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THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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ARTICLE I.

PRELACY A BLUNDER.

Two theories of Christianity prevail in Christendom, which are in fact essentially opposite. If one is the gospel of God, then the other cannot be. To him who heartily holds the one, the assertor of the other must be as one who "brings another gospel," and who ought to "be Anathema Maran-atha." That the advocates of these incompatible schemes should co-exist, and should have co-existed for three hundred years, in the bosom of the same communion, can only be accounted for by the stringency of the political influences which originally dictated the unnatural union, and by the absurdity of that theory of the Church which requires its tolerance. The hatred of Queen Elizabeth for the gospel, with what she regarded as her diplomatic and secular interests, prompted her to coerce the two religions into cohabitation in the State Church, by the despotic hand of persecution. The blunder of making a visible unity an essential attribute of the Church, where Christ required only a spiritual unity, has betrayed both parties into a dread of "the sin of schism," which holds them to the hollow mockery of union.

The one of these plans of salvation may be described, with sufficient accuracy, as the high-Prelatic, held by Rome, the Greek Church, and the Episcopalian Ritualists. It is often called the theory of "sacramental grace;" not because the other party deny

all grace through sacraments, but because the sacramentarian party makes the sacraments essential to the reception of grace. The dogma of a tactual succession, through prelates, from the apostles, is its corner-stone. This dogma teaches that the apostles transmitted their peculiar office by ordination to the prelatish bishops and metropolitans; and with it a peculiar *χάρισμα* of the Holy Ghost, which is conferred in every case of canonical, prelatish ordination, by the Lord Jesus Christ, through the laying on of the prelate's hands; making every "priest" thus ordained a depository of the spiritual energy, and every "bishop" (apostle) a "proxy" of the Saviour himself, endued with these gifts, in the same sense in which he was endued with them by his Father. Thus Dr. Hammond, for instance, with the current of prelatists, interprets our Saviour's words, John xx. 21: "As my Father hath sent me, even so send I you." This *χάρισμα*, transmitted in ordination, includes a spiritual superintendence, which keeps the clergy orthodox (and, as represented in their head, the Pope, says Rome, infallible) in expounding the gospel to souls. It also enables them to put into the sacraments a supernatural energy of the Spirit, by which they omnipotently *work grace*, and are not mere means of grace. Rome was accustomed to say, in her scholastic nomenclature, that her sacraments wrought saving graces, *ex opere operato*: by which she seems to have meant, that the manipulation itself effected the gracious result, without any dependence on any state of knowledge, holy desire, penitence, or faith, in the recipient; even as calomel would touch the liver of the patient who supposed that he had taken only a bread pill. The ritualists assert substantially the same view, in teaching the baptismal regeneration of an unconscious or sleeping infant, by the application of the water. Rome teaches that her sacraments are so absolutely essential and efficient, that no soul can be introduced into a state of grace, save by them. The Anglican ritualists say that without the prelatish sacraments, the soul is left to the "uncovenanted mercies."

Thus, the theory of the gospel dispensation described amounts to this: that Christ's provision for applying his mercy for man, consisted simply in his instituting on earth a successive hierarchy

as his "proxies," empowered to work, through his sacraments, the salvation of submissive participants, by a supernatural power, precisely analogous to that by which he enabled Peter to speak in an unknown tongue, and by which Peter and John enabled the lame man to walk.

It is perfectly obvious that if this claim of *χάρισμα* bestowed in prelatic ordination, is unfounded; if the only energies of the Holy Spirit now bestowed on men are given to them, not as priests or prelates, but as penitent, believing, praying sinners; if they are given by the Holy Ghost in his own gracious and sovereign intercourse with souls, through no other mediator than Christ, and by the means of the word and ordinances intelligently apprehended and embraced; if this communion in his grace is as common to the layman as to the clergyman; then the whole scheme of sacramental grace, above described, is a dream. Then, the dependence on that hierarchy and its sacraments, working *ex opere operato*, is related to true Christianity, precisely as is a fetish or a pagan incantation. It is an attempt to heal the soul by a series of acts of ecclesiastical jugglery. It is not asserted that the transaction carries all this profanity and mischief to every misguided votary. As in so many other instances, so here: grace may render men's subjective faith better than their dogmas; the Holy Spirit may mercifully disarm the destructive points of the evil theory, and turn the soul's attention to the other parts containing an element of truth. We doubt not that many devout minds, under this sacramentarian teaching, embrace, with a true though obscure faith, the saving, didactic truths so beautifully taught in the sacraments and in the Scriptures. But they do so in spite of this Gentile error which overlays the doctrine of redemption, not in consequence of it. The theory itself is, essentially, superstition, and not Christianity.

The rival scheme of the application of redemption is that summed up in the words of our Saviour: "Sanctify them *through thy truth*: thy word is truth." The apostle Paul declares it in one word: "It pleased God, by the foolishness of *preaching*, to save *them that believe*." 1 Cor. i. 21. So in Rom. x. 4 to 17: "Whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord, shall be

saved. . . . So, then, faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God." John i. 12: "As many as received him, to them gave he power (*ἐξουσίαν*) to become the sons of God, even to them that believed on his name." Eph. iii. 17: Christ "dwells in your hearts *by faith*." 1 John v. 11, 12: "This is the record, that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son. He that hath (*ἔχει*, holds,) the Son, hath the life; and he that hath not the Son of God, hath not the life." The previous part of the chapter proves that the holding of the Son is faith on him. But to cite all the proofs of this view, would be to repeat nearly the whole of both Testaments. Ps. xix. 7-10; cxix. 9, 93, 98, 104, 130; Prov. iv. 13; Isaiah xxxiii. 6, liii. 11; Jer. iii. 15; Hos. iv. 6; Hab. ii, 14; 1 John v. 1; 1 Pet. i. 23; Luke viii. 11; 1 Cor. iv. 15; John viii. 32; James i. 18; John v. 24; xv. 3; Acts xiii. 26; xx. 32; 1 Pet. ii. 2. And here, at the outset, is an insuperable objection to the scheme of sacramental grace, that it is irreconcilable with this universal teaching, repeated in such multifarious forms. For its constant doctrine is: The Son of God having purchased redemption for his people by his vicarious work, that salvation is actually applied to their souls by the agency of his Spirit, through the means of his word, taught, intelligently apprehended, and embraced by faith, without other conditions or *media*. Hence, all preachers, even inspired evangelists and apostles, instead of being a mediating hierarchy, are "*ministers* by whom we believed;" themselves partaking of redemption precisely as the believing layman does. The sacraments are but "*means of grace*," presenting the truth in symbol, and, while greatly instructing and assuring the faith of the believer already in Christ, yet doing it no otherwise than the Word also does it. Christ reserves the administration of them to the ministers whom he calls in the Church, not on any hierarchical or sacerdotal ground, but simply on grounds of *ἐνταξία* and didactic propriety.

Which of these theories is the more favorable to priestcraft, priestly assumption, and spiritual tyranny, may be seen without a word. We shall not say that this tendency is the thing which commends the doctrine to all prelatists; it would be puerile to

deny that history shows us a multitude of them using it for a weapon of despotism over souls ; and still another multitude of prelatists, less malicious, but more romantic, cherishing it at the unconscious promptings of self-importance. It is a fine thing when a poor mortal can believe himself the channel of eternal life to his subject fellow-creature—the “proxy” of the Son of God and King of Heaven ! The motives which have led the majority of nominal Christians to hold a theory so glaringly opposed to Scripture, are complex, but easily detected. On the part of the hierarchy, those motives are lust of power and pride of importance. On the part of the laity, they are the natural tendency to find a concrete object for the instinct of superstitious veneration ; the terror of the despotism in which they have been reared to believe holding the issues of their salvation or damnation at its option ; and above all, the intense craving of the sinful heart, remorseful yet impenitent, for a palpable mode of reconciliation to God without the prior necessity of the sincere crucifixion of self and sin. As long as men are weak, superstitious, depraved, and conscious of guilt, sacramentarianism must have abundant followers.

This prelatist theory is founded on the following assumption as its corner-stone : That episcopal ordination *confers* the spiritual gifts, or *χαρισματα*, of spiritual powers, instead of merely *recognising* ministerial qualifications, and conferring official title. And this assumption, in its turn, rests upon the false claim that the acts of apostles, laying on hands to confer the Holy Ghost, as in Acts viii. 17, 2 Tim. i. 6, are the prelates’ precedents and warrants for it. The especial object of this discussion is to overthrow this false foundation. If it can be shown that this employment of those passages of Scripture is essential to the prelatist theory of orders and sacramental grace, and that prelatists do, in fact, so usurp them ; and if it can then be evinced that these Scriptures relate to a wholly different subject, when properly understood, and have nothing to do with scriptural ordination to clerical office ; then the whole system of Prelacy is effectually undermined.

I. Our first position, then, is, that the advocates of sacramental

grace do, in fact, usurp those passages in which the *χάρισμα* of working supernatural "signs" is conferred or promised. as the authority for their false scheme of ordination to their so-called priesthood. If they did not, they would have no show of Scripture proof-texts whatever to support the wondrous fabric! This position must be supported by citations from their own authorities, ancient and modern. But as the prelatie scheme was the gift of Rome to the modern churches, we will begin with her most authoritative standards, the Decrees and Catechism of the Tridentine Council. First: In the Cat., Part II., Chap. vii. Q. 25: The administration of the "sacrament of orders" belongs to the bishop; "which it will be easy to demonstrate by the authority of the Sacred Scriptures, most certain tradition," etc. The texts cited here—such as Acts vi. 5, 6, xiv. 22; 2 Tim. i. 6—show that Trent asserts this because she holds bishops to be apostles, and because she usurps these texts erroneously. Then, in the decrees concerning the "sacrament of order," Session 23d, she proceeds thus:

"I. Sacrifice and priesthood are so conjoined by the ordination of God, that each has existed under all dispensations. . . . This (New Test. priesthood) has been instituted by the same Lord, our Saviour: and the Sacred Scriptures show, as the tradition of the Catholic Church has always taught, that the power of consecrating, sacrificing, and distributing his body and blood, and also of remitting sins, has been delivered to the apostles and their successors in the priesthood."

"III. It is plain from the testimony of Scripture, apostolic tradition, and the unanimous consent of the fathers, that *grace is conferred* by holy orders, which are solemnised by words and exterior signs," etc.

"Canon IV. If anybody says that the *Holy Ghost is not given by holy orders*, and that accordingly the bishops have no ground to say " (to the recipient,) "*Receive ye the Holy Ghost*, or that the character is not impressed through this sacrament, etc., let him be accursed."

Rom. Catechism, *De Ordine*, Chap. VII., § 28: •

"But it is certain that, although the Sacrament of Orders, as before stated, regards very greatly the advantage and beauty of the Church, yet it also works in the soul of him who is initiated into sacred things, the grace of sanctification, by which he is rendered fit and able for the right performance of his duty, and for the administration of the sacraments: just as a person, by the grace of baptism," (baptismal regeneration,) "is fitted for receiving the other sacraments. It is plain that another grace.

also, is ascribed to this sacrament," (ordination,) "viz.: *the special power* which relates to the most holy sacrament of the Eucharist, which power is in the priest, full and perfect; so that he alone is able to make the body and blood of our Lord," etc.

Let us pause here to introduce one proof of Rome's misunderstanding. She expressly teaches that this gift of the Holy Ghost conferred in ordination, and this character impressed, *are not the illumination and sanctification* which make men believers and saints. For Rome holds that men can "fall from grace," while they can never lose this gift and character. Rome holds that the ordained man may be all his life unconverted, and still he has the whole gift and character. Now, then, if they are not saving grace, what are they? The only other kind of *χάρισμα* of the Holy Ghost known in Scripture, is that gift of supernatural tongues and signs which Judas had; which was conferred sometimes on females and children, and which 1 Cor. xiii. 1, 2, describes as compatible with spiritual death. But the texts which Rome quotes to sustain her dogma, clearly betray the same thing. They are mainly and foremost, John xx. 21, 22, 1 Tim. iv. 14, 2 Tim. i. 6, with some others not even apparently relevant. But on these three she "rings the changes" throughout the chapters; and especially on John xx. 21, 22.

Before we examine these texts more nearly, let us also look at the doctrine of the Anglican Church. In the form for the consecration of bishops, the following words are addressed to the candidate by the presiding bishop, as he and his assessors lay their hands upon his head:

"Receive the Holy Ghost for the office and work of a bishop in the Church of God, now committed unto thee by the imposition of our hands, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost."

Then follows the exact language of 2 Tim. i. 6. And one of the Scriptures directed to be read before the consecration is John xx. 21. The Anglican Church has learned her lesson from Rome accurately in this matter. The same formula of words is also put into the bishop's mouth for ordaining a "priest," along with an alternative which is less unscriptural. Bishop Cummins, in ordaining Bishop Cheney, refused to employ the unscriptural

language of Rome, because he had repudiated her theory of sacramental grace. He discloses the interesting fact, that it was not until the twelfth century that these superstitious words were finally established in the Romish formulary; and that to this day, they are not used in that of the Greek Church. It required all the ignorance, superstition, and priestly imposture of the dark ages, to prepare the way for this usurpation of the teachings of Scripture.

Let us now see whether the three texts support the dogma of such a "gift of the Holy Ghost," actually conferred by a prelate's hands in our day, in ordinary consecration of a minister; or whether they do not belong to wholly another matter. 1 Tim. iv. 14, and 2 Tim. i. 6, are parallel verses in part. The first reads: "Neglect not the gift (*χάρισμα*) that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy, with the laying on (*μετὰ ἐπιθέσεως*) of the hands of the presbytery." The second: "Stir up the gift of God which is in thee, by the putting on (*διὰ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως*) of my hands." The interpretation which we shall establish at a more appropriate stage for these verses, is, that the latter refers to a time when Paul, by his peculiar, apostolic power, and with the laying on of his hands, conferred on Timothy a *χάρισμα* of supernatural working, just like that he conferred on the disciples at Ephesus—Acts xix. 6; and that the former contains a double reference to this same endowment by Paul and to Timothy's regular presbyterial ordination to office as a minister—the two having probably been near or at the same time.

Let us now look at John xx. 21, 22, which Prelatists evidently regard as the mainstay of their dogma. Christ is now risen. Meeting ten of the apostles at night, he says: "Peace be unto you; as my Father hath sent me, even so send I you. And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and said unto them, *Receive ye the Holy Ghost*. Whosoever's sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye retain, they are retained." To the Protestant these words are plain enough—Christ is God-man, Redeemer, High Priest, Sacrifice, King, and Intercessor to his people. These offices he devolves on nobody, but holds them always. But he condescended for a time to be

“sent” by his Father, in the humble office of a preacher in the Church. This office he now devolves on his twelve apostles. They, as his heralds and ministers, are to proclaim and explain to mankind the terms on which sins are pardoned by him; “for who can forgive sins but God only?” But as they would enjoy the guidance of inspiration, their publication of their Master’s forgiveness would be authoritative, and would be ratified by him in heaven. (Compare Matt. xvi. 19.) For thus setting up the new dispensation, the apostles needed supernatural assistance, and it had been promised to them before the crucifixion—John xvi. 13. They were, at the proper time, to be inspired. They would also need to be accompanied by some supernatural attestations. These, also, the Holy Ghost would work by and in them. These gifts Christ now ensures to them by a significant act, while he repeats the promise, as near its fulfilment. That the gift of the Holy Ghost which he now bestowed was the very same exercised by the apostles in the day of Pentecost, is made as clear as a sunbeam, by Christ’s own words, as recorded by Luke, Acts i. 4, 5: “Depart not from Jerusalem, but wait for the promise of the Father, *which ye have heard of me*. For John truly baptized with water; but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost, not many days hence.” *When* did they hear this promise from him? Evidently on the night described by John xx. 21, 22. Thus, that gift of the Spirit, whose bestowal was then symbolised by the act of breathing upon them, is identified with the effusion of the day of Pentecost. What that was, all know (Acts ii. 2—4)—a miraculous inspiration.

Thus, when Prelatists claim this promise of John xx. 21, 22, as the foundation of their doctrine of orders and supposed power to work sacramental grace, they claim what Christ applied to a totally different matter from ordination: the bestowal of supernatural powers of the Holy Ghost. Our charge is made out by their capital text.

The next proof-text quoted by Rome, and by the Anglican divines, is Acts vi. 3, the appointment of the first recorded deacons: “Wherefore, brethren, look ye out among you seven men of honest report, full of the Holy Ghost, and wisdom, whom we may

appoint over this business." Then (verses 5, 6,) the multitude chose, and apostles set them apart, by laying on of hands and prayer. To the plain Protestant reader, it would seem that this instance is totally irrelevant to prove that ordination *confers a gift of the Holy Ghost*. For, the possession of that gift by the seven men was the prerequisite qualification for ordination, which, because the gift was already possessed, conferred simply the diaconal office. But stay: Rome wishes to imply, in spite of this, that the apostles' hands *conferred the charisma*. Chrysostom argues expressly, that Stephen is not heard of, as exercising that gift, until after this laying on of hands, when (verse 8) he "did great wonders and miracles among the people." The interpretation is false; but it none the less establishes the charge with which we set out, that Prelacy erroneously builds upon these instances of supernatural gifts; when, in fact, they belong not to the matter of ordination to the ministry at all, as results thereof. It may be added here, that the Pentecostal Church being adorned with many instances of these extraordinary gifts *among its laymen*, the apostles deemed it proper, for the time, to take the deacons from among these laymen thus honored of God. The occasion of their choice was a threatened faction in the Church; and they wished the present appointment to carry universal confidence. But when we turn to 1 Tim. iii. 8, etc., where we find the regular qualifications for the diaconal office defined for customary times, the power of tongues and miracles is not heard of among them.

Our next proof, that the Prelatists have actually built their theory on the mistaken foundation, is also historical. Every intelligent reader knows the monstrous lengths to which the abuse of purchasing ordination to clerical office went, in the Romish and Anglican Churches. It was the glory of the administration of the great Pope Hildebrand, Gregory V.II., to resist this abuse; but it has never been conquered. Now, Prelacy has given it a name, which exactly and technically separates it from all other sins. That name is *Simony*. It is confessedly taken from Simon the Samaritan, usually known as Simon Magus, in that act which is described in Acts viii. 14 to 21. Philip the Evangelist,

though supernaturally qualified for preaching by the *charisma* which he had before he was appointed deacon, and though competent to convert and baptize people, yet was not an apostle; and hence he could not confer these extraordinary gifts by laying on hands. Hence, the church newly planted in Samaria as yet lacked that honor. Peter and John, apostles, were sent down to confer it. Those on whom they laid their hands received these visible *charismata*. Doubtless they spake with unknown tongues, or prophesied; for the result was obvious to Simon's observation as a spectator (verse 18). The same ambition which has moved so many an assertor of Prelacy since to claim this peculiar apostolic power, moved him. He proposed to give them money, "saying, Give me also this power, that on whomsoever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost." Note, the thing Simon craved was not the ability to speak with tongues or work a miraculous sign. Possibly he had received this as a reprobate Judas received similar powers. He desired *the ability to confer this power on others*. And this criminal proposal so perfectly defined by Simon's own words, is precisely the thing which Rome and the Anglican Church have selected to denominate the sin of procuring clerical orders by money. The fact is evinced yet more clearly by another trait. The canon law of Rome declares that an ordination procured by Simony is null and void *ab initio*, and all priestly acts done by the man thus ordained, are utterly invalid. The Hildebrands, more righteous than the Anglican dignitaries, actually enforced this law. The scriptural basis of it is the words of Peter: "*Thou hast neither part nor lot in this matter.*"

Thus prelacy shows that, in its apprehension, the imposition of hands by Peter and John on these Samaritan converts, and the consequent possession of the extraordinary *charisma*, was a precedent and a basis for their doctrine of orders. The disclosure is complete. Prelacy deems, that when a man purchases of the Bishops the powers conferred, as they claim, in Episcopal ordination, he commits the identical sin attempted by Simon. But did these Apostles then ordain those members of the new Samaritan church to clerical office? Obviously they did not; but

did wholly another thing : conferred on some laymen, and possibly women, a *charisma* of supernatural powers. Thus the sheer usurpation and misconception of the Scripture by the prelatist is again disclosed.

Our next testimony is even a more express betrayal of the blunder. It is from the *Parainesis* of Dr. Hammond, *Quere 5th*: “*Χειροθεσία* is answerable to that imposition of hands in ordination so often mentioned in the New Testament . . . as, generally, when *by that laying on of hands it is said they received the Holy Ghost*; where the Holy Ghost contains all the *χαρίσματα* required for the pastoral function, and also signifies power from on high,” etc.

Dr. Hammond here betrays the fact that his prelatist error was carried by him through the whole New Testament. Quoth he, “Generally by *that laying on of hands*,” [*scilicet*, ordination to clerical office,] “it is said they received the Holy Ghost.” But it is never said of any ordination to clerical office, that the clergyman received the Holy Ghost from his ordination; never once within the lids of the New Testament. But hear him again :

“*Of this ceremony, thus used*” (meaning imposition of hands for ordination) “several mentions there are. First, Acts viii. 17, where after Philip the deacon had preached and baptized in Samaria, Peter and John, the Apostles, came from Jerusalem to perfect the work, and laid hands on them, [not on all that were baptized, but on some special persons whom they thought meet,] and they received the Holy Ghost.”

This pious Anglican prelatist thus declares expressly the same mistake which his predecessors in error had made, when they supposed that the sin of obtaining ordination by a bribe was just the sin which Simon Magus committed.

To show that this was the traditionary and original ground of prelacy, we will now go backwards, and cite two examples of the same false exposition, from the most learned of the Greek Fathers. Theophylact, on 2 Tim. i. 6, gives as the equivalent of the words, *διὰ ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν μου*, this gloss: *Τούτ' ἐστὶ, ὅτε σε ἐχειροτόνουν ἐπίσκοπον*. He thus expressly confounds the appointment to clerical office, with an Apostle's bestowal of spiritual gifts.

Chrysostom on Acts vi. 8, says: "See how one man (Stephen) was preëminent among those seven, and held a primacy. For although their ordination was common among them, yet this man derived a larger grace. But before this ordination, he wrought no signs, but only after he was manifested. This was designed to teach them that grace alone was not sufficient; but that ordination is requisite, in order that the access of the Spirit may take place."

It is still the same obstinate misconception: that ordination is the bestowal of supernatural gifts, instead of the recognition of gracious qualifications for clerical duties.

The prelatist conception of an application of redemption exclusively by sacramental grace has been thus carefully explained, and its founding, by its own architects, upon an imaginary scriptural basis has been evinced; because so many, even of Protestants, fail to conceive it aright. We repeat then: The prelatist supposes that the grace of Christ is applied to the soul, not as the Bible teaches, by the Holy Spirit, through the Word rationally apprehended and embraced by faith; but by the Holy Spirit working miraculously, without the truth, but through a priestly and sacramental hand, just as when, through a miracle-worker, He casts out a demon or heals a leper. In the eyes of the prelatist, ordination is not the conferring of a didactic and ruling ministration, proceeding on the candidate's previous possession of natural and gracious qualification; but it is a miracle wrought upon the candidate, by the hand of an Apostle, enabling him in turn to work certain other miracles. When the priest, clothed with this endowment, consecrates the Eucharist, he truly works a miracle, then and there, converting bread and wine into the real flesh and blood of Christ, and conveying by them supernatural and spiritual life into the souls of the persons in whose mouths he puts the elements. So, when he applies the water of baptism to an infant, he works another miracle by it: he quickens the soul thereby, which was born dead in sin. In a word, souls are brought into a state of salvation, not by a rational, scriptural, and spiritual faith on the gospel; but by a miracle-working power, deposited with the priest, and dispensed by his sacramental forms.

And the deposition of that power by the Apostle-Bishop is precisely a case like that of the communication of tongues and powers by the Apostles' hands in the book of Acts.

This last point, we repeat, is imperfectly apprehended, even by many intelligent opponents of prelacy. They do not grasp here exactly what prelacy means. One cause of this imperfect apprehension is, that they see these same prelatists claiming these instances of the imposition of hands as precedents for their "sacrament of confirmation," or, as the Episcopalians have it, rite of confirmation. It seems unlikely to our friends, that prelatists should be guilty of the inconsistency of claiming the same set of cases for two different uses. We reply, first, that if they appreciated the nature of prelatistical logic more justly, it would not appear to them at all strange that prelatists should use the same cases in two inconsistent ways. But second, from the prelatists' point of view, (if once its error be assumed,) the inconsistency is less than at first thought appears. According to them, only a bishop (an actual apostle) can ordain a priest; and he only can confirm a convert. When the first Apostles conferred *charismata* of spiritual powers by the laying on of hands, those powers were numerous, and varied with the different needs of the recipients. Some received tongues; some the powers of healing; some prophecy; some casting out demons. So, when the apostle (bishop) ordains some, and confirms others, he bestows different supernatural powers. To the one he gives the power of regenerating infants with water and of making a mass; to the other, the power of resisting the flesh and the devil. But in either case, it is a *charisma* through the apostolic hands: a supernatural endowment through the tactual means. This is the common point of union for these parts of their scheme.

In dismissing this point, we may remark once for all, that if our view of these impositions of hands be sustained, then all scriptural ground for the rite of confirmation will be as completely removed, as for prelatist orders and sacramental grace.

Another source of defective apprehension concerning the real nature of the prelatist scheme, is the studied intermixture which they make of their real doctrine with certain scriptural truths

concerning gracious qualifications for the pastoral office. They so mingle the scriptural and the superstitious, as to throw dust into Protestant eyes, and to obscure certain plain distinctions. True, the two schemes, of a ministerial or a sacerdotal work, are incompatibles; but prelatists are not troubled by logical inconsistencies. Thus, at one time, when descanting on the *charismata* bestowed in orders, they speak in the most edifying way of the integrity of spirit, spiritual discernment, and biblical knowledge, which enter into our Protestant conception of the "aptness to teach." To us it seems that the only channels by which these things come from the Holy Ghost, must be study and prayer. We can scarcely raise our Protestant minds to the height of the conception, that our prelatist brethren should apprehend even these as oozing through a prelate's fingers into a priest's skull. We fail to grasp their meaning. Then, to complete the confusion of our minds and the intermixture of pastoral qualifications with supernatural, sacerdotal powers, they take us to such passages as 1 Cor. xii. 28, etc., and Rom. xii. 6. We are reminded that the apostolic, prophetic, and miracle-working (*δυνάμεις*) offices are here described as "set in the Church," alongside of the pastoral, the ruling, and the diaconal. They show us the *χαρίσματα κυβερνήσεως* side by side with the *χαρίσματα ἰαμάτων*. They intimate to us, that as the latter endowment must have been bestowed through the supernatural power of an apostle, so the former, so familiarly associated with it, must have been also. And thus they would have us jump to the prelatist conclusion, that the pastoral qualification in our day as well as the first age, is conferred by the tactual succession.

The trick here is obvious to a little reflection. It consists in assuming that the *charisma* was a specific thing always; namely, some endowment of spiritual power conferred by imposition of the Apostles' hands, and distinct always from those "graces of the Holy Spirit" which characterise the saint, whether layman or clergyman, as a believer. But in fact, the word *χάρισμα*, in the usage of the New Testament, is general; almost as general as its *congener*, *χάρις*. The common idea of both words is that of gratuity. bestowing without price. The only difference between

them is, that while *χάρις* denotes the generous and disinterested affection in God. (or his child,) *χάρισμα* signifies something bestowed, the expression of that affection. The latter word is still a general one. In Rom. v. 15 and 16, justification through Christ is called a *χάρισμα*. In Rom. vi. 23, eternal life is called *χάρισμα*. In xi. 29, electing love is called *χάρισμα*. In 1 Cor. i. 7, utterance and knowledge are spoken of as *χαρίσματα*. In 1 Cor. vii. 7, Christian continence is called a *χάρισμα*. 1 Cor. xiii., plainly implies that in the light of the last verse of the preceding chapter, faith, hope, and charity, are *χαρίσματα*. Thus, anything with which God endues a Christian out of his unbought kindness is, in this sense, a *charisma*. The word is, beyond doubt, used a few times to describe those supernatural endowments; and so is the word *δωρεά*, as in Acts viii. 20. When, therefore, qualifications for pastoral or diaconal service are called by the Apostles *χαρίσματα*, by that term alone *nothing is taught as to the channel* of their bestowal; all that is taught is that they have their source in the grace of Christ. To find whether they are attained in any "sacrament of holy orders" or not, we must look elsewhere in the Scriptures.

Making these obvious discriminations, then, we remove the dust from our eyes. We are able to disembarass the matter of this question: Whence the pastoral qualifications? whose reality in true ministers and elders we all admit. We separate the question, whether ordination by the modern prelate bishop confers any power to work sacramental grace. And we detect the hollowness of that claim by tracing it to its *genesis* in a sheer misconception of the Apostolic history.

II. We are thus led to the second department of our discussion, for which the way has designedly been prepared. We have repeatedly stated the postulate in the first branch, that the instances of the Apostles' conferring supernatural *charismata* by laying on their hands, have nothing whatever to do with the substance of ordination to ordinary church offices. It remains now to establish that postulate. We have shown that prelacy is compelled to assume the opposite, as one of the foundation stones

of its theory; so that when our position is established, that theory is overthrown.

Other lines of argument against it have been successfully followed. The claim of an "apostolic succession," in the sense of sacramental grace, is utterly demolished, by proving that *there are no apostles* in the world; that there have been none since the death of the Apostle John; as, in the nature of the case, it is impossible there should be. The apostolic office proper was necessarily temporary; because it could only be filled by men who enjoyed the inspiration of the Holy Ghost; who possessed the gift of working palpable miracles; who had "seen the Lord Christ;" who had "compained with the eleven all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among them, beginning from the baptism of John, unto that same day that he was taken up from them, and so could be a witness with them of his resurrection."

This figment of "apostolic succession" is destroyed again by showing that the thing has no existence on earth, to which they claim to succeed. When we ask the early prelatic Church, the Latin, the Greek, and the Anglican Catholic: *To what* have your prelates succeeded? The universal answer is: "To priesthood and sacrifice;" to the mediating functions of a hierarchy. The succession is that, or it is nothing. But since Christ's ascension, there is neither priest nor sacrifice on earth. The true Apostles were not priests, in the prelatic sense, and had no atoning sacrifice. There is no altar nor priest on earth. This line of refutation has been pursued by Dr. Thomas E. Peck, among others, in *THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW* of July, 1872, with irresistible perspicuity and force.

Again, the claim of apostolic succession in the Anglican Church has been historically refuted, by showing this fatal chasm, among almost a score of others: That during the reigns of Elizabeth and her successors, the succession was filled by the crown, and not by the episcopate. And the persons wearing the crown were rebels against the Lord Jesus Christ, living in open sin; if not infidels, friends rather of Popery than of the Church of Christ; and uniformly filling the succession on grounds of choice not spiritual or Christian, but wholly secular and usually

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wicked and selfish. The pretended election of a Bishop by his Chapter, was under a *Conge d'elire*, which contained the single name for which the electors were compelled to vote by the vague but urgent terrors of the statute of "*Præmunire*." The consecration which followed by the hands of three prelates appointed in the same anti-christian manner, was obviously, as the pretended "creation of a bishop," a farce too hollow to impose on any sane mind. Hildebrand, the great bulwark of Middle Age prelacy, utterly refused to recognise the validity of such a farce, when attempted by the Emperor of Germany.

Again, the scheme of sacramental grace is refuted by the doctrine of the gospel in the Old Testament. If the two Testaments contain the same covenant of grace, then salvation under both must be substantially by the same means and agencies. For then the two Testaments contain the same religion and the same salvation. But that this is so is evinced by these among other facts. Both Testaments have the same Mediator. Both suspend salvation practically upon faith on Him. Both promise precisely the same redemption from the same evils. The very ordinances which distinguish the Old Testament from the New foreshadowed the gospel truths, more clearly taught in the latter. But under the Old Testament, no sacraments saved souls *ex opere operato*. There was no regeneration by circumcision parallel to the pretended baptismal regeneration of prelacy; but if the Jew became a "breaker of the law, his circumcision was made uncircumcision; and he was a Jew who was one inwardly; and circumcision was that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter." "All those fathers were baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and did all eat the same spiritual meat, and did all drink the same spiritual drink: for they drank of that spiritual Rock which followed them; and that Rock was Christ. But with many of them God was not well pleased; for they were overthrown in the wilderness . . . Now these things *were our examples*." Then no salvation by sacramental grace is promised to us in the New Testament. "Wherefore, let him that thinketh he standeth, (upon this prelatie foundation,) take heed lest he fall." (1 Cor. x.) "Abraham's faith was imputed to him not in

circumcision but in uncircumcision. And he received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had yet being uncircumcised." Such was the meaning of an Old Testament sacrament. But he is still the exemplar to us, "who also walk in the steps of that faith of our father Abraham." (Rom. iv. 11, 12.) To him therefore who understands aright the relation between the Old Testament and the New, prelacy is impossible.

But our purpose is to pass hastily over these more familiar topics of refutation, and to establish the correct view touching these *charismata* conferred by the Apostle's hands, which prelacy endeavors unwarrantably to press into its service. We do this, because they are less understood, and the doctrine of them needs explication, even to many Protestant minds.

We hold, then, that Christ by his Spirit bestowed these supernatural powers on his Apostles and certain others, for a temporary purpose. That purpose cannot be more accurately stated than in the language of Paul, 1 Cor. xiv. 22: "Wherefore tongues are for a sign, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not." Compare Mark xvi. 15 to 18. "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature . . . And *these signs shall follow them that believe*: in my name they shall cast out devils, they shall speak with new tongues," etc. See also, 1 Cor. xiv. 14 and 19; Acts iv. 29, 30; Acts v. 12; Hebr. ii. 4. The fact of the resurrection is the corner-stone of the whole gospel-promise. But the credence of an unbelieving world to that most surprising event was to be gained by the testimony of the Apostles as eye-witnesses. The world was invited to commit its immortal interests to the "say-so" of twelve men, who were but *ιδιωται*, and even unlearned and obscure in the main, asserting a most extraordinary fact! Manifestly, when they first stood up before an unprepared and unbelieving world, it was absolutely essential that God should sustain their credibility by some supernatural attestations. He did this accordingly by enabling them, from the day of Pentecost onwards, to exhibit manifestations of divine power, palpable to the senses and of indispu-

table force. The legitimate effect on men's reason was seen in the conversion of the three thousand.

But twelve men could not preach everywhere. Therefore it was desirable that others should be endued with the power of exhibiting these divine "signs." Notice now, the consistency and wisdom of the divine plan here. If any human agency was employed to communicate, to others than the twelve, these powers, that agency was the twelve themselves; and they were appointed to do it by an obvious, visible action. To this agree the best expositors, ancient and modern, including the prelatie. This, indeed, is their ground for restraining all ordaining and confirming acts to their bishops, whom they deem Apostles. And the reason why the power of working "signs" was derived by others only from the twelve, was, that *they were the appointed witnesses to the resurrection whose testimony needed support*, and received support, from the signs. Thus, through Peter's agency, the power of speaking with new tongues came to the family of Cornelius. (Acts x. 44.) Let us represent to ourselves a young child of the Centurion exercising indisputably before us, this supernatural gift. It demonstrates the fact that God has here intervened. But for what? That boy is no competent eye-witness to the Resurrection! But he can say that it was through Peter's agency he was enabled to exhibit this sign: and Peter is one of those eye-witnesses. Thus, the endowment of the boy reflects back its evidence upon Peter the witness whose credibility is all-important to the propagation of the gospel. Again, let us suppose the young evangelist Timothy endued with this *charisma* by the laying on of Paul's hands, going forth to a heathen village to proclaim the resurrection of Christ, and to exhibit his "signs." The question immediately arises, To what does this divine attestation bear relation? Timothy answers: To Christ's resurrection. But was Timothy an authentic eye-witness of the fact? No: he does not pretend to be. But he can testify that it was Paul who bestowed this power of working "signs;" and Paul claimed to have actually seen the Lord in glory, after his resurrection. Thus, in a word, it was best that the ability of others to exhibit the "signs" should visibly proceed from the

Twelve; because it was *to sustain the testimony of the Twelve* that the "signs" were needed.

But the necessity was temporary. By the time that the last of the apostles and their converts had passed off the stage of life, the attitude of the new dispensation before the world was greatly changed. The civilised world was now dotted over with churches. See, for instance, Rom. xv. 19. The canon of Scripture was complete. The effects of the gospel in the renewal and sanctification of souls were now visible to every nation. When at first the twelve unknown men stood up before a world all unbelieving, to claim belief for the astounding fact, a miraculous support of their credibility was absolutely needed. Without it, the credence of mankind could not have been reasonably or justly claimed. But now, this species of support to the great central facts was no longer necessary. The world now had, in place of the few original eye-witnesses, a countless multitude of witnesses at second hand, but still honest witnesses. It had the historical attestations of the recent past to a multitude of miracles, the authenticity of all of which could not be impugned. Mankind now had the completed Scriptures, with all their self-evidencing light, and the witness of the Spirit in the called. And above all, they had the divine results of the gospel in paganism overthrown, and souls sanctified under their own inspection—a kind of evidence whose stream has widened and deepened to our day. The same necessity for supernatural "signs" now no longer existed; and God, who is never wasteful in his expedients, withdrew them. Henceforward, the Church was to conquer the belief of the world by its example and teachings alone, energized by the illumination of the Holy Ghost.

Finally, miracles, if they became ordinary, would cease to be miracles, and would be referred by men to customary law.

The good sense of both Chrysostom and Augustine led them in some places to teach this view of the matter, with remarkable distinctness; although they both, in other places, inconsistently assert the validity of post-apostolic, and even contemporary miracles.

Chrys., in Acts, Vol. III. 65: "On this account, *charismata*

were given, at the beginning, even to the unworthy; for the early Church had need of this support for the sake of (sustaining) faith. But now these *charismata* are not bestowed even on the worthy." Hom. in Cor.: "The fact that signs do not occur now, is no proof at all that they did not occur then; because then they were necessary and now they are not." Aug. De Vera Relig. c. 47.: "For since the Catholic Church is spread and founded through the whole globe, those miracles have not been allowed to continue to our times; lest the mind should continually demand something visible; and mankind, who, when the miracles were novelties, were all on fire about them, should become callous by means of their customariness."

Such being the purpose of these peculiar *charismata*, it was reasonable that there should be no regular connection whatever, between them and the ministry as an office. They might, in many cases, be connected with that office; and in many other cases they might be bestowed upon laymen, as in 1 Cor. xiv. 5, or on a child, as in Acts x. 44, or on women, as in Acts xxi. 9. They might even be exercised by an ungodly man, (see 1 Cor. xiii. 1, 2,) and yet might have their effect as signs. But neither child, nor female, nor unrenewed man, was allowed to hold any episcopal or presbyterial office known to the New Testament. See 1 Tim. iii. 6; 1 Tim. ii. 12; 1 Tim. iii. 9. Hence it is manifest that the imposition of hands, conferring these *charismata* of signs, could not have been ordination.

The general evidence in favor of this position, will be seen to be in its consistency with the whole history of the Apostolic Church and the teachings of its founders. When the scheme is viewed dispassionately in this light, it will appear satisfying in its coherency. Another general evidence in its favor is, that it gives a satisfactory and consistent solution to the vexed question, when and how miracles ceased out of the primitive Church. That all these supernatural signs would vanish, while the Church was still on earth, was clearly predicted by St. Paul: "Whether prophecies, they shall fail;" (not fail of fulfilment; but the power of uttering them by divine warrant was to be withdrawn, *καταργεῖσθαι*;) "whether tongues, they shall cease." But *how*

long they endured after the Apostles' deaths, is still greatly debated. Rome claims, from her prelatie false premises, that the Church still enjoys these *charismata* of miracles. The intelligent reader is familiar with her "lying wonders," even in this day. And Rome is herein far more consistent than the high Anglican prelatist. If the bishops are literal apostles, holding their very office by succession; if ordination is still that very *χειροθεσία* to convey supernatural powers; if the sacramental performances of the priest are, every one of them, exercises of that very power, and every baptism and "sacrifice of the altar" is literally the exertion of the very same *charisma* by which men who had received this *χειροθεσία* of old, spake with tongues and healed diseases; (which is precisely their theory;) if the very work of the priest for his charge is, to make the sacramental application of the ghostly powers of redemption to their souls, by this personal power of *charisma*, instead of being the rational, didactic minister of their effectual calling by the Word and Spirit: then this same priest ought to be expected, from time to time, to exhibit this other fruit of his *charisma*, MIRACLES. The man who has the supernatural power to quicken the dead soul of an infant with water, any hour of the day, and to make a divine sacrifice out of a piece of bread, every Sunday and saint's day, ought to be expected to shew us the easier miracles of an inspired prediction, and a Tartar or Chinese sermon, and a case of paralysis cured by his word, at least now and then. Why does he not? It would be very satisfactory! And the apostle who is able, by the touch of his fingers, to manufacture us one of those stupendous miracle-workers every time he "consecrates a priest," ought to be able to endow us a few holy virgins, like Philip's four daughters, to speak with tongues. Why is he so prodigal of the former species of manufacture, and so stingy of the latter? We stubborn Protestants are greatly in need of some such "signs," to establish our faith in the prelatie gospel! Why do not the Anglican Catholics, give us some, like the French Popish clergy? For somehow, the *δυνάμεις* wrought by the Ritualists at "the font and the altar," with water and bread and wine, seem not to be convincing! The children that are "now regenerated" do not remain regene-

rate long enough for us to find it out; but go on, from the first, to exhibit the same waywardness, innate love of lies, carnality, and devotion to the "world, the flesh, and the devil," with our unfortunate little ones, who are aliens from the ritualistic Israel; and if the former ever become Christians, they have to be converted in precisely the same Protestant fashion—"by the foolishness of preaching." The prelatric communicants, who feed on the "real presence" at "the altar," thus literally eating and drinking spiritual life, as they would have us believe, go so straight from "the altar," back to "dead works," in so many cases, that our eyes are not quick enough to see the change, and we remain sceptical about the "altar's" working any *δυνάμεις* for them. And we have to ascribe the piety of the many pious ritualists rather to that *modicum* of "the foolishness of preaching" which they still get in spite of the altar. Thus, the Papists who stand to their error consistently, by giving us all the kinds of *δυνάμεις* still, are much wiser than the "Anglican Catholics."

But another embarrassment is, about the reported miracles of the third and fourth centuries. The "Fathers" gravely detail them, in great numbers. The great Augustine in his sermons on the martyr Stephen, for instance, relates some wonderful things wrought at his tomb. Ambrose was a stout asserter of miracles wrought by his Milan relics. The learned Jerome was a devout believer in the miracles of his hero, the Monk Anthony. What to do with these stories occasioned, in the last century, a stout debate in the Anglican Church. Dr. Conyers Middleton was rather inclined to treat them all as so much "gammon." The famous Bishop Warburton, and the Dodwells, on the other hand, argued that Middleton's spirit, if consistently indulged, would equally impugn the apostolic miracles themselves. For, said they, if the authentic Fathers may not be admitted as sufficient, though uninspired, testimony to historical events, occurring not long before their day, in their own country, it will be hard to show on what plea greater authenticity is to be claimed for Mark and Luke. The best solution of this difficulty is suggested by our account of these *charismata* of supernatural powers. If

the Twelve could confer them, and nobody else, then they would continue to the end of the second generation of Christians. The Apostle John might have conferred them on some favored young convert, in the ninth or tenth decade after the Christian era; for to the latter date this apostle lived. The recipient might have lived, like the aged Polycarp, far into the second century: so that until that time, the occurrence of a genuine *σημειον* in the Church was possible. But the Christians of that and the next generations, with much of the ignorance, and some of the superstition of their recent paganism, cleaving to them, were doubtless very tenacious of this splendid endowment of the churches just before them. We see traces of this in 1 Cor. xiv. Hence, they would naturally close their eyes to the unwelcome fact, that this gift of power was dying out. They would catch at anything which wore the appearance of it. They would find here a most alluring field for the exercise of the art of pious frauds, which the Church was even then learning. Hence, the state of opinion and assertion which we have exhibited—the abler men avowing, in their better moods, that the power was gone, because no longer needed; and the weaker men still passionately asserting its continuance, and persuading themselves that they found instances of it in every startling occurrence—is precisely what we are to expect on our hypothesis. This difficulty may be further explained by the ambiguity of the words employed by the Fathers. The term, miracle, had probably not then received its exact definition. *Miracula* meant, by its etymology, “something to be astonished at.” In this sense, the magnetic telegraph, the Great Eastern, the *Credit Mobilier* at Washington, and the fortunes of “Beast Butler” and “Boss Tweed,” are *miracula*. It is most likely that Augustine intentionally used it in this sense, of striking religious events; and that his great mind did not claim in them the perfect, supernatural demonstration, which we claim for a strict technical miracle; but only that strong probability of the divine, providential superintendence, which every devout mind sees in rare and impressive concurrences. Again, the Patristic mind, ardent and indiscriminating, often rushed to the conclusion that a certain event could only be caused by strictly supernatural in-

tervention, which we would account for as an infrequent, but natural, concurrence of providences. Such may have been the "miracle" of the Thundering Legion, in the days of M. Antoninus, if it is authentic at all.

But we have more positive arguments to support our theory of these *charismata*. One will be an examination of a number of Scripture passages, which will, as we claim, be successfully shown to maintain it. Others will be drawn from principles recognised in the Scriptures.

These peculiar gifts began, for the new dispensation, with Pentecost. Let us take the apostle Peter as an example of the Twelve, and examine the relation of the endowment to his Christian experience. Luke tells us (ch. xxii. 62,) of one instance of Peter's repentance; which our Saviour, in John xxi. 18, evidently sanctioned as evangelical and genuine. For when he affectionately replied to Peter's solemn protestation, "Lord, thou knowest all things; thou knowest that I love thee;" "Feed my sheep"—we have the assurance that Peter was then a new-born man. Now, repentance and holy love are fruits of the Spirit. No sinner has them, until he has the work of the Spirit in him. Yet, there was another sense, in which the Spirit was not yet received by Peter. For, this same Saviour, on the very day of his ascension, says to Peter, along with the others: "Wait for the promise of the Father, which ye have heard of me. For John truly baptized with water; but ye shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost not many days hence." And in verse 8: "But ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you." In one sense, Peter had already been "baptized with the Holy Ghost." In one sense, that Agent had already "come upon him," and he had "received His power;" otherwise he would have been no saint. It must, then, be in the other sense, that he was still to wait for it. And what that was, is clearly disclosed in ch. ii. 4: "And they were all filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak with tongues." There was therefore, one kind of spiritual influence, which *made sinners Christians*, which wrought effectual calling, faith, repentance, love, and obedience. There was another kind clearly distinguished from it.

and here called the power of the Holy Ghost, which made men *sign-workers* who were already Christians, or which, if it found them unrenewed, left them so. The latter was the power especially bestowed at Pentecost.

Which, now, of these two species of power does the Church of Christ profess instrumentally to dispense to sinners? Which do sinners now need? All answer: That kind which, of sinners, makes them Christians indeed. The terms of the dispensation of the other species, then, have nothing direct to do with those ordinances by which the Church proposes to save souls: it is another matter.

We now proceed to another illustration of this truth. When the multitude at Pentecost was amazed at the supernatural signs wrought, Peter explained: "This is that which was spoken by the prophet Joel: And it shall come to pass in the last days, saith God, I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy," etc. . . . "This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses. Therefore being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this, which ye now see and hear." Acts ii. 16, 18, and 32, 33. The apostle's argument is as follows: Your prophet Joel has given you a visible mark by which God will signalize "the last days," or the latter dispensation of his Kingdom. That mark was to be the powerful effusion of supernatural signs, just such as are now exhibited before you. Your Scriptures also predicted that your Messiah should be distinguished by rising from the dead. These two signatures of the new dispensation, pointing to Jesus as that Messiah, precisely concur, here, and now. For, we attest the fact that he rose and ascended to his Father; and as for the other sign, the supernatural prophesyings and tongues, you can hear for yourselves, and see for yourselves. The conclusion is, that your Messiah is come, and the latter dispensation of the kingdom has come, claiming your allegiance.

The demonstration, as put by Peter, was perfect. But the reader must observe, that to make it hold, he must interpret the prediction of Joel, "God will pour out his Spirit on all flesh,"

as Peter does, of the power which made men *sign-workers*. For, in the other sense, of the power which makes men Christians, *the outpouring of God's Spirit is not the peculiar mark of the new dispensation*. The Spirit performed his converting and sanctifying office-work throughout the old dispensation. He who doubts this, may examine Gen. vi. 3; Psalm li. 11, 12; Is. xxxii. 15; Zech. iv. 6. Moreover, the silent, gentle, gradual operation of sanctifying grace, while ultimately presenting a powerful evidence, under the rule, "By their fruits ye shall know them," could not constitute such a σημεῖον as would fix the new epoch of the Church by an outward, palpable, definitive, temporal mark. Nor would the pouring out of this influence of conversion and sanctification on "all flesh." *i. e.* on Gentiles and Jews, and on many of all nations alike, present such a mark. This also is probably involved in the blessed promise of Joel; but it is not this which answers Peter's purpose of fixing the epoch of the new dispensation by a something which spectators could "now see and hear." We are thus compelled, by another line of argument, to discriminate this "power of the Holy Ghost" from that which the Church undertakes to minister for the conversion and sanctification of sinners.

The hearers are, by Peter's sermon, cut to the heart by conviction, and cry out, "Men and brethren, what shall we do?" In Acts ii. 38, we have the apostle's reply: "Repent, and be baptized, every one of you, in the name of the Lord Jesus, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." See the exact correspondence of the latter part of this promise with our Saviour's in Mark xvi. 17. The previous verse had said, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." (Compare Peter's "Repent, and be baptized for the remission of sins.") "And these σημεῖα shall follow them that believe. In my name they shall cast out devils," etc. (Compare Peter's "and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost;" *i. e.*, the gift of working those σημεῖα.) Here, repentance, (μετάνοια) is the prerequisite of baptism. In Mark xvi. 16, and Acts viii. 12, we learn that faith is a prerequisite for it. The gift of the Holy Ghost is here mentioned as consequent on baptism. Now, we

are taught in both Testaments, that faith and repentance are the fruits of the Holy Spirit. No man exercises them sincerely until the Spirit of God has been given to him, to enlighten and quicken his dead soul. Hence, when the reception of the gift of the Holy Ghost is here spoken of as a consequence of repentance, the apostle evidently has in mind some other phase of that gift than that which converts and sanctifies. What is this? Obviously, the same phase whose miraculous effects had filled the hearers with amazement: We may justly explain the apostle's promise thus: The penitent and believing sinner, professing a saving faith, by the act of baptism, shall receive, first, that which is his prime need, reconciliation with God. But the Scriptures of the Jews themselves had just taught the hearers that these supernatural powers the apostles then displayed were the very signatures of that blessing and of its new dispensation. Now, saith he, embrace this gospel with penitent faith, and you shall receive the prime blessing of redemption, and, in addition, shall share with us these miraculous "signs" which are given to attest it infallibly.

This meaning Peter confirms in the 39th verse: "For the promise is unto you," etc. What promise? Obviously the one cited from Joel, to which their attention had been so recently and strongly pointed. But, as we have seen, this promise specifically indicated these *charismata* of supernatural signs.

This passage, therefore, correctly understood, contains no intimation of baptismal regeneration. The prelatists who so often quote it as a proof-text for their baptismal grace, wholly miss the mark. Of these adults, this text requires evangelical repentance as a prerequisite; and no man repents, save he who already enjoys the regenerating and saving grace of the Spirit. And that species of spiritual power which is promised as the consequence of a saving change, of baptism, and of forgiveness, is the temporary kind exhibited by the inspired twelve at Pentecost.

The next clear teaching concerning this influence is at the appointment of the seven deacons, Acts vi. As has been remarked no *charisma* of tongues or miracles is required among the permanent qualifications of deacons, in 1 Tim. 3d. But as the juncture was critical, the office now newly instituted, and the Church in its

incipiency very liberally adorned with these extraordinary gifts, the apostles deem it well to make the first selection from among men who possessed them, in addition to the regular qualifications of wisdom and good character. Hence they were to be also men "full of the Holy Ghost." This undoubtedly means, in this place, possessed of the extraordinary gifts. It is explained in vi. 8. and viii. 6 and 13. Stephen, one of the seven, "full of faith and power, did great wonders and miracles among the people." Philip, another of them, did "miracles and signs." But it is certain, against Chrysostom and later Prelatists and Papists, that ordination to the diaconship by the apostles *did not confer these miraculous powers* upon Stephen and Philip. They were, as we have seen, possessed before. Their previous possession was the very qualification by which the people were guided to vote for them. That supposition of Chrysostom, that, at any rate, they had not exercised them before, is untenable, because, when the question is of the possession of this kind of gift, it can only be known by its visible exercise. All that the apostles do, is to confer the diaconal office upon those whom the people select. And the exercise of supernatural powers is not among the duties of that office, which is expressly defined as "serving tables." Stephen and Philip, then, both wrought signs and preached, not in virtue of their diaconal ordination, but in virtue of their previous endowment with those *charismata*, at some time and by some means not recorded. And the Prelatists may not even surmise that unknown juncture to have been some previous "sacrament of orders;" because the diaconship was the lowest order then existing in the Church.

The next passage illustrating the subject is Acts viii. 15, etc. This proves two points. The twelve alone could confer the supernatural powers. Philip could exercise them in his own person, but he could not confer them. Notwithstanding his splendid success in winning souls and founding a church, it was necessary to send to Jerusalem, and secure the presence of two of the original twelve in person, to gain for any Samaritan the honor of this gift. So Simon Magus clearly perceives in the 18th verse. The other inference drawn from this instance, is that this gift was

distinct from that work of the Holy Ghost which makes men true Christians. These Samaritans had "received the word of God." They were "believers." They were full of spiritual joy. They were fit for adult baptism. Yet they still lacked this gift of the Holy Ghost. But the sinner who "receives the word," "believes," rejoices in Christ Jesus, already has the saving powers of the Spirit in him. And finally, when Simon Magus was detected as not a true believer, Peter does not recommend to him the attainment of this *charisma* as the remedy for his wretched case, but repentance and prayer.

The next instance requiring our attention is that of Saul of Tarsus, Acts ix. 17. He had been awakened partially, even in the midst of his controversial bitterness, by the powerful demonstrations of truth in the discourses of the martyr Stephen. He had been thoroughly convicted by the appearance of the Messiah on the way. The converting Spirit had employed the truth thus carried home to his mind, to bow him in sincere repentance. The renewal of his soul was unmistakably expressed in the words: "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" and in the prayer which now occupied his hours. It was after his effectual calling that the pious Ananias, probably one of the earliest evangelists among the disciples at Damascus, came to him by the special commission of God, "and putting his hands on him, said, Brother Saul," thus recognising by the fraternal title that he was already reconciled to Christ, "the Lord, even Jesus, that appeared unto thee in the way as thou camest, hath sent me, that thou mightest receive thy sight, and be filled with the Holy Ghost." The Lord distinctly informs Ananias, verse 15, why it was desirable that Saul should be filled with these powers: "for he is a chosen vessel unto me, to bear my name before the Gentiles and kings, and the children of Israel." In this arduous mission Paul would need the support of miraculous signs, if any man could. We pursue here the same line of argument, to prove that this endowment of the Spirit was not the converting and sanctifying, but the miracle-working influence. The former he had already: this alone was able to awaken him, to convict him, to convert the rebel into a submissive servant, to make him a child

of prayer, to make him a "brother" of the saints, to fit him for adult baptism. The ceremony used by Ananias points the same way—"putting on his hands." Thus far we have seen this form used but for two things: ordaining to office, and conferring the supernatural power of signs. But Ananias certainly did not ordain Paul to his office. (See Gal. i. 1.) The rite was therefore for the other purpose. For in what other possible sense could it be said, after Paul had received an unusually forcible and effectual renewal by the power of the Spirit, that Ananias must still be sent, in order to fill him with the Holy Ghost? Some probability is also found in the accompanying work, the opening of Saul's eyes. This was no doubt an extraordinary cure, wrought by God, through the good Ananias. It therefore concurs with the belief that the filling with the Spirit, which attended it, was also extraordinary.

The next case is even more plain. In Acts xix. 2, the apostle Paul for the first time came to Ephesus. That it was his first visit is plain from Acts xvi. 6; and it seems plain that none of the twelve had yet been there. But the eloquent Apollos, and the good Priscilla and Aquila, had been there, and their labors had resulted in the beginning of a church. The apostle Paul found this little band unadorned by any *charismata* of miracles. This led him to ask, "Have ye received the Holy Ghost since ye believed"? And they said unto him, "We have not so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost. And he said unto them, Unto what, then, were ye baptized? And they said, Unto John's baptism." Paul explained to them that John's, while an evangelical, was yet a preliminary and prospective baptism; and administered Christian baptism proper. "And when Paul had" (then) "laid his hands upon them, the Holy Ghost came upon them, and they spoke with tongues and prophesied:" verse 6.

It is absolutely impossible to explain this singular history in any other sense than the one we advocate. Shall we say that these twelve men were now ordained to be clergymen? This is preposterous. One does not see cases where *all* the males in a Christian community are ordained presbyters or "priests;" and that, the first day they received Christian baptism. Shall we say

that they now, for the first time, received the sanctifying and saving influences of the Holy Ghost? for, that the gift they now received was a novel one, is beyond all doubt. But these men were the pupils of the eloquent Apollos, who came from Alexandria, the focus of Hebrew learning, who was mighty in the Old Testament Scriptures, who had adopted the doctrines of John the Baptist, and recognised his mission as divine. Such a teacher had taught them "diligently;" and yet they were ignorant even of the work of the Holy Spirit in effectual calling and sanctification! Is the Old Testament, then, such a stranger to that great and blessed truth? This is absurd. When these men said, "We have not so much as heard whether there be any Holy Ghost," we must understand them as intending, We have not so much as heard anything of those *charismata* of miracles. You are the first apostle we have ever seen. We are a little band in the bosom of a great pagan city, one of the very centres of superstition. We have had no privileges of communion with other more favored Christians. The only knowledge of the new dispensation we have, is such as our revered teacher, Apollos, has been enabled to give us from the predictions and promises of his Old Testament Scriptures, and from what he was able to hear in Alexandria, of the great forerunner, John, and his preaching and baptism. Until recently, this pair of humble mechanics from Rome, told us a few things more. So that, so far from possessing any of these supernatural attestations, we never witnessed any of them; we know nothing of them. We only trust in God's written word, and endeavor to walk in the grace of his promises, while we wait for more light. This view of their meaning is confirmed, again, by their profession of John's baptism. This was a baptism unto true repentance. Is it not the doctrine of the Old Testament as much as the New, that only the Holy Ghost produces true repentance? They are recognised as disciples or professed believers. But it is equally the doctrine of both Testaments, that true faith is the implantation of the Holy Ghost. As soon as the apostle learned that they had only received John's baptism, the cause of their having no miraculous signs among them was clear to his mind. That peculiar gift of

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the Holy Spirit was *subsequent* to John's whole mission, as John himself knew. "There cometh one *after me*, who shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost and fire," saith he. But if it had been question of the illuminating and sanctifying influences of the Spirit, their lack of it would have found no explanation in their having received John's baptism; for those influences were implied in John's baptism, as they inspired his preaching. Those influences had been shed upon the saints of all ages, before John; from Enoch and Noah, through David, Isaiah, and Jeremiah, to the latest prophets. Preparation for John's baptism, then, should have made them acquainted with the ordinary saving work of God's Spirit. But when we apply the question of Paul to his supernatural influences in working "signs," we see that the nature of their baptism is the sufficient explanation of their answer; because the Church was not fully endowed in that way, until Christ's baptism was instituted.

Our view is confirmed, finally, by the result. After these men had received Christian baptism, Paul laid his hands upon them with the purpose of bestowing the gifts in question; and "they spake with tongues and prophesied." The narrative plainly implies that this was just what the apostle designed. He wished, it may be presumed, to strengthen the faith of the little band, struggling with all the might of Greek paganism, by these visible attestations. He was the first of the twelve who had visited Ephesus. He was about to publish his testimony as an eye-witness to his risen Lord. He was about to begin a series of labors in Ephesus, to be continued two years and three months. See 1 Cor. xvi. 9: "A great and effectual door was opened to him there; and there were many adversaries." It was every way desirable that the cause of truth should be armed with these incontestable signs, and that connected immediately with his person; so that in the coming debates with unbelief, every Christian might point to these miraculous energies, proceeding, notably, from Paul's person, and say: "There God sets to his seal, to the testimony of his servant."

In the Epistle to the Romans, written before Paul, and, as we believe, before any other apostle had ever visited the imperial

city, he begins by declaring his eagerness to see them in person. In chapter i. 11. he says : " For I long to see you, that I may impart unto you some spiritual gift, to the end ye may be established." It is every way probable that this spiritual gift was the power of miracles. One of the twelve only could impart it, by the laying on of hands. None of them had yet visited the infant church of Rome. Thus far, they had contended against Judaism and Paganism, only by the powers of argument and example. Could an apostle reach them and clothe even a few of their members with the miracle-working energies, not only would their faith in the testimony to the great Christian facts, which thus far they had reposed in witnesses far from them, unseen and unknown by face unto them, be greatly established, but the infant church would attract far more notice, and be a more powerful witness for Christ, in that grand centre of empire and population.

The next passage which seems clearly to treat of this subject is 1 Cor., chapters xii. to xiv. The discussion of the *χαρίσματα πνευματικά* here is so extended and explicit, that the necessity of comment is almost superseded. For the same reasons which we have just applied to Ephesus and Rome, the infant church in the important metropolis of Corinth had also been liberally supplied with supernatural endowments while Paul was with them. But he had learned (chap. i. 11) that in his absence they had been abused. Each possessor of a given *charisma*, fascinated by its splendor, and by the pleasure of exerting it, was exalting his particular power as the chief one, and depreciating those of his brethren. Hence the Church was threatened with parties and strifes. It is to meet this evil that the apostle enters into a detailed explanation of the nature and objects of these gifts. The main truths he inculcates are these : While there are diversities of gifts, the same Spirit gives them all. None is given for the aggrandisement of its subject ; but all for the good of the common body. Hence, all should be exercised in their respective places, harmoniously and concurrently, even as the several grades of the ministry should be. Of these supernatural gifts, tongues, though a more startling and splendid endowment, were less useful than prophecy, inasmuch as the former could but excite atten-

tion and convict the unsanctified reason. The most splendid of these supernatural gifts were inferior to the graces of true sanctification ; and indeed, without them, worthless to the possessor. It was entirely possible for an unrenewed soul, heir of perdition, to receive these miraculous endowments ; so that their enjoyment was no sufficient evidence of a state of salvation. And all of them were destined to vanish from the Church at no remote day, (their purpose having been attained,) leaving the graces of spiritual life and sanctification, "faith, hope, love," as inwrought by the Spirit, through the truth, to be thenceforward the only abiding gifts of the Holy Ghost to Christ's Church. Finally, the apostle's discussion implies, beyond all dispute, that the *charismata* of supernatural powers in that church, were the endowment not of their clergymen only, but also of the lay members. Thus we have in this important passage all the points confirmed, by which we separate these gifts from ordination and clerical qualifications.

The two parallel passages remain to be noticed in the Epistles to Timothy. In 1 Tim. iv. 14, the apostle enjoins on the young evangelist : "Neglect not the gift that is in thee, which was given thee by prophecy. with the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." In the 2d Ep., i. 6 : "Wherefore I put thee in remembrance, that thou stir up (kindle up) the gift of God, which is in thee by the putting on of my hands." Of these two texts, Rome, and her imitators among the Ritualists, endeavor to make pillars for their favorite doctrine of ordination-grace. Here, argue they, ordination certainly *confers* a grace of the Holy Spirit. For, say they, when we put the two texts together, we clearly learn, first, that it is Timothy's ordination which is here alluded to ; and it is as clearly said that it imparted a gift of God. One has even said that this imposition of the apostle's hands imparted all Timothy's qualifications for the work of the ministry.

One insuperable difficulty offers itself to the prelatie view at first sight. If the texts describe only an ordination to ministerial office, and refer to the same event, then it was a presbyterial ordination. It is as clear that the eldership laid on hands as that Paul did. And this is fatal to the prelatie scheme. The Anglican Church seeks to evade this difficulty, by allowing three

presbyters to join the bishop. as a kind of sub-assessors, in ordaining a "priest." If ordination is a sacrament, in which the apostle-bishop. and he alone, imparts the qualification for the priestly work, by infusing a *charisma* of miracle-working energies, then this usage is thoroughly inconsistent. If ordination is a joint, ruling act of presbyters, in which the diocesan acts as merely a presbyter-president among presbyters, then the usage is most consistent. But the prelatist theory is surrendered, and our debate at an end. But, to return. If the two verses do not describe the same act, then the proof that *ordination imparts gifts* of the Holy Ghost is gone. Such gifts were imparted to Timothy; but it may have been the other transaction which imparted them. Between the horns of this dilemma we hold the Prelatist inexorably. If nothing but ordination is here described, then it was Presbyterian ordination. If something else than ordination is described, then the spiritual gift may have been imparted by that something else.

The latter is evidently the correct alternative. Paul here stimulates the conscience of Timothy by recalling two transactions, which probably occurred at or near the same time. One was his ordination to office, which office he received at the hands of his brother presbyters. The other was his endowment with some supernatural gift to fit him further for the missionary work, which he received from the apostle's own hands. This gift he received *διὰ προφητείας*, through prophecy. Doubtless the explanation of this may be found in Acts xiii. 1, 2, where the Holy Ghost, moving in the hearts of the prophets and teachers at Antioch, as a spirit of prophecy, said, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them." In like manner, some prophet, either Paul himself, or possibly Silas, (see Acts xv. 32,) "who was a prophet also himself," and was with the apostle when Timothy was called to the missionary work, (Acts xv. 40,) received the prophetic injunction that the young disciple of Lystra should be ordained, and clothed also with the power of working signs. Of this transaction we have the history in Acts xvi. 2, 3: "Timothy was well reported of by the brethren that were at Lystra and Iconium. Him would Paul have to go forth with

him; and took and circumcised him, because of the Jews which were in those quarters: for they knew all that his father was a Greek," *i. e.*, a pagan. Henceforth we find Timothy accompanying Paul, Silas, and Luke, in the missionary work in "Phrygia, the region of Galatia," and Macedonia. Although the ordination and the imparting of the *charisma* are not mentioned in the two verses recited, we can scarcely doubt that it then took place. We read in Acts xiv. 23, that the churches of Derbe, Iconium, and Lystra, had been for some time furnished with ordained elders. We can hardly err in supposing that "the presbytery" which ordained Timothy an evangelist, was composed of presbyters from "Lystra and Iconium," with perhaps Silas and Paul himself (who could say with Peter, "which also am an elder,") as assessors.

Whether the imposition of Paul's hands *conferred* on Timothy his ministerial qualifications, as the Prelatists would have it, or whether his presbyterial ordination proceeded upon his previous possession of the natural and gracious qualifications, as we believe, may now be decided. The brief record in Acts, mentions as a ground of Timothy's selection as missionary-companion for Paul, that "he was well reported of by the brethren which were at Lystra and Iconium." Unless Luke intended us to understand that Timothy enjoyed a deserved reputation with them for qualities fitting him for this ministry, his statement seems aimless and unaccountable. Timothy was recognised as having these qualities before his ordination; and his appointment was grounded on this fact. Again, Paul, in 2 Tim. iii. 14-17, (compare, also, ch. i. 5,) evidently refers much of Timothy's ministerial qualification to the work of the pious Lois and Eunice, his grandmother and mother, and to the study of the Old Testament Scriptures. The apostle then proceeds to exalt the value and sufficiency of those inspired Scriptures, and declares that by their study alone, the man of God—the minister or herald of the gospel—"may be *perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works.*" We are not ignorant that some prelatie expositors would have us take the phrase, "man of God," in the sense of "believer," "servant of God," in order to obliterate this damaging argument. But we

can show that their rendering is wrong. Neither Paul, nor any other New Testament writer, employs this phrase at all, except in the two places in the Epistles to Timothy: the one under discussion, and 1 Tim. vi. 11. But it is a very common title in the Old Testament, and there it means some distinguished church officer, commissioned prophet, or theocratic king. Who can doubt that Paul had this usage in his eye when he called this pious and glorious evangelist "man of God?" Again, the apostle has his own phrases for denominating believers, which he uses so currently and accurately, that we are never in uncertainty about it in any other Epistles. The established phrases in Paul's mouth for a "believer," are, πιστός, πιστός ἄνθρωπος, ἀδελφός, or ἅγιος; never once ἄνθρωπος τοῦ Θεοῦ. What violence to the apostle's meaning, then, is committed, when this peculiar phrase is here reduced to the meaning of simple "believer"! Again, in 1 Tim. vi. 11, the apostle's scope shows very clearly that he designed by the phrase, "O man of God," to address Timothy as a church officer, for a particular purpose. In cautioning him against complicity with the corruptions prevailing among some church members at Ephesus, Paul aims to bring the considerations, drawn from a clerical appointment and profession, to bear upon his conscience. He intimates that, while avarice and its attendant evils are bad enough in a private Christian, they are far more heinous in a "man of God," an ordained leader and teacher of God's host, who ought to be an "ensample to the flock;" and that a blameless and zealous Christian warfare is more obligatory on him than on others, as a clergyman. The "man of God," then, in 2 Tim. iii. 17, is a preacher of the gospel; we are willing to say, an evangelist. But if Prelatists will have it that Timothy was a diocesan bishop, so much the worse for them; for the apostle here declares that the inspired Scriptures are able to make such a preacher "qualified and thoroughly equipped" (ἀρτιος καὶ ἐξηρτισμένος) "unto ALL good works" incumbent on his office, without any ordination graces imparted from a prelate's hands. Of course the apostle here has in view the ordinary duties of the minister's office, in the stated condition of the Church—not the extraordinary energies of the miracle-worker, in the ages of inspiration; for these

he had found it desirable to convey to Timothy by the putting on of his hands, after all the latter's scriptural and gracious qualifications had been acquired. If they insist on making Timothy a diocesan bishop, then they only get the damaging declaration, that even the prelate gets all needful qualification for all *his* work, without any "holy orders," by the faithful, believing study of the Scriptures!

After this simple and obvious review of the history of Timothy's case, the meaning of the apostle in the two verses referring to his ordination is easy. Timothy had been inducted into the ministerial office by the laying on of the hands of a presbytery; which transaction proceeded on their knowledge of his ministerial qualifications, previously possessed. But in connexion with that act, the apostle had also, by the imposition of his own hands, imparted to him some *charisma*, (most probably of prophesying.) which an apostle alone could give, and which was given on suitable occasions to laymen, women, ministers, or even to children; because Timothy would be thereby better fitted for convincing sceptical pagans, among whom he was to labor. It is worthy of notice, that when Paul, 1 Tim. iv. 14, mentions the imposition of the hands of the presbytery in connexion with this *charisma* to Timothy, he does not attribute to them any *agency* in it, but only an accompanying presence. It is μετὰ ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν τοῦ πρεσβυτερίου; but in 2 Tim. i. 6, it is διὰ τῆς ἐπιθέσεως τῶν χειρῶν μου. In the latter place, the apostle omits all reference to Timothy's presbyterial ordination; and speaking of his *charisma* of inspiration, assumes to himself all the human agency in conferring it.

We have thus gone over all the clear instances of these *charismata* in the New Testament history. The result has been a complete discrimination between them and the power of the Holy Spirit in effectual calling and sanctification on the one hand, and ordination on the other hand. These gifts were not the former; because a man might have them in eminent degree, and yet be so utterly devoid of grace as to be "as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal," because they were in many cases yet to be enjoyed, or even heard of, by true believers already effectually called and sanc-

tified. These gifts were not ordination, because we have seen them fall on laymen, women, and children, as well as unrenewed men ; because a presbytery can ordain, according to Scripture, while only an apostle could bestow these powers ; and as soon as the original twelve were gone, the influence died out of the world, with the next generation, despite the passionate longing of misguided Christians to display them still. The irresistible conclusion is, that they were peculiar powers of exhibiting miraculous "signs," temporarily given to some professed Christians, for the sole purpose of supporting and reinforcing the testimony of the twelve to the cardinal Christian facts, by divine attestation, until their witnessing work was completed.

This conclusion is exceedingly profitable and instructive in many directions. It teaches us, first, that the sight of a physical work of supernatural power, however stupendous, is not the immediate instrument of true conversion. Men are truly born again only by the instrumentality of the Word. 1 Peter i. 23. We expose here a superstition very current among the ignorant. Thus, the nominal Christian negroes, and many ignorant white Christians, believe that Saul of Tarsus was converted by *the vision* on the road to Damascus ; whereas, he was converted by gospel truth, and the vision had no nearer connexion with the saving work than to establish intellectual conviction of the truth. Had not the Holy Spirit applied that gospel to his soul, in the rational, enlightening, renewing work of effectual calling, Saul's godless heart would never have been made one whit better by all the terrors of ten thousand visions and voices, or of the rising dead and opening hell. This is obvious enough to the intelligent reader. But it is instructive to note the close affinity between this Bœotian superstition and the theory of your Ritualist, who considers his company the aristocracy of the religious world. He also expects men to be renewed by a *charisma* of power, instead of a work of rational illumination through the truth. He makes the same confusion between the physical *δύναμις* and saving grace. Whereas, the apostle teaches us that all the former does is to make way for the saving truth, by attracting the attention and convincing the understanding. "Wherefore tongues are for a

sign, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not." Here again, the self-destructive inconsistency of the prelatic system is displayed. They say that their canonical sacraments impart a *charisma* of saving grace; such a one, viz., as the "priest" receives from the laying on of the apostles' hands. But Paul says, the utility of such *charismata* is only for the unconverted.

Second: The discussion is valuable, to refute a cardinal error of the sect of Alexander Campbell. This heresiarch taught, in the interests of his thoroughly Pelagian scheme, that no agency of the Holy Ghost whatever is concerned in the sinner's believing and conversion. But the Scriptures assert so clearly that there is an office-work of the Spirit, that he dared not wholly deny it. Hence, his expedient is to say that this work begins after, and only after, baptism and conversion. Now, the texts he quotes are precisely such as we have explained. But when we show that the spiritual gifts which were once the occasional sequel of conversion and baptism, were temporary *charismata* of miracles, his whole argument explodes.

It remains to add the general arguments, establishing the other branch of the conclusion, that these *charismata* are entirely distinct from ordination. The sacramentarian theory is, that they are *conferred* in the ordaining act, when the bishop (apostle) lays on his hands. The Protestant and Bible theory is, that ordination, which is a presbyterial, and not a ghostly act, only *recognises* ministerial qualification, inwrought by Christ's Spirit, and confers nothing but office-title. Now, we demonstrate our theory by these two arguments: *First*. The Holy Spirit, legislating by Paul for the ordinary and stated times of the Church, has expressly given two lists of the qualifications requisite for all orders of clergy—bishops or pastors, "elders that rule well," and deacons—in 1 Tim. iii., and in Titus, i. So, in Acts 20th, he has given to the bishops of Ephesus a detailed injunction as to their official duties. So, Christ has left, in the "letters to the seven churches," a number of items of duty and qualification enjoined on their "angels." *But in none of these is any power of working "signs" or power of sacramental grace required of them.* We hear of sincere piety, gravity and virtue in example, fidelity

if oversight, and aptness to teach, or didactic ability; but we hear not a word of any gift of *charismata* derived or transmitted through apostolic hands.

The *second* argument, is that all the clergymen of the primitive Church were undoubtedly chosen by election of the brethren. The apostles fixed this precedent, even for deacons, in the very outset, in Acts vi. The usage of electing all presbyters and bishops prevailed, and the right was claimed by the brotherhood universally, in the ages next the apostles; and every one well-informed in church-history knows through what a long train of usurpations and resistances the usage which now prevails in prelatic churches was finally reached. Now, it was to guide the brotherhood in bestowing their votes, that the apostle describes the qualifications requisite in a bishop, elder, or deacon, so accurately and completely. But these qualifications must be pre-existent, in order to justify the casting of the votes to their possessor. Hence, indisputably, they are not *conferred* by the ordaining rite, which follows and is predicated on the election. Some attempt to evade this, by pleading that these lists of qualification, given us in the Pastoral Epistles, do not contain all the endowments and qualities of the acting clergyman, but only those which constitute a suitable state of reciprocity for the gifts to be bestowed in "holy orders" by the bishop's hands. This evasion will not answer. The apostle, in giving the list of qualifications, says expressly: "*A bishop* then must be blameless"—not "*a candidate for the bishopric.*" He thus shows that these are the qualifications and gifts the man will exercise after his ordination, in his actual ministry. And again, in all the descriptions and inculcations of the episcopal, or pastoral work, relating to the stated condition of the Church and her ministers, there is no whisper of any possession or exercise of any other endowments by ordained men.

We have now gone over the whole teachings of the New Testament on this question of the minister's endowments. We have drawn a clear line of demarkation between those gifts or powers of the Holy Ghost, which enabled some men in the Apostolic Church to work miraculous signs, and the ministerial gifts and

powers of the scriptural clergyman. Removing the prelatie mistakes and errors touching the former, we have not left one line or word of Scripture to support the theory of tactual succession and sacramental grace. It stands a mere dream-castle, with no basis, except the corruptions of the uninspired and decadent ages of Christendom, the strength of blind and erroneous prescription, and the superabounding assertions of its advocates.

The writer experienced for some time, a certain difficulty in realising to himself the full destructiveness to prelacy of the line of criticism along which he has now attempted to lead the reader. It is to be expected that the latter also will feel something of the same difficulty. This will be, not because the criticism is, in any point, inconclusive; but because it will appear almost incredible that a great and permanent party in Christendom, and especially that a party in a certain sense evangelical, like the High Church Episcopal, should really hold a theory which is obnoxious to so easy a refutation, and which is, to the thoroughly Protestant mind, so intrinsically absurd. Another, and a more seemly-looking cause of the same difficulty, is in the pious confusions which so-called Protestant prelatists have introduced into the subject. No better example of this need be sought, than parts of the Anglican liturgy: the wretched patchwork of churchmen overruled by the most deceitful, unscrupulous and truth-hating politician who ever sat upon the throne of England, acting from motives always purely secular, and often wicked. The doctrine of the Anglican forms (not the Articles) touching "holy orders," is a medley of inconsistencies. Ordination is not a "sacrament," as Rome holds; and yet, as Rome holds, it confers an invisible grace by a visible sign—which is the very essence of a sacrament. The bishop is authorised to say to the "priest" on whom he lays his hands, "Receive thou the Holy Ghost," etc.; and yet, the bishop has a little before required the candidate to profess that he has already experienced the powers of that Spirit, qualifying him for, and moving him unto, the office. The ritual professes to arm the priest with ghostly power to regenerate the infant in baptism; and tells him and the parents, in the most solemn form of prayer to God, that He "hath regenerated *this infant* with thy

Holy Spirit." But as soon as he has come to years of understanding, this same "priest," now a pastor, is sent forth to preach to him, as a sinner, dead in trespasses and sins, the excellent doctrines of the "Articles and Homilies"; exhorting him to receive the application of redemption through that effectual calling whose theory is utterly incompatible with that of sacramental grace.

Protestant prelatists, again, obscure the real nature of their theory of sacramental grace, by seeming to concede that the age of miracles is past; and that they claim for their "priests," on whom the bishop has conferred the grace of holy orders, no gift of tongues, or healing, or casting out dæmons. But they do claim for him a gift of conferring sacramental graces; which is another thing than that ministerial instrumentality, which the Protestant pastor claims to exert, in inculcating the truths which the Holy Ghost uses as his rational means for working grace. We ask the prelatist: Is this all you claim to do for souls? Do you, in this thing, put yourself into our class? He stoutly refuses; and he asserts that he can communicate a something which we cannot, who do not boast his tactual succession from the apostles—namely, sacramental grace. But the Scriptures discriminate the efficacious influences of the Holy Ghost into only two classes: his sanctifying influences through the truth; and his direct, supernatural, physical *δυνάμεις*, through a miracle-worker. If sacramental grace is not the one, it must be the other. Besides, if their sacramental grace is apprehensible at all, it can only be apprehended as the sort of thing which the *χάρισμα* was—a power exerted *ex opere operato*, and not only through the rational means of truth understood and embraced. There is a more crucial question: Why this rigid, inexorable requirement of a tactual succession? Why will not a correct doctrinal succession from the apostles, like that claimed by Irenæus, answer the pastor's purpose? The true answer is, that this power of working sacramental grace claims to be the *χάρισμα* of miracles—the thing, and the only thing, which, in the New Testament, could be received only from the laying on of the apostles' hands. Finally, we have seen the *genesis* of the theory in the

doctrine of Rome, which is avowedly and explicitly built upon her claim of possessing the same miraculous *χαρίσματα*, and all of them, which the apostles wielded. The daughter is of the same species with the mother. We have also quoted some of the more perspicacious and candid prelatists, as Hammond, expressly avowing the mistaken claim and basing it upon the Roman position.

It is true, that the Protestant and prelatie conceptions of the application of redemption are incompatible. The one excludes the other. The ultramontane Papist is the only consistent asserter of sacramental grace. And this is the explanation of the characteristics of the Protestant-prelatie logic, with its sophisms, pious confusions, and *non-sequiturs*. Those men cannot be expected to build better, who condemn themselves to the task of combining the clay with the iron, the gold, and the brass.



ARTICLE II.

THE TITHE LAW.

As a starting point to the discussion of one of the most interesting questions of the present day, to wit, how may the pecuniary resources of the Church be drawn into action, the tithe law serves a good purpose. As a positive law, its reaction on the popular thinking of the day is to correct the erroneous conclusion that gospel liberty is the balance between action and non-action; between compliance and refusing to perform Christian duty. For true Christian liberty has no negative pole. It is essentially positive, and consists in our introduction into a region of motives which impel to action and create liberty.

As a dogma, it will help us to form a just estimate of the comparative excellence of those great heart-forces which it is the prime object of gospel truth to cultivate and employ, and which it takes care not to wrap up in any fixed formularies.

Incidentally, it has the additional value of promoting the discussion of a question which has never yet been definitely an-

swered, and that probably never will be definitely answered, to wit: What are the relations of the new to the old dispensation? Not what is the relation of the principles and doctrines involved in the new and old respectively, since in its matter God's revelation is unchangeable. But how far the Jewish Institute, considered as a formal polity, may be regarded as in a fossil state, and, as such, an adaptation of our religion to a particular civilisation in a previous age and to a previous stage of thought; how far it has yielded, if it has yielded at all, any of its "patterns" to that living Institute which forms the Church of the present; how far the old was provisional, and embodied within its forms of typical and symbolic teaching its own statute of limitation, in virtue of which it required no repeal further than the expiration of its appointed time; how much of it is to be considered an ecclesiastical archæology on which, as on a background, was projected the great redemptive scheme which was meant for future ages; from what materials was this ecclesiastical structure compacted—from actually existing usage, from actually existing but previously and supernaturally furnished forms, or, from forms providentially rendered sacred and popular and afterwards by direct command appropriated; by what processes of decay or obsolescence these forms fell into disuse and the Institute itself "went the way of all the earth." Some, if not all, of these questions must be better understood than they are at present, before the proposition that the tithe law is still of force can be made good. It is proposed to exhibit some of the difficulties of this proposition.

1. It seems to have been a general principle governing the transfer of the great religion from the old to the new dispensation, that none of the "forms" of the old should be retained in the new without bearing upon it some mark of the transition. Those which were typical in their character, and carried in them their own statute of limitation, were completely changed or dropped. Those which belonged to the ritual or moral-positive classes, were modified either as to their form or their significance. Thus, sprinkling has been retained, yet it has been made under the new regimen a *successor* to another rite, which as a mode has

been completely merged and lost in its great substantive doctrine—the circumcision of the heart. Sprinkling has *changed its position* not merely, but it is covered by a term, which, according to circumstances, admits a variety of significations. That term is baptism. And so slight was the interest felt in the retention of it seemingly, that it was left to the good sense of the Church to select for itself among the modes embraced under that general term. So stern was this law of change that even the Sabbath which had borrowed nothing from the Jewish Institute, was changed from the seventh to the first of the hebdomadal series, that it might cover a new meaning yet retain the old. Under the shadow of an ecclesiastical revolution so complete, so thorough, it would be necessary that the tithe law should have undergone some modification of its form or significance. As from the very nature of its positive side, it must be identical in the new and old dispensation, it would be scarcely possible that in the incipency of the New Testament Church, in the midst of her pecuniary difficulties, in gathering her congregations and extending her missionary operations, no notice should have been taken of this law, and no evidence that the apostles availed themselves of it. When it is mentioned, it is mentioned by Christ in connexions which do not honor it. It was part of the hypocritical righteousness of a Pharisee: “I pay tithes of all that I possess.” It is mentioned by Paul in connexion with the history of Melchisedec, but it is no more his intention to commend it to us, than it was to commend the double office of that person. The very strongest case in the New Testament is an *allusion* to it in these words: “Even so hath the Lord ordained,” etc.—language which implies unmistakably a comparison of cases which of necessity involves a difference; and yet if there is any difference in it under the new and old dispensations, the argument for the tenth must change its course. The only modification which the argument for it has hitherto advanced is, that it is to be regarded as a “minimum” standard of our offerings. But after the Master has exacted a definite proportion as his, we still hold the remainder, in virtue of our stewardship, subject to his order, and it would be presumptuous to change the ratio of the two properties,

or to speak of the Lord's legislation on a Christian duty as the lowest standard of our obedience. The effect of such an interpretation of his word would be, to lower our estimate of Christian obligation. On the contrary, the teaching of the New Testament raises our duty to a "maximum" standard. God does not consult our weakness but our strength, because his aim is to raise our energy and devotion to their highest development. We are never instructed to give the least but the very highest proportion we can spare. The language of the New Testament looks to nothing short of perfection as the goal of all the virtues. The soldier, the statesman, the scholar, the Christian, is best educated, best developed, by having his aspirations stretched to the highest effort of which they are capable. "Strive to enter in," appeals to our highest manliness and devotion. "Pray without ceasing," looks not back to the "minimum" amount of prayer which may be consistent with mere religious vitality, but to our highest earnestness and effort for the triumphs of the gospel. And when we are incited to liberality, it is to "abound" in this as in every other Christian virtue.

If it is contrary to the nature of New Testament instructions to make the law in question a "minimum," it is equally so to make it any other standard short of throwing in "all the living" that we have. The New Testament does not recognise any fixed law which may put a bound to Christian sacrifice. It would doubtless be proper to propose to Christian people that none drop lower than a tenth in their offerings, and that all endeavor to reach a higher standard. But, in such a proposition, a tenth is not propounded as a law, much less a fixed law, but a starting point for a standard continually moving upward. It is not really possible to put any limit to the expanding quality of Christian liberality without stopping its life. It knows no law but the law of growth. Man was not made for law, but law for man. Its object is to facilitate, not to cumber his action.

There was no inherent propagandism in the Jewish Church : none on the face of her charter. But it is the prime and prominent feature of Christianity, that it aims to convert the world to its doctrine. It is its explicit commission. To have fixed a

limit of expense and of effort to a Church which had no territory to win outside of her own nationality, was a fitness. We cannot tell what more Jehovah intended. But to prescribe a law to the growing strength and expanding conquests of a Church whose mission it is to conquer the world, were to tantalize and torture the bounding ambitions of the soldiers of the cross. It would append a codicil which would annul our charter.

We are told that when the tithe was in operation, Jewish liberality sometimes bounded over its law, and the people brought their contributions so freely that it was necessary to restrain their giving. But it was in spite and not in virtue of the habitual effect of this law. No law creates or restrains national and religious enthusiasm.

2. The tithe law is a moral-positive statute. It enjoins liberality and enjoins an arithmetical rule for it. As a moral law, it is forever in force; as a positive statute, it shares the lot of all positive statutes, which, as having a special and not a universal quality, exist so long as the reasons exist for which they were instituted. To be generous to mankind is our duty; to be generous to the extent of an eighth or tenth, is our duty labelled with a positive quality. These two ideas are perfectly distinct—the moral duty, and the special form in which that duty is put. And yet, in the argument for the tithe, it is pleaded as a moral law, but applied as a positive statute. It is insisted that it is in virtue of its moral quality that it descends to us, and yet it is in virtue of its positive quality that it is pressed upon us. It passes the ordeal of the great revolution as an honorary member of the Decalogue without being questioned as to its right of passage, and then assumes its place in a dress in which it was not admitted. To its moral element no one objects; it is not as such, therefore, that it should be pleaded to have descended from the one dispensation to the other. Its moral nature cannot bring over its ancient arithmetic with it; since the very condition of a true passport is that we leave our luggage behind. It is like the last passage—death. Even a law so venerable as the Sabbath, which is more than an honorary member of the Decalogue, because it had a positive quality about it, doffed its ancient dress, and put

on a new attire for the new age. It was changed from the seventh to the first of the hebdomadal series of days. It might, indeed, be said, that even the arithmetical quality of this law had a moral quality in it, as being a convenient and righteous proportion around which the charities of the people were to circulate. We do indeed think that the number ten had a representative and even a typical quality to set before the Jew the idea of a perfect beneficence. But then it is this very view of it, to wit, its being representative and typical, which necessarily limits its arithmetical existence, and consigns it as a positive statute to a fossiliferous stratum in the past. And more: as all the moral precepts of the New Testament, and liberality among them, polarise to no inferior centre, but to perfection as their final maximum, the tenth is never there indicated as the representative of that maximum. What remains to be shown, therefore, is, not that the tithe law is a moral thing, but that in the new dispensation of religion, which is everywhere represented as an emancipation of religious truth from its former confinement, God has been pleased to make an exception of our liberality, and to hedge it around with a positive arithmetical quality. If such exception is made, the order must be explicit to save us from the error of supposing, that, while other forms of positive enactment have either expired with the Institute, of which they formed a part or found substitutes, this one also shares their fate. For this has been practically the judgment of the Christian Church from apostolic times down to the present.

The law in question is opposed in spirit and operation to the design of New Testament teaching, which aims not to break down our reluctance, but to raise our liberality. The law of the tenth appeals, on the other hand, not to our giving faculty, but to our sense of justice. The "tithe is the Lord's." "It is robbery to withhold it." Which is indeed true and proper to be said under the new dispensation, if we wish to carry the consent of men by storm. But if we wish to train up a generation of "cheerful givers," and thus also eventually the most liberal givers, we must send home our appeals, not so much to our people's reverence for law, as to their emulation of highest examples. This is the

method of the New Testament: "Give to him that asketh;" in which the appeal is to our generosity, rather than our sense of justice. This, truly, is a holy motive. But why should it be first or alone? The gift of the Macedonians is called a "*liberality*," which it would scarcely have been styled if they were raising supplies for the Church, under the operations of a positive assessment. And in presenting this case to the Corinthians, to stimulate *their* liberality, Paul makes his appeal in delicate terms to their self-respect: "As ye abound in everything, in faith, in utterance, in love of me, see that ye abound in *this* grace also." And to show that he would not have them give under any extraneous pressure, he adds: "I speak not this by commandment;" and then cites the greatest motive and holiest example: "For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ," etc.; that as Jesus was under no compulsory commandment when he exchanged riches for poverty, we might be stimulated to a like noble generosity. It is noticeable that it was to this very people, to whom he addresses motives of a free and generous liberality, that he said: "Even so hath the Lord ordained," etc. If he was here speaking of the law of the tenth, he was more delicate than usual in pressing a commandment of God; he was more tender of Corinthian sensibilities than of the Lord's rights. It would seem to have been also a questionable generosity on his part, to have intermitted his great work, perhaps for months, and "wrought with his own hands," that he "might not be chargeable" to any, when there was an unrepealed law of God for the support of the ministry, and for the very purpose of carrying on the great work without remission.

And as it is the design of New Testament teaching to raise our liberality rather than break down our reluctance, let us inquire *how* it proposes to raise Christian liberality. The great Householder plants a vineyard, and hedges it round about, digs a wine-fat, builds a tower, and lets it out to husbandmen, and takes his journey into a far country. It was on every account necessary that the Householder should retire, because his object was to elicit the wisdom, fidelity, and perseverance of the husbandmen themselves, as well as the direct profits of the vineyard.

But even here the cup is too small for the abundance of truth which it in part holds up to us. The gospel vineyard is not only a Church, to be trained and educated: it is also a ministry, whose tact, wisdom, and fidelity are to be educated in the process of educating the Church. The Master retires, because more help than general instructions would be injurious. He throws the husbandmen upon their own resources, and commits their success to their own thrift in the application of the general laws of culture. If he had given them the influence of a positive command from the Master, to use in pressing on the laborers, he would so far have defeated the very object which he had in view in intrusting the vineyard to them. Their own wisdom and effort were of utmost value to them. The means are sometimes as valuable as the end. It is the purpose of the great Lord of the Church to give as little help as is consistent with its growth and development. If the gospel minister had the clear and unmistakable authority of God for calling upon the Church for a tenth, it would clear the field at once of half the work which he is appointed to do in educating the liberality of the people. And while this toilsome work of training the Church is of value to the gospel minister himself, it is no less necessary to the Church that it be trained not by tightening upon it the authority of law, or by overleaping intermediate steps in the process of improvement, and catching conclusions which the mind of the Church is not prepared to understand, but by earnest and patient labor to bring her into sympathy with the great object which she is to accomplish. No church can give faster than it has learned to be in sympathy with the cause of Christ; and happy is he who shall not be offended with Christ's toilsome life, and the slow development of his kingdom. The triumph of to-day is worth as much as the triumph of to-morrow. In our eagerness to grasp the victories of the future, we forget the spiritual conflict of the present, and in our almost unconquerable disinclination to effort and self-denial, we seek the easier and the shorter route.

God loves natural law, and hath subjected the kingdom of heaven to it. It is impossible to divert the channels of wealth, or to tap them so as to cause even rills to flow from them into the

Church, without interesting the hearts of men in the great work in which the Church is employed. A tithe law proclaimed, demonstrated, and pleaded with superhuman eloquence, would prove as ineffectual to reach the sources of human beneficence as delicate hints. To appeal to the voluntary beneficence of our people, as the Church ever has done, and as our General Assembly continues to do, without attempting to say to them what proportion of their income they ought to give, is the gospel method of raising supplies for all its wants. All it lacks of apostolic example is the fervid zeal and indomitable energy wherewith they prosecuted the work.

The attempt to resuscitate the old law of the tenth is a retrograde movement. It is to fasten upon the Church of the present, a law which was a special adaptation to a past civilisation and a past stage of thought. It is an anachronism. History has already demonstrated that it was "weak through the flesh;" and when revived again in a corrupt age of the Church, it served only to aggrandise ecclesiastical power, and to vex God's people with an unrighteous domination.

ARTICLE III.

INTERPRETATION OF HEBREWS IX. 16, 17.

16. Ὅπου γὰρ διαθήκη, θάνατον ἀνάγκη φέρεσθαι τοῦ διαθεύενου.

17. Διαθήκη γὰρ ἐπὶ νεκροῖς βεβαία, ἐπεὶ μήποτε ἰσχύει ὅτε ζῆ ὁ διαθέμενος.

Our English version of these words is, "For where a testament [is], there must also of necessity be the death of the testator. For a testament [is] of force after men are dead; otherwise it is of no strength at all while the testator liveth."

The Syriac version, as given by Murdoch, rather freely, is: "For where there is a testament, it indicateth the death of him who made it; for it is valid only of a deceased person, for it hath no use so long as the maker of it liveth."

The Vulgate version is: "For where there is a testament, it is necessary that the death of the testator follow; for a testament is valid after death, since it does not avail while the testator liveth."

The Rhemish New Testament renders the passage more freely: "For where there is a testament, the death of the testator must of necessity come in. For a testament is of force after men are dead; otherwise it is as yet of no strength, while the testator liveth."

It is very evident that all these versions represent the purport of the passage to be the statement of a general principle, respecting a last *will* or *testament*. Such appears to be the view of the great bulk of our standard interpreters. Some, however, of much reputation, as Doddridge, Whitby, McKnight, and others, dissent.

I. The correctness or incorrectness of the principle, as thus presented, is a question of some, though not material, moment. Specially, it may be questioned whether these versions do not involve a proposition not fully sustained by fact, and this in two particulars. First, they represent the *death* of the testator rather as a cause than a mere *occasion* of the efficiency of the will. That efficiency is due to the purpose of the testator, the execution of which, it is true, is suspended on his death. But that death is not a *cause*. On the one hand, the *existence* of a will does not *necessitate* the testator's death; and on the other, the *existence* of a will does not *depend* on the testator's death. Second, the translation of *μηποτε ισχυει* by "it is of no strength at all," (conceding the correctness of the version,) is hardly an accurate statement of the fact respecting wills. The will, indeed, may have no validity in the way of conferring legal claims on legatees, or depriving expecting heirs of their supposed rights, till it has been admitted to probate. But this is solely due to the fact that the testator has chosen to suspend the execution of his purpose, to give certain property to certain persons, and not to give certain property to others on the closing of his life by death. It is obvious that he might, as some have done, give efficacy to his will or purpose by anticipating its execution during his life. But the proposed interpretation connects the will and the death

as both essential to the efficacy of the will. Further, it is notorious that every will, the contents of which happen to transpire, or are divulged by the testator, has *strength of some sort*, by giving grounds for well-founded expectations and hopes. True, there may be disappointments. So there may be as to the execution of the will when admitted *to probate*; because the testator may have made mistakes in his estimates of the value of his property, or the amount of his debts. But after all, expectations and hopes will exist, and thus show that the will has some "*strength*"; and so, to say "it is of no strength at all," raises a doubt as to accepting the proposed sense of *διαθήκη*. These expectations will have a strength derived from an existing will, as supposed, proportioned to the probabilities of a change in the testator's purpose, or to the relations of heirs, or to both, and will be stronger or weaker. Still they show the will may have some strength "while the testator liveth."

II. There are further grounds for exception to the interpretation given by the versions. (1.) It is very doubtful whether *φέρεισθαι* will bear the translation, "be," or "must be," of the English, or "indicateth," of the Syriac version, if "testament" be adopted for *διαθήκη*. The marginal reading, "brought," is, by some, accepted as a legal term to denote the *formal* proof of death, to give efficacy to the will. This would be all well enough, if satisfactory evidence could be found, otherwise, to establish the peculiar meaning of *διαθήκη* proposed. But it is not to be accepted as a reason for that meaning; for while *φέρεισθαι* is capable of a *passive* acceptance, and *may* be rendered "to be brought," the sense thus derived involves some futurity as to time, and the future form of the verb would be expected. Even by some, as Bloomfield, who hold the views of the versions above given, this sense is rejected as harsh. By accepting *φέρεισθαι* as a present Infinitive *middle*, a good sense is given: "Where there is a *διαθήκη*, it is necessary that [it] bring [with it] the death, etc.;" or making *θάνατον* the subject, as the Rhemish version renders, "the death of the [*διαθεμένον*] must come in." This subject will be resumed below. Meanwhile, the purport of the foregoing is

merely to raise a doubt of the interpretation favored by the versions.

(2.) Admitting that the preposition *ἐπί* may mean "after," in a temporal sense, as derivative from its more generic idea of addition, it is questionable whether, in the phrase, *ἐπὶ νεκροῖς*, such a meaning is so clear as to justify the paraphrase, "after men are dead." It is very evident, in this case, the paraphrase is mainly due to the previous using of "testament" for *διαθήκη*. The usage above noticed is confined, so far as authorities examined justify an opinion, to the statements of successive events, a construction which allows the general idea of superposition. Its derived sense, "on account of," is more usual with the dative. If *διὰ τῆς διαθήκης* be accepted in its usual sense, the meaning, "by reason of," or "by means of," would be more consonant. In these remarks, no reference is had to the application of *νεκροῖς*, of which more below.

(3.) The doubts thus raised are increased by considering the use of "testament" in verse 15th, and understanding it, as a necessary consequence, in verse 18, and also by examining the context preceding and succeeding verses 16, 17, and the intimate relations of these verses to these connected passages.

In verse 15, Paul says, "For this cause, he is mediator of *καίνης διαθήκης*." The versions say, "new testament." But where do we ever read of a mediator of a testament or will? It may be replied, the language uses mediator in sense of executor or administrator. Grant this, and carry this sense of *διαθήκη* to verse 16, and then if Christ is executor, God the Father is testator, and the testator *dies*! Again, if mediator of a testament in the sense supposed, then he is executor of a *new* testament: and as we have, in verse 18, to supply "testament" after "*first*" we represent two wills, both valid and both executed, both "sanctioned," "instituted," "dedicated," or "consecrated" (*ἐγκειμέναι*).

In verse 9th, the apostle begins a contrast of the efficacy of the Mosaic ritualistic sacrifices and the work of our great High Priest. Whatever else the sacrifices of the Old Testament dispensation effected, he avers, very distinctly, that "they could not make him who did the service perfect, as pertaining to the con-

science." But verses 11, 12, "Christ being come, an High Priest of good things. . . by his own blood. . . entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us;" and verses 13, 14, recognising the efficiency of the blood of bulls and of goats, etc., to sanctifying, "to the purifying of the flesh," *i. e.*, to relieve men from the defilement and condemnation of sins against the ritual law, he adds, as an argument from the less to the greater, "how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through the Eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God. *purge your conscience* from dead works to serve the living God." Then, in verse 15th, he explains in what office or relation to God and man Christ effects this as a "mediator of the new διαθήκη," and in this office, "by death." So he is not, and cannot be, "mediator," in the sense of executor or administrator of a will; but only as victim in the sacrifice which he offers: for it is "his own blood" he presents before God, and it is by his "death" he procures eternal redemption; or, as verse 15 explains, "that by means of death, for the redemption of transgressions under the first διαθήκη, they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance." It is unnecessary to discuss, specially, a question agitated among interpreters, whether by "transgressions under the first διαθήκη," we are to be restricted to those of the ante-Christian era, who had been saved by faith in a Mediator to come, whose work was typified under the services of the Mosaic law, or that we are to receive the words, "under the first," etc., as qualifying "transgressions," whenever and by whomsoever committed. The latter seems best. The sentiment is that of Paul, Rom. iii. 20: "By the law is the knowledge of sin;" iv. 15: "Where no law is, *there is* no transgression;" and especially Gal. iii. 19: "The law was added, because of transgression," etc. See, also, Rom. vii. 8, 9. The contrast is certainly more steadily carried on by this latter view. Ritual services might avail to "purifying the flesh," but "transgressions under the first διαθήκη," (see Rom. ix. 4, of whom are the διαθήκαι, both that given to Abraham and that to Moses, and Gal. iv. 24, "which," *i. e.*, Hagar and Sarah, "are two διαθήκαι"—that represented by Hagar the law, the other the gospel, preached before to

Abraham, Gal. iii. 8; see, also, Heb. viii. 9, and ix. 20;) *i. e.*, under the law. could only be pardoned and transgressors have their consciences purged, and so be redeemed by "the death and the blood" of Christ, and so receive "the promise of eternal inheritance." This view covers the cases of Old Testament saints, who "saw Christ's day" through the types and shadows of the Mosaic institutions.

Passing over verses 16 and 17, except to note the *γάρ* introducing verse 16, and pretermittting, for the present, the close logical *nexus* by which these verses stand connected with the foregoing context, let us now examine verses 18–22. Here the introducing particle is *ὅθεν*, verse 18. On its force as such a connective, verse 23 may be quoted, which is a summary of the relation subsisting between verses 14, 15, (with the statements of verses 16, 17.) and verses 18–22. Verse 23: "[It was] therefore necessary that the patterns of things in the heavens should be purified with these;" *i. e.*, the services used in dedicating the first *διαθήκη*: "but the heavenly things themselves, with better sacrifices than these." Now let us look at the teaching of the context, subsequent to our passage: *ὅθεν*, "whence," *i. e.*, as illative from the language of verses 16, 17, "neither the first [*διαθήκη*] was [purified] dedicated without blood." Paul precedes the statement of the mode of such dedication by a historical record, evidently supplementing, on adequate authority, the words of Ex. xxiv. 8: "Moses took the blood" of the sacrifices mentioned in verse 5, "and sprinkled on the people, and said, Behold the blood of the *διαθήκη*, which the Lord hath made with you concerning all these words." From verse 6, it seems Moses had used "half the blood" in sprinkling the altar. Paul tells us "the blood of goats and calves" was used, adding "goats," as the "calves" are represented in Ex. xxiv. 5 by "oxen," little *bullocks*, calves a year old. He also, to the blood used, adds "water," and besides the "people" and the "altar" named by Moses, he tells us, "the book, the tabernacle, and all the vessels of the ministry," were sprinkled; and that, in the process, he used "scarlet wool and hyssop." It is immaterial to this discussion, to consider the source of Paul's addition to the statement of

Moses. It is sufficiently clear that he speaks of the event recorded in Exodus xxiv. 3-8. "These words," of Ex. xxiv. 8, or "the words of the Lord," verse 3, are "every precept" of Paul: "The blood of the *διαθήκη* which the Lord hath made with you," Ex. xxiv. 8, are the same terms used by Paul, except he employs, "God hath enjoined unto you," for the last clause. Nothing is clearer than that blood of a victim or victims slain in the sacrifices mentioned, verses 4-6, was not the mere *occasion* by which this memorable "covenant" was rendered valid, but the *cause*. The transaction involved the *necessity of death*. In our passage, however, if *διαθήκη* be rendered "will," the language is too strong to be used. Death must occur, but it does not enter into the essential constitution of the will as a *cause*, but is merely contemplated as *occasion*.

(4.) The logical ground for sustaining the versions in ascribing to *διαθήκη* the meaning of testament or will, is doubtless the latter clause of verse 15: "They which are called might receive the promise of eternal *inheritance*." But this very statement suggests another doubt of the correctness of the interpretation favored by the versions. For, (a) as has been remarked in another connexion, this view makes God the Father the testator who dies! He is the author of the promise; and (b) it is he of whom believers are heirs: "heirs of God and joint heirs with Jesus Christ;" Rom. viii. 17. "If a son, then an heir of God through Christ;" Gal. iv. 7. But (c) "inheritance," "inherit," and cognate terms, are often used in the wide sense of "possession," "to possess," or "possessors." Thus, the verb *יָרַשׁ* is given, by Gesenius, as meaning, first, "to take," or "occupy," and this specially by violence, 1 Kings xxi. 15. And he adds: "Derivatives (of this verb,) such as *רֶשֶׁת* a net, from its idea of taking or catching, and *תֵּירוֹשׁ* new wine, from the idea of occupying the brain, shew that the sense of *inherit* is not a primary meaning." After remarking that the same idea of "seizing" is found in cognate etymons, as *רָץ*, *רָם* etc., he adds that "the Latin, *hæres*, may have the same origin, unless it be derived from the Greek *αἰρέω*, to take." A large number of examples are given of the

meaning "to take," or "occupy," or "possess"—as, Lev. xx. 24; Deut. i. 8; iii. 18, 20; Ps. xlv. 4; lxxxiii. 13; Deut. ii. 12, 21, 22; ix. 1; xi. 23; xii. 2, 29, etc. So it expresses, tropically, a high degree of happiness, as Ps. xxv. 13; xxxvii. 9, 22, 29, with which *cf.* Matt. v. 5. In confirmation of this, "possession," by another Hebrew word, is often used for expressing the idea of "inheritance"—Gen. xvii. 8; xxxv. 43; Lev. xiv. 34; Num. xxvii. 4, 7; and often expressing the same fact elsewhere presented, by using the word which is rendered "inheritance."

But even holding to the stricter idea of "inheritance," a possession received from another by occasion of his death, such an interpretation, as has been shewn, involves a contradiction of the scripture teaching elsewhere, in which our Lord is represented as an elder brother, *with* whom believers are "joint heirs," and not *to* whom they are "heirs."

III. The difficulties, thus presented, in the way of accepting the interpretation of the versions, if not conclusive of its falsity, are enough to induce and encourage the effort to discover whether our passage is not susceptible of a sense which at once more fully corresponds with the context, and allows the usual meaning of *διαθήκη* to be retained. To the discussion of this question, let us now turn. The Hebrew word *בְּרִית* is uniformly represented in the Septuagint by *διαθήκη*. This is a derivative of *διατίθημι*, meaning "to appoint," or (with this noun,) "to make," "establish," etc. Thus: Gen. ix. 17, "the covenant which I establish;" xxi. 27, 32: "they made a covenant;" xxvi. 28: "Let us make a covenant;" Ex. xxiv. 8: "the covenant which the Lord has made." So Joshua ix. 6, 7, 15, 24, 25. In the New Testament, Acts 3. 25, Heb. viii. 19, etc., the noun would, therefore, some think, be better translated "appointment," "arrangement," "dispensation," or some synonymous word. The word *συνθήκη*, by its etymology, would seem more appropriate. But the Septuagint have used this only three times, and in every case as a translation of a different Hebrew word, but never of *בְּרִית*. The Apocryphal books of Wisdom and Maccabees use it five

times, and in every case in the sense of obligatory arrangements : *i. e.*, of a "covenant" as a *bargain*. It is highly probable that the translators of the Hebrew into Greek regarded *συνθήκη* as too strong a term to designate God's transactions with Noah, Abraham, and Moses as mediator for the Jews, or with the Jews themselves, since, in all such transactions, God appears as a supreme Law Giver, and "these words," "every precept," and similar phrases, are the expressions of his sovereign will. He prescribes the terms. The reception of this prescription, by divine authority, on the part of those to whom it was addressed, is the only feature of the transaction which would give color to the idea of bargain. But this was not always contemplated. Moses says, (Deut. xxix. 14, 15.) "Neither with you only do I make this covenant and this oath, but with him that standeth here with us this day before the Lord our God, and also with him that *is not here this day with us*" We find, too, that the law (both Decalogue and additional laws,) is designated a "covenant." Deut. v. 2, 5, where Moses recapitulates the law, given in Exodus xx., with no other variations than the changed circumstances of the people required; and again, Deut. xxix. 1, where he prefaces the *commands* he proposes to utter. In both occasions, he describes the revelation of God's will in the cases named, by the term "covenant." So the Psalmist, "He hath commanded his covenant," Ps. cxi. 9. "Moses commanded us a law," Deut. xxxiii. 4, shewing covenant and law to be the same. In Deut. ix. 9, 11, 15. "tables of covenant," *cf.* Heb. ix. 4, is the same as "tables of testimony," Ex. xxxii. 15, or Deut. iv. 13, "His covenant which he commanded you to perform, ten commandments." The word is, on the other hand, used with special reference to what is termed the "Abrahamic covenant" in the sense of "promise." Not only have we the phrase, Eph. ii. 12, "covenants of promise," alluding to the transactions with Abraham, Gen. xv. 18, xvii. 2, etc., but the words in which the terms of this covenant are expressed in Gen. xxii. 17, 18, are quoted Heb. vi. 14, and called in verse 15 "the promise." See also Luke i. 72, 73: the "oath" of promise (Heb. vi. 17, 18.) is "the covenant." Recalling the term used in Hebrew for covenant,

בְּרִית, we find the best lexicographers referring it to a class of derivatives, from a primitive meaning, "to cut," "to form," to "create." It thus denotes "a formation," or as to the acts of those concerned, a "transaction." Hence we obtain the idea of the Greek διαθήκη—"arrangement" or "dispensation." It is suggestive that the Syriac version, though in a language cognate with the Hebrew, has rendered the word by one which is only a *Syriacized* form of the Greek word, employing the almost precisely literal representation of the Hebrew word to express "creation," "creature," "building," but never covenant or dispensation. It would seem, then, by induction from the foregoing facts, that the word διαθήκη has been employed by the Greek translators of the Old Testament and the writers of the New, both in its stricter etymological sense of "dispensation" or "arrangement" or "institution," and a diviner sense of "covenant." This latter is a particular form of an "arrangement," in which are parties assenting or agreeing, each to certain terms, however prescribed, involving obligations or duties. Inasmuch, as suggested already, such transactions between God and man are really representative of certain prescriptions of duty or offers of privilege, proceeding from God's sovereign will, these might be termed "dispensations;" but, as "covenant" has acquired a place in Christian literature, it may be best to retain it, though always with the remembrance of this modified sense. In transactions between men who are equals, the secondary sense of a "bargain" needs no remark. Such are Gen. xxvi. 28, 31, 44; Ezra x. 2. There are also cases, as Gen. xvii. 2, where the language used justifies the derived sense of "covenant," though the terms are prescribed of God. The former examples are illustrated as capable, notwithstanding the implication of parties, of the stricter sense: Thus Gal. iii. 15, etc., "Though it be but a man's covenant, no man disannulleth or addeth thereto." The terms prescribed by man to man, as the steadfast purpose or arrangement of any one, are not to be changed by others. But in none of the cases cited can the sense of a *testament* or *will* be discovered. That the word had such use in classic Greek, and from its primary signification, is susceptible of such use, is not denied. But

the question of its propriety here is dependent on the results of of an investigation into the relation of *διαθήκη* and sacrifice, to which it is now time to turn our attention.

IV. We read in Ex. xxiv. 8, Zech. ix. 11, Heb. x. 29, and xiii. 20, of the "blood of the covenant;" and in Ps. l. 5, of those whom God says, "have made a covenant with me by sacrifice." In Heb. xii. 14, we read of "Jesus, the mediator of the new covenant, and the blood of sprinkling which speaketh better things than the blood of Abel," *i. e.*, this blood of Jesus, which is "the blood of sprinkling," "speaketh better things" than that which Abel shed in the sacrifice he offered. In Matt. xxvi. 28, and parallel in Mark xiv. 24, we have, "This is my blood of the new covenant" (*διαθήκη*) E. V. Testament. So in Luke xxii. 20, and 1 Cor. xi. 25, "This is the new covenant (E. V. Testament) in my blood." In all these cases, the context, or references of the subject under discussion, relate to transactions of a religious character. They are suggestive of a connexion of bloody sacrifices and covenants; and Heb. ix. 18, in which after "first" "covenant" is to be supplied, says expressly, "neither was the first [covenant] dedicated (initiated, sanctified, or ratified,) without blood." There is some ground for the statement, that in covenants made between men, there was also some equally solemn mode of ratification. Thus in Gen. xxvi. 26-30, the covenant made between Isaac and Abimelech, and his officers, seems to have been confirmed with a feast; and we often find that a sacrifice was followed by such a feast. In Gen. xxxi. 44, a covenant is proposed between Laban and Jacob, which is followed by the offering of sacrifices and the union of both parties and their families, etc., in a feast. This notice of covenants between men is, however, not specially important nor pertinent to this discussion. While the quotations, made above, might be said to raise a strong presumption, that religious covenants or transactions between God and man were ratified by bloody sacrifices, there is an additional ground for such a presumption, in the relation of the sacrifice to the offerer and to God, whenever presented as an expiatory service. Man as a sinner cannot treat with God. In his sin, he is not only infinitely an inferior, but, by sin, incapaci-

tated to approach God acceptably. That pardon which he seeks, by offering the victim to suffer in his place, is granted by God on the merit of that substituted sufferer—of course, in all transactions which had regard to spiritual relations and benefits, as a type of Christ. “the Lamb of God who taketh away the sin of the world.” Here, then, the transaction is somewhat of the nature of a covenant. But not only is such presumption of the ratifying relation of the bloody sacrifice thus raised. We may examine some striking instances and illustrations which bear on the question before us, and shew that the bloody sacrifice was not merely an attending incident or *occasion* to which the covenant owed its validity, as in the case of wills, the execution of which was, or might be, suspended on the death of a testator, but constituted a contemporary an *essential element* in establishing the covenant.

1. When Noah left the ark, Gen. viii. 20, “he builded an altar” “and offered burnt-offerings on the altar.” God, verse 21, accepted this act. It may be understood as designed by Noah as an expiation for himself and family, and, in some sort, for the earth and irrational creatures, under the curse of sin for man’s sake. We find, then, that God’s purpose in accepting this service is first expressed to himself, viii. 21, 22; and then, ix. 9–seq., a covenant is announced, pledging his promise no more to visit man’s sin on him and on the earth, as he had done; not only should there continue “seed-time and harvest,” etc., viii. 22, but besides this “covenant of day and night,” “there should no more be a flood,” etc., verse 11. He then gave also a token or sign of that covenant to represent his faithfulness, so that he would remember this “perpetual covenant” between him and all flesh. Though there is no explicit statement that the “bloody sacrifice” was an essential element in giving validity to the transaction, such, in the view already given, is rendered morally certain.

2. Besides the general promise to Abraham, in Gen. xii. 1–7, of giving to him and his seed the land of Canaan, we have in chap. xv. 1–7. the renewal of this promise, with special reference to a promised heir. In reply to Abraham’s question, “Whereby shall I know that I shall inherit it?” (*i. e.*, the land) verse 8,

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God proceeds to instruct Abraham in presenting an offering, in which the victims selected are animals belonging to the class afterwards prescribed in the Mosaic institutions. In verse 18, it is added, "in the same day, the Lord made a covenant with Abraham, saying, Unto thy seed have I given this land." In the process of this remarkable offering there is mention of the "horror of great darkness" which fell on Abraham, preceded by a trance or "deep sleep." This would denote that abnormal state not unusual under the impressions produced by special revelations of the divine presence—as Job iv. 13, etc. It is further stated, verse 17, that this service was closed by an appearance of a "smoking furnace" or oven, and "a burning lamp passing between these pieces." This is variously interpreted as to its symbolical import. In the only other instance of a passing between the pieces of the animal, in a sacrifice, Jer. xxxiv. 18, 19, the *offerers* passed between the pieces. This fact throws doubt on those interpretations, which represent that God thus manifested his presence, to consume by this furnace and lamp the offered victims. May not the two elements of the symbol, the furnace and the lamp, denote the divine Redeemer, the representative of his Church, the furnace setting forth his wrath and destruction of the enemies of his people, and the burning lamp (Is. lxii. 1) the salvation he was to procure? He thus enters into covenant with the Father for his people; and thus we have the first intimation of the covenant of redemption. But however these symbols may be interpreted, there is clearly here a covenant ratified by a bloody sacrifice. It must be remembered also, that this is the most solemn and emphatic description of one of those "covenants of promise." Eph. ii. 12, by which "the gospel was preached before to Abraham."

3. In Ex. xxiv. 1-9, we are informed of the solemnities attending the ratification of the first covenant. This is the passage already—above, II., (3.)—adduced in another connection, in which were pointed out the supplemental and altered phrases—Moses acting as mediator, Gal. iii. 19: "The law . . . ordained by angels in the hand of a mediator." After he had communicated to the people "all the words of the Lord," and they had avouch-

ed their obedience, he builded an altar, with twelve pillars, symbolical of the united twelve tribes, and "he sent young men of the children of Israel, who offered burnt-offerings," etc. Having consecrated the altar by sprinkling half the blood on it, he used the other in the manner stated by Paul, Heb. ix. 12-21, saying, "Behold the blood of the covenant which the Lord hath made with you concerning all these words." This was the event expressly stated by Paul, Heb. ix. 18, to have been a consecration or ratification of the first covenant.

4. We find among many historical allusions to this ratification, in respect of its general obligations or specifications of duty growing out of it, several which were attended with peculiarly solemn services. (1.) In 2 Chr. xxxiv. 31, we read that "Josiah made a covenant with the Lord," into which he induced all that "were found in Jerusalem and Benjamin" to enter. The writer of the history, after summarily stating the permanent effect of this procedure, verse 33, proceeds to recount the very solemn observance of the passover, in which Josiah secured the concurrence of such a multitude, that, xxxv. 7-9, thirty-six thousand five hundred small cattle and three thousand eight hundred bullocks or oxen were required for the paschal services and the burnt-offerings, verses 12, 14, which were offered. In verse 11, we read of the "sprinkling" [of the blood.] In verse 12, they removed the burnt-offerings . . . to offer to the Lord; and these may have been some of "the smaller cattle," as it is added, "and so they did with the oxen." Thus we see this renewal of the covenant was accompanied by a great sacrifice and "sprinkling of blood."

A similar service was held under Hezekiah, 2 Chr. xxx, in which "burnt-offerings" are named, verse 15; but though the purport of the transaction was evidently of the same nature—a reëngagement of the people in God's service—there is no mention of a covenant, while, however, it appears to be implied that there was its renewal. (2.) In Ezra x. 3, it is said, that after Ezra's solemn prayer of confession and supplication, chap. ix., with special reference to the mixed marriages of the people, and even priests, Shecaniah, as a representative of the great congregation,

made confession and proposed to "make a covenant with God" to sunder their unlawful connections. This determination was executed, verse 19, and accompanied by an offering of a ram for their trespass. Nehemiah ix. 38, (Heb. x. 1,) having led the people in prayer of confession of similar specific as well as more general transgressions, after a season of humiliation and fasting, also led them, verse 38, in making "a sure covenant." The word "covenant" is evidently rightly supplied, as in x. 29. the obligation incurred is indicated by "oath," which is constantly used in the sense and often as a synonym of covenant.

5. The covenant with Abraham, emphatically, "THE COVENANT, (Gal. iii. 17,) confirmed of God in Christ," *i. e.*, in him as the promised seed, (though some prefer *eis* in the sense of "concerning,") so that thus "the gospel was preached to Abraham"—this covenant is named by David, in connection with the solemnities of prayer, sacrifices, and hymns of praise, with which the ark was introduced into the sanctuary, 1 Chr. xvi. 15, "Be ye mindful always of his covenant, the word [which] he commanded to a thousand generations." There was thus a renewal of entering into covenant with God by these solemn acts of worship, involving the use of sacrifices, and these bloody offerings. This covenant, in which David represented the people as well as his own dynasty, was solemnly renewed by Solomon on the dedication of the temple. We read, 2 Chr. v. 6, of the immense number of sacrifices of sheep and oxen, the acts of praise and prayer, verses 12, 13, and vi. 3-42, God's acceptance of the sacrifices. vii. 1, the renewal of them and of acts of prayer and praise, verses 4-7, and God's revelation of his gracious answer, verses 12-17, and especially verse 18, his confirmation of the covenant with David, thus renewed, as to Solomon. In both these instances, there appears to have been a recognition of the covenant with Abraham and the obligations of the law.

6. In Jer. xxxiv. 17-20, the prophet expostulates with the princes of Judah, and reproves them for having violated the provisions of God's covenant, which he represents as having been made "when they cut the calf in twain and passed between the parts thereof." From this passage several inferences have been

drawn. as (1) that the phrase, "cut a covenant," (similar to the Latin "*ferire fœdus*," and the Greek ἄρκια τέμνειν or σπονδὰς τέμνειν,) is derived from the custom of slaying an animal for sacrifice; or (2) that the "cutting" refers to this division of the victim in twain, as here mentioned, and also in Gen. xv. already noticed; (3) others accept this particular statement of the "cutting" and "passing between the parts" as only an illustration of *one mode* of making a covenant by sacrifice. In such a view, the symbol of "passing between" might denote the identification of offerer and victim, denoted in most cases by the laying of the offerer's hands on the head of the victim. But this method, of which we have but two instances recorded, that of Gen. xv., and this of Jeremiah. could hardly have been the usual method; as intimated, it may have been adopted, in the first case, as a most solemn and impressive mode of setting forth the action of the mediator of the covenant, represented by the smoking furnace and the burning lamp; and, in the latter, of indicating the identification of the whole nation, represented by their princes passing between the victim divided. The Hebrew word כָּרַת has the meaning of "cut," and, used with בָּרַת, it may have allusion to this custom, as mentioned in these instances, and, though not mentioned, observed in others. But other terms are frequently employed, such as קָם in hiphil, or כָּתַן. It is, in Gen. xv. 18, after the whole service of the sacrifice had been concluded, that we find the phrase which, literally rendered, is "cut a covenant." The term "cut," etc., may as well be applied to the mode of slaying, as the Latin and Greek phrases cited above. On the whole, the generic sense of the verb, as rendered "*to make*," in one version, is, perhaps, as good as any, and no special allusion need be inferred as to the mode of making the sacrifice. The LXX., almost uniformly, use διατίθημι to represent the Hebrew verb, in only some half-dozen cases employing it for as many different Hebrew verbs, meaning to raise up, to set, to give, etc. The Greek verb, thus employed, is the primitive of διαθήκη and is used with it, and contains no modal sense, but merely expresses the fact, as our word "*make*," that a cove-

nant was appointed, constituted, arranged, or made. This case, thus so fully examined, contains explicit mention of the presence of a bloody sacrifice. With those preceding it, the evidence of the relation of such a sacrifice to the ratification of a covenant must be regarded as conclusive. It is not asserted that no covenant was ever otherwise ratified than this between man and man, or between God and man. But it is clear that such relation existed in these, which all regard as the most solemn, impressive, and binding, revealed to us in the divine revelation. The passage, Ps. 1. 5, in which God's saints are described as "those who have made a covenant with me by sacrifice," receives from the cases examined a confirmatory commentary, by which it must stand as a fundamental proposition in all estimates of the validity of a covenant.

V. The difficulties in the interpretation of our passage, as represented in the versions, having served, at least, to raise doubts of its correctness, and the discussion of the term *διαθήκη*, and the scriptural method of ratifying a covenant, prepare the way for the inquiry, whether there may not be another interpretation consistent with the scope of the entire context and the established sense of *διαθήκη*.

1. The mediator of verse 15 effects his work by death, and that of himself, at once priest and victim. The mediation, thus contemplated is under a new *διαθήκη*. The basis, on which it is conducted, is not merely "death," but a sacrificial death; for verse 12, it is said that "he, by his own blood, entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption," and arguing from the less, the efficiency of "the blood of bulls and of goats, etc., to the purifying of the flesh," verse 13, the apostle states the greater, the efficiency of "the blood of Christ" "to purge" the conscience. It is, then, clearly Christ who offers himself, and by his bloody sacrifice ratifies the covenant, of which he is mediator, and "brings eternal blessings down" to men. Paul now introduces by *γάρ* of verse 16, the statement of a general principle, respecting *διαθήκη*, as the ground or confirming reason why this mediator should suffer death, and so after *γάρ* he states the proposition, "where [there is] a covenant, [there is] a necessity

that [the] death τοῦ διαθεμένου come in, [or be implied,] (if a passive sense of φέρεσθαι be preferred.)

2. Before proceeding to consider v. 17, it may be well to apply the results of the discussion of διαθήκη, and consider the untranslated term διαθεμένου.

(1.) The meaning which it has appeared best to give διαθήκη, in view of the context, has been fully sustained to be *covenant*. It may be well to notice further, that in the passages in Matthew xxvi. 28, Mark xiv. 24, Luke xxii. 20, and 1 Cor. xi. 25, "covenant" instead of "testament" is clearly demanded by the terms of Ex. xxiv. 8, "blood of the covenant," and Zech. ix. 11, Heb. ix. 20. and xiii. 20, x. 29. This last verse is in exact accordance with the passages from the Gospels and 1 Corinthians and with Heb. ix. 24, where "blood of sprinkling" is evidently the blood of "the mediator of the new covenant" mentioned in the preceding clause, and also accords with the ix. 15, already explained. In 2 Cor. iii. 6, 14, the "new testament" and "old testament" of our version, clearly denote what Paul, Heb. viii. 8-13, contrasts as new and old covenants. It has been alleged that the use of "testament," in our passages in connection with death, is either a play on words, which, to say the least, is, in such a matter, apparently derogatory from the apostle, or, with more plausibility, that it may be justified as an illustration, by the fact that the validity alike of a "covenant" and a "testament" has a common element, death. But it must be remembered, that the death, on the occurrence of which, as an *occasion*, the efficiency of a *testament* is suspended, is by no means a death necessarily *bloody*, while verses 14 and 15 remind us that a bloody or sacrificial death is that which a covenant demands as an essential element—at least in covenants such as Paul here introduces. And further, it is not as an illustration, but as a ground or reason for the specialities of verses 14, 15, that the propositions of verses 15 and 16 are presented. The difficulty arising from the translation "*testament*," that we make God the testator who must *die*, has been already suggested. It seems equally illogical to introduce Christ in verses 14, 15, as mediator

of a "testament," which needs no such person, and inconsistent to convert the mediator of those verses into the testator of these.

(2.) The critical word is then *διαβήμενος*. It has been proposed to accept this as meaning "victim," (or some synonymous word,) and this requiring the term to be passive—"the one appointed." and authority has been cited to justify the use of a middle second aorist participle as passive: (1.) Because the present and imperfect forms of the middle and passive are the same. (2.) That a passive sense is involved in the middle, this being reflexive and expressive of the action, in which subject and object are the same: the sense of the active verb becoming capable of expression by a passive form, when the object becomes the subject, and the subject (with a preposition) follows in the objective case: "I killed John," or "John was killed by me," being identical propositions. In the same manner, substantially, "I kill myself," middle form, is expressed by, "I am killed by myself," passive form. So the middle becomes passive. Passive and active are in contrast; the middle, and for this, perhaps, so named, holds a relation to each. (3.) That examples of the use of middle aorist in finite forms, are cited by such grammarians as Kühner, Buttmann, etc. (4.) That the verb having never developed a full passive paradigm, writers may have felt justified in assigning the middle forms double duty, so as to serve also as passive forms. But whatever force may be assigned these considerations, such a solution of the difficulty is not required. Let the middle sense be accepted. We may select any one of several words of synonymous force, in the connection in which the Greek word stands, as proposer, offerer, etc. The writer, in stating the general proposition, states what is specially and in fact true, in the case presented, in verses 14 and 15, *i. e.*, the mediator is also the victim—he offers himself. It is of the essential character of all expiatory services, that the victim represents the offerer. Whoever approaches God for the benefit of forgiveness for himself or those he represents, as he is a sinner, must present a substitute. "The wages of sin is death," and if the sinner is to live, his life can only be secured by the death of a victim. "Without the shedding of

blood there is no remission of sin." Heb. ix. 22. It is useless, to the readers of these pages, to expatiate on these well-settled truths of Scripture. When then Moses, in the transactions of Ex. xxiv. 1-8. representing Israel, proposes to enter into covenant with God, or is invited by God to do so, he must bring an offering to release him as a representative, a "mediator," Gal. iii. 19, from the obligation to die, that his clients may treat with God. Abraham, the father of the faithful, and, in his relation to his seed, a type of Christ, had done the same, in the memorable transaction in Gen. xv. 7-18. The services of the great day of atonement required a similar course by the high priest. All these and others of similar character were typical. Now Christ being come a High Priest, not by the blood of bulls and of goats, by the death of irrational substitutes, but by his own blood and his own death, representing his people, ratifies the covenant. What had all along been the essential principle of a covenant, the death of the offerer, and from the actual incurring of which, the types were relieved by the offering up of substitutes, now finds its full force, in the actual death of him whose work and sufferings the types and shadows of the old dispensation had set forth. In that the offerer died vicariously. Christ dies himself. He is the *διαθέμενος*, the one "having set forth or offered himself."

3. Turning now to verse 17, we find *γάρ* again introducing, by way of illustrative confirmation, something like a concrete case. "For a covenant [is] firm (or sure) on account of the dead (offerings or bodies, see Heb. x. 10), otherwise it is of no strength at all while the offerer liveth." The signification of *ἐπί* is well established, and the sense given in the versions has been shewn to be inappropriate with the proper meaning of *διαθήκη* allowed. Much has been said to sustain the allegation that *νεκροῖς* is incapable of application to others than dead men. The suitableness of such a view to the use of testament is obvious; though a question might be raised by any disposed to quibble, whether the gender (masculine, as supposed) would suit the case of female testators. But (1.) supposing a general proposition, couched under terms which savor, to some extent, of a concrete case, as the writer uses *διαθέμενος* in singular, we might expect *νεκρός* in

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singular also, and this the more as the *testator* is opposed to the dead *men*. (2.) There is some, though little usage, for νεκρός of other than rational beings, Eccl. ix. 4, (LXX.,) a *dead* lion; Ps. cv. (cvi.) 28, of "sacrifices of the dead," *i. e.*, idols, and as Baal-peor is named in the context, it might be concluded it was of a senseless creature; Is. viii. 19, "for the living to the dead," *i. e.*, senseless idols. In New Testament we have "dead works," Heb. vi. 1; ix. 14; "dead faith," James ii. 17; "sin-dead," Rom. vii. 8. In our passage the obvious purpose is to indicate the death of whatever, according to the interpretation, intervened between the transaction of making a covenant and the benefit, in order to secure efficacy to the act; while the plural form is liable to the objection stated, because, when testament and testator are used, there is but one dead person involved, the objection does not apply in the proposed interpretation. In constituting a covenant there may be many sacrificed victims or dead bodies, though all are representations of the offerer in the typical cases presented. So it is truly correct in the sense given to διαθεμένου, to aver, that his vicarious death is necessary; and in the application to our Lord, what was thus the statement of a principle becomes the assertion of the essential "needs be" that "he must suffer and enter into his glory."

(3.) Accepting as correct the rendering of μήποτε, as was shewn in the earlier part of this discussion, "not at all" is inconsistent with fact as to a testament, the idea in using that word would be more accurately presented by μήπω, not yet.

(4.) But the proposed interpretation, whatever may be our conclusions on the verbal criticisms, is even more strongly sustained by the subsequent, than the former context; verse 18, ὅθεν, introduces an analogous case, "whence or whereupon neither the first [covenant] was dedicated [or ratified] without blood," and this is followed by a particular statement of the august and impressive transactions recorded Ex. xxiv. 4-8, which have been already fully discussed. Now there can be no doubt that διαθήκη is to be supplied after "first," and contrasts with "new covenant," verse 15. The analogy then is complete. As in one, so in the other. In the one, there was the blood of the offerer himself; in the

other, the blood of vicarious sacrifices. As to effects: in the typical transaction, there was a ceremonial purifying of the flesh; in the real sacrifice by the Mediator, there was a purifying of the conscience; in the typical covenant duties and privileges, there was provision for an outward service; in the real covenant, sealed and ratified by the bloody death of Christ, provision for the writing the law on the hearts, and a gracious forgiveness of transgressions.

Of many profitable reflections, either suggested or confirmed by this discussion, want of space allows the mention of only a few.

1. The covenant of Abraham was confirmed "in Christ." This confirmation was by typical sacrifices, in which the blood of beasts represented his blood. Through these the covenant and its blessings were ratified to the believer, in Him "who was to come," so that David could speak of that covenant, 2 Sam. xxiii. 5, as "ordered in all and sure," "all my salvation and all my desire," just as the *typical* sacrifices of the Mosaic ritual were to the believer in a great Sacrifice and Mediator to come, efficacious to the satisfying of the conscience. But now, since, in the fulness of time, Christ has come and actually ratified this covenant with his bloody death, believers no longer see through a glass darkly, but behold the grace of God in all its extensive provisions made by this sublime and affecting transaction.

2. Thus we see how the "covenant of grace," as we are wont to call the Abrahamic covenant, has foundation. In the derived sense of *διαθήκη*, contemplating parties in the "arrangement" which it declares, in a *covenant of grace*, there could hardly be properly *parties*. All is of grace and man only receives what God gives. But in this aspect of the relation of Christ to the covenant, he, as representative of his people, performs a *work*; and while that is his part in a covenant with his Father, which some call the "covenant of redemption," his people are left but to receive him to secure its blessings. It is a *work* by him, but the blessings to them are all of *grace*.

3. The words of our Lord in the institution of the Supper,

“This is my blood of the new covenant,” become fully significant. The partakers receive it as the ratifying of their relation to Christ, by which they are one with him in the “great transaction,” and wherein the benefits of this new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to them.

4. Thus, by this union, the believer is not only held free from condemnation, pardoned, and accepted, but can understand fully, and plead the promise, that he is faithful and *just* to forgive his sins and cleanse him from all unrighteousness. He has a *right* to the tree of life.

5. We are taught the comprehensive meaning of “believing on Christ.” As, on one hand, whatever our purposes, words, or works, we remain under God’s wrath and curse, till convinced by the Spirit of the “sin of not believing on Christ,” we humbly, penitently, and sincerely receive him by faith; so on the other, thus believing on him, he is made of God, unto us, wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. One with him in this covenant, we are complete in him, enabled to die unto sin and live unto righteousness, till we attain unto that life which is incorruptible, undefiled, and fadeth not away.

ARTICLE IV.

THE PAN-PRESBYTERIAN ALLIANCE.

The writer once inquired of Gen. R. E. Lee, whether it was his purpose to attend the meeting of the Education-Association of the Teachers of Virginia. He replied: “If I could see that they were going to effect anything except talk, I might think of attending.” This seems, to the plain mind, the most obvious objection to the project of a Pan-Presbyterian Alliance. In order to avoid being dangerous, it finds itself compelled to limit its functions to “talk.” Such pious reunions may be as pleasant as

Dr. Robinson seems to have found the tentative meeting in London. But if this is all, evidently the Churches have more urgent and useful applications to make of their time and money, than to these ostentatious and costly prayer meetings.

But are there not more serious difficulties in the way of Southern Presbyterians mingling in these meetings? The writer cannot forget an event, of which present advocates of this alliance seem strangely oblivious, that advances from us were, at a very recent date, repelled by the very people with whom we are now invited to associate ourselves. Do gentlemen recall the appointment of Drs. Palmer, Girardeau, and Hoge, by the Memphis Assembly, to go abroad as its commissioners, to explain the position of our Church to the Presbyterians of Great Britain, and conciliate some moral support in the day of our need and insulation? But these commissioners, fortunately, were so discreet as to write letters of inquiry, before they went, whether they would be received in a manner consistent with their self-respect. The answer they received was, *that they would not*. Because they were the representatives of a Church which refused to array itself upon an anti-scriptural Abolition ground, they were informed that they would not be received as equals; and they at once concluded that respect for themselves and the Assembly absolutely forbade their going. Like sensible men, they stayed at home. Have our brethren also forgotten that the "Evangelical Alliance," so called, also excluded ministers from the American Presbyterian Church, because it had not placed itself upon their Abolition platform? But these are the churches on whose fraternal embraces we are now asked to throw ourselves! If the self-respect of Drs. Palmer, Girardeau, and Hoge forbade such an act then, why does it not forbid it now? Which of the parties has changed? Have the Southern Presbyterians at length adopted the infidel-abolition creed? Or have the Northern and the European Churches forsaken and repented it? It is very well understood that the latter are now more mad on this idol than at any previous time. It is equally well understood that the entrance of our Church into their fraternity is permitted only as it is construed as a tacit surrender of our position, and a silent

acceptance of theirs. The proof of this is very easy. Let our commissioners simply remind the next Alliance that we still stand immovably upon the position of our Assembly in 1845, and that if they embrace us, it must be on this express understanding. Candor will, indeed, require no less of us. We shall see a tempest of fanatical excitement, which will effectually estop our entrance. Dr. McCosh is usually regarded as the author of this Pan-Presbyterian movement. Preaching in the Central Presbyterian church in Baltimore, he said that Southern Christians, once justly excluded from the Evangelical Alliance for slave-holding, might now be admitted, because slavery had been removed by Providence! But has the question been settled? The institution has been unlawfully and violently overthrown. True. Does that remove the question from between honest men? An invitation to us to a fraternity from which we were once excluded for slave-holding, now tendered on this ground, can only mean one of two hypocrisies: either that we shall consent to be construed as forsaking and repenting and confessing acts which we have neither forsaken nor repented, or that Dr. McCosh shall feign satisfaction with sins in us unrepented, which his conscience abhors, because its overt perpetration is prevented by force. At neither of these hypocrisies can we connive. The pickpocket shall be held, forsooth, a very proper gentleman, not because he has repented his thefts, but because there are iron bars between his fingers and other people's pockets, and because he is sufficiently a sneak to be silent now about his former exploits! If Dr. McCosh is satisfied with such a basis of fraternity, we presume Southern Presbyterians are not. We scarcely think they are ready to be construed into a desertion of the time-honored testimony of their fathers, and into the concession that these holy and venerated men were men-stealers.

But, proceeding in our inquiries, we ask—

1st. Whether our representation in this Alliance will not be a step towards a dishonest compromise with the Northern Presbyterian Church! We have charged upon them that, in a critical time, they abandoned their covenanted Constitution, and usurped Popish powers of perverting the spiritual authority of the Church

to override the secular rights and liberties of its members ; thus assisting to precipitate upon us and our neighbors the horrors of invasion, rapine, bloodshed, and subjugation. We have charged upon them a foul slander of our good name, which has been industriously published to the very Churches with which we are asked to ally ourselves. If these charges are erroneous, we cannot too soon retract and repent them. If they are just, then we have done right in requiring the disavowal of the slanders, and a return to the sacred principles of the Constitution, before we can, with any respect for truth, or for ourselves, enter into fraternal relations with them. They will neither retract the slander, nor repair the disastrous usurpation. Meantime, it is now proposed that we shall meet them abroad, on the very footing on which we refused to meet them at home ! If this is not a stultification of our testimony, it is hard to see what would be ! We say to their glozing invitations : “ No. We can wish you well ; we can forbear retaliation ; we can render, not railing for railing, but contrariwise, blessing ; we can endeavor faithfully to exercise all the graces of Christian charity towards those who injure us ; but with this slander and this usurpation unredressed, duty forbids us to meet you in fraternal correspondence.” And then we go incontinently across the water, and *meet them in fraternal correspondence !* When we enter the assemblage of those whom they made the sympathising auditors of their burning slander against us, what do we see ? The representatives of the slanderers sitting “ in the chief seats of the synagogue,” most numerous of any delegation, and most honored.

Let it be noted here, also, that the advocates of this measure among us greatly misrepresent the true position of our Church. They now say that the Popish usurpation and violation of the Constitution committed by the Northern Church, would be no just barrier to fraternal correspondence, if they would only retract their slander against us. *This is not what our Assembly of 1870 said.* That Assembly expressly declared that both wrongs must be amended before fraternal correspondence would be possible. It declared that while this fatal usurpation stood unconfessed, we could not break the force of our obligatory and

righteous protest against it, by any fraternal correspondence. But now, these brethren would have us recede from half of our stronghold.

Is it not very clear to any plain mind, that this will soon lead to the betrayal of the other half? If we go into the fraternal correspondence across the water, with the Northern Presbyterians, with whom we refuse to correspond on this side of it, will not the stultification of ourselves be so complete that the loss of our position must follow? In a few years, the absurdity will become irksome to us, and we shall be betrayed into a dishonest compromise and a forsaking of the testimony which Providence has called us to bear. Dr. Girardeau foresaw this, and with his clear, honest, good sense, pointed it out to the last Assembly; but amidst the special pleadings which prevailed, he was unheeded.

But Dr. Robinson does not think that such will be the result. He thinks our position will be rather strengthened by meeting the representatives of our usurpers and slanderers on that common ground. It is hard for a plain man to see how we can strengthen our position by inconsistency, by "blowing hot and cold" on the same parties. He says that if a neighbor in a city has wronged a sensible man of business, he does not exclude himself from the bank or exchange to which his business and his rights lead him, because he meets the injurer there. This illustration presents a false analogy. The scenes to which our business and our duties call us, are our own pulpits and charges. These are *our* banks and counting-houses. Well will it be for us if we stick to them. If the slanderer intrudes there, we will *meet and resist* him as we may. The just analogy to our position would be the case where a wealthy host invited us to a social entertainment, such as a dinner-party, and also invited the man who had injured and slandered us; to whom we had sent word that honor forbade our social recognition of him until he made amends. Now, could that invitation be accepted by an honorable man? He would not seek to make a disagreeable parade of the unfortunate quarrel at the table of the host, who probably designed the invitation, however ill-considered, as a kindness. He would not endeavor to implicate the host or the other guests.

He would keep his grievance to himself, with dignified quiet. But he would certainly not accept the invitation. He would feel that to accept it, would be as senseless an outrage upon the host as upon his own self-respect; for he could not extend social recognition to that slanderer as he met him at the host's table, without degrading and stultifying himself; and he could not refuse it, without a discourtesy to the host and the other guests. So, if he were a man, he would politely, but firmly, decline the invitation. In the Assembly, Dr. Robinson urged that, since we had the true Presbyterianism, we should go to the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance to proclaim it. The answer is, that this was the very place where he could not proclaim it. He found himself in the very position in which the injured citizen, of the parable just drawn, would have been, had he been so unwise as to accept the invitation to the feast. Dr. Robinson found himself an "invited guest" of European Presbyterianism. He also found present, as invited and especially honored guests, the very men whom our proclamation of our pure Presbyterianism would have assailed and indicted. Consequently his mouth was sealed. It was no place to bear his testimony, because the courtesies of the occasion forbade. *So it will ever be.*

2. It has been argued that if we stay out of this Alliance, we shall be considered "sore heads," "sulky," etc. All we can say to this plea is, that it seems to betray an astonishing oblivion of our true position as witnesses for righteous principles; and that if the argument should ever be verified by any act of the outside Christian world, the sensible Southern Presbyterian will regard it with the contempt due to a low insult. These terms, if they mean anything, suggest the idea of a wrong-headed person, sulking over an imaginary injury, or of a perverse school-boy, who has gotten a part of the drubbing which he deserved, and is still too insubordinate to submit to it. Do those who use this argument intend to present this as the attitude of the Southern Presbyterian Church? Were our wrongs imaginary? Are we like the insolent boy who has only gotten a part of the drubbing he deserves, and whom the other part, soundly laid on, would probably bring to his good humor? If *this* is their appreciation

of the position of the Southern Presbyterian Church, then we think their proper place is not only in the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance, but in the bosom of the Radical Church. If their estimate of our position were the just one, then the thing we ought to do is to confess our evil temper, and to ask pardon of those who have wronged and slandered us, before we presume to ask admission to the Presbyterian fraternity. To any one who has the head and heart to appreciate the height of the great argument to which God has been pleased to call the Southern Church, this charge is unspeakably grovelling. Have these gentlemen no other conception of fidelity to right trampled down by unjust violence, than "sulking?" It is to be presumed that in their eyes, the "witnesses for the truth" throughout the middle ages, were but "sore heads," because they stood aloof from the corrupt Church whose errors they were called by God to oppose! Yea, the apostles were "sore heads" when they separated themselves from the opposers of God's truth! In a day when truth has fallen in the streets, it becomes her friends to have *sore hearts*, which shall be too full of righteous grief for the wrongs done to her, to truckle and compromise.

3. It has been argued that we must go into this promiscuous Alliance, in order to get out of our insulation, in order to be better understood and appreciated by Christians abroad. But suppose it should be, that this insulation is the very position assigned us by the Head of the Church, in which to perform the high duty laid on us. Then to get out of it is a sin. If he has assigned us a particular testimony, in which other Churches will not join us, in respect of which they are misunderstanding and neglecting their duty, then a state of insulation is precisely the one we should occupy. There is something else far more essential than "appreciation" by foreigners, and this is the appreciation of our Almighty Head. But so far as we may legitimately desire just appreciation from others, the way to win is "to mind our own business." Let us preach a pure gospel, purify our own charges, extend the gospel with power, present the fruits of righteousness; and then, if these outside Christians have anything

of the mind of Christ, they will appreciate us as much as will be good for us.

4. We would also request brethren to consider whether another very serious objection to our entering this Alliance will not emerge from the nature of the representation which we shall unavoidably have in it. The meetings will usually be at a distance, and often across the ocean. Attendance must always be expensive, and often lavishly so. Such a journey to and from Europe as a delegate would wish to make, must cost between \$700 and \$1,000. The Alliance proposes to allow us twenty-eight representatives. Has our Assembly between \$20,000 and \$28,000 to expend upon sending delegates to this useless convention? But it will be said, "All the twenty-eight need not go." We remark, first: Then, what will our ratio of representation avail us? But second: If six or eight go, has the Assembly the \$7,000 to waste in this useless journey? Has it even \$2,000? Though it is obvious that the good sense of the Assembly will never consent to the abstraction of even this smaller sum from the urgent and sacred uses of our missions, and other works, for such a mere waste; and the Church would cry shame upon the Assembly, if it did commit the perversion. Then the commissioners will have to furnish their own expenses. But it is very well known that, to the great bulk of our ministers and elders, such an expense is about as much out of the question as a journey to the moon. The result, then, must be this: that when a selection of delegates is to be made, the Assembly, instead of electing the representative men of the Church, the men who are worthy to be trusted with her honor, must appoint a committee who will seek out the men who have a trip to Europe in view on their own account, or who have private fortunes, or bad throats coupled with rich and generous congregations. In other words, the selections will be determined, not by fitness, nor wisdom, nor experience, but by some mere irrelevant accident or advantage of money or leisure. This point alone is enough to betray the unsuitableness of the whole scheme for us, and the impossibility of our deriving any good fruits from it.

5. Another fatal objection is, that this Alliance will only ex-

pose our Church to additional peril, from that which is the great evil of the times, the spread of a latitudinarian spirit. The leading bodies with which we are invited to ally ourselves are *all tainted with Broad Churchism*. That this charge is true as to the Radical Presbyterian Church of America, none among us can deny. The fusion of the two branches made it avowedly a Broad Church, as was demonstrated, not by our writers, but by the Rev. Drs. Hodge and Van Dyke, and the Rev. Samuel Miller. As to another leading denomination represented in the Presbyterian Alliance, it was the fortune of the writer to hear the following sentiments publicly uttered by one of its prominent ministers, and applauded to the echo: "We have no right to require uniformity of doctrine or ritual within any of our own borders. We are bound to recognise *all the variety in our own Church, that we recognise in others*." That the same latitudinarian spirit is leavening the Presbyterian Churches of Great Britain, is but too plain from their church journals. They no longer have the true ring of orthodoxy. The Presbyterian Church of France has lately been rent into two bodies. One is Rationalistic and Socinian; the other, the comparatively sound one, did not dare to reëadopt the Gallican Confession, and enforce its teachings upon all its officers, but only adopted, in general terms, an evangelical creed. The Broad Churchism of the Alliance itself is clearly disclosed by its ambiguous doctrinal basis. This is the "*consensus of the Reformed Churches*." Who shall state this *consensus*? Does it include the sense in which Drs. Beman and Barnes professed to hold the Westminster Confession? This is to be supposed. Again, according to the uniform classification of church history, the Congregational Churches of New England belong to the Reformed branch of Protestant Christendom. Lately, the highest convention known to this body of Christians, formally cast away their doctrinal standards. Drs. N. Taylor and Bushnell are probably the accepted exponents of the larger part of their ministers. We presume that this *consensus* may embrace this type of the Reformed theology also. We repeat, the associations into which this Alliance will introduce us, will be found Broad Church. Now, as long as the words of Scripture

hold true, that "evil communications corrupt good manners," the association will inevitably be found unwholesome to our own soundness in the faith and doctrinal unity. But that watchman upon the walls of Zion, who "has knowledge of the times, to know what Israel ought to do," is aware that the peril to truth and righteousness, from this latitudinarian spirit, is so fearful, that to expose our beloved Church to it causelessly, is little short of madness.

Dr. Palmer, in his unanswerable argument at St. Louis, foreshadowed another influence which must make this Alliance a Broad Church one. Its creed, as to doctrine and order, must be the result of concessions. Whatever is obnoxious to the convictions of any of the constituent bodies, must be eliminated from the common platform. One point must be conceded to one party, and another to another, until there is left, as the common doctrine taught by the Alliance, only the most emasculated Presbyterianism.

6. But there are more grave objections to this movement than those already unfolded. It contains the egg of a monster. The principle on which it is demanded is anti-Protestant and anti-Presbyterian. The first development may appear but harmless and trivial,—indeed, the first organisation is so trivial as to be nugatory and useless;—but the principle which dictates the alliance will be sure to unfold itself with logical consistency, and the "King Log," which is now tendered to us silly frogs by this Jupiter Tonans of Nassau Hall, will in due time be replaced by the "King Stork." Dr. Blaikie, of Scotland, may be accepted as a good exponent of the movement. He tells us that the need of this alliance is to supply a defect of Presbyterianism, which is an ecumenical presbyterial court at the *apex* of our constitutional system of Presbyteries and Synods. He declares that without such a visible centre of unity, our system is incomplete and weak; that Christ evidently did not design it to remain so; and that the true significance of this Alliance is, that it is the germ of that ecumenical court having supreme jurisdiction over all the churches in the earth. Do they propose to claim such jurisdiction for it? Oh no, not now. This, says Dr. Blaikie, "would

wreck the whole scheme." But yet he is discontented with the Evangelical Alliance, because its meetings "have avowedly been meetings, not of church representatives, but of individuals associated only in a private capacity." He desires that the delegates to the Pan-Presbyterian Council shall be representatives appointed by the Assemblies of the several Churches, either directly or through committees. He says that we are as yet "unripe," indeed, for such a council as would have authoritative jurisdiction. "But the idea is of course not excluded." "Whether the council proposed will work towards such a result," is a question which he does not decide. But that it ought to work towards it, he very obviously believes and expects; since he declares it the "natural crown of an edifice which has never yet been brought to completion."

Such are the desires and theories which underlie and prompt this alliance. *They involve one of the essential elements of Popery.* The cardinal doctrine of the Reformers concerning the Church was, that only the spiritual and invisible Church could be Catholic or Ecumenical. They taught that the only unity designed by Christ among the several branches of his people on this earth was the spiritual unity. It was only on these premises that they were able to refute the pretensions of Popery. If the edifice "is not brought to completion" until this visible ecumenical bond is provided, then it is still incomplete until a universal unity of the whole visible Church, Reformed, Lutheran, and Episcopal, is formed—that is to say, a pope, either singular or plural. That such a papal head will need infallibility, and all other papal attributes, to decide correctly all the multifarious interests and differences of the Christian world, is very evident. Citations might easily be made from the soundest Reformed divines, proving this point. Turretin denies that such an external unity in a visible centre is any mark of the true Church. Principal Cunningham (*Hist. Theol.*, page 24, of Vol. I.) says there is "no warrant in Scripture for alleging that the unity there predicated of the Church of Christ necessarily implies that all the societies claiming to be regarded as churches of Christ must be included in one external visible communion, and subject to

one external visible government." And in other places he intimates pretty clearly, that this demand contains, in his view, the foundation principle of Popery. Let the notions which the advocates of this Pan-Presbyterian Alliance desire, through it, to propagate, once become current, and we shall soon learn practically that there is little difference between a pope in the singular and in the plural number. The essential doctrines of Popery will reappear: the necessity of outward uniformity; the damning nature of outward schism (so called); the confounding of the attributes of the visible and invisible Churches. Again, the same argument which demands that the Presbyterian Churches must be unified in a visible centre, will necessarily be extended to all others recognised as true Churches, though non-Presbyterian—such as the Wesleyan, Lutheran, Congregational. Thus will come about a still wider confederation, not Pan-Presbyterian, but Pan-Protestant; and the necessary conditions of its existence will be precisely that combination of loose, unfaithful, *doctrinal* Broad Churchism, with tyrannical enforcement of outward union and uniformity, which now characterises Popery. The Protestant world will be soon educated to set inordinate store by that of which God makes least account—formal union; *at the expense* of that which he regards as of supreme value—doctrinal fidelity. He who does not see that the Evangelical Alliance has already begun to produce this disastrous result, must be blind indeed. It is obviously the "tidal wave" of modern sentiment, the "*zeit geist*" of our day, as truly as it was of the days of Leo the Great; and it is as vital to the life of Christianity now, as it was then, that it be exposed and resisted.

The theory of real Presbyterianism is as plain as it is scriptural. It recognises the subordination of courts, and of a smaller part of one communion to the whole thereof, (in the Lord,) as represented in the higher or highest church court. It proposes to extend the communion thus unified, *so far as hearty and thorough agreement upon doctrines and church order extends, and no farther*. This subordination, affected beyond this, can lead only to tyranny, or latitudinarianism, or both. Our Fathers gave a notable illustration of this scriptural view in 1837. Find-

ing under the nominal jurisdiction of our Assembly, two schools of conviction as to both doctrine and order, they persistently destroyed the pretended unity, and compelled a separation into two communions. Did they attempt to exclude the New School from the pale of the visible Church catholic? Not at all. They continued to recognise their ordination, sacraments, and church-rights. But they insisted that it must be a *separate church order*: so separate, that they would not even enter into a "fraternal correspondence." This was the Presbyterianism of the Bible—of the Reformers. Now, so far as a real and hearty unity of doctrinal belief and church order extends, so far may a supreme presbyterial court extend its common jurisdiction. Does such a real unity exist among the Presbyterian Churches of the world? Will it ever exist this side the *millennium*? Differences of race, language, geographical position, national customs, and interests, will inevitably perpetuate such differences as will render it impossible to unite them all in one jurisdiction until "there shall be no more sea," and until the curse of Babel shall be repaired. Would the old Assembly, in the glorious days of 1845, have permitted the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland and Ireland, then so much sounder than they are now, to legislate for us, or even to claim the moral force of their recommendations over us? Nay, verily! Even to the latter, our Assemblies sternly demurred—and rightly. They refused to allow the abolition diatribes of the Scotch and Irish to be obtruded on our people; knowing that the local and national differences of Great Britain disqualified them for understanding or handling our rights and duties in this matter. Our Assemblies did right. Slavery has been violently and wickedly abolished, partly through the mischievous influences of those very diatribes. *Have all the grounds of social and national difference in the future been abolished?* He must be a soft and childish Utopian indeed, who flatters his hopes with this. "That which hath been is that which shall be." But men exclaim: Is not Christianity to make these things better? We reply: Yes; in that unknown future day, when Christ shall, by his own secret power, (by that kingdom which is within us, and not by men's exclaiming, Lo here, and lo there!)

have made the churches "first pure; then peaceable." But the writer, for one, confesses that he fails to see a single hopeful sign that this blessing is to be brought to man by the hands of a generation of Christians who are now generally dominated by a truculent and infidel abolitionism; who confound with the Protestant theory of constitutional republican right, the insane Levellers' theory of the frantic Lilburn of Cromwell's day, or the atheistic radicalism of the Reign of Terror, and impudently call them by the same name; who immerse modern society in the most lavish and luxurious sensuous indulgences ever known to any age; who revel everywhere in an atmosphere of ritualism and will-worship; and whose evangelical reign is signalled by this modern outbreak of social and political corruption, threatening, according to their own confession, to dissolve our social order in general moral putrescence.

7. The crowning objection to our representation in this Alliance is, that our own Constitution forbids it. We hold that, according to that Constitution, our Assembly had precisely as much right to appoint commissioners to such a body, as to appoint a Grand Lama for Thibet. "The Assembly only appointed a committee, with powers to appoint delegates." This evasion serves no purpose; for what the Assembly did by its committee, it virtually did *per se*; and if the connexion between us and the Alliance is to subsist, future appointments must, of course, be made on the floor of the Assembly, or confirmed there. Now, either these councils are to be judicatories exercising church-power over the Assembly, or they are not. If they are, then representation in them is substantially a new feature, outside of our Constitution. That instrument calls our Assembly our supreme court. In it all appeals and references stop; from it emanate the highest instructions, under Christ. But here is a higher court, and another source of authority. It is difficult to see how any moral truth can be plainer than this: that, if it is right for us to be represented in these councils, then the imperative step for us to take beforehand, is to procure an amendment (or rather a revolution) in our own Constitution, by an orderly reference to the Presbyteries. But gentlemen will take the other horn of the

dilemma: they say the councils of this Alliance are not to be church courts. Very well; then they are private and voluntary meetings of Christians. From this point of view, the Assembly has neither power nor business touching an appointment to them. And precedents show that the Assembly has always understood its powers, as well as the proprieties of the matter, thus. The Assembly approves the Temperance cause. Has she ever condescended to appoint a commissioner to represent her in a Temperance convention? If such a thing were moved, any Assembly would rise up as one man and resist. But we have a case still more in point: The Assembly never consented by her authority to appoint a commissioner to the Evangelical Alliance. If any of her ministers went, they went on their own responsibility as private individuals. When the Alliance was about to meet in New York, and the Yankee heavens and earth were moved about it, our Assembly at Little Rock was not jostled from its course one minute—not a vote was cast in favor of its prostituting its authority to such an appointment. Now, this case is exactly parallel—this Presbyterian Alliance, according to this second branch of the dilemma, is precisely an Evangelical Alliance of smaller extent.

We may be reminded of the clause in the Form of Government which clothes the Assembly with the power of “corresponding with foreign churches on such terms as may be agreed upon by the Assembly and the corresponding body,” and of our Assembly delegates annually sent to the (Dutch) Reformed and the Associate Reformed Churches in America. We reply with the question: Is this Pan-Presbyterian Alliance a *Church*? Has it ecclesiastical powers? If so, let it be spoken out. Again, the correspondence to be lawful, must be between the Assembly and the *Churches represented in the Alliance*. Is this so, or not? When Dr. Girardeau charged that our appearance in this Alliance brought us into correspondence with our detractors and injurers, the Radical American Church, with whom we had so solemnly said we would not correspond, gentlemen said, Oh, no! Now, which is it? If we do not, in this Alliance, correspond with the Churches represented in it, and that directly, including

this one with which we refuse to correspond, this article gives our Assembly no right. Once more, the *terms* are to be arranged *between* the Churches corresponding—not with a non-descript *tertium quid*. When Alexander of Macedon was asked to run a race at the Olympian games, he answered: “Yes, provided kings are my competitors.” So, our Assembly deigns to treat, provided spiritual queens treat with her: she does not stoop to place herself on a level with any voluntary association of private persons which offers itself. Her acts are and must be authoritative and responsible. She demands a responsible party to treat with, and that not a superior, but an equal. Finally, who dreams that, under the modest word, “correspondence,” the framers of our Constitution ever designed to confer all these vague legislative powers? Their meaning in the Constitution is the Constitution. They doubtless chose the word correspondence, because *correspondence is not alliance*. My correspondent is not my business partner. The relation which our Assembly assigned to itself as to “foreign Churches,” was carefully chosen so as to repudiate that common visible centre of unity at which this Alliance aims, and to leave the manifestation of Christian unity, where the Bible leaves it, in community of principles, spirit, and affections.

It was with good reason, then, that Dr. Palmer warned Dr. Robinson, in the last Assembly, that in going into this Alliance, he was launching into a disastrous revolution. The step which the Assembly has been betrayed into is but as “the letting out of waters.” If the chasm be not speedily closed, we shall find ourselves upon a flood, which will strand us far from our proper moorings, and amidst the wreck of the precious interests which the Head of the Church has committed to our care.

ARTICLE V.

THE VATICAN DOGMA.

1. *Constitutio Dogmatica Prima de Ecclesia Christi.* Cap. iv. 1870.
2. *The Pope and the Council.* By JANUS. Authorised Translation. London. 1869.
3. *The Condemnation of Pope Honorius.* By P. LE PAGE RENOUF. London. 1868.
4. *The Case of Pope Honorius Reconsidered, with reference to Recent Apologies.* By P. LE PAGE RENOUF. London. 1869.
5. *A Letter addressed to the Duke of Norfolk, on occasion of Mr. Gladstone's Recent Expostulation.* By JOHN HENRY NEWMAN, D. D., of the Oratory. London. 1875.

The doctrine of the Infallibility of the Pope is the most recently accepted Church doctrine in Christendom. In every age, the inspiration of prophets, apostles, and evangelists was an admitted fact; but the notion that the divine gift is so connected with a particular ecclesiastical office, that when a fallible man is by fallible men appointed thereto, he instantly becomes infallible, is an idea which was utterly unknown in the earlier centuries of Christianity. The first Roman bishops, omitting of course the apostle Peter, whom some, indeed, claim as the first Pope, never asserted such a thing for themselves, and nobody in the earlier ages asserted it on their behalf. The most ambitious spirit among them for four hundred years, did not dream of anything higher than to have the occupant of the Roman See acknowledged as first bishop among the bishops of Christendom. In the humble pastor of the Christian congregation at Rome, in Pagan times often a confessor and a martyr, and even in Christian times the subject and protégé of the emperor, none then, except a seer to whom futurity read like an open book, could have beheld what the after ages saw in his successor, the Universal Bishop, the Head of the Church, the Vicar of Christ, the King of Central Italy, the Sovereign of the World, the Infallible Pope.

Though the Bishop of Rome, like other ecclesiastics of the time, was in the habit of giving his opinion on doctrinal subjects, yet

down till the time of Siricius in the year 385, he issued, so far as is now known, no doctrinal decree whatever. Leo the Great (440—461) was the first Roman bishop in whom the papal spirit unmistakably appears, and his letter to Flavian in the year 449, containing a doctrinal exposition of the two natures in the person of Christ, was the first dogmatic decision from the Roman chair which was accepted in the east as well as in the west; but he himself admitted that its acceptance by the other bishops was necessary to its validity, and, as a matter of fact, it was not regarded authoritative until it was confirmed by the Council of Chalcedon. The Greek Church does not yet, and never did, receive the mere definition of the pontiff as decisive of any doctrinal question; while even in the Western Church, a thousand years from the introduction of Christianity had to pass before the bull of a pope, unconfirmed by a General Council, was regarded as conclusive and final on any religious matter whatever. The idea of infallibility being lodged in the person of the pope, was during that period unknown, or, if mooted by any individual, found no acceptance from any large portion of the Church.

The basis for the great dogma was not laid till the eighth century, when the Roman bishop became a temporal sovereign, through the favor of the Frankish kings. The forged Decretals in the following century attempted to throw the halo of antiquity around the temporal power, and in an ignorant uncritical age, succeeded in convincing the world that the pontiff, by right, had always occupied the position of supremacy in the Church, and of territorial sovereignty in the world, which he occupied then. It is not supposed that the popes were the authors of these celebrated forgeries; but there is apparently some impeachment of their infallibility, in the fact that successive occupants of the Roman See used the Decretals, either knowing or not knowing them to be forgeries, (it matters little which,) in extending their spiritual power, in establishing their temporal independence, and in having their claim to supremacy admitted by kings and governments. It became forthwith an idea, settled down in the mind of the world, that these spurious epistles, professing to have been written by the Roman bishops of the second and third centuries,

were genuine and authentic documents; and under this impression Gratian had extracts from them, ascribing almost unlimited power to the pontiff, inserted in his *Decretum*, which appeared in the twelfth century, and which became the basis of the Canon Law.

Two principles in the Decretals laid the foundation for the doctrine of Infallibility: the first is, that the decrees of no council are to be held valid until they are confirmed by the pope; the second is, that the Roman bishop is the one bishop of the Universal Church, and that all the other bishops derive their authority from him. These two principles being admitted, infallibility followed as an inference. Nicholas I. (858–867) lost no opportunity of pressing on all with whom he came into contact, that the decisions of the pope were laws for the whole Church. Two centuries afterwards, the school of writers who took their tone from Gregory VII., elaborated the principle, that the authority of the pope was superior to that of fathers and councils, and rested his claim to dominion over kings and emperors on the fact that Christ had bestowed on St. Peter power to bind and loose—an expression which, wrested from its original setting, is vague enough to mean anything, but which Gregory interpreted to mean that he himself had power to bind upon men for king or emperor any person whom he pleased, and at his pleasure to loose subjects from their allegiance. Though his claim to supremacy rested ultimately on his own authority, and the admission of his claims necessarily implied his infallibility, still it was not so much infallibility as personal sanctity, on which he built. But as it was well known that some popes had not much sanctity to speak about, he maintained that every pope, however wicked his previous life had been, became a saint on his appointment to the Papal chair, through the imputed merits of St. Peter. Had that idea been followed up, the sinless perfection of the pope, not his infallibility, might now have been an article of faith in the Romish Church.

The *Decretum* of Gratian, which appeared about the middle of the twelfth century, and which was based on the fabrications and false interpretations that for the previous four hundred years

had been accumulating and lodging themselves in the mind of Christendom, did much to aid in prostrating the Christian world at the feet of Rome. It laid the foundation for extensive religious persecution, by teaching that heresy is an offence worthy of torture and death, and that all who disobey a papal command are heretics; and it taught that the pope, being vicar of Peter, is entitled to the same authority as is due to him whom Peter represented, and consequently that he is superior to all law, and that the laws of the Church derive their validity from him only. The Canon Law, from this time forward, became the favorite study of the clergy; it was taught at Bologna, and carried out into practice in the Roman courts; and none took the trouble of examining into the series of fictions and forgeries which supplied so much of the material out of which it was constructed.

From this time onward, the papal power grew rapidly. About the middle of the thirteenth century, a Latin ecclesiastic, whose name is not now known, published a work with the view of providing a historical basis for the claims to universal monarchy then advanced by the papacy in the most aggressive and offensive form. This work consisted of a series of extracts, from writings ascribed to Chrysostom and two Cyrils, and various other Fathers and Councils, which are now known to be spurious. In that uncritical age, the writings out of which this *catena* was made, passed for being both genuine and authentic. This work, got up entirely in the interest of the papacy, was laid before Pope Urban IV. in 1261. Urban himself had no doubt that the authorities quoted were all trustworthy, for he not only made use of its statements in writing to the Greek emperor, but sent it to Thomas Aquinas, the most celebrated theologian of that age. Aquinas, though a man of great industry and subtle intellect, was not only ignorant of the way in which the genuineness of historical documents may be tested, but also of the Greek language, and consequently never suspected that the materials supplied to his hand under the names of Chrysostom and Cyril, were extracts from writings which Cyril and Chrysostom had never seen, and contained sentiments which they would have been the first to repudiate. The "angelic doctor" was imposed upon. He believed

that in the work sent him by Pope Urban, he was possessed of a series of trustworthy testimonies, which proved beyond a doubt that the Great Councils and the Great Fathers of the fourth and fifth centuries, acknowledged the bishop of Rome as the infallible monarch of the whole Church. The information thus obtained was systematised by Aquinas, and all of it which concerned the pope was inserted in his work *Against the Greeks*, and also in his *Summa*. He was the first to give adequate expression to the idea of infallibility, and thus the doctrine regarding the pope found its way into the greatest work on Dogmatic Theology which the middle ages produced, and was sent out to the world under cover of an illustrious name.

That doctrine was in substance this: that Christ conferred his own plenary authority on Peter; that the pope, as Peter's successor, has alone power to bind and to loose and to command, and that every one in the Church is bound to obey the pope as he would obey Christ. The apostolic see alone is the fountain of truth, for its faith cannot fail, while that of all other Churches may; it is a sort of central sun, with which all other Churches are to associate, and from which they are to derive their light. A general council is not only inferior to the pope, but receives whatever authority it has from him; it belongs to him, not to it, to decide every doctrinal question; and whoever rejects his authority is a heretic.

St. Thomas knew so little of the genuine writings of Chrysostom and Cyril, that he accepted the above summary of doctrine taught in the forgeries put into his hands, as if it had been the real doctrine of those eminent fathers of the Greek Church. But as all know who have taken the pains to examine their writings, their tendency was in an exactly opposite direction. No doubt, when controversy and strife ran high in the east, the weaker party always tried to strengthen its position by being able to allege that the great ecclesiastic of the west was upon its side; still the fact remains, that the Greek bishops and councils, jealous of the growing power of the Roman see, never conceded to it anything but a primacy, and successfully resisted then, as they do at present, every attempt to establish over them a papal domination.

"It was then," says Janus, "on the basis of fabrications invented by a monk of his own order, including a canon of Chalcedon giving all bishops an unlimited right of appeal to the pope, and on the forgeries found in Gratian, that St. Thomas built up his papal system, with its two leading principles, that the pope is the first infallible teacher of the world, and the absolute ruler of the Church. The spurious Cyril of Alexandria is his favorite author on this subject, and he constantly quotes him."*

The great service which Aquinas thus rendered to the papacy, was to take the doctrine regarding the pope out of the Canon Law, in which it had been assigned a place by Gratian and the jurists, and to give it a place in the greatest production of mediæval times as an integral part of Dogmatic Theology. For such a distinguished service to the cause they had at heart, the popes were not ungrateful. St. Thomas ever after became the favorite theologian of the Church. John XXII., in the Bull in which he canonized him, affirmed that Aquinas had not been without a special inspiration from the Holy Ghost; and Innocent VI. said that whoever opposed the teaching of St. Thomas incurred *prima facie* the suspicion of heresy.

Time was needed, however, to enable the new doctrine to make way. Though it was generally supposed even then that the Church, by a special providence, was exempted from falling into error, it was not then, nor indeed for a long time after, the common doctrine, that a pope could not under any circumstances fall into heresy, nor give an erroneous decision upon a question of faith. So little way had the doctrine made, that in 1388, a century after the death of Aquinas, the theological faculty of the University of Paris, in its quarrel with the Dominicans, selected a series of errors out of the writings of St. Thomas, and among others the doctrine of the Papal Infallibility, alleging it to be a well-known doctrine of the Church that there does lie an appeal from the pope to a general council.

The impetus given to the subject by Aquinas, backed up by the whole power of the papacy, was, however, too strongly supported to be successfully resisted, and as time passed on the doctrine became more fully developed. Trionfo in 1320, and Tor-

* See *Janus*, p. 267.

quemada about 1450, the latter resting his arguments mainly on quotations from the spurious Cyril, and other questionable testimonies, followed in the track of Aquinas. Torquemada maintained that the pope is infallible, that all other bishops derive their authority from him, and that the decrees of councils which are not confirmed by his authority are of no validity. Cardinal Cajetan, in the Reformation age, Melchior Canus, and Bellarmine, took the same side, all pleading the authority of Aquinas, and all like him quoting the same forged documents in support of their views. So much is this the case, that Aquinas, Cajetan, and Melchior Canus, may be regarded as the authors of the doctrine: they put it at least into shape, and gave it currency through the world. The Dominicans themselves in due time discovered the mistake which had been made by St. Thomas, the great ornament of their order, in taking spurious writings of the early ages for genuine historical documents; but long after the decretal epistles had been given up on all sides as an exploded forgery, the Jesuits continued to quote the spurious Cyril in support of the papal pretensions; and "Janus" states that even so late as 1713 an Italian professor used the latter in historical proof.

While the doctrine of papal infallibility was thus manifestly gaining ground, evidences on the other hand were frequently presenting themselves that it was very far as yet from meeting universal or even general acceptance. The Councils of Constance and Basle, in the fifteenth century, both decided that a council is a higher authority than a pope. Adrian VI., before ascending the papal chair, when acting as theological professor at Louvain, had maintained that a papal decision might establish a heresy, and had asserted that as a matter of fact several popes had been heretical: and so far was he from resiling from the doctrine thus given to the world, that after becoming pontiff he had his work, in which these opinions are stated, republished at Rome. The declaration of the General Assembly of France, drawn up by Bossuet, and issued in 1682, expressly stated that—

"Although in the decision of questions of faith, the Sovereign Pontiff has the principal part, and his decrees regard all Churches and each Church in particular, yet they are not to be considered infallible unless they have been accepted by the Church."

And in a declaration issued by the Romish bishops of Ireland at the time they were seeking emancipation in 1826, it is stated—

“It is not an article of the Catholic faith, neither are they required to believe, that the pope is infallible.”

So matters stood, so far as this doctrine is concerned, up till the 18th of July, 1870. For six hundred years previously the papal infallibility had been a matter of opinion, which a devout Romanist might at his pleasure believe or reject. But upon the day aforesaid, a doctrine which was absolutely unknown for the first seven centuries to the fathers, the bishops, and even to the popes themselves; which had its roots in the Roman temporalities and in the arrogant pretensions of Gregory VII.; which found its authority in the forged decretals, and in spurious documents fathered upon ancient Greek fathers and councils; which, owing to an entire misconception and error of Thomas Aquinas, went out to the world with the sanction of his great name; which has no place in that most Romish of all Romish symbols—the creed of Pope Pius IV.; and which has been repudiated by many of the best men in the Catholic Church in past and present times—was proclaimed by Pius IX., with the approbation of the Vatican Council, and has since been accepted, as we believe, by all Romish Bishops throughout the world. From that day the infallibility of the pope has ceased to be a matter of opinion—it has become an article of faith, which no Roman Catholic can now deny, without heresy and exposing himself to excommunication.

The value of the dogma may in some degree be estimated by the avowed motives and objects of those who took part in its manufacture. The dogma itself, as it was defined at the council, professes to be divinely revealed; but beyond this bare asseveration, there is no attempt to shew that it was the subject of any special revelation. Few of those who spoke in its favor at the general congregations of the council, attempted to prove that it was founded on Scripture, confirmed by history, or even supported by the unbroken tradition and universal consent of the Church. They assumed it to be true—the main question to which they addressed themselves being, whether it was opportune

to proclaim it. It was urged, for instance, that the promulgation of the dogma would restore the broken unity of the Church, which it could do on no principle except this—that henceforth when the pope speaks no man must presume to differ. It was alleged also, that the dogma, if adopted, would restore the coercive power of the Church, for each bishop, speaking as the pope directs, would be simply repeating the words of the Holy Spirit, and resistance to such words would be rebellion against God. It was also urged in its favor, that multitudes outside the Church would be drawn into her communion by the assurance of finding there a living, authorised, unerring guide, to whom they could always have recourse, in order to have their doubts satisfied and their scruples removed; that it would facilitate the conversion of pagans, to be able to point them to a living authority, whose decisions on all subjects of faith and morals could never be wrong; that no time was so suitable for the proclamation of the doctrine as then, when all the bishops were so devoted to the See of St. Peter; and that the definition would gratify the aged pontiff, whose pontificate already promised to surpass in length the legendary pontificate of St. Peter himself, console him for the loss of his temporal dominions, and comfort him amid his sorrows. The dogma was thus assumed to be true, and no serious attempt was made to produce in its favor any evidence which could weigh for one moment with those who make the Holy Scriptures their only rule of faith, or who feel it impossible to resist the pressure of historical proof. It was simply taken for granted by the majority that a general council of the Church could not err, that the Vatican Council of 1869 was *(Ecumenical*, and that if the Vatican could only be persuaded to affirm the doctrine with moral unanimity, then, as a matter of course, it must be divinely revealed. When the minority asked to be shewn authority from Scripture in its favor, the only answer given was to repeat the passage where Christ prayed for Peter that his faith should not fail. When it was said that the council should be careful about a doctrine that is in direct opposition to historic fact, the answer invariably given was, that fact must yield to dogma—that faith must conquer history.

The terms in which the Vatican dogma is expressed have been already,* and need not here be repeated. They are so vague as to be capable of more than one or two plausible interpretations, but they appear to involve clearly the following propositions :

1. That infallibility is vested in the Roman pontiff only when he speaks *ex cathedra*.

2. An *ex cathedra* decision is not a private and personal opinion, dropped incidentally in conversation, or otherwise, but a special declaration given in his capacity as a public teacher—"the pastor and doctor of all Christians."

3. Though the pontiff requires submission from pastors and people in matters of government and discipline†—matters in regard to which he is not declared infallible, yet the doctrine to be held by the universal Church, which he has power to define infallibly, must concern faith or morals.

4. The only infallibility which he possesses is that with which Christ willed his Church to be endowed in defining a doctrine regarding faith or morals.

5. The source of this infallibility is the Divine assistance promised to the pope in the blessed Peter, thus enabling him to speak with apostolic authority.

6. The purpose of thus defining is, that the dogma may be held by the universal Church—that is, may be binding on all Christians.

7. Definitions thus pronounced, being beyond the possibility of error, are unchangeable in their own nature, apart altogether from the consent of the Church.

8. The Vatican Council, or rather the pope, speaking with the approbation of the Council, proclaims all this as a dogma divinely revealed.

That these propositions are embodied in the decree seems clear enough ; but some reflection is needed before the mind can take in the vast extent of territory which these propositions cover, and the full meaning which underlies them. If a man accept

*See *Southern Presbyterian Review*, for April, 1875, p. 372.

†*Dogmatic Constitution on the Church*, chap. iv.

this dogma as an article of faith, he must be prepared to receive as a divine revelation any sentiment whatever that the present pope, or any of his successors, may choose to issue *ex cathedra* hereafter, however false, absurd, or contradictory it may appear to him to be. Not only so, but it binds him to believe in the infallibility of no fewer than 256 men who filled the apostolic chair before the present pontiff, each of whom had an equal claim to supreme apostolic authority, and had as good a right to depend upon the divine assistance promised in blessed Peter as Pius IX. In regard to some of these, the records of their public and official instructions are lost, so that their alleged infallibility is of no use to the Church at large, however it may have benefited their own generation. But with regard to a large number, there exists a tolerably complete collection of their doctrines and principles, contained in their published treatises, sermons, letters, their bulls and decretals, and in the decisions of councils which they publicly accepted and confirmed; and the Vatican decrees affirm, as a matter of divine revelation, that in none of all these public utterances, extending over nineteen centuries, is any error in faith or morals to be found.

Moreover, faith and morals are themselves terms capable of such wide application, that they may be interpreted so as to include almost anything. Under the head of faith, anything whatever which might be supposed to affect the Romish religion injuriously, such as the circulation and reading of the Scriptures in the vulgar tongue, the freedom of the press, the elementary education of the people, or the toleration of a different form of Christianity, the pope might use his newly-admitted privilege to condemn. Morals is a term so vast in its reach, that it comprehends all that ought to be done, and all that ought not to be done, by a man, or a society, or a nation; and if there be anything not comprised in it, that defect can easily be supplied, for Dr. Manning claims for the pope, and denies to the State, the right of defining how far the sphere of faith and morals extends.* If the owner of a territory is vested with the sole right of fixing the

* *Cesarism and Ultramontanism*, p. 40.

limits of it at any point he pleases, it depends, of course, on his mercy and pleasure whether the limits are not fixed at a point which will include his neighbor's estate as well as his own. It follows that a very little pretension, and no ingenuity whatever, is needed to make any secular subject an ecclesiastical question, and to bring it within that sphere or territory over which the pope claims sole and exclusive jurisdiction. On any matter whatever, which touches the connexion between Church and State, the law of marriage and divorce, the punishment of criminals, church property, wills, taxation, even on subjects of peace and war,—for on all such subjects there is a right and a wrong,—the pope, acting strictly within the decree, may, at any moment when it suits him, claim a right to speak; and when infallibility speaks, there is nothing left to kings and governments but to obey, on pain of being publicly condemned as atheists and open enemies of God. Grant to the pontiff all that is claimed in the decree, and let the Christian kingdoms obey the orders of infallibility, and that moment the Pope of Rome becomes the master of the world.

There is much more, therefore, in the dogma of the Vatican than the simple imagine. It involves interests and consequences the most momentous. Governments and nations need not practise the self-deception of supposing that they have nothing to do with it, or that it is a mere abstract theory—a dead letter lying on the ecclesiastical statute-book, never intended to be carried out. Can any man who has read history hesitate to believe that if Rome only had the power, it would be carried out to-morrow, with a terrible consistency, in every corner of Europe? We may feel assured that the decree was not made for nothing. It is an instrument fashioned for a purpose. Carefully and quietly in the ecclesiastical armory it may be deposited for a time; but when the moment comes, if come it ever will, when the Church shall have power to use it, kings and governments may expect to feel its edge. This much at least is obvious, that however abstract and harmless the dogma may appear, there lie coiled up within its folds consequences of a very dangerous kind; and this fact alone

would entitle the whole subject to a very careful and serious examination.

The Vatican Council expressly says that its design in proclaiming the doctrine of the Papal Infallibility, is "for the glory of God our Saviour, the exaltation of the Catholic religion, and the salvation of Christian people."* This makes it the more necessary to inquire whether the doctrine has any real basis in the Holy Scriptures. It would be rather strange should it turn out that any doctrine conducive to such great and important ends has been entirely omitted in the inspired writings, which of themselves, without any human additions, are "able to make wise unto salvation."

To come at once to the root of the whole matter, let us consider, in the first place, whether, as the decree affirms, there is any divine assistance promised to the pope in the blessed Peter; for it is in virtue of that assumption that he claims to be infallible. The fact, upon investigation, is found to be, that the Holy Scriptures never mention the pope, and never allude to such a dignitary; and consequently they do not contain a promise of divine assistance to him more than to any other Christian. To Peter, as distinguished from the other apostles, there was no special promise, except what may be implied in the two expressions, "the rock" on which the Church was to be built, and that to him were given "the keys of the kingdom." But what is conveyed by these figurative phrases? It has been shewn so often that it is almost unnecessary to repeat it, that the first of these phrases predicts the personal eminence of Peter among the apostles; he was to be a rock among the foundation stones of the Christian temple (Eph. ii. 20); while the other promise finds its fulfilment in the fact that Peter was the first with the key of gospel doctrine to admit the Jews and Gentiles into the Church visible (Acts ii. and x.), and with the key of discipline to shut transgressors out of the kingdom (Acts viii. 20-23). But in the words of Christ in Matt. xvi. 17-19, there is no allusion to infallibility in his public teaching, and consequently no promise of

* *Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ*, chap. iv.

divine assistance to him or to his successors (if he had successors), in the attainment of that result. Inspiration no doubt was a divine gift, common to Peter and to all the apostles and prophets; but what we need to have, in order to give validity to the Vatican statement, is evidence to shew that this divine gift descended to the pope as successor of Peter, and not to the successors of any of the rest. If such be the fact, there is no intimation of it in the Christian Scriptures; if such be not the fact, nobody has any grounds for speaking of "divine assistance being promised to the pope in the blessed Peter."

The words in the New Testament which make the nearest approach to teaching the Infallibility of the Pope, are Christ's words to Simon Peter (Luke xxii. 31, 32):

"Simon, Simon, behold, Satan hath desired to have you, that he may sift you as wheat; but I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not: and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren."

To any man whose simple object is to know the true meaning of the Divine Word, it must surely be evident that this passage refers to Peter personally: to the Satanic agency which would tempt him to deny Christ; to the divine help which would be afforded him in his special temptation; to the faith which would still survive, though not strong enough to keep him from falling; to his grievous sin; his subsequent restoration to favor; and to the practical use he was to make of his own sad experience in strengthening others to resist and overcome the assaults of the Tempter. The answer of the Apostle implies that he himself did not understand these words as conferring a privilege which was to elevate him above his brethren, but as intimating a personal defection which he thought he had zeal and attachment sufficient to avoid. The whole passage is personal, experiential, practical, in a high degree; and nothing but the exigencies of a doctrine otherwise totally wanting in support from Scripture, could determine any man to press this passage into the service of infallibility. It is only to men who literally can allege nothing else, that such a text seems decisive.

Nothing can be more satisfactory than to see how the fathers of the Church themselves interpreted these words in the centu-

ries before papal infallibility was heard of, and when there was no foregone conclusion to be supported.

Ambrose of Milan (340–397) expounds the passage thus :

“If Peter, who followed the Lord at the first call, is to be converted once more, who can say that he himself was suddenly converted? Be on your guard against boasting; beware of the world: for it was he who said, ‘We have left all and followed Thee,’ who is here commanded to strengthen his brethren.”*

Cyril of Alexandria (412–444), one of the men in whose name the writings were forged which imposed upon Aquinas, and which helped so much to introduce the doctrine, saw in this classical passage no proof of the infallibility, as is evident from his exposition of it :

“With the intimation, he brings in immediately the word of consolation—‘When thou art converted,’ etc.—that is, be thou the strength and teacher of them that come to Me by faith. Admire, again, the aptness of the word, and the excellence of the Divine gentleness. Lest the fear of degradation from the apostleship in consequence of his denial should tempt him to despair, He fills him with the hope that he will obtain all the good which has been promised. For He said, ‘When thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren.’ What ineffable love of man! Before he sinned, he is already pardoned, and replaced in his apostolic dignity.”†

The Venerable Bede (673–735) follows in the same line of exposition :

“As I, says He, have by prayer protected your faith lest it should fail by the temptation of Satan, so do you remember to raise up and comfort, by the example of your patience, the weaker brethren, lest perhaps they may despair of pardon. He gave the same exhortation also after His resurrection, when on him who three times professed his love, He notwithstanding three times bestowed the recommendation to feed His sheep; for it was proper that the love manifested in a triple confession should wipe away the fear produced by a triple denial.”‡

Thus it appears that the passage now supposed by some of the Vatican fathers to teach the papal infallibility, was not so interpreted by the fathers of the early ages. It is evident from the

*Ambrose, *Expositio Lucæ*, ix. 50.

†Cyril, *Comment. in loco*.

‡Bede, *Expositio Lucæ Evangel.*, Lib. vi. *in loco*.

above extracts, that they understood it simply in the practical sense. But Trent and the Vatican are at one in saying that Scripture is not to be interpreted "contrary to the unanimous consent of the Fathers :"* and as it is clear from the extracts quoted that the Fathers are not unanimous in saying that this passage teaches the infallibility of the Pope, it is evident that those who interpret it in that way incur the anathema of the Council. But if not taught there, in what other passage of Scripture is it taught ?

Till the end of the seventh century, it is quite certain that none of the Fathers interpreted Luke xxii. 32 as teaching the papal infallibility. When they did begin to deviate from the natural interpretation, the first idea which it suggested to them was the indefectibility of the Roman Church—that it would never fail in point of orthodoxy and truth. Perhaps the earliest of the Christian writers who understood it in this sense was Pope Agatho, who occupied the Roman See from 678 till 681. In his letter to the emperor, he appeals to the promise of Christ to Peter as confirmatory of the fact that the Roman Church had never erred nor succumbed to heresy : and he asserts that his predecessors in the See had always obeyed the admonition to strengthen the brethren, and expresses his own determination to do so ; "for," he adds, "woe will be to me if I shall neglect to preach the truth of my God which they sincerely preached."†

Agatho saw in the passage the indefectibility of the Roman Church ; but that error was the stepping-stone of one still greater. Some centuries after, the idea of the indefectibility of the Roman Church blossomed into the notion of the infallibility of the man who is the chief pastor and head of that Church.

No intelligent man desires to claim for history a position to which it is not entitled. It is not a fountain of inspiration ; it makes no pretension to unfold the whole counsel of God ; it does not undertake to prove or to disprove any doctrine which is a matter of pure revelation only. But doctrines which have no

*See *Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith*, chap. ii.

†*Epistolæ, l. Ad Augustos Imperatores.*

solid basis in the Bible, but are the mere human creation or development of after times, come occasionally within the range over which history sweeps, and sometimes find it hard to take shelter from its fire. Some would place tradition, for example, as a teacher almost on a level with the Divine Word; but history steps in to shew that unwritten tradition has never transmitted with accuracy the details of any event farther down than one or two generations. We are asked to believe that supremacy was a divine gift conferred on Peter and his successors in the Roman See; but history teaches, and Dr. Newman himself is forced to admit, that its true source is in the usurpation by the Roman bishop of the privileges which the new-born zeal and superstition of the emperors conferred upon the bishops of the fourth century, and that is the natural product of a series of human agencies, some of them of a very questionable kind.* In like manner, when we are asked to admit that no pope has ever erred, or can err, in an official declaration regarding faith or morals, it is quite competent to shew, if we can, from history, that on such subjects popes in past ages have erred again and again. To deprecate the application of the touchstone of history to such a doctrine, is to betray the fear that possibly it may not stand a test so powerful and searching.

The Vatican dogma includes within it necessarily the statement, that no Roman Pontiff ever officially propounded a heresy, or taught any principle at variance with Scripture or tradition, or with what is now taught by the Roman Catholic Church on the subject of faith or morals. But many instances, as we think, have been pointed out in which popes have either fallen from the faith personally, or condemned their predecessors as impostors, or have publicly taught principles contradictory to those now avowed by the Church at whose head the Pontiff stands. We would specify the following cases:

Callistus was Bishop of Rome from the year 219 till 223. Originally a slave, who embezzled the money deposited in a bank which his master had started in Rome, he was afterwards con-

**Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*, pp. 23-27.

victed of raising a disturbance in a Jewish synagogue, and for this offence was scourged and transported to the mines of Sardinia. Accidentally released from this position, the recent convict made his way home, got into favor with the Roman Bishop Zephyrinus, and eventually succeeded him in his See. St. Hippolytus does not scruple to say, that even after he became Bishop of the Roman Church, Callistus was "an impostor and a knave," and that he "established a school of theology in antagonism to the Church." He seems to have denied the distinction of persons in the Godhead. His own words are, as represented by Hippolytus :

"I will not profess belief in two Gods, Father and Son, but in one. For the Father, who subsisted in the Son Himself, after He had taken unto Himself our flesh, raised it to the nature of deity by bringing it into union with Himself, and made it one ; so that Father and Son must be styled one God ; and that *this person being one, cannot be two.*"*

St. Hippolytus ends his description of Pope Callistus thus :

"A senseless and knavish fellow, who improvises blasphemies in every direction only that he may not seem to speak in violation of the truth, and is not abashed at being at one time betrayed into the tenet of Sabelius, whereas at another into the doctrine of Theodotus."†

It seems clear enough, if St. Hippolytus is deserving of any credit, that Pope Callistus in his public teaching was anything but infallible. One cannot but feel how strangely these words sound when set alongside of the testimony which the Vatican Council bears to the orthodoxy of the popes in the following words of the *Dogmatic Constitution on the Church* :‡

"All the venerable Fathers have embraced, and the holy orthodox doctors have reverently followed, their [successors of Peter] apostolic doctrine : knowing most fully that this See of holy Peter *remains ever free from the blemish of error*, according to the divine promise of the Lord our Saviour, made to the prince of His disciples, 'I have prayed for thee that thy faith fail not, and thou at length converted, confirm thy brethren.'"

*Hippolytus *Philosophumena*, lib. ix., cap. vii.

†The extracts from Hippolytus are given in the words of the translation in Clark's *Ante-Nicene Fathers*.

‡See chap. iv.

Liberius was Roman Pontiff from 352 till 366. For refusing to condemn the orthodox champion, Athanasius, he was banished to Thrace by the Arian emperor, Constantius. Two years of exile not only cooled his courage, but relaxed his faith. To procure his freedom, he renounced communion with Athanasius, and subscribed the Semi-arian creed of Sirmium, which contained the following words:

"No one can doubt that the Father is greater in honor, dignity, and divinity, and in the very name of Father: the Son Himself testifying, 'My Father is greater than I.' And no one is ignorant of this catholic doctrine that there are two persons of the Father and Son, and that the Father is the greater: but that the Son is subject, together with all things which the Father has subjected to Him."*

The words of the heretical pontiff himself, are:

"... The Catholic faith, which was handled and set forth at Sirmium by many brethren our fellow bishops, by all who were present, this I receive with willing mind, I contradict in nothing, I agree to it, I follow it, it is held by me."

Well may St. Hilary, the Athanasius of the West, as he records these words of the fallen pontiff, exclaim: "Again, and for the third time, anathema to thee, thou prevaricator, Liberius."† If there be truth in the orthodox doctrine, surely, the pontiff who subscribes an Arian creed in the face of the world, is not infallible.

Zosimus occupied the papal chair in the years 417 and 418. He publicly investigated the charges of false doctrine advanced against Pelagius and Cœlestius, the former of whom has given a name to a heresy which has never died out of the world since his time, pronounced sentence in favor of the heresiarchs, stigmatised their accusers as false witnesses, and wrote exultingly to the African bishops: "Rejoice you to learn that those whom false witnesses accused, have not been separated from our body and from Catholic truth."‡ But fortunately for the cause of truth, Augustine and the African bishops did not believe in the infallibility of

*See Socrates, II. E. lib. ii., cap. 30.

†*Epistola Liberii* in Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, vol. x., p. 691.

‡*Epistola Zosimi*, iii. 8, in *Patrologia Latina*, vol. xx., p. 660.

Zosimus; if they had, Pelagianism would probably have been orthodoxy over half of Christendom at present. Augustine and the Africans remained firm in their condemnation of Pelagius. Their condemnation was followed up by an imperial edict from Ravenna banishing the two heretics from Rome. The emperor of the time not only exercised the civil authority, but was wont to rule in ecclesiastical affairs as well; and the pope of that day, notwithstanding the highflying pretensions of his successors now, did not venture even to mutter his discontent. The pontiff, on the contrary, seeing that the Christian world did not come round to him, prudently determined to go with the world. He forthwith entered on the case afresh, viewed the whole subject in the light of events, excommunicated the men whom he had formerly cleared, and condemned the doctrines of Pelagius. In this case infallibility is found tripping, but it recovers itself before it totally goes down.

Pope Gelasius I. (492-496) clearly taught that the reception of the Eucharist is essential to the salvation of a child. In speaking of John vi. 53, which he interprets of the Lord's Supper, he says:

"There is no exception, nor has any one dared to say that an infant without this sacrament can be brought to eternal life, whereas without that life, it is certain it will be in eternal death."*

But the Council of Trent, whose definitions have been sanctioned by successive popes for three centuries, says the very opposite. In their *Catechism*,† the Fathers at Trent say:

"Although this law, [that all should communicate once a-year,] sanctioned by the authority of God and the Church, appertains unto all the faithful, it must, nevertheless, be taught that those are excepted who, by reason of their tender age, have not yet attained the use of reason; for they are incapable of discerning the Holy Eucharist from profane and common bread, and cannot bring with them to its reception piety and religion of mind."

* Gelasius, *Epistola* vii., addressed *Ad Omnes Episcopos per Picenum*, in *Patrologia*, Vol. lix., p. 37.

† Part ii., chap. iv., quest. 59. See also Sess. xxi., chap. 4. of *Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, which says: "This same holy synod teaches that little children who lack the use of reason are not by any necessity obliged to the sacramental communion of the Eucharist."

Gelasius says one thing : Trent, with the popes who have since sanctioned it, says the opposite. Which is infallible ?

Pope Vigilius (537-555) rose to the first position in the Church through the influence which the notorious Antonina, the profligate wife of the celebrated General Belisarius, was able to exercise at the Court of Justinian. Towards the close of his pontificate, in 553, the fifth general council condemned the three chapters—that is, the writings of the three Greek theologians, Theodore, Theodoret, and Ibas, who were supposed to favor the tenets of Nestorius, and forthwith issued a decree, to which, by order of the emperor, the bishops of the east and west were required to subscribe. Vigilius refused to accept the decree. He was forthwith summoned to Constantinople, and cast into prison. Three times he withdrew his condemnation of the Council's decision, and three times he renewed that condemnation. But he ended by accepting the decree which he had three times condemned, and afterwards being dismissed, he died on the return journey to Rome. Nothing could be more ignominious than such behavior. He had all the suffering of martyrdom, but none of its renown. The treatment which he received was not creditable to the emperor, and even a pope is not raised above the ordinary weakness of humanity. Acute suffering may account for the vacillations of ordinary individuals, but then one does not expect infallibility to veer with persecution. Let the winds of this world blow, and let the storms of human passion rage, one who cannot err must always point steadily to the truth. It is in vain to expect such a thing in the ecclesiastical weathercock, which Justinian could turn at his will.

Honorius was in possession of the popedom from 625 till 638. Sergius, patriarch of Constantinople, who originated the Monothelite heresy, took the precaution to obtain from him in 634 a statement favorable to his own opinions, in which Honorius said, "Whence also we confess the *one will* of our Lord Jesus Christ." A doctrine which had the patriarch, the pope, and the Emperor Heraclius all upon its side, might be expected to succeed ; but it did not. First, it was opposed by Sophronius, Bishop of Jerusalem, and in the end by nearly all the eastern bishops. Then it

was opposed by Popes John IV. and Theodore I. and Martin I.—the latter of whom was summoned to Constantinople for his opposition, and there cast into prison. Twenty years after, the sixth general council, commonly called the Council in Trullo, which met at Constantinople in 680, condemned Monothelitism, asserted that in Christ “there are two natural wills and two natural operations, without division, change, separation, or confusion,” and condemned the Patriarch Sergius and all his adherents, adding these ever-memorable words :

“We anathematise all of these ; but together with them we decree that the former Pope Honorius of Old Rome should also be excluded from the Church and anathematised, since we find in his letter to Sergius that he followed the opinions of the latter in all points, and confirmed his impious dogmas.”*

Not only did the papal legates who attended the council unite in this anathema of Honorius, but Pope Leo II. joined in the condemnation, stating that his predecessor had not only fomented error by his negligence, but “perverted the immaculate faith by a profane betrayal.”

The sentence of anathema against Pope Honorius for heresy was thus passed by the bishops of the sixth general council, subscribed by the papal legates, sanctioned by the reigning pope, confirmed by the emperor, and repeated in the seventh and eighth general councils. Hefele, Bishop of Rottenburg, who himself has since accepted the Vatican dogma, has stated these facts, and called attention to their importance, as shewing (1.) That the sixth general council claimed the right of passing judgment on a pope speaking *ex cathedra*. (2.) It condemned a decree given by him *ex cathedra*, because he thereby sanctioned heresy.†

*“Præter hos autem ex sancta quoque Dei ecclesia simul ejici et anathemate feriri censemus Honorium, quondam Papam Romæ veteris ; propterea quod nos invenimus per factas ab ipso litteras ad Sergium, eum illius sententiam esse secutum in omnibus, et ejus impia confirmasse dogmata.”—See Harduin *Concilia*, Vol. III., col. 1599.

† See also the evidence for the whole case admirably stated, and Dr. Newman’s objections anticipated and answered by a Roman Catholic writer, Mr. Le Page Renouf, in the two pamphlets named at the head of this article.

This case alone would be sufficient to shew how much the assertion of the personal infallibility is in contradiction to the facts of history. Dr. Newman's attempt to evade the consequences, demonstrates clearly the difficulties in his way. According to him, the words of Honorius "were not *ex cathedra*;" they "were not accompanied with the intention" of exercising infallibility; his condemnation "only decides that Honorius, in his own person, was a heretic;" but he "rather hopes and believes that the anathema fell, not upon him, but *upon his letters*, in their objective sense, he not intending personally what his letters legitimately expressed."* To all this it is a sufficient answer to say, that the letters written to Honorius by the eastern patriarchs, were official letters—that his reply was no less public and official—that it was pronounced by the council a "dogmatic letter"—and that the anathema did not fall on the letters, but, as the council takes good care to say, upon "the pope of Old Rome" (Honorium quondam Papam Romæ veteris). As to his intention we know nothing, apart from his words, which seem clear enough; but if men are at liberty to say that a pope's intentions are the very opposite of his words, how are we to benefit by the infallibility? The infallible interpreter would, in that case, himself need an interpreter—a Dr. Newman, to stand by his side and tell us when he means to speak truth.

Formosus, who had been excommunicated by a previous pontiff for being an accomplice in an attempt to murder a pope, and who had sworn never to resume episcopal functions, and never to return to Rome, eventually rose to the apostolic chair. He was pope from 891 till 896. The spirit of faction then ran high in the eternal city. Formosus took sides with the German against the Italian party. On his death, in 896, an Italian was elected to the popedom in the person of Stephen VI. On his accession, the dead body of Formosus was raised out of the grave, arrayed in the habiliments of a pope, solemnly tried by a council, stripped of its vestments, and, three of the fingers having been cut off, was cast into the Tiber. Not only so, but all the ordinations

* *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*. pp. 107-109.

which the deceased pontiff had performed, were declared null and void, and such persons as had submitted to them, and who were then alive, were reordained. Formosus had officially declared that those ordained by him were true priests; Stephen now officially said that they were not. *Ex cathedra* declaration here contradicts *ex cathedra* declaration. To crown all, Stephen VI. was soon afterwards himself cast into prison and strangled: and on the accession of Pope Theodore II., the same farce was acted over again, and all Stephen's ordinations reversed in their turn. To detect the infallibility here would be almost as difficult as to trace the line in which the apostolic succession ran.*

Pope John XXII. (1316-1334) set himself in his public decisions directly at variance with Nicholas IV. (1289-1292.) Nicholas had endeavored to terminate the strife in the Order of St. Francis, and in one of his Bulls had drawn a distinction between the use of property and its possession, saying that the possession of the property of the Order belonged to the Roman See, but that the members of the Order might use it in perfect consistency with their vow of poverty. The Franciscans regarded the Bull which made this distinction as the very charter of their order, and at a chapter held in Perugia, it was declared unanimously that to assert the absolute poverty of Christ is not heretical, but catholic, and in harmony with the faith. Pope John XXII. reversed all this. He pronounced the chapter guilty of heresy, rescinded the Bull of Nicholas, denounced the distinction between use and possession, and pronounced all who said that Christ and the apostles had no property, to be guilty of damnable heresy.† Had one pontiff under one set of circumstances prescribed poverty for the order, and another under a different set of circumstances prescribed and sanctioned the possession of property, there would be no contradiction, and infallibility might be claimed for both; but it is difficult to see how two pontiffs can both be infallible, when the one says that to assert the absolute poverty of Christ and his apostles is catholic and consistent with the faith, and the

* Milman's *Latin Christianity*, book v. chap. vii.

† *Constitutiones in Corpus Juris Canonici*, tit. xiv. ch. iii.

other is no less positive in asserting that the idea of the absolute poverty of Christ is an idea deserving of damnation.

These facts, even if nothing else could be produced, are surely sufficient to shew that some popes taught heresy, that they contradicted and condemned each other, that they reversed the action of each other, and that they taught officially in some instances what was condemned by general councils, and subsequently repudiated by the whole Church. Can any decree of infallibility reverse these historical facts? Was not the dogma proclaimed in defiance of them, or rather in the hope that the world had forgotten them, and that they would never again arise out of the tomb, in which so much of papal history lies conveniently buried, to confront the Fathers of the Vatican?

So long as Britain shall remain a great Protestant nation—strong at home and respected abroad—the doctrine of the infallibility is likely to remain among us a mere theory, void of all practical result; for to free countries, such as Britain and America, able to keep their ground against the world, it does not matter much what extravagant claims the old man at Rome, along with his curia and cardinals, may choose to set forth. But Britain may not always be a Protestant country, and a time may come when neither it nor America shall be so powerful as they are at present among the nations of the earth. It is in the hour of a nation's weakness that infallibility will have power to hurt. No man ought to shut his eyes to the fact that the pope, though a dethroned potentate, is not a mere individual bishop, but the recognised head and representative of the most complete organisation which ever existed in the world, comprising, perhaps, not less than one hundred and eighty millions of human beings; that from this time forth every one of these millions is bound, on penalty of heresy and excommunication, to believe that every sentence which is an official utterance of the pope on faith and morals, is as true as if it fell from the lips of God; and that when in future the pope shall take up a position of antagonism to any earthly government, as he is constantly in the habit of doing when a nation is in difficulty, or when it suits his purpose, it will be found that every subject who belongs to that ecclesiastical or-

ganisation will be under religious obligation to side with the pope against the government, and will be sure to do so in proportion to the strength of the religious spirit by which he is guided. Infallibility and truth are at one; God, therefore, must be on the side of infallibility, and the man who opposes what he believes to be infallibility, is opposing what he believes to be God. It is no comfortable reflection for the civil power to think that, in all future conflict with the power ecclesiastical, it is certain to have the conscience of its Roman Catholic subjects always on the opposite side; nor is it entirely reassuring to consider that its security lies in the fact that, with the most of men, their interests for this world are valued at a higher rate than the concerns of conscience and religion. No man can imagine that the decree of infallibility, which was carried through the Council with such persistence, and at such an immense cost of time, money, labor, and character, in defiance of advice, expostulation, warning, and fierce opposition, was intended to be a dead dogma on the books of the Church, never to be quickened into life nor turned to practical account. Results the most serious are certain to follow—some foreseen, and some, perhaps, unforeseen.

The supremacy of the Apostolic See over the civil governments of Christendom has been in past ages asserted over and over again. The well-known Bull of Pope Boniface VIII., entitled *Unam sanctam*, lays down the principle that the temporal authority is to be subject to the spiritual,* and we have been told on good authority, that the said Bull “contains no more than Ultramontanism.”† History furnishes not a few illustrations of the exercise, as well as assertion, of this power on the part of the pontiffs. The state and feeling of society for some ages past, have not, however, been favorable to such ecclesiastical intervention in the politics of nations; so much so that some had even ventured to hope that their dormant claims had become obsolete, and in the light of modern civilisation would never be revived. But for all such dreamers the Vatican Council had a rude awaken-

* “Oportet autem gladium esse sub gladio et temporalem auctoritatem spirituali subiecti potestati.”—*Corpus Juris Canonici*, vol. ii., col. 1159.

† Dr. Manning's *Cesarism and Ultramontanism*, p. 36.

ing in store. The decree has given vitality to all their claims, and has decided that they are the voice of infallibility seeking justice for the Church at the hands of the kings of the earth. Among the condemned errors of the Syllabus, we find this to be one—to say that Roman pontiffs and Œcumenical Councils have exceeded the limits of their power, or usurped the rights of princes.* In exercising authority over the civil power, to appoint or to depose kings, or to loose subjects from their allegiance, the pope is acting strictly, as he conceives, within the sphere, the limits of which he claims the absolute right of defining for himself. The powers that were exercised in the middle ages may therefore at any moment be exercised again. What follows? If the State acquiesces in the claim, it surrenders thereby its freedom, and makes itself the instrument of the curia to work out its ends; every citizen in that case becomes virtually a subject of the pope, and the pope becomes virtually the monarch of the nation. Of course there can then be no conflict of jurisdiction; for in the case supposed, the civil is merged in the spiritual. But should the government repudiate the claim, and assert its independence of priestly rule, then in the conflict which necessarily results, every citizen must take his side, and it is easy to see what side conscience and consistency require a man to take, who believes that there is a real infallibility on the one side and none on the other. In the conflicts of jurisdiction throughout past ages, a catholic layman, without forfeiting his position, could use his own judgment, and as a matter of fact, sided as often with the crown as he did with the tiara. This is now at an end. Liberty of thought and action, when infallibility speaks, finds no longer any place for itself. A catholic must take the pope's side, on penalty of forfeiting all hope for the other world. Hereafter, when his Holiness intervenes in politics, and asserts his claim to guide the legislation of a country, he will fight with a new weapon and under other conditions.

The adoption of the dogma gives new force and interest to all those Canons and Bulls by which the councils and popes of

* *Syllabus*, Prop. 23.

past ages were accustomed to deal with heretics. "Whoever does not agree with the apostolic See, is, without doubt, a heretic," says Pope Paschal II. The third canon of the Fourth Council of the Lateran, held by Innocent III., shows how the Church disposed of heretics when she had it in her power. By that canon the secular authorities were directed to exterminate *bona fide*, in proportion to their strength, all heretics pointed out by the Church. Should any temporal lord neglect for a year to act on this order, this is to be signified to the pope, who is then to loose his subjects from their allegiance, and is to give over the land to others to possess it without dispute, after the heretics are exterminated.* In the Provincial Council of Toulouse, held in the year 1229, and presided over by the papal legates, it was decreed that any person wilfully permitting a heretic to remain in his lands should lose his lands forever; and the whole population—males above fourteen and females above twelve—were ordered to swear that they would preserve the faith which the Roman Church holds and preaches, and that they would persecute the heretics in proportion to their strength.† The canons then passed were immediately ratified in blood: and the tragedy of Toulouse is one of the darkest passages in history. The French massacre of 1572, and the fiendish exultation with which that deed of mockery and crime was regarded at Rome, have lately received memorable illustration from the pen of Lord Acton. Protestants were trying to forget such things, and beginning to believe that the Church herself was unconsciously sharing a little in the more tolerant spirit of modern times, when Pius IX. intervened to remind us in the Syllabus that it is an error to say that "the Church has no power to employ force" to effect its objects, and, by defining infallibility, he has put every official utterance of dead popes in regard to faith and morals on a level with a fact of divine revelation. There is no more possibility of error in the one than in the other, if we are to believe the Vatican Council.

This necessitates as well as sanctions the revival of persecution

* Harduin *Acta Conciliorum*, vol. vii., col. 19. †See *Canons* 4 and 12.

in every country where it can be done with safety, and as a consequence the restoration of the Inquisition in every country where there is the power. The Dominicans, it is known, managed that dread institution in virtue of the pope's appointment. The Inquisition was always the pope's agent. Innocent IV. prescribed torture for the purpose of compelling prisoners to make confessions which could be used against themselves. It is sickening even to think of the effects of that terrible machinery which ecclesiastical wisdom invented, and ecclesiastical fear and hate kept in action. Men were seized on bare suspicion of heresy, and without being brought to trial, kept in dungeons till their death. Sons were encouraged to betray their fathers, and fathers to accuse their own children. An accused man was not permitted to cross-examine those who gave testimony against him, to see them face to face, or even to know their names. To a person on his trial, all legal assistance or advice was denied; and from the sentence of the tribunal no appeal was allowed. From the confession of guilt, which torture often compelled a man to make, and which in the circumstances was often untrue, if the victim was ever known to resile, there was no mercy: the assertion of his innocence was fatal; for a relapsed heretic there was nothing but inevitable death. Apart altogether from his opinions, the temptation to inflict death upon an accused man was almost inevitable, for the property of a condemned heretic passed away from his family and went to his murderers, in the proportion of one-half to the Inquisition and the other to the pontiff. The civil authorities executed the sentence which the council pronounced. It was theirs to build and maintain the prisons at their own expense, and to carry out the sentence of the holy office on pain of excommunication. The magistrate gathered the faggots for the fire: the Inquisition and the pope provided the lamb for the sacrifice; and between them the dark deed was done. What a pope then said and did is right, if he was infallible; can it now be wrong for infallibility to do over again what it said and did before? Certainly not. "No pope," says the Syllabus, "ever exceeded the limits of his power."

Not to dwell farther on the political consequences of the

dogma, such as its tendency to impair the civil allegiance of Roman Catholics, and to set civil governments at war with the consciences of their subjects at any moment when it may please the pope for his own ends to embarrass the civil power, we pass on to speak of some serious ecclesiastical consequences which have not received such prominent illustration in the controversy of the last few months.

One of the most important of these is the change which it makes in the constitution of the Church. Few of the great controversies of primitive ages passed away without an Œcumenical Council being summoned to pronounce a doctrinal decision on the subject. Even the great Reformation controversy of the sixteenth century was followed up by the Council of Trent, which clearly laid down the principles by which Catholicism was prepared to abide. But, henceforth, when an infallible decision on any point of faith or morals can be had from a man, what necessity can there be to trouble a council? What could a council do more than to lay down the infallible truth? But if this can be had from the pope, why go to the delay, the expense, and the parade of a council? There would be a useless expenditure of power in gathering from all ends of the earth a multitude of ecclesiastics to do what one man could do as well, if not better. If the primitive and mediæval Church had only known and believed in papal infallibility, no general council ever would have met: as the Romish Church now knows and believes it, there is no need for any general council in time to come. Except the Church shall make up its mind to break with the past and return to a still older past, the Vatican closes the list of Œcumenicals. The old Gallican theory which was broached at Constance, and which has found many learned advocates in the period that has since intervened, is now subverted at last. Henceforth there lies no appeal from the pope to a council. What more could men want than an infallible decision? The moment that infallibility opens its lips, every good Catholic is dumb.

The dogma makes all ecclesiastical reform impossible, or what amounts to the same thing, any ecclesiastical reform which the pope does not approve. Four or five centuries ago the public

voice clamored for the assembling of a general council to undertake the rather onerous duty of reforming the Church in its head and members; but until the Church, now caught in the net of infallibility, shall snap its ligaments and regain its freedom, no man will ever again think seriously of such a remedy for ecclesiastical abuses. The Church, as represented by the Vatican prelates, has signed away the power of reforming herself; she must no longer dispute the arrangements of the Infallible, however onerous or injurious they prove, but leave all to the pope, who can either reform or deform as he pleases.* His past conduct in the line of reforming abuses does not encourage us to be sanguine as to the future. History does him great injustice if he ever was a very vigorous reformer. The general belief is that in the past ages the pope was the most uncompromising enemy of all reform, and that he lightened but very few of the heavy burdens which men were called upon to bear. All who filled the Roman See, we cheerfully admit, were not equally wicked. It is well known, however, that some of the worst specimens of humanity with which the Church has ever been afflicted, made their way to that position, and from men so unsuccessful in reforming themselves, little hope of Church reform could be expected. But a good man in the papal chair, even if disposed to remove abuses, will henceforth find it impossible: the decrees of his infallible predecessors will tie his hands and shut his mouth.

The effect of the decree on the position of Roman Catholic bishops in their relation to the pope, is also very marked. Although it is one which is of little concern to the world outside, it is almost tantamount to a revolution in the government of the Romish Church. Previous to the year 1870, the bishops of the

*"Since by Divine right of the apostolic primacy the Roman Pontiff presides over the Universal Church, we further teach and declare that he is the supreme judge of the faithful, and that in all causes appertaining to ecclesiastical jurisdiction, recourse may be had to his judgment; and that none may reopen the judgment of the apostolic See, than whose there is no greater authority, and that it is not lawful for any one to sit in judgment on its judgments."—*Dogmatic Constitution on the Church*, ch. iii.

Church in general council assembled were understood to be the witnesses as to general tradition and the supreme depositaries of the faith. A doctrine affirmed by them was held to have the *semper ubique et ab omnibus* on its side, and instantly became part and parcel of the rule of faith. They were the legislators of the Church; it was understood that they could define doctrine, prescribe ritual, or decree canons of discipline at their pleasure. That idea dominated in Nice, Ephesus, Chalcedon, and in all subsequent councils. Even in later times all that the popes did was to manage the bishops so as to control their decisions, and afterwards to give effect to these decisions by their sanction and ratification. But the late council at the Vatican altered this state of things entirely. The pope there proclaimed the decrees, the council simply giving its approval.* His superiority to general councils, and his personal infallibility, entirely independent of them, were for the first time acknowledged. Henceforth the pope is free to act without the assistance of the bishops in defining doctrine, and without deigning to consult them, can henceforth frame canons on discipline and government, "to which all, both pastors and faithful, are bound to submit." His duty in future is to lay down the law: theirs simply is to obey the Infallible. In all time coming, a bishop is not a witness for the truth—a member of the supreme court, from which there comes forth infallible legislation: he is now a mere administrator, the executive servant of the supreme government, the delegate of the pope. This difference in position is one, however, which more concerns themselves, than any external parties. What we have to note is, that henceforth the statement of a Romish theologian, or even of an ancient father, does not weigh for a feather, when the declaration of a pope can be obtained: Cyprian and Ambrose, Jerome and Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas—the great intellects, the brilliant stars, which have lighted up the gloom of the early and middle ages, must henceforth pale before such modest luminaries as Popes Callistus and Honorius, Formosus and Alexander VI. Romish doctrine is no longer what it once was boast-

*" *Sacro approbante concilio.*"—*Constitutio Dogmatica*, in initio.

ed to be—the expression of the universal consent of the Church as witnessed by a general council; in future it is to be based on the *ex cathedra* declaration of the pope alone—the one grand centre and sole fountain of doctrinal and moral truth to all who believe in the decrees of the Vatican. Protestant writers henceforth may give themselves to the fathers and councils as well as to the Scriptures: Romish divines in future need not extend their studies beyond the bulls and allocutions.

In one point of view the prelates of the council deserve the praise of being disinterested, as they could not but know that the pope would be the main gainer by the decree. The universal reception of it must add immensely to his power. Formerly he was only a limited monarch; now he is an absolute sovereign. Formerly he was held to some extent in check by a general council, which, as at Constance and at Basle, has pronounced occasionally very cruel sentences on popes themselves, and to which an aggrieved person could always with some plausibility appeal. Formerly he was in some degree controlled by the canon law, which, amid its accumulation of rubbish, has treasured up the collective wisdom and practice of ecclesiastics in preceding ages, and which, in theory at least, was supposed to be unalterable except by a general council. But the recent council has cleared away this obstruction, and invested him personally with the power of annulling or modifying or adding to any portion of the canon law at pleasure; for, as Mr. Gladstone has justly observed, the same dogmatic constitution which endows him with infallibility in faith and morals only, requires implicit obedience from clergy and people on matters of discipline and government—subjects for which no infallibility is claimed.* Privileges which in the course of ages had grown up under the canon law, he can now reverse or reduce to nullity by his own individual act. The Jesuits, or those whom Dr. Newman calls the “partisans of Rome, who have not the sanctity and wisdom of Rome herself,” know when to apply the pressure, and can make the fountains of inspiration play at any moment they please. There is no longer need,

*See *The Vatican Decrees in their bearing on Civil Allegiance*, p. 39.

as was once said with more wit than reverence, "to carry the Holy Ghost down to Trent in a portmanteau" to find expression in the council of bishops; henceforth the Holy Ghost will not leave the Vatican, provided the pope himself can manage to remain there. Having inspiration at command, the occupant of the Roman See has it in his power to turn to folly the wisdom of the most venerable council; he can make laws at pleasure; he can coin a new doctrine, a new rite, a new canon, a new festival, and give it the current stamp of the Church Catholic, without taking the trouble either to inquire at the Holy Scriptures, or to gather up the tradition of the Churches, or to obtain the consent of bishops or priests, kings or governments. Let the decrees of the Vatican be only wrought into the everyday thought of the Christian population in Roman Catholic countries, until they come to regard them as among the eternal verities of their faith, and the pope becomes the most irresponsible and absolute potentate upon earth.

The fact is that modern ingenuity has now opened at the Vatican a storehouse, out of which an inexhaustible supply of Christian doctrines and duties and regulations and orders can be procured as it may be necessary. In past centuries error travelled at a pace comparatively slow. Falsehoods in doctrine or inventions in ritual, if they originated, as they did not always do, in some distant outskirt of Christendom, usually travelled towards the centre at no very rapid rate, and only rose to the place of honor after they had won over the world to their side. So gradual was the advancement of error, that it required very nearly a millennium to bury the truth out of sight of men. But now when the official dictum of one man can make an article of faith, which the whole Church is bound to believe for no reason whatsoever except that it falls from him, the noxious plant may be expected to grow with more than tropical luxuriance. In these circumstances, let any man who knows the papal spirit of the age, reflect what guarantee the Christian world at this moment has that the following doctrines and edicts may not be sent forth from the Vatican, before the nineteenth century closes, with all the solemn sanctions of infallibility:

1. That the temporal power of the popedom is an essential doctrine of Christianity, and a dogma divinely revealed.
2. That all Christians are bound to maintain the temporal power of the popedom, or, if necessary, to fight for its restoration.
3. That every Christian sovereign is bound to do homage to the pope, before exercising sovereign rights in his own territories.
4. That no act of parliament shall be counted valid among Roman Catholics until it has first received the papal approval.
5. That when the law of the land comes into collision with the law of the Church, the former is in every case to give way.
6. That every copy of the Scriptures in the vulgar tongue circulating among the people, is to be forthwith called in and burned.
7. That every man who persists in reading them or any other book on the Roman Index, shall be handed over to the care of the holy office.

We do not say that these principles ever will be affirmed by the papal chair. We believe they will not, for two reasons—*first*, that the ecclesiastical power is of itself too feeble to carry them out; and, *secondly*, because the civil power, even in Catholic countries, has discovered that it is not for the general good, that the State shall act as a menial and executioner by the Church's order. But nought is wanting at the centre of Christendom except the power; and no man who has studied the spirit of the papacy under the present pontificate can entertain a doubt that, if the ability existed, most of these principles would, before seven years, be in practical operation. Except the want of power, what other guarantee has the Christian world that they will not? The will is not lacking, and infallibility supplies the means. The simple truth is that there is now no doctrine, or edict, or pronouncement, however improbable it may appear, which the pope may think useful either for perpetuating his own domination or securing the eventual triumph of his religion, which may not issue at any moment from the centre of infallibility when the curia judges that it can be done with effect. This being so, error, disdaining the delay and mishaps and slow

advances of the ancient method, may be expected in future to advance with telegraphic despatch, and to multiply and grow till the end is reached.

The influence of the recent decree on the science of Biblical interpretation is not unworthy of being considered. In bulls issued by the Roman pontiff, passages of the Holy Scriptures are frequently quoted, and occasionally some strange and amusing expositions are given. Thus Innocent III., in an epistle addressed to the churches, preparatory to the Lateran Council of 1215, takes the words of Christ in Matt. xvi. 24: "If any man will come after me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross and follow me"—and interprets them thus: "If any man would follow Me to the crown, he must follow me to the fight"—meaning to go and to fight with the Saracens of Palestine for the recovery of the the holy sepulchre.* The same pontiff, in the sermon with which he opened the council, took as his text Luke xxii. 15: "With desire I have desired to eat this passover with you before I suffer." In his exposition he took the passover mentioned, not as referring to the Jewish festival so called, but in the literal sense of a *passing over*, and applied it to himself in a threefold manner. He (Innocent) desired to pass over with the bishops in a *corporal* manner, by going on the crusades for the deliverance of Jerusalem; in a *spiritual* manner, by reforming the Universal Church; and in an *eternal* fashion, by passing over with them from this to the better life.† The celebrated bull, *Unam sanctam*, contains also some rare specimens of biblical interpretation. According to its author, Pope Boniface VIII., the "two swords" which the disciples of Christ possessed amongst them on the night of His betrayal, are the spiritual and the temporal power, both of which belong to the Church. The word of the Lord to Jeremiah (chap. i. 10): "See, I have this day set thee over the nations and over the kingdoms, to root out, and to pull down, and to destroy"—is interpreted to be the power given to the Church over the kingdoms of this world. Again, 1 Cor. ii. 15: "He that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is

*Harduin *Concilia*, vol. vii., col. 1.

†*Opera* Innocentii, vol. iv., col. 675.

judged of no man"—is interpreted by Boniface to mean, that if the civil government go wrong, it is to be judged by the pope; but if the pope go wrong, he is not accountable to any earthly government, but to God alone. Perhaps these expositions are illustrations of Dr. Newman's remark, that "at Rome the rules of interpreting authoritative documents are known with a perfection which at this time is scarcely to be found elsewhere." However this may be, similar expository efforts may be found to any extent in the bulls and encyclicals of pontiffs. It might have been possible under other circumstances to forget such things, and to make allowance for spiritual darkness in high places. But the dogma does not permit this to be done. Infallibility stamps on these grotesque expositions the attribute of perpetuity. No Catholic now, on penalty of his ecclesiastical allegiance, must dare to differ from such an interpretation, however absurd it may appear to him. Infallibility, it is true, may substitute another interpretation in place of the former, but even that does not remove the difficulty: it only plants one infallible exposition over against another infallible exposition. By this autocratic method of exegesis all private study of divine revelation is not only discouraged but made useless. Henceforth it is in vain for any Roman Catholic scholar to trouble himself about the correct reading of ancient manuscripts and versions, the exact meaning of the original words of Scripture, the laws of interpretation, or the philosophy of language, so long as there is a living interpreter who has already imposed, or who can at pleasure impose, on the words of Scripture a signification which sets the science of hermeneutics at defiance, and which, however absurd or erroneous, no human being, out of the one hundred and eighty millions over whom he is the spiritual monarch, can, except at the risk of his salvation, either gainsay or resist.

The same is equally true in regard to the science of theology. It will be in vain henceforth to study afresh the facts and phenomena of the Old and New Testaments, either with the view of combining them into new forms, or of confirming still farther the ascertained verities of religion. In fact, if the pope is really infallible, theology in future is not to be the investigation of the

grand truths communicated to men in the written revelation of God, and the setting of them forth in due and relative proportion to each other; it degenerates simply into an inquiry as to what the pope has declared *ex cathedra* on this or the other question of faith or morals. The man who is best acquainted with the bulls and decretals will henceforth be the greatest theologian. Besides, if the pope choose to create another new article of faith, or add a new precept to the whole duty of man, what Catholic in future can take exception to such a thing? It is the product of infallibility, and he is bound of course to receive it as the truth. If matters proceed in that line—and there is no reason why infallibility should be restricted from teaching all it can—a time may come when Trent itself shall have become obsolete, and when the creed of Pope Pius IV. shall contain as little of the Catholic doctrine of the future as the three ancient creeds contain of Romish doctrine now. When development of doctrine is within the competency of an individual, there is no limit to development, except the pleasure of the individual. Specimens of his pleasure in this direction Pius IX. has given already. He decreed the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin by his own authority, and without having a line of the Bible in its favor. He has solemnly pronounced the toleration of Protestant worship in Catholic countries, the separation of Church and State, the abrogation of the temporal power of the papacy, and the freedom of the press, to be errors and sins.* He has proclaimed his own infallibility. Should he and his successors proceed in the line of the Encyclical and Syllabus and Vatican Council, where is this mania for making dogma to end? End where it may, it is already clear that, in future, Romish theology will have little to do with the Old and New Testaments, the Fathers, the Councils, or the Canon law; these things may all be relegated to the care of antiquaries and of Protestants. The

*Dr. Newman pleads that the list of errors in the Syllabus is to be interpreted in the light of the bulls and allocutions in which they were originally condemned. We have examined some of them in this light, and are convinced that the attitude of the pontiff towards civil society and religious freedom is not improved when seen in its original setting.

Catholic theology of the future will be a condensed summary of the bulls and decretals, together with such additional articles of faith and precepts of morality as the pope from time to time may choose to send out upon the world. This being so, theology two or three centuries hence may turn out something hideous and ghastly, at which the Romanist of the nineteenth century would stand very much amazed. One cannot help thinking sometimes what St. Peter would have said had he read the canons and decrees of the Council of Trent, or what Clement of Rome and Tertullian would have thought had they known Pius IV. Probably the surprise of Pius IX. and the Fathers of the Vatican would not be less intense were they to be favored with a prophetic glance at the Catholic creed of the future.

These are among the obvious results of the tremendous power with which the Roman pontiff has been invested with the consent of the majority of the Vatican Council. All future popes may of course be expected to exercise this power according to circumstances, and with more or less discretion. Should the grand prerogative be frequently and vigorously used, the effects described are sure to follow; but it is to be remembered that these effects cannot fail to be modified by the weakness of the papacy, by the amount of check which each State, from its own internal vigor, will be able to place upon ecclesiastical ambition, and more especially by that sluggish *vis inertiae*, which prevents the mass of men from carrying out to their practical conclusions all that they themselves theoretically hold. People often accept principles authenticated by the sanction of those in whom they put confidence, without inquiring into the exact bearing of these principles, and consequently without suspicion of their real nature; but, fortunately sometimes for the public interest, they do not always make such principles the rule of their own personal conduct, and if they were to see them embodied in action and carried out by others to their legitimate result, they would stand aghast at the result, and, on the impulse of their better nature, would cast such fatal consistency aside. In this way multitudes of Roman Catholics at present nominally accept the infallibility, and the pontiff now flatters himself that all is safe, because since

the withdrawal of the Old Catholic party no sound of opposition is heard from within; but let his Holiness carry out his infallibility in the line of the syllabus, and attempt to prevail on the masses in any community to combine for accomplishing, either by force, which he affirms he has a right to use, or by any other means, such objects as the restoration of the temporal power of the papacy, the overthrow of the freedom of the press or of liberty of conscience, the persecution of nonconformity in Catholic countries, or even domination over the civil authority, and he will discover that millions who now think that they believe in the infallibility, will be no parties to help him to effect his ends. With the masses the dogma is a mere abstract theory, about which they know little and care less; only as the Church has affirmed it, it must, they think, be so; but with the pope it is simply an instrument for effecting ulterior ends. As these ends develop themselves more and more, his people will have their eyes opened to the nature of the instrument, but probably not till then. Now they merely acquiesce; in due time they will resist. Multitudes of Protestants who profess to believe that the Holy Scriptures are given by inspiration of God, do not, as is well known, carry out in their practice what they believe inspiration commands; and in like manner it will be—and while human nature remains as it is, it cannot but be—that multitudes who believe in the doctrine of infallibility will never travel in the line that the doctrine points. The very inconsistency of men may, in such a case, be the protector of human freedom. But the misfortune is, that in future every consistent and honest Roman Catholic will, in proportion to his faith in the papal infallibility, be unable to resist what seems to him the call of duty, and will regard himself as under obligation to submit heart and conscience and life—not to God, for that is a noble thing—but to a man, a poor, weak, erring man, no better than his brethren, who has contrived to put himself in the place of God; and that he will find his position compromised, and his happiness and comfort diminished, every time that it may please this infallible man to command his adherents to take a course at variance with other

obligations and duties, which other powers are not wanting in the will and in the vigor to enforce.

For the reasons now specified, the circumstances of the social and political world are unfavorable to the full development of the natural results of the dogma; yet there is reason to think that more will come out of it than anybody at present sees. The tendency of a dogma so entirely without a basis in divine revelation, and so inconsistent with historic fact—so purely a human device for the depreciation of the bishops, and for the personal glorification of the pontiff—a weapon so obviously prepared for giving deadly blows to nations and civil governments which refuse to aid him in carrying out his personal and sectarian ends, cannot but be evil and dangerous in a high degree; but as we have seen, there are at work, in the debility of age which has fastened upon the papacy, in the growing intelligence of statesmen, and even in the inconsistencies of humanity, counteractives which will prevent much of the evil, and sensibly diminish the danger. Modified by such controlling influences, the dogma of infallibility is not likely to produce all the advantages which its friends expect from it, nor to do so much injury as its opponents dread.

Dr. Newman, near the close of his able and most suggestive pamphlet, has set himself with the most praiseworthy zeal to define the limits of the sphere in which infallibility is to operate. If he could only impart legal validity to all his limitations, the world would have little to fear from the Vatican; in that case not more than half-a-dozen infallible decrees would appear in a century, and then, if we did not like them, we could say of their author, as Dr. Newman says of Honorius, that he “could not fulfil the condition of an *ex cathedra* utterance if he did not *mean* to fulfil them . . . it is mainly a question of *intention*.” But this will not do. Dr. Newman, however distinguished, is but a private theologian. His fine-spun distinctions can no more bind the pope, than a spider by its cobweb-net can entangle an elephant. The fallible can set no limits to the infallible. So long as Pio Nono does not pinion his own hands, it is not Dr. Newman, however powerful his intellectual arm, who can do it against his will. “No pledge from Catholics is of any value to which

Rome is not a party ;” and after having had that important lesson brought home to us so lately with all the force of demonstration, we cannot give much confidence to the limitations which private individuals attempt to fix upon the papal power without the pope’s knowledge and consent. The time for imposing such restraints on absolute power is, we fear, gone by. The balloon, broken loose from its fastenings, rises high in air, and scorns any longer to be tied to earth. Pius IX. is not now to be repressed. His voice goes to the world’s end. Speeches and bulls follow each other in thick profusion. The echo of one allocution has scarcely died away in the distance, till the air is disturbed by the approach of another. He is now an old man—the oldest pope who ever sat in the Roman chair—but he may live to fix upon half-a-dozen other new doctrines the stamp of St. Peter, and may add them to the Catholic creed before the curtain drops.

ARTICLE VI.

CALVIN DEFENDED AGAINST DRS. CUNNINGHAM
AND HODGE.

Fifteen years ago Principal Cunningham wrote: “But though there is no great difference of opinion among the Reformed Churches and among Protestant divines concerning the general doctrines of the sacraments, there seems to have sprung up in modern times a great deal of ignorance and confusion in men’s conceptions upon this subject. . . . The general doctrine . . . has been very much overlooked. . . . The disregard of this topic has tended to produce a great deal of confusion and error. . . . We are in the habit of seeing baptism and the Lord’s Supper administered in the Church, and are thus led insensibly and without much consideration to form certain notions in regard to them without investigating carefully their leading principles and grounds. . . . We believe there is scarcely any subject set

forth in the Confessions of the Reformed Churches that is less attended to and less understood than this of the sacraments; and that many, even of those who have subscribed these Confessions, rest satisfied with some defective and confused notions on the subject of baptism and the Lord's Supper, while they have scarcely even a fragment of an idea of a sacramental principle or of any general doctrine or theory on the subject of the sacraments." (*Cunningham's Works*, Vol. I., pp. 237-9.)

Some three or four years before Principal Cunningham thus expressed himself, Dr. Thornwell had said to a colleague about to take the chair of Ecclesiastical History and Polity in the Seminary at Columbia, "I hope you will make the Fourth Book of Calvin's Institutes your text-book in church government, for I, in my department, carry our students through the first three books so that they learn Calvin's theology, and it would be well for them to go with you over the Fourth Book that they may get his views of church government;—*besides* (he added) *I do believe in Calvin's doctrine of the Lord's Supper.*"

Now what was Calvin's doctrine of the Lord's Supper?

If we put this question to Principal Cunningham, his answer will be as follows: "Zwingle's views were a reaction against those which generally prevailed in the Church of Rome; but the extent to which he went rather reacted upon the other Reformers and made them again approximate somewhat in phraseology to the Romish position. This appears more or less even in Calvin, though, in his case, there was an additional perverting element—the desire to keep on friendly terms with Luther and his followers, and with that view to approximate as far as he could to their notions of the corporal presence of Christ in the Eucharist. We have no fault to find with the substance of Calvin's statements in regard to the sacraments in general, or with regard to baptism; but we cannot deny that he made an effort to bring out something like a real influence exerted by Christ's human nature upon the souls of believers in connection with the dispensation of the Lord's Supper—an effort which, of course, was altogether unsuccessful, and resulted only in what was about as unintelligible as Luther's consubstantiation. This is perhaps the greatest blot on

the history of Calvin's labors as a public instructor; and it is a curious circumstance that the influence which seems to have been chiefly efficacious in leading him astray in the matter was a quality for which he usually gets no credit, viz., an earnest desire to preserve unity and harmony among the different sections of the Christian Church." (*Ibidem*, p. 240.)

This is a statement not *of* but *about* Calvin's doctrine. And the reader will notice that it is not a little disparaging to the great Genevese. There are not less than five charges here made against Calvin, and these by one of his staunchest disciples and warmest admirers: (1.) The Reformer's views were not strictly his own—the product of his own calm and unbiassed investigation and reflection, but were reached under the control of a reactionary influence from Zwingle's genius, or at least from Zwingle's extravagance. (2.) Calvin, under this influence, went astray and approximated Rome. (3.) Acting along with Zwingle's reactionary influence over this feeble and impressible mind, there was another perverting element—a rather weak desire to keep on friendly terms with Luther. (4.) All this gave rise to a dishonest effort on Calvin's part to bring out of Scripture what was not in Scripture. (5.) The result was, of course, a *failure*, as Calvin, if he had really had good sense, ought to have anticipated;—it was the miserable invention of a theory as unintelligible as Luther's consubstantiation, which constitutes the greatest blot on Calvin's character as a public instructor! Some of these charges it is one object of this paper to examine, and thus we redeem the pledge given in concluding our former article.

We propose now to submit to our readers, not any statements of our own about the doctrine of Calvin, but the thing itself as he sets it forth, and every one can then judge for himself whether Principal Cunningham has correctly represented the great Reformer. We shall endeavor to reduce the full exposition of it by its author to the shortest compass consistent with clearness.

1. In the fourteenth chapter of the Fourth Book of his Institutes, Calvin discusses the sacrament in general, defining it to be "an external sign by which the Lord seals on our consciences his promises of good-will towards us, in order to sustain the weak-

ness of our faith; and we, in our turn, testify our piety towards him, both before himself and before angels, as well as before men." Thus there never is a sacrament without an antecedent promise to which the sacrament is a kind of appendix for confirming and sealing it. Sacraments, therefore, are exercises which confirm our faith in the word of God; and because we are carnal they are exhibited under carnal objects, that thus they may train us in accommodation to our sluggish capacity, just as nurses lead children by the hand. Here is seen the condescension of our merciful Lord, who, because from our animal nature we are always creeping on the ground and cleaving to the flesh, having no thought of what is spiritual, and not even forming an idea of it, yet declines not to lead us to himself by means of these earthly elements, and even to exhibit in flesh itself a mirror of spiritual blessings. Hence Augustine calls the sacrament *a visible word*, because it represents the promises of God as in a picture. (Chap. XIV., §§1-6.)

Now in assigning this office to the sacraments, it must not be understood that there is any kind of secret efficacy inherent in them by which they can of themselves promote or strengthen faith, but they perform this office because our Lord has instituted them for it, and they perform it only when accompanied by the Spirit, the internal Master. If he is wanting, the sacraments can avail us no more than the sun shining on the eye-balls of the blind. Wherefore we ascribe the whole energy to the Spirit, and to the sacrament only ministry, which without the Spirit is empty and frivolous, but when he acts within is full of power. (*Ibid.*, §9.)

It is therefore a fixed point, that the office of the sacraments differs not from that of the word of God, which is to hold forth and offer Christ to us. They confer nothing and avail nothing, if not received in faith. We must beware of being led into error by the terms somewhat too extravagant which ancient Christian writers have employed in extolling the dignity of the sacraments. (*Ibid.*, §17.)

After saying these things, Calvin proceeds to set forth that the term *sacrament*, in the view he has taken of it, includes generally all the signs which God ever commanded men to use, that he

might make them sure and confident of the truth of his promises. These were sometimes placed in natural objects, and sometimes were exhibited in miracles. Of the former class, was the tree of life to Adam and Eve—it was an earnest of their immortality, that they might feel confident of the promise as often as they ate the fruit. And so when the Lord withdrew from our first parents the promise of life, he withdrew also the sacrament which assured them of that promise. Another example of the same class was the bow given to Noah and his posterity. Of the second class, one example was the light showed to Abraham in the smoking furnace; another, the wet and dry fleece to Gideon; and a third, the going back of the shadow on the dial to Hezekiah. Still more eminent examples of sacraments, were those *pactions* (to use the term of Chrysostom) by which God entered into covenant with his people for their training in faith and that they might testify his truth to men, such as circumcision, and all the purifications, sacrifices, and other rites of the Mosaic law, and more recently Baptism and the Lord's Supper. For the ancient sacraments had the same end in view as our own, viz., to direct and almost by the hand lead us to Christ; or rather, they were all like images to represent him and hold him forth to our knowledge. For sacraments are seals of the promises of God; and as no divine promise has ever been offered to man except in Christ, whensoever they remind us of any divine promise they must of necessity exhibit Christ. There is only this difference, that while the former shadowed forth a promised Christ while he was still expected, the latter bear testimony to him as already come and manifested. (*Ibid.*, §§18–26.)

Nothing more needs to be added from Calvin's general doctrine of the sacraments in this fourteenth chapter, except that he deals in it with two classes of opponents of the truth: those who undervalued the power of the sacraments, as the Anabaptists, and those who exaggerated their power, as Rome. Under the latter head, (though Principal Cunningham charges that Calvin, in his doctrine of the Sacraments, goes astray and approximates the Romish position,) we find the Reformer, all unconscious of this error and this approach, denouncing as "fatal and pestilential."
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tial this sentiment—that the sacraments have a kind of secret virtue.” In fact he says, in his own forcible way, that “it is plainly of the devil.” (*Ibid.*, §14.)

2. The seventeenth chapter, which treats especially of the Supper, consists of two principal parts. In the first eleven sections Calvin delivers his doctrine of the Supper, and in the remaining sections refutes the errors which superstition has introduced.

He begins with a reference to John vi. 51, and calls the Supper a spiritual feast, at which Christ testifies that he himself is living bread on which our souls feed. We get invisible food from the body and blood of Christ, and the signs which represent this are bread and wine. The mystery of the secret union of Christ with believers is incomprehensible by nature, and it is therefore exhibited to our dull minds in visible, familiar signs, showing that souls are fed by Christ just as the corporeal life is sustained by bread and wine. The end then of this sacrament is to assure us, that the body of Christ was once sacrificed for us, so that we may now eat it and eating feel within ourselves the efficacy of that one sacrifice, and that his blood was once shed for us so as to be our perpetual drink. Pious souls have great delight in this sacrament as a testimony that they form one body with Christ, so that every thing which is his they may call their own. For these are words which can never lie nor deceive: “Take, eat my body broken for you; drink my blood shed for you.” In bidding us *take*, he intimates that it is ours; in bidding us *eat*, he intimates that it becomes one substance with us; in affirming that his body was broken and his blood shed *for us*, he shows that both were not so much his as ours, because he took and laid down both not for his own advantage but for our salvation. So the chief and almost the whole energy of the sacrament consists in these words, “It is broken for you, it is shed for you,” because it would not be of much importance that the body and blood of the Lord are now distributed, had they not once been set forth for our redemption and salvation. (Chapter XVII., §§1–3.)

The principal object of the sacrament, then, is not simply by signs to set forth the body of Christ, but rather to seal and con-

firm the promise that his flesh is meat indeed, and his blood drink indeed, nourishing us unto life eternal, and that he is the Bread of Life, of which whosoever eats shall live forever;—and to seal and confirm that promise it sends us to the cross of Christ, where that promise was performed and fulfilled in all its parts. For we do not eat Christ duly and savingly unless as crucified, whilst we perceive the efficacy of his death in lively apprehension. Because he did not take the appellation, Bread of Life, from the Sacrament, as some perversely understand, but such was he given to us by the Father, and such he exhibited himself, when, partaking of our mortality, he makes us to share in his divine immortality; when, offering himself a sacrifice, he bore in himself our curse that he might cover us over with his blessing; when, in his dying, he devoured and swallowed up death; when, in his resurrection, this our corruptible flesh, which he had put on, he raised to glory and incorruption. (*Ibid.*, §4.)

3. Thus far Calvin has been declaring what it is which God exhibits in the Holy Supper. But now he proceeds to set forth by what means and to what extent that which is there exhibited by God, becomes ours. This discussion occupies sections 5–11, and it is here we shall discover all that distinguishes his doctrine of this sacrament.

His first statement in section 5, is that the whole of what is exhibited in the Supper becomes ours *by application*, and then he proceeds to say that the means of the application are the Word, and still more clearly the Sacred Supper. Of course the agent is the Holy Spirit. We pause to suggest the inquiry, which at present we have not the opportunity to determine ourself, whether it was not just here originated the use of the term “applied” as it is employed in the Shorter Catechism’s answer to the question, What is a sacrament? Principal Cunningham (see Works, Vol. I., p. 278,) finds some “difficulty” in this word, and calls it “a single, vague, and ambiguous expression.” His “difficulty” he states thus: “Do not these words [*exhibiting* and *applying*] convey the idea of conferring or bestowing what was not previously possessed? Do they not thus sanction the notion

that Christ and his benefits are conveyed or bestowed, not previously to the lawful reception of the sacraments, but in and by the use of them?" What he is apprehensive may be wrongly inferred from the term, is, that the sacrament is to be used by others than believers, and he elaborately argues to prove that the Catechism is not to be so understood. But it appears to us that the answer of the Catechism itself sufficiently guards against such abuse by its own emphatic statement, that in the sacrament "by sensible signs Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to *believers*." The term "*applied*" then appears to us a perfectly innocent, as it is a very transparently clear one. What is the sense of it as used by Calvin, who was perhaps its originator? Manifestly that the Supper, *like the word*, though (for certain reasons derived partly from our own weakness and carnality) *still more clearly than the word*, is for our assurance that the benefits of the new covenant are all ours, through Christ, by faith—in other terms, that these are both of them means of grace to us in the hands of the Spirit of all grace. He says that in the Supper, with special clearness, Christ offers himself to us with all his blessings, and we receive him in faith. Then he reiterates that the Supper does not make Christ become, for the first time, the Bread of Life, but recalls to our mind the fact that he was made that Bread and makes us feel the efficacy of it, by assuring us, *first*, that whatever Christ did or suffered was to give us life, and, *secondly*, that this vivification is eternal. For as Christ would not have been the Bread of Life to us if he had not been born, and died, and risen again, so he could not now be the Bread of Life to us if the efficacy of his birth, death, and resurrection, were not eternal. This is what Christ himself said: "The bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world"—intimating that his body would be as bread for the life of the soul, because delivered unto death for our salvation; and intimating, also, that he extends it to us for food when he makes us partakers of it by faith. So that he gave himself to be bread for us, when he was crucified for the redemption of the

world; and daily he gives himself as bread, when he offers himself in the word to be partaken of by us, inasmuch as he was crucified; when he seals that offer by the sacred mystery of the Supper; and when he accomplishes inwardly what externally he designates.

But now there are two extremes to be avoided: the one is to extenuate too much these *signs*, and so to dis sever them from the mysteries to which they are in a certain manner affixed; the other is by extolling these signs immoderately to seem even to obscure the mysteries themselves.

And here Calvin pauses to consider whether, as is affirmed by some, the eating of the flesh and the drinking of the blood of Christ be nothing more than believing in Christ. And he says that it seems to him that something more express and more sublime is taught in that noble discourse of our Lord, [viz., John, 6th chapter,] where he recommends the eating of his flesh; viz., that it is with a real participation of his life we are vivified, which he designates by the terms *eating* and *drinking*, lest any one should suppose that the life we partake of from him may be obtained by *simple knowledge*. For as it is not the sight but the eating of bread which nourishes the body, so the soul must truly and thoroughly partake of Christ that it may grow in spiritual life by his energy. But we admit that this eating is nothing else than the eating of faith, and that no other eating can be imagined. This (says Calvin) is the difference between their mode of speaking and mine. According to them, to eat is merely to believe; but I maintain that the flesh of Christ is eaten by believing, because it is made ours by faith, and the eating of it is the fruit and effect of faith. Or, to be plainer, with them the eating is faith; with me it rather is a consequence of faith. The difference is little in words, but not in reality. The apostle teaches that Christ dwells in our hearts by faith, but who interprets that *dwelling* to be faith? Every one sees that that saying explains the admirable *effects of faith*, because it is by it that believers have Christ dwelling in them. In this way our Lord, by calling himself the Bread of Life, designed to teach us not only that our salvation is in the faith of his death and resurrection, but that it

is accomplished by a real communication of himself to us, so that his life passes into us and becomes ours, not otherwise than as bread taken for food administers vigor to the body. (*Ibid.*, §5.)

4. Having thus disposed of the question, *by what means* that which is exhibited in the Supper becomes ours, the Reformer next proceeds to consider *to what extent* it is made to be ours. He declares that it is not sufficient to say that our communion with Christ makes us partakers of his Spirit, omitting all mention of flesh and blood, as if all were nothing which is said by Christ, of his "flesh being meat indeed, and his blood drink indeed," and that we "have no life unless we eat that flesh and drink that blood," and other words of the same tenor. Seeing, therefore, that full communion with Christ goes beyond this restricted account of it, he undertakes to show how far it does extend, before proceeding to speak of the contrary vice of excess. He promises to be brief here, for he must have a longer discussion with the hyperbolic doctors [that is, as afterwards appears, the *transubstantiators* and the *consubstantiators* as well] who, whilst, through their own grossness, they fabricate an absurd mode of eating and drinking, do likewise transform Christ, divested of his flesh, into a phantom. But here he gives expression to his doubts whether, indeed, it be lawful to put into any form of words this great mystery—a mystery which he freely confesses that he is not able to grasp with his mind, lest any should undertake to measure the sublimity of it by his (Calvin's) infantile capacity. Wherefore he exhorts his readers not to confine their apprehensions within those too narrow mental conceptions of his, but to seek to rise higher than he is able himself to lift them. For whenever this subject is under consideration, after he has done his utmost, he always feels that he has spoken far beneath its dignity. And though the mind for thinking excels the tongue for speaking, the magnitude of this subject overcomes and overwhelms the mind likewise. All that remains then is to break forth in admiration of the mystery which the mind is as inadequate to comprehend as the tongue is to express it. He will now, however, undertake to give a summary of his views as best he can, which, as he doubts not himself the truth

of it, he trusts will not be disapproved by pious hearts. (*Ibid.*, §7.)

5. We are persuaded that the thoughtful and candid reader has found nothing as yet in these statements of the great Genevese to justify the condemnation of Principal Cunningham. Let the same candor and thoughtfulness be employed in considering the most precise and exact account of this mystery which Calvin now proceeds in sections 8, 9, and 10, to give, and we are confident his doctrine must be pronounced both scriptural and reasonable and also edifying.

First of all, we are taught in Scripture that Christ was, from the beginning, the vivific Word of the Father, the fountain and origin of life, from whence all things should always receive life. Hence John calls him the Word of Life, and says that in him was life, and intimates that he was then pervading all creatures and instilling into them the power of breathing and living. But he adds, that the life was at length *manifested*, when the Son of God, assuming our nature, exhibited himself in bodily form to be seen and handled. For although he previously diffused his virtue into the creature, yet because man, alienated from God by sin, had lost the communication of life and saw death impending over him on every side, it became necessary, in order for him to regain the hope of immortality, that he should be restored to the communion of that Word. How little confidence can it give you to hear that the Word of God, from whom you are at the greatest distance, contains in himself the plenitude of life, whilst in yourself and all around you nothing but death meets your gaze! But, indeed, ever since that fount of life began to dwell in our flesh, he now lies not hidden and far away from us, but exhibits himself before us to be partaken of by us. Nay, the very flesh in which he is dwelling he renders vivific to us, so that by partaking of it we may feed for immortality. "I am (he says) that Bread of Life. I am the Living Bread which came down from heaven. And the bread which I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world." Here he declares not only that he is life, as the eternal Word who descends to us from heaven, but that by coming down he diffused that same power of

life through the flesh which he put on, so that from thence a communication of life can emanate to us. Hence it follows that his "flesh is meat indeed," and his "blood drink indeed." Here then is wondrous consolation for the pious, that they find life now in their own flesh—not only easily reached by them, but set right before them, so that they will get it if they but open their bosom to receive it. (*Ibid.*, §8.)

The flesh of Christ, however, has not this vivific power in itself, but was originally subject to death; and now that it is endowed with immortality, it lives not by itself. And yet it is called *vivific*, because pervaded with the fulness of life for the purpose of transmitting it to us. Thus Christ says, "As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself"—when he speaks not of the properties he had from the beginning with the Father, but of those with which he was invested in that flesh in which he appeared, so that in his humanity there dwells a fulness of life, and every one partakes of this who communicates in his flesh and blood. This can be illustrated thus: As a reservoir of water furnishes a supply to drink, to draw from, and to irrigate the fields, and yet does not itself possess this abundance for so many uses, but gets it from the source which with perennial flow sends forth continually fresh supplies, so the flesh of Christ is a full and inexhaustible reservoir transfusing into us the life which constantly flows into it from the spring-head of Divinity itself. Who does not see now that a communion with the flesh and blood of Christ is necessary to all who aspire to the heavenly life? Hence those expressions of the apostle in Ephesians about the Church being the "body" and the "fulness" of Christ, and our being "members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones," which could not be said if he did not adhere to us wholly in body and spirit. At length Paul cries out, testifying that the matter is too high for utterance, "This is a great mystery." Ephes. v. 32. (*Ibid.*, §9.)

And now Calvin concludes that the flesh and blood of Christ feed our souls just as bread and wine support our corporeal life. For the sign would have no aptitude, did our souls not find their nourishment in Christ; and this could not be, did not Christ truly

form one with us and refresh our strength by the eating of his flesh and the drinking of his blood. But if it seem incredible that the flesh of Christ so far removed by distance from us should be food to us, let us recollect how far beyond our conception is the secret power of the Holy Spirit, and how foolish it is to measure his immensity by our modes. What the mind, therefore, cannot comprehend, let faith apprehend. Now the sacred communication of his flesh and blood by which Christ transfuses his life into us, he testifies and seals in the Supper, and that not with an empty and vain sign, but he there exerts the efficacy of his Spirit, and so fulfils what he promises. And let none object that the language employed is figurative, as though it therefore set forth nothing real or true. We admit that the breaking of the bread is a symbol and not the reality, yet is the reality duly set forth and exhibited in the symbol. For unless one would charge God with deceit, let him never dare to say that any empty symbol is held forth by him. (*Ibid.*, §10.)

6. When Calvin comes to his long discussion with the "hyperbolic" consubstantiators, we hear him express himself on the subject of the presence of Christ in the sacrament. Two restrictions we are never to lose sight of: one is, that our ideas of the presence must never derogate from the heavenly glory of Christ; the other is, that no property be assigned to his body inconsistent with his human nature. Accordingly it is a great mistake these consubstantiators make, to imagine that there is no presence of the flesh of Christ in the Supper unless it be placed in the bread. Christ does not seem to them to be present unless he descends to us, as if we did not equally gain his presence when he raises us by faith to himself. They place Christ lurking in the bread; we deem it unnecessary and unlawful to draw his body down from heaven. For, seeing the mystery is heavenly, why bring his body to the earth to be conjoined to us? But as to the mode of this conjunction of Christ's flesh to us, Calvin freely confesses the mystery too deep for his mind to comprehend or his words to express. He says he rather feels than understands it, yet, that without controversy, he embraces the truth of God and rests in that. Christ declares his flesh the food, his

blood the drink of my soul ; I give my soul to him to be fed with such food. In his sacred Supper he bids me take, eat and drink his body and blood, under the symbols of bread and wine ; I have no doubt that he will truly give and I receive. Only I reject the absurdities which appear to be unworthy of the heavenly majesty of Christ and are inconsistent with the reality of his human nature. But when these absurdities are discarded, he willingly admits any thing which helps to express the true and substantial communication of the body and blood of the Lord as exhibited to believers under the sacred symbols of the Supper ; understanding that they are received, not by the imagination or intellect merely, but are enjoyed in reality as the food of eternal life ; but also understanding at the same time that the bread and wine only exhibit and seal this sacred communion, for the presence is not in the bread, and the communion is only by faith. He proceeds to testify that there is no cause for the odium with which this view is regarded by the world and the unjust prejudice incurred by its defence, unless it be in the fearful fascinations of Satan ; for that what he was teaching on this subject is in perfect accordance with Scripture, contains nothing absurd, obscure, or ambiguous, is not unfavorable to true piety and solid edification, and in short has nothing in it that could have offended if it had not been that for some ages while the ignorance and barbarism of sophists reigned in the Church the clear light and open truth were so unworthily oppressed. (*Ibid.*, §§19, 32.)

Thus in a comparatively brief space we have presented a full and we hope clear statement of Calvin's doctrine of the Supper. It may be useful now to give a yet briefer summary of it thus :

(1.) The Son of God has ever been the author and dispenser of life to all. But when man fell, life was lost by him and the dead sinner could no more reach the infinite Source of life ; nor could he reach us except by coming nigh to us in flesh, taking our nature and our guilt so that he might make us partake of his righteousness and his nature. Not only the legal obstacle must be removed, but a vital connection be formed between the Redeemer and his people, as there was between the first Adam and his children. When Christ then assumes our nature and our

guilt, life is brought nigh to us and within our reach. It is given to all who believe. This life is not in God, but in the Son of God incarnate. The flesh of the Son of God is for us the seat of life. He pervades that flesh with his own immortality in order to communicate the same to us who could not otherwise be reached by him. He fills that reservoir with life from the spring-head of his divinity and it constantly flows with a perennial stream into us, so that we partake of his human-divine life. Life then, for us, depends on our being in communion with the flesh of Christ and not simply on our having his Spirit. He could never have reached us by his Spirit had he not first taken upon him our flesh and in that flesh made atonement and purchased grace for us. Those are, therefore, not empty words,—not mere figurative words without any real or substantial meaning,—which our Saviour spoke, “Except ye eat my flesh, ye have no life in you.” There is some deep and true sense in which we are “members of his body, his flesh, and of his bones.” But “this is a great mystery.” And we speak very properly of the union betwixt Christ and his people as “the mystical union.” This mystery is above our comprehension, like many other of the revealed things of God. Faith must apprehend what reason does not enable us to grasp intellectually. And the communion in the flesh of Christ is itself only by faith.

(2.) Now this communion with the flesh of the Son of God, which becomes ours when we believe in him, is signified and also sealed or confirmed to us in the Sacred Supper. The presence of Christ at that Supper is not in the bread, nor is it a physical presence of his body which is in the upper sanctuary. Yet it is a real presence by his Spirit to our faith, and we have in the sacrament especial communion with his flesh or human nature through the elements of bread and wine. In them we do after a peculiar manner apprehend our incarnate Lord and Saviour. Bread and wine set forth to our spiritual apprehension his body broken and his blood shed for us. The language of Christ on this subject is figurative, but it figures something real and actual. What he exhibits to us in the Supper is by emblems, but they

set forth what is substantial and true, and we are not deceived with empty words.

Let the reader now judge for himself between John Calvin and William Cunningham. The one says these views are "in perfect accordance with Scripture;" and contain "nothing absurd, obscure, or ambiguous;" and are also "not unfavorable to true piety and solid edification." The other says they constitute "an effort to bring out of Scripture" what was not in Scripture; "an effort of course unsuccessful;" and the result "about as unintelligible as Luther's consubstantiation." For ourselves we see "nothing absurd, obscure, or ambiguous," in the doctrine of the Reformer, while all that is "unintelligible" in it is the mystery of the deep things of God.

But let us go now into a brief examination of Consubstantiation, with which Cunningham compares it.

Transubstantiation (as Calvin points out) claims to convert the bread into the body, soul, and divinity of Christ, so that it is bread no longer. Thus the nature of the sacrament is overthrown, since, in the mode of signifying, the earthly sign no longer corresponds to the heavenly reality. True bread must represent the true body of Christ, or the truth of the sacrament is lost. Now Consubstantiation perceives that the analogy of the sign to the thing signified must not be destroyed, and it maintains therefore, contrary to Rome, that the bread remains unchanged. And yet it insists, from its literal interpretation of the Lord's words, that the body of Christ is by a real physical presence included in, with, and under the bread. Of course, then, ubiquity must be ascribed to the body of our Lord, and it must also be invisible and immense, with dimensions not more circumscribed than those of heaven and earth. Thus the reality of Christ's human flesh is denied, and he is no longer a true and proper man. The old Gnostic errors which made the body of our Lord a phantasm were no worse than this. Our Lord, however, in the emblems of the sacrament, gave to his disciples the day before he suffered, his mortal and true body which afterwards suffered death. Nor was that body attached by any physical tie to those elements which

merely signified and set it forth, because then his flesh must have been dissevered from his blood. So, Consubstantiation affirms that the blood is in the body, and again the body is in the blood, by what they call *concomitance*, but then the symbols which are separate from each other do not answer to the reality they set forth.

Now is there not something *absurd, obscure, ambiguous* here, and still more something contrary to Scripture? The real and true body of Christ is what he gave for us, and what he gave in symbols to the disciples at the Supper. It is then as fatal to the doctrine of the sacrament to construe away the real and true body set forth, as to construe away the real and true bread and wine which symbolize it. Rome transubstantiates the bread. Luther holds fast to the bread, but consubstantiates the body. And so the body given by Christ to his disciples is to be supposed ubiquitous, invisible, immense, phantastic; with the flesh of it separated from the blood, and the blood of it separated from the flesh.

Such is the theory which Principal Cunningham says is no more "unintelligible," than Calvin's doctrine of the Sacrament. But supposing this to be so, who would maintain that that quality is any absolute proof that a doctrine is not true? If Consubstantiation, or if Transubstantiation itself, were but revealed in the Scriptures, we could not object that it was *unintelligible*. Principal Cunningham is no Rationalist, and he must not talk like one. Does he claim that he finds the Trinity, or the humiliation of the Second Person, or the omnipresence of God, or the connexion of sovereignty and free agency, all plain and easy to be understood? And while complaining that Calvin's doctrine is "unintelligible," which is evidently as well as professedly drawn from our Lord's own words in John vi., does the Principal presume to say that he comprehends those mysterious and sublime utterances themselves? As for us we discover no self-contradictoriness in Calvin's doctrine, and are by no means stumbled at its mystery. We find mystery above and beneath and around and within us. If we abandon all the mysterious revelations which are unintelligible to our weak comprehension, we must just aban-

don our whole faith. Christianity itself moves always in the sphere of the supernatural.

And now let us quote the *summing up* by Calvin upon the theory of Consubstantiation, for it forms a beautiful contrast between that theory and his views, which two things Cunningham would identify:

“The presence of Christ in the Supper we must hold to be such as neither affixes him to the element of bread, nor encloses him in bread, nor circumscribes him in any way. for all these obviously detract from his celestial glory; at the same time it must neither divest him of his proper dimensions, nor dis sever him into different places, nor assign him boundless magnitude diffused through heaven and earth, for all these are plainly repugnant to his true humanity. Never let us lose sight of these two restrictions: *first*, let no part of his heavenly glory be taken away, which happens whenever he is reduced under the corruptible elements of this world, or bound fast to any earthly creature; *secondly*, let no property be assigned to his body which is not consistent with his human nature, which happens when either it is said to be infinite, or is said to occupy many places at once.”

We have disposed of two of the five charges of Principal Cunningham; there is but one more that we care to examine. It is that Calvin was “led astray” by the “perverting” influence of his desire “to keep on friendly terms with Luther and his followers.” Now, in the first place, it is unfair as well as unreasonable to take this ground against the Reformer, seeing that he claims to derive his doctrine so definitely and so clearly from the Scriptures. Again, if the doctrine of Calvin were the absurd and foolish theory it is represented by Principal Cunningham to be, then we might consent to let him explain the fact of Calvin’s making such a poor invention by the statement that he was trying by it to please Luther with some “unintelligible” nonsense like his own. But seeing that Calvin’s doctrine of the Supper has in it nothing “absurd, obscure, or ambiguous,” but everything sober and scriptural, the charge made by Principal Cunningham must be held to be an unfortunate blunder which recoils on himself. We have great respect for William Cunningham, but more for John Calvin. Instead of Calvin’s doctrine of the Supper being “the greatest blot on his labors as a public instructor,” this accusation of Cun-

ningham is to be considered, so far as we know, the only serious blot on what he has otherwise so well written.

But the very chapter wherein Calvin sets forth his doctrine of the Supper furnishes evidence in denial of the charge that he was misled and fell into egregious error through an overweening anxiety to please the Lutherans. His earnest desire to bring both Zwinglians and Lutherans back from their erroneous extremes on two sides to the true scriptural middle where he stood himself, is very well known; but it is a gratuitous and most unjust allegation, that this desire led him to trim and twist his doctrine into a particular shape for the purpose of pleasing either party. And this is made manifest by the plainness of speech he employs in sections 16-21 of the chapter on the Lord's Supper. Does it sound like the language of a boot-licker to Luther to speak of Consubstantiation as "a monstrous dogma," and to complain that, so far from those who sent it forth "being ashamed of the disgrace," they "assail us with virulent invectives for not subscribing to" it? Surely the mean spirit ascribed by Cunningham to the Reformer does not consist with his saying of those who "fix the body itself in the bread," and so "attach to it an ubiquity contrary to its nature," and by "adding *under* the bread, will have it, that it [the body] lies hid under it," that he "must employ a short time in exposing their craft and dragging them forth from their concealments." He proceeds to charge them with "rashness" and with "obstinacy," with "calling [the Gnostic] Marcion from his grave," and making the body of Christ, as he did, a mere "phantasm." And he calls one of their statements "a frivolous pretence," and speaks of them generally as "absurdities." All these offensive expressions are found in the sections referred to above, and they were of course calculated to offend Luther and his friends.

Looking into Calvin's *Short Treatise on the Lord's Supper*, we discover still further proofs how impossible it is that he could ever have truckled to Luther, much and rightly as he did undoubtedly honor and love him. In paragraph 41, we read:

"To wish then to establish such a presence as is to enclose the body within the sign or to be joined to it locally, is not only a reverie, but a

damnable error derogatory to the honor of Christ and destructive of what we ought to hold in regard to his human nature."

Again we read in paragraph 42:

"To fancy Jesus Christ enclosed under the bread and wine, or so to conjoin him with it as to amuse our understanding there, without looking up to Heaven, is a diabolical reverie."

Again in paragraph 58, which is headed, *Attempted Reconciliation—Cause of Failure*, it is thus written:

"We thus see wherein Luther failed on his side, and Zwinglius and Ecolampadius on theirs. It was Luther's duty *first* to have given notice that it was not his intention to establish such a local presence as the Papists dream; *secondly*, to protest that he did not mean to have the sacrament adored instead of God; and *lastly*, to abstain from those similitudes so harsh and difficult to be conceived, or have used them with moderation, interpreting them so that they could not give rise to any scandal. After the debate was moved, he exceeded bounds as well in declaring his opinion as in blaming others with too much sharpness of speech. For instead of explaining himself in such a way as to make it possible to receive his view, he, with his accustomed vehemence, in assailing those who contradicted him, used hyperbolical forms of speech very difficult to be borne by those who otherwise were not much disposed to believe at his nod."

Surely this does not sound like undue homage to Luther. And yet Calvin could speak of Luther as "a man whose memory I revere, and whose honor I am desirous to consult." [Exposition of Heads of Agreement in the Mutual Consent.] It is also worthy of note that the treatise on the Lord's Supper, wherein Calvin speaks so freely about Luther and his doctrine, was "not only generally welcomed, but received commendation in quarters from which it was least to have been expected [as Henry Beveridge, who translates Calvin's Tracts, remarks]—even Luther speaking of it in terms alike honorable to himself and gratifying to the heart of Calvin." Mr. Beveridge certainly perceived clearly that Calvin did not basely court the Saxon Reformer's favor.

As for Westphal and Heshusius, they come on the stage after Luther's death; so that the severity of Calvin's lash administered to these worthies, affords no positive proof that he did not pay

any undue homage to Luther. And yet we are satisfied the candid and careful reader must feel that the man who could deal so sharply with Lutheran ideas after the death of their great author, cannot, without being both a coward and a knave, have winked at them, much less been controlled by them, whilst Luther was alive.

There is one more witness whom we shall now introduce, as not only denying Principal Cunningham's charge, that Calvin's doctrine of the Supper was the fruit of a "perverting" spirit of compromise, but as confirming the account we have given of *what* and of *what character* really was the doctrine taught by Calvin. This witness is very competent. The editors of his latest volume, (published since his death,) describe him as "the man who for fifty years had lived in close intercourse with Calvin, who had made his writings, his works, his person, the objects of his continual study, and had become impregnated with his spirit more, perhaps, than any one in our age—the man who was the first to hold in his hand, to read without intermission, and to analyse, almost all the innumerable pieces that proceeded from the pen of the Reformer." It is the late Dr. Merle d'Aubigné of Geneva. Now, what does he say, who surely knew well what we wish him to testify about? Describing the Synod of Berne, which met in 1537, where Bucer represented that portion of the Swiss ministers who were more disposed to stretch out the hand to Luther, and Megander the others who would make no terms with him, and where the discussions between these Helvetic leaders were hot and angry, D'Aubigné says:

"A young man of only eight-and-twenty, but known for his love of the Holy Scriptures and his slight respect for tradition, was sorrowfully contemplating these discussions. It was John Calvin, he who called the discussions 'a deadly plague' for the Church. His convictions were *free and spontaneous*. *They did not proceed, as with others, from a desire for compromise, [the italics are our own,] but from a perception of what is the essence of the faith. He would not at any price have sought some expedient for the union of minds by a sacrifice of the truth. But he knew by experience the power of the Holy Spirit.* And he was the man called to stand between the two armies, to get the sword returned to its sheath, and to found unity and peace."

“ We almost hesitate to report his words, because they will be difficult to comprehend. He spoke for the faithful, of a complete union with Christ, even with his flesh and blood, and nevertheless of a union which is effected only by the Spirit. Calvin's speech was of so much importance that we cannot think of suppressing it. Vulgar minds insist on comprehending everything as they do the working of a steam engine: but the greatest minds have acknowledged the reality of the incomprehensible. Descartes said that ‘ in order to attain a true idea of the infinite, it is not in any sense to be comprehended, inasmuch as incomprehensibility itself is contained in the formal definition of the infinite.’ ‘ Infinity is everywhere, and consequently incomprehensible likewise,’ said Nicole. The Christian, however, comprehends to a certain extent the mystery which we are now considering; and above all, he experiences its reality. ‘ If, as the Scriptures clearly testify,’ said Calvin at the Synod of Berne. (1537,) ‘ the flesh of Christ is meat indeed, and his blood is drink indeed, it follows that if we seek life in Christ, we must be thereby veritably fed. The spiritual life which Christ gives us, consists not only in his making us alive by his Spirit, but in his rendering us, by the power of his Spirit, partakers of his life-giving flesh, and by means of this participation, nourishing us for eternal life. Therefore, when we speak of the communion which the faithful have with Christ, we teach that they receive the communication of his body and his blood, no less than that of his Spirit—so that they possess Christ wholly.’ ”

“ ‘ It is true that our Lord has gone up on high, and that his local presence has thus been withdrawn from us. But this fact does not invalidate our assertion; and that local presence is by no means necessary here. So long as we are pilgrims on the earth, we are not contained in the same place with him. But there is no obstacle to the efficacy of the Spirit; he can collect and unite elements existing in far separated places. The Spirit is the means by which we are partakers of Christ. The Spirit nourishes us with the flesh and blood of the Lord, and thus quickens us for immortality. Christ offers this communion, under the symbols of bread and wine, to all those who celebrate the Supper aright, and in accordance with his institution.’ Such was Calvin's speech. ‘ I embrace as orthodox,’ said Bucer, ‘ this view of our excellent brothers, Calvin, Farel, and Viret. I never held that Christ was locally in the Supper.’ ”
[*D'Aubigne's Reformation in the time of Calvin*. Vol. VI., pp. 330-332.]

It is of course to be expected that the three great volumes of “Systematic Theology,” put forth recently by the eminent and venerable Princeton Professor—the fruits of his laborious and learned investigations during fifty years—should receive continuous and repeated examinations by Calvinists and Presbyterians.

We devote the remainder of this paper to a brief review of what he has published on Calvin's doctrine of the Supper. His second volume contains some forty pages on the Reformed doctrine, besides many more on the Lutheran and Romish views. Also, in the *Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review* for 1848, there is an elaborate article, manifestly from his pen, discussing Calvin's doctrine at great length. It contained some statements which the author has corrected in his *Systematic Theology*, and some others, which appeared to us to need correction or qualification, have been omitted by him.

Before proceeding to point out what we consider to be still objectionable in Dr. Hodge's treatment of Calvin, as touching his doctrine of the Lord's Supper, let us first hear him on the difficulty which necessarily attaches to the subject. We quote from the *Princeton Review* for 1848 :

"Whatever obscurity rests on that union, [of believers with the Lord,] must in a measure rest on this sacrament. That union, however, is declared to be 'a great mystery.' It has always, on that account, been called 'the mystical union.' We are therefore demanding too much when we require all obscurity to be banished from this subject. If the union between Christ and his people were merely moral, arising from agreement and sympathy, there would be no mystery about it, and the Lord's Supper, as the symbol of that union, would be a perfectly intelligible ordinance. But the Scriptures teach us that our union with Christ is far more than this. It is a vital union—we are partakers of his life; for it is not we that live, but Christ that liveth in us."

Over against what Principal Cunningham objected to Calvin's doctrine as "unintelligible," may be therefore put these wise and scriptural words of the Princeton theologian.

But let us quote further from Dr. Hodge, stating the points relating to this union of believers and Christ, about which there is "a general agreement amongst Christians :"

- (1) A federal relation by a divine constitution.
- (2) On Christ's part, a sharing of our nature.
- (3) A participation by us of the Spirit of Christ, and his indwelling within us.
- (4) This union relates to body as well as souls. Our bodies are temples of the Spirit, and even in the grave they are still

united by the Spirit unto Christ. All these features of the union are certainly not a little unintelligible; and yet, *being revealed*. "almost all Christians," says Dr. Hodge, believe them. He adds: "This union was always represented as a real union; not merely *imaginary*, nor simply moral, nor arising from the mere reception of the benefits which Christ has purchased." Dr. Hodge might have added that this union is no mere *figure of speech*; for of course he believes so. And we submit that he ought to have added a fifth point to the four named above, namely, that whilst Christ shares our nature, we, on our part, share also in his, and therefore participate not only in his Spirit, but also in his flesh and blood. This would have made the statement not only Christian, but Calvinistic in full. The Scriptures as plainly say this as that other wondrous thing Dr. Hodge names—that our bodies even in the grave are by the Spirit united to Christ; and Christians in general, we suppose, do believe the former, just as much as they believe the latter. Indeed, how can the Lord be of the same nature with us, and we not be one with him in that flesh and blood which he assumed for the very purpose of giving us life by becoming one with us?

Now, what we regard as objectionable in Dr. Hodge's treatment of Calvin's doctrine, is, *first*, that he does not state it *fairly*. Indeed, it would have been strange if he could have stated the doctrine fairly, seeing that he really makes no attempt at any *articulate* statement of it. Calvin himself devotes one long chapter to the sacraments in general; and when he takes up the Lord's Supper in particular, he first devotes seven octavo pages to it, and then, in three more, gives what he calls a "summary" of his view, after which he proceeds to a full discussion of the subject in some fifty-five more pages. What, then, could Dr. Hodge possibly achieve in the way of a fair statement of what Calvin teaches on this subject, when, instead of giving to his readers at least the Reformer's "brief summary" of this doctrine in three sections, (see sections 8, 9, and 10,) he quotes merely the half of the last one of these, and so furnishes but eighteen lines from this long discussion, adding two more short paragraphs from some other writings of Calvin? We do not hesitate to say that it is

quite impossible for any student of the "Systematic Theology" to obtain an adequate idea of what Calvin really teaches about the Lord's Supper, from the brief, imperfect, and, as it were, *haphazard* quotations made—just as impossible as it would be to judge of a fine building from three specimen bricks.

But in some dozen lines of his own, which precede and introduce these inadequate quotations, Dr. Hodge, we are constrained to say, caricatures the doctrine of the great Genevese. He says it was "that from that glorified body there radiates an influence, other than the influence of the Spirit. (although through his agency,) of which believers in the Lord's Supper are the recipients. In this way they receive the body and blood of Christ, or their substance, or life-giving power. He held, therefore, that there was something not only supernatural, but truly miraculous, in this divine ordinance." (Vol II., p. 628.) Again, elsewhere, he represents Calvin's doctrine as being "that what is received by the believer in the Lord's Supper, is a supernatural influence emanating from the glorified body of Christ in heaven." (*Ibid.*, p. 656.)

Now, we request the candid reader to compare for himself with this statement, the full and articulate account given in this paper, of what Calvin really did teach. We challenge any one to produce a word from Calvin to support the representation of his doctrine which Dr. Hodge has made. The Reformer says "it is a fixed point that the office of the sacrament differs not from that of the Word, which is to hold forth and offer Christ to us." He says: "We get invisible food from the body and blood of Christ; and the signs which represent this are bread and wine." He says: "The end, then, of this sacrament is to assure us that the body of Christ was once crucified for us," and "to seal and confirm the promise that his flesh is meat indeed, and his blood drink indeed." He says that, "in the Supper, with special clearness, Christ offers himself to us, with all his blessings, and we receive him in faith." He says that Christ "gave himself to be bread for us when he was crucified for the redemption of the world; and daily he gives himself as bread when he offers himself in the Word to be partaken of by us inasmuch as he was

crucified, when he seals that offer by the sacred mystery of the Supper, and when he accomplishes inwardly what externally he designates;" and he bids us not to "extol the signs immoderately, lest we should seem even to obscure the mysteries themselves." He says: "The Son of God is the eternal source of all life, and that for sinful man life now is in the incarnate Saviour; that in order to partake of life again, we must be in communion with that flesh and blood of the Son of God, which is the seat of it for us; and that the sacred communion of his flesh and blood, by which Christ transfuses his life into us, he testifies and seals in the Supper." He says that "the bread and wine only exhibit and seal this sacred communion, for the presence is not in the bread, and the communion is only by faith." He says: "Life for us depends on our being in communion with the flesh of Christ, and not simply on our having his Spirit;" and that "he could never have reached us by his Spirit, had he not first taken upon him our flesh, and in that flesh made atonement and purchased grace for us; and that those are not empty and merely figurative words, 'Except ye eat my flesh, ye have no life in you,' but that there is some deep and true sense in which we are 'members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones;' that this communion with Christ is 'a great mystery;' and that this communion with the flesh of the Son of God which becomes ours when we believe in him, is signified, and also sealed or confirmed to us in the Sacred Supper." He says: "The presence of Christ at that Supper is not in the bread, nor is it a physical presence of his body which is in the upper sanctuary; yet it is a real presence by his Spirit to our faith, and that we have in the sacrament especial communion with his flesh or human nature, through the elements of bread and wine." But there is nowhere to be found, so far as we know, any such language used by Calvin as that "from the glorified body of Christ there radiates an influence other than the influence of the Spirit, although through his agency, of which believers are recipients at the Supper;" or that "what is received by the believer in the Lord's Supper, [as though there and only there,] is a supernatural influence emanating from the glorified body of Christ in heaven;" or that there is "something not only

supernatural, but truly miraculous, in the divine ordinance." Not only Calvin uses no such language as this, but he does not express these ideas in any form. The Reformer ascribes no influence to the body of Christ, apart from the influence of the Spirit. There is life in the body of Christ for all in whom the Spirit works true faith, and only thus, and only for these. And the Reformer ascribes no power to the Supper, other than what the Word also has, for bringing to believers any supernatural influence emanating from the body of Christ. Nor does Calvin ever speak of this ordinance itself as being, or as having in it, anything "miraculous." We feel sure he would have characterised such language as "immoderately extolling the sign, and thereby obscuring the mystery itself." The fault committed by the eminent Princeton theologian is the drawing certain inferences of his own from Calvin's principles, and then ascribing these inferences to the Reformer, which he would doubtless have repudiated.

In another place (pp. 646, 7,) Dr. Hodge undertakes to explain away what Calvin says about "the life-giving flesh of Christ," so as to save "the illustrious Calvin" from the accusation of being "inconsistent" with himself. For he says, that in the *Consensus Tigurinus*, Calvin expressly *denies* that any "supernatural influence flows from the glorified body of Christ." With profound respect for Dr. Hodge's learning we venture to say, that he appears to us to mistranslate the Latin passage which he quotes from the *Consensus* as completely as he misconceives the doctrine of the Reformer.

But *secondly*, what we regard as objectionable in Dr. Hodge's treatment of this subject is, *that he separates between the Calvinistic Confessions and Calvin*. He says (p. 626): "There were three distinct types of doctrine among them, (the Reformed,) the Zwinglian, the Calvinistic, and an intermediate form, which ultimately became symbolical, being adopted in the authoritative standards of the Church." He can hardly mean to say *three distinct types*, for immediately afterwards he remarks, that "there was no essential difference as afterwards appeared between the churches of Zurich and Geneva." And yet it must be Dr. Hodge's meaning, that if Zurich and Geneva came to be one, it

was *in spite* of and not because of Calvin, and only through means of an intermediate form of his doctrine which afterwards became symbolical. The doctrine of Calvin Dr. Hodge misrepresents, and then he affirms that it was not admitted into the Reformed Confessions! What was admitted was an intermediate form of it, that is, we suppose a compromise of it with the views of Zwingli! Accordingly, he gives us, *first*, the Zwinglian Confessions; *then* Calvin's doctrine (so called) where he refers to the Gallican, Scotch, and Belgic Confessions as those *most nearly* conforming to Calvin's peculiar views; and *thirdly*, he names those Confessions where the intermediate idea appears.

Now the Gallican Confession was adopted in 1559, the Scotch in 1560, and the Belgic in 1561, when Calvin was at the very height of his widespread influence amongst all branches of the Reformed Church. And the testimony of all three of these Confessions is as direct and as positive and strong for Calvin's doctrine of the Supper as if written with his own pen. And there were no more important sections of the Reformed than these three. Our failing space forbids quotation from these documents lying open before us. But we may tell the reader who has not access to them or cannot translate Dr. Hodge's Latin extracts from them, (which fully confirm our assertions respecting their Calvinistic character,) that he may easily lay his hand upon a document in English, appearing nearly one century later than these, but speaking the very same language with them respecting the Sacraments. Untold numbers of the descendants and followers of the Reformed, acknowledge at this day the true doctrines of that document. Let the reader look into the Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter XXIX., § viii., and he will there find Calvin's doctrine of the Supper in full. But so surely as the Westminster Confession is altogether Calvinistic on this point, so surely were the Gallican, the Scottish, and Belgian Confessions, not the "most nearly," but strictly and completely Calvinistic likewise.

The first one of the third class of Confessions named, is the *Consensus Tigurius*, or Agreement of Zurich, Dr. Hodge would have it appear that Calvin, who was its author, in his zeal to gain

over the Zurich brethren, softened away his own views. Yet this is the language used in it, and to this extent only is there any *softening* :

§ 23. "*Of the Eating of the Body.*"

"When it is said, that Christ, by our eating of his flesh and drinking of his blood, which are here set forth in emblems, feeds our souls through faith by the agency of his Holy Spirit, we are not to understand it as if any mingling or transfusion of substance took place, but that we draw life from the flesh once offered in sacrifice and the blood shed in expiation."

This is the passage which we ventured to say Dr. Hodge had mistranslated. He gives the Latin of it on page 632, and on page 647 declares, that in it Calvin "expressly" says, "that what the believer receives in the Lord's Supper is not any supernatural influence flowing from the glorified body of Christ in heaven, but the benefits of his death as an expiation for sin." Certainly neither *expressly* nor *impliedly* does the Reformer say in this section what Dr. Hodge finds in it, but he is giving just his *own doctrine* so often set before our readers in this paper, not softened away here, but only guarded in this as in several other sections from flagrant abuse and misunderstanding.

Of this Agreement of Zurich, the church historian Dr. Kurtz says, (contrary to Dr. Hodge,) "In the *Consensus Tigurinus* (1549) prepared by Calvin, German Switzerland embraced Calvin's view of the Lord's Supper. (Vol. II., p. 92—Edinburgh translation.) We refer also to Dr. Dorner's *History of Protestant Theology*, Vol. I., p. 409, in correcting Dr. Hodge's translation of this passage.

The next one of Dr. Hodge's third class of Confessions where he would have us suppose we shall find the compromise between Zwinglians and Calvinists, is the Heidelberg Catechism. This is one of the symbolical and authoritative standards of the Reformed, which is put by many in the front rank of such Confessions. Dr. Hodge chooses to represent it as one of those *in which Zwinglians and Calvinists agree*. We have had to rub our eyes several times in encountering this representation. It is no doubt true enough; but so in the same sense it is true also, that Zwinglians

and Calvinists would agree in the Gallican, Belgic, Scotch, and Westminster Confessions as to the Lord's Supper. The history of this Catechism may be thus given: Tilemann Heshusius, a violent advocate of pure Lutheranism, is driven away from Heidelberg by the Elector of the Palatinate, Frederick III., who determines that his kingdom shall hold Reformed doctrines. He appointed Calvinistic teachers throughout his country, and directed two Heidelberg professors, Ursinus and Olevian, the former a friend of Melancthon, and the latter a disciple of Calvin, to prepare the Heidelberg Catechism for the use of the schools of the Palatinate. Such is the account of it given by Kurtz the Church Historian. (See Vol. II., pp. 132,3—Edinburgh Ed.) This famous symbol is perfectly clear in setting forth the peculiar doctrine of Calvin. It says, Christ "feeds and nourishes my soul to everlasting life, with his crucified body and shed blood, as assuredly as I receive from the hands of the minister, and taste with my mouth, the bread and cup of the Lord, as certain signs of the body and blood of Christ;" also that "to eat the crucified body and drink the shed blood of Christ, is *not only* to embrace with a believing heart all the sufferings and death of Christ, and thereby to obtain the pardon of sin and life eternal; but also, *besides that*, to become more and more united to his sacred body by the Holy Ghost, who dwells both in Christ and in us; so that we, though Christ is in heaven, and we on earth, are, notwithstanding, 'flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone;' and that we live and are governed forever by one spirit, as members of the same body are by one soul;" also that through the Spirit "we are as really partakers of his true body and blood as we receive" the signs by the mouth.

Now, this Heidelberg Catechism is the peculiar symbol of the German Reformed Church, which comprises the Reformed churches of the Palatinate, (Germany,) and of the German part of Switzerland, and which has a branch in the United States also. It was also solemnly approved by the Synod of Dort in 1618, and so has the endorsement of the Reformed Dutch Church. It is just another Calvinistic symbol as truly as the Gallican, Belgic, Scotch, and Westminster, though Dr. Hodge sees proper to put

it down as amongst the Confessions of his "intermediate form" where two distinct types of the doctrine of the Supper meet and blend. But really so far is it from having any distinctively Zwinglian features that Dr. Kurtz (see *History of the Christian Church*, Vol. II., p. 133) actually declares, that it "makes the nearest possible approach to the Lutheran dogma concerning the Lord's Supper." Dr. Dorner, also in his *History of Protestant Theology*, (Vol. I., p. 405,) puts it down as amongst the most distinctively Calvinistic symbols.

Next comes, (will our readers believe it ?) as one of this "third class" of Confessions, that of the Synod of Dort itself, which makes us rub our eyes again. But passing this by as quite inexplicable, let us go to the next, which is the Second Helvetic. This was written by Bullinger in 1562, but became of public authority in a few years later, when the Elector Frederic III., anxious to meet the extreme intolerance of the Lutherans at this time against all the Reformed, but himself and his subjects particularly, and desirous to make at the Imperial Diet which was at hand as fair a showing as he could for the side he had espoused, writes to Bullinger for some such statement as might serve to repress the cavils of the Lutherans. Dr. Hodge says he wanted one that "might, if possible, unite the conflicting parties, or at least meet the objections of the Lutherans." This is enough to evince that it was to be *pretty highly Calvinistic*, else how could it possibly satisfy the Lutherans? To give it more authority, it was adopted by the Helvetic churches. Dr. Hodge says, that, as drawn up by Bullinger, the successor of Zwingle, "it cannot be supposed to contain anything to which a Zwinglian could object." We answer, of course not; but then, as prepared by Bullinger to satisfy, if possible, the Lutherans, it cannot be supposed that the Zwinglians were now other than Calvinistic on this subject, which, indeed, we know very well they had generally become.

Examining now this Second Helvetic, it is found to be full and clear in the statement of Calvin's doctrine. It says: "Believers receive what is given by the minister of the Lord, and eat the Lord's bread and drink the Lord's cup; *inwardly*, however, in the meantime by the work of Christ through the Holy Spirit, they

partake also of the Lord's flesh and blood, and are fed by these unto eternal life. For the flesh and blood of Christ are true meat and drink unto eternal life, and Christ himself as delivered up for us and our salvation is that which mainly makes the Supper," &c. It speaks of a threefold manducation or eating: the corporal with the mouth; the spiritual by faith; and the sacramental. In the second, we "receive not an imaginary food, but the very body of the Lord delivered up for us, which, however, is received by believers, not corporally, but spiritually by faith." In the third, "the believer not only spiritually and internally partakes of the true body and blood of the Lord, but outwardly by drawing nigh to the table of the Lord accepts the visible sacrament of the body and blood of the Lord."

This is the Confession of which Kurtz says, in his History of the Christian Church, (Vol. II., p. 92,) that it "was acknowledged by all the Reformed countries, and is decidedly Calvinistic." And Dorner, having elsewhere referred to it by name as "entirely" Calvinistic, says (Vol. I., p. 413): "Of all the Confessions belonging to the second period of the Reformed Church, it was the only one which obtained more than a local or national recognition, being formally approved by the Scotch Church in 1566 and 1584, by the French Church, the Hungarian, and the Polish, as well as by the whole Reformed Church in Switzerland, and by the Palatinate." And yet Dr. Hodge, seeking to evince that Calvin's doctrine was not, but that some intermediate form between his and Zwingli's was, the *Symbolical*, undertakes by a sort of double mistake to put this down as one of his *third class*.

This third class of Dr. Hodge is completed by the Confessions of the Church of England, respecting which he declares, that they are rather Zwinglian than Calvinistic; and then he accounts for this "by the fact, that it was less important for the English than for the German churches to conciliate the Lutherans;" which appears to us not fair nor respectful to the memory and good name of our Reformed forefathers.

What we are objecting to then in Dr. Hodge's treatment of Calvin, is his labored endeavors to deny to the Reformer the honor so justly his, of being the author (so far as any man was or could

be) of that doctrine which the Reformed churches have generally held respecting the Lord's Supper. The Reformed held three types of doctrine on this subject, says the distinguished theologian of Princeton—the Zwinglian, and the Calvinistic, and another intermediate between these, which became symbolical, and is found in the authoritative standards. So then the Agreement of Zurich (written by Calvin) is not Calvinistic, nor is the Heidelberg Catechism, nor yet the Confession of Faith of the Reformed (Dutch) Church, nor yet the Second Helvetic! No, not one of these gives us the doctrine of Calvin in purity, while the Dutch, Scotch, and French Confessions approach it, but yet do not give it fully or without mixture! So that the Reformer does not really live and move and make himself felt in the Reformed Confessions, except as his extreme views were modified by wiser men and deeper students of the word!

Over against these views, which not disrespect for Dr. Hodge, but loyalty to what we think true, just, and right, requires us to pronounce *preposterous*, let us set before our readers as we close a few quotations from the eminent Dorner of Berlin :

“The Reformed Church . . . has as it were two stages of reformation, a less ripe and a riper; and only by means of both together did she become what—over against the Romish Church—she is, the twin sister of the Lutheran Church, which spread in the west of Central Europe, from Geneva, through France, and along the Rhine to Holland, England and Scotland, and afterwards took possession also of the northern half of the new world. In the first of these two stages it is Zwingli who certainly occupies the first place, but alongside of him every canton has its own Reformer, almost none of whom (some Zurichers excepted) bears his stamp in the way that so many fellow-workers of Luther in Germany are moulded by him. Hence too, as the Confessions of the Reformed Church show, Zwingli's mind and manner of doctrine, so far as his peculiarities are concerned, no where achieved (only Zurich again being partially excepted) a symbolic expression and currency.” (Pp. 283,4.)

After a full exposition of what Zwingli's views of the Supper were at the first, what they became afterwards, and then how “towards the end of his life,” he “rather inclined again to the more positive views he had held at the outset,” it is thus Dorner speaks of Calvin :

"In the doctrine of the Sacraments also, as well as in the doctrine of sin, guilt and justification, Calvin has sought to draw nearer to Luther than Zwingli did. He has also effected the adhesion to his type of doctrine of the Reformed Confessions of the second formation, which are at the same time the most important, while the doctrine held by Zwingli in the middle period of his life found reception in no symbol." "Calvin's fundamental thought follows up that which Zwingli taught at the outset and again at the close, namely, that the Sacraments are not bare signs nor merely a performance of gratitude or confession, but are a pledge and a seal of divine and present grace, and are in so far efficacious and mysterious. Entirely to this effect are the Heidelberg Catechism, the Helvetic Confession of 1566, the Gallic, Belgic, and Scotch Confessions." (Pp. 404.5.)

"But the understanding which had been effected between Zurich and Geneva, was still more fruitful of results for the Reformed Churches outside of Germany. For now that the point of crystallization had been given, the power of the mind of Calvin drew the different Reformed Churches into his sphere; his doctrine of the Supper in particular passed over into the chief Reformed Confessions." (P. 414.)

Of Calvin's "small but very important treatise *De Cæna Dei*," Dorner gives these statements as a kind of summary:

"The purpose of the sacred procedure is the divine sealing of the promise of the body and blood of the whole Christ as food unto life eternal. . . . In comparison with the Gospel, the Supper secures a fuller enjoyment and greater certainty . . . Christ, his *humanity also included*, is the matter and substance of the Sacraments; the graces and benefits of Christ are the power and *effect* of this substance. The substance must be conjoined with the effect so that the effect may be based in a sure reality. The fruit would be nought, if Christ, the substance and basis of the whole matter, was not given to us in the Supper; the *Cæna Sacra* is *communicatio Christi*. But Christ, his *humanity included*, is the source and matter of every benefit, (*fons, origo, materia bonorum omnium*.) (Pp. 406,7.)

CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, and Critical, from Hutcheson to Hamilton. By JAS. MCCOSH, LL.D., D. D. New York: R. Carter & Brothers. 1875. Pp. 481. 8vo.

The mind of man, the origin, validity, and extent of human knowledge, are subjects of inexhaustible interest. Whole libraries have been written, and will continue to be written upon them, in spite of the unsatisfactory results, or, rather, in consequence of the unsatisfactory results, which have been reached. The sarcasm of the keenest wits, from Aristophanes to Dean Swift, has been levelled against such inquiries, but levelled in vain. The wonderful progress made by the mind of man in other fields of investigation, the triumphs achieved in every department of the creation and in every walk of art, have only intensified man's curiosity in regard to the constitution and powers of the instrument by which such progress has been made.

This volume of Dr. McCosh is a very interesting review of what has been done in this department of thought by the thinkers of Scotland. And what thinkers have really done more? The Germans, indeed, profess to have penetrated to a depth much below any which has been reached by the line of any Scottish thinker, and perhaps they have. But of what profit to the less favored portion of mankind, who are unable to follow them? Hegel is reported to have said upon his death-bed: "Alas! there is but one man in all Germany that understands my philosophy, and he don't understand it." If this mystic philosophy needs interpretation to Germans, surely we may be pardoned for not having a particularly clear apprehension of it. The truth is, that these great thinkers are wrong in their *method*; and *speculation*, in the German sense of that word, is an illicit process for such creatures as we are. The "*ratione ferox*" ends in the "*mens pasta chimæris*." It is a noble feature of the Scottish philosophers, with a few exceptions—Lord Monboddo, for instance—

that they adhere to the Baconian method of induction, and content themselves with inquiring what *is*. It is a very great merit in them, and a merit made more conspicuous by two circumstances. One is, that philosophy is a region of thought in which the mind may more easily depart from this method without being conscious of such departure, than in those sciences which have *matter* for their object; and the other is, that even the masters of natural science have constantly betrayed a tendency to unprofitable speculation without the guidance of facts. This tendency is particularly marked in some of the leading *savants* of our own day. They profess to be men of *advanced* thought, and yet commend the cosmogonical speculations of Læcippus or Democritus as furnishing perhaps the true solution of the mystery of the universe! We sympathise, therefore, heartily with the author of this volume in his warm commendation of his countrymen for their rigid Baconianism.

The next feature of the Scottish school signalised by our author, is "the use of self-consciousness as the instrument of observation." Des Cartes is commended for "teaching men, in studying the human mind, to seize on great internal ideas." We question, however, whether the good service rendered by that great thinker, in this respect, was not more than counterbalanced by the *a priori* tendency imparted by his method to the thinking of Leibnitz and his successors in Germany. The reasoning from thought to existence, involved in his famous *dictum*—"Cogito, ergo sum"—became the fruitful source of error in the philosophy of the Continent. Thought became the measure of being, and was identified with being. Thinking could construct a universe, and (*horrescimus referentes*) even create God! The true father of this presumptuous method is the Realism of Plato. We find Anselm, the great metaphysical Realist of the eleventh century, employing it, and propounding, in pursuance of it, the same ontological argument for the being of God, which was afterwards taken up and elaborated by Des Cartes. We have reason to congratulate the Scottish philosophers, that they have not followed the method of Des Cartes in commuting the subjective with the objective, and that, while doing Des Cartes proper honor for the

important truth which he signalised, that "the ultimate organ of science consists in an appeal to the facts of consciousness," they did not follow him "in arbitrarily applying it to the outward world through the false assumption of an innate idea of God, and thus create or assume a chasm where none exists, and then bridge it over with a figment of the imagination." (See *Tyler's Progress of Philosophy*, p. 91.)

The *third* character by which the Scottish school is distinguished, according to our author, is the assertion of principles in the mind, which though reached by observation, are yet prior to and independent of experience. This character "distinguishes it on the one hand, from empiricism and sensationalism; and on the other hand, from the dogmatism and *a priori* speculation of all ages and countries." These principles prior to and independent of experience have been differently apprehended and denominated by the masters of the school. But whether denominated "principles of common sense," or "fundamental laws of human belief," or "simple and original intuitions," or "*a priori* forms and conditions," all who are truly of the Scottish school agree in maintaining, that there are laws, principles, or powers in the mind anterior to any reflex observation; and that these laws or principles are necessities of the intelligence and the indispensable conditions for organising the facts of observation and experience into systems of philosophy and science.

But we must stop. The predominant interest of this work of Dr. McCosh, at least to ourselves, is the Biographical, and we suppose this was the design of the author as indicated in the title. We feel grateful to him for this "labor of love." He has given us notices of about fifty names more or less conspicuous in the history of Scottish thought, and the most of them names of men whose minds were moulded under the influences of the Presbyterian Church.

The volume is gotten up in excellent style by the publishers, R. Carter & Brothers, New York.

Neuro-Psychology; or the Dual Constitution of Man. By Dr. S. S. LAWS. New York: Angell, Printer, 101 E 31st St. 1875. Pp. 35, 8vo.

This is a thesis read before the Bellevue Hospital Medical College, New York. The author, at once divine, philosopher, and physiologist, here grapples with the theory of materialism, and in a small compass destroys its plausibility by an argument of a thoroughly scientific nature, and of masterly force. He insists that facts of consciousness are even more justly "empirical" than facts observed by the senses; because the cognition of the latter is only mediated through consciousness. He wrests from the materialist's hand the analogy which compares the nervous system to a galvanic machine, by reminding us that the galvanic battery, by itself, only performs the monotonous, senseless function of resolving a salt; while to make it perform an intelligent function, we must always add *the mind* of an operator. He explodes, by a simple but conclusive experiment, the current assertion that the passage of nerve-force along the nervous chords, can be measured in time. He shows that the electrical theory of nerve-action is merely a gratuitous hypothesis.

History of the Reformation in Europe in the time of Calvin. By J. H. MERLE D'AUBIGNE, D. D. Translated by WILLIAM L. B. CATES, joint author *Encyclopedia of Chronology*. Vol. VI. Scotland, Switzerland, Geneva. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1876. Pp. 526, 12mo.

There had appeared before this one, ten volumes of the *History of the Reformation*, by this distinguished author. He contemplated two more, but death cut short his plans. Nearly eighty years old, he was working incessantly to finish his task, but he did not quite complete it. Particularly is it to be regretted that he was not spared to write what he designed should be his last chapter on the Work and Influence of Calvin in Christendom. He had made his great Geneva predecessor a study for fifty years, analysing everything the Reformer wrote, with unceasing labor and ardent delight; and of all men living, he could have given probably the best estimate of his influence;

but it was not permitted him to perform this work for the Christian Church. And now where shall we find one competent in all respects to accomplish it?

The editors of this volume are the son-in-law of the deceased, by name *Duchenun*, and a colleague Professor in the Theological School of Geneva, by the name of *Binder*. They announce that two more volumes are yet to be given to be public from the voluminous manuscripts left by Dr. d'Aubigné.

The first fifteen chapters of the present volume, forming the Tenth Book, relate to Scotland. Patrick Hamilton, the first Reformer of that kingdom, who sealed his testimony with a martyr's death, of course figures largely and most attractively. Affecting in the highest degree is the account of his death. They fastened him with an iron chain round his body to the stake, which at last became red hot and burnt him almost in two. But they had only green wood for their fire, and it went out three times. He begged for dry wood, and at last it was brought. A by-standing disciple asked him, when nearly consumed, to give a sign if he still held fast to his doctrine; and two fingers being gone, he stretched forth his arm with the remaining three fingers, and held the same motionless. The torment of that slow fire had lasted from noon till near six o'clock. At length the martyr's arm fails; he cries, Lord Jesus, receive my spirit; his head droops, his body sinks down, and the flames reduce it to ashes!

Among the canons of St. Andrews was Alexander Alane, known by his Latin name, Alesius. He had disputed with Hamilton. Witnessing his martyrdom, his conversion is confirmed. He suffers the most cruel imprisonment, but escapes to Germany. Other martyrs, however, are not wanting, as Kennedy and Russell, Robert Lamb and his noble wife Hellen, who "bade her husband good night with a kiss, and told him they should suddenly meet in the kingdom of heaven," and the famous Wishart, whose death was avenged on the wretched author of it, the cruel Cardinal Beatoun.

These fifteen chapters give a full account of the events of the reign of the miserable James V. of Scotland, the father of Mary Stuart, whose son sat afterwards on the English throne.

Patrick Hamilton and George Wishart, but not John Knox, appear in these chapters. The third and greatest of Scottish Reformers will be introduced to the reader in a subsequent volume.

The remaining eighteen chapters form the Eleventh Book, and relate to the life and operations of Calvin at Geneva. The history takes him up in 1536, shortly after his arrival at Geneva. We meet with him that same year at the disputation of Lausanne, where his voice is first lifted to declare the true doctrine of the misquoted fathers, Augustine, Ambrose, etc., touching the real presence. The next year he is at the Synod of Berne, where appears the growing discussion between the partisans of Luther and Zwingli, and where Calvin intervenes to make peace between these brethren. The scriptural views which he there uttered, we have elsewhere, in this number of our journal, signalised as disproving the charges made by Principal Cunningham and Dr. Hodge against the Reformer's doctrine.

But the chief interest of this book is in its account of the rising difficulties at Geneva, which finally culminated in the banishment of Calvin and Farel; and in the history of their wanderings until the latter settled at Neufchatel, and the former at Strasburg, nothing could be more interesting than the graphic description given by D'Aubigné, of Farel's stormy eloquence when he preached in the church, and declared, amidst tumult and noise that he would not administer the Supper at the bidding of the magistrates to unworthy recipients; and on the other hand, of Calvin's calm, simple, luminous exposition to his congregation in the Cathedral of St. Peter's, of the motives which forbade his administering the communion to such parties. He spoke with solemn tranquillity in the morning, and he was heard in quiet. But in the evening, at the church of St. Francis at Rive, he spoke more emphatically, as though he must not seem to fail of sustaining his colleague. Some word he spoke produced a sudden explosion of popular passion. Swords were drawn, but friends gathered round the pulpit, and he returned safely to his home.

We could wish these volumes in the libraries of all our ministers, and on the tables and in the hands of all our people.

Forty Years in the Turkish Empire; or Memoirs of the Rev. WILLIAM GOODELL, D. D., Late Missionary of the A. B. C. F. M., at Constantinople. By his son-in-law, E. D. G. PRIME, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1876. Pp. 489. 12mo.

The period covered by the forty years of these Memoirs has been quite as eventful for the empire of Turkey as for any part of the world. Politically, it has been for Mohammedan rule in those beautiful regions of the earth, a period of decay; but for the Christian populations under that rule, possibly the dawn of a brighter day. Religiously, the day-star certainly has risen upon Turkey. The Scriptures have been circulated in its various languages, very freely—even amongst Turks, in certain places—and the gospel has been preached far and wide. And at least one of the Christian Churches—the Armenian—has witnessed, on a smaller scale, a work of reformation not unlike that of the sixteenth century in Europe.

At the time that Dr. Goodell was sent to Constantinople, viz., 1831, (for it was in 1822 he was sent out first to Syria, from whence the missionaries were shortly driven back to Malta,)—at that time Turkey was supposed by all but a few believing Christian hearts, to be closed against the missionary. And the door certainly was shut as to all access to the Turk. The door is open now, however, for access to all its various populations; and it has been open for a generation, and men have entered, bearing the light of truth, and it now shines in Turkey as in China. Forty years ago, both these empires were inaccessible to the gospel; now it runs through both, and has free course and is glorified.

The Memoirs of Dr. Goodell are those of a man whom we personally know to have been (as Dr. Prime describes him) not only the pioneer of the American missionaries to Turkey, but, all things considered, the one most honored and beloved of them, and by them all. He was indeed of “almost singular simplicity of character.” With convictions of truth and duty that were most decided, he had indeed the “gentleness of a child in expressing them.” Pursuing his work for the Master as the one absorb-

ing object of his life, yet his cheerful disposition, and the love that filled his heart for everybody, and which exhibited itself in his conduct towards everybody, made his presence indeed "a continual benediction."

Whoever is disposed to question whether modern Protestant missions have accomplished any great results, can easily have his doubts removed, if he be candid and honest, by looking into this work, or any other like record. The glory of the nineteenth century is not the progress of freedom, or of science, or of civilisation and the arts, but it is the progress of Christianity in the dark parts of the globe.

This volume is chiefly filled with accounts of Dr. Goodell's especial operations as a Missionary, and his correspondence with many friends at home, as well as colleagues in the field. It is largely autobiographical; and his simplicity, integrity, and cheerful piety, are such as necessarily to make whatever he writes entertaining and attractive. But the reader must not look to this book for anything like a comprehensive view of the missionary work of the last forty years in Turkey. Notwithstanding the advantage of a choice subject, we cannot say that the volume deserves to stand along-side of the very best missionary memoirs.

Jonah, the Self-willed Prophet: a Practical Exposition of the Book of Jonah, together with a Translation and Exegetical Notes. By STUART MITCHELL. Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. 1875. Pp. 247, 12mo.

This book is dedicated to the members of the Congregation in Bloomsburg, Pa., in whose service it was prepared. Our interest in its pages has increased as we have read, and our disposition to criticise diminished, until its perusal was accomplished. The character of Jonah would be a perfect enigma, if we did not know that the heart, independent of the renewing influences of the Holy Spirit, is desperately wicked, and that even in a well balanced mind, like that of Paul, who was not permitted, after his conversion, to do aught unworthy of his character as an apostle, there is yet a perpetual conflict between the flesh and the spirit, the old man and the new.

Jonah, whose brief writings occur in the collection of the Minor Prophets, preceded, in the order of time, all the rest whose writings are preserved, excepting those like Samuel and Moses, to whom we are indebted for the earlier historical books. He was by nature an obstinate and self-willed man ; one who thought much of his own country and nation, and did not care to go as a missionary to that heathen Nineveh, to which he was sent. Against no book of the Scriptures have the shafts of infidelity and the speculations of rationalism been more keenly directed ; and yet we have our Saviour's testimony to its historical verity, and to the fact that the strangest thing recorded in it was a *miracle*, not to be explained, therefore, by any natural laws ; a *sign*, and a sign which had its parallel in his own burial and miraculous resurrection. If it was the mission of Jonas to go forth beyond the intervening deserts and preach to a heathen city, it was a premonitory token given ages ago, that the particularism of Judaism was to cease, as it has done, now that Christ has risen from the grave that imprisoned him, to the mediatorial throne, and is receiving as his inheritance, the whole heathen world. It makes for the genuineness of the book and for its inspiration, that it conceals nothing of the rebellious spirit and strange inconsistencies of Jonah, that the story breaks abruptly off, saying nothing of his repentance and subsequent history ; so that if Jonah wrote it, he takes all the shame to himself, and leaves all the glory with God. The exposition is an interesting one, and affords the author a fine opportunity to show to the men of this day, that there are like inconsistencies among them and in every community where the truth from heaven is proclaimed.

God's Word through Preaching. The Lyman Beecher Lectures before the Theological Department of Yale College. (Fourth Series.) By JOHN HALL, D. D. New York : Dodd & Mead, Publishers, 751 Broadway. Pp. 274.

In accordance with the design of the Lyman Beecher Lecture-ship, Dr. Hall has furnished in these ten lectures a body of valuable suggestions drawn from his own protracted and eminently successful ministry. The impression is becoming preva-

lent that our practical age calls for just such practical counsels from just such wise and judicious teachers, and that the increase and popularity of "lay preaching" is partly a protest against an excess of homiletical culture.

We trust the time will never come when the pulpit will feel it can afford to dispense with our scientific treatises on the arts of sermonizing and sacred oratory. But while we do not need less abstract and theoretical teaching, we do greatly need more practical, experimental instruction. In the words of our author: "No talent is too great, no genius is too brilliant, no attainments are too rich, for the work of preaching; but thank God, average capacity can be trained into such an instrument as God and the Holy Ghost will employ for the 'work of the ministry, and for the edifying of the body of Christ.'"

The average minister will derive encouragement and stimulus from this great teacher, as he unfolds from his own affluent and instructive experience the methods by which ordinary talents may by industry and perseverance be turned to the best account.

It will be seen, therefore, that the general design of these lectures is not to consider preaching as a professional art, but in its relations to the whole work of the ministry; in relation to the Church; and in relation to the features and wants of the age.

The first point on which the lecturer insists with great earnestness, is the specific function of the preacher as an ambassador, who has definite and limited instructions, and whose only business is to deliver his message—"Whatsoever I have commanded you." He is the expositor of a revelation that "settles things," not a seeker after truth like the pagan philosophers. This necessarily excludes, as irrelevant to his mission, all discussions of science, philosophy, history, all theological speculations, and private opinions, all Ritualistic Preaching and Sacerdotalism.

In connexion with this, Dr. Hall observes that the Church of Christ, with all its denominational differences, is generically Christian. "Christian is the *substantive*, Episcopalian, or Methodist, or Moravian, is the *adjective*. And this ought to be true of the ministry and the sermons. There are times, and there is a place for sectional truth; but the staple of our ministry is to be Christian."

Dr. Hall is a strong believer in pastoral work, and urges the duty with all the enthusiasm of one who knows whereof he affirms by a rich and happy experience. "We venture to think," he says, "that, whatever may be done by extraordinary men, who attempt little beyond preaching, and who effect much by the influence so exercised over masses of men; to the average preacher the greatest amount of usefulness comes by his being a pastor." He considers it the first duty of a minister to *know his people*. By the free, familiar, and sympathetic intercourse of the fireside, channels of confidence and affection are opened through which moral and spiritual influences may flow. The pulpit not only reflects the abstract themes of theological treatises, but resounds with the echoes of the manifold experience of sin and sorrow-burdened hearers. The power thus gained more than compensates for lack of special gifts. Here lurks the secret of short pastorates. Men of ordinary talents gain but a slender and temporary hold upon a people with whom they do not come into close and frequent personal contact. "And the experience of the Church is that the pastor effects the most in the end who comes into closest contact with his charge. No amount of organising, no skill in creating machinery and manipulating "committees," is a substitute for this. The minister who would be like his Master, must go, and like Him lay the warm, kindly hand on the leper, the diseased, the wretched. He must touch the blind eyes *with something from himself*."

Next to pastoral work, Dr. Hall emphasizes expository preaching, as that kind of preaching which most honors the Word of God and the Holy Ghost. There is nothing like "the very Word of God set forth in its native force and allowed to speak for itself," to kindle the emotions of genuine piety, and edify the believer. Moreover, very few men have the ability to produce every week two finished sermons. But let one-half of the discourses be expository, and there is no limit to the power of interesting and instructing the same congregation for many years. It keeps his mind full and lifts him out of old ruts. Fidelity to Christ would seem to demand this kind of preaching, as the whole Scripture testifies of Him.

Dr. Hall utters a timely warning against the indifference of Americans to the Romish controversy. He thinks that many of our ablest ministers would find themselves embarrassed in a discussion with a well-educated Romanist.

The lectures on sermonizing are replete with wholesome practical suggestions, enforced and illustrated with passages from the author's own experience.

On the subject of manuscript preaching, Dr. Hall agrees substantially with Dr. Storrs. Dr. Hall seems to allow the memory some play in preaching, which Dr. Storrs proscribes altogether. Both of these eminent preachers magnify the office of the pen, and insist upon the absolute necessity of habitual and careful writing. Referring to his own method, he says, "I put on paper all I know about my subject, in the order in which it had better be spoken. I fix this order and the illustrations in my mind, in studious disregard of the language, except in the case of definitions, if there be any, depending on verbal exactness. I try to have it so that I could talk it over—give the end first, or begin in the middle if need be; and then I go to the pulpit, and converse with the people about the matter in a tone loud enough to be heard through the house, if I can. That is all—there is no secret about it, gentlemen."

He discourages "class-preaching;" he ridicules "announced preaching" as "competitive oratory," on a par with "competitive rowing and running." He would substitute for these expedients for drumming up an audience, a series of connected discourses. Here again he reiterates his former plea for more Bible preaching. "Let me declare again and again, that what is most wanted among professing Christians is knowledge of their Bibles. Sceptics know but little of it, and great masses of the otherwise intelligent but ungodly of our population do not know it at all. Ignorance of it is the soil in which the rank growth of 'isms' of every kind flourish."

A great deal has been said about "preaching to the times." But to Dr. Hall "the 'times' are less variable for the purposes of the preacher than is commonly supposed." Truth does not change, neither does human nature, nor Satan's tactics. Indi-

cating the tendencies of the age, we are reminded that there are good as well as bad tendencies, which croakers commonly overlook. Over against the race for riches; the selfish love of money; the overestimate of the value of physical studies; and the idolatry of genius: he sets the independence of thought; the humanity of the age; missionary zeal; yearning for Christian union; the practical character of the times; and Christian activity in its various forms. The encouragements of the preacher quite counter-balance his discouragements.

In the last lecture, Dr. Hall dispels with masterly ease the popular fallacy respecting the decline of pulpit power, so often paraded in specious rhetoric by literary critics. But the young candidate for the ministry is assured that he is not "going to a sinking profession, falling into a forlorn hope, or sacrificing himself to a lost cause; there never was more of energy, talent, zeal, culture and ability consecrated to Christ in the pulpit than now; and you may catch a certain inspiration from the association with a noble, numerous, and devoted band of fellow-laborers, inferior to no race of ministers since the days of the apostles."

The faithful minister will find much to give weight and authority to his preaching, in his official standing, in the power of educated mind, the power of moral character, the power of truth addressing the conscious wants and experiences of men, the power of God's word and of the Holy Spirit.

The lectures are written in that simple, clear, forcible style so characteristic of this distinguished preacher. But behind the homely drapery of language, the reader clearly discerns a massive mind, profound learning, and thorough scholarship.

We regard this work as a valuable contribution to Homiletical Literature; and, adopting the language of the Faculty of Yale, "we are confident that the ministry generally, of all denominations, and especially young ministers, will thank God for the grace that has been given to Dr. Hall for this good work."

The Appendix consists of answers to questions on various topics not touched upon in the lectures; such as the Free Seat system; preaching to the masses, prayer-meetings; Bible exercises; choir singing; clerical manners, etc.; all of which are judicious, pithy, and suggestive.

The Vedder Lectures, 1874. Prayer and its Relation to Modern Thought and Criticism. A Course of Lectures delivered before the Theological Seminary and Rutgers College (New Brunswick, New Jersey). By ISAAC S. HARTLEY, D. D., Pastor of the Reformed Church, Utica, N. Y. New York: Board of Publication of the R. C. A., 1875.

The Vedder Lectures, 1875. "The Light by which we see Light," or Nature and the Scriptures. A Course of Lectures delivered before the Theological Seminary and Rutgers College, New Brunswick, New Jersey. By TAYLER LEWIS, LL. D., L. H. D., Union College. 'Εν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος—John i. 1. New York: Board of Publication of the R. C. A., 34 Vesey Street. 1875. 246 pp. 12mo.

"The Vedder Lectures" for 1875 are not without evidences of the genius and learning by which their venerable author has been so long distinguished from the mob of American writers. It is refreshing in these days, when the undoubted value of mathematical and physical studies is so often urged even to the disparagement of the classics and philosophy, to fall in with a man who, whilst betraying familiarity with some of the latest results and processes of "science," is yet one whose true delight is in the speculations of the ancients and in the unadulterated Greek of Plato and Aristotle. Still more is it gratifying to meet with a thinker of breadth and robust force, who, in these perilous times of infidelity, remains proof against every seduction, and "whose delight is in the law of the Lord," and who "meditates in that law day and night." It is also pleasant to find that, after his many encounters, the bow of this hoary champion abides in strength. The scholarship of Dr. Lewis is something remarkable. He is not only at home among the pages of the old Greek philosophers (accepting nothing at second hand), but Latin, German, and Hebrew, seem to be equally at his fingers' ends. It is with a novel sensation that one plunges into a volume newly from the press that bristles so with the characters of old Assyria. Several of the translations that are here offered, as well from the New as from the Old Testament, are noticeable not only for their exactness but their beauty and impressiveness. There are not wanting, too, traces of an acquaintance with other

Semitic and possibly with Indian dialects. There is withal no pedantry. The idea impressed on the reader is that of thoroughly mastered learning. The writer loves to get away from the atmosphere of the grammar and lexicon and soar into the regions of high philosophising and fervid imaginative and spiritual eloquence. The style is here and there, perhaps, too dithyrambic, and the diction is throughout certainly too technical. Many new words are coined, and Horace's "unaccustomed words" freely used. Yet it is the lecturer's own style, and we would not have it either changed or copied.

The work consists of five lectures; of which the first is entitled, "The Fearfulness of Atheism;" the second, "The Denial of the Supernatural;" the third, "The Cosmical Argument—Worlds in Space;" the fourth, "Cosmical Argument continued—Worlds in Time;" and the fifth, "The Kingdom of God; or, The Greatness of the Bible Theism, as compared with the Physical, Scientific, and Philosophical." The first lecture is one of the most striking. It is here shown that many dislike the theistic idea, but few are willing to abandon it altogether; that the consequence of such abandonment is intellectual and moral desolation; that the doctrines of hell and retribution themselves are not so dreadful; that no recourse can be had to the hypothesis of chance, or even to the supposed refuge of mere law; that Atheism is a gulf of horror; that there is a momentous seriousness about the world problem; that the ideas of holiness and justice fascinate even in their condemnation; that Atheism is without hope, without *security*; that Atheism does not protect against the chances of a future state; that there is no room in this scheme for the idea of progress; that nature is of necessity a *finite* thing; that the evolution hypothesis involves the notion of decay as well as growth, and that, with whatever interior cyclical movements and retrogradations, the grand cycle of the universe must at last run round and run out; that there is need of a renovating power, of a movement *ab extra*; that Plato and Socrates and Aristotle teach this; that the argument for Deity must be plain, adapted to all; that motion demands a mover; that the infidel cry for illimitable time furnishes its own refutation, inasmuch as on the

Atheist's view the direction of the universal movement is then indeterminate; that an insect crawling amidst the machinery of the great Haarlem organ, or over the dome of St. Paul's, would not be in a less favorable position for forming oracular judgments; that the mighty music of the Cosmos is unintelligible on Atheistic principles; that the world has higher aspects than the physical; that the physical is subordinate to the hyperphysical; that nature considered as a *mean*, has no *end* terminating in itself; that mind—that idea—that *the perfect*, should be placed first; that Strauss in his final melancholy utterance, is the despairing Prometheus of Æschylus.

It would be impossible within our limits to give a fuller outline of the argument as a whole. All that we can do is to seize upon certain points that have arrested our attention. There is admirable force and skill in the fencing by which the weapon of law is wrested from the hand of the modern Atheist. Upon *his* principles, it is triumphantly evinced there can be no *law* other than mere sequence, and that the most fortuitous sequence has as much the character of law as any other. The boasted ideas of order, relation, causality, are themselves mere products of a mindless power, and thus themselves mere contingencies. With a different atomic adjustment, order might have been disorder. Comte and his followers have consistently abandoned eternal and necessary ideas. It is a logical sophism, therefore, that would interpose the *tertium quid*, law, betwixt chance and mind. Another point that is made with ingenuity and pressed home with cogent power, is, that on the assumption of infinite ages in the past during which the evolution of the Cosmos has been going on, the result reached is far beneath what might naturally have been predicted. It was only yesterday, for instance, that man was an ape; whereas he ought long ago to have been an angel or a glorious demiourgos—unless, indeed, the progress were towards the worse and not the better; which had been proved to be just as tenable as the more flattering hypothesis. In that case, it follows by parity of reason, that by this time, in the possible sequences of a duration absolutely without beginning, there may have been evolved out of nature itself, and may now

be in existence, a baleful demon who may one day wreck the universe, and whose *mirabilia* may be to-day as repugnant to the familiar course of things as any of the *miracula* of the Bible are imagined to be by the Atheist. There is an elaborate attempt made in this chapter to offset the vaticination of Spencer (who is, however, not expressly referred to,) as to the probable fate of the stellar universe, by a masterly reproduction of the arguments of Plato and Aristotle. Spencer surmises a perpetual series of oscillations between the minimum of rest and the maximum of advance. The astute lecturer, on the other hand, revives the subtle *a priori* argument of the ancients, that "a movement right onward" must finally come to an end. There must be what Socrates calls a *καμπή*, or *turning* round, before the movement can be renewed and thus perpetuated. But though there may be something partial of this kind, inasmuch as part acts on part, there can be nothing of this kind that is predicable of the whole, inasmuch as there is nothing *else than* totality, and consequently, no the atheistic view, nothing to produce the cyclical return. We confess to an admiration for this species of mental gymnastics, and fancy the lecturer to be in occupation of ground as safe as that of Mr. Spencer; but we have grave doubts whether there is any gain in leaving the sure foothold of the *a posteriori* arguments.

The second lecture is a very fine one. Without pretending to analyse it, we are content to bring out some of its salient ideas. The charge of anthropomorphism is here retorted upon the positivist. Much of the discussion in this chapter had been previously gone over in the "Divine-Human in the Scriptures," which is a book that deserves a more unqualified commendation even than these "Vedder Lectures" of the same author. There is nothing like slavish repetition, and the other work is not referred to in these pages. There is, however, much also that is new here, and much that is equally admirable. The alleged impossibility of the supernatural is carefully considered and denied. The Divine constancy in nature is admitted. The *moral* power of a miracle is eloquently illustrated. Nature is a kind of screen. There is something soothing in the notion of physical law. Yet

there is also a fascination about the *supernatural*. There are two kinds of incredibility: that of the sense, and that of the reason. Hume went no further than that of sense. A miracle was a thing unknown and unknowable, not impossible. The modern Atheist boldly asserts that miracles are incredible to the reason; that they are *per se* impossible. The author maintains that what is incredible to the sense may be credible to the reason, and illustrates his meaning by reference to the choral song of the angels at the birth of Christ, and the prodigies of the crucifixion. It was meet the angels should make merry and be glad. It would be almost *incredible* to the reason that the earth and heaven should be unmoved at the death of their Lord. *Moral* reasons come in. The total *absence* of the supernatural would be repugnant to every rational principle. The moral power of the biblical supernatural, in comparison with every other, and the sublimity of the Christian's, in comparison with all other sacred books, is amply set forth. The soul cries aloud for some supernaturalism. It is a childish argument that may be thus stated: nature is *all*; therefore there is nothing above or beside nature. There are manifold absurdities in the scheme of an eternal evolution which is itself self-evolved; in a scheme which finds the highest in the lowest, and educes *more* out of *less*. The impossibility of the supernatural is shown to be the staple of the rationalistic exegesis; and it is finely indicated that the subjective truthfulness of the Bible involves the objective reality.

We can say but little of the next two lectures. The first of them answers the astronomical objection, and in an admirable manner. The arguments of Whewell and Chalmers are given substantially, and the former is expressly cited. This, however, is only part of the reply, and is itself completely remodelled. Dr. Lewis's own answer to the cavil is wholly *suigeneris*. There is something almost fantastic in his "trine aspect of the universe," and his "three dimensions of being." These are breadth, length, and altitude. By breadth, he would denote space-relations; by length, time-relations; and by height or "altitude," supra-cosmical or hyper-physical relations. Yet there is a great thought wrapped up in this odd phraseology. True greatness is not mere

bigness or mere duration. The soul is greater than the fixed stars, apart even from the consideration of its immortality. God's ends cannot be determined by rule and compass. There is an interesting account given of the grandeur of the ancient views of the stellar world. The remainder of the lecture is devoted to an exhibition of the sublimity and non-scientific character of the Bible language. It is strongly argued that this language is so constructed as always to harmonise with the progressive relations of God's word and the progressive disclosures of human science. There are no double or cabalistic senses, but there are mounting or germinant senses. Old ideas undergo new expansions. The second of the two lectures on the Cosmical argument does not contain much that is fresh to readers of the "Six Days of Creation," and the Lange Commentary on Genesis. As is well known, the lecturer adopts the long-day view, and endeavors to sustain it by pure exegesis of the text and by the testimony of the fathers, unassisted by the help of the geologists. This chapter shows a knowledge of the Hebrew and cognate dialects that is possessed by few. There is perhaps nothing better on this side of the question. Without naming Hugh Miller, the "Mosaic vision" theory is advocated by the lecturer. Without entering upon the open question of the length or nature of the creative days, we are convinced that the first chapter of Genesis is more akin to the historic than to the prophetic books. There is something rather mysterious about the lecturer's "æonic words" and "olamic ages," though much that he says on these topics, where not obscure, is excellent. There is a marked tendency towards a sort of Christian mysticism that is observable in several parts of this volume. It is hard to say whether the respected lecturer has been most influenced by Plato, by such writers as St. Victor, or by S. T. Coleridge. It is evident that he has been influenced most of all by the Divine Logos, of whom he so loves to speak.

The last of the five lectures is perhaps the best of all. He draws rather a whimsical distinction between the words *conception* and *idea*. We think the lecturer concedes too much to the pantheist (on p. 239) where he holds that there is a pantheism that is true and scriptural. Much of the preceding discussion is

condensed and recapitulated in a more impressive form. There is a good deal of this kind of repetition in the book, but it is exactly of the kind that is necessary in oral addresses. There is no apparent effort at symmetry in the arrangement of the particular topics. Everything seems to flow from the point of the pen. The hideous *hysteron-proteron* of the modern Atheist is once more presented, in the fifth lecture, and forcibly exposed. Matter and force ought not to be put first. The nebula could not have come first. The lowest could not precede the highest. Quantitative or dynamical are not to be ranked with *spiritual* values. *Faith* has inestimable value as the measure of spiritual worth. (Heb. xi.) Strauss's dictum is grandly refuted, that the Hebrews had only the *personal* and the Greeks the *absolute* idea of God. The anthropopathism of the Bible is not a mere figure, but a real approach of the infinite to the finite. It is just here that infidel philosophy loses its balance.

"*The Vedder Lectures*" for 1874, had already won their way into the regards of those who were acquainted with their object; but they are now for the first time offered to the reader. While not seeing our way clear to accept all the subordinate arguments as conclusive, we do not hesitate to pronounce the argument-in-chief unanswerable. The method is a good one. The first lecture is on the nature, history, and practical uses of Prayer. The second is on the being and personality of God. The theistic proposition, with its corollaries, is supported by a variety of proofs, some of which (as that of Dr. D. H. Hamilton, pp. 69-73) being of a purely metaphysical character, hardly possess the weight which the lecturer gives them. The voluntary character of the Divine action is abundantly established. The third lecture, which discusses the question, whether God can answer prayer, or the relations of prayer to science, is the ablest of the series. The argument here is essentially the same with that of Argyll's "Reign of Law." Prayer, however, is considered too much in the light of a natural force, rather than as a means of securing a divine action. There seems to us to be a confusion in this chapter, and occasionally elsewhere in the book, of God's miraculous and unmiraculous interpositions. At all events the discussion is not

clear on this point. On p. 140, it is argued that God may "suspend or reverse" any law; not by "a new force," but through "other laws." The meaning seems to be, that God may answer prayer without working a miracle. But in the account the author gives, on pp. 137-139, of the miracles of Scripture, we understand him to analyse them into the same kind of operations with ordinary, so far as physical laws are concerned. Either, then, there is no such thing as a miracle, or it is still to be shown that all prayer does not demand the miraculous. The next chapter is on the notorious "Prayer-Test," which the lecturer shows up very cleverly and successfully. He is, however, too mild. There was room for more of virtuous wrath. The grand reply is omitted, viz., that such a test involves the sin of the arch-tempter on the mountain-top. The fifth lecture discusses the point, does God answer prayer, or prayer and miracle.

The thought in this book is better than the language, which, though commonly good, is often diffuse. We challenge the word "reliable." The book abounds in apt illustrations.

Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman: Written by Himself.
D. Appleton & Co. 2 vols. 8vo. Pp. 405, 409.

Darwinians say that the first of a new *genus* is created by its "environment." No other environment than that of Yankee "civilisation" could have rendered possible such a book as this from a man holding such a position. Its author is a distinguished member of an educated profession, and commander-in-chief of the armies of this Empire. His book may be briefly described as lively, perspicuous, egotistical, reckless, slashing, with a spice of profanity, a large infusion of slang, and a general complexion of vulgarity. Military and political criticisms are out of the sphere of this Review; and, for literary criticism, the work does not present a subject matter at all. Our only object in noticing it, is to remark upon its code of official ethics.

Gen. Sherman here not only avows, but glories in his ravages of the South. During his career, his usual answer to remonstrance was: "You Southern people chose war; and war is war."

Mankind will yet decide that, while Gen. Lee's career in Pennsylvania *was war*, Gen. Sherman's, in Georgia and Carolina, *was brigandage*. It is a duty which every civilised and Christian person owes to his kind, to insist on this verdict. *Grotius*, whose international code was the harsh one of the ancients and of the middle ages, declares, (*De Jure Belli et Pacis. Liber III., Chap. VI., §27*):

“But this external right to acquire possessions captured in war, is so restricted to formal wars arising out of the law of nations, that in other wars it has no place; for, in wars between foreigners, the property is not acquired by virtue of force of arms, but for compensation of dues which could not be otherwise obtained. *But in wars between citizens*, whether they be small or large, *no transfer of ownership takes place, except by authority of a judge.*” The doctrine is, that, in no war, does mere superior force create any just title to the spoils obtained; brute force decides no right. Hence, when at the end of a war between foreigners, the conqueror retains his spoils, it is not on the ground of superior force; but on the ground that, where there is no common arbiter, these spoils of war are his only means of getting just indemnity; and the strong hand, the only process. But civil wars, between citizens of the same nation, are waged for the avowed purpose of reducing opponents under the regular jurisdiction of the laws and magistracy. In this the combatants have a common umpire when peace returns. It is the judicial decision of law which confers a just right of property, not brute force; and hence *civil war confers no right of spoil*.

Says Vattell, Bk. III., Chap. 9: “It is lawful to take away *the property of an unjust enemy* in order to weaken him.” But “only with moderation, and according to the exigencies of the case.” “If an enemy of superior strength treats in this manner a province which he might easily keep in his possession, he is universally accused of making war like a furious barbarian.” “The pillage and destruction of towns, the devastation of the open country, the ravaging and setting fire to houses are measures odious and detestable, on every occasion when they are evidently put in practice without absolute necessity.”

Gen. Sherman claims a belligerent right to take or destroy everything, which if left might have enabled the South for farther resistance—even including, according to that practical explanation of his code given in Georgia and Carolina, plate, watches, jewelry, spoons, pianos, harps, pictures, statues, churches, libraries, sacred vessels of the sacraments, clothing of females and infants, bedding, and dwellings; as much as iron-foundries and powder-mills. Why did he not apply his doctrine also to murder the children, because they might speedily grow up into soldiers; and to murder the women, because they might breed soldiers? This would have been just as consistent.

Gen. Sherman's crowning exploit, as is well known, was the sack and burning of the city of Columbia, the capital of South Carolina, peacefully and formally surrendered to him by its civic authorities, upon his express guarantee of its protection. This beautiful town, then containing twenty thousand people, was systematically sacked during the day, and at night fired with equal system in various places, and the larger portion of it burned to the ground. We will not attempt to detail the complicated horrors and crimes of that night; but will present Gen. Sherman's own version of their cause. Vol. II., p. 287, he says:

“Many of the people thought that this fire was deliberately planned and executed. This is not true. It was accidental, and, in my judgment, began with the cotton which General Hampton's men had set fire to on leaving the city, (whether by his orders or not is not material,) which fire was partially subdued early in the day by our men; but when night came, the high wind fanned it again into full blaze, carried it against the frame-houses, which caught like tinder, and soon spread beyond our control.”

Every intelligent person in Columbia believed that Gen. Sherman, probably without formally ordering it, designed and managed this burning. In their eyes, this method of procuring the crime only added to its meanness, without diminishing anything of its atrocity. The impartial reader may, perhaps, determine where the truth lies, from the following facts:

Gen. Sherman, on the same page which has just been quoted, adds: “In my official report of this conflagration, I distinctly

charged it to Gen. Wade Hampton, and confess I did so pointedly, to shake the faith of his people in him, for he was in my opinion a braggart, and professed to be the special champion of South Carolina." Above, he confesses that he had not sufficient evidence to show whether Gen. Hampton was responsible for the fire or not, this point not being "material." Here, he avows, that in a formal, official report, he "distinctly and pointedly" charged Gen. Hampton with the act, for the purpose of defaming him with his own people! The curious reader will perhaps be embarrassed in deciding how much (or little) weight may be attached to any averment of one whose views of the obligation of veracity are so peculiar.

Next, let it be added, that according to express testimony of eye-witnesses, this cotton, placed in a very wide open street, was not fired at all by Gen. Hampton, or by any Confederate agency; but by the pipes, cigars, and matches of Sherman's soldiers lounging upon it; and that this fire was not "partially," but utterly extinguished by a fire company of the city, who saturated and drenched the whole mass with water; and that the same wind was blowing then and afterwards. Let it also be considered, that threats were notoriously uttered by officers and men of Sherman's army, reflecting his own vindictive temper, before it crossed the Savannah river, against Columbia, as the capital of the State which was first to secede, the place of refuge for the people and the wealth of hated Charleston, and the seat of important Confederate works and stores. The broad track of ruin left through the State shows of what this General and his army were capable. Who so likely to have burned the city, as they who avowedly burned the whole country over which they marched? We remind the reader again, that a multitude of soldiers and officers, some of considerable rank, declared that the city was to be burned at night. Accordingly, the work was begun at an appointed time, by a preconcerted signal, (the rise of sundry rockets,) and by large bands of soldiers deliberately prepared with combustibles, and acting with perfect deliberation and method. To show that it was a purposed crime, we need only add, that when the fire companies of the

city endeavored to arrest the flames, they were driven off, their hose cut, and their fire-engines disabled. Will it be said, that all this was done by the army without the consent and approbation of its commander? Then let the following facts be noted: That from 10 o'clock a. m., Gen. Sherman was, according to his own statement, riding or walking about the town nearly during the whole day (as during the subsequent night); while his people were openly engaged in the pleasant pastimes of robbing stores and dwellings, murdering blacks, committing rape on their women, stealing watches off the persons of ladies, and tearing rings from their fingers; that he had his whole army otherwise under rigid and perfect discipline; and that, accordingly, when the work of destruction had reached a certain point, a single bugle call from headquarters sufficed to arrest it, and at the first bidding of authority, the tumult subsided, the hordes of drunken soldiers vanished, and order was at once restored. Why was not this authority exerted at 8 o'clock p. m., instead of 5 o'clock a. m.? It was only because the designed work was unfinished.

Gen. Sherman recites his amiable charities to those whom he had ruined, with a refreshing simplicity. He gave a parcel of bacon and half a tierce of rice to each of two widows. But the provisions were stolen from their fellow-citizens. He left with the Mayor five hundred cattle. But these were driven from the farms, and were famished, unable to travel, and dying a score a day of exhaustion!

When any attempt was made to shame the incendiaries, they usually replied, that on their return home they should glory in the act, and that nothing would be so grateful as their vengeance to the people of the North. Did they estimate their country aright? The city of Chicago rung joy-bells at the news; and the chief actor has since been rewarded for it by "a grateful country" with the highest military honors in her gift.

Recent journals have told us, that when a representative of Great Britain lately met the Spanish General, *Burriel*, in his own country, he refused him all recognition, because this officer had ordered the execution of the "Virginus prisoners," whom, from his point of view, he regarded as caught in the act of piracy.

Gen. Sherman's little finger has been thicker than Gen. *Burriel's* loins. But the journey of the former through Europe was almost an ovation! Why this? Because it happened that Gen. Sherman's victims were the protectors of those poor Africans, whom the slave-trade, fostered by Europe and New England, had torn from their homes! Well; we presume that the people who could calmly look up to the righteous heavens amidst the horrors of that *pandemonium* which reigned in Columbia the 17th of February, 1865, will survive this injustice also, with an equanimity only disturbed by a quiet contempt.

There are two disclosures in Gen. Sherman's memoirs which have some value to the South. The Convention made with Gen. Jos. E. Johnston at Raleigh, in April, 1865, promised to the Confederate people restoration of all their constitutional rights and franchises, on condition of their submission to the Washington Government. How came Gen. Sherman to promise terms so much more just than those actually granted by that Government? Not, certainly, because of any special mercifulness or justice in the man; as the fate of Carolina clearly showed. The solution obviously is, that the blunt soldier, zealously engrossed with his war, in a region remote from the capital, had not kept pace with the developments of faithlessness in the ruling minds there. He had not comprehended, that all the solemn pledges made to the country and the world, of waging the war to uphold the constitution and laws, meant that, so soon as the South was helpless, the war was to be used to destroy them. It should be added, however, for Gen. Sherman's credit, that as soon as he was corrected, he hastened to amend this little error.

The other item is contained on p. 373 of Vol. II. We are there informed that Mr. Chase (doubtless the Ahitophel of the conclave) demanded of the President, so early as April 12, 1865, suffrage for the negroes; and that the reason which was assigned for this insane and criminal measure, was simply the desire to strengthen the radical faction in the Government after the restoration of a nominal peace. Thus the sagacity of Mr. Calhoun is verified, who had long before predicted that this dishonest motive would make negro suffrage the sequel of abolition; and the flimsy pretence of justice to the negro is dropped.

A Weekly Publication containing Sermons by Rev. B. M. PALMER, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, New Orleans. Reported and published by C. W. COLTON, Phonographer, No. 16 Carondelet street, New Orleans, Lock Box 68.

To the numerous friends and admirers of Dr. Palmer, this publication of his current weekly discourses is a truly acceptable offering. They are a favored people who sit under such a ministry from Sabbath to Sabbath, receiving constantly such rich instruction, uttered with so much simplicity and freedom, presenting old truths with such freshness and point. Fine specimens are they of the free style of extemporaneous speech, in which far reaching thoughts are expressed, not in stilted Johnsonian phrase, but in language easily apprehended, and stimulating to all. Occasionally only, does a word come in belonging to the abstruser studies of the professional man, not oftener certainly than other terms drawn from the usages and experience of common and daily life.

We quote the following from the Sermon XVIII. of this series, a discourse on "The Darkness of Providence," delivered on the 28th of November, 1875, from John xviii. 7: "What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter," as a specimen of his style and method, not because we have been culling passages of peculiar excellence, but because we happen just now to have it before us :

"But the text declares—and the declaration is of the nature of a promise—that WHATEVER BE THE DARKNESS RESTING UPON THE DISPENSATIONS OF PROVIDENCE, IT WILL BE TEMPORARY. 'What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter.' In the case of Peter, that promise was very soon fulfilled; for when the Master had washed the disciples' feet, He laid aside the towel with which He was girded, and seated Himself at the table, and gave the explanation: 'Know ye what I have done to you? Ye call me Master and Lord: and ye say well; for so I am. If, I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet, ye ought also to wash one another's feet.' It was the germinant fulfilment to Peter. And yet, with all the understanding which Peter had of this mystery through the explanation which was given to him, how far short did it fall of the larger knowledge which he had on the day of Pentecost? when, through the inspiration of the Spirit, he had a more complete knowledge of the whole scheme of grace, and went forth, under the in-

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fluence of that Spirit, preaching the wonderful sermon in the streets of Jerusalem, under which three thousand souls were converted at once. But even that knowledge, given to him on the day of Pentecost, was itself but a symbol of the larger knowledge which he should have beyond the grave. Just so, my brethren, it is with us in the different stages of our Christian experience. Many a dispensation of God towards us is dark and inexplicable, until God lifts us up by the hand and brings us into higher views of Himself and of His grace. Then we look back reflectively upon that which we experienced long ago, and begin to understand it. And yet, with all that knowledge which a growing experience affords, it is but the germinant fulfilment of that which will be entirely accomplished when we enter into the world of life and blessedness above. There we shall no longer see as through a glass darkly, but face to face, and shall know even as we ourselves are known.

"In regard to the revelation which is to be given to us of these mysterious providences, I have several considerations to submit :

"1. *There is a strong presumption of it, from the known connexion between the two worlds.* Man has 'a true body and a reasonable soul,' and thus the two worlds are united in himself. Through the body of flesh, he is of the earth and is related to earth; through the immortal soul, he is a native of the skies and must find his home above. Though depraved by sin and wholly turned away from the holiness of God, there is a spiritual instinct in man which yearns to overleap the bounds of sense and to grasp the things which are beyond. These aspirations after the spiritual and the eternal, reveal that he belongs to a higher sphere. As 'fire ascending seeks the sun,' so the unconquerable instincts of his spiritual nature leap upward, with a restless discontent of the earthly and the material. Just as the balloon, by its own buoyancy, strains the cords which impede its flight, and then mounts through the air and is lost in the clouds: so the cords of sense bind the soul to the objects of time, which yet long to burst from the constraint and rise into its kindred element. The very principle of ambition in man, which grasps at sceptres and titles on earth, is but the finger upon the dial-plate of our spiritual nature, pointing to hopes and to rewards which can only be realised in the spiritual world.

But when the soul is renewed by the Holy Ghost, and through its progressive sanctification is more and more recovered from the dominion of sin, there is a clearer apprehension of spiritual realities, and a holier longing for that world which Jehovah fills with the glory of His presence. Why need I speak of this to those who are so familiar with the blessed privilege of prayer? Here, in the closet, we make the telegraphic signals which go up through the heavens and touch the very throne upon which our eternal Father sits. We play with our hands, as it were, upon the keys of a mysterious instrument, and thoughts, affections, de-

sires ascend from the depths within us, which instantly repose upon God and the joys of the upper kingdom. And when we come to the borderline which, at death, separates the two worlds, what a strange overlapping we are sometimes permitted to see! What visions of heaven do often burst upon the spirit, just while it is engaged with the mortal agonies of nature's last hour! The crushing of the timbers of this earthly frame only seems to let in the light of the glory that is beyond. Must not the mystery of this union between matter and spirit be cleared up at last? Shall the two worlds touch each other in us, all through our earthly career, and their relations not be disclosed to us at length? In this occasional overlapping of the two, is there no intimation that what is dark here will be made light there?

"I have no idea that, when we pass into eternity, we are to mingle like the drops in the ocean, losing the separateness and individuality which belongs to each. The thread which death breaks at the grave is gathered up by an unseen hand and woven into new relations and into new purposes in the world of light and of glory. We shall enter heaven, if it is God's purpose to carry us there, with our distinct individuality; each man carrying his own personality, and, with it, all the memories which connect him with the world of training in which he lived below. The career upon which we shall enter there will be as distinctly personal, as distinctly characterised by all that is individual and peculiar to us, as ever was the career which we ran whilst here upon the earth. The two worlds lie close together. It is one step across the brook, and we are over; transfigured it may be, glorified into the image of our Divine Head, but yet the identical and real persons there that we were here. Beyond a question, our whole destiny beyond the grave is to be colored by that which marked our history upon the earth. It is this which renders our earthly existence, brief though it be, and checkered, of such sublime significance. At every moment we touch wires that vibrate in eternity.

"2. Then, too, *in the world to come all the limitations of sense will be removed.* It is this which now fetters us, and makes it so hard for us to understand and know. In the world of reward we shall possess what the Apostle calls the 'spiritual body.' What its attributes are, the Word has not revealed to us. It will be body, but it will be spirit. It will be a spiritual body, with instincts and appetites and organs and senses that are peculiar to it as such—able to take cognisance of what belongs to a spiritual world. Just as our natural senses, which are adequate to the flesh which we wear, are suited to give us apprehensions of matter, of the things that are substantive and real; so shall the spiritual body possess spiritual organs, which shall enable it to understand and to investigate the spiritual world. I think one of the most beautiful lessons which the magnificent science of this age teaches us—for, brethren, I have no jealousy in my heart of any of the adventures which

science makes, nor of any of the stores of knowledge which she communicates. I have a sublime confidence that all truth is one. God will heal the schisms which spring up between the advocates and the investigators of truth; for truth springs from Himself, and it possesses the real unity which exists in Him. Truth, as God stamps it upon the frame of the universe—truth, as He writes it with His own finger upon the rocks in the bowels of the earth—truth, as it is written upon the face of the sky, the stars themselves being the embossed types by which He prints the great attributes of His being and of His glory upon the parchment of the sky: all truth, whether it be of nature or of grace, we shall be able in the spiritual world to read, not only in its absolute reality, but in its most perfect and blessed unity. But the lesson, which science gives us in the revelations which she is making to us at this day, is just this lesson of humility. Wherever she opens a rift through the cloud, and we gaze with such enthusiasm and delight upon the truth that is beyond, all that truth is itself veiled in a robe of mystery. Science, lighting her torch, as she ought to do, at the altars of God, pursues her march with adventurous spirit into those mysteries that are beyond; and as she uncovers one mystery, there opens another; and she passes from mystery to mystery, just as truly as she passes from knowledge to knowledge. We feel, in the very height and glory of all these investigations, how the spirit of man is here fettered by sense—how unable we are with these eyes to see right through matter into that which lies beyond it, and to grasp those forms of knowledge which are to be found in matter itself. Ah! if we are ever permitted to reach the world where these limitations of sense shall be thrown aside, we shall be able to survey God's solemn Providence, and the darkness will disappear. 'What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter.'

"3. In the third place, *God's plans will there be complete*, and the embargo which is here put upon our knowledge, from the incompleteness of the view which we have of God's purposes, will be entirely removed. There it will be spread out in all its beautiful connexions. Our own personal history will be brought to a close, and that personal history as it is involved in the history of those with whom we associated in life. The parent, with the child that was born of his loins—the influence which he exerted upon that child through the one and twenty years of its minority, when it was placed under his control; this influence, as it goes down from that child to the children of the next generation; and then unto the third generation; and as it widens out over the broad sea of human existence: all will be brought to a grand conclusion when we stand before the judgment bar, and still more when we view it in the light of God's eternal throne. All these things being consummated, and all the parts of them being brought together in all their relationships, we will, at a glance, spread our eye over the whole

of God's providential dealings with us; and knowing the end from the beginning, the darkness will be dispelled. 'What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter.'

Or this, being the closing paragraph of Sermon XVII., preached on the 17th of November, and entitled "The Other Comforter:"

"Does this discourse require a special application? Or, has the truth been so sweet that it has applied itself all the way through? See the ample provision that is made in the gospel for the salvation of man. Let us not be satisfied with merely general and vague conceptions of the mighty plan; but as far as it is revealed to us, let us strive to look into its close and beautiful articulations. It is no ill-jointed and indefinite scheme, but perfect and compact in all its parts. And as you dwell upon the harmony and proportion of its features, learn to trust in it with a perfect heart, and to rejoice in the glory of its precious hopes.

"Does any one say, all this is but the dream of an enthusiast? Verily, my hearer, God is not far from us, as too many suppose. We can turn nowhere without beholding the traces of His presence and His power. The heavens above us sparkle with the testimonies of His being and of His glory. The earth upon which we tread is a grand temple—upon every pillar of which, as upon the obelisks of Egypt, is the hieroglyph of His finger. As I walk up and down through the aisles of this vast cathedral of the universe, voices come up from air, earth, and sea, which testify of God. The stars, which sweep through the void immense, yield their music to the listening ear of angels. The ocean, with its deep, hoarse bass, swells the anthem back to the stars. The winds whisper God's secret in the tops of the trees, and then breathe it to the flowers which they stoop to kiss. And these flowers, in their turn, give forth their fragrance as the breath of their praise. Say, shall I come down from all this high testimony of Jehovah to a poor, earth-born philosophy which tells me that man is only a pismire, and God is nothing but a dream? No, sceptic, no; I cannot stand with you upon the bleak, dreary waste of deism. I am pierced through with the cold. The dank air of your charnel-house stifles me. Let me go, let me go; let me dream these dreams of Christian faith and hope, until I awake in the daylight of heaven. Let me tread every roundle of Jacob's sacred ladder, till I mount up and be with God."

Not unfrequently we meet, through these pages, with choice passages which remind us of a home on which the dark shadows of earthly sorrow have fallen, but into which the light of "the house not made with hands" has also entered and over which is hovering the heavenly dove, that expressive emblem of "The Other Comforter" of whom he speaks.

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ARTICLE I.

THE SUFFERING SEABOARD OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

Among those who encountered the severe trials induced by the late war, none have experienced greater sufferings than the people who dwell on the seaboard of South Carolina. We propose to make some remarks in reference to the past and present condition of this people. We are led to do this by a desire to chronicle events which are but transiently under the eye of observation—*quæque ipsi miserrima vidimus*—and because we are deeply interested in the welfare of near neighbors, and cannot but profoundly sympathise with them as they walk in the furnace of affliction. We are so constituted as to be more thoroughly moved by actual instances of suffering and want, than by any abstract description of their nature, or by the most vivid portraiture of scenes which practically involve them. However forcible may be the expositions of the obligation to exercise pity, or however touching may be the narratives of remote cases of distress, we are more intensely excited by the spectacle of the object in affliction. The account of a starving fellow-creature may to some extent call forth our sympathy; but it is the sight of the emaciated form, the hollow eye, the sunken features, which stir the deepest emotions of the heart. The presence, in an Athenian court, of the wife and children of a man charged with the commission of a capital offence, more moved the Judges than the

most affecting appeals of his advocates. Justice herself ceased to be blind, and, looking upon the silent but eloquent suppliants before her, shed the tears which spring alone from the fountains of mercy. In the sad and dejected condition of some of our own people, which for years has thrust itself upon daily observation, we have a powerful incentive to sympathy, a resistless motive to beneficent offices in their behalf.

We are, too, by our natural constitution, always affected by nearness of relationship to objects of distress, especially when it is influenced by that principle of association which is denominated the law of contiguity in time and place. Even the general feeling of human brotherhood forbids our insensibility to the sufferings of our fellow-men. When, some years ago, accounts reached us of the afflicted condition of Ireland, the whole country was thrilled, and generous contributions were sent for the relief of her distress. We cannot read the narratives of the calamities induced by any providential visitation upon a people, however distant from us, without a strong impression upon our sensibilities. The sufferings to which we now advert, however, are not merely those of our fellow-men, but of our own countrymen and neighbors. They breathe our air, speak our own dialect, are characterised by the same type of sentiment with ourselves, and in the past shared our sorrows and our joys. They and we belong to the same school of thought, and worship at the same altar. Their social life, their politics, their religion, are ours.

Nor can we be indifferent to the reflection that the vessel in which our comrades sunk, carried us also—the crushing force of the tempest fell upon them and us alike. If there be any whose efforts to recover themselves from the disasters of the great shipwreck a benignant Providence has blessed, the memory of a past companionship in misfortune would impel them to extend their sympathies to their unhappy brethren who still swim for life in the waters of the mighty gulf. It is such feelings as these which lead us to present a brief description of the suffering condition of the seaboard of South Carolina, in contrast with that happier one which preceded the war, and which is now remembered only as a charming vision which has vanished forever.

It may be observed, at the outset, that the very nature of the country on the seacoast of South Carolina is such as to engender in those accustomed to it from childhood, an attachment amounting to a passion. There is something in this affection which is almost singular; at least it is not merely that love of locality which is, to a greater or less extent, a common attribute of the race. It is true that the Laplander, when removed from his ice-bound home, pines in a foreign clime, and sighs for a return to his fields of everlasting snow; and the red man of the West, though for years impressed by the influences of civilisation, nurses in his breast a longing for the free airs of his native prairie, and the hunting grounds of his boundless forests. The reason of the discontent of the Laplander or the Indian with any other home than that of his boyhood is obvious. In addition to that affection for the soil on which one was born, that belongs to all men alike, there is an utter unfitness for the habits of civilised life, which converts its palaces into prisons, and its restraints into fetters. The unhappy victim, incarcerated amidst its stiff conventionalities, like the caged eagle, beats against the bars which confine him, and pants for his former liberty. The case is different with the lowland Southron. He may be polished by a culture the most refining and exquisite; but standing on Alpine summits, or beneath Italian skies, his "heart untravelled, fondly turns" to the densely wooded shore, kissed by the glittering waters of the Atlantic. This ineradicable love for the scenes of his childhood, exerting an enchanting spell upon his heart when absent from them, has been expressed by a gifted son of South Carolina, whose genius once adorned her literature and illuminated her halls of science, in the simple but touching lines beginning,

"I sigh for the land of the cypress and pine,
Where the jessamine blooms and the gay woodbine."

Nor is this devotion entirely extravagant, or the natural expression of a mere narrow provincialism. The early European explorers, when they first touched the southern coast of this continent, could not refrain from bursts of admiration at the beauty of the new country, which exercised a sort of intoxicating influence

upon their senses. The Florentine, Verazzano, the Frenchmen, Ribault and Laudonniere, and the Englishman, Walter Raleigh, each, in turn, in the quaint but racy language of the time, gave vent to his joyful emotions. "The great spreading oaks, the infinite store of cedars, the palms and bay-trees of so sovereign odor that balme smelleth nothing in comparison, the meadows divided asunder into isles and islets interlacing one another—these made the place so pleasant that those which are melancholick would be forced to change their humour." The hands which penned these graphic descriptions have long since mouldered into dust; but none of those who have, after their day, lived and died amid the scenes which so vividly impressed their ancient beholders with their beauty, would have been willing to blot out a single line of the glowing picture. There is a loveliness in the very face of the country, which, stealing into the opening senses of the child, dwells ineffaceably in the heart of the man, and, like a rich perfume, lingers in the memory of the aged when sinking into the decline of life upon some distant soil. Those who have left it, to dwell on the banks even of the majestic Mississippi, find themselves unable to forget these peculiar features of their native lowlands, and tell us that they turn with inexpressible fondness to the blue waters of the sea, and the strong, booming spring-tides of the Chicora and the Etiwan. We have, on some calm and mellow evening of autumn, stood on the margin of one of our ocean inlets suited to be a gateway of nations, and have kindled into a species of rapture at the matchless beauty of the prospect. The unrippled stream rolled its deep and noiseless current before us, reflecting from its bosom the roseate hues of the fading light, and lined on either hand by a beach of snowy whiteness thrown into bold relief by the background of forest dense with mingled oak, palmetto, cedar, and myrtle, and now embrowned by the deepening evening shade; while in the distance the leaping breakers threw up their white and flashing crests against the darkening amethystine haze that blended sea and sky. Or, perhaps, we have stood on the crumbling edge of some thickly-wooded bluff on some glorious night at summer-tide, and watched the placid stream, silvered by moonbeams, and eddy-

ing among overhanging boughs, and caught the sound of the distant stroke of oars and the well-timed song of merry negro boatmen, as they struggled for the mastery in the friendly race. Or, again, we have, on some delicious morning of early spring, while yet more northern regions were wrapped in a mantle of ice, strolled through the woods; and as we inhaled the soft and balmy breath of nature, and gazed upon the luxuriant masses of green foliage, and the great banks of yellow jessamine, have had suggested to us Milton's inimitable description of the "vernal airs" and "verd'rous wall of paradise."

Probably one of the reasons for that strong local attachment to which allusion has been made, was, that in this seaboard country, nature and art were not divorced, but were strangely mingled with each other. The elegant refinements of civilised life existed, as it were, side by side with the untamed wildness of the original scenery. It was only necessary to walk a short distance from many a mansion which was the seat of a polished culture and the abode of a generous hospitality, to encounter the frowning edge of a deep and solemn swamp, with its tangled thickets, its aisles of majestic cypresses, its weird and dreadful gloom. We cannot refrain from citing a few lines of one who, perhaps, has done more than any other writer to impress upon her sons the historic traditions of South Carolina, and to signalise the peculiar features of her lowland scenery.* He is describing the sombre grandeur of one of her swamps:

" 'Tis a wild spot, and even in summer hours,
 With wondrous wealth of beauty, and a charm
 For the sad fancy, hath the gloomiest look,
 That awes with strange repulsion. . . .
 Cypresses,
 Each a great, ghastly giant, old and grey,
 Stride o'er the dusk, dank track, with buttresses
 Spread round, apart, not seeming to sustain,
 Yet linked by, secret twines, that underneath
 Bend with each arching trunk. Fantastic vines,
 That swing like monstrous serpents in the sun,
 Bind top to top, until the encircling trees

* William Gilmore Simms.

Group all in close embrace. Vast skeletons
Of forests, that have perished ages gone,
Moulder in mighty masses on the plain,
Now buried in some dark and mystic tarn,
Or sprawled above it, resting on great arms,
And making for the opossum and the fox
Bridges that help them as they roam by night."

There was, too—we scarcely know how to describe it—a sort of inspiration derived from the recollections of the old Revolutionary struggle that delivered this land from foreign rule, which seemed to be infused into the natural features of the country—a fragrance of heroic deeds lingering around the cedars growing amid the ruins of old homesteads, the venerable avenues of oak curtained with moss, and the almost impenetrable swamps which the imagination ever converted into the strongholds of freedom and peopled with the shades of partisan heroes. The very air was charged with the breath of liberty; for was it not in the glades of this low-country that the almost extinguished spark of revolutionary fire was kept from altogether expiring? The unwritten traditions of the great partisan chieftain—the incarnation of gentle courtesy, of indomitable bravery, and of quenchless devotion to patriotism—are yet rehearsed in the ancient homes which line the banks of the Santee. Noble, chivalrous Francis Marion! The storm of another conflict, with widely different results, has swept the theatre of his exploits; but distant, far distant, be the day when the ruthless spirit of change shall efface the memory of as true a patriot as ever led a forlorn hope, or nursed with vestal care the dying flame of constitutional right!

But not only did the inhabitants of this section of country rejoice in the natural beauty of their fair heritage, and in the thrilling associations which clung to it; they were also blessed by a beneficent Providence with a rich and fertile soil. The earth brought forth abundantly of her fruits; their herds of cattle roamed over green savannas abounding in nutritious grasses of native growth; their labor was seldom disappointed of its reward, except through the occurrence of some unusual calamity; their corn, rice, and cotton fields yielded an ample subsistence to themselves, while thousands were fed and clothed by their gener-

ous products. Nothing seemed to be wanting to complete the pleasantness of their physical condition but the guarantee of its stability.

Another source of happiness to this seaboard people was their peculiar social condition. That was of such a nature as in great measure to exclude those turbulent and disorderly elements which prove the bane of so many communities that boast the possession of a superior civilisation. This result, we are persuaded, arose mainly from the mechanical displacement of these disturbing forces by the peculiar character of the laboring class, and from the absence of that bitter struggle for supremacy between capital and labor, which is the fret of modern society, and thrusts upon it one of its mightiest practical problems, with no apparent hope of any peaceful solution. Whether there were other and less obtrusive causes of that social quietude, that freedom from agitation which we are noting, we will not now inquire. It is sufficient to the purpose in view, that the fact be signalled. Our people were more free from social difficulties, from tumults, disorders, and the violence of mobs, than any population on the face of the globe, not held down by the strong arm of despotic power. Social abuses there were, of course, for there is no Utopia on earth. And had those abuses constituted the rule and not the exception, no just claim to happiness could have been made by the society which tolerated them. No community can uniformly and habitually violate their social relations and disregard the duties which spring from them, without invoking the destruction of its peace as the retributive reaction of its sins. We would no more apologise for cruelties suffered by slaves at the hand of masters, than for those experienced by factory operatives at the hands of employers, or by wards at the hands of guardians, or by children at the hands of parents and teachers, or by soldiers at the hands of officers, or by subjects at the hands of kings.

It may now be urged that the hardships endured by former slaveholders, in consequence of the liberation of their slaves, is a just retribution inflicted upon them by Providence for their crimes. It is always a venturesome, often a presumptuous and

wicked thing, to interpret the sufferings of our fellow-men as expressions of the punitive justice of God against them. We are all sinners, and therefore all deserve, in ourselves, to suffer. But no Christian can overlook the fact that the mediation of Christ modifies the relations of men to the retributive justice of God. Suffering is frequently calamity, falling upon the righteous and the wicked alike, and therefore incapable of being construed as the discriminative measure of a vindicatory Providence. It is sometimes disciplinary, and designed, as the expression of fatherly kindness, to develop the character and promote the good of the sufferer. And it is at other times exemplary, and intended to furnish a specimen of heroic constancy and patience as a stimulus to virtue and holiness in others. Surely no one would contend that the martyr, in consequence of his suffering a fiery death, is proved to have been a capital sinner. That would be to confound the highest exercise of piety with the lowest development of crime. It is safe, it is right, for those who were slaveholders, to humble themselves, in their sufferings, under the mighty hand of God. But it does not follow that it is either safe or right for others to interpret their sufferings as expressions of God's penal displeasure against them. Still less is it warrantable in others to infer from their great sufferings that they were great sinners—sinners above all other men, because they suffer such things. And least of all is it legitimate to conclude from these sufferings that they are punished because they had been slaveholders. To say that because they suffer as slaveholders, therefore slaveholding was a sin, is to prove too much. The same line of argument might be used to show that because certain men suffer as Christians, therefore Christianity is a sin! We intend no comparison between the things themselves; we only point out the fallaciousness of this mode of argumentation. It is one thing to say that a man ought to suffer because he is a criminal, and another thing to say that a man is a criminal because he suffers.

It is possible to conceive that this question as to providential retributive visitation may meet a settlement, on their principles, altogether unlooked for by those who raise it. It must not be forgotten that there two parties in the case. There is not only

the slaveholder, but the slave. Their relations were reciprocal, and, according to the Scriptures, reciprocal obligations were involved. Now, if suffering is to be assumed as an indication of retributive dealing, it would be a question to be decided, which of these parties will be proved by his sufferings to have been the greater sinner in the matter of his relative duties? And if ultimately it should chance to be proved that the emancipated slave is the greater sufferer of the two, then, according to this method of interpreting Providence, he will be shown to have been the greater offender. We are seriously disposed to counsel these interpreters of Providence, for the sake of their own cause, not to press their method too warmly. The indications even now are that they may fall on their own swords. We really pity the negro, and hope that our people may have grace, in the event of his becoming a greater sufferer at the hands of friends, than his master at the hands of enemies, not to infer that his calamity is an evidence of divine retribution against him. We are all sinners together, and equally stand in need of the mercy of God, through the blood of his dear Son.

Were we inclined to retort, we might say that it is a gigantic problem, and one hastening to its solution, whether the party which for forty years agitated the country in behalf of emancipation, has not, in the very act of grasping the long-sought prize, wholly defeated itself—whether, in liberating the negro race from slavery, it has not dug its grave. We confess to great shortsightedness in regard to the future. We know not the ends of divine providence in the solemn events which have befallen us as a people. There may yet occur unexpected changes in our affairs which will upset the calculations of the shrewdest observers of the signs of the times. But should the unnatural political and social antagonism to the white race, into which the colored race has been thrown, produce its logical results; should natural causes tending to the deterioration of the latter not be checked in their development; it will be no impossible consummation of the whole matter, that the Rationalism which animated the abolition movement may meet an extraordinary sort of refutation; not by argument, but by fact—a refutation which would

prove that its fundamental intuitions were blunders, that its boasted philanthropy was a real misanthropy, and that its efforts to save a race were crowned by its destruction. If the colored race should degenerate and die out, that is the kind of refutation which a rationalistic abolitionism would receive. There is a way in which, to our poor wisdom, it is conceivable that such a result, which without its adoption we think not improbable, might even now be averted; and had we the ear of those who have influence with the colored race, we would most earnestly urge them, as they would save themselves from signal failure in their efforts to benefit that race, and would preserve it from ruin, to counsel the negroes to place themselves in the position, mainly, of a laboring class, to cease from political aspiration, and to avoid that competition with and attrition against the white race, which must ultimately wipe them out. Could that be done, we have no doubt that the old kindliness of relation between the two classes would, in great measure, be restored, and the Southern white race would throw its skirt over its dark neighbor, and cherish his interests as identical with its own.

But to return: the abuses which disfigured the relation of master to slave were, we are confident, so far as the people of whom we are speaking were concerned—and we speak as of personal knowledge—of an exceptional character; that is, that they were departures from the general rule, which was that the benefits of the relation preponderated over the evils; and they tended almost inevitably to the punishment of their authors, by arousing against them a public sentiment which had the force of unwritten law, and extended its ægis of protection over the dependent and the powerless. It deserves to be considered, moreover, that as the planters were very generally persons of culture and refinement, and were limited in numbers, the force of this check to the wanton and arbitrary exercise of power was an effective one, and was of necessity felt by every individual member of society. If he ventured to disregard and outrage this conservative sentiment, the effect was his loss of the respect of his neighbors, and his exclusion from their fellowship.

Great changes have come over us; and novel social experiments

are now making, but the record of past facts must stand. Let the world believe it or not, seldom, if ever, has a happier civil society existed than that which was embosomed in that fair country of which a brief and imperfect description has already in these remarks been furnished. The innocent holiday festivities in which the children of masters and servants partook together; the reciprocal offices of kindness in the chamber of sickness, at the bed of death, and at the grave; the common participation of the sacred ordinances of the Church—these were anything but evidences of unhappy relations between the different classes of society. Take the scene which used to be presented on any bright and sunny Sabbath in the country. Plantations are astir, cheerful groups of servants in their best attire are pouring into the roads which lead to the house of worship; some who are feeble and aged go on horseback, or are taken up into their masters' vehicles by the way; kindly greetings and polite courtesies are exchanged; both classes occupy the same floor in the sanctuary, and join with each other in the tender services of a common religion; together they sing the psalm of praise, awaking melodious echoes in the surrounding forest; together they reverently approach the throne of grace; together, as consciously in the presence of him who is the Maker of them all, they listen to the salutary instructions of the same gospel, and the affectionate counsels of the same pastor; together they approach the sacramental table, eat of the same bread and drink of the same cup; and receiving from the same healing fountain consolations in their afflictions, hope to meet, life's journey ended, in nobler services on high.

Thus peacefully and contentedly did this seaboard people dwell in that goodly land bequeathed to them by their fathers, favored with a fair proportion of the bounties of Providence, and endeared to them by a thousand hallowing associations of the past. It was not an Eden; for Paradise was once lost, and has not yet been regained; but it was a pleasant country, and they were satisfied with it and loved it. Begrudging no other people the blessings they enjoyed, interfering with the rights of no other men, happy would they have been to have been permitted to dwell

under their own vine and fig-tree, and to pursue without disturbance their quiet and useful avocations. That happiness they were not destined to enjoy. A day, dark and ominous, came, when the tempest which had so long been gathering and muttering, began to emit angry flashes and discharge its bolts upon their heads. The thunders of opening war, louder and deeper than those of the ocean's surf that beat upon their shores, resounded in the woodlands which environed their peaceful homes. Nothing was left them but to flee. Reluctant to go, they dared not stay. Taking a long—and to many of them a last—look upon the scenes in the bosom of which so many happy days had been enjoyed, grey-haired sires, bending under the infirmities of advancing age, collected their wives, and their sons' wives and their daughters, and sought in the interior and upper portions of the State a refuge from the fury of the storm. None but those who have experienced them, can appreciate the pangs of that separation. To many of them it was felt to be a final parting. The course of nature must needs soon be finished; the few remaining sands of life could not be expected to run until the fearful conflict should be over. They had fondly hoped that when "the inevitable hour" should come, and the closing passage of nature be reached, they would be permitted to breathe their last amidst the gentle ministries of kindred and neighbors, and lay their bones beneath the shadow of the churches in which they had worshipped, and in the burial-grounds already consecrated by the sleeping ashes of their dead. This hope they were compelled to relinquish, and in profoundest sadness they took their departure from their homes, to seek a dwelling-place among strangers, and to encounter, in age, the hardships and the toils of youth.

There was a four-fold form of suffering to which these unhappy refugees were exposed. In two respects they were subjected to trials which were common to them with their fellow-citizens at large; but in two others they were called to endure afflictions which pertained almost exclusively to themselves, and to those whose lands, like theirs, were permanently occupied by the enemy. Like all around them, they were harrowed by anxiety in reference to the issue of the struggle in which their people were

engaged. They had regarded it as one which was demanded by love for the sacred principles of constitutional liberty, and consequently had not hesitated to send their sons to the field with their blessings on them and the cause in which they had embarked. As the fearful drama moved on, and hopes and fears alternated with each other at every fluctuation in the progress of the great conflict, they were tortured on the rack of suspense, or agitated by every presage of defeat. In common, too, with the body of their people, they were kept in continual perturbation and alarm in regard to the fate of their sons, husbands, and brothers, who were exposed to the awful hazards of war. Many and severe were the hardships, privations, and sufferings which those objects of their affections and prayers were forced to undergo during the course of the sanguinary struggle; but it is doubtful whether, even when wasting with sickness or suffering from wounds, they experienced a bitterer anguish than that which wrung the hearts of their fathers and mothers, their wives, sisters, and daughters, at home. The quick glance with which each column of casualties in a daily journal was scanned; the anxious groups which gathered at every passing train, to glean some tidings from the seat of hostilities; the unutterable agony depicted in the face when some doubtful hint was received touching the fate of those they loved; the broken voice of the aged father, pouring forth at the family hearth prayers for God's protection of beloved sons—all betokened a suffering of soul which none but those who felt it could know. And then, when the long-dreaded intelligence came at last, and the faintest hope of seeing their loved ones on earth again was extinguished, a sickening death-qualm came over the heart, and a deep shadow settled upon it, which it was felt no earthly light could ever avail to dispel. Ever after, the imagination became a bier on which lay stretched the loved form that had fallen in gore, or had sunk into death amidst the official attentions of the hospital-ward.

In addition to these trials, which were not singular to these people, except as they had to be borne by them when away from home and among strangers, they had to undergo others which were peculiar to themselves, and those situated as they were.

Cut off from their usual means of subsistence, driven from their lands and homes, many of them were dependent upon the scanty pittance of a depreciated currency which their relatives in service were able to send them, or upon the products which their own hands could extort from a soil less productive than their own, or upon the charity of sympathising neighbors. Gentle women, nursed in the lap of affluence, toiled in the field to secure bread for themselves and their children. One such case we knew, in which a lovely Christian lady, laboring, hoe-in-hand in the corn-field, contracted from exposure a disease which, though endured with saintly patience, caused her distress for two long years before death released her to the enjoyment of her everlasting rest.

These greatest sufferers of the war, moreover, were kept in a state of continual anxiety in reference to their estates, from which they were compelled to be absent, and which they knew to be daily threatened with devastation. Imagination was busy in presenting, among other shapes of terror, the images of their blazing homesteads; images which, in the case of many of them, were destined to become stern realities. But why farther recite the troubles of these refugees? They constituted but the first bitter lesson which they were called to learn in their dreadful school of affliction; and to many of them they were in measure relieved by hope in regard to the great issue which absorbed all minds—a hope which, indeed, was never realised, but which, while it lasted, served to check their apprehensions and alleviate their woe. It would have been well with them if, with the termination of their dreary period of refugeeness, the end of their sufferings had been reached. Could the hopes which they had cherished through four years of agony untold, have been at length fulfilled; could they have welcomed the dawn of peace as the precursor of that golden day on which their aspirations had been centred; all the sacrifices and sufferings, in the midst of which they had walked as in the fire, would have been counted as naught, or forgotten in the transports of an overwhelming joy. But peace came not with the bursting glories of the morning. It came as the tempest comes which rushes on the wings of dark-

ness at the dead hour of midnight. The great crash was felt, and hope gave up the ghost. There was weeping and wailing for the loss, not of homes and firesides; not of earthly goods and possessions; not even of fallen kindred; but for that loss with which no other can be put in comparison, save the loss of honor or the loss of the soul. There was lamentation, deep, heart-rending, indescribable, over the loss of a country. Country! Sweet, potent, magical name! All that the human mind conceives of as great, noble, sublime, all that the human heart clings to as dear, precious, priceless, on earth, is wrapped up and consecrated in that one talismanic word. A grand unity, it embodies in itself all ideas of the true, the beautiful, the good; of home, wife, child, friend; of justice, purity, liberty; of honor, virtue, and piety. It embraces the joys of childhood, the loves and hopes of youth, and the venerable honors of age. Like a mighty outspread wing, it spans the changes of human life, and throws a grateful and protecting shadow from the cradle to the grave. Who can ever forget the horror of thick darkness that settled upon him when the awful fact confronted him that the country of his love was no more, and that he must accept another in her room, or else be an expatriated exile on his native soil?—that his mother was dead, and that he would be required by the stern challenge of brute force, to stifle his filial instincts, and call another by that sacred and inalienable name? But one fearful image seized the soul, and froze the currents of life—the image of that country wrapped in the winding-sheet of her own battle-rent ensign, descending into the grave, with all her disarmed and dejected children around it and shedding tears of blood. The heavens appeared to be clothed in sackcloth, the earth to be covered with a funeral pall, and the voices of nature to be chanting a mournful requiem. And as memory instinctively turned homeward and swept the happy, happy past, the scenes of childhood seemed to be clouded with woe, the air to be laden with death, the fountains of youthful association to be poisoned, and the once free and flowing streams of one's birth-place to be dammed up with everlasting barriers. Who, without infinite sadness, could ever lift his eye again while passing Mount Ver-

non, King's Mountain, Cowpens, Eutaw Springs, and the swamps of the Pee Dee and the Santee? One felt ashamed to live, since all that was worth living for was gone. Nay, hold! Two things remained—memory and religion. With the one we might still live in the glorious past, and with the other for the more glorious future. Thanks be to God, there is a treasure which no change of circumstances can tarnish, of which the gates of hell cannot rob us; for though Liberty dies when bound, Religion survives, though immured in dungeons and manacled with chains!

Under the crushing weight of such feelings was it that the disconsolate refugees turned their steps once more in the direction of their dismantled lowland homes. The close of the war was to them the beginning of new sorrows. To many it brought the dawn of a reviving material prosperity; the gloom of reverse and disaster has been lighted by the success which has attended their efforts to resuscitate their fallen fortunes. Not so has it been with these children of affliction. The ground-swell of the great storm has continued to heave beneath them, and to make them feel that they are still tempest-tossed and not comforted. Some of them have failed to recover even the land on which their dwellings stood. In these cases, the aged and infirm, and the women and children, have been compelled to become the recipients of charity; and we would take this occasion to say, that in many instances most timely and effective assistance has been rendered by generous and noble-hearted persons residing at the North. We have been made the medium of transmitting not a few of these benefactions to those who needed clothing and food, though they themselves had once dispensed them to the poor. May God requite these disinterested donors according to the riches of his grace on earth, and the riches of his glory in heaven! One could not contemplate the lot of these victims of want without feelings of the deepest condolence. Reduced from circumstances of comfort to absolute poverty, unaccustomed to hard and continuous labor, and yet obliged to perform it, they have exhibited a fortitude and a cheerfulness which were almost incredible. Silent under their trials, their inclinations would have led them to

be ; but it is affecting to know that they have sometimes been forced by a hard necessity to confess their wants and seek relief.

Others returned to behold the ashes of their former comfortable homes, and to find every vestige of property swept away, save the immovable earth itself. In the spirit of an unyielding manhood, they have lived in humble cabins, and have strained every nerve to achieve a support for their families. They have plied the hoe and driven the plough in their little fields of corn, potatoes, and cotton, though enfeebled by disease, wetted by the unhealthful dews of morning, and scorched by the heat of the summer sun. It has, however, pleased an inscrutable but all-wise Providence in great measure to withhold from them the expected fruits of their labors, and in some cases toil seems almost to have been in vain. An unusual succession of calamities has befallen this afflicted people. Caterpillars have appeared more frequently than in the past ; storms and drought have damaged their crops ; and, to crown this accumulation of trials, the price of our great staple has been ruling lower and lower, until it has reached a point at which the question arises, whether production does not cease to be remunerative.

In addition to these trials, they have not only, in common with their countrymen of the South, experienced that form of suffering which results from the overthrow of their political ideas, and the necessity of accommodating themselves practically to a condition of things to which they had always been theoretically opposed, but they have been subjected to an aggravated pressure of that difficulty from the circumstance that the great majority of the population is negro, and the political and civil power in their hands descends to the most subordinate local offices. They are incessantly brought into contact with ignorant officials of every sort. The field-hand of to-day sits in judgment upon his employer to-morrow. Intelligence belongs to the class which is ruled, ignorance to that which rules.

These are facts which the faithful chronicler of the times cannot fail to note, and the bare statement of them furnishes a picture which, in contrast to that which has been presented of the condition of this people before the war, is sufficiently affecting. But

we are far from intimating that there is any necessity that they should take a despairing view of their situation, however humiliating and depressing it may now appear to be. It must strike even the casual observer, that the sufferings to which this people have been subjected, have, in the main, originated in causes which lay beyond their control. The most of them have been the direct appointments of divine Providence; and from that fact we are disposed to extract a strong and confident hope of their beneficial results while they last, and of their removal at no distant day. We think we can see in these providential ordinations a tendency already manifested to the production of real good. It must be admitted that a strong disposition was displayed on the part of many to pass by a leap into a recovery of their former prosperity—to rehabilitate themselves with the golden estate of other days. To accomplish this, large sums were borrowed, and extensive outlays made. Had this policy proved successful, the ends contemplated by the painful but salutary discipline instituted by a wise and merciful Providence would have been defeated. The lesson of dependence on God could never have been learned as now it has been, and in all probability there would have been a speedy return to the defects and follies of the society which existed before the war, without its compensating virtues and advantages. Very soon, for instance, a snob aristocracy would have taken the place of that which formerly existed, (though perhaps it ought never to have existed in a society which should have been conformed to the genius of republican institutions,) but which, whatever were its faults, was not purely based in wealth. Even to our limited judgment, it seems better that our people, peculiarly circumstanced as they were after the war, should acquire habits of patient industry, dependence on Providence, and submission to the divine will, even though these inestimable lessons had to be learned in the painful school of affliction.

It is, moreover, encouraging to reflect, that He who has been pleased to inflict these troubles is able to remove them. Their continuance is contingent upon his will. The caterpillar, the rain, the drought, the storm, are ministers of his providence, and

are subject to his control. The hearts of men are in his hand, and he turneth them whithersoever he will, even as the rivers of water are turned. The destinies of peoples and nations are ordered by him. His merciful providence has brought us through great and sore trials in the past; there are others which now oppress us; but Christian faith may surely comfort itself with the assurance addressed by the great Trojan leader to his followers, in circumstances of distress not wholly unlike our own: "God will also grant us an end of these." Meanwhile, it becomes us to await in patience the accomplishment of his will. It is not difficult to see that the swift removal of these evils might have wrought incalculable damage to us. Sudden inflation might have proved the greatest, because a moral, ruin. It was not meet that a deeply afflicted people should be exposed to the temptations which pride and fulness of bread are sure to engender. Our poor human nature cannot bear with moderation these rapid transitions. Character is developed, in this world, in the school of discipline. Prosperity without discipline would be prosperity without character. In view of that consideration, it must, in some measure, reconcile to the trials through which they are passing, even the old and infirm, upon whom they press the hardest, to know that the youth of this generation are training, in the gymnasium of hardship and self-sacrifice, for a future of usefulness and honor which could in no other way be reached.

Our deliverance from these sufferings is, in some degree, conditioned upon our conduct under them. There is a sort of covenant into which God enters with communities, in which he pledges them that if they will adhere to him, he will adhere to them, but denounces the threatening that if they forsake him, he will forsake them. It is our privilege to throw ourselves upon the provisions of such a covenant. If we humble ourselves under the mighty hand of God, which it were worse than vain to resist, if we confess our sins and turn to him, he will, as in the case of the penitent individual, transmute the retributive measures of justice into the healing chastisements of fatherly love. And if we call upon him in the day of our trouble, he will answer and deliver us. It were folly in us to struggle like a bull in a net.

The deliverance must come from God. For him to will is to act—to speak is to do. Our emergence from present troubles, however great, would be the easy result of the putting forth of almighty power.

Moreover, it was not to be expected that we could pass either suddenly or comfortably through a social revolution so radical and fundamental as that which has swept over us like a storm. Our people are in a situation very much akin to that of a new colony, endeavoring to establish its distinctive forms of life in a strange country, and in the midst of a disaffected population, from which it seeks to obtain the materials of labor. Principle has to be retained, but something also has to be conceded, in order to secure a necessary adaptation to novel circumstances. The process must needs be slow, and attended with difficulty; and precisely those hardy virtues which are necessary to ensure the success of colonists, are now required of us. The case is very peculiar. The same peoples which occupied the territory before, remain together upon it now; but their relations, how changed! The slave laborer of the past is the free laborer of the present. Nor can his labor be dispensed with on this seaboard territory, so far as we can see, without its speedily taking on the aspect of a wilderness. White labor is insufficient in quantity and incompetent to cope with climatic difficulties. The great industrial problem, consequently, of this seaboard country, is the reconciliation of capital in the hands of intelligence, with labor in the hands of ignorance—the closing up of the race schism which was opened by a revolutionary force. And as the colored race is massed in heaviest numbers on the seacoast, that region becomes the theatre upon which this mighty problem is emphatically to be worked out. We have the hope that if wisdom, moderation, and patience rule our counsels and control our actions, that problem may there, with God's blessing, notwithstanding the great difficulties in the way, be brought to a successful solution. The chief obstacle in the way of reaching this end, is the theory that either race on the seaboard can be independent of the other, in regard to material interests—theory, we say; for it is ideas which regulate action and give shape to policies. So long

as this theory is entertained, there can be no practical blending of the interests of the races. But the result may soon be different, if the idea prevails and is explicitly confessed, that intelligence needs labor, and labor needs direction—in other words, that the two classes are mutually interdependent. From the nature of the case, self-interest must be the principal factor in the production of this effect, as it is the chief practical bond which for the present relates the races to each other. We hope that the day will arrive when other and higher feelings will come prominently into play; but the exigency presses, and it is the dictate of wisdom to appeal to the motive which is now an operative and powerful one. A man overboard seizes the first plank that floats by him.

The perplexities which oppress our people in general, in regard to their future, are peculiarly enhanced to the inhabitants of this seaboard territory, by the vast preponderance in numbers of the colored race over the white. But it is not inconceivable that, in the wonder-working providence of God, what seems to be the greatest cause for apprehension may ultimately prove to be the chief source of prosperity. If, in the changes which are possible, it should come to pass that the political power now lodged in the hands of the colored race, should either pass out of them, or, continuing in them, should no longer be used by a hostile partisan faction, but be employed favorably to the interests of the Southern white race, one great barrier to the realisation of the supposition we have made will have been removed. We are not shut up to the necessity of judging that our future must be a disastrous one. We have at least the consoling privilege of trusting in a merciful Providence, which has so far signally preserved us from imminent and obvious perils. Prayer and faith are our best guarantees for the future. "Man's extremity is God's opportunity." Now, should it please God to order the change which has been mentioned, it is at least possible that the mass of laborers on the seaboard may become more and more manageable. There are formidable difficulties which, even on that supposition, would remain, growing out of social and industrial relations. But who can tell what the future may develop in the

shape of wise and moderate legislation by which the superior race may yet control the inferior to the advantage of both? The judgments of the most sagacious thinkers in the past, in regard to the probable results of emancipation, have not altogether been sustained by events. Mr. Calhoun, in his second speech on the Force Bill, in 1833, expressed the opinion that the effect of enforced emancipation would be the expulsion of the white race from the Atlantic States. That, however, has not taken place, though ten years have elapsed since the accomplishment of that fact; and without the occurrence of new and extraordinary causes, it is not likely that it will. Chancellor Harper, in his profound *Memoir on Slavery*, gave it as his judgment, that the result would be one or other of three alternatives: either the expulsion of one race by the other; or the extermination of one by the other; or the reënslavement of the former servile class. So far, neither of these alternatives has been realised. The possibilities of the case are, however, not yet exhausted; and with great diffidence we venture a few thoughts in regard to them. The last of these hypotheses we consider as out of the question. We have no idea that the Southern people, even if they had the power, would be willing to restore the relation of slavery. The whole genius of the age precludes the supposition. The maintenance of an existing institution, in the teeth of such a difficulty, is one thing; the restoration of it when it has ceased to be, in the teeth of the same difficulty, is a very different thing. Nor could that unity of action be secured which would be necessary to effect the result. The second hypothesis we regard as extremely improbable. It could only be realised by concerted aggressive action on the part of one race against the other; certainly not by mere local collisions. Common benevolence, the spirit of the gospel, and the dictates of self-interest, would combine to deter the white race from such a course. To the colored, the requisite organisation to accomplish such an end would be impossible. The first hypothesis naturally falls apart into two subordinate suppositions: either, first, the white race would expel the colored, or, secondly, the colored would expel the white.

The former supposition is wholly unlikely. The whites have

not now the power to expel the blacks ; and if they should ever have, it could only be possessed in consequence of such a change in their relations to the colored race as would give them the opportunity of using it as a laboring class ; and then self-interest would lead to its retention and not its expulsion. The deportation or colonisation of the colored race, for obvious reasons, could only be accomplished by the agency of the General Government, or by that of State Governments in combination. That is out of the question for the present. What the future may develop, "not knowing, we cannot say ;" but it appears to us that the scheme would be opposed alike by philanthropy towards the colored race, and by the material interests of the white. It would be to remand the former to barbarism, and to deprive the latter of what, through providential agencies and by means of a judicious policy, may become available and profitable labor. The remaining supposition—that the colored race may expel the white, by the direct agency of force, we do not regard as probable enough to justify its discussion.

There is a supposition which can only be settled by the facts of the future, and about which it would be rash to adventure a definite opinion—that is, that the whites may be induced to abandon the seaboard belt, in consequence of not being able to live either comfortably or profitably upon it. Granted the possibility of its realisation, still it is strongly opposed by such considerations as the following : the *vis inertie* of the population would render them indisposed to remove. In addition to this must be taken into account their attachment to a soil endeared to them as the heritage of their fathers, and as the scene of a thousand tender associations, and their unwillingness to abandon it into the hands, not of a co-equal race, but of an inferior, which formerly toiled upon it as a servile class. Their retirement, moreover, would be a tacit but emphatic acknowledgment of banishment enforced by the aggressions of that class—a consideration which would appeal to the pride of race, and may retard the growth of a tendency to emigrate until the necessity for such a measure would fail to press. A practical difficulty, besides, powerfully opposes this supposition : the owners of lands—and lands constitute the

bulk of the property of this people—cannot carry them with them, nor dispose of them at compensatory prices; and the parties who would, in the greatest number of instances, be purchasers, are precisely those to whom the possessors would be least willing to sell. Finally, the Providence which in answer to the prayer of distress has saved this people from imminent perils in the past, may, in response to the same call, avert from them this climax of calamities. We presume not to dogmatise, but bating the possibility of revolutionary causes, or others of an extraordinary character, such as those which originate in a state of war, which may of course occur at any time, we are disposed to think that the two races will continue to live side by side, and that they will be more and more impelled, as time rolls on, to cultivate friendly relations to each other, and so, by helping one another, to help themselves. And if the colored people could only be persuaded to abandon their suicidal pretensions to political and social equality; or if they should be compelled by the operation of providential causes to relinquish them, and if they should assume the attitude of a subordinate laboring class, we see no reason why they may not be conserved and cherished by the whites as contributors to the material interests of the country. Otherwise the friction of the great, growing, developing Caucasian race against them, must ensure their ultimate extinction. Are there not some, having influence with them and perceiving their critical emergency, who will at once and urgently point out to them these alternatives, and help them to know the day of their visitation?

There is one other form of suffering endured by this seaboard people, to which, before closing, we will advert—their destitution of the regular ministrations of the gospel. They have been precisely in that condition in which they were most needed. In happier days, they were accustomed to enjoy them, and also to impart them freely to those who were dependent on their care. They had supported a great network of missions among the slaves, embracing almost the whole extent of the seaboard territory. Churches which had been the almoners of the gospel to surrounding populations have been brought to the verge of ex-

tion. Obligated to struggle for the means of keeping soul and body together, they had no ability to recall their pastors to their ancient folds, or when they had passed away, to invite others to take their places. The pulpits were silent, the communion-tables were unspread, and such sanctuaries as had escaped the torch were hung with cobwebs. Sometimes it happened that the transient preacher, summoned from a distance to unite a youthful couple in marriage, would enjoy the mournful privilege of ministering at the dying bed of some lovely saint who would otherwise have met the last conflict without the soothing words or the sympathetic prayers of the servant of God. And so he would pass from the couch of suffering and death to the festivities of the wedding-party. Broken in spirits, low in hope, they possessed not the powerful supports and encouragements of a stated ministry. They who had been the sustainers of missions, became themselves the glad recipients of occasional missionary supplies. And when the evangelist would arrive, it was most touching to see those who had formerly been accustomed to traverse distances in comfortable equipages, now repairing in carts and on mules to the house of God. Still more affecting was it to witness the avidity with which they would listen to the dispensation of the blessed Word, and the tearful gratitude with which they would drink in its cheering consolations. The calamities through which they had passed were sufficient to test the faith of the stoutest believer, but they were not made infidels by the defeat of hopes grounded even in prayer, and the shocking reverses of their earthly circumstances. They bore the long night of sorrow and hardship with a marvellous patience; and now, partly through missionary services rendered them in their time of need, gathering them periodically into church assemblies, and partly in consequence of their own unbroken energies and indomitable perseverance, they are beginning to emerge from their ruins, and to group into pastoral charges, to be supported by their own contributions to the maintenance of gospel institutions.

The fiery discipline to which they have been subjected, has, under the influence of grace, trained them as in the school of sacrifice. Again, as they begin to recover from their prostrate

condition, are they endeavoring to resume their old missionary functions; and like the Samaritan, although excommunicated in part from the fraternal communion of those who were formerly pensioners upon their bounty for evangelical blessings, are ready to pour oil and wine into the spiritual wounds of their political foes. The negro will yet, we venture to say, find in them the truest friends of his soul. When his temporary inflation shall, like a delirium, have passed away, and the hard necessities of life shall again call out the parasitical tendencies of his nature, he will once more receive through them the bread of life, and be welcomed to drink again with them from the fountains of living water which he had been influenced to forsake. They who are impressed with the transitoriness of all earthly relations and the imminence of eternal destinies, will, in the spirit of a Christ-like charity, forget past animosities and shake hands across past dividing lines. Either the colored race is destined to live and prosper, or to wither and die. If the former supposition be realised, then must the pure gospel be given to them, not only for the sake of their own highest interests as immortal and responsible beings, but also as a preservative of the temporal welfare of the community—as a check to turbulence, anarchy, and crime. There are, we believe, worthy exceptions; but, as a rule, it is certain that they are under the lead of utterly incompetent spiritual guides. Our conviction has never slackened, that the gospel is the true remedy for the evils which now oppress them and us, and which frown upon both alike from the future. Christianity is at once our cheapest and surest defence. We hail it as a harbinger of better things, that the minds of our youthful candidates for the ministry are turning to this great home missionary work. We look upon it as a star of hope. If the second supposition we have made should prove true—that the colored people may deteriorate and ultimately die out, then, as we would bear the last consolations of our religion to an expiring individual, much more should we carry them to the dying-bed of a fading race. Unless the churches of this section of country shall sadly decline from the spirit of their Master, which even now moves in them, the generation may not be far off which will witness the realisation of this picture. And

if so, one of the sublimest examples ever given in this sad world will be furnished of the power of the cross of Christ to obliterate bitter memories, to overcome political antagonisms, and to heal the otherwise irreparable schisms of conflicting races. Not that we are so vain as to dream that distinctions springing from the ordinations of Providence and stamped upon the very face and form of men, will be discarded in obedience to the dictates of a leveling and infidel theory ; but that spiritual unity will be approached which the apostle assigns to the new man, where there is neither male nor female, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ is all and in all.

God may yet confer upon this people and their brethren of the South, so long *tabooed* by Christendom, the high honor of refuting charges which originated in unscriptural hypotheses of human rights, by such an exhibition of magnanimity as the world has seldom seen. Magnanimity we say ; for they have been exposed to strong temptation to resent the harsh interference of the Christian world, and to abstain from efforts to benefit that race which, though in the past it received through them the institutions of the gospel, has in great measure withdrawn from ecclesiastical fellowship with them, and allowed itself to be thrown into political hostility to them. They cannot but feel that injustice has been done them ; and human nature is apt, in that case, to cherish feelings of resistance, if not to exact reparation. Up to the beginning of the late war, the Christian sentiment which dictated the melioration of the condition of slavery, and the extension of the instructions and privileges of the gospel to the slaves, was rapidly growing. We speak as interested eye-witnesses of its progress. The hindrances to its legitimate expansion were largely due to the interference of an outside sentiment, which induced in many minds the conviction that restraints upon the culture of the colored population were demanded by considerations of safety. Abolitionism was the parent of most of the police regulations which appeared to bear hardly upon the rights of the negro as a man. Had the Christian sympathies of the slaveholders been permitted an untrammelled development, a primary school education for the negroes may have been in time

the logical result. As it was, with all these obstructions to its growth, as the white people themselves passed more and more under the moulding influences of the gospel, and the slaves for the same reason receded farther and farther from the savagery of their original condition, and required less restriction upon its manifestation, Christian instructions and privileges were more freely imparted to them. The seaboard of South Carolina, where large masses of that people were gathered, may furnish an illustration of the historical truth of these remarks. A distinguished statesman and pure Christian gentleman, now venerable in years*—we had it from his own lips—decades ago suggested to the Rev. William Capers, afterwards a bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South, the idea which subsequently expanded into a great scheme of Methodist missions, which reticulated the rice-fields and cotton-fields of the coast, from the Santee to the Savannah. That great system of missions among the slaves was mainly supported by the voluntary contributions of the planters, of different religious denominations. Concurrently with the working of that enterprise, the pastors of the churches on the seaboard, of all denominations, gave their personal efforts by preaching and catechising to the evangelisation of the slaves. The pastoral charges were composed of both whites and blacks—the latter largely preponderating in numbers. We speak what we know when we say that from plantation to plantation, in the cold of winter and the heat of summer, by day and by night, these missionaries and pastors faithfully wrought among the slaves; preaching to congregations, teaching the children, and visiting the sick. We would not boast, but for a thorough-going impression of the knowledge of Christianity upon a laboring population, we believe that a parallel to this system was not to be found among the nations. Indeed the missionary spirit and the missionary efforts of the churches in this

* The Hon. Robert Barnwell Rhett.—Since writing the above, we have been informed that the suggestion is regarded by our Methodist brethren as having first emanated from Gen. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. It is likely that the two suggestions were nearly contemporaneous. We undertake not to say which preceded the other.

section of the country were largely expended upon this interesting field. In the city of Charleston alone, the negro communicants in the various churches were not far from ten thousand, out of a total colored population of twenty thousand. Yet, near the close of the war, a celebrated preacher from another section, preaching in the largest church-edifice of that city, to an immense congregation of the emancipated colored people, congratulated them on their deliverance from the hardships of their former condition, but made no allusion to the fact, known to them, that the house of worship in which he was speaking, was built at a cost of twenty-five thousand dollars, by the white people of the city, for the special benefit of the blacks. Nor did he advert to the fact that white pastors of the flock which worshipped there, had been supported by white people, and that, through the blessing of God upon their labors during a few years from the inception of the enterprise, more than five hundred colored people had been gathered into the fold of Christ.

Are we not warranted in saying that injustice has been done to the Christian people of this section of the land? When, in the face of such facts as have been mentioned, they were generally regarded and stigmatised as tyrants and oppressors, and the tendency was a growing one to banish them from the communion of the faithful, had they not reason to feel aggrieved by this treatment at the hands of brethren? And would they not act in the spirit of Christian magnanimity, if, notwithstanding the misrepresentations of the past, and the peculiar trials of the present, they should still exert themselves to communicate the gospel to the colored race? We trust that they may be enabled to furnish, under these circumstances, a noble exemplification of that Godlike principle which is the crown of their religion—the greatest of its three fundamental and abiding graces. “And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.”

ARTICLE II.

LAY-PREACHING.

- Minutes of Assembly, Southern Presbyterian Church.* 1869.
Narrative of the Awakening. London: Jas Nisbet & Co.
 Large octavo. Pp. 384.
The American Evangelists. By Dr. JNO. HALL and GEO. H.
 STUART, Esq. 12mo. Dodd & Mead. Pp. 455.
Addresses and Lectures, with Narrative of Labors of Messrs.
Moody & Sankey. A. D. F. Randolph. 8vo. Pp. 222.
The Work of God in Great Britain. By RUFUS W. CLARK,
 D. D. Harper & Bros. Pp. 371.
Sacred Songs and Solos, sung by IRA D. SANKEY. London:
 Morgan & Scott. (With Music.)

When a work is exciting the pious enthusiasm of good men, it is an invidious task to cry, "*Cave.*" But it may, none the less, be a necessary and imperative duty to utter that *caveat*. No friend of God and man, who witnesses efforts which really result in rescuing sinners from perdition, can fail to approve of that effect, however he may mistrust the mode; and if he permits any pride of class, or spirit of party, to sway him into condemnation of the former, he is not only weak, but criminal. We may concede, likewise, that it will be very difficult for the dissentient from the new mode so to utter his *caveat* against it, as not to appear opposed to the result, in which all good men should concur. Yet, the friends of truth may be shut up to attempt that nice distinction. Ministers of the gospel should, of all men, be most humble; and therefore they should be the first to remember that their regular membership in the ecclesiastical *guild* will by no means ensure to them a monopoly of all the skill for its functions. The regular medical faculty has doubtless learned some things from classes whom it stigmatised as quacks. The Thompsonian taught them some things about caloric as a remedial agent, and the Homœopathists have made them more sparing of their drugs. The ministry should be discreet, and be taught by such instances, not to be too proud to learn from humble laymen the

ways of proclaiming God's truth more effectively, if there is anything to be learned from them. The history of Eldad and Medad (Numb. xi. 27-30) has not seldom been cited against the clergy, and the modesty of Moses commended, when he replied: "Would that all the Lord's people were prophets." Although ministers might fairly except to this instance, that the two new prophets in the camp of Israel presented in their inspired *affatus* a divine warrant which would, in any age of the Church, if it were really manifested, supersede the necessity of regular appointment, but which none in our age can claim, either in or out of the ministry; yet they may well regard it as always seemly for them to pay a modest heed to this instance.

Whatever, then, can be learned from eminent lay-preachers, of devotion, simplicity of language and aim, or skill in winning souls, all this the ministry should meekly and thankfully learn. We may note among these timely lessons, the following. The success of Mr. Moody in enlisting the popular attention to the gospel, should be an impressive illustration of some homiletical truths, which our Church anxiously seeks to impress on her young ministers—such as these: that preaching to the people should usually be in popular, as opposed to theological structure; that it is the fundamental truths of the revealed gospel-theology which, above all human speculations and niceties, command the heart of man.* This example reminds us, also, that the profane classes of men will never be brought under gospel influences by building churches and inviting them to come to the minister; the minister must go after them. The practical sense of Mr. Moody has also shown him the importance of finding some way by which transient impressions made in public may be promptly followed up with personal inculcation. He has also given us another illustration of that which can never be too often impressed on those who aim to do good—the power of sympathy and sincerity over depraved hearts.

We shall now claim at the hands of our readers credit for our candor in declaring that all assaults upon Mr. Moody's purity of

* See Text-book of "Sacred Rhetoric," by Dr. R. L. Dabney. Lectures II., VII., XVIII., XX.

motive and Christian character are as far as possible from our thoughts. In dissenting from a part of his example, we only assert the well known fact, that good men have often made mistakes, which, though not designed, have been hurtful. It seems almost customary now to assert that the unquestionable divine blessing which is claimed to attend the labors of the lay-evangelists, is God's sanction of their method. This supposed argument has been lately heard from the most respectable as well as the most inconsiderate sources. Plausible as it appears to the pious, it is transparently erroneous. This is patent from a simple question: Has not God often blessed the pious effort of misguided men, not for the sake of, but in spite of, their peculiar errors? The monk Augustine went to Canterbury among the Pagan Saxons, preaching the gospel indeed, but with especial purpose to assert among them the papal supremacy. Did not God largely employ his preaching to Christianise those barbarians? Doubtless. But are we ready to concede that God thereby set the seal of his approval upon the missionary's Romanizing principles? This was, indeed, the stupid and superstitious inference of Augustine; it is not that of any Protestant. Again: John Wesley urged his great evangelistic movement in the especial interest of an Arminian theology and an unscriptural church-government. No Presbyterian grants that the unquestionable success of him and his missionaries in winning souls, is God's endorsement of his erroneous principles. A search through our Church histories might multiply these instances a hundred-fold.

With these preparatory truths, we wish to remind our readers of a few admitted scripture facts. Christ, the Head of the Church, has himself ordained the mode in which his gospel shall be preached to mankind. He has instituted in the world a visible Church, and appointed it to be "the pillar and ground of the truth." (1. Tim. iii. 15.) He has given it, at least in outline, its form, laws, and officers, and has enjoined upon it the species of didactic and disciplinary functions it is to perform. He has taught this Church that her public organic functions are all to be performed through these officers, whose names and places he has himself assigned. When he was pleased

to ordain that "by the foolishness of preaching" those who believe are saved, he provided expressly how the preachers were to be selected and appointed. The qualifications of the men he bestows by the gifts of his providence and grace. The brotherhood recognise the possession of these qualifications by certain *criteria*, which he has caused to be laid down in his Word. The existing elders of the Church are clothed with the function of trying the qualifications of the new heralds, and, on verifying the presence of those qualities, of clothing them with the office-power of the ministerial elder. It was thus the highest evangelists were appointed. (Acts xvi. 1-3; 1 Tim. iv. 14; 2 Tim. i. 6.) Thus the ordinary ministers of the Church are to be perpetuated. (2 Tim. ii. 2.) We thus see that Christ has not left anything to human invention, as to the instrumentality for preaching his gospel—that matter is distinctly settled. It should be enough for the humble Christian, that thus Christ has ordained. Hence, we are as sure that Christ's plan is the wisest, as any human experience can make us; we do not need the lessons of Church history, so often repeated, where the betterments, which man's officious zeal has insisted on making upon Christ's plan, have borne their regular fruits of mischief and confusion, to make us content with the ordained method. Amidst all the plausibilities and excitements of the human inventions, we remain quiet in the conviction that *Christ knows best*.

But it is not unprofitable to recur to the practical reasons for this divine ordinance of a regular ordained ministry, preaching officially only as they are commissioned by the Church, through her presbyterial courts.

Were we Quakers, we could consistently claim an exemption from this law. If all preaching were done, like Eldad's and Medad's, by the specific and immediate inspiration of the Holy Ghost, the preacher might consistently claim that he was not dependent upon these practical reasons. But the apostle taught us (1 Cor. xiii. 8) that "prophesyings should fail." The modern evangelist and pastor must preach aright, by the combined assistance of his natural and acquired mental gifts, scriptural knowledge, and spiritual discernment. Hence, the preacher

needs all the support, the guidance, and the restraining responsibilities, arising out of his official relation to the Church; and the Church cannot possibly fulfil her grand function of being "the pillar and ground" of the gospel, unless she preserves those official relations and checks with those who preach. She must claim her rights of selection, ordination, and government, over those who preach her gospel, for her own and her Master's sake, as well as for the sake of sustaining and endorsing their message. This point of view gives us a triumphant answer to that flippant argument, which asks what actual effect an ordination ceremony has upon the ordained. "Do gifts and graces," they ask, "emanate from the palms of the ordaining prelate or presbyters, and penetrate the skulls or hearts of the candidates?" If the truth is preached, what difference can be made by a formal, human appointment of him who preaches it? We answer, it makes this difference: In the one case, the hearer has the opinion of one individual fellow-sinner; in the other, he has the judgment of the Church of Christ, uttered through her proper organ, that the things uttered are the truths of God. This is a very different position from that of the Papist, who claims for the Church infallibility and demands of the hearer an implicit faith; yet it secures to the sinner an important didactic advantage. He can only be saved by the truth, as he has rational assurance that it is from God, and therefore of divine authority. Of that rational conviction, the associated testimony of the Church, God's appointed witness on earth, is an important element. The minister is, to most of his hearers, personally a stranger; they know nothing whether he is a wise and true man or not; but the Church he represents is not a stranger; her character and *status* are known. Again: the lay-preacher speaks under no ecclesiastical responsibility; he may present the truth aptly or inaptly, to the edification or the misleading of his hearers; but the Church which permits him to preach without her commission, cannot curb him. He does not derive his right to speak from her. How can she supervise it, so long as his errors are not flagrant enough to constitute what would be a disciplinable offence in a layman? The Presbyterian Church does not make it a *cen-*

surable crime for a layman to believe that children should not be baptized, that a saint may totally and finally apostatize, that regeneration is synergistic. Then, can she punish one who owes her no other responsibilities than those of a layman, for saying what he believes? This view makes it perfectly obvious, that *lay-preaching implies Broad-Churchism*. The church which accepts it as a customary ordinance, must, in consistency, fling down her doctrinal standards, and open her doors to latitudinarian doctrine, with all its fearful consequences. Let all Presbyterians, then, bear in mind as one "fixed fact," that the recognition of lay-preaching *means Broad-Churchism*. This argument may now be brought within very close and simple limits. Christ ordained that the human heralds of his truth, since they would not be infallible, should preach under strict responsibility to his Church. But the lay-preacher, especially the one who merges his own denominational connexion in catholic labors, is under no responsibility to the Church. She has no check on his motions. We must add, that the concession of the full right of lay-preaching will leave us no guarantee of the preacher's preparation. Christ has declared that particular qualification and preparation are essential. But if the preacher appoints himself, how is this requirement to be enforced? The impulse to preach, of course implies the subject's conviction of his own fitness; and he "is judge in his own case." There is no safeguard left.

The momentous nature of this consequence is not apprehended until we remember that such lay-evangelists as Messrs. Moody and Sankey are destined to have many imitators. It might be well for the Church, could we be guaranteed that all these who are to come after, will be as sound and scriptural as the distinguished leaders. But we have no right to anticipate any other result than this: that these imitators will be of all kinds, "good, bad, and indifferent." If the journals may be believed, our prophecy is already fulfilling in some who are aping Mr. Moody's *role*. But when we are infested with that harvest of rashness, indiscretion, bad taste, heresy, and intrusion, which is to come from this sowing, we shall understand why the Head of the

Church imposed official responsibilities, in addition to the lay, upon those who publicly preach his gospel.

We are perfectly aware of the retort which awaits us: that the Church court is no more infallible than the lay-preachers. We shall be told that the preacher's keeper needs keeping as much as he does. But the reply to this is in the principle which Solomon announces in the words, "In the multitude of counsellors is safety." The error or apostasy of the many is far less probable than that of the one; the aggregate wisdom of the many is far greater than that of the one. All legitimate governments are but specimens of the wisdom of divine Providence, in so combining men in society as to make them checks upon each other. Church government contains the same useful and beneficent feature. And we repeat, that it should be enough for us that this is the method which Christ, in his divine wisdom, has actually adopted to repress the disorders of erratic individual minds and wills in his kingdom on earth. If the objection meant no more than that this method will also come short of yielding perfect results, we should freely concede it. No plan, though devised by divine wisdom, will ever work perfection when intrusted to human hands; for these are, at best, imperfect. But shall we therefore disdain the safeguards which that wisdom has devised to protect us from total and disastrous failure?

But to our Assembly of 1869, there appeared to be another side to this subject. That body looked abroad upon the vast destitutions of the country, and then observed the lamentable masses of buried talents in the laity of the Church. It seemed to ask itself why this latent talent should not be at once directed to attack these vast destitutions, everywhere, and without the formality of professional training. Thus it was prompted to adopt the ambiguous action, which authorised church sessions to license, in a sense, elders and laymen, who should be virtually lay-preachers, and yet, in some sort, ecclesiastical officers of the church. To us it always appeared that the Assembly should not have gone thus far, or else should have gone farther. The only kind of preacher, not an ordained minister and administrator of the sacraments, known to our Constitution, is the "probationer." The

only court which can lawfully license him is the Presbytery; and he can only be licensed lawfully after a certain prescribed preparation. But these sessional *appointees* were preachers, and yet not probationers. If the Assembly judged it right to direct lay effort into public channels, it would have been less inconsistent and illegal simply to invite laymen (and elders) to exercise their gifts publicly, without waiting for formal authority from any church court. That is to say, it would have been better for the Assembly to hold and teach that these extra-constitutional public exercises of individual gifts, while encouraged by the brotherhood, must yet be held as authorised by the personal rights of private members, as Christ's freemen, and not by any official appointment. Or if the Assembly felt the intrinsic looseness of this footing for the exercise—as Presbyterians could not but feel—and yet desired to encourage this species of public labor, it should have gone farther, and changed the Constitution, so as to provide for sessional "licentiates," who should not be "probationers," nor trained for the ministry, and yet regular ecclesiastical officers. It is fortunate for the integrity of our system and the peace of our churches, that the instincts of good sense in our people have left this legislation practically a dead letter. So may it remain until the "sober second thought" of the Assembly shall revoke it.

But yet, pious zeal urges us with such thoughts as these: There is, notoriously, high qualification for usefulness outside of the ordained ministry; why not let it act, when the world is perishing? The truest wisdom is to give free scope for all good energies. And then, has not Christ made every believer a teacher of his lost fellow-men, leaving it as the last enactment entered upon the pages of the New Testament: "*Let him that heareth say, Come?*" (Rev. xxii. 17.) Thus, it is the very condition of every Christian's life, that he shall, somehow or somewhere, speak to others for Christ. Now, if, by speaking for Christ to one fellow-creature, a believer ascertains that he can edify two, where is the difference in principle? Is it not twice as well? And if he may properly speak to two, why not to twenty, or to two hundred, or to two thousand? And if God

blesses his speaking in the awakening, renewal, or edification of souls, how can any good man dare to arrest the blessing for the sake of a human ordinance which is lacking to the speaker?

This is plausible; yet the reconciliation is not difficult. We remind the pious advocate of this liberty, that ordination is not a "human ordinance," in the sense of his argument, *but a divine one*. Christ enjoins it; only he enjoins man to perform it. When amiable enthusiasm asks of us, whether we expect divine grace to "run in our ruts," we fearlessly reply, (abating the homeliness of the image,) that we do expect it to move in channels which Christ has assigned for it; and if we have these, then we are entitled to expect that Christ will honor his own institution. The solution of the objection is found, secondly, in the fact that, this side of the official heralding of the gospel by the word and sacraments, there is a wide and diversified field for lay-effort, extending from the teaching of the child, at its parent's knee, up to the school and Bible class. But, third, if this lay-effort developes in any male Christian real qualification for more public usefulness than all this field can offer him, *this is one element of his call to the regular ministry*; and with the seal of success added, it is the crowning and decisive element. As a devout and faithful believer, he is bound to accept the sign as meaning this. The "aptness to teach," "good report with them that are without," and other traits which constitute him a successful lay-preacher, are precisely those which Christ has laid down as designating those whom he calls into the ministry. That regular ministry, ordained in the regular ecclesiastical mode, is precisely the agency which he has appointed to do the preaching. Hence the case is perfectly clear. If the man is mistaken in supposing he has the gifts for lay-preaching, he should be stopped. If he really has them, then Christ thereby calls him into the regular ministry, either as a pastor or evangelist. How else can any man be more clearly called, than by just the gifts and successes which are claimed for these evangelists by their friends? If they may refuse to heed, we see not how any other man can be more bound to come into the ministry. If love and duty to Christ prompt them to preach as laymen, we see not how the same

affections can fail to draw them into the ministry. If, for instance, such laymen as the late Mr. Brownlow North and Mr. Moody have the qualifications and the seal of the divine blessing, which their friends claim for them, this is, to our minds, a demonstration that God calls them into the regular ministry, and they should seek a regular ordination, like other ministers, each in that branch of the Church which has his conscientious preference.

This, then, should be the solution of the impulse to lay-preaching. The consistent application of this solution would not imply the refusal of all liberty to the exercise. The ecclesiastical authorities would permit a tentative use of the gifts of laymen in this way. But they would require that each case should, before very long, find its appropriate issue, either by passing on into the regular ministry, or by such practical evidence of the lack of ability to edify, as would justify the church-court in withdrawing the exceptional privilege. If the possession of gifts were evinced without the learning and culture which the Church rightfully requires as necessary to the highest ministerial efficiency; then the same honest zeal which prompts the aspirant to serve God in public, should surely prompt him to submit to that training by study, which will equip him for serving God effectually and wisely in public.

Now, the evasions which will be attempted from this plain reasoning are: First, that the lay-evangelist honestly believes he can do more good thus than if ordained. This plea deserves no more answer than has been already intimated. We presume that God knows best; and he has called the preachers into the ministry. Another plea is, that the irreligious will listen with more sympathy and confidence to one who is not paid for his preaching. Again we retort, we presume that the God who "ordained that they who serve the altar should live of the altar" knows best. If the regular ministry is indeed mercenary, then the proper remedy is to correct the fault by rigid church discipline, to extrude the mercenary men, if necessary, from the office they disgrace, and to fill it with regular ministers of a Moody's generous devotion. If the profession is not obnoxious to this suspicion, then we opine that to truckle to the hostile infidel prejudice, which wickedly

defames a noble and disinterested order of men, is but a sorry way to promote the interests of truth and righteousness. A third, and a more respectable plea, remains: that there are gifted elders, who are prevented by the duties already owed to dependent families, or by the *res angustae domi*, from making their way into the regular ministry, but who are admirably qualified to do good by public discourse. The aspirations of this class deserve the most generous sympathy of every good heart. The true solution, which ought to be applied to their cases, should be assistance from the brotherhood, so unstinted that it would meet all domestic obstacles, and open up a happy road for these yearning souls into the full work of God, by supplying the wants of those dependent on them, while they are preparing for the higher sphere. But suppose this solution is not given; then it might be a more harmless irregularity, if there must be any, for these gifted elders to continue to speak in public, with due prudence and modesty, *by virtue of their ordination as elders*, than to resort to a species of licensure as preachers, from a court which has no constitutional right to give it. Believing assuredly, as we do, that the ruling elder is a presbyter, a member of that order of which "aptness to teach" is required in general terms, we would rather see the zeal and gifts of non-clerical laborers expand themselves in elders'-preaching than in lay-preaching. For the former exercise would possess the all-important advantage, that it was performed under official sanctions and responsibilities.

There are heedless thinkers, who call themselves "practical," who suppose they find an answer to all cautions and every plea of principle, in the triumphant question: "How many regularly ordained ministers preach as well or with as much success as Mr. Moody?" Possibly, few or none. Any admission we might make on this point, is wholly irrelevant to the argument. For the "practical" Christian will not defy God's word, by denying that study and sacred learning give some advantage for expounding Christianity; or that the church institutions Christ has ordained, have some utility for promoting the great work of the world's redemption. Now we remind them that Christ requires all of us to love him with all our hearts, and serve him with all

our strength. The thing which Christ demands from a Christian of eminent natural gifts and zeal, is not merely that he shall love and serve God better than we poor, plodding "professionals," but that he shall serve him as well as he can. If his natural gifts, unassisted by ministerial training and sanctions, enable him already to surpass us, that is not the question. The question is, whether the gifted layman, with this training and ordination, might not surpass us a great deal farther in glorifying God? If he might, then he is solemnly bound to do it; and thus he is bound to make these professional acquisitions which confer that fuller efficiency.

It is from this point of view that we would proceed to what is the most distasteful part of our task—and yet a part required by fidelity to truth—the criticism of Mr. Moody's actual method of preaching the gospel. Let it be, then, distinctly borne in mind, that we do not complain that his preaching is not good, but that it is not better. We do not charge upon it fatal error, or any criminal unfaithfulness to truth; but we assert that it presents blemishes enough to offer precisely the proof that might be expected, of the necessity of regular training to him who undertakes to preach the gospel. Mr. Moody's preaching is correct enough to evince great promise, and great knowledge of the English Scriptures; but it is not correct enough to evince that he, more than any other man, can adequately instruct the Church of God without the regular training. The point which we claim, after conceding all his eminent merits, is, that here again we have the experimental evidence, the more conclusive because it is found in so eminent an instance, to prove that no man should preach who has not had the advantages of preparation and regular appointment.

We hear Mr. Moody, for instance, telling the Christians of Edinburgh, in January, 1874, it was "his belief that God punishes believers in this life for their transgressions, while the punishment of unbelievers was reserved for a future state." The natural construction of this sentence would, of course, give the same meaning to the word "punishment," in its two members. Were Mr. Moody's attention challenged to this grave error, he

would probably claim that he knew the wide difference between chastisement (of justified believers) and punishment (of condemned sinners). But our objection is, that his language teaches the ignorant to confound that distinction.

In a sermon delivered in London, he divides his hearers into three classes: Christians; those who have wandered from God, or backsliders; and "those that never have been saved." This distribution seems to imply that the second class are not Christians now, but were once saved. Yet Mr. Moody is a declared believer in the perseverance of saints.

Again, he paints in colors of the warmest approval, the conversion of a bereaved father, who professes no motive for desiring salvation or heaven, except the certainty that only by reaching that state and place, could he again enjoy the society of a favorite and engaging child, who had died in early youth. And this conviction was the result of a vivid dream only! How dangerous may not this delusion be, which thus encourages impulsive minds to confound the yearnings of an affection merely natural, and shared by myriads of hearts utterly carnal and impenitent, with spiritual-mindedness?

In a sermon on the new birth, he describes the domestic peace and happiness which have returned to the hearth of a reformed drunkard, who is the father of a family, and exclaims: "Yes, God has done all that; and that is regeneration." Would it not have been safer to say: "That is one of the fruits of regeneration," lest some vicious man might adopt, from his words, the soul-destroying error that reformation is regeneration? In the same sermon he describes Nicodemus, whose history gives him his text, as "belonging to the house of bishops;" "one of the church dignitaries;" "one who now would doubtless be a D. D. and LL.D." There is here, perhaps, a very fair hit at the two unfortunate classes among the moderns, designated by these titles; but we perceive also a rather confused view, for a religious teacher, of the duties of the Jewish Sanhedrim!

In the sermon on the word "gospel," he repudiates the kindly intercessory petition of a brother, that he (Moody) "might lay hold of eternal life." He declares that, having gotten this gift

at his conversion, nineteen years before, he has no use for this prayer. Does not this savor a little of the unscriptural extravagance of the Plymouth Brethren? They deem it an absurdity to pray for the Holy Ghost, because, they argue, every man who has faith to pray, has the Holy Ghost already. Such teachers forget that Bible saints, whose title to an assurance of a gracious state is at least as sound as that of any modern Christian, do continually pray for life and for the Holy Ghost, and do expressly exhort each other to "lay hold on eternal life." They forget that rudimental truth of Christian experience, that breathings after spiritual blessings are the very acts of soul in which the possession of spiritual gifts finds its normal expression.

In the same sermon, a desire for eternal life is unhesitatingly ascribed to every person in a vast congregation of impenitent persons; and "eternal life," that which is the great gift of the gospel, is described and illustrated as merely the endless prolongation of that natural life to which any worldly man would cleave in the prospect of natural death, even at the cost of his wealth. The argument by which this multitude, dead in trespasses and sins, are assured that they all really have a supreme desire for "eternal life," is simply this. Suppose any one of them were in the condition of a rich man, with a million sterling in a sinking ship in mid-ocean, who offered to give all this wealth to save his life from drowning—would he not do the same? Of course. Well, then, he supremely desires eternal life; and as the heavenly Father stands yearning to bestow it on everybody, everybody may get it on these terms. Thus "slightly is the hurt of the daughter of the people healed." Yet Mr. Moody would promptly accede to those Scripture statements which describe all unbelievers as carnal, and dead to every spiritual desire. The slightest discrimination should have saved him from this dangerous confusion of that natural love of existence which every vilest sinner feels, and feels all the more pungently by reason of his guilty remorse and fear, with the desire for that true life which is a "hungering and thirsting after righteousness." It is to the latter only that the gospel-promise is made; and the real misery and sin of every unbeliever's state is, that of this desire he *does not*

feel a single pulse, and never will, save as the Holy Ghost quickens his dead soul.

And here a solemn protest should be uttered against this trait, which pervades much of the preaching of Mr. Moody and his admirers, that tends so strongly to betray the partially awakened sinner into a "temporary faith." These teachers regard the inviting features of the gospel as far the most persuasive. Hence they are not thorough in probing the corruptions of dead souls with the instrument of God's holy law. They wish to make coming to Christ very easy. Hence they continually speak to wicked men as though all that is needed is to gratify the natural desire for well-being and impunity. They are so eager to induct their pupils into the joys of a full assurance, that they tacitly pass over that careful self-examination and the self-distrust implied therein, which alone can safely discriminate, as assisted by the witnessing of the Spirit, between a spurious and a genuine faith. They abound in soft and sensuous pictures of the believer's life and of heaven, as smiling with enjoyments and security. Thus, in his sermon on the great commission, Mr. Moody tells sinners expressly, "Let me say—mark the words—God does not come here and ask any man to give up anything." Is it possible for a religious teacher to fly more directly into the face of his Master? We remember that Christ said, in Luke xiv., except a man gives up *everything*, he cannot be his disciple! It is true, that the preacher explains his declaration by promising his hearers that their cases shall be all like his; in that the reception of a free salvation through Christ's blood, in his own case, immediately made the crucifixion of his sins perfectly easy. We feel no disposition to test the accuracy of Mr. Moody's own peculiarly happy experience. But this we do know, that if his experience has been thus singular, he has no right to promise a similar one to other believers—Christ never did. The teaching which we hear from him is after this fashion: that the denial of our lusts for his sake ought not to be difficult, and were holiness complete in us, would not be; that therefore redeemed sinners, in their militant state, are bound in duty to practise that self-denial manfully, whether they find it more or less bitter: that, by reason of in-

dwelling sin, they will find it more or less bitter; but that his grace will assuredly give them prevalent consolation and final victory in this death-struggle, if they cleave to him by faith. Such is the amount of encouragement upon which Christ invites the soul that is awakened to the "sinfulness of sin," and animated by the "godly sorrow that worketh repentance unto life," to enter upon the Christian warfare, by trust in his love and grace. To the truly humbled and renewed soul, it is glorious, sweet, and sufficient; to the mere stony-ground hearer, it is but a sapless promise. What he desires is a gospel of easy impunity, selfish advantage, and luxurious sentiment. But we warn those who preach the gospel thus, that they must expect their converts to fulfil the prophecy, "When tribulation or persecution ariseth because of the word, by and by they are offended."

The sermons since preached in America, betray similar inaccuracies. At Northfield, Mass., Mr. Moody tells us "Paul's letter on election was written to the Church, and not to the world." First, we ask, Which is Paul's "letter on election," the Epistle to the Romans, or Ephesians, or those to Timothy? The intelligent reader finds election in all his epistles, as well as in Christ's sermons. And next, we see no evidence that the holy apostle restricted his teachings of this doctrine to believers; certainly Rom. ix. 20 does not wear this appearance. Again, at Northfield, commenting on Matt. vii. 7, he teaches his hearers that the "asking Christian" is a lower grade, the "seeking Christian" a higher, and the "knocking" the highest and best grade; the last being most assured of an answer to prayer. But our Saviour, in the next verse, proceeds to give the very same promise to all three, thus showing that he did not mean to distribute praying people into gradations by this language, but to reinforce the encouragement given to all praying people in common, by an emphatic repetition. It is a far graver error, that he evidently confounds the two classes of objects of prayer and promises of answer given in the gospel. He speaks as though Christians had the same specific warrant to pray for objects of problematical benefit (yet naturally and innocently desirable to the pious heart,) as for the benefits of redemption expressly

pledged to faith in the promises. This heedlessness tends to encourage believers who are more ardent than well-informed, to push their faith into presumption. The wretched result will be, when they are refuted by a final disappointment, that they will infer either their own rejection by God, (and thus fall into profound discouragement,) or a sceptical doubt of God's faithfulness. This error and its dangers has been fully explicated in a former number of this REVIEW, (*Theology of the Plymouth Brethren*, January, 1872,) and we therefore dismiss it with a reference to that discussion.

The reporters have doubtless done that kindly office for Mr. Moody, in preparing his speeches for the journals, which they are wont to render to other extempore orators. Enough remains, however, in defects of grammar and style, to make every cultivated Christian feel that training for the ministry would not have hurt the preacher. The bad grammar and the provincialisms which bristle over his discourses, are not the worst blemishes. An English wit has drawn an amusing picture of a lady of the old-fashioned high-breeding, who was intensely anxious to rebuke in her son a certain fashion of speech, and who yet could not bring herself so far within that guilty fashion as to pronounce the unseemly (though only) word which characterised it—"slang." We labor under a similar embarrassment in doing our duty on this point to Mr. Moody. We can only protest that we do not believe even a coal-heaver or sailor finds the infusion of this element. in addition to all that simplicity, perspicuity, earnestness, and affection can do, essential to his edification.

There are two more points in this movement which require a word of caution. One is the absolute importance attached by the lay-evangelists to the undenominational quality of all their measures. The point to be remarked is not that their services are "union-meetings," or that the evangelists deem it expedient sometimes to subordinate their own denominational convictions for the temporary purposes of wider Christian communion. The most decided and consistent ministers have done this. But the point is, that the leaders of the new movement make not only the subordination, but the suppression, of their own and of all

other people's denominational convictions, even the most conscientious, an absolute requirement of the success of their work; and that not occasionally, but uniformly. When Mr. Moody was asked, in London, to what branch of the Church he belonged, the only answer he would give was, "that he belonged to the general assembly and church of the first-born, whose names are written in heaven." When a young person honestly asked him, in Edinburgh, to instruct her conscience as to the proper mode of baptism, he positively refused, and required her to satisfy herself with some views as to the significance of baptism. These must have been most inconsistently "sectarian," inasmuch as immersionists differ from us as much about the significance as the mode of this sacrament. In a lecture at Dublin, Mr. Moody's two chief topics were "*drunkenness and sectarianism.*" "God had vouchsafed a blessed unity; woe to the unhappy person who should first break it. Yet it would be broken, if there was proselytism. This would be the triumph of sect over Christ. The cry is, 'Come out, come out from a sect.' But where? Into another sect? Every body of believers is a sect."

There are several remarks which will serve to set this claim in its proper light. It is almost self-evident that he who would cooperate in a work thoroughly undenominational, with members of several denominations, must expurgate his teachings of everything which might impinge against either of his friends' peculiarities. Now the evangelist, who is at once competent and honest, must be supposed to have adopted for himself, either from the standards of some denomination, or from his own original studies in Scripture, a *system* of revealed doctrine, which he conscientiously believes to have correctness and a certain completeness. If private members were justly blamed by the apostles, in Heb. v. 12, because they had not advanced beyond "the first principles of the oracles of Christ," such a state of knowledge is, of course, unpardonable in one who assumes to teach multitudes. But this teacher must now clip off one truth at one corner of his own system, in concession to his Methodist ally; another for the Immersionist; another for the Episcopalian; another for the Romanist. He will plead: "Yet the fundamentals

of saving truth remain." We reply, Possibly. But yet, dares he assert that a maimed system of truth will be as efficacious as a complete one? Is any divine truth valueless? Is the faithful soldier as willing to fight for his king with a sword which has large gaps on its edge, and has lost its point, perchance, as with a perfect blade? A good man, as we conceded, may consent to a temporary silence concerning a peculiar truth which he believes to be God's truth, for the sake of other righteous objects of wider Christian communion. He may concur in a Bible Society effort with Quakers, Papists, and even Socinians. But to consent to a constant silence, is dishonest and unfaithful.

In the second place, the great proximate end of the Church is the redemption of souls. If undenominational teaching is so much the most efficient for this end, it seems very evident that denominations ought not to exist in the Church at all. That is to say, the Church ought to have an absolute visible unity, as Rome claims. Then, first, the Church must either have an earthly, infallible head, to settle and suppress all doctrinal differences, as Rome claims; or secondly, this catholic Church must be a "broad church," wholly latitudinarian as to doctrine outside of the bare fundamentals of saving truth; or, thirdly, some Christians must be forced to surrender a part of their fundamental convictions to other Christians no more conscientious or infallible than themselves.

In the third place, this exalting of the union effort as the only efficient mode to build up Christ's kingdom, and this denunciation of denominationalism as an obstruction to good in revival meetings, contain a very plain implication that denominations are wicked things. The inevitable effect will be, that a generation of Christians will be educated, opposed to all denominational distinctions. Then there will be but three possible resorts for these Christians—Popery, or Broad Churchism, or the renunciation of the visible Church in every form. This is the lesson which divine Providence has taught to Christendom by the struggles of eighteen hundred years, and especially by the agonies and blood of the Protestant Reformation: the existence of the visible Church catholic in branches or denominations, each conscientiously teach-

ing the whole counsel of God for man's salvation, as it honestly understands it from the Scriptures, yet each respecting the sincerity and the church rights of the others, is the only condition possible for the existence of orthodox Protestantism—on the one hand not persecuting, and on the other hand not dishonestly latitudinarian—in such a world as ours. Such, we solemnly testify, is the lesson of God's providence, as of sound reasoning. Let the reader scan the grounds of this conclusion again and again: he will find them adamant. It will be a calamitous day for truth and for immortal souls, when the novelties of a restless and conceited age shall persuade us to cast away this costly truth.

Let a more popular *ad hominem* argument be applied to Mr. Moody. He is, we will suppose for the argument's sake, an Immersionist. His own denominational connexion is with that Church. Now, either he believes that there is some value in the argument for that mode of baptism, or that there is not. If there is none, why is he himself an Immersionist? If there is some value in that mode, then he is bound in honesty to seek that advantage for his converts also. Why should a good man be willing to leave others deprived of that scriptural means of blessing which has done his own soul good?*

We conclude with a word touching the office of Mr. Sankey, "singing the gospel." The Jewish temple service had its chief singer. It will be a curious result if this modern movement should develop this function into a new and prominent branch of the ministry, unauthorised by the New Testament. Singing is unquestionably a scriptural means of grace, and good singing is a very efficient one. But in order that the Church may retain the blessing of good singing, the privilege which Mr. Sankey and his imitators claim, of importing their own lyrics into God's worship, must be closely watched. That saying has been quoted in favor of Mr.

* NOTE.—We are not alone in foreseeing the disorganising consequences of this self-appointment of evangelists. Dr. Thos. H. Skinner of Cincinnati has clearly demonstrated the same point, in a pamphlet upon "Lay-Evangelism," of unrivalled manliness and vigor, in which he fortifies the inferences of good sense by the lessons of experience borrowed from the Congregational, the Scotch, and the Presbyterian Churches.

Sankey's "ministry of song," which has been assigned to Lord Macaulay, and to Sir W. Scott, and to Thomas Moore: "Let me make the ballads of a people, and I care not who makes their laws." We cite that very principle to condemn the approaching license of (so called) sacred song. Dr. Nettleton was wont to say, that he could cause a company of people to "sing themselves into the doctrines of the gospel more easily than he could preach them into it." Then, it is even more important that church courts should use their authority of deciding what shall be sung, than of securing the qualification and orthodoxy of its preachers. Dr. Nettleton took the liberty of compiling and using his "Village Hymns" in public worship. His learning, sanctified genius, and experience excused the act in him. If the same license is to be usurped by every self-appointed chorister, we shall in the end have a mass of corrupting religious poetry, against which the Church will have to wage a sore contest. Our children will then learn, to their cost, how legitimate and valuable was that restriction, which we formerly saw in the lyrical liturgies of the old Protestant churches, expressed by the *imprimatur* of their supreme courts: "*Appointed to be sung in churches.*" The most that can be said of Mr. Sankey's developments in this direction is, that they do not appear to have introduced positive error, as yet, and that they exhibit no worse traits than a marked inferiority of matter and style to the established hymnals of the leading churches. The most danger thus far apparent is that of habituating the taste of Christians to a very vapid species of pious doggerel, containing the most diluted possible traces of saving truth, in portions suitable to the most infantile faculties, supplemented with a jingle of "vain repetitions." What shall we gain by giving our people these ephemeral rhymes in place of the immortal lyrics of Moses, David, Isaiah, Watts, and Cowper, so grand in their rhythm and melody, so pure in taste, and above all, so freighted with compact and luminous truth? "The old wine is better."

Intelligent Christians will watch the results of these mammoth meetings with interest, that "by their fruits we may know them." It is probably impossible to eliminate the chaff from the wheat as

yet, in the reported results in Great Britain. No one is competent to decide how much of the apparent enthusiasm was due to curiosity, to animal sympathy, to a species of religious fashion and social furor, to the impressive *stimulus* of vast multitudes singing or agitated with a common impulse; and how much to divine truth and sanctifying grace. We have seen the London press, with Mr. Spurgeon, after six months' experience, pronouncing the successes in that city delusive. It is very apparent that the supporters of the effort in Brooklyn were disappointed, though loth to confess their failure. We incline to the conclusion that this method with its monster congregations and extraordinary incidents, is mistaken; that it will prove a waste of money and labor, as compared with the more humble and unobtrusive but permanently fruitful work of parochial laborers; and that it will be found more promotive of an unwholesome religious dissipation than of holy living.

ARTICLE III.

THE ROYAL SEED.

A plain Christian who has not had the advantages of scholastic training, is easily bewildered by the technicalities of modern theological disputation. And the dominant idea in his mind will be something like this: As the unlettered believer will attain the inheritance of the saints by simple faith in the revelation of God, which revelation contains no hint of the vexed questions so much debated, there must needs be some other system of religious doctrine for the scholar. The prompt reply of Paul to the jailer at Philippi was sufficient for his case; but if the apostle had been dealing with a thinker of the nineteenth century, he must have shown, with the most elaborate precision, the connexion betwixt the objective salvation and the subjective mental exercise that secured it. So the conclusion is reached, that the religion of the

primitive believer was far different from the religion of Thornwell. To the poor the gospel is preached; to the learned, a system of philosophy, that has been constructed with agonizing care, in order to escape positive contradictions of the divine word.

All this reasoning is, of course, totally erroneous. Under similar circumstances, that is to say, if confronted with the visible and audible tokens of God's almighty interference, and therefore of God's immediate presence, the most highly cultivated sinner would by grace accept Paul's exhortation to the jailer, without demur or delay. The simplicity of the gospel scheme does not detract from its grandeur. And the most gifted of the sons of men have found in the petition of the publican the solution of all the problems that affect the relations subsisting betwixt man and his Maker.

But the reasoning is still more emphatically false, because the scheme of redemption, whose chief postulates commend themselves to the acceptance of the most simple-minded, is, considered as a system of philosophy, the most utterly inexhaustible of sciences. The mere fact that theology, as a formulated science, is the knowledge of God, is destructive of the very idea of limitation. In the investigations of the laws that regulate the diurnal motions of the earth, the philosopher might find it needful to ascend from its surface; but there is a distance beyond which no physical organism known to man could live. Or he might find it needful to explore the dark caverns that are hidden below the surface, but there are depths where physical life would inevitably cease. The limitations that are set up on every side, reduce the number of exact sciences to a minimum. Everywhere, inanimate nature raises the same warning voice to her most gifted students, saying, "Thus far shalt thou go, but no farther;" and the barrier separating ascertained fact from allowable inference, is reached near the threshold of all philosophy.

Not so with the knowledge of God. While finite man cannot, by searching, find out the Almighty to perfection, he can continue his search throughout endless ages! If he begin the study—inspired by the forces he obtains from the new birth—he

is invested with the powers of an indestructible life; and the pulsations of that life become more vigorous while cycles count as days. There will never come a time when he may count himself to have attained. But from heights that are inaccessible to angels of mightiest pinions, he, the redeemed of the Lord, shall soar still aloft, ever approaching, yet never attaining, the knowledge of God. It is this grand destiny of mortal man of which the asymptote of the hyperbola is the type and shadow!

The limit which God himself has established, and which cannot be overpassed here by the wisest of the sons of men, is the revelation given by God to the race. Even if there shall be other revelations to be made hereafter, while man is on this earth, he cannot be wise above that which is written. The exhortation, "Search the Scriptures," meets all possible exigencies in human life in the present dispensation, because God, who inspired the Word, knew from the beginning all the events of time, and provided for them in his revelation. And the dogmatic assertion of the Catechism, that the primal object of revelation is to teach man what he shall believe and what he shall do, is not only abundantly fortified by Scripture proof, but is also rationally exhaustive of the possibilities in the case. Moreover, the exact gradation of dogma—beginning with the announcement of man's chief end, the glorification of God, involving of necessity the giving of a rule, and then limiting the rule to God's revelation, and finally, shutting man up within the limits of this God-given rule, with all his powers of thought and action—is as accurate and symmetrical as the articulation of the bones in the vertebral column. No improvement is possible or thinkable. Even those modern philosophers who are wise above that which is written, admit the perfection of the physical frame of man, as the culminating excellence in all known organisms, albeit the outgrowth of a dreamy chain of development, wherein God interposed no finger and exercised no control.

Alongside this main thought runs another, which is also logically inevitable. The possession on the part of man, of powers of analysis—or, more simply stated, the possession of mental force—involves the necessity of an object worthy of these powers.

It is not thinkable that such vast dynamical machinery could be constructed, or could have been developed, to waste its tireless energies upon mere temporalities. The volcanic force that heaves up a continent from the depths of ocean, does not so much indicate *design* as does the structure of the coral formation which it brings to the surface; yet the resistless power that rends the earth in the one case, is never wasted upon minor phenomena. There is such a thing as a law of forces; as accurate, no doubt, in its application to what are termed convulsions of nature, as in the adaptation of centripetal and centrifugal forces to the motions of planets. God is orderly in all his working.

Now, if you try to imagine the known powers of man, considered as an intelligent being, employed solely upon interests that terminate with the present life, you will find nothing attainable that is commensurate with his powers. It cannot be true, that the needful provision for mere bodily necessities exhausts these powers, because the lower creation is more adequately furnished to this end than the lord of creation. No dread of possible privation in the future oppresses the beast of the forest. The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air have nests, and, according to the philosophy which denies God's watchful providence, inanimate nature beneficently furnishes food and shelter to animate nature in its lower gradations. And the tribes of men who have not been cursed with a useless civilisation, find all the appliances of their mortal lives scattered profusely in the places of their habitation. The Digger Indian subsists upon the roots which his brute instinct teaches him are edible and nutritious. And the dim glimmer of immortal life that he has by virtue of his humanity, only teaches him to find a possible deity in the snake or the ground-hog.

But you cannot place a civilised man in such rude surroundings, and keep him alive. Even if his animal life could be sustained by the nutriment that suffices for the savage, there are mental forces within him that would destroy his mortal frame, even as the fabled fire enkindled by the breath of genii, consumed the human organism with which it came in contact. And as the food taken into the body is only fuel destined to be

consumed in sustaining the vital force, so the thoughts and aspirations of the soul are simply the aliment which the soul requires for its normal existence. The man who lives without thought or affection, is only a vitalised corpse. And the man whose thoughts and affections are grovelling and sensual, differs from the brute most distinctly, it may be, in the possession of capacities for endless agonies hereafter.

Neither is it possible—advancing a step higher—for man to find employment for his powers in the pursuit of temporal knowledge. So far as the interior life of atheistic philosophers has been open to mortal scrutiny, there is not a case on record where such philosophers attained contentment. There *are* cases on record where their lives exhibited the longing for something more and better than philosophy could give, and where their deaths were enveloped in gloom or dismay. The Christian philosopher has the ready dogma, that the study of the character and laws and works of God can never satisfy the soul until God is cognised as the Redeemer and Restorer of a royal seed. Yet the unbeliever meets the dogma by demanding, illogically, the proof of its truth in a demonstration that can be tested by the same faculties that cognise the phenomena of matter. The inherent impossibility of such a demonstration is in the fact that eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived the things that God has in reserve for the employment of the undying energies of human souls. And herein is another hint of the true difficulty in the way of human contentment. God made man upright, with dominion. And this dominion, if not entirely wrested from him in the fall, was still so seriously impaired, that he must go discrowned throughout his earthly pilgrimage. But there come over him, dream-like, visions and dim remembrances of crown and sceptre. He is living under usurped authority, and the consciousness of his rights, (vacated by his own act,) which consciousness abides with him, only makes the usurpation more galling. The usurper is the prince of the powers of air; but man outranks him, being the lord of the intelligent creation, destined by God to take the first place, and having, by inheritance, a more excellent name than any of the hierarchs. It

must needs be so, if only because God himself—passing by all the exalted ranks, the principalities, and thrones, and dominions—took upon himself the nature which he had created with royal powers and invested with royal prerogatives. And as in ancient story, the pilgrim, clad in humble garments, carried hidden in his bosom the golden chain and knightly spurs, to be resumed when his pilgrimage was over, so the son of Adam carries with him the tokens of his regal birth, albeit hidden under the rags which Satan gave his progenitor, when he found him naked in the garden. He also shall reassume the signs of his rank, at the end of his pilgrimage, where crown and robe await him. And, in the meantime, he is restive under domination. The energies wherewith God has equipped the race of royal priests, will endure while God reigns, and these forces cannot be made to terminate upon the things of time. You cannot train the eagle to perform the work of the carrier-pigeon. You cannot make immortal man the slave of mortal cares. He cannot think without thinking God! and he cannot think of God without dread, so long as he finds only the tokens of power and Godhead. He must recognise the Fatherhood, with all that the relation involves, before he fulfils his destiny and glorifies God.

Much that is mysterious about the revelation of God and the plan of salvation it unfolds, is made plain and simple by the clear apprehension of the two doctrines thus imperfectly suggested. First. The grand doctrine that God, in making man, had reached the culmination. Nothing was created after Adam. God made all things besides, animate and inanimate, and then made the king. And when this crowning work was marred by sin, the restoration of it to its pristine glory was a work worthy of the power of God, because of the innate nobleness of the race he had created.

Secondly. The entire defilement and degradation of this race by the fall. There is something awful in the very name of sinner! The term is not applied to the powers of darkness, or to the fallen seraph who reigns over them. The sinner is like his betrayer, in that he rebelled against God; but the sinner did far worse—he violated a covenant, whose obligations he incurred

with his crown upon his head! None but a crowned king could have assumed the responsibilities that Adam assumed when he engaged to do or to refrain, not only for himself but also for his posterity; for whom he undertook, by virtue of his essential royalty, as well as by virtue of his paternity. He was not only the progenitor, but also the federal head of his seed. Therefore his rebellion, which is too feeble a word to express the enormity of the offence, was a heinous sin. It was the violation of treaty obligations. It was the act of a king, who poisoned all the springs throughout his wide dominions, thus insuring the death of each one of his subjects, and his own death, at once; a murderer and a suicide! Surely, in all the universe of God, there is no such monstrous deformity as the sinner, unique in his hideous proportions!

And as appropriate just here, note that the gospel comes to man with no indispensable condition excepting this, that he shall be a sinner! It is true that repentance is required; but he giveth repentance, with the remission of sin. It is true that faith is indispensable; but he is the Author and Finisher of faith. The one faithful saying, worthy of universal acceptance, is this: "Christ Jesus came into the world to save—sinners!"

Now consider this salvation and this Saviour, and see some of the things that are involved in the glorious doctrine, that Christ is Jehovah's Anointed.

I. CHRIST, THE ANOINTED PROPHET.

It should be clear, from the foregoing argument, that the restoration of this lost race to the favor of God and to its normal place in the scale of created intelligences, must be accomplished by divine power. Still keeping within the limits of revelation, it is not otherwise possible than in the exact way that God has revealed. The God made known to man in Scripture could not restore this race by a mere decree of amnesty. He would not be the God who is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his perfections, if he condoned the offence that filled his universe with horror. The terms of the covenant bound God to the punishment of sin. No created wisdom could solve the problem, how

God could be just and justify ; so the restorer must be God himself. Familiarity with the opening words of John's Gospel has made men overlook their startling emphasis. The fact of the eternal existence of the Word and his essential divinity, and the other fact, that this Word was made flesh and dwelt among us, are not incidental parts of the plan of redemption. They are the inexorable axioms upon which the entire system is builded. Christ Jesus—that is, the anointed Saviour—must needs be very God and very man. And the man who has apprehended the two points already suggested, to wit, that he is discrowned, and that he is a sinner, readily accepts these axioms as the only thinkable propositions in the case. It is not more infallibly true that a whole must be greater than any one of its parts, or that things which are equal to the same things must be equal to each other. To make this proposition plain, look at some of the circumstances of the case—the primal conditions of the problem.

Remembering the chief postulate, that man was made the head of creation, essentially regal in his attributes, it is clear that no subordinate intelligence could confront the dread penalty annexed to the first covenant. The seraph who glories in his effulgent beauty nearest the great throne, would wither under the sentence, "Dying, thou shalt die!" And there is here revealed another phase of the inevitable necessity. "It *became* him by whom and for whom are all things, to make the Captain of Salvation perfect through suffering." None other than the Prince of the Lord's host could reach this perfection ; and none but he could assume the prophetic office, because the Lord of creation could not be instructed by minor intelligences, especially in the divine logic of the scheme of redemption.

The term employed in Scripture is one that represents this redemption as a new creation. "He that is in Christ is a new creation." And the Lord himself uses the same form : "Ye must be born again." The idea thus conveyed, owing to the infirmity of humanity, involves the destruction of the original life principle. The new heart involves the annihilation of the old heart. And the poverty of human language is seen in the apparent contradictions contained in these statements. It is the

same life of the soul, redeemed from destruction ; the same heart, transformed from stone to flesh. Yet the change wrought is so radical that it is equivalent to re-creation. Strictly speaking, there has been no work of creation wrought, since God *rested* on the first Sabbath. He ceased from all the work, forever. And this is the precise argument in Hebrews, where the apostle compares the resting of Christ from his work of redemption, with the resting of Christ from the work of creation, and therefore concludes, "there remaineth a Sabbath-keeping to the people of God." It was not the rest of the first Sabbath, he argues ; it was not the rest of Canaan, to which Joshua led the people ; but it was the eternal rest to which Christ—the Captain of Salvation, the Captain of the Lord's host, who encountered the typical Joshua at Jericho—brought his armies. "When he ascended up on high, he was the leader of a vast multitude of captives—redeemed, ransomed, to whom he gave this ineffable rest. And all the paradoxes of scripture cluster around this vital doctrine: "Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God." It is a mystery which may not be solved by finite wisdom. It is a revelation from God, the Divine Prophet, to the rescued victims of the tempter's lie, "Ye shall not surely die, but shall be as gods, knowing good and evil." And the Anointed Prophet, confirming the exact terms of the old covenant, thus explains the paradox : "Ye must die, and be born again—nay, ye are dead in trespasses and sins—and therefore must die in endurance of the penalty ; therefore ye die in me ; for if I die for all, then all die, and henceforth you derive your life from the true vine, and the lives you live in the flesh you live by the faith of the Son of God, who, loving you, gave himself *for* you ;" that is, "instead of you."

Now, the proposition stated in 2 Corinthians v. 14–21, covers the whole ground. The death of the Redeemer is the saint's death ; therefore let every man in Christ be a new creation ; because God hath made Christ sin for us, and made us the righteousness of God in him.

It needed the authority of the Divine and Anointed Prophet to unfold and enforce this doctrine of imputation, growing out of the doctrine of substitution, which, in turn, is founded upon the

unchangeable integrity of God. The justice of God is the obverse side of the medal that exhibits the mercy of God. Justice and judgment are the foundation of his throne; mercy and truth are the heralds that proclaim his exalted majesty. The thick bosses upon his buckler are terrible to his adversaries, but in their concavities are hidden supplies of grace for his redeemed, who repose securely behind it. And the salvation of the sinner necessarily involves the punishment of sin.

These are the truths which Christ the Prophet reveals to men. And he was anointed for this special work, and sent, the Apostle and High Priest and Royal Captain of the host he marshalled, as set forth in Isaiah lxi. And in the very first discourse recorded in Luke, at the beginning of his ministry, he announces himself as the fulfiller of the prediction, the anointed Prophet of God, and distinctly assumes the threefold office. The prompt response of his auditory, wondering at his gracious words, was, "Is not this Joseph's son?" And it is instructive to note here, that the whole of that initial discourse was the naked assertion of the sovereignty of God. There were widows in Israel, there were lepers in Israel, but God sent relief and cure to the widow of Sarepta and the leper of Syria.

Because the whole scheme of redemption, the "good tidings" this anointed teacher brought, must needs rest upon this essential sovereignty of God the Pardoner. If the salvation is not all of grace, none of it is of grace, and grace is not conceivable in any other than a sovereign. When he ceases to have mercy on whom he will, it ceases to be mercy. When grace ceases to discriminate, it ceases to be a royal prerogative, and the paradise of God, which the Scriptures call a kingdom, degenerates into a republic.

And so the response of the auditors of Christ the Prophet, "Is not this Joseph's son?" is the key to the mystery of his rejection. None but God could assume this absolute sovereignty; and if he had been Joseph's son, he could not have said, "This day is this Scripture fulfilled in your ears!" Only the Son of God could appropriate this language.

Therefore, the rejection of the teachings of this Prophet, down to the present day, always begins with the denial of his divinity.

It is always Joséph's son who is dethroned and dishonored and rejected. He taught as one having authority; and men, feeling the stirring of royal blood, resisted the authority when they denied the Godhead. If he is called "Jehovah's anointed," the answer is, that Jehovah could not invest a mere creature with such awful authority, without reversing his original plan, because he made man the chief of all creatures, and put all things under his feet. And this instinctive recoil from creature domination, is a normal sentiment. You cannot enforce the matchless teachings of Jesus, no matter how clearly you show the purity of his human character, or the sublimity of his human wisdom, so long as you call him Joséph's son. His words are weighty, because he spake as never man spake. It is not enough to say, "Rabbi, we know that thou art a teacher come from God." But the answer of Peter covers the whole ground: "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of eternal life, and we believe and are sure that thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God!"

Howbeit, this divine Prophet is also man. The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us; and although the logical necessity of the Incarnation is not so apparent in view of his prophetic office, as when his priestly work is considered, still, he must needs partake of the nature he instructs, as well as the nature he redeems. Only one or two suggestions will be offered upon this point, and they are merely tentative.

First. There may be some analogy betwixt the tri-unity of the Godhead and the threefold office work of Christ. The creed that asserts the Unity of God, insists upon the Trinity also, and it is not merely the poverty of human language that makes the apparent paradox. Perhaps no portion of evangelical creeds is more cautiously constructed than the dogmas that relate to this doctrine. In the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, there is probably apparent a more laborious effort after *accurate* definitions here, than in any other parts of these documents. But there is a natural obstacle in the way of accurate definition, and that is simply the impossibility of measuring Infinity. It is not saying too much to assert that no created intelligence really apprehends the naked idea of Infinity. There are types of this vast problem in the

domain of human science, but they are only types. As for the doctrine itself, it is as pointedly revealed in Scripture as the doctrine of God's existence; and the believer accepts the doctrine upon the authority of God. And it is certainly the highest wisdom to rely upon God's plain statements, without subjecting the doctrine to the test of inherent probability.

But admitting, for the sake of argument, that God has really revealed the doctrine, it is perhaps not improper to make this statement: If God exists in tri-unity, then this mode of existence is necessary. And so thinkers have constructed hypotheses whereby they seek to demonstrate this necessity. It is not difficult to show that God manifests his glory in the three personifications, as he could not do otherwise. But the original problem is as far from solution as ever. If the Godhead consists of a triune personality, certainly this is the most glorious possible mode of existence. Yet the accordance of this truth, with the other emphatically asserted truth, that God is essentially One, is by no means demonstrated, when you show the necessity for a Trinity.

There is a great gulf fixed between all those topics and the clear apprehension of them by the creatures of God. The Bible does state and answer objections, as in Paul's great argument upon the resurrection in 1 Corinthians. But here the discussion begins and terminates upon the creature and his destiny. But you will search in vain for anything that resembles explanation in relation to the mode of God's existence. And there is an awful depth of mystery about such announcements as that already quoted from Hebrews ii. 10: "For it *became* him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the Captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings." And again at the 17th verse: "It *behoved* him to be made like unto his brethren, that he might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people."

This inexorable necessity is all that God announces. He took not the nature of angels, but he took the nature of man; and he did this because it "became him" and "behoved him." What

shall finite man say concerning this inscrutable mystery? Here is the Sovereign of the universe represented as becoming incarnate for the salvation of man, under the operation of some force, in his own adorable attributes—some moral obligation, indicated by such wondrous words as “it *became* God” to do so and so.

Secondly. As the doctrine of God’s tri-unity is a clearly revealed doctrine, yet one that cannot be reduced to mathematical accuracy of statement, and as the whole scheme of human redemption hangs upon its truth, so the doctrines relating to the Anointed Saviour’s threefold office-work, and his divine humanity in all, are woven into the texture of every part of this scheme. And he does not exercise the functions of these offices *separately*. He is Christ—Prophet, Priest, and King—when he instructs, when he intercedes, and when he reigns. And in bringing many royal sons unto glory, the Divine Captain must be made, for a little season, lower than the angels, because the redeemed seed have fallen temporarily into this subordination. The First-born—higher than the kings of the earth—voluntarily becomes like his brethren, the Prophet whom God promised in the days of Moses.

II. CHRIST, THE ANOINTED PRIEST.

The great atoning work of the Lord Jesus is the burden of evangelical preaching, and therefore his priestly office is magnified. According to Presbyterian standards, his prophetic work consisted in “his revealing to the Church in all ages, by his Spirit and Word, in divers ways of administration, the whole will of God, in all things concerning their edification and salvation.” All that the Church has learned since the day when the flaming sword was first unsheathed, to keep the way of the Tree of Life, has been learned by revelation, and Christ, the Anointed Revealer, executes this office while time endures. The Catechism more briefly expounds the second office. “Christ executeth the office of a priest, in his once offering himself a sacrifice without spot to God, to be a reconciliation for the sins of his people; and in making continual intercession for them.”

That wonderful book, the Epistle to the Hebrews, contains so

elaborate a treatise upon the office of this High Priest, that the short sentence from the Catechism appears more meagre by comparison. During the days of his personal ministry, he executed this office in divers ways. In the establishment of rites and ordinances, and notably in the institution of the Supper, the sacerdotal authority of the Lord is perhaps more prominently in view than either the prophetic or regal authority. And in support of this proposition, it may be noted that the anti-Christ or vice-Christ of all ages, have always usurped authority precisely in this direction. It is the priests of the apostasy that have uniformly cursed the Church and the earth. And keeping up the same ghastly caricature, the chief anti-Christ assumes regal powers also, dominating God's heritage *ex officio*; that is, being high priest, he is also king in the Church. In the midst of profaneness, as against God, and of usurpation, as against man, the Papist is still logical and consistent.

Because the priesthood of the Lord Jesus is preëminently a royal priesthood. He is made, by the oath of God, an eternal Priest, after the order of Melchisedec, king of Salem. And in the Psalm (cx.) where the announcement is made, his kingly authority is first clearly described: "Rule thou!" Also, in the prophecy of Zechariah vi. 13, the same order is observed: "He shall sit and rule upon his throne; and he shall be a priest upon his throne." The heathen rage, and the kingdoms set themselves against Jehovah's Anointed, being incited thereto precisely by the adversary, the key to whose antagonism is his hatred of the God-man, exalted in his triple majesty.

The Epistle to the Hebrews lays special stress upon the isolation of the priesthood of Melchisedec—no forerunner, no successor—and therefore Christ is called a priest after this order, because he hath an *unchangeable* priesthood; that is, a priesthood that does not pass from one to another. And the Church has been content throughout the ages with this blessed fact, because his "continuing ever" involves his ceaseless intercession for his people, and his ability to save "evermore all who come unto God by him."

But there is yet more of comfort to the saint in the great doc-

trine. It was not accidental that Jesus came of the tribe of Judah. He must needs come of that tribe, because it was the royal tribe. He must needs be of the lineage of David, because David was the first king whom God selected and appointed. It is true, he designated Saul, when the people clamored for a king; but David was the first king of God's choice, and the type, as king and prophet, of the true King anointed of God, to whom he said, "Thou art my Son," and whom he set upon the holy hill of Zion.

So, attempting once more the separate consideration of the threefold office, notice that the sacerdotal work of the Redeemer involved the necessity of royal dignity, because his redeemed people, albeit discrowned and captive, were still *kings*. The race which God made upright, was invested with dominion. And it lost both rectitude and dominion together. So when the Anointed Restorer finishes his work, leading the multitude of captives, rescued and saved, into the restored paradise, these redeemed sinners will have *crowns* to cast at his feet. The domination will be restored with the righteousness.

In the list of blessings furnished in the second and third chapters of the Revelation, the first promised to "him that overcometh," is access to the Tree of Life—the identical thing his progenitor lost in the fall. The flaming sword is sheathed, because One whose countenance is as the sun shining in his strength opens the way to the tree. And he is able to do this because he liveth and was dead; that is, because he is God-man, Mediator, and his name is Alpha and Omega. And the *last* thing promised in that list of beatitudes, is a seat upon the throne of this adorable Potentate.

The Priest who dies for a race with so exalted a destiny, must needs be a Royal Priest.

Going back again to the old history, look for a moment at the case of the supplanter Jacob. In an hour of dire extremity, One met him and wrestled with him. It was the Prince of the Lord's host, who met Joshua afterwards, and Manoah still later, always concealing his name, which was "Wonderful," yet always revealing himself as the proper object of their worship. The sup-

planter was on the eve of meeting his brother, from whom he had taken the birthright so many years before, by subtlety. In dread, not only for himself, but for the children that God had given him in the land of his long exile, one can imagine the horror that filled the mind of this man, in view of the coming of Esau. But there had been tokens of divine favor spread over all his life; and now, in that mysterious conflict, he exchanges his name for "Israel," an earnest of the inheritance reserved for those whom God makes princes and priests.

The Priest after the order of Melchisedec is, by interpretation, King of Righteousness and King of Peace. And his priesthood differs from the Aaronic priesthood, in that it was inherited from the royal tribe. He came not of Levi, but of Judah. And because he abideth ever, he hath an unchangeable priesthood; that is, one that passeth not from one to another. And in a sense that is not applicable to any other, he is Jehovah's Anointed Priest. "I have found David, and with my holy oil I have anointed him."

III. CHRIST, THE ANOINTED KING.

The Son of David inherits regal authority. It is his birthright. The sceptre could not depart from Judah until Shiloh came to assume it, and to him was the gathering of the people. God is the great King over the universe, and the Second Person of the Trinity was always and will always be King, because he was always and will always be divine. But he is King over his Church, because he is the Son of man. He executeth judgment also, because he is the Son of man. He shall call the dead from their graves, because he is the Son of man. And when Pilate asked, "Art thou a king?" he replied, "Thou sayest. To this end was I born, to bear witness to this truth."

His formal assumption of royalty is recorded in the four Gospels. In Matthew and Mark, the announcement that the "Son of David" is the inheritor of the kingdom, is recorded also.

The Bible is full of texts that refer directly to the kingship of the Redeemer; yet the children of men have fallen into two mistakes regarding this royal personage. First. They have usually

accepted the announcement of his rank as referring to the eternal reign in the coming ages. He was fulfilling the prophetic office during the days of his personal ministry; he was specially engaged in his priestly work when he bore the sins of his people on Calvary; and he shall specially assume the kingly office in the time of millennial glory. The second mistake is the connexion of these official relations which he sustains to his Church, with his divine nature specifically. He is the divine Prophet, as contradistinguished from Isaiah; the divine Priest, as differing from Aaron; and the divine King, in opposition to all the theories of human domination, and all examples of earthly authority. But the Scripture does not so teach. "A Prophet shall Jehovah raise up unto you from among your brethren, like unto me," said Moses. And he was able to fulfil the obligations of his office, *because* he was the Brother of those whom he instructed. He was a "merciful and faithful High Priest," *because* he was made in all points like unto his brethren, yet without sin. And in his exhortation to the Church of the Laodiceans, he says he attained his seat upon the throne by "overcoming," according with Paul's exhortation in the Hebrews, referring to "Jesus, who, for the joy that was set before him, endured the cross and despised the shame, and sat down on the right hand of God." And following the record in the Apocalypse, you find this Lamb, this Lion of the tribe of Judah, this root of David, starting forth on the white horse, crowned with a single crown, and armed with a bow, and returning (in the 19th chapter) mounted upon the same white horse, and crowned with many crowns, followed by armies, and bearing upon vesture and thigh the majestic titles, "King of kings and Lord of lords."

This Potentate is he who was born in Bethlehem of Judea, and who died without the gate, and who was laid in the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea.

Now what is the specific thing which this Anointed Redeemer does for the race of man?

He restores the royalty. He is King of kings, because his saints are kings. Do not speak contemptuously of the grand race that Christ redeemed! It is a race of kings, crowned by

God himself, and innately noble! Alas! the crown has been cast into the dust, and the ermine smirched in the mire of the horrible pit; but this Lion of Judah is able to restore crown and sceptre. He is not ashamed to call them brethren. The robes worn by the armies that follow him, are "white and clean," and their diadems, differing in glory, are still all glorious. And the man who once catches the sheen of that crown, his *own* crown, is the man who will shrink back with unspeakable horror forever from all that would degrade and defile. And the adversary veils his haughty crest when he encounters the saint who wears the golden circlet on his helmet of salvation, and *knows* that he wears that token of royalty.

There are two or three possible objections to be considered, in conclusion.

First. It may be asked, is man really the very culmination of God's creative power? Is it clear, from the teachings of Scripture and from fair logical deduction, that none of the heavenly bodies contain inhabitants nobler than our race? Is it certain that God never made and cannot make any creature more materially glorious than man?

The grand difficulty in the way of satisfactory answer to the first of these queries, is in our experience. We only know the race in its fallen condition; and to predicate symmetry of moral character and dominant royalty of a race of sinners, in the midst of deformity and in bondage to the devil, seems to contradict the plainest dictates of reason. It is true that God has promised to transform some of this race into kings and priests, and to give them an eternal inheritance in a future world. But this is the product of a *new* creation. And as eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived of these ineffable glories, the common judgment of the Church places them all among new creations, to which Adam was not the possible heir. The Bible does not very minutely describe the primal man; and perhaps the habit of modern thought is to rank him, not a little lower than the angels, but very far inferior to them, and not *very* different from the best types of his progeny.

Here, then, is the first point sought to be established in the

present discussion. Adam was the noblest of God's creatures—the last product of creative energy—the master-piece wherein all that was possible to creaturehood, in the way of glory and honor, was displayed.

For the Scripture proof of this proposition, there is, first, the declaration that God made Adam in his own image and likeness, in knowledge and holiness. This is not said of any other creature of his hand. And beyond this nothing more is *possible*. Let it be remembered that the moral law—of whose inherent perfection, as the sum of all conceivable obligation, nothing need be said in these pages—was the habitual element, so to speak, in which the man lived in his normal condition. It was the spontaneous *habit* of his life; because God had stamped this grand law upon the nature, which is something underlying the will, the affections, the thoughts, and the actions. And the breach of the covenant involved the violation of this glorious law, because the violation of the covenant was the most hideously unnatural thing so gifted a creature could do! The very groundwork of the doctrine of imputation is in this postulate. And the new creation of the gospel is confessedly the *renovation* of the temple in which God dwelt in Eden, but which is now defiled and defaced. He that is in Christ Jesus is a new creation, precisely because Christ Jesus is the second Adam, who restores the ruins of the first. It is nowhere held that God makes human nature over again. He restores the normal tendencies of all human attributes to *himself*; and the change from the evil proclivities of a race of sinners is so radical that it is called a new birth. The objection of Nicodemus, that a man could not be born a second time, physically, was a true objection. And if he were *literally* born again, spiritually, he would not be the old man saved, but a new man created.

The reality of the new birth does not depend upon a contrary hypothesis. The life inherited from the first Adam, dies under the penalty of his covenant. The life which the saint lives in the flesh, he lives by the faith of the Son of God, inherited from the second Adam in his covenant. In the one case, the saint inherited natural life, which was destructible, although capable of being transformed, or rather endowed with *everlastingness*. And

this was the kernel of the first covenant. In the other case, the saint inherits eternal life, because the surety of the second covenant is the Vine of which the saint is the branch. And this life was never destructible. "My sheep shall never perish, because I give unto them eternal life." And this is the kernel of the second covenant.

Now, if the creature fashioned by God on the sixth day of creation, was really made in God's own image, and made capable of everlasting duration, endowed with such regal attributes as enabled him to enter into *covenant* with God himself, and into a covenant which involved the countless millions of his progeny, it would appear probable that man was the lord of creation.

The second Scripture proof is in the fact that Christ assumed man's nature. "He taketh not hold on angels," says the apostle to the Hebrews; and the reason given is that "it *behoved* him." The force of this moral obligation is not all explained in the mere matter of human sympathy. It is a glorious and precious truth, that the sufferers of earth have a Saviour who was also a sufferer. But a far more vital doctrine is found in the announcement, "If any man *sin*, he hath an Advocate, Jesus Christ, who hath *not* sinned." And in all the revelation of God, there is no indication that any other race of creatures has such an advocate. And the same apostle asserts with startling emphasis, "If Christ died for all, then all died." And no such announcement is found in Scripture, addressed to any other race. He is made unto man, propitiation, righteousness, redemption; and none of these blessings are offered to any other creatures.

Now, this exalted Personage is man, very man. And God Almighty introduces him to the universe as man, claiming for him universal homage. "And when he bringeth his First-begotten into the world, he saith, Let all the angels of God worship him." There was no need to command the angels to worship the second Person of the adorable Trinity. But here was presented the wonderful God-man, Mediator; and doubtless the angelic host learned the true status of the fallen race, *first*, when the mystery of the Incarnation was revealed to them.

Therefore, the second Scripture proof is indicated. The God-

man will always wear this nature, and be worshipped by all creatures throughout eternity. It is not credible that any intelligencies will be found in the universe, endowed by God with a nobler nature than that which occupies the throne.

The possibility that highly exalted races of creatures inhabit other worlds, cannot grow into anything beyond possibility, in the present state of human knowledge. Recent astronomical investigations have apparently settled the question, so far as the planetary system to which the earth belongs is concerned. If one will patiently ponder the question, he will find there are but few attainments in material development which humanity might reasonably desire, after all. The angels that excel in strength are not ubiquitous; they are not omniscient; but they can pass with incredible swiftness from point to point, and they can pass material obstacles, as in the case of the angel who liberated Peter. He entered the prison, broke the bonds from the arms of the apostle, led him to the outer gate of the prison, and here the barrier which had not prevented the ingress of the angel, had to be opened to allow the egress of the man. But this power over matter will be one element of the restored royalty which comes with the resurrection body. The Saviour who, previously to his death and resurrection, had never passed through such obstacles, appeared in the midst of his disciples, *the doors being shut*. And this was probably a less manifestation of divine power than any one of his former miracles. But it might well have been an illustration and example of the restored *human* power, which the surety of the covenant won back for the royal seed. It will be remembered that this same risen body of the Lord partook of actual food on this occasion, as recorded in the last chapter of Luke's Gospel, and *emphatically* insisted upon by Peter in Acts x. 41. Here is one of the things that angels can *do*, then, and which man cannot do. Wait until man gets his resurrection body.

In the matter of swift locomotion, in which the angels excel, there is a hint given in the Acts, viii. 39, 40. Philip, preaching to the eunuch, between Jerusalem and Gaza, suddenly disappears and is found at Azotus. The clear teaching of the passage seems

to be that there was a swift transportation, by "the Spirit of the Lord," of the body of Philip, from one point to the other. He was "caught away." Another hint is in Paul's mysterious reference in 2d Corinthians xii. 2-4, to his revelation, when he was "caught up" to the third heavens. The word ἀρπάζω is the same in both Scriptures.

Here, then, are the illustrations of the *possibilities* in the case. Even in his lapsed condition, man is now able to converse with his brother at the antipodes, annihilating the *immaterials*, time and space, by the employment of material agency. And perhaps Lord Lytton, who has always leaned towards mystical theories, and always attempted the analysis of occult psychological phenomena, may have written a parable and prophecy of human attainment, in "The Coming Race." The book is full of keen satire, and the most attractive part of it is the trenchant ridicule of popular modern maxims; but, underlying much that is frivolous and fanciful, there is the deep-seated conviction that a time is coming when the royal race will dominate the earth. The dream of the "Vril-staff" will one day give place to the reality of august dignity and resistless power manifest in the Lord of creation, animate and inanimate. It is proper to say here, that Tyndall's lately announced postulate, concerning the potency of matter, (like all other famous errors,) has necessarily this thread of truth in the warp of false theories. The electric force, an acknowledged entity in all systems of dynamics—a material entity—set over against those impalpable nonentities that have mocked and baffled human powers since the creation. Time and space! The plaintive lay of the Psalmist, "O that I had wings like a dove!" has the beginning, the earnest, the prophecy of God's response in the later attainments of human science. And when God shall fully restore the lost sceptre, do you think the prince of the power of the air, then dethroned and subdued, will yield up a *superior* sceptre?

There is one other question, suggested perhaps by the reference once and again to the apparent *necessity* for the redemption of a race so highly endowed. And the central doctrine of all evangelical creeds is the readiest answer. Salvation is all of grace. The

grace is free and sovereign. God hath mercy, and therefore any are saved; God hath distinguishing mercy, and therefore individual men are saved. And nothing in the previous character or the possible future attainments of the saint has the slightest influence in attracting God's favor. This cardinal doctrine is logically necessary to any scheme of redemption, even if it had not been announced in unmistakeable terms in Holy Writ. For the whole argument of Paul is summed up in the proposition, "otherwise, grace is no more grace." Nothing in the character of the man made salvation obligatory upon his Maker.

It is not possible to find out the Almighty by searching. Mercy was an attribute of God before there were any creatures, and God manifests this mercy to man for his own glory. And in creating man, he formed the being who would most accurately illustrate this glorious attribute, as the subject and object of it. And if God made man for a brief season (how brief, compared with the unmeasured enduring of eternity!) lower than the angels, he will also crown him with glory and honor, and will put *all* things under him. For in that he hath put all things under him, he left nothing that was not put under him. O Jehovah, our King, how glorious is thy name in all the earth!

God always preserves analogies and antitheses. As the federal Head of the race was royal, the federal Head of the redeemed race is royal. The Saviour quoted this same sixth Psalm when the children cried out, "Hosanna to the Son of David!" As Prophet, his most eminent type was the royal Solomon, the wisest teacher of the sons of men; as Priest, his type was the King of Salem; as King, his type was David, the most absolute of all earthly potentates. There is not another case on record, in sacred or profane annals, where three warriors broke through a host of enemies, merely to gratify a transient desire of their monarch for a draught of water.

Will it be said that too much is made herein of a race of sinners? Or that the presentation of this family of sinners to men and angels, as innately noble, is to make a light thing of sin? Or that this view of redemption would seem to excuse the en-

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trance of sin in the world, because the glory of God is magnified in the salvation of so exalted a wrong-doer?

Alas! the shame is in the fact that it is ermine that is polluted. The royal law was originally written upon the royal nature. Oh, the shame, that man should fail in perfect conformity to it! Oh, the scandal, that man should be a transgressor! And oh, the glory and honor and praise due to him that sitteth upon the throne, and to the Lamb forever, for the redemption of the royal seed!

ARTICLE IV.

THEISM.

Three Essays on Religion. By JOHN STUART MILL. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1874.

It may appear to some a useless task, either to write or to read anything more concerning the argument for the existence of God. But many urge the claim made by Mill in the volume, the title of which is given above: "It is indispensable that the subject of religion should from time to time be reviewed as a strictly scientific question, and that its evidences should be tested by the same scientific methods, and on the same principles, as those of any speculative conclusions drawn by physical science." Since some men will thus discuss the subject of religion, with a view to its overthrow, others must do it with a view to its maintenance. Even apart from the transcendent practical importance of the questions involved, their truth should be ascertained for the truth's sake. It can never be wholly superfluous to expose a sophism, or to indicate the conditions on which truth of any sort must be determined. Much more is inquiry demanded, when the erroneous conclusions, reached either from false premises or by bad logic, affect man's dearest interests, and result in grievous detriment to him in every department of thought and in every sphere

of life. When so distinguished a thinker and writer as the late John Stuart Mill announces in a paper which is presented as the result of long and patient inquiry, "that the First-Cause argument is in itself of no value for the establishment of Theism;"* when he assigns a similar value to all the other arguments which have been relied on to sustain the truths embodied in that word, except the argument drawn from the marks of design in nature; and when of this he says: "I think it must be allowed that in the present state of our knowledge, the adaptations in Nature afford a large balance of probability in favor of creation by intelligence. It is equally certain that this is no more than a probability, and that the various other arguments of Natural Theology which we have considered, add nothing to its force"†—surely it cannot be superflous to point out, if it be possible, the fallacy by which conclusions so threatening are reached.

Doubtless many of his readers have been surprised that Mr. Mill has gone no further, and that he has not attempted to sweep away the whole fabric of Theism, without leaving room for a surmise that there is even a probable God, with limited powers. Some of his reviewers are inclined to censure him for not making a complete end of the teleological as of all the other theistic arguments. Of course the men who admired him while living, have not failed to praise these posthumous publications; but by some, the *eulogiums* of the essay on Theism are presented with considerable qualifications. The *modicum* of scientific basis left by him for religious belief, these men would have entirely swept away. Consequently, our author is charged with exhibiting in this part of his discussion certain "philosophical infirmities," which are ascribed "to the unconscious despotism of personal predilections, to the tyranny of transcendental sentiment, to the shuddering recoil at the presence of the world's misery, and the amiable desire to deal tenderly with the fair humanities of religious faith."‡ Many will be surprised to learn that Mr. Mill was guilty of such weaknesses, or subject to such despotism. Whatever may have been the reason, it is evident that he has not

* *Essays on Religion*, p. 153.

† *Ibid.*, p. 174.

‡ *Westminster Review*, January, 1875, p. 2.

gone far enough in the atheistic direction to satisfy the more ultra of that school of thought to which he belonged. These will not be content until $\delta \zeta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\varsigma \tau\omicron\upsilon \sigma\kappa\acute{o}\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \epsilon\iota\varsigma \alpha\iota\omega\upsilon\alpha$ is reached. While, therefore, his fellow-schoolmen are busy in their attempts to break down the admitted force of the teleological argument, they cease not to celebrate the praises of his discussion of nature, his utter rout of superstition, and his ability to discern, while not denying, the many beauties and glories of nature, "her innumerable imperfections, her circuitous mode of attaining her alleged purposes, her contrivances without object, her monstrous and suicidal fecundity, her terrific machinery of destruction, her savage cruelty, and the inexorable necessity of laws 'which have neither morals nor heart.' " *

The essay entitled "Theism" is the last, and by far the longest, of the three which appear in the volume named above. In regard to it, the editor says that it was produced at a much later period than the other two, entitled, respectively, "Nature" and "Utility of Religion;" and that it "has both greater value, and less, than any other of the author's works, . . . it shows the latest state of the author's mind, the carefully balanced result of the deliberations of a life-time. On the other hand, there had not been time for it to undergo the revision to which, from time to time, he subjected most of his writings, before making them public." † This essay is divided into five parts. The first consists of an introduction, followed by some general remarks on Theism, indicating the state of the question, the author's view of the conditions under which, and the methods by which, it is to be determined. Then follows a criticism of the "Argument for a First Cause;" that based on the "General Consent of Mankind;" that drawn from "Consciousness," and the "Marks of Design." The remaining parts are taken up with the questions of God's attributes, immortality of the soul, and revelation, followed by a summing up, which presents the results of the discussion.

It is proposed in this article to confine attention to this essay, and to examine only so much of it as pertains to the "Argument

Westminster Review, January, 1875, p. 2.

† Preface, p. x.

for a First Cause," and that based on the "Marks of Design," with the following specific objects in view, viz., to show—

1st. That Mr. Mill's attack upon the Argument for a First Cause fails.

2d. That this argument, in so far as it is designed to prove the existence of some eternal uncaused (or self-caused) being, is a good one.

3d. That the world, as known to us, does bear witness to a God, as its intelligent cause.

It must be borne in mind that Mr. Mill uses the word *Theism* as synonymous with *Monotheism*, and by it expresses the idea of God which represents him as an intelligent personal agent, the eternal, omnipotent, and omniscient Creator and Preserver of the universe. By the expression, "Argument for a First Cause," he means the argument by which an eternal self-caused being is proved to exist, and to be the cause of all things, from the fact that something now is which was caused. To this argument he assigns no force whatever as a theistic argument. His statement of it is not in the usual form, and is obnoxious to a serious objection. It leaves open a wide door for the introduction of sophistry, arising from a double use of terms. It will appear, during the course of this review, it is hoped, that our author has not escaped this error.

The fact that he has entirely failed to note the cumulative effects of the several arguments employed to establish Theism, must also be signalised. Mr. Mill is the more to be criticised on this account, because he belongs to that school of philosophy which pretends to found all rational conclusions, in the last analysis, on the cumulative evidences afforded by observation and experiment. He was the last man in England, therefore, who could be excused for such an omission. He says, indeed, that the argument for a first cause adds no force to that based on the evidence afforded by design; but when examining the question as to the character of eternal force, he is careful to rule out, or to remand to another part of the discussion, the bearing of "contrivance" on this subject. But it was precisely at this point that it should have been introduced; for it is evident that the

ontological and the teleological arguments may sustain a supplementary relation to each other. If by the former, some eternal being can be proved to exist; if by the latter, a wise and powerful *Artifex mundi* is presented; and if, moreover, these two can be identified, then the theistic position is impreguably established. It may be assumed by unbelievers, that these conclusions cannot be reached. It was at least incumbent on Mr. Mill, in so elaborate a discussion, to consider the relation between these two lines of proof. An additional reason for such a course is found in the admission by our author, that if the doctrine of the conservation of force be true, (and the converging evidences of all branches of physical science, he says, tend to prove it,) there is an uncaused force which may be regarded as the First Cause, in the sense that it enters as the "primeval and universal element in all causes."* Had he instituted the proposed inquiry, he might have discovered that the converging evidences of the two lines of argument tend to prove that this eternal force is mind.

We now proceed to a more detailed examination of the essay.

The argument for a First Cause is thus stated: "Everything that we know had a cause, and owed its existence to that cause. How, then, can it be but that the world, which is but a name for the aggregate of all we know, has a cause to which it is indebted for its existence?"† The attack is directed against the major premiss of this argument. Our author says, the fact of experience, "when correctly expressed, turns out to be, not that everything which we know derives its existence from a cause, but only every event or change. There is in Nature a permanent element, and also a changeable; the changes are always the effects of previous changes; the permanent existences, so far as we know, are not effects at all."‡ It is a little remarkable that no proof is presented for these assertions; the more so, because the distinction (an all-important one) between that which in nature is permanent and that which is changeable so confidently asserted here, where it is needed, is made at a subsequent point in the discussion, to depend on the results of physical inquiry, which have as yet not been certainly determined.|| Now, there is such a distinction or

* Essay, p. 145.

† p. 142.

‡ *Ibid.*

|| See pp. 144, 145.

there is not. If not, then the attack fails, badly stated as the argument is. The fact of experience, so far as it teaches anything on this subject, assures us that *all* we know had a cause, and consequently that the world had a cause. As to the nature of that cause, whether it be a first cause, itself uncaused, or self-caused; or one in an infinite series of causes, this question must be determined by further inquiry. If, on the other supposition, there be a permanent, an eternal element in nature, then the question recurs, whether or not this may not be the God searched for. It is but fair to say that Mr. Mill discusses this latter question, as we shall see. Meantime, having postulated the distinction, he concludes that "causation cannot be legitimately extended to the material universe itself, but only to its changeable phenomena; of these, indeed, causes may be affirmed without any exception. But what causes? The cause of every change is a prior change; and such it cannot but be; for if there were no new antecedent, there would not be a new consequent." Hence it is concluded, that "the very essence of causation, as it exists within the limits of our knowledge, is incompatible with a First Cause."*

An attempt will be made in the course of this article to disprove these assertions out of Mr. Mill's own mouth. Meantime, it is obvious that if they be true, it is useless to attempt any criticism of an argument for a First Cause. Such an argument bears *prima facie* evidence of absurdity. It is equally obvious that these assertions contain a bald *petitio principii*; for the question in debate is, whether we are not compelled by the law of causation, as apprehended by the mind, to postulate a cause which is not a prior change; in other words, a First Cause? It is necessary, therefore, Mr. Mill himself asserts, "to look more particularly into the matter, and analyse more closely the nature of the causes of which mankind have experience."†

The result of this analysis is given, and claims particular attention. "Whenever a physical phenomenon is traced to its cause, that cause, when analysed, is found to be a certain *quantum* of force combined with certain collocations."‡ There are

* p. 143, 144.

† p. 144.

‡ p. 145.

two ways in which this expression may be understood. Force may exist apart from the objects which form the collocations. In this event, the cause would be a combination, the nature and origin of which could only be determined by a further analysis. Or force itself might arise from the collocation of objects, and then the cause of the phenomenon must be sought in the nature and origin of the collocation. In either case, the definition given is not the result of a *last* analysis; it is not necessary that the cause should be a "prior change;" nor is this expression exhaustive of the notion of cause as understood by mankind. In his "System of Logic," Mr. Mill defines the cause of a phenomenon "to be the antecedent, or the concurrence of antecedents, on which it is invariably and *unconditionally* consequent."* In other words, the cause of an effect is that assemblage of antecedents which *secures* the effect; for, as he admits, invariable sequence is not synonymous with causation, as, for example, day and night. The reason is, that one might have existed and the other not have followed. Day is not unconditionally consequent to night; it is conditioned on the presence of other antecedents which are positive, and not merely negative in their relation to the sequence. The cause of a phenomenon, therefore, is that assemblage of positive conditions on which it necessarily depends, which secures its existence.

Again, it is admitted that "there exist in nature a number of permanent causes, which have subsisted ever since the human race has been in existence, and for an indefinite and probably an enormous length of time previous. The sun, earth, and planets, with their various constituents, air, water, and other distinguishable substances, whether simple or compound, of which nature is made up, are such permanent causes."† In tracing phenomena to their source, "we reach," he says, "as the ultimate step attainable by us, either the properties of some one primeval cause, or the conjunction of several. The whole of the phenomena of nature were therefore the necessary, or, in other words, the unconditional consequences of some former collocation of the permanent causes."‡

* Harper's edition, 1874, p. 245; italics his. † *Ibid.*, p. 249. ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 250.

It is evident that the results presented in the "System of Logic" are very different from those exhibited in the essay on "Theism." In the latter, the permanent element in nature, if it exist at all, is not a *vera causa*; it only enters as a con-cause into all causation. In the former, every phenomenon is traced either to one primeval cause, with its properties, or to a combination of several. These primeval causes are not necessarily *prior* changes, or even changes at all. They are not known to us as beginning to exist, and they are causes in the sense that they constitute the conditions upon which all phenomena necessarily depend. They are not phenomenal, they are efficient causes; they are not merely con-causes, they are *verae causae*, because they form the assemblage of antecedents, upon which all effects are unconditionally consequent. Moreover, while the sun, earth, and other objects and "periodical cycles of events," are enumerated as among these permanent causes, it is not pretended that an exhaustive catalogue is given, nor that these may not be referred to others. To pretend this, would be to beg the question; for it may turn out that these apparently permanent causes are only relatively so, and in fact are themselves phenomenal, and to be referred to others, which are the real permanent causes.

It is therefore of the first importance, in the theistic controversy, to ascertain the nature of these permanent causes, and their mutual relations. Now, there are two things which at once present their claims for consideration, as being primeval causes. These are matter and force. These constitute, so far as we know, that assemblage of conditions upon which the universe, as known to us, unconditionally depends. What, then, is force; what is matter? Are they different manifestations of the same thing? Are they convertible terms? Is force a property of matter, or matter a mode in which force exists? If they belong to different categories, then we must inquire whether force be of one sort only; or whether there be several kinds of force. Our attention may be confined to these, because all that we know may be referred to them.

So far, we have proceeded upon Mr. Mill's own principles, and found his own results inconsistent with them. But all his prin-

ciples in this argument may not be admitted. It is not true that the necessary belief of a cause for every effect is a dictate of "experience;" it is a necessary law of the reason, *a priori*, to experience, and it alone makes intelligible experience possible. It is not true that this law of the reason is limited to the demand for an antecedent for every *change*, or that changes are the only effects demanding cause. The true extent of the law of the reason is, "*ex nihilo nihil*." Blank nothing can no more be the efficient of real being than of phenomenal change. Nor is it true that the antecedent cause must also be a change (whence Mr. Mill infers that the ontological argument can never prove a God, a changeless First Cause). It is the easiest thing in the world to mention instances refuting this assumption. The sun is a permanent body, and its attraction of gravitation upon its planets is not a change, but a property absolutely stable and changeless; yet it is perpetually causing in them the effects of orbital motion.

Let Mr. Mill, however, define every effect as a change, and limit the *a priori* belief in cause to this; he cannot thus evade the argument for a First Cause. For if the permanent being of a given thing, in time, as, *e. g.*, the sun, is not an effect, *i. e.*, a change, yet *the beginning of that being would certainly be a change*. As such, it would be, on Mr. Mill's principles, an effect, and would demand a cause. He must face, then, this *dilemma*. If that being ever began, there was a cause out of itself for its beginning. If it never began, it is absolutely eternal, and so self-caused, and a First Cause. So that Mr. Mill must either accept our theistic argument, or the absolute eternity of the whole universe. But as to the latter, does he not know the irresistible argument by which all philosophers of all schools have concurred in exploding the absurdity of an eternally independent series of beings and changes, yet dependent in each and every part? Will he be guilty of the sophism of making an aggregate of dependent beings and changes, all severally dependent, as a whole absolutely independent? Or will he fly to the only other anti-theistic resort, Pantheism, and seek to identify all the opposites in the universe, thus making thought itself impossible by obliterating the essential condition thereof, the distinction of subject and ob-

ject? He who has not considered this result, has but a sorry title to write a book upon natural theology.

But to return: It should be observed that the inquiries suggested as to force and matter are important in the theistic argument, because of the absolute eternity of both of these things, unless it should appear that one was the cause of the other, or both effects of a still earlier cause. On this point the law of causation admits of but one conclusion. Mr. Mill asserts in his "System of Logic," that the universality of causation "consists in this, that every consequent is connected in this manner (*i. e.* invariably) with some particular antecedent or set of antecedents. Let the fact be what it may, if it has begun to exist, it was preceded by some fact or facts with which it is invariably connected."* From this it is clear, that if there were no antecedent, there would be no consequent. But since we know that there are consequents, we know also that there has always been something to constitute an antecedent. This is the statement of the argument for a First Cause in the usual way, and in a manner free from the objections which lie against it as presented in the essay under review. Taking the law of causation as a major premiss, we infer from the facts of experience that there is some eternal being. There is no occasion, in this connexion, to discuss the question of the origin of this law as it is held by the mind. We are not called upon to vindicate the position of those who, with Mr. Mill, base this law on the objective facts of experience, nor to reconcile their inconsistencies and bad logic. The law itself is assumed because recognised as valid by all sides in the theistic controversy. Indeed all logical reasoning depends upon it. The doctrine of conservation, as all other doctrine, is a "night-mare of ill-digested thought" without it. As Mr. Mill admits, this law is the "source from which the canons of the Inductive Logic derive their validity."* It resembles "the truths of geometry in their most remarkable peculiarity, that of never being in any instance whatever defeated or suspended."†

From this law of causation and the facts of experience, we infer

* P. 237, *Logic*.

† *Ibid*, 235.

with certainty that there is a permanent and eternal element in nature, which Mr. Mill first postulates and then presents as contingent on the result of physical inquiry which has not been fully determined. The argument may be stated as follows: Something now is (a consequent); something has therefore always been; for if there had ever been a time when there was nothing to constitute an antecedent, there could never have been a consequent. Hence there is some eternal uncaused or self-caused being—uncaused in the sense of having nothing prior to itself; self-caused in the sense that it is itself the assemblage of conditions on which it necessarily depends for its own existence. The something that we know, when phenomena are traced to their efficient causes, is matter and force. Possibly these can be unified. If so, the result constitutes the First Cause. If not, then together these two primeval elements, which make up the assemblage of conditions on which the universe, as known to us, necessarily depends, point us back imperatively to something which is the cause of them, and so is the First Cause of the universe. In either case, the establishing of an eternal being (or beings) as the *vera causa* of the universe, is an important step in the direction of Theism. The First Cause argument is so far sound, and when fairly stated, is impregnable to attack.

Let us advance to the third and last position. It is just at this point, as no one more clearly saw than Mr. Mill, that the stress of the argument is felt. This permanent element, this unconditioned being, this eternal and self-subsisting matter, or force, or the cause of these, may or may not be an unique and personal being.

In his examination of the argument—as old as Plato—by which mind is proved to be the only force, or the only cause of force, our author denies the fundamental assumption of that argument, that matter is passive, and that consequently only mind is capable of originating change. “Granting,” he says, “that it (*i. e.*, mind,) originates motion, it has no means of doing so but by converting into that particular manifestation a portion of force which already existed in other forms.”* Mind, therefore, he argues,

* Essay, p. 147.

does not create force, it only uses force. Hence, mind does not answer to the idea of a First Cause, since force must be assumed as either prior to it, or coëternal with it. Nor does mind, he adds, possess the exclusive privilege of originating motion. "Whatever volition can do, in the way of creating motion out of other forms of force, and generally of evolving force from a latent into a visible state, can be done by many other causes. Chemical action, for instance, electricity, heat, the mere presence of a gravitating body : all these are causes of mechanical motion on a far larger scale than any volitions which experience presents to us ; and in most of the effects thus produced, the motion given by one body to another is not, as in the ordinary cases of mechanical action, motion that has first been given to that other by some third body. The phenomenon is not a mere passing on of mechanical motion, but a creation of it out of a force previously latent or manifesting itself in some other form. Volition, therefore, regarded as an agent in the material universe, has no exclusive privilege of origination ; all that it can originate is also originated by other transforming agents."*

There is an attempt also to meet the argument presented by the existence of mind. Since there are finite minds, must there not be, it is argued, something permanent in mind as in matter or force : in a word, an eternal mind ? To this Mr. Mill replies, "that nothing can consciously produce mind but mind, is self-evident, being involved in the meaning of the words ; but that there cannot be unconscious production must not be assumed, for it is the very point to be proved. Apart from experience, and arguing on what is called reason, that is, on supposed self-evidence, the notion seems to be that no causes can give rise to products of a more precious or elevated kind than themselves. But this is at variance with the known analogies of nature. How vastly nobler and more precious, for instance, are the higher vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of which and by the properties of which they are raised up."†

The two last quotations are given at length, because they pre-

* P. 148.

† P. 162.

sent the essential points in the theistic controversy. The questions to be determined are—

First. Do causes give rise to products more elevated and precious than themselves?

Second. Has mind the exclusive privilege of originating change?

In considering these questions, it must be understood that the word *cause* is used to express not merely a prior change, or the immediate apparent antecedent of any phenomenon, but that assemblage of conditions containing efficient power upon which the effect necessarily depends, and which *produces* the result. In the former sense, that of "prior change," it may be true that mind has not the exclusive privilege of causing phenomena. Electricity, heat, gravitation, can cause motion and produce changes. These forces may, for all the purposes of this argument, be regarded as efficient physical causes. There are also effects which apparently rise higher than those antecedents upon which they are immediately consequent. We have been careful in the discussion of the senses in which the word *cause* is used, to define that one which alone presents the idea to the mind of a *vera causa*. In this true sense of the word, of the two questions above stated, the first must be answered negatively, the second affirmatively.

As to the first. If it be true that the effect in any case rises higher than the cause, then the law of causation ceases to be rigorously and universally true. If, for example, there be any thing in the oak which was not in the acorn, its environment and the forces of vegetable life which controlled its growth, in other words, in the assemblage of conditions on which the oak necessarily depends, then the law of causation is a dream of the fancy, having no reality whatever. We do not need, in order to secure this position, the observations of the learned Pasteur, confirmed by the French Academy of Science, that the assumption of a *generatio spontanea* or *aequivoca* must be considered as scientifically disproved. If there be anything in the effect that was not in the cause, then the consequent is not *unconditionally* dependent on the antecedent, and every canon of inductive logic, as of

all logic, indeed every process of reasoning is unfounded, and the whole fabric built on the uniformities of nature crumbles into a shapeless mass of ruins. If the wildest dreams of the Darwinians be sober verities, and all the corollaries of their theory be established truths, then, in the primordial germ or germs, and in the developing force or forces, whether inhering in that germ or extraneous to it, were the power and potency of all the subsequent development. The Theist, the Deist, the Pantheist, and the Atheist, are here agreed. None but the victim of Pyrrhonic doubt can deny it, and he must postulate it in order to establish his scepticism.

If mind, therefore, be a product of matter, it belongs not to a different and higher category. It is matter. If it be not matter, (or physical force,) if mind belong to a nobler sphere, then we must look for its cause in something like itself. When Mr. Mill endeavors to impugn the self-evident truth that the effect cannot contain more than was in the cause, by pointing us to a splendid vegetable growth from putrid mould, he is but quibbling upon the word "more." Let the instance be, if he pleases, the most beautiful rose-tree. The assemblage of conditions, which he would call the cause of this tree, must include at least its seed, or other germ, containing vegetable vitality, all the nutriments, gaseous, liquid, and solid, and the caloric, luminous, electrical, and other influences which caused its growth and flowering. As soon as this statement is made, we see that there *is nothing*, literally nothing, in the effect which was not in the (complex) cause. The vegetable vitality was there; every molecule of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, oxygen, and alkaline earth in the rose tree, was there before; all that is new in the effect is a *mode of organisation*; the molecules are now so arranged as to present a different shape, colour, and fragrance, under the influence of the preëxisting vegetable life, from those presented by them when in the form of water, carbonic acid gas, and mould. But *is mind only a mode of organisation of molecules of matter?* Had Mr. Mill claimed this, his illustration might have been consistent. But to say this is to assume all the absurdities of materialism. If

mind is spiritual substance, distinct from matter, as our consciousness assures us, then only mind can produce mind.

At present this is the only tenable hypothesis. The Darwinian theory is as yet a theory. Its bearing, if true, on the argument, will be considered below. At present it is enough to say that matter is not self-conscious; mind is. This is the radical difference between them, as presented by the facts in the case; a difference manifesting itself further in the total want of similarity between the attributes of mind and those of matter. This truth, which is a dictum of consciousness, arising from the antithesis of subject and object, is confirmed in the results given by the teleological argument. Mind is not, and so far as we know, cannot be, the production of matter or physical force. There must therefore be a cause for finite mind; there must be a permanent element in mind corresponding with the permanent element in matter or force, unless, indeed, it should be found that mind is the permanent element in both.

This brings us to the second question: Has mind the exclusive privilege of originating change? The all-important question here is, What, within the sphere of our knowledge, is essential to the production of phenomena? Mr. Mill admits that every phenomenon is caused by a collocation or assemblage of conditions; in other words, by a combination of force with force, or of forces in mutual adjustment. This is true as to physical causes and the consequent phenomena. The last result of every inquiry into physical cause is not a force, nor a mere assemblage of several forces, but of forces having a definite relation to each other. This definite relation is the principle of adjustment, the adaptation of means for the accomplishment of purpose. This fact, signalled by the Duke of Argyll in his "Reign of Law," is the ultimate fact of all discovery. It is force so combined with force as to produce definite and orderly results. The forces which determine the harmonious effects of the planetary system are at once the grandest and the simplest illustration of this truth. Gravitation is a force which apparently prevails through all space. "But it does not prevail alone. It is a force whose function it is to balance other forces, of which we know nothing, ex-

cept this—that these, again, are needed to balance the force of gravitation. Each force, if left to itself, would be destructive of the universe. . . . The orbits, therefore, of the planets, with all that depends upon them, are determined by the nice and perfect balance which is maintained between these two forces, and the ultimate fact of astronomical science is not the law of gravitation, but the adjustment between this law and others which are less known, so as to produce and maintain the existing solar system.”*

These remarks apply equally to every phenomenon of which we have any knowledge. Hence the fact that there are phenomena, involves the necessity for a mind to originate these adjustments or combinations of forces which produce them. It is evident that we have now passed from the domain of the ontological into that of the teleological argument. These are not rival lines of proof, they are supplementary. The mere fact that something is, warrants the inference under the law of causation, that something always has been. As soon as advance is made beyond “being” pure and simple; as soon as a kosmos is postulated; as soon as the existence of phenomena is admitted, then the nature of that kosmos, and the modes by which phenomena as known to us are produced, enter at once into the premises, and are to be considered in their bearing on the theistic conclusion. It will not do to separate the ontological from the teleological argument, nor to weigh each by itself, and then fail to combine the results. It is admitted that every phenomenon is produced by an adjustment of forces. Does this adjustment certainly indicate purpose? If so, then the conclusion is inevitable that mind is the author of the adjustment and the cause of the phenomenon. The validity and force of the teleological argument must therefore be ascertained. Mr. Mill, while he admits its validity, is inclined somewhat to depreciate its force. An elaborate attempt has been made in a recent number of the *Westminster Review* to overthrow it altogether.

This argument falls under that division of inductive arguments

* *Reign of Law*, pp. 91, 92.

which is designated by Mr. Mill as the *method of agreement*. There is, for example, a resemblance between all the parts of the eye and the collocations which produce sight, in this one particular, viz., that they all conduce to secure vision. This is the sole point of agreement between them. The question is, "What brought these heterogeneous elements together, having this single point of resemblance? The instances are sufficiently numerous to eliminate chance. It is not a fortuitous concurrence. Moreover, sight is subsequent and not precedent to the structure; it cannot be, therefore, the efficient cause of the structure; it is presented only as the final cause. It would seem, then, to be certain that whatever be the physical cause of the eye, the efficient cause is an antecedent idea of vision, which the structure of the eye was designed to realise. This involves the necessity for an intelligent will, to whom the idea belonged, and who had wisdom and power sufficient to produce a contrivance by which the idea was realised.

The application of this argument in the theistic controversy has so often been signalised, that it is not necessary to dwell on it. Its force can be broken, if at all, in but two ways: First, by showing that there is no analogy between the works of man and the works of nature. Consequently, while we are warranted in inferring mind from human contrivances, we would not be warranted to do so from the apparent evidences of design in nature. Secondly, by proving that the idea, as for example, of sight, is not precedent but subsequent to the structure that produced it, in which event the structure would be the efficient cause of the idea, not the idea of the structure.

In regard to the first, it is argued that adaptation and utility are not sufficient to prove design in any case. So far as man's workmanship is concerned, it is asserted that we infer design, not because we observe that there is adaptation of means to ends, but because we see the marks of human handicraft. We do not, it is said, hesitate to refer a fragment of a watch to a human being as its maker, although adaptation and usefulness are wholly wanting, because we see on the fragment the marks of man's work. If these latter were wanting, the mind would not refer

the structure to a human being. Now, it is in this respect that it is objected that the analogy between man's and nature's work fails. In the latter, although there are adaptations analogous to those observed in man's work, yet there are no marks of God's handicraft, and therefore we are not warranted in referring the world to him.

The reply to this is, that the marks of human workmanship alone are not sufficient to prove a designing mind. These by themselves only prove that the workman is a human being. If there were no obvious adaptation of means to secure an object, there could be no inference of mind, except where, as in the case of a fragment of a watch, the analogy to useful works, in other respects, is immediately and clearly seen. Scratches made by a lunatic's hand, exhibit marks of human workmanship. These marks prove that the scratches were made by a human being, but they by no means prove a designing mind. The scratches must exhibit the fact that they were made for the accomplishment of purpose, before this latter inference can be drawn from them. It is notorious that just in proportion as there is skilful adaptation between the means employed and the end attained, is power of mind inferred. So far from it being true, that the marks of human handicraft alone are adequate to prove a designing mind, they are wholly inadequate, unless there be also the indication of adaptation and usefulness in the means employed to secure the results which are accomplished. The inference of mind proceeds solely from this indication, an inference made necessary by the law of causation. There is, therefore, a strict analogy in this regard between human contrivances and the works of nature. In both we have an inductive argument from effect to cause. The induction in both instances depends for its validity on the law of causation. The particular form of the structure, its size, beauty, peculiar marks, usefulness, are employed to indicate the character, the wisdom, and the power of the maker. If, in any case, there be a manifest adaptation or adjustment of parts to secure a result, design is proved. It is not necessary to show that it is the best possible or the only one. A glass may be so arranged, that by a combination with sand and the force of gravity, the

flight of time may be marked. The fact that a chronometer is a better time-keeper, in no way invalidates the conclusion that the hour-glass is the work of a designing mind. Digestion is a contrivance by which the tissues of the body are renovated. The fact that the tissues might have been otherwise and in a better way renovated, does not prove that digestion did not have an intelligent cause.

Again, ignorance on our part of the true nature of the function performed by a structure, does not invalidate the argument from design, if it appear that some end is attained. Thus we know that the lungs perform a function in the maintenance of human life; for if they be wholly wanting, such life cannot exist. We may not be able to define with accuracy what this function is, nor to point out the immediate end this organ is designed to attain. This inability does not invalidate the conclusion that the lungs had an intelligent cause; for it is evident that they are contrived, with other organs, to realise the idea of human life.

The same remark is applicable to the notion of usefulness, as affording evidence of design. If by utility we mean adaptation, then of course utility is essential to the argument; but if by the useful, we mean that which contributes to life or comfort or happiness, it is not necessary to the argument. The useful in this latter sense is employed only to prove the character of the designer, or to indicate the special object he had in view. The rack of the inquisition was a contrivance admirably adapted to torture human bodies. This fact proves that it had an intelligent cause. That it contributed nothing to human life or happiness, in no wise affects this conclusion.

The application of these remarks to the theistic argument drawn from the marks of design in nature is apparent. The fact that the eye is not the best possible eye; that men have been mistaken in their opinions about the functions of different organisms; that there are contrivances to kill as well as to make alive; in no way whatever invalidates the teleological argument, which is a good one, as well in the sphere of nature's work as in that of man's.

Let us now consider the other way in which this argument is

impugned. It is asserted that after all, the idea of any given structure may not be antecedent to but consequent upon the structure. This is the method adopted by the Darwinians, who would have us believe that the idea of sight never existed in any mind until sight itself was an accomplished fact. Mr. Mill, though not a Darwinian, says: "Creative forethought is not absolutely the only link by which the origin of the wonderful mechanism of the eye may be connected with the fact of sight. There is another, . . . though its adequacy to account for such truly admirable combinations as some of those in Nature, is still and will long remain problematical. This is the principle of the 'survival of the fittest.' "*

It is to be regretted that Mr. Mill did not discuss more at length the relation of this daring speculation to the teleological argument. He admits that the theory, if true, would in no way whatever be inconsistent with creation; but he adds: "it would greatly attenuate the evidence for it." †

If the views expressed in this article be correct, it is difficult to see how this theory, if true, affects the teleological argument, except to strengthen it. The question is not whether a designing mind might not have used this principle of survival in fashioning the eye or any other structure, but whether the principle alone is adequate to account for the results. Does it supersede the necessity for intelligent cause? Is it sufficient of itself to constitute the sole causal connecting link between the mechanism of the eye and the fact of vision?

Now, it is evident that the survival of the fittest, however adequate it may be to account for the manner in which *genera* and *species* have been produced, is totally inadequate to account for the fact that they have been produced, for the reason that the survival of the fittest is itself to be accounted for. The question of questions just here is, Why should the fittest survive? It is a *petitio principii* to answer, Because they are the fittest. These words mean, if they mean anything, that there were some individuals at every stage of the development with structures and

* Essay, p. 172.

† p. 174.

powers adapted to their environment in such way that in the struggle for life they were better able to contend against adverse circumstances, and so lived. They survived while others perished, because there was adaptation between their peculiar structure and the environment which secured their survival. Whence this adaptation? It is not from the adaptation itself; it is not a fortuitous concurrence, for there is law here. The development (according to the hypothesis) is regular. Indeed, it must be so, else the facts could not be ascertained and formulated. The argument, according to the method of agreement, may, therefore, be applied. The "survival of the fittest" is a result. Certain means are employed to secure it; certain heterogeneous elements are brought together, having this single point of resemblance, viz., they all concur to secure this one thing, that of any given number of organisms, those having certain relations to their environment succeed in the struggle for existence. Hence, not the success, not the "survival of the fittest," but an antecedent idea of "survival," must be the efficient cause of it. So of the whole development, considered objectively. Surely the development is subsequent and not precedent to the forces, germs, protoplasm from which it has sprung. The development, then, cannot be the efficient cause of the forces and objects which produce it; it can only be the final cause. The efficient cause is the mind to which the *idea* of the development appertained, and which adjusted the various forces by which it has been realised.

The teleological argument is not, therefore, invalidated or weakened by the Darwinian theory. So far from superseding the necessity for a contriving mind, it would enhance that necessity. To say nothing of the fact, that many of the instances relied on to sustain the theory are precisely those in which the guiding mind of man has controlled the development, the whole scheme imperatively requires, under the law of causation, a designing mind as its author. According to this theory, there is a most wonderful combination of force with force. The law of atavism, or hereditary transmission of qualities, is combined with the law of variation, or minute departures from the parent type. There is, besides, the principle of adjustment between certain

varieties produced by this combination and their environment, by which they survive and transmit their qualities to posterity, while others perish. The plan of creating a number of distinct species in conjugal pairs, with power to procreate, according to the law of atavism, is a plain and simple one, in comparison with the famous speculation of Dr. Darwin. The Theist, as distinguished from a believer in the Bible, might well wish success to this theory. For the Being who could construct a germ, single, simple, unique—endow it with the power to develop a *kosmos*, such as is known to us, with no further aid or guidance from its Author—would have to give no further proof that he was all-powerful and all-wise. If the Darwinian hypothesis be sustained, it will greatly enhance the evidence for creation by intelligent foresight.

The relation of this speculation to revelation is a different question. When it is demonstrated, the friends of the Bible may consider its bearing on the Mosaic cosmogony. So far, it is a contribution to the teleological argument in the theistic controversy, regarded merely from the position of natural theology.

The force of the teleological argument cannot be successfully impugned, either by the speculations of Hume or the theory of Darwin. If the world be a "singular effect," showing no hand-prints of God, and if the ape be the progenitor of man, there is as much need as ever for a God to produce the "singular" world, and the no less singular development of the human race. It only remains to combine the results of the ontological and the teleological arguments.

By the former, we infer that there is some eternal uncaused or self-caused being. The existence of mind, belonging apparently to a different and higher category than matter or physical force, at once suggests and compels the conclusion that there must be an eternal mind as the author of finite mind. This amounts to proof, unless it can be demonstrated that mind may and does arise from matter. By a strictly *a posteriori* argument it is proved that this is not and cannot be true. An inquiry into the cause of all phenomena, conducted with the great law of causation as our starting line and guiding principle, reveals the fact that the

efficient cause of all phenomena is mind; and consequently that mind is not the product of matter or of physical force. When phenomena are studied in detail, it appears that there is a unity of plan and a convergence of purpose in all, which inevitably point to one master mind, the Author of the kosmos as well as the Father of our spirits. Natural theology, therefore, gives us eternal mind and eternal force—God and force, unless it should transpire that the former is the creator of the latter. The world, therefore, as we know it, does bear witness to a God. The testimony of Aristotle, (*De Mundo*, c. 6,) “although invisible to every mortal nature, God is yet manifested by his works;” the testimony of Cicero, (*Tus.*, c. i. 29,) “Thou seest not God, and yet thou knowest him from his works,” agree with that of the apostle Paul, (Romans i. 19,) “that which is known of God is manifested to them, (*i. e.*, the Gentiles,) for God revealed it to them; for his invisible attributes, from the creation of the world, by his works, are made known to the reason, even his eternal power and divinity.”

On the question of the absolute eternity of physical force or matter, it is doubtful whether reason, unassisted by revelation, can authoritatively pronounce. True, force, so far as we know, is powerless, apart from mind, to manifest itself in orderly phenomena. Practically, force is not force, except as it is directed and used by intelligence. There is but little difference between this conclusion and the assertion that mind itself creates force; or that force is only a manifestation of mind. Unquestionably it may also be urged, that the mind seeks unity in its search after cause. Still, it must be admitted that neither these considerations, even when fortified by the law of parcimony, as stated and urged by Sir William Hamilton, (which indeed may be regarded as the formal expression of the mind's desire for unity in its search for cause,) nor the various metaphysical arguments presented by Dr. Clarke and others, can settle this question satisfactorily. Reason gives us God and force. But this grant is a magnificent contribution to Theism. For a direct revelation from God has no longer to prove that God is. There are no *a priori* objections to the Word of God, on the ground that there is doubt

as to his existence. The argument for a First Cause, combined with the teleological argument, is therefore of great value for the establishment of Theism. These arguments prepare the way for an appeal to God himself to settle the question as to the eternity of matter. We believe he has spoken on this point. While, therefore, reason alone gives us God and force, revelation assures us that God creates force. "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the Word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."

ARTICLE V.

THE DEMISSION OF THE MINISTRY.

The subject indicated by this title has been one of great interest in our Church for many years, and cases occur from time to time which make it a subject of very painful interest. It is perfectly notorious that men are ordained to the work of the ministry who discover, in the course of time, that they have mistaken their calling, and in this unwelcome conclusion they have the concurrence of the congregations of God's people and of the Presbytery. They have the same sort of evidence, and the same degree of evidence, that they have not been called of God, as they at first supposed they had that they were called. Some of this unhappy class feel grievously oppressed by their ordination engagements, which they have no ability to meet, and desire to be released, to lay aside the title and privileges of the ministry of the Word, as well as its duties. They plead, and with great plausibility at least, that a Christian man ought to attempt to do no work in which he cannot maintain a good conscience before God and man; that in such a work as that of the gospel ministry, it is impossible to be useful or to enjoy any comfort, if a man's conscience is constantly accusing him of exercising an authority which the Head of the Church has not given him.

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There are a few, perhaps, who enter the ministry from unworthy motives—to obtain a social position they are unable to acquire in any other calling, or to avail themselves of the reputation for good moral character and a high degree of intellectual training which is usually associated with the office of a minister, or even to gain some sordid advantages for which the ministry is supposed to afford an opportunity—whose consciences do not afflict them when they find that their calling is not practically sanctioned by the Church. They readily turn aside to any work which may promise to furnish the means of living or of wealth, and yet are not unwilling to wear the title, share the honors, and exercise the privileges of the *laborers* in the vineyard of the Lord. They constitute a sort of prelates in the Church; exercising, without the consent of the Church, an episcopal jurisdiction along with their brethren of the Presbytery who are faithfully preaching the gospel. If they are charged with neglecting their duty, the answer is ready, that the people are not willing to hear them. How can they preach, without a congregation to hear? The experiment has been tried, and has failed. At the same time, no flagrant offence has been committed, either against the faith or against manners which could justify the use of discipline and deposition from the ministry.

Now, what is to be done with such cases? Deposition for crime, by the terms of the foregoing description, is out of the question. Shall the one class be compelled to endure the tortures of conscience, under the supposition that ordination vows are irrevocable? Shall they be compelled to wear the title of an office whose duties and privileges they have demitted, and that, too, by the consent of the Presbytery? Shall they be forced to keep up a *sham* of this sort? Shall the other class be allowed to dishonor the ministry and the Church, by neglecting the duties of their calling, and by enjoying privileges and rights which properly belong only to those who perform those duties? Is the Church of Jesus Christ the only corporation on earth which has no power to get rid of incompetent officers? Is it indeed true that her Head has made the vow to hold on to the *title* and *office* of a minister irrevocable, while the vow *to do the work* may be

revoked?*

This seems monstrous; and yet it has been recently pronounced by the largest Synod of our Church to be the teaching of our Constitution; and some of its leading members pronounced the decision to be in accordance with the teaching of the Word of God concerning the nature of office in the Church, and the nature and obligations of ordination engagements. The doctrine of the "indelible character," which we had supposed to be the peculiar error of Papists and High Church Episcopalians, seems not to be peculiar to them, but to be held by brethren who profess—and we have not the shadow of a doubt, *sincerely* profess—to abhor the figment of the Priesthood and of the Apostolical Succession.

Let us, then, examine this question: Whether the Church, acting through its proper courts, can divest of his office, without censure, and restore to the condition of a private member, a minister whom it believes, upon good grounds, to have been inducted into office without a divine vocation, and that, too, even when the minister may think himself called?

We have chosen to state the question almost exactly in the words of the Revised Book of Discipline, (c. viii., § 10,) sent

* We may as well say here, once for all, that the New Testament seems to have no knowledge of the broad distinction which is made by some of our brethren in this argument, and which seems to be involved in allowing a man to retain his office and title, when he has ceased to do the work. Of course the distinction must be recognised so far as to allow the faculty or power or *habit* to exist, when it is not in exercise. A minister cannot *always* be preaching, or performing any other ministerial function. The power exists, as the schoolmen say, *in actu primo*, when it is not *in actu secundo*. As Horace has it (Serm. L. i., Sat. 3, vs. 129 et seq.):

“——quamvis tacet Hermogenes, cantor tamen atque
Optimus est modulator; ut Alfenus vafer, omni
Abjecto instrumento artis clausaque taberna,
Sutor erat, . . .”

Hermogenes is a singer, even when he is silent, and Alfenus is a cobbler, even when his shop is shut up. But this is a very different distinction from that which allows a man to be a minister when he expects to minister no more. The New Testament contemplates an office as an *officium*. Paul and Barnabas had hands laid on them for a *work*. (Acts xiii. 2; xiv. 26.)

down by the General Assembly of 1869 to the Presbyteries, and by a majority of them approved, although not adopted. We propose to examine it in the light of the Word of God, of the teaching of the Reformed Church, and of our Constitution. It will be borne in mind that in this discussion the only class of ministers we have reference to are those described in the question as stated. We have no reference to those who have been laid aside from infirmity or ill health, much less to those faithful soldiers of the Lord Jesus who have worn themselves out in his service. Yet we are free to say that if any even of these should profess that their consciences are burdened by the title and office of minister, when they have ceased to do the work, and they could not be persuaded to take a different view of the matter, we should vote for their release. We beg that it may also be borne in mind that we are debating only with those brethren who concede that a minister, like a ruling elder or a deacon, may demit all the duties of the office, and yet deny that he can be divested of the office and the title except by a deposition which implies censure.

As the question of the Church's power to divest a man of his office is to be determined, in the absence of positive statute, by her power to clothe him with office, it will be necessary, in the first place, to inquire what part the Church has, according to the Scriptures, in calling her members into office.

I. She has *some* part in this vocation, and, we may add, the *same* part, in regard to all her *ordinary* officers. Extraordinary officers, no doubt, have been given to her by her Divine Head, as the exigencies of her condition demanded, in whose calling she had no part. Apostles and prophets were of this class. They were commissioned directly and immediately by God himself, and of their qualifications and tenure of office the Church was not constituted a judge. The Levitical priests, though in a certain sense ordinary officers of the Jewish Church, exercised their office altogether independently of the congregation. In another sense, their calling was extraordinary, because it depended upon their birth in a certain tribe and in a certain family of that tribe—a matter which must be supposed to be under the very

special superintendence and providence of God. Besides, as both priests and Levites were officers about the temple, employed in a worship strictly sacrificial, there are no officers corresponding to them under the gospel, and the mode of their calling, therefore, does not concern us as Christians, except so far as it illustrates the calling of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ to be the only Priest, and the Priest forever, of his Church, in the proper sense, and the calling of his people to be a royal priesthood, in a figurative sense.* We think it important to remind our readers of this distinction between the ordinary and extraordinary officers of the Church, and between the ordinary and extraordinary calling belonging to them respectively, because the overlooking of this distinction has been the occasion, if not the source, of fanatical error. It does not at all follow, that because a Moses, or an Elijah, or a Jeremiah, or a Jehoiada was frowned upon and disowned by the visible people of God, that a man may exercise the office of a preacher, or a ruler, in opposition to the Church, upon the pretence that he has received a call too potent to be resisted.

Now, as to the *ordinary* officers of the Christian Church, it is clearly the teaching of the New Testament that they are called to office through the action of the Church, and this in two ways—by *election* and by *ordination*. The election is made by the Presbytery and by the congregation or Christian people; the ordina-

* The "sons of the prophets," (1 Sam. xix. 18; 2 Kings ii. 3, 5; iv. 38,) furnish a closer Old Testament analogy. The selection and admission of persons who were suited for the prophetic office by their personal character, and who had a divine call, probably depended on the prophetic judgment of those who presided over these institutions ("the *schools* of the prophets," commonly so called, though the phrase does not occur in the Scriptures). Comp. 1 Tim. i. 18. The prophets, from the time of Samuel, (comp. Acts iii. 24) became, in a certain sense, an *ordinary* office of the Jewish Church, *munus propheticum*; the *donum propheticum* had appeared before in sporadic instances. A still closer analogy is found in the elective elders in Israel (Deut. i. 9-15). The people, it appears from a comparison of this place with Ex. iii. 15, chose these elders under the guidance of Moses, "which directs us," as John Owen suggests, "to the right interpretation of Acts xiv. 23." (True Nature of a Gospel Church, c. iv.)

tion, by the Presbytery or existing rulers of the Church. Thus the original deacons were chosen by the brethren from among themselves, and then ordained by the laying on of the hands of the apostles. (Acts vi.) Then as to the elders: In Acts xiv. 23, Paul and Barnabas, in our Authorised Version, are said to have "ordained" elders in every church. But there are two good reasons for objecting to this rendering. The first is, that the word in the original, though afterwards used in the Greek Church for the ceremony of laying on of hands, had no other sense in the apostolic age than that of choosing by suffrage; for this is manifestly its sense in 2 Cor. viii. 19, the only other passage where it is used in the New Testament. The other reason is, that the ordination is separately mentioned in the last part of the verse as a "commending of them to the Lord on whom they had believed." The meaning of the passage, therefore, seems to be, that elders were appointed by the suffrages of the disciples in every church under the direction of Paul and Barnabas, and then by these last ordained—there being, by the supposition, no existing court to perform the act of ordination. This is the interpretation of Calvin and Turretin among the Reformed theologians, and of Gerhard among the Lutheran. Gerhard (*Loc. Theolog.*, L. xxiv., cap. iii., sec. 4, ¶ 93,) quotes Alfonso Salmeron as defining the Greek verb, by "*per majorem partem suffragiorum eligere*," and then as proceeding to say, "As therefore the apostles committed to the faithful the election and nomination of the seven deacons whom they themselves inducted into office by prayer and imposition of hands, so here Paul and Barnabas gave to the believers the privilege of nominating and electing in each city a bishop, whom they themselves afterwards consecrated by prayer, fasting, and imposition of hands." Pretty well for a Jesuit, and a sufficient answer to the subtleties of his brother Jesuit, Bellarmine. The only difficulty in the way of this interpretation is, that Paul and Barnabas are said to have done the act denoted by the Greek verb; *they* chose the elders. The difficulty is not serious. The apostles no doubt concurred with the people in choosing, and probably led the way by nomination, as is constantly done now in the choice of officers, both by the con-

gregational and classical Presbyteries. All we are contending for is, that the suffrage of the congregation is a *sine qua non* to the appointment of men to the ordinary offices of the Church. And this right of the congregation is so clear that it has been acknowledged in all ages of the Church, even when practically withheld by the tyranny of its rulers; acknowledged, as we have seen, even by Jesuits.*

The right of election grows out of the very nature of the Church and its relation to its offices. The reader may see this point stated and illustrated at some length in the article on Apostolical Succession, in this REVIEW, Vol. XXIII., pp. 380 *et seq.* It is sufficient for the purposes of the present argument, to say that all gifts and grace, all power of every kind, whether of *order* or of *jurisdiction*, exercised by officers in the Church, according to the law of Christ, belong originally and virtually to the Church itself. She is the *principium quod*. The officers who exercise the functions of preaching, ruling, distributing, act in her name, as well as in the name of Christ, her Head. They constitute the *principium quo*. The power of seeing belongs to the human body, but the body sees by the eye.† All gifts, grace, and power come from the hand of Christ, by the effectual working of the Holy Ghost; but it belongs to the Church, by the grant of Christ, her Head, to say what persons, possessing these gifts, shall exercise office. "If a man desire the office of a bishop," and feel moved to seek it from a sincere and godly motive, very well; but he cannot consider his call to be authenticated and made out, until the Church approves. If he is called to preach and rule, the Church is called to be preached to and to be ruled; and she is at least as good a judge of the question of *her* calling, as the man is of *his*. Suppose that they differ in judgment. Then, either there is a dead lock in the machinery, or the Church surrenders the liberty wherewith the Saviour has made her free, and becomes the slave of men.

* A collection of testimonies may be found in Calvin's Inst., L. IV., c. 3. Turretin, Loc. xviii., Q. 24, Secs. 14, 15. Gerhard, *ut supra*, Secs 94-97. Owen's True Nature of a Gospel Church, c. iv.

† See Voet. Polit. Ecclesiast., P. I., L. I., Tract. 2, cap. 5.

This view of the relation of the Church to her officers is so obviously the true one, that it is recognised even by writers in the Papal body, although diametrically opposed to the whole doctrine of the priesthood. Take, for instance, the following passage from Tostatus (Bishop of Avila in Spain, and member of the Council of Basle, in 1434): "A community," he says, "since it is not properly a unit, but only *per accidens*, like a heap of stones, cannot exercise some acts; nay, it is impossible that a community should exercise jurisdiction. There is indeed jurisdiction in the community *originally* and *virtually* (*i. e.*, as the schools express it, *in actu primo*, or *quoad esse*,) because all persons to whom jurisdiction is given, receive it by virtue of the community; and they can exercise it, but the community not. . . . The Church received the keys from Christ, and the apostles also received them as ministers of the Church, and now the Church has the keys, and prelates also have them; but the Church in one way, and the prelates in another; for the Church has them *originally* and *virtually*, (*secundum originem et virtutem*.) but the prelates for use and exercise' (*i. e.*, *in actu secundo*, or *quoad operari*).* Truly, well stated; and if Tostatus and the Basle Council could have succeeded in persuading the Pope and his prelates to take this view of the power of the keys, we might never have heard of Luther.

It would seem to follow inevitably from this right of the Church to judge of the qualifications of her officers and to call them into office, that when she becomes satisfied of their present unfitness or of her mistake in ever having judged them to be fit, she may reverse her judgment and revoke her call. Nobody doubts that this may be done in regard to a *probationer* for the ministry, even without reasons given, by a mere resolution of the Presbytery. And if she may not do the same in regard to an ordained minister, with reasons and by a solemn judgment of the Presbytery, it must be because there is something in the nature of the ceremony of ordination, or in its effects, which forbids it. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire what ordination is, and what it does. This is the other branch, as we have stated, of vocation.

* Cited by Turretin, Loc. xviii., Q. 24.

According to the Papists and their followers in the Protestant Church, ordination is the *whole* of vocation. It imparts the office and the charisms necessary for the discharge of its functions. A bishop is a sort of Leyden jar, charged with spiritual electricity, and by the contact of his hands with the head of the candidate, the subtle power is conducted into him, and he becomes a priest. Or, if he is to be made a bishop, it requires three of such jars to charge him with a sufficient amount of power to make a priest and to assist in making other bishops. Nay, worse than this; the bishop claims the awful prerogative which the Lord of glory challenges to himself, of bestowing the Holy Ghost. In their ordinations, at least in the Papal, an "indelible character" is imparted; and a man once made a priest, he can never more become that despised thing they call a "laic." No damnable heresy, or damnable immorality, no murders, no incests, no sodomies, can *delete* the sacred character.

According to the Scriptures, ordination is simply an act by which the Church, acting through the proper officers, "commends" the ordained man "to the Lord for the *work* whereunto he has called" him, or the Church judges he has called him. (Acts xiii. 3; xiv. 26, and verse 23.) This commending of the man to the Lord for the *work*, is done by prayer and the laying on of hands. This is the great mystery of ordination! It imparts no gift, or character, much less one that is indelible. It confers no *title*, except so far as the title may serve to describe or indicate the kind of *work* the man is expected to *do*. The man makes no unconditional promise to do the work so long as he lives; and such a promise would be rash and foolish to the last degree.* He

* The Eleventh Canon of the Discipline of the Reformed Church of France is as follows (Quick's Synodicon, p. 19): "Such as shall be chosen into the ministry of the gospel, must know that they be in that office for term of life, unless they be lawfully discharged upon good and certain considerations, and that by the Provincial Synod." This is the only declaration of the perpetuity of the obligation a man assumes in entering the ministry, that we have been able to find in the Reformed Church; and, with the qualification which accompanies it, it has our hearty assent. It may be further observed, that the canon seems to refer to just such a case as we are considering in this article, the case of one who may be dis-

does not know how long the Lord may want him in that work, or whether he will be permitted long to do any work at all. His voice may fail. His memory may become so weak as to make him incapable of any public performance. All his faculties may insensibly decay, or some mysterious, inscrutable disorder may destroy his self-possession and make him unable to face an audience. In short, he may get into a condition, without any fault of his own, so far as appears, which, if it had existed at the time of his application to the Presbytery, would have prevented his ordination. Does the mystic power of ordination still compel the Church to commend him to the Lord for a work which she knows or believes him utterly incompetent to do? Does it compel the Church to give him still the title, and him to wear it, when, by the consent of the Church, and of his own conscience, he has ceased to do the work? Must Hermogenes be still called a singer, when he has renounced singing, because he has lost the power? Must the subtle Alfenus be still *entitled* a cobbler, when he has not only thrown aside every tool of his trade, and shut up his shop, but has also turned lawyer?

Such seem to be some of the absurdities involved in the mystic view of ordination. The Church once, by the laying on of hands and prayer, publicly professed her belief that God had called a man to a certain work, and her readiness to receive and obey him in the doing of that work; and in this faith commended him to the Lord. Now she is convinced, both in Presbytery and congregation, that she was mistaken; she is sure that he was never called, or that he is no longer called. Nevertheless, she is bound to consider him a minister, and he is bound to consider himself such, at least in name! We admit that there ought to be this difference between a probationer and an ordained minister, that, as the latter has been formally and solemnly recognised as called

charged without censure, upon good and certain grounds. The matter of *deposition* is fully treated in the other canons concerning the ministry. Certain it is, that in our Church a man's ordination engagements (or "vows," as they are called, without warrant,) do not bind him absolutely for life. See these "engagements" in Form of Government, c. xv., sec. 12, and compare for the word "engagements," c. xvi., sec. 6.

of Christ to do a certain work of preaching and ruling in the Church, this act of recognition ought not to be annulled without grave and solid reasons, and these reasons made matter of record along with the judgment of the court; and further, that the right of appeal and complaint to the higher courts ought to be fully allowed and recognised. But we cannot see that ordination entitles him to claim more than this. Where the minister not only consents to be relegated to the status of a private member of the Church, but even requests it, there is no difficulty in the case, if he has the concurrence of the Church in his judgment that he has not been called, or is no longer called, of Christ to the work.

But brethren insist that there must be more in ordination than the little we have admitted. Some, whose minds are inclined to a sort of mystic exaltation all much impressed by phantoms and apparitions which, after their manner, refuse to take shape and form, and by the very absence of definite shape, exercise a power of fascination all the more despotic. These phantoms are sometimes the ghosts of departed entities, and come in a "questionable" shape indeed, but in a very different sense from that in which Hamlet used the word. One of these departed entities is the "indelible character." As the ghost of transubstantiation still haunts the imagination of some intelligent believers when they partake of the Lord's Supper, and the ghost of baptismal regeneration still lingers around the baptismal font, even in some Presbyterian churches, so the ghost of the indelible character occasionally flits before the mind when the ceremony of ordination is performed, even where there is no unction, no delivery of the cup and paten, no blasphemous breathing upon the person ordained, accompanied by the words, "Receive thou the Holy Ghost!" These apparitions defy not only the "cock-crowling of the intellectual morn," but the full blaze of the intellectual noon. We remember to have heard an argument made by one of the clearest-headed men in our Church, in favor of the irrevocable nature of a minister's ordination engagements, characterised by another equally clear-headed as "metaphysical and mystical."

We hope to be excused from arguing against these shadows, which are proof against all weapons of a mortal logic.

But it is said that the notion of an irrevocable vow in ordination finds its analogy in the similar vows of *marriage* and of *church-membership*. Great mistakes occur in both. Conditions of things are revealed in the course of time, which, if they had been known to exist at the time the relation was formed, or could have been foreseen, the relation never would have been constituted or the vows assumed. But the relation has been constituted, the vows have been taken, and there is no remedy. The unfortunate parties may be pitied, but not released.

As to the analogy of marriage, we find it gravely alleged in a solemn deliverance of the Kirk of Scotland.* “Some things there are which may debar a man’s entering into the ministry, and may be reason enough for the Church to shut the door upon him, such as some mistakes and escapes offensive in the life, that may proceed from rashness, weakness, ignorance, or want of prudence; yet when he is once admitted and entered, the like escapes will not be found sufficient to depose and thrust him out; for, *multa impediunt matrimonium contrahendum, quae non dirimunt contractum.*” Upon this analogy it is sufficient to observe, *first*, that it is a poetical or rhetorical, not a rational or logical analogy: *secondly*, that the same analogy was used in the ancient Church, to prove that bishops ought not to be translated from one charge to another; and such a translation was stigmatised as spiritual adultery; † *thirdly*, that the parties married, so long as the *vinculum* remains, are not allowed to demit all the duties of the rela-

* Pardovan’s Collections, Part I., p. 205, Edin., 1837. We have said that this was a “deliverance” of the Kirk of Scotland, but it is contained under Title II., of “Methodised Collections and Observations concerning the Worship, Discipline, and Government of the Kirk of Scotland,” gathered by the collector out of “old and late manuscript and printed Acts of General Assemblies.”

† See Kurtz’s Manual of Church History, § 87. The canon of the Council of Nice on this subject is well known. The Councils of Antioch and Sardica passed similar canons. The necessities, or the good sense of the Church, notwithstanding the moving appeal to the marriage relation, soon made a dead letter of all these canons.

tion, and to retain only the names of husband and wife; and *lastly*, that we have an *express statute of God making the marriage relation permanent until death*. Let a similar statute be produced in regard to the ministry, and there will be at once an end of controversy.

As to the relation of church-membership, the brethren who defend the theory of irrevocable vows are equally unfortunate. For, *first*, that which makes the vows irrevocable in the case of a church-member is, that he was bound before he made the vows at all: bound as a creature of God, who has sinned and has had the offer of salvation made to him freely in the gospel; and bound by his dedication to God in infancy in the ordinance of baptism, if he was then baptized. His vows, then, assumed when he is admitted to the full communion of the Church, only confirm and strengthen obligations which held him before, would have continued to hold him if he had never "joined the Church," and will hold him to the end. Now there is nothing analogous to this in the engagements assumed by a church officer at his ordination. He was not bound to preach, or rule, or "distribute", before he was called to it, or supposed that he was called. It is the call of the Church that creates the obligation, and he is neither bound nor allowed to be a minister, elder, or deacon, until he has it. And the same voice of the Church that created the obligation, may annul it. The Church may err or sin in annulling, as she may also in creating. We are not contending for the abuse of her power, but for the lawful use of it. *Secondly*, that there is no proper analogy between the engagements of a minister, as such, and the vows of a church-member, is the judgment of Christians generally. Nothing but idiocy or insanity will excuse a man, in the judgment of Christians, from the exercise of faith and love. A minister who has no gifts for his calling, is readily excused from attempting to exercise it; and he will be even more honored for giving it up and coming down to the place of a private member of the church. It is not easy to sophisticate the moral sense of Christian people. It is hard to persuade them that it is as wicked to let a drop of the communion wine fall on the floor, as it is to steal, or slander, or murder. Some nominal Chris-

tians there may be, who have been so persuaded, as there are inmates of our penitentiaries who have been put there for cutting people's throats, who are yet too tender of conscience to eat flesh on Fridays; as there were some of old who tithed the mint, anise, and cummin, and yet devoured widows' houses; and as there was one (and he no Pharisee) who, from a tender regard to the sanctity of an oath made to a dancing girl, cut off the head of the greatest of the prophets. Every step we take, as a Church, in the line of supporting *shams*, is a step in the direction of Phariseism and Popery. Let us beware, and not insist on an irrevocable vow to hold on to a title when all that makes the title anything else than a sham, has been laid down and given up forever. No man can lay down his obligation to serve the Lord as a member of the Church. This is the judgment of the whole Church. A man *may* lay down his obligation *to do the work* of a minister; this is the judgment of the whole Church. A man may lay down the title and name which describes the work, as well as the work itself! May this be speedily the judgment of the whole Church!

We have now sufficiently considered, in the light of Scripture, the nature of vocation to office in the Church, so far as it consists in election and ordination. There remains to be considered another element, which must always be taken into the account before a man can be regarded as competent to undertake to fulfil the duties of any ecclesiastical office, and especially that of a minister of the Word. This element is the man's own conscience. "In every act we can perform on earth, we are entitled to expect, before we can be required to perform it, and we are bound to have, before we venture to perform it, the testimony of a good conscience; and the clearness and force of our conscientious convictions should be analogous to the magnitude, the perplexity, the difficulty of the contemplated duty. For a man, then, to presume to be an ambassador for Almighty God, and that touching questions no less awful than the glory of his throne and the endless state of his rebellious subjects, without a settled conviction in his own soul that this fearful trust is laid on him by the King Eternal—is insane audacity. I say not he must be convinced he

ought to be sent—Moses pleaded hard against his mission—the conviction must be that he is sent. I say not he must judge that he is fit to be sent, for no man is fit. I say not that this or the other motive—as many will assert—or any motive at all, beside the simple one of obedience to the voice of the heavenly monitor, should mingle with the inward, fixed conviction; nor that this proof or the other proof—as many will contend—or any proof at all, beside the testimony of consciousness itself, should beget within us this strong assurance that it is God's Spirit which has wrought us for this self-same thing. I say not there may not be doubts and perplexities, trials very sore, and temptations of the adversary—fightings without and fears within, and troubles on every side—for if these things be not, it is either that grace is overwhelmingly abundant, or that Satan judges us to be workmen that he need not fear. Nor do I deny that, like as the kingdom of heaven itself is but as a grain of mustard planted in the broken heart, which must be watered by many a tear, and watched amid long and anxious vigils, as its roots strike down and its branches spread strongly and widely abroad, so this inward testimony of a divine vocation may be a whisper to the soul, almost inaudible in the profoundest stillness of the spirit of man—lost, restored again, strengthened, repeated, struggling amidst the passions that toss us to and fro, and fighting against the sins that would quench it—following us, if need be, as God followed Jonah, till out of the belly of hell the right of the Almighty Disposer is confessed.”*

No man would ever be ordained, we suppose, to ecclesiastical office against his conscience. The “*nolo episcopari*” may be announced with great emphasis and sincerity, but it may be overcome by the voice of the Church. But unless it be overcome, and the man become “willing” at least to accept the office, he ought not to be put into it. Farel and the Church of Geneva had great difficulty in conquering the repugnance of Calvin to the work in that city, and, it would seem, to the work of preaching itself. But the repugnance was overcome, and the conviction

* R. J. Breckinridge's Sermon on The Christian Pastor.

was produced in that great man's conscience, that God had called him. John Knox resisted the importunity of his brethren, and with the like result. Indeed, it is intuitively obvious that, in any office whose power is moral and spiritual, the conscientious convictions of the incumbent are fundamentally important. In a mechanical or magical system of religion like that of Popery, the sacredness of the *office* is the primary consideration. No kind of holiness is indispensable in the priest, except that which belongs to the stones of which the temple is built, or to the bells which announce the hours of worship. A man is still a priest, and his functions are efficacious, though he be wicked enough to mingle poison with the wine which he gives to a guest at his own table, or even with the consecrated wafer which he administers to the communicant. But in the Church of Christ, holiness attaches to persons, not to things; and the power of a man's office will generally correspond with the moral and spiritual condition of the man himself, whether he be preacher, ruling elder, or deacon. Illustrious exceptions to the rule may be alleged, as Chalmers and Thomas Scott; as, in the Old Testament, Balaam is an exception to the rule of "*holy*" prophets, and his dumb ass is an exception to the rule of the ministry of *men* or of *angels*. But the exceptions are rare. Now, what could be more unfriendly to the interests of holiness in a minister of the gospel, than a perpetual war with his conscience? How could anything, short of open and downright heresy and immorality, more effectually cut the nerves of his ministry? No man, therefore, in a church worthy of the name, would ever be required to enter an office, if he conscientiously believed that Christ had not called him into it.

Now, is the case materially different of a man who *once* believed that he was thus called, but is now satisfied that he was mistaken, or that he is no longer called? * Shall we say to him,

* "Quod valet ad legitimum vocando impedimentum adferendum, idem ad vocatum abdicandum valere debet."—Gerhard, *Loc. Theolog.*, L. 24, c. iii., sec. 16, § 175, note. It will be observed that the Lutheran Theologians, in general lean, in matters of this sort, more towards the Papal system, than do those of the Reformed Church. This fact makes the *dictum* quoted more weighty.

that there is now no remedy ; that he must either commit some offence which may open an avenue of escape through *deposition*, or remain *in statu quo* ; that his vow to retain the *title* is irrevocable, though his conscience may be relieved from the responsibility of the work ? The afflicted man replies, that his conscience will not allow him to retain the title when it is an empty show ; that he feels like a hypocrite ; that he is sailing under false colors ; that he cannot endure to receive the honors of a minister which the title and name, to a greater or less extent, procure for him, even against his wishes. He implores the Presbytery to relieve him from the burden of a name. Shall it refuse ? Certain it is, that this relief is practically given to a ruling elder and deacon in our Church. They have no "Reverend" to their names, and no D. D., and therefore could not lose the title. It is the misfortune of the preacher that he has a title to lose, and it seems he must not lose it, even if it should prove the shirt of Nessus to him.

But it is said, again, consider how different the call of a preacher is from that of an elder or deacon ! We answer, we have considered it, and the only difference we have been able to discover is this: that different gifts are bestowed upon the man who is called to preach—from those which are given to qualify a man merely to rule or to distribute. The conviction of duty as to the call, may also be expected to be stronger in a teaching elder than in an elder who rules only, or in a deacon. But the mode of calling is the same—by the Holy Ghost, through the Church ; and our Book evidently treats them all in the same way as to the demission of the active exercise of their offices. (See Form of Government, xiii. 6.) We must either give up the doctrine of the *divine right* of the ruling elder's office, or admit that there is no difference between his call and that of the minister. Then, if an entire demission is practically allowed to the deacon or the ruling elder, why should not the same privilege be conceded to the preacher of the Word ? There is no reason why it should not, is the answer, it seems to us, which every man will give who is not frightened or fascinated by the ghost of "the indelible character."

The case, then, would seem to be very plain, so far as it concerns the man who is himself satisfied that he has mistaken his calling. He may be right in this conviction. Who, then, would compel him to retain the office? He may be wrong; and if the Church does not concur with him in his judgment, it is possible that he ought to submit his judgment to that of the Church. But the fact remains: he is convinced that he ought not to preach; the conviction is not a thing of to-day; it has been growing for years, like the contrary conviction so forcibly described by Dr. Breckinridge, at first "a whisper, to the soul almost inaudible in the profoundest stillness of the spirit—lost, restored again, strengthened, repeated, struggling amidst the emotions that toss him to and fro, but following him, till out of the belly of hell the will of the Almighty Disposer is confessed."

As to the other case contemplated in the thesis which we have been endeavoring to establish—the case of a man who, in the judgment of the Church, has not been called, or is no longer called, to do an ecclesiastical work—we have only to say that the judgment of the Church must settle the question of his continuing in office, as it settled the question of his entrance into it. These two things must concur, in order to warrant any man in exercising an ordinary office in the Church—the judgment of the Church, and the conscientious conviction of the man himself. If either be absent, the man has no right to the office. This conclusion is inevitable from the general doctrine of vocation as held by the Protestant Churches, both Lutheran and Reformed, and as expounded in the preceding part of this article. There might be, and doubtless would be, a practical difficulty in dealing with this class of cases, which would not be encountered in dealing with the other class; but the general doctrine of vocation must determine both.

We come now to consider the doctrine of the Church of God, in reference to demission, as against the doctrine of Rome concerning the "indelible character." We confess to some disappointment in not finding discussed by Protestant Theologians the specific question we have discussed in this article. Voetius, for example, treats of several modes of "*desertio ministerii*," but not

of the particular mode of "desertion" on account of the absence of any evidence of a call.* Their view, therefore, must be gathered from their doctrine of vocation, and this is the same as that which we have endeavored to expound. That they held no other view than that which we have been defending, may be further gathered from the acknowledged *dictum* we have already quoted from Gerhard, that the same reason holds for a man's demitting office and for his not taking it up in the first instance, and from their denunciations of the Papal doctrine of the indelible character and of *titular* dignities in the Papacy. As to this last abuse, Calvin, for example, says (Inst. L. iv., c. 7, sec. 23): "Let them tell me upon what principle they require him to be considered as a bishop who never, even in appearance, with his little finger touches the least portion of the duty." So also the Lutheran theologian, Chemnitz (*Examen Con. Trident. De Sacramento Ordinis*): "This is justly to be blamed in the Papal orders, that they retain the title without the thing, and usurp the benefits of the titles without performing the duties. . . . The lectors do not read that the people may understand. The singers do not raise the tunes, that the people may sing. The bishops do not teach, the presbyters do not administer the sacraments to the people." We are very far from insinuating that our "W. C.'s" are as bad as the titular dignitaries of apostate Rome; but we insist that a man who does not touch with his little finger the least portion of the *officium*, ("nullam officii partem,") has a slender claim to the *office* or to the title which describes it. Surely every such man may be said, with more than ordinary emphasis, to "walk in a vain show."

We propose, in the last place, briefly to consider the doctrine of our Constitution upon demission. It is conceded on all hands that the Constitution allows of demission, without censure, of everything but the office and the title. We have no need, therefore, to argue this point. But it is contended by the brethren on the other side that it makes the offices of minister, ruling elder, and deacon "perpetual;" that they can neither be "laid

*See his *Politica Ecclesiastica*, P. II., L. iii., Tract ii., c. 10.

aside at pleasure," nor be taken away but by deposition. (Form of Government, c. xiii. sec. 6.) This looks decisive; and we admit that it is decisive against that part of the thesis we have been defending, which concerns *compulsory* demission. Our Constitution exhibits a very great, and in general a just, jealousy of the rights of the officers and members of the Church, while it is jealous also for the jurisdiction of its courts. So, on the one hand, it ordains that no man shall lay down his office at his own pleasure—that is, without the action of the court—and on the other, that he shall not be "divested of it" (against his own consent) "except by deposition." Of course, we think that the jealousy here manifested for the rights of officers is excessive. No man has a right, morally, to retain the honors of a title when he has ceased to do the work, and the Church judges him not called, although he may not make himself liable to discipline by any "offence."

But in reference to the other part of our thesis, which concerns *voluntary* demission, it is by no means clear to us that our Book forbids it. We do not rely upon some of the arguments which have been used by brethren on our side of the question. We do not believe, for example, that the "Presbytery" is the source of power, and that therefore all powers which it has not expressly abandoned, or has not resigned to other courts, it has reserved to itself; and that of these reserved powers this is one, to allow a minister of the Word to demit totally, while the elder or deacon, being subject to the jurisdiction of a "Session," can demit only in part. The theory of our Constitution is, that all power resides radically in the Church as a whole, and, as to its exercise, in the officers and the courts. And as to what powers this court or that may exercise, these are matters which must be determined by the Constitution, which *distributes* the powers according to the will of the Church, under her allegiance to her Divine Head. Ministers might have been ordained, for instance, and governed by the congregational presbytery (the "Session"), or by the Synodical or General Presbyteries, ("Synod" and "General Assembly,") if the Church had so ordered; for all that Christ enjoins is that ordination be done by a presbytery, a college of presbyters. Hence.

the "classical presbytery", known in our Form of Government as "the Presbytery," has no more reserved powers than any other of the courts. Besides, it is clear to us, that all the officers are put on precisely the same footing by the Constitution in regard to this matter of demission.

There is a sense, however, in which *all* the courts have reserved powers, and powers which are reserved, in general terms, by the Constitution itself. Our courts are courts of *conscience* as well as of law. This peculiarity is constantly overlooked by our ruling elders who are professional practitioners in courts which are *only* courts of law.* They forget that there is always a silent recognition in our standards of the supreme authority of the Word of God. So that, provided no injury is done to individual rights, as guaranteed in the Constitution, relief may be given to distressed consciences, if such relief is warranted by the Word of God. The principle laid down in chap. i. of the Form of Government, entitled "Preliminary Principles," (a sort of "Bill of Rights,") is that "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrine and commandments of men which are in anything contrary to his Word, or beside it, in matters of faith and worship." Nay, more; in the exercise of discipline, the Church claims the power of making that an "offence" (and therefore an object of censure) which is condemned in the Word of God, although it may not be enumerated among sins in the law of the Church. (See Book of Discipline, c. i., sec. 3.) Hence we find our courts constantly doing things which are supposed to be warranted by the Word, though not by the letter of

* For the same reason, it would seem, the lawyers in our church courts can with difficulty be made to understand that our courts are *penitential* tribunals, and that one great end of discipline is to bring the offender *to inculcate himself*—an end which the civil courts altogether disown. The Inquisition in the Papacy professed, indeed, to be a tribunal of this sort, (a "penitential,") but it was only a pretence. Its atrocious cruelties demonstrated it to be a tribunal of hell, not of the Church. But that our Constitution gives an inquisitorial power to the session, in some sense, is plain from the clause numbered "(1)" in Form of Government, c. ix., sec. 6. For a satisfactory defence of this power of inquest, see Thornwell's Works, Vol. IV., pp. 304-7, and 371-3

the Church's law. Thus, it is very common to ordain elders and deacons by the laying on of the hands of the session, although the Book prescribes a different method. Our Foreign Missionary Committee exercises powers with respect to ministers, which the law gives expressly to the Presbyteries, because the Committee acts in the name of the General Assembly, as a court empowered to conduct missions, and therefore empowered to remove ministers from one field to another, without consulting the Presbyteries of which they are members, and to the jurisdiction of which they are constitutionally subject. Indeed, all our Assembly's Committees are *commissions*, and not mere committees; and yet commissions are not recognised in our Constitution. In the face of these facts, it seems not a little odd that our courts should be so rigid in adhering to the letter of the law where the conscience of a minister is to be relieved by allowing him to lay down his office. They prefer to run the risk, rather than yield, of forcing him to leave the Church of his birth and of his choice, and to join another as a private member; and when this step has been taken, they at last acknowledge, *without censure*, that he is no longer a minister, by simply striking his name from the roll! Would it not be more sensible, as well as more in accordance with Christian charity, to release the burdened brother? We think it would; and should feel assured, in voting for his release, that we were honoring the Word of God and our Constitution. We are fully persuaded that the "divesting," which the Constitution contemplates, is a divesting *against the consent* of the party divested. This interpretation is confirmed by what follows in that chapter, in reference to the demission of the active duties of the office. Even demission to this extent, is the implication of the law, shall not take place without the consent of the party, except by advice of Presbytery.

It is objected to this view, that we are advocating the principle known as the "higher law." We are doing no such thing; we are interpreting a particular statute by the analogy of the law or code, considered as a whole. We are attempting to show that the statute has no application to the case of *voluntary* demission of ecclesiastical office by consent of the Church and the formal

act of the court having jurisdiction; that this case, if a "*casus omissus*," is not so in the sense of the lawyers, but belongs to the reserved powers granted in the Word of God, and *recognised, in a general and comprehensive way, by the law itself.*

It is said, again, that there is great danger of making the tenure of office in the ministry very loose. We answer, *first*, that this objection does not come with the best grace in the world from those who make *entrance* into the ministry very loose. Who does not know how elastic the statutes touching the qualifications of ministers in our Church become in the hands of the Presbyteries—how constantly a friendly contest is going on between the Presbyteries and those brethren whom the Church has appointed to aid their candidates in acquiring the knowledge and discipline by which they may be fitted for their work—how it has almost become a thing of course for a young man, who has been once received as a candidate, to be in due time ordained—to how great an extent the Presbyteries fail to demand in a candidate evidence of gifts and even of intelligence at all above the popular average? If there must be rigor, let it be impartially exercised in regard to candidates as well as to the unhappy class of ministers we have been considering. We answer, *secondly*, that this danger, supposed, is altogether imaginary in such a system as ours. There is a force of public sentiment in the people and in the ministry, which will, on the one hand, discourage applications for release on the part of ministers who judge themselves not called, and, on the other, make it exceeding difficult to bring the Presbytery to the point of *compelling* incompetent ministers to lay down their office. The danger appears to us to be in the contrary direction.

It is even said that our view squints towards "rotation" in the offices of the Church. This objection scarcely deserves a serious answer. Is there no difference between the position that a man who is well qualified for his office by gifts and experience, who is growing in usefulness and honor, and is receiving the tokens of the divine blessing upon his labors, must lay down his office when a particular day comes, and the position that a man who is not qualified must lay down his office? Is there no difference be-

tween saying that the tenure of office must be settled by the Almanac, and that it must be settled by the indications of the will of the Holy Ghost?

But we are not to settle this solemn question of demission by considerations of expediency. To the law and to the testimony. If we speak not according to this word, it is because there is no light in us.

ARTICLE VI.

THE GRATUITOUS IMPUTATION OF SIN.

The question whether the Augustinian theology teaches that sin may be justly imputed to or charged upon the guiltless without their concurrence, is now a question of vital importance to every branch of the Presbyterian community in our land, and we propose to devote the present article to a consideration of it. Dr. Hodge, for many years past, has decidedly taken the affirmative, and in his *Theology* repeats his previous utterances, and not only insists that this doctrine is an integral part of the Calvinistic system, and that it was held by Augustine, and by the representative divines of the Church ever since his day, but also that it is fundamental to the Protestant theology and evangelical system of doctrine as taught in the word of God. We cannot acquiesce in this representation, but, on the contrary, insist that it is unauthorised; and further, that it proceeds upon a misconception of the meaning of sundry terms employed in our theological language in relation to the doctrine of original sin. In a single brief article, we can present but few of the results of a protracted and thorough examination, and few only of the multitude of facts which may be alleged to prove that the doctrine referred to has not only never been recognised as a part of the Calvinistic system, but has always been regarded as hostile to the distinguishing principles of that system. The subject is one of vital importance,

both to ethics and theology; and our aim is to awaken not a spirit of prejudice and proscription, but such an interest in the subject itself as shall secure its timely and thorough investigation. And in order to prevent the misconstruction or misapplication of what we offer, we here remark that, by *the gratuitous imputation of sin* to the guiltless, we mean the doctrine which the distinguished Professor at Princeton has propounded on the subject, together with the exegesis by which, as he claims, it is supported.

The conception that sin may be gratuitously imputed to the guiltless, is charged by Zanchius* (when treating on the false views which have been entertained on original sin,) as one of the three leading errors of the Armenians, an ancient people dwelling in Armenia, converted early in the fifth century, and belonging to the Eastern or Greek Church. His words are: "In sententia itaque Armeniorum tres sunt errores: 1. Nullum reipsa in homines derivari peccatum ab Adamo, ut et Pelagius dicebat. 2. Omnes tamen damnationi aeternae obnoxios teneri *propter alienum peccatum*, Adae scilicet, omnium hominum parentis, nisi per Christum liberentur." In the view, then, of this truly great and representative divine—the intimate friend and correspondent of Calvin, Hyperius, Bullinger, Melancthon, Bucer, and Ursinus—it was a great error to hold that the posterity of Adam (unless redeemed by Christ,) are exposed to eternal death for a *peccatum alienum*, or foreign sin of their parent. In the Latin Church, however, the error does not make its appearance until much later. P. Lombard (1164) refers, without naming them, to some who taught it: "Quidem enim putant originale peccatum esse *reatum poenae pro peccato primi hominis*."* But after Scotus (1308) had laid the foundation for it by his bold and unambiguous assertion that "morality is founded on will," his disciple, Ockham, (1347) the founder of the sect of the Nominalists, gave to it a full and formal expression by defining original sin as imputed to the posterity of Adam, to be "the guilt of a foreign sin without

*Op. Tom. IV., pp. 34, 35.

†Lib. II., Distinct. 30, page 211, Paris, 1846.

any inherent demerit of our own ;" *i. e.*, as the ground or basis of its imputation : ("Reatus *alieni peccati sine aliquo vitio haerente in nobis.*") And Chemnitz, in his *Examen Conc. Tridentini*,* referring to the scholastics, says : "There are those who think that original sin is neither privation nor any positive depravity, *but only guilt on account of the fall of Adam, without any inherent ill-desert of our own*—sed tantum reatum propter lapsum Adæ sine pravitate aliqua haerente in nobis ;" thus making the depravity of our nature, and all the calamities of life, result from a *peccatum alienum* alone ; all of which representations evince that such a conception is exceptional and in conflict with what the Church has ever regarded as the Augustinian doctrine. And when Erasmus, with his strong predilections for Pelagianism, adopted the same view, Luther (on Gen. ii. 16, 17) thus refers to it : "And it seems that in our own day also, there are those who are deceived by this argument. For they so speak of original sin (*i. e.* inherent corruption) *as if it were no fault of ours, but only a punishment* (ac si non culpa sed tantum poena) : as Erasmus somewhere argues in express terms, 'that original sin is a punishment inflicted on our first parents, *which we their posterity are compelled to suffer on account of another's crime, without any demerit of our own*, (propter alienam culpam, sine nostro merito,) as an illegitimate child is obliged to endure the shame arising not from his own fault, but from that of his mother ; *for how could he have sinned who as yet did not exist ?* *These things may be flattering to reason, but they are full of impiety and blasphemy!*" And further on he adds : "Satan makes a mighty effort that he may nullify original sin ; and this would be to deny the passion and resurrection of Christ."

Pighius and Catharinus (who were both subsequently members of the Council of Trent,) taught at this time the same view. Pighius, in a work which he published in 1542, and of which Chemnitz, in his *Examen*, (page 97,) gives an analysis, had clearly asserted it, and maintained that "original sin consists alone in this, that the actual transgression of Adam is transmitted and

* Part I., p. 97, Frankfort, 1578.

propagated to his posterity only by guilt and punishment, (*reatu tantum et poena*.) without any corruption and depravity inhering in them; and that they, on account of the sin of Adam, are now guilty, because they have been constituted exiles from the kingdom of heaven; are subjected to the dominion of death; exposed (*obnoxii*) to eternal condemnation, and are involved in all the miseries of human nature; even as servants are born from servants, (who by their own fault have forfeited their freedom,) not through their own desert, but by that of their parents. And as children born out of wedlock suffer the shame of their mother, without any inherent fault of their own." This view of Pighius, as Chemnitz remarks, was approved and accepted by Catharinus. And it was presented and defended by him in the Council of Trent in two orations when the doctrine of original sin was under discussion. We have room only for a brief extract: "He maintained," says Polano,* "that it is necessary to distinguish sin from the punishment; that concupiscence and the privation of righteousness are the punishment of sin; and that, therefore, it is necessary that the sin should be a different thing." . . . "If they were the effects of sin in him, (Adam,) they must of necessity be in others also (*sin verò in eo peccati fuerint effectus, in aliis itidem esse*)." . . . "*He oppugned, likewise, the transmission of sin through generation, saying, 'that as, if Adam had not sinned, righteousness would have been transferred, not by virtue of generation, but only by the will of God, (non virtute generationis, sed solâ Dei voluntate.) so it is fit to find another method for the transfusion of sin.'* And he explained his opinion in this form: that as God made a covenant with Abraham and all his posterity when he made him father of the faithful, so when he gave original righteousness to Adam and all mankind, he made him such an obligation *in the name of all, to keep it for himself and them, observing the commandments, which because he transgressed he lost it as well for others as for himself, and incurred the punishment alike for them.*" . . . "So the very transgression of Adam belonged to every one: *to him as the cause, to others*

* See Hist. Conc. Trident., by P. S. Polano, lib. II., pp. 192, 193. Frankfort, 1621.

in virtue of the covenant (illius tanquam causae, aliorum virtute pactionis); so that the action of Adam is actual sin in him, and imputed to others is original; because when he sinned, all mankind sinned in him."

Now the theory thus expounded by these men, and set forth in the Council in 1546, was rejected by the divines of the Reformation, to a man, as subversive of the whole system of grace. Nor can one prominent theologian, either Lutheran or Calvinist, be named amongst them, after this utterance, who (in referring to original sin) has not directly adverted to and condemned it, as given either by Catharinus or Pighius. The Socinians, however, who became a sect in Poland in the latter part of that century, adopted and defended it with great learning in order to destroy the doctrine of our participation in the first sin; and, in its support, elaborated the exegesis of Rom. v. 12-19, which has been adopted also by Dr. Hodge, as we shall show in the sequel.

The doctrine plainly announced by Augustine, and which has been always entertained and defended by the Calvinistic Church, affirms: 1. The natural and moral (or federal) headship of Adam. 2. That the threatening in Gen. ii. 17, included not only the loss of original righteousness, but spiritual and eternal death. 3. That in the threatening, both Adam and his naturally-begotten posterity were all comprehended. 4. And, consequently, *that all the evils which his posterity suffer, result from the first transgression.* Thus far Pighius and Catharinus concur in statement with Augustine; but at this point they diverge vitally and fundamentally from *the doctrine* he taught: *they* claiming that "the first transgression" was Adam's personal sin alone, which, being gratuitously imputed to the race when guiltless of subjective ill-desert, was the procuring cause of all the evils we suffer; whilst Augustine and the Reformed Church teach that "the first transgression" was not Adam's personal sin alone, but our sin also, in and with him; and which being imputed, produced all those appalling evils; *since in that transgression they all sinned, not putatively, but originally and potentially*, and were thus constituted ἀμαρτωλοί—*really sinners.* In other words, by participating in that offence, they became culpable; so that his sin, and

their sin in and with him, was imputed to them all; and that hence, from this common or universal sin, originated the inherent, hereditary corruption in which we all are born.

Such is the Church view. She has never denied, but on the contrary, has always pronounced it a heresy to deny that the very sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity. But her doctrine is and ever has been that that sin is imputed to us, not simply because of Adam's guilt therein, but because we ourselves participated with Adam therein, and that therefore it is charged upon us as well as upon him, and that we with him are thereby constituted sinners. It was imputed to him and to Eve, because they were alike guilty of its formal perpetration, and was not imputed to Eve merely because Adam had committed it, (though he was her representative,) but because she had participated therein. And in like manner it was imputed to the rest of the race; not merely because their father was guilty of its perpetration, but because they were guilty by participation, when "all sinned." That is, there was a moral and subjective ground in his case, and in the case of Eve, and in the case also of their posterity, for regarding and treating them as sinners. To say that the sin was not imputed to or charged upon our first parents, because they committed it, would be to deny that they were thereby constituted sinners with the rest of the race.

The imputation, therefore, was not that of a *peccatum alienum*, or *gratuitous* in either case. It was direct or *immediate* to Adam and Eve, but not *antecedent* to their personal transgression. With their posterity, however, who sinned in and with them, it was both *immediate* and *antecedent*, for they were not yet in possession of actual personality; or, as Augustine expresses it, *of the forms of life and being which they thereafter should possess*. Nor has the Church ever confounded *immediate* and *antecedent* imputation with *gratuitous* imputation.* Dr. Hodge, however,

* It was through courtesy to the distinguished Professor in Princeton, and in order to avoid the very appearance of captious criticism, that in the discussion of Imputation, in the *Danville Review* for 1861 and 1862, the terms *antecedent* and *immediate* imputation were occasionally employed (though under protest against such use as inaccurate,) as he em-

has repudiated the doctrine thus presented, by affirming that in the first offence the posterity of Adam contracted no subjective guilt or ill-desert, and that all the evils they suffer are penal inflictions on account of Adam's merely personal sin—a sin which, as he affirms, is to them purely a foreign sin, or *peccatum alienum*. But let us hear his own statement.

In the Princeton Essay,* the Doctor says: "Therefore, it is for the one offence of the one man that the condemnatory sentence (the *κρίμα εἰς κατάκριμα*) has passed on all men." Also in his late work, when referring to the analogy in Rom. v. 12–21, he says: "The parallel is destroyed, the doctrine and argument of the apostle are overturned, if it be denied that the sin of Adam, as antecedent to any sin or sinfulness of our own, is the ground of our condemnation."† Again: "There is a causal relation between the sin of Adam and the condemnation and sinfulness of his posterity." "His sin was not our sin. Its guilt does not belong to us personally. It is imputed to us as something not our own, a *peccatum alienum*, and the penalty of it, the forfeiture of the divine favor, the loss of original righteousness, and spiritual death, are its sad consequences."‡ And after describing the universality of sin in the race, he adds: "The only solution, therefore, which at all meets the case, is the scriptural doctrine that all mankind fell in Adam's transgression; and bearing the penalty of his sin, they come into the world in a state of spiritual death, the evidence of which is seen and felt in the universality, the controlling power, and the early manifestation of sin."§ Hereupon follow his citations of the Confessions of the Reformed Churches, in Latin,|| as though to verify the accuracy of this his representation of the church doctrine; and yet in not one of them can the principle be found which he has thus por-

ploys them. This acquiescence has since been regretted: for even under protest it was calculated only to perplex the question. The terms should be employed only in accordance with their usage in our recognised theology.

* First series, p. 161. Wiley & Putnam, 1846. These essays all originally appeared in the *Biblical Repertory* or *Princeton Review*.

† See his *Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 212, 213.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 215, 225.

§ *Theology*, Vol. II., p. 240.

|| *Ibid.*, pp. 228, 229.

trayed. In fact, Dr. Hodge is obliged to admit this, substantially, in the summary which he presents of their teaching.*

Again: "The sin of Adam did not make the condemnation of all men merely possible: it was the ground of their actual condemnation." "*All mankind were in Adam. He was the federal head and representative of the race. All men sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression. The sentence of condemnation for his own offence passed upon all men.*"† "It was by one man, he (Paul) says, that sin and death passed upon all men, *because all sinned. They sinned through or in that one man.* His sin was the sin of all, in virtue of the union between him and them."‡ By comparing the view thus presented with the view as above given of the Armenians, Erasmus, Pighius, etc., it will be perceived that on the great points immediately under discussion, they are one and the same: that is, they all concur in stating (1) that the first sin was the sin of the first man only, and not of the race; (2) that it was charged upon his posterity gratuitously, *i. e.*, without any subjective demerit of their own; and (3) that through this imputation that one sin of the one man became the procuring cause of all the evils which have come upon the race. But before proceeding to examine the arguments by which Dr. Hodge would sustain this theory, it seems necessary here, in order to prevent any unnecessary mystification of the issue, to inquire into the meaning of the phraseology which, in the above quotations, we have *italicised*.

In presenting for the consideration or acceptance of our fellow-men any really important principle, it is obvious that all equivocal or ambiguous phraseology should be avoided, so far as its avoidance is possible; and, moreover, that in relation to matters sacred or divine, the obligation becomes absolutely imperative. How, then, may we regard these conditions as met or fulfilled in the foregoing exposition of a principle affirmed by its author to involve (according as it may be either accepted or rejected,) the well-being of the Church, and the very truth and existence of the religion of Christ? for Dr. Hodge repeatedly affirms that such is the fact. Let us endeavor briefly to sift this inquiry.

* Theology, II., pp. 230, 231. † *Ibid*, pp. 551, 552. ‡ *Ibid*, p. 202.

We do not remember that the Doctor, anterior to the discussion of the subject in the *Danville Review*, has, unless very sparingly, in the delineation of his theory, employed the language which we have placed in italics in the forecited passages. In his late work, however, it is of frequent occurrence. Has he then changed or at all modified his views of the doctrine itself? Not at all; for he still affirms them more emphatically, if possible, than before. Why, then, employ thus frequently the language referred to? And how is that language to be understood in the connexion?

Catharinus, as shown above, in unfolding and defending this same theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin, likewise endeavors to incorporate with his statement the same expressions; his aim being obviously to foreclose the objection arising from the divine affirmation in Rom. v. 12, that "*all sinned.*" But whether that objection can be thus ignored, will appear in the sequel.

Whatever may be the ordinary or established usage of the terms referred to in the forecited passages from Dr. Hodge, he therein confessedly employs them to convey no meaning which can be inconsistent with his constant affirmation that in the fall, *Adam alone contracted moral ill-desert or subjective guilt.* For though in this language his posterity are declared to *have sinned in and with him* in that first transgression, the sentence of condemnation which passed upon them was not for this *their* sin and fall in and with him, but for his sin and fall alone. Dr. Hodge, as he has so often announced, and now repeats in these very citations themselves, employs the terms to convey this and no other meaning. While in his Commentary on Romans v. 12-21, and in scores of other instances, he affirms that to suppose that the posterity themselves had contracted subjective guilt or depravity in the first sin, and anterior to the imputation to them of Adam's personal sin, and that this *their* sin was imputed to them, would be in effect to subvert the doctrine of justification by faith alone, and overturn the whole argument of the apostle.*

Let our readers, therefore, contemplate the statement. The

* See especially his review of Dr. Baird's *Elohim Revealed*, in the April and October numbers of the *Princeton Review*, for 1860.

posterity of Adam *sinned* in and fell with him in his sin, and yet *his sin (and not theirs)* is the sole ground of their condemnation and punishment. His sin and fall, and their sin and fall in and with him, brought subjective guilt and criminality *upon him*, and yet left *them* free of all subjective guilt and criminality until after his own sin and fall had been forensically imputed to them. They are condemned for his sin alone; and his sin alone is, by "a sentence of condemnation," (*κρίμα εις κατάκριμα*), set over to their account, and they are made forensically guilty of that sin alone, and not of their own sin and fall. Then, in virtue of the natural and federal relation between them and Adam, (which in no way, however, connects them morally or subjectively with his crime, according to Dr. Hodge,) this sentence of condemnation really constitutes their sinning in and falling with him, so far as any ill-desert on their part is concerned. For, until this sentence comes upon them, they are free of all sin or guilt, whether inherited and inherent or imputed; and free also of all subjective ground of condemnation, even though they sinned in and fell with him who in and through this very fall *did* contract subjective criminality. *So that their sin consists solely of the forensic imputation of his sin to them.* But as such imputation of a foreign sin could not, confessedly, take place until *after* the sin thus imputed had been perpetrated, so it is plain that they did not really sin in and fall with Adam, or *when* he sinned, (as the apostle affirms they did,) but *after* he had sinned and fallen. And if after he had sinned, then on what possible principle do Dr. Hodge and Catharinus allege that we sinned in and fell with him? His posterity were innocent (says Dr. Hodge) previous to the imputation of the *peccatum alienum*, and it was the imputation itself which constituted them guilty. Their sinning in and falling with him, therefore, is neither more nor less than a judicial act of the Creator, condemning them on account of a foreign sin of their father. But how, or on what ground, an act of the holy and blessed Creator is to be construed as our *sinning and falling*, and how it should come to be so described in a plain historic statement, Dr. Hodge has left the reader to explain.

Such, then, is the result which a fair analysis of the forecited

language yields : a judicial sentence of the righteous and eternal Judge condemning a subjectively innocent race for a crime which had been previously committed by their father, and of which he alone with Eve was subjectively guilty, may be fittingly and veraciously described in a dogmatic explanation of the occurrence by saying that *they sinned in and fell with* their father in that criminal transaction ! In view of which it need only be added that if Dr. Hodge considers such an utterance intelligible, he surely should be less free than he has shown himself to be in his application of the term "nonsensical" to the views of his brethren.*

As Adam was already morally depraved when he reached forth his hand and partook of the interdicted tree, on what ground are we to conclude that his posterity likewise were not depraved when they really (and not putatively) sinned in and fell with him in that transgression ? Such is the Augustinian faith on the subject ; and what, then, is there in the utterance that ought to have aroused, as it has, Dr. Hodge's denunciation and ridicule ? † It has the direct support of God's word, and is, moreover, clogged with no such incongruous consequences as attach to the theory which he has offered in lieu of it. Why, then, treat it thus ? Is it because we did not then *personally* exist, and therefore could not have personally participated in the sin ? But the Church has never taught that we did then personally exist, or personally participate ; and yet she has ever affirmed that we did then sin "originally," "potentially" (*δυνάμει*), "by participation;" and to use a more recent expression, "by an ethical appropriation of the guilt of the fall." But the *mode* in which this was effected, she has never professed to know, and therefore employs these expressions to designate the sinning of *the race*, as distinguished from the personal sinning of our first parents. For the fact of our actual sinning is historically announced as a momentary action of

* Dr. Hodge must excuse us for suggesting that the keen-edged satire of Pascal on a *sufficient grace that was not sufficient*, is quite in place here respecting this *sinning and not sinning at the same time, and by one and the same act*. See his Provincial Letters, Letter III.

† See especially his Revised Commentary on Romans, chapter v. 12-19.

the past; and the objection that we could not then participate, because we had no developed personal existence, if it could be made to apply to the case at all, is as fatal to the doctrine of any imputation as it could be to any participation in the offence. If, as Dr. Hodge alleges, a nonentity could not sin, a nonentity surely could not incur an imputation. And yet the divine averment directly assures us that the sinning of the race actually occurred *not after*, but *when Adam sinned*. And then, as both the act of Adam, and the already existing corrupt inclination which induced its perpetration, are the grounds of his condemnation, what hinders that our sin in and with him, and the corruption which led to it, should in like manner and along with his own sin as our head, constitute the ground of our condemnation—that is, the ground on which the apostle affirms that death passed upon all? Why vary the ground in its relation to his posterity?

The Church has always disclaimed any and every attempt at the philosophical solution of the *modus* of this participation, and is, therefore, (as stated in an article in the number of this REVIEW for April last,) quite as unwilling to adopt the solution which philosophical Realism proposes, as to sanction the solution propounded by Nominalism. She has always accepted the inspired statement (in Rom. v. 12, 18, 19,) *as a fact*; and in that fact, though of itself wholly inexplicable, her inner consciousness has always recognised a divinely given explanatory principle, which furnishes an intelligible and sufficient basis for the solution of all the great problems which have been started respecting the calamities of the race and their reconcileableness with the holiness, justice, and goodness of God.

We shall now proceed to consider the method of reasoning by which Dr. Hodge endeavors to sustain his doctrine; but must preface our argument with a brief remark on a point or two greatly insisted on by him in connexion with his claims on its behalf. And *first*, the Doctor objects strongly and repeatedly against the application of the term *theory* to designate his doctrine and exegesis on the subject. He frequently, and in a form that is calculated only to wound, applies that term to the doctrine of our participation in the Adamic sin, though this is the recog-

nised doctrine of the Church, and yet is aggrieved when either that term, or the term *dogma*, is applied to his own doctrine; though these terms have been applied to it directly by the Church theologians ever since that doctrine, with its exegesis, was asserted by Pighius, Catharinus, Slichtingius, and Crellius. We cannot, therefore, admit the disclaimer, much as it would gratify us to acquiesce in the wishes of Dr. Hodge. And neither can we, in the next place, assent to the demand that has recently been made on behalf of this theory, claiming that it is entitled to the *sobriquet* of "*the federal or representative system*"; for it has really no alliance with that system as taught in Calvinistic theology; but, as we are fully prepared to prove, is in radical hostility to all its distinguishing principles. Both Catharinus and Crellius claim quite as strongly as Dr. Hodge, that it was in consequence of Adam's violation of the covenant (*pactum*) made with him, that his innocent offspring were involved in the fearful calamities which have come upon the race. In regard to Catharinus, this is clear from the extracts given above. And as to the Socinian school, we cite below a passage from Crellius, the most profound genius of that school, which surely can leave no doubt on the subject.* But can this claim of theirs entitle their theory to the time-honored appellation of "*the federal or representative system*?" We say, No! and a thousand times, No! And yet, though this constitutes the sole claim of Dr. Hodge's theory to be so entitled, those who repudiate its claim to such a designation, are already invidiously accused of "*rejecting the federal system!*" To apply the term thus is therefore a misnomer; and Dr. Hodge must excuse us for affirming that it

* In his *Paraphrase of Romans*, he thus gives what he regards as the sense of Rom. v. 18: "Quare ut comparationem superius coeptam absolvimus, et totius rei summam concludamus: *quemadmodum ex uno delicto unius hominis, consecutum Dei iudicium omnes homines damnationi subiecit, eo, quo supra explicuimus, facto: ita etiam una unius hominis justitia factum est, ut gratia divina, in omnes homines, qui nempe eam, ut diximus, amplectuntur, dimanaret, ac vitam illis sempiternam afferet.*" Let the reader compare this with a passage in Dr. Hodge's *Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 26, 27, beginning with, "Not only, however," etc.

can on no account be recognised. When Epeus had fabricated the wooden horse, Sinon was adroitly sent forth to the crowds of admiring Trojans to give it a name. He bestowed upon it a sacred appellation, (donum Minervae,) through the influence of which the inhabitants of the city became so infatuated as to welcome the structure, with all the desolation and horrors it contained, into the very heart of Troy; and on the following morning, ILIUM FUIT told the sorrowful result.

And now, as to the reasoning which has been advanced in support of this theory.—Dr. Hodge admits that there must be a basis for the imputation of Adam's personal sin to his posterity, and that otherwise such imputation would be arbitrary and incapable of being justified.* But he maintains that the basis, is not their own subjective ill-desert, as, of course, he must do, claiming as he does that it is the imputation of a *peccatum alienum*, or Adam's strictly personal sin, which is the procuring cause of the spiritual death and moral corruption of the race. He, however, professes to find that the basis consists of "the union natural and representative between Adam and his posterity;" not, however, as it is taught by the Church theology, that this union, *by connecting the race subjectively with the sin of Adam*, constitutes thereby the ground of the imputation (*natura corrumpit personam*); but that it constitutes the ground of it without any such connexion, and while the race is entirely free of all subjective ill-desert; and on such a basis he endeavors to vindicate the procedure which he attributes to the Most High. He attempts, moreover, to support his view by adducing Rom. v. 12–21, together with numerous facts (claimed by him as analogies) derived from the Scriptures, and from the operations of Providence in its dealings with men. We shall defer our remarks on the passage in Romans until we shall have considered his statements containing the rest of the argument.

He says: "Our obligation to suffer for Adam's sin, so far as that sin is concerned, *arises solely from his being our representative, and not from any participation in its moral turpitude.*"†

*Theology, Vol. II., p. 196.

† Princeton Essays, first series, p. 17i.

And he cites from Stapfer the following statement: "God, in imputing this sin (Adam's), *finds* the whole moral person (the human race) ALREADY a sinner, and not merely constitutes it such." And this Dr. Hodge actually represents as a denial of antecedent and immediate imputation, and an assertion of the doctrine of "mediate imputation."* And in his *Theology*, he reiterates the affirmation.† Such a confounding of antecedent and immediate imputation with gratuitous imputation, on the one hand, and the church doctrine with the technical notion of *mediate* imputation on the other, is, to us, wholly inexplicable. But our limits will not permit us to dwell upon it here.

Thus, the actual doctrine entertained by the Calvinistic Church from the beginning, is set aside by Dr. Hodge, who, in lieu of it, maintains that the first sin *became common by being imputed*,‡ and not, as the Church has ever held and taught, *that it was common to all, and therefore imputed to all*; or, as Edwards, in his Reply to Dr. Taylor, expresses it, "The sin of the apostasy is not theirs, because God imputes it to them; *but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground God imputes it to them.*"§ And again: "The first existing of a corrupt disposition *is not to be looked upon as sin distinct from their participation of Adam's first sin. It is, as it were, the extended pollution of that sin.*"|| It is noticeable in the connexion that Dr. Hodge attempts no discussion of the view thus intelligibly and clearly presented, though it be the doctrine perpetually inculcated by the Church from the days of Augustine, but satisfies himself by stigmatising it as philosophical Realism, and mediate imputation, in the offensive theological sense of that term as applied to the views of Placaenus.

In his late work, and when treating on "the Representative Principle in Scripture," as involved in his views of the imputation of Adam's sin, he proceeds in the following line of argument, to which we invite especial attention: "2. This representative principle pervades the whole Scriptures. The imputation

* Princeton Essays, first series, p. 149.

† Vol. II., p. 207.

‡ See his *Theology*, Vol. II., pp. 191, 192, 196, 204, 205, 240, 253.

§ See Edwards's Works, Vol. II., p. 559 (New York, 1830). || *Ibid*, p. 334.

of Adam's sin is not an isolated fact;" in illustration and proof of which he adduces Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7, Jer. xxxii. 18, and the cases of Esau, Moab, and Ammon, with their descendants, and of Dathan, Abiram, and Achan, with their families; and also refers to other similar facts everywhere occurrent in the word of God, as well as to others mentioned in profane history. And then, by way of anticipating what he supposes "may be said—that this is not to be referred to the justice of God, but to the undesigned working of a general law, which, in despite of incidental evil, is, on the whole, beneficent," he adds: "The difficulty on that assumption, instead of being lessened, is only increased. On either theory, the nature and the degree of suffering are the same. The only difference relates to the question, why they suffer for offences of which they are not personally guilty. The Bible says these sufferings are judicial; they are inflicted as punishment, in support of law." . . . "The assumption that one man cannot righteously, under the government of God, be punished for the sins of another. is not only contrary; as we have seen, to the express declarations of the Scripture, and to the administration of the divine government from the beginning, but it is subversive of the doctrines of the atonement and justification," etc.*

The *imputation* which, in all these passages, (as well as throughout his three essays on that doctrine,) Dr. Hodge thus labors to sustain is, as our readers have doubtless observed, *gratuitous imputation*. And yet, though he has, in the same connexion, cited the cases, he does not believe that Philemon could have justly imputed gratuitously the debt of Onesimus to Paul, or that our sins were gratuitously imputed to our adorable Redeemer; that is, that in either case there could have been a just imputation, without the concurrence of him who was the subject of it. In what way, then, can such cases either illustrate or confirm the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin? But not to dwell upon this, let us proceed to consider briefly this line of labored ratiocination; for the simple question is, whether sin may be gratuitously imputed or charged upon the guiltless.

* Theology, Vol. II., pp. 198-202.

The first important point demanding the reader's attention, is the marked endeavor of Dr. Hodge to illustrate and confirm and so identify his theory of the imputation of Adam's personal sin to a *subjectively innocent* posterity, (for so he affirms them to be,) with the imputation of a parent's sin to an already *subjectively guilty* offspring—as is the fact in all the cases adduced by him in confirmation and illustration of his position and argument. For he claims that the doctrine of imputation may be alike impeached in both cases, if it be liable to exception in the former. He assumes this without attempting to establish it, vital and fundamental as is the difference between the case of Adam and his offspring, and the other cases alleged; and thus rests the whole of his ratiocination upon a mere *petitio principii*. But let us contemplate the procedure in the light of a brief illustration.

If, in relation to the administration of some human government, it were claimed that, because the ruler had the conceded right in regard to sundry criminals already under sentence of death, to make a summary disposal of them by associating them in the punishment to which other criminals had been consigned, (*i. e.*, executing them all together,) and which punishment in no way transcended their own real desert, he therefore possessed the prerogative likewise to condemn and execute the guiltless, and that the two things are so far analogous that to question his right to do the latter would involve the denial of his conceded right to do the former, what would be either the moral or logical value of such an argument, however boldly and emphatically it might be insisted on? And what weight or intelligence could be accredited to the opinions of those who should insist on the validity of such a conclusion? And does the actual case in the matter before us (so far as the real point is concerned,) differ, in any essential particular, from that of the case supposed for illustration? Here is an existing race; guilty, polluted, and already under sentence of death; and God has, without transcending their actual desert, taken occasion to include portions of it in the punishment which is inflicted upon other portions for some specific offence. And this procedure, says Dr. Hodge, is sufficient to illustrate and confirm the assertion that God claims and exercises the prerogative

to condemn also the guiltless, and to treat them in a similar manner!

If Dr. Hodge can really regard these cases as parallel, we shall not object to his thus reasoning from one to the other; nor are we unwilling that his argument should be accepted as conclusive by any who may see its force and relevancy. But we do object to his endeavors to represent such views as the doctrine of the Church, or of the word of God. The Reformed divines could and did, with entire propriety, adduce the cases of Esau, Dathan, Achan, etc., with their seed, in illustration and confirmation of their doctrine of the imputation of the Adamic sin. For, according to that doctrine, the race was not (as Dr. Hodge makes it,) subjectively innocent anterior to the original imputation, but subjectively guilty, by a participation of the first offence, which was, therefore, imputed to them. But Dr. Hodge can, in no legitimate sense, allege those cases in support of his view, *that the race was guiltless when the imputation was made, and was constituted guilty through the imputation itself.*

This, however singular it may seem, is not the main feature of logical incongruity in this endeavor to sustain his theory. It will be observed from the foregoing citations that in the one case, to wit, that of Adam and his seed, Dr. Hodge finds both a natural and federal relation actually existing, and which he names *a federal and natural union of Adam with his posterity*; and thus far his finding is certainly accurate. But inaccurately, and upon the ground of this union alone, he assumes to justify the gratuitous imputation of guilt and punishment to the posterity of Adam, on account of his *peccatum alienum*; and claims, moreover, that this relation furnishes just and righteous ground for such imputation. In the other cases, however, which he alleges in confirmation of his argument, to wit, those specified in Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7, and Jer. xxxii. 18, as well as those of Korah, Achan, etc., and which he regards as sufficiently analogous to warrant his reasoning from the one to the other, he finds existing *the natural relation alone*—that of parent to his descendants. And yet, on the sole ground of this natural relation, he would justify the imputation and punishment in these cases. He has repeatedly

averred, as we shall presently see, that the difference between the two, as furnishing a ground for imputation, is vital and fundamental. And yet, notwithstanding this vital and fundamental difference, he here, in the extremity of his theory, is compelled to regard the cases as so intrinsically alike, that (as he endeavors to show) the justice of God may impute sin, pronounce sentence, and then punish, as well on the ground of the natural relation alone, as on the ground of the natural and federal conjoined; and that in either case, as well on the one ground as on the other, notwithstanding this vital inconsistency with each other, the requirements of justice may be exacted, and the divine law be sustained in its demands, and fully vindicated in its exactions! Such is the representation here exhibited, and by which the gratuitous imputation of sin is to be demonstrated. But if the facts be so, why and on what ground did divine justice, as Dr. Hodge so emphatically alleges, *require as indispensable to a just imputation*, that a moral or federal relation, along with the natural, should exist as the basis of its exactions and of the punishment it inflicted in the one case, (*i. e.*, that of Adam and his seed,) while in the other cases claimed by him as analogous and confirmatory of this statement, it makes no such requirement, but, on the contrary, regards the natural relation alone as a wholly sufficient basis for these exactions? Can any legitimate conclusion in favor of the gratuitous imputation of sin be deduced from such an argument?

And then still further. Even this is not the most incongruous element in the foregoing attempt to assimilate that dogma with Augustinian theology; for in regard to Adam and his posterity, Dr. Hodge finds *the federal relation alone* the ground of the judgment unto condemnation which passed upon the race. In referring to the *Larger Catechism*, Question 22, he says: "If English be any longer English, this means that it was our representative—as a public person we sinned *in him—in virtue of a union resulting from a covenant or contract*. Let it be noted that this is the *only union* here mentioned. The bond arising from our natural relation to him as our parent, is not even referred to. It is neglected because of its secondary importance,

representation being the main ground of imputation ; *so that when representation ceases imputation ceases, although the natural bond continues.*”* Again : “According to this view of the subject, *the ground of the imputation of Adam’s sin is the federal union between him and his posterity, in such a sense that it would not have been imputed, had he not been constituted their representative.* It is imputed to them, not because it was antecedently to that imputation and irrespective of *the covenant on which the imputation is founded,* already theirs, but because they were appointed to stand their probation in him.”†

Now if all this be so, then we are logically brought to the conclusion that the justice of God vindicates itself, and so sustains the divine law and government, on grounds which are not only opposite, but really subversive of each other, according to Dr. Hodge’s often-repeated affirmation. In the one case, it vindicates itself and sustains the government on the ground of the federal relation alone, as that relation is (says Dr. Hodge,) the sole ground of imputation ; and in the other and analogous cases, (as Dr. Hodge’s argument represents them to be,) it vindicates itself in the same demands, and upholds the same government, on the ground of the natural relation alone. And furthermore, in the former case, (*i. e.*, that of Adam and his seed,) the “*sin would not have been imputed ;*” and “*there could have been no imputation on the ground of the natural relation ;*” yet in the latter cases adduced for confirmation and illustration of the truth of this representation, *the natural relation is the sole ground of the imputation !* Such is the argument by which the Doctor would demonstrate that his theory is an integral part of Calvinistic theology, and so justify his violent proscription of his brethren who repudiate that theory. And thus, by confounding gratuitous with immediate and antecedent imputation, and by persisting in the unauthorised assumption that the gratuitous imputation of sin was taught by the Reformed Church, and that, consequently, what the Reformers with reason urged in support of their doc-

* Princeton Essays, first series, p. 187.

† Princeton Review, for 1860, p. 340.

trine, might also be alleged by him in support of his theory, Dr. Hodge has been led into these mortifying and fatal inconsistencies and contradictions. The instances alleged, as we have already stated, are all of them applicable for illustration and confirmation of the doctrine entertained by the Protestant Church, to wit, that the race was already morally corrupt when the imputation was made; while, on the contrary, every one of them furnishes a direct and unanswerable argument against the theory which Dr. Hodge would incorporate with the theology of the Church.

That the posterity of Adam were condemned for his personal sin alone, or the children of Dathan, Achan, and others, for their parents' sin alone—that is, without regard to their own existing depravity, as the argument of Dr. Hodge necessarily infers, is not only a wholly baseless assumption, but is condemned alike by the word of God and the convictions of our moral nature. The theological views of our Church in regard to the cases of Achan, etc., which are now adduced by Dr. Hodge in support of his theory, are clearly expressed by the late venerable Dr. Junkin, who, in 1835, in his argument before the Synod at York, (Pa.,) in the case of Mr. Barnes, remarks: "Mr. Barnes says that to deny this principle is the object of the eighteenth chapter of Ezekiel. *Here we agree, for I deny that the sin of Achan was the sole or true ground of his children's death.* And I deny it simply on the principle that evils upon a moral being can follow, in a perfect government, only the transgression of law; and this transgression must be committed either by the individual or by one rightfully authorised to act for him. *But Achan was not so appointed, . . . and therefore his sin could not be the sole, true, and legal procuring cause of their death; at the very most, it was the occasion only.* (b) Because, if Achan's sin was the *sole cause* of their death, they being yet infants, *their execution was itself an infinitely greater offence against the laws of right than Achan's sin.* He was not their representative in this matter, and their lives could not *justly* be the forfeit of his act. On the contrary, (c) they had been born under sentence of condemnation—they were guilty of death by the transgression of Adam," etc. "Here Mr. Barnes remarks: 'How can a just government

be sustained, in the ends of moral agents, if it holds those guilty who are innocent, and punishes those who have no ill-desert? This objection to the language is insuperable.' *So it is. But whose language is it? No Calvinist ever held it.* We do not say that children are innocent. The reverse is our doctrine. They have deeply-seated corruption in the heart, *and this is a result of their sin in their original representative, Adam.*"*

Our next point is the use and application which Dr. Hodge makes of Rom. v. 12-21, in order to support his theory. How, then, would he prove the gratuitous imputation of sin from this passage? for he claims most emphatically that it is here indubitably taught.

The points which he is obliged to assume as the basis of his argument from the passage are: 1. That *ἡμαρτον* they (all) *sinned*, and *ἁμαρτωλοὶ* *sinner*s, are to be construed in a metonymic or merely putative sense. 2. That the *modes* in which sin and righteousness are transmitted, are points of comparison in the analogy here instituted between the First and Second Adam; and 3. That the key of this alleged comparison of the modes, is the gratuitous imputation of the righteousness of Christ to his spiritual seed; that is, that Paul here compares not merely the facts of an imputation in both cases, but the *mode* in which Adam's sin is communicated to his posterity with the *mode* in which the righteousness of Christ is communicated to his seed; which being, confessedly, by a gratuitous imputation, and without any subjective desert of their own, so it must follow, says Dr. Hodge, that Adam's sin is imputed to his seed gratuitously, and without any demerit or ill-desert on their part; † which being granted, it becomes, of course, an actual necessity that both *ἀμαρτάνειν* and *ἀμαρτωλός* should be taken in a merely putative sense, and not as importing subjective demerit or sin.

* *The Vindication*, etc., by Rev. George Junkin, D. D., pp. 104, 111. Philadelphia. 1836.

† See, for example, his *Theology*, Vol. I., pp. 26, 27, and Vol. II., pp. 187-192, and 551, 552; also, his *Commentary on the passage*, especially the Revised Edition; and likewise, the *Princeton Essays*, first series, pp. 171-174, 176, 177; also, the *Princeton Review*, for 1860, pp. 339-341, 368, 763, 764.

The *first* of these points we shall consider presently. The *second* (*i. e.*, that the *modes* are here compared,) is the merest assumption, the truth of which is emphatically denied by all the leading divines of the first ages of the Reformation, such as Calvin, Hyperius, Beza, Pareus, Piscator, Rivetus, Gomar, De Dieu, and others; who, while they affirm the imputation of both sin and righteousness, deny that this imputation constitutes any part of the comparison in the analogy, and affirm that they are therein presented as points of antithesis. Rivetus, for example, says: "For the sin of Adam is communicated to us by generation, but the righteousness of Christ by imputation." So, too, Beza, Gomar, and the others.* Later divines, however, who affirm, equally with the above, the subjective guilt of the race in the first sin, *e. g.*, such as Marck and De Moor, think that the modes are herein presented as points of comparison, so far as the *fact* of our imputation in both cases is concerned; but at the same time are very careful to state that the *imputations themselves* are not to be compared. For there would be danger to the truth from such a procedure in regard to both branches of the comparison; that is, it should not be strained on the one hand, so as to enervate the doctrine of justification by faith alone; nor on the other, the doctrine that the first sin was the common sin of the race, and that the posterity of Adam were already corrupt and sinful when his sin was imputed to them. In other words, that the comparison of the modes here pertains simply to the fact *that both sin and righteousness are imputed*, and is not to be pressed so as to teach, on the one hand, that because the posterity of Adam *subjectively deserved* the imputation of his sin, the spiritual seed of Christ therefore *subjectively deserve* the imputation of his righteousness; or, on the other hand, that because Christ's righteousness is imputed gratuitously, therefore the merely personal sin of Adam was gratuitously imputed to a subjectively innocent offspring, as was then asserted by the Socinians and Remonstrants. And as

* Our limits will not allow us to cite here the testimony of the learned and venerable men referred to; but our readers may find a goodly number of them carefully and accurately cited in the *Danville Review* for 1862, pp. 517-530.

thus guarded and qualified, the statement that the modes may be referred to in the analogy, even if admitted, is, as is evident, wholly subversive of the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin.

But the *third* of these assumptions, and that on which Dr. Hodge's theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin depends wholly for support, (for though we have stated them separately, it really involves the other two,) is not only unauthorised in Calvinistic theology, but contrary to the expressed dogmatic utterances of the Church from Augustine until now. In the commencement of this article we have shown how the principle itself has always been regarded by our approved divines, whenever they had occasion to advert to it. And we now affirm that Dr. Hodge cannot adduce a single representative theologian of the Church who has ever taught his theory and the exegesis he gives of the passage before us. The following are a few of his statements in which he endeavors to show that the passage does support it. "The scope of the passage is to illustrate the doctrine of justification on the ground of the righteousness of Christ, by a reference to the condemnation of men for the sin of Adam. The analogy is destroyed, and the point of comparison fails, if anything in us be assumed as the ground of the infliction of the penal evils of which the apostle is here speaking."* So, too, in his *Theology*: "Not only, however, does the comparison which the apostle makes between Adam and Christ lead to the conclusion that as all are condemned for the sin of the one, so all are saved by the righteousness of the other, those only excepted whom the Scriptures except."† Again: "The parallel is destroyed, the doctrine and argument of the apostle overturned, if it be denied that the sin of Adam, as antecedent to any sin or sinfulness of our own, is the ground of our condemnation."‡ All this, however, is but piling one assumption upon another, to wit, that the apostle, in order to show that God's mercy is perfectly gratuitous in justifying the penitent ungodly, must necessarily affirm like-

* Commentary on Romans v. 12, and repeated also on verses 15, 18, 19

† Vol. I., pp. 26, 27.

‡ *Ibid.*, Vol II., pp. 212, 213.

wise that his sentence of condemnation must also be gratuitous, and have no relation to the subjective demerit of the condemned. But the only refutation that an assertion so utterly unauthorised and absurd requires, is a bare denial. *It is not true* that, because God extends mercy gratuitously to the penitent believing sinner, he therefore inflicts vengeance gratuitously upon the innocent. Paul has in no way taught any such notion.

If this tremendous doctrine, that God may, without regard to its own agency or concurrence, charge soul-destroying guilt upon a guiltless, rational and accountable, creature, be taught in the Scriptures, this is absolutely the only place in which, with the slightest shadow of reason, it is claimed to be found. But though it be a doctrine which seems not only irreconcilable to the moral consciousness, but which, on the ground of the universally conceded canon—*causa causae est causa causati*—appears also to furnish a logical basis for the extenuation and excuse of all actual sin in the posterity of Adam, we offer not these as objections to the truth of the doctrine itself, on the supposition that there is to be conceded with it a scriptural basis; for, if but once plainly announced by the Spirit of Truth, it is as worthy of all acceptance as if he had announced it on every page of his word. But in respect to the claim that it *is* here announced, it certainly is not apart from the province of due consideration to suggest whether a doctrine which, if conceded to be taught, must essentially modify the conception hitherto entertained by the Church universal as to the whole system of revealed truth, and (as can be fully demonstrated,) logically render the most peremptory convictions of our moral nature pointless and uncertain, might not be expected to have been taught in the form of direct dogmatic statement, rather than be left to be merely *inferred* from a doubtful, or, at most, an incidental allusion found in an illustration which the apostle had selected for the purpose of setting forth to our helpless and perishing race the mercy and goodness of God. We say *doubtful allusion*; because the whole claim that the doctrine is true, depends on the aforesaid unsustained assumption that the *modes, i. e.*, of our justification through Christ and condemnation through Adam, form an integral part of the

comparison: an assumption which is destitute of support alike from exegesis and the analogy of faith. Take away, then, from the supposed points of resemblance the alleged comparison of the modes, and Dr. Hodge's whole theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin vanishes into thin air, hopelessly and forever. And since, therefore, the leading divines of the past ages, (as we have shown,) in expounding the passage, have failed to find the mode mentioned therein, and have emphatically denied that it is therein introduced as a part of the comparison of similitudes, is it not, we again ask, somewhat surprising that a doctrine of such tremendous sequences, both as regards our conception of God's moral perfections and of the relations he sustains to his accountable creatures, should have been unrecognised by the Church in any age, and be left by the Author of revelation to be developed only inferentially from one little corner of an illustration which had been introduced for the purpose of setting forth, by various points of similitude and dissimilitude, God's boundless love and compassion towards man as exhibited through our Lord Jesus Christ? And is it really conceivable that Paul should undertake to *illustrate* and establish God's infinite goodness and mercy to the race *by showing that he charges them gratuitously with soul-destroying guilt, and then treats them in accordance with the charge?*

The apostle having previously set forth the ruined and helpless condition of our race, and announced the way of deliverance through faith in our Lord Jesus Christ, and having shown, moreover, that they who accept the proffer of mercy obtain peace with God, being thus reconciled to him, and have free access to him through Jesus Christ, next proceeds to present, in a condensed and most impressive form, a view of the points which his argument had thus far elicited, and to show their relation to the whole scheme of redemption. He had been unfolding the awful truth that the Gentile world, and along with it the Jews, were all under sin—in a guilty, condemned, and hopeless state—but as yet had said nothing of the first fall as the procuring cause of all this woe, nor of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. The fact that they were all alike under sin, (a fact to the truth of which their

own consciences bare witness,) was plainly stated, and there left as undisputed and indisputable. He had, as stated above, also announced salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, and illustrated the method by which we may avail ourselves of the proffered mercy, declaring that God would receive and justify, through Jesus, all who believingly accept that proffer; and now, in summing up and illustrating the argument, he introduces the First Adam—the procuring cause of our fall and misery—and, after remarking that he was a type of him who was to come, to wit, Christ, shows how Christ, sustaining the relation of a Second Adam, was the procuring cause of our deliverance and salvation; and in dwelling on this analogy, shows that, as we were constituted sinners by the disobedience of the one—we all having sinned in and with him—so we are constituted righteous by the obedience of the other, who, by his obedience, had effected the reconciliation of which (in verse 11) he had just spoken. So that, as by the one offence, (justice demanding our punishment,) the judgment unto condemnation was pronounced against us, so by the one righteousness the free gift came upon all unto justification of life.

Such is a brief outline of the argument. On what ground, then, is it to be supposed that the analogy thus presented requires a comparison between the *mode* in which the judgment unto condemnation is inflicted, and that in which the free gift of righteousness is bestowed? Does not the simple fact that the one is inflicted on the race as a punishment for their sin, and the other bestowed as the free gift of mercy, delivering from all sin and condemnation, render the whole matter sufficiently obvious and easily understood? Then further. Can it really amount to anything, except to perplex the argument of the apostle, to add that the sentence of condemnation resembles the sentence of acquittal? They cannot certainly be compared as points of similarity, except so far as the righteous Judge of all has pronounced them both; and this surely does not infer a resemblance between them. For the judgment comes upon the race for the one offence in which we all participated; while, in the other case, the free gift, which is more than a sentence of mere acquittal, comes to us gratuitously; for in no sense could we merit that.

Where, then, is the resemblance? In the former, the one offence, on account of our participation therein, (*ἐφ' ᾧ πάντες ἠμαρτον.*) is charged upon us for condemnation; and is, therefore, in no sense a gratuitous imputation. In the latter, the one righteousness in which we did not participate, is gratuitously bestowed upon us for justification. And these things were, from the preceding argument of the apostle, sufficiently plain, and needed not to be formally presented in the analogy, even as points of antithesis, the mere statement of the facts being sufficient. But as to their being points of similitude and comparison, in the sense asserted by Dr. Hodge, there is nothing of the kind in the passage, nor has the Church ever entertained any such conception!

But as the Doctor claims that they really are points of similitude and comparison, let us now briefly inquire what he proposes to gain by so doing. We have shown above that in the analogy the two points—the one relating to justice, and the other to mercy—may, either or both of them, be unduly extended, unless the scope of the apostle be regarded, as De Moor, (*ut supra*) and Turretin, (Loc. 16, Quaest. 2, § 19,) and others, have carefully stated, though they held that the fact of an imputation in both cases is here implied. But Dr. Hodge, in this his assumption, does not propose to show that as the judgment unto condemnation is an act of punitive justice for subjective ill-desert, therefore the justification must likewise be regarded as flowing to us for subjective desert (which principle, absurd as it is, is still maintained by multitudes); but has chosen the other member of the antithesis as his starting-point; and as the free gift is a gratuitous bestowment, and in no way dependent on our subjective desert, so, in like manner, must the condemnatory sentence be a free and gratuitous bestowment! It is simply to incorporate with evangelical theology this astounding conception, that the analogy must be here pressed into a formal recognition of the modes—not as points of antithesis, which the early divines insist that they are—but as points of similitude! And Dr. Hodge peremptorily insists that unless this be granted, the whole analogy fails, “the apostle’s argument is overturned,” and we “take sides with the Jews against

him*." So that, according to the Doctor's exposition, we are to believe that, as the Most High bestows blessings and favors gratuitously, he therefore gratuitously curses his innocent creatures, and visits them with the exactions of his punitive or avenging justice. It would certainly seem that the mere statement of such a conception must, on reflection, suffice for its refutation and rejection. The subject is suggestive of themes for reflection, and we refer to a single one before passing to our next point.

The mercy here adverted to by the apostle as the free gift of God, is, as we have seen, a purely gratuitous bestowment upon the needy but penitent believer. It is entirely the work of God, therefore, who confessedly takes pleasure in all his works and ways, (Psalm civ. 31,) and can, with complacency, contemplate this and its happy results as his own work. Now the theory of Dr. Hodge makes the condemnatory sentence of Adam's *guiltless* offspring (for such he of necessity affirms them to be antecedent to that sentence) equally gratuitous, equally the work of God, who, as he thus clothes with this fearful guilt the innocent creature, hands him over into an indescribably dreadful condition of spiritual death and misery, and of abiding enmity to holiness and to himself, and to all his works and ways. And this, agreeably to the theory in question, is as purely and simply his own work as is the other. Will Dr. Hodge, then, or any who may have adopted this theory, undertake to say that our good and gracious God, who takes no pleasure in the death even of the sinner, can with complacency contemplate such a work as this, with its assured and eternal enmity to himself? Let the inquiry be fairly met and answered, and let there be no attempted evasion to the effect that the exhibition of wrath or indignation against sinners is always unpleasant to the Divine Nature, and is his strange work, and the like; for, even admitting this in its fullest extent, the question here pertains not to *sinners*, (as Dr. Hodge himself constantly affirms,) but to the *guiltless*. It relates to the grounds for the exhibition of this wrath against those who were *not* sinners, but subjectively *guiltless* or innocent of all sin and free from all ill-desert, and from any subjective blame whatever.

* See *Princeton Review* for 1860. pp. 341, 344, 345.

And, moreover, it was the exhibition of this very wrath against them which subsequent to its infliction brought them out of their guiltless state into a state of guilt and misery and spiritual death. We ask, then, again, will the venerable Princeton Professor, or any who accept his views, venture to affirm that God could with complacency contemplate *as his own* such a work, as he confessedly can his work of renewing and justifying and saving the redeemed? Their theory demands an affirmative answer to the inquiry; for a negative will be tantamount to an admission that the theory itself is false.

The science of hermeneutics, therefore, can furnish no relief in the extremity to which this theory finds itself reduced in the attempt to constitute *gratuitous* justification and *merited* condemnation points of resemblance and comparison in this analogy. And to achieve such a result, while *κρίμα* here retains its relation to *εἰς κατάκριμα*, is simply impossible. For a sentence unto condemnation can never be other than antithetical to the bestowment of a free and gracious gift.

In regard to verbal criticism, our readers need be detained but a moment. We have already shown that Dr. Hodge's attempted construction of the analogy renders it logically imperative that he attach to both *ἀμαρτάνειν* and *ἀμαρτωλός* a merely putative or tropical meaning, and that consequently he does attempt to explain them in this manner. In the issue these are the determining words, so far, at least, as this—that if they are unsusceptible of such a sense, the doctrine of the gratuitous imputation of sin becomes the merest fancy. For if *to sin* and *sinner*, are here to be understood in a literal and not tropical sense, it irresistibly follows that there was in the race itself a moral or subjective ground for the imputation of the Adamic sin. How, then, stands the case in respect to the meaning of these terms?

Ernesti, in his *Institutio Interpretis*,* lays it down as an unquestioned principle of interpretation, that words are not to be explained tropically which have lost their *original* or proper signification (in tropicorum numero non esse habenda verba, quae

* In Part IV., Sect. ii., Cap. iv., § 7, Dr. Ammon's edition, Leipsic, 1809.

proprium significationem amiserunt); and in the category of these, both of the words referred to are indisputably to be placed. And accordingly, they are never employed in a metonymical or tropical sense in the Scriptures, unless their use in the passage before us is to be excepted. And hence Meyer, perhaps the ablest of modern interpreters, denounces the forensic interpretation of *ἀμαρτάνειν* in Rom. v. 12 as “*sheer grammatical arbitrariness*, for *ἡμαρτον* means *they sinned* and nothing else.”

In the New Testament, *ἀμαρτάνειν* is employed *forty-three times*, and *ἀμαρτωλός* *forty-six*; and in no instance is it even pretended that they are elsewhere employed therein in the sense claimed by Dr. Hodge in the passage before us. So that Whitby, in his Commentary, (in which he assails to his utmost the church doctrine of original sin,) after adopting for this purpose and insisting on the same exegesis of the passage which Dr. Hodge has given, is obliged to say that “it is true we meet not with the words *ἡμαρτον* and *ἀμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν*, in this sense, elsewhere in the New Testament.” This is so. And there is really, therefore, no solid reason why Dr. Hodge should insist on giving the words in this instance the meaning he does. Nor can he name any, except that (as we have above shown) the exigency of his theory requires it.

He claims, however, two instances in the Septuagint. The first is Gen. xliii. 9, (compare also xliv. 32,) where Judah uses the phrase, *ἡμαρτηκῶς ἔσομαι*, to bind himself to his father to return Benjamin to him; *i. e.*, If I fail to bring him back, then I shall have transgressed, or broken my faith with thee. Of course neither Judah nor his father would construe the pledge as irrespective of divine providences over which man could have no control. And this being so, can any one allege that Judah would not have been in every sense of the word *a sinner*—guilty of the breach of a solemn covenant, had he failed to do what he pledges himself to his father to perform? Where, then, is the metonymy?

In the second of these instances, (1 Kings i. 21,) Bathsheba, referring to herself and Solomon, says to David that, if Adonijah succeed in his attempted usurpation of the throne, I and my son shall be *ἀμαρτωλοὶ*, that is, we shall be held and treated as guilty of

that of which we shall really be guilty, to wit, *disaffection to his usurped reign*. Had he succeeded, therefore, and had he thus treated them, would the treatment have been contrary to the actual facts of the case? Could they have been otherwise than disaffected with such a usurpation of their prerogatives? And would their punishment have been for a merely putative guilt? Of course not. Such instances, therefore, instead of confirming Dr. Hodge's assumption, only add their testimony to prove it untenable.

Before leaving the point, we ought to remark that the claim set up by Whitby and Taylor of Norwich on behalf of this exegesis, to wit, that it was favored by several of the Greek fathers, is of no real weight. Those fathers did not receive the doctrine of original sin, and hence suggested the metonymic or figurative interpretation. It probably originated with Chrysostom, though not to the extent of making the verbs (*i. e.*, ἀμαρτάνειν and καθιστάναι) metonymic; but places the metonymy upon the noun ἀμαρτωλοί, which he makes to mean *obnoxious to punishment and condemned to death*. The conception owes its elaboration to the Socinian school in their efforts to destroy the doctrine of our participation in the first sin. And they and their followers, the Remonstrants, extended the metonymy, as Dr. Hodge also does, to both noun and verbs; thus making the apostle teach that the posterity were guiltless before the judgment came upon them; and that it came upon them because they were "regarded and treated as sinners" by that judgment coming upon them: which is certainly an "un-thinkable proposition."

Such, then, are the reasons on which Dr. Hodge would justify his interpretation of ἀμαρτωλός and ἀμαρτάνειν throughout this paragraph, to wit, that they are to be taken in a putative and not in a moral or literal sense; and signify simply that the race, not for its own sin, but on account of the merely personal sin of Adam, "*were regarded and treated as sinners.*" And this interpretation he arrays against the doctrine that all so participated in the first sin as to become really sinners. This, too, is precisely the exposition of the passage which the Socinian school from the first arrayed against the church doctrine of original sin. They adopt

and apply it with the view of destroying that doctrine, while the Doctor adopts and applies it just as they do, and claims to be thereby defending that doctrine. It would require many pages to develop the facts fully; but we can cite only a brief specimen or two.

Socinus (on verses 18, 19) says, that to be constituted sinners, and to be constituted righteous, here mean *to be regarded and treated as such*. "Pro peccatoribus habiti, atque ut tales tractati;" "Pro justis sunt habendi, atque ut tales tractandi."* Death entered into the world "*because God saw fit to punish the sin of the first man with death.*"†

Again: "For, as the offence and disobedience of Adam proclaimed him guilty of death, *from which it came to pass that the whole human race, as procreated and propagated from him after that guilt, was wholly exposed to death, so,*" etc. (ex quo factum est, ut universum humanum genus, quod post reatum illum ab ipso procreatum et propagatum est, morti penitus obnoxium sit, sic, etc., p. 225.)

Crellius, in his Paraphrase on verse 19, says: "For as through the disobedience of one it came to pass that many, that is, all who are begotten of him, *should be treated as sinners, and be subjected to the same punishment with the parent who had transgressed the divine law,* (tanquam peccatores tractarentur, et eidem supplicio cum parente legem divinam transgresso subjicerentur,) so also shall it be through the obedience of one man, that many, even all who by him are spiritually renewed, should be treated as righteous, and obtain the same reward which he obtained." (P. 213.)

Slichtingius, in his Commentary, says, on verse 14: "Sins, therefore, are imputed for death (imputata sunt ad mortem) to the posterity of Adam, not on account of the law of God which had not then been proclaimed, but on account of Adam and his sin (sed propter Adamum ejusque peccatum"). And after quoting verse 19, he adds: "*Of one man, even Adam—were constituted sinners; that is, were pronounced sinners, were condemned, were adjudged to death, and affected with death; for this constituting was by a decree and in execution of a decree.*" (P. 208.)

* Opera, Tom. I., p. 149.

† *Ibid*, Tom. II., p. 225.

In the *Compendiolum Socinianismi*, containing a statement of the doctrine of their churches, they say (in chapter iv., *On the Fall of Man and Original Sin*): "Our churches acknowledge that this guilt (*reatus*) has passed upon all the posterity of Adam, without any intervening fault (*culpa*) of their own:" That is, by a gratuitous imputation.

Here, then, is the theory of the gratuitous imputation of sin fully taught and affirmed by this school for the express purpose of destroying the doctrine of original sin as entertained and taught by the Churches of the Reformation. And is it really conceivable that that theory now, under the Midasian touch of Dr. Hodge, should have become that very doctrine of the Reformation itself, though we find it rejected and refuted by the Reformers, to a man? It is the theory which the Remonstrants likewise, and for the very same purpose, adopted; and the modern semi-Pelagians, such as Whitby, (see his commentary on the passage,) and Taylor of Norwich, throughout his work on Original Sin, which Edwards refuted; all of which can be demonstrated. And yet we are now required by not a few in our Church to accept it, under the penalty of forfeiting all claim to soundness of doctrine.* We earnestly hope that the matter will be promptly and thoroughly investigated by the Church, though in the kindest and most considerate spirit towards the venerable Professor at Princeton which fidelity to the truth of God will allow; for, after the most laborious and candid and thorough examination of the facts in the case, (not a tithe of which could be presented in

*See in Dr. Baird's *Rejoinder to the Princeton Review* a fact in illustration of this statement, which has never received from the Church the attention it demands. Dr. Baird, in the summer of 1854, when applying for admission into a Presbytery in New Jersey, on being questioned, expressed his dissent from Dr. Hodge's tropical interpretation of the passage before us, "that we are regarded and treated *as though* we had sinned in Adam;" upon which he was by the leading members of that body denounced and stigmatised "with almost every name of heresy which is most obnoxious to the Reformed Churches." (See pp. 2-5, published by Joseph Wilson, Philadelphia, 1860.) Such was even then the claim of this Socinian exegesis to revolutionise the theology of our Church.

this brief article,) we cannot but believe that the result of now accepting this theory and exegesis will be to clothe our Church in sackcloth and ashes for generations to come.

We cannot conclude without adverting to a matter which it would be unpardonable wholly to pass over in the connexion. Dr. Hodge, in defending his theory and exposition of Romans v. 12-21 from the charge of heresy, (see *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 762-763,) has remarked that the late Dr. Archibald Alexander read and approved his Commentary on Romans, anterior to its publication. The Doctor would do us great injustice were he to suppose that we would raise a question as to veracity in regard to anything which he has presented as a fact. But the precious memory of Dr. Alexander certainly does require a suggestion of the probability of mistake, or failure of recollection, in regard to some particular or other pertaining to this matter; for in 1833, and therefore only a short time anterior to the publication of Dr. Hodge's work, Dr. Alexander translated, endorsed, and published in the *Princeton Repertory*, part of the Refutation of the Socinian System by Arnold of Franeker, in which this very theory and exegesis are pointedly rejected and condemned. The article is republished in the Princeton Essays, first series, pp. 228-249. Let our readers turn, for example, to pp. 235, 237, and 241-243, and peruse likewise Dr. Alexander's concluding remarks, and they will perceive the grounds on which we offer the above suggestion.* For it does seem inconceivable

* For the sake of those who may not have access to the work referred to, we here present a brief extract. Arnold says: "As to the exception of Ostorodos, (a noted Socinian,) that in this passage the word 'sinners' does not denote those who were really such, but persons who are spoken of as if they had been sinners, it is too unreasonable to require a moment's consideration; but it is enough forever to silence this objection, that these persons are really subject to the penalty of death; if, therefore, they are liable to death, which is the wages of sin, they must be sinners; otherwise there would be no correspondence between the crime and punishment. If the crime was merely supposititious, and the punishment real, how could God be a just Judge when he treated those as real sinners who were putatively such?" (P. 243.) This work is highly extolled by Marck. Arnold died in October, 1680.

how that illustrious divine should, at that very time, have approved what he thus united with Arnold in so strongly denouncing. But we submit the facts without remark to the candor and kind consideration of our readers.

ARTICLE VII.

THE PROFESSIONAL STUDY OF THE BIBLE.

To the Church God has assigned the duties of preserving and of propagating the truths of the Holy Scriptures. She performs this service by her representatives, who are lawfully called and set apart for the purpose. Such officers are known by the Scripture term, presbyters, [elders,] and comprise two classes, presbyters who *teach* and *rule*, and presbyters whose sole function is that of *ruling*, generally distinguished by the terms teaching presbyters and ruling [elders] presbyters. The parity of these classes of presbyters is recognised in the constitution of the courts of the Church, and in all acts of government, except those belonging to a distribution of powers by rightful authority. These courts both preserve and propagate the truth, by Confessions and other formularies of doctrine, order, discipline, and worship, and also by special testimonies for sound doctrine and piety, or against heresy and vice. To the teaching presbyters, however, is assigned, by the Scriptures and the standards of the Church, the special work of propagating the truths of revelation, by the authoritative exposition of the Word, and the defence and inculcation of whatever "we are to believe concerning God, and the duty which God requires of man." That the ruling presbyter, or the probationer for the ministry and other lay catechists, may be intrusted by church courts, under proper restrictions, with a similar work, in subordinate positions and for limited periods, is not inconsistent with the foregoing propositions.

I. It is now of those who are, or propose to become, the teach-

ing presbyters of the Church, that a professional study of the Scriptures is predicated. In the course of this discussion, there may be suggestions adapted to the case of ruling presbyters and of laymen, in any relation, to increase in scriptural knowledge; but it is obvious that those who are set for "the defence of the gospel," and the formal, solemn, and constant preaching of the Word of Life, are under special and solemn obligations to make the highest practicable attainments in full and accurate knowledge of divine revelation.

But however obvious the soundness of this proposition may be, especially to those familiar with the uniform teachings of our Church, it may be well to offer scriptural authority for its acceptance. Though trite, the proposition is no less true. The records of Scripture bearing on its importance furnish the best justification for a discussion, the main object of which is to stir up the "pure minds" of Christian brethren on the subject.

With his works and teachings, the inspired declarations of his predicted forerunner, and a voice "from the excellent glory," (three times) attesting his Messiahship, our Lord quoted and applied to himself the things "written in the Law of Moses, and in the Prophets, and in the Psalms." He declared that he "came not to destroy, but to fulfil the law," and made its words the subjects of his authoritative exposition. His first recorded parable sets forth the WORD to be the means of man's regeneration; and in his prayer, John xvii. 17, he recognises it as the means of sanctification. Peter and Paul have given a similar testimony, though inspired to teach with authority. The specimens of their preaching are mostly expositions and applications of the Old Testament Scriptures. John assigns the reasons for writing his Gospel, that men might "believe that Jesus is THE CHRIST, [O. T., MESSIAH, Dan. ix. 26,] the Son of God," and that believing, men might "have life through his name." In Revelation i. 3, he pronounces the blessing on those "that read and hear the words" he revealed. In the Pastoral Epistles to Timothy and Titus, Paul is very explicit in urging on them, and so on all ministers, "attendance to reading," "meditation," consecration to such work, "taking heed to themselves and to the doctrine," or teaching, which they

“had received of him and must teach others,” and “to hold fast the form of sound” and faithful “words.” He, though inspired, and addressing specially inspired men, recognises the value of his “books,” and especially “parchments left at Troas.” In short, the Scriptures, of both the Old and New Testament, are replete with attestations of their value, as “able to make men wise unto salvation, through faith in Christ,” and “profitable,” especially to the minister, “for doctrine, for reproof, for correction and instruction in righteousness;” so that the “man of God,” nourished up in the “words of sound doctrine,” may be “thoroughly furnished for every good word and work,” as well to “convince gainsayers,” “stop the mouths of foolish men,” and “reprove and rebuke with all long-suffering,” as “to shew himself approved unto God,” “war a good warfare,” and “save himself and those who hear him.” Further reasons justifying this discussion, and especially its pertinence to our times, need not be here given, as they will be sufficiently manifest from the advantages of the proper study of the Bible, presented in the latter part of this article.

II. A scriptural illustration, if not a definition, of the work of a minister in setting forth the truth, is given in Nehemiah viii. 8: “They read in the book, in the law of God, distinctly, and gave the sense, and caused [the people] to understand the reading.” This work of INTERPRETING THE BIBLE, requires of the minister an adequate knowledge of the evidences, and a full persuasion of its divine inspiration, of the substantial integrity of its text, of the canonical authority of its books, and of the sufficient correctness of the English version to give its faithful readers a knowledge of salvation. With all this, he must be a successful student of the languages in which the Holy Scriptures were revealed. The summary of the course of study, preparatory to licensure, given in our Form of Government, Chap. xiv., is the law of the Church, sustained by the Scriptures and the experience of centuries. The obligations imposed, and the exceptions of “extraordinary cases” allowed, as well as other exceptions, allowed in the spirit of this special provision, are all so fully set forth in an article in this number of this REVIEW,* on

* Pp. 228 *et seq.*

“Lay Preaching,” that any remarks in this connexion are unnecessary. This law is fully recognised and illustrated in the organised plan of study presented in the annual catalogues of our Seminaries. Most of the studies prescribed in this plan call for no special consideration in this discussion. It is, however, very pertinent to its purpose to offer suggestions respecting some others, concerning the methods of prosecuting them, and their relations to the right interpretation of the Holy Scriptures.

1. Biblical criticism is the science of correcting the text of the Bible. It investigates the history, classification, and authority of manuscripts in which the Bible existed, previous to the invention of printing; examines the versions, especially the ancient, and quotations of Scripture found in the early writings of Christians and others. It proposes certain laws, by which the corrupt readings, thus discovered, may be corrected. In the exercise of its legitimate functions, under wise laws, it is obviously a science of vast importance. After the revival of letters, the work of examining and correcting the text of the classics, was prosecuted with great diligence and valuable results. But the extant copies of such writings were, obviously, not so numerous as those of the Scriptures, and, of course, the methods and results of correcting corrupt readings not so important. There had, however, under various influences, arisen in the middle of the eighteenth century many men more eminent for scholarship than piety and reverence for the word of God. In applying to biblical criticism the principles by which classical criticism had been conducted, they erred in two respects. (1) With very meagre supply of materials for classical criticism, they often made corrections on *conjectures*. But considering the much more numerous manuscripts, the ancient versions and quotations supplied in biblical criticism, the use of conjecture by the critic was not required, and it was not in the spirit of a true scholarship to employ such a treacherous instrument. (2) Then they overlooked the vast interests at stake. It might be a small matter to make a mistake in correcting the text of Xenophon or Horace; but it was a very solemn responsibility to make a mistake as to that of John or of Paul. Coincident with the establishment of our oldest

theological seminaries, intercourse between our country and Germany became more frequent. In a few years the results of such intercourse began to appear. Our more enterprising students of theology, especially in the North, resorted to Germany, to sit under the teachings of men whose elementary works on the original languages of the Bible had won for them much deserved reputation. They learned to regard German scholarship in other departments with great favor. Some sought a certain factitious distinction in translating their monographs on biblical subjects, or Introductions to critical expositions of Scripture, or learned "Excursus" on important topics in biblical criticism; and thus disseminating their views and enhancing their reputation in our country. Doubtless the motives were good, but often such; inadvertently, held a poisoned chalice to the lips of their contemporaries, and thus spread evils, which might have been comparatively limited in effect, had they remained covered in the clothing of a foreign tongue. "Bliss" and safety may sometimes alike be purchased by "ignorance." Two kinds of injury were inflicted on biblical students and biblical learning. (1) On one hand, the "pride of learning and the paraded tongues," exhibited in some of these transatlantic contributions to the poverty of our Christian literature, misled many "vainly puffed up by fleshly minds" to mistake the means for the ends, and congratulate themselves as possessors of rare accomplishments for the work of interpreting Scripture, when they could speak glibly of the *Codex Vaticanus*, or *Cantabrigiensis*, of *uncial* and *cursive* manuscripts, or dogmatise on the correct readings of such and such passages on the authority of the last immature opinion of the most recently heralded German critic. (2) On the other hand, to sincere and humble inquirers after truth, the discordant testimonies respecting "readings," and "versions," and "weight of authorities," and "recensions" given by men, who, however small in mental stature at home, seen through the mists of the credulity and ignorance of American admirers, loomed up to gigantic proportions, produced uncertainty and confusion, till some, mistaking effect for cause, were ready to pronounce the science of biblical criticism the high road to infidelity. In the providence of God, unsound

principles of criticism, weakened by the conflicts of their votaries in efforts to use them for sustaining special pleas, have been fairly deprived of power for evil by the labors of a scholarship of higher grade, in the use of larger resources, and under the influence of a better faith. Thus the science has been reduced to more order, and its results invested with more value. Much remains to be effected by men now coming on the stage, with increased facilities for acquisition and wise discrimination. The student who uses them to profit, will reach one (even if the least) important result, in the confirmation of the proposition, that doubts cast on our received text by the most faulty of the leading manuscripts, or by omissions of disputed readings of important passages, would not suffice to annul a fundamental article of Christian faith, to cancel an obligation of duty, or to suppress a warning to the wicked or an invitation to the penitent believer. Under the instruction of an experienced and judicious teacher, the student may make a profitable use of the vast stores of material now accumulated, mostly the fruit of German industry and enterprise, and in this receive important aid from the works of European scholars, at once of high attainments in the science and of sound Christian faith. And this he is under strong obligation to do, not only for his own benefit as a student of the Bible, but that he may thus be enabled "to contend for the faith" with weapons forged by infidelity and long used by neologists to infuse distrust and awaken contempt for "the sure word of prophecy."

2. The knowledge of the languages (Hebrew and Chaldee of the Old, and Greek of the New Testament) in which the Holy Scriptures were revealed, is an object worthy of most diligent effort. The orthography and orthoepy of the text of the Old Testament is governed, in the Bibles now generally used, by the laws of the Masoretic points, representing vowels, accents, and so on. Of course a knowledge of them is a necessary accomplishment; but as an element affecting the interpretation, it is only valuable as representing the opinions of uninspired men, whose opinions, however, are worthy of the same kind of regard, and sometimes in higher measure, with which the versions of early times are

held. The ready reading of the text attained, and a few selections from the Scriptures perused, too many quiet any sense of the obligations of conscience and duty, and satisfy the slight tests applied by indulgent Presbyteries, with this meagre measure of oriental learning.

The candidate, on presenting himself for admission to the seminary, is presumed to understand the Greek language sufficiently well to make the contents of the New Testament, as presented in it, a subject for critical study. How violent such a presumption sometimes proves to have been, can only be known by those who have undertaken the work of training men in the interpretation of the New Testament. They sometimes find that their pupils, when for the time they ought to be teachers, have need that one teach them the first principles of this sacred tongue.

Now it is very obvious, that the capacity to distinguish ך from ך, or ך from ך, and discriminate between vocal and silent sheva, qamets and qamets hhatuph, or the accents athnahh and yerehh, and to translate, in somewhat school-boy style, the words of the sacred penmen in the Hebrew, Chaldee and Greek languages, constitutes a very small minimum of linguistic preparation for the exercises of interpretation while in the seminary, to say nothing of the work of after years. It is gratifying to believe, on good evidence, that such is yearly becoming illustrated by fewer and fewer specimens. For it requires but little reflection to be satisfied that one frequent occasion for alleging the uselessness of studying the Scriptures in the original languages, has been the failure of students to reach a measure of attainment adequate to be a source of advantage. We might, by the bye, profitably expatiate on the sophism of the poet's famous lines, by easily shewing that even enough knowledge of these languages to enable its possessor to understand criticisms involving the use of them, is by no means of no value. But this hint must suffice.

Now, to lay a proper foundation, the student needs first of all to become *familiar* with the "forms" of parts of speech, their classifications, methods of derivation, both by prefixed letters and by addition, and (in the Greek especially) of composition. Then

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the laws of agreement and government, in all their modifications, must be mastered. "Exercises" have been found invaluable in this course of study; but nothing can supersede the daily *drilling* of the living teacher, for which, indeed, "exercises" are rather an auxiliary than a substitute. This grammatical study involves, of course, reading and the acquisition of a vocabulary. To make this truly and permanently promotive of the desired end, there must be both *critical reading* and *much reading*. But in the former more is meant than the perfunctory use of a lexicon. Language represents the mind of writers, who know how to employ it properly; not only the idea in its general aspects, but all the modifications which influences on words, arising from national and domestic life, religion, customs, and culture, may effect. Now these are different, in many aspects, in different nations. It often occurs that we meet with words in one language, for which that we use furnishes no exact equivalent. This is eminently true of the Hebrew. Hence we must trace the biography or natural history, so to speak, of the word under consideration. Its primitive may be found in some etymon, which is (to continue our figure, the parent or genus,) the stem of numerous derivatives. This etymon may belong, indeed, to some other language, of which the lexicographer will give information and explanation. But in all such cases, the modifications of primary sense due to the causes above noticed, or arising from usage and other sources of settling the meaning, may present, ultimately, a meaning only expressible in our tongue by some paraphrase. But as the student is not making a *translation*, in order to use the pedantic formula, "This word means (so and so) in the original," but aims to obtain a *just conception* of what the author's language conveyed to his contemporaries, and, in his exposition, convey that to his hearers, the paraphrastic meaning is enough. It is true, as often observed, that our version wonderfully expresses, in the use of many words and phrases, as nearly the equivalents of the Hebrew and Greek as could be expected. One of its few blemishes, indeed, is the frequently occurring use of explanatory additions, unnecessarily introduced.

In the Bible many words occur, either (as in the New Testa-

ment) in a *sense* peculiar to the teachings of revelation, or (as in the Old Testament) as representatives of ideas entirely foreign to pagan religious systems, and the immediate production of the Divine Spirit. Such are replete with thoughts due to their etymology and usage, and belong to a class of words, in each of which are to be found the leading topics of a sermon. Similarly, the idioms of a foreign language can only be represented by an interpreter, in either plain forms of speech, or the idioms of that in which he desires to express his thoughts to others, and need a careful analysis for a clear apprehension of their force.

The plan of study, here only suggested in outline, will at once yield fruit, in that each word with which a familiar acquaintance may be formed, will serve as an introducer to another and to its family, and so a widening circle will be established, and the student's progress, persistently pressed, will be increasingly rapid and increasingly useful. Of course but little more than a beginning can be made by the candidate. This, however, will be so made as to constitute a solid foundation for the structure, to which he can add through life.

But there must be *much reading*. To be *thorough*, few have time for *much* and *critical* reading combined. Still, there is a large number of words with some well established sense fairly expressed by English equivalents, and others by paraphrastic terms, besides many others, mainly modified by scope or context or subject or style, or all together; and with all these the student needs to become familiar, till, in the reading of Scripture, no pause for a lexicon will be required. To read *much* and profitably, the aid of Bagster's interpagged Hebrew-English Old Testament and Greek-English New Testament has been found useful. This plan of reading is, however, no substitute for the course in grammar and etymologies suggested, and indeed will be of very meagre advantage till substantial acquisitions in that method have been secured. The two courses will be mutual helps. In perusing a chapter with the version, many words or passages for critical study will be suggested; and on the other hand, the "much reading" will confirm into familiar acquaintance the words introduced to the reader by his critical investigations.

Much of the failure of tolerably fair Hebraists to derive more decided benefit from their study, is due to the mistaken view that the great advantage of it is to be found in the power of making readily a good translation of any part. Such an attainment is desirable, and may, with due diligence, be made. Yet that which, though not so extensive, is practically, perhaps, of equal or more value, is such knowledge as will enable the possessor, by clearer apprehension of the meaning of the original language, to cast light on the version we have. This can be acquired by diligence and perseverance, on some such method as that now suggested, the young minister devoting an amount of time which might average two hours a day. Before he will have reached middle age, he may illustrate "the mighty power of littles" in becoming "mighty in the Scriptures."

3. Candidates sometimes evince great deficiency in the knowledge of the English Bible. This is not to be ascribed, as some have flippantly done, to "forgetting the English version in studying Hebrew and Greek." The methods of reading the Bible, among those who pretend to any regular perusal of it; the neglect of its reading, on any comprehensive system involving analyses of books, or divisions and subdivisions of them, including the learning of the scope of each; and the occupation of Sabbath-school and Bible-class pupils, with a very limited course of studying particular portions, may go far to account for the fact that the bulk of candidates are more ignorant of the contents of the Bible, as to its history, biography, and general outlines, than German youth of twelve to fifteen years old, in many German schools. But however accounted for, measures should be adopted in our theological seminaries and by our Presbyteries for arresting the growth and preventing the continuance of such an evil. The subject is commended to the attention of the Assembly's Committee on Theological Education. Besides the subjects of professional preparatory study now mentioned, there are others not strictly so reckoned, attention to which will be useful to the interpreter of Scripture. The bee, by a process and a chemistry unknown to us, gathers and assimilates from various sources the elements of her delicious food. So, for confirmations

and illustrations of Scripture, the minister may gather contributions from history, geography, astronomy, numismatics, travels, ethnography, and archaeology, and also from the accessions to the two last-named subjects made by the recently exhumed and deciphered records of the Assyrian and Babylonian empires. Even the fine arts, particularly architecture, are not without value to his work.

4. The science and art of interpretation, as a subject of the course of study in the seminary, calls for no suggestions in this place respecting the method by which it may best be prosecuted. It may, however, be well to offer a few hints on the work of an interpreter. God has revealed himself to man, in his works and in his word. In both, the revelation is one of facts. It is man's part to obtain knowledge of these facts, and by processes of deduction and synthesis, to ascertain certain principles. These are postulated in systems, setting forth the knowledge obtained, which we call science. So we have sciences of chemistry, astronomy, and so on—or generally, science of nature, or natural science—on the one hand; and on the other, science of providence, of sin, of redemption, and so on—or generally, science of moral things or moral science; or we may call the works of God, in the material universe, God's kingdom or government of nature, and the facts revealed in the Bible, respecting God and his relations to man, God's kingdom or government of the spiritual world, or God's spiritual kingdom. In neither case does man *make* the science, nor does he *make* the facts. He constructs the science. God has not taught it, in either case, by connected series of propositions, in chapters, sections, and paragraphs. The facts of natural science are scattered here and there. So the facts, what God has done and what he has said, are scattered through the Bible. In both cases, man's place is to collect and arrange them. Man is fallible. In both cases, he may err by combining heterogeneous materials, or making wrong deductions and in other ways. But in respect to moral science, the student has a great advantage. In natural science, the inquirer has only reason, perverted and blinded, and at best imperfect, to guide him. In moral science, he has the promise of an infallible

guide. In natural science, men may be misled to accept as facts things only apparently such; in moral science, all are of divine authentication. Further, in both there may be progress and development, but only in the increase of man's ability to understand and report what God had already put in his works and in his book. Man has learned from the one what is essential to his present temporal interests; and from the other, what is essential for his knowing the way of salvation. Many things in both, misunderstood or imperfectly understood, or not understood at all, in past ages, have been latterly more clearly unfolded. So it may still be. But there is no increment in the word or in the works respecting God's teachings. We know from the Scriptures (Deut. iv. 12; xii. 32; Prov. xxx. 6; Rev. xxii. 18, 19.) that the book is complete. Its scheme is final. And whatever man's efforts may yet, with better means, ascertain from the works or from the word, especially as to prophecy, is only an addition to *his* knowledge; for "known unto God are all his works, from the beginning of the world."

These views lead us to two conclusions. (1) As God is a God of truth, and all truth is consistent, there can, rightly, be no conflict between the true teachings of moral science and natural science, or God's works and God's word. (2) And since it is no part of man's office to invent facts, or make science, but only accept the facts, and combine them and their teachings into that which is the expression of the resulting knowledge called science, then all *a priori* propositions, suggesting how or why God has spoken, and what ought to be the teaching, are utterly precluded. This is the duty of man—and angels have no higher function known to us, and man is fitted to perform no higher—to *ascertain, by the use of right means and the guidance of God's promised Spirit, what God has taught.* Reason is given to learn his duty and the means to perform it. Honor enough is it to man to become the representative of God, an ambassador of his Son, our Lord and Redeemer; to declare what God has revealed respecting faith and duty, man's relations here and his destinies hereafter.

5. The proper use of commentaries is found in the confirma-

tions and corrections of the results of the course of personal investigations now given. They also supply valuable suggestions of difficulties or questions for solution, which may have escaped the attention of a young student. The varied and extensive research and learning which distinguish the German critical commentators, furnish a storehouse of facts in every department of biblical study, especially in philology, grammar, and ancient history and geography. But as expositors, with some honorable exceptions, headed by Dr. Tholuck, they have, for a century or more, used their materials rather in the interests of Rationalism and infidelity, than of Christian truth. During the last fifty years, American and British scholars have, by a discriminating use of the same materials, made valuable contributions to the critical exposition of Scripture. Some of them, indeed, have been content to follow, without proper care, their German guides. They have thus widely diffused among biblical students of English-speaking nations, much of the rationalistic sentiment, which, though perhaps less virulent than in the land of its origin, has done much to undermine sound views of the inspiration of the Scriptures, by impairing confidence in the credibility of its history, the divine authority of its doctrines, and the sufficiency of the whole as a rule of faith and practice for men of all nations and all ages. While either too timid, in view of public sentiment, to avow a positive antagonism to the divine authority, or too unsettled in their principles to postulate them in terms, they succeed in "destroying the faith of some" in the word of God, but provide nothing in its place. The least injury they effect is that of leaving their readers in ignorance. For, with a servile imitation of their German prototypes, they detail "the thoughts of other men," variant and discordant as they may be, not selecting the true and rejecting the false, and not teaching their readers how to discriminate, so that they leave them to the danger of choosing what is wrong, or, fortunately, disgusted with the whole, to the less danger of choosing nothing. There is a large number of commentators, both of former and of later periods, Continental, British, and American, who, while in our view more or less unsound according to the Westminster standards, exhibit

great ability as expositors of Scripture. Under proper cautions, such may be used with great advantage. There are, on the other hand, some commentaries which have the confidence of our Church as to soundness in theology, and yet may be inferior in respect to merits as expositions of Scripture. It is thus evident, that while it is unnecessary to extend even consultations to all works on the Bible, (and indeed to do so is impracticable,) it would be, obviously, a grave error to bind ourselves to accept implicitly all the views of any one. Every student must obtain the best in his reach, and as many such as means and opportunities allow, and use the views presented as aids to form his own. But there can be no really valuable aid derived from commentaries unless the student has, by a right study of the Bible, prepared himself for a proper use of the aid they may offer.

6. We propose, in closing this part of our discussion, to present to the attention, especially of those preparing for the holy office or just commencing their professional career, at once an exemplification of the value of a thorough course of biblical study, and a model, not perfect, but as nearly so as can be found, of a successful commentator. Hengstenberg never uttered a sounder opinion respecting any uninspired man than when he wrote: "In Calvin, the theological exposition of the Pentateuch reached its highest point, and he stands much higher above those who followed than those who preceded him." Tholuck honored himself and conferred on his young countrymen a lasting benefit, in publishing some of Calvin's most important commentaries; and T. & T. Clark of Edinburgh, in the present decadence of a knowledge of the Latin language, under the clamor for a so-called "practical education," have made a greater contribution to sound biblical exposition, than in all their translations besides, by bringing out Calvin's entire Commentaries in the English language. It is very common to apologise for the infirmities and errors of men of other times by a very proper consideration of their disadvantages. An English essayist has put this sentiment in a series of striking examples. Thus, Columbus was really a greater navigator than Cook, though he had never heard of New Zealand: Newton as great an astronomer as Herschel, though he knew

nothing of the Georgium Sidus ; Caxton's press, in Westminster Abbey, is as striking an exhibition of art, as the last steam press invented, rolling off scores of printed sheets in a minute ; and the rude stool on which "erst King Alfred sat," or the coronation chair of Henry VII., may have been the results of as much mechanical skill as the last invented spring-seat invalid chair. Calvin needs no such apologetic eulogy. Had he merely exceeded his predecessors in learning, zeal, charity, activity, and successful energy, this had entitled him to praise ; but he did more : he has excelled posterity. We speak of him only as an expositor of the Bible. We say nothing of the teacher, the pastor, or the reformer. Nor need we mention him as the great republican, the expounder, defender, and almost discoverer of principles of government, now felt in lands he never knew, as well as in his own narrow circle of Geneva. They are at this day illustrated in our common Christian civilisation, in all English-speaking nations, and felt even in the despotic governments of Russia, of Turkey, and of Egypt. Men are reposing in safety under the protection of laws, the basis of which he laid, and enjoying privileges, the very existence of which would have been problematical apart from his labors ; of whom many who traduce his character and vilify his memory are indebted to his learning, his teaching, and his wisdom, for the liberty they exercise in violating the sanctity and disturbing the repose of his ashes. And all this represents the mere *results* to man's *temporal* interests which have flowed from his thorough study of the Scriptures and exposition of their meaning, and the systems of theological truth and of church government which he evolved and formulated. Luther translated the Bible, but Calvin expounded its contents. It is not, then, of his personal character or his person we would speak ; of his simple garb, his rigid self-denial, his inflexible integrity, his abounding benevolence, his steady zeal, his ardent yet unchanging piety, and his enlarged patriotism ; nor need we expatiate on his eloquence, his voluminous correspondence, and his sound evangelical Protestantism. Let us view him in his study, communing with the giant intellects and holy saints of old, the inspired prophets and apostles, the "sweet singer" and the wise king of Judah—

above all, with the ever-blessed God, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Let us consider his wide and profound course of study in other books than the Bible, drawing his vast stores of learning from daily consultation with ponderous volumes, which we look at once a year, and making hourly companions of authors we use as occasional referees, and know more by repute than by a personal acquaintance; and then consecrating all his acquirements to the expounding, illustrating, and enforcing the truths of divine revelation. It has been suggested that he was no Hebraist. If to be a Hebraist one must be an obsequious disciple of the Masorets, bowing to the dictates of a pattach, or acquiescing in the decisions of a sheva, must intersperse his page with Rabbinic quotations from Jarchi and Kimchi, or mar the beauty of typography with excerpts from languages he never understood, filched from some predecessor in literary plundering; cite, with parrot-like proficiency, authors he had never consulted, or copy, with the slavish servility of an amanuensis, what he could not interpret; if these things constitute a Hebraist—and examples, in our age, might suggest such to be the judgment of some—then Calvin was no Hebraist. But he grasped with extraordinary power the sense of Scripture, discerned with a clearness similar to intuition the force of the words he explained; imbued his own language with the spirit of the writers of Holy Writ, and those perused not merely in a version, fully appreciated the value of idiom and usage without being a slave to either; was an etymologist without being a trifler, and a critic without being a pedant. We may sometimes regret that he did not give more fully the process by which he reached his conclusions; but we gain by the use of the space thus saved for more important matter. Unlike some of his successors, he never obscured his work by the immensity or clumsiness of his scaffolding, or hid his statuary from view by heaps of chips, rubbish, and fragments accumulated under his chisel. His books are not deformed by introductions as long as the text, or appendixes so elaborate as to neutralise the discussion which they are designed to elucidate. He does not approach the text of David and of Paul with the pygmean implements of trifling verbal criticism, or

expend his force on the position of an accent or the power of a point. By no means indifferent to the etymology or syntax of the passages under consideration, and often anticipating criticisms based on grammatical laws which modern expositors have ignorantly assumed the credit of having first discovered, he is more eminent for the use of a logical power, strengthened by his study of the Scriptures. This is displayed in his ready comprehension of the writer's scope and the true relevancy of the context to the passage he expounds. He so enters into the spirit of the text, that many of his expositions more resemble extended paraphrases. The sudden transpositions, concise ellipses, and parenthetically disjointed sentences of Paul, are relieved of that obscurity in which they appear to ordinary minds, by his clear conceptions of the author's purpose and his ready skill in its development. Thus we have explanation instead of conjecture, well sustained propositions of truth, instead of mere suggestion, and inferences, not of sophistry, but stern logic. Whoever doubts his piety, let him read his work on the Psalms. If any one questions his learning or judgment, or both, let him study his Harmonies of the Pentateuch and the Synoptical Gospels. If we desire to appreciate his love for gospel truth, we must peruse his Exposition of John's Gospels and Epistles. If we wish to know his views on the great fundamental truths of God's government of men as sinners, and the methods of his grace, we must peruse his Commentaries on the Epistles to the Romans, Ephesians, and Galatians, and the summaries of Bible teaching on such subjects in his "Institutes." Despite the caricatures of his theology which error and infidelity have repeatedly propogated, the misrepresentations of his temper and agency in respect to the tragical death of Servetus, and the uncharitable construction placed on some of the memorable events in his stirring age in which he acted a conspicuous part, his name still lives unsullied. As the faith of a true Protestant theology advances with the spread of true Protestant Christianity, and the principles of government, of law, and a conservative republicanism, extend among men, so widens and strengthens a fame, based not on birth, or national relations, but on the simple and sublime power of the truth, of

which, among uninspired men, he stands the peerless expounder, advocate, and propagator.

III. The foregoing sketch, while fitly closing what relates to the course of profitable biblical study in this discussion, as suitably introduces some thoughts commending its pursuit, arising from a consideration of its advantages for the "work of the ministry," both generally and especially, in view of the present times.

1. It is presumable that the usual preparatory course of theological instruction will prepare the intrant into the ministry with an adequate knowledge of the evidences, both internal and external, which sustain the divine authority of the Scriptures. But while thus furnished for the ordinary formal discussions of the subject, in a mode convincing to opponents and edifying to inquirers and to the faithful, there is another kind of persuasion of the truth which it is exceedingly desirable for him to possess. Of the unlettered Christian, it is often properly said that the most conclusive evidence of the inspired truth of Scripture is to be found in his perception of the coincidence of its teachings with his own religious experience or knowledge of his own heart, under the instructions of the Bible. He will say, "I know it to be true, for I *feel* it to be true." The sincerely pious minister has this conviction also. But he adds a conviction deduced from an intelligent and intimate acquaintance with the unity of scope and relations of all parts of Scripture. Thus, as an illustration of the nature of this twofold conviction, consider the persuasion he may have of the doctrine of our Lord's divinity. As a part of scientific theology, the ordinary proof is derived from a collation of "proof texts;" both those clearly (by right interpretation) asserting the fact, and those predicating of him divine attributes and perfections. But he finds this truth permeates the whole structure of the teachings of the New Testament, and is so interwoven in the parts of the Old Testament which relate to him, that should it be eliminated from such teachings, they will remain irreconcilable inconsistencies or impenetrable obscurities; and further, that with his understanding of the scriptural representation of man's "estate of sin and

misery," its demands can only be met by the sacrifice and mediation of one uniting a perfect divine and perfect human nature, "very God and very man." So he finds the scriptural teachings of God's person, nature, and government, to be those that none other than God could have taught men to present; and while they further confirm and illustrate what Deism had discovered in natural religion, they resolve its perplexing problems as to the divine government, and to all add the only satisfactory disclosures to souls seeking peace with their Maker, respecting his relations to man as the subject of his condemning justice and of his redeeming mercy. With such combined convictions of the truth of the Bible, together with (though some hold, even without) that proof derived from external evidences, the student feels "strong as an angel of God," as good Dr. Baker was wont to express himself. His persuasion reaches an irrefragable moral certainty, only less, if so, than consciousness itself, in uttering the terrors of the law and the mercies of the gospel. "Thrice armed is he who knows his cause is just." All the weapons of scepticism and cavils of heresy avail nothing.

"In vain shall Satan rage
Against this book divine,
When wrath and lightning guard the page,
And beams of mercy shine."

2. Thus will the minister be prepared for the best use of all his scriptural knowledge for scriptural preaching. His business is explaining the Bible. This is most directly done by the method so much exemplified in the "Acts of the Apostles," and may be called "expository preaching." This, however, is not limited to the exposition of connected and consecutive passages. It is equally applicable to the discussion of some concise and summary statement of Bible truth in the form of what is called a "text," by means of other scriptures, explained and applied. Thus there will, in both modes, be opportunity, and of the most suitable kind, for didactic instruction, both doctrinal and practical, for exhortation, warning, invitation, and encouragement, as inferences from the teaching of the passages explained. Notwithstanding the greatly increased circulation of the Bible during the

last forty years, it is a matter of very general and just regret that the Bible is not read as much as in a former period. The multiplication of "story books" for children, religious tales in and out of the periodicals, religious periodicals for children and youth in the form of newspapers monthlies and quarterlies, has very much tended to distract attention from a due degree of Bible reading and Bible study even on the Sabbath. This state of things calls for every effort to make the Bible more than ever the subject of more special attention in the ministrations of the sanctuary. If ministers would combine with their weekly prayer-meetings a continuous "Bible reading" of a chapter or more with short pertinent expositions, and when they have a second service on Sabbath, substitute more extended exposition, and in both cases select the more important portions of the Scriptures, their people would not only find instruction and edification, but be led also, it may be, to more diligence in the perusal of the word of God; and the facility of obtaining Bibles to take to church would be a means of greatly promoting such a scheme. It is greatly to be feared that the rarity of expository preaching is very much due to the want of adequate knowledge of the Scriptures. The advantages of such a method are too obvious to need discussion. They enforce the obligation taught in the Pastoral Epistles, as already shown in the former part of this discussion. "Aptness to teach", "the words of faith and good doctrine," "rightly dividing the word of truth," and so "able to exhort and convince gainsayers," are suggestive specimens of inspired instruction to ministers, which need no comment. Some may be disposed to consider this work of less importance, because it is only *ministerial*, as the preacher is limited to telling what the Bible teaches. Hence they affect the possession of some sort of power to *forgive sin*, or at least to pronounce *absolution* authoritatively. We hear of *confirmation*, and of *imparting grace* in inducting men into the holy office, and much more of the same sort of arrogant assumptions and presumptions. But we have seen the work of the student who will be "thoroughly furnished for every good word and work," and be "mighty in the Scriptures," is sufficient to occupy his time and tax his talents.

The truth pertaining to eternal life, with whatever is needed to its proper advocacy, illustration, and enforcement, must be "sought out" in the manner already explained. Even the "words of the preacher" must be "sought out" to be acceptable, and such as the Holy Ghost teacheth. The preparation thus made, the "speaking the truth in love," meekly, wisely, clearly, and faithfully, will be the means of "teaching the people knowledge," that so the gospel may prove the power of God and the wisdom of God to salvation. Such a method of preaching will secure the minister against a failure to find matter for his public or private instructions. *He can never exhaust the Bible*; and familiar with its contents, even though some "hard places" may yet remain which he does not satisfactorily understand, he will not be tempted late on Saturday to look up a text and pack together, by cursory reading of commentators, or perhaps some other sermon, (his own or another's,) an ill-digested discourse. He will not exemplify the poet's satire,

"How oft when Paul has served as with a text,
Has Epictetus, Plato, Tully preached."

Scriptural study will make scriptural preaching. The priest's lips will keep knowledge, and the people receive the law at his mouth.

3. The advantages of this thorough study of the Bible extends beyond its effect on the public preaching of the word. Extempore prayer does not mean unpremeditated prayer. In approaching the dignitaries of earth, men deem it necessary to "set in order" their terms of address, however strong the emotions which press them to the duty, and it may be the necessity is even greater by the existence of emotion. The whole book of Psalms is devotional and constitutes an inspired liturgy for the universal Church. Besides, other scriptures present us models of prayer and praise. There is no better source of instruction in the acts of prayer and praise, as well as the necessity, the duty, privilege, and encouragement to perform such acts, than that of the Scriptures. Then how valuable is a familiarity with the divine teachings in pastoral work! Not only does the minister find the words

of God the best introduction to private personal conversation on religious truth, but the equally appropriate basis of family instruction, of catechising of children, and especially of ministering to the awakened and to serious enquirers for the "way to be saved." Besides these duties belonging to his office as an instructor in righteousness, there are the occasional but exceedingly important, and to the young, inexperienced minister, often delicate and difficult pastoral services, due to the aged, the afflicted in body or in mind, the bereaved and those "nigh unto death." In no part of his ministry, as sad experience has often taught, will the young pastor feel his deficiencies more keenly than in this. No system of Pastoral Theology can provide for the constantly recurring specialities in the cases to which he will be called to minister. Fulness in Scripture truth, both in examples, in its didactic teachings, and especially fulness in "the exceeding great and precious promises" which the Spirit has written for encouragement in the warnings, by which men need in such cases to be admonished, and in the discriminating views of truth pertinent to the particular exigencies, will prepare him best for his work. He must be ready to speak "a word to the weary," comfort mourners, tell the way of peace to the troubled with doubts and fears and laboring under morbid states of mind, often the result of mistaken views or interpretations of Scripture. No form of "visitation of the sick," or the bereaved of parent or child, or those broken in health of body, or by loss of worldly goods, can supply his necessity as well as a capacity for the prompt and pertinent application of Scripture. When called to stand in "the chamber where the good man meets his fate," when the dreadful tyrant death is pressing his struggling victim, who, with faltering tongue and quivering lip, is endeavoring to speak his words of prayer or of praise, confession, or thanksgiving, or ask for pastoral guidance through the dark valley, while weeping friends are bending over him; or when called to go to the "house of mourning," and in the midst of wailing orphans and stricken friends and relatives, and to the disconsolate bereaved husband or wife, called to speak words of comfort; or when summoned to the soul, whose work, the mighty "work of life, too

long delayed, repentance," is "yet to be begun upon a dying-bed," when tempted to heal the wound of the soul slightly, and cry peace, when there is no peace; when clearly stated truth, and just what is needed, must be uttered with unflinching fidelity and ineffable tenderness—in all such cases, the richness of Scripture, which has become the food of his own soul, will be illustrated. These are seasons, when he and those to whom he ministers, will alike feel that its declarations are true, its representations of God, of sin, of salvation, of faith, and of prayer, are no delusive fables, and no mere speculations, and no idle declamations. The approach of death, the reality of eternity, the promised peace of heaven, and the awful miseries of hell, will be so present to the soul, that none but the guidance and comfort of God's word and Spirit will suffice to raise from the horrible pit the awakened anxious soul trembling on the brink of the grave, or set the believer on the Rock and put into his mouth "the new song," with which to part from earth and time and enter heaven and eternity.

4. But not only has the minister need of "fulness" of Scripture in the right performance of his ministerial and pastoral functions. He is "set for the defence of the gospel" and has to parry with "the word of God, which is the sword of the Spirit," the attacks of all kinds of infidelity and error. The forms of scepticism which formerly assailed our common Christianity, attacked it as a *system* of religious truth in its entirety. It questioned the possibility of a revelation from God, and, even granting that, denied that the Bible contained such a revelation. By some, Mohammedanism, and Paganism, in its many schemes, were set forth as entitled to equal confidence with Christianity; and the religion of natural reason was held to be our only guide to the knowledge and worship of nature's God. As to the person, nature, and work of Christ, the opposition to the revelation of the New Testament assumed varied forms, from a scornful spurning of the claims of our Lord by Jews and infidels, through every shade of perversion of scriptural statements, by Arians, Socinians, Unitarians, and Universalists. In all, there was an open, outspoken expression of unbelief. But in the generation of the first half of our century and that succeeding it, infidelity has

changed its base and its tactics. It has ascended the pulpits consecrated to the advocacy of a pure gospel, harangued from the platforms of nominal Christian conventions and societies, and discoursed from the cathedra of lecture rooms in institutions founded in the interests of a true Christianity. It denies the charge of being unchristian, and sets forth its allegations, or worse, its insinuations, in critical diatribes or theological essays, pervaded by a manifestation of *respect* for the very faith they undermine; and courts the confidence of orthodoxy and piety, by mingling with its perversions, half truths, doubts, suggestions of falsehood, and a few commonplaces of Christianity, the least objectionable to the carnal heart. It teaches a Christianity without a Christ, a heaven without holiness, and a hell without horrors. All forms of Broad Churchism, Humanitarianism, false philanthropy, unionism, false charity, and a so-called "liberal Christianity," arise from ignorance of Scripture, misquotations, misapprehension, or perversion of the word. As our Lord foiled Satan by, "It is written," so must the "man of God" steadfastly resist such, "holding fast the faithful word, as he has been taught." There is also now, as of old, (2 Tim. iv. 3,) a wide-spread intolerance of sound doctrine. A distinction is alleged, between the formulated declarations of truth in our *standards* and the *actual* belief of its office-bearers; the standards are no longer to be accepted as a test, and the "actual belief," whatever a man professes it to be, becomes his "confession:" so, virtually, every man may be a "law unto himself." Men now speak of the "progress of the age," and the "advanced thought of the nineteenth century," and would have us accept (and many, alas, it is feared, do accept) the position that theology, like medicine and law, must change; that with discoveries in science and inventions in art, there must be expected discoveries in theology, and inventions in the means of grace. But human nature has not changed; and, blessed be God, Jesus Christ, the Saviour for sinful, ruined man, is "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever!" Man has never made any really valuable progress in moral science—(*moral*, in *narrow sense*),—if, indeed, *any* progress whatever, independently of the teaching of Revelation.

It remains to be proved that the eminent moralists of heathen nations derived the principles they inculcated from no higher source than human reason. It is notorious that man's tendency, left to himself, is to deteriorate, and that, according to history, moral as well as intellectual improvement has come to all people from abroad. Now, to all these "novelties" which hinder the progress of true scriptural teaching and piety, the "watchmen" of Zion must be prepared, at every new phase in the "advanced thought," by careful interpretation of the word of God, to present successfully the needed refutations.

5. Again, in view of the conceded simplicity of the gospel, many have taken ground against the full requisitions of our Form of Government [Ch. XIV.], and insist that men of ordinary talents and mental culture are adequate to the work of dispensing the gospel successfully, for edifying the "body of Christ," and the awakening, conviction, and conversion of the ungodly. It is readily admitted that we have had in the success of the Haldanes, of North, and more especially, in eminent "lay preachers" of our day, some remarkable supports, in appearance, to these views. Such cases are fully discussed, and adequate reasons for pleading them only as *exceptions* to our time-honored plans, are presented in another article of this *Review* on "Lay Preaching." To this the reader will refer. But these and similar proper exceptions aside, there have not been wanting examples of the injurious consequences of placing men devoid of an adequate training in the knowledge of a true scriptural theology, in the responsible position of authorised expositors of the word of God. Becoming self-reliant, imbued with a Jehu-like zeal and its characteristic rashness and self-adulation, their success, for a time, in urging the simpler truths respecting man's salvation, leads them to two great errors: (1.) On the one hand, they adopt reason, not as a guide to the apprehension of truth, but as an arbiter to decide what is or ought to be truth, and dogmatically avow that no interpretation of Scripture can be right which teaches a doctrine or a practice inconsistent with what, *a priori*, they have decided ought to be taught by God. (2.) On the other, they boldly decry those solemn mysteries of divine revelation, con-

nected with the divine government, such as God's sovereignty, the Trinity, man's helplessness and yet responsibility, and the sole agency of the Divine Spirit in man's spiritual renovation. It is not surprising that, under the leadings of the ignorance and fanaticism of such men, their hearers, with "itching ears," "heap to themselves teachers," who "turn aside unto vain janglings," "understanding neither what they say nor whereof they affirm." Now some of the most common and the simplest truths rest on those which are abstruse. The very simplicity of the gospel offer involves the acceptance of "God's free grace," man's ruin and helplessness, the mystery of the Incarnation, and the vicarious nature of Christ's great sacrifice. No wonder, then, is it that those who stumble on abstruse doctrines and reject all they cannot understand, end by rejecting the simple truths themselves, in the praise of which they have been so emphatic, when they find their basis to be in the abstruse mysteries of the kingdom of God. But men do not pursue a course so absurd in the affairs of this life. Some of its ordinary daily occupations rest on mysteries in God's natural government as profound and inexplicable as any in his spiritual government. Were men as irreconcilably opposed to their best interests, in this world as to those affecting the life to come, they would, consistently, as completely deprive themselves of temporal blessings by rejecting the truths in the reception of which these blessings are secured. It is, then, of the most weighty importance and advantage, that those who desire to be teachers, should be diligent to understand the "ways of God" to man, as taught in his word. What is the ignorance of teachers of law or of medicine, or agriculture, or of any science or art, which influences men's worldly interest, compared with the ignorance of the great scheme of saving men's souls? Let charity, with her amplest folds, cover the "multitude of sins" which the ignorance of the minister in sacred things may occasion, still the presumption of those who, uncalled of God and his Church, "rush where angels dare not tread," can find no folds of "charity" ample enough to protect them from a merited condemnation. Of course, we are speaking of professed teachers, not of "whosoever heareth:" men, every where to be found, humble,

docile, and modest also, who, while aiding the faithful pastor by seeking out the wanderers and unawakened and sin-burdened and inviting them to Christ, do not undertake to be teachers of what they do not understand and fear they might pervert.

6. As "set for the defence of the truth," the minister, well taught in the word, will be prepared to make a wise decision on the character of all kinds of religious literature claiming the approbation of the Christian public. During the last fifty years this has increased to an amount past computation. In volumes of all sizes, in magazines and other pamphlets, and even in newspapers of single, double, and quadruple sheets, we have offered, commentaries on the Bible or parts of it, for the young and for adults, and discussions on biblical subjects both adverse and favorable. Some of such publications are offered as "family" or "Sunday-school libraries," with contents good and bad mixed. The authors of these numerous productions represent every age and degree of ability and soundness or unsoundness of faith; for "who will may write, and what he will." Some represent the views of the historical Churches of the Reformation. Others present those of Papists, now that Rome finds it necessary to affect a desire for enlightening men by means of the press. Others, those of various religious bodies, of both older and of more recent origin. In all these we know what to expect. But there are many others whose self-imposed task is setting forth an undenominational literature. Some distinctly avow an evangelical character. Others, arrogantly assuming that all which is denominationally distinctive is useless, present those religious truths to which no believer in the inspired authority of the Scriptures will object, and about the interpretation of which no one doubts. Yet another class, wishing to please also the sceptical and rationalistic, occupy a yet lower sphere, representing themselves only and all who may happen to agree with them, among those they compliment as "liberal," in all churches or in no churches. And still others, whether belonging to sound or unsound denominations or to no one, becoming enamored with the importance of some particular religious truth, press it, with one-sided and extreme views, irrespective of "the analogy of

faith," and to the injury of other scriptural truth. Even Christian book publishers are inattentive, in many cases, to the true character of what they publish, not regarding the scriptural principle of—"Woe to him that giveth his neighbor drink," as applicable to the manufacture and selling of poison for the soul. And, as if the regular course of trade were too slow a method of disseminating books of doubtful, as well as those of good character, agents are employed, to traverse the land, making domiciliary visits, and tempting the unwary with books, sustained by pages of recommendations, some meaning nothing and some any thing, the bindings of flimsy leather and flimsier cloth, but glittering with spurious gilding, and the pages interspersed with indifferent lithographs or wood-cuts, being "pictures to match" the text. Clergymen are the desired victims of the process, and offers of books at *half-price*, the additional inducement to secure their patronage. This is no fancy sketch, depicting the extent to which our age illustrates the wise man's saying, "Of the making of many books there is no end." The land is equally, if not more abundantly, flooded with school-books.

Now to guard the masses of the people from impositions and injury, neither the Churches nor the State can interfere; not the Churches, because no one alone can control such a matter, and it is impossible for a union to be effected; and the State cannot be trusted with the two-edged sword of a censorship of the press. Nor *would* real Protestant Churches combine in the tyrannical scheme of an *Index Expurgatorius*, which Rome employs to repress whatever is inconsonant with her teachings. The remedy is to be found only in the work of a ministry, fully prepared to check the progress of error by the best method of dealing with it, that of forestalling its entrance by filling men's minds with the sound and sober truths of God's word, faithfully interpreted and earnestly and plainly presented. It is neither practicable nor to be expected that they will be able to keep abreast with all the pernicious literature, and all the oppositions of false science, so as, by the reading of each specimen as it comes forth, to be prepared to refute it. A people, well trained in Scripture truth, with God's blessing, will not "be carried about with every wind

of doctrine," "but speaking the truth in love, will grow up into Christ," "the Head of his Church, rooted and built up in him."

This already protracted discussion will be closed with two suggestions in application:

1. Our Presbyteries are intrusted with a wide discretion as to the trials by which they must test the fitness of probationers under their "care" for the ministry; neither the Church, nor a world dying in sin, want a pietist without knowledge, nor a scholar without grace; not a drone in studying his Bible, however industrious in conning his grammar; not an ignoramus in theology, however skilled in mythology; not a tolerator of heresy from the revealed word, however lenient to aberrations from a formulary. Let, then, more time be given and appropriate means used, to test probationers in their knowledge of the Scriptures in all their parts, and the purport of each. Let no haste "to get through," drive into an hour or so, to be prosecuted as a mere routine, this most important duty of Presbytery. This is the authority, and not theological professors, to whom our Church assigns the work.

2. Probationers should ponder this whole subject—we say not this feeble presentation of its claims. Success of the Church and its ministry is graduated by the power of two factors—the WORD and THE SPIRIT. Man employs one, God sends the other. If man does his part, he may expect God's part, most assuredly, will be supplied. Leading authorities among the Unitarians ascribe the failures of so-called "liberal Christianity" to a want of "definite theological convictions," and argue that, however superior may be their systems and methods, as seen from "an intellectual standpoint," [they being judges,] "the dogmatic errors" [truths] of orthodoxy are the "conditions of its efficacy." Just so. In all forms of Christianity in which any thing supersedes or pushes aside *preaching the word*, there must be failure. The sum of all pastoral theology and homiletics, the end of all controversies on doctrine and polity revealed to man, are obtained in the right exposition and enforcement of the three pregnant words of Paul—PREACH THE WORD. To do this, the word must be understood, treasured, loved, and made the counsel and the

guide. To convince gainsayers, silence the pratings of vain talkers, and humble the unruly, **PREACH THE WORD.** To lead back the wanderer, restore the backslider, comfort "mourners in Zion," and guide sin-burdened souls to Christ, **PREACH THE WORD.** "In season and out of season," in private and in public, earnestly, solemnly, above all, prayerfully, **PREACH THE WORD.**

ARTICLE VIII.

ECCLESIASTICAL STATUS OF FOREIGN MISSIONARIES.

It is a matter of practical and growing importance that the ecclesiastical relationship of missionaries to the church courts which they have left behind them in their native land, upon which they are dependent for support, as well as to those that have been formed through their agency in foreign lands, should be distinctly understood and definitely settled. Principles and measures are now being sanctioned by practical usage, which, if in the course of time, they should prove unwise or unscriptural, it might become very difficult to correct or abandon. Our Form of Church Government was drawn up at a period when the cause of Foreign Missions was little understood or appreciated, and hence its principles can be applied only by inference to many of the details of this work. No religious body holding the general principles of Presbyterian government, so far as is known, has ever legislated on the subject, and, of consequence, there is not only great variety of views and usages among those of like faith, but there is no authoritative standard to which an appeal can be made for the solution of the many perplexing questions which are constantly arising in the prosecution of this great enterprise. One of those problems needing solution at the present time, is the one indicated in the opening sentence of this paper.

It is not the design of this paper to discuss all the principles of

Scripture that are involved in the matter ; but leaving this for those who are more conversant with the subject of Church Government, simply to set forth the ideas and usages that have already been sanctioned, and to point out the necessary and logical results that must flow from them.

Among the various Presbyterian bodies engaged in the Foreign Missionary work, there are no less than four different plans or schemes by which this matter of ecclesiastical relationship is regulated.

The first is where the local churches that may be gathered out of a heathen community, no matter how many there may be, are never brought into any general organisation, but are governed separately by the missionaries, who are always organised into what is technically called a "mission," or sub-committee, which acts under the immediate direction of the Committee or Board at home. This plan, when carried beyond the incipient stages of the missionary work, becomes essentially Congregational in its features, and there is no occasion for considering it further in connexion with the subject in hand.

The second scheme is where two Presbyteries are formed : the one made up exclusively of the foreign missionaries, but having connected with it no churches or church-officers ; whilst the other is made of native pastors and native elders, having under its care and supervision all the churches in a given territory. In relation to the first of these, it is questionable whether a Presbytery made up exclusively of ministers without elders or churches, either present or prospective, would be compatible with Presbyterian order and polity. Nor is it probable that any Synod would feel authorised to organise such a Presbytery. Nor is it necessary, as it seems to us, that any such organisation should exist. The missionaries, in all the schemes that we have under consideration, are always organised into a "mission," which is virtually a sub-committee, and which has executive, but not ecclesiastical powers. It is through this body that the Committee or Board at home transacts all its business. With such a body as this, there is no need for a Presbytery made up entirely of min-

isters, which, from the very circumstances of the case, would necessarily become an executive body.

Having disposed of these two schemes in this brief and summary way, we may now give our attention to the other two, which are really the only ones that are worthy of serious consideration, and the only ones about which there is much diversity of views among those who hold to the general principles of Presbyterian government.

In relation to the first of these two, it is assumed that, whilst the foreign missionaries should always be formed into a mission, (in the sense just explained,) they should also be formed into a Presbytery, which should embrace all the native pastors, elders, and churches that might be gathered as the fruit of their labors. According to this arrangement, the native pastors are not necessarily members of the "mission;" but in the Presbytery, the foreign missionaries and the native pastors, including the native elders, are all on a footing of perfect equality, and of course exercise a common oversight of the churches under their care. According to this arrangement, a foreign missionary may become the permanent pastor of any one of these churches; and in fact this is constantly done in all those missions where mixed Presbyteries prevail. Moreover, all Presbyteries of this kind, together with the churches under their care, are necessarily allied to the Presbyterian Church in this country, and in fact form an integral part of it. The course heretofore pursued by our own as well as most other Presbyterian bodies, is to acknowledge and ratify this relationship by attaching this mixed Presbytery to some particular Synod under the care of the Assembly, and thus establish a direct communication between it and the highest church court of the whole body. This carries the authority of the Assembly to every foreign land where we have missions; and in the course of time, if the work of missions is prospered, the Church will have its ramifications in every portion of what is now known as the unevangelised world.

It is argued in favor of this plan, that it brings the foreign missionary and the native pastor, as also the native churches, into closer and more endeared fellowship; that the missionary can be

more helpful to his native brethren by being in the same ecclesiastical body with them ; that a Christian community, just emerging from the depths and darkness of heathenism, cannot carry out the principles of religious worship and church government without having some one, in and of them, to lead and guide them in all such matters. Now, we do not pretend to give the full force of the argument that might be offered in support of this particular theory ; nor do we undervalue the weight and force of the argument, though presented in this brief way. But we shall endeavor to show, in the course of this discussion, that these important ends can be attained in a better way and without involving any of the evils that are inseparable from this particular plan. We proceed, therefore, to point out some of the difficulties that are necessarily connected with this general scheme for carrying on the foreign missionary work.

In the first place, there is a constitutional difficulty lying in the way. We doubt very much whether a Synod has the constitutional power to stretch its arm across the territory occupied by coördinate Synods and across seas and continents, in order to supervise and manage a Presbytery in the work of evangelisation in one of the most distant parts of the earth. And yet this is exactly what the Synod of Kentucky has to do in having the Presbytery of Hangchow placed under its care. Undoubtedly, a Presbytery has the power to follow and control its members to any part of the world. Any such member is liable to be summoned before its bar to give an account of himself, or to answer to charges of immorality or heresy, no matter to what part of the world he may have been sent. But this is a different thing from a Presbytery's having churches and a Synod's having Presbyteries grow up under its spiritual supervision in one of these remote parts of the earth. Every church court has complete powers in itself, so that a Presbytery or a Synod, in the exercise of its inherent powers, might send missionaries to any part of the world. But according to the Constitution of the Church, these powers are so distributed that a Presbytery, in the exercise of her functions, is necessarily restricted by territorial limits, and so also in relation to the Synod. But no such restrictions can be applied

to the General Assembly. As the representative of the whole body, she stands related to all mankind. She has not only authority to send the gospel anywhere, but she is bound by the terms of the great commission, at least to the extent of her ability, to send it to every human being on the face of the earth. It is not necessary, however, for her to subordinate her foreign conquests to her own perpetual authority. Her work is done in any given place when the churches she may have gathered, and the Presbyteries formed; shall be able, with the help of God, to stand in their own strength.

There is also a further constitutional difficulty in the way of the Assembly's maintaining permanent jurisdiction over one of the mixed Presbyteries to which we have referred. It is a well-understood principle among ourselves, that a Presbytery is never to be interfered with in the management of its internal affairs, unless a reference or appeal is taken by some of its members to a higher court, or unless some irregularity is discovered in its proceedings when its record is reviewed by a higher court. Especially has it the right to form and dissolve the pastoral relationship, and to direct all the missionary and evangelistic labors within its own boundaries. Any interference with the exercise of these prerogatives, except in the way just indicated, would be regarded as a violation of constitutional rights, and would be resisted with all possible earnestness. But such conflict is almost sure to take place sooner or later between the General Assembly and these foreign mixed Presbyteries. The cause of the friction here would be that such Presbyteries are made up partly of foreign missionaries who are under the immediate control of the Assembly, and partly of native pastors and elders who bear no such special relationship. Nor can the Assembly abandon this control over its missionaries, without giving up any particular schemes of evangelisation that it may have contemplated. The Presbytery might insist that a missionary, in virtue of being a member of its body, should occupy a given post and perform a certain kind of labor, whilst the Assembly, in carrying out its particular views, might prescribe an entirely different course. The Assembly, having the support of the missionary in its hands,

would no doubt override the decision of the Presbytery. But is it wise to countenance an arrangement that would necessitate, or be liable to necessitate, the violation of constitutional principle at the very beginning of things?

But apart from these constitutional difficulties, there are practical difficulties in the way of the Assembly's maintaining thorough and permanent control over churches and church organisations in remote parts of the world. Questions relating to morals, to church government, and even to matters of theology, will be sure to be sent up from these inferior courts, in relation to many of which the Assembly will find it difficult to come to anything like a satisfactory conclusion. Take one or two illustrations. A spirited controversy has been going on among the Protestant missionaries in China for more than twenty years, which indeed dates back to the old Roman Catholic missions there, in relation to the proper word to be used for the name of Deity. Two distinct words are in actual use. The parties to this controversy, though volumes have been written on the subject, are as far apart now as they ever were. Now, suppose the Presbytery of Hangchow should refer this matter to the General Assembly for an authoritative decision, by what means could the Assembly form a judgment that would be satisfactory even to itself?

Again: The practice of *foot-binding* in China is not only a very absurd, but a very cruel usage. But cruel and absurd as it is, it is regarded as absolutely essential to respectability. A mother who neglects to perform this service for her daughter when a child, will be sure to be reproached and despised by that daughter for the neglect when she grows up to womanhood. The converts to Christianity cannot always resist the influence of this custom. Some of the missionaries think it should be made a matter of church discipline. Others again, though conceding that it is a very cruel practice, are not prepared to admit that it should be made a matter of discipline. Now suppose this case should be referred to the Assembly. Could the Assembly decide wisely about it, without knowing something about its origin, its design, its influence upon individual character, and its influence over society? These and similar questions can be wisely settled

only by missionaries on the ground. To throw them into the Assembly for discussion would be simply to create endless debate without coming to a satisfactory conclusion. It is natural to suppose that missionaries would want help in the solution of these difficult and perplexing questions; but the Assembly can only promulgate general principles, which may or may not be of appreciable advantage to the missionary.

But there is a still more serious matter that must not be overlooked in considering this particular mode of carrying on the foreign missionary work. By forming mixed presbyteries, we virtually establish branches of our own Church in all those portions of the world where we have missions, thus not only creating the necessity for an oversight which can scarcely be carried out, but effectually preventing the churches under our care from forming alliances with other churches of similar faith and order in the same region of country. It might be necessary to keep these newly formed churches isolated for a time, but as a permanent policy it is very undesirable. If our own Church should adopt the policy of having a separate and independent Presbyterian Church in China, as well as other portions of the heathen world, then every other Presbyterian body engaged in prosecuting the work of missions in China should naturally do the same thing; so that instead of having one Presbyterian church in that country, we would have fifteen or twenty. Is it really wise or desirable that any such project or plan should be carried into effect? Would it be possible, even if it were wise, to perpetuate in a country like that all those nicer shades of doctrine and policy which prevail in this country and Europe? Would it be proper to tax the minds of heathen converts with certain theological subtleties or intricate points of church order when they are scarcely able to grasp the first and simplest elements of the Christian salvation? Will it not require generations to bring up such communities to that line of thought and inquiry where our own and other Presbyterian Churches diverge from each other? Is it certain that the causes which have led to these divergencies in Europe and in America will ever prevail in India or China? Why impose upon the mind of these heathen

converts the necessity of inquiring about matters that have only a temporary or local application? In our own judgment, it would be far better to let all these minor divisions and subdivisions of Presbyterian converts crystallise into one solid body, just so soon as the component elements are prepared for such a consolidation. If we give occasion to converts from heathenism for controversy in relation to those minor points which separate Presbyterian bodies in Europe and in America, it will not only be the means of starting endless strifes among themselves, but it will be likely to frustrate and paralyse all the efforts they would otherwise make for the propagation of the gospel among their own benighted countrymen.

Before passing from the consideration of this particular scheme, it may not be out of place to show, in very brief terms, that the idea of those who wish to see branches of our Church established in all those portions of the world where we have missions, and which logically follows the scheme we are opposing, is in fact an impossibility. If these mixed presbyteries are integral parts of the Church, as they undoubtedly are, then they are entitled to representation in the General Assembly. But, in the first place, how would it be possible, even with all the facilities of modern travel, to bring together for mutual consultation representatives from all these various and distant bodies? And without the gift of tongues, how could the Assembly, with a constituency speaking a dozen or fifteen languages, transact business with any thing like order? And if the matter of language presented no difficulty, how could the Assembly intelligently discuss the thousands of questions that would be brought up for consideration by these foreign representatives?

The other arrangement, and the one which we consider as most practicable, as well as most consonant with the teachings of Scripture, is where every ordained missionary is regarded in the light of an evangelist, in the common and scriptural acceptation of that term. In going to a country lying outside of the pale of the Christian Church, he carries with him and exercises, for the time being, all the functions of a presbytery. He may, by virtue of his office, organise churches, ordaining deacons and elders

over them, so that first the parochial and then afterwards the classical Presbytery emerges. He may devote himself to the translation of God's word, to the education of a native ministry, or whatever else may be necessary to the establishment of the Christian Church on a firm basis in any country to which he may go. He is never to become the pastor of any particular church that he may form, except under special circumstances and for a temporary purpose; but he is to ordain pastors and elders over them, and to go on forming others, but maintaining a general and advisory supervision over all these newly-formed churches, until such a time as they shall be able to dispense with his services. The evangelist is never to become a *de facto* member of any Presbytery he may form; but he may sit in it as a corresponding member to advise and give counsel. He is to continue to be a member of the Presbytery in this country which clothed him with the powers and functions of an evangelist, with this understanding, however, that when he is ordained to the work of a foreign missionary, he is transferred by his Presbytery to the control and direction of the Assembly, so far as his missionary labors in a foreign land are concerned. There is no incompatibility in this between the authority of the Presbytery and that of the General Assembly. The ecclesiastical power of the Presbytery remains unimpaired. It supervises his conduct, though in an imperfect way, as a minister of the gospel; it can summon him, no matter where he lives or labors, before its bar, and try him for immorality or heresy; it can defend and protect his good name, if he is assailed; and it can appoint him, whenever it chooses, as a commissioner to the General Assembly. On the other hand, the Assembly can exercise no immediate ecclesiastical control over the missionary. It cannot try or depose him for heresy or immorality, unless the case comes up in form of appeal and complaint from the Presbytery. The Assembly simply claims the right to direct his labors, and may dismiss him from its service for incompetency, for disobedience, or for the want of fidelity in the discharge of his duties. In this respect the status of the missionary is analogous to that of the secretary of one of our schemes of benevolence. A secretary may be set aside by the

Assembly for incompetence, for disobedience, or for the want of energy and fidelity in the discharge of the duties assigned him ; or he may be defended and vindicated by the Assembly, if unjust charges are preferred against him. But when charges of immorality or heresy are preferred, the trial must begin in the Presbytery to which the Secretary belongs.

The authority of the evangelist over the churches he may gather in a foreign land is complete in itself, but temporary in its duration. For the time being, he may receive or dismiss members from the church ; but this is to be done only in the initiatory state of things. As soon as a church or churches are thoroughly organised and officered, they become capable of self-government, and the authority of the evangelist expires, except that he may continue to act as an adviser so long as his services shall be needed.

This view of the office and functions of an evangelist is not only in strict accordance with the example of the great Apostle to the Gentiles, so far as he acted as an evangelist himself, and with the powers with which Timothy and Titus were clothed, but it is the only one that places the modern missionary in his right position to the Church, both at home and abroad. At the same time, it not only frees us from all the difficulties and inconveniences of the system which we have considered at length, but it shows that the foreign missionary work, as little as it was understood by the framers of our Constitution, can, nevertheless, be carried on without any material modification or change of that Constitution.

Nor do we see that the general work of missions can be carried on less effectively under this than the other scheme. We do not see that a missionary would have a stronger influence for good by being a pastor of a church or a member of a native Presbytery, than he would have as an adviser or counsellor, standing outside of that church and Presbytery. In the one case, the people would be almost sure to be mere unthinking followers ; in the other they would soon learn the art of managing their own affairs. In the one case, they would be apt to take the simple *ipse dixit* of their pastor as their rule ; in the other, they would be taught to search the Scriptures to find that rule. Character must be

cultivated; and without this, the mere routine of duty can be of very little avail. In training a Christian community that has just emerged from the darkness of heathenism, three things are of special and acknowledged importance, viz., "self-government," "self-support," and "self-propagation." All such communities should be trained to govern themselves as speedily as possible, whether reference be had to the government of themselves individually, or of the churches into which they may be organised. Until this art is acquired, there can be but little stability, either of individual character or of church organisation of any kind. Mistakes will be made, especially in their earlier attempts to maintain church government; but these will be overruled, in the providence of God, for their more rapid advancement in the principles of sound government. But so long as the foreign missionary is in the pastoral office, not only will his ruling be silently acquiesced in, but all feelings of self-reliance on the part of the people will be kept in abeyance, and the Church must necessarily continue in the condition of a nursling.

Nor is the case any better when we come to consider the matter of self-support. The foreign missionary must necessarily look to the Church at home for his support. With very few exceptions, none of the churches in these foreign lands can give the missionary the salary his circumstances, habits, and associations in life demand. He is therefore in an anomalous position, being the pastor of a church, without deriving his support from it. This state of things, when made permanent, not only breaks up that bond of mutual relationship which should always exist between pastor and people, but it leaves the benevolent energies of the people almost entirely undeveloped. But this would not necessarily be the case if there was a native pastor. He could not only live on a smaller salary than the foreign missionary, but it would be such as the people could afford to give, and would, in the result, establish the closest bonds of friendship and confidence between pastor and people.

But the great end to be achieved in the prosecution of the missionary work is "self-propagation," or the extending of the knowledge of the gospel by those who have been made the subjects of it. The great end of the missionary enterprise will be

frustrated unless this particular object can be attained. No heathen land can ever be thoroughly evangelised except through the agency of its own people. The foreign missionary may, with the blessing of God, set the ball in motion; he may shape its course for a time, but it must afterwards be kept in motion by those who are raised up on the soil. But no native community can be expected to do much in extending the knowledge of the gospel to regions beyond, until they have been first trained to self-government and self-support. Nor is this a mere matter of speculation. Previous to that period in the history of modern missions, when that great change, involving these principles of self-reliance and self-government was inaugurated, little or no progress was made in extending the knowledge and power of the gospel beyond the immediate vicinity of the stations occupied by the missionaries. But since then a new life has been imparted to these churches. They have risen up out of this nursling condition, and in the exercise of gifts that had for a long time lain dormant; they are now putting forth energies in many places for the salvation of their fellow-men, which may well put to blush the feebler efforts of many of our home churches. In consequence of this, more souls have been converted to the Lord Jesus in the last fifteen or twenty years, than in the previous forty or fifty.

In view of these, as well as other considerations that might be adduced, it seems to us that this latter plan of conducting the missionary work is far the better and safer one. It not only avoids many of the difficulties and inconveniencies which inherently belong to the other, but it is in more strict accordance with the plan and example of the great Apostle of the Gentiles, and with the principles of our divine system of church government. By this arrangement, our Church avoids the necessity of having branches of its own in all the distant parts of the earth; the churches gathered through the labors of her missionaries will be left free to form Presbyterian organisations of their own, or to unite with other churches of like faith and order with her in the formation of a more general Presbyterian organisation; and so our missionary brethren whom we send abroad will remain in ecclesiastical connexion with the Church in which they were brought up, and which they represent abroad.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Memoirs of Rev. Charles G. Finney. Written by himself.
New York: A. S. Barnes & Co. 1876. 12mo., pp. 477.

This is a very melancholy record. It is the record of the life and labors of a professed minister of the gospel, and yet of a minister who denied and labored to overthrow the great doctrines of the gospel; the record of a man who professed to be, and believed himself to be, under the constant direction of the Holy Ghost, and yet of a man who flagrantly and constantly dishonored the Holy Ghost, not only by denying the teachings of his word, but by denying to him any other kind of agency in the salvation of sinners than that which was exercised by the preacher himself. The subject and author of these memoirs may be described as a representative of the *extreme left* of the "New School" party of his day, and of that class of "revivalists" who undertake to "get up" revivals instead of looking and waiting for them to come down. He was a minister who had no training for his profession, and yet a writer on "Systematic Theology": an instructive example of the intimate connexion subsisting between ignorance and pretension, and, we may add, pernicious error.

Extremes meet. Mr. Finney denied any other agency of the Spirit in the regeneration of a sinner, or in the sanctification of a believer, than an agency mediated by revealed truth, and at the same time speaks of himself habitually as receiving suggestions immediately from the Spirit. His statements, indeed, on this subject, are sometimes so strong as to justify us in charging him with *enthusiasm*, if not with *fanaticism*. By enthusiasm, we do not mean a fictitious fervor merely, a fervor produced by a distempered imagination, or a fervor produced, indeed, by realities, yet altogether disproportioned, in the way of excess, to the nature of the realities; but a fervor produced by an imaginary direct intercourse with the Deity. We should not hesitate to

stigmatise it as *fanaticism*, if this word were not generally understood as connoting a depraved moral temper. The state of Mr. Finney's heart it is no prerogative of ours to judge. All the phenomena of his life, as here recorded, may be explained without the supposition of imposture or badness of heart.

The anthropology of Mr. Finney is the baldest Pelagianism. He denies any sinfulness of *nature* in man. Take the following passage as a specimen of statements which he makes frequently on this subject: "I have everywhere found that the peculiarities of hyper-Calvinism have been a great stumbling-block, both of the Church and of the world. A nature sinful in itself, a total inability to accept Christ and to obey God, condemnation to eternal death for the sin of Adam and for a sinful nature, and all the kindred and resultant dogmas of that peculiar school, have been the stumbling-block of believers and the ruin of sinners." (P. 368.) And these words were written when their author was seventy-five years old! (See p. 3.) More than three-quarters of a century, it appears, had not been sufficient to convince Mr. Finney that he had a sinful heart! Such a miserably shallow anthropology must of course have a correspondingly shallow soteriology. Hence, we find him insisting upon the sinner's ability to save himself, if he be properly instructed; that is, if he be taught that he is *not* helpless, that he *can* change the "governing purpose" of his life, cease to serve himself and the devil, and give himself to the service of God. The thing which hinders sinners from converting themselves is the Calvinistic error that they are unable to convert themselves. If they can only be persuaded that they *can* beget themselves, that they *can* rise from the dead, that they *can* create themselves anew, they will do it. (See p. 256, first paragraph of chap. 19.) Among "the false comforts for sinners" which Mr. Finney enumerates, one is "telling the sinner to *pray for a new heart*." He asks: "Does God say, Pray for a new heart? Never. He says, 'Make you a new heart.' And the sinner is not told to pray to God to do his duty for him, but to go and do it himself." (Lect. on Revivals, cited by Wood, in "Old and New Theology.") And he somewhere says that, as Adam made himself a sinner, he could

make himself holy again. Mr. Finney seems to have no place in his system for the Holy Spirit, except as a sort of mysterious, impressive notion which may intensify the sinner's feelings. He has written many pages which we should be obliged to construe as insulting to the Spirit of God, if there were not still room for charitably judging that he knew not what he said nor whereof he affirmed. For ourselves, we should prefer being broken on the wheel, or burnt at the stake, to being the writer of such pages. If Mr. Finney is in heaven, it is quite impossible, of course, for mortals to conceive how he can escape the agony of shame when he remembers the pernicious lies which he ignorantly preached, wrote, and printed when on earth.

Pelagianism logically involves Perfectionism. If a man can make himself a new heart, he can make it *altogether* new, without one remnant of the old being left to mar the beauty and symmetry of his work. The great heresiarch himself, in the fifth century, was a perfectionist, and only bad logic or modesty has prevented all his followers from landing in the same conclusion. The subject of these memoirs had less of modesty than of logic, and hence avowed the theory of perfectionism. Says he, (Wood, *ut supra*, p. 204,) "Now, suppose God to have come out upon Adam with the command of the text, 'Make you a new heart, for why will ye die?' could Adam have justly answered, Dost thou think that I can change my own heart? Can I, who have a heart totally depraved, can I change that heart? Might not the Almighty have answered him in words of fire: Rebel, you have just changed your heart from holiness to sin; now change it back from sin to holiness." (Sermons on Important Subjects, p. 13.) Again: "Jesus Christ is Lord over his Church; and if he does not actually restrain her from sin, he has it to answer for. It is his business to take care of the Church, and keep her from sin; and for every sin of every member, Jesus Christ is responsible and must answer." (Wood, *ut supra*, p. 221.) Again: "There is no more moral inability to be *perfectly* holy, than there is to be holy at all." (*Ibid.*) Though we have no reason to think that Mr. Finney had ever read enough in Church History to know anything of the Pantheistic sect of the Middle Ages, called "The

Brethren of the Free Spirit," yet there is a remarkable correspondence between their language and his. In the language of both, the idea is conveyed of a freedom from sin to be attained by the saint in this world, and to be attained by identification with God in Christ, who thenceforward becomes "responsible" for the saint's acts. In this Autobiography, the author thus states his views at the age of three-score years and five: "I was satisfied that the doctrine of sanctification in this life, and *entire* sanctification, in the sense that it was the privilege of Christians to live without known sin, was a doctrine taught in the Bible," etc. (P. 341.) The italics are ours.

What Mr. Finney's views were in reference to that branch of soteriology which concerns the work of our Lord Jesus Christ, will be readily guessed by all who are acquainted with the comparative anatomy of theology. He had as little use for Christ in his system as for the Holy Ghost. The work of Christ was no proper satisfaction to the law of God, but a sort of dramatic exhibition, a moral display to warn sinners against their evil ways, to make salvation possible, and to enable sinners to save themselves, with the aid of Mr. Finney, Mr. "Diagram" Gilbert, and the like.

If anybody desires to see how the way of salvation can be belittled and made mean, even when it is not denied, let him read this book! If he loves the gospel of our Lord, and has felt its power and glory, he will be thankful that he was not trained under such preaching as Finney's. If he is a Presbyterian besides, he will bless God for the great deliverance of '37.

Lectures to My Students. A Selection from Addresses Delivered to the Students of the Pastor's College, Metropolitan Tabernacle. By C. H. SPURGEON, President. First series. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1875.

These Lectures do not claim to be a systematic and elaborate treatise on sacred rhetoric. Indeed, some topics are discussed which belong rather to the sphere of pastoral theology. If we were asked to furnish a title, we would give the following: "A Treasury of Valuable and Practical Advice to Young Ministers and Christian Workers."

The book is just what we should have expected from Mr. Spurgeon. The same characteristics which mark his sermons, may be found here: the same deep earnestness and unction; the same simplicity of style, profuseness of apt, telling illustrations, intense practicalness and common sense. The Lectures are colloquial, familiar, and abounding in anecdotes and humor; the style very spirited and vigorous. The author is sometimes betrayed into an irreverent use of Scripture, in his attempts to make his Lectures lively and interesting. They are slightly marred by a species of Scripture-punning. We give a specimen from his Lecture on the Voice: "Do not, as a rule, exert your voice to the utmost in ordinary preaching. Now, it is all very well to 'Cry aloud and spare not;' but 'Do thyself no harm,' is apostolical advice. Do not give your hearers headaches, when you mean to give them heartaches. You aim to keep them from sleeping in their pews; but remember, it is not needful to burst the drums of their ears. 'The Lord is not in the wind.'" This style of smartness is not to be imitated, even though it is countenanced by so good, useful, and judicious a man as Mr. Spurgeon.

In the order of his subjects, the lecturer does not seem to have had any special regard for logical arrangement. The subjects are as follows: The Minister's Self-Watch; The Call to the Ministry; The Preacher's Private Prayer; Sermons—their Matter; On the Choice of a Text; On Spiritualizing; On the Voice; Attention; The Faculty of Impromptu Speech; The Minister's Fainting Fits; The Minister's Ordinary Conversation; To Workers with Slender Apparatus. The views presented on these topics are generally very sound. But there are two points to which we take exception. In discoursing on the Call to the Ministry, the author says: "In order further to prove a man's call, after a little experience of his gifts, he must see a measure of conversion-work going on under his efforts, or he may conclude that he has made a mistake, and therefore he may go back by the best way he can." He even says, "There must be some measure of conversion-work in your irregular labors, before you can believe that preaching is to be your life-work." This position cannot be maintained; for there are many most useful and

acceptable ministers in the Church who had no conversions under their preaching for the first year or two of their ministry, as far as they knew. Again, we cannot always see the effects of the workings of the Holy Spirit at once. Men often hope that they are converted, and on account of timidity and other causes, do not make a profession of faith for a considerable length of time. A young preacher may sometimes be placed over a field of such a character that he could not reasonably expect conversions at once. Jeremiah was sent to preach to a people who had grieved the Holy Spirit finally. May not another be so sent? Besides, we cannot always judge of a minister's acceptance with God by the number of souls he claims to have converted on his list. "One soweth and another reapeth." A large share of that honor which is claimed by the reaper, we believe, God often bestows upon his humble servants who toil under many discouragements in preparing and sowing the field.

The second matter to which we object may be found in the Lecture on Spiritualizing. The author begs leave to dissent from the writers on Homiletics who "condemn the occasional spiritualizing of a text." The manner in which he expresses his dissent is not in any way to be admired. As will be seen, the author commits a fault for which his acknowledged and high reputation leaves him no provocation, in attempting to excite jealousy and *odium* against those who dissent from his usage, by charging them with literary arrogance. Every perspicacious reader sees that, in this instance, the arrogance is his. We shall refute his opinion, not by an assumption, but by the obligations of modesty, humility, and faithfulness. "A great deal of good," says he, "may be done by occasionally taking forgotten, quaint, remarkable, out-of-the-way texts; and I feel persuaded that if we appeal to a jury of practical, successful preachers, who are not theorizers, but men actually in the field, we shall have a majority in our favor. It may be that the learned rabbis of this generation are too sublime and celestial to condescend to men of low estate; but we, who have no high culture or profound learning, or enchanting eloquence to boast of, have deemed it wise to use the very method the grandees have proscribed; for we find it one of the best ways

to keep out of the rut of dull formality, and yet it yields a sort of salt with which to give flavor to unpalatable truth."

No one can read Spurgeon's Sermons without observing here and there one which can claim no relation to the text. For example, in his eighth series there is a sermon entitled *The Barley Field on Fire*, based on 2 Sam. xiv. 29-31. "Absalom sent for Joab, to have sent him to the king: but he would not come to him; and when he sent again the second time, he would not come. Therefore he said unto his servant, See, Joab's field is near mine, and he hath barley there: go and set it on fire. And Absalom's servants set the field on fire. Then Joab arose, and came to Absalom, and said unto him, Wherefore have thy servants set my field on fire?" We have here the simple narration of a mean, cunning trick. And yet, after this text has been subjected to a legal process of *spiritualizing*, it is made to illustrate the use of God's afflictive dispensations to saints and sinners! Can it be that the Holy Spirit intended to convey any such instruction under this curious disguise? The sermon is a good and instructive one, but it does not belong to the text. Why not use one of the many texts which are exactly suited to the theme in hand?

This selection of quaint, queer, out-of-the-way texts, which have no relation to the sermon, except as far-fetched illustrations, must inevitably produce confusion in the minds of ordinary listeners, and work mischief. Having a number of hearers on the tip-toe of intense curiosity, saying to themselves, "I wonder what on earth he is going to make out of that strange text," may enable a minister to keep their attention for a while, but it is not legitimate. The minister is God's herald; and therefore, in fidelity to his trust, he has no right to change the message, or make it carry a meaning which the Holy Spirit never intended. The reader of Scripture is liable to be misled in his study of the Bible by this kind of spiritualizing. And his reverence for the word of God is not likely to be cultivated by observing such liberties in his spiritual guide.

Some of the suggestions in the *Lecture on Public Prayer* are very good. "Vary the length of your prayers. Do you not think it would be much better, if sometimes, instead of giving

three minutes to the first prayer, and fifteen minutes to the second, you gave nine to each? Would it not be better sometimes to be longer in the first, and not so long in the second prayer? . . . Would it not be as well to have a hymn after reading the chapter, or a verse or two before prayer? There is no necessity for adhering to a fixed rule always in the order of the services, or in the length of the public prayers. Monotony often produces weariness in the best Christians; and variety sometimes will do good."

The chapter on Attention is striking and full of valuable suggestions. We give a few of the rules laid down for securing attention: "Always say something worth hearing." "Be interested yourself." "Use a goodly number of illustrations." "Cultivate what Father Taylor calls the *Surprise Power*. There is a good deal of force in this for winning attention. Do not say what everybody expected you would say." "A very useful help in securing attention is a *pause*. Pull up short every now and then, and the passengers on your coach will wake up. The miller goes to sleep while the mill-wheel revolves; but if the grinding ceases, the good man starts and cries, 'What now?'" The last rule, on which most stress is properly laid, is, "Be yourselves clothed with the Spirit of God." We do not believe much in ministers resorting to rhetorical tricks to gain attention; but the *surprise power* and the *pause* may be used to good advantage and legitimately. If carried too far, their use is very unbecoming in a minister.

The chapter on the Faculty of Impromptu Speech contains a great deal of sound advice and good sense. Much stress is laid on the importance of cultivating this faculty; and it is asserted that there can be no success without constant study and hard work. The author advises every preacher to discard the use of manuscripts altogether, and thinks that a discourse should be committed to memory and recited rather than read. It is impossible to lay down rigid and inflexible rules here. Some men can preach more efficiently from a manuscript than in any other way. After several careful perusals before entering the pulpit, many ministers can use written sermons with great effect; and it would

often be difficult to tell whether they were using manuscripts or not. Every man, we believe, should follow that method by which he can be most efficient.

After a careful examination of this work, we cordially recommend it. No one can rise from its perusal without having the conviction strengthened that true piety is the foundation of the preacher's power, and the word of God the only sword of the Spirit.

The rich and varied experience of one whose labors God has so eminently blessed, must furnish results of great practical value. The popular and attractive form in which the thoughts are clothed, is well suited to the purpose which was intended.

The Life and Death of John of Barneveld, Advocate of Holland, with a View of the Primary Causes and Movements of the Thirty Years War. By JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY, D. C. L., LL.D., author of the *Rise of the Dutch Republic*, etc. In two volumes, with illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1874. Pp. 389 and 475, 8vo.

In a brief notice of these volumes on their first appearance, it was intimated that we might at another day give them a somewhat further examination. This promise we are not able to redeem to the extent deserved and designed, but proceed now to say what will perhaps suffice.

The work displays the virtues of the author's earlier essays, in an extenuated, and their vices in an aggravated, form. The first production, extravagantly lauded in America, found a just estimate among friendly critics abroad, in such judgments as the following: The *London Examiner* said: "The badness and the goodness of the book are alike conspicuous." M. Guizot, in the *Edinburgh Review*, 1857, said of Motley: "His style is always copious, occasionally familiar, sometimes stilted and declamatory, as if he thought he could never say too much to convey the energy of his own impressions. The consequence is, that the perusal of this work is alternately attractive and fatiguing, persuasive and irritating." This last production of Motley may justly claim the merits of vivacity and graphic force. It is even more absurdly repetitious than the former histories. The reader is told

a score of times that James I. of England is a pedant ; and Barneveld. the author's hero, a patriot. While much of the language is nervous, much also is turgid ; and the author's rhetoric rises not seldom into the fantastic, and descends to the gross. The portraiture of events is deformed (like Froude's) by excessive detail. Motley seems resolved to make his reader pay for the industry and originality of the research, by swallowing most inordinate and unnecessary doses of the "new and authentic details" exhumed out of forgotten archives. The minute familiarity displayed with historical personages, becomes an affectation.

John van Oldenbarneveld was the leading statesman of the province of Holland, and the virtual minister of the Confederation of the "United Provinces" for Foreign Affairs, during a generation. His fall and judicial murder were coincident with the solution of the Arminian or Remonstrant quarrel, the Synod of Dort, and the revolution by which Prince Maurice overthrew the confederation and established on its ruins a consolidated union. Mr. Motley's real objects in this partisan biography seem to be to express his usual just admiration for Dutch institutions, to attack the doctrine of States' rights, and to indulge his native *animus* against the evangelical system. It is true that his hero, the illustrious Oldenbarneveld, was the great assertor of States' rights, and died, really, in their defence, and not of Arminianism, for which he cared nothing. It is also true, that the Synod of Dort, which Mr. Motley especially hates, was the work of the consolidation party and of the usurping Stadtholder, Prince Maurice. This creates, of course, a quandary sufficiently ridiculous for a partisan historian who is endeavoring to color this very history against "States' rights," and in favor of consolidation. But a diplomatist who, like Motley, has written a book against States' rights in the American Federal Union, in which he repudiates all the essential premises of Webster and Story, (as his historical knowledge forced him to do,) and yet claims their conclusions, find no difficulty in the inference that the principles of the hero he almost adores were wrong, and those of Dort, which he abhors, were right. He promises us, in his introduction, page x., that he will not meddle with the theology of the Dordracene controversy,

but treat only its political lessons. This promise he immediately proceeds to break—pronouncing his judgments throughout the book upon the theology and ecclesiastical principles of the two parties. The intelligent reader perceives a very strong reason why the author should not only have made that promise, but kept it, in his ignorance of the doctrine he condemned. He tells us (Vol. I. p. 40,) that the Netherland churches and pastors held “the doctrine of predestination in its sternest and strictest sense.” The competent theologian knows that while this may have been true of John Bogerman, the Heidelberg and Belgic symbols, the prevalent part of the Synod of Dort, and the articles they adopted were not extreme, but sublapsarian. The Calvinistic ministers are everywhere called a “priesthood!” Because they asserted the correctness of the national creeds, the author currently styles them “Infallibilists,” ignorant that each member of the Synod of Dort was sworn to refer the opinions in dispute to no standard except the Bible. The conclusion of the Synod, from this impartial inquiry, that the Heidelberg and Belgic Confessions needed no Arminian amendment, because consonant with Scripture, is thus absurdly stated: “On the 30th of April and 1st of May, the Netherland Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism were declared to be infallible.” (Vol. II., p. 310.) On the preceding page it is said: “It was settled that one portion of the Netherlanders had been expressly created by the Deity to be forever damned.” In the first volume we are told that the Calvinists “could hold no communion with those who believed in the efficacy of repentance” (Vol. I., p. 344.) Now, any child who has the slightest tincture of Calvinism knows that this is either shameful ignorance or malignant travesty.

It was the misfortune of orthodoxy, that in this death-struggle with Arminianism, it was complicated with other questions, secular and ecclesiastical, of the most exciting nature. To reach a just verdict, these must be understood. *First*, there was the question of States’ rights against consolidation: the claim of the former unquestionably founded in the Articles of Confederation; the pretensions of the latter urged in the interests of public strength and defence. Prince Maurice, the Stadtholder, at first

an Arminian, and at no time a Christian, found it his interest to strengthen his faction, the one of consolidation, by courting the orthodox. They perceived that he had influence to cause the general congress of the confederation to do what they had no right to do, and what the party of States' rights, headed by Oldenbarneveld, would not do—convene a national Synod and support its decrees. The orthodox came to this bait—a few of them, perhaps, dishonestly; the most of them inconsiderately. *Next*, there was the ecclesiastical question, touching the spiritual independence (in spirituals) of an established Church. It must be remembered that no party in that day disputed the lawfulness or necessity of Church establishments. To Papists and Protestants, Lutherans, Prelatists, and Puritans, this union of Church and State seemed as natural as that of man and wife; and all parties would have joined in condemning the American doctrine on this point as lunacy. But on the question, how much control the State might exercise over the Church it endowed, there was then the very same dispute which existed in 1843 between Dr. Chalmers and the British ministry. Oldenbarneveld held to the rights of advowson, and to the duty of the State to regulate the Church to which it appropriated the people's money. The Calvinistic clergy held, as afterwards Dr. Chalmers, that in all spiritual functions the spiritual courts of the Church ought to be supreme, under God. This issue had to be settled. The Federal Congress deceitfully promised to settle it in favor of the Church, and did so for the nonce, by assembling and sustaining the Synod of Dort. The Arminians, on the contrary, supposed that they found their interests in sustaining the views of Oldenbarneveld, and the friends of patronage.

But, *thirdly*, the question of true religious liberty was *not* sustained by either party. The Arminians, when in a minority, pretended to assert it, and clamored for toleration. But whenever they were in the ascendant, they had precisely as little thought of granting it as the Calvinists. Neither party would have avowed our American doctrine. Oldenbarneveld and Grotius, just as much as Gomarus and the Stadtholder, held the necessity of religious unity and outward conformity.

The injustice of which the friends of orthodoxy rightfully complain, in all such representations as those of Mr. Motley, is this : that the Calvinists of Holland are condemned for not being wholly in advance of their age ; for acting consistently upon the prevalent theory of Church-power and State-power over religion, which everybody held. They were wrong ; but no more wrong than everybody else of their day. They persecuted Arminians ? True ; and the Arminians persecuted them. They used civil pains and penalties ? All parties used them, and deemed it their duty to do so. So that Mr. Motley's indictment against them amounts to no more than this : that in 1619 they had not learned the new lessons which his Puritan fathers in Massachusetts had not learned a century later ; and that they held in 1619 precisely that doctrine, touching Church and State, which the great Chalmers tenaciously retained in 1843. Arminianism has enjoyed its revenges. That theory of State control over spirituals, which Mr. Motley's hero advocated, is precisely the one which prevails in the kingdom of Holland to-day ; and the consequence is a corruption of doctrine, a covert infidelity in the clergy, and a spiritual deadness among the people, over which angels might weep.

In conclusion, we have to remark : (1) That the history of the Arminian controversy, according to Motley's own premises, is a striking illustration of the evils of consolidation and the advantages of States' rights, for Oldenbarneveld was the head of the States' Rights party. (2) The fair historian, in judging of the Calvinism of that day, can only be just to it by allowing for the influence of the union of Church and State, and by noting the unrighteous excesses of the Consolidation party, who made a cat's paw (for ends ambitious and rascally) of the controversy. (3) The odium which Calvinism has incurred in that matter should be a lesson to churchmen how criminal it is to allow the mere politician to mix theology and party-tactics, as has been and is done in some quarters in this country. (4) There is a special lesson for our Southern people in this volume. It illustrates powerfully the fatal advantage surrendered by us and laid hold of by the enemies of our section, in a diligent and skilful use of

authorship. The Arminians excelled in their employment of that weapon, and so got the advantage of the less zealous Calvinists, as the North has always got the advantage of us in the same way. Episcopius, Grevinchovius, Limborch, Gerard, Brandt, the Wetsteins, and Grotius, have thus come to have almost the exclusive "hearing" before the bar of posterity; so that *litterateurs* like Motley really know nothing of the merits of the Calvinistic side, and cannot do it justice.

Practical Hints on the Quantitative Pronunciation of Latin.

By ALEXANDER J. ELLIS, B. A., F. R. S., F. C. P. S., F. C. P.
London: Macmillan & Co. 1874.

In this little book we have a plea for the recovery and resumption of the lost art of reciting Latin, by the variations of quantity and pitch. The author's chief aim is not, however, merely to give clearness to our conviction that, by the modern force or stress-accent, we greatly misrepresent the Latin which we read. This uncomfortable conviction he no doubt rightly supposes must have formed itself with sufficient distinctness in the mind of every scholar who has paid attention to the definitions of "accent" and "quantity" given by the ancient grammarians; and who, in reading many remarks of Cicero and Quintilian, has noticed how thoroughly the assumed basis of those remarks is abhorrent to our own practice.

If "*accentus dictus est ab accanendo*" (Diomed. in Putsche, p. 425), and if, as Priscian says, it is "*certa lex et regula ad ELEVANDAM et DEPRIMENDAM syllabam uniuscuiusque particulæ orationis*;" and if, furthermore, quantity is the "*longitudo in tempore*" which Priscian declares it to be, then we have only to refer to our practice, to see how it differs from the native, and, as it seemed to the ancients, the "natural" modes described by them. We do not, we scarcely know how to, "sing to" our utterances in prose; and when we pronounce, *e. g.*, "*propugnator*," an augment of force and a *bearing down*, in fact, upon the syllable "*na*," is the only representative which we employ for the acute and grave accent [*"sublimare et deprimere*," "lifting and sinking"]; and when, further, we utter "*propugnatoribus*," changing

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our stress to the syllable "to," we do not, we think we *cannot*, preserve any appreciable trace of the long quantity (the *longitudinem in tempore*) of the syllable "na."

But the words of Cicero, in *Orator.*, § 173, give a very different view of his practice—a practice which was so natural to him, that his habit seemed a necessity to him: "*et tamen omnium longitudinum et brevitatum in sonis, sicut acutarum graviumque vocum iudicium ipsa natura in auribus nostris collocavit.*"

It is therefore a preliminary postulate with Mr. Ellis, (p. 4,) that the "Augustan pronunciation of Latin differed in almost every characteristic point from the Victorian pronunciation of English, and therefore of Latin also." To this we cannot but agree; and unless we can catch something of the hope with which Mr. Ellis puts his essay forth, we must bear as best we may his enthusiastic cry of reform (page 82): "But only fancy a Frenchman declaiming Shakspeare with his own values of the vowels, his own curious use of the force and pitch accent and emphasis, his own treatment of quantity, and his own intonation! Would not every Englishman stop his ears and flee? And this is but a faint shadow of the atrocious manner in which we have hitherto dared to treat Virgil and Horace and Cicero!"

But how shall we escape from the ever-present influence of our inbred habit? How cease to overrun long syllables and spread out short ones, under our force-accent, to which we are impelled by an unreflecting motive, seemingly as "natural" as that "nature" which Cicero conceived made it necessary for the Latin speaker to observe his quantities? How, too, shall we compel or accustom our monotonous voices to the musical modulation of accent? How attune our prose to the rise and fall of the flute? These are the questions to which Mr. Ellis undertakes to give plain and practical answers. The reader cannot fail to be impressed by the earnest conviction displayed by so learned an author, that the plan of reform he proposes is practicable. And if the reader can bring himself to share this conviction, influenced, as he ought fairly to be, by the title well earned by the author to speak with authority upon all questions of phonetics, then he will peruse with great interest the details of Mr. Ellis's practical plan. We

know of no difficulty in giving our assent theoretically to any of the positions taken in the essay, with the exception of one, that is to say, the utter silencing of final *m* in Latin words. This, as a novelty, is argued at great length in pp. 43-73. Yet we know not how to reconcile such a theory with the statement of Quintilian on the same point (x. 4, § 40): "*Neque enim eximitur (m) sed obscuratur.*" But the great question raised in this interesting little book is: Can we reasonably hope, by effort and industry, so to loosen the trammels of our adverse habit, as really to return to the native Latin modes of recitation, to recover the lost "Augustan ring?" Whatever we shall conclude, there is no reader but will thank Mr. Ellis for a valuable display of argument and experiment, looking towards a gratifying solution of a problem before which the world of modern scholars has hitherto displayed the apathy of conscious incapacity.

Truths for the People: Or, Several Points in Theology Plainly Stated, for Beginners. By WILLIAM S. PLUMER, D. D. American Tract Society, 150 Nassau Street, New York. 12mo., pp. 227.

We have here another volume from the prolific pen of the venerable author, another of the fruits of his untiring industry. One would suppose that he would begin to rest from his labors, and to convert the evening of a useful and laborious life into a sabbatic repose. But he seems to act under the conviction that there are twelve working hours, and that he may not cease to work until the gnomon throws its shadow on the last moment marked on the dial-plate of life. Although he has laid his hand upon the goal of three-score years and ten, he pauses not, but presses on in the race as one contending for the prize, and quickening rather than relaxing his pace as he nears the terminal point, hears more distinctly the thunders of applause, and sees more clearly the amaranth in the extended hand of the Judge. Well, let such a one work on! There will be rest enough soon—rest not from activity, but from the pains of labor. In the grave, "the weary are at rest;" and in the paradise of God, the sweat of toil as well as the tear of anguish will be wiped away

by the hand of One who said on earth: "I must work the works of him who sent me while it is day; the night cometh when no man can work."

The work before us treats the main topics of theology, as the title indicates, in such a manner as to make them apprehensible by the popular mind. There are certain technical terms either furnished in the Scriptures themselves, or rendered necessary by the conflicts of the Church with errorists, which, of course, are indispensable. These are found in this book, without a labored and useless attempt to translate them into the vernacular dialect. But in the main, the style is precisely adapted to the end in view. The author is a master of terse, pure, vigorous English; and in either writing or speaking, never fails to make himself definitely understood. There is no haze about his meaning. It is always unmistakable. This quality of mingled force and perspicuity is stamped upon his book, and will introduce to untrained minds entering upon theological study those great and vital truths which are usually presented in scholastic form for the eye of the disciplined scholar.

One of the marked excellences of the work is that it is eminently scriptural. Its statements are not only derived from Scripture, but in most cases explicitly based upon it. Proof-texts are almost as numerous as the affirmations of the author's views.

These features of the book are suited to render it especially valuable to that class of persons who, without the discipline of academic or scholastic study, are engaged in the pious effort to communicate to others the truths of theology, in an orderly and systematic manner; while many—in an age the temper of which is lamentably untheological—may be tempted to read it who would be frightened by the very aspect of more bulky and technical productions. We hope that it may be as useful as it appears to us to be timely.

The dress of the book is neat, and the type faultless.

The Life and Letters of James Henley Thornwell, D. D., LL.D., Ex-President of the South Carolina College, Late Professor in the Theological Seminary at Columbia, South Carolina. By B. M. PALMER, D. D., LL.D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, New Orleans, Louisiana. Richmond, Whittet & Shepperson. 1875. Pp. 614, 8vo.

A most elegant volume—a most completely successful effort by its distinguished author to reproduce before our Church his illustrious friend—a charming biography, whose fascinations many a Southron Presbyterian family have been feeling all these long winter evenings past. We believe it is the universal judgment that Dr. Palmer has done his task with masterly skill, and that he has the thanks of our whole body for thus embalming our revered and beloved dead. The present brief notice is only designed to give a pledge that in our July number, with the leave of Providence, we shall undertake, in a full review of this work, to set forth our conceptions of its interest and value.

The Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century Considered. By ROBERT L. DABNEY, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Divinity in the Union Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church of the South, Prince Edward, Va. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co. Pp. 369, 8vo.

Of this excellent and valuable fruit of recent Southron authorship, we have to say the same as of the one just named. Having no space in this number for a full exhibition of its character, we can only pledge an effort to do it justice in our next issue.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXVII.—NO. 3.

JULY, MDCCCLXXVI.

ARTICLE I.

THE METAPHYSICAL POSTULATE OF HERBERT SPENCER'S FIRST PRINCIPLES.

First Principles of a New System of Philosophy. By HERBERT SPENCER. Second Edition. Appleton & Co. 1871.

Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Education and University Reform," etc By Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON, Bart. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers. 1853.

The Limits of Religious Thought: Examined in Eight Lectures Delivered before the University of Oxford, in the Year MDCCCLVIII., on the Bampton Foundation. By HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B. D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College; Tutor and Late Fellow of St. John's College. First American, from the third London, Edition. With the NOTES translated. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859.

The corner-stone of Positivism in all its forms is the doctrine, now so fashionable in scientific circles, of the unknowable; and the derivative doctrine as to ultimate causes, whether final or efficient. Since this is so, it is worthy of remark that the founder of French Positivism, M. Comte, has taken this doctrine of the unknowable for granted. There is not a scintilla of proof for it in the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. We are not aware that either M.

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Littre or Mr. G. H. Lewes* has added anything of value in support of the doctrine. It was reserved for another English writer, and one not a professed disciple of Comte, but one who is regarded as the coryphæus at once of British science and of British scepticism, to perceive the defect and to attempt to repair it.

The most inattentive reader of Mr. Herbert Spencer's "First Principles," the title of which work stands at the head of this article, can hardly fail to have been struck with an important admission which he makes in the Prospectus, issued in March, 1860. In defining the scope of the first part, which treats of the "unknowable," Mr. Spencer says that he is but "carrying a step further the doctrine put into shape by Hamilton and Mansel"; and "pointing out the various directions in which science leads to the same conclusions." Mr. Spencer's doctrine of the unknowable, then, in some sense stands or falls with Hamilton's doctrine of the unconditioned. An examination of the five first chapters, which together constitute that first part, abundantly confirms this *prima facie* inference. Whether the "new system of philosophy" is to any extent a logical evolution out of the doctrines of Hamilton and Mansel is a question we intend to discuss. One point, though, is clear enough *in limine*. Unless Sir W. Hamilton's position with regard to the unthinkable be a valid one, the position of Mr. H. Spencer with regard to the unknowable is as evidently invalid and as pure assumption as was that of Auguste Comte.† This proposition we expect to prove. The Hamiltonian theory of the unthinkable, it must be remembered, has long been and is now the subject of the sharpest criticism. It has most acutely, and, as many believe, conclusively animadverted upon by John Stuart Mill, and has been rejected by such experts as Dr. Young, Dr. Calderwood, Mr. James Martineau, Dr. McCosh, Dr. Charles Hodge, President Noah Porter, and the late Dr. McGuffey. But until this vexed question of the limits

*See "History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte." London. Vol. II., pp. (500-625). A defence of the Positivist doctrine of the Unknowable, which admits the evidence of a knowable, can hardly be sought for in the principles of Hume, who denies the validity at all knowable. Mr. Mill does not take the doctrine without caveats.

†See Positive Philosophy, Bohn, chap. I.

of the thinkable can be settled, the redoubtable Herbert Spencer has positively no ground whatever on which to make a stand.

On the other hand, on the assumption that Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine of the Incogitable is sound; if the Hamiltonian and Kantian doctrine of the unthinkable be reconcilable with the theology of Hamilton and Mansel, then again the doctrine of Mr. Spencer touching the unknowable is effectually undermined. This is so plain to Mr. Spencer himself, that he devotes all his strength in the first part of his "First Principles" to an attempt at showing that the doctrine of the unthinkable as expounded by those authors is inconsistent with their own and all other current forms of theology. Now in this attempt Mr. Spencer is either successful or not. If successful, then he has only (though without design to do so) *disproved* the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable, by a *reductio ad absurdum*. If not, then (as before) the whole structure of Comte, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and the Positivists, lies in ruins.

Here is a sample of his argumentation. We quote from his fifth chapter on "the Reconciliation" of Science and Religion:

"Some do indeed allege that though the ultimate cause of things cannot really be thought of as having specified attributes, it is incumbent upon us to assert those attributes. Though the forms of our consciousness are such that the absolute cannot in any manner or degree be brought within them, we are nevertheless told that we must represent the absolute to ourselves under these forms. As writes Mr. Mansel, in the work from which I have already quoted largely—'It is our duty, then, to think of God as personal; and it is our duty to believe that he is infinite.'* . . .

"Have we not seen how utterly incompetent our minds are to form even an approach to a conception of that which underlies all phenomena? Is it proved that this incompetency is the incompetency of the conditioned to grasp the unconditioned? Does it not follow that the ultimate cause cannot in any respect be conceived by us because it is in every respect greater than can be conceived? And may we not therefore rightly refrain from assigning to it any attributes whatever?† . . .

"After it has been shown that every supposition respecting the genesis of the universe commits us to alternative impossibilities of thought—after it has been shown that each attempt to conceive real existence ends in an intellectual suicide—after it has been shown why, by the very constitution of our minds, we are eternally debarred from thinking of the

*First Principles, p. 108. †*Ibid.*, p. 109.

absolute; it is still asserted that we ought to think of the absolute thus and thus. In all imaginable ways we find thrust upon us the truth, that we are not permitted to know—nay, are not even permitted to conceive—that reality which is behind the veil of appearance; and yet it is said to be our duty to believe (and in so far to conceive) that this reality exists in a certain defined manner. Shall we call this reverence? or shall we call it the reverse?''*

On a preceding page, in reference to the alleged duty of thinking of God as personal and believing him to be infinite, Mr. Spencer says:

“That this is not the conclusion here adopted, needs hardly be said. If there be any meaning in the foregoing arguments, duty requires us neither to affirm nor deny personalty. Our duty is to submit ourselves with all humility to the established limits of our intelligence; and not perversely to rebel against them. Let those who can, believe that there is eternal war set between our intellectual faculties and our moral obligations, I for one, admit no such radical vice in the constitution of things.”†

All that we have to say to this is, as previously in this discussion, if such reasoning is valid, it simply goes to invalidate the entire Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable. That which leads by necessary logic to the utmost lengths of blasphemous absurdity must itself be false. Now as this Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable of the unconditioned, with a certain important “qualification,” is the main premiss of the Spencerian doctrine of the unknowable, and as the removal of the premiss carries with it the removal of the conclusion, it follows that the total overthrow of Hamilton on the one point is *ipso facto* the total overthrow of Spencer on the other.

The reader will not fail to have noticed that even in the very act of denying that any attributes can be predicated of God, Mr. Spencer has in spite of himself in plain terms admitted several, viz., existence, absoluteness, infinitude, causation, greatness, superiority to human conceptions; and throughout the course of his writings he admits others. But if no attributes are predicable of God, then is neither substantiality, intelligence, wisdom, love, justice, or holiness, predicable of him; and the very existence of God in any proper sense of the term becomes a matter

**Ibid.*, p. 110. †*Ibid.*, p. 108.

no longer of belief but of conjecture. If this is not Atheism, in the technical meaning of the word, it is Atheism to all intents and purposes. We are none the less "the inhabitants of a forsaken and fatherless world."* But it would be no difficult task to show how this Agnosticism of the Positivists can be reduced in the crucible of logic to formal Atheism.

It is somewhat remarkable that both Mr. Spencer and the late J. S. Mill have constructed themselves arguments which if valid go far to demolish the very groundwork of Sir William Hamilton's whole theory as to the relation of the human mind to the unconditioned, and the whole logical edifice of Dr. Henry Longueville Mansel in his well-intended Bampton Lectures on the "Limits of Religious Thought." These replies of Mill and Spencer have probably done more to shake the confidence of the orthodox in the Hamiltonian theory, or at all events the theory of the Bampton Lectures, than even the more elaborate efforts of Dr. Calderwood and Dr. John Young, the one in "the Philosophy of the Infinite" and the other in "the Province of Reason." Mill's critique was designed to be, in all essential respects, utterly destructive; that of Spencer to be merely corrective. Their complete success in these efforts must involve their own logical ruin: that of Mill directly carrying with it the ruin of Spencer, and indirectly his own; and that of Spencer gravitating unavoidably to the success of Mill. These two intellectual athletes (like Samson in the Philistine temple) have bowed themselves with such might between the pillars which support the roof, that the house (if we suppose it to have fallen) has fallen not only on the Hamiltonian lords and their following, but also upon the suicidal authors of the overthrow.

We now propose to show still more distinctly, by citation from the pages of "First Principles" that the connection between the "new system" and the older one is such as has been stated. We shall then undertake to substantiate the assertion that the new philosophy is destitute of more than the shadow of a logical and metaphysical basis.

We go on to give the words of Herbert Spencer:

*Robert Hall's Sermon on Modern Infidelity.

“There still remains the final question—What must we say concerning that which transcends knowledge? Are we to rest wholly in the consciousness of phenomena?—is the result of inquiry to exclude utterly from our minds everything but the relative? or must we also believe in something beyond the relative?”

“The answer of pure logic is held to be, that by the limits of our intelligence we are rigorously confined within the relative; and that anything transcending the relative can be thought of only as a pure negation, or as a non-existence.” . . .

Whence the conclusion seems to follow that “we cannot rationally affirm the positive existence of anything beyond phenomena.” Unavoidable as this conclusion seems, it yet involves, he thinks, a grave error.

“If the premiss be granted, the inference must doubtless be admitted; but the premiss in the form presented by Sir Wm. Hamilton and Mr. Mansel is not strictly true. Though, in the foregoing pages, the arguments used by these writers to show that the absolute is unknowable, have been approvingly quoted; and though these arguments have been enforced by others equally thoroughgoing; yet there remains to be stated a qualification, which saves us from that scepticism otherwise necessitated. . . . To speak specifically:—Besides that *definite* consciousness of which logic formulates the laws, there is an *indefinite* consciousness which cannot be formulated. Besides complete thoughts, and besides the thoughts which though incomplete admit of completion, there are thoughts which it is impossible to complete; and which yet are still real, in the sense that they are normal affections of the intellect.

. . . “To say that we cannot know the absolute, is, by implication, to affirm that there *is* an absolute. In the very denial of our power to learn *what* the absolute is, there lies hidden the assumption *that* it is; and the making of this assumption proves that the absolute has been present to the mind, not as a nothing, but as a something. Similarly with every step in the reasoning by which this doctrine is upheld. The noumenon, everywhere named as the antithesis of the phenomenon, is throughout necessarily thought of as an actuality. . . . Strike out from the argument the terms unconditioned, infinite, absolute, with their equivalents, and in place of them write ‘negation of conceivability,’ or ‘absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible,’ and you find that the argument becomes nonsense. Truly to realise in thought any one of the propositions of which the argument consists, the unconditioned must be represented as positive and not negative. How then can it be a legitimate conclusion from the argument, that our consciousness of it is negative? An argument, the very construction of which assigns to a certain term a certain meaning, but which ends in showing that this

term has no such meaning, is simply an elaborate suicide. Clearly, then, the very demonstration that a *definite* consciousness of the absolute is impossible to us, unavoidably presupposes an *indefinite* consciousness of it."*

We are willing to leave it to the intelligent reader whether this is not a giving up of the whole position. If it be not a total surrender of the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable, it is manifestly a surrender of the only ground on which that doctrine is logically defensible. The Hamiltonian argument, if it proves anything, proves everything; if it does not prove everything, it proves nothing. It is contended above by Mr. Spencer that "the very construction" of that "argument" involves a necessary absurdity. The common sense of mankind will then certainly conclude that "an argument" which is admitted to be "an elaborate suicide" is, not in part only but in whole, nugatory and worthless.

Yet on that argument is founded the entire structure of the Spencerian, or Positive, doctrines of the unknowable. We cannot thus consent to allow Mr. Spencer, like Æsop's man in the cave with the satyr, to blow hot and cold with the same mouth. In the third chapter of this first part, the author attempts to show that all our "Ultimate Scientific Ideas," whether in the outer or inner world, are inconceivable, and inconceivable by consequence of this very doctrine of the unthinkable as propounded by Sir William Hamilton and defended by Dean Mansel. This is elaborately undertaken in that chapter with reference to our ideas of subject, object, space, time, matter, motion, force, and consciousness. Now, on the evidence just adduced, we pronounce this whole argumentation "an elaborate suicide." It would be very easy to demonstrate that Mr. Spencer does thus base on the doctrine of Hamilton his own conclusion with regard to the inconceivability of our ultimate scientific ideas. His main scope throughout the chapter is to evince that these ideas *are* inconceivable, or, as he sometimes expresses it, "unthinkable" or "incapable of being represented in thought," "of being realised to thought," or of "being mentally imaged." This unthinkable-

*First Principles, pp. 87, 88, and 89.

ness he maintains throughout on the authority and principles of Hamilton and Mansel. He deals in this way with our ideas of space and time, on pp. 47, 48, 49, and 50; with our ideas of force and matter, on pp. 53, 58, 59, and 60; and of motion, on p. 58. All our ideas of the outer world are vexed with the contradictions of which so much is made in the Bampton Lectures. And so too of the inner world. "We are equally unable either to know it as finite or to conceive of it as finite." (P. 63.) To every challenge and interrogation there are returned "inconceivable answers." (P. 63.) The "primitive dualism" of "Mr. Mansel" is appealed to (on p. 65) as the basis of "his refutation of the German absolutists." "So that the personality of which each is conscious, and of which the existence is to each a fact beyond all others the most certain, is yet a thing which cannot be known at all: knowledge of it is forbidden by the very nature of thought." (P. 65.) So, it follows, our personality, of which each of us is most certain, is yet unknowable, and that by the very nature of thought. (P. 66.)

An examination of the passages cited will, we are persuaded, satisfy the most incredulous reader that Mr. Spencer makes out his case of the inconceivableness, and therefore inscrutableness, of all our ultimate scientific ideas, only by a constant appeal to the touchstone furnished him by the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unconditioned and incogitable.

Throughout the discussion, it will also appear on examination, Mr. Spencer has been betrayed into the fallacious assumption (which he has also borrowed from his blind guides,) that what is incomprehensible is necessarily also inconceivable, and therefore wholly inscrutable. He is guilty of this paralogism in his concluding remarks on our "ultimate scientific ideas" (on pp. 66 and 67.) Similarly with regard to our "ultimate religious ideas," Mr. Spencer, in his second chapter, finds them all to be resolvable into the unimaginable, unrepresentable, inconceivable, inscrutable, and incomprehensible; and this for the same Hamiltonian reason as before. Sir William's shibboleth about the unconditioned is the incantation which causes all these bodiless ghosts of ideas to "vanish into thin air."

With respect to the origin of the universe, Mr. Herbert Spencer holds that three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made: that it is self-existent, or that it is self-created, or that it is created from without itself. The question as to which of these is most credible, is not discussed here. "The deeper question into which this finally merges, is, whether any one of them is even conceivable, in the true sense of the word" (p. 30). He then tests every one of these suppositions in turn, and shows it, on the adopted Hamiltonian principles, to be inconceivable. Yet we must think of the external world as caused, and inevitably adopt the hypothesis of a First Cause. But is the First Cause finite or infinite? If we say finite, we are involved in an inextricable dilemma. Then the First Cause is infinite. Mr. Spencer also proves that it must be independent. "Thus," in brief, "the First Cause must be in every sense perfect, complete, total; including within itself all power, and transcending all law. Or, to use the established word, it must be absolute." (P. 38.)

Having thus shown that there is a First Cause, and that the First Cause is infinite and absolute, Mr. Spencer stigmatises "these reasonings and their results" as "illusions;" and in order to make good this assertion, proceeds to avail himself, *totidem verbis*, of "the demonstration which Mr. Mansel, carrying out in detail the doctrine of Sir William Hamilton, has given in his *Limits of Religious Thought*." (*Ibid*, pp. 39-42.) The result is, that, to use Mr. Spencer's language, "passing over the consideration of credibility, and confining ourselves to that of conceivability, we see that Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism, when rigorously analysed, prove to be absolutely unthinkable." (P. 43.) Mr. Mansel could hardly ask for a more thorough-going adhesion in terms on the part of his obsequious convert; and yet Mr. Spencer is unwilling to be set down as more than a half-way disciple. Apparently, so far from disclosing a fundamental verity existing in each of the three cosmological schemes, the inquiry seems rather to indicate that there is no fundamental verity contained in any. Yet to carry away such a conclusion would, in Mr. Spencer's opinion, be "a fatal error." (P. 43.) This he endeavors to make sure by further argument. A religious

creed he defines as an *a priori* theory of the universe, and attempts to show that not only Fetishism, (which sees a separate personality behind every phenomenon,) the high forms of Polytheism, (where the personalities are partially generalised,) Monotheism, (where they are wholly generalised,) and Pantheism, (where the generalised personality is merged in the phenomena,) but even the seeming negation of all religion—positive Atheism—falls within the definition. (P. 43.) The ground for this statement is, that Atheism, “asserting,” as it does, “the self-existence of space, matter, and motion, which it regards as adequate causes of every appearance, propounds an *a priori* theory, from which it holds the facts to be deducible.” (P. 44.) Now every theory supposes two things—an explanation and “something to be explained.” By implication, then, all theories agree that there is a problem to be solved. If all the solutions are erroneous, then the problem is insoluble, and this theory is the common verdict of mankind. In other words, “the existence of the world, with all that it contains, and all which surrounds it, is a mystery ever pressing for interpretation. On this point, if no other, there is entire agreement.”

In the first and second chapters, the author had considered the relation between religion and science, and had argued that human beliefs in general, and especially the perennial ones, contain some soul of truth; that the most abstract truth contained in each must be the one in which the two coalesce; that, uniting these positive and negative poles of human thought, it must be the ultimate fact in our intelligence. In every respect, therefore, he holds, the conclusion in the present chapter answers to the requirements, possessing as it does all the characteristics which were inferred as necessarily belonging to that fundamental verity expressed by religions in general. (P. 44.) That this is the vital element in all religions, Mr. Spencer further argues, not only from its persistence through and after every change, but from the observed fact that it grows more distinct the more highly the religion is developed. (P. 45.) “The analysis of every possible hypothesis proves, not simply that no hypothesis is sufficient, but that no hypothesis is even thinkable. And thus

the mystery which all religions recognise, turns out to be a far more transcendent mystery than any of them suspect—not a relative, but an absolute mystery.” The chapter ends as follows: “There then is an ultimate religious truth of the highest possible certainty—a truth in which religions in general are at one with each other, and with a philosophy antagonistic to their special dogmas. . . . If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of reconciliation must be this deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts—that the power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable.” (*Ibid*, p. 46.)

The reader who has a competent acquaintance with the subject discussed, will be satisfied with the evidence we have now given to prove that Mr. Herbert Spencer relies upon the Hamiltonian doctrine of relativity and the unthinkable, to make out his case of the inscrutableness of our ultimate religious ideas. It has also been proved that he relies equally upon that doctrine to support him in his similar position as to the inscrutableness of our ultimate scientific ideas. It is, therefore, in proof, that the position of Mr. Spencer, as to the inscrutableness of all our ultimate ideas, whether scientific or religious, is by him made to rest upon the same basis, viz., the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable. But the five chapters of the First Part of Mr. Spencer's work, and which embody his teaching as to “the unknowable,” are wholly taken up with the discussion of this very point, of the inevitable futility of all human efforts to arrive at the ultimate ideas—further than this, that there exists, and that the universe manifests, a cause; which cause, however, is utterly inscrutable. From which follows unavoidably the proof of the averment which we engaged to demonstrate, viz., that the Spencerian doctrine as to the “unknowable,” is ostensibly based on the doctrine of Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel as to the “unthinkable.”

It is worthy of remark here, before passing to another topic, that (as has been pointed out) when Mr. Spencer wishes to establish *the existence* of an inscrutable Power, that is, the ultimate Cause of all things, he thereupon arraigns the argument of Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Mansel on the charge of “an elaborate suicide.” When, on the other hand, he desires to establish

the *inscrutableness* of the Power thus seen to be existent. he waives all objection to an argument that is become necessary to the support of his own system.

We shall probably be reminded here, that in making this criticism we have not taken into the account Mr. Spencer's "qualification," by which he supposes that he evades the consequences of a complete adoption of the Hamiltonian principles, and that we have overlooked the canon of interpretation that in a case like this, that which is more general must be limited by that which is more special. Let this be granted; yet we are now about to make a "qualification" ourselves, which will at once remove all occasion for this protest, and we ask the benefit of the same canon in our own behoof, in application to the preceding strictures. *Our* qualification is not absolute, but relative, and it is this: that if Mr. Spencer be authorised by the common rules of logic, to make *his* qualification, and at the same time to avail himself of the advantage of the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable, in his effort to ground his own doctrine of the unknowable—then our present strictures are admitted to have no weight. But, as we have already pointed out briefly, Mr. Spencer's qualification by necessity involves not merely a partial but a total abandonment of the Hamiltonian doctrine. If this be so, Mr. Spencer is manifestly convicted of the folly of trying to carry water on both shoulders; or (to express it in a still more homely way) of "having his cake and eating it too."

That Mr. Spencer's qualification does lead to this conclusion, is sufficiently evident from the arguments by which he seeks to justify it. It would require a detailed examination of his reasoning to show that every one of these arguments involves this fallacy. Let one of them stand as a sample of the rest; "Strike out," says Mr. Spencer, "from the argument" [of Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel] "the terms, unconditioned, infinite, absolute, with their equivalents, and in place of them write 'negation of conceivability,' or 'absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible,' and you find that the argument becomes nonsense. Truly to realise in thought any one of the propositions of which the argument consists, the unconditioned

must be represented as positive and not negative." But if so, then manifestly the entire Hamiltonian doctrine falls to the ground for the lack of logical support; and that doctrine can no more be legitimately used (when convenient) to make good the position that "the ultimate cause," thus shown to be possible and otherwise proved to be existent, is "utterly inscrutable." Apply Mr. Spencer's "qualification" to Mr. Spencer's reasoning to show the inconceivableness of all our "ultimate ideas," and Mr. Spencer's own "argument." (to use his words in regard to Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel,) "becomes nonsense;" and it would be idle to add that an argument which has been turned into nonsense, is deprived of all probative force. The author of "First Principles." has, therefore, fatally contradicted himself, and by his own showing, his much-lauded defence of "the unknowable" is logically worthless.

But the certification of this last point, which is the vital one, does not depend alone on Mr. Spencer's fortunate (or unfortunate) concessions. Our counter-argumentation might then be objected to as being merely *ad hominem*. We are willing, therefore, to concede, argumentatively, that Mr. Spencer's reasoning is not justly liable to the exception we have taken to it, and that the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable may be consistently employed by the author of "First Principles" to make good his own position as to the "unknowable." Still, if the Hamiltonian doctrine be indefensible and untrue, it is as certain as before, that Mr. Spencer's theory is equally untenable. The two systems stand or fall together; to this extent, at least, that if Sir William's conclusion as to the unthinkable be wholly invalidated, then confessedly the entire theory of Mr. Spencer, as to the unknowable, is invalidated also. A house from which every one of the foundation stones has been removed must fall.

If any still doubt that the doctrine of the unknowable, as expounded by Mr. Herbert Spencer and his school of "scientists" has its basis in the metaphysics of Sir William Hamilton, as expounded by Dean Mansel, let that doubt be set at rest by Mr. Spencer's "last words and confession" at the end of the volume, where he tacitly admits that not only his own doctrine of the

unknowable, and that wholly, but also to some extent his own philosophy of the knowable, in short *his entire argument* throughout this his initial and fundamental volume, to a greater or a less extent, turns on the truth or falsity of the propositions taken by the great Scotch critic of Cousin. After recapitulating the course of the argument, in the First Part, as to the ultimate results of both science and religion, as ascertained by his analysis, he says: "We found that subjective science can give no account of those conditioned modes of being which constitute consciousness, without postulating unconditioned being." So, too, objective science was seen to postulate something that, unaccountable otherwise, continues constant under all forms. "This," he adds, "is the implication to which we are now led back by our completed synthesis." (P. 551.) The analysis of the First Part has led up to the conclusion of an inscrutable Power or Cause. The synthesis of the Second Part has required the same conclusion. Analysis and synthesis thus coincide in their results. The recognition of a persistent Force, of ever-variable manifestations, but invariable quantity, is that which alone makes possible each concrete interpretation, and unifies all of them. "*Not, indeed,*" continues Mr. Spencer. "*that this coincidence adds to the strength of the argument as a logical structure. Our synthesis has proceeded by taking for granted at every step this ultimate truth [which had been ascertained by his analysis]: and the ultimate truth cannot, therefore, be regarded as in any sense an outcome of the synthesis. Nevertheless,*" he proceeds to show, "the coincidence yields a verification." But if the analysis is worthless, let it here be remarked, that coincidence no more exists. He then goes on to set forth that after science has done all, it has only systematised, and not enlarged, our experience; and that his own implications are neither materialistic nor spiritualistic in the highest or ontological sense. The correlation and equivalence between the forces of the outer and the inner worlds, may be made to assimilate either to the other, matter to spirit, or spirit to matter, according as we begin with one or other of the terms.*

* Prof. Huxley takes the same general view in his Examination in "Lay Sermons" of Descartes's "Art of Thinking."

"But," he goes on to say, "he who rightly interprets the doctrine contained in this work, will see that neither of these terms can be taken as ultimate. He will see that though the relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these antithetical conceptions of *spirit and matter*, *the one is no less than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the Unknown Reality which underlies both.*" Thus Mr. Spencer's book is brought to an end. This is its last sentence; and in this sentence is contained the marrow of Mr. Spencer's metaphysics, which (as will again be perceived,) is wholly dependent on Sir William Hamilton's and Dr. Mansel's.

We would here call the attention of our readers to the fact that has been made obvious from the foregoing exhibition, viz., that the views entertained by Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel *quoad* the relation of the human mind to theological truth, are regarded by Mr. Spencer as identical. If this be indeed so, then plainly the refutation of either (for example of the Oxford scholar.) would be amply sufficient. If not so, then (whatever attitude be taken in regard to the great schoolman of Edinburgh,) Mansel, inasmuch as he goes farther than Hamilton, must be right, or else Spencer is left without support, for Spencer goes the whole figure. If Hamilton did not really hold with Mansel, Hamilton's *opinion* cannot be fairly quoted on that side. If Hamilton's principles lead logically to Mansel's conclusion, even in despite of his own better judgment, Hamilton's principles may indeed be pleaded in evidence by Spencer, if they can be sustained. If, however, Hamilton's principles, when correctly expounded, do not carry with them Mansel's conclusion, then neither need they carry with them Spencer's. Again, (waiving the point just made,) if Hamilton's principles be unsound, so manifestly are Mansel's and Spencer's. It is therefore plain, that in any case the controversy turns as on two hinges on these two questions, the correctness of Mansel's principles as set forth in the Bampton Lectures, and the worth of the logic which has deduced from them Mansel's conclusion. If (conceding the sameness of their principles,) Hamilton was fundamentally wrong, then Mansel and Spencer are alike subverted. If Hamilton was fundamentally right, and only Mansel wrong, still Spencer is sub-

verted. It is, accordingly, immaterial to the main issue raised by this controversy, whether Hamilton was right or wrong, provided Mansel was wrong; since in that event Spencer's ground is, upon either view of Hamilton, taken from under him. On the other hand, if Mansel is right in his deductions from Hamilton's principles, and Spencer also right in his further deductions from the same principles, then the whole question turns on the soundness of those principles. Those principles, on the assumption, are maintained in common by the Bampton lecturer and the late philosopher of Edinburgh. It follows, that upon any hypothesis as to the position of Hamilton, the whole question, considered essentially, may be narrowed down to an examination of the principles of Mansel, an inspection of the logic by which those principles are connected with the conclusion of the argument in the Bampton Lectures as to the Limits of Religious Thought, and a scrutiny of the procedure by which the author of "First Principles" has carried the same logic so far as to sustain the blank negation of theology, even regarded as a matter of faith, as distinguished from knowledge.

The case, then, stands thus: On the supposition that Dean Mansel, in his principal argument, has correctly reasoned from true premises, even then Mr. Spencer's position remains to be established. If not only the principles and main reasoning of Dean Mansel, but also certain of his distinctions, together with the corollaries he holds to be connected with them, are to be accepted, then Mr. Spencer stands wholly unsupported as to his fundamental postulate. Again: whether those distinctions be valid or not, if Dean Mansel's deductions from his principles are unwarranted, then clearly no less than before, Mr. Spencer's metaphysical prop stands itself unsupported. The same thing is true, if the reasoning of the Bampton Lectures be sound, but their principles invalid.

Whilst thus it is true that Mr. Spencer's postulate may be discussed apart from the subtle lucubrations of Sir William Hamilton, except so far as these are reproduced in the Bampton Lectures, it will facilitate our inquiry, as well as strengthen our

foundations, to pay some attention to the views of the Scotch philosopher.

The following questions will therefore comprise the whole discussion :

I. Is Mr. Spencer justified in the further extension he has given to the argument of the Bampton Lectures ?

II. Is he justified in assuming that the teaching of the Bampton lecturer is the same with that of Hamilton ?

III. Is he justified in his postulate, that the teaching in the "Limits of Religious Thought" is sound ?

It is evident from what has now been said, that if the second of these questions be answered in the negative, Mr. Spencer is wholly debarred from appealing in his own favor to the authority of Sir William Hamilton. He would not, though, be estopped from appealing to the name and arguments of Dr. Mansel. If the second question be answered in the negative, everything turns, in that case, on the answers to be given to the first and the last question. Unfortunately, however, for Mr. Spencer, and irrespective altogether of the debate touching the true position of Hamilton, things are in *this* predicament, (as is clear from what has already been argued,) that if either one of these two questions be answered negatively, the metaphysical sill underlying "First Principles" is as effectually taken away as if it had never existed.

I. The first of these questions has received consideration, and it has been shown that Mr. Spencer's argument breaks down under its own weight. In other words, he has himself invalidated the reasoning of the Bampton lecturer, in so far as it is destructive of all knowledge of the *existence* of the Absolute; and in doing so, has thoroughly undermined his own ground as to the possibility of knowing anything as to the *nature* of the Absolute. He is therefore precluded from the opportunity of reaching his results by the method of his own selection. We have nevertheless agreed not to press this point against him. There is, it is true, no apparent way (other than the one which has thus failed him,) of legitimating the distinction which he has sought to draw betwixt the two kinds of knowledge in relation to the Infinite and Abso-

lute, namely the knowledge *that* it is, and the knowledge (true, however partial.) *what* it is. It is, notwithstanding, evident that by abandoning his strictures upon the sweeping force of the Hamiltonian logic, and by accepting the argument of Dr. Mansel in its integrity, our author might then plausibly contend for the doctrine of the unknowable in the form in which that doctrine was held by Comte, and is still held by some of Comte's followers. He might, that is, contend with at least the show of reason on his side, for the doctrine of human nescience, not only as respects the *nature*, but the very *existence* of the Absolute. This Mr. Spencer has not done; but this, we say, Mr. Spencer might do. Yet, as has been seen, before Mr. Spencer could be justified in so doing, it would be incumbent on him to overthrow the barrier which Kant has raised between the speculative and the practical reason, and the barrier which the Scotch Professor and his Oxford pupil have raised between ordinary and regulative knowledge and between faith and science. At any rate, his nominal victory would be without the desired fruits. For although the objective verities contemplated by theology were denied as matters of cognition, they might and would still be affirmed as matters of sure credence. The author of "First Principles" is thus again between the horns of a dilemma. If either of these distinctions can be established; if, for instance, Kant's "certainty" of the practical reason, or Hamilton's assured conviction, derived through faith, can be saved from the shipwreck of pure or speculative knowledge, ontology, in the technical sense, is indeed impossible; but we may still hold to the imperishable truth of the sacred oracles. If, however, these distinctions must be given up, it is only because faith, belief, credence, is itself considered to be a form of cognition, and therefore an exercise of pure intelligence. Whichever way the question is decided, Mr. Spencer's reasons are demolished, and the postulate of "First Principles" is without evidence, whether intuitive or discursive.

II. We are thus brought up to the second question in our series, which is this: Is Mr. Spencer justified in regarding the teaching of the Bampton lecturer as identical with that of the

Scottish philosopher? If the answer to this query be in the negative, it must then follow that the Bampton Lectures are founded on a misstatement or perversion of the views set forth in the Discussions, the Annotations on Reid, and the Lectures on Metaphysics. In that case, there is no more real connexion between the views of Sir W. Hamilton and the "First Principles" of Mr. Herbert Spencer, than there is between the ring of Saturn and the crater of Vesuvius. If Hamilton consciously went all lengths with Mansel, of course no one will deny that the principles of Hamilton have been truly expounded by Mansel. But if that far-sighted Aristotelian could not see his way so far as this, or seeing, deliberately refused (like a nervous passenger in a stage-coach,) to take the perilous journey in the Bampton mail, the question is still open as regards the inevitable drift of Hamilton's acknowledged speculations. What did Hamilton mean to teach, when he announced his peculiar view of the relativity of knowledge and of the boundary of speculative thought?*

* See the first seven chapters of Mill's Examination of Hamilton, for a curious and almost exhaustive discussion of this and the connected points. Mill allows that Mansel's premises are those of Hamilton (Examination, London, p. 106); but elsewhere uses the following startling language: "The conclusion I cannot help drawing from this collation of passages is, that Sir W. Hamilton either never held, or when he wrote the Dissertations had ceased to hold, (for his theory respecting knowledge of the Primary Qualities does not occur in the Lectures,) the doctrine for which he has been so often praised and nearly as often attacked—the Relativity of Human Knowledge. He certainly did sincerely believe that he held it. But he repudiated it in every sense which makes it other than a barren truism. In the only meaning in which he really maintained it, there is nothing to maintain. It is an identical proposition, and nothing more." (*Ibid.*, p. 29.) Compare with this the very significant statement of Dr. McCosh, in his valuable work in "Defence of Fundamental Thought." (See "An Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill's Philosophy," New York, 1866, p. 234, foot note.) Both Hamilton and Mansel undoubtedly held to the existence and reality of the *mundus transcendentalis*. None is more free to acknowledge this than Calderwood. It does not follow that they recognised the validity of theological knowledge. One of them certainly did *not*, if his language expresses his judgment. The doubt is respecting the other. For an elaborate and comprehensive

to say on this difficult subject? Would he have allowed the terms infinite and absolute to be so defined and employed as to be used indifferently of the pantheistic *Idea* of the German, and of the awful personal Jehovah?

The perplexity in this case, as in that of Kant, is that Sir W. Hamilton has made contradictory statements on the subject of man's capacity to construct a theology. One class of these statements seem to conduct us to a denial of all knowledge of God. The particular statements in question are thought to admit, indeed, of a more generous interpretation. Another class of these statements require us imperatively to affirm the possibility of some knowledge of God. For instance, Hamilton says in one place, "Thus it is, that our theology is necessarily founded on our psychology; that we must *recognise a God from our own minds*, before we can *detect a God in the universe of nature*."* Upon this and similar passages in Hamilton's writings, we need no better comment than that of Mr. Martineau: "To recognise a God from our own minds," says this sharp-witted critic, "is surely to discover a 'passage from psychology to ontology;' and the transition which Sir W. Hamilton denies to Cousin, he finds possible himself. There is a way—and he has indicated, with the clearest discernment, precisely where it lies—to reach the sublime truths in which philosophy culminates."† In the mean-

discussion of this point, see Hamilton's Letter to Calderwood, and Calderwood's minute dissection of it, in "The Philosophy of the Infinite," Cambridge and London, second edition (pp 497-511): Appendix. In this Letter, Hamilton regrets (on p. 498) that "my doctrines (briefly as they are promulgated on this abstract subject,) *have been now again so much mistaken*." (The italics are ours.) That there was obscurity in Hamilton's own mind as to this matter, seems not unlikely, after comparing such statements as those on pp. 507, 508, with such as those on pp. 498 and 500. In the place last cited, he uses the term, "comprehend," as a synonyme of "conceive."

* Quoted by Martineau, from "Discussions," p. 298.

† Martineau, *Essays*, Vol. II., p. 288. Compare with this the striking argument in defence of Hamilton, by Young, in the first chapter of his third section, pp. 128 *et seq.*, and more particularly the quotations from Hamilton's first Lecture. See "Province of Reason," pp. 134, 135. Two will answer for the rest: "Philosophy would then be subverted in the

time, it is not competent to Mr. Spencer to claim the authority of Sir W. Hamilton for the views presented in "First Principles" as to the Infinite. The utterances of Dean Mansel are confessedly plain.* The utterances of Sir W. Hamilton are deemed by many to be as ambiguous as they are otherwise oracular; and by not a few, the utterances relied on by Dean Mansel and Mr. Spencer, are understood in a distinctly opposite sense from the sense they have put upon them.

In order to determine what are the views of a given writer, it is always necessary to consider his scope. This obvious rule has been violated by many of Hamilton's adversaries, but has been carefully observed by Dr. John Young, the brilliant author of the "Christ of History," and the "Province of Reason," and, we regret to have to add, of other works which cannot be so highly commended. Dr. Young agrees in his critique on this subject with Professor Calderwood in his strictures on the Bampton Lectures, but differs from him as to the attitude of Sir William Hamilton, who he thinks has been misinterpreted by Dean Mansel. The effort is made to evince that the teacher never would have gone the lengths of the pupil. Hamilton was merely beating down Cousin and the Hegelians. Hamilton's "Causality," which is demonstrated to be "a mental impotence," is only causality in the sense required by the argument of Cousin. Hamilton's "Absolute" is nothing but the vacant abstraction of the German idealists. It was *this* "absolute" that Hamilton was battering and showing to be unknowable and worthless.† All

subversion of its [!] three great objects—God, free-will, and immortality." (Hamilton's Lectures, 90–93.) "Mind rises to its highest dignity when viewed as the object through which alone our unassisted reason can ascend to the knowledge of God." (*Ibid*, Lecture I., 35.) The same side of the question, regarding Hamilton's true meaning, has recently been taken in this REVIEW, in an able paper by the Rev. Mr. Quarles of Mo., which has since appeared in pamphlet form.

* Yet even Mansel sometimes recoils from the plain consequences of his own logic, and with "a noble inconsistency" repudiates the inferences of Mill as to the bearing of certain of his statements. (See Examination of Hamilton, Chap. VII.)

† "Province of Reason," 1860, pp. 133–145. See, particularly, the quotations from Hamilton's first Lecture on Young's, pp. 134 and 135.

this is exceedingly generous and ingenious ; and if it could only be made out to be *true*, every word of Hamilton's celebrated paragraphs on the unconditioned might be accepted, and yet Mr. Spencer be forced to give up his already precarious hold on Sir William Hamilton, and cling fast and solely to Dr. Henry Longueville Mansel. We may at least admit to Dr. Young that Sir William was not *meditating* the destruction of Christian theology, but simply the overthrow of Continental Absolutism.

The same view of his intention was apparently taken by Dr. Thornwell, and the general position of Hamilton, interpreted in this sense, was accepted by him with certain important modifications.* The question we have been considering under this head, is perhaps forever insoluble. Till it is fairly set at rest, however, Mr. Spencer is certainly estopped from numbering the great Scottish thinker with the conscious advocates of utter nescience as to matters of theology ; or even of claiming the unchallenged support of Hamilton's avowed theory. It is of course quite conceivable that the sage of Edinburgh has *unwittingly* enunciated propositions that allow of no other construction than the one which, in the able hands of Dean Mansel, has yielded the results given in "The Limits of Religious Thought."

The whole question in regard to the true reading of Sir William Hamilton is, however, a question of mere interpretation.

* See, for example, Thornwell's Works, Richmond, Vol. I., p. 18, and Vol. III., pp. 96-99. The wonderful analysis of Hamilton's doctrine, however, which is given in the examination of Morell's "Philosophy of Religion," should be compared with the following remarkable criticism, which is worthy of being especially pondered: "Sir William Hamilton, whose philosophy by no means leads to a total denial—on the other hand, it expressly postulates a necessary faith and a relative knowledge—of transcendent existence, has yet, at times, expressed himself in terms which justify the remark of Professor Fraser, [Essays in Phil., p. 222,] that 'the Scottish philosopher seems to cut away every bridge by which man can have access to God.' To maintain the absolute incognoscibility of God, is to maintain the absolute impossibility of religion. The philosopher, accordingly, who, in modern times, has so triumphantly demonstrated that ontological science is a 'mere fabric of delusion,' was but consistent with himself, when he resolved religion into obedience of the moral law."—*Id.*, Vol. I., p. 107.

It is, as we have said, hard, if not impossible, to give a decisive answer to that question. Mr. Herbert Spencer has boldly taken his leap in the dark, without waiting for the answer to be given, or without considering that an answer was required. But it is only on the assumption of the identity of the premises of Mansel with the principles of Hamilton, that the founder of "A New System of Philosophy" could obtain aid or comfort from the intractable antagonist of Cousin.

Let us put it in this way. Sir William Hamilton's well-known theory on this subject logically involves the conclusion of the Bampton lecturer, or not. If his theory does involve that conclusion, then the matter can be greatly simplified by restricting the debate to the contents of the Bampton Lectures. If Mansel is approved, Hamilton is approved. If Mansel is condemned, not even the exalted name of the Scottish Stagirite can protect him who bare it from the same condemnation. On the other hand, if the theory of Hamilton does *not* involve that conclusion, then manifestly the corollaries of Mr. Spencer can derive no countenance from Hamilton's authority. The interests of the present discussion do not seem to call for a choice between these alternatives. In either case, the course of Mr. Spencer, in counting upon this backing in Scotland, has been shown to have been a precipitate one.

If the propositions in the "Discussions" on the subject of the unconditioned are compared with the propositions in the Bampton Lectures, from which the logician of Oxford has derived his conclusion as to the limit *ad quem* of religious thought, these propositions will be seen to be obviously and expressly the same, in so far as they bear against the ontology of the German idealists. The real question, however, is, would Hamilton have been willing to substitute the word *God* for the word *Absolute*, as Dr. Mansel has done, thus regarding the terms as convertible, and thus permitting the batteries that had before concentrated their fire upon the Pantheists to be directed also against the Theists? It is upon this question that a subsidiary one depends, viz. : Was the Bampton lecturer reasoning fairly from his premises when he argued to the extreme conclusion he has reached in "The

Limits"? His premises are ostensibly the positions of Hamilton, which he has carefully re-stated and expounded. If, then, his statement and exposition are to be received as accurate, we are free to admit that his main argument is unassailable. If, however, he has misconceived the sense of his master, there is a sophism at the very outset of the reasoning, considered as reasoning based upon the principles of Hamilton. Viewed in that aspect, the reasoning is inconsequential. Regarded apart from the question of the just connexion of Mansel's premises with the Hamiltonian principles, the special reasoning of Mansel from his own premises is legitimate or not, according to the view that may be taken of the propriety of interchanging certain terms, such as "know," "conceive," "comprehend," and the like; the correctness of his doctrine of relativity; and a number of other matters which are intimately bound up with the general Hamiltonian philosophy, and at once lead to the discussion of that philosophy on its merits; but above all, according to the view that may be taken of the justifiableness of that process by which the Bampton lecturer skips so lightly—

"As on the unsteadfast footing of a spear,"

from the Absolute, or the Infinite, and what may be concluded respecting them, to *the Deity*, and what may be concluded, by stress of the same arguments, respecting *it* (or *him*). Even if the Hamiltonian philosophy, in its other teachings, be approved, (the inquiry as to Hamilton's responsibility for Mansel's procedure in the particular instance having been suspended,) before the Bampton lecturer is warranted in drawing his extreme conclusion, he must be able to show authority for the procedure by which he has so constantly identified in his argument what is true of the mere abstraction of the German ontologists, and what is true of the awful and transcendent Jehovah of the Scriptures. Admitting the validity of Mansel's reasoning, viewed in other lights, and of the Hamiltonian philosophy on which it depends, if the Infinite-Absolute of the Germans be not identical with the God of heaven and earth, then all the lecturer's pains have been to no purpose, and his famed argument in "The Limits of Religious Thought", is utterly inconclusive.

We are thus abreast of the last and largest question of the series which we have been examining, which is this: Are the principles, whether they be regarded as those of Mansel alone, or of Hamilton as well, upon which the Bampton Lectures rest for their logical support, *sound* principles, or are they not? As introductory to this question, or as wrapped up in it, there would be a pertinency in discussing also the soundness of Sir William Hamilton's conceded position in regard to the possibility of a philosophy of the Unconditioned. The whole of this discussion, as to the true relation of the human mind to the Infinite and Absolute, may be properly reserved for another number of this REVIEW, where we lay out to take a broader view of the modern doctrine of the Unknowable.

It is now sufficiently plain that there could not well be a greater misnomer, when applied to certain current forms of philosophy, than this term "positive," which Mr. Herbert Spencer and his school (though eschewing all affiliation with Comte,) affix to modern science. It is notorious that Comte insisted on this very thing of the positiveness of modern science, and of modern science only, as the key-stone of his philosophy. Nor is Mr. Spencer behind Comte in the importance which he too attaches to this dictum. By positive, we commonly mean either that which is opposed to what is negative, or else that which is opposed to incertitude. But in neither sense are the Agnostics* entitled to appropriate to themselves (as Comte and his immediate followers have done,) the name of Positivists. So far as all profound knowledge of anything is concerned, and all knowledge whatever of "ultimate ideas," of the Infinite and Absolute, and of God, their system is a system of stark negations and of utter nescience. It is, moreover, a system that is centred in one of the most perilously insecure, even if it is not one of the most demonstrably rotten and untenable, of purely *a priori* speculations.

Even should it be granted, whether absolutely or merely for the sake of argument, that the Hamiltonian doctrine of the un-

* A descriptive term, suggested by Dr. Littledale, and employed by him to designate all the schools that found on the doctrine of the unknowable.

thinkable has not been overturned, but only shaken by the heavy strain put upon it, one thing at least is undeniable: that doctrine, the validity of which, in the sense given it in the Bampton Lectures, can alone insure the philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer, is, in point of fact, true, or it is false. If it is *false*, then (on grounds already won by argument,) the whole philosophy that is based on the doctrine of the unknowable, is subverted. If the doctrine of Hamilton is *true*, the work of that philosophy remains an open question, to be finally decided on independent evidence. The force of this evidence has been sufficiently examined to have justified us in pronouncing it unsatisfactory and untrustworthy. The teaching of the first five chapters of "First Principles" is not in such a manner dependent on the conclusion of Sir William Hamilton, that if the latter remains intact, so necessarily does the former. It must first be shown that the conclusion of Hamilton is identical with the doctrine as stated by Mansel; and even then the teaching in "First Principles" remains intact only on the assumption that the conclusion of Hamilton and Mansel is irreconcilable with "the current theology." The truth of this assumption would, however, involve the disproof of Mansel and Hamilton, by a *reductio ad absurdum*. If the distinctions that have been drawn by Sir William Hamilton between knowledge and belief, and between ordinary and regulative knowledge, or if simply the general distinction of Kant between the pure and the practical reason can be successfully maintained, then once more, and manifestly, the entire Positivist teaching as to the unknowable will have to be abandoned. We take stronger ground. The Positivist teaching is subverted all the same, if the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable be saved, yet saved only at the sacrifice of the distinctions just referred to—though still saved on the basis of a reconciliation in *some* mode between the Hamiltonian metaphysics and Christian Theism.

Here is our *ars inexpugnabilis* against the assaults of Mr. Herbert Spencer and his followings. For the Hamiltonian doctrine of the unthinkable is at best a precarious, and, in the form in which it is restated by Dr. Mansel, a most treacherous founda-

tion; but the Bible and Christian Theism rest upon a basis of evidence that has no weak point, and can never be successfully assailed. Whatever else is doubtful, this is beyond all reasonable dubiety. Whatever else may be "unknowable," the truth of Christianity is unquestionably known. This, then, is the final dilemma in which Mr. Herbert Spencer is involved. Either the Hamiltonian doctrine of the Unthinkable is *false*, and the system of Mr. Spencer consequently subverted; or else it is *true*, but only true upon grounds which, admitting of the reconciliation of nescience and faith, equally necessitate the overthrow of Mr. Spencer's Atheistic philosophy as to the Inscrutable. The doctrine of the unknowable, and, by consequence, the entire system of the Positivists of every school, is therefore built upon the sand. So far as that system has reference to supersensual verities, and especially in so far as it has reference to the knowledge of God, and in particular to the authority of the Christian Scriptures and the truth of the Christian religion, it is at bottom absolutely worthless. This result will be still more apparent from a discussion, upon their *merits*, of the metaphysical principles on which the new system is professedly grounded. The consideration of this branch of the subject is necessarily postponed to another issue of this REVIEW.

ARTICLE II.

JOHN KNOX, AS THE ENGLISH AND AS THE SCOTTISH REFORMER.

John Knox and the Church of England: His work in her Pulpit, and his influence upon her Liturgy, Articles, and Parties. A Monograph, founded upon several important papers of Knox never before published. By PETER LORIMER, D. D., Professor of Theology, English Presbyterian College, author of "Patrick Hamilton," "The Scottish Reformation," etc. Henry S. King & Co., 65 Cornhill and 12 Paternoster Row, London. 1875.

Some three years ago, the amiable and accomplished Dr. Lorimer, of the English Presbyterian College, London, while mining in the rich quarry of the William's Library, London, laid his hand upon certain "Knox papers," in what is known as the "Morrice Collection" of manuscripts, which, for some unaccountable reason, had never yet been published. They consist of four papers, all relating to Knox's work as a Reformer in England, viz.: (1) "An Epistle to the Congregation in Berwick, in 1552;" (2) "A Memorial or Confession laid before the Privy Council of Edward VI. in 1552;" (3) "The Practice of the Lord's Supper, used in Berwick, by John Knox;" and (4) "A Letter written to Knox from London, 1566." These papers, though not originals, but transcripts from the originals—the one made by a contemporary of Knox, in the era of Edward VI., and the other in the last quarter of the seventeenth century—Dr. Lorimer has demonstrated to be, beyond all question, genuine productions of Knox and his contemporaries.

The discovery of these papers, furnishing so much new material towards a more correct estimate of the character of Knox, suggested to Dr. Lorimer the thought of re-writing the English section of Knox's life, interweaving with the facts already well known concerning him, the new facts brought out by these papers. The result of this happy thought is this *monograph* on the English section of Knox's life. He has done his work with singular skill and ability, and laid under lasting obligation to himself, all genuine Presbyterians; for genuine Presbyterians so reverence

the memory of Knox that an author who brings to light any new facts to his honor is looked upon with a sort of family affection, as having added to the honor and the good repute of the family name.

It gives special value and interest to the discovery and the labors of Dr. Lorimer that he has been enabled to bring out a phase of Knox's character hitherto almost entirely unnoticed. The current estimate of this grand historical personage makes him all sternness and boldness—distinguished for narrowness of view and uncompromising iron-sidedness—one ever ready

“ To prove his doctrine orthodox
By apostolic blows and knocks.”

Nor has it been his enemies who have been responsible wholly for this injustice to the character of the great Reformer. His friends, many of them, have regarded his bold, fierce, unmerciful attacks upon those who set themselves openly or by treachery against the progress of the Reformation in Scotland as the crowning honor of his life and character, while others of them have been too ready to apologize, when no apology was necessary, for what they deem his too fierce spirit by pleading the spirit of the age in which he lived. Even Dr. Paul Henry, the eulogist of Calvin, is found indulging in the loosest and most careless statements in regard to the character of John Knox, whom he styles “the founder of the Scotch Presbyterian Church, from which arose the rude, fierce spirits of a subsequent period.” He even sets up Knox as a foil for the better display of the character of Calvin in the following style :

“The difference of character in Calvin and Knox was early displayed when the latter was in England and interested himself in the revision of the Prayer-book. Then, as subsequently, he exhibited the most decided hostility to the Anglican Church on account of its retaining some of the Catholic forms, and not adopting the severe rule of the Scotch. Calvin, who so energetically strove against superstition, was not in this case disposed to agree with Knox. He willingly suffered outward forms to remain, or at least did not *assail them with fanatical violence, as if they had a real importance.*”*

Now, in the first place, at the time when Knox was interested

*Life and Times of Calvin, vol. 2, p. 328.

in the revision of the English Prayer-book, he had never seen Calvin, nor probably had much acquaintance with Calvin's writings; for the revised Prayer-book of Edward VI. was just issuing from the press when Knox first landed in England after his captivity, and began his more public labors as a preacher. He could, therefore, have had no communication and comparison of views with Calvin on the subject. In the second place, it would have been little to Calvin's credit as a Reformer if he had differed seriously with Knox in his chief objection to Edward VI.'s Prayer-book, namely, the claim set up in one of its forty-two articles that the Church has the right to ordain rites and ceremonies, and, therefore, was competent to ordain kneeling at the Lord's Supper. And, in the third place, as will be seen further on, Knox, so far from "fanatical violence" against outward forms to which he objected, exhorted his former parishioners to conform to the order for kneeling at the Lord's Supper rather than create disturbance, as appears from one of the newly discovered papers.

It is gratifying to note that even before the recent discoveries of Mr. Tytler and Dr. Lorimer, more philosophic and less partisan writers, such as Thomas Carlyle, Froude, and Dean Stanley, had gathered even from the general history of those times the evidences on which they have felt bound to depart from the current estimate of the character of Knox. Carlyle had said of him, in his own quaint way :

"They go far wrong who think this Knox was a gloomy, spasmodic, shrieking fanatic. Not at all; he is one of the solidest men; a most shrewd, observing, quietly discerning man; an honest-hearted, brotherly man—brother to the high, brother also to the low: sincere in his sympathy with both: a cheery, social man with faces that loved him. An ill nature he decidedly had not. Kind, honest affections dwelt in the much-enduring, hard-worn, ever-battling man. Close at hand, he was found to be no mean, acrid man, but at heart a healthful, strong, sagacious man."

And the truthfulness to nature of this picture Dr. Lorimer's new discovery combines with Knox's letters, as published by Dr. Laing, to confirm. So the candid, nicely discriminating

Froude had said of Knox, among many similar references to his character in his history :

“Penetrated to the heart with this conviction, John Knox became thus the representative of all that was best in Scotland. *He was no narrow fanatic*, who, in a world in which God's grace was equally visible in a thousand creeds, could see the truth nowhere but in his formula. He was a large, noble, generous man, with a shrewd perception of actual fact, who found himself face to face with a system of hideous iniquity.”*

And, in spite of both ecclesiastical and Rationalistic prejudice, even Dean Stanley had suggested that “John Knox himself *had a tinge of moderation* which has been little recognised, either by his friends or his enemies,” though he cites as an evidence of his moderation the not very significant proofs that Knox proposed in the Confession prepared by him to take back any of its utterances which might be shown to impugn God's word; and also that Knox was not a rigid Sabbatarian.†

Dr. Lorimer shows from these newly discovered papers that in the capacity of an English Reformer Knox exhibited, in a remarkable degree, the combination of tenderness with strength; of playful humor with the profoundest seriousness; of all genial human sympathies with fervor of devotion and burning zeal for truth. And if our author had done nothing more than bring out the facts which go to establish these more just estimates of the character of the great Reformer, he would have done no mean service to the cause of truth and righteousness. But he has accomplished far more. He has drawn a distinct and most attractive picture of Knox as the English Reformer—the gospel preacher invited by the Privy Council of Edward VI. to preach the Reformation gospel in the north of England; singularly tender and wise as a guide of souls in trouble; the chaplain of Edward VI., having a high place in his confidence, and the confidential adviser of his Privy Council; in all of which official capacities he displayed remarkable wisdom and moderation. He has brought out not only another photograph of Knox, but one so contrived that when placed side by side with the old portrait,

*Froude's Hist. of England, Vol. 6, chap. 37.

†Lectures on the Church of Scotland, Lect. iii, p. 112.

the two combine to create a more distinct and life-like representation. Just as in the beautiful results of the stereoscope, it requires two pictures, somewhat varied in the point of view to be seen together as parts of a whole, in order to the beautiful statuesque effect; so the tame uniformity of the current portrait of the Scotch Reformer, when it is viewed side by side with this new portrait of Dr. Lorimer, has a sort of stereoscopic distinctness and completeness which it could not have alone.

Referring the reader to Dr. Lorimer's admirable monograph for the view of Knox as simply an English Reformer, it is proposed here to present the character and spirit of Knox as they appear from the combination of Dr. Lorimer's picture of the English Reformer Knox with the picture of McCrie and others of Knox as the Scottish Reformer.

It is worthy of note that nothing is known of the first forty years of Knox's life, beyond the mere fact that he was born in 1505; was educated in part at the University of Glasgow; at fifteen was the fellow-student of George Buchanan, under the famous scholastic Doctor John Mair; was admitted to orders in the Church of Rome as a secular priest, at the usual age; and that he united with the office of "Rood-Priest" in the chapel of St. Nicholas, in the neighborhood of his birthplace, the function of private tutor in the family of the Kers of Samuelston.

His character and convictions as a Reformer must have developed very slowly. For though the books of Luther and Tynedale had come into Scotland so early as 1525, and Patrick Hamilton had suffered martyrdom for the gospel truth in 1528; yet Knox is found so late as 1543 signing a notarial instrument of assignment as still an apostolic notary of the Church of Rome, entitling himself, "*Johannes Knox, sacri altaris minister, Sancti Andree diocesos auctoritate apostolica notarius.*"

But in 1546 we find him the friend and companion of the holy George Wishart, accompanying him with a two-handed sword to protect him, up to the time of his martyrdom. Calderwood relates that when Wishart was leaving Haddington on the evening of his arrest, "Johne Knox preassing to have gone with him, he said, 'Nay, returne to your childrein (his pupils) and God

blesse you. One is sufficient for one sacrifice. So he caused a two-handed sword which commounlie was carried with him to be takin from Johne Knox. He obeyed albeit unwillinglie, and returned with Hugh Dowglas to Langnidrie."* Knox had by this time thoroughly embraced the Reformation under the teaching of Guillaume and Wishart, and it must be borne in mind that Wishart's Protestantism was of the Helvetic type, demanding a "Thus saith the Lord" as authority for every religious opinion and practice. So that the life of Knox as a Protestant Reformer, of the Helvetic or Calvinistic type, began in his forty-second year, immediately after the martyrdom of Wishart. The death of this martyr being avenged by the taking of the Castle of St. Andrews and the murder of Cardinal Beaton by Norman Leslie and his fellow-conspirators, they continued to hold the castle as a place of refuge for themselves and other Protestants against the wrath of Cardinal Beaton's Popish adherents. Into this castle Knox retired for shelter in 1547. His own account of this going into the shelter of St. Andrews with his pupils, and the reasons for it, is thus given in his own History of the Reformation in Scotland :

" At the Pasche after (April, 1547) came to the Castell of Sanctandros Johnne Knox, who, wearied of removing from place to place by reassone of the persecution that came upon him by this Bischoppe of Sanctandros, was determinat to have left Scotland, and to have vesited the schooles of Germany (of England then he had no pleasur be reassone that the Paipe's name being suppressed, his laws and corruptions remaned in full vigor). But becaus he had the cair of some gentilmenes childrene whome certain yearis he had nurished in godlyness. thare fatheris solisted him to go to Sanctandros, that himself might have the benefit of the Castell and thare children the benefit of his doctrine; and so (we say) came he the tyme forsaid to the said place, and, having in his cumpanye Francis Dowglas, of Langnudrye, George, his brother, and Alexander Cockburne, eldast sonne then to the Lard of Ormestoun, began to exercise thame after his accustomed manner. Beside thare grammar and other human authoris, he redd unto them a catechisme, acompt whareof he caused thame gave publictly in the parishe Kirk of Sanctandros. He redd moreover unto thame the Evangell of Johnne. Thei of the place, but especeallie Maister Henry Balnaves and Johnne

*Calderwood's Hist., vol. i, p. 195.

Rowght, preacher, perceaving the manner of his doctrin, begane earnestlie to travail with him, that he wold tak the preaching place upon him. But he utterlie refuissed, alledging that 'he wold nott ryne whare God had not called him.' meaning that he would do nothing without a lauchfull vocatioun.*

But, after advice with Sir David Lindsay, it was agreed that the preacher Rowght (Rough) should, after a sermon on the nature of a call, publicly demand of Knox that he enter upon the work of the ministry, in the name of God as now calling through them. He yielded and preached with great power on several occasions. But soon the French fleet came in the interest of Mary and the Papists, and captured the fortress of St. Andrews, carrying off the occupants as prisoners of war, and in violation of the Articles of Capitulation, which provided for carrying them to any port in Europe out of Scotland, they were kept as chained prisoners in the galley for eighteen months or more, and subjected to every sort of annoyance in order to bring them to the service of the mass. It was at this time that the celebrated scene occurred between the galley master and Knox, when the attempt was made to force the Scotchman to kiss a splendid image of the Virgin. The story is most interesting, as told by Knox himself, though he does not mention his own name. After speaking of their attempts to worry the prisoners back to the Popish services, he continues :

"Yea, when upon the Setterday at nicht thei sung thare *Salve Regina*, the holic Scottishmen pute on thare capps, thare hoodis, or such thing as thei had to cover thare headis; and when that otheris war compelled to kyss a paynted brod, (which thei called Nostre Dame,) thei war not pressed after ones; for this was the chance. Sone after the arrivall at Nances (Nantes) thare great *Salve* was song, and a glorious painted Lady was brought in to be kissed, and, amangis otheris, was presented to one of the Scotishmen then cheyned. He gentillye said: 'Truble me nott; such an idole is accursed; and therefore I will not tuich it.' The Patron and the Arguesin, with two officeris having the chief charge of all such materis, said: 'Thou shalt handill it,' and so thei violentlie thrust it to his face, and put it betwix his handis: who, seeing the extremitie, took the idole, and advisitlie looking about, he caist it into the rivare and said: 'Let our Ladie now saif herself; she is lycht aneuch:

*Knox's Hist. of Reformation, book i, p. 185.

let hir learne to swyme.' After that was no Scottish man urged with that idolatrie."*

It was during this imprisonment that his friend Balnaves wrote his treatise of Justification, and Knox the famous preface to it.

After eighteen months of such ignominious bondage as Knox describes it—"going in irons, miserably intreated, and sore troubled by bodily infirmitie"—the Reformer was released, probably by English interposition. He went to England, and then began his labors as an English Reformer in 1549, in the forty-fifth year of his age. And now of the twenty years of active public service that followed, a summary chronological statement will show that about one-half of them were spent in connection with the Church of England, either in England or with refugees from England on the continent. Thus, early in 1549 Knox came to England, and was appointed by the English Council to be preacher in the town of Berwick. At the close of 1550 he was removed from Berwick to Newcastle. In December, 1551, he was appointed by the Privy Council one of six chaplains to Edward VI., which led to his occasional residence in London during 1552 and 1553. In October, 1552, he was offered the Bishopric of Rochester, but declined the preferment. In April, 1553, he declined the vacant living of All-Hallows in London, and on his refusal was summoned before the Privy Council to show why he refused these positions. In July of that year Edward VI. died, after which followed the persecutions of the Protestants under "the Bloody Mary," which drove him with multitudes of others to the continent. In 1554 Knox was called to become minister of the English congregation of Frankfort. In 1555, on account of the troubles stirred up by Cox, Grindal and others concerning the use of the English Liturgy, and their unworthy accusations of Knox before the Government as a seditious person, to secure their partisan ends, Knox left Frankfort and went to Geneva, and became one of the pastors of the English congregation there. In 1555-6 he made a visit to Scotland, where he preached privately in Edinburgh and elsewhere. He married in 1556 and returned to Geneva. In 1559, at the

*Knox's Hist. of Reformation, book i, p. 226.

invitation of the "Lords of Congregation," he finally left Geneva and reached Edinburgh on the 2d of May, in which month the Queen Regent published her Declaration against the Protestants, and drove them to take up arms in self-defence, and to seek alliance with England. In 1560 English troops entered Scotland, and the Queen Regent died in the Castle of Edinburgh. Peace was concluded in July, and the Parliament assembled in August, adopted the Confession of Faith, and established the Protestant religion, and in December the first General Assembly met. In 1561, at the invitation of the Scotch nobility to their young Queen Mary to visit Scotland, she came and assumed the Government, and began the attempt at once to overthrow the Protestant established religion. From this time until 1567, when Lord Darnley was murdered, when Bothwell carried off the Queen, and when the young Prince James was crowned, Knox was engaged in a constant struggle, with the Queen on the one hand and the treacherous nobles on the other, to maintain the established religion. In 1569 Regent Murray was assassinated, and Knox preached his funeral. In the following year Knox had a stroke of apoplexy, and in 1572 died.

From this chronological outline it will be seen that the prime of Knox's life was devoted to the work of reformation among Englishmen, either in England or on the continent.

It is noteworthy that so little account is made of the five years of Knox's labors in England in the Scottish Church histories of that era. Calderwood despatches his chapter of "Mr. Knox; His Travells in England," in a very few lines beyond citations from his sermons before King Edward VI. and his Privy Council, and his apostrophe to England at Hammershame :

"Mr. Knox had taught at Berwick, Newcastle, London; at Winsore before the King's majestie; at Hampton Court, at Westminster, and many other places. In his admonition to the faithful in London, Newcastle, Berwick, printed *anno* 1554, we may perceave how painfullie, how powerfullie he taught the word in England since he was delivered out of the galleys. He foretold Newcastle and Berwick of the Tweate. He was free and plaine before the Duke of Northumberland at court. Before the Duke of Somerset he was apprehended."*

*Calderwood's Hist., vol. i, p. 279.

And even in Knox's own History of the Reformation in Scotland, though so largely occupied with transactions in which he took part, the account of his labors in England is summed up in one paragraph :

"The said Knox was first appointed preacher to Berwick, then to Newcastle ; last he was called to London, and to the south parts of England, where he remained to the death of King Edward the Sixth, when he left England ; then he passed to Geneva, and there remained at his private study till he was called by the English congregation that then was assembled at Franckforde to be preacher to them ; which vocation he obeyed, (albeit unwillingly,) at the command of that notable servant of God, John Calvyne. At Franckforde he remained till that some of the learned (whose names we suppress) moir given to unprofitable ceremonies than to sinceritie of religion began to quarrell with the said Johnne : and because thei dispared to prevail before the magistrat there, for the establishing of their corruptionis, thei accused him of treason committed against the Emperoure and against thare Sovereigne Quein Marie, that in his 'ADMONITION TO ENGLANDE,' he called the one lyttle inferiour to Nero, and the other more cruell than Zezabel."*

But of however small importance this era of his life in the estimate of himself and the Scottish historians, as compared with the subsequent twelve years of his labors in Scotland, the papers now published by Dr. Lorimer show that, during his life among the English, Knox not only became intimately connected with English life, and connected himself by marriage with influential English families, but as a public man exerted a very great influence, not only while in England, but by his association on the continent afterwards with such men as Coverdale, Bale, Whittingham, Goodman and others, and, as the result of all, left his powerful impress upon the Reformation in England.

But our present purpose is to show that, though Knox's Reformation views, derived from Wishart, were of the most decided Helvetic type, as his discourses in the Castle of St. Andrews had clearly shown, and though he held that every question of doctrine and Church order must be brought to the test of the word of God, yet in all his teachings, and even in all his controversies, he exhibited a broadness of view and a true catholic spirit that surpassed most of his contemporaries. And on all oc-

*Knox's Hist. of Ref. in Scotland, vol. i, p. 231.

casions, so far from stickling at trifles, he proceeded upon the principle which Row has so comprehensively and philosophically stated: "Many thingis must be tolerated for a tyme in the infancie of a Kirk which may not be tolerated when the Kirk comes to greater perfection—many things in *ecclesia constituenda* which are not to be tolerated in *ecclesia constituta*;"* a principle, by the way, of very large application to the measures of the Presbyterian fathers.

Dr. Lorimer brings out very prominently the thought that Knox was a Puritan—entitled to be regarded as the father of English Puritanism. While the facts cited make it evident that Knox was indeed the champion of what would now be called Evangelical Protestantism as against the High Church half-way Reformation of the Church of England, which the people were subsequently compelled by the Government to be content with, it may be questioned whether the term "Puritan," as that term came to be understood afterwards in England, may be properly applied to John Knox. The Scottish as well as many of the English Protestants were indeed Puritans, and were banded together against the common enemy, the advocates of royal prerogative under the Tudors and Stuarts. But while the English Puritans fought the Tudors and the Stuarts, because they trod upon their individual rights as freemen, the Scottish Puritan resisted the Tudors and Stuarts with their high claims to prerogative because they trod upon the crown rights of Jesus Christ in his Church. English Puritanism represented the freedom of the *individual* conscience in religion as its primary idea; Scotch Puritanism represented as its primary idea the freedom of the Church of Christ as the spiritual commonwealth. This distinction was not developed in the era of Knox in England as subsequently. But one maintaining the principles of Knox would not, in the second Reformation of the following century, have been found in sympathy with the "thorough" school of English Non-conformists. His Presbyterianism, as all true Presbyterianism, was as churchly as the Church of England.

At Knox's advent in England, the Reformation, under the

*Row's Hist. Kirk of Scotland, p. 22.

young King Edward, had proceeded to the point of the issuing and the sanction by Parliament of the "*Book of Common Prayer* and administration of the sacraments and other rites and ceremonies of the Church, after the use of the Church of Englande." To this Book, with its peculiarities, most of his work as a Reformer in England had reference. While the book was a vast advance on the superstitions of the Papal worship, it fell as far short of what the more zealous Protestants desired as its advance beyond Popery shocked the prejudices of the party, then immensely in the majority, who favored reconciliation with Rome. The book could not command the services of over a half dozen bishops in the whole kingdom to introduce it into their several dioceses. Hooper, in a letter to Bullinger, in 1549, declares: "On the other hand, a great portion of the kingdom so adheres to the Popish faction as altogether to set at nought God and the lawful authority of the magistrates, so that I am greatly afraid of a rebellion and civil discords." And in another letter, a few weeks later: "The Marquis of Dorset, the Earl of Warwick, and the greater part of the King's Council, favor the cause of Christ as much as they can. Our King is such an one for his age as the world has never seen." In still another letter Hooper points out the real difficulty: "It is no small hindrance to our exertions that the form which our Senate, or, as we term it, our Parliament, has prescribed for the whole realm is of so very defective and doubtful construction in some respects, indeed manifestly impious. I am so much offended with that book, and that not without abundant reason, that if it be not corrected, I neither can nor will communicate with the Church in the administration of the Lord's Supper."

It will be seen, therefore, from this picture of the sad state of things in England at this period, and this protest of Hooper against the earlier forms of the English Liturgy, that any protests that Knox may have made were no evidence of peculiarly rigid and narrow views on his part; but that he only protested in common with Hooper and other earnest and godly men of the Church of England against principles fatal to true reformation.

The chief issue in controversy at the time may seem to us at

this day to have been trivial. The Liturgy offered by the Government to the Church, particularly the order for administration of the Sacraments, (which were the great subject of the controversy with Rome,) retained many of the old Popish usages, as vestments, candles, wafers, and kneeling to receive the emblems in the Lord's Supper. The last of these came into great prominence. To superficial thinkers and writers, this would seem too small a matter upon which to divide and agitate the Church. But as men can understand so readily how so small an affair as a three-penny tax upon tea could become representative of the great issues of constitutional liberty involved in the American Revolution, why can they not understand how this question of kneeling at the Lord's Supper might involve all the tremendous issues involved in the death struggle with Popery in England at the middle of the sixteenth century? This question did involve in it the question between a real and a half-way reformation from Popery.

The Ritual of Edward VI., though introduced by authority of Parliament in 1549, seems to have worked its way so slowly that so late as 1552 it had not been brought into use in the churches so far north as Berwick. Knox, though one of Cranmer's licensed preachers, seems to have preached and administered the Sacraments there according to his views of the word of God, without encumbering himself with the forms prescribed by the Prayer-book of Edward VI. His success as a minister among a rude, fierce people, in a border town, garrisoned with soldiers, seems to have been astonishing. In the popular impression and rumors of his success doubtless originated the charge repeated by Queen Mary ten years afterwards, that he had "practised necromancy upon the people in England when a minister there." He carried over the great bulk of his people from the superstitions of the mass to the simple form of the Lord's Supper, as administered by Presbyterians ever since. His bold, manly style seems to have been very attractive to the soldiers of which the town of Berwick, being on the border, was always kept full. And though within twelve months he was transferred to Newcastle, the letter to his congregation at Berwick which Dr. Lori-

mer recently discovered, shows that there grew up between him and them a lasting affection. In his famous vindication in response to the demand made of him in 1550 to give account of the doctrine he had constantly affirmed in Berwick, occurs this characteristic passage, when contrasting the doctrine of the mass with his true doctrine of the Lord's Supper:

“They differ in use, for in the Lord's Supper *the minister and congregation sat both at ane tabill*—no difference betwixt thame in pre-eminence nor habit, as witnesseth Jesus Christ with his discipills and the practice of the Apostles after his death. But in the Papisticall Masse the priestis (so they will be stylit) are placed by themselves at ane altar. And I wold ask of the autorite thair of and what scripture commandeth so to be done. They must be cled in a sevarill habit, whair of no mention is made in the New Testament. It will not excuse tham to say Paule commandit all to be done with ordour and decentlie. Dair thair be so bold as to affirme that the Supper of Jesus Chryst was done without ordour and undecentlie, whairin were seen no disagysit vestamentis? Or will thair set up to us agane the Leviticall priesthood? Suld not all be taught by the plane word?”

It is very manifest, therefore, that the popular conception of a ritual of the Church of England at that time, and also that of her real Reformers, and of the Council at whose request Knox made this exposition, was far different from that which was settled upon after the Bloody Mary had crushed out the first Protestantism. Knox, in this grand vindication before the Council and an immense crowd, represents the Protestantism of Cranmer, and Ridley, and Hooper.

In December, 1551, it was determined that the King should retain six chaplains in ordinary, who should not only attend upon him, but also be itineraries and preach the gospel over the whole of Britain—two of them remaining at court, and four of them to go preaching, two and two, changing circuits year by year. It was doubtless in this character as one of the Government itinerants that Knox preached next at Newcastle; for there is an entry in the Privy Council Journal of 1552 in these terms: “A warrant to the four gentlemen of the Privie Chamber to pay to Mr. Knoles, preacher in the North, in the way of the King's reward the sum of XL l.” And Knox himself refers in one of

his letters to the fact that "the Queen's majesty (Mary) or the Thesaurer will be XL pounds richer by me;" that is, that his stipend had failed to be paid by that much. As these six itinerant chaplains were selected on account of their distinction as preachers, here is evidence clear enough that Knox had gained the confidence of the pious young Edward VI. and his Privy Council. In such position it was occasionally his duty to speak of national affairs. No marvel, therefore, that a man who spoke with his faithfulness should arouse the fierce wrath of the Popish and semi-Popish nobles, and cause the memory of Knox's ministry in England to be execrated by these, and by their admiring biographers and historians, and the devotees of a half-reformed, mongrel, semi-Papal, semi-Protestant Church.

It was in the autumn of 1552 that Knox visited the court in his capacity as chaplain to the King, and preached the sermon before the court which created so much stir on the subject of kneeling at the Lord's Supper. This was no new question to the King and court, for Hooper, in one of his Lent sermons on Isaiah in 1550, had declared, touching the receiving of the Lord's Supper :

"The outward behaviour and gesture of the receiver should want all kind of suspicion, shew, or inclination of idolatry. Wherefore, seeing kneeling is a shew and external sign of honouring and worshipping, and heretofore hath grievous and damnable idolatry been committed by the honouring of the Sacrament, I would wish it were commanded by the magistrates that the communicators and receivers should do it standing or sitting."

Knox's sermon on the subject before the court is nowhere reported; but the record is that it was a vehement one and produced so great an effect upon the minds of the nobles and great men as to have excited the expectation that a further reform of the Church would grow out of it. The excitement was no doubt the greater because Parliament was then issuing a new Rubric for the first time *commanding* kneeling at the Lord's Supper. Nor is it singular that Knox, having taught his people for two years past that sitting was the proper position, and foreseeing the trouble which the new Rubric must excite in the Northern churches, should speak strongly as a royal chaplain against it.

That Knox displayed none of the spirit of a fanatic in his opposition against certain errors of the new Prayer-book, but with frankness and moderation stated his views, is evident from Calderwood's picture of the scene between Knox and the Privy Council, before which he was called to answer why he had refused, first, the Bishopric of Rochester, and subsequently also the benefice of All-Hallows in London. Since, so far from taking offence, the Council immediately sent him out again as a royal chaplain itinerant to Buckinghamshire :

"He was called before the Counsell the 14th of April, 1553, and demanded three questions: First, Why he refused the benefice offered to him? Next, Whether he thought that no Christian might serve in the ministree of England, according to the rites and lawes of the realme? Thirdly, Why he kneeled not at the Lord's Supper? To the first he answers that his conscience did witness to him that he might profite more in some other place than in London; and, further, Northumberland had given a contrare command. To the second, that unless many things were reformed, no minister could discharge his office before God in England, for no minister had authoritie to divide and separate the lepers from the whole, which was a cheefe point of his office. Yit he did not refuse such office as might appear to promote God's glory in utterance of Christ's gospel in a mean degre. To the third he answered that Christ's action was most perfyte; that it was most sure to follow his example; that kneeling was man's addition or imaginatioun. In this last question there was great contention between the whole table and him."*

And just here it is that the newly discovered letter to his congregation at Berwick a year or two later brings out the new view of Knox's character. Though his appeal was so powerful as to cause a desire in many of the Privy Council to reconsider the Rubric, Cranmer, who in this strongly dissented from Knox, pressed his point that Parliament had already decided the question, and went forward to put forth the order for kneeling. But Knox, with so much to arouse his spirit, when subsequently the new Rubric, as he anticipated, was likely to create great excitement in his old charge, wrote to them from the continent in the following considerate, compromising strain :

"These things granted unto me, I nether will gainstand godly magistrates, nether brak commune order, nor yit contend with my superiors or

*Calderwood's Hist., vol i, p. 280.

fellow-preachers, but with patience wile I bear that one thing; daylie thirsting and calling on God for reformation of that and others. * * * And, thairfore, brethren, it is not the feare of corporall punishment, but *onlye the feare that Christian charitie be violated* and brokin that swaideth and moves me to give place in this behalf. Albeit I could, with all soberness and dew obedience, shew causes why sitting at the Lord's table is to be preferred unto kneeling; yett if the upper powers, not admitting the same, would execute upon me the penaltie of their law, (because they may not suffer a common order to be violated,) assuredly 'Christian charitie was broken and dissolved;' &c.

"And besides the breach of charitie, which is always to be avoided, I have respect to the quieting of your consciences, that if ye shall be compelled by the rigor of a law to alter that order, which of God's assured truth ye have learned and received, that nether shall ye dampne yourselves as transgressours of any law or violators of any common order for that which before ye have godlie used; nether yet that ye shall be accused as declinars or fallen back from the treuthe for that which ye shall after do; for when ye followed and received Christ's simpill institution sitting at a tabill, thair was no law, (except the statute of that Roman Antichrist,) and, thairfore, where there is no law there can be no transgression. And if now, by especial command of your uppar powers, ye shall be compelled to observe the common order, God forbid that ye shall be dampned or judged as shrinking from Christ; if first ye rejois not that ye are called back again to a gesture that is joyned with danger in that action. * * * If these things by you be righteouslie observed, understand and believed, God forbid yat any of you shall be suspected, as that your former fervencaye toward the treuthe began to abaitt and wax cold, albeit contrary to your harts' desire, your order be altered; which unto my heart is so dolorous yat yf anye corporall pane that my wicked carcass is able to sustean nicht confirm and establish that ordour which Godd's treuthe hath planted among you, rather I should suffer deathe," &c.

Such is the tone in which the Berwick ex-pastor writes back to his beloved flock when the new Rubric concerning kneeling at the Sacrament is about to be enforced upon them by the Government. It tends greatly to enhance the force of this testimony in favor of moderation and peace in the Church, when we come now to examine another of these newly discovered papers, which proves to be a powerful "*Memorial to the Privy Council*," which Knox and some of his co-workers had presented to the court against the thirty-eighth of the forty-two articles of the Prayer-book of Edward VI., which seems to have been submitted

to them for their advice. While speaking in such a tone of moderation as we have seen to the body of the people, Knox (for this memorial to the Privy Council is evidently in large part his or inspired by him) can speak in tones of manliest protest to men in power against the very order to which he afterward advises the people to submit. The memorialists, taking exception to the thirty-eighth article on "The Book of Common Prayer," which declared the whole ritual, including the new Rubric, to be in conformity with the word of God, proceeds to except specially to this one ordinance of kneeling, and presents an elaborate argument against it, of which the following are some of the points:

"First. No mane as we suppose of holie judgment will denye but knelyng in the action of the Lord's table proceeded from a fals and erroneous opinion, to wit: That there was Christis naturall body containd either by way of transsubstanciation or else by conjunction reall or corporall of his body and blood within the visible elements. That the same deceivable opinion doith yet remayne in the heartes of many, experience itself will well testyfy and playnelie declare. Then if a law may be confirmed, (Goddess majesty not offended,) that ceremonie that hath spronge furthe from a false opinion, &c.

"Secondaryly. By knelyng in the Lord's Supper the consciences of weyke brethren are not a lyttel offended, &c.

"Third. The Churche of God that be strong and growne to some perfection is greatly injured; for it is permitted for idolatours to triumph over the Church of God, seeing that after so long contention between the professors of the treuthe and maintainers of idolatrie, the idolatours have vanquished; and of their victorie they glorie not a littel, &c.

"Finally. As knelyng is no gesture meete at the Lord's table, so doth it obscure the joyfull sygnifications of that holie mysterie," &c.

These extracts are of profound interest ecclesiastically as pointing out the origin of the famous "Declaration on Kneeling," which was appended to the English Prayer-book, and was the most Protestant thing in it; and also as an evidence of the powerful influence of Knox in framing the English Articles of Religion. But they have a special interest as bearing upon the personal character of Knox as a Reformer, showing, by a comparison with his letter to his former charge at Berwick, that whilst he could stand forth boldly for the truth before the court, he could act as pacificator of the people when disposed to rebel

against the very order of the Government which he had labored to prevent.

It adds still further to the force of the facts already stated that his moderation exposed Knox occasionally to the sorrowful rebukes of his brethren, as having taken a position in which his views were used by their enemies against them. This appears from the fourth of these newly discovered papers, which is "A Letter Written to Mr. Knoxe," from which we can present but brief extracts:

"Our brethren do give hartly thanks for your gentle letter written unto them, but, to be plain with you, *it is not in all points liked*; and, for my part, if I had known the tenor of it when I was with you, I would have said many words that I never spoke. * * *

"Whereas you wish that our consciences had a better ground, truly we cannot see by these Scriptures that should alter our consciences from a Reformed Church that hath those marks to go back to mixtures. * * * Also, when you say, 'God forbid that we should damn all for false prophets and heretics that agree not with us in our apparel, and other opinions that teacheth the substance of doctrine and salvation in Christ Jesus', we heartily thank you for your good desire, but we never were of that mind to condemn any man's person," &c.

Now, taking these presentations of Knox in these three papers—first, as the calm, moderate adviser of the people to waive every matter of feeling and prejudice against an obnoxious ritual; secondly, as the bold and manly profester again the Government action when proposing to order such ritual; thirdly, as bearing the reproaches of his brethren, interpreting his moderation as unfaithfulness to his testimony—and we have a character in many points the opposite that of the Knox who has heretofore figured in Presbyterian history. We add here an extract or two from Knox's private letters by way of showing that the internal movings of the man's spirit corresponded with this view of the gentleness and moderation of his public acts and deliverances.

Dr. McCrie tells us of the somewhat romantic courtship of Knox and Marjory Bowes, daughter of Richard Bowes, of Aske, whose family resided near Newcastle while Knox was there, and how, as usual, "the course of true love did not run smoothly," by reason of the opposition of the father to the marriage. But

Mrs. Bowes, the mother, was a woman of eminent piety, yet subject often to profound religious melancholy and doubts of her acceptance with Christ ; and between her and Knox, who was her constant spiritual adviser, there grew up the strongest friendship. Dr. Laing, of the Advocate's Library, the editor of Knox's writings, who deserves the thanks and affectionate regards of all English speaking Presbyterians for his eminent services, has brought out in his "Knox's Works" (vol. 3) a collection of "Epistles to Mrs. Bowes and her daughter Marjory." In these letters we get views of the inmost heart of the great Reformer. In one of them, addressed to Mrs. Bowes to relieve her spiritual darkness, we find him saying of himself, after referring to former conversations with her :

"But now absent, and so absent that neither of us by corporeal presence can receive comfort of the other, I call to mind how that oftimes when, with dolorous hearts, we have begun our talking, God hath sent great comfort unto both, which now, for my own part, I commonly want. The exposition of your troubles and the acknowledging of your infirmities were first unto me a very mirror and glass wherein I beheld myself so rightly painted forth that nothing could be more evident to my own eyes," &c.

Then, again, in another letter, we find a paragraph in which this man, supposed to be so rough and plain spoken when reproving the sins of others, is as plain spoken of himself in sentences not less eloquent than the famous passage in Hooker which it so much resembles :

"Albeit I never lack the presence and plain image of my own wretched infirmity, yet, seeing sin so manifestly abound in all estates, I am compelled to thunder out the threatenings of God against all rebellers ; in doing whereof (albeit as God knoweth I am no malicious and obstinate sinner) I sometimes am wounded, knowing myself criminal and guilty in many, yea, in all things, (malicious obstinacy laid aside,) that in others I reprehend. Judge not, mother, that I write these things debasing myself otherwise than I am. No! I am worse than my pen can express. In body ye think I am no adulterer ; let so be. But the heart is infected with foul lusts, and will lust, albeit I lament never so much. Externally I commit no idolatry, but my wicked heart loveth the self, and cannot be refrained from vain imaginations ; yea, not from such as were the fountain of all idolatry. I am no man-killer with my hands, but I help not my needy brother so liberally as I may and ought.

I steal not horse, money, nor clothes from my neighbor, but that small portion of worldly substance I bestow not so rightly as his holy law requireth. I bear no false witness against my neighbor, in judgment or otherwise, before men, but I speak not the truth of God so boldly as it becometh his true messenger to do. And thus, in conclusion, there is no vice repugning to God's holy will expressed in his law wherewith my heart is not infected."

It needs only the following extract from another letter to Mrs. Bowes, illustrative of the great Reformer's tenderness toward all troubled souls bewailing their sinfulness and helplessness, to complete the view of his inner life :

"Fear not, mother, that the care of you passes from my heart. Na! He to whom nothing is secret knoweth that I never present myself, by Jesus Christ, before the throne of my Father's mercy, but there also I commend you; and seldom is it that otherwise ye pass from my remembrance. The very instant hour that your letters were presented unto me I was talking of you, by reason that three honest poor women were come to me, and were compleaning of their great infirmity, and were showing unto me the great assaults of the enemy, and I was opening the cause and commodities thereof, whereby all our eyes weeped at one time, and I was praying unto God that ye and some others had been with me for the space of twa hours: and even at that instant came your letters into my hands, whereof ane part I read unto them, and ane of them said: 'O would to God I might speak with that person, for I perceive there be more tempted than I.'"

Behold, then, this fierce man of war, before whose Herculean blows the kingdom of Satan trembled and sinners in high places quaked, now unfolding the secrets of his own heart and confessing that his strokes at sinners fell first upon his own soul, and, anon, sitting weeping with three honest poor women, bewailing their sins together! Here we have the secret of that "necromancy" to which the unspiritual multitude attributed his power of fascination over the English people.

Space fails us to follow the Reformer through his labors among the English on the continent, to which they and he were alike driven on the death of young Edward VI. by the "Bloody Mary" and her parasites, now exalted to power. The history of his labors at Frankfort and Geneva could be shown to have been in tone and spirit but a continuation of his labors in England. Had he been left undisturbed in his labors at Frankfort,

there is every reason to believe his success would have been as wonderful as at Berwick and Newcastle. The influx of a new element from England, driven out by the inconsiderate savagery of Mary's rule, soon, however, disturbed the peace of the congregation. A coterie of those Ritualistic martinets, (whose pseudo-aristocratic airs, and their intensely narrow and brainless conceptions of the public worship of God as a display of man-millinery and lisping cockneyism, has exposed the Church of England, so far as represented by them, to the contempt of both Papists and Protestants,) came into the congregation of the exiles at Frankfort with insolent demands to introduce the Liturgy of Edward VI., which as yet one-tenth of the English people themselves had not accepted; and in order to get Knox, their fellow-exile, out of the way, were guilty of the Iscariotism of trumping up against him the charge of treason against the Emperor, founding the charge upon some old strongly rhetorical expression which he had used long before he came to the continent. Of course, a foreigner and an exile could not afford to discuss ritual questions with a party which sought to bring in the secular power to their aid. Knox, therefore, removed to Geneva, and labored there as pastor of the English congregation, enjoying meanwhile the society and the instructions of the illustrious Calvin. Through the whole of this period Knox's correspondence exhibits him as the same earnest but moderate advocate of the great doctrines of the Reformation, never stickling for forms and non-essentials, as Dr. Paul Henry and others represent, but in the spirit of a broad catholicity, laboring to bring all Protestants to stand upon a common platform in their protest against the tyranny and wickedness of Rome.

With the key thus furnished in the first ten years of his public ministry in the Church of England and among the English on the continent, we are able to unlock the secrets of the character, conduct, and spirit of Knox, the Scottish Reformer, when, in 1560, he was called by the "Lords of Congregation" to return to his native country, and became the guide of the Reformation movement there. We may now see that whatever of uncompromising harshness and unyielding stubbornness he may have ex-

hibited came not altogether from the personal disposition of the man, nor from his ambitious desires to rule or ruin, but from his courageous and earnest zeal for a true spiritual Church against avaricious nobles and other leaders, traitors to the cause, who sought to grasp the wealth of which the Church of Rome was despoiled; and the open effort of a Popish Queen, backed by the power of France and Spain, to crush out the Reformation in Scotland, as it was crushed out in France and Spain. Knox, who, as the English Reformer, was a man of peace, was, as the Scottish Reformer, compelled to become a man of war or prove faithless to his mission. Thus forced into the conflict, he recognised the fact that so many are slow to comprehend—that “war is war.”

The limits of one article forbid such illustration of this proposition as the subject merits. The other view of Knox as the Scottish Reformer must be left to a future occasion.

ARTICLE III.

THEOLOGY AS A SCIENCE, INVOLVING AN INFINITE ELEMENT.

FATHERS AND BRETHREN OF THE ASSEMBLY: Did not usage require that something be said touching my induction into this chair, I would prefer to be silent upon that subject. A few words will, I trust, suffice for the demands of the occasion, and I shall pass on to the discussion of a more congenial topic.

The act just performed in your presence scarcely needs comment—it speaks for itself. Yet it is proper that I should say it has been done without reserve. I accept your Standards in the sense in which they were construed by the Old School Church in 1837 and 1838, and in which they are notoriously understood by the Southern Presbyterian Church. Accustomed for years to teach those venerable documents in the pulpit, the Sabbath-

school, the Bible class, and the family, it occasions me no difficulty to bind them thus solemnly upon the conscience. It is only to repeat what was once done when I stood up with profound emotion to assume my ordination vows. I have no particle of sympathy with the infidel cant which prates of the tyranny of creeds and the decay of "crumbling theologies." On the contrary, I fully subscribe to the necessity of confessions and symbols, as a testimony to the truth of God, and as a bond of union between the faithful witnesses for Christ. Still I feel bound in honesty to express the opinion, that as there is a possibility in the future of more and more perfectly conforming our doctrinal standards to the word of God as the supreme and infallible rule of faith and practice, some wise and carefully guarded provision to that effect should be made in the Constitution of our Church; and also to state, that as such a provision exists for the amendment of our governmental standards, one is at liberty to discuss the necessity or expediency of changes in them, it being at the same time understood that until they are duly made, the practice of the Church ought to be in accordance with the existing law.

I would avail myself of this occasion to tender to my able and honored brethren of the Faculty of the Seminary my grateful acknowledgments for the welcome to their sacred academic fellowship which they have been pleased to extend, and to express the hope that the fraternal intercourse with them which it has been my privilege already to enjoy may know no unhappy interruption. An obvious delicacy restrains me from speaking of the present, with its living actors, but I may be indulged in a brief allusion to the past, and especially to those who, once connected with this institution, have rested from their toils for Christ's kingdom and truth upon earth, and have taken their seats among the General Assembly on high.

I esteem it a joy that the school of sacred learning, in which I have been called to occupy a place, is that at whose maternal breasts I first drew my knowledge of theology. There it was my privilege to sit at the feet of Dr. George Howe, the erudite and accomplished scholar, and Dr. A. W. Leland, the sacred

orator, endowed by Providence with rich and splendid gifts. The grand head, the classic face, the organ-like voice, the majestic elocution, the fervent and evangelical delivery of truth, are matters of tradition now, for he has been gathered to his fathers and sleeps in Jesus. At the same time it was my happiness, with my fellow-students, to listen to the eloquent and powerful preaching of James H. Thornwell and Benjamin M. Palmer, whose pulpits were additional professorships of theology to the favored pupils of the Seminary. I blush at the thought that the chair to which I have been called, and which I have reluctantly consented to ascend, was subsequently filled by both these distinguished servants of the Church—by one provisionally for a brief period, and by the other for a term of years. Yes, I blush to venture into a seat which Thornwell illuminated by his ample learning, his profound genius, and his exquisite tact for instruction. He shone in the ecclesiastical firmament a brilliant star, of the first magnitude, which blazed the more lustroously as all too swiftly it sunk to its setting in a dark and frowning horizon; and although, alas! it disappeared from our straining eyes, it has left behind a trail of light which lingers a wake of glory upon the scene of his last labors and the Church of his passionate love. Plato thanked God that he was permitted to live in the age of Socrates, and no youthful lover of theological truth who ever sat under the teachings of Thornwell would be ashamed to confess a kindred gratitude. But though he be dead, yet shall he, by the grace of Providence, yet speak in the place in which his eloquent tongue discourses no more. Had he survived to complete the labors so auspiciously and magnificently begun, the Calvin of our Southern Presbyterian Church would have produced a work which would have been to us what the immortal Institute of the Christian Religion was to its age, and upon which the encomium contained in the line of Martial might justly have been pronounced:

“Unum præ cunctis fama loquatur opus:”

at least the great work of the illustrious Princeton theologian would not now, save as to the doctrine of the Church, be without a peer as a comprehensive modern recast of theology. What

he has left will yet, I trust, make its mark upon the Columbia Seminary, and the grand analyses and comprehensive principles of revealed truth he has embodied in his writings be infused into the minds of the students of that institution. It will be a labor of love for one who has studied in the school of this master—and it was the school of Christ—though he may follow with no equal pace, nay, at a long interval behind, to endeavor up to the bent of his ability to continue its methods and inculcate its doctrines.

The communications which have been presented to the Assembly render it unnecessary for me to allude to the great reluctance with which I entered upon the duties of this position; but I take leave to say that, in their susception, I acted not from choice, but in obedience to the repeated call of my brethren. Now that the trust is assumed, nothing remains but that I bring to it what industry and ability the Head of the Church has granted me. Discarding all dependence upon fleshly wisdom, and implicitly relying upon the unction from the Holy One, who teacheth all things, I not unwillingly dedicate myself to the performance of this office. Profoundly conscious of insufficiency for these responsibilities, I am nevertheless comforted in part by the conviction that the love of the truth, which has never been a subordinate passion of my heart, has not diminished with the lapse of years. I can sincerely adopt the language in which the great scholar, Sir William Jones, has beautifully paraphrased a noble passage of Berkeley's *Siris*:

“ Before thy mystic altar, Heavenly Truth,
I kneel in manhood, as I knelt in youth;
There let me kneel till this dull form decay,
And life's last shade is brightened by thy ray!
Then shall my soul, now lost in clouds below,
Soar without bounds, without consuming glow.”

When Dr. Thornwell was inaugurated into his Professorship in the Seminary, he pronounced a discourse in which he discussed all the great aspects of theology—its nature, its scope, its methods, its distributive principle, and its importance. That address is extant in his writings; and however appropriately to the circumstances of this occasion one might submit his own

views upon these subjects, the fact which has been mentioned deters me from so ungraceful and supererogatory an effort. I shall, therefore, content myself with inviting attention to the discussion of a more specific question.

It is now so generally admitted that theology is a science, that any elaborate attempt to establish its claims to that denomination would seem to be superfluous. It has been said that the title of science is denied to theology, "partly on the ground that the habit corresponding to it is not natural, but supernatural; and partly on the ground that it does not spring from principles of reason, nor proceed by logical deductions. It does not, in other words, find a place under the Aristotelic definition of science." Now, even were it conceded that it professes to be a subjective and not an objective science, the first of these objections would not necessarily be fatal. For if there may be a natural habit of natural knowledge, there is no just reason why there may not be a supernatural habit of supernatural knowledge; and if reason, in its natural condition, is adapted to the scientific treatment of the former, one fails to see why reason supernaturally enlightened may not be competent to deal with the latter. Theology, however, claims to be mainly a science in the objective sense, as concerned about the theory rather than the habit of religion, and the difficulty alleged is consequently deprived of force. To the other objection it may be answered that theology does in part spring from the indestructible principles of reason, endorsed and enforced by revelation; that in so far as it arises from the dicta of a supernatural revelation, it does no more than other sciences in accepting fundamental principles already furnished; that if that be granted, it grounds itself upon data which are at least of no lower original than those supplied by reason; and that if the facts and doctrines of a divine revelation be given so as to be apprehensible, our faculties, if supernaturally illuminated, not only may, but must, by a logical necessity, proceed to arrange and classify them—in other words, to reduce them to scientific form. It may surely be allowed to a theologian to do reflectively what every intelligent man of piety, to a certain extent, does spontaneously.

It is not, however, my purpose to vindicate at large the claims of theology to be a science, but to endeavor to meet what is, perhaps, the most formidable difficulty lying in the way of these pretensions, growing out of the allegation that the attempt is made to reduce the infinite to scientific conditions—to make the unthinkable a term of human syllogisms. It must be admitted that, as to His essence, God is undefinable; an infinite being, as He is in himself, cannot be subjected to logical forms, cannot be made an element in the narrow premises of finite reasoning. We know nothing of our own substances except through their phenomenal properties, and what can we know of the substance of God? But if this were all, as theology has for its chief object an infinite God, it would follow that its pretensions to be a science at all, in any proper sense, must at once be discharged. With a profound conviction of the littleness of man and the greatness of God, and, I trust, with the reverence which befits the discussion of such a theme, I would adventure some reflections upon the questions: Have we a valid knowledge of the Infinite Being? What is the mode of attaining to that knowledge? And is it possible for the reason to employ it as an element in the processes of science? In order to clear the way, it will be necessary to institute some preliminary inquiries, and to fix the meaning of the terms which will be prominently employed.

In the first place, what is the relation between faith and reason? It has been so customary for certain writers to speak of the distinct provinces of faith and reason, and to represent them as occupying entirely different domains, and performing entirely separate functions, that there is no wonder that confusion has been the result. It would seem to be obvious that there can be no generic difference between them. Take any view of the nature of faith, except the special one of a feeling of trust, and it cannot be excluded from the territory of the reason. If we adopt the distribution of Kant, and regard the pure reason as distinct from the logical understanding, and as constituting the seat of transcendental ideas, it is manifest that such a faculty would be the very repository of our fundamental faiths. It

would be the precise office of the reason to believe those truths which transcend the forms of the logical understanding. Take the view of Hamilton, and identify the reason with the understanding as the same generic faculty, and it is clear that it must be considered as the place in which these primary faiths or fundamental laws of belief are to be found. And as faith, in all its aspects, whenever it is in exercise, involves as its first element the assent of the understanding, it must be admitted that since the understanding and the reason are, on this hypothesis, the same faculty, faith can only be regarded as a function of the reason. To what other department of the mind can we assign it? The truth would seem to be that reason is simply the *genus* of which faith is one of the species. The other is cognition; and the distinction, which is really valuable and deserves to be noted, is not between faith and reason, but between faith and cognition. In the one case it is the reason believing, and in the other the reason cognising. It is one and the same faculty discharging distinct specific functions. If this view be correct—and I see not how it can be fairly disputed—a considerable advance is made toward disentangling the difficulties connected with the main questions before us.

In the second place, the inquiry must be met as to the real distinction between faith and knowledge. It is one of critical importance in regard to the possibility of a knowledge of God as an infinite being. It deserves to be signalised in consequence of differences which, I am inclined to think, are to a certain extent more apparent than real between the parties to the issue in reference to the cognoscibility of God. It is moreover deserving of consideration in view of the fact that, as the result of inadvertence, or perhaps, in some cases, of the desire to avoid an apparent captiousness and technical minuteness, the greatest writers have not always used their terms with that rigid uniformity which is demanded by the importance and difficulty of the subject. Sir William Hamilton, notwithstanding the ordinary accuracy of his terminology, has not always been free from vacillation in this matter. And one at least of his distinguished critics has, in consequence of the same fact, rendered it doubtful

whether his intention was to affirm or deny the possibility of knowing the infinite by the functions of the cognitive reason. Now, it is respectfully submitted that knowledge sustains to faith the same generic relation which I have attempted to show is held by reason ; with this important difference, however, that reason is the generic source from which faith and cognition spring as species, while knowledge, on the other hand, is the generic result of the exercise of these specific powers. Is it not clear that there are some things which we know because we believe them, and other things which we know because we cognize them? And yet there appears to be a continual tendency to confound the cognoscible with the cognizable. There are cases in which they coincide, but there are others in which they do not—in which the cognoscible transcends the cognizable. There are instances in which knowledge is the common product of faith and the cognitive reason ; and there are others in which faith attains a knowledge which lies utterly beyond the reach of the cognitive faculties. There is, therefore, no generic distinction between faith and knowledge, just as there is no such distinction between faith and reason. Knowledge is a result of which at one time faith is a factor, and at another, cognition. When, therefore, it is affirmed that we cannot know the infinite by the cognitive reason—in other words, that we cannot conceive or think it—the meaning need not be taken to be that we cannot know it at all ; but, on the contrary, the position is consistent with the affirmation that we know it by faith. When Hamilton sometimes says, We do not know, we only believe, the infinite, he departs from his own strictness of speech. His meaning is that we do not cognize or conceive it, but we know it by believing. “The Divinity,” he correctly remarks, “is in a certain sense revealed, in a certain sense is concealed ; he is at once known and unknown.” That is to say—his meaning obviously is—the Deity is known as revealed to faith, and unknown as infinite through the exercise of the cognitive reason. The knowledge derived through faith immeasurably overpasses that acquired by thought. Dr. Thornwell, who, with a philosophical genius akin to Hamilton’s, criticises the position of the great Scotchman in

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reference to the cognoscibility of the infinite, enounces the distinction for which I am now contending when speaking of the knowledge even of finite substance. His language is: "In our knowledge of the finite there are evidently two elements or factors. There is, first, the relative and phenomenal which can be conceived and known; this is the proper object of thought. There is, secondly, the substance or substratum, the *quasi* absolute, which cannot be represented in thought, but which is positively believed as existing. One element addresses itself to the intelligence and the other to faith. * * * It is in and through the phenomena that substance is known." Here knowledge in one relation is attributed to conception, and in another to faith. These citations are sufficient to indicate that the view now insisted upon was at bottom held by both these great thinkers, to wit: that faith and knowledge are not contrasted, but that knowledge is a product of which at one time faith is the efficient, and at another time, cognition.

I would take occasion, in connection with this subject, to remark briefly upon the vexed question of the relation, in the order of sequence, between faith and knowledge; for that is the form in which the question is nearly always stated, although the terms of the relation ought to be not faith and knowledge, but faith and cognition. It would appear to be evident that first of all would come a fundamental belief or faith, and then a special act of cognitive knowledge, and, lastly, a particular exercise of faith resulting in another kind of knowledge. Let me illustrate by two cases—one drawn from the sphere of nature, the other from that of grace. We have, it is now well nigh universally admitted, at the root of our faculties fundamental laws of belief, which are elicited into exercise upon the occasions which occur in experience. Among these, characterised by simplicity and necessity, is the intuitive faith in the relation of effect to cause. We behold a new event. Something begins to be which did not exist before. What takes place? Apparently there is first the cognition of the event. But back of that act of cognition lay the fundamental law of belief in the relation of cause and effect. That law, existing prior to the cognition, but latent and unde-

veloped to consciousness, is now elicited by the cognitive act, and the result is a special exercise of faith, necessitating the inference that the event perceived was due to some sufficient cause. Take a case from the supernatural sphere. A sinner believes in Christ as his Saviour. What is the order here? First, there is the power to believe—a fundamental law of the spiritual life, imparted by the grace of regeneration. Then there is a cognitive apprehension of the propositions of the gospel which offer Christ to sinners, and, lastly, there is the special act of faith by which the soul apprehends those propositions as the testimony of God, embraces the Saviour, and knows him unto salvation. We would infer from this analysis that the special acts of cognition are preceded by fundamental faiths, and that the special acts of faith are occasioned by the particular exercises of the cognitive faculty; and it would further follow that the knowledge which results from the energy of the cognitive and ratiocinative faculty is of one kind, and that produced by faith is of another sort.

There is but one difficulty which I can conceive in this statement of the order of procedure among the mental powers in the evolution of knowledge. It is one which arises from the fact, that it is not uncommon to rank primitive cognitions, as well as primary or intuitive faiths, among the fundamental data of consciousness. If by primitive cognitions be meant formed and developed knowledges, as the term would strictly imply, it is evident that the theory of their existence is based in mistake. Whatever were Locke's defects, he exploded the doctrine of innate ideas as involving formalised knowledge. If it be meant that they are laws of thought bearing the same regulative relation to the specific cognitive acts as the laws of belief may be conceived to sustain to the special exercises of faith, the question of their separate existence would be a fair one. It would seem, however, to be unnecessary to make the distribution. The fundamental laws of belief are usually considered as holding, in the form of certain necessities of thinking, a common relation to all the cognitive functions. But if the distinction be admitted between the primary laws of thought and those of belief, it is obvious that, as both classes would equally lie at the very foundations of

the mental processes, there could be no precedence of one to the other. They would be concurrently evolved, each in its own special direction. It cannot be shown that, in the last analysis, faith is ever grounded in cognition. The probability lies the other way—that our fundamental faiths lie at the basis of all our mental acts. Knowledge begins in faith, and ends in faith.

Having endeavored to clear away certain difficulties which lay in the path of the discussion, by indicating the relations of faith and reason, and of faith and knowledge, and by calling attention to the real distinction which deserves emphasis, viz., that between faith and cognition as specific functions of the reason, and specific factors of knowledge, we are prepared to take up the question as to the validity of our knowledge of the Infinite, and as to the mode of its possession.

There are two sorts of revelation which God has furnished—the first natural, the second supernatural. Natural revelation is the testimony of God to natural truth—concerning himself, man, and the relations involved. That testimony—the unwritten word of God—is contained in the microcosm within man, and the macrocosm without him. It is imbedded in his make and constitution, and utters itself in every energy which wakes to activity from the profoundest depths of the soul. It whispers in consciousness, thunders in conscience, and breaks into doxologies in the instinctive worship of the heart. Every bodily sense gives it a tongue. It proclaims itself at the gates, through which the procession of the mental powers marches out to communicate with the external world, and through which a mighty host of influences from the universe without throngs into the capacious courts of the human spirit. It breathes in the air, shouts in the storm, and lifts up its awful voice in the roar of tempestuous seas. By day, it is read in the light poured out upon the earth like a baptism of glory, and by night unrolls its flaming register upon the distant vault of heaven. In a word, the testimony of God afforded by natural revelation is inscribed upon every power of man, and upon every element of external nature.

Supernatural revelation is the testimony of God to supernatural and redemptive truth—concerning himself, man, and the

relations involved. This is furnished in the Scriptures. They discharge a twofold office. In the first place, they republish and confirm the lessons of reason, of the external universe, and of the Covenant of Works as a positive element in the first religion of man as an unfallen being. They bring out afresh and illuminate the testimony of God furnished in natural revelation, but rendered, in great measure, illegible, inaudible, and impotent by the deadening influence of sin. In the second place, they create the knowledge of the scheme of redemption, reveal the original principles of God's moral government under new modifications and altogether singular and distinctive methods of application, and unveil to the gaze of a holy universe, an attribute of the divine nature, which had not previously terminated upon its appropriate objects—the lovely quality of mercy, yearning over the guilty, the wretched, and the lost, and suggesting their recovery from sin and hell through the blood of the eternal Son, and the grace of the eternal Spirit. The gospel, therefore, is not co-extensive with the Scriptures. They are generic; it is specific. So far as the Scriptures reveal redemption for sinners, they are the gospel.

Corresponding to these two kinds of revelation, and to the respective divine testimonies yielded through them, there are two sorts of faith—natural and supernatural. Generally considered, faith, as fundamental and undeveloped, is an aptitude for, and as elicited into act, an assent to, truth upon evidence, and commonly evidence in the form of testimony. Truth is the object, faith the organ, and testimony the ground. Specifically contemplated, natural faith is an aptitude for, or assent to, the truths of natural revelation upon the testimony of God.

Supernatural faith—the product of the regenerating grace of the Holy Ghost—in so far as it is fundamental and regulative, is an undeveloped spiritual power lying at the roots of the renewed nature, and adapted to the reception of the transcendent truths of redemption upon the written testimony of God. In so far as it is brought out into special exercise, it actually receives the truths of the gospel upon God's testimony, and embraces and relies upon the Lord Jesus Christ as the only Saviour of sinners.

Let us now inquire into the functions of these respective sorts of faith in regard to the infinite element in natural and supernatural revelation ; and the apostle Paul shall furnish us a text for the discussion : "He that cometh to God must *believe* that he is."

1. We begin with natural faith. The proposition which I desire to establish is, that there is in the soul a fundamental faith which adapts it to the knowledge of the Infinite Being, and that, when developed through a cognitive experience, it positively affirms his existence. It is in this way we know God as infinite, and not through the processes of the cognitive reason. It has been the common opinion of theologians that the knowledge of God is intuitive. It is not to be understood that they meant, by the use of this language, to affirm that there is any presentative knowledge of him. Intuition, though sometimes employed in that sense, is not in this relation. Had we such a knowledge of God, we could describe him as we do objects upon which we gaze. What they intended was, that man is so constituted that the truth of the divine existence is self-evident—it vouches for itself by its own light. Of course, by such a doctrine, if it be not unmeaning, they designed to teach that there is an intuitive knowledge of an infinite Being. As specimens of theological consent in this matter, I cite a witness from the Reformation period, one from a later age, and two from our own time. Calvin, sometimes, is wont to say that the knowledge of God is implanted in the mind, and at others that it is carved into it. De Moor, in his able and learned Commentary on Marck's Compendium, expressly draws a distinction between the *notitia insita* and the *notitia acquisita*—the implanted and the acquired knowledge of God. Dr. Charles Hodge, by a convincing argument, sustains the position that such knowledge is intuitive ; and Dr. Thornwell, although somewhat guarded in his language, admitted that there is a fundamental faith which necessitates the inference of the Divine existence. And yet it seems strange that, notwithstanding these express admissions, the two last-named illustrious divines were reluctant to concede the impossibility of knowing the Infinite Being through the processes of the cognitive understanding. They criticise the doctrine of the great Scotch phi-

philosopher, that we know the Infinite only by faith, and appear to hold, that by thinking away limitations, and removing imperfections, from our concepts of finite manifestations of the Infinite, we may reach, though only a partial, yet a real and valid, knowledge of it. I must confess that, to my mind, such a process of the cognitive faculty, however indefinitely prosecuted, could only avail to give an ever-enlarging conception of the finite. We know the Infinite Being, as infinite, by faith; we know his finite manifestations by the cognitive faculties.

There are criteria by which the existence of fundamental beliefs may be tested—they are self-evidence, simplicity, and necessity. If a principle is revealed in its own light, if it cannot be resolved into simpler elements, if it must be admitted in a healthful and moral condition of the faculties, it ought to be acknowledged to be primary and fundamental. Universality, though not strictly one of these coördinate criteria, is a fair proof of necessity. Beliefs which we find existing in every partially civilised tribe of men, and expressed in the language of every people possessed of even a moderate degree of cultivation, are proved by that fact to be necessary. Subjected to these tests, the belief in the Infinite, and, I am disposed to think, in an Infinite Being, will be evinced as one of the fundamental faiths of the human mind. It certainly is characterised by simplicity, for it cannot be resolved into anything more ultimate. It will be said that it cannot abide the tests of self-evidence and necessity, in view of the fact, first, that there are some who are ignorant of it; and secondly, that there are some who theoretically deny it. To the first objection it is easy to reply that no acknowledged intuition is developed in the mind of an infant, and that there are tribes of men who, in intellectual culture, are in an infantile condition. The belief in substance is self-evident and necessary, whenever the faculties are developed by education; but there may be an intellectual state so brutish that it is not elicited into exercise. There is a failure, even on the part of some philosophers, to distinguish between the originality and the comparative maturity of a principle. Paley, for example, confounded the maturity and the originality of conscience. It is conceded that a fundamental

faith, like a fundamental law of morality, depends for even its lowest development upon the conditions furnished by experience, and that the degrees of its expansion correspond with the degrees of a regular and normal cultivation of the faculties. It is susceptible of doubt, moreover, whether the cases are not exceedingly few, in which men have been found in so dwarfed a state of the intellectual and moral faculties, as not to possess some belief in the illimitable.

To the second objection—that there are some who theoretically deny the existence of an Infinite Being—it may be answered that the number of such thinkers is just exceptional enough to challenge attention to the general rule. The rash and abnormal expressions of a few men cannot be assumed as at all affecting the consentient faith of the race. It is worthy of notice that when God himself deigns to speak of those who deny his existence, he stigmatises them not so much as criminals, but as fools. The indescribable folly of such a course would appear to transcend its impiety. It is to the credit even of a sinful and infatuated race, that this variety of it, like the mutilated specimens of some animal species, are very limited in number. They may emphatically be regarded as *lusus naturæ*, since in their production nature seems to indulge in a horrible amusement at her own expense; and so, by the hideous caricature of herself, proves that the sin, which has revolutionised her integrity is as besotted as it is devilish.

The whole difficulty, if any there be, is relieved of force by the simple consideration that there is scarcely any self-evident truth which has not had some one to deny it. It would seem as if the ultimate effect of sin would be to craze the reason, and to convert the world into a lunatic asylum.

Having endeavored to prove, positively, that there is a fundamental law of belief which guarantees the Infinite, I pass on to show, negatively, that we can reach the knowledge of the infinite in no other way—that it is not possible for cognition to furnish it. It is the province of the strictly cognitive faculties to perceive, to conceive, to form judgments from concepts, to construct arguments from judgments—to proceed by analysis and synthesis, and

by induction and deduction. It is clear that as each one of these powers is limited to phenomenal properties, the conclusions which they reach must be characterised by a corresponding limitation. There cannot be in the conclusion more than is contained in the premises. Let us test this law of the cognitive processes by a single illustration. Take the notion of substance. How do we know it? What the cognitive faculties give is simply the phenomenal properties. Think away, for example, from this desk all its properties—its dimensions, its configuration, its color, its divisibility, and others which belong to it—and what remains to the apprehension of the cognitive faculties? Nothing. And yet we must postulate the existence of a substance in which these properties inhere, and of which they are the phenomenal manifestations. What we know by cognition is the accidents, what we know by faith is the substance. In like manner think away thought, feeling, desire, volition, moral perceptions from the mind, and what remains to be conceived? Nothing. Still we must demand a substance which is ourselves, to which these qualities belong, and which they express. How do we know it? Not by cognition, but by faith. The knowledge of the substance is as valid as the knowledge of the properties. The explanation of the process would seem to be clear. The cognitive apprehension of the phenomenal manifestations elicits into exercise a hitherto dormant fundamental law of belief; that necessitates the inference from the properties that the substance exists; and that inference is precisely a special act of faith. It is necessary; we cannot avoid it. It is immediate. It differs entirely from the mediate inference of the syllogistic process. There is no enthymeme with a suppressed premise; for there is no suppressed premise to be supplied. We pass, *per saltum*, from the concept of the properties to the existence of the substance. Now what is true of our knowledge of finite substance is, *a fortiori*, true of our knowledge of an infinite substance. Let us take, for instance, the famous cosmological argument. We cognize effects, and effects upon a stupendous scale. We refer them to an adequate first cause. That, however, only gives us a sufficient, not an infinite, cause. The effects are ap-

prehended as finite ; the cause that is postulated need not be more than a vast finite cause. Were the process purely ratiocinative, that would be the result. Limited and conditioned effects, however great, demand no more than a limited and conditioned cause. But this, it will be said, is not a complete account of the argument. We cognize the cosmical effects as changing, fluctuating, contingent; and we refer them to a first cause which is unchanging, unfluctuating, uncontingent—that is, to a necessary Being who has the reason of his existence in himself. But given a necessary Being, and we have an infinite Being. Now, in regard to this procedure, we submit a few remarks: In the first place, it is based, even in its simplest form, upon a fundamental law of belief, namely, the principle which demands a cause for every effect, and a cause sufficient for, and corresponding to, the effects. What, then, is the process? Cognition furnishes the phenomenal effects, and the fundamental law of causality necessitates the inference to the cause. That inference is but a special act of faith. Call it judgment, if you will, but it has no middle. It is immediate and necessary, and therefore ceases to be ratiocinative, and takes on the complexion of faith. In the second place, the inference from contingent effects to a necessary Being as their cause is only legitimated by a similar fundamental law of belief. The mere process of cognition would never conduct us to it. In the third place, it is possible to doubt whether the affirmation of a necessary Being is tantamount to the affirmation of an infinite Being. It may be conceivable that a Being might have the reason of his existence in himself, and yet not contain all that is strictly demanded by the notion of the Infinite. But granted that such a result follows from the attainment of a necessary first cause, and still it is urged that the knowledge of that Being is the product, not of the conceiving and reasoning process, but of an act of faith enforced by a fundamental and regulative law of belief. Why not admit that there is a primary and intuitive faith, which is at once an aptitude and a guarantee for the knowledge of the Infinite? I have already attempted to show that there exists such a fundamental principle, which will stand

the test of criteria by which the existence of such primitive laws are determined.

Let us then start with that assumption, and indicate the steps of the process by which an actual knowledge of the Infinite Being is reached. Let it be observed that there is not here even an oblique squinting to the theory of the Absolutist philosophers—that we immediately know the Infinite Being as the result of this law of belief. Were that possible, what could we know? Nothing but the Infinite itself, without the qualification of a single attribute. Properties are given only by the cognitive faculties. They cannot, therefore, be overslaughed in the effort to answer the question, What God is, as well as the question, Does God exist? Hence it is no marvel that Cousin, who contended that the mere possession of the belief in the Infinite necessitates the immediate knowledge of the Infinite God, denied his personality, and made the human reason itself impersonal. It is true that the term Infinite, unless it symbolises nothing, and language in its most solemn and impressive form be only an imposture practised upon our faculties by themselves or by some malignant spirit, implies the existence of a corresponding reality. But that determines nothing in reference to the mode by which the knowledge so represented is ultimately attained. What is that mode?

Our cognitive faculties give us the phenomena of our own being and those of the external world. We perceive them as effects, and effects upon a vast, an universal scale. The fundamental belief in the Infinite, elicited into exercise by these conditions of a cognitive experience, induces the inference, in the form of a special act of faith, not only of a first cause, but of an infinite first cause. We cognize the moral phenomena of our minds; we infer a moral lawgiver and ruler. This conducts us, however, only to one who has knowledge and power sufficient to enable him to govern the universe. The fundamental belief in the Infinite leads to the inference, by a special faith, in the infinity of the moral Ruler. We are conscious of the sense of dependence, and of religious tastes and emotions which infer a Being of vast knowledge and power, and of beauty, loveliness, and glory as the object of worship. But we have not reached the Infinite.

That is given by faith. We know the Infinite Creator, Governor, and Object of worship as infinite, not by cognition, but by faith.

To be more particular: for it is special cases which are the tests of theories. How do we acquire the knowledge of infinite attributes? Let us take the instance of power. We cognize effects, which we are constrained to refer to power as their cause. That reference is itself necessitated by a fundamental belief. But finite effects can only give us finite power. I do not deny that we have a real and valid cognitive knowledge of the finite manifestations of infinite power, just as we have the knowledge of our own power and of the forces of nature, in their lower degrees of exercise, as well as their higher. But still we have only reached limited power. We then, by the cognitive faculty, endeavor to think away all limitations, and to attain in thought to an unlimited and illimitable power. We fail; for conception cannot grasp the Infinite. Here faith comes in, and projects the highest concept of finite power into the region of the infinite. Without the condition afforded by the cognitive apprehension, faith would sleep; without faith roused into activity by that condition, cognition would stop infinitely short of the Infinite.

Indulge a figure for a moment. Faith and Cognition—twin powers—go forth together to the examination of phenomena, of effects and properties; and at first Faith leans upon the arm of her sister. Cognition perceives the phenomenal, then rises concept by concept, and removes imperfection after imperfection, in her endeavor to reach the Infinite. Foiled in her attempt, she sinks in her final effort, breathless and exhausted, on the hither side of the chasm, which opens up between the highest concept of the finite and the Infinite God. “Art tired, sister?” says Faith; “rest thou here, until I essay the passage of this gulf.” Then stretching her hitherto folded wings, and planting her feet on the last standing ground of Cognition, as her point of departure, she flies across the ocean impassable to her feebler sister, home to the bosom of the Infinite Being. She sees the invisible God, hears his inaudible voice, and, by a mysterious and inexplicable power, apprehends his infinitude. Then returning, she furnishes her grand knowledge to Cognition, and ever after

the form of the Infinite, so to speak, is imposed upon the processes of finite thought. Thenceforward, Faith and Cognition unite their forces, and reason together concerning the infinite, as though it had been an original datum of the cognitive intelligence. The same line of argument might be pursued in regard to the other attributes—wisdom, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. By cognition, we validly apprehend them in their finite manifestations. This gives us, so to speak, their quality, under the imperfect but real analogies presented by the properties of our own being. By faith we know them as infinite. And then the irresistible inference is to the existence of an Infinite substance, of which they are the wholly singular and peculiar properties. It deserves to be remarked, that in this account of the mode by which we reach the notion of the Infinite, I have described the reflective rather than the spontaneous process. So much for the office of natural faith in conducting us, upon the evidence furnished by natural revelation, to the knowledge of an Infinite God.

2. The limits of this discourse will allow only a brief reference to the distinctive influence of supernatural faith in regard to the knowledge of the Infinite. And, indeed, it is not necessary to prosecute in detail that branch of the inquiry, for the reason that what has been said of the office of natural faith may, by an easy change of the terms and relations involved, be applied to that which is supernatural. The latter kind of faith reaffirms all that the former declares, and, in addition, discharges a characteristic office in receiving all that the written Word and the Spirit reveal of the infinite perfections of God, under the transcendent relations of Redemption. The apostle Paul tells us that “through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, so that things which are seen were not made of things which do appear;” and that “he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of such as diligently seek him.” In these remarkable words we are taught that there are truths which, though they lie beyond the range of the cognitive faculties, are known by faith. The existence of God, the creation of the worlds out of nothing, the infinite moral

government of the Divine Ruler, and his infinite perfections as the supreme object of worship, are all among the *cognita* of faith. Our blessed Saviour also teaches that this super-cognitive power belongs to faith. "This," says he, "is eternal life, that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." Thus to know God, is to know him as infinite, for only an infinite is the true God; and thus to know Jesus Christ, is to know him as an infinitely sufficient and merciful Redeemer. A knowledge of the Infinite, Paul expressly assigns to faith, and that of which our Saviour speaks is of course attributable alone to the same exalted principle. This ought to settle the question of the cognoscibility of God by faith; and, I humbly conceive, does confirm what I have claimed for the office of faith in furnishing the infinite element in our knowledge. It is said, however, that faith is a spiritual cognition. In a sense, this is true. When the believer cognizes the facts of revelation which are level to the apprehension of the unbeliever, he knows them after a spiritual fashion which is impossible to the latter. But there are other elements which not even the renewed cognitive powers, strictly speaking, are competent to understand. It is a supernatural faith, as distinguished from cognition, and it alone, which apprehends the infinite perfections of a Redeeming God, and the transcendent, the inconceivable facts and relations and ends of the glorious scheme of redemption.

It only remains to gather up the results of this discussion, and show their bearing upon the question with which we began—whether the fact that theology involves an infinite element bars its claims to be regarded as a science. It is necessary, in making this final statement, to pause a moment in order to anticipate and, if possible, obviate a confusion of thought which is apt to arise in regard to this subject. It is urged that as science proceeds by definition, the infinite cannot be made an element of it, because to define it is to limit it, and that involves a contradiction. The difficulty is removed by noting the distinction between logical definition and limitation as to extent. To illustrate: Unless we take the ground of the Pantheist, we must distinguish the divine substance from all created substances. He is not they,

and they are not he. We define, but we do not limit the divine essence as to extent. It is immense, and contains the sum of all being, but it is different from finite essences. Further: We distinguish between the divine attributes. Justice, for example, is not mercy. We define, but we do not limit these attributes as to extent. They coexist as equally infinite, but they are both really and logically distinguishable. We are forced to do this not only in theological statement, but in ordinary preaching. There is a sense, therefore, in which we are obliged to define the infinite, but in which we by no means limit it as to extent. There is, then, no contradiction emerging on this score from the introduction of the infinite into the scientific procedure of theology. A distinction must also be taken between different sorts of knowledge of the Infinite Being. It is one thing to say that by faith we know the fact of God's existence, and quite another that we know the *how* of his existence—we know that his essence is, but not how it is. The latter we cannot know, for we are not God; but the former we not only may but do know. It is known as revealed to faith. It is susceptible of affirmation and negation—may be made a term of human judgments. In like manner, a divine attribute cannot be perfectly comprehended by us, but it may be known as an infinite perfection by faith; and as known may be made the subject or the predicate of a proposition. Cognition may furnish one term and faith the other, and yet the proposition be valid. For example, we are entitled to make the affirmation: the justice of God is infinite. Cognition gives justice, a particular kind of perfection, as the subject, and faith gives the term *infinite* as predicable of justice. Here, then, we have an infinite element as a valid constituent of a premise, and as other premises may be constructed in the same way, legitimate conclusions may be drawn. But if we may reason about the infinite and from the infinite, it is manifest that it may constitute a valid element in human science, under the limitations, however, which have been pointed out. To all this it may be objected that it involves a mere juggle of words—that the term infinite is a symbol of nothing real and positive, but represents only a bald negation. We deceive ourselves by the “fatal im-

posture" of words. Then, if that be so, an infinite God means nothing, and infinite guilt means nothing, and infinite mercy means nothing, and nothing an infinite Saviour and an infinite salvation. They are mere negative conceptions; at best but protests in thought against the absolute restrictions implied in positive affirmations of the cognitive reason. No doubt it would be pleasant to some to get quit of an eternal hell as a mere negative concept, a grim play upon words; and *that*, it is likely, is the end sought by the objection; but we insist on an infinite Redemption and an eternal heaven as something more than a mere charlatantry, a petty quackery, of terms. It deserves to be carefully considered by those who either deny the knowledge of the Infinite altogether, or affirm what is impossible and must have a terrible recoil—that mere cognition can furnish us that knowledge, what a practical sweep these positions imply. They threaten the foundations of both natural and supernatural religion. But if we are made to know God, and not to know him as infinite is not properly to know him at all; if he has laid deep in the very ground-forms of the human soul a fundamental faith adapting us to that knowledge; if he has so constructed our powers as by the very virtue of their energies to conduct us to it, and if he has been pleased more fully and explicitly to reveal it to us in his written Word—what hinders that, in the employment of our reasoning powers, which were made with an adaptation to order and system, we should attempt to arrange and digest that knowledge into a theoretical and practical science of religion? If the term *infinite* has no corresponding reality, it is of course admitted that there can be no science which involves an infinite element, but it also follows that there can be to us no God. But if the knowledge of the infinite Being and his infinite perfections be a real and not a delusive human knowledge, it may, under proper restrictions, be made the subject of scientific treatment, both inductive and deductive. Not only does the theologian act upon this assumption, but every preacher of the gospel proceeds upon it. He reasons concerning the Infinite inductively when, for example, by a collation of infinite titles and attributes and works, he establishes the divinity of Christ or the Holy Spirit.

He reasons concerning it deductively, whenever, in reply to the difficulty of the sinner that his sins are infinitely great and deserve infinite reprobation, he infers the possibility of his pardon from the infinite mercy of God, from an infinite atonement, and from the infinite ability and willingness of Jesus Christ to save. It is obvious that there is a sense in which the Infinite not only may, but does and must enter into the reasoning processes of the human mind. That being conceded, the possibility of a science of theology is granted. Soberly and reverently to reason about God is not to dishonor him; not to do it is to degrade ourselves.

This is the science of sciences which the theological instructor is called to teach. It deals with the high problems of the infinite, the unchangeable, the eternal, as well as with questions adjusted to the measures of the finite intelligence. It lays under tribute every other science, subordinates its lessons to its supreme religious end, and, recapitulating the resources of all into its own grand unity, it offers the collected results in adoring worship before the altar of God. Exploring three worlds in the scope of its mighty induction, examining by its analysis the doctrines of Natural Religion, and the sublimer principles of Redemption, it employs its comprehensive synthesis in the construction of a system which refuses to be a cold and formal digest, and rises, step by step, into an immortal epic, moving to the passionate notes of a triumphal anthem, and pouring its rich and thrilling doxologies into the ear of the Triune God. Not confined within temporal limits, death will lay no arrest upon its quest of truth, but translated with the glorified Church into the eternal sphere, it will develop its principles through the everlasting ages. The infinite perfections of God will be its text-book, Redemption its transcendent theme, Heaven its seminary, and Eternity its time of study.

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ARTICLE IV.

THE SENSUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CONSIDERED.

The Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century Considered. By ROBERT L. DABNEY, D. D., LL. D., *Professor in Divinity in the Union Theological Seminary of the Presbyterian Church of the South, Prince Edward, Va.* 369 pp., 12 mo. Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., 770 Broadway, N. Y.

We have here a work on Philosophy from the pen of a divine. What is the significance of this? Nothing; only that it affords an opportunity for levelling a criticism against a species of cant, which affects to exclude this class from the domain both of philosophy and science by remanding them to the province of faith alone. Emancipation from all authority is claimed as the necessary prerequisite for the investigation of truth, which these "slaves to a book" cannot profess, who are bound by their vows to receive its dogmas, as it is said, "*obedientia fracti animi.*" Truths which are wholly transcendental in their nature it may be proper to receive upon the authority of a divine revelation, and within this sphere the theologian must be rigidly confined. If he attempts to cross the line which separates faith from knowledge, he is a trespasser who is guilty of poaching upon a territory strictly forbidden to him. It is quietly assumed that the acceptance of any truth upon any authority whatsoever is in so far an abdication of the reason, which works the forfeiture to employ it in the fields where its excursions are legitimate. It is claimed that the habit of mind induced by the practice of faith disables from bold and independent investigation. A feebleness of intellect ensues, which renders it impotent to trust in its own deductions; whilst the fearlessness is wanting which is so necessary to the explorer who would push his adventures into the regions of the mysterious and unknown. There can be no free movement, it is alleged, in the mind which is shackled with any antecedent beliefs, and which is weakened by compulsory deference to an external and supreme authority. And so the theolo-

gian is incontinently warned away from the field of speculative inquiry, and told to be satisfied with the communion of ghosts and spectres which may peer out from the mist and cloud above him.

Considering, however, the immense contributions to human knowledge in every department which have been made by this proscribed class, and considering the fact that in every age they have been the teachers of the race, instructing it in the art of thinking itself, the eye cannot help twinkling a little at the grotesque humorousness of these allegations. The feeling of merriment displaces that of resentment. Even the milder sentiment of pity is extinguished in the mere fun of the thing. Serious men as theologians are, perhaps, from the very gravity of their calling they more richly appreciate a joke; and the relaxation experienced from this is more than an offset to the insult which is intended.

But to deal seriously with this jest for a moment. It would not be difficult to show that the parties who lie under this interdiction possess qualifications and enjoy advantages which singularly fit them for these special investigations. And if they are subject to bias of any sort, or to peculiar mental temptations, this is no more true of them than of other men; whilst the danger of error lies upon the side of caution and safety to a most extraordinary degree. For example, the theologian is brought under the most solemn and recognised obligation to embrace truth whenever it shall be demonstrated as such. The kingdom to which he belongs is the kingdom of the truth; the Master whom he serves declares: "To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world, that I should bear witness unto the truth;" and the truth is the only weapon which he is commissioned to wield. We are far from denying to other men that "honesty of reason" which leads them to follow truth for the truth's own sake, and by whatever path she may conduct them. On the contrary, nothing is more cheerfully conceded than that the influence of true philosophy and of correct science is to purge the mind of prejudice and passion; and to make the truth, pure and simple, the loadstone by which its movements are secretly di-

rected. But what we signalise here is, that, in addition to this, theologians are under a public vow which consecrates them to the maintenance of truth; that under a sacramental oath they are bound in loyalty to her throne; that they are anointed as a priesthood to minister at her altar. It would be an unreasoning prejudice that would deny them an equal share in that natural candor which other men claim as an attribute for themselves; whilst they are professionally bound to search for truth wherever she may lie concealed, and to transmute it into the worship which their office compels them always to render. It must not be overlooked that, in their own sphere, they have been called to combat prejudice of the strongest kind, and to overcome the stout resistance of the carnal heart to the authority of God. They have passed through a moral training which has taught them to hold a solemn watch over themselves, and to check every movement of insubordination against the supremacy of truth.

Passing over this initial consideration, the theologian has a manifest advantage, with a mind at rest upon all subjects which transcend the power of reason, in being at leisure to prosecute the search into those things which reason is able to disclose. The history of human thought teaches nothing more clearly than that the subjects of most enduring interest are those which relate to the soul and to God. If we go back to the earliest period, we find the speculative genius of antiquity wasting its strength upon these identical topics, which reason is utterly incompetent to explain. Yet so supreme is the relation in which they stand to man, that, until they were determined, human thought revolved around this moral and religious pole. What God is—whether a personal being outside of and distinct from nature, or only the *anima mundi*, the hidden spring of all its energies and processes; whether matter be eternal, what are its constituent elements, and how it comes to be cast into so many changeful forms; what the soul is—whether distinct from the divine essence, or only the most ethereal manifestation of matter; whether it be immortal, and how it survives the dissolution of the body; whether it will preserve an individual subsistence, or be absorbed into the substance of the Deity—such were some of the themes of absorb-

ing interest intermingled with their physical inquiries; and so they toiled on weaving their cosmogonies, which, like Penelope's web, were doomed to be as laboriously unravelled. All these points are, however, settled for the theologian by a divine testimony. The mind is released from inquiries which reason cannot resolve, to reap the knowledge which philosophy and science shall discover. With their systems of theology and morality constructed, they can turn to nature and gather her responses from a thousand oracles.

It is idle to declaim against this. Just in so far as modern speculation undertakes to settle these points it encounters the same obstacles, walks in the same circuit, and lands in the same confusion with the old. And just in so far as modern Atheism attempts to disown and to deny them will the obstinate spectres refuse to down at its bidding, but reappear to haunt the conscience and alarm the fears of mankind. The Schismatics who rend the fair body of truth, by the effort to put reason in antagonism to faith and science against revelation, would do well to remember the historical date of the inductive method which has wrought such reform in the systems of philosophy; that Wiclif and Huss and Jerome were forerunners of Copernicus and Galileo and Tycho Brahe; that Luther shattered the idols of the Church before another iconoclast arose and smote the idols in the temple of science; and that Tindal's translation of the English Bible preceded, by nearly one hundred years, the publication of the *Novum Organon*. If any fact is established beyond dispute, it is that the world had no system of philosophy or science, nor was the path of discovery rightly opened in either, until the Bible was brought forth from its concealment and shed its benign influence upon the human intellect. This authenticated fact, that the restoration of the Scriptures to their lawful supremacy antedated the rise of true philosophy, refutes the slander that the two are irreconcilably at feud.

The mental discipline, too, of the theologian preëminently fits him for the researches of reason. It would be pertinent here to observe that the inductive method which builds up a true science is precisely the method for building up a true theology. Just as

the materials of the one are scattered in magnificent disorder through the fields of nature, so the materials of the other lie undigested and fragmentary upon the pages of Revelation. The same patience, diligence, and caution, are required in collating the facts in both, and in the construction of the system founded upon them. In both alike man is but an interpreter to decipher the record, and to read the lessons of truth written alike on the page of Nature and on the page of Scripture—the two Testaments in which God is revealed to man. The same faculties of mind are brought into play; and in the study of theology these are sharpened to their finest edge. The most refined distinctions require to be drawn; shades of thought need to be carefully separated; the most anxious sifting of testimony is demanded, and the closest examination of its meaning and force; a constant verification of their conclusions must be made by reference to the facts and principles from which they spring. This is precisely the intellectual discipline by which men are trained to prosecute successfully the researches of science; and the due consideration of this diminishes the wonder that divines are so eminently successful who happen to turn their attention to physical studies.

So far as philosophy is concerned, there is no occasion for surprise, since the two departments are not so much conterminous, as that theology implicates philosophy through and through, and raises most of the questions which the latter seeks to answer. It is simply impossible for one to be a complete theologian, without being in almost an equal degree a logician and a metaphysician. A fair preacher a man may be, simply delivering to others the message of grace which he finds in the word; but he cannot compass the science of theology and soteriology, without an acquaintance with the very truths which fill the speculations of every philosophic school.

But we find ourselves pushing into large discourse what was intended only as an allusion, which should gracefully introduce the author and the book whose names are prefixed to this article. We shall seek to make amends for our indiscretion by not making the work under review a mere hook upon which to hang an

independent disquisition; but, by a faithful rendering of its text, to excite the reader's desire to possess and master the volume for himself. In executing our task, we shall adhere to our author's forms of expression even where this is not indicated by marks of quotation. The necessity of the case will compel us often to roll up the language, and to run sentences together.

A genuine book bears always the "image and superscription" of the author; it is, in the language of Milton, "the pure extraction of the living intellect that breeds it;" and Dr. Dabney is just the last of men to fail to put the stamp of his own individuality upon his writings. All who are familiar with his mental attributes will find them breaking forth from every line and every page. In this age of mechanical authorship, where the water is simply emptied out of one bucket into another, it is no slight pleasure to get hold of a book that comes to us with thoughts directly from the mint in which they were coined. All of this author's characteristics are here. That wonderful subtlety of mind which penetrates to the core of a subject, and distinguishes between the nicest refinements of thought; that incisiveness of expression which cuts the thought so clean, even to its furthest edge; that firmness of grasp and positiveness of tone which belong only to those of the strongest convictions; that honesty of mind which leads to the embrace of what is held to be the truth, and a corresponding fearlessness in its defence; and that glow of indignation against the wickedness and impudence of error: all these make the book the impression of the man who wrote it. We think it was Adam Smith of whom the incident is told, that when a certain indifferentist, who always extenuated error, left the room, he exclaimed: "I breathe more freely now that he is gone; he has no indignation in him." Dr. Dabney is not constituted to be one of these neutrals. What he believes he believes thoroughly; and his blows against falsehood and wrong go out straight from the shoulder. In the work before us his indignation only warms against what would stir any honest heart; and the reader easily surrenders himself in sympathy with the burning invective levelled against those who subvert the foundations of order and virtue in the world.

As may be inferred from the title, the volume is throughout strictly a criticism. We do not mean by this that it is negative in its character, destructive rather than constructive. The author is of too positive a build to be content with the work of demolition. And one of the most valuable portions of his treatise is where he sets over against the system he destroys that which must occupy its room. But the leading design is a complete exposure and refutation of the sensational, or, as he prefers to term it, the sensualistic philosophy of the day. This is done with a thoroughness which makes the book a real contribution to our philosophical literature. Its range is so entire over the subject in its historical developments and connections that even those antecedently familiar with it are refreshed by the conspectus of it as a whole, whilst the discussion of the several parts is sufficiently full to leave the tyro under the necessity only here and there of resorting to the larger commentaries to supply the exposition which to him may be occasionally too brief.

The first difficulty in philosophical writing arises from the ambiguity of the terms which are of necessity employed. To invent a vocabulary which shall be exclusively its own would be to create a cipher wholly unintelligible, save to the initiated. The only resort is to take up the language in common use, which must, however, be transfigured from the popular into a technical and scientific sense. It must begin with the definition of its terminology; and the reader is thrown into inextricable confusion who fails to adhere rigidly to the same. In his opening sentence, therefore, our author is called to disclaim the popular signification of the word "sensualistic," as meaning simply "the predominance of the animal appetites," and to define it as "the philosophy which finds all its rudiments in sensation," which "accounts for every general and every abstract judgment, as an empirical result of our sensations, and consistently denies the validity of any *a priori* ideas." The distinction is one readily apprehended, and cuts the line of demarcation very distinctly between itself and every other system. We do not know why the more usual title of "sensational" is discarded for "sensualistic" throughout this volume. We would prefer the former,

perhaps because it is more familiar to our ear. But both are equally equivocal, and needing to be purged of their ordinary meaning. When strictly defined, either will subserve the purposes of disquisition.

Although it is the Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century which is to be brought under review, it eminently subserves our author's purpose to introduce this by a brief survey of the speculations of the preceding age. Most fortunately, the first writer who is struck is the author of "the Leviathan," whose reckless spirit did not hesitate to push his system to its necessary conclusions; thus "anticipating," says Dr. Dabney, "all the fruit which history has subsequently shown the system is fitted to bear." With Hobbes, "sensations are the principles of knowledge, and all knowledge is derived from them. Thus memory consists in our having a sensation that we have had a sensation. Imagination is a sensation which continues with feebler force, after its cause has ceased to act: * * * and all the acts of generalizing, naming our ideas, comparing, and reasoning, are but associations of these sense-perceptions." The next step, of course, is to "generate the emotional and voluntary powers of the soul." "Conceptions are only certain movements excited in a substance within the head. This movement is propagated also to the heart, and either concurs with or retards the vital movement there. This concurrence we call pleasure; this retardation we call pain. * * * Love and hatred are only these feelings of concurrence or retardation again, relatively to their objects. * * This concurrence draws towards its object, which is desire, and the opposite retardation repels, which is aversion and sometimes fear. The oscillation between these is deliberation; and the last desire or fear in this series of oscillations, being the most vivid, becomes volition. Of course, there can be no liberty of the human spirit, which is the passive victim of any objective impression ordained for it by fate or a mechanical necessity."

The scheme of ethics, evolving itself from these principles, can be easily anticipated. That is good which pleases us, and

that is evil which displeases ; "there exists no goodness, absolutely considered, without relation ; there is no uniform standard of moral right, no moral motive except selfishness, and conscience is as thoroughly obliterated as the existence of the fairies." The political theory of Hobbes is determined by the same principles. Self-interest being the only motive of rational conduct, the conflict which this brings on betwixt man and man makes his natural state one of constant warfare, until, enlightened by experience, he discovers the necessity for repressing this strife, which upon this theory can be accomplished only by force. This then becomes the essence of government, which must be absolutely despotic.

Such is the line upon which this philosophy was first projected, from which it has not materially deflected, though the refinements of later thinkers have made the system a marvel of ingenuity—as curious a specimen of metaphysical joinery as perhaps the history of Philosophy can show.

Dr. Dabney thus sums up its conclusions, as these are delivered over by the philosopher of Malmesbury to his successors : "In consistency, it must include a denial of spirit, of God, of all *a priori* judgments, of the reason and abstract ideas, of all moral distinctions, of free agency, and of civil liberty. It leaves man, in reality, only sense-perceptions, appetites, and associations thereof, presenting them in apparent modifications of memory and experience." "The sole plausibility," he adds, "of Hobbes' description of human nature arises from his tacitly assuming the fact of *man's depravity* to construct a sort of *saturnine travesty* of his practical principles and actions."

In the order of time, Mr. Locke falls next under review ; under the cover of whose fundamental mistake philosophical heresies find shelter, which he himself would have openly repudiated. "The fatal vice of his method," according to our author, "was that he started with a hypothesis as to the origin of the cognitions of which he found the mind possessed, instead of reaching these as the final induction from the facts of consciousness." He argued from the faculties we possess for acquiring ideas against the supposition that we have any which are innate ;

and pushed this conclusion, which is recognised to be sound, so far as to exclude with them any innate principles of cognition, a proposition which the reader perceives to be very distinct from the first. In Mr. Locke's system, the two sources of all the operations of the mind are *experience* and *reflection*. But experience means only that which is given through the senses, and the reflective process is only the mind's operation upon this objective experience. At last we have only what was originally derived from sensation. Dr. Dabney points out most clearly the pervading fallacy here, in the utter confounding the *occasion* with the *cause* of our ideas. It may be true that experience gives the opportunity for the mind's putting forth its powers of cognition, while it neither bestows these capacities nor establishes the laws under which they act. This distinction is one of the key-notes of this criticism, at the sounding of which the spectral apparitions of this false philosophy are compelled often to retreat. It is scarcely necessary to follow the remorseless logic which proceeds to show the fatal consequences of these assumptions in destroying the value of that *a posteriori* argument for the existence of God which Mr. Locke so highly valued, but which, on his principles, Dr. Dabney most triumphantly proves can yield us nothing beyond a Demiurgus; and in upsetting his moral theory, as grounded only upon law to which obedience is rendered from fear of the penalty and a hope of advantage. We entirely concur in the remark with which Dr. Dabney dismisses Mr. Locke—that "the havoc which this sensualistic philosophy makes in the foundation of ethics presents one of the most crushing refutations." Those speculations cannot be true which lead to the subversion of all rectitude, and mislead the race as to the highest functions of their nature.

The French Condillac pushes these doctrines to their extreme in assuming that every process of the soul is reducible to one single principle, and that is sensation. The metaphysical jugglery by which this is accomplished is curious to contemplate. If the mind has but one sensation, or one that dominates over others which fade out, there is *attention*. If the sensation belongs to the past, there is *memory*. Wherever there is a double

sensation, we have *comparison*, and with this *judgment*. The attention is carried from one object to another in considering their qualities; this is *reflection*. *Abstraction* is only the attention directed to a single quality of an object, disregarding the rest. *Reasoning* is only a double judgment; *imagination* is only reflection combining images. Everything, in short, is generated from sensible impressions, and the magical term of "transformed sensations" explains the entire process. For the faculties of the will are produced in the same way with those of the understanding. Every sensation is pleasant or otherwise. This transforms itself into *desire*; and from the modifications of this proceed the passions, such as love and hatred, hope, fear and joy; while *volition* itself is only an absolute desire for what we think within our power.

It is unnecessary to follow the system in its ethical exposition, for, resting upon precisely the same basis with the preceding, we should only repeat the same statement of its necessary consequences.

The transparent fallacy of this whole scheme is exposed by our author when he shows that "in the obstinate and blind resolve to generate everything in man's soul out of simple sensation, the analyst practically leaves out the soul itself." "If *feeling* is the one original power of man's soul, how is a system of cognition to be built upon it?" The scheme "leaves out that rational consciousness which is essential in order to sense-perception." "That which makes all the difference between impression and perception is the intelligent *Ego*; if the subject of the sensation has not *seen* it in his rational consciousness, it has not been a sensation, but a mere organic vibration, a function simply animal and unintelligent." This critical discrimination Dr. Dabney then applies to the several parts of Condillac's theory, showing its entire falsehood in detail. The limited space allowed to us in these pages forbids that we shall follow him in this minute analysis, which is pursued with an exhaustive thoroughness that suffers not a shred of the entire fabric to remain. For the same reason we must pass over the searching exposure of the gross Helvetius, who sought under the sanction of this

philosophy to canonize vice itself, as well as St. Lambert, who, without amending these principles, covered them under euphemisms that somewhat veiled their indecency. The most impressive commentary upon the moral results of such teaching is found in the horrors of the French Revolution, the leading agents in which were as thoroughly imbued with its spirit as they had completely embraced its doctrines.

The book deepens in interest as it takes up the more modern speculations of this school of philosophy. The chapter which is devoted to the criticism of the two Mills, father and son, the reader will confess exceedingly difficult of condensation in the few paragraphs in which we are compelled to dispose of it. The elder Mill "undertakes to construct a complete science of the human mind and will of two elements—*sensation* and *association*." It is in the use of the latter that we are to find the distinguishing characteristic of his system; since "by means of this, we shall see him create every primitive judgment, every *a priori* idea, every rational and intellective faculty, and all the powers of the will." The two ties of association are previous coexistence and succession; for sensations are in the mind synchronously or successively, and the ideas which are only "the copies of sensations" must follow the same order. We shall discover the reason for this when it is applied to the exclusion of all *a priori* ideas and powers. Evidently, in long trains of associated ideas, some will be less vivid to the mind and finally drop out of the view. Originally necessary as links in the chain, the mind, in abridging its processes of association, forgets them and comes at length to err as to the real source of some of its conceptions, which has given occasion for inventing *a priori* principles in order to explain them, but which, as abhorrent to this system, are after this fashion accounted for. Then as the two classes of association are always either synchronous or successive, the association comes to appear necessary, which is the explanation of what in other schools are termed necessary beliefs.

The dialectic skill with which the subjective power of the mind itself is evaded is seen in the definition which is given of *conception*. As an idea is only the "copy or trace of a sensa-

tion," so a conception is only the taking up several simple ideas into a complex, which is only the return of a train of associated ideas. When we think a horse, for example, it is not the real concrete animal, as we imagine from inseparable association, but only the ideas clustered together of color, figure, size, &c. In the same way all the powers of the mind are resolved into this one principle of association. The imagination is denied all creative or constructive power. An image is simply a train of associated ideas, and all modification of structure in the imagination is due simply to the fading out of some of the links in the association itself. So classification, and abstraction, and memory, are only instances of association more or less complex. Belief is only inseparable association, and what are called "necessary beliefs" are simply judgments of invariability in the associations experienced. Our idea of duration is the result of an observed succession in our own consciousness, and the relation of past, present, and future arises by association. Space is but the idea of extension, emptied by abstraction of the feeling of resistance. The infinite is only the indefinite; the cause is nothing more than the immediate invariable antecedent; and what we call power in the cause is only an expression of our inability to separate in thought what by constant recurrence have always been presented together. Our belief in our own identity is the result of experienced impressions indissolubly associated. The most astounding fact of all, however, is the theory which is propounded of the will. As muscular movements are often produced automatically by sensation, as in sneezing or involuntary winking, and as ideas are only copies of sensation, so all voluntary movement must be referred to these in the form of *motives*; and "every case of volition, however conscious, is regarded by Mill as virtually automatic, save that the idea which immediately moves the muscles is also known in consciousness." Such, says Dr. Dabney, is "the stark fatalism which would reduce man's free agency to a cheating illusion."

The younger Mill, though recoiling from the hardy consistency of the elder, in not venturing to construct generalisations without comparison, or memory without judgment of self-identity

prior to it, retained nevertheless the fundamental errors of his father's system. They both agreed in regarding causation as nothing more than constant, immediate sequence, in denying any intuitive judgment as axiomatic, and in recognising no truths save as they are empirically established. The exposition of the several points of their common system our author accompanies with strictures which reveal an exquisite subtlety of mind and the power of cleaving betwixt the nicest shades of thought. Without any attempt at reproducing all this, for which the reader must be referred to the book itself, we will simply indicate the line of his criticism. In the first place, he shows the absurdity of attempting to construct the *powers* of the mind out of a single accident qualifying it. For "if there be this law of habit called association, there must be powers that shall operate under it. As in physics, a force must exist in order to be the subject of any regular method, so in psychology, the faculty must be given in order to come under this habit of association." In the next place, he undermines the corner-stone on which this philosophy rests by showing the doctrine of inseparable association to be baseless. On the contrary, the most inseparable association will arise out of a single instance, without frequent concurrence of the same ideas; whilst, on the other hand, ideas are easily separated which have always been connected, as when one living in the tropics first is made acquainted with the phenomenon of ice. The inference is unavoidable that something deeper than association must exist to explain these facts. In the third place, he shows the tendency of these speculations to Nihilism as their last result. We quote our author: "The mind, says Mill, is entitled to no cognitions save those which come from sensation. Hence, we may admit objective properties, but not objective substances. We are conscious of impressions and ideas which are copies thereof; but we are not directly conscious of spirit. Therefore, we must define our sentient being as 'composed of points of consciousness;' and what the world calls objective matter, as only 'a permanent possibility of sensation.' Thus mind and matter both vanish into two trains of impressions." Even this is not all. "If consciousness tells us that we cannot know

real substance apart from its properties, she tells us as absolutely that we cannot know properties, save as the properties of a *subjectum*. So that if our cognition of subject is invalid, a valid cognition of properties is also impossible. Where, then, are we left? Without either real object, or real subject, or any real cognition, on the dreary coast of that ocean of *Nihilism* to which the idealism of Hegel passed, and in which the empirical philosophy of Hume perished in the blank of universal scepticism."

Then fourthly, Dr. Dabney proceeds to show that, upon this theory, knowledge would be impossible. "In reducing mental affections and consciousness to feeling, intelligence is impossible." Nay, further, "there can be no sense-perceptions, no ideas." "It is only as consciousness refers the impression to self, intelligent subject, that idea arises." But let this suffice, as illustrative merely of the dialectic skill with which this critic hunts a philosophic heresy out of its most secret hiding-places.

It is apparent that we must pass over the intervening chapters until we reach the writer's analysis of the evolution theory, which was to us the freshest part of the book. The popular treatises of the day have put the intelligent reader in sufficient possession of this theory. But we have nowhere seen the several steps of its development so clearly traced, nor so compactly grouped, nor the relation so distinctly revealed, which this form of scientific research sustains to the sensational philosophy of which it is born. Let us trace these connections a little, under the guidance of our author. "The heart of the evolution theory," says he, "is that *the series contains within itself a natural power of differentiating its effects, at least slightly.*" Under this principle, the old law, of like producing like, is modified. Thus the leading postulates are "the law of *Heredity*, by which the progeny reproduces all the essential points of the parents, whether originally generic or newly developed; the law of *variation*, by which such differences in individuals accumulate until they give rise to a distinct variety; and the law of *equilibrium* in nature, whereby the individuals and species best adapted to existing conditions survive, and the less fitted perish." These principles

are summed up in the terms, "natural selection" and "survival of the fittest." That is to say, "in the reproduction of likes by likes, there would be a slight differentiation of successors from predecessors, in any series of animated nature. This difference at one step might be almost infinitesimal, might result in nothing permanent through a myriad of instances, and only evolve something stable in the species, in advance of its prior points, in the ten thousandth case. Yet if we postulate a time sufficiently vast during which the law has been working, the result may at length be the evolution of the highest from the lowest form of animal life." By this theory, it is declared, the teleological argument for an intelligent Creator drawn from the contrivances in the organised world, is totally exploded.

The first advocates of this theory were not avowed Atheists. The author of "The Vestiges of Creation," for example, "professed to recognise a Creator, and the evidence of his final causes, as fully as the theologian, and taught that the powers of evolution in organised beings were originally infused by him, and intelligently directed to evolve the creatures designed." And even Dr. Darwin "supposes that we shall have to look to a Creator to give us the animated germ to start with." But other writers soon dispensed with this disagreeable necessity altogether; which leads us to the progressive developments of the system. "Dr. Darwin requires only his laws of evolution and the rudimental forms of animal life, to construct animated nature." Of course, this creates "the necessity of evolving man's spiritual nature out of the instinctive animal functions of the brute." The next step was "to identify animal with vegetable life." This Dr. Huxley does by the origin of both in what he calls "protoplasm," which is the "physical basis of life;" and which is composed of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon, chemically united, just as water is composed of two volumes of hydrogen and oxygen gas. And just "as a certain aggregation of these four elements is protoplasm, the basis of all life, so the higher vital functions, including those of mind, must be explained by the same force acting in a more complicated way."

The only remaining gap to be filled is that between organic and
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inorganic life; when Mr. Tyndall comes to the relief with the revival of the Atomic system of Democritus, and Herbert Spencer with his doctrine of material force. "There is but one cause in the universe, *force*; and there is but one kind of effect in the universe, *motion*." Out of these the whole universe, material and spiritual, is constructed. This *force is universally persistent*, and only transmuted out of one form into another; and from this universally persistent force all other ideas are derived. For example: "Our notion of space is our 'consciousness of coexistent positions;' position being simply the *ubi* of a force. Our notion of matter is a consciousness of coexistent positions that offer resistance—resistance being the manifestation by which force reveals itself to us." "Time is but experienced succession. Our notion of material motion is the consciousness of matter in successive positions in time." In this manner, these *a priori* notions are all empirically generated. With one or two additional principles in regard to motion, we can see the whole process of world-making. "Motion is always along the line of least resistance." "It is in its nature oscillatory." "As matter concentrates, motion dissipates itself; and as motion concentrates itself, matter is dissipated." "Force does and undoes it all—concentrating matter and dissipating motion, or dissipating matter and concentrating motion." Such is the theory, in its salient features.

In the two lengthy chapters devoted to its consideration, the reviewer pursues it through all its windings with a remorseless inquisition. The first impulse is to protest against these wild conjectures put forth in the name of science, whose proud boast is that it is knowledge, and accepts nothing upon trust, and against the enormous demand upon our credulity, when we are asked to believe "that blind unintelligent force should exhibit more thought, choice, and wisdom than all the philosophers in the whole world will attain unto." There is, too, a scathing exposure of the inconsistency of those who scout all metaphysics, and yet are obliged to assume an *a priori* principle as the foundation of their speculations; as when Herbert Spencer assumes the universal persistence of force; and the absurdity of a proposition claimed to be necessary and self-evident, being historically reached

as a final deduction from a multitude of experiments. The *reductio ad absurdum* is further pressed, in the tendency of this Sensualism, to run into the extreme of Idealism. "Mechanical action is motion of masses, and mental action is motion of molecules. Mind-power will some day be literally correlated to material forces, as caloric in water has been to elasticity in steam. We must not, then, think of matter as a something dull, gross, passive, simply ponderable, opaque, and inert, but as the refined *habitat* of force, the invisible universal cause."

Not content, however, with these more general considerations, Dr. Dabney attacks the system in its details. If, for example, Mr. Tyndall takes refuge in the doctrine of the concurrence of atoms, the reviewer wishes to know, upon the admission of the infinite divisibility of matter, how we shall ascertain when we have got down to the atoms which are ultimate and permanent. If Dr. Darwin assumes myriads of failures in this blind *conatus* of nature towards an improvement, Dr. Dabney asks why no trace can be found of any of these abortions in all the fossil remains which are discovered; and he reproduces the crushing refutation by Hugh Miller, who avers "that some of the fossils discovered by him in strata so old as to have been supposed too old for any organised life, were of quite well developed vertebrata." Thus Palæontology, Dr. Dabney insists, delivers its testimony against the whole theory. Not only so, it utterly breaks down under the total absence of verification in its facts. "No man has ever changed any inorganic matter into a living vegetable, without the help of a preëxisting vegetable germ; nor vegetable matter into animal, without an animal germ; nor animal into human, save by the aid of a human germ." "In all the duration of human history, moreover, the animals have evolved nothing essentially different from their earliest faculties." Dr. Dabney consistently argues that "the process should be going on now as well as in all the past;" nay, it "should proceed with geometrical progression; and man should have advanced by this time to faculties as essentially different from those of Homer and Moses, as their's are different from the ape's."

We are simply skimming, in a sort of bird-like flight, over th

surface of these chapters ; rather indicating the general line of criticism, than attempting to reproduce it. The book is too compact to be condensed. Its method only can be illustrated ; beyond that we attempt nothing. So far, our author's task has been to demolish, rather than to construct. He has subjected the false system to the furnace heat of the severest criticism, under which it has been utterly dissipated. The reader who is not familiar with metaphysical researches, would, however, be wholly bewildered if left by the author to flounder in a conclusion so negative as that which results from a purely destructive criticism. He will turn, therefore, with a sense of relief to the remaining portion of the treatise, which places in contrast a sound and spiritual philosophy. In four elaborate chapters, which together compose more than one-third of the volume, Dr. Dabney discusses "the spirituality of the mind," "the validity," and "the origin of *a priori* notions," and "the philosophy of the supernatural." These topics are discussed, of course, chiefly in reference to the preceding controversy, but at the same time with a freedom which allows a wider range. We shall only attempt to give the reader some idea of the method pursued by our author.

The argument for the spirituality of the mind is drawn from the facts of consciousness. This he attempts to define in such a way as to exclude whatever is in dispute between the parties. All will agree that consciousness is "a cognition which the something that thinks has of its own thoughts, feelings, and volitions"—"that no mental modification can be so in the mind as to be subject of observation and inference, without being in the light of our self-consciousness." It is plain, moreover, that we "are equally indebted to this one faculty for our cognitions of the objective and the subjective." The quiet assumption of the sensualistic philosophy is preposterous, "that only objective facts in consciousness are observed experimentally. For if this faculty is trustworthy anywhere within its proper limits, it is trustworthy everywhere within the same;" and "the subjective cognitions revealed in consciousness are even more truly facts observed, because it is only through these that the objective becomes experimental." Now "consciousness implies a being which is conscious.

Man's knowledge of himself as conscious, thinking substance, is *a priori* to, though implicitly present in, all his other thinkings. He knows his own thinking self first—the *ego*—while “the sensations from the objective side he is necessitated to refer to real objective being the *non-ego*.” But then may not the two be distinguished from each other, and yet both be matter? Just here comes in the argument that mind must be spiritual and not material. Dr. Dabney dwells upon the *singleness* of the mind as contrasted with the plurality of material objects; “the simplest material substance is constituted by an aggregation of parts, and may be conceived as divided. The lightest has some weight; the smallest some extension; all have some figure. But consciousness says that the thing within us, which knows, feels, and wills, is simple.” “Moreover, every act and affection of the mind is known in consciousness as having complete *unity* ;” while “we are taught by our senses that all qualities and affections of material masses are affections of their parts aggregated”—as, for example, “the whiteness of a wall is the whiteness of a multitude of separate points in the wall,” etc. He sums up the argument under this head in the following terms: “The law of the reason compels us to refer this complete contrast of attributes to a real difference of subject. While we name the *ego*, spirit, we must call the objective something else, matter. The latter has extension, parts, weight, resistance, figure, and usually color, with other secondary properties. The former has none of these, but singleness, indivisibility, identity.”

His next argument is, that “materialism contradicts our immediate consciousness of *free agency*.” This cannot consist merely in “the opportunity for the muscles to effect, without obstruction, the impulses from within emitted by the something that thinks; for there is a conscious free agency as to emitting the impulse from within. The very essence of the case is, that the something which thinks forms self-determinations.” “Force is blind, unintelligent, and necessitated; choice is intelligent and free. Whenever we exercise moral and rational self-command against the attraction of some vivid impression on the senses, we have a clear evidence of the subjective and spiritual seat of the will.” Dr.

Dabney proceeds to show that "force and volition cannot be equivalent and transmutable powers;" but even further, that volition is the original, and the only original, spring of material force—so that we pass easily by analogy to the conclusion "that all natural forces have the same origin in the will of the supernatural mind, God."

The argument against materialism drawn from our *moral judgments*, is similar to the preceding. "No man thinks of holding a blind material force to a moral responsibility. But we know that we are responsible, and that this implies a rational spontaneity in acting"—and "this conviction of responsibility in conscience is universal, radical, unavoidable, and intuitive."

The objections to all this reasoning urged by Materialists are considered by the author, and are easily parried. If it be asked, for instance, why the *brain* may not be the subject of this consciousness, the answer is, "that while the properties and functions of brain-matter are material, qualified by extension and divisibility, those of consciousness are spiritual, simple, and indivisible." "We know, too, that our brain, like other matter, like the eye-ball, is objective to that in us which thinks." "If the brain, again, is the mind, how is it that the mind, like the brain, is not dual, why have we not normally a dual consciousness?"

If it be urged that "material affections, which are not a unity, have this seeming unity to our conception—as a musical tone which is yet a numerous series of successive vibrations"—the answer is, that "the oneness is only in the perception of it; only as it becomes a mental affection, does it assume unity, which proves most strongly the unifying power which belongs to the mind alone."

If it be alleged that a parallel argument will prove brutes to have distinctive spirits, Dr. Dabney replies "that this is an objection *ad ignorantiam*;" whilst the evidence is pretty conclusive that "brutes lack what is most essential to a rational personality," viz., "moral judgments and sentiments, the æsthetic faculty, and the ability to construe the contents of their own consciousness to themselves in any rational order."

We will close this article, already too long, by a slight recapitulation of what our author has to say upon "the validity and origin of *a priori* notions;" in which two chapters the reader will find the clearest illustration of his critical sagacity, as well as of his mental independence. "*Addictus jurare in nullius verba magistri.*" Dr. Dabney collides as freely with Sir William Hamilton, in what he regards as unsafe and extravagant speculation, as with Darwin and Herbert Spencer in their reckless and unauthorised assumptions.

The Hamiltonian doctrine, for example, that it is impossible to think the infinite, is greedily seized by Spencer to rule out God and to refer all effects to a single power, eternal force. Our author happily retorts that Spencer's ideal matter and force are just as unthinkable; and that nothing is gained, upon his own hypothesis, but the substitution of one for the other. But passing this by, the argument for the relativity of our knowledge is presented thus: all cognitions are such, only as they are known in consciousness—the essential condition of which is the distinction of the *Me* and the *Not-Me*, the perceiving subject and the perceived object. If, then, nothing is known except as it is in relation, how are we to cognize the unconditioned? This doctrine Dr. Dabney combats with several very sharp distinctions. He admits that "cognition takes place by means of some relation; but not that the cognition is *merely that relation.*" For example: In the relation of cause and effect, it is by means of the sequence that the mind sees efficient power in the cause; but reason refuses to confound this with the mere relation, through which it is known. He "does not, therefore, concede that human cognitions are only relatively valid"—"whilst the impossible something-nothing, the unconditioned abstract, is unknowable, he does not concede that an Infinite Being is unknowable." Knowledge is relative, in so far as through relation it arises; but the knowing, and the means of the knowing, are quite distinct. By this distinction he meets the extreme view of Mr. Mansel in his "Limits of Religious Thought," that God's nature is not cognizable. However true this may be of the Pantheistic conception of God, an absolute being which cannot be in relation with any

other being, but in which the Creator and creature, matter and spirit, finite and infinite, are contradictorily identified—it is not true of the God of the Bible. “True, he does not need to be related to other being in order to his existence; but he has entered into relations, as Creator, Ruler, Benefactor, Revealer—and in doing so, has become cognizable to us; not completely, yet truly cognisable within certain limits.”

Dr. Dabney next assails the terms in which Hamilton speaks of our primitive judgments, which he describes as *incomprehensible*. Very true, says the reviewer, in the sense that they are not comprehended under any prior truth, for the simple reason that they are themselves first truths; but not true, in the sense that they are *inconceivable*. And here is to be found the pith of his own doctrine: “that our specific ideas and judgments are conditioned upon the mind’s *a priori* rational power of forming certain abstract notions. Thus we only cognize body in *space*, an event in *duration*, an effect from the *power* of its cause, moral responsibility in *spontaneity*, phenomena in *subject*, qualities in *substance*,” etc. “Each of these notions will be found as ultimate in simplicity, as it is *a priori*.” “The reason is possessed of its own cognitive powers, and the abstract notion is in order to the idea of the concrete.”

The attempt to replace in the form of *belief* what is denied as a valid cognition, Dr. Dabney vigorously repels. According to Hamilton, “the primary data of the reason are incomprehensible, but they are held by faith. First truths we believe; conclusions deduced from them, we know.” This position is denied. “The difficulty does not exist of knowing our legitimate primitive and infinite notions as valid cognitions. But if it did, this tender of a belief in them, which is something distinct from knowledge, would be only mischievous.” The twofold objection is urged: first, “that the word belief is too ambiguous.” “Its proper sense is a conviction grounded in trust.” But, asks Dr. Dabney in this case, “trust on whom? The only answer is, on my reason. But my reason is myself. This is not a faith, but knowledge, there being no other witness but my reason, which is myself.” And secondly, that “if the ultimate facts of consciousness are

given less in the form of cognitions than of beliefs, then the deductions of them are less cognitions than beliefs." The stream cannot rise higher than its fountain. We are not sure but there is here a little play upon words, such as too often occurs in metaphysical speculation. As to the precise issue raised by our author, he is unquestionably right. But there is a generic sense in which we use the word faith. By the constitution of our nature, we are obliged to accept these primary truths as the starting point of all reasoning, and as the tests by which all our deductions are verified. As Mr. Stewart terms it, they are "*regulæ philosophandi*;" necessarily accepted in the trust which we are obliged to repose in our mental constitution. And this accounts, we suppose, for the fact that they have been so constantly designated as "fundamental and primary beliefs." The truths themselves are, as represented by Dr. Dabney, recognised as knowledge, but by a necessary trust in that mental constitution which compels us so to receive them.

From the validity of these *a priori* notions, Dr. Dabney proceeds to discuss their *origin*. He has assumed hitherto, that "though arising upon the occasion of some connected perception, these are determined from within by the constitution of the mind, and not from without, by the power of the objects of sensation." This, then, as the advocate of the Rational philosophy, is what he must undertake to establish. It is no slight presumption in favor of his view, that Sensualism itself is unable to construct a system of cognitions without the aid of primitive judgments, which it affects to discard. If all ideas are derived from sensation, then the validity of sense-perceptions must be assumed as axiomatic. Positivism, again, builds upon the fundamental postulate, that all "phenomena are subjected to invariable natural laws." How can there be comparison between any given sensations, without assuming the identity of the intelligence which perceives them? "Our abstract notion of space is the mental *locus*, which must be given by the mind itself, in order to think the idea of body;" and "when we speak of succession, we have already formed the notion of time." In this forcible way, the argument is wrenched out of the hands of his antagonist.

"The accepted tests of a primitive intuition," says Dr. Dabney, "are three: that it shall be a *first truth*, not learned from any prior premises; that it shall be *necessary*, immediately seen to be such, that it not only is true, but must be true; and that it shall be *universal*, true of every particular case everywhere and always." If our primitive beliefs can abide these tests, the case is made out; and it is incumbent upon the Sensualistic school to show that they cannot—which accordingly it rashly undertakes to do. It is objected, that they fail under the first test: in that "they are learned by every man, in the course of his own observation, like all inductive truths." "But why," says our author, "is the experimental instance the occasion of the mind's seeing the necessary truth? It is only because the concrete case is the means which enables it to apprehend the real meaning of your abstract enunciation." "Moreover, sundry intuitive truths are incapable of being experimentally inferred. Divergent straight lines, we are sure, will never enclose any space, though infinitely produced; yet who has ever inspected an infinite straight line with his eyes?" "How has he (the Sensualist) learned that sensational experience is itself true? Only by a primitive judgment of the reason."

In applying the second test, every objection founders upon a false definition of what is a *necessary* truth. If we answer that it is one the denial of which involves a contradiction, the same may be said of all truth, and does not distinguish such as are *necessary*. If it be defined as a proposition the falsehood of which is inconceivable, the difficulty is that "the antecedent probability of any statement depends very greatly upon our mental habits, associations, and acquirements." But all evasion is cut off by a correct definition, "that a *necessary* truth is one the denial of which is immediately self-contradictory." "We do not call a truth *necessary*, because, negatively, we lack the capacity to conceive the opposite thereof; but because, positively, we are able to see that the denial of it involves a self-evident and immediate contradiction."

Against the third test, it is urged that there is debate which are first truths, and that some long held to be such are now dis-

carded. To which the author replies, that this only proves the human mind to be an imperfect instrument. The same objection would lie against the validity of all empirical truths, as to which mistakes are constantly made. "The fact still remains, that there are axiomatic truths which no sane man can dispute, as that the whole must be greater than one of its parts." "There must be a ground for this uniformity, else the uniformity would not be. The cause of uniformity again, must lie in human minds, because it is there we find the results. What is it except universal *a priori* laws of the reason?"

Dr. Dabney further vindicates the originality and immediacy of these primitive judgments, by exposing the blunders into which his opponents are driven when attempting to explain the logical force of the syllogism; and still further, by maintaining the thesis, "that it is only by postulating final causes we can have any foundation whatever for an inductive science, leading us to any general laws of natural causes." Through these interesting pages, we will not, however, attempt to follow him.

We must abruptly terminate this article, just at the point where the reader's appetite is whetted for more. Our object is to drive him to the book itself, of which this is a review in the old-fashioned style, which we are sorry has gone so much out of vogue, and whose object is to give a relish of what some abler mind has produced. It has not been the writer's privilege to be thrown into that personal intimacy with the author of this volume, which would knit to him the sweet affections of the soul. But we have a broad attachment to him, as a bold and honest lover of the truth for the truth's own sake. We rejoice in the gifts with which he is so richly endowed; and in the grace given him, now in the maturity of his knowledge, to use his grand powers for the glory of God and the welfare of his fellowmen.

ARTICLE V.

PALMER'S LIFE OF THORNWELL.

The Life and Letters of James Henley Thornwell, D. D., LL.D., Ex-President of the South Carolina College, Late Professor of Theology in the Theological Seminary at Columbia, South Carolina. By B. M. PALMER, D. D., LL.D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, New Orleans, Louisiana. Richmond: Whittet & Shepperson. 1875. 8vo., pp. 614.

When a great and good man dies, there is a natural demand for the perpetuation of his memory in some enduring form. It is not satisfied by the monumental marble which is erected above his grave, nor by the brief eulogies, however true and eloquent, which may be pronounced upon the occasion of his death. There is the desire for the living, breathing, connected story of the life which has ceased among men. Unrecorded traditions, however numerous and vivid, are apt to become exaggerated and untrustworthy, are lacking in unity, and are destined to lose their distinctness even in the memories of contemporaries, to fade into a few great outlines as the generations recede from that which knew the man himself, and finally to sink into utter oblivion. Such a contingency is deprecated as a species of calamity. We are conscious of a feeling that, although we are unable to arrest the stroke of death which removes the body from the fellowship of the living, we may rescue the memory of departed worth from the shadow and mould of the tomb. Not only do we crave the opportunity of reading a full and graphic account of what we in part may have personally known, but of imparting to those who may come after us the benefits ourselves have derived from contact with a great and useful life.

These feelings are enhanced by the obvious consideration that the history of any period is, in a very large degree, that of the great men who live and act in it. They not only create events by their own energies, but use those which originate in natural

causes, apart from their instrumentality, for the attainment of the ends they seek to achieve. Their genius rules the elements which move upon society, and moulds them in obedience to its inspiration. They do the thinking of their time, and to a great extent stamp the character of its measures and policies. No history of an age can be produced which does not recount the deeds of the individuals who were a conspicuous part of it. The truly great men of a period are its jewels—its ornament and glory; and, if it cannot leave them, it seeks to transmit their memories as its choicest heirlooms to its successors. It is natural, therefore, that each generation should desire the biographies of its actors, as well as the chronicles of its facts, to represent it in the court of the future which will surely sit in judgment upon it. It is in this way it leaves its likeness behind it, to be suspended for study in the galleries of history. The doom of being forgotten is as much dreaded by an age as by an individual; and it well knows that upon the men who illustrated it by their thoughts and their deeds must depend its title to future fame, or even to future recognition. The Church, as a society composed of human beings, is not insensible to these feelings; but to her there are other and loftier motives to perpetuate the memory of her sons. Their lovely graces, noble virtues, and heroic achievements, are confessedly the fruits of that supernatural grace to which she owes her distinctive existence, and which it is her peculiar mission to glorify. Every precious gem which she wears upon her bosom is polished by the hand of the Divine Spirit, and she hastens to blend them into a coronet of honor with which to deck her glorious Redeemer's brow. In rehearsing the story of the lives of her worthies, she composes fresh psalms to the grace of redemption, which touches the lips of mortal men with coals of living fire, transmutes their energies into angelic virtues, and inspires their hearts for the achievement of immortal deeds.

Such were the emotions which were awakened in the breasts of his contemporaries by the lamented death of the great and good Thornwell. It was felt that it was a duty which the present owes to the future that the record of such a life as his should not be allowed to exist as a precarious tradition, but, reduced to perma-

ment form by competent hands, should be handed down for the contemplation of after times. But who should perform the delicate and responsible office? Who could be found to unite in himself all the qualifications requisite for its successful discharge? Happily, there was no difficulty in answering this demand. It seemed to be generally conceded that there was one among us who possessed all the requirements for the undertaking, and that into his hands there would be no hazard in committing it. The friends and admirers of the distinguished dead turned with a sort of instinctive unanimity to Dr. Palmer. He did not take to himself the honor and the responsibility of the work; he was summoned by a distinct vocation to gird himself for the task, and then cheerfully addressed himself to its performance. The finger of the general judgment indicated him as the man. For a number of years he had been intimately associated with Dr. Thornwell, both in his personal and ecclesiastical relations. For that period they labored together in the same town, and the utmost freedom and cordiality of intercourse existed between them. The unconscious future biographer had the fullest opportunity of becoming acquainted with the inner characteristics, as well as the more obtrusive qualities, of the man whose life he was afterwards to delineate. The warmest friendship attached them to each other. We recollect that on one occasion, when the question was before the Charleston Presbytery, to which they both belonged, of the removal of Dr. Palmer from Columbia to Charleston, Dr. Thornwell felt it to be his duty to advocate that measure, but remarked that he did so in opposition to all his personal feelings for a friend whom he loved as his own soul. Such an affection for another must have opened to him the doors of his heart. The work itself, as now given to the public, furnishes evidence that there was the most unreserved communion between them. The author, therefore, is a witness who speaks, in great measure, of his own personal knowledge; he knows whereof he affirms. We have alluded thus particularly to the means enjoyed by the biographer of fully taking the measure of his subject, in view of the fact that the estimate which he has expressed of him is so exalted as almost to suggest the apprehension that much has been spoken

from that indiscriminating admiration of genius which results from the contemplation of its object at a distance, and through the magnifying medium of a partial and inadequate knowledge. To a reader unacquainted with the great man who is the subject of the work, the author's language in regard to his powers and attainments will sometimes appear to be positively extravagant; and it would not be strange if he should feel disposed to ascribe it to an hallucination of mind, perfectly consistent with honesty, but springing from insufficient grounds of judgment, and leading an admirer to sublimate the object of mental homage above the region of tame and sober fact. The relations sustained by the author to the man of whom he speaks forbid the entertainment of this mythical hypothesis. He was with him under all circumstances, with and without the uniform of public parade; and there was no man who in undress was simpler, more artless, more childlike than Dr. Thornwell. He witnessed the free play of his intellect when there was no opportunity for special preparation, but when questions suited to task the highest intelligence and the profoundest scholarship were suddenly sprung upon him. We here recall a conversation with Dr. Palmer, in which he told us that he had not long before, in Dr. Thornwell's study, asked him for an account of Kant's philosophical system, and that, in ready response to the request, he expounded for an hour to his single auditor the theories of the great German, with all the earnestness and thoroughness which would have been elicited in addressing an assembly of hundreds. Access so unrestrained to the eminent subject of this memoir must have furnished the writer as complete a knowledge of his gifts, acquisitions, and character, as it is possible for one man to gain concerning another.

During this period, too, of intimate personal intercourse, Dr. Palmer was the fellow-presbyter of Dr. Thornwell. On the floors of Presbytery and Synod, he frequently heard him in debate upon ecclesiastical questions, and, of course, often listened to his profound and eloquent discourses from the pulpit. It is scarcely necessary to add, that he possessed all the ability and scholarship necessary to enable him to enter into sympathy with the intellectual powers with which Dr. Thornwell was so richly endowed,

and which are so vividly portrayed in the work before us. Himself gifted with the inspiration of the orator and the sagacity of the ecclesiastical statesman, and characterised by a remarkable facility for linguistic studies and a natural capacity for metaphysical thought, which, although it does not often display itself in technical forms, is revealed in the structure and staple of his public efforts, he could not fail to absorb, without any special endeavor, that acquaintance with the capabilities and acquirements of his distinguished friend which prepared him in subsequently taking the *role* of the biographer at once to do him the amplest justice and to "speak the words of soberness and truth."

Such were the qualifications of the author for his work. Socrates had his Plato and his Xenophon; and could it have consisted with the Christian humility of the great Carolinian that he should not have been insensible to "the last infirmity of noble minds"—a desire for posthumous fame—such an ambition would have been satisfied if he could have foreseen that the writer of these charming memoirs—the sharer of his inmost thoughts and feelings—would be called by the voice of his surviving friends to tell to posterity the story of his life and labors. It might, however, be supposed that the intimate friendship which existed between them would have tended to produce a partial judgment, insensibly leading the biographer to form an overweening estimate and to present an exaggerated portraiture of the qualities of one so greatly loved and admired. There is some force in this presumption; but it is checked, if not entirely removed, by the knowledge which the most intimate and dispassionate friends of the author possess of his singular freedom from prejudicial judgments and his wonted judiciousness and impartiality. He is not the man to pronounce an ill-considered and extravagant opinion in reference to friend or foe. He wrote for the eye of Dr. Thornwell's contemporaries; and any exaggeration of statement he full well knew would evoke attention from all parties, and most probably hostile criticism from some. It behoves a history of contemporaneous or very recent events to be exact, for the opportunity of correction and denial is palpable. The truth is, that the writer could hardly have uttered encomiums too highly

pitched when he described what was generally admitted by those competent to form a judgment to be supreme human genius. The only criticism which we have heard, charging defect upon the work, is that the author has not sufficiently signalized the marvellous influence which Dr. Thornwell wielded as an educator over the young men who came under his instruction at the South Carolina College—an influence which impressed itself upon them as well in the development of habits of thinking as in the actual formation of opinion. We mention this not because we deem the criticism well founded, for it appears to us that while no doubt that point might have been more minutely and impressively insisted on, the author could not well have yielded to the temptation to do so without dwelling at disproportionate length upon a single though remarkable feature of Dr. Thornwell's many-sided career. We call attention to the criticism in order to evince the fact that in the State in which the subject of the memoir was best known there does not exist, so far as we can ascertain, any impression that the picture of his life is too brightly tinted by the partial hand of friendship. The coloring is strong, but it is conceded to be true to fact.

Dr. Palmer usually addresses audiences eagerly awaiting his appearance, but never, probably, has he spoken to one which more anxiously expected him than that multitude who greeted the issue of this book. Desire was keen and expectation ran high—desire stimulated by unbounded admiration for the genius and tender love for the memory of the lamented subject of the work; expectation based upon the known ability and eloquence of the author. No apprehension was entertained as to his success in accomplishing this office of affection for his departed and illustrious friend; there was only anxiety to witness its completion. It was believed that a chaplet would be woven by his hands worthy to be placed on Thornwell's grave. Nor when the book appeared was there any disappointment of these feelings. They were fully justified by the result. The work, in the opinion of all from whom we have heard, is grandly successful. From all sides we learn that it is read with absorbing interest. Our friend, the editor of the *Southwestern Presbyterian*, tells us that on the

evening on which the book was received, he took it up with the intention of consulting a portion of it in regard to a topic in which he happened to be interested, and that the breakfast bell next morning summoned him from the closing chapter. We had a nearly similar experience, except that we began at the beginning, and finding it impracticable, notwithstanding the avidity with which its contents were devoured, to get through six hundred octavo pages in a single night, broke off in time to secure a short nap before the labors of the day, and reserved the rest for the next opportunity we could snatch. The hours rolled by unheeded while the spell of the entrancing story was upon us. The naked truth in regard to the triumphs of genius over obstacles blocking its path, and the wonderful method by which Divine grace prepared and trained it for the sublime mission of subsequent life, wore the charm with which the artist of fiction, by grouping ideal qualities and events into a transcendent unity of his own creation, invests the visions of the imagination. The reading was attended with varying emotions, akin to those with which a traveller, passing through a new and picturesque country, beholds fresh and surprising scenes of interest at every turn of his road, and again like those by which one is thrilled who watches the shifting fortunes of a well-fought field. Alternately we were melted by some exquisite touch of pathos, provoked to laughter by a stroke of humor, electrified by the account of some marvelous intellectual achievement, stimulated by the proofs of courage displayed by an intrepid spirit, rebuked and saddened by the record of untiring industry and consuming zeal, and bowed into adoration of the power and wisdom and mercy of a covenant-keeping God and Saviour. There are no contests more interesting than those of the forum and the deliberative assembly, no battles so grand as those which are waged for principle, no sufferings so sacred as those which are endured for truth, no struggles so suited to elicit human sympathy as those which are maintained with the tyranny of the devil and sin and hell, those which take place on the arena of the soul itself, between powers once pervaded by unity in the service of their God, but now split asunder in consequence of the fatal schism effected by the fall.

Such is the drama which moved before us as this narrative of Thornwell's life unfolded itself. Though an account of a theologian, a philosopher, and a scholar, and therefore chiefly interesting to those whose lines of study and order of thought are intellectual, this memoir is by no means destitute of attraction to the less cultivated people of God. The letters which it embodies breathe an earnest spirit of piety, and a tender sympathy with the afflicted, which will render them affecting and useful to those who desire to grow in grace, and to the stricken mourners who weep at the graves of kindred and friends. They are charming specimens of epistolary writing. The work, consequently, is winning praises from all classes of readers. The scholar and the student read with rapt admiration of the wonderful powers and attainments which are so eloquently depicted, and the humble child of God, whether lettered or unlettered, is delighted and edified by the spiritual counsels, so wise and salutary, with which the narrative is freely interspersed. There is scarcely an end which may be sought in the composition of a memoir which is not attained by this. There is, however, a special and paramount value which attaches to it, and of that we may have more to say before we close.

The style of the work is entitled to unqualified praise. It displays all the attributes for which the gifted author is distinguished, whether in speech or in writing. No reader can fail to be struck by the rhythmical flow and musical cadence of the sentences, the graceful elegance of expression, the copiousness and yet the appropriateness and vigor of diction, the graphic vividness of portraiture, and the transparent clearness and masterly ability of didactic statement and exposition, which characterise the book. It is the very "image and presentment" of the author. We hear the orator speaking through the printed page. We imagine the expressive gesture, the kindling eye, the magnetic tone. The pen did not seem to fetter the free action of his genius. He had a noble subject, and he has nobly responded to its demands upon his powers. We have not heard of a shade of disappointment in the minds of Dr. Thornwell's friends—the most jealous of his reputation—in regard to the style in which the

work is written. There is but one expression from all—that of satisfaction and delight. There is a sense of genuine pleasure when a production fulfils the law of fitness and congruity; and we confess to having experienced that feeling in reading this memoir. It was meet that the life of Thornwell should be written by one whose style would not suffer censure by comparison with the pure and lofty English of which that great man was a master, and in which, as in royal vesture, his grand ideas were wont to habilitate themselves. We are conscious of a feeling of gratification at seeing the two associated by the bond of this beautiful memoir. In our younger days we were accustomed to hear them preach when they occupied neighboring pulpits in Columbia, one in the chapel of the College, the other in the Presbyterian church; and to listen to them proclaiming “the glorious gospel of the blessed God” before the Charleston Presbytery and the South Carolina Synod. We cherish a distinct remembrance of the last time when that rich privilege was ours. We will be excused in recurring to it. It was at the meeting of the Synod at Chester, in 1856, when, after a close debate, it was decided, upon an appeal from the court below, to advise Dr. Palmer to accept a call from the First Presbyterian church of New Orleans. On the Sabbath, Dr. Palmer preached in the morning, and Dr. Thornwell in the afternoon. The occasion was one of touching interest, for it was felt that the former was to preach for the last time as a member of the Synod in which he had labored for years, and which had given him every mark of its confidence and affection. His text was, “God forbid that I should glory save in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ.” The sermon was a noble and affecting one, and the eyes of his brethren were wet with tears. But the feast was not over. In the afternoon, Dr. Thornwell came on, with a sermon from the words in the 10th chapter of John: “I am the good shepherd; the good shepherd giveth his life for the sheep.” He was manifestly in the vein to preach, for he moved off, at the start, like a free charger impatient for the course, or a gallant ship with all her canvas spread and a favoring gale behind; and having recently passed through severe bereavement in the loss of his venerated mother and a beloved child, was in a tender

and melting frame. Who that heard him can forget the unction and the power—the glow, the fervor, the deep pathos, with which he delivered himself on that occasion? Who can forget the cogency of reasoning by which from the text he fortified the doctrines of substitution, particular atonement, and final perseverance, and the classic and elevated diction, the flowing periods, the charming, fascinating manner in which he depicted the gentleness of Christ's rule as symbolised by the pastoral staff? And whose memory does not retain the impression of the thrilling scene when, having described the trials through which the great Pastor safely conducts his people to the heavenly fold, he leaned over the pulpit, and with uplifted arms and tones of indescribable intensity, exclaimed: "I am tired of temptation and of sin; I am tired of death-beds, funerals, and graves. Oh for the pinions of a dove, for then would I fly away, and be forever at rest!" The memorable day was closed with a beautiful sermon at night from the eloquent Dr. Thomas Smyth, now with Dr. Thornwell, where the clash of discussion is merged into shouts of praise. The reader will pardon the tear which these recollections press into the eye. This was the last occasion upon which we saw Dr. Thornwell and Dr. Palmer together, and heard them on the same day. Now once more, in this captivating memoir, they seem to us to be in company. So, linked by this tie, let them go down to posterity—*par nobile fratrum!*

We give a few extracts from different parts of the book, as furnishing specimens of its style, and as serving to justify the laudatory terms in which we have spoken of it. The first is taken from the opening chapter:

"History loves to trace the lineage of those whose lives have been heroic. It seems to add grace to virtue when it descends from sire to son.

And is successively, from blood to blood,
The right of birth."

Even the pride of birth which it begets is shorn of its offence when it becomes the spur to honor, and the legacy of a spotless name is bequeathed, with increasing splendor, to succeeding heirs. The claim of birth is buffeted with scorn only when it stands upon the merit of the past, which it is powerless to reproduce. The rugged sense of mankind discriminates, with sufficient sagacity, betwixt the counterfeit aristocracy

and the true. The veneration which is natural to us, resents the fraud of an empty name, without the solid worth it was supposed to represent. But if the blood that courses through the veins bears upon its tide the virtues by which it was first distinguished, and the scions of an ancient house give presage of the honor which made their fathers renowned, it bows to such with a deference that seals the legitimacy of their sway. It turns, with a lofty disdain, from those who gild their vices or their weakness, with the lustre of a name which is prostituted in the use; but it accepts the blessing coming from ambition itself, when the *prestige* of birth prompts generations, in their turn,

‘To draw forth a noble ancestry
From the corruption of abusing time,
Unto a lineal, true-derived course.’

“But the longest pedigree must have a beginning; and the whole force of these suggestions goes to show that the chief glory belongs to the founder of a family. It is the impress of his character which honorable descendants are careful to preserve; and though the original dignity may be enlarged, it is by the stimulus derived from his example. The glory of embellishing a name can never be superior to that of first drawing it from obscurity. As, too, a wise government recruits its nobility by timely and gradual accessions from the commons beneath it, so God, in his adorable providence, is continually bringing out the unknown to be princes in the power of their influence over the Church and the world. This pre-eminence is challenged on behalf of the subject of these memoirs. If his name was never borne with ‘chant of heraldry’ along the aisles of the drowsy past, he has the superior glory, in this respect, of being born only of himself. . . .

“It is unfortunate that so little can be traced of Dr. Thornwell’s parentage on the paternal side. Of his grandfather, nothing is known but what has been mentioned above. Of his father, little can be gathered beyond the fact that he belonged to that important and useful class, so necessary under the partially feudal system which has passed away, who managed the estates of others; serving as middle-men between the proprietors, who were often absentees, and the baronial estates, which they managed as their representatives. He is described as generous in disposition, free-handed and hospitable, living always up to his means, and accumulating nothing. Firm in the execution of his purposes, he acquired the reputation of being a good planter and an excellent manager; and to the period of his death held positions of responsibility and trust. When this event occurred, he was in charge of the business of a widowed lady, Mrs. Bedgewood, afterwards Mrs. Billingsley.

“The scene of death is thus described by an eye-witness; and it is interesting, as bringing, for the first time, distinctly before us the subject of this book. It may lend additional zest to the narrative to say that it

is told by one from whom he was separated in birth by only the interval of an hour, in homes which were in sight of each other, upon the same plantation. This surviving friend, sustaining almost the relation of a foster-brother, thus depicts the sensibility and grief of the youthful orphan: 'At that time I lived a great deal with my aunt, Mrs. Bedge-wood, and was there when Mr. Thornwell died. Though only some seven or eight years old, I remember the day perfectly. The house was not more than a quarter of a mile from my aunt's; and both she and I were there when he breathed his last. It was the first time I had ever seen death face to face. I remember the looks of Mr. Thornwell to this day. After he was laid out, James and myself looked wonderingly on his remains, and then went to the spring, talking, as boys might, of the strangeness of death. I recollect his saying, in almost heart-broken accents, *What will mother do? What will become of us?* We remained some time at the spring; he often weeping bitterly, and I consoling him as well as I could. No day of my life is more vividly impressed upon my memory.'

"It is an artless story like this which most quickly suffuses the eye with tears. It is graphic in its very simplicity. Every line in the picture is sharply cut. Two young boys, just eight years of age, stand together by the side of a corpse, with that strange awe which all remember to have felt when first gazing upon the great mystery of death: then sitting down by the cool spring to appreciate what it imports to the living; then the sudden rush of grief upon the orphan's heart, and the affectionate sensibility which stretches into the desolate future, breaking into the wail, 'What will my mother do?' It is the first sign given of the broad and noble nature, which it will be the business of these pages to portray; of that deep affectionateness, which flowed like a majestic stream through a generous life, fertilising friendships as tender and as lasting as ever gathered around the memory of the dead. It shall be told in due time 'what that mother shall do,' when we come to see the filial love which bursts forth in the passionate cry of the boy, folding at last her venerable form in his manly embrace, smoothing the pillow under her dying head, and writing her praise in lasting marble over her grave."

We next furnish some selections from different parts of the book, which will at once illustrate the writer's style, and be interesting to the reader as exhibiting the evidences of Dr. Thornwell's wonderful power as a preacher. The first presents him as going, not long after his licensure, to fulfil an engagement to preach, under a cloud of doubt as to his call to the ministry, and even his conversion:

"In his solitary way, as he journeys along, in the beautiful spring,

terrible thoughts settle upon his mind which he cannot conjure away. What if, after all, he should not be a converted man! What, if it should be a profane touch that he was to give to the ark of God! What, if the ministry should prove to him an iron bondage, and, having preached to others, he himself should be a castaway? And so he journeyed on, like Saul to Damascus, with the deep midnight upon his soul. At the end of a day's travel, he rested under the hospitable roof of a pious elder, to whom he opened all the sorrow. But no comfort came from all the comfort that was spoken. The good elder could succeed only in exacting a promise, at parting, that he would go on to his appointment; and if the Lord, in answer to prayer, did not make his duty plain, why, then, he need not preach. The place is reached: he enters the pulpit with 'the great horror of darkness' resting upon him still. It is the garden of Gethsemane to this young but chosen servant of the Lord, who must here learn to drink of the Saviour's cup, and be baptized with his baptism. He rises to preach: and now the time has come for the revelation of the Saviour's love. Through a rift in the gloom, there rushes down upon him such a sense of his acceptance with God as was overpowering. The assurance and the joy overflowed into the discourse, which poured the sacred oil over the assembly, until some gathered unconsciously near the pulpit, in breathless suspense upon the young prophet's lips. He was from that moment anointed to a life-work, which is precious in its record here, and—above."

The next extract gives Dr. Palmer's first impressions of Dr. Thornwell as a preacher:

"Dr. Thornwell was, however, no stranger to the Columbia pulpit, as he often, during the preceding year, for consecutive Sabbaths, occupied the place of the pastor, Dr. Witherspoon, when disabled by chronic sickness. It was at this period the writer's acquaintance with his friend began: though his own position as a divinity student did not warrant the intimacy which was enjoyed a little later, when brought into the relation of a co-presbyter. The impression will never be erased of the first discourse to which he listened, in the year 1839. A thin, spare form, with a slight stoop in the shoulders, stood in the desk, with soft black hair falling obliquely over the forehead, and a small eye, with a wonderful gleam, when it was lighted by the inspiration of his theme. The devotional services offered nothing peculiar, beyond a quiet simplicity and reverence. The reading was, perhaps, a trifle monotonous, and the prayer was marked rather by correctness and method, than by fervor or fulness. But, from the opening of the discourse, there was a strange fascination, such as had never been exercised by any other speaker. The subject was doctrinal, and Dr. Thornwell, who was born into the ministry at the height of a great controversy, had on then the wiry edge of his

youth. The first impression made was that of being stunned by a peculiar dogmatism in the statement of what seemed weighty propositions; this was followed by a conscious resistance of the authority which was felt to be a little brow-beating with its positiveness; and then, as link after link was added to the chain of a consistent argument, expressed with that agonistic fervor which belongs to the forum, the effect at the close was to overwhelm and subdue. 'Who is this preacher?' was asked of a neighbor, in one of the pauses of the discourse. 'That is Mr. Thornwell; don't you know him?' was the reply. Thornwell, Thornwell! the sound came back like an echo from the distant past, or like a half-remembered dream, which one strives to recover; when suddenly it flashed upon the memory that, eight years before, when a lad of thirteen, he had heard a young collegian say, 'There is a little fellow just graduated in my class, of whom the world will hear something by and by; his name is Thornwell.' This and that were put together; the prophecy and the fulfilment already begun. How little did the writer dream, in the wondering of that day, that nearly twenty years of bosom friendship would bind him to that stranger as Jonathan was knit to David; or that after five-and-thirty years he would be penning these reminiscences in this biography. Let him be forgiven for floating thus a moment upon the flood of these memories."

We offer next to the reader a portion of the author's recapitulatory analysis of Dr. Thornwell's qualities as a preacher, which contains as fine writing of the sort as we have ever encountered:

"The feature most remarkable in this prince of pulpit orators was the rare union of rigorous logic with strong emotion. He reasoned always, but never coldly. He did not present truth in what Bacon calls 'the dry light of the understanding;' clear, indeed, but without the heat which warms and fructifies. Dr. Thornwell wove his argument in fire. His mind warmed with the friction of its own thoughts, and glowed with the rapidity of its own motion; and the speaker was borne along in what seemed to others a chariot of flame. One must have listened to him to form an adequate conception of what we mean. Filled with the sublimity of his theme, and feeling in the depths of his soul its transcendent importance, he could not preach the gospel of the grace of God with the coldness of a philosopher. As the flood of his discourse set in, one could perceive the ground-swell from beneath, the heaving tide of passionate emotion which rolled it on. Kindling with a secret inspiration, his manner lost its slight constraint; all angularity of gesture and awkwardness of posture suddenly disappeared; the spasmodic shaking of the head entirely ceased; his slender form dilated; his deep-black eye lost its drooping expression; the soul came and looked forth, lighting it up with a strange brilliancy; his frail body rocked and trembled as under a divine

afflatus, as though the impatient spirit would rend its tabernacle and fly forth to God and heaven upon the wings of his impassioned words ; until his fiery eloquence, rising with the greatness of his conceptions, burst upon the hearer in some grand climax, overwhelming in its majesty and resistless in its effect. In all this there was no declamation, no 'histrionic mummery,' no straining for effect, nothing approaching to rant. All was natural, the simple product of thought and feeling wonderfully combined. One saw the whirlwind, as it rose and gathered up the waters of the sea ; saw it in its headlong course, and in the bursting of its power. However vehement his passion, it was justified by the thoughts which engendered it ; and in all the storm of his eloquence, the genius of logic could be seen presiding over its elements, and guiding its course."

"To understand Dr. Thornwell's power, these several elements must be combined : his powerful logic, his passionate emotion, his majestic style, of which it may be said, as of Lord Brougham, that 'he wielded the club of Hercules entwined with roses.' This generation will never look upon his like again ; a single century cannot afford to produce his equal. It may listen to much lucid exposition, much close and powerful reasoning, much tender and earnest appeal, much beautiful and varied imagery ; but never from the lips of one man can it be stirred by vigor of argument fused by a seraph's glow, and pouring itself forth in strains which linger in the memory like the chant of angels. The regret has been expressed that his unwritten sermons had not been preserved through the labors of a reporter. It is well the attempt was never made. What invented symbols could convey that kindling eye, those trembling and varied tones, the expressive attitude, the foreshadowing and typical gesture, the whole quivering frame, which made up in him the complement of the finished orator ? The lightning's flash, the fleecy clouds embroidered on the sky, and the white crest of the ocean wave, surpass the painter's skill. The orator must live through tradition ; and to make this tradition, we have described one of whom it may be said, as once of Ebenezer Erskine, 'He that never heard him, never heard the gospel in its majesty.'"

The only other extract which we will present is one in which an account is given of Dr. Thornwell's last illness, death, and funeral :

"But we must return to a more peaceful scene, one of surpassing solemnity, but one the sadness of which is chased away by the light of Christian triumph and joy. On the very day that father and son parted in Charlotte, Dr. Thornwell took his bed, from which he was lifted only to be borne to his burial. From the beginning of the attack, he was impressed with the conviction that it was his last. The Rev. John Douglas, a tried friend of his from early college life, came to him at the first

stage. As he entered the room, he said: 'You have just come in time to see me die.' As we have narrated, by what seemed an accidental circumstance, his beloved wife was at his side. To her he mentioned the pleasing fact, that at Wilson's Springs, from which he had just come to meet his son, though in some respects uncomfortable, he had had a time of great spiritual enjoyment. He seemed to have been taken there, away from all whom he loved, that in solitude and prayer he might be prepared for the coming of his Lord. For nearly two weeks he lingered, being tenderly nursed at the house of Mr. William E. White, of Charlotte, by loving friends, who would cheerfully have saved his life by the surrender of their own; until, on the first day of August, 1862, he gently fell asleep. It was only this; there was not a struggle, nor a groan. He threw himself back upon his pillow; lifted his right arm and hand; it quivered spasmodically for a few seconds, and then dropped; his eye became fixed; and with a few short breaths his spirit passed away.

"The nature of his malady prevented him from speaking much. He had been threatened all his life with consumption, which perhaps settled upon a different organ from the lungs. A chronic dysentery had slowly undermined his strength, and the toneless system had not power to resist the final assault. The lethargy to which this form of disease predisposes, made him quiet for the most part; although he was easily aroused, and always with the full recognition of those around his bed. Being asked if he had any word to leave to his boys, he replied: 'Oh! they are the burden of my soul; if they were only children of God, I would ask no more.' Being further pressed to know if he had any directions to give concerning them, he added: 'The same Jesus who has watched over me can take care of them.' On being asked again, if there was anything he wished done, when he was gone, the triumphant word of faith came back, 'The Judge of all the earth will do right.'

"He lay much with his hands folded across his breast, with lips moving as if in prayer. Then, at other times, there would fall upon the ear troubled and incoherent utterances, which, when caught, would reveal his mental habits. Lifting his finger, as if addressing an imaginary class, he would say, 'Well, you have stated your position; now prove it.' Again, as if musing upon some metaphysical theme, he would articulate: 'The attributes—first the moral, then the intellectual, and thirdly, the religious or spiritual;' reminding one of the good Neander, who, in a like condition, would lift himself on his dying couch and say, 'To-morrow, young gentlemen, we will resume our exertions upon the sixth chapter of John.' It is our loss that there are no more last sayings to record of such a master; for

'The tongues of dying men
Enforce attention, like deep harmony;
The setting sun, and music at the close,
As the last taste of sweets, is sweetest last,
Writ in remembrance more than things long past.'

Yet, they are not needed. Our brother's whole life was a continued chant; and memory will preserve its music, returning upon us with ceaseless echoes, till we, too, sleep. The last time but one it was the writer's privilege to hear him in the pulpit, in one of those outbursts of emotion so characteristic of his eloquence, he exclaimed: 'I am often very weary; weary with work, as the feeble body reels beneath its accumulated toils; weary of struggling with my own distrustful and unbelieving heart; weary with the wickedness of men, and with the effort to put a bridle upon human passions; and I often sigh to be at rest.' Brother, thou hast entered into rest; and we are the more weary for the loss of thee!

The Holy Spirit placed his seal upon that pallid brow. The partition is very thin between the two worlds, when we come to stand upon the borders of both; and the beautiful light streams through the curtain which separates them, and throws a strange radiance upon the dying believer, the prophecy of a glorious transfiguration. Says Dr. Adger, who came in at the last hour, just in time to catch the last look of recognition and love: 'Delightful smiles played over his countenance, as, on a summer evening, the harmless lightning plays, with incessant flashes, upon the bosom of a cloud.' The last work of the Holy Ghost was being done, in completing the saint's likeness to his Lord; and that Lord was speaking with his servant face to face, as he did with Moses out of the cloud. The last broken words, upon which the departing soul was borne into the bosom of God, were ejaculations of wonder and praise: 'Wonderful! beautiful! Nothing but space! Expanse! Expanse! Expanse!' And so he passed upward and stood before the Throne.

'How glorious now, with vision purified
At the Essential Truth, entirely free
From error, he, investigating still,
From world to world at pleasure roves, on wing
Of golden ray upborne; or at the feet
Of heaven's most ancient sages sitting, hears
New wonders of the wondrous works of God.'

"His remains were conveyed to Columbia, in a car specially set apart by the kindness of the President of the railroad. The funeral services were conducted, on a Sabbath afternoon, in the Presbyterian church, where he had so long proclaimed the gospel of his Lord, in the presence of an immense multitude, who had assembled to pay the last homage to greatness and to goodness. The Rev. Dr. John B. Adger, with difficult utterance, took, as the text of his discourse, the watchword of his departed friend, 'Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?' The Rev. Dr. George Howe, his colleague in the Seminary, and the Rev. F. P. Mullally, who had been co-pastor with him in the church, assisted in the impressive service. As the long procession moved through the streets of

that beautiful town, to the resting-place of the dead, the city bell tolled its solemn and plaintive notes, expressive of the public and the common grief. In the family enclosure in Elmwood Cemetery, the precious dust was committed to the earth, by the side of the loved daughter, who but three years before was laid to rest. There, in a quiet and beautiful spot, by the banks of a soft-murmuring stream, the stranger will find a solid block of pure white Italian marble, upon whose face he will read only this inscription, in bold relief,

‘JAMES HENLEY THORNWELL.’”

The method of treatment adopted by the author we regard as, on the whole, very judicious and happy, although we apprehend that it is only concerning this matter there is likely to be any difference of opinion in the minds of the readers of the work. We would be glad to furnish extracts conveying the author's account of some of the principal features and incidents of Dr. Thornwell's life, but the fact that this could not be done with justice either to the writer or his subject without considerable fulness of detail, and that the limits of this article will not admit of our doing that prevents us from gratifying our desire in this regard. We must content ourselves with exhibiting the manner in which the author has used the materials which he had at his command—and they were so meagre that the wonder is he has succeeded as well as he has—by submitting the headings of the chapters into which the work is divided. They are as follows: “I. Parentage and Birth; II. Early Boyhood; III. His Patrons; IV. Preparation for College; V. College Life; VI. College Life Continued; VII. His Conversion; VIII. His Teaching at Cheraw; IX. Residence at Cambridge; X. First Pastorate; XI. First Professorship; XII. Voyage to Europe; XIII. Letters from Europe; XIV. Old and New School Controversy; XV. Polemic Career Begun; XVI. The Board Question; XVII. General Correspondence; XVIII. The Elder Question; XIX. Call to Baltimore; XX. Question of Romish Baptism; XXI. Assemblies of 1847 and 1848; XXII. Personal Friendships; XXIII. State Education; XXIV. Call to Charleston; XXV. Presidency of the College; XXVI. Presidency Continued; XXVII. Close of His Presidency; XXVIII. Editorship of *Southern Quarterly Review*; XXIX. Seminary

Life; XXX. Seminary Life Continued; XXXI. Second Voyage to Europe; XXXII. The Late War; XXXIII. His Course in the War; XXXIV. Organization of the Southern Assembly; XXXV. His Death; XXXVI. General Review: As an educator; as philosopher and theologian; as a preacher; as a presbyter; as a Christian and a man. Appendix: I. Notices of Sermons; II. 'Our Danger and Our Duty;' III. 'The State of the Country.'"

This general view of the contents of the book indicates the mode in which the author has treated the life of his great subject. The sectional distribution of the history is natural and logical, and its development sufficiently exhaustive. We admire the taste and judgment which led the writer to confine himself to a single volume; there are perhaps none who will not concede that he has been governed by a just sense of perspective in the composition of the work. It may be that some of Dr. Thornwell's friends would have been gratified by a somewhat fuller and more circumstantial presentation of incidents, as, for example, the effects produced by the delivery of particular sermons and speeches. Such a desire would be easily accounted for; but, in the first place, it is not at all improbable that the author has availed himself of all that sort of material which came into his possession, after using every fair means to solicit such contributions to his work from parties in whose power he supposed it lay to furnish them; and, in the second place, it may be that, supposing he did have in hand a somewhat ampler stock of personal incidents than has been embodied in the book, he deemed it inexpedient, by such an addition, to spin out the story to greater length than it actually assumed under the prosecution of his plan. Everything—his scrupulous regard for the reputation of the man whose life he was writing, his intimate friendship for him while living, and his veneration for his memory now that he is dead—conspire to make him a competent judge in the case. We confess that we would have been glad if Dr. Palmer had deemed it consistent with the limits or the scope of his work to have taken up and subjected to examination a criticism which has been passed upon Dr. Thornwell's consistency as a theologi-

cal thinker, in reference to a point of doctrine which he has discussed in his writings. There was no one more able than he to have set that matter in a true light, but we have no doubt that he had good reasons for refraining from its consideration. It is not unlikely that he may have judged that as the criticism alluded to was occasioned by the posthumous publication of Dr. Thornwell's Writings, the office of replying to it belonged more properly to a reviewer than to a biographer. As we have adverted to this subject, we will embrace the opportunity of offering some explanatory statements which, we think, will be sufficient to show that the criticism in question is grounded in a misapprehension of the facts of the case.

In the year 1860 appeared the elaborate and able work of the Rev. Dr. Samuel J. Baird, entitled "Elohim Revealed," in which he propounded his theory of the "numerical identity" of the race with Adam as the ground of their implication in the responsibility of his sin. This work Dr. Thornwell reviewed in an exceedingly vigorous and masterly article published in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW. In that article he utterly denies the theory of numerical identity, and contends that the federal relation between Adam, as a representative, and his posterity, is the real ground of the imputation to them of the guilt of his first sin, and at the same time furnishes a sufficient vindication of the justice of God in holding the race responsible for that sin. More than ten years after the publication of the article against Dr. Baird, the first two volumes of Dr. Thornwell's Collected Writings were issued. The first volume contained his Lectures on Theology, which had not previously appeared in print. This led to the supposition that the Lectures were written subsequently to the publication of the review of Dr. Baird's work. In the Lecture on Original Sin, Dr. Thornwell confesses the leaning of his mind to the theory of a generic or substantive unity between Adam and his race, as vindicating the justice of his appointment as their federal head and representative, and of the imputation of his guilt to them. Through ignorance of the facts of the case, it was supposed that this lecture was posterior in the order of production to the article against Dr. Baird, and

that in it Dr. Thornwell had receded from the ground maintained in the article, and had substantially adopted the theory of numerical identity which he had previously so strongly opposed. Hence the charge of inconsistency arose, and, it must be admitted, was, on that hypothesis, invested with some plausibility. For the discussion of Dr. Baird's position had thoroughly drawn Dr. Thornwell's mind to the questions involved; his judgment must have been carefully and definitely formed in regard to them. And if the lecture was written afterwards, there would seem to have occurred some modification of his views, or at least a strange inattention to the possible construction of his terms. Now, the fact is, that the lecture, as it stands in the Collected Writings, was written before the article. Before obtaining full evidence in regard to the matter, we had come to the conclusion that the lecture was the earlier production of the two, for the obvious reason that it contained no allusion whatsoever to the theory of numerical identity—a thing which would have been unaccountable had the article been first written. But we had the means of verifying this judgment, and we took the pains to employ them. We knew that Dr. T. D. Witherspoon had, while a student of theology, in 1859, had taken full notes of Dr. Thornwell's Lectures, and had enjoyed the opportunity, in consequence of his peculiar relations to the Doctor, of comparing them with the manuscripts of the lectures. Accordingly we wrote to him in regard to this matter, asking him to inform us whether his notes of the Lecture on Original Sin were identical with it in the form in which it appears in the Collected Writings. He replied, stating that the correspondence is almost *verbatim*, as well in regard to the portion in which Dr. Thornwell speaks of generic unity as to the others. As the notes were taken in the spring of 1859, and the article against Dr. Baird was written in 1860, the proof is transparent that he could not in the lecture have abandoned the ground maintained in the article. If there was any change at all, it was from the position of the lecture to that of the review.

In the next place, it cannot be fairly shown that the position of the lecture coincides with the theory of Dr. Baird in regard

to the nature of the relation between Adam and his seed. Dr. Thornwell nowhere in that production uses the terms "numerical identity," and it is but fair to suppose that he meant something else than Dr. Baird's identity by the expressions "fundamental," "generic," and "substantive" unity. We have Dr. Wither-
spoon's statement that in the year previous to that in which the Lecture on Original Sin, as contained in the Collected Writings, was delivered to the Senior class of the Seminary, Dr. Thornwell used the following language in commenting upon Calvin's view of the transmission of Adam's sin: "Calvin draws a distinction between Adam as a parent and Adam as a root. In the term *root* he implies the mystic unity of the race in Adam. He was not merely man, but humanity; not a man, but human nature. This is but a modification of the old dogma of Plato and the Realists. Adam, as a root, contained the ideal humanity. Every man was generically or potentially in Adam, and thus destroyed with him. Calvin certainly inclines to this doctrine of the Realists, that there is an abstract essence of humanity participated in by all men. But this involves a philosophical dogma which the Scriptures do not recognise, and upon which, even if it were philosophically true, we would have no right to found a scripture doctrine. But I do not believe in generals as really existing. They are only logical deductions from particulars, and, therefore, I cannot rest the truth of the doctrine upon any such theory." It is not probable that in the interval between this utterance and that of the article against Dr. Baird, Dr. Thornwell had adopted a theory coincident with that of numerical identity. That would involve the supposition of two changes—one to that theory, and the other from it; and that in the course of three years. *Credat Judæus!*

In the third place, the language of the Lecture on Original Sin in regard to the unity of the race in Adam is hypothetical and cautious: "If there is a fundamental unity in the race," "I must confess that in my own mind there is a leaning towards a theory which shall carry back the existence of the individual in some sense to Adam." On the other hand, the tone of the article upon Dr. Baird's book is positive and dogmatic. Our own

conviction is, that when he wrote the Lecture on Original Sin, Dr. Thornwell had allowed himself to go farther than was his wont into speculation as to the nature of the relation between Adam and his posterity, and the ground of divine justice in the imputation of his guilt to them; but that, when he encountered Dr. Baird's theory, he saw the peril of indulging in that line of thought, and definitely resiled to his old, scriptural position in reference to the representative relation. At all events, it is incontestable that there was no subsequent abandonment of the view so powerfully maintained in the review of Dr. Baird's theory, and that that article embodied his last published thoughts upon the important subject it discussed. The lecture, therefore, must be interpreted by the article.

To return to Dr. Palmer's book. We trust that the results which it will achieve will be commensurate with the consummate ability with which it is written. We doubt not that one of the first which it will produce will be to correct certain misapprehensions which have been entertained by those who did not know him well in reference to the great man whose life it so faithfully depicts. It was supposed by some that he was stern and gloomy, and by others that he was simply and coldly intellectual. An English Presbyterian magazine spoke of him as being to his people the incarnation of "sheer intelligence." No one can read this memoir without perceiving that there was in him a singular absence of harshness and asceticism, and that he was at the farthest possible remove from being a huge intellectual iceberg. He was as simple and gleeful as a child; and while he had a marvellous intelligence, it were difficult to say whether or not it preponderated over the warm and loving sympathies of a broad and catholic heart. If we might appropriate to him language which savors of paganism, we would say that upon him

"Every god did seem to set his seal,
To give the world assurance of a man."

He was not perfect, for when we knew him he lived on earth, but all the virtues were represented in him; the Sacred Nine of the Scriptures, the sisterhood of the heavenly graces, attended him whithersoever he went.

Another beneficial result that we confidently expect to flow from the publication of this work is the elevation of the standard of scholarship and preaching among us, and the encouragement of young men to overcome by invincible determination and strenuous effort all the obstacles which oppose the cultivation of their powers, and the accomplishment of the noblest ends of life. A concrete case of the realisation of ideal excellence is a mighty enforcer of the obligation to seek it. The attainment is seen, at least in measure, to be a possibility. The temptation to despair in the face of difficulties is lessened, if it be not entirely destroyed. Every man, it is true, is not a genius. But what one man by labor and patience has achieved, another man, in his degree, may do. We need just such an exemplification as our biographer paints of the acquirements of the scholar made by one born and reared among us, in our present depressed condition, in which some of the spurs to exertion created by the opportunity for honor and preferment are taken away, and the struggle for subsistence thrusts itself upon our young men as apparently the paramount duty of the hour. Thornwell, too, was the powerful preacher, and his example, as held up in this book, must stimulate candidates for the ministry to follow in his steps. While he lived he stamped, as far as his influence reached, his impress upon the style of preaching. That cold and passionless tone of pulpit effort with which, in our boyhood, we were familiar could not live in the contrast furnished by his fervent, unread, apostolic delivery of the glorious gospel of the blessed God. It is our belief that he has wrought a revolution in the type of preaching in all that section of country of which he was a radiating centre of influence. A Presbyterian need not now be told that he preaches like a Methodist because he looks at his congregation instead of his manuscript, and takes fire from the inspiration of his theme. He may even escape the imputation of rant, although in the vehemence of his zeal he may sometimes dare to employ what was common to the ancient orator, and the absence of which in the British Parliament David Hume deplored—the *supplicatio pedis*—and may lift up his voice like a trumpet and speak of Hell instead of Hades to immortal spirits,

swiftly passing with him to a flaming bar and an eternal doom. We can never forget how we were waked up as from a dream when we first heard the thrilling tones and saw the impassioned manner of this mighty preacher. We were wont to come away from listening to him, as John Foster said of himself after a sermon by Robert Hall, with the impression of having breasted a storm. And now that he is dead, he yet speaketh through the eloquent portraiture of this book. We trust and believe that it will exercise a powerful influence in moulding the type of preaching in the Southern Presbyterian Church.

This biography, moreover, must unquestionably contribute to direct attention, on the part especially of non-ministerial readers, to Dr. Thornwell's writings—a result the value of which it is impossible to overestimate. It will be a happy circumstance, a matter of devout thanksgivings to God, if the noble, comprehensive views of the gospel, and the scriptural representations of the Church and the Presbyterian system, expressed in those works, shall be, through the instrumentality of this book, brought into contact with the mind and heart of those who are taking the place of the fathers, and by whom, under God, the future policy and interests of our Church must be directed. Dr. Thornwell was a reformer in the sphere of the Church. The grand, distinctive principles of the Presbyterian system which others had contended for amidst the stern conflicts in which his life began, it became his vocation, by the instrument of his powerful logic, to develop into higher significance and fuller proportions; while there were other cardinal truths, as, for instance, the spiritual office and sphere and ends of the Church, which it seemed to be his mission to call out into light and to imbed in the hearts of the people of Christ. For some time he battled with undaunted courage, but with apparently trivial success, for these inestimable principles; but ere he fell asleep he was permitted to witness the organisation of a church which welcomed them to her heart, and made them the watchwords of her future career. Wo worth the day if she should consent to sink this her peculiar testimony, for the utterance of which she was born, and profanely despising the glorious opportunity opened up to her in

the providence of her Head, relinquish, by a species of moral suicide, her distinctive existence, and, by her own election, pass once more into the forlorn estate of Gibeonitish hewers of wood and drawers of water to a secularized ecclesiasticism!

The only remaining result of the publication of this work which we will mention is, that it adds a fresh contribution to the vindication of the Southern participants in the late war from the charge of having been governed by unwarrantable passion, or the temper of wicked resistance to legitimate authority. Dr. Thornwell was not a disciple of Calhoun, nor bred in the school of nullification and secession. He was ardently attached to the Union, and almost to the opening notes of the great struggle deprecated the severance of the bond which linked the States together in a mighty confederation. Nothing but the profoundest convictions could have induced him to espouse the other side, and by argument and appeal and personal sacrifice, urge the Southern people to contend as for altars and hearths. The advocacy of the cause by such men was not needed to make it right; but it will tend to redeem it from unmerited reproach before the bar of an impartial future. And when, finally, it shall come to a higher and truer judgment upon this solemn matter than this poor world can furnish, it will afford a presumption in favor of our approval if we shall be found in the company of such men as James H. Thornwell.

We had hoped to append a few personal reminiscences of Dr. Thornwell as a thinker and a preacher, but the length to which this article has been protracted warns us to desist. We would have been glad to steal to his grave and add our humble sprig of cypress to that beautiful wreath of amaranth which has now, by the hand of affection, been reverently laid upon it. For we, too, knew him; and although we were not privileged, as was the author of this memoir, to lie in the bosom of his friendship, yet it was once ours to hear him from Sabbath to Sabbath, as, with scarcely less than an angel's ability and fervor, he preached the glories of redeeming grace. We have wept freely under the naked exhibitions of his argumentative power, and been transported out of self-consciousness by appeals that seemed to blend

the thunders of Sinai and the judgment bar with the melting accents of the Cross. We are not reluctant to state that we have gained more insight into the scheme of redemption from his writings—gathered and treasured as our theological jewels long before his works were collected and given to the world—than from those even of John Calvin and John Owen themselves. Wonderful man! When we were on a march to Malvern Hill, one whispered to us that Thornwell was dead! Fatigue, privation, hardship, country itself, were all forgotten under the weight of those appalling tidings, and thousands experienced the same overwhelming emotions. Lamentation broke forth from the length and breadth of the South; his native State covered her face and wept; but it was the Church of his love—the darling Jerusalem of his heart—that bowed in deepest grief above his bier; while she might have been conceived as pouring forth the passionate and touching lament:

Λάμβανε, Περσεφόνα, τὸν ἐμὸν πόσιν· ἔσσι γὰρ αὐτὰ
Πολλὸν ἐμεῦ κρείσσων· τὸ δὲ πᾶν καλὸν εἰς σὲ καταρῖρει.
Θνάσκεῖς, ὦ τριπέθατε· πόθος δέ μοι, ὡς θναρ. ἐπιτη.

But nay; he cannot vanish as a dream, though he walk no more among living men. Embalmed in the heart of the passing generation amid a thousand precious recollections, he cannot by them be forgotten; this memoir, attended by a retinue of traditions, will transmit his memory to other times; nor will he cease to be remembered while a human name is cherished as the symbol of genius, learning, and piety, of courage, honor, and truth.

We cannot close these comments upon the work before us without adverting to the fact that it was purely a labor of love, unattended with the slightest material advantage to the author; and without also giving expression to the feeling that, by its production, he has entitled himself to the gratitude of the friends of Dr. Thornwell, of South Carolina, of the Southern Presbyterian Church, and of the whole South whose distinctive opinions that great man so ably expounded, and whose memorable struggle for constitutional rights he so earnestly endorsed. Nor will he be without the meed of praise from the admirers of genius and the friends of truth everywhere into whose hands his book may

come. He has, indeed, erected a monument to the memory of the illustrious dead more durable than brass or stone—one which the weather of centuries will not disintegrate, nor the tooth of time corrode. He has already won the plaudits of his brethren, and the cordial, Well done! of all whose approbation he would esteem. We have understood that a second edition of the book is called for. It is to be hoped that the author may see his way clear to issue it. It will afford the opportunity of eliminating errors of typography, and a few others affecting the sense, which through inadvertence crept into the present edition and mar its perfection. These external blemishes ought to be removed from a work which is internally a master-piece.

ARTICLE VI.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT SAVANNAH.

There were present at the Savannah Assembly only one hundred and twenty-one commissioners, against one hundred and thirty-three at the St. Louis Assembly. Not counting Hangchow and Sao Paulo, we have fifty-five Presbyteries, entitled each to two, and seven entitled each to four, so that the whole possible number of commissioners is one hundred and thirty-eight. Last year all were present except three ruling elders. This year some three ministers and a dozen ruling elders were absent. But the body was large enough for all useful purposes. The Lord grant that our Church may prosper and increase; but let us make arrangements in season to prevent our highest ecclesiastical court from ever becoming an overgrown assemblage. One hundred and fifty men, carefully selected, can better serve the Church as a supreme judicatory than any crowd of three hundred which can be brought together.

There was some complaint of a difficulty in hearing, owing to a muffled echo in the house; but we experienced no particular

difficulty of this sort, albeit not blessed with very good ears. But it may be added that there were no adequate arrangements for reporting the proceedings. The consequence is, that the Church must be content with a meagre and very frequently an erroneous representation of what was said. Here, as well as anywhere else, it may be mentioned that this Assembly appointed a new officer, with a view to remedying this crying evil. At the Augusta Assembly, it was urged that the body stood as much in need of an official reporter as of clerks; but we failed in our effort then to get one appointed. Now, at this fifteenth of our General Assemblies, it was renewed with success. What a high value we would all set on full and accurate reports of all the proceedings of these fifteen Assemblies, if arrangements had only been made to furnish them! The plan now adopted is for the Assembly to appoint a reporter, thus giving permanence, dignity, and value to the office, and then, this reporter and the two clerks are made a committee to make all proper arrangements for publishing the reports. It is supposed that the expense can easily be paid, partly by the newspapers which will desire to have access to the reports, and partly by subscriptions of individuals desirous to get a daily account of proceedings. The reporter is allowed to appoint two assistants, and the clerks to fix his and their salaries, the whole expense to the Assembly in no case to exceed two hundred dollars. The Rev. George L. Wolfe was appointed the reporter; and the clerks were empowered to fill any vacancy.

The number of new men was considerable, and it may have been feared that the Assembly would prove to be inferior, in point of ability. Such apprehensions vanished early in the sessions. The younger brethren won golden opinions for themselves by their modesty and discretion, joined to their power in debate. It appears to us that not many of our Assemblies have contained more material of good quality. None that we ever knew was more patient and good-tempered. Unfailing courtesy was observed from first to last. The discussions were earnest, and on subjects which roused the feelings of men; but not one word was spoken giving personal offence to any. Dr. William Brown, who ought to know, says, "taken all together, this is the

most important Assembly which has met since 1861, and we think its business, on the whole, was wisely disposed of." He adds that the seasons of worship held by the Assembly were very delightful, and that the way a good old tune or a good new one, heartily sung by such a body, puts into the shade the trills and demi-semi-quavers of our ambitious choirs, was remarkably illustrated in the late meetings at Savannah.

THE MODERATOR'S SERMON.

Though not doing justice to his well-known eloquence and power, this was an able and effective discourse of just one hour's length, from John iv. 38: "Other men labored and ye are entered into their labors." Dr. Hoge is every inch a preacher, and reading a written discourse is not preaching such as he can dispense. Yet the beauty and the force of what he read secured for it the unflagging attention of his large audience.

ELECTION OF NEW MODERATOR.

Since the adjournment of the Assembly, it has been intimated in more than one quarter, that this turned on the successful candidate's being more ready than his brethren to join hands with the Northern Church, just as Dr. Van Dyke was made Moderator at Brooklyn, in testimony that the barriers to fraternal correspondence were giving way. Both statements, we believe, belong to the one order of *gush*. Certain we are that the former statement is entirely incorrect. Dr. Smoot was nominated and modestly declined in favor of older servants of the Church. Dr. Stuart Robinson then named two such, whom he held up as having earned the honor by their services; but one of these had always declined the Moderator's chair, because of partial deafness, and so he moved that the other, Dr. B. M. Smith, be elected by acclamation. Dr. Adger then said the sooner our Assembly abandoned all idea of electing men to do them kindness or show them honor, the better, and that the true principle is to elect for the work to be done. The Assembly ought to choose the man who will best serve it in the chair. He would be flattered by election, but was of opinion that a man whose hearing is imperfect ought not to be chosen. Nor yet should one of the

oldest men be made Moderator, but the man who can best do the work of presiding, even though he were the youngest in the house. And he hoped that Dr. Robinson's motion would prevail, and Dr. Smith be elected by acclamation. Then Dr. Brank was nominated as well fitted for the position. Dr. Adger's nomination was still insisted on, probably by some who, like himself, are a little *hard of hearing*; but after one balloting and one standing vote, which gave Dr. Smith the majority, his election was declared by vote to be unanimous. Probably it never entered into the mind of one member of the body to inquire whether one or another of those named was for or against fraternal relations.

The principle here enunciated by Dr. Adger, it must be confessed, is the true one. Of course nobody would deny that it is well enough to acknowledge eminent usefulness, and that it is highly proper to pay respect to a great truth in any man who may have successfully vindicated it; but unquestionably the main point in electing a Moderator for the Assemblies, as also in electing commissioners to the Assembly, is to get *a certain work well done*. The past will be rewarded in the future, but let the present look to it that it gets its work well done. This idea of *not honors but work* has a very wide sweep. Not only does it cut off that false notion in some Presbyteries, that the members are to go to the Assembly in rotation, but it cuts off as well in the Assembly the abomination of "log-rollings" for office, and all "the special requests" by the friends and admirers of some great Doctor to have some particular honor done to him. If our Assemblies were more in dead earnest about their work, there would be less thought and said about the honors.

The new Moderator presided with dignity, vigilance, and ability, and, as all will testify, with complete fairness and impartiality.

The Rev. J. E. DuBose was elected the Temporary Clerk.

REPORT ON FOREIGN MISSIONS.

The Executive Committee reported that this is the first year since our Church fairly entered upon Foreign Missions that no new missionaries have been sent abroad. Never was the call more urgent for more laborers; never our young people more

willing to consecrate themselves to this work. One young minister under appointment eighteen months, holds a call from one of our best churches, waiting to see what commands shall issue from this Assembly. Not only have no new missionaries been sent, but none can be sent for some time to come, without large augmentation of the receipts at the treasury.

We began the year just ended with a debt of \$15,000. It came upon us thus: During the two years which ended April 1, 1875, twenty-two missionary laborers and about half that number of native helpers, were added to our force. This large increase was not made hastily, but considerately. And it did not appear to the Assembly, or to the Committee, in May, 1874, that the needful increase of \$12,000 was too much to be expected from the churches. But our hopes were not realised.

The contributions of the year just closed, however, have been \$19,038.98 in excess of the year previous. Had there been a like amount raised that year, we should have had no debt. We have also applied the pruning knife abroad, reducing schools, diminishing colporteurs, and in some cases diminishing the salaries of missionaries. We report, therefore, the debt reduced to \$9,848.67. The number of contributing churches is 1,121, an increase of 224, which makes nearly two-thirds of the whole. The number of Ladies' Associations is increased by 50, and now amounts to 108, and they have contributed \$3,362.52 more than last year. The contributing Sabbath-schools are 270, and their gifts amount to \$6,605.51—an increase of \$549.02.

We have 75 laborers in the field, and 16 principal stations, with many more out-stations, 12 schools of various grades and 500 pupils in them, many of whom will become, it is hoped, efficient helpers. As now projected, to say nothing about enlargement, the work cannot be effectively carried on and the debt paid, without an income of \$75,000 as against \$61,273.27, contributed this year. The churches must this year raise \$75,000, or some portion of our foreign work be abandoned. And which portion shall it be? Shall the Greek, the Chinese, the South American, the Mexican, or the Western Indian missions, be the first to be thrust from the bosom of our Church?

ACTION TAKEN ON FOREIGN MISSIONS.

Dr. Adger reported on behalf of the Standing Committee, "that the facts presented by the Executive Committee in their report, were well fitted to disturb our Church's equanimity. The work as at present projected could not be carried forward effectively, and the debt be paid, without an increase of contributions of some \$14,000 over the last year's amount, and yet the last year's givings to Foreign Missions by our Church, were \$19,000 in advance of the year previous. One thing was plain, namely, that the Assembly is required to look very carefully into whatever measures are proposed by its Executive and also its Standing Committee on Foreign Missions. If we moved forward too rapidly in 1874 and in 1875, the responsibility of the grand and noble error lies at the door of the Church's highest court. It cannot devolve on its Committees the task of saying how much money may be expected during two years to come, from its Presbyteries and their churches, and accordingly on what scale the Executive Committee must graduate the expenses of our share of the dissemination of the gospel abroad. The Assembly therefore must carefully consider and decide what is to be said on the one hand to the Committee at Baltimore and to the missionaries abroad and to the people to whom they have been sent, touching the extent and degree of our willingness to support this work; and what should be said, on the other hand, to ourselves and our fellow-ministers and our fellow-members of Christ connected with our Presbyteries and Sessions, as to the duty we owe to our Lord, relative to the spread of his kingdom abroad. Our Church is now on trial before its sister Churches and the world, and before its adorable Head, touching the question whether we shall sustain what we have undertaken, or abandon it in dishonor. In the meanwhile it is ground for rejoicing that we have the seal of our Master's approval on every department of the work abroad, and that we are straitened nowhere except in about one-third of our churches, who give nothing for foreign missions, and in a portion of our ministers and elders who do not strive as they might to rouse these churches to some share in this work.

"In view of all these things, your Standing Committee recom-

mend that the Assembly do now take up, as the one great matter regarding our foreign work, these questions: Shall we endeavor this year to stand where we now stand? or, shall we go backwards by retrenchment of our operations? or, relying on our brethren who are the pastors of the flock, both teaching and ruling elders, to appeal earnestly to the people, with full instructions given them on the subject, and relying also on the grace which our Master only can afford by his Holy Spirit, shall the Executive Committee be authorised and instructed to send out those sons and daughters of the Church who are waiting to enter the field, and in other needful respects to undertake such moderate enlargement as may seem to them imperatively necessary?"

In presenting this report, he remarked that we had evidently reached a crisis. We have a debt resting on this work, of \$10,000. And if we do not raise, this year, \$14,000 more than the last, the question will be, which of our missions to cut off. But can this Assembly consent to take any step backwards, or even to stand where we are, and not move forward at all? Life must involve growth, and to cease growing is the beginning of decay. He confessed to great embarrassment of mind. The times are hard, and may become harder. To increase our debt is to be rash. Yet we could raise \$75,000; yes, and could swell it to \$85,000, if all our ministers and elders will but instruct and encourage our people. Moderator, what shall we say? Will this Assembly speak to our Israel to go forward, or must we say, stand still, or turn and flee?

Dr. John L. Wilson, the Secretary, said it is impossible to carry on the work of Foreign Missions without the liability to debt. Contributions are irregular, and the progress of the work itself is irregular. We must follow the indications of God's providence and God's Spirit. We cannot set a limit beyond which we will not go. The estimates of the missions last January, for the current year, were reduced by the Committee from \$60,000 to \$50,000, and it was one of the most painful duties of his life to take part in this reduction. But the letters from the missionaries afterwards were still more painful. Nor is it possible to stand still until the financial distress is over. There is no

such thing as standing still. He spoke then of the experience of the Free Church of Scotland, which in similar circumstances decided that it would not go backwards but forwards, and did go forward, with God's manifest blessing. To go back would be to bring disgrace upon our Church.

A venerable ruling elder, T. Q. Cassels of Georgia, rose and asked if it was proposed to turn the wheels of salvation backward. Let His cause go backwards, who has redeemed us to himself!

Dr. Hoge thanked Mr. Cassels for his figure, and said those chariot wheels of salvation were not made to go backwards, nor yet to stand still. One reason why the Church is not doing more for missions, is the infidelity that has crept into her bosom on the whole subject. We have to combat the heresy that some of the races are too low for the gospel to raise them up. Dr. Hoge's was one of the most effective missionary addresses ever heard by us, but we are unable to report it. And he was followed in another most effective speech by Dr. Robinson, which we are also quite unable to report. Dr. Robinson moved to recommit with instructions. Subsequently, the following report was presented by Dr. Adger, and adopted:

The Assembly having recommitted this report with instructions, the Standing Committee now return it, and recommend for adoption (along with the same) the following resolutions, to wit:

1. That this General Assembly, after full consideration of the question brought before it in the above report of the Standing Committee as to the alternatives between which we have to choose, of endeavoring to maintain merely our present hold of the missionary work, or of retrenchment on the one hand, or prudent and cautious yet firm and steady progress on the other, are convinced that to stand still or go backwards a single step are alike impossible if we would save the work from ruin and our Church from dishonor, and that there is nothing else we can say to our Executive Committee, except that in reliance on the grace of our Master and the faithful zeal of our ministers and elders and people, young as well as old, female as well as male, we do bid the Committee go forward, wisely, prudently, courageously, hopefully, trustfully in the glorious work committed to its hands.

2. That notwithstanding the debt of \$10,000, which still remains to be paid on foreign missionary work, it has the manifest seal of our Lord's most gracious approbation, and that our Church, though coming

very far short of its full duty, is evidently on the upward march on this matter; that this Assembly commends the increasing liberality of our churches, our ladies and our Sunday-schools, and that it earnestly exhorts all to aim at raising at the very least \$75,000 for this sacred cause during the current year.

REPORT ON SUSTENTATION, ETC.

The Executive Committee reported that it is matter of congratulation that in a year of unwonted stringency, our people have been able to maintain these agencies of the Church in vigor, and to add something to their strength and usefulness. There is an increase in contributing churches of 219 to Sustentation, 187 to Evangelistic work, and 222 to the Invalid Fund. For *Sustentation*, the total receipts this year have been \$22,664.68, against \$21,186.65 last year. For the *Evangelistic Fund*, the receipts have been \$852.82 more than last year. For the *Colored Evangelistic Fund*, the receipts, though small, were enough to meet all demands upon it. For the *Invalid Fund*, the receipts have been \$1,700.25 more than last year. For the *Relief Fund*, the investments now reach \$18,000 in good bonds, and from this fund \$2,880 have been paid this year to the families of five deceased ministers.

During the year past, fifty-one Presbyteries have been aided from the Sustentation Fund, for the support of one hundred and eighty-five ministers, to the amount of \$19,117.81, and for nineteen church-buildings, to the amount of \$25,520. Much more was called for by the Presbyteries, but this was all the Committee could appropriate without running into debt.

Fifty-one "evangelists" have been employed, in whole or in part, by thirty-six Presbyteries; the results are represented as, on the whole, satisfactory. The chief difficulty grows out of the paucity of ministers whose qualifications and circumstances unite in fitting them for the work.

Fifteen Presbyteries report something done for the evangelization of the colored people. The Presbyteries of Augusta, Savannah, Central Mississippi, Charleston, and Roanoke, have been assisted from the fund. The Presbytery of Memphis has sustained its own efforts, without aid from this fund.

From the Invalid Fund, appropriations have been made to thirty-six Presbyteries for twenty-six aged and infirm ministers and sixty families of deceased ministers ; in every case to the full amount asked for. The fund has been just sufficient to meet the demands on it, leaving in the treasury only \$67.40.

On the Relief Fund there were eighty-seven names on the 1st April ; of these, seventy have paid their premiums, and seventeen have failed to do so, some of them for two years. A full and searching investigation has been given to this scheme by the aid of Mr. C. F. McCay, one of the Committee, who has had large experience as an eminent insurance actuary. It is believed to be sound, and capable of doing all that it promises. But the scheme has two defects : one that no provision exists for any minister over fifty to obtain its benefits, the other that the premiums being of the same rate for all under fifty, those much younger have no inducement to enter it. The Assembly was therefore asked to adopt the following paper, with a view to the benefits of the scheme being more generally enjoyed. Five families of ministers had the past year received the benefit of this scheme : one received \$360, and another \$720, these sums being four times the amounts they paid in ; two other families have received two annuities of \$400 each, and another an annuity of \$200.

I. The rights and privileges in the Relief Fund, as heretofore administered, shall be, and hereby are, guaranteed to all who are on its lists, and these shall be preserved to them intact.

II. The relief scheme, as heretofore administered, shall be and is hereby repealed, (except for those who are already beneficiaries under it,) and the following scheme substituted therefor, to wit :

(1.) Any congregation, or union of congregations, whose pastor at the time may be in sound health, which will pay \$30 annually to the Relief Fund, will establish a claim at his death to an annuity of \$200 for six consecutive years. If \$60 per annum is paid to the fund, the claim for annuity will be for \$400 for a like term of years. If \$100 per annum is paid, the annuity will be \$600 for a similar term.

It is understood that the benefit thus secured shall accrue only to the family or other heirs of *the regularly installed pastor* of the contributing church.

(2.) Any minister in sound health, at the age of forty-five years, may be entered on the fund by the payment of \$30, \$60, or \$100, as the case

may be, by himself, his congregation, or other person. Any minister who is less than forty-five years of age may enter the fund by the payment of an annual amount less than \$30, \$60, or \$100, by two per cent. of said sums for each year that he is younger than forty-five years; and any minister older than forty-five years up to seventy years, may have the same privilege by the annual payment of an amount larger than \$30, \$60, or \$100, by an addition to said amount, of eight per cent. per annum for every year of said excess of age.

The only limitation in the case, either of churches or individuals, beyond the above conditions, is, that no claim on the fund will be established to the full amounts above mentioned, until the fourth annual payment has been made. Previous to that period, the family or heirs will be entitled to four times as much as has been paid in to the public fund. And, further, failure to make regular annual payments shall work the forfeiture of interest in the fund, except that at the death of any pastor or other minister whose claim is thus forfeited, an amount equal to all that has been contributed to the fund on his account shall be paid.

III. It is further provided that, as heretofore, the Relief Scheme shall continue to be worked for the sole benefit of those who are subscribers to it; and if hereafter it shall be found able to pay a larger amount to the families of its deceased subscribers than is herein pledged, such an amount shall be sacredly conveyed to them under regulations approved by the General Assembly.

IV. The following particulars shall be observed:

(1.) All intrants to this scheme shall be dated as of January 1st of the current year.

(2.) Annual payments must be made promptly on or before January 1st of each year, so that the liabilities of the fund may be met at that time and investments may be made. Failure to make payment beyond the month of January shall forfeit the rights in the fund of the party thus failing, unless for good reasons, and without injury to the fund, the Executive Committee shall restore its privileges on the payment in full of arrearages, with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent. per annum.

(3.) The annuities due the families of deceased ministers are to be paid beginning with the 1st of January next succeeding the death of said ministers.

(4.) All further detail in the management of this fund is intrusted to the Executive Committee of Sustentation.

V. The investment and reinvestment of funds in permanent stocks shall be under the care of the Executive Committee, who shall report annually to the General Assembly their accounts, with a statement of the funds in hand, whether invested or not, and all other matters pertaining to the fund. The permanent investments of the fund shall be

held as heretofore by the Trustees of the General Assembly, who shall be responsible to the General Assembly for their safe custody.

ACTION TAKEN ON SUSTENTATION, ETC.

Judge Ould, chairman of the Standing Committee, reported four resolutions. The first commends the diligence of the Committee; the second enjoins the Presbyteries to foster this cause; the third approves the new plan for the Relief Fund; the fourth reappoints the Committee.

Dr. McIlwaine, the Secretary, congratulated the Assembly that the Committee were not in debt; yet he wished that the work of the Church could have been fully done. The Committee had been obliged to resort to a system of repression. The Assembly should understand that the funds are inadequate—\$18,000 more were needed, and could have been judiciously used last year. If we had \$40,000 for Sustentation, we could send joy all through the Church. Between seven and eight hundred of our churches contribute nothing. General and hearty efforts would accomplish wonders.

The Evangelistic and Invalid Funds are increasing. For colored evangelizing, thirteen Presbyteries report something doing; forty-four, however, implicitly state that they are doing nothing—a sad statement.*

Judge Ould called attention to the large number of non-contributing churches. Each should give something, if only five cents.

Dr. Burgett thought Presbyteries should require excuses from such churches.

The report was adopted.

REPORT ON PUBLICATION.

The Executive Committee reported that during the earlier months of the year their business was greatly depressed. In November it began to revive; and from the 1st January till now, it was never more prosperous. The total available receipts were \$42,704.26; disbursements for merchandise, *Children's Friend*,

*Leaving out Hangchow and Sao Paulo, we have sixty-two Presbyteries. Five of these we understand pass this matter by in silence.
EDITORS OF REVIEW.

Earnest Worker, etc., \$22,020.53 ; grants, \$5,014.28 ; commissions of agents, \$460.45 ; reduction of debt, \$3,416.38 ; salaries, \$7,726.65 ; general expenses, \$3,227.65 ; balance, \$838.02.

The assets of the Committee amount to \$61,105.20. Its liabilities amount to about \$20,000, which gives an excess of assets of \$39,705.37.

The business capital is now \$39,576.36.

The value of the Publishing House, which cost \$42,566.12, is certainly equal to this amount, according to the judgment of the most trustworthy real estate agents in the city.

The arrangements for coöperation with the Reformed Church have been consummated in part.

The assets reported are less than they were last year. Disaster overtaking so many branches of business, this Committee could hardly expect to escape reverses, especially as it has peculiar difficulties to encounter, which do not stand in the way of other houses. (1) Its object is not to make money, but furnish books at the cheapest possible rates. For example: if we had put on our Hymn-Book a revenue price, as the Methodists did, that book alone would have given us the \$20,000 capital we now need so much. (2) Our sales being chiefly to churches, Sabbath-schools, and ministers, we have to make a discount of 20 per cent. on most of our sales. (3) Our business property is some \$39,500 ; but some \$24,500 of this sum is in stereotype plates and fixtures, so that our working capital is only about \$15,000. But our business extends from New York to Western Missouri, and from Richmond to the Rio Grande ; and we can never have less than \$10,000 due on a business so scattered. (4) A publishing house cannot stand still ; it must go forwards or backwards. (5) Other houses publish popular books suited to the tastes of people. We can only publish what is of permanent value and illustrates the gospel of Christ. Our books, therefore, never can have what is called "a run." (6) The field of operations given this Committee is our own Church, and that is a body of very limited proportions.

The Committee has done its best. Men of more experience might have done better ; but the Committee has done what it

could. It has not received that material support from the Church which it was led to expect. It has been as an eagle ready to soar, and has found itself pinioned. But under the circumstances, instead of giving way to disappointment, it confesses its gratification that so much has been accomplished. But if this work is worth doing at all, it is worth doing after a new fashion. Two things are essential—a building to work in, and capital to work with. The Committee closes with the recommendation that immediate steps be taken to pay the debt on the house, and that one or more agents be appointed to visit the churches and raise the money needed for this purpose.

THE SECRETARY'S PRINTING PRESSES.

A special statement was submitted by the Secretary. In 1867, he found it necessary to purchase a press of his own, that the Committee might be able to do that part of the work which had to be done in Richmond, on moderate terms. This was sanctioned by the Committee and the Assembly, and all that was anticipated had been realised in the results. But it never was expected to be a permanent arrangement, and the Secretary had never heard a whisper of objection to the arrangement till the meeting of the last Assembly. Hearing then of this dissatisfaction, he sold out in good faith; and since January 1st has had no interest of this sort.

ACTION TAKEN ON PUBLICATION.

Dr. Burgett, chairman of Standing Committee, reported twelve resolutions, all in commendation of the diligent and faithful work of the Committee. The first one declares that there is no need for special examination into the affairs of the Committee. The seventh recommends that the Rev. A. J. Withersoon be appointed a special agent to collect funds for the Publishing House.

Touching the first resolution, the Rev. J. E. DuBose said he had had doubts whether the Committee had worked to the best advantage, but he was fully satisfied by Dr. Baird's report. The credit of the Committee must not be ruined on mere rumors. A great work had been done on a very small capital.

Rev. Jno. S. Park said the overture from the Synod of Mem-

phis, calling for investigation, was put through at the fag end of the session, when many of the members were absent.

Rev. J. B. Carne said the overture was adopted under the lead of one who brought a long statement of the business affairs of the Committee. No other person claimed to know anything about it. If we would support our Committee as earnestly as we find fault, we could do great things.

Ruling elder Moore called for a vote of censure on the Synod. They should only have acted on specific grounds.

Rev. J. A. Sloan washed the hands of Chickasaw Presbytery from the overture of the Synod.

Judge Estes favored the resolution, but opposed the censure of Synod. He was satisfied there was needed no investigation; but the Synod, as a constituent of this body, had the right to ask for investigation at any time.

Dr. Robinson was delighted with the candor of the members of the Synod of Memphis. Something should be done to stop this clamor. He was a constituent part of the State, as being a citizen, but had no right to demand investigation of officials without specific charges to make. His indignation was moved. Our Publication cause has neither money nor the credit which comes from capital. It rests on the financial genius of one man, and he has built it up by unremitting labors, and you want to *investigate* him. Sir, it is cruel. Dr. R. was ready for a general vote of censure upon fault-finders. To the financial genius of two men this Church has been greatly indebted in the line of publication, and yet they have both continually been picked at. And here on this Committee are put your best men—whose time is gold, and who serve gratuitously; and you want them investigated! It was time for this picking at our best men by sore-heads to be stopped.

Rev. Dr. T. D. Wardlaw said for some time there has been dissatisfaction and discontent, and investigation was asked, not in hostility, but to remove discontent. Suspicion is working evil. You may censure as you please, if you will remove the suspicion by investigating. Those who urge it are men worthy of all esteem and confidence.

Ruling elder Professor Waddell said the Standing Committee could find no ground for investigation, though vague dissatisfaction everywhere. But there is nothing with which somebody does not find fault.

The whole report was adopted—the first resolution by a large majority. Dr. Robinson declared when that topic came up that the purchase of the Publishing House was, in his judgment, wise and judicious.

REPORT ON EDUCATION.

The Executive Committee reported ninety-five beneficiaries, fifty-four of them in the seminaries. Twelve or fourteen of the ninety-five had been compelled to withdraw from their studies, partly for want of health, and partly of funds.

The year's work closed 30th April, with a deficiency of \$4,473 due on appropriations. Since 1st May it has been reduced to about \$3,000.

There have been eighty-eight more contributing churches the past year than the year previous, but in a majority of cases the contributions have been less; and the number of large individual contributions has also diminished.

The entire amount of funds is \$15,131.97.

The Secretary has supplied one of the organised churches in Memphis, devoting to this church only such time as was not occupied with the duties of his office. A difference of opinion prevailing as to the propriety of this arrangement, the Secretary agreed to surrender \$1,000 of his salary, beginning from the 1st of January last, and the question of this double service is submitted to the Assembly for action.

The legacy of the Lusk estate has been paid over to us by the Northern General Assembly. The amount for Education is not less than \$3,000. It was suggested that this legacy be used to pay off pledges to students.

Another legacy of \$1,000 was reported as paid since the close of the ecclesiastical year.

Much opposition to the Assembly's plan exists in influential quarters, and there is an increasing tendency to independent Presbyterian action.

The report enumerates sundry modifications which have been proposed in our Education plans : one to confine all benefactions to theological students ; another to substitute loans for appropriations ; another to remit the whole work to the Presbyteries.

SUPPLEMENTARY LETTERS.

Several of these are appended to the report, showing a difference of opinion in the Committee as to the double duties of the Secretary. Eight out of eleven members believe the two engagements to be incompatible, and urge the entire devotion of the Secretary's strength and time to the interests of Education. They express entire confidence and affection for him personally. What they desire is that he go and instruct congregations, Presbyteries, and Synods, on the whole subject. He is fully adequate, they say, to this task.

ACTION TAKEN ON EDUCATION.

Dr. Brank, chairman of the Standing Committee, reported eight resolutions, and a supplementary one approving the Secretary's supplying the church at Memphis. The resolutions were adopted without debate. One of them directed the use of the Lusk legacy in payment of the Committee's debt.

The Secretary expressed his great encouragement by the action of the Assembly. He hoped the able special report of Dr. Stratton would be read by the churches. The expenses of the Education Committee do not reach \$2,000. You pay the Secretary only \$1,500 ; and if that seems to you too much, he will serve you for less. He appealed to the Presbyteries who had overtured against the Committee to give it a fair trial. He had strong hopes that the future course of this Committee would be upward and onward.

Upon this whole subject the reviewer has but one remark to offer, and that is, to question the wisdom of using the Lusk legacy in the manner agreed on.

BENEFICIARY EDUCATION.

On this subject the last Assembly appointed a committee, (but we can find in the Minutes for 1875 no reference to the matter,) of which Dr. J. B. Stratton was the chairman, to report to the

Assembly at Savannah. His report was read on the second day, and was considered to be as clear and able as it was full. It favored the continuance of the present scheme. We are not able to state what precise action was adopted respecting it.

COLORED THEOLOGICAL INSTITUTE.

Drs. Stillman and Steadman, and ruling elder Estes, were appointed by the last Assembly to report a plan for the organisation, management, and support of such an institution. Their report was read and referred to the Standing Committee on Education. Its report favored the establishment of such an institute in a modest way, limiting the training to the English branches and instruction in Church History and Government and Systematic Theology. It recommended the appointment of Dr. Stillman, with an assistant to be chosen by him, for instructors, and places the school at Tuskalooosa. The financial responsibility was lodged with Dr. Stillman, under the general direction of the Committee of Education; and the paper as amended, was adopted.

THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION.

The Moderator, as chairman of a Committee to consider changes in our system of ministerial education, reported elaborately and fully. It was ordered that so much of this report as related to proposed modifications, be printed in the Minutes and referred to the next Assembly.

SECULAR OR POLITICAL UTTERANCES.

Drs. Brown, Hoge, and Read, were appointed last year to revise the records of all our Assemblies, and make diligent search for declarations incidentally made that were unsuitable for an ecclesiastical Assembly to utter. The object of the appointment, as stated in the original motion, was that "no vestige of anything inconsistent with the clearly defined position of our General Assemblies may be left to impair the testimony of our Church upon this vital point," of the non-political and non-secular character of the Church of Jesus Christ.

The report presented by Dr. Brown was very full. It commenced with various very explicit declarations made by our Assemblies, that the Church has nothing to do with political affairs.

Then it passed, secondly, to notice every utterance alleged to be inconsistent with these principles thus set forth. The principle is not that Christians owe no duty to the State, but that the Church shall not decide political questions. The Church may not decide which Cæsar is your master; but if he is your master, it can enjoin that you pay tribute to him. The government, as to the Church, can only be *de facto*; as to the citizen, it may be both *de facto* and *de jure*. The Assemblies of our Church never decided the question of allegiance for those living under another *de facto* government, and made that decision a test of membership and a ground of discipline. But the expressions, "we," "our cause," "our army," which were sometimes inadvertently used, should be disapproved. The Narrative of 1864, hastily adopted on the eve of adjournment, and under the excitement of the news of terrible battles which had just occurred, contained two expressions requiring notice: one about domestic servitude being of divine appointment, like civil government and like marriage; the other about our Church's mission to conserve slavery. Touching the former, it was maintained that the clear meaning was not that slavery was of divine appointment as universally obligatory, but under peculiar circumstances. Touching the latter, that in the "New School Minutes" of 1865, we read that it is "the mission of the Church to conserve the State;" and in the same sense the term was applicable to slavery, viz., the sense of *improving* and *making the best of it*. On the whole, (1) it is matter of gratitude that so little can be found to be animadverted on; (2) that the most of what lies open to criticism, arose manifestly from inadvertence; (3) that the unfavorable interpretations put on them are opposed to the plain declarations made of her principles by our Church.

The report then declares, in the name of the Assembly of 1876, its reaffirmation of the explicit and formal statements made in 1861 in our "Address to all the Churches;" and then, inasmuch as some incidental expressions, uttered in times of great public excitement, are found upon our records, and have been pointed out, which seem to be ambiguous or inconsistent with the statements aforesaid, this Assembly does hereby disavow

such wherever found, and does not recognise them as forming any part of the well-considered authoritative teachings or testimony of our Church.

The Assembly then expressed its sense of the fidelity and ability with which the Committee had done its work; and without formally adopting in all its details the whole extended report, gave to it as a whole its hearty approval, and ordered it to be printed in the Appendix to the Minutes, subject to such revision and abbreviation as to the Committee may appear suitable, that shall not be inconsistent with the tenor of the document.

ECCLESIASTICAL STATUS OF FOREIGN MISSIONARIES.

The Committee appointed by the last Assembly to report on this subject, consisted of Drs. Adger, J. L. Wilson, and Peck. The chairman read their report, and then printed copies of it were placed in the hands of the members. In 1874 the Assembly, there being present at Columbus a missionary from China, assumed to organise a Presbytery in that country out of five missionaries and one Chinese elder, and called it the Presbytery of Hangchow, and then admitted the missionary by courtesy to a seat on the floor, as representing that Presbytery. The missionaries overtured the Assembly of 1875 to dissolve this Presbytery and restore them to their former relations. Upon this the Assembly referred the subject to the aforesaid Committee, to consider and report.

The report states three grounds on which the Committee hold that the Assembly has no constitutional power to organise a Presbytery, and arrive at the conclusion that if the Assembly could not set up a Presbytery of Hangchow, there exists no such Presbytery for it to dissolve. There is added a fourth consideration, viz., that Presbyterian churches ought not to seek to propagate their separate organisations all over the world, but suffer all Chinese Presbyterians, for example, to constitute one church.

To the objection that according to this view the Assembly can do little in spreading the divine system of Presbytery abroad, it is answered that that system recognises evangelists, extraordinary officers with extraordinary powers, sent abroad outside the settled church-state, where church-courts rule. These organise churches

which are all free-born, having the right of self-government through rulers of their own election. So that the Assembly, under our Constitution, cannot set up a Presbytery over them.

Then is encountered the question. What are the powers of the true and proper evangelist, and what his relations to the courts of the Church? The Committee's answer is—a minister of the word, commissioned by the Presbytery to go into frontier and foreign parts with powers he could not be allowed to wield in the settled church-state; church courts belong to that regular and established state of the Church, but the solitary evangelist must precede the elderships. He must go found and plant, go organise churches, each with its plurality of elders to govern it, and then his extraordinary one-man power of rule must go again outside, must remove to regions still further beyond.

The Committee then set forth the relation of this evangelist to the Presbytery, on the one hand, who have given him his powers both of teaching and of organising churches, and doing other acts of ruling, such as in the ordinary church state are never to be committed to one man's hand. It is the Presbytery alone to whom he is responsible, in the first instance, like the minister at home, for his use and administration of the twofold power it has committed to him. On the other hand, however, he has a responsibility to the Assembly and to its Executive Committee, which is fully set forth and defined in the Report.

The conclusion is, that for the Assembly to set up a Presbytery by its own act, in any foreign land, is an act unconstitutional, unscriptural, and void.

The report then proceeds to discuss at length another question submitted to the Committee, viz., Should missionaries abroad become associated with natives in the composition of Presbyteries? and it answers this question also in the negative, and presents three reasons for this answer.

ACTION ON THIS REPORT.

It was at first docketed. Coming up at a late period for discussion, Dr. Adger suggested that unless the members had found time to read and consider the printed report, it might be better not to attempt its consideration by this Assembly.

Dr. Mallard offered a paper approving the report, and declaring that the Assembly has no authority to organise Presbyteries on foreign soil. It was adopted.

The next day Dr. Robinson moved that the Treasurer of the Assembly pay for the printing of this report.

Mr. Primrose raised objection to the doctrine that the evangelist cannot be clothed with his proper extraordinary functions within the bounds of the settled church state.

Dr. Adger moved to reconsider the vote last night approving the report, that it might be referred to the next Assembly for full consideration. It was carried, and there ensued a confused discussion, which Dr. Smoot arrested by this resolution, which was passed, and the report was then referred to the next Assembly :

“Resolved, That the General Assembly has no express constitutional power to establish or dissolve Presbyteries, and accordingly that the brethren of whom the Assembly of 1874 proposed to constitute the Presbytery of Hangechow, are now and have continuously been de jure members of the same Presbyteries to which they belonged at the time such action was taken.”

NEXT PLACE OF MEETING.

By a very close vote between New Orleans and Knoxville, the former was chosen.

THE COMMISSIONERS' FUND.

A report was adopted, abandoning the *per capita* plan, and going back again to the old plan of assessments.

DISMISSING MINISTERS TO OTHER RELIGIOUS BODIES.

A report from the Judicial Committee was made of a reply to an overture from the Presbytery of Atlanta. We cannot recall, nor do we find it plainly set forth in any report of the proceedings, how this matter got into the hands of the Judicial Committee. It certainly was not a case of *appeal*, and it does not seem to have been one of *complaint*; and if it was one of *reference* by the Presbytery itself, then clearly it ought to have gone, as being ordinary in its nature, to the Synod of Georgia. It seems to us that it must have been simply an overture for a deliverance from the Assembly, and then the Committee on Bills

and Overtures should have had charge of it. But passing this by, the Presbytery of Atlanta dismisses one of its ministers to the Methodist Church, and exceptions are taken to it. The Committee which reported an answer for the Assembly, said it is sufficient in such cases to give a certificate of good standing, and not a dismissal.

Mr. Davies, for the Committee, said, to dismiss is to release from ordination vows, both as to doctrine and polity. To give a certificate involves less responsibility—it only vouches for good standing.

Ruling elder R. A. Collins read a minority report, declaring that the Presbytery should have dismissed the minister to some particular Conference.

Rev. J. A. Sloan insisted on the same view, and quoted from the Form of Government and the Digest, to prove that the Presbytery, Association, Classis, or other religious body to which dismissed, must be specified.

Dr. Robinson said, all this referred simply to bodies with which we are in correspondence; and he read from the Digest three decisions of 1828, 1830, and 1854, warranting the simple striking off from our roll the names of ministers who have joined other bodies.

Dr. White wanted the proof that “other ecclesiastical bodies” means corresponding bodies.

Rev. Mr. Cartledge said the core of the question had not been touched, for in fact the minister dismissed had told the Presbytery that he is an Arminian; and in the face of that statement had received a certificate of good standing when he should have been deposed for heresy! And he moved to refer the question back to the Judicial Committee; but his motion did not prevail, and the report of the Committee was adopted.

It appears to us very clear that, taking the case as it stood before Mr. Cartledge’s statement, the simple certificate, and not the dismissal, is the proper paper to be given; and that for the case as he presented it, the Revised Discipline provides the proper course in its chapter on *Cases Without Process*, thus: “When any person comes forward and makes known his offence to the

court, a full statement of the facts shall be recorded and judgment rendered without process." Chap. XII., § 1.

THE DISMISSED RULING ELDER WHO RETURNS LETTER OF DISMISSAL.

Holston Presbytery asked whether a ruling elder dismissed to join another church, who returns his letter unused, and so becomes a member again, does by that act also return to his office of ruling elder? The Committee on Bills and Overtures recommended that the answer be that he does. It was adopted.

Rev. Donald Fraser held that such elder was in the same position with the pastor dismissed to another Presbytery, whose pastoral office is dissolved before he can be dismissed. Returning his letter would not *ipso facto* restore that relation.

Dr. Robinson said the letter of dismissal is just a piece of machinery; if not used, it does not avail.

Dr. Adger said there is no parallel in this case with that of the pastor who is loosed from his pastoral relation and then dismissed to another Presbytery. This elder was never formally released from his pastoral office in that congregation.

Mr. Fraser held that the application for dismissal is a resignation; and if the Session grant the dismissal, they accept the resignation.

It appears to us that this question was rightly settled. The ruling elder is a true and proper pastor and bishop, called by the church to his office, and ordained and installed in it by the parochial presbytery or Session. Whenever a teaching elder (who is not to be an evangelist) is called, ordained, and installed, it is in each case to the pastoral office, for our book knows no other ministerial ordination than that of pastors or else evangelists. Now, this called, ordained, and installed pastor cannot lay down his pastorship without the act of the Presbytery, *after hearing from the people*. The logic of our system requires the same in the case of the other class of pastors. No ruling elder can properly or legitimately, on our principles, be released from his charge unless first *the people be heard from on the question*. It is not in the power of a Session to accept the resignation of an

elder and loose him from his installation vows, without first hearing from the other party to the contract. If it be said that no such course is ever taken, and that the eldership is by consent and by usage left to stand or fall with the membership, then, of course, it must follow that the eldership in the case before us is restored with the membership.

PERMANENT STANDING COMMITTEES.

Mecklenburg Presbytery having asked the Assembly to provide that its Committee on Bills and Overtures and its Judicial Committee be made permanent standing committees, to whom matters shall be submitted before they go to the Assembly, and who shall publish their decisions for discussion in the newspapers before submitting them to the Assembly; the answer recommended to be given was unfavorable, on the ground that the Assembly is a supreme court of Christ to deliberate, and, under the guidance of the Spirit, to decide matters, and not merely to express the public opinion of the Church. Adopted.

CONGREGATIONAL MEETING.

The same Presbytery inquired whether it is competent to a church session to call a congregational meeting for other objects than those mentioned in the book, and to a congregation in its meeting to choose its presiding officer. The Committee on Bills and Overtures recommended the following answer, which was adopted: "As the purpose of congregational meetings in all cases must be presumed to relate more or less directly to the spiritual interests of the congregation, it seems to follow that it is competent to the Session to call congregational meetings for any proper purpose. In case the subject to be considered at the congregational meeting be such as to prevent the pastor, out of motives of delicacy, from presiding, it is competent to the meeting to choose its own presiding officer."

THE REVISED FORM AND DISCIPLINE.

Ruling elder Joyes offered a resolution that the Committee on Bills and Overtures report to this Assembly whether it is not expedient that the subject of the new book be again referred to the Presbyteries. Adopted.

An overture also came up from the Presbytery of Abingdon in reference to sending the new Discipline again to the Presbyteries.

Overtures also came up from the Presbyteries of Abingdon and Greenbrier, praying the Assembly to send down to the Presbyteries an overture proposing to strike out Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Chapter X. in the Form of Government, so that every church may send a ruling elder to the Presbytery and Synod, whether there be several churches grouped into one pastoral charge or not.

Also there came up from the Presbytery of East Hanover an overture praying the Assembly to propose to the Presbyteries so to amend the Constitution as to legalize the divesting a minister of his office in certain cases without censure.

The Committee on Bills and Overtures, in view of the increasing number of overtures praying for changes in the Constitution, such as those from the Presbyteries of Abingdon, Greenbrier, and East Hanover, recommend that instead of sending down these overtures for partial changes, the Assembly send down to the Presbyteries, for their action, the Revised Form of Government and Book of Discipline before submitted and approved (though not adopted) by a majority of the Presbyteries, as was reported to the General Assembly of 1870 at Louisville. Adopted.

Ruling elders Judge Ould and Mr. Grattan and Rev. S. D. Stuart spoke in favor.

Rev. G. H. Cartledge preferred the new book as it is to the present one, but he wanted to see it improved. He favored the appointment of a committee to revise it.

Rev. J. E. DuBose thought the Presbyteries just as likely to adopt this new book as any other.

Rev. W. W. Brimm hoped the matter would not be agitated again in the Presbyteries. There are things in the Form of Government that could be improved, but he hoped it would be done by amendments.

DR. GIRARDEAU'S INAUGURATION.

This took place on Tuesday night, 23d May. The Moderator presided and administered the oath of office. Dr. Robinson delivered a brief charge to the new Professor, and referred in the

course of it to the unexampled pressure with which the call had been forced on him by the Church. The inaugural was marked by all the incumbent's eloquence and learning. As it appears in this number of our work, nothing further need be said except to refer our readers to it.

SYSTEMATIC BENEVOLENCE.

Dr. Smoot read a report on this subject, but we are not able to state what action was taken.

EVANGELISTIC LABOR AND SABBATH-SCHOOLS.

On the former of these two topics the Rev. Robert Price made a report, and on the latter the Rev. Dr. Ewing did the same; but we are unable to give any adequate account of either.

PAN-PRESBYTERIAN ALLIANCE.

This subject came up on Friday, the second day, by Dr. Robinson's presenting two reports—one, that of the Committee appointed by the last Assembly to correspond with similar committees of other Presbyterian bodies, and, if they deemed it wise and practicable, to appoint a delegate or delegates to the proposed conference; the other his own report, as having attended the preliminary conference last July in London. The former was docketed and made the order of the day for Saturday, at 10 o'clock a. m. The latter stated that our delegate had received from the representatives of nearly twenty Presbyterian churches every mark of affection and Christian regard, and that he had spoken as freely there as if in our own Assembly. It also stated that our own Committee had submitted to the conference a draft of a constitution for it, differing from two others submitted chiefly in these respects: *First*, they wished all proceedings of the council to be officially submitted to the different Assemblies for their consideration, but what was adopted simply provided for communicating to these supreme courts forming the alliance the minutes of the council, without any obligation at all laid on them to take any action respecting them; and, *secondly*, they wished the council to consist of not more than one hundred delegates, but it was decided that three hundred were required to give due dignity and moral influence to the proceedings.

The debate which was then commenced, and which ran through five days, was in certain respects rather a remarkable one. Not to speak of its notable good temper from beginning to end, unbroken by a single ripple of unpleasant feeling, it may be allowed us to state that at first perhaps there was a majority for the action proposed—at least, a majority was *claimed* with great confidence; but daily, as the debate went on, this majority appeared to diminish until the very last speech was made, which, for reasons of a peculiar sort, carried over a good many of the opposition.

It may be mentioned, as another somewhat remarkable feature of this debate, that the rhetoric was all on one side, but the argument all on the other. The alliance was recommended to our Church by Stuart Robinson, than whom no man in our whole communion has more power of persuasion with that Irish tongue of his, and also by that preëminently fascinating speaker, Dr. Hoge. These two distinguished orators of the ministry were backed by two worthy compeers amongst the eldership, the urbane and accomplished and winning Judge Estes, and that fiery and forcible Virginian, Judge Ould, known so well and so favorably all over the South for his services in the war. Seldom has any ecclesiastical body been more effectively addressed than was the Savannah Assembly when this gentleman took the floor and poured out a stream of earnest advocacy of this movement, fitted in many respects to sweep away all opposition. But it did not sweep it away. And why not? The speakers on the other side laid no claims to popular eloquence. They were all of them plain, honest, earnest men, setting forth in unpretending simplicity their objections to the alliance, drawn chiefly from the Constitution of our Church and that of the proposed confederation itself, and from the expense to be involved. These objections were not met and could not be met. It was felt day by day more and more that logic in this instance was more than a match for eloquence. The Assembly more and more clearly perceived as the debate went on that there was no reply to the arguments of the opposition.

It may be added to all this, as another rather remarkable thing, that the opposition should have yielded to the advocates of the

alliance the tremendous "parliamentary advantage," in Dr. Robinson's phrase, of the *last speech*—and that to be a speech from Moses D. Hoge! What else but their calm confidence in the force of truth against the innate weakness of all that was urged in favor of this movement could have reconciled them to surrendering so quietly this immense advantage? He had no just right to it as Chairman of the Committee on Bills and Overtures, because it was only an accidental circumstance that any report came in from them on this subject, and they had given it no adequate consideration; and, moreover, their report was a single sentence, baldly expressing approbation, with no elaborate statement of grounds or reasons which required defence. The truth is, that Dr. Robinson submitted resolutions from his Committee *accepting as satisfactory the constitution agreed on by the conference*, and Dr. Hoge added nothing to this, but really took from it when he said in his report as Chairman that the confederation itself was *not contrary* to our Church Constitution. The matter in debate, then, was the report of the committee appointed last year, and not the hastily adopted recommendation of this Assembly's Committee on Bills and Overtures. The opposition understood, therefore, very well how little claim the other side possessed to this "last speech," which was sure to be so damaging to themselves; and Dr. Hoge himself abjured any such claim and accepted it as pure courtesy. And he used it courteously, and also wisely and effectively, as it was expected he would do; all which makes the debate somewhat remarkable in this aspect of it.

Then there was this feature of the discussion, which made it rather a curious one. The proposition which was really acted on was kept back by the friends of the alliance until they had got it allowed that the "last speech" was to be from their side, and *that by their most accomplished advocate*; while another proposition, that never was voted on at all, was argued and urged all through the debate, only to be abandoned by them in the end! Here was the Chairman of the Committee on Bills and Overtures, for whom it was claimed that he had a right to the concluding words (though he abjured the claim himself), holding

back till the last speech was made, to which there was to be no reply, the very thing which was really asked for at the Assembly's hands! Now, of course this was not *in order*, and was a very *unparliamentary advantage*; but the finished orator who obtained it was so yielding himself, he was so conciliatory, he approached us with so much winning gentleness, especially he gave up so much and asked for so little of what had been urged all along, he was so perfectly "of neither side," and he so heartily disapproved himself of the constitution of the alliance and of the claim sometimes made that it was an œcumenical council or a step to it—in fact, he so modified the proposition before us as he went along, without formally enunciating any amendments to it, that it came to be somewhat difficult for us to tell, under the jugglery and magnetism of his eloquent appeals, whether he wanted us to get over on his side or proposed to come over and stand on ours. All this was certainly a little remarkable, and it shows where lay the true strength of the Assembly and how real was the victory of the seeming minority. Not seldom, as we all know, does the minority in fact carry the day and win all the substantial gains of the contest. This is as well understood by observing and reflecting men as it is that Calvin was right when he said that opinions ought to be *weighed* (if that were possible), and not *counted*. The truth, we all know, is always really much more apt to be maintained by the few than by the many. And yet it is not often, and that makes this case a little remarkable, that a minority succeeds so nearly in bringing over the majority quite to their own ground.

One more remark of this sort. Should the other side object to anything in these statements, they will nevertheless, we suppose, be ready to agree that the debate was rather remarkable in this, that both sides were, on the whole, well satisfied with the results attained. They got their Pan. We got the Pan changed into a very different sort of a vessel from what they proposed—in fact, it is not any sort of vessel for cooking up things which our Church is required to eat, but it is merely a conference, with no powers of action whatever.

And now, in order that the reader may distinctly perceive what was proposed at first for the Assembly's adoption and how essentially it was modified, we shall place here the resolutions of Dr. Robinson's Committee, as at first offered by him, and the resolution of the Committee on Bills and Overtures, as offered by Dr. Hoge; and then the same as they were at the very close of the debate amended by their authors, and also the explanatory minute which was brought in by them the next day, with the exception of a single vote unanimously adopted. We shall also place here the paper of the opposition, which was offered by the Rev. Joseph Bardwell.

The parts which were amended, and as they were amended, are indicated by italics.

DR. ROBINSON'S RESOLUTIONS.

1. *Resolved*, That this Assembly hereby expresses its approval, in general, of the proceedings of the Conference held at London in July last, composed of the representatives of a large portion—some 15,000 congregations—of the Presbyterian Churches of the world.

2. That this Assembly *accepts as satisfactory the constitution agreed upon by that Conference*, providing for an *Ecumenical* Presbyterian Council every three years.

3. That this Assembly will appoint delegates to represent the Presbyterian Church in the United States in the General Council to be holden in Edinburgh in 1877.

DR. HOGE'S RESOLUTION AS AT FIRST.

"That the proposed Confederation is not contrary to the constitution of our Church, and it is advisable to appoint delegates."

THE AMENDED RESOLUTIONS AS THEY PASSED.

1. *Resolved*, That this Assembly hereby expresses its approval, in general, of the proceedings of the Conference held at London in July last, composed of the representatives of a large portion—some 15,000 congregations—of the Presbyterian Churches of the world.

2. *Resolved*, The Assembly *approves of the general tenor of the constitution of the Alliance*, providing for a *general* Presbyterian Council, to be held every three years.

3. *Resolved*, That this Assembly will appoint delegates to represent the Presbyterian Church in the United States in the General Council, to be held in Edinburgh in 1877, *provided that this appointment of delegates shall not be understood as pledging any funds of the Church to defraying the expenses of the delegates to the Council.*

4. *Resolved, That the delegates so appointed shall select from their own number members to prepare any papers, concerning the condition and position of our Church, to be spread upon the records of the Council; and in case the delegates be unable to attend the Council, they are hereby authorised to represent our Church in such official letter as they may agree upon.*

THE EXPLANATORY MINUTE.

Resolved, That in appointing delegates to the General Presbyterian Alliance, it is with the distinct declaration that it is not to be regarded as another and a higher court, but as an assemblage of committees appointed by the several Churches which they represent, for the purpose of joint conference and joint report, and for such action only as belongs to an association of delegates thus constituted.

THE PAPER OF THE OPPOSITION.

1. *Resolved, That the Assembly recognises with satisfaction the efficiency and ability with which our representative in the preliminary conference discharged his trust in the report of such measures as seemed best fitted to advance the interest of the cause of Christ.*

2. After mature deliberation, this Assembly, while cordially rejoicing in every sincere attempt to extend the Redeemer's kingdom, deem it unadvisable to adopt the constitution proposed and appoint delegates to the "Alliance of Reformed Churches," to meet in Edinburgh in 1877. This consideration is fortified by the fact that the proposal to engage in this movement has already awakened a strong and widespread dissatisfaction throughout our Church, as has appeared in the utterances of the press and the action taken by several of our lower courts.

3. God, by his providence, has not called our Church into a position of isolation from the Christian world; but as at the organisation of our Assembly in 1861, so now "we desire to cultivate peace and charity with all our fellow Christians throughout the world. We invite to ecclesiastical communion all who maintain our principles of faith and order"; "and especially do we signify to all bodies struggling to maintain the true principles of the same time-honored Confession, our desire to establish the most intimate relations with them, which may be found mutually edifying, and for the glory of God."

On Saturday morning, Dr. Robinson, in beginning his argument, referred to Dr. Hoge's statement that his committee were unanimous in the answer they had recommended, and held that to be an indication of the sentiments of the Assembly, so that he "would take it for granted that the majority were on his side." Not having engaged, out of regard to his official position, in any controversial discussions of the subject of the coun-

cil, he hoped the more time would be allowed him now. It was true he had protested against a certain paper in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW—not to controvert its positions, but because it bore on the question of “fraternal relations,” disturbing our settlement of that matter by the Baltimore Conference. But he had avoided going into any discussion of its main topic. And he was now entering not upon a forensic contest, which is contrary to the nature and functions of a supreme council of the Church, and so was not looking for any divided vote, but was expecting a unanimous agreement. This he felt sure of if he could only bring before the body the matter as it lay before his own mind.

He was surprised at the mistakes and misapprehensions which had arisen. First of all, there was no conflict between the action at Columbus in 1874 and that at St. Louis in 1875. The former, and rightly, objected to the credentials of the parties proposing to treat of this question, because then it was an affair only of individuals. Hence what was said at Columbus about the “coördination of courts.” But at St. Louis six Presbyterian bodies in the United States and Canada and six in Great Britain had acted, and so the proposition came to this Assembly in 1875, from official representatives of some twelve Presbyterian supreme courts. Queens only, it had been said, it could treat with; here were twelve of them, each equal in dignity to itself.

Again, he had supposed Southern Presbyterians to be agreed that the whole Church is one body, and were ready to manifest, as far as possible, the visible unity of the Church. The Calvinistic theology holds for its central standpoint God’s eternal purpose to redeem a body, and not myriads of individual sinners. This was the idea of Thornwell, who said that any Church is self-condemned which does not wish to realise the visible unity of the whole Church of God, and who held that the unity is to be realised in representative assemblies, and that so the Church has an indefinite expansibility, so that the whole Church on earth might be embodied in one grand parliament. Dr. Palmer also recognised this doctrine, and had objected to the alliance, because it did not go far enough. He wants not an advisory

council, but an authoritative court: the reply to which is that we cannot have such an Œcumenical court without preceding conferences. But the most of those who have spoken or written on the subject seem to have no sympathy with Thornwell's idea of the unity of the Church, or Palmer's notion of the Œcumenical court. It has been denounced as "one of the essential elements of Popery," which is the first time he had ever met with such an opinion from a *jure divino* Presbyterian. For he had never before met with the idea that the unity of the Church of Rome *per se*, and apart from Rome's false theory of the bond of Church unity, is a heretical opinion. The fathers of the Reformation, so far from regarding the unity of the Church as a heresy, longed to unite the Protestant Churches into one body, and mourned over the bigotry and partisan fanaticism which prevented it. Calvin longed to "bring the separated Churches into one." The Second Book of Discipline—one of the grandest pieces of constitutional law in the world—said "assemblies are of four sorts," and that the fourth represents "the universal Kirk of Christ." It is evident that these Presbyterian fathers three hundred years ago had conceived of the whole Church as one, in accordance with their Calvinistic theology.

I confess, sir, to some alarm at finding any Presbyterian of high intelligence maintaining that "the only unity designed by Christ among the several branches of his people on this earth is the *spiritual* unity." While I have never had any sympathy with the clatter about "Christian union," founded upon an entire misconstruction of our Saviour's prayer for his people, yet I have as little sympathy with the ecclesiasticism which insists that the geographical or social barriers of Jew, Greek, Barbarian, Scythian, must separate the people of God who hold the same standards of gospel faith and order.

This brings us to the question of the constitutionality of an Œcumenical parliament. Is it not a suspicious circumstance that out of the twenty Presbyterian bodies united in this alliance, this difficulty has occurred in no one but ours? That word *un-constitutional* has two meanings—it may mean *contra-constitutional*, or it may mean *non-constitutional*. Nobody has attempted

to show that to confer with other Presbyterian Churches is contra-constitutional. On the contrary, our Confession teaches that the visible Church consists of all *those throughout the world* that profess the true religion, and that the communion of saints, as God offereth opportunity, is to be extended to all those in every place who call on the name of the Lord Jesus.

But the plea of "unconstitutional" in this case rests mainly on the idea of *non-constitutional*. Of course, the fathers could not foresee how "God would give opportunity" in this generation by so wonderfully annihilating distance, and so breaking down the barriers between nations, as to render an Œcumenical Council possible. But if the alliance is unconstitutional because there is no specific provision for it in the Constitution, then is not your whole scheme of Foreign Missions likewise non-constitutional? So with your Theological Seminaries. But while I admit that, in order to have an Œcumenical General Assembly, it would be necessary to make changes in our Constitution, yet there is now already in our book ample powers given our General Assembly to cover such a triennial conference of delegates as is proposed. The Assembly has the power of *correspondence with foreign Churches*. It may confer once, and it may confer as often as the interests of the Church require. Nobody has questioned our right to hold the Baltimore Conference with the Northern Church, or with delegates from the Reformed (Dutch) Church. Where will you draw the line between conferring with one Church or with many—between conferring at Baltimore or in London? It is asked, "Is this Pan Presbyterian Alliance a Church?" I answer, No, but it is *Churches!*—a gathering not of unofficial men, but office-bearers, the representatives of *Churches*. Nor is it a "voluntary society," but an alliance of Churches as such to confer about the common interests.

Here Dr. Robinson said he encountered perhaps the main objection to the alliance, viz., that it would bring us into relations with the Northern Church, with which we had refused to correspond, and with other Churches which had not stood true to the Confession. He held this to be an old and a common blunder, which he illustrated by a humorous account of his attending in

1854, as a delegate from the Old School Presbyterian Church of that day, the General Association of Massachusetts, where he had encountered Dr. Edward Beecher. He held that ecclesiastical correspondence involves no endorsement whatever of the peculiar views of the Church we correspond with.

It is objected that such a measure should be referred to the Presbyteries. But the Presbyteries have nothing to do with it. The Constitution puts the whole matter of correspondence with foreign Churches into the hands of the Assembly, and the Presbyteries have no business with it. The General Assembly is no mere creature of the Presbyteries to register their decrees. It is as truly a court of Jesus Christ, with the promise of Christ's presence in it, as a Presbytery. And the Presbytery has no more right to interfere with the Assembly's business than the Assembly has to license or ordain a minister.

Dr. Robinson proceeded to hold up to ridicule the wisdom of three or four Presbyteries which had taken action on this subject. "As to the action," he said, "of one of our Kentucky Presbyteries (Transylvania), which has formally sent up its grave advice on the subject, I judge the members of the house will not be able to get much light as to which way they ought to determine the question from this paper, so remarkably judicial in its form. The corn is very gravely and carefully put into the bag—pretty good corn at that—but, as if for the purpose of protecting the corn, the stone (or rather the *gravel*) is as gravely put into the other end. Some of our brethren have become so habituated to riding astride—evenly between the genuine and the counterfeit packages—that they seem to think it unseemly to carry their grist to the ecclesiastical mill, except riding astride, taking their position just evenly between right and wrong."

The whole conception of asking the advice of Presbyteries he held to be incipient Congregationalism. It would be time enough to consult them twenty years hence, when we shall be ready not only for a triennial conference, but a full-fledged Œcumenical General Assembly of all the Presbyterian Churches of the world.

It is objected that, by opening this question, we endanger the peace of our Church. Well, sir, who is responsible for opening

this question? None of us. The providence of God brings it before us through the call upon us of nine-tenths of the Presbyterians of the world. But he was free to say he had more patience with almost any other defect in the character of Presbyterian men than this miserable demagoguery that raises the cry of "the peace of the Church!" "the peace of the Church!" whenever some great question of order or Church action is to be discussed. It is a miserable partisan cant from a class that claim all the piety and all the knowledge of vital godliness. He went on to refer to articles in a late paper which depreciated the value of discussion, and exalted, instead of it, "devotion" and "vital godliness," as proofs of a growing tendency to clamor down the discussion of great questions.

Coming to the objection from the expense, he said that would not be more than from \$150 or \$200 a delegate. And then every second meeting will be on this side of the Atlantic.

The advantages of the Alliance would be, first, to restore to the consciousness of the Church the fact that the Church's unity lies at the foundation of the Presbyterian polity.

Secondly. It will tend to remove from Presbyterianism the reproach of its divisions.

Thirdly. It will give to feeble Presbyterian bodies on the continent of Europe, struggling under persecution, the moral support of stronger bodies.

Fourthly. It will enable the various Presbyterian bodies of the world to distribute missionary work in heathen, Papal and Mohammedan countries.

Fifthly. It will enable us all to understand better precisely what our differences are, which must lead to greater unity.

Sixthly. It will enable our own Church to get out of its isolation.

But the disadvantages of our refusing to go into this Alliance will be, first, it puts us formally out of connexion with the whole Presbyterian world, and fixes attention upon our singular position.

Secondly. It will confirm the idea that our position of separation proceeds from spite and bad humor.

Thirdly. It will excite restlessness and dissatisfaction among a large class of our people who yearn for a wider Presbyterian communion, and so it will awaken a tendency towards organic union with the North and the disintegration of our body.

We have condensed as faithfully as possible the remarks of Dr. Robinson from his own manuscript of his speech furnished by him for the papers. The speech as he delivered it was fully two hours long, but it did not conform as written to what he uttered, for he both added and omitted as he went along. The replies made to him, therefore, do not always suit this report of what he said. He was listened to by a large congregation with the closest attention.

Dr. Adger obtained the floor, and said that, while he would not, like his friend, lay claim to a majority for his side, he yet hoped to show him at least a very large minority opposed to his views. The continuation of the debate was made the order for the evening session, at 8 o'clock. His speech occupied over one hour. He said that his old friend, Dr. Robinson, was incapable of tricks, yet it was hardly fair in him to make capital out of the accidental unanimity of the Committee of Bills and Overtures. He had said there was no opposition, for we were all agreed, and yet he had gone on to confess his astonishment at the opposition aroused, and that amongst the very class of men he most respected—the *jure divino* Presbyterians. He had claimed that the Assembly of 1874 was not against him, but for him, because insisting on our coördination with Church courts only, and not voluntary associations; so that that Assembly, in his view, was all right on that point. But that Assembly had said this Alliance was no Church court; so that while he says the Assembly of 1874 was all right, it makes him out all wrong. They said we can deal only with Churches; he tells you this Alliance is "merely conferential" where "votes were of no importance," a mere "advisory body." (which has too much of the Congregational twang either for him or for us,) an association "you may go into or go out of whenever you please."

Then my brother says this is a step towards the true and proper Œcumenical Council, and will grow into it. Am I to

tell him how necessary it is for your first step to be a right step, and how hard it is to go back and correct a wrong beginning? He claims that we have the same right to go into this Alliance as into the Baltimore Conference. Let me ask, What would our Church have said to the Baltimore Conference had it made an Alliance for us with a constitution and all? He says that if your Constitution has nothing warranting the Alliance, so it has nothing which warrants Foreign Missions. But Foreign Missions are in the Bible, and is not the Bible a part and the very foundation part of a *jure divino* Presbyterian Constitution? Let him show us that any such body as the Alliance is in those scriptures which (nobody better knows than my brother) do reveal the system of our Church courts. He admits there is "Rationalism in those bodies," but says neighbors may have social intercourse without being responsible for one another's ideas. Is it mere "neighboring" to go and take part officially with Rationalists in regulating all the great matters which this Alliance entertains? He says it is "none of the business" of our Presbyteries, but of the Assembly alone, to determine this question, and he ridiculed the deliverance of one of the Presbyteries which have overtured us about it. But did not this whole matter begin in the Presbyteries and come here by overtures from them? And will a strict constructionist, like my brother, deny that wherever our book undertakes to prescribe the powers of the Assembly, that it limits them on those matters? Would he allow our Assembly to take *original* jurisdiction over a minister? And when the book says the Assembly may *correspond*, would he admit that it can *unite* us with other bodies? The Constitution defines clearly what the Assembly may and may not do on sundry points, and then how does it close up on the powers of the Assembly? Why, by prescribing in the famous Section VI., that before any new constitutional rules may be made the Presbyteries must be consulted. Now, which is the greater stretch of this Assembly's power, to make a new rule, or to carry us bodily into a new Church?

Then we were told of the claims on our sympathy and protection of the feeble and oppressed Presbyterians of the continent,

and how they had said in the Alliance that they looked to it as to protectors and "big brothers." Moderator, I ask if our poor Church looks like anybody's "big brother?" Go over to South Carolina and ask the Presbyterians there if they do not themselves need a "big brother." Well, we have got one above, and we depend on Him only.

Now, my brother found it difficult to tell us whether the Alliance is a Church or a mere advisory body. He says it is a Queen—yes, twelve Queens all in one, and entitled to some of the consideration due to a proper Œcumenical Council. He holds up to us a beautiful, nay, a dazzling picture of its glory. It is important for us to ascertain if all the advantages he promises are likely to be realised. The only way of judging that I know of is to look not at the spoken representations of an earnest speaker, but to examine the written constitution of the Alliance. And now with this before us, can we hold the Alliance to be such a Church court as we can agree to come under? I find that it has a great *name*—"The Alliance of the Reformed Churches throughout the World Holding the Presbyterian System." Whether we go into it or not, it is the *Alliance of the Reformed throughout the world*; and if this is its just title, then we are self-excluded as not of the Reformed, and as not holding the Presbyterian system unless we consent to accept a share of this glory. Again, I find that it has conditions of admission; meets stately; has a President and other officers; adopts a certain method of apportioning the votes to be cast at its meetings; undertakes great and numerous works and duties; has a binding constitution that can never be changed, except at its triennial meetings and by a two-thirds vote; and while it declares that it will not interfere with the internal affairs or external relations of its constituent Churches—though laying its hands upon the most vital interests of Christianity in the world—yet sends its annual minutes of proceedings to the supreme courts of all the Churches it has agreed to receive into its membership.

Now, surely this is considerable of a *body*, of an organism, whether it is or is not anything of a Church or anything of the true and proper Œcumenical Council. And now let us look at

what are the objects and the powers it assumes. My brother undertook to distinguish between these words, in order to remove Dr. J. Leighton Wilson's objection that it claims the right to "distribute mission work," and "combine Church energies" for the evangelisation of the world. He said that would be found put down as one of the objects, but not one of the powers of the Alliance. But what is the use or value of objects without powers to attain them, or of powers without objects on which to exercise them? No, Moderator, that distinction will not answer. And it must be acknowledged that the Alliance lays claim to the most important and vital of all the interests of the Church of Christ as the objects on which it is to exercise its powers. It will distribute mission work, and it will combine Church energies—mark the force of those tremendous expressions. Yes, and it will "entertain all subjects directly connected with the training of ministers, the use of the press, and the religious instruction of the young." These are certainly very serious and delicate subjects it presumes to handle, and its claim of powers might satisfy the loftiest ambition.

And now I wish to ask my brother, how does it happen, if this Alliance be a Church, that it can be so easy to get out of it as he says? I never heard before of a Church separation from which so unceremoniously would be a right thing and no schism.

Again I would ask, how, if a Church or a Church court, it can be the mere advisory body, the purely conferential meeting, he alleges that it is?

Again, if it be a Church court, and that one of such lofty powers, where are the full provisions needful in its constitution to guide it, and check it, and restrain it, which our Constitution provides for our highest court? Does this Assembly need to have such checks and restraints, and does this Alliance need none?

These are some of the difficulties in my brother's way, when he would say the Alliance is a *Church*, and that it is constitutional to correspond with it, and even to join it.

But when he says it is only an advisory body, into which we can freely go, and out of it freely come, then I ask him if it be not a Church court, why does it *act on moral and religious*

questions? Does not my brother continue still to hold with all *jure divino* Presbyterians that in moral and religious matters we want absolutely no association whatsoever except the Church of Christ in her courts?

Again I ask, if not a Church court, but only a conference, if my brother and his associates in the Alliance went there only to confer, why did they make an alliance and a constitution for it well nigh unchangeable?

And again I ask, if it was only a step taken towards the true and proper Œcumenical Council, why did it not say one word in its constitution about such a council?

Such being the indefinite and uncertain nature of this Alliance, are we prepared to go into it against the widespread dissatisfaction which the action of the late Assembly has awakened? We hear of it from Virginia, from Kentucky, from Mississippi, from Louisiana, from North Carolina, and from South Carolina—through the press in various forms of utterance, and from different Presbyteries and at least one Synod. And now are we prepared against all this manifested opposition, and with a much divided vote in this Assembly, and without clear constitutional authority, are we prepared to carry our Church into this Alliance, the objects and powers of which are so vital and so vast, and the character of it so indefinite and so uncertain?

Having thus followed my brother through his long and very interesting and eloquent speech, pointing out what appeared to me to contain that which was open to criticism, I desire now to proceed and suggest to my brethren of this Assembly a few other considerations bearing on the question before us.

Moderator, the spirit of our age is latitudinarian, and this tendency is increasing. Not what is *orthodox* is honored now, but what is *liberal*. Once *heresy* was held to be evil; now the only bad thing is *bigotry*. There is loud outcry against sectarianism, while our times swing round to the utmost laxity of religious opinion.

Let me give you two or three specimens:

1. It has been gravely proposed and seriously urged in Northern religious papers, Presbyterian and Congregationalist, that

these bodies are so nearly one that it becomes their duty to be united.

2. The Presbyterian Assembly of the North, at Brooklyn, is now discussing whether they shall not take back the testimony of 1845, at Cincinnati, under Dr. Thornwell, against the validity of Romish baptism.

3. A Presbyterian Church corner-stone was laid recently in Boston, and ministers of various Christian denominations were invited to take part in the proceedings and did so. Amongst others came a Universalist brother, the Rev. Dr. Miner, and he welcomed the new church into the fellowship of his people. He said: "They have a way of thinking over there at their corner, which does them good; just as you have a way of thinking here at your corner, which does you good; but it is all one work;" and so at the close he dismisses the assembly—this Universalist brother—with his apostolical benediction.

Such is the spirit of this age. All who call themselves Christians, whether they hold to Christian doctrine or not, must come together and be one. This is what the age demands, and we must not scrutinise closely any of the schemes proposed in this liberal and lax time respecting Christian union. But if we should venture to exercise this right or perform this duty, we must expect to be called bigot and Pharisee

But is not Christian union a good thing? Certainly. And is not the close and strict union of all true Presbyterians both good and desirable? Most assuredly. And Dr. McCosh, the President of the Alliance, was not, by many, the first who expressed this desirableness. Calvin and Melville and Henderson and Gillespie and R. J. Breckinridge—yes, and our own Stuart Robinson and Ben Palmer—all expressed the earnest wish and desire for the union of all Presbyterians in the whole world, and the latest of them long before this Alliance was thought of. Here is what Breckinridge said in 1840: "There is no glory now within the reach of some great, heaven-inspired man equal to that of uniting together the different Presbyterian bodies of the earth." But what was it which all these, our trusted leaders, desired? Sir, it was the true and proper Œcumenical Council.

This is what Calvin and the Second Book of Discipline of the Scotch and Gillespie and all the others wanted, and what my brother tells you that he wants. But that would be a very different thing from this Alliance. My brother quoted Dr. Thornwell as saying that a Church is self-condemned which does not expect itself to spread over the whole earth; but Dr. Thornwell does not say that he wants our divinely revealed system of Church government to be spread over the world in the shape of an advisory body, into which and out of which you may come and go at your pleasure.

Now, the true and proper Œcumenical Council was and is, and probably will continue to be, an impossibility. Differences of race, language, nationality, and also distance and expense, must needs keep us separate, and in a sense isolated, while yet really one. All these are legitimate grounds of separation, and they do not destroy true union. The chronic state of Europe is war, and we have passed through war, too, and how, when there are contending Cæsars, can Christian people, rendering to Cæsar his things, be formally united in visible, actual confederation? My brother says that steam makes Churches now able to be one in formal bonds. I say you must first abolish war. Has not our own Assembly decided, and rightly, that a difference of race is a just and legitimate and necessary ground for separate Church organisation? We are, therefore, and we must perhaps continue to the end, to be isolated in one sense from our brethren of other lands and races. Gillespie, whom my brother has studied, and whom he venerates, says (for I conferred with him just before I came here) that the true visible union on which the communion of all the Churches is based is not of companying, of acquaintance, of actual formal union, but of doctrine and order. He says the dwellers of one country may have the former, but the latter only is what must and does bind together all who are of one faith, and that the true unity of the visible Church is only in the Spirit and in faith.

And so, Moderator, the Alliance meets all the difficulties, but provides not the advantages of a true and proper, but alas! impossible Œcumenical union. And so we who do not go into the

Alliance are no more isolated than those who enter. What can the meeting of a few deputies, having no proper representative authority, effect towards a true union of the Presbyterian Churches of the world? This Assembly is the bond of union for all our Churches, because it has authority representative, and its action is the action of us all. But here is an Alliance that disclaims authority, and is either a mere loose confederation for religious conference and devotion, or else a dreadful usurper of powers not justly belonging to it.

But, Moderator, though we should not go into the Alliance, our hearts are all right towards all our brethren. We love our brethren. Our hearts beat responsive to theirs. And we feel hurt and wounded by allegations to the contrary. If we have a testimony to bear that compels us to stand apart from some of them, or if we have conscientious difficulties that hinder our entering the Alliance, we ought not to be called bad names. And we beg our brethren who are for union with those outside to remember that something is due to us who are already of their body.

We are not enemies of the Alliance, and we wish it well in all that is good, but we do not feel prepared to be dragged into it against our judgment if we can legitimately help it. And I say that if it should turn out that the majority here do really favor the movement, they ought to be willing at least to refer it to the Presbyteries by an overture. to be reported on to the next Assembly.

There is one other point on which I have a word to say. We are not lovers of what is or what looks *sensational*. And the Alliance looks like one of the many sensational movements invented by brethren of a higher latitude than ours. Is this a hard saying? Then listen while I read from the *New York Evangelist*, when it was agreed by the Alliance to hold its next meeting at Edinburgh on the second Tuesday of July, 1876. That happened to be the 4th of July, and it was the Centennial Fourth, so that the Northern Presbyterians had to decide between Philadelphia and the Centennial or Edinburgh and the Alliance. The *Evangelist* took ground, therefore, that "our

Presbyterian ministers, at least *those of them who care to make any record for the future,*" would not be willing to go to the Alliance, and it ought to be postponed, and must be postponed. "Why," said the *Evangelist*, "when they have carefully prepared, and on the first Sabbath of July delivered each in his place, the historical sermon enjoined upon them as a filial and patriotic duty by the General Assembly, their minds will be too full of the inspiration of these and other services and scenes appropriate to the high noon of our National Centennial to give attention to any proceedings at Edinburgh." Unhappy Alliance! You belong to the family of sensational things, and in the presence of a greater sensation you must hide your diminished head. The Northern Presbyterian preacher merges his Church in his country, and his Presbyterianism in his patriotism. Edinburgh and the Alliance must be put off a whole year till Philadelphia and the Centennial have had their full swing.

But listen to another illustration: The Alliance, in its published minutes, gives us a letter from the Rev. D. Bruce, clerk of the Assembly of the New Zealand Presbyterian Church. His suggestions have the sanction of the Alliance, for they have put them into their minutes. One of these is, "That the propriety be considered of setting apart men of acknowledged literary talent for the purpose of directing their whole time to the producing of standard and yet telling works on religious subjects," etc.

Another is: That it be considered whether there could not be established a Pan-Presbyterian periodical, etc., etc.

Another is: That it be considered what measures might be taken for conferring merited degrees of honor on clergymen of the Presbyterian Church generally, and especially on the colonies, where the claims of clergymen have been all but totally overlooked by the old seats of learning, etc.

Moderator and brethren, is this the kind of thing it becomes us to rush into, with a loud outcry against it heard all over our Church?

Dr. Smoot spoke about forty-five minutes. He said the matter was not a permanent thing, binding the Assembly indefinitely, but would be for reconsideration every three years. If

we cannot be unanimous, the minority can nobly testify to the unity of the Church by submitting to the will of the majority. He held to the ground of the Louisville Assembly of 1870 in relation to fraternal relations with the Northern Church, though acquiescing in the Baltimore action. But Dr. Niccolls's speech at Cleveland shows there is no true fraternity in them towards us; yet if we enter this Alliance, we shall put a stop to many of the reproaches cast upon us.

What is this Alliance? It is neither a voluntary association, nor a Church court, but an extraordinary combination of commissions. It is not the first, for laymen are not admitted into it; nor is it the second, for it disclaims all power over the bodies entering it. Have we a right to take part in it? In 1873 we declined to send delegates to the Evangelical Alliance, because a voluntary association merely; but the next day we formed a real Presbyterian alliance with the Synod of Missouri and the Dutch Church.

He referred to Dr. Adger's argument from the constitution of the Alliance. Every deliberative body must have rules. Is it lawful? Is it expedient? We are anchored right on the bar. If the tide goes out and leaves us, our ship must be broken in pieces. We must go forward and spread our sails, or backwards into the bay.

On Monday, the Rev. J. S. Park replied to what had been said of latitudinarianism, and urged the argument against our isolation. We are engaged in a life and death struggle with organised Popery, and we cannot afford to fight alone. We must organise, too.

Rev. J. Rice Bowman favored the movement.

Dr. White said he had long been convinced that the theory of this Pan-Presbyterian Council is a false theory, and he was now more convinced of it than ever. The plea for it is the unification organically of the great Presbyterian family. But that can never be realised, and the Scriptures do not authorise us to expect it. The idea of all Churches being united in one organism never can be realised, except under a universal Bishop. If the Presbyterian polity is to prevail all over the world, this kind of

visible union can never be realised. It is a false theory that we ever can be actually bound together in one organisation. The Scripture does not recognise it. But if this basis of the Alliance is false, everything built on it must be vain. And then the scheme is unconstitutional. We have a constitution; it consists of grants. The powers distributed amongst the four courts of the Church are clearly designated; and we have no power to make a higher court.

What is this Alliance? It has been called a commission. It is doubtful whether the Assembly has authority to appoint commissions. It looks like a court. It will have great popular influence. Its resolves will soon become laws. The Associations and Consociations of Congregationalism have acquired the authority of Synods. Let us guard the constitution of our Church from danger. We have had a dangerous correspondence before, and it rent our Church asunder. The secret of the harmony of the London Conference was their suppression of all but the minimum of truth. If this is to be a Pan-Presbyterian Council, then all Presbyterians must come in who desire it, and so those also must be admitted who deny the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, and men of all shades of heterodoxy. The most bald and piebald sacramentarianism is not found alone in the Church of Rome, but also where Presbyterian forms prevail. I speak what my eyes have seen and my ears have heard, and if my statement is called in question, I will substantiate it. There are men in Reformed Churches who deny the atonement, and who hold to the inherent efficacy of sacraments. It is safer for us to stay at home.

Ruling elder General A. J. Hansell said if we go in at all, we should go in with the privilege of withdrawing at any time. Dr. Robinson said we could withdraw at any time, but I do not see this in the constitution. I wish to protect the rear. The scheme certainly is non-constitutional. History is fraught with the danger of alliances, especially to the weaker parties. While the Council is called Pan-Presbyterian, I hope it will not prove a pandemonium.

Dr. Robinson here rose and expressed the wish to have the

following paper allowed to form a part of his original report. This of course was not exactly in order, and no motion was made on the subject:

“In accepting the constitution proposed by the London Council, and in sending representatives to this General Council, it is with the distinct understanding that this Council is not another court of Presbyterianism; and, further, that should it appear at any time hereafter that the interests of the Church represented by this Assembly require such action, it may, without violation of any covenant or any discourtesy to their brethren, withdraw from the Alliance.”

Rev. W. W. Brimm would not discuss the constitutional question, but the advantages and disadvantages. What does the Southern Church want with such an advisory body? Are we not doing all we can? Will a vehicle draw easier because you put more wheels to it? It takes all our strength to move the machinery we have now. But this is a day of big shows.

It is said we can draw out when we please. No more than a crew can forsake their grand ship, tossed by tempest and confronted by breakers. Why, we should be disgraced.

And whence comes the desire for this thing? Either from the felt need of new honors and prominent positions, or from the wish to realise here the unity which is in heaven—from a mistaken interpretation of Christ's prayer. It was not the visible unity of his Church he prayed for. Had it been, such unity must have been realised long ago.

But it is said we are on the bar, with anchor cast, and must go out to sea or back into the bay. No, sir, with our glorious doctrines, our well tested government, are we not already sailing on the broad seas?

The objection from the expense has not been met. Our Church has as many financial burdens as it can bear, and cannot afford the money for this grand Presbyterian tea party in Edinburgh. He spoke very touchingly of the destitutions in Texas. If there ever was a time for economy in our Southern Church, it is the present. Our Foreign Missions work is crippled, and may have to be partly suspended. Let us spend our money on the institutions of our Church and not for big shows.

On Tuesday, Judge Estes discussed the constitutional bearings of the question. The Assembly fixes the terms of correspondence with foreign bodies. What does *correspondence* mean? Are we to understand by this word simply the interchanging of delegates? Let us look elsewhere for the meaning of this term, as used in our Book. The General Assembly, it is elsewhere said, is "the bond of . . . correspondence between . . . the churches;" so that "correspondence" means more than the interchange of courtesies, and it gives us treaty-making power, and warrants our entering into this alliance.

Nor is there anything in the Constitution of the Alliance to imperil our interests. The only thing it can *decide* is the admission or exclusion of churches; other matters it can only *entertain* and *consider*.

We have been vilified. If we refuse to enter the Alliance, we shall be worse misunderstood than ever.

Dr. Mallard said a boy holding a little piece of glass in his hand can send a ray of sunlight into a dark room. He was opposed to this Alliance out and out. *First*, on account of the expense. At the lowest calculation, it will take \$300 to send each delegate, and twenty-eight will cost the Church \$8,400. *Secondly*, he opposed it as unconstitutional. If it is not an ecclesiastical body, what can ecclesiastical courts, as such, have to do with it? *Thirdly*, he opposed it as dangerous. It claims the power to promote great causes by joint action. Its constitution gives it alarming scope. Moral power is the most dangerous of all power.

Rev. J. V. Logan said, if we adopt this proposal, we revolutionise our conservatism, and overturn the whole policy of our Church. Are the advantages equal to the disquiet and anxiety it occasions? Can we safely adopt a scheme which has no clear outline defining it? What does it matter whether the right to govern be or be not formally claimed, so that it be eventually used, and even now, in effect, exercised?

This proposal falls in with the tendency of the times to do the work of the Church by conventions and other unchurchly agencies. We do not favor the isolation of our Church, and have

no objection to correspondence, but we want no entanglements. The strength of Dr. Robinson's argument lies wholly in his appeal to this sentiment of unity—I call it a sentiment, for no reasonable man can hope to realise unity this side heaven. Let us strive for unity as we strive for holiness; but don't let us build a tower of Babel.

Rev. J. Rice Bowman said a meeting of the Assembly costs \$1,000 per day. If it sits five hours a day, the cost per hour is \$200. So that the man who speaks an hour on this subject, has spent enough almost to carry him to the Council and back.

Ruling elder Gen. Hill wanted to know what this thing is. Various names and various definitions have been given it: Pan-Presbyterian Alliance, Œcumenical Council, Twelve Queens, Edinburgh Tea Party, and a neighbor of his suggests "Compound Standing Committee of Conference *de omnibus rebus et quibusdam aliis.*" A good name for it might be drawn from the worthy county of Buncombe, North Carolina. We have been invited to this christening, and the parents have not a name for the baby, nor have they defined its sex. Dr. Robinson makes it a big thing, and then a little thing. We don't know whether it is a fire-cracker or a Columbiad. Perhaps it is a Centennial fire-cracker, or it may be a Columbiad loaded with blank cartridges. In either case, it will make a great noise. And who is to bear the expenses? We shall have some one moving that brother Jones go, because he is rich; brother Scruggs, because he has a rich church; and brother —, because he has a rich uncle. Is that Presbyterian?

The Assembly adjourned with Gen. Hill in possession of the floor.

On Wednesday the subject was resumed, and Gen Hill not being present, the Rev. D. O. Davies took the floor and said he wished to dwell on two aspects of the case—the nature of the Council, and our status in respect to it. As to the former, he maintained that it is simply a Committee of Conference. As to the latter, he said the question had been unfairly put, Shall we enter? The true question is, Shall we remain in? We are as

much in as any Church is ; no further in and no less. The opposers of this measure are proposing to go out.

Dr. Adger interrupted the speaker to ask if the last Assembly did not appoint a committee to consider and confer, and said we could not be in until we have adopted the Constitution which has been reported to us.

Mr. Davies said if there is any body to which there are any parties, *we sustain* the same relations that any others do to that body. And we cannot withdraw from it without bringing on ourselves evils which God has not called us to endure.

Gen. Hill resumed remarks, and said he had written some notes, but could not read his own writing. Yet he made a number of points effectively.

Rev. Mr. Branch said we are invited to decide about an anonymous institution. Dr. McCosh had said it is not an ecclesiastical body, but an evangelistic body. The idea of the *ecclesia* is cast out. Nobody knows what it is. If not an ecclesiastical body, what right have we to recognise it ?

Ruling elder Judge Ould argued that to the Assembly alone are committed the external relations of the Church. He was a strict constructionist in State affairs, but a loose constructionist in reference to the Church. The more power and the more action to be possessed and to be exercised by this Alliance, the better it would suit him. The Southern Church must make herself heard ; and there can be no grander opportunity than this gives. Whether right or wrong, the watchword of the day is consolidation. When the united Presbyterian churches shall speak, they will secure the ear of the world. He wanted our Church to come to the front, and to speak with the enemy at the gate. When the powers of despotism see the mighty religious power represented by this Alliance, they will move cautiously.

Dr. White said lawyers were not in general safe interpreters of ecclesiastical constitutions. Our Book is definite. We can no more transgress the Church's ecclesiology than her theology. The right to superintend given to the Assembly in our Constitution, refers to the work of the churches under its care, and is specific.

On Thursday, Rev. Joseph Bardwell commenced his speech by

expressing his thanks to the Committee on the Alliance, whose report we are discussing. They had well done their duty, but they have become vanishing factors, and we are not considering their fidelity, but their report. As to the report of the Committee on Bills and Overtures, that is only incidental. The real question is the adoption of the constitution proposed. Such a constitution is not necessary for any mere conference, and it is evident from this constitution that the Alliance is a new court and a high court, which the Assembly can have no hand in organising, because it possesses no such power. Our Presbyteries are the primary sources of power, and only they can change our constitution so as to have an œcumenical council set up, such as this Alliance must be considered. We are asked to adopt this constitution, and the request is preposterous. He then replied to Judge Estes on correspondence and to Judge Ould on superintendence. There are two kinds of correspondence, and they must not be confounded, for they are intrinsically different. It is not by the power of correspondence that such an alliance as this is to be founded; that could only be done by some power of organisation which the Assembly has not. For if the Assembly has any power to erect a court above and beyond itself, where is it so declared in the Constitution? Nor yet has the Assembly any treaty-making power which can be deduced either from the word "correspondence" or from the other word "superintendence." The Assembly has no superintendence given to it in the Constitution, except over the internal affairs of our own body. He then read a paper as part of his argument, which he proposed to offer for the Assembly's adoption at the close of the discussion.

Rev. L. McKinnon, a member of the Committee on Bills and Overtures, said the report before the Assembly was no longer the *unanimous* report. Our first duty is to be united among ourselves, but we are almost equally divided on this subject. Old friendships at home are better than new alliances abroad. He dreaded the idea of consolidation broached by Judge Ould. And he judged the expense of the Alliance more likely to be \$20,000 than \$9,000.

Ruling elder Kennedy spoke at some length in favor of the alliance.

It was moved and carried that Dr. Hoge be heard and then the vote be taken.

Ruling elder Patrick Joyes called for the reading of the constitution of the Alliance, and the Stated Clerk read it.

Dr. Hoge proposed to speak in the most quiet and temperate manner, in the hope that he might conciliate some and harmonise the views of all. And as not by right but through courtesy he was allowed to make the last speech, he wished to say that if any brother desired to make any comment on what he might say or to put any questions to him, "it never interrupted him to be interrupted." He proceeded to give to the opponents of the Alliance full credit for the purest motives, and expressed his respect for that wise conservatism which recoiled from entangling alliances with irresponsible bodies, and still more for that jealous regard for the orthodoxy and purity of our Church which would protect both from injury. And if he believed that either was now imperilled, he would be the first to withdraw from any sympathy with the proposed movement.

Before entering on the main topic, he would consider three preliminary points. The *first* was the effect our decision was likely to have on the harmony of our own Church. Now, when God's providence calls his people to "a new departure," the primary consideration is *right* and not *peace*. If *peace* were the great interest, then none would ever be justified in taking part in the great conflict between truth and error which is forever in progress in the world. If *peace* were the only watchword, then no great charter of rights would ever have been wrung from the hand of tyranny, and none of the battles of freedom would have been fought, and no religious reformation achieved, rescuing the Church from priestly domination. The cry for *peace* must never arrest true progress. And if he had the faintest belief that this movement would tend to disintegrate our Church, he would say, Drop the subject now and forevermore.

But there are two extremes. Some say the adoption of these resolutions will rend our Church asunder; but others rush to the

other extreme, and say that, if not adopted, many of our people will have their attachments to our Church weakened, and will wish to go where there are less restrictions. Thus there are two sides to this question of the effect on our own harmony of the action to be taken here. For himself, he belonged to neither. Should this measure fail, he would acquiesce in the will of the Assembly, and, returning to his pastorate saddened and somewhat depressed, he would devote himself to the Church's service as faithfully as ever. He would always regret, however, that his brethren had slighted a scheme which he was convinced would in its fruition prove of inestimable benefit to the Presbyterian Church.

The *second* point was the alleged tendency to consolidation. He would assert, and assert it emphatically, that the tendency of the age in the career of churches was not to consolidation. The tendency is to operate as a unit in schemes of benevolence, but for each church to maintain its own corporate life.

The *third* point is the expense—a grave difficulty which he had no wish to treat lightly. It never was intended that the expense should come out of any fund of the Church; nor would he consent for one dollar to be taken for this purpose from any of the enterprises of Christian benevolence. But we have one hundred pastors whose churches would cheerfully provide the means of their going. Moreover, four or five men, or two or three, or even one—say Dr. Palmer, of New Orleans—would fully represent the Church. Again, it is not annual but triennial, and half the times it will meet on our own shores. Nor was it ever expected that twenty-eight delegates would attend any one meeting. But, to put an end to all doubt on this point, he would insert in the resolutions proposed for our adoption the provision that the expense was not to come out of any funds of the Church.

And now, coming to the great question of constitutionality, he was glad it had been so fully discussed. He respected the scruples of his brethren, and would show how many of their difficulties might be relieved. If the Assembly will grant our request and permit the proposed representation, then it might throw around its delegates such guards as might be deemed requisite.

It might map out their line of action, and, if the council should infringe on their rights, they could report it on their return, and the Assembly never send another delegation; so that it would not be necessary to carry across sea that "pontoon bridge" which his gallant friend, General Hansell, had suggested as a proper part of our equipment.

Dr. Adger inquired whether the advocates of the scheme would meet their opponents on the ground of declaring the Alliance simply a conference.

Dr. Hoge signified that he would be satisfied, but declined to give a categorical answer, saying that he would meet the question as he went on. Then he proceeded to declare that the close analysis of the constitution is in a great measure unnecessary. He had never favored our adoption of the constitution of the Alliance at all, nor as a new constitutional rule of ours, and hence he was opposed to sending it down to the Presbyteries.

Dr. Adger—But we are required to adopt the constitution of the Alliance as preliminary to being represented in it.

Dr. Hoge—How are we required to adopt it?

Dr. Adger—By the resolution appended to the report of our delegate we are called upon expressly to say that "this Assembly accepts as satisfactory the constitution agreed upon by that Conference."

Dr. Hoge—Yes, that is the language of the resolution, and you have put the proper interpretation on it; but we do not propose for you to adopt that resolution, but to substitute in its place the following: "The Assembly approves of the general tenor of the constitution of the Alliance providing for a general Presbyterian council to be held every three years." This is all you are to say. You are not called on to take up the constitution and endorse or accept its several clauses, but only to approve the spirit and general objects of it.

Dr. Adger—But will Dr. Robinson be satisfied with that?

Dr. Robinson—Yes, I accept it as a subsequent interpretation of the Assembly's views.

Dr. Hoge—Yes, we are agreed upon this interpretation; and, moreover, we do not admit that the Alliance is an œcumenical

council, or even a stepping-stone to one. It is simply a collection of committees from different churches, bound together by a set of simple and necessary rules for their own government; and this is really what the constitution, about which so much has been said, was designed for. Now, in this view of the matter—and here we can all agree—there will surely be no doubt of the constitutional right of the Assembly to send its committee to meet with like committees of other Reformed churches.

As to the question, *Cui bono?* Dr. Hoge said there are many obvious advantages. Amongst these, a large increase of knowledge is possible and desirable with regard to the strength, character, modes of working, and prospects of the different members of the Presbyterian family scattered throughout the world. Notwithstanding the number of well informed men in this Assembly, there are probably not five members of it who could rise up at this moment and tell us even the names of the different Presbyterian Churches in the world.

As to the part of the country where it is supposed this scheme originated, he thought intelligent, right-minded, and right-hearted men ought to estimate the character of any plan or institution on its own merits. It is not manly or Christian to be controlled in matters of duty by prejudice or passion.

Much had been said of the exercise of arbitrary power on the part of this council. Moderator, would our Church be the only sufferer by such a usurpation? Have the other churches of the world no rights to guard, no principles to protect, no purity, no orthodoxy, no independence to preserve?

Dr. Hoge proceeded to name some of these churches, when General Hill interrupted him to inquire if Dr. Hoge considered the French Protestant Church, three-fourths of which are said to deny the divinity of Christ, a sound church. Dr. Hoge replied that this was not true of that branch of the French Church which was represented in the Alliance. General Hill then asked: Do you consider the Northern Presbyterian Church orthodox? Dr. Hoge replied: "I do in the sense in which that term is applied to other churches represented in the Alliance; and leaving out the question of organic union, I consider the Northern Church ortho-

dox to the extent that I am willing to enter into fraternal relations with that Church, whenever a basis is adopted proposing terms which are just on their part and honorable to ourselves."

This declaration was greeted with a sudden, hearty burst of applause, which was suppressed by the Moderator, who stated that it was expressly against the rules of the Assembly to indulge in any such demonstration. And we would take this occasion to remark that evidence is here once more presented of what has been the honest sentiment of our Church ever since the Baltimore Conference. Our Church there took the ground that terms "just on the part of the North and honorable to ourselves" are all that we would insist on as prerequisite to fraternal relations with them, and we have since then asked for nothing else. But let all parties observe the language—"just on their part and honorable to ourselves:" or, to express the same idea in other words, "honorable to both parties."

Here the Rev. Mr. Cousar asked Dr. Hoge: Would a majority of the Alliance accept your theory of the council?

Dr. Hoge—That subject has already been fully considered. We cannot go back and discuss that question again.

Rev. Mr. Cousar—I do not want to go back.

Dr. Hoge—Then suppose you join us and go forward.

Here the Rev. Mr. Saye asked a question inaudible to the reporter.

Dr. Hoge answered: Moderator, I wish I knew everything. Then I could solve all doubts about the orthodoxy of continental creeds and confessions and the like.

Reverting to what Dr. Hoge had said a little before as to other churches having rights to guard and principles to protect as well as ours, so that we need not be afraid of what the Alliance may hereafter be led to do, Dr. Adger inquired: Can we devolve our responsibility on other bodies, instead of sacredly guarding ourselves the trust committed to us?

Dr. Hoge—Of course we cannot transfer our responsibility to any other body; but have we not a guaranty in the character of the great churches represented in the Alliance that they will not betray the interests which are as dear to themselves as to us?

He then appealed to his brethren to allow our Church to take her place in the family gathering of the Presbyterian Churches of the world. We desire organic union with no other church, but we do wish to belong to the great Presbyterian brotherhood.

Rev. Mr. Bardwell—Would the Alliance accept this interpretation of the constitution and receive our delegates on these terms?

Dr. Hoge replied, that but for his belief that our committee would be admitted, he would not have advocated the views he had presented, as it would have been a waste of time to form a plan which would exclude us from representation.

The reading of Mr. Bardwell's paper was now called for, and the vote taken on it as a substitute for the Committee's paper. It was rejected by seventy-eight against thirty-eight. The Committee's resolutions as modified by Dr. Hoge, though really not in order, because in fact a new paper proposing a new plan, were nevertheless allowed to be put before the Assembly, and were adopted by a vote of seventy-eight to thirty-nine.

On Friday Dr. Hoge offered his explanatory minute, and then Dr. Adger rose and said that he had no hesitation in expressing his gratification with the concessions proposed by the majority in this minute. And he would add, that had the Alliance been held up at the beginning in this aspect of a mere conference of committees, we never would have opposed it, and four or five days of debate might have been saved. He would say also, for himself and those acting with him, that we cannot be excelled by the majority in affectionate interest in all the Presbyterian bodies of the whole earth and a desire to be found conferring with them, so far as practicable, respecting the common advantage.

Dr. Mallard and the Rev. Mr. Carne concurred with Dr. Adger. The minute was then adopted with only a single negative vote. Dr. Robinson wished the concurrence might be set forth in some special form. Dr. Adger replied that he thought it was sufficiently set forth in the vote.

In concluding our review of this subject, let us here set down briefly the points of the discussion:

1. Dr. Robinson declared that at Columbus the objection was simply to *credentials*. The parties proposing to treat were indi-

viduals, and the Assembly insisted on the coördination of courts and demanded equals to treat with. But twelve churches propose now to treat, and the difficulties of 1874 were thus removed in 1875, and do not now exist.

The reply was, after all, the Alliance is only an "advisory body." It is not "committees of churches" we are to meet, but we must enter an organism, a *real body*, and yet only an *advisory one*, and not a church court. So that the objection of 1874 still stands, which, properly stated, was this: that Presbyterians cannot act in church affairs except in the line of coördinate courts.

2. It was urged that we are bound to realise the unity of the visible church as "God giveth opportunity," and that the œcumenical council, the "grand Presbyterian parliament of the world," can be now realised, and that the Alliance is a step towards this consummation.

It was answered, with reasons given, that no such parliament is or ever can be possible in the present dispensation; and that the Scriptures do not hold out to us any such idea of church unity as this; and that this Alliance can be no step towards such a parliament.

3. It was urged that the Assembly, as the only body to "correspond" with foreign bodies, has the right to join us to this Alliance without consulting the Presbyteries, who really "have no business with it."

It was answered that to adopt the constitution of this Alliance as binding us is to make a new constitutional rule for our Church, which the Assembly is forbidden to do without first obtaining consent from the Presbyteries; and, further, that the right to "correspond" is not the right to organise a new court, which the Alliance must be held to be; for why should a mere conference be an alliance or have need of a constitution?

4. It was insisted the expense was overrated. Dr. Robinson said that the trip from New York to Edinburgh would not be over \$200 each.

It was answered that, taking the lowest estimate, it was wrong to undertake the expense of such a movement in the needy con-

dition of our church enterprises and the general poverty of our people.

And let us now briefly notice how all these objections are affected by the modifications proposed and adopted. To make the Alliance a mere conference, without any power to act, and that a conference with committees from other churches, must, *in the first place*, remove the objection that we cannot act officially with Rationalists, &c., in church work. Here comes in the argument that we may do good, if we cannot get good from this movement.

Secondly, it must meet the objection that we cannot deal as a church with individuals or with irresponsible societies, and that we cannot act as a church except in the line of the coördination of courts.

Thirdly, this denial that the Alliance is in any sense the germ of a true and proper œcumenical court, having supreme jurisdiction over all the churches of the earth, keeps us back from an inconvenient and hurtful confounding of the attributes of the visible with those of the invisible church, and so removes another and very serious objection to the Alliance as at first proposed to us.

Fourthly, it accords in a way and to a degree which it is to be hoped will prove harmless, with the spirit of the age which cries aloud for unification. To this demand we answer that we are ready to come together for conference, but not to be bound in close bonds of union. Doctrinal fidelity is of supremest importance in these lax times, and we will not sacrifice it to formal union, which is of infinitely less consequence.

Fifthly, these essential modifications of the proposition have preserved the unity of our Church. It had been a sad thing for the Assembly to have been dissolved with two parties in its bosom, perhaps evenly divided. Whether either side are completely satisfied or not with the final decision, both have reason to rejoice in it as affording a way of escape from the rending of our Church. That calamity threatens to overtake the Northern overgrown Church; and he is a blind man who does not see that we are very liable to the same danger ourselves, and possibly in the

near future. . . But it will not come, we now confidently trust, as a result of the Pan-Presbyterian Alliance. That question is settled both amicably and safely, and to God be the praise.

One inconsistency, we confess, attaches to the settlement as made. Our Church, we have said, goes in merely to confer, and that by a mere committee; and yet to effect such a simple and temporary object we have to enter a corporation formally organized and expected to have permanent existence. Dr. Robinson called it an "alliance to confer," which expression fairly involves and sets forth all this inconsistency.

FRATERNAL RELATIONS WITH THE NORTHERN ASSEMBLY.

This subject came up by overture from the Presbytery of St. Louis, desiring the Assembly to give them relief from the embarrassments of their position. Being on the border, they encounter the charge that our Church is unreasonable in its demands on the Northern Assembly. For their relief, the Committee on Bills and Overtures offered a declaration that no deliverance of ours was to be construed as impugning the Christian character of the Northern Church. After it was prepared, (as we understood Dr. Robinson publicly to declare,) Dr. Ganse, now of the Northern Church, lately of the Reformed (Dutch), comes to Savannah unofficially, as he declared, though it appears that it was otherwise represented in the Northern Assembly. Some of the members of our body, it seems, met him in informal conference, where it would appear there was more or less discussion of the paper prepared as our answer to the St. Louis Presbytery, and where, as it turns out, Dr. Ganse had said something about his getting the Northern Assembly to pass any acknowledgments reciprocally which our Assembly might make. At this conference, Dr. Smith received the telegram from the Northern Assembly, and it is read to all present, but it is agreed that it ought to be withheld until the body should have acted on the St. Louis paper. This was Friday, and that evening this reply to St. Louis comes up, but there are suspicions aroused that something is behind, and the paper cannot pass. Adjournment takes place before it is settled. The Moderator throws out the suggestion of meeting with closed doors in the morning. But next morning objection is

made to this, and the Moderator explains that he only intended to suggest an interlocutory meeting. Such a meeting is held; that is, the Assembly resolves itself into a committee of the whole, Judge Ould in the chair. The reply to the St. Louis Presbytery is amended by Dr. Mallard, so as to declare that we are standing on the ground of the Baltimore Conference, and by the writer so as to declare that, though not impugning their Christian character, we had condemned some of their deliverances. The committee rose and reported, and the paper was then passed. Then the Moderator produced his Brooklyn telegram. The Committee on Bills and Overtures, enlarged by several new members, is sent out to prepare a reply. It finds the Northern telegram utterly unsatisfactory, because it refuses all reference to the past. Probably not one man in the whole body would have consented to our treating with them on the basis of that telegram, proffering to us fraternal relations on terms of perfect equality and reciprocity. We were not on terms of equality with them, for we had never vilified their character in any official deliverance. Moreover, there could be no reciprocity of confidence without a "few plain words" from them, expressing their disapproval now of the hard names they applied to us, when much excited, before this, though in a different way. Those "few plain words" demanded by us in the Baltimore Conference they had now again refused to utter. The Committee were not long in preparing our reply, which was, that we were ready for correspondence with them on any terms honorable to both parties; that we were standing yet on the ground we took at Baltimore, and that we had never impugned their character, though condemning some of their deliverances.

When this answer was reported, there was not much discussion of it. Judge Estes seemed to object to our *volunteering* any statement that no deliverance of ours was to be construed as impugning the character of the Northern Assembly. The writer declared that the more spontaneous such a statement the better; that we ought to be and were ready anywhere and always to declare ourselves in the wrong whenever we had been so, and *that* not with any view to drawing out corresponding concessions

from the other side, but out of our own self-respect, and that we might say and do the thing that is right. So the answer was sent on to Brooklyn. Our Assembly met again in the evening at 8, in order to finish up the business that remained and be dissolved. It was supposed that possibly some answer might come from the Northern Assembly requiring consideration. None coming, when our business was all finished, we were dissolved at 10 o'clock, our usual hour of adjournment.

It may seem strange to outsiders that our Assembly did not hold over until Monday, in order to complete these negotiations. But all intelligent persons inside of our communion will easily understand that the body had no such thought as that any practical negotiations were really going on. The Northern Assembly sent to us their usual request for fraternal relations, with their accustomed refusal of what was due from them and to us, and what was honorable to both parties. We returned our usual answer, accompanied with a declaration that we had never impugned their Christian character. We had very slight expectation that anything could come out of all this, and, not being excited a particle with the centennial fever, we quietly went through with our work and were dissolved.

The newspapers have fully declared what took place on the other hand at Brooklyn, and we have neither space nor disposition to recount it. Dr. Talmage has our thanks for the kind and brotherly words he wished to have his Assembly utter. The writer freely joined with Dr. Hoge and others in a telegram to Dr. Talmage, stating to him that had his Assembly passed his resolutions, we should have been ready for the correspondence; nor was it his notion to take exception to any part of those resolutions, but he yielded to the judgment of others on this point. No doubt there were many others in that Assembly besides Dr. Talmage who had the same truly brotherly feelings towards the Southern Church and the same manly readiness to express just regret for the injury done to us which were uttered by him. It is not for us to say whether there were any or how many of different character. But this we cannot help declaring: That they were flagrantly misled as to what our Assembly intended to sig-

nify. And our first feeling, already publicly expressed, was that of indignation at what appeared a transparent and insolent trick. We have come, on maturer deliberation, to perceive that what happened may have been not *trick*, but only *blunder*, and to acknowledge that certainly there was some blundering on the side of our Assembly. It was a sad blunder on our part to consent to any communications by official telegrams. It may have also been a blunder to consent to answer them and our St. Louis Presbytery in part by portions of one and the same paper.

And now what? Are we in any degree hampered by the blunders, if any, or by the tricks, if any, which have been witnessed? Is our position in any degree altered by the mistake into which the Northern Assembly was led? They said they wanted correspondence on terms of perfect equality and reciprocity. We answered that we wanted only what was honorable to both parties. The next step, of course, was for them to say what terms they had to offer. They took no such step, but simply denying that they ever impugned our character, they declare, with boisterous applause, that the case is settled.

Now, if our construction of their action is the right one, then, of course, the case is not settled, nor is it made any better, but worse.

The *New York Observer*, whose chief editor led the way in this action, would persuade itself and the Northern Church that the correspondence is established. The *New York Evangelist*, on the other hand, says truly, "the Southern Assembly has not committed itself to any course of action. It adjourned before our final action was taken. It appointed no delegates to our Assembly. The whole of its direct reply to us is in the words that it is 'ready to enter into fraternal relations with us on any terms honorable to both parties.' This of course has often been said by both parties. . . . All this is very well, as far as it goes. . . . But it does not bind either party to any action. . . . We cannot see that much has as yet been gained. All will depend upon the question whether the Southern advocates for fraternity will be able to bring their Church to meet ours upon perfectly equal and common ground, without renewing the questions and

controversies of the past." This shows that some at least in the Northern Church understand very well these two things: *first*, that our Savannah Assembly has not taken any new ground, or committed itself to any new action; and *secondly*, that the Brooklyn Assembly did not mean to construe away what has been complained of by us in the past.

And yet some amongst ourselves would fain believe that the Northern Assembly has taken a long step in advance of, and in fact in flagrant contradiction of, its past deliverances on this subject. Rejecting the interpretation of its words as a *denial* that it ever impugned our character, and understanding it to mean that it *repudiates* all that was ever said by their Assembly or the historic bodies that preceded it, unfavorable to our character, they point out how the Brooklyn Assembly has done what some of its predecessors have so loudly declared never could be done—that is, it has actually gone back to condemn everything that was ever said by either the Old or the New School Assembly, in disparagement of the Southern Church! Which is the right construction of the Brooklyn action? Did they *deny* having slandered us? Or did they *repudiate* their slanders of us? Of course Dr. Prime, the chairman of their Committee of Correspondence, knows. Let us ask him to tell us what they mean. Well, the deliverance he is to expound was written by his pen and offered to his Assembly on Monday, the 29th May; and on Thursday, June 1st, we read in his editorial columns this remark respecting the telegram sent to our Assembly on the preceding Friday, May 26th: "It was the first distinct and emphatic utterance made by the Northern Assembly that it was done forever with negotiations and concessions and explanations." This is Dr. Prime's language after they have adopted the deliverance which some of our brethren suppose is to be understood as *repudiating* all their offensive terms in the past. Now, if, on the 29th May, Dr. Prime had led his Assembly to *construe and explain away* all their past denunciations of us, could he have gloried on the 1st day of June that on the preceding Friday, May 26th, it had distinctly and emphatically declared that it was done forever with *concessions and explanations*?

And how did Judge Strong, who moved the adoption of that deliverance, which some of us would charitably understand as taking such a long step in advance—how did Judge Strong understand that deliverance? Why, he said, in all the frankness of that hour of supposed triumph over the poor South: “Those of us who have approved the declarations of the Assemblies during the excitement of the war, and those who are unwilling to retract anything we expressed at that time, I feel, can all meet on this common platform without taking back anything we have said, or renouncing our own convictions of right.”

Alas! when will our simple-hearted Southern brethren learn to understand that the men we are dealing with never make such blunders as this interpretation of their late action would represent them to have committed!

Now everybody knows that the matter of interchanging delegates with the Northern Assembly, and so carrying on what is called by the high-sounding title of “Fraternal Correspondence,” is really in itself considered a very small affair. And what makes it a question of serious importance, is simply this, that no sooner shall we have entered into these *brotherly* relations with the Northern Church, than they will begin their efforts to bring us into organic union with them. He has no eyes who cannot see that they will never rest till their Church becomes “National.” Dr. Musgrave, their leader, expressed their feelings on this point at Brooklyn. Correspondence established, union will be the next objective point. And not one argument is used now for the former but will come into the plea for the latter, and come in legitimately and with power. We shall be harassed for ten years, and if needful, for twenty years, with this question. And this question, with its endless, wearisome, exhausting agitations, will wear out our Church. We shall have neither time nor strength left for any other business. Nay, more; that question will divide us. And our loving brethren will all the more, perhaps, press upon us, in that prospect, this union with themselves. Let us be wise in time. Let us be warned by the turn taken on us at Brooklyn. That Assembly never intended to stultify itself by construing away all

its historic predecessors and itself have said. Its leaders were for *taking us in*, but never designed to repudiate anything their Church had said of ours. We cannot trust some of those leaders. Our safety is in declining further negotiations with them. We are small and weak, and we are destined to be divided and destroyed if we do not take the alarm. Let us cling fast to one another, and patiently bear the trials which afflict our border churches, and which also, in various forms, are meted out to all our people alike. Let us stand in our lot and quit ourselves like men. We have a great work to do, and a high testimony to maintain. And the Lord our God is with us, the God of Jacob is our refuge.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Christ and Humanity ; with a Review, Historical and Critical, of the Doctrine of Christ's Person. By HENRY M. GOODWIN. New York : Harper & Brothers, Publishers, Franklin Square. 1875. 12mo., pp. 404.

The author justifies the publication of this book on the ground that the old doctrine of the Person of Christ is now attracting to itself fresh interest. "The time has come for a new method and direction of theological and Christological inquiry ; and the tokens are abundant that it has already begun." (Preface.) We have no disposition to shackle free thought. The decisions of Councils, against which the author entertains a hearty grudge which reveals his type of thinking, are certainly not beyond discussion. Some of them have grievously erred ; and it is a matter of inquiry whether those which settled the faith of the Church in the constitution of Christ's Person, may not have been in the same category. But, at the same time, it would seem that a modest man would treat with some respect the presumption created by the *consensus* of the true Church of Christ in favor of a certain doctrine for fifteen centuries. If he leave the road crowded with "the footsteps of the flock," he might do it without flouting the saintly multitude who throng it, and loudly vaunting that he alone has found the right path. He might take leave of Fathers and Reformers and Martyrs, without informing them, at parting, that they are "dogmatists and shallow thinkers," and that a few Germans, Horace Bushnell, and himself, are the people with whom doctrine will die. A little more of the modesty of "learned ignorance" would not have hurt Mr. Goodwin's work. "But every man has a right to his own opinion." Oh, of course ; provided his opinion be true. Every man has a perfect right to utter truth. Perhaps, however, it may be discovered some day, that there never was any right to utter error. But let it be conceded that, so far as man's judgment is concerned, every one is at

liberty to advance his own views, and it must equally be admitted that his neighbor has the same liberty to come and search him. The great question in regard to this book is, Does it present the truth respecting the Person of Christ?

The key to the author's doctrine is, that the divine and human natures of Christ are not distinct, but identical. He admits his divinity; he admits his humanity; but these are essentially the same. Consequently, he rejects the orthodox doctrine of two natures coëxisting without identification in the one personality of the Mediator. He finds a general basis for his view in the extraordinary theory that God is essentially human, and man is essentially divine. In the Incarnation, therefore, there was no mere assumption of the human nature into connexion with a divine personality; there was not simply a union of the divine with the human; but there was the phenomenal realisation of an original element in the Godhead, an actual reduction of the Infinite Being within finite limitations. God really became man; that is, what he always was, now he appears to be. The humanity of Christ is God manifest in the flesh. Christ did not assume a foreign nature; he only developed what was originally his own. What the orthodox term two natures in the one personality of Christ are not two distinct natures, but only two manifestations of the same nature. The Saviour had no distinctively human soul, and consequently no distinctively human consciousness. His was a divine-human soul; that is—if language has meaning—a human soul which was at the same time divine. Yet he must have had a human soul in some sense, in order to sympathise with human beings. But since all human beings are essentially divine, the divine human soul of Jesus was in sympathy with them. Christ was tempted as he was divine, and suffered as he was divine. God was tempted, God suffered as man. All this is sustained by the author's hypothesis as to the nature of the image of God in which man was made. This was by no means a mere likeness; it was the phenomenal manifestation of the essential humanity eternally existing in the Deity. And it follows, argues the author, that this image of God in man cannot be lost without the destruction of the human being himself; or,

what is the same thing, the destruction of a part of the divine essence itself. The moral resemblance of man to God may be impaired, and even that not nearly so badly as the orthodox dogmatically affirm, but this real image of God in man is indestructible. In short, this was the image of God which the Son originally bore, and in appearing on earth as a man, all he did—there is no more mystery in it than this—was to reduce to human form and lineament his own archetypal existence.

Such is a brief sketch of the main positions of a work which is an honest attempt, in coöperation with that of some Germans and Horace Bushnell, to lead the Church back from that false conception of the Person of her Saviour, which the tyranny of Councils has infused into her creed, to the pure, scriptural doctrine in regard to it! We have been struck by the truth of the often repeated maxim, that new errors are almost always reproductions, in somewhat different guise, of ancient heresies. What is Mr. Goodwin's theory, in substance, but the old Monophysite one in relation to the person of Christ, except that it makes its appearance now with the plausible face of Pantheism? The two natures are not two, they are identical. Of course, then, they are one. Is not that the doctrine of one nature? What is that but Monophysitism? But God is "essentially" human, and man is "essentially" divine. What is that, in substance, but Pantheism? It would be fairer in Mr. Goodwin to announce himself, not as an evangelical Christian minister, but as a Pantheistic Monophysite. His trumpet would give no uncertain sound. And if he would do that, he might console himself by the reflection that in advocating Pantheism, he would use the subtlest form of philosophy in combating the faith of Christ's people, with which it has ever had to contend. But in putting on the armor of Goliath, let him be as honest as the Philistine—take a position squarely on a hill opposite to Israel, and defy the armies of the living God.

The limits of a notice will allow only a few remarks upon the doctrine of this book.

1. The author, like all dissentients from the faith of the Church, talks of the vain effort of the orthodox to reduce mysteries to logical

form, so as to be comprehensible by the human understanding. We deny that the Church makes any such effort. She has always confessed the transcendent mystery of the Incarnation. Luther said that no man could understand it and live. What the Church has done is to clear the doctrine of Christ's Person of elements which contradict the intuitions of the reason, and to present it in its scriptural form. Our author, notwithstanding this stricture, makes an attempt to simplify the doctrine of the complex personality of Christ. He professes to relieve the formidable difficulty of the coëxistence in the same person of two natures with diverse consciousness; but he does this by substituting in its room, not a mystery merely, but a bouncing absurdity. The infinity of God, in the Incarnation, is "reduced" to finite form. Infinity reduced to finiteness! That is the simpler form of the doctrine we are asked to embrace. The nature of God and the nature of man are identical. Infinite and finite attributes are reduced to unity upon identically the same nature. If transubstantiation offer any contradiction to reason greater than that, we fail to see it.

Si pictor, etc.

2. If the author had contented himself with the Platonic doctrine of ideas, the case would not have been so bad; but he cannot expect humble people to follow him in the position that God is essentially human and man essentially divine. The doctrine is incapable of gloss. The Pantheism is confessed. He may not have meant it so, but essence means essence, and that is the word the author employs. Humanity is of the essence of divinity. This is a short-hand method of making a Christian man a partaker of the divine nature. What need is there of regeneration and prayer and holy discipline? We are divine by nature.

3. But if we be real human beings and not gods, then the divinity of Christ's human soul puts him out of sympathy with his brethren. He could not suffer like them, he could not be tempted like them. The author professes to make the sympathy of Christ with men stronger and tenderer because divine. Yes, but he destroys it as human.

4. The author holds the doctrine that God suffered for man from eternity. Being essentially human, he could not contem-

plate the future misery of men without the pangs of sympathy. It is enough to state this amazing theory.

5. The author teaches that Christ is the root of humanity, and in his work represented the whole human race. He applies to this union terms which are only applicable to that subsisting between Christ and his believing people. For example, he cites the words, "I am the vine, ye are the branches," as spoken by our Lord in relation to the whole race. This is a violent wresting of the Scriptures from their obvious meaning. And it follows from the author's position as to the relation between Christ and humanity, that, logically, he is a Universalist. How can divine human beings, connected with a divine Saviour as their root, ever perish? Are not the gods immortal?

6. The author speaks as though he were ignorant of the patent distinction between the simple humanity and the mediatorial character of Christ. All the passages, for instance, in which Jesus speaks of himself as subordinate to the Father, he represents the orthodox as applying only to his human nature. Had he known their doctrine, he might have saved himself some labored argumentation.

7. He insists on the great importance of the doctrine of Trichotomy. The soul is not the spirit—it is the principle of animal life. The spirit is the immaterial and deathless essence. The Scriptures will not bear him out in pressing these distinctions. What, says our Saviour, shall a man give in exchange for his *psyche*? For his animal life? Did he mean that?

8. In reference to man's origin and make, his theology and his psychology are extraordinary. Reason, in contradistinction from the understanding, conscience and will are supernatural powers; understanding and sense, natural. So it was not natural for man to be possessed of reason or conscience or will. These faculties do not belong to his nature. They are *dona superaddita*. The Romanist doctrine can no longer be charged with extravagance. It is sober, compared with this wild hypothesis. The author makes reason at once a transcendental and the thinking faculty, and the understanding the faculty of sense-perceptions.

Wonderful! This has at least the merit of originality. It out-cants Kant!

9. Finally, the author denies the total corruption of the race through the fall, and really makes a gallant knightly tilt in behalf of little innocent children. Did not our Saviour say, "of such is the kingdom of heaven?" Of course, they do not need regeneration and the application of atoning blood. Little divine-human beings! Do these truculent orthodox people dare to call them sinners? It is worthy of them—this slandering of helpless children! And when they grow, their "spiritual wills" are all right; it is only their "carnal wills" that are naughty! Most surely! Divine humanity cannot be "lost and ruined by the fall!" How it can sin at all, is the mystery. But sin is a fact! Since, then, divine-human beings commit it, it is no more sin. Can God sin?

The Person and Sinless Character of Our Lord Jesus Christ.

By WILLIAM S. PLUMER. Richmond: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co. pp. 127, 8vo.

This monograph of the venerable Dr. Plumer is printed in a style of elegance and accuracy delightful to the eye of the reader, and appropriate to the sacredness of the subject, and its reverent, pious, and orthodox treatment by the author. The essay has one dominant purpose—to assert, against modern teachings, the old and received doctrine of the Reformed Churches, not only the actual sinlessness, but the impeccability of the Redeemer. The former is impugned by none but infidels; the latter it has become the fashion to deny among certain authors, from whom we were entitled to hope better things. They concede to Christ's humanity the contingent or mutable power—*posse non peccare*; they deny to it the *non posse peccare*. The ground of this denial is, in substance, the plea that a being must be peccable in order to experience temptation, to be meritorious for resisting it, and to be an exemplar and encouragement to us who are tempted. Thus argue Ullmann, Farrar, the author of "*Ecce Deus*," Dr. Schaff, and even Dr. Hodge, in his "Theology;" while Dr.

Dorner, in his "History of Protestant Theology," revives the Nestorian and Pelagian doctrine of a meritorious growth or progress of Christ's humanity from peccability to impeccability, by virtue of the right use of his initial contingency and self-determination of will. Those who are acquainted with the mysticism, obscurity, and confusion of the last author, will not be surprised to see him advancing this error in its most offensive form.

It is subjected by Dr. Plumer to a thorough and almost an exhaustive examination. He establishes the impeccability as well as the sinlessness of Christ's person, including his humanity, by scripture and reasoning, and, in connection with this process, sets in a clear light the teachings of the orthodox concerning the hypostatic union.

If the endowment of Christ's humanity with holiness rose no higher than a *posse non peccare*, it seems obvious that there was a possibility of the failure of God's whole counsel of redemption. For, as all agree, a sinning sacrifice and intercessor could redeem no one. Why this dishonor to Christ's person and work? The pretext, as we have seen, is, that if Christ absolutely *non potuit peccare*, he could not have been subjected to temptation. It is only necessary to show that this pretext is groundless. Certainly our Saviour was subjected to temptation, and he did thereby become an encouragement, and an exemplar, and a sympathising helper for us in our temptations. But this is not inconsistent with his absolute impeccability. These writers seem to suppose that if there were no self-determination and contingency in the hitherto sinless will of Jesus when he came to be assailed by temptation, there could have been no realisation in his human soul of the spiritual assault, and so no real victory or real merit. Dr. Plumer here gives a caution, which professed Calvinists at least would do well to look at heedfully. Are they willing to teach that the existence of "concupiscence," at least in rudiment, in the soul of Jesus, was essential to this victory and merit? Would it not then follow that the presence of concupiscence is necessary to perfect a holy, creature-free-agency? And then must we not of course hold, with Pelagius, that concupiscence is not sinful?

The truth is, that the supposed stress of our opponent's plea is dissolved by a simple distinction between the act of intellection as to a sinful object and the existence of spontaneous appetency towards it. *The latter is the sin of concupiscence.* The former exists in rational and holy agents, entirely independent of it. The conception of what are the natural attractions of any given unlawful object may exist in the intellect, as it is merely a function of intelligence, absolutely without a spark of "evil concupiscence," or even a possibility thereof. The proof of this is ready. Does not the omniscience of God himself include, among the infinite numbers of his cognitions, the intellectual conception of precisely what are the "pleasures of sin for a season" to the evil heart of the sinner? How else could he judge that sinner justly? But did God share the concupiscent appetency? That would be blasphemy. This instance of our distinction is peculiarly useful in this argument, because it exposes the frivolity of the attempt to connect a contingent peccability necessarily with the finitude of Christ's human nature. For we find this intellectual conception of temptation common to the minds of God and the holy creature. But here we have all that is necessary to give Jesus a realisation of the assaults of temptation, and a full sympathy with us in those assaults, without any phase of peccability of will. While the human will of Jesus was made, by its own native endowment and by the indwelling of the Godhead, absolutely incapable of the first gleam of concupiscence towards any forbidden object, why may not the omniscience of the Logos have taught the human reason in Jesus to realise to itself intellectually precisely how such a forbidden object could affect both mind and heart of his sinful people? Thus his experience, though implying no phase of peccability, taught him to be a sympathetic helper to us who are tempted. This distinction is also illustrated in the resistance of his sanctified people to temptation in some of their purer and happier moments. The soul can only feel as it sees; intellection is, in some degree, always necessary in order to emotion. Let us suppose that the intellectual conception of a forbidden object takes place in the intelligence of a saint (in part, we will say, through the

work of an evil spirit). One of two things may happen: In virtue of remaining concupiscence in that imperfectly sanctified soul, the cognition may result in some conscious glow of spontaneous appetency towards the object; but the sanctified conscience is sufficiently watchful to recognise the appetency as evil, and so to resist it that it does not flame up into volition. This perhaps is the usual result. And of all such cases our opponents will say: Therein is righteous self-discipline; therein is the credit of the saint that the evil appetency was quenched by this righteous resistance before it was matured into evil purpose. Well, let us suppose the other case, which happens at least sometimes to the saint—that the intellectual conception of the forbidden object is intruded, but the conscience is so prompt in its watch that the evil appetency is anticipated, and the thought is suppressed before it even passes into concupiscence. Is not this still more creditable than the other case? Surely! If, in the former case, we approved of the man's sanctified will, because it maintained such a state of atmosphere in the soul that the *evil spark went out* before it had set fire to the stream of action, we shall, in the latter case, approve still more of that more sanctified will which maintains a spiritual atmosphere such that the spark of evil desire is *not lighted at all*. This credit is an humble illustration of that which belongs to the temptation of Jesus.

There is another distinction which is overlooked in this argument, the obliviousness of which is yet more alarming, because it seems to imply a forsaking of a well-established theological truth, which is one of the corner-stones of our system. That truth is, the consistency of an entire certainty of the will with a real free agency. These writers argue that unless Jesus were spontaneous in his rejection of temptation, he would have wrought no moral victory, and acquired no worthiness in conquering it. Very true. But they then proceed to infer, as though they were genuine Pelagians, that in order to this true freedom, he must have begun his moral career with a will *in equilibrio* between the right and the wrong, and with a contingent possibility of willing wickedly. It is against this mischievous confusion that we protest. Such theologizing jeopardds

other truths besides the holiness and dignity of our Redeemer's person; it vitiates the whole doctrine of the will, of the divine attributes, of human responsibility, and of original sin. We repeat: to the correct understanding of all these, that distinction is vital which is made by the Reformed theology, showing that the most perfect and absolute certainty of will is compatible with the fullest freedom. "God cannot lie." This is absolutely true. But why? Has not God a natural omnipotence which, if his holy will could prompt it, would be capable of making any manifestation whatsoever to the mind of the creature, however contradictory to reality? But his will is too absolutely holy to be capable of prompting such a manifestation. His infinite freedom is at one with his infinite holiness here, in that the absolute perfection of the principles regulating his will ensures his freely rejecting all the false and freely choosing only the true. There is, unhappily, a counterpart illustration of the same distinction. The wicked "have eyes full of adultery, and *they cannot cease from sin.*" Are they not yet free agents? Does not God hold them justly responsible for their career of transgression? Assuredly. They have just those faculties of intellect, memory, affection, on which the free agency of the renewed man is naturally conditioned; and were the evil dispositions of their own hearts renewed, they also would freely exercise their rational powers in turning from sin. But as long as their free agency is qualified by that total "inability of will" unto all spiritual good, their disuse of these faculties in spiritual duties is as absolutely certain as though the faculties themselves were paralysed into idiocy. So the holy humanity of Jesus doubtless included, and now includes, every natural human power which, in Adam's abuse of his free agency, was employed in transgression. But these powers were, from the birth of the "holy child Jesus," absolutely regulated by what Adam had not—a certain, yet most free, determination of will unto immutable holiness. This is what the Church means when she says Jesus was not only absolutely sinless, but impeccable. Does any one now desire to debate the bootless question, "Whether Jesus could have sinned if he had chosen?" *He could not choose to sin.* Of what avail

is it to debate what might have occurred, if that choice had perchance arisen in Christ's will, which was impossible to arise? If any one desires to assert that impossible contingency, under the name of a "hypothetical peccability" in Jesus, we reply to him, that we have more practical uses for our time than to discuss it, and that the established statement of the truth among the Reformed divines is good enough for us: Christ was not only actually without sin, but impeccable.

The Hulsean Lectures: Sin as set forth in Holy Scripture.
By GEORGE M. STRAFFEN, M. A., Vicar of Clifton, York.
New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1876. Pp. 106.

Physicists tell us that a cubic inch of gold can be beaten out until it covers 282,000 square inches, and that one ounce can be made so attenuated as to stretch over fifty miles. In an age so remarkable as this for malleability and ductility of ideas, it is truly refreshing to take up a work like that of Mr. Straffen.

The first criticism we have to make is one rarely called for now-a-days: the Vicar has not sufficiently beaten out his gold. In his introductory notice to the reader, he says that he is aware the Lectures are much shorter than usual; "but his regret is, that he has not been able to make them shorter still." This most praiseworthy desire to condense and compress has rendered the treatment of some important subjects rather meagre. These brief, compact Lectures are six in number. The subjects are as follows: "*The Sense of Sin*," "*The Nature of Sin*," "*The Organ of Sin*," "*The Consequents of Sin*," "*The Disclosure of Sin*," "*The Propitiation for Sin*."

The book is a model of pure, smooth, and elegant English. There is no display of ornament or learned phrases, and no manufacturing of words. The Lectures are critical, exegetical, and didactic. The subject is one of the very greatest importance, presenting questions which penetrate at once to the heart of theology. As the views we entertain concerning it determine our conceptions of redemption and the complexion of our personal religion, we are happy to say that the author's treatment is sound and scriptural as far as it goes. His contribution to popu-

lar theological literature is a timely one in this age, when there is so much disguised as well as open Pelagianism and Semipelagianism. Unsound and unscriptural views of sin lie at the foundation of most of the loose theology which prevails. At the outset, the author very sensibly and judiciously discards all questions relating to the origin of sin, as being utterly beyond us. For all the attempts which have ever been made to solve the dark problem have been abortive, and have represented God's power as limited and his wisdom as imperfect.

In the first Lecture, Mr. Straffen discourses on the existence and universality of the sense of sin. Man is conscious of inward disturbance and personal shortcoming. He has that within him which testifies of duty, order, and excellence, and which reproves him when he violates them. The most ignorant and ill-instructed instinctively distinguish between misfortune and misconduct. The result of this sense of sin is self-condemnation, uneasiness, and unhappiness.

In the second Lecture, the author acknowledges the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of giving a proper and accurate definition of sin. "Sin, when defined, is always defined out of itself—in equivalent, not really interpretative, terms. And this is true of those seeming definitions of sin which meet us in Holy Scripture. They are descriptions and intimations rather than definitions, though one of them, at least, has all the form of a definition." It is gathered from Scripture that "sin is every act and state which is contrary to God's law." It is then shown that, although opposition to God may be unconscious on the part of the offender, it is still criminal. We think that Mr. Straffen placed himself here under the necessity of saying a great deal more than he has said. In his analysis of sin, he finds two things: "(1) A will set against God's will; and (2) this will exerted for self. . . . And this brings us to the very root of the matter, and lays bare what may be called the principle of sin, viz., selfishness."

In the latter part of this Lecture, the awful nature of sin is very solemnly and impressively set forth: "Sin is always an evil: it is THE EVIL THING. Hate it, therefore; hate it bitterly. Hate

it for God's sake, for it assails his life. Hate it for Christ's sake, for it 'crucifies him afresh.' Hate it for the Spirit's sake, for it 'does despite unto him.' Hate it for your own sake, for it degrades and ruins you. Hate it for its sake, for it is most hateful and damnable."

In the third Lecture, the writer shows how completely man's carnal nature has asserted the supremacy over soul and body. His state by nature is one of corruption and apostasy from God; the flesh supreme, and soul and body subordinate, humiliated, vitiated. The body is the handmaid of the soul, its "coördinated associate and helpmate." It is, therefore, noble and not to be despised. The manner in which the Scriptures magnify the body is dwelt on at some length.

The fourth Lecture is entirely too brief, occupying scarcely ten pages. The consequents of sin are represented as two: (1) Guilt; (2) Punishment. We notice here a failure to keep before the mind and to present clearly that most important distinction between the *pollution* and *guilt* of sin, the *macula* and *reatus*. He would have done well, too, to have shown how sin, as an evil principle, works out the destruction of the soul, carrying along with it shame and remorse, and involving necessarily hopeless bondage and endless punishment. But the narrow limits of the Lecture did not permit an enlargement on some important points which we observe were in the author's mind. All that he says is well said, only the subject demanded wider and fuller treatment.

In the fifth Lecture, Mr. Straffen first shows the extent of man's knowledge of God and of right in his natural corrupt state. God did not leave himself without a witness after the fall. But this natural conscience which God continued to man was entirely insufficient to guide and restrain him. It was "mainly a *conscience* of sins, yet was also a conscience of God and of God's claims—a conscience of eternal law and of unalterable obligation." Out of its insufficiency arose the necessity for an outward authoritative rule to regulate it. Such a rule we have in the Decalogue. The author proceeds to explain how the law reveals man's innate corruption and the exceeding sinfulness of sin; how it works *wrath and death*, and proves that all men

are in a helpless and ruined condition. The gospel also reveals the exceeding sinfulness of sin in the most affecting manner possible.

In the last Lecture, which is the most important of all, we have to regret more particularly the author's brevity. Justice cannot be done to such a subject as the atonement in a short discourse. The discussion is clear, forcible, and instructive, but is very far from being exhaustive. In viewing the book as a whole, it strikes us that two chapters are lacking to give completeness—one on imputation and another on original sin. These subjects appear to us more important than some which are treated.

All lovers of truth will be glad to see this book widely circulated. Sin is presented as that abomination which God hates, as the deadly poison of the soul, producing death temporal and eternal, as the fearful malady which divine power alone can heal.

The volume is gotten up in beautiful style by E. P. Dutton & Co. The type is clear and faultless.

The Family, in its Civil and Churchly Aspects: An Essay in two Parts. By B. M. PALMER, Pastor First Presbyterian Church, New Orleans, La. Richmond Presbyterian Committee of Publication. New York: A. D. F. Randolph & Co., Broadway. Pp. 291, 16mo.

We feel indebted, speaking for both the Church and the State, to Dr. Palmer for writing and publishing his beautiful and instructive Essay, so replete with sound and attractive sentiment. Still more, we feel indebted in the interest of the same parties, for that he has presented the stereotype plates of this charming volume to our Richmond Committee, enabling them to issue the book in pleasing style, for the low price of one dollar. Would that we had the means, or that some one who has them had also the disposition, to give to our Richmond Committee the price of the plates of Dr. Thornwell's Collected Writings, and of his Life by Dr. Palmer, so that they might all be put down at a moderate price, and so get the widest possible circulation amongst our whole people.

The first part of the volume before us consists of eight chapters on the following topics :

1. General View of the Family.
2. Supremacy of the Husband.
3. Subordination of the Wife.
4. Authority of the Parent.
5. Filial Obedience.
6. Authority of Masters.
7. Subjection of Servants.
8. Collateral Relations in the Family.

Part II. consists of six chapters on the following topics :

1. Historical Development of the Church in the Family.
2. The Church under Natural Religion.
3. The Church under the System of Grace.
4. The Symbolical Mystery of Marriage.
5. The Church, the Family of God.
6. The Family in its Offices of Instruction and Worship.

We have been especially interested in Dr. Palmer's account of the Supremacy of the husband and the subordination of the wife. The apostle exhorts the husband to *love*, but the wife to *submission*. Conjugal love begins with the man ; and so it is written : "For this cause shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife." Woman must impose a restraint on her affections until she is challenged. She may arouse the love which shall draw forth her own in absolute response ; but that love must first speak from another's lips, and her own be but the echo of it. Thus, man's love must always go at the front. As he began, he must continue to be its exponent and representative and organ. And so with him, love is the *primary duty*. And he must cultivate it as a principle ; for, swallowed up in the details of business, love with him is apt to prove only an episode, while woman breathes it as an atmosphere.

Now the general idea of a husband's love is by the apostle enforced through this particular form of exhortation : "Be not *bitter* against them." The *bitter* may be in a lordly assumption of superiority which depreciates the wife. She stands upon a level with him—each is best in its own place, and neither perfect

without the other. What is called the weakness of woman is really her strength. Her dependence is not her degradation, but her glory. And there is no bitterer bitter to a true woman than the disparagement which degrades her in the eyes of him she is herself bound to honor.

There is bitterness in the withholding of that demonstrated love which is the woman's solace. She was won by this, and for this she left her childhood's home, and it is a tribute due to her for the sacrifice.

There is bitterness when proper sympathy in her cares is refused. Man's burden rests on him in bulk; woman's lot is not so much of toil as of solicitude, which wears her out. A kind look, a soft tone, makes her burden a joy.

Now, how is that *second* will which marriage joins to the first to move freely on its own pivot, and yet harmonise with the other? How are the two to coalesce, and yet be distinct? How is one to be superior, and yet both be free? How shall subordination exist, and not destroy spontaneity?

The answer of Dr. Palmer is, that the woman voluntarily relinquishes her independence. In framing the contract, she appears as the equal of him beneath whose sceptre she consents to bow. And thus it is that her subordination differs from that in the other relations of the family. For example, the child is *born* dependent; but the wife becomes voluntarily subordinate, though equal; resigns her independence, and yet is free; surrenders her will, yet retains her personality. All this is involved in the apostle's one word, *submit*. We have never read anything more just and true and wholesome, more beautiful and pleasing and satisfactory, than the full delineation our author gives of the sweet harmonies of marriage bliss.

We must signalise one more of the specially charming discussions to be found in this volume. It is where the author shows how, under the New Testament economy, as always from the beginning, and under the Patriarchal and the Mosaic dispensations alike, *the family is the Church's home*. The line of the Church is ever through the household. The family is the radix of the Church. As to the State, the family may be called the *source*,

but of the Church, it is the very *fundamental idea*. The family *may become* the State, but *it is* the Church.

Now, very cogently do these facts bear on the doctrine of Infant Baptism. Two principles must be acknowledged. (1) In the family, both the State and the Church are in embryo. (2) In both, the status of the child is determined from that of the parent by right of *birth*.

The State recognises the citizenship of its infant members, yet withholds the full enjoyment of their privileges until they shall be rendered competent by suitable training. During their minority it protects them, supervises the parental control itself, and provides a measure of education, and is guardian until the period of majority.

So the Church distinguishes between her members who are in full communion, and those who are still minors; and of these she takes the spiritual oversight.

Only in one particular the Church differs from the State, as to the period of majority—the latter fixes on a definite age for it; but *she* demands a well-defined spiritual condition as a prerequisite.

Now, the token of the covenant which God made with Abraham, and which still remains as the charter of the Church, was circumcision, but is now baptism. And now, as in Abraham's day, those *born in the Church* have a right to the seal of that covenant. And the principle of infant church-membership having been acknowledged ever since the days of Abraham, no special statute for Infant Baptism was necessary. It is the organic law of the Church throughout her entire history, especially since the days of Abraham, and its operation cannot be estopped without a formal repeal. And so we demand that the legislative Act be produced which has deprived those born in the Church of their right to be acknowledged its members. None has ever been, none can ever be, shown.

Bible Lands: Their Modern Customs and Manners Illustrative of Scripture. By the Rev. HENRY J. VAN LENNEP, D. D. With Maps and Woodcuts. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, Franklin Square. 1875. Pp. 832, 8vo.

This volume consists of two parts: the *first* treating of customs which have their origin in the physical features of Bible lands; the *second*, of customs which have a historical origin. Each part is divided into twelve chapters.

In part *first*, we have (1) Physical characteristics of the lands of the Bible in general, and of Palestine in particular; (2) Water and life upon the water; (3) Products of the soil—cereals; (4) Gardening and cultivation by irrigation; (5) Vineyards and the uses of the grape and the olive; (6) Fruit and forest trees, with the flowers of Bible lands; (7) Domestic animals—cattle, sheep, and goats; (8) The horse, mule, ass, and camel; (9) The wild beasts of Bible lands; (10) The scavengers; (11) Birds of passage; (12) Reptiles and insects of Bible lands.

In part *second*, we have (1) The ethnology of the lands of the Bible; (2) Oral and written language; (3) The tent and nomad life; (4) Permanent habitations—the house and the town; (5) The furniture of the house; (6) The inmates of the house; (7) Life in the family; (8) Social life; (9) Government; (10) Religious houses and men; (11) Religious practices; (12) Commerce and the mechanic arts.

Valuable appendixes and a full index of subjects are added to the volume. Each part begins with a short but learned introduction; and the volume is profusely illustrated with striking pictures.

Dr. Van Lennep we were personally well acquainted with while in the East, and indeed we were for years associated with him in Foreign Missionary work. He is a native of Smyrna, and a member of one of the old Dutch families long resident there. A knowledge of the English, French, Italian, and Greek languages came natural to him as a child brought up in that modern Babel—the ancient city of Smyrna; and the Latin, the Armenian, the Turkish, the Arabic, and the Hebrew languages, he acquired partly by education in America, and partly by the demands of

his life and duty as a missionary. He has made his home in different cities of the East, at different periods of his life, and has been called on to travel over a large part of the Bible lands which he describes. Probably no living man has had better opportunities to acquire the information necessary for writing such a book. And we do not know of any work which better deserves to be consulted upon the endless variety of topics discussed in its pages. It will do to stand alongside of the celebrated work of another of the friends of our early days, "*The Land and the Book*," by Rev. Dr. William M. Thomson of Beyroot, Syria. In fact, we suppose that Dr. Van Lennep's book is a much more full and complete account of Eastern matters.

Dr. Van Lennep has been residing in America for years—a sufferer from some complaint of the eyes. His production, in these circumstances, of the magnificent volume, appears to us a marvel of industry and energy, which perhaps entitles him to rank alongside of Prescott, the blind historian. We recommend his book in the strongest terms to all ministers and others who would know all about Bible lands without actually visiting them.

Parliamentary Principles in their Application to the Courts of the Presbyterian Church, in Sixteen Articles. By Rev. RICHMOND K. SMOOT, D. D., Pastor First Presbyterian Church, Bowling Green, Kentucky; with an Appendix, containing Catechetical Analysis and General Rules. Louisville: Webb & Breeding, 77 Fifth Street. 1875. Pp. 148, 12mo.

The author of this little manual, indulging in that vein of pleasant humor which is natural to him, represents himself in this, his first appearance as an author, under the figure of a stag essaying to run through the drive, and whose chief danger is not from the drivers and the pack who follow him, but from the experienced hunter who places himself on the stand, and discharges "the terrible buckshot" at his game. "The stander's character as a crack shot is involved, and he kills on the spot, or the stag goes free." The stander will not pursue a single foot. That is left to the noisy drivers and the yelping pack who pursue till the stag gets beyond their reach. So the real and chief danger

which Dr. Smoot thinks he has to encounter with his book, is from "the honest deadly critic." He dreads being "brought down along the line of the standers, under the first fire;" and "if so, the game is theirs, and the chase ended."

Now, our profession being that of the "honest critic," and not necessarily the "deadly" one, we hasten to assure Dr. Smoot, (with whom we formed a very pleasant personal acquaintance at the late Assembly,) that we have no desire at all to shed his blood or take his life; and that we have no terrible buckshot to discharge at him. We must charge him with a degree of carelessness in his style, and his printers with a quantity of typographical errors; but these little *grazings of the skin* are all the wounds we wish to inflict. He has given us a good and useful manual on an important subject, and we hope that many of his brethren will reward his labors by procuring his book and studying it carefully.

The science of parliamentary law is not the accidental product of capricious decisions, nor is it reducible to the mere matter of making motions and putting questions. It is, as Dr. Smoot well says, "a compact system and a beautiful structure," which the experience of many ages has brought into methodical arrangement and form. It is not rules merely, but principles. A severe logic runs through it all, and makes it what it is. And its value cannot easily be estimated to deliberative bodies in general; but to our Church courts, especially the larger and higher ones, it is unspeakable. Order is indispensable in our Synods and Assemblies, and a thorough acquaintance with the rules of order, and also with the principles which underlie those rules, facilitates business, saves time, and promotes peace and concord.

No minister, however learned or eloquent, can preside over a Synod or General Assembly with comfort to himself and satisfaction to the body, if he is ignorant of parliamentary law. What a blessing to an Assembly, especially when great and difficult and exciting questions are before it, to have a competent Moderator, understanding exactly how to guide the house through all the complications that are liable to arise. In fact, there are few of our ministers who make really first rate Moderators of

either the Presbytery, the Synod, or the General Assembly. And if we must be hanged for it, let us still make bold to express the opinion, that whenever one such is caught, he ought to be elected often. Yes, and if hard pressed, we shall even dare to say he ought to be elected always, until a better shall arise. We know what is said, and truly, of the connexion between the permanent Moderator and the prelatie Bishop. But we have seen so much misery and suffering result from incompetency seated in the Moderator's chair, that we have got hardened, and are willing to run a little risk for a while from that deadly poison of prelacy.

Several points have been noted for animadversion, but the limited space allotted to these criticisms must shut them out.

Our author holds that by explicit provision only a teaching elder can be chosen to preside over the General Assembly, and that a similar provision, equally explicit, limits the choice for Moderator of the Synod. By parity of reasoning, says our author, this same provision extends to the Presbytery; so that business would be as effectually suspended by placing a ruling elder in the chair, as if there were no *quorum* present. This is the way Dr. Smoot states the case. But additional force will be given to his view if it is considered that even in our lowest church court—the Session—the book is evidently urgent for the presence of a teaching elder to moderate the proceedings and allows proceedings without a minister, only where it is very inconvenient to obtain one.

In chapter xv. our author treats of reports of committees, and touches, incidentally, on the point of the *receiving of the report*. It seems to be his idea, very plainly, that the *receiving* or *not receiving* a report, becomes a question only where "some member may object," or where "the Moderator may, from some informality, decline to receive it." "In such cases there must be a motion and question either to receive it at that time, or to fix upon some time in the future when it shall be received." It appears to us that Dr. Smoot has taken the correct view of this matter. We never could see the necessity or advantage of putting formally in the case of every report, (as was continually done at our late Assembly,) the question, "Shall this report be re-

ceived?" with the usual voting upon it. The consumption, of time which is thus occasioned is a great evil. And we see no counterbalancing good. In all ordinary cases, the body is of course ready and willing to receive the report of any committee which it has appointed to inquire respecting any matter. Should the Moderator or any member be aware that there is some reason to doubt whether a given report is fit to be received, then, in such case, but in such case only, ought the question to arise, Shall this report be received?

Medical and Surgical Memoirs: Containing Investigations on the Geographical Distribution, Causes, Nature, Relations and Treatment of Various Diseases, 1855-1876. By JOSEPH JONES, M. D., Professor of Chemistry and Clinical Medicine, Medical Department University of Louisiana; Visiting Physician of Charity Hospital; Honorary Member of the Medical Society of Virginia; formerly Surgeon in the Provisional Army of the Confederate States. Volume I.

The learned author of the work whose title is above announced speaks in the following language of its purpose and aim:

"The object of the *Medical and Surgical Memoirs* is to place in an accessible form, for the use of students and practitioners of medicine, the results of investigations and researches, which the author has conducted during the past twenty years, and which embraces the eventful period of the American civil war, 1861-1865.

"The volume now issued embraces more than eight hundred closely printed pages, from the press of Messrs. Clark & Hofeline, of New Orleans, and relates to diseases of the nervous, circulatory, respiratory and osseous systems.

"The effort has been made to illustrate all important conclusions, or laws in pathology and therapeutics, by carefully recorded cases and experiments on living animals; and in the present volume the former number about eight hundred and the latter four hundred. Many facts illustrating the systems and mortality of diseases, under the various modes of treatment, and in different climates, have been condensed in tabular form, for purposes of reference and comparison.

"In the second volume, which will be issued in the course of the following eighteen months, the author will group the monographs relating chiefly to endemic, epidemic, and contagious diseases, embracing malarial fever, yellow fever, typhoid fever, small pox, cow pox, syphilis, measles, cholera, cholera infantum, and dysentery.

“The third volume will embrace more especially the consideration of the diseases and accidents of armies, and such observations on the medical and surgical history of the Confederate army as the author was able to make himself, or to obtain from the Confederate medical officers.

“The results of the investigations concerning the nature, relations, and treatment of special diseases during the civil war of 1861–1865, will also be found under the appropriate divisions of each monograph in the three volumes constituting the present series.”

From his early days the tastes and studies of the author had directed him to those departments of natural history and science which were a fitting preparation for the extended researches he has so enthusiastically pursued since he entered the medical profession. Occupying an important and responsible position on the medical staff in the Confederate service, not merely were the practical duties of the camp and hospital performed, but his studies and researches were pursued with unremitting industry, and the facts and results of his observation elaborately recorded. The volumes containing these results were either captured or burned at the evacuation of Richmond, in April, 1865. So much as he has been able to recover, with the results of subsequent studies, he has given in part in the present volume, and will continue to give in the two volumes that are to follow.

There are points where the active sphere of the minister of the gospel and that of the physician come in contact—in the hovels of the poor and the abodes of wealth, where there is disease, sorrow, and mortal suffering. The Master himself was physician to soul and body too, and ministered to both, but with unfailing remedies. And the human frame, in its complicated structure and exquisite sensibilities, the constant study of the medical practitioner, gives forth its testimony to the being and attributes of Him that made it. And if the undevout astronomer is mad, may not a similar madness be bound up in the heart of the undevout physician also? But there are points of contact between all the professions.

At the close of his exhaustive and instructive history of the opinions and researches into the anatomy, physiology, and functions of the brain and nervous system, Dr. Jones affirms that both the material and intellectual part of man have been con-

structed with exact reference to the exterior universe; that the material part of man has also been constructed with exact reference to the structure of his intellectual and moral nature; that it stands between the material universe (a part, as it were, of itself) and the immortal mind, a fit instrument for the spirit breathed into it by the great Creator. Perfect, however, as this adaptation may once have been, "the history of the world presents a mournful picture of a strife between two antagonistic principles of good and evil." So that, "in his present state, man resembles the ruins of a majestic temple, whose columns, though marred and broken, still retain enough of beauty and symmetry to remind us of its former grandeur; the inscription upon the wall of the innermost chamber, although covered with the decay and damp of ages, still points to a hand divine."

The important branch of knowledge which he thus discusses is beset with difficulties, but not without its interest to the general student and the theologian also.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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OCTOBER, MDCCCLXXVI.

ARTICLE I.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF DR. BLEDSOE.

The Sufferings and Salvation of Infants, and Reviewers Reviewed, being Dr. BLEDSOE'S rejoinder to the strictures of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW on his *Theodicy*. Southern Review, January, 1871.

History of Infant Baptism. Southern Review, April, 1874.

The Southern Review and Infant Baptism. Southern Review, July, 1874.

The Suffering and Salvation of Infants. Southern Review, January, 1875.

Infant Baptism and Salvation in the Calvinistic System. By C. P. KRAUTH, D. D.

Our Critics. Southern Review, October, 1875.

The Perseverance of the Elect. Southern Review, Jan., 1876.

We have a long score to settle with Dr. Bledsoe. Something more than twenty years have elapsed since we noticed, in two *critiques*, his great work, then newly published, "the *Theodicy*." This dogmatic and spirited book, as we then showed, has for its key-note the Pelagian doctrine, that, in consequence of the self-determination of the rational will, omnipotence itself cannot efficaciously control a soul without destroying its freedom. And the great "theodicy" or vindication of Dr. Bledsoe, for God's admission of sin into his universe is, that *he could not help it*. These strictures Dr. Bledsoe resents in his Review of January,

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1871: and he has followed this rejoinder up, in the succeeding numbers noticed, with attacks on Calvinism and applications of his philosophy to two or three other important points in theology. To understand these, a knowledge of his personal history is needed.

Dr. Albert Taylor Bledsoe, a native of Kentucky, and *alumnus* of the Military Academy of West Point, became a minister of the Protestant Episcopal Church. But in a short time his bold and independent mind saw that the standards of that Church indisputably teach Calvinism and also baptismal regeneration, and the eternal damnation of unbaptized infants dying in infancy. Incapable of the mental chicanery which reconciles so many men to insincere or formal professions, he frankly demitted his clerical function and went into the practice of law, which he pursued with distinguished success at Springfield, Ill., for a few years. But seeking more congenial pursuits and associates, he then became a distinguished Professor of Mathematics, first in the University of Mississippi, and then in that of Virginia. Upon the formation of the Southern Confederacy, its need for military knowledge in its service prompted him to resign his chair and take the post of Assistant Secretary of War. Leaving this post he went to Europe, and devoted the remaining years of the war to the literary defence of Confederate principles, and to extended studies. After the return of peace, he founded, first in connection with another gentleman, the "Southern Review;" a well known quarterly which, like the starry sphere sustained upon the shoulders of Atlas, has been chiefly borne upon his sturdy arms. A few years ago Dr. Bledsoe, after having long held, under protest as to some of her doctrines, the attitude of a layman in the Protestant Episcopal Church, joined the Methodist Episcopal Church, and resumed his clerical function, though without assuming any pastoral relation. His Review was soon adopted by the General Conference of the Methodist Church South, as their literary organ, though not without dissent on the part of leading members. Since that adoption, Dr. Bledsoe has seemed to add to his former praiseworthy mission of defending sound opinions and faithful history in ethics and politics, the

more special one of exposing and correcting what he deems the enormities of Calvinism. His first onsets possessed all the zeal of a new recruit. Subsequent researches have shown him something to admire in some Calvinists; and he now announces it as his chosen task to discover the common ground which Wesley dimly groped after, upon which sincere Calvinist and Arminian may meet in a code of doctrines at once evangelical and soundly philosophical.

Convinced as we are, that this triumph is impossible for mortal man, we yet admit that the peculiar doctrinal code of Wesley and Watson is, in some important respects, a return towards the truth, from the worse extremes of early Arminianism. It is perhaps the very closest approximation to the truth which can be made by evangelical minds still unfortunately infected with the *πρώτον ψεύδος*, of the *equilibrium* of the rational will. To us it appears clear that the Wesleyan creed contains far more of God's truth than the New Haven theology. Wesleyanism teaches, indeed, that the bondage to native depravity is in part relieved under Christ, and that the sinner's will is now restored to such *equilibrium* as to be able to coöperate with God's grace in the spiritual acts of repentance and faith. But the Wesleyan admits that the depravity, as inherited from Adam, is total, until retrieved by "common sufficient grace." The semi-Pelagian of New England denies total depravity, and ascribes to man by nature, an ability of will to all spiritual good. The Wesleyan does indeed teach a universal atonement for the sins of all the race. But he holds to a true vicarious satisfaction for guilt; while the New Haven divine denies this vital truth, and invites us to rest our hope of pardon upon some Socinian device of an exemplary suffering by Jesus. The Wesleyan claims that, by virtue of "common sufficient grace," all sinners have ability of will to embrace Christ; but he teaches that it is a "grace," a redemptive purchase of Calvary, and not a natural endowment of fallen souls, which enables dead sinners to perform the living acts of faith and repentance. He holds against the Scriptures, that God was moved by an eternal foresight of believers' faith and holy obedience, to predestinate them to life: but he at least

holds that God has in this way a personal, infallible, and eternal predestination: which the New Haven divine refuses to accept. It is to us a pleasing thought, that multitudes of the adherents of Wesley grasp with a sanctifying faith these saving truths, while they quietly, and perhaps unconsciously, drop these unscriptural excrescences, which their great teacher attached to them in the vain hope of bending God's word to his unfortunate philosophy. And thus these excellent people really build their hopes upon grace, and grace alone. These rudiments of vital truth are practical to them; the excrescences fortunately remain unpractical.

Dr. Bledsoe is perspicacious enough to see the vital connexion between the theory of free agency and the doctrines of grace. Hence he tells us that he has made the great work of Edwards on the Will the study of years. One of his chief works has been an attempted refutation of Edwards's doctrine of the moral necessity, or certainty, of our volitions; and the opposite view of self-determination is continually asserted and expounded by Dr. Bledsoe, as the corner-stone of all his speculations. He is too shrewd to adopt the old Arminian *formula*, that the will determines itself to choose; or the modern form of the heresy, that volition is an uncaused event in the world of spirit. He admits the first principle, "Nothing arises without cause." But says he: The mind itself is simply the cause of its own volitions. Motives are indeed connected with volitions, as their necessary occasions, but not as their efficient. The action of intelligence and sensibility, the presence of motives in the mind, all these, he admits, are the conditions *sine qua non*, under which acts of choice take place; but still it is the mind itself, and that alone, which is the efficient or true cause of volition. And in this assertion he places the very being of our free agency and responsibility.

Now this is more adroit than the old scheme demolished by Edwards; for it evades the most terrible points of Edwards's refutation. As Dr. A. Alexander has admitted, there is a sense in which, while the will (in its specific sense as the faculty of choice) is not self-determined, we intuitively know that *the soul is self-determined*, and that therein is our free agency. But still the scheme of Dr. Bledsoe is the opposite of Dr. Alexander's,

and is but the same Arminian philosophy in a new dress. When Dr. Bledsoe says that the mind is the true cause of all its own volitions, he means that this mind causes them contingently, and may be absolutely *in equilibrio* while causing them; he means that the mind does not regularly follow its own strongest judgment of the preferable when acting deliberately and intelligently; he means to deny the efficient certainty of whatever in the mind produces volition; he means to apply his theory of the will to the very results in the theology most characteristic of the semi-Pelagianism, or even worse, of Pelagianism. It is to this philosophy he appeals to justify an omnipotent God in permitting sin, simply because he could not help any sinner's transgressing who chose to do so; to argue the necessity of synergism in regeneration; to deny the sinfulness of original concupiscence. ✓

This novelty of Dr. Bledsoe's statement of the old error does not require a re-statement of the impregnable argument by which the certain influence of the prevalent motive has been so often established. The well-informed Presbyterian reader will not need this repetition. For such a one, the whole plausibility of Dr. Bledsoe's argument is destroyed by simply pointing out two of its omissions. He speaks of the presence of motives in the mind as conditions *sine qua non*, of volition, and yet denies them causative efficiency. But he has failed to perceive the essential difference between sensibility and desire, between the passive and the conative powers of man's soul, and between the objective *inducement* and the subjective *motive*. For this confusion, as for the apparent weakness in our demonstration, he and we are indebted to the Sensualistic philosophers. Were Dr. Bledsoe reasoning with Hobbes or Locke, his refutation would be sound. Were it true that there is nothing in the mind but sensations and the reflex modifications or combinations thereof; that sense-impression is the $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu$ of mental affections; that the presence of the object necessitates the nature of the impression, and the nature of this passive impression on the sensibility necessitates the nature of the reflex appetency, and this in turn necessitates the volition, then man would be a sentient machine, and his free agency would be gone. The sinful volition of the sheep-stealer,

for instance, would be as much the physical result of the sight of the sheep, as pain over the skull is the involuntary result of a blow with a bludgeon. But must Presbyterians forever advertise the Arminians, that Hobbes is not their philosopher? We now again notify Dr. Bledsoe, that we surrender that scheme of necessity to his devouring sword. Let him demolish it as fast as he pleases. Dr. Alexander has given him a proof much simpler and shorter than any of his own, that objective inducement is not the efficient of any deliberate and responsible volition. It is found in the obvious fact, that the same object, the same sheep, for instance, is the occasion of opposite volitions in the sheep-stealer and the honest man. But were the sheep *cause* of volition in each case, "like cause should have produced like effects." But let us pass now from objective inducement to subjective motive, from the passive impression on the sensibility to the conscious, active, spontaneous appetency; and it needs no argument other than our own consciousness to convince us that deliberate volition always does follow subjective motive: or that the choice will infallibly be according to the soul's own subjective, prevalent view and appetency. The stray sheep did not *cause* the thief to purloin, nor the honest neighbor to restore it to its owner's fold. But subjective concupiscence, whose action was *occasioned* by the sight of the animal, *caused* the one man to steal it; moral love for "our neighbor as ourself" *caused* the honest man to restore it. Let Dr. Bledsoe make full allowance for this distinction, and he will attain to what he has not yet reached, amidst all his studies: a clear understanding of the Calvinistic and Bible philosophy of the will. And here we can see in what sense Dr. Alexander could justly admit, that, while the faculty of will is not, the soul is, self-determining. Motive, which is the uniform efficient of rational volition, is subjective: it is as truly a function of self-hood as volition itself. It is not an impression superimposed on the spirit from without; it is the soul's own intellection and appetency emitted from within.

The reader is now, we trust, prepared for seeing how fatal is Dr. Bledsoe's second omission in his analysis of free agency. He has left out the grand fact of *permanent, subjective disposition*

(the *habitus*, not *consuetudo*) of the Reformed theology. When we appreciate the flood of light which this fundamental fact of rational nature, in that theology, throws upon the main questions of free agency and morals; and when we see how usually great philosophers, as Dr. Bledsoe, overlook it, we are often amazed. He may rest assured it is the "knot of the whole question." Let this simple view be taken. Grant that the soul of man is self-determining. *Where then are we to seek the regulative law of its self-action?* No agent in all God's creation works lawlessly. "Order is heaven's first law." Every power in the universe has its regulative principle: is mind, the crowning being of God's handiwork, lawless and chaotic in its working? This regulative law of man's free agency is found in his *disposition*, his moral nature. Though one being detects another's disposition *a posteriori*, by deducing it from his observed volitions, yet in each spirit, disposition is *a priori* to volition; for it is the original, regulative power which determines what subjective motives have place in the mind. These facts are so evident to the consciousness that to state them is to show their justness. How, then, are free acts of choice in the moral agent regulated? We reply, not by objective impressions; for then the man would not be free; but by the agent's own permanent disposition. There is the fullest, most efficient certainty, that the specific subjective motive will arise according to the man's own disposition, and that the volition will follow the prevalent motive. Does Dr. Bledsoe complain that then it is man's disposition which governs him? I reply: Yes: and nothing can be so appropriate, because his disposition is himself; it is the ultimate, the most original, most simple function of his self-hood.

From this truth it follows, that to control the disposition of a creature is to control his motives and actions. When Omnipotence, which first created, now creates a sinner's disposition, although we may not explore the mystery of that act, we see clearly enough that God thereby determines efficiently the new line of action. And yet free agency is not infringed; but the uniform law of connexion between disposition and subjective motive, and motive and act, so far from being tampered with, is reestablished

and ennobled. But on Dr. Bledsoe's philosophy, God possesses only a contingent, possible power of occasioning, not causing, some of the volitions he desires, by the ingenious and multiform play of his skill amidst those feelings and impressions in the sinner's soul, which are only the conditions of the creature's self-determination! Which of these is the Bible account of saving grace?

Amidst the many refutations which he claims to have made of Edwards's argument, we notice only one; because it will be found to bear upon our subsequent discussion. Edwards has argued the certainty of the acts of free agents, from the fact that God certainly foresees them. This unanswerable argument Dr. Bledsoe thinks he has neutralized. He admits the fact of God's foreknowledge of such acts. But he argues that, since this is the foreknowledge of an infinite mind, it is the most unwarrantable presumption in us to suppose that it implies such sort of causative connexion between the volitions and their antecedents as would enable our finite minds to foreknow future events. He rebukes the Calvinist with heat, because, from the fact of God's foreknowledge, he presumes to infer the mode of it. Dr. Bledsoe here travels precisely over the ground of the famous controversy about *scientia media*, and asserts the same sophism which the Jesuit and semi-Pelagian assertors of that error attempted to sustain. Admitting, against the Socinian, that God has foreknowledge of all the volitions of rational creatures, they supposed it to be a mediate and inferential knowledge. What did they suppose to be its *medium* or middle premise? God's knowledge of all the conditions under which any free-agent will act being an infinite omniscience, his insight into the disposition of each creature enables him to infer how that creature will act under those given conditions.' But Dr. Bledsoe ought to know how often the demolition of this scheme has been completed. For instance: this Jesuit theory makes this branch of God's foreknowledge derived or inferential; if we mistake not, Dr. Bledsoe, with all sound theologians, believes all God's knowledge to be immediate and intuitive. Again, every one who is able to put premises together must see that the middle term of this *scientia media* virtually assumes that efficient

connexion between the agent's (subjective) disposition and motives, and his volitions, which the Calvinist assumes and the semi-Pelagian denies. We ask: How does God's insight into that agent's disposition enable him *certainly* to infer the action. unless as God sees that this disposition certainly regulates the agent's free choice? Hence, when the Jesuit cries that we must not measure the method of God's omniscience by our knowledge, he is pretending to claim for God, as a mental perfection, a tendency to draw an inference after the sole and essential premise thereof is totally gone! Is this a compliment or an insult to the divine intelligence? To every right mind it will be clear, that, whether a mind be great or little, it would be its imperfection, and not its glory, to infer without a ground of inference.

But as Dr. Bledsoe does not seem to be aware that he is treading the oft-refuted path of the Molinist, so he does not seem to understand the true nature of the argument from God's foreknowledge to the certainty of the creature's will. We will expound it to him. He will not deny that the Bible says God made man's soul after his image, in his own likeness. While God's intelligence may, consistently with this fact, surpass man's infinitely, the two intelligences cannot, while acting aright, expressly contradict each other. Second, Dr. Bledsoe doubtless believes, with us, that the necessary intuition, "no effect without its adequate cause," is valid and correct. If this is the fundamental *norm* of the human reason, and was impressed on our minds by a truthful God, it must be because it was also, from eternity, a principle of the divine reason. Now then, if the divine mind foresees an event as certain in the future, he must foresee it as to be effectuated by *some* true cause; for *ex nihilo nihil* is also true to God's thinking. Again: if a mind infinitely correct foresees that a given event is certainly going to occur in the future, it must be certainly going to occur. Is not this so true as to be almost a truism? But unless those were *somewhere, some true cause efficient to produce* the certain occurrence of that event, its occurrence would not be certain. Here is a case, *e. g.*, where God certainly foresaw that Nebuchadnezzar would freely choose to sack Jerusalem. Then, the occurrence in the future

was certain. Then, there must have been, somewhere, a cause efficient to produce that choice. Where now will Dr. Bledsoe find that cause? In fate? Oh, fie! In God's compulsion of the Assyrian's freedom? This is as bad as the other! Or in the Devil's compulsion? This is worse yet! There is absolutely no place for Dr. Bledsoe to rest, save in our good, Calvinistic, Bible philosophy: that the efficient of Nebuchadnezzar's free volition was in the power of his own disposition and subjective motives over his own will. These lying open before God's omniscience, and indeed operating under his perpetual, providential guidance, he thus foresaw infallibly the free volition which he purposed to permit the wicked pagan to execute; foresaw, because he purposed to permit.

We are compelled, then, to return to the charge made in our pages in 1856, which he so much resents: that he has mistaken the nature of the creature's free agency; that he has infringed the omnipotence of God, and therefore that his "theodicy" is nothing worth. As he complains of injustice in our presentation of his views, we now give them in his own words (Theodicy, p. 192, etc.): "Almighty power itself, we may say with the most profound reverence, cannot create such a being ('an intelligent moral agent,') and place it beyond the possibility of sinning." "It is no limitation of the divine omnipotence to say that it cannot work contradictions." To suppose an agent to be created and placed beyond all liability of sin, is to suppose it to be what it is and not what it is, at the same time . . . which is a plain contradiction." His theodicy is, that in this sense God tolerates sin in his natural kingdom, because he cannot effectually exclude it without destroying the creature's free agency.

How can any just mind fail to see that here we have a total oversight and exclusion of that vital distinction, so well known in sound philosophy, between certainty and compulsion? Compulsion would overthrow free agency; certainty as to the nature of volitions does not. Deny this, and you cannot hold that God is indefectible, without uprooting his freedom. Deny this, as Dr. Bledsoe virtually does, and it becomes impossible for God to answer a prayer for grace with any certainty; or to regenerate

any sinner certainly; or to promise certain glory to any elect angel or to any redeemed man in heaven. Deny this, and it becomes impossible for Jesus Christ to give us, in the infallible holiness of his Person, a safe ground for our trust in him. We forewarn our Wesleyan brethren that this is but blank Pelagianism: it uproots all foundations of faith and believing prayer; and it flings a pall of doubt and fear over the assurance of angels and saints in glory. We beseech them again, to beware; and not to allow Dr. Bledsoe's zeal in assailing what they deem the errors of Calvinism, to seduce them to this fearful position, so destructive of redemption itself. Happily Dr. Bledsoe is too good a Christian to stand consistently to his own philosophy: he contradicts himself. On page 174 of his *Theodicy*, he states that "as every state of the human intelligence is necessitated," and "every state of the sensibility is a passive impression," a "necessitated phenomenon of the human mind," as the sensibility "*may be dead*," an almighty God may so act on this necessitated intelligence and sensibility as to create new light and a new heart, in the sinner. On this remarkable concession we make several remarks. First, Dr. Bledsoe here, in his misconception of the real doctrine of the Calvinist concerning the will, actually goes into the extreme of the ultra-necessitarian—he talks just like a follower of Hobbes or Spinoza. Second, he confirms our charge of a failure to distinguish between sensibility and conation, as two opposite capacities of the soul, and between mere objective inducement and subjective motive. In describing God's agency in creating the new heart, he omits what is the hinge of the whole change, fundamental disposition and its renewal. Hence, third, in quoting Dr. Dick as presenting a parallel theory of regeneration, he shows that he misconceives the whole matter, mistaking the semi-Pelagian conception of "moral suasion" for the Bible one of a quickening of the soul into spiritual life. His theory vibrates between semi-Pelagianism and Fatalism. Nothing is easier than to show, from his position, that the man thus renewed of God would act under a fatal necessity. If "states of intelligence are necessitated," and "states of sensibility are passive and necessitated," and God creates light and a new heart through a

necessary operation on these, then there is an end of the converted man's free agency—his gracious state will consist in his actions' being directed by the two necessitated powers of intellect and sensibility. That is too fatalistic for us Calvinists! Spontaneity is left out. Dr. McGuffey was evidently correct in his verdict upon this book: that its peculiarities arose from Dr. Bledsoe's not conceiving aright the true nature of the Reformed theology he supposed himself refuting.

But let us bring his conclusion to a test surer than any philosophy: the Word of God. He, speaking precisely of this department of his Providence, his rule over free agents, says: "My counsel shall stand, and I will *do all my pleasure.*" "He doeth his will among the armies of heaven, and the inhabitants of this earth: and *none can stay his hand*, or say unto him, what doest thou?" "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." The 110th Psalm, glorifying the gracious influences of the Messiah's kingdom, says that "his people shall be willing in the day of his power." So, "his people never perish, and none is able to pluck them out of his hand." "They are kept by the power of God, through faith, unto salvation." But why multiply proofs? The effectual calling of every soul "dead in trespasses and sin" is a proof that God's omnipotence is able to renew every sinner. For the clear teaching of the Bible is, that, while there are differences of degree in the developments of native depravity, the deadness towards God is entire in every sinner, and "the carnal mind enmity against him." The whole activity of every natural man is put forth for self-will and against godliness. Hence, were not an efficient and invincible power put forth in the quickening of every believer, none would be quickened. This divine power which quickens one would be enough to quicken all the rest, had God purposed to attempt it. The uniform tenor of the gospel teaches us that we are all lost sinners; and that when one is saved instead of another, it is the divine mercy which has originated the difference, not the superior docility of the favored man. "What hast thou that thou didst not receive?"

Does the caviller, then, harass Dr. Bledsoe with the question:

If God was as able to keep Satan in holiness, as Gabriel; if he was as able to redeem Judas, as Saul of Tarsus, why did he choose the everlasting crime and misery of his creatures, Satan and Judas? It will be better for him, instead of asserting God's benevolence at the expense of his omnipotence, to answer, with us: "Secret things belong unto the Lord our God." For the pretermission of Satan and Judas, our God doubtless saw, in his own omniscience, a valid reason. It was not capricious, nor cruel, nor unfair; nor did God find it in his own impotency. Had God seen fit to reveal that reason, every reverent mind would doubtless be satisfied with it. He has given us no knowledge of it. Yet one thing we know, that this unknown reason implied no stint of divine benevolence and infinite pity towards the unworthy, in God. That we know, at least, by the fact that God is so merciful as to give his only Son to die for his enemies. There we rest satisfied. "What he doeth we know not now, but we shall know hereafter." There our author and the caviller whom he vainly seeks to satisfy, had better rest, with us.

The second great task which Dr. Bledsoe proposes to himself, is the application of his philosophy of the will to the "suffering and salvation of infants." In four of the articles of his Review, cited at the head of this paper, he zealously impugns Calvinism, and especially the Calvinism of the Protestant Episcopal Church, as involving the damnation of dying infants. While we shall resist with all our might this indictment against the Presbyterian Church, justice requires us to say that in some of the positions of these articles Dr. Bledsoe is correct, and by his candor has earned the approbation of all. Among these praiseworthy places is his clear exposure of Lecky's Rationalism in Europe, for assailing early Christianity on this subject; when it is transparently manifest that he knew not whereof he affirmed. He has here convicted this defender of Rationalism of a pretentious sciolism. Another passage which deserves the earnest sympathy of the friends of truth is that in which he demonstrates that the Thirty-nine Articles, especially as expounded by the Homilies of the Protestant Episcopal Church, are sternly Calvinistic, and where

he exposes the miserable shufflings of her Arminian and pretended Low-Church clergy, around these doctrines and that of baptismal regeneration. He shows that the most offensive points, in the whole discussion upon the destiny of dead infants, have grown out of this wretched error of baptismal regeneration, with the kindred one of a "tactical succession;" and he convicts the original Lutheran, along with the Anglican Church, of being committed to the harsh doctrine of the eternal damnation of all unbaptized children. But when, with Dr. Krauth, he attempts to include the Presbyterian Church in the same charge, we must wholly demur. A part of their proof is, that Calvin and the supralapsarian divines use language implying that they believed there are infants in hell, whose eternal perdition began before they were old enough to commit overt sins; and they remind us that, among these extremists, was Dr. Wm. Twisse, the first Moderator of the Westminster Assembly. It is a sufficient reply that the Assembly *did not* endorse Dr. Twisse's supralapsarianism; that Presbyterians are responsible, not for the writings of any uninspired men called Presbyterians or Calvinists, nor even of Calvin himself, but only for the creed which they have expressly published as their own. If Dr. Bledsoe must judge of the complexion of that creed by the literature of that age, then, in fairness, he is bound to remember that our ablest and most esteemed divines of that age, as of this, like *Turretin*, do most expressly refute the ultrisms of *Gomarus* and *Twisse*. But he thinks, with Dr. Krauth, that when our Confession (Chap. X., §3) speaks of "elect infants dying in infancy" as being redeemed in some way by the blood and righteousness of Christ, the only antithesis implied is of "non-elect infants dying in infancy." To a mere surmise, a simple denial is a sufficient answer. We assert that the fair and natural implication is, of *elect infants who do not die in infancy*, but live to be adults. For, the subject of the previous proposition is the manner in which grace is applied to rational adults. It asserts that, in their case, it is by effectual calling. How then is grace applied to elect souls, *i. e.*, to elect infants called in the providence of God to die in infancy, who are not in a rational condition? This question the article in hand undertakes to answer. Though

these little souls be not in a condition to experience the rational part of effectual calling and to exercise conscious faith, the omnipotence of the Saviour can and does apply redemption to them also; and in like manner to dying idiots and lunatics. This is the blessed truth here stated, and it is the whole of it. The natural antithesis implied is that between the elect soul that dies in infancy and the elect soul that lives to be adult, and the different modes in which the same redemption is applied to each. Does the objector cry, "Why then did not the Confession speak out plainly and say whether it supposed there was any soul, not elect, which ever died in infancy?" We answer: Because on that question the Bible has not spoken clearly. Let Dr. Bledsoe show us the express place of scripture, if he can. Herein is the admirable wisdom and modesty of the Westminster Assembly, that, however great the temptation, they would not go beyond the clear teaching of Revelation. Where God is silent they lay their hands upon their mouths.

Our assailants also think they find clear traces of infant damnation in our Confession, (as in the 39 Articles,) where it asserts that original sin is, even in the infant, true sin, carrying guilt, and making the soul justly obnoxious to the moral indignation of God. Here they bring us, indeed, to the hinge of the whole question. Is "concupiscence" real sin? Or is it only an infirmity? Does it involve guilt, even apart from the overt transgression to which it naturally tends? If it does, then it indisputably follows that even the young infant is worthy of condemnation before God. But *it does not follow that any dead infant is actually in hell*: nor that we, who are convinced "concupiscence is sin," should dispute the application of Christ's blood to atone for that sin in every soul dying without actual transgression. This obvious distinction Dr. Bledsoe quietly leaves out; while he charges that, as we hold concupiscence by itself is really guilty, we must believe many infants are damned for it. He stoutly holds that it is no sin at all; and therein, as we shall show, commits himself to the baldest Pelagianism. And here again, in passing, we solemnly caution our Wesleyan brethren to take care how they permit this champion of theirs, under the appearance

of a zeal against a despised Calvinism, to betray them to an error which Wesley, Watson, and all their leaders reject. We testify to them, that this doctrine of the *Southern Review* is not Wesleyan: it is Pelagian; it is Socinian. It says (Jan., 1875, p. 97): "New born infants *deserve no punishment at all, much less God's wrath and damnation.*" P. 103: "The guilt of original sin" is only "supposed," "founded only on the sand of human opinion." P. 105: "Before the time of Augustine . . . natural depravity was looked upon by the Fathers of the Church not as 'truly a sin,' but *only as misfortune.*" April, 1874, p. 353: "The omnipotence of God himself cannot take away our sins, and turn us to himself, without our own voluntary consent and coöperation." Do not Wesley and Watson teach that there is an original sin derived by fallen man from Adam, which is so truly sin as to need and receive the propitiation of Christ's blood offered in a sacrifice of universal atonement "for every man?" Do they not teach that this original sin also necessitates the redemptive gift of "common, sufficient grace," purchased by Christ's blood, and inwrought by his Spirit, to relieve, in the common, unrenewed sinner, the bondage of the will, and lift him again to the power of self-determination for gospel acts? Surely this doctrine and Dr. Bledsoe's are at points! Again, according to him, a dying infant, not being a sinner, has no need of a Saviour in the gospel sense. It is not *redeemed* by Christ, but only helped in some such sense as a physician who eases its sufferings. It is not pardoned; for it has no "true sin" to be pardoned. It cannot be renewed; for according to Dr. Bledsoe it needs no renewal; and if it did, could in no possible way receive it, since "the omnipotence of God himself cannot turn it to itself without its own voluntary consent and coöperation." But the dying infant has not sense enough to give that *voluntary consent*. Hence, when ransomed parents reach heaven, their glorified little ones will have no part with them in the "song of Moses and the Lamb." When Christ blessed little children, claiming them as subjects of his "kingdom of heaven," he was mistaken; for that kingdom is the one which he purchased with his blood. No infant should be baptized. The water represents the blood and Spirit of Christ

cleansing *sinner*s from guilt and corruption. But according to Dr. Bledsoe they are not real sinners, have no guilt, and instead of needing a renewal of their corruption, are only laboring under a "misfortune." Why he should hold to infant baptism it passes our wit to conceive. In one place he says he has a reason for baptizing them; but we have not been able to find the place where he has condescended to state it. Now, *for what does the Methodist Church baptize infants?* Does she do it, like Pelagius and the Papal priests, to deliver them only from a *limbus* of eternal natural blessedness; or to signify their deliverance from sin and wrath? Let its standards and ritual answer. Again we warn our Methodist brethren; they cannot afford to carry this doctrine: it is neither theirs nor Christ's.

We also justly complain of Dr. Bledsoe for certain passages in which he endeavors to involve Presbyterians in *odium* for this solemn and awful fact of original depravity, *which they did not invent*, but sorrowfully recognise as a great reality. His language is worthy of a cavilling Lecky, or of a Universalist. He speaks ironically of "innocent little babes" condemned by a God of love to cruel and everlasting torments, only because Adam chose, some thousands of years ago, to eat an apple. He should know that this is unfair; for no Calvinist ever ascribed any imputed guilt of Adam's first sin to any posterity of his which was innocent of all subjective depravity. Our Confession says that "original sin" is, in all, true sin, and carries true guilt. But it defines original sin as including not only the guilt of Adam's first sin, but always, inward corruption also. Dr. Bledsoe affects to draw a contrast between the earthly parent, though a sinner, loving and cherishing the smiling babe, and the Calvinist's God, though holy, hating and damning it. Does he not know that this is precisely the song of cavilling Universalists? He professes to believe that God will certainly punish our adult sinful children in hell, if they refuse to repent. But does not the Christian parent cherish and pity that adult impenitent child in any hour of his helplessness as he did the infant? To any one but a Universalist the solution is plain. Our children are bone of our bone. We are not the appointed judges and punishers of

ungodliness. God is that Judge. Hence, while he discloses towards our impenitent children, in ten thousand mercies, a pity far more watchful and tender than a parent's, yet when he assumes his rightful judicial function, he condemns each man according to his deserts. He is a Ruler "both of goodness and severity."

But to return. The Bible teaches that inherited depravity of nature is, apart from actual transgressions, truly sin, as such involving guilt, and therefore obnoxious to the righteous wrath of God, and to such penalty as his equity apportions to it. Dr. Bledsoe thinks that inherited depravity, apart from actual transgression, is not truly sin, involves no guilt, is only a "misfortune," and merits no wrath or punishment at all. This is precisely the issue between him and Calvinism. In giving it practical form and extent we have another distinction to present, which is of cardinal importance. It concerns that general proposition which Dr. Bledsoe would also contest: that every sin, being committed against an infinite God, is an infinite evil, and so, carries a desert of everlasting punishment. Let us, for illustration, discuss this proposition as to a specific sin of a rational adult. Many, in this instance, would deny it, because they are so in the habit of estimating transgression as the civil magistrate does, insulated from all its attendants and sequels. Does the court, for instance, indict a man for murder? That single act is considered by itself; and the court does not concern itself with antecedent character, or with consequences, except as they throw some light on the evidence. Now men continually deceive themselves by these examples, as though a heart-searching God could or would judge sins against himself in this partial and inadequate way. They seem to have before their imaginations some such case as this: Here is a man who has truly and literally committed only one, insulated sin against God; and God has this one act to judge, as expressive of no antecedent moral state, as destined to have no repetitions, as unconnected with any formation of evil habitudes in the agent's soul, and as carrying no consequence or influence upon his immortal character or on that of immortal fellow creatures. Has God said that this one act, thus

insulated, is by itself worthy of eternal penalty? We reply, we are ignorant of any revelation on that question. For, in fact, such a case never existed, and God will never have such an instance to judge. It is impossible that it should arise; were it possible, we do not profess to know what God would think of it. Every case which God has to judge is that, not of a sin by itself, but of a sinner; not of an act merely, but of an agent; and the infallible omniscient mind will, of course, look at each act as it truly occurs, in its whole connexions with character, destiny, and example to others. Here, for instance, a profane oath has been uttered. God sees that this oath is, first, an expression of certain prevenient sentiments of wilfulness, irreverence, carelessness, and enmity in the mind of the swearer. Then, secondly, it involves certain influences for evil on spectators and imitators, the evil tendency of which is to wide-spreading and everlasting mischiefs. Then, thirdly, it strengthens the profane temper and habit of swearing, thus involving the natural promise of a series of profanities continued forever. In a word, God, as an omniscient judge, has to weigh the sinner as a concrete whole, and to estimate each transgression as part, and index, and cause, as well as fruit, of a *disease of sin*, a spiritual eating cancer: which is an immense evil, because involving, unless grace intervene (and the sinner has no *claim of justice* to that remedy), an everlasting mischief and criminality. Thus judged, sin is manifestly an infinite evil; it manifestly deserves an endless penalty. One reason why a holy God punishes forever is, that the culprit sins forever. The everlasting series of sins is the fruit of the first rebellion. This is God's point of view. When we argue thus, ✓ we do not depreciate those aggravations which attach to any one particular sin, by reason of the majesty and holiness of the party offended, and the perfectness of his claim of right to our obedience. It was well said by the Puritans, "To have a little sin, one must have a little God."

Let us now apply this view to the case of a depraved infant, standing, as yet, before the divine inspection, without actual transgression. He has one sort of sin and guilt as yet, that of his original sin. If that is real sin and real guilt, as we shall

prove, then a righteous divine judge will, and ought to, disapprove it as such, and adjudge to it *whatever penalty is its fair equivalent*. How unanswerable is this? But the objector, when we proceed to the question, how extensive that penalty may justly become, preposterously argues as though this infant's sin and guilt were to have no natural sequel or increment. They seem to imagine that somehow God continues to view him as not growing up from a depraved infancy to a sinful manhood, and to an endless series of provocations. But in fact God views him as one who will grow into all that sin; for this career is simply the sure and natural outgrowth of his own corrupted free-agency. The objector, with a strange hallucination, seems to suppose that, if there should ever be, beyond the grave, a soul condemned for its infant depravity, (just as *we see* all infants this side the grave at present under condemnation for their infant depravity,) that first infant would be sinless of all save its initial depravity. But obviously, if there were such a case, that infant would develop precisely like the unconverted infants we see around us every day, and precisely like them *would continue a condemned soul because it continued a sinning and an increasingly sinful soul*. Let the man who cries out against the "monstrosity of infant damnation" drop these absurd scales from his eyes. Let him remember what it is that the Calvinist asserts. We do not assert that there is a single case of an eternally damned infant in the universe; for we know Christ redeems infants, and we hope he redeems all who die infants. But we assert that were not the infant guilt of depravity cleansed by Christ's blood in the case of those who die infants, it would be just in God to disapprove, judge, and condemn them, *precisely as we actually SEE HIM condemning the living ones in our own households*. Does not Dr. Bledsoe believe, sorrowfully, that the condemnation of some of these living ones may become everlasting? He says he does. But on what conditions? On the conditions of growth into adult sin and perseverance in impenitency. Well, were the grace of Christ not applied to the soul of the infant that dies, its condemnation would also turn out to be everlasting on precisely the same conditions. Does Dr. Bledsoe think the eternal doom of the adult unjust, who, begin-

ning a depraved infant, lived on in a life of voluntary depravity to a final impenitency? He does not. He regards it as solemn, fearful; yet worthy of a holy God. Why then this outcry, when the case of the non-elect dead infant, if there were such a case, would be precisely parallel? There is then no use in this vain attempt to cavil against God's condemnation of the guilt of original sin. It is precisely what we see every day in the living infants of our own families. We see it in their alienation from God, in their sicknesses, mortality, and community with us in the curse. We hear it in the express word of God, that they "are *all by nature* heirs of wrath, even as others;" that "all the world are become guilty before God; and that "the wrath of God abideth" on every son of Adam who has not believed.

But let us now return to the hinge of the whole debate. Is that *habitus* of soul which the depraved infant inherits, really sin, in such a sense as to carry guilt and to deserve penalty? Dr. Bledsoe is constrained by his erroneous philosophy to say, No: it is, so far, only an infirmity. We say his philosophy constrains this answer. For, first, if certainty in the influence of subjective disposition and motive over volition were absolutely inconsistent with free-agency and responsibility, there would be no real guilt in the actual transgressions which are the fruits of such *habitus*, and, of course, no guilt in the parent state of soul. Secondly, if self-determination and contingency are essential to free agency, in Dr. Bledsoe's sense; then no permanent and decisive state of soul can have moral quality. There remains nothing to which moral quality can be ascribed, save *acts of soul*. This conclusion, which is virtually Dr. Bledsoe's, should have opened his eyes to the error of his premises; for that "sin consists only in sinful acts of soul," has always been the key-note of the cry of ancient and modern Pelagians. Let us test the question whether a depraved disposition is truly sin, by sound reason and Scripture.

The stereotyped argument in the negative is, "that nothing can be sin which is involuntary; but the disposition cannot be voluntary, being, as the Calvinists themselves teach, *a priori* to all the volitions it regulates." This plausible sophism proceeds

simply upon an ambiguity in the word "involuntary." In one sense, an act or state is involuntary when the agent wills positively not to do it, but is forced against his will; as when one striving to cleave to his support is yet forced to fall. The result which is in that sense "involuntary" is, of course, devoid of moral quality, and blameless. The other sense is, when an act or state of soul is called involuntary because it did not result from any express volition. In this sense, that which is not the result of an intentional volition may have moral quality, and be criminal. An envious man may so think of his innocent enemy as to have envy excited, by reason of an involuntary train of association; yet that envy is criminal. Let the ambiguity be removed by employing the word spontaneous. Responsibility is coëxtensive with rational spontaneity. But the envy, in the case supposed, was spontaneous. The disposition to ungodliness is spontaneous. The sinner cannot say that it subsists in his breast contrary to his will. No power makes him entertain it against his wishes. It is as much a function of his selfhood, prompted from within, as any volition he ever executes. It may be, then, like the express volition, responsible and criminal.

We argue that native evil disposition is such, again, from the testimony of conscience. Every man blames himself, when he thinks dispassionately, for inclinations to evil not formed into purposes. He would blush to have them disclosed to his fellow men. Why this, except that his moral intuition tells him his fellow will rightfully disapprove it? If he perceives a mere inclination in his neighbor, to wrong him, he resents it, though it be formed into no purpose.

Many sins of omission prove the same thing. Here, for instance, is a well-dressed and self-indulgent man, walking beside a stream. A prattling child falls into the water, and while he is hesitating to infringe his bodily comfort and tarnish his goodly raiment by leaping after it, the child is drowned. Here is guilt, but there has been *no volition*: the lazy man can say with truth, that positively he had not made up his mind to neglect the drowning child. But he is guilty of breaking the sixth commandment. Now every one sees that it is to his selfish hesitancy

the guilt attaches. But hesitancy is a state, and not an act of soul. We blame it in this case, because it is the index of a selfish, cowardly disposition.

This suggests a stronger plea. Every practical mind gauges the moral quality of an act according to its intention. When, for instance, a just judge would ascertain the guilt or innocence of a homicide, he inquires into the intention. He knows that "all killing is not murder." It is the malicious intent, which stamps criminality upon the act. This is but stating, in another form, the admitted truth, that the subjective motive determines the moral quality of the act, as it decides its occurrence. But it is the natural disposition which regulates the subjective motive. Hence, it is so far from being true, that morality resides only in acts of soul—if it did not reside in the dispositions which regulate these acts and give them their quality, it would not be found in the acts at all: it would be banished from the earth. In fine, we appeal to that common-sense of mankind which persists in imputing moral merit or demerit to *character* as well as to actions. What is character? Wherein does the thievish character of the rogue reside, in the intervals when he is eating, or is asleep, or anyhow is not thinking of his thefts? The only answer is, it resides in his disposition and habitudes. We appeal to that common sense which always regards cause and effect, parent and child, as kindred. When we see concupiscence, in the words of the Apostle James, conceiving and bringing forth sin, we know that mother and daughter have a common nature.

This suggests to us the scriptural argument. Here we are on solid and impregnable ground. Job declares that none can bring "a clean thing out of an unclean." Does he not use the term "clean" in the same sense in the parent and the child? David confesses in the 51st Psalm that he "was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did his mother conceive him;" and this inborn sinfulness he makes, along with the crimes which were its fruit, subject of profound repentance. The 58th Psalm declares that infants go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies; their poison is as the poison of the adder, hereditary and natural. Our Saviour tells us "that which is born of the flesh is flesh,"

and on this he grounds the necessity of a new birth. He tells us, "Either make the tree good and the fruit good, or else the tree evil and the fruit evil." Does he not use the words "good" and "evil" consistently throughout, of the soul's dispositions and its acts? The great apostle tells us that we were all naturally "dead in trespasses and sins and were *by nature* children of wrath." Does anything that is not truly sin excite the "wrath" of a righteous God? Lastly, God prohibits concupiscence, saying, "Thou shalt not covet;" and in his own inspired definition, by the Apostle John, makes *discrepancy with his law* the characteristic of sin. Ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία. This must include not being, as well as not doing, what God's law requires.

Now a mind tinctured with unscriptural philosophy will suppose that it sees two stubborn objections to this Bible doctrine. He will exclaim, "The infant cannot reason. Intelligence is necessary as a condition of guilt. It is as unreasonable to regard this little creature in its cradle as criminal for a natural state of soul of which it comprehends nothing, as though it were a kitten." But we reply, It is not a kitten. It has what the kitten has not: a rudimental reason and conscience. Why should not this be enough to ground a rudimental responsibility? Let it be noted here, that we did not claim the responsibility for mere disposition to evil was as developed, or as heavily criminal, as that for intentional and overt rebellion; we claimed that it is a true moral responsibility. It may be added that, as a question of fact, there is nothing in mental science about which it is more perilous to dogmatize, than touching the state of the intelligence, and the degree of its development, in the human infant. All we know is, that it cannot exercise the communicative faculty of speech, and that its consciousnesses are not of such a quality as to be remembered to after years. He would be a rash man who would dare to assert, on these grounds, that the infant human has no more functions of rational consciousness than a mere animal. But aside from all this, we make our appeal again to common sense. Do we not morally disapprove the evil disposition of a bad adult, at such moments as it lies quiescent, and is not provoking his

own intelligent consciousness by acts of soul? Do we not despise the thief as a thief while he is asleep?

Ah but, exclaims our opponent, this is because the thievish disposition of this man is his own voluntary acquisition: he has created it, or induced it upon himself by a series of thievish acts, intelligently and freely performed before. No being can be worthy of praise or of blame for what he has not freely chosen. Here we have, in this final objection, the last stronghold of the Pelagian philosophy. It is easily demolished by the same distinction which separates the *spontaneous* from the *positively involuntary*. No man is blameworthy for a defect which afflicts himself *against his will*. Every man may be blameworthy for a moral state which is spontaneous. That our disposition is spontaneous, we have shown by a simple appeal to consciousness. We know that it is the most primary function of selfhood; we cherish and exercise it of our own motion, not compelled from without; it is the most subjective of all subjectivities. And now that its being coeval with our rational existence is no ground for disclaiming responsibility for it, we are able to prove by an adamant demonstration. If a being is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy for his moral disposition, because it was native, and not taken to himself by a subsequent act of choice, then Adam could not have any holiness in Paradise, for God "created him upright." Then Gabriel can have no credit for his heavenly holiness, because it was original. Then the humanity of Jesus deserved not a particle of credit, because it was born of the virgin "a holy thing," by "the power of the Highest." And chiefly, the eternal God deserves no praise, because he has been eternally, naturally, immutably, necessarily holy. This proof we crown, by showing that the Pelagian theory of the rise of responsible character is a case of logical suicide. Say they: a man is justly responsible for his character, because he intelligently chose it for himself. Then, we argue, that act of choice must have been a responsible one. But the moral quality of every volition depends on that of its intention, *i. e.*, of its subjective motive. If the motive be non-moral, the act will be non-moral, and can conduce in no way to a moral habitude. Thus, on this absurd philosophy,

the disposition must act and become a cause before it is in existence. This result teaches us that when our analysis of moral actions has led us back to the ruling disposition, we have the ultimate moral fact. Beyond this we cannot go with our analysis. The *original disposition*, which, though not arising in an act of choice, is *spontaneous*, communicates the moral quality to all the volitions it regulates, *because it has moral quality in itself*.

Now then, if Dr. Bledsoe will admit the Bible doctrine, that a fallen infant is guilty for his sinful disposition, he will also admit with us, that a righteous God will hold him guilty therefor, in precisely such a penalty as is equitable. And hence, did the purpose of grace as to dying infants dictate God's leaving such a soul, beyond the grave, to bear that just penalty, and work out its own ulterior character and conduct, the result would be precisely what we see in this life: where a fallen infant, beginning its career a culprit, and adding, of its own free will, a life of sin and final impenitency, works out for itself an everlasting perdition. But *is it God's real purpose* to permit a single dying infant thus to remain without the grace of Christ? It is on this question that the fact wholly turns, whether there are any lost infants. And of this question, we presume Dr. Bledsoe knows precisely as little, and as much, as we do. Neither of us has a precise "Thus saith the Lord." We presume that the silence of God on this point of his gracious purpose is accounted for by this trait of his revelations: that they are always intensely practical; that he never turns aside to gratify mere curiosity; and so, as there are no instrumentalities for us to use in the redemption of dying infants, he has, in his usual practical fashion, remained silent. But in one thing we agree with Dr. Bledsoe: water-baptism is not an essential instrumentality for the applying of Christ's grace to a dying infant, nor is the lack of it decisive of its fate. To teach this is an odious, unscriptural Phariseism; and, being unwarranted by God, is a brutal cruelty to bereaved parents. We know that a multitude of dying infants are redeemed. To us it appears every way agreeable to the plan of redemption through grace, that, as dying infants never sanctioned Adam's rebellion in overt act, so, in the liberality of God, they all enjoy union

with the second Adam, without being required, like us adults, to sanction it by overt faith in this life. No man can prove from the Scriptures that any infant, even dying a pagan, is lost.

The next movement of Dr. Bledsoe's polemic, in the *Southern Review* of October, 1875, and January, 1876, is against his own Methodist brethren. Here we have, therefore, the more pleasing task of spectators, interested for fair play. One of the positions which he has found for the meeting point of Wesleyanism and Calvinism, of which he hopes to be the efficient, is his doctrine of "the perseverance of the elect." To Arminians the doctrine of the "perseverance of saints" has been very obnoxious. But Dr. Bledsoe distinguishes between "the elect" and "the saints." He avails himself of a modification of the doctrine of conditional decrees, fully sanctioned by the greatest Wesleyan divines, including the great founder himself and Watson. According to these, while all predestination in God is grounded in his foresight of men's free acts, there is a threefold division of the objects. Those who God foresaw would stubbornly reject his gospel, he for that reason determined to leave to their doom. Those who he foresaw would truly believe and repent, he for that reason determined to renew, justify, and adopt. The smaller number who he foresaw would persevere in that faith until death, he for that reason predestinated to everlasting glory. This view Dr. Bledsoe adopts. One consequence justly inferred from it is, that he thinks a man may be a saint, a true, renewed believer, without being one of the elect. Another is, that a man may be a true believer for a time, and be totally and finally apostate. A third is, that the elect must certainly and infallibly persevere in a state of grace to the end and be saved. Thus, while, with other Methodists, he denies the perseverance of the saints, he startles them by roundly asserting the infallible "perseverance of the elect." This conclusion is obviously implied in the Wesleyan positions, as Dr. Bledsoe argues with resistless logic. If God elects to eternal life only those who he foresees will persevere in faith and repentance until death, then their perseverance therein must be certain. That is, *if God's foreknowledge is certain.* This Dr.

Bledsoe is led, of course, and correctly, to assert in the fullest terms. When asked whether this is not virtually the Calvinist's doctrine of perseverance, he replies, No, because while he holds the fact, he utterly dissents from the grounds of the fact asserted by the Calvinist: he ascribes the perseverance of the elect to the foreseen determinations of their own free will; still holding fast to his Arminian *ποῦ στῶ*, that no degree of grace from without could limit this self-determination without destroying free-agency. But his speculation as to the "perseverance of the elect" leads him to other sound positions. He is led to see, as he consistently must, that we should ascribe to God a foresight of all things, including all free determinations of created wills, absolutely infinite, eternal, infallible, and immutable. Hence, he repudiates with contempt the feeble notion of Adam Clarke, that God forbears from foreseeing certain acts of men. Dr. Bledsoe also recognises the iron logic of the Calvinist, that if the believer's faith and repentance are fruits of regeneration, then these, as foreseen by God, cannot be the causal grounds of his purpose to regenerate; for this would represent the divine mind as making an effect the cause of its own cause. Hence he concedes that in the *act of regeneration* there can be no synergism; the coöperation of the human will begins thereupon, in the consequent process of *conversion*. Is the reader ready to exclaim, Then Dr. Bledsoe is a good Calvinist! So have some of his own brethren exclaimed. But stay: his escape is in claiming that God's regeneration produces no certainty of will in its subject as to gospel acts; it only lifts him, as to them, into an *equilibrium* of will! Here we are tempted to make three remarks. First: we thought Dr. Bledsoe, as an Arminian, was bound to hold that "*common sufficient grace*" had done that much for the gospel-sinner before regeneration. Secondly: how different is Dr. Bledsoe's regeneration from that of the Bible, which St. John assures is such that "whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him: and *he cannot sin*, because he is born of God." Thirdly: it seems as though, after all, the only barrier between Dr. Bledsoe and Calvinism is the *εἰςῶλον* of "self-determination."

The Doctor also asserts that he does not believe God gives

preventing grace to all men under the gospel. For God's foreknowledge being infinite and infallible, he foresees some cases in which preventing grace would be stubbornly resisted, and thus become the occasion (not *cause*) of an aggravated doom. Hence it is in mercy that God sometimes withholds it, that his kindly-intended grace may not become the occasion of the poor sinner's making his case worse than before. Here again we have two words. First: how much difference remains between this doctrine and that Calvinistic doctrine of *preterition*, which under the ugly name of "reprobation" Dr. Bledsoe so much abhors? Secondly: well does Dr. Granberry say of this, that it "*seems* to teach that God withholds the grace essential to conversion from *all* who he foresees would fall." It is hard for us to see how it teaches anything else. For has not God, according to Dr. Bledsoe, a complete foreknowledge of everything? Then he foreknows *every case* in which converting grace is destined to be slighted; and of course the same wisdom and mercy which cause him to withhold the useless gift in some cases, will withhold it in all. How does the reader imagine Dr. Bledsoe escapes? It is by saying (October, 1875, p. 479) that God may give prevenient grace in cases where he foreknows it will be despised, "in order to demonstrate the malignity of sin, and cause the universe to stand in awe of its deadening, destroying, and soul-damning influences." Really, it seems to us, that Dr. Bledsoe might just as well adopt, at once, the Calvinistic statement, that God gives or withholds grace "*for his own glory.*"

These teachings, and especially that of the "perseverance of the elect," awakened some of his brethren. Dr. Granberry, the excellent Professor of Practical Divinity in the new Vanderbilt University, objected strenuously, first in the *Christian Advocate*, and then in the Annual Conference of the Southern Virginia Methodists for 1875. Here the two met in oral debate, and Dr. Bledsoe has further defended his views in his Review for January, 1876. It is with good ground that the honest Methodist instincts of Dr. Granberry snuffed the taint of Calvinism in this doctrine. We have seen the corollaries, in part, to which it has already led Dr. Bledsoe. They do not contain the unsophisticated Arminian-

ism; they savor of the Westminster scheme. But further, the doctrine of the "perseverance of the elect" in itself virtually asserts the *perseverance of saints*, of some saints, (the hated dogma to the zealous Arminian,) for Dr. Bledsoe's elect are a certain species of "saints." Worse yet: both Dr. Bledsoe and Dr. Granberry agree in holding that there is *no essential difference of grace* in the saint who is, and the saint who is not, elect. They must hold thus, or else we truculent Calvinists will compel them to acknowledge our "sovereign distinguishing grace." The difference then, between the non-elect saint who falls, and the elect saint who cannot fall, is contingent and not essential. So that Dr. Bledsoe forces us to admit the perseverance of certain saints who are, virtually, like other saints. This is not old Methodism. But most of all, Dr. Bledsoe presents us, in every case of the "perseverance of the elect," with an instance utterly destructive of the Arminian philosophy. *The Arminian holds that certainty in volitions is inconsistent with freedom. That is his corner stone. But every persevering elect person is a case of certainty of volitions consistent with freedom.* Dr. Bledsoe has thus placed Dr. Granberry and himself helplessly between the jaws of the Calvinistic vise; and we design to turn the screw remorselessly. Let us see what premises he has given us. If God certainly foresees who will persevere and thereon elects them, they must be certain to persevere. Otherwise God's foreknowledge would be erroneous. But unless the volitions to cleave to the gospel were free, they would have no moral quality, and would be no steps or means towards holiness. Now any volition which is not foolish has a motive. If the gospel motives, in these cases, are certain to produce the continuance of gospel-volitions, there must be an efficient connexion between motive and volition here. Yet the agent is free. This is all the certainty, or "moral necessity", any intelligent Calvinist asks in his philosophy of the will. Dr. Bledsoe's doctrine has given us our case.

And lastly: we now find the application of our discussion on a previous page, of Edwards's argument from God's foreknowledge to the "moral necessity" (or as we prefer to say, certainty) of

the volitions foreknown. The key of the argument is in the great truth, that no effect is without a cause. We know that God knows this universal law, because he makes us know it intuitively. Now, then, no event could be certain to occur in the future unless there was to be also a cause efficient enough to make it certainly occur. If then, it is certain that any elect person is going to persevere in gospel volitions, *it can only be because there is, somewhere, a suitable cause efficient to produce them.* Now Drs. Bledsoe and Granberry do not believe that this certainly efficient cause is in the Christian's will; for they think that is contingent, else, they insist, it would not be free. The cause must then be in God's grace. This then is the blessed doctrine of "efficacious grace." *This is Calvinism.*

The question then remains in this attitude: Dr. Bledsoe says, and proves, that the Wesleyan doctrines include the inference of the "perseverance of the elect." Dr. Granberry says, and proves, that this inference is Calvinistic. They both conclude correctly; and *our* conclusion from the whole is, that the Wesleyan theology, like a generous but over-fresh must, should work itself clear by ripening into "the old wine well refined upon the lees" of the Westminster Confession. Our sincere prayer is that the venerable editor of the *Southern Review*, with all his younger brethren, may find in every hour of temptation, and in their last conflict, the priceless support and comfort of "efficacious grace." This intercession we offer with a comfortable assurance, "being (with Paul, Phil. i. 6) confident of this very thing, that he which hath begun a good work in them will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ."

ARTICLE II.

THE MODERN DOCTRINE OF THE UNKNOWNABLE.

- First Principles of a New System of Philosophy.* By HERBERT SPENCER. Second Edition. Appleton & Co. 1871.
- An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the Principal Questions Discussed in his Writings.* By JOHN STUART MILL. Third Edition. London: Longmans, Green, Reade & Dyer. 1867.
- The Philosophy of the Infinite.* By JAMES CALDERWOOD, D. D.
- The Province of Reason.* By JOHN YOUNG, LL.D. Edinburgh and New York: Carter & Bros. 1860.
- An Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill's Philosophy: being a Defence of Fundamental Truth.* By JAMES MCCOSH, D. D., LL.D.
- Systematic Theology.* By CHARLES HODGE, D. D. Vol. I. Ch. Scribner & Co. 1872.
- Essays in Philosophy and Theology.* By JAMES MARTINEAU. Boston: 1868.
- The Human Intellect.* By NOAH PORTER, LL.D. Ninth Edition.
- Recent British Philosophy: a Review, with Criticisms, including some Comments on Mr. Mill's Answer to Sir William Hamilton.* By DAVID MASSON. London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. 1865.

In a recent number of this REVIEW, the attention of our readers was called to the metaphysical postulate of Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his "First Principles;" and the endeavor was made to shake the confidence of those who have accepted the "New System of Philosophy" in its teachings regarding the Unknowable. We attempted there to show that even if that postulate be granted, the results claimed by Mr. Spencer do not necessarily follow; and further, that, to say the least, the justice of that postulate may be reasonably questioned. The postulate involved we proved to be the same with the conclusion of the late Dean Mansel, in his "Limits of Religious Thought." We have in view in the present article, to give a careful examination to the doctrine of that treatise, with a view to showing that the premises of Mr. Spencer's argument in "First Principles" are without

foundation in truth; and now proceed at once to arraign the theory of the Unconditioned, advocated in the Dean's "Bampton Lectures," as being opposed alike to sound principles of logic, sound principles of psychology, and sound principles of metaphysics.

I. The Hamiltonian view of the Unconditioned (as expounded by Mansel,) involves fatal errors of logic. These may be conveniently arranged under three heads: Sophisms arising from ambiguous terms; sophisms arising from inaccurate definitions; and sophisms arising out of suicidal reasonings. Let us consider these in the order stated. We have, then,

1. Sophisms growing out of the illicit use of ambiguous terms. It need not be pointed out, that of the many sources of fallacy, this is one of the most common as well as one or the most fruitful. It only remains to give a few examples.

(1.) And the first that we shall indicate is in the peculiar use that is made of the word "relative," in the expression "the relativity of knowledge." It would be carrying coals to Newcastle, to undertake the proof that the whole theory of the Unconditioned now under examination, is dependent on Sir W. Hamilton's somewhat obscure doctrine of "the relativity of human knowledge." But this expression, "the relativity of our knowledge," is capable of being understood in any one of a plurality of different meanings; and (as Mr. Mill has shown conclusively,*) Hamilton and Mansel pass from one to another of these distinct senses in a manner that is very confusing and certainly illegitimate. When the relativity of all our knowledge is affirmed, one or other of four things is meant. It is meant that we cannot know the "inmost nature or essence" of the object said to be known, but only certain impressions which that object produces on our senses [or minds]. In other words, it is meant that we cannot know the nature or even the existence of a world of Noumena, but only of a world of Phenomena.† This is the doctrine of relativity accepted by Mill and the extreme Positivists. Or

*Ex. Ham., Chaps. III., IV., VI., VII. *et passim*.

†An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy. London, 1867, p. 14.

it is meant that we cannot know the object as it exists in itself as contradistinguished from its properties; although we may know its existence, and something, too, of its nature, through its properties. This sense of the phrase, "relativity of our knowledge," is discounted by Mill,* but is a sense in which the phrase is often used by Hamilton, Thornwell, and others, and is the only important sense in which the doctrine stands true. The two remaining senses of the expression are justly set aside by Mill as trivialities; though Dr. McCosh has judged them worthy of a restatement.† They are these: "Either that we can only know what we have the power of knowing; or else that all our knowledge is relative to us, inasmuch as we know it."‡ There is indeed a fifth sense the words might seem to bear, viz., that we know things partly as they are in themselves, (considered irrespectively of our knowledge of them,) and partly as they are reported to us through the medium of our knowing powers. On this view, "our absolute knowledge may be vitiated by the presence of a relative element."§ But as Mill well says, one holding this opinion could not consistently assert that *all* our knowledge is relative; but only that we are liable to mistake our relative for our absolute knowledge.||

Sir W. Hamilton's serene and formidable critic goes on to argue that the doctrine of the "Relativity of Human Knowledge," though true in one or two senses of the expression, and though employed by Sir William in more than one and in true senses of the expression, is nevertheless ordinarily employed by him in a sense which makes the doctrine a false one, and that the employment of the expression in this false sense is essential to Hamilton's argument against Cousin to establish the unthinkableness of the Unconditioned;¶ but that Sir William was himself probably mistaken in thinking that he himself held this false doctrine; or he had perhaps abandoned it by the time that he came to write his Dissertations.** Mill points out the seemingly irreconcilable positions of Sir W. Hamilton, as to perception and as to rela-

*Ibid., *ubi supra*.

†Laws of Fundamental Thought, Chap. X.

‡Examination of Hamilton, p. 15. §Ib., p. 16. ¶Ib., *ubi sup*.

¶Ibid., p. 6.

** Ibid., p. 29.

tivity, and thus hits the blot exactly. "He affirms without reservation," says Mill, "that certain attributes (extension, figure, etc.) are known to us as they really exist out of ourselves; and also that our knowledge is relative to us. And these two assertions are only reconcilable [*sic*], if relativity to us is understood in the altogether trivial sense, that we know them only so far as our faculties permit." (*Ibid.*, p. 29.) Mill hence concludes that Sir W. Hamilton himself really repudiated the doctrine he imagined himself to have espoused—"repudiated it in every sense which makes it otherwise than a barren truism." (*Ib.*, p. 29.) Mill then gives some of Hamilton's own definitions of relativity. "You will be able, I hope, to understand what is meant by the proposition that all our knowledge is only relative. It is relative, 1st. Because existence is not cognisable absolutely in itself, but only in special modes. 2d. Because these modes can be known only if they stand in a certain relation to our faculties."* Now, says Mill, "whoever can find anything more in these two statements, than that we do not know all about a thing, but only so much of it as we are capable of knowing, is either more ingenious or more fortunate than myself."

(2.) A similar and equally perilous ambiguity is found in the words "conditioned," "unconditioned," "infinite," and "absolute."

It was reserved for President Porter, of Yale College, in his very able work on the Human Intellect,† to submit to a patient, and, as it would appear, exhaustive, analysis the various terms that occur so often in this discussion, and to give a judicious and comprehensive statement of what seems to many to be the exact truth, so far as known, on the whole subject under investigation. This author clearly establishes the point, that the words *limited* and *conditioned* are not always synonymous. The first of these terms is plain enough; the second is ambiguous. As properly

* Lectures. p. 148.

† Human Intellect, ninth edition, Chap. VIII., pp. 645-662. It is due to Dr. Porter to say, that what is stated above, respecting the equivocal words employed in this discussion, is little more than an abstract of that valuable chapter.

used, the word *conditioned* denotes that which *depends* on something other than itself for what it is and does. The universe is said to be conditioned, in that it is dependent on certain causes, laws, and ends. The finite is that which has bounds or limits; and these limits are also *conditions* of its existence, or of the mental act by which the mind conceives it. The unlimited, the infinite, the unconditioned, the absolute, are all, strictly speaking, negative terms. The *infinite* is the unbounded. The primary application of the term (as of its positive correlate) is to spacial *quantity*, and then to duration and number; the secondary to the exercise of *power* by material and spiritual agents. The infinite is the not-finite, and the term has as many possible senses as the term finite has. The un-conditioned, in like manner, is the not-conditioned, and the term again has as many possible senses as the term conditioned has. In its primary use, the word conditioned properly denotes *necessary dependence*; in its secondary use, spacial or temporal or numerical limitation. The process is thus the reverse of the process in the case of the finite. The *finite* proceeds from a signification of *quantity* to one of *quality*; whereas, the conditioned proceeds from a signification of *quality* to one of *quantity*. This important fact, and the still more important distinction which it involves, are both overlooked by Sir William Hamilton, as well as by those who accept his position as to the relation of the human mind to the infinite and absolute.

It is essential to observe here, (as is done by Dr. Porter.)* that there is a special sense in which the terms *conditioned* and *unconditioned* are employed by Hamilton and Mansel, and one which enlarges the range of their signification. With them the conditioned is equivalent to the *related*, and the unconditioned to the *unrelated*.

The word *absolute*, once more, means *freed-from*, *released from*, *cut off*, and then *finished* or *completed*, and thus *perfect*. The adjective and corresponding adverb are applied to any thought or thing regarded simply in itself; that is to say, without reference to any of its relations. The transition is easy from

*Ibid., p. 649.

this to the sense of *complete within or by itself*. The term is next applied to that which is thus complete, so far as regards the relations of *dependence*. In this meaning it is equivalent to the word *independent*, and nearly so to the word unconditioned, in its *primary* sense. It is next employed in a sense involving severance from all relations whatever, as denoting the *unrelated*, that which does not admit of any relations. This is the sense in which it is used, and unwarrantably and sophistically used, by Mansel. Then it comes to be applied to objects of *quantity*, to the complete or finished sum-total of existence, whether limited or not in extent and duration. Thus Hegel, by the term *absolute*, means the totality of being, after the travelling *Begriff* (or Idea) has found its complete development and finished expression in the conscious *spirit* of humanity.

Dr. Porter, following Professor Calderwood and Dr. Young, then proceeds to point out that the three equivocal terms are liable to further ambiguity, owing to the uncertainty which may exist as to whether they are used in an abstract or a concrete sense.*

It is now many years since one of the younger pupils of Sir William Hamilton, Professor Calderwood of Edinburgh, undertook to bring out an elaborate rejoinder to the great master; which he did in his "Philosophy of the Infinite," a work remarkable for its clearness, its acuteness, its fulness, and its independence. Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is the Appendix, where he gives the now famous letter which he received from Sir William himself, in criticism of the first edition, together with his own respectful but decided and often cogent replies; and where he convicts Hamilton of logical inconsistency on a comparison of his theory of Perception on the one hand, and his doctrine of Relativity and his classification of the mental powers, on the other.

Soon after the appearance of Professor Calderwood's treatise, and when it began to be criticised by Dean Mansel and others, Dr. John Young of Edinburgh, the author of "The Christ of History,"

**Cf.* Mill Ex. Ham., p. 112. It is perhaps too much to say of Hamilton, or even of Mansel, that he ever consciously regarded the absolute as—the unrelated. Yet the Bampton argument requires it.

came to the rescue, both of Sir William Hamilton and of Dr. Calderwood, in a richly-freighted little volume, entitled "The Province of Reason." So far as Sir William is concerned, the new champion contended that the strictures of the Edinburgh Professor do not apply. So far as Professor Calderwood's book has to deal with the Bampton Lecturer,* Dr. Young is wholly and cordially on the same side. After a brilliant résumé of the Continental philosophy, from Kant to Hegel, the author of "The Province of Reason" recapitulates with a bold but accurate hand the main positions taken in "The Philosophy of the Infinite," and proceeds to advance certain positions of his own, often very similar to those of his predecessor, but now and then quite unique. One of the most striking of the many good points that he makes against Dean Mansel, and one that has attracted the notice and admiration of Professor Calderwood, is where he convicts the Bampton Lecturer of confounding a *qualitative* with a *quantitative* infinite.† The entire argument of Dr. Young is concentrated, vivid, enthusiastic; but at times his doctrine is loose or his statements are unguarded. This is seldom the case, however, in the critical, but only in the constructive portion of the treatise. We think he is unjust to the eminent lecturer in denying that in his book Dean Mansel allows to faith what he is unwilling to accord to knowledge. The position of Hamilton and of Mansel is one and the same as to our *belief* in the infinite and absolute as a reality. With this exception, the ground taken by the two critics of the Bampton Lecturer we regard as unassailable. No matter what may or may not have been correctly argued by the two disciples of Kant concerning these vague abstractions, "the absolute," "the infinite," "the unconditioned," their sharp-eyed critics have, in our judgment, made good their point, that the knowledge of an absolute and infinite *God* is not inconceivable.

Besides the confusion of a "qualitative" with a "quantitative" "infinite," which was pointed out by Dr. Young and Dr. Calder-

*In his first edition Calderwood only discussed Hamilton. In the second, he also discusses Mansel.

†Prov. Reason, p. 72., *et seq.*

wood, and has more recently been animadverted upon by President Porter, there is also apparent throughout Dean Mansel's argument, as we have already seen, the confusion of an infinite (absolute) *being* with an infinite (absolute) *abstraction*. From this there results a fallacy which, in its consequence, is fatal to his whole undertaking. Sir William Hamilton's cool-headed reviewer, Mr. Mill, maintains that when we speak of the "absolute" and the "infinite" as unthinkable, we must mean (in order to avoid self-contradiction) "absolute existence" and "infinite being;" and that there is here a *positive* element in our conception—inasmuch as we still think of existence or being as *something* which absoluteness or infinitude is predicated.* But the learned Dean, as we have had occasion to notice, argues indifferently from one of these meanings to the other, and therefore of course in the most inconsequent manner. We can heartily adopt, in the main, the language in which Mill sums up the amount of what Hamilton has accomplished in his celebrated essay in the *Edinburgh Review*: "Our author has merely proved the uncognoscibility of a being which is *nothing but* infinite, or *nothing but* absolute: and since nobody supposes that there is such a being, but only beings which are something positive carried to the infinite, or to the absolute, to have established this point cannot be regarded as any great achievement."†

A large part of the reasoning of Dean Mansel and his school goes upon the assumption that the Absolute is the same with the wholly unrevealed. This fallacy has been distinctly pointed out by several of the critics of Sir William Hamilton.‡ It is nothing but the old sophism of Spinoza, which was expressed by him in the formula, "*Omnis determinatio est negatio.*" What is essential to the conception or to the real existence of the Abso-

*This, it will be remembered, is precisely the point made by Spencer himself in his "Qualification" of the general approval he had given to Mansel's argument.

†Exam. Ham., pp. 69 and 70. Cf. the admirable discussion on pp. 119, 120, etc.

‡*E. g.*, Hodge's *Theology*, Vol. I., p. 358; Cf. *Province of Reason*, p. 150; and *Phil. Inf.*, p. 177.

lute, is, however, not the exclusion of *all*, but only of some, relations, viz., *the relations of dependent being or origination*.^{*} It is not true that the Absolute, whether considered as a concept or an entity, is devoid of *interior* relations. This point is strongly asserted [in opposition to the Scotch and English School of Ne-science,] by the author of the "Province of Reason," and is again urged by the Yale President. The Absolute is thus not a something *entirely one and simple*. Upon the opposite view there is, again, no escape from the logic of Spinoza. It is equally untrue that the Absolute is without *exterior* relations. It is self-evident that, on Hamiltonian principles, the Absolute is related to the human faculty of believing. Further than this, it is certain [as Mr. Martineau has suggested,] that everything in the universe of being *exists in* relation; and this is especially true of the infinite, as having a greater multitude of points of contact with the finite than any finite object can have with another.

Intimately connected with the fallacy just exposed, and indeed logically bound up with it, is the one which receives its most naked form in the statement that the Absolute (Infinite) is the sum-total of existence. It is amazing to find such a thinker as the late Dean Mansel arguing as if, having proved something to be true of the Absolute in this sense, he had *eo ipso* proved it of the Absolute Jehovah. This confusion of thought pervades the whole fabric of the Dean's argument. That argument relies on the notion that the Absolute is the sum of all being. This notion is an utterly false one. This is the grand blunder of the German Idealists. To identify the Absolute with the aggregate of what exists, were to confound the cause with the effect. The *absurdum* of Spinoza is thus unavoidably reached, viz., that there is but one being or substance in the universe, and that this being or substance and the universe are one and the same. The fact is that, according to a sagacious thinker,^{*} the terms *unconditioned* and *infinite*, though often used in that way, do not, in strict propriety of speech, apply to quantity at all; space and time being not themselves quantities, but the conditions of quantity.

^{*} Porter's Human Intellect, p. 653.

†Porter, p 654. Cf. Prov. Reas., p. 70. See also p. 75.

Dr. John Young has finely shown that what may be true of *the* infinite and *the* absolute (the τὸ πᾶν of the philosophers) in the sense of *the All*, need not be true, and in point of fact is not true, of *an* infinite or *an* absolute, viz., of *the One*. We do not remember, however, that he has distinctly referred to the fact, which has been much dwelt on by others, that there is a sense in which the phrase "*the Absolute*" also expresses an important truth. The Absolute, in this sense, is not a mere idea or abstraction on the one hand, or the sum or aggregate of being on the other; but defines the Supreme Being, the being of absolute perfections. This meaning of the phrase is fully recognised in the "*Limits of Religious Thought*," but is viciously confounded with the others. The confusion of the Absolute (or the infinite) with the sum of all being, (the τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πᾶν of the ancients,) leads inevitably to the vortex of idealistic Pantheism. Dr. Hodge (following Calderwood) has ably shown from their etymology and usage, and from the nature of the case, that the terms infinite and absolute have another meaning, which is their only proper one when they are made to stand for God; and wonder and displeasure are intimated at seeing the first principles of religion and morality thus sacrificed, "out of deference to the assumption that the Absolute must be unrelated."*

(3.) The argument of the Bampton lecturer confounds "*negative thinking*" with the "*thinking of a negative*." It is in proof (and is conceded both by Mill and Spencer) that there must be, and there *is*, something *positive* in our concept of the Absolute or the Infinite. We may, however, view the matter either positively or negatively. We may say that a triangle is *not* a circle, or we may say that a triangle is a figure having three angles. Precisely so we may, if we please, say that the Infinite is *not* the finite; or we may say that the Infinite *is* that which is all-perfect. Our *negative thinking* about the triangle does not make

*Hodge's Theology, I., p. 358. It is but fair to say, however, that both Hamilton and Mansel disclaim this meaning of the term; but as Mill shows, (Exam. Ham., p. 109,) the argument of Mansel at least requires it; and Calderwood asserts the same of Hamilton's "Unconditioned."

the triangle itself a negative thing: its characteristic properties are as strictly positive as the characteristic properties of the square or the ellipse. In like manner, when we think the negative of the Absolute, we do not think out of being the Absolute itself as a positive entity. It is surely most sophistical ground for any one to take, that because one can and does think the negative of A, (viz. B,) that B is of necessity *nothing more than* the negative of A, and that it can have no positive character of its own. When we think the negative of *something*, (generically considered,) we think of that which is *nothing* and *only* nothing. But it is different when we think the negative of a *particular* something. *Exempli gratia*: when we think the negative of the objective world, it is no mere negation that we think; it may very well be, and commonly is, the entire subjective world; and so *vice versa*. When, therefore, we think the NOT-*me*, it is a very positive thing indeed which we think, viz., the outer world of substantial being. The author of the "Human Intellect" argues cogently, that a negative *term* does not necessarily imply a negative *concept*, much less a negative *thing*.* The negative involved in the term simply denies that one thing or concept is identical with some other thing or concept. He might have appropriately illustrated it from the use of the term *non-ego*, to denote the objective world. The objective world is not a negative thing, and its concept is not a negative concept.† Neither are the concepts in question the products of what is called "negative thinking;" that is to say, the result of a fruitless attempt to think positively.

(4.) There is a strange confusion of thought in the use that is made by Hamilton, Mansel, Spencer, and to some extent Mill, of the terms "think," "know," "imagine," "conceive," "comprehend," and the phrases, "mentally image" and "represent in

* Porter (p. 654, note,) holds that Locke gives some countenance to the view opposed in the text; (Essay, B. II., c. xvii., §§ 13, 16, 18; Cf. Leibnitz, Nouv. Ess., B. II., c. xvii. :) but that he does not push it to the extreme, as Hamilton does. As to Locke's view, however, consult McCosh's "Intuitions," pp. 217 and 218, where this point is considered in a footnote.

† Cf. Prov. Reas., p. 280 *et seq.*; also, Mill.

thought." We have already adverted to this point in what we had to say on another part of the subject. This fallacy is happily exposed by Dr. Calderwood, and also by the venerable Professor of Theology at Princeton. To *know* an object, according to the writers of the entire Hamiltonian school, is to "form a mental image of" that object. To *conceive* is to picture with the mind. Dr. Hodge does not deny that this is the proper sense of the word *conceive*; though he might have said that this sense of the term is confined to the extreme school of Nominalists. The Conceptualists, headed by Reid, repudiate this definition of the term, and point out the fallacy that lies in the assumption of its propriety.* But waiving this, the Princeton critic contents himself with showing that to "*know*" and to "represent in thought" by a "mental image," are not necessarily the same. Knowledge he declares to be the apperception of truth. "Whatever the mind perceives, whether intuitively or

* "I believe every man will find in himself what this ingenious author [Berkeley] found—that he cannot imagine a man without color, or stature, or shape. Imagination, as we have before observed, properly signifies a conception of the appearance an object would make to the eye if actually seen. A universal is not an object of any external sense, and therefore cannot be *imagined*; but it may be distinctly *conceived*."

"When Mr. Pope says,

"The proper study of mankind is *man*,"

I conceive his meaning distinctly, though I neither imagine a black or a white, a crooked or a straight man. The distinction between conception and imagination is real, though it be too often overlooked, and the words taken to be synonymous. I can conceive a thing that is impossible, but I cannot distinctly imagine a thing that is impossible. I can conceive a proposition or a demonstration, but I cannot imagine either. I can conceive understanding and will, virtue and vice, and other attributes of mind; but I cannot imagine them. In like manner, I can distinctly conceive universals, but I cannot imagine them."—*Reid's Essays on the Intell. Powers*, p. 326, *Walker's Ed.*, Boston, 1855.

Compare with this the elaborate discussion in the "Philosophy of the Infinite" and "Fundamental Truth." See, also, Hamilton's valuable note on p. 330, where he shows that the whole controversy between the Nominalists and the Conceptualists is founded on the ambiguity of the terms they employ, and admits that "with us, *idea*, *notion*, *conception*," etc., are often "confounded."

discursively, to be true, that it knows." (Theology, p. 360.) This process does not always take place through the medium of a representative image. I know that my next door neighbor has a soul. How do I know it? I can certainly form no ideal *picture* of it that corresponds at all with the reality. In the same way, in order to be able to know *that* God is, and, to some extent, also *what* God is, it is by no means required that I shall be able to form in my mind a visual similitude of the divine Being. The terms and phrases in question are by Mansel and Spencer employed convertibly, or else are but slightly and inaccurately distinguished from one another.* The entire argument for human nescience *quoad* the Unconditioned, is incompatible with the sober conceptualism of the school of Reid. And even granting, with the extreme Nominalists, that every concept is a product of the imaging faculty, that argument still demands, if not that conception and knowledge are the same, certainly that knowledge and comprehension are the same, and that there is no knowledge that is not perfect in degree. In point of fact, all these terms are, for the most part, used interchangeably by these writers. According to this, we must know all our acquaintances equally well, and know them all "even as they are known" by their Creator.†

* See Mill, *Exam. Ham.*, p. 83, for Hamilton's sophistical use of the word "conceive." Cf. McCosh, "Intuitions," p. 218. Ambiguity is sometimes occasioned by Hamilton's constant use of the term "conception," in cases where later writers employ the term "concept." Mr. Spencer's reasoning on the 73d page, and elsewhere, deserves a moment's notice, by which he labors to show that since all explanation consists in a reference of the facts to be explained to larger classes, a class must ultimately be reached than which there is no larger. This ultimate class must therefore be "inexplicable," "unaccountable," "incomprehensible." In reply we have merely to say (passing over the circumstance that all this is borrowed from Comte), as Mill says to Mansel in connexion with another matter, *Quis dubitavit?* That which is "inexplicable" is not necessarily "inconceivable," or incogitable, or "wholly inscrutable;" or if so, only so on the Hamiltonian principles already examined and refuted.

† Young's *Prov. Reas.*, 294. McCosh's *Laws Fund. Truth*, p. 383. Porter, *Human Intell.*, p. 656.

2. We shall next call attention to sophisms growing out of false, perverse, and even contradictory definitions. Several of these have already been brought under notice where reference has just been made to certain ambiguities of language; and stress has been laid on certain erroneous definitions of such terms as "absolute," "unconditioned," "conceive," "think," and "know."

(1) The fallacy involved in the definition of the Absolute and Infinite is fundamental. These definitions of course determine everything, and may be shown to lead to a multitude of contradictions and absurdities. The very fact that they do so is proof enough that they are erroneous. They are, furthermore, in themselves without reasonable basis. "They are," as a judicious writer well says, "founded on purely speculative *a priori* grounds;" and are thus destitute of all authority: nay, they are absurd. "For if, as these philosophers say, the Absolute and Infinite cannot be known, how can they be defined?"*

It may be well just here to expose the inaccuracy of Hamilton's novel and private distinction *between* the Absolute and the Infinite; † as though there were not a self-contradiction involved in speaking of the "*un-conditionally limited*." ‡ In making this distinction, Hamilton has not been followed by many of his own disciples, and not even by Dean Mansel.

(2) Another definition, that is almost or quite peculiar to Sir William Hamilton himself, is the one he gives of "*Causality*," in his memorable replication to Cousin. The famous argument of the Scotch philosopher about the positive and negative poles of thought, is carefully restated by the author of "*The Human Intellect*," and proved to be fallacious. § Both Hamilton and Mansel concede that the Absolute is truly *believed* to exist, and after all refinements, this means, to all intents and purposes, that

*Hodge's System. Theol., Vol. I., p. 358. See, however, Porter's Human Intell., p. 658. The *ad hominem* argument would remain.

† See Hamilton, Discussions, p. 584, *et seq.* This exposure is admirably made by Calderwood, Phil. Inf., chap. iv.; and again by Dr. Young, in the Prov. Reas.

‡ See Discussions, "Philosophy of the Unconditioned."

§ This is beautifully done also by McCosh, in an exceptionally clear and striking foot-note. See "Intuitions," p. 219.

they are *known* to exist. The so-called negative thinking must be regarded as only a *particular mode* of knowing or believing, which is *not* identical with another particular mode of knowing or believing.*

After accepting Hamilton's argument as valid against the German Absolutists, and fully admitting that all our knowledge is relative, Mr. James Martineau† subjects to a searching and, we think, crushing pressure of analysis, Sir William's ingenious but whimsical attempt to resolve the judgment of causality into "a mental impotency;" and then proceeds to vindicate the truth of our ontological conclusions from the sweeping overthrow intended for them by the Scotch philosopher. As to the first point, the essayist shows beyond the power of successful rejoinder, that our notion of a *cause* is by no means the notion of the phenomenon itself as præexistent, and that the suggestion that it is, comes with small grace from the life-long antagonist of Brown; that our concept of *creation* is by no means the pantheistic one of metamorphosis: that our judgment of causality is far from tantamount to a denial of origination, and consequently presents no contradiction to the doctrine of freewill, being in fact the corollary of that doctrine; that the contradictory poles of which Hamilton says so much, are contradictory only in his own fancy;‡ that the concept of the infinite need be no more a negative one than that of the finite, the relation between them being strictly convertible; that the two are not alike "conceivable" in the sense of *presentable in imagination*, but are alike *cogitable*, and alike objects of assured certainty. The proofs brought forward by Hamilton to sustain his position, are deficient and invalid, and the conclusion to which he comes is intrinsically absurd. Sir William Hamilton declares a first cause to be inconceivable, and the very notion of causality to be a mental impotence. We ask, *why* is it that causation is inconceivable? The answer given us supposes

* See McCosh, *Method Div. Gov.*, pp. 529-30, *et seq.*, for a close refutation of Hamilton's whole theory of the Infinite.

† *Essays, Philosophical and Theological*, by James Martineau. Boston: 1868. Vol. II., pp. 268-290.

‡ *Cf.* a shrewd criticism in *Mill Ex. Ham.*, p. 103.

something to be inconceivable, which, however, is *not* causation, (except in the erroneous judgment of Hamilton,) but its very contradictory.

Again: The two "poles of thought" of which Hamilton makes so much, do not involve us in the contradiction *here*, which the author of the Dissertations tries to make out. One of the seeming contradictories is really *incogitable*; but the other is only *unrepresentable* and *incomprehensible*. The fallacy thus involved in Hamilton's critique is the same which was noticed under 1 (4) on pp. 672-674*.

3. Under a third head we throw sophisms, whether concealed or apparent—whether found in the premises or the reasoning—which must be admitted on all hands to exist wherever the conclusion is absurd; and especially where (as here) the logical issues branch out into numberless contradictions. The refutation under this head is of the nature of a *reductio ad absurdum*. It was a saying of John Randolph of Roanoke, that when he met with a conclusion that was false, he never cared to examine the argument which led to it; for he knew that there was error either in the premises or the reasoning, and he did not care which. It can be triumphantly shown that this is exactly the predicament with the argument of the Bampton Lecturer. The conclusions to which that argument conducts us are notoriously false. It matters little therefore whether fallacy be detected in the original propositions or in the ratiocination; that argument must be worthless. From his own definitions of the Infinite and Absolute, the distinguished lecturer, in "The Limits of Religious Thought," is at great pains to make clear the point that the most contradictory conclusions inevitably follow. His object in doing so was simply to invalidate our supposed knowledge of the

* Dr. McCosh appears to have been the first to draw attention sharply to this distinction, unless indeed he was anticipated by Professor Calderwood. Sir William Hamilton's theory of Causality has been widely censured even by his own warm admirers. See, for instance, McCosh's *Div. Gov.*, p. 530, and Thornwell's *Works*, Vol. III., c. iii., p. 93, where will be found an adequate statement of the true doctrine on this subject. Cf. the fine critique of Martineau, p. 270.

unconditioned; but like the creator of Frankenstein, he has accomplished more than he intended. The answer to all this part of the Dean's book is obvious. If his definitions be true, (conceding the propriety of his reasonings,) the contradictions he points out must and do exist. But the contradictions in question do not and cannot exist. Therefore his definitions are false, and the argument that he has based on them is nugatory. From these definitions it follows that the Absolute and Infinite are terms equivalent to the word God, and yet may stand for the Sum of *all* being. It equally follows from the definitions, that the Infinite or Absolute cannot be either the object or the subject of knowledge, or in any sense conscious, or in any sense cause.* The only theory on which several of these statements can be mutually reconciled, is that of thorough-going Pantheism. The only theory on which several other of these statements can be mutually reconciled, is that of blank Atheism. There are other deductions not here stated, together with certain *admissions* of the Dean, which are only compatible with Theism. The mutual reconciliation of *all* the Dean's statements is by his own confession wholly impracticable. The conclusion to which the argument, in certain directions, unavoidably leads, is thus shown to be the very same Pantheistic Atheism which it was invented to oppose. But this is not the end. There are yet deeper circles in this pit of Tartarean darkness. Viewing the argument as a whole, and following it to the utmost possible lengths, it is found to issue on the verge of a labyrinth of sad and hopeless perplexities; and passing on, to plunge into the eternal void of stark and utter Pyrrhonism. The arms forged in the interests of a high religious Faith, have thus been found serviceable only to the black uses of universal, soul-destroying Doubt.

There are other contradictions which might be mentioned, that just as surely conduct the reasonable mind, by easy stages and a sharp incline, to the gulf of a scepticism as dark and absolute

* See Hodge's Systematic Theology, chap. iv. Dr. Hodge includes Sir William Hamilton (against whom he is mainly contending,) as well as Mansel, in his condemnation.

as that which has been attributed to Gorgias the Sophist. If the necessary laws of thought and moral consciousness are deceptive and not to be depended on, there is manifestly no other result possible. There is one point especially that deserves marked emphasis. The glory of Sir William Hamilton, as a psychologist, has been said to be the vindication of the authority of consciousness. But if this grand witness has been convicted of perjury in certain of its most solemn averments, then, on the principle, *falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus*, its whole testimony must be rejected: and to deny the veracity of consciousness, is not only to upset the Hamiltonian psychology, but to scatter to the winds every shred of human credence, every ray of divine promise, every gleam of Christian hope.

We close this branch of the subject by presenting the following striking summary from the pen of Dr. Charles Hodge. "The theory of Hamilton and Mansel, as to the knowledge of God, is suicidal. It is inconsistent with the veracity of consciousness, which is the fundamental principle of their philosophy. The theory is an incongruous combination of sceptical principles with orthodox faith, the anti-Theistic principles of Kant with Theism. One or the other must be given up. We cannot believe in a personal God, if an infinite person be a contradiction and absurdity."* "What, then," he had already asked in another connexion, "is the result of the whole matter? [that is, of the doctrine of the Unthinkable, as set forth in the critique of Sir William Hamilton's.] It is that . . . the Absolute, from the nature and the necessary limits of human thought, is unknowable, and consequently that the stupendous systems of pantheistic Atheism which had been erected on the contrary assumption, must fall to the ground. These systems have indeed fallen by their own weight." . . . "Unhappily, however, Hamilton, † like Samson, is involved in the ruin which he created. In overthrowing Pantheism, he overthrows Theism. All that he says of

* Theology, I., p. 363. The relation of Hamilton to Kant is ably treated by Dr. Young in the *Province of Reason*; and by Mr. Martineau in *Essays*, p. 286.

† We here put in the gloss, "as interpreted by Dean Mansel."

the Absolute, he affirms to be true of God. All the contradictions which attend the assumption of an absolute and infinite being as the ground of philosophy, he says attend the assumption of an infinite God."*

II. After what has been said, it does not need to be repeated that the theory advocated in "The Limits of Religious Thought," necessarily postulates a false scheme of psychology. What Darwin calls "the law of heredity," is of wider application than even Darwin has insinuated. It is true everywhere, that like begets like. As truth is the progenitor of truth, so error propagates error. These remarks find illustration ready to our hand. The sophisms in the terms and phrases made use of by the Bampton Lecturer, stand in a strictly parental relation to the sophisms in his definitions; and these again (where not the very same,) own a natural kindred to the sophisms presupposed by the issue of his self-destructive reasonings.† The surrender of the Hamiltonian psychology is, as we have just seen, one of the inevitable consequences from those reasonings. It is equally true, as has been already implied, but may now be more distinctly asserted, and asserted, too, on new grounds, that the argument of Dean Mansel carries with it the necessary abandonment of the only psychological system that can give a just account of the psychological phenomena.

1. Granting, for the argument's sake, that Mansel's theory of Consciousness is consistent with itself, it is not consistent with the facts, and is consequently false. We need not dwell on this. The proof is not far to seek. Whatever arguments go to prove the authority of Consciousness, are good to prove the total authority of Consciousness, and therefore good to prove its authority in its averments touching the Unconditioned.

2. We proceed, therefore, to make another point, which is this, viz., that both Hamilton and Mansel are at fault, at once as to the nature of cognition, and as to the dividing bounds they assign to the cognitive and moral faculties.

* Theology, p. 349.

† Hobbes has some interesting remarks on the propagating force of bad definitions.

(1.) Attention has been previously directed to the questionable view entertained by Hamilton and Mansel, as to what is involved in every act of conception; and it has been observed that this view is entertained by no one who does not belong to "the extreme left," to wit, the most advanced and radical thinkers among the advocates of Nominalism. If this view of what is necessary to the production of a concept is erroneous, (and we are satisfied that it is,) the error is a grave error in psychology. This, however, we concede to be a moot case; nor is the question about concepts quite so fundamental as the one about cognitions. According to the reasoning of Hamilton, (we have not forgotten it,) the Unthinkable, or the inconceivable, is exactly the same with the unimaginable. To think and to image are thus regarded as identical processes. Let us apply this criterion to our notion of a centaur or a hippogriff. There is, as we have seen, great ambiguity in the use of the word conceive. Sometimes it means to imagine; sometimes to judge to be possible; sometimes (and this is the strict sense) to form a notion of anything. Can I conceive, *i. e.*, judge it to be possible, that such a creature exists as the centaur? * Not unless I can accept the truth of the impossible and contradictory. Yet I can form a *mental image* of a centaur. If all that is meant by saying that I conceive of the centaur is that I can and do draw a picture of him on the mental tablets, then the thing said may be regarded as correct. † It would be indeed hard to think of a centaur without the aid of a material

* Thus Hamilton himself says: "There is only one conceivable alternative." See *Lectures on Metaph.*, II., p. 319. There were other *imaginable* alternatives in this particular case, for it might be *imagined* that an absurd alternative offered itself, and even that it was chosen. What is meant is, that there was only one alternative that a sane mind could choose. Hamilton employs the term "conceive" in still another and an erroneous sense, *viz.*, as the equivalent of "comprehend," or "construe in thought." See Mill, *Ex. Ham.*, chap. vi., for an able discussion of the whole subject. For a good vindication of our *real* though *inadequate* conceptions, both of the infinite and the finite, *v. ibid.*, p. 100.

† See McCosh, "Laws of Fundamental Thought," chap. xi., for a detailed and excellent exposure of this fallacy. *Cf.* *Prov. of Reason*, pp. 143 and 167, and Martineau's *Essays*, p. 283.

or mental picture of that fabulous being. Yet the notion of a centaur is not identical with the mental image. To form that notion is to conceive of a centaur. The solution, as we have before seen, is in the equivocal nature of the term. Now apply the criterion to the notion of a triangle. Plainly, (notwithstanding Locke,*) no man can form a notion of a triangle that is at the same moment of thought neither right-angled nor acute or obtuse; and also at one and the same moment of thought neither equilateral nor isosceles or scalene, and yet all of these at once. If conception and image-making are one and the same, it follows that the extremest Nominalism is right. But can I not form a notion of hardness, of beauty, or of virtue? And do I frame a mental image of these? We give this question pause. The grand hitch remains. Dr. C. Hodge has tacitly given up this point, and yet undermined the Hamiltonian psychology as to the nature and scope of the *cognitive* process.

The whole controversy turns upon one hinge. What is knowledge? What is the proper import of the words "I know?" Plainly it does not mean that I know all about the object of cognition. In this sense we know nothing. The domain of the Unknowable would, on this view, be coextensive with the universe of being. Because we cannot comprehend a thing, therefore, it by no means follows that we cannot know it.† We can comprehend nothing, in the fullest sense; that is, there is no object of cognition that we can know in all its relations. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but *canst not tell* whence it cometh and whither it goeth." Our knowledge may be valid, and thus perfect in quality, and yet not complete, and therefore not be perfect in extent.‡ Our faculties may be veracious, and yet their information be limited. I know my butcher and my baker, and I know them truly; but I do not know them well. The intelligence we receive by the oceanic cable may be

* *Essay on the Human Understanding*, B. iv., chap. vii., § 9, p. 441, London, 1841.

† This point is well argued in Mill's *Ex. Ham.*, ch. vii., p. 120.

‡ *Cf. Prov. Reas.*, p. 177, and *Laws Fund. Thought*, p. 247.

as accurate, though it is not so full, as that which comes afterwards by the oceanic mail.

The fact, then, that we cannot know the Unconditioned comprehensively and absolutely, is no reason why we may not be able to know it partially. Professor Calderwood has made it clear in his comments on Sir William Hamilton's letter, that a partial knowledge of the Infinite does not imply that the Infinite has parts.* The Infinite cannot be known exhaustively. But as has often been well said,† neither can the finite be known exhaustively. The finite universe is not likely to be mastered by the finite mind. To our limited intelligence the world is practically limitless. A drop of water is *infinite* to us. The Yale Professor makes an admirable point just here. There is, he says, an unfathomable mystery common to the finite and the infinite. It is that of *self-existence*. The difficulty is not lessened but increased by diffusing it among a multitude of integers.‡ It is indeed this unavoidable fact of self-existence that constitutes the real mystery that is involved in the Absolute and Unconditioned. But a self-existent *person* is no greater mystery than a self-existent *thing*. The astute President next undertakes the proof that the Absolute is a *thinking agent*. It surely ought to be admitted even by those who, with Mr. Spencer, regard the nature of the Absolute being as wholly inscrutable, that the Absolute *may* be a thinking agent. Dr. Porter, with theologians in all ages, considers the finite universe as an expression of that agent's thought. It may be added to what he says, that the finite universe is equally an expression of His creative will. There is nothing, then, (he concludes,) in the nature of the object sought to be known, or in the nature and limits of the knowing mind, that should deter us from receiving the truth of the proposition that it is competent to the human intellect to arrive at a true and positive knowledge of the infinite and absolute being, and a knowledge of him *as* infinite and *as* absolute. It is indeed undeniable that the conception we form of the Absolute is not an

* Philosophy of the Infinite, p. 221.

† See Human Intellect, p. 660.

‡ Ibid., p. 661.

image.* It is not a product of the imaginative faculty. It is, however, a cognition. The *antinomies* of Kant and *essential contradictions* of Hamilton, that are supposed to beset the inquirer on this subject, and that occupy so much of the "Limits of Religious Thought," are all invented by the mind itself, in the effort to *illustrate* the infinite from the finite.

(2.) Sir William Hamilton and his school are also astray in the view they take as to the nature of *faith* or *belief*, and its relation to the cognitive faculty. Hamilton's two positions are scrutinised by Dr. Hodge, by which he endeavors to save his theology from the logical effects of his surrender of ontology, viz., first, that God, though not an object of knowledge, is an object of faith; and second, that of regulative knowledge. Neither of these positions, it is argued, can be maintained. Not the first, because the Unthinkable or Impossible cannot be an object of faith; and because knowledge is essential to faith. Not the second, because this doctrine of regulative knowledge is self-contradictory; because it is powerless to effect its ostensible object; because it is derogatory to God, and because it is subversive of the authority of the Scriptures.†

In "The Philosophy of the Infinite," the two domains of knowledge and faith are carefully discriminated, and yet shown to be to a large extent mutually dependent; though the author holds with Hamilton, that they are not exactly coextensive, and that the sphere of faith is wider than that of knowledge. In reply to the letter from the great philosopher, he however contends that the knowledge of a negative is not necessarily itself a negation; that a partial knowledge of the infinite does not necessarily imply that the infinite has parts; that much of Hamilton's reasoning is due to a materialistic or purely mathematical notion of the infinite; and that the infinite and absolute are both positive and negative concepts, and also are positive realities.‡

The author of "The Human Intellect" additionally shows that

* *Ibid.*, pp. 656-58. Porter here pursues the same general line of refutation that is marked out by McCosh and Martineau.

† *Theol.*, chap. iv., p. 358.

‡ *Philosophy Inf.*, Append.

the intellectual apprehension of the Absolute is true *knowledge*, as opposed to *faith* or *feeling*. In Porter's system, our primary *beliefs* are themselves *cognitions*. Hamilton is evidently puzzled to know what to do with this thing of human credence. He is certainly at fault in his whole treatment of *faith*, and leaves no room for such a faculty in his psychological classification; unless indeed he may be thought to have done so in treating of our primary beliefs under the head of the cognitive powers. This is clearly the head under which they belong. The term *faith* is another that is very ambiguous. Henry Rogers's distinctions between "Reason and Faith" are justly drawn.* *Faith*, however, is a reasonable thing, and there is an important sense in which all the "intelligent" acts of the soul are acts of the reason.† *A priori* or intuitive knowledge is not the same with discursive, but still it is knowledge; it is knowledge in its highest form. To allege the contrary is to undermine the foundations of all science.

III. The theory of the Bampton Lectures involves a false and ruinous metaphysic. This is the obvious conclusion from the foregoing arguments, as well as from others that have not yet been mentioned. The term metaphysics is one of the most equivocal in the language. We employ it here in the sense given it by Mr. James Martineau. According to this high authority, the aim of metaphysics is "to ascertain whether they [*i. e.*, the primary notions, substance, cause, etc.] be, as we imagine, also *real*, belong to existence as well as thought. Here, therefore, we have a science which is not exclusively either *notional* or *real*, but occupies the transition space from the one character to the other. It endeavors to settle accounts with reality on behalf of the ideal objects given to us by our reason, and determine whether they have an existence independent of our faculties. Should they prove to be only the mocking image of those faculties themselves, then the only result of metaphysic research is to dissipate its own

* Cf. the chapter on this head in the Province of Reason.

† Hamilton in one place says of the mind, that its highest dignity is as the mean "through which . . . our unassisted *reason* can ascend to the knowledge of God." We have italicised the word.

objects ; it springs into life for no other purpose than to commit suicide, and consign all its affairs, by process of relapse, back into the hands of logic. But should they, on the other hand, legitimate their claim to be regarded as objects, and obtain a footing on the ground of positive existence, they forthwith become the concern of *ontology*, which endeavors to evolve true propositions respecting God, the soul, and nature, as *a priori* objects of knowledge, and whether by deduction, intuition, or dialectic, to reach the essence of their necessary being. It is therefore a *real science* ; accessible, however, only from the *notional territory* of logic, and contingently on some means of transport being found ; a divine Elysian land, longed for by shades of thought on the hither side of Styx, and destined to be touched perhaps, provided the metaphysic boat of passage does not leak."*

The careful reader will not fail to have noticed that the question now propounded has already been definitively answered. This was inevitable. Psychology and metaphysics (in the sense just adopted) are so intimately connected, that in the treatment of either one of them the two subjects cannot be wholly sundered. Yet the two subjects are in themselves entirely distinct. It is one thing to inquire into the powers of the human mind : it is quite another thing to interrogate the oracle as to the existence or non-existence of a *mundus transcendentalis*. Two things may be different, and yet be united, and be so united as still to remain different even after the union between them has been effected. The soul and the body are united in man ; but it will hardly be pretended that the soul and body in man are identical substances. It is nevertheless quite impossible, under present conditions, to consider the soul without also to some extent considering the body, or to consider the body without also to some extent considering the soul. So in the case before us. The topic of the mental phenomena and laws is intrinsically distinct from the topic of ontological existence or non-existence : yet these two topics cannot long be considered apart. The reason for this is obvious. One grand department of mental activity

*Essays, pp. 238, 239.

comprises those operations which are classed as the cognitive. But what is cognition? It is the process of KNOWING. And what is it to *know* anything? Manifestly it is to be convinced on good grounds of the fact that it exists, and that it possesses certain qualities and relations. Now it is evident that this process cannot be justified or vindicated from the charge of delusiveness, unless there be correspondence betwixt the facts and the mental judgment. That mental judgment is one which affirms not merely the phenomenal but the substantial reality of the object known. The vindication, therefore, of the mind's power to *know* supersensual realities, necessarily involves a determination of the question whether or not there *be* a world of supersensual realities to know. And similarly, the vindication of a domain of ultra-phenomenal being necessarily involves the true doctrine as regards the nature and scope of the cognitive faculties. In considering the psychological question, Can the human mind *know* the Absolute, *i. e.*, know the Absolute Being, God, we have unavoidably been considering also the metaphysical question, Does there *exist* such a being as the Absolute—as God? If there is such a being as the Theist's and the Christian's God, then self-evidently we must hold to the doctrine of a transcendental world. Those, again, who acknowledge the existence of a world lying beyond the sphere of the phenomenal, usually find no difficulty of reaching the conclusion of the existence of a supreme being who possesses attributes which may be definitely recognised. Both Hamilton and Mansel, as we have seen, are assured of the existence of such a being; but it is on the authority of *faith*, not that of *reason*. This is, at all events, the attitude of the Bampton Lecturer. The distinction they draw between knowledge and belief, we have ascertained to be without foundation. If God cannot be known, his existence cannot be credited by the mind. The logical result is the metaphysic of Auguste Comte. Even granting the distinctions, the corollary is a metaphysic that closes the door of all ontological inquiry in the limited sense of the term. Are we prepared to accept a conclusion so sweeping? Of the two rival schemes of metaphysics, are we ready to take that one which blots out all knowledge of

the unseen world? To this question, as we have previously argued, the reply must be peremptorily in the negative. In our investigation of the mental powers, we have not only shown that there is nothing in the nature of those powers, or in the limits which have been set to their exercise, to *prevent* a knowledge of the Infinite, but also that in a legitimate use of the cognitive faculty, man *can* and *does* arrive at a knowledge of the Infinite. The stress has hitherto been laid chiefly upon the *process* of *knowing*, rather than upon the *object known*. It now behoves us to resume the inquiry from the metaphysical point of view. But though the result aimed at in this inquiry is a proposition, or series of propositions, in metaphysics, the method by which alone we may hope to reach that result is, as before, in large part psychological. It is, in short, but a continuation of the foregoing discussion, though it is important to repeat that the discussion is now carried on with an ulterior object held plainly in view.

We are thus once more face to face with the grand riddle, Can the finite mind know or think the infinite? Can the mind, conditioned as ours is, form a positive and true conception of the Unconditioned? Can the relative processes called thought and knowledge, lead up to the Absolute?

These questions are stated almost in the words of Porter. They are all elaborately considered by Professor Calderwood and the other critics of Sir W. Hamilton, whose works are mentioned at the head of this article. Before going into the discussion, the author of "The Philosophy of the Infinite" repeats Hamilton's well-known statement of the different opinions which may be entertained about the Unconditioned, regarded as an immediate object of knowledge and thought. These are four: that of Hamilton himself, that of Kant, that of Schelling, and that of Cousin. Hamilton's opinion is that the Unconditioned is incognisable and inconceivable, its very notion being the mere negative of the conditioned, which last alone can be positively known or conceived. Kant's view is also that the unconditioned is not an object of knowledge, but that its notion is a regulative principle of the mind, and thus more than a mere negation of the

condition. Schelling's theory in that the Unconditioned is cognisable, but not conceivable; that it can only be known by a sinking back out of consciousness and reflection (which are confined to the relative and different) into identity with the Absolute. Cousin holds that the Unconditioned "is cognisable and conceivable by consciousness and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality." Each one of these schemes is disposed of separately by the Edinburgh critic, the view of Hamilton being reserved for the last, and being subjected to an extended and most searching examination. No essential difference is perceived by Dr. Calderwood betwixt the tenets on this subject of Hamilton and Mansel. What is implied or casually asserted by the one, is continually reiterated and fully developed by the other. Hamilton's main object was, indeed, to overthrow the continental Absolutists rather than to discuss the question in its didactic theological bearings. In the main body of Calderwood's work, the school of Paley are berated for restricting the teleological argument so much to the field of physical nature, whilst Hamilton is still more severely judged for rejecting all evidence for the being of a God that is not based on the phenomena of mind. Dr. Calderwood himself views the world of matter and mind as an organic whole; discounts all evidence from ratiocination, whether inductive or deductive, and accredits our conviction of absolute existence solely on the ground that it is one of our primary beliefs.

The argument of "The Philosophy of the Infinite" seems to have been not without influence on the thinking of the Yale President. Indeed, the American writer treads close upon the footsteps of the Scotch critic of Hamilton in holding that the Absolute, though knowable, is not the product of any sort of reasoning, whether inductive or deductive, and that it is not susceptible of logical definition. (P. 662.) We do not demonstrate that God exists, but simply that *every man must assume that he exists*. And this because these processes severally involve the assumption of the Absolute as their ultimate condition. The unconditioned and absolute cannot be called a *summum genus*, embracing all forms of the conditioned and finite. The relations

subsisting betwixt the absolute and finite are not generic, any more than the relations of space and time to extended and enduring objects are generic. The infinite does not fall under the categories, which themselves demand the infinite as their postulate. On this particular question, as to whether the reality of the Absolute can be *proved* by apodictic logic, we reserve our judgment. It has been abundantly shown that it can be *known*. It can be known (as Porter well says, p. 659,) as the correlate of the finite, and as necessary to explain it. It cannot only be known respecting the Absolute *an sit*, but *quid sit*.* It is indeed impossible to know *that* it is, without also knowing in some degree *what* it is. If the supposition of the Absolute is required to explain the finite, the relations betwixt them must be real and known as such. "They must also be capable of expression in language." It is sophistical to assert that relation always involves limitation. Mr. Spencer commits this error throughout his volumes. Yet, as we saw reason to infer, he is inconsistent. Even the "indefinite consciousness" that the Infinite exists, which he admits, must evidently involve some knowledge of its relations.†

We now call to the witness-stand no less a personage than Mr. John Stuart Mill, an *expert* in this whole matter, and a critic who will not be suspected of any unfriendliness towards Mr. Herbert Spencer, and certainly not towards the broadest doctrine of Relativity. Mill (though, as it now appears, himself a dubitative Atheist,) has done yeoman service to theology in establishing the position that if anything may be shown to exist, and may to some extent be known, God may be shown to exist, and may to some extent be known. This is the clear doctrine of the first chapter of Romans ‡ The very word is *γνωστόν*. Mill holds that, if ever sustained at all, Theism and Theology will have to

* The doctrine of Spencer, that we can know the *fact* of the existence of the Infinite, but nothing as to its nature, is at least as old as Hobbes. This is precisely the view of Kant and Brown as to the nature and existence of an external world.

† See *Human Intellect*, p. 656. *Cf.* *Phil. Inf.*, p. 264.

‡ *Romans* i. 19, 20, 21.

be sustained by the *a posteriori* argument; *i. e.*, by Paley's method and that of the Bridgewater treatises; in other words, must be based upon rational inferences from the facts that come within our observation according to the ordinary principles of reasoning. In other language, if Mr. Mill had believed in substantial existence at all, he would have been convinced by Bridgewater treatises, possessing a certain degree of force, of the existence of a God.* This is a considerable admission. He concedes the propriety and conclusiveness of the cosmological and teleological argument for the being of a God, only asking for *sufficiency* of this kind of proof; and a sufficiency is at hand. On this point Mill would be immeasurably nearer the truth than Mr. Herbert Spencer, were it not for the former's peculiar doctrine of idealistic Sensationalism and virtual Nihilism,† which Nihilism, however, he professed to hold only tentatively and dubitatively, so far as *mind* is concerned. His language on this point is remarkable, and has been much neglected by some who have attempted to expound his system.‡ But once convinced of the error of this Nihilistic theory, Mill (if he stood to his own words) would have become a respectful and inquisitive student and an acknowledged adherent of natural theology.

The subject is presented in a variety of other lights, and with great learning and cogency, by Dr. McCosh.

One of the ablest replies to Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel is also the one contained in the fourth chapter of Dr. Charles Hodge's Systematic Theology. The topic of that chapter is "the knowledge of God," and the first thesis maintained is that "God can be known." The method is a dilatory but exhaustive one. The author first states the question, then defines

* This point is well brought out in Masson's "Recent British Philosophy."

† Mr. Masson calls Mill's system "Empirical Cogitationism," and sometimes "Empirical Idealism." See Recent British Philosophy, p. 405, etc. And for an exhibition of Mill's *quasi* Nihilism, *ibid.*, p. 410, and on all parts of the subject the thorough-going discussion of Dr. McCosh, in his "Laws of Fundamental Thought."

‡ Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 242.

in what sense God is and is not inconceivable, and admits that he is incomprehensible, and that our knowledge of him is partial. The manner in which this knowledge is arrived at is then indicated, and justified from our moral and religious nature, from the actual revelation of God in his works, from the Scriptures, and from his manifestation in Christ. The second thesis is then maintained, that God cannot be fully known. Under this head, the argument of Sir William Hamilton is stated, carefully examined, and articulately impugned. It is shown that Hamilton dislodges the false psychology of Schelling, of Hegel, of Cousin; but by a process which, according to this critic, leads back inevitably to the same Pantheistic absurdity, and then forward to the extremist confines of Atheism and Pyrrhonism. This judgment, as we have seen, is not to be avoided, if the view of Hamilton be the same with that of Mansel.

By Mr. James Martineau it is further contended that, since all our knowledge is relative, our knowledge of the Infinite and Absolute may be relative, without losing the character of knowledge. To say that we know an object relatively, is still to say that we know it, and not to say that we do not know it. We know everything in relation, and not, as the Germans hold with regard to a part of our knowledge, in the absence of all relation. Everything (as we have had occasion to say before) *exists* in relation; and this is especially true of the Infinite. To know it any other way, therefore, would be to *mis*-know it. Our subjective impressions may and do correspond with the outward reality. Our knowledge is thus, in this sense, a knowledge of *things in themselves*. To assert the contrary is to prostrate Hamilton's own most cherished doctrines as to perception and consciousness, and leads directly not only to ontological but universal scepticism. Mr. Martineau craves no better statement of the truth than in Hamilton's own argument from the data furnished by our moral nature for the being of a God. If we "*must recognise a God from our own minds,*" (Discussions, p. 798,) we have surely discovered a "*passage from psychology to ontology,*" and Hamilton treads the bridge he denies to Cousin.

We have now reached the conclusion of the whole matter.

The premises of "First Principles," in so far as the argument of that work relates to the Unknowable, can be justified only on grounds which require the sacrifice of every principle of human reason and every dictate of supernatural revelation. They are at war (as we have seen) with the sciences of logic, of psychology, of metaphysics, ontology, theology. Those who would accept those premises in the full extent of their destructive sweep, must make up their minds to bid adieu to the noblest lessons of philosophy as well as to the cheering assurances of inspired Scripture. If this doctrine of Nescience be the sound one, then the light which has hitherto brightened the course of history, and which affords us our only glimpses of the future, is turned into darkness, a pall has descended upon the universe, and the voices of wisdom [whether of man or God] are hushed in silence or echoed back to us in mocking laughter.

We look upon the specious argument of Dean Mansel as having been fairly exploded, and hold that with it has been also exploded so much of Mr. Herbert Spencer's system as depends on the validity of that argument. But it is in proof that the whole weight of Mr. Herbert Spencer's chain of reasoning hangs upon that argument; and, so far as we are apprised, this is the only reasoning that has ever been attempted in the way of a metaphysical defence of the extreme doctrine of nescience. If this be so, the Positivist doctrine of the Unknowable, in all its forms, whether as advanced by Comte or Spencer, or by any of the so-called Positive school, has nothing left on which it can logically stand. The authority of our intuitions establishes the law of causation and forbids the limitation of our knowledge to observational experience. That authority is flatly rejected by this school; but there is then no escape from the infinite series of the Pyrrhonist and all the horrors of utter scepticism. The denial of all true causal efficiency, as well as of final causes, will not avail. Common sense demands a true efficient and a *raison d'être* for every change; and without them all philosophy and all science are confusion. The doctrine of Hume and Brown, which resolves causation into mere antecedence, is triumphantly

confuted by Sir William Hamilton,* as it had been confuted the year before in the *Princeton Repertory*, by the then Senior Professor of Theology in Princeton Seminary.† The doctrine of final causes is well sustained in President McCosh's Lectures on Positivism. The Pantheist's blunder in confounding *cause* and *substance*, is exposed by Dr. Thornwell,‡ Dr. Christlieb, and very recently by Dr. R. L. Dabney;§ and the whole doctrine of causes established on the ground of the original law of causation, as a primitive and fundamental law of thought and existence.¶

But this denial of all true causation is not merely an untenable shift for those who would avoid the consequences of the exposure of their analytic and synthetic proofs of the great Unknowable; it is the inevitable corollary of those attempted proofs. For, on the one hand, under the imperative demands of the law of causality, we rise, through efficient causes, unavoidably to a knowledge of the great First Cause; whilst, on the other hand, the hopeless surrender of final and efficient causes, involving as it manifestly does the repudiation of that divinely constituted law which is their guaranty, must also involve the inference that the great First Cause is inscrutable, which *ultima causa* would otherwise, under the guidance and sanction of that law, become the object of knowledge.

We have here made an advance beyond the conclusion which merely negatives Mr. Spencer's negation, and have asserted and established the affirmative of the proposition Mr. Spencer has denied. The modern doctrine of the Unknowable, therefore, is not only "not proven," but decisively *dis*-proved; and it is shown

* *Edinburgh Review*, 1830.

† *Princeton Review*, 1829, p. 326. See also Life of Dr. A. Alexander, 1854, p. 449.

‡ Thornwell's Works, Vol. III. p. 147.

§ See "The Sensualistic Philosophy of the Nineteenth Century Considered." This exceedingly able work appeared after the greater part of the present article had been committed to writing. It might have been appealed to in support of nearly every position we have taken; but the argument in this essay is wholly independent of the argument in that book. Dr. Dabney's work deals Mansel very heavy blows.

¶ See Thornwell's Works, Vol. I., p. 57, etc.

to be not only possible, but certain, that God may be known by his intelligent creatures.

This is but a meagre outline of the scope of an argument which would require for its proper exhibition the limits of another article. Our purpose in the present article has been the simple one of showing how vain and how profane is the effort that has been made in these our days to erect "an altar to the *unknown* God." The result of the whole is, that whatever may be true of the "Absolute" and the "Infinite" of the philosophers, our conception of God, of Jehovah, of the Infinite *One*, though it is very inadequate, is also to some extent direct and positive, and is a true conception. We *can* form a conception of the great First Cause; a poor one indeed, but yet a very precious, and one around and upon which we may safely build the solid fabric of evidence to establish or confirm the *existence* and *attributes* of such a being.

That we do not and cannot know God perfectly, is (as was admirably pointed out by the Positive astronomer, Mr. Richard A. Proctor, of the Royal Society, in one of his recent lectures in this country,) one of the fundamental teachings of the Bible itself. "Who," indeed, "*can* find out the Almighty *unto* perfection?" "Such knowledge is too wonderful for us; it is high, we cannot attain unto it." But if we cannot *comprehend*, we can *apprehend*. We may know the meaning of the proposition that "there is a God," and we may assent to it. Nay, we must assent to it. We may also know much about God; and, by the gift of his Spirit, may "know the love of Christ which passes knowledge, and be filled with all the fulness of God."

How dreary is the alternative! The systems of unbelief have been exposed in all their utter worthlessness, and there is nothing left in their stead. On this point Dr. Theodore Christlieb asks, in his most attractive address before the Evangelical Alliance: "And what is the present condition of philosophy? Since the systems of 'Absolute Idealism' have broken down, and the reaction against them has led men into the slough of Materialism, philosophy is at a loss. The one party loudly cries that we must return to the old leader, *Kant*; others wearily labor to arouse

some interest by means of historical representations of past systems, by excursions into the history of literature, or into the natural scientific research of the day. Others, however—and these it is who most attract the world's attention—draw from all that has gone before, an awful conclusion, and before the astonished world hoist the flag—or rather let me say, the distress-signal—of the most extreme *Pessimism*. Schopenhauer sees in all existence nothing but misery and suffering, and can find true happiness only in self-dissolution into an absolutely empty *Nothing*, the *Nirvana* of the Buddhists. And Edward von Hartmann, who, in his rapidly-sold book on the 'Philosophy of the Unconscious,' (a book of which I shall certainly not deny that it has some real merits,) exhibits to us the workings of this great 'Unconscious' in the corporeal and spiritual world, declares it to be a mistake that the world should ever have sprung into existence at all, and even an inexcusable crime, if it had been created by a self-conscious God. All hope of happiness in this or in another stage of the world's history is, according to Hartmann, a pure illusion; before us stands the senile age of mankind, in which, after all hope has died away, our race 'finally abandons all claim to positive happiness, and only yearns for absolute painlessness; for the *Nothing, Nirvana.*' '*

* *The Best Methods of Counteracting Infidelity*, by Theodore Christlieb, Ph.D., D. D. Harper & Bros., 1874. P. 41.

ARTICLE III.

GOD AND THE BIBLE.

God and the Bible: A Review of Objections to "Literature and Dogma." By MATTHEW ARNOLD, D. C. L., formerly Professor of Poetry in the University of Oxford, and Fellow of Oriel College. Boston: Jas. R. Osgood & Company. 1876.

We give it up. We cannot devise a theory of Mr. Arnold and his book, which the book itself does not seem to overthrow. Whether he is teaching us, or quizzing us, or burlesquing the pretentious infidelity of the day—these are questions! While we have our own opinion of his purpose, as may presently appear, we confess it will not be difficult for friend or foe to quote his own words in disproof thereof.

It will only be respectful to the Professor, however, to hear his own statement of his object and the business of his treatise, and believe it if we can. That, we venture to say, will be found more difficult than believing in the inspiration of the Bible.

"But 'Literature and Dogma' had altogether for its object, and so too has the present work, to show the truth and necessity of Christianity, and its power and charm for the heart, mind, and imagination of man, even though the preternatural, which is now its popular sanction, should have to be given up. To show this, was the end for which both books were written.

"For the power of Christianity has been in the immense emotion which it has excited; in its engaging, for the government of man's conduct, the mighty forces of love, reverence, gratitude, hope, pity, and awe—all that host of allies which Wordsworth includes under the one name of *imagination*, when he says that in the uprooting of old thoughts and old rules we must still always ask:

'Survives *imagination*, to the change
Superior? Help to virtue does she give?
If not, O mortals, better cease to live!'

(*Risum teneatis, amici.* We are not at the climax yet.)

"Popular Christianity, drenched in the preternatural, has enjoyed abundantly this help of the imagination to virtue and conduct. I have always thought, therefore, that merely to destroy the illusions of popular Christianity was indefensible. *Time, besides, was sure to do it;** but

* Italics ours.

when it is done, the whole work of again cementing the alliance between the imagination and the conduct remains to be effected. To those who effect nothing for the new alliance, but only dissolve the old, we take once more our text from Wordsworth, and we say:

‘Why with such earnest pains dost thou provoke
The years to bring on the inevitable yoke,
Thus blindly with man’s blessedness at strife?
Full soon his soul will have have its earthly freight.’

Soon enough will the illusions which charmed and aided man’s inexperience be gone. What have you to give him in the place of them?

“Dr. Colenso had nothing, and hence our dissatisfaction with his work. . . . But at the present moment, two things about the Christian religion must surely be clear to anybody with eyes in his head: one is, that men cannot do without it; the other, that they cannot do with it as it is.”*

Our readers will bear with us, we hope, while we add a few detached sentences, to make this wonderful programme a little more clear:

“The indispensableness of the Bible and of Christianity cannot, therefore, be exaggerated. . . . So it is with perfection and salvation in conduct, men’s universal concern, *the way of peace*; they are not to be reached without the Bible and Christianity. By the Bible and Christianity, though not by what our missionaries now offer as such, the non-Christian nations will finally be won.” “It is true that the Bible is the great means for making men feel this, and for saving them. It makes them feel it by the irresistible power by which Israel, the Seer of the Vision of Peace, testifies it; it saves them by the method and secret of Jesus!” † “Compared with Professor Clifford, [a wild assailant of Christianity,] Messrs. Moody and Sankey are masters of the philosophy of history.” ‡

Per contra. “Is it [the story of Adam’s Fall] true? . . . Now, sooner or later, as our experience widens, we must see that the story is not true; we must inevitably come to say to ourselves, ‘It is all a legend! it never really happened, any of it!’” And he goes on with good taste, quite equal to his good sense, to liken it to the Peruvian legend of Manco Capac and Mama Oello. At great length he accuses the Christian world of a “want of intellectual seriousness.” Pp. xxiii.–xxxi. Thus he ranges from mystically pious phrase to the baldest contradictions of this indispensable and invaluable Scripture.

Perhaps the most delightfully astonishing thing in the book is

* Pp. xi., xii., xiii.

† P. xxxv.

‡ P. xvi.

the arrogation to himself and the sceptical world, of "intellectual seriousness." Our churches, prayer-meetings, revivals, our home and foreign missions, our Sunday-schools and seminaries, our prayers, tears, lives, deaths, all betray an unintellectual seriousness or a non-serious intelligence—it is hard to say which. But to sit at home and write books on sweetness and light; to call religious language "materialised poetry," and accuse the religious world of being the real Atheists—this is the fruit of "intellectual seriousness."

Mr. Arnold has doubtless observed many things in his life; but we borrow from Thomas Hood the doubt whether "he ever looked at a human gullet with the aid of a spoon." There *are* some things that cannot be swallowed.

The plan and avowed object of the work is to eliminate—no, we are wrong—to *assume the elimination* of the "preternatural" in which we are "drenched," and then to restore to us, or to inform us that we have not lost, anything worth having in religion.

Now, if the Professor had called out to us in tones of alarm, that the great Pyramid was being undermined, and called for help from the science and fine feeling of all nations to preserve it, we might at least thank him for his good will. But when he backs up to the mighty pile, crowned with "forty centuries," standing like a rooted mountain in its place, and calls out cheerfully, with hands on knees, "Observe, gentlemen! the foundation is all dropping out, but there is no danger—I hold it up:" we find him decidedly original and grotesque.

But it may be asked, What does he propose to take away—or to ask us to surrender—or to inform us that the "intellectually serious" have surrendered—of the long-accepted notions of Christianity?

He substitutes for "God" the formula, "the Eternal, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." P. xxxvi. *et passim*. He ridicules—for one cannot well call it arguing against—the application of the words "person," "being," "existence" even, to this Somewhat, called God. Chap. II. He calls the miraculous histories of the Bible "a beautiful and powerful fairy tale;" p. 117. His principle of criticism of the Gospels, whereby to find

and give us a better Saviour than the writers knew, is—in his own words, italics and all, “*Jesus over the heads of all his reporters!*” This is “the only safe guide” in reading the Gospels;” p. 256. He denies that Christ really rose from the dead; p. 261—and also that he ever promised so to do; p. 263. He treats the Incarnation as an impossibility, and the Miraculous Conception as a myth. And—deeper yet, if deeper wrong may be, because it invites utter scepticism concerning all revealed facts—he avers that religious language (and by consequence, the language of the Bible,) “is approximative merely, while men believe it to be adequate; it is *thrown out* at certain realities which they very imperfectly comprehend;” p. xxxvii.; “its anthropomorphic language about God is *aimed at** a vast, though ill-apprehended, reality.”

Now, when the emphatic and enthusiastic language we have quoted in praise of the Bible is recalled, and compared with these other sayings, the difficulty of believing that Mr. Arnold is in earnest will begin to be appreciated.

Let us add one other extract, and we shall have dwelt enough, perhaps, upon a point of subordinate importance—yet not really idle or irrelevant, if it shows with what kind of enemies in the high places of literature the only true religion in the world has now to deal. Our author is stating—and we will do him the justice to say, lamenting—the probable rise of a “revolutionary Deism” among the working classes of England, with which the “political Dissenters” may think it good policy to fall in; and he proceeds to show them up in a strain of *badinage* which it is not unjust to call ribald:

“The God of this religion will still be a magnified and non-natural man indeed, but by no means the magnified and non-natural man of our religion, as now current. He may be best conceived, perhaps, as a kind of tribal God of the Birmingham League. Not by any means a *Dieu des Bonnes Gens*, like the God of Beranger, a God who favors garrets, grisettes, gayety, and champagne; but a *Dieu des Quatre Libertes*—the God of free trade, free Church, free labor, and free land—with a new programme, therefore, and with Birmingham for his earthly headquarters, instead of Shiloh and Jerusalem, but with the old turn still preserved for

* Italics ours.

hewing Agag in pieces, and with much even of the Biblical worship and language still retained; Mr. Jesse Collings and Mr. Chamberlain dancing before the ark, and Mr. Dale and Mr. George Dawson in the Birmingham Town Hall, offering up prayer and sacrifice!" (P. 48.)

After this, such little affectations as a few constantly recurring phrases—"vigor and rigor," "the method of Jesus," "the Eternal, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness," and such like—may be dismissed as merely betraying the weakness and vanity of the ex-Professor of Poetry.

It may be more profitable, however, to examine his way of treating certain momentous topics; still, rather as features of his class than as remarkable or dangerous assaults on the truth. And we select three, viz., miracles, the words "being" and "existence," and the sayings of Jesus in the Gospel of John.

But a preliminary matter arrests us for a moment. The object of Mr. Arnold's discussions of miracles, personality, etc., is to rid religion of a personal God. He and Mr. Newman have an exasperating way of condescending, smilingly, to the æsthetic and emotional infirmities of mankind, and indulging us in the use of such phrases as "a personal God" *as poetry or rhetoric*. But they, superior beings! have a higher craving, which can be satisfied even in religion only by SCIENCE. They find that language incapable of precise definition, and the fact alleged equally incapable of rigorous proof. They, therefore, will none of it.

Somewhat dashed—as much by their compassion and kind forbearance as by their conscientious stickling for precision—we venture to ask them, at last, for *that* about God which shall be, not poetry—oh no! not rhetoric, but science. They, nothing loth, from their serene heights, hand it down to us: God is "*the Eternal, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness.*" For fear we should not appreciate it at once, Mr. Arnold kindly arrests our attention by italics. We do hope we are not rhapsodical, but is not that *lovely*? The words so delicately guided—reined up short, one may say, lest they say too much—the adjective bereft of its noun, and comforted with a capital letter—the verb, "make for," so nicely selected to convey almost, but not quite, nothing—but above all, that sweetly modest "not ourselves!" O Mr. Arnold, how did you do it?

Sed serii simus. The Professor is not laughing, if he is the cause of laughter in others. Does he seriously believe that that phrase—"the Eternal, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness"—is scientifically precise language, or that the thing asserted is scientifically verifiable? Not at all: the word "science," as employed by these writers, is mere strategy; to borrow the author's own happy term, it is "thrown out" at an idea to which it is not at all adequate. As the less may be contained in the greater, as the part is involved in the whole, the fact alleged may be proved by proving the existence of that personal God whom Mr. Arnold discards. Otherwise it can no more be established than a drop of quicksilver can be held between the finger and thumb. It is too *unfixable* to be proved.

But the author of "God and the Bible" alleges that "support for them [*i. e.*, the magnified and non-natural man called God, and the etherealised men called angels,*] is obtained from two grounds—from metaphysical grounds and from the ground of miracles." P. 71. The implication is that metaphysics and miracles are the only support of man's belief in a personal God. This we flatly deny, inasmuch as Mr. Arnold's little brochure on miracles does not include among them—Creation. But let that pass for the present.

How does our author deal with this great question, the truth of the record of miracles?

He surrenders the old dogma of the Germans, that miracles are impossible—admits that such impossibility cannot be proved. He concedes in terms the fallacy of Hume's argument that the evidence for a miracle cannot countervail the overwhelming evidence of the

*Lest it should seem incredible that a gentleman could write such things, we quote: "But it is different when we profess to speak exactly, and yet make God a person who thinks and loves. Some, we know, have made their God in the image of the inferior animals. We have had the God Apis and the God Anubis; but these are extravagances. . . . So we construct a magnified and non-natural man, by dropping out all that in man is a source of weakness, and by heightening to the very utmost all that in man seems a source of strength, such as his thought and his love. . . . Then between this magnified man and ourselves we put, if we please, angels, who are men etherealised." (Pp. 70, 71.)

the uniformity of nature. And then he brushes lightly away all the testimony for the wonders of power in the Bible, by reminding us that they were produced in an age given to believing such things. He considers that it is no longer worth while to discuss the evidence. The miracles gravely recorded by Herodotus are not even canvassed in these days; the greater intelligence of mankind now dismisses them. It knows their natural history. And just so, he says, with the narratives of John or Luke. We can make room for only a sentence or so, but that will show we are not misrepresenting:

“But we do not believe that Phylacus and Autonous arose out of their graves and were seen fighting with the Persians: we know by experience, we all say, how this sort of story grows up. And that after the crucifixion, then many dead saints arose and came out of the graves, and went into the holy city, and appeared unto many, is not this too a story of which we must say, the moment we put it fairly side by side with the other, that it is of the same kind with it, and that we know how the sort of story grows up? . . . The miraculous beard of the priestess of Pedasus is really just like the miraculous dumbness of Zacharias, the father of John the Baptist.” (P. 76.)

So far as the argument here is made by comparing the legends of mythology with the histories of religion, it was worn out before Mr. Arnold was born. It amounts simply to this: that the travesty of a good thing proves the non-existence of that thing. It is difficult not to be disgusted with the revival of such nonsense. So far as it turns upon what is called “the natural history of miracle,” there is nothing new about it but its impertinent flippancy. Mr. Lecky had labored it after his solid-looking fashion, and set out a great show of learning and philosophising around it. But its only weight, even in the “History of European Morals,” is in the way of stating it. Sift it, and you get just this—that what is believed in a credulous age, and doubted in a sceptical age, is not worthy of belief. The difficulties about accepting this as an argument are two: first, that the rule itself is not sound; and secondly, that the thing implied (*i. e.*, that the gospel miracles were received first in a credulous age,) is not true. The rule is not sound. The belief of a reasonable being is to be founded, not on other men’s belief, but on evidence. True, the

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amount of credence given any alleged occurrence is a part of the evidence, but only a part. And if Mr. Lecky had accepted the whole of the principle, that the credulity of an age discredits all that the age believes, his history would have been a short one. Or suppose we reverse the order of the ages, and apply the rule: must we discard all that this age receives, but other ages doubted or disbelieved? Then down goes the Copernican system, and the earth no longer revolves on its axis! If Mr. Arnold protests that this is not a credulous age, and only believes on evidence, we answer, no man considers himself credulous. The Professor has no more authority on that point, in the judge's seat, than has Herodotus. But he will not take that ground, for he compassionately permits (good, easy man!) so much of mankind as cannot rise to his height, to go on believing. And for our part, we declare that the men who accept this book and its notions are "sceptics" of a very peculiar class indeed. Like philosopher Bayle, in Charles the Second's sarcasm, they can believe anything but the Bible.

The "natural history" rule, therefore, runs down to this—"What other ages have received, and we (free-thinkers) reject, will soon be rejected by everybody, and ought not to be believed by anybody;" which is a very comfortable way of inviting the mountain out of our road. As a matter of fact—and we challenge denial—a larger proportion of mankind believe the miracles of the Bible, and discard all other miracles now, than ever before since the Bible was penned.

But is it true that the age of the Gospels was a credulous age? We have not so read history. We have understood—and Mr. Lecky confirms us in that opinion—that belief was *drying up* in the lands all round the Mediterranean. And the evangelists themselves make confession of *incredulity* with a frank simplicity that adds its own charm to their recital, and its own weight to their testimony. The women who had seen Christ after his resurrection reported the fact to the twelve, and it seemed to them as idle tales, and they believed it not—and that, though John, at least, believed that Christ had risen. When the ten had seen and been convinced, Thomas held out against them all, until he

should put his finger in the print of the nails, and thrust his hand into the cleft side. And, to cut the matter short, when the Lord appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, though the greater part believed and worshipped, *some doubted*. Indeed, the whole aspect of the history makes Pilate seem almost a representative of the period, when he asks, with supercilious levity, What is truth? The people to whom Christ preaches is "like a wave of the sea driven of the wind and tossed;" as sheep having no shepherd, they wandered and fainted. They seem singularly incapable of resolute religious belief until drawn under the vital influences of the Redeemer himself. National pride and factious hatred kept the sacrificial fires burning; but the venerable beliefs that had kindled them at first were well nigh extinct.

But we propound one other question before we leave this topic. What arrested the growing incredulity of the age—brought on that "loose-jointedness" of which Mr. Arnold so poetically speaks? It is a settled principle of historical philosophy, that the occurrence of any great and deep sensation begets imitations and spurious or morbid repetitions. "Moral epidemics" arise just in that way. The passions, convulsions, sins of to-day, are the echoes of distorted images of the sublime event of yesterday. The French Revolution of 1789 was the illegitimate child of the American Revolution of 1776. The Koran is the broken shadow of the Bible. The Deluge-legends, from Assyria to Mexico, are reverberations of the most venerable and pathetic history in human speech. About the light is the twilight, everywhere—with its sheeted mists, its half-seen objects, its soft and its terrifying illusions.

No! the ebb and flow of the spirit of mankind is effected by *facts*, not by fancies, in the first instance; though the facts will immediately begin to breed fancies. And the question to be met by every "intellectually serious" thinker is, What are the facts? And this, clearly, is a question to be answered not by theory, but by evidence.

When we inquire, What changed to so large an extent the temper of a sceptical age? How was it that, whereas the augurs of the day of Cicero could hardly look into each others' faces

without laughing, the children of the second generation following could and did die for the name of Jesus?—when we put such questions, the Professor of Poetry may say, if he pleases, that it was the change that made the difference (for it amounts to that); but history will say, it was the Resurrection of Christ, and the consequent miracles of his apostles.

To sum up on this point, then: Mr. Arnold finds one of the two chief supports of the belief in a personal God in miracles, ignoring entirely the argument from creation, and barely mentioning that from design. In treating of miracles, he does himself the dishonor, and the Christian world the outrage, to liken them to the fables of Paganism, forgetting alike their obvious object, their common majesty, their massive unity of character, and their inextricable *embedment* in the Bible he professes such a desire to preserve. He not only asserts, in the face of established fact, that they owed their acceptance to the credulity of the age in which they occurred—whereas *that* age was *not* credulous but sceptical, and the easy belief of the following age was the indirect result of the slowly accredited wonders of Christianity; not only that, but he makes this assertion in applying a principle, which, if sound, would crumble all history to pieces, profane as well as sacred—the principle, namely, that what one age believes and another doubts, the next must deny.

We approach a much more difficult portion of our task when we examine our author's account of "the God of Metaphysics." Not because of the power of his arguments, indeed; but by reason of the intolerable diffuseness of his style, and the *fractionary* way in which his thoughts are brought out. Indeed, we may as well acknowledge that we cannot quote enough to reproduce his discussion of his "Unknown God;" we cannot even promise that what we do quote shall be entirely consistent with all we do not quote. Our readers must be content with our own summary, and a very few sentences, *purpurei panni*, as samples of the cloth. Let us prepare the way by the very threadbare inquiry, How do we obtain our abstract terms?

Everybody knows that an abstract term is that by which we indicate a point in common between things that otherwise differ—

that it simply names that point, whether of quality or fact—and that it expresses our conviction of some sort of *actuality*. The term so employed either had itself a concrete use and signification, or is derived, by one or two removes, from such a term. Etymology does often cast a light upon the history of abstract words, and the manner in which they came to be selected, and even the erroneous views of those who employed them abstractly in the first instance. But the last thing a sound and careful reasoner would do would be to pin down such a word to its original sense, and insist not only that it *should*, but that it *does*, bear only that meaning always and everywhere.

Mr. Arnold tosses about, in his talk, his ignorance and lack of philosophy, as airily as Mr. Harold Skimpole did his ignorance of the value of money. And there really seems to be some ground for the boast, (or confession,) if his treatment of the present matter is taken as a test.

He insists largely (p. 94) elsewhere, that metaphysicians continually employ the words *essence*, *being*, *existence*, without defining them, and that he could not and did not know what idea they intended to convey by them, and therefore could neither admit nor deny the truth of those things which they constantly affirmed, because the main term in their propositions was thus left obscure. He relates in a very lively way, how, having in vain sought relief from the professors of logic and metaphysics, who were “altogether above entertaining such a tyro’s question as what *being* really” is (p. 95), he was happily delivered and restored to the sunlight of clear knowledge by—*Curtius’s Greek Grammar*. There he found that *εἶς*, *esse*, *is*, *essence*, are forms in different tongues of a very old substantial verb, whose original meaning, addressed to the senses, it is “all but certain,” was *breathe*—the almost certainty being furnished by “the Sanscrit *as-u-s*, life-breath, *as-u-ra-s*, living, and *as*, mouth, parallel with the Latin *os*. “The three main meanings succeed each other in the following order: *breathe*, *live*, *be*.”* “Here was some light at last! We get, then, for the English *is*, the Latin and French

* Quoted from Curtius’s Principles of Etymology, on p. 97.

est, the Greek *estin* or *esti*—we get an Indo-European root *as*, breathe." (N. B. The "*all but certain*" of the Professor of Grammar disappears swiftly, with the Professor of Poetry. It drops out here.) So Dr. Curtius digs up "the root *bhu*, in Greek *φν*," which reappears in *future*, *physics*, French *fus*, Latin *fui*. "The notion *be* attaches to this root, says Dr. Curtius, evidently on the foundation only of the more primitive *grow*."

It seems nearly incredible, and yet it is true, that this logomachist wastes page after page, on this discovery, of which the philosophers were ignorant! (P. 102.) "*Virtue is*," means, *Virtue breathes*; "*Truth does not cease to be*," signifies, '*Truth does not cease to grow*'; which two last propositions, we remark in passing, will be identical just when two and two make five. And "*I Am hath sent me unto you*," (Latin, *ero*,) is, "*I will breathe hath sent me unto you!*" He even dares—after a gloss upon the word *anima*, animal, as meaning a *breather*—to translate *Etre Supreme*, the Supreme Animal! The object of these contortions and ribald violences is to wrench away these accepted abstract terms, and give us nothing in their place. It is to convince men that we cannot predicate being, far less personality, of the Eternal God, without talking bald nonsense.

After playing with these terms thus for a while, and even admitting that philosophers used them figuratively, (p. 105,) *i. e.*, of course, *borrowed* them from their original employment—an admission that virtually nullifies all he had been saying, and puts us back where we were before—after all this, he proceeds to tell us something:

"Or again, they become aware of a law of nature, as it is called—of a certain regular order in which it is proved, or thought to be proved, that certain things happen. To this law, to the law, let us suppose, of gravitation, they attribute *being*. They say that the law of gravitation is, exists, *breathes*, *steps forth*. . . . Or, finally, they become aware of a *law of nature** which concerns their own life and conduct in the highest degree—*of an Eternal, not ourselves, which makes for righteousness*. For this is really a law of nature, collected from experience, just as much as the law of gravitation is.* . . . We no more pretend to know the origin and composition of the power that makes for righteousness than of the

* Italics ours.

power that makes for gravitation." P. 107. These be thy gods, O Israel!

Significantly enough, when Mr. Arnold attempts to show us how man made his God, he abandons this wonderful illustration of the law of gravitation. It is certain man never "made that into" a human being, and called it a God. His object of comparison now becomes "the sun." P. 109. But feeling that the hiatus must be covered, if it could not be filled, he proceeds thus: "What was the Apollo of the religion of the Greeks? The law of intellectual beauty, the Eternal, not ourselves, that makes for intellectual beauty. . . . *Who doubts this?*"* A trace of Mr. Bayle again. This idle assumption, to back up the other incredible assertion, is the sort of Bible and God this wise man would give us, in place of what we have. We make no detailed reply to this "stuff." We merely set over against it the following brief showing.

The constitution of man's mind is such that—guided toward the truth by the sense of power exercised upon us, (as upon the child by its mother or nurse,) and the consciousness of power exerted by us—it refers events to causes. Ignorance, whether in the individual or the race, makes continual mistakes, and continually ascribes causal power to that which has none. But the principle is intuitively true, let the applications be ever so erroneous.

Each discovery that a thing, or a series of things, had a beginning, converts such thing, or series of things, into an *event*—for which, of course, a cause must be found. If it cannot be found, it is still recognised as necessarily existent: it is *x*, the unknown cause of *a*, the known event. And when, by a generalisation that true science has only and always confirmed, the world itself is placed in the class of events, (*i. e.*, a series that had a beginning,) it comes under the same necessity of being referred to a Sufficient Cause.

But there are two sorts of causes known to man, which may be called, respectively, mechanical, and voluntary, causes. It will be seen, a little farther on, that the radical difference which divides science from sound theology at present, is just the differ-

* Italics ours.

ence between the allegation of a mechanical and the allegation of a voluntary cause of the Cosmos. At this point we are concerned simply with the natural history of man's actual beliefs, and of the terms by which he indicates them. Man has always, everywhere, by an inward necessity, decided in favor of a Voluntary Cause, and justified his decision by proving Design.

True, Mr. Arnold says that "when we are speaking *exactly* of the ear or the bud, all we have a right to say is, it works harmoniously and well"—not that it was contrived to do so. We respectfully submit that Mr. Arnold is not as foolish as he thinks he is; and that when he discovers harmony and goodness, *he knows they had a capable cause*. Showing that *be* is derived from *bhu*, and *is* from *as*, does not upset everything!

The question arises, now, How shall this dimly known Voluntary Cause of the Cosmos be named? Clearly—on the supposition that no revelation of a name is made—either some one term must be set aside as the Name, or various words must be employed to adumbrate what is known or thought concerning Him in various directions. And as the thought and worship of Him outran by many ages the advent of scientific terminologies, it is nearly certain, in advance, that many different names would come into use. And even on the supposition that this Great Cause revealed himself, it might confidently be expected that he would *set* the most impressive facts concerning himself in names, as precious stones are set in gold.

And it is a fact of the highest interest here, that the Hebrew tongue is rich in names of God beyond all other riches: El, Elohim, Jehovah, Jah, Shaddai, The Mighty, The Rock, Jehovah of Hosts—these are the usual titles the God of the Bible wears, and upon them are heaped other words of glorious meaning, like embroideries upon royal robes. Or it may be fitter to say that they are the windows of the divine palace, through which, standing afar off, we see the King.

Now let it be settled in our readers' minds, that when proofs of Design and Volition are seen in that which had a cause, then the *personality* of the cause is a fact absolutely unquestionable. The valves in our arteries, the *suspension-bridge* (as it has been in-

geniously called) in the foot of a cat—the grouping of the masses of land in the northern hemisphere, so that nine-tenths of mankind have their summer when the sun is in *apogee*, and their winter when he is in *perigee*—the incommensurability of the times of the heavenly bodies—these, and the million other facts like them, by showing Thought and Will, show that the First Cause is a Person. And then it follows that Religion is not Morals, but Worship, Obedience, and Love.

We had intended to examine at some length Mr. Arnold's theories and vanities concerning the Fourth Gospel, but really cannot waste the space or time upon it. They are little more than yesterday's Germanisms warmed over. This precious word from God is, according to him, the work of a "literary arranger [of traditionary accounts derived originally from John] sometimes embarrassed in dealing with his materials (p. 253)—marred by literary blemishes, "blots and awkwardnesses" (p. 248); reporting inaccurately, grouping incorrectly, and putting into the mouth of Christ sayings such as he *could not* have spoken.

All this would seem to shake the Gospel pretty much to pieces, and leave us bereaved of the sweetest messages of the Love of God. But Mr. Arnold cheers us up. He assures us he is equal to the occasion. The casket is broken, and the jewels are fallen into the sea; but he shall fish them up for us. The "*logia* of Jesus" were but half-remembered by John, and dismembered by the literary arranger; but never mind! By sheer force of the critical faculty, the Professor will restore to us—so much of the word of God as he believes himself; and who would be so unreasonable as to ask him for more? Not we, certainly—not of *him*. We shall ask very little of the man who thinks he has cut down the Tree of Life, and consoles us with a basket of chips.

We are not indignant with Mr. Arnold—far from it. He seems to be an amiable, somewhat frisky, young man, who has made a great mistake. The critical antics at which one might smile, while performed about human poets, are pitiable indeed before the Ark. *Pitiable* is the word. The Ark is in no danger; but the man who trifles with its reverence and grace is in peril indeed—

none the less because he "rushes in where angels fear to tread." We advise him, in all kindness, to get back to his poetry, and let his noble old father's religion, and mankind's, alone.

Taking our leave of him at this point, we devote our few remaining pages to a matter of great interest and encouragement, chiefly in the hope of stirring up some competent teacher to do in full that of which we can give but a meagre outline. It is the progress actually made in the Great Controversy between Bible Religion and Secular Thought.*

Paley's Natural Theology is the representative of the Christian argument on this theme during the earlier years of this century—the Bridgewater Treatises simply expanding that argument, without attempting to modify it. It was simply an application of common sense to the question, whether the universe had a Designer and Creator.

The Nebular Theory (as a part of this controversy) was simply an attempt to *disperse* without refuting. It proposed to explain the order of the universe by tracing it back to star-dust reduced by the cloud-compelling force of gravitation to fiery and then to fruitful worlds. After an effort to discredit the very existence of genuine nebulae by the resolution of spurious nebulae into systems of stars—an effort that could not succeed, inasmuch as comets have this very nebulous quality whose existence was questioned—the sounder answers were made: (1) That the star-dust itself, by the very hypothesis, must have begun to be, and must have had a Creator to impress its laws upon it; (2) that the proofs of Design were not in the least disturbed by the theory; and (3) that Life was the gift of Infinite Power alone.

The first of these three positions is virtually unassailable. But if it could not be carried, it might be turned and rendered valueless, if the *personality* of the First Cause could be drawn into doubt. Secular Thought, therefore, addressed itself to an assault

* The writer feels constrained at this point to explain that his inability to consult even his own few books, or to visit any well-furnished library, makes this sketch even more jejune and unsatisfactory than he imagined when the plan of the article was made.

upon the second position. It undertook to show that those facts which were continually quoted as marks of Design, were really and simply the products of Natural Law. Vital laws, including the laws of heredity, accounted for the eye. Laws of gravitation, of motion, of chemistry, accounted for the material world. And so on through the whole round of nature. These are the positions of the "Vestiges of Creation," and other similar works. The old "development theory" is simply an attempt to ascribe power to Law, and get rid thereby of Design.

To this, Bible Religion presented two replies: First, upon the question of fact, it was shown (by Hugh Miller and Agassiz, to name no more,) that the *progress* proved and conceded involved no *paternity*—that no race or kingdom, through all creation, was *bred out* of another, but *superinduced* upon it. Secondly, and as we venture to think, far more conclusively—it was shown (1) that the *Design was visible in the laws*, and had equally to be accounted for there; and (2) that the laws themselves were in many cases simply and only LAWS OF THOUGHT, and compelled belief in a thinker. While this main battle was being fought, a very remarkable flank attack was also made, which "came to grief" in an extraordinary way. This was the debate upon the Unity of the Human Race.

The proposition on which Messrs. Nott, Gliddon, Morton, and all their allies, laid out their strength, was, the unalterable fixedness of type in the various races of mankind. The monuments of Egypt and the mounds of America, the negro's foot and the Indian's skull—things small and great, new and old—were ransacked for evidence, and triumphantly declared to have produced it too, that the negro could not be, and never was, anything other than he is to-day.*

But now arose Mr. Darwin and Mr. Wallace, and undertook to prove *the very opposite!* namely, the utter fluidity of specific

*We take this opportunity to urge that careful measurements, casts, etc., of the present negro race be made and preserved; inasmuch as the race is *now changing*. The American negro and the African are not physically the same. That was abundantly seen when the Niagara brought captured slaves into Charleston Harbor.

types. The laws of nature for which they plead—the law, namely, of incessant, minute variation, and the law of natural selection—so far as they may be established—go to show that no amount of departure from any given human type can be taken to disprove the genesis of one from the other.

Let it be conceded that the present statements of their doctrine are extreme; that the tower they are building *leans over* beyond its foundation so far as to threaten its fall. Nevertheless, they have made one infidel position untenable; they have proved that the descent of all men from one pair is, in the judgment of science, possible. What remains is simply the question of fact.

The two latest phases of Secular Scientific Thought are contemporaneous or nearly so, involved with each other, and indeed parts of one system; they may therefore be mentioned together. The last is, that life is not only the subject, but also the creature, of law, and the product of natural forces; that therefore the intervention of a Creator-God is unnecessary. This is the sum of Mr. Huxley's deliverances concerning Protoplasm. We may say, in passing, that Mr. Huxley is far too good a logician not to know that he has done nothing in the way of proof in such a matter until he produces a fact. Let him make the living creature! Theories and inferences are not to be endured as evidence in science. And if he should ever produce such a fact and establish it—what then? Why, he would simply have taught us that the power of God flowed through one channel more than we had yet discovered. We should but be the more impressed with his magnificent greatness.

But this is, after all, only a branch of a yet wider scheme of Secular Thought, which may be called Transcendental. Mr. Tyndall's studies of what used to be called the Imponderables, have led him, and many after him, to deny the substantial existence of Matter, and refer all its manifestations to Force. "*All matter is force,*" says Mr. A. R. Wallace, who has said something else equally memorable, to be rehearsed presently.

No solid rocks, no rolling water, nor clouds, nor trees, nor people, in any substantial way! The earth is dissolved, and the

inhabitants thereof. The promise and the potency of all life, mentally or bodily, is in Force.

Now we have not the remotest desire to break this fancy on the wheel. Religion need not answer it at all, until it enunciates itself much more clearly, and brings a world of proof at its back. But we are glad to be able to point out how wonderfully—all the more wonderfully because unconsciously—how swiftly and near (at one point) this speculation draws to the Great First Truth; so near, that one of their best thinkers has actually stepped across the line of difference. In the paragraph succeeding that which is entitled "All Matter is Force," Mr. Wallace states and argues the theorem—"All force is probably will-force." What the "advanced thinker" refers to Force, the Theist ascribes to STRENGTH. They are *Biaotai*; we are *Powotai*.

Whether or not there must be solid nuclei, from and to which forces must act; whether the word molecule itself is or is not a blunder, and Mr. Tyndall's own terminology is likely to be swept away in this new cataclysm: these and such as these are very interesting questions to *Science*. But Religion is far more interested in the coming debate between Force and Power. It may safely be prophesied that Power will hold the field, so far as human belief goes. Mr. Tyndall cannot keep men in the horse latitudes; they will cross the line with Mr. Wallace, and the trade-winds will sweep them home.

It is to this issue that the great debate is rapidly narrowing down. In the presence of the mighty phenomena of the heavens and the earth; while the plains are tilted up into mountains, and the mountains are swept into the sea; while the thought of man grows god-like, and that chiefly through the discipline acquired in studying the Thought and Plan impressed on Being; while our physical energies are more and more felt to be as nought, measured against the energies of Nature: is man's normal condition to be Fear or Awe? Is he condemned to dread, or commanded to love?

Let it be confessed that Science, as such, can never produce, define, or place the First Cause. In "a voluntary humility and will-worship," its apostles often confess so much. And therein

they simply acknowledge the truism that Science is only one department of Thought. To Science the sea saith, It is not in me ; and the depth, It is not in me. But they have another voice for the heart—the heart, whose existence Mr. Tyndall's own manhood admits. It was not as astronomer that Herschel knew God ; but it was Herschel knowing God that illuminated astronomy.

Let it be confessed, we say, that the place of Jehovah is not within the petty landmarks of scientific thought. It is not, just as the sun's place is not among the flies and beetles of the entomologist. Nevertheless, it is in his rays the ephemeridæ disport themselves ; from his fulness the diamond beetle and the emperor butterfly draw their glitter and their tints. And he would be but a poor student even of insect-life, who took no account of the sun, because he was not on the lists of the Coleoptera.

We need not waste time now to show that certain assumptions are always and absolutely necessary, in order that Science should exist. The assumption of a God is necessary, that Science may be glorified. Without him, it is but a landscape under a north-east rain ; the headlands are there, and the rivers, and the trees, but all is dank and dreary. When he appears, the sunlight pours in and touches every pebble with glory.

“Ye Ice-falls ! ye that from the mountain's brow
 Adown enormous ravines slope amain—
 Torrents, methinks, that heard a mighty Voice,
 And stopped at once amid their maddest plunge !
 Motionless torrents ! silent cataracts !
 Who made you glorious as the gates of heaven
 Beneath the keen full moon ? Who bade the sun
 Clothe you with rainbows ? Who, with living flowers
 Of loveliest blue, spread garlands at your feet ?
 God ! let the torrents, like a shout of nations
 Answer ! and let the ice-plains echo, God !
 God ! sing, ye meadow-streams with gladsome voice !
 Ye pine-groves, with your soft and soul-like sounds !
 And they, too, have a voice, yon piles of snow,
 And in their perilous fall shall thunder, God !
 Thou, too, hoar Mount, with thy sky-pointing peaks,
 Oft from whose feet the avalanche, unheard,
 Shoots downward, glittering through the pure serene
 Into the depth of clouds that veil thy breast—

Thou, too, again, stupendous Mountain! thou,
 That as I raise my head awhile bowed low
 In adoration, upward from thy base
 Slow travelling, with dim eyes suffused with tears,
 Solemnly seemest like a vapory cloud
 To rise before me—Rise, O ever rise;
 Rise like a cloud of incense, from the earth!
 Thou Kingly Spirit throned among the hills,
 Thou dread Ambassador from Earth to Heaven,
 Great Hierarch! tell thou the silent sky,
 And tell the Stars, and tell yon rising Sun,
 Earth, with her thousand voices, praises God.”

We respectfully suggest that the Professor of Poetry may yet learn a good deal from the poets.

At the point at which “advanced thought” has now arrived, viz., the theorem that Matter is Force, it is evident that the lines of scientific and philosophic thought overlap, and that, just where Natural Theology is especially interested in them. So soon as the acknowledgment of Will-force is made, the question of the personality of the First Cause will be settled.

It is true that Mr. Matthew Arnold attempts to block the wheels by insisting that the word “personality” is unintelligible, or at any rate unscientific, when applied to a being without a body; but then he is *philosophe manque*, by his own boastful confession. Only a fractional man, like himself, here and there, will hesitate to infer thought, will, plan, reason, where their work is seen, in advance even of the question whether that thinking nature inhabit a material body.

But when the Personality of the First Cause is admitted, even advanced thinkers must soon see the possibility, and then the probability, and then the necessity, of a way of communication between Him and us; the doctrine of Revelation, and the doctrine of Prayer, will follow by a natural necessity. In them are involved all the essentials of the Christian position.

The Church, which has been almost always and necessarily the assailant of the world on the spiritual side, has been almost equally the assailed party on the intellectual side. Knowledge itself has not made the trouble, but hasty inferences from knowl-

edge—inferences often made by champions of the Church, we confess; but oftener made and urged by her enemies.

But, looking back thus over the long campaign, it appears that all the main positions taken for the Bible are still held, and more abundantly fortified; while the attacking forces have had to reconsider, and even reverse, their positions.

Every struggle, in its turn—and the order of the contests, as we have seen, follows a logical sequence—settles something; and every settled something is ultimately a gain to evangelical religion. It is impossible that any actual fact or established principle should militate against the truth of God. The Church has less to fear from Science than the Science of to-day has to fear from the Science of ten years hence.

“The counsel of the Lord standeth forever;
The thoughts of His heart to all generations.”

ARTICLE IV.

OUR CHURCH NOT SUFFICIENTLY EVANGELIS- TIC: WHY?

It is the purpose of this article to plead for a policy more aggressive than our Church has been pursuing. Far be it from the writer's mind to concede that Presbyterianism is a failure in the South, or to claim any warmer love for the stones of her beautiful temple than that of his brethren. We sound the trumpet for no revolution, but only to wake any that may be slumbering, and to call them to sterner resolves for duty. The question to be considered is one of public policy. It is not, Are we evangelistic, but, Are we *sufficiently* evangelistic?

I. To this inquiry, we think that facts give a negative reply. We are not sufficiently evangelistic in the policy of the Southern Presbyterian Church.

We recall with much gratitude that the Head of the Church has added many souls to our communion. Our actual growth

has been very gratifying to those who "walk round about Jerusalem and tell the towers thereof." But all growth does not indicate, much less prove, that we are evangelistic. We are a church of pastorates; and faithful pastors have brought in many accessions from their particular congregations. Churches may grow by union of two or more bodies together. Our Church has grown in this way by gaining the Presbytery of Patapsco, the Synod of Kentucky, and the Synod of Missouri. In 1867 we had 859 ministers, 1,309 churches, and 80,532 members. In 1875 we had 1,084 ministers, 1,797 churches, and 107,334 members. Our actual gain those eight years has been 234 ministers, 488 churches, 26,802 members. Of these, the Synod of Kentucky brought in 75 ministers, 137 churches, over 5,000 members; the Synod of Missouri brought 67 ministers, 141 churches, and about 5,000 members; the two making in the aggregate, 142 ministers, 278 churches, and, say, 10,000 members, or a proportion, to the whole increase to our Church in the eight years, of sixty per cent. ministers, fifty-seven per cent. churches, and thirty-seven per cent. members. From such facts the reader may see that the growth from evangelistic effort can not be large. Including additions from all the sources named, our increase for the eight years bears the following ratios to our forces of 1869, viz.: twenty-seven and one-half per cent. ministers, thirty-seven and one-half per cent. churches, and thirty-three and one-third per cent. members, or an average increase on the membership of 1869, per year, of little over three per cent. of ministers, less than five per cent. of churches, and four per cent. of members. Ordinarily, the increase of churches would be the best exponent of what we are doing in the evangelistic work; but owing to the unusually large proportion of churches brought in by the Synods of Kentucky and Missouri, this is not the case with us. Considerations, such as the above, lead us to say that actual increase is not a sure measure of evangelistic character and work.

Nor does relative increase guide us to a safe and sure judgment as to this character and work; yet comparison may teach us some useful and encouraging lessons, or stimulate us to greater

zeal. We will compare our growth with that of the Baptist and Episcopal Churches, some of whose statistics we have at hand. The statistics of both these Churches embrace both the North and South.

The Baptist Church in 1860 numbered 7,779 ministers, 12,279 churches, and 1,016,939 members. In 1873 it had 12,598 ministers, 20,520 churches, and 1,633,939 members. Ratio of increase upon 1860: a fraction less than sixty-two per cent. of ministers, a fraction less than sixty-seven per cent. of churches, and sixty per cent. of members, for a term of 14 years, or an average yearly increase of four and one-half per cent. of ministers, a fraction less than five per cent. of churches, and four and one-half per cent. of members. According to these figures, the Baptist Church has outgrown "the Presbyterian Church in the United States," per year, one and one-half per cent. in ministers, and one-half per cent. in members, while in churches they have increased equally. Remember that the period included in this reckoning embraces the war, and hence that they put the Baptist Church at a disadvantage with us, especially as we have received two Synods within eight years past.

Let us now compare our work with that of the Protestant Episcopal Church. The Episcopal Church in 1868 had 2,662 ministers, 2,299 parishes, and (estimated) 200,000 members. In 1874, it had 3,086 ministers, 2,741 parishes, and (estimated) 289,359 members. This gives an aggregate increase, for six years included, of fifteen per cent. of ministers, nineteen per cent. of parishes, and forty-three per cent. of members; or an average increase per year of two and one-half per cent. of ministers, three per cent. of parishes, and 7 per cent. of members. From this it appears that the Presbyterian Church has outgrown the Episcopal per year by one-half per cent. of ministers, and two per cent. of churches; and that the Episcopal Church has outgrown the Presbyterian by three per cent. of members.

In comparing ourselves among ourselves, and measuring ourselves by ourselves, it is impossible to get an absolute unit of measurement; and if we could, it would have some of the imperfection of all human works. We must, therefore, look elsewhere for a uniform infallible standard.

What, then, is the true standard by which we must test our policy? We reply, that "the only rule given to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy God, is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments." The Book of Acts and the Epistles of the Apostles are the special rule to direct us how to administer the affairs and carry on the work of the Church. These teach us what we know of church order and church methods. They contain the history of the planting and training of the primitive Church. We profess and believe that the essential features of the Apostolic Church are incorporated in our Constitution. It is sometimes well, however, for churches, no less than individuals, to apply the unit of measure to their conduct, that they may see in what respect they fail to give measure for measure. Let us now do this in a general way.

It will scarcely be denied that, in order of time, the first work done by the apostles and evangelists was strictly evangelistic. They evangelised, then organised, then ordained pastors in every church. And as evangelistic work was first in order of time, so it is most prominent in the history of the primitive Church, as related in the sources above mentioned. We believe in the pastorate; it is a grand school from which blessed influences proceed to mould opinion and character for ages; it is an army of occupation, to defend future generations against the hosts of error, superstition, and sin. But the evangelist is the pedagogue to lead sinners into that school; he is the cavalry to lead advances, to clear the way for progress, to protect the flanks, and to make reprisals from the enemy for our Lord and King. It is important that this branch of the service shall bear a liberal proportion to the main body of the army. It should be our aim to ascertain as nearly as possible what proportion it bore to the pastoral host in the sacred word; and then make that proportion in the distribution of the King's forces now.

A question like this can not be settled with mathematical accuracy; but we may learn to approximate to the right proportion in the same way that we learn what proportion of our earthly goods are to be laid upon God's altar. We must study the word and seek the Spirit with reference to it, until the Lord

imbue us with the spirit of the apostles and evangelists. Now when we read the book of Acts we can scarcely fail to see that its most prominent feature is that which tells of the evangelistic work of the actors. The Epistles speak of Paul's leaving Timothy at Ephesus, and Titus in Crete, and throw out lights enough, as to the training of the church, to justify us in maintaining pastorates. A correct history of our Church would deal chiefly with the pastoral work. And if such a history were put beside the historical parts of the New Testament, we should see that the preponderance of the two narratives would rest upon different points. Without neglecting the conservative element for training the church, the apostles pushed on rapidly to new territory, organised new churches, and had the extension of the Church in mind in all their labors. They burned with the desire to raise up an ensign, around which the scattered might rally, and to testify for Christ to those who knew least and needed most of the blessings of the gospel. And as they went forth in the spirit of the "great commission," the Angel of God's presence went before them, removed obstacles, and blessed their labors with wonderful success in all its departments.

We should, in all fairness, set both our foreign and domestic missionary work in comparison with the evangelistic work of the apostles. They are, in fact and substance, one and the same work. But when we have taken them both into the comparison, the written history of our body is not up to the model on which we profess to be formed. But we deal now with evangelistic work proper. We conduct our work too much on the erroneous idea that we must make converts and educated Christians of each entire community before we take up new ground. This evidently is not the idea of our "great commission;" it is not the idea on which the apostles did their work. They were required to begin "at Jerusalem," but they were to preach repentance and remission of sins "unto all nations." "Ye shall be my witnesses both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth." And there is reason to believe they attempted, with success in their generation, to preach the gospel "for a witness" in all the known world, without waiting

to convert Jerusalem, etc. We take it that the apostles organised a model Church, and that the Spirit has transmitted to us a model history of that Church. What we want is to see our Church brought up to the model, so that a correct history of her work shall correspond closely with that given us in God's word.

Here we are met by several objections, such as the following: *First*: "The state of the Church has changed: the apostles were *planting*, we are *training* the Church." We reply that it is the quiet practical assumption of this very idea, that the time of planting is gone and the time of culture is fully come, that we are combating: "There remaineth yet very much land to be possessed;" and this will be true almost to the end of the Church's witness-bearing upon the earth. And for this reason evangelists were embraced in the permanent ascension gifts of Christ. *Secondly*: "The state of society has changed." We demur to this objection, and charge that it may be used as a cloak to cover prejudices, as a principle to license almost any prevalent errors, and as a vindication of almost any indolence. A few years ago it was a favorite argument against weekly Sabbath-day collections; now who urges it? If the evangelist is a permanent officer, as our standards hold that he is: and evangelistic work is an essential part of the Church's "great commission," then no changes that can occur in society can justify us in neglecting this work, which the Master has given us to do, and for which He has "given gifts unto men." *Thirdly*: "We can not adapt the machinery of our Church to the doing of so much evangelistic work." The reply is at hand: then change whatever there is in your machinery that keeps it from doing the work which the Master has assigned to us. The work is the Lord's; it must be done. He has set before us the model by which evangelists and apostles did substantially the same work; let us imitate that model more perfectly, if need be. The writer has great veneration for our standards, because he thinks they contain substantially the same principles of church work as are revealed to us in God's word. If then we have any accidents of our system which impede our progress, they are to be regarded as barnacles, and to be knocked off as soon as possible. And this

may be done without injury to our beloved system. Machinery is valued, not for the beauty and polish of its structure, but for the work which it does. We have no controversy with the Constitution; the point at which we raise issue is just where the discretion of the workmen is exercised.

Reflection upon facts and principles like the above has led us to conclude that our Church is not evangelistic enough for corresponding with the scriptural model, for doing all the Master's work, and for meeting the claims of the people, and winning their favor as we ought to do and as we might do.

II. The rest of our space shall be devoted to a discovery and statement of the principal *causes* of the failure alleged above. We do not ascribe the present state of our Church to any one cause; we think it is rather the joint product of a number of influences. We begin upon the surface.

1. The most obvious reason, and the one most commonly urged by our Presbyteries, is the *want of money*.

In an important sense the whole Church is the source from which each Presbytery may draw its supply of men for this work. But not so in regard to funds. Except in rare and extraordinary cases, each Presbytery must raise the funds needed in its bounds for evangelisation. Not unfrequently those which need most are able to raise least. In the days of prosperity our people were not generally trained to "honor the Lord with their substance and the firstfruits of all their increase." Many are now actually poor. All of them are relatively poorer than formerly. Corrupt rulers and bad government have mercilessly stripped, peeled, and impoverished us; but what is of more painful significance, they have studiously sought, and not without some success, to pour streams of corrupt influences throughout all our fair and once happy land. In deference to the cry of poverty, some Sessions have not given their people the opportunity of contributing to evangelistic work. Ministers too often fail to instruct their people on the subject of "laying by in store" for the Lord, and to present the evangelistic cause at all, or they do it so timidly and obscurely as to amount to a discouragement to the exercise of the people's liberality. The Treasurer's report

to the Assembly of 1875 shows that only 415 churches contributed to this particular cause within the year! The sum given by them in that time was \$3,838.73, which, divided among our 64 Presbyteries, is an average of \$103.80 to a Presbytery. It is obvious that we cannot press our work of evangelisation far with only 415 churches at work, and only \$104 to a Presbytery.

2. The next most obvious reason for our want of evangelistic work, is the *paucity of ministers*. We have said that in an important sense, the whole Church is the source of supply to each Presbytery. This proposition would soon find a practical limit if our Presbyteries would undertake to employ as many men as their fields need. As a whole, our supply is too small for all the work that we see to be done. It is known that we have many ministers unemployed in preaching for a part or the whole of their time. Having looked over the figures of some other Churches, the writer thinks that our loss of labor from this source is not so great as the average of other Churches. If it be possible for Presbyteries to gain anything from this source, by all means let it be done. But it is exceedingly doubtful if they can gain much. In the present state of things we suffer absolutely by not sending the gospel to destitute regions; and we suffer relatively from the fact that other, more aggressive and stronger Churches go ahead of us, circumvent us, and catch the ear of the people. Instances might be multiplied.

The standard of education required by us explains our scarcity of ministers. While we adhere to our standard, we must expect a very limited number of ministers. For thereby we limit the sources of supply to educated men, who are always a lean minority in our land. While we adhere to our present rule, and advocate an educated ministry, honesty compels us to count fairly the cost at which we are cherishing it. Possibly the action of the Assembly respecting lay exhorters, taken some years ago, but not much carried out by Presbyteries, might be made to furnish some supply of laborers. Possibly our people may so rally upon the Education fund as to enable it to take up young men at a much lower point in their education than it can

now do, and in this way enlarge the source of supply. At present neither of these results is in sight; and we must make up our minds to hear the familiar echo given from our courts, "The harvest truly is plenteous, but the laborers are few."

The problem, however, is, Are our present forces wisely distributed? We must work with what material we have. Our limited number prevents our extending our labors as widely as we could wish to do; but this fact need not prevent our being more evangelistic with our present force. We should still be evangelistic.

3. Another cause that hinders this work is the *want of a more general and thorough spirit of evangelistic work*. We note as one of the most hopeful signs for the future that the spirit of missions seems to be growing upon us.

The Presbyterian Church long since chose a conservative policy. Our practice has been too conservative. We have rested too much on our pastorates. We have allowed a generation to slip away from us to too large a degree, while we were planting and training a school for the education of some future generation. Accordingly, we have provided for recruits to our number, and conducted their education too largely with reference to pastoral qualifications, and proportionately too little with reference to present evangelistic work. Our young men are willing enough to practise self-denial where they see the value of it. But it would be strange if they failed to imbibe the prevalent sentiment that the evangelistic work is of inferior importance, or if they should be expected to assume the responsibility of a more aggressive policy than their fathers have chosen. Taught on all sides that the pastoral office is of so much greater importance than the evangelistic, and so much more in harmony with our established policy, they gladly avail themselves of opportunities for accepting the former, as offering "the larger sphere of usefulness," without the inconveniences and discomforts of the latter. To a ministry educated as ours is, the pastoral work is usually much more pleasant than the missionary work. Ministers are human, and not raised entirely above the influences of personal considerations. An educated minister finds pleasure in

the society of educated men, and the companionship of the illiterate and ignorant is a weariness and a burden if suffered without much intermission. A man of cultivated social tastes and refinement of feelings suffers excruciating pain in the continued society of the ignorant, rude, and coarse. Much better society prevails ordinarily in our pastorates than in destitute fields to which evangelists are sent. Under such circumstances, our average ministers feel that they would labor under many disadvantages in these fields; and, pressed by this thought, they decide in favor of the pastorate "as the larger field of usefulness." Older ministers, already settled down in pastorates themselves, find it hard to break the shell and thrust the young men out into fields which they have declined. So the disease is propagated. We see no remedy but for the Presbyteries and teachers to rise to a higher appreciation of the evangelistic work, and to invest the office of evangelist with more dignity.

4. The last cause we will mention is one of much practical power. It is the *mode of presenting the truth in our sermons*. For cultivated audiences we think that our ministry is unsurpassed. But we have long thought that we shoot above the heads of the common people. This thought has been impressed very deeply upon the writer's mind by hearing some of the most learned and gifted of the Methodist ministers, who, without any want of learning or chastity of style, or of intellectual pabulum, so presented the grand truths of the gospel as to reach the hearts of their uncultivated audiences. It does not follow that because an intellectual audience enjoys a particular mode, or a particular structure of a sermon, that common uneducated people will enjoy the same mode and structure. We must make allowance for education, both as to the mode and topics of discussion. True, we must reach the heart and stir the feelings through the head; but if ideas are too big to get into the head, they are effectually estopped from influencing the emotional nature. Hence, "milk for babes, strong meat for them that are of full age, and those who, by reason of use, have their senses exercised, etc." "I have fed you with milk and not with meat; for hitherto ye were not able to bear it, neither yet now are ye able." We have no

admiration for incoherent reasoning; we despise vulgarity and clap-trap; but we plead for simplicity that will bring our priceless truths into the hearts of the masses of our fellowmen, and for a tenderness that will win their hearts, and beget an attachment in their minds to both the gospel which we preach and the Church in which we delight to serve the Master. The habit of preaching to cultivated pastoral charges has a tendency to raise us to a plane above the less favored; and the writer feels no doubt that our mode and style of preaching thus fostered go a long way in explaining the painful fact that Presbyterianism has not taken hold of the masses of souls. We know that the agreement between Calvinism and the Scriptures brings them into a common antagonism to the natural heart. Men are born Pelagians. As they break away from Pelagianism, they find refuge in Arminianism. It requires special efforts to lead them into Calvinism; but it may be done to a much greater extent than it is if our ministers would begin at the beginning, and lead them on by plain paths and easy stages, as Paul did the Corinthians. We think that we may learn lessons of wisdom bearing on this point, from the popular favor with which Mr. Moody's talks are received in our great cities; but we do not mean hereby to signify our endorsement of all his methods. Our mode of preaching does much to keep us from getting a hold upon the common people; and then this failure deters us from further effort, and limits our operations too closely to appreciative audiences.

We have endeavored now candidly to look some of our difficulties in the face. There are other influences of greater or less force that meet us in the way of a more aggressive policy. Prominent among such is that of our Form of Government, which unquestionably contemplates chiefly the pastoral office, and leans hard upon the conservative protective arm of the Church. It allows, indeed, that the evangelistic office and work are "sometimes desirable and important;" but from its treatment of them it would seem to make them exceptional. The relative treatment of these two offices, has no doubt had the effect of putting a discount upon aggressive effort. And this must have been the

judgment of our late Revision Committee, as in their report they give the evangelist and his work a more definite and prominent place in our system. But we do not think that this defect in our Form of Government should exert a great influence; for the Book does distinctly recognise the office, and make provision for the officer's ordination. We note the defect, however, as one argument for revision; but we need not pause until it is remedied—we have the necessary authority.

Another influence, bearing upon this work, is the too great prevalence of a social and religious jealousy which makes so many of our people indifferent to the souls of their less favored fellows. Many of our congregations dislike for their ministers to go out upon missionary work, yet they take no steps to bring the wretched masses into their church so that the minister may reach them from his own pulpit. But this would soon be corrected, if our ministers and officers were thoroughly imbued with a missionary spirit. These and other obstacles would gradually melt away before the fervor of a ministry whose hearts were all burning with a missionary zeal.

ARTICLE V.

RECENTLY DISCOVERED MEMORANDA OF THE
WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY.

Minutes of the Sessions of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, while engaged in preparing their Directory for Church Government, Confession of Faith, and Catechisms (November, 1644, to March, 1649). From Transcripts of the Originals, procured by a Committee of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. Edited for the Committee by the Rev. ALEX. F. MITCHELL, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History of the University of St. Andrews, and the Rev. JOHN STRUTHERS, LL.D., Minister of Prestonpans. William Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh and London, 1874. Pp. 556, 8vo.

The Dr. Williams Library, Grafton Street, London, seems to be a rich mine of Presbyterian antiquities. From it were obtained the "Knox Papers," which have proved so valuable in the illustration of Knox's career as an English Reformer. And in it also have recently been found these "Minutes of the Westminster Assembly of Divines," contained in three volumes of manuscript foolscap, inscribed with this title, though in a more modern hand than the manuscripts themselves. In the judgment of those competent to decide such a question, there can be no doubt that the "Minutes" are in the handwriting of Adoniram Byfield himself, one of the Clerks of the Westminster Assembly, whose name is written several times on the records in the same handwriting as the Minutes. The whole record extends from August 4, 1643, to April 24, 1652. The present published volume, however, embraces only that portion of the records extending from November, 1644, to March, 1649. No one seems to know how this remarkable manuscript came into the Williams Library. In the catalogue of manuscripts, it is merely said: "It does not appear when these volumes were deposited in this Library. They came, most probably, with Morrice's Manuscripts."

This record, imperfect as it is, will be deemed by Presbyterians of greater importance, because, as will be remembered, no formal record of the minutes of the Westminster Assembly is now known

to be extant. The record is supposed to have been destroyed in the great fire in London.

It will be found, however, that these are not, in any strict and formal sense, "Minutes" of the Westminster Assembly, but merely such memoranda as a clerk of one of our Presbyteries is accustomed to make while business is going on, with a view to aid his memory in making up the records more fully and accurately at his leisure, only that, in this case, the clerk seems to have aimed to discharge the functions of a reporter as well as clerk. The resolutions passed in the Assembly are not entered, but merely referred to, as is the custom with our clerks. Occasionally the memoranda of speeches made are sufficiently full to enable us to get the drift of the argument and sentiments of the speakers; but more commonly the record is only of broken sentences and catch-words, from which no one but the writer, by the aid of his memory, could gather the full sense.

From this general description of the manuscripts should properly be excepted one portion of them, which seems to have been written out more fully and accurately from his memoranda by the scribe. This portion embraces what more properly may be called the "Minutes" of the Assembly from March 9, 1645 to August, 1647. It is to this portion that the editor of the volume has given special attention, and by most painstaking search of the contemporary records of Parliament, has been able to supply important documents which are referred to in these Minutes, but not recorded in them.

On the discovery of these papers, the General Assembly of the Established Kirk of Scotland took immediate measures to secure the publication of them. A Committee was appointed to procure a transcript, which, when obtained, was put into the hands of Prof. Mitchell and Dr. Struthers, to be carefully edited and published. The present volume, embracing an important part of the records, is the result of this arrangement.

Probably to no other man in Scotland could such a trust have been more appropriately confided than to the amiable and accomplished Professor of Church History in Saint Andrews. His position, his tastes, and his high accomplishments, all combined

to secure for him the confidence of the Presbyterian public, and fit him for the peculiar work to be done. The result of his labors justifies fully the wisdom of the Assembly's selection. His very able introduction, his well considered notes explanatory of his text—or of the omissions of the text—and his singular and successful diligence in searching the contemporary Journals of the Houses of Parliament for Acts and Resolutions concerning the Westminster Assembly and its labors, with which to illustrate and interpret these imperfect memoranda, all evince the signal qualifications of Dr. Mitchell for the task undertaken, and entitle him to the grateful acknowledgments of Presbyterians of all names and countries.

Though the discussions on Church Government and Discipline form a small part of the record now published, Dr. Mitchell announces his purpose in the introduction to deal almost exclusively with the proceedings of the Assembly connected with the framing of its doctrinal standards; leaving the question of Church Government, we suppose, to be discussed in connexion with the "Minutes" of sessions from July, 1643, to November, 1644, which relate more especially to the questions of Church polity and worship of the Church. He supposes that the account of the doctrinal discussions connected with the framing of the Articles of Religion will be of more general interest, seeing that here Presbyterians, Episcopalians, and Independents were more generally agreed. And his judgment is that the history of these Articles of Religion will "tend to remove misunderstandings which have long alienated those who were then so closely associated, and lead them again to think and speak more kindly of the Westminster divines and the work they sought to forward, of uniting all these Protestants in defence of the principles of the Reformation."

It is well also for another reason, that—if obliged to publish at present only a part of these records—Drs. Mitchell and Struthers should have selected the "Minutes," beginning with November, 1644, for this first volume. From "Lightfoot's Journal of the Assembly of Divines," extending from the opening of the Assembly, July 3d, 1643, to December 31st, 1644, and from

George Gillespie's "Notes of Proceeding of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster," extending from February 2 to May 3, from September to December 31, 1644, we are enabled to form a much clearer conception of the course of discussion in the Assembly, than could possibly be done from the imperfect memoranda of these Minutes. This will be very apparent on a comparison of the jottings of these Minutes with the Notes of Lightfoot and Gillespie, covering, with several omissions, the brief period from November to December 31, 1644. The three records of December 9th, 1644, are as follows:

1. Lightfoot's account is:

"We speedily fell upon the business about burial as soon as we were set; and the matter was, whether to have anything spoken at the burial of the dead.

"Dr. Temple moved that something might be said at the very interment of the body; but this was thought not fit to be given any rule for, but rather to pass it over in silence; and so the minister left something to his liberty. Dr. Temple moved again, whether a minister, at putting a body into the ground, may not say, 'We commit this body to the ground,' etc. And it was conceived of the Assembly that he might; and the words '*without any ceremony more,*' do not tie him up from this.

"Then fell our great controversy about funeral sermons; and here was our difficulty—how to keep funeral sermons in England for fear of danger by alteration, and yet to give content to Scotland that are averse from them. It was the sense of the Assembly in general, that funeral sermons may be made, if a minister be called on for it; and the debate was now to find terms to fit and suit with both parties. At last we fixed on this: 'That the people should take up thoughts and conferences concerning death, mortality, etc.; and the minister, if he be present, shall put them in mind of that duty.' Here I excepted at the last word, 'duty,' for that a little speech would put them in mind of meditating and conferring spiritually; therefore I moved an alteration, which was much backed by divers, and it was changed, '*of their duty.*' The mind of the Assembly was that these words give liberty for funeral sermons. And thus we had done the directory for burial.

"Then fell we upon the report of our votes concerning Church Government, where we had left off the last day; and when we had done them, Mr. Burroughs entered his dissent against two or three propositions, viz.: against the subordination of Assemblies one to another, and against the instance of the Church of Ephesus for a Presbytery; and so did Mr. Nye, Mr. Carter, Mr. Sympson, and Mr. Bridges; and Mr. Sympson offered from Mr. Goodwin to enter his dissent; but we would not admit of any proxies."

2. Gillespie's account of the same debate, under date December 9, 1644, is :

"The votes of Government were read and ordered to be transcribed, that they may be sent to the Parliament.

"Messrs. *Burroughs*, *Nye*, *Bridges*, *Sympson*, and *Carter* entered their dissent from three of the propositions : 1. That there is a subordination of congregational, classical, provincial, and national Assemblies for the government of the Church. 2. That the example of the Church of Ephesus proves the propositions concerning Presbyterian government. 3. That no congregation which may associate ought to assume all and sole power of ordination. Mr. *Goodwin* and Mr. *Greenhill* were not present."

It will be seen that he omits the debate on funerals altogether.

3. Now, under the same date of December 9, 1644, the Minutes before us make the following record :

"*Sess.* 337, *Dec.* 9, 1644, *Monday Morning.*

"Protestation read. Debate of the Directory for Burial. . . . Nevertheless this doth not inhibit any minister at that time being present to give some seasonable word of exhortation.

"*Mr. Marshall* offered a paper to express the affirmative part.

"Debate about something to be added to the negative.

"*Dr. Temple* made report of the alterations in the frame* of government.

"Ordered, this draught of Government be transcribed, to be sent to both Houses of Parliament.

Mr. Burroughs enters his dissent from the subordination of Assemblies in that proposition, 'it is lawful and agreeable;' and that 'of particular congregations assuming the power of ordination;' and that 'of the Church of Ephesus,' if you mean [that they were congregations, fixed†.]

"*Mr. Nye* enters his dissent to the same propositions.

"*Mr. Carter* desires the same. *Mr. Sympson* desires the same. He also desired that *Mr. Goodwyn's* dissent may be entered, he being not well.

"*Ordered*, That he have leave against to-morrow.

"*Mr. Bridges* desired the same."

This comparative exhibition of what is said in the "Journal" of *Lightfoot*, and the "Notes" of *Gillespie*, and in these "Minutes," touching the debate of December 9, selected by us at

* "Draught" is written above "frame" in the manuscript, which, as will be seen from *Lightfoot*, quoted already, is more proper.

† The words in these brackets are crossed over with a black line.

random, will enable the reader to form some conception of the general nature and style of these recently discovered records.

Within the limits of a single article it would be folly to attempt to sum up the history and estimate the character of the Westminster Assembly. Hetherington, in his *History of the Westminster Assembly*, McCrie, in his *Annals of English Presbytery*, and Stoughton, in his *Church of the Civil Wars*, have, with less restricted limits, very fully and ably handled the subject. But the perusal of these Minutes suggests several new and striking views of certain points in the history and acts of this remarkable body, which are well worthy the consideration of those who would fully understand the spirit of our standards. Premising that the calling and the deliverances of this body are not to be estimated from our American point of view in the nineteenth century, but from the European point of view in the seventeenth, it is proposed here to call attention to certain facts in the history of the Westminster Assembly and certain phases of its action brought out in the volume before us somewhat more fully and distinctly than in previous writers on the subject.

1. It is important to bear in mind that the Westminster Assembly was the creature of a civil revolution, and lived, through the whole period of its existence, in the midst of tumult and excitement. The Ordinance of Parliament of the 12th June, 1643, declared that, as the present Church government by archbishops, bishops, convocations, and chapters, is offensive, it is resolved to remove it for one more agreeable to God's holy word, to the Church of Scotland, and to the other Reformed Churches abroad. That an Assembly should be called, consisting of learned and godly men—thirty lay assessors, ten of whom should be peers, and one hundred and twenty divines, all to be chosen by Parliament. This Assembly was prohibited from assuming any other ecclesiastical powers than those delegated to it by Parliament. In case of any differences of opinion, their proceedings should be directed by Parliament. The delegates selected were chosen largely from the Episcopal dignitaries and learned men of England as well as from among those whose predilections were for Presbytery and Independency. But King Charles, though in

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May he had expressed his consent to such a council, yet by public proclamation of the 22d June, 1643, prohibited the Assembly as illegal, and forbade those named in the Ordinance of Parliament to meet. In consequence of which prohibition, the great part of the Episcopal dignitaries and learned men declined to attend the Assembly. So that, at the opening of the sessions, July 6, 1644, there were but sixty-nine of the one hundred and twenty delegates chosen in attendance.

The personal advantage of service in the Assembly was certainly no temptation; for the provision for its members was four shillings per day for every day's actual attendance, and for the ten days previous to taking a seat, and ten days after leaving it. And even this small sum was so poorly paid, that many of the ministers were forced to go home from inability to pay their boarding. These Minutes show that the pay of the members was sent to the Assembly usually in driblets of 100, and 200, sometimes 1,000 pounds, at long intervals. And the great Moderator, Dr. Twisse, died while in attendance at his Assembly, in the greatest pecuniary straits—so much so, that during his last sickness his extreme poverty was brought to the notice of the Assembly.

The contemporary newspaper notices of the meeting of the Assembly reflect the public sentiment of the two opposing parties touching this remarkable Council. Says a bulletin of the Parliamentary newspaper, entitled "*Certain Information from Various Parts of the Kingdom*," under date of 3d-10th of July, 1643: "On Saturday last the Assembly of Divines began at Westminster according to the Ordinance of both Houses of Parliament, when Dr. Twist of Newbury, in the County of Berks, preached on John xiv. 18: 'I will not leave you comfortless; I will come unto you'—a text pertinent to these times of sorrow, anguish, and misery, to raise up the drooping spirits of the people of God who lie under the pressure of Popish wars and combustions. But we shall forbear to relate any of the points thereof, because we suppose his said sermon will be published in print for the satisfaction and comfort of all who desire to read it. The number that met this day were three score and nine," etc.

On the other hand, the Royalist journal—the *Mercurius Anglicus*—of Friday, July 7, 1644, presents its readers with this account of the opening of the Assembly (which adjourned from the 3d to the 7th July): “It was advertised this day that the Synod which, by the pretended ordinance of the two Houses, was to begin on the 1st July, was put off till the Thursday following, being the sixth of the present month, that matters might be prepared for them, whereupon to treat, it being not yet revealed to my Lord Say, Master Pym, and others, what gospel ’tis that must be preached and settled by these new Evangelists. Only it is reported that certain of the godly ministers did meet that day in the Abbey church to a sermon and had some doctrines and uses; but what else done, and to what purpose that was done, we may hear hereafter.”

In evidence of the extreme ecclesiastical party spirit of the times, may be cited the fact that during the period of the civil conflict in England, no less than thirty thousand pamphlets were issued from the British press, mostly on the Church controversy. Many of these were indeed grave and masterly discussions of the great issues of the struggle for civil and religious liberty, but the large majority of them the fiercest and most violent of philippics of partisan against partisan. Indeed, no more striking illustration of the fierce blindness of the partisans on one side, is needed than the fact that not only Clarendon, a contemporary historian, with all his assumption of philosophic elevation and his native courtly elegance of style, should malign the great men of the Westminster Assembly,* but that the philosophic Hume, a century later, should have so imbibed the malignant partisan spirit of the preceding age as to speak of the “barbarism and ignorance” of the Scottish commissioners, Henderson, Baillie, and Gillespie, and describe their sermons as “holy rhetoric delivered with ridiculous cant and provincial accent.”† It seems never to have occurred to these accomplished historians that in the judgment of thoughtful and candid men, such statements are far more discreditable to their own repute than to the men whom

* History of Rebellion, Vol. I., p. 258.

† History of England, Vol. III., p. 311.

they thus malign. For what can be more absurd than to speak of the ridiculous cant, the barbarism and ignorance, of Alexander Henderson, the man whose counsel King Charles valued above all others, and who was thrice invited to the most important professorships in the great Universities of the Continent? Or to speak of the barbarism and ignorance of the accomplished Baillie, who wrote Latin in almost the purity of the Augustan age, and was master of some thirteen different languages? Or to speak of either the cant or ignorance or barbarism of the youthful George Gillespie—that prodigy of learning—who proved more than a match in debate for the “learned Selden,” the astute jurist and encyclopædic scholar? And yet these absurdities—as if the partisanship of the English Revolution were transmitted by a sort of “apostolic succession”—are repeated by scores of historians and critics down to this day!

It was the misfortune, as men would say, of the Westminster Assembly and its work, to be allied politically with a “lost cause”—though that cause was the cause of liberty and righteousness, which, in the mysterious providence of God, is often allowed to be a failure in a human point of view. And what renders the matter worse is, that the great ideas represented in it being first crushed out by the strategy of Oliver Cromwell, its treacherous ally in the cause of liberty, it has nevertheless been held responsible for the deeds of Cromwell, its ally, when the treacherous Charles, by whom its adherents were again betrayed, re-established religious despotism. Hence this great Christian Council has been assailed and maligned for more than two hundred years by the partisans of the two extremes of thought, to which the men of the Westminster Assembly stood equally in antagonism—the advocates of *individualism* and no-churchism, which renders a free Christian Commonwealth impossible on the one hand, and the advocates of a hierarchical despotism on the other.

It has been a very common mistake with writers on the era of the Westminster Assembly to classify all who opposed the usurpations of Charles I. as *Puritans*, and thus to hold Presbyterianism responsible for the theories and measures of the English Pu-

ritans, to whom, in all except the matter of theological creed, the Presbyterian was as thoroughly in antagonism as to Prelacy itself. True, the Presbyterian and the Puritan were allied as one body in warring against the despotic claims of the Tudors and the Stuarts for royal prerogative. But the grounds upon which they fought the Tudors and the Stuarts were widely different. The Puritan resisted the Stuart because he trod ruthlessly upon his own individual rights as a man. The Presbyterian resisted the Stuart because he sacrilegiously invaded the kingly prerogatives of Jesus Christ in his Church. The Puritan, with all his zeal for religion, cared nothing for a visible Church, united as one body, in which Christ rules. The Presbyterian was just as *churchly* in his conceptions as the most earnest champion of Prelacy, though differing from him *in toto* as to the mode by which the unity of the Church is secured, and the authority by which the Church shall be governed. And in this conflict between the great churchly ideas that prevailed in the Westminster Assembly, with extremes on either hand, is doubtless to be found the solution of the singular fact that for two hundred years past, Pilate and Herod—Rationalism and Ritualism—have been friends together as against the Westminster Assembly and its work, and have united in misrepresenting and maligning it.

Yet, so far as pertained to the main purpose of this Council—the framing of Articles of Religion which should give expression to the great gospel doctrine of the Reformation in a form which might secure universal agreement among Protestants—it may well be doubted whether, with all the difficulties in its way, any other Christian Council, since the Nicæan, was ever so successful. For, however much it may be the fashion in this day to rail at the Westminster Confession and Catechisms as presenting a narrow, harsh, gloomy theology, it is beyond all question that these standards expressed the views of almost the entire Protestantism, of whatever name, both in Great Britain and on the Continent, at that era. That it expressed the views of the true Protestantism of the Church of England, will be made abundantly manifest a little farther on. That it expressed the theological views of the Independents, is shown by the fact that in the “Declaration

of the Faith and Order owned and practised in the Congregational churches in England," agreed on at the Savoy in 1658, it is affirmed that they and their brethren in New England fully assent to the substance of the Westminster standards. That it expressed the theological views of the Baptists of Britain is shown by the "Confession of Faith put forth by the elders and brethren of many congregations of Christians," agreed on at London in 1688—in which Confession they desire "more abundantly to manifest their consent to the Westminster standards in all the fundamental articles of the Christian religion." The criticism so generally current which pronounces the theology of the Westminster standards narrow and harsh, must be founded upon partisan narrowness and ignorance of the history of Christian doctrine in the seventeenth century. A theology which met the assent alike of Usher, Calamy, Baxter, Davenport, Bishop Hall, John Bunyan, Howe, and John Owen, could hardly be obnoxious to criticism as narrow and rigid.

It is well known that the first labors of the Assembly were directed, not to the framing of an independent Confession, but to revising the Articles of the Church of England; that after revising the first fifteen Articles, this business was thrown aside and the work of framing a new Confession taken up. Yet after three years, the matter of revising the Articles was again taken up, and these revised Articles are found figuring in negotiations with King Charles in the Isle of Wight. This whole matter is so fully explained in the Assembly's Memorial to the Parliament, enclosing the fifteen revised Articles, and the paper so well illustrates the relation of the Assembly to the Parliament in framing Articles of Religion, that we recite here the Assembly's official paper :

"To the Honorable House of Commons assembled in Parliament :

"The Assembly, at their first sitting, received an order from both the Honorable Houses of Parliament, bearing date July 5, 1643, requiring them to take into their consideration the ten first Articles of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England, to free and vindicate the doctrine of them from all aspersions and false interpretations. In obedience whereunto they forthwith took the said first ten Articles into consideration. Afterwards they received another order for the nine next follow-

ing; and accordingly took the same into consideration. But being limited by the same orders only to the clearing and vindicating of them, though we found ourselves necessitated for this end to make some, yet we made fewer alterations in them and additions to them than otherwise we should have thought fit to have done, if the whole matter had been left to us without such limitation; conceiving many things yet remaining to be defective, and other expressions also fit to be changed. And herein we proceeded only to the finishing of fifteen Articles, because it pleased both Houses, by an order bearing date October 12, 1643, to require us to lay aside the remainder and enter upon the work of Church Government. And afterwards, by another order, to employ us in framing a Confession of Faith for the three Kingdoms, according to our Solemn League and Covenant; in the which Confession we have not left out anything that was in the former Articles, material or necessary to be retained. Which having finished and presented to both Houses, we would have forborne the tendering of these fifteen Articles, (both as a piece several ways imperfect, and the whole as relating only to the Church of England,) but that we were commanded otherwise by an order of the Honorable House of Commons, bearing date December 7, 1646. According whereunto we present them as followeth."

It will be perceived, therefore, that the change of plan from the revision of the Thirty-Nine Articles to the framing of an independent Confession of Faith, was from no fickleness of purpose on the part of the Assembly, nor any unwillingness on their part to accept the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England as the basis of the Confession to be framed by them. This fact of itself makes it manifest that these men were no narrow, bigoted theologians, bent upon radical changes and a revolutionising of the current religious belief of the nation, after the fashion of the "Thorough" school.

2. Dr. Mitchell, in his introduction, brings out very prominently a fact which hitherto has been little noticed, namely, that there is not merely a similarity, but frequently an absolute identity between a large number of the Articles of the Westminster Confession and the Articles of Religion of the Irish Church prepared by Archbishop Usher and others, agreed to by the Archbishop, Bishops, and Convocation of the Irish Church, and approved of by the Viceroy in 1615. Nothing is more evident than that these Irish Articles, and not any foreign Confessions—Dutch or Genevan—formed the basis of the Westminster Con-

fession. This Dr. Mitchell demonstrates by setting over against each other, in parallel columns, first, the headings of the Articles of the two, respectively; and secondly, the language of the Articles, particularly the Article of God's Decree—thus:

IRISH ARTICLES.

I. Of the Holy Scriptures and the Three Creeds.

II. Of Faith in the Holy Trinity.

III. Of God's Eternal Decree and Predestination.

IV. Of the Creation and Government of all things.

V. Of the Fall of Man, Original Sin, and the State of Man before Justification (including the English Article of Free Will).

VI. Of Christ, the Mediator of the Second Covenant.

WESTMINSTER CONFESSION.

I. Of the Holy Scripture.

II. Of God and of the Holy Trinity.

III. Of God's Eternal Decree.

IV. Of Creation. V. Of Providence.

VI. Of the Fall of Man, of Sin, and of the Punishment thereof. IX. Of Free Will.

VII. Of God's Covenant with Man.

VIII. Of Christ the Mediator.

This remarkable parallelism of titles is extended to every Article of the Confession of Faith, except six—the 12th, 15th, 17th, 18th, 20th, and 24th. But not less remarkable is the identity of the language of the Articles—particularly in the Article of "God's Eternal Decree," which it is the fashion of Episcopalians now-a-days to hold up as the special bugbear in our Confession—thus:

IRISH ARTICLES.

Art. III. Of God's Eternal Decree and Predestination.

God, from all eternity did, by his unchangeable counsel, ordain whatsoever in time should come to pass; yet so as thereby no violence is offered to the wills of the reasonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of the second causes taken away, but established rather.

By the same eternal counsel, God hath predestinated some unto life, and reprobated some unto

WESTMINSTER CONFESSION.

Chap. III. Of God's Eternal Decree.

God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated

death; of both of which there is a certain number known only to God, which can neither be increased nor diminished.

Predestination to life is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby, before the foundations of the world were laid, he hath constantly decreed in his secret counsel to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ unto everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honor. The cause moving God to predestinate to life, is not the foreseeing of faith, etc.

We have here cited only a part of each of the two Articles "of God's Eternal Decree," by way of illustration. The remaining portions of the two Articles are as nearly identical throughout as the portions here cited.

3. It is very evident that in framing the Westminster Articles, there was not, as some have intimated, an attempt to determine certain points of doctrine more rigidly even than the Synod of Dort had done. Instead of falling back, as they might have done, upon the decrees of the Synod of Dort, they fell back upon the Articles of the Irish Church, which were drawn up before the Synod of Dort had framed its decisions; and which, before the time of Laud, expressed the commonly received faith of the Church of England. Having been called together for the special purpose of vindicating the doctrine of the Church of England and showing that it was in harmony with that of the other Reformed Churches, and to devise such changes of polity and worship as would bring her into closer union with the Church of Scotland and the Churches of the Continent, the men of the Westminster Assembly aimed throughout, in the most catholic and

unto everlasting life, and others are foreordained to everlasting death. These angels and men thus predestinated and foreordained are particularly and unchangeably designed, and their number is so certain and definite, that it cannot be increased or diminished.

Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works, or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions moving him, etc.

compromising spirit, to set forth in very cautious and moderate terms a creed that could be accepted by all parties. And no doubt it was with that design that they selected Archbishop Usher's Articles as the basis of a new formula, when, by order of Parliament, they laid aside the revision of the Thirty-Nine Articles of the Church of England. If Archbishop Usher, the author of the Irish Articles, is justly eulogised by all parties as a divine of the most enlarged views and catholic spirit, why are the men of the Westminster Assembly denounced as narrow-minded and rigid bigots, who accepted Usher's Articles, and endeavored to make them, substantially, the creed of all Britain?

That the Assembly was ruled by this moderate and cautious spirit—even though its Moderator, Dr. Twisse, and others of its leading members, were not behind the Synod of Dort and Gomarus himself in the rigidity of their Calvinism—appears from many memoranda of debates in these "Minutes," which show at the same time, that, while adopting the Irish Articles as the basis of discussion, the Assembly scanned closely every word of their utterances. Thus, under date of August 29, 1645, Friday morning, we find these entries :

"Debate on the report of the first Committee of God's Decree."

"Debate upon the title.

"Debate about the word 'counsel;' about those words, 'most holy, wise;' and about those words 'his own.'

"Debate about the word 'time,' about the word 'should.'

"Debate about the transposing."

So, again, in the continuation of the same general subject, under date of October 20, 1645 :

"Proceed in the debate about permission of man's fall, about 'the same decree.'

"*Mr. Seaman.* If those words, 'in the same decree,' be left out, it will involve us in great debate.

"*Mr. Rutherford.* All agree in this, that God decrees the end and means; but whether in one or more decrees, is not . . . say 'God also hath decreed.' . . . It is very probable but one decree: but whether fit to express it in a Confession of Faith . . .

"*Mr. Seaman.* . . .

"*Mr. Rutherford.* If there can be any argument to prove a necessity of one and the same decree, we would be glad to hear it.

"*Mr. Whitakers.* If you take the same decree in reference to time, they are all *simul* and *semel*; in *eterno* there is not *prius* and *posterius*.

"*Dr. Gouge.* I do not see how the leaving out of those words will cross what we aim at. I think it will go on roundly without it.

"*Mr. Whitakers.* Our conceptions are very various about the decrees; but I know not why we should not say it.

"*Mr. Seaman.* All the odious doctrine of Arminians is from their distinguishing of the decrees; but our divines say they are one and the same decree.

"*Mr. Gillespie.* When that word is left out, is it not a truth? and so every one may enjoy his own sense.

"*Mr. Reynolds.* Let us not put in disputes and scholastic things into a Confession of Faith; I think they are different decrees in our manner of conception.

"*Mr. Seaman.* You know how great a censure the Remonstrants lie under for making two decrees concerning election; and will it not be more concerning the end and the means?

"*Mr. Calamy.* That it may be a truth, I think in our Prolocutor's book he gives a great deal of reason for it; but why should we put it in a Confession of Faith?

"*Mr. Calamy.* I question that 'to bring this to pass:' we assert *massa pura* in this . . . I desire that nothing may be put in one way or other; it makes the fall of man to be *medium executionis decreti*.

"*Mr. Palmer.* You will be in a worse snare in leaving it out.

"*Mr. Woodcocke.* I desire to know whether this be meant of the decree or the execution of it.

"*Mr. Gillespie.* Say 'for the same end God hath ordained to permit man to fall.' . . . This shows that *in ordine naturae* God ordaining man to glory goes before his ordaining to permit man to fall."

So, again, under Sess. 521, Oct. 21, 1645, Tuesday morning:

"Report made from the first Committee, sitting before the Assembly:

"*Resolved* by them, that mention be made of man's fall.

"*Resolved* by them, that those words, 'to bring this to pass,' shall not stand.

"*Dr. Wincop* to pray with the House of Lords next week.

"Debate about those words, 'to bring this to pass.'

"*Mr. Reynolds* offered something: 'As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the same eternal and most free purpose of his will, foreordained all the means thereunto, which he, in his counsel, is pleased to appoint for the executing of that decree; wherefore, they who are endowed with so excellent a benefit, being fallen in Adam, are called in according to God's purpose.'

"*Mr. Chambers* offered something.

"*Ordered*, To debate the business about Redemption of the elect only by Christ to-morrow morning."

This long extract, which presents a very fair specimen of this whole volume, shows how carefully and with what moderation of spirit the Assembly engaged in framing the standards of faith. Though, as has been shown, they had the discussions and decrees of the Synod of Dort before their minds, and though they even made the Irish Articles, prepared by Archbishop Usher, the basis of discussion for their own Confession, yet they did none the less carefully canvass every expression and clause of their own doctrinal statement, as if no other standards of faith had ever before been set forth.

The Catechisms, Larger and Shorter, were discussed with equal care before the whole Assembly, as reported from their Committees, question by question. Under date of January 14, 1646, the record is :

“Upon motion made by *Mr. Vines*, it was *Ordered* :

“That the Committee for the Catechism do prepare a draught of two Catechisms, one more large and another more brief, in which they are to have an eye to the Confession of Faith, and to the matter of the Catechism already begun.”

To Dr. Tuckney was assigned the Shorter Catechism.

It is not until April 12, 1648, that we find the Minute of their completion, as follows :

“The proofs for both Catechisms shall be transcribed and sent up to both Honorable Houses of Parliament. *Ordered* to be carried up on Friday morning by the Prolocutor with the Assembly.”

“APRIL 14, 1646, Friday Morning.

“Prolocutor informed the Assembly that he had delivered the Catechisms, and was called in and told that they had ordered six hundred copies with those proofs to be printed for the use of the Assembly and two Houses ; and give thanks to the Assembly for the same.”

4. The Confession of Faith proposed by the Westminster Assembly seems to have been accepted by the House of Lords without so much discussion and hesitancy as in the House of Commons. Dr. Mitchell, in a very interesting and important note, (p. 412.) presents a compend of the proceedings of the two Houses of the English Parliament and those of the Scottish General Assembly and Parliament in regard to the Confession of Faith, as he has laboriously gathered them from the Journals of the Parliaments and the Minutes of the Scottish General Assembly. It appears that the first nineteen chapters of the Confession were passed by

the House of Lords on the 6th of November, 1646, in the exact form in which that first instalment had been sent up from the Assembly of Divines. And on the 16th February, 1646-7 the Lords took up the remainder of the Confession (Chap. 20-33) and read and passed upon them chapter by chapter, and then the Confession as a whole was adopted and sent down to the House of Commons with a request for the speedy concurrence of that House. But though the Lords, representing Episcopacy, accepted, the Commons seem to have been disposed to examine very critically. The subject was not taken up till the 19th May; and then after discussing it paragraph by paragraph, the first chapter, "Of the Holy Scriptures," was adopted with the exception of the 8th section, which was postponed till the next sitting. This was on the 28th of May, when that paragraph was referred to members of the Assembly who were also members of Parliament, to confer with the Assembly and report on Wednesday next; and chapters 2d, "Of God and the Holy Trinity," and 3d, "Of God's Eternal Decrees," were taken up and adopted without division. This shows that at that time in Britain all parties were agreed as to these two great doctrines of the Trinity and of God's eternal decrees. It was not till near a year after, February 4th, 1647-8, that the House of Commons resumed the subject, adopting that day chapters 21 and 22, and the first three sections of chapter 23, paragraph by paragraph; also the first two sections of chapter 24, "Of Marriage and Divorce." Milton's crotchets about divorce had gained adherents. A debate arose on the clause, "a man may not marry any of his wife's kindred nearer in blood than he may of his own," which on the 18th February was voted out of the Confession, 71 to 40. Sections 5th and 6th were also negatived at that time. On 13th March the House adopted chapters 25, 26, 27, 29, 32, and 33. At that time also the title "Confession of Faith" was voted down, and the title, "Articles of Christian Religion approved and passed," was substituted. This led to one or more conferences with the House of Lords, which had passed the whole Confession in its original form. At a conference held 22d March, 1647-8, the Commons presented the Lords with "the Confession of Faith passed by them, with

some alterations, viz., That they do *now* agree with their Lordships and so with the Assembly in the doctrinal part, and desire the same may be made public: *that this kingdom and all the Reformed Churches in Christendom may see the Parliament of England differ not in doctrine.*" But this did not embrace chapters 30 and 31 of the Confession.

It was not until the 3d June, 1648, that the Lords sent a message to the Commons announcing their concurrence in the Book as amended; and on the 20th June the House ordered the publication of the Confession with the proof texts.

It should be understood that the Confession as thus at first issued by authority of Parliament omitted the chapters 30th, "*Of Church Censures,*" and chapter 31st, "*Of Synods and Councils;*" also the 4th section of chapter 24th, "*Of Liberty of Conscience;*" and the 5th and sixth sections of chapter 24, "*Of Marriage and Divorce.*" These omissions are all significant as presenting the issues on which the conflict ensued between the Presbyterianism of the Assembly and the Erastianism of the Parliament. It was not until March, 1659, when the Long Parliament was restored, that the Confession, with all the chapters except the 30th and 31st, was agreed to by the house, and these chapters referred back to the committee that reported the Confession. On the 14th March a bill was passed for the Presbyterian government of the Church according to the ordinance of Parliament in 1648, entitled "The Form of Church Government to be used in England and Ireland." The Scottish General Assembly in 1648 had adopted the Confession of Faith and Catechisms of the Westminster Assembly, and their act was ratified by the Scottish Parliament on the 7th February, 1649. Thus Presbyterianism, with the Westminster Standards, became for a time the established religion of all Britain. And though this ordinance was rescinded by the general Act of 1661, yet these standards were reënacted by the Scottish Parliament after the revolution in 1690, and thus have continued to be the established creed and Church order in Scotland to the present time.

5. We have a purpose in view beyond the mere statement of historical facts in this recital in detail of the enactments of the

secular government, whereby the theology of the Westminster Confession of Faith was ordained by law to be the religion of the British nation. That purpose is to suggest the inquiry on what ground American Presbyterians receive with so much reverence the doctrinal standards of the Westminster Assembly? It is very apparent that this was no free council of the Church, called by the Church itself under the authority given by her Head to the Church to assemble in council, with the promise of Christ's presence and the guidance of the Holy Ghost in the interpretation of the Word. It was called and controlled by the secular authority of England to which Christ has given no promise of the Spirit to guide it in a spiritual matter of such immense importance as the holding of a Christian council to determine the fundamental question of what shall be held and taught concerning the doctrine and order of Christ's kingdom. What makes it worse is that the convocation of such a council was the movement of a political party for the promotion of its own ends in a violent political convulsion. And worse still, the Christian council was not left free to pronounce authoritatively its clear convictions as to doctrine to be accepted by the people, but its decisions must be reviewed, amended, rescinded, or accepted by a secular legislature, a majority of whose members, perhaps—certainly a large number of whom—gave little evidence of personal guidance by the Spirit of God. How could the decrees thus framed go forth with that solemn and sublime preface, that ought to introduce all decrees of the true Council of the Church, "*It seemeth good to us and to the Holy Ghost*" that such and such things should be accepted as the truth and the will of Christ?

There is one significant ground upon which, in accord with the principles of American Presbyterianism, we justify our veneration for these doctrinal symbols. It is because of the intrinsic excellence and self-evidencing authority of the symbols themselves, and not the official authority either of the council that framed them, or the Parliament, its master, that enacted them. We heartily accept the pious Baxter's noble eulogy of the men. "The divines there congregate were men of eminent learning and godliness and ministerial abilities and fidelity: * * * and

as far as I am able to judge by the information of all history of that kind, and by any other evidences left us, the Christian world, since the days of the Apostles, had never a Synod of more excellent divines (taking one thing with another) than this Synod and the Synod of Dort were." But we cannot accept the council as such in its official character as an authoritative council. The best explanation of the matter is that this was another instance in the history of the Church in which God caused the "wrath of man to praise him and restrained the remainder thereof." He overruled the storm of political passion in England and the partisan strategy of the Long Parliament to bring out of it this noblest of all the doctrinal symbols of the Reformation—the noblest, because produced in a country wherein the earlier symbols, under the reviving influences of God's grace, had trained an evangelical ministry and people in the knowledge of the gospel until they saw eye to eye the great doctrines of salvation.

6. While the secular authority accepted and ordained for the most part the symbols of the Westminster Assembly, so far as they related to other gospel doctrines than the doctrine of the Church, and the functions and authority of the Church; and while it even accepted in abstract form the germinal doctrine of the Church—perhaps from oversight of the bearing of it—yet it is readily seen from these "Minutes" that the Parliament, so far from being ready to accept and ordain the concrete forms of the Assembly's doctrine of the Church, when it came to devising an order of Church government and discipline, watched the Assembly with jealous eye and aimed with despotic power to crush out any attempt to erect a free Christian commonwealth according to the ordinance of Christ.

7. It will be said, indeed, that the Scottish Church, through her supreme courts, not only endorsed the calling of the Westminster Assembly, but appointed commissioners to confer and advise with it through the whole course of its deliberations. Nay, the enemies of Presbyterianism are wont to assert that the Assembly itself was a strategical contrivance of the Scottish Church to proselyte England to Presbyterianism. As to the latter insinuation, the history of the connection of the Scottish Church with

the movement for the Assembly at Westminster shows most conclusively, that, in the first place, the Westminster Assembly had been in session a month before the proposition for coöperation came before the General Assembly of Scotland, and in the second place, that the overture for coöperation was brought by Sir Harry Vane, the younger, Stephen Marshall, a Presbyterian, and Philip Nye, an Independent minister, as a delegation from the Westminster Assembly. And with them came a declaration from both Houses of the English Parliament making known to the Scottish Assembly their purpose to reform religion in England, and desiring that ministers be sent by the Scottish Church to join with the English divines. And with these commissioners came also an official letter from the Westminster Assembly, asking the same thing. The primary issue involved was really whether Scotland would throw the weight of its military power into the balance in which, at the time, were trembling the destinies of the civil war in England. The king had taken Bristol, and everything indicated that he was about to sweep the forces of the Parliament before him. Henderson was Moderator of the Assembly, upon whom a great pressure had been brought to bear by the agents of the Parliament. And though he had previously declared that "Scotland should rest satisfied with her own Reformation, which the king had confirmed, and not meddle with the affairs of the English," yet now having given way under the excitement of the crisis, he made a powerful speech, inclining toward the alliance with England. But Guthrie was, at least, one man in the Assembly who saw the whole matter in its true light. He admitted that "the Assembly of Divines in their letter, and the Parliament in their declaration, were both clear and particular concerning their privative part, namely, that they should extirpate Episcopacy root and branch. But as to the positive part, what they meant to bring in, they huddled it up in many ambiguous general terms. So that whether it would be Presbytery or Independency or anything else, God only knew, and no man could pronounce infallibly. Therefore so long as the English stood and would come no farther, *he saw not how this Church, which held Presbyterian government to be *juris divini**,

could take them by the hand." He therefore moved that, "before any further step was taken, the Assembly should deal with the English commissioners present to desire the Parliament and the divines assembled at Westminster to explain themselves, and be as express concerning what they resolved to introduce as they had been in that which was resolved to remove." It is said the Assembly remained in profound silence for a good while after this vigorous and judicious speech, which evidently expressed the real thoughts of a majority. Even Henderson sat pensive and made no reply. But no one openly backed Guthrie, and the question went by default to leave the matter to the Moderator and the committee. It was one of the few errors of the great Henderson's public life, and there is reason to believe that he saw it and lamented it before his death.

8. It is remarkable that, though this effort to combine Presbyterianism with English Puritanism proved so signal a failure, resulting only in the acceptance of the Westminster compromise by the Scottish Church in place of the noble standards already existing in that Church, with an utter failure of England, the other party to the compromise—that Presbyterians have seemed to have a tendency to fall into the same trap in every generation since. The American Fathers in their "Plan of Union" with New England fell into the same error on a smaller scale. And the mongrel Presbyterianism which still prevails in some sections of the Presbyterian Church of America, a Presbyterianism of expediency merely, mingling with its ideas the ideas of New England Congregationalism, falls into the same error with the Scottish Fathers of the Westminster era. They do not see the profound significance of Guthrie's saying, "How can the Church which holds Presbyterian government to be *juris divini* take by the hand" those that do not so hold; nor do they perceive that Presbytery is really as wide apart from Independency as from Prelacy.

It is true that the state of parties in England at the opening of the Long Parliament seemed to justify the opinion that the way was open for the establishment of Presbytery. Each of the two great English parties in Church and State was subdivided into two classes of moderate men and of fierce men. The Epis-

copal party was divided into two classes—one, to which the king and court belonged, holding that prelatical bishops were essential to religion, since without them there could be neither ordination nor administration of sacraments. Another class, while it venerated Episcopacy as an ancient and expedient form of Church government, held that it was not essential to the existence of the Church, and was therefore willing to modify but not to abolish Episcopacy. The majority of both Houses of Parliament were probably at first of this opinion. Of the Puritan party, one class was disposed to Presbytery with a free Church; the other, of fierce Independents resolved on abolishing both monarchy and all church authority, with whom very naturally were allied the great Erastian lawyers, such as Vane and Selden, who would place all Church authority in the Parliament. With these also combined the smaller parties of Anabaptists and other fanatics, and the large body of profane men who cared nothing for the Church and resisted the yoke of ecclesiastical discipline.

The outworking of the political and ecclesiastical problem from such elements is well known. When the order of the king prevented a large number of the moderate Episcopalians from entering the Westminster Assembly, and the court party had been driven from Parliament, Presbyterianism was largely in the ascendancy in the Assembly, but Independency and Erastianism the governing power in Parliament. Hence the Independents, a small but very able body, did everything they could to retard the action of the Assembly, and when that action could no longer be hindered, through their allies in Parliament, met the Church theory of the Assembly there with a most determined opposition. As the cause of the king waned and they had no longer any need of the assistance of the Scotch army, the Independents became bolder in their measures of hostility. In spite of their engagement in the Solemn League and Covenant to promote "*uniformity of religion*" in the two countries, they at length threw off the mask and laughed at the Solemn League and Covenant as an old almanac. As the revolution advanced, the "party of progress" and of the "thorough" school, under the guise of zeal for the reformation of religion, succeeded against a majority of Parliament and a

majority of the people—who were a staid, order-loving people—gained command of the army, abolished the House of Lords, murdered the king, turned out the House of Commons, subdued Scotland, whose alliance they had courted so eagerly, and drove the Scottish Assembly, whose influence they had invoked so earnestly in 1643, by an armed soldiery out of their Assembly house with the fierce word of command “to convene their Assemblies no more.” Then at last the Presbyterianism of Scotland found that the benumbed serpent which Henderson and his compeers had with more benevolence than prudence taken into their bosom, once they had rescued it from the verge of death, darted its venom into the blood that had warmed it into life.

These final results could not of course have been dreamed of, much less have formed any part of the scheme of the no-churchism—whether of Independency or of Erastianism—at the era of the opening of the Westminster Assembly. But it might not be difficult to show the connection as seed and outgrowth between these results and the germinal insincerity and treachery that had played so large a part in the discussions in Parliament touching the Westminster Assembly’s doctrine of the Church as developed in its frame of a church order and discipline. It is very evident from these “Minutes,” and from the contemporary Journals of Parliament and other records, that while the Parliament sought anxiously to gratify the Scottish Presbyterians and thereby hold fast to the Scottish army, and also sought anxiously to keep with it the very earnest religious sentiment of the English people, and while therefore it affected great zeal to reform religion and promote uniformity of church doctrine and order in the three kingdoms, there was from the first a determination among the leaders of the House of Commons that no Church of Christ as an autonomy, with liberty to exercise all the functions of a spiritual government, should be allowed within the British realm. We have already seen that the House of Commons refused to accept the 30th and 31st Chapters of the Confession, touching Church Censures, and Synods and Councils, together with the 5th and 6th sections of Chapter 24, “Of Marriage and Divorce,” and the 4th section of Chapter 20, “Of Liberty of Conscience,” all of which

bear directly upon the question of church government and spiritual authority. And though, probably by oversight, allowing to pass the clause in Chapter 25, "Unto this catholic visible Church, *Christ hath given* the ministry, oracles, and ordinances of God", and the clause in the 45th answer of the Larger Catechism, "Christ executeth the office of a king, in calling out of the world a people unto himself; and *giving them officers, laws, and censures*, whereby he visibly governs them"—yet when in the Form of Government the same *jure divino* doctrine was asserted, the statement was stricken out, and the rather tame and ambiguous statement of our Form of Government, Chapter 8, was substituted, "*It is expedient and agreeable to Scripture and the practice of the primitive Christians, that the Church be governed by congregational, presbyterial, and synodical assemblies.*" For it should be understood that our Form of Government accepts not the Westminster, but the Parliamentary statement here. And when the Assembly remonstrated vigorously against the mutilation, the Parliament silenced them with a threat of *præmunire*—whether intending the charge of introducing a foreign authority into the realm to have reference to their demand to set up Christ as Head of the Church, or the authority of the Church of Scotland in England, we do not undertake to say.

9. But the most remarkable instance of impertinent badgering and bullying of the Westminster Assembly by its master, the Parliament, will be found in connection with the discussion of the Assembly Directory of Worship in the matter of excluding the profane and scandalous from the Lord's Supper. The Parliament seem to have been determined to prohibit the exercise of any such power by the elderships, except in subordination to the secular authorities. The first demand was that the Assembly should enumerate by name the several things which exclude from the Lord's table. And strangely enough, the Assembly was entrapped into an attempt at this impossible task of enumerating what must be in the nature of the case innumerable. When the list of causes for exclusion was sent in, the Parliament in its profound wisdom annexed the proviso that commissioners should be appointed by the State in every parish, whose function

it should be to decide in case of sins not enumerated whether the church sessions might exclude from the Lord's table or not. When this monstrous proposition was enacted, the Assembly—which claimed that the spiritual rulers of the Church by divine right may debar the profane and scandalous—felt called upon to remonstrate. Though this article is already sufficiently extended, we cannot forbear citing from these Minutes and Dr. Mitchell's notes the extraordinary proceedings of Parliament in this matter.

Under date of March 20, 1645, *Mr. Marshall* called the attention of the Assembly to "an ordinance for church government which had been put out and is now in every man's hand, some things in which will lie heavily upon the consciences of many of our brethren if called to carry it into execution." It was "Ordered that *Mr. Marshall, Mr. Vines, Mr. Seeman, Mr. Newcomen,* to consider what point of conscience may press this Assembly to make their humble address to the Parliament by way of petition to that purpose, and make report to the Assembly."

Mr. Marshall reported the same day a form of petition, which was agreed to after amendment; and on 23d March, the petition, signed officially by the Moderator, assessor, and scribes, was carried up to the Parliament. In this petition, after expressing gratitude to God for what the Parliament has done heretofore, they say:

"That nothing but conscience of duty to God, to yourselves, and the souls of the rest of our brethren, the people of the Lord, could excuse us in any seeming backwardness to act according to your vote and ordinances leading thereto. Yet are we to our grief constrained at this time in all humility and faithfulness to represent to the Honorable Houses that there is still a great defect in the enumeration of scandalous sins—very many scandalous sins ordinarily committed in all places, and formerly presented by your petitioners, being still omitted: and that the provision of commissioners to judge of scandals not enumerated appears to our consciences to be so contrary to that way of government which Christ hath appointed in his Church, in that it giveth a power to judge of the fitness of persons to come to the sacrament unto such as our Lord Christ hath not given that power unto: and also layeth upon us a necessity of admitting some scandalous persons to the sacrament, even after conviction before the eldership, and to be so differing from all example of the best Reformed Churches, and such a real hindrance to the bringing of the Churches of God in the three kingdoms to the nearest conjunction and

uniformity, and in all these respects so disagreeable to our Covenant, that we dare not practise according to that provision. * * * We do humbly pray that the several elderships may be sufficiently enabled to keep back all such as are notoriously scandalous from the sacrament of the Lord's Supper * * * it expressly *belongeth unto them by divine right* and by the will and appointment of Jesus Christ, which with the help of superior assemblies will prevent all the feared inconveniences," etc., etc.

At this day and under our American notions of the autonomy of the Church of Christ, nothing can seem more preposterous than that such a claim for the Church should ever have needed to be petitioned for to a Protestant Christian legislature. But it seems to have raised a storm in the Parliament—whether of real or affected passion we are not able to determine. After debating the matter in committee of the whole from the 1st to the 11th April, the House of Commons voted by 88 to 76 "that this petition thus presented by the Assembly of Divines is a breach of the privilege of Parliament." On the 16th April a committee of thirty-one, with Sir Harry Vane, Jr., and "the learned Selden" at the head of it, was appointed "to state the particulars of the breach of privilege in the petition." But before this committee could report—on the 17th April—the House thought fit for its own vindication against the Assembly, the city, and the Scotch, to issue "a declaration of their true intentions," etc. In this paper they assert that to admit the claims of the Assembly would be to grant "an arbitrary and unlimited power and jurisdiction to near ten thousand judicatories to be erected within the kingdom, and to set aside its fundamental laws, which devolve supreme jurisdiction on the Parliament; that experience manifests that the reformation and purity of religion and the preservation of the people of God in this kingdom hath under God been by the Parliament and their exercise of this power."

It is to the doctrine of this declaration that Gillespie applies the knife so effectually in "Aaron's Rod Blossoming," and in view probably of this declaration he "vindicates Presbyterian government from the charge of domineering arbitrary power."

The Parliament sent down a committee to the Assembly to point out to that body its dreadful crime in sending such a petition. These Minutes, under date of April 30, 1646, contain memoranda of the several speeches of this committee, though

most of them very imperfect. We conclude with a few specimen sentences from each speech.

"*Sir John Evelyn.* The House of Commons having not long since received a paper * * * They did find things in it that did strike at the foundation and roots of the privileges of Parliament. * * * If divisions shall arise, you will, give occasion to all the world to say that as you were willing to serve the Parliament awhile, so you were willing to have them serve you forever after."

"*Mr. Fiennes.* Amongst those privileges (of Parliament) none more essential than this: that in them resides the power of making laws, and once passed all are to be subject unto them. Whosoever shall infuse anything to the contrary in the mind of those that should obey them, are guilty of a great offence. If an assembly shall, so soon as a law is made, set a brand upon it as contrary to the will of God and mind of Jesus Christ and our Covenant, what can more stifle it in the birth and make it of none effect? * * Did the Houses of Parliament give any colour of power to this Assembly to give any judgment of the National Covenant, especially in relation to making laws? Did it give authority to this Assembly to give their judgment after a law settled? * * * You are not to make use of the public character the Houses have put upon you to contradict their votes," etc.

"*Mr. Browne.* This day that's done that never was done to any Assembly or Convocation * * to send members of their own to give satisfaction to you. * * * This offence of yours is in respect of both a contempt of the court and of the persons, inasmuch as they are judged as to the Covenant."

"*Sir Benjamin Rudyard.* The matters you are now about, the *jus divinum*, is of a formidable and tremendous nature. It will be expected you should answer by clear, practical, and express Scriptures, not by far-fetched argument. * * * I have heard much spoken of the 'pattern in the mount', so express. I could never find in the New Testament such a pattern. * * * The civil magistrate is a church officer in every commonwealth."

Such are some specimens of the hectoring received by the Assembly from the committee of the House of Commons, sent down evidently to frighten the body. As if still not satisfied, the House spread on their Journals "A Narrative of the Matter of Fact concerning the Breach of Privilege," etc., from which, if there were room for further citations, it would be interesting to make extracts.

The committee of Parliament, after all this storming—evidently "fearing the people", if they went too far—left a paper contain-

ing nine queries as to the *jure divino* right of elderships, presbyteries, synods, etc., and the authority of elderships to exclude the scandalous from the sacrament. It was demanded that the votes on these points, "aye" and "no," should be recorded, and also the opinions in full of any dissenting member—the intention evidently being to let each member see that he would be held personally responsible for his vote. The Assembly appointed for themselves a day of fasting and prayer in reference to this great business. And during the whole month of May and June following the discussion of *jus divinum* absorbed all attention. The results are not recorded in the Minutes.

10. The impression made upon most genuine Presbyterians this side the Atlantic by an examination of this curious volume will be somewhat complex. It will add much to their reverence for the Westminster doctrinal standards, bating their doctrine of the Church. It will also increase their reverent affection for "the personal greatness of the men who composed the Council, as men of singular purity, learning, and genius. But it will diminish the respect for the official authority of the Westminster Assembly as a free Christian council. And above all, will it diminish their respect for the Long Parliament, and for the leaders of English thought in that era—Vane and Selden, and Milton and Cromwell—as champions of religious as well as political liberty. And it must excite devout gratitude to God that our lot is fallen in an age and country in which the secular power is compelled at last to *seem* to admit the right of the Church of God to organise under Christ's ordinance and exercise her authority without the hindrances which prevented the Presbyterian fathers both of the first and the second Reformation from giving perfect form to their ideas of the Church according to the "pattern in the mount."

We shall look forward with much eagerness for another volume of these remarkable records. We hope that in connection with that volume an index of subjects for both volumes will be published. We have found the labor of reference to this volume very great because of the lack of an index or table of contents.

ARTICLE VI.

GEOGRAPHICAL REVOLUTIONS.

Uniformity seems to be the law written on all the pages of nature.

“Flow on, cold rivulet, to the sea,
Thy tribute wave deliver;
No more by thee my steps shall be,
Forever and forever.”

But though never revisited, the rivulet flows on, ripple succeeding ripple, from generation to generation. The mountains stand to-day as they have stood from the beginning of the present geologic epoch, and the great rivers wind between the same banks where the ancient races found them. Damascus and Rome are changed only in their structures since the days of Tidal, king of nations, and since the herdsmen of Numitor stalled their cattle on the Aventine Hill. The Parthenon and the Coliseum stand, shattered, it is true, but in substance preserved, as they appeared to Pericles and Titus. So it is, at least to all appearance, and such is the almost universal impression. The oceans, too, are presumed to be confined in immutable bounds, and to have, through all historical time, the same unmoved and eternal shores.

So far, however, from this condition of stability being, in reality, the fact, *precisely the reverse is the case.*

Mankind have slowly, but finally, accepted what seemed to contradict the evidence of their senses, that the earth is moving rapidly through space, and revolves, in addition, diurnally on its axis. They have slowly accepted the rotundity of the earth, and discarded the “everlasting pillars” on which it was supposed to rest. They are called upon now to recant their impressions about “the everlasting hills,” and to renounce those convictions which seemed to be almost primary truths, with regard to the fixed and permanent character of the land as distinguished from the sea. The intelligent merchant, standing upon his stone steps on Fifth Avenue, does not dream that the street is rising. The fisherman, whose boat is rocking at the foot of the cliff, is accus-

tomed to tide and wave, but is little prepared to learn that the precipitous coast itself is unsettled, and that its lofty summit is daily being lifted higher and higher above his stormy element.

Not only is the volcano and the earthquake upheaving and dislocating extensive tracts of land ; not only are the rivulets shifting their courses, and lakes appearing and disappearing ; not only are the waves eroding and wearing away, and the winds and currents adding to, the coast-lines of the continents ; not only are rapid accumulations of silt and peat burying deep the present habitations of men ; but the great continents themselves, stirred by mighty and incomprehensible pulsation, ebb and flow like the sea—rising, in one age, far above its tides ; sinking, in another, until the forests that fringe its coasts, and the cities that sleep upon its bays, are submerged by the waves. The firm ground “is replete with vitality, and is actuated by incessant motion.”

These statements, in this hurried paper, we propose to make good, and for that purpose shall endeavor, by the citation of a number of examples, to make clear to the reader. If he will have the patience to follow us, he will comprehend how rapid and how vast are the physical revolutions of every part of the earth.

It is well known that, geologically speaking, at a very recent date, the rivers ran at much higher levels than they do now, and that the sea and the land sustained very different relations to each other from those presented in the historic period. The Thames and the Somme, the Tiber and the Mississippi, the lakes of Switzerland, were, since the advent of man, one or two hundred feet higher than they have been since the so-called Primal Stone Age. In those days, the mammoth and the woolly rhinoceros, the great Irish elk, the hippopotamus, the cave-lion, the cave-bear, the cave-hyena, and the reindeer, roamed over Europe, and the mammoth, the mastodon, the megatherium, and the megalonyx, constituted prominent features in the fauna of America. Europe was connected, either at this time or just before, with Africa at Gibraltar, and by an extension of the land from the southern point of Sicily ; the island of Ceylon was united to Asia ; Asia and North America were united at Behring's Straits ;

and North and South America had not been divided at the Isthmus of Darien.

It is not to these post-glacial aspects of our continents, however, that we refer. The modifications of the earth's surface, which we have in view in this article, have occurred in considerable measure since the Christian era, and are truly astonishing to one who has not been led to direct his attention to them.

Nearly a hundred and fifty years ago, the Swedish philosopher Celsius became convinced of the fact that the Gulf of Bothnia was steadily diminishing in depth and extent. Old men pointed out to him various points over which the sea used to flow, and he observed the sites of former seaports removed inland from the sea, the remains of vessels found at a distance from the coast, and edifices originally built upon the shore abandoned by the waves. In 1730 he propounded the hypothesis that the Baltic sunk about three feet four inches every century. The following year, in conjunction with Linnæus, having made a mark at the base of a rock in the island of Loe Hgrund, he was enabled to verify, thirteen years afterwards, that the retreat of the Baltic was taking place quite as rapidly as he supposed. It did not occur to Celsius that the solid earth, as he regarded it, was in motion; he considered that the phenomena was due to the gradual depression of the level of the sea. But even in this modified form, his views shocked the orthodox divines of Stockholm and Upsal. He was accused of impiety; and in the Swedish Parliament, the representatives of the clergy, followed by the burgesses, condemned the new opinion as an abominable heresy. The fact, however, stubbornly existed, and more recent observations have confirmed the correctness of the philosopher's speculations, save that it has been ascertained that it is the land, and not the sea, that is in motion. At the northern extremity of the Gulf of Bothnia, at the mouth of the Tornea, the continent is emerging at the rate of five feet three inches in a century; by the side of the Aland Isles it only rises three and one-fourth feet per century; south of this archipelago it rises still more slowly; and further down, the movement seems to cease. And when we proceed yet further, the terminal point of Scania seems to be

gradually sinking beneath the waves, as is evidenced by the submerged forests which are there observed. The streets also of some of the seaport towns in this part of the country are now submerged, as those of Trelleborg, Ystad, and Malmoe; the streets of the last place having sunk five feet two inches since they were observed by Linnæus.

The west coasts of the Scandinavian peninsula have also been elevated within recent times. In the island of Munkholm, the land has risen about twenty feet in the last thousand years. The portion of the coast nearest the pole is rising most rapidly. Traces of more ancient movements are also observed here. Elevated beaches, which can be traced by the eye, like the steps of an amphitheatre, are seen at various heights on the slopes of the mountains. Heaps of modern shells are found at elevations of from five hundred to six hundred and fifty feet above the level of the sea, and the great branches of pink coral formed by the *Lophohelia prolifera*, which lives in the sea at the depth of one thousand or one thousand two hundred feet, are now raised up to the base of the cliff. It is very probable, says M. Reclus, that the great lakes and numberless sheets of water which fill all the granite basins of Finland, have taken the place of an arm of the sea which once united the Baltic to the great Polar Ocean. The shells belonging to the polar waters, which are found as far as the basin of the Volga, demonstrate the existence of a former arm of the sea.

The word *Scandinavia* itself seems to be a memorial of another geographical structure than that which now binds together the modern peninsula. "The Isle of Scand" might be supposed to have been merely an ignorant fancy of the early population, did we not know from the presence of marine remains far in the interior, and from the changed character of the mollusks now inhabiting the Baltic waters, that the Baltic and the North Sea were once connected by a wide channel, the deepest depressions of which are now occupied by the lakes Mälär, Hjelmär, and Wenern. Heaps of oyster shells are found at several points on the heights above these lakes; while on the rocks now laid dry, which surround the Gulf of Bothnia, banks of the same mollusk

have been discovered exactly similar to those of Norway and the western coasts of Denmark. The oyster cannot live in water holding more than 37 parts in 1,000 of salt, or less than 16 or 17 parts in 1,000. The Baltic, however, which is the recipient of a vast amount of fresh water from its various tributaries, does not contain, on an average, more than 5 parts in 1,000 of salt; and yet, as the heaps of shells prove, its waters were once as salt as the North sea. We have it recorded, also, that various remains of boats, anchors, etc., have been found, mingled with marine shells, at a height of forty feet above the Cattegat. We may add that the ancient geographers speak of Scandinavia as an island; and Celsius was of the opinion that it ceased to be so after the time of Pliny, and before the ninth century.

The coasts of Scotland presents similar phenomena; and in this case we have the means of reaching a precise date. On a raised beach at Leith, fragments of Roman pottery, and the bones, apparently, of the deer, have been found associated with marine shells at a height of twenty-five feet above the present sea level, showing that since the time when the Roman galleys anchored in this ancient harbor, the coast has been elevated to that extent. Similar appearances are observed at Inveresk, a few miles below Edinburgh, and at Cramond, at the mouth of the Almond, above Edinburgh—the latter the *Alaterva* of the Romans, and their chief harbor on the southern coast of the Forth. The old quays here, says Sir Charles Lyell, have been lifted up here some twenty feet, and thrown far back from the shore.

It has not been long, indeed, since the sea stood at Glasgow on the west, and at Falkirk and Stirling on the east, its waves only parted by an isthmus of some twenty-five or thirty miles in width. The foundations of the old Roman docks are several miles up a small stream near Falkirk, considerably beyond the reach of the tides. The wall of Antoninus, which stretched across the island from Firth of Forth to that of the Clyde, terminated on the east at Carriden, and on the west on an eminence called Chapel Hill, at West Kilpatrick, on the Clyde. Mr. Geikie has ascertained that a depression of twenty-five feet would not lay the eastern extremity under water, while, on the west, he found the foot of

Chapel Hill to be twenty-five or twenty-seven feet above high water mark. All the low land, from Chapel Hill and the mouth of the Clyde, was, a short time before the Roman period, under the sea; while on the east the flat Carse of Falkirk, overlooked by Carriden Hill, lay under twenty-five feet of water.

Before the Roman period, also, the sea extended even beyond Falkirk. In Blair Drummond Moss, seven miles above Stirling, that is, nearly twenty miles beyond Falkirk, were found, not many years since, the remains of a *whale*, and beside it a rude harpoon of bone, with a wooden handle, an oaken quern, a wooden wheel, and some flint arrow-heads. In the carse below Stirling, an iron anchor was also found. Naval implements of iron have also been found farther north, in the Carse of Gowrie, on the Tay. In this region are found also a number of hillocks, designated by the Celtic name of *Inch*, showing that they were once surrounded by water or marshy ground.

On the western coast, no less than seventeen canoes have been dug out of the flat lands along the banks of the Clyde, within the past century. Five of them lay buried under the streets of Glasgow, one of which contained marine shells. Twelve others were found about a hundred yards back from the river—one of them as far as one hundred and thirty yards, at the average depth of nineteen feet below the surface, and seven feet above high water mark. Several of them were only four or five feet below the surface, and were consequently more than twenty feet above the sea level. Some of these canoes were rudely hewn out of a single trunk, apparently with stone implements (the wood being first charred); others were finely and sharply cut, evidently with metallic tools. In one of them a beautifully polished celt of greenstone was found, and in the bottom of another a plug of *cork*, which must have come from Southern Europe—and it is a curious fact that this cork plug was found in one of the rudest (and, therefore, inferentially, one of the oldest) of the canoes.

What was the aspect of England at this time? There are various examples of raised and subsided beaches in England; but the most conspicuous changes along the coasts of this country have been due to the erosion and destruction of those coasts by

the waves. There are evidences that the south coasts of England have been raised eighty feet within the human period; while on the east coasts we find the oyster and other marine shells at Peterborough, in the basin of the Ouse, twelve miles from the sea; the remains of the walrus and the seal, with sea-shells, in Whittlesea Mere, fifteen miles from the sea; the remains of the whale at Waterbeach, not far from Cambridge, thirty-five miles from the sea; and also the remains of the whale at Icklingham, on the Lark, thirty-five miles in the interior. Submerged forests exist at Torquay, on the Devonshire coast; at Porlock Bay, on the coast of Somersetshire; and old historians mention a tradition of the submersion of the Lionesse—a tract of country thirty miles in length by ten in breadth, stretching from the Land's End to the Scilly Islands.

The loss of land from the action of the waves is observable on all of the English coasts. In Yorkshire, from Bridlington (near Flamborough Head) to Spurn Head, a distance of thirty-six miles, the coast (forty feet high) has lost one mile in breadth since the Norman Conquest, and more than two miles since the occupation of York (Eboracum) by the Romans. The towns of Auburn, Hartburn, and Hyde, are now sandbanks in the sea. At Owthorne, for several years preceding 1830, the annual rate of encroachment was four yards.

Edward Baliol and the confederated English barons sailed from Ravensper in 1332, to invade Scotland, and it was at this port that Henry IV. landed in 1399, to effect the deposal of Richard II. Ravensper was at this time the rival to Hull. Nothing remains of it now but a waste of land, overflowed by the tides.

At Sherringham, on the coast of Norfolk, Sir Charles Lyell mentions that there was in 1829 a depth of twenty feet (sufficient to float a frigate) at one point in the harbor, where, only forty-eight years before, there stood a cliff fifty feet high, with houses upon it!

Per contra, Norwich, on a branch of the river Yare, about twenty miles from the coast (and from Yarmouth), was, in the times of the Saxons, at the head of a great estuary; and even in the fourteenth century it is described as "situated on an arm of

the sea." The sea is now shut out from the mouth of the river by a line of dunes which have gradually blocked up the entrance to the estuary, and there is no navigation to Norwich, except in barges. By the exclusion of the sea, thousands of acres in the interior have become cultivated lands; and as many as sixty fresh-water lakes have been formed, varying in depth from fifteen to thirty feet, and in extent from one acre to twelve hundred.

On the coast of Suffolk, Dunwich, the ancient capital of East Anglia, and subsequently an important seaport, with an extensive trade, has been almost entirely devoured by the waves. It formerly contained twelve churches and two abbeys, and returned two members to the House of Commons. It is now a mere fishing village, with about twenty houses and one hundred inhabitants.

Reculver, on the coast of Kent, (the Regulvium of the Romans, and under them an important military station,) was, in the time of Henry VIII., one mile from the sea. Some time before 1780, the waves had reached the site of the Roman camp. Eighty yards farther from the sea stood the church of Reculver. In 1804 this was reached, and part of the church-yard and some adjoining houses washed away. The ruins of the building still remain, an artificial causeway and large wooden piles having broken the power of the waves.

The northeastern corner of Kent projects out far into the sea, and bears the name of the Isle of Thanet. The Isle of Thanet, in the time of the Romans, was in fact, an island, separated from Kent by a navigable channel, through which the Roman ships sailed on their way to and from London. In the eighth century, Bede describes this channel as being nearly half a mile wide.

The town of Winchelsea, on the southern coast of Kent, formerly an important place, was destroyed by the inroads of the sea in the reign of Edward I. The inhabitants, before its destruction, removed to New Winchelsea, about two miles to the southwest. By a singular fatality the new town was ruined in a manner the very reverse of what befell the first. In the sixteenth century the sea began to *recede* from New Winchelsea, and it is now one and a-half miles from the coast, and in part surrounded by a salt marsh.

The whole coast of Sussex has been incessantly encroached upon by the sea from time immemorial. Mantell states that in a period of eighty years the records attest as many as *twenty* in-roads by which tracts of land, of from twenty to *four hundred acres*, were overwhelmed at once. Since the reign of Elizabeth, the town of Brighton has been entirely swept away.

These examples will suffice. The same phenomena present themselves all along the south and the west coasts of England.

London itself was formerly a lake village. This is indicated in the name of the city—Llyn Din, from *llyn*, in Celtic, a lake, and *din*, a town. This etymology is confirmed by the facts stated by ancient writers. Dion Cassius describes London as situated “at the *estuary* of a river ;” Ptolemy describes Kent as all maritime, and not as bounded on one side by a river. Cæsar also seems to speak of the Thames as being higher up than the present London, locating it in the territory of King Cassivelaunus. Further confirmation is gathered from recent excavations at London Wall. At the depth of many feet, *piles*, like those in the Swiss Lake Dwellings, were encountered, mingled with Roman remains and the bones of existing animals. These piles have been met with again north of the Bank, near the Mansion House, and in the line of old Wall Brook. They were through a bed of peat, and into the subjacent sand and gravel. If we proceed down the Thames, towards the sea, we meet with subterranean forests at Purfleet, Grays, Dogenham Marsh, and Tilbury Fort. In the Isle of Dogs, a forest of this description was found at the depth of eight feet, consisting of elm, oak, and fir trees, some of the first of which were three or four feet in diameter, accompanied by human bones, but no traces of human implements.

The reader is now prepared to realise the immense changes which must have taken place in the world in the past two or three thousand years. He comprehends that Rest is by no means the normal condition of the globe. We have not made reference so far to volcanic action. The changes to which we have referred have been silent and without violence—for the most part gradual—effected by that never-ceasing movement of the solid land, which, as we learn from modern science, is more unstable than the sea.

Of course these movements which we have indicated in Great Britain and Scandinavia, have been traced on the main continent of Europe. Hubert Thomas tells us (says Goldsmith in his "History of the Earth") that the sea formerly encompassed the city of Tongres in Belgium, which was, however, in his day, thirty-five leagues removed from it; and this assertion he supports by various facts, among others by that of the iron rings affixed in the walls of the town for fastening the ships which came into the harbor. Goldsmith mentions also the irruption of the sea in the territory of Dort, in 1546, by which one hundred thousand persons were destroyed, and a yet greater number around Dollart. In Friesland and Zealand more than three hundred villages were overwhelmed, "and their ruins still continue visible at the bottom of the water, in a clear day." The Baltic Sea has, by slow degrees, covered a large part of Pomerania, and, among others, destroyed and overwhelmed the once famous port of Vineta. The German Sea has advanced upon the coast of Holland, near Catt, so that the ruins of an ancient citadel of the Romans are now under water. At the mouth of the river Ness, near Bruges, in Flanders, at the depth of fifty feet, are found great quantities of trees lying close to each other—the trunks, the branches, and the leaves in such preservation, that each kind of tree is immediately distinguished. The plains of Dordrecht, Holland, we are told by Reclus, have become a forest of reeds; who mentions also that at the bottom of the port of Husum, on the coast of Schleswig, there was discovered, in the midst of a submerged forest of birches, a tomb of the Age of Stone. On the eastern coast of Schleswig, near the mouth of the Schlei, the stumps of the trees of an ancient deer forest of the Middle Ages may be seen under the water, about half a mile from the shore. According to John Paton, Denmark and Schleswig have lost, since the year 1240, an area of about 1,225 square miles; that is, about *one-eighteenth* of their territory. Further to the east, round the southern basin of the Baltic, we find Rügen broken up into islands and peninsulas; Bornholm surrounded by submarine forests, one of which is twenty-six feet below the line of the shore. Other submerged forests fringe the coasts of Pomerania

and Eastern Prussia. On the point of Samland, the church of St. Adalbert, built at the close of the fifteenth century, some four and a half miles from the sea, is now only one hundred paces from the beach.

M. Beauvais is of the opinion that the whole of France is being slowly upheaved on the southern side, and turns on a base-line passing through the peninsula of Brittany. At all events, the coasts of Poitou, Aunis, and Saintonge, appear to have risen since the commencement of the historical period. The former Gulf of Poitou, the entrance to which two thousand years ago was from eighteen to twenty-five miles in width, is now nothing but a small bay, known as the Creek of Aiguillon. Brouage is now some distance from the sea—having been, in the Middle Ages, a port of some importance. In 709, the monastery of Mount St. Michel was built in the midst of a forest ten leagues from the sea; it now stands, like an island, in the midst of sand banks. At St. Valery, at the mouth of the Somme, we are told by Sir John Lubbock, that the river-gravel of the former bed of the Somme stands at a height of one hundred feet above the level of the sea. This is the famous deposit explored by M. Boucher de Perthes at Abbeville, (where it is some eighty feet above the level of the present river,) and contains the bones of the mammoth and tichorine rhinoceros, and the rude flint implements now acknowledged to be of human workmanship.

In Southern France, it has been proved that, in the times of the Romans, and as late as the Middle Ages, the marshes extended much further inland. Astruc points out the remarkable fact that the Romans, who highly appreciated thermal springs, were not acquainted with the abundant wells of Balaruc, although the eddies of steam could not have failed to point them out, if they had not been covered by the waters of Lake Thau.

M. de Botella, in a letter to M. Elie de Beaumont, (writing from Spain,) says: "From the village of Villar don Diego, in the province of Zamora, it is now possible to see half of the bell-tower of Benifarzes, a village in the province of Valladolid, while twenty-three years ago, (1847) it was scarcely possible to see the top of the same tower." "A similar fact," says M. de

Botella, "has been noticed in the province of Alava, it now being possible to perceive from the village of Salvatierra the whole village of Salduente, while in 1847 it was difficult to distinguish the vane of the bell-tower."

In Central Italy, in the North of Italy, and along the coasts of the Bay of Naples, these changes are very conspicuous since the time of the Romans, and even the Middle Ages. In the sixteenth century, Angiolo Eremitano suggested that the isles of Venice were sinking at the rate of about a foot in a century. This hypothesis, derived from a comparison of the buildings and the pavements of the streets of various towns with the water, has since been abundantly confirmed. The town of Conca, once situated near the mouth of the Crustumio, has been entirely under the sea for some centuries, and the remains of two of its towers may still be seen beneath the waves. Pavements may also be seen at Trieste, below the level of the water.

Col. Hamilton Smith mentions that the town of Adria, said to have been built on the seashore by Tarchon, leader of the ancient Etruscan people, about the time of the Trojan war, is now fifteen and a half miles from the mouth of the river Tartarus, which is still six miles within the farthest point of land projecting in the sea. Excavations at the depth of several feet reveal a former level of the town, with Etruscan and Roman pottery, and at a still greater depth another settlement was reached, where all the earthenware was Etruscan, and there were vestiges of a theatre. The famous city of Ravenna, formerly on the Adriatic shore, is now three miles from the sea; and this, notwithstanding the fact that the pavement of the cathedral is only six inches above the level of high tide, showing that the land has sunk. This phenomenon is explained by the immense amount of sedimentary matter deposited at its mouth by the Po. Sir Charles Lyell, in his "Principles of Geology," states that "from the northern part of the Gulf of Trieste, where the Isonzo enters, down to the south of Ravenna, *there is an uninterrupted series of recent accessions of land, more than one hundred miles in length, which, within the last two thousand years, has increased from two to twenty miles in breadth.*" And this has occurred in spite of the

fact ascertained by Mr. Morlot, that the coast and the bed of the sea, since the time of the Romans, have subsided five feet.

The Temple of Serapis, at Puzzuoli, on the Bay of Baiæ, and other Roman remains on the same coast, give evidence of marked changes in this region during the past one thousand six hundred years. Sir Charles Lyell states that since the Christian era the relative level of land and sea have changed here twice, and that each movement, both of elevation and subsidence, has exceeded twenty feet. At one point on the coast, the elevation was "more than thirty feet"—which shows that these movements are not absolutely uniform. We learn here the remarkable fact that the shore-line at this point has, within the period mentioned, experienced a vertical movement of fifty feet.

Three marble pillars, forty feet high, of the Temple of Serapis, still stand erect, their pedestals washed by the waters of the Mediterranean. The marble pavement on which they rest is sunken three feet beneath the waves. Six feet beneath this is another costly pavement of mosaic, the original floor, doubtless, of the temple. As the land subsided, the second floor was laid, and a new structure reared above the waves. But twelve feet above the pedestals of the columns we come to numerous holes bored into the marble, which enlarge inward, and at the bottom of each repose the remains of a little boring bivalve shell—the *Lithodomus*—which still inhabits the adjacent waters. These perforations are observed on the columns as high up as twenty-three feet above the surface of the water, showing that the columns have been submerged up to that point. Subsequently, they were lifted up again above the water. But this is not all: during the present century the foundations of the temple have been again sinking, and are now some two feet lower than they were in 1807.

About a mile northwest of the Temple of Serapis, and about five hundred feet from the shore, are the ruins of two other temples—one a temple of Neptune, and the other a temple of the Nymphs. Both of these ruins are now under water. There are also two Roman roads under water in the bay—one reaching from Puzzuoli to Lucrine Lake, and the other near the castle of

Baiæ. On the opposite side of the Bay of Naples, on the Sorrentine coast, another Roman road, with fragments of buildings, is covered to some depth by the sea; and in the island of Capri, in the Bay of Naples, one of the palaces of Tiberius is now covered with water.

The shores of the Mediterranean, on the south and east, and in the islands of Sardinia and Sicily, afford the same indications of raised and subsided beaches. At Cagliari, in Sardinia, there is a raised beach three hundred feet above the present level of the sea, containing ancient pottery and other objects of human workmanship. The cave of San Ciro, near Palermo, in Sicily, which is one hundred and eighty feet above the sea, contains broken pieces of coral and shells, (especially oysters and pectens,) showing that it was once filled by the waves; and immediately above the level of this beach, *serpulae* are still found adhering to the rock, while the walls of the cave, like the pillars of the Temple of Serapis, are pierced by *lithodomi*. Dr. Philippi found here forty-five different species of shells, all of which, with two or three exceptions, still inhabit the adjoining sea. Overlying this shell-gravel is a deposit of bone breccia, containing the remains of those extinct animals which characterise the river-gravels of the Somme and the ancient bone-caverns of England, France, and Germany.

The shores of Asia Minor have risen with a rapid movement during the historical period. The inhabitants of Miletus, Smyrna, and Ephesus, have several times been compelled to change their habitations, in order to follow the sea. The ruins of Troy have also gradually receded from the shore. Many of the Ægean Isles have become united, or joined to the main land. The mountain of Lade in the time of Herodotus was an island, near which the Ionian galleys and the Persian fleet fought a battle. At the present day it stands in the midst of the plain of the Meander. The town of Priene which, in the time of Strabo was four and a half miles from the shore, had been originally built on the shore. The village of Ayasoulouk, the site of the city of Ephesus, is now two leagues from the coast, and the

former estuary, which is commanded by the town, is a marshy plain.

Banks of modern shells have been left by the sea at considerable heights on the hills of Thrace and Anatolia; and around the Crimea, salt lakes and stagnant marshes now exist far inland in the place of the former gulfs.

On the coast of Africa, the ancient ports of Carthage, Utica, Mahedia, Porto Farina, Bizerta, etc., are now filled up.

The sea once washed the base of the rocks on which stand the Pyramids of Memphis, and which is now inundated by the Nile, at an elevation of eighty feet above the Mediterranean. The Nile once entered the sea by seven principal mouths, two of which have now entirely disappeared. The city of Foah, which stood, in the fifteenth century, on one of these branches, is now more than a mile inland, and Pharos, anciently an island, which Homer speaks of as *one day's voyage* by sea from Egypt, is now joined to the continent.

Herodotus, Strabo, Ptolomy, and other ancient writers, speak of the *Hyrceanian Ocean* as occupying at one time a much larger area than that covered by the present Caspian Sea; most of them, indeed, considered this inland sea as a prolongation of the Frozen Ocean. Herodotus describes it as even in his day an ocean by itself, (communicating with no other,) and of such size that a swift-oared boat would traverse its length in fifteen days. Strabo speaks of the Caspian as a *gulf of the Northern Ocean*, and repeatedly assumes its connexion with those waters. Ptolemy gives the greatest length from east to west, making it much longer than it is at present.

"Nearly in the middle of the south border of the Great Plain," says McCulloch, in his "Geographical Dictionary," "on both sides of the hills of Mugodsharsk, and the countries lying south of it, between 45° and 64° east longitude, occurs the most remarkable depression on the surface of the earth. A tract of country extending over an area of more than three hundred thousand square miles, exclusive of the Caspian Sea, is according to the supposition of Humboldt, lower than the surface of the ocean. The lowest part is occupied by the Caspian Sea, which was sup-

posed by Humboldt to be no less than three hundred and forty-eight feet below the surface of the Black Sea ; but later, and it is believed more correct, observations, make the level of the Caspian one hundred and sixteen feet below, and that of the Lake of Aral fourteen feet above, the level of the Black Sea. According to Humboldt, this depression occurs between the rivers Kooma, Wolga, and Oural, up to a line drawn from Saratow to Orenburg, whence its boundary runs to the Lake of Aksakal, (48° north latitude and 63° east longitude) and then includes the countries traversed by the lower courses of the Sir-Daria (Siheon, *Jaxartes*,) and the Amoo-Daria (*Oxus*). This country is so little elevated above the level of the great lakes which lie in the midst of it, that a strong northwest wind of some continuance, forces their waters over many miles of the adjacent tracts. Its soil consists partly of sand and partly of hard clay, on which neither trees nor shrubs grow, and which only in spring, after the melting of the snow, is covered with a scanty but nourishing grass and numerous flowers."

The waters of the Caspian Sea, the Lake of Aral, and all the numerous smaller lakes which occur in this depression, are *salt*. The bed of the Caspian appears to descend in terraces ; and on the east and northwest shores the land rises in the same manner. The surface of this depressed land abounds in sea-salt, sea-weed marshes, salt-pits and lakes, and contains innumerable shells exactly resembling those of the Caspian Sea, and which are not found in any of the rivers. It is evident, therefore, that this area was once covered by the Caspian, and constituted, in fact, the Hyrcanian Ocean of which the ancients speak. There are plain evidences that the waters of the Caspian, the Aral, and the Black Sea, were once united ; and M. Reclus adds : "We may venture to assume that during some portion of the present period, a vast strait, like that which once ran along the base of the Atlas, extended from the Black Sea to the Gulf of Obi and the Frozen Ocean."

On the north, the Northern Ocean advanced to meet this oriental Mediterranean. The *tundras* of Siberia, which extend hundreds of miles into the interior from the coast, constituting

what is now called the lowland of Siberia, are covered with a thin coating of sand and fine clay, and contain marine shells, which point to the fact that they once formed the bed of the sea, and the character of the shells shows that they were deposited at a very recent period. The land in fact has been steadily rising in Siberia for centuries, and this, in conjunction with the draining of the great inland ocean, is the explanation of the change of climate which has unquestionably taken place in this country. It is well ascertained that trees, at a very recent period, (as proved by the state of preservation of their trunks and roots and branches,) which now grow only in the central or southern regions, formerly flourished at least three degrees farther to the north.

The land in Siberia is rising at the present day. Around Spitzbergen and in the Polar Sea of Siberia, the waters have shallowed so fast, in the memory of the seal-fishers and others, as to exclude the right whale. The island of Diomeda, which Chalaourof noticed in 1760, to the east of Cape Sviatoj, was joined to the continent at the date of Wrangel's voyage, sixty years later.

If from Siberia we pass to China, we find that the bed of the Gulf of Pechili has risen fourteen feet in the last two hundred and fifty years. If, instead of rising fourteen feet, the land had *subsided* fourteen feet, one-third of the low, thickly-populated parts of China would now be covered by the sea. Du Halde adduces facts to prove that all of the Gulf of Pechili was at one time dry land, and indeed that there was, when the Chinese abridgment of chorography, entitled *Kwang-in-ki*, was prepared, a *continuous plain* from Peking to Corea.

The performances of the Hwang Ho, or Yellow River, in China, are such as utterly to confound our prevalent notions of the stability of the natural features of the earth. This great stream changed its course in 602 B. C.; in 350 B. C.; in 132 B. C.; in 11 B. C.; in A. D. 70; A. D. 1034; A. D. 1043, etc. One of these great changes has occurred in the past twenty-five years. Instead of emptying into the Yellow Sea, the Hwang-Ho now has its mouth in the Gulf of Pechili, and its course is at a right

angle with the old one—the distance from its former mouth to its present one being more than three hundred and eighty miles in a straight line, and more than twice that distance along the sea-shore!

Cities that were built on the delta plain of this river centuries ago, are now far removed from the sea. Putai, which is said in the year 220 B. C. to have been one *li* (about one-third of a mile) west of the sea-shore, in A. D. 1740 was one hundred and forty *li* inland. Hienshuikan, on the Pei-Ho, is said to have been on the seashore in A. D. 500, and is at present about eighteen miles inland.

A conspicuous example of a raised beach is seen in the “lateritic” formation of Madras and North Arcot. The elevation here is three hundred feet. This falls within the human, but not within the historical, period. Rude flint implements, like those of the Somme Valley, have been found here by M. Bruce Foote, and are cited by Sir John Lubbock and other archæologists as evidencing the presence of “palæolithic” man in India.

The vast amount of earthy matter carried down by the Ganges, is shown by the fact that the delta of this river commences two hundred and twenty miles from the sea, and at this day its sediment colors the sea for a distance of sixty miles from the shore. Mr. James Fergusson, the learned author of “The Rude Stone Monuments in all Countries,” in some remarks on this delta before the Geological Society of Great Britain, has pointed out that in historical times the Brahmapootra and Ganges, (which now run parallel to each other,) on entering the plains of Bengal—passing Goalparah and Rajmahal, respectively—ran originally to the sea in a nearly due north and south course, parallel to one another. This symmetry was first disturbed by an *upheaval* of the Modopore jungle, north of Dacca, by which the Brahmapootra was diverted in a southeast direction into the depression known as the Sylhet Jheels, which were the result of the upheaval in question. The river then filled these Jheels, and returned to its former bed within the limits of the present century. Mr. Fergusson stated that we had reason to believe that in the past five thousand years the plain of Bengal has been nearly in the same condition that

the valley of Assam now is—a jungle swamp. The tributaries of the Lower Ganges—the Coosy, the Mahanada, and the Soane—are constantly shifting their mouths farther up stream—the last-named water-course having retreated four miles in eighty years.

On the coasts of South America we find the same evidences of important physical changes. On the coast of Chili, Darwin, during the voyage of the *Beagle*, found heaps of modern shells at a height of three hundred and forty-seven feet on the hills of Chiloe; and on the north of Conception traces of the waves during the present (geologic) period, are found at an elevation of from six hundred to one thousand feet. At Valparaiso these levels are as high as one thousand two hundred and ninety-five feet above the sea. In front of Arica, on the coast of Peru, the sea has receded one hundred and sixty-five yards in the space of forty years. In front of Callao, on one of the cliffs of the island of San Lorenzo, at a height of eighty-five feet above the sea, Darwin discovered in a bed of modern shells, deposited on a terrace, roots of sea-weed, bones of birds, ears of maize, plaited reeds, and some cotton thread almost entirely decomposed. These relics of human industry almost exactly resemble those which are found in the *huacas* or burial-places of the ancient Peruvians.

Mr. Darwin also traced a raised beach from the Rio Colorado, on the eastern coast of South America, a distance of six or seven hundred miles southwards, spreading itself over the plains of Patagonia two hundred miles inland from the seashore. He believes that the land has been raised in mass from the Rio de la Plata to Tierra del Fuego—one thousand two hundred nautical miles—to a height of four hundred feet, within the period of existing sea-shells, which are found on the surface retaining their colors.

The waters of the great Bolivian lake once bathed the walls of Tia-Huanacu, one of the principal cities of the Incas. They are now twelve and a half miles distant from this locality, and more than one hundred and thirty feet below their former level. This phenomenon has been caused, however, not by any movement of the land, but by the diminished rainfall.

Similar observations have been made along the Atlantic and

Gulf coasts of the United States and the adjacent countries. On the coast of Texas, the shores of the Bay of Matagorda had risen from eleven to twenty-two inches from 1845 to 1863. In consequence of the gradual increase of the land; of which one of the evidences is the heaps of shells left far from the shore, it has been necessary to transfer the port of Indianola to Powderhorn, a place four and a half miles nearer the entry. On the other hand, at St. Augustine, Florida, the stumps of cedar trees stand beneath the hard beach shell-rock, immersed in water at the lowest tides.

Some of the sounds of North Carolina, which have been navigable within the memory of living sea captains, are now impassable bars or emerging sand-flats.

Along the coasts of New Jersey the sea has encroached within sixty years upon the sites of former habitations, and entire forests have been prostrated by the inundation. In the harbor of Nantucket are found eight feet below the lowest tide the upright trunks of trees, with their roots still buried in the original soil. Similar remains of ancient submarine forests occur on Martha's Vineyard and on the southern side of Cape Cod, and again at Portland. In the region of the St. Croix River, separating Maine from New Brunswick, the coast has been raised, carrying deposits of recent shells, in one instance to the height of twenty-eight feet above the present level of the sea. The island of Grand Menan, says Prof. Winchell, off the mouth of the St. Croix River, is slowly rotating on an axis, the south side gradually dipping beneath the waves, while the north is lifted into high bluffs. The north side of Nova Scotia is sinking, while the south is rising.

Prof. Winchell mentions also that the ancient city of Louisbourg, in the island of Cape Breton—the stronghold of France in America in the eighteenth century—is gradually sinking beneath the waves. The rock on which the brave General Wolfe landed has nearly disappeared, and the sea now flows within the walls of the city.

The straits of Hell Gate, which form the entry to the port of New York, are, according to tradition, of recent origin. Two

centuries ago the natives related to the Dutch colonists established in the island of Manhattan, that at the time of the fathers of their grandfathers it was possible to cross dry-shod from one bank to the other, and that the sea only entered the straits at the time of the great equinoctial floods. This portion of this coast seems to be subsiding at the rate of twenty-three and a half inches in a century.

Our examples have been chiefly drawn from those changes in the physical geography of the world which are presented on the shores of the oceans and seas, and which have been for the most part a slow and gradual process. We have not mentioned those more violent and sudden transformations which are effected by earthquakes and volcanoes. Some of these are very remarkable, and in some regions of the world, as, for example, in South America and India, the configuration of the country has been seriously modified by these agencies. The movements of the earthquake at Cutch, in the delta of the Indus, in 1819, were felt over an area having a radius of one thousand miles from Bhoj, the principal town of the district, extending to Khatmandoo, Calcutta, and Pondicherry. The eastern channel of the Indus (which had been almost deserted) before the earthquake was fordable at Luckput, being only one foot deep when the tide was at ebb, and at flood-tide never more than six feet; it was afterwards filled with water to the depth of eighteen feet at low tide. The fort and village of Sindree, on the eastern arm of the Indus, were submerged, the sea flowing in by the eastern mouth of the Indus, and in a few hours a tract of land two thousand square miles in area was converted into an inland sea or lagoon. A tract of country about five miles from Sindree, some fifty miles in length from east to west, and sixteen miles in breadth in some parts, was elevated to the height of ten feet above the original level of the delta. To this tract the natives gave the name of *Ullah Bund* or the *Mound of God*. More recent geographical changes of great magnitude have occurred in the district of Kutch, near the mouth of the Koree, or eastern branch of the Indus, by which a large area appears to have subsided, and the Sindree Lake has been converted into a salt marsh.

In the year 1812 a great convulsion occurred in the neighborhood of the village of New Madrid, in the valley of the Mississippi. A tract of many miles in extent, near the Little Prairie, became covered with water some four feet deep, and large lakes twenty miles in extent were formed in the course of an hour. The graveyard at New Madrid was precipitated into the bed of the Mississippi, and the river-bank sank eight feet. This region (west of New Madrid) is now called *The Sunk Country*, and extends along the course of the White River, a distance of seventy-five miles north and south and thirty miles east and west.

The Japanese affirm that the celebrated Fusi-Yama, the highest mountain in Japan, was upheaved in a single night from the sea twenty-one and a half centuries ago. Whether this be true or not, it is a fact that in the year 1007 a roar of thunder announced the appearance of the volcano of Toinmoura on the south of the Corea, and after seven days a mountain twelve miles in circumference appeared, towering up to the height of one thousand feet.

A similar phenomenon in Mexico is recorded by Humboldt. On the 14th of September, 1759, he tells us, the mountain of Jorullo was seen to rise from a level plain to a height of one thousand six hundred and eighty-one feet.

The earthquake at Lisbon in 1755 was felt over an area greater than the extent of Europe. The movement reached to the great lakes of America and the West India Islands on the one hand, and to the coasts of Scotland and Sweden and along the southern shores of the Mediterranean on the other. The larger portion of Lisbon was shaken down in an instant, and sixty thousand of its inhabitants overwhelmed in its ruins; one of the quays of the harbor, on which a great concourse of people had assembled, was suddenly engulfed in the sea to such a depth that not one of the dead bodies ever floated to the surface, and the sea rose fifty feet above its ordinary level, sweeping over the adjacent coasts, while several of the mountains of Portugal were violently convulsed, and belched forth smoke and flames. The same shock was felt in the Alps and in Northern Thuringia. In the islands of Antigua, Barbadoes, and Martinique, the tide (which usually rises about two feet) suddenly rose twenty feet, the water assuming an

inky blackness. In Loch Lomond, Scotland, the water rose two feet four inches.

In 1746 Peru was visited by a tremendous earthquake, two hundred shocks having been experienced in the course of a single day. The ocean twice retired and returned upon the land; Lima was destroyed, and part of the coast of Callao converted into a bay. Fifty-nine years before, a similar convulsion had taken place, the sea at that time retiring and advancing again, overwhelming Callao and drowning man and beast for fifty leagues along the shore. On the 13th of August, 1868, the same disturbances recurred, and with greater violence than ever. Along the coasts of Peru and Bolivia, the sea retired and came in again at the rate of ten miles an hour, with a wave fifty feet high, that covered many towns and lifted many ships upon the land. Arequipa, a city of fifty thousand inhabitants, about forty miles from the coast, was almost entirely destroyed. Iquique, another city in the southern part of Peru, met the same fate. Arica, after being destroyed by the earthquake, was obliterated by the sea. The town of Tambo was entirely washed away, and those of Tiabaga, Vitor, Molliendo, and Mahia, and all the villages within one hundred and fifty miles, were destroyed. At Islay the earthquake wave rose to the height of sixty feet. The shocks were very severe in the Chincha Islands, and were felt in Ecuador between the 13th and 16th. In the province of Imbabura, the cities of Ibarra, San Pablo, Atuntaqui, Imantad, Otovala, and many villages, were laid in ruins. In Ibarra, Otovala, and Cotacachi, almost the entire population perished. The site of Cotacachi was covered by a lake. The shocks extended also to Chili, where the sea was greatly agitated; they were observed also at the Sandwich Islands on the 14th, and at Yokohama, Japan, on the 15th. On the coasts of the Sandwich Islands the sea rose and fell from six to twelve feet. On the morning of the 17th (the 16th as compared with time at the Sandwich Islands) the shocks were felt in New Zealand at several points, while in eastern Australia there were unusual waves and tidal disturbances.

With these secular elevations and subsidences of the solid

earth—more conspicuous along the shores of the sea, but more considerable in the upland and mountainous regions—with the wear and tear of the coasts under the action of the waves, and with these tremendous dislocations resulting from volcanic action during the first two thousand or three thousand years, we can imagine how changed is the face of any continent—Europe, for example—since the beginning of the Christian Era, or since the epoch of the Phœnicians and the Etruscans.

But only the half is told. Other agencies have been at work to modify the physical aspects of the dwelling-place of man. All Europe was formerly full of vast marshes and spotted with innumerable lakes which no longer exist. This was the case with Germany, according to Tacitus; and Mr. Turner, in his *History of the Anglo-Saxons*, gives the same account of Britain. Rudbeck states that, according to tradition, the low parts of Scandinavia presented the same aspect. The same state of things existed in France and in Northern Italy. There is, as it were, a lower soil underlying the present occupied surface of Europe, which contains the remains of departed races and the arts of communities, historic and pre-historic, whose relics have sustained at the hand of Time and of Nature a general burial by the gradual superposition of modern geologic formations. Far down beneath the modern pavements of London, twenty feet sometimes, rest the tools and tiles of the Roman occupation, while below them, or mingled with them, are the remains of the palustrine dwellings which were tenanted by the ancient Britons when the Thames ran in a much broader channel than at present, and the marshes on its banks constituted the capital and the fastness of such redoubtable chieftains as Cassivelaunus. The now famous lake-villages of Switzerland belong to the same period—some of them found far inland from the shores of the lakes in which they were originally built, others (like Robenhausen) found beneath the peat-bogs that occupy the sites of former lakes. At the bottom of the peat, in the valley of the Somme, at Abbeville (below which M. Boucher de Perthes found his palæolithic flints) were found the traces of an ancient lake-dwelling—buried now by the peat (or the silt of the river) thirty-five feet deep. At the bottom of this same

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peat are found also the implements of the ancient races who formerly dwelt in this valley—implements of stone, bronze, and iron; objects in bone and horn; pottery made by the hand and turned on the wheel; Celtic, Roman, and Gallo-Roman; and mingled with these the remains of the deer, the ox, the beaver, and animals constituting the existing fauna of this region. Several vessels or large masted boats have also been found at different points—one of them freighted with Roman bricks, showing, on the one hand, the rapid accumulation of peat and mud deposits, and on the other either that the volume of the Somme, even in Roman times, as high up as Abbeville, was much greater than it is at present, or that the sea extended at that time, in the form of an estuary, up to this point. This last conclusion is sustained by the presence of marine remains in the peat.

A striking example of the deep burial to which the ancient life of Europe has, in many instances, been consigned, exists at Modena, in Italy. Beneath this city, and for some four miles around it, at the depth of fourteen feet, are found the ruins of an ancient city—paved streets, houses, floors, and pieces of mosaic work. Beneath this settlement the earth is solid; but lower down, at the depth of twenty-six feet from the surface, are the trunks of large trees, among them the walnut, the fruit still hanging on the stems. In this layer are found pieces of charcoal, bones, and bits of iron—showing that, even in the Iron Age, a yet earlier population had resided on this spot (Etruscan probably), which being duly committed to the grave, was succeeded by a Roman population; followed, in turn, by the modern city.

In Hatfield Moss, in Yorkshire, England, which formerly covered an area of ninety thousand acres, at the depth of many feet, when the bog was drained, were found the remains of an ancient forest—the trunks of immense trees—oaks one hundred and one hundred and twenty feet long; firs, ninety feet long, so firm and strong as to be sold for the masts and keels of ships. Some of these trees had been burnt, some quite through, others on one side. Others were chopped and squared, others bored through. Among them were found Roman axes and knives, old links of chains, and a number of coins of Vespasian and other Roman

emperors. In the time of Vespasian this forest was cut down and burned by Ostorius, the Roman general, in order to dislodge the Britons who had taken refuge in it.

At Kincardine Moss, in Scotland, is a Roman way twelve feet wide, and regularly formed by trees or logs of wood laid across each other. The average depth of the peat here is seven feet, but there are parts of it fourteen feet deep. It is conjectured that this Roman road was constructed in the expedition of Severus, A. D. 207, whilst Donald I. reigned in Caledonia.

The Danish archæologists have made the Danish peat famous. The depth of these mosses is from ten to thirty feet. In them have been found innumerable remains, representing, in the language of the archæologists, the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age. The most beautiful stone weapons of Europe have been obtained from the lower beds of these deposits, while the bronzes are some of them superb. The animal remains found in them belong mostly to species still inhabiting Denmark, or living there since the Christian era; but the bones of the reindeer and the cave-bear are also stated by Prof. Worsaae as occurring.

The lake villages were not by any means confined to Switzerland. Traces of these habitations on piles have been found all over Europe. In Italy M. Desor (followed by others) has found them in the lakes of Varese, Garda, Maggiore, Monate, Lecco, Fimon, etc. Seven stations have been signalled on the Lake of Varese, nine on that of Garda. Captain Angelucci has found the remains of one as far south as the Lake of Salpi in the province of Capitanata, on the southeastern coast region of Italy. In Austria they have been discovered along the shores of the Attersee, on the banks of the March, near Olmutz, in Moravia, and at other points. Implements of stone, of bronze, and of iron, all occurred. In Bavaria the pile-villages are found in six of the lakes. In Prussia one has been discovered in the environs of Lubtow. In Poland M. Przewdziecki has discovered the site of one at Grobowek, on the banks of the Vistula. In Scotland they occur in the lochs of Wigtonshire and Dumfriesshire; in England, on the River Nare, near Norwich; in Ireland, on Lough Neagh, while in the same country the *crannoges* (constructed of

heaps of stones) are met with in great numbers. We have mentioned the platforms and piles discovered by M. Boucher de Perthes in his explorations in the peat at Abbeville; but in the past few years many ancient lake stations have been recognised in south-western France, in the Haute-Garonne, in Ariège, in Aude, and the Pyrénées-Orientales. All of the valleys of the Pyrenees, as well as the sub-Pyrenean basin, furnish indications of these aquatic habitations—though the lakes have for the most part disappeared. They are observed in the lakes of Saint-Pé, of Mas-sat, of Augat, of the environs of Tarascon; in the turbaries of divers localities of the four departments mentioned; and even in the alluvions of the mountain valleys. They extend over the whole region from the Mediterranean to the ocean, from Bayonne and Dax to the eastern limits of the Pyrenees. Most of these stations are assigned to the age of iron. A very interesting discovery in this connection, as showing the very recent period to which the lacustrine settlements descended, has been made by M. Chantre in the Lake of Paladru, in the department of Isère. An old legend represented that there existed at the bottom of the lake the ruins of a city destroyed by the divine vengeance: and the legend, in part at least, has been verified by the revelation of the remains and relics of several lake-villages at which M. Chantre has obtained axes, lance-heads, keys, spurs, etc., all of iron, and a *Carlovingian coin*—bringing the settlement down, in the words of M. Quatrefages before the French Academy, “to the Carlovingian epoch”—about 800 A. D.

The north of Italy, equally with the Pyrenean region of France, affords a vivid illustration of the wonderful change which has occurred in the physical aspect of Europe. The *palafittes* (as the French call the lake-dwellings) are found not only in the waters of existing lake-basins, but also in the turbaries or peat-bogs, which, in ancient times, made part of these basins, and even in turbaries which are the sites of former lakes now entirely filled up. These occur in Piedmont, Lombardy, Venetia, and the ex-duchies, and in them are found objects of ancient industry, particularly of the age of bronze. We may mention especially the turbarry of Mercurago, those of the Parmesan explored by

MM. Strobel and Pigorini, and those of the territory of Reggio and of Modena, explored by MM. Chierici, Pigorini, and Canestrini. Mercurago, near Arona, is a peat-moor, the site of which was formerly occupied by a lake. M. Gastaldi describes as found here flint arrow-heads, a bronze lance, and a wooden anchor. Subsequently, M. Moro found amongst the piles "an extraordinary quantity of objects in flint, bronze, and clay, and a *canoe*." In the neighboring moor of Conturbia, a number of piles were found, driven into the peat, which are said to have had the lower end furnished with *iron* points.

First cousins to the lake-dwellings are the so-called *terramares* of Italy. These seem to have been constructed in the swamps and marshes, the piles being driven in the mud, and a platform laid down on which the Terramarians erected their cabins. On this platform was gradually accumulated a quantity of rubbish and refuse-matter, until finally a new platform was laid down, and this was sometimes repeated even a second or third time, until, in the course of centuries, a little hillock (*tertre*) was formed—constituting the sites of these *terramares*. At Montale this eminence is some sixteen feet high, and has a diameter of some seventy-five yards.

Most of these *terramares* which have been recognised lie in the plain of the ancient *Via Emilia*, which extends from the Arda to the Reno, between the Apennines and the Po, covering an extent of one hundred kilometres long by fifty broad. In the moiety of this area which belongs to the Parmesan, that is, in a district of twenty-five hundred square kilometres, as many as *fifty-five* stations have been discovered. These piles are found under the city of Parma itself, where three succeeding platforms have been recognised. The remains found in these stations are in general pottery, objects in wood, bronze, and, sometimes, iron. Such is an accurate picture of the former condition of Europe. The changes in southwestern France and northern Italy are only illustrative of the same or equivalent changes in other regions. Vast areas were occupied by marshes, and innumerable lakes, now utterly obliterated, slept in the primeval forests of Britain and Germany, as well as of Gaul, and notably in the

valleys of the Apennines. As Holland has been reclaimed from the sea, the interior regions of Europe have been reclaimed from a state of semi-fluidity, and in consequence the physical features of the country have immensely altered since the Romans pushed their armies north of the Alps. The lacustrine stations of south-western France—the vanished lakes in whose placid waves platform, and pile, and floating cabin, were reflected—flourished, we are told, in the *Iron Age*. This, even according to the long dates of archæology, was récent. The very fact that we find several of these stations on the Lake of Paladru in the 8th or 9th century, invites us to believe that those of the Age of Iron at least can hardly possess any considerable antiquity; which is confirmed by the fact that at perhaps every station attributed to the Iron Age in Switzerland (notably at La Tène) we find Roman relics which are hardly earlier than the Christian era. We may fairly conclude then that a century or two before this time, possibly a century or two after, the region of France now embraced in the departments of Haute-Garonne, Ariège, Aude, and the Pyrénées-Orientales, was interspersed with lakes, and that many village communities lived in habitations constructed over their waters.

The southern coasts of France, to the east of this region, give evidence that at this date the sea and the marshes extended farther inland than they do at the present time. We have mentioned that the thermal springs of Balaruc were not known to the Romans. M. Reclus mentions farther that the ancient road from Beaucaire to Béziers describes a wide curve to the north, "doubtless to avoid the plains on the shore, which were then entirely under water." Ancient cities, with Gallic names, are found along this road, while all the towns to the south of it, as Aigues Mortes, Franquevaux, Vauvert, Frontignan (*Frons stagni*), bear Latin or Roman names. It is, moreover, says Reclus, proved by various documents that ancient ports have filled up, and been converted into *terra firma*.

The palafittes and terramares of Northern Italy are of much earlier date than the lake stations in valleys of the Pyrenees—contemporary, perhaps, with the epoch of the primitive

Etruscans. But even in Italy we must remember that at fourteen feet below the present city of Modena are found the remains of a Roman city, while twelve feet below this were found the relics of another occupation belonging to the Age of Iron.

Coöperative with the effects produced by the clearing of forests, diminished rainfall, the formation of the peat-mosses, the deposits of river silt, the drying up of lakes and rivers, we have seen that there has been a movement bodily of the solid crust of the globe, sometimes of elevation, sometimes of subsidence, elevation at one point, contemporaneous subsidence at another, so that, in these sudden or secular variations, the land has proved to be as fickle as the sea. And so that, in fact, we do not now look upon the same Europe which existed in the times of Strabo and Herodotus, but upon landscapes and prospects where the sea has at one point overflowed the land, and the land at another has advanced into the sea; where cities have retired miles from the shore, or disappeared deep down in the bowels of the earth; where rivers have wandered far from their original courses, and glassy lakes have been converted into peat-moors and cultivated fields. If the bell tower of Benifarzes is no longer visible at Villar don Diego, where thirty years ago one half of it was a familiar object to the villagers, how many other bell towers and spires may have ascended or retired, silent and unobserved, in the vault of heaven; and how many of the hills and valleys on the surface of the globe may have been brought into new relations with each other, if not in thirty, in three hundred, or three thousand, years? And if these things are so, may not the New Zealander who has been supposed some ages hence to take his seat on London Bridge, to survey the ruins of that once mighty metropolis, see other marvels than those majestic relics—or may it not, rather, be necessary for him to seek some more elevated position from which to contemplate the area now covered by London? The Thames at London, in “palæolithic” times, was some three or four miles wide, and, as we have stated, even in Roman times, was a much broader stream than it is to-day. If our imaginary traveller should cross the Atlantic, he may find the island on which New

York is built joined to the continent, and this famous port, like Ravenna or Ephesus, far removed from the sea.

The reader will be startled to learn that the volcanoes of Central Italy and France have also been active within historic times—the latter since the Christian era. It created some surprise when it was ascertained, not many years since, from an old Gaulish history, which was reëdited at the time, that the volcanic peaks of Auvergne had been in eruption in the years 458–460 A. D., and that this whole region was, during this period, so shaken by earthquakes, that Mamercus, bishop of Vienne, appointed the Rogation Days for the purpose of chanting litanies to stay the disastrous convulsions which were inflicting so much injury on the cities and villages of his diocese.

In Italy, on the other hand, in 1817, a number of ancient tombs were found at Albano, about twelve miles from Rome, covered by the undisturbed peperino or solidified volcanic ash which prevails in this locality. In these graves were a number of sepulchral "hut-urns," (representing, it is supposed, the dwellings of the primitive population,) a number of bronze knives and fragments of iron; showing conclusively that since the introduction of iron implements into Central Italy, the volcanoes of this region had been in eruption—a period corresponding, probably, with the date of the foundation of Rome. Rather later than this, but during the monarchical period of Rome, the crater of *Monte Pila* was opened on the side of the more ancient one of *Monte Cavo*. There were no volcanic fires, but we read of violent earthquake shocks at Rome as late as B. C. 300.

The Lake of Albano is the crater of an extinct volcano. In the fourth century of Rome, during the siege of Veii, the waters of this lake rose to such a height that the oracle at Delphi was consulted, and it gave no hope, while the waters continued thus to swell. In consequence of this response, the Romans drained the lake by an emissary or tunnel cut through the rock, a mile and a half in length, four feet wide, and six feet high, which is still in perfect preservation.

The Lake of Bracciano, about twenty-five miles from Rome,

presents also the characteristics of an extinct crater ; it was called the Lacus Labatinus by the Romans, and derived its name from an ancient Etruscan city of Labate, which was believed by the Roman historians to have been submerged by its waters—a tradition which was in all probability correct.

From all the facts which we have recited, we learn how rash are the men of science who heedlessly infer from the changes which they observe in the physical geography of the valleys of the Somme and the Meuse, that the relics which are contemporary with the beginnings of those changes are necessarily of immense antiquity.

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CRITICAL NOTICES.

Memoirs of Eliphalet Nott, D. D., LL.D., for sixty-two years President of Union College. By C. VAN SANTFOORD, D. D.; with Contribution and Revision by Professor TAYLER LEWIS of Union College. New York: Sheldon & Company. 1876. Pp. 390, 12mo.

Dr. Nott was undoubtedly very great as a man, as a mechanist, as a financier, as an orator, as an educator, as a College President, as a politician and statesman, and as a Christian and a Christian minister. Prof. Joseph Henry well and truly says that he was one of the most impressive of preachers, and especially excelled as a reader of the Scriptures. By emphasis and inflection he could bring out the sense, with the effect, as it were, of a commentary. He was a close observer of what is called "human nature," and had accumulated a large collection of aphorisms in regard to human tendencies, which he employed very successfully in the instruction and government of his students and in his intercourse with the world. He excelled in wisdom more than in learning, and took more delight in general principles than in minute details.

This memoir shows (p. 125) that Dr. Nott regarded the differences between Congregationalists and Presbyterians as very slight, and (p. 55) that he may be viewed as one of the fathers of the *Plan of Union* between those denominations, the fruits of which were, to say the least, very *mixed*. He is held forth (p. 70) as addicted long ago to preaching *to the times*. His life-long practice in public speaking (p. 68) was to write out in full and commit to memory, for which he had the greatest natural facility. Great pains are taken in this memoir to exhibit Dr. Nott as an earnest Abolitionist. It is also shown (p. 190) that "one of his favorite theories was that of two kinds of wine mentioned in the Scriptures, the one good, the other bad; the one, pure juice of the grape, not fermented and not intoxicating; the other deleterious because fermented; the one spoken of in connexion with

a blessing, the other in connexion with a curse." We cannot help saying that the distinguished educator, in whose justly glorious reputation we claim to feel a filial pride, is unfortunate here in his biographer. Not Ham, but Shem and Japheth, should have been imitated as touching his relations to the wine question.

Dr. Nott was very great as a disciplinarian. But he governed by kindness and love, and through appeals to the self-respect of his pupils, and to every other proper and elevating motive. Prof. Tayler Lewis, in an admirable chapter on this subject, shows how, when a wild and reckless boy had well-nigh been ruined at College, it was Dr. Nott's delight to "give him *another chance*." We know, personally, how he thus sometimes rescued the almost lost young man. Prof. Lewis exhibits his greatness in managing a College rebellion; but says he never did it by having it understood that the "offensive regulation is to be repealed after a season, or modified, or made optional in its observance, or something less stringent introduced in its stead." He "never yielded to a College rebellion."

He was undoubtedly a *father* to all his pupils; and it was his practice in writing to any one of his many hundred pupils, even to one who had come to be a sexagenarian himself, to address him by the title, "My son." And yet it must be confessed, and his biographer in vain attempts to deny it, that Dr. Nott was a man of too much policy, and used too much policy as a College President. We once knew him to affix a stigma of censure to the name of a little Southern boy on the *merit roll* of the students, for an indiscretion, and to shield from such public censure two older students more deeply involved in the same, because they were *candidates for the ministry*—one of the Dutch and the other of the Episcopal Church. The motive was good, and the result was possibly in some aspects good, but the principle was very bad. Dr. Wayland, a beloved and a loving pupil, and himself an eminent educator, acknowledges (p. 238) that Dr. Nott sometimes preferred "to do things indirectly which might as well be done directly." He also admits that he devoted himself too much to the material prosperity of the College, and too little to its means of instruction.

Union College was chiefly endowed through lotteries. The management of these came to fall upon the eminent President, and he was involved subsequently in the most serious imputations upon his honesty and unselfishness. But he lived to enjoy, through the devotion chiefly of one of his pupils, the Hon. John C. Spencer of New York, a most complete and satisfactory vindication. Towards the close of his long life of ninety-three years, he made a gift to the College of \$600,000, the result of many and vast financial operations, conducted for a long period with a single eye to such a consecration. The object of this large donation was to create professorships and scholarships, and promote in other ways the advantage of the institution.

The Doctrine of Prayer, its Utility, and its Relation to Providence. By P. H. MELL, D. D., LL.D., Professor of Ethics and Metaphysics in the University of Georgia. New York: Sheldon & Company, 8 Murray Street. Pp. 71, 24mo.

As appears from its title, this capital little treatise is divided into three parts; to each of which one chapter is devoted. The first sets forth fully and fairly the Bible doctrine on the subject of prayer; while the second answers, both in general and very specifically, the question of the utility of prayer. In the third chapter, the author undertakes to meet the objection, that as related to Providence, the doctrine of prayer involves "the utmost absurdity, inconsistency, and confusion." Rain and disease, according to the Scriptures, have been influenced by prayer; but if God has put it into the power of his people to control such important affairs as the seasons and health, does he not virtually abdicate his throne and put them upon it? The answer is very complete and satisfactory: Men never truly pray except as God himself indites their petitions, and he will not kindle in the hearts of his people any desire which it is not his purpose to fulfil. These propositions Professor Mell sustains by proofs from Scripture and reason in the most convincing way. Then, having established irrefragably what he has asserted, we have, in the conclusion of the treatise, two practical applications of the doctrine of prayer: one is that these things being so, it is not surprising

that God should raise up in every dispensation men remarkable for their power in prayer ; the other is, that Dr. Tyndall's famous prayer test is utterly illogical. Our readers of course remember the proposition that certain inmates of a London hospital be selected, whose recovery should depend on prayer only, while the remainder should be treated medicinally, without prayer ; and the question was, which should be most likely to succeed in healing the sick—Christians with their faith and prayers, or physicians with their skill and medicines ? The author of this truly admirable treatise thus points out how this proposition of the unbeliever is based upon an entire misconception of prayer : “The Bible represents that Christians pray because the Holy Spirit puts it into their hearts to do so ; the test proposes that they should pray, because Dr. Tyndall suggests it to them. The Bible teaches that effectual prayer for others is impelled by a benevolent and disinterested desire for their good ; the test proposes that it should be undertaken in a spirit of antagonism—to join issue with Dr. Tyndall. The Bible exhibits a praying man as approaching the throne of grace with humility and self-abasement ; the test proposes that he should step forth as a champion vaunting his own importance and self-sufficiency. The Bible requires one who would pray, to come with faith, nothing doubting ; the test requires that he should come in behalf of Dr. Tyndall, to put God to the test, thus virtually justifying him in withholding confidence until God had satisfactorily passed the test. Finally, the Bible requires us to pray impelled by a desire for God's glory ; by the test, we are urged to do so to convince Dr. Tyndall—or, if he is uncandid, to expose and put him to confusion.” Add to this, that no such test is requisite to prove that God does hear prayer. There is on record already, evidence enough to prove this. And Dr. Tyndall could explain away any proof this test might furnish, as readily as he disposes of all which is otherwise afforded.

The Life and Letters of Lord Macaulay. By his Nephew, G. OTTO TREVELYAN, M. P. Two Volumes, 8vo. Harper & Brothers, New York.

We suppose that most readers of Macaulay's *Essays* and *History* have a very distinct picture in their minds of the personality, moral and intellectual, of the man himself, his biographer to the contrary notwithstanding. Mr. Trevelyan says that "his work did not reflect his features." Now, while there is not the shadow of egotism, or a hint of individual history introduced anywhere into Macaulay's pages, still the salient points of his character everywhere display themselves. We cannot read his stern denunciations of what is base or unfair or hypocritical in his trenchant criticism, or his bold, unswerving historical statements, and not feel assured of the directness, honesty, manliness, integrity, and brave independence of the writer. One quality, perhaps, we do not learn from his pages: the extreme tenderness of his home affections, so brimming over in many of his family letters, is something we are hardly prepared for. We had not counted on the keen reviewer having such a woman's heart as to write thus in the midst of his triumphant Leeds' election, on the occasion of his younger sister's marriage: "I am sitting in the midst of two hundred friends, all mad with exultation and party spirit, all glorying over the Tories, and thinking me the happiest man in the world. And it is all that I can do to hide my tears, and to command my voice when it is necessary for me to reply to their congratulations. Dearest, dearest sister! You alone are now left to me. . . . The separation from dear Margaret has jarred my whole temper."

This union between all our preconceived ideas and the actual reality of the *Life*, makes it exceedingly delightful. It is just what we expected Macaulay to be, we say to ourselves; and we congratulate ourselves on our own perspicacity. Throughout, Mr. Trevelyan is eminently unprejudiced and candid; and does not hesitate, upon occasion, to point out errors in speech and judgment. We have seldom read a biography written in so entirely temperate a tone; and this is all the more remarkable, because of the tender closeness of the tie between biographer

and subject, and the variety of the facts with which he had to deal. It must certainly take its place among the classic *Lives* of literature.

From his birth, Macaulay's career was an exceptional one. He was the son of a remarkable man; and at the feet of Zachary Macaulay and Wilberforce and Thornton and Babington, he imbibed from his earliest years that love of liberty, that detestation of tyranny, that boldness of opinion and speech, those free Whig principles and positive views on great religious points, that characterise all his writings. It is superfluous to refer to the precocity of his boyhood; it is patent to every reader, from the many anecdotes afloat about him. We have all heard of his miraculous memory. Let a hint or two as to it suffice. When he was thirteen years old, while waiting for a post-chaise in an inn, he picked up a newspaper and read two specimens of trashy provincial poetry. After this one reading, he never gave them a thought for forty years, and at the end of that time repeated them without a misplaced word. He knew *Paradise Lost* by heart; and in one of his letters he speaks of entertaining himself during a stormy night in crossing to Ireland, by repeating the first six books. *Pilgrim's Progress* he could have reproduced, had every copy been lost out of the world; and so of other books. His boy-life was a very hilarious one; he was the eldest of a large family, and never was brother more doted on by loving sisters. To these sisters and their children, the deepest affections of his being went forth. It cannot be denied that his father snubbed the youth somewhat. He may have thought some such counter influence needful, amid so much praise as was poured out on the precocious boy. On the occasion of his making a brilliant speech (when only twenty-one) before the Society for the Suppression of the Slave Trade—"the happiest hour, perhaps, of Zachary Macaulay's life"—all he had to say to his son after it was over, was, that he thought it ungraceful in him to have stood *with his arms folded, in the presence of royalty!*

Yet nothing could exceed the reverence of the younger Macaulay towards his father. When the handsome property of the latter was suddenly swept away, it was to this son he was indebted for a support, both for himself and his family.

We have not space to touch upon the joyous Cambridge life of this indefatigable student ; nor his short experience of practice at the bar ; nor his early introduction into political life. He was only twenty-five when his brilliant essays in the *Edinburgh Review* brought him to the notice of those in power, and it was not long before a seat in Parliament was offered him. With infinitely fewer personal and family advantages than the younger Pitt, he was in the midst of public affairs almost as early. He in a short period held office under the administration, and before he was thirty, he was one of the most noticeable young men in England.

At thirty-four, he was offered a place in the Board of Council for India. Nothing, apparently, could have induced him to leave his native land, except the prospect of providing, from the large salary offered, for his father's family ; but for their sakes he cheerfully bore his four years of exile, only on condition, however, that his beloved sister Hannah, afterwards Lady Trevelyan, would accompany him.

The record of his work in India is a very noble one. In addition to his burdensome duties as President of the Council, he voluntarily took upon himself the forming of a *Penal Code* for the Eastern Empire, which to this day is law for a hundred millions of people. He also revised and placed on a firm footing the educational system under which the country has gone on prospering ever since. When one takes into consideration that he only had three thousand pounds to distribute over the whole of India, one may well be amazed at the results he was able to achieve.

All these public duties would seem to be more than enough to overburden Macaulay in that relaxing climate ; but when we read the mere list of the books read, we know not how to credit its correctness. To give it, would be to enumerate the classics of all languages, ancient and modern.

Immediately on reaching his native shores, we find him turning eagerly to what he had long revolved in his mind, as the main business of his life—his *History*. With the utmost assiduity he set himself to work. Never was history written with minuter

care and research. He visited over and again all the principal spots of which he wrote. Londonderry he examined with unwearied care, pacing round its walls four several times. He went to Glencoe before he would seat himself to write of the massacre; he went to Holland, to Belgium, to France, to every locality where minuteness was necessary in his descriptions. He would read volumes of old papers to verify a half page, and write letters upon letters to fix a line and a half of text. One reads his *History* with greatly increased trust and interest, when one is thus assured that, if ever true history is written, we have it here. Those who have been accustomed to think that points of verity were sometimes sacrificed to points of rhetoric, will change their minds after reading this *Life*. How little Macaulay was affected by the immense popularity of his *History*, is apparent in his journal and letters. The expressed admiration of the Duke of Wellington gratified him, he says, "for about a minute." That success gave him pleasure, there is no question; but he judged his performances more severely than any one else did. Thucydides he esteemed the prince of historians; and when the reviewers lauded him overmuch, he would take up the old Greek, and his equilibrium would soon be restored. Some critics seem to think that Macaulay had an overweening estimate of himself. *We* fail to find anything that looks like it. It would have been strange, indeed, if he had not found out that he could do things better than most people; but to none but his bosom intimates does he ever give utterance to even his honest impression of his work. One of the finest reviews of this *Life* which the British Quarterlies give us, finds fault with Macaulay's habit of establishing matters (as the writer says) by cases of precedence, rather than by reason: an unjust charge, so it seems to us. No doubt his mind was crowded with illustrations drawn from precedent—that precious thing to the average Englishman—but that there is evidence of argument being set aside for it, we cannot see.

There is one thing we miss from this *Life*, with all its rich and varied excellences, and it is the only thing we have to regret: we are not sufficiently informed as to the religious be-

liefs of its subject. There is absolutely nothing to show whether Macaulay had a *personal* faith in Christ. And however pure and honorable and upright his entire course was, we still want to know whether his individual trust was in the God of his fathers, in the Saviour of men. This we do not learn from Mr. Trevelyan's *Life*.

The Puritans and Queen Elizabeth; or, The Church, Court, and Parliament of England, from the Reign of Edward VI. to the Death of the Queen. By SAMUEL HOPKINS. 3 Vols. A. D. F. Randolph & Co., New York.

We believe, though at this moment we cannot verify the statement, that the first of these volumes was published some five years ago. The completed work was issued about the middle of last year; and we are inclined to think that, among the multitude of books put forth by the press, this has not received at the hands of the critics that notice which its importance demands. It is a detailed, and possibly rather voluminous, account of a portion of religious and ecclesiastical history, very interesting and of great moment, in more aspects than one. Puritanism, or Non-conformity in England, was a secondary Reformation, as real as the Reformation under Luther, and, in its influence, inferior only to it. "The Reformation by Luther had for its central idea *justification by faith*, and its result, fully carried out, is freedom from priestly domination. . . . Of the second Reformation, the central idea is the supreme authority of the Scriptures in all that pertains to the constitution of the Church; and this fully carried out, would lead to religious freedom, and to the separation of Church and State." How this result was reached in New England, under the influence of its settlement by the Puritans, the author shows. Indeed, we think he has overstated somewhat in presenting it as a complete separation of Church and State. It certainly did deliver the Church entirely from the domination of the State; but it did not, at the same time, establish the other part of the Reformation, that the Church should not assume an unlawful prerogative in the management of the affairs of government. This was done earlier and more completely in Virginia,

Maryland, and the Carolinas, by the operative force of sentiments quite wide apart from Puritanism.

The author is not free from a narrow-mindedness common to many of his latitude, of supposing that, because Puritanism was really true in its origin and its principles, and immediately beneficent, that therefore it was the only or the most important factor in determining the character of our institutions and our people. If we make, good-naturedly, the proper allowance on this score, we may enjoy fully the excellencies of this instructive, interesting, and most timely history.

The terms, non-conformity and dissent, have no meaning in the United States, because their correlative, an Established Church, has no existence. Yet the spirit of arrogance, in some quarters, still is rife; and as it arises mainly from ignorance, there may be many persons in whom the Christian grace of humility may be developed by the perusal of these volumes. For they will find, to their amazement, that the views which they treat with supercilious opposition, were the views of the best men of the very Church which they ignorantly worship; and that the position they now occupy was undoubtedly forced upon a portion of the Reformed Church by the power of a Government that, but for political reasons, would never have separated from the Papacy. Strikingly is this the case as to the foolish notion in regard to the exclusive validity of Episcopal ordination.

For those readers who are only moderately acquainted with ecclesiastical development, it will be serviceable to have the facts of history presented as they are so clearly and vividly in these volumes, and established by incontrovertible authorities so numerous. We have not examined the work with that minute care which justifies a positive statement; but we are of the opinion that much new matter in detail is brought to view, not found in that important historical repository, Neal's *History of the Puritans*; and that many original authorities are appealed to. Over the book is spread that attractiveness which arises from our sympathy with those who are cruelly persecuted for righteousness' sake. Martyrology reaches the deep fountains of those feelings common alike to the simple and the learned. The persecutions, mock

trials, illegal convictions, and barbarous murders of Non-conformists, are presented to our view vividly but without exaggeration. The story of the execution of a young Catholic priest, and the imprisonment for twenty-eight years of a Catholic gentleman of ancient and noble descent, and connected with the blood royal, who had given shelter to the priest, attests the fairness with which our author deals with history.

In connexion with the strictly ecclesiastical portion of history, topics of general interest are treated: as the characters of Leicester and Burleigh; the execution of Mary Queen of Scots; the schemes of Philip of Spain; and above all, the life and character, political and religious, of Queen Elizabeth. Not unfrequently we are surprised that the author, after all that he records of the actions of some conspicuous personage, should be as charitable as we find him in his general estimate. His picture of Burleigh is certainly more favorable than that given by Macaulay. As to Queen Elizabeth, his admiration of her as the political supporter of the Reformed religion against the Roman Catholic, makes him sometimes almost apologise for her treatment of her Non-conforming subjects.

This History, though dealing with a most serious and difficult subject matter, is in its nature, and by the skilful treatment of its author, a delightful and entertaining book for popular reading. For a large circulation, it ought not to be quite so voluminous. This amplitude is in part due to the dramatic form given to not a few portions of the work. Some readers may find this acceptable; but most persons, we think, would have preferred that the whole should have been composed in the picturesque style of the narration in which the greater part is written. Even this is rather fervid, not to say florid, at times. If the general reader is pleased, the philosophical student will find abundant material for profitable study of the characteristics of the English mind during this period. It is not easy to reconcile the universal and intense concern about religious truth, which gave tone to society and government, with the apparent ignorance of some of its fundamental principles and some of its plainest requirements. We are amazed to see a Parliament at one time so bold, and at another

so subservient; and we can hardly understand the unswerving loyalty of martyrs to the Queen, when they were dying for testimony to truth which she was barbarously and wickedly attempting to crush.

Some other questions, speculative, perhaps, but interesting, would reward inquiry: What would have been the effect upon the Reformed religion, if the Puritans, as a body, had, as some of the most eminent and pious among them did, conformed to the requirements in ceremonials of a Church whose doctrines they did not dissent from? And what would have been the result, if the Puritans, in their Form of Church Government, had been not Congregationalists but Presbyterians?

Such topics, and others, are suggested by the reading of this interesting and important work, and might afford abundant material for a well-considered review of it.

LATEST PUBLICATIONS.

D. Appleton & Co., New York, publish "*Schools and Masters of Painting*, with an Appendix on the Principal Galleries of Europe. By A. G. Radcliffe." Small 8vo., \$3. Such a book was needed. "*Darwiniana: Essays and Reviews Pertaining to Darwinism*. By Asa Gray, Fisher Professor of Natural History (Botany) in Harvard University." 12mo., cloth, \$2. This work is favorable to a modified form of Darwinism. "*All the Way Round: or What a Boy Saw and Heard on his Way Round the World*. A Book for Young People, and Older Ones with Young Hearts." Illustrated, \$1.50. "*Introduction to the Study of Chemical Philosophy*. The Principles of Theoretical and Systematic Chemistry. By Wm. A. Tilden." 12mo., cloth, \$1.50. "*Old Greek Life*. A new volume of 'History Primers.' By J. P. Mahaffy, A. M." Illustrated, 50 cents.

The American Baptist Publishing Society, Philadelphia, publish "*Notes on the Gospel of Luke—Explanatory and Practical*. By Geo. W. Clarke. D. D. Designed for Pastors and Sunday-Schools. With Illustrations." 12mo., 510 pp. Cloth, \$1.50.

The Authors' Publishing Company, New York, put forth "*Common Sense: or First Steps in Political Economy*. By M. R. Leverton. Ph. D., A. M.; with an Appendix for Schools." 12mo., 215 pp. \$1.25.

Cassell, Petter & Galpin, New York, offer "*The Races of Mankind: being a Popular Description of the Characteristics, Manners, and Cus-*

toms of the Principal Varieties of the Human Family. By Robert Brown, M. A., Ph. D., F. L. S., F. R. E. S. Over 500 Illustrations." 4 Vols., large 8vo., \$12; 4 Vols. in 2, \$10. The same house lately issued "The Bible Educator. Edited by the Rev. E. H. Plumtre, M. A., Vicar of Bickley and Professor of Exegesis of the New Testament. King's College, London." 4 Vols., 8vo. Among the contributors are Dr. Birdwood, Dr. Caruthers, Dr. Farrar, Dr. Leathes, Dr. Hanna, Canon Rawlinson, Dean Payne Smith, Canon Venables, E. R. Conder, of the Palestine Expedition, and the Editor. The work is at once Bible Dictionary and Commentary, by the best hands.

Harper & Brothers, New York, publish two interesting books, viz.: "The First Century of the Republic; a Review of American Progress. By Rev. Theodore D. Woolsey, D. D., LL.D.; F. A. P. Barnard, LL.D.; Hon. David A. Wells; Hon. Francis A. Walker; Prof. T. Sterry Hunt; Prof. Wm. G. Sumner; Edward Atkinson; Prof. Theodore Gill; Edwin P. Whipple; Prof. W. H. Brewer; Eugene Lawrence; Rev. John F. Hurst D. D.; Benjamin Vaughan Abbott; Austin Flint, M. D.; S. S. Conant; Edward H. Knight, and Charles L. Brace." 8vo., cloth, \$5; sheep, \$5.50; half morocco, \$7.25. A work rich in valuable information. "Historical Studies. By Eugene Lawrence." 8vo. cloth. This last is graphic and popular, but somewhat over-colored. The Harpers have also lately given us a much desiderated volume in "The Mikado's Empire. Book I.: History of Japan, from 600 B. C. to 1872 A. D. Book II.: Personal Experiences, Observations, and Studies in Japan, 1870-74. By Wm. Elliot Griffis, A. M., late of the Imperial University of Tokio, Japan." 8vo., pp. 625.

Hurd & Houghton have brought out an octavo volume on "Autumnal Catarrh (Hay Fever). By Morrill Wyman, M. D. With Illustrative Maps." 233 pp., cloth, \$2.

Nelson & Phillips, New York, publish "The Modern Genesis; being an Inquiry into the Credibility of the Nebular Theory, of the Origin of Planetary Bodies, of the Structure of the Solar System, and of General Cosmical History. By Rev. W. B. Slaughter." 16mo., pp. 290. This is a scientific refutation.

Charles T. Dillingham, New York, has issued "The Chinese Problem. By L. T. Townsend, D. D., Author of 'Lost Forever,' 'Oredo,' etc. Boston: Lee & Shepard." 16mo., pp. 86. A plea for the Chinese on the Pacific coast.

J. B. Lippincott & Co., Philadelphia, give us "Scheyichbi and the Strand; or Early Days Along the Delaware: with an Account of Recent Events at Sea-Grove. To which is appended a Geological Description of the Shore of New Jersey. By Edw. S. Wheeler. Illustrated with twelve full-page Engravings." Small 4to., cloth, \$1.25. "Truths Illustrated, by Great Authors: A Dictionary of nearly Four Thousand Aids

to Reflections, Quotations of Maxims, Metaphors, Counsels, Cautions, Aphorisms, Proverbs, etc., in Prose and Verse. Fifteenth Edition." 12mo., cloth. "*Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*. Vol. XI. Comprising Portions of his Diary from 1795 to 1848. Edited by Hon. Charles Francis Adams." 8vo., cloth extra, \$5.

Nelson & Phillips, New York, publish "*The Chronology of Bible History*. By Rev. C. Munger, A. M." 12mo., 32 pp., paper, 40 cents. Also, "*A Hundred Years of Methodism*. By Matthew Simpson, D. D., LL.D., one of the Bishops of the M. E. Church." 21mo., 369 pp., cloth, \$1.75.

J. W. Schermerhorn publishes "*Elements of Latin Grammar, in Connection with a Systematic and Progressive Reader*. By Gustavus Fischer, LL.D."

Scribner, Welford & Armstrong, of New York, bring out the following works: "*Manual of Design*. By R. Redgrave." Illustrated, 12mo., pp., 173, cloth, \$1. "*Memorials of Burns*. By Aiken." 12mo., 422 pp., cloth, \$2.50. "*Shells from the Sand of Time*. By Dowager Lady Lytton." 12mo., 243 pp., cloth, \$5.25. "*Notes on Collecting and Preserving Natural History Objects*. Edited by J. E. Taylor." 12mo., 215 pp., cloth, \$1.75.

John Wiley & Sons, New York, publish "*Lessons on Elementary Mechanics*. Introductory to the Study of Physical Science. By Philip Magnus. Edited by Prof. De Volson Wood." 18mo., cloth, \$1.50.

T. Whitaker, New York, publishes "*The Spectre of the Vatican; or The Efforts of Rome in England since the Reformation*." 12 mo., 128 pp., cloth, \$1.50.

THE
SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS.

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The present Number will exhibit the first fruits of this new arrangement.

There will be no change in the terms of publication, nor in the general principles of the conduct of the work.

Communications may be addressed to the publisher, JAMES WOODROW, Columbia, S. C., or to ROBERT L. DABNEY, Hampden Sidney, Va., or to JOHN B. ADGER, Pendleton, S. C.

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☞ The Editors of the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW think it is due to themselves and to their subscribers to announce that they do not endorse in every particular what is uttered in their pages. Each author is responsible for the views he expresses. This is a matter of convenience where there are minor differences between editors themselves, or between them and their brethren. Free discussion, too, is important to the interests of truth, if kept within just limits. These limits must be strictly observed. Editors would be worthy of censure, should they allow opinions to be expressed, subversive of any doctrine of the gospel; nor would it be becoming to allow their own views, or those of their contributors, to be rudely attacked in their own pages.

Their desire is, to make the REVIEW worthy of the Presbyterian Church in the United States—the representative of its views and its literature, the means of disseminating sound doctrine, and a stimulus to the genius and talent of our ministers and people.

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SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

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