribed to the Fathers of Constantinople, and to this hour passes under their name. From that time the Council of 381, which was seldom spoken of before, rose at once in public estimation, and although it contained no representative from any of the churches of the West, it was forthwith elevated to the dignity of a general council, and its alleged revision of the Nicene Creed was everywhere accepted as the symbol of orthodoxy.

The alterations thus made consisted in the omission of the expression, "God of God," and also of the anathema appended to the original, together with the insertion of a variety of clauses, and the amplification of the declaration in regard to the Holy Ghost. The following is the formula sanctioned at Chalcedon, the alleged Constantinopolitan additions being printed in *italics*:

"We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, and of all things, visible and invisible: and in one Lord, Jesus Christ, the *only-begotten* Son of God, begotten of the Father *before all worlds*, Light of light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made; who for us men, and for our salvation, came down *from heaven*, and was incarnate *of the Holy Ghost and the Virgin Mary*, and was made man, and was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered, and was buried; and on the third day he rose again, *according to the Scriptures*, and ascended into heaven, and *sitteth on the right hand of the Father*, and shall come again *with glory* to judge the quick and the dead; of whose kingdom there shall be no end. And in the Holy Ghost, *the Lord, the Giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father, who, with the Father and the Son together, is worshipped and glorified, who spake by the prophets: in one holy Catholic and Apostolic Church. We acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins; we look for the resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come. Amen.*"

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\* *Ancoratus*, ch. cxx.

It is stated by the historian, Theodorus Lector, that Timotheus, bishop of Constantinople, ordered (A. D. 511) this creed to be used at every congregation in public worship; previously it was in use only when the bishop, before Easter, catechised the catechumens.

Still, the creed was not yet complete. Two important changes were made afterwards. The clause, "God of God," which formed part of the original Nicene symbol, but for some reason was omitted at Chalcedon, was subsequently restored. The circumstances under which the excluded phrase made good its right to its old position are not now known; but the re-insertion is first observed in Latin copies of the creed, as used in Spain, in Isidore Mercator, in the Council of Toledo, and in a creed which Etherius and Beatus quoted in their work against Elipandus. From this fact, it is reasonable to infer that the restoration of the clause was accomplished in Spain.

But at the Council of Toledo, held in 589, a change of much more momentous consequence was introduced. The Council of Chalcedon had used, in regard to the Holy Ghost, the words, "who proceedeth from the Father;" but the sixty-eight Spanish bishops, met at Toledo, inserted the words, *Filioque*, "and from the Son"—words which, however expressive of doctrinal truth they may have been, ought not to have been interpolated by a few local bishops in a public document which, as the creed of the whole Church, had the sanction of a General Council. The creed, with the new addition, was subscribed by Reccared, king of the Goths, and by his queen; and at the same council a canon was passed ordering it to be chanted by the people in a clear voice, before the Lord's Prayer, in the public services of the Church. The reason assigned for making it a part of the Church worship is, that "testimony may thus be borne to the true faith." Owing to this constant use of it in public, the laity grew familiar with the document in the interpolated form, and it became difficult afterwards to introduce among them the Roman form, in which, as yet, these changes had not been made.

The practice of using in the mass the Nicene Creed thus amended, spread from Spain into France, and to other parts of Christendom. It had reached England at an early period; for

the Synod of Heathfield, in 680, is found to employ the expression—"from the Father *and the Son*." Yet the interpolation had not become so marked and general as to draw the attention of the Sixth General Council, which met the same year at Constantinople; for it contented itself with reciting the form sanctioned at Chalcedon, in which the addition is not contained. Even the Seventh General Council, in 787, did not use the interpolation; but there was an evident approach thereto, when the Patriarch Tarasius professed his faith in the Holy Ghost, "who proceedeth from the Father *by the Son*," and the words were accepted by the papal legates. Against the use of this phrase the Emperor Charlemagne remonstrated in a letter addressed to Pope Hadrian II., finding fault with Tarasius for not saying, "from the Father *and the Son*"—a fact sufficient to shew that, in two centuries, the Spanish interpolation had already found acceptance in France and Germany. Hadrian did not reprove his correspondent for heterodoxy, nor did he call his attention to the fact that his own favorite phrase was an unauthorised addition to the original form; he contented himself with shewing, by quotations, that the form of phrase used by Tarasius was sanctioned by the authority of Athanasius, Hilary, and other orthodox Fathers. In 794, the Synod of Frankfort, summoned by Charlemagne, and composed of three hundred bishops, declared its belief to be, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. About two years after this, the Provincial Synod of Friuli met, and adopted the interpolated creed, the President, Paulinus, Patriarch of Aquileia, justifying the addition in the following words:

"Just as the one hundred and fifty Fathers, who met at Constantinople, did, by way of exposition, supplement the meaning of the three hundred and eighteen, and confess that they believed in the Holy Spirit, *the Lord and giver of life*, so afterwards, because of those heretics who whispered about that the Holy Spirit is of the Father alone, the words were added, "who proceedeth from the Father *and the Son*." Yet they are not to be blamed who effected this, as if they had added or diminished aught in the creed of the three hundred and eighteen, for they held no opinions different from theirs—they sought only to fill up the meaning which, in other respects, they left untouched."\*

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\*Swainson, p. 148.

From this point, therefore, the *Filioque* may be regarded as having established its claim to be recognised a portion of the creed of western Christendom. Popes, indeed, occasionally muttered disapproval, and Roman councils lifted up their protest. To hush the rising controversy about adding the *Filioque*, Pope Leo III. (795–816) expressed a wish that the singing of the creed should be abolished in Germany, inasmuch as it was not sung at Rome; and he had suspended in the Basilica of St. Peter's two shields, inscribed, the one with a Greek and the other with a Latin copy of the Nicene Creed, as amended at Constantinople, both, of course, wanting the disputed phrase. Pope John VIII. (872–882), in a letter to Photius, condemns those who, as he says, in their madness made the addition. A local council, held at Rome in 810, united in the papal protest. But, in the eleventh century, the Pope at last gave way. As Swainson remarks, with truth, the occupant of the Apostolic See rarely leads in any matter except what concerns his own supremacy and power; the approved practice with him is to wait until a doctrine or rite has fought its way to general adoption, and then, when it has won over the majority to its side, the "Teacher of all Christians" smiles down benignly from the heights of the Church, and pronounces it to be orthodox and Catholic. However this may be, the fact in the present case is, that the Emperor Henry prevailed upon Benedict VIII (1012–1024) to introduce into the mass the Nicene Creed, as then used in France, Germany, and England, and this involved, of course, the adoption of the *Filioque*. Since that time it has formed a part of the Eucharistic service in all Roman Catholic churches, and it received the formal sanction of the Council of Trent at its first session, held on the 4th of February, 1546.

Even the Reformation, which swept away so many unauthorised innovations upon doctrine and ritual, made no change as to the *Filioque*. The Anglican communion, in its public services, still recites, in the vulgar tongue, the amended creed of Nice, as sanctioned at Chalcedon, with the subsequent interpolations inserted. The other Reformed Churches, without attaching the same importance to the letter of the document, or reciting it in public

worship, still hold by the doctrine of the double procession, of which the *Filioque* is the sign. But the Greek Church has always condemned the interpolation. The Nicene Creed, as approved at Chalcedon, without further addition, is still the only symbol of the Eastern Church, and is found in all the Oriental liturgies; while the doctrine of the double procession, and the word in the symbol which expresses it, have been always made by the Greeks a prominent ground of their isolation, both from the Roman and Protestant churches. Dr. Döllinger has lately been making some effort, at the head of his party, to bridge the chasm; it remains to be seen whether the attempt will result in anything more important than words.

#### THE APOSTLES' CREED.

The opinion is as old as Ambrose, in the latter half of the fourth century, that the creed so called was written by the apostles. Pope Leo the Great, as well as others, committed himself to this statement,\* and a later tradition, in a sermon erroneously ascribed to Augustine, not only assigns a clause of it to each of the twelve apostles, but undertakes to name the apostle to whom each of the clauses owes its existence.

Laurentius Valla was the first to question the accuracy of this oft-repeated statement.† Erasmus, as his manner was, "did not know" the truth of it, but as guilty disbelief of the whole story was supposed to lurk under the mask of a nescience seemingly so innocent, he was censured by the Faculty of Paris. But the honor of disproving the whole story is due to Gerard Vossius, who, in his *De Tribus Symbolis*, published in 1642, demonstrated that the assertion rests on no solid evidence whatever. His conclusion is now disputed by none competent to judge, and acquainted with the facts. Had this creed been the production of inspired men in the first century, it would be impossible to explain why it is not found in the New Testament; why it is never cited nor

\*Thus in *Sermo* xcvi., Leo speaks of the enemies of the Church as rejecting the symbol instituted by the apostles—"instituto a sanctis apostolis symbolo repugnantes."—See *Migne*, vol. liv., c. 466.

†See Fabricius, *Codex Apoc. N. T.* vol. ii. p. 325.



alluded to as a document by any writer of the first three centuries, inspired or uninspired; why it was not originally written in Greek, as all the extant literature of the first two centuries was; why it was not used in the Christian worship, as all the canonical, and some uncanonical, writings were; why the Church of Jerusalem, in the fourth century, as well as other churches, had a creed of its own entirely different; why, subject to the casualties of transcription only, it did not at all times retain the same unvarying form, as is done by the shortest and least important document which makes a part of holy Scripture; and why so many Christian writers, in the second and third centuries, produced each a summary of his own, instead of pointing to the form established by the apostles once for all. These facts seem to us unaccountable on any other supposition, than that the document did not exist in the first century, and, consequently, that it was not written by the apostles.

In the third and following centuries, it was the custom of the Christian teachers to give catechumens a short summary of Christian doctrine—a *breviarium fidei*, as Ambrose calls it—which might be easily retained in the memory. This short exposition of Christianity, orally communicated, served in ancient times the same purpose as catechisms and abridgments of Christian doctrines serve in some churches still. Each of them took for its basis the baptismal formula in Matt. xxviii. 19; the persons of the Trinity in the order there mentioned constituted the central stem, from which all the other parts branched forth. These summaries were at first short, and understood to contain nothing which was not counted fundamental.\* Not being committed to writing, but communicated by the living voice to those under Christian instruction, there was among them a manifest agreement as to substance, yet a difference of expression, which shews itself distinctly in the forms which are still preserved. The profession of faith which the catechumen afterward made at baptism,

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\*Augustine thus explains the nature and object of these summaries: "Collecta breviter et in ordinem certum redacta et constricta tradenda sunt vobis; ut fides vestra ædificetur, et confessio præparetur, et memoria non gravetur."—*Sermo ccciv. 1*, in *Migne xxxviii. c. 1066*.

was usually much shorter than the summary of doctrine that he was taught to repeat while under instruction. The baptismal formula in the second and third centuries was seldom more than a simple profession of faith in Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; the latter—the *rule of faith*, as it was often called, though very improperly, by ancient writers—was intended to embrace the sum and substance of Christianity, and was gradually enlarged by the introduction of clauses designed to affirm the truth, as opposed to this or the other form of error which was constantly cropping up. The tendency, of course, was for the summary of faith to fall into a set form of words; but the forms still extant vary so much in language, as to shew that there was no authoritative formula with Church sanction then in general use. Among the numerous creeds of individual writers, the oldest perhaps is that of Irenæus; but we select that of Tertullian as being the oldest Latin form, with the view of shewing the first rough sketch out of which the more finished picture was produced in the course of ages:

“There is one God only, and He is none other than the Creator of the world, who produced all things out of nothing through His own Word, first of all sent forth; this Word is called His Son, and, under the name of God, was seen in divers manners by the patriarchs, heard at all times in the prophets, at last brought down by the Spirit and power of the Father in the Virgin Mary, was made flesh in her womb, and, being born of her, went forth as Jesus Christ; thenceforth He preached the new law and the new promise of the kingdom of heaven: worked miracles: having been crucified, He rose again the third day: then having ascended into the heavens, He sat at the right hand of the Father: sent instead of Himself the power of the Holy Ghost to lead such as believe: will come with glory to take the saints to the enjoyment of everlasting life and of the heavenly promises, and to condemn the wicked to everlasting fire, after the resurrection of both these classes shall have happened together with the restoration of their flesh.”\*

Can there be a doubt that Tertullian would have given, in preference to his own, a summary drawn up by the Apostles, had he known of the existence of such a document? He never alludes to such a thing, but inserts a summary of his own; and, as if to shew that there was no uniformity in the matter, the same writer gives two other abridgements, substantially the same, but verbally

\*Tertullian, *De Praes*, ch. 13.

different.\* Similar abridgments, none of them exactly in the same terms as the others, may be found in the Fathers of the first five centuries. We quote another of them, found in the *Confessio*, attributed to Patrick the Apostle of Ireland, which belongs to the fifth century, more particularly as it has escaped the notice of Swainson :

“There is no other God, and never was, and never will be after Him but God the Father, unbegotten, without beginning, from whom all beginning is, occupying all things, as we have said: and His Son Jesus Christ, whom we witness to have been always with the Father, before the commencement of the world, spiritually with the Father, begotten in a manner not to be described, before all beginning: and by Him all things were made, visible and invisible: He was made man, and, having conquered death, was received into the heavens to the Father. And He gave Him all power over every name, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth, that every tongue may confess that Jesus Christ is Lord and God: on whom we believe, and whose coming we expect: He will, in due time, be the Judge of the quick and the dead, who will render to every man according to his deeds; and He hath shed abroad upon us abundantly the gift of the Holy Ghost and the pledge of immortality, who makes men believing and obedient, that they may be sons of God the Father, and joint heirs with Christ, whom we confess and adore, one God in the Trinity of the sacred name.”†

Some of these so-called rules of faith were so comprehensive, as to include points of ritual as well as doctrine;‡ but in every case without canonical sanction, being in each case summaries used by the individual writer, or by some individual church. It was none of these, however; it was the *Romanum Symbolum*, that is, the summary for the instruction of catechumens in the Church at Rome, which grew up into the document now known as the Apostles' Creed.

The first glimpse we obtain of it is during the Arian controversy, about the middle of the fourth century. When Marcellus of Ancyra, the friend of Athanasius, was charged with heresy, and went to Rome to clear himself of the charge, he wrote out,

\*Tertullian, *Adv. Prax.*, ch. ii.; *De Virginibus*, ch. i.

†*Confessio Patricii*, ch. ii., in *Migne*, vol. liii. c. 802.

‡Polycrates followed, as he says, the rule of faith, in keeping Easter on the 14th of Nisan. See Eusebius, *H. E.*, v. 24.

and handed in, a confession of his faith, which is found to be almost identical with that which Rufinus, fifty years later, says, was the *Romanum Symbolum* in his time. The only difference between them is, that Marcellus omits the word "Father" at the beginning, and adds the clause, "life eternal," at the end.\* Marcellus, it is true, does not profess to give the Roman Creed, he only gives his own; but the verbal identity between them, in almost everything, leads us to believe that he sought to prove his orthodoxy by shewing that his faith was substantially the same with that professed in the Church of the metropolis of the west.

Ambrose, writing to Pope Siricius (385-398), is the first to designate it the *Apostles' Creed*.† Rufinus (350-410) gives the popular account of its origin on the authority simply of "tradunt majores nostri," and is the first to furnish what is professedly a copy of the creed which was used in the Roman Church in his time, that is, in the beginning of the fifth century. It reads thus:

"I believe in God the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ His only Son our Lord, who was born of the Holy Ghost from the Virgin Mary, crucified under Pontius Pilate, and buried: on the third day, He rose from the dead: He ascended to heaven, sits at the right hand of the Father, whence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead. And in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Church, the remission of sins, the resurrection of the flesh."

Rufinus states expressly, that to this form some things were added in other churches; for example, the clause, *He descended into hell*, was in use in the Church of Aquileia, in his time. But he accounts for the brevity of the Roman form, by saying no heresy took its rise there, and that, as the creed there was recited publicly in the presence of the Church, it was more difficult to make additions.‡ This copy is of great value, as shewing the Apostles' Creed in process of formation. The skeleton is here, but the bare bones have yet to be covered with flesh and skin.

\*Epiphanius, *Haer.* lxii. in *Migne*, Greek series, vol. xlii. c. 386.

†"Credatur Symbolo Apostolorum, quod Ecclesia Romana intemeratum semper custodit et servat." *Migne*, vol. xvi. c. 1125.

‡Rufinus, *In Symbolum*, ch. 3. *Migne*, vol. xxi. c. 339. Swainson, p. 160, gives the Latin of the *Rom. Symbolum*.

Rufinus speaks of it, as it then stood, as "the sum of all perfection;" and although Augustine's form did not contain a clause more, he praises it in these terms: "This is the Christian, this is the Catholic, this is the Apostolic, faith."\*

After ages did not, however, agree in this, either with Augustine or Rufinus. The following clauses were inserted in the *Romanum Symbolum* before it assumed the exact form now known to us as the Apostles' Creed:

1. The clause, *Maker of heaven and earth*, borrowed from the Nicene Creed, is first found in a copy of the Apostles' Creed contained in a Gallican Sacramentary, appended to the works of Germanus of Paris.† It had not found its way into the Spanish creeds of the age of Charlemagne.

2. *Who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary*, is an altered form of the expression given by Rufinus. It makes its first appearance in a summary of doctrine ascribed to Augustine, and afterwards in Faustus of Riez, A. D. 490.

3. The word *dead* occurs for the first time in the creed as given in the Gallican service-books; it is wanting in the early creeds of Spain, England, and Ireland.

4. The clause, *He descended into hell*, appeared first in the third Sirmian Creed, which was published at Rimini in 359.‡ It had reached Aquileia in the time of Rufinus, and again appears in the Apostles' Creed as given by Ildefonsus, A. D. 669.

5. The clause, *and sitteth on the right hand of God the Father Almighty*, first makes its appearance in Faustus of Riez, and afterwards in the Gallican and Spanish creeds.

6. The word *catholic* is also wanting in the Apostles' Creed as used in the Roman Church in the fourth century. It was first inserted in the copy given by Faustus, and afterwards in the Gallican and Spanish books.

7. The phrase, *communion of saints*, is found first in the creed contained in Faustus, and afterwards in the Gallican service-books.

\* Migne, vol. xxxviii. c. 1072.

† Migne, vol. lxxii. c. 489.

‡ Socrates, *H. E.*, book ii. ch. 37.

8. The clause, *and the life everlasting*, first inserted in the creed of Marcellus of Ancyra, A. D. 341, reappears in the Ravenna creed of the fifth century.

That some of these expressions are found originally in the Scriptures, or in the early Fathers, or in individual professions of faith contained in ancient writers, is not denied; we only desire to note in each case the earliest known instance in which they are found inserted in the *Romanum Symbolum*.

The first dated instance of the Apostles' Creed, complete as it stands at the present day, occurs in a treatise written by one Pirminius, a Benedictine monk, who, after laboring in France and Germany, died in the year 758. The next complete copy is found in the Gellone Codex at Paris—a manuscript assigned to the year 790. This form was diffused through Europe by the psalters sent out from the schools of Charlemagne. That emperor, who was very careful about keeping the clergy to their work, directed, in various capitularies, that the priests should teach and preach according to the canons, and be able to repeat the Lord's Prayer and the Creed. The former was at that time supposed to express every want that a human soul could feel; the latter, to contain the whole catholic faith. To assist the priesthood to comply with the imperial orders, the creed in its complete form was inserted in the psalters and missals of the time, and thus it got into general circulation. It soon reached Italy and Rome. One of the oldest copies now known is contained in a psalter said to have been written by Charlemagne himself, and sent as a present to Hadrian II. It gradually made its way into all the service-books of the West. The first indication of its use at canonical hours in the mass is found in the fourth book of the *De Ecclesiasticis Officiis*, a work written by Symposius Amularius, a presbyter of Metz, who died about 834.

"The general result of this," says Swainson, p. 170, "is unquestionable. The complete copy of the Apostles' Creed, as it exists in the present day, was Frank; the separate articles which distinguish it from the old Roman, Aquileian, African, Spanish, English, Scotch, and Irish types, are all of Gallican origin. They came through, or from, Faustus of Riez and the old Gallican service-books to Pirminius, the Frank missionary of the middle of the eighth century, and the completed creed gradually spread from that time."

From the psalters of Charlemagne it was copied into the other psalters of the ninth and tenth centuries, few of which are without it; so that, although less complete forms lingered in remote corners of the West for some ages after, it may be said that the Apostles' Creed as it now stands was in general acceptance from the tenth century. Without the sanction of any ecclesiastical council, it made its way into the service-books, and of course into public worship. It was supposed to contain a perfect summary of the most important doctrines of Christianity. The people were expected to commit it to memory, and to repeat it like the Lord's Prayer. No one doubted then, nor for some centuries after, that it was the genuine production of the apostles of Christ. The name was probably derived from its supposed authorship; but the fact is, that the apostles had no more to do with its composition than with that of any modern sermon or treatise, whose statements find a doctrinal basis in their inspired words.

The result of a careful inquiry, conducted on principles strictly historical, is to shew that the so-called Apostles' Creed is entirely of human origin; that it is a compilation, the foundation of which was laid in Rome, and the completion of which was perfected in France; that the document in its rudimentary form does not emerge out of darkness till the fourth century; that it was in process of construction from the fourth till the eighth; that it was in general circulation in the ninth century, and used in public worship from the tenth. In the East, it never came into general use at all. The earliest Greek copies of it in existence are only translations from the Latin original. So late as the Council of Florence, in 1439, the legates of the Greek Church said that this creed was not used in their churches, and that they had not seen it before.\*

\* Romish writers of the modern school, such as Möhler and Newman, are too intelligent to deny this. They fully admit that what so long passed for a production of the apostles, is a gradual growth, a composite thing, constructed out of elements which

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\* Mark of Ephesus said at the Council: "Nos nusquam habemus, neque novimus Symbolum Apostolorum."—Fabricius, *Codex Apocryphus*, N. T., vol. ii. p. 350.

were floating about for seven centuries, before falling into their present order. But they present a new front when they convert the fact into an argument in favor of tradition, as opposed to Scripture. They tell us that it did not spring from the Bible; it was not made, it grew; it was self-produced; it is the outgrowth of Christianity itself—the spontaneous product of the life of the Church. They point to it as the product of tradition, outside the Bible.

But if we possess, as they assume, a source of divine truth outside the Scriptures, and independent of them, we need not trouble ourselves farther about inspiration. In that case, the word of man would be a much more accessible and prolific fountain of religious knowledge than the Word of God. The living Church, in that case, could always produce new dogma; a book, completed eighteen hundred years ago, never could; while any old truth in the latter is liable to be superseded by some new revelation of the former. The Scripture, in such circumstances, would be a stagnant pond, whose pent-up waters would always be stale and unwholesome: the Church an everflowing spring, giving out traditions, fresh, gushing, inexhaustible. Were such a notion true, the Bible of the future would not be the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, but the *Bullarium Magnum* and the *Acta Conciliorum*.

The fact, however, is, that there is no truth in the Apostles' Creed which is not expressed in some form or other in the Holy Scriptures. "All that you are about to hear in the creed," says Augustine, "is contained in the divine letters of the Holy Scriptures."\* Ildefonsus speaks of it as "a summary gathered by the Apostles out of all the Scriptures."† Thomas Aquinas, a higher authority still, is quoted by Swainson, at p. 179, as saying, "Only a few have the opportunity of learning from Scripture what is necessary to be believed, therefore a summary was collected out of the sacred writings; and this summary must be regard-

\* *Migne*, vol. xxxviii., ch., 1060.

† "In quo ideo ab apostolis collecta sunt ex omnibus Scripturis," etc., *Migne*, xvi., c. 127. Martin of Liege repeats the same sentiment in almost the same words. *Migne*, vol. ccviii., c. 1345.



ed, not as added to Scripture, but as extracted from it." In face of such authorities, therefore, it is rather too late in the day for our modern Romanists to pretend, that the creed is the product of a tradition which has grown up independent of the Bible.

It seems very unaccountable, also, if the creed is the outgrowth of the spontaneous life of the Church, that it has not gone on to grow, that this symbolical development received a sudden check in the eighth century, and that, although the Church lives on, no new truth has been added since.

It seems still more strange that the Romish Church herself, in her authorised formularies, gives an account of the origin of the document very different from that given by these able theologians. Thus the Trent Catechism says: "The first points which Christian men ought to hold, are those which the holy Apostles, the great leaders and teachers of the faith, inspired by the Holy Ghost, have divided into the twelve articles of the creed; for when they had received a command from the Lord to go forth into the whole world, acting as his ambassadors, and preach the gospel to every creature, they thought fit to compose a form of Christian faith, to wit, that all might think and speak the same things,"\* etc. This, as we now know, is quite contrary to historical fact, so far as it speaks of the origin of the creed; but its statement, that the creed is the composition of inspired men, is quite sufficient to dispose of the modern Romish theory—that it did not spring from the Bible, but is the product of a divine tradition.

Apart, however, from all questions of its origin and structure, the Apostles' Creed, viewed simply as a document, is, so far as it goes, a valuable compend of Christian doctrine, the contents of which are scripture truths, and therefore the common heritage of all Christians. But we must not close our eyes to the fact, that very much that is fundamental finds no place therein. It is silent as to the doctrine of grace, and the gospel plan of salvation. It does not testify to what Paul testified, "Repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ." Besides the unanimity with which it has been adopted by western Chris-

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\* Catechism, p. i., ch. i., q. 2.

tians, is very much owing to the vagueness produced by the simple brevity with which it states biblical facts without details, and leaves every one free to form his own opinion as to their cause and manner, their nature and design. If the various ecclesiastical bodies, which profess to accept the creed, and to believe the doctrines that it contained, were to give each its own interpretation of the several clauses, the real diversity would soon shew itself.

#### THE ATHANASIAN CREED.

The document known by this name, but more accurately designated, from its opening words in the Latin original, the *Quicumque vult*, long enjoyed a factitious importance, founded upon its supposed authorship. For a long period it was received without question as the genuine production of the celebrated bishop of Alexandria, whose character and sufferings, no less than his orthodoxy, have shed a lustre over the fourth century. But this illusion, like many another, has been dispelled by the light of strict and sober historical inquiry. Doubt was expressed by Jewel, in 1569; Vossius, in 1642, attempted to shew that, in its present form, it could not be traced to any earlier point than the beginning of the ninth century; Waterland assigned it to the sixth century; and now Swainson, after an investigation more painstaking and extensive than any of his predecessors, produces good reasons for believing that, in its completed state, it did not exist before the ninth century.

The labors of these and other inquirers have produced the conviction, now almost general, that however substantially identical the teaching of Athanasius on the subject of the Trinity may be with the doctrine embodied in the creed, the great champion of orthodoxy was not concerned in its composition. It is not found in his writings. The term *homo-ousion*, or con-substantial, for which he battled so long and consistently, is not mentioned therein. It is quoted neither by contemporaries nor by those nearest to contemporaries. The theologians who took part in the Nestorian and Eutychian controversies of the fifth century, to whom its clear utterances on points in dispute would, as coming

from Athanasius, have been so precious, never quote or make any use of it whatever. It is not referred to by Leo in his celebrated letter to Flavian, which dealt so clearly with the subjects traversed in the creed, and which formed the basis of the decision at Chalcedon. Besides, its pronouncements on the Incarnation are themselves an explicit and designed condemnation of the Nestorian and Eutychian heresies, neither of which appeared till the century after Athanasius died; while some of its constituent clauses did not appear for several centuries later still. For these reasons it could not have been written by the bishop of Alexandria, after whom it is called.

As usually printed in the *Book of Common Prayer*, the Athanasian Creed consists of forty-two clauses. But like the *Romanum Symbolum*, it is not the work of one author, or of one age. Some of its clauses are in existence at an early period. These clauses afterwards reappear, sometimes with additions, at others with omissions. New clauses make good their claim to take rank with those of an older date. At last the document, formed out of these accretions, assumes its present shape, and no important change is made subsequently. It is thus in its structure a composite work, deriving its material from a variety of sources, and combining all into one document, well suited to the purpose of its compiler, clear, compact, terse in expression, gradually making its way to general acceptance, not by the decree of a council, or the authority of the Church, but by the condensed brevity and force with which it gives expression to the orthodox faith.

Augustine never cites, nor even refers to, the Athanasian Creed, but in his work, *De Trinitate*, and in others of his writings, he uses language, in some cases borrowed from Philastrius, and in some cases his own, which obviously formed a basis for the more precise and compact epithets of the document. This is true more particularly of clauses 7-29, which contain the doctrine of the Trinity. When these identical expressions are quoted by later writers, it does not follow, as has been sometimes supposed, that they are citing the creed; it is at least possible that they are citing Augustine.

In the *Commonitorium* of Vincent of Lerins, there is no quotation from the Athanasian Creed, or reference to it; but there is found there a still greater similarity of language, and a nearer approach to the expressions of the creed, than is found in Augustine. In that work, words resembling closely five or six clauses of the creed are contained.

In the Councils of Toledo, in Spain, held in the sixth and seventh centuries, and in the speech of Paulinus of Aquileia, there are expressions which find a parallel in various clauses of the creed; but none of these even cite it, or seem to be aware of its existence. Pope Leo II., in 682, gives a profession of his faith,\* in which he gives his views in detail in regard to the Trinity and Incarnation, and in which he refers to the councils, but never to the creed. Down to the close of the seventh century, there is not a single citation professedly taken from the so-called faith of Athanasius; yet during that time the doctrine contained therein was held by the Church, and expressions closely similar to various clauses in it are met with frequently. The earliest parallel to the damnatory clauses is not found till we reach a Spanish Synod in 693, from which Swainson infers that the creed itself is older, in point of date, than the framework in which it is set.

Out of the material thus provided, the first rude form of the creed was constructed. The oldest of these outlines now known is preserved in the fragments of a manuscript originally found at Treves, but now in Paris, and supposed to belong to the year 730. It is a portion of the address of a preacher to his congregation, and was intended by its author to be an exposition of the Apostles' Creed; but the remarkable thing about it is, that it brings together and states, though with some verbal variation, what now stands as clauses 30-41 of the *Quicumque*. The parallelism and "antithetical swing" of the document were afterwards added, to adapt it for chanting; but, in the words of this unknown preacher, we have the first rough sketch out of which the latter part of it was formed.

In a profession of faith made by Denebert, bishop of Worcester, about the year 798, there are no less than *eleven* or *twelve*

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\* See vol. cv. of *Migne*, cols. 54-60.

clauses of the creed as afterwards constructed; but they, unlike those of the Treves MS., are now found in the part of the creed which speaks of the Trinity—that is, between clauses 1 and 28.

Though nearly all the materials which compose it were thus in existence about the end of the eighth century, it was not yet known to the leaders of thought at that time; it was not known to Aleuin, nor to Pope Leo III., nor to Charlemagne, nor to Rabanus Maurus. It is contained in no prayer-book or hymnal before the middle of that century. From that time it does begin to appear, but at first in a shape different from the form now received, and which shews that it had not then been admitted into the public services of the Church. No psalter contains it previous to the time of Charlemagne. From his time, and after, the Gallican psalters begin to have it. No one before Theodulf, who was bishop of Orleans in the time of Charlemagne, is known to quote it as a document. After Theodulf, it is quoted by Agobard of Lyons, Ratram of Corbey, and Hincmar of Rheims—all of the ninth century. By no less than four or five lines of independent testimony, it can shewn that it was brought prominently forward in the space of five and twenty years before and after the death of Charlemagne in 814. It was not known to Paulinus of Aquileia in 791; but it was well known at Rheims about 860.

There is every reason to believe, therefore, that the Athanasian Creed did not originate in Africa, but much nearer home. It was in process of formation in Western Europe from the fifth till the eighth century, and was not completed till the ninth. It appears in the province of Rheims, Swainson attempts to shew, about 860; but even if we fall back on Vossius, and say fifty or sixty years sooner, the result is not materially different. By either account, the Athanasian Creed is a Gallican production of the ninth century. Vossius, Muratori, Waterland, and Swainson, all agree as to the place of its birth, though Waterland contends for an earlier time. It rapidly gained circulation and credit. It had reached Italy before the end of the tenth century. Its authorship was attributed to the great Alexandrian bishop, the supporter and champion of orthodoxy. Its ring on

the two grand doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, was clear. Its language was concise, and well calculated to fasten on the popular memory. Its turns of expression were well adapted to chanting in public worship. and it soon won for itself a place in the Church service, as the two sister creeds had done before it.

The arguments advanced by Ussher and Waterland in support of an earlier date are plausible; but their force is weakened, if not destroyed, when the clear light of historical research is directed to the alleged facts which constitute their basis.

Waterland lays much stress upon a document with the name, *Libellus Fidei*, or *Expositio Fidei Athanasii*, which is as old as the sixth century, and which he seems to think is the same as the *Symbolum Athanasii*. But there were several documents with this title, ascribed in turn to Damasus of Rome, Vigilius of Tapsus, Jerome. and Athanasius, but none of them identical with the *Quicumque*. Swainson prints several of them,\* and shews, that while these so-called rules of faith resembled in some points each of the three creeds, they were not identical with any of them. It is from these old expositions that the citations are made, which Waterland and others suppose to be made from the *Quicumque*. Thus Ratram of Corbey quotes from the *Athanasii Libellus Fidei* a passage not found in the *Quicumque*, but in the *Libellus* given by Swainson at page 274. It is true, that in another passage he now cites what stands as clauses 21-23 in the Athanasian Creed. But the former fact is sufficient to shew that when sixth and seventh century writers refer to the Athanasian *Book of Faith*, it is not necessary to suppose that they refer of course to the *Quicumque*.

The same learned theologian dwells on the canon of Autun, which he ascribes to the year 670, and the substance of which is, that any clergyman who cannot repeat "the Symbol, which, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, the apostles have handed down, and the *Faith of the Prelate St. Athanasius*, let him be condemned by the bishop." This argument would have weight if we could determine with accuracy the date of the canon, or identify the *Faith* with the *Quicumque*. But there is no satis-

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\* See pp. 273-277.

factory evidence of either. The canon is contained in five MSS. of the ninth, and in only one of the eighth century, while there is nothing to make it clear that it does not refer to the *Libellus Fidei*, or to some other of the expositions referred to in the preceding paragraph, and which are quite distinct from the Athanasian Creed.

It was supposed by Muratori that the author of the Creed may have been Venantius Fortunatus, of Poitiers, who lived between 566 and 599. It is true that a *Comment* on the Creed ascribed to one Fortunatus is extant; but Swainson shews that this Comment belongs to the eighth century; and that the document, though on the whole harmonious, "differs seriously" from the *Quicumque* in clauses 21-23. But what settles the question of date is the fact, that of four MSS. of this exposition of the creed, the Milanese copy alone assigns the authorship to Fortunatus; and that copy contains a quotation from Alcuin, the contemporary of Charlemagne, thus proving that the date could not have been earlier than the close of the eighth century. This entirely invalidates the statement that the comment is the work of Fortunatus of Poitiers, and consequently the proof that the creed itself existed in the sixth century.

Various writers also attach importance to the statement of Regino, abbot of Prüm (892-899), who, among his *Articles of Inquiry*, has one which Waterland assigns to the year 760, and which is thus expressed: "Whether the clergy have by heart Athanasius' Tract upon the Faith of Trinity, beginning with, *Whosoever will be saved,*" etc. The facts are these: The abbot of Prüm, in the close of the ninth century, drew up a series of visitation inquiries for the use of Radbod, archbishop of Treves. He drew up ninety-five articles, and justified his selection of these by reference to canonical authorities. Many of these authorities were taken from capitularies and synods of the ninth century. He does not quote the canon of Autun, or indeed any canonical authority for the inquiry as to the Tract of Athanasius. His inquiries are not, in fact, older than his own time; and all agree in saying that, at that time—the end of the ninth century—the so-called Athanasian Creed was a completed document.

We have reserved for the last the argument of Ussher, which, for two centuries, has been regarded as conclusive proof that the Athanasian Creed is as old as the sixth century.

After the publication of the *De Tribus Symbolis*, in which Vossius assigned the commencement of the ninth century as the date of this document in its completed form, Ussher, in the preface of his work, *De Symbolo Romano*, published in 1647, remonstrated with Vossius, and said that he had found in the Cotton Library two MSS. of an earlier date than the ninth century, in both of which the Athanasian Creed was contained. One of these he assigned to the time of Gregory the Great (590–604,) the other to the beginning of the eighth century. If Ussher was right as to the date of either of these MSS., it is clear that the proof, which goes to shew that the creed is a production of the ninth century, entirely breaks down. Vossius, in his historical inquiries, had used printed materials only; he had neither access to MSS. nor time to examine them; and in deference to the judgment of the most learned British theologian then living, he modified his conclusion so far as to say that the Athanasian Creed was not earlier than the year 600. This submission was regarded as confirmation of the general impression, that Ussher had completely answered Vossius, and for two centuries no scholar ventured to question the statement, that the *Quicumque* was as old as the sixth century at least.

Farther inquiry was, indeed, made impossible by the fact, that the older of the two MSS. referred to by Ussher soon afterwards disappeared, and from his time till our own the place of its depository was known to no English writer. Its rediscovery was owing to Professor Westwood, who, in his valuable work, entitled, *The Miniatures and Ornaments of Anglo-Saxon and Irish Manuscripts*, inserted a drawing from an Utrecht Psalter, without appearing to know anything of its history or relations. In 1871 this drawing was brought under the notice of Professor Swainson, and he immediately identified it with the long lost MS. of Ussher. As it became important to determine accurately the age of the original, colored lithographs of that part of it which contained the Athanasian Creed were received in England



in 1872. One of them was put into the hands of Sir Thomas Duffus Hardy, Deputy-Keeper of the Public Records, who formed an opinion of its date identical with that of Ussher. Professing to form his judgment on palæographical grounds alone, he stated, in a public report addressed to Lord Romilly, then Master of the Rolls, that he fixed its date to end of the sixth century; and he assigned his reasons for believing that it was written in some continental monastery, and brought to England by Queen Bertha, who bequeathed it to the monastery of Reculver, in Kent.

The whole subject excited interest in various ecclesiastical and literary circles throughout England. It was discussed in the newspapers, and talked over in Convocation. At length the Foreign Office had its attention called to the matter. Through its intervention the original MS. was obtained on loan from Holland by the authorities of the British Museum, and submitted to the examination of the most experienced palæographers in England. The result is, that Sir Duffus Hardy stands alone in his opinion. No other high authority, who bases his judgment on artistic and palæographical grounds alone, assigns the manuscript to an earlier period than the school of Charlemagne. The style of the calligraphy, the illuminations in the initial letters, and the contents of the volume, all point to a date not earlier than 800 A. D.

The second MS. spoken of by Ussher is described by Dr. Heurtley in his *Harmonia Symbolica*. It consists of three parts, each of which was written a different time; and by no authority is the part containing the *Quicumque* allowed to be older than the ninth century, while by some it is assigned to the eleventh.

Ussher's answer to Vossius thus entirely breaks down. It is now known that no existing MS. which was produced before the time of Charlemagne, contains the Athanasian Creed. But from this time onwards, the Gallican psalters do contain it, and ascribe it invariably to Athanasius. After a very extensive and critical examination of the documents supposed to cast light on its origin and structure, Professor Swainson thus sums up:

“It remains for us to inquire whether we can trace any closer the author, or the time, or the locale of the forgery. Forgery it certainly

was; that the production of this work under the name of Athanasius was an intentional and deliberate attempt to deceive, no reasonable person can question. It was analogous to the production of the forged decretals. And it is doubtless to the skill with which the imposture was wrought out, that we owe the difficulty which has been felt for so many years in discovering the author." (P. 381.)

It will be obvious, from these considerations, that the Athanasian Creed was written originally in Latin. The Latin MSS. which contain it are not only the oldest and most numerous, but they present the fewest variations. Every Saxon and English version up till 1548 was, without exception, taken from the Latin. The document was in common use throughout the West before it was known in the East. In the oldest Greek versions of the psalter there is no copy of it found. Even in those psalters which contain the Nicene Creed and the Apostles' Creed in Greek and Latin, the Athanasian does not appear. No Greek copy is known to be older than the thirteenth century. Early in that century there is evidence that a Greek version of it was in existence, in which the words, "*and from the Son,*" do not occur; for, about that time, some Greeks are found complaining that "they do not know who it was that inserted this clause in the *Faith* of the holy Athanasius." In 1233, the Franciscan envoys of Gregory IX., who were anxious to conciliate the Easterns, produced this creed at Constantinople, and on the Greeks expressing their surprise that the production of a Greek Father should be written in Latin, they assured them that Latin was the original language in which it was composed by Athanasius during his exile at Treves. From this time onwards the Greek copies grow numerous. One of these a MS. of the fifteenth century, at Florence, contains a text exactly similar to the vulgar version in the English prayer-book. But the Greek writers constantly maintained that, as it stands, it could not have been written by Athanasius, and that, if the great bishop had anything to do with its composition, it must have been adulterated by the Roman pontiffs. Within the last two hundred years, private editors have occasionally printed it in Greek books of devotion and in the symbolical collections of that Church, but up till the present time it has received no ecclesiastical sanction in the East.

Stranger still, there is some reason to doubt whether it has ever received the formal sanction of the Roman Church. Aquinas indeed says, that "it is admitted by the authority of the Roman See as containing a complete system of Christian faith;" but this admission is made by its adoption into service-books and its use in worship, rather than by any official sanction of the Church. The Nicene formula is embodied in the creed of Pope Pius IV. as "the symbol of faith that is used in the holy Roman Church;" the Apostles' Creed is the symbol expounded in the Catechism of Trent; but Professor Swainson can find no authority for the Athanasian, except that of a small Synod held at Lovitium, in Poland, in the year 1556. Still, the constant and universal use of it in the services of the Romish Church, is perhaps as strong an expression of approval as could be given it by any canon of her councils or by any bull of her popes.

Prior to the Reformation, it had found its way in the Romish breviaries used in England, and from them it passed over into the Book of Common Prayer. The Athanasian Creed was inserted in the new Liturgy of the Anglican Communion in the year 1549. But as the Rhemish Testament was the translation of a version, and not of the original, so it happened to the creed. Under the mistaken notion that the document was the genuine production of Athanasius, and, if so, must have been written in Greek, they translated it into English out of a Greek version, and not from the Latin original. The vernacular version is thus the representative of a Greek copy comparatively modern. Out of eighteen verbal changes\* upon the form previously in common use, fifteen are due to the influence of this Greek version. Prior to 1549, there were only two or three Greek copies printed, so that there was not much field for comparing readings and selecting a text. But the alterations adopted were made in accordance with the text published by Cephaleus, at Strasburg, in 1524, and that of Wechel in 1538.

Ever since its introduction into the English service-book, the Athanasian Creed has occasionally been the subject of modification, in consequence of attempts, more or less successful, made

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\*See these in Swainson, p. 493.

at different times to revise the formularies. Some of these changes were very minute; but they are sufficient illustrations and assertion of the right which the Church must always possess of revising any human composition whatever that it has raised to the rank of a symbol. In 1552, the expression, "give account of their own works," was altered to *for*. In 1559, "but" was continued in the thirty-seventh clause; it was omitted in 1604. In 1637, Laud made a variety of changes in the form inserted in the prayer-book which he intended for Scotland; but all that came to a sudden and unexpected end. In 1662, it would seem that the divines of the Restoration had begun to feel the influence of those doubts as to the authorship, which the work of Vossius had been producing for the previous twenty years, for then, for the first time, the prayer-book speaks of it as "this confession of our Christian faith, *commonly called* the Creed of Saint Athanasius." The revision, prepared at the Revolution, but which never became law, did not meddle with the document; it proposed merely to append a rubric, limiting the reference of the damnatory clauses to "those who obstinately deny the Christian faith."

Fresh interest has lately been imparted to the subject by the action of the Synod of the Episcopal Church in Ireland, which has been taking advantage of its recent liberation from state supremacy, to revise its formularies. The work hitherto has advanced but slowly, owing to the Fabian policy of those who are opposed to all change, and who seem to act upon the principle, that nearest to Rome is best. Many think that the Athanasian formula is not exactly the portion of the prayer-book which stands most in need of being retouched; still the revisionists touched it, yet as all admit, with a soft and silken hand. They propose to print the Athanasian Creed in the prayer-book, and to use it in the public service as heretofore, but that, in reading it in the congregation, the damnatory clauses may be omitted at the pleasure of the officiating clergyman. To the clergyman himself this is but a small relief; for, as the damnatory clauses are continued in the prayer-book, and as each at his ordination is required to assent to all that it contains, it seems strange to

permit him to omit in reading what he was required to consent to as truth. The arrangement seems intended to spare the ears of those who cannot read; to others who take exception to the expressions, it is no relief—their eyes fall upon the prayer-book, and they see that the condemning sentences are there. A doubtful expedient of this kind is not likely to please anybody.

On the other hand, it deserves consideration, whether the Three Creeds should not obtain a position of greater importance in non-Episcopal Churches than it is common to award them. From what has been said, it is manifest that they have no real claim on the ground of antiquity, or authorship, or even of canonical authority. We admit, farther, that there is little or nothing in them which is not virtually carried over into the Reformed Confessions, and which is not there as accurately and as fully expressed. But it is not to be forgotten, that although the Three Creeds require to be supplemented, they are, so far as they go, orthodox in statement and catholic in spirit. There is not a tinge of Popery in any of them. They are most precious, as bearing witness to all ages the great broad truths which the Church saw in the Bible before Popery dimmed her eye. They are a specimen of the grand old doctrines that the Church supported and exhibited from the beginning. There is nothing in any of them which has not its counterpart and authority in the word of God. They are non-sectarian in character, having been produced ages before most of our modern differences and divisions arose. The most recent of them is more than ten centuries old. They constitute a doctrinal link which unites the present to the past. Why should they not still be, on the ground of their scriptural truth alone, a bond of union among Christians in all churches? If all the Churches which believe in substance the doctrines that they contain, were to give them a place in their symbolic collections, and require from their teachers a public acceptance of them, this would do something to form a bond of union among various sections of the Christian family now widely estranged, and to afford visible proof that there is a succession of true doctrine in the Church of God in every generation.

## CRITICAL NOTICES.

*The Life, Letters, and Journals of George Ticknor.* 2 vols.  
J. R. Osgood & Co.

This biography of a purely literary man has only been issued within the last year; and yet on the title page of the copy before us we find *sixth edition*—a proof of its wide popularity. This is not so surprising, as the book commends itself very especially to the American reader, inasmuch as it records one of the most successful merely scholarly lives we know of, and by its wide sympathies touches a vast circle of interests. More or less, the great names of the country all come into this Memoir. There is not a man of note in New England whom Mr. Ticknor did not know; and the same might be said of the rest of the country. New York celebrities were as familiar to him as those of Boston; and in reading his correspondence, we meet with all our great Southern names—Madison, Jefferson, Clay, Calhoun, Randolph, Legaré, W. C. Preston, Allston, and hosts of others: thus finding evidence of the extended acquaintanceship which may account for the wide popularity of these two large volumes. But we see the last English edition advertised in one of our latest London papers, and are surprised to find it numbered as the *seventh*.

Mr. Ticknor's was as uneventful a life as preëminent success in his chosen line of work could well make it. He was his wise and judicious father's only child; he inherited an ample fortune; he had every advantage of culture, travel, and society, that this country, sixty years ago, could furnish, and he was then sent abroad for that finish and perfection in modern languages which only years of foreign residence can impart. During these years of exile, the handsome, genial, and always remarkably courteous, young American was received into the best continental and English circles. We find him at twenty-three or twenty-five the intimate companion of such persons as the Schlegels, Humboldt, de Stael, Chateaubriand, Lafayette, Bunsen, on the Continent, and Brougham, Mackintosh, Lord Holland, Coleridge, Wilber-

force, Sir Walter Scott, in Britain. There must have been some singular personal magnetism about the plain young republican that won him, without any seeming effort on his part, an easy place in such grand society.

On his return to America, he was elected Professor of Modern Languages in Harvard University, which post he filled for fifteen years. But even in his early travels in Spain, he had been attracted peculiarly to its literature, and he then began to make the collections for what, in the end, proved to be the *magnum opus* of his literary life—his admirable and exhaustive *History of Spanish Literature*—the standing authority, both American and English, on this subject, ever since.

After completing this long labor, he went again to Europe with his family, for several years; and again had the *entree* into the best society of the land. Letters from all sorts of people—world-known and others, show in what estimation Mr. Ticknor was held. He never seemed to press himself forward, never held any official place, never was mixed up in politics; and yet, he made his way, simply as *an American gentleman*, everywhere. As Americans, we owe him this—that wherever he appeared, he made it to be acknowledged that a simple untitled American gentleman could take rank with the highest.

After his second return from abroad, Mr. Ticknor devoted his time and means to the establishment of the great Public Library of Boston—a labor which occupied him several toilsome years, and which finally took him to Europe again, towards the latter part of his life, for the purchase of rare books.

He was a very tolerant man in regard to all things: and one of the secrets of his success with all sorts of men, may have lain in this suavity of mental mood, that never opposed anything with vehemence—though he was firm enough in his own opinions. He always had warm friends among Southern men; and never in any form approved of abolitionism, or any violent movements in Church or State. During the war of the States, which filled him with sadness, in order to compel, as he averred, some sort of forgetfulness of the situation, he occupied himself in writing the *Life of Prescott*, the historian, who was his life-long and bosom friend.

Mr. Ticknor's house was, all through his long career, the centre of a refined and scholarly hospitality, and we suppose no American ever threw open his doors to so many distinguished foreigners, especially English, as he did. He died peacefully, after having passed his eightieth birth-day. There is not a great deal said of his inner religious life; but we are told that it was exemplary; and he always seems to have considered himself a Christian man. To minister by benefactions and visits to the poor and afflicted, was one of the chosen occupations of his later years.

The piquant sketches of character in which these pages abound, make delightful reading, especially as so many of these characters are of men of world-wide reputation. Mrs. and Miss Ticknor are the main editors of these Memoirs.

*Life of the Prince Consort.* By THEODORE MARTIN. Volume II. D. Appleton & Co.

It constitutes rather a bitter sarcasm upon royalty, that pre-eminently, because Prince Albert's domestic qualities and conduct were such as characterise all good husbands and fathers, he is therefore portrayed as a model man; and not because he had fine native ability, or because he had a rarely balanced union of noble parts, or because he had much of that peculiar wisdom that comes of experience rather than intuition, or because he was statesman-like in his views, or because he was possessed of that masterful energy which would have won for him a foremost place, had he occupied a position where free action had been allowed him, as a man among men. Royalty fully merits all the sarcasm implied. The world does not expect to find model men in a rank of life in which weak human nature is plied with extraordinary temptations; and it does *not* find them. To be passably virtuous, is all that is expected: to be eminently exemplary, is something that rather exceeds belief, or at all events, occasions surprise.

Not in all the annals of English sovereigns can we put our finger down on any chronicle of pure, simple, domestic, Christian living, that can compare with that here given us of Queen Victoria and the Prince Consort. Wise King Leopold never did a



better thing, than when he brought together this beloved niece and nephew of his, and gave them the opportunity of learning to love each other with that true and beautiful affection which led to a heaven-made marriage, in which mere state-craft had no part. Therefore, as this picture of a royal life is one quite apart, and abounds in lessons from which even the sons of stern democrats may learn something, it is well to have it so minutely delineated by Mr. Martin.

The second volume is dedicated, as was the first, to the Queen, in a dignified and graceful form. With that inherent loyalty which is a passion in the English blood, as a wise Frenchman declares, we yet find nothing fulsome either in this Dedication or in the body of the biography. All this is the more remarkable as the work is prepared by the command and under the eye, in a measure, of the sovereign. With singular judiciousness, we think we may affirm, has Mr. Martin performed, thus far, his difficult task. One more volume will complete it; and we shall look forward with increased interest to the closing book which is to show us how this well poised life reached its ending.

The period covered by this Volume II.—from 1848 to 1854—was one of the most stirring of modern times, and much space is given to the consideration of European political complications. The opening chapter contains a very admirable review of Europe antecedent to any of the revolutionary outbreaks, and this the reader could not have spared. But so far as the narrative loses sight of the central figure, and merges itself in this background of Continental politics, as perhaps to an inadmissible extent it does, just so far is our individual interest sacrificed. A measure of this history was absolutely needful, in order that Prince Albert's relations to European affairs might be more clearly understood; but the general thus too much overshadows the particular. But it is, perhaps, narrow in us to suppose that because such questions have less interest for American readers than more personal detail, this may be the case with English readers. In no other way could the political insight of Prince Albert have been set forth: for, from his large correspondence with Baron Stockmar, (himself a most sagacious statesman,) we come to find

how closely he had studied politics as a science. And, besides, the pride is natural and commendable, which would make the widowed Queen desire that her people should have some knowledge of the positive, yet legitimate, influence her husband exerted in various directions—shut out as he was, by his unique position, from all overt action.

Nothing impresses us more in this volume, than the conscientious industry of the Prince. He allowed himself in none of the idleness and dawdling that appertains more or less to all ceremonial lives. He rose early, and by seven o'clock would be at his desk doing everything that in him lay, to lighten the pressing burdens that rested upon the Queen. Voluntarily did he assume all sorts of disagreeable work, that she might be saved labor—toiling ever, as it were, in her shadow, more than willing, in his great love for the wife, that she should be the focus upon which should be concentrated all the rays of splendors as the sovereign. As he was one of the manliest of men, this self-abnegation deserves all the more notice: and as the object of it, we may understand somewhat of the feeling of the Queen, when in some of her letters she styles him her "Lord and Master": evidently on Coleridge's principle, that

"—— it is pretty to put together  
Thoughts so all unlike each other."

But outside of the royal circle, Prince Albert's energy made itself felt in a great many practical ways. He labored to promote advanced thought as to University reforms; he was profoundly interested in agriculture, and furthered it to the utmost of his power; he took all pains to promote industrial matters; he was actively alive to every question touching national affairs, and was constantly preparing *resumés* to the Queen's hand. No one needs to be told that the modern institution of International World's Fairs was inaugurated by him; and the brightest, most glowing chapter in this volume, is the one describing the triumphs of the opening of the Exhibition of 1851—when, as the Queen says, her joy and "thankfulness to Almighty God" so overcharged her heart as to be almost painful.

The chapter on the education of the royal children shows what

clear and Christian views the Prince had on this topic. His refusal of the Commander-in-Chiefship of the Army, pressed so warmly by the Duke of Wellington, did him great honor. The Queen, who was more ambitious for her husband than he was for himself, would have been only too glad of his acceptance; but his wisdom showed him that the movement would in the end not be a popular one. The insular Briton never forgot that the husband of the Queen was a foreigner: and hence the shameful impeachment to which, not long after, the Prince was so unjustly subjected.

The touches of light imparted by side allusions to the domestic felicity enjoyed at Balmoral and Osborne House, when the cares of royalty were as far as possible set aside, give a very sweet human interest to this book. No burgher husband or wife could write more simply and tenderly than "Albert" does of "Victoria," or "Victoria" does of "Albert"; and their mutual love for their children and interest in their daily amusements as well as lessons, is pleasant to read of. A prettier picture of royalty we cannot recall, than the nightly hearing by the Queen at her knee of the prayers of the little Princess of Wales, and her grief at the interruption of the habit. To how many fashionable mothers in our own republican country, does this example of the first female sovereign of the world need to be commended!

*The Complaint of the Rev. Thomas H. Skinner, D. D., against the Presbytery of Cincinnati, at its Fall Meeting, 1876. 8vo. Pp. 50.*

The attentive readers of our REVIEW will remember the eccentric course of the Rev. Mr. McCune, of Cincinnati Presbytery. He proceeded, while a member of that body, to create a new religious denomination, on the most extreme Broad Church platform, exactly imitating that of Alexander Campbell, except the dipping. With much vilification of creeds, including the one he is sworn to uphold, Mr. McCune actually organised one or two churches (so-called), including in them some members of Presbyterian churches in Cincinnati, who had no dismissal from their sessions. Of one of these Mr. McCune got himself installed

pastor; and Dr. Morris, Professor in the Assembly's Theological Seminary near by (Lane), endorsed the movement by preaching and presiding at this anomalous instalment. These events are now two years old.

Dr. Skinner came to the defence of truth and order, by moving the Presbytery to disapprove Mr. McCune's heretical opinions and disorganising practices. As this would have implicated Dr. Morris, the dignified Professor made common cause with McCune. He "rose to a point of order," Dr. Skinner having made his motion, having gotten a second, and holding the floor. The point was, that it was unconstitutional to animadvert upon Mr. McCune's opinions or practices, however made public by his own responsible acts, without putting him formally upon his trial. This was sustained by Moderator and Presbytery, and Dr. Skinner and his motion were thus thrown out. The Presbytery next raised a Committee of Inquiry to collect and report information to a subsequent meeting. This Committee proved an *ex parte* one. Its reported statements contained much matter inculpating Dr. Skinner, and some scurrilously assailing him. Their report was not only read, but "accepted" (not adopted), and as such, found wide circulation as a part of the Presbyterial record. Against these wrongs, and some collateral points, Dr. Skinner complained to his Synod. Meantime, rather than fail in his attempt to vindicate the order of the Church, he took up the wager of battle tossed to him by the Morris party in the form of a challenge to become the prosecutor of McCune.

Dr. Skinner's fate in the Synod was analogous to that he had met in the lower court: the consideration of his complaint was waived, after the Judicial Committee had found it in order, on the pretext that the case was still pending in the lower court. Whereas, the complaint raised new issues. In the lower court, the simple issue was, (and is,) "Is McCune censurable?" The issue raised in the complaint to Synod is: "Is the Presbytery censurable for denying Dr. Skinner his rights of motion and speech, and in neglecting its own duty of oversight?" So, against this fresh outrage in the Synod, Dr. Skinner now appeals to his Assembly in 1877.

Among several minor points, his able and spirited argument discusses these two:

1. Was it competent for the Presbytery to refuse him the right to make and argue a motion, on the mere point of order, that the Moderator deemed the thing moved would be found unconstitutional? Common sense would say: Whether it were so or not was one of the very things Dr. Skinner was entitled to argue before Presbytery. If that body judged, after argument, that his motion was unconstitutional, they had a right to negative it. But by assuming to make it out of order, they deprived Dr. S. of his constitutional right of free speech. It is obvious that, by the same expedient, a ruthless majority might absolutely silence and enslave their equals and fellow-members. This point is forcibly made by Dr. S. in his complaint, and sustained by the additional arguments: That by such a decision the Presbytery had usurped an interpretative power over the constitution, which belongs to the Assembly alone; and that they thus turned a constitutional question into a rule of order, and so invented a new rule of order, not found in their book.

2. But the other question is, if possible, more grave. Has a church court, and especially a Presbytery, any "episcopal power," or power of oversight over its members, additional to its judicial power of trial for offence? Dr. Morris' position seemed to deny this. Dr. S. stoutly asserts, and successfully demonstrates it. The question has a historical interest. In 1829 Albert Barnes, about to become the pastor of an important church in Philadelphia, preached and printed a heretical sermon. The Synod ordered the negligent Presbytery to exercise its episcopal function by examining this sermon. Mr. Barnes rejected the authority, assuming the very ground upon which Dr. Morris has now thrust his Presbytery. He succeeded, by the help of an accidental New School majority in 1834, in getting the sanction of the Assembly. But the Assemblies of 1835 and 1837 reversed this decision and reestablished the authority of the Church. To this power Dr. Skinner gives his support in an argument of masterly force. He not only shows that Assemblies had uniformly claimed and exercised the right, as is evinced in the five noted

cases of Harker, 1761; Balch, 1797; Davis, 1810; Craighead, 1824; and Barnes, 1829-37; but he appeals to the constitution. The Confession of Faith is more authoritative than the Books of Government and Discipline, in that it is more expressly and solemnly adopted. Hence, the Government should be interpreted in accordance with the Confession. But the latter, Chapter XXXI., §2, says expressly: "It belongeth to Synods and Councils *ministerially* to determine controversies of faith and cases of conscience," etc. But the Government, Chap. X., §8, clothes Presbyteries with power "to resolve questions of doctrine or discipline, seriously and reasonably proposed, to condemn erroneous opinions," etc. This power is evidently contemplated by the Discipline, Chap. I., §5, when it says: "Circumstances may require a very *different mode* of proceeding in *similar cases*, at different times." Chap. XII., §5, of Government, gives to the Assembly the power "of reproof, warning, or bearing testimony against error in doctrine or immorality in practice, in any church, Presbytery, or Synod."

These grants of the episcopal power are sustained and interpreted by the obvious considerations: That to deprive pastors and church courts of it would strip them of far the larger and the more beneficial part of their pastoral action, for they would be estopped from all intervention in backsliding or error, until the extreme grade was reached, usually hopeless, where judicial accusation becomes the only resort. That if this power is consistently denied a church court, even judicial process can never begin; because some inquiry must have preceded, raising such a likelihood of the person's guilt as justifies formal accusation. That every committee of inquiry virtually exercises this episcopal function, but the judicatory appointing is greater than the committee appointed. That the classical passages of the New Testament defining Church Government, such as Matthew xvi., obviously confer the power. And that the Synods of the early Church uniformly and unquestionably exercised the power. The great plea of Mr. Barnes's party in the Assembly of 1834, was, that a censure of an opinion or practice ascribed to an author was a virtual trial and condemnation of the person; but this

cannot be justly visited on any one, unless he has the rights of a judicial investigation. It is a sacred principle, which even the old Romans laid at the basis of their civil law, that no man should be condemned until he has been heard in his own defence. But surely when a man has so matured his opinions as to commit them to publication, *he has been heard!* His books have spoken for him. Unless he is ready to disclaim the authorship of the book and thus clear himself, he has already, by his own act, placed himself at that point, as to the evidence of culpability, which it is the sole object of judicial investigation to reach. What is the real end of that inquiry? To give a guilty party room for tricks and quibbles by which he may escape? Is it not simply to ascertain *whether the accused party is guilty* of the thing charged? When a man has of his own accord published his own guilt, we see little use for a formality which only ascertains what is already ascertained. There is, besides, a very clear practical difference between the disapproval of a man's published opinions and an ecclesiastical sentence against his person. Does the former unavoidably carry some discredit against his person? But it leaves his ministerial rights undiminished. The action amounts simply to a choice of a milder remedy over a harsher; and the whole result of this objection is a petulant complaint that the judicatory is merciful. Every such caviller deserves to be served precisely as Dr. Skinner is now endeavoring to serve Mr. McCune: give him the severer course which he invokes, in the form of a direct and vigorous indictment and trial.

*Addresses: Inauguration of S. S. Laws, L.L. D., as President of the University of Missouri at Columbia, July 5, 1876. Columbia, Mo. 1876. Pp. 119.*

The occasion on which these addresses were delivered was made to combine a centennial anniversary of the "national" existence, the thirty-sixth anniversary of the University, and the retiring of the former, and induction of the incoming, President. The celebration was therefore attended with impressive and memorable ceremonies, as well as with these appropriate addresses. These services were introduced and closed by prayer. The retir-

ing President, Dr. Read, venerable in years and honored for a long life of valuable labor in the University education, having spent forty-seven years in three institutions in other States, and closed his career by ten years of energetic, judicious, and successful service in the University of Missouri, modestly and gracefully related some of his prominent labours, and committed the institution of his love to "abler hands." Prof. Ficklin for the Faculty, Mr. R. L. Todd, the oldest graduate of the first class, (1843,) for the Alumni, Mr. John H. Duncan for the students, Lieutenant Governor Colman, in place of Governor Hardin, and Hon. J. S. Rollins, its President, for the Board of Curators, followed with addresses replete with congratulations on the growing importance and value of the Institution, acknowledgments of obligations to Dr. Read, and warm expressions of confidence addressed to the new President. Of course, with the same theme substantially, these five addresses could hardly be free from much repetition, both of facts and sentiment. Still they added impressively to the solemnities of the occasion. We are glad to record many pleasing evidences of the rise and rapid growth of such a valuable institution in a State but little over half a century old, and already teeming with a population of two millions. The institution was placed at Columbia in Boone County, which gave, in money and lands, \$120,000 to the endowment commenced by the Congressional grant of two townships of land to the infant State in 1820, "for the support of a seminary of learning." The institution is recognised in the fundamental law of the State. It now owns in land and funds nearly a million of dollars. Its income has grown from \$7,300 in 1866, and that rather uncertain of payment, to \$64,000 in 1876. The number of students, from 104, to an average, for four years past, of 480,—one year reaching 553. There had been, previous to 1840, a small incorporated institution known as "Columbia College," which was ultimately merged in the University. Till 1866 the course of studies was limited to the *curriculum* of a "College of Science and Arts." To this as a nucleus have been added the Colleges of Normal Instruction, of Agriculture, of Law, and of Medicine, and a School of Mines. The advantages of the institution, with a



Faculty of thirty Professors, are extended to females ; and those who have witnessed this experiment, as well as favored it, pronounce it successful. We are rather too far in the rear of the "progress of the XIXth Century" to sympathise with them. But we are willing to believe some good results may follow this new modelling of such an institution, and to hope the evils to be feared may not arise. We only raise the question, whether to satisfy the proper demand for State recognition of the needs of the "better half" of its population, separate institutions might not be endowed and prove equally beneficial, indeed far more beneficial?

Dr. Law's inaugural indicates his views of the structure and conduct of a University in very plain terms. He seems to have introduced two most valuable changes, by making it the terms of his accepting the office of President, that the tenure of the office should be permanent and not limited to a number of years, and that the entire government of the students should be in the hands of the Faculty with no appeal to the Curators. He is very emphatic in the advocacy of sound views. We began to make a few extracts from pages 59-61. But we found such a mine of nuggets that we are constrained greatly to extend our quotations. Says Dr. Laws:

"It is conceived there is a principle which presides over" [the subject of college government,] "and that it is obvious on enunciation and all-comprehensive in its application. That principle is simply this: *The authority of government in a school is not derived from the pupils, nor is it dependent on them in any sense whatever.* This holds true, whether it be a private school or a public school, an academy, a college, or a university. In no case is the authority of the school master derived from his pupils. In the private school it is an extension of parental authority ; in the public school of all grades, including the university, it is an extension of the authority of the State." [He might have added, *and the parent combined.*] "But in no case is the authority of the school house derived from the scholars. It does not come up from them, but it comes down upon them. It is not from below, it is from above. Scholars, then, do not come to a school to govern it, nor to take any part in its government. . . . A proper understanding of this very simple and comprehensive principle of action takes all the windy conceit and swollen importance out of the self-constituted leaders of

college broils and rebellions. *The only alternative to a pupil in a school is to obey or leave, willingly or by constraint.*"

"Any other theory works its own inevitable destruction. Take the popular but utterly fallacious and pernicious alternative, that young gentlemen in an institution of learning are to be thrown upon and guided by a sense of honor. The question at once arises, whose sense of honor? Is each to be a law to himself? Hardly any two in many cases can be expected to agree. Most flagrant misbehavior, not unfrequently, has the sanction of the guilty party's sense of honor. By the operation of this principle every one would do that which was right in his own eyes, which is a natural description of a state of barbarous anarchy. Between the loyal and orderly subordination of the pupils to the constituted authorities of the school-house, and the lawless and disgraceful subordination of the Faculty to their own scholars, no sound, well-informed, and unprejudiced judgment can hesitate for a moment. Whatever the college or school-house laws, they are entitled to vindication by enforcement till altered or repealed by the proper authority in the proper way. The school, in its organisation and operation, is not a democracy nor a republic any more than is the family. The authority in the family does not come from the children. To recognise the children as the source of power, or the governing authority in the family, would destroy the household. Any other view tends to breed anarchy and lawlessness; and that, too, not only in schooldays, but in the after life of pupils as citizens. 'The heir, as long as he is a child, differeth nothing from a servant, though he be lord of all; but is under tutors and governors until the time appointed of the father.'

"In its measure, this enunciation holds good of the professional schools just the same as of the undergraduate schools. Underneath all their freedom of personal action and exemption from surveillance, there are certain established rules which are not established nor changed at their bidding, and to which the professional or proper university students must conform as a condition of pupilage and recognition. It may be truly said of them, as of the contestants in the Grecian games, 'If a man also strive for masteries, yet is he not crowned except he strive lawfully.' A student is not entitled to the benefits nor to any of the honors of an institution of learning, except upon the condition of loyal compliance with its requisitions."

These are words of the wise, and they are timely words. In Church schools and State schools the so-called *liberal spirit* of the age has entered. We remember among the many inventions of the "land of notions" many years ago, a great improvement in school government was announced, consisting in submitting all questions of discipline to the vote of the school children! Since

then, *honor, conscience*, and the like, take place of law, order, and wise government.

Dr. Laws is equally pronounced in assigning to the President, who is intrusted with the *responsibility* for the right government of the institution, a power of veto on appointments to the Faculty. His views on the relation of State Educational Institutions to the Christian religion are very conservative. Whether holding that the *right* to establish such institutions, primary and higher, belongs to the State or not, if the State assumes it, the only safe position is that of neither *prescribing* nor *proscribing* religious teaching and influence. Dr. Laws accepts the doctrine that Christianity is a part of our common law. This may be rather strong for some minds. But none can gainsay the proposition, that ours is a Christian civilisation, for a people *Christian*, as opposed to heathen, and the influences of the surroundings of literary institutions are Christian. While there should be allowed by the State no sectarian or proselyting policy, the State will do what is only fair to all, not to *proscribe* the Bible nor its teachings.

Dr. Laws defends the University against the charge of having proscribed the religion of the Bible or its ministers. This charge grew out of a provision in the organic law of its Constitution, forbidding professional men from exercising the functions of their professions while professors in the University. But this law has been for twenty years understood practically only to inhibit them from making the duties of their profession paramount, or so undertaken as to interfere with their obligations as teachers.

But we pause. To much more in this excellent address we would gladly respond with our hearty amen. And so as to much in some other addresses on education in various aspects, printed in the appendix, we would gladly give expression to approval. We regret to find no such certain sound as we would like on the value of classical studies. But our space is filled.

*Centennial Historical Discourses delivered in the city of Philadelphia, June, 1876, by appointment of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, with the Moderator's Sermon before the General Assembly of 1876.* Philadelphia. Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 1,334 Chestnut Street. Pp. 300. 12mo.

This volume is far superior in tone and value to the one we criticised in our preceding issue, by Dr. Breed, entitled, "*Presbyterians and the Revolution.*" It consists of five discourses. Dr. McGill of Princeton treats of the period from the founding of the Presbyterian Church in this country to the commencement of the Revolutionary war. Dr. Hopkins of Auburn, of the next period down to the adoption of the Form in 1788. Dr. Wilson of Allegheny, of the period from that time to the present. And Dr. E. P. Humphrey of Louisville discourses of the present condition and prospects of the Church. Dr. Morris of Lane closes with his Moderator's sermon of 1876.

Dr. Morris's sermon is for the glorification of "American Presbyterianism," somewhat in the vein of Dr. Breed. Also, he believes in and advocates as practicable the combination of Presbyterians throughout the world. And he is quite loving, in a sense, towards the Southern brethren, though impenitent yet as to the "sin" they used to live in; and he is very hopeful not only of "fraternal relations," but even "fraternal union" with these impenitent sinners.

Dr. Wilson's discourse also contains a *modicum* of stuff about "slavery and the rebellion," but not more than we can bear with, where there is so much else of historical value in his production.

Dr. Humphrey does not appear to have equalled himself in his discourse. But it is both interesting and instructive, and especially is his account of the "formation of the Westminster formularies" (pp. 228, 229,) worthy to be noted.

Dr. Hopkins's and Dr. McGill's sermons are the best parts of the book. That of Dr. McGill, especially, is worthy of an eminent ecclesiastic like him. His statement of the few elementary principles of the Presbyterian system is in many respects a far better one than his great colleague undertook to make in the Assembly

at Rochester. And yet Dr. McGill represents the General Assembly as being "next and nearest the Head, . . . so that if there be power in the Church anywhere lodged, which has not been specifically distributed by a formal constitution, this high court is the depository of such power to meet the exigencies that cannot be foreseen or provided for by any written constitution." This account of the Assembly's powers he carries out into the broad statement, that it is the Assembly which has granted to the Presbyteries and Sessions all the rights they enjoy, (pp. 32-35.) Neither of these views will be apt to strike our readers favorably.

On the whole, these Centennial Historical Discourses do some honor to the Church which appointed and has published them.

*Centennial Discourses. A Series of Sermons delivered in the year 1876 by the Order of the General Synod of the Reformed (Dutch) Church in America.* New York. Board of Publication of the Reformed Church in America. 1877. Pp. 601. 8vo.

Here is another collection of Discourses commemorative of the closing of the first century of American Independence. It is a massive volume elegantly got up, both internally and externally. It consists of two and twenty discourses by many of the most eminent ministers of the Reformed Church, with which our Church is in a peculiar sense allied. To these twenty-two discourses is appended the Latin inaugural of the Rev. Dr. Jas. H. Livingston, the magnificent preacher and Theological Professor of the Dutch Church. Elected by the General Synod their Professor of Theology in 1784, this address on *the truth of the Christian Religion* is supposed to have been the first one of the kind ever delivered on this continent.

This volume we judge to be possessed of more than a temporary value. This will be apparent when a few of the subjects discussed are named, as follows: "The character and development of our Church during the colonial period;" "The Huguenot element amongst the Dutch;" "The literature of the Church during the last hundred years;" "Its type of doctrine as represented by the symbols of Heidelberg and Dordrecht."

*Commenting and Commentaries. Lectures addressed to the Students of the Pastor's College, Metropolitan Tabernacle, with a list of the best Biblical Commentaries and Expositions, and a Lecture on Eccentric Preachers, with a complete list of all of Spurgeon's Sermons, with the Scripture Texts used.* By C. H. SPURGEON, President. New York. Sheldon & Company, No. 8 Murray Street. 1876. Pp. 324. 12mo.

"Students [says the author] do not find it easy to chose which works to buy, and their slender stores are often wasted on books of a comparatively worthless kind. If I can save a poor man from spending his money for that which is not bread, or by directing a brother to a good book may enable him to dig deeper into the mines of truth, I shall be well repaid. For this purpose I have toiled and read much, and passed under review some three or four thousand volumes. From these I have compiled my catalogue, rejecting many, yet making a very varied selection."

First on his list Mr. Spurgeon puts Matthew Henry, and second, John Calvin.

Having been often applied to by young students of theology for just such information as this volume contains, we recommend it as fitted to be very useful.

*Rays from the Sun of Righteousness.* By the Rev. RICHARD NEWTON; D. D., author of "the Jewel Case," "the Wonder Case," etc. New York. Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1876. Pp. 341. 16mo.

This volume consists of ten sermons for young people, all about Jesus. It is beautifully got up, and has a number of pretty pictures, and is filled with capital stories, which must make it very attractive to those for whom it is designed. The author commenced writing books for children twenty-five years ago, and hopes this may prove the best and most useful of all he has written.

*Principia or Basis of Social Science: being a Survey of the Subject from the Moral and Theological yet Liberal and Progressive Standpoint.* By R. J. WRIGHT. Second edition. Philadelphia. J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1876. Pp. 524. 8vo.

The author complains that hitherto "Social Science" has been "abandoned to the Infidels and the Socialists." But he main-

tains that it is "moral in its very nature," and that "Social Science and Christianity run parallel to each other most of their length," (pp. 20, 21.) Throughout his book he writes like a believer in the Christian religion. He is in favor of Communism, but he is not a Communist of the Parisian sort. He insists that his whole "theory is entirely different from the Parisian, scientifically, metaphysically, morally, and theologically," (p. 434.) He favors Communism, but with many limitations. He would "limit it to incomes and labors, and not extend it to capital nor principal," and in many other ways which we cannot mention. Yet, "Communism is the ideal of Social Science," (says the author,) and "Social Science does for society what Christianity is doing for the individual." And the design of this elaborate and voluminous treatise is to recommend, as the cure for most of the ills to which mankind are subject, some kind of *cænobitism*.

It is enough for us to know that the Saviour of men provided for the cure of these ills, so far as they are curable or to be cured in this world, a different life from the *cænobite* in any shape or form. His Church is in the world as the light of it, and must come in contact with the world as the salt which is to save it. The field of labor into which he sends his people, all of them, old and young, high and low, is the world, and he authorises and encourages no form of actual withdrawal by them from its scenes of toil and trial.

Mr. Wright claims to differ from all the hitherto recognised leaders in Social Science, Comte, Carey, Mill, Spencer, Mulford, and Fourier, and others.

One of the most original and valuable parts of his theory (he says) is, "that human society and therefore Social Science each consists of six fundamental elements or units, namely, individual, family, social circle, precinct, nation, and mankind," (pp. 82, 83.) By social circle he means *tribe*, and by precinct he means *State*. And his idea is that "the duty of society is to give to each unit its due proportion of influence, and that only in proportion as society does this can it produce either a happy people or a good government," (p. 91.) It is also a favorite idea with this author that our States are altogether too large, and should be broken up

into a great number of smaller ones, to consist of say from 20,000 to 70,000 souls. This would be the sure way (he thinks) to prevent any more danger of secession, which seems to be the object of almost his greatest political apprehension. Some of us dread centralisation, but for Mr. Wright that appears to have no terrors.

The population of the United States about the year 1900 "will have reached its utmost scientifically legitimate results." About that time Mr. Wright looks for a new nation to be formed, that is, two nations out of the present one. "Of course (he says) not between north and south,—dissimilar climates, and making territories three thousand miles long and only five hundred broad—but between east and west, making two, averaging about fifteen hundred long by one thousand wide. All our extra stimulation to immigration, and all our hurry in developing the resources of the 'Great West,' are tending to this result," (pp. 251, 252.)

The reader who has leisure and a fondness for social and political speculations novel, ingenious, amusing, and sometimes ridiculous, will be entertained in looking through this book.



## RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The last quarter has been prolific in new issues. The lovers of the fine arts, of the natural sciences, and of the belles-lettres, all are provided for by the Appletons: in Mr. Beckwith's account of Porcelain-ware and Pottery,<sup>1</sup> Professor Tyndall's newly edited Miscellanea,<sup>2</sup> the Chart of Ancient Territories and Places,<sup>3</sup> Mr. Spencer's last contribution to Sociology,<sup>4</sup> and two new volumes of the Library Waverley.<sup>5</sup> The merits and demerits of the two *savans* are so well known as to call for no special comment. Dr. Farrar's Sermons cannot fail to prove interesting, especially to those who know the charm of his previous writing.<sup>6</sup> "The Gates of the East" will be approached the more readily, now that the Cossack is thought to be seeking to open them.<sup>7</sup> The "Still Hour" has long held its place as being no less profound and suggestive in quality than it is diminutive in size.<sup>8</sup> The "Self-Help" Biographies are highly instructive and stimulating.<sup>9</sup> A new edition of Kitto's valuable Repository is to be welcomed.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Majolica and Fayence. By Arthur Beckwith, Esq. Illustrated. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. D. Appleton & Co., N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>Fragments of Science. By John Tyndall. New edition. 12mo., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Appleton's Hand Atlas of Ancient Geography. By Rev. George Butler. With 28 maps. 4to., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Descriptive Sociology, No. 5. By Herbert Spencer. Folio, boards, \$4.

<sup>5</sup>Sir Walter Scott's Works. New library edition. Vols. IX. and X. 8vo., cloth, \$3.50 each. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>In the Days of our Youth. Sermons. By the Rev. F. W. Farrar. 12mo., pp. 320, cloth, \$2. E. P. Dutton & Co., N. Y.

<sup>7</sup>The Gates of the East. By Rev. H. C. Potter. Small 4to., 220 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>The Still Hour. By Prof. Austin Phelps. 4to., cloth, tinted paper, \$1. D. Lothrop & Co., Boston.

<sup>9</sup>The Self-Help Library. By Samuel Smiles. Consisting of Life of Geo. Stephenson, Industrial Biographies, and Self-Help. 4 Vols., 16mo., cloth, each \$1.25; per set, in box, \$5. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Phila.

<sup>10</sup>Kitto's Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature. New edition, containing upwards of 5,000 separate articles. Illustrated by 500 wood engravings:

The romance of history is nowhere better illustrated than in the story of the Fur Trader.<sup>1</sup> Voltaire's Life of the brilliant Swedish hero is one of the best of the French classics.<sup>2</sup>

Fresh interest seems to be felt in the poets of Weimar, and particularly in him who died asking for "more light." The prose selections now offered will be useful to many, and not least to those who know Schiller's great friend and co-adjutor through such aids only as those of Carlyle, Brooks, and Hayward.<sup>3</sup> Lady Barker can tell us what there is for a woman to see in the land of Ostriches and Spring-bok.<sup>4</sup> A work on Physics, commended by the late Alexander Bain, and that has passed through six editions, ought to have points of value.<sup>5</sup> The Essays from Blackwood, now reprinted in separate volumes, on the life people lead in France and Germany, awakened some attention when they first adorned the pages of "Ebony."<sup>6 7</sup> The title of Dr. Smith's Etchings snacks in an appetising way of those of Dr. Boyd, "the Country Parson:" if it shall turn out to be half as entertaining, either the publisher or the editor, or both of them, will be rewarded by a full pocket.<sup>8</sup> Dr. Pitzer has added to his reputation for "*Ecce Deus Homo*" by his excellent work on the

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also, plates and maps. 3 Vols., royal octavo, cloth, \$18; half calf, \$24. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Phila.

<sup>1</sup>Snow Shoes and Canoes; or, The Early Days of a Fur Trader in the Hudson Bay Territory. By W. H. G. Kingston. Illustrated. Small 4to., cloth extra, full gilt, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup>History of Charles XII. By Voltaire. Hachette's French Classics. Crown, 8vo., cloth extra, \$1. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Goethe's Prosa, consisting of Selections from Goethe's Prose Works, with Introduction and English Notes. By C. A. Buchem, Ph. D., F.C.S., etc. Being Vol. vi. of Lord's New German Series. 12mo., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Letters from South Africa. By Lady Barker. 8vo., cloth extra. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Elements of Physics; or, Natural Philosophy. By Neill Arnott, M.D. Edited by Alexander Bain, LL.D., and Alfred Swaine Taylor, M. D. Seventh edition, 12mo., 873 pp., \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>German Home Life. Reprinted from Blackwood. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50.

<sup>7</sup>French Home Life. Uniform with "German Home Life." Reprinted from Blackwood. \$1.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Stoneridge. Etchings from the Sketch Book of a Country Pastor. Edited by the Rev. Charles A. Smith, D. D. 12mo., cloth extra, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

prophetic office of our Lord, a work distinguished by clearness, vigor, compactness, and sound orthodoxy.<sup>1</sup> We are not apprised that the American Returning Board is included among the fair products of "The Century."<sup>2</sup> The volume, nevertheless, may be of service to those who did as well as those who did not go to Philadelphia; *non omnes eadem mirantur amantiq̄ue*.

A new work on Animals;<sup>3</sup> a new work on the Painters;<sup>4</sup> a new work on Hydraulics;<sup>5</sup> a new work on Finance;<sup>6</sup> a new work on Economics;<sup>7</sup> admit of little further description. The illustrations of the second may be balanced against its cost. The first is also richly furnished in the same way, and is not half so dear. The history of gold and of paper money in France has elicited discussions lately from ex-Secretary McCulloch of the United States and ex-Governor Musgrave of Australia: the present disquisition is confined to the subjects of the Assignats and Mandats. It is in paper, and may be had for thirty cents. The Cornell Professor ought to be competent to handle the wider and more difficult topic he has proposed to himself.

The Wild Flowers of America have fit treatment at the hands

<sup>1</sup>Christ, the Teacher of Men. By A. W. Pitzer. 12mo., cloth extra, \$1.25. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Phila.

<sup>2</sup>The Century: Its Fruits and its Festival. Profusely illustrated. 8vo., cloth extra, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Animals Painted by Themselves. Adapted from the French of Balzac, Louis Bande, G. Droz, Jules Janin, E. Lemoine, A. de Musset, George Sand, etc. With upwards of 200 illustrations from the vignettes of Grandville. Edited by James Thomson, F.R.G.S. 8vo., cloth extra, \$4. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>A Brief History of Painters of all Schools. By Louis Viardot and other writers. Handsomely and profusely illustrated. Crown, 8vo., cloth extra, \$10. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Rural Hydraulics: A Practical Treatise. 8vo., cloth, 75 cents. Henry C. Baird & Co., Phila.

<sup>6</sup>The Money and the Finances of the French Revolution of 1789. Assignats and Mandats. A True History, including an Examination of Dr. Andrew D. White's "Paper Money Inflation in France." 8vo., 72 pp., paper, 30 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>First Principles of Political Economy, with Reference to Statesmanship and the Progress of Civilisation. By Prof. W. D. Wilson of Cornell University. 12mo., 361 pp., cloth, \$1.50.

of an eminent botanist.<sup>1</sup> Hurd & Houghton give us this, as they do also two more volumes of Scott in the exquisite Riverside fashion;<sup>2</sup> another volume of the Riverside DeQuincey;<sup>3</sup> and the seventh and eighth volumes of the Library Dickens.<sup>4</sup> The Scott and Dickens have the advantage of being small, and therefore portable and easily handled. Nothing in this country can equal the Riverside types, and hardly anything foreign can be thought to surpass them. It is pleasant to observe a taste for the revival of such masters of their craft as the author of *Waverley* and the English "Opium Eater." Dickens is not such an *artist* as some of his contemporaries, but his genius both in a comic and a tragic vein will probably be acknowledged by posterity; whilst his sentimental humanitarianism may exert no more permanent effect than the theory of Godwin's Political Novel does now.

The Constitution of the United States still deserves the study of *laudatores temporis acti*, and of those who retain the hope of recovering and preserving our liberties.<sup>5</sup> The fiords, the salmon-fishing, the upland scenery, the simple manners, the old world legends, of Norway, lend attraction to the country visited by comparatively few who see the continent of Europe, but described by Mr. Anderson.<sup>6</sup> People with as little "Silver and Gold" as

<sup>1</sup>The Wild Flowers of America. Part I. Containing superb colored plates of the Wild Columbine, Wild Cranesbill, Wavy-Leaved Aster, and Gerardia, after Drawings from Nature by Isaac Sprague. With Descriptive Text by Prof. George L. Goodall of Harvard University. 4to., 16 pp., \$5. Hurd & Houghton, N. Y.; H. O. Houghton & Co., Boston.

<sup>2</sup>The Heart of Mid-Lothian: and, The Bride of Lammermoor. By Sir W. Scott. Vols. VII. and VIII. In the New Riverside edition of the *Waverley Novels*. 12mo., 809, 402 pp., each, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Literary Criticism. By Thomas DeQuincey. Vol. IV. In the New Riverside edition of DeQuincey's Works. Crown, 8vo., 582 pp., cloth, \$1.75.

<sup>4</sup>Old Curiosity Shop. By Charles Dickens. Vols. VII. and VIII. In the New Illustrated Library edition of Dickens's Works. 12mo., 457, 443, pp., cloth, \$4.

<sup>5</sup>The Constitution of the United States, with the Fifteen Amendments, the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and Washington's Farewell Address. 8vo., 60 pp., paper, 25 cents. Robert Clarke & Co., Cincinnati.

<sup>6</sup>Six Weeks in Norway. By E. L. Anderson. With map. Square 12mo., 80 pp., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

the Apostle at the beautiful gate of the Temple may, notwithstanding, chance to get something out of the book of Mr. Horton.<sup>1</sup> This is a new edition, and, like the two foregoing, is put forth by the Cincinnati house of Robert Clarke & Co. Dr. Perowne's Commentary on the Psalms is lauded to the echo in the highest English journals as the very best that England has to offer.<sup>2</sup> The Saturday Review and the Contemporary agree in regarding the author as the best Hebrew scholar in the land, and at the same time a popular writer and earnest Christian. This republication we owe to the zeal and unfailing sagacity of W. F. Draper, Andover, Mass. The same house issues Dr. Hill's massive contribution to the *Bibliotheca Sacra*.<sup>3</sup> Dr. Hill is a Unitarian, but a man of rare mathematical and theological ability.

The importing house of Scribner, Welford & Armstrong have in Mr. Welford (one of the partners) a scholar, a gentleman, and a wonderfully discerning bibliophile, who, besides being an Englishman by birth and breeding, is (if we mistake not) now a resident of London. Their repertory is uncommonly well stored this time. Haydn's Dictionary of Dates we have been using constantly for years, and do not scruple to pronounce one of the most valuable books we ever owned.<sup>4</sup> Mr. Trollope's fine letters to the *Christian Intelligencer* will have prepared the readers of that journal for a masculine and unsparing treatment of the

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<sup>1</sup>Silver and Gold, and their Relations to the Problem of Resumption. By S. Dana Horton. New edition, revised and enlarged. 8vo., 196 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>2</sup>The Book of Psalms. A new Translation. By J. Stewart Perowne, D. D. With Introductions and Notes, Explanatory and Critical. 2 Vols. 8vo., i., 566; ii., 477 pp., \$7.50. W. F. Draper, Andover, Mass.

<sup>3</sup>A Statement of the Natural Sources of Theology: With a Discussion of their Validity, and of Modern Sceptical Objections; to which is added an Article on the First Chapter of Genesis. By Thomas Hill, D. D., LL.D. Reprinted from the *Bibliotheca Sacra*. Cloth, \$1; paper, 75 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Haydn's Dictionary of Dates and Universal Information, relating to all Ages and Nations. 15th edition. Containing the History of the World to the Autumn of 1876. By Benjamin Vincent. 8vo., 837 pp., cloth, \$9. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, New York.

papal question in his new octavo.<sup>1</sup> "Sermons in Stones" have gone through twelve editions, and concern the vexed though endless question about geology and Genesis.<sup>2</sup> Everything is *prima facie* good in Bohn's Library; the translations are, however, of various degrees of merit; of the present translation of *Alfieri*, we know nothing but what is disclosed on the title page.<sup>3</sup> Ulrici's critique on Shakspeare done into English is another of the Bohn collection. The Germans are the only critics who are able to see more in Shakspeare than he probably saw himself.<sup>4</sup>

Goethe and Schlegel opened a path to Coleridge and Charles Lamb, whose understanding of the great dramatist is so profoundly intimate in the one case, and so instinctively refined and delicate in the other, as to leave little to be said by their English successors, except where they are themselves silent. Yet Ulrici and the modern Teutons are continually striking upon fresh views of thoughtful, if at times precarious, exegesis. Dr. Carpenter in his *Human Physiology* mentions two men that possessed what he thinks to be an automatic power of artistic production: Mozart and Coleridge. The present edition of Coleridge's poems is expensive, and *ought to be* handsome.<sup>5</sup> There is a new book on Iceland, which we shall suffer to make its own appeal to the reader.<sup>6</sup> Dr. McCausland's "Adam and the Adamite" is a

<sup>1</sup>The Papal Conclaves, as they Were and as they Are. By T. Adolphus Trollope. 8vo., cloth, \$8.

<sup>2</sup>Sermons in Stones; or, Scripture Confirmed by Geology. By Dominick McCausland. 13th edition. Carefully revised and corrected. 12mo., cloth, \$2.25. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, N. Y.

<sup>3</sup>The Tragedies of Alfieri. Complete. Including those published posthumously. Translated from the Italian. Edited by Edgar Alfred Bowring, C.B. With a Preface, containing a short Sketch of the Poet's Life. New volumes Bohn's Library. 2 Vols., post 8vo., \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Shakspeare's Dramatic Art: The History and Character of Shakspeare's Plays. By Dr. Hermann Ulrici. Translated from the Third Edition of the German, with Additions and Corrections by the Author, by L. Dora Schmitz. New volumes Bohn's Library. 2 Vols., post 8vo., \$2.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>The Poetical and Dramatic Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 4 Vols. 12mo., cloth, \$15. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Across the Vatna Jokull; or, Scenes in Iceland. By W. L. Watts. 12mo., \$3. *Ibid.*

defence of Scripture from the view-point of Ethnography,<sup>1</sup> and is in some sense a companion to his work on Geology. "Underground Jerusalem," by Captain Warren of the Royal Engineers, is a fit sequel to "The Recovery of Jerusalem," and like it partakes the accuracy of an official report.<sup>2</sup> The standard History of the Crimean War is that of "Eothen" Kinglake.<sup>3</sup> Mr. Wilkes discusses the Shakspearian problem with American bias.<sup>4</sup> We also have a new Commentary on Isaiah,<sup>5</sup> and a new Dictionary of Familiar Quotations.<sup>6</sup>

Dr. Schaff's absence in the Holy Land does not prevent the appearance of the new volume of Lange on the Old Testament.<sup>7</sup> A new and cheaper edition of Dr. Schuyler's famous book on Russian Turkistan<sup>8</sup> we notice on the counters of Messrs. Scribner, Armstrong & Co.; as we also find there a new edition of Professor Perry's capital work on Political Economy.<sup>9</sup> This is one of the soundest and most readable of text-books on the

<sup>1</sup>Adam and the Adamite; or, The Harmony of Scripture and Ethnology. By Dominick McCausland, LL.D. 4th edition. Crown, 8vo., cloth, \$2.50. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, New York.

<sup>2</sup>Underground Jerusalem: An account of some of the principal difficulties encountered in its Exploration, and the results obtained. With a narrative of an Expedition through the Jordan Valley, and a Visit to the Samaritans. By Charles Warren, Captain the Corps of Royal Engineers. With illustrations. 8vo., cloth, \$10.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>The Invasion of the Crimea: Its Origin, etc. By A. W. Kinglake. Sixth and new edition. 12mo., \$3.

<sup>4</sup>Shakespeare from an American Point of View: Including an Inquiry as to his Religious Faith and his Knowledge of Law; with the Baconian Theory considered. By George Wilkes. 8vo., cloth, \$8. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>The Servant of Jehovah: A Commentary on Isaiah. By Wm. Urwick. 8vo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Dictionary of Quotations: A Book of Ready Reference for all Familiar Words and Phrases in the English Language. 12mo., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Lange's Commentary: Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Esther. By Philip Schaff, General Editor. 8vo., 552 pp., cloth, \$5.

<sup>8</sup>Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, etc. By Eugene Schuyler, Ph. D. A new and cheaper edition. With three maps and numerous illustrations. 2 Vols., 8vo., cloth; price reduced from \$7.50 to \$5. Scribner, Armstrong & Co., N. Y.

<sup>9</sup>An Introduction to Political Economy. By Professor Arthur Latham Perry. 12mo., 350 pp., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

subject. The biography of Dr. Arnold is a *chef-d'oeuvre* by Dean Stanley. Arnold is really made his own biographer.<sup>1</sup> How the vagaries of his son Matthew would have shocked the master of Rugby! Yet Atheism is the true corollary of Broad Church. The fast presses of the Messrs. Osgood yield us three more volumes of Longfellow's "Poems of Places,"<sup>2</sup> three Memorial Poems of Lowell,<sup>3</sup> and Tennyson's Harold.<sup>4</sup> The last work has scarcely made a ripple as yet among the British quid-nuncs. Queen Mary was a novelty; but Harold —. The Ephesian excavations have interest for the class of readers who follow Layard, Schliemann, and Curtius.<sup>5</sup>

The house of Roberts Brothers are nothing if not fastidious. The "Sappho" of Miss (or Mistress) Frothingham will probably go the way of nearly all contemporary dramas intended for closet reading.<sup>6</sup> Goethe's Divan<sup>7</sup> comes next, in rather trying contrast with the preceding. A new book by William Morris awakens lively expectations among the readers of this delightful but not wholly satisfying writer.<sup>8</sup> The Troubadours are taken up by a

<sup>1</sup>Life and Correspondence of Thomas Arnold, D. D. By A. P. Stanley, Dean of Westminster. With Steel Portrait. Crown, 8vo., cloth, \$2.50.

<sup>2</sup>Poems of Places. Vol. VIII: Scotland and the Scandinavian Lands. Vol. IX: France. Vol. X: France and Savoy. Edited by H. W. Longfellow. 18mo.; viii., 268 pp., cloth, \$1. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

<sup>3</sup>Three Memorial Poems. By James Russell Lowell. Square 16mo., 92 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Harold: A Drama. By Alfred Tennyson. 16mo., 170 pp., cloth, \$1. Ditto, illustrated with 12 Heliotypes after Maclise, \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Discoveries at Ephesus: Including the Site and Remains of the Great Temple of Diana. By J. T. Wood, F.S.A., Fellow of the Royal Institute of British Architects. With numerous illustrations from Original Drawings and Photographs. Imperial 8vo., 531 pp., gilt top, bevelled boards, \$20. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Sappho: A Tragedy. From the German of Franz Grillparzer. By Ellen Frothingham. Square 18mo., red edges, \$1. Roberts Brothers, Boston.

<sup>7</sup>Goethe's West-Easterly Divan. Translated by John Weiss. Square 18mo., red edges, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>The Story of Sigurd the Volsung, and the Fall of the Niblungs. By William Morris. Square 8vo., gilt top, \$3. *Ibid.*



well known magazine writer.<sup>1</sup> The Harvard Sermons of ex-President Walker are recommended to us on several grounds, without reference to the question of their theological soundness.<sup>2</sup> Dr. Martineau's is one of the keenest minds in England: as Herbert Spencer well wotteth.<sup>3</sup> Landor is one day to be numbered with our classics.<sup>4</sup> John Keats wrote what will be (as he said of *any* thing of beauty) "a joy forever."<sup>5</sup> Those who are ignorant of the Boston Radical, may learn much about him from his own lips.<sup>6</sup> The less known about him, however, the better.

We are glad to see a new edition of Martineau's *Materialism*; though, like Dr. McCosh's reply to Huxley, it is not resolute enough to satisfy many.<sup>7</sup> The Douglas Edition of Justin Martyr is another of Dr. B. L. Gildersleeve's unequalled exploits in the way of classic and patristic criticism. It is a book for the scholar more than the theologian or the dilettante. There is meat for all, however, in the Introduction, and especially for the lover of belles lettres.<sup>8</sup> There is another work about the Civil Power and Rome.<sup>9</sup> Trevelyan's *Life of Macaulay* is in the last degree

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<sup>1</sup>Troubadours and Trouveres: New and Old. By Harriet W. Preston. Bevelled boards, gilt top, \$2. Roberts Brothers, Boston.

<sup>2</sup>Reason, Faith, and Duty: Sermons, Preached chiefly in the College Chapel. By James Walker, D. D., late President of Harvard College. With a fine Likeness of the Author on Steel, Engraved expressly for this Work. 12mo., \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Dr. Martineau's Hours of Thought on Serious Things. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Landor's Imaginary Conversations. Third Series. Dialogues of Literary Men. Square 12mo., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>The Poetical Works of John Keats. Chronologically Arranged, and Edited, with a Memoir, by Lord Houghton. 16mo., cloth, bevelled boards, gilt top, \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>A Discourse of Matters Pertaining to Religion. By Theodore Parker. With a Biographical Sketch by Hannah E. Stevenson, and an Introduction by O. B. Frothingham. New edition. 12mo., cloth extra, \$1.50; paper, \$1. G. P. Putnam's Sons.

<sup>7</sup>Materialism, Theology, and Religion. By James Martineau, LL.D. New edition. 16mo., 211 pp., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Justin Martyr. Edited by Basil L. Gildersleeve. In Douglas's Series of Greek and Latin Writers. 12mo., cloth, \$1.75. Harper & Bros., N. Y.

<sup>9</sup>The Papacy and the Civil Power. By R. W. Thompson. Crown 8vo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

fascinating, but prejudiced in favor of the Whigs and the heathen.<sup>1</sup> The Selections we fear are a sort of catch-penny.<sup>2</sup> "Naked Truths of Naked People" takes one to the interior of a mighty continent crossed by the Equator.<sup>3</sup> Letters from High Latitudes carries us to Canada.<sup>4</sup> Lord Dufferin is as a speaker and writer as popular as he is as a Governor-General. Of books on Philosophy and Religion, there seems to be no intermission in the torrent.<sup>5</sup> Several of them would gain in interest after a perusal of the Illustrated Handbook.<sup>6</sup> Mr. Chauncey Wright's Discussions must stand or fall on their own merits.<sup>7</sup>

One may be certain of a pretty book from A. D. F. Randolph & Co., New York, and of a lively book from Mr. Wm. C. Prime. Whether Mr. Prime was ever in truth wrecked on the Sea of Galilee, is not now the precise question before us. What he offers us here is an entertaining story of the wood styled "the True Cross."<sup>8</sup> Miss Martineau's recent death at an advanced age, at her lovely Shrubberies in Westmoreland, makes the publication of her English History a little pathetic.<sup>9</sup> It need hardly be said in addition, that no allowance need be made for

<sup>1</sup>The Life and Letters of Macaulay. By G. O. Trevelyan. 8vo., cloth. \$1.75. Harper & Bros., N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>Selections from Macaulay. By Trevelyan. \$2.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Central Africa: Naked Truths of Naked People. By Col. C. Chaille Long. 8vo., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Letters from High Latitudes. By Lord Dufferin. New illustrated edition; with Portrait and New Preface. 12mo., 258 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Lovell, Adam, Weston & Co., N. Y.

<sup>5</sup>Studies in the Philosophy of Religion and History. By A. M. Fairbairn. Crown 8vo., 348 pp., cloth, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>The Illustrated Handbook to all Religions, from the Earliest Ages to the Present time. Nearly 300 engravings. Royal 12mo., 600 pp., cloth, \$2.

<sup>7</sup>Philosophical Discussions. By Chauncey Wright. 8vo., 435 pp., cloth, \$3.50. Henry Holt & Co., N. Y.

<sup>8</sup>The Holy Cross: A Sketch of its Entire History, so far as it can be Gathered from Old Authors, Ancient Chroniclers, and other Writers. By William C. Prime. 16mo., 150 pp. A. D. F. Randolph & Co., N. Y.


<sup>9</sup>History of England; from the Beginning of the Century to the Crimean War. By Harriet Martineau. 4 Vols., 12mo., cloth extra, \$4. Porter & Coates, Phila.

her sex, and that she was a disciple of Auguste Comte. We conceive the matter in this way, that Dr. G. W. Sampson, late President of the Columbian University, means to give his sanction to Dr. Nisbet's work on the Resurrection.<sup>1</sup> The "Essentials of English Grammar" could not easily be in better hands (or mouths) than those of Professor Whitney, whose German Grammar is one of the best extant, and whose works on General Philology are valued in Prussia no less than in Connecticut.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The Resurrection of the Body: Does the Bible Teach it? By E. Nisbet, D. D. With an Introduction by G. W. Sampson, D. D., Late President Columbian University, D. C. 12mo., 124 pp., cloth extra, \$1. Authors' Publishing Co., N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>Essentials of English Grammar. By Wm. Dwight Whitney. 12mo., 272 pp., cloth, 95 cents. Ginn & Heath, Boston.





# THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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## ARTICLE I.

### A BIRD'S EYE VIEW OF THE CHURCH UNDER THE PATRIARCHS AND MOSES.

The Church considered in this sketch is the Church visible, that community which consists of all who "profess the true religion, together with their children."

No man, with a spark of liberal curiosity, can contemplate this community as it now exists amongst men, without desiring to know something of its history and its origin. The same motive, if no higher, which induced the first explorer to ascend from the delta of the Mississippi to the springs from which it flows, would induce the student of man to trace the course of that institution which has, in such a marked degree, moulded the character and fixed the destiny of so large a portion of our race. And if, like the adventurous travellers who for centuries sought for the sources of the Nile, the inquirer should be again and again baffled in his researches, the disappointment may serve as a wholesome discipline for his faith and patience, if he be a believer in God, and prepare him for the glorious discovery that the Church took its rise not in any feeble fountains of earth, but in the vast "nyanza," or ocean, rather, of the bosom of God; that it is the unfolding of "the economy of the mystery which, from the beginning of the world, hath been hid in God," the demonstration "to princi-

palities and powers in heavenly places" of the "manifold wisdom of God." (Eph. iii. 9, 11.)

Almost the only account, certainly the only authentic account, which we have of the Church for forty centuries. is contained in the Sacred Scriptures. This account is not only authentic, but divine; a record made by God himself, who instituted the Church, and governed and directed it by his special and extraordinary providence. No ancient institution, therefore, can be compared to this, in the trustworthiness of its history, and in the materials it affords for a clear and full knowledge of the changes and vicissitudes, both of form and fortune, through which it has passed along the track of ages.

This history may be conveniently divided into four periods. I. Its patriarchal and catholic form, from the giving of the first promise of salvation to the time of Abraham, say from B. C. 4004—2000. II. Its patriarchal and "particularistic" form, from Abraham to the time of David, say from B. C. 2000—1000. III. Its monarchical or kingly and particularistic form, from David to Christ, say from B. C. 1000—A. D. 35. IV. Its Christian and catholic form, from A. D. 35 to the second advent of the Saviour. We propose at present to consider the Church only in the first two of these periods.

#### PERIOD I., B. C. 4004—2000.

The form of the Church in this period is called "patriarchal," because it had no visible organisation or government distinct from that of the family. The head of the family was "*rex sacerdosque.*" It is called "catholic" or "universal," because the blessings of salvation were not, by any act of God, confined to a particular family or line. We say by any act of God; for it is only too evident that Cain, in the family of Adam, by a voluntary apostasy, separated himself from God and renounced his interest in the proto-evangelium and in the suffering of the woman's seed by which the serpent's head was to be crushed; and that his posterity, down to their total destruction by the flood, walked in his steps.

During this period the Church had, so far as appears from the

record, no distinct organisation. Those who "professed the true religion" seem to have been known rather as a *party* than as a *separate community*. We are told (Gen. iv. 26) that in the days of Enos, "men began to call upon the name of the Lord," or to "call themselves by the name of the Lord," or to "call (upon men) by the name of the Lord"—for all these renderings of the text have been proposed—which statement seems to imply some formal profession of faith in God on the part of a portion of the race. According to the first-named rendering, nothing more might seem to be meant than formal assemblies of the worshippers of God, in opposition to the assemblies of the wicked. According to the second interpretation, the true worshippers assumed the name of "the Lord's people;" or, as they seem to be denominated in the 6th chapter, "the sons of God," in opposition to the wicked and apostate, who desired to be recognised in no higher relation than that of "the children of men." According to the third interpretation, the professors of the true religion began to teach or preach righteousness in the name of the Lord. Enos, in this view, was the first, as Noah was the eighth "preacher of righteousness." (See 2 Pet. ii. 5, and Owen on Heb. xi. 7.) But whatever interpretation we adopt, there is no necessity for supposing a separate organisation of God's people, such as we now recognise in the Church. There is only a clear recognition of spiritual *relations*, and of the superiority of these relations to those which obtain between man and man, and which are of the earth, earthy.

The rule of faith, in this period, was unwritten and very short. So far as the record informs us, it consisted only of the first promise (Gen. iii. 15), and the rule of duty was the remnant of the law written on the heart. Perhaps the institution of bloody sacrifices may have served, in connexion with the promise, the purpose of a fuller revelation in words, as the judgments of God upon sinners, in the course of his providence, served the purpose of a clearer revelation of law. The revelation, however, though short, was comprehensive, embracing the essential features of the plan of salvation. It was the germ of the whole subsequent revelation. Nothing *essential* was ever added afterwards. It was sufficient, though incomplete. It had the "*perfectio partium*,"



though not the "*perfectio graduum.*" And may not the same be said, in a certain sense, of the revelation which *we* have? But it would not be safe to conclude that the brief notices of revealed truth contained in Genesis, tell us all that the first men knew of God and redemption. The purpose of revelation in the Pentateuch is not to satisfy our curiosity, but only to connect the different stages of the history of redemption.

The worship of the Church in this period was exceedingly simple, for it was a *catholic* dispensation of religion. Prayer and sacrifice and the preaching already mentioned—whatever that was—constitute all of which the record informs us. Of sacraments, in our present ecclesiastical sense of the word, we find no trace. There is some trace, in the beginning, of a *sacred place* (Gen. iv. 16), but there is no evidence of any such thing being necessary to the patriarchal worship. The patriarchs seem to have built altars anywhere. Nor is there any trace of a stated symbolical worship, beyond the offering of sacrifice. This negative fact is interesting in connexion with the positive statement of Scripture, that there were preachers of righteousness in this period. We are forced to the inference that instruction in religion was given more by words than by symbols, a feature eminently characteristic of the latest Christian and catholic dispensation of religion, and a feature which we should not expect to find in the infancy of the Church and of the race.

Now, what was the life which these elements of the Church combined to produce? What was its actual faith? How much of the knowledge contained in the revelation of that era, and unfolded in the worship, entered into the living faith of the people of God? In answering this question, we should guard against a very natural illusion, springing from the possession, on our part, of a clearer objective revelation. The first impression made upon one who goes from a brilliantly illuminated room into the open air at night, is an impression of total darkness, although the stars may be shining bright. But to one who has been all the time out of doors, the light of the stars has been sufficient to guide him; and as darkness reveals worlds of light which are never seen by day, the advantage, upon the whole,

may not be in favor of him who has the most objective light. Again, vision depends not upon the objective light only, but upon the condition of the eye. A "single" eye may see more in twilight than an eye which is not single in the blaze of a meridian sun. Who will venture to say that Enoch did not see more in the few promises that he had, than many believers now see in the whole gospel now spread out before them? Surely he must have had a very clear understanding of heavenly mysteries, who could so walk with God by faith as to be accounted fit to escape the stroke of death, and to ascend, perhaps, like Elijah of a later age, to the bosom of God, in a chariot of fire. In one sense, faith has an advantage in a darkness which is inevitable, and not self-imposed. It comes by hearing; and as the sense of hearing often acquires extraordinary sensibility and acuteness in the absence of the power of sight, so the faintest whispers of these primeval revelations may have been more audible to those ancient worthies than the trumpet and thunders of Sinai, or the charming strains of prophets and apostles to men of a later dispensation, but of duller ears.

It is also worthy of consideration, whether there may not have been something in the mode of apprehending truth, which had a natural tendency to give this truth a greater power of moving the heart and of controlling the life. There is a vivacity and freshness, a power to impress and move, in the conceptions of childhood, which we do not find in those of riper years. We are often tempted to wish that we could return to the period of childhood, and look upon the objects which we now look upon with the eyes of a child. And it is characteristic of minds of the very highest order that they *do* thus contemplate nature and the works of God. He who would enter into the kingdom of nature, says Bacon, must, like him who would enter into the kingdom of heaven, become a little child. May there not have been something childlike in the mode of seeing truth in the infancy of the Church, which created an enthusiasm and imparted a stimulus, which it is difficult for us, save in a few favored moments, even to conceive? There was a rapture, no doubt, in the flights of

Enoch's childlike faith, not only as far removed from the noisy mirth of the children of Cain as his life of simple walking with God from their cunning study of nature with the view of living without God, but much beyond the rapture of the most favored saints, in their most favored moments, under the fuller dispensation of the gospel. If it be said that Enoch's was a peculiar case, still it must be admitted to be a case belonging to a period of very partial objective revelation. The Spirit of God strove with sinners as they listened to the preachers of righteousness. (Gen. vi. 3.) How much more mightily did he work in the elders who obtained a good report! We find similar phenomena now among illiterate Christians who have neither the time nor the opportunity for the study of the Word. Who has not been astonished at the depth and clearness of the knowledge of the plan of salvation exhibited by some of this class? Whence have they this wisdom, having never learned? The only answer is, *from the Spirit.*

What the more enlightened of these elders had learned for themselves, they could communicate to others. The word of God is *seed*. It falls into the mind and germinates and brings forth fruit: some thirty, some sixty, some an hundredfold, according to the soil. This fruit becomes seed in its turn, and, falling into other soil, brings forth fruit again, and so on forever. At each remove from the primary seed, and with each change of soil, the product is modified, indeed, but retains still the original type or form; wheat is still wheat. Stranger still, the primary product is not always the best. The secondary, or even a more remote product, may conform with greater exactness to the type than the primary, because it is the product of a soil more congenial with the nature of the seed, or because other external conditions of growth have been more favorable. Hence we may understand how, in an Enoch or a Noah, the seed of the original promise may have expanded into a noble tree, laden with fruit and bending its branches within the reach of the masses of inferior men; and these inferior men might, in their turn, become fruitful soil for the seed, which, in its original form, would, perhaps, never have sprung up. This, perhaps, was one reason why God ap-

pointed "preachers of righteousness" then, as it is, no doubt, one reason why he has his preachers of righteousness now. This is the main reason, no doubt, why the revelation, as we have it, has been given through so many ages and in so many forms—"at sundry times and in divers manners." What does not strike in one form strikes in another. Paul is better adapted to arrest the thought of one man, John of another, Peter of another; or each of these, in his turn, may be best suited to the condition of the same man in the varying states of feeling or of thought. The thought of one age, in order to become the thought of all ages, must be capable of *translation*. He is the most successful preacher who, other things being equal, has his own mind most thoroughly saturated with the truth of God, and is best able to translate it into the modes of thought and speech current in his time.

It does not follow, therefore, that the theology of this period was meagre, because the bulk of the rule of faith was small. The whole Bible, as we now have it, is small in comparison with the enormous mass of literature to which it has given rise, in the form of exegetical, historical, and dogmatical theology. Men lived longer then than they do now; and if the spoken commentaries upon Gen. iii. 15, of an Enoch, had been recorded and transmitted, the ponderous folios of the Fathers, or of the voluminous theologians of the seventeenth century, might appear a mere trifle in the comparison. We may form some conception of the thinking of these ancient times, as well as of the style in which the results of that thinking were conveyed, from the ancient book of Job. Whatever theory we may adopt concerning the *historical* character of this book, it is certain that it belonged to the canon of the Jews, and that its canonical authority was affirmed by the Saviour, and therefore that it does not violate the laws of verisimilitude in its representations. Let us then cease to estimate the volume of patriarchal theology by what is actually recorded of divine revelation. This revelation fell into a virgin soil, and was fruitful. There were some deep musings in the minds of these ancient worthies as they sat in their tent-doors, or as they reclined upon the earth, in the midst of their flocks, and

gazed upon the star-spangled vault of heaven. We are apt to confound the *march of mind* with the *progress of knowledge*: and with respect to certain branches of knowledge, the present generation is unquestionably in advance of that ancient generation we have been considering, and indeed of all past generations. But in those departments of inquiry, in which all the facts were before the minds of the earliest thinkers of the race as fully as they can be before ours, in those branches in which all the materials and instruments of knowledge are within the man himself, and not in nature without, the difference is not so great. Observation was then confined to the soul within, and its relations to its Creator, and the great problems of the origin and destiny of man were studied with an attention undistracted by the bustle and running to and fro, which characterise an age of *material progress*. "Aristotle," says South, "was but the rubbish of an Adam;" and how little advance has been made beyond Aristotle, even in this boasted age, in many fields of thought; yet it is not improbable that there were some before the flood, of whose philosophy of man the very best of Aristotle's is only a sort of reminiscence.

We recur now to the question touching the living faith of the people of God in this period; and this is only a question as to how much, with the illumination of the Spirit, could be legitimately gotten out of the proto-evangelium. In addition to what has been said before, it may be observed that they were fully warranted in believing that the victory of the serpent would be no victory in the end, but would be turned into defeat; or, in other words, that what man had lost by yielding to the suggestions of the tempter, would be restored by means of the very nature which had lost it, and by the suffering of that nature. Now, what had man lost? He had lost the favor of God, the image of God, and consequently communion with God, and that right of dominion over the earth which could only exist while he bore the image of God and continued in full communion with him. The dominion was to be restored, and of course, in order thereunto, the image and the favor of God. This may be called the hope of the Church of that era.

It may help us to form an idea of this dominion or kingdom, if we consider what the political condition of the human race would probably have been, if Adam had not sinned. There can be little doubt upon this point to any one acquainted with the history of man. The patriarchal government has been emphatically *the* government of man in some form or other. It is the least artificial of all kinds of administration, and that to which all men are subject, by necessity of nature, in their infancy. The refined and complicated politics of modern times, the elaborate paper or parchment platforms which the sagacity of statesmen has invented, are felt to be intensely artificial, and have been found exceedingly difficult, if not altogether impossible, to maintain. The tendency has constantly been to concentrate the power of rule in the person of one man, who is to be regarded as the "father of his people." The most extensive empire now on earth, is an empire of this sort. We allude, of course, to China. The tendency to empires is natural to man; and it cannot be regarded, in itself, as a fruit of man's apostasy and a consequence of the ruin of his nature. It is rather the attempt to recover a lost inheritance. Man shows his utter moral ruin in the kind of dominion he seeks, and in the spirit in which he exercises his power, as also in the means by which he endeavors to establish and maintain his dominion. He endeavors to establish a dominion of *force*, and rules with the spirit of a *beast*, without God and against God. If Adam had stood the trial, he would doubtless have been the head of his race forever, a universal king. He would have been the priest, also, of the whole race, so far as such an office might have been either necessary or possible to a race without sin. It is not needful to suppose that in such an empire no distinction would have been made between the civil and religious relations of men; between the relations of man to man, and the relations of man to God. This distinction could not but be perceived, and might have been observed in practice; but Adam would have been the head under God in both respects. Reason would have had full scope in temporal affairs, while in all man's intercourse with God, he would have been guided, helped, elevated by ever-growing revelations of the glory and blessedness

of his Creator. His chief and highest end, *de facto* as well as *de jure*, would have been to glorify and enjoy the Author of his being; and all temporal works or joys would have been, and would have been felt to be, subordinate to this chief and highest end. There would be no occasion for the exercise of *force*. The loyalty of the heart would have been perfect, not external and professed merely. The government would have been one of direction rather than that of coercion. All its subjects desire to glorify God, and to bless one another; they only need to be instructed how to do it, how to manifest the love which, by the terms of the supposition, pervades all their hearts. In short, the dominion of man would have been a *theocracy*, a government in which God would have been the acknowledged and real Ruler, the all-disposing Lord and the all-comprehending Good, exercising his authority and communicating his blessings through a visible Head and Representative. Some very imperfect shadow of this theocracy may have been seen in the posterity of Seth, during Adam's life, nearly a millennium.

Now the fall of man ruined all these prospects; and if there had been no gracious promise of recovery given, no government could ever have existed on earth but one of force, with mailed hand restraining the transgressor or hurling him to destruction. This is the kind of rule suited to an apostate earth, where all are born sinners, with a perpetual inclination to evil and evil only. But a promise *was* given of a kingdom or reign of *Heaven*, a reign of God on earth in man; a restoration of the dominion originally given to man; a restoration to be achieved by the destruction of the works of the serpent. This was the hope of the antediluvian fathers, as they testified and struggled against the Cainites who were carrying it with a high hand, proclaiming that might was right, and filling the earth with "violence." This was the hope which expressed itself in the sublime prophecy of Enoch, preserved to us in Jude's Epistle, concerning the vengeance of God upon them who destroy the earth. They may not have recognised in the promise of the woman's seed, the second Adam, the Lord from Heaven, or a theocracy in which the King should be both God and man in one person forever.

This revelation was probably reserved for a later period. But undoubtedly they looked for a universal reign and triumph of righteousness among men, to be brought about, in some strange way, by the weakness and suffering of the righteous. They could see it written in the very terms of the promise, that the right should conquer, and that the right should conquer *as right*, and therefore must conquer not by might, but by weakness and suffering.

One great example of God's vengeance upon the seed of the serpent, executed for the salvation of the woman's seed, was given in this period. The cause of the devil was ruined for a time by the deluge. The prophecy of Enoch received its first fulfilment, and a judicial discrimination was made between the righteous and the wicked, which was a new prophecy *in act* of the final discrimination and of the utter overthrow of the serpent's kingdom. Thus the faith of the righteous was increased and confirmed in the proto-evangelium; and it was signally demonstrated that it is not a vain thing to serve the Lord.

Another example, of a different sort, yet bearing upon the same end, was given after the flood, in the defeat of the scheme of the Babel builders. These men were the legitimate successors of the Cainites in spirit (compare Gen. iv. 16, 17, with xi. 4), building a city in anticipation of the city which God intended to build (Heb. xi. 10-16; xii. 22; xiii. 14; Rev. xxi. 2, 10-27), and so renouncing their interest in God as the covenant God of his people. Their language was, "Our tongue is our own; who is Lord over us?" so showing itself to be a tongue speaking proud things and exalting itself against the heavens; a tongue set on fire of hell, and setting on fire the whole course of nature. "Let us make ourselves a *name*;" a name which shall represent as much as the name of God, an all-disposing Sovereignty and an all-comprehending Good. (Compare the language of Nebuchadnezzar in Babel Redivivus, in Dan. iv., 30, and that of Babylon the Mystical; again, in Rev. xiii. 5; xviii. 7; see also Rev. xiii. 18, for the signification of the *name*, and compare xix. 16. The name of Babel is only, after all its pretensions, three 6s, not a 7, the number of God.) Here the spirit of the world, of heathen-



ism, (which is the worship of the creature, and specially of *man*,) of the kingdom of the dragon, comes out in an audacious form, and its defeat is a pledge and earnest of the final defeat, when all languages (see Dan. iii. 7, 29; Rev. xiii. 7; xvii. 15) shall unite in the praise of Christ, and in swearing to his name; when the tongue shall no more be set on fire of hell to blaspheme God and slander his King and his saints, as well as to glorify man and his works; but shall be set on fire of heaven, to show forth the wonderful works of God. (See the pledge and earnest of the glorious consummation, in Acts ii. 1-11.) Then, once more, shall the earth be "of one language and of one speech," and the Lord shall be King over all the earth. "In that day shall there be one Lord, and his *name* one." (See Zech. xiv. 9, and compare Zeph. iii. 8, 9.) "For then," saith the Lord, (Zeph. iii. 9) "will I turn to the people a *pure language*, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve him with one consent."\*

PERIOD II., B. C. 2000—1000.

The Church is still patriarchal in its form, but no longer catholic. A hint had been given of the coming change in the prophecy of Noah, concerning the history of his sons. Canaan seems there to be entirely shut out from covenanted mercy, and Japheth is represented as partaking of it only after it had been first and specially deposited in the line of Shem. And here let it be noted, once for all, that the changes in the forms of the Church are never abrupt or violent. Intimations are given before hand that the change is coming; and after it is come, the dispensation which is passing away, is suffered to overlap that which is coming in; so that no rude shock is given to the habits or the hopes of the people of God. Thus, besides the instance before us, in which Noah's prophecy went before, and Melchizedek appears afterwards to show that the Adamic or Noachian

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\*"It was the opinion of Zoroaster, the founder of the Magian sect, that the earth, after the general dissolution and destruction of Ahriman, (the evil principle) would all be a plain and make one city, wherein men would live together in a happy state, and all use '*one language*.'"—*Plutarch De Isid. et Osir. apud Russell's Connection of Sac. and Prof. Hist.*, Vol. I., p. 78, note.

dispensation still bore good fruit, we have the "particularistic" dispensation of Abraham and Moses overlapping the catholic dispensation of the Gospel. (See Acts, *passim*.)

Up to the flood, the true religion had been found, in point of fact, only in a particular line. The line of Cain had repudiated its interest in God and in the promise of the woman's seed, but had not been deprived of it by any formal constitution of God. Those who waited for the promised salvation were found in the line of Seth. After the flood, all men were, of course, of the race of Noah, and the same proneness to go astray from God was exhibited as before. The Babel-builders were the successors of the Cainites in spirit and temper, renouncing God as their all-disposing Lord and their all-comprehending Good, substituting their own will in the place of his, and the combined resources of man for the fulness of God, as their satisfying portion. The tendency to apostasy and idolatry was desperate and universal. Speaking after the manner of men, the only hope for the preservation of the true religion seemed to be in the segregation of some one family from the mass, in making this family the depository of the promise, and in confirming the promise by some visible sign and seal, which might be at once a remembrance of the faithfulness of God and of the obligation of man.

Accordingly, we find the family of Abraham thus separated from the mass, and a formal covenant made with him on the part of God, and confirmed by the sign and seal of circumcision. We say a covenant, for it seems to us to be refining too much, as Dr. Mason does (*Essays on the Church*), to suppose two covenants, in one of which temporal blessings are promised, and in the other spiritual. The fifteenth and seventeenth chapters of Genesis record, not the ratification of two covenants, but two ratifications of the same covenant. If it be asked, Why two distinct ratifications of the same covenant? the answer may be found, perhaps, in the use which Paul makes of the history in his Epistles. A careful examination of the passages will show that, in illustrating the nature of faith, the organon by which our justification is accomplished and our communion with God maintained, and in adducing for this purpose the "Father of all them that believe,"

he refers mainly to that part of the history which precedes the institution of circumcision, and very specially to the incidents of the fifteenth chapter of Genesis. Now the reason of this is obvious. In the fifteenth chapter the patriarch is almost wholly passive, a passive recipient of promises. The covenant here is a covenant rather in the sense of a dispensation of promises given by one party and received by the other, than in the sense a contract involving *mutual* stipulations and engagements. We have, indeed, the usual ceremonies for ratifying a covenant, but God alone (in his symbol) passes between the parts of the slain victim. So far as the patriarch is active, his activity is ministerial mainly; it is the activity of an attendant and a servant, rather than of a contracting party. But as to the promise, God gives; Abraham receives by faith. Hence the frequency with which Paul refers to these incidents, when his purpose is to illustrate the great truth that righteousness comes by believing, and not by doing. It is here, perhaps, we are to find the explanation of that text in the third of Galatians, which has been for ages the *crux interpretum*, "a Mediator is not of one, but God is one"; there was no need of a Mediator here, for there was but one God, and the seed to whom the promise was primarily made, was one with God. In the *covenant of redemption*, there was no Mediator, for the high contracting parties were God the Father and God the Son, the Seed (compare John i. 1); in the *covenant of grace*, God the Son and Seed becomes the Mediator. In a word, the promise is made sure to Abraham and all his seed by the fact that it is absolutely unconditional and free. Under the Abrahamic dispensation, therefore, a great advance is made in revealing the nature of the promise, the nature of the means by which the promise is made sure to all the elect, and the nature of the faith of the elect. "Abraham believed God, and it was accounted to him for righteousness;" *i. e.*, as the apostle explains, his faith is reckoned to him as the means (instrumental) of obtaining the righteousness of God.

In the seventeenth chapter we find the covenant ratified again, and ratified now in a manner which makes the agency of Abraham, as a contracting party, conspicuous. A seal is ordained,

not in the heavens above, like the bow in the cloud in the covenant with Noah, nor in nature around, like the tree of life in the covenant with Adam; but in his own body and in the bodies of his seed; a *sacramental* seal, not an arbitrary or conventional sign, and therefore a seal which might subserve and was designed to subserve the double purpose of confirming the faithfulness of God in fulfilling his promise, and of confirming the faithfulness of Abraham and his seed in fulfilling their vows to be the Lord's. He promised to be their God and they vowed to be his people.

Again: this new dispensation of religion was distinguished by a new development of the doctrine of the Church. The Church had not yet become clearly distinct from the other fundamental forms of human society. The State does, indeed, seem to have emerged in the line of Cain, where there was no Church; but in the line of Seth, the Church was still confounded if not identified with the family. Now, however, a line is drawn within the sphere of the family itself, by which those who are in covenant with God are separated from those who are without. All of Abraham's descendants except those who were in the line of Isaac, are excluded from the Church visible. This is the reason why the writers of the New Testament make so much of the Abrahamic covenant in connexion with the doctrine of a Church visible, and go no farther back in the history of the race.

Another very important point in the constitution of the Church visible established by the Abrahamic covenant was the membership of infants. This may be said to have been implied in previous covenants with man, in the Adamic and the Noachian, and seems to grow, almost of necessity, out of the constitution of the family as the unit of society; but it is articulately announced in the covenant with Abraham. As this covenant is perpetual, according to the statements and reasonings of Paul, in the third of Galatians and the eleventh of Romans; and this feature of the covenant has never been repealed, the conclusion is inevitable that the infant seed of believers are still to be recognised as members of the Church visible. The conclusion, we repeat, is inevitable, if the perpetuity of the Abrahamic covenant be conceded, and no act repealing the membership of infants can be alleged.

As to the faith of the Church in this period, it may be observed that, in consequence of the fuller revelations to Abraham, the people of God had clearer views upon some points of theology than they had before. A few of these may be mentioned: 1. That the original promise of the woman's seed should be fulfilled in the line of Abraham, more definitely in the line of Isaac, more definitely still in the line of Jacob; and in the last days of Jacob, he announced by the Spirit of prophecy that the great salvation was to be expected in the line of his son Judah; and further, in this last prophecy, the promise points out more clearly than ever before, *one person* as the seed, by way of eminence. It is to Shiloh that the people shall gather, or be obedient. The kingly or monarchical form of the body of the seed is also clearly hinted at. 2. That this promise is the promise of a great work to be done, a work so great that divine power alone can accomplish it. Along with the renewal of the promise is the revelation that it shall be fulfilled in the seed of Abraham himself. This could not be without a special and supernatural work of God. Incredible it seemed to the patriarch, even at the first announcement of it; and yet the birth of Isaac was yet longer delayed, in order to make it all the more evident that the seed was, as it were, created or supernaturally produced. The birth of Isaac was a shadow of that greater birth which should come to pass by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of a virgin, and a shadow also of the birth which takes place in the soul of every man who enters into the kingdom of God. Salvation is not reformation brought about by argument and persuasion, but the communication of life to the soul which "is not." 3. That the suffering of the woman's seed should be that of a victim offered in sacrifice. This was the great lesson impressed upon Abraham and Isaac by the scene of the intended sacrifice of "the only begotten." In the mount of the Lord it was seen, and should be seen. Abraham saw Christ's day and was glad. 4. That the inheritance should be restored: not the lost Eden, indeed, but a real outward inheritance, which should combine all that was beautiful in a garden, with all that was strong and splendid in a city, "a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is

God." (Heb. xi.; Gal. iii.) 5. That as in all God was the worker, so he was sovereign in all. How strikingly does this come out in Abraham's own household, and then still more in Isaac's! (Compare Rom. ix. 11-13.) As all was pure grace, so all was pure sovereignty.

As to the worship of the Church, it was essentially the same until Moses as it had been before, with the exception of the sacrament of circumcision.

*The Mosaic Dispensation under the form of a Commonwealth.*

The body of Abraham's chosen seed has now grown into a *nation*, and needs new revelations and a new form. The following are some of the features which distinguish the Church visible in this period of its history:

1. It remains *particularistic*, consisting of the chosen portion of Abraham's family in the line of Isaac and Jacob, and this only, in covenant with God. Provision was made indeed for the reception and incorporation of Gentiles; but they must first be circumcised and become Hebrews.

2. There is an enlargement of the revelation of the promise and a fuller interpretation of the covenant. The idea of *redemption by blood* comes out more fully, and a special sub-covenant is made by God with the people, to bring out this idea more fully.

"As before he called upon Abraham to enter into an instrument with him, by an external act, affixing his seal thereto, and saying, 'This is my covenant: every male shall be circumcised, and it shall be a token between me and you;' so now, appointing the shedding and sprinkling of blood, he declares 'The blood shall be to you for a token.' This, therefore, is a covenant of a sacramental nature; and, after the method of the former covenant, a seal is appointed to be affixed thereto, which seal itself is found to be a symbol of all the great truths and blessings stipulated in the instrument.

"Looking backward, and comparing this with the previous covenants of Jehovah, we shall find this to embrace and bring out more clearly the truths and blessings of those that precede it. The enmity and struggle between the two seeds of his Eden covenant here stand forth strongly in the hostility of Egypt to Jehovah, and cruelty to his chosen: the bruising of the heel, in the sufferings endured by the chosen seed; and the bruising of the head, in the overwhelming judgments upon Pharaoh. The theology of the sacrifice by blood, revealed in Eden, now reappears

in the blood of the lamb slain and sprinkled. The promise of the covenant with Noah, securing the descent of the blessing to the line of Shem, here appears in the body of his descendants selected as special objects of divine favor. The provisions of the charter-covenant with Abraham, organising the descendants of Israel as a visible Church, here appear as actually fulfilled, in not only a vast body of people, but that body organised as the congregation to which Moses speaks, and that, too, with its elders already executing their office of rule; to whom he came at first with his credentials from Jehovah, and to whom, as representing the congregation, he now repeats the command of Jehovah."—*Robinson's Disc. of Redemption*, pp. 102, 103.

We are not to think of Israel, therefore, as an ordinary nation in political bondage, throwing off the yoke under the guidance of some great patriot, and achieving its liberty and independence; nor are we to think of Egypt simply as a mighty national power oppressing a weaker by force and fraud; but we are to think, on the one hand, of a visible representation of the old dragon, the serpent, receiving from that dragon his "power, seat, and great authority;" and, on the other hand, the people of God redeemed from bondage and oppression. We have here the beastly kingdom, and the kingdom of the Son of man; the kingdom of darkness, and the kingdom of light; the world which lieth in the wicked one, and the Church of the living God.

Further, it is an instance, an example, a specimen, of an actual redemption vouchsafed to the Church; not a mere sign or type of the great redemption. We lose not a little of the instruction and comfort which the history of God's dealings with his Church is designed to afford, when we look at these great facts of his providence merely as modes or forms of imparting truth or of revealing promises. They are promises of redemption *fulfilled*, though fulfilled only in part; actual *instalments* of redemption, if we may so speak; and therefore pledges and earnest of the completing and consummating of the redemption. As Peter (2 Ep. iii.) and Jude (Ep.) argue from the past judgments of God, in which there was a separation between the righteous and the wicked, to a final judicial separation between these two classes, so we may argue from the partial and preliminary acts of redemption performed for the Church to its final and complete redemption. The preliminary acts constitute redemption in a

preliminary stage; hence the Church of the redeemed in the Apocalypse (c. xv.) appropriating the "song of Moses" as its own, as well as singing the "song of the Lamb." They are songs of the same redemption, sung by the same body of redeemed people.

3. The *ceremonial law*, as it is mainly a ritual of worship, must claim a fuller notice in this sketch of the development and phases of the visible Church. This law was designed to accomplish two ends entirely distinct: one was the same with that of the moral law, to express the conception of holiness, and to teach the redeemed people how to glorify God; the other was a gospel end, to teach the redeemed people how sin was to be taken away and holiness to be acquired. In both relations, it was a school-master to bring the Church to Christ, who is the fulfiller of the law; who is at once a perfect example of the holiness which the law requires, and the taker away of the sin which the law condemns, the Lamb of God which taketh away the sin of the world.

The moral law, from its very nature, is eternal; the ceremonial, from its very purpose, is provisional and temporary. It did not need to be formally repealed; it was necessarily superseded by the next stage in the development, just as the bud is superseded by the blossom, and the blossom by the fruit. The "good olive tree" (Rom. xi.) has passed through many stages in its growth; and in every stage the essential has been preserved and strengthened, while the accidental of the stage which preceded has passed away. While it was in bud, no power on earth could suddenly advance it to the stage of fruit-bearing; when it is bearing fruit, no power on earth can put it back into the state of budding. So the Church can never go back to the Mosaic ritual. A society may be organised, calling itself a Church, which may adopt such a ritual, but it will not be the Church. Rome has Judaized; but with what result? The ceasing to be a Church of Christ.

The ceremonial law, then, was a mode of preaching the gospel, and this was its principal end. It was a mode suited to that stage of the Church's development. The promised seed had not yet come, and the representations of His person and work



were of course prophetic. not historic; and being prophetic, the symbolic and typical modes of representation were best adapted to the condition of the Church. In reference to things future, the only way, so far as we can see, by which the Church could have any adequate conception of them, was by conceiving them in the forms of the present; that is, by symbolical and typical forms. Hence, even in the New Testament, after plain unsymbolical history and theology constituting the great mass of its contents, we find at the end a book of the future fortunes of the Church, written in the language of symbols, and cast in an Old Testament mould throughout. The symbols of this book, however, are not symbols to be *acted* as a part of the worship of God, as in the Mosaic ritual, but to be contemplated as the vehicle of a divine revelation of the future.

The reason why the ceremonial law is generally regarded, even by intelligent Christians, as a legal discipline rather than as an evangelical dispensation, is probably twofold; *first*, because it was a mode, as we have seen, of setting forth the moral law; and *second*, because the Jews, as a body, lost sight of its principal intent, and perverted it, as they did the moral law also, into an instrument of justification. Hence, to their unenlightened consciences, it became a yoke of intolerable bondage. That it was not so to the enlightened saints of the Old Testament, is abundantly evident from the Psalms. This perversion was one of the circumstances which created the necessity for the order of prophets. The first chapter in the greatest of the prophets (Isaiah) reveals the whole case, and shows how deplorably a beneficent institution of God had been abused by the folly and perverseness of man. We find a similar abuse under the dispensation of the gospel. The *means of GRACE*, and especially the only two which possess a symbolical character, Baptism and the Lord's Supper, have been put in the place of Him to whom they were designed to be merely *pointers*, and the doing of them has been trusted in as a justifying righteousness.

The true statement of the matter is, that there has always been but one Church; that this Church has always been under a dispensation of promise and of law; that the promise and the

law have not always been equally prominent; that under the pre-Mosaic and the Christian dispensations, the promise was more conspicuous than the law; that under the Mosaic, at least until the decline of the Jewish monarchy, the law was more prominent than the promise. There were beatitudes and maledictions under all dispensations; in some it might be said that there were beatitudes as well as maledictions; in others, that there were maledictions as well as beatitudes. When, therefore, John says, "the law came by Moses, but grace and truth by Jesus Christ," we are to understand that the contrast is one of *degrees*, not of *kinds*. Moses was a deliverer as well as a lawgiver. (Acts vii. 35.) Christ was a Lawgiver (Matt. v.—vii.) as well as a Saviour. The Old Testament and the New contain one and the same religion for one and the same Church. The Church, under the Old Testament, is the son and heir in a state of childhood, subject to tutors and governors; the Church, under the New, is the son and heir in a state of majority. (Gal. iv.)

We close this account of the ceremonial law with the following pregnant and beautiful statement of the relations of the law and the gospel, (these terms standing here for the Old and New Testament dispensations) in Bernard's Bampton Lecture (L. vi., p. 146, Amer. ed.):

"The gospel is the heir of the law; it inherits what the law had prepared. The law, on its national and ceremonial side, had created a vast and closely-woven system of ideas. These were wrought out and exhibited by it in forms according to the flesh; an elect nation, a miraculous history, a special covenant, a worldly sanctuary, a perpetual service, an anointed priesthood, a ceremonial sanctity, a scheme of sacrifice and atonement, a purchased possession, a holy city, a throne of David, a destiny of dominion. Were these ideas to be lost, and the language which expressed them to be dropped, when the gospel came? No! It was the heir of the law. The law had prepared these riches, and now bequeathed them to a successor able to unlock and diffuse them. The gospel claimed them all, and developed in them a value unknown before. It asserted itself as the proper and predestined continuation of the covenant made of God with the fathers, the real and only fulfilment of all which was typified and prophesied; presenting the same ideas which had been before embodied in the narrow but distinct limits of carnal forms, in their spiritual, universal, and eternal character. The body of types according to the flesh died with Christ; and with Christ it rose again a body of

antitypes according to the Spirit. Those who were after the flesh could not recognise its identity; those who were after the Spirit felt and proclaimed it. The change was as great, the identity was as real, as in that mystery of the resurrection of the body which the same preachers showed; in which the earthly frame must lay aside the flesh and blood which cannot inherit the kingdom of God, and must reappear, dead and raised again, another and yet the same, 'sown in weakness and raised in power, sown in dishonor and raised in glory, sown a natural body and raised a spiritual body.' "

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ARTICLE II.

WILSON'S SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA.

*History of the Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America.*  
By HENRY WILSON. Boston: James R. Osgood & Company.  
3 Vols., 8vo., pp. 670, 720, and 774.

This ponderous work is what the well-informed reader would expect from its author. The first volume professes to treat the rise of slavery in the United States, from its beginnings up to the admission of Texas. The second continues the history of the sectional controversies about it, to the election of Lincoln. The third treats of the war and its results.

Of this huge "partisan document," it may be justly said, that its staple material is sophistry and misrepresentation, and its very title an insult and falsehood. In the sense of the author, there has been no "slave power" in America. It suited the purposes of the conspirators among whom Mr. Wilson acted all his political life, to advance their project of riding into sectional domination by means of the Abolition phrensy, to imagine a "slave power" in the South, which cherished the counterpart design to his: that of usurping the authority of the United States to extend slavery, at the expense of others' rights, over the whole country. But in fact, the States whose citizens owned slaves, never were a "slave power" in any sense but this: that they endeavored to employ the rights guaranteed to them by the laws

to protect their legal property ; just as Ohio sought to protect the property of her citizens in their swine ; Kentucky hers in their mules ; and just as Mr. Wilson sought to protect his property in shoes. The only differences were that the South never imitated his protection of his shoe-making profits by partial and dishonest tariffs ; and that those interested in the swine, the mules, and the shoes, were not compelled to a constant self-defence, because they did not experience from us the constant and lawless assaults on their rights, which Mr. Wilson's set aimed at our industries and lawful interests.

The book, whose very title is false, may be safely expected to furnish abundance of similar material in its pages. The reader has to go a very short distance, indeed, to find this expectation verified. The preface, in its first paragraphs, informs us that in 1860, 1861, "treasonable menaces had ripened into treasonable deeds. A rebellion of gigantic proportions burst upon the nation with suddenness and fierceness." . . . "These crimes against the peace, the unity, and the life of the nation, and these sacrifices of property, of health, and of life, were the inflictions of the slave-power, in its maddened efforts to make perpetual its hateful dominion." These six lines contain just seven manifest misstatements. There was no "nation;" for the United States were then a confederation of sovereign States, and consequently there was no "national life," in Mr. Wilson's sense. Secondly, it was hence impossible that one of these sovereign constituents could commit "treason" against its own creature, the common agent. Hence, thirdly, there could be no rebellion in the case. Fourthly, the resistance of the Southern States against usurpation was not sudden ; it had been uniformly and long foretold, and was the deliberate and fore-declared result of the vital aggressions aimed at their existence. Neither, fifthly, was there any "fierceness" about it, in Mr. Wilson's sense. The South prosecuted its defensive war with a humanity and moderation chivalrous, and, in the light of subsequent events, even Quixotic. Mr. Wilson's imagination had evidently not recovered, when he penned this preface in 1872, from the impression of "fierceness" derived from his own panic at Bull Run, when he fled so fast from the "rebels"

he had come to see conquered. Sixthly, none of the miseries of this war were inflicted by the States of the South, whom Mr. Wilson chooses to stigmatise as the "slave power;" for they desired only to be let alone in possession of their constitutional rights. The war was caused deliberately by Mr. Wilson and his party, who, as none know better than he knew, with calculated malice invaded our rights, goaded us to resistance, and refused all compromise, in order to avail themselves of the Abolition phrensy to revolutionise the government, establish their own faction in power, and gratify their spite against the men whom they could never forgive for being injured by them. The South made the war only in the sense in which the lamb of the fable muddied the stream by drinking below the wolf. Seventhly, and last, the Southern States never had any "dominion," hateful or otherwise, to perpetuate, and never sought any. They never aimed to be anything but what the laws entitled them to be, coequal parties to an equitable confederation. The only "dominion" they ever had was this: that their statesmen had so commended themselves by their ability, patriotism, purity, and disinterestedness to the confederacy, that the majority of the Northern as well as the Southern citizens had preferred them to demagogues of the Wilson type. *Hinc illae lachrymae!* The true solution of these three ponderous tomes is, that they are the howl of his malice at the American people's preference for Southern gentlemen over such as him, and of his gratified revenge for the slight.

He begins his "history" (!) Vol. 1., Chap. I., by ascribing the existence of slavery to men's selfish desire to live at other people's expense. This solution suits the slavery of his own State very well; for they, having no aliens nor savages among them by providential dispensation, went all the way to Africa to steal them for slaves. But the account which the Bible gives of the origin of slavery (Gen. ix. 25-27), is, that it came as the remedy for the depravity of the enslaved; and that it was the righteous means ordained by God to protect civilised society against the vice, laziness, theft, and violence of degraded persons, whose wickedness and ignorance rendered them unsafe depositories for the franchises of citizenship. Mr. Wilson is an ardent

specimen of that species of "Christian" whose Bible is no rule when it crosses his spite or his crotchet. The Bible account of the matter is one expressly appropriate to the South; for we, when we became free commonwealths in 1776, retained slavery as the necessary and just remedy for the presence of the savage Africans, with whom the "Christians" of New England and Old England, those simon-pure Abolitionists, had deluged us against our protest.

The author then proceeds: "American slavery . . . converted a being endowed with conscience, reason, affections, sympathies, and hopes, into a chattel. It sunk a free moral agent, with rational attributes and immortal aspirations, to merchandise. It made him a beast of burden in the field of toil, an outcast in social life, a cipher in the courts of law, and a pariah in the house of God. His master could dispose of his person at will," etc., etc.

Here, again, the errors are at least as numerous as the propositions. American slavery did not make the moral personality of the bondsman "a chattel," but *established property in his labor*; precisely the thing which Mr. Wilson possessed in his shoe factory operatives, in a much more selfish and grinding form than our system. We did not make the African a "beast of burden in the field," but a laborer, more humanely treated than Mr. Wilson's hirelings. We did not make him an "outcast in social life;" he possessed among his equals abundant social ties and enjoyments, and was, moreover, connected by real and tender domestic sympathies with his master's family; a thing which Mr. Wilson never dreamed of extending to the families of his hirelings. The bondsman was not "a cipher in the courts of law." His life, person, and chastity were shielded by the same law which protected his master; and his rights had such full recognition here, that he could sue his own master, with every advantage in the litigation, for his own liberty, if he could show any suspicion of unjust detention in bondage. He was not "a pariah in the house of God." He worshipped and partook of the Lord's Supper in the same sanctuary with his master; and with at least as little social distinction as existed between Mr. Wilson and the

white hireling who had been; perhaps, his late comrade on the shoe-bench. The master could not "dispose of his bondsman's person at will." The law among us secured his personal safety, life, chastity, Sabbath-rest, and subsistence, against his own master. Now, to appreciate the wickedness of this train of atrocious libels, one must remember that this man, if he ever took pains to inquire into the real nature of what he was denouncing, must have met with refutations of them all at his first step, and that, unless he literally stopped his ears, he must have often heard them disclaimed and refuted in the Senate of the United States by Mr. Calhoun, Mr. Hunter, and Mr. Chestnut.

The reader will be curious to know what the author does with the slave-holding and slave-trading record of his own State, both of which were of the blackest and most diabolical sort. To assume that an American Senator of Mr. Wilson's type knew something of the authentic history of his own country, might be a very violent surmise. But it would appear that this man knew he was deceiving; because he refers expressly, Vol. I., p. 6, to Moore's "Slavery in Massachusetts," a book which tells the plain story. He glozes about the protest of one or two old gentlemen, in the early days of the colony, and some abortive and deceitful legislation against the slave trade. He quotes quite at large the protests of the Quakers (whom Massachusetts was then persecuting!) He informs us that little Rhode Island was actively engaged in the slave trade, and that Newport was a great *emporium* for this nefarious traffic. But he takes care not to tell us that in 1637, when the Plymouth colony was but seventeen years old, it made trial of its infant strength by sending out the slave ship "Desire;" that the most fiendish laws were deliberately passed and habitually enforced, for kidnapping, enslaving, and deporting the Indians near them, from whose hospitality they had secured their homes; that the "General Court" of Massachusetts recognised the trade as legal, and took a share in its profits, in the shape of an impost; and that the United States census of 1790 found six thousand slaves in this little and barren territory. These facts are all substantiated by Moore, Winthrop's Journal, and other well-known authors.

But we pass to more recent facts. Mr. Wilson, Vol. II., Chap. XLV., of course lauds the vulgar old murderer, John Brown, as one of the purest, noblest, and most disinterested of heroes and Christian martyrs. He has no objection to the crimes of the old cut-throat, save that they pursued the wrong method for assailing slavery, and prejudiced the character of the party to which they belonged. The Senator does not claim any credit for Brown's exploits; but he does not seem to care at all to veil the fact that he was cognisant of his plans, and took no effectual steps to prevent their execution. That is to say, this sworn Senator of the United States sat silent while he knew that treason against not only the State of Virginia, but the United States, was brewing; and he did nothing to arrest the crime, save dissuade from it on grounds of party policy. It was well for his neck that the laws of the United States did not retain the doctrine of constructive treason, and that the Constitution and Government were so soon destroyed; else the historian might have shared the fate of his hero.

As a specimen of his historical accuracy, we may note, Vol. III., Chap. XII., where he assures us that the "capture of Washington was among the first things laid down upon the rebel *programme*." . . . "To seize the capital and all the departments of the Government; to hold Mr. Buchanan in abject surveillance during the remainder of his term, or, if he should prove too refractory, to eject him for a more serviceable tool; to prevent the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, and make Jefferson Davis, or whoever should be chosen leader of the new *regime*, President—these were the real and avowed purposes of the conspiracy." On what evidence does the reader suppose he asserts this marvellous fiction? Either upon the reports of those notoriously accurate persons, anonymous newspaper-scribblers, or the gasconading of some excited stump-speaker! Or else he absurdly wrests the expressed purpose of the leaders of the Confederacy, *after it became rightfully an independent power*, and had been reluctantly forced into a defensive war, to end that war with the least effusion of blood, by capturing the hostile capital! He also asserts, upon evidence equally baseless, the purpose of the Confederates to reopen the



African slave trade ; although, as appears, Vol. III. Chap. IX., he had under his eye the unanimous adoption by the Confederacy of a Constitution, which prohibited that trade far more effectively than the Constitution of the United States.

In Vol. III., Chap. XLII., Mr. Wilson gives his version of that act of usurpation and lawlessness, the Emancipation Proclamation. The narrative is singular. He desires to represent this act as the deliberate result of Mr. Lincoln's progress in conscientious conviction and statesmanlike insight. He would fain have us believe that he grew honestly to it from a more defective view. But even the brazen armor of the Wilson forehead seemed to be not quite hard enough for this assertion. He therefore conveys it to us as the testimony of that sheet, always so impartially and correctly informed upon American affairs, the *London Times*. Now, Mr. Wilson can hardly have been more ignorant of the real history of that step than other well-informed contemporaries. He knew that Mr. Lincoln, as well as the Freesoil platform on which he was elected, always and expressly disclaimed the right and purpose to meddle with slavery in the States ; that Mr. Lincoln spoke this doctrine and swore to it at his inauguration. He knew that there was no truth whatever in the pretext that the right to liberate the seceded States' slaves had emerged as a war power, because he had himself, after his Bull Run foot-race, voted solemnly, along with the Congress and President, that the war was not to be prosecuted for purposes of emancipation, but only to restore the Union as it had been ; and that Mr. Lincoln had been accustomed to reiterate this doctrine continually, in answer to all the urgency of the Abolitionists. Only a fortnight before the Emancipation Proclamation appeared, he had been urged by a committee of these fanatics to use the war to free the negroes ; when the "martyr-President," with the suavity and refinement which were usual with him, made about this reply, as he almost expelled them from his presence : "You must either be fools, or must think me a fool, that you ask me to do this thing which I have no right to do, and which I have sworn I cannot lawfully do. The Constitution does not empower me to make war to free negroes, but to restore the Union." Yet, *in*

*one fortnight thereafter*, he did the perjured thing! Mr. Wilson doubtless knew the solution of the question, Whence this summersault? The solution was this: that the great British public, though passionately anti-slavery, had at length been so thoroughly awakened (largely through the sagacious efforts of Admiral M. Maury) to the deceitfulness and injustice of the Yankee war; that public opinion was pressing the ministry irresistibly towards that just act, the recognition of the gallant Confederacy. It was then that Lord John Russell, the Liliputian prince of the pettifoggers and Abolitionists, instructed his envoy at Washington, Lord Lyons, to inform Mr. Lincoln's Government that there was no artifice by which the British people could longer be restrained more than a few weeks from recognition, except the playing upon their anti-slavery passions by making the war tangibly a war for abolition. This was the news which caused Mr. Lincoln to hasten to forswear himself. This is precisely the amount of credit which the great "Liberator," and the party he represented, deserved at the hands of their "fellow-citizens of African descent."

Vol. III., Chap. XLVII., contains our author's advocacy and account of the enormous innovation of universal negro suffrage. On p. 672, he intimates that the few sensible men who opposed this perilous measure were very naughty children, in that they imputed a partisan desire to manufacture voters for the Radical ticket, as the motive. He would have us believe that their motives were the most disinterested possible, and their deliberation the most cautious, patient, and candid; but that, turn whichever way they could, they found themselves shut up to the measure of universal negro suffrage, by their gratitude to the two hundred thousand negro soldiers who had eaten rations for the salvation of "the life of the nation," by the logical consistency of their principles of equality, and above all, by the truculent determination of the "ex-rebels" to trample on the colored man, unless he were defensively armed with the ballot. The Senator should have foreseen how dreadfully this nice story was to be damaged by the "peaching" of an accomplice. Unfortunately, Gen. Sherman, in his most veracious Memoirs, tells us that Mr. Chase, the power behind the throne at Washington, assured him in May,

1865, that it was the purpose of the Government to bestow universal suffrage on the negroes, and avowed the very reason which Mr. Wilson pretends to disclaim. *Sherman's Memoirs*, Vol. II., p. 373.

The author died in 1872, bequeathing to his country the curse of his public career, and this large legacy of error and prejudice, to poison the stream of history for those who believe in him. Since his death, the party whom he represented has been covered with so many infamies by its crimes against liberty and public virtue, that it is becoming hard for even the Yankee mind to conceal from itself the dishonesty of Radicalism. The best, and indeed the only, refutation of false history like this, will be the developments of the future. The day will come when all men will recognise the truth that the freesoil, the warlike, and the reconstruction exploits of Mr. Wilson's party had precisely as much patriotism and sincerity as its *Credit Mobilier*, its salary-grab, its executive and legislative bargains, and its returning boards. This is the only answer to slander of the South, to which the audience for whom he wrote will listen. True as all well-informed men know our criticisms to be, they will pass for nothing with his people at this time.

It may be asked, Why repeat, then, these futile corrections of pertinacious falsehood, since intelligent men at the South are so fully informed of them, and others will not heed them? We write for the generation of young men now growing up at the South, to whom the old *regime* can only be known as history. They will be prone to feel, with an ingenuousness natural to the Southern gentleman, as to his fathers, that it is scarcely conceivable a man who had been Vice-President, should write so large a book, so prejudiced and false in its very structure. In the facility of their charity and truthfulness, they will find it hard to appreciate the reality. For their sakes the correct history must be perpetually reasserted, and its falsifications unmasked. The task is a tedious and repulsive one: to refute again oft-refuted slanders and sophisms. But it must be done, or we shall have a generation of sons befooled into Mr. Wilson's venomous estimate of their fathers' deeds, and drugged with his poisonous heresies.

This book impresses the candid reader with several facts and inferences, which are consolatory or instructive. Mr. Wilson displays, in his vain-glorious desire to be a martyr for truth, the estimate which respectable and sensible men at the North almost universally held of his party at its origin. He tells us, truthfully, that Abolition was at first denounced, alike by the Senate, the Bench, and the Pulpit, as a crime and a mischievous and senseless fanaticism. The explanation is, that the men of 1833, in the North, while no friends of slavery for their own society, yet knew enough experimentally of its real nature to understand the diabolical wickedness of Abolition. Respectable Northern public men had not then become factionists. They had some respect for law and covenants. They knew what Africans and slavery were. Hence, they knew Abolitionism to be, what it has proved itself, the dire enemy of the Constitution, the African, and the white man, at once. It was only after the school-master and school-marm, the hirelings of a political faction, and its Dugald Dalgettys, the politicating parsons, had educated a new generation upon the *pabulum* of fiction and hatred, that the Wilson tribe began to appear statesmen and patriots, and his libels history.

The attentive reader will rise from the perusal of this book also impressed with another fact: the Freesoil party never designed anything short of the utter overthrow of Southern rights. Every page reveals, directly or indirectly, that it was not free-soil in the territories, but the destruction of the South, which was its real aim. The pretence of the Lincoln platform, that the right of the States over their own institutions was inviolable, fades away as one reads, into an invisible veil. There is here the consolation that the resistance of the South, which was the occasion, NOT THE CAUSE, of so much woe, was not an act of gratuitous heat. It was the work of the Southern masses, and not, as Mr. Wilson pretends to believe, of the leaders. Our leaders were mostly behind the emergency, and were still crying to the people, Peace! when there was no peace. But the honest sense of the people had an intuition of the true state of the crisis; that it was their vital rights which were aimed at. This book convinces the reader again that the people were right.

Mr. Wilson evinces also the vast mischief done to their own section by a certain type of Southern men, once much admired among us. The slaveholder of this class was usually a gentleman of some culture, and by affectation a philanthropist. He had probably been educated at Harvard, Amherst, Yale, or Princeton. Accustomed to the simple, unaffected honesty of Southern cultivated sentiment, and the disinterestedness of Southern patriotism, he was simply incapable of believing in the duplicity and one-sidedness of Northern politics. When his more clear-sighted neighbor cautioned him, his answer was: "For shame! Do not yield to prejudices so bitter." So, in his unsophisticated eyes, all that glittered from the Yankee mint of opinion, passed for gold. He imbibed with docility the fictions which were given him as history, and the pretentious social science which had libels and boasts for its main facts. When he returned from the North, and contrasted its prosperity, bloated with commercial plunderings of the South, and protective tariffs and bounties, and endless jobs, with the leanness of the South, he accepted the solution which his professor of this profitable philosophy had so industriously "dinned into him," that this was the curse of slavery. Thus, so soon as he became a petty politician, he sought occasion to utter the spurious wisdom of his alien teacher. Thus he became, unintentionally, an echo of the slanders of the enemies of his own people. He ascribed to slavery a depression which, but for that most energetic and economical form of labor, would have depopulated the South, and which was really the result of the calculated oppression of New England, through the Federal Congress. He babbled the imaginary political economy of men who never saw slavery, and who argued from assumed facts which never existed, its impoverishing effects. He was even criminal enough to echo the shameful indictments against the morals of his own people, which had been cunningly thrust into his mouth. No where was this species of nascent politician more prominent than in Virginia, in the Legislature which followed the "Southampton insurrection." These young members ventilated their logic and self-importance by spouting in Richmond all the false facts and absurd theories which they had imported from Yale

and Harvard, about "the fearful insecurity of the system, its injustice, its wastefulness, and its debauching effects upon morals." The future found these young gentlemen, indeed, in two widely sundered classes. Those whom Mr. Wilson quotes with most admiration, if they survived, were found among our most despised renegades. The rest, as soon as their beards were grown, learned better wisdom, and with a happy inconsistency, became staunch Southern men. But the mischief was done. They had given the truculent assailants of their fatherland a text. When the most brilliant of them, James McDowell, in his wiser years, essayed to stay the tide of fury and aggression in the Federal Congress, he was answered from his own speeches in the General Assembly of Virginia. And Mr. Wilson has again taken care to embalm all the most extravagant of these declamations in his storehouse of slander, as the testimony of Virginia's own best sons against her. He tells his readers nothing of the other side. He professes his wonder that Virginia, after these emphatic confessions, *did nothing*. He says nothing of the sober logic of wiser men among the Virginians, which speedily blew away all this froth of youthful eloquence, leaving the sober reason of all calmed into the clear truth that the old system was safest, best, and most beneficent to the African. He never heard, we presume, of the masterly essay of President Dew of William and Mary, in which that accomplished man combined the finest resources of the historian, the jurist, and the political economist, to evince the shallowness of the emancipation rhetoric. It was such discussion as this which reassured Virginia and opened the eyes of all her young anti-slavery men, save such as were ripening into future scalawags. But meantime they had slandered their own mother, and her embittered enemies will take good care not to let the slanders die.

In conclusion, one rises from the perusal of this book with a mournful impression. What must be the future of a people, the majority of whom accept such writings as this for history? This science is the very eye of statesmanship. With false history for pilot, can the ship of state land anywhere but on the breakers? That people which "lives, breathes, and has its being" in an

enveloping atmosphere of falsehood in history and sophisms in philosophy, has nothing before it but to unlearn its heresies in a fearful school of experience. And what prospect has the South for just or even merciful rule, when subjugated by a people who believe Senator Wilson's black representations about us? *His book has passed already through four editions.* The disdainful and imperious North, pleased to see those whom she has violently crushed accused of all guilty things, will never condescend to look at any reply, until a retributive Providence compels her to read it in the calamitous fruits of her creed.

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ARTICLE III.

Dr. BLEDSOE'S PHILOSOPHY OF VOLITION.

*An Examination of President Edwards's Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will.* By ALBERT TAYLOR BLEDSOE. Philadelphia: H. Hooker. 1845. 12mo., pp. 234.

*A Theodicy, etc.* By A. T. BLEDSOE, LL.D. New York: Carlton & Porter. 1856. 8vo., pp. 368.

*Vindication of our Philosophy.* By the Rev. A. T. BLEDSOE, LL.D. *Southern Review*, Art. V., January, 1877. Pp. 54.

The nature of free agency constitutes much the most important problem in the whole range of philosophy. Indeed, it would be no exaggeration to claim for it an importance greater than all the rest of philosophy together, after man's rationality is admitted. The connexions of this problem with theology are manifold and vital. As is one's philosophy of the will, such, if he is a consistent thinker, must be his theory of providence, of foreknowledge, of the decree, of original sin, of regeneration, of the perseverance of the saints, of responsibility. The most momentous things to man, in all the universe of space and time, are responsibility, sin, penalty, and redemption. But one of the clearest of our intuitions tells us that free agency is essential to

a just responsibility, to guilt and merit, to reward and penalty. What, then, is, free agency? What are its real conditions? This must ever be the question of questions.

Dr. Bledsoe has seen clearly this fact; and hence all the discussions of his Examination of Edwards, his Theodicy, his debate with the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW from 1871 to his last thundering broadside, January, 1877, are virtual or actual discussions of free agency. When we add the other fact, that no point in philosophy has been surrounded with more of confusion, ambiguous definition, and prejudice, the thoughtful mind will need no apology for our continuance of this vital discussion. A special and practical reason exists for carrying it, in this case, to a thorough result. This is the mischief which Dr. Bledsoe is unconsciously doing among evangelical Christians and ministers. He has been an Episcopalian and is now a Methodist minister. He stoutly declares he is no Pelagian; he considers himself quite a Pauline divine. His theory of free agency retrenches some of the untenable logic of his school, and frankly admits some of the positions and arguments of the orthodox philosophy. Especially does he teach his errors with an equal vigor of thought and style and obvious integrity of purpose. The sad result is, that he is forming the opinions of a multitude of young Christians, and ministers even, in the Episcopal, a Calvinistic, Church, to what will turn out, in their cases, bald and poisonous Pelagianism and Socinianism. These young men, scantily furnished, perhaps, in the history of doctrine and philosophy, adopt Dr. Bledsoe's conclusions, unconscious that they contain the very rudiments of those heresies, supposing them to be new (and safe) results of his original discussions. But they will, we fear, think too connectedly to adopt also the happy inconsistencies by which Dr. Bledsoe arrests himself; and they will be plunged into deadly errors, which he, with us, will lament. We are convinced thus, that there is nothing in Southern, or even in American, theological literature, more important than a thorough adjustment of this debate.

Dr. Bledsoe's reply to our very courteous and measured argument of last October, is delivered with unspeakable energy, and



eloquence of invective. He professes to see in the provocation nothing but imbecility and ignorance. But his readers are asking, "Why, then, this effort?" Why should leviathan thus "tempest the deep" to crush a minnow? Would he fill the whole sea with bloody foam, unless the lance of his little assailant had pierced consciously to his vitals? He complains that his theory of free agency has been criticised without ever having been read; that he is represented as holding exactly what he repudiates and refutes; that page and word have not been quoted faithfully from his *Examination of Edwards and Theodicy*, to show what he really holds. Now, a sufficient reply to this loud complaint would be to say that *neither of these works was placed at the head of our critique*; that we did not undertake specially to discuss them at that time, but only to defend ourselves and the truth from the aggressions contained in the pieces which we expressly named. Is it not preposterous that, when a voluminous writer is taken to account for his recent declarations, he should claim a right to have works of twenty years ago included? But we stoutly assert, as we shall evince, that our recent chastisement of Dr. Bledsoe's trespasses on Presbyterianism was not composed without just understanding of those books. If there remains any appearance of unfairness, it will be removed by remarking, first, that Dr. Bledsoe has, in some cases, very causelessly mistaken his critic as meaning to put propositions into his mouth as Dr. Bledsoe's own, when the thing obviously designed was to show that Dr. Bledsoe's positions were obnoxious to certain absurd corollaries; and second, that it may be entirely feasible for him to quote from his earlier writings what is opposite to positions we do ascribe to him, *because he so contradicts himself*. But that is his misfortune, and not our fault. He complains that we did not cite his own words. We surmise that when we proceed to do this, and show that the same contradictions remain, he will be hardly so well satisfied as he now is. One bitter complaint is, that we charge the virtual tendency of his scheme of free agency to be Pelagian, when it is not. We shall see. Another is, that we accuse him, in his account of the rise of volition, of not seeing the significance of subjective disposition in the matter;

whereas, he claims that he does see and teach all about it. We shall see whether he does. Still another complaint is, that we charge him, in speaking of motive, with overlooking the vital distinction between subjective appetency and objective impressions on the passive sensibility, which, he claims, he has most perspicuously separated. We shall see whether he has. A fourth complaint is, that we make him hold mind itself to be the "efficient" and the "cause" of volitions; whereas, he now wishes to be understood as holding that "mind is not the efficient cause of volition." We shall see whose is the contradiction.

Chiefly Dr. Bledsoe seems to complain, because our review did not again go back and debate his theory of the will. We will endeavor to remove that ground of complaint also. Mere rejoinders, sur-rejoinders, and replications upon personal and partial issues, are little to our taste, and of little fruitfulness. We presume that neither the Presbyterian nor the Methodist public is much interested in that thesis which Dr. Bledsoe pursues with so much zeal and pleasure, viz., that his critic is silly and ignorant. It is more important to settle the question, whether Dr. Bledsoe's way of asserting *the contingency of all responsible volitions* is any more valid than the old way, which, he admits, Edwards has demolished.

Before we proceed, however, to this main object, we wish to show the reader with how much violence our author is in the habit of contradicting himself and the truth. Our purpose is not so much to enjoy our reasonable self-defence against his accusations, as to convince of the real incoherency of Dr. Bledsoe's theory. He contradicts himself because the positions he wishes to occupy are contradictory, and the candor and vigor of his own spirit precipitate him into the pitfalls he has prepared for himself.

Thus we are much berated for representing him as holding that the mind is the efficient or the cause of its own volitions. He tells us that he has asserted the contrary. The latter is perfectly true, both of his books and his Review. Thus, in the latter, p. 11: "All . . . must admit this exemption of the mind in willing from the power and action of any cause. . . . It is this exemption which constitutes the freedom of the human mind." And p.

20: "What he (Dr. Bledsoe) really denies is, that there is *anything*, either in the mind or out of the mind, *which produces volition.*" This is clear enough. But in Section IV. of the Examination of Edwards, and in the Rev., p. 16, he finds himself face to face with the inevitable maxim, *Ex nihilo nihil*; and he admits the absurdity of a change, either in mind or matter, "without any parentage whatever." It is easy to anticipate that the stress of his own common sense must precipitate him into the opposite declarations which we ascribed to him, and it accordingly does so more than once. Thus, on the very page cited (16th), "Volition never comes of itself at all; *it comes of mind.*" "Volition always has its parentage in mind." Is not a "parent" a *cause* to its own offspring? On the same page, he angrily declares *he has not denied* that "volitions have any efficient cause or antecedent *of any kind.*" On p. 21 he declares that original concupiscence, "caused" by Adam's fall, while not itself sinful, is the "source" of all men's sin, and leads uniformly to sin. On page 14 he assures us that he, along with all the advocates of free agency he ever heard of, has maintained always "*that the mind is the cause of volition.*" So also in his Examination of Edwards, we find him saying, p. 47, "Under certain circumstances, the free mind will furnish a SUFFICIENT *reason and ground* of the existence of a volition." Page 48: "I do not deny that it (volition) *depends for its production* upon certain circumstances, as the conditions of action, *and UPON THE POWERS OF THE MIND,*" etc. Page 71: "It is true that President Edwards tells us of those who 'imagine that volition has no cause, or that it produces itself.' . . . But who ever held such a doctrine? . . . I have never been so unfortunate as to meet with any advocate of free agency, either in actual life or in history, who supposed that a volition arose out of nothing, without any cause of its existence, or that it produced itself. They have all maintained, with one consent, that *the mind is the cause of volition.* Is the mind nothing?"

We now ask the candid reader, does not this last passage mean that the mind is the *producing cause* of it? Again, when Dr. Bledsoe says that volition has "its parentage" of the mind, that de-

pravity is the "source" of all sins, has he not said in substance, what in another place cited above he has said in words, that the mind is the efficient cause of volitions? Is not the cause which produces a thing efficient thereof? If Dr. Bledsoe desires to use words without sense, he must excuse us; we cannot follow him. If he now means to say that his own words, the mind is "the cause" of its volitions, are meaningless, it is his only excuse, but a very poor one. It is perfectly true that he does contradict himself by stating with the greatest perspicuity and by arguing, that volitions have no true cause, that they are not effects at all; that they are contingent as to all antecedents whatsoever. But this (the stronghold of his philosophy of the will) is yet so utterly incompatible with consciousness and common sense, and with his own admissions, that he cannot avoid declarations equally emphatic on the opposite side; he slips into them by the mere force of nature.

Dr. Bledsoe complains again, that we do him great injustice in saying that he, like many other analysts of mind, has failed to give proper weight to that decisive fact, the influence of disposition, or *habitus*, on volitions. And yet in the same breath he glories in asserting that *he does not ascribe* any important influence to that great fact. Well, that is precisely what we charged and now charge on him as a fatal error. And when we come to test what he so modestly terms that "most careful, conscientious, painstaking, and elaborate discussion," in the 15th Section of his Examination, or 3d Chapter of his Theodicy, in which he impotently endeavors to dispute (what his own common sense makes him in many places assert) that the mind's native dispositions are, and must be, regulative of its volitions, we shall show by the confusions and futility of that argument, the full justice of the charge.

He also complains grievously of our charge, that in discussing the efficiency of motive, he fails to see and use the vital distinction between the objective inducement and the subjective motive. We now proceed to show that this *our charge is exactly true*. This is clearly betrayed by the manner in which Dr. Bledsoe declaims about it, at this very place. (REVIEW, p. 42.) He assures

us that he understands it perfectly, of course; for he proceeds to tell us, "this distinction has never been overlooked by anybody." . . . "We have certainly never known any man or read any author who was so weak or so silly as to overlook such a distinction." But it is a well known fact in the history of philosophy, that the distinction between objective inducement and subjective motive, which we have in view, and of which we were speaking, *has been overlooked*, and that *by all philosophers* of the Sensationalist schools. Hobbes overlooked it; Locke overlooked it; so of course did *Condillac* and *Helvetius*; so did all the fatalistic schools. Yea, more: their very principles necessitated that they should overlook it; because, from their maxim, *Nihil in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu*; in other words, from their analysis of all subjective states of appetency into mere reflexive modifications of states of passive sensibility caused by the objective, they could not, as consistent thinkers, hold or use the distinction. This is notorious. Now, the above assertion of Dr. Bledsoe inevitably proves one of two things: either that *he does not appreciate* that important distinction as we hold it, or that *he is ignorant* of the ordinary history of philosophy. And it is very vain for him to endeavor now to prove his correct appreciation of the difference between objective inducement and subjective motive, by citing to us, as he here does, sentences from his books, in which, wrapping both kinds of antecedents together, under the common promiscuous name of "motive," he asserts of them all indiscriminately, that they are all not efficient, but mere occasions of volition. *That very mode of assertion betrays the justice of our charge.* But we shall not rest it here alone. Sometimes it is hard to "prove a negative." But one evidence in this case, of at least partial weight, is, that the Examination of Edwards may be searched through in vain for an articulate statement or application of the distinction. But more than this: numerous passages imply its rejection. To apprehend these, a word of explanation may be needed. The sensational theory of the soul's powers, with which both English and French psychology were so deeply tinged by the ascendancy of Locke, traced all mental modifications, whether intellectual or emotive, to the

objective impressions. As with it all cognition was empirical, so all emotion was passion. (The very language confounded the words.) The outward impression on feeling was regarded as the *cause* of the emotions which followed. In somewhat the same way as the blow caused the pain in the head of the man struck, so they conceived that the pain caused the resentment, and the resentment caused the volition to double the fist and strike back. Now, if this is the whole account of the emotions of this rational agent, his free agency is illusory. Resentment efficiently determined the volition to hit back; pain from a blow caused the resentment; the blow delivered by another man caused the pain. Thus, while the man struck acts as a sentient agent, he does not act as a self-determined rational one. He is but a sentient machine, whose acts are remotely but efficiently determined from without, not from within. The theory of the causative efficiency of motive, thus expounded, was a theory of fatalism. Such was that of Hobbes; such that of all consistent sensationalists, as well as of theological fatalists.

But a more correct psychology supervened. Scholars grasped the all-important truth, all along practically assumed in the philosophy of the Bible, that the human soul has not only percipient faculties and sensibilities, but, *a priori*, constitutive powers of reason and appetency; that in the emotive sphere of the soul's action, these appetencies (and repulsions) were inherent, subjective, and spontaneous; not functions of passive sensibility, but functions of subjective activity, whose spontaneous movements are merely conditioned on, not caused by, the impressions on sensibility. And they saw, what the Bible had intimated, that it is these subjective desires and repulsions which are the true motives (*motiva*) of volitions. It is this vital distinction which Sir William Hamilton makes under the terms sensibilities and conative powers; and he (erroneously) claims to have been the first to discriminate them clearly. One more important truth remains. The rational agent's "conative powers" do not move at hap-hazard; they have their regulative principle; and this, in every case, is the agent's subjective native disposition, or *habitus*. In the order of causation, disposition is *a priori* to the operation of

inducement, and is not modified by it. It is not the pain of a blow which determines a given human soul to be resentful : but it is the preëxistent resentful disposition which determines that man to resent a blow. It is not applause which causes the spirited young man to desire fame ; but it is the native, preëxistent desire of fame which determines the young man to regard applause as an objective good. When an objective inducement becomes the occasion of an act of soul, as, for instance, a forgotten purse, of a servant's theft, the causative efficiency is not projected from the gold upon the thief's soul, but from the thief's covetous desire, as regulated by his evil disposition, upon the gold. This was established in our article of October last. Now, then, from the point of view of this Bible psychology, the rise of volition becomes intelligible. Our consciousness had told us, on the one hand, as against the Sensationalist scheme of motive, that we are free agents ; that in all our deliberate and responsible volitions, our souls are self-determined. Our common sense and experience had told us, on the other hand, that such volitions cannot be uncaused and contingent changes in the mind ; that the very notion of a rational volition is of one for which the man had a controlling reason ; or, in other words, of one which the motive efficiently prompted. It is because this distinction between subjective motive and objective occasion of choice has not been clearly held to, that nearly all the confusions in the argument have arisen. The great treatise of Edwards, while on the right side, is by no means free from this confusion. All the arguments of Reid (on the Active Powers) against the moral necessity of volitions, are occasioned by this confusion ; and they have force, just so far as they are aimed against the Sensationalist view, which makes the passive sensibility the efficient motive. So, the whole force of Dr. Bledsoe's reasonings against Edwards—so far as they have any force—is from this mingling of the sensationalist theory of necessity, with the true theory of certainty, which views volition as the effect of subjective motive. It is certainly true that Dr. Bledsoe blindly opposes both systems, the correct one and its sensationalist travesty. But the question is, Has he intelligently discriminated therein, and has he seen the decisive

consequence of that discrimination? We again affirm, *he has not*; and we proceed to affirmative proofs from his own works.

Thus, Exam. of Edwards, p. 40, line 2d, Dr. Bledsoe says: "The strength of a motive, as President Edwards properly remarks, depends upon the state of the mind *to which* it is addressed." (There is another fatal admission here, which we reserve.) Now, manifestly, Dr. Bledsoe, like Edwards, confounds motive with objective inducement. Their "motive" is something which "*is addressed to the mind!*" That tells the whole story: it is the objective inducement! He argues in utter obliviousness that the real "motive" is not the thing "addressed *to the mind,*" but the subjective appetency determined by the "state of the mind" to which the object is addressed.

So, p. 75, line 7: "A mind, an object, and a desire, (if you please,) are the indispensable prerequisites, the invariable antecedents to volition; but there is an immense chasm between this position and the doctrine that the mind cannot put forth a volition unless it is made to do so by *the action of something else upon it.*" Here, again, Dr. Bledsoe betrays the fact fatally that he does not perceive what the Calvinist means by efficient motive. He thinks we mean the objective; the "something else" than the mind, that is supposed to "*act upon it.*" He is fighting blindly. This passage also presents another proof of this: that, like so many others in all his writings, it confuses together objective inducement and subjective desire, as all alike *not "causes,"* but "*conditions*" of volitions. Had he seen the proper distinction, he would never have spoken thus; he would have said that the objective is the one thing, namely, the condition only, and the subjective desire is the opposite thing only, namely, the cause.

On p. 89 again, the author fails to apprehend the true doctrine in the same way: "External objects are regarded as the efficient causes of desire; desire as the efficient cause of volition; and in this way the whole question seems to be settled." That is to say, Dr. Bledsoe has still no other apprehension of our doctrine than that of the sensationalist. He thinks that we think desires are *efficiently caused* by external objects! He has not gotten out of the delusion that the desires which we hold prompt volitions, are



functions of the passive sensibility; and this is the doctrine which he opposes. And how does the reader suppose Dr. Bledsoe designs to fight it? By attacking the second link of what he erroneously supposes to be the Calvinist's chain; by denying what he grants every other assertor of free will, besides himself, has held; by denying that such desires have any efficiency as causes of volitions! Thus, p. 92: "Our desires or emotions might be under the influence and dominion of external causes, or of causes that are partly external and partly internal; but yet our volitions would be perfectly free from all preceding influences whatever." Thus, it appears plainly, he is still in the dark. For, we do not hold that our desires or subjective emotions are "under the influence and dominion of external causes." We hold that they arise from within, functions of the soul's own spontaneity, and efficiently regulated by the soul's own permanent *habitus*.

On p. 97, again, the same confusion appears. Dr. Bledsoe asks, "Is it true, then, that any power or efficacy belongs to the *sensitive or emotive* part of our nature?" So, on pp. 99, 100, Dr. Bledsoe cannot accept that law so beautifully expounded by Bishop Butler, that while our passive impressions become blunter from habitual action, (*consuetudo*,) our active principles become stronger. What is his difficulty about it? He tells us that he cannot see how, when the passive function of sensibility is weakening, the effect thereof can be increasing. Still he is in the same fog; he supposes our active desires to be mere functions of passive sensibility. We crown our proof with Dr. Bledsoe's concluding words, p. 102: "The truth is, that in feeling the mind is passive; and it is absurd to make a passive impression the active cause of anything. The sensibility does not *act*, it merely *suffers*. The appetites and passions, which have always been called the 'active powers,' the 'moving principles,' and so forth, should be called the passive susceptibilities. Unless this truth be clearly and fully recognised, and the commonly received notion respecting the relation which the appetites and passions sustain to the will—to the *active power*—be discarded, it seems to me that the great doctrine of the liberty of the will must continue to be involved in the saddest perplexity, the most distressing darkness."

It would not be hard to add many other proofs, as p. 182, (top,) but they are superfluous. It is Dr. Bledsoe who is in "distressing darkness." He has mingled together the functions of conation and sensibility in inextricable confusion, and hence can see no light. The very passage in the Theodicy to which Dr. Bledsoe so confidently appeals to show that *he does appreciate* the vital relations of native, subjective disposition, and of subjective appetency to volition, betrays an ignorance and blindness about the whole truth that are simply pitiable. Does he (Theodicy, pp. 173-4) distribute the powers of the mind into "intelligence, sensibility and will?" Yes. But by "will" he means exclusively here, not Hamilton's "conative powers," not what the Calvinists mean by "will" in its wider sense, the whole subjective activities, including disposition and subjective desires leading to volition; no: but simply and nakedly, the power of choosing, the volition-making power. Either he is ignorant of the *main drift* of our meaning, or he discards it. Then he tells us every act of the intelligence is merely passive. And "*every state of the sensibility is a passive impression!*" Then comes volition, efficiently produced by nothing, within or without the mind, always contingent. These are the only antecedents of free volition of which Dr. Bledsoe knows anything! The Almighty may necessitate states of intelligence (mere passivities) and states of sensibility (mere passivities again) by his agency in providence or regeneration, if he pleases. But he has not thereby communicated either necessity or even certainty of a single right volition in the newborn creature; for those states are only antecedent occasions, not efficient of volition. God may have new created the heart, but the man may still make every volition a sin, if he chooses!

One more of Dr. Bledsoe's complaints of unfairness remains to be noticed. This is, that *we assert his philosophy to be virtually Pelagian*. This charge we did undoubtedly make, and intend to repeat. Now, Pelagius and Celestius taught sundry dogmas, such as baptismal redemption, monkery, the existence of unredeemed infants dying in infancy in a happy eternal state which yet is not the Christian's heaven, which Dr. Bledsoe does not hold; nor does the veriest Socinian on whose modern shoulders Pelagius'

own mantle has fallen, hold them. They are as antiquated as the Ptolemaic Astronomy. These ancient heretics, again, carried out their erroneous first principles with a symmetrical consistency in some results, which we never dreamed of ascribing to Dr. Bledsoe; we do him no such injustice. In these senses he is, if he will prefer it so, no Pelagian. But in Church history, Pelagianism is a given, definite code of doctrines in philosophy and theology, clustering around certain hinge-propositions. These hinge-propositions granted, the essential body of the system follows for all consistent minds. What we mean by calling Dr. Bledsoe a virtual Pelagian is then this: That he asserts these hinge-propositions, and the more obvious and important of their consequences.

The central position of Pelagius and Celestius was this: 1. That volitions are contingent, and uncontrolled by any efficient antecedent either in or out of the mind; and that if they were not, man would neither be a free nor justly responsible agent. Accordingly, 2. They define sin and holiness as consisting only in sinful or right *acts of soul*. They hold, 3. That a natural or original sin or righteousness would be no sin or righteousness, because not chosen by the soul in an originating act of choice. They also hold, 4. That responsibility is absolutely limited by ability, taking "ability" in its scientific sense. Hence, 5. Primal man did not have any positive moral character impressed on him at creation. (If he had, not being the result of his own volition, it would have been as absolutely non-moral, as the natural color of his hair.) But he was *innocent; i. e.* in a state of harmless neutrality at the outset, and had to acquire his own positive moral character in his after career, by right acts of choice. Hence, 6. No power, not even the Almighty, could determine or give certainty to man's free volitions consistently with the nature of his free agency. Hence, also, 7. There can be no such native immoral disposition as that which Calvinists call moral depravity, inherited by children from Adam, for, if original, it would not have originated in the child's act of choice, and so, would have been involuntary and non-moral. Children, therefore, however they may go astray into sin from evil example, are not actually born

depraved. So also, 8. "concupiscence," an appetency for wrong not matured into purpose, although the occasion of sin, is not sin. And last, 9. The recreation of a soul into holiness, in regeneration, would be incompatible with free agency; hence, the gracious agency in regeneration is only suasive; and the change of heart can be, essentially, no more than the sinner's putting forth a hearty volition to change his conduct. Such is the well known outline; it is not necessary to burden the page with an array of names of learned sound, to substantiate the statement. It will not be disputed by the well informed. Our testimony is, that this is virtually Dr. Bledsoe's creed; and that it is not Wesleyan Arminianism. We shall let him speak mainly for himself.

Now, as to the first position, hear him—Theodicy, p. 153: "We lay it down, then, as an established and fundamental position, that the mind acts or puts forth volitions, without being caused to do so—without being impelled by its own prior action or by the prior action of anything else. . . . It is this exemption which constitutes the freedom of the human mind." Exam. of Edwards: "I think we should contend for *a perfect indifference*, not in regard to feeling, but in regard to the will." P. 110.

As to the 2d, it is enough to quote from the REVIEW, p. 28, these words: "*Holiness consists in those things which 'are done' by us according to the will of God, and not in those things which he has given us.*" Can anything be more explicit?

On the 3d point, Dr. Bledsoe is equally explicit. The whole 15th Section of his Exam. of Edwards is but a distillation of this Pelagian heresy. Let this unmistakable sentence suffice, p. 198: "It strikes my mind with the force of self-evident truth, that nothing can be our virtue, unless we are, in some sense, the author of it; and to affirm that a man may be justly praised or blamed, that he may be esteemed virtuous or vicious on account of what he has wholly and exclusively received from another, appears to me to contradict one of the clearest dictates of reason."

That Dr. Bledsoe holds, with all his heart, the 4th Pelagian principle, is sufficiently evinced by this sentence from the Exam. of Edwards, p. 182: "If my volitions are brought to pass by the strength and influence of motives, I am not responsible for them."

On the 5th point, our evidence is superabundant. REVIEW, p. 28, Dr. Bledsoe professes to quote, and adopts expressly these words of another: "Was not primal man *holy*? . . . I answer, innocent, *but not holy*." Exam. of Edwards, p. 199: "I deny that Adam was created or brought into existence righteous." P. 198: "He is neither virtuous nor vicious, neither righteous nor sinful. This was the condition of Adam, as it very clearly appears to me, at the instant of his creation."

On the 6th point, may be quoted, along with many passages from the Theodicy, the following from the REVIEW, p. 34: "Behind this veil of words," (the phrase, "certainty of volitions," used by Calvinists,) "as thin as gossamer, we see the same old thing, *the Scheme of Necessity*, grinning upon us." This latter he declares impossible to be reconciled with free agency. And REV. p. 6, borrowing the words of another: "Therefore, (with reverence be it spoken,) the Almighty himself cannot do this thing."

On the 7th point, Dr. Bledsoe professes, (in some places,) to depart from the consistent Pelagian track. He says, p. 21, that he has always held, in direct opposition to Pelagius, that Adam's sin "caused the depravity of human nature;" and that, while "Adam was created upright, in the image of God," "infants are born with a fallen and depraved nature, and can therefore, never be saved, without the regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit." Let us pause here a moment, to illustrate the intensity of his self-contradiction, both in thought and word. In this point, he is not, according to his present assertion, a Pelagian; but it is absolute absurdity that he, with his positions, is not a Pelagian here, as in other things. Let the reader note, first, the flat verbal contradiction. On the last page, "Adam was not created holy," only innocent. "I deny that Adam was brought into existence righteous." But now, lo! "Adam *was* created upright." Does not "upright" mean "righteous?" or is there some miserable jugglery in the interchange of these synonyms. But second, Dr. Bledsoe has no business believing that infants are born with a fallen and depraved nature. For, according to his own clearest doctrine on the last page, any quality which is original, *cannot be a moral* quality, not being the acquirement of the agent's own

undetermined, electing act. Any mind that can put two and two together, will see that Dr. Bledsoe is bound to follow his leader here also. Again, he has "dinned into us" his heresy (thoroughly Pelagian) that if a volition is caused efficiently *by anything*, in the man or without, it is not *free*. Then, it is impossible that a free agent can have a native principle in him certainly causative of sinful acts; because, according to Dr. Bledsoe, such acts would not be free. Hence, this doctrine of a depravity which is the "source" of all man's errors, is, in his mouth, utter contradiction and absurdity. Again, Dr. Bledsoe cannot hold that sinners have native depravity and need salvation by grace, as he has said, p. 21 REVIEW; because, in strict accordance with his philosophy, he has assured us, again and again, to the contrary. Thus REVIEW, Jan., 1875, p. 97: "New born infants *deserve no punishment at all.*" April, 1874, p. 353: "*The omnipotence of God himself cannot take away our sins and turn us to himself, without our voluntary consent and co-operation.*" *Does the dying infant give that voluntary, rational consent and co-operation?* Of course not; it is incapable of it. *Then, either it has no original depravity, or dying in infancy, it must, according to Dr. Bledsoe, inevitably be damned by it.* Let him be honest, then, and either go to the Pelagian ground, where he properly belongs, or else admit himself the believer in universal infant damnation. Now, let the reader pause and weigh for himself the inexorable logic of this dilemma. When he has done so, he will say, it is vain for Dr. Bledsoe, according to his wont, to writhe and roar, to scold and vituperate, in the hope of hiding his agony.

On the 8th point, Dr. Bledsoe so "glories in his shame," that it is almost superfluous to quote evidence that he does not think concupiscence is sin. But, as further illustrating his consistency, we quote REVIEW, Jan., 1877, p. 24: "Dr. Dabney says that we appeal to our philosophy 'to deny the sinfulness of original concupiscence.' We do no such thing. We appeal to our consciousness, to the consciousness of all men, and not to any philosophy whatever, to show that *a new born infant is not sinful*, or deserving of punishment on account of what it brings into the

world with it." Yet, he had said, p. 21, that it is born depraved! He then goes on to assert, in manifold terms, that concupiscence is not sin. He is even rash enough\* to quote Augustine, as holding with him.

On the 9th point of the Pelagian scheme which I have mentioned, Dr. Bledsoe, according to that method of absolute self-contradiction which is the chief trait of his philosophy, is both on the Pelagian side and the opposite. Consistency would require him to be all the time on the Pelagian side. If, as he so often holds, volition *cannot be caused* by anything either in the

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\* That Augustine did not exclude concupiscence from his definition of sin is evident from many passages of his writings against the Pelagians: one of which we shall quote from the very treatise cited by Dr. Bledsoe, "Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum," Lib. I., Cap. 10: "Magis enim se dicit (Paulus, Rom. vii. 16,) legi consentire quam carnis concupiscentiæ. *Hanc enim peccati nomine appellat.*" In Chapter 13 of the same book there is a passage which will perhaps account for the mistake into which Dr. Bledsoe has fallen. Augustine is explaining in what sense concupiscence *in the baptized* may be called sin and yet not sin: "Sed hæc (concupiscentia) etiamsi vocatur peccatum, non utique quia peccatum est, sed quia peccato facta est, sic vocatur: sicut scriptura manus cujusque dicitur, quod manus eam fecerit. Peccata autem sunt, quæ secundum carnis concupiscentiam vel ignorantiam illicite fiunt, dicuntur, cogitantur; quæ transacta etiam nos tenent, si non remittantur. Et ista ipsa carnis concupiscentia, in baptismo sic dimittitur, ut quamvis tracta sit a nascentibus, nihil noceat resurgentibus."

So also in his "De Nup. et Concup." I. 26: "In eis, qui regenerantur in Christo, cum remissionem accipiunt prorsus omnium peccatorum, utique necesse est, ut *reatus* etiam hujus licet adhuc manentis *concupiscentiæ* remittatur; manet *actu*, præterit *reatu*." This is almost identical (allowing for the clearer views of Luther and Melancthon on the subject of justification as a forensic act) with the statement of the Apology for the Augsburg Confession, Art. I. (See Hase's Evangelisch-Protest. Dogmatik, p. 75.) "Lutherus semper ita scripsit, quod baptismus tollat *reatum* peccati originalis, etiamsi *materiale* peccati maneat, videlicet *concupiscentia*. Addidit etiam de materiali, quod Spiritus Sanctus, datus per baptismum, incipit mortificare concupiscentiam." Melancthon, more than once in the Apology, says that Augustine is accustomed to define "peccatum originis concupiscentiam esse."

Dr. Bledsoe, it would seem, has taken a limited statement (and that not understood) in regard to concupiscence in the regenerate; as if it were designed to be universal.

mind or out of it; if all antecedent states, whether of intelligence or emotion, (the only emotions he knows of being passive impressions or sensibilities,) however they may be determined by omnipotence itself, still bear to volitions no other relation than that of conditions and not efficient; then Pelagius' view is the only possible one. There can be no other regeneration than a moral suasion resulting in a contingent and mutable change of choices as to sin and righteousness. And when Dr. Bledsoe is fighting a Calvinist, he is virtually in this position. He denies that there is or can be a necessitated holiness; and by this denial he makes us clearly see he means to deny the possibility of God's propagating in a free agent any such subjective state as would be followed with efficient certainty by any given kind of volitions. He also travesties the Bible doctrine of regeneration (showing again that he does not understand it) as God's directly and necessarily *producing the volitions* of the new born man. Whereas the Bible doctrine is, that God efficiently *produces the holy disposition* which regulates the man's volitions. When he would fain cleanse himself from the slough of Pelagianism, he paints to himself a regeneration which consists in God's efficiently creating in the man new views of truth in the intelligence and new acts of sensibility. But on this monstrosity we have sundry remarks to make. One is, that Dr. Bledsoe declares all the time, these new views and feelings God has produced are but mere passive functions of soul; and again, that volitions are, after all, uncaused by them. Then, of course, such impressions, however far omnipotence might carry them, *would constitute no moral change of the soul*. And we have, after all, no certainty of any new conduct from the new born man. If each volition arises uncaused, contingent, connected by no tie of efficiency with any antecedent state or act of mind, then all the volitions possibly may; so that we might have this monster: a man thoroughly regenerated by Omnipotence, and yet happening to choose to do nothing but sin! Our second remark is, that this scheme of regeneration, if it amounted to anything, would make the converted man a mere machine. It is entirely too necessitarian for us Calvinists! The states which are the necessary antecedent



conditions (not causes, according to Dr. Bledsoe,) of all his regenerate volitions, are mere functions of passivity. So far as those volitions have any connection or character at all, it is with impressions, in which the soul is *merely passive!* Thus, true spontaneity is left out; it is entirely too mechanical for us Calvinists.

But Dr. Bledsoe appeals to his friend *Wiggers*, ("Augustinianism and Pelagianism") (who is himself Pelagian in tendency, who helped him so much in writing his *Theodicy*,) to show what Pelagianism really is. Well, *Wiggers'* showing is pretty just, so far as it goes, but it is incomplete and superficial. It must be borne in mind that this system of error, like every other system of error or truth of human origin, was not fully developed by its inventors. Pelagius and Celestius did not establish all the regular parts and corollaries of their heresy, any more than Copernicus developed all the laws of that planetary system called Copernican. But from the premises which Pelagius gave, the rest grew, in the ulterior discussion, by a logical necessity; and thus *the system* known as Pelagianism came into the history of theology. Every one who thinks connectedly, whether he be friend or enemy of that system, recognises the vital members of the system, as belonging to it. Dr. Bledsoe quotes *Wiggers*, as saying that *the results* of Pelagianism condemned by the General Council of Ephesus, A. D. 431, (Wasn't that the "Robber Council?") were seven. Now, first, we have not been speaking of the results, but of the principles of the system; and second, these were very far from being all the results of Pelagianism debated in the Church. But some of these propositions Dr. Bledsoe says he holds; some he both holds and rejects, as we have seen; and all of them he would hold, if he had the logic and consistency of the early Pelagians. Thus, he assures us he does not think Adam's body would have died, whether he had sinned or not. He would be much more consistent if he did think so; for he thinks that millions of infants die who have no sin original or actual. Why not Adam too?

Nor can we see why Dr. Bledsoe should repudiate the 6th and 7th results of Pelagius: that the law, as well as the gospel, may be

a means of salvation; and that men without the gospel may in some cases practice true godliness, and go to heaven. For upon his theory of free will, why should not these volitions, which are always loose from all efficient control, happen sometimes to be right? And none but a Calvinist can consistently hold it certain that no Jew nor Pagan can serve God because he knows no gospel; for this would make him responsible for volitions which arise with certainty. The only reason then, that Dr. Bledsoe disclaims these "results" is that he does not think consistently.

In dismissing this part of the discussion, we beg the reader especially to note Dr. Bledsoe's positive claim that he holds the Wesleyan theology. This we shall now effectually explode. On pp. 24-25, of his REVIEW he concludes, sustained by the suffrages of a wondrous theologian, in the form of a Presbyterian young lady, that he knows intuitively no one is responsible for his native depravity; and he tells us in the same connection, that it is also an intuitive *datum* of his, that concupiscence is not sinful. "This," he exclaims, with ardor, "is our Methodism . . . . . born with John Wesley in the year of our Lord 1788." Now, Dr. Bledsoe is very right in his chronology, so far as that his doctrine was "born" long since the days of inspiration. But we utterly dispute that it is Methodism; or was born with John Wesley. No. This is his Pelagianism, "born" in the fifth century. Hear David, in the 51st Psalm, *repenting because he was shapen in iniquity and conceived in sin*. Hear Christ say, John iii. 6: "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." Hear Paul, Eph. ii. 3: "We were by nature children of wrath." Is God angry with what is not sinful? Who knows best what is guilty, God, or that wonderful "Presbyterian young lady?" And when we hear Wesley, we find that he has as little to do with the paternity of Dr. Bledsoe's doctrine as the Bible has. Doctrinal Tracts, page 251: "It has already been proved that this original stain cleaves to every child of man, and that *hereby* they are children of wrath and liable to eternal damnation." Says Dr. Bledsoe, REV., p. 24: "A *new born infant is not sinful, or deserving of punishment*." Says Wesley, it is, by reason of its original depravity, "*a child of wrath, and liable to eternal damnation*."

Wesley, on Original Sin, 1st British Edition, pp. 155, 156 :  
 “Now, *this bias of the will is certainly evil and sinful, and hateful to God*; whether we have contracted it ourselves, or whether we derive it from *Adam*, makes no difference.” . . . .  
 “Therefore the inference, ‘if natural, and (in some sense) necessary, then no sin,’ *does by no means hold.*” (Dr. Bledsoe asserts that if it be natural, and *in any sense necessary*, it is no sin.)  
 Wesley adds: “This doctrine has been held . . . . so far as we can learn, in every Church under heaven, at least from the time that God spake by Moses.” Alas for Dr. Bledsoe, Wesley discards him; says to him: “I never knew you.” Let him now launch some of his scornful invective at the great Founder of Methodism. We wait to hear the thunder. (Many proofs, equally explicit, might be collected from Wesley on Original Sin.)

On p. 27, of his REVIEW, as in the 15th Section of his Examination of Edwards, Dr. Bledsoe asserts in its baldest form, that most characteristic Pelagian principle: that Adam was not *made* holy, but only innocent, which he explains as meaning, neither positively righteous nor sinful; that no moral agent can have such positive initial righteousness; because such a state, if possessed, not being freely chosen by an act of will, would be no moral state at all. He proceeds, p. 27: “Probation is the necessary antecedent to the only means of attaining moral freedom or holiness.” On this heresy, we remark first: Scripture says, Luke i., 35: “The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee . . . . therefore, also, *that HOLY THING which shall be born of thee*, shall be called the Son of God.” Here was a thing *holy before a probation, born holy*. It was not the eternal Word, for that was not born of Mary; it was the humanity of the Messiah. This simple but terrible antithesis should be enough to open our author's eyes to the depth of his Pelagianism! In fact, his own proposition, as stated by himself, does articulately dispute the possibility of our Redeemer's being by nature a holy free agent. But this is the common faith of all Churches, and the corner-stone of our salvation. We now prove that Dr. Bledsoe's Wesleyan authorities are *as dead against him* as is the Bible, and the Church of all ages. Thus:

When Dr. Taylor, of Norwich, a recognised modern Pelagian, said, exactly according to Dr. Bledsoe's philosophy: "Nature cannot be *morally corrupted*, but by the choice of a moral agent"—Wesley's reply is in these emphatic words: "You may play upon words as long as you please, but still I hold this fast: I, (and you too, whether you will own it or no,) am inclined, and was ever since I can remember, *antecedently to any choice of my own*, to Pride, Revenge, Idolatry." (Isn't Dr. Bledsoe also evidently inclined to the first two?) "If you will not call these *moral corruptions*, call them just what you will. But the fact I am as well assured of as that I have memory or understanding." Original Sin, pp. 193, 194.

Dr. Taylor, in accordance with Dr. Bledsoe's philosophy, had said: "It is absolutely necessary before any creature can be a subject of this," (God's peculiar kingdom,) "that *it learn* to employ and exercise its powers suitably to the nature of them." Says Wesley: "*It is not necessary.*" . . . . . "But it must appear extremely absurd to those who believe God can *create* spirits, both wise and holy: that He can stamp any creature with what measure of holiness He sees good, at the first moment of its existence." . . . . "Just in the same manner you" (Taylor) "go on: 'Our first parents in Paradise were to form their minds to an habitual subjection to the law of God, without which they could not be received into his spiritual kingdom.' This runs upon the same mistaken supposition, that God could not *create them holy*. Certainly *he could, and did.*" Pp. 221, 223. Says Taylor, the Pelagian, like Dr. Bledsoe: "*Righteousness is right action.*" Says Wesley: "Indeed, *it is not*. Here, (as we said before,) is your fundamental mistake. *It is a right state of mind*, which differs from *right action* AS THE CAUSE DOES FROM THE EFFECT. Righteousness is properly and directly a right temper or *disposition of mind*; or a complex of all right tempers." Wesley here, at one trenchant blow, demolishes Dr. Bledsoe's whole philosophy of the will, and teaches, with the Bible and all orthodox Christians of all Churches, that right volitions are not uncaused; but the "effects" "caused" by holy dispositions acting *a priori* to the volitions. P. 286. And says Wesley in conclusion, p. 291: "From

all this it may appear, that the doctrine of *original righteousness* (as well as that of *original sin*) hath a firm foundation in Scripture, as well as in the attributes of a wise, holy, and gracious God."

This express contradiction of Wesley himself, leaves poor Dr. Bledsoe's "Methodism" in a pitiable plight. We have one more Methodist authority, which is, if possible, still more damaging, that of Mr. Richard Watson's *Theolog. Institutes*, Pt. II., Ch. 18, "Fall of Man, Doct. of Orig. Sin." Having stated precisely the doctrine of Dr. Bledsoe and the Pelagians, he proceeds to refute it thus: "If, however, it has been established that God made man 'upright;' that he was created in 'knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness,' and that at his creation he was pronounced '*very good*;' all this" (viz. Dr. Bledsoe's theory of volition) "falls to the ground, and is the vain reasoning of man against the explicit testimony of God. The fallacy is, however, easily detected. It lies in confounding '*habits of holiness*,' with the principle of holiness. Now, though habit is the result of acts, and acts, of voluntary choice; yet, if the choice be a right one—and right it must be in order to an act of holiness—and if this right choice, frequently exerted, produces so many acts as shall form what is called a habit, then either the principle from which that right choice arises, must be good or bad, or neither. If neither, a right choice has no cause at all; if bad, a right choice could not originate from it; if good, then there may be a holy principle in man, a right nature before choice; and so, that part of the argument falls to the ground. Now, in Adam, that rectitude of principle from which a right choice and right acts flowed, was either created with him, or formed by his own volitions. If the latter be affirmed, then he must have willed right before he had a principle of rectitude, which is absurd; if the former, then his creation in a state of moral rectitude with an aptitude and disposition to good, is established." The author then sustains the truth by citing similar arguments from Wesley and President Edwards.

Now this book is one of the text books of the Wesleyan ministry. The words we have quoted from it, which are worthy of being written in gold, give with unanswerable precision, the very argu-

ment we advanced in our REVIEW of October last, pp. 651, 656. The reader is referred to the discussion there, in which we established by the same logic and by unanswerable Scriptures, this doctrine of the Christian Churches. Dr. Bledsoe, in his reply, took good care not to venture near that part of our argument. Let it be also noted how scornfully and utterly Wesley and Watson here cast away his pet theory of the will. The latter states the idea "a right choice has no cause at all," Dr. Bledsoe's very theory, as a self-evident absurdity, which he uses to reduce his opponent to a ruinous dilemma. Both of them teach expressly and by constant implication, that holy dispositions are the efficient cause of right volitions. We have seen Wesley declare that Dr. Taylor's theory about volition, which is Dr. Bledsoe's, is his "*fundamental mistake*." Is Dr. Bledsoe a Wesleyan? or, like Taylor, a Pelagian?

The sophism which underlies this fundamental mistake is so mischievous and has evidently so completely deceived Dr. Bledsoe, that although we explained it briefly in our October No., p. 652, (top,) it is worthy of further illustration. The old sophism is, that a man cannot be responsible for a disposition with which he is endued by nature; because we intuitively judge that *we cannot be responsible for what is involuntary*. The answer is, that in the sense of that intuition, *a man's own native disposition is voluntary with him*. Nobody constrains him to feel it, or yield to it; he feels it of himself; he yields to it of himself. The meaning of the proposition, "a man is not responsible for what is involuntary," as our common sense assents to it, is this: *A man is not responsible for what befalls him AGAINST his own sincere volition*; that is all. Now, will Dr. Bledsoe be rash enough to say that a man's natural disposition actuates him against his own sincere volition? that the naturally envious man, for instance, is actuated by *his own* envious disposition, against his own hearty volition? Hardly. Nature does not act against itself. Dr. Bledsoe seems very strangely to jump to the conclusion, that, because we do not elect beforehand our natural dispositions, therefore we do not have them voluntarily, and ought not to be held responsible about them at all. He cannot see the simple truth, that this native disposi-

tion being *the man's own*, its influence is as really *a function of his spontaneity* as any volition could be, even on Dr. Bledsoe's extreme theory. Now, one simple question will clear away his confusion. May not a man's free preference accept and adopt that which nature gave him, just as much as though he had first elected the quality and procured it for himself? For example, here is a young gentleman who has a very nice brown beard. How does he like it himself? Extremely well; indeed he altogether prefers and admires it and quite prides himself on it. But whence did he get it? Shall we insinuate that it is the work of his own volition? (by the aid of a hair-dye?) Oh no. Nature gave it to him; and that is one essential ground why he is proud of it! So we see how entirely possible it is that *a quality* which one did not *acquire by an act* of choice, may yet be most entirely his *free, spontaneous preference*. Once more. We beg our young gentleman's pardon for supposing, (merely for argument's sake,) that he has the most frightful "carrotty red" beard, and (what is not at all impossible) that he is very foolishly and heartily proud of that same beard. Do not all the young ladies judge him to be therein guilty of "shockingly bad taste?" Of course. Dr. Bledsoe would come to his defence with his Pelagian logic and would argue that, inasmuch as his young gentleman had not voluntarily dyed his beard carrotty red, (but naughty Dame Nature had done it for him,) therefore his perverse liking for it must be involuntary; and so it is no violation of any principle of taste. But none of the young ladies would believe him; their common sense would show them, that this perverse pride in the carrotty red was just as spontaneous and free as though the fop had dyed the fair brown beard red "on purpose." Let the reader apply this parable to man's native moral disposition, and he will see that, although they be native, yet are we as free and responsible in them as though we had first procured them by a volition.

Once more. Dr. Bledsoe is much aggrieved by our saying that the result of his "Theodicy" is, that God admitted sin into his universe, *because he could not help it*. On p. 23d of his REVIEW, he exclaims that to hold such an opinion of God would be virtual atheism. And he urges, p. 24, that the very *gist* of his theory is,

that no one ought to discuss the question "why God *permitted* sin," because, in fact, he does not permit it at all. That this last is a play upon words only, and that he does teach substantially that *God cannot help* men's sinning if they choose, Dr. Bledsoe shall himself prove. He believes that sin is here, and that it is not God's choice it should be here. See Theodicy, pp. 197 and 199. He sees that sin "*will raise* its hideous head; but he does not say, 'So let it be.' No: sin is the thing which God hates, and which *he is determined*, by all the means within the reach of his omnipotence, *utterly* to root out and destroy." It is here. God does not consent to it, but is determined, as far as he can, "*utterly* to root it out." Yet it will *always* be (*i. e.* in hell.) Now, we ask any plain mind: Has not Dr. Bledsoe, in saying these three things, substantially said, that sin enters, because God cannot help it. Again, he says, with much iteration: "Having created a world of moral agents . . . . it was impossible for him to prevent sin," etc., etc. "He could not prevent such a thing." How much difference is there between this, and our "could not help it?" The candid reader will see none. And as to the question, whether it is correct to say God has "permitted sin?" this, even after Dr. Bledsoe has robbed him of his omnipotence, is a mere verbal quibble. When he says we must not speak of God as "permitting" sin, he is merely asserting that the word is always the synonym of *consent to from preference*. Of course God does not consent to sin, out of preference for sin itself; and if that is the only meaning of "permit," then God does not "permit sin." But wise men "permit" many things which they do not prefer. This use of the word is undisputed. And since we do not, like Dr. Bledsoe, rob God of his omnipotence over rational free agents, when we see him, for instance, permitting an archangel (Satan) to sin, and we know that his omnipotence would have enabled him to sustain Satan in holiness, even as it sustains Gabriel; then we are certain that we are right in saying, God *permits* sin, while he does not for its own sake prefer it.

Had Dr. Bledsoe considered a little, he would not have robbed God of his almightiness in the interest of a false speculation. He would have seen these consequences. If God, "having created a



world of moral agents, . . . could not prevent such a thing," then, first, there is no certain encouragement for sinners to pray to God for grace; and second, there is no certainty that God can keep sin out of heaven. Are not angels and saints in heaven free moral agents? If God was "determined, by all the means within the reach of his omnipotence," to root sin out of this world, and *has failed*, may he not also fail to keep it out of the heavenly world? Dr. Bledsoe cannot evade this by any of his expedients. Thus, his work, instead of being "a Theodicy," spreads the pall of despair over the kingdoms both of grace and glory.

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ARTICLE IV.

GODLIKENESS.

In the midst of a sermon, or obituary notice or funeral discourse, preached, written or spoken about a certain defunct statesman, the Rev. Professor Swing, of Chicago, compares the life of the statesman with the life of One whom he calls "God's Earthly Image." Profane history does not reveal much concerning the spiritual life of this statesman, except that he had for his spiritual adviser Mr. Ralph Waldo Emerson, whose only published theological doctrine is Brahminism, and who has never been called a Trinitarian. And Professor Swing keeps within the same safe limits in his theology, referring at times to the "divineness" of the Redeemer, but never to his divinity.

The object of this quotation is, to introduce the question: "What is meant by God's image?" Mr. Swing evidently uses the title as applicable to the Lord Christ, exclusively, or else uses it as equally applicable to him and to mere men. That there is such a thing as Godliness—or, literally, Godlikeness—is abundantly demonstrable by Scripture proof.

Giving the first place to Revelation, it is clear from the record, that God made man in his own image and likeness. "In the day that God created man, in the image of God created he him;

male and female created he them." And the meaning of this expression is involved in no doubt, but is plainly stated in Presbyterian standards as including a likeness in "knowledge, righteousness and holiness." Throughout both Testaments the exhortations to holiness are frequent, and are usually coupled with the announcement that the ineffable holiness of God himself is the unchanging standard as well as the foundation of the unchanging rule. "Be ye holy, *because* I am holy." In the New Testament the famous exhortation in the Epistle to the Ephesians explicitly reaffirms the old statement: "Put on the new man, which, *after God*, is created in righteousness and the holiness of truth." "After God," undoubtedly meaning, according to the image of God.

It also seems plain that these exhortations to righteousness do not touch the general doctrine of imputation. The righteousness of the new man, who is said to be a new creation, is his own personal rectitude of heart and life, and not the justifying righteousness which he obtains from the Redeemer in exchange for his own personal guilt.—He enters heaven, because the scars and stains of his sin have been obliterated by the exhaustion of the penalty. When Christ died, the saint died. If he died in the room and stead of his saint, then the saint died potentially. And the robe of righteousness in which he is clothed, was woven for him and put upon his redeemed person, without reference to his own personal acts, by Jesus Christ. It is the gift of grace, and no thread in warp or woof has been spun out of any element in his native character.

But this robe is never put upon the person of any non-saint. It can never be worn by any man who does not also put on anew the image of God in righteousness—personal to himself—and the holiness of truth. And while this God-wrought robe will not fit the person of any other than the man who also obtains the renewed image, it is also true that no personal holiness of heart and life can earn the robe. The restoration of the image is the work of God's free grace. The bestowal of the robe is the *gift* of God's free grace. The image is attained through conformity to the law, culminating in perfect sanctifica-

tion. The righteousness that justifies is not possible under *any* law. If it had been, verily it would have been by *this* law. But by the deeds of the law can no flesh be justified. Because, "justification is an act of God's free grace unto sinners, in which he accounteth those persons righteous in his sight, not for anything *wrought in them* or done by them, but only for the perfect obedience and full satisfaction of Christ, by God imputed to them and received by faith alone." (Larger Catechism, Q. 70.)

Nevertheless, the exhortations which abound, especially in the Epistles of Paul to the Romans, the Corinthians, the Galatians, and the Ephesians, must certainly indicate that the attainment is both possible and indispensable. As we have borne the image of the earthly, so also must we bear the image of the heavenly. And as the definition of sin is "any want of conformity to God's law," so the definition of personal righteousness must needs be conformity to this same law. And the powers conferred upon man at his creation, revived and renewed at his regeneration, were conferred originally precisely to this end. Man was created to bear the image of God. The first Adam lost it. The second Adam restores it. This much is revealed.

Before discussing the question, "What is the image of God?" it is proper to consider the creature and his capacities, as far as the declarations of Holy Writ and the deductions of reason will admit.

The institution of the Sabbath, whatever its value, considered economically, was originally to celebrate the rest of God from his work of creation. It really is not affected as an obligatory observance, by the question that relates to the length of the work, or the lapse of time between God's first command, "Let there be light," and God's final announcement, that all his works were "very good." God set apart the seventh day to commemorate his rest. If the investigations of science shall prove that the six days wherein orderly nature emerged from chaos, were really enormous epochs, beyond the reach of human computation, still the command rests upon the foundation of God's subsequent cessation from work. And the Christian Sabbath is a double memorial to the worshipper: testifying first, that the Creator

finished his work with the creation of man; and, secondly, that he can be just and yet justify the believer in Jesus, because the day witnesses the completion of redemption and the resurrection of the Redeemer. "He hath ceased from his work, and entered into his rest, and therefore there remaineth a rest (*Sabbatismos*) to the people of God." The argument in the Hebrews, (iv. 9, 10,) is the exact argument now presented, to wit: that the *one* work of redemption was finished at the resurrection of Christ, and there remaineth no more offering for sin; and accordingly the work of creation culminated in the creation of man, and there remaineth no possible creation of other intelligences.

Notice then: that God's last work was the creation of Adam—the man. Creation was not complete, and the Creator could not rest, until the highest possible product of creative energy was made. You cannot think of God as withholding certain reserves of power not required in the production of man. There are thinkable limitations to creative power. God could not create another God, because no creature can be infinite; and yet God could not cease from his working until he had made a creature endowed with all possible excellency short of Godhead. *Therefore* he made a creature capable of bearing his image and likeness. He made man, and entered into his rest.

Revelation does not tell explicitly what this last creature could accomplish by his normal powers. The most that is known is either by implication or by obscure hints scattered through the sacred volume. He was made upright and regal, "with dominion." The holy law, afterwards formulated upon Sinai, was written upon the nature and was the law of man's existence; *because* he was made in the image of God. This law, in its ten specifications, enjoins certain duties, none of them arbitrary, but all of them logically flowing from the relations that necessarily affected this Godlike creature. Thus, the Decalogue deals with two sets of obligations growing out of man's double relation, and a brief analysis will suffice to show the inexorable nature of these obligations.

First: The relations subsisting betwixt God and man—God the Creator, and man the creature. Given intelligent apprehen-

sion of this relation, and the obligation resting upon the creature to serve, obey, and glorify God appears. Nothing can be clearer than the first postulate of Calvinistic theology, that "man's chief end is to glorify God," and this postulate is logically based upon no other foundation than the relation of Creator and intelligent creature. You cannot predicate *duty* any otherwise than upon relation. Then, the stipulation of the covenant of works was clearly that man should be lifted out of the status of mere servitude, and given the status of sonship. Therefore, the second relation appeared: God the Father, and man the son. Given intelligent apprehension of this relation, and the obligation resting upon the son to serve, obey, and enjoy the Father, is plain. So the second postulate of pure theology is clear: "Man's chief end is to enjoy God forever;" and this postulate rests upon no other foundation than the relation involved in fatherhood and sonship. The enjoyment of God is not possible to any other than the children of God.

Secondly: The Decalogue presents a set of obligations founded upon the relations subsisting betwixt man and man. Three of these are very special, and all of them are enwrapped in the primal relation of brotherhood of race. This must needs be, because God, in this final exhibition of creative power, made a being who was to become a progenitor, and brotherhood was involved in the first words uttered by God to this creature: "Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth and subdue it."

The first provision in the formulated law belongs to the relation subsisting betwixt parent and child. Another touches the relation subsisting betwixt husband and wife. And a third conserves the relation subsisting betwixt master and servant. It is not necessary to enlarge upon this branch of the topic, and the only object of this short analysis is to bring into view the accurate accordance of God's wonderful law with the very prerequisites involved in the doctrine of Godlikeness.

Notice first, the fatherhood of man is the shadow and parable of the fatherhood of God. It is no where said that God made the angels in his own image, and no where are angels spoken of as progenitors. They are hierarchs—each angel made separately,

and undoubtedly equipped for separate and special duties. But there is no hint in Scripture that suggests the unspeakable tenderness of Fatherhood in the intercourse betwixt God and angels, or the love of brotherhood as betwixt the angels themselves; while the Scripture abounds with the most touching and emphatic assertions of the fatherly love of God to man, and with earnest exhortations to "the love of the brethren" as the very test and proof of interest in Christ. "We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren." But none of the examples of brotherly love that are recorded in Scripture will compare with the illustrations of *paternal* love that are so frequently given; as in the cases of Jacob and Benjamin, Abraham and Isaac, David and Absalom. No compositions have ever appeared in the world's literature that could raise such tumults of agonising sympathy in human souls as those brief stories of Scripture that touch upon this topic. What law, therefore, could be more deeply graven upon the soul of man than the "first commandment in promise"—"Honor thy father and thy mother?" Because in this relation of fatherhood, involving indestructible love, forbearance, long-suffering, gentleness, beneficence, and every noble attribute of humanity, man most accurately shows forth his Godlikeness.

The next relation involving specific obligations is that subsisting betwixt husband and wife. It also is founded in the nature of the case, and all the requirements of this law find a prompt response in the intelligent apprehension of humanity. It is at the very foundation of all forms of human society, and the marriage relation, with its reciprocal duties, is honored even among tribes that have not been enlightened by Christian civilisation. If this were not the case, if marriage were really an invention of priestcraft, as some filthy dreamers in this land assert, it would not be found in the Decalogue; because this wise and beneficent law was written upon the nature *formed* for Godlikeness. "These, not having the law, are a law unto themselves," and the argument of Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans, hinges upon this *natural* cognition of duty in the unreached heathen tribes who "do by *nature* the things written in the law." In many

tribes, where no formulated code of morals can be found, there have been the most stringent traditional customs conserving this sacred relation.

Here again, the human relation is seen to be the shadow of one subsisting betwixt God and the creature. The figure most constantly used in Scripture to illustrate the union established betwixt God and the Church, is that of the marriage relation. Christ is called the "Husband of the Bride." And one of the most gorgeous visions of the Apocalypse is that of the formal nuptials of the Lamb. Throughout the prophetic Scriptures the various forms of idolatry into which Israel had fallen are constantly presented under the form of violations of the marriage contract. Any reader of the Old Testament Scriptures will readily call to mind the numerous passages where this illustration is employed. And here again, the accurate correspondence betwixt the two tables of the law is revealed. The first "command in promise" is rather of the nature of a *nexus* connecting the human table with the divine; as the duty of obedience to parental authority rests upon the duty of obedience to the great Father, God. "Thou shalt have no other God before me;" or, as it may be rendered: "No other God—in my opinion"—is the opening injunction of the first table. "Honor thy father," is the opening command of the second, or the link betwixt the two. The honor is due, because the Father, the Royal Head of the household, is the representative and viceroy of God. And the sixth commandment thus naturally falls into place, prohibiting murder, because man was made in the image of God!

With this correspondence in view, notice the accordance of the seventh commandment with the second of the other table. Here is forbidden specifically the sin of idolatry, "Thou shalt not make graven images or worship them;" and, as already noted, the violation of this law is everywhere in Scripture likened to the breach of the seventh commandment. And while the unenlightened reader might say that God had selected this relation as the most appropriate among the relations of earth to enforce his prohibition, the Christian knows better. It is because man was made in the image of God that the relation is possible. If it

were not so, there would be no more of moral quality involved in the relation than may be found in the mating of birds and beasts. It is enough to say that the instinctive recoil of human hearts from this conclusion contradicts the postulate. It is the eccentric cognition of a prerequisite.

In confirmation of this theory of correspondence betwixt the two tables, it may here be noted that the eighth and third are brought into contact in the prayer of Agur, (Proverbs xxx. 9,) "Lest I be poor, and steal, and take the name of my God in vain."

The last relation touched by the Decalogue is that subsisting betwixt master and servant, involving all others, where domination on one hand is made to correspond with subordination on the other. The gospel precept enjoins the duty upon the naked fact that the relation exists by the ordinance of God. Obey the rightful authority—for this is the command of God; and obey without regard to the goodness or frowardness of the dominant power. And so the exhortations abounding in the New Testament relate to obedience to the most absolute forms of authority, and there is no provision, either in the law or the gospel, for popular forms of government. The only case on record in Scripture is that of Israel, when in *anarchy*—when "every man did that which was right in his own eyes." On the contrary, the King is constantly hedged about with a divinity that proclaims his Godlikeness, and his supreme authority *because* of his Godlikeness. "He is the minister of God, appointed for this self-same thing," to wit: to dominate his subjects, as God, the great King above all gods, reigns over all the universe. And considered independently of national prejudice and vanity, the republic is the most unstable of all forms of government. It hangs upon a shaking chain of contingencies; it is builded upon the shifting sands of popular whim; its origin is in the same form of unbelief which says "No God," and "Corban," and it is prolific in "writs of divorcement." The stability of human society would perish under democratic theories, were it not that God has engraven upon the *nature* of man the ineffaceable doctrines of the Decalogue, and followed the race through forty centuries with the



examples and traditions of regal authority. The postulate that "all governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed," is as absurd in political economy as it is false in logic and heretical in theology.

Note God's orderly sequences in the history of the race—past and to come.

First, the Theocracy—God dominant, and all the race subject. Second, the Kingdom—the king, the vicegerent of God, representing God, and reigning by divine authority. "By me, princes reign." Third, the Interregnum, whose last days are now upon the earth; characterised by curious antitheses, such as papal assumption on one hand, ruling over body and soul, following its victims through purgatorial fires into the dark chambers of hell; and, on the other hand, agrarian combinations that essay to override all law and authority—illustrated by Trades Unions, the Commune, Mormonism, and the other popular inventions of the devil that abound in this free and happy land. Then, (in the near future, it may be,) the Restoration, when the true divine Fifth Monarchy shall be established, and He, whose right it is, shall reign. And finally, the Culmination, when He shall have put down all authority and rule, and abolished death and hell, and when God supreme shall once more reign, all in all.

The patent objection to the argument thus far presented is, that the domination and authority of Father, Husband, and King, involve the subordination of Son, Wife, and Subject, and therefore the Godlikeness cannot be predicated of *all* the race. Look at these classes separately.

The subordination of the son is so important a doctrine of Holy Writ, that it is carefully noted even in relation to the mysterious Sonship of Christ, who, "though he were a Son, yet learned he obedience by the things which he suffered." (Hebrews v. 8.) And once more, in the same Epistle, (Heb. ii. 10) the apostle asserts the force of the moral obligation, compelling this Captain of salvation to be perfected through suffering, the sentiment being reiterated in the 17th verse: "It behoved him," etc. The positive subordination of the son, exemplified in all the patriarchal history, taught throughout all the prophetic Scriptures,

and engrafted upon the laws of the household, is emphasised by the Lord Christ in his withering denunciation of "Corban." (Mark vii. 10.) It is the very essence of the relation, and no man can outlive the obligation. When Lamech died, aged 777 years, he owed unanswering obedience to his father Methusaleh. And it may be noted here, that God did not require Noah to enter the ark and leave *any* of his ancestry upon the doomed earth. It would have been a horrible reversal of the inherent law of the relation, and God never does monstrous things. Noah was six hundred years old when he entered the ark, and the last man of his progenitors had already passed from earth.

Now, concerning this relation, the son who is subject is constantly reminded that he also becomes a progenitor, and is therefore invested with absolute authority in turn. The subjection of the son is *in order* to the authority of the parent. The patriarchs were instructed to teach the law of God to the children, in order that they, in turn, might teach it to *their* children; and so, each man of the race passed from sonship to fatherhood, in the ordinary march of providence. The first man born upon earth was hailed with the announcement, "I have gotten the man, the Lord!" And there is still found in the hearts of men, a vague cognition of the royalty belonging to their progeny. The heir, in his non-age, differeth nothing from the servant in his subordination; yet the fact abides that "he is lord of all." (Gal. iv. 1.) The children that are subject, therefore, are not excluded from the inheritance of the Godlikeness involved in the fatherhood. The intermediate subjection is the accident of the relation.

The next point relates to the subordination of the wife, so clearly taught throughout the Scriptures. And there is less difficulty in dealing with this relation, because the essential idea of unity, identity of interest, and almost identity of personality, pervades the Bible theory of marriage. The commandment that enforces parental authority, specifically includes both father and mother; and in all parts of the Scriptures, equal honor and reverence are enjoined upon the children. And the true nobility of wifeness is no where else so clearly defined as in the Bible.

All those exhortations that affect the relation and recognise the dominant authority of the husband, are most emphatic in their limitations. "Husbands, love your wives, even as Christ also loved the Church." "So ought men to love their wives as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife, loveth himself. For no man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth it and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the Church." (Eph. v. 25-29.) And while these exhortations in nowise diminish the lordship of the husband, they so conserve the relation as to take away all humiliation from the submission of the wife. The Church never feels humiliated in yielding obedience and reverence to the Lord Christ. So, no wife is humiliated by yielding obedience and reverence to the husband, who is the representative of Christ, and dominant because *his* husbandhood is the type and parable of the husbandhood of Christ. And the wifely graces that are commended in Scripture and that adorn profane literature, in nowise detract from the Godlikeness. As the Church, being finite, cannot be Godlike in infinitude, because of the impassable limitations of creaturehood, so the wife cannot attain the right of domination, because of the very nature of the relation. Therefore, all modern vagaries touching women's rights, are illogical, unnatural, and heretical.

One other relation demands a brief notice. The domination of the ruler involves the subordination of the subject. How then shall Godlikeness, including dominion, be predicated of the class that serves?

Here, again, analogies are abundant, scattered broadcast among the theories of the age. The prime axiom of republican institutions invests the subject with the titles and powers of royalty. The citizen who carries the hod is the true sovereign, and the executive head of the commonwealth is the servant of all; and the bald sarcasm of this popular maxim might be more apparent if the number of Godlike executives were not so lamentably small. But the miserable caricature will not endure the scrutiny of sober reason. The man who wields the sword, though called in euphemistic parlance the public servant, is in reality the public tyrant, and democratic government merges by easy grada-

tions into the most remorseless of despotisms. It is an accepted proverb that no tyranny is so hideous as mob rule; and if popular governments should really prove stable and beneficent, as they have never yet done, then the world's history contains no lessons, and the decrees of God will have lost their potency. You cannot render the things that are Cæsar's to a presiding authority clad in the livery of a servant; and the rigorous analogy gives the reason, to wit, because you cannot render the things that are God's to an idol of your own creation. Therefore, the very constitution of society, as ordained of God, is based upon the relation subsisting betwixt king and subject.

You prove nothing when you appeal to the general immoral character of the kings of earth, because there was once a king called Melchizedek; and there will be another King, at the "time of restitution," even one Jesus. The hope of the race is in His Fifth Monarchy.

Now this Potentate is called the "King of kings:" that is, the King of a race of kings. His subjects are royal, and though now in nonage, their heritage is sure, and this heritage includes throne and sceptre. Or they are now in bondage to a usurper; but when their King ascended, he led a multitude of ransomed captives, whose crowns will be restored in due time. The Godlikeness involves domination; and the message addressed to the "poor and blind and naked," contains the exhortation, "Let no man take thy crown!"

The 8th Psalm seems to confirm this argument, and is quoted by the Lord Christ (Mat. xxi. 16) when he formally assumed regal authority as the Son of David. The triumphal entry of the King into the royal city is recorded in all four Gospels, and the Lord quotes this 8th Psalm in justification of the children who shouted, "Hosanna to the Son of David." The Psalm begins and ends with ascriptions of praise and honor to King Jesus: "O Jehovah our King, how excellent is thy name in all the earth!" and all the rest of it is taken up with the contrast between men and angels. First, the verse quoted by the Lord, "Out of the mouths of babes and sucklings hast thou perfected praise," gives the preëminence to man; because no babes are found

among angels. They have no progeny, because they are not invested with Godlikeness. Then (verse 2) the reason for this domination—"that thou mightest *still* the enemy and the avenger," thou hast ordained strength in babes and sucklings; that is, the enemy, the *accuser*—Apollyon, Satan—the prince of the powers of the air, the seraph who fell, probably from the very highest rank in angelic glory and honor, and became the Lord of devils. Then (verse 5) the announcement, "Thou hast made man, for a little season, lower than the angels," as if the Psalmist, recognising the fallen condition of this glorious creature, would inquire how he could ever regain his domination over the angels; and so the verse concludes with the answer: "(but) Thou hast *crowned* him with glory and honor," because (verse 6) "thou *madest* him for dominion over all the works of thy hands!" And the enumeration of the subordinate creation corresponds with the order observed in the first chapter of Genesis—beasts, birds, and fishes—and also, reversely, it may be noted, with the order observed in Dr. Darwin's patent Evolution process.

Now, is Professor Swing in the right, when he confines the title, "God's earthly Image," to the Lord Christ, or is the Rev. John Miller in the right, when he asserts, "the Lord Christ is a personal inheritor of Adam's sin," and that "he redeemed his own soul as well as the souls of his elect," and that "there is no personality in the Godhead, distinguishing the Father from the Son?" The object of this argument is just to deny each of these propositions.

First. The Lord Jesus is called (Coloss. i. 15) "the Image of the Invisible God—the first-born (*prototokos*) of every creature." This is the only passage in the New Testament where the name is applied to him. And it is not straining the sense to say, the clear meaning of the apostle is, that Christ, *manifested* in the flesh, incarnate, was the *visible* representation of the God who was *invisible*, except as incarnate. And also, that incarnation did not involve creaturehood, because he was (*prototokos*) "born *before* all the creation." As in the Apocalypse, (Rev. iii. 14) he is called "the Beginning of the creation of God," the literal sense of the passage is, that he is the Sovereign Instigator

of the creation—rather the Beginner—(Arché) higher in rank than any creature.

The Godlikeness which the saint shall attain in perfection, is undoubtedly the resemblance to the Lord Christ. “We shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is.” And the life of the Lord, when he dwelt upon earth, was undoubtedly in perfect conformity to the moral law, which is the only possible Godlikeness predicable of humanity. But the man who perfectly keeps the law, supposing this to be possible—is not therefore *Christ-like*. On the contrary, the perfectness of Christ’s human life was an indispensable factor in the covenant of grace, because it must be a Lamb *without blemish* that is offered in sacrifice. His death avails for the sinner, because the God-man could endure and exhaust the penalty, under which any *creature* would be annihilated. And he was obliged to be a perfect man, because the elect children were partakers of flesh and blood, and therefore it *behoved* him (Heb. ii. 17) to be made like unto them. And in this second chapter of Hebrews, the doctrine of the 8th Psalm is again brought out: “We see Jesus, made for a little while inferior to the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor, that he should (by the grace of God) taste death for every man. For it became him,” (that is, God, the Eternal Father,) for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Prince of their salvation (Archegon) perfect through sufferings. The Godlikeness could be restored no otherwise. It is defective in logic and unsound in theology, to call men Christ-like. Christ is man-like, and *therefore* God-like; but no man is perfected through sufferings like those endured by the Surety of the Covenant.

No historic personage has ever appeared upon earth whose identity is so positive as that of Jesus of Nazareth. Yet no man ever lived whose non-official life was so entirely hidden. The four Gospels reveal nothing, or next to nothing, of the acts of the Lord, that may be measured by the Decalogue. He sustained none of the relations upon which duty is based. He was not a father or husband. He was not a son owing subordination to an earthly father; and when he was “subject” to his reputed

father, as recorded in Luke ii. 51, it was under protest: "How is it that ye sought me among your kindred? Wist ye not that I must be at my Father's house?" [Tischendorf.] He was not a ruler, exercising political domination. He was not a subject, owing *involuntary* obedience to the Roman authority. On the contrary, when arrested by those who claimed domination over him, he asserted that twelve legions of angels were waiting his slightest hint, to overwhelm his enemies. And all the miserable Arianism of Professor Swing is based upon his irreverent familiarity with the august Jehovah Jesus, before whom angels veil their faces.

Secondly: In the trial before his Presbytery it is remarkable that not one word was said touching the logical absurdity of Mr. Miller's heresies. If Christ really inherited Adam's guilt, he must needs be purged from that *before* he could offer a sacrifice for others. But he did not inherit *sinful* human nature. He was made of a woman—"made of her substance"—but sin is not predicable of substance. In any aspect of the doctrine, it is more horrible and more illogical than the Papal heresy of the Immaculate Conception. The two points above suggested, sweep away the whole theory of Mr. Miller's book, logically considered. And the plain declarations of Scripture, that he knew no guile or sin, that he was holy, harmless, undefiled and *separate* from sinners, sweep away those false postulates, in their theological aspect.

Thirdly: The separate personality of the Redeemer is plainly announced in every page of Scripture where his name or acts are recorded. And it is not a thinkable proposition, that a covenant could be made, except between two persons. The covenant betwixt God and Adam, involved personality in the man, and regal personality also. Else God could not treat with him. The federal headship of Adam is not an afterthought of theologians. It is involved in the very nature of the case. The man must be Godlike, to become a party to a covenant with God. And nothing less than the destiny of his entire race could be the issue involved, because anything less would be beneath the dignity of the contracting parties. And so also with that other covenant, betwixt

God and the last Adam. Nothing short of regal dignity in the Surety, and nothing less than the salvation of his entire progeny could engage the attention of this exalted being who had a separate throne of his own. "He that overcometh shall sit with me in my throne, as I overcame and am set down with my Father in his throne." (Rev. iii, 21.)

Thus far, the scope of this paper, through brief hints and suggestions, has tended to the recurrence of the opening question: "What is meant by God's image?"

Consider man, the lord of creation. As men know God best by contemplating his infinite perfections, so may men know man most accurately by the scrutiny of his perfections. And while nature does furnish many analogues among the numberless races of creatures, there is no other being in the universe endowed with similar attributes.

Examine first the physical constitution of man. His vision is superior to the vision of any other known creature, in that it discriminates between the most delicate shades of color, estimates distances and proportions, and conveys to the mind certain knowledge of the properties of matter which could not be apprehended by inferior organisms. His hearing is more acute than that of other known creatures, in its accurate discrimination between sounds, its appreciation of melody, its recoil from discords. His taste distinguishes between the slightest variation in flavors, his smell separates the most delicate varieties in odors, and his touch is so sensitive as to convey to the mind on the instant, the proprieties of matter in contact with his hand. Yet all these powers are the lowest in the scale, and sink out of sight when compared with his mental constitution.

Look then for a moment at man's logical powers. Think of what is involved in the construction of the syllogism. Consider the inexorable force of logical deduction, and the vast growth of the race in knowledge attained through the orderly arrangement of known facts, in the systems of philosophy. And yet there are higher manifestations of Godlike power, inherent in humanity, than the construction of the most faultless syllogism known to logic.

Think of man's prompt cognition of prerequisites. For here



is the topmost manifestation of Godlikeness: the intuitive apprehension of axiomatic truth, without the testimony of the senses, and without the slow processes of logic. Herbert Spencer, sneering at the superstition of the cultivated Christian, shows the accurate correspondence betwixt his "faith" and the crude apprehension of the Fetish worshipper, who finds a deity in a shadow. But in reality, he proves the unity of the race, which cognizes *God* by a swift intuition, overriding sense and logic. Like the spark that leaps from the voltaic battery to fix upon the metal, so the pure aspiration of the human soul fastens upon God, because God is, and because man *knows* that he exists, by encentric cognition:

And finally, consider man's capacity for Faith: Faith, the faculty of strange paradoxes. The substance (hypostasis) of that which, being hoped for, is *unsubstantial*; the evidence of that, which, being invisible, is *incapable* of evidence. This is the sum of Paul's argument in the Hebrews. And yet this mysterious force, which no creature exercises excepting the man made in the image of God, not only overcomes the world, but leads many undaunted to the gate of Eden, disarms the cherub whose flaming sword forbids his entrance, and enrobing the saint in royal purple, conveys him to the midst of the Paradise of God, and to the Tree of Life that blossoms there.

Thus endowed, distinguished from all the creatures of God, man fulfils his high destiny. As God takes for his most glorious title the name of "Giver," the Father of Lights, with whom "is neither parallax nor tropical shadow," so Godlike man gives with bountiful hand, whenever he attains his true stature. And as God forgives, so man forgives, seventy times seven offences. As God manifests his lovingkindness, throughout the stately march of his providence, causing all things to work together for the good of his children, so man, in his place and degree, scatters his benefactions through the earth. All the maxims of Holy Writ tend in this direction: "It is better to give than to receive." The Lord Jesus proved at once his divinity and his pure manhood, in that "He went about *doing good*." And the gifts of the saint who has attained a good measure of Godliness, resemble the gifts of

God, in that they do not humiliate the receiver. It is called the Royal Law, that enforces these acts of beneficence, because it is a law that regulates the acts of Kings. And it is worthy of note, that God has so exalted this noblest creature of his hand, that man can confer happiness by a *word* of sympathy, or a *look* of kindness. Surely, no other intelligence in the world of creatures possesses such powers.

One final word, touching the degradation of the sinner. How can such things be said of man, who has shown himself capable of sins that would shame devils, described by the prophet as horribly loathsome, as "wounds and bruises and putrefying sores?"

Why just here is shown the prowess of the Prince of Salvation, in working the redemption of sinners so utterly lost. And the thinker is brought to the same conclusion here as everywhere else, in investigating God's dealings, to wit: to the apprehension of the glory and grace of Christ. All things, all events, all results, are made for Him and by Him, and He is Head over all things to His Church.

And this is the final thought. The *Church* is the royal seed of God. And the Redeemer of this seed, God-man-Mediator, has eyes as a flame of fire, and through the defilement of sins, hideous in deformity, through the rags of self-righteousness, under the gown of the scholar or the rude tunic of the peasant, His eye can see the glint of the crown that is the *inheritance* of the man made for Godlikeness.

## ARTICLE V.

## A STEP IN ADVANCE.

About twenty years ago, the writer of the following pages published, in this REVIEW, an article entitled, "Our Problem," which discussed the duties of the proprietary race to their slaves in respect to religion. Not that the white people were ignorant of, or inclined to deny, the general proposition that they should seek the salvation of the negroes; they were then diligently—but not diligently enough—engaged in that great enterprise. But there were differences of opinion among ourselves as to certain methods, certain involved questions, which seemed to call for study and comparison of views.

The article was published, as we said, and very kindly received at home, and measurably so abroad; as kindly as the much-misunderstood South could hope that any such deliverance would be. The writer trusted that his labor had not been in vain.

And now! The past is—not gone, but—*laid up*. The whole fabric of our life has been crushed in and shaken to pieces. The relations of labor to capital, the principal form of wealth, the structure of families, the traditions of social existence, the peculiar bonds of affection between the strong race and the weak—all, all, have either passed absolutely out of sight, or submitted to such a revolution as makes us a new people.

We are not chanting a dirge. And we are not afraid of God's providence. But we state again this well-worn fact, that it may be seen that we are looking open-eyed and without blenching upon the new world so stormily created about us, and inquiring with courage, because with reverence, what it means to us. Hopes are mortal; but duty is immortal.

As we look up from our study of these things, we see, between a tall mimosa and the eaves of our roof, a strip of deep blue sky. The generous flowerage of the tree has passed its prime and begun to fade; the roof is weather-worn and acknowledges its sure decay; but the sky is the sky of our youth, and of the youth of our forefathers, and of all the generations. It has shed the

same sheen into their eyes and the same sweetness into their hearts.

And even so in the revolution which has befallen us—*culbute generale*, as the old Count de Mirabeau phrased it—amid the many things, among the forms of duty even, which are utterly changed, there is one thing that endures—“the grace of God, which bringeth salvation.” The same Word sanctifies. The same hope is born of the same love. The same torch is in our hands wherewith to shine down the darkness of our generation. The same treasure is in the same earthen vessels, and for the same blessed purpose.

Another thing that has not changed is the relative position of the races. The effect of hereditary civilisation and culture has not disappeared. The larger brain, the richer life, the power of superior knowledge, are still with us. We have *the authority of the higher*; and we cannot, if we would, evade its enormous responsibility.

Let it be admitted that our difficulties are also enormous—poverty, prejudices on either hand, collisions that come by nature, and collisions that are works of art. If, of the many ties that once united us, but two remain, they are the fundamental and vital ties—a common humanity, and a common gospel.

We imagine that few of our people can read the second chapter of the book of Nehemiah without being reminded of the meeting of our first General Assembly after the war, December, 1865: “And I went out by night by the gate of the valley . . . and viewed the walls of Jerusalem, which were broken down, and the gates thereof were consumed with fire. . . Then said I unto them, Ye see the distress that we are in, how Jerusalem lieth waste, and the gates thereof are burned with fire; *come, and let us build up the wall of Jerusalem, that we be no more a reproach.*” Glorious logic of believers! Mere *non-sequitur* for man!

Then, and since then, at every succeeding meeting of that high court, and almost incessantly in Presbyteries and Synods, in Church Sessions and around our evangelists, this problem has been emerging, and has been patiently and prayerfully con-

fronted. The labors, the experiments, the conferences, the gifts, persuasions, failures, of these twelve years would fill a volume—a volume that ought to be written for man. It is already written with God. Not that all has been failure—not by any means. But so far as the discovery of a system whereon to work is concerned, we had no real success until the adoption of the principle that churches distinctively of the colored people must be organized, and must be assisted to begin, and live on, their own separate life.

It is not pretended that even now, and on this plan, we have as yet attained any brilliant or large success; first, because there has not been time enough since we adopted the scheme; then, because we had a great deal of lost influence to recover; thirdly, because we had not devised means to meet one obvious necessity of the scheme, (to which the rest of this article will be largely devoted;) and lastly, because few of our own people seem to have discerned how great a step we were taking—even removing the work bodily from the category of Domestic, to the category of Foreign Missions.

What, precisely, is the radical difference between these two grand departments of Christian work? At the time and in the way in which modern Foreign Missions came into being, the distinction seemed clear enough. Foreign Missionaries went abroad, and Domestic Missionaries stayed at home; they were distinguished accurately enough by their place. And this grew, without discussion, to be the accepted discrimination between them; so much so, that when, in the providence of God, the Indians came to be surrounded by white settlements, and the Chinese began to immigrate among us, it was commonly said that Foreign and Domestic Missions had *merged*, and the work had become one in two (merely formal) divisions. We think it can be shown that this is a mistake, and that the true distinction is the distinction of race.

Confining our attention for a moment to the general question, it is obvious to remark that Foreign Missions find the ground preoccupied by a *false religion*, while the prepossessions of our own race are once and always for Christianity. To whatever

continent our heralds go; with whatever non-Caucasian race they labor—Mongol, Malay, or Ethiopic—there is a mythology to be assailed, a solid body of superstitions to be sapped and riven asunder, venerable traditions, customs, and even laws, to be overturned.

And then the law of heredity comes in. The people make their gods, but then the gods re-make the people. Climate, food, and religion, are factors of the highest order. They combine, just so far as they are different from our own, to build up any given people on its own separate base. And these influences permeate the race more and more deeply, till even blood and bone tell the story.

Consequent upon these facts is this: that the methods and appliances of gospel labor will vary directly as the variations of the races themselves.\*

Some races are casuistical and argumentative; some are emotional and impulsive; some are moved to investigate by the display of a superior civilisation; some cannot be moved to investigate at all, and must be assailed and won by sheer importunity. Some races eagerly crave education; some scorn it. Some are charmed by music; some are deaf to it. Some, like the Chinese, look down with contempt upon the foreign devils; some, like the South African, are ready to worship us as gods. And to all these, and a hundred other types of the one disease—sin, must we bring appropriate styles of the one remedy—Christ.

It is, therefore, a received truth that a wise missionary will apply himself diligently to the study of race peculiarities and the best methods of dealing with them, just as a good general studies a fortification and seeks its vulnerable point. And it is interesting to reflect, and to see that the reaction of these peculiarities on religion will make a visible difference, an individuality, in the product, *i. e.*, the churches.

We are now brought to a last remark on this point, viz: that

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\* It surely cannot be necessary here to make formal concession of the unity of mankind, its common ruin in the fall, or the identity, under all genuine forms, of the gospel and the way of life. All that is assumed in what we are saying, and is indispensable to our argument.

there are limits to the association even of Christians across the lines of race. No missionary loses himself or his nationality among Hindoos, or Indians, or Polynesians. The instances of honorable immergence in an alien race are so few as merely to punctuate the law of separation. It is a law, a law which enforces its own observance. But it is a law out of which has grown, and must more and more completely grow, separateness of church organisation. If one, sufficiently polyglot, could pass from prayer-meeting to prayer-meeting; from Shanghai or Soochow to Oroomiah and Constantinople, and thence to Corisco, to Zulu-land, the Fiji, the Tahitian, the Choctaw; how intensely would he feel the oneness of the gospel and the vigor of that life which could put on so various forms and utter itself by such different but harmonious voices!

And is there not a hint of the perpetuity of these differences in the vision of John: "After this, I beheld, and lo, a great multitude which no man could number, *of all nations, and kindreds, and people, and tongues*, stood before the throne and before the Lamb?" The Evangelist seems to have seen, and gloried in, their combination out of all varieties of man in one blest throng. It is to the splendor of that day, that ovation of Christ, that our missionaries are bringing their contributions of redeemed souls.

It cannot be necessary to go in detail over all these points and run the parallel between the African race, as domiciled in America, and the other non-Caucasian races. They brought from the beautiful and terrible land of their ancestors all they had by way of religion—a coil of cruel and debasing superstitions. And now that a century has elapsed, and although our divine gospel has been so largely made known to them, and though it has been perhaps universally (more or less intelligently) accepted by them, those superstitions are a power among them still. Voodoo and Obeah have still their thousands of votaries; the dread of witchcraft makes many slaves whom the law calls free; charms and counter-charms, silly and stupid beyond belief, are practised to this day, and by nominal Christians. Within the past year, if we are not misinformed, murders have been traced directly to

this source—the belief that witchcraft, or conjury of some sort, had been employed to work a man's death.

Further : these uncured superstitions and the mental and moral diseases connected with them, corrupt the gospel itself, where they are left to themselves. No other such scenes are to be found in our land, as scenes of so-called worship among the negroes. Only they worship God by dancing—they only, besides the Shakers, a “sport” of Northern civilisation, and an illustration how extremes meet. But dances are often the more seemly and decent form of their worship.

We hasten to say, however, and will maintain it with whatever emphasis may be necessary, that there is much genuine religion among them ; but it bears the race mark. It is often a singularly touching and beautiful piety ; it humbles many a beholder whose culture has done much for him, but left him to admire an unlettered negro's grace, as far above his own attainments. But their celestial dialect is *theirs*, and not ours. We enjoy their prayers, but we could not have offered them.

When to these unquestionable truths is added the fact—at which theorists may carp, but which common sense and statesmanship have found it necessary to accept, viz.—that the race lines are permanent, and limit the possibilities of fellowship, and that there will not and cannot be any honorable and reputable reduction of the two to one mass, we seem to have proved the point that labors among the colored people belong properly to the department of Foreign Missions.

But it may be said, “The two races formed churches together of old ; why not now ?” That is a fair question, but easily answered.

A large part of the slave population formed churches of their own, served by a white evangelist, who was, oftener than not, called a *missionary*. We need spend no time upon their case.

A great many churches contained a few colored members each. They were not eligible to any office ; their votes were not taken upon the election of pastor or other ruler. They were cared for, and taught, and remained always in the same condition of tutelage as did the juvenile white members during their childhood.



Such Presbyterian churches, at least, were evidently in an abnormal condition.\*

The remaining portion is the most interesting and decisive of all. In the region of large plantations, where the colored population largely outnumbered the whites, but were members of the same communion, often in the proportion of ten to one, what was the actual constitution of the churches? Nominally, there was but one session, as there was but one pastor. But in fact the pastor governed the colored membership, aided by a body of colored "leaders," or "watchmen," or "superintendents," as the Assembly at Memphis called them. In fact, the session was guided almost entirely in the admission of members and the administration of discipline, by the reports and suggestions of these men. It was they, to a very large extent, who discharged pastoral duty, beyond that very limited portion of it which the pastor himself could undertake. It was they who had charge of the plantation prayer-meetings—who visited the sick, and in many instances even buried the dead.

Every faithful pastor, of course, did his best to know his leaders well, to hold them well in hand, to supervise their judgments, correct their mistakes, and perform as much of his own normal work as he could for so large a population, scattered over so great a surface. But when he had done his best, and his elders had done as much as they could or would, it remained true that the real session of the colored members was the bench of leaders: and thus that the pastor was virtually *pastor of two churches*, white and black. And no amount of theoretical tight-lacing ever prevented it, except by sacrificing the work.†

Taking it for settled, now, that this work is to be prosecuted on the basis of Foreign Missions, with such modifications of any

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\* The question is here suggested, whether those who were so embarrassed in the attempt to accommodate the Church to its new duties after the war, by the fear of committing some anomaly, had not overlooked these obvious facts?

† Zion church, Charleston, Glebe St. and Calhoun St., became the typical instance of success. The white church worshipped in one building, and the colored in another; one session governed both, but were aided by leaders, Dr. Girardeau being the pastor.

particular method as may prove to be necessary, we are brought to the point which the great Missionary Societies had reached many years since, and to the problem which then confronted them: How are these native churches to be supplied with pastors? It is our impression that the American Board strove long and hard to furnish the Sandwich Islands with a ministry from this country; and that only a cluster of insurmountable difficulties—of which the ruinous expense was but one, and not the greatest—drove them at last to consider whether it was not the divine plan that every nation should raise its own spiritual guides and shepherds. And yet the Word is very clear about ordaining elders *in* (not *for*) every city. And now that the thing is done, and the principle adopted, it is so evidently right and wholesome, that we wonder why there was ever any hesitation about it.

It might be pretty safely said, that wherever missions have had the most rapid, permanent, *revolutionising* successes, there this principle has been most cordially adopted and thoroughly wrought out. The Baptist Mission to the Karens, the Methodist Mission in the Fiji Islands, the American Board among the Armenians, and the English labors in the Coral Isles of Polynesia, will occur at once as cases in point to every student of Foreign Missions.

And now, at last, we, in our own difficult and honorable enterprise, are led to the same point. The Assembly of 1877, by a unanimous vote, has recognised the truth that if we found African Presbyterian churches, we must raise up for them African Presbyterian ministers. It has established an Executive Committee to take this work in hand; has formally adopted the Theological Institute at Tuskalooza, Ala., opened with its encouragement a few months since; and ordered the committee to digest and report to the next Assembly a complete scheme for the conduct of the Institute. The brief remainder of this article will be devoted to the submission of certain views on the subject to the consideration of the Church.

Two or three features of the mind of the race may here be mentioned, as bearing upon their prospects in this regard. The first is, the almost entire absence of the logical faculty. *Exceptis*

*excipiendis*, of course, ratiocination, in any higher form than the adducing of direct testimony, and the quotation of apt texts, need not be looked for, at present, at any rate. When you have built up your little argument, in terms as simple and cogent as you can command, and proved your point, you find not merely that they reject the conclusion now who refused it before, but that those who receive it, receive it without the slightest reference to the argument. Examine the construction of their sermons, and you will be struck with the absence of reasoning and of proof. The discursive faculty often shows well; pathos is not wanting; exhortation is their strong point.

Another point of importance is the great relative strength of the verbal memory. Words are easily and willingly committed, especially such as have the swing of rhythm or the clue of rhyme. This is a great advantage in lodging the "form of sound words" firmly in their minds, and thus providing a safeguard against doctrinal error; a partial safeguard only, however, limited by that ratiocinative weakness already spoken of, but real and important. On the other hand, this very gift of verbal memory makes special vigilance necessary to ensure their learning more than mere words.

There can be no doubt, now, that the law of heredity, operating upon a race whose ancestors have been ignorant and debased for many generations, and indeed had not begun to be civilised until they were brought to this country, will make their culture, their education to anything like thoroughness, a very slow and difficult work. Indeed, it is a long battle to give them the idea of thoroughness and accuracy at all. We may as well make up our minds that only substantial and necessary attainments must be sought in the training of preachers, except in exceptional cases. Of *them* we would make energetic use, and give them as much education as they can hold, and prepare them with the utmost care to be "leaders of the people." For the rest, we must be content with (1) a close acquaintance with the Scriptures; (2) an intelligent soundness in our standards; and (3) aptness to teach by speaking.

We should do our own views, and the people whose interests

we are anxiously considering, great injustice, however, if we left the impression that they are a dull and unimprovable race. At different times, and in many instances, they have developed remarkable power for the acquisition of languages. They have a singular gift of pathos; and their eloquence is genuine, effective, and original. Many of us have listened and worshipped while they prayed in strains that made us glow with feelings far above mere admiration. And we feel that all this is merely a glimpse of capabilities yet to be developed: and this is one of the things that spur us up to labor for them.

It need hardly be added, that in the process of making these acquisitions, a great many things will be picked up incidentally, or that they will benefit greatly (by absorption, one may say,) from daily intercourse with cultivated and active minds.

It thus appears that no rigorous schedule-laying is possible at present. With the three conditions stated above as a *minimum*, each student must be carried as far as his powers and opportunities admit. But of merely literary culture there must be but little, in ordinary cases, because time and strength will hardly avail for the most necessary studies. This is already the conclusion of some of their best teachers from abroad. The fact is not without interest, that these students have so strong a desire to master the Greek Testament and to read the Lord's words in their original record. And difficult as is the task of teaching them another tongue, who have so superficial and defective acquaintance with their own, who can say that it is not a sound Christian instinct which impels them in this direction, and makes them persevere, despite their early discouraging experience of it? What labor should be more cheerfully bestowed than that which gratifies this desire?

One of the pressing problems of the enterprise is, How most rapidly and effectively to broaden and develop their general intelligence? Probably no better general rule can be laid down than to encourage conversation on almost every topic that comes up, and hold "question-meetings" with them, where they may suggest any topics that interest, and any questions which perplex them, and follow the discussion along, wherever it may spontaneously flow.

Another very necessary exercise is the search for proof-texts by the help of a concordance. Here, there will be abundant opportunity to drill their powers of selection and discrimination. They must grow skilful in distinguishing between verbal and real correspondence of texts, seeming and real appropriateness and cogency of quotation. This will be an admirable tonic for their weak logical faculty, which must not be abandoned because it is feeble. Great pains must be taken, also, with their *reading*. The fact that they are to serve an illiterate people, greatly enhances the value of such an accomplishment, which we may be permitted to say is hardly ever enough regarded by our educated men. Indeed, are there not some, even in the highest walks, who look on careful and expressive reading (of hymns and Scripture) as too closely allied to sensational preaching? Yet it is hard to overrate the power of a Psalm of David, or a hymn, impressively read. Certainly, for that great mass who cannot read well enough ever to be thrilled by what they find in books, it is of inestimable importance that their preachers should be able to express and convey to other hearts the sacred emotions germane to the Word.

Without endeavoring to exhaust this portion of the subject, we proceed remark upon some of the dangers that beset the work. Singularly enough, most of them originate in one tendency, the tendency to give up manual labor on undertaking professional study.

If this be allowed to assert and develop itself, the many who are still prejudiced against such enterprises, (and no new good thing makes friends of all men at once,) will be clamorous in denouncing (what they will call) the encouraging of indolence under the pretence of study. That is the first danger.

And it points to another, more serious still, that there will be such pretenders, eager to live idly at the expense of the Church, and keeping an appearance of piety and industry for the sake of the loaves, saying, with some of old, "Put me, I pray thee, into one of the priests' offices, that I may eat a piece of bread."

There is a third danger involved, one yet more profound. It is that a class, growing up without habitual experience of physical

toil, will both forfeit the sympathy of the great working mass and lose their own sympathy with that mass. And if once the tree be thus divided in its very roots, the best hope of our enterprise is gone.

And aside from this particular line of perils, there is this, that a body of men, lifted by careful cultivation so far above the bulk of their people, will encounter swarms of temptation—inwardly, to vanity and self-conceit; officially, to lording it over the churches; outwardly, to political and other worldly aspirations, which will destroy their spiritual aptitudes and lower their spiritual life. It cannot be too distinctly understood that a sense of irresponsibility brings a thousand evil passions into play, beyond what their subject, even, ever suspected of himself. And we must not be surprised, or too greatly disheartened, if instances of this sort arise, in the course of time.

Where are our safeguards against these dangers?

So far as they are to be sought in methods of instruction, they may be said to lie, first, in scrupulously avoiding a showy course of study and practice, and particularly a *superficial* showy course. The more solidity and thoroughness, the more humble, persevering application, the less sensation and clap-trap, the more safety.

Secondly, in the diligent cultivation of conscience, not only in its stricter meaning, the sense of obligation, but also in a taste for what is clean and honorable in things small as well as great.

Thirdly, (we are still speaking of methods of instruction,) in the constant inculcation, by precept and example, of the wholesomeness and honor of hard work, bodily as well as mental work. No place must be given, even for a moment, to the notion that it is a good thing to have gotten through a day without having touched the axe or the hoe.\*

But there is a better way of dealing with the "lions in the way" than pausing longer upon them than will suffice for their recognition. It is to go forward and meet them as they come.

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\* We remit to a foot note the suggestion, whether such a seminary ought not ultimately to become a farm school. We are probably not ripe for a formal discussion of that question now.

If we know anything of this matter, it is that we have been led "by a way we knew not." WHO led us? It is He who will yet move us on, point by point, until his work is done, for us, by us, in us.

Love for this race is the Southern Christian's inheritance. There is hardly a pious lady of middle age who has not toiled hard for their good. There are many ministers, who for years did, of their own free will, harder work outside than inside of the stipulations of their call. Few more precious memories are in our hearts than those of the happy seasons when we welcomed our dusky brethren and sisters into the church and sealed them with baptismal water. We have wrestled for them in prayer; we have knelt beside their sick beds; we have closed their dying eyes. And now this faithful God, whom it is our glory to have served, and our grief to have served so poorly, comes to change the *method of the service*—only that—and bids us be more loyal to the new commission than we ever were to the old.

It is into this new form of the old service that we are slowly finding our way. He who knows its difficulties, its dangers, and its rewards—He will never leave us, unless we leave Him. To be His, is everything.

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ARTICLE VI.

THE NEGATIVE TENDENCIES OF THE AGE.

Were any one, amid the ceaseless activity of the age in which we live, to put forward the inquiry of inspired wisdom, "Is there anything whereof it may be said, See, this is new?" and to answer that inquiry in the words of inspiration, "There is no new thing under the sun," the scoffer would curl his lip in derision, and the sceptic be ready with the muttered sneer, "dreaming idealist," "pietistic enthusiast," while even the thoughtful would consider such a statement as farfetched and extravagant. And yet, as the stream of time rolls on, the words of

Israel's wise king are being more and more verified, "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done." We may mournfully exclaim, with the legendary hero in Tennyson's beautiful poem:

"The old order changeth, yielding place to new,  
And God fulfils Himself in many ways,"

or lament the incessant change to which everything here below is subjected, in the words of one who is said to have "uttered nothing base:"

"It is not now as it hath been of yore;  
Turn wheresoe'er I may,  
The things that I have seen I now can see no more."

But still, in spite of all the progress, the restless activity, the intense eagerness to grasp at every new bauble that presents itself with its tinsel-glitter to the wondering eyes of the leaders of our age, we have every reason to affirm that, in reality, "there is no new thing under the sun." Is not the ocean of truth as unfathomable as in the days when the dying philosopher compared the researches of a lifetime to the work of a child gathering pebbles on the sea-shore? Have any of the great discoveries of the age brought us nearer the goal we are so desirous of reaching—the haven of rest where the storm-tossed bark may ride safely at anchor? Does not the unknown and inscrutable surround us and hem us in on all sides? Have we, in reality, added to the sum of human knowledge, or are we ever mocked by the phantasmagoria of a diseased intellect? Are we not ever at work with problems which seem incapable of solution the further we advance; and does not the end of our intellectual wanderings often bring us back to the point from where we started? Our age is involved in a labyrinth of speculations. As the wheel of time revolves, the new is ever superseding the old, and the old is ever becoming the new. From the dead past the mouldering remains of extinct philosophies are brought into the light of day, the fast decaying members are touched with the magic wand of science, and they spring again into life and vigor. Long forgotten theories, gropings after truth, abortive attempts to pass the limits of the known, and to enter the world of the unknown and unknowable, are re-



vived, modified by some master-spirit; and the admiring crowd of worshippers fall down before this golden image of their fancy with a shout of adoration. "Great is Diana of the Ephesians!" Yet the simple cottager, whose scanty stock of words has never passed beyond the narrow range of household duties, and in whose life of toil the Bible has shed the rays of a brighter world, is often nearer the truth when she utters the prayer of faith, "Our Father who art in heaven," than all the vain dreamers who are ever chasing the phantoms of their own creation. Every age is but the outgrowth of every preceding age. The atmosphere of human thought is filled with ideas which come floating in upon our consciousness to rouse us into activity; we give these ideas a new form, clothe them in other words, modify them according to our fancy, develop them slightly to suit new intellectual tastes, and then we are considered *original thinkers*! Truth never alters, though the way of presenting it may be new. "The child is father of the man" in this respect also, that as the ages roll on, the germs of thought which apparently lie dead in the intellectual soil, are preserved, cherished, and prepared for future use.\*

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\* Great thinkers have at all times felt their want of true originality. Thus Goethe: "Much is talked about originality; but what does originality mean? We are no sooner born than the world around begins to work upon us; its action lasts to the end of our lives, and enters into everything. All that we can truly call our own is our energy, our vigor, our will. If I could enumerate all that I really owe to the great men who have preceded me, and to those of my own day, it would be seen that very little is really my own." Canon Liddon, who quotes this passage in his *Bampton Lectures*, says, on the same subject: "Our relationship to the world of thought has been, after all, that of a nurse, not that of a parent. We have protected the idea, cherished it, warmed it, and at last it has grown within the chambers of our own mind until we have recognised its value, and let it forth into the sunlight, shaping it, coloring it, expressing it after a manner strictly our own, and believing in good faith that because we have so entirely determined its form, we are the creators of its substance." A thinker of a different school, Mr. Buckle, in his *History of Civilisation* remarks: "It is impossible for any man to escape the pressure of surrounding opinions; and what is called a new philosophy or a new religion, is generally not so much a creation of fresh ideas, but rather a new direction given to ideas already current among contemporary thinkers."

This past and present are indissolubly united; the past has formed the present, the present forms the future. We live upon the past, we have the future under our control; our own present is but a single step beyond the narrow range of what has ceased to be. Hence our present is but too often a repetition of our past, and our future a repetition of the present.

As an illustration of this thought, we may instance the different stages through which the transmutation theory has passed. While *ancient* philosophy, unable to account for the origin of the universe, started the most extravagant theories, and evolved everything out of one simple element—whether earth or air or fire or water—or otherwise sought for a substratum in some imaginary indivisible atom, which, by combination with other atoms, formed all we see around us, *modern* science, throwing its mantle over the wild speculations of antiquity, carries the extravagance of ancient sages a little further, and leaves us to grope about in the greatest uncertainty, continually taunting us with the cry, “Where is thy God?” Thus Lamarck derived all animals from a *monad*, which in course of time developed into a *polypus*, and this polypus again into all other forms of life, even the most elevated. The great transforming agent, according to this system, is “the force of habit, and the efforts which the new animal imposes upon itself.” There are other transforming agents besides these, such as “the influence of subtle fluids,” “efforts of internal sentiment,” “acts of organisation,” terms which are not very intelligible. But the principles which underlie the theory are very simple. Changes in external circumstances are supposed to superinduce a real change in the wants and requirements of the animals. These changes in their wants again necessitate new actions to satisfy these wants, so that, finally, new habits are engendered. These habits again tend to develop new organs, or strengthen those which are specially required, or render obsolete by neglect those which do not answer to the new wants. Thus, for example, the various kinds of antelopes in escaping from beasts of prey, had to depend chiefly upon their fleetness and agility. This, in course of time, gave them that symmetry of form and elegance in structure which we so much

admire. In the same way the water-fowl acquired their web-feet after long ages of struggle in a new element to which they were attracted, and in which at first they could not move very freely. Lamarck acknowledges God as Creator, but as the Creator merely of dead matter. Matter is composed of minute cells, which act and react upon each other according to the play of different forces, so that, ultimately, life is produced by a sort of spontaneous generation. God Himself looks on with supreme indifference. Having once delegated His power to nature, He sinks into insignificance altogether.

Lamarck's theory was soon superseded by another. The anonymous author of the *Vestiges of a Natural History of Creation*, adopting La Place's "nebular hypothesis," maintained that, as the heavenly bodies were formed from an original fire-mist under the influence of physical laws, in the same way every organic existence on the globe may have been produced. He held that "the simplest and most primitive type gave birth to a type superior to it in compositeness of organisation and endowment of faculties, and this again to the next higher, and so on to the highest." According to him, "the great trunk of animality lies in the ocean, up even to the mammalia." Seas and sea-animals were the first therefore, to present themselves on the face of the earth; and, *by a process of development*, as the dry land gradually began to rise, the various animals which people the surface of the globe began to make their appearance. The line of development closes in man—"Last of all issued from the woods a being erect, majestic, and with many traits of external beauty, to overspread the whole earth with his race." Great stress is laid upon the changes which the human foetus undergoes in the womb. It is well known that the human foetus passes through the different stages of the reptile, fish, bird and man: from this it is argued that man, the highest stage, is but the development of the lowest, and that, therefore, there is a regular gradation upwards, the simpler forms always producing the more complex.

Mr. Darwin's theory of "natural selection, and the preservation of the fittest," is but another phase in the whole inquiry.

Here, too, we are brought back to some "primordial form from which all the organic beings that have ever lived on this earth may have descended." The difference between Mr. Darwin and his predecessors consists mainly in the fact, that, while they insist upon the existence of some internal power of development by which new forms are constantly produced in the great struggle for improvement, he maintains that the laws of nature do all that is necessary, by combining against the weakest, killing them off, and only preserving the fittest.

Without pronouncing an opinion on these different theories, do we not find in them the speculations of ancient philosophers slightly modified to suit the intellectual wants of this generation? Have we, in reality, made progress in the direction of truth? Behind such words as "law of development," "natural selection," "acts of organisation," and many others met with in Lamarck, the *Vestiges*, and Darwin, do we not find the vast abyss of the unknown, which will ever remain unexplored, and into which the feeble taper of science can throw no ray of light? What do these terms imply? Are they not mere inventions to hide our ignorance, without solving the difficulties? With regard to Lamarck, Lyell has well said:

"When Lamarck talked of the 'efforts of internal sentiment,' 'the influence of subtle fluids,' and 'acts of organisation,' as causes whereby animals and plants acquire new organs, he substituted names for things, and resorted to fictions almost as ideal as the 'plastic virtue' of some geologists of the middle ages."\*

The author of the *Vestiges* speaks of the law of development as *some abnormal and not yet understood tendency*: if *abnormal and not understood*. what have we gained? Is it not possible that, after all we may be wrong in our suppositions; and that, what we attribute to the great unknown, is the work of a supreme mind, whose acts, however inscrutable, are guided by wisdom and love? Let us have done with this prating about "unknown tendencies," and not venture to start a new theory of creation, when we cannot clearly define our position. Mr. Darwin also does not give that full explanation of the new law which we de-

\**Principles of Geology*, vol. ii. p. 254.

sire. It is supposed to be some power of nature, yet where it originated, how it works, how it brings about the various changes in structure and form, we are left to ourselves to discover. If nature works these mighty changes, then what is nature? Mr. Darwin defines the word as "the aggregate action and product of many laws." If nature be merely "an aggregate of laws," how can we speak of its *power of selection*? A mere "aggregate of laws" can surely have no inherent power to produce such mighty changes as are here implied? If for nature we substitute God, we can find no difficulty in ascribing to him the origination of certain laws which are under his own control. Mr. Darwin complicates matters still further by calling *nature*, *natural selection*, *struggle for existence*, "metaphorical expressions." And yet these "metaphors" perform acts of intelligence and scientific skill, are called *powers*, as though they had real existence, and, in fact, have many of the attributes which are usually attributed to the deity. Mr. Darwin, anticipating some such objection, calls it superficial, and maintains that it is difficult to avoid personifying nature, even though natural selection be spoken of as an active power or deity. But the strength of the objection lies in the fact, that nature is made a *person*, and not, as it ought to be, an observable *mode of divine activity*; that nature's "laws" are considered to be certain independent forces over which God has no control; that the world is given over to the dominion of chance, or else becomes a self-governing machine, surveyed with stoical indifference by a distant, impotent God. Mr. Darwin is at liberty to make use of any number of "metaphors;" but metaphors are not realities—and if not realities, how can they be supposed to perform acts of scientific skill? Or granting them to have real existence, where do they exist? in the animals themselves? or is there something outside of the animal world superintending this process of change? In other words, must we acknowledge that, after all, the Supreme Being has more to do with the origin of species than the new theory is inclined to admit? In justice to Mr. Darwin, it must be admitted that he does not exclude the divine Being. There is room for the action of providence, which shades the insect's

wings to preserve it from danger, or hardens the shell of the mollusc when exposed to a rougher sea. But, after all, the Deity is ignored, and nature substituted; and the idea of a special providence adapting its arrangements to the new circumstances which occur, left out of view entirely. Mr. Darwin attributes to nature a creative energy which belongs to God alone; the devout student of the theory may still find room for the action of God's providence, but from the theory itself this does not necessarily follow.

What advance, then, has Mr. Darwin made on Lucretius? He, too, assigns to nature the highest place in his system; he speaks of her as "creatix," as calling all things into being without the intervention of the gods, as acting spontaneously in the generation and development of all organisms. Has Darwin improved upon this? Is not his theory the outgrowth of past speculations? and are its modifications really an advance upon bygone fancies of ancient philosophy? "The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done." History must and will repeat itself; what one age rejects, another will consider the highest wisdom; and thus to the very end of time philosophical speculation will busy itself with the highest problems, and modify, change, remodel, whatever results may have been reached by antiquity.

Our age is not very original. We are blown about with every wind of doctrine. Scientific investigation is becoming more and more *anthropocentric* instead of *theocentric*. Hence in the anthropological studies of the age a subordinate place is assigned to the deity, except where he is brought forward as a mere *Deus ex machina* to support some tottering theory or system which is fast crumbling away. Everywhere we meet with the eager inquiry, "What is truth?" and too often the answer is given in the hopeless language of Faust:

"Ich sehe dass wir *nichts* wissen koennen  
Das will mir sehier das Herz verbrennen."

Hence there is intense restlessness, coupled with intense credulity. That which is fresh, startling, paradoxical, which feeds the flame of restless inquiry, which increases without satisfying the yearn-

ing for something real and substantial, is hailed with delight, while old landmarks are shifted and old truths denied.

The master-spirits of the age are feeling this struggle. Intellectual and moral weariness is the result. No where does this appear more prominently than in the poetry of the age. Turn to any modern poet, and you find expression given to this feeling of despair which characterises every sphere of investigation. Pressensé has well said: "All poetry is a rainbow formed of tears wrung from us by our present miseries, with rays of glory from our noble origin." There is sadness in all true poetry, because there is sorrow in the human heart. The poet gives expression to the heart's longings and aspirations, its sorrows and cares, its doubts and struggles. To know the temper of an age, one must study its poetry. In the greatest drama of modern days—the *Faust* of Goethe—we find this startlingly exemplified. Goethe has read the world's heart. Hence those wild ravings of Faust are but the echo of the world's cries, his struggles but a copy of the world's attempts to free itself from uncertainty, error, and doubt. The agony of his despair bears the impress of reality. His soul is the battle-field of contending forces. On the one hand, there is a burning desire to fathom all the mysteries of the universe, "the secrets of th' abyss to spy," to know the unknowable, to scale the battlements of heaven, to settle the doubts which disturb mind and heart, to lay the evil spirit which is destroying the very life of the soul; and on the other, the feeling of helplessness, of utter inability to rise above the world and its associations, the conviction that he is "cabined, cribbed, confined," bound to the sensual and earthly, groping about in a darkness where no ray of light has penetrated, or can penetrate. The past is mystery, the present full of toil and trouble, the future all opaque, because knowledge cannot solve the riddle of continued existence hereafter:

"Oh happy he who still can hope  
Out of this sea of error to arise!  
We long to use what lies beyond our scope,  
Yet cannot use even what within it lies."

Faust tries to rouse all his energies to the task; he would follow

the sun in his course; he would rise from the world with its doubts and fears and unsatisfied longings:

“Oh God! for wings to lift me from the ground,  
Onward, still onward after it to strive!”

Alas! with the wings of the spirit no corporeal wings can keep pace. The yearning to move onwards and upwards is inborn. The struggle to reach the goal is incessant. But there is internal war the more we try to overcome doubt and darkness and despair:

“Two souls, alas! within my bosom throne;  
One from the other wildly longs to sever.  
One with a passionate love that never tires,  
Cleaves as with cramps of steel to things of earth:  
The other upwards through earth's mists aspires  
To kindred regions of a loftier worth.”

In the quiet of his study Faust opens the sacred volume to find comfort there. The heart craves for a revelation; perhaps the supernatural may bring a solution to all doubts. But the captious spirit is not satisfied: it still questions. Mind and heart, reason and faith, struggle for the mastery; and the sacred Book is closed without bringing peace. Thus cast adrift, thus hopelessly lost to all holy influences, Faust enters into a league with the evil one, who drags him down into the very filth of debauchery; but the end is bitterness. the bitterness of hell.

What Goethe has thus described in Faust, was specially applicable to his own age. The mighty heavings of the tide of unbelief which was beginning to sweep everything before it, were experienced in his day, and the master felt its influence, and gave expression to popular feeling. Hence a vein of sadness runs through much of his poetry, and that of his contemporary, Schiller. Schiller's life was, in many respects, a nobler one than Goethe's. He stands above Goethe in the purity of his character, but below him in true poetic genius. Goethe never shrinks from grappling with the very highest life-problems, and he attempts a solution in his own naturalistic way. He himself has said in the *Westöstliche Divan*: “The only real and the deepest theme of the world's and of man's history to which all other



subjects are subordinate, is the conflict between faith and unbelief. But the frivolity of his character makes him impatient of the struggle; that conflict has never been a matter of inward experience. Hence Goethe solves his problem in a very unsatisfactory way, while Schiller stands aghast at the awfulness of the crisis, and the tremendous issues involved in it. Schiller, therefore attempts no solution: he bewails, with a pathos which is irresistible, his own inability to "face the spectres of the mind, and lay them." It has been well said, "Schiller knew *sin*, but no *redemption from sin*, no spiritual harmony; Goethe knew *no sin*, and therefore he attempts to harmonise without redemption."\* The contradictions between desire and attainment, between hope and fear, between faith and unbelief, meet us everywhere in Schiller. Thus, in the *Götter Griechenlands*—a poem oftener misunderstood than any other—he enters a strong protest against the shallow deism of his day. His soul thirsted after the living God, and rationalism gave him a cold abstraction, which quenched all spiritual life. Hence he sought for a living breathing reality in the gods of ancient paganism. Those gods were human—the ideal creations of a mind seeking perfection, the embodiment of all that was beautiful and true in character or in life—but the dreary negations of unbelief lacked all that was divine, and ignored all that was human. No wonder that an earnest inquirer after truth should recoil from a theology so cold and lifeless. In some of Schiller's touchingly beautiful lyrics we find indications of his earnestness. But there is a hopelessness, a deep undertone of sadness, which startles while it attracts us. Thus, in *Der Pilgrim*, he exclaims:

"Ah, the pathway is not given,  
Ah, the goal I cannot near;  
Earth will never reach the heaven,  
Never can the There be Here."

In *Sehnsucht* and *Der Taucher* the same restless spirit gives utterance to its yearnings without any hope of relief.

But turning from Germany to England, we observe in the poetry of our own day the same struggle between the positive

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\* *Goethe's Faust. Eine Studie* door J. H. Gunning.

and negative. In Tennyson this has become painfully real. The most philosophic of his poems is *In Memoriam*, but already in the *Idylls of the King* we have an indication of his peculiar aptitude for treating the highest subjects in a truly artistic way. The weird music keeps us spell-bound; the purity of thought and loftiness of sentiment make an impression not easily forgotten. King Arthur is supposed to represent "the king within us—our highest nature—whether conscience, spirit, the moral soul, religious sense." Each of the *Idylls* gives a picture of the wavering conflict between this highest principle and all the lower appetites and passions. King Arthur is at last overcome and sorely wounded, is conveyed "to the island valley of Avilion," whence,

"After healing of his grievous wounds,  
He comes again."

Whether in this we have indicated the soul's spiritual resurrection, or its purification by trial and disappointment, is not quite clear. There is a haziness about the whole, an air of mystery, which obscures the meaning; the allegory, if rightly interpreted by us, is not always well kept up. Like Sir Bedivere, we stand on the shore of that inland lake, gazing wistfully after the departing king, revolving many memories. But the only sound which reaches our listening ear is that of

"The ripple washing in the reeds  
And the wild water lapping on the crag."

We have, therefore, to seek elsewhere for further light. *In Memoriam* gives us that light. Mr. Tennyson's creed is expressed there. Always ready to let the science of the age sway his mind and influence his thoughts, he is evidently afraid to break with old forms of belief, and yet too careful to be hurried away by the new. The death of his friend has awakened memories of bygone days; he pictures that friend to us in all the nobility of his character and the grandeur of his intellect. Mr. Hallam has had to struggle with doubt; every thoughtful mind has its seasons of perplexity. But a pure and lofty soul was his, fighting the spectres which himself had raised. In lines of touching beauty he has described his struggle:

“Dark, dark, yea ‘irrecoverably dark’  
Is the soul’s eye; yet how it strives and battles  
Through th’ impenetrable gloom to fix  
That masterlight, the secret truth of things  
Which is the body of the infinite God.”

Tennyson also, in his tribute to the memory of his departed friend, speaks of him as

“Perplexed in faith, though pure in deeds.”

The two are kindred spirits; and as the grave closes over the one, the survivor tries to look beyond death, and to clear up the mysteries with which it is surrounded. He raises a long series of speculations about the unseen world, from which he himself shrinks in the end, because his perplexity becomes greater the more he tries to grapple with his doubts. He leads us to the very borders of the unknown, and, as a mighty ocean stretches before us, we have to strain our eyes to catch a glimpse of the distant shore. But no ray of light pierces the darkness which surrounds us. Guided by one who has himself to feel his way, and who exclaims,

“I falter where I firmly trod,”

we are conscious of the utter futility of attempting to obtain the proper answer to those “obstinate questionings” which have been forced upon us.

*In Memoriam* is in this respect a creature of the age. It is a grand and beautiful poem, remarkable for its reverence for the things of God; and yet too negative to meet the spiritual wants of the day. To the decay of faith, which we all lament, it presents but feeble opposition. The poet appeals very hopefully to the

“Strong Son of God, immortal Love,  
Whom we, that have not seen Thy face,  
By faith, and faith alone, embrace,  
Believing where we cannot prove.”

But, screening himself behind his “honest doubt,” he discards many of the existing creeds, because truth is not to be found in them. He starts question after question, which he leaves unanswered, insinuating, though not fully expressing, what he really does believe. He tries in vain

"To face the spectres of the mind,  
And lay them."

The very hopelessness of the task appals him; and the reader is left to solve the difficulties as he may, without any help from the writer who has raised those doubts. This dallying with doubt displeases us. But we live in an age of doubt, and our poets have caught the spirit; so that from them we cannot expect that higher and nobler faith which "endures as seeing him who is invisible."

Mr. Swinburne is far more negative than Tennyson. He openly avows as his creed:

"God, if a God there be, is the spirit of man, which is man:"  
and ventures to prophesy in terms bordering on blasphemy:  
"Yet thy kingdom shall pass, Galilean: thy dead shall go down with the dead."

Mr. Arnold, again, in the piteous accents of despair, exclaims:

"Your creeds are dead, your rites are dead.  
Your social order too!  
Where tarries He, the power who said,  
'See, I make all things new'?"

Thus we have full expression given to the various tendencies of the age. Some we find boldly breaking with the traditional creeds of Christendom, taking refuge in a hopeless scepticism, feeling perhaps that

" 'Twere best at once to sink to peace,  
Like birds the charming serpent draws,  
To drop headforemost in the jaws  
Of vacant darkness, and to cease."

Others are always hesitating between the two extremes, afraid to wander too far from the beaten track, and yet bold enough to break through old-established creeds, and to find a way for themselves. Such half-heartedness is sickening; and yet it passes for enlightenment. The more negative a certain class of men become, the more they boast of their superior wisdom. They detect flaws in the ancient building of faith. They take out a brick here, and a piece of mortar there, carefully stopping up the holes thus formed with the dry sand gathered from a dreary waste of barren speculation.

But, turning again to Germany, it is interesting to notice how scientific materialism expresses itself in poetry. Ludwig Feuerbach, who not very long ago passed the "bourne from which no traveller returns," has written a long poem on death, (*Reimverse auf den Tod*,) part of which we transcribe:

"I depart from this life, to surrender myself to nothingness. The old fable, indeed, teaches that I should come among the angelic host; but this is only a delusion of theologians, who have ever deceived us. My troublesome self will rot in its coffin; ideality will be at an end, for death is no mere joke. . . . Therefore, beloved ego, adieu, adieu for ever. Alas! alas! weep not, dear soul, though the ego be shattered to pieces. . . . I go down into nothingness, to become the fuel of fresh life. . . . To you, beloved posterity, who will take our places, and draw the breath of life from our cold graves. . . . I must come to utter nothingness, if a new ego is to arise from me." \*

Here we have reached the culminating point where the materialistic science and the poetry of the day converge. In no country has materialism expressed itself so boldly as in Germany. It does not believe in the supersensuous, the transcendental, the superhuman. Knowledge comes to us through the senses; the senses reveal to us only the existence of matter, infinitely modified by force. Thus Büchner declares it *der oberste Grundsatz* (the ruling principle) of his philosophy, that there is "no force without matter; no matter without force." Hence we know nothing of mind, except as dependent upon matter. Matter is alone true and real, uncreated and eternal. It is the "primeval cause of all existence; and by the eternal interfusion of matter and force, all organic existences have been produced. Man is but the highest and last stage in this process of development.

"The same carbon and nitrogen," says Moleschott, "which the plants derive from carbonic acid, humic acid, and ammonia, becomes successively grass, clover, wheat, beast, and man, to be again dissolved into humic acid and ammonia."

Thus there is an eternal springing into life, and becoming extinct; a death springing out of life, a life growing out of death. Annihilation there is not; neither is there any immortality of the soul, for we know nothing of the soul:

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\* Quoted by Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths of Christianity*.

"The only immortality there is," says the same writer, "is, that when the body is disintegrated, the ammonia, carbonic acid, and lime, serve to enrich the earth, and to nourish the plants which feed other generations of men."

Man is therefore but the product of certain chemical elements; his thought the result of certain molecular changes in the nervous system. To return to a Creator who called him into being is absurd, for the body is soon decomposed, and "a spirit without a body," according to Büchner, "is as unthinkable as electricity or magnetism without the matter of which they are the manifestations." \* Creation, therefore, is a term unknown to materialism; Creator, a postulate in the systems of theologians, a predication of an ultra-mundane existence, which the inexorable logic of scientific observation has proved to be false.

\* It is not strange, amid the conflict of opinions, to hear a distinguished naturalist, whose *Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection* have become so deservedly popular, maintaining the very opposite theory. *Matter*, according to him, does not exist; all is *Mind*. "The whole universe," he says, "is not merely dependent on, but actually *is*, the WILL of higher intelligences, or one Supreme-Intelligence." Matter is not "distinct from, and coexistent with, Mind;" "it is a far simpler and more consistent belief that matter, as an entity, distinct from force, does not exist, and that FORCE is a product of MIND. Both science and philosophy have demonstrated our incapacity to prove the existence of matter as usually conceived; while it admitted the demonstration to each of us of our own ideal self-conscious existence." Surely history is repeating itself, and instead of advancing on the royal road to truth, we are retracing our steps. Is Berkeley's idealism to be brought up again in our day? Truly "the thing that has been, it is that which shall be; and that which is done is that which shall be done; and there is no new thing under the sun." Mr. Wallace thinks that the "noblest truth in philosophy, and what may prove the highest fact of science," has been expressed in the following verse of an American poetess:

"God of the granite and the rose,  
Soul of the sparrow and the bee!  
The mighty tide of being flows  
Through countless channels, Lord, from Thee:  
It leaps to leaps to life in grass and flowers,  
Through every grade of being runs:  
While from creation's radiant towers  
Its glory flames in stars and suns."

"We know of no creation," says Vogt, "either in the beginning or in the course of the world's history, and regard the idea of an extra-mundane self-conscious Creator as ridiculous." [With the Creator all responsibility ceases.] "It is indeed true," says Vogt. "Freewill does not exist, neither does any amenability or responsibility, such as morals and penal justice, and heaven knows what else, would impose upon us. It is impossible to demonstrate the admissibility of punishment. At no moment are we our own masters, any more than we can regulate the secretions of our kidneys."

Such is German materialism. We have seen how one of its leaders found expression in poetry. It has been well said that "true poetry occupies itself with only one theme---the torments of the human soul before the question of its destiny." Whenever, therefore, a great intellectual or spiritual crisis is impending, by which our aspect of things, human and divine, will be modified, we shall find in contemporary poetry what effect it has on the human heart. Poetry, therefore, ought to be reflex of those ideas which agitate and disturb the conscience. In our age especially, when the wildest theories force themselves upon our attention with startling reality, we must examine its lyrical poetry to notice the effect. If it be true, as Fichte has observed, that "our systems of philosophy are too often the reflex of our hearts and lives," it is nevertheless true that questions which disturb the heart and influence the life, will find an expression—not in the dry, formal language of philosophy, but in the softer melody of verse. M. Caro, therefore, has conferred an obligation on all lovers of literature, when, in an article in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, of 15th May, 1874, he drew attention to the writings of a Madame Ackermann, whom he calls *un poète positiviste*. She is a true poet, whose views of life are based on the speculations of Darwin, Spencer, and Comte. There is a hopelessness, a despair, in her poetry, which indicate the terrible and melancholy earnestness of her convictions:

"Her fierce passion, and her protestations against the God whom she abandons, strikes the reader at once on opening these pages. He feels keenly the violence of her anathemas against old forms of the ideal and the divine, which the poet repudiates with too much hatred, because she cannot believe in them."

It is impossible in a translation to give back the fire of her poetry.

A few specimens are all that we can give. Her greatest poem is styled *Prométhée*, consecrated and dedicated to the name of Pascal. She cannot understand a life of Christian heroism, calmly bearing its cross without a murmur. Hence she reviles the God of Pascal. Against that God—the God of the gospel—her exasperated blasphemy hurls its bold but impotent defiance. It is thus she breaks out:

“In Thine avidity, disastrous, infinite,  
A cross and death were all Thou gavest him;  
Thou didst but rob his treasures, one by one:  
His love, his genius, Thou didst take away.  
A sacrifice complete! no mortal e'er  
Did yield so many gifts to Thee!  
Thy light was lightning falling on his soul;  
Thou didst devour both holocaust and altar.”

But, after all, can there be such a God? Is it possible that a Being so fierce, so passionate, disposes the lot of man, and “gluts his ire” by imposing massacre or inflicting agony? If He exist at all, let us dare Him with fierce anathema, to reveal His terrible power, and to crush us at once. Shall we meet Him with a salutation when about to trample upon us, and, like the gladiators of old, exclaim, “Ave, Cæsar, morituri te salutamus”?

“Who knows? perhaps we sin in such a way  
As to provoke His wrath; His arm of strength  
Might hurl this feeble planet from its sphere,  
And break in thousand pieces this our globe.  
Our daring then will save from being born,  
You, whom the gloomy future hides from view;  
We then shall triumph—we, who ceased to be,  
Because this God with man can strive no more:  
Oh joy immense, after such misery!  
Upon the ruins of this charnel-house  
At length to raise the cry of liberty—  
‘No longer men on earth, the last were all.’”

What, then, is to be the end of all? Shall we, thus liberated, reach the millennium of glory, when conscience, freed from servile fear, shall breathe more freely under the deserted heaven? Faith banished for ever, God dethroned, will that open for us a grander and happier future? Alas! the reply is, “We shall be sadder than ever.” The poet triumphs, because reason and



science have conquered all; but there is a grimness of despair in that song of triumph which startles and appals us:

“At length there opens up, where science thrones,  
A void, which faith has held, alas! too long;  
There, in that dark abyss as lord, it reigned,  
And meant to fill it with its dismal light,  
But now we drive thee from thine own domain.  
Oh, tyrant fierce! the day and hour are come  
When thou shalt wander exiled and alone,  
Thy phantoms gone, and closed for e'er th' unknown.

“But he who triumphs o'er thee will expire;  
His ruin is complete, the conqueror overcome.  
In dispossessing thee, all has been lost;  
We stay, but without refuge, help, or hope,  
The vast abyss still opens to our gaze,  
And the desire, though banished, still returns.”

Have we not something Miltonic in this poetry? Are we not reminded of Satan's despair, when heaven was closed for ever, and hell, with all its horrors, broke in upon the suffering fallen angel?

Our poet, having worked herself into a state of frenzy, and intoxicated with blasphemy, now turns to Christ. The cross is to her a stumbling-block. Pascal found rest for his soul on Calvary. But, alas! he has been sadly deceived. That Christ can bring no peace:

“When from his Golgotha, with blood-stained brow,  
Thy Christ would come to us, His arms outstretched,  
And to our bleeding heart would bring a balm,  
And with his word divine would whisper peace,  
  
Then would we turn from this celestial tempter,  
Who offers us His blood, but takes our reason.  
We would resist th' exchange so terrible,  
Our mouth would never cease from crying ‘No!’  
No, not that cross, which casts a baleful shade,  
A night, in which the human spirit dies;  
That cross, which bars the way to all advancement.  
No, not that instrument, where innocence  
And justice, too, expire.”

Thus breaking with faith, with God, with Christ, life becomes a

sad, a hopeless mystery. A dire necessity sweeps us on, from which there is no deliverance, either here or hereafter.

Madame Ackermann does not stand alone. Her pessimistic creed is shared by many; and though few thinkers dare to go the lengths she went, she has but given expression to what many feel. In our age there is a tendency to revive ancient speculation. Men have wearied themselves in their search after truth; the task has become hopeless, and a refined heathenism has been declared the highest wisdom of the day. It is ever thus when men leave the fountain of living waters, and hew out cisterns which can hold no water. The human heart craves for some revelation of God; and if the Word made flesh be discarded, man will create his own God, and worship that creature of the imagination. Hence the tendency to revert to ancient forms of belief; hence the paganising of religious thought. It reminds us of a scene in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*. When the ghost of Hamlet's father appears before the castle of Elsinore, Horatio addresses it in great perturbation: "Speak, speak, I charge thee, speak!" And when it stalks away, apparently unconscious of his presence, he yet again makes an attempt to attract its attention: "I'll cross it, though it blast me." So, too, in this intellectual and spiritual crisis, of which we are the witnesses—a crisis terrible in its significance and intensity—we often hear the cry of the burdened heart to the unknown God: "Speak, speak, O God; we charge thee, speak!" But as no voice reaches us from the sky, as no answer comes, save the dreary echo of our own cry, as Moses and the prophets are to be the only guides sent us from on high, the daring blasphemy of many who have long since broken with traditional beliefs, or discarded the God-given revelation, exclaims, "I'll cross Him, though He blast me!" The grandest intellects of the day have gone to wreck in this way. We have not, indeed, the frivolity which characterised the great revolutionary crisis in France. The age of the Diderots or Voltaires is past. Men are in earnest; all flippancy disgusts the sober-minded. But it is the earnestness of those whose task is a hopeless one. It is scepticism shaping its course in the dark. There is not the freshness and vigor and elasticity of faith. Reason attempting to grope its

way up to God, unaided and alone, may well be compared to the stern warrior, with brow furrowed by lines of thought, eagerly trying to gain a foothold at the sword's point, amid the mists and darkness of the Unknown; while the angel form of faith is soaring upwards with radiant face, and eyes beaming with light from above. No where does this strike us more sadly than in the later works of John Stuart Mill. Reared in a cold atmosphere of negation, under a father whose austerity chilled the heart of his nobler son, nursed in the selfish Utilitarianism of Bentham, taught from his very youth to suppress those feelings of love which gushed from his heart—we find a character which at once commands our respect, though it inspires us with pity. There was a spiritual crisis in that life, which is well described in the "Autobiography," a revolt from the narrow soulless Benthamism of earlier years. The "happiness theory" was modified, and a certain amount of satisfaction was the result. But other and greater questions remained; the life problems had not been solved. How shall we account for the sin and misery in the world? is there really a wise and beneficent Creator who "seeth the end from the beginning," and who maketh all things work together for good to them that love God?" A hopeless pessimism gives answer: "I could not find absolute goodness in a world so corroded with suffering and deformed by injustice as ours." And in the posthumous essays on Religion and Theism, we are told that the one great characteristic of nature is "its perfect and absolute recklessness;" that "nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another are nature's every day performances"; that "Anarchy and the Reign of Terror are overmatched in injustice, ruin, and death, by a hurricane, and a pestilence." What, then, is God? Mr. Spencer had long since, in his peculiarly dogmatic way, maintained that "duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny the Personality of God." Mill the elder had found "no halting-place in Deism until, after many a struggle, he yielded to the conviction that, concerning the origin of things, nothing whatever can be known." But Mill the younger simply ignores God. The world, according to him, is hopelessly wrong. The elements of good and evil are ever strug-

gling for the mastery; and even those "optimists" who believe that "whatever is, is best," must conclude "that their God could do any one thing, but not a combination of things; that His government, like human government, is a system of adjustments and compromises; that the world is inevitably imperfect, contrary to his intention." If there be an Author of good at all, a Being of perfect beneficence, then "the only admissible theory of creation is, that the principle of good *cannot* at once and altogether subdue the powers of evil, either physical or moral." His beneficence, therefore, if granted, is at the expense of His power. If Mr. Mill had half the frivolity of Strauss, he might have quoted with equal satisfaction those words of Diderot, "Il n'y a point de bon père qui voulût ressembler à notre père céleste." (*Alte und neue Glaube*, p. 30). These being Mr. Mill's views about God, what are his views about Christ, and the Bible which has painted Christ's character? Of the Bible he speaks with a reverence which many of his followers might copy:

"Even now it would not be easy, even for an unbeliever, to find a better translation of the rule of virtue, from the abstract to the concrete, than to endeavor so to live that Christ may be our life."

Miracles are, of course, rejected. The Gospel of John is a compound of mysticism, borrowed from Philo and the Alexandrians, and of "long speeches about himself put into the mouth of the Saviour." These speeches, which the Church of God at all times has considered her greatest treasure, are characterised by Mr. Mill as "poor stuff," which numbers of men "might have stolen" at any time, "as the multitudinous sects of Gnostics afterwards did." And yet

"the prophet of Nazareth, even in the estimation of those who have no belief in his inspiration, must be placed in the very first rank of the men of sublime genius of whom our species can boast." He was "a man charged with a special, express, and unique commission from God, to lead mankind to truth and virtue."

Such is Mr. Mill's theology. Students of his works were prepared for some such result. The theology is generally the outgrowth of the philosophy. And in Mr. Mill's philosophy we find utterances which might have led us to anticipate his opinions

on the Being of God, as set forth above. Mind and matter are not carefully distinguished, and made imperceptibly to shade into each other. Mind is considered to be "a series of feelings and possibilities of feeling;" matter "a series of sensations, with a background of possibilities of sensation." But as sensations and feelings are necessarily interwoven, it may be questioned whether a real distinction is here given. Hence Mr. Mill elsewhere rather inconsistently says, "The thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life, consists not only of present *sensations*, but also of *memories* and *expectations*." The difference between *matter* and *spirit* is a cardinal point in all philosophy. If this difference be overlooked, wrong conclusions in the great doctrines of theology will be the result. The belief in a personal God, and the immortality of the soul, will have to be given up. What Mr. Mill thought of the immortality of the soul, we cannot gather with sufficient clearness from his posthumous works. He speaks of a "problematical future existence," and believes in a kind of pure morality not dependent for its ascendancy on any hope of reward. The consolation man is to receive from this morality would be the approbation "of those whom we respect, and ideally of those living or dead whom we admire or venerate." This seems to correspond somewhat to the idea of Comte, who maintained that every great man had two forms of existence: the one conscious before death; the other unconscious after death, in the hearts and memories of other men. As Mr. Mill's theory of morals, though an improvement on Bentham's, is a thorough selfish one, it need not surprise us that its application is limited to this world. When, therefore, he speaks of the "infinite and eternal beatitudes" as "baseless fancies, which must recede into the past," and puts in their place "the good of one's country," and "the absolute obligation towards the universal good," it may well be questioned whether Mr. Mill believed in a future state.\*

\* In the *Posthumous Essays*, a section is devoted to the discussion of the Immortality of the Soul. But there is a haziness about it, a want of outspokenness, which one would not have anticipated. The usual arguments for the immortality of the soul are discarded. All we know is, that there is a *probability* of a continued existence hereafter. "There is

The difference between matter and spirit is the *question brulante* of our day, and every leading thinker has to deliver his opinion. Hence Professor Huxley, in his own impetuous way, expresses his contempt of all opponents in the following emphatic words:

“After all, what do we know of this terrible matter, except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness? And what do we know of that ‘spirit’ over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation is arising, like that which was heard at the death of Pan, except that it also is a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause or condition of states of our consciousness? In other words, matter and spirit are but names for the imaginary substrata of the groups of natural phenomena.”\*

Along with matter and spirit, every supernatural element in the history of the world, every providential adaptation of means to an end, every manifestation of design in the works of nature, is ignored.† God is an unknown quantity, a cipher in the universe. Professor Huxley has published no creed, but he is unsparing in his denunciation of traditional beliefs. He avows himself a disciple of Hume, claims fellowship with Herbert Spencer, believes only in “experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence,” commits every volume to the flames which does not contain “abstract reasoning concerning quantity and number,” banishes all else to the region of “sophistry and illusion.”

A man of a totally different stamp is Mr. Matthew Arnold. His religion is that of the polished gentleman, who does not shrink from a refined atheism, as long as it does not exercise the conscience overmuch. Mr. Arnold finds that the Bible has lost its hold upon the masses, because men have read the Bible wrong. The key to a true interpretation is “culture,” which is variously

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no assurance.” says Mr. Mill, “of a life after death, on grounds of natural religion. But to any one who feels it conducive either to his satisfaction or to his usefulness, to hope for a future state as a possibility, there is no hindrance to his indulging that hope.” (P. 210.)

\* *Lay Sermons*, p. 143.

† [This Article was in type before the delivery in Glasgow, 16th February, 1876, of Professor Huxley’s Lecture on Morphology and Teleology, which shews the consistency of the theory of evolution as held by him and the argument from design for the being of God. We welcome this frank and honest utterance as modifying the statements in the text.—ED.]

defined as "perception, delicacy of perception, the quality specially needed for drawing the right conclusion from the facts." To this must be added "a special knowledge, good fortune, natural tact, to make our criticism sure." But true "culture" is difficult; so, too, is the right reading of the Bible. Mr. Arnold, however, as the high priest of culture, will lead the way for as many as choose to follow. Unfortunately, however, his creed consists of cold, lifeless abstractions. He begins by denying the personality of God. Our conception of God springs from a gross anthropomorphism, which involves us in a number of absurdities.

God is not a person, but simply the "not-ourselves," "the stream of tendency by which all things fulfil the law of their being," which "a man of imagination instinctively personifies as a single mighty living and productive power." Even among the Israelites God was simply "the power that makes for righteousness." But popular religion has wrongfully represented that same God of Israel as "a magnified and non-natural man, working stupendous miracles." What Moses meant by the term Jehovah, was simply "the not-ourselves, by which we get the sense for righteousness," while modern interpretations have raised the name into that of "a mere mythological deity," or by translating it as "Lord," have given us "the notion of a magnified and non-natural man." Gradually, however, even among the Jews, there arose an "Aber-glaube, or extra belief," by which the simple creed of their fathers was encrusted with dogmatic prejudices. Revelation lost its clearness, and the popular religion became more and more anthropomorphic. Prophets and righteous men, it is true, tried to preserve the simplicity and purity of their primitive beliefs, but the mass of their countrymen could not be raised out of their numberless misapprehensions in regard to the Supreme Being. Men began to look forward to the future, in the hope that some great and radical change, socially, politically, and religiously, would ensue. Hence the belief in a coming Messiah sprang up. Even prophets delighted to picture this glorious future in glowing colors, but in reality "it was a kind of fairy tale which a man tells himself; which no one can prove impossible to turn out true, but which no one also can prove certain

to turn out true." When Christ appeared, he applied to himself what the prophets had predicted. But while doing so, he tried to restore those simpler, purer intuitions, which time had nearly effaced from religious thought. His "sweet reasonableness, exquisite, mild, winning felicity," together with "his method of inwardness, and the secret of self-renouncement working in and through this element of mildness," which produced the total impression of his "epieikeia," or "sweet reasonableness," were the means by which he brought about this change. His watch-words were *repentance* and *peace*, the former consisting specially in that "method of *inwardness* which takes counsel with conscience;" while to produce the latter, he drew attention to the fact, that man in this world has to live two lives—a higher and a lower—the higher being "the life, properly so-called, full of light, endurance, and felicity," and destined to rule over, restrain, and keep under the lower, "in connexion with the lower and transient self."

This, then, is the new religion of culture. Whether it be an improvement on the old Hegelian theory, that God is only man's contemplation of his own inward being, may be gravely doubted. At times Mr. Arnold makes an approach towards Hegelianism, as, for instance, when he says that the impulse in man to seek after God is not different from the impulse to seek his own perfection. But while Hegel's religion is the apotheosis of self, Mr. Arnold denies the "theos" altogether: and God, "if a God there be," is to him some dreary abstraction, of which nothing whatever can be predicated. Hence Mr. Arnold's book is a mere literary curiosity. It has its merits, from a literary point of view; but in reality nothing has been contributed towards the solution of the great problem of the day—how to harmonise Christianity with negative thought. The new reading of biblical doctrine, attempted under the influence of Broad Churchism and culture, is a failure: and the new theory will soon be consigned to the limbo of theological antiquities. Washington Irving has somewhere said that "theories are the mighty soap-bubbles with which the grown-up children amuse themselves, while the honest vulgar stand gazing in stupid admiration, and dignify these learned vagaries with the name of wisdom." The theology



of culture has but added another soap-bubble to the many which amuse the grown-up children of the age.

While thus the existence and personality of God are the great themes of discussion in our day, it is interesting to notice the opinions of leading scientific men on these subjects. There is too often a shirking of the question, a hesitancy to express themselves fully and clearly, observable among physicists. The form in which they delight to speak of God is as the great Unknown; or, otherwise, they so represent nature as though the existence or non-existence of God is a matter of no consequence at all. Hence the doctrine of final causes, as adopted by Christian philosophy, is entirely ignored in modern biological research. Every manifestation of design in the works of nature, every adaptation of means to an end, which we in our simplicity deemed conclusive in establishing an argument for the existence of God, has been gradually explained away. It is granted, indeed, that there are wonderful correspondences; but we are warned against ascribing any intention to nature. Where we speak of a designer, science speaks of the laws of development and growth; where we rise up on stepping-stones from nature to nature's God, science interposes a barrier of fixed, unalterable, inexorable law. It is maintained that life is a mere mode of motion; that there is no such thing as "vital force;" that what we, in our ignorance, called by that name, was merely another form of one of the "physical forces." Even the spiritual part of man's nature is but a modification of the various physical forces acting upon the bodily organs. Sensation and thought are due to molecular changes in the nerve-centres and the brain; what we term "soul," is but matter under different influences.

May we not fairly ask here for proof, for evidence, upon which these bold assertions rest. If unverified theories and fanciful hypotheses take the place of experiment and observation, do not scientific men lay themselves open to a charge of dogmatism, which is as pretentious as it is unphilosophical and intolerant? And what have we gained? As far as human research goes, living and dead matter seem to run in parallel lines, and science has not yet found the point where they converge.

Following in the wake of Huxley, Professor Tyndall has at-

tempted to solve the mystery of the universe. In his inaugural address at Belfast, he maintained that the great benefactors of mankind were the atomic philosophers—Lucretius, Democritus, Epicurus, Giordano Bruno—for they tried to base science upon law, and swept from the field of theory a mob of gods and superstitions with which the popular mind had crowded scientific investigation. Lucretius especially finds favor, and is quoted with approval, where he “combats the notion that the constitution of nature was in any way *determined by intelligent design*,” and maintains that “from all eternity, atoms had been driven together, and, after trying motions and unions of every kind, had fallen at length into arrangements, out of which this system of things has been formed.” Professor Tyndall endorses the views of those philosophers of antiquity and of modern days, who denied the existence of any design in nature, and believed that the whole universe was formed by the fortuitous concourse of atoms. These atoms—small and indivisible portions of matter, without intelligence, will, perception, life—have produced all we see around us. But where do they come from? Have they existed from all eternity, or must we consider them to be “the prepared materials, the manufactured articles, which, formed by the will of the Highest, produced, by their subsequent interaction, all the phenomena of the material world?” This is the theory held by Professor Clarke Maxwell; but of him Tyndall says very significantly, “I doubt the legitimacy of his logic.” It is indeed acknowledged that there is some *insoluble mystery*, by the operation of which “life is evolved, species differentiated, and mind unfolded.” The key to the true solution must be found in the words of Lucretius: “Nature is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself, without the meddling of the gods;” or, in the saying of Bruno, that “matter is the universal mother who brings forth all things as the fruit of her womb.” And if we trace the line of life backwards, we must be prepared to answer questions which are approaching with accelerated speed, and which must be answered, whether they are introduced with reverence or irreverence. Hence the Professor sums up his theory in the following words:

“Abandoning all disguise, the confession that I feel bound to make is.

that I prolong the vision across the boundary of the experimental evidence, and discern in that matter which we in our ignorance, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of every form and quality of life."

No wonder that these dreary negations have found a fitting climax in words of sad meaning :

"Here, however, I must quit a theme too great for me to handle, but which will be handled by the loftiest minds after you and I, *like streaks of morning cloud, shall have melted into the infinite azure of the past.*"

It is true these words have been recalled, and some exquisitely beautiful lines from Wordsworth's poem on *Tintern Abbey* have been substituted. But the words *have* been uttered, and the shock caused by them has possibly urged Professor Tyndall in his published address to alter and amend what at first he may have considered perfectly legitimate.\*

If views like these are generally adopted, when then is to be the religion of the future? To this question M. Caro has given answer in that interesting paper on Madame Ackermann's poetry, from which we have already quoted. If, he says, the doctrines of physicists are the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, there will in the future be no feeling of aversion to Jehovah, such as we now have to Jupiter. For there will be but one philosophy, that of nature; one religion, that of nature; one poetry, again that of nature. Jehovah will disappear, and nothing remain but that *gouffre défendu* of Madam Ackermann, "around which our desires will be eternally wandering," and that Unknown of which Mr. Spencer speaks so authoritatively. M. Caro is right :

"If Tyndall's last word be indeed the last,  
Of Hope and Faith hence with each rag and tatter,  
A black cloud shrouds our future, as our past;  
Matter, the wise man's God: the crowd's—no matter."

Dogmatism is characteristic of the science of the day; and a recklessness has taken possession of the leading physicists, before which everything is to give way. Tyndall himself has boastfully

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\* We have quoted from the address as published in *Nature* immediately after delivery, and not from the pamphlet as altered by Professor Tyndall, after the various criticisms.

pointed to the time when "all religious theories, schemes, and systems which embrace notions of cosmogony . . . must submit to be controlled by science, and relinquish all thought of controlling it." That time, according to him, has now come. We may wonder at the audacity which has prompted this assertion, and regret, with the *Spectator*, "that cowardly subservience to authority which marks some would-be students of science." But there are many who will accept this mindless theory of the universe, because all religion, all responsibility, will be done away with. "Thought evolved from matter is thought without responsibility, man is necessarily sinless;" and conscience will raise its warning voice in vain.

While the learned thus indulge in the wildest possible extravagances, there is provided for the masses an increasingly redundant supply of infidel and impure literature. Dr. Duff drew attention to the fact some year or two ago, in his admirable address as Moderator of the Free Church General Assembly. It has been calculated that in 1851 more than 12,000,000 copies of infidel publications were issued from the London press alone; while the total annual issue of immoral publications, according to the *Edinburgh Review* of the same year, has been estimated at 29,000,000—making therefore a larger aggregate than the total issues of the Bible, tract, and other religious societies. The perusal of these works by the lower classes, and the sensational stories scattered abroad by the wretched penny papers, contribute largely to spread infidelity and immorality among the masses.\*

But the truth must prevail. Christianity has nothing to fear from these repeated attacks. With the lamps burning and the loins girt, the Church must wait for the coming of the Bridegroom. "The gates of hell shall not prevail against her." The story is

\* Popular demagogues in our day are trying very hard to uproot Christianity. As an instance, may be mentioned what Christlieb calls the "blasphemous manifestoes of the Commune and the 'International.'" In *La Libr. Pensee* for October, 1870, Gustave Flourens, a leader of the Red Republican party in Paris, wrote as follows: "Our enemy is God. Hatred of God is the beginning of wisdom. If mankind would make true progress, it must be on the basis of atheism. Every trace of religion must be banished from the education of our children." (See Christlieb, *Modern Doubt and Christian Belief*, p. 139.)

told, that about a hundred years ago a number of infidels met together in the magnificent saloon of Baron d'Holbach. The doctrines and the person of Christ were discussed; and every one of the assembled guests aimed his shafts of ridicule at the Christian religion. At length Diderot, one of the fiercest and most impetuous of the number, rose and said:

"Excellent, excellent, gentlemen! in all the world none will be found better able to combat traditional beliefs than you. But yet of all the evil we have meditated against that accursed book, the Bible, I challenge you all to compose a history so simple, and yet so dignified, as that of the sufferings and death of Christ—a history which, after so many centuries, still exercises such an influence."

When these words had fallen from the lips of Diderot, an ominous silence took possession of the assembled infidels.\*

And as we watch the course of events, we have no reason to fear. Another Armada may be sent to extirpate Christianity; but of this it will be said in future ages, as of the first, "*Flavit Deus, et dissipati sunt.*"

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#### ARTICLE VII.

#### THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT NEW ORLEANS.

This was justly said to be the fullest Assembly of our Church that has yet been held, and also one of the strongest. Certainly there never was one that excelled this in patience and good temper. The unanimity of its voting on nearly all the chief questions was wonderful. Let this be noted by any who are afraid that our Church is not fully at one. As to the debates, the proportion was unusually small, perhaps, of commissioners who burned with a desire to air their logic or eloquence. If there were any of that disposition, the Assembly's good nature submitted quietly to the infliction. A large proportion of the

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\* This story is told by Stier, in his *Reden Jesu*, and quoted by Van Oostersee, *Voor Kerk en Theologie*, i. p. 2. It was related to Hess in the last century, by an eye-witness.

members were new men and young men, of whom many were perfectly silent until called on to vote; but some took an active part in the debates, and bore themselves well. Let it never be said that the Presbyteries should always send their oldest men to the Assembly—there is no fool like an old fool. The Presbyteries ought to send their ablest, wisest, and best men to this high court. The idea of sending every member in rotation deserves to be scouted by all. It is *an election* the case demands—an election of whomsoever the Presbytery shall choose to send to this free representative Assembly of the whole Church. Each Presbytery is privileged to elect, but the representative commissioned is not the representative of his own Presbytery, but a *general* representative—a representative of the whole Church. Now it is not every man who is competent to fill such a high and responsible position, and the Presbyteries ought to send their best men to occupy it. But George Gillespie, perhaps the ablest as well as most learned member of the Westminster Assembly, (his colleague Henderson excepted,) was perhaps the very youngest member of that illustrious body.

#### THE MODERATOR'S SERMON.

The opening sermon by Rev. Dr. B. M. Smith, of the Presbytery of West Hanover, on the promise of the Holy Spirit and his work in the redemption of man, from Luke xi. 13, and John xvi. 8–11, was just what was expected from such a scholar and divine. Sound and orthodox, learned and instructive, pervaded throughout with a manifest sense of the power of the Holy Ghost and our dependence upon him for all grace, it closed with an earnest appeal to the Assembly, justly presumed to be “filled with anxious forebodings” concerning several of the questions before it, to pray “for the promised Spirit.” The preacher declared his conviction that in the midst of “the perplexities and anxieties” which marked the closing scenes of the Savannah Assembly, there was felt a deep sense of the need of the Spirit’s guidance and earnest prayer offered for the same, and that we had evidence of the bestowal of that blessing “in the unanimity with which conclusions were reached upon very perplexing ques-

tions and the wide spread approbation of our people" giving their seal to those conclusions. It is not too much to say that the same sense of dependence on the guidance of the Spirit was felt in the New Orleans Assembly; the same earnest prayers put up for that blessing, and the same gracious answer received.

If there must needs be offered some criticism of this excellent discourse, let it be that, considering to how large an extent the congregation which heard it was a popular body and not purely a company of learned scholars, it perhaps evinced too clearly how the eminent preacher's chosen and favorite studies are occupied habitually with the critical study of the Scriptures.

#### ORGANISATION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

Commissioners were present from all our Presbyteries excepting the remotest ones. The number in attendance was one hundred and thirty-eight. We must soon begin to guard against the Assembly getting to be too numerous and unwieldy a body.

Drs. Stillman, Woodrow, and Rutherford, were nominated for the Moderator's chair. Somewhat strangely the vote stood, Woodrow, 42; Stillman, 41; and Rutherford, 40. According to custom, the choice was now confined to the first two, Dr. Woodrow receiving 58 votes, and Dr. Stillman 68, who thereupon was declared Moderator, took his seat and presided with dignity and ability. The Rev. Mr. Lacy was elected temporary clerk. It was then made known to the Assembly that the Rev. Mr. Wolfe, elected reporter by the last Assembly, had expected to be present but was prevented by sickness. The clerks had therefore applied to the Rev. Wm. P. Jacobs, of the South Carolina Presbytery, at the last moment, to take his place, to which Mr. Jacobs, (a competent stenographer,) had consented. Subsequently it being supposed that Mr. Wolfe had declined the position, it was moved that Mr. Jacobs be appointed by the Assembly to be its reporter. This, however, being explained to be not the fact, the matter was left just where the Savannah Assembly had placed it. Very much is it to be desired that Mr. Wolfe may find himself able to fill this important and useful office.

## THE REVISED BOOK OF ORDER.

The Rev. Dr. George D. Armstrong moved that a committee be appointed to take charge of all the papers coming up from Presbyteries touching the Revised Book. Dr. Adger enquired whether the proposition was simply a committee to report to the Assembly what the returns might be from the Presbyteries, or to take the whole matter in hand and mature action on the subject for the Assembly's adoption. It was explained that the latter was the object proposed, and the Assembly voted to have such a committee. George D. Armstrong, John B. Adger, A. Cowan, J. R. King, W. H. Davis, T. W. Erwin, and R. R. Houston, Ministers, and S. P. Greves, James Carson, T. Frierson, and R. L. Beall, Ruling Elders, were appointed. Dr. Armstrong, the chairman, it was, as the reader may remember, who rendered such eminent service to the cause of revision in that curious debate at the Richmond Assembly. He seems to have attended the Assembly at New Orleans, having in view, as his one great end, to help forward the revision. It was a very arduous work which was imposed on him by his chairmanship of this Committee, to collate and digest all the Presbyterial reports, but he went through it skilfully, and also successfully carried through the Assembly all that his Committee reported to that body. Let those who love our Doctrine and Order, as they stand associated in vital relations, see that to Dr. Armstrong there shall be erected for this service done the Church *monumentum ære perennius*.

On the seventh day of the sessions, Dr. Armstrong read the report of his Committee. Answers had been received, either official or through the commissioners present, from all our sixty-three Presbyteries except Indian, Central Ohio and Sao Paulo. These answers were to be classified thus: Twenty-five Presbyteries have adopted the Revised Book as it now stands, and thirty-five have not adopted it, but twenty of these express approval in the main, and ask that the revision may go on. Two Presbyteries wish the work of revision to be stopped. The Presbyteries are therefore overwhelmingly in favor of prosecuting the work, and that on the basis of the present Revised Book. Two plans



of doing this have been suggested by Presbyteries: The one to commit the work to a convention to perfect a book on the basis of the present revision, which should be sent down to the Presbyteries for adoption or rejection before the next Assembly; the other, to carry on the work under the auspices of the Assembly, as follows: (1) That certain articles in the Revised Book, on which there is a difference of opinion in the Church, be submitted to a separate vote in the Presbyteries; (2) that certain amendments in the revision desired by the Presbyteries be acted upon by this Assembly, and the Book, thus amended, be sent down to the Presbyteries for their adoption or rejection. The latter plan was recommended by the Committee, chiefly on the ground that outside the six or seven points to be submitted to the separate vote, there is very little difference of opinion in the Church. Nine-tenths of the amendments suggested by the Presbyteries are mere verbal changes, affecting only the style. The *first recommendation* of the Committee, therefore, was that the Assembly consider seven articles to be submitted to a separate vote in the Presbyteries. The *second recommendation* was to consider eleven amendments of the Revised Form, and thirteen amendments of the Revised Discipline proposed by Presbyteries. And the *third recommendation* was that this Assembly should remit the whole work of amending and polishing the style and language of the Book to the next Assembly, which shall appoint a committee for this purpose, to whom shall be referred all the criticisms sent up by the Presbyteries, and who shall revise it, but make no alteration affecting the sense, and who shall have it printed.

The Committee's *recommendations* were then taken up in their order: *first*, the seven articles to be submitted for a separate vote. They were as follows:

1. The restriction of a right to vote in Presbytery. (Revised Form, Chap. V., Section 4, Art. II.)
2. The whole matter of Ecclesiastical Commissions. (Ditto: Chap. V., Section 7.)
3. The question of voters in the election of a pastor. (Ditto: Chap. VI., Section 3, Art. IV.)

4. The examination rule. (Ditto, Chap. V., Section 4, Art. V.)

5. The case of an offence voluntarily confessed. (Revised Discipline. Chap. XII., Art. I.)

6. The transfer of the unregenerate communicant. (Ditto. Art. II.)

7. The demission of the ministry. (Ditto, Art. III.)

Gen. W. L. T. Prince, ruling elder from Mecklenburg Presbytery, thought there should be sent down, as an eighth article, the question of the revised definition of offence. But there was no debate at all about submitting the seven named above, excepting as to the third article. Dr. Armstrong's report stated that there had been reported by the Revision Committee three propositions, submitted by various Presbyteries, as follows: (1.) Allowing adults regular in attending on the common ordinances and contributing regularly to the support of the pastor to vote in such elections along with Church members. (2.) What is known as the Memphis Assembly's compromise rule, allowing a separate vote to non-communicating members, to be submitted to the Presbytery as information. (3.) Confining the election strictly to members of the Church in full communion. Dr. B. M. Smith moved to withhold the first form and submit only the two last. Dr. Adger said he had hoped the Assembly's time would not be occupied at all with these seven articles which were to go to the Presbyteries for a separate vote, seeing there are some five and twenty other amendments to be discussed and decided by this body. But he was very desirous that all three propositions touching the election of pastors, should be submitted together for the choice of the Presbyteries. There is a very great difference of opinion in the Church on this subject. Numbers one and three are the extremes, number two is a compromise, which he feared must work badly, by setting the inside and the outside elements in opposition. It is an invitation to contention between them. If either form is to be dropped, let us drop this compromise and leave the Presbyteries to choose between the extremes. For himself, he was decidedly in favor of the liberal rule, as were large numbers of brethren and possibly whole Presbyteries.

and he hoped the Assembly would not refuse to let the Church consider its merits. The class of outsiders whom it would favor are the most hopeful class, and we should seek to attract them and not repel. Gov. Marye, ruling elder from East Hanover Presbytery, earnestly opposed the liberal rule. He was not insensible to the social value of the non-communicating element in the Church, but was not willing to let it ever have control in the election of a pastor. Dr. Smith's motion was lost; 34 yeas to 71 nays. And then the seven propositions were sent down. Subsequently Gen. Prince's motion was carried without any debate, and an eighth article, touching "offence," was added.

The *second recommendation* was taken up, and eleven amendments in the Revised Form by various Presbyteries were considered and acted on. None of them were of any fundamental importance, and yet they could not be classed with mere verbal emendations. The *first* one proposed to strike out the title *missionary* from the names given to the minister of the word, on the ground that this one alone is not found in Scripture. It was adopted. The *second* amendment proposed to add to Chapter Fourth, Section 2d, an article coming in betwixt the sixth and the seventh, in these words: "When a minister is called to labor through the press or in any other needful work, it shall be incumbent on him to make full proof of his ministry by disseminating the gospel for the edification of the Church." The idea evidently is to recognise the press as a legitimate tool of the gospel ministry. There was opposition made to this view. The Rev. R. T. Berry said that the editing of a newspaper is no part of a minister's work. You are violating the Scriptures and our constitution in recognising this as a ministerial calling. If there be anything calculated to injure our church, it is the course of the so-called religious press. The Rev. A. J. Loughridge demanded to be informed from whom comes this "call" to be an editor. Dr. Armstrong replied, it comes from the Holy Ghost, and the Presbytery must judge of it as of any other "call." Mr. Loughridge rejoined, that the religious paper, so-called, is an agency of strife that is doing immense evil in our Church. The editors should be held responsible for everything that appears in

their columns, even for those humbug advertisements they frequently admit. Dr. Adger called attention to the place in which this amendment is to be inserted. The doctrine of the Revised Form, Chap. IV., Section 2, Art. III., is that "the Church is authorised to call and appoint ministers to labor as pastors, teachers, and evangelists, and *in such other works* as may be needful to the Church, according to the gifts in which they excel." Then the duties of the pastor are defined, then those of the Theological Professor or College Chaplain, and then it is proposed to say that the *editor*, who is called by the Church to be such, must preach the gospel and teach sound doctrine with his types, and, in fine, must do just what the last speaker said that he ought to do, but does not. The judgment of our times is so settled that the press is a mighty instrument for good or for evil. We are irrevocably committed as a Church to the legitimate use of the press. He was prepared to have the Church elect its editors as the Methodists do; and perhaps that is the very way to cure the evils that have been charged on our editors. Does any one want Scripture for the use of the pen and the types in disseminating the Word? Why, is not the Scripture itself just the written and the printed word of God? And who will venture to decide whether Paul the Apostle was most useful when he preached, or when he wrote the Epistles? The amendment was adopted by a vote of 73 yeas to 27 nays.

The *third* amendment proposed to make it obligatory on the Church to commit the temporal matters of the Church to the deacons, by substituting the word "shall" where the Revised Form has used "may." It was not agreed to.

The *fourth* amendment related to Chapter V., Section 1, Art. III., where it is written: "The pastor is moderator of all congregational assemblies." Naturally enough, some of the Presbyteries, as well as members of the Assembly, supposed the reference must be to meetings of the congregation, and it was proposed to insert after *Moderator*, the words "of the session and." Dr. Adger pointed out how the obscurity of meaning in the Revised Form had arisen from a too close following of the terminology of the present Book. It says the Church is to be "governed by

congregational, presbyterial, and synodical assemblies," and, of course, "congregational assemblies" means simply *sessions*. The Section is describing our various courts, and has no reference to meetings of the congregation as such. Accordingly, the Assembly, by vote, made the clause read thus: "The pastor is Moderator of the session."

The *fifth* amendment provided for the calling together of a session, where there is no pastor, by two elders. It was adopted.

The *sixth* amendment makes a distinction in Chapter V., Section 4, Art. X., between "corresponding members" and "visiting brethren." Adopted.

The *seventh* amendment strikes out of Chapter VI., Section 4, Art. I., the words "the session shall hold free conference with reference to his vocation and obligation to accept the office." Adopted.

The *eighth* amendment strikes out of the same Chapter and Section, Art. 5, the words "*of the ceremony of.*" Adopted.

The *ninth* amendment strikes out of the same Chapter, Section 5, Art. III., the last sentence of the paragraph relative to a fast day. Adopted.

The *tenth* amendment proposed to alter Chapter VII., Art. II., so that it would not be necessary for a second Assembly to sanction any proposed change in the Book of Church Order. The Assembly rejected the amendment.

The *eleventh* amendment proposed a substitute in Chapter IV., Section 1, Art. I., of the words "united them to the household of faith," for the words "formed them into one body." The object was to guard against the error that the New Testament Church is not the very same Church established by the Lord at the beginning. Adopted.

The Assembly then passed to the consideration of the fourteen amendments in the Revised Discipline, which had been proposed by various Presbyteries.

The *first* one proposed to leave out of Chapter II., Art. I., the words "continues during the minority of their children and." The Assembly rejected it.

The *second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh* and *eighth* amendments, being verbal, though valuable, were all adopted.

The *ninth* proposed to alter Chapter IX., Art. XIII., so that on the discovery of new evidence, either the accused party or the Church itself may demand a new trial. A lively discussion ensued, and several ruling elders of the legal profession took earnest part in it. Mr. Brooke, of Chesapeake Presbytery, said it was a fundamental principle of criminal law that no man shall be twice jeopardised for the same cause. He would be sorry to see the Presbyterian Church adopt a principle which the civilisation of the world repudiates *in favorem libertatis*. Col. Billups, of Augusta Presbytery, fully concurred with Mr. Brooke. It would be subversive of right to allow a movement for a new trial to be made by the officers of the law. Col. Anderson, of the Presbytery of South Alabama, said this provision is in the Constitution of the United States and of every particular State. It is a part of the common law, and has grown out of the experience of many past ages. It is also a part of the civil law, and reaches back beyond the days of Justinian. And then it is a maxim of law that there should be an end of litigation—*ut sit finis litigationis*. If this be a good maxim for the State, much more for the Church which wants peace and quietness. Of all disturbing elements in any community, a criminal trial is perhaps the very worst. The provision for a second trial would just open the way for the inroads of malice. It would only be malice that would, in general, call for the second trial. The amendment was rejected.

The tenth, eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth amendments were all adopted, without giving rise to any discussion. They are not without value, but require no comment here.

Subsequently, another amendment was made, so altering the whole of Chapter VI., Art. V., as to make it read thus: "In drawing the indictment, the times, places, and circumstances should, if possible, be particularly stated, that the accused may have full opportunity to make his defence."

Having disposed of the amendments, the Assembly passed to the *third recommendation* of its Committee, providing for the appointment by the next Assembly of a committee to perfect the style of the Book, should the Presbyteries send up favorable answers respecting it, as now amended and submitted to them. The

Rev. W. H. Davis objected that, unintentionally this committee might modify the teachings of the Book. Dr. Adger said there were perhaps hundreds of these merely verbal changes proposed by the Presbyteries, and that no Assembly could possibly deal with them directly. The Rev. G. W. Finley offered as a substitute for the Committee's recommendation, the following:

“*Resolved*, That the Revised Book, as amended by this Assembly, be put into the hands of a committee of five, to revise the style and language of the same in the light of the criticisms sent up to this Assembly, and that the same be printed and sent down to the Presbyteries.”

Dr. Adger seconded and urged the adoption of the substitute. It was carried. Then the report was recommitted, with instructions to report an overture, to be sent down to the Presbyteries, proposing the Revised Book, as amended, for their adoption, and specifically presenting the eight points for their separate votes. On the next day, Dr. Armstrong, the Chairman, presented the report of the overture, which was adopted, as follows:

“The General Assembly, having carefully revised the Book of Church Order, amending it in a number of particulars suggested in the papers sent up by the Presbyteries, and through its committee corrected its language and style, now send it down to the Presbyteries to be acted upon as follows, viz.:

“The Presbyteries are directed—

“I. To vote upon the adoption of the Book as a whole.

“II. To take a separate and distinct vote upon the adoption of each of the following parts of the Book, viz.:

1. Form of Government, Chapter V., Section 4, Article II.
2. Form of Government, Chapter V., Section 4, Article V.  
The first sentence of the Article.
3. Form of Government, Chapter V., Section 7.
4. Form of Government, Chapter VI., Section 3, Article IV. The Presbyteries will adopt one of the three forms of this Article contained in the Book.
5. Book of Discipline, Chapter III., Article I., and Chapter I. Article II. of the present Book of Discipline, as alternative propositions, adopting one of them.

6. Book of Discipline, Chapter XII., Article I.
7. Book of Discipline, Chapter XII., Article II.
8. Book of Discipline, Chapter XII., Article III.

“The Presbyteries are further directed to send up to the next General Assembly a properly authenticated record of their vote upon each of these several points.”

On motion of Dr. Armstrong, it was

“*Resolved*, That the Committee of Publication be instructed to have the Book of Church Order, as now revised, printed, and, as soon as practicable, that a copy be sent to each minister and each session in the Church.”

Drs. Adger, Palmer, and Armstrong, with Ruling Elders Mar-rye and Anderson, were appointed the Committee on style and language, under Mr. Finley's resolution. This Committee met on the morning after the dissolution of the Assembly, in Dr. Palmer's study, and accomplished their task before separating. They felt it to be their duty to confine themselves strictly to such merely verbal and literary amendments as were sent up from Presbyteries.

#### PLACE OF NEXT MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY.

On the second day, on motion of Dr. Welch, nominations being called for, Knoxville, St. Louis, the Second church, Charlotte, and Wilmington, were nominated, and very warm pleas in favor of each were urged by various advocates. It was not a little gratifying to see what a cordial welcome was held out from so many different places. The Rev. Mr. McCallie said the First church, Knoxville, would take good care of the Assembly and treat them well. Knoxville had never had the meeting; and has had its trials, both during the war and since. That First church building was battered and abused and the pews torn out of it, and for a long time after the war possession of the building was withheld. But through years that church had stood up nobly and sublimely in the midst of much opposition for true Presbyterianism, and to every call of this Assembly that scarred and battered church has cordially responded; and now then, in answer to their earnest invitation, go there and give them the



blessing of your presence. Ruling Elder J. A. Caldwell, of the Presbytery of Knoxville, seconded and warmly urged the motion. The church which invites you is an old church, organised in the last century, and has done good work for the cause. And the two churches there can take good care of the Assembly. The hospitality of these mountain people only wants an opportunity to manifest itself. And it will do the Assembly good to breathe the pure air and drink the clear crystal waters of that region.

Ruling Elder I. M. Veitch, of the Presbytery of St. Louis, claimed that that city is the centre of the continent, being half-way from New York to San Francisco. The Assembly was there two years ago, but for special reasons was wanted there again. And Dr. Rutherford was persuaded that St. Louis was the best place for the meeting. In no place could it possibly meet with better prospects of good effect. To this day they are feeling in St. Louis the good effects of the Assembly's meeting there.

Ruling Elder W. L. T. Prince urged that Charlotte is the true centre. That is the headquarters of the Presbyterian Church. There are our Trustees of the Assembly. There we hold our charter. A warm welcome awaits you to the centre of Presbyterianism. It would add much to the efficiency of the Second church there, if you would meet with them. The Assembly has not met in North Carolina since the war, but it has met twice in Tennessee, and but two years ago in St. Louis. The favors of the body ought to be distributed. The Rev. W. H. Davis read a resolution of the First church, offering to unite with the Second, in the entertainment of delegates.

Then Ruling Elder B. G. Worth, of the Presbytery of North Carolina, very modestly but warmly urged the invitation of Wilmington. But it was a foregone conclusion. St. Louis and Wilmington each got 3, Charlotte 23, and Knoxville 90 votes: and so the next Assembly is to meet in the grand Tennessee mountains.

#### THE BIBLE CAUSE.

This came up on the third day upon an answer from the Committee on Bills and Overtures, to overtures from the Presbytery

and Synod of Memphis and the Synod of Alabama, asking that collections for the Bible Society be ordered in all our churches, and a column added to our statistical reports to show the amounts contributed. Dr. B. M. Smith, Chairman, reported, recommending to answer, 1: That the Society is not under control by our Church; 2. That its contributions are made through channels other than the Church; and 3. That recognising the zeal of the Synods, and commending the cause of the Bible as heretofore, we feel bound to decline the requests. Dr. Smith explained that there is really no room mechanically for another column in our report, but that the main difficulty is that the institution is not of our Church. It was urged by Rev. Eugene Daniel and Rev. W. D. Morton that we ought not to receive so much from the American Bible Society without making any return or doing adequately our duty to that cause. Dr. Hoge, also, in a somewhat extended and very eloquent speech urged the same view. The foundation on which our whole structure of doctrine and order rests is that Word of God which this Society publishes and circulates, and if we have not yet given it our official sanction, it is time that we were doing it. And if we cannot endorse the American Bible Society as a Society, because not under our control, we can endorse the Bible work. Now the Synod of Virginia had been recommending by resolutions (which so often prove to be nothing but ecclesiastical extinguishers of good things) this Bible work, but no fruit came until their churches were enjoined to take up a collection every year. He did not care about the statistical column, but wanted our churches enjoined to take up a collection for this cause and report it in some way. Our impoverished South owes a great debt to the American Bible Society. It has often made grants unsolicited. Last year it gave in this way to our Virginia Bible Society twenty-five hundred dollars' worth of Bibles.

The Rev. J. K. Hazen said the Bible Society had changed its plan of working—giving up its own agents and seeking to work through the churches—and, therefore, if we wish to coöperate, it must be as churches. And then we want, in some way, to show what our Church is doing for this cause.

Ruling Elder D. N. Kennedy, of the Presbytery of Nashville, bowed to no man in his love for the Bible cause, but opposed enjoining. Let us fill the six columns before we add any more columns.

The Rev. Alex. Cowan said that, in his section, the contribution of the Presbyterian Church is larger than that of other Churches, and not for vain-glory, but the truth's sake, some way should be provided to keep a record of gifts.

Mr. Daniel moved a recommitment. There was manifest a general agreement, the drift being that the Church must not be mixed up with voluntary societies, but must work for the general cause. The Chairman, Dr. Smith, seconded the motion, and the report was recommitted. It was afterwards reported back, declining still the requests made, but commending the cause and enjoining on Presbyteries to take such action as will best advance the Bible cause in their various territories; and so it passed unanimously.

Certainly no intelligent Christian man can wish otherwise than well to every endeavor to disseminate the Scriptures. This, in fact, is expressing it very feebly—every Christian man and every Christian Church will certainly try and do all that is possible in aid of every such endeavor. This discussion, however, must make it plain to every one of us that there is and must ever be a serious difficulty in the way of our coöperation, whether as individuals or churches, with the Bible Society. The difficulty is, that we Presbyterians are *Church men*. We believe in the Church and not in voluntary Societies, however excellent for any moral or religious ends. We believe in Church action for all such ends, and not in action by any man-made Society, however wise or earnest or orthodox. It is the Church to whose care the Scriptures are especially committed of God; and what Society so proper as this which God himself founded to do the work of disseminating his Word? Moreover, how can the God-made Church turn over her own proper work to any man-made institution instead of doing it herself? It appears now, from what Mr. Hazen and others said, that the Bible Society itself perceives this difficulty, and has taken a very important step towards meet-

ing and removing it. It abandons all agencies in many sections and seeks to operate through Churches. So far, so good; but this is not going very far—at least, it is by no means going far enough—to remove our difficulty. Let us make a suggestion: Might it not be possible, under the charter of the American Bible Society, to have all its work done directly by the Churches? Might not the Society itself arrange to have its Executive Committee composed of Commissioners who should be members of the different Churches and appointed by the different Churches to do this work? We suppose no Presbyterian could object to have his Church work in connexion with other Christian Churches in spreading the Bible. Then we should have, indeed, a grand coöperative union of all Christian Churches which would be a real thing, presenting the advantages of a true organic union, without its difficulties and disadvantages.

#### REPORT ON THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION.

The history of this report is as follows: The Assembly of 1874 appointed Drs. Smith, Palmer, Kirkpatrick, Stillman, Howe, and Robinson, to report on desirable changes in our methods of educating candidates. The Committee could not be got together, but the Chairman endeavored to obtain its views by correspondence, and then presented a report to the Assembly at Savannah, stating that he assumed its entire responsibility. That Assembly resolved to defer action until this year, but ordered the publication in the *Appendix* of so much of it as sets forth proposed modifications. To the Assembly of this year the Presbytery of New Orleans sends an overture on Theological Education, in reply to which Dr. Smith, Chairman of the Committee of Bills and Overtures, presented, on the fourth day, the following for the adoption of the Assembly:

“This General Assembly, in view of the suggestions of the report on theological education, referred to it by the Assembly of 1876, respecting the desirableness of sundry modifications of our methods of training candidates for the ministry, hereby solemnly enjoin on the Presbyteries, and recommends to the theological seminaries under its care, to take order in their respective spheres

of service, in such training for carrying forward that training in the methods herein commended.

“I. 1. Applications to be received under the care of the Presbytery, by a candidate not well known to most of its members, shall not be acted on for a period of less than three months.

“2. The Presbyteries shall observe with increased strictness the provisions of our Form of Government, Chapter XIV., Sections 3-6; and to avoid precipitate action in the licensing of candidates, they shall be required to pass through a probation of at least one year, involving an attendance on at least two meetings of Presbytery, at each of which a portion of their examinations shall be held. The examination of candidates in the seminaries shall in no case supersede the examination by Presbyteries.

“3. Every candidate, except as regarded as an ‘extraordinary case’—Form of Government, Chapter XIV., Section 6—shall be required to prosecute successfully the scholastic course prescribed in the Form of Government, and, at the discretion of Presbytery, exhibit any other evidences of piety, literature and aptness to teach which may be required by the Presbytery.

“4. To improve candidates in aptness to teach, the Presbytery shall provide opportunities for such as need additional advantages for that purpose, by granting them license for a limited period, and prescribe a field of labor, to conduct public religious services, involving the exposition of the Scriptures, and provide for the adequate superintendence of such candidates, and for a reasonable compensation for their services.

“5. Candidates whose residences are at an inconvenient distance from a seminary for a frequent attendance on Presbytery, may be placed under the care of some Presbytery more convenient to the seminary; but, ordinarily, such candidates shall be required to pass their final examinations and receive their licenses by the Presbytery under whose care they had first been taken.

“II. 1. The seminaries shall so arrange their programme of study that candidates may abridge or extend the time of scholastic study according to previous preparation and ability for its successful prosecution. But in no case shall such programme lessen the requisitions of our Form of Government.

“2. In no case, except under the authority of Presbytery, shall a candidate be allowed to pass to a higher grade of study till he shall have sustained a satisfactory examination on the studies of the grade preceding.

“3. The authorities of the seminaries shall annually report to the Presbyteries with which candidates may be connected, by a formal relation or by residence, their scholastic progress, and whatever else respecting their merit which the Presbyteries may request.

“4. They shall also provide a course of ‘vacation study’ of such a character that the student shall pass a satisfactory examination. This provision is designed to meet the wishes of candidates, who, in the judgment of their Presbyteries, ought to complete the prescribed course of study in a less period than three years, either to enter on the work of the ministry, or to spend an additional year in prosecuting such a post-graduate study as the faculty may prescribe.”

Dr. Smith said he would not discuss the terms “undigested and vague,” by which the Presbytery of New Orleans had characterised his report presented last year. Brethren will differ on such matters. This short abstract covered his views on the subject.

There were two extremes touching theological education, one being that the requisitions of our Book are not high enough, and we must alter our organic law. But there is a clause which gives Presbyteries full power to demand whatever will satisfy them. The other extreme is that our training for the ministry is above the heads of the people. A clamor has rung through the land for an order of ministers of more practical turn to go and preach to the ignorant. But the best preacher to the poor slave he ever had known was Dr. Archibald Alexander.

There is no method for training young ministers which is acknowledged in our Book—the words “Theological Seminary” are not found there. Seminaries, in fact, are recent experiments, commencing about 1811–’12. They are all constructed on the model of Andover. That was a curriculum school—so are Princeton, Union, Columbia, Danville. The Theological Seminary is an American, indeed, a New England institution. In the old

countries, usually the candidate for the ministry goes to the University; and perhaps it would be better that our theological students associate with young men training for other professions.

Two parties, then, are connected with the training of our young ministers—the Presbytery recognised in our Form, and the Seminary not so recognised, but added in the wisdom of the Church. Accordingly, this paper presents *first*, the relations of the Presbytery to the student, and *secondly*, the relations of the Seminary to the student.

Dr. Woodrow expressed thanks to the Committee for the time devoted by them to this matter; but before entering on any examination of these propositions, he would express his sympathy with Dr. Hoge as to the value of any mere resolutions. He did not wish the Assembly to adopt any resolutions which must necessarily be inoperative. Now how are we going to put any part of this paper to work? Take the first proposition—a Presbytery shall not receive a candidate till he has knocked three months at their door. Where does the Assembly get authority for any such rule? In its proper sphere the Presbytery is as independent as the Assembly. The constitution puts the whole matter of licensing and ordaining in the hands of the Presbytery, and the Assembly has no more right to legislate about it than the Session has. We cannot ordain constitutional rules in this body. We are supreme only in what the constitution commits to our care, and it does not commit this matter to our care. We are asked now to say and do that which can have and ought to have no effect. This is the first objection I have to that which constitutes the bulk of this paper. Every direction given to the Presbyteries is cut to pieces by this one principle.

In what way much of the residuum of the paper affects the Seminaries may next be shown. Union Seminary, we are told, is a law to itself—what will that which is a law to itself care for anything you may do? It does not belong to the Assembly. You might as well give orders to the South-western Bible Society or other outside bodies, and begin to exercise the functions of adviser-general. Then, how is it going to affect the Columbia Seminary? The chief recommendation touches what is func-

tional, and not what is organic. It recommends the Professors to be more careful in applying tests they are already bound to apply. I refuse to be advised to do what I am already doing to the best of my ability—your recommendation comes in the form of a condemnation. But further, suppose there were an organic difficulty, this is not the way to reach it. The Assembly has prescribed in a constitution the way in which we are to obey you. All these recommendations are worthless paper, unless you put them into the constitution.

Rev. S. W. Watkins said it was singular for Dr. Woodrow to put his Seminary under the care of the Assembly, and then refuse positively to listen to or obey any counsel from the Assembly.

Rev. J. C. Graham, from the Presbytery of New Orleans, said the answer was not full enough. We can wait a year or two, if necessary, but we want an elaborate report on the subject.

Rev. W. D. Morton moved a discussion of the resolutions *seriatim*, but Dr. Howe called for more free and general discussion first, and the debate went on.

Dr. Smith believed abstract principles were important, yet we may become so straight-laced as to squeeze all life out of the Church. He did not attach much importance to these "*high pints*." The Assembly cannot make a constitutional rule, but what hinders it from interpreting the rule which declares how Presbytery shall examine a candidate, and to see that Presbyteries carry out their rules? He didn't want the Church choked with tight lacing. The Assembly had legislated in Columbus about the Seminary at Columbia. As for Union, he thought she would submit to the care of the Assembly in the premises and gladly receive any advice or direction from the Assembly. If Dr. Woodrow's (Augusta) Presbytery believed the Assembly had no right to enjoin, why did it memorialise and so bring this subject before us? He did not approve of the thistle's idea, "Don't touch us, we'll stick you." Dr. Woodrow had placed himself in a position liable to be misunderstood.

Now look at the suggestions of the paper. They advise our Presbyteries, fifty or sixty in number, to avoid precipitancy—not to take a man under their care in the morning and license him at



night, but allow a year, at least, to pass, so that part of his examinations may be at one Presbytery and part be postponed till the next. Is this to break through the constitution? We cannot guard the door too closely. We need to make it harder to get into the ministry rather than easier. One reason of so many failures, is, that there is not sufficient care as to receiving ministers. He had been present at a Presbytery once where candidates were licensed almost as fast as you could sort a barrel of apples.

As to the third resolution, about the full course, he had been asked how did they graduate at Union Seminary twenty-five, and yet only thirteen had taken certificates? The answer was, the rest did not deserve certificates. If we send you a man with one of our certificates, it signifies "interrogate and examine him as much as you please," but it does not signify "license him." I know we don't do our duty fully at Union; but if you tell us so, we will take it gracefully. See how I took the thrashing of New Orleans Presbytery, when they called my report an *indigesta moles*, although I think the trouble is there are some things in that report which do not suit the stomachs of some brethren.

Fourthly: to improve candidates in aptness to teach. It is necessary to send out the young men to practise teaching and conducting prayer-meetings. A man in Louisville, not a member of the Church, had sent him \$200 to educate a student who should not be a "reader of essays."

The last resolution is surely a good one, which requires those students who put themselves under the care of Presbyteries near the Seminary, to go back to the Presbyteries "to which they naturally belong" for their final examination.

Then as to seminaries, this paper provides that they may abbreviate and alter their courses of study. The juniors at a seminary may be all graduates, and yet one may be an A. M., and another hardly know his Greek alphabet. Why should the former be kept back for the other? Why hold back the better scholars to drag forward the poorer ones? But the student must not be allowed to pass into a higher class, unless he can pass a good examination on the studies of the class below? Then the report directs the Seminary to report to the Presbyteries, so as to help

them in their oversight of the candidates. The last resolution is an experiment to provide a course of study for vacations, to meet the wants of those who desire to go forward rapidly. For himself, he thought the system of vacations a humbug.

Dr. Howe was sure we understood better the object of this paper from the general explanations entered into by Dr. Smith. This subject lies at the foundation of everything in the Church. One of the propositions is that our course of studies be elective. Were this plan adopted, many a young man would be glad to pass by the study of Hebrew. Yet it was the study of the original Scriptures that brought on the Reformation. Another proposition is to mark our students, grade them, appealing thus to their vanity and ambition. The judgment of most teachers in theological institutions has been that it is better to appeal to their love of God and their love of men. Then again, it is true that men differ as to their degree of intellectual power, but it is not the finest scholar in the class room that makes the most useful minister. There are young men who get puffed up and imagine they can do anything. It is best to make our appeals to their higher and nobler feelings. Then again, as to whether the men of quick perceptions are to be pushed forward, there is enough for any of them to do, if he will but turn to the mass of information that is around him at the Seminary and push his researches. There is no advantage in his rushing forwards. And then suppose that, under the new plan, a student wants to be examined for certificate at the end of two years, there may arise a difference of opinion between himself and his professors, advantageous to neither. As to the vacations, our waste places need the services of our young men, if they are not employed in teaching. But it is very important to prevent their imagining themselves to be ministers before they are such.

The Rev. James Stratton said that in our theological training the Hebrew begins too late. Students ought to stand in Hebrew about where they stand in Greek at the time they enter the Seminary.

The Rev. G. W. Finley moved to amend the report by substituting "urge" or "recommend" for enjoin.

Col. Billups, ruling elder of the Presbytery of Augusta, seconded the motion. He would have words advisory every where substituted throughout this report for words mandatory. Loyalty is conformity to fundamental law—it is not obedience to the mandates of any usurper who tramples under foot the requirements of the fundamental law. The Presbyteries and the Seminaries both have the right to pursue the course here marked out, and the Seminaries are now practising what is contained in these resolutions. If so, where is the necessity for adopting this report? If this is aimed at a particular Seminary, it is not the best way to reach it; charges should be made and names given.

The word “enjoin” was stricken out and the word “recommend” was substituted. Then the resolutions were taken up *seriatim*. When the first one came up, Dr. Welch moved to lay the resolution on the table. Lost by a vote of 45 to 47. The Rev. E. W. Bedinger moved to substitute *any* for *most*. Agreed to. Dr. Welch called attention to the fact that the action of the Assembly last year (see Minutes, p. 230,) covered this very ground. Rev. W. D. Morton moved to recommit the whole paper, but on motion, the Assembly then decided to lay the first resolution on the table. Then the Rev. Mr. Cowan moved to postpone the whole matter indefinitely. Pending this motion, Dr. Woodrow asked leave to say that he agreed with almost every proposition in the report, but objected that the effort was not made in the right way. He was surprised that Brother Watkins and Brother Smith had so misunderstood his remarks as to suppose him disloyal to this Assembly. They could not possibly have meant *him*. He did not claim merit of any other sort, but he did claim the merit of *loyalty*. But what is loyalty? It was well defined by his legal friend from Augusta Presbytery. It is obedience to law. The loyal man is he who cares for the “high points.” What are the high points? Principles. I do care for the high points. The high points are the principles on which we stand. I apply to these principles that terrific sentence of Scripture: He who adds to or takes from the word of God is cursed. I am too loyal to add to this Book or to disregard its principles. The Assembly has no more loyal son than myself. My loyalty requires me to

spurn your commands when you command me to reject these "high points," as they have been sneeringly called. So much I felt it obligatory upon myself to reply, touching matters in which I feel it necessary to be sensitive. In some places we ought to be sensitive.

Mr. Watkins said he humbly begged Dr. Woodrow's pardon, if he had misconstrued his words.

Dr. Smith said he did not misunderstand Brother Woodrow, and never doubted his loyalty, and if he felt that necessary, also begged his pardon.

The second resolution or proposition was then adopted, and also the third. To the fourth, the Rev. Mr. Cozby objected that it made two classes of licentiates—one *licensed* and one *permitted*. Dr. Smith explained that this was to be a part of their training for licensure. The clause was adopted.

On the fifth day, the business was resumed, and the fifth clause of the first part was adopted. The second part, relating to seminaries, was proceeded with and the first recommendation was read.

Dr. Woodrow said the Assembly had in the Columbia Constitution told the Faculty not to do the very thing you are now asked to require of us. There it ordained a close curriculum, and now you are asked to tell us not to have such a curriculum. The paper will necessarily be inoperative and void. You are asked to put us into the position of necessarily refusing what you require at our hands. He hoped, therefore, the paper would be referred to the Committee on Theological Seminaries, with instructions to bring in amendments to our Constitution, and then we will do as you bid us.

Dr. Smith asked whether Dr. Woodrow's idea of a close curriculum was that the students shall take no additional studies. The object of the paper is to make it proper for students to take up additional studies.

Dr. Woodrow answered that it would be utterly impracticable in Columbia Seminary.

Rev. S. W. Watkins thought this recommendation would be a temptation to the young men to shorten the course.

Rev. Mr. Daniel hoped we would give no permission to depart from this curriculum. Many a man would think he had peculiar reasons for hurrying forwards. And at the end of the session the Faculty would perhaps think that he had failed, and so at the close of every term we should have several dissatisfied men.

Dr. Smith called attention to the fact that the more hasty course could only be pursued under direction of the Presbytery.

Dr. Howe urged that this proposition would embarrass the Faculty, for students would be for pushing forwards.

The motion to recommit was lost, and the first clause was adopted.

The second clause being read, Dr. Woodrow again pleaded with the Assembly that it was in contravention of the Constitution imposed on the Columbia Seminary.

The second clause was, however, passed, and also the third. The fourth clause being read, Professor Campbell, ruling elder from Lexington, said he was in favor of the first of its two provisions. In many cases a young man may save a whole year by a vacation course.

Rev. W. H. Dodge said all these propositions must needs be inoperative.

Dr. Smith said they might be in advance of the age, but it would be seen that it could be done.

The last recommendation and the preamble were then adopted. Dr. Woodrow made another effort to have the matter committed to the same gentlemen, that they might meet, as they had never done, and report as a Committee to the next Assembly. He warned the Assembly that their recommendations must needs be thrown away unless made to consist with the constitution.

Rev. Mr. Cowan offered as a substitute for Dr. Woodrow's motion, to commit the papers to the Committee on Theological Seminaries, to report at this meeting the necessary amendments to the constitution of the Seminaries.

Dr. Smith opposed the motion and it was withdrawn, and the question recurring on Dr. Woodrow's motion, it was lost. Col. Billups moved to amend by adding a clause stating that the Assembly regarded the action as merely advisory and not as intended

to override any constitutional principles. It was in these words: "In adopting this report, the General Assembly distinctly disclaims any purpose to exercise any right not clearly given in the constitution or to restrict, in the slightest degree, the rights of Presbyteries in the premises. This action is merely advisory." The vote on this clause was a tie—51 to 51—but it was adopted by the Moderator's casting vote. The report was adopted as a whole, and Mr. Cowan's motion was then renewed and lost. Such was the very singular termination of this very singular debate.

#### WORLDLY AMUSEMENTS.

On the fifth day, Dr. Smith presented this reply from his Committee to an overture from the Presbytery of Atlanta, asking the Assembly to interpret the law of the Church in reference to card playing and promiscuous dancing:

1. The Assembly has uniformly discouraged and condemned the modern dance in all its forms, as tending to evil, whether practised in public balls or in private parlors.

2. Some forms of this amusement are more mischievous than others—the round dance than the square, the public ball than the private party, but none of them are good.

3. The extent of the mischief done depends largely upon circumstances. The church session is, therefore, the only court competent to judge what remedy to apply; in most cases it is the result of thoughtlessness or ignorance. We recommend to sessions great patience in dealing with those who offend in this way.

The Rev. J. W. Montgomery thought the Assembly had passed papers enough on this subject. He was not prepared to condemn all dancing. He did not know who were present at the festivities at Cana in Galilee, and could not go further than the Bible went.

The Rev. E. O. Guerrant opposed all dancing. It was more injurious than horse-racing and drinking, as presenting to our Church members and to young persons a more fascinating temptation and a more dangerous snare. There is no difference between the square dance and the round dance—the devil will cut off all the corners after the second round. We need just such a deliverance as this.

Ruling Elder J. W. McPherson, of Muhlenburg Presbytery, said the word "promiscuous," in the past deliverances of the Assembly, was a promiscuous kind of word adopted as a compromise to suit conflicting views and leave each church to determine for itself what the law is. He would like to have the truth on this subject clearly defined. Is playing cards or dancing *per se* sinful, or is it their concomitants that make them wrong? Promiscuous dancing he understood to mean a general ball, to which every body might go who had a dollar to pay. This and the round dancing is wrong, of course, and we need no deliverance respecting these. But he doubted whether every other kind or form of dancing is *per se* sinful.

Ruling Elder R. L. Beall, of the Presbytery of Concord, wished to have the phrase "are not good" changed to "all are evil."

Ruling Elder J. A. Minniece, of Tombeckbee Presbytery, offered the amendment that "dancing in all forms, whether round, oval or square, is not to be engaged in, and is a disciplinable offence."

The Rev. E. O. Guerrant preferred the report as it was. He held that the ancient sacred dance of Scripture was dancing before the Lord; the modern dance was before the devil. The dance-houses in New Orleans are the most dangerous evils in the city. So of card-playing. He had known a young man who learned to play cards in the family circle, and was found afterwards night by night in a gambling-hell with a revolver by his side.

Ruling Elder D. N. Kennedy, of the Nashville Presbytery, said that card-playing and dancing had almost obliterated the line between the Church and the world. He moved to substitute for "are not good" the words "all are evil and should be discountenanced."

The Rev. A. Cowan came from a church which had its spirituality well nigh destroyed by dancing and card-playing. His blood runs cold when he hears an elder in any way defend dancing. When ministers of city churches allow it, how can a humble country pastor successfully oppose it? The cities have their

dancing-masters, and some ministers there plead that nothing else gives such grace of carriage to children. He wanted the Assembly to condemn dancing-schools as well as dances.

The Rev. A. R. Banks moved to add, "and we affectionately urge all Christians not to send their children to dancing-schools where they acquire a fondness and an aptitude for the dangerous amusement." This amendment and Mr. Kennedy's were both adopted, and so was then the whole paper.

The modern dance we suppose to have come out of the French school of manners and morals. It is, if we do not mistake, the offspring of modern French gallantry. Its distinguishing feature—that which separates it from all ancient forms of this amusement—is that the sexes dance together. This is the charm of it. There would be no dancing if the boys had to occupy one ball-room and the girls another. And here lies, in our judgment, the evil and the danger of it. It is a form of dalliance between the sexes. No man would suffer a stranger, sitting on the same sofa, to lay his finger on the shoulder or on the hand of his sister or his daughter. But liberties of this sort are freely and of necessity allowed in the dance. And we therefore are of those who look upon it, whenever it is *promiscuous*, as inherently wrong. This word "promiscuous," in our Church deliverances, is not any word of compromise. It expresses the vital idea that familiarities which may be innocent between the members of one family or between near relatives or very intimate friends, become dangerous and improper when allowed outside of such a sacred circle. So much as to the essential nature of the modern dance. But there are many concomitants of the modern dance which aggravate the necessary evil of its nature and give emphasis to the constant testimony of the Church in all ages against it.

We have thus expressed our opinion on this subject; but it is only an opinion, and other persons have a right to entertain and do entertain a different opinion. This is our way of understanding and interpreting the modern dance; but the Scriptures do not mention that particular subject at all. It gives general laws against being conformed to this world, and inculcates sobriety of behavior and a constant sense of the powers of the world to come.



But men have to apply these general directions of the Word according to the best light they can obtain. And what is more, all are free to judge for themselves in such matters. The Church can make no new laws, nor is the Church infallible in interpreting Christ's laws. And the right of private judgment is sacred and inviolable.

It follows that the Church should be very careful in dealing with questions of this sort. Where the Word is not express, and men, consciously fallible, have to apply its principles, sobriety and modesty are indispensable—such as the resolutions proposed do certainly display, but the speeches not all so very fully. The Assembly must not only be moderate and wise lest its utterance should slide into some fanatical extreme, but it is under the imperative necessity of carefully considering how far what it enacts can be made operative. If the Assembly must make a rule, the Sessions should always be prepared to carry it into practice. But is not Calvin manifestly right when he says that we must not attempt to carry out discipline where the disease to be extirpated is wide-spread and we are not therefore going to be sustained by the judgment and sympathies of the people? In such cases of prevailing evil, the remedy to be employed is preaching and not discipline. Our brethren, therefore, whose congregations have been so much injured by dancing and card-playing always had a far better remedy, each in his own hands, than any new deliverance of the Assembly could possibly be. Let them preach in public, if they judge it needful and wise, or let them reason the case in private with offenders. Two of our most eminent and successful pastors in two of our largest cities told us at New Orleans that they had no difficulty in their churches on this subject, and that was their way of dealing with it. What can be the use of any more deliverances by the Assembly? It has often spoken already. A mere verbal fulmination which its Sessions are not able to carry out in the way of actual discipline cannot be the medicine a diseased congregation or community requires. We have the effective weapon of a faithful ministry. We have the sweet and gracious potency of a loving pastorate. Let these be employed, and the Assembly will have no need to

reiterate its warnings. Worldly amusements, like temperance, covetousness, marriage, etc., etc., are subjects involving many nice questions somewhat difficult to be wisely and safely determined in a hasty discussion of the Assembly.

On the eighth day, the Rev. J. W. Montgomery presented a protest against the Assembly's reply to the overture of the Presbytery of Atlanta on the subject of dancing, which was admitted to record, and is as follows:

The undersigned respectfully requests the Assembly to record his protest against so much of its deliverance, in reply to overture No. 7, from the Presbytery of Atlanta, as relates to dancing, which protest is made for the following reasons:

1. Because the Assembly, by condemning actions as actions which may or may not involve an element of sin, weakens the force of its own protests against real and acknowledged wrong.

2. Because in the judgment of your protestant this deliverance controvenes Sec. 2, Chap. XX., Confession of Faith, which declares that "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men, which are in anything contrary to His word or beside it," &c.

#### CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE NORTHERN PRESBYTERIANS.

On the fourth day, in response to a letter received from this body through Rev. Dr. Hatfield, its Stated Clerk, Dr. Adger, Chairman Committee of Correspondence, reported the following paper for the adoption of the Assembly, and it was adopted by vote of 109 to 4, and ordered to be transmitted immediately by mail. But those who voted in the negative afterwards explained formally that they did not think it consistent with self-respect for this Assembly to press its ultimatum after its distinct and repeated declination by the Northern Assembly.

WHEREAS, The General Assembly of this Church, in session at St. Louis in 1875, adopted a paper tendering special thanks, in the name of the whole Church, to our Committee of Conference at Baltimore, for their diligence, fidelity, and Christian prudence, and in particular approving and endorsing, "as satisfactory to the Southern Church, the condition precedent to fraternal relations suggested by our Committee, viz.: 'If your Assembly could see its way clear to say, in a few plain words, to this effect, that these obnoxious things were said and done in times of great excitement, and are to be regretted, and that now, in a calm review, the

imputations cast upon the Southern Church' (of schism, heresy and blasphemy) 'are disapproved, that would end the difficulty at once.'"

And, whereas, our General Assembly in session at Savannah in 1876, in response to a paper from the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, which met in Brooklyn, adopted the following paper, viz. :

"We are ready most cordially to enter on fraternal relations with your body on any terms honorable to both parties. The Assembly has already, in answer to an overture from the Presbytery of St. Louis, spontaneously taken the following action :

"*Resolved*, That the action of the Baltimore Conference, approved by the Assembly at St. Louis, explains with sufficient clearness the position of our Church. But inasmuch as it is represented by the overture that misapprehension exists in the minds of some of our people as to the spirit of this action, in order to show our disposition to remove, on our part, all real or seeming hindrance to friendly feeling, the Assembly explicitly declares that, while condemning certain acts and deliverances of the Northern General Assembly, no acts or deliverances of the Southern General Assemblies are to be construed or admitted as impugning in any way the Christian character of the Northern General Assembly, or of the historical body of which it is the successor."

And, whereas, The said General Assembly at Brooklyn, in response to the foregoing paper of our Assembly at Savannah, adopted the following, which has been communicated to us at our present meeting, viz. :

"The overture of this Assembly having been received by the General Assembly in the South with such a cordial expression of gratification, the Committee recommend that the same resolution, declarative of the spirit in which this action is taken, be adopted by this Assembly, viz. : 'In order to show our disposition to remove on our part all real or seeming hindrance to friendly feeling, the Assembly explicitly declares, that, while condemning certain acts and deliverances of the Southern General Assembly, no acts or deliverances of the Northern Assembly, or of the historic bodies of which the present Assembly is the successor, are to be construed or admitted as impugning in any way the Christian character of the Southern General Assembly, or of the historical body or bodies of which it is the successor.'"

Therefore, be it resolved by this Assembly, that we cannot regard this communication as satisfactory, because we can discover in it no reference whatever to the first and main part of the paper adopted by our Assembly at Savannah, and communicated to the Brooklyn Assembly. This Assembly can add nothing on this subject to the action of the Assembly at St. Louis, adopting the basis proposed by our Committee on Conference at Baltimore, and reaffirmed by the Assembly at Savannah.

If our brethren of the Northern Church can meet us on those terms,

which truth and righteousness seem to us to require, then we are ready to establish such relations with them during the present sessions of the Assemblies.

On the fifth day, the following was offered by Dr. Adger, to be sent as a telegram to the Northern Presbyterian Assembly, so that no time should be lost in communicating to them our action. Some objection was made to the Assembly "going again into the telegraphing business," after what we had suffered from it last year at Savannah, but the Assembly overruled the objection and voted, 73 to 35, to forward the telegram:

NEW ORLEANS, LA., May 22, 1877.

*The Rev. Edwin F. Hatfield, Stated Clerk General Assembly:*

This Assembly has adopted, by 109 to 4, a paper which recites the action of our Assemblies at Savannah and St. Louis, which also refers to the communication from your Assembly received at our present session. It concludes with expressions of dissatisfaction with this last named paper, because it contains no reference whatever to the main part of our paper, sent from Savannah to Brooklyn, and declares that this Assembly can add nothing to our action at St. Louis approving the ground taken by our Committee at Baltimore, which approved what the Assembly reaffirmed at Savannah. The paper adopted here concludes thus: "If our brethren of the Northern Church can meet us on those terms which truth and righteousness seem to us to require, then we are ready to establish such relations with them during the present sessions of the Assembly."

Our letter has gone by mail.

JOSEPH R. WILSON, Stated Clerk.

No response was received to either of these communications. It is understood that in the Northern Assembly Dr. Marquis, Chairman, presented a paper which their Committee of Correspondence had unanimously adopted, in which occurs a resolution, which, had it been adopted, would no doubt (like Dr. Talmage's resolution last year) have been perfectly satisfactory to our Church. It also reported a delegation to be sent to our Assembly, in the confident expectation (which would not have been disappointed) that a similar appointment would be made at New Orleans. The resolution was as follows:

*Resolved, 2.* That, without casting any reflection upon past General Assemblies of our Church, and without touching or changing any of their deliverances or testimonials, (a thing which this General Assembly is entirely incompetent to do.) we do nevertheless declare that the language

specially complained of by the Southern Assembly is a part of that sorrowful past which we in the day of peace and fraternity would wish to forget; and it is to us a matter of sincere regret that terms of "schism," "heresy," or "blasphemy" should ever have been applied to Southern Presbyterians by any General Assembly of which this Assembly is the successor.

But as at Brooklyn, so this year at Chicago, the influence of Dr. Van Dyke, claiming to know better than any other man what would be acceptable to the Southern Church, was successfully employed to prevent the adoption of this paper.

Here is what the Northern Assembly did adopt in lieu of Dr. Marquis's resolutions:

*Resolved*, That, while we are sincerely desirous to be reunited in closer relations with the brethren from whom we have been separated, we do not deem it expedient at present to take any further action upon the subject, except to repeat the declaration of the last Assembly that we are ready cordially to receive a representative from the Southern Church, and to send a delegate to their Assembly whenever they may intimate a willingness to enter into fraternal relations upon such terms.

It is worthy of record that this action of the Northern Presbyterians was taken in the face of an earnest plea by Dr. Plumer for them to adopt the paper of Dr. Marquis. Here is a portion of what Dr. Plumer urged:

Another thing I wish to say, and that is that this body will candidly, I have no doubt, vote as it has done hitherto—candidly vote what it wishes to say. It will be understood. It will be settled. I would love to see the hindrance removed in my time, but there will be a great many good things after my head goes down to the grave; and if God denies me that privilege, be it so. Can't you do it? There isn't a man in the Southern country that doesn't desire fraternal relations on terms equal and honorable. [Applause.] There isn't a man in the Southern country that wishes this body to humble itself, to abase itself before anybody. But this is true: If I have said, Moderator, that you are not a gentleman, it is due to me—it is more due to me than it is to you—that I should say, "I ought not to have used those words." [Applause.] We ask no regrets in the sense of repentance. Nobody asks it. There isn't a man in the South that would esteem a man more if he were to humiliate himself. That is not it. But, sir, if Dr. Dickson had said of the Moderator something unhandsome, I might truly say to Dr. Dickson, "I am very sorry, Dr. Dickson, that you said that of the Moderator." I regret it. I don't repent of it. Can't you say that? One thing is clear: if the resolutions

reported by your Committee are rejected, it will be understood everywhere North and South, and it will be a finality on this whole subject.

We think little more need be added. What has been done we consider to be indeed "a finality on this whole subject." And we commit the matter to the Adorable Head, to be overruled and made to work to His glory and the establishment of what is true and right. But one word further. In view of this final result of negotiations with the Presbyterians of the North, many will appreciate more highly than ever our friendly relations with the Reformed. *There* is the proof patent that our spirit is not sectional, and that we are not lovers of strife. Our demands of the Northern Church were reasonable. She cannot well afford to stand where the refusal of them puts her.

COMPLAINT BY DR. SAMUEL J. BAIRD.

The Judicial Committee, through its Chairman, Dr. Woodrow, reported that, inasmuch as Dr. E. T. Baird had appealed to the Synod of Virginia, it would not be proper for the Assembly to entertain a complaint touching the same case, and therefore the Committee recommend that the complaint be referred to the Synod of Virginia. Ruling Elder I. M. Veitch made a minority report that the complaint be entertained on several grounds, which may be called technical or constitutional, and also on the personal or moral grounds of the undue severity of the sentence and the propriety of giving immediate relief, in justice as well as in mercy, to a brother and a minister whose welfare, temporal and spiritual, is most seriously involved.

The Rev. R. T. Berry moved to take up the minority report. Reference and appeal have to go up in regular gradation, but not so with complaint. Dr. Samuel J. Baird had a right to complain, and Mr. Berry wanted fair play.

Ruling Elder J. A. Billups said it is a principle in law that a multiplicity of law suits must be discouraged. The adjudication of this complaint would not dispose of the appeal. Does this Assembly wish to receive questions just to discuss them? It will be for the Assembly of 1878 to settle this matter finally, and we cannot afford to engage here in useless work. Col Billups pro-

ceeded to show from our Book that where an appeal is taken, complaint cannot lie.

Dr. Woodrow said we all desire fair play, and not only that justice be done, but that it be tempered with mercy, and every doubt be in favor of the accused. Our Book says the cases in which complaint is proper are, *first*, where the judgment was favorable to the accused, so that of course he would not appeal; or, *secondly*, it has wronged no individual, and so there is no appeal; or, *thirdly*, the aggrieved party may decline the trouble of an appeal. There being no appeal, the Book says some other than the aggrieved party can complain. But here there is an aggrieved party and he has appealed, and it is the complainant himself who has been at pains to inform us all that this appeal has been made, so that we have the best possible evidence of that fact. Dr. Woodrow went on to explain that the reason why the Committee proposed to refer and not dismiss the complaint, was their desire to preserve the rights of the complainant. Possibly the appellant may conclude not to press his case before the Synod of Virginia; and the object of the report is that in such case the complainant, by the action proposed, will be preserved from having lost his opportunity of complaint to the Synod by the lapse of time.

Ruling Elder I. M. Veitch urged that we had no *official* information that Dr. E. T. Baird had appealed.

Ruling Elder D. C. Anderson said the question of Dr. E. T. Baird's having appealed was one of evidence, and that the evidence was abundantly sufficient. It is the appellant himself who furnishes it, for we read his announcement in the *Richmond Dispatch* that he has appealed. Col. Anderson proceeded to show that it is contrary to all jurisprudence for two tribunals to have one case before them at the same time. And also, that it is unprecedented to suffer one condemned in an inferior court to be deprived of his right of appeal to a higher court. If a party accused has appealed, who shall interfere and take away his rights from him? If another party can jump the next superior court and carry the case by complaint to the court beyond, the appellant might be forestalled and cut off, for the other might get

the case determined in the highest court adversely to the appellant in advance of his being heard in the Synod. The appeal having been taken, it would be in violation of all rule and of the rights of the appellant for this court to listen to the case. He has a right to a fair field and an open way. He is not here. He has no witnesses here. He has not been heard. It would be the grossest injustice to press the case.

Dr. Hoge said the Assembly would notice that no one from East Hanover had taken any part in this discussion. That the appellant should have an open and a fair field is what East Hanover desires. Moderator, the gentleman whose name has been heard so often in this discussion lived amongst us for twelve years and never had better friends. There has never been the first ripple in the smooth current of our social harmony. At one time he was a member of my family, and one member of his family is a member of my church. Our desire to protect him is inferior only to our desire to protect the honor of the Presbyterian Church.

The motion to take up the minority report was lost, not more than eight members voting for it, and the majority report was then adopted.

#### REPORT ON FOREIGN MISSIONS.

On the second day, Dr. McIlwaine, Secretary, read the annual report of the Executive Committee of Foreign Missions. The death of one missionary, the Rev. Wm. LeConte, and the loss of health amongst other missionaries, along with the interruption of their labors in Colombia and in the Creek country, are mentioned as unfavorable facts; but, on the other hand, notwithstanding severe financial restrictions imposed, all or most of the missions had been carried on with no apparent diminution of energy, and accessions to the churches have been numerous. There had been a falling off in the receipts of \$6,152.12, but by the most rigid economy the expenses had been brought down to \$50,098.75—so that the debt is now reduced to \$4,826.27—an amount every year liable to be found on the one or the other side of the account.



## ACTION TAKEN ON FOREIGN MISSIONS.

On the fifth day, in the evening, the usual Foreign Missionary meeting was held. The Rev. Dr. Samuel R. Houston, himself a Missionary formerly to Greece, the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Foreign Missions, presented the report. It set forth the encouragement given in an increased spirit of liberality manifest towards this cause, and commended the good management of the Committee in the removal of the burden of debt. It also approved of the manual prepared by the Committee. Drs. Houston and McIlwaine followed the report with very interesting addresses, as did also the Rev. Jacob Chamberlain, M. D., the delegate of the Reformed Church, who was a missionary for eighteen years in India. His address was interesting in the extreme and highly instructive. The report was adopted, and the Assembly adjourned.

## REPORT ON EDUCATION.

On the second day, Dr. Waddel, Secretary, read the annual report of the Executive Committee of Education. Seventy-four candidates, thirty-three of them in their theological course, have been recommended for assistance by their Presbyteries. The collections from the Lusk legacy have amounted to \$769.55, which, with other contributions and collections, have reduced the debt to \$1,789. The Committee hold this legacy as a kind of reserve fund sacredly for the extinguishment of their indebtedness, devoting it to that object as rapidly as it is collected, and, as it is nearly double the amount of the indebtedness, there is no reason to doubt that the debt will be ere long cancelled. The income of the year has been sufficient to pay in full all the appropriations made to students. But there are two circumstances which have contributed to this result—one, the smaller number of students: the other the curtailment of the amounts appropriated. But why such a diminution and such a curtailment? These are questions which the Committee press on the Church.

The example of the churches of the Presbytery of Brazos is especially signalised, every one of which had made a contribution for Education during the year.

The report made reference to the Institute for the training of colored Presbyterian ministers, respecting which Dr. Stillman would make a full report separately.

The whole amount of funds raised during the year is \$13,077.99. Economy in the management has been rigidly enforced. Salaries, travelling expenses, printing, postage, and revenue stamps, did not reach the sum of \$2,000.

The last Thursday of February is suggested as a day of special prayer for the youth of our Church and country, and for God's blessing on this cause.

#### ACTION TAKEN ON EDUCATION.

The Standing Committee offered resolutions, *first*, requesting Presbyteries to report the names of candidates and their places of study to the Secretary, Dr. Waddel; *secondly*, calling attention to Dr. Stratton's report on beneficiary education in the Assembly's Minutes for 1876; *thirdly*, directing attention to the Institute for colored candidates; *fourthly*, calling on all our churches for a collection in aid of the Executive Committee; and *fifthly*, recommending earnest and united prayer for more laborers to be sent forth into the Lord's harvest.

The discussion which arose went largely into the question whether, as is alleged by some, beneficiary education tends to make weak ministers. The Rev. G. W. Finley insisted that it is not true that it takes the pith out of men. Was the pith taken out of Lee or Jackson by their education on a national fund? The Rev. W. H. Davis said we are urged to pray God to send forth laborers. The men present themselves and we say, we are not able to send you forward—go back to your secular work. Sir, we ought to help this cause or stop our prayers, else we shall stultify ourselves before Almighty God. The Rev. Mr. Neel endorsed all that had been said, yet there was a truth that ought to be brought out: some Presbyteries were extremely lax in receiving candidates, and this undermines the Church's faith in this cause. The Rev. A. Cowan said it is the fault of the ministry if the churches do not contribute to education. Dr. Howe, Prof. Campbell, and Dr. Waddel, all testified that beneficiary

candidates were in no respect inferior to others; and Dr. Waddel said that Foreign Missions were one pillar and Sustentation another pillar of our Church's work, but Education was not to be seen; it is out of sight, because it is the foundation.

REPORT ON SUSTENTATION.

The Rev. Dr. McIlwaine, Secretary, read the report on the second day. There are five departments of the Sustentation work: it calls for funds to assist feeble churches; to sustain evangelists in our Presbyteries; to promote the evangelisation of the colored people; to support the families of disabled or deceased ministers; and the fifth department constitutes an effort to provide annuities for the families of deceased ministers in whose favor regular payments, according to a fixed rate, are made by their churches or themselves. The securities belonging to this fund now amount to \$21,000, and they are all considered good and more than sufficient to meet all the obligations of the fund. During the past year annuities were paid to the amount of \$1,200 to the families of three deceased ministers. The receipts on account of interest have been this year more than enough to pay all annuities which fell due.

The whole receipts of the year have been \$43,102.90. There has been some decrease in receipts for Sustentation and for the Invalid fund—the former due to the fact that some of the Presbyteries have been acting independently.

The sixty-one home Presbyteries are thus classified:

1. Requiring large help to carry on their work efficiently, 29 Presbyteries. 2. Able to conduct their own work, but unable to help others, 11 Presbyteries. 3. Estimated to be strong, 21 Presbyteries.

But with reference to this third strong class, the Committee report that four of them received from the fund more than they gave to it, and eight others gave only a pittance more than they received!

For several years Concord and Wilmington Presbyteries have conducted their work separately from the Assembly's Committee, and they do not direct collections for the Assembly's work.

Nashville Presbytery has also conducted its work separately, but gives the Committee one-half of its collections. During the past year Augusta and East Hanover, amongst our strongest Presbyteries, have also withdrawn and are acting independently; but each of them sends the Committee ten per cent. of the funds they obtain. This has brought to the treasury of the Committee from the Augusta Presbytery \$12.35, and from East Hanover Presbytery \$180. The report dwells in very strong terms on these facts, and depicts in emphatic language the consequences which may flow from them.

#### ACTION TAKEN ON SUSTENTATION.

The Standing Committee's report, on the evening of the sixth day, commends the wisdom and fidelity of the Executive Committee, and exhorts the Presbyteries to persevering efforts to enlist the interest of all our churches in this work. Dr. Rutherford, the Chairman of the Standing Committee, presented the report and followed it with an able and interesting address. Then the Rev. Dr. Palmer and the Rev. Dr. Marshall addressed the Assembly to the delight and edification of all present. Dr. McIlwaine also spoke earnestly and effectively. And then the report was made the second order of the day for the morrow.

When the subject came up next day, Dr. Woodrow remarked that it was evident the members of the Committee had given their whole hearts to the work intrusted to them, but some portions of their report called for some comments. What is the relation betwixt the Executive Committee and the Assembly? Is the former the hand or the head of the Church? And does it come to the Assembly to tell how the hand has been employed, or to direct the Assembly and criticise the Presbyteries? In former days the Boards forgot that they were mere hands, and year after year the Assembly had to receive a kind of Presidential message. If this or that Presbytery had not done exactly as this self-constituted head had supposed to be proper, it received the lash—and this led to the withdrawal of our portion of the Church from the work. That such a condition of things might never come to exist amongst us, he would utter, with all gentle-

ness, a few words of criticism of the report of our excellent and devoted Committee. We are told, on page 7, that one or two Presbyteries have done admirably, but that some of the Presbyteries "are lamentably behind." Moderator, I did not listen with pleasure to language of this kind when it was uttered by an agent. The agency was not constituted for that purpose. The report proceeds: "How this painful dereliction"—of which you, my brethren, have been guilty—"may be remedied, is a question to which the Assembly may properly apply its wisdom."

I am not willing to listen to such language as this. I cannot but remember that I am a member of the Presbytery of Augusta, and I find that the Presbytery of Augusta has not pleased, at all, our agents in the matter of Sustentation. They are "sorry" to inform us that the Presbytery of Augusta has terminated its connection with the Assembly's work. The "unavoidable tendency" of which action is, we are told, "to narrow the sympathies, and contract the benevolence of those who are subjected to it." I plead not guilty for my Presbytery. We have not shown any lack of sympathy in the work of Sustentation. I may say, sir, that I was opposed to this action of my Presbytery. I have always been in favor of coöperating with the Assembly's Committee; but it never occurred to me, when pleading with my brethren of the Presbytery not to sever their connection, to use as an argument the sorrow of the Sustentation Committee. I thought that the matter was entirely in our own hands. Such rebukes, however, will alienate one after another of the friends of the cause. I do not forget, Moderator, that we are told that it is not intended to "censure" the Presbytery whose action is being considered, but only to have a "statement of facts as they exist." But this action of Presbytery is spoken of as "unwise," which "prompts the Committee to bring the matter to the intelligent consideration of the Church before irreparable damage has been suffered." I will not speak ironically and say that we are much obliged to the Executive Committee for not censuring us; but their statement certainly implies that they think they have a right to censure. If this course is pursued much longer, there will not be much need for the Sustentation Committee. There has already

been presented a memorial from one Presbytery of the Church, asking that the cause of Sustentation be remitted to the Synods. And the question may soon be asked, Why not, rather than be subjected to criticisms of this kind? The report shows that from only five Synods are the receipts in excess of the amounts paid back to the same Synods. The amount of excess was \$2,490. The expenses of the Committee were \$2,200. If we are to be put in a position that is in any way antagonistic, we would be forced to look at these figures and inquire if it would not be better to accept the policy of East Hanover Presbytery. The result will be to put us beyond the power of this annual criticism. Therefore I have felt obliged to say what I have said, though second to no one on this floor in my admiration of the zeal and fidelity of the Committee, and of the way in which their work has been done.

Dr. McIlwaine—I will not pretend to justify every word in that report after having heard it criticised by Dr. Woodrow; perhaps the word “dereliction” ought not to have been there, and other individual words; but I can say this, that when they were used, they were not used for the purpose of conveying any sense that would be injurious to the feelings of any Presbytery or brother. The part of the report to which Dr. Woodrow specially objects, was one that gave me more earnest and anxious labor than all the rest of the report put together. The view that I took in preparing this report was the view which I found common with the Committee when I took charge of this department, and has been the view upon which I have acted for the five years during which I have written the reports; that it was the duty of the Committee to inform the Assembly of the exact state of the work, as we understand it, in all its departments, and that as laid down in the constitution of the Sustentation Committee, namely: “In the exercise of its advisory power it shall report to the General Assembly the condition and wants of the whole field, and also communicate to the Presbyteries such information with respect to the necessities and progress of the work as will tend to incite them to greater liberality.” How can they be incited to do more, unless they know how little they are doing? How would

a Presbytery be incited to get its churches to come up more liberally in contributions, unless they have it brought before them that a number of churches have failed to contribute? This is all we had in view. If we have failed to make the real state of things so plain that everybody could see it, it was not because we have desired to injure the feelings of any presbyter or brother. With reference to the criticism of Augusta and East Hanover Presbyteries, it was not intended as a criticism. What we intended was to make a distinct, plain statement of facts, and then present the difficulties which lay in the way. If this system should be pressed, as to the question of continuing the Sustentation, Dr. Woodrow is not the first man who has asked that question. I have asked myself the question, Is it best to maintain this Committee? And standing here, the Assembly's Secretary, I do say it, that unless the work progresses, I cannot see that it is of use to keep it. I was called to this office, not of my own seeking. I did not know that such an office was to be created until the very day before I was elected to it; and I do say, sir, that not one moment longer than I believe in my heart that I can be of service to the Church, do I want to hold the position. For five years I have labored to this end, and while I have, no doubt, made mistakes, my sole object has been to labor for the good of the Church and comfort of God's people. We have on that Committee such men as Dr. Lefevre, Judge Inglis, and other brethren of like mind and like spirit. No, brethren, if such an attempt were made by anybody, it would obtain resistance nowhere sooner throughout the breadth and length of the Church, than among the members of that Committee. I have said about all that I think needs to be said. We had no idea of taking anybody to task; all we wanted to do was to put the Assembly in possession of the facts. If the language is too strong, it did not so appear to us at that time.

Rev. Mr. Neel heartily endorsed Dr. Woodrow's remarks, which he did not consider as captious. The Committee had fallen into the error of preaching to the Assembly. What we wanted from the Committee was the information that our brother has given us; but we also want the poor privilege of acting for ourselves, and let the facts stimulate us.

The Rev. Dr. Rutherford concurred in what Dr. Woodrow and Mr. Neel had said, and yet it was the Committee's duty to bring to the attention of the Church the action of the Presbyteries, and especially when any of them withdrew from coöperation.

Rev. Mr. Daniel said the Secretary had done only his duty. We talk of the unity of the Church, but what we want is not sentimentalism, but practical unity and hearty coöperation.

Dr. Armstrong explained that the situation of East Hanover Presbytery was peculiar. A large proportion of their churches are feeble. A rule of the Committee required churches receiving aid to be dropped after five years. As that rule cut off all our feeble churches from aid, we had to take the matter into our own hands, resolving to give ten per cent. of our collections to the Committee, and use the rest ourselves for our own bounds.

Rev. S. H. Isler said Wilmington Presbytery had no fault to find with the Committee, but its circumstances were peculiar and justified its separate action.

The report was adopted.

It appears to us a duty to add our testimony as to the dissatisfaction with which portions of the Sustentation Report were heard. It was too much in the style and manner of a lecture from the high powers to their subordinates. It brought to our recollection those old times when Dr. Musgrave and his Board of Missions used to come down annually to the Assembly to tell it all about its duty and to objugate the Presbyteries for not having done theirs. The Boards in those days, too, made common cause if anybody ventured to criticise either of them, and uniting their forces to crush all opposition, well-nigh made themselves the masters of the Assembly. This, of course, would be a very odious comparison for us to make, but we do not make it. All that is designed is simply to state why the portions of the Report criticised were to us so disagreeable, as reminding us of a condition of things which we trust never to witness in this Church.

There is another observation which we venture to make. The meeting on Wednesday evening was a meeting of the Assembly to carry on its business. A report was submitted for its action. There are no corresponding members allowed on the floor of the



Assembly as in our Synods and Presbyteries. The Secretaries of our Executive Committees, by special enactment, are allowed to be heard on the business committed to them. Delegates from corresponding churches bring us the salutations of their churches, but they take no part in our debates, unless the case of the Reformed Church, with whom we stand in close coöperative union, is a solitary exception. Dr. Chamberlain, the delegate from that Church, spoke at the Foreign Missionary meeting in his character of delegate from the church that coöperates with us. But on what principle or by whose authority was the Assembly treated to those two admirable speeches which were interjected into its business on Wednesday evening? If there is any precedent warranting it, we do not know it, but we can see how there might grow much evil out of such a practice, which runs directly counter to our principles.

#### REPORT ON PUBLICATION.

This report, signed W. A. Campbell, Secretary *pro tem.*, was read on the third day of the sessions. It consisted of two parts—the one making the usual statements, the other giving a full account of the case of Dr. E. T. Baird's defalcation.

#### ACTION TAKEN ON PUBLICATION.

On the evening of the seventh day, Dr. Welch presented the Standing Committee's report. It closed with several resolutions. The first one expresses the Assembly's sympathy with the Committee in its embarrassments; approves its maintaining the honor of the Church, by offering to pay the liabilities incurred by the late Secretary; and commends its fidelity and zeal in obtaining money to pay those losses. The second instructs the Committee to carry on the sale as well as the publishing of books by contract, if it be found practicable to effect such contract. The third instructs it to sell the Publishing House as soon as may be, without unnecessary sacrifice of value, unless means are raised in a reasonable time to pay the debt on it. The fourth requires the *Earnest Worker* to be published only once a month, and devoted exclusively to Sabbath-school work. The fifth takes off all restric-

tions as to the terms on which the Committee shall sell its publications. In the sixth, the Assembly expresses the opinion that on these plans expenses can be much reduced, and yet great good be accomplished; and it recommends the churches to raise the money to repair the losses and protect the honor of the Church. The seventh reappoints the same Treasurer and Committee, with two names added, those of Messrs. H. H. Hawes and M. M. Gilliam.

Dr. Welch stated that the report of the Standing Committee made no reference to the second part of the Executive Committee's report, as the parties interested would appear before another tribunal.

The Rev. W. H. Davis vigorously assailed the Executive Committee's management, and was unwilling to have them reappointed.

Ruling Elder J. L. Marye dwelt on the high character of the gentlemen in question. Their misfortune was that they had not expected fraud. Even banks are sometimes overreached. He was not here to say that the salaries paid the secretary and book-keeper, store-keeper and treasurer, were as moderate as they might have been. But this work of the Church must not be looked at simply in its monetary aspect. When the Assembly allows the \$20,000 that we lost on the sale of hymn-books, at cheap rates, by the Assembly's orders, the present loss will not appear so great.

Ruling Elder J. L. Campbell said the resolutions offered were the unanimous judgment of the Standing Committee, one vote excepted; and that, differing very widely at first, it was only very slowly that they had come to one opinion.

Ruling Elder R. M. Patton, of the Presbytery of North Alabama, said, let us not be discouraged because we have lost a little money. By the blessing of our all-wise Saviour, good will come out of these troubles.

Dr. Woodrow asked Dr. Welch to state if the Committee had got a business-like statement of the affairs of the Executive Committee from its books.

Dr. Welch replied that the Committee's statements were made on the judgment of others; they were able to give no information of their own knowledge.

Dr. Woodrow said, that answer means that although all the books of the Committee are present, yet with them all it is impossible to get a business statement of the assets and liabilities of the Executive Committee.

Dr. Hoge said, had a volcano broken out at Richmond, they would not have been more surprised than at the Secretary's involving himself and the Committee in this calamity. They immediately, by telegram, called brethren from various points; and they all appeared on the day appointed, and for an entire day it was considered what should be done. The first thing was to repair the material damage and provide for the notes falling due. Dr. Brown went to the Valley of Virginia, and he to Georgia. He had a sad and mortifying story to tell; but when, at Augusta, he told the simple story, one said, "There is but one thing to do: put me down for \$300;" and another, not a member of our Church, said, "Yes, put me down for \$300, and more, if necessary, to protect the honor of the Presbyterian Church." The only thing lacking was time. I could have obtained the whole amount, could I have visited more churches. Dr. Hoge went on to speak of the very high character of the Treasurer and all the members of the Committee. But he acknowledged that some things about the situation cannot be made plain. Dr. Baird himself cannot fully explain all of his own transactions; but by two methods of calculation, the same conclusion is virtually arrived at, within a few hundred dollars. One thing I do know: we got our printing done at the lowest rates; and another is, we never undertook to manage a printing-office. Dr. Baird had printing-presses, and we made contracts with Dr. Baird, and he printed and bound our books well.

But if Dr. Woodrow should get up and say, "Do you think your Committee have managed this work in the best way possible?" I would answer, "No, Doctor." Why not? Because we trusted too much to a single man, and grievously have we suffered for it. We all have to learn in the school of adversity. He wished all guards and checks put on the Committee's business, so that disaster may be prevented for the future. He would go home encouraged; for instead of being disbanded, his breth-

ren seemed disposed to say to the Committee: "You have met with a great disaster, and have our sympathies, and we will help you." He did not regard the publication work merely in a commercial light. If that is the test, every Theological Seminary is a failure. We give largely for their endowment; and yet we have seen four Professors getting comfortable salaries sometimes to teach a dozen or two students. That is the commercial view of the value of the ministry of reconciliation. Dr. Hoge concluded by saying, as two new business men had been put on the Committee, and as we are going to manage economically, don't take advantage of a great disaster to put needless burdens on us.

The next day, Dr. Welch, chairman of the Standing Committee, endorsed all that Gov. Marye and Dr. Hoge had said of the Executive Committee. Had he been on that Committee, he must have done just what they did. The whole case is in one word: it was an instance of over-confidence. And now, like the skilful mariner after a storm, we must take our bearings. And we shall find that we are all agreed on almost everything: as to continuing the work; as to the Committee exercising a control over the whole work; as to conducting the business by contract, and as to keeping prominently before the mind of our people the missionary part of this work. One word as to the statement made in the report, that it is impossible for us to obtain an *exact* account from the books. When a balance sheet is made up, it ought to balance to half a cent. Now the difference is not a great one, but the accounts do not balance. This is what we intended to be understood as saying. And now for the differences amongst us: some favor selling, as well as publishing by contract, and the Committee do recommend that course to the Assembly; and some are for holding the house, if the money can be raised to pay for it; and the Committee wish to give the brethren the opportunity of doing so, for this would furnish them the full amount of endowment they need, inasmuch as the house, in good times, would be worth the sum of \$50,000.

Dr. Hoge moved that a committee of three of our best business men be appointed to go to Richmond, make full investigation, and report through the religious papers.

Ruling Elder D. N. Kennedy, of Nashville Presbytery, had had something to do in the past in criticising the Committee and the late Secretary. And now he was in the position of a man who had studied John Calvin's works, and was called suddenly to make a speech in support of John Wesley's views. He would say nothing intentionally to wound the feelings of the Executive Committee, although he might utter what would not be pleasant for them to hear. As to the late Secretary, he would appeal to the Synod of Virginia to throw the mantle of charity over that brother, and do all that might be possible to save him.

He was glad to hear Dr. Hoge stand up like a man last night, and acknowledge that the Committee had not been as scrutinising as they should have been. There was all the fault, and he has made the *amende honorable*. I give this reason publicly for the course I am pursuing, as otherwise my Presbytery might misconstrue my position. At present we must excuse their unbusiness-like statement of their condition just now, because at this time they are in a disjointed state. They are to be censured for the want of accuracy in former reports, but we must overlook this fault now at this unfortunate juncture.

The Committee did right in assuming those obligations for materials used for its benefit, though not signed by Dr. Baird as Secretary. Although there is a close legal question here, we must assume this debt; it will not do to have the shade of dishonor brought on our fair name.

The Executive Committee can be relieved of its embarrassments, and the work carried on more efficiently than ever. The trouble in the past has been largely attributable to enormous expenses. They trusted the whole matter to one very confident, efficient man, and he made such expenses as must necessarily have led to bankruptcy. But we can do what the Boston Tract Society did. Having gone on as we did, (only for fifty instead of eleven years,) they found themselves bankrupt. But seven years since they changed front, and took the very plan now proposed. And in six years they paid off their indebtedness, and had money to lend. The old plan was for the Committee to print by contract, but also to keep a store, and pay \$2,000 to a business

agent, and then salaries to four or five other employés. The new plan is, that the *publishing* is done by contract; and instead of our paying clerks, etc., to the amount of \$4,000, we propose to be paid by a publisher for the privilege of selling our books. If you give your contract to a publisher, you introduce him throughout our entire Southern Church, and he can secure the sale of large amounts of his own publications. One word as to any change in the Committee: admit that they did make very considerable mistakes, yet they showed their love for the Church by their efforts to repair the wrong. "When you are swimming a river, and are in the middle of the stream, it is no time to swap horses." If you try it in the middle of this river, you will all be drowned. This Executive Committee is the only Committee that can extricate the work from its difficulties.

The Rev. W. H. Davis said, whoever has studied Turretin knows that whenever he gets into a tight place, he always says, "Let us stop here and make a distinction." So I wish now to make a distinction. I venerate the noble men on that Committee; but I distinguish between the men and their mode of doing our business.

Last night he had made remarks based on the figures furnished by the Committee. The intimation of Dr. Hoge to-day is, that if one of their business men were here, a different showing could be made. I am not responsible for any mistake based on information that was not here at that time. I only took the figures of the Committee, and based my calculations on them. The brother intimated that I am ready to lay the axe at the root of all the trees in our garden of missionary enterprise. Sir, that would be to draw a knife across what is dearest to my heart. I have a brother beloved a missionary on a foreign shore. Would I lay an axe at the root of that, to destroy which would send agony through my heart? I am secretary of the Sustentation Committee of our Presbytery. Would I lay an axe at the root of that? In his section there is a deep conviction amongst the Scotch-Irish, that these men are not the men to carry on this work. He pledged himself to coöperate cordially when the vote

was taken, but he would fight for his position as long as it was an open question.

Ruling Elder W. L. T. Prince, of the Mecklenburg Presbytery, spoke as representing principles embodied in the memorial he had read here. Who were these memorialists for whom he spoke? He paid a glowing tribute to Gen. D. H. Hill, Dr. Arnold W. Miller, and other signers of it. The work of the Church is spiritual. It has no right to engage in business speculations. He differed from the Committee in only one or two points—one was the method of conducting the sale of books. Too much discretion was left to the Executive Committee. Another was that he wished the house sold outright. There was no use for such a house, if the work was to be done by contract. Yet he would not sacrifice the property. It was argued that the house ought to be kept as an investment. Is the Church to be a speculator in real estate? The expense of keeping the building was another great objection. Taxes, repairs, insurance, and interest would consume all the profits there might be from rent.

The Rev. E. Daniel wished to strike out the clause, "unless the means be raised to pay the debt on it." He was satisfied that disaffection would not be removed if the house was retained. We have no objection to parties presenting this house to the Assembly; but we object to the Assembly's assuming this debt of \$31,000. Let this clause be removed, and the Assembly can be unanimous for the report.

In the evening the resolutions were taken up *seriatim*. The *first* was adopted. Upon the *second*, Dr. Smith said, if a contract were made with any bookseller, and he be thus introduced to all your people, he might sell many books to them which you would by no means approve. Dr. Hoge wanted to know whether the Assembly intended to give discretion to the Committee regarding this matter of selling by contract. Dr. Woodrow answered, that if the Assembly should adopt, there would be no discretion with the Committee as to making a faithful effort to carry out this plan. Having done this, the Committee has discharged its duty, though the plan should fail. As to Dr. Smith's question, the Committee is not required to contract with book-stores already

existing. One source of large revenue could be made from the fact that \$5,000 worth are given away every year. I presume this is at catalogue prices—costing the Committee about \$3,000—so that there is about \$2,000 a year clear gain. If the Publishing House would not give a royalty for issuing your works, here is an opportunity for making your contract with the seller more profitable, and one that any man would be glad to take hold of. The *second* resolution was adopted. When the *third* came up, Mr. Daniel made his motion to strike out all after the word “unless.” The Rev. S. M. Neel said the Committee are now in trouble, and this necessity of selling should not be made imperative; besides, it may be a perversion of trust funds to sell that house. And in view of the financial troubles of the times, it is better to postpone this question. Dr. Hoge said, if we fail to make arrangements for sale by contract, you may need this house to give you place for your business and your books. Let us retain the house till we can see what we can do with our books. Ruling Elder J. L. H. Tomlin, of the Presbytery of Western District, asked, Is the house paying the insurance and interest on it? Dr. Hoge replied that it was, and also what we should have to pay for another building. Mr. Daniel’s amendment was lost, and the third resolution was adopted.

On the next day, the fourth, fifth, and sixth resolutions were adopted. The seventh, which appointed the members of the Executive Committee, was made the order of the day for twelve o’clock, when the new Secretary was to be elected. When that hour arrived, the Rev. J. K. Hazen of Alabama was nominated, with the highest testimonials to his fitness from Col. Anderson and others. The Rev. Dr. R. L. Breck of Kentucky was also nominated, with very high testimonials from Col. Kennedy and others. The vote stood, Hazen, 65; Breck, 32. Dr. Hoge renewed his motion for a Committee of three business men to investigate and report through the papers. The motion prevailed, and the following are the names of the appointees, three of them being alternates: L. C. Inglis, Baltimore; J. J. Gresham, Macon; W. S. Macrae, Louisville; J. Adger Smyth, Charleston; Joseph R. Mitchell, Knoxville; G. W. Macrae, Memphis.



## INSTITUTE FOR COLORED MINISTERS.

On the second day, Dr. Stillman presented his report. The Rev. A. F. Dickson had been engaged to take charge of the Institute. Many applications for admission had been received. The Seminary had two Presbyterian, one Baptist, and three Methodist students. The raising of funds for its support had been no easy matter. Recent aid had been received from the Reformed Church. The Institute had been conducted on the simplest plan—a single room, rented for two dollars per month, and the simplest furniture, all borrowed, were its only outward appurtenances.

This report was sent to the Committee on Theological Seminaries. On the ninth day it reported the appointment of an Executive Committee, consisting of a Secretary and four members, to present to the next Assembly a complete Constitution for itself and for the Institute. It also recommended that Presbyteries provide for the education of the colored candidates under their care, and that such as have none be expected to send contributions to the Executive Committee, and that the first Sabbath in December be appointed for the taking up of the annual collection for this purpose. Dr. Stillman was nominated to be Secretary, and Messrs. W. P. Webb, Jonathan Bliss, J. T. Searcy, and R. D. Webb, with Dr. Stillman, to constitute the Executive Committee.

The Rev. Mr. Dickson was invited to address the Assembly. He said it was not possible at once to establish a full curriculum of studies. Good Bible knowledge, some business knowledge, soundness in the Confession of Faith, and aptness to teach by preaching—these are for the present the main points to be acquired by our candidates. They have been deeply interested in studying the Greek Testament.

Dr. Stillman said he believed that the plan adopted was the true plan for our working amongst the colored people. As to the proposed Executive Committee, he would say the Secretary would ask nothing for his services. Of course Brother Dickson's salary must be provided for. Let the Presbyteries provide for

the support of their candidates, and send them to us, and we will do our best for them.

The report was adopted.

#### THEOLOGICAL SEMINARIES.

Besides what has just been mentioned as part of this report, the Rev. Mr. Dickey, Chairman, reported on Union Theological Seminary, noting a decrease of students; that only a portion of the senior class had received certificates of graduation; that the institution was more prosperous financially than hitherto; and also commending the Seminary to the hearts of the people.

Touching Columbia Seminary, the report related chiefly to changes in the constitution, which had been revised. There was a majority report objecting to the revised constitution, and a minority report approving of it. On motion of Dr. Smith, the minority report was considered first. According to this report the election of professors is given to the Board, with a veto power in the Assembly. After debate, the minority report was adopted by vote of 79 to 12. The remainder of the report was also adopted.

#### CORRESPONDENCE WITH OTHER CHURCHES.

There were present at New Orleans delegates from the Reformed (Dutch) Church, the Associate Reformed Church, and the Reformed Episcopal Church. The Rev. Jacob Chamberlain, M. D., (who attended all the sessions, from beginning to end,) represented the first; the Rev. John Miller, D. D., the second, and the Rev. Benjamin Johnson, the third. On the third day, Drs. Chamberlain and Miller addressed the Assembly; the former dwelt much on the interest felt by his Church in our evangelistic work amongst the negroes, and the latter said that deep down in the hearts of his people there was a feeling that they and we ought to be one. On the eighth day, Mr. Johnson made his address, filled with the most catholic sentiments. The Moderator replied to each in the most felicitous manner.

#### THE TITLE S. S. OR STATED SUPPLY.

On the sixth day, Dr. Smith presented a report on an overture from the Presbytery of Ouachita, asking the Assembly to dis-

continue the term *Stated Supply* in the Minutes. The Committee recommend the letters A. P., *Acting Pastor*. Dr. Woodrow objected that the pastor is a member of Session, but "acting pastor" would be a new officer not recognised by our constitution. It would be giving the authority of a member of Session to one who is not such. Dr. Adger said the name *Stated Supply* was very unpopular amongst Presbyterians, and rightly. Very often the man is really an acting pastor and is not called and installed simply because an adequate support cannot be promised. But, of course, an *acting* pastor is not a *proper* pastor, and has not the rights of such. He is *acting* but not *actual* pastor, and, of course, while presiding and keeping order in the Session, he could not be allowed to vote. He would recommit with a view to having the term *Acting Pastor* more fully defined. But it was evident the Assembly was not prepared to act. Various substitutes for S. S. were proposed, such as L. E., *Local Evangelist*; L. P., *Local Preacher*; P. E., *Pastor Elect*. To end the discussion, Dr. Welch moved to lay the matter on the table, and it was so voted.

#### EPISTOLARY CORRESPONDENCE.

On the ninth day, Dr. Adger called from the docket the report on epistolary correspondence. It consisted of the following resolution from the Committee of Correspondence:

*Resolved,* That, in accordance with the strongly expressed desires of a number of our Presbyteries—some of them among the largest—this Assembly will, after the present session, hold its correspondence with all the churches with whom we maintain that sort of relation, by letters instead of deputations, always excepting the Reformed Church, with which we are united in peculiar co-operative alliance. The Assembly will appoint a Committee of Correspondence amongst its regular standing committees, which shall prepare the letters to be sent by us to our corresponding churches; and this Assembly does hereby invite all churches with whom we are in correspondence to communicate with us in this form.

Dr. Adger said: If this plan were adopted, a great deal of time and money would be saved. That is one argument. He moved the adoption of the paper.

Dr. Welch said that our present mode of correspondence was not official; that our delegates did not receive direct authority to

speak for the Church. They could only give their individual experience. It would be very much more suitable and satisfactory to have a letter carefully prepared, amended, and adopted, and then sent as a message from the church corresponding with us, to be replied to in the same official manner by us.

The report was adopted.

Mr. Daniel reported, nominating as principal delegate the Rev. J. B. Adger, D. D., and as alternate Rev. E. H. Rutherford, D. D., to the Reformed Church in America.

The motion was adopted.

#### THE ASSEMBLY'S THANKS.

Dr. Welch introduced the following resolution:

*Resolved*, That the thanks of the Assembly be returned to the members of the First Presbyterian church, and other citizens, for their hearty hospitality to the members of this Assembly.

A resolution of thanks was also adopted to the railroad companies, and to the churches that have opened their pulpits to the Assembly.

On behalf of the First Presbyterian Church, the Pastor, Rev. Dr. B. M. Palmer, came forward and said: "Moderator, if it had been possible to have a conference of the pastors and sessions of this city, I think they would have reversed the order of this resolution, feeling that they are the parties who are put under obligation. Certain it is that you have been welcomed with great cordiality by us, and there is no other feeling, now that you are about to depart, but that of regret and sorrow. Let us remember that there is no meeting in this world that is not followed by parting, no smiles that are not followed by tears.

"I have heard it said, again and again, as I have been thrown into communication with the different families that have entertained the Assembly: 'We have the most pleasant guests of any family in the town.' So I take it for granted that the families have been as much pleased with the guests as the guests with the families that entertained them.

"Moderator, I have been exceedingly encouraged by the decisions and discussions of this Assembly. I feel that there is a future—

a future that is noble—before our Church, and I shall address myself to the labors in my own sphere with a lighter heart and a stronger hope than ever. I have been a member of many General Assemblies; but I have never seen an Assembly which has exceeded this in the patience which has been exhibited under the pressure of business, the courtesy extended by members to each other and to the officers of the body, the fairness with which the work has been done, and the unanimity with which conclusions have been reached. This has been a notable Assembly. May God bless you, Mr. Moderator! The blessing of the Church rests upon this General Assembly. May it be ours to meet, without a solitary exception, in the General Assembly and Church of the First-Born which are written in heaven!”

#### DISSOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

After the reading of the final minutes, the vote for dissolving the Assembly at New Orleans was taken, and then the Moderator, as required in the constitution, said, from the chair: “By virtue of the authority delegated to me by the Church, let this General Assembly be dissolved, and I do hereby dissolve it, and require another General Assembly, chosen in the same manner, to meet in the First Presbyterian church in Knoxville, Tennessee, on the third Thursday of May, 1878.” Then with singing and prayer and the Moderator’s pronouncing the Apostolic benediction, the sessions came to a close.

Thus ended, as Dr. Palmer justly characterised it, one of the “notable” Assemblies of our dear Church!

## CRITICAL NOTICES.

*Our Theological Century: a Contribution to the History of Theology in the United States.* By JOHN F. HURST, D. D.,  
Drew Theological Seminary. New York: Randolph & Co.

The occasion of this essay of seventy pages is of course the centennialism for the United States of the year just closing. The history of the century would be incomplete without a section given to its theology; and any well considered contribution looking to this, is in order. As such, what Dr. Hurst offers is acceptable, even to those who may not fall in with all his views. The central proposition, which, after a well-written introduction, he proceeds to develop, is, that "the history of our theology during the century of our national existence, presents as gratifying features of progress and strength as our century of advancement in any other field." Obviously there is need of limitation here, if exactness is intended. The advance of the United States in what constitutes material prosperity, is so wonderful that no one questions it, whether considered absolutely or by comparison with other nations. So, too, that the literature of to-day in the United States is much superior to that of a hundred years ago, cannot be denied. Would every one admit this superiority in either the theology, (considered as the science of religion,) or in religion itself? If this is true, we think it must be for other reasons than those assigned by Mr. Hurst.

The American development of theological thought he considers under five periods, covering (1) the colonial history; (2) the revolutionary period, which prepared the way for the Unitarian secession of New England; (3) the controversial period introduced by Jonathan Edwards; (4) the Unitarian period, assuming an organised form from 1805; (5) the Œcumenical and Irenical period, the present characteristic phase of American theology.

In the judgment of Dr. Hurst, each of these periods has helped in its way to advance theology to a higher plane. The

present result he gives in the following remarkable sentence: "Just now, for the first time, we see reproduced the beautiful *catholicity* and *scripturalness* of the Church of the Pilgrims." (The centennial afflatus is here very manifest.) If the Pilgrims were distinguished for catholicity of doctrine or of sentiment, we are very much mistaken. And not less so, if scripturalness is the special characteristic of modern theology.

The practical benefits with which Dr. Hurst credits the century of American Christianity are, evangelisation, improved interpretation of Scripture, increase of theological literature, establishment of theological seminaries, and the stand maintained, as compared with other countries, for evangelical truth against Rationalism and scientific Materialism. He also mentions prominently the part borne by the Church in the disappearance of African slavery. This view is so natural in a Northern centennial writer, that we excuse the error, without thinking it worth while to point it out. We can wait. Long before another centennial, it will be acknowledged that the great achievement of American Christianity was not the emancipation of the slave, but the civilisation and Christianising of the African barbarian. We are at a loss to account for the omission to notice the part borne by the American Church in missions, and still more surprised, that under the conditions of his book, the author says little if anything in a distinct way about what is the peculiar feature of American ecclesiastical polity—the separation of Church and State.

Altogether, though by no means complete, and not without error, this little volume is a pleasant and timely contribution to a work which awaits more thorough treatment by an abler hand.

*The Turks in Europe.* By EDWARD A. FREEMAN, late Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford. (Harper's Half-Hour series.) Harper Bros., New York.

*The Eastern Question, Historically Considered.* By JAMES M. BUGBEE. Osgood & Co., Boston.

The Eastern war, as the most conspicuous phenomenon above the horizon, is the great object of attention to the civilised world. To some of the European nations it is a subject of immediate

concern, as well as of lively curiosity. It may seem to touch us only as it raises the price of breadstuffs and depresses that of tobacco and cotton. But this view is too narrow to be just. The world's interests are so complicated, that a mighty agitation in one quarter, extends its waves with more or less force to very distant shores. A calamitous war in Europe will finally damage America, and we are interested in the ultimate settlement of all great questions of civilisation, government, morals, and religion, though they may have no traceable application to our present condition. Were all other considerations absent, the single fact, that of the contending parties one is Christian and the other Mohammedan, and that they are engaged against each other professedly on the ground of this difference, connects us in sentiment and sympathy strongly with the issue of the war.

We are all watching with eagerness the advance of the Russians in the direction of Constantinople from the east, and the massing of her corps for the passage of the Danube on the north. Our sympathies, however, as Protestant or as Roman Catholic Christians, are checked in their outflow towards Russia, by our estimate of the Greek Church as being at once corrupt and intolerant, our suspicion of the sincerity of the avowed motives of Russia, and some reasonable doubt whether the Christians in Turkey care to exchange for the proposed protection of the Czar, the present rule of the Porte.

Another question will also bear discussion. What right have other nations to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey, in order to correct abuses unquestionably enormous, which undeniably exist? This state of the public mind has called forth with great rapidity a mass of literature bearing upon the subject, of varying bulk, interest, and value. As the reader has time and taste for an examination of the several questions involved, he will take up the more elaborate or the more compendious volumes now issuing in profusion from the press. For those who care for nothing more than will enable them to comprehend the general relations of the subject, and thus to follow with greater satisfaction the movements of the armies along the Danube, or the eastern shore of the Black Sea, we recommend the two



little volumes named above. Mr. Freeman's is put up in such small form and at so insignificant a price, that it might be suspected of being a catch-penny, (it belongs to the Messrs. Harper's unique and valuable little Half-hour Series, which are sold at fifteen cents a volume,) but it is in fact a reprint of an English publication of acknowledged authority, which has had a large influence in shaping the public opinion, and thus the government action of Britain. Mr. Freeman discusses his topic under three questions: "Who and what are the Turks? What have the Turks done? and, What is to be done with the Turks?" His historical outline is clear, his arguments incisive, and his conclusions dogmatic. "The Turk came in as an alien and barbarian, encamped on the soil of Europe. At the end of five hundred years, he remains an alien and barbarian, encamped on soil which he has no more made his own than it was when he first took Kallipolis. . . His rule has been a rule of cruelty, faithlessness, and brutal lust; it has not been government, but organised brigandage. His rule cannot be reformed. While all other nations get better and better, the Turks get worse and worse. . . For an evil which cannot be reformed, there is but one remedy only—to get rid of it. Justice, reason, humanity, demand that the rule of the Turk in Europe should be got rid of, and the time of getting rid of it has now come."

The other book, Mr. Bugbee's, *The Eastern Question*, is not much larger than Mr. Freeman's, and is more moderate in tone, waiving argument, but giving very clear historical statements, particularly of the several steps taken by the European powers for a settlement of the questions involved. A serviceable map of Europe, though not as distinct as could be wished, is bound up in the volume, and there is a valuable appendix on the resources of Russia and Turkey, together with the *personnel* of the Legations of Russia and Turkey at Washington, and of the United States Legations at St. Petersburg and Constantinople.

In this notice of important summarised information upon the Eastern Question, we would call attention to two admirable articles in the *North American Review*; one by Mr. Godkin, January, 1877, the other by Mr. Oliphant, March. This last, if not *quasi* pro-Turkish, is sharply anti-Russian.

*The Warfare of Science*, by ANDREW DICKSON WHITE, LL. D., President of Cornell University. Introduced by Professor Tyndall. London and New York. 12mo. 1876.

We have here another virtual attack on Christianity, after the manner of Lecky, and of Dr. John W. Draper ("Conflict of Science and Religion.") Mr. White brings the same charge: That religion, by which he means the Christian Church, has always fought against "science" with hard names and hard blows, and is pursuing this naughty work still. The conclusion, of course, is: That as Mr. White and his friends believe that "science" is inspired, and that the Bible is not, this "warfare" puts the Bible and its friends wholly in the wrong. One would suppose that "science" ought to mean truth indisputably ascertained. But these gentlemen, according to the witty definition of old Bishop Warburton, that "orthodoxy is *my doxy*, and heterodoxy is *other people's doxy*," coolly usurp the venerable word, science, for any speculation or hypothesis, however dissented from by the best physicists, which they happen to like for its anti-Christian tendencies.

In all these books there are sundry points of glaring unfairness, besides the one just noted. They like to speak as though Christianity meant nothing but Romanism; which all know to be, by theory and practice, the enemy of all liberty of soul. They choose to disregard the well-known fact that Protestant Christianity, on which their blows designedly fall, in large part, holds just the opposite ground; that it indicts Rome as anti-Christ for this very thing; and that true Christianity, in the form of Protestantism, is the power which purchased with her best blood, for Mr. White and his friends, this very liberty of thought which they are now abusing; and which gave parentage to modern science, with all its splendors. Did they ever read *Villers' Essai*?

Another trait, equally childish and absurd, is their claim to be treated with perfect calmness and courtesy, while they go about destroying what most men believe to be their holiest and most precious interests. The "science" which Mr. White would fain have politely treated includes, not seldom, atheism and materialism; and always, a denial of the inspiration of the only document

in the world which teaches the way of redemption. Now, although these gentlemen may deem that they have no souls to be saved, we are very sure that we have; and that "their redemption is precious." Hence, we beg to remind them, that their ruthless attempt to reduce us, "will we, nill we," to their own hopeless condition, presents a case neither for forbearance nor equanimity. They offer us a vital stab; they should expect to receive good "hard knocks" in return. We have, indeed, no disposition, like the Papists, to roast them, or starve them. But we very naturally claim the right of an indignant, honest resistance and exposure. If they really believe their gospel of death and despair is the truth, let them be done with the childish and cowardly puling which claims a pacific reception for so deadly an onset. Here is a ship full of passengers, at midnight, in a stormy sea, with a lee shore probably not far off. A neat, little-fopling mariner insists, with the most amiable pretence of nonchalance, on throwing the only "compass overboard," in the interests of "science!" And when the sailors give him a pretty surly "No," he exclaims against nautical bigotry and prejudice! The silly fellow might better thank his stars that he has not had his head broken with a "marlin spike." These gentlemen expect us, too, to tolerate with entire coolness and amiability the invasions of our holiest moral convictions and affections. Their mission is like that of the man who should come to Virginia or Carolina for the express purpose of proving that Washington and Jackson were certainly either hypocrites or ninnyes, or most probably both at once. But here are whole commonwealths of honest folk who verily believe that those were noble patriots who gave their heroic devotion and hearts' blood to purchase for them precious rights. Yet your little invader says he expects to have his libel entertained by those people, and by the very child in whose veins runs the blood of the martyred hero, with entire politeness! And if they display any honest warmth, oh! they should unlearn such stupid heat by taking example of his historic coolness! Now, all this is timple silliness and impertinence. The man who attacks his neighbor's very heart must expect to be beat off, if the assailed man can.

It is also quite refreshing to witness the unconscious verdancy with which these gentlemen ring their changes on "superstition" and "priestcraft" against the clergy, when they themselves appeal to a scientific superstition and claim all the privileges of a scientific priestcraft. They deliver, for instance, their lectures on science popularised, to us common people, in which they require us to accept most wondrous results. They tell us of recent corrections of the solar distance; of the wonders of *spectrum analysis*; of the almost infinite age of the world; of the vast atmosphere of the planet Jupiter. We must believe it all, of course; else we are guilty of sacrilege against these high priests of science, and draw on our heads streams of scientific anathemas. But do they *make us understand* the supposed demonstrations of all these wonderful things? Oh, not at all! They do not try; we should not be competent to understand them if they did. The processes, they tell us, involve physical manipulations too nice for any but a practised hand and the most refined integrations of the higher *calculus*, besides large infusions of their own abstruse hypotheses, in addition to their asserted observations. We must take the conclusions on their "Say so," and we are expected to take them thus, although they should by corollary expel our Bibles and our only hopes of salvation. Now where was there ever a truer priestcraft? What Romish priest ever made on his stupid votary a clearer demand for an "implicit faith?" Verily, the superstitions of science are outrunning those of Popery. Gentlemen "scientists," you are bound in fairness to imitate the despised Protestant parsons; labor, week in and week out, to make your "laity" understand your gospel of microscopy and integral calculus thoroughly for themselves, before you ask all this faith of them.

But we have other pleas. Whereas these writers parade many shoddy profundities (gathered, we fear, mostly from dictionary books on the history of science of very dubious authority,) about the wicked oppositions of theologians (chiefly papal) against science; and they never fail to enlighten us with those very novel and original narratives of Galileo and the Inquisition, and Columbus and the Spanish monks; we find that they make very unfair

omissions. For instance, they fail to recall the numerous instances in which the "warfare" of the Church against science turned out to be altogether wholesome and righteous. Now, Messieurs Scientists, "give the devil his due." There was the case, for instance, in which the scientists of the day were gone, almost to a man, after the follies of alchemy. Do you not now admit that, if science had not waked up from that dream to the great principle of the permanency of substances, modern chemistry would have been impossible? Well, the Church was as much against the alchemists as the Copernicans. Why not give her the credit of being in the right once? Again, astronomers, we believe, now regard the art of judicial astrology as a "science falsely so called." Well, the Church always thought thus of it, and did her best, wisely and unwisely, to arrest it. Let her have the credit. In our day, again, all orthodox parsons, despite their naughtiness, took Bible ground against modern "Spiritualism." Well, the great "scientists," Faraday and Carpenter, take the same side. So, it seems that religion does not "war" on the wrong side all the time.

But the most enormous and unrighteous chasm in the representation of these books is: that they tacitly pass over another fact, that where religion has "conflicted" with science once, science has conflicted with itself twenty times. We wish we had time to tell a small fraction of the history here, over which Mr. White and Dr. Draper pass silently. We could tell them, for instance, how a large part of the support of the monk Copernicus came from ecclesiastics and popes, and that for a long time; and how his opponents were chiefly among the scientists: among which opponents must be ranked, would you believe it? my Lord of Verulam himself; and how good Bishop Wilkins, a clergyman, did more than anything else, in the day just after Bacon, to spread Copernicus' doctrine in Britain. We could tell how Giordano Bruno, whose fate so wrings Mr. White's tender heart, was not executed (A. D. 1600) for being a Copernican at all; the Pope of the day being, most probably, of the same way of thinking, but for a venomous political pasquinade against the Roman See. We could remind the professional mourners at Galileo's

perpetual funeral that the only circumstance which really got him into trouble was this: that by his day German Protestantism had so generally embraced the scheme of the Florentine, and of its compatriot, Copernicus, that the new astronomy came at length to be regarded as a *purely Protestant affair*, and hence grew to be *obnoxious at Rome*. Now, when we assure Mr. White, that in our eyes Protestantism *is religion*, while the Italian Popery of 1612 was no religion at all, but simply secular despotism under a mask, will he not allow us to say what is true: that *the religion of the day* was mainly on the side of poor Galileo?

So Mr. White should have remembered how "science" (not religion) "warred" against Dr. Harvey's great discovery (1628) of the circulation of the blood. It is stated by Dr. McCosh, that scarcely a single physician of middle age ever acceded to it. His own profession, largely in England and more in France, only abused him for his demonstration. So strongly did the old gentleman become impressed with the fierceness of the opposition he had raised among the scientists, that he refused afterwards to publish his essay on generation in his life-time, in order that he might not "stir up tempests that may deprive one of his leisure and quiet for the future." So, when Lavoisier discovered the office of oxygen, and attacked the old *phlogiston* theory, Klaproth, in Germany, Cavendish, Kirwan, and Priestley, in England, at first assailed it as an innovation; and the last never surrendered the old theory. When Dr. Young, at the beginning of this century, revived Huyghens' undulatory theory of light, who "conflicted" with it? Not the parsons, but the *Edinburgh Review*, (the scathing criticisms being written by Brougham,) and such philosophers as Brewster, and, at first, Herschel and Davy! Nor is the "warfare" to this day finished. Does Mr. White forget how the immortal Newton himself was resisted, not by the Church, but by the Leibnitzians in Germany and the Cartesians in France: and how the illustrious *Bernouilli* received the honors of the French Academy for upholding against him the vortical theory, as late as 1730? Indeed, the contest only ceased by the dying off of a whole generation of unconquerable Cartesians. So, in recompence, the English *savants* rejected the *calculus* of

Leibnitz, in favor of the worse system of their own Newton; and it was actually not until the dawn of our century that Cambridge ceased to calculate in "fluxions," and consented at last to accept the more convenient German instrument of the "differential coefficient." When Jenner blessed the world with his famous prophylactic against small-pox, a few of the clergy may have illustrated their indiscretion by attacking him. But thousands of his medical brethren assailed his proposal with ridicule and abuse. Some invoked legislation against him as a poisoner. And it has not been so very long since the war was reopened by physicians, and the attempt made to abolish vaccination on medical grounds. But why multiply instances? Surely Mr. White is not ignorant of the fact that, as physical science extends, so the conflict within its own bosom waxes hotter. There is now twenty times as much debate, tempered with as large an infusion of scientific bigotry, between physicists, as there is between them and theologians. Wernerian has assailed Huttonian, and the geologic convulsionist attacks the uniformitarian. Agassiz denounces Darwinism as a dream. Huxley berates Sir William Thomson, and Professor Tait disparages Professor Tyndall. So the warfare waxes louder and louder, until one should think that the thunder of it had filled Mr. White's ears. But so intent is he upon the little sporadic bickerings of the theologic skirmish, that he seems not to hear the great battle.

Now, the plain conclusion from these facts, when taken all together, is: that there is no such thing as a warfare, in Mr. White's sense, between science and religion. That is to say, between true science and Christianity there is no hostility whatever. Nor has there ever been any *animus* in the Church, even as corrupted, constituting an abiding cause, in the debates which have attended the progress of science. The real cause is the dogmatism which is native to man—as native to Mr. White as to the parsons; the conservatism always attaching to deliberate opinion and the natural effect of novelty in speculation. The simple amount of the matter is, that *novelty has always provoked opposition*. This is not because the opponents of innovations have been theologians, but because they have been men. The whole

philosophy of this history is summed up in the homely saw: "It is ill teaching old dogs new tricks." As we have seen, new scientific doctrines have always had twenty opponents among "scientists" for one among clergymen. The induction of Mr. White and his friends is, therefore, shallow and faulty; and if he reasons in the same heedless way from his physical facts as from his historical, we fear he will add very little to that treasure of science which the world has inherited from Protestant Christianity through her Tycho Brahe, her Kepler, her BACON, her NEWTON, her Harvey, her Leibnitz, her Huyghens, her Boerhaave, her Berzelius, her Franklin, her Wollaston, her Dalton, her Herschels, her Buckland, her Smith, her Davy, her Watt, her Cuvier, her Brewster, her Whewell, her Hugh Miller, her Faraday, her Morse, her Agassiz, her Henry.

*Recent Advances in Physical Science.* By P. G. Tait, Professor of Natural Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. London. McMillan & Co. Large 12mo, pp. 363.

Here is a book totally different from the previous one. Professor Tait gives, in a series of Lectures to educated men of middle age, the increments which physical science may be regarded as having solidly gained since the day when such as we were studying its usual manuals. While we do not embrace all his speculations or conclusions, we find him refreshingly free from the unscientific extravagances of the Huxley-and-Tyndall school. Our author declares with emphasis two vital rules which that school has overlooked. One is, that physical science can be advanced *only by experimental observations* upon the outer world; and that, consequently, whenever the physicist ventures to conclude any of its laws from assumed *a priori* grounds, he is sure to err. The other is, that when physical science, with its methods, reaches the border of psychology and natural theology, she is bound to pause and acknowledge her incompetency in that field. *Of consciousness and volition*, she is not, by her methods, qualified to speak.

Professor Tait, of course, devotes the larger part of his discussions to establishing the doctrine of the conservation of energy



and its equivalent transformations, with the recent researches into "the imponderables," on which that doctrine is so largely based. He would not have us speak of "correlation of forces," or "transformation of forces." In his vocabulary the proper name for that generic power or physical causation whose unity in nature is supposed to be established, is "energy." "Force" (that which results in motion of matter in bodies) is but one of the protean effects of "energy." "Energy" is as truly an objective entity, and as indestructible as "matter." Nothing but omnipotence can either add to or diminish from the total of either; for such addition or decrease would be creation or annihilation. Hence, all physical effects, whether optical, chemical, thermal, molecular, mechanical, are but the varied transformations of the generic energy. Its *quantum* is conserved in absolute stability, even as truly as that of matter; its modifications are always really equivalent, and they account for all the changes in nature.

Professor Tait gives two results, which make his book of interest to Christians. While thus teaching the "conservation of energy," he asserts that science demonstrates a vital difference between the two directions in which the "transformations of energy" naturally take place. When the transformation is from a lower to a higher form of energy—as, for instance, from mechanical force to heat—the whole energy can be transmitted. But when the change is from a higher to a lower—as, for instance, when the steam engine seeks to transmute heat into mechanical force—only a part of the energy can be transformed. Hence, the inevitable result throughout the realms of nature—for this is but a typical instance—is a tendency towards the lower homogeneous forms of energy, away from the higher and more varied forms. He concludes, therefore, that natural energy never could have inaugurated its own workings: Nature points to a higher Cause out of nature, which must, of course, be eternal, self-existent, and immutable. He also infers that our system of nature is not permanent. It tends steadily to a break-down. The earth is not now rotating on its axis as briskly as it was two thousand years ago. The transformations of nature's energy are steadily degrading its forms. Let this natural process continue long enough, and physics

itself teaches us that there must be another external intervention of the supra-physical cause or the machine stops. The clock of the universe does not run without winding up. Thus is refuted the vain atheistic vision of Herbert Spencer, which was characterised by a recent American book as "an absurd infinite series of universes 'ending in smoke,' and smokes generating universes."

The other point of interest is Professor Tait's clear and amusing description of the processes by which his friend and co-laborer, Sir William Thomson, proved that the earth cannot have existed during the long ages, which the "uniformitarian" schools of geology claim. Whereas the followers of Darwin say they need several hundreds of millions of years for the later evolutions alone, the earth cannot be more than twelve, or at most, fifteen millions of years old. (Of course Sir William Thomson is too good a philosopher to claim more than a negative force for his argument: it shows that the earth cannot be more than so old. It only asserts that it may be so old, *nisi intersit causa supra naturam*.) Were our globe and its present relations to the solar system older than that, the retardation of its diurnal revolution by the friction of the ocean tides would be greater than it is. Again, it is demonstrable that, even suppose with the "Plutonian" theorists, that our ball began its planetary existence a molten globe of granite, its thermal condition must have been different from what it now is. And still again: had the diurnal rotation been as rapid as we know it would have been more than fifteen millions of years ago, and had the ball been as hot as we know from its present thermal state it would have been more than fifteen millions of years ago, the inevitable result of that more rapid rotation must have been to flatten our globe into a spheroid a great deal more oblate than it actually is. This, we believe, is the demonstration which roused in Mr. Huxley a scientific bigotry that betrayed him into even worse manners than those naughty men, the theologians. We may then add this to our other instances, which prove that the "conflict" and "warfare" of science is not with Christianity, but with "science falsely so called."

*Questions Raised by the Study of the Bible.* By the Rev. JOHN MILLER, D. D., of Princeton, N. J. Dodd & Mead, New York. 12mo., pp. 400.

This is the book which, as our readers have already learned, led to the suspension of its author from the ministry by New Brunswick Presbytery. That such a step should have been, or should have been deemed, necessary, is a subject of profound regret to all of Dr. Miller's friends, and they are deservedly many. Neither this sentence, nor our emphatic dissent from the startling positions to which he has come, will ever cause those who know him to doubt the integrity and sincerity of his convictions, or the chivalry of his character, or the reality and depth of his piety. This book displays in a high degree all the excellences and peculiarities of his style: freshness, piquancy, originality, and that unrivalled power of terse, perspicuous, and sparkling statement, which renders the reader so much the more impatient of the frequent obscurity, because he sees the author so well able to avoid it. This blemish, indeed, does not result from obscurity of thought—that is manifest—but only from the compression and quaintness of the expression. Dr. Miller, in his notice of appeal to the Synod of New Jersey, argues that he has been unjustly condemned; that undue haste and manifest prejudice swayed the prosecution; and that his points of dissent from the Westminster standards do not, in any vital way, affect the integrity of his Calvinism. His protest is quite a distinct intimation—which, we must confess, appears credible—that the prosecution is prompted much more by the desire to avenge Dr. Hodge for the trenchant criticisms of his views in a previous work of our author, which was not judged "actionable," than by a disinterested zeal for the truth. A right thing may be done in a wrong spirit.

We are, nevertheless, bound to dissent from Dr. Miller's estimate of the significance of his new conclusions (which are not new). They are three: First, he discards what has always been the catholic understanding of the Church, as to the teaching of the Scriptures, concerning the soul of man. The author does not believe that it is a distinct spiritual substance, capable of existing independent of the body, and actually destined to exist so

for a time ; but that it is a function of material organisation, more or less akin to those lower but mysterious functions, vegetable and animal life, only much higher and nobler. He believes firmly in the ultimate immortality and conscious identity of man ; but of course, while the body is resolved into its dust, the soul has no conscious being, since it is only a function, and it resumes consciousness and the continuity of its being, at the resurrection. It is, indeed, substantially the creed of that Dr. Thomas, who, in the country regions of Virginia, plagued the churches of Alexander Campbell with this speculation, and with whom Dr. N. L. Rice so plagued Campbell himself in Lexington, Ky., in the debate upon the question whether his denomination had a "creed." (The point of the goad was in this query : "If Mr. C. has no creed but the Bible itself, by what *hocus-pocus* has he convicted and ejected Dr. Thomas for heresy, when the latter says that he finds this 'sleep of the soul' in the Bible, just as sincerely as Mr. C. says he does not?") Dr. Miller has, we fear, been too much actuated by love of paradox and craving for novelty, in pursuing these speculations against the almost universal *consensus* of God's people ; and he must find his chastisement in being anticipated by some thirty years, by a foolish and erratic smatterer in philosophy. Often have we heard the same reasonings and the same results ventilated by philosophic mechanics and yeomen, in the "meeting-houses" of Lunenburg, Va. They carried off Dr. Miller's laurels from him by a thirty years' start.

His second point is, if erroneous, less vital. He believes that while Christ, in virtue of the hypostatic union, was born with a spotless humanity, yet as very man, sharing our nature thoroughly, he bore the imputed guilt of Adam's sin. Hence, he needed, as to his humanity, and received, from the first moment of his incarnate existence, the justifying righteousness of his own priestly work. Dr. Miller complains, with justice, that he has been here much misrepresented, as though he taught that the human nature born of Mary had an actual initial depravity, and needed an actual sanctification. He should be doubtless acquitted of this. But we cannot acquit him of a departure from our Confession, neither sustained by logic nor Scripture, where our standards limit the

imputation of Adam's guilt to that part of the race descended from him by ordinary generation. We confess ourselves unable to see how our Redeemer can be, *qua homo*, obnoxious to this imputed guilt, and yet, as God-man, propitiation for the same. This is too much like making the effect cause of its own origin.

Dr. Miller's third departure is a denial of the Trinity. If we understand him, he denies a threefold subsistence in the Godhead, but believes in the strict and proper divinity of the Messiah and the Comforter. He believes that there is a true hypostatic union of the deity with human nature; but it is no second person who is thus united; it is the One, God, Father. Dr. Miller claims that his speculations are not the same with any previous heresy rejected by the Church, and that he is therefore entitled to have their bearing upon our Calvinistic system examined *ab initio*, before he is held responsible for any vital departure from it. We are unable, nevertheless, to see anything in his position here, except the idea of the ancient "Patripassian," examined and repudiated by the Church in the third age. *Noetus* claimed, just like Dr. Miller, that he retained in the fullest sense the proper deity of the Messiah, because he held that the one God, one Person, Father, was incarnated in Jesus, and acting as propitiator, appeased the righteous wrath of the same Person and Father, acting as Judge. According to him, the names of persons which Trinitarians understand as denominating the three distinct subsistences in the one Essence, are but names of the three parts or three "*rôles*," in which the one individual God appears while carrying out the drama of redemption.

It is not our purpose, in this brief notice, to discuss Dr. Miller's arguments. We shall not seem to admit the necessity of such renewed discussion; for we are entirely incredulous as to his having really unsettled the foundations of the old catholic belief on these three points. The day of discussion on them has long ago passed for men like him and us, who hold the plenary authority of the Scriptures. The Church has reviewed and re-reviewed her grounds here too often for us to believe that there is either a new assault or a new defence of her old positions, that will be found to have any substantive importance. Dr. Miller's

grounds of doubt have been all considered and answered already, in the exhaustive discussions of past ages. But there are a few remarks which should be made upon the special aspects of his new position.

With regard to his denial of the substantive existence of spirit, Dr. Miller tells us that it was the Bible, and not psychology, which unsettled his trust in the traditionary opinion. We have no doubt but he honestly believes so; but we shrewdly suspect that he is unconsciously mistaken, and that his new and regretted position is the result of psychologic speculations, and not of the stress of the Scriptures he adduces. To us it seems that he argues against the philosophic proofs of the existence of spiritual substance in man, amazingly like those philosophic heretics, Professors Ferrier and Alexander Bain. We must be pardoned for telling him that we fear it is his studies in those perverse books, or others like them, and not his studies in the evangelists and the apostles, that have done him this mischief. He unconsciously carried the materialistic sophisms into his exegetical inquiry. For we remember that he has lately written on Psychology, endeavoring to prove that "perception" is the whole of our mental functions, both cognitive and emotive. This, we believe, and not hermeneutics, is the starting place from which he has reached his present position. After robbing the rational soul of all function save one that is objective in the causation, and that is common to man and beast, it is not so strange that he should next deny all generic difference between the rational "soul of man that goeth upwards, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downwards." And when we recall the old proof-texts which the defenders of the faith have used so many ages against the *psychopannuchia*; when we hear our Saviour warn us of Him who, "after he hath killed the body, hath power to destroy the soul in hell;" when we hear the Messiah promise the dying robber, "This day thou shalt be with me in paradise;" when we hear the inspired martyr cry in his death gasp, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit;" when we hear Paul declare that to "depart from the body is to sojourn with Christ," we do not believe that Dr. Miller's ingenuity in exe-

getical novelties, unrivalled as it is, can sustain any other sense than the one accepted by the Church.

As to the Trinity, we can by no means accede to the representation that Calvin or Melancthon "looked askance" upon the doctrine, as it was the doctrine of the Church catholic. We know very well that the most subtle and reverent minds differed when they attempted to formulate in words the definition (perhaps beyond human grasp,) of the threefold distinction of subsistence, as "real," "virtual," "modal," or "eminent." We know very well that Calvin "looked askance" on the attempts of Origenist and of Latin Scholastics to give a *rationale* of the genesis of the Persons. But we deny that there is a particle of uncertainty in his adhesion to the catholic doctrine as the inexplicable but only scriptural statement of the great "mystery of godliness." "What can he do that shall come after the king?" Nor can we concede the correctness of Dr. Miller's intimation that Trinitarianism has been a rationalistic refuge of human pride of intellect from the revealed doctrine of the three manifestations of the one personality. The history of opinion shows that the fact is exactly opposite. All the various "Monarchian" schemes have been but the struggles of a recalcitrant proud reason against the revelation of the inscrutable Three in One. He may claim that, like the early Patripassian, he holds fast to the proper deity of the Redeemer; since it is the First (and only) Person, Father, the very *Ἀρχήθεος*, whom he supposes to be incarnate in Jesus. Thus much we willingly concede. But he retains this saving truth at the expense of the consistency of Scripture. The Patripassian, instead of having three true Persons, makes the personal titles names of three *rôles* merely, which the same person *successively* plays. It is like the simple art of the old Greek drama, where the whole troupe was limited to four actors and *chorus*; and the *dramatis personae* were made out by the same man's appearing first in one and then, with a change of mask (or *persona*), in another "part." Thus, in the *Iphigenia in Aulide*, one ruddy youth, with the help of two wigs and two masks and two suits of raiment, could personate first the youthful warrior *Achilles*, and then the maiden *Iphigenia*. But suppose the poet, in construct-

ing the plot, had been foolish enough to devise a scene in which both Achilles and Iphigenia must *come on the stage together*, and even declaim to each other! He would have caught himself indeed! This is just the absurdity in which the scheme of the Patripassian entangles itself; whenever it approaches any of those Scriptures in which one Person feels, acts, or speaks towards another, it finds itself in just such a hopeless quandary.

The best wish which Dr. Miller's true friends (among whom we claim to be) can make for him is, that he may have magnanimity to rise above the sense of injustice and persecution, by which he is naturally goaded into inflexibility, to curb his native craving for mental novelty, and to return to the good old paths of his honored father. We are well aware that it has been the fashion to exalt other stars in the Princeton firmament above Dr. Samuel Miller, for profundity and learning. But for our part, we have ever honored him as among the best of thinkers; and we know no one whose candor, perspicacity, and justice of mind, can give to his followers a safer guarantee for the truth of the opinions which he had carefully inspected and deliberately adopted. We purpose to follow the father in preference to the son, and we affectionately advise our author to do the same.

*The Cruise of Her Majesty's Ship, "The Challenger."* By W. J. J. SPRY, R. N. Harper Brothers.

The Royal Society of Great Britain, stimulated by a desire to find out more about the ocean—the character of its bed, the force of its currents, the temperature of its waters, the kind of plants and creatures that inhabit it, its ascertainable depth, and many kindred investigations—petitioned the Government, in 1872, for a vessel that should be fitted for a three or four years' cruise in the service of science. *The Challenger* was placed at the disposal of the Society, and in November, 1872, it sailed from Sheerness, having on board a very competent corps of scientific men, with Prof. C. Wyville Thomson at their head, perfectly manned in every respect, and provided with all possible appliances for making the investigations they had in view. The author of this volume was Assistant Engineer: and while he disclaims all intention of giving



any account of the scientific results reached, which he leaves to Professor Thomson, he addresses himself more particularly to such general outlines of the cruise as would not be taken note of otherwise; as descriptions of regions from the tropics to the Antarctic circle but rarely visited; the manners and customs of strange peoples; climates; the incidents and *personnel* of the voyage; and many other interesting topics.

The book is largely illustrated; and the descriptions of the various apparatus for chemical and naturalistic investigation, deep-sea sounding, etc., will be found most interesting. A large map, showing the track of *The Challenger*, is a valuable addition: and full-page pictures of multitudes of strange places visited, enliven its chapters.

Although Lieut. Spry disclaims any intention of conveying scientific knowledge, and aims to entertain rather than instruct, still he gives a sufficient insight into the doings of the scientists: tells of the results of the dredgings; describes very minutely the instruments for sounding, and the manner of their use; gives the reader just enough of the botany, geology, engineering excursions and natural history researches, to stimulate without wearying. He acquaints us with the social status of the points at which they touched, and does not disdain to describe now and then the balls, dinners, and fandangoes given in honor of the officers of *The Challenger*, showing that, altogether, they had a very pleasant time of it, off shipboard as well as on. He embodies in his text an interesting account of two brothers, "would-be Robinson Crusoes," written down from dictation, who had gone seal hunting from the Tristan Islands, off the South American coast, who, after more than two years in exile, were only too glad to be taken on board *The Challenger* and restored to the world out of which they had been so long lost.

We should have said that the first course of the vessel was westward—Madeira, the Bermudas, the Azores, Cape of Good Hope, Australia, New Zealand, the Hebrides, the Fiji Islands, China, New Guinea, Japan, the Sandwich Islands, Valparaiso, Straits of Magellan, Falkland Islands, Montevideo, Cape de Verde Islands, Spain, Spithead. This may indicate faintly the

track of *The Challenger*. But the reader must go to the record itself for the delightful variety of incident and description and pleasantly conveyed instruction that fill up the book.

Our Engineer was no where more charmed than with what he saw in Japan, if we may judge from the glowing accounts he gives of the scenery, the social customs, the pretty almond-eyed girls, the tea-gardens. These are the most ornate pages of his book. Cruising among the Philippine Islands, the visit to Hong Kong, the ins and outs of the beautiful bays of Japan, sights in Hawaii, dredgings among Antarctic icebergs, life at Ternate, sketchings in Australia—these are among the most picturesque and attractive pages in Lieut. Spry's volume, which we doubt not will be the source of entertainment and profit to a wide circle of readers, both in England and America. The fine, large, open text of the Harpers' reprint is a delight to the eye, and of itself commends the book.

*Through Persia by Caravan*, by ARTHUR ARNOLD, a large, handsome volume of 500 pages, is also from the Harpers' press. It is one of the well-timed publications which just now are enlightening Europe and America in regard to portions of Occidental and Oriental regions somewhat out of the line of travel, and may be classed with Schuyler's *Turkistan* and Wallace's *Russia*, and Baker's *Turkey*. Mr. Arnold was accompanied by his wife, who braved all that had to be encountered in a rough journey of several thousand miles, with the resolution and nerve of a true-born Englishwoman.

The travellers began their journey at Warsaw, passed on thence to St. Petersburg, went southward to Astrakhan, voyaged on the Caspian Sea, from one end to the other, and traversed the entire length of Persia, from Enzelli to Bushire.

Of Russian domination in Poland, Mr. Arnold gives a picture that is saddening enough, so thoroughly is the haughty spirit of the once patriotic Poles crushed and broken. There is, in fact, no Poland; it is a mere dependency of the *Tsar* (as the autocrat's title is always given). He goes into no enthusiasms over St. Petersburg, if we except the cathedral of St. Isaac, which

he thinks one of the noblest buildings of modern times. He has no patience with the childish superstition of the Greek Church, and wonders how Dean Stanley, in his *Lectures on the Eastern Church*, can speak of it with so much moderation. At Nijni-Novgorod, where the great yearly fair is held, our travellers had an opportunity of seeing an exposition half-a-dozen times as large as the English one of 1851, and very picturesque is the description of the great scene of barter. Here they took tickets for two thousand miles of travel, and thenceforth the refinements of continental journeying had largely to be dispensed with. A most valuable chapter is given to a consideration of the Empire of the Czar, under its various aspects—its “sham press,” its miserable agriculture, its autocratic rule, its “absurd bureaucracy,” its crushing debt, its unfertile wastes, its ignorant emancipated serfs; and reading this, one wonders how such a country can wage a successful war. The voyage on the Caspian gives us a fresh leaf of travel, and we enter Persia, the land of Hafiz and Saadi, and fire-worshippers, and roses, and nightingales, to have all our pleasant ideas of it dissipated, and to find it a region of “dust and desolation.” Mr. Arnold was strangely disillusionised to find that the readers of the *Zendavesta* actually worshipped *petroleum*! “Surely” (he says) “there never was such a pitiful *reductio ad absurdum*! Before us stood the priest of a very venerable religion, which has always seemed to me to be one of the most noble and natural for a primitive people. There he stood, ready for half a ruble, to perform the rites of his wornout worship, and there was also the object of his life-long devotion, set to work as economic firing!!” The petroleum gas is used for making lime.

But all Persia was not desolate. At Kasveen, Mr. Arnold found the delicious grapes which we call “Sultana Raisins.” Teheran, the capital of Persia, is represented as a city of mud walls, very uninteresting, made more so him by a violent attack of fever. The Shah’s Government seems to be a very rude and shaky affair, everything manifesting Oriental tyranny and disorder. We are surprised to find such accounts of the intense cold of the country. Riding on muleback, the travellers found it dif-

ficult to face the snow and winds that they encountered on the vast plains.

What visions of Eastern luxury arise before us at the name of Ispahan! Yet our English friends "were dismayed at its wretchedness and ruin." The British missionary, Mr. Bruce, was in trouble at the time of Mr. Arnold's visit, as the Government had ordered the closing of the mission school. Mr. Arnold appealed to the son of the Shah for relief; but although an autocrat in Ispahan, he refused to allow the school to be again opened. He was no bigot, he said; but he dared not resist the Moolahs. Some interesting chapters are given to the history of Persia, ancient and modern; and there is a *résumé* of its literature which is full of entertainment. We have not the space to follow our travellers to the goal at which they take leave of the reader, Alexandria. The volume is stored with precise information, and abounds in careful statistics, which may be studied to great advantage just now, when the Russo-Turkish war is directing the eyes of the world to portions of the region which Mr. Arnold traversed. As a mere book of travel, it is delightful and fresh, taking the reader over regions of country quite out of the beaten track of the tourist. Mr. Arnold writes charmingly, without any effort, and with a natural simplicity very characteristic of the educated Englishman. He is a son of Dr. Arnold, former Master of Rugby.

*Harriet Martineau's Autobiography*: Edited by MARIA WESTON CHAPMAN. Two volumes. J. R. Osgood & Co.

The fact that the attention of the reading public of Great Britain and America has been so specifically directed to Miss Martineau's life, is sufficient reason why a REVIEW, that takes note of literary as well as religious matter, should not pass it by. It is not because we feel any overweening interest in the subject of the memoir, that we grant it consideration in this place; but as this "Life" mixed itself up so thoroughly for forty years with all the grave questions of the time—with politics, social reform, political economy, in its varied ramifications, religious controversy, the slavery agitation, and every other kind of agitation,

as well as with the best of English and the best of American "Society" (so called), a more than usual importance belongs to it.

From beginning to end, the work is *sui generis*. The *Autobiography* was written and *printed* twenty years ago, and by the author's order, stowed away in her publisher's ware-rooms till her death should give him leave to have it bound and thrown upon the public. Miss Martineau's self-consciousness and self-importance were prodigious; and she begins her biography by telling the reader that the obligation she owed the world to write her own life, so "weighed upon her conscience," that she had no peace till the work was accomplished. And to ensure the manuscript's being untampered with by friends, who, after her death, might desire to soften what they might consider its harsh features, she resorted to this strange expedient of having it *printed*, remembering that *littera scripta manet*. No doubt, could she have foreseen that she would live twenty years longer, she would not have been so precipitate; for the mortal disease with which she was suffering while writing it, did not finish its course for that period. She supplemented the *Autobiography* also by an obituary of herself, prepared for the *Daily News*, (the London journal to which she had been a contributor for twenty or thirty years,) and had it printed and laid away for safe-keeping; and, the morning after her death, this obituary sketch, *verbatim*, with the only blank, *the date*, filled in, appeared in the *Daily News'* issue for the day.

That Miss Martineau's life was a remarkable one, we must admit. She was born in Norwich in 1802, and she gives an exceedingly minute account of her early years. She was, according to her own showing, an unattractive, morose child; indeed, the picture of her home-life is in no degree pleasant; and she is unsparing in her condemnation of her mother's system of training. This outspokenness is apparent everywhere in her *Autobiography*. She was a severe judge, even of herself, and very few of her dearest friends are passed in review without scathe. That she was eminently truthful, so far as her prejudices did not blind her, there can be no question; but what need had she to set before the world the faults of her own family circle a

score of years after most of those who composed it were in their graves?

From her earliest years she claims to have been very religious, in her way. She was born a Unitarian, and remained one till about her third decade, when, after writing three defences of the doctrine, (addressed to Jews, Mussulmans, and Romanists,) and carrying off all three of the prizes offered for these essays, her eyes became opened, as she declares, and she found in a certain nihilistic philosophy that peace which her soul had so long craved! The circumstance of her father's bankruptcy sent her to her pen as a means of support, and she began her *Political Economy Tales*—or *Illustrations*—as she calls them. England was, at that time, in a condition of great ferment, and these stories, addressing themselves to the questions of the hour, bounded at once into an immense popularity. Wages, Tithes, Excise, Corn Laws, Banking, Bills of Exchange, Poor Laws—these were some of her themes; and her influence was at one time so great with the reading public that the ministry often sought her aid, or deprecated her opposition. She gives some amusing accounts of agents from the different Government Departments, meeting on her stairs. That, for a time, she *was* a power in the realm, we are disposed to admit; from her own showing, there was no question about it.

Miss Martineau's visit to America in '34, just when the Abolition furor was at its height, was an important epoch for her. At first she looked upon the "agitators" with some distrust, and while she held her opinions of them in abeyance, she was very heartily received both at the North and in the South; but upon her affiliation with Garrison and his fanatics, her former friends regarded her coldly. That she ever was in the danger she represents, Dr. James Freeman Clark, of Boston, who was posted in regard to all circumstances of the case, denies. She makes herself out quite a martyr, and would fain picture herself as almost a prisoner in Boston, at least, as being ostracised on account of her active sympathy with abolitionism. That she did what no foreigner had a right to do—help to foment discord between the two sections of the country—is evident enough. She represents the London publishers, on her return home, as elbowing each other,

in their eager haste to petition for the privilege of printing her book on America, not one page of which she had yet written.

Miss Martineau rather enjoyed having something or somebody to oppose. She was an invalid for six years, a hopeless one, it was supposed; and she horrified all the medical faculty in England by giving out that she was cured through the use of mesmerism. Her indefatigable industry manifested itself during this illness in the production of some six volumes of *Tales for Young People*, besides her *Life in the Sick Room*. After her recovery, she built herself a home in the beautiful Lake District, and gave herself up assiduously to literary work. Here, through her intimate acquaintance with a Mr. Atkinson, a sort of nihilist in religion, her opinions as to spiritual things became still more divergent from all truth. She ceased to believe in a personal God; she gave up, as a consequence, all prayer; she went to the Holy Land that she might be better able to explode "the Jewish superstition;" she became, so far as a thoughtful human being can, *an atheist*. It is inexpressibly sad to read of the fearful lapse of faith, in which she settled herself with such peace as she averred she had never known before. The Christian believer in reading of it shudders as he thinks of the "seared conscience," the heart "past feeling." Yet we cannot think the setting forth of her unbelief will do much harm; for what she offers as a substitute is fitted to make every soul start back in horror. "*Probable annihilation!*"—this was her ghastly creed. There is no sadder picture in all feminine literary history than this deliberate choice of *nihilism* as the only comfort of her woman's soul. She did labor for and desire the good of the race, and strive to forward its progress; but upon what principle, she never makes plain. Not to please God, for she did not believe in Him; not to please man, for she abjures any such motive; not to add to the mere material comfort of the poor and oppressed, for she thought that a low aim; not to prepare struggling souls for a holy future, for that she scouted; not for mere pity, for she was a trifle hard.

We will not deny to Miss Martineau the many excellent qualities she certainly possessed. Her industry was untiring; her

benevolent helpfulness eager and ungrudging; her bravery not to be questioned; her sympathy for the "bruised classes," of the most emphatic sort; her indignation against what she conceived wrong, very pronounced. Yet the impression produced by her *Autobiography*, extremely interesting as it is, from its wide notice of all British celebrities who came under her eye, is somewhat painful. Some reviewer calls her "spiteful;" and perhaps that is the right word to designate much of the sharp, acid judgment passed upon her contemporaries. She had an eye always for the disagreeable side of every character with which she came in contact; faults came out clearer to her vision than virtues. "The Memorials," added by Miss Martineau's American friend, Mrs. Chapman, possess nothing like the interest of the *Autobiography*, because they are written in a somewhat fulsome style, and not always in the best English. There is too much of them, and the Abolition controversy is dwelt upon *ad nauseam*. There is hardly anything in these volumes that surprises us more than the letter of Florence Nightingale—England's Protestant saint—written immediately after hearing of Miss Martineau's death. Speaking of her departure, she says: "I have thought how great will be the *surprise* to her—a glorious surprise! She served the Right, that is, God, all her life. How few of those who cry 'Lord, Lord,' serve Him so *well* and so wisely! We give *her* joy. . . . She is gone to our Lord and her Lord!" And yet, Miss Nightingale says she *knew* that Miss Martineau did not recognise the Being of a God!

*Outlines of Hebrew Grammar.* By GUSTAVUS BICKELL, D. D., Professor of Theology at Innsbruck. Translated by Samuel Ives Curtiss, Jr., Ph. D., Leipzig. With a Lithographic Table of Semitic Characters, by Dr. J. Euting. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus. 1877.

This title introduces us to a volume of 140 pages, 8vo., exclusive of the valuable table of Semitic characters. The translator, who is an American, resident for the time in Germany, appears to have done his work faithfully, and to have succeeded, in great measure, in rendering the technical terms of the German into



intelligible English. He has added some notes and references, and indexes of the names, subjects, and Hebrew words.

We cannot undertake a discussion of the different points suggested, or institute any comparison of this with other grammars. The author accepts the theory of the historical development of language from isolation, through agglutination, to inflection; regards the Semitic languages as daughters of a common mother, whose features are best seen in the Arabic; finds nothing in this family to prevent one from assuming a common origin for all languages; and appears to lean to the views of Delitzsch and his fellow-believers as to the connection of the Semitic and Indo-Germanic families. These statements will make sufficiently plain to what school of grammarians Dr. Bickell belongs.

The work has five chapters, with the following headings: History of the Hebrew Language and Writing, Phonology, Doctrine of the Formation of Stems, Doctrine of the Formation of Words, and Syntax.

The treatment of the Syntax is very meagre; but the discussion of Phonology, Stems, and Words, will be instructive and suggestive to students of the Hebrew.

The author's method is, to derive all the Hebrew forms "by means of comparative analysis, from a more ancient Semitic language, which is best represented by the Arabic." While this method gives us a clearer apprehension of the forms by giving us the benefit of comparison, yet we may be allowed to suppose that the erection of such a standard is somewhat arbitrary, and the primitive Semitic somewhat artificial.

This grammar is not suited to beginners and was not intended for them. It will be of great service to those interested in the growth of the Hebrew in its sounds, stems, and words, and of benefit to all who are studying this language, either for the sake of its literature, or for the purposes of Comparative Philology.

*The Psalter: A Witness to the Divine Origin of the Bible.* By TALBOT W. CHAMBERS, D. D., one of the Pastors of the Collegiate Dutch Church of New York. New York: Anson D. F. Phelps & Company, 900 Broadway, corner of 20th Street. 1876. Pp. 188, 12mo.

This volume constitutes the Vedder Lectures for 1876. They are five in number: (1) Introductory—The Nature of the Psalter; (2) The Doctrine of God in the Psalter; (3) The Doctrine of Man in the Psalter; (4) The Messiah and the Future Life; (5) The Ethics of the Psalter.

The reader will find this little volume well worth all it will cost in money to buy it, or in time to read it and read it again. It is learned, suggestive, thorough, simple, orthodox. One seldom meets a volume of so much merit with so little pretension. It is an argument to prove the Bible a revelation from God from the "unearthly ideas for which no philosophy, no theory of development, can ever account." But the Bible, or even one of the two Testaments, being far too large for a course of lectures like this, the author chooses a single book, the Psalms. And his proposition is, that these Psalms, as a whole, when viewed as to their subjects, aims, spirit, and teaching, especially in comparison with the corresponding literature of all other forms of religion, can be accounted for on no other ground than a divine origin.

The introductory lecture is all that one could desire. The second lecture considers the doctrine of the Psalter respecting God, "the object of worship is the first point in all religion." This decides everything else. One who is wrong here will be wrong on every point. "If he believe the Deity to be impersonal, or identified with the world, or more than one, or without providence, or limited, or partial, or immoral, all his other beliefs will be modified accordingly." This will give the reader an idea of our author's course of inquiry. He is led, after making his positive examinations of the Psalter on these points, to compare it with the ancient Greek lyrics found in the minor Homeric poems, and with the Vedic hymns and those of the Zoroastrian psalmists. And then the question is, How can we explain the

incomparable purity, beauty, and consistency of the doctrine of God, set forth in the old Hebrew Psalms, except on the theory that they are human-divine?

The third lecture exhibits a "trinity of truths" respecting man, "with a precision, variety, fulness, and force, not surpassed even by the New Testament." These are man's original position as a son of God, his fall and ruin, his restoration. "These truths no other set of men even thought out, much less made them their own by such a living experience that they were uttered in poetry and song with pathos, with sublime glory, with more than earthly beauty." The explanation is, that "along with the poetic inspiration in these sweet singers of Israel, there was the afflatus of the Divine Spirit, and the Psalter came from God."

This is a good and just and useful distinction, which Dr. Chambers makes between "poetic" inspiration and "divine" inspiration.

The fourth and fifth lectures are fully equal to the others. The doctrine of the Messiah in the Psalms, a Priest and yet a victim, a King and yet a sufferer, is set forth by the author in a way that will refresh the reader's soul. As to that of the future life, his remarks are both original and satisfactory. He has evidently studied the subject. But in no part of this admirable treatise is there more thorough work than is done in the fifth lecture, on the Ethics of the Psalter. We close with the most earnest commendations of this production.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

The issues from the press during the past quarter have been prompted in large part by the Russo-Turkish war. This remark does not apply to the Essays of the eminent thinker, Bagehot,<sup>1</sup> or to Herbert Spencer's volume on Sociology.<sup>2</sup> Those who dislike the smell of war may find escape too in the valuable (though unequal) Primer series, and in a multitude of other works. The science of language is now reduced to a horn-book.<sup>3</sup> Even the litter of an artist<sup>4</sup> should not be swept out too hastily at the back door. These are from Appleton. All who remember "The Wide, Wide World" will rejoice to see Miss Warner's quaint title.<sup>5</sup> Anything by Miss Catherine Marsh<sup>6</sup> passes muster without challenge; and especially on such a theme. This and the two books,<sup>7</sup> and <sup>8</sup>, about Jesus have the *imprimatur* of the Carters. So has the new edition of Kitto's Illustrations,<sup>9</sup> which, however, need no endorsement *aliunde*.

Travels and history continue to vie with natural science. The author's name adds interest to the Biography of a North-British *savant*.<sup>10</sup> The reader may take his choice, whether to trot

<sup>1</sup>The English Constitution, and other Political Essays. By Walter Bagehot. Revised edition. 12mo., \$2. D. Appleton & Co., N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>The Principles of Sociology. Vol. I. By Herbert Spencer. 12mo., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Philology. By John Peile, M. A. Vol. II. in Literature Primer Series, 45 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Gatherings from an Artist's Portfolio. By J. E. Freeman. 12mo., cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Pine Needles. By Miss Warner. 12mo., 360 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Robert Carter & Bros., N. Y.

<sup>6</sup>A Hero in the Battle of Life. By Miss Catherine Marsh. 18mo., 160 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Servants of Christ. 18mo., 180 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>My Saviour. By Rev. John East. 16mo., 230 pp., cloth. *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>Kitto's Bible Illustrations. New edition. 8 vols., 12mo., cloth., \$10. *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>Life of a Scotch Naturalist, Thomas Edward, Associate of the Linnaean Society. By Samuel Smiles. Portrait and illustrations by Geo. Reid, A. R. S. A. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. Harper & Bros., N. Y.

through the territories of the Shah with Mr. Arnold,<sup>1</sup> or encounter African savages and morasses with Commander Cameron,<sup>2</sup> or renew acquaintance with the old Peruvians under the guidance of Mr. Commissioner Squier.<sup>3</sup> Others will prefer the vehement protest of an English scholar against the occupancy of any part of Europe by the Turks.<sup>4</sup> The annual registers of the Smithsonian Institution<sup>5</sup> are of permanent and singular value. The Oxford Law-lecturer does well to enlighten the readers of Freeman's "Norman Conquest," and others, on the previous stages of early English history,<sup>6</sup> whilst another pen carries the record down as far as the Great Charter.<sup>7</sup>

If the Harpers' "Seneca"<sup>8</sup> compares favorably with their "Latin Hymns," their "Persius," and their "Justin Martyr," it is an honor alike to American types and American heads. Professor Schaff has again made the Church his debtor by his el-

<sup>1</sup>Through Persia by Caravan. By Arthur Arnold. 12mo., cloth, \$1.75. Harper & Bros., N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>Across Africa. By Verney Lovett Cameron, C. B., D. C. L., Commander R. N., etc. With a map and numerous illustrations. 8vo., cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Peru: Incidents of Travel and Exploration in the Land of the Incas. By E. G. Squier, M. A., F. S. A., late U. S. Commissioner to Peru. With map and 258 illustrations. 8vo., cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>The Turks in Europe. By Edward A. Freeman. 32mo., paper, 15 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>The Annual Record of Science and Industry. Edited by Spencer F. Baird, Assistant Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, with the assistance of eminent men of science. Large 12mo., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Early England, up to the Norman Conquest. By Frederick York Powell, Law Lecturer Ch. Ch., Oxford; Historical Lecturer Trin. College, Oxford. With four maps. 25 cents. [Half-Hour Series.] *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>England a Continental Power, from the Conquest to Magna Charta. 1066 to 1215. By Louise Creighton. With a map, 25 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>L. Annæus Seneca. Treatises on Providence, on Tranquillity of Mind, on Shortness of Life, on Happy Life: together with Selected Epistles, Epigrammata, an Introduction, Copious Notes, and Scripture Parallelisms. By John F. Hurst, D. D., President of Drew Theological Seminary, Madison, N. J., and Henry C. Whitney, Ph. D., Professor of Ancient Languages in the Centenary Collegiate Institute, Hackettstown, N. J. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

borate history of the Creeds.<sup>1</sup> The first volume only now appears, and is to be succeeded by two others. The work could not possibly have fallen into more competent hands. In the author we have one who unites the spirit of the Western with the learning and breadth of treatment of the Continental world.

A racy title<sup>2</sup> leaves the question open, whether Mr. Heywood is an egotist or no. We think we have seen the book favorably noticed by a usually caustic writer. Englishmen all seem to have a knack of writing books of travels. In this case, we Americans are not impartial critics.<sup>3</sup> It becomes the privilege of those who buy Lippincott's "Epictetus"<sup>4</sup> to follow the editorial guidance of one of the first classical scholars of the age, and one in whose fame two continents have part. When shall we ever get to the bottom of linguistics? A new contribution to this branch of knowledge is made by a writer with an unfamiliar name.<sup>5</sup> The last work<sup>6</sup> by the Rev. John Miller, of Princeton, will be sought for with avidity and perused with a mixture of admiration and sorrow: admiration for the talents and general character of the man, and sorrow for his perverted views in theology. "Hamlet" is an inexhaustible theme.<sup>7</sup> Dr. Maclean

<sup>1</sup>Bibliotheca Symbolica Ecclesiae Universalis. The Creeds of Christendom. With a History and Critical Notes. By Philip Schaff, D. D., LL. D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, N. Y. Three Vols. Vol. I.: The History of Creeds. Vol. II.: The Greek and Latin Creeds, with translations. Vol. III.: The Evangelical and Protestant Creeds, with translations. 8vo, cloth, \$15. Harper & Bros., N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>How They Strike Me, These Authors. By J. C. Heywood, A. M. 12mo., cloth, extra, \$1.50. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Phila.

<sup>3</sup>The Two Americas. By Sir Rose L. Price. Bart. Illustrated. 8vo., cloth, extra, \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Epictetus. Translated by George Long, M. A. 12mo., cloth, extra, \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>The Science of Language: Linguistics, Philology, Etymology. By Abel Hovelacque. Translated by A. H. Crane, B. A. Vol. I. of the Library of Contemporary Science. 12mo., cloth, extra, \$1.75. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Questions Awakened by the Bible. By Rev. John Miller, Princeton, N. J. 12mo., cloth, extra, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Hamlet. Edited by Horace Howard Furness, A. M. Being the Third Play of the Variorum Edition of Shakespeare. 2 vols. Crown 8vo., cloth, extra, uncut edges, gilt top, \$8. *Ibid.*

has had unrivalled opportunities for writing the History of the College of New Jersey.<sup>1</sup>

Cyclopædias of Fact are always useful.<sup>2</sup> Cyclopædias of Illustration should commonly go to the trunk-maker. Dr. Mahan has not succeeded to the extent implied by his title.<sup>3</sup> There is a touching interest attaching to the songs and story of Mr. Bliss.<sup>4</sup> The well-known characteristics of the late F. W. Robertson appear in his "Genesis."<sup>5</sup> A brilliant orator and writer, the Brighton pastor is one of the most unsafe guides on some of the most vital subjects. The unqualified approval of his sermons<sup>6</sup> by the critic in a late number of the *British Quarterly Review*, ought to give pause to the orthodox friends of that periodical, which has been claimed to be the true successor of the North British. The Witness of the Psalter<sup>7</sup> to the Saviour is a noble subject for a Christian author.

If we were to confine ourselves to a single guide-book, we would take the anonymous "Satchel Guide."<sup>8</sup> Having carried it

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<sup>1</sup>History of the College of New Jersey, from its Origin in 1746 to the Commencement of 1854. By John Maclean, Tenth President of the College. 2 vols., 8vo., cloth, extra. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Phila.

<sup>2</sup>Students' Common-Place Book. A Cyclopædia of Fact and Illustration. By Rev. Prof. Henry J. Fox, D. D. Interleaved with blanks for additions. 4to., 500 pp., half roan, \$4.50. A. S. Barnes & Co., N. Y.

<sup>3</sup>A Critical History of the Late American War. By Dr. Asa Mahan. 8vo., 461 pp., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Memoirs of P. P. Bliss. With steel-engraved portraits of the Bliss family. By Major D. W. Whittle, assisted by D. L. Moody, Ira D. Sankey, Geo. F. Root, and others. Sold only by subscription. 8vo., 350 pp., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Notes on Genesis. By the late Rev. Frederick W. Robertson, M. A., of Brighton, England. 12mo., \$1.50. E. P. Dutton & Co., N. Y.

<sup>6</sup>F. W. Robertson's Sermons. Complete in one volume. With Portrait on steel. 838 pp., \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>The Witness of the Psalms to Christ and Christianity. By Rev. W. Alexander, D. D., Bishop of Derry. 8vo, 300 pp., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>A Satchel Guide for the Vacation Tourist in Europe. A Compact Itinerary of the British Isles, Belgium and Holland, Germany and Switzerland, France, Austria, and Italy. With maps. Edition for 1877. 16mo., 327 pp., morocco, \$2. Hurd & Houghton, N. Y.

for months in Europe, we are able to give it the most unstinted commendation. "Gesta Romanorum"<sup>1</sup> ought to be a compilation of interest and merit. Everything, even "expression," must now be treated philosophically. This the author says he does in a little volume on an attractive subject.<sup>2</sup> There is good reading in store for those who sail with the "Swan and Her Crew."<sup>3</sup> Charles Mackay's bluff and hearty songs are worth the price of his "Poetical Works."<sup>4</sup>

Probably no one knows more about "Paradise Lost"<sup>5</sup> than the author of the first volume of a biography of John Milton. Zerffi<sup>6</sup> (we conjecture) knows what he is writing about. We are less interested in the Epic of Portugal<sup>7</sup> than in its British translator, the author of "The Dews of Summer Night did Fall," and

<sup>1</sup>Gesta Romanorum; or, Entertaining Moral Stories, invented by the Monks as a Fireside Recreation, and commonly applied in their discourses from the pulpit: whence the most celebrated of our own poets and others, from the earliest times, have extracted their plots. Translated from the Latin, with preliminary observations and copious notes. By the Rev. Charles Swan. Revised and corrected by Wynard Hooper. Bohn's Antiquarian Library. 12mo., cloth, \$2. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>The Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression as connected with the Fine Arts. By Sir Charles Bell. Illustrated. Bohn's Artists' Library. 12mo., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>The Swan and Her Crew; or, Adventures of Three Young Naturalists and Sportsmen on the Roads and Rivers of Norfolk. By G. C. Davis. Second edition. With numerous illustrations. 12mo., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Poetical Works of Charles Mackay. New Volume of Scribner's Popular Poets.

<sup>5</sup>Paradise Lost. By John Milton. A Poem written in ten books: Being a Fac-simile Reproduction of the first edition published in 1667. With an Introduction by David Masson. Square 12mo., cloth, \$5.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>A Manual of the Historical Development of Art—Prehistoric, Ancient, Hebrew, Classic, Early Christian. By G. G. Zerffi. With special reference to Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, and Ornamentation. Crown 8vo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>The Lusiad; or, The Discovery of India. An Epic Poem. By Luis De Camoens. Translated from the Portuguese, with a Life of the Poet, by William Julius Mickle. Fifth edition. Revised by E. Richmond Hodges. (Bohn's Standard Library.) 12mo., cloth, \$1.40. *Ibid.*



"There's No Luck about the House." Another life of the false prophet of Arabia<sup>1</sup> sheds further light on a vexed question.

Leonardo<sup>2</sup> was the "admirable Crichton" among the Painters. He was moreover the only one that belongs to the rank of Raffaele and Michel Angelo. Mr. Wedmore contributes "Studies in English Art;"<sup>3</sup> and if the treatment of the subject be equal to its intrinsic interest, the book is worth turning over. The New Library edition of Burns<sup>4</sup> comes before us with stately pretension, in the first of its six octavos. There is a new work on Physical Geography and Palæontology,<sup>5</sup> by a distinguished Professor in the St. Andrews University.

Islam, this quarter, outshines Buddhism as a cynosure of eyes that are far from being neighboring. The work of Mr. Stephens<sup>6</sup> will tend to keep up the interest of a subject that has been handled by writers like Gibbon and Mommsen. Froude is at his best in his Short Studies.<sup>7</sup> Another volume of Lange<sup>8</sup> covers

<sup>1</sup>The Life of Mahomet, Founder of the Religion of Islam and of the Empire of the Saracens; with Notices of the History of Islamism and of Arabia. By the Rev. Samuel Green. New edition, 16mo., cloth, \$1.25. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>Leonardo Da Vinci's Treatise on Painting. Translated from the Italian. By J. F. Rigaud. With a Life of Leonardo, and an account of his works, by John William Brown. (Bohn's Artist Library.) 12mo., \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Studies in English Art. By Frederick Wedmore. 12mo., cloth. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Complete Works of Robert Burns. Vol. I., New Library edition. . . . Edited by Professor Nichols, Glasgow. To be completed in six volumes. 8vo., cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>The Ancient Life-History of the Earth. A Comprehensive Outline of the Principles and Leading Facts of Palæontologic Science. By Henry Alleyne Nicholson, Professor of Natural History in the University of St. Andrews. With 270 engravings. Crown 8vo., cloth, \$5.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Christianity and Islam. By the Rev. W. R. W. Stephens. 12mo., x., 168 pp., cloth, \$1.25. Scribner, Armstrong & Co., N. Y.

<sup>7</sup>Short Studies on Great Subjects. Third Series. By J. A. Froude. M. A. Library edition. Crown 8vo., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Lange's Commentary. The Books of Samuel. By the Rev. Chr. Fr. Dav. Erdmann. 8vo., cloth, \$5. *Ibid.*

the books of Samuel. Forsyth<sup>1</sup> presents Cicero in the garb of the modern Inns of Court. As a biographer, he is neater and less partial than Middleton. The Eastern Question,<sup>2</sup> Turkey,<sup>3</sup> Russia,<sup>4</sup> are discussed in all their phases. Emerson<sup>5</sup> and Lowell<sup>6</sup> are in accidental, but in fit companionship.

The publisher and author go far to warrant the Letters from Linlathen.<sup>7</sup> The same may be said of "God ever active in Christ."<sup>8</sup> Bastiat<sup>9</sup> is fortunate in his American Editor. We do not easily tire of books on the Holy Land.<sup>10</sup> Marvels of Prayer,<sup>11</sup> if well vouched for, are exceedingly precious. They are not indeed confined to "this mountain" at Fulton Street.

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<sup>1</sup>Life of Marcus Tullius Cicero. By Wm. Forsyth, M. A., Q. C. New and cheaper edition. Illustrated. 2 Vols. in one. Cr. 8vo., cloth, \$2.50. Scribner, Armstrong & Co., N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>The Eastern Question Historically Considered. With Notes on the Resources of Russia and Turkey, and an Abstract of Treaties with the United States. By J. M. Bugbee. With two Maps. 18mo. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

<sup>3</sup>A Brief History of Turkey. From the German of Dr. Johannes Blochwitz. Translated by Mrs. M. Wesselhoeft. With two maps. 18mo., 176 pp., cloth, 50 cents; paper, 25 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>A Brief History of Russia, from the small beginnings of the Nation to the vast proportions of the Empire. By Francis A. Shaw. With two fine maps. 18mo., 123 pp., cloth, 50 cents; paper, 25 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Books, Art, Eloquence. By R. W. Emerson. 32mo., 104 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

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<sup>7</sup>Letters of Thomas Erskine, of Linlathen. Edited by Wm. Hanna. D. D. 8vo., 420 pp., cloth, \$2.50. G. P. Putnam & Sons, N. Y.

<sup>8</sup>God Ever Active in Christ. First number of "Pulpit Teachings." By the Rev. Howard Crosby. 12mo., paper. *Ibid.*

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The Turkish Question reappears twice again.<sup>1 2</sup> The Commentary on Luke<sup>3</sup> we take to be by an accomplished and gifted disciple of the late Alexander Campbell.

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<sup>1</sup>The Eastern and the Western Questions. Turkey and the United States: How they travel a common road to ruin. Addressed by way of warning to President Hayes. By Henry C. Baird. 8vo., 16 pp., paper. 10 cents. H. C. Baird & Co., Phila.

<sup>2</sup>Turkey. By Col. James E. Baker. Uniform with Wallace's Russia. 2 Maps. 8vo., \$4. Henry Holt & Co., N. Y.

<sup>3</sup>New Testament Commentary. Vol. II., Luke. By J. S. Lamar, Augusta, Ga. Crown 8vo., 400 pp. cloth, \$2. Chase & Hall, Cincinnati.

<sup>4</sup>New Cyclopædia of Prose Illustrations. Second Series. By Rev. Elon Foster. 8vo., 791 pp., cloth, \$5. Thos. Y. Crowell, N. Y.

<sup>5</sup>Hours with Men and Books. By Wm. Mathews, LL.D. 384 pp., cloth, \$2. S. C. Griggs & Co., Chicago.

<sup>6</sup>The Turks in Europe. By E. A. Freeman, LL.D. Pamphlet. Lovell, Adam, Wesson & Co., N. Y.

<sup>7</sup>Patriarchs and Lawgivers of the Old Testament. By F. D. Maurice. 12mo., 350 pp., \$2. Macmillan & Co., N. Y.

<sup>8</sup>Tour of the Prince of Wales in India. By Dr. W. H. Russell. Forty Wood cuts and six full page illustrations. 552 pp., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>Birds of the Northwest. By Elliott Coues. 8vo., 471 pp., cloth, \$4.50. Estes & Lauriat, Boston.

<sup>10</sup>The Westminster Review on "The Recent Origin of Man." West, Johnston & Co., Richmond, Va.

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# THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXVIII.—NO. 4.

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OCTOBER, MDCCCLXXVII.

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ARTICLE I.

DR. BLEDSOE'S PHILOSOPHY OF VOLITION.

PART SECOND.

We now approach the second part of our undertaking—the more articulate discussion of Dr. Bledsoe's special theory of free agency. He charges us with a delinquency in not discussing it formally in our number of October last; where we did not propose nor undertake to do it. We shall now repair that omission; but in a manner which, we surmise, will contribute very little to his contentment. Other inducements to this discussion exist in the fundamental importance of the doctrine of free agency, and in the relation between Dr. Bledsoe's theory of it and all his other theological lucubrations. He seems to suppose that we evaded the task of arguing for our view, under the pretext of such discussions being superfluous for Presbyterian readers; when in fact we knew that his mighty logic (in the Examination of Edwards) had already demolished all the Calvinistic arguments. The reader shall see. The method we propose is, to define carefully our theory of free agency, and then to prove it. We shall then be prepared to entertain Dr. Bledsoe's rival theory, and weigh its contents—if there be any.

First then, the question between us is not whether man is a real free agent, or whether consciousness testifies that we are, or

whether such real free agency is essential to just responsibility. We believe the affirmative of all these as fully as Dr. Bledsoe; and when he represents the debate as between those who hold to a real and conscious free agency and those who dispute it, he misrepresents us. The question is, not whether a real free agency is, but only what it is.

Second. The word "will" has been often used in a broad, and also in a narrow sense. In the broad sense, it is what the Scripture popularly calls "the heart," or what Sir W. Hamilton calls the "conative," or Dr. McCosh the "optative" powers. This is the sense in which Calvinistic writers use the word "will," when they distribute the powers of man's soul into the powers of sensibility (passive,) powers of intellection (simply cognitive,) and "will," or active powers. In this broad sense, the "will" includes much besides the specific power of volition; viz., all those appetitive or "orectic" powers which furnish the emotive element in subjective motives. In the narrow sense, the word "will" means the specific power of choice, or the "volitional" power. This is the sense in which Dr. Bledsoe uses it; and this is the sense in which we shall use it.

Third. The "motive" of volition is a term which is continually used by Dr. Bledsoe, and even by Edwards, with a mischievous ambiguity. It is often employed for the object, that to which the soul moves in volition. And nearly all the confusion in the arguments on the will have arisen from the mistaken notion, that we regard this object, along with its involuntary impression on the sensibility, as the efficient of a volition. Again do we forewarn Dr. Bledsoe and our readers, that these, in our view, are not motive, but only the outward occasion for the action of real motive. What then, according to us, is the efficient motive? The soul's own spontaneous, subjective desire as guided by its own intelligence; and this desire is a function of a faculty distinct from, yea, an opposite to, the sensibility; of an active power, (whereas the sensibility is a "passive power;") of a power wherein the soul is self-moved, instead of being moved from without; wherein the soul is agent, and not mere subject of an effect.

Fourth. If we should say that volitions are "morally necessary," we should mean, with Edwards, only that they arise with *full certainty*, and by the efficiency of their subjective motives. We think, with Dr. Hodge, that the misunderstanding of the word "necessity" does boundless mischief in this debate; but we do not think that this is the fault of the word. The truth is, that since this (Latin) word was domesticated in philosophy, it has undergone a change in its popular use; and even scholars have lost sight of the fact, that its philosophical sense, of full certainty of eventuation, and nothing more, is its proper etymologic meaning. What is its real origin? The "*necessitas*" is simply "*quod non cedit*," the *unfailing*. We can recall the reader's mind from its hallucination, by reminding him of the twin-brother of this word, which has not been abused by modern popular use: "*incessant*." Every school boy knows that "in" is "un," the negative particle. So that "incessant" is *the unceasing*; and so "necessary" (necessant) is *the non-cessing*. But our familiar word, "incessant," has not undergone the bad luck of being perverted to mean (wholly another thing) *the compulsory*. Nobody is so perverse as to think the "incessant talker" is a compulsory talker—a man who is compelled to talk. Well, let the reader only give the great Latin scholastics credit for understanding the real meaning of the word, and this mighty bugbear of "necessity" will vanish. He will then see that it is no dishonest afterthought, no "dodge" to escape the just *odium* of a hateful theory, to say that by a "necessary volition," we mean (and philosophy always did mean) simply what the phrase, an "incessant volition," would classically mean, *volitio quæ, mediante motivo, non cedit*; simply this, that, supposing the subjective motive present, the volition will not fail to rise. Now, "where is the murder?" Why should our innocent Latin word be held responsible for the wholly different idea which popular use has forced upon it: that of inevitable compulsion? But Dr. Bledsoe declares roundly (as in REVIEW p. 34) that he will not be appeased by this definition; that nothing shall satisfy him except our believing that volitions are uncaused and contingent; and that they *may fail to rise* though every condition of their rise be present. Else he thinks the mind is not free.



But, fifth, what is free agency? Let the reader note that we do not say "free will." Dr. Bledsoe himself is constrained, in a sort of grudging way, to grant the reasonableness of Locke's remark, that freedom is an attribute of an agent and not of a faculty; so that, properly speaking, it is the mind which is free, and not the will. So we will not speak of "free will" (at best an ambiguous term,) but of free agency. Dr. Bledsoe is much dissatisfied with Edwards for defining freedom as a man's privilege of doing what he chooses. We will venture the assertion, that Dr. Bledsoe will not find any man of common sense who desires any fuller freedom than this. But the ground of objection against this clear and practical definition is, that the way in which choice comes to pass ought to be determined also; that if a man has the privilege of doing what he chooses, yet he may have been *made to choose* in some way infringing his freedom. And Dr. Bledsoe cites Edwards with great condemnation as saying, that no matter how a man comes to choose thus and thus, if he has unobstructed privilege of acting as he has chosen, he has all the freedom he can ask for. Now we presume that the difference between Dr. Bledsoe and Edwards here is simply this: that the latter was too clear a thinker to have his mind haunted with any phantom of a *choice* which is *compelled*. His common sense taught him that choice, on any theory whatever, must still be an *uncompelled determination* of the soul; so that his practical definition of freedom does include a freedom of the soul, and not of the limbs only, as Dr. Bledsoe cavils. Edwards had in his view, doubtless, that declaration of the Westminster Confession (Chap. ix.,) which frankly says, that freedom is an attribute of the rational agent so inalienable and essential that it cannot be and is not infringed, whatever the moral state of the soul. So, if Dr. Bledsoe could only think that "*any* good can come out of Nazareth," he might see that when we define free agency as a man's liberty of doing as he chooses, we are not laying a wicked trap for him, to catch him in this fraud, viz., that while he has privilege of *doing as he chooses*, we will *compel* him to *choose as he chooses*. No; we cannot conceive of that bugbear of his, a *compelled choice*; we assure him we think

it, just as he does, the intensest of contradictions. And so, in our generous desire to calm his apprehensions (not because it is really necessary,) we tender him this definition of free agency: It is the soul's power of *deciding itself* to action, according to its own subjective nature. (But even this is not going to satisfy him!)

But let it be distinctly understood, that by "ability of will," we understand a very different thing, namely, fallen man's supposed power to reverse that nature by his volition. That power we utterly deny to a born sinner; we do not believe that he can or will choose dispositions exactly against those which it is his nature to prefer, and thus revolutionise that very nature by a volition. Ability we deny, free agency we grant to him.

Sixth. We do not regard President Edwards as infallible, and did not before Dr. Bledsoe assailed him. The essential structure of his argument is indestructible, but it has some excrescences and blemishes. He, like nearly all the English Christian philosophers of his day, was too much under the influence of the pious Locke; and hence his usually clear vision is sometimes confused by the shallow plausibilities of the sensationalist psychology. Hence he sometimes seems to confound objective inducement with subjective motive. He also confuses his reasoning by sometimes using the word "will" in the broad, and sometimes in the narrow sense.

Seventh. The question, How volitions arise in a free agent, has received three distinct answers. One is that of the consistent sensationalist, fatalist, and pantheist. According to these, volition is efficiently caused by emotion; but emotion is only the necessary reflex of impression made on the sensibility from without. We think with Dr. Bledsoe that this scheme is virtually no scheme of free agency at all. Under it the soul is, after all, determined to action by an efficient external to itself; the soul is really not agent, but acted on.

The second answer is in the opposite extreme: it stakes our true free agency in this, that the volition may always be a mental modification arising immediately in the mind without any efficient at all: a self-determined change. The advocates of this scheme

hold that the free volition must be disconnected even from subjective motive, and arise, in that sense, absolutely uncaused. Its advocates describe it sometimes as the theory of the self-determination of the will, (as opposed to the self-determination of the soul,) using the "will" in its narrow sense. Sometimes they say, the mind must be in absolute *equilibrium*, as to even subjective motive, when the free volition takes place. Sometimes they say, volition is an *uncaused event*. But always they concur in holding that the free volition must be a *contingent event*, whatever may be the antecedent states of mental conviction and desire looking towards the object of choice.

The third answer shuns both these extremes, and defines free agency as the self-determination of the soul (not of the specific faculty of choice). But it holds that rational spirit, like every other power in nature, conforms to the maxim, "Order is heaven's first law." In other words, it acts, like everything else in divine providence, in accordance with a regulative law. And this law of free volitions is the soul's own rational and appetitive nature—its *habitus*. Hence the rational free volition is not an "uncaused phenomenon" in the world of mind; it only arises by reason of its regular efficient, which is the subjective motive. By subjective motive is meant that complex of mental judgment as to the preferable, and subjective appetency for the object which arises together in the mind (on presentation of the object,) according to the regulative law of the mind's own native disposition. In a word, the free volition will rise according to, and because of, the soul's own strongest motive; and that is the reason why it is a rational, a free, and a responsible volition. Hence, we believe that such volitions are attended with full certainty, (which is what we mean by moral necessity,) and also with full freedom. (We are fully aware that every man performs acts whose causation in the soul is more secondary. Thus, the snuff-taker opens his box and "takes his pinch," often, perhaps, without any remembered consciousness of the subjective motive. It is because both mind and limbs have come, by repetition, so under the influence of the law of habit—*consuetudo*, not *habitus*. This law is so influential in this case that we popularly term the acts "mechani-

cal." Are such acts still rational, free, and responsible? They are, so far as previous acts of conscious freedom formed the *consuetudo* which now influences the mind and body.)

Now the third is the theory of the will, or of the way responsible volitions rise, held by Calvinists. Does not its right statement evince of itself its correctness to every candid mind?

1. Our first argument for it then shall be, that it is supported by men's consciousness. Dr. Bledsoe thinks not. He is, indeed, too adroit to say that we are conscious of having rational responsible volition *without motives*; for he foresees the reply, that consciousness can only be of what is in the mind. He admits (Examination of Edwards, p. 230): "We are not conscious that there is no producing cause of volition. No man can be conscious of that which does not exist." His position (p. 227) is that "we find our minds in a state of acting. *This is all* we discover by the light of consciousness." But is this all? We raise the question of fact. We assert that whenever the soul chooses with sufficient deliberation, we are conscious of choosing according to a subjective motive. Dr. Bledsoe is misled in the reading of consciousness by haste, pride of hypothesis, and the evanescent nature of the impression left on remembered consciousness by the motive when the mind hurries on to the execution and fruition of its choice. This cause of an erroneous reading of consciousness may be well explained by the manner in which we instantaneously drop out of remembered consciousness the *objects* also of rapid volitions. The intelligible perception of the object is, as Dr. Bledsoe admits, the absolutely essential condition (not cause) of the act of will. Yet often its presence is not consciously remembered for a moment. Here is a man fencing. We see him intentionally bring up his sword and make the "guard in tierce." He saw his adversary make, perhaps with almost lightning speed, the "thrust in tierce." That occasioned his making the guard in the same figure (the subjective motive being of course the desire, according to his nature, to preserve his own body.) Does he remember, an instant after, in which figure his adversary made his thrust? Perhaps not. But Dr. Bledsoe admits that his perception, at the time of the "thrust in tierce," was

the occasion without which he would not have made the "guard in tierce," which he did intentionally make. What is the solution? That in the speed of the mental processes the conscious perception of the thrust dropped instantaneously out of remembered consciousness. There is no other. Now, Dr. Bledsoe will ask that fencer: Do you remember being rationally conscious of the desire of self-preservation as your subjective motive for making that rapid guard? And very possibly the fencer will answer: No. The solution which Dr. Bledsoe has just used applies again. Haste and excitement caused the *motive*, as the *occasion*, to drop out of remembered consciousness. But the intelligent volition to "guard in tierce" could no more have arisen in that fencer's mind without motive than without object. Let us then eliminate the cause of confusion, and inspect any volition which is sufficiently deliberate; we know we are conscious that motive prompts it. Had the motive not been, the volition would not have been. This is but saying that a reasonable man knows that when he acts deliberately he thinks he has his own "reason for acting." When he sees one act, and asking, "Why did you do that?" receives the answer, "Oh, for nothing at all;" he sets down the answer as silly. It is the very characteristic of a fool to act "without knowing what for." Is this the description Dr. Bledsoe means to give of himself when he declares (p. 227) that he "sees not the effectual power of any cause operating to produce his volitions?" Did he write all these wise books and reviews without "effectually" or decisively "knowing what for?" Courtesy requires us to leave him to make the answer. For ourselves we can only say, that when we get to that pass—that we deliberately choose a line of action without even thinking we have in ourselves a rational motive (an *aiṛia*) determinative of our choice—we hope our friends will select a lunatic asylum for us.

2. If the most deliberate acts of choice may be thus loose from the efficiency of all antecedents in the mind, then we could not make a recognition of any permanent character in ourselves or our fellow-men. What do we mean by *a character*? Clearly a something having continuity and permanency qualifying the free spirit. (Any man of common sense will add, "a character is a certain

set of practical principles permanently qualifying the man." But we need not claim more than the general answer.) Now one man does not have the gift of "discerning another man's spirit" by immediate intuition; he learns character *a posteriori* by observing his fellow-man's volitions. But, if Dr. Bledsoe's theory were true, volitions would be no *indices* of character, for they must be loose from the efficiency of "all antecedents in or out of the mind;" and of course loose from the regulative power of that permanent something in the mind constituting its character. But we ask, emphatically, May not character be at least sometimes known by conduct? If not, how does a jury ever find out whom to punish? How does Dr. Bledsoe find out whom to esteem?

Dr. Bledsoe (in Section XV., Examination of Edwards) makes a set effort to escape this fatal logic. The place abounds with the baldest assertions of the fundamental Pelagian postulate, that a concreated righteousness of principle would be no righteousness, because not the result of an act of choice; and that hence no moral agent can be made righteous, but he must do a righteousness. President Edwards had argued (Treatise on Original Sin) in exact conformity with the Wesleyan Watson, and with Wesley himself: "Not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but that actions derive their goodness from the principles whence they proceed; so that the act of choosing what is good, is no further virtuous than it proceeds from a good principle or virtuous disposition of the mind."

Dr. Bledsoe conceives that the fallacy of this argument proceeds from the ambiguity of the term principle. Taking, *e. g.*, the instance of Adam's first eating the forbidden fruit, he claims that the "principle" from which this evil volition resulted, was not any "implanted principle" at all, but Adam's "intention, or design, or motive." The only "implanted principle" Dr. Bledsoe sees in the case is, that native desire for material good and for knowledge which Adam's Creator had placed in the animal and spiritual parts of the creature's person. If God put them there, he urges, they could not have been sinful; they must have been innocent. Says he: "And hence, we very clearly perceive that

a sinful action may result from those principles of our constitution which are in themselves neither virtuous nor vicious." And again: "In fact, the virtuous principle from which the virtuous act is supposed to derive its character, is not an implanted principle at all, but the design, or intention, or motive, with which the act is done, and of which the created agent is himself the author."

Now, on this evasion we remark, first: he misrepresents us in saying we teach there must have been an "implanted principle" of evil from which Adam's first sin must proceed. No. We say there must have been a principle of evil prior in the order of causation to the act, or else the act would not have been qualified as evil. And this Dr. Bledsoe is compelled to own, p. 201: "As it is truly said, . . . a holy action can proceed only from a holy principle or disposition," etc. Second: we ask the reader to note how unavoidably Dr. Bledsoe falls into the true doctrine: "holy action *proceeds* from;" "a sinful action may *result* from," etc. Surely that which "proceeds" and "results from" antecedents, is an effect. Common sense will assert its rights. Third: Dr. Bledsoe thinks that the "agent is himself the author" of "the design, or intention, or motive," which is "the principle from which the virtuous act is supposed to derive its character." Very well. He has taught us that all functions of intelligence, and all functions of emotion or feeling, are passivities; the will is the only active power. Now, then, if the agent is author himself of the principle of his volition, he must have originated that principle by an act of choice! What principle of "design, intention, or motive," regulated that prior act of choice? And must he not have chosen to choose? Thus Dr. Bledsoe is hopelessly entangled in the endless *regressus* and in Mr. Watson's fatal refutation at once.

But fourth, and chiefly: let us look a little more narrowly at this self-originated "design, or intention, or motive" in Adam, from which Dr. Bledsoe admits his unholy action proceeded. What was this intention? Merely to gain knowledge, and please his palate naturally and innocently? That was not all; for as Dr. Bledsoe justly argues, the appetency for these natural goods being implanted by his Maker, were not essentially sinful, but

legitimate in their proper bounds. There was an intention to gratify these unrighteously. There was intelligent intention to prefer these natural goods to duty. Now let this "intention" be inspected. Who fails to see that it involves a subjective appetency? A desire; the new expression of a new and perverted disposition; the *habitus*, namely, of unrighteous self-will. While we know very well that this new disposition, qualifying Adam's soul now, was *in time* synchronous with the evil act, we also know that in the order of production it was precedent to it, and so qualified it as evil. Thus Dr. Bledsoe's pretended analysis is only an attempt to wrap up the great facts of the precedent disposition and appetency under the word "intention." But, we repeat, intention involves them. "*Intentio*" is a subjective and active directing of the soul upon (*tendere in*) an objective end. This is the analysis of common sense. Every lawyer and jurymen thinks that in proving "evil intention" on the murderer, he has proved "malice."

Dr. Bledsoe thinks that if Edwards argues that Adam's first holy volition would never have taken place, unless God implanted a principle of holiness to prompt it, he is equally bound to argue that the first sin could never have occurred unless the Maker first implanted an evil principle to prompt it. Our author forgets, in this ingenious cavil, that there is an important contrast in the essence of holiness and sin. Sin in principles and acts, is a *privative* quality. Holiness is a *positive* one. Ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία. Discrepancy from law is sin. But only positive conformity with the standard is holiness. Now surely it is one thing to say that a finite, dependent creature cannot, if created in a state of defect, out of that defect originate the positive, and a very different one to say that this finite, mutable creature, naturally endued with the positive, may admit the negative defect. Dr. Bledsoe's logic is precisely this: because a candle sixteen inches long will never shine unless it be positively lighted, *ergo*, it will never cease shining unless it be positively extinguished. That might follow as to an infinite candle; but this one, being but a few inches long, has only to be completely let alone, to burn itself out.

3. If our theory were not true, no certainty would attend any



form of influence which man exerts upon man. Education would yield no definite results in the formation of character. Human control over a fellow-man beyond the material grasp of the controlling person, could never be exerted with full certainty; for the way in which human control exerts itself, is by addressing some inducement to some known subjective appetency of the person governed, which is known to be adequate to occasion the designed action. For instance, may not the employer present to his servant's native desire for gain a pecuniary reward, which will certainly result in the performance of the service? Does not the teacher present to the urchin's desire of bodily welfare, a positive threat of the birch, modifying that native appetency into active fear, which will result in punctual and unflinching obedience? Dr. Bledsoe knows that this is often done. He has friends, from whom, unless death or casualty intervene, he knows his requests will secure an infallible compliance, in at least some things. *How* does he know this? If volitions are efficiently caused by "no antecedent in or out of the mind," he has no right to think it—no means to know it. His doctrine is, that every antecedent condition of choice may be there, looking to the confidently expected volition, and yet there is always the possibility that the will may fly off at a tangent, as men popularly say, into the opposite determination. He has no right to be *entirely certain* that the best friend he has in the world is going to comply with his most reasonable request, though able to do so.

4. The free volition which should arise exactly according to this theory, would be neither rational nor moral. The very ground of our judging these qualities to an act is, that we recognise it as proceeding out of a rational or a moral motive, which was efficient thereof. Dr. Bledsoe is so unable to blind his eyes to this fact, that he says, while the rational or moral volition has *no cause*, it has *its ground* in reason, of course. But what is *the ground* of an act? The phrase is a metaphor. The ground of a thing is that on which it stands, as a house on its foundation. The ground of a volition is the state of soul on which it stands for its being. What is this but *its cause*? The ground of an act which yet is not its cause, would be a ground that was not a

ground. How can a volition derive positive or certain moral character from its rational or moral "ground" in the mind, unless the volition is positively and certainly connected therewith? Let common sense answer. We see a man perform an act, in outward form charitable. We ask, "What made you do that?" He answers, "Nothing; the volition *just came so.*" Instantly we withdraw our moral approbation. The man, instead of appearing approvable, now seems only silly.

5. Dr. Bledsoe's scheme breaks down utterly when brought to the test of man's free choice concerning his *summum bonum*. Let natural good and evil be presented in alternative before the free soul; as, for instance, sickness and health. Let him be free to choose between them simply for their own sakes, without any complication of the question by connected consequences or moral restrictions. Let him be invited to exercise his freedom by electing sickness rather than health, simply for the sake of being sick. Is there a particle of uncertainty? Is there the faintest possibility that he will so elect? Yet is that man's election just as free and rational, though morally necessitated or made certain by the efficient influence of his own common sense and natural desire of welfare as any other volition he ever performs.

6. Every rational being in the universe, except man, is an instance exactly against Dr. Bledsoe's theory of free agency. God's holy volitions are morally necessitated by his eternal and immutable perfections. Is he therefore not free? The Bible itself tells us that "he cannot lie," "he cannot be tempted to evil." Then, according to this philosophy of contingent volitions, none of God's moral volitions are free! Our Lord Jesus Christ, as we have seen, *was born* a "holy thing." According to Dr. Bledsoe, he was therefore not a free agent. Holy angels, as we are expressly taught by Scripture, had holiness as "their first estate," and they are now made known to us as "elect angels." Now Dr. Bledsoe himself says he believes in the infallible "perseverance of the elect." So it appears these angels must be certainly determined to holy volitions, and therefore they are not free agents; and if they are not free agents, they cannot

have moral character: so the holy angels cannot be holy, because they are indefectibly holy! Again, according to Dr. Bledsoe, elect sinners will infallibly persevere in so many at least of the acts of holy volition as will maintain their spiritual union with their Redeemer; for Dr. Bledsoe believes in the "perseverance of the elect" (though not in the "perseverance of the saints"). Now there are some "mighty curious" corollaries attached to this doctrine of the "perseverance of the elect." God's decree of their election to glory is conditioned on his foresight that they will not only believe on Christ, but continue in faith to the end. But if the creature's volitions are contingent, God's prescience of them must be contingent, since he knows them just as they are to be. Here, then, we have a perseverance grounded on the fact that they will persevere, and a perseverance which is but contingent, *i. e.*, a perseverance that may not persevere! But our main point is to argue that as to those persevering elect, at least those volitions by which they cleave to Christ must be certain. But Dr. Bledsoe's theory teaches that if they are certain, they are not free. Once more: lost souls and evil angels are infallibly certain never to will holy volitions. Then, their unholy ones are not free, and therefore not blameworthy!

We quote, under this head, from Wesley on Original Sin, pp. 286-7, in order that Dr. Bledsoe may see how much title he has to call himself a Wesleyan. Dr. Taylor of Norwich had advanced (precisely Dr. Bledsoe's doctrine on p. 28 of his Review) the proposition that a being "must exist, and must use his intellectual powers *before* he can be *righteous*." Wesley, adopting Dr. Jennings's reply, answers precisely according to our argument in this 6th head:

"But according to this reasoning, *Christ could not be righteous at his birth*. You answer, 'He existed before he was made flesh.' I reply, He did, *as God*. But the man Christ Jesus did not. . . . According to your reasoning, then, the man Christ Jesus *could not be righteous at his birth*."

"Nay, according to this reasoning, God could not be righteous from eternity, because he must exist before he was righteous. You answer, 'My reasoning would hold even with respect to God, were it true that he ever did begin to exist; but neither the existence nor the holiness of God was prior to each other.' Nay, but if his existence was not prior to

his holiness—if he did not exist before he was holy—your assertion that ‘every being must exist before it is righteous,’ is not true.”

7. The Bible doctrines of God's certain foreknowledge of men's volitions, of his foreordination of them (see Acts ii. 23; Isaiah x. 5–7) of his prediction of their voluntary acts, and of his providence over such acts, present an unanswerable demonstration of our theory of volition. We shall not fatigue Christian readers by citing many Scriptures to prove either of these doctrines. God's providence is “his most holy, wise, and powerful sustaining and governing all his creatures and all their actions.” That his efficacious providence extends, in some mysterious way, to men's volitions, is expressly asserted in the Bible. “The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord as the rivers of water: he turneth it whithersoever he will.” Prov. xxi. 1; 2 Sam. xvi. 11; xxiv. 11, etc. Is God's providence here efficacious? If one answers, “No,” he contradicts the Scripture, and robs God of his sovereignty. If he answers “Yes,” as he must, the question is settled; for in causing this volition certainly to arise in the man's soul, God has procured the operation of some sort of causation. The argument is so true, that it is hard to express it without uttering a truism. But then that volition (which still is free and responsible) was not uncaused. Now the species of causation which we assign for it, subjective motive, is beyond question more consistent with the man's free agency, than any other possible species. Let Dr. Bledsoe try his hand at explaining how there can be any other possible species of efficient causation of that volition in that man's soul, more compatible with his free agency therein, than subjective motive acting spontaneously, yet according to the known law of his disposition. But we need not press him so far. The argument is in these simple and inevitable propositions: God efficiently controls the man's volition; therefore the volition had some efficient. But the essence of Dr. Bledsoe's theory is, that volition has no other *efficient* antecedent, either in or out of the mind, than the mind itself.

Again: God has predicted a multitude of volitions to be formed in subsequent times by free agents. He has foretold them positively. He has, so to speak, made the credit of his veracity

responsible for their certain future occurrence. Here we have two arguments. These predictions imply a certain foreknowledge in God; and from this foreknowledge we argue the certainty of the events foreknown. Again: inasmuch as God is well acquainted with the feebleness and fickleness of man, and the uncertainty of human affairs in themselves, unless, when he predicted that a certain man should freely do a certain act, he purposed effectually to bring the doing of it to pass, he could not safely or wisely have committed himself to the prediction. Would Dr. Bledsoe, knowing that the cashier of his publishing house was both poor, fickle, foolish, mortal, and of uncertain moral principle, like to pledge his credit that this cashier shall, on the first day of June, 1885, infallibly pay a given paper merchant five thousand dollars, unless he felt, while giving the pledge, that he himself possessed some effectual mode of causing the cashier to do it? God, in the Bible, pledged his credit to many such things.

But God's universal and infallible foreknowledge is sufficient to prove our doctrine. Dr. Bledsoe cites Edwards as presenting this argument in this comprehensive form: "When the existence of a thing is infallibly and indissolubly connected with something else which has already had existence, then its existence is necessary; but the future volitions of moral agents are infallibly and indissolubly connected with the foreknowledge of God, and therefore they are necessary." This is so conclusive that Dr. Bledsoe admits frequently that God's prescience proves *the certainty* of free volitions. Thus, p. 141: "It is freely conceded that whatever God foreknows will most certainly and infallibly come to pass." Watson, in his Institutes, (Part II. Chap. IV.) admits that God's prescience refutes the idea of any *uncertainty* in the volitions foreseen. He says that when he teaches the "contingency" of volitions, he does not mean their uncertainty, but their freedom. "Contingency is not opposed to *certainty*, but to *necessity*." He then proceeds to define the species of necessity which he denies of free volitions, in the following unmistakable terms: "The very nature of this controversy fixes this as the precise meaning of the term. The question is not, in point of fact, about

the *certainty* of moral action, that is, whether they will happen or not; but about the nature of them, *whether free or constrained*," etc. It thus appears that the necessity against which Watson protests, is the necessity of *constraint*. Abating the novel and unusual definition of the word *contingency*, Watson's statement is one which every Calvinist can accept. But Dr. Bledsoe certainly cannot adopt that view of "certainty" in volitions, which the leading Wesleyan authority here gives us.

The argument from God's prescience to our theory of volition, was stated by us (REVIEW, October, 1876,) in a form to bring out articulately a link which Edwards leaves to be implied. That which is by an infallible mind certainly foreseen, must be certain to occur. Nothing would be certain to occur in the sphere of dependent being, unless there were some efficient of its certainty. Does anything come absolutely *ex nihilo*? Even Dr. Bledsoe concedes that it does not. Well, then, when a thing is certainly to come, it is equally clear that the something out of which it comes must be such a something as will not fail to produce it. For if it may fail to produce it, then the thing is not certain to come. This is the idea of efficient causation: a producing agency which will not fail. Now, then, unless the event be certain to arise, no correct mind will have a certain belief it will arise. If any mind correctly and certainly expect it to arise, it must be because there is seen some efficient cause to make it arise. For since nonentity cannot produce, an event that did not have *some* certainly efficient cause would not be certain to occur. Every gambler knows that the dice which always fall six up, are loaded. But where will you find that certain efficient of the free, foreseen volition? Our theory presents the answer most consistent with free agency; for if you place the causation anywhere save in the efficient influence of subjective motive, under the regulative control of the soul's own disposition, free agency is lost.

Such is the point of this unanswerable argument. Dr. Bledsoe is hugely offended because we intimated that he misunderstood or evaded its point. If the reader will examine the 11th Section of the Examination of Edwards, he will see the mode in which our author proposes to resolve it. He tells us in the outset, that

“to many minds, even among distinguished philosophers, the prescience of Deity and the free agency of man have appeared to be irreconcilable.” Among these are Dugald Stuart, Dr. Campbell, and Locke. Yet Dr. Bledsoe believes that he can easily remove the argument which convinced them! How does the reader suppose this exploit is wrought? By begging the very question in debate, whether volition is an event without efficient cause; and by deciding, in opposition to the intuitive judgment of all other philosophers and common men, that in the mental world changes may and do arise without efficient cause. He would have us draw a distinction between “logical certainty” and a “causal certainty.” He admits that God’s certain foreknowledge of a volition must imply its “logical certainty;” but he denies that we are entitled to infer therefrom its “causal certainty.” Let him express his idea in another form (p. 135): “But is this indissoluble connexion” (of the occurrence of volition with God’s certain foresight thereof) “at all inconsistent with the contingency of the event known? *This is the question.*” . . . To settle this question, . . . “let us suppose, to adopt the language of President Edwards, ‘that nonentity is about to bring forth,’ and that an event comes into being without any cause of its existence. This event then exists; it is seen, and it is known to exist. Now, even on this wild supposition, there is an infallible and indissoluble connexion between the existence of the event and the knowledge of it; and hence it is necessary, in the sense above explained. But what has this necessary connexion to do with the cause of its existence?” By supposing such a case, Dr. Bledsoe endeavors to show that the “logical certainty,” which he concedes, does not imply a “causal certainty,” which he denies. But the reply is very simple: Such a case cannot be supposed. That “nonentity can bring forth,” is a proposition which the reason rejects as a self-evident impossibility. Does not he himself admit that it is a “wild supposition?” If it might be assumed, then we might admit that a “logical certainty” does not imply a “causal certainty.” But it may not be assumed. On the contrary, we assert that, because the reason tells us by its most fundamental intuition that every event must have a cause,

the "causal certainty" does and must follow from the logical certainty. If we are certain a given event is going to happen at a given time, then we are intuitively certain that the efficient cause of that event is going to be present at that time. Our reason tells us that otherwise the event would not be. What is this but the intuitive judgment on which all valid inductive science proceeds? Unsettle this connexion between the logical and the causal certainty, and a *posteriori* argument is at an end. The very *organon* for ascertaining natural laws is broken up; the foundation of the reason is uprooted. Dr. Bledsoe exclaims, that then we bring the law of causation to complete the argument from God's prescience to the efficient influence of motive. Of course we do. His complaint betrays the very fact, whose intimation he so resented. Of course the intuition that no change comes uncaused, is an implied premise of Edwards's enthymeme. He did not expand it in that place, because he did not imagine that any one would argue from the opposite and impossible supposition that nonentity can bring forth events.

It is wholly unnecessary to follow Dr. Bledsoe through all the confusions of his attempted evasion from the grasp of our argument. In one place, for instance, he endeavors to insinuate—what he dares not assert plainly—that the intuition which demands a cause for every event is not binding in this argument, by bringing in the assertion of Stewart, that the deductions of geometry are not founded on its axioms, but on its definitions. We might pause to ask whether it is creditable to one who has written on the philosophy of mathematics, to be misled by this very one-sided statement. He should long ago have found its solution in the obvious view that while the properties of figures and bodies (described in the definitions of geometry) are of course the subject matter of geometrical reasonings—the things geometers reason about—still the axioms, or primitive judgments of the reason about quantity, are the logical foundations of all the reasonings about properties. But why intrude that old, quibbling debate? Could geometrical reasoning proceed without any axiomatic truths? Can philosophy proceed without the fundamental axiom of cause? After all, Dr. Bledsoe does not dare to



say it can. Even in the construction of his sophism, he admits that it would be a "wild supposition." The outrage done to reason by this attempt to sunder a "causal" from a "logical" certainty is so great, that Dr. Bledsoe's own mind recalcitrates, and constrains him to a fatal concession. (Examination of Edwards, p. 146.) "If Edwards means that a thing cannot be foreknown unless it has a sufficient ground and reason for its existence, and does not of itself come forth out of nothing, we are not at all concerned to deny his position." Now, why should Dr. Bledsoe deceive himself by calling the efficient cause of volition a sufficient "ground and reason"? Is volition only a logical inference? He of all men is compelled to deny that proposition. We properly speak of a "sufficient ground and reason" for logical conclusion. Why, then, seek to hide under this nomenclature of logic, what is nothing else but *efficient motive* of the act of soul? The only sufficient ground and reason, in whose certain action God sees the certainty of the volition, is the *subjective motive* which, he sees, *determines* that volition. It is true, Dr. Bledsoe proceeds to speak, as he so often does, of volition as "proceeding from the mind, acting in view of motives." First, we remark on this subterfuge: here is the old and obstinate confusion of objective inducement with true, subjective motive; our author still is under the hallucination that "motive" is *something objective, at which* the mind is looking. But, second, has not Dr. Bledsoe said many times that "motive" (whatever it may be) is only the occasion and not the cause of the mental determination? The question then arises, since the objective *at which* the mind looks, does not efficiently dispose or influence the mind to choice, *what does?* Does the mind determine itself to choice? Dr. Bledsoe gives up that solution, as contradictory. (See his 16th Section, Examination of Edwards.) Then what does? Does "nonentity bring forth"? And here we commend to Dr. Bledsoe's lips one of the few valid specimens of his own philosophising. He teaches us, very correctly, that it is not the *agent* which is the cause of effects, but it is his action which causes it. The being or existence of a given agent is not what is fruitful of effects; it may exist for ages, (as the arsenic has existed in the

mineral ore ever since the creation, and caused the death of no animal,) without generating a given effect. It is when it acts, that it produces effects. While we loosely speak of the agent as cause, yet, in strictness of speech, it is *the agent's appropriate action* which is real cause of the resultant change. This is excellent doctrine, and according to it, Dr. Bledsoe contradicts himself, when he speaks of the mind as causing or producing volitions, and yet denies that any antecedent action in the mind produces it.

Dr. Bledsoe virtually concedes that, to the human reason, at least, a logical certainty must imply a causal certainty, by the subterfuge to which he is at last driven, on his 147th page. It is in substance this: that although our minds are so constituted that it would be absurdity and contradiction in us to think a thing certain to occur, without thinking there will be any certain thing anywhere to make it occur; yet it may not be so with God's mind; and it is very presumptuous in us to assume it. That is to say, although God assures us that our spirits are formed in his image and likeness; although we are assured that every constitutive feature of the human reason which is a mental excellence, also exists in God's mind in the higher grade of an infinite rational perfection; although God enjoins us by the very intuitions which he has implanted as our regulative laws of thought, not to think that an event will be certain to arise without any cause certainly efficient of its rise; yet it is presumptuous in Calvinists to say that God certainly will not perpetrate the mental solecism which he has made impossible for us, formed in his image! Dr. Bledsoe thinks that somehow God's infinitude may make such a difference between his thought and ours, that a species of thinking which would be preposterous in us, may be legitimate for him. This is substantially the solution which Archbishop King gives, to escape the stress of our argument from God's foreknowledge. If the reader would see a calm and masterly refutation of Dr. Bledsoe and Archbishop King on this point, let him consult again the Wesleyan text book, Watson's *Theological Institutes*, Part II., Chap. IV. He there shows that the position is "dangerous," "monstrous," and in premises

"anti-scriptural." He asserts that the fact God is incomprehensible, does not prevent our knowing him truly and correctly, up to the limits of our finite knowledge. He teaches that his prescience differs from ours, not in kind, but in degree. He declares that if God's attributes, both rational and moral, are not really like the scriptural, human conceptions of them, but mere analogues, then the foundation of religion is gone. Is Dr. Bledsoe a Wesleyan?

Again, we beg the reader to fix the true question before his mind. The question is not, whether God has modes of cognition inconceivably above ours. Doubtless he has. The question is, whether God has modes of cognition contradictory to those which he has himself made not only valid but imperative for us, created in his image. If one of us were to convince himself that an event is certainly coming, and yet that there is nothing anywhere certainly efficient of its coming, we should outrage our reason. Does God *commit that very outrage* in the higher use of his reason? We answer, No! And we say, No, not because his doing so would be incomprehensible, but because it would be contradictory. Dr. Bledsoe shall here define this difference. P. 221: "There is some difference, I have supposed, between disbelieving a thing because we cannot see how it is, and disbelieving it because we very clearly see that it cannot be any how at all." This is well said. Because we see that, according to that law of cause, which God has impressed both on nature and reason, the thing that is certain to happen must have, somewhere, an efficient which will certainly make it happen; and inasmuch as the efficiency of subjective motive over volition is the only explanation thereof, consistent with free agency; therefore, we know that when God foreknows volitions certainly, our theory of motives producing volitions is true.

Dr. Bledsoe takes an attitude of humility, in order to escape this argument. He falls back on his ignorance. He chides us for assuming, as he charges, that God has no way of knowing certainly the contingent volition; because we cannot explain it. But let not the reader be deceived. Dr. Bledsoe thinks that he can explain it none the less; and this by the Molinist scheme of

*scientia media*, which, he tells us, he adopted with all his heart, when he became acquainted with it. Church History tells us that Rome has never had the audacity to adopt it, in the teeth of the Scriptures, the Fathers, and Philosophy. But Dr. Bledsoe is a bold man. In his Review, pp. 47-51, we have his attempt to escape our exposure of Molinism; an attempt made up of confusions and misstatements, in which he so loses himself as to ascribe to us precisely what we were confuting. We will not weary the reader by unwinding all these tortuous and entangled threads. It will be shorter to restate the problem.

In the latter part of the sixteenth century, the Pelagian theory of volition, which was substantially Dr. Bledsoe's, found itself crushed by this argument from God's certain prescience. To escape this refutation, Louis Molina, a Spanish Jesuit, devised his theory of mediate foreknowledge, which he introduced to the learned world, A. D. 1588, in his book entitled *Liberi Arbitrii Concordia cum Gratiae Donis*. Dr. Murdock, on Mosheim, Vol. III., p. 111, states his doctrine thus: "What depends on the voluntary action of his creatures, that is, future *contingencies*, God knows only *mediately*, by knowing all the circumstances in which these free agents will be placed, what motives will be present to their minds, and thus foreseeing and knowing how they will act."

Those orders of the Romish clergy who followed Augustine, resisted this doctrine with all their might. The controversy was ardent, because the Jesuits, according to their usual policy, defended their member with a strict partisan zeal. The question was referred to Rome, where a special commission of theologians was raised to examine it, called the *Congregatio de Auxiliis (Gratiae)*. Mosheim, who made no secrets of his leanings to Arminianism, says (Vol. III., p. 327) that after long debates, this commission actually reached a decision, which was reported to the Pope for his sanction and publication. The substance of this was, that this "opinion of Molina approximated to those of the Pelagians, which had been condemned" by the Roman Church. (We have, then, the suffrages of Rome herself, in addition to early history, in support of our assertion that Dr. Bledsoe is a

virtual Pelagian, for he says that he heartily adopts the doctrine.) But the usual crooked and time-serving policy of the Popes, and their fear of the growing ascendancy of the Jesuit order, prevented the publication of this decision.

Dr. Bledsoe and we both agree, that since God's cognitions are perfect, eternal, coëtaneous, and unchangeable, none of them can have arisen deductively, after the method of our inferential and "discursive" processes of logic. All must be primary and intuitive. The theologians mean this: that it cannot be that God, like us, first knew premises, and then *afterwards*, by a process of derivation and a *succession* of thought, learned from them conclusions not before known to the divine mind. For this is inconsistent with the eternity and completeness of the divine omniscience. But no theologian means to deny that this immediate intuition of God takes in truths according to their actual relations. Doubtless, since his knowledge is absolutely correct, it takes truths exactly as they are; but many truths are truths of relation. These, therefore, the divine mind, while it takes them up intuitively, takes as related truths. For instance, in the history of the material world, God had no occasion to learn the power of a given cause, *a posteriori*, from its effect, as we do, since he eternally and immediately knew both cause and effect. But he doubtless always foresaw that cause and its effect as thus related, because in fact they were thus related; and his intuition is always true to fact, being absolutely correct. Nor will the considerate mind have a particle of difficulty in admitting that there may be immediate intuition of a truth of relation. Are not several of our own primitive judgments of this kind? What else is this? "If two magnitudes are respectively equal to a third, they must be equal to each other."

With this obvious explanation, we make our first remark against this ascription to God of a *scientia media*. However Dr. Bledsoe may have modified the theory for himself in his last Review, under the stress of our criticism, it was, in the hands of its inventors, an ascription to God of an inferential knowledge. If it is not such in Dr. Bledsoe's hands now, he is evidently improving somewhat in his theology; our tuition is doing him some

good!) Why did its own inventors name it *scientia media*, mediate foreknowledge, except because they thought its conclusions were mediated to the divine mind by premises? And do they not state expressly what those premises, as they suppose, are? "the circumstances in which these free agents will be placed, and what motives will be present to their minds." What else did the inventors mean, by placing this species of cognition between God's *scientia simplex*, or knowledge of the infinite possible, and his *scientia visionis*, or knowledge of all the uncontingent actual? Surely these include all possible forms of the divine intuition. The intermediate class they thought, therefore, to be a class of inferential cognitions. So, certainly, judges Dr. Hodge—Theology, Vol. I., p. 400: "The kind of knowledge this theory supposes cannot belong to God, because it is inferential. It is deduced from a consideration of second causes and their influence, and therefore is inconsistent with the perfections of God, whose knowledge is not discursive, but independent and intuitive." This makes our first objection against *scientia media* sufficiently clear.

Our second is an argument *ad hominem*; but it is a just one. It proceeds against Molina on grounds which we do *not* hold, *but which he does*; and it is therefore fair to hold *him* to them and their consequences. It is to be regretted that Dr. Bledsoe did not perceive this obvious character of our argument on this head, as he might have thus saved himself from sundry confusions which are especially preposterous. The Molinist supposes that the divine mind *infers* what the human free will may please to do, "from all the circumstances in which these free agents will be placed, and the motives present to their mind." But on his and Dr. Bledsoe's theory of volition, these circumstances and motives furnish no ground for any inference; because they say that there is no efficient or certain tie of influence between the free volition and the circumstances or motives, or both together. Of all the men in the world, they are the last who have any business with such an inference as to what free volitions will be; because the very heart of their theory cuts all tie of efficient influence between the proposed premises and conclusion. We Calvinists are

the men who are entitled consistently to draw that inference, because we believe that there is an efficient tie between (subjective) motive and volition. We have not, like Dr. Bledsoe and his Molinist friends, cut our premises and conclusions fatally asunder. And we, reasoning experimentally, after that inferential manner suitable to temporal and finite minds, actually do infer, in a multitude of cases, what free agents will choose, from our knowledge of "circumstances and motives." And we can see how, if God did also reason deductively, (which he does not,) as the Molinist supposes, he also could, in *all* cases, infer what *all* free agents will choose to do, from his prescience of their "circumstances and motives;" that is, provided our Calvinistic theory of the efficient influence of motives is the true one. And, inasmuch as God sees all truths, both truths of relation and all others, not deductively, but immediately and intuitively, we suppose that God eternally and intuitively sees what free agents are going to choose, in relation to the foreseen motives which are going to cause these free choices. That is, we suppose God's intuitive prescience is *exactly according to the actual fact*; and as these future free volitions, when they come, are to come out of the efficient influence of motives in the men's spirits, God foresees them as thus connected. And this is the way, we suppose, God has, not a *scientia media*, but a *scientia visionis*, of all that free agents are going to choose; a *scientia visionis* which, while not an inference from premises after the mode of our successive, discursive thought, is yet an intuition of truths in their destined relations. We are certain the matter is now clear to the candid reader; and we even venture to hope, to Dr. Bledsoe. One thing is clear to all except him: whether God's foreknowledge of free volitions were an inference from premises, or an intuition of truths in relation, it must be equally impossible for a correctly thinking mind to think the two parts of the truth in relation, if Dr. Bledsoe were right in saying the relation does not exist. But this is his position: "Motives not related to volitions by any tie of certain efficiency." And we humbly presume that God's omniscience no more enables him to think this erroneous solecism, which no rational man can think, than God's infinite holiness could enable him consistently

to do an act which would be intrinsically wicked if done by his inferior, man. There is the sum of this whole matter.

8. The way is now prepared for our eighth argument in support of the efficient influence of subjective motives over volitions. As we saw it was implied in the Bible doctrine of original sin, so it is necessarily implied in the doctrine of regeneration. What is it? That God so exerts a gracious efficiency upon the depraved soul, (called in Scripture "the new creation unto good works," the "new birth," or birth from above, the "quickening," the "illumination," the "heavenly calling," etc.,) that the souls hitherto certainly self-determined to ungodliness are now graciously yet freely determined to certain perseverance in godliness. They "are created unto good works, which God hath before ordained that they should walk in them." They "are kept by the power of God, through faith, unto salvation." They cannot practise habitual sin, because they "are born of a living and incorruptible seed, which liveth and abideth forever." Such is the work. Now, it is impossible that this permanent effect can be graciously propagated, consistently with free agency, except on the theory of a tie of efficiency between the renewed disposition, with its holy subjective motives, and the free volitions of the soul in this gracious state. This is the *minimum* postulate on which the doctrine of regeneration can possibly hold, and man yet remain a free agent. If grace turns man into a stock, or a machine, or an irrational sentient beast, which moves at the spur of a mere instinct provoked from without, then it is conceivable how grace may certainly and regularly evoke the series of acts which is outwardly conformed to godliness. But then, where is free agency? If we retain free agency, we must either hold to the causative and efficient influence of motives over free volitions, or we must give up the Bible doctrine of regeneration.

Dr. Bledsoe makes an impotent attempt to reconcile the difficulty. In the chapter cited from his *Theodicy*, he teaches that motives, while not the efficient of volitions, are their invariable antecedents. The judgments of the intelligence, if incorrect, may be antecedents to wrong choices. The desires of the heart, if perverse, may be antecedents to wrong choices. Both these



functions of spirit he supposes to be purely passive. He can concede, then, that grace may omnipotently renovate these passive antecedents of free choice, without infringing the freedom of the will; and this is regeneration. Such is his scheme. The fatal defect is, that according to that theory, which is his corner-stone, *such regeneration would not ENSURE a single holy act*, much less an infallible perseverance in holy strivings. For these "necessitated" states of passivity, correct judgments of intellect, and right desires, he tells us, are *not efficient*, but only antecedents, to volitions. These arise in the will itself, "not determined, but determinations," connected by no tie of efficiency with "any antecedents in or out of the mind." What can be plainer then, than this: that according to Dr. Bledsoe, God might "necessitate" these antecedents, and yet procure not a single holy volition! The whole scheme is naught.

9. The last argument we adduce is the well known *reductio ad absurdum*, which has descended from the Scholastics to President Edwards. If the will is self-determined, since this faculty has but the single and sole function of volition, it must be by a prior volition that it determines itself to the given choice. But now the question recurs, What determined the will to that prior volition? The only answer is, an earlier volition, still prior to this; because the faculty of choice, which is supposed to exert the self-determination, has but the one function. Thus, it must have chosen to choose, and we have a ridiculous *regressus*, to which there is no consistent end. Dr. Bledsoe endeavors to escape this argument by two expedients. One is to say that he does not use the words, "the will self-determined," "the will determines itself," along with all prior advocates of his theory of free will. They ought not to have used such language, he holds; it is not correct. He tells us they have been all off the track in debating the question whether motives determine the will, or whether the will determines itself: for in fact the will is not determined at all; it determines. Its sole function, volition, *is not an act determined, but a determination*. This is as pretty a *couundrum* as was ever made up of a mere verbal quibble. "Volition is simply a determination," quoth 'a. But did ever

one hear of an action without an agent? Who or what does the determining in this *determinatio*? Only the will, says Dr. Bledsoe. Then the will determines—what? Oh, says Dr. Bledsoe, the will determines not itself, but its volition. But what is volition save *a function of itself*? Then the stubborn fact remains, that on his theory the will does determine itself. All the rest of the semi-Pelagian and Pelagian worlds were not fools, nor was Dr. Bledsoe the only wise man among them. The phrase, “the will determines itself,” is, on their theory, perfectly correct and unavoidable. Dr. Bledsoe's other evasion is to blink the fact, on which Edwards's argument in part hinges, that when the specific faculty of will is made self-determining, then our opponents are shut up to the concession that it must determine itself to choose by an act of choice, since this is its sole function, viz. : emitting acts of choice. The other functions of spirit all belong to other faculties.

From this point of view the reader can easily see how shortsighted and impotent is the effort which our author makes, in many places, to wrest this famous argument from Edwards and turn it against him. Dr. Bledsoe pleads, that the only way for us Calvinists to avoid the absurd result of a *regressus* without end, is to adopt his notion of volitions arising in the will determined by nothing. For, reasons he, if Calvinists say that volition cannot arise save from some other mental modification or function, prior to volition, and the efficient thereof, then he has equal right to say that this prior mental modification must also have had its prior efficient to produce it. And if we demur to his logic, he will prostrate us with the same formidable maxim, *ex nihilo nihil*, with which we threatened him when he advanced his volition without efficient cause. Here, again, we have a smart quibble; that is all. He forgets that the something for which he asserts absolutely self-determined (or, if he prefers it so, undetermined action) is a specific faculty in the soul, which his theory absolutely severs from all tie of efficient relation to any other faculty. But the thing for which our theory claims self-determination is, not a severed faculty, but the soul itself, the spiritual agent, qualified consistently by all its related faculties

of intellect, and appetency and sensibility. *There* is the vital difference. Dr. Bledsoe's theory is guilty of asserting, in this undetermined faculty, a function which would be *ens ex nihilo*; and it is also guilty of derationalising this function of choice by thus severing it from all efficient relation with the regulative faculties of the soul. But, according to our view, it is *the soul* which has the function of originating modifications in itself on occasion of suitable objectives. Therein is its spontaneity. The soul *does originate* new modifications of thought and appetency. We need no *regressus* without end to account for a given act of thought or appetency in the mind. But the simple question is, How are the several faculties related to each other in their efficient inter-action? Which is directive, and which executive? Are the conjoined faculties of intelligence and appetency directive of the will, the faculty of choice? That is what common sense and the Bible declare. Or is the faculty of choice, the executive faculty, unrelated by any efficient tie to any directive faculty? That is Dr. Bledsoe's theory; and we assert that it disjoins the soul, leaves man a blind agent, and confounds the whole psychology on which rational agency and responsibility rest. It is perfectly true that we must assign to the soul some function, somewhere, of self-caused action, else we should be involved, for each mental state and act, in an endless *regressus* of mental causations, and real spontaneity would be lost. But the point of the matter is this: that the naked function of volition, as among the related functions of the soul, is the very one which cannot be, in Dr. Bledsoe's sense, self-caused.

It should not be concealed here that there is a sense in which every change in the world of mind is connected with a chain of efficiencies, which goes back to eternity; which is a literal *regressus in infinitum*. We speak, now, of that providential control over souls and their states and acts, which the Almighty secretly exerts, in the endless execution, in and through men, of his eternal decree. But both consciousness and Scripture assure us, that the way in which this providence operates does not infringe our true spontaneity. And as the point now in debate

is not the theology, but the psychology of human volitions, we content ourselves with simply recording this truth.

We are now prepared to approach the remaining task which we assigned ourselves, to examine Dr. Bledsoe's peculiar phase of the theory of free will, and ascertain whether it contains anything entitled to modify our views. Many of his arguments have been already considered and refuted in connection with our affirmative establishment of the Calvinistic doctrine. Repetition will be avoided as much as possible.

We have seen how our author, conscious of the utter overthrow Edwards has given to the proposition, that "the will determines itself," endeavors to change the issue of the debate. All the great men, like Dr. Reid, who have made inconsistent attempts to sustain his view of free will, he thinks have conceded too much. They have allowed it to be taken for granted that volitions are determined somehow; and, rejecting the doctrine that they are determined by subjective motives, have attempted to show that they are determined by the will. But on that position, Dr. Bledsoe confesses, Edwards has utterly overthrown them. So he would take a higher position: *that volitions are not determined at all*; that they are not *effects of any* efficient cause. If he is met by the maxim, *ex nihilo nihil*, his evasion is, to say that volitions arise from the mind, and the mind is something. But he would concede to Edwards, against his own friends, that it is not correct to say "the will is self-determined" to choose; or that the will "remains *in equilibrio* in the act of choice;" or that the mind is conscious at the moment of choosing of a "power of contrary choice." He admits the fatal logic of our champions against these positions. Now, upon these admissions we remark, first, is it not a little presumptuous for this last champion thus to criticise the positions of all the great men upon his own side? Is he alone the consistent advocate of their common theory of free will? Common sense will rather incline to the conclusion that these great and astute advocates of the Arminian philosophy knew what they were about, at least as well as Dr. Bledsoe. We surmise that they declined to adopt his favorite position of *an undetermined determination*, not from shortsightedness, but be-

cause, like us, they regarded it as intrinsically absurd. We hold with them, that if either their or Dr. Bledsoe's theory of free will were true, then it must result that the will is *in equilibrio* as to motives. Very true, the will cannot be *undecided when it decides*, but, on their common theory, it remains *in equilibrio quoad* the motives competing to influence the choice. Whatever inconveniences Edwards's logic has attached to this position, Dr. Bledsoe will have to abide. So "the power of contrary choice" must be claimed if his theory be true; for if the will, when choosing an affirmative choice, had not the power to choose the contrary, it was efficiently determined from that contrary to the affirmative,—the very doctrine Dr. Bledsoe abhors. These attempts to modify the old doctrine of absolute free will are, therefore, but virtual confessions of its overthrow.

But the kernel of Dr. Bledsoe's doctrine of the will is in his notion of cause and effect. He asserts that the mind has no notion of "effect," save as it is physical change produced in a passive subject. He asserts that no true agent can be so the subject of causation, as that thereby its active function shall be produced efficiently. He regards passivity as of the essence of all true effects. Act and effect with him belong to irreconcilable categories. He is even rash enough to say that "a change in matter is the only idea we have of an effect;" and on p. 81, Examination of Edwards, that "we have no experience of an act of mind produced by a preceding act of mind." He is willing to grant that the volition has conditions *sine qua non*, but denies that it has any efficient cause.

Now, the intelligent reader will have noticed, that all this is simply a *petitio principii*. Whether in the dependent being, man, the action of the soul can be efficiently produced, and yet be proper action, is the very question to be proved in this discussion, and not to be assumed, as Dr. Bledsoe does. To say that an effect proper must be a change wrought on a *passive* subject, is simply begging the very question to be settled. That the assumption is not true as to conscious volitions, we have proved (not assumed) in our affirmative discussion. That it is not true of other activities of the mind, as a general proposition,

is easily proved both by Scripture and reason. When, for instance, the Apostle tells us of God's "*working in us*, both to will *and to do*, of his good pleasure," have we not a truly *caused action*? According to Dr. Bledsoe effect is limited to the realms of matter and instinct; there is no class of rational and spiritual effects that are truly effects. Yet every man in the world (doubtless including Dr. Bledsoe) aims to produce them! For instance, all speak of evidence as *producing* mental conviction. Oftentimes the conviction of mind is an effect of evidence as inevitable and certain as any physical effect in the world. Now, we know that Dr. Bledsoe will attempt to exclude this class of mental effects, so fatal to his position, by saying that the functions of the intelligence are passive. But no psychologist will say so. No other philosopher will rank the intellect among the "passive powers" of the soul. He is refuted again by all the numberless instances in which volition itself is directed, not upon the bodily members, but upon our own mental faculties. Dr. Bledsoe says that it is the very nature of volition, not to be a real effect, but to produce real effects. Well, let the latter part of his assertion be true, and then, in every case in which volition is directed upon the action of our own mental faculties, he has refuted himself. There is the case, for instance, of voluntary attention, in which the will directs the intellect, and energises it to its highest and most creative acts of cognition. But why multiply words? Does Dr. Bledsoe require us to think that the familiar phrase, "self-government," is a mere metaphor, save as it is applied to the direction of our limbs and sense-organs? If not, he must admit that there are multitudes of cases in which acts of mind are causes of other acts of mind.

So hard pressed does Dr. Bledsoe evidently feel himself, by the difficulties of his position, that he even resorts to a wretched piece of genuine sensationalist analysis, worthy of James Mill himself, to account for our very notion of cause and effect, p. 77: "The only way in which the mind ever comes to be furnished with the ideas of cause and effect at all is this: we are conscious that we will a certain motion *in the body*, and we discover that the motion follows the volition," etc. Surely it is not necessary

at this day to refute this analysis, and to prove that such instances as these, of conscious (or observed) causations, are merely the occasions and not the sources of our rational notions of cause and effect. God and angels have no bodies, no limbs, to be moved by volitions; hence, according to this marvellous explanation, they would not have any notion of causation at all! Conscious instances of such bodily motions produced by volitions are merely the occasions (and not the only ones) upon which the mind evolves its own *a priori* notion of cause and effect,—the antecedent which contains efficiency to effectuate the consequent—and forms the inevitable judgment, that without such antecedent the consequent change would not have been.

In his third section, our author endeavors to raise a difficulty against the doctrine of the efficiency of motive as producing volition, by asserting that there is no way to measure “the stronger motive.” When Edwards teaches that the choice always is as the stronger motive, the question is asked, What is motive? Let the answer be, motive is the complex of all that in the mind which immediately produces the volition. How, then, asks Dr. Bledsoe, is it known which is “the stronger motive?” Edwards replies, as he supposes, by the fact that it is the one which the volition follows. And then he charges, that Edwards has proceeded in a circle: first assuming that the volition must follow the stronger motive, and then, that the motive the volition actually followed was the stronger. Now that this cavilling is fallacious may be shown by a parallel fact. By precisely the same process Dr. Bledsoe might show that the science of mechanics is all fallacious. But he doubtless believes in the laws of mechanics. The motion of a body will be in the direction of the stronger force, will it not? Undoubtedly. But how is the relative strength of forces measured? By the motion they produce. The stronger force will overcome the greater resistance, will it not? Yes. But how is the relative strength of the force estimated? By the amount of resistance it overcomes. Have we not here, then, the very same “circular” process? Undoubtedly. Yet Dr. Bledsoe believes firmly in the validity of these mechanical laws, in spite of our cavil! Then his parallel cavil is worthless

as against Edwards. The truth is, that on Dr. Bledsoe's empirical philosophy the cavil would be insoluble for him in either case, though worthless in both cases. The solution is, that our necessary conviction of the great law of causation is not derived from experience as he supposes, but is an *a priori* result of the law of the reason; and it is law which alone enables us to formulate our experience rationally. It is not experience which has gradually taught us that every motion in bodies is an effect of related force, and that every deliberate responsible volition is the effect of subjective motive. It is intuition which prepares our minds thus to construe the sequences of change given us by observation. And by the same law of the intuitive judgment, which demands a cause for every change, we know that cause must be adequate to and so related in its degree of energy to its effect.

It is very true that, in the case of a given motive in our fellow-creature's mind, we can only determine its relative strength *a posteriori* by its effect in producing volition. But do we ever suppose that the motive derives its strength from this circumstance? No; our reason forbids it.

There is one general but conclusive reply to all of Dr. Bledsoe's argumentation against the efficient certainty of motive. *He has himself made admissions* (unwillingly and under the unconscious stress of common sense) *which retract and destroy his whole theory.* Thus, p. 93, "A desire or affection is the *indispensable condition*, the *invariable antecedent*, of an act of the will." P. 216, "Has volition an efficient cause? I answer, No. Has it 'a sufficient ground and reason' of its existence? I answer, Yes. No one ever imagined that there are no indispensable antecedents to choice, without which it could not take place." . . . . "But a power to act, it will be said, is not a sufficient reason to account for the existence of an action." (He means, of this or that specific action.) "This is true; the reason is to come. The sufficient reason, however, is not an efficient cause; for there is some difference between a blind impulse or force and rationality," pp. 92, 93. "Our volitions might depend on certain desires or affections, but they would not result from the



influence or action of them. . . . The reason why this principle has not been employed by the advocates of free agency, is, I humbly conceive, because it has not been entertained by them." (Jouffroy, as admitted on p. 92, did not "entertain" it.) P. 40, "*The strength of a motive*," as President Edwards properly remarks, "DEPENDS UPON THE STATE OF THE MIND *to which it is addressed.*" Thus does Dr. Bledsoe stumble unintentionally, but unavoidably, into the Calvinistic doctrine of volition. By "motive" he here means objective inducement, as is perfectly obvious from his describing it as a something "*addressed to the mind.*" So that he has acceded to our position, which is the corner-stone of our whole philosophy of the will, viz., that the strength of objective inducement "depends on the state of the mind." Now then, first, will not that state of the mind be regulative of the volitions, of which these objective inducements are the occasions (not causes)? The affirmative is too plain. And second, what is included in that "STATE of the mind," or, as Dr. Bledsoe expresses it elsewhere, "*nature*" of the mind which is thus found to be efficiently regulative of volitions? This is the crucial question, from the investigation of which he always recoils, by reason of that obstinate confusion of sensibility and conation, of the objective and subjective, with which we charged him in the outset. Had he dared to look this question steadily in the face he would have seen what all common sense recognises—just what the Calvinistic philosophy formulates. This "state," this determinant "*nature*," is precisely the *habitus*, the *disposition*, regulative of the rise of subjective appetencies, and thus of the volitions which these cause. In this fatal admission, Dr. Bledsoe has refuted his whole refutation. Again, Dr. Bledsoe finds that none of his colleagues, in the advocacy of self-determination of the will, concur with him,—not even Jouffroy, in his idea that while volitions "depend on certain desires or affections," yet they do not "result from their influence or action." No wonder; for they have not Dr. Bledsoe's capacity for self-contradiction. To him alone must belong the unique glory of believing that an event is "not influenced by" what it "depends on!" Again, he teaches that not only a mind but an object and a desire

are the invariable, the indispensable antecedents of volition. Well, sound philosophy teaches that a change has no invariable and indispensable antecedent except its efficient cause. Why should a given antecedent be indispensable to a given consequent, except that it is its cause? It is by this very principle that all the methods of experimental induction into the laws of cause in nature proceed. The philosopher knows that when he has found the invariable indispensable antecedent, *he has the cause*. Hence this is what all his canons of induction are framed to seek for.

Once more: Dr. Bledsoe admits, that while he thinks volition has no efficient cause, yet it has, of course, "its sufficient ground and reason." He exclaims, "There is some difference between blind impulse or force and rationality!" In that we all agree. But is force the only species of cause, and physical motion in the passive body the only species of effect? That is what Dr. Bledsoe assumes without proving. What we proved by Scripture, experience, and reason, was, that there are spiritual causations as well as physical. And we presume again, that Dr. Bledsoe has the unique honor of being the only philosopher, who is not a materialist, who ever denied it. Now, then, in this sphere of spiritual causations, our plain theory is, that *as the effects are rational the causes also are rational*. Now, what is a rational cause save "a sufficient ground and reason?" The Greek, the native language of philosophy, suggests this obvious truth by using the same word for both. *Aitia* is *cause*; and *aitia* is reason of acting; rational, subjective motive.

With this complete answer, which Dr. Bledsoe has given of himself, we conclude our answer. And thanking him for his efficient aid in his own demolition, we make our final bow, reciprocating his courteous wishes for our welfare.

## ARTICLE II.

## CONCERNING THE MANNER OF PREACHING.

We wish, in an informal way, to consider a little the question, How shall a sermon be best presented to the people for whose benefit it is intended? Shall it be read in whole, read in part, or shall it be memorised, word for word, memorised as to portions only, or memorised not at all, *i. e.*, be purely extemporaneous? On the entire subject thus indicated, there has been a good deal of loose thinking and much inconsequent discussion. It is a theme which almost every one feels himself competent to treat; but with reference to which almost no one is entitled to oracular speech. The greatest minds have all differed, and all of them who had any modesty have confessed their inability to reach a perfectly satisfactory conclusion. We do not pretend that it is in our power to solve the problem, which has perplexed and baffled so many. It is one of those subjects, in fact, whose settlement will never be reached in a manner that shall meet the approbation of all who have a right to an opinion upon it; and for this reason, that it will always be true in the future, as it has been in the past, that this, that, or the other method of homiletic delivery must be chosen to suit this, that, or the other variety of homiletic talent. You can no more expect a hundred men to utter their thoughts in accordance with one uniform mode of delivery, than you can expect them to think alike in accordance with one invariable standard of logical or rhetorical excellence. In view of this remark, we might content ourselves with endeavoring to impress a single rule: let each preacher study his own peculiarities of mental structure and accommodate thereto his pulpit action, so that in the best manner which *he* can employ, without the least regard to the habits of others of his profession, he may set forth the truths of Scripture. We have known some men, who had accustomed themselves to writing and closely reading their sermons, but who, being evidently greatly hampered by this method, ought at once to have abandoned it for one that was freer. Others again we have known, who, igno-

rantly supposing themselves gifted for extemporaneous delivery, were as obviously unfitted for this method as they were for chiselling statues or manufacturing stars.

Is there not, however, some ideal standard of oratory which, arising out of the very nature of this most difficult art, presents that highest type of perfection towards which every gospel minister should aspire, and which, whatever be the peculiarities of his talent, he should constantly strive to attain? There undoubtedly is a transcendent point of excellence which now and then has been reached by a few, the attainment of which has made them renowned for all time—a renown that is shared by others in proportion to the degree of their approach towards these peerless masters. The point to which we refer—so far from the possibilities of ordinary minds as to be almost out of their sight—is where that orator stands, who seems to be endued with a species of inspiration, and who, in a style of speech at once the most natural and the most artistic, pours forth his illustrative and argumentative utterances in a flood of irresistible persuasion, almost as if he were some superhuman being, and who accordingly appears to move upon his object by the force of pure intuition.

The ideal standard of oratory, then, is undoubtedly displayed by the ideal man, who commands, to their full extent, the gifts of extempore speech, and who needs only an occasion in order to exhibit the highest order of eloquence. Whatever, in public address, most nearly, in the effect produced by the orator, conforms to this standard, must be thought most nearly to approach what every preacher should seek to reach. All this is so obvious, that it has become the commonest matter of course remark on the part of those who have expressed themselves on the subject, that none but an extemporaneous sermon ought ever to be tolerated; that if it be written, or even carefully memorised, it does, to a vicious extent, impair its force, if not destroy its very nature, and that therefore he is not deserving the name of preacher, who is not accustomed to rely on the spur of each stimulating moment of delivery for his utterances of sacred truth. But such persons habitually, though often unwillingly, commit the mistake of supposing that nothing, or, if anything, but little, of the

power of oratory consists in the thought that is uttered ; or, when they do allow weight to this prime element in oration, of supposing that thought can be extemporised as well as language, which is far from being the case. And although it cannot be denied that the persuasive force of a given discourse depends in very large measure upon the style of its delivery, yet neither can it be denied that the best model on which delivery can be formed is useless, unless the matter possess the substance of strong and vigorous thinking. So far is this true, that it sometimes has happened—in the cases of John Howe and Jonathan Edwards, for example—that the importance and the vitality of the thought have been sufficient to atone for the drawbacks that attended the most deformed and awkward style of labored utterance. A sermon, therefore, may be closely read, and yet be mighty in its effect upon the audience ; so mighty, indeed, as to render it difficult to believe that it could be mightier, even if delivered with all the appearance of an off-hand readiness.

Assuming, then, as the ground upon which all discussion with reference to the mode of oratorical speaking must proceed, that the speaker has something to say that is worth attention, and is appropriate to the occasion, the question narrows itself down to this : How best shall the preacher secure a requisite clothing of language for the proper setting forth of his previously prepared thoughts ?

In answer, we remark, first, that it is possible for all ministers to construct a wording for their sermons at the time of actual delivery ; *i. e.*, unless they are utter idiots, they can find some language, good, bad, or indifferent, in which to express themselves. There is such a thing as pure extemporaneousness in so far as the mere phraseology is concerned ; and a certain degree of success in it is within every one's reach. Just as a man may privately converse, so may he publicly speak. If he have anything to say, he can say it more or less gracefully, unless he be seized with the paralysis of a helpless embarrassment. But yet there is, after all, a difference (sufficiently wide to justify a warning) between the mere conversationalist and the orator. The one has no sustained effort to make, and no culminating effect to produce ;

moreover, he is helped to language by the suggestions that proceed from the words of his interlocutor. The other is compelled, in cold blood, as it were, to maintain a continuous and growing interest towards a foreseen important result; and his auditors, so far from aiding him, are rather a hindrance, because of a certain fear he has of disappointing them. Besides, the language of solemn discourse is required to be more elevated than would be expected in the ordinary interchanges of friendly colloquy, and because more elevated, more difficult of selection. It is not every one, therefore, who converses well, that can speak correspondingly well, when placed in circumstances where it is his office to instruct, convince, and persuade his fellow-men on subjects of great moment. Let no one, then, suppose that he is able to sermonise successfully on the spur of the moment, because he may admirably succeed in throwing interest into a drawing-room discussion, or a road-side talk. We know, indeed, that there are many who imagine that they have only to stand up in God's name, for the purpose of addressing a congregation, and relying upon some previous but vague preparation of a general order of thought, they will at once find themselves in a condition to give apposite and lively and brilliant utterance to what is in their minds, as if that day of inspiration had returned when it was needful to take no thought how or what one should speak. And many do thus stand up, expecting some wind of heaven to waft to their lips suitable words for the accomplishment of their design; but usually they wait thus in vain. That man's is certainly an exceptional case, who excels in this mode of preparation. No one, indeed, can safely rely upon it, whatever his ability in other respects, whatever the splendor or variety of his genius. He may sometimes be successful, but cannot be uniformly so. He may occasionally even go beyond himself, but much oftener will fall far behind what might be justly expected of him. Hence you will have observed that extemporaneous address of the character now indicated, when attempted by most of those presumptuous preachers who have tried it, is usually discursive, is generally commonplace, is often dull, is not seldom even contemptible! The wording is tame; the periods are badly formed; the gram-

mar, even, is faulty; the whole movement is languid; and the discourse, as a whole, deliquesces into an indescribable something that is wretchedly thin, watery, and tiresome; all this being certainly true of the discourses of men who are very far from being fools; but yet, however good their thoughts, however glib their utterance, however taking their voice, are deficient in certain essential underlying qualities which they have never been able to acquire, because possessing no foundation for them in the native peculiarities of their mind or temperament. Nature must previously have done much for the preacher who hopes for even occasional excellence or for respectable proficiency in such off-hand address. He must have been gifted with a lively sensibility, (as Bautain puts it,) a penetrating intelligence, a prompt imagination, a decisive will and an instinct of speech, which urges him to speak as the instinct of song urges a bird to trill its notes. Any one, indeed, who has self-confidence, who has a wordy tongue, who has so little knowledge of his subject as to impose upon himself the delusion that he has a mastery over it—any one who thus superficially endowed, cares more to fill up the hour of discourse than to impress his audience with the importance of what he is saying, may without fear leave to the occasion to suggest what language he will employ; but still, how far short does such a one come of any just standard of oratory! Mark his twisted sentences, note his broken imagery, observe his perplexed style throughout. Where is his reasoning cleanly cut by well-chosen phrases, his descriptions couched in vigorous idiom, his passion that flames into burning figure, its proper vehicle? Where is his impressiveness? No, the mere power to multiply words, the utmost power to which the majority of this style of extemporisers attain, a power easily gained, is not the only nor the first essential of even passable oratory. To this the discriminating ability to select words is necessary to be added—to select them instantaneously—with which to clothe each successive train of thought, and then to transfuse them with the spirit, to heat them into the glow, to lift them into the light, which the narration, or the argument, or the exhortation severally demands.

Let no one dream, therefore, of this kind of slip-shod prepara-

tion, if preparation such unpreparedness can be called; a preparation that is content with any words that may come, with any sentences that may arise; with any poverty-stricken phrases which, threadbare and untidy, may present themselves. We may dismiss this species of extemporaneousness as entirely out of the question. Speaking strictly, it is an *impossible* kind. We know a minister who is accustomed to say that he needs only fifteen or twenty minutes to prepare as good a sermon as he desires to preach; and truly, to hear his sermons, you would say that his desires were very moderate! He has words—or words have him—and the abundance of their flow is surprising; but whilst he says much, he impresses nothing; every garment with which he attempts to clothe his ideas, is either too large or too small, and many of them are in tatters to an extent that does not conceal the nakedness of his matter; and yet, this same preacher is a man of fine native ability, and had he been a student, might have achieved even greatness as a pulpit orator.

Taking it for granted, then, as surely we must, that no kind of sermonising can be recommended, even to men of first-rate mental powers, which is not preceded by the most careful preparation, (as to its language we now mean,) what shall be the next sort to come under review? If the preacher may not depend upon the hasty and careless product of that one particular instant of time in which he is proceeding to speak, what alternatives has he? Is there no other kind of extemporaneous speaking to which he is at liberty to resort? In the strict etymological sense of the word extemporaneous—no. By this we do not mean that all oral delivery is out of the question, in contradistinction from the written discourse. Did we mean this, we would be rebuked by the recollection that some of the most elaborate literary productions—some that have become classic, and will live through all time—have been thus spoken before being reduced to writing. Homer thus extemporised the “*Iliad* ;” being blind, he could not do otherwise. So, for the same reason, did Milton dictate to his daughter the “*Paradise Lost*.” Walter Scott employed an amanuensis in the rapid preparation of some of his most exquisite works. So, Napoleon, in causing to be put on paper the



outlines of some of his most brilliant campaigns; and long before his day, Cæsar. Wordsworth was accustomed to hum over to himself the verses of his poems, as one after another they arose in his mind, and then had recourse to some inmate of his house to fix them on the sheet. There is a species of extemporising which is quite compatible with perspicacity of insight into a great subject, with clearness, beauty, and energy of expression, and with the very highest power of word-painting. To this, accordingly, the studious preacher may safely resort. If there only be a mind well ordered and assiduously kept in order, abundantly stored with the materials of discourse, and above all, accustomed to the habit of *mental composition*, there need be no further difficulty; the rest will all depend upon mere elocution. The men, however, who thus prepare their sermons, (and the history of the pulpit contains a number of illustrious names of this class,) are men who would scorn the idea that they preach without the most labored antecedent study. No one of their discourses can be said to be the immediate product of the very hours during which they are engaged in setting their thoughts in array before their own minds and giving them due form, each in its turn, in appropriate words; but lying behind each separate performance, is the whole past of his life, with all that culture and all that acquisition of knowledge, which have served to make him what he now is; and so, every special discourse contains the result of years of previous discipline, the result of much closeted research and closet reflexion. One of those Oriental magicians, who amazes the spectator by causing a tree visibly to grow from the soil at his feet, gradually spreading out its branches, unfolding its blossoms, and ceasing its wondrous movement only when the limbs appear laden with fruit, does not perform this marvellous achievement by the sudden use of a skill which he that moment made his own; his magical tree is the offspring of an unbounded foregoing labor of contrivance. When Sir Joshua Reynolds was once remonstrated with by a person for whom he had painted an exquisite but small cabinet picture, on the ground that he was only five days in its execution: "Five days! Why, sir, I have expended the work of thirty-five years upon it." That habit, accordingly of rapid

mental composition, which has characterised some of the masters of pulpit oratory, was the result of no mysterious inspiration, caught at the time of preparation, but of the studies, the toils, the practice of the greater part of a lifetime. Even, however, all that has thus gone before in the work of gathering the materials, of acquiring the art of arranging them, and of becoming familiar with the use of strong, graceful language, does not do away with the necessity for hard mental labor, when the time shall have arrived for condensing a portion of this collected matter into the sermon then demanded. The speaker still is compelled to choose, to cull, to collate, to cast into shape, to memorise. It is not needful, surely, to expand further the thought we have thus illustrated. The sum of the whole is this: No one can successfully preach who does not carefully study both the matter and the dress of his sermons. There is no royal road here. There is no escape from assiduous labor. There is no room for dependence even upon assured genius.

We have thus reached another point in the field of these suggestions, where that question meets us, how shall the beginner, supposing him to be a hard student (for no rules can serve the case of an indolent man,) how shall the conscientious *outstart* learn how to prepare for the solemn work to which the pulpit calls him? It can be readily perceived upon what ground the experienced preacher, most of whose life has already been passed in the practice of sermonising, stands. Upon what ground does he stand, whose experience has all yet to come, from which he is to receive a push in the right direction? 1st. He must be warned away from the purely impromptu method, the taking of a text *ad aperturam libri*, as the worst that is possible to be conceived. The utmost that this method can secure will be, mighty vociferation, extreme volubility, daubily-colored diction, unearthly pageantry of metaphor, and certain mortification and ultimate failure. In the second place, to repeat what was hinted at a little while since, he must accustom himself to mental composition, if he have or can, by any effort, acquire the habit of close and concentrated attention; which with some is a rare gift, and with others is a possibility of pure acquirement. Every one can do

this to some extent; many can do this in a very considerable degree; some few can do this to the very best and happiest effect. But, now, in the third place, let us say what is dictated by the universal experience of orators, granting that he has good matter to start with, that in no case can one readily learn to compose mentally, so as to give to his compositions good arrangement, so, as furthermore, to add to the arrangement a good filling in of words, to the words a good degree of correctness, to the correctness a good embellishment of ornamental dress, to the ornamental dress a good show of grace, and to the grace a good portion of energy, unless he *write*. Every one knows it is matter of painful observation, and can escape no observer, that most of the discourses which are uttered from the pulpit by men who are manifestly unaccustomed to the use of the pen, are not what they should be; that they are destitute, in large measure, of both those solid qualities—to say nothing of their other features—which congregations have the right to expect in their religious teachers. They are too often badly conceived, ramblingly put together, and obscurely worded; or else flat, stale, and unprofitable because abounding throughout in the merest commonplaces of theology. Mind you, we do not say that the only cure for this is to write your sermons and carry them into the *pulpit*. This habit of taking them into the pulpit is not now under consideration. All that we are at present aiming to impress, is that almost no man can become a good preacher at all, whether he use his manuscript at the time of delivery or not, unless he write a good deal. Moody may be an exception. Writing fixes thought by the very mechanism employed, for it is strangely true that the mere presence of a sheet of paper, the mere handling of the pen, with its nib directed to the inviting blank, exerts an influence truly great, in enabling one to gather to a focus his scattered ideas. Who has not felt the force of this inscrutable agency, and been astonished at the facility he has had in inking ideas which was denied him in thinking them out whilst pacing his room, or, may be, walking through the solitary woods. But, over and above this, you actually see the process of evolving thought when you are engaged in writing. You observe how the first sentence

gives impulse to the composition of the second, how the subtle suggestions of these prepare you for the third, and so on; whilst this very observation interests your mind, serves to warm it, and you go on kindling as you proceed. Besides, when you write you are not constrained to exert memory in an effort to retain what has gone before. The last spur is all that the mind needs to enable it to retain the impulse of what has immediately preceded the point the writer is now laboring on,—a point which is, indeed, the concentrated summing up of the whole that has been previously written; or, if you shall lose the promptings of this essential spur at any step of your progress, there is your manuscript, and you can go over it all, gather it again to a head, and by bringing it to bear upon the spot where you have stuck, impart the blow of a further increment to the growing discourse. Nor is this all. You can cautiously choose your words as you proceed, carefully select the order of their marshalling, ponder the force of the qualifying terms, shade the coloring of your illustrations, disentangle confusing figures of speech, and by a hundred little devices cause every succeeding portion to take in its share of the unity and consistency, that will issue in a harmonious whole.

One will thus at once put himself in the way of acquiring the art of thinking and of expressing thought with neatness and vigor, so that by and by he may reach that rewarding moment of time, when he will no longer need the paper or the pen, but can, by the slowly acquired dexterity which has been imparted to the intellect, write what he wishes to speak, upon his memory by just setting the machinery he has patiently mastered to work upon a given mass of sermonising material. It is by such a process, long and diligently continued, that many a man has been empowered with the ability to think as promptly and as compactly when walking the street or treading the paths of his garden, as when in his study; and to dress his thoughts as becomingly as when his pen was tracing characters upon the paper. Thoroughly discipline the mind, in other words; and he who does this will make it his glad and willing servant at all times, whenever bodily health will allow its free and vigorous

use. It requires time, it requires exertion, it requires perseverance, it requires the acquisition of self-poise, to enable any man to speak eloquently in public once; how much more to speak to the same public, several times every week, for years together. And it is to this that the preacher is to look—preparation for homiletic exercises. And the best preparation for ensuring uniform success is *much writing*; in connection with that, much study, which will always be giving him something both important and fresh to write about. The standard, then, ought to be, discourse that is methodical as to plan, connected as to thought, orderly as to internal arrangement, close as to the maintenance of unity, and finished as to rhetorical style. By whatever process a speaker may be able to reach this standard, he ought to reach it; but he will surely find that the daily use of the pen is at once the most direct and philosophical way for approaching it.

Our readers will have observed that in all these remarks, not yet has been touched that other question, which some may deem, after all, the most important: Shall the preacher learn to preach without having his manuscript before him in the pulpit? We are prepared to aver that this is a question of importance, rather in appearance than in reality. No one can presume to establish a *law* at this point. Some men can learn to preach best by previous meditation only, having acquired, and still daily acquiring, accuracy of thought and energy of expression by a diligent employment of the pen. Others can preach best by writing out their sermons in full and committing them to memory. Others again can preach best by memorising portions of each discourse, and leaving the other portions to be filled out amid the accumulating heats of actual delivery. Others still can preach best by having before them a carefully prepared outline, where all the thoughts are presented to the eye in their due order, but depending upon the occasion for the very words which shall be made the immediate vehicle of communication. Others there are who feel that they must depend upon the presence of the entire sermon lying on the desk before them. Which of these methods, or what varieties of them, any man shall see fit to

adopt must be left to his own intelligent choice—a choice that is to be regulated by his own idiosyncrasies of mind.

What, then, is that one essential of good preaching which ought to distinguish the pulpit exercises of the man (whatever mode he may adopt for the supreme moment,) when saving truth is to be uttered to a waiting congregation? We hesitate not to say that that essential thing does *not* attach to the circumstance of the mode of preparation. It lies far apart from all this. It lies in the acquisition of the ability to preach *to* the people not *at* them. And if it be asked what is meant by such a statement, we would reply that it means simply this: the preacher and his sermon should, for the time being, be identical—it should be *a part of himself*; so that he can say, not, *I have* my sermon, but, *I am* my sermon. The great, the potential, the essential thing is this: *be absorbed in your subject*, so that when it comes flowing from the lips it will stream therefrom like living waters, and will rush upon the audience in a manner bold, fearless, and go directly to the mark, from the understanding to the understanding, from the heart to the heart, from a soul on fire to souls gradually kindled into sympathetic heat. Earnestness is the thing; the earnestness that is awakened by the consideration that the good man has something to say, which is deserving of a hearing not only, but *that must be heard*, as you and the people shall answer for the result in the dread day of final judgment. Cold preaching is none. Doctrine, as a corpse, is not only itself dead, but deadening. Truth vitalised is truth triumphant. And tell us, does this kind of preaching depend upon off-hand delivery more than upon written discoursing? Yes, if you are able to throw impressive warmth into your manner only by that kind of delivery; but no, if you can do it equally well by the alternative method, or by some mixture of the two. We know that there are some who cannot preach with vigor, with enthusiasm, with contagious sympathy, unless they are unhampered by manuscript. Let, then, such men never use the manuscript; let them not *dare* to use it, for they will only be throwing away their time and scandalising their opportunities. If, however, any others are enabled to hit upon that very way, which shall be, in their

cases, most promotive of the true end of preaching—*i. e.*, convincing men of the truth, and persuading them to act in accordance with its demands—whether that way be this, that, or the other,—such is the way for them. We would not, therefore, tie any preacher to rules of universal applicability. There are no such rules. He must just preach in the most efficient way that grace and nature—and grace and nature cultivated—shall point out as his special path to success in the great work. If he be a *live* man, if he have the weight of souls upon his conscience, if he have the glory of the God who has commissioned him, enthroned as a constraining, royally commanding motive in his breast, he will *preach*, will preach well, will preach to the upbuilding of Christ's kingdom, will preach as one who shall *need never to be ashamed*. Essays, indeed, have no place in the pulpit; close, dull, perfunctory reading has no place there. It is the place for the preacher whose lips have on them the word of salvation; and, if he write, or if he write not, he will, nevertheless, so deliver his prepared thoughts as if he means what he says, and as if he is saying only what he means. He will be showing, not himself, but Christ; he will be displaying, not his own talents, but the precious gospel; he will be intent on winning, not the poor tribute of human applause, but the rich reward of his Master's approbation; he will be lost in his theme, and feel after he has closed his sermon, not that he has done discredit to his own reputation, but that he may, after all, have proved but a poor steward of the mysteries of the grace of God. Binney, when asked what he thought the best method of preaching, replied, "Gather your materials with all care, and set fire to them in the pulpit."

## ARTICLE III.

## THE STUDY OF NATURAL HISTORY.

*Gilbert White's Natural History of Selborne.* George Routledge, London.

*Life of a Scotch Naturalist, Thomas Edward, Fellow of the Linnæan Society.* By SAMUEL SMILES. Harper Brothers, New York.

Our eyes are capable of seeing whatever is visible. Every human eye, in its normal state, can see whatever any other human eye can see; nor can our eyes refuse to see whatever, under the proper conditions, is presented to them. Conscious perception, however, is something different from mechanical vision. While we must see what is before us, we often fail to perceive it. Thus, the power of sight being originally the same in all, the power of perception is, respectively, very varied.

This variation is due sometimes to congenital aptitude, and sometimes, perhaps most commonly, to training and the force of circumstances. Some men see much, and see it well; others but little, and that indifferently. Some see admirably one class of objects, others another, and both confess to reciprocal deficiencies. We may regret that all do not perceive all things equally well; but this is to ask for perfection; and this, again, is unconscious impiety, seeing that to be perfect, we must be infinite, and thus partake of the attributes of God. Being, as we must be, incapable of omniscience, it is a kind ordering of the Creator that we should be severally attracted to special and different things, in order that the acquisitions of some should supplement the deficiencies of others, and thus the accumulation for the benefit of the whole race be the greater. It is wise, therefore, for every one who would be successful and useful, (and this is to be happy,) to devote his powers mainly to the one pursuit for which his genius, or the peculiar bent of his mind, fits him.

Where the conditions of a man's outward life allow him to follow unimpeded the impulses of a strong natural propensity for a worthy pursuit, he must be very awkward in handling his op-



portunities if he does not secure success. Not a few exemplifications of this truth are furnished by the life-story of sculptors, painters, musicians, and poets, and all readers feel a cordial sympathy with the happiness that gilds the career of a man continuously prosperous in a work for which he has a passion and a genius. Nature does not yield to any of the fine arts in awakening enthusiasm in her devotees, nor in the rewards she bestows. Many readers, unappreciative of these arts, contemplate with delight the work of a naturalist who finds all-sufficient and unalloyed enjoyment in observing, understanding, and interpreting the endless manifestations and varieties of nature. If we were called on to say whose life presents us with a picture of absolute contentment, we would name Gilbert White of Selborne. He accomplished nothing surprising even in his own line. We never assign him rank along with Linnæus and Buffon, who may be called his contemporaries, nor with Cuvier, who lived about half a century later, nor with Wilson, nor Audubon, nor Agassiz, of our own times. We rather are inclined to associate him in our mind with old Izaak Walton, of a century earlier; but such a classification is vague and inaccurate. Walton was an angler, not a naturalist, though thoroughly imbued with a fresh unaffected love of nature. The charm which has kept his writings alive for more than two hundred years, is the healthy out-door breath which vivifies them, their simple enthusiasm and poetic coloring, together with the wisdom, wit, and picturesque piety of the old angler himself.

White of Selborne, however, was purely a naturalist; not a sportsman, nor angler, nor a collector, nor a sketcher, nor yet a poet. He was not stimulated in his study of nature as were Buffon, Wilson, and Audubon, by a desire for any kind of fame. He made some contributions to natural history, the value of which was promptly acknowledged; but his authorship seemed to be incidental, rather than to have been deliberately planned.

Gilbert White was born of good parentage in 1720, in Selborne, a little village in the extreme eastern corner of Hampshire, about fifty miles from London. He took his degrees at Oxford, and was elected Fellow of Oriel College. His English

biographer says that, "being of an unambitious temper, and strongly attached to the charms of rural scenery, he early fixed his residence in his native village, where he spent the greater part of his life in literary occupations, and especially in the study of nature. This he followed with patient assiduity and a mind ever open to the lessons of piety and benevolence, which such a study is calculated to afford. Though several occasions offered of settling upon a College living, he could never persuade himself to quit the beloved spot which was indeed a peculiarly happy situation for an observer. Thus his days passed, tranquil and serene, with scarcely any other vicissitudes than those of the seasons, till they closed, at a mature age, June 26th, 1793."

Gilbert White's writings will be relished most by those who read with the same spirit in which he wrote. He did not propose to produce a systematic work upon natural history in general, nor upon any specific division of it; nor does he avail himself of the labors of others. He finds complete satisfaction in becoming acquainted with the natural history of Selborne. What is obvious, he contemplates daily with complacent admiration; and what is minutely curious or recondite, he studies by means of enthusiastic but unlaborious comparative observations of year after year, through a long lifetime. If a student should take up his volume, expecting to find a text-book which will lead him systematically to a scientific acquaintance with any branch of natural science, he will be disappointed; for he will find here no definitions, divisions, classification, nor method, no theorising, and no quoting of authorities. Nature is not dissected, but delineated by one whose converse with outward objects was that of unforced companionship, and whose only purpose in writing, if he had any special purpose, was to make his readers sharers of his unaffected enjoyment. The vicissitudes of the seasons supply him with appropriate subjects for comment, but do not fetter him to the observance of them, if others naturally suggest themselves. So neither is one department of natural history taken up and continuously treated, and then laid down for another. You are not studying with him the history of mammals, birds, fishes, insects, and plants, but are introduced to them as they are

found in Selborne, in miscellaneous proximity of place or time. This want of system is made pleasantly conspicuous to the eye in the English edition, by numerous engravings. On one page you have the raven, and on the next, perhaps, the otter or the hedgehog, or the peacock, or the deer, or the tortoise, or a giant oak, or some strange fossil. Thus is his book, in its unclassified variety, an unconscious copy of Nature, whose prodigal profusion make monotony impossible.

Yet, strange to say, the highest rule of art (which is also the controlling principle in the works of Nature) has been observed, though never indicated. There is in all the volume the most absolute unity. It is a book on the natural history of Selborne, and *nothing else*. Writers of natural history are prone to two things, which, though easily and indeed naturally connected with their subject, do not strictly belong to it—poetizing and theologizing. Old Izaak Walton indulged himself freely in poetic fancies, and for a man not liberally educated, executes his passages with surprising effect. Note his famous description of the song of the skylark and the nightingale. Buffon was conspicuous for his elaborate flights, and Audubon also; while Wilson mars his truthful descriptions by efforts in style more ambitious than successful. Linnæus, though occasionally eloquent, wrote in a concise and unadorned manner. Possibly his command of Latin (the language he used) did not allow him any other. White, though an Oxford scholar, (rather because he was one,) has in his style no more ostentation than has Nature herself; and at the same time is equally free from meanness. He has given some specimens of his own verse, on the model of Thomson. The reader is glad that he has not given more, and especially pleased that he has kept his poetry, such as it is, to itself, and has not introduced any of it into his clear, natural, idiomatically English prose. This remark is not extended to the elegant quotations from the Latin poets.

Natural History so well illustrates Natural Theology, that we approve this use made of their subject by almost all naturalists. Still, as a strict question of art, unity is infringed when they are treated together.

It was remarkable in White—and considering that he was in holy orders, not altogether commendable—that he so seldom refers to the Divine Providence in which Nature consists. In fact, in two instances he seems to be rather inclined to criticise the arrangements of Providence. In speaking of the tortoise, (of which a very interesting history is given,) he says: “When one reflects on the state of this strange being, it is a matter of wonder to find that Providence should bestow such a profusion of days, such a seeming waste of longevity on a reptile that appears to relish it so little as to squander more than two-thirds of its existence in a joyless stupor, and be lost to all sensation for months together, in the profoundest of slumbers.” Referring to the habits of the cuckoo, which never builds a nest for itself, but deposits its eggs in the nests of other birds, he calls it “such a monstrous outrage on maternal affection, one of the great dictates of nature, and such a violence on instinct, that had it only been related of a bird in the Brazils or Peru, it would never have merited our belief.” Mr. White, however, gives credit to Providence for the cunning and address with which the cuckoo accomplishes this act of doubtful morality in his eyes. Until recently the cuckoo alone was supposed to represent this anomaly; but Wilson has established the same habit upon our American cow-bunting or cow-bird, a species quite different from the cuckoo. And the providential ordering in the case is more clearly exhibited by the ascertained fact, that the eggs of the cow-bird require two or three days less of incubation than those of the birds in whose nests they are deposited, and thus the life of the foster young is secured at the expense of the legitimate brood, which invariably perishes.

In the History of Selborne, nothing appears extraneous, even by allusion, though some of the most startling and momentous events of modern history belong to the period which it covers. In the opening of a letter, dated 1779, the author gives a casual backward glance upon the preceding forty years of his life, and remarks: “New occurrences still arise as long as any inquirers are kept alive;” which philosophic observation he illustrates, not by referring to the defeat of Culloden, the victory of Plassy, the

capture of Quebec, the Peace of Paris, or the War of Independence in America, then going on, but by recording that "in the last month, five of those most rare birds, too uncommon to have obtained an English name, were shot upon the verge of Fanshaw Pond!" His book is as achronic as Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress*; nor does it aim at utility more than a Greek play. We have no suggestions for advancing agriculture, nor for the improvement of domestic animals; he has no sympathy for the sportsman nor angler, but for birds and fishes; nor does he feel called on to treat insects as pests, but as curious and attractive objects of study. Two of his principal *dramatis personæ* are an old tortoise and an intelligent toad. Men themselves fall within the scope of his notice only as *lusus naturæ*. A singular account is given of an idiot boy, who is characterised as a bee-eater, and of another who furnished perhaps the last instance in England of a sufferer from leprosy.

It is a little startling to read the record for fifty years of a clergyman, and never meet with even the slightest allusion to his professional work. His parishioners were of more value than many sparrows, blue-jays, and gold-finches, and the condition of the soul after death a vastly more practical as well as a profounder subject of inquiry than the migration of swallows. Doubtless our amiable and pious naturalist recognised this as clearly as we do, and acted conscientiously his part as a divine; but he did not deem this the place to talk about it, and he was right. He had one thing before him to do; and by confining himself to this, he has done it so well that he has given delight to innumerable readers, and embalmed his name, and that of his native village, imperishably in the literature of the English language.

Nor are his writings without their moral value, as awakening the attention of many to the sources of blameless enjoyment accessible at the cost of little more than attention to what is round about us. It is true that to few would the conditions of studying nature be as favorable as they were to Gilbert White, possessed of the opportunities of sufficient fortune and more than common leisure. Nor are there many who have his natural aptitude for this kind of study, and his constraining impulse towards it. Let

it be remembered, however, that a pursuit of this science by no means as exclusive as his, and an acquaintance with it much less extensive, will insure enjoyment and profit.

For one who shares the enthusiasm of White of Selborne for natural science, and yet is deterred by the want of opportunity from its study, *The Life of a Scotch Naturalist*, (still living,) Thomas Edward, is full of encouragement. His marvellous persistency amid every species of hindrance that obscurity, poverty, want of education, neglect, and lack of all help and appreciation in the line of his inborn tastes, has been told recently by Samuel Smiles; and the pathetic story is one that cannot fail to act as a stimulus to all investigators of the wonders of nature. That this poor shoemaker in the north of Scotland, denied all encouragement, and opportunity, and means, and friends, and leisure, and pressed by the grinding necessities of a large family, has achieved such wonders, and added so largely to the natural history of Britain, can be accounted for only by attributing to him the irresistible enthusiasm of genius and the inexplicable faculty of instinct.

Persons like Gilbert White of Selborne, and Thomas Edward of Banff, need no encouragement to the study of natural history; they cannot be kept back from it. Perhaps to others less strongly predisposed, it would still prove a delight, if once they were introduced to it. And what a safeguard against listlessness, idleness, and something worse, it may be, would it prove to many! The wife of Edward was wise as well as tender, when she submitted to multitudes of discomforts and privations connected with her husband's insatiable thirst for scientific knowledge, and justified herself by saying, when questioned on the point, that "the shoemakers of the place were a' a drunken set; but her gude man was so fond o' his beasties, that he never wasted time or money at a public house, and never neglected his bairns."

Perhaps no class of men are more advantaged by this sort of study than ministers of the gospel. Revealed Religion has as its basis, Natural Theology, and as its illustration, Natural History. Thus, for the minister, this study is in a measure professional, while in its nature different from the other topics which may

engage his attention. This undesignedly turns a recreation to profit. As a theme for agreeable and useful conversation, none is more generally adapted to all classes, especially in country congregations, than this. The most direct benefit, and the most important, is, that it gives motive and increased value to the outdoor exercise of every man of sedentary habits.

The branch of natural history to which any one will attach himself, will be determined by his taste and his circumstances. Perhaps the most generally attractive section is that of ornithology. Some find the history of wild animals a little coarse, and that of domestic insipid and tame. Botany is too tedious to fall in with every one's taste. Entomology is too minute and occasionally repulsive; while nothing but a share of the geniality and poetry of quaint old Izaak can make one take thorough interest in the cold, silent nomads of the streams, never subject to scientific investigation except out of their native elements, and never so much relished as when upon the table.

But birds delight all, and offend none. With a liberality as free as the air through which they glide, they bestow their attractions unbought and even unsought upon all. We need scarcely go abroad to search for them; they come to show themselves to us. In the forests, in the fields, in the gardens, at our doors, under our eaves, even in the parks of crowded cities, we meet with them. They ask not at our hands food, shelter, or defence; never themselves annoying us, they are our efficient allies in the contest we wage with noxious insects, which, unchecked, would render the earth uninhabitable. To every sense they afford gratification. The artist cannot transfer to his canvas their grace of form, nor match the brilliancy nor variety of their coloring; nor can the musician emulate the exquisite tones of their song. They connect themselves, by natural associations and analogies, with all the vicissitudes of our daily lives, and the varying moods of our feelings. They awake us in the early morning with their delicious melody; they cheer the labors of the day by their activity; they chant vespers for us with the shades of evening. The light hearted, the pensive, and even the melancholy, may all hear, if they listen, the respective key-notes

of their hearts. Birds in a gay procession of countless bands accompany the advance of spring, vie with the bright glory of summer, and silently gliding away in autumn, harmonise with the falling leaves in chanting the cadence of life's litany, while some abide with us during the deadness of winter as pledges of the resurrection of the buried year. So human are birds that they have decorated the literature of all ages, and (what is almost too solemn to refer to in this connexion) a bird has been selected in the Book of Inspiration as the emblem of Deity.

The presence of birds gives us scarcely more pleasure than the study of them affords us instruction. It is most curious to observe their habits, acting under the impulse of irresistible instinct in migration, pairing, nidification, incubation, watching their young, and supplying them with food; and yet to see them adapting themselves to circumstances, and to note the modifications wrought in their manner of life, and, as we may say, in their moral nature, by the influences of climate, supply of food, and the presence of man and his civilisation.

Finally—for we must not indulge ourselves further with so pleasing a theme—how improving to our moral and religious sensibilities is an intelligent and kindly acquaintance with a portion of creation which brings us so easily and so directly to the contemplation of the wisdom and beneficence of the Creator!

We hope our readers will not regard us as assigning to ornithology the first place in the study of natural history, but only as indicating our personal preference. Others may choose the wider scope of mineralogy and geology, and study them in connexion with the important questions which they involve; others may be moved by the sublimities of astronomy, or fascinated by the tantalising secrets of meteorology. We may have our respective preferences, but we cannot have any controversy. Nature is one and the same, and those who love her and seek to understand what she is ready to reveal to their ardent research are ever at one. Whether we study Nature in all her various manifestations, or devote ourselves to investigations of a narrower scope, whether we make it the main work of our lives, or only a



subsidiary pursuit, or even a mere recreation, we are secure against disappointment,—

“——for Nature never did betray  
The heart that loved her;”—

and we are assured of proportionate reward, if not in fame, at least in self-improvement and rational enjoyment.

It is to be noted, also, that the study of any section of natural history may be carried on to greater or less completeness, according to the aptitude, taste, and opportunities of the observer, yielding, meanwhile, profit and pleasure at each stage of progress. We may acquire a knowledge of the feathered tribes of our own locality,—their names, characteristics, colors, notes,—so as to be able to class them intelligently. By means of books we may extend our acquaintance till it embraces birds of all species; we may turn to their anatomy and physiology, and pursue this investigation by the recent methods of genetic biology, until we feel ourselves competent to verify or explode the evolution theory, that “Birds with all their grace, beauty, and innocence, are neither more nor less than transformed reptiles.”

Some inquirers may feel well rewarded for all the labor which will be required to secure this position. White of Selborne would have felt great respect for such high knowledge, but would not have enjoyed it as much as he did his loving familiarity with Nature; neither would the Scotch naturalist, Thomas Edward; and old Izaak Walton would have resented such irreverent speculation as he would have done an insult offered to one of the pretty milk maids who sing for us in *The Complete Angler*.

As for us, let each one take of this pleasing lore as much as he desires and is capable of. Nature is not dogmatic, but without restraint, stint, or satiety, is accessible to all who seek her. “What is the end of Nature? Where is the end of a sphere? The sphere balances at any and every point. So everything in Nature is at the top, and yet no *one* thing is at the top.”

## ARTICLE IV.

A QUESTION FOR OUR CHURCH : WHO SHALL VOTE  
FOR PASTORS?

The framers of our Form of Government, in 1788, evidently had before them a very celebrated Presbyterian manual, of which the title runs thus : "*Collections and Observations Methodized, Concerning the Worship, Discipline, and Government of the Church of Scotland, in four Books, by WALTER STEUART, Esq., of Purdivan ; to which is added the Form of Process in the Judicatories of the Church of Scotland.*"

On the first page of that work, they met with this statement : "And it is also agreeable to and warranted by the word of God, that some others besides those who labor in the word and doctrine be Church governors, to join with the ministers of the Word in the government of the church and exercise of discipline, which office-bearers Reformed Churches do commonly call ruling elders."

We find a good share of this statement transferred to our Chap. V. of Ruling Elders, but it sounds somewhat feeble, rather less positive and decided, and a little more apologetic, as our fathers put it, than as it streamed from the pen of the sturdy Scotch Presbyterian. What he wrote was Presbyterianism, pure and simple, as it was understood in Scotland. When our fathers took up the pen, it was "to present to the *Christian public* the form they had adopted," which they hoped would meet with "the approbation of an *impartial public*," as well as "the countenance and blessing of the great Head of the Church universal." Now, in 1648, at Cambridge, Massachusetts, a Platform was "gathered out of the word of God" by the Congregationalists, which, on the subject of the Ruling Elder, was everything the strictest Presbyterian could desire. But sixty years afterwards, at Saybrook, Connecticut, in 1708, the same people adopt the "Heads of Agreement," drawn up in Old England, to effect a union betwixt Presbyterian and Congregationalist ministers there, of which Cotton Mather says : "The brethren of the Presbyterian way in England are lately come into such a happy union with

those of the Congregational, that all former names of distinction are lost in that blessed one of *United Brethren*." These *blessed* Heads of Agreement take very different ground from the Cambridge Platform about ruling elders. The agreement was that "divers being of opinion" favorable to ruling elders, while "others think otherwise," "we agree that this difference make no breach between us." It is now *opinion*, not *doctrine*, they handle. They would act together as one body, though differing on the great fundamental question, What sort of government has Christ established in his Church? Such was the spirit of the New England Congregationalists in 1708. But "the office of the ruler elder" (as Dr. Bacon wrote in 1843) "soon died away." Sixty years had been enough to uproot this doctrine, "gathered out of God's word" by the men of 1648. And so, eighty years after the meeting at Saybrook, when some of these same Congregationalists are in 1788 associated at Philadelphia with sundry Presbyterians of Scotch and Scotch-Irish blood and descent, in making a Form of Government for the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, which was to be "acceptable to *the public* as well as the Head of the Church," it is not so very strange (considering also the circumstances that New England was near neighbor to New York and Pennsylvania, having intimate relations with them, and great influence over them in many ways) that we should find some slight modification of the old Scotch statement of the doctrine of God's word touching the ruling elder.

On the same first page, Steuart of Purdivan says: "It is likewise agreeable to the same Word, that the Church be governed by several sorts of judicatories, such as Kirk-sessions, Presbyteries, Provincial and General Assemblies," etc. Our fathers having this statement evidently before their eyes, under the same influence above described, modify the Scotch terms into this shape: "And we hold it to be expedient and agreeable to Scripture and the practice of the primitive Christians, that the Church be governed by Congregational, Presbyterial, and Synodical Assemblies." If the doctrine of Church courts be *agreeable to Scripture*, why bring in the practice of the primi-

tive Christians, and especially why introduce that miserable Yankee idea of expediency ?

We turn over to the second page of Steuart of Purdivan, and we read how an election for pastor is to be managed : "When the Presbytery are well informed that a parish for the most part is unanimous to elect a fit person to be their pastor, then they are to appoint one of their number to preach on a Lord's day in the vacant congregation," and to notify the elders, heretors, magistrates and town council, and heads of families, to meet at the church after ten days for the election. On the appointed day, "the church-session is to meet and proceed to the election ; and it doth most properly belong to them, as the representatives of that congregation, to look out for a fit person to be their pastor. But seeing the heretors (especially such as reside in the parish) and magistrates, with their town councils, (in burghs) are the most lasting as well as the most considerable heads of families, on whose satisfaction and assistance the comfortable living of ministers may much depend, the 33d Act of King William and Queen Mary's Parliament hath enjoined them, (being Protestants,) with the elders, in subscribing of calls to ministers. It is to be minded that both session and town council do subscribe personally as the heretors do. By the above mentioned Act of Assembly, no person under the censure of the kirk is to be admitted to vote in the election of a minister." Now Chapter fifteenth of our Form answers well to this account of the matter : when the people appear prepared to elect, the session shall convene them ; a neighboring minister is to be solicited to assist ; on a Lord's day, after sermon, notice shall be given and the day fixed ; and when the election comes off, no person shall be entitled to vote who will not submit to church censure, or does not assist in supporting the minister.

And then *the call*, as Steuart of Purdivan gives us the form of it, (pp. 3 and 4,) resembles the same thing amongst us. It runs thus : "We the heretors, elders, and magistrates of the town council of —, being destitute of a fixed pastor, and being most assured by good information and our own experience of the ministerial abilities, piety, literature, and prudence, as also of

the suitability to our capacities of the gifts of you, Mr. A. B., preacher of the gospel," etc. But it is observable that what with us is justly considered the most essential part of the call, and the only test of its reality and sincerity, viz., the promise to pay a certain sum of money for the minister's services, is quite wanting in "the call," as Steuart of Purdivan states it—the reason being, of course, that in Scotland the Church was endowed, whereas, in this country, the support is by individual contributions.

It appears, then, that in the Scotch Kirk, magistrates, landed proprietors, and heads of families, because of the assistance they could give in the comfortable support of the minister, were allowed to be associated with the elders in his election.

And now of what value is this precedent? When we can show that the Church of Scotland, even in her best days, held a certain doctrine, or followed a certain practice, does that prove that we are to hold and to practise the same? By no manner of means. Our appeal is never to the Church of Scotland or any other human authority, but to the Scriptures. And just so we are to understand, when it is proposed to revise our own Form of Government and Book of Discipline, that there is no such sacredness about either document as gives it immunity from correction and improvement. Amongst us there have been several revisions of the work of the fathers of 1788. And what were those fathers but men? And what were Steuart of Purdivan and the Presbyterians of his country and his time but men? We get our Church Government from the Bible, but in no other shape than as we get our Theology. There is a doctrine of Church Government, as of the Attributes, or the Trinity, "to be gathered out of the Scriptures." The principles of Presbyterian Church Government (very few in number) are expressly revealed in the word. It is not given to every age or to every man to see them with equal distinctness of vision. The past forty years in this country have been years of earnest discussion amongst Presbyterians. Perhaps we understand some things now, touching the Church Government revealed in the Bible, better than our fathers did; but probably we do not understand as well as they did, the

points of our theological system. If this be so, letting our doctrinal standards alone in their scriptural glory, we may well amend and improve our Book of Order. And whether it is Steuart of Purdivan, or any other high authority that speaks, we must always fetch him to the word and measure his every utterance by that sole test of all religious truth.

Now, the Scotch Kirk idea touching the election of the pastor was, that the Session, as composed of the representatives of the Church, was the proper body to act for them in such elections. The Session acted for the Church in other matters, and why not in this matter? It acted for the Church at Presbytery and elsewhere, and why not here? The whole discipline and all the spiritual interests of the congregation were confessedly in the hands of Session. In nothing did the people act directly, but always by and through their representatives, for Presbyterian Church Government is representative government. And why should not the Session choose the pastor. Well, the answer of the Scottish Kirk was, that that would be strictly proper, but inasmuch as the comfortable living of the minister may much depend on the satisfaction and assistance of the heads of the families, and inasmuch as the most lasting and considerable of these are the inheritors or landed proprietors and the magistrates and council, it is right that they should be joined with the elders in making the election. Now, the question is, and it is a fair question, and it ought to be fairly answered, Was this answer consistent with the principles of the Presbyterian system revealed in the Scriptures?

But before taking up this question, let us glance at the American Presbyterian idea touching the election of pastors, and contrast it in both particulars with this idea of the Scotch Kirk. In our American Form, the business begins with the Session; in the Scotch Kirk, it begins with the Presbytery. In our Form, the minister invited by the Session, after preaching, notifies "all the members of that congregation" to meet on a given day. In the Scotch Kirk the minister appointed by the Presbytery, after sermon, "intimated that elders, heritors, magistrates and town council, and heads of families," should assemble. In our Form,

no one shall vote who refuses to submit to Church censures, or who does not contribute to the expenses of the congregation. In the Scotch Kirk, no one could vote who was under the censure of the Kirk, but heads of families on whose satisfaction and assistance the comfortable living of the minister might much depend, were allowed the privilege of voting. In our Form, it is understood that all communicants may vote, (females as well as males?) and that in fact "all the members of that congregation" have that right, excepting such church members as will not submit to discipline, and such non-professors as do not contribute to the support of the church. In the Scotch Kirk, the idea distinctly was, that the voting did most properly belong to the elders, as the representatives of the congregation, but that heads of families, whose satisfaction and assistance were important, might also vote. The American Presbyterian idea, therefore, glorifies the people; the Scotch idea exalted the Session.

And now, when we examine all that follows in our Form of Government, nothing is to be found which throws any doubt upon the interpretation just given of its provisions respecting the electors of pastors. The "Questions," for example, which are propounded to the people at the installation of their minister, are applicable to the mere supporters and the members all in one. And in Chap. XVII., Sec. 7, "the heads of families of that congregation who are then present, or at least the elders and those appointed to take care of the temporal concerns of that church," (referring apparently to the *trustees*, who are so often not members of the church,) are to come forward and offer the installed minister their right hand in token of cordial reception.

And then the only record in Baird's or in Moore's Digest, referring to this question previously to 1837, is a decision made by the Assembly, 1711, declaring expressly that "none shall be allowed to vote for the calling of a minister but those that shall contribute for the maintenance of him." (Baird, p. 63. Moore, pp. 404, 405.) In the same place, Moore also informs us that "as adopted by the Synod in 1788, the margin for the direction of the presiding minister read, 'The minister shall receive the votes of none but regular members, and who punctually pay

toward the support of the church.' This was stricken out in the revision of 1820."

It appears, then, to be the idea of our Form, that voting for the pastor is not to be confined to the communicating members, but the supporters of the church are also to take part. And this certainly is and has always been the practice in our Church, so far as known to us.\*

Coming now to the question whether the Scotch Kirk's position and practice is according to Scripture, it is to be observed that there are two parts to the question: *First*, Is it according to Presbyterian principles for the elders to choose the pastor for the people? *Secondly*, If others besides the elders are to vote, shall it be the heretors, magistrates, and town council?

As to the first: admitting in full the representative character of Presbyterian church government, still it is not for the Session to choose the pastor, for they do not even choose the elder who rules. The Session are chosen themselves by the vote of the people. It is not admissible, therefore, to say that the people, who, in a certain sense, do make the Session, may not, in that same sense, make the pastor. If the Session have in a certain sense sprung from the people, shall the higher officer not also spring in the same sense from the fountain head whence they derived their being, but spring only from the Session? Have they, who were made by the people, a power to make pastors which the people do not possess? It comes, then, to this, that

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\* It will be admitted by most readers of this REVIEW, that very high ecclesiastical authority is quoted in favor of such being the rightful practice amongst Presbyterians, when it is stated that in 1863, Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge led in a complaint to the General Assembly "against the Synod of Kentucky in its action limiting the right of voting in the election of a pastor to communicating members of the church."

The resolution of the Assembly was as follows: "*Resolved*, That the complaint be sustained; but the Assembly in this judgment does not intend to condemn a practice prevalent in some of our congregations, in which the right of voting for pastor is confined to communicants." Perhaps this may have been blowing both hot and cold, yet it is evidence that the practice in the Northern Church, as in our own, and in the Scotch Kirk, has generally been in favor of allowing certain non-communicants a vote for pastors. (See Moore's Digest, p. 405.)



representative church government is very far indeed from denying that the people may choose their own representatives; in fact, that choice is of the very essence of representative government. Ruling elders are representatives chosen by the people; teaching elders are also representatives chosen by the people; both together rule over the church; but the rule of the church is always and only by her representatives.

As to the second part of the question: the objection that will, no doubt, be made to the manner in which the Scotch Kirk proposed to extend beyond elders the privilege of voting for pastors, is that church power can be only for Christ's people, and that it cannot be legitimately shared by landed proprietors, magistrates, or town councillors. Upon this objection two remarks are offered: 1. It seems impossible to deny that, *as such*, neither of the classes named can have any right to vote for the pastor of a Christian flock; for what connexion is there between the ownership of land or the office of a magistrate or town councillor, and voting for a pastor? But it is not so clear that non-communicating individuals of either of these classes, being stated worshippers with a Christian congregation, and feeling interested, perhaps deeply and even savingly, in the truth; being also sincerely desirous (perhaps out of a secret, almost unconscious, love for Christ) for the church to grow and spread; being also, perhaps, themselves of the baptized children of the church, but not seeing their way clear to come to the Lord's table; being, yet further, so circumstanced as that without their assistance the pastor cannot be supported; and being, once more, themselves heads of families, and much concerned to have their children under such a ministry as they can approve: it is not clear that such individuals of either of these classes may not legitimately be allowed the privilege of voting against an unsuitable and for a suitable minister. 2. It is not clear that the allowing such parties, as have now been described, to vote for a pastor, is to be considered the bestowing upon them any share of church power. It is not as a ruler in the church they vote for him, although, of course, every teaching elder does rule in every act and exercise of his teaching office. But to allow the parties described the vote

under consideration is merely to allow them to unite in calling such a *preacher* as interests and benefits them; and it is very easy to conceive of this as not strictly a question of church power at all. It is not like voting for a ruling elder.

This view will be further confirmed if it be considered what really is the significance of church power. No class of outsiders, say some, is to be allowed in any case any sort or any degree of this power, for, of course, that can belong only to Christ's true people. Now the question, whom has our Lord constituted the subject of this gift? is a nice and somewhat difficult question, and it has been, and still is, much disputed. One party is found insisting that the rulers, in distinction from the ruled, are its proper subjects; while another party take the exactly opposite view, and hold that the primary subjects of church power are the ruled, and that rulers are simply their creatures and nothing more. Here, then, are two extremes of opinion,—the Romish and the Independent—both dangerously erroneous. As usual, the Presbyterian doctrine runs to neither extreme. It makes the Church, in her organised form, the rulers and the ruled, as they stand indissolubly united in one body, to be the proper subject of Church power. It is not the elders, it is not the members, but it is the Church, including both, which has the power Christ has given to men to act in his name. And now if the Scriptures lay down no law on the subject of voting for a pastor, then that is a circumstance for the Church to arrange in her prudence according to the general regulations of the word. She is to determine in her Form of Government who is to vote for pastors, and it is not otherwise to be claimed by the communicants as their exclusive right. Who gave them such exclusive right? Does the Lord give it in his word? Let it be pointed out then, chapter and verse. If He did not so give it, then it does not belong to them unless the Church judges best to introduce such a provision as an entirely new feature into her Constitution. For this or any other exercise of church power belongs not to any individuals or to any class of men, except it be given them either by Christ or by his Church. No individual and no class can claim any aboriginal rights in the premises. It

is the Church to whom Christ gives all church power, and she must give it to whom she judges fit. This is not a matter settled directly by the Word, but by the Church in her wisdom as the Lord has authorised her to determine it. The question of voting for pastor, as to its exercise by males or females, by church members or by church supporters, is not a scriptural, but a constitutional question.

The case stands thus: here is a community of people attached to the Presbyterian doctrine and order, some of them in full communion with the church, some of them baptized members but not communicating, and some supporters of the church, regular attendants on its ordinances, and more or less interested about their own and their children's religious instruction and training. And a minister is to be elected to teach them the truth and be the means of enlightening and saving them. Now to whom will the church intrust the privilege of voting for this minister who is to communicate spiritual benefits to all these classes, and receive carnal ones in return from them all? Some will answer promptly, as perceiving no difficulty at all in the case, "Oh, of course, to nobody but communicants." And when asked to give a reason for this decision, it is, that church power belongs to the Bride; but evidently *the Bride* does not mean the communicants of that single congregation, so that the answer is a manifest *non sequitur*. And then, again, it is not a question of church *power*, but of *preaching*. The man to be voted for is, so far as concerns all besides the communicants, only a teacher and not a ruler. Why not let their votes declare whether they like or dislike him in this capacity simply of *their teacher*; for if they like him not, how can he hope to do them any good?

This view of church power being given only to the *cœtus fidelium* (comprising both officers and members, collectively considered) is sustained even by John Owen, the famous Independent. He says, "The calling of bishops, pastors, elders, is an act of the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven. But these keys are originally and properly given unto the whole Church." He says of Church power, "it is given to the whole Church." The Church (he says) is the bride, the wife, the queen, of the King

of the Church, Christ Jesus, and the power of the keys is expressly granted to her. (*True Nature of a Gospel Church, Works, Vol. XX., pp. 419, 420.*) It belongs not to any individual or class until it is given them by the Church. To whom she approves, she gives the right to hold office; to whom she approves, she gives the right to vote for office-holders.

This same view is also set forth by Bannerman, the great Presbyterian ecclesiologist, as being maintained by many of the most eminent Presbyterian authorities, such as Voetius and Gillespie. And he quotes, as expressing it distinctly, the 25th chapter of the Confession, where we read of Christ giving the ministry, oracles, and ordinances to the catholic visible Church.

And here it is necessary to refer to the error, as touching this matter, which disfigures the Revised Form of Government now before our Presbyteries for their adoption or rejection. In the first article of chapter second, section third, it is said, very properly, "The power which Christ has committed to his Church vests in the whole body, the rulers and the ruled, constituting it a spiritual commonwealth." But then, infelicitously, it is added, "This power, as exercised by His people, extends to the choice of those officers whom he has appointed in his Church." The meaning is, that the people choose the officers. For, in the second article of chapter sixth, section first, we read, "Since all the power which Christ has committed to the Church and vested in his people, is exercised by them in the choice of their officers, and since the government of the Church is representative, the right of the election of their officers by God's people," etc., etc. Plainly what is intended to be asserted is, that the people elect the officers. But "*the people,*" as such, ought not to have been confounded with "*the Church*" and with "*God's people,*" or "*His people,*" which term necessarily includes, according to the Presbyterian view, an *element* additional to *the people*, viz., *the officers*. It is not true that "all the power which Christ has committed to the Church and vested in his people," is to choose officers. It is not true that the choice of officers is all the exercise of Church power which belongs to "His people." That may be all which the people of a given congregation are allowed

to do, but it is by no means all the power which is committed to "the Church," and vested in "God's people."

But in answer to our call for proof from Scripture, it may be said that the Apostles authorised the brethren to look out amongst them seven men to be ordained deacons, which plainly gives the choice of Church officers to the members of the Church. But let it be observed, that at that time there could hardly have been any others but *members in full* connected with the Church; certainly there could not have been then any adult males who had been baptized in their infancy. The Apostles allowed the brethren to choose, and did not choose for them. This settles the question, that it is not Church rulers, whether one or many, who are to appoint pastors, but the people are to elect such as they desire. And this principle must stand now and to the end. The Church is a representative republic, and chooses its own officers. This is the point which is established by the election of the seven deacons. But that election does not necessarily determine who are "*the brethren*," who are the Church members to vote in the election. If the Church is now in a very different position, as to her members, from what she then occupied; having now, as she had not then, a numerous class of what may be called *secondary* members—members baptized but not communicating; and having, what she had not then, many friendly, sympathising supporters, whom she ought to bind more closely to herself, instead of driving them away from her; both of which classes want the privilege of indicating whom they could and would accept readily and gladly as their and their children's religious teacher; may it not be granted that a different rule for the election of officers is requisite now, and that it belongs now to the Bride, as it did then to the Apostles, to regulate the matter according to the dictates of prudence and the general provisions of the word?

And here, perhaps, it will be said, that the Bride being the catholic visible Church, we cannot point to the Form of Government of any one denomination of Christians, and say that the Bride has enacted it. This is, of course, admitted. And yet we must maintain that in the sad and lamentable condition of

separation and division in which the people of the Lord find themselves, and which they are not able, however sincerely so disposed, to bring to an end, the very nearest access that can be had to the Bride, is, for us, in the communion of our own Presbyterian Church, so that what it enacts we must and we will gladly accept as enacted for us by the Bride.

Here at length there arise to be considered the three forms of a rule on this subject submitted by the Assembly at New Orleans to the Presbyteries. The *first* one confines voting for ruling elders and deacons to communicants in good standing, but in the election of the pastor admits also to a vote adults regular in attendance on the common ordinances, and regular contributors to the support of the ministry. The *second* one calls for a separate vote by non-communicating adult members of the Church, regular in their attendance and regular contributors, which separate vote is to go to the Presbytery, that their desires may be understood by that body. The third one allows no one to vote for any church officer except members in good standing.

The second has appeared to many to be liable to the grave objections, that it is awkward and cumbersome, and liable to be considered offensive to the classes named, and also liable to the danger of its arraying against one another the two elements referred to in the rule. It is thought by judicious persons that such a rule will constitute a bid by the Church for hostile factions to arise in every congregation when about to elect a pastor. Accordingly it is urged, and with great show of reason, that the Presbyteries would do well to adopt either the first or the third of these rules, rejecting altogether what has been called the compromise rule.

The third one is a very rigid rule now proposed to be introduced into our form. It excludes all mere friendly supporters of the pastor from a vote, and so it must necessarily cripple four-fifths of all our churches, inasmuch as many of the excluded will take offence and withdraw their help. The consequence will be a heavy blow to ministerial support, already in a languishing condition in our churches. But this is not the chief objection. It excludes from this kind of coöperation with the Church what

may be considered a very hopeful class of persons—such as stately attend on the ordinances, and regularly give of their means to support the gospel. Of one who was like this class of modern hearers of the gospel, the Lord said, “Thou art not far from the kingdom.” Such persons are to be attracted to the Church by every lawful means, and never repelled. The Church suffers by repelling such, and they suffer—perhaps fatally and forever. Now, contrasted with this unhappy influence and tendency of the rigid rule, what must be the operation of the liberal one? That rule puts the Church and the ministry in the true and proper attitude of being light to the world and salt to the mass which is to be saved. Where the officer to be elected is for the church members as such most especially, there it confines the vote to church members. But where the officer is to have most important relations, and be in the most close and intimate connexion with such as are regular attendants and supporters, there this liberal rule allows these classes to express their preferences at the election. They are not to exercise church power in voting for a ruler as such, but, viewed as a teacher merely, they vote whether they wish or wish not the instructions of a certain minister. The liberal rule is designed to give the pastor every advantage in dealing with these hopeful classes. He is to instruct and exhort and persuade and convert; by all means he ought to be the man whom they have chosen to do for them these great and needful works. So important is this that one of our most eminent pastors and preachers (Dr. Palmer of New Orleans) says, and says well, that he would never accept a call where the outsiders had not had the opportunity to express their wish for his services.

But the greatest objection to the rigid rule remains to be stated. It excludes from voting for the pastor all the baptized non-communicating members of the church of adult age. It is obvious, of course, as Dr. Thornwell expresses it, (*Works*, IV., 327,) that in every commonwealth there are peculiar privileges and peculiar disabilities—rights and privations are conditioned by qualifications and characters. It is so in the Church. All may not be officers, all may not come to the Lord’s table, all are not

capable of technical church discipline, which is not for the dead, but only for the living. Now, the rigid rule makes the expression of a preference for one teacher rather than another, to be as much beyond the capacity of this class of persons as is the power to discern the Lord's body by faith, and as is the life of God begun in the soul. It seems to make the power to cherish preference and liking for one teacher rather than another to be as great, as peculiar, as distinctive, a thing as the new birth itself. Surely it will not be denied that a man may be incompetent to discern the Lord's body, and yet competent to say whether he is interested and attracted by a given preacher, and prefers him to any other.

Dr. Thornwell (Works, IV., 333,) says, "The Church contains a sanctuary and an outer court. True believers are in the sanctuary, others (baptized non-communicating members) in the outer court, and the sanctuary is constantly filled from the court." Now, the rigid rule seems to regard the outer court as full only of "enemies and aliens." In one aspect this is true. Yet, is there not an aspect in which those who frequent, voluntarily, the outer court deserve to be viewed otherwise than as aliens and foes? Do we not wish and hope to attract them within? Voetius, the celebrated Dutch theologian, in his great *Ecclesiastical Polity*, as quoted by Dr. Thornwell, (Works, IV., 344,) divides the "people," in contradistinction from the "clergy," into "*partes proprias*," that is, proper members of the Church, and "*partes analogicas*," that is, those who are analogically members. Among these latter he puts the baptized sons of the Church, and then names three other classes—"audientes, catechumeni, competentes," that is, those who *listen*, those who are in a *class of learners*, and those who are *seeking after the truth*. There seems no room to doubt that the eminent Hollander would have found amongst the "aliens and enemies," who swarm the outer court, some not altogether indocile children of the Church, some willing listeners, some anxious learners, and some sincere seekers of the truth. And he must therefore have said that the disposition to repel rather than attract such is a disposition that smacks of a somewhat fanatical zeal.



In all the struggles of Presbyterianism in days gone by for the "people's right to choose their church officers," the consent of the congregation has ever been insisted upon against patrons and princes, against prelates and popes. But in the old country, where chiefly this battle has been waged, the congregation has usually consisted altogether of church members—few ever reached the years of discretion without making a public profession of faith. It is different in this country. In Scotland only communicants voted, but that included every head of a household. Our ideas of the Supper perhaps are stricter, or our family training is looser, or the cause may be some other still; but the fact is patent, that many heads of families are diligent attendants on the ordinances amongst us who yet see not their way clear to the table. They may be listeners, learners, and seekers; they may be such as were baptized into the adorable name; they may be the sons of the Church, anxious to be enlightened, themselves and their children, by the preacher they prefer; and yet on some severe, anabaptistic principle, which construes them all to be sons of Belial and children of the devil, their wishes shall not be consulted in the choice of their pastor!

One writer says, "The very idea of those who profess no faith in Christ, and practise habitual disobedience to his authority, acting as electors on such an occasion, is repugnant to the fundamental notion of the Church. For to the Church is given the Holy Spirit to direct in all matters legitimately coming before her for adjudication or for action. And when, more than in the election of a pastor, does the Church need the guidance of the promised Spirit?" Surely the fanaticism of such a statement hardly needs a word to point it out. Will every individual church, where non-communicants are rigidly excluded, be infallibly guided by the Spirit in the election of a pastor? Or, does *the Church*, to which the Spirit's infallible guidance is promised, mean the individual church at all?

Another writer calls it "monstrous" to intrust "unconverted men and women" with such "a prerogative of church power," "because (1) contrary to all analogy in human governments; (2) averse from the spirit of Scripture; and (3) fraught with

danger to the dearest interests of the Church." As to the first point, it is not very Presbyterian to argue from human governments to that of the Church; yet, in point of fact, this very government of the United States does the very thing this writer alleges that no human government would do, for it allows the "citizen of a rival and hostile kingdom, if he be simply a resident and a tax-payer, the same sovereign right with the native citizen," without pretending to know whether he is converted to republicanism or not. The government never looks at all to the state of the alien's heart, but welcomes him to the vote, on the ground of his residence and tax-paying, with the merest formality of an oath of allegiance, often in a language of which he knows not a word, and about which neither he nor the government officer who administers it, cares one farthing, as everybody knows. As to the second point, it certainly is not contrary to the Scriptures to accept others than communicants as, in an important sense and for important ends, true members of the Church. As to the third point, the idea that a vote for pastor by certain classes not communicants is fraught with danger to the dearest interests of the Church, is manifestly a new discovery. The Presbyterians of Scotland never entertained that idea. And the Old School Assembly, North, met at Peoria, Illinois, as this writer himself tells us, decided that the Form of Government, as it now stands, means that the vote does belong to such classes. And such, we venture to affirm, is the theory and the practice of most of *our* churches and Presbyteries. Another objection is urged by the same writer, when he hesitates not to charge that "the whole meaning of allowing such classes a vote is to secure the support, the moneyed help, of those who voluntarily remain among the enemies of our blessed Lord. It is pure simony—selling church power for an annuity." To such a base and unworthy charge, who would stoop to make any reply? Could anything but a spice of fanaticism lead an otherwise fair and sober writer to make such a dreadful charge against the honest convictions of his brethren?

Another form in which the same idea is presented, is as follows: "Church power in every case, and in every form, and in

every degree of it, necessarily belongs to Christ's true people alone." Thus they conformed the Church of Christ, the Bride to whom belongs, by gift, all promises, privileges, and power, with individual Christians or individual congregations. Thus also they take for granted that all communicants are of the true people of the Lord. Thus also they set forth an idea very similar to what may be and is called the Puritan;\* that is the Brownist or Independent idea of the Church. It is, that the Church is only of regenerate persons, and that every Church is to sit and judge whether an applicant for admission is truly born of God. "A particular church consists of a number of true believers united together by mutual covenant, and no one is to be admitted to church membership who does not give credible evidence of being a true child of God. And by 'credible evidence' is to be understood not such as may be believed, but such as constrains belief. All such persons, and no others, are admitted to the Lord's Supper. Such persons only as are thus *judged* to be regenerate, constitute the Church. All other professors of the true religion, however correct in their deportment, are denied that privilege." (See Hodge's Systematic Theology, Vol. III., pp. 545, 569-571.) But the scriptural idea of the Church, held forth in our standards, is that the Church consists of all who *profess* the true religion, together with their *children*. We express or imply no judgment that a man is regenerate when we receive him into church fellowship. We only accept him as making a credible, or perhaps we might better say *a not incredible, profession* of his faith. The responsibility is on him. The Lord has given us no power to judge the hearts of men, and therefore does not expect us to judge them. But we may and we must judge their professions; we may and we must judge their lives, and refuse to believe any man's profession, if his principles or his

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\* The name *Puritans*, originally a much wider one than now, is, according to modern usage, restricted generally to the Independents, or followers of Brown, and the Congregationalists, or followers of Robinson. The latter are fain to repudiate the former. But Dr. Leonard Bacon, in his *Genesis of the New England Churches*, seems to have found a name he likes better, viz., *Separatists*, and scouts the name *Puritans* for the New England people.

works contradict it. Nothing, however, authorises a refusal to admit a man into the Church, which would not require us to exclude him if he were already a member.

Now, manifestly, it was not the purpose of God that the Church on earth should consist exclusively of believers. Our Lord expressly condemns all attempts by men to separate the tares from the wheat, and says, "Let both grow together till the harvest." There never has been a *pure* Church on the face of the earth. And perhaps there is no more dangerous error touching the Church, than that which makes her to consist only of regenerate souls. This was the error of the Novatians or Cathari, in A. D. 251, and of the Donatists in A. D. 311-415, and of the Anabaptists in the sixteenth century, even under the milder form of their doctrine, which Menno Simonis introduced. And this again was the error of the intemperate Brownists. Dr. Hodge says (Vol. III., pp. 571-2) of the form of the error as the Brownists and those who followed them in New England stated it, that it is (1) a novelty that never was adopted by any Church until the rise of the Independents. (2) It has no warrant from Scripture, either by precept or example. Under the old economy, those who professed the true religion were admitted to the theocracy, but no body of men sat on the question of their being regenerate. And the apostles acted on the same principle, not examining nor deciding upon the regeneracy of the five thousand admitted in one day in Jerusalem. (3) That the attempt to make the visible Church consist exclusively of true believers, must not only fail of success, but also be productive of evil. He adds that experience proves it a great evil to make the Church consist only of communicants, and to cast out into the world, without any of that watch and care which God intended for them, all those, together with their children, who do not see their way clear to come to the Lord's table. And he quotes an old writer, who says: "In Church reformation, 'tis an observable truth, that those who are for too much strictness, do more hurt than profit to the Church." And from another he quotes: "If we do not keep persons in the way of a converting grace-giving covenant, under those church dispensations wherein grace is given, the

Church will die of a lingering though not violent death. The Lord hath not set up the churches only that a few old Christians may keep one another warm while they live, and then carry away the Church into the cold grave with them when they die; no, but that they might, with all care and with all the obligations and advantages which may be, nurse up still successively another generation of subjects to our Lord, that may stand up in his kingdom when they are gone." Elsewhere Dr. Hodge says (III., 577-8): "All attempts to preserve the purity of the Church by being more strict than the Bible, are utterly futile, nay, seriously injurious. They contravene the plan of God. They exclude from the watch and care of the Church, multitudes whom he commands his people to look after and cherish. Confining the visible Church to communicants in churches, unchurches the great majority even of the seed of the faithful. The Church does not consist exclusively of communicants. It includes also all those who, having been baptized, have not forfeited their membership by scandalous living.

Now, let the candid reader say whether the new and rigid rule which proposes to shut out from all share in calling a minister all the baptized sons of the Church who are not communicants, does not bear a striking resemblance in the spirit of it, to this Catharist and Donatist, this Anabaptist and Brownist conception of the Church. Meaning no offence by the question, Is there not a spice of the old fanaticism in the very idea that the head of a house and the father of a family, who is regular in his attendance on the common ordinances, and who contributes conscientiously and cheerfully to the support of the ministry, simply because he has certain difficulties in the way of his making a public profession of the faith, which it may well be hoped is in him, shall be by this new law excluded from all participation in the choice and calling of a minister? Are not the baptized sons of the Church really the *members*, and what for, then, shall they be excluded from this privilege, which has always been theirs? Shall we give to the Baptists a fresh proof that we really hold infant baptism very cheap, and do not, in truth, believe what we say of the church membership, which Baptism acknowledges our children to pos-

sess? And are we willing to cast out, as it were, into the cold world, and away from the watch and care and full sympathy of the Church, those who are only too honest and sincere, perhaps, to make a hasty profession of religion in public? Shall we not keep such persons in the way of a converting, grace-giving covenant, and under those dispensations wherein grace is given, and by cherishing all the interest they have in the Church's welfare, and nursing up all their love for her ministers, and encouraging all the delight they show in the preaching of any one of God's messengers—shall we not, by these and all other like means, seek to draw them out to a full and hearty profession of faith, and to endeavor to raise up successive generations of real hearty subjects of our Lord?

There seems to be no principle forbidding the present liberal way of allowing the baptized and the constantly attending and supporting classes to vote in the election of a pastor; for it is not as ruler, but teacher, they vote for him; and the Church, which is the subject in which Church power inheres, has the right to grant them the privilege of voting. But on the other hand, there is a principle which demands that, at least, the baptized non-communicating church members shall have this privilege, and that is the principle that he is a veritable church member, and ought to be encouraged as much as possible to recognise his own membership. It will never do for our Church to go into any such a narrow, stringent, unscriptural position, as the denial of the real membership of her baptized ones will constitute. They cannot be church officers, nor go to the table, nor be subjected to technical discipline, because they do not profess to be alive and in Christ; but they are nevertheless church members, and should be allowed to experience that their church membership is indeed a reality, by their being privileged to vote, not indeed for church rulers, or for deacons, but for the man whom they shall feel is best fitted to teach and guide them into the truth that saves.

So much is to be urged for the adult baptized members of our Church. A few words, now, touching all the classes together, whose participation in the election of pastor has been advocated

in this article. As to them all, the eminent Gillespie says (Miscellany Questions, p. 9): "It is very expedient for the credit and better success of the ministry, that a bishop have a good name and testimony even among them that are without, as the apostle teacheth, 1 Tim. iii. 7." He adds in the same place, that "it is a common maxim among the Fathers, Schoolmen, and Summists, *Quod ad omnes pertinet omnium consensu fieri debet*," which means that "what pertains to all, should be done with the consent of all." Now, unquestionably, the choice of the minister, who is to teach them and their families, is a matter which much interests all these classes—it manifestly pertains to them, and therefore, while they ought not to vote for ruling elders and deacons, Gillespie's observation shows the propriety of their voting for pastors.

His next remark is, that "the free consent of the people in the election is a great obligation and engagement, both *to them*, to subject themselves in Christian and willing obedience to him whom they have willingly chosen to be over them in the Lord, and *to the person elected*, to love them and to offer up himself gladly upon the service and sacrifice of their faith;" and this may certainly be applied to the classes in question.

On page 4 of the same treatise, Gillespie quotes from Walæus (Tom. II., p. 52): "The feeders of the people's souls must be no less (if not more) beloved and acceptable than the feeders of their bodies; therefore, these must be chosen with their own consent, as well as those." This sets forth the true position of the pastors with respect to all these classes. It is not as rulers, but as *feeders of their souls*, they need pastors, and it is absolutely necessary, if the feeding is to be done successfully, that their free consent be given to the choice of the feeders.

On page 12, Gillespie says: "Though nothing be objected against the man's doctrine or life, yet if the people desire another, better or as well qualified, by whom they find themselves more edified than by the other, that is a reason sufficient." Who does not see that this observation applies just as fully to the classes in question as to the communicants themselves?

It is to be observed that in all this discussion, Gillespie is

urging the rights of the people against the claims of patrons and prelates; he is advocating the liberal course of proceedings for his time against the strict and rigid course. That is precisely the attitude manifested in this article. Gillespie is for the consent of the people as against a one-man power; this article urges the consent of all who are concerned, as against the narrow and iron rule, which would confine election to but one class of those interested.

Finally, on the same page, Gillespie meets the objection that to let the people vote would be very dangerous for an apostatising congregation; for a people inclining to heresy or schism will not consent to the admission of an orthodox or sound minister. This is just the way that the advocates of the iron rule object to the liberal one: "it will result in the choice of bad men for pastors." Now, that is a strange idea for those who hold to the power which Presbytery has over ministers, to refuse installing, and even to depose the bad ones. But mark how Gillespie sets forth the ability of the people to discern the fittest, and their disposition to select the best minister. He says, on the next page, (p. 13,) "a people may follow leading men, and yet see with their own eyes, too; . . . the congregation judgeth not simply and absolutely whether one be fit for the ministry, but whether he be fit to serve in the ministry among them; . . . a rude and ignorant people can judge which of the two speaketh best to their capacity and edification." And even when he admits that "oftentimes the greater part shall overcome the better part, because in every congregation there are more bad than good, more foolish than wise," this great Presbyterian leader is still found urging the necessity of *popular election*, and his wise counsel is thus given: "*De incommodis prudenter curandis, non de re sancta mutanda temere, sapientes videre oportuit.*"



## ARTICLE V.

## THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.

*The Christian in the World.* By Rev. D. W. FAUNCE. Roberts Bros., Boston, 1875.

*Children of Light.* By Rev. W. W. FARIS. Roberts Bros., 1877.

The Hon. Richard Fletcher, LL.D., of Boston, by his will, bequeathed to Dartmouth College a fund, from the proceeds of which should be offered biennially a prize of \$500 for the best essay on the importance of holy living on the part of Christian professors. Under the provisions of this bequest have appeared the two volumes above named. Of Mr. Fletcher we personally know nothing more than is intimated by the extract from his will, prefixed as an explanatory advertisement to each of these volumes. It is evident that he was pressed by the difficult problem of reconciling the spirituality of the renewed heart, and the consecration of the sincere Christian, with the inevitable claims of practical life.

He has also contemplated the lamentable and sinful loss of power in the Church because of the conformity of professed Christians with the world; and he has sought by means of this bequest to have this important subject kept in view by its periodical presentation to the Christian public. If, by means of this bequest, heedless Christians are made to consider, and those who are honestly struggling with perplexity are aided, hardly could the testator have made a more fruitful disposition of so much of his estate; for with difficulty we bring ourselves up to the doctrine of entire consecration. As an article of our creed, we cannot reject it; but in practice, we are inclined to evade it. Self-denial is painful, otherwise it would not be self-denial; and in contemplation, it is even more formidable than in reality. And to those who have honestly resolved upon entire consecration, the perplexity as to the true meaning of the term is often bewildering.

The extremes of the topic are so opposed to each other, that there is no possibility of their being confounded. This is Christian duty—that is sinful worldliness. Debate here is inadmissible. But the confines of the adverse territories approach until they are separated only by a line, which, unmarked by color, and not determined by positive authority, must be ascertained by each for himself and at his own risk.

Now there is one method of escaping danger, which at first sight might seem for the Christian the proper one. Let him occupy the extreme of his own territory, and then he will be safe. This is the crude notion of the Christian life, that in early and dark ages sent men into the solitary desert, or gathered them into secluded monasteries. But society is as really the ordinance of God as the Church; and it is equally a sin to disregard the requirements of the one as of the other. Apparently, however, they are in conflict. Literally interpreted, the rule of Scripture condemns much that is so interwoven into social life that its elimination would seem to imply disintegration. Add to this, that the Christian side of the question is at disadvantage. The fashion of the world adapts itself our natural propensities. Christian integrity demands sharp self-denial. Nevertheless, the command is unequivocal: "Be not conformed to the world, but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of God." Many a Christian thinks that he honestly desires to know what is the perfect will of God, and yet feels himself unable to answer for himself, his children, or a person who consults him, in regard to not a few questions emerging from social life. And the very doubt itself has its peculiar edge to wound a sensitive conscience. Would I not know what is the perfect will of God if I were a true child of God? The difficulties of the Christian on this subject are thus presented with force by the author of *The Christian in the World*:

"See, then, where the Christian stands. Influences from beneath and from above engird him. This world and the other both urge their claims. Society, business, recreation, literature, the arts, the news of the day, the duties of citizenship, the claims of the family, the tempting world, the stealthy evil, the ripe questions of reform, the duties of private de-

votion and of public worship, the demands of benevolent enterprise—these things all utter, at one and the same time, their multitudinous voices, until the earnest heart is confused, baffled, and perplexed. May we do this thing, or only that? Some good men say, *yea*, and some as good say, *nay*. May one engage in that or the other kind of business—read this or that class of books—attend the theatre, or only the opera—or go to neither—play this or the other game? What time spend in social life, and what time devote to prayer? What style of living shall a Christian adopt, and how much may he spend on dress and furnishing? And since no man lives on the bare necessities of life, what luxuries may he rightfully enjoy? What shall he spend on himself, and what shall he give to others? Is it then an easy thing to be a Christian in such a world as this?"

Under the pressure of these perpetually recurring difficulties, some may be tempted to wish that the Bible were a book of casuistry, laying down specific rules for all possible cases. That this would be impossible, is at once obvious, when we reflect that such a book would be incomplete, and thus misleading, if it did not take into view the infinitely varied conditions of every possible form of civilisation, from the earliest date of the written Scriptures to the final period of the world. How, in Leviticus, could a place be found for a precise rule about holding stock in a railroad company running its cars on Sunday? But even if it were possible, it would not be good for the moral training of the race. Our life is a continuous probation, and this implies the choice between good and evil; and this, again, the cultivation of conscience. The Bible is a book of principles formulated into as many positive precepts as are necessary for the guidance of sincere seekers after truth, and illustrated by the actual biographies of good men and of wicked men, in all conditions of life; and above all, by the perfect exemplar life of Jesus Christ. Still, believers need the help of the Church as given in her standards, and as expounded and enforced by her authorised teachers. The importance of such help gave rise, in part, in the Roman Catholic Church, to the confessional, one office of which is to decide cases of conscience. The soul-destroying abuse of the confessional, in all of its functions, including that of casuistry, made it such a horror to Protestants, that legitimate casuistry, whether in public preaching or private application, has been abandoned, perhaps,

to too great an extent. A very important place is thus left to be occupied by well considered books on practical piety. But the writers need to be very wise who attempt this work. It is not difficult to portray a Christian character, wholly spiritual, whose breath is devotion, whose words are sermons, and whose only thought is the conversion of sinners. But if this is set up to be the type of all Christian men and women, it is at once untrue and hurtful. To say that the *chief* end of man is to glorify God, is true, because it distinctly implies that there are subordinate ends apart from the chief end. To call upon us to be what under our circumstances we cannot be, is to throw such doubt upon either the sincerity or the common sense of the writer, that we are indisposed to accept of his exegesis what is true, or to attempt what is actually attainable.

Nor is the effect less injurious when this doctrine is pressed upon us in the biography of some exceptional Christian, or Christian in exceptional circumstances, who has led a life of unusual spiritual exaltation. Read, for instance, the accounts of the way in which the English religious writer, Anna Shipton, has been guided, according to her own showing, in the minutest affairs, by direct answers to prayer, and, filled with admiration of her spirituality made practical, open some book of active life—say *The Cruise of the Challenger*—and we are instantly made aware of the difference of things. To circumnavigate the globe—now to face an equatorial storm; now to guide the vessel amid antarctic icebergs, to dredge the fathomless deep and secure its results for science—is a noble and useful work, and thus may be a religious one, but it is not spiritual. A writer who assumes to give us practical instruction is worse than useless, if he ignores this actual difference of things.

On the other hand, a great deal that is attractive may be said in a general way, about the brotherhood of man, the claims of human sympathy, the demands of civilisation, the sweetness of culture, the beauty of liberality, the hatefulness of bigotry, until we begin to feel that the only error is condemning anything, and that to be singular is not only ungentle, but unchristian.

A book, then, upon the Christian life, which shall avoid the

unpracticalness of what, for want of a better name, we may call extreme evangelicism, and at the same time shall be effectual in counteracting the seductive liberalism found in so much of our current literature, and coloring, to no inconsiderable degree, some teaching, called Christian, ought to be accepted as a boon by every Christian struggling with the difficult and practically important questions, What is meant by entire consecration? What does it bind me to? What does it forbid?

The author of *The Christian in the World* presents, as we have seen, very fairly, the difficulties inherent in the subject. The principles which must govern the inquiry are clearly laid down and impressively enforced. These principles are three: We must do (1) what will please Christ; (2) what will develop our own Christian character; (3) what will promote the holiness of others.

This is just the ordinary, comprehensive, threefold division of duty—to God, to ourselves, and to our fellow-men. The development of these topics, if not altogether original, is clear, systematic, fresh, instructive, and stimulating to the conscience. The three tests given above are so simple, so universally applicable, and so easy to remember, so portable, as it were, that no one can establish the habit of constantly using them, without great benefit.

Mr. Faunce, after expounding and illustrating his principles, proceeds, after giving an admirable dissertation on Prayer, to apply them to the Christian in business and the Christian in his recreations. To this, what had been before said is mainly preliminary, and doubtless it was with the view of securing instruction upon these points, that Mr. Fletcher made his bequest, and to these chapters the reader is most apt to turn first. They contain discriminating views and wholesome counsel, and cannot be carefully and honestly read without profit. If, however, the reader expects to find in them a dogmatic decision of special cases, he will be disappointed. And it may be, that not a few will dissent from the unlimited application by the author, of sound principles. Thus, if we are to gather from what he says, that the *sole* motive which ought to prompt to the acquisition of property, is to use money for Christ, the proposition is untrue,

in just the sense that we have noticed in speaking of the chief end of man. By the constitution of our nature, imposed by the Creator, we are impelled to labor, not by one, but by several motives—the simple pleasure of gain, the gratification of our wants, the desire of power, the love of our family, the wish to do good. All these are legitimate motives, and all may exist in harmonious coördination. At the same time, it is according to the laws of human diversity, that these several motives should have respectively unequal power over different men, and this it may be, in a sinful degree. A man may become a miser, or a sensualist, or selfish, or tyrannical. Even a desire to do good to others, may be perverted so as to lead to a disregard of other duties. John McDonough gave up his life to the accumulation of immense property, with the controlling purpose (if he was not mistaken in his motives) of establishing in two of the principal cities of the United States, institutions of learning of prospective usefulness almost beyond calculation. With this noble object in view, he denied himself the comforts of life and the blessings of family, pursued his business so as to be counted hard, if not unjust, did little, if anything, to promote the current civilisation of his day, or the spread of religion in his own or heathen lands, and could not be said to have so exhibited in his own character and career, the excellence of Christ's gospel, as to recommend it to others. In doing this, doubtless he was justified to his own conscience, and so supported, did not hesitate to endure obloquy; but doubtless, too, he was mistaken, as judged by sound principles, and in the light of the results of his labor, which, though securing one noble monument of his beneficence, fell short of more than half of its possibilities.

In like manner the author errs, when, as a decisive test in doubtful cases of duty, he bids us ask the question, "What would the Master have done in just our situation?" Surely this is a question always to be asked, and often an honest answer will determine duty for us, but not always. Like Christ, we must be holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners; but we cannot determine many of the perplexing questions of duty presented to us as parents, children, citizens, lawyers, physicians,

merchants, men of business, by putting Him, by our imaginations, just in our place. He could not be just as we are, without ceasing to be what he was. We cannot imagine him a poor, weak, perplexed, ignorant creature, seeking deliverance from bewildering questions; and that is just what the Christian in the world is!

The least satisfactory chapter in the volume is the one entitled, *The Christian in his Recreations*. The question of the lawfulness of certain recreations, is the one which ordinarily gives young Christians and Christian parents the most trouble, and which they would be glad to have authoritatively decided for them. A young girl came to her pastor and asked him if it would be wrong for her to attend a ball to which she had been invited. The pastor put before her what he considered to be the principles governing the general subject, and bade her decide for herself. "No," she said, "I want you to decide for me; I will act accordingly." But he wisely refused to assume the office of priest, and chose to train her conscience rather than control it. She did not go to the ball. This pastor, with good result, adopted the Scripture method. We would not complain of our author, because, avoiding specific discriminations, he has confined himself in the main to indicating the general application of his principles as already laid down, if only he has not fallen into error. But this we think he has done. He maintains that recreation is not *a cessation of Christian work, but only a change in the form of the work*. If this is true, then recreation is directed to the same general objects, and is prompted by the same general motives as work. Work sets before itself some valuable object to be achieved, and is undertaken from a sense of duty. That this is not so in the matter of recreation, is instantly made certain by an appeal to our consciousness. Enjoyment is the object of recreation, and we seek it because we love it, and not from a sense of duty. We remember being at table once with the venerable Dr. Plumer, who, when asked by the hostess to partake of some very beautiful honey, replied,—his dark eyes gleaming with humor, while his deep voice displayed its fullest intonations,—“Yes, madam, I will eat some honey. I always

eat honey; we are so commanded in Scripture,—‘My son, eat thou honey,’—and the reason for the command is given, (pausing for emphasis,) ‘because it is good.’”

Quite different in sentiment is the following extract from a Roman Catholic manual: “‘Take your meals with a pure intention, that is, because it is the will of God. Remember that it is not for your pleasure that you should eat or drink, but to support nature and maintain your strength for the divine service.’” Interpret the words of the Doctor, not as a command, but as a permission, and the pleasantry is seen to enfold the kernel of truth. We seek pleasure for pleasure’s sake, and this without sin, because our Maker has so constituted us.

If our theory is, that no recreation is legitimate that has not a basis of utility, and we attempt to reduce our theory to practice, either we become ascetics, and ungratefully refuse the sweetnesses of life provided for us by our bountiful Benefactor, or we strain our candor by a false hypothesis of utility, and by proclaiming one motive and acting upon another. The consequence of our author’s untrue analysis becomes apparent in the application of his principles. According to this view, only those recreations are allowable of which it can be distinctly said that they please Christ or do good to others. Tried by these tests, how very narrow would be the margin of recreation, and for not a few there could be no recreation at all. But let us stand upon the broader ground presented by nature and commended by the word of Scripture,—that recreation, as recreation, and for the sake of enjoyment, is itself allowable if only due limitations are observed, and then the principles laid down have their full operations, applied, not positively, but negatively,—we may not indulge in any recreation which is displeasing to Christ, or which would injure ourselves or others. If we could always say with certainty what are the specific modes of recreations forbidden by these canons, we would have nothing more to ask. But we cannot expect this certainty, it being in the nature of the case impossible without perpetually receiving new revelations; nor should we desire it, seeing that then conscience would then be a machine, and no longer a moral faculty.



Although the method of this chapter is erroneous, it contains much that is particularly valuable; for example, the caution against believing that things once blameless are to be held as so in other periods and other phases of society, and *vice versa*; that recreations are to be judged by their tendencies as well as by their abstract quality, and that Christians are never safe in places of amusement where the world distinctively gives the law. In fine, while the author has not solved all the difficulties that belong to the life of "the Christian in the world," his contribution to this important branch of religious literature is timely, judicious, and well executed, and his little work is calculated to be profitable to every serious reader.

The second product of the bequest of Mr. Fletcher, is an essay by the Rev. Wm. W. Faris, entitled *Children of Light*. (1877.) This volume is not equal in merit to its predecessor. In the treatment of their common topic, Mr. Faris is inferior to Mr. Faunce in solidity, method, directness, and excellence of literary execution. The figurative character of his title pervades the entire book. Thus, the headings of his divisions are, *Coming to the Light, Mistaking Darkness for Light, Standing in the Light, Walking in the Light, Working in the Light*. The same thing is found in the subdivisions, and a corresponding style of expression indicates the prevailing tendency of the writer's thought. This imparts in some degree an air of unreality to what he says, which is unfavorable to the force of a work upon a subject, which, of all others, is absolutely practical. Mr. Faris has illustrated his theme by a profusion of anecdotal incidents along with an unusual amount of religious poetry. We cannot help supposing that he has been unconsciously affected by Mr. Moody's influence. But the primary object of an instructive essay is not to stimulate the imagination nor arouse the sensibilities.

Let us not be understood as finding fault with this book. It is fervent in spirit, is faithful in admonition, and abounds in testimonies drawn from the Scriptures and well authenticated sources. We have only said that it pleases us less than *The Christian in the World*. It by no means follows that this must be the experience of others. It may be exactly suited to meet

the cases of many who would be less in sympathy with the subject as treated by Mr. Faunce. For this is partly true of all good books, that Mr. Faris so well says of the Bible: "This Book is so fashioned that peculiar messages suited to his needs are hidden in the lettered shell for each believer, which another may not find there, and which he finds only as the needs arise." This much we may with safety say: Whoever reads either or both of these volumes will be well rewarded, and will bless the memory of the pious founder whose bequest provides for the publication of valuable works upon a subject whose importance can never lessen, and whose aspects so often vary.

In conclusion, we cannot deny ourselves the pleasure of quoting the following passage from *Children of Light*, both because of its value, and because it is grateful to find outside of his native South a just and generous appreciation of the Christian hero, one of whose favorite passages of Scripture was, as the writer of this can testify, "Walk in the Light:"

"Probably, all things considered, the most successful general, and certainly the man whose name and memory are had in highest esteem and warmest affection, in the armies of the South in our late civil war, was one, the secret of whose vigor, energy, daring, and resoluteness, in no small part lay in his daily walking with God, whose success could not have been so rich but for the maintenance of a pure conscience on all occasions. General Thomas J. Jackson was a man of might, because he knew and realised "the secret of the Lord," and walked accordingly. Even his nickname—*Stonewall*—fitly characterises the rocky firmness which grace is wont to impart to the human will."

## ARTICLE VI.

## CAPITAL AND LABOR.

There are few topics attracting the attention of thinkers at the present time that are environed with more difficulties and contradictions than are suggested by the title of this paper. The actual existence of the two forces in the world, and the apparent antagonism between them, are patent facts, which have engaged the earnest attention of master minds for the best part of the present century; and the efforts projected for the reconciliation of the opposing forces have so far produced no better results than Communism on one hand and dreamy Utopian schemes on the other. The philosophy of Auguste Comte, which is the foundation of Socialistic theories, is only a refinement of the essentially brutal dogmas of the Commune. And both are opposed to the teachings of Scripture and the deductions of sound reason. In the same general category must be included the laborious attempt of John Stuart Mill, to reduce the contradictions and antagonisms to argument and accord by the operation of an algebraical equation. You cannot measure human passions, or limit the scope of human desires, by algebraical analyses or mathematical barriers. And the subject has an ethical aspect which most of the philosophers have wholly neglected to notice, or have touched but superficially, and dismissed as of little importance.

In the attempt to gain a clear conception of the topic, the first difficulty presented is in the inaccuracy of the general terms that are employed. There is a vague idea that capital means wealth, and, *therefore*, that labor means poverty. Because the predominant idea in the world is that of antagonism, and the mind naturally seeks an antithesis. Capital is associated with the idea of inglorious idleness, and labor suggests the thought of incessant toil. Capital is supposed to mean the lazy enjoyment of all attainable good, with selfish disregard of everything else. Labor conveys the idea of chronic weariness under oppressive burdens. Capital means the forcible seizure of luxury and station and

dainty fare. Labor means servitude and wages doled out with niggardly exactness, and, at the best, only adequate to the provision of actual necessities. Capital dwells in the palace. Labor cowers in the hovel. If these are not the ordinary estimates of men, the public prints do not express the public sentiment.

In so far as these views are modified by intelligence, the central theory is still untouched. Capital is still regarded as the ultimate good, and the lack of it, the ultimate evil. It is quite fashionable to laud virtue, intelligence, and the like, and to proclaim the superiority of moral gifts to the gifts of fortune, but the arena that is most densely crowded with gladiators is that in which money is the chief prize. The attainment of capital in order to beneficence is constantly commended, upon the general theory that man can give nothing of value to his brother-man except money. Even the prayer of Agur has been invested with such wonderful elasticity, that the happy mean, separating poverty from riches, varies with the habits of greed or careless extravagance in each suppliant.

In general terms then, capital means any sum that will relieve its owner from compulsory labor. It must be large enough to purchase with its revenues whatever the heart of its possessor may crave. And it is probable that very few men in the world would limit these cravings exactly to their present desires. It is more satisfactory to fix upon some large sum as the minimum, with the vague idea that the capitalist would have some surplus for charitable gifts after his own legitimate wants were supplied. It is not safe to fix upon a very moderate annual revenue, because new wants may arise, and the value of purchasable commodities is not stationary. And there is probably in the heart of every man an indefinite desire for such a volume of revenue as will leave some surplusage, year by year, for reinvestment. No man thinks of contentment with the supply of daily wants. No sane man is content with capital sufficient for all reasonable needs, if the capital, instead of the revenues from it, must be expended to provide these necessities. It is money and its accretions—that is, it is *more than enough*—that is the enemy of labor. In all the speeches of the Communistic philosophers, there are two

inevitable postulates: first, capital rolls in luxury,—that is, capital has more than enough. The other count in the indictment reads: capital buys with this surplus that which labor creates, and the creator is justly the proprietor; so, property is robbery.

On the other side, labor is always associated with the idea of poverty. The clerk who works twelve or fifteen hours over complicated accounts, day by day, does not receive wages. He receives a salary. In the Northern cities it is customary to speak of “hiring” a clerk. In Southern cities it is usual to discriminate between the worker who is “hired” and the clerk who is “employed.” The great difference in the status of the two is due to the superior education and better social position of the clerk, and secondly, to the idea of permanence that belongs to this kind of employment. The laborer is hired by the day; the clerk is employed by the year. The worker at any sort of handicraft engages for day wages. It may be that he earns five dollars per day, while the clerk’s daily earnings are less than half this amount. But the one is wages; the other is salary.

Now, in all contests between capital and labor, the clerk, with an annual salary of five hundred dollars, never takes a part in the battle. But the skilled worker, with an annual income of fifteen hundred dollars, (made up of three hundred *days’ work*, at five dollars a day,) is always found in the forefront of the battle. The worker joins all the other workers of the same craft and enacts a law, making eight hours a day. And this law is inexorable as the laws of the Medes and Persians. But the clerk never thinks of regulating his working hours. So long as the merchant demands his presence at the desk, he must be there, early and late. In all essentials, he is ten times more enslaved in body and mind than the drayman, (who is paid by the day,) yet the drayman is considered the “poor man,” while the clerk is among the “aristocracy,” both in his own estimation and in that of the day laborer.

Once more: there are multitudes of accountants of large experience and acknowledged skill whose average annual salary is twenty-five hundred dollars a year. With house-rent, expenses of education, medical attendance in times of sickness, and other

inevitable outlays, these men rarely have any surplus of savings at the end of the year. Generally, they are incessant workers, with large responsibility pressing upon them, and always oppressed with the conviction that forty men of equal ability are ready to take their position any day in the year. There are not many kinds of work that involve more actual toil. And yet there are few workers in the world more utterly helpless than these, when commercial reverses take away their employment. But these are never included in the category of laborers, when the disputes between capital and labor are discussed.

It therefore follows that labor does not mean work. The book-keeper (who is never called a laborer) works with hands and brains, and any business man in any large city knows many cases where this work is prolonged from dawn to nine or ten o'clock at night. And not one in a thousand of these workers expects to do more than provide daily necessities for his family. He does not expect to accumulate "capital." If you were to address him as a "laborer," you would insult him. If you instance his case, in a discussion with a Communist, you would be met by a laugh of derision. And although, in Northern latitudes, men "hire" everything,—a dray, a house, a hall for religious services, a lawyer, a doctor, or a preacher,—this book-keeper would resent being called a "hireling" with hot indignation. The more polished manners of the South leads men to discriminate and enlarge their vocabulary. There, they employ, or engage, or rent, or secure the ministrations of a pastor. It may be added in parenthesis, that in some cases they carry their politeness so far that they do not pay the pastor the stipulated salary with the prompt accuracy common at the North, and sometimes carry their delicacy to the extreme point of not paying at all.

There is one other point to be made, relating to the question of work. There are many men among the so-called capitalists who are incessant laborers. Sometimes, and indeed very frequently, the city merchant, whose entire fortune is invested in his business, is compelled to give constant attention to the details of his occupation, not only to save or increase his wealth, but to

avert possible bankruptcy and ruin. The close application and the endless anxiety of mind do not fail to make their impression upon the mortuary statistics, and as a class merchants are not long-lived. In fully ninety-five cases out of a hundred, the mill-owner or merchant fails, after giving employment and daily wages to hundreds or thousands through a course of laborious years. The great corporations that employ such hordes of workmen, and against which these workmen combine so relentlessly, are in the majority of cases potentially bankrupt. How many of them are to-day in the custody of receivers, while their capital stock is utterly worthless? A great deal of ignorant abuse is heaped upon these "soulless corporations," which are really conducted with strict integrity in the interests of their officials of all grades, as well as in the interests of the stockholders. No better token of the insecurity of such enterprises can be found than the fact that four cent. bonds issued by Government command a price above par, while the best obligations, at high rates of interest, of the best corporations, are subject to violent fluctuations in all the markets of the world. There is no assurance of stability in any enterprises where gain is dependent upon more or less contingency.

Returning to individual examples, it may be noted that the most prominent merchant in this country, and probably the most remarkably successful man in any country, was a constant worker almost to the day of his death. His fortune was counted by millions, and many millions, and the entire country stood agape at the date of his decease, waiting to see what magnificent gifts would be announced in his will. All institutions supported by voluntary gifts, and claiming to work only in the interests of unfortunate humanity, looked for a slice in the vast partition that was to come. Hundreds of men, who never dreamed of seeking his aid in his lifetime, were clamorous in their demands upon his *post mortem* charity. As this man had accumulated his enormous wealth from the community in which he traded, the least he could do was to return it to the same community at his death. Through a half century of patient working, with no whisper against his inflexible integrity, he had gathered in his millions.

A worker himself, he exacted the best labors from all who served him. Fulfilling all his contracts with scrupulous exactness, he exacted the last dollar due him from all his debtors. Here and there, as in the case of the Chicago fire, he gave prompt aid with a munificent hand. He telegraphed the Chicago authorities to draw upon him for a hundred thousand dollars, and the generous public immediately announced that he should have made the gift a million! There were hundreds of smaller benefactions, known only to his most intimate associates, where the deserving poor were sustained through years by his gifts.

It was a curious study to watch the drift of public sentiment, when the fact became known that he had endowed nothing! He devised a large sum in the aggregate to certain personal friends, to a large number of his clerks, and then it was discovered that the vast bulk of his wealth was still retained intact, and did not become public property! In fact, he had somehow managed to retain control of his power even in his last resting-place. The great business he had conducted went on with no perceptible change. English and American newspapers, commenting upon the event, pronounced it the most astounding failure of modern times. His last testament was assailed upon the ground, that the man who had been wise enough to gather up this great heap of riches was not wise enough to dispose of it. But no one referred to the one great fact, that this very disposition of his estate was the most beneficent act of his long career!

Because it insured the continued employment and the punctually paid wages of ten thousand people, every one of whom would have been thrown into idleness, and the most into positive poverty, by the sudden cessation of this vast business. At a time of commercial depression, when the entire country was slowly emerging from a panic, such an event would have been followed by frightful consequences. And it is difficult to imagine any other *possible* arrangement that could have averted these calamities, or any other disposition of his enormous wealth that could have secured the welfare of so large a number. The last analysis of all the fault-finding comments reveals latent Communism.



One more example that may be noted, pertinent to the present discussion, is that of a widely known merchant, whose estate is measured by millions, who has representatives in every important market in Europe, and who gives unflinching attention to his business from morning to night, allowing himself no relaxation, and neglecting no interest that claims his care. He is one of the busiest men in this country, and with all his close application to his occupation, manifests none of the mere passion for money getting that usually fires the energies of traders. He has control of the complicated machinery of his business, and has reduced his multifarious operations to a regular system, which he pursues with vigor and success. His mandates are obeyed to the remotest corner of his dominions, and the most conceited man in his service does not dream of questioning the wisdom of his rules. With a cold and impassable exterior, he has a vast fund of Christian charity, and adorns the doctrine of the Lord in his walk and conversation.

There are two points herein suggested: capital does not mean luxurious idleness; labor does not mean compulsory poverty.

It will probably be apparent to the readers of the REVIEW, that these thoughts have been suggested by the recent conflict between employers and employed, spreading over so large a portion of the country, and only quieted at last by appeal to military force. The "strikes" were called the combat between capital and labor; the struggle between the oppressor and the oppressed; the conflict between the bloated idler and the starving sons of toil. The newspapers generally deprecated violence, riot, and mob rule, though many of them assailed the great corporations, whose property was being destroyed, for their cruel exactions, and appealed for sympathy for the down-trodden rioter. Of course the discussion in these pages is confined to the moral aspects of the question, and the simple statement of the facts will readily reveal the true nature of the sudden uprising.

No one will deny the right of the worker to refuse or discontinue his labor. In so far as he is bound by contract for a specified time, he owes obedience to the employer. The relation subsisting between employer and employé involves the duty of

obedience and subordination on the part of the worker, and the duration of the obligation is a matter of contract. The employer cannot legally terminate an engagement in advance, except for specified cause. The worker cannot legally withhold his labor while the contract is in force. Therefore the strikers, in most cases, gave due notice of their intention, and ceased working at the end of the week or month, so as to keep within the pale of the law. And as isolated cases of suspension would work but little hindrance and inflict but trifling damage upon the employer, the workers *combined*. There were unions under regular organisation, and the strike was simultaneous over large areas. This, also, may be strictly legal. It must be remembered, however, that combination was confined to the labor side, because many of these corporations were antagonistic, each to the others, and, in fact, combinations of capital against labor are comparatively unknown in this country. In England there are such combinations, but they are purely defensive in their operations, and there is no authenticated case of oppression, properly so called, in any of them. All the capital in the world could not compel labor to work; while all the labor in the world *could* combine to render capital worthless.

However, if the striker did no more than quit his working, his strike would inflict no mortal injury. Because the land is filled with idle men who are ready to take any employment at almost any rate of wages. To make the strike effective, it is always necessary to prevent the labor of others. These strikers never content themselves with saying, "we will work no longer," but always add menace and violence if any substitutes are engaged. Molly Maguires is the name that distinguishes one guild; but the acts of the Molly Maguires are the legitimate outcome from all such combinations.

The clear definitions of law make an agreement between two men to injure a third, a conspiracy. It is a grave injury to the capitalist to stop the movement of his machinery, and thus prevent the prompt fulfilment of his contracts. But the law does not touch this offence, except in the way of civil damages. However, when the strikers conspire to prevent other laborers from

working, the law does annex a penalty. The would-be laborer can only be hindered by violent means, and the strike therefore *means* a breach of the peace—a riot.

Concerning the actual rioting, which was quelled by Federal troops at last, it has been asserted with virtuous indignation that the workers did not take part in any place, and did not attempt or countenance the destruction of property. But the plain fact abides that their strike was the instigation. Suppose it to be true, that the large majority of the several mobs that committed acts of arson, burglary, and murder in Chicago, Baltimore, and Pittsburgh, were really idle vagrants who found no sympathy or encouragement from the Unions? It is still true that the strike, with its aggressive assault upon peaceable laborers, was the open invitation to the mob. The *London Economist*, the very best of English commentators upon American affairs, describes the American strikes as follows:

“THE RAILWAY STRIKE IN THE UNITED STATES.—The political torpor which has prevailed in the United States since the formation of President Hayes’s Cabinet, has been broken by the most unexpected convulsion. Early last week, the stokers and brakemen employed in the goods department of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad struck against a reduction of wages, which the managers of the road, acting upon the policy lately adopted by all the great trunk lines, had announced. For some time previously there had been rumors of a general railway strike, but they met with little credence; and the representatives of the men, though holding a high tone in their negotiations with the managers, intimated through the press and otherwise that they were unwilling to push matters to extremities. There were, however, many slight incidents which gave ground for uneasiness, though no one anticipated the outbreak of insane fury which has actually taken place. The ‘Brotherhoods’, or ‘Trades’ Union Organisations of Engineers, and other classes of workmen, had lately attained great power, and had become formidable as the railway corporations grew in unpopularity. The general dulness of trade, and the consequent fall in wages, had produced a feeling of intense bitterness in the minds of the working classes, and the tone of political discussion in recent years has contributed to the generation of an envious passion in the minds of the poor against the rich. It must not be supposed that Communistic principles are gaining ground among the American people. In no country is individualism more sturdily rooted; in none is the institution of property more securely grounded upon popular respect. Yet it may be admitted that in

a very crude form, among certain classes of the community, the accumulation of capital has been assailed by interested agitators, and the minds of the populace inflamed by suggestions that they are oppressed by the aristocracy of the wealthy. The Inflationists, the Grangers, the advocates for paying off the debt and its interest in paper, have all helped to foster the delusion in the minds of the working men that legislation in the past has been used for the advantage of the rich only, and that the time has come to give the poor a turn. This dangerous infatuation came out prominently during the late Presidential campaign in the West, where the rights of the 'debtor class,' and the wrongs of the 'poor boys,' and of the 'bread-winners,' were a part of the stock-in-trade of the agitators on the Democratic side. The Republican party are not quite free from the discredit of having encouraged the same follies, and some of its free-lances, notably General Butler and Mr. Wendell Phillips, have done as much mischief as any demagogues on the other side. But undoubtedly the Democratic stump-orators did more than any other class in the country to influence the temper of the working men last autumn against an economical and practical Government, and when the winter followed, with its widespread distress and scarcity of employment, their preaching began to bear fruit.

"The great cities of the Union are filled with mixed multitudes, living by daily labor, and not in any degree superior in education or intelligence to the masses that are crowded in European towns. The Irish and German immigrants are for the most part easily influenced by appeals to passion, and many of them have in their hearts the germs of that dreamy socialism which is alien, as we have said, to the character of the Americans themselves. Above these masses are the organised leaders of the labor movement in the United States; neither better nor worse, on the whole, than the chiefs of our own Trades Unions. Below them are the idle, the reckless, the debased 'loafers,' who abound in all great cities, European as well as American, and who can hardly be distinguished from the criminal classes. All these strata of society have been disturbed during the past year by the dislocation produced by the economical crisis. They needed only the signal to break out in revolt, each in its own way, and with its own objects, against a state of things that pressed hardly upon every one of them. Completely ignorant of economic truths, and careless of the general welfare of the community of Trades' Unionists, the ordinary uneducated laborers, and the criminal and semi-criminal classes, declared war upon the Government and upon capital last week. The first did not intend, we believe, to do any serious mischief when they opened this campaign with the Baltimore and Ohio strike; they thought that they would be able to stop goods traffic, and to bring one company after another to terms, without inflicting any serious inconvenience upon the community at large. But

they had set a force in motion which they were powerless to control. The seizure of the West Virginian section of the line at Martinsburg was followed by a collision between the strikers and the local militia, who had been ordered out to rescue the property of the company. The defeat of the latter, and their open manifestation of sympathy with the rioters, gave courage to all the discontented elements in the State. The appeal to the Federal Government for aid did not overawe the insurgents, who held their ground daringly, and at Baltimore used violence to prevent the despatch of the soldiery to the scene of the strike. Up to this point, however, the struggle had been merely between the men on strike and the Baltimore and Ohio companies. The advance of the Federal troops, the vigorous action taken by nearly all the State Governments, and the spread of the excitement beyond the ranks of the railway servants, gave the affair a new aspect. One after another all the principal trunk roads—the Pennsylvania line, the Erie, and, last of all, the New York Central—were attacked; energetic attempts were made by the insurgents to obtain possession of the important points at which the main roads converge; the movements of the troops were deliberately obstructed by the tearing up of the permanent way, the breaking down of bridges, and the cutting of the telegraph wires. At first, it appears, these destructive measures were carried out with an intelligible purpose, but after a while it became evident that the plans of those who had organised the strike had been thrown into confusion by the increasing and purposeless fury of the ignorant masses who joined in the strife, as a demonstration against an unfeeling and corrupt society, or were tempted into it by the hope of plunder. At Pittsburgh, where the mob came into violent collision with the soldiery on Sunday last, their victory led to a carnival of savagery that could hardly be matched in the annals of European revolutions. During several hours the city remained in the hands of ten thousand armed roughs, who broke into shops, destroyed property, and spread terror until fatigue and drunkenness overpowered them. It was not until this burst of madness had spent its force—at a cost, it is said, of 4,000,000 of dollars—that the citizens plucked up courage enough to form a Vigilance Committee for the protection of life and property. In other important railway towns—at Newark, in Ohio; Buffalo, in New York; Cleveland, on the Lake Shore Railway; Indianapolis, Columbus, and more especially St. Louis—the rioters encountered scarcely any resistance; and though the Federal Government has lost no time in collecting all its available troops, little has yet been done to recapture the lines that are blockaded. The process, indeed, must be of necessity a slow one, for some 30,000 miles of railroad have been affected by the operations of the insurgents.

“We need scarcely say that, in spite of the momentary successes of this insane enterprise, we have no doubt that the Government and people

of the United States will promptly and firmly trample out a flame that is dangerous and discreditable to American society. Such lawless outrages upon order as the men on strike and their allies have been guilty of would not be tolerated in any country, and least of all in a country like the United States, where the Federal system and the Democratic jealousy of centralised authority leaves the Executive permanently weak, and threatens to reduce the army almost to nothingness. If the railway strike were to succeed in its aims, there is no saying what other attempts might not be made to cow 'capital' into submitting to the demands of 'labor.' Fortunately, the managers of all the great railroads, whatever their delinquencies in other respects, are men of strong will, and they are not likely to yield to claims, the concession of which would be ruinous to the interests of bondholders and shareholders. Considering the startling character of the events that have taken place, and the grievously uncertain condition of railway property in the United States, it is rather astonishing that the price of the securities affected showed so little variation. The fact indicates an amount of confidence in the stability of American property, and the firmness of the social fabric in the United States, which is of good omen."

"THE FIRST LESSON OF THE AMERICAN STRIKES.—The most remarkable fact about these American strikes is the evidence they afford that popular Governments, even when Republican in form, do not enable nations to dispense with a standing army.—The old idea of most Liberals and of nearly all commercial men was that standing armies were the toys of Kings, and useful only to repress the people or to further projects of ambition. It was supposed that if the people were once recognised as the possessors of power, and if the boundaries of a nation once satisfied its inhabitants, standing armies might be dispensed with, and the public rely for security entirely upon a civic police. Even when this idea was slightly modified, and the utility of an armed force for defence was acknowledged, it was asserted and believed that a citizen militia would be amply sufficient, and that the existence of a caste trained to arms, and separated from the general body of the people, must be, if not mischievous, at least only a wasteful and costly surplusage. So powerful was this idea, that one or two nations—notably Switzerland—tried to act on it; and in England and the United States experienced statesmen strongly apprehended that the representative bodies, unless deceived or soothed, would in the end abolish the standing army. Especially were the theory we have spoken of and the fear we have mentioned entertained in America. The United States is the only first class nation with no enemy on its frontier, with no external adversary to dread, and with no internal and visible danger which the very efficient citizen militia could not repress. No army is necessary to resist either Canada or Mexico; and for repressing Indians, it is very doubtful if the army is

not a positive diminution of the national strength. Many officers of repute doubt if the partisan bands called Rangers, or Volunteers, or Regulators, mere bands of coalesced citizens, with elected officers, would not suppress Indian movements more effectively than trained soldiers; and certainly experience shows that regulars are more easily deceived by Indian wiles than the more accustomed border-men. The United States, it was believed, did not need a regular army at all—for years the problem of each Administration was to protect the Military School at West Point; and even after the war, the army was in danger of being swept away, and was reduced to the very lowest point compatible with existence. There is not in the Union to-day one full *corps d'armee* of thirty thousand men, and half the population believe that the twenty-five thousand men still provided for in the estimates, are useful only as a sort of frontier guard, or body of sentries for the marches.

“The recent labor-war will, in this country at all events, remove many of these impressions. That short but dangerous movement revealed a truth long since recognised by practical statesmen, though not entirely acknowledged by thinkers—that civilisation is no perfect protection against civil war, and that it sometimes increases the facilities for outrage, and that it always increases the temptations to an attack on property. If nobody wanted anything in a Republican society, an army might be needless, but then that is not the fact. Under every form of government there is a residuum of the population full of strength and vigor, which is unwilling or unable to work, but wants, nevertheless, to live with a degree of physical comfort which rises with the general standard of enjoyment. This residuum is not greater in Republics than in Monarchies, is indeed probably less, but then it is much more fierce and dangerous. Republicans do not pet the residuum as Kings do, because they are not afraid of them, and have not the same lofty idea of the equality of all grades before the throne. The residuum is composed of men less ashamed of themselves, less accustomed to pay deference, less willing to believe that their sufferings are part of the natural order of things. They are many and the capitalists seem few; and as the world ought, on the accepted theory of Republics, to be governed by numbers, their own numbers ought to be taken into consideration. Above all, they are not afraid of the permanent forces of society, which, though often fearfully strong in Republics—for instance, society and its police are much sterner in America and Switzerland than in England—never *appear* to be so strong as under the organisation of a Monarchy. Whenever, therefore, this class sees a chance, it is, under a Republic, very apt to ‘rise’—that is, practically, to attack property by force; it can be repressed only by force, and no force except that of a regular regiment can be applied *quickly* enough. Twelve hours’ ‘loot’ will destroy the prosperity of a city, and a city militia has difficulty in becoming efficient

without more time. Its members half sympathise with the residuum, or with the cause with which that residuum is nominally in connexion. Its officers have to live among the people they are required to shoot. Its men are not quite sure how far they are justified in obeying orders. Above all, it has and can have neither effective cavalry nor scientific artillery, and it is horsemen and gunners of which an undisciplined, or, still more, a half-disciplined mob, is most afraid. The force required is one which will act quickly, act effectively, and act without any sense of responsibility, provided the Government will give clear and unmistakable orders; and such a force, *except under singular social circumstances—such, for example, as bound the slave-owners of the South together*—can be found only in a regular army. A small garrison of regulars will suffice to save a city, merely because it will act without thinking, without partisanship, and without delay; and saving a city means saving material civilisation. For example, 500 Regulars with a gun would have saved Pittsburgh from its twelve hours' sack, and thereby saved, first, £800,000 in direct cash, or fourteen times the cost of the half-regiment for that year; next, the still greater sum lost in the lowered value of all securities dependent on order in Pittsburgh; and finally, the cost of all the outrages caused by the example of the short impunity enjoyed by the Pittsburgh rioters. No doubt a Vigilance Committee would have done as well, but then it could only be organised *after* the outrages had been committed, while the citizen militia, which could have done even better, showed itself reluctant to do anything at all. The Regulars were indispensable, and sensible, average Americans, accustomed to boast that they needed no army, regretted for twenty-four hours that the regular soldiers were so few. And they were quite right. Chicago, unless it is calumniated in its own reports, was only saved by the accident that a force which in England we should call a brigade, could be rapidly collected there, and the vast dimensions of the general riot were due almost exclusively to the want of about 5,000 trained troops at hand. Thirty thousand miles of railway were thrown out of gear, to the immense injury of the country, because there were not troops sufficient to hold the junction stations against mobs bent openly on doing all the mischief they could, and composed of men brave enough and disciplined enough to face anything except the regular troops of the Federation. If these mobs, hated or feared by perhaps nine-tenths of the entire community, had had the intelligence to march on the Legislatures, and compel them to pass laws, instead of marching on the railway stations, they might have made the mischief almost irremediable, as the smallest faction on their side could have delayed the repeal of the laws for weeks.

“This is, as we have said, a crucial instance of the value of a standing army. Not only is the Union free from external foes, but it is, in the long-run, protected from all permanent dangers by the devotion of its



citizens. One week's time being granted, the President could have raised enough citizen troops in Illinois to have held down all the cities of the State, even if all their inhabitants sympathised with the revolution; but then within that week all the wealth of those cities might have perished. Three hours suffices in a State, if its cities are once seized, to burn the archives, to destroy the records of the debt, to pillage the banks, and to burn the books of the railways having city terminuses—that is, in fact, to destroy the artificial system upon which the prosperity of modern cities rests; and in three hours a citizen militia can hardly be got together, while subsequent punishment, however sharp and extensive, does not, in any way whatever, remedy the mischief. There is strength enough in London to do anything—as was shown in 1848—but a mob in possession of the city for twelve hours might almost destroy the Empire, and could certainly not be put down by any rush of an unarmed and undrilled force. There must be an army, must be a certain insurance paid for our property in wages to men who are of no particular use until the moment of danger arrives; and it is well that this disagreeable but most certain truth should every now and then be brought home to minds otherwise too apt to believe that the existence of the army is a concession to tradition, and that a State, if only organised on liberal principles, may be emptied of troops without any danger to society.”

The first of these articles is from the issue of July 28th, and the other from that of August 4th. Of course, these sentiments are more or less colored by English prejudice, and are more emphatic under the pressure of English traditions. But this excellent periodical, conducted in the interest of merchants and bankers, and occupying the first place, beyond question, among the commercial journals of the time, has always been specially fair and specially intelligent in its strictures upon American affairs. As affecting the moral aspect of the question, the remarks touching the “residuum,” in the issue of August 4th, are worthy of special attention. The sentence referring to the condition of Southern society, (which is not italicised in the London paper,) gives the key to the ethical side of the subject.

Because God has established in all societies those indestructible relations which involve subordination, you cannot think of cases where men act in numbers, without some semblance of authority on one side, and consequent obedience on the other. Even robbers and pirates have their chiefs. A mob, which has been accurately enough characterised as “a wild beast,” has always some

recognised leader. The ravages of this wild beast are not committed by isolated members of its organism; it is the whole beast, led by its head. The "Brotherhoods" and "Unions" themselves are under the most galling form of despotism, though the authorities are chosen by and from themselves; for no member can withdraw from the communion or resist its mandates, except at the peril of his life. If it is remembered that all the force of the *strike* (which is the only object of the Union) is derived from the pitiless brutality of its vengeance, this miserable bondage of the individual member can be better appreciated. It is more inexorable than the caste laws of the Hindoos. It is more operative and efficient than the awful code of Loyola, wherein each subordinate is a "dead corpse" under the commands of his superior. It is far more appalling in its hideous reality than the dream of Milton, wherein he describes the government in the wide realms of hell.

Very possibly some reader of gentle sympathies may think this language somewhat exaggerated. But no one who has seen or read of the atrocities of the Molly Maguires, will think so. A mine superintendent, who stood in the way of some purpose, was to be murdered, and his body was found, mutilated almost beyond recognition. An official of higher rank conspicuously opposed some demand of the order, and his body was found riddled with bullets. The most extravagant bloody-shirt story ever produced by the combined genius of Boutwell and Morton, could not stand a moment in competition with the horribly truer revelations at the trial of these miscreants. A number of them were actually tried, convicted, and hanged a few months ago, but two or three counties in the Keystone State shuddered with a nameless terror on the next night, when the "Brethren" held their wakes over the unlovely corpses. There is not one Christian woman, probably, throughout all that mining region who would not rejoice with thanksgiving at the utter destruction of this truculent brotherhood. And there is probably not one civilised man in the same locality who does not feel that he takes his life in his hand whenever he issues from his home.

The argument of the *Economist* in favor of an efficient army,

rests upon the inevitable existence of the "Residuum." And the writer carefully distinguishes between this residuum and the body of workmen. It is composed of drones with fierce instincts, hating work, while they curse capital; the tramps that are spread over the face of the land, and the vagabonds and petty thieves that infest large cities. Their heroes are the burglars, more ardently worshipped if they add murder to theft. Their enemies are the industrious citizens who feed them when on the tramp. When the lager-beer-seller calls a "workmen's meeting," these wretched criminals attend in force, and swell the majority that denounces the "bloated bondholder." But the point demanding particular attention is the italicised passage containing the ambiguous hint relating to the South before the abolition of slavery.

The wisest of English writers always blunder when they discuss the slavery question. And this writer, so intelligent at most times and upon most topics, is evidently under the impression that Southern slave-owners formed some sort of a combination to repress something analogous to "strikes" among their laboring population. It is well known that the state of Southern society was eminently peaceful and prosperous before the war. There were no alms-houses, few penitentiaries, no divorces, and very few murders, in the common acceptation of the term. There were homicides, it is true, but these were usually the result of a fair encounter, hand to hand, where the slayer took the risk of being slain, and they were analogous to the duels of our earlier era. Happily, this relic of barbarism has fallen under the popular ban, but in its worst days it was not so bad as the cold-blooded murders of the Trades' Unions. No such thing as Trades' Union was known in the larger portion of Southern territory. And the true status of the subordinate race was that of a people not merely under domination, but also under kindly tutelage. There were sad cases of maltreatment and tyranny; but these were uncommon, and always against the instincts of Southern society. The domination of the superior race was an accepted fact, and no formal combination of capital against labor was possible under the conditions of Southern society. Capital owned

the labor, and the work was compulsory ; but capital gave in requital, food, raiment, shelter, medical attendance, Christian instruction, and protection. All that was compatible with the existence of slavery was given by the lords of the soil, and the peasantry of the South was far in advance of any other peasantry on the face of the earth in all the elements of material prosperity, except freedom and the acquisition of positive property. Well, a dozen years of freedom has not added much to their prosperity. A dozen years of political equality, or, rather, political supremacy, has not done much to develop statesmanship ; a dozen years of evangelical teaching, *from without*, has not caused their spiritual graces to abound. And during the prevalence of the mania that recently rent the Northern States, the good effect of the Southern system was seen in the total absence of similar disturbances and riots. If the domination of the white race were not a recognised fact, whether acknowledged or not, the spirit of insubordination that began its manifestation on the Baltimore and Ohio road would have spread like wildfire all over the Southern land. Yet there was no such thing known as a combination to prevent it. Economically considered, the enslavement of the vast army of nomads that now rove over the breadth of the North, stealing all that their hands can reach, would prove a real blessing to the tramps themselves, and an unspeakable blessing to civilised society.

Wealth generally induces conservatism ; and the domination of riches, intelligence, and virtue, over poverty, ignorance, and vice, accords with the ordinance of God. He allows poverty and ignorance to abound in order to the exercise of beneficence on the part of those whom he makes to differ ; because he orders the lot of each individual of the race, maintaining the essential oneness of the race, while he makes of the same lump vessels of honor and vessels of dishonor ; chosen vessels to dominate, and subordinate vessels to serve. The essential equality of the race before God, appears in the common sinfulness of all sons of Adam, and the common offer of salvation to them. He commandeth all men, everywhere, to repent. But, as concerns the relations betwixt man and man, God establishes differences in the cases of

individuals, differences in cases of classes, and differences in orders, ranks, dominions, principalities, and powers. All have not equal rights. The tax-payer who sustains the government of his community, state, or nation, has rights that do not belong to the tramp. The capitalist who erects costly mills and controls extensive industrial interests, has rights that do not belong to the laborer he employs. And all the precepts of both Testaments are based upon these inevitable gradations in human society; that is, in so far as they affect merely human relations.

The closing sentence in the article from the *Economist* suggests another reflection. The writer treats the employment of military force, and the ever-present reserve of this force, as so much percentage of insurance upon life and property. The experience of five centuries of good government, (for it has been the best government, on the whole, in the world,) has taught Englishmen this grand lesson, to wit, that the well-being of society does not depend upon moral suasion; upon a generous confidence in the masses (*the residuum*); upon the largest liberty, the most perfect equality, the most ardent fraternity; but upon the stern menace of armed authority, everywhere visible, and known to be maintained by legal enactment. The Vigilance Committees that have done good service once and again, are extra-legal, and therefore highly objectionable; and they can at the best only repair damages already done. But the legal authority of the Government is expected to repress possible violence, and nothing else than this very plea made it possible for a rough soldier in time of peace to keep his troops in possession of Southern States. The sentiment of law-abiding but prejudiced men at the North would have forced even Mr. Grant to withdraw these insulting threats long ago, but for the tacit acquiescence of the people in this organic law. And the deliverance of the South to-day from the same incubus, is rather due to the overwhelming pressure of Northern public opinion than to any clemency on the part of the Executive. It is just to add, however, that the present Executive does manifest human instincts, which were never credited to his predecessor; but the fact remains, that conservative men all over the North were most emphatic in their demands for this tardy act

of justice. And if the South should be overrun by lawless bands of tramps and strikers, it would be eminently proper to exterminate such bands by the employment of Federal troops.

Finally, whatever else may be involved in the relations subsisting betwixt capital and labor, there are some points that seem to be plain, and yet they are rarely if ever prominently presented in the public prints. Admitting the existence of such an entity as capital in contradistinction from labor, the drift of this paper has tended to demonstrate that authority must be exercised by capital. There is doubtless much to be said about the tyranny and oppression of capital, but it does not affect this point. Whether rightly or wrongly exercised, the authority must abide with capital. Any other theory is Agrarian and Communistic, and destructive of the system of society. And if authority be admitted, subordination is involved, and obedience is better than sacrifice. The worker must obey and honor the payer. The gospel explicitly commands the subordinate to render obedience and honor to the superior, and the gospel commands faithful payment of wages and forbids oppression, but never assaults the *relation*.

It is because popular forms of government have produced a class of politicians whose living depends upon the suffrages of the vile, that these troubles appear. The mischievous theories of perfect equality form the staple of campaign speeches. The illiterate vagrant is assured that he is fully equal to the lord of the soil, and he is instructed to vote for the poor man's champion. The statesman, the scholar, the thinker, whose hands are not worn with actual toil, it may be, yet whose lives are expended in beneficent work, are called the drones in the world's hive. That which they earn or inherit of worldly goods, is called *property*, and the representative of universal license proclaims the possession a robbery. And it is a wise and merciful dispensation of Providence that dispels these illusions, now and then, by the roar of artillery. In dealing with mobs, no argument is so effectual as that which comes from the mouth of a cannon.

## ARTICLE VII.

THE LATE GENERAL PRESBYTERIAN COUNCIL  
AT EDINBURGH.

The papers of our Church with one accord have fully set forth all the sayings and doings at the General Presbyterian Council, and it may be fairly presumed that Southern Presbyterians are all tolerably well informed of what took place at its first meeting in St. Giles—the church where Jennie Geddes threw her stool at the dean's head, and where John Knox used to thunder and lighten in his pulpit,—and at its subsequent meetings for seven or eight days at the Free Church Assembly Hall in Edinburgh. The constitutionality of our taking part as a Church in this Council, and the propriety and expediency of our Church's having any representatives there, were discussed as abstract questions at Savannah. The question of the Council now comes back to us on the report of its proceedings as an actual and practical one. And in this new aspect of the case, it is proposed in this article to offer some observations upon what took place in the Council, and what seem likely to be the practical manifestations and tendencies of this movement. It would be strange if this summing up should point to no commendable features of so imposing an assemblage. And if, on the other hand, any of its aspects should appear to demand criticism, it ought surely to be offered in a spirit not less fair than frank.

One must suppose, of course, that the claims of the Council to the approbation of all good men, for what it said and what it did, could hardly be set forth in more fitting terms than were employed by Dr. Blaikie at its last meeting, when this eminent minister of the Free Church, who had acted so prominent a part in getting up the Council, spoke of its bringing together “a multitude of brethren, members of the same family, who had never seen each other's faces in the flesh,” and then added that it had “indicated the real unity of that great body of which Christ is the Head,” and “in some measure fulfilled the prayer of our blessed Lord the night before he died.” The “multitude

of brethren, members of the same family," were, of course, Presbyterians coming together at the Council, which was a plain fact. The "great body of which Christ is the Head," and which he prayed might all be one, is, of course, the visible Church catholic, and Dr. Blaikie considered that in some measure its real unity was indicated and secured in the unity of the Presbyterians at this Council.

Alongside of these very Christian expressions may be placed what Dr. J. Oswald Dykes of London, of the English Presbyterian Church, a prominent member of the Council, said in the concluding address:

"Our alliance . . . must repose upon the basis, not of ecclesiastical polity alone, but of Christian life and Christian love. . . . We have been occupied to some extent with matters which were of necessity denominational, but much more with such as are of universal concern to Christian men. If we gave one day to Presbyterian questions, we have given the rest to wider ones, such as the work of the ministry, the extension of the gospel, and the defence of the faith. In discussing even these, it is perhaps inevitable that we view them from a more or less denominational standpoint; but it is not inevitable, and it would be fatal, that we should treat them in a denominational spirit."

And so with these estimates of the character and influence of the General Presbyterian Council, made by two of its most eminent members across the water, let the following be considered, which the distinguished Northern Presbyterian, Dr. Howard Crosby, of New York, has published in *The Christian Union*:

"Now, if you ask what good has the Council done, I answer, that it has (1) brought into actual contact all the Presbyterians of the world, and thus created a true sympathy; (2) prepared the way of help for the weaker bodies from the stronger; (3) made Presbyterians to see that a letting up in non-essentials will not harm their orthodoxy; (4) agitated among Presbyterians the idea of universal Christian unity; and (5) enlarged the outlook of all the members."

Now, this is the very same Dr. Crosby whose "Life of Christ" this REVIEW once pronounced heretical, and the reader will perhaps not be surprised at the slack tone of this utterance from him. Dr. Crosby glories in the Council because of its "letting up" as to orthodoxy, and its "universal" notions of Church unity. Well, this is just Dr. Crosby,—and let it pass. But as to what



fell from Drs. Blaikie and Dykes, is there not room to ask what is the significance of it? What is the tendency of a Presbyterian Council where apology has to be made for one day spent in considering Presbyterian questions? and where condemnation falls upon denominational zeal on the part of Presbyterians? and where praise is meted out only to Christian zeal and Christian love, but discussion in a denominational spirit is condemned as a fatal thing? "We have been occupied to some extent," says Dr. Dykes, "with matters which were of necessity denominational, but much more with such as are of universal concern to Christian men." Now, was it expected in assembling representatives of so many Presbyterian Churches, that Presbyterian questions were to be barely tolerated, or even scouted as unworthy to be considered, while only missions, and temperance, and Sunday-schools, and other matters of universal concern to Christian men, were strictly proper to be introduced? Certainly no such view of the proposed Council was presented at New Orleans, or urged at Savannah, to induce our Church to go into this alliance. Those General Assemblies verily thought it was a conference of committees from real and true, not *quasi*, Presbyterian Churches, which they were invited to meet by a committee of our own, and that this conference was not to be ashamed to confer freely and fully about Presbyterian matters.

When it was proposed in the Council to publish the opening sermon of Professor Flint, of the Established Church of Scotland, Dr. McCosh said emphatically, that he did not agree with all the statements made in the sermon. This was a little hard on the Professor, who must be well aware what a misfortune it is for any man to have the Doctor disagree with him. Notwithstanding this censure pronounced in Scotland, it may be ventured away off here in the bosom of the Southern Presbyterian Church to declare that the Inaugural was a most admirable discourse. Our "back country elder" has compared Professor Flint, in person, manner, and style of composition, (but not in his reading his sermon instead of preaching it,) to Dr. Thornwell. It is a high compliment to the living theologian, and a careful reading of the discourse must fill one with a strong desire to hear more from the

Professor. On this occasion he took his text from John xvii. 20, 21, and his theme was *Christian Unity*—the gift which Christ asked for his people—the “very best gift he could ask for them.” But there is “a false as well as a true unity in every sphere of thought and of life.” And “no where have erroneous notions of unity been so injurious as in religion.” “In the name of Christian unity men have been asked (said Professor Flint) to sacrifice the most sacred rights of reason, conscience, and affection: Independence of judgment, honesty, brotherly love, and every quality which gives to human nature worth and dignity, have been treated as incompatible with it.” “The unity our Saviour prayed that his followers might enjoy has been widely confounded with kinds of unity which have no necessary connexion either with Christian peace or love, and which may be, and often have been, the occasions of most unchristian discord and hatred.” The preacher then proceeds to tell what true unity is: (1.) It is a unity of supernatural origin. (2.) It is a unity which has not only its foundation but its standard or model in heaven. (3.) It is a unity which exists already just so far as Christianity exists; and it does not require different denominations to surrender their differences. (4.) It is a unity underlying all the differences which distinguish the denominations from one another, and is not to be identified with any such secondary unities as identity of doctrine, or uniformity of ritual, or oneness of government.

Now it seems very manifest that this discourse does not favor the sentiments expressed by Dr. Dykes, although Dr. Dykes refers to it as if in accordance with them. He says, “God’s servant told us how our alliance, if it is to be an instance of genuine Christian unity, and not of that which is mechanical or secular, must repose upon the basis, not of ecclesiastical polity alone, but of Christian life and Christian love.” But, surely, no such language and no such idea as this is to be found in Professor Flint’s sermon. *There*, it is distinctly pointed out that genuine Christian unity is one thing, and denominational unity quite another thing, and that the former does by no means require the latter to be disparaged as something “mechanical or secular,”

while the latter does by no means stand in the way of the former, or form any hindrance to it. It is just possible that Dr. Dykes and Dr. McCosh neither of them heard perfectly what the preacher said, or that in the flow of his exquisitely fine thought and language they did not precisely catch his meaning. The attentive reader will find no such difficulty. The Professor distinguishes Presbyterian unity from Christian unity, (as well he might, and as Dr. Dykes in a most important aspect failed to do,) but the Professor does not, like Dr. Dykes, disparage Presbyterian unity or denominational spirit. He warns the Council, and very properly, against the "undue exaltation" of what distinguishes Presbyterians from their Christian brethren of other denominations. He speaks of Church Government as an "outward form," (which it certainly is,) and he refers to some other Churches as separated from the Presbyterian "by so thin a partition wall as a mode of ecclesiastical government," but these are perhaps the only expressions used by him in the whole discourse which the most thorough-going Presbyterian would be disposed to criticise, and in the connexion where they are employed he would probably not criticise them at all. Professor Flint said, "We have come together as Presbyterians, but with the wish to promote Christian unity." But he says he knows "scarcely any truth about Christianity which we are more apt to forget, and which we more need to remember, than just this, that Christian unity already exists as far as Christianity itself does. . . . The great duty of Christians in this matter, some seem to think, is to ignore their differences, or to conceal them, or to get rid of them any how; they appear to find it difficult to understand how there can be a unity coëxisting with and underlying differences, and wholly distinct from the uniformity which can only be gained by the surrender or the suppression of differences. This is a very superficial view, for it represents Christian unity not as a living and spiritual thing at all, but as a mere dead outward form of doctrine or policy." He also said, "Christian unity does not require us to undervalue any particular truth, or to surrender any denominational principle; . . . it merely requires that we do not allow our denominational differences to

prevent us from tracing and admiring the operations of the Spirit of grace through the most dissimilar channels. There may be Christian oneness where there are also differences which no man can rationally count of slight moment."

He added, "As to the differences between these denominations, they might surely exist and yet prove merely the means of exercising and strengthening Christian unity. If we can only be at one in spirit with those who agree with us in opinion, there can be but little depth or sincerity in such oneness. The love which vanishes before a difference of views and sentiments must be of a very superficial and worthless nature." And he proceeded to show that it is not differences of principle between denominations which ever do violate Christian unity, but it is evil and unchristian passions gathering round these differences.

This admirable sermon goes on to show that "a true union between Churches must be rather grown into than directly striven for." And Professor Flint sets forth that such is the only ecclesiastical union which we are to value. He says:

"There are not a few who hold that the Church, as the body of Christ, must become externally, visibly, organically one. This is the sort of unity which the Church of Rome has ever maintained to be an essential characteristic of the true Church. . . . It is a unity, I am persuaded, which would be pernicious if it could be attained, but which fortunately cannot be attained; an ideal which is a dream—a grandiose dream, and also a diseased dream—an ambition which is foolish if not guilty. The notion of a universal Church in this sense is precisely the same delusion in religion as the notion of a universal monarchy or a universal republic in politics, and in fact implies that that Utopia is a truth which can be, and will be, realised. . . . A universal Church would be as surely a misgoverned Church as a universal empire would be a misgoverned empire."

Thus Professor Flint; yet Dr. Crosby sighs after the ideal of "universal Christian unity" agitated at the Council, and to be brought about by "letting up" in orthodoxy; and Dr. McCosh does "not agree with all the Professor's statements,"—especially, perhaps, the statement about its being a mere "grandiose dream, a diseased dream, and a foolish, if not guilty, ambition" for any man to cherish and undertake to realise the delusion of any universal Christian unity in this present dispensation.

Recurring to the very catholic spirit and utterances of some leading men at the Council, the reader will remember that our own Dr. W. Brown has publicly declared in emphatic terms that there were no Broad Church views in the Council, or none except very cautiously expressed. It is not intended to be affirmed, as to what has been quoted from Drs. Blaikie and Dykes, that they expressed any Broad Church views, either cautiously or incautiously. Because that term signifies, as commonly understood, the widening out of Presbyterian doctrine and creed, so as to embrace in our particular connexion those who hold the very opposite ideas. Now, Drs. Blaikie and Dykes were not talking at all of that thing. The point which they held up to the Council's admiration was not the ecclesiastical identification of other Churches with the Presbyterian on any terms whatever. They were not guilty at all of so broadening our Presbyterian platform, as to recommend it to the adoption of others. Not at all. But what they did was possibly quite as much to be condemned. The fault to be found with these leaders of the Council was that of so narrowing and straitening and belittling all purely Presbyterian matters as to make them out contemptible and unworthy of consideration, while they magnified the things that are of "universal concern to Christian men." It is not Broad Church views, nor Large Church views, nor High Church views they are to be charged with, but with the representation of the whole Presbyterian Church as little and mean, and its peculiar affairs not to be discussed except with apologies for so occupying the general Presbyterian Council! These leaders glorified universal Christian unity, but Presbyterian life and vigor and zeal were made of no value.

If there were then no Broad Church views at Edinburgh, there seems to have been there some little of a Presbyterianism which had no self-respect, or rather which lacked reverence for the Divine right justly claimed for the system. Not as the representatives of universal Church unity, but of Presbyterian Churches they came together, and they should not have sought to pass themselves off for anything wider or more liberal. To meet as Presbyterians and then talk of the "denominational

spirit" as improper or "fatal," was utterly unworthy of the Council. And now the logic of the position of these leaders requires that at the meeting in 1880, Baptists, Methodists, Episcopalians, and all other Christian bodies, should be invited to be present and take an equal part. There, in the city of "brotherly love" (so called) let universal Church unity appear and manifest itself.

Our Dr. William Brown is, of course, as competent a witness as could be desired touching the question on which he has testified as to there being any Broad Church views in the General Presbyterian Council. And yet, competent as Dr. Brown is, it may be doubted whether, being present and catching the spirit of brotherly love and of large and liberal Christian affections, which undoubtedly pervaded the body, (very much to their honor,) Dr. Brown might not become a little blind to what the reader of the speeches can see as he sits coolly and calmly down to examine what was said and done. It is generally wrong to make a man an offender for a word, and yet it is right to watch, with the keenness of an eagle's eye, any, even the slightest, indications of a tendency in a body constituted like this Council, towards latitudinarian views. In such an age as ours there is danger all the time of drifting away from safe anchorage. If there was at Edinburgh any squinting towards a consolidation of Churches based on the surrender of principle, it deserves to be exposed and condemned, because not for any such purpose did the Council profess to assemble. And it must be confessed that there were some inklings of opinion touching the merging of differences amongst Presbyterians, and indeed amongst all Christians, which will not bear the closest examination. For example, at the first public meeting the Rev. Mr. Henderson, from Australia, had over and over again the loud plaudits of the Council when he described the union formed there in 1858, under which the various kinds of Presbyterians "forgot all their differences," and not only so, but Congregationalists, Baptists, Wesleyans, and Presbyterians were practically merged into one, freely occupying one another's pulpits, and knowing no separating peculiarities. Mr. Henderson closed his speech with an expression of the

confident belief, that "before he died, or at least in his children's time, or if not then, yet in the time of his children's children, it would be in Scotland as it is already in Victoria," and loud applause greeted the sentiment. Now, then, if it ought to be and is to be thus in Scotland, why not in the United States and everywhere else? Mr. Henderson said the people "forced all the various Presbyterian ministers in Australia to be one;" and so they might as well force, one would suppose, Baptists, Methodists, and all to be one. Now, was there not a little, just a very little, squinting towards Broad Church in this much applauded speech? And so Professor Brummelkamp, of the Reformed Free Church of the Netherlands "rejoiced in the spirit of unifying," and at "this idea taking root in the hearts of Christians all round. They could become one because they were one. . . . Everything was united to bring them together; there was only one voice against it, and that was the voice of Satan, who was always pushing forward everywhere little differences and fixing their eyes on them." And so the Rev. Dr. D. Fraser, of the English Presbyterian Church at London, "did not believe in the communion of Presbyterianism. He loved it, but only as a part of the great communion of saints."

These are just a few specimens of the kind of liberality that was rife in the Council, and was *sure to be applauded*. How would such declarations be received in any General Assembly of our Church? What should we say to any minister or elder in our highest court at home, all whose favor was for other Churches of Christ, and who had no preference and almost no charity for his own individual denomination? And what is likely to be the effect upon our delegates to the General Presbyterian Council in its triennial meetings, should we continue to send delegates, if they are always to hear these liberal expressions welcomed with shouts of praise, while no encouragement is given to the firm and manly profession and maintenance of principles honestly and conscientiously and intelligently entertained?

Indeed, how is it conceivable that forty-nine Presbyterian bodies, assembling by delegates at Edinburgh, which cherish tenaciously widely conflicting differences in dogma, from the

straitest lines of the Old School in this country down to the broadest latitudinarianism, should earnestly confer together without either too much complaisance for honesty, or else a downright contention? There are Presbyterians who hold Unitarian ideas, and there are Presbyterians who deny the inspiration of the word, and there are Presbyterians who accept the union of Church and State; and when a conglomerate body of different doctrinal views like these gets fairly at work counselling together, there must come either an open rupture amongst them, or else, as Dr. Crosby elegantly expressed it, some "letting up of orthodoxy," and even some denouncing by good men like Dr. Dykes, of "the denominational spirit" as a "fatal" one. Accordingly, it will be observed that at the first public meeting, the Reformed Confessions, in all their grand Calvinistic theology, were the theme of the Council's praises, but that after days of "gush" about "universal Christian unity," the same Council, in its breaking up, is persuaded by some of its best leaders to frown on denominationalism, and even the stern and usually uncompromising Dr. Begg, of the Free Church, so far relaxes as to follow Dr. Dykes's speech with praises of "the firm tone pervading the addresses."

And yet, whoever will sharply scan the address of Dr. Schaff on that first day, upon the consensus of the Reformed Churches, will find in it not only statements confirmatory of the representations now made as to the strong divergencies of doctrine existing amongst the Reformed Churches of this day, but also expressions dropping from Dr. Schaff himself, which indicate the *broadness* of views of that eminent leader of the Council. Notice the statement, that "in the middle of the last century a theological revolution, such as never swept before over the Christian Church, swept over the Reformed Churches," by which "the symbolical books were dethroned on the continent, and in almost every country in Europe lost their former authority," and that "in the present century the authority of the symbolical books is [only] on the increase." Then notice the statement, that "the faith [of those Reformed Churches] is the same as that of the Reformation, but the theology is different, not in substance, but in form and



the relative importance of topics." Read still further: "Every age must produce its own theology, adapted to its peculiar condition and wants." Then notice the statement of differences "between the modern and the old theology of the Reformed Churches:" one is a difference with respect "to the mode of inspiration, but not the *fact* of inspiration, nor the authority of the Bible;" another, the old "was intensely polemical, confessional, and exclusive, while modern evangelical theology is catholic." And finally observe that Dr. Schaff wants "a new Œcumenical Reformed Confession," that is, the consensus of the old "freely reproduced and adapted to the present state of the Church." "The preparation of such a Confession would afford an excellent opportunity to simplify and popularise the Reformed system of doctrine." "But the expediency of such a work at the present time is, to say the least, very doubtful. The pear may be ripening, but it is not ripe yet. . . . Our theology is in a transition state, and has not yet reached such clear and definite results as could be embodied in a form of sound words. It would be impossible to unite all the Reformed Churches under an elaborate Confession. . . . The Anglo-American Churches would require a *maximum* of orthodoxy, the Continental Churches would be content with a *minimum*. The recent Confessions framed by the Free Church of the Canton de Vaud, 1847, the Free Church of Geneva, 1848, the General Synod of the Reformed Church of France in 1872, of the Free Church of Neuchatel in 1874, of the Evangelical Church Association of Switzerland in 1871, and of the Free Church of Italy in 1872, are very brief, and leave room for a great variety of views. So are the nine articles of the Evangelical Alliance. At all events, I am quite satisfied that the present Council would not be competent in the short time of a week to mature such an important document, but would have to leave the whole subject in the hands of an able committee to report to the next triennial meeting."

Thus Dr. Schaff tested the Council at its first meeting as to a new Confession of Faith, (advocating the measure very cautiously,) but found the pear not ripe. Too many were present who, like Dr. Begg, were disposed to question the position, that "every

age must produce its own theology," and to maintain, on the contrary, that "theology has been the same since the days of Eden," that there have been really no "discoveries in theology, though the frequent resurrection of old errors," and that as to the idea of a new theology, "he just wished it to be understood that they did not mean to swallow that." And so that "able committee," to "adapt and popularise the old Confessions," and report "the theology for this period," to the Council at Philadelphia (of all places in the world) in 1880, was not appointed. And yet the Council decided that the proper place for its next meeting was Philadelphia, and that (as appeared from the speeches of Dr. Blaikie and others who advocated the choice) mainly because *there* had taken place the *glorious union consummated betwixt the Old and the New School!* And our eight and twenty representatives, whether they approved or disapproved of this as the ground of the choice, seem to have felt that it would not be the proper thing for them to make objection. Diametrical as our Church considers to be the opposition between Old and New School Presbyterianism, it was felt at Edinburgh that it would not be decent to say anything against that argument for holding the Council at the city of brotherly love. It would have been too positively hostile to the general *animus* of the body in favor of "universal Christian unity."

The reader who has candidly considered what has been said, has no doubt already begun to think it not so very certain that there were no Broad Church views in the Council. Of course there will be many, even in our Church, of the "high pious" order, ready to denounce this article as exhibiting "a very bad spirit;" for where there was so much harmony and brotherly love, and so many prayers offered, and so much discussion about missions and Sunday-schools, with so many affecting anecdotes thrown in, and so many touching appeals made, and so many moving exhortations delivered, must it not be a *very bad spirit* that would lead any one to find any fault at all with the proceedings of so venerable, learned, excellent, and holy an assembly? Especially, must it not be very wicked to assail any of the good men there gathered, as not sound Calvinists and Presbyterians?

Was it not *the General Presbyterian Council*, occupying, as far as it was possible, the œcumenical position and character, and entitled to many times more reverence than any General Assembly? Let this point, therefore, of Broad Church views in the Council be dismissed as having been sufficiently presented in such a bad spirit, after reference has been made to only one more circumstance, confirming all that has been said; that circumstance is the presence and the prominence in the Council of Principal Tulloch of the Established Church of Scotland. And who is Principal Tulloch? Read Dr. William Cunningham's review of Principal Tulloch's book on the "Leaders of the Reformation," and see that work charged by Dr. Cunningham (whose authority our Church regards so high) with "unsound and dangerous," with "loose, dangerous views," and with "giving up the theology of the Reformation as untenable and unsatisfactory." Dr. C. does not hesitate to say that Dr. Tulloch is a "latitudinarian, to whom the *jus divinum* of Presbyterian Church Government is very offensive." And surely nothing in this article will compare with the following: "When Dr. Tulloch intimates his approbation of '*the idea of a free faith holding to very different dogmatic views, and yet equally Christian,*' we presume he just means, in plain English, to tell us that Calvinism, Arminianism, and Socinianism, are all equally Christian." (Cunningham's *Reformers and Theology of the Reformation*, p. 51.)

Steuart of Purdivan tell us (see Book I., Title XVIII.,) that in 1581, in the Book of Policy, the Kirk agreed that "besides the General Assembly, there might by an Universal Assembly of the Church of Christ in the world, commonly called an œcumenical Council, representing the universal Church, which is the body of Christ." The idea then was, that the Protestant Princes and commonwealths should concert as to the time and place and means and security of such a council, and that the National or Provincial Assemblies should each delegate one minister and one elder to attend for each province consisting of an hundred parishes: "Most of the churches being already bound and obliged to own and maintain that Confession of Faith which they have

by their canons authorised and approved; and there being an universal harmony in the doctrine contained in all the Confessions of the Reformed Churches, the work of a General Council as to matters of Faith, would in all probability be sweet and easy; and if in what relates to the worship, discipline, or government of the Church, there should be some misunderstandings, God would reveal even this unto them." The plan of those times was that the Council should meet every seven years, and one from different churches be chosen to the chair at every new Council. To prepare the way for such a catholic meeting, correspondence was to be had amongst the various Churches. And the devout language of our forefathers on this subject was: "When it shall please the Lord to make ready and dispose the nations for a General Council, then shall beauty and strength appear more remarkably in the whole catholic Church, which is the body of Christ."

But in 1552, Archbishop Cranmer, writing to Calvin, proposed a "godly synod for the refutation of error, and for restoring and propagating the truth." It was not so much a *general* or *universal council* the Archbishop had in mind, as that "learned and godly men, eminent for erudition and judgment, might meet together, and, comparing their respective opinions, might handle all the heads of ecclesiastical doctrine, and hand down to posterity, under the weight of their authority, some work not only upon the subjects themselves, but upon the forms of expressing them." Calvin, replying, expresses the judgment that, "in the present disordered condition of the Church, no remedy can be devised more suitable than if a general meeting were held of the devout and the prudent, of those properly exercised in the school of God, and of those confessedly at one on the doctrine of holiness." "Would that it were attainable," he says, "to bring together into some place, from various churches, men eminent for their learning; and that after having carefully discussed the main points of belief, one by one, they should, from their united judgments, hand down to posterity the true doctrine of Scripture. This other thing, also, is to be ranked among the chief evils of our time, viz., that the Churches are so divided that human fellow-

ship is scarcely now in any repute amongst us, far less that Christian intercourse, which all make a profession of, but few practise. . . . Thus it is, that the members of the Church being severed, the body lies bleeding. So much does this concern me," he adds, "that could I be of any service, I would not grudge to cross even ten seas, if need were, on account of it." In a subsequent letter to Cranmer, Calvin speaks of the proposed meeting (which he intimates could not be had,) as to have been "an assembly of the most eminent men of learning from all the various Churches which have embraced the pure doctrine of the gospel;" and that they were to have "discussed, separately, the controverted topics of the day," and transmitted "to posterity, out of the pure word of God, a true and distinct Confession."

Now, the Council contemplated in the Book of Policy, and described by Steuart of Purdivan, was to be an authoritative body representing national or provincial assemblies, united together; and all these Assemblies, and the Churches they governed, were united "in a universal harmony of doctrine." Any work they might undertake, "as to matters of faith, would," therefore, "in all probability, be sweet and easy." It could only be in reference to worship, discipline, or Church government, there could be "misunderstanding." But the late Council at Edinburgh was not an authoritative body; it was not, strictly speaking, a body of representatives; the Churches they belonged to were not harmonious as to either doctrine or order, nor could any work of theirs, as to matters of faith, have been "sweet and easy." On the contrary, it must have been full both of difficulty and of bitterness. And so it has to be confessed, that it did not please the Lord in those days, and has not pleased him since those days, down to our time, "to make ready and dispose the nations" for such a General Council as Steuart described. To this day the nations are not ready for such a Council, nor the Churches either.

As to the Council so earnestly described by Calvin thirty years before the Book of Policy, that also was to have been "from all the various Churches which have embraced the pure doctrine of the gospel," and which were "confessedly at one on the doctrine of holiness." But did Calvin contemplate such a Coun-

cil as practicable? All his expressions indicate the contrary. He says, "Would that it were attainable;" and he implores Cranmer to "increase" his "exertions until something at least shall be accomplished, if not all that we could desire." Why, Calvin had experienced to the full the difficulty of bringing separated doctors and divergent Churches together, having labored incessantly for years, and in vain, to reconcile Luther to the Swiss. He desired the conference and the Confession proposed by Cranmer, and wished to have Churches which "had embraced the pure doctrine of the gospel, and were confessedly at one on the doctrine of holiness," brought to agree, if possible, on the still "controverted topics of the day." But he tells Cranmer of the "present disordered condition of the Church," and "how licentiousness is here and there breaking forth and ungodliness spreading abroad, so that religion is become a mere mockery," and that "in the ranks of the pastors, also, the malady is now gaining ground." He also complains of the "divided Churches," where "human fellowship is scarcely in any repute, far less Christian intercourse." And so in his second letter to Cranmer, he speaks of the Council as that which is "most of all to be desired," but "least likely to be attained." It is in such a condition of things when, her members severed, the Church of Christ lay bleeding, and there was no prospect of the separated parts being brought together, that Calvin is heard saying to the Archbishop, "So much does this concern me, that could I be of any service, I would not grudge to cross even ten seas, if need were, on account of it." But feeling (the truly modest and magnanimous, and so the really great man that he was,) his own "insignificance," he begs "to be passed by," and that "Mr. Philip and Mr. Bullinger" might undertake the difficult task if they would.

Now Calvin's desire for the union of all the Reformed, and his willingness to cross ten seas to accomplish it, if it were attainable by such means, were frequently referred to in the late Council; but Calvin's sense of the actual unattainableness of such an end was never mentioned once. It is to be questioned if the body in general, and even if some of its most forward and self-confident leaders, had any full sense of the difficulties Calvin perceived

so clearly. Where men see not the true nature of an arduous and perhaps impossible enterprise, they can be very brave in undertaking it. One of the great doctors at Edinburgh said Calvin had the will, but *he* had done the deed for the Council's establishment; Calvin was ready to cross "he knew not what ocean," but "I" have thrice actually crossed the Atlantic to accomplish the object. But has the object been attained? Have the separated Churches got nearer by any actual step? Granted that they know a little more than formerly about each other, have they come any nearer to agreeing with one another respecting the "controverted topics of the day?" There was great harmony in all the discussions at Edinburgh; but what were the subjects of discussion? Missions and Sunday-schools, and other matters of "universal concern to Christian men." Was it found that "work by the General Council in matters of faith was sweet and easy?" So far from this, they dared not discuss any matters of faith in the Council itself but only missions and such subjects of general interest. They dared not submit to Dr. Schaff's "able Committee" the enterprise of a new Œcumenical Reformed Confession; nay, they strictly forbade the Committee appointed to gather information, from accompanying their report with any "comparative estimate of the various Confessions, or any remarks on their respective value." Mr. Taylor Innes, whose studies and writings had made him familiar with the subject, gave the Council some very wise advice when he said they "should be very cautious in the whole matter of dealing with this complicated and very delicate and difficult question of creeds," and the Council had the wisdom to take Mr. Taylor Innes's good advice. They knew that to have discussed matters of faith, or undertaken the new Œcumenical Confession, would just have blown their Council to the four winds. There was not harmony enough for such an undertaking in the Council itself, and there is not harmony enough in the Reformed Churches. They are not sufficiently at one for such a Confession. Yet Dr. Schaff (whose thorough scholarship and sincere piety is to be most highly appreciated,) could venture, encouraged, doubtless, by some of the other leaders, to feel the pulse of the Council as to such a project. But

where is the "able Committee," if even Dr. Schaff had been made its chairman, that could have commanded the confidence of the Reformed Churches, while it attempted so delicate a task? The noble Calvin ardently desired the unity of all the Reformed, but his eye could see that it was not attainable in his day; and surely the difficulties are far greater in the way of it now. Few and feeble, and under persecution, as those Churches were then, and having a very few acknowledged leaders in whom the utmost confidence was reposed, the thing could not be, and so it was not; and how can any observing and reflecting man have the least hope of it in the circumstances of the present? Is it not rather to be concluded (looking observantly at the past, and considering well the present, and going to Scripture for our expectations for the future) that our blessed Master no more intended that his visible Church on the earth in this present dispensation should be organically one, than he intended that it, or any part of it, or its officers, members, or ordinances, should be pure and perfect?

No, it is all a dream—"a grandiose dream, a diseased dream, a foolish if not a guilty ambition." That sort of unity is what Rome believes, but the Scriptures do not teach it. And the Reformed Churches have never held forth such a doctrine as that the catholic visible Church is or can be organically one. How preposterous the pretension, when at the late Council itself, they could not all even sit down together at the Lord's table. A proposition to commune together was suddenly sprung upon the body, and the danger of exploding it into fragments became immediately so apparent, that it was as suddenly hurried out again. It had to be suppressed in the Council, and managed outside, by that wise and prudent Business Committee. It was arranged that Saturday should be a *dies non* for the body, and that all who *could* and who *would*, might on that day acknowledge each other as brethren at the table of the Lord. An organic union of all the Reformed Churches, and an Œcumenical Council representing them all, indeed! And yet in Edinburgh, a small fraction of them could not and would not sit together at the Sacramental board! Nor could they understand each other when



even a few of their many various languages were spoken. But what possibility is there that they could get on together in an orderly or edifying way when the Chinese, and the Hindoo, and the Japanese and the Birman, and the African, and the Australian, native Presbyterians should come to join in a true World's Presbyterian Assembly? What house could ever hold them, what chairman ever moderate the meeting, what time be found sufficient to give the multitude of eager speakers any opportunity to express their sentiments?

This leads to the remark that there is a tendency, perhaps inevitable, in such a meeting as the late Council, to a good deal of worthless, vapid, stale, flat, unprofitable speaking. If all debatable points of doctrine and order are necessarily ruled out, can there be any valuable or useful discussions, albeit the whole proceedings be very "harmonious?" What is the "harmony" worth which cannot endure the strain of a frank and manly discussion of the disagreements which really obstruct the actual and honest, the real and truthful harmony of the Reformed Churches? This single circumstance seems to show that the whole conception of a Council such as that was and must have been, is a mistake. Nothing valuable can be evolved, nothing important or useful established in an assembly constituted on the principle of excluding all subjects of discussion where any difference of ideas existed. Let any such rule be acted on in any of our General Assemblies at home, and how completely all vigor of thought, all earnestness of spirit, would be quenched.

But there was another rule of the Council which must necessarily have cramped the spirit of their speakers—the rule of confining all written papers to twenty minutes, and all speeches to fifteen and to ten minutes. How was it possible that there could be any earnest deliverances under such a rule as that? And how was it possible that the mixture of a few bites of so many different sorts of mental and spiritual food in the course of a single *sederunt*, should fail to constitute in the soul of every hearer what the Edinburgh *Daily Review* said that it became, and that was a most *indigestible melange*?

And yet why not just such a rule, if nobody was to propound anything but what everybody else present believed and accepted? And how dispense with such a gag law when there were present so many distinguished men who must be all heard, if only for a little while? But let Brother Jonathan alone for managing John Bull. When three Americans are to introduce "Missions in the United States and other countries"—Drs. Paxton, Dickson, and Van Dyke, of the Northern Church—the rule is changed for that occasion, and then the eagle spread his wings indeed; and when those three had finished, the audience had had enough, and began to disperse, so that there was no chance for other speakers, or other countries, or other Churches. Then it was that Dr. Stillman's report, touching the Tuscaloosa Institute for colored Presbyterian ministers, could not be heard, nor Dr. Plumer, who was to have presented it.

In the second place, just let it be considered how the men who went to this great gathering of Presbyterians from Europe and America, (and what would it have been if all Asia and Africa and the thousand islands of the sea had been represented there?) how these men were all jaded by the inevitable and unmeasurable dissipation of constant dinings, (and perhaps winings,) and teaings, and sight-seeings; and above all, with that most wearisome and exhausting labor of listening to speeches lacking the advantage of that interest which collision of opinions alone can excite.

Now, it is perfectly well known that there were numbers of very able and learned and eloquent men in that Council. Certain it is that the Southern Church sent some of her foremost men, whose genius and whose power of speech are well known to all the land. But what opportunity was afforded in the circumstances and under the rules of that body, for any of them to say anything worthy of their reputation in our own Church and country? In some off-hand address at some little country church in the Blue Grass region of Kentucky, in some crisis of debate in the Synod of Virginia, or in the Assembly at Savannah or New Orleans, our delegates to Edinburgh would doubtless have employed and manifested incomparably greater force and genius than in the

great General Council with all its glory and splendor, and that because in Kentucky and Virginia, at Savannah and New Orleans, there was the soul of earnest men poured out before other men as deeply in earnest as themselves. But at Edinburgh (excepting a few of the written papers, which were worthy of the highest praise, such as Dr. Patton's, and Dr. Cairns's, and Dr. A. A. Hodge's, and Dr. Stuart Robinson's,) it might almost be said that nobody said anything, or not anything worth crossing the ocean to say. Think of men who can speak almost with angelic tongues, addressing, in and through that Council, the whole Presbyterian world, and then ask how much thought and power ought to have been put into their utterances! But how could the most truly accomplished speaker say anything worth saying, where everybody agreed with everybody about everything, and where there was really no need to say anything, because no man's soul was on fire respecting anything at all!

And then remember the demoralising and unmanly influence of the uniform principle which rules at such great gatherings of eminent and distinguished men—especially when they take place in our mother country. A convocation in England, whether political, or literary, or scientific, or religious, is nothing, if compliments and flattery be wanting. The rule is, "You tickle me, and I will tickle you." In ecclesiastical meetings, as much as in any other, it is humiliating and disgusting, the sycophantic spirit which is expected to prevail. And then, alongside of it there will usually appear the spirit also of self-laudation and of bragging about one's country or one's Church. Let any one observe the remarks of Principal Brown of the Free Church College of Aberdeen, after Dr. Schaff and Professor Godet of Neuchatel had spoken of the consensus of the Reformed Confessions at the first day's public meeting. The *Edinburgh Daily Review* says, "he confined himself almost entirely to well-deserved compliment of the previous speakers—a duty which he discharged with pleasing grace." Think of that; the *duty* of one good man to compliment other good men for their Christian or Presbyterian addresses to the Council! It is even so—the Church is educated downwards to a style of praising men to their faces, which is

degrading and nauseous to all worldly men of good and true taste. Dr. Brown spoke of their "esteemed friend, Dr. Schaff," and their beloved friend, Professor Godet;" "the former was the right man in the right place, when treating of the harmony of the Confessions; he had written much, and it might be said, voluminously, upon it, and he had so spoken to-day as to convince every one that he had a comprehensive grasp of the entire subject." "The latter it was a treat to see present. Combining in himself a high spiritual tone, a living faith, an exegetical instinct, and a severe spirit of criticism, he was doing a great work in rolling back the tide," etc. Or, take what Dr. McGregor of Edinburgh said after the speech of Dr. Fraser of London: "He was sure he expressed the feeling of every gentleman in the house when he said how thankful they were that the able discussion which had taken place that day had been closed with the very liberal, catholic, and able speech which they had just heard from Dr. Fraser." Now, was not this a tolerably flattering speech for a Presbyterian preacher to make in the presence of the man whom he so bepraised? And then the way they followed, (so common in all Dissenters' meetings in England, who have not many noblemen and gentry at their call,) of having some one rise, just as certainly as a titled Lord happened to preside at the Council, and move a vote of thanks to his Lordship for his kindness in coming down to preside at their meeting! Lords Moncreiff and Polwarth, and Earl Kintore, all of them were good enough to gladden and to ornament the Council by presiding over its deliberations, and to honor it with a brief speech, and accordingly to each of them, but, so far as observed, to no others who presided, the Council must needs return thanks by special vote! But what shall be said of one of our own Southern Presbyterian delegates who actually told Lord Moncreiff, sitting there before him in the chair, that the Presbyterian cause was safe so long as defended by men of the lineage and name of Moncreiff?

And this leads to another criticism. The Rev. Dr. Goold, who is Moderator of the Free Church of Scotland, presided on the afternoon of the Council's first public day, on the fourth day

of July. In his opening prayer he touchingly referred to the day being "Independence day." "This," says the *Edinburgh Daily Review*, "so moved the patriotic spirit of Dr. Irenæus Prime, (of the *New York Observer*,) that in his very capacity as representing the Business Committee, he made his first appearance by a flagrant breach of order, which was readily forgiven on account of the ardent feeling with which he expressed the depth to which the expression of Dr. Goold's sympathy had touched his nature." Dr. Prime, it is generally supposed in this country, does not very often or very easily *boil over*; but when about to engage in such an extraordinarily lofty duty as the making his official report (as joint convener with Dr. Calderwood of the Business Committee,) to the great Council, his ears caught the sound of the chairman's voice, alluding in sympathising tones to his country's natal day, and the chords of Dr. Prime's heart, high-strung already by reason of the exalted work before him, could not but vibrate uncontrollably under the affecting allusions, and so, forgetting the dictates of cold propriety, he felt that he must make some response, "if it killed him." An American convener of such an illustrious assemblage in Edinburgh, under British rule, on the 4th July, and a British subject acknowledging in those solemn circumstances, American Independence! Why, such a conjuncture might never happen again in the world's whole history, and Dr. Prime had to violate propriety and speak his patriotic sentiments. He therefore pauses (official report in hand,) and publicly renders thanks (compelled thereto by his overpowering emotions) to Dr. Goold, "for the kind and tender and fraternal reference to his country (applause) in connexion with the 4th July. (Applause.)" But these thankful words did not sufficiently relieve the patriot's heart. He therefore added this glowing sentence: "In no part of the world did he ever before listen to a prayer that came more touchingly than to-day in that house from Dr. Goold when leading his brethren and theirs in that prayer to a recognition before God of American Independence, in that hearty petition for their prosperity." Upon this statement it is to be remarked that Dr. Prime rather *listened to* than *joined in* that touching prayer, and that the main aspect

in which it seems to have presented itself to his mind as he listened, was how completely, on British soil, an audience largely British had been led in Dr. Goold's prayer to acknowledge before God that the United States were independent of Great Britain!

Now who can deny the smartness of this turn? And yet it must have been far more offensive to the British gentlemen present than even the very offensive spread-eagle speeches which some of the Northern Presbyterian delegates, when they got the opportunity, inflicted on the Council. And even if there had been no offensive smartness of trickery in the remark of Dr. Prime, yet, what propriety was there in any such political allusion? What was it to the Council whether American Independence was acknowledged or not, and what to them, *as a Presbyterian Council*, was the 4th of July more than any other day?

Of course, there was a counterpart to this, which, however, of course, had not the peculiar quality we have ascribed to Dr. Prime's violation of order. The Business Committee propose an address to the Queen, and the Council agree to it. Three eminent ministers are appointed to draft it,—viz., Dr. Adams, the Rev. Sir Henry Moncreiff, and Dr. Phin,—the chairman being a distinguished American of New York. The Address expressed the unfeigned respect of forty-nine Presbyterian Churches, having in all 19,040 ministers and 21,443 congregations in twenty-five different countries, for Her Majesty's throne and government. It referred to the liberty enjoyed under her majesty's constitutional government for the proclamation of the gospel, and acknowledged her majesty's recognition of Presbyterianism whenever in Scotland; and it assured the Queen of the Council's prayers for her temporal and spiritual welfare, and expressed its strong desires that Britain and America might join the continental states in the interest of peace.

Now, no Christian of intelligence in this country or the world but must honor Queen Victoria, and certainly this Address was in itself as perfectly suitable as any such address by the Council could possibly have been. But it may well be questioned whether

it was proper for those assembled Churches to unite in any address whatever to Her Majesty. We are commanded to render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, to pay honor to whom honor is due, and to honor the king. But these commands are not *to the Church* nor to *her representatives*, but to individuals. The reader will be apt to think the Church, as represented at Edinburgh, did not put itself into the right position by this address so ceremoniously moved and prepared, and adopted and signed by the three hundred and thirty-three members, when he reads the very unceremonious and apparently haughty reply of Her Majesty, addressed to Dr. Blaikie by one of the Queen's Secretaries, as follows:

"WHITEHALL, July 21.

"SIR: I have had the honor to lay before the Queen the address forwarded by your ministers and elders representing forty-nine Presbyterian Churches, severally in twenty-five separate countries, expressing their good wishes toward Her Majesty and the Government of this country; and I have to inform you that Her Majesty was pleased to receive the address very graciously.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

R. ASSHETON CROSS.

All these Churches of the Lord Jesus Christ, *as such*, laying their homage at the feet of an earthly monarch, and she condescending to reply that she has very graciously received it! That may do for Presbyterians connected with national establishments, but how can any free Church tolerate such profane obsequiousness to a mortal? Surely, to say the least of it, the Council adopted in that Address a precedent which may prove very inconvenient hereafter! Is it England's monarch only who is to have the opportunity of slighting such homage? Or is every Republican President in the United States, or France, or Geneva, and every German Emperor or Prince, to be complimented similarly?

More at length than was anticipated, but not more so than the immense importance of the occasion demands, these grounds of objection to some of the proceedings of the General Presbyterian Council have thus been detailed. And now after so much criticism of certain features of the case, which it has not been an

agreeable task to offer, let it be said in all sincerity that no other company of three hundred and thirty-three Presbyterian ministers and elders, which could have been selected, would probably have done any better, possibly none so well, as the very body with some of whose sayings and doings there has been fault found very frankly in this paper.

And let it be also acknowledged, to the credit of the Council, that contrary to what was expected by some, it allowed no one to appear as a member without a commission, which took away from it the objection that it was a mere voluntary society or gathering of individuals without any sort of authority.

Let it also be noted, that to no one man was given the distinction of presiding over the body.

Still further, let it be granted that some good may come from the display of the strength of Presbyterianism in numbers and learning and wealth and zeal; and that great importance is to be attached to the mutual advances made towards coöperation amongst Presbyterians in the work of foreign missions; and to the *impetus* given to historical researches, necessary in order to the more perfect vindication of Presbyterianism; and to the encouragement afforded to remote Churches of our order, especially on the continent of Europe.

Still further and finally, let it be very freely and cordially admitted, that there is something attractive and grand in the central idea of this great gathering of Presbyterians. The true Calvinists of the world, that is to say, all the men who really accept and maintain the inspired theology of Paul the Apostle, (alas, that there should be Presbyterians so called who do not hold fast these truths,) ought, if it were possible, to be united in one. And, indeed, it must be admitted that the Presbyterian system is incomplete without the Œcumenical Council. But, then, all that can be said touching such Council is what the great Genevese said: "Would that it were attainable!" It does not seem to be attainable. The ages, the races, the nationalities, the languages, the oceans, and the continents divide, and have divided, and must divide, the visible Church. Evidently this is the Lord's plan. Yet it is very desirable that these Calvinists and



Presbyterians should, as far as it is possible, somehow meet one another face to face. Let them come together to worship their Lord and have communion with each other, and, as at Edinburgh, confer about missions and Sunday-schools and temperance and Presbyterian literature and history, but (as they did not at Edinburgh) let them also earnestly and without reserve consider all their Presbyterian affairs, and freely, fully, and frankly exchange their views upon matters where they have not been at one. This is the very thing Calvin would have crossed ten seas to attend, if he had believed it practicable and would avail—a Council where, from various Churches of pure doctrine, eminent men, *after carefully discussing the main points of belief one by one*, and especially the *controverted topics of the day*, might draw up for them all a true and distinct Confession. But in Calvin's day such a thing was not attainable. And in our day the Œcumenical Council is not attainable; nor will it ever be attainable, in all human probability, in our dispensation. Yet there are Presbyterian Churches, and a good many of them, which ought to be able to meet and confer about their differences, which are few and small compared with the points wherein they agree. Let them meet as our Synods and Assemblies meet, to debate and discuss and determine matters whereupon they are not agreed. Any other sort of conference must be tame and comparatively useless. That such a conference could have peaceably been had in the Council at Edinburgh is doubtful. Perhaps the report on the actual Confessions may make such discussion possible with good results hereafter. If needful, let the gate of entrance be made straiter. Away with every Broad Church idea. Let all such Presbyterians as deny the Trinity, the true and proper divinity of our Lord, the full and plenary inspiration of the Word, and its sole and sufficient authority, all or either of the five points of Calvinistic theology, the divine right of Presbyterian Church Government, or the Church's absolute independence of the State, be excluded from the Council. To reduce the numbers, but elevate the qualifications of the component members of this ecclesiastical alliance, will not hurt but help and benefit the union. It never advances the prosperity of a particular Church

to lower its standards; and to Churches united together by proper bonds, it can be no advantage to widen too much their distance from each other. In every battle it is necessary to close up the ranks and let the touch of the elbows of his comrades be felt by every man. A truly and really united, an earnest and harmonious, a compact and vigorous Presbyterianism, is infinitely better every way than a slack, diluted, over-liberal latitudinarianism, offspring of human wisdom, and a piety better than the Bible, trustful in numbers, flattering to men, treacherous to God and to truth.

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### CRITICAL NOTICES.

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*Origin and Doctrines of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church.*  
In two Parts. By E. B. CRISMAN, D. D. St. Louis, Mo.:  
Perrin & Smith, Steam Book and Job Printers. 1877.

This book has amused, provoked, and instructed us. We have been amused to watch the author in one part weaving a net for the Calvinist, and then in another part vainly endeavoring to extricate himself from the meshes of the same. We have been provoked to witness his repeated and persistent misrepresentation of the Westminster Confession of Faith. We have been instructed, once at least, (on page 17, folio 20,) by finding that the doctrines we have ever delighted to preach were not Calvinistic but Cumberland! This champion puts "one in mind of a landless laird straddling the line-fence between two farms. He is always found standing upon that leg which is the other side of the fence."

Some politicians for popularity's sake assume the position which is well denominated "on the fence." This book bids fair to be popular in the same way. We do not remember ever to have read anything which is likely to be more popular with all classes: it contains the very cream of Arminianism, some fine

specimens of Calvinism, whilst to all good Cumberlands it must of course commend itself as perhaps the best that can be said for those occupying that peculiar position above mentioned. The Baptists will enjoy so much of this book as is Calvinistic. The Episcopalians—as they are some Calvinistic and some Arminian—will enjoy it *pro re nata*; and again, all who believe in infant baptism, and in baptism by sprinkling, will find something to approve. Even the Universalist will find comfort by combining the author's argument on pages 88 and 106 with his interpretation of 1 Cor. xv. 22, on page 91. The Jew, by combining the author's proposition—"The fact that God has foreordained an event is incontrovertible evidence that he approves it"—with the Scriptures which reveal God's purpose of the death of his Son at the hands of the generation which crucified him, will find no cause to mourn when they look upon him whom they have pierced. We are inclined to the opinion that Peter was not of the Cumberland persuasion, or consistency would have prevented his saying, "Him, being delivered by the *determinate counsel* and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken and by WICKED hands have crucified and slain." Had Judas only been supplied with the author's "*incontrovertible*" proposition, he would have found no necessity for throwing down the thirty pieces of silver, repenting, and hanging himself.

Possibly Dr. Crisman will say, "This is all sheer misrepresentation;" if so, he will sympathise with us in our provocation at his misrepresentation of our time-honored Confession. We think, however, it is a logical deduction from his own premises, while no disclaimer of his against these deductions is found upon his pages,—such a disclaimer, *e. g.*, as is found against "fatality" in the Westminster Confession. In quoting from our Confession, why did the author quote Chapter III., Sections 3 and 5, *leaving out Section 1* of the same chapter, which contained an *explicit disclaimer* of the *very deduction* he insists repeatedly in drawing from Sections 3 and 5? Again, in quoting Chapter X., Section 1, why omit the latter part of the Section, which would have turned the edge of his slashing (?) sword?

The author has made a very common mistake: he approaches

the difficulties of Calvinism by the route of human reasoning and philosophical speculation. He makes little or no attempt to refute our position by Scriptural exegesis. By the author's method, the Unitarian and the Universalist and Arminian proceed. There are two productions we ardently long to see: an honest and able effort at an *exegetical* refutation of Calvinism, and an able, succinct, and exhaustive presentation of the Difficulties and Absurdities of Arminianism,—something similar to, but projected upon a broader plan, than Brown's Arminian Inconsistencies and Errors. There is too much disposition to represent Calvinism as *full* of difficulties, whilst Arminianism and Cumberlandism (if there is any difference between the last two) are brought to the popular attention as *free* from difficulties; whereas, the truth is, neither system is free from difficulties. No one sees and appreciates the real difficulties of Calvinism more than the thorough Calvinist himself; but he sees at the same time *greater* difficulties in the rival scheme. Hence we would hail as an auspicious omen the day when the rival champions of these conflicting schemes shall contend with the weapon of Scriptural exegesis rather than of theological disputation. Thus far the Calvinist has chiefly employed the exegetical, the Arminian, the theological, method.

In the sense, that truth is most frequently found as a mean between two extremes of error, it has been our delight for years past to note this as an attribute of our Westminster Confession in "Doctrine," "Government," "Discipline," and "Worship." Dr. Crisman, however, has been indulging himself in the same way, and he would seem to have almost a prescriptive right to do so, logically at least, although not chronologically. For "Cumberland Presbyterians have claimed from their earliest history that their position in theology is a medium between the extremes of Calvinism and Arminianism;" page 98. On the next page he styles it "the medium system." On at least three other pages,—54, 59, and 104,—the author distinctly refers to his as the medium system. But the difference between us seems to be, that he *builds much for defence* in this peculiarity, whilst we simply delighted to trace in our system the incidental develop-

ment of the fact that it stands between two extremes. To him the proof that it is *medium* seems to be an end of all controversy respecting its truth. To us the great question has been, Is Calvinism Scriptural? if so, it is true; and having settled the question affirmatively, there arose an antecedent probability, that, since true, it would be found a mean between two extremes of error; and our delight has been to have this instinctive judgment meet ever and anon with *incidental confirmation*. The labored attempt (pages 102 and 103, and abundantly throughout the work,) to prove the Cumberland system a "medium" instead of a "Scriptural" system, we consider the great and all-pervading defect of this book. Perhaps in no book can there be found on two pages more concentrated misrepresentation of Calvinism than on pages 102 and 103, yet without this misrepresentation the author's beautiful scheme would topple to immediate ruin like an arch deprived of its keystone. To illustrate:

"Calvinist: Salvation *unconditional* to sinners; *certain* to saints.

"Arminian: Salvation *conditional* to sinners; *uncertain* to saints.

"Cumberland Presbyterian: Salvation *conditional* to sinners; *certain* to saints." (Page 102. Author's italics.)

"Calvinism: Every man's destiny was eternally FIXED and CERTAIN.

"Arminianism: Every man's destiny is UNFIXED and UNCERTAIN at all periods in this life.

"Medium Ground: Every man's destiny is UNFIXED and UNCERTAIN until he believes; then it is FIXED and CERTAIN." Page 103. (Author's capitals.)

We have furnished these quotations as a specimen of the author's fairness in presenting the Calvinistic scheme! The book *literally abounds* with such specimens; they will seem, moreover, to display the author's powers in the play of the "landless laird." For another instance of most inexcusable unfairness, (or inability to interpret language,) see page 84, 10th and 11th lines from the bottom.

The author labors under at least three radical misconceptions: 1. That the Westminster Confession teaches "fatality." We recommend him to read "Confession of Faith," Chapter III., Section First, the whole of it, especially the latter part, together with the proof texts. 2. That the eternal decree would render

God unjust if he punished the sinner for his sins. We recommend him to read Romans, 9th chapter, and to pause frequently, as he reads verses 13 to 20, listening attentively to the echoes in his own soul as he reads verse 19, and heeding well the inspired answer in verse 20. It is a *remarkable fact*, that Romans 9, if once mentioned in this book, escaped our scrutiny; certainly no one would dream, from the mere reading of this book, that such passages as verses 19 and 20 had ever been recorded by the pen of inspiration. 3. That the decree of election is not *eternal*. For information on this point, will the author turn to Romans viii. 29, 30, Ephesians i. 4, 9, 11, 2 Timothy i. 9.

One of the most amusing and striking features of this book is the *dearth of Scripture* references when the author is advocating his peculiar "medium" views. In Chapter IV., the author strikes solid ground,—“Perseverance of the Saints,”—and then the proof texts begin to bristle all over the pages. This feature is so prominent that we feel persuaded no reader can fail to recognise it when once his attention is called to it. We notice, too, that the author is very bold in attacking Arminian (?) texts when he is fighting under the Calvinistic banner; but when upon his own peculiar “Medium Ground,” he is very skilful in keeping Calvinistic texts in the background; and “Medium” (?) texts, the author (one would judge from his tactics) thinks had better be kept in the rear too, for he seems conscious that he is in the condition of that one who, with ten thousand, was going to meet one coming against him with twenty thousand. Still, he does not send an embassy desiring conditions of peace; he rather manœuvres so skilfully that the twenty thousand can never discover the whereabouts of their adversary’s forces. This seems to prove that our Cumberland brethren have not been very successful in finding Scripture to support their peculiar “Middle Ground.” They have learned to array themselves with wonderful agility, now under “Calvinism” and now under “Arminianism,” with their respective array of Scripture passages, *i. e.*, they have learned to imitate, but not to originate.

On page 52 the author makes the usual Arminian perversion of the expression, “elect infants dying in infancy.” Should he

ever issue another edition of "Origin and Doctrines," we recommend him to read "Discourses of Redemption," by Stuart Robinson, D. D., page 92. Perhaps he may learn the difference between what a "Presbyterian" minister *may* properly "say in the funeral of a child," indicating what "he sincerely believed," and what a doctrinal symbol *should* say, as a "Confession of Faith," speaking "fearlessly" "when the Bible speaks," and stopping resolutely "when the Bible stops."

In so far as Calvinism and Arminianism are concerned, we have found nothing new in this book. The same old misconceptions and objections which are familiar to every Calvinist are reiterated, and, of course, are answerable to the old line of defences. But remembering that this is a "Middle Ground" theory,—partaking partly of Calvinism and partly of Arminianism,—we might expect to find something new, and our search has been rewarded! To get this new idea properly before the reader, we must present a few quotations.

On page 86 the author begins an enumeration of "some of the points on which we object to the system of doctrines held by our Presbyterian brethren:"

"1. We object to the date of the act of election. . . . We think the Bible is exceedingly clear in teaching that men are personally and individually elected to salvation when they believe, and at no other time. 'When ye believed, ye were sealed.' " So it seems that "election" is synonymous with "sealing."

On page 103, "Cumberland Presbyterian: The date of election is at the time of regeneration and adoption. 'When ye believed, ye were sealed.' " "Election" synonymous with "sealing."

On page 109, arguing for the Perseverance of the Saints, the author says:

"5th. From the election to eternal life of all who believe."

"That God has an election, no man who reads and believes the Bible will deny. Calvinists teach that this election is unconditional, and took place before the foundation of the world. The Bible teaches that it is conditional, that faith is the condition, and that it takes place when the individual believes. 'When ye believed,' (condition and date,) 'ye were sealed with that Holy Spirit of promise which is the earnest of your inheritance.' The Bible certainly teaches that God elects believers to heaven at the moment of their espousal of Christ by faith."

Here again we have "election" the same as "sealing." This furnishes one of those amusing instances of the paucity of Scripture to support the "Medium Ground." The author states the Calvinist view: Election from eternity. Arminian: Election at the death of the believer. Cumberland: Election is at the time of regeneration and adoption. This position is taken, of course, to get on the "Medium Ground:" thus, Eternity—Faith or Regeneration or Adoption—Death. Now that he has found his position, he must *next* find his Scripture. But the man on the fence might as well search the records of the clerk's office for *his title to the fence* between two other persons farms. In the search, however, something is at last found recorded in Ephesians i. 13. "When ye believed, ye were sealed." This trumpet is sounded three times. Here is a "seal," at least it was impressed at the time of "believing;" *ergo*, "election" is equal to "sealing;" *ergo*, election is not from eternity! Now this is certainly something new and something peculiarly *medium!* Would the reader believe, that although this position is one of the characteristic, we might justly say fundamental and essential, positions of the Cumberland theology, yet this text is absolutely the only quotation the author makes in support of it. Would he believe that although he quotes it three times, he never once furnishes you with the book, chapter, and verse where it is to be found. But perhaps the reader's thoughts revert to Romans viii. 30, and he is wondering if the author means to slight that Calvinistic proof text, that election is from eternity; this was the current of our thoughts as we read along to page 112: "But let us notice several other passages. Romans viii. 30,— 'Whom he did predestinate, them he also called; and whom he called, them he also justified; *and whom he justified, them he also glorified.*' WE PASS OVER THAT PART OF THIS PASSAGE WHICH IS USED TO PROVE UNCONDITIONAL ELECTION, to the latter part of it which teaches that they who are *justified* are *glorified.*" (The italics are Dr. Crisman's, the capitals are ours.) When we read the above, the impulse to laugh outright was irresistible. True, the portion italicised is that which is pertinent to the Doctor's argument in this place; but when we reflect how



exceedingly pertinent the whole passage is to the ground just travelled over by the author on pages 86, 103, 109, to dismiss it in such style,—“we pass over,”—was certainly not pertinent. “They saw it, and so they marvelled; they were troubled, and hasted away;” Psalms xlviii. 4. And this one of the towers of our Zion is never again approached, if careful search has not failed us.

On page 119 the author undertakes the exposition of Hebrews vi. 4, 5, 6, so far as to wrest it from the Arminian's use, as a proof text against the Calvinistic doctrine of the “Perseverance of the Saints.” The trouble, however, which he experiences, is to wrest it in such a way as to keep it on the “Medium Ground;” for, whilst he is not willing for the Arminian to appropriate it, he seems equally unwilling for the Calvinist to do so. Hence, he says: “In our opinion, the persons here designated are not Christians, but *deeply convicted and penitent sinners.*” Had he stopped here he would have been on Calvinistic ground, and clean out of reach of the Arminian; but this will not do, he must get on Cumberland ground, and so must spice it a little with Arminianism, hence he adds: “We are strengthened in this opinion because it is not said that it is impossible ‘to renew them again unto religion,’ but ‘to repentance;’ as much as to say that they had never been further than repentance.” Now, to say nothing about the difficulty that would still remain in the expression, “renew again,” from his sentence,—“they had never been further than repentance,”—this difficulty might occur: that *μετάνοια* in Scripture is invariably a Christian grace, hence accompanies “faith,” which, according to the Scriptures, is always accompanied by “sealing,” which, according to the author, is the same as “electing,” (page 86,) which, according to the same authority, is at the time of “regeneration” (“renew again”) and “adoption,” (page 103.) Thus the author has, in that unfortunate sentence—“as much as to say that they had never been further than repentance,”—actually yielded the dispute to the Arminian. Here is amusement again. This champion of the line fence rescues a text from the Arminian only to find that the Calvinist gets it, then facing about he rescues it from the

Calvinist, but, alas! the Arminian gets it. It seems to us that the Doctor had better drop down quietly on our side, or give up this text to the Wesleyans; for we see not how he is to retain possession of it; for should he fall back upon another line of defence, taking his stand at the 6th verse, on the word "IF,"—saying, "A supposition can never prove the existence of an event," (page 119,)—he will find some one in the Calvinistic uniform ready again to take charge of the text; and, moreover, ready with *that same weapon*, which he borrowed originally from our side, to drive him from some other of his imaginary "Middle Ground" positions.

Spurgeon, in one of his sermons, says, "Some of you cannot open your mouths wide enough to sing this song of election now; but when you reach heaven, God will open your mouths, and then you will sing it." Were we personally acquainted with the author, we should say to him privately, Remember, Brother Crisman, not all things occupying a middle ground between two extremes are approved of God. "Cold" and "hot" are extremes; the Laodiceans were on the "Medium Ground." The time may soon come when we shall pass over the river and rest beneath the shade of the Tree of Life; then we feel sublimely assured we shall vie, each with the other, in celebrating the praises of that God, "who hath saved us and called us with a holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own *purpose* and *grace*, which was given us in Christ Jesus, before the world began."

*"The Higher Life" Doctrine of Sanctification Tried by the Word of God.* By HENRY A. BOARDMAN, D. D., Author of "The Apostolical Succession," "The Bible in the Counting House," "The Bible in the Family," "The Great Question," etc. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1334 Chestnut Street. Pp. 286, 16mo.

Dr. Boardman has done a good work and done it well. He is a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth. Perhaps nothing could show the urgent necessity of such a work more than the following announcement by the *New York Evangelist*:

"The Rev. Joseph Lehmann, of the Baptist Church, writes from Germany that Antinomian views of the most radical type have penetrated some of the churches there, and caused trouble. He states specifically, referring to the Baptist brotherhood, we suppose: 'The church at Berlin has lost more than sixty members through this heresy, which throws overboard prayer, the Lord's day, Church organisation, temperance, together with confession of sin, as no longer necessary for the "perfect Christian."' He ascribes these untoward results as due, at least in part, to the teachings of Mr. R. Pearsall Smith!"

The human heart is the same in all ages, and in all men since the fall. Antinomianism on the one hand, and Legalism on the other, is the constant tendency. Satan fishes for souls first with one bait then with the other, and anon he combines the two, not being particular, so long as he can succeed in their destruction, whether men are enticed by one or the other, or both.

The "Higher Life" Doctrine of Sanctification, by Dr. Boardman, is a formal and painstaking effort to present the teachings of the Higher Life school, and at the same time to furnish the scriptural refutation of their doctrine, and the proof of the Reformed doctrine. We have tasted the old wine and the new, and we judge "the old wine is better." There is, no doubt, a fascination in the new doctrine, especially to saints afflicted with spiritual laziness. It is so congenial to the indolence of the depraved heart to vault at once into an estate of "perfection" by "one act of consecrating faith." Why be burdened with the girdle of sincerity, the sandals of peace, the breastplate of righteousness, and the helmet of salvation, when, with the shield of *faith alone*, we can quench *all* the fiery darts of the adversary? Why, after a grievous fall into sin like Noah or David or Lot, be burdened with a sense of guilt and agonize at a throne of grace, crying, "Have mercy upon me, O God, according to thy loving kindness; according unto the multitude of thy tender mercies, blot out my transgressions," etc., etc.? Why not just rise up from your wallowing in the mire and say, "I confess my sin," repeat your act of consecrating faith, and then go on your way rejoicing! How such bold freedom as this would commend itself to the heart of the Antinomian, and how the self-righteous Pharisee, having again returned to his accustomed spiritual (?)

devotions, would comfortably conclude that all was right once more between him and God. What does Satan care whether you are in assurance or in doubt, provided you are in doubt of Christ, or in fullest assurance of faith in your own faith. He cares not whether you have faith in your own faith, or faith in your act of consecration, or faith in your assurance, provided only you have not saving faith in Christ, which works by love, purifies the heart, and overcomes the world.

Assurance of faith is not of the essence of saving faith, as our Methodist brethren teach; assurance is not unattainable in this life, as the Romanists teach. Our Confession of Faith wisely and beautifully antagonises both these errors, declaring assurance to be *attainable* in this life, but *not essential* to saving faith. John Calvin has been misrepresented as teaching on this point the Methodist doctrine. A casual reading will produce this impression, because the prominent error before Calvin's mind was the *Romish* doctrine on this subject; but a careful and discriminating study of his "Institutes" and of his "Commentaries" will prove that he is in full harmony with the Confession of Faith, Chapter XVIII. Were this the proper place, nothing would be easier, as nothing would be more pleasurable, than to place Calvin and the Confession side by side on the subject of assurance.

Besides a well written preface of six pages, Dr. Boardman treats the subject in sixteen chapters: I. Lofty Claims. II. The Old Doctrine and the New. III. Faith Misapprehended in its Nature and Objects. IV. The Will not Omnipotent—"Consecration." V. Further Mistakes as to Consecration. VI. Novelty in Scripture Interpretation—Mysticism. VII. More Texts Misinterpreted—Romans vii. VIII. Half Truths—Commands and Promises—Prayer. IX. Passivity *vs.* Activity—Faith Restricted, and Scripture Slighted. X. The Lessons of 1 John, Chapter i. XI. The Law Debased—Sin no Sin—The Lord's Prayer. XII. The Scheme Incompatible with the General Tone of the Inspired Word—Pilgrim's Progress. XIII. A Bleak System for Doubting and Desponding Believers. XIV. The Scheme Deficient in Solid Comfort for God's Children—Self-

Deception—Egoism. XV. Higher Life Examples. XVI. Trustworthy Experiences—Conclusion.

We had intended to give a few extracts illustrative of the Higher Life Doctrine, and Dr. Boardman's method of dealing with it, but space forbids. Suffice it to say, he is kind, courteous, and fair, in representing the position of the Perfectionists; for the most part allowing them to speak for themselves by quoting *extensively* from their writings; but having thus given their side a fair hearing, he draws the sword of the Spirit and hews Agag to pieces.

“Be *ye* therefore PERFECT, even as YOUR FATHER, which is in heaven, is perfect,” Matthew v. 48. Again and again does the author hurl this ponderous text with telling effect against the defences of the Perfectionists, until their ramparts are levelled with the dust.

*A Word to Christian Teachers and Students of the Ministry.*  
By SAMUEL B. SCHIEFFELIN, Author of the “Foundations of History,” “Milk for Babes,” and “Children's Bread.” Committee of Publication, Richmond. Pp. 89. 16mo.

Here is a little book that is *a book*,—clear, manly, direct, earnest, thoroughly biblical, with a large amount of instruction packed into its small dimensions. We accord it our unqualified admiration for the great amount of biblical text interwoven in the discourse, for its clear, correct, outspoken theology, and for its wise instructions aglow with a continuous current of ardent piety. A few selections from the book will best commend it.

“Beloved in the Lord Jesus Christ,” it opens, “we have great reason to thank the Lord that we are living in the world at this time.” Speaking of God's appointing teachers, he specially honors parents as God's original teachers, and earnestly presses on them the use of this faculty. Teaching from the Bible, in stories and illustrations, is far more enjoyed by children than Mother Goose's Melodies. To Sunday-School teachers he says: “Have you a desire to bring souls to Christ to be saved? Do you receive the doctrine, that salvation is by faith in the Lord Jesus Christ?”

“Many Christians close their prayers with, ‘and *save us at*

*last.* The word of God teaches that believers *are* saved." "Many teach that our great aim should be to be prepared for death, whereas we should be prepared to live." "Dying is instantaneous experience, but living is awful." Speaking of "motive and manner" in teaching, he says: "Be ready to be laid aside when your work is done. With John the Baptist say, He must increase, but I must decrease." Among many excellent instructions about "meetings," he says, "Be prepared, be in earnest, be prompt, be ready, be short. Do not preach to men in your prayers. Do not scold the absent." "Queen Esther on going into the presence of King Ahasuerus might use this language: '*Perhaps* he will admit my plea; *perhaps* will hear my prayer.' Away with this kind of teaching. Sinners should not be encouraged to use such language as this in approaching Christ."

The untitled man rises manfully and powerfully, too, to "the height of the great argument" against modern scientists. Their systems of evolution and development are headless trunks. They are reached "not by enticing words of man's wisdom." "Poor orphans! without a father, they try in vain to resign themselves to a dark future. They give their attention to the very lowest field of science—matter." The gospel of God is the power that convinces and saves them. It addresses their hearts as well as their understanding. We have not met so fine a Scripture argument against infidelity in brief space.

In an age when the Church is employing a variety of workers, and is apt to run too fast, it is admirably conservative in its hints to parents, teachers, and students of divinity, recalling all to the Bible and to our grand old theology in the Heidelberg and Westminster Forms.

*He will Come: or, Meditations on the Return of Jesus to Reign over the Earth.* By STEPHEN H. TYNG, JR., D. D. With an Introduction by STEPHEN H. TYNG, D. D., Rector of St. George's church, New York city. New York: Mucklow & Simon, Publishers, Forty-Second Street and Madison Avenue. 1877. Pp. 212. 12mo.

This is one more added to the many attempts made in late times to anticipate the grand finale of our world. To a book-

maker it is an attractive theme. He can say many sublime things, and run out many beautiful and even unobjectionable speculations, without committing himself to many positive *puncta stantia*. The author has indulged himself freely in these pious "meditations." We accord to this book a truly pious vein of thought and of fancy, with some noticeable flashes of intellectual force.

But, as usual, it adventures upon a definite programme of the Second Advent. The coming of the "Glorious Man" will be first "in the air for his saints." This will be the signal for the first resurrection. "A thousand years or more will intervene" between this resurrection and the "rest of the dead." Then will come the great "manifestation" of Christ, "with his saints as assessors, in judgment on a wicked world. Then cometh the end." The writer does not descend to the arena of ordinary discussion, but maintains the position of a teacher instructing the Church. He gives no previous or present theory on this great subject even a passing recognition. His mode of argumentation supposes no antagonism, and coolly plants his points in the midst of pious reflections and Scripture quotations. Discourse on points which have hitherto balked *exegesis*, would have been well to have been less didactically stated.

Our author speaks, of course, like an Episcopalian when he says that Advent Sunday is a reminder at once of the two Advents,—the first and the second comings of our Lord. As a pious man and an evangelical divine, where does he find the authority for his Church's inventing any such appointed days? On the part of other Churches we demur to the quiet assumption that these appointments have any authority whatever. The Apostle tells the Galatians, "I am afraid of you; ye observe days." The day and the month, and even the year, of our Lord's first advent are all incapable of positive determination, and it is a sort of imposition on the uninformed when any Church pretends to fix either of them. With all respect for our prelatial brethren, we are conscious of some degree of rebellious recusancy against the cool superciliousness which speaks of St. Andrew's and St. Agnes' as of course belonging to the world's calendar.

Shall we not even have a time *Almanac* any more, which shall not demand on the face of it our tacit acquiescence in ecclesiastical nuncupations?

Without abundantly substantiating the first coming "*for* the saints," and the second coming "*with* the saints" after an interval of a thousand years, Dr. Tyng describes the disintegration of the righteous from the wicked by an historical illustration most infelicitous. During the Protectorate, England's rightful sovereign (?) was a fugitive from her shores. The confidence of his loyal people was sorely tested by his long delay to return. To those who remained faithful he at last came in utmost secrecy. None but his friends knew that he had crossed the channel. After many days spent in secret appointments and in resurrecting the elements of fallen royalty, the day of the king's "appearing" and proclamation arrived. There was a secret but rapid elimination of the faithful from the malcontents. But it was not Charles so much, nor his immediate adherents, that gained him his throne, but a parliamentary party dreading the army as much as it hated Charles, and a reticent George Monk at the head of that army, answering the questions of the impatient with a "splash of brown juice," and a boiling, seething London engaging the attention of both, that "set free" the royalists. This royal helplessness, in the midst of revolutionary turmoil, makes the analogy exceedingly unhappy and even offensive.

In that awful period between the resurrection of the righteous and the wicked, the righteous shall be looked for, "but shall not be found." The world will be surprised to find them absent. But they will soon forget it. Government will go on. Deterioration will be rapid, and the world will rush to a terrible demise. The conversion of the world is an impossibility. The next era will in no wise be a "development" built on the analogies of the present. The Jews and a literal Jerusalem shall have priority and superiority in the grand æon to come.

These are great themes, and more, they are futuritions but dimly bursting the surface of our revelation, requiring far more of the "spirit of prophecy" and profound exegesis than our author has shown on the pages of his little book. It is a pity



that so much of pious, devotional, even rapturous, thought should be based upon an almost invisible filament of reasoning.

*Memoirs of Philip P. Bliss.* Edited by D. W. WHITTLE. Contributions by Rev. E. P. GOODWIN, IRA D. SANKEY, and GEORGE F. ROOT. Introduction by D. L. MOODY. A. S. Barnes & Company, New York, Chicago, and New Orleans. Pp. 367, 8vo.

Of the many who perished in the awful Ashtabula catastrophe, the loss of no one perhaps was so widely lamented as that of P. P. Bliss, the sweet singer of Zion. His popular religious songs, which are sung all over the United States and Great Britain, had made his name familiar throughout the land; and there was a deep and wide-spread regret when it was reported that under such *appalling circumstances* his lips had been suddenly sealed in death.

The volume before us is a loving tribute to his memory by one who had been for many years most intimately associated with him in Christian labors. The author makes no pretensions to literary merit or distinction. He modestly styles himself as only the "editor" of the work, which he had undertaken at the solicitation of friends, who desired a correct and faithful narrative of Mr. Bliss's life. And it is in itself but the simple story of a very simple life, told in plain and simple style. Mr. Bliss was of humble origin, and enjoyed few advantages of education in early life; and his public career was short and in no wise a distinguished one, except in the sphere of sacred song. In this his gifts were rare and eminent. He possessed to a wonderful degree the faculty of translating religious thought into song; composing rapidly and freely both the music and the words, and then being capable, through a rich and well trained voice, of rendering them into sweet and effective song. His poetry, it must be admitted, is not of a high order, and his music is characterised by simplicity rather than grandeur. But in both he has undoubtedly struck a popular chord, which has given his songs a very wide circulation and use.

These gifts, to which was added the best of all, the gift of

divine grace, which manifested itself in zeal for the salvation of others, naturally led to his employment in late years as a "singing evangelist." His labors in this respect, in which he was actively engaged at the time of his tragical death, are minutely recorded in these memoirs, and are full of interest. But, perhaps, the most interesting part of the volume is the history of many of his most popular songs which are familiar among ourselves; such, for example, as "Almost Persuaded," "Only an Armor Bearer," "Hallelujah, 'Tis Done," etc.

The thoughtful reader of this book will probably be impressed with a feeling of disappointment at the want of dignity in the subject, which, to a certain degree, imparts its character to the whole volume. But perhaps this ought to be excused as the exuberance of a most buoyant spirit not yet trained to *great* work in the Master's service.

*William the Baptist.* By Rev. JAMES M. CHANEY, Lexington, Missouri. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. St. Louis: Presbyterian Publishing Company. 1877. Pp. 245, 16mo.

We have examined this little book with care, and it is our deliberate opinion that its author has succeeded admirably in all respects. The temper and the spirit of it, the language and the argument, are all just what were to be desired. The method is *Socratic*, of which Mr. Chaney seems to be complete master. He carries on his discussion altogether by *conversations*, and he certainly knows well how to frame and put his questions so as to compel the truth to come out in the answers given.

Very fully we agree with the author, that the ordinance of baptism is in nothing second to the Lord's Supper,—both being sacraments instituted by the Lord himself, and both of the highest importance and value. No person in the Presbyterian Church may hold either in light esteem.

And we agree with him that much of the heresy prevailing in reference to the rite of baptism is chargeable to neglect and indifference on the part of those whose practice accords with the truth. That this is so, (he rightly declares,) must "appear from

the fact that nine-tenths of the arguments of immersionists are based on concessions made by such."

Another point, respecting which Mr. Chaney is undoubtedly right, is that they greatly err who suppose that one mode of baptism is as good as another, and that the question, which is the right mode, is not worthy of discussion. On the contrary, the difference between us and the immersionists is radical, and both cannot be right. We do not hesitate to affirm with him, that immersion is not a *scriptural* mode of baptism, while at the same time we hold with him that it is *valid* baptism, and we call attention to the very clear elucidation made of this distinction on pp. 58-60. The subject is, indeed, so left in the word of God, that many think they find one mode, and others another mode, therein approved. But this by no means shows that the sacred writers did not intend to prescribe any particular mode. Many of the most vital doctrines of the gospel are thus left by the pen of inspiration. Those doctrines can be and are rejected by many as not scriptural, and thus men are tested. We must search the Scriptures daily to find out whether these things are as men represent; and we shall have to give account of prejudice, or carelessness, or pride of opinion, or any other cause lead us to reject the truth and espouse the error.

Mr. Chaney uses no unkind words, but yet employs great plainness of speech. The idea he opposes is with him "a heresy that would drag the sacred rite of baptism from the place assigned it by Jesus, as a symbol of the Spirit's work, down to a useless work of symbolising in a very awkward manner an event that had *nothing to do* with man's redemption." And he justly holds that "the evil of such perversion is aggravated when we remember it necessitates the denial on the part of immersionists, that we form any part of the Church of God." "Transubstantiation is no greater perversion of the Lord's Supper than is the *burial* theory a perversion of baptism."

Mr. Chaney confines himself "to the word of God alone," and examines the subject in what he conceives to be "an exhaustive method, to wit:

"1. To ascertain *the meaning of the word* used to designate the rite; to

do this by examining those passages where the word occurs, and from the context and attending circumstances, to ascertain in what sense the word is used by the sacred writers.

"2. To inquire what is the *significance* of the rite, and see what light this throws on the question of mode.

"3. To examine the cases of its administration found recorded in the New Testament; to examine these in the light of *circumstantial evidence*.

"These methods are independent of each other, and if they unite in bringing us to the same conclusion, we may be assured that we have the truth."

*Witherspoon: Proceedings and Addresses at the Laying of the Cornerstone, and at the Unveiling, of the Statute of John Witherspoon in Fairmount Park, Philadelphia.* Compiled by the Rev. WM. P. BREED, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1334 Chestnut Street. Pp. 104, 12mo.

This is another of Dr. Breed's publications, full of the Declaration of Independence, and the Continental Congress, and the Centennial Anniversary, and mixing up patriotism and religion in the style most approved at Philadelphia.

Dr. Breed, as is common with many Presbyterians of that city, takes delight in identifying the original Synod with the present Synod of Philadelphia, which Dr. Musgrave used to call so reverently "the Mother Synod." Dr. Breed asserts (p. 24) that "this Synod meeting October 19th, 1876, was then virtually not eighty-eight but one hundred and seventy years old, for as early as 1706 the organisation of the original Presbytery of Philadelphia took place. This body was then Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly, all in one." And he says, in 1716 "it resolved itself into the Synod of Philadelphia," and in "1788 resumed its old name, which it has since retained." Now, the original Presbytery was never called *the Presbytery of Philadelphia*, but "*the Presbytery*." And when in 1716 it creates out of itself from subordinate Presbyteries, and becomes a Synod, its proper name was simply "the Synod," and not the *Synod of Philadelphia*, though sometimes it was so called. In 1741 there is a schism, and then we have a Synod of Philadelphia and a Synod of New York. These are merged into one in 1758 under the title of "the Synod of New York and Philadelphia." In 1788 this

Synod is divided into the four Synods, the Synod of New York and New Jersey, the Synod of Philadelphia, the Synod of Virginia, and the Synod of the Carolinas.

It would not hurt anybody very much to let this coveted glory be allowed to the present Synod of Philadelphia. But the only trouble is that the truth of history cannot be sacrificed. The present Synod is not "*the Mother Synod*" nor "*the Original Synod*." And this Philadelphia minister may as well give up that point.

*History of the College of New Jersey, from its Origin in 1746 to the Commencement of 1854.* By JOHN MACLEAN, Tenth President of the College. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1877. 2 Vols., 8vo. Pp. 414, 450.

This college, which has sent forth from its walls so many men who have been eminent in the Church and in civil life, both in the North and in these Southern States, was originated by the Synod of New York during the first great schism in the Presbyterian Church of this country, which began in 1741, was consummated in 1745, and terminated in 1757 by the union of the Synods of New York and Philadelphia.

This schism, as is well known, did not arise from differences as to doctrine, but as to the measures which were adopted by the revivalists of that day, and as to education for the ministry—the one party holding that piety and zeal, with an inferior education and meagre acquaintance with science and learning, is all that is needed; and the other, putting a higher estimate on the culture of the intellect, and demanding it of those who should enter the ministry and stand forth as teachers of others.

The friends of the college applied for years in vain for a charter. As it was in South Carolina, so here the civil rulers were devoted to the interests of the Church of England, and, like Sir Francis Nicholson of South Carolina, refused to grant privileges to Dissenters. Such was Lord Cornbury, Governor of New York and New Jersey, the persecutor of Francis Makemie and John Hampton, two Presbyterian ministers, among the earliest known in this country. After many discouragements

a charter was obtained from Governor Hamilton in 1746,—a Churchman himself, but of enlightened views.

The author corrects the statement that the college owes its existence to the expulsion of David Brainerd from Yale College, although he admits that this may have stimulated those who originated it to mature their plans without further delay. He also denies that it originated from the Log College at Neshaminy, the school of the Tennents. The college was indebted under God to Jonathan Dickinson, John Pierson, Ebenezer Pemberton, and Aaron Burr, and their immediate friends and helpers, for its first establishment. A new and better charter was given to it in 1748 by Governor Belcher.

The college was opened in May, 1747, at Elizabethtown, the Rev. Jonathan Dickinson being President, who died in October of the same year. Upon his decease, the Rev. Aaron Burr became President, and the students were removed to Newark, where he resided. In 1752, the college was fixed at Princeton, and buildings having been erected for its accommodation, it was removed to its present site in 1756. Gilbert Tennent and Samuel Davies were sent to Great Britain in 1753-4 to solicit aid, bearing with them a petition from the Synod of New York to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, in which reference is made to the destitutions in Maryland, Virginia, and North and South Carolina. Collections were made in the Churches of Scotland and Ireland by order of the General Assembly of Scotland and of the Synod of Ulster. This effort was eminently successful. Funds were obtained sufficient to defray the cost of the buildings erected; and a fund was also commenced for the education of pious and indigent youth for the gospel ministry.

Among other efforts made for its endowment from time to time, was one extending through Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, by Rev. James Caldwell of Elizabethtown, N. J. We have met with notices of this gentleman in the diary of Rev. Archibald Simpson, of Stoney Creek, in this State, as he visited Wiltown and other localities on his way to Georgia in 1770 upon his agency. He speaks of him as "much

of a Christian and gentleman, a fine scholar, and in every way an accomplished minister." He also speaks of the college as "that most excellent and flourishing seminary of learning, which has hitherto been, and promises to be, the most useful of any ever erected in America." Mr. Simpson promoted the objects of this agency as much as possible at Wiltown, Pon-Pon, and Jacksonboro. It revived his desire to gain a majority of the independent congregations of this State and Georgia, with those under the Old Scotch Presbytery, to join the Synod of New York and Philadelphia, "with a view to promote a catholic, evangelical, and useful ministry, and strengthen the dissenting interests over all British America." *History of the Presbyterian Church in South Carolina*, pp. 378-9. This was under the Presidency of Dr. Witherspoon.

The next year Mr. Ogden came to collect Mr. Caldwell's subscriptions, which were made payable in coin in Carolina, and in produce in Georgia. This same Mr. Caldwell had a price set upon his head in the war of the Revolution, his church was burned by a refugee in 1780 a few months after, his wife was shot through the window of the room to which she had retired with her children for safety, and he himself was shot while conducting a lady to the town who had arrived from New York under a flag of truce. (*Ibid.*) Much and interesting information is contained in these volumes concerning its trustees, professors, tutors, and more distinguished Alumni.

The administration of its distinguished Presidents, Dickinson, Burr, the elder Edwards, Davies, Finley, Witherspoon, Samuel Stanhope Smith, Ashbel Green, and Carnahan, passes in review before the author, and their biographies are given down to the period of his own inauguration in 1854. Of these distinguished names, that of the elder Edwards is perhaps the most illustrious for his mental vigor and the service he rendered to the theological world. *His* presidency was a brief one. He entered upon it on the 16th of February, 1758. On the 23d he was inoculated with the small-pox, with other members of his family, as a prophylactic against that disease which was prevalent. On the 22d of March following he died from the effects of the inoculation

in perfect peace. The administration of Witherspoon was an illustrious one, though interrupted by the war of the Revolution. Words cannot express the hold which he and his associates had upon the confidence of the public. After the war was ended, they came forward with great liberality, the living giving cheerfully of their diminished substance, and the dying making their bequests to the trust funds to secure what the friends of the college had so much at heart, the preparation of pious youth for the gospel ministry.

These provisions have doubtless increased the number of students resorting to the college from that day to this, and their character has had something to do with the religious interests of the college itself. Some sixty-two scholarships of \$1,000 each were founded between 1853 and 1873 to pay the tuition fees of students.

This college was always the favorite resort of Southern students, irrespective of their religious proclivities, down to the commencement of our late civil war.

Dr. Maclean's connexion with the college dates back, we believe, to the year 1818. In reviewing the measures adopted from time to time by the ruling authorities of the college, he expresses his own judgment with freedom upon them, as he is entitled to do from his long experience, as to the proper discipline and instruction of young men in the period of their education for further professional study, or the practical duties of life. The work will be valued as an authentic history of the third college founded in the United States; Harvard being the earliest, founded in 1638; Yale the next, founded in 1701; Princeton the third, founded in 1746.

*Village Improvements and Farm Villages.* By GEORGE E. WARING, Jr. J. R. Osgood & Co.

This author has for many years past given his attention so closely to agricultural and sanitary questions, and has written so largely upon them, that he has come to be regarded as authority upon these points. One of his first books, "A Farmer's Vacation," was taken up mainly with such matters as would be



most likely to engage the attention of an agriculturist in Europe, as, drainage in Holland, Dutch farming, the peculiarities of French tillage, and kindred subjects. He has written a book for practical farmers (being one himself), with sufficient science to assist, without exciting prejudice against "farming by book." But his most valuable contributions are without question his works on "Drainage,"—especially as applied to swamps and malarious districts,—and on "Sanitary laws." No books of a practical character are more needed among Southern farmers just now than such as these. Owing to the neglect of drainage since the war, many districts among us, where malaria has not heretofore existed in the memory of living men, are now visited yearly by chills to such an extent that for three months of the hot weather plantations in these localities have to be abandoned. The study of Col. Waring's books might be productive of better results than the planting of a grove of eucalyptus trees.

The small volume before us is not the less suggestive of helpful hints in the very direction in which we of the South need them. None of us ought to be offended when we are told that, as a general thing, our Southern villages are slovenly and neglected-looking as to their external aspect, however much hospitality and culture their unpainted weather-boarding may represent. We drove the other day through a village which our travelling companion said he had known for forty years, and he declared that during that period not a tree had been planted, not an old fence (apparently) mended, not a gutter drained. To the denizens of such villages and towns, (and there are plenty such through all the South,) the hints about "improvement" at small cost, to be found in this book, would be a God-send, provided they were carried out. It is the system of "Village Improvement Associations," which Col. Waring commends, that has made many of the villages and towns of the Northern States noted for their beauty. As to what this farmer has to say about "Farm Villages," we think his scheme quite impracticable. Our farmers do not need (as the Oriental tiller of the ground, or the Continental one during the turbulent ages of the past,) to live in proximity for mutual protection. As to the question of thus making farmers' families

more contented by providing society at hand, it sounds chimerical. In a new condition of things,—Arizona for example,—the system is capable of being tried, but never in the old settlements, and we doubt if it could be a working system anywhere.

*Poems of Places.* By HENRY W. LONGFELLOW. Osgood & Co.

This is one of the richest anthologies ever put forth, as well as one of the most extensive. It is said that Mr. Longfellow has the finest poetical library in America, and that in making his selections he has not to go beyond his own collection. Of course, with such a purveyor as our best American poet, (may we not truly say, as the most beloved and popular poet in the world?) we have a guarantee that nothing unworthy shall find admission into these pages, and that the choice of all that has been written about *places* shall be provided. Some fifteen volumes have already appeared, and the limit the editor has set himself is not yet reached. England, Ireland, Scotland, and Wales have been here photographed; France, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway have had their chief points outlined; Italy has furnished an embarrassment of riches; and now in these last three books we have Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Austria. One can see at a glance how rich and varied the culling must be. The sources from which the poems are drawn cover every name known in modern poetic annals. There is something very fascinating in thus being invited to link hands with the singers of all countries, and to ramble with them over hill and plain, through valleys and across mountains, by ruined castle and historic river, by lakeside and seaside, while they chant at your ear the legends, the romantic associations, the suggestive fancies summoned up by all that meets the eye. Truly a captivating and flowery way of studying geography! The mechanical execution of these volumes is everything that can be desired, and we hope the series will find a place on multitudes of such library shelves as are more specially designed for a plurality of readers.

The literary fashion of the hour is, that everything shall be offered in *Series*. Some one book of strong motive power is started from the press, and is made to draw by its enginery a whole train after it. It is not much to our credit, as intelligent readers, that the "Helen's Babies'" Series races like a mad locomotive train over the continent. But if the fashion has its ridiculous aspects, it is also made the vehicle of much that is good.

The Osgood house has issued one hundred fairy-sized volumes at fifty cents a-piece, beautifully printed, bound, and illustrated, which would enrich a home and largely educate its inmates, even if they had access to no other books, into a knowledge of the finest pieces of writing, prose and verse, to be found in the English language. It is too much to expect of the indulged and pampered young people of the present day, that they should go back to the old calf-bound copies that their parents and grandparents were only too proud to possess, of the classics of our tongue. Nor, indeed, are they willing to take the trouble to hunt up for themselves the choicest poems and finest essays of even more modern writers. So, in this age of knowledge-made-easy, all this is done to their hand. The copies of this "Vest Pocket Series" are so attractive looking that, perforce, the half-idle youth or maiden is beguiled into the reading of them, and thus come to acquire a degree of culture and an acquaintance with the best authors such as the shabby old household copies never could have induced. When we take note that they go as far back as the Elizabethan period, and give us what the common consent of the world has agreed to consider the *best* of the lesser productions of the most distinguished writers,—such as Milton's short poems, Shakespeare's Sonnets, George Herbert's quaint things, Gray's gems, Pope's Essay on Man, Cowper's, Goldsmith's, Campbell's, Scott's, Coleridge's, and every later poet's "Favorites," (whole poems, not extracts,) with such prose as Carlyle's "Cromwell" and Macaulay's most brilliant Essays, (a volume given to each,) such as "Milton," "Bacon," etc., together with many noted things American writers have given us,—such as Lowell, Emerson, Holmes, and a score or two of others,—it will be seen how wide the range is through the fields of English literature.

Their name is well chosen; they are volumes to be pressed in anywhere,—the pocket, the travelling bag, the portmanteau, will seem none the heavier or more crowded for half a dozen of them; and they are so beautifully printed, the text so large and clear, and the binding so light yet substantial, that they can be read under any light, and will be unobtrusive in any company. Our much travelling fellow-citizens can now take a very complete course of reading in English literature while they are crossing the ocean, or speeding all over the country on the rail, or walking the steamboat deck, or waiting for their meals in hotels and restaurants. We surely think the Osgoods have done a good thing in thus thrusting into the hands of the readers of the day so much of the mental wealth of the past, and obliging them to accept it as if it were so much fresh matter.

Here and there we find some author, or the special production of one, which hardly deserved to be admitted into this category, but as a general thing the selections are very discriminating. We think it would have been well to have embraced some of the fine *religious* literature of the language in this Series,—an essay of Foster's, or an astronomical discourse of Chalmers, or a sermon of Melville or Robertson.

## RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

There is the usual (perhaps more than the usual) variety in the literary produce of the last quarter. The *menu* is in other respects good, whilst the *cuisine*, though often capital, sometimes illustrates the adage, that "too many cooks spoil the broth." The Old World is worth seeing through *any* eyes, and eyes of any age, if the eyes are only sound.<sup>1</sup> Lecky's important work<sup>2</sup> we have always thought over-praised. Though apparently sincere, it is rationalistic, and we think superficial and heavy.

Chronology and Geography have been said to be the eyes of history, but geography is unintelligible without maps. The four maps issued by Barnes & Co. will doubtless be useful to a large number.<sup>3 4 5 6</sup> No one acquainted with the author's fervid story of American "Methodism," or with his high standing in the Virginia Conference, will be apt to underrate Dr. Bennett's welcome narrative of the Confederate awakening.<sup>7</sup>

Dr. Schaff was the very man of all others in this country to

<sup>1</sup>An Old World as Seen Through Young Eyes; or, Travels Round the World. By Ellen H. Walworth. 12mo. Illustrated, \$2. D. Appleton & Co., New York.

<sup>2</sup>History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne. By William E. H. Lecky, M. A. Third edition, revised. 2 Vols., 12mo. Cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Map of Canaan to Illustrate the Old Testament. By James Monteith. 25 x 42 inches. Mounted on rollers, etc., \$3. A. S. Barnes & Co., N. Y.

<sup>4</sup>Map of Palestine to Illustrate the New Testament. By James Monteith. 25 x 42 inches. Mounted on rollers, etc., \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Map of Southeastern Europe and Western Asia, to Illustrate the Travels of St. Paul. By James Monteith. 42 x 52 inches. Mounted on rollers, etc., \$5. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Physical Map of the World. By James Monteith. 42 x 52 inches. Mounted on rollers, etc., \$5. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>A Narrative of the Great Revival which prevailed in the Southern Armies during the Late Civil War between the States of the Federal Union. By William W. Bennett, D. D., Superintendent of "The Soldiers' Tract Association," and Chaplain in the Confederate Army. Illustrated. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, Philadelphia.

describe, translate, and chronicle the "Creeds of Christendom."<sup>1</sup> In the Tusculan Disputations,<sup>2</sup> the noblest subjects are treated of in dialogue form by the greatest of the Roman prose-writers and philosophers. The difficulty here is not to render the Latin into English, but to gather the subtle meaning after it has been thus rendered; yet the translation offered by Mr. Yonge will be gratefully accepted by many; and Mr. Yonge is a competent translator. There is nothing more delightful in all Cicero than these high colloquies. The applications of Art culture<sup>3</sup> are often more directly serviceable to our daily wants than one might at first imagine. Nor is it possible to study Art without also studying Grecian and Roman Mythology.<sup>4</sup> The highest reach of æsthetics is to carry one to the utmost boundaries of thought and expression<sup>5</sup>—the idea and the form.

The name of Daniel Webster is a tower of strength wherever the English language is spoken. As an expounder of the Constitution he had many superiors. As a mere lawyer he was surpassed by such men as Horace Binney and Choate, and at a later day O'Connor and Curtis. As a statesman he does not take equal rank with Clay, nor as a logician and political philosopher

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<sup>1</sup>The Creeds of Christendom. *Bibliotheca Symbolica Ecclesiae Universalis*. With a History and Critical Notes. By Philip Schaff, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, N. Y. Three volumes. Vol. I.: The History of Creeds. Vol. II.: The Greek and Latin Creeds, with Translations. Vol. III.: The Evangelical Protestant Creeds, with Translations. 8vo., cloth, \$15. Harper & Bros., New York.

<sup>2</sup>Cicero's Tusculan Disputations; Also, Treatises on the Nature of the Gods, and on the Commonwealth. Literally Translated, chiefly by C. D. Yonge. Uniform with Harper's New Classical Library. 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Art Education Applied to Industry. By Col. George Ward Nichols. Illustrated. 8vo., cloth, illuminated and gilt, \$4. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>The Mythology of Greece and Rome. With Special Reference to its use in Art. From the German of O. Seemann. Edited by G. H. Bianchi, B. A., Late Scholar of St. Peter's College, Cambridge, Brotherton Sanskrit Prizeman. 1875. With 64 illustrations. 16mo., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Thought and Expression. By S. S. Greene. 12mo., 112 pp., boards, 35 cents. Copperthwait & Co., Philadelphia.

with Calhoun or Madison. As an orator, he was grand and imposing; and his speeches will compare favorably with those of Burke and Erskine. As an advocate, he had scarcely a rival in America,—after Patrick Henry. As a master of the English tongue, it would be hard to find his match. The condensed edition of his great orations<sup>1</sup> will shed new lustre on a name that will always be a name of power. Living Questions<sup>2</sup> have an able treatment, we doubt not, at the hands of another author. The Stagirite<sup>3</sup> is one of the two or three highest minds the world has known. The distinguished Principal of the University of Edinburgh has favored us with a new translation. Mrs. Oliphant turns from her novels and her biographies to the study of the great Italian epic;<sup>4</sup> and the new volume of President Adams covers the period of Independence.<sup>5</sup>

Since Mark Twain's "Roughing It," there has been an increased disposition to learn more about the life beyond the Sierras.<sup>6</sup> Those who are curious respecting some of the tenets of Swedenborg and his followers, may find satisfaction in the publication of the New Church Academy.<sup>7</sup> No one will question

<sup>1</sup>Daniel Webster: The Life, Speeches, and Memorials of Daniel Webster; Containing his Most Celebrated Orations, a Selection from the Eulogies Delivered on the Occasion of his Death, and his Life and Times. By Samuel M. Smucker, LL.D. 12mo., cloth extra, \$1.25. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

<sup>2</sup>Living Questions of the Age. Discussed by James B. Walker. 12mo., cloth extra, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Aristotle. By Sir Alexander Grant, Bart., LL.D., Principal of the University of Edinburgh. Vol. V. of the Supplemental Series of Ancient Classics for English Readers. Fine Cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Dante. Edited by Mrs. Oliphant. Vol. I. of a Series of Foreign Classics for English Readers, a companion series to "Ancient Classics for English Readers." 16mo., cloth. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Memoirs of J. Q. Adams. Vol. XII. Comprising portions of his Diary from 1795 to 1848. Edited by Hon. Charles Francis Adams. 8vo., cloth extra. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Beyond the Sierras; or, Observations on the Pacific Coast. By Rev. A. H. Tevis, A. M. Illustrated. 12mo., cloth extra, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>The Advent of the Lord: Part I. of "Words for the New Church," a Serial controlled by the Academy of the New Church. 8vo., 72 pp., paper, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

the eminent fitness of Mr. Inglis for the task he assigned himself in the Cyclopædia of Texts,—a work greatly needed, and peculiarly useful to preachers.<sup>1</sup> The great "Strike" has wonderfully freshened the interest in the old problems touching the employer and the employé.<sup>2</sup> Punctuation is hardly a fixed science. The American compositor sprinkles commas from a pepper-box. On the other hand, the Cambridge school in England, headed by such men as Munro, the editor of Lucretius, use as few points as possible. Macaulay had a system of his own. Dr. Johnson used to say that a sentence is a bad one which can only be made intelligible by these artificial marks. Mr. Turner's treatise is the best we know.<sup>3</sup> The depth and sweetness of à Kempis are lost to a great degree in any translation.<sup>4</sup>

We do not regularly take notice of law books. The general and compendious nature of Judge Smith's work, and the station of the author, should recommend it to others beside lawyers.<sup>5</sup> "The Beautiful Blue Danube" is again the theatre not only of military but of literary adventures.<sup>6</sup> The infidelity of the day, so far as not avowedly atheistic, has a leaning towards one or

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<sup>1</sup>Bible Text Cyclopædia: A Complete Classification of Scripture Texts in the Form of an Alphabetical List of Subjects. By Rev. James Inglis. New edition. Crown 8vo., cloth extra, \$2.50. J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia.

<sup>2</sup>Labor and Capital: The Conflict between Labor and Capital. By Albert S. Bolles. New edition. 12mo., paper, 75 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>A Handbook of Punctuation: Containing the more Important Rules, and an Exposition of the Principles upon which they Depend. By Joseph A. Turner, M. A. New revised edition. 16mo., limp cloth, 75 cts. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>On the Imitation of Christ. By Thomas a Kempis. Beautifully illustrated, with etchings on steel and woodcut engravings, and elegantly printed on superfine paper. Crown 8vo., vellum cloth, gilt top, \$5. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Elements of the Laws; or, Outlines of the System of Civil and Criminal Laws in Force in the United States and in the Several States of the Union. Designed as a text-book for general use. By Thomas L. Smith, late Judge of the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana. New edition, revised. 12mo., fine cloth, \$1.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>The Principalities of the Danube—Servia and Roumania: Their History, Inhabitants, Governments, and Relations to the Turkish Empire. By G. M. Towle. With map and portraits. 18mo., 91 pp., cloth, 50 cents; paper, 25 cents. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.



other of three sorts of "religion:" the small remnant of Comte-ists, who accept their master's latest views, espouse "the religion of humanity;" the disciples of Mill and Tyndall affect to cherish "the religion of the emotions;" whilst the bulk of thinkers and scholars of anti-theistic tendencies favor the "absolute religion" advocated by Foxton and Theodore Parker. The critics have latterly fallen much in love with Brahmanism, and especially with Buddhism. Mr. Samuel Johnson, who treats of this subject, will not be confounded with the author of *Rasselas*.<sup>1</sup> Everything from the pen of Mr. George Henry Lewes is worthy of attention. As the author of the life of Goethe, as the historian of philosophy, as the foremost English exponent of the views of Auguste Comte, and as the husband of "George Eliot," the speculations of this writer on the connexion betwixt Physics and Psychology are sure to be as engaging as they are unquestionably unsound.<sup>2</sup> The Vest-Pocket Series<sup>3 4</sup> of classics and favorite authors is destined to be a never-ending joy to those who not only read but travel. *Haud inexperti loquimur*. Charles Knight's "Year of the Poets," thirty or forty years ago, gave rise to a succession of like works, of which "Lucy Larcom's" is the last.<sup>5</sup>

Modern Greece, containing as it does the embalmed body of that "Mother of Arts and Eloquence," of whom Milton speaks in the "Paradise Regained," has always for the thoughtful had a pathetic fascination. This influence was heightened by the Suliote war, and is still further augmented by the possible issues of the war

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<sup>1</sup>Oriental Religions and their Relation to Universal Religion—China. By Samuel Johnson. 8vo., 1,000 pp., \$5. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

<sup>2</sup>The Physical Basis of Mind: Being the First Volume of the Second Series of "Problems of Life and Mind." By George H. Lewes. 8vo.: xii., 556 pp., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Favorite Poems. By Thomas Hood. Vest-Pocket Series. 32mo., 96 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Favorite Poems. By Alfred Tennyson. Vest-Pocket Series. 32mo., 96 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Hillside and Seaside in Poetry. A companion volume to "Roadside Poems." Edited by Lucy Larcom. "Little Classic Style." 18mo., 303 pp., \$1. *Ibid.*

with Turkey.<sup>1</sup> But Montenegro and Bulgaria are in the very focus of all that is at present sanguinary and heroic in the eastern hemisphere.<sup>2</sup> We need no prophet to tell us that "that twice battered" *eidolon* of "Materialism" has fared badly at the hands of the great Christian exegete of Germany.<sup>3</sup> Moosehead Lake is comparatively flat and tame, but perhaps Mount Kinneo and the twin summits of Spencer mountain will repay the tourist even if he do not fish or shoot. We not only remember the Lake, but the Journal,—now reissued (if we mistake not) after a lapse of twenty years and upwards. The sketches are from a gifted pen.<sup>4</sup> We have to speak once more of the Vest-Pocket Series, with which the Osgood firm have enriched the lovers of good English, and in which they appear to have touched the limit of smallness, compactness, and elegance. One of these little thin volumes takes up no room in one's portmanteau; but we carried one of them this summer which was large enough to hold several plays of Shakespeare. We have selected for notice those which we think are the best of the batch during the last few months. It is gratifying to have in this form such standard works as Thomson's Seasons,<sup>5 6 7 8</sup> Milton's smaller

<sup>1</sup>Modern Greece: Its History, People, Institutions, and Relations to Turkey and the "Eastern Question." By G. M. Towle. With map. 24mo., 87 pp., paper, 25 cents; cloth, 50 cents. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

<sup>2</sup>Montenegro and Bulgaria: A Brief History of these Provinces, their Inhabitants, Institutions, Governments, Religions, Customs, and Relation to the Turkish Empire. By Geo. M. Towle. With map. 24mo., 94 pp., paper, 25 cents; cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>A History of Materialism, and Criticism of its Present Importance. By Frederick Albert Lange. Authorised translation by Ernest Chester Thomas. Vol. I. in English and Foreign Philosophical Library. 3 Vols., crown 8vo., xx., 330 pp., cloth, Vol I., \$3.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>A Moosehead Journal. By J. R. Lowell. Vest-Pocket Series. 95 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Winter. By James Thomson. Vest-Pocket Series. 96 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Spring. By James Thomson. Illustrated. Vest-Pocket Series. 80 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Summer. By James Thomson. Vest-Pocket Series. 103 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Autumn. By James Thomson. Vest-Pocket Series. 89 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

pieces,<sup>1</sup> Cowper's,<sup>2</sup> Burns's,<sup>3</sup> Pope's choicest things,<sup>4</sup> Carlyle's Cromwell,<sup>5</sup> and Lord Macaulay's Milton<sup>6</sup> and Byron.<sup>7</sup>

The same discerning House gives us also, and in the same fastidious shape, favorite poems by Kingsley,<sup>8</sup> Byron,<sup>9</sup> Coleridge,<sup>10</sup> Southey,<sup>11</sup> Scott,<sup>12</sup> and Macaulay,<sup>13 14</sup> and the Sonnets of Shakespeare,<sup>15</sup> together with two volumes of Schiller.<sup>16 17</sup> The same publishers issue another book on the geography and manners of the Caucasus and the Mediterranean Asia,<sup>18</sup> as well as another

<sup>1</sup>L'Allegro, il Penseroso, etc. By John Milton. Vest-Pocket Series. 96 pp., cloth, 50 cents. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

<sup>2</sup>Favorite Poems. By William Cowper. Vest-Pocket Series. 96 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Favorite Poems. By Robert Burns. Vest-Pocket Series. 106 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>An Essay on Man. By A. Pope. Illustrated. Vest-Pocket Series. 96 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Oliver Cromwell. By Thomas Carlyle. Illustrated. Vest-Pocket Series. 111 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>John Milton. By T. B. Macaulay. Illustrated. Vest-Pocket Series. 104 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Lord Byron. By T. B. Macaulay. Illustrated. Vest-Pocket Series. 89 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Favorite Poems. By Charles Kingsley. Illustrated. Vest-Pocket Series. 96 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>Favorite Poems. By Lord Byron. Vest-Pocket Series. 127 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup>Favorite Poems. By S. T. Coleridge. Vest-Pocket Series. 104 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>Favorite Poems. By Robert Southey. Vest-Pocket Series. 95 pp., *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>Favorite Poems. By Walter Scott. Vest-Pocket Series. 126 pp. *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup>Horatius and Virginia. By T. B. Macaulay. Vest-Pocket Series. 94 pp. *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup>Lake Regillus and Ivry. By T. B. Macaulay. Vest-Pocket Series. 96 pp. *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup>Sonnets. By W. Shakespeare. Illustrated. Vest-Pocket Series. 103 pp., 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup>The Lay of the Ball. By Friedrich Schiller. Vest-Pocket Series. 79 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup>Favorite Poems. By F. Schiller. Vest-Pocket Series. 96 pp. *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup>Asia Minor and the Caucasus. By Sir Randal Roberts. With maps. 95 pp., cloth, 50 cents; paper, 25 cents. *Ibid.*

Essay on the reign of law,<sup>1</sup> and a book about the prince of caricaturists.<sup>2</sup> We shrewdly suspect that Miss Edith Simcox has not a very strong grasp on her subject, but we desire to avoid a precipitate judgment. Leech never had an equal, unless it were Doyle. Cruikshanks never approached him. Leech's forte was not in the "cartoon" style of Punch, but in the pictures that used to occupy about a quarter of a page, and that are still imitated *longo intervallo* in that marvellously clever hebdomadal.

Who more fit than Professor Sumner to discuss with fairness and ability the vexed question of Protection or Free Trade?<sup>3</sup> Professor Sumner, it will be remembered, was one of the spies who brought back a true report of the land from the monstrous parishes of Louisiana. With the exception of Mrs. Markham's charming little work, we happened to know of not a single history of France in English until the appearance of Mr. Parke Godwin's ample volumes. There would, therefore, seem to be "verge enough" for Mr. Van Laun, whose third and last volume is now on the counters.<sup>4</sup> The low premium on gold stimulates the hope of payments in coin. The silver question ought to be intelligently dealt with by the director of the United States Mint, especially as he has a German name.<sup>5</sup> The most popular of English Astronomers is one of the most active also of *littérateurs*.<sup>6,7</sup> It is not known to all our readers, perhaps, that this attractive person and writer is a wrangler of Cambridge, and a lover of

<sup>1</sup>Natural Law: An Essay in Ethics. By Edith Simcox. Vol. II. of "English and Foreign Philosophical Library." Crown 8vo., xii., 361 pp., \$3.50. J. R. Osgood & Co., Boston.

<sup>2</sup>John Leech. By Dr. John Brown. Illustrated. Vest-Pocket Series. 92 pp., cloth, 50 cents. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Lectures on the History of Protection in the United States. By Prof. W. G. Sumner. 8vo., 64 pp., cloth, \$1. G. P. Putnam's Sons, N. Y.

<sup>4</sup>History of French Literature. Vol. III. By Henri Van Laun. Third and last volume. 8vo., cloth extra, \$2.50 *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Money and Legal Tender in the United States. By Henry R. Linderman, Director of the United States Mint. 12mo., cloth extra. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Myths and Marvels of Astronomy. By R. A. Proctor. 8vo., cloth extra. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>A New Star Atlas. By R. A. Proctor. 12 maps. 8vo., 36 pp., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

*bon mots* and music. What more entertaining reading is there than old English ballads? Percy's *Reliques* and Ellis's *Metrical Romances* are at length followed up by Mr. Bell's collection.<sup>1</sup> The *Song of Songs* and *Ecclesiastes* once more tempt the mealy wings of new, yet it may be more fortunate, adventurers.<sup>2</sup>

We regard the symbolical view of the Apocalypse more reasonable than the strictly chronological. Peradventure the reader might find the worth of his money in these "Symbolic Parables:"<sup>3</sup> we trow not. Everything depends on the theological standing-point. Biblical psychology can best be treated in *outline*.<sup>4</sup> Much, at least, that has been written on this topic, had better have been left unwritten. We trust, therefore, that Mr. Beck has shown more wisdom than some of his forerunners. The book of *Notes and Sketches*,<sup>5</sup> about the 18th century, has a taking aspect. This was the age of Swift, and Steele, and Addison; of Marlborough and Turenne; and latterly of Dr. Johnson, Sir Joshua Reynolds, and Oliver Goldsmith. Bailey's "Festus,"<sup>6</sup> is a strange poem, an audacious poem; but there are fire and imagination in it. His later work, "The Age," was torn to pieces by the reviewers, but was witty and caustic. The theology of "Festus" is not in harmony with our standards. Nobody understands Papal Rome

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<sup>1</sup>Early Ballads and Songs of Peasantry of England: Taken Down from Oral Recitation and Transcribed from Private Manuscripts, Rare Broad-sides, and Scarce Publications. Edited by Robert Bell. (Bohn's Standard Library.) 12mo., cloth, \$1.40. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>Commentary on the Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes. Translated from the German by the Rev. M. J. Easton. (Clark's Foreign Theological Library.) 8vo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>The Symbolic Parables of the Church, the World, and Antichrist. Being Separate Predictions of the Apocalypse, Viewed in their Relations to the General Truths of Scripture. 12mo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Outlines of Biblical Psychology. By J. T. Beck. Translated from the third enlarged and corrected German edition, 1877. 12mo., cloth, \$2. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Notes and Sketches, Illustrative of Northern Rural Life in the 18th Century. By the author of "Johnny Gibb of Gushetneuk." 16mo., boards, \$1. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Festus: A Poem. By Philip James Bailey. Tenth edition, enlarged, etc., 8vo., cloth, \$6.25. *Ibid.*

better than Adolphus (not Antony) Trollope.<sup>1</sup> Poor Montenegro!<sup>2</sup>—a bone for Ottoman and Cossack, and for the hostile tribes of British criticism. Cardinal Manning speaks *ex cathedra*, and is always plain and downright<sup>3</sup>. He never minces matters.

There never was another like Shakespeare. Even the author of the Iliad gives no evidence of such wide and varied comprehension. Shakespeare extenuates nothing, nor sets down aught in malice. One never tires of him, or of Mr. R. G. White—when Mr. White is writing of *him*. *This* time, however, it is a Mr. Ingleby.<sup>4</sup> The *Chansons* of Beranger and others are fairly rivalled, in some things surpassed, by living writers of French Songs.<sup>5</sup> The whole subject is illustrated in a new volume of the “Chandos Classics.” Ferns<sup>6</sup> are a study in themselves. The *bracken* is a fern; and the identical species of bracken that waves near Buttermere in Cumberland, is found in this country. Izaak Walton himself would have been pleased at sight of a book entitled “By Stream and Sea: A Book for Wanderers and Anglers.”<sup>7</sup> Scandinavia<sup>8</sup> is becoming more and more a centre of

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<sup>1</sup>A Peep Behind the Scenes at Rome. By T. Adolphus Trollope. 12mo., cloth, \$3. Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, New York.

<sup>2</sup>Montenegro: Its People and their History. By the Rev. W. Denton. 12mo., cloth, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>The Independence of the Holy See. By Cardinal Manning. With an Appendix, containing the Papal Allocution of March, 1877, and an English Translation. 12mo., cloth, \$2.50. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Shakespeare: The Man and the Book. Part I. Being a Collection of Occasional Papers on the Bard and his Writings. By C. M. Ingleby. 4to., boards, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>The Book of French Songs. By Oxenford & Costello. “Chandos Classics.” Illustrated. 12mo. 475 pp., cloth, gilt, \$1; paper, 75 cts. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Ferns, British and Foreign. With a Treatise on their Cultivation. By John Smith. New and enlarged edition. Illustrated. 12mo., cloth, \$3.75. *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>By Stream and Sea. A Book for Wanderers and Anglers. By William Senior (“Red Spinner”). 12mo., cloth, \$2.40. *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup>Through Norway with Ladies. By W. Mattieu Williams. With Maps and Illustrations. 12mo., cloth, \$6. *Ibid.*

attractions. "Grattan's Reports"<sup>1</sup> are as well known, as much admired, and far more connd, than "Grattan's Speeches." The new volume by the venerable, learned, and pious author, carries the reader down to the beginning of the present year.

Moore's instructive and (so far as we can recall it at this lapse of time,) harmless little romance,<sup>2</sup> sheds a pleasing light on the dawn of ecclesiastical history, in the limited sense of the term. We had supposed the book had long since passed into the *limbus* which conceals so much that was once fair and of good report. "Gems<sup>3</sup> Carved by the Miraculous Fingers of Benvenuto Cellini," was part of the inventory given in the *London Times*, of the possessions of William Beckford, the author of *Vathek*. Similar carvings, and by the same hand, (though mostly in other material) may be seen to-day in the Green Vault of the Palace of Saxony. The work of Mr. Sommerville is on a kindred topic, The two allegories of Bunyan,<sup>4 5</sup> are constantly going through new editions. Though the author of the *Task* dared not name Bunyan in his verse, the author of the *History of England* and of the *Essay on Milton*, admits that the two great imaginative writers of the time were the author of *Paradise Lost* and the author of the *Pilgrim's Progress*. It is good, then, even on purely literary grounds, to see these works reproduced so often. We are also glad to see once more our old friend, Lord Kames<sup>6</sup>—though it is a descent from *Hyperion*. Dr. Boardman has done

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<sup>1</sup>Reports of Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. Vol. XXVII., from January 1, 1876, to January 1, 1877. By Peachy R. Grattan. 8vo., 1074 pp., calf, \$6 net. West, Johnston & Co., Richmond, Va.

<sup>2</sup>The Epicurean: A Romance. By Thomas Moore. 12mo., paper, 75 cents; cloth, \$1. James Miller, New York.

<sup>3</sup>Engraved Gems. By Maxwell Sommerville. With 55 Engravings. 8vo., cloth, gilt, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>Pilgrim's Progress. By John Bunyan. New edition, with 8 Illustrations. 12mo., cloth, extra, black and gold, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup>Holy War. By John Bunyan. New edition, beautifully illustrated. 12mo., cloth, extra, black and gold, \$1.25. *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup>Elements of Criticism. By Lord Kames. 12mo., cloth, \$1. *Ibid.*

good service in exposing the "Higher Life"<sup>1</sup> doctrine, and Dr. A. A. Hodge in putting together and circulating his *Manual and Forms*.<sup>2</sup> Several new works have appeared lately on the duties of the pastor. The most recent is that of Dr. Murphy.<sup>3</sup> No one can speak with more authority on all matters pertaining to the system first prominently advocated by Alexander Campbell, than his successor in the Presidency of Bethany College.<sup>4</sup> Once neglected and afterwards traduced, the rarely gifted author of "The Raven" has now a host of intelligent and sympathising admirers, biographers,<sup>5</sup> and critics. The *Life of "Arnot"*<sup>6</sup> is pronounced by one who may probably be trusted, "a book to revel in." Those of us who remember his brilliant fancy and delightful glow, will go to it with eager expectation. The name of Dr. Dykes<sup>7</sup> calls up unavoidably the name of Hamilton, whom he has succeeded, and as some hold, exceeded. Arnot was Hamilton's biographer. The worship of the Dragon still exists in Japan and China; and the Ophites thrust the same superstition into the bosom of the early Christian Church.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>The "Higher Life" Doctrine of Sanctification Tried by the Word of God. By Henry A. Boardman, D. D. 16mo., 286 pp., muslin, \$1.25. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

<sup>2</sup>Manual and Forms for Baptism, Admission to the Communion, Administration of the Lord's Supper, Marriage, and Funerals. By A. A. Hodge, D. D. 16mo., 64 pp., muslin, 50 cts. *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup>Pastoral Theology. The Pastor in the Various Duties of his Office. By the Rev. Thomas Murphy, D. D. 8vo., 510 pp., muslin, \$3. *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup>The Connection between Baptism and the Remission of Sins. By W. K. Pendleton, President of Bethany College. 8vo., 32 pp., paper, 10 cents. Chase & Hall, Cincinnati.

<sup>5</sup>The Life of Edgar Allan Poe. By William Gill. With sixteen Illustrations. 12mo., 315 pp., cloth, \$1.75. William F. Gill & Co., Boston.

<sup>6</sup>Autobiography and Memoir of Dr. Arnot. By Mrs. Fleming. 12mo., 450 pp., cloth, \$2. Robert Carter & Bros., New York.

<sup>7</sup>Abraham the Friend of God. By J. O. Dykes, D. D. 12mo., 380 pp., cloth, \$1.50. Robert Carter & Bros., New York.

<sup>8</sup>Serpent and Siva Worship and Mythology, in Central America, Africa, and Asia, and the Origin of Serpent Worship. Two Treatises. By Hyde Clarke, M. A. I., and C. Staniland Wake, M. A. I. Edited by Alexander Wilder, M. D. 8vo., stiff cover, 50 cents. J. W. Bouton, New York.



We had heard that "the devil can quote Scripture," and knew from the gospel narrative that he is a more plausible *exegete* than some of the German commentators. We were also aware that he is responsible for a great deal of ancient and modern *casuistry*. He is now presented in the character of a teacher of *ethics*.<sup>1</sup> The title of Dr. Henry's work may have been prompted by the same consideration which suggested one of DeFoe's. It is getting to be the fashion now to trace the origin of insanity mainly if not wholly to physical causes. It is our impression that the Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Health<sup>2</sup> has abetted this theory; but we may be in error on this point.

The official papers of a famous Revolutionary soldier cannot fail to possess both interest and value.<sup>3</sup> Robinson's Practice has been ably digested by a rising lawyer of Winchester.<sup>4</sup> There are those who may be aided by an elementary book on engineering.<sup>5</sup> Still another History of France! The subject borrows a strange suggestiveness from the death of the great French statesman, and is not likely to receive a treatment at the hands of any foreigner like that which a portion of it received at the hands of the author of the Revolution, the Consulate, and the Empire.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Satan as a Moral Philosopher. With other Essays and Sketches. By Caleb S. Henry, D. D. 12mo., 296 pp., cloth, \$1.50. T. Whitaker, N. Y.

<sup>2</sup>Disease of the Mind. Notes on the Early Management, European and American Progress, Modern Methods, etc., in the Treatment of Insanity, with Especial Reference to the Needs of Massachusetts and the United States. By Charles E. Folsom, M. D., Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Health. 8vo., 109 pp., flexible cloth, \$1. A. Williams & Co., Boston.

<sup>3</sup>Memoir and Official Correspondence of Gen. John Stark, with Notices of several other Officers of the Revolution. By his grandson, Caleb Stark. 8vo., 495 pp., cloth, \$3. Edson C. Eastman, Concord, N. H.

<sup>4</sup>The Practice in the Courts of Law in Civil Cases, founded on Robinson's Practice, published in 1832. By R. T. Barton, of the Winchester, Va., Bar. 8vo., 590 pp., sheep, \$6. Randolph & English, Richmond, Va.

<sup>5</sup>Elementary Course in Civil Engineering. By Col. J. B. Wheeler, U. S. A., Instructor at West Point. Issued as a Text Book for the Cadets of West Point. 8vo., 470 pp., cloth, \$4. John Wiley & Sons, New York.

<sup>6</sup>A History of France. By John J. Anderson, Ph.D. Illustrated with numerous elegant Engravings and Maps, colored and plain. 12mo., 370 pp., cloth, \$1.20, net. Clark & Maynard, New York.

It is of some moment to inquire where Mr. Anderson got his Ph.D. This mark of distinction, even in Germany, means more in one department and in one University than in another.

We call special attention to the volume which closes the De Quincey series, not only because of that fact, but for the reason that it contains a general index to his writings.<sup>1</sup> Principal Shairp is one of the finest literary critics of our generation; and it is not obnoxious to the graver charges that cloud the otherwise high name of his predecessor in the Poetry chair at Oxford.<sup>2</sup> The two writers who did most to prepare the way for Tennyson and his innumerable imitators, were John Keats and William Wordsworth.<sup>3</sup> Much of "The Excursion" is heavy; and "The Idiot Boy" is painfully flat; but Wordsworth at his best is equalled by few, even of the greatest masters of English verse. We have waited a score of years for just such an edition as this is of Lord Verulam.<sup>4</sup> We shall certainly buy it, albeit we regret the necessity of going elsewhere for the Latin.

Senator Bayard's Phi-Beta-Kappa Address won golden opinions among the Boston literati.<sup>5</sup> What "the Square of Life" may be, we cannot divine; but one is sure of something pious, something earnest, and something practical, from the lowest of Low-Churchmen, and one of the most active and useful of city pastors.<sup>6</sup> The

<sup>1</sup>Narrative and Miscellaneous Papers of Thomas De Quincey. With a General Index to De Quincey's Writings, closing the series. Crown 8vo., xxiv., 856 pp., cloth, \$1.75. Hurd & Houghton, New York; H. O. Houghton & Co., Boston.

<sup>2</sup>Poetic Interpretation of Nature. By J. C. Shairp, successor to Matthew Arnold, as Professor of Poetry at Oxford. 16mo., red cloth, \$1.25. *Ibid.* [Riverside Press, Cambridge.]

<sup>3</sup>The Poetical Works of William Wordsworth. With Portrait on steel. In three volumes. Crown 8vo., cloth, gilt top, \$5.25. *Ibid.* [Riverside Press.]

<sup>4</sup>The Works of Lord Bacon. With two Portraits on steel. In two volumes. Crown 8vo., cloth, gilt top, \$5.25. *Ibid.* [Riverside Press.]

<sup>5</sup>Unwritten Law. An Address Delivered before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Harvard University, at Cambridge, Mass., June 28, 1877. By Thomas Francis Bayard of Delaware. 8vo., 47 pp., paper, 25 cents. A. Williams & Co., Boston.

<sup>6</sup>The Square of Life. By Stephen H. Tyng, Jr., D. D. Square 16mo., 100 pp., paper, 40 cents. Wm. B. Mucklow, New York.

legend of the ever-living Jew has given rise to almost as many fictions as that of Dr. Faustus. Among these there is nothing in our language that has made a mark like that of "Salathiel,"<sup>1</sup> which has long been out of print. Dr. Croly was clergyman, historian, and poet, as well as novelist. Many will recall the splendor of his "Solomon."

<sup>1</sup>Salathiel : the Wandering Jew. A Story of the Past, the Present, and the Future. By the Rev. George Croly. Vol. XXIII., of Peterson's Sterling series of New and Good Books. Paper, 75 cents; morocco cloth, black and gold, \$1. T. B. Peterson & Bro., Philadelphia.