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THE SOUTHERN

PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW,

CONDUCTED BY

AN ASSOCIATION OF MINISTERS,

IN

COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA.

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VOLUME XXV.
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COLUMBIA, S. C.

PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN PUBLISHING HOUSE.

1874.

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THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXV.—NO. 1.

JANUARY, MDCCCLXXIV.

ARTICLE I.

RELATIONS OF SCIENCE TO THE BIBLE.

1. *Modern Scepticism: a Course of Lectures Delivered at the Request of the Christian Evidence Society. With an Explanatory Paper*, by the Right Rev. C. J. ELLICOTT, D. D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. 1 vol., pp. 526. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 27 Paternoster Row. 1872.
2. *Modern Materialism: Some of its Phases and Elements*. By GEORGE B. CHEEVER, D. D. Published in Nos. I. to XI., in the *New York Observer*, March, April, May, and June, 1873.

Our remarks in this article will be confined to the single question, What are the relations of modern physical science to the Bible—to the volume which claims to be a very gradual revelation of spiritual truth, by a personal God, for his own glory, in the redemption of fallen man, created in the image of his Creator? We intend to discuss neither the evolution hypothesis and other forms of modern scepticism, nor the influence of physical science on modern morality, civilisation, and Christianity, as affected by arts, manufactures, and commerce. Has any truth of science been shown to conflict with any plain declaration of revealed truth? Can science discredit revelation? Is true science responsible for the use of physical hypotheses by sceptical scientists? Can theologians who are ignorant of science, reply wisely to speculations that grow out of scientific discoveries? Does the Bible denounce physical science, as it does divination,

enchantment, sorcery, soothsaying, and astrology? Does it caution man to beware of the tendency of science to generate scepticism? Does it discourage, in any way, the earnest investigation of the laws of the material creation? All these questions we shall examine briefly, and answer negatively.

Dr. Cheever will, it is hoped, pardon the use made of his labors by a retired old teacher of science, to whom such writings as his numbers in the *New York Observer* have long appeared manifestly unwise and injurious, because they induce a general, vague, and false belief that there is some real discrepancy between true science and revealed truth.

We must be allowed to say that Dr. Cheever, how learned soever he may be in theology, is not qualified to reply successfully to such sceptical scientists as Darwin, Tyndall, Huxley, and Virchow, or to writers like Renan and Comte, all of whom he attacks in his articles. He may quote isolated portions of their writings to prove the correctness of some postulation; but the overthrow of their very different hypotheses can be effected by scientists alone.

They do understand science; and they know the wide difference between science and hypothesis or theory; yet they can, by the injurious use of scientific terms, and the perversion of hypotheses that arise naturally from the rapid progress of modern science, not only disguise their real designs and confuse common readers, but excite doubts in the minds of even intelligent readers as to the truth of portions of the Bible, which they wish to assail, or as to popular interpretations of it, which they believe to be incorrect. Against the latter they do not hesitate, of course, to use correct teachings of science. Many of them are honest, truth-seeking men.

We cannot expect all scientists, any more than we can reasonably expect all of any other class of men—learned men—to be Christians. Like Maillet and his successors long ago, and like the ingenious author of the “*Vestiges of Creation*” at a later period, in their attempts to discredit the Bible, such writers as Darwin will exert all their ingenuity, and call to their aid every available fact and principle, to give to their speculations the similitude of science; for they know this is a scientific age; that

physical science has become an immense power in effecting both evil and good in all human affairs; that the civilised world is deeply imbued with a sense of obligation to it; that it is known to be a great system of truth, which has more than quadrupled man's power, and greatly increased his employments and refined his enjoyments; that nations feel its benign influence, and can neither neglect nor reject it; and that any attempt, by individuals, sects, or nations, to repudiate it, would be futile.

Hence the dangerous character of such sceptical scientists as Darwin, the author of valuable scientific books, and also of the purely hypothetical "Descent of Man," in which the evolution hypothesis is skilfully developed and defended. Of course such infidel speculators claim for their speculations some of the respect due to their scientific productions. They are opposed to the Bible, and they know that, while many Christians cannot detect their fallacies, their misuse of hypotheses, and their perversions of science, a still larger number of educated people are willing, if not anxious, to see the religion of the Bible overthrown, if possible, by the resistless power of scientific truth. Hence, such writers are gratified when their speculations are accepted, either as new theories or as outgrowths of science, or as scientific in any sense of the term. Of course they are still more pleased when they see their speculations denounced as *scientific* by religious writers, over the responsible signatures of learned teachers of revealed truth, especially when such Christian writers assail science as the enemy of the Bible. This is exactly the conviction which they wish impressed broadly and deeply on the public mind; for they know that the public mind is convinced of the reality of physical science, and that the public heart loves it as a great benefactor. Let Christians beware, therefore, how they publish any thing calculated to aid sceptical writers in producing the belief that true science and the Bible are antagonistic in any sense of the term.

Few men are qualified to write wisely on any supposed discrepancy between science and revealed truth. To discuss any such question, so as not to excite in the public mind the latent tendency to unbelief, requires more knowledge and wisdom than most men — even learned theologians — possess. It requires, also,

a steady adherence to a correct use of terms; and especially does it demand, in all Christian controversialists, a studied recognition of the wide difference between science and theory or hypothesis, on one side, and of the difference in importance between the plain teachings of the Bible and certain human interpretations of it, on the other side.

At the risk of being tedious, let us illustrate briefly what we mean. Dalton's "Laws of Combination" are truths of science, so firmly established by facts, that the human mind can no more refuse assent to them, when the facts are verified and understood, than it can deny the truth of the problem that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. These laws, with their facts, may properly be termed scientific. Dalton's Atomic Theory, however, beautifully as it then explained the laws of combination and other phenomena, was not regarded by its author as science, and many chemists rejected it from its publication. Of course the hypotheses as to the size, shape, weight, and polarity of the theoretically indivisible atoms, were mere speculations, which no one versed in science termed scientific.

In like manner, Agassiz's "Glacial Theory," published years ago, and supported by many facts, is still called a theory by its author; and of course the hypotheses to which it gave rise, as to the causes, during the supposed glacial era, of the intense cold required to congeal such masses of ice as the theory postulates, are even less entitled to the terms science and scientific than the theory itself.

The sciences of chemistry and geology are independent of all such theories and hypotheses. They are great systems of truth, to which the human mind cannot refuse assent. The theories and hypotheses are merely ingenious speculations that amuse and instruct, but cannot produce conviction of their truth, even when lucidly explained and ingeniously supported by arguments; and science is not responsible for any use that sceptical writers make of them. They are, it is true, outgrowths, often mushroom offshoots, from scientific discoveries, and are used by such sceptical scientists as Darwin, in vain attempts to mar the beauty, or to shake the foundations, of the temple of revealed truth. Indeed,

while there are sceptical readers, there will be sceptical writers, just as novels and romances will be written while thousands are anxious to read ingenious fictions.

Having shown the importance of a technically correct use of terms in all discussions, by Christian writers, of apparent discrepancies between science and the Bible, let us next make a few brief remarks on the equal necessity of cautiously keeping in view the difference between the express and explicit teachings of the word of God, and human interpretations of it.

Apparent discrepancies between geology and the Bible imperatively claimed our attention forty years ago, when official duties first required us to instruct classes of young men in physical science. For twenty-three consecutive years were we forced, most reluctantly, to differ with friends, clergymen and others, who clung to the generally received interpretations of indefinite English words in Genesis, which interpretations science compelled us to reject. With them, the commonly received interpretation as to the recent date and oneness of the creation of the earth as a finished world; the duration of a day of creative time; the universality of the deluge—was as much a part of the Mosaic record as the sublime announcement, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.”

At that time, many incompetent men—bishops, deans, presidents of colleges, and other eminent theologians, but novices in science—wrote voluminously in vain attempts to prove that the Bible teaches the recent creation of the universe; that there was but one creative period; that it was of six literal days' duration; and that the deluge covered the whole globe. Many young and ardent men, who knew more of science than of the evidence of the divine origin of the Bible, were led to believe that the discrepancies were real, and *they rejected the Bible as a human production*. It is fearful to think how many were made sceptics by such Christian writers. Darwin and others may be of the number.

At an early period, however, a few Christian scientists, such as Sedgwick, J. Pye Smith, Mantell, Hitchcock, Hugh Miller, Harris, and others, equally versed in philology, theology, and science, pursued a wiser course, and proved that Genesis does not

fix the date of creation ; that there may be a gap, the duration of which cannot be ascertained, between the second and third verses of Genesis ; that as gradualness is manifest in all God's works, why not in creation ? that the then commonly received chronology of man's creation, (one of a hundred or more,) did not claim to fix it exactly ; that the length of a day of creative time is not necessarily inferred from the record ; that the word day is used in different senses in the Scriptures ; that in the first chapter of Genesis, four verbs—to create, to form, to make, and to build—are used, the verb to *create* being found in verses 1, 21, 27, only ; that other portions of the chapter can be interpreted to describe a reformation or adjustment for a new era, the creation of immortal man in the image of God ; and that the rules of philology, used in interpreting the Bible, do not necessitate belief in either the recent creation of the earth, or in the universality of the deluge. A great change in religious belief took place slowly ; the exegesis of Genesis was improved, as may be seen, in the "Speaker's" and other Commentaries ; and now there are few educated Christians who do not regret that learned and pious but mistaken writers, ignorant alike of philology and science, supplied the enemies of the Bible with so many authorities against it. At that time—a memorable period in the history of Christianity—the battle was between true science and false interpretations of Genesis. And the principle was verified, that true science, correctly understood, cannot conflict with revealed truth, rightly interpreted.

We should bear in mind that the Bible was not written to teach science. The divine purpose was higher and holier—a revelation to man, an immortal fallen creature, of some of the attributes of the Creator, and of some of the laws of his spiritual government. Man's reason could record facts, and deduce from them physical laws ; but it could not, by searching, find out God. The needed revelation was gradually made, through human instrumentalities, and by means of imperfect human language. It touched incidentally only the domain of physical science ; yet, numerous as are these points of contact, the ingenuity of man, in an age eminently scientific, has not been able to establish one real

discrepancy between the two distinct systems of truth; and now, near the close of the nineteenth Christian century, theories and hypotheses only—the mushroom outgrowths of human science—are the most solid foundation, if we except “historical criticism,” on which the most learned opponents of the Bible erect their batteries against it.

The “Evolution Hypothesis” of Darwin, so often referred to by Dr. Cheever in his articles, is an illustration of what we have said. It is neither more nor less than a modification of the development or transmutation hypothesis, which began with one Maillet, a century ago; was revived by some French and German scholars about the time of Voltaire; was extended in England by the unknown author of the “Vestiges of Creation;” and is now ingeniously supported by Darwin and others, who know well that they are using hypotheses and not science, in their efforts to gain notoriety by a display of talent, sophistry, and learning. The fact may be mentioned here, that Agassiz, in his communications to recent meetings of the American Academy of Science, asserts positively that the evolution hypothesis is but a continuation of the old “transmutation theory;” and also that he continues to prove, by new discoveries, that it is opposed and refuted by many facts and principles of science.

Let us now state briefly why Dr. Cheever is not qualified to criticise wisely the sceptical writings—the speculations of such scientists as Darwin, Huxley, and Tyndall.

In doing this, we shall not examine his several articles in the *Observer*, but shall make such general remarks on isolated portions as will enable us to indicate clearly why we believe that such Christian writers make impressions unfavorable to piety, on the minds of many readers, especially on two distinct classes: *First*, on the very large class who are anxious to believe that the Bible is being overthrown by the progress of scientific discovery; and *second*, on the equally large class of nominal Christians, who are unstable and ignorant and ready to be swayed by every wind of doctrine. To our mind it is obvious, that such writers, perhaps because they are ignorant of science, attach vastly too much importance to the real absurdities of the

evolution and other hypotheses, and yield to the writings of their supporters some of the respect due to their discoveries in science. Hence, such writers as Dr. Cheever are too ready to affirm that *science* is assailing the Bible, when in reality true science is calmly but efficiently defending it from vain speculations, prompted by an evil heart of unbelief. Their use of such terms as science and scientific, and avoidance of the words theory and speculation, prove that they are not scientists, and that they fail utterly to perceive the relations of true science to the Bible. The Bible uses words adapted to the masses of men; physical science employs technical terms, each of which, in all discussions relating to the influence of science on religious belief, should be used in its strictly limited technical sense. A few brief illustrations from Dr. Cheever's articles, will apply to a large class of writers of whom he is a fair specimen.

In the first sentence of his first number, he announces his subject thus: "Modern Materialism is Scientific Atheism."

As he does not define these terms, the reader cannot readily decide what idea he intends to express. Modern materialism, like the ancient, assumes and affirms that matter is eternal and indestructible, and, therefore, that creation is impossible; but, unlike the ancient, it denies the existence of a God of any kind, while atheism merely denies "that in, or over, or with nature, there is any thing besides nature;" that there is not, as theism affirms, a personal God. Does Dr. Cheever mean that physical science has reconciled the two, and that the result of the compromise is modern pantheism, which admits the eternal existence of matter with "a diffused impersonal divinity—a harmony, a unity, an unfolding plan and purpose, which must be recognised as transcending all limitations, being unerring, inexhaustible, infinite, and therefore divine?" If this be his meaning, he not only puts physical science in very bad company, but he supposes it to possess powers which its best friends never ascribed to it. Its sphere of action is limited to the simple service of recording *observed* material phenomena or facts, and of systematising and generalising the modes of action—the laws—of the forces acting on matter. Physical science was not present, like Wisdom,

at "the beginning," and therefore recorded no observed phenomenon as to the origin or duration of matter. It is impossible for science to know any thing of the origin of matter, mind, or spirit. It records that alone which the human mind observes when matter is acted on by forces, the origin of which it did not record. How, then, could it coöperate, as Dr. Cheever supposes, with materialism and atheism in the formation of a pantheistic union? If science so departed from her sphere of action and duty, and so transcended her legitimate powers as to assume to speak at all of the origin of matter, or of the existence or non-existence of mind or spirit, she degraded herself below the rank of well-behaved theory, and descended to the trivial and often vicious business of hypothesis.

Dr. Cheever, if he would divest himself of all prejudice against science, could easily prove, what Darwin, Tyndall, and Huxley admit, that materialism, atheism, and pantheism, are all *unscientific*—that science can prove neither their truth nor falsehood. Perhaps he would find the true cause of all three kinds of speculation assigned by David: "The *fool* hath said in his *heart*, There is no God." Nor must we be charged with calling such scientists fools, in the usual sense of the term. The scientists, Darwin, Tyndall, Huxley, and others, have clear heads and vivid imaginations; and their works show that they describe scientific facts, principles, and discoveries, with cautious and rigid accuracy; and yet, that they often indulge their fancies in bold, perhaps wild and impious, speculations, which they know and admit are not science. They have long used, like other scientists, theories and hypotheses in collecting and grouping facts in the zealous search for new truths of science; and some of them deserve the respect of the world, because they have made valuable discoveries; and the sympathy of Christians, because they have not been made wise unto salvation.

Dr. Cheever needlessly admits, in effect, that the establishment of the evolution hypothesis as scientific truth, would prove the non-existence of a personal God, and the human origin of the Bible. He says: "It makes but little difference whether we undertake to get rid of God by denying revelation, or of revelation

by denying God. 'Modern thought' takes the latter path by pretended *scientific demonstrations*." The italicised words show that his controversy is with science, and not with hypothesis. He certainly knows that hypothesis cannot demonstrate any thing. If we have stated correctly the limited sphere of physical science, it can demonstrate neither the non-existence nor the existence of a personal, spiritual Creator. It is, by its very nature, limited to deductions from material phenomena, observed and verified; not assumed or guessed at by human minds. Now, if this be true, the physical demonstration of the possibility of the material evolution of monads from dead earthy matter, or of man from monkeys, would be very far from proving the non-existence of a SPIRIT, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable—a Being capable of creating a universe of spiritual creatures. Christian scientists would still cling to the Bible, and venerate, love, and worship the God of revelation, because science cannot *prove* his non-existence. Such proof is an impossibility. All experimental attempts, however, to evolve animalcules from inorganic matter have failed, and so have all efforts to evolve higher from lower species of plants and animals. Moreover, if evolution should be proved to be a possible mode of the origin of plants and animals, the doctrine would still fail to account for the origin of the endlessly diversified fossil genera and species, in constantly ascending series, not one of which has been proved to afford evidence of its evolution from a lower type, by any process of selection. Nor could it possibly account for the numerous anachronisms which Agassiz and other scientists have observed and described, during their long, earnest, and patient study of fossils—the "musty fossils" of a recent writer. Hence, fossils have become important witnesses against atheists, pantheists, and evolutionists. And if Dr. Cheever will examine "Modern Scepticism," a valuable collection of lectures published recently in London by the "Christian Evidence Society," he will see to what extent each lecturer uses and relies on science for evidence against the various forms of modern speculative materialism.

Is Dr. Cheever not aware of the fact, that the Christian Church has entered a new era, and that a large majority of the most

learned, distinguished, and pious theologians of the period, are now zealously employing physical science in defence of the Bible against various forms of sceptical hypotheses? He may rest assured it is the only kind of evidence that can overthrow the false assumptions of learned but sceptical scientists. "Historical Criticism" may be met in a different way.

He often cites an objectionable passage from Huxley's or Tyn-dall's publications, without perceiving correctly the idea of the writer; and hence his replies are pointless and inconclusive. One example only will be given. He makes Huxley say: "The progress of science has in all ages meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought, of what we call spirit and spontaneity."

Strange as it may seem, he indirectly admits the truth of Huxley's absurd assertion, by not even attempting to point out its falsity, which is palpable. Without a word of denial or refutation, he leaves his bewildered unscientific reader to ponder on the supposed disastrous effect of the progress of science on Christianity, and utters a useless homily in these words: "God is a Spirit; but the progress of science will necessarily banish him from all regions of human thought, with all that is called theology."

Now, much of Huxley's sentence is true. The general proposition is correct; but it is artfully perverted and vitiated by the insertion of a modifying clause. Physical science, though still young, is rapidly attaining strength, and its progress has demonstrated that it deals with matter only, and cannot prove any thing with regard to spirit and spontaneity. Its teachings all relate something of matter—its properties, forces, and laws. When asked what life, or soul, or spirit is, it is absolutely deaf and dumb. It cannot be used to deceive, like ancient sorcery and divination, and it cannot be made to favor priestcraft, witchcraft, or spirit-rappings. In this respect, Huxley is right. But the clause which claims for physical science the power of banishing all thought on other subjects from the human mind, is simply one of those hasty, extravagant, and unscientific expressions of

which even wise men are sometimes guilty. Huxley is as ardent in scepticism as in science. He probably meant to say, emphatically, that physical science cannot prove the existence of a personal God, or the truth of revelation. This is true, and it is true also that it cannot be used to prove the opposite. It can, however, prove the falsity of vain, material speculations, when employed in assailing some part of the Bible. Revelation rests on a different kind of evidence, which is independent of physical science. This evidence has not been rightly examined by Huxley and Tyndall; and having rejected the Bible, they cannot see in the results of science, that evidence of design in the operations of nature, which is both consolatory and convincing to Christian scientists. The unbelief of one affects his feelings and thoughts in his researches, experiments, studies, and writings, against the Bible; while the faith of the other affects him in its favor. Both are fallible, and each is liable to go too far, and suffer his belief to *color* his scientific expressions. Both agree perfectly as to scientific truth. No Christian scientist bases his faith on science; but his faith is strengthened when he sees science used successfully, as it now is, in the overthrow of atheistic and pantheistic speculations; and when he finds, in all the operations of existing and living nature, as well as in the fossiliferous strata, evidence of the existence of a ceaselessly active, infinite, creative agency, his belief in a personal God is confirmed, and his heart is filled with emotions of adoration. This result of scientific progress is what Huxley abhors and rejects, because he does not believe the Bible. He knows that science, by searching, cannot find out God to perfection; but he refuses to believe that the Bible itself supplies the evidence of its divine origin and plenary inspiration.

Dr. Cheever quotes Tyndall against Genesis, thus: "In our day, the best informed clergymen are prepared to admit that our views of the universe and its Author are not impaired, but improved, by the abandonment of the Mosaic account of creation." Does he deny either this reproach of the clergy, or the abandonment of Genesis? Not at all. His sole reply is in these words: "Count us out, therefore, as not best informed, but still holding to the authority of Moses, until some greater scientist than Prof.

Tyndall, having been present at the creation, and made experiments, shall deserve belief accordingly."

What his object was in thus publishing Tyndall's hostility to Genesis, is not easily perceived. Was it to assist his own adhesion to the Mosaic record, in spite of an admitted abandonment of it by the clergy of his day?

Must not the perusal of Tyndall's assertion, and Dr. Cheever's reply, have left a vague impression on the minds of many readers of the *Observer*, that a victory, more or less complete, has been achieved by physical science over the oldest book of revelation? In his eagerness to assail science, because it is cultivated and taught by very eloquent lecturers and skilful experimenters, some of whom are sceptics, he fails to rescue the ministry from aspersion, and the Bible from false accusations of decay and weakness.

Some weak clergymen, and a few wicked ones, have, no doubt, degraded themselves, and injured the Church, by abandoning the Pentateuch; but Tyndall must know that their defection is to be ascribed not so much to science as to the application to the writings of Moses, since the time of Niebuhr, of the rules of historical criticism, which yielded satisfactory results in profane history.

Geology, as has been stated, proves the great antiquity of the earth, and repeated creations before the recent human era of creation described by Moses, after the general description found in Gen. i. 1 and 2; and the consequent abandonment of the old interpretations of Genesis, which are found in the notes of Henry's, Clarke's, and Scott's Commentaries, is probably what Tyndall refers to. It may safely be said, that though science has forced the rejection, by a very large majority of educated people, of the interpretation generally received when such commentaries were written, yet many facts prove that neither the clergy nor the laity of England have abandoned a line or a word of the inspired volume. In proof of this, two facts only will be stated.

The *first*, already referred to, is the formation in London, in 1871, of the "Christian Evidence Society," "for the maintenance of the truth of the Christian revelation." The Society is composed of the wisest and *best* men of all creeds, classes, and ranks;

and its fields of labor are designed to reach all grades of inquiring minds. One volume of eleven lectures, adapted to the educated classes, was published in 1872; and though some of the reverend lecturers—archbishops, bishops, deans, canons, and professors of theology, occasionally use the words science and scientific loosely, yet all recognise the value of science as a part of Christian evidence. All believe the Pentateuch has been strengthened by the assaults of scientists on it, and none agree with Dr. Cheever in hostility to science. To one of the lecturers, Rev. R. Payne Smith, D. D., was assigned the task of pointing out “the strictly scientific basis of a revelation,” which he did with signal ability. He describes the error of such writers as Dr. Cheever so clearly and correctly, that we shall quote a part of it for the special benefit of that class of writers. He says: “They take up an antagonistic position to science, and try to make out systems of geology, astronomy, and anthropology, from the Bible, and by these judge of all that scientific men say. Really, the Bible never gives us any scientific knowledge in a scientific way. If it did, it would be leaving its own proper domain. When it does seem to give us any such knowledge, as in the first chapter of Genesis, there is a very important differentia about it. What it says has always reference to man. The first chapter of Genesis does not tell us how the earth was formed absolutely; geology ought to tell us that. It tells us how it was prepared and fitted for man. Look at the work of the fourth day. Does any man suppose the stars were then set in the expanse of heaven absolutely that man might know what time of year it was? To the geologist, man is just as much and just as little as a *trilobite* or a *megatherium*. To the student of the Bible, man is everything, and the first chapter of Genesis teaches him that man was the sum of all other terrestrial creation, the sum and crown of the Creator’s work.”

The *second* fact is the “Speaker’s Commentary,” in eight volumes. A few years ago, the Speaker of the House of Commons suggested the necessity of the execution of a new commentary on the Bible, in which the latest information—physical, philological, and historical—might be made accessible to all.

He and many wise men seem to have felt that "while the word of God is one and does not change, it must touch, at new points, the changing phases of physical, philological, and historical knowledge; and so the comments that suit one generation, are felt by another to be obsolete."

The Church authorities were consulted; a plan was matured; the work was assigned to a company of divines, "who might expound each the portion of Scripture for which his studies might best have fitted him;" and the "Speaker's Commentary" is the result. In it the text of the old English version of 1611 is unchanged; but copious notes expound anew all doubtful passages, those especially which have been assailed on philological, historical, or scientific grounds.

A careful examination of the Commentary on Genesis, by the Rt. Rev. E. Harold Browne, D. D., Bishop of Ely, and author of "The Pentateuch in reply to Colenso," will convince any one that science has not caused the abandonment of a line or a word in the English version of the Mosaic record of creation, or of the deluge; but that it has shed much light on some of its most general statements, made in common words, adapted to all capacities, in all ages. The Church, the Parliament, and the people of England, have thus re-uttered solemnly their belief in the Mosaic record, after a protracted period of fierce assaults on it by sceptics of all creeds, and names, and nations, including Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, and other English scientists. The Bishop of Ely closes his introduction to Genesis in these words: "Certainly as yet nothing has been proved which can disprove the record of Genesis, if both the proof and the record be interpreted largely and fairly."

All that has been said seems to prove, therefore, that attacks on science and scientists, by Christian writers, are generally unwise, because such attacks, as experience shows, proceed from misapprehension of the relations of science to the Bible. Assumptions or speculations inimical to revealed truth, may safely be replied to as such; but all must admit that theory is the vital part of any science—that which excites curiosity, and stimulates to earnest efforts to add new truth to the common stock of knowl-

edge. Nor can experienced Christians doubt that the sceptical hypotheses of this period, like those of the past, will eventually augment the cumulative evidence of the existence of a personal Creator, and of the inspiration of his word, without overthrowing any thing more sacred than some interpretation of it. In all such discussions, care in the use of terms is necessary, to avoid making the impression on general readers, that scientific can be opposed to revealed truth. "It is no use," says a wise theologian, "treating physical science as a bugbear. Let our theologians master it, and they will find it a manly study, which will give their minds breadth, and will teach them what are the difficulties that press heavily on many thoughtful minds, and which must be fairly met." And the reason is obvious. All real science is truth, from which the human mind cannot withhold assent. Each truth of any kind is consistent with every other truth of every kind. To suppose the reverse is an absurdity. The Bible is essential truth. All physical truth is but an expression of God's laws impressed on matter, as understood by man. Both physical and revealed truth are but parts, and probably very limited parts, of one infinite system of harmonious truth; and it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that finite human reason may misinterpret and misunderstand both one and the other.

Writers are apt to forget, however, that physical truth is strictly limited to the study of material substance, and can give no direct and positive response to any inquiry relative to the existence or non-existence of spirit. Nor is this a peculiarity of physical science. Mental science can give no information of the origin of mind or spirit. Both kinds of science are but deductions from facts and phenomena, long and patiently and accurately observed, collated, and compared by human minds; and no human mind ever observed the origin of either matter, or mind, or spirit. To this point all scientists, physical and metaphysical, proceed harmoniously in company. At this barrier to further progress in the light of scientific truth, some admit the existence of a personal God, and accept revelation as necessary for the supply of their spiritual wants, while others reject revela-

tion, and seek the gratification of their irrepressible spiritual longings in either deism or some form of pantheism.

Tyndall admits this. In his "Forms of Water," he says: "The blindness is ours; and what we ought to say, and to confess, is that our minds are absolutely unable to comprehend either the origin or the end of the operations of nature." We can, however, *believe* what we cannot comprehend. This, too, Tyndall and all scientists admit in all processes of scientific reasoning. He admits it repeatedly in his splendid Lectures on Light, while demonstrating experimentally some of the wonderful truths of science; as, that one solution is transparent to the light, but opaque to the heat from the sun or incandescent bodies; while another solution is opaque to light, but transparent to heat. He believes this; but he cannot comprehend the origin of the difference in the two solutions.

Hence, unbelieving scientists have industriously and faithfully aided Christian scientists, in so augmenting and perfecting science that it goes far already, and will go farther, in demonstrating a necessity for a revelation, as a part of God's plan of creation—"of the operations of nature," and of the end too.

We live among mysteries, which no finite mind can comprehend. To our minds, our own minds are mysteries. Some external, higher intelligence is needed to tell us what we are, and what is our destiny. Let science go on helping man to feel and believe this. Let it go on, solving one apparently fundamental problem after another, to convince him that ignorance alone is presumptuous; for science is gradually supplying evidence that faith in revealed truth, which has withstood successfully all scientific assaults for centuries, and which is still the only refuge from the deadly chill of atheism or the dreamy uncertainty of pantheism, is the beginning of wisdom.

Both mental and physical science tell us plainly that we cannot learn for ourselves what mind and matter cannot teach us; and we have seen that neither can teach us anything of its own origin, or of the origin of the other, or of the existence or non-existence of a spiritual creation or existence. In all researches, in any direction, a limit is soon reached, which arrests the pro-

gress of successful inquiry by science ; and, at that barrier, the baffled and anxious soul pauses, and desires more light as to its origin and end. It makes new efforts, and solves new problems, to find that it is again arrested, without any real approximation to the end of its search, though it has, in the mean time, learned many new truths of science, each of which says plainly that it cannot tell the origin of the operations of nature. The real tendency of true science, then, is to convince man of the reasonableness of a revelation, as the only means of gratifying those inward longings for a knowledge of the future, of which all human beings are more or less conscious.

From true science Christianity has nothing to fear. The real danger to the Bible is totally different ; or, rather, (for the Bible is not in danger,) the danger of a temporary prevalence of scepticism is very different ; and it certainly is not understood by such writers as Dr. Cheever.

It is to be feared that ministers of the gospel, as a class, devote themselves too exclusively to the study of the old science of theology, and know too little of progressive physical science, which has come, and will continue to come, into contact with the Bible. If they continue to decry it, instead of studying it so as to understand its relations to the Bible, they will lose their influence over the intellect of the country ; for the tendency of the refined physical researches of this period is, unquestionably, to generalisation and simplification ; and from this source will continue to arise dangerous forms of speculation. To distinguish these forms of speculation from science ; to know their real nature and strength ; and to meet them successfully, will necessitate in a writer at least a comprehensive knowledge of the special science from which the assailing speculation is an offshoot. This want of scientific knowledge is the danger to which we refer. We see this, for example, in the continued, earnest efforts to prove that all the phenomena of heat, light, electricity, magnetism, gravitation, and affinity, including crystallisation, (once believed to result from distinct forces—perhaps subtle forms of fluid substance,) are all produced by one force acting on the molecules of bodies—in one mode or direction to produce heat, in another mode to produce

light, etc. This belief is still theoretical ; but it is supported by so many facts, that many scientists assume it to be proved. Allied to this is Darwin's theory of the Conservation of Force, which assumes, in addition, that the aggregate amount of force in nature is constant, and, like that of matter, changes in form or mode of action, but is incapable of increase or diminution. To such assumptions, on scientific grounds, we see no objection ; but when a few learned sceptics assume further, that the same force or selection can finally be made capable of explaining all the phenomena of vital action, the case is very different.

How vital force is originated or produced, is a problem which physical science can never solve. The other forces, as heat and light, can be evolved, and one can be made to evolve another ; and we may admit, for the sake of argument, that one is convertible into another form of force ; but the *production* and evolution of the vital force (different things,) by the combined action of all the physical forces on dead matter, has never been effected. All experiments have demonstrated the futility of the attempt. The vital force preëxists in all ova or cells from which organised structures originate. Agassiz says there is no exception to the law ; and much of his long life has been devoted to its verification. In this way science meets and refutes hypothesis in its most subtle forms. Moreover, the production—the origin—of physical force has not been and cannot be accounted for by physical science.

Scientists will, however, go on questioning nature, through experiments on material bodies. They will strive to reach and solve the fundamental problem of molecular dynamics. And should they be able to reach and solve it—a mere possibility—speculative scientists would build hypotheses upon it, from which to assail the Bible, as the evolutionists and others have done, and are now doing.

A Scotch scientist, Croll, has published recently some excellent articles on force. In one he shows that force cannot produce force, and that the production of motion by force is a very different thing from the *determination* of motion. Hence, if all physical forces should be proved to be forms or modifications of one force, and this force should be proved to include the vital force,

(which Croll and Agassiz say is impossible,) the material evolutionist would be no nearer the attainment of his object than now; for the question would recur, what *determines* all the molecular motions in substance—living and growing substance—the kinds, directions, intensities, and durations of motion, in all portions of infinite space? The explosion of gunpowder moves a ball, but does not determine its course. A magnet evolves electricity, but does not, without a determining will, send it north or south. Force produces but cannot determine motion. Croll's article is a very lucid one. He is a scientist and a very skilful controversialist. He grants some of his opponent's assumptions, goes with him into his chosen field of inquiry, and very politely points out to him the error in his fundamental position. It is the error in science that he seeks. It is the assumption that he exposes. It is some theory or hypothesis that he undermines. He knows what is and what is not science; and he knows that speculations, assumptions, and hypotheses, cannot prove anything; and he believes that the Bible is in no danger from the truths of science. He is not made tremulous, and nervous, and apprehensive, when the Bible is assailed by sceptical scientists. He does not provoke attacks on it, by such manifestations of want of faith in it. He avoids causing a public apprehension that it may be overthrown by even the great power of modern science. He is sure that, to this day, science has strengthened the external evidence of its divine origin, by correcting false interpretations of its multitudinous and minute teachings, without touching any one of the great requirements of faith, like those embodied in the Apostles' Creed.

The truth is, that in this scientific age, the importance of science to the Bible is not understood or appreciated.

We should hearken to an adversary, and try to make a wise use of the truths uttered by him. Tyndall says, in the same work referred to above:

“But while we thus acknowledge our limits, there is also reason for wonder at the extent to which science has mastered the system of nature. From age to age, and from generation to generation, fact has been added to fact and law to law, the true method and order of the universe being thereby more and more revealed. In doing this, science has encountered and overthrown

various forms of superstition and deceit, of credulity and imposture. But the world continually produces weak persons and wicked persons; and as long as they continue to exist side by side, as they do in this our day, very debasing beliefs will continue to infest the world."

Now, feel or think as we may, the passage just quoted contains much important truth. It is what the pious Sir David Brewster proved in his *Natural Magic*, and Sir W. Scott in his *Witchcraft and Demonology*. Tyndall is a sceptic, and he may have had reference to ancient and modern superstitions or to the abuses of some particular Christian sects, or he may mentally have included all ancient and modern religions; though his words will hardly bear the latter interpretation. Be this as it may, the paragraph gives us the opinion of a great scientist, as to the increasing power of modern science in religious affairs. And will the Christian Church forego or neglect the acquisition of such a power? Is it wise to rest satisfied with denouncing it, and to discourage the study of it? The Church has often rejoiced in the successful services of some man, skilled in the use of some branch of human learning. And is not this a time when profound Christian scientists are needed to "encounter and overthrow" various forms of hypotheses, used actively against the Bible, by a few sceptical scientists, skilled in the use of scientific language, and aware of all the conquests of physical science? When learned theologians, ignorant of science, attack such men as Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, and Virchow, with theological arguments only, they remind us of a man endowed with mere muscular power, assailing with a club a skilful fencer, fully equipped for the conflict.

Will the Church continue to intrust such a power to secular instruction and to chance? Is it safe to rely wholly, as heretofore, on such volunteer Christian champions as the Duke of Bridgewater, J. Pye Smith, Hitchcock, Sedgwick, Mantell, Murchison, Hugh Miller, Harris, and Croll? What ought the Church to do?

Before we answer this question, we will inquire briefly what the Bible says about science. It is the standard of faith and practice. We approach this part of the subject with diffidence

If we make any mistake, however, correction is easy. It seems to us that those Christian writers who denounce science and the study of it as inimical to religion, ought to be able to show that their opinion is sanctioned by Scripture authority, express or implied. Have they done it? Can they do it? In the discussion of a subject of so much importance, assumption and perversion of one or two texts of Scripture are inexcusable. If they have proved that either directly or indirectly the cultivation of physical science is condemned or censured in revelation, their arguments, with proofs, have escaped our attention. If they can prove it, our very careful examination of this special subject has been strangely unsuccessful.

We are not aware that the Saviour uttered a recorded word against science. On the contrary, he seems to have recognised one branch of physical science, medicine, when he said, "They that be whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." And in Proverbs we are told; "A merry heart doeth good like a medicine." Joseph, too, ordered the physicians to embalm his father, and "they embalmed Israel."

In Eadie's Concordance, we can find the word science in two verses only. In Dan. i. 4, the king directs Ashpenaz to select from the captive "children of Israel," some "skilful in all wisdom, and cunning in knowledge, and understanding *science*," to be taught "the learning and the tongue of the Chaldeans." The three terms, wisdom, knowledge, science, are obviously used in the same sentence, in a purely historical statement of a fact, in three different senses, *science* referring probably to mathematics, mechanics, astronomy, and medicine, of which much was then known. In this verse, wisdom, knowledge, and science, are connected as coördinate names of things of the same general character. All are tacitly commended or approved.

In I. Tim. vi. 20, the apostle solemnly entreats Timothy to "keep that (the pure gospel,) which is committed to thy trust," and then warns him to avoid "profane and vain babblings, and oppositions of science falsely so called." Scott tells us that efforts were early made, which finally corrupted the Church, to introduce into Christianity, not only frivolous observances of the

Jewish scribes, but also the doctrines of the Gnostic philosophy. The former were probably described by the apostle as "profane and vain babblings," and the latter as "oppositions of science falsely so called." Hence we may infer, that the special object of the verse was to warn Timothy and other Christians of that period, to avoid the incorporation of Jewish observances or heathen philosophy into the belief and worship of the Christian Church; and we may also admit that the general truth expressed in the warning, forbids the intermixture of human invention, knowledge, or science with the truths of revelation. Scott says: "These speculations of the Gnostics were borrowed from the vain philosophy of the Gentiles, and being distorted and mutilated to suit their purposes, men introduced them into Christianity." As science was made directly the subject of thought, may we not venture the remark that, to our mind, the very guarded language of the inspired writer indicates a wise purpose to avoid any seeming condemnation of science or of scientific pursuits?

So, in the same Concordance, two verses only are cited in which the words philosophers and philosophy occur. In the first Acts, xvii. 18, we are told: "Certain philosophers of the Epicureans and Stoics met him," Paul, while preaching at Athens. In this verse, the term philosophers is limited by the inspired writer to two Greek schools of heathen philosophy. Hence, may we not infer that this common meaning of the Greek word was attached to it by the apostles, when they wrote? If so, should we not limit the word to this meaning, as Scott did, in the only other verse in which it is used, Col. ii. 8? And may not the question be asked, why this verse should be made the text of sermons preached against science?

In Col. ii. 8, the apostle says: "Beware lest any man spoil you, through philosophy and vain deceit, after the traditions of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ." This verse seems to us to be so guarded in expression, the word "philosophy" being connected with "vain deceit," and immediately followed by the significant clause, "after the traditions of men," as to *exclude* the idea of physical science, some parts of which, as astronomy, were then well known. It is very

similar to 1 Tim. vi. 20, though it is, perhaps, more explicit in condemnation and prohibition of any mixture of any human science, philosophy, traditions, and observances, in the Christian Church, with the purely spiritual teachings of the gospel. Even the ritual of the Jewish Church, prescribed in the Old Testament, including circumcision, was abolished or superseded. It was obviously a caution to a Church recently organised near the centre of heathen materialism and Grecian mythology, to beware of the speculations of schools of philosophy incompatible with and subversive of the spirituality of the religion of Christ. On this verse we subjoin a part of the exposition by Scott, who says : " The Judaizing teachers seem to have blended their system with speculations borrowed from the Pagans and their different sects of philosophers ; thus the traditions of the sages, and those of the Pharisees, were incorporated ; and the worldly elements of heathen superstition or philosophy were blended with legal and traditionary external observances, and these were opposed to the simple faith of the gospel."

Four verses, therefore, seem to contain all direct teachings of the Bible on the direct relations of science, philosophy, and philosophers to revelation ; and all will admit that two of the verses — Dan. i. 4, and Acts xvii. 18 — are simply historical statements of facts, which have no reference to the subject we are discussing. The part of the Bible, therefore, which can be tortured to refer directly to science or philosophy, is thus reduced to two verses, which are so exceedingly similar in import, that both may be regarded as a caution to avoid the same attempt to incorporate the traditions of the Pharisees, and the speculations of heathen philosophy, with the spiritual truths of the recently established Christian Church.

In explanation of these two verses, we have purposely quoted the exposition of Scott, one of the most learned of the commentators, who wrote before the discrepancies between geology and the generally received interpretation of the Mosaic record were voluminously discussed. Scott does not allude to any implied caution, in either text, against any possible evil tendency, in any extension, by zealous cultivation, of true physical science.

When the Bible was translated, the words science and philosophy were in common use, and the translators recognised the Hebrew and Greek as the languages which the Spirit had employed in making the revelation to man. Hence, we must presume that the translators sought to use, in our English version, the word or words which expressed most accurately the meaning of the word or words in the original Hebrew or Greek text; for to these appeal is made in all cases of doubt. Relying on this rule, we infer that the verses which we have cited, are the only portions of Scripture in which the translators were required to use the words science and philosophy. We thus add to the authority of Scott, that of the translators of the Bible, who certainly did not understand Paul to caution Timothy or the Colossians against science of any kind. As to the word philosophy, it has not had a definite meaning in modern times; but science has long denoted systematised known truth; and the almost total absence of the word, and of the idea expressed by it, from the Bible, is a significant fact, which should be kept in view in all discussion of the influence of physical science—known truth—truth divested of all theory and hypotheses—on efforts made to obey the command, “Go ye into all the earth, and preach the gospel to every creature.”

We have searched in vain for any prohibition, express or implied, of the investigation of physical phenomena, in order to ascertain the laws of the material creation.

Yet, how often have we heard, in the past thirty-five years, with mortification and regret, the passages which we have cited used even in the pulpit, whence truth only should flow, in sweeping denunciations of physical science as the enemy of the Bible; and also in support of groundless assertions that the study of science tends to alienate the minds and hearts of its devotees from revealed truth, and to foster pride, unbelief, and atheism itself; and this in a greater degree than an equal devotion to the study of history, Church history, law, ethics, and metaphysics.

Our long experience has convinced us that a larger per cent. of men, devoted to the study of one or more of the numerous branches of physical science, have been and now are Christians,

than of any other class, clergymen not excepted, especially if we include Unitarians, Universalists, and various sects who zealously teach false interpretations, perversions, and mutilations of the Scriptures.

We greatly fear that the many volumes industriously poured forth by nominal clergymen, from a professedly Christian press, are doing more to foster scepticism than the writings of Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, and others, who are known to be speculative scientists, and who deny that the Bible is a revelation from a personal God, and who are willing to treat it as a collection of human productions. They are some of those to be found in every class of men, to whom the SON has not revealed the FATHER. For "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him."

The writers of the Old Testament were surrounded by enlightened heathen nations, and understood the general principles of the sciences and of the systems of philosophy taught in the schools of the Medes, Persians, Chaldeans, and Egyptians. These systems were modified and improved by Democritus, Epicurus, Zeno, and others, in Greece and adjacent countries, between the time of Malachi and the Christian era. And the Saviour taught, and his apostles preached and wrote, in the midst of these nations, when their systems of philosophy had attained their greatest influence over the minds and consciences of men. Now, the Bible not only prohibits sin in general, and many sins by name, but it warns and cautions man against many things, innocent and even commendable in moderation, but sinful in excess; as gluttony, sloth, riot, waste, and covetousness. If the study of science is adverse to the spread of vital godliness, and liable to cause its devotees to run into scepticism and atheism, why do we find so few direct allusions to it in the Scriptures, and not one caution as to its effects on the hearts and consciences of men? The prophets and apostles, as men, must have abhorred much of the philosophy of their heathen contemporaries. Why, then, did they not explicitly condemn and denounce it in their inspired writings? The true answer is, it seems to us, that the Holy Spirit restrained them; for the revelation was made neither to teach science, nor

to prohibit research in the material creation. This silence of the Scriptures on a subject so intimately and vitally connected with modern civilisation, is a striking proof of the divine origin of the Bible. It condemned most explicitly, however, the worship of anything except God as idolatry; all false teachings as foolishness; and all attempts to deceive and mislead nations or individuals, *by the pretended exercise of miraculous powers*, as divination, sorcery, enchantment, astrology, and necromancy. Such practices were not, in any degree, of the nature of physical science and true philosophy. They were infamous and cunningly devised arts to deceive and mislead men into superstitious beliefs; and that, too, at the time when prophets were making known revealed truth, and occasionally working miracles.

The Psalmist said: "Truth shall spring out of the earth." And so it did; for the progress of physical science, in modern times, has exposed the folly of "foolishness," stripped sorcery of its charms, shown the absurdity of enchantments, divested divination of all plausibility, and enabled man to weigh the planets, and to predict with certainty the reäpppearance of comets. And science has made itself accessible to all, in such works as the "International Scientific Series," in journals, in cheap periodicals, and in newspapers. In the clear light of modern science—true physical science—all mists of necromancy vanish, and idols become hideous and disgusting to even unrenewed minds.

We proceed now to show why we think the general tenor and intent of the Bible favors and encourages research into the causes and laws of physical phenomena, having shown, we think, that it does not condemn, directly or indirectly or impliedly, the study of science, and that it studiously avoids any caution to the Church against its tendencies. How else can we understand the sublime allusions of its poetry and prophecy to the works of creation? "Before the mountains were brought forth, (not created,) or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God." The fact has already been stated, that in the first and second chapters of Genesis, four Hebrew verbs are used, which mean, respectively, to create, to make, to form, and to build; and that the use of these verbs is

such as to prove, as Hebrew scholars affirm, that the Mosaic account of creation, beginning at verse three, is a description of the remodelling of the planet, preparatory to the *creation* of immortal man. In Genesis i. 1, Moses says: "God created the heavens and the earth;" in Ps. xc. 2, he says, "formed the earth and the world." In Prov. viii. 23—31, Wisdom says: "I was set up from everlasting, from the beginning;" "before the mountains were settled, before the hills" were settled; "while as yet he had not made the earth;" "when he prepared the heavens;" "when he established the clouds;" "when he gave to the sea his decree:" "then was I by him," "rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth, and my delights were with the sons of men."

Now, may not the geologist ask, while reading and studying such portions of Scripture, (and they are numerous,) are not these descriptions of the remodelling of the earth which preceded the human creation? The terms, prepared, made, settled, established, and gave, applied to the heavens, earth, sun, moon, stars, mountains, hills, clouds, and seas, seem to denote changes in preëxisting objects of creation, by which changes the earth was made "habitable" by "the sons of men." And this is precisely what the science of geology demonstrates to be true. Now, can scientific investigations that lead to such results, be unfavorable to religion in the heart of a right-minded student of science?

True, Darwin, a geologist, is an evolutionist; but, if the study of geology made him such, why did it not have the same effect on Murchison, Sedgwick, Hitchcock, Hugh Miller, and Mantell, all Christians, and the contemporaries of Darwin, and his superiors in science?

May not physiologists safely inquire how they are "fearfully and wonderfully made?" Astronomers, how "the heavens declare the glory of God?" Opticians, how the "sun brings forth precious fruits?" Chemists, how clouds, hail, snow, rain, and dew are formed? Electricians, the cause of lightning and thunder?

Was Franklin doing wrong when, with his kite and key, he demonstrated the identity of electricity and lightning? Morse, when he learned to teach man to communicate, in an hour, with

his brother across oceans and continents? Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton, when they opened distinctly to human view the wonderful working of the machinery of the heavens? Priestly, Lavoisier, and others, when they studied and made known the constitution and adaptations of the firmament or atmosphere?

Did David, in Ps. xxix., caution the Jews against investigations into the laws of the material creation, as exhibited in storms, tempests, lightnings, and earthquakes? In Ps. viii., against searching for a more full comprehension of the manifestation of the divine perfections, in the works of creation? In Ps. xix., against efforts to show, by the discovery of new facts and principles of science, that the man "is without excuse," who does not discover, in the creation and government of the world, evidence of "the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and godhead?"

Finally, how can we interpret the first sentence of the Confession of Faith, that "the light of nature and the works of creation and providence do so far manifest the goodness, wisdom, and power of God, as to leave men inexcusable"—how can we understand this to imply any mistrust of the tendency of scientific pursuits, or of science carried to its utmost limits of perfection?

An attempt has thus been made to show that the Bible neither condemns science as inimical to faith in it, nor warns us to beware of any evil tendency in science to generate scepticism. We have attempted, moreover, to show that, in tone and import, the Bible encourages close and constant examination of the phenomena of the material creation, and that it teaches explicitly, Rom. i. 20, that he is inexcusable who does not see enough in the things that are made, to induce him thankfully to glorify the Creator; and, in part, because the Romans failed to do this, they became vain, foolish, and darkened idolaters, and were given over to all manner of "uncleanness." Rom. i. 21-24.

It may be asked, if such views be correct, why are some learned theologians opposed to science, and mistrustful of scientists? To this question the correct reply seems to be this: Before geology demonstrated the great antiquity of the earth, there was very little, if any, opposition to science by religious writers. In the

long, learned, and excited discussion of what were then supposed by many to be irreconcilable differences between the conclusions of science and the Mosaic record of creation, much was unwisely written before it was finally settled, with the sanction of a large majority of Christians, that science was in conflict, not with the Bible, but with one of about one hundred human interpretations of it. Added to this was the republication, in the *Vestiges of Creation*, of the transmutation hypothesis. All this time, many pious scientists were exerting themselves to prove that the transmutation hypothesis is contrary to fundamental principles of science, and Hebrew scholars exerted themselves to prove that the generally received Scripture chronology could be safely and advantageously abandoned, and the lapse of long ages, anterior to the human creation, be admitted.

Deep impressions against science were made, however, on many learned and pious, but mistaken minds, which were transmitted to others; and the volumes then written against geology and geologists, are still read by some as oracles of truth, and the same volumes cited by sceptics in proof of their assertion, that portions of the Bible itself have been overthrown and discredited.

Such adherents to the old interpretation of Genesis remind us of the old physicians when the circulation of the blood was discovered and described by a young anatomist. Most of them rejected it to the day of their death. School girls now read the proofs with admiration, as they do also those of the sphericity and revolutions of the earth, which the Roman Catholic world rejected with horror, at the time of Galileo's forced recantation.

This controversy with science and scientists has too long withdrawn the attention of the true Church of all denominations from the real danger to the success of its operations. We have already referred to this danger; and again we ask the question, is not this an age in which profound scientists are needed in the Church, to wield successfully, in defence of the Bible, the power described by Tyndall? Are they not more needed to "encounter and overthrow" various forms of hypothesis, speculation, and assumption, used actively against the Bible by a few sceptical scientists, skilled in the use of scientific terms, aware of all the changes in

refined and abstruse scientific research, and fully apprised of the import of the fundamental physical problems now sought to be solved? Tyndall is right in saying that physical science is a stupendous power in ecclesiastical as well as in civil affairs. It cannot be safely decried and ridiculed by Christian writers, neglected by candidates for the ministry, nor rejected by Church judicatories and theological seminaries. And should not the Church enlarge the course of scientific instruction in its colleges and theological seminaries? This is a question of much importance, and should be carefully considered by all concerned in the management of those institutions.

ARTICLE II.

THE PAULICIANS.*

About the year of our Lord, 650, a Syrian deacon, returning from captivity amongst the Saracens, was entertained for some time by a man named Constantine, of Mananalis, a small town near Samosata. On leaving his hospitable host, the deacon presented him with two books, written in the Grecian language; the one comprising the four Gospels, and the other the fourteen Epistles of the apostle Paul.

Constantine, in opposition to the restrictions of the priests concerning the reading of the Bible by the laity, studied his incomplete Testament with great diligence and care. The consequence was, as might have been expected, that his religious opinions underwent a decided change, and from being a rigid Church-

* Mosheim's Church History, Gieseler's Church History, Milner's Church History, Kurtz's Church History, Neander's History of the Christian Church, Jones's History of the Christian Church, Gibbon's Decline and Fall, Faber's Ancient Vallenses, Allix's Albigensian Church, Sismondi's History of the Albigensians, Blair's History of the Waldenses, Sime's History of the Waldenses, Waddington's Library of Useful Knowledge, Gardiner's Faith of Worlds, Milner's Religious Denominations, Peter Bayle's Dictionary, etc., etc.

man, he became a zealous Reformer. He took a determined stand against the clergy, and, whilst boldly proclaiming the truths he had learned, did not hesitate to denounce the errors which he discovered the Church had blindly upheld. Numbers flocked to the standard which was thus raised, and even many descended from the Marcionites, or best school of Gnostics of former centuries, finding that his views were grounded on the truth, and that his doctrines were akin to those towards which their own degenerated tenets aimed, became his most devoted followers. As their numbers increased, they formed themselves into an organised body of Christians, with a definite basis of doctrine and discipline. This society, from the very beginning, was characterised by an earnest missionary spirit; for, as soon as its existence was established, its members began to proclaim zealously the sacred truths which they had learned.

Constantine, having chosen the scriptural name of Sylvanus, became their recognised head and leader. He was a man of great determination and real ability. The provinces of Pontus and Cappadocia were the fields of his first missionary labors, and the first regular community was established at Cibossa, in Armenia, to which he gave the name of Macedonia.

The combined labors of the society were greatly owned and blessed, for congregations were soon formed over the greater part of Asia Minor. Their success, however, aroused the jealousy of the clergy, who calumniated them with the greatest bitterness. In derision they called them *Paulicians*, because they venerated the writings of the apostle Paul; and out of respect for that great missionary of the Gentiles, the society accepted the name. There is no trustworthy evidence that the Paulicians owed their origin to the teachings of Paul, the arrogant and immoral prelate of Samosata, who lived in the third century, or to the teachings of the two brothers, Paul and John, living at Samosata during the fourth century.

The clergy not only gave them the name of Paulicians, but accused them of being revivers of the ancient Manichæan doctrines. Manichæanism was, at that period, the generic name for all theories supposed to have any mixture of dualism, or the doc-

trine of two independent antagonistic principles (the good and the evil) in them; and although no formal charge was ever brought against them, still they were generally condemned as holding and teaching this fundamental error. It is to be lamented that many eminent Church historians, as Mosheim, Neander, Kurtz, Schaff, and others, have followed Petrus Siculus and Photius, writers living at the time of the Paulicians, and have accepted the testimony of these enemies of this people as proof of their heretical tendencies. And yet some of these same historians acquit the Paulicians of being guilty of Manichæism. Petrus Siculus himself declares "that the Paulicians, with prompt minds, spat upon and detested Scythianus, and Budda, and even Manes also." Mosheim states that "they declared their abhorrence of Manes and of his doctrines, and it is certain that they were not genuine Manichæans, although they might hold some doctrines having a resemblance to those of that sect." Kurtz also, after denouncing them as Manichæans, declares "that later investigations have failed to discover any traces of Manichæan tenets in their system."

This will be all the more evident when we consider their views concerning many of the leading abuses of the established Church at that time; for they not only denied having any connection with the theology of Manes and other kindred heresies, but wisely rejected all the fabulous writings and spurious productions of that early age. In short, they appear to have been truly scriptural in their belief, as will be seen from the classification of their doctrines by Petrus Siculus, in the following six articles which we give in his language.

I. THERE IS ONE SUPREME GOD, AND ANOTHER GOD WHO INTRODUCED SIN.

The explanation of this statement is, that whilst Petrus Siculus was amongst the Paulicians, and during a conversation on the subject of the Godhead, some one said to him, "We are Christians, you are Romans; you believe in the Creator of the world, we believe in him concerning whom our Lord speaks in the Gospel, 'Ye have neither heard his voice nor seen his shape.'" He in-

ferred from this, that in addition to the Creator of the world, they believed in another God, who secluded himself from all worldly affairs; whereas, they meant that this Creator is the deity whose voice had not been heard and whose shape had never been discerned. The introducer of evil was represented by them as the adversary of souls and the enemy of all good; so that in holding these doctrines in common with the established Church, they were free from the dualistic error of Manichæism. Nevertheless, from this statement the above article was deduced, and the Paulicians have ever since been unjustly condemned by many for holding the Manichæan belief of two independent principles.

II. THE VIRGIN MARY DOES NOT DESERVE DIVINE ADORATION.

This their incomplete New Testament clearly taught in the words used by the Tempted to the tempter: "Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve." The Virgin Mary, so idolatrously worshipped by the dominant Church, was dethroned by the Paulicians from her divine position, and her reputed sinless nature was tarnished with original sin and actual transgression. The glorified saints and ministering spirits deserted their accustomed office of mediation, and were no longer invoked by them; for the Paulicians, though possessed of only an incomplete copy of the Scriptures, discovered none able and qualified for the position but "the one Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus."

III. THERE ARE THREE PERSONS IN ONE GOD, AND ALSO JESUS BECAME INCARNATE.

In this they sided with the Church, and opposed the theology of the Manichæans. Throughout their entire history they were consistent in holding the doctrine of the Trinity, and rejected any speculation that attempted to explain it away. This was also the case regarding the incarnation and Godhead of Jesus Christ in opposition to Manichæism, which taught that he came from the sun, with a seeming body, to teach the souls of light how to be freed from the chains of darkness in which they were bound.

They believed in the two exclusive sacraments, baptism and the Lord's supper. Asceticism was condemned and marriage allowed, although celibacy was reckoned a mark of superior sanctity and virtue. Baptism administered by water, was held in opposition to Manichæan baptism with oil. Also, in opposition to the belief of the established Church, baptism was held not to be essential to salvation, but only necessary in order to be received into the fellowship of the Church. Infant baptism was generally held in theory by the fathers, if not universally practised by the people, and both methods were in use, immersion being dispensed to those who were well, whilst sprinkling was administered to those who were ill. Gradually, however, the administration of infant baptism was commonly delayed, either from indifference, superstition, or doctrinal prejudice. We find, also, that some of the western reformatory bodies opposed infant baptism; but the Waldenses and Albigenses, with whom the Paulicians afterwards became incorporated, were consistent in maintaining it. Wherefore, if infant baptism and sprinkling were common in the primitive times of the Church, is it too much to say that the Paulicians, in their thorough reformatory endeavors, brought baptism back to its original mode and significance, and stripped it, of all the rites and ceremonies with which the Church had encumbered it?

Again, with regard to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, they seem to have been strictly orthodox. They certainly did not believe that the material presence of the Lord's body and blood was in the consecrated elements, but seemed to have looked upon them as visible signs and seals of their Master's sufferings and death. In this, as in baptism, they opposed the established Church and Manichæism; for the former held the unreasonable doctrine of transubstantiation, whilst the latter administered the Supper with bread alone.

IV. THE SIGN OF THE CROSS IS TO BE CONDEMNED, AND IS A GROUND OF SEPARATION.

By a knowledge of the truth, superstition had been unmasked, and the objects which many of the Paulicians had formerly venerated, now stood before them portrayed in all their real and na-

tural colors. An image or painting appeared to them nothing more than a mere specimen of artistic skill, worthy indeed of all due praise and admiration, but far from exciting any feelings of devotional piety whatever, whilst the so-called real and life-giving cross was but a simple piece of mechanism, that any one might easily construct. The relics appeared shorn of all their healing virtue and miraculous powers, and lay before them as remembrancers of the urn and sepulchre. Consequently, in their antagonism to image-worship, veneration of relics, etc., they incurred the displeasure of the Church, but oftentimes enjoyed the favor and protection of the iconoclastic Emperors.

V. THE SCRIPTURES ARE TO BE READ, AND THE POPE IS NOT SUPREME.

Some of their expressions were as follows: "Both priest and people are in duty bound to the constant perusal of the Gospel;" "God wishes all to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth;" "the priests of the day adulterate God's holy word, garbling, and concealing, and omitting a great part of its contents." At this time the Scriptures were kept from the common people, and confined altogether to the clergy. The opinion that had gradually spread amongst the laity from an early period, was, that the Bible should not be read by profane persons, but by the clergy alone. This idea had its origin in the great ignorance of the people, and the encouragement given to it by the clergy; for there was no prohibitory decree against the reading of it, nor indeed was there any need for one, because the clergy knew too well how to augment the gross darkness of the people, without having resort to arbitrary measures. That the Pope was not considered by the Paulicians as the supreme ruler of the Church and vicar of Christ on earth, is evident, because it is uncertain whether they ever received the Epistles of Peter into their Bibles, by reason of the aversion they had for him who boasted that he was a successor of that apostle, and sat in his papal chair at Rome. Hence, in upholding the Scriptures, they were directly opposed to the corrupt teachings of the Church, and were free from Manichæism, because that sect did not believe in the inspired word of God.

VI. THERE IS NO GROUND FOR THE DIFFERENT ORDERS OF THE CLERGY IN THE CHURCH, ALL PASTORS BEING FELLOW-PILGRIMS.

Here again the Paulicians took issue with the Church, and also with Manichæism ; for the former claimed different orders amongst its clergy, and the latter held that the Paraclete, as supreme, had twelve apostles, seventy-two bishops, and other minor officers, whilst the people were divided into catechumens and the elect. The only distinction the Paulicians held was that of believers and unbelievers, and they looked upon their pastors or teachers as fellow-pilgrims with themselves. Gradually their leaders began to devote their time and energies to the management of the secular affairs of the body ; but in the beginning they had been revered by the people as their chairmen or moderators, those in whom they had every confidence, to whom they came seeking aid and advice, and by whose decisions they firmly stood. The greediness for wealth and honors, so openly manifested by the anti-Christian pride of the prelacy, was held up by them to contempt, ridicule, and condemnation. Nor was this the case with the founders and leaders only, but all through their eventful existence as a body, this admirable trait was manifested, and their lives were generally characterised by great zeal, deep humility, and an exemplary walk and conversation.

It is remarkable how near the apostolic Church they were in doctrine and discipline ; and it is no wonder that the clergy sought by all manner of means to trample them under foot, so that they might eventually crush them out of existence. Fearful indeed would the condition of the Paulicians have been if they had endured persecution from the Church only ; but doubly terrible was their lot when the emperors also commenced bloody persecutions against them, which continued, with but little interruption, for more than five hundred years. The first of these broke out about A. D., 670, under the reign of Constantius Pogonatus, who determined to use both law and sword in their extirpation. He sent Simon, an imperial officer of his household, with orders to put their leader to death, and also to scatter the people throughout the Church, so that they might be led the more easily to adopt its faith and practice. Simon succeeded in capturing Con-

stantine Sylvanus, together with most of his intimate coadjutors, and required of them that they should either join the Church and put their leader to death, or suffer death themselves. They all preferred martyrdom except Justus, the adopted son of Constantine Sylvanus, and one of his earliest followers, who proved cruelly unfaithful to his master, by stoning him to death with his own hand, and joining the Church. This occurrence happened at Soros, a name given to the place in commemoration of the finished labors of a faithful servant, who, after twenty-seven years of service in the cause of reformation, passed from trials to glory in the year 677.

The persecution then became general. Simon sent his soldiers in all directions, to burn Paulician tractates and books, and ordered that those found secreting them should be burned at the stake, and their property confiscated. He also disputed with them, but failed in gaining a single convert, whilst his own mind became greatly prepossessed in their favor by their humble and sincere Christian behavior.

Satisfied at length that nothing more could be done, and no doubt conscious of the injustice of his mission there, he returned to Constantinople, but found it impossible to forget the patient suffering Paulicians. The martyr of Pontus became the waking dream of the courtier at Constantinople. After three wretched years of court life, he fled in secret to Cibossa in Armenia, and began at once to learn and labor amongst the Paulician remnant he had spared. Some time having elapsed, during which he proved himself worthy of the cause he had espoused, they elected him as their leader, and on accepting the position, he chose the scriptural name of Titus, in addition to his own. After a little, the renegade Justus was readmitted, and proved the precursor of impending calamity. He had a controversy with their leader, Simon Titus, about Col. i. 15-17, and afterwards in the year 683, with the Grecian bishop of Colonia, during which he was forced to justify his own conduct, as well as give an account of the doctrines, practices, and success of the Paulicians.

The bishop, surprised and alarmed, at once sent an account to the Emperor, Justinian II., who fearing that they might soon be

come troublesome, immediately resorted to the most inhuman measures for their extirpation. He burned at the stake vast numbers of those who proved steadfast in the faith, during the year 690, amongst whom perished their noble and self-sacrificing leader, Simon Titus.

The Paulicians, although greatly weakened by this persecution, displayed their wonted zeal and fortitude. Among those who had fled from the persecution of Justinian, was a certain man named Paul, who repaired to an obscure place called Episparis, with his two sons, Genesisius and Theodore. These two brothers soon rose to eminence, and both became aspirants for the political headship. Already the Paulicians recognised the utility of having one to manage their secular affairs, and yet one who would not forget to advance the cause of religion whilst promoting the civil interests of the community. Two modes of procuring these political leaders presented themselves, the one by inheritable succession, which was advocated by Genesisius, and the other maintained by Theodore, from the possession of the necessary gifts and qualifications independently of any other claim. How the controversy was carried on is not stated, but Genesisius ultimately gained the position, and chose the scriptural name of Timothy. Under his leadership, and aided by his father's counsel, the Paulicians revived and spread their doctrines once more throughout the land. They removed their centre from Pontus into the north-eastern part of Cappadocia, and soon brought upon them the wrath of the Emperor, Leo III., the Isaurian, by their rising influence and increasing numbers. One thing, however, favored them: he was an inveterate iconoclast, and opposed image-worship as strenuously as they did. About the year 720, he summoned Genesisius Timothy to appear at Constantinople for examination, hoping by this measure to effect a final settlement. The inquisition was presided over by the Emperor himself, and conducted by the Patriarch of the Grecian Church, the aged Germanus. Genesisius skilfully evaded the questions asked, and represented matters in as pleasing a light as possible, no doubt palliating his deception on the ground that the preservation of both himself and his people depended on the favorable result of this interview.

The examination was, upon the whole, superficial, but terminated to the satisfaction of all parties ; for Leo gave him a letter of protection, and Germanus a certificate of orthodoxy, with which he returned and retired with his followers eastward into the Saracen territories. His life seems to have been a peaceable one, during which the Paulicians had greatly increased in numbers and prosperity ; and after an active service of about thirty years, he died A. D., 745.

He was succeeded by his son, Zacharias, who came westward soon afterwards, preaching with his assistant, Joseph, and endeavoring to collect the scattered people throughout Cappadocia. Their success brought another persecution upon them, from which Zacharias fled into Phrygia ; afterwards he taught for some time at Antioch, in Pisidia, and probably ended his days there.

Joseph, his assistant, succeeded him, and chose the scriptural name of Epaphroditus, but nothing is left on record concerning either his life or death. The Paulicians then elected Baanes to the leadership, one who was cynical in disposition, immoral in his habits, and utterly unfit for the responsibilities of sacred office.

He does not seem to have adopted a scriptural cognomen at all, and for the want of one the people styled him by the significant title of Baanes Ruparos, *the filthy*.

Under his rule the Paulicians became divided into two or more sections, which were not united again till more than ninety years afterwards, and which deteriorated also in morals and strength. Up to this time they had been zealous and successful in obtaining proselytes from not only the uneducated laity, but also from monks and priests ; and their firm adherence to their religious principles was marked by their frequent and ready submission to martyrdom. But now many became dissatisfied with the changed state of affairs, and, wearied out by incessant persecutions, resolved to migrate to some peaceful locality, beyond the reach of the hatred of the Church and the cruelty of the reigning powers.

At this juncture, however, the Emperor, Constantine V., (about the year 755,) made an excursion into Armenia, and found a large number of Paulicians, especially in and around Melitene and Theodosiopolis, whom he removed to Constantinople and

planted throughout Thrace. No doubt this was in accordance with a friendly arrangement that each party entered into, for the accomplishment of their own special interests and comfort. By it the Emperor expected to be disturbed no more in future, and that their peculiar tenets would soon die out ; but, without intending it, he also assisted the Paulicians to diffuse their doctrines over eastern Europe, and prepared the way for thousands who came after them. Notwithstanding this removal into Europe, the Paulicians were still numerous in Asia Minor and the neighboring countries, having Phanaröa, in Helenopontus, as their capital and centre.

Baanes Rugaros died not long after, (in the year 800,) and left behind him a scattered and demoralised people. This seems to have led the Paulicians to be more cautious in their next selection, since they were fortunate in choosing a notable character, named Sergius, who proved to be a man of extraordinary talent, energy, and virtue. He had formerly been of the established Church, but now, somewhat advanced in life, was converted by having his mind directed to the word of God, through the agency of a poor Paulician woman. By carefully studying the Scriptures, he obtained a clear insight into the vital truths of Christianity, and coming to a knowledge of Christ, became a devoted follower of the Paulician faith. He was a carpenter by trade, and, Paul-like, when out of employment or in need, wrought at it in order that he might not be a burden to the community.

In the year 801, he was chosen as their leader, and adopted the Bible name of Tychicus. He immediately endeavored to reform the sect, which had become degenerated through the immorality of Baanes Rugaros, and, by his gentle, winning ways, conciliated his bitterest enemies ; so that he earned for himself the reputation of being a second founder, both by his antagonism to the corrupt tendencies that had crept in, and by his continued efforts for the extension of the sect. In his presentation of the truth, he differed from his predecessors, in that, whilst they launched out at once against the glaring errors of the Church, he having first presented the simple truths of the gospel, gradually advanced to the corrupt doctrines and practices of the clergy.

By this mode of reasoning, he gained over many from the monks, nuns, priests, and common people, so that the sect greatly increased in numbers and morality. He strenuously opposed image-worship, veneration for the cross, relics, etc.; and by his writings also, which were held in high esteem, he was the means of accomplishing great good for his Master's cause.

As the Paulicians now took such a determined stand against the abuses so prevalent amongst the clergy, they were called Separatists, which clearly showed their desire for reformation; and burning once more with the zeal of their fathers, sought to revolutionise the Church, and restore it to its primitive purity and simplicity.

The reigns of Leo IV. and the Empress Irene, during which the circumstances of the Paulicians were greatly improved, produced nothing worthy of note; but the succeeding reign of Nicephorus I. was marked by the greatest clemency. He absolutely refused to act at the bidding of the clergy, and instead of persecuting, promised the Paulicians, especially those of Phrygia, the free and full exercise of their religious belief. His successor, however, Michael I., although urged to desist by the more clement of the clergy, assailed them through the inducements and by the directions of Nicephorus, the Patriarch of Constantinople, but to what extent is not known. After him came Leo the Armenian, who, envious of their increase, sent Thomas, bishop of Neo-Cæsarea, and Paracondacis, an abbot, as leaders of an expedition for the purpose of converting them to the Church from which so many had wandered. Those who recanted were welcomed as proselytes, but those who remained steadfast in the faith were put to death. The persecution at last became so violent, that Sergius Tychicus and many of his followers were obliged to flee into Lesser Armenia, and seek the protection of the Saracens. The Emir of Melitene gave them a little town on the mountains of Argæus, the name of which Sergius Tychicus changed from Argaum to Colosse.

The Paulicians seem to have been driven now to desperation. They made frequent predatory expeditions into the Byzantine empire, and, aided by the Saracens, retaliated in a spirit of re-

venge, which greatly pained their old peace-loving leader. He boldly expressed his disapprobation of their conduct, and admonished them to practise forbearance, but all with little or no effect. However, his end was at hand. He had fought a good fight, he had finished his course, he had kept the faith; and like a shock of corn fully ripe, he was soon to be gathered to his fathers. At Colosse he employed his spare moments at his trade; and whilst alone one day, felling some trees on the woody slopes of Argæus, he was attacked by a ruffian named Tzano, of Nicopolis, who, taking advantage of his years and failing strength, chopped him in two with his own axe. This happened in the year 835, and ended a worthy life of thirty-three years spent in the cause of the Master.

After his death, the Paulicians, for some unknown reasons, resolved to intrust the civil oversight of the community (as they had always intrusted their religious affairs,) to a number of the prominent men of their body, instead of to one person, as had formerly been done. Amongst the political council thus formed, were men of eminence and worth, of whom nothing besides is known except the names, some of these being Michael, Canacares, John, Theodotus, Basil, Zosimus, and others. This plan of supervision was followed by a partial falling away on the part of the people from their remarkably pious and humble disposition, to one of secular aggrandisement. Whilst their form of government was federal, and their head was the free choice of the people, they seemed to have been zealous and united; but as soon as a supervisory committee was formed, their confidence was shaken, for the central object of their trust was gone. In consequence, a portion of them residing in Cynoschora, broke out in an open rebellion, and banding themselves together, put to death the imperial judges and the inquisitors, Thomas, bishop of Neo-Cæsarea, and Paracondacis, the abbot. The Paulicians were then compelled to form Colosse into a military colony for protection, and were continually making inroads into the neighboring countries for pillage or revenge. This state of affairs continued until the year 841, when Theodora, the patroness of image-worship, ascended the Byzantine throne; and from her inconsiderate zeal,

the Paulicians suffered even greater calamities than any that had hitherto befallen them. She resolved to bring them into the Church in a body, or, if they remained steadfast, to crush them out of existence. For the accomplishment of this inhuman design, in the year 845 she sent noblemen and magistrates into the different provinces of the empire, with orders to spare none who held such a perverse creed. During this short persecution, at least one hundred thousand persons perished, and many of them no doubt for no other crime than iconoclastic tendencies. Still, a remnant was saved; for about five thousand fled once more into the Saracen domains, where the Emir of Melitene again received them. Here they built a city which, with the region around it, they called by the name of Tibrica. Their former capital, Colosse, seems to have been destroyed, for it is never mentioned again.

Whilst such persecutions were raging, and the spirit of retaliation was burning in their bosoms, their religious zeal seems to have greatly abated, and their love for the spread of the gospel almost entirely died out. Their unchristian actions show that they had now lost, in a great measure, the spirit of that true devotion which characterised their forefathers; and not only was their good name greatly marred, but their schemes of worldly ambition oftentimes frustrated. As they were now more political than religious, they could not exist long without a temporal head, and were again fortunate in their selection. Carbeas had been at one time first adjutant of the guards of the imperial forces in the east, but had become a worthy Paulician, and was waiting for an opportunity of avenging the death of his father, who had been impaled by the inhuman inquisitors. Skilled in generalship, he formed the five thousand fugitives into a standing army, and, negotiating with the Mohammedan Caliph, defied the forces of the cruel Theodora.

Whilst thus engaged, his forces were increased by a union with the Baanites, in this way healing the division made by Baanes Rupas over ninety years before. This union seems to have been made more on a political than on a religious basis. Their characteristic feature as reformers of the corrupt Church, was

lost sight of in the midst of such civil commotions; but, for all this, we cannot say that they lost sight of the doctrines for which their fathers had died, or that the mass of the people held them with less strictness and purity.

The Paulician army, led on by the strategic skill of Carbeas, repeatedly put to flight the combined forces of Michael the drunkard, so that he was at last compelled to march to the scene of action in person. The contending hosts met under the walls of Samosata, where the Paulicians completely routed the imperial hosts, and having captured a number of generals and over a hundred tribunes, carried them to their strongholds, to be kept as hostages.

About this time a portion of the Paulicians separated and formed a distinct sect; but the accounts of their rise, progress, and distinguishing characteristics are so meagre, that almost nothing reliable can be gathered concerning them. They originated in the province of Ararat, by the teachings of a Paulician, named Sembat; and as their Church was formed in the village of Thontrake, they were called by the name of Thontrakians. Having existed for about one hundred and fifty or two hundred years, they gradually became extinct.

Carbeas died about the year 867, and the Paulicians chose Chrysocheris as his successor, who, aided by the Saracens, ravished the fairest provinces of the Grecian empire without opposition. In a still more secular spirit than that which had actuated Carbeas, he retaliated the persecutions of his sect by the pillage of Nice, Nicomedia, Ancyria, and Ephesus, so that the very temple of Ephesus was made a stable for the mules and horses of the Paulician army to rest in. For more than thirty years did this warlike spirit exist, causing many of the unoffending and helpless to spend a miserable existence as exiles in the Saracen territories.

The Emperor Basil found his forces greatly reduced by such repeated defeats, and made proposals of peace, but all to no purpose. Finding that there was nothing left but to crush them by numbers, he reinforced his army, and leaving Constantinople, marched across the country to their chief fortress, Tephrica, with-

out opposition. But when he was made aware of the strength of their fortifications, the numbers of their allied hosts throughout the country, and the ample provision made for a protracted war, he saw that victory was impossible, and returned to Constantinople, without striking a single effective blow.

However, in the year 870, his army had two engagements with the Paulicians, and the following year, by some strategic movement, Chrysocheris was surprised and slain, whilst the Paulician army was almost entirely annihilated in a narrow defile of the mountains near by.

During the two engagements of the year 870, mentioned above, Basil sent one of his courtiers, named Petrus Siculus, as an envoy to Chrysocheris, at Tibrica, to negotiate with him about an exchange of prisoners. He remained nine months amongst them, and afterwards wrote their history, which, as might have been expected, is full of accusations, either erroneous or altogether false. There is a vein of persistent misrepresentation running through the whole work, which is so manifest that it can scarcely escape the most careless observation.

About this time, also, they added to their incomplete Bible—consisting of the four Gospels and the Pauline Epistles—the Acts and the Epistles of John, James, and Jude; so that, with the exception of the Epistles of Peter and the Apocalypse, their New Testament was complete. They were familiar with the Old Testament also, although no express mention is made of it by their historians. The Apocalypse was afterwards received; but so guarded were they, that it is exceedingly uncertain whether they ever received the Epistles of Peter or not.

After the disastrous defeat above mentioned, the Paulician political power was completely broken; their fortress, Tephrica, was reduced, and once more they had to seek the aid of the friendly Saracens. Protected by this warlike people and by their own mountain fastnesses, they kept up a kind of independence until the close of that century, during which time many on both sides were slain, and several of the fairest provinces of the Grecian empire were ruined. Such warfare so troubled Theodorus, the neighboring bishop of Antioch, that, fearful for his

own flock, he petitioned the Emperor to have them removed. In accordance with this request, Basil, with a powerful army, forcibly transplanted a colony of them into Bulgaria, giving them Philipopolis as their centre and capital. Ever since the middle of the eighth century, when the first colony had been settled in Thrace, a regular correspondence had taken place, and no doubt a continual emigration had been going on from Asia Minor. Consequently, by weakening their force in the east, he mightily strengthened that of the west, and did the most opportune thing for the further extension of his cause of reformation.

There is here a gap of a whole century in the history of the Paulicians, during which they were no doubt assiduously promulgating their doctrines and gradually increasing in strength and numbers; for their political spirit seems to have been in a great measure broken up, and they evidently turned their attention for the time being to the advancement of their religious interests, with renewed energy and zeal.

In the year 970, a treaty was made with them by the Emperor, John Zimisce, by which a large number of them, together with other religious sects, were transplanted from Syria to the valleys along the base of the mountains of Hæmus, in Thrace. These, with the Paulicians already there, were appointed to guard the northern frontier against the Scythian hordes that were threatening to invade the empire. Being here the dominant party, the Paulicians had for a little while greater freedom, and occupied villages and fortresses in Epirus and Macedonia, as well as important strongholds in Thrace and Bulgaria, but nevertheless were in continual conflict with the Church, and oftentimes with the State.

What became of the remnant that remained in Asia Minor after the last exodus, is not definitely known. It is, however, likely that they never left the rocky defiles of Armenia, but either died out shortly afterwards, or became incorporated with the neighboring sects that were continually breaking away from the bonds of a corrupt and demoralising Church.

From Thrace and Bulgaria the Paulicians were soon obliged to emigrate, on account of the persecutions which they suffered, both

from Church and State. They removed westward, and in the course of time made settlements in Macedonia, Sicily, and northern Italy, particularly in Lombardy and Piedmont, where numerous churches were formed, which were at continual variance with the established Church. In Italy they received the names of *Paterini* and *Cathari*: the former from a certain part of the city of Milan, called Pateria, where they held their assemblies; and the latter is probably derived from the Greek word signifying *the pure*.

We pause here to remark how orthodox the Paulicians were in their Church polity, as well as in their theology. They had churches and congregations, which were presided over by pastors and teachers, without being encumbered with other offices which are neither necessary nor commanded. These churches were linked together by a higher court; for in Italy they met at Pateria, in Milan, on certain occasions, as general assemblies, presided over by their western patriarch or moderator, and seem to have had no other offices except those of leader or president and pastor.

Their secular spirit had now passed away, and in its place came an earnest desire for evangelizing the southern and eastern provinces of Europe, as they had endeavored to do in Asia Minor. In leaving their home in the east, they had left their warlike retaliating spirit behind them; and now, in this the land of their adoption, they once more devoted themselves exclusively to the work of the Master, and instead of seeking after military or political power, again became faithful soldiers of the cross and followers of the Lamb. Many of them took up a wandering life, and, actuated by a true missionary spirit, spread their doctrines with great zeal and success.

In their westward peregrinations, they came to the foot of the Alps, where they found the Waldenses professing the same doctrines with their own, in all their simplicity and purity. This noble band of reformers had existed from the primitive times of the Church, and, walled about by the good providence of God, as they were by their own mountain resorts, they had kept the gospel lamp burning in the midst of great mystical gloom and heathen darkness. It is remarkable that, so far as we know, they were

entirely ignorant of each other's trials and teachings; and yet, when they met, their doctrines were found to be almost identical, clearly showing that they were both living witnesses for the same truth, actuated by the same spirit, and watched over by the same Head and Lord.

Not long afterwards, many of them scaled the Alpine range, and descending into France, found the Albigeois or Albigenses holding the same truths with all godly sincerity, amongst whom they settled, and were called by their name, although coming from Bulgaria. However, they were often called Bulgarians, which the French corrupted into *Bougres*, as a term of reproach. Their arrival in France took place about the year 1011, and they were first noticed at Aquitain by the established Church, which, in the year 1019, convoked a Synod to be held at Toulouse, for the purpose of debating their condition and actions. As this branch of the Paulicians was now at a considerable distance from Milan, and could not attend the appointed assemblies in that city, it appointed one to be held at Orleans, which seems to have been presided over by a moderator.

From Italy and France the Paulicians extended their missionary operations northward into Germany, where they received the name of *Gazari*, which is probably derived from the country bordering on the Black Sea, from whence they had come.

Thus, in a short space of time, the sect was scattered throughout the most of Europe, and drew vast numbers into its ranks by the teaching and sanctity of its members. Their great centre was still in Milan, where their assemblies were held, and this continued to be the case until the middle of the eleventh century. Their general name of Paulician or Pavlikian, was changed into Publican, Paphlagonian, and Poplicani, according to the nationality in which they resided, until all were lost by their becoming absorbed into the Albigenses and Waldenses.

Their distinct history in western Europe ended soon after, but in Thrace and Bulgaria it still remained distinct and separate.

Passing over a century of unimportant events, about the year 1120, Alexius Comnenus determined to try the effect of a public discussion with the Paulicians, being one of the most refined

minds of the age, and well able to combat the various theories then in existence. For this purpose he fixed his winter quarters at Philipopolis, the Paulician capital, and spent days and nights in discussion with them, using such means to enforce his arguments as circumstances required. Those who recanted and joined the Church lived by themselves, so that in a short time a city sprang up, which was honored by the name of Alexius. Those, however, who resisted alike promises, rewards, and punishments, were banished to life-long exile; their capital, Philipopolis, was taken from them, and their lives were spared more from motives of prudence than mercy.

After this, the Paulicians in Bulgaria and Thrace passed under the name of *Bogomiles*, either originating that sect, or being assimilated with it; and thus the distinctive history of this notable sect is brought to a close by their being incorporated into those three other bodies, viz., the Albigenses, Waldenses, and Bogomiles. Eneas Sylvius mentions their existence in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Slavonia, in the fifteenth century. In the seventeenth century, Peter Deodatus, archbishop of St. Sophia, in Constantinople, brought many of those residing near Nicopolis in Bulgaria, who were no doubt descended from the Paulicians, over to the Greek Church; and at the present time, the so-called Paulicians, still living around their old capital, are steeped in the greatest ignorance, superstition, and degradation. They know little or nothing of their ancestors, and their religion is corrupted by many of those rites and ceremonies which their forefathers had so faithfully contended against.

In conclusion, we would reiterate our firm belief that the Paulicians were a noble band of Protestants, living long before the time of the Reformation, and that their history has not only been overlooked, but shamefully misrepresented. This conviction is based upon a threefold argument, drawn from their history and doctrines:

1st. *Their high esteem for the logical, doctrinal, and practical epistles of the apostle Paul.*—They moulded their rules of faith and practice and tested all the theories of other sectaries by his teachings; and to be Pauline, is to be orthodox and pure.

2d. *Their nearness to the apostolic form of government.*—As they had only pastors and teachers, with chosen moderators over their assemblies, they were entirely free from Papal errors as to hierarchical offices—errors which characterise some denominations of the Protestant Church in our day.

3d. *Their opposition to the corrupt practices of the established Church.*—They had separated because they could not tolerate its many errors and innovations; and their hostility to these was the occasion of their being persecuted for over five hundred years, by both Church and State.

“Thrice hail! ye faithful shepherds of the fold,
By tortures unsubdued, unbribed by gold;
In your high scorn of honors, honored most,
Ye chose the martyr's, not the prelate's post;
Firmly the thorny path of suffering trod,
And counted death all gain to live with God.”

ARTICLE III.

LECKY'S HISTORY OF EUROPEAN MORALS.

History of European Morals, from Augustus to Charlemagne.
By WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY, M. A. 2 vols.
New York: D. Appleton & Company. 1870.

There is nothing more important to the casuistic infidelity of the day, than to account, upon natural principles, for the existence and success of Christianity. And there is nothing more entirely satisfactory to the Christian thinker, who has nerve to face the argument, and see it through, than the manner in which it is endeavored to be done.

It is a grand question, if one only could grapple with it, and really settle it! This mighty mass, which touches the earth, but will not mingle with it, or mixes with it only at the cost of life to the contaminated member; whose inner laws are in perfect harmony with the laws of God's lower kingdom, yet absolutely refuse to acknowledge any parentage or descent from them, much

less any subordination to them; this mass, upon which all evil things move to destroy it in vain, but which, in its turn, self-moving, descends upon them in a volume and power that overwhelms them all; whose energy is of the spirit, so subtle as to seem unreal, yet more solid than the mountain granite; whence is it? And how shall we account for its existence and its victories, *quin Deus intersit?* And verily, if it could but be explained on purely natural principles; if it could once be shown that no divine hand had been needed to send these springs of the water of life among the valleys, to give drink to all that are athirst; the whole question concerning the efficient interposition of God upon the earth would cease to have any living interest for any practical mind. If he did not command light into the pitchy darkness of man's ruin, we shall not very vehemently care whether he spoke it into the material chaos. If he is not the author of salvation, it is of little consequence to us whether he is the author of what we call creation. The God who was not our Father, would be indeed a God far off.

But if, on the other hand, he did thus interpose; if redemption is a real work, and his work, (as it must be, if it be at all;) then, when that point is proved, the infidel has really lost the whole battle; for there need be no question that God, who sovereignly restores, did sovereignly produce; and that he who has built the splendid temple, Grace, did not need to borrow the foundation, Nature. None the less, however, will we do battle wherever we find the foe. It is by faith we understand that the worlds *were made*, and did not grow. In them hath he graven the record of his eternal power and Godhead, (*Θειότης*) and not a letter or a vowel point shall any sacrilegious hand obliterate while Christ's Church can prevent it.

If, now, any reader shall consider these remarks irrelevant to the subject suggested by the book before us, it can be only because he has not read—or, reading, has not inwardly digested—the very subtle, learned, and elaborate work itself. The name is an egregious misnomer. Barring the last chapter, the book is only incidentally a “History of Morals.” It is not morals, nor the history thereof, that gives it unity. That must be sought in the

effort to do what Gibbon failed to do—to explain the success of Christianity on natural principles. The author's plan is exceedingly ingenious, his methods wisely chosen, his style laboriously good, his lore prodigious. Nevertheless, he has signally failed. Failing, he has demonstrated that the thing attempted cannot be done; for, if it could have been done, Mr. Lecky would appear to be the man to do it.

But we pause at the entrance of the lists, to congratulate him on his prudence. He has nowhere, not in one paragraph, or sentence, or clause, attempted to explain the *existence* of Christianity. He rigorously confines his speculations and reasonings to its *success*. It surely did begin to be; and inasmuch as, our author himself being judge and witness, it has changed the face of Europe, and made morals, in a thousand ways, just what they are, there would have been no fatal irrelevancy in his digressing so far as to tell us whence this marvel sprang, and with what throes of nature she came to the birth.

But no such dangerous question will Mr. Lecky handle. He is as prudently silent, just here, as the Pharisees, when they were asked of "the baptism of John, was it from heaven, or of men? And they reasoned among themselves, saying, If we shall say, from heaven, he will say unto us, Why did ye not then believe him? But if we shall say of men, we fear the people."* He contents himself with acknowledging that the prodigy *is*; and being here, he will show us by its behavior and achievements, that it is no such prodigious matter, after all.

Now, we confess that, logically, this is all right. Every man has a perfect right to select the question he will discuss, and to try it with such resources as he has, and such wit and wisdom as he is capable of. But to Mr. Lecky's claims as a historical philosopher, we submit that this course is fatal. It was clearly his duty to trace the Stoical Philosophy, *ab ovo*, and he has done so. He has made sufficiently clear the rise of Neoplatonism, and of such other schemes and schemers as have largely affected the received ethics and the moral practice of mankind. Why not of Christianity also? This mightiest factor of all—this

* Matt. xxi. 25, 26.

all-potent, world-moulding element—shall we be contentedly ignorant of its cause? Shall we trace the Nile to its source, and not the River of the Water of Life? Shall Seneca have dozens of pages, and be quoted, and praised, and dissected, and “accounted for,” through the whole gamut, and Christ have not a line?

Nor shall this assailant of a divine redemption escape under the plea that, his subject being *European* morals, he cannot be called to account for not passing over into Asia. There is no such canon of historical writing. Mr. Lecky may safely be challenged to produce a single standard work in history, which does not go outside of its assigned limits to investigate the origin of those forces whose play and inter-relations produce the history.

Besides, the author has not hesitated to cross the great sea for his own purposes. Why should he not do as much to do honor to the convictions and the reverence of the Christian world? He has not hesitated to speak of the Pentateuch as “writings in which religious massacres, on the whole, the most ruthless and sanguinary on record, were said to have been directly enjoined by the Deity;”^{*} or to sneer at the sun’s being “literally arrested in its course, to illuminate an army engaged in massacring its enemies.”[†] Even so small a matter as that “St. Paul was probably unmarried,” and that “his writings showed a decided preference for the unmarried state,”[‡] is not overlooked; but neither Paul, nor John, nor Christ is found worthy of record in a History of European Morals, or to take a place, we will not say beside Seneca, or Plutarch, or Cicero, but beside Maximus of Tyr, or Apollonius of Tyana! He who could go back beyond Augustus to Joshua, and on beyond Charlemagne to Madame de Stael,^{||} can make no room for the ethics of Peter or James. It would have been as easy to find the reasons for the success of the gospel in those reverend names and holy truths, as to say that “Christianity floated into the Roman Empire on the wave of credulity that brought with it this long train of oriental superstitions and legends.”[§]

^{*}Vol. I., p. 421.

[†]Ibid, p. 376.

[‡]Vol. II., p. 111.

^{||}See her eloquent panegyric, Vol. II., pp. 62, 63. [§]Vol. I., p. 397.

The simple truth is, that Mr. Lecky *dared not* join issue with the Christian world, respecting the central facts of the Christian religion. Investigation has gone too far; the science of history is too vitally interested in their acceptance and recognition. This author is a man of too much learning and English common sense, either openly to deny the facts, or, admitting them, to hope to blink the conclusion. It remained, therefore, only to blur them by discrediting the system which rests upon them. And the quotations we have given, (which might be multiplied,) unhappily make it only too plain that this was his design.

In the brief discussion on which we propose now to enter, we omit all reference to the first chapter, devoted to "the Natural History of Morals," in which we have a very large and candid account of the two great systems of morals—the utilitarian and the intuitional—with an able advocacy of the latter; and also to the last chapter, on "the Position of Woman," in which Mr. Lecky abundantly shows us what a History of Morals he could have written, if he had really desired to do it. Here is one great ethical topic treated after a proper historical method, in an essay replete with learning, and enriched with much wisdom set forth in language often singularly beautiful and strong.

They are passed by here, therefore, not at all as unworthy of our best attention—for they deserve it—but as almost entirely apart from that great argument of the book, with which we are at present concerned.

Mr. Lecky's chief endeavor, to which we now limit ourselves, may be described as a game of three moves. The first move, made by means of Chapter II., on "the Pagan Empire," is an elucidation of, and panegyric upon, the Stoical Philosophy. Chapter III. makes the second move, by "accounting for" the Conversion of Rome. Chapter IV. should give the finale by its delineation of the moral ideal of Christianity and the methods by which "the new religion" attempted to introduce that ideal. For clearly, if the said philosophy, was not indeed quite the equal of our religion, yet such a precursor of it as admits of being favorably compared with it, and even of boasting certain moral superiorities; and if the preparatives for the advent of

Christianity into Rome were of such kinds, and of such force, as that the wonder would rather have been that it had not prevailed, on the ordinary and natural principles of human history alone; and if, thirdly, so great and virulent were the involved evils of Christianity, that nothing but the advent of Rationalism and Scientific Scepticism could have emancipated man; then Christianity is very unfortunate and very absurd, in having ever made pretensions to the character of a divine revelation.

It is a most significant fact, that, with our author, while man's philosophies are natural, his religions are artificial. He sees in the religion of the Greeks, "the creations of an unbridled and irreverent fancy;" in the gods of the Egyptians, "representations of the forces of nature;" in those of the Romans, "for the most part simple allegories, frigid personifications of different virtues, or imagined presiding spirits." Now, while there is enough of truth in these statements, correctly to characterise and distinguish these systems as against each other, it is unphilosophical to ignore the existence and power of the religious instinct itself, which impelled these efforts and enforced them upon the belief of the people, in the first place, and afterwards as irresistibly constrained men to cast them away like worn-out raiment, because they failed to satisfy its wants.

Of these two, religion and philosophy, each springs from a constitutional principle in man, but receives its shape from the peculiarities of the people, or of their circumstances. Thus "Xenophanes remarked that each nation attributed to the gods its distinctive national type; the gods of the Ethiopians being black, the gods of the Thracians fair and blue-eyed." And Mr. Lecky is as prompt as any man, not only to see this truth, as concerns philosophy, but to work it out in pages of fine and often profound reflections. But he fails to discern the fact, that while the philosophic impulse is intrinsically inventive and independent, the religious impulse is essentially receptive and dependent; and that, therefore, while philosophy is to be achieved, religion is to be acquired; while the doctrines of the one are to be discovered and wrought out, those of the other are to be accepted and wrought

in. All religions profess to have come down to man; if there is a true one, it must have done so.

It is written in the horoscope of every mere mythology that it shall fail of human reverence after a shorter or longer trial, because only a divine knowledge comprehends man's need, and only divine power can supply it. The pages of this book are burdened with the evidence of it, in the noblest instances of all:

“The very children and old women ridiculed Cerberus and the Furies, or treated them as mere metaphors of conscience. In the deism of Cicero the popular divinities were discarded, the oracles refuted and ridiculed, the whole system of divination pronounced a political imposture, and the genesis of the miraculous traced to the exuberance of the imagination, and to certain diseases of the judgment. Before the time of Constantine, numerous books had been written against the oracles. The greater number of these had actually ceased; and the ablest writers justly saw in this cessation an evidence of the declining credulity of the people, and a proof that the oracles had been a fruit of that credulity. . . . Cato wondered that two augurs could meet with gravity. A Roman general named Sertorius made the forgery of auspicious omens a continual resource in warfare.” Pp. 173, 174. “Augustus solemnly degraded the statue of Neptune, because his fleet had been wrecked. When Germanicus died, the populace stoned or overthrew the altars of the gods. The idea of sanctity was so far removed from the popular divinities, that it became a continual complaint that prayers were offered [to them] which the most depraved would blush to pronounce aloud.” P. 178. Mr. Lecky felicitously describes the state of the public mind as one of “superstitious scepticism.” It is the bourne to which every human religion descends, and from which it never returns.

But if the derivation of the word “religion” which Cicero accepts—*a religare*—be admitted; if its office is to bind man afresh to duty and to virtue; then we must agree with the author that the counterpart of religion, in our sense of the word, must be sought rather in the philosophies than in the mythologies of Greece and Rome. Gods that gave no law, and observed none but their own impulses, from high to vile; gods to whom good-

ness was not dear, with whom virtue was not safe; how could they fail to *rot* the country that did them reverence? Religious thought and feeling, and the sense of moral obligation, took refuge from these deities "revengeful, lustful, blind, passionate, unjust," with men that either scornfully discarded them, or mocked them with perfunctory observance.

We must now inquire of our author what guidance was offered, what work was done, what truths were taught, and how widely, and how practically, by that famous body of men, the Stoical philosophers.

The central conception of their system was "the dignity of man."* Pride was its leading moral agent; "pride, which looks within, making man seek his own approbation;" which never doubted the essential excellence of human nature; which counted man master of his own feelings, and "capable of such excellence that he might even challenge comparison with the gods."

Sin, in their conception, was "simply disease." In their scheme of preparation for death, "repentance for past sin has absolutely no place." And though some of the later writers improved a little upon this dreary self-worship—as we shall see, when we turn to their theology—they are confessed by their eulogist to be inconsistent in this respect.

Stoicism was an endeavor after a purely intuitional morality; *i. e.*, it insisted upon the sole worth and absolute obligation of virtue, and discarded not only the grosser utilitarian inducements, but even the affections themselves. The love of children, the purest conjugal love, were as alien to its theories as avarice or drunkenness. The sage, theoretically, was as absolutely self-centred and self-absorbed (on the affectional side) as the gods of Epicurus. He resolutely rejected from his thoughts even such motives as a future beyond the grave, with its rewards and woes, would have supplied. He bade man be absolutely pure, and self-sacrificingly patriotic, and the brother of universal man, not because it is prudent, not even because it is sweetness to the heart and peace to the conscience, but because nothing else is worthy of—Himself.

*Vol. I., p. 205, *seq.*

Now, we decline the plunge into the profound questions here suggested, touching the nature of virtue, the ground of its obligation, and the motives which may lawfully impel us to it. Our duty is with the historical sequences. However utterly astray its speculations may be, we cannot but confess that the enterprise this ancient system undertook was sublimely audacious—wonderful in its conception, marvellous in its temporary and partial success. It arose among the crude, passionâte, selfish minds which have composed the bulk of mankind, and challenged them to the pursuit of an ideal, the very loftiest invented by man, and to a faith in themselves, that they were naturally, and at the root, the very opposite of that poor and mean thing which each man knew himself in daily life to be. It floated truths—kept them from submersion and forgetfulness—which must always be foreign to the sloth and self-indulgence in which the world lived, and lives. It uttered them in words so grand as to have become a precious heritage of the race, as thus: “Cicero, expounding the principles of Stoicism, declares that no one has attained to true philosophy who has not learned that all vice is to be avoided, ‘though it were concealed from the eyes of God and men.’” Similarly write those who were more distinctively Stoics. “‘Nothing for opinion, all for conscience.’ ‘He who wishes his virtue to be blazed abroad, is not laboring for virtue, but for fame.’ . . . ‘If you do anything to please men, you have fallen from your estate.’ . . . ‘Never forget that it is possible to be at once a divine man, yet a man unknown to all the world.’ . . . ‘We do not love virtue because it gives us pleasure, but it gives us pleasure because we love it.’ ‘To ask to be paid for virtue, is as if the eye demanded a recompence for seeing, or the feet for walking.’ In doing good, man ‘should be like the vine which has produced grapes, and asks for nothing more after it has produced its proper fruit.’” Vol. I., pp. 195, 196.

What men of marble they strove to make, is well seen in the close of Seneca's account of clemency and pity—the former of which he makes “one of the highest virtues, and the latter a positive vice.” “The sage will console those who weep, without weeping with them; he will succor the shipwrecked, give hospitality to the proscribed, and alms to the poor, . . . restore the

son to the mother's tears, save the captive from the arena, and even bury the criminal; but in all, his mind and his countenance will be alike untroubled. He will feel no pity. . . . His countenance and his soul will betray no emotion as he looks upon the withered legs, the tattered rags, the bent and emaciated frame of the beggar. But he will help those who are worthy, and like the gods, his leaning will be toward the wretched."*

Three questions now require an answer: What religion did they teach? What did they effect for the people at large? What were they in their own lives?

That neither they, nor their rivals, the Epicureans, nor the Eclectics, (such as Cicero,) taught the religion in which they professed to live, is abundantly evident. Lucretius "boasts that the popular deities dwindle into significance" when compared with Epicurus. To destroy the superstitious terrors created by the popular religion "was represented as the highest function of philosophy." Yet they not only acquiesced in the worship of these immoral gods, but urged its practice upon each other, and accepted office in the temple. What was their theology, then?

Mr. Lecky acknowledges that it was "an ill-defined, uncertain, and somewhat inconsistent Pantheism; the divinity was especially worshipped under the two aspects of providence and moral goodness." But what kind of "worship" this was—whether it was a mere inward, silent interpretation of the service offered to gods whose persons and whose story symbolised neither of these two "aspects," or whether it was simply the utterance of these fine phrases about them—does not appear. That they did say many admirable things, in these two regards, is certainly true; but if they must be construed in a particular sense, they become as vapid as any German religiosities of the same class. Quoth Cicero, "There never was a great man without an inspiration from on high;" but what boots it, if the folly as well as the wisdom is from on high? Seneca says, "Nothing is closed to God. He is present in our consciences; he intervenes in our thoughts." Yea, verily, that is a purely identical equation, if he is we, and we are he. Mar-

*See this interesting discussion at length, Vol. I., pp. 199, 200.

cus Aurelius gives the highest possible expression to their religious ideas—literally the highest possible—when he says, “Offer to the God that is in thee,* a manly being, a citizen, a soldier at his post, ready to depart from life as soon as the trumpet sounds.” It is sufficient to believe in the genius who is within us, and to honor him by a pure worship.†

But let us consult our author as to the instructions they gave upon two very important matters; the one fundamental to all spiritual religion, the other a crucial point in morals, as the corollary of religion. We mean the doctrine of immortality, and the ethical quality of suicide.

As regards the first of these, we are told that, while Cæsar could assert in the Senate, “without scandal, and almost without dissent, that death was the end of all things;” while Pliny, speaking for the school of Epicurus, “describes the belief in a future life as a form of madness, a puerile and a pernicious illusion,” “the opinions of the Stoics were wavering and uncertain”‡ Their pantheism naturally led some to believe in the reabsorption of the soul into the parent Spirit. “Panætius, the founder of Roman Stoicism, maintained that the soul perished with the body; and his opinion was followed by Epictetus and Corutus. Seneca contradicted himself on the subject. Marcus Aurelius never rose beyond a vague and mournful aspiration.”||

Touching suicide, “among the Stoics, the belief that no man may shrink from a duty, coexisted with the belief that every man has a right to dispose of his own life.”§ Seneca, the most eminent of Latin Stoics, has left, not a defence, but a passionately eloquent panegyric of suicide. “The doctrine was, indeed, the culminating point of Roman Stoicism. . . . Life and death, in the Stoical system, were attuned to the same key. The deification of human virtue; the total absence of all sense of sin; the proud, stubborn will that deemed humiliation the worst of stains, appeared alike in each. The type, of its own kind, was perfect. All the virtues and all the majesty that accompany human pride,

‡ Vol. I., p. 192.

|| *Ib.*, p. 193.

§ *Ib.*, p. 225.

* Italics ours. † These quotations are all from Vol. I., pp. 207–209.

. . . were here displayed. All those which accompany humility and self-abasement were absent."*

This brief exhibit may be yet more briefly summed up: If such philosophy is the Pagan coördinate of religion in our sense of the word, it is a miserable failure. It blurred the personal gods that men had served, and gave them instead, themselves and the dim star-dust-cloud, Nature. It robbed its adherents of all those sublime motives that gather about man's immortality. It left man, a godless, hopeless wreck, to cast himself, with a last irrevocable defiance, into the abyss of death.

But, perhaps, though of so little substance in theory, Stoicism may have shown itself of more solid value in practice. Such things have been. There is an adventitious strength appearing, in certain cases, in connection with systems of little or no intrinsic power. It is fair to ask, therefore, whether this vaunted "wisdom of the world" took effectual hold upon the people, and so proved itself great? This question need not detain us long. The admissions in one quotation—whose audacious praise we pass without comment—are quite sufficient to settle it:

"On the one hand we find a system of ethics, of which, when we consider the range and beauty of its precepts, the sublimity of the motives to which it appealed, and its perfect freedom from superstitious (*quere*, religious?) elements, it is not too much to say, that though it may have been equalled, it has never been surpassed. On the other hand, we find a society almost absolutely destitute of moralising institutions, occupations, or beliefs, existing under an economical and political system, which inevitably led to general depravity, and passionately addicted to the most brutalizing amusements. The moral code, while it expanded in theoretical catholicity, had contracted in practical application. . . . The later Romans had attained a very high and spiritual conception of duty, but the philosopher with his group of disciples, or the writer with his few readers, had scarcely any point of contact with the people. *The great practical problem of the ancient philosophers was, how they could act upon the masses. . . . This problem the Roman Stoics were incapable of solving, but they did what lay in their power.*" Vol. I., pp. 308, 309. [The italics are ours.]

That is entirely conclusive of that question. Had we space, and were it necessary, we might give pages of vivid description

* Vol. I., pp. 234, 235.

from this high authority—description, contrasting “the party of virtue” with the people they manfully endeavored to purify, and in whose foulness and corruption they were at last submerged.

But we can clinch the argument still more effectually by drawing from his pages a brief answer to our third inquiry: What were these great teachers, these lights of ancient morals, themselves?

“There was one form in which [the love of truth] was absolutely unknown. The belief that it is wrong for a man in religious matters to act a lie, to sanction, by his presence and example, what he regards as baseless superstitions, had no place in the ethics of antiquity. The religious flexibility which Polytheism had originally generated, . . . had rendered nearly universal among philosophers, a state of feeling which is often exhibited, but rarely openly professed among ourselves. . . . No one did more to scatter the ancient superstitions than Cicero, who was himself an augur, and who strongly asserted the duty of complying with the national rites.” Vol. I., p. 430.

Other examples follow.

“While, too, the school of Zeno produced many of the best and greatest men who have ever lived, it must be acknowledged that its records exhibit a rather unusual number of men who, displaying in some forms the most undoubted and transcendent virtue, fell in others far below the average of mankind. The elder Cato, who, though not a philosopher, was a model of philosophers, was conspicuous for his inhumanity to his slaves. Brutus was one of the most extortionate usurers of his time; and several citizens of Salamis died of starvation, imprisoned because they could not pay the sum he demanded. . . . Sallust, in a corrupt age, was notorious for his rapacity. [Seneca's] life was deeply marked by the taint of flattery, and not free from the taint of avarice.” *Ib.*, pp. 203, 204.

This is not all, but it is surely enough.

It really seems unnecessary to go into further detail; to hear how Stoicism became religious, p. 259, and more introspective, p. 261; or to unearth for Mr. Lecky the moral of the story of Marcus Aurelius, which he has beautifully told, p. 263, *seq.*; or even to discuss his explanation of Stoicism, p. 204, farther than to draw from it the antithesis, that while this philosophy originated naturally, but became unnatural, Christianity originated supernaturally, yet proved its perfect adaptation to the nature of man.

Suffice it that it *did* fail. It fell, according to our author, before three tremendous antagonists—imperial despotism, slavery, and the “peculiar institution” of the Roman empire, the gladiatorial spectacles. It would not be difficult to show that his second point is wrongly taken, and that *clientelage* should take the place he has allotted to slavery. The first and second of these died a natural death, though they were too strong for philosophy. The third, Mr. Lecky himself declares, *was destroyed by Christianity.*

Hear, then, the conclusion of this matter: Stoicism gave the world a virtue without affections, a religion without a God, a soul without a future. It tried, by writing, by oral instruction, even by preaching,* to get hold of the people, and failed. It tried to produce model men, and failed. It tried to reform and save the empire, and failed. Of the splendid graces of character displayed in many cases; of the admirable patience and moral courage of this last effort, especially, it would be delightful to speak, if there were space. What chiefly concerns us is the fact, that while it was the very noblest thing man ever did, it broke down completely, and passed away, leaving hardly a wreck behind.

Yet its ethics were positive. It taught virtue biographically, which is of all methods the most efficient; it displayed many virtues in their very highest living expression. It gave way at last to Neoplatonism, and the Egyptian Orientalism, whose teachers brought their stores of learning, and wisdom, and a rich devoutness of spirit to the enterprise of religious reform, and gave a sad but beautiful afterglow to the declining day of Rome. But as the system that had strength was fatally devoid of spiritual life, so the system that had beauty, was without inward strength. The one denied man a heart; the other scorned his reason. Proud and high as they were, they toppled and fell.

They left the field to a religion, compared with whose venerable years—little as Mr. Lecky seems aware of it—the oldest of them had but the life of a babbling infant, which, nevertheless, is seen to-day to be rather in its youth than its age, and mewing its half-ried powers for flights of glory over all the world. Whence

* See pp. 327, 328, 329, Vol. I.

came that religion? And whence had it the strength it unquestionably displayed in the conversion of the Roman Empire?

Mr. Lecky's answer to this question constitutes what we have called his second move. It need not detain us long; for though he has written on it at great length, and enriched his numerous pages with stores of curious lore, and ingenious reasoning, and fine joinery of quotation, he has gathered his main points within a narrow compass. In the space of four pages,* he has given us "the main causes," "the cause," and "the chief cause." They are, respectively, "the general tendencies of the age," the combination of "so many distinct elements of power and attraction," and "the congruity of its teaching with the spiritual nature of mankind." Here you have the full-fledged philosopher in his best estate. Verily is it, as one said of old, "altogether vanity"!

For, as touching his "main causes," viz., the general tendencies of the age, it is obvious that he has confounded the *preparations* (providential as we maintain) for an event, with the *causes* of the event. The two are as distinct as the ploughing of a field from the sowing of the seed. Very far are we from blinking the truth that it was "in the fulness of time, that God sent forth his Son." Gal. iv. 4. It is a very precious and even necessary truth to us, that that supreme event came in no hap-hazard, but at an hour as closely calculated as the transit of Venus. The consolidation of all the important nations of the earth in one great empire, the reign of peace throughout its bounds, and the pervasion of the whole world by three languages—Hebrew for devotion, Greek for theology, Latin for organisation and business—these illustrate a class of preparatives just as real, and in some respects as necessary, as the decay of the old religions, the exhaustion of the old philosophies, the conscious misery and corruption of mankind, or the revulsion toward religious belief from the frivolous scepticism and infidel superstition into which the noblest nations of antiquity had descended: facts, which fall under Mr. Lecky's title of "general tendencies." Which of all these could have begotten Christianity? And if the answer be

* Vol. I., pp. 410-413.

attempted that these general tendencies explain not the existence, but the success of gospel religion, then we insist that the author has *confessedly* overlooked the royal and only perfect cause of that success—and that is, the gospel religion itself.

But this conclusion, of course, relegates us at once to the other explanations tendered us, viz., the many elements of power and attraction combined in Christianity, and chief of them all, its congruity with the spiritual nature of man. This witness is true. Its combinations of power and attraction were unrivalled. Its congruity to man's fallen but redeemable nature is absolutely unique. But if the witness is put forward in a naturalistic sense, we are ready for Mr. Lecky with his bravuras about Stoicism. Had Christianity greater men than Seneca, and Cicero, and his other worthies? Not in his opinion. Were the individual Christian teachers men of profounder wisdom and deeper insight, or a nobler type of man? He will admit no such thing, as we have seen in quotations already made. What was it then—or rather, let us reverently ask, Who was it, that out of His infinite treasures combined these attractions? Who understood man, when he failed to understand himself? Who founded this religion, which the philosophers detested and scorned, which the Emperors bitterly persecuted, which the heart of man in every nation and every age invariably rejects before it accepts; yet gave it, in their despite, imperial prevalence and ever-expanding conquests? In truth, if Mr. Lecky were as much of a philosopher as we wish he was, he would have seen that this congruity of which he speaks is by no means a simple congruity. There are elements in human nature with which Christianity is congruous; but they are submerged elements. Sense, and sinful habit, have overgrown them. They rarely understand themselves. They need a seer to behold them, a prophet to give them voice. The face of the world is strewn with wrecked mythologies and philosophies, whose fate was sealed by the fact that, though born of men, they were incapable of adjustment to the true needs, the inarticulate desires, the sublime inward challenges, of human nature. The statement does indeed explain the success of the gospel, but that explaining fact can itself only be accounted for by the confession of a re-

vealing God. To use it in any other interest is to beg the question.

But, seeing there is no relief from the acceptance of Christianity in either the first or the second of these efforts, can the historian, in the third place, so cheapen its character or its achievements, or make out such a case of failure, that the suggestion of a divine Redeemer, and great First Cause of the gospel, becomes an impertinence? The attempt is not new, but that is a small matter. Is it successful, to any seriously damaging extent?

It seems scarcely credible that a son of Protestant England should (1) segregate historical Christianity from the facts which are its root, and the authoritatively declared principles which are its life; (2) identify Popery and the Greek Church with Christianity; (3) be absolutely insensible to the difference between belief and faith. Yet this is the condition of this author, and if the masses of writing in his unconscionably long fourth chapter, which owe their presence there to these three mistakes, were extracted, the remainder would be almost an eulogium upon the Christian religion.

A few brief sentences comprise all that need be said in rejoinder:

(a) God has given no guarantees that a revealed religion should be incapable of corruption; on the contrary, it is a part of man's responsibility that it should be capable of it.

(b) The ordinances and false doctrines of the apostate Churches bear upon their face the distinctive marks of that very thing, namely, corruption—there being a wide difference between a thing of native growth, and the perversion of another thing.

(c) The application of the power of the gospel being first to the heart, secondarily to the individual life, and only in the third remove to communities, the possibility of its perversion is formidably large, and its development to perfection correspondingly difficult and slow.*

*Mr. L. caught a brief glimpse of this truth—see Vol. II., p. 156: "Its moral action has always been much more powerful upon individuals than upon societies; and the spheres in which its superiority over other

(d) There is absolutely no Church in the world, whether fallen or standing, that does not constantly and emphatically distinguish between intellectual belief and Christian faith. The blunder is one of which Mr. Lecky and his comrades of the "advanced thought" have the monopoly for public use. Faith is too rich and sweet and deep, a power both of action and of joy, to be lost sight of in a frame of mind of which even a philosopher is capable. The two are perfectly distinct and distinguishable, even when they relate to the same truth. The one is the having been convinced; the other is the being able to rely. The one is concerned most directly with the evidence; the other, with the witness. Intellectual belief is the work of that one power (the judgment) alone. In faith, the whole spiritual nature conspires and consents. But all that, however he may indirectly recognise it elsewhere, disappears from this writer's view, when it most concerns the great subject of his book that he should remember and grapple with it.

As to his second mistake, it really seems hardly worth while to repeat—what every Protestant but Mr. Lecky familiarly knows—that Popery is not Christianity; that it has always claimed to be that very divine institution which it has always been engaged in subverting; and that its divergencies from Christianity began early, ran far, and have never returned. And probably enough has been said, incidentally, concerning the first mistake in the opening pages of this article, to justify us now in passing it by.

It remains only to say—what he, alas, cannot appreciate, but our readers will feel to be of vital consequence—that there is no page in this book which recognises the existence, as a substantive reality, of religion. The word is there in superabundance; but the author does not (even intellectually) apprehend the thing. Unless the occasional mention of reverence as a virtue may be taken to mean something, this great book, with all its eloquence and all its learning, is on this subject a blank.

religions is most incontestable, are precisely those which history is least capable of realising." If he had carried that thought with him, how different a book this might have been!

It is merely *ad hominem* to say that such an omission is absurd in a work whose burden is Christianity. As a characteristic of a whole school of assailants, however, the point is exceedingly important and encouraging. The Church is in the world, as Lot's house was in Sodom. The angels are within; and they who would dishonor them, "weary themselves to find the door," but they cannot.

We look with wonder at the groping malignity whose very movements show the blindness of ungodly men to the real nature of the gospel and the priceless value of its religious products. Let them ask their irrelevant questions, and bring their cheapening histories to bear down the loftiness of Christianity to a purely human level. Milton's famous mathematical critic, with his "What does it prove?" exposed, not the poem, but himself. And so do they betray themselves, who attack a divine religion, while taking no account of sin, and scorning the doctrine of providence, and stumbling over the fact of an atonement, and superciliously slighting the promise of grace.

The *actual experience* of the Christian through this grace, is what enriches and illuminates his life. Very possibly, he has stood on the philosopher's high moral ground, and challengingly held up his virtues before God. He knows now how dreary and how dead a life that is, from which a Father, a Redeemer, and a Royal Comrade are absent. His new riches, his new light, are due not merely, not even chiefly, to comfort sensibly enjoyed, the daily and spontaneous pleasures of the renewed soul. Far more are they due to the responses of God's word to his inner life, and the experience of a Saviour's presence with him continually. The doctrine of a personal Providence, at which Mr. Lecky elaborately sneers, is the inevitable corollary of that kindred between God and his soul which *he knows* to exist, without which his present and current experience would be impossible.

Now, when the believer finds the busy enemies of his faith utterly astray, absolute blunderers, on these primary and fundamental matters, he smiles with pity upon their "foolishness." It is not by discussing adventitious questions, and belittling a history.

humiliating enough, indeed, to man, but resplendent with the prowess of heaven, that these men can accomplish the despair of millions.

Before that cruel work is done, they must obliterate the instinct of religion in man's nature, reverse the lessons of design written on rocks, and seas, and stars; disprove the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and thus wrench God's signet-ring from the hand of revelation.

Until all this is effected, we will still adore a Creator, carry our burdens of sin and woe to a Redeemer, hold up our tainted hearts to a sanctifying Spirit. We will still see in the Gospel the Rock hewn from the mountains without hand, rolling on and growing through the ages, crushing superstitions, gladiatorial games, oppressions, and even nations that will not be blessed; and preparing to fill the whole earth. We will still see in the only true religion a balm, healing the deadly wound of mankind, through the regeneration of the individual heart. We will still pray for these unfortunate men who "despitefully use and persecute" their and our divine Friend.

Meanwhile, Mr. Lecky must try again.

NOTE 1. Mr. L. has once or twice disclaimed any desire to meddle with theological matters. We have disregarded those disclaimers, because he *does* meddle with them.

2. We have omitted almost all reference to the valuable and interesting final chapter, on "the Position of Woman," partly because little of its matter is germane to the present discussion, and partly because he who does treat that chapter, ought to *complete* the history—if we may risk the Hibernicism—by writing the *first part* of it, viz., the position of woman in Old Testament history.

ARTICLE IV.

THE BENEDICTION NOT A MERE FORM.

Aaron and his sons were divinely required to pronounce, and Israel warranted to receive, "the blessing from the Lord." Among the Levitical injunctions, we read the following in Numbers vi. 22-27: "And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Speak unto Aaron and unto his sons, saying, On this wise ye shall bless the children of Israel, saying unto them, The Lord bless thee and keep thee; the Lord make his face shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee; the Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace. And they shall put my name upon the children of Israel, and I will bless them." Here the emphasis is noticeable: "On this wise ye shall bless; . . . and they shall put my name upon the children of Israel." And the concluding promise is, "And I will bless them."

That the benediction was assigned no essential place in the order of tabernacle services, further proves that it was not an unmeaning form, merely to conclude public worship. Yet propriety, and gratification from an interest ever deepening, frequently reserved it for the close and climax. Thus having been invested with his high priestly office, and the sacrifice having been offered, "Aaron lifted up his hand toward the people, and blessed them, and came down from" the altar. (Lev. ix. 22.) There we have the manner of pronouncing the blessing; and there in both manner and act, as Matthew Henry has suggested, Aaron was a type of Christ, who came into the world to bless us; and when he was parted from his disciples, at his ascension, lifted up his hands and blessed them, and in them his whole Church, of which they were the elders and representatives, as the great High Priest of our profession. Aaron's hand lifted up toward the people, doubtless signified the imparting the blessing. It was also evidently in acknowledgment of the source of these benefits, and as a voiceless invocation of the Almighty, first to bestow grace upon the priest, that with becoming solemnity and fervid desire, he may

pronounce blessed those whom the Lord Jehovah has truly blest.* Hence the Hebrew doctors warn the people, "that they say not, What availeth the blessing of this poor simple priest? For the blessing depends not on the priest, but on the holy blessed God, from whose own lips these wondrous words first proceeded." Accordingly, it is with reverence and deep solemnity that the modern Jews, with bowed heads and silence unbroken for many moments succeeding, receive the benediction.

In this threefold benediction, there are three prominent suggestions:

I. The blessing is personal, being addressed to Israel as an individual: "The Lord bless *thee*, and keep *thee*."

It is evidently not without design that the singular number characterises many of the exceeding great and precious promises. The promises have been called the overflow of God's love. They suggest that the ever-blessed God is so eager to bless his people, that he cannot restrain the opening of the windows of heaven until their hearts' fallow-ground is broken up to receive the fructifying rain. He must signify beforehand his gracious design, that they may hasten the preparation, and not permit his pent up yearnings to do exceeding abundantly for them, too long to chafe and chide within his heart of infinite love. The promises are the result. But lest one true child, in conscious unworthiness, disclaim the blessing as too great, although his rightful inheritance as a son and heir, a pitying Father frequently addresses him alone: "Fear *thou* not, for I am with *thee*; be not dismayed, for I am *thy* God; I will strengthen *thee*; yea, I will help *thee*; yea, I will uphold *thee* with the right hand of my righteousness." What stricken heart, pouring forth its deep tide upon the grave containing all which constituted earth to her, has not praised the Inspirer of that personal consolation? "Thy

* Poole writes (*Synopsis Criticorum, ad loc.*,) that six things are required for this benediction: 1. That it be uttered with a holy tongue. 2. While standing. 3. With uplifted hands. 4. With elevated voice. 5. With countenance turned toward the people. 6. That it be done in the four-lettered Name. (*Nomine tetragrammato*).

Maker is thine husband ; the Lord of hosts is his name ; and thy Redeemer the Holy One of Israel ; the God of the whole earth shall he be called." And she rejoices in the further assurance of *her* covenant-keeping God : "The mountains shall depart, and the hills be removed ; but my kindness shall not depart from thee, neither shall the covenant of my peace be removed, saith the Lord that hath mercy on thee." Likewise, we are grateful for the personal character of many of the Psalms, permitting each communing heart to exult : "The Lord is my light and my salvation ; whom shall I fear ? The Lord is the strength of my life ; of whom shall I be afraid ?"

As in these promises in Isaiah, Jerusalem or Zion is addressed for an individual application, so in the Old Testament Benediction, all Israel are permitted to claim the blessings pronounced upon all collectively, as if one person. He who telleth the number of the stars, and calleth all by their names—Arcturus, Orion, and the Pleiades ; who orders the fall of the sparrow, and numbers the hairs of the head, will much more remember and bless each member of each of the families of Jacob. He knows each endeared name, with the wants and joys of each, and commands on every one who will receive it, the blessing of his Triune Name : The Lord bless *thee* and keep *thee*.

The patriarch-judge, Moses' assistant, perplexed in arbitration, jealous for the integrity of each decision, recognises in this full utterance, all requisite guidance for his just, impartial verdict, to the glory of Israel's God. There some anxious Hannah, clasping her little Samuel's hand, burdened with the responsibility of that immortal spirit, and trembling at her helplessness rightly to train up her consecrated child in the way he should go, takes courage from this personal address. He who has honored her with this charge, Abraham's God and hers, *will* make his face shine even on her, revealing every path of duty in which to lead her tender one, from which, when he is old, he will not depart. And Samuel also perceives in the blessing that even he shall be able to keep dread Sinai's command, "Honor thy father and thy mother ;" and hears a gracious invitation, "Wilt thou not from this time cry unto me, My Father, thou art the

guide of my youth?" Some Hagar returns with cheerful footstep to her menial tasks, to do with her might whatsoever her hand finds to do; and by faithful service in her humble sphere, to glorify the God who thus promises to bless and keep even her, and give her peace. And now the song of the shepherd is borne from the neighboring hillside where, rejoined to his browsing flock, he realises that whom the Lord hath blessed, he is blest indeed.

II. This frequent and almost unparalleled repetition of the incommunicable name, Jehovah, argues in each case a special meaning.

Instead of reading, "The Lord bless thee and keep thee; AND make his face shine; . . . AND lift up his countenance," as we should naturally expect, each of the three blessings is distinct, and introduced by the word Jehovah: "Jehovah bless thee; . . . Jehovah make his face shine; . . . Jehovah lift up his countenance."

This name, we are aware, the Jews regarded with such awe as never to write it in full. They called it "the four-lettered name," fearing to utter it. Accordingly, in connection with its four consonants, (the Hebrew language, as is well known, being originally written without vowels,) they pronounced the vowels of the less dreadful word, Adonai, or "Lord." When, in later years, they added the vowels, and marked with pause accents the divisions of clauses for reading or chanting, they expressed the mysterious awe with which this threefold, unexampled, and seemingly needless repetition was universally regarded, by affixing a different pause accent in each case, (Tiphcha, Darga, and Mahpakh,) although the word Jehovah, occupying the same relative position, the second word in all the verses, according to usage, should receive in each case the same diacritical points.

We who have the New Testament, in which, as Augustine says, "the Old Testament lies open," possess the explanation of this repetition. The Christian mind here adoringly recognises the doctrine of the Sacred Trinity. Can it be a coincidence alone that the Apostolic Benediction is likewise composed of three portions each, in different order indeed, exactly corresponding to those of the Levitical, yet amplified, inasmuch as the doctrine of

the Trinity, this great mystery of life and immortality, is in the gospel brought to light? "The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all." We may therefore accept the Old Testament benediction as the Old Testament promise of blessing from the several persons of the Triune Jehovah: That God the Father will bless and keep; God the Son be gracious; and God the Holy Ghost will communicate peace to the Israelite indeed. This view is confirmed by the verse succeeding: "And they shall put MY NAME upon the children of Israel; and I will bless them."

III. The third suggestion is, that the peculiar blessing bestowed by the respective persons of the Trinity is described in the clause added to each invocation of Jehovah.

The words, "and keep thee," show how or in what manner Jehovah the Father will bless: The Lord bless thee *in* keeping thee.

The second invocation promises that Jehovah the Son will make his face shine upon thee *in* being gracious unto thee.

The third invocation declares that Jehovah the Spirit will lift up his countenance upon thee *in* giving thee peace.

In briefly examining these blessings, no one of which is complete apart from the rest, let us more closely observe their exact correspondence with the apostolic benediction.

1. The first blessing is comprehensively described as a keeping: "The Lord bless thee and keep thee." This is the Bible representation of the office-work of God the Father, with reference to his people. His keeping or providential care of them, is the theme of praise or prayer in both Testaments. The Psalmist declares that "He that keepeth Israel shall neither slumber nor sleep," and permits the believer to rejoice, assuring each, "Jehovah is thy keeper." The Son of God, in the sacerdotal prayer with which he concluded his active ministry, invokes the fulfilment of this office-work: "Holy Father, *keep* through thine own name, those whom thou hast given me." And Peter, introducing his First Epistle with the beatification, "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," describes believers as those

“who are *kept* (garrisoned) by the power of God; through faith, unto salvation.”

Protection is therefore the divine work of our Father God. He blesses by protecting his people. What do we rather need, who have once become the children of his grace? Is it not this bestowment which, “through all the changing scenes of life,” evokes from their glad hearts that daily song, each day more precious?—

“The hosts of God encamp around
The dwellings of the just;
Protection he affords to all
Who make his name their trust.”

Now, in the Apostolic Benediction, can the invocation of “the love of God” to his chosen people, be more adequately fulfilled than by the assurance, “Your wants shall be his care?”

2. We are pervaded with holy rapture in recognising in the second invocation, the promise of pardoned sin. This is the result of the redemptive work of the Lord Jesus Christ: “The Lord make his face shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee.”

Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. Grace! everything for nothing; God’s unmerited favor, by which alone man gains the keeping of the Father and the blessing of the Spirit. “We have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ.” From his grace as the fountain, flows the stream of salvation. This was the motive-power as well as the sole explanation of his infinite condescension: “Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye, through his poverty, might be rich.” Accordingly, we are not surprised that in the New Testament benediction, that larger development of divine love, this portion of the threefold blessing precedes, in logical order—not, indeed, of origination in the Triune Mind, but as practically experienced in the heart of man. “The grace of the Lord Jesus Christ” once received, guarantees and prepares us for the consequent “love of God,” and “the communion of the Holy Ghost.”* This is the natural order in

* “The love which God the Father hath for any of us, is only in his Son, and for his sake, without whom we could expect nothing but wrath.

which God conveys the benefits of redemption to mankind. "Christ and his grace," says Luther, "must precede everything else, or our evil consciences will prevent us from trusting to the love of God. Both are united together in our hearts by the fellowship of the Holy Ghost. This threefold band encircles all who are willing to be the Lord's, and makes them children of the Father, members of the Son, and temples of the Holy Ghost."

With propriety, then, is the sun, with its vivifying, renewing, and all-sufficient radiance, nature's emblem of the love of God in Christ to lost men, chosen to enforce the power and glory of this second promise: "The Lord make his face *shine* upon thee, and be gracious unto thee."

Here is man's chief need. All his wants are concentrated *in the pardon of sin*. He is now reconciled to God; and if God be for him, who can be against him? Life presents no real sorrow; death hath lost its sting, and the grave its victory. If sin be pardoned, he is secure. Upon him the Lord hath commanded his blessing, even life forevermore. Here, then, is proclaimed God's boundless love:

"See where it SHINES in Jesus' face,
The brightest image of his grace;
God in the person of his Son,
Has all his mightiest works outdone.

"GRACE! 'tis a sweet, a charming theme;
My thoughts rejoice at Jesus' name;
Ye angels, dwell upon the sound,
Ye heavens, reflect it to the ground."

and vengeance from him; and by consequence the grace of Christ is most properly here placed before the love of God, seeing we cannot have this unless we have that first. The same may be said also of the communion of the Holy Ghost; for that likewise is "shed on us abundantly, through Jesus Christ our Lord." (Titus iii. 5.) Wherefore, seeing that we can never have either the love of God the Father, or the communion of the Holy Ghost, but only by the grace of God the Son, there was all the reason in the world that the apostle should pray for this first, and say first, 'the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ;' then, 'the love of God;' and lastly, 'the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all.'"—Bishop BEVERIDGE: "*The Sacramental Benediction in the Name of the Trinity.*" Works, Vol. I., p. 100. London: 1720.

"*Nam per gratiam Christi venit ad Patris amorem.*"—BENGEL.

3. After pardon comes peace. Now, in the light of his countenance reconciled, with the lifting up of a benignant countenance, God's pardoned children are promised "the peace of God which passeth all understanding."

This is the office-work of the Holy Ghost, the ascension-gift of the Son, and whose essential work the apostle invokes: "And the very God of peace, sanctify you wholly."

"Peace" is the most comprehensive word in the Hebrew language to express all good which goes to make up a complete happiness. As in the most ancient times, so to-day in derived word (salaam) "*peace!*" is the common Eastern salutation in meeting and parting. When Jacob inquires regarding Laban, "Is he well?"—he asks, "Is he at peace?" David at Besor "saluted" the people; literally, he "inquired of their peace." The courier's report of Absalom's defeat, "All is well," in the original is, "All is at peace." Whereupon David inquires, "Is the young man Absalom *safe?*" which is "peace" in the Hebrew. Therefore, the omniscient, all-loving Jehovah, that he may omit nothing in earth or heaven which may minister to the happiness of each of his covenanted people, concludes the triune benediction, with the promise of all needful temporal, and all spiritual PROSPERITY. This is the communion of the Holy Ghost. From the communication of and participation in the Holy Ghost, is borne the fruit of the Spirit, which in the larger language of the New Testament is "love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance."

And, further, this peace is the result of the *active exercise* of divine love. It evidently indicates the Spirit's *application* to the believer of the blessings of redemption already purchased by the Son. The shining of the face, however cheering, does not necessarily imply a deliberate act of favor. Moses' countenance shone involuntarily, and inspired awe and dread. But in this third and perfecting blessing, there is promised *the lifting up* of Jehovah's countenance on the once guilty, wretched sinner, now the pardoned, redeemed son, an heir of God and joint heir with Jesus Christ, who becomes our peace through the inworking of the Holy Ghost.

And thus even in the Old Testament, God is love, through his priests commanding upon every true Israelite: Protection from the Father, pardon by the Son, and peace through the Holy Ghost.

From the above premises, the following are the natural conclusions:

1. That the customary "benediction" is by no means a mere form, or simply a convenient method of concluding church services.

It were presumption and blasphemy for mortal man pronouncing the name of the sacred Trinity, to invoke their respective blessing as a mere form of dismissal. The ordained minister of Christ, thus giving the unholy touch to the ark of God, might well apprehend Uzzah's immediate doom.

This position is also substantiated by the unanimous testimony of the Christian ages. Brief citations from representative writers may at this point be cited, in proof that the benediction has ever been regarded by the Church with peculiar reverence, and esteemed one of its most precious possessions.

Chrysostom (Hom., 2 Cor. i. 10, 11,) says:

"Then we bid them" (the congregation) "bow their heads; regarding it as a proof of their prayers being heard, that God blesseth them. For surely it is not a man that blesseth, but by means of his hand and his tongue, we bring unto the King himself, the heads of those that are present. And all together shout, AMEN."

Bishop Beveridge thus closes his sermon on "The Sacerdotal Benediction:"

"We may learn wherefore our Church concludes her daily prayers as the apostle doth this Epistle with the words of my text, (2 Cor. xiii. 14,) even *because they contain in short all that we can pray for,** and are in effect the same in form which God himself prescribed wherewith the priest should bless the people. (Num. vi. 24-26.) And when the priest pronounced this blessing to the people, (as we still do in the visitation of the sick,) God promised that he himself would accordingly bless them. And if you faithfully and devoutly receive it as ye ought, I do not question he will do so now upon my pronouncing in this name the same blessing, according to this apostolic form in my text: 'The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ,' etc.

*Italics ours.

Bishop Patrick in annotating upon the words, "And I will bless them," (Num. vi. 27,) remarks :

"The Jews from hence observe that God's blessing in some sort depends upon the blessing of the priest; which they thought so necessary that such priests 'as were admitted to no other service' might perform this; for fear the people should at any time want it."

Dr. Thomas Scott impressively comments upon both the Old and the New Testament formulas :

"As the ministers of the Lord, the priests very solemnly prayed for the people, and pronounced a blessing upon them: the apostolical Epistles are most of them begun or closed with a similar benediction; and it has been a common and very proper custom, for the minister, in Christian assemblies, to dismiss the congregation in the same manner; both as expressing his affectionate good-will to them, and his fervent prayers for them; and as assuring them in the name of God, that a blessing will attend on those who are indeed the Lord's believing people; for hypocrites can have no share in these special benefits.

"This most comprehensive benediction" (the apostolic) "has generally been adopted in the worship of Christians when about to separate; but, alas, it is too evident, that most in our congregations, not to say of the officiating ministers, regard it as a mere form. . . . What more can we desire for ourselves, or our brethren, than this frequently repeated apostolical benediction implies? May we then at all times, when these words are on our lips, or spoken in our hearing, so enter into the meaning of them with fervent affections and enlarged desires and expectations, that the blessings prayed for by them may be upon us and all our fellow-worshippers, now and forevermore! AMEN."

Charles Simeon (Skeleton, 491,) excellently suggests that—

"It was repeatedly declared to be the office of the priests to bless the people in God's name, (Deut. xxi. 5,) and the constant practice of the apostles shows that it was to be continued under the Christian dispensation. In conformity to their example, the Christian Church has universally retained the custom of closing the service with a pastoral benediction. We are not, indeed, to suppose that ministers can, by any power or authority of their own, convey a blessing; they can neither select the persons who shall be blessed, nor fix the time, the manner, or the degree in which any shall receive a blessing; but as stewards of the mysteries of God, they dispense the bread of life, assuredly expecting that their divine Master will give a salutary effect to the ordinances of his own appointment. The direction of the text was confirmed with an express promise, that what they spake on earth should be ratified in heaven; and every

faithful minister may take encouragement from it in the discharge of his own duty, and may consider God as saying to him: 'Bless *thou* the congregation, *and I will* bless them.' To this effect, see Luke x. 5, 6; and John xx. 23.

"Let not then the benediction be so slighted, as though it were only a signal to depart; but while it is delivered with solemnity in the name of God, let every heart be expanded to receive the benefit. Let every one consider *himself in particular* as the person addressed, and may the experience of all attest at this time that God is ready to 'grant us above all that we ask or think.'"

That opinions on this important theme be not here unduly multiplied, let us sum up all in that last issued from the press. "The Speaker's Commentary" thus treats of "the Priestly Blessing:"

"(Cf. Eccles., xxxvi. 17: 'O Lord, hear the prayer of thy servants, according to the blessing of Aaron over thy people, that all they which dwell upon the earth, may know that thou art the Lord, the eternal God.') The blessing gives, as it were, the crown and seal to the whole sacred order, by which Israel was now fully organised as the people of God, for the march to the Holy Land. It is appointed as a solemn form to be used by the priests exclusively, and in this function their office, as it were, culminates. (Lev. ix. 22.) The duties thus far assigned to them and their assistants have had reference to the purity, order, and sanctity of the nation. This whole set of regulations is most suitably and emphatically closed by the solemn words of benediction in which God vouchsafes to survey as it were (Gen. i. 31) the whole theocratic system created by himself for man's benefit, and pronounces it very good. Accordingly a formula is provided by God himself, through which from time to time his people, by obedience, place themselves in true and right relationship to him; the authorised mediators may pronounce and communicate his special blessing to them. The Jewish tradition, that this blessing was given at the close of the daily sacrifice, is at least in accordance with its character and tenor. It will be observed that the text does not appoint the occasion on which it is to be used.

"The structure of the blessing is remarkable. It is rhythmical, consists of three distinct parts, in each of which the Most Holy Name stands as nominative; it contains altogether twelve words, excluding the Sacred Name itself, and mounts by gradual stages to that peace which forms the last and most consummate gift which God can give his people.

"From a Christian point of view, and comparing the counterpart benediction, 2 Cor. xiii. 14, (cf. Isa. vi. 3; Matt. xxviii. 19), it is impossible not to see shadowed forth the doctrine of the Holy Trinity. And the three several sets of terms correspond fittingly to the office of the Persons in their gracious work in the redemption of mankind.

“Maimonides states that the Sacred Name has never been used even in the solemn benediction of the sanctuary since the death of Simon the Just. (Eccus., Ch. 50.)”

Notwithstanding this wide recognition of its extraordinary character and privileges, how many in Christian congregations in act disdain this marvellous condescension of Almighty God in eternal blessings! Instead of the seemly decorum of the bowed head, the solemn, prolonged silence, the reverential awe—that eloquent interval of succeeding quiet before the noiseless passage of the congregation from the courts of the living God—there is frequently during the offering of the benediction, the reaching forth for needed articles of dress, a restless impatience to leave the pew, a bustling, whispering departure down the aisle, as if from the hall of ordinary secular amusement; as though no words of boundless import, and of favors unnumbered had been offered unto each!* And thus do they—how unwittingly—spurn God’s richest gifts tendered even to the unthankful and the evil. Thus might the ingrate husbandman, in contempt of Providence screening a cultured spot from the essential sunbeams and the fructifying rain, yet expect an abundant harvest. Even thus, careless professed worshippers in act despise the freely proffered benediction; while the reverent ear and glowing heart of the humble Christian, receive with gladness from authoritative lips, the assurances of grace, mercy, and peace from God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Then after an interval of silence, as if applying to his soul these gracious words; repeating in his heart-depths a fervent “AMEN,” he passes from the sanctuary,

*“It is with great reason that this comprehensive and instructive benediction is pronounced just before our assemblies for public worship are dismissed, and it is a very *indecent* thing to see so many quitting them, or getting into postures of remove before this short sentence can be ended.”

“How often hath this comprehensive benediction been pronounced! Let us study it more and more, that we may value it proportionably; that we set ourselves to deliver or receive it with a becoming solemnity with our eyes and our hearts lifted up to God, when out of Zion he commandeth the blessing, he bestows in it ‘life for evermore.’ AMEN.”

Doddridge’s Family Expositor, 2 Cor. xiii. 14.

privately to commune with this newly-confirmed God of his salvation.

2. Nor is it merely a prayer. Else were the New Testament more circumscribed than the Old, which commands the blessing, (see also Ps. cxxxiii. 3,) and as a part of worship, independent of the sacrificial and typical ordinances to be abrogated by the Antitype. The Saviour implies that the salutation given by the twelve to the houses entered during their mission, was not a wish, or even a prayer; but an influence for good authoritatively proceeding from them vouchsafed from himself, and to return to them should the recipient prove unworthy. Were it to possess no other power, great though it be, than as a fervent petition for the welfare of the congregation, why is the ordained ministry jealous of the prerogative of pronouncing the benediction, denying it even to the candidate for sacred orders—although well qualified for public prayer, and more tenacious alone of the right to administer the ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper? Good George Herbert evidently thus held, for he quaintly seeks to condone clerical dulness thus:

“The worst speak something good: if all want sense,
God takes a text, and preaches patience.
He that gets patience and the blessing which
Preachers conclude with hath not lost his pains.”

The view of Bishop Beveridge above is profoundly impressive. The Benediction is not so much *our* prayer as it is the Lord's “Amen” to his people's prayers and praises. Into it he collects all the desires and vows and holy meditations of the service now being terminated, and in this single sentence assures every true worshipper that every thing conformable with his will shall be accomplished; yea, that he will do exceeding abundantly, filling them with “all the fulness of God.”

3. The divine injunction regarding the very words of the blessing, suggests the inquiry, whether gospel ministers are not restricted to Bible language, and that a Bible invocation of the Trinity in offering the Benediction. Twice it is the divine admonition: “*On this wise ye shall bless the children of Israel, saying unto them,*” etc. Aaron and his sons may not court a

seeming propriety in concluding even a peace-offering by the invocation alone: "The Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace." Even then they must pronounce also the conjoined blessings of the Father and the Son.

Ministers often deprive congregations of their complete and rightful benediction by employing their own unauthorised language, or by the partial although scriptural blessing: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with you all." We are always safe in offering the Levitical or the Apostolic Benediction. The Triune Name is also implied in the inspired form appropriate for funeral services, and beginning—"Now the God of peace that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus, that great Shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting covenant, make you perfect," etc. Our standards* also recommend this form for the Lord's Supper.

With propriety the minister may employ at the close of a consolatory discourse, the words: "The God of all grace, who hath called us unto his eternal glory by Christ Jesus, after that ye have suffered a while, make you perfect, stablish, strengthen, settle you. To him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. AMEN." And can we, it might almost be said, dare we, at the sacramental table, or in dissolving ecclesiastical courts, bless the assembly in our own unauthorised language, while there exists the thrilling formulary of the beloved disciple?—"Grace be unto you, and peace, from him which is, and which was, and which is to come; and from the seven Spirits which are before his throne; and from Jesus Christ, who is the faithful witness, and the first begotten of the dead, and the prince of the kings of the earth. Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father: to him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. AMEN."

Again. Consider the joy of the minister of Christ, thus, not permitted only, but commanded to bless his endeared people.

During the week past, he has perhaps stood at the dying-bed of a mother in Israel. He has seen her trembling, triumphing

*Directory for Worship, Ch. VIII.

hand laid upon the head of her son entering upon the life-work for which in his infancy he was by her devoted to the God of the covenant. Her fast glazing eyes filled with a radiance not of earth, rest upon a daughter long active in the service of her own and her mother's God. Now the last parting smile beams upon the companion of her life-long walk with God, and the freed spirit beholds the face of her Redeemer. Clad in habiliments of sorrow, the bereaved are now gathered in the sanctuary, worshipping him whose very name is "the Comforter." Upon them rests the eye of the minister as he rises to bless his people. With deep emotion he bestows with the promise of the Triune God, "beauty for ashes, the oil of joy for mourning, the garment of praise for the spirit of heaviness."

In another seat is a young disciple, who but few days since found peace in believing while kneeling with him who now blesses with a meaning never before perceived.

Now he is able abundantly to requite the delicate attention of a family who, for Christ's sake, have recently anticipated his servant's needs. And now he rewards that word of cheer from one prayerfully appreciating the burden of souls devolving upon his pastor—a word which, all the past week, whether presenting his people at the throne of grace, or laboring from house to house, or preparing his Sabbath services, has caused his soul to make him like the chariots Ammi-nadib. Now also he is permitted, nay, divinely required, to bestow a blessing for those private injuries and half-insinuations of some, professing godliness and committed to their pastor's cordial support, whose private life is yet a record of open maledictions, or furtive mournful protestations, which more than any cause soever injure that pastor's influence and deplete the Church.

Thus, while compelled as a faithful ambassador of Christ, from Mount Ebal, to denounce against the ungodly the direful curse, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die," the radiant herald from Mount Gerizim, he may also offer them, together with the people of God, the triune benediction.

In conclusion. What must be the agony of lost members of Christian congregations, forever reminded that the promised bless-

ings of eternal protection, pardon, and peace, depended alone upon their acceptance?

Is God's Spirit now striving with any unconverted readers, convincing of sin, its inevitable doom, pointing to a Saviour, their only Saviour, dying for them? Do they need the assurance of his willingness to receive them? They had it in all the fulness of divine love, in last Sabbath's benedictions. They will have it next Sabbath: "The Lord bless thee, and keep thee; The Lord make his face shine upon thee, and be gracious unto thee; The Lord lift up his countenance upon thee, and give thee peace." Also whensoever and wheresoever a burdened soul hears the benediction—"The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the communion of the Holy Ghost, be with you all," let him remember that thus to him "the Spirit and the Bride say, Come."

ARTICLE V.

CAUSE—FIRST AND FINAL.

Christianity and Positivism: A Series of Lectures to the Times, on Natural Theology and Apologetics. Delivered in New York, January 16 to March 20, 1871, on the "Ely Foundation" of the Union (N. Y.) Theological Seminary. By JAMES MCCOSH, D.D., LL.D., President of the College of New Jersey, Princeton. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1871.

The Theistic controversy is an ancient one. The historical age of philosophy may be said to have begun with Plato. He informs us that, prior to Democritus, in the Ionic School, there were those who denied an extra-mundane, spiritual Creator. On the other hand, there were deep thinkers, such as Socrates and his illustrious pupil, who were not satisfied with material causes, with ascribing all things to chance, to nature, and to art.

Prof. Tayler Lewis, in a recent article in the *Princeton Review*, and, perhaps still more fully, in his scholarly and enchanting notes on *Plato against the Atheists*, has certainly shown it to

be a plausible belief that these Athenian sages were believers in one personal Deity, that their θεοί is to be reckoned the same plural as the אלהים of the Hebrews.

The parties to this fundamental controversy are Theists on the one side, and Atheists, Polytheists, Pantheists, and Deists, on the other. Theism, as against Atheism proper, asserts simply the existence of a being, superior to matter and human mind, and the cause of both. As against Polytheism, it contends that this superior nature is a single, individual being. As opposed to Pantheism, it affirms that this one superior being, the infinite creator, is an intelligent person, distinct from the created universe of matter and mind. As opposed to Deism, it believes that this intelligent, spiritual, infinite creator, has not only revealed himself in nature and providence, but also authentically in the written revelation of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures.

It is believed that these generic terms will properly embrace all possible shades of belief as to the Deity. All men are Atheists, or Polytheists, or Pantheists, or Deists, or Theists. It will be observed that we use Theism as the scientific designation of the Christian conception of God. We use it as distinct from Deism, as well as from the other shades of error.

What is the point at issue? We answer readily, the existence of God. Yes, but the Polytheist, the Pantheist, and the Deist all reply that they believe in the existence of God. It would seem, then, that we have no adversary but the Atheist. When, however, we question the Polytheist, the Pantheist, and the Deist, we find that the God of their belief is to us no God at all. So that we are compelled at the opening to define, as far as it can be done, the principal term of the question, that we may know exactly where we stand.

The God of the Theist is the *cause* of all things, the *efficient* cause of all things, the *first* efficient cause of all things, depravity alone excepted; the Eternal, Omnipotent, Wise, and Good. The God of the Theist is *one* infinite Essence.

The eternal, all-powerful, all-wise, all-good, individual Creator is a *person*, distinct from all created mind and matter.

This individual, personal, perfect Creator, is the universal *Law-*

giver and providential ruler, the *Saviour* of men, and the final *Judge*.

Such are the theses with reference to God, which Theism undertakes to defend. If the true God be such a being, then all falling short of such a conception of him, are really without God—Atheists, as Dr. Buchanan very properly calls them. The Atheist proper, the Polytheist, the Pantheist, and a portion of the Deists, all discard such a Deity. The Theists and a section of the Deists alone maintain his existence.

Another interesting preliminary question concerns the origin of this conception of God. Some have said that it was innate. Since the days of Locke, this philosophic figment has been cast to the moles and to the bats. Some, again, have attributed it to the human reason, in its noetic and dianoetic exercises. If by this it is meant to assert that the mind of man is capable of an *independent* origination of the true idea of God, then we must demur, and call for proof that it has ever done so in one single instance. The most that can be said even of the "divine Plato," is that he was manifestly *feeling after* the true God. If, however, it is intended to affirm that, having already received the idea, the mind can construct a satisfactory proof of an answering reality, then we give our adhesion to the statement. This cannot be said properly to be an origination of the idea.

The third opinion is, that the knowledge which man has of his Maker, is due to the revelation which he made of himself to the fathers of the race, and especially upon the pages of inspiration. This knowledge has been partially perpetuated by tradition amongst those tribes which are destitute of the written Word. Our judgment adopts this last view.

There are four arguments of a positive character, which Theists have been accustomed to present as the basis of their belief.

I. The argument from *common consent*. This may be stated syllogistically thus: Whatever is universally believed, must be true. The existence of God is universally believed. Therefore, the existence of God is true. The major premiss is regarded as a first truth. Cicero says, in his *Tusc. Quest.*, i. 30: "*Omni autem in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturae putanda est.*" It

is perhaps better known as expressed by the famous dictum of Vincent: "*Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus.*" It is a serious thing to assert axiomatic authority for any opinion. It should be accepted as a valid claim only where it is indisputably true. Is it so with this generally admitted statement? We feel quite confident that it is neither a first truth, nor a truth of any kind. In the first place, what is its exact meaning? Is "*universally*" to be taken absolutely or comparatively? If comparatively, does it mean the majority of men, the masses of ignorance and thoughtlessness being allowed equal suffrage? Or does it refer to the *elite* alone? We affirm that it is not true either in its restricted or in its widest meaning. One example will suffice to show this. There was a time when it was universally believed that the earth was the stationary centre of our system of planets. This was an absolutely universal belief. Was it true? Other examples could be given. The minor premiss of this syllogism involves also a material fallacy. It is not now true, and has not been since the days of Babel, that the existence of God is universally believed. To our mind, it is entirely out of the question to attempt to prove this statement, by referring to the sorcerers, witches, medicine-men, and evil spirits of the degraded and superstitious heathen. How would the natural theologian, using such facts, relish being identified in court as an animal having long ears and a peculiar braying voice? Of course, this is ridiculous; but none the more so than the endeavor to identify Jehovah with the evil spirits of the Hottentot.

This minor premiss is hardly true, even as Plato makes Clinias express it, in his 10th Book of the Laws: "*Καὶ ὅτι πάντες Ἕλληνές τε καὶ βάρβαροι νομίζουσιν εἶναι θεούς.*" Though it should be admitted that all men believe in some kind of a god, it is certainly not true that all men believe in the Theist's God.

This first argument we reject, therefore, as worthless.

II. The *ontological* argument, which Reid incorrectly attributes to the invention of Descartes, (though it was probably original with him also,) is first found in the Proslogium of St. Anselm, the Archbishop of Canterbury, though by birth a Piedmontese.

It has been presented and urged, with some variety in form, by Leibnitz, Cudworth, More, Clarke, Butler, and others.

As given by Anselm, it is: "All men have the idea of God, even those who deny it; for they cannot deny that of which they have no idea. The idea of God is the idea of a being absolutely perfect, one whom we cannot imagine to have a superior. Now, the idea of such a being necessarily implies *existence*; otherwise, we might imagine another being, who, by the superaddition of *existence* to the perfection of the first, would thereby excel him; that is to say, excel one who, by supposition, is absolutely perfect. Consequently, we cannot conceive the idea of God, without being constrained to believe that he exists."

This argument of Anselm is presented syllogistically by Leibnitz: "A being from whose essence we can conclude existence exists in fact, if it is possible. Now God is such a being that we can infer from his essence his existence. Therefore, if God is possible, God exists." As urged by Descartes, it has three forms: 1. That which is founded upon the idea of *perfection*. "As soon as I perceive myself, an imperfect being, to exist, I have the idea of a perfect being, and am under the necessity of admitting that this idea has been imparted to me by a being who is actually perfect, who really possesses all the perfections of which I have some idea—that is to say, who is God." 2. He combines perfection with the principle of *causality*: "I do not exist by myself; for if I were the cause of my own existence, I should have given myself all the perfections of which I have an idea. I exist, then, by another; and this being by whom I exist is all perfect; otherwise I should be able to apply to him the same reasoning which I have just applied to myself." 3. In its last form it is based upon the idea of the *infinite*. "At the same time that I perceive myself as a finite being, I have the idea of an infinite being. This idea, from which I cannot withdraw myself, and which is derived from no other idea, comes to me neither from myself, nor from any other finite being; for how could the finite produce the idea of the infinite? Therefore, it has been imparted to me by a being really infinite."

These arguments seem to show that the reformer of modern

philosophy considered the idea of God as one of our original, *a priori*, necessary convictions. They give color to the interpretation placed upon him by his illustrious disciple, Fénelon, that vividness and distinctness were meant by him as the criteria of first truths, intuitive beliefs, corresponding to Hamilton's incomprehensibility, simplicity, etc.

The ontological argument, if its validity were unquestioned, is too abstract for popular use. It must, however, be interesting to all philosophical minds, especially as presented by Descartes.

III. The *cosmological* argument. Whatever begins to exist, must have a cause *ab extra*. The cosmos began to exist; therefore the cosmos had a cause *ab extra*.

The principle of this argument, enunciated in its first premiss, is that of causality. This is a universally admitted principle, though its basis is one of the disputed points of metaphysics. Whichever of the eight possible or actual theories, as unfolded by Sir William Hamilton, we may choose to adopt; whether we consider it empirical or *a priori*, objective or subjective, original or derivative, necessary or contingent, as evolved from the law of contradiction or the law of the conditioned, we all believe that no effect can exist without an adequate cause. The mass of sound thinkers have regarded it as an *a priori*, original, necessary truth. So we regard it; but for our argument, the low views of Locke, Brown, or John Stuart Mill, would perhaps suffice. There is no question, then, as to the major premiss.

The minor premiss is the bridge of Lodi. Is the cosmos an effect? Did it *begin* to exist? Let us lay down a few postulates. That something now exists, necessitates that something must have always existed. This will be admitted by all. Sir William Hamilton makes it the foundation of our belief in causality. Again, mental existence is superior to material. This will be accepted even by the materialist. Again, the creator is superior to the created. With these as our guides, let us enter the labyrinth. There must have been an eternal existence. This eternal existence must have been matter or mind. It could not have been matter, for that would make matter the creator of mind, and superior to it. If, then, the original, eternal existence must have

been mind, this mind must have been finite or infinite. It could not have been finite, for two reasons. No finite mind could create. Moreover, geology teaches us that finite mind is one of the latest beings to appear upon the earth. If the eternal original was neither matter nor finite mind, then it must have been an infinite mind from whom matter and finite mind have proceeded. But it may be asserted, as it has been, that finite mind and finite matter are both eternal, and therefore uncreated. To this supposition, several insuperable objections immediately appear. As to mind, there is the clearest evidence, admitted alike by sceptic and theist, that the existence of finite mind upon the earth is of comparatively recent date. It therefore could not have been eternal. It must have sprung from matter, or it must have been created. As to matter, the proof is not, perhaps, so clear, and yet it is satisfactory. If we mistake not, this is the strategic point of the conflict. Is matter eternal? The ancient Atheists found work for only three forces in the universe. The first of these was Τύχη, Chance. Having traced things back as far as they could go, they asserted that their original condition was due to τύχη. Φύσις, Nature, then took them up, and developed them according to her laws of natural necessity. Finally, Τέχνη, Art, receiving them at the hands of φύσις, gave them their final form, through human ministry. Does this differ from modern scepticism, as reviewed by Dr. McCosh? With them, evolution, development by natural selection, are but other names for φύσις. Development begins with nebulae, star-dust. Star-dust came, they know not how, they care not how. It is unphilosophical to inquire. If many of them would express their real thoughts, perhaps they too would say, from τύχη. Others would say, *star-dust is the eternal*.

Is it? That is *the* question. No, for several sufficient reasons. In the first place, the very existence of star-dust is problematic, though we admit probable. Its existence has not yet been proven. Secondly, if admitted, it is no fountain from which such a stream as this universe, or the cosmos, could have come. It is matter. As such, it could never have originated mind, as the higher cannot be created by the lower. There can be nothing in an effect which was not primarily and potentially in its cause. Thirdly,

geology gives us an authentic history of the material cosmos. It tells us that it is now in the most highly developed condition that it has ever known. It traces it back, step by step, until it shows us the world as a spheroid, whose corrugated surface is bare of all organism, whose depths reveal no stratifications, whose very substance seems but a cooled mass of lifeless mineral. So far geology leads us. Submitting ourselves now to the guidance of the development philosophy, we are led still further back to a period when our world was simply an extended mass of heated vapor. Now development makes one thing of these facts. We propose to suggest another. As far as science leads, the material creation is rapidly running up to its pyramidal point. Development says that the tapering process is carried on beyond where science throws her friendly light. Shall we not, then, conclude from these undisputed facts, that matter does finally reach its *initial point*? As far as we can see, the lines are oblique and converging. Who, then, is justified in asserting that they change their uniform direction, and, amid the mists of eternity, become forever parallel? Development is certainly a two-edged sword.

Fourthly. There is an ontological objection to the eternity of matter. Infinite and finite qualities cannot inhere in the same substance. A finite substance cannot possess infinite attributes. Matter is confessedly a finite substance. Eternity is confessedly an infinite quality. Matter, therefore, as finite, cannot be eternal.

Such is our solution of this gravest, perhaps, of all questions. The *onus probandi* belongs to the Theist. Matter now exists; he must therefore give satisfactory proof that it began to exist. Demonstrative evidence is neither necessary nor possible. The human mind is so constituted, that it determines the most serious matters by the superior weight of comparative probabilities. We accordingly ask ourselves, in view of all the facts apparent, shall we believe that matter is eternal? Or, that there was a period when it began to exist? We affirm, with candor and confidence, our belief that the evidence is decidedly in favor of its having had a beginning.

Our syllogism is complete. Its two premises are true. The major is an *a priori* truth. The minor we have shown to be true.

Every effect must have an efficient cause out of itself. The cosmos is an effect. Therefore, the cosmos must have had an efficient extraneous cause. There is a First Cause, adequate to the production of this universe, who did actually produce it.

We prefer the argument in this shape to its ancient form, as presented by Plato from the existence of motion. It seems more difficult to show the absolute beginning of motion; and, if this were proven, there is matter yet beyond it whose origin must be shown.

There are a few special objections to this argument which demand a brief notice:

1. The effect, the cosmos, is finite; therefore we have no right to infer aught but a finite cause for its production. This difficulty, simple as it may seem, we have never seen successfully met in any printed work. Dr. McCosh does not meet it. There is an answer, to our mind perfectly satisfactory, given to us while a college student, by Rev. S. S. Laws, LL.D., formerly President of Westminster College, Mo., a man of the highest order of metaphysical ability, to whom we are indebted for the syllabus of this Theistic argument. His answer is simply this: The chasm between existence and absolute non-existence is infinite, requiring omnipotence to span it. The creation of a single atom, therefore, is an infinite effect, to whose production an infinite power is necessary.

2. Again, it is objected that we have proven naught but the existence of a causal power. This is true, but power is an attribute which must belong to some Omnipotent Causal Being.

3. Hume urges that as we have never seen a cosmos created, we know nothing about the matter. This objection an empirical dogmatism could never meet. Let it be once granted, as Locke asserted, that our knowledge is purely experimental in its origin, and Hume's scepticism is the logical result. To meet it, it is only necessary to add intuition to the original sources of knowledge. This gives the idea of causality a primary, fundamental authority.

4. It is urged that we have shown the necessity of naught beyond a blind mechanical agency. This omnipotent Cause

may have been material. To this it is sufficient to say that the effect is partly spiritual, and that consequently the Cause must have been a spiritual being.

This argument we regard the bulwark of Theism, so far as the Deity is considered simply in the light of the First Cause of the universe. What are its exact, necessary results? A First Cause, Eternal, Omnipotent, Spiritual, Infinite, One. These points are all, doubtless, sufficiently apparent, except possibly the last. It may not be at once seen how this argument proves the unity of the Deity. This is involved in his infinitude, which itself results from his being an eternal, omnipotent Spirit. There cannot possibly be more than one such Being.

These truths are an effectual offset to both Atheism and Polytheism. There is One God.

This argument, founded upon causality, we have already presented with some fulness; and yet it has two important corollaries which demand special consideration. They are commonly presented as independent arguments, but manifestly have their appropriate place as subordinates to this, being particular applications of the principle here involved.

1. The *Teleological* argument. According to the Aristotelian organon, it reads thus: Whatever effect shows design, reveals intelligence in its cause. The universe is full of design. Therefore, the universe had an intelligent Cause.

According to Xenophon, this was the simple way in which Socrates met the Atheism of his day. It is quite in character that the practical soldier should have preserved this relic of his teacher, while his fellow-pupil, Plato, should have retained from the same source the metaphysical reasoning, to which we have already alluded.

Cicero employs the same defence of Deism in his writings upon the subject. Paley has seized the same truth, and, with an unsurpassed profusion of simple and striking illustration, has made a very effectual use of it. This is also the great argument of Dr. McCosh, whose principle he has ably defended against its present opponents.

The minor premiss is here the point of interest. Does the

universe show marks of design? Here we are met by two classes of objectors, both of whom are effectually answered in the Ely Lectures by Dr. McCosh. The first, among whom was Descartes, are those who say that it is irreverent in us to pry into the purposes of the Creator. These do not require notice in this connection, because the objection, as thus presented, acknowledges the existence of the Creator.

The other objection is a metaphysical one, asserting that there is in nature no such thing as Final Cause. Hegel says, "That which is called Final Cause is simply the inward nature of the thing." To this we reply, that a belief in design is intuitive. We have no doubt that Hegel himself believed it, though he fancied otherwise. There are several objections urged by this class of philosophers against design in creation, all of which are successfully met by Dr. McCosh. The most important are these: There are some things in nature whose purpose we cannot discover; there are other things which are disagreeable; there are still others which seem manifestly designed for evil ends. The last of these is the favorite, as it is the strongest objection, of the sceptical. In reply, we say: 1. We do not deny that the principle of design applies to this class of facts. The teeth, claws, bones, stomach, viscera—the whole anatomy of the lion designates him as truly a beast of prey as the eye of that same animal was manifestly intended for vision. The painful destruction of life is clearly one of the purposes of nature. 2. Are pain and death necessarily evil? Does not pain accomplish some of the most valuable ends in the discipline of life? Is it not the needful medicine of the soul? Is not death even, taking the universe of life in the aggregate, rather a blessing than an evil? Do not successive generations enjoy more of happiness and accomplish more than a single, perpetuated generation would? 3. The earth is manifestly a sinful world. May not the evils found therein be a necessary and just evidence of the Creator's displeasure at this sin? 4. Can our sceptical opponents explain the existence of these evils, apart from the moral providence of God?

With reference to these evidences of design in the universe, they are so numerous and so palpable that no man, without a

theory, can avoid seeing them and being impressed by them. We cannot open our eyes and fail to see them. In earth, air, sea, sky, in our own bodies, in animals, in vegetables, in minerals even, they are everywhere apparent. Microscope, telescope, spectroscope, all reveal them. When we examine our teeth, tongue, salivary glands, throat, stomach, intestines, pancreas, liver, and gall, no man can convince us that this complicated and nicely adjusted system of organs was not *intended* for the mastication and digestion of food. So of a million other things. The universe is certainly full of design.

This corollary to our main argument proves the intelligence and wisdom, and, as resulting from these, the *Personality* of the Creator. An intelligent spirit must be a person.

Just here we must venture a criticism upon Dr. McCosh. The Pantheist objects to the personality of God on the ground that personality implies limitation. Dr. McCosh replies, as is usually done, by denying that limitation is necessarily involved in personality. Is he or the Pantheist right? Does personality necessarily involve definition? We believe that it does. What is included in the idea of our own personality? Is there not wrapped up in it, as essential to it, the fact that we are separate beings, distinct from all others? Is not our personality the very hedge and limit of our individuality? If our personality does not limit us and separate us from all others, then we are not only prepared to accept the impersonal, universal, human reason of Aristotle and Cousin, but also the breadth of Pantheism itself. It is doubtless asked, Does God's personality limit him? Is he not the infinite, the unlimited? We assert that God's personality does limit him, and that yet, paradoxical as it may seem, he is the Infinite. Unless we are Pantheists, we must believe that God is a Person, separate and distinct from all his created universe; that his personality is the boundary between him and his creation. He is thus limited. Moreover he has other necessary limits. He cannot lie. His moral nature is a limit to him. He has all the boundaries of absolute perfection. Personality is an element of perfection; therefore he has its necessary limitations. *He is the Infinite within*

the limits of perfection. There is a marked difference between limitation and imperfection.

This argument, showing the wisdom and consequent personality of the Deity, is the bulwark of Theism against Pantheism. The infinite, spiritual First Cause is an intelligent Person.

2. The second corollary, or special application of the main argument founded upon the principle of causality, is technically known as the *Eudaimonological* argument. As a syllogism, it is: Whatever effect shows the adaptation of means to the production of happiness reveals benevolence in its cause. The universe shows such adaptation. Therefore, the universe is the product of a benevolent Mind.

No candid person will deny that benevolent adaptations everywhere abound in the universe. This would seem sufficient for our purpose; as these evidences of beneficent design furnish our minor premiss as given above. Here, however, we are met by the difficulty already partially discussed, growing out of those natural contrivances, which seem clearly designed to produce suffering. The existence of such we freely admit. In addition to what we have before said as an answer to this objection, we would suggest the following reflections: The existence of mingled good and evil in the world shows either, 1. That the Creator is a being in whose character good and evil alike are found; or, 2. That there are two eternal principles, the one good, producing the good; the other evil, producing the evil; or, 3. That there is no design in either case, the good and the evil just happening to be; or, 4. That there is one infinitely benevolent Creator, who has filled his universe with the evidences of his love, but who has, for wise reasons, of a judicial or disciplinary character, introduced evil as a chastisement and punishment. Let us see which of these views is the most rational.

The first, so far as we know, has no historical representative. It is presented only as a possible alternative. It is not morally possible for the infinitely Perfect to possess such opposite traits of character. All of his attributes must be in perfect harmony with each other.

The second is the old Gnostic doctrine. It has, however, long

since been discarded, because it manifestly involves an ontological contradiction. The coexistence of two infinite, eternal antagonists is a metaphysical impossibility.

The third is the published creed of the scepticism of the present day. Such we understand to be the position of Herbert Spencer and all his school. To it we oppose the common sense of the intelligent world. When we find that all the necessary functions of the sentient animal organism yield pleasure in their discharge, none of us can be convinced that this was not designed. On the contrary, when we, carelessly or intentionally, put a hand into the fire, no man can persuade us that the consequent suffering is merely accidental or casual. The pleasure and the pain alike we believe to be the result of an intelligently framed law.

The fourth alternative alone is left. It is that which has commended itself as true to the most thoughtful minds of every intelligent age. It is a view of this, confessedly the most difficult of all problems, to which no *special* rational objection can be urged. If it does not fully meet the question, (and we do not think that it does,) may we not wisely conclude that the *residuum* of difficulty is due to the finiteness of our understanding and to the depravity of our hearts, which prevent in us a competent and impartial judgment?

IV. These reflections very properly introduce the fourth or *Ethical* argument, with which they have a close connection.

This argument is based, (as all true arguments must be, either immediately or mediately,) in the intuitions of the mind. 1. We have, on the observance of any positive moral act in ourselves or others, the idea that it is either right, on the one hand, or wrong, on the other. Thus we obtain the primitive beliefs of the *right* and *wrong*, as moral opposites. 2. Along with these ideas come the corresponding judgments of approbation and disapprobation, with the conviction that we ought to do the right and shun the wrong. This is the principle of *obligation*. 3. Obligation necessarily implies *authority* to whom it is due. In this case, it is an authority who discriminates between the right and the wrong, and who indicates his hatred of the one and his approval of the other.

This argument is the fitting cap-stone to the pyramid which we have endeavored to build. Resting upon the others, it lifts the mind to the sublimest thoughts of the Deity, presenting him to us as the *Moral Governor* and *Final Judge* of his intelligent and responsible universe. In proportion to our own moral elevation, will be the impression which it will make upon us. There are few, if any, minds upon whom its influence will not be perceptibly felt.

As we have traversed the field of our argument, let us see what flowers we have been able to gather. We have found THE FIRST CAUSE, ETERNAL, OMNIPOTENT, INFINITE, SPIRITUAL, SINGLE, WISE, PERSONAL, GOOD, THE PERFECT LAWGIVER AND JUDGE. These truths are inconsistent with Atheism, Polytheism, and Pantheism.

Let us not deceive ourselves, however. There is an element in the Theistic conception of the Deity, which has not been presented, much less proven. It is that aspect of the Divine Nature which presents him to us as the *providential* Governor of the universe, considered more especially in its material conditions. It is this feature of the subject which comes prominently before us in the first series of the Lectures which we now take up for special consideration.

These Lectures were delivered before the Union Theological Seminary of New York upon the Ely foundation. On the title page, we are told that they are "Lectures to the Times on Natural Theology and Apologetics." They are polemic in their character, and are designed to be a defence of Christianity against the assaults of its present adversaries. These opponents have entrenched themselves in three separate positions, from which they have opened their batteries upon the Theistic citadel. These are Physics, Metaphysics, and Criticism. The ten Lectures are accordingly divided into three series, the first three being devoted to the relations of Christianity to Physics; the next four being occupied with its relations to Metaphysics; and the last three being concerned with its relations to the Criticism of Historical Investigation. There is an appendix containing three articles: the first on the Gaps in the Theory of Development, the second

on Darwin's *Descent of Man*, and the last on the *Principles of Herbert Spencer's Philosophy*.

In the present paper we propose to limit ourselves to the first two series, which are connected by a common relation to *Natural Theology*. The peculiarities of Christianity, as distinguished from Deism, do not appear until we enter upon the third series, where the Christian Revelation is defended from the assaults of Renan, and a positive argument in its favor is presented.

A few general remarks: 1. The paper is good, the letter-press is fair, but the binding, like that of nearly all American books, is quite poor. Our copy seems ready to come to pieces.

2. We learn, from private sources, that the Lectures were attended during their delivery by large audiences, hundreds besides the students being present. This reminds one of Cousin's famous *Psychological Lectures*, which were listened to with delight by popular multitudes in Paris. In the present case, we are told that the speaker added nothing to their interest by any of the charms of oratory. In style, however, they may be considered models of popular philosophical eloquence. It is clear, smooth, rich.

3. Quite a marked feature in the character of the lecturer is the spirit of candor shown. He never takes an unmanly advantage of an opponent. He never fails to give his antagonist all that is due to him. He never conceals the weak points of his own position. He is frank in acknowledging his own comparative inferiority as a physicist.

4. Another notable fact in our author's method of warfare, is his habit of using one of his adversaries to confute another. He quotes Huxley against Bastian; Mill and Tyndall against Huxley; Wallace against Darwin; Huxley against Comte, and so on.

5. He has correctly apprehended and stated the relations between theologians and science, between philosophers and Christianity. Theologians, as such, have nothing to do with science. Philosophers, as such, have nothing to do with Christianity. It is a sad truth that some Christians think they show the strength of their faith by an abuse of science and scientific men. Every

intelligent, candid mind sees that this is the exhibition either of ignorant fanaticism or of timid unbelief.

THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES.

The discussion of these occupies the first three lectures, and two articles in the Appendix.

Dr. McCosh tells us that his argument for the Divine existence is drawn from the evidences of design in nature. This argument is made up of the principle of causality, admitted by all, and of a body of facts, manifest in the physical universe. The principle he now assumes, and remits its discussion to his second series of lectures.

He finds two ultimate existences in the physical world, 1. Matter; 2. Force. Is this an assertion of the substantial existence of Force? Hume was a sceptical *Nihilist*. Berkeley was a *unitarian* Idealist. Reid was a natural *Dualist*, and so are most philosophers. Is Dr. McCosh a *trinitarian* philosopher? Does he hold to a threefold classification of substance, Mind, Matter, Force? He tells us what a *substance* is, p. 114. Its three essential qualities are being, potency, and permanence. Force has all of these. It must, therefore, be a substance. If a substance, does it belong to the category of mind? There is nothing in the lectures to lead us to believe this. It belongs to the physical universe, he says. Is it a species of matter? We suppose not, for it is here specially distinguished from it. It is an ultimate existence, distinct from matter.

We have another trouble about Dr. McCosh's doctrine of Force. Here, p. 12, he tells us that it is an ultimate existence, as it were, coördinate with matter. On p. 15, he says that the profoundest minds "regard Force as the very power of God acting in all action." This was the teaching of Algazel, the famous Mahometan philosopher of the twelfth century, as it was of Malebranche, the distinguished Cartesian friar. This is the author's second statement. In the first article of the Appendix, he uses the ordinary language of philosophy, speaking of the Forces as "properties of matter." Can Force be an ultimate physical

existence, the very power of God, and a simple property of matter, all?

Matter comes up for special examination. What was its original condition? The evolutionists say that it was Star-dust, or Fire-mist. Here he comes into direct contact with the theory, which he manifestly regards as the stronghold of infidelity, so far as physical science is concerned. This theory, first suggested by the elder Herschel, then presented by La Place as an hypothesis, has been taken up by the opponents of Christianity, and applied not only to astral cosmogony, but also to the garnishing of the earth with organic life, to the progress of civilisation among men, and even to the growth of Christianity itself.

Dr. McCosh discusses it as it is used to account for those existences upon the earth which show organisation, and thus seem to evince design in their construction. The evolutionists begin with star-dust, or fire-mist, and from it, by a process of development, evolve all that has since existed, or that now appears within the observation of man. All this is done, according to the infidel portion of them, not only without any coöperating efficiency from any extraneous power, but even without any intelligent supervision by a superintending mind. It is matter in the mill of Law, whose machinery is run by blind Force. Every form of beauty, usefulness, and sublimity, is thus created.

The special advocates of this general hypothesis whom the lecturer undertakes to refute, are Prof. Huxley and Mr. Darwin. Prof. Huxley is distinguished in this connection by his relations to *Protoplasm*, the physical basis of all life. This is his starting-point, living protein. In this we have matter and force: force residing in and operating upon the molecules of matter. By this process, the protophyton is first formed, then acrogenous, endogenous, exogenous, agamous, cryptogamous, phænogamous, in their regular ascending series. By a still further exertion of this same developing force, the highest vegetable germ is raised to a protozoon, or to a zoophyte. Or, it may be that the original spring of life, as it exists in the protoplasm, sends forth its living stream in another direction, and produces an infusorial animal. This developes into a radiate, the radiate into a mollusk, the mol-

lusk into an articulate, the articulate into the lowest vertebrate, and so on up to man. Here, for the present, the process has reached its goal.

Prof. Huxley is also distinguished by his extreme views upon the family of forces. In this one household, he not only domesticates the mechanical, electric, chemical, and vital branches, but the intellectual and moral as well. Our opinions and our virtues are the results of molecular changes in the brain.

Mr. Darwin individualises himself amongst the evolutionists by his discovery, illustration, and maintenance of the law of natural selection, and by his special application of it, to account for the origin of man. The law of natural selection is simply this, that in the struggle of life going on in the vegetable and animal kingdoms, those who have inherited the best constitutions from their parents, and who are surrounded by circumstances best adapted to their nature, will survive and produce offspring, while the less fortunate in these respects are doomed to perish. It is thus that the stronger, better elements are perpetuated, while the weaker are eliminated, resulting in a progressive development in all the realms of organic life.

Huxley begins with protoplasm. Darwin does not go back quite so far, but commences with a few forms into which the Creator originally breathed life. He traces the human genealogy back to the lowest order of Agassiz' acephalous class of mollusks. Adam and Eve, according to him, were "united in the same individual," constituting "an animal more like the larvæ of our existing marine ascidians than any other form known;" we suppose resembling the embryo of the *Amaroncium proliferum*, described by his not very special friend, the eminent French philosopher, Milne Edwards. We observe that Mr. Darwin felicitates himself upon having traced his ancestry back to a shell-fish with a tail like a tadpole, but *without a head*.

In the first article of the Appendix, Dr. McCosh gives eleven difficulties in the way of the general doctrine of development. "1. Chemical action cannot be produced by mechanical power. 2. Life, even in its lowest forms, cannot be produced from unorganised matter. 3. Protoplasm can be produced only by living

matter. 4. Organised matter is made up of cells, and can be produced only by cells. Whence the first cell? 5. A living being can be produced only from a seed or germ. Whence the first seed? 6. An animal cannot be produced from a plant. Whence the first animal? 7. Sensation cannot be produced in insentient matter. 8. The genesis of a new species has never come under the cognizance of man, either in pre-human or post-human ages. Darwin acknowledges this. 9. Consciousness cannot be produced out of mere matter or sensation. 10. We have no knowledge of man being generated out of the lower animals. 11. All human beings are capable of forming certain high ideas, such as those of God and duty. The brute creatures cannot be made to entertain these."

These positions, well substantiated, present not only formidable but fatal objections to the hypothesis of development.

In the second article of the Appendix, the special objections to Darwin's hypothesis of the Descent of Man are given. 1. Man instinctively shrinks from such an origin. 2. Natural selection, confessedly, cannot account for life.—The same Being who produced life, produced the rational soul of man. 3. There are wide gaps unfilled between the lowest races of men and the highest brutes. Take the skull. The lowest human average is 77 cubic inches; while the highest average in any species of brutes is 30 cubic inches. Darwin acknowledges that he cannot account for the origin of mental phenomena. The gap between man and the highest known animal cannot be bridged, except by supposing an undiscovered link. For this, he falls back upon the general principle of evolution. 4. The testimony of the Holy Scriptures. As the Bible has anticipated geology, and, in addition, is supported by a perfectly satisfactory body of evidence, why may we not admit its testimony as to the origin of man? May we not ask, however, does the Bible definitely decide this point? When it asserts that God made the body of man from the dust, does it say, positively, whether this was done mediately or immediately? Is there not possibly room there for divine development from dust? Dr. McC. thinks that there is. 5. There is no decisive fact to support the hypothesis. The nearest approach to this is

the fact contained in the "generalisation of Von Baer, that the growth of the animal in the womb corresponds very much to the progress of the animal races in the geological ages." This is quite an interesting point. As thus presented, the fact observed by Von Baer seems favorable to Darwin.

Development is made plausible by a double fact. 1. That geology reveals to us, as chronologically true, that the various orders, genera, and species of organic life, as a general fact, manifest themselves upon the earth in a somewhat regularly ascending scale. This gives coloring to the hypothesis that the subsequent and higher were evolved, by progressive influences, from the antecedent and lower. 2. The less significant fact, or aspect of the same fact, that the present existences within human observation, constitute a symmetrical pyramid, from its base in simple elementary matter, up to man, the wonderful apex of the whole. This double fact can be readily explained, however, without resorting to the development hypothesis. There is in creation a development, but it is *in thought*, in plan, in design. An illustration will convey the idea. We enter a factory of wind musical instruments. We first see the unmanufactured material; then the simple whistle; then the fife; then the flute; then the trombone; then the melodeon; and finally, the grand organ. Here is development, not of one, materially and organically, out of the other, but the thought of the whistle suggests the higher thought of the fife, the fife suggests the flute, and so on up to the organ.

With regard to this theory of development, as it bears upon the teachings of Theism, the following considerations should be borne in mind:

1. It is, at best, in the present stage of scientific investigation, but a plausible hypothesis. It may, in time, be proven to be a true theory. So far, the evidence is against it.

2. Before development can be accepted as true, its two fundamental doctrines must be proven. The first of these is spontaneous generation, and the other the transmutation of species. Both are essential to the doctrine as held by Huxley, who begins with protoplasm. Much more are they necessary in the extreme form given by the manifestly crazy Swiss philosopher, Oken. Darwin

may dispense with spontaneous generation, as he allows a few created living forms as the starting point for development. It is manifest that the evidence up to this time is decidedly adverse to both of these tenets.

3. There is a form in which the theory is held, which is, *a priori*, untrue. When it is asserted that, beginning with star-dust, possessed of only the ordinary properties of matter, mechanical and chemical, there have been developed from it, without the coöperation of any extraneous efficiency, all the organised and spiritual substances now upon the earth, a palpable impossibility is uttered. This is a violation of the axiom, that there can be nothing evolved which was not involved, that there can be nothing in an effect which did not exist in the cause. If it is declared that the original fire-mist contained in itself all mechanical, chemical, vital, intellectual, and moral forces, then the impossibility is relieved, and there is gratuitously substituted for it an unwarranted declaration, which, in the very nature of the case, can be neither proven nor denied. To most men, such a statement bears absurdity upon its face, as it did to Prof. Tyndall, who declares that "the mere statement of such a notion is more than a refutation."

4. Dr. Oken speaks approvingly of the metaphysical absurdity of a "development from nothing;" though he elsewhere seems to admit that possibly "infusorial points" were created as the germs of development. With this exception, so far as we know, the theory is always presented in a shape which is consistent with the theistic conception of the *Creator*. Star-dust or fire-mist must have had a cause. Protoplasm is confessedly not an original. Darwin expressly speaks of creative agency preparing the way for development. "The Vestiges" write reverently of the "Creative Intelligence" and the "Great Author" of the worlds.

5. The theory impinges upon the theistic doctrine of *Providence*. But it is not necessarily incompatible even with this. It may have been God's providential plan, as Darwin teaches, to create a few primordial germs, and from these, *by his own developing efficiency*, to evolve the present advanced inhabitants of the earth. This is surely not impossible, nor in any way derogatory

to his providential dignity. Here, again, "The Vestiges" utter sound doctrine: "When we speak of natural law, we only speak of the mode in which the Divine power is exercised; it is but another phrase for the action of the ever-present and sustaining God."

When, however, the developing force is represented as inherent in matter and self-efficient, then there is at least a setting aside of God's providential control of his own creation. It is a lamentable, but, we believe, well ascertained fact, that the theory is so held by a majority of its advocates. Its genesis in many minds, we fear, is in that "tormenting theophobia," of which Tayler Lewis speaks, which prompts them to deny God's providence, though they do not absolutely dispute his existence.

We should not forget that development is a doctrine consistent with true Theism, and to be judged, like all other hypotheses, upon its own evidence. The nice and varied adaptations, necessary in so complicated a process as development must be, furnish, as Dr. McCosh well insists, so many proofs of an Intelligent Mind presiding over it.

There are five points in which the lecturer gathers up the results of his discussion of the relations of Christianity to the physical sciences: 1. We find everywhere traces of Final cause. 2. There is the appearance, ever and anon, of new agencies. 3. There is proof of plan in the organic unity and growth of the world. 4. We see higher and higher products appear and reveal the higher divine perfections. 5. We behold glimpses of the future history of our world. Dr. McCosh is an enthusiastic optimist. The conclusion of his second lecture is a fine specimen of eloquence. There he takes the law of natural selection and applies it to human history, in which we find, first, the age of physical giants; then the golden age of intellect; and finally the dawning of the period predicted in prophecy, and presaged by Plato, when "the good shall be the uppermost, and the evil the undermost, forevermore."

THE RELATIONS OF CHRISTIANITY TO MENTAL SCIENCE.

Our author devotes four Lectures and one article in the Ap-

pendix to the discussion of these relations. In the first lecture, he considers the proofs of the existence of mind, and the reality of its knowledge, and attacks the doctrines of nescience and relativity. In the second, he gives his positive argument, from a metaphysical standpoint, for the existence and nature of the Deity, and criticises Mr. Herbert Spencer. In the third, he reviews the progress of free thought in America, and gives a special discussion of Positivism. In the fourth, he devotes himself to Materialism in its various aspects. The article in the Appendix is a more special critique upon Herbert Spencer.

Proofs of the existence of mind. 1. "Man has the means of knowing the existence of mind as *immediate* as the means of knowing the existence of matter." 2. "We have a *positive* though limited knowledge of mind, even as we have a positive though limited knowledge of body." "We know more of mind than we know of matter." 3. "As matter cannot be resolved into mind on the one hand, so mind cannot be resolved into matter on the other." (1.) "The two are made known to us by different organs: the one by the senses, the other by self-consciousness." (2.) "We know them as possessed of essentially different properties." Descartes said truly, that they possess no two qualities in common. Of course he meant to except bare existence, which brings them together into the *summum genus*, being.

What does the mind reveal to us? It reveals to us things, realities. By it we not only know the qualities of matter, but matter itself, as thus qualified. By it we know not only the various energies of mind, but mind itself, as thus energised or endowed. So far, clear and good. Our lecturer next makes a criticism upon a phrase, (which is somewhat common in psychological literature,) which, with deference, we would say has surprised us, as coming from so astute a metaphysician. It is the phrase, "thing *in itself*." He affects to be ignorant of the meaning of the expression, originating, as he says, in the German of Kant. He asks, "Does it mean that, besides the thing we know, there is something else—a thing *plus itself*?" If this be not its meaning, he supposes that it signifies the thing *within* the thing! Now, does Dr. McCosh seriously assert that either of

these is its meaning, as used by the most eminent metaphysicians who write the German or English language? Is he serious, when he says, "What is meant by the *thing in itself* I do not know, and think it proper not to affect to know?" Or is his design simply to throw ridicule upon the expression? It may be confessed that the phrase is not idiomatic English; that it is possibly pleonastic. The preposition, *in*, may be superfluous. But that is an obscure or unintelligible expression, as used by the most accurate English psychologists, is surely not true. It was employed by the most learned and profound metaphysician of this century, whose scholarship was perhaps not inferior to that of Scaliger or Milton, and whose exact use of his native tongue is not surpassed by any writer with whom we are acquainted. It was used by him as a technical, philosophical phrase, in two distinct controversies. 1. In the dispute of centuries, as to the immediate object of sense-perception. Do we perceive the external object *in* and through a *tertium quid*? Or, *in* an ideal, mental modification? Or, *in itself*? Reid, Hamilton, all common-sense natural realists, say that we perceive the external object *in itself*; *i. e.*, manifestly, we perceive *the very* thing, and not a representative image. 2. It is used in an entirely different sense by the same eminent philosopher and others. He says: "In so far as mind denotes that substance in which the phenomena of knowing, willing, etc., inhere—something behind or under these phenomena—it expresses what, *in itself*, or *in its absolute existence*—*i. e.*, considered apart from its phenomena—is to us unknown." Is this language unintelligible? Is it not a simple assertion of the doctrine that our knowledge is phenomenal, relative; that we know not the absolute; that the substance, apart from its phenomena, in itself, is unknown? It is known in its phenomena, but not in itself, its absolute, separate subsistence.

The lecturer is mistaken in his statement that the phrase is German, originating with Kant. It is an old scholastic expression, used in the second sense above alluded to. *Substantia* is defined as "*Res per se subsistens*," "*Ens per se subsistens*." Melanchthon, as quoted by Hamilton's editor, says: "In philosophia, generaliter nomine Essentiæ utimur pro re *per sese* con-

siderata." Indeed, we may trace it and the enshrined doctrine back to the first, in eminence, of all human philosophers, the Stagirite. He writes: "Ἡ ὑλη ἀγνωστος καθ' αὐτήν."

We do not recover from the surprise created by the criticism upon "in itself,"* before we are again startled by the lecturer's views with regard to *substance*. In our limited reading they are novel and peculiar. He rejects the idea (so far as we know, universally received,) of substance as the basis or *substratum* of phenomena, whether mental or material, and gives an analytic definition of it, as that which possesses or involves, 1. Being; 2. Potency; and 3. Permanency.† As being is the *summum genus* of human knowledge, substance is that species of being whose *differentia* is potency and permanency; in other words, substance is a permanent power. We have already seen that this definition makes force a substance. It applies equally well to the qualities of matter or the energies of mind. They have being, power, and permanency. It is also applicable to relations themselves.

A definition is designed to be a boundary, to distinguish the thing defined from its closely related terms especially. Is that true of this one? Substance, quality, relation, are three well known metaphysical categories, mutually exclusive of each other. Has Dr. McCosh the right to confound them? If he rejects the common idea of substance as a delusion, is he justified in transferring the name to a far more extensive conception? Is the ordinary doctrine of substance, as contradistinguished from phenomenal quality, a "counterfeit," a "ghost," as affirmed by the lecturer? As this is an alleged primary, necessary conviction of

*Indeed, so recognised a place has this phrase in the standard literature of philosophy, that Dr. McCosh himself has not failed to use it: *e. g.*, in the *Intutions of the Mind Inductively Investigated*, p. 169, we read, "No doubt a substance is a thing known *in itself*."

†In an article in the January number, 1873, of the *Princeton Review* upon Berkeley's Philosophy, Dr. McCosh substitutes the more notative phrase, "Independence of our perceptions" for permanency. In the same place, he says that "substance, as thus understood, has no need of a *substratum*." We are not aware of any philosopher who thinks that it needs aught but the Divine support. It is itself the *substratum*, or support, of material qualities and mental energies.

our mental nature, there can be nothing done beyond the mere statement of the question. By sense-perception, we become acquainted directly with the qualities of matter, *e. g.*, the paper before us. We perceive that it has a certain color, shape, thickness, smoothness, etc. Is the color the paper? Is the shape, the thickness, or the smoothness? Are they all, taken together, the paper? Are we not compelled, by the necessities of our thought, to regard them as *radii* from a common centre of being, as qualities inhering in and showing forth to us a common nucleus which we call the paper, or the substance of the paper? That there is a substance, as a *substratum* for qualities, is the catholic doctrine of philosophy, and the teaching, as it seems to us, of common sense.

We are next treated to a brief discussion of Nescience, which is identified with the scepticism of Hume. Upon this we have only to remark that we do not apprehend the distinction made between Nescience and Nihilism. We read, "It is called Nescience, in so far as it holds that man knows nothing, and can know nothing, of the nature of things; and Nihilism, inasmuch as it is averred that there can be nothing known." As one of the young men sought to be instructed by Dr. McCosh, we frankly confess that our obtuseness does not allow us to see the distinction, as thus given. We venture to ask, if the former term does not properly refer to the subjective aspects of knowledge, while the latter more appropriately regards the objective? Is this Dr. McCosh's meaning?

He next notices one of the most interesting questions in the metaphysics of the present age, the Relativity of human knowledge. He believes that man's knowledge is relative in three senses: 1. He can know only so far as he has a capacity of knowing. 2. He has the capacity of discovering relations. 3. His knowledge is finite. He rejects the doctrine: 1. That we know relations and not things. 2. That the mind creates the relations. His objections are: 1. That this doctrine must issue logically in Nescience. 2. It is inconsistent with consciousness. 3. It is inconceivable that we should know relations between things unknown. In the next lecture, in a criticism of Herbert Spencer, he applies

these principles to our knowledge of God. Spencer says that appearance without reality is unthinkable, so that beyond the apparent, the phenomenal, there must be an absolute reality. But with reference to the Infinite Absolute, he says "that the power which the universe manifests to us is *utterly inscrutable.*" In reply, the lecturer says: 1. That Spencer, on his principles, is not entitled to assume that, beyond what appears, there is a something which is a reality. 2. That he, the lecturer, believes in a real something, beyond what falls under the senses. 3. That we know that reality beyond the apparent. 4. That we are not directly conscious of God. 5. That we know God from his works. 6. That God is the best known of all our objects of cognition. 7. That our knowledge of God is partial, from two causes: (1.) Mainly, from our limited capacity. He is infinite, and, moreover, possesses perfections differing in kind from anything possessed by man. (2.) Partly, because of our pollution. Thus he is "the Being of whom we know the most," "and yet he is the Being of whom we know the least."

Upon this portion of the discussion we would venture a few remarks:

1. When Dr. McCosh says that man can know only so far as he has the capacity of knowing, and that his knowledge is finite, he stands upon common ground with the believer in Relativity. These statements, however, are not expressive of the peculiarities of Relativity.

2. His use of the very indefinite and extensive word "thing," is such as to make a categorical denial of what are meant to be the peculiarities of his position impossible. He says that "man is so constituted that he can know things." Who doubts this, as thus stated? Thing is as extensive a term as being. It may mean substance, quality, or relations, or all of them. Of course man knows things; but what is meant by things? Substances? relations? qualities? or, all three? He says, "We know things appearing." Will any Relativist deny this? That is precisely their doctrine. Of the extensive *genus* things, man knows that species which is apparent, the phenomenal. Still again, "We argue that these things appearing, being real, imply other things

also real, though not appearing to the senses." Spencer would certainly assent to this. Just such a sentence we might expect to find in Sir William Hamilton on Relativity. "Things appearing, being real," *i. e.*, qualities appearing, "imply other things also real," *i. e.*, substances, "though not appearing to the senses." The same ambiguity puts his opponents at a disadvantage. He says that the doctrine of Relativity, "means that we know relations and not things." Relativity, in the hands of Sir William Hamilton, could hardly teach this, for such a statement is contradictory of itself. Relations are things, so that if we know them, we must know things. This usage of Dr. McCosh seems to have arisen from his antipathy to the philosophical term "substance," and its equivalent, "thing *in itself*."

3. The real issue between Dr. McCosh and the Relativists is as to our knowledge of substance. Let us see this doctrine as presented by its ablest and most perspicuous advocate. The whole doctrine is contained in two statements: (1.) "All human knowledge is only of the relative or phenomenal. I shall illustrate this by its application. What do we know of matter? Matter is to us the name either of something known or of something unknown. In so far as matter is a name for some *thing known*, it means *that which appears to us* under the forms of extension, solidity, divisibility, figure, motion, roughness, smoothness, etc.; in short, it is a common name for a certain series, or aggregate, or complement, of appearances, or phenomena manifested in coexistence. But as the phenomena appear only in conjunction, we are compelled by the constitution of our nature to think them conjoined in and by something; and as they are phenomena, we cannot think them the phenomena of nothing, but must regard them as the properties or qualities of something that is extended, solid, figured, etc. But this something, absolutely and in itself—*i. e.*, *considered apart from its phenomena*—is to us as 'zero,' or 'unknown.'" (2.) "We must more precisely limit our sphere of knowledge, by adding, that all we know is known under the special condition of our faculties." "This principle divides itself into two branches. In the first place, it would be unphilosophical to conclude that the properties of existence

necessarily are, in number, only as the number of our faculties of apprehending them; or, in the second, that the properties known, are known in their native purity, and without addition or modification from our organs of sense, or our capacities of intelligence." The latter of these is the more important. So we will give Hamilton's illustration of it. "For example: I see a book—I see that book through an external medium—and I see it through my organ of sight, the eye. Now, as the full object presented to the mind, (observe that I say the mind,) in perception, is an object compounded of the external object emitting or reflecting light, *i. e.*, modifying the external medium—of this external medium—and of the living organ of sense, in their mutual relation—let us suppose, in the example I have taken, that the full or adequate object perceived is equal to twelve, and that this amount is made up of three several parts—of four, contributed by the book—of four, contributed by all that intervenes between the book and the organ—and of four, contributed by the living organ itself. I use this illustration to show, that the phenomenon of the external object is not presented immediately to the mind, but is known by it only as modified through certain intermediate agencies."

These are the tenets of Relativity. We must say that they are not, to our mind, incredible. We are further struck with the facts that Dr. McCosh's expressions of the opposing doctrine form a part of this. Hamilton says that matter and mind are to us the names of "things known;" they are *things which appear to us* under certain forms. Hamilton teaches that, beyond the things known, there are other things unknown, but necessarily inferred and believed. McCosh, in correspondence, teaches that there is a something *beyond what falls under the senses*, inferred, under the principle of causation, from the things appearing. Where do they separate? Here, Hamilton says that this something beyond the sensible, apart from the phenomenal, is necessarily believed to exist, but is unknown. McCosh affirms that we know this reality, beyond what falls under the senses. We inquiringly ask, How do we know it? By what faculty? Not by

the sense-perception, for it is "beyond our sensible experience," as he says. Not by consciousness, or internal perception, for that recognises the present states of the mind alone. Not by intuition, for he expressly disclaims this position of Morell and others. Does he say that we know it, as appearing, "so far know it"? Hamilton says the same. It is a matter of belief, not of knowledge.

4. Must the doctrine of Relativity issue logically in Nescience, as the lecturer affirms? Every doctrine which invalidates the true foundation of knowledge, or which presents a false foundation, must issue logically in a Nihilism, more or less complete in proportion to its fundamental error. Is Relativity chargeable with either of these? Its alleged error is in not presenting a sufficiently broad foundation. Let us see. The three primary, originating faculties of the mind, are the intuitional reason, the consciousness, and the sense-perception. All the other cognitive powers are either elaborative or conservative of what is furnished by these. Does Relativity deny consciousness or the sense-perception? Does it improperly limit their capacity? No, it admits implicitly all knowledge furnished by either. The energies of mind and the qualities of matter are the facts to which they testify. Both of these classes of cognitions are freely admitted as original and immediate by Relativity. Does it deny or unduly limit the noetic faculty? It does not; for it expressly admits the compelling force of its testimony, demanding our belief in that, to which sense-perception and self-consciousness are unable to lead us.

Relativity, however, it is alleged, teaches that substance is unknown. This is Nescience so far. If substance is unknown, there is but a step to the denial of its qualities, manifested as phenomena. But what are the teachings of Relativity upon this point? 1. That matter and mind are both known phenomenally to exist. 2. That their absolute existence, though not known, must be believed, for three satisfactory reasons: (1) Its denial "belies the veracity of our primary beliefs; (2) it leaves unsatisfied the strongest necessities of our intellectual nature; (3) it

admits as a fact that the phenomena (of their associated qualities) are connected, but allows no cause explanatory of the fact of their connection."

Is the parallax of the moon and planets invalidated, because we are not able to find a base large enough for that of the north star? Is our knowledge of phenomena jeopardized by our inability, from want of natural endowment, to know substance? We know that the north star has parallax, though it is by us inappreciable. We know that there is substance, though our Creator has not fitted us to look directly upon it.

What was it that led to the idealism of Berkeley, and the Nihilism of Hume and Fichte? Was it not the philosophy of Locke, itself based on the errors of centuries? What was it in Locke's teaching that generated these systems of partial and almost complete Nihilism? It was manifestly his error as to the origin of knowledge, making it all ultimate in sensation, denying both consciousness and intuition (especially the latter) as sources of primary truth. Hume's scepticism was the logical result of the denial of intuitive truth. It was this, along with the Cartesian doctrine of ideas, founded upon the impossibility of mind recognising its unlike, which undoubtedly produced the partial theories of modern philosophy; whether idealistic, materialistic, or nihilistic in their character. It seems to us that Hamilton's position is not liable to so serious a charge as having Nescience for its legitimate offspring. It lays, apparently to our mind, a broad and secure foundation for real knowledge, and for all the knowledge of which our Creator, in this stage of our being, has made us capable. Because there are some things which we do not know, as there are certainly many such things, we should not thence conclude that we know nothing.

5. Dr. McCosh says that it is inconceivable that we should know relations between things themselves unknown. (1.) Is this inconceivable? Are we compelled to know both terms of a proposition, before we can know any thing of their relations? We mean, of course, outside of the known relations. In other words, must we know all about both terms before we can compare them and observe their relations? We cross a stream in

the middle of its course. That stream we know is a relation, connecting a fountain and an outlet. Of these two we know nothing, except that they must exist. Does this ignorance prevent a full knowledge of that to which they are both related? One not a chemist knows nothing of oxygen and hydrogen beyond their bare existence. Does this prevent a clear, practical knowledge of their related compound, water? Is it said, that he must know them so far as their relations to water are concerned? This is true, and is just that measure and kind of knowledge admitted by Relativity.

(2.) What is really meant when it is asserted that our knowledge is relative? We have already seen from the extracts quoted above. There is meant, in the first place, that our knowledge is of the phenomenal, as contradistinguished from the absolute, of qualities as discriminated from substance. We see nothing here of relations between things themselves unknown. On the contrary, it is expressly asserted that the things are known, so far as their phenomena, apprehensible by us, manifest them. But, in the second place, Relativity teaches that in every act of sense-perception, the object perceived is a complex one; made up of several elements. The external object, the intermediate medium, and the organ of sense all contribute to it. To express it perhaps more accurately, the real object perceived or known, is the quality of the external object, its color for example, as modified by the transmitting medium and the physical organ of vision. Is there any statement here of a knowledge of relations between things themselves unknown? If it be said, Yes; the object of knowledge here is neither the quality of matter absolutely, nor either of its modifications, but the former, unknown in itself, as related to the other two, unknown in themselves; then we must ask ourselves, Is it not the truth, nevertheless? Do we not really perceive the qualities of matter, subject to these modifying influences? Hamilton says, that it is one of the highest problems of philosophy to analyse this object into its elements, and to determine the exact degree of each.

6. Of finite substance, taken absolutely, according to the power of cognition given to us by our Maker, we know nothing. Of

the qualities of finite substance, however, we are relatively cognisant. Of the divine essence or substance, considered absolutely, by a parity of reasoning, we are equally ignorant. We know not the absolute, either creature or Creator. But the attributes of the divine essence, are they cognizable by us, as the qualities of created essence are? The Relativists say not. We *know* neither the essence nor the attributes of the Deity. The ground upon which they deny to man a knowledge of the divine characteristics is that they are *infinite*. The infinite is, by the human intellect, inconceivable. Here comes in Hamilton's pet Law of the Conditioned, as he calls it: "All that is conceivable in thought, lies between two extremes, which, as contradictory of each other, cannot both be true; but of which, as mutual contradictories, one must." To apply to the case before us, the attributes of God are either finite or infinite. They cannot be conceived as finite, for finite qualities of infinite being are inconceivable. They cannot be conceived as infinite, because, as Pascal says, "the infinite is infinitely incomprehensible." Therefore, the attributes of God, as well as his essence, are to man unknowable, in the sense of incomprehensible. We may observe here, parenthetically, what is not stated by Hamilton, that the inconceivability of these two contradictories rests on very different grounds. In the former instance, it is inconceivable, because it is false and absurd; in the latter, because, though true, it is beyond the limit of finite human capacity. Both are inconceivable; but one is credible, while the other is not.

To bring Hamilton's position fairly before us, we must make another quotation from him: "We must believe in the infinity of God; but the infinite God cannot by us, in the present limitation of our faculties, be comprehended or conceived. A Deity understood would be no Deity at all; and it is blasphemy to say that God is only as we are able to think him to be. We *know* God according to the finitude of our faculties; but we *believe* much that we are incompetent properly to know. Faith—belief—is the organ by which we apprehend what is beyond our knowledge. In this all divines and philosophers, worthy of the name, are bound to coincide."

Let us now compare McCosh and Hamilton as to the doctrine of the Deity. They agree: 1. That there is a God. 2. That he is an infinite Person. 3. That he can be known, in the sense of apprehension. 4. That he cannot be known in the sense of comprehension. Here McCosh must be quoted: "I must ever hold that we can come to know God; still, he is, to a great extent, unknown. 'Canst thou, by searching, find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection? It is high as heaven; what canst thou do? Deeper than hell; what canst thou know?' We can so far apprehend him; but, to use an old distinction, we cannot comprehend him." 5. That God's incomprehensibility by man is due to the limitation of the human faculties.

Wherein, then, do they differ? As we understand them, simply in this: that the dead giant taught that a partial finite knowledge of the infinite is "a contradiction *in adjecto*;" that our apprehension of the Deity is a belief, not a knowledge. The living giant, on the other hand, teaches that our apprehension of God, though finite and partial, is knowledge, so far as it goes.

7. As to Spencer's doctrine of the Deity, that his very existence is problematical, and, if existent, that he is not apprehended by man, of course it is to us irrational in the extreme; but we do not see how such teachings could flow from Hamilton's doctrine of Relativity.

Just here it may be appropriate to give the following lines, translated by Sir Jno. Bowring, from the Russian poem of Gabriel Romanovitch Derzhavin:

O thou Eternal One! whose presence bright
 All space doth occupy—all motion guide;
 Unchanged through time's all-devastating flight,
 Thou only God! there is no God beside,
 Being above all beings, mighty one!
 Whom none can comprehend and none explore!
 Who fill'st existence with thyself alone,
 Embracing all, supporting, ruling o'er!
 Being whom we call God, and know no more!

In its sublime research, philosophy
 May measure out the ocean deep—may count
 The sands, or the sun's rays—but God! for thee
 There is no weight nor measure. None can mount

Up to thy mysteries. Reason's brightest spark,
 Though kindled by thy light, in vain would try
 To trace thy counsels, infinite and dark ;
 And thought is lost, ere thought can soar so high,
 Even like past moments in eternity.

Thou from primeval nothingness didst call
 First chaos, then existence. Lord, on thee
 Eternity had its foundation ; all
 Sprung from thee—of light, joy, harmony,
 Sole origin—all life, all beauty there ;
 Thy word created all and doth create ;
 Thy splendor fills all space with day divine ;
 Thou art, and wast, and shalt be glorious, great,
 Life-giving, life-sustaining Potentate.

Thy chains the unmeasured universe surround,
 Upheld by thee, by thee inspired with breath ;
 Thou the beginning with the end, wast bound,
 And beautifully mingled life and death !
 As sparks mount upward from the fiery blaze,
 So suns are born, and worlds spring forth from thee ;
 And as the spangles in the sunny rays
 Shine around the silvery snow, the pageantry
 Of heaven's bright army glitters in thy praise.

A million torches lighted by thy hand,
 Wander unwearied through the blue abyss ;
 They own thy power, accomplish thy command.
 All gay with life, all eloquent with bliss,
 What shall we call them? Piles of crystal light ?
 A glorious company of golden streams ?
 Lamps of celestial ether burning bright ?
 Suns lighting systems with their joyous beams ?
 But thou to them art as the moon to night.

Yes, as the drops of water in the sea,
 All this magnificence in thee is lost ;
 What are ten thousand worlds compared with thee !
 And what am I, then? Heaven's unnumbered host,
 Though multiplied by myriads, and array'd
 In all the glory of sublimest thought,
 Is but an atom in the balance weighed
 Against thy greatness—is a cipher brought
 Against infinity. What am I? Naught.

Nothing!—but th' effluence of thy light divine,
 Pervading worlds, hath reached my bosom, too.
 Yes; in my spirit doth thy spirit shine,
 As shines the sunbeam in a drop of dew,
 Naught! but I live, and on hope's pinions fly,
 Eager toward thy presence! for in thee
 I live, and breathe, and dwell, aspiring high,
 E'en to the throne of thy divinity.
 I am, O God, and surely thou must be!

Thou art! directing, guiding all, thou art!
 Direct my understanding, then, to thee;
 Control my spirit, guide my wandering heart.
 Though but an atom amidst immensity,
 Still I am something, fashioned by thy hand!
 I hold a middle rank, 'twixt heaven and earth,
 On the last verge of mortal being stand,
 Close to the realms where angels have their birth,
 Just off the boundaries of the spirit land.

In the next lecture, we have the positive argument for the existence of the Deity. There is, 1. The intuition of *power* given us in every act of sense-perception, (for we know objects without us only as they exert power upon us,) and in every personal act of our own. A power is a cause producing an effect. The adaptations perceived in the universe show that it is an effect. For this effect there must be an adequate cause. This is the cosmological argument. From final cause we have First Cause.

2. The *spirituality* of the Deity is inferred from the consciousness of our own spirituality.

3. So in the intuitive conviction of our own personality, there is given to us our belief in the personality of God. We have already noticed Dr. McCosh's answer to the objection that personality implies limitation. This he denies; we think, improperly. God's personality does limit him to the sphere of perfection. It is the boundary between him and the finite and the depraved.

4. The ethical argument. First, the perception of *good* and *evil* in the voluntary acts of intelligent beings. Secondly, in the perception of these, *obligation* is implied. Thirdly, obligation

points to a *Power*, to whom we are accountable. Fourthly, this Power is the *Moral Governor* and Judge.

In connection with this, he meets Mill's theory, that our moral ideas are the product of association, by the triumphant criticism that the power of association is one of the comparative and not one of the originating faculties of the mind.

5. The *infinity* of God, Dr. McCosh says, cannot be proven from his physical works. In this, we feel assured that he is mistaken. We have already given our reason, and here simply repeat, that the creation of a single atom *ex nihilo* is an infinite effect, requiring omnipotence to produce it.

The idea of the infinite, according to the distinguished lecturer, is due to a necessary law of the mind, by which it not only cannot set limits to existence, but is constrained to believe that there are no limits. Furthermore, we are obliged to believe that infinite objects are incapable of increase or diminution. These ideas transferred to the Deity bring him before us as the PERFECT. This, moreover, is a necessary, intuitive perception.

The conviction of God's existence is spontaneous in all minds; though it may be and often is not only repressed but perverted. Upon this we would venture to say that it is to us quite doubtful whether a belief in God is either spontaneous or universal. Perhaps we misapprehend the meaning of spontaneity as thus applied. If it means no more than that the mind is fitted to apprehend and receive the idea of God, when it may be communicated or suggested, then we believe that the idea is spontaneous. If it means that the mind, already possessed of the idea, can construct an argument to show it rational, then again we believe it. We cannot, however, think that Dr. McCosh meant either of these. If he means that the belief in God is native to the mind, one of its intuitive convictions, spontaneously suggested, then we are compelled to dissent. We can hardly believe that the existence of God is a self-evident, simple truth. So far from this being so, we doubt whether the idea has ever occurred independently to any human mind. We have already given our views as to the universality of the belief.

In the two remaining lectures, there is given a historical and

critical survey of the various forms of sceptical or infidel belief, as they have been developed in this country.

BOSTON THEOLOGY, as represented by Dr. Channing, is first presented. As a philosophy, it was rationalistic; as a theology, it was Socinian. By a rationalistic interpretation of the Bible, he sought to find Unitarianism there.

Rationalism, however, was too cold, and so gave way to *intuitionism*, under the leadership of Theodore Parker and Ralph Waldo Emerson, inspired by Carlyle and Coleridge, Cousin and Goethe. The Bible was now cast aside, and the new creed based itself on the intuitions of the mind: 1. That there is a God. 2. Of the just and right, of an independent moral law. 3. Of immortality. [These are all truths; but only the second is an intuition.]

To intuitionism, the fundamental reply is in the question, what is the final arbiter? Not the reasoning faculty, for this is specially discarded by its advocates. Not physical science, for religious truth does not belong to its domain. Is it to moral intuition? Then why such divergence of belief as to these fundamental feelings and articles of faith?

As a consequence, these free-thinkers are in a state of unrest, without doctrine, without an organisation, without prayer, without piety, without God. Some are recoiling and coming back to the old Puritan faith. Some are still clinging to their position. The mass are moving on to

POSITIVISM, the Awful Nothing of which Diodorus, the Slow, wrote, and then died in despair.

I. Its chief representatives are Comte, Mill, and Spenser, upheld by Grote, Lewes, Buckle, Bain, and Huxley.

II. The chiefs agree, 1. That man knows nothing of the nature of things. 2. That he knows phenomena merely, or the relations of things unknown. 3. That all he can do is to generalise these into laws. 4. That a knowledge of first or final causes is impossible.

III. They differ, 1. As to the origin of knowledge; Comte deriving it from the brain; Mill, from sensation and feeling; Spenser, by development from the brutes. 2. As to the true,

the beautiful, and good. Comte pays little attention to them; Mill refers them to association; Spencer obtains them from development. 3. As to the Deity. Comte is an avowed Atheist; Mill makes no profession of his faith; Spencer allows that there may be a God in the regions of the unknown.

IV. Comte's religion. No God but collective humanity. Nine sacraments, with a priesthood and public honors. Instead of a Sabbath, two hours daily are to be spent in religious service. Collective humanity is rather too abstract a deity, so we may worship the worthiest individual representatives, Carlyle's heroes. No, they must be women; mother, wife, daughter, representing the past, present, and future, and calling forth our veneration, attachment, and kindness. This and Mormonism are the two new religions of this century. Comte's English followers are ashamed of his religion; and he in turn has denounced them for their want of religion.

V. Comte's direct influence is small; his indirect, through others, great. There is a reaction against him. Sir John Herschel has impeached his mathematics; Mill, his sociology; Spencer, his famous generalisation of the progress of knowledge, as, first, theological; secondly, metaphysical; and thirdly, positive; and Huxley, his physics. It is another case of Actæon and his hounds.

VI. Fundamental objections to Positivism: 1. It is founded upon Nescience. Mill denies all absolute truth, and says there may be worlds where two and two make five. If that is so, then we will admit that we have no proof of God's existence. But the universal human consciousness is against such a position. 2. It is fatalistic. According to Mill, all things come by mere association, with no rational connection, and so are either fortuitous or absolutely fatalistic. According to Spencer, we have an absolutely fatalistic development; forces segregating, equilibrating, and dissolving, according to four fundamental laws: 1. Persistence of force. 2. Least resistance. 3. Instability of the homogeneous; and, 4. Rhythm of motion. Who would leave the fire for such an iceberg as this?

Positivism is not the last in this series of development. There

is a lower and more repulsive form than even it presents. Its negative barrenness is making it yield to

MATERIALISM, for which the age is ripe, and to which several influences tend. In this country, there are two chief causes which are operating to produce this effect. The first is the immense undeveloped material wealth of the land. This is taxing our energies of body and mind to the very utmost. For it we are making requisitions upon the money and muscle of the old world. This great cause is conducing to the second, noticed by Dr. McCosh, that many of our colleges and schools are paying almost exclusive attention to the cultivation of the physical sciences. Large endowments are now given to those chairs, while the study of mind is, to a lamentable degree, overlooked.

Dr. McCosh reviews the several forms of materialism, beginning with the grossest.

I. The representative of this is the German, Büchner, who lectured last winter in this country, and whose work, "Force and Matter," has been translated into our language. Its principles are simple and unmistakable. "The soul is the product of a peculiar combination of matter." "As there is no bile without liver, so there is no thought without brain." Thought has not even the permanence of the other secretions.

This gross form of materialism, we have reason to know, is, or has been recently, taught in some of our medical schools. We have met with it in gentlemen of this profession, who have assured us that they received it from the public instructions of their professors. Within a few years past, in a conversation with an intelligent physician, at that time a professor in a medical college in St. Louis, he told the writer that such was his own belief, and that such were the teachings of his institution. Strange as it may seem, the gentleman had occupied himself so exclusively with physics, that it had absolutely never occurred to him that such a position was utterly inconsistent with the immortality of the soul!

This is one of Dr. McCosh's objections to it. He has another. Bile proceeds from the liver. Its elements we can find in the liver producing it. It is not so, however, with thought and the

brain. There is that in thought, the effect, which we do not find in brain, the alleged cause of the effect. This cannot be, for a cause cannot produce an effect "altogether unlike itself." To this the Materialist would reply, with an *ad hominem* argument, "Does not a spiritual God, according to your belief, as a cause, produce material effects, 'altogether unlike himself?'" We do not see how Dr. McCosh could answer this. The principle does not seem to be true, as thus stated. Its correct form is, there can be nothing in an effect which did not exist, actually or *potentially*, in the cause. In still another shape, it is true that no cause can produce an effect higher than itself. In either form, the principle is hostile to the production of thought by the brain; the effect is manifestly superior to the supposed cause.

II. Dr. Maudsley, physician of the Manchester Royal Lunatic Hospital, is the exponent of the next higher phase of Materialism. 1. He asserts that mental insanity arises from bodily causes. Let this be admitted, and it does not militate, necessarily, against the separate existence of the immaterial spirit. The brain is the home and organ of the soul. Thalberg sits down to give us his rendering of "Home, Sweet Home." The instrument is sadly out of tune. He may touch the keys with perfect accuracy, but no harmony is produced. There issues nothing but discord. Does this prove that he and the instrument are one? That he has no separate life, no independent skill? Is not the discord as sure to be in this case as in an automatic instrument, like the music box?

2. He believes that psychology is possible only through physiology. It has not yet constructed its psychology, but it has overthrown all the old systems, by showing the fallaciousness of consciousness. This is surely subverting the foundation of a spiritual philosophy. How is it done? The lunatic fancies himself a king. Here consciousness testifies to a falsehood! Well may Dr. McCosh say that such a mistake is puerile. Consciousness does not witness to objective conditions, but only to subjective states. The lunatic's consciousness testifies that he thinks himself a king, not that he really is a king.

3. He denies the unity of the soul, except as a material organism is a unit. In this he is opposing an intuitive conviction.

4. He identifies the brain cells, and the forces operating in them, with mental operations. Impressions on the body go through the nerves, and somehow produce thought. They do not exhaust themselves in this primary operation, but leave *residua*, which constitute what is permanent in mind. In plain English, rays of light from Washington's tomb become remembrancers of him, admiration of his character, resolution to imitate him! *Credat Judæus Apella!* Tyndall says that molecular grouping and motion explain nothing of mental phenomena.

III. There is a third, the highest, class of Materialists. These deny that they are such; but assert that matter has high qualities, not only mechanical and chemical, but vital, and, some say, intellectual and moral. There are three distinguished representatives of this system reviewed by the lecturer.

1. Prof. Huxley, who makes vital action, thought, feeling, will, but the result or action of molecular change. To this Dr. McCosh says that the subject of these operations knows them to be different.

Prof. Huxley denies that he is a Materialist, because he believes neither in matter nor in mind, *as substances*. He is, as he says, a Humist. He uses, however, a materialistic terminology, and falls back upon a "physical basis" of life. This produces a practical impression, which will lead to gross materialism among the vulgar. He is, in Sir William Hamilton's classification, a Nihilist.

2. Prof. Bain. Like all the rest of this class, he admits that there is such a thing as mind, whose properties are different from those of ordinary matter. In one way or another, however, they all identify them. Prof. B. says that there is but one substance, with two sides, physical and mental. In Hamilton's table, his is the theory of absolute identity, leading to Pantheism. He introduces anatomical terms into his psychology.

He divides the mental faculties into: 1. The senses. 2. The intellect. 3. The emotions. 4. The will. This classification the lecturer criticises. 1. He assigns no separate place to the

moral faculty. Is there a separate moral faculty? If so, is it gnostic or orectic, cognitive or appetent? Does it belong to the understanding or the will? In Kant's and Hamilton's division, is it a faculty of the understanding, a capacity of feeling, or a power of conation? In our study of psychology, the mind seems to have a moral phase, if we may use the expression, rather than a moral faculty. We mean that several, if not all of its faculties, have moral functions. Notably it has moral intuitions, moral judgments, moral emotions, and moral purposes. Is there a separate faculty for each or all of these? By the law of parcimony, we think not.

Dr. McCosh thinks that the sensations of pleasure and pain should not be classed with the mental emotions, under the common head, feeling. In this he agrees with Kant and Hamilton. Bain, however, has in this simply followed the current classifications of philosophers from Aristotle down. In criticising a Materialist, this may be regarded as an error (if an error at all) of quite inferior moment. The lecturer well says that Prof. B.'s division of the mental powers is from a study of mental phenomena, and not from an anatomy of the brain. No study of the brain will enable us to map out the mental faculties.

3. As the last and most honorable of the list, there is presented Prof. Tyndall, who has lately attained such notoriety through the proposed prayer-test, who has been lecturing with so much *éclat* on physics in this country, during the winter, and who gave seventeen hundred dollars to the Young Men's Christian Association of Washington. He asserts that the growth of the body is mechanical, and that the various thoughts, emotions, and volitions have their correlatives in the physics of the brain. He contends, however, for the existence of the mind. There is no proof that a man's mental condition can be determined by an inspection of his brain.

All attempts to localize the various faculties in different parts of the brain have been unsuccessful. If it should ever be done, it would only prove that the mind uses one part of its instrument for one purpose, and another part for another. Dr. Maudsley confesses that we have no certain knowledge of the functions of

the various cerebral convolutions; that it is not agreed that man has any definite system of convolutions; that we only know that they are more complex and less symmetrical than those of the monkey.

A general criticism of Materialism:

1. We have an intuitive consciousness of the personality and unity of the mind.

2. The mind follows laws of its own, which are not laws of matter. The laws of matter are attraction, definite combination, assimilation, absorption, etc. The laws of mind are cognition, perception, consciousness, memory, imagination, association, judgment, emotion, free-will, obligation, etc.

3. Mind cannot be shown to be one of the correlated physical forces. We cannot weigh thought, nor measure affection. Spencer asserts that all mental phenomena are the result of some physical force. This is not correct. Many affections and thoughts are produced solely by internal contemplation; penitence in reviewing our past conduct, for example.

Dr. Barker, of Yale College, argues, from the motion of the needle consequent on brain action, that thought is the result of electric or magnetic force. The fact is true, but the interpretation is not. The mental action excites the brain, and the brain excitement produces the magnetic phenomena. The excitement of the emotions produces more heat than the action of the intellect does. This shows simply that the emotions agitate the brain more and cause it to expend more physical force. So recitation to one's self produces more heat than does oral recitation. This is due to the force, in the latter case, being expended on articulation. When physical force disappears in one form, it is found in another. Is this true of mental force? What becomes of it at death?

4. The following is Dr. McCosh's hypothesis of the relations of mind to matter: Mind is intimately associated with matter; not, however, with the molecules of matter, but with the correlated forces. These must exist in the brain and concur with the mind in producing mental action. Force comes from the sun to vegetables and animals. These being digested by man, the forces

in them are carried by the blood to the brain, and there deposited in the gray cortical layers. These forces partly form the brain. The mind uses them as the instrument of its action, just as a mill uses the water-power to make its machinery effective. These forces, however, are not the mind, as the water-power is not the mill. In this life, the mind cannot act without these brain forces. This, however, may not be the case in another state. The mill may run by steam. So to the mind another class of forces may be supplied. The mind, like matter and force, can never perish.

There are few questions more interesting to the thoughtful than the relations of mind, matter, and force. Those relations are not yet fully and definitely ascertained. We have had occasion to observe that Dr. McCosh is not entirely clear as to the connections of the last two. Force is undoubtedly intimately associated with both of the others. All of the manifestations of mind are in the form of energies. Its faculties are generalised as powers.

As to matter, in all of its observed forms, it is not only capable of being moved, but is also constantly in motion. In unorganised matter, there is a force producing atomic motion. Beyond this, it exerts an attractive and repulsive influence (the *ἔπος* and *ἔπις* of the ancients) over separate masses of inorganic matter. In the vegetable world, this force produces atomic, attractive, and repulsive motion, and, in addition, the motion of growth from a fixed point, that of germination. In the animal kingdom, it produces all of these, with the additional motion of change of place in absolute space.

Let us examine consciousness as to the relations of these. What is its testimony as to our perception of matter? The primary idea of matter comes from our apprehension of its extension. How does extension manifest itself to us? As far as we perceive it by touch, it is as resisting us in three directions perpendicular to each other. Plainly we know it as a force in contact with our tactual sense. So it is with all those qualities of matter, which, as essential to extension, are called primary. Several of these, as given by Hamilton, are purely negative; as divisibility. In such cases, the mind perceives an absence of force simply.

Hamilton enumerates, as secundo-primary qualities, gravity, cohesion, inertia, and repulsion. It is now generally settled that inertia is not a quality of matter at all. If it be, then it shows itself as a power resisting a moving force, on the one hand, or an impeding force, on the other. Gravity is simply a power attracting separate masses of matter. Cohesion is a similar power uniting particles of the same mass. Repulsion appears as a separating influence.

The secondary qualities even more clearly show the same thing. What do we know of colors, sounds, tastes, or odors, except as powers in matter producing certain peculiar sensations in us?

With regard to the phenomena of mind, as stated above, the truth is so well recognised that we call all of its manifestations, operations or acts of its several powers or energies. Thus it is also with our knowledge of God. We know him as a Power, and all his attributes as particular exhibitions of his essential energy.

So it is true that we know nothing but power. All existence, material and spiritual, finite and infinite, manifests itself to us as such. In view of these facts, is it a foolish conjecture that possibly all finite substances, material and spiritual, find their unity in the higher sphere of force? The *summum genus* of finite, created being, then, would be force; its two proximate, subaltern *genera*, mind-force and matter-force. Over all, as issuing from him, dependent on him, is the infinite, spiritual, perfect Force; the First Cause, from whom proceed and to whom point all secondary and final causes.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Spiritual Kingdom: An Exposition of the first eleven Chapters of the Book of Revelation. By the Rev. JAMES B. RAMSEY, D. D., late pastor of the First Presbyterian church in Lynchburg, Va. With an Introduction by the Rev. CHARLES HODGE, D. D., LL.D., Professor in the Theological Seminary at Princeton. Pp. 518. 8vo. Richmond, Va. Presbyterian Committee of Publication. 1873.

The volume bearing the title above mentioned is the only production of considerable extent left behind by Rev. Dr. Ramsey, who died on the 23d of July, 1871, at the age of 57. He was greatly revered for his warm-hearted piety, his sound judgment, his clear and vigorous mind, and his great familiarity with the Scriptures. The introduction to the work by Dr. Hodge, which occupies thirty-five pages, will itself be valued as an expression of the views of that eminent divine on prophecy, the prophets, the nature of the prophetic influence, its subject, its effect, its mode of communication, and rules for its interpretation.

The work of Dr. Ramsey is divided into five parts: the first is introductory; the second treats of the visible representation of the kingdom under the symbol of the golden candlesticks, and the seven letters to the churches; the third speaks of the true conception of the spiritual kingdom; the fourth, of the Mediator King, and his reign; the fifth, of its conflicts and triumph. Under these heads he explains the entire series of symbolical representations embraced in the first eleven chapters of this book, so remarkable in its structure and contents, which, written by the apostle whom Jesus loved, fitly closes the canonical Scriptures. These general divisions afford but a faint view of the specific contents of the volume before us. He does not interpret the symbols as predictions of particular events, but as pictures of the sorrows and triumphs of the Church, and of the overthrow of those powers of this world which interrupt its progress. The

seven golden candlesticks represent the Church as a light-bearer; the seven stars in the right hand of its Lord and Head, that authority which Christ has given the Church and vested in its officers. The seven epistles to the seven churches exhibit a seven-fold picture of the Church universal as it is, of its mixed condition of strength and weakness, of apostasy and faithfulness. Then follows in chapter iv. a symbolical picture of the spiritual kingdom of God in its essential elements. The throne and its formless occupant, the four living creatures symbolical of human nature as united to Christ and made to partake of the divine, the worship of the kingdom as represented by them and the four-and-twenty elders, at the investiture of the Lamb with supreme dominion, the opening of the seven seals, and the unfolding thus of the plan of God even to the end, the seven angels with the seven trumpets symbolizing the judgment sent upon the enemies of the Church of Christ, the mighty angel clothed with cloud and a rainbow upon his head symbolizing the glory of the ascended Redeemer and his mighty power, the eating of the book, the digesting of gospel truth by the minister of Christ that he might be prepared to prophesy again, the measuring of the temple, which is the Church of God, by the measuring rod of the word, all but the court of the Gentiles, that worldly power in the Church visible which is to be cast out, the two witnesses, the priestly and regal power of Christ her Lord as shown in the witnessing power of the Church, slain indeed for a short time but resuscitated in new vigor and power, till the seventh angel sounds, "and there are great voices in heaven, saying, The kingdoms of this world have become the kingdoms of our Lord and of his Christ; and he shall reign forever and ever." This is the golden thread running through these twenty-eight lectures, the style of which is a model of pulpit exposition for purity, simplicity, directness, instructiveness, spirituality, fervor, and discriminating views of those great truths which fill the Christian heart with energy and life.

Physical Geography. By M. F. MAURY, LL.D., author of "Physical Geography of the Sea," late Superintendent of the National Observatory, Washington, D. C., etc. University Publishing Company, New York and Baltimore. 1873. Imperial octavo; 218 pages. \$2.25.

Few studies could be so practically useful in our schools as Physical Geography. Few books would make a more valuable addition to the libraries of our farmers, merchants, and editors, than this work of Commodore Maury's.

The fund of information which it contains may indeed be found elsewhere, but scarcely anywhere arranged in so orderly a fashion, or so attractively and luminously set forth.

The science which the Germans call earth-knowledge, and which owes its place among the sciences to the life-labors of Humboldt, in addition to its practical application to the earthly concerns of human life and to its large illustration of the provident wisdom and love of our Maker, has this element of attractiveness: that it is based upon the results of scientific investigation in so many departments, that its study necessarily involves some rudimentary instruction in other sciences. Hence it opens the mind and excites the interest of the student in so eminent a degree, that he is not likely to rest satisfied with a partial knowledge of the great truths unfolded to him with the view of making this special study clear.

Let us briefly indicate the scope of this study and the ancillary sciences upon which it touches. Commodore Maury states in his introduction, that "Physical Geography views the surface of the earth and its enveloping atmosphere and waters as the scene of the operations of the great physical forces, and studies the terrestrial developments of these forces in connection with man's agency in controlling and utilising their results. It studies the life of the globe, whether on its surface or within its waters. It is especially interested in the earth as the abode of man." In pursuance of this scheme of study, Part First treats of the earth as a planet, and thus gives the student a taste of the results of astronomical investigation. This part of the subject also includes a short treatise on the crust of the earth, involving an outline of geology.

Part Second takes up the features of the land, its plains, its mountains and table-lands, its lakes and drainage, and its volcanoes and earthquakes. Part Third is devoted to meteorological phenomena, such as heat, light, the seasons, winds and the circulation of the air, dew, rain, magnetism, and electricity, with their effect in producing varieties of climate. Part Fourth treats of the phenomena and life of the sea, the circulation of its waters, the life with which it teems, and the industries connected with it. Part Fifth deals with the life and products of the earth, the physical relations between plants and animals, the geographical range of both, the mineral productions of the earth, man's influence upon physical geography, and the geographical distribution of labor. So far, it may be observed, the student has been occupied not only with geography proper, but also with meteorology, botany, physiology, mineralogy, and political economy, though some of these subjects are presented to his mind briefly and almost imperceptibly. In describing man and the races into which he is divided, some slight knowledge, too, of ethnology has been imparted to him. Part Sixth is a special treatise on the American continent.

The volume is of a most convenient shape and size, and is enriched with admirable illustrations and numerous charts of great value even to the casual reader.

It is the last work of our God-loving Southern scientist and sailor.

The Women of the Arabs, with a Chapter for Children. By Rev. HENRY HARRIS JESSUP, D.D., seventeen years American Missionary in Syria. Edited by Rev. C. S. ROBINSON, D.D., and Rev. ISAAC RILEY. "The threshold weeps forty days when a girl is born;" (Mt. Lebanon proverb.) New York: Dodd & Mead, Publishers, 762 Broadway. Pp. 372, 12mo.

This volume is dedicated to the Christian women of America. Its author justly regards "the remarkable uprising of Christian women in Christian lands to a new interest in the welfare of woman in heathen and Mohammedan countries," as one of the chief features of the present century. His book is "meant to be a

memorial of the early laborers in Syria, nearly all of whom have passed away." "It is intended also as a record of the work done for women and girls of the Arab race."

Dr. Jessup opens with some details of the state of woman amongst the Arabs of former days. Time was when daughters were reckoned no blessing, and female children were often buried alive. So late as Mohammed's day, this cruel practice lingered still amongst the tribe of Temim; but Islam afterwards eradicated it. The older Arab proverbs show that this horrid custom was deemed praiseworthy. "The best son-in-law is the grave." The Koran says that certain men, when hearing of the birth of a daughter, hide themselves "from the people because of the ill-tidings; shall he keep it with disgrace, or *bury it in the dust?*" It is said that the only occasion on which Othman ever shed a tear, was when his little daughter, whom he was burying alive, wiped the dust of the grave-earth from his beard. Down to this very day the congratulation to a newly married pair is, "With concord and permanence, with sons and no daughters."

But there was another side to this picture. Despised and abused, woman often asserted her dignity by intellectual force. The Arab poetesses were numerous, and hold a high rank. Their poetry was impromptu, impassioned, and chiefly elegiac and erotic. The queen of Arab song was Khumsa, who flourished in the time of Mohammed. The most ancient Arab poetess was Zarifeh, who is supposed to have lived in the second century.

The Koran does not teach that women have no souls, but it sanctions the scourging and beating of wives, which is one of the worst as well as most common features of modern Moslem domestic life. Ordinarily, when you hear a scream in the Moslem quarter of the city, and ask the reason, it will be said with a shrug of the shoulder, "It is only some man beating his wife." In ancient times, Moslem women were occasionally taught to read the Koran, and amongst the wealthier and more aristocratic classes, married women are now sometimes taught to read, but the men generally are bitterly opposed to the instruction of women. Many Moslem girls have been taught by the missionaries, however, and many are now learning in the various American, British, and

Prussian schools. But it must be long before the Arab mind in general shall rightly regard woman. Their ideas on the subject are far below what the Jews formerly, and the modern Greeks, Armenians, or Maronites now entertain. There is indeed a striking difference between the lowest nominal Christian community in the East and the highest Mohammedan, in the respect paid amongst them to women.

The third chapter of this book gives a brief account of the Druze religion and the Druze women. This religion is secret, the main doctrine being the unity of God. Two Druze women, educated in the mission, have been converted, and have long adorned their Christian profession, along with a few Druze men. Not a few Druze girls are now in the mission schools of Syria.

The Nusairiyeh are a strange, wild, blood-thirsty race, living in a low range of mountains to the north of Lebanon. To an account of these people Dr. Jessup devotes his fourth chapter. They number about 200,000 souls. Like the Druzes, they consider it a meritorious thing to lie to all infidels. And further, these Nusairiyeh rob and murder Moslems and Christians without compunction. Their women are excluded from all religious ceremonies and teachings, and are despised as unclean. Polygamy is practised. The Reformed Presbyterians have for some years past had a mission amongst these strange people, and some success has attended. The first Christian woman to undertake the direct task of educating Nusairiyeh females, was Miss Crawford, who commenced a boarding school in the fall of 1869. In November, 1871, seven of these girls, on their own application, were received into the Christian Church by baptism. In the spring of 1872, another was added to the list.

The next eight chapters are devoted to the record of Christian woman's work for Arab woman.

The thirteenth chapter presents "Modern Syrian views with regard to Female Education." In 1847, through the influence of the missionaries, a literary society was formed in Beyroot, numbering amongst its members the leading men of the various native communities, and important papers were produced and read on scientific and social subjects. Extracts from some of these which

Dr. Jessup gives, show what an amazing advance Syrian thought is making and has made, touching woman and her proper lot in life. There are three more chapters akin to this thirteenth.

The next chapter gives an account of the various Protestant agencies which are seeking the elevation of woman in Syria; and the next one explains the modes in which Christian women operate amongst their Arab sisters.

The nineteenth and concluding chapter is entitled the Children's chapter, and contains a great variety of details, such as would interest American boys and girls respecting affairs in Syria.

In 1870, when the Old and New School Presbyterians of the North became one, the latter separated as to the Foreign Missionary work from the American Board, with which they had long coöperated. The Syrian mission, to which Dr. Jessup belongs, with one or two others, were then set off as to be thereafter connected with and supported by the Presbyterians.

We cordially commend this book to all our readers, and especially to the ladies of our Southern Presbyterian Church. We can desire for them no higher honor than some share in the blessed work of the elevation of their sex in dark benighted lands.

The Principles of the Westminster Standards Persecuting. By WILLIAM MARSHALL, D. D., Coupar-Angus. Edinburgh: William Oliphant & Co. 1873. Pp. 300. 12mo.

This volume is composed of nine chapters. The *first* is Introductory. The *second* is on the "Persecuting Principles of the Scottish Reformation, prior to the era of the Westminster Assembly." The *third* is on the "Persecuting Principles prevalent during the era of the Westminster Assembly." The *fourth* discusses "The Persecuting Principles of Chapter XX. of the Confession of Faith." The *fifth* discusses "The Persecuting Principles of Chapter XXIII. of the Confession of Faith." The *sixth* examines "The Persecuting Principles of the Larger Catechism." The *seventh* presents us with "Light Shed on the Persecuting Principles of the Westminster Standards by the personal

Writings of their Compilers." The *eighth* presents "Light Shed on the Persecuting Principles of the Westminster Standards by their Adherents in subsequent times." The *ninth* contains the "Conclusion."

The clauses in the Westminster Standards which set forth the principles justly criticised by Dr. Marshall were, as is well known by intelligent readers, stricken out when our fathers, in 1788, adopted them as their own. It was, however, only the omission of one expression in the Catechism, and of one clause in Chapter XX. of the Confession, and the alteration of two paragraphs of Chapters XXIII. and XXXI. which were required.

It will interest our readers to have the Westminster Confession on this point, and our own, put in parallel columns so as to present at a glance the difference.

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Chapter xx. 4. Of certain offenders, just described, it is said: "They may lawfully be called to account and proceeded against by the censures of the Church, and by the power of the civil magistrate."

Chapter xxiii. 3. "The civil magistrate may not assume to himself the administration of the Word and Sacraments, or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven; yet he hath authority, and it is his duty, to take order, that unity and peace be preserved in the Church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed. For the better effecting whereof, he hath power to call Synods, to be present at them, and to provide

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Chapter xx. 4. "They (the same offenders) may lawfully be called to account, and proceeded against by the censures of the Church."

Chapter xxiii. 3. "Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the administration of the Word and Sacraments, or the power of the keys of the kingdom of heaven, or in the least interfere in matters of faith. Yet as nursing fathers, it is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the Church of our common Lord, without giving the preference to any denomination of Christians above the rest; in such a manner that all ecclesiastical persons whatever shall enjoy the full, free, and unquestioned liberty of discharging every part of their sacred functions, without violence or danger. And, as Jesus Christ hath

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that whatsoever is transacted in them be according to the mind of God."

Chapter xxxi. 1. "For the better government and further edification of the Church, there ought to be such assemblies as are commonly called Synods or Councils." 2. "As magistrates may lawfully call a Synod of ministers, and other fit persons, to consult and advise with about matters of religion; so if magistrates be open enemies to the Church, the ministers of Christ, of themselves, by virtue of their office, or they, with other fit persons upon delegation from their Churches, may meet together in such assemblies."

The conclusion to which our author brings his reader is this, that down to the times of the Westminster Assembly good and wise men had not learned the doctrine of toleration. At that period the Church had not fully emerged out of the darkness of the Romish apostasy, and the subject of religious liberty had not

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appointed a regular government and discipline in His Church, no law of any Commonwealth should interfere with, let or hinder, the due exercise thereof, among the voluntary members of *any* denomination of Christians, according to their own profession and belief. It is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the persons and good name of all their people, in such an effectual manner as that no person be suffered, either upon pretence of religion or infidelity, to offer any indignity, violence, abuse, or injury to any other person whatsoever; and to take order, that all religious and ecclesiastical assemblies be held without molestation or disturbance."

Chapter xxxi. 1. "For the better government and further edification of the Church, there ought to be such assemblies as are commonly called Synods or Councils; and it belongs to the overseers and other rulers of the particular Churches, by virtue of the office and the power which Christ hath given them for edification and not for destruction, to appoint such assemblies, and to convene together in them as often as they shall judge it expedient for the good of the Church."

been thoroughly elucidated. On this point our fathers in America were in advance of their brethren in the old world.

Dr. Marshall belongs to the United Presbyterian Church, between which and the Free Church negotiations for union have been going on for years. The United Presbyterians have in some degree relaxed the rigor of the Westminster doctrine on the point of toleration, having also sought to cut the Church loose from the State to the most absolute degree. On the other hand, the Free Church confesses the right and duty of the State and the Church to coöperate (though by no formal union) for the glory of God and the highest good of men. Our author declares that his book is in the interest of union. He is for a revision of the Westminster Standards on this point which shall prepare the way for the union of "all Scotland's Presbyterian churches." He admits, however, that "the majority of Scottish Presbyterians have already revised them virtually, as the Americans have done so actually."

The Gospel Self-Supporting. By ALEX. L. HOGSHEAD, Abingdon, Va. With an Appendix by Rev. JNO. W. PRATT, D. D., Lexington, Va. Wytheville: D. A. St. Clair, Printer. 1873.

This is the title of a volume of 258 pages, small duodecimo. The author has been long known to the editors of this REVIEW as a most deserving minister of the gospel, whose claim to a hearing upon subjects of practical interest to the Church is not inferior to that of any of his brethren. The subject Mr. Hogshead now undertakes to handle is one of vital importance and only beginning to be understood. In the preface we have opened to us the writer's own sense of its magnitude. He says: "The experience and observation of twenty-five years in the ministerial work produced in the mind of the author an increasing conviction that there was some serious defect in the prevailing modes of providing for the support of the ministry and for the spread of the gospel. For a long time he was disposed to attribute the acknowledged inefficiency of these modes to defects in practice rather than in principle. Within the last three years a combination of influences, not necessary to detail, constrained the

author to resort to the inspired Word, with diligent and prayerful research, to learn what provision God has made for the work and advancement of his Church. The further that research was carried, the stronger grew the conviction that the modes in common use for raising material means for religious purposes do not accord with the mode provided and commanded by the Head of the Church. To point out briefly the chief errors into which the Church has fallen in this department of her work, and to set forth the true teachings of the Scriptures on this subject, has been the honest and earnest aim of this discussion."

In pursuing this aim, Mr. Hogshead shows at once his conscientiousness and his thoughtfulness. We heartily commend what he has written to the attention of our readers, and especially to those of them who, by warmly and studiously interesting themselves in this great subject, may be able to explain to Christian people still more fully and in still other lights what is truly the mind of God touching it. In a number of particulars the author before us endorses the views of the Rev. Dr. A. W. Miller with reference to the tithe, and in the progress of his argument quotes happily the opinions of various other thinkers who have discussed this or that branch of the whole matter. The Appendix, by the Rev. Dr. Pratt, is a truly valuable addition.

Hints and Helps in Pastoral Theology. By WILLIAM S. PLUMER, D.D., LL.D. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1874. Pp. 377.

The title of this book, "Hints and Helps," would seem to intimate on the part of its author that he did not aim to produce a full and exhaustive treatise on the subject of which he speaks. Partly it is of the nature of aphorisms, the 20th and 32d chapters being of this character; but chiefly it is a discussion of those practical topics which are connected with the official life of the minister of the gospel. Among these are the Call, the Character, the Education, the Studies, the Difficulties of the Minister; his Preaching, his Pastoral Visiting, his Conduct in the Chamber of the Sick, his Care of the Poor, his Sabbath-Schools,

his Doing Good with the Pen, his Conduct of the Worship of the Sanctuary, and of Revivals of Religion; these, with the chapters, "Should I become a Foreign Missionary?" "The Duty of Americans," "The Relations of America to other Lands," "The Sure Success of Evangelisation," present to our view the various subjects herein discussed.

The author's experience in the pastoral office and in the pulpit, in both which he has been eminently successful, and his long service as a teacher of our rising ministry, entitle his counsels to the respectful consideration of all who are entering upon such labors, and are beginning to say, "Who is sufficient for these things?" At this period of life they need these counsels, that they may begin aright, and be guided by the wisdom of their predecessors—a wisdom often dearly bought in the stern schools of experience.

These hints, suggestions, and discussions of the author, are reinforced throughout by happy quotations from others, or by historic facts and personal anecdotes, adding thus to the weight of his own testimony. The book may well be read by others than ministers of the gospel; by all, indeed, who are interested in the public worship of God, by those church members and officers to whom it would be well to know the duties and responsibilities of the Christian pastor, and infer the corresponding duties of those to whom they minister. For among a people who have never reflected on these things, the pastor is sometimes not allowed the position he ought to occupy, and his well-intended efforts to promote the spirituality of his church are often inconsiderately thwarted. And usages and customs insensibly arise in Christian congregations, even in the conduct of worship, adverse to those high interests which it is ever the object of the true pastor to promote. The book *abounds* in useful hints to our young ministers, to whose attention it is especially commended.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXV.—NO. 2.

APRIL, MDCCLXXIV.

ARTICLE I.

THE INTERNATIONALS.

*“The Catechism of the International.” Editorial—New York
Journal of Commerce, Dec. 11, 1873.*

No apology is needed for presenting this topic to the consideration of the Christian people of this land. The principles upon which Communism are builded, are very imperfectly understood; and the prominence given to the general subject by recent events, is due rather to a combination of circumstances that brought the Society itself into view, than to any change in or aggravation of those principles.

In all countries where Communism has obtained a foothold, the proceedings of the society have been secretly conducted. It is not possible to give any authentic or trustworthy account of the birth and growth of the theories of those misguided men, except so far as their public deliverances have revealed their true animus. The general statements they have promulgated are based upon worn-out proverbs, like that which declares that “the world owes every man a living,” whereas no truth is clearer than that the world does not owe any man anything. Another favorite maxim asserts that “property is robbery,” whereas none but robbers would dream of assailing the rights of property. Another proclaims the doctrine that labor, by some natural law, must be confined to so many hours of the twenty-four, and not only denounces the capitalist who requires more, but also the laborer who gives

more. And the text of this law gravely asserts that eight hours make a legal day, without reference to the rising or setting of the luminary that God made to divide the day from the night.

The antagonism between Capital and Labor, however it may arise, or however indefensible it may be upon logical grounds, lies at the foundation of Agrarianism. Take any postulate among those enumerated, and examine it. For example, the laborer who denounces work for wages beyond the prescribed limit, will work eight more hours for his own comfort or pleasure. He does not devote sixteen hours to rest and recreation. It is more than man requires; and if compulsory, so long a cessation from active employment would be intolerable to any man in ordinary health. But if the man who pays for work gets the benefit of the work, then the labor which was easy for eight hours, becomes unendurable on the ninth. It is a curious fact, that none of these combinations have ever made provision for a prolongation of the work for *pro rata* wages. On the contrary, one of their most stringent laws requires that double pay shall be given for what they term "extra" hours.

Those combinations of laborers, called "trades unions," are one form, and perhaps the least hurtful form, of manifested antagonism to capital. It is fair to allow skilled workmen to combine and fix a rate of wages. If the power of the combination terminated here, there would be no complaint made by capital, even when strikes were inaugurated, and the consequent breach of contract involved loss and annoyance to masters. But this is not the limit. The union forbids other workmen to labor when the combination decides to rest. And as clearly shown by English legislation, this form of oppression is illegal, because it is of the nature of conspiracy—two or more men conspiring to damage a third man, who may be a non-communist, and who may desire to work. To go a step farther, it may be said that strikes are always wrong, because they result in compulsory idleness, thus *wasting* the productive power of *both* labor and capital.

The subject is environed with great difficulties, and some of the profoundest thinkers of the age have discussed it without reaching a conclusion. John Stuart Mill attempted to meet and over-

come the difficulty by algebraical analyses. This could never be successful, because the conditions on either side of his equations were variable. The trouble is something more than the law of supply and demand. It would be tyrannical to command working men to abstain from all forms of combination for mutual protection. It is quite as tyrannical in the workingmen to forbid one of their own class to labor upon any terms that may please himself.

A little reflection will reveal the steps by which "part ownership" is claimed by the laborer; and this is an important point, because the maxim that "property is robbery," grows out of it. A locomotive engine is to be constructed at a cost of ten thousand dollars. The master furnishes so many pounds of iron, steel, and the like; so much fuel, so many tools, buildings wherein the workmen may labor under shelter, and all the appliances that may be bought with his money. All of these cost less than half the contract price, and the remainder is made up of skilled labor. The completed machine is made up, say of four thousand dollars cost in material, and six thousand dollars cost of wages. Therefore, the Internationalists say, the larger part of the ownership is vested in the worker. Here these philosophers rest their case. But the ready answer is, that six millions of dollars worth of toil and skill would produce no engine, if capital did not furnish the material. Then, responds the Internationalist, let us take possession of the capital. The man who owns it is one, and we are many. It cannot be right that one man should thus render useless the labor of hundreds.

It is usually supposed that those combinations of workingmen known as coöperative associations, are one form of enmity to capital. But this is a mistake. The most that such unions as the Rochedale Pioneers, and those that followed in their footsteps, essay to do, is to dispense with middlemen. The margins that are frittered away in commissions, are saved by bringing the producer into direct contact with the consumer; and this is the prominent object of coöperative unions, working two ways: first, as touching their own supplies, which they endeavor to obtain from first hands; and second, as touching their handiwork,

which they sell directly to the consumer, as far as possible. This is, after all, a real union of capital and labor; a partnership, not a rivalry.

While the legal and moral right to form combinations like trades unions cannot be denied, without doing violence to the foundation axioms of all free governments, the notorious *acts* of these combinations are undoubtedly both illegal and immoral. And while the right to "strike," in so far as no breach of contract is involved, must be conceded, the right to prevent the labor of non-members does not exist. Yet the potency of strikes depends entirely upon the power of the strikers to prevent the employment of substitutes. And the common, nay, almost universal effect of these efforts, is to drive industrious and willing workers, who are under no obligations to the union, from the field of competition; sometimes by brute force, but ordinarily by the dread of brutal and murderous assaults. The members of these unions are bound by a fatal force to obedience to the society. Their authorities have power to excommunicate unruly members; but these are compelled to fly for their lives. Obedience or death. There is no alternative.

If this heavy charge should seem too sweeping, the objector is invited to read the account of any formidable "strike" in any part of this country. There has never been one of any importance, where this murderous spirit has not been kept in check only by military interference, if substitution has been attempted. No form of tyranny is more odious, no system of government is more infernal, than the *efficient* working of trades unions. And they have culminated in the formation of the band of atheists, thieves, and murderers, known as the Internationals.

It is amazing that these wretched outlaws should be allowed to live in civilised communities; because they do not scruple to proclaim their incendiary designs, and to defend their principles by formal argument. If it were a mere question of morals, it would be just for the law to exterminate or banish the teachers of doctrines so pernicious as those they proclaim. But it is a question that affects the very existence of society; and, in its ultimate an-

alysis, the cardinal doctrine of the Internationalists is, "Destruction to the Decalogue."

To make this proposition plain, the following quotation from the editorial columns of the *New York Journal of Commerce* is commended to the reader's attention. It is given entire; first, to show the bold insolence of the Revolutionists; secondly, to show the calm moderation of the editorial criticism; and thirdly, to account for any seeming harshness in the tone of the present article. The quotation is the leading editorial of the *Journal of Commerce*, New York, December 11, 1873:

THE CATECHISM OF THE INTERNATIONAL.—For the past week or so there has been largely circulated through the metropolis a handbill bearing marks of the International Society, both in the names that are appended to it, and in the doctrines that are more or less directly displayed in its staring type. This document is at once a call for a mass meeting and a schedule of questions which that mass meeting is to answer in "thunder tones." As the questions are important, and as it is not unreasonable to infer that the questioner in answering himself would not be altogether clear of that confusion of thought and recklessness of assertion which here and there manifest themselves in the interrogatories, it has seemed good to us also, far as we are from pretending to thunder tones, to offer some modest hints toward the true answers.

Before proceeding to the questions themselves, we may be permitted a remark on a proposition which is introduced as "our motto," and which precedes them—"No more wars until we have paid for the last one." We would rather say, No more wars at all, so far as the choice rests with us. But that, until the national debt is paid off, any power that can get possession of a man-of-war shall be at perfect liberty, anywhere on the broad ocean, to pounce upon a ship bearing the safe-conduct of the United States, and to annul that safe-conduct at its own pleasure, appropriating the vessel to its own use, and summarily putting to death those who are found on board, ignoring the right which some, as American citizens, have by treaty to a deliberate and public trial with the help of counsel—this, we should hope, is what very few Americans are prepared to tolerate. War is not, as the author of this "motto" seems to fancy, a holiday recreation, to be indulged in by those who can afford it; it is, as Sir Thomas More said of the headsman's axe, a "sharp medicine;" it is never to be employed save when the case is otherwise desperate; and then it should be applied without that hesitation which might baffle its efficacy.

Now for the questions. The first is—"What has caused this sudden stoppage of all the industries of our nation?" In the first place, there has not been a *stoppage* of *all* the industries of our nation, nor anything

approaching it. Recall the condition of Memphis, or the more complete desolation of Shreveport, in the height of the yellow fever; imagine that to be the condition of the whole United States, and you have a nearly adequate idea of the plight of a nation when all of its industries are stopped. The truth is—and it is bad enough—there has been a very serious *diminution* of some of our industries, and to a considerable extent that diminution continues. The cause is a reduced demand for the products of industry consequent largely on the inability of railroad projectors to obtain capital to continue the execution of their schemes. Hence a greatly abated demand for railroad material and furniture, and a greatly reduced ability to purchase other things; men who but yesterday were lavish, now coming to the discovery that they are not so rich as they thought they were, and their creditors simultaneously finding it out too, and refusing the extensions of old loans and the according of new ones, which a little while previously would have been freely granted; so that our great operators have a shorter supply of cash at the very moment when there is an increased demand upon them for it. At such a crisis, not only railroad supplies, but a great many other things, have to be sold at reduced prices, or cannot be sold at all. Manufacturers experience something of the same difficulty in getting credit, and are thus straitened in their means of keeping their workshops in operation; and much of what they might have done has been thwarted by the impracticability of workmen, who insist on conducting both sides of the negotiation for wages, and seem to think that, while nearly all the products of manufacture must be sold for much less than heretofore, the manufacturer can continue to pay just as much for the production.

2. "Is there any less real wealth in the country now than when the monte-tables of Wall street turned against those who were so recklessly gambling in the people's highways—our common railroads?" This question trails at its heels an assertion, the relevance of which is not so obvious as its erroneousness. The people at large have certain rights in the railways; so far as they have conferred special privileges on the owners, they have a right to require that those privileges shall not be perverted from the objects for which they were granted. So far as public money has been expended in the construction of the railroads, the public has the rights of a stockholder. But the notion that the man who has invested his money in a railroad has no more right in it than his neighbor who never risked a penny in it, is nonsense pushed into the domain of morals, and taking the form of gross injustice. As for the question itself, the answer to it is involved in the answer to the first. There is little (if any) less real wealth now than there was; but there is much less than was imagined. What we counted as real, turns out, much of it, to be fictitious. Railroad bonds that were thought sure to yield \$70 or \$80 a year for every \$1000 of the investment, prove to yield nothing now, and are

almost certain to yield nothing for years to come, the uncertainty being whether they ever will pay at the rate that was hoped.

3. "What can be done for the one hundred thousand idle men and women of our city, and the tens of thousands all through the land, stricken down by the causeless panic?" The panic is not altogether causeless, as we have seen. The best thing that can be done for the idle men and women, be their number greater or less, is what they can do for themselves: accept work when it offers, and be content with such wages as employers can afford to pay. If work does not offer, then let the unemployed, individually or through their trade organisations, seek out responsible men who have capital to carry on industrial operations, whether it be here or in distant parts of the country, and offer them labor on terms which will afford the employer reasonable prospect of a profit. We are confident that this method, faithfully carried out, will reduce the number of the unemployed to a very small proportion of the industrial population. Those whom the faithful use of this method will not provide with employment, and who have in better times laid up nothing for a rainy day, must apply for help to the Commissioners of Charities, or to some voluntary charitable organisation, or to some individual who knows the meritoriousness of the applicant.

4. "Is it the duty of any man or woman who has led the life of a good and industrious citizen and toiler to starve and freeze amid all the plenty and wealth of this great city, and is the government that permits and compels it, the government to live under?" Whatever might, under other circumstances, be the duty of the man and woman here described, it certainly is not their duty to starve and freeze when (as in the present case) their more fortunate fellow-citizens do not desire they should, and will not consent to it. If any one has starved or frozen to death in this community, it has been because he neglected to make his necessities known.

5. "Is it employment and pay that the working people should demand, or the grudgingly-given and debasing bread of charity?" The bread of charity is not grudgingly given to those who have done their best to be independent of it, nor when received by such persons is it debasing. But a false pretense of earning one's bread by work which nobody but the doer wants done, the bold demand that others shall not only give you food, but give you also tools and materials to waste for the sake of displaying a sham independence, is debasing in the extreme.

6. "Is the centralising of enormous wealth, earned by the masses, into the coffers of the few, the system that should obtain in a republic, while the common people are steadily going down to want and helpless dependence?" The concentration of wealth in the hands of individuals, the more of them the better, is a good thing in a republic, or any other political community. That the "common people" should steadily go down

to want and helpless dependence is a very bad thing, or rather would be if it were the case. If the rich grow richer, there is no need at all that the poor should grow poorer; the prosperity of the rich need not impoverish them, nor will their poverty promote the prosperity of the rich. Great fortunes, as a general rule, are the product of industry, economy, and sagacity; and those same virtues—there is no rule with fewer exceptions—wherever and by whomsoever applied, may be relied on in their degree to produce like results. The man who grows rich usually does so by creating wealth, or saving it from waste, not by chousing others out of wealth already created. “Earned by the masses” we interpret as an insinuation that all the merit of wealth is due to the physical labor which is employed in the production of it. We hold, on the contrary, that the excellence and merit of the workman himself is chiefly in the mental qualities of intelligence and diligence which he exercises. If mere physical energy were the subject of merit, no man could pretend to equality with an ox or a steam-engine. But if wealth is earned by the intellectual and moral qualities that direct the physical force, then the earnings of the man whose beneficent wisdom directs the efforts of multitudes of other men away from that which is fruitless, and upon that which is profitable, are fully equal to any share of the product that he ever receives.

7. “Is the present system of taxation just and equitable, and would not the system be radically improved by taxing largely the surplus and hoarded wealth of the individual, and thus lift the burdens from the shoulders of those who now bear them, *i. e.*, the common people?” The present system of taxation aims in the main at what is just and equitable, *i. e.*, that every man shall, according to his ability, contribute to the expense of government. It does not in all respects perfectly accomplish that aim, and it would be difficult to devise a system that would. Some of our acutest intellects have been long at work on the question, and have not yet produced any scheme in which we are able to put entire faith; but improvements can doubtless be made. It would, however, be a movement away from what is just and equitable to tax “largely” (if that means, as we suspect, disproportionately,) either “surplus and hoarded wealth,” or anything else that is taxable. So far as the burden of taxation now rests on the poorer classes, it is not by direct imposition, but by an inevitable law of distribution consequent on the relation which every member of the community bears to every other, and which makes it impossible for one to be affected without the others in some degree sharing in the result.

8. “Should there not be some proper limit placed upon the avarice of man in the acquirement of speculative wealth, so that after he had reached that limit he would begin to use his increase to help and bless his less fortunate fellow-beings?” We confess our inability to say what would be a proper limit, and we have no confidence in the inspiration of the

propounder of the question more than in our own. It is to be wished that every man should have all the property he is capable of managing wisely. Whatever any man has more than that, he is very likely to lose before long without the need of any restrictive law. What he does manage wisely must of necessity "help and bless his less fortunate fellow beings." If a limit were fixed by law upon accumulation, no one, having reached that limit, would "begin to use his increase," etc., etc.; he would not trouble himself to have any increase. To discourage the accumulation of wealth, is to discourage men of business capacity from efforts to direct the energies of other men and the material resources within their reach to profitable employment. The faculty of wise direction is the rarest and most precious of all a nation's riches, and legislation that should aim at repressing it would not "help and bless," but be a hindrance and a curse, and make "less fortunate fellow beings" more unfortunate still.

The cardinal principle of the Communists is, that "property is robbery," as is very fairly set forth in the last question of the foregoing catechism. And it is not at all strange that such a theory should find favor among those who own no property. According to the Communist doctrine, any form of accretion is destructive of the inalienable rights of man. A citizen of New York, forty years ago, left by will a parcel of land to minor grandchildren, to be sold and distributed when the youngest attained his majority. At the date of the testator's death, the property was worth a few thousand dollars; at the date of distribution, it was worth many millions. Now the doctrine of the Internationalist positively forbids the increase of value, by the growth of cities, and in its last results reduces civilised communities to a savage state; or it breaks up the family relation, by breaking up the law of inheritance. Not one among the many public utterances of these ignorant and wicked men will bear the test of logic or morals. Not one among the many Agrarian theories they hold, fails to cut across some relation established by God when he created the race. And the present discussion, as appropriate to these pages, will of course be confined to these bad theories in their purely ethical aspects.

The law of God, summarily contained in the Ten Commandments, divides human duty into two parts. First: It regulates the duties that man owes to God; the creature to the Creator;

the redeemed to the Redeemer; the child to the Father. In this beautiful and symmetrical code, the two tables are made to accord with and respond one to the other, as might be easily shown, if pertinent to the present argument. But the second table, which relates to the obligations growing out of the brotherhood of the race, is that which lies athwart all the schemes of Communism. In this table there are six specifications; and the present purpose is to show that Communism, which is Internationalism, which is Atheism in its last analysis, precisely transgresses each of these six commandments.

1. The last and lowest of the prohibitions of the Decalogue forbids covetousness. It is the unlawful desire for that which belongs to another. None but God could make a law so far-reaching, touching the very thought and intent. None but God could deal thus authoritatively with mere emotion. Because it is conceivable that the covetous man might live and die in the constant indulgence of this sin, yet never pass into the overt act with which law deals. But God, who made the nature, knew that the poisonous root was in the heart, out of which proceed evil thoughts and evil acts. And he also knew that all the outward violations of human rights were hidden in the secret thought and purpose.

Now here is the corner-stone of the Commune. God says, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods." The Communist answers: "There is a higher law, which makes all goods common, and therefore my neighbor has no goods." Or, "If my neighbor holds possession of lands or moneys, while I am landless and moneyless, it is he who transgresses this natural law, which overrides the Decalogue. The ownership of anything beyond the daily need of the holder, is robbery. I do not covet another's goods. I only desire possession of that which belongs to me, by a right that inheres in me, by virtue of my manhood." Stripped of verbiage, this is the precise announcement of the Internationalist.

The folly of such statements is clearly set forth in the comments of the New York journal already quoted. Nothing can be plainer than that the prevalence of such theories would be de-

structive of enterprise, thrift, industry, and of all that distinguishes civilised from savage life. But it is a graver charge against the Commune, that it accurately contradicts the law which God wrote upon the nature of man, and announced upon Sinai. If God had not intended man to accumulate and retain possession of worldly goods, he would never have created the universal instinct which leads men to gather and to keep. And the International coveter does not quarrel with the goods. He does not object to the possession of goods. He only objects to the possession of the lawful owner in the property which he desires for himself.

It is proper to notice just here, that the substitution of "higher laws" for those enacted by God, leads logically to the same evil conclusions in all cases. Thus, the higher law that was proclaimed from forum and pulpit before one half of this country was devastated, bore its largest crop of fruit precisely in this field of covetousness. The private property of the non-combatants, the money, plate, and apparel of those who were powerless to resist, were taken; the communion-service from helpless churches coveted and confiscated by the pious patriots who lived under this higher law. And after all else was done, these new law-makers instructed the enfranchised negroes to take possession of all that their hands could reach. Who has not seen, many times, the doctrine in print, that all the opulence of Southern citizens was coined out of the very blood of the oppressed slaves, and was therefore by right the property of these slaves, transformed into freedmen? Does any sane man believe that the universal expectation of the negroes, of "a mule and forty acres," was a spontaneous growth of the African mind? And does any thinker fail to see some glimpse of retribution in the open threat of the Communist to-day? In both instances, certain rights conferred by God are assailed.

2. The next specification of the divine law forbids lying, and the most notorious example of this sin may be found in that branch of Agrarian philosophers known as trades-unions. The questions propounded in the catechism already quoted, contain, each of them, flagrant falsehoods by implication, and the answers

given are, in the main, contradictions of these implications. The arguments supposed to lie in these questions are all based upon an untrue assumption of facts. As a general rule, it may be noted that the deliverances of the Internationals are so absurd in their falsity, that no one takes the trouble to contradict them. But that form of lying known as a breach of contract, is the form in which the trades-unions excel. The efficiency of strikes depended upon the obligations resting upon the contractor or master to furnish certain goods in a specified time; and this obligation was and is always incurred in dependence upon the fidelity of the workmen. The agreement, in the nature of the case, must extend to the completion of the contract, and the threatened loss and damage to the contractor for non-fulfilment, is the strong weapon of the striker. It is utterly vain, in this country, to appeal to the original terms. All terms are set aside by the authority of the officers of these incendiary unions. In England, there has been some recent legislation, intended to make such violations of contract on the part of the workingman, an offence in law, and to fix the penal sanctions by which the law may be enforced. America has not yet reached the point where legislators dare to be just at the risk of offending possible voters.

3. Theft is the next specification. Here the Internationalist makes his most apparent assault upon society and law. His avowed doctrine is a denial of ownership. And while he takes possession of all that his hands may find, he does not, in turn, relinquish such gains to his brother-robber. The success of his theories would reduce humanity to the savage state. It would abolish labor which God has mercifully ordained, and substitute the dominion of brute force. It forbids man to enjoy peaceably the fruits of his work, and compels him to obtain his food like the beasts of the forest, fighting over the carcass of their prey. So flagrant is the violation of this command, that the Communist is as much worse than the highwayman or burglar, as these are worse than the pickpocket. By arrogant violence he essays to abolish the law that conserves the rights of property. And with infinite pains he argues to show that the inalienable rights of man forbid ownership; and thus abolishing property, he abolishes theft.

So he boldly denies the existence of God, and so abolishes all forms of impiety. No God—therefore no authoritative law. No law—and therefore no possible transgression. This prince of robbers not only steals the goods of all other men, but robs God as well.

4. The command which God announced to conserve the marriage state is set at naught by the philosophers of the Commune. So far as their theories, especially in France, have been avowed, they are far more brutal than those of the Oneida community. The most appalling manifestations of depravity, truculence, and beastliness in Paris, during the reign of the Commune, were those exhibited by the abandoned women of the city. And the most sickening details of the retribution that followed the entrance of the Versailles army, were the executions of these terrible female demoniacs by scores. Perhaps the majority of those who read these lines—living in God's great mercy far away from the scenes that filled the civilised world with horror—can hardly realise the hideous facts in the case. The daily press was laden with details which put to shame all the enormities of the ancient heathen. And although the orators of the Commune in this country have not yet openly expressed their contempt for the family relation, it is certain that they did it in the old world, and that they will do it in the new whenever they dare.

5. It is hardly necessary to show that the Communist is a murderer by occupation. The record they left in the world's capital, will abide while time endures. The slaughter of the Archbishop, of which so much was written at the time, was only one of numberless murders of which they were guilty. But the animus is the same in the Communist of Paris, the Internationalist of Belgium and Germany, and the Trades-Unionist of England and America. Among the miners at a recent strike, murders by the "Molly Maguire's men" put a stop to all attempts to employ laborers outside of the fraternity. In England similar murders have been frequent under similar circumstances; and it is hardly possible for a non-unionist laborer to live in any of the large manufacturing centres. And if such an one should engage in any work, he does it at the peril of his life. This is not strange,

because the efficiency of the Union depends upon the terrorism that overshadows both its own members and its opponents. It is nothing if not murderous. If its members did nothing but argue with its opposers, or engage in litigations before established tribunals, or denounce them in public prints or at public meetings, any one can see that all of these would avail nothing against the necessities of a man seeking employment to sustain himself and his family. He would scout all these with derision. But he cannot afford to deride "Molly Maguire," because when she threatens she murders.

6. Thus brought to the culmination of wickedness in its development under the second table of the law, look for a brief space at its Communist manifestation as related to the first command of this table. The reader will have noticed the gradation of offences, as arranged by the Lawgiver himself; and in this specification of the royal law, all Christian standards recognise the true authority for human domination and human subordination. The authority of the parent is the shadow of the authority of God, as the fatherhood of the parent is the shadow of the fatherhood of God. And as God has set this law first in the code which he has revealed for human guidance, it is probable that he regards the obligation it enforces as the highest obligation resting upon the race.

Accordingly, Communism, under all its bad synonyms—Internationalism, Agrarianism, and the like—builds all its false postulates precisely here. It derides *all* authority. It scoffs at all thought of subordination. The "equality of men" is the sweeping charge wherewith it abolishes all distinctions in society, ordained of God—all ethical restraints, all honor to rulers, all obedience to law. If the truculence of the brutalised members of this vile association did not fill the mind with dismay, the bald insolence of its principles would fill the civilised world with unspeakable scorn and contempt. Unlettered, untutored, unpolished democracy, has here its true development; because, in practical experience, the cases are very rare in which the silent force of virtue and cultivation fails to overawe the inferior, and check the more presumptuous leveller, when he enters the social circle of

those whom God has made to differ from him. But your Internationalist breaks down such feeble barriers by sheer brute force. He tramples upon what he terms adventitious distinctions, as the swine trample pearls under their feet. He scouts the most sacred of human reserved rights, and like the dog in the same parable, turns again and rends the man who claims superior grace.

The apathy with which God-fearing men and women regard this monstrous outgrowth of modern thought, is probably the most appalling sign of the times. But it is not possible for any thinker who will acquaint himself with the progress of events in the old world and the new, to look upon this latest manifestation of the devil's power and malignity, without grave apprehension.

In order to show that the violation of the second table of the law is necessarily joined to the breach of the first, attention is now solicited to the deliverances of the representatives of Free Thought, who proclaim themselves Internationalists and Communists in their public speeches. The quotation appended is from the *New York Herald* of the 31st January, 1874, and is the report of a mass meeting of the Free Thinkers at the Cooper Institute :

Long before eight o'clock last night, the time appointed for the opening of the Freethinkers' meeting at the Cooper Institute, the approaches to the great hall were blocked by a motley crowd of Germans. Loud above the din of foreign tongues could be heard the words "Polizei" and "Constitution," uttered with terrible emphasis. In fact, before the doors were opened, a meeting had been held outside the hall, at which the Police Commissioners were condemned in unmeasured terms. As eight o'clock drew nigh, the crowd, which was beginning to feel the effect of being left out in the cold, became very boisterous, and loud calls were made for admission. The usual force of police was at the several entrances, but that platoon of grim-visaged constabulary that Superintendent Matsell was to command in person was not to be seen. The absence and scarcity of policemen were a noticeable feature of the meeting, and the uninformed pedestrian passing by would have thought that only an ordinary lecture was expected. When the doors were thrown open the rush was terrible to endure and exciting to behold. The crowds went pell-mell down the stone steps, and several frail individuals were seriously hurt, but not enough to prevent them from leaving for home as soon as the great influx ceased. By ten minutes past eight all the seats in the house were occupied and the aisles in the hall were filled. In the corridors outside the

hall there were stationed, at convenient distances for mutual protection, many of the detective force from Police headquarters. These gentlemen declared it as their opinion from the first, that the meeting would be a very quiet affair. As to the preservation of the public peace, the sequel proved the excellence of their judgment; but never was a more boisterous or demonstrative audience gathered in the Cooper Union. From the time Mr. Lilienthal stepped forward on the platform until Mr. Gerau finished his speech, the hall resounded to the applause of the audience.

The audience was composed for the most part of apparently intellectual Germans, with a sprinkling of ladies, and fanatics, noticeable from the rest of the assembly by their *decollete* collars, loud neckties, and flowing locks. This last named species were loud and conspicuous in their applause when anything ultra-radical was advanced by a speaker. Two of these long-haired gentlemen, who were in the middle aisle, near the door, continually interrupted the speakers by crying "Louder!" and they made themselves otherwise conspicuous by requesting Mr. Gerau "*Ein tumble zu nehmen!*" The great body of the audience went to the meeting evidently to get advice, judging from the manner in which they showed their appreciation of everything that pointed towards common sense.

The stage was not decorated in any way, nothing but the plain lectern, with its single gas jet, intervening to interrupt the vista through to the back. Around the entrances on either side of the platform were seated most of the members of the Committee of Safety of the Internationals. A great many ladies were on the platform, but few were visible from the auditorium, owing to their having kept well in the rear behind their male cicerones.

Dr. F. W. Lilienthal called the meeting to order. He said the union of free thinkers were ready to guard and protect the rights of citizens in this crisis. They held a meeting three days after the riot, and concluded to protest against the flagrant violation of the right of free assemblage. They had issued a protest, but the printer was afraid to be cited to Police headquarters, and the proprietor of the place of meeting, which had first been decided upon, refused to admit them to the hall because he was afraid that the police would not like it. When they tried to obtain Cooper Institute, the managers of the hall had first to consult with the Police Commissioners, who were gracious enough, however, to consent to the holding of the meeting. Elements had been introduced, however, which tended to disturb them, and he hoped they would preserve the dignity of the assembly. ("Bravo.")

Dr. E. W. Hoerber spoke in German. He said the only safeguards which they wanted were those likely to protect them against the clubs of the police. If they could not obtain this protection from the police, they would know how to secure it otherwise. They had met this evening to take some measures against the brutality of the New York police. The

German element was sure to respond to this call of duty. A venal press had slandered them in every possible manner, although German free thinkers had a greater sense of honor and right than the Chief of Police or the editor of a certain paper. ("Bravo! Bravo!") They had called them Communists, but who could be more common than Chief Matsell, or any of the editors of that paper? ("Bravo!") There was only one right, which was on their side, and one tyranny and brutality, which was on the side of the New York police. ("Bravo!") Why was it that this quiet, cosey society, which generally occupied itself with philosophical questions alone, took such a leading part in this matter? Because the misery and degradation of the workingmen of New York had appealed to all their hearts. They thought that if the Irish had the right to infest the streets once a year in honor of some queer saint named Patrick, they might also be allowed to parade for a purpose of their own. If Mark Flanigan had the right to carry a green flag, Schwab certainly had the right to carry a red flag. They did not interfere with anybody's belief, and why should any one interfere with their belief, even though it be a disbelief? ("Bravo!") The meeting in Tompkins square was first not forbidden by the Park Commissioners, until they revoked, late at night, the permission which they had already given. The Police Commissioners had goaded them on to this act of meanness. And why did they not take possession of the park? No, they set the workingmen a trap, in order to revel in a butchery and a clubbing of citizens which must have brought a blush to the face of every citizen. The police was created for purposes of order, yet in Tompkins square the police had created disorder. Woe to the venal press which could applaud such actions of the police. The present crisis was one of vast importance. The station-houses were filled every night with hungry, starving workingmen. Ah! and the banker cried "Communism!" "Rabble!" The only rabble he knew of was that of the Fifth avenue! The Republic was on the brink of a terrible volcano. It was the duty of society to save its members from death by starvation. This condition could not continue any longer. They had heard proposals of erecting public working places, public universities, and the counter-cry was "Communism!" What they wanted was an investigation and examination of the present social laws and privileges, and they wanted to do this without being attacked by the press and clubbed by the police. In Belgium, in Switzerland, and in many European countries, the poor had many more privileges and rights than they possessed in this vaunted land of freedom. With Mirabeau they must say to the police, "We are here in the name of the people and to defend their rights;" and if they were still not allowed to assemble peaceably, they would go out into the streets and fight for their rights. (Tremendous applause.)

Mr. John Swinton, who addressed the meeting in English, said the con-
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duct of the police was an outrage on law, decency, humanity, and the laborer's misery, and if the people did not maintain their rights, their liberty would at last be totally subverted. If the police could interfere with the freedom of speech in any one direction whatever, they could at once abolish all freedom of speech. The oppression of any man was the oppression of every man. Twenty years ago the word abolitionist sounded as terrible as the word Communist did now. It was not necessary now to recount the old story, but he saw the wretched masses in Tompkins square, towards whom only Yahoos and not men could have acted as the police did. The prisoners were taken before a police justice, who accused them of Communism, and seemed to consider the accusation enough to warrant a conviction. The free people were supposed to rule in this country, and it was a farce and a fraud to pretend that a disturbance had been anticipated by the police when they prevented the workingmen from assembling in Tompkins square. The power and advice of moneyed corporations had inspired these outrages. The freedom of speech and meeting must be maintained at all hazards. He was here to say that the principles of freedom could not be clubbed out of men's heads. Mr. Mattsell supposed that the Communists wanted to drink human blood. (Laughter.) There were elections this year for Congress, and he proposed to ask gentlemen like Messrs. Morton, Blaine, and Conkling, if they intended to enact laws legalising the acts of the municipal rioters of New York city. The proper servants of the public must be requested, and required, for the matter of that, to disband this vile body of police, and dismiss their infamous Chief of Police. ("Bravo!") All these men who oppressed the laborers, from the President to the Assistant Aldermen, were merely a set of cowards. (Terrific applause.)

Mrs. Lilienthal, a tall, stout lady, who spoke in a very faint voice, addressed the meeting in German. She said gentlemen who had addressed them before her had told them in more graphic words than she was capable of, of the uncalled for and felonious outrage perpetrated upon workingmen in Tompkins square on the 23d of January. They told them that they lived in a republic. Was it an actuality or a mere name? She thought it was the latter; for they told them of a long list of rights they were to have, but she did not see them. Their rights were like the music of a musician playing on a violin without strings in a castle in the air. The constitution afforded them the right of free speech; but the police robbed them of the right guaranteed by the constitution. The violations often perpetrated by the police could scarcely have occurred in a monarchical country. Would the police have disturbed Messrs. Astor, Stewart, Vanderbilt, etc., in a meeting of theirs? Oh no; they would have taken great care to secure them a peaceable and quiet gathering. And who were the men who were clubbed in Tompkins square? They were the real citizens, the real workers, the real taxpayers. And why were

they there? In order to demand work, and because they wanted bread for their wives and children. Poor people who were ill were sent to the hospital, and if the community relieved one man it must also relieve the other. The workingmen had a right to expect that the city would relieve their unprecedented sufferings. The workingmen built palaces, and had to live in hovels; they wove the rarest stuffs, and had to clothe themselves in rags. These were told to leave the Park, and beaten and clubbed if they were not quick enough about it. The police knew that they who were armed and organised could easily have the upper hand, and they used their superior power mercilessly. The speaker had found honest men behind iron bars and in cells, compared to which the menageries in Central Park were palaces of pomp and splendor. ("Bravo!") It was the police that violated all order, and not the workingmen, and the police ought to be prosecuted. If men of New York were what they pretended to be, they would not rest until they had brought the Police Commissioners into the State prison. ("Bravo! bravo!") But men would always elect the men foisted upon them by Tammany Hall. Was this already a country where the brutal police club was the supreme symbol of power? The greatest power in a republic was the vote of the people; but instead of using their votes for the maintenance of their most sacred rights, they had demeaned themselves by making unholy bargains with their enemies. She (the speaker) was a woman, and as a woman she would say that if the gentler sex would enter the political arena, all brutality and coarseness would vanish at once. (Loud applause.)

The following resolutions were then read and adopted, amid the loudest applause:

We, citizens of New York, in mass meeting assembled, declare:

Whereas, on January 13, 1874, quiet citizens intended to assemble on Tompkins square; whereas, they were fully entitled to hold this meeting, according to the rights guaranteed by the constitution both of the United States and of the State of New York; whereas, this meeting was frustrated by the illegal action of the New York police; whereas, finally, this unlawful dissolution was executed in the most brutal manner, regardless of the life and liberty of our fellow-citizens; therefore, be it

Resolved, That we hereby solemnly protest against the violation of our fundamental rights by the authorities of our city;

That we denounce in the most unequivocal manner the Park Commissioners for their unwarranted and cowardly compliance with the arbitrary demands of the Police Commissioners;

That we express our indignation at this wholly unjustifiable and brutal proceeding of the police against those intending to hold the said meeting;

That we deeply and sincerely deplore the unscrupulousness of those of our newspapers who, instead of being true guardians of the liberties of the people, have reported the revolting events aforementioned, and the

violation of one of the most important fundamental rights, without a word of indignation, or warning even ;

That we mutually pledge ourselves to oppose, in the most decided manner, any future violation of our rights ;

That copies of these resolutions be transmitted to the Governor, the Mayor, the Common Council, the Police Commissioners, the Park Commissioners, and the press.

Mr. Wm. Grindlach then delivered the following address : Ladies and gentlemen, the speakers who have preceded me have told you at length of the unmitigated outrage perpetrated in Tompkins square on the 13th of this month. We are here to protest against this outrage which some—I am sorry to say, too many—regard with an apathy which, in the face of the facts, is incomprehensible to me. We are here to work up those people who smoke good cigars, drink good beer, and club laboring men for attempting to ask for what belongs to them. These gentlemen of polite indolence would like to reduce the pay of the laboring classes so as to accordingly increase the quality of their smoke and drink. In fact, the times when a man could go home after working eight hours, and feel conscious of his wages, have gone among the things that were. Notwithstanding that the good time seems to have gone, a workingman is a workingman, and will ever remain such. He works to improve his condition, and in so doing only follows the example of those men who say he commits treason in so doing. If we cannot say what we think, we are an abortion on manhood, and a living lie on freedom. The grand objection to us is that we are Communists and Internationalists ! Is not the priest-craft which cries out against us an International as well as we ? (Cries of " Yes ! " and " That's so ! ") You answer yes ; then why not suppress it ; it is older and stronger than we.

Mr. Alexander Jones said : Ah ! if words were only deeds ! ah ! if meetings could only effect revolutions, the state of the future would no longer be a state of the future. They listened to the speeches, they adopted resolutions, and then went home with the pleasing conviction that they had once more saved the country. (Laughter.) Providence had been kind to them in giving them the blessings of the police. The police were not satisfied with having trodden upon a defenceless assemblage of workingmen, but they must use their power to prevent even a future peaceable meeting. Now the question was, where was this tyranny to end ? It was this question which had led thousands to this hall to-night, as he hoped, with the firm resolution not only to crush this arbitrary power, but to root out this entire system of deceit and fraud and villainy. How many noble lives had been immolated on the altar of the Republic, and now they saw outrages here for which they could only find precedents in Russia and Turkey. He thought it was ludicrous to confine this discussion merely to that particular violation of the right of free

meeting. He would like to know what rights were not being violated constantly by every official in the land, from the President down to the most brutal and ignorant policeman? It was all one system of corruption and hypocrisy and falsehood. What must the country have come to, if 3,000 or 4,000 men could not assemble peaceably, without being dispersed by the clubs of the police! Well, history had taught them a great lesson. To-day, when they had still strength enough to fight for their rights, they could easily accomplish what they would find impossible to do after having been reduced by years of starvation and misery. There was only one remedy, and that was organisation from house to house, from ward to ward, from city to city, and from State to State. Everywhere the spark of freedom would light a flame, and they would soon be able to cope with the arbitrary power of the police, who then would have to flee before the champions of right and justice. ("Bravo!") Oh, but there were people who would say, "This is winter, and in a few months coal will be much cheaper. Let us wait." He would warn them against this delay. Let them write one word on their banner, "Organisation!" and then they would surely conquer.

Mr. Julius Kaufman, a turner, said that this attack upon Tompkins square would, perhaps, be the first means of liberating the people from the present *regime* of tyranny, bigotry, and oppression. The Republic did not rest upon the foundation of clubs and police, but upon the self-esteem of citizens, and by occurrences such as those in Tompkins square, they must all lose their respect for free institutions. Could any citizen preserve his self-esteem, when he knew that he was liable to be clubbed by a policeman if he dared to go to a peaceable gathering? What was the next consequence? The citizen also learned to fear the police as a power to which he must bow, whether they be in the right or wrong. Well, as soon as this condition of things prevailed, the "citizen" ceased to exist, and the "subject" began to take his place. Could they have respect for laws which compelled workingmen to hear the vapid nonsense of ministers on Sunday, instead of enjoying themselves with the great works of poetry and music? He spoke to those who knew how much to drink; and could they have respect for temperance laws, devised to keep sots out of the gutter, who could not be kept out of it by any other means? ("Bravo!") The laws were enforced and relaxed according to the likings of politicians, and how could such laws be respected? They were now fast approaching a time when but few remnants of the glorious old structure of freedom would exist. Frederick the Great had declared that money, money, and money, was necessary to carry on a war, and money, money, and money, was necessary now to obtain political power. So long as they supported a platform because it was republican or democratic, and not because it is right or wrong, they could not possibly boast of possessing a free government, in the true sense of the word. But,

perhaps, the time might come when men would be elected to offices, who would really be their servants and represent their interests, and then the foreigners would no longer be regarded as citizens of the second class. Then they, as foreigners, would have something to do with the government, but now they stood aloof from it. Might they not despair? The name of Freedom, as William Tell said, was founded on God. (Terrific applause.)

Dr. Alexander Gerau, a tall, nervous gentleman, whose head was completely hidden behind clouds of hair, and who spoke principally with his hands and legs, said it was time to remind the people what they owed to themselves. Freemen never bore the bit of freedom, but spit it away. Such a bit was offered to them, and they must spurn it. The slaves of an arbitrary power were not represented at this meeting. They who liked their slaves were disgraceful villains. Such men belonged properly to the despotisms of Asia, and not the Republic of America. The speaker descanted at length against the bigotry and hypocrisy of "the nation." They who came here to this American world without these pretensions of virtue and piety, could of course not prevail against this brutal power of the police. Should they prostitute themselves before a spectral phantom of freedom, before a thieves' ideal of liberty? (Flinging about wildly his hands and arms.) There was a sense of honor in-born in Germans, which prevented them from bowing to this thieves' ideal. Ah, but, alas! the German's purse-strings were not less tight than those of a Yankee. He thought his friends were suffering under the idleness which had been called "greenbacks." These police souls were well known by them, and they understood the rotten system of laziness, corruption, and licentiousness, which they protected in this priest-ridden country. Liberty was dead in this El Dorado of the people; and instead of free meetings, they had the police stations and the Tombs.

A Voice—I move that we adjourn.

Dr. Gerau—*Wie?* (Taking a drop of water.) The club *regime* had taken the place of the government by the people. Would they tolerate this any longer?

And in the same rhapsodical strain the speaker, who assumed the most tragical attitudes, went on for an hour.

After laughing at the comical sallies of this speaker, the meeting separated with three cheers for the Freethinkers' Union.

But little remains to be said. As already shown, the vicious association under review has, in logical sequence, abolished each requirement and prohibition of the second table of the Decalogue. In the foregoing quotation they logically, and in due order, deface the first in the same summary manner. They abolish the Sabbath—the lowest of the four commands—and contend with

fierce insolence against any infringement of the "liberty" to desecrate God's holy day. They profane the sacred name in their assaults upon all that God has revealed, by which his name is made known—all forms of worship; and anon will punish with death any who dare to seek his face in prayer. They establish a form of idolatry more hideous than that of the old heathen, who still pursued in their deification of lusts, some semblance of taste and culture. And they abolish God from the universe. They have said in their heart, "No God;" and they mean what they say.

It is not the time for smooth speeches or careful selection of soft phrases, when honest men oppose this portentous evil. That the most outspoken and insolent of Communist orators are not Americans, is of God's great mercy; and the sober sense of American workingmen will perhaps be able to retard the flood of villainy with which the country is menaced. The South has been groaning under a corrupt despotism for weary years. It has been a sore trial, and men's stout hearts have failed in view of abounding desolations. But there is even a lower depth. The prevalence of the horrible theories of Communism would be worse, as the Vandalism that burnt Columbia was a slight offence in the sight of heaven compared with the Thuggism that attempted the destruction of Paris under the Commune. The clear duty of every man who can speak or write, is to resist this incoming and poisonous flood—this "argument with hell," which only God can disannul—and to beset the great throne with appeals against this flagrant assault upon Jesus Christ and his gospel.

ARTICLE II.

IS THE LOT AN ORDINANCE OF GOD?

The writer of this article, when a boy, was engaged in a quiet game of backgammon with a brother at home, when a venerable minister of the gospel, for whom he had had the highest respect, and whose opinions he generally received almost as an oracle, entered the room.

The minister expressed his surprise that he should be found playing a game of chance. He confessed that he could see no harm in it merely because it was a game of chance, and for the first time was told that every cast of the die was a direct appeal to the God of providence to decide the matter for him. The venerable man of God said that the *lot is an ordinance of God's appointment, and that every careless and irreverent use of it is a great sin*. He held that every decision obtained by casting the die, drawing straws, or throwing up chips after the manner of children in their games, involved an appeal to God, and could not be considered otherwise than profane, confirming his statements by repeating the well known Scripture: "The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord." Prov. xvi. 33.

The youthful mind could not accept this teaching, because conscious that there was no appeal made, and that consequently there could be no sin, unless it be in the act itself, or in violation of some command given in the Bible. As to the game of backgammon, he felt that it might be a game of evil tendency, and might well be avoided for other reasons; yet he could not see that there was any sin in the mere act of casting the die. Deference to the views of such a man and others deservedly held in high esteem for piety and learning, held the mind open to conviction on this subject, until it could be satisfied on a close and critical examination.

The present article presents some of the reasons for the conclusion reached; and the only apology for writing on this subject, after the interesting article which recently appeared in these pages, on "The Moral and Religious Aspects of Lotteries and

other Modes of Gambling," is to examine a little more into the doctrine held by many, (though not by the author of the article alluded to,) that the main sin of the lottery lies in the abuse of the lot. It is of the first importance in condemning any sinful practice, that we condemn that feature in which the sin really lies, lest when error is made on this point, one who sees the error may be thus led to other sins left unnoticed by one who has pointed out the supposed sin.

The fact that thousands everywhere in Christian lands, well versed in Bible knowledge, do daily use some method of determining indifferent and doubtful questions by lot, without the least twinge of conscience, or the first thought of sin therein, until approached by some one tainted with this theological dogma, affords a strong presumption against the doctrine; and this presumption is of such a nature that direct Bible proof must be given to show that the careless use of the lot is sin, before we can admit it.

Far be it from us to teach the idea of a higher law in conscience, now so prevalent in some quarters, by which to try the Sacred Scriptures; yet we contend that the innate ideas of right and wrong are deeply implanted in the human mind; and we are so constituted that we do not sin in obeying these, so long as they do not run contrary to the teachings of Scripture. The fact above mentioned, therefore, furnishes a presumption which nothing but Scripture evidence to the contrary can destroy.

The great coryphæus of the idea we oppose is Dr. John M. Mason, a learned, pious, and zealous minister of New York city, for some time Professor of Theology and Provost of Columbia College. His sermons and other writings are rightly held in great esteem. Among the latter are his "Considerations on Lots," in five numbers, whence most of those who consider all use of the lot as sinful, draw their arguments. These we will therefore examine. We have great respect for Dr. Mason and his opinions, yet we believe that on this subject his own language, together with his great desire to check the growing abuse of the lot as used in lotteries and gaming, led him in his zeal to lay down in the first two numbers of his article, positions which are

too much strained, and which cannot be sustained from the oracles of God. We think that any position of this kind, which goes beyond the teachings of the word of God, is apt to react upon the mind, and do more harm than good. We fully appreciate the motive and intent of the venerable writer, yet object to the mode of argument used in the first two numbers of the article alluded to.

In the last three numbers he develops the true arguments against all abuse of the lot, which are enough to carry conviction to the mind of any intelligent Christian. The argument of the first two could never satisfy an unbeliever, and only leave the mind of the Christian in a state of doubt as to whether he should believe the teachings of his own conscience, or the seemingly good conclusions of the venerable Doctor in reference to the casting of lots in matters of indifference. Such a mode of argument furnishes scoffers a ground of reproach, which they are not loth to use, from the disregard which many of the best men among us show to this so-called ordinance of God.

Believing that the true mode of arguing against every sin is the Bible mode, and that we should not go further than the Bible authorises, we shall attempt to show wherein Dr. Mason has, by a false use of words, and an illegitimate interpretation of Sacred Scripture, deceived himself as well as many of his readers, as to the sinfulness of all uses of the lot. Thereafter we shall only briefly recapitulate the true arguments in accordance with the manner of the three last numbers of Dr. Mason, because the true sources of the sin have been recently very clearly pointed out in this *Review*, in the contribution already alluded to.

In the commencement of Dr. Mason's article, he defines a lot to be "*an action intended to decide a point without the aid of human skill or power.*"

This is his *πρῶτον ψεῦδος*. This definition begs the question. If he is attempting to define the lot in its broadest sense, as used in matters of indifference, his definition is not adequate, and therefore we cannot accept it. If he is meaning to define it as an ordinance of God, under the Mosaic dispensation, it is correct and suitable. There is a fallacy involved in the word *intended*, coupled with the word *human*, so that when completed, his defini-

tion would read thus: "The lot is an act intended to decide a point without the aid of human skill or power, but intended to decide it by the aid of divine skill or power." We contend that this definition begs the question, in assuming that the indifferent use of the lot always includes an *appeal* to some power. Hamilton says: "A definition should be adequate; that is, the subject defined, and the predicate defining, should be equivalent or of the same extension." In this case, the subject—lot—refers either to the specific use of the lot as used by God's appointment, or to the use of the lot in its widest sense in matters of indifference. If the former is meant, then the definition is correct, for it does involve an appeal to God; but if the latter, then it does not touch the question, because the implication that it is intended to decide a point by the aid of divine skill or power involved in the predicate, is of greater extent than the subject, and hence the definition is false. It certainly assumes an appeal, either intentional or unintentional on the part of the agent; and every reader who examines carefully, will see that it is upon this fallacy that Dr. Mason founds his whole argument. We deny that there is any appeal whatever in the use of the lot in matters of indifference, and this point must be *proved* before it can be inserted into our definition of a lot, either expressly or impliedly.

Dr. Mason very conclusively shows that there is no appeal to man, or to any other creature superior to man, or to nothing, or to chance, and very acutely argues that this latter has neither life, nor intelligence, nor power, as if it were supposed that there were any such personage as chance, and then triumphantly concludes that there is no escape—it must be a direct appeal to the living God—without having first established whether there is any appeal at all. He is confused and deceived by his definition.

Let us take his own definition and remodel it, making the subject cover the matter under consideration, and then giving the predicate the same extent, and we shall have a true definition. "The lot is an action which decides a point without the aid of skill or power;" or if one should stickle for the intention: "The lot is an action intended to decide a point without the aid of skill or power either human or divine." This we know is the inten-

tion in the indifferent use of the lot. And if it be intended to cover both uses of the word, "The lot is an action intended to decide a point without the aid of human skill or power, and either with or without the aid of divine skill or power."

Having laid down this definition, let us proceed. If there is sin in every use of the lot, this sin must either be, 1. In the physical act; 2. In the intention of the agent; 3. It must arise from the direct appointment of God; or, 4. From the very nature of the lot. If, then, we can show against Dr. Mason, that there is necessarily no sin either in the thing itself, or in the mind of the person casting the die thoughtlessly, then there can be no sin involved in the act, unless it consist in the violation of an ordinance of God's appointment, is contrary to what is taught us in the word of God, or on the supposition that the lot is in its very nature sinful when used in matters of indifference.

It is clear to every one, that there is no sin in the physical act of casting the lot; for in shuffling and throwing the die, or in the mere throwing up of a chip, no moral action is required. A monkey or a dog may perform the same act, and it does not even involve rationality. It is in the intention that sin in such action is found.

In the second place, we contend that in the ordinary uses of the lot, where there is no conscious appeal to God, there is no sin. It is merely an agreement to abide by the issue of an unknown event. Far be it from us to depreciate in anywise the universal and particular providence of God in all things, even the minutest. We agree entirely with Dr. Mason on this point; yet whilst he proclaims this view, he unconsciously runs beyond this platform when he speaks, near the end of his first number, "of the *interposition* of God's providence in the decision of the lot," as if he understood that there is a special providence over the lot, *more than* over all other events of his government. If he only means that the same kind of providence is exercised over the casting of the die as over every other event, as the falling of a sparrow, we agree with him exactly. And from such a point of view there can be no more sin in abiding by the issue of the die than of any other event of providence, as the decision of an umpire, or in saying "I will do thus and so to-morrow," or in plant-

ing corn when we know that it will be of no avail without the hand of Providence guiding the rain and light and heat for its growth and sustenance, since all these things, as well as man's heart, are no less under the entire control of God's providence than the lot; for "man proposes, but God disposes," and "the king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, and he turneth it whithersoever he will." If there is sin, then, in the careless use of the lot, it is not in the conscious intention, for there is no appeal made to God. There can be no appeal without a consciousness of such appeal by the agent. If there be sin in the intention, it consists either in a lack of intention to appeal, which will be disproved below, when we show that the lot is not now a divine ordinance, and its use not pronounced a sin in the Bible; or it consists in a wrong intention which prompts the use of the lot.

We freely admit that there may be and often is sin in the intention in casting the lot, as when in gaming it is cast for purposes of gain, which violates the Eighth and Tenth Commandments, or where it is used in a solemn appeal to false gods, as used among the heathen, because then the Third Commandment is broken by rendering divine worship to another, which is due to God alone.

If there is sin, then, it must arise from some other source; either from the abuse of God's ordinance, from something contrary to the teaching of God's word, or from the supposition that the lot is, in its very nature, an appeal to God, and hence its use in matters of indifference is sinful. As to the first of these points, Dr. Mason says that an indifferent use of the lot is "a profane appeal to the divine throne, and the wanton prostitution of a divine ordinance." In the use of the lot under the Mosaic dispensation, we freely grant the appropriateness of all that Dr. Mason says; for it was then a divine ordinance, instituted by God for particular purposes. But we contend that this was peculiar to the Jewish Church, and that no such use of the lot is authorised at present. In every case mentioned in the Bible, where decisions were given by lot among the Jews, it is either expressly said that the lot was given by the high priest, or by the high priest together with the highest civil officer, or else this is im-

plied by the gathering together of the people for this purpose. No case is given of any *private* lot cast for *private* purposes by the children of Israel in the Old Testament. The use of the lot as an ordinance of God under the ceremonial dispensation, was of a special character. By it, during the administration of a theocratic government, God's will was made known through the proper officers. It belongs to the same class with the trial of the suspected woman by bitter water; and being of the same nature, and a part of the same appointed ceremony, should be considered now of equal force. The latter has long since disappeared from among Christians, and so should the former.

In the middle ages, trial by fire and other barbarities similar to the trial by bitter water, sprang up; yet all these have been discarded as a better knowledge of Bible doctrine has increased. This theory of the lot as a divine ordinance deserves the same fate. Let us see what this idea will lead to. The lot is either a divine ordinance, or it is not. If it is not, then Dr. Mason has no reason to argue from it as such. If it is, then it is binding upon the Christian Church to use it, or at least it is legitimate to do so. Then it follows, that the Church should settle all troublesome disputes and differences of doctrine which they are otherwise unable to adjust, by solemn appeal to God in the lot. Thus they should determine the true calling of men to the important office of bishop of souls, and should regulate the appointment of officers, and other matters of vital interest to the Church. This doctrine leads to these absurdities. Before a perfect expression of the revealed will of God was given in his word, he did, according to ways of his own appointment, indicate his will to his people of old by the use of the lot.

The New Testament is the perfecting stone in the building of Revelation, given to the Church for its guidance. "The WORD of God which is contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is the ONLY rule given to direct us how we may glorify and enjoy him." We are told to expect no new revelations until the consummation of the kingdom which Christ set up in the earth. In the establishment of that kingdom, neither Christ nor any of his inspired apostles has given his Church any reason

to believe that he will decide questions for them by the use of the lot. In the New Testament we have no instruction about this ordinance, or any intimation that it was continued from the Jewish dispensation. The case of the apostles is an anomalous one, and of such a nature that none like it could occur again. They were men inspired of God. They lived in an age when the Church was undergoing a state of transformation from that of the Jewish ceremonials to the gospel dispensation. The latter was not yet fully established. Christ himself had chosen twelve disciples, representative of the twelve tribes of Israel. One of these had proved an apostate, and it was necessary (Acts i.) for them to appoint another, as Peter tells them, that the Scripture might be fulfilled, "His bishopric let another take." It was necessary, from the very office and function of an apostle, that he should be one who had himself been a personal witness of the truths of the gospel history. Two were found having these qualifications. It was also necessary to the office of an apostle, that he should be chosen and appointed directly by God. See the necessity of this requirement in the miraculous manner in which Paul was appointed at a later time by Christ in person. They knew this fact. Christ had just ascended into heaven. To him they desired to appeal to fill up the apostolic college. The only familiar appeal for divine decision was the lot used in the Jewish Church, and still legitimate in this overlapping state of the Church, before the Christian Church was yet fully organised, just as afterwards Paul winked at circumcision, and Christ said at his baptism, "Suffer it to be so now," though he needed no baptism of John. This was the uniting act of the two dispensations. In John, the Jewish prophet, it was the Jewish ceremonial form of purification, necessary in the fulfilment of the type when Christ was thus set apart to the office of High Priest. But in Christ it was the baptism which openly signified the fact of the establishment of his kingdom on the earth. The same act thus fulfilled a double purpose of binding together the two dispensations as the one Church of God. But in addition to the peculiar time at which this occurred, when Jewish observances had not totally ceased to be observed, the apostles were inspired men, to whom there were many spe-

cial powers and privileges given, as in the gift of healing, tongues, etc., from which we can argue nothing as to their appointment under the gospel dispensation, since there is no particle of ground given for such belief anywhere else in the New Testament. In the case of Jonah, it is true, we find God answering the lot, (which was cast by heathen men,) but not as a *religious ordinance*; for the lot was cast by heathen men, who cried "every man unto his own god." Jon. i. 5, 7. It is true, that in this case God overruled the lot for his own purposes, just as he made Baalam's ass to speak; or just as in the ordinary dispensations of God's providence, he fulfilled all the minute points of prophecy foretold of Christ's person, both life, death, and history. Dr. Mason thinks he makes a strong point from the use of the lot to decide things already foretold by God as certain in the cases of the division of the land of Canaan, and the appointment of Saul as king. But this only proves God's special providence in the lot, as in all other events by which he fulfilled the various predictions given in his word, as of Christ mentioned above.

We readily admit God's providence in the lot as in other events, but deny that there is anything in the word of God which anywhere intimates that the careless use of the lot is now any more sinful than other careless acts. We are told of the casting of Purim or lots before Haman. It is predicted in Joel, Obadiah, and Nahum, of their enemies' casting lots, *i. e.*, dividing by lots their young men, maidens, and honorable men who should be taken prisoners; and in Psalms we are told they should cast lots for Christ's garments; but there is no intimation in any such place that there is any sin in the mere fact of casting lots.

The only two passages of Scripture much handled by Dr. Mason to establish his doctrine, are Prov. xvi. 33, and Prov. xviii. 18. Of these in their order.

Dr. Mason, as well as all those who hold his view, lays much stress on these passages, for in fact they are the only ones which even seemingly give direct countenance to such an opinion; and we shall show that they are of no use in this question. We desire first to call particular attention to these two well known and universally recognised canons of interpretation: 1. That it is

not sufficient to found a doctrine upon the teachings of a parable or proverb, unless the same is fully confirmed by other parts of Scripture; and 2. It is not safe to found a doctrinal interpretation on one or two passages, especially if they can be legitimately interpreted in accordance with the teachings of the rest of Scripture. Both of these passages are from the book of Proverbs, and many of the best interpreters understand them differently. Such circumstances carry with them at least the presumption that this is a false interpretation. Let us examine these two passages, remembering these canons.

Dr. Mason compares Prov. xviii. 18, "The lot causeth contentions to cease, and parteth between the mighty," with Heb. vi. 16, "An oath for confirmation is an end of all strife," and concludes from this that they are similar in their use, and therefore similar in their *nature*, which last we deny. He says, "The one appeals to God for the sincerity of our declaration, the other for the direction of our choice." This may be true, if in this passage the word lot is restricted to its religious use; for in the times of Solomon the ceremonial law was still in force, and we may believe that the mighty of the nation still appealed to God through it to decide matters of importance, and accepted this decision. If the reference is to this use of the lot, it does not touch the question before us, which is its use in matters of indifference. But the Septuagint version, which our Saviour commended in his day, does not favor the interpretation of Dr. Mason, for the word there translated "lot," is "*σιγηρός*," "silence," or the silent lot, and not "*κλήρος*," which is usually translated lot. The former is not the word usually found when the religious ordinance is meant, and may mean any casting of the lot, even in matters of indifference. According to this interpretation, this passage directly favors the idea that the mode of decision by the silent lot, not as a religious action, *i. e.*, its indifferent use, is not improper, but a true means of settling difficulties. But not to press this interpretation, the passage cannot possibly be twisted so as to place the lot on a par with the oath, as Dr. Mason desires. The parallelism is only in the result and not in the *nature* of the oath and the lot. To prove this, we have only to appeal

to Scripture testimony. In many passages the oath is spoken of as an appeal to the Searcher of hearts to witness the truth of what we affirm. God himself confirms his promise with an oath, and we see that his servants swear by his name reverently, sincerely, and faithfully. We are cautioned against swearing *idolatrously* in the name of false gods, or by inanimate things, in Josh. xxiii. 7, James v. 12; against swearing *deceitfully*, in Jer. xlii. 5 and 20; against swearing *falsely*, in Lev. vi. 3, and xix. 12; as well as against swearing *rashly*, in Lev. v. 4, Matt. xiv. 7. But on the other hand there is *no* passage in the Bible which forbids the use of the lot, or declares it sinful, when used either in matters of indifference or of sport. In all these points his comparison fails. Yet he says that they are alike, in that they are to be used in matters of importance, "for all appeals to God are improper when made upon trifles." Here again he assumes the point at issue. His argument applies only to the religious use of the lot, and fails in matters of indifference, because it turns upon his unfounded assumption that there is an appeal to God in matters of indifference.

The very nature of proverbs is such that we cannot restrict the use of terms employed in them. We must give to each its widest meaning, and in doing so there is nothing which condemns the indifferent use of the lot. Such an interpretation as that given above is perfectly legitimate, and is consistent with the passage, with Scripture teaching, and with fact. No *doctrine* can be based upon such a passage until it is proven that the interpretation of Dr. Mason is the *only* one possible in the context. This surely cannot be done.

The only other passage which seems to favor this idea is Prov. xvi. 33: "The lot is cast into the lap, and the whole disposing thereof is of the Lord." This is the crowning stone of Dr. Mason's whole argument, as he himself acknowledges. He says of it, "This will be decisive with him who in simplicity and reverence inquires after the truth. But as there are captious spirits who seek to hide themselves in the mist of objections," he would pursue a little farther "the denial of such a providence as embraces the drawing of a ticket, or the cast of a die." This we do not

deny, but *only* that there is a *special* providence over the lot more than over other things. He is confirmed in his error by too strict a literal interpretation of this verse from the English version of Prov. xvi. 33. This verse is not intended, as we believe, to teach the fact of God's providence in the special case of the lot, specifically so called, but the great fact of God's superintending providence in all the dispensations of his government. This is a much higher view of the passage, and one not only supported by the original passage, but strongly confirmed by the rendering of the Septuagint: "Εἰς κόλπους ἐπέρχεται πάντα τοῖς ἀδίκους, παρὰ δὲ κυρίου πάντα τὰ δίκαια." "All things return into the bosoms of the wicked, but with God all things are just." A careful criticism of the original Hebrew will give the same idea, viz.: "The portion is caused to be cast into the bosom, and all the judgment of it is from the Lord." The Hebrew word, קִרְקַל translated "lap," is so translated nowhere else in the Old Testament. It is used about thirty-three times, but never in the sense of the English word "lap." It means, primarily, "the bosom," as a place of affection and endearment, in such passages as "the wife of thy bosom," and taking a child "into one's bosom;" and secondarily, it means "the bosom," in a tropical sense, for the inner man. In this sense, it is used in such passages as these: "For anger resteth in the *bosom* of fools;" "render sevenfold into their bosom;" "though my reins be consumed in mine bosom;" and is found eight or ten times. It never has the meaning "lap." The nearest approach to this is found in 1 Kings xxii. 35, where, speaking of the death of Ahab, smitten by an arrow, the writer says: "The blood ran into the *bosom* of the chariot," or "into the *midst* of the chariot," as the English version reads, where the idea is still that of the *central part* of the chariot. This criticism is confirmed by the fact, that where the context requires the English word "lap," another word is used, as in Neh. v. 13: "I shook my lap and said, So God shake out every one from his house;" and 2 Kings iv. 39: "Found a wild vine, and gathered thereof a lapful." In each case a different Hebrew word is used from the one translated lap in the passage before us. Again, Calvin says that the word GORAL here translated lot, "has, in the

Old Testament, two distinct and well-established meanings: 1. The lot as a special ordinance of God, under the Jewish dispensation; and 2. That *portion* which is given by lot;” and hence, since God in his providence assigns the portion of every one, it means the lot or portion which every one has in this life. This gives a much wider and higher interpretation to the passage than that which confines it to the casting of the lot. The idea is: “Every portion is assigned into men’s bosoms, and God’s judgment in it all is just.” In order to establish a doctrine from this proverb of God’s special providence in the special act of casting the die, its advocates must, according to the canon of interpretation, show that the passage cannot be so-interpreted, and that their interpretation is the only correct one. This they cannot do, either from the usage of the word or the analogy of the Scripture. Hence all doctrine founded upon it, as Dr. Mason confessedly avows his theory of the lot to be, must fall to the ground.

There remains, then, but one other subterfuge, of which Dr. M. shrewdly avails himself. It is, that the lot is, in its very *nature*, an appeal to God, not made so by special injunction of God, but taken for this purpose because such an appeal is *essential* to the lot. He says that God “only appointed the use of a *known* method of bringing a matter before the divine tribunal in preference to other modes which might have been selected.” He here again assumes the question, viz., that it was a *known* method of bringing a matter before a divine tribunal. Can any one show that the lot was a *known* method of appeal to God before it was appointed such by God, as recorded in the sixteenth chapter of Leviticus? Has Dr. M. shown it to be so? It is true, he may find a seemingly good argument from the use of the lot among heathen nations as a mode of appeal to their gods. To this we reply that it is very probable that this custom is derived from this revelation, received by tradition, and perpetuated by the heathen. But were the fact admitted as claimed, it does not prove that the lot is in itself an appeal to God, but rather that the mind sees the lot to be of *such* a nature as to make it suitable to be used as a mode of appeal to God. There is some truth in this position of Dr. M., and just enough to lead astray if not

carefully guarded. He says that "it was not the special injunction of God which converted the lot into an appeal to him," because "the injunction *presupposes* such an appeal as being essential to the lot." This we cannot admit. We admit that the injunction does presuppose a certain *appropriateness* in the lot to be used as an appeal to God—just as the appointment of water in baptism is suitable to represent the cleansing power of the Holy Ghost; and bread and wine in the Lord's Supper are suitable to represent the blood and body of Christ, feeding upon which by faith the believer is as truly nourished and strengthened as the natural body by partaking of bread and wine. But this appointment is not because these things are essential to the nature of water, bread, and wine, nor is the careless use of them in indifferent matters sinful. They are appointed because *appropriate* for the ends intended. Just so with the lot. The truth seems to lie here: The lot is of such a nature as to constitute it a proper mode of appeal to God under proper circumstances, and hence, when appointed by God, becomes his ordinance. But it does not at all prove that the lot is in its very nature essentially an appeal to God, and hence heinously sinful unless used always with special prayer and preparation. This appointment affects only cases which come under it, and does not apply at all when used indifferently or thoughtlessly.

In the concluding portion of his first number, Dr. Mason says: "The sum is, that against the *interpositions* of God's providence in the decision by lot, there can be advanced no argument which does not lead directly to Atheism." This he argues from the general and special providence of God, assuming that those who object to his view of the lot, deny these. We only deny a *special interposition* in the lot not found also in any other fact in providence. Let us see whether it is clear, on the other hand, that his own view does not lead much more directly to Atheism. When he lays down the principle that every cast of the die is a direct appeal to God, *because he is the God of providence*, he seems to forget that the same principle would deprive man of all responsibility as a free agent. He holds that every use of the lot in matters of indifference, is a profane appeal to God, be-

cause intended to decide a point beyond the aid of human skill or power. Is it not clear that many other things are just as much beyond the reach of human guidance as the lot; and since, in his providence, God "rules in the hearts of men," all appeals to umpires are just as much an appeal to God as the lot? In one he acts through physical, and in the other through moral and spiritual forces. Again, on the same principle, would it not be sinful for us to promise to do anything in the future, for our ability to fulfil it depends upon God's sustaining us in health and strength, and such a promise would be profane, unless made with prayer and solemnity? In like manner, how could we plant our corn without sin, unless accompanied all the time with singing and prayer, since the dropping of each grain is in the same sense as the indifferent lot an appeal to God for his providential guidance of the birds, the storm, the rain, the sunshine, and a thousand other things? Just in the same manner God rules in the decisions of the lot. When it is cast into the air, the result is the direct effect of the forces operating upon it; and if we knew exactly this force, the angle at which it is thrown into the air, the resistance it meets, and all the attendant circumstances, we could calculate with precision the result. Now, when God appointed the lot to be used for the determination of certain questions, the forces set in motion by the hand of the person casting it, in connection with the resistance to be overcome in order to bring about a particular result, were entirely under his control, and he used them to accomplish his end. So, too, when cast before other gods, and not used as a religious ordinance, as in the case of Jonah, he could and did overrule the lot for his own ends, just as he caused his own predetermined will to be fulfilled by the Jews who crucified our Lord. Then, since God rules supremely in providence, there can be no reason for placing the lot on any higher ground than other things, unless this ground be gotten from the word of God. It is either on higher ground or it is not. It is not on higher ground, as we have seen from an examination of the word of God. This is practically acknowledged by those who hold the opinions of Dr. M., *for they do not use it to determine matters of importance.* We bring this as a good ad

hominem argument against them. If there is any Bible ground for this doctrine, they act inconsistently in not employing the lot as a valuable auxiliary to the Church in deciding many doubtful and important matters. Their own inconsistency should drive them to the light. But on the other hand, if the lot is not on higher ground than facts in providence, does not this theory rather drive to Pantheism? Their position is that any indifferent reference to matters beyond our control is sinful, because a direct appeal to God. Hence man cannot be responsible for anything, for in every act he appeals to the God of providence to decide for him. Man is then but a spark of the deity, and God the only responsible agent in the universe. Consistency in this mode of reasoning makes God the author of sin, and reduces everything to bare Pantheism. Such a *reductio ad absurdum* forces us to give up such a theory, and believe, in accordance with the natural convictions of every one, that the use of the lot to decide doubtful or indifferent questions, is not a sin *per se*, but merely a mutual determination on the part of those using it, to abide by a result to them unknown, and which they are not able to govern.

In the third number of his article, Dr. M. very well shows the sinfulness of that "signal abuse of the lot which employs it as a means of determining the spiritual state and character of individuals." All such superstitious notions are naturally fostered by his doctrine. The true mode of destroying them is by teaching the true doctrine, that God is no more concerned in the lot than in any other of the modes of manifestation in providence. It is true that fortune-telling, and divining from various sources, either from an improper use of revelation or providence, will always interest those slightly superstitious; yet Christians should be careful not to encourage such things, nor be wise above what is revealed. But if the sinfulness of lotteries does not consist in the very act of casting the die, it is of the first importance to decide what part of the action is sinful and what not, because, according to the constitution of man's mind, when the sin of an action is placed where his conscience, enlightened by the word of God, cannot see it, he is too apt to overlook the sin altogether. Just as the consciences of many Christians revolt when told that

dancing is *in itself* sinful, whilst they will readily assent when shown that it is sinful to Christians, because of its dangerous tendency, the results which follow, the estimation placed upon it by the world, its effect upon personal piety, upon the Church, and upon the Christian character of those around us. What, then, are the sins connected with the use of the lot in its grosser forms in lotteries and in games of chance? Dr. M. says that the essence of their sin lies in the "*abuse and profanation of the lot, which is an institution of God for special religious and moral purposes;*" and again: "*They are profane appeals to the divine throne, and a wanton prostitution of a divine ordinance.*" From what has been said in this article, this assertion is at least of doubtful authority. In the first place, it must be shown that this is a "divine institution" and "ordinance." That it *was* such, may be safely granted; but it is evident, from the appointment and use of the lot, that it belonged especially to the Jewish dispensation. It was revealed under that dispensation, and *never* used after its close, so far as we know. It is not enjoined in the Decalogue, and no precept concerning it is given in the New Testament. The example there given of choosing Matthias, was a special case, which could never again arise. It was *before the close* of the Jewish dispensation, just after the ascension of our Lord, and before the formal opening of the Christian dispensation on the day of Pentecost. The disciples, at the time it was done, did not clearly understand the nature of the gospel dispensation, for the promised Comforter had not yet been poured out upon them, showing them all things revealed of the Father. They were acting according to all the lights before them, yet in that mode which was already well known to them. Their example is never commended to us for imitation; and if an ordinance of God, surely it would have been used by the apostles in times of doubt, trial, and suffering. Their example should of itself be a sufficient guide for us, and we see no valid reason why we should call the lot an ordinance of God at the present time.

Again, if, as Dr. M. contends, the essence of the sin of gaming consists in the false use of the lot, then we would ask in what does the essence of the sin of horse-racing and cock-fighting con-

sist? They are just as much recognised modes of gambling as any others, though not so *convenient* for their purposes at all times. They are even worse, for to the other sinful motives, there is superadded cruelty to animals. In neither of these is the lot used; yet their tendency, as universally acknowledged, is no less evil than that of cards or lotteries.

And once more. It is a poor rule which does not work both ways. If it be admitted that the indifferent use of the lot is *per se* a sin, it follows that the practice of it *must have an evil influence* on those habituated to its use. This is true in certain games of chance; but is it universally so? How many of the most virtuous youths of the land are there, who have regularly used the lot in some mode or other to decide their choice in their pastimes, without one pang of conscience or one evil effect? How many girls are there who have drawn straws to decide many little questions between themselves and their companions, and yet have never grown worse by the habit? Add to this the fact, that many church-members of undoubted piety constantly resort to the die to decide *indifferent* matters, without the evil effects which attend games of chance. The rule does not work both ways; and these facts furnish a presumption amounting to a certainty, that the peculiar sin which makes gaming so objectionable, must be sought for elsewhere than in the mere "profanation" of the lot.

We have seen that the same results follow when the lot is used and when it is not used, as in horse-racing and cock-fighting. Then the question remains, What are the special sins peculiar to games of chance and gaming? This question has been so well handled in the article already alluded to, that we shall do nothing more than indicate and enumerate them.

All games, when played for a wager, are direct violations of the 8th and 10th Commandments: "Thou shalt not steal;" "Thou shalt not covet." These are the motives which prompt a man to seek that which does not belong to him, without working honestly for it. Failures in the attempt, and losses not calculated on, drive its victim, under a present sense of remorse, to the worst acts of which he is capable—to murder, blasphemy, and even suicide. The same principles operate where no lot is used, as in

cock-fighting and horse-racing. Lying, cheating, deception, and fraud, are naturally associated with all attempts to acquire gain without an equivalent given; and the very nature of games of chance furnish greater facilities than any other for carrying out these purposes. The most adroit expert can most easily deceive his antagonist.

It is in these attendant circumstances that the sin of gaming chiefly lies. The following results and concomitants of gaming may be mentioned also as arguments against it:

1. Great loss of time.
2. Dangerous associates and associations.
3. Hence, drunkenness, excess, rioting, and every sinful way.
4. The common estimate of such things.
5. The gamester's estimate of the character of his associates.
6. Intellectual dissipation—
7. Which checks higher aspirations—
8. And sears the conscience to all that is good.
9. The uncertain results which lend a deceitful enchantment, and lure the soul on to its own ruin.
10. The breach of the 8th and 10th Commandments crowns the whole.

ARTICLE III.

COMPULSORY EDUCATION.

The idea of educating the masses is not a new one; neither have there been wanting schemes for making the idea practical. In the several states of Greece, various methods and principles for general education were adopted. Lycurgus made the most stringent laws with regard to this whole subject, and Plato sought to establish a common school system at the public charge, so that all the young might have what advantages were needful to make them "able to perform justly, wisely, and magnanimously, all the duties both of peace and war." In the ancient and wonder-

ful empire of China, the rules and regulations for the education of all the children are said to be excellent. Provision is made for a high grade of scholarship by the special interest of the government in colleges, and by the offer of places of public trust to those only who have first gained scholastic honors. Even the children of the poorest subjects, with rarely an exception, possess the knowledge of reading, writing, and arithmetic. The law requires this. During and since the wars of the First Napoleon, many of the continental powers of Europe have given a special and increasing degree of attention to this subject of general education; and to-day England is considering what has been accomplished by her Educational Act of 1870. That these several *governments* should not have concerned themselves with the education of the masses, we are not prepared to assert; for there is nothing intrinsically wrong in the effort to secure universal education, and all will admit that ignorance has a sad effect upon the material and moral prosperity of any people. But popular education, encouraged by state authority, is one thing; and the education of the masses under a system of compulsory laws, is a very different thing. Popular education may produce the happiest effects among any people; it is really essential to the success of a republican form of government; but a compulsory plan of education is not only unnecessary, but its tendency would be to enslave both the person and the opinions of the citizen. It is not agreeable to the genius of republicanism, nor is it friendly to the liberty of any people. Once well established, the system of compulsory education is all that any despot need desire in order to execute his plans and to perpetuate his dynasty. Hence we regard the whole subject of compulsory education, which to a greater or less degree is agitating the American mind also, as another one of those dangerous subjects with which practically we ought never to have anything to do. We propose to say a few words to sustain this opinion.

To compel all parents to discharge the duty of educating their children up to a certain standard, (and this is what is meant by compulsory education, in general terms,) is but another way of saying that the civil government must assume this

obligation, and see to it that all children are properly educated; for, as is well known, a large number of parents, on the one hand, are financially incapacitated from discharging such a duty to their children. They find it difficult to earn money enough to purchase the necessaries of life for their families. Bread, and not books, is the all-absorbing topic with them. They are far more inclined to seek places of work for their children, than sittings in school-houses. On the other hand, very many parents feel no interest in this subject of education, and they will take no steps to awaken any in their children. Even among the class of "well-to-do" parents, there is often found an unwillingness to allow the children any educational advantages. If the rudiments of the "three R's," as the expression is, are mastered, this is considered enough "schooling" for any child. To support and encourage them while they are seeking to acquire a substantial education, is regarded by many parents as a waste of time on their children's part, and a great waste of money on their own part. They judge of education by what they have acquired at some log-cabin school-house, and they estimate its value to the rising generation by the pecuniary profit they themselves have derived from it. Thus a want of means and a lack of appreciation of education on the part of so many parents, will compel the civil authority to take the whole subject into its own hands, provided the system of compulsory education is adopted. As parents cannot or will not fully attend to their duty, the government must step forward with its compulsory laws, if all children are to be educated. Under these circumstances, the government becomes the educator of all the youth. The state will appear *in loco parentis*. All children will be required to attend school.

But school-houses for the proper accommodation of this vast number of pupils do not spring up in every district as by the touch of the magician's wand. They must be built as other houses are built. The skill of the artisan, and the material upon which he will bring to bear his mechanical genius, are offered to the state as they are offered to any other party needing them. The government must become a builder of school-houses, equal

to all the demands of this educational system. Houses for school purposes are to be erected wherever they are needed. The poor and sparsely settled districts, no less than the richer ones, are to be well supplied in this regard. If the compulsory system be any more than a mere theory, then the state must be prepared to make it practical in every way. The obligation of the government to build the school houses is as strong as is that which its compulsory plan lays upon all the children to be educated. To require the education of the masses, and then to neglect the erection of suitable houses for the accommodation of the youth, is very much like the demand Pharaoh made upon the children of Israel. No such requirement could be made. Consequently, vast sums of money must be expended on these buildings. And yet the government is not rich as by inheritance, so that it can draw from the treasury any amount of money; nor are its coffers filled at call by some outside friend who holds gold in abundance for public use. The government is only rich as the people are rich. They must pay its expenses. Hence, if any state plans require any special amount of money, a tax must be levied upon the people to meet this demand. The tax is a full one, for no government is ever found careless enough in calculations to ask for less money than is necessary for the accomplishment of any proposed plan. Contractors' profits, rarely ever intentionally small, special commissions claimed for regular work, and all the "extras" which seem to belong as matter of course to government business, must all be considered as inseparably connected with the erection of these school houses. It will thus require from the people a larger amount of money than would actually be needed, if private parties were the builders. It will enrich the few at the expense of the many. Yet the additional tax must be paid; the people must bear heavier loads upon their shoulders, no matter how "grievous they are to be borne." The system of compulsory education demands increased taxation.

But let us take another step. The government being charged with the educational interests of the masses, must make arrangements for teachers. The calling for properly qualified teachers is essential to the success of the system. Children collected in

school-houses without teachers, would be exceedingly troublesome, to say the least. Hence the government must employ, in sufficient numbers, those who are fitted to guide and control these young minds. Proper advertisements are posted, the responses are very prompt, a perfect army of teachers is enrolled. These persons are not only under that broad ægis which the government holds over them as citizens, but they are now actually in its employ. They are salaried officers of the state. To it they owe all the comforts and conveniences of life which they are enjoying. Naturally they regard the state as in some way a benefactor. Not that their office is a sinecure, but after all, the government pays her teachers well. Hence gratitude, to say nothing of self-interest, makes these teachers unwilling to oppose, if not formally to advocate, any public schemes. In this way many more of the citizens come under the special influence and control of the state. In any emergency for the furtherance of any special plan, the authorities would have these teachers, the tax-gatherers for the system, together with all other public officers, ready to do their bidding. These all occupy so peculiar a relation to the state, that anything like an independency of opinion need not be expected. The government must think for its employees, if not for all the governed; and that it should receive their moral and moneyed support, is as clear as any political proposition. Consequently, we find the patronage of the state bestowed only upon those who are pledged to its support. These school teachers cannot be considered as exceptional. The state supports them, and they "reciprocate the kindness." Thus, by this compulsory system of education, the patronage of the government is greatly increased.

Again, after the appointment of teachers, the next step the state will take will be to prescribe the course of study for the children, and to require each student to remain a certain length of time under the care of these teachers. Parents can have no voice here; their poverty and lack of interest in the whole subject closes their lips; the government alone must speak. Surely this is no unreasonable demand! The state builds the school houses, employs the teachers, has all the trouble connected with

with so vast a scheme. Is it overmuch, then, for it to claim the right of directing the course of study for the children under its care? Any how, such reasoning will prevail, and the course will be scientific alone, or classic as well. It will be mixed up with theology, or solely secular, according to the taste of "the powers that be." It will be useless for the parent to object that, in his opinion, the things taught are dangerous to the moral and religious welfare of the young. This compulsory system cannot allow any interference upon the part of parents. They must not only send their children to school in order to be taught the prescribed course of study, no matter what that may be; but if by reason of dissatisfaction with teachers or text-books, they keep their children at home, then they will be treated as law-breakers, and punished with fines.

With such a system as this in well working order, what hinders the citizen from becoming the mere tool or slave of the state? Provision is made by it for the complete control of the persons, opinions, and services of the people. As the gardener who desires the tree to grow in a certain way, begins by bending the twig in that direction, so the government, in seeking to get control over the people, begins with this system of compulsory education to mould the minds of the young by the use of those forms of thought and modes of action which express its own views. The children are taught to walk in certain ways, to think according to rule, to act always in obedience to orders. What could hinder any administration from perpetuating itself, if this system of compulsory education were the prevailing system? Balloting for officers by the people—this mere form of free suffrage—might go on as usual, and yet the result of every election prove that the patronage of the government influenced the majority of the votes. In free America, no President, under the system we are considering, need have any fear of defeat if he desired to continue in power, though the forms of a constitutional election were all duly observed, as he could easily control as many votes as would secure his election. Is this system of compulsory education a safe one for a republic to adopt?

Does any one say this picture is overdrawn, the evil of the

system exaggerated? Then take an example. Open Grecian history and read. It is the page devoted to Sparta. Glance down the column, and you will see many points bristling like sharpened bayonets, to sustain the view that has been presented. In Sparta compulsory education prevailed. There the rights of parents and children were little respected. Every one must be governed by the will of the state. Whenever a child was born, he was taken in charge by the civil authorities. If, on a careful examination, he was adjudged of a sufficiently promising appearance to be reared, then he was allowed to remain at home, under the care of mother and nurse, until he had reached his seventh year; afterwards he passed under the authority of the public teacher. His education—physical, mental, moral—was entirely under the control of the state. The rights of parents, the tender claims of affection, and the solemn requirements of God, as he makes it the *duty of parents* to bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, were all ruthlessly set aside by the legislation of Lycurgus. Plutarch, speaking to this very point, says: "It was not left to the father to rear what children he pleased, but he was obliged to carry his child to a place called *lesche*, to be examined by the most ancient men of the tribe who were there assembled. If it was strong and well proportioned, they gave orders for its education, and assigned it one of the nine thousand shares of land; but if it was weakly and deformed, they ordered it to be thrown into a place called *Apothetæ*, which is a deep cavern near the mountain *Taygetus*, concluding that its life would be of no advantage either to itself or to the public." The state could not afford to rear weak or sickly children; they would never be adapted for state purposes; hence the peculiar rights of parents must be sacrificed, and the helpless children must meet an untimely death. Nothing must interfere with the execution of the will of the state—parental affections, the voiceless though eloquent appeals of sickly children for mercy and special tenderness, the voice of conscience, the voice of God—nothing would be heard or heeded by these authorities. The system adopted must be the system enforced. There could be in the nature of the case no merciful clause about it. It set forth

the idea, and both parents and children quickly understood it, that individual rights were not to be considered, and that all must yield to the demand of the state. And as the civil authorities made demands upon the parents and children, using them only for the public advantage, they were simply executing to the full intent those compulsory laws which had been enacted. They could stop only as they bound all hand and foot.

Revolted as all this may now appear—Spartan civilisation as it may be called—yet it all naturally belongs to this compulsory system. And to-day there are men holding high positions in the world's civil affairs, who would rejoice to have this system adopted by the people, and to find themselves charged with the enforcement of its despotic requirements.

At this point are we directed, by the friends of compulsory education, to England, as a practical illustration of this system, divested of its cruelty and despotic character. We reply, that it is hardly fair to allude to England in this connection, as the system there has failed, or at least is not working well; for from the *London Quarterly Review*, October, 1873, we learn that the school reports, as made of late to the General Education office, are not at all satisfactory, that there is a great waste of money in the erection of school-houses under this system, that the expenses *per capita* for educating the children is greater than under the voluntary plan, that the irregularity of attendance upon the part of the scholars is very noticeable. Evidently *this* is not the compulsory plan. There is not enough power in it. It favors the people too much. Let the Crown conduct the system in order to make a success of it, and there will not be wanting evidences that the system of compulsory education favors despotism. You can see this system in fuller development in Prussia. Bismarck understands its advantages to the State, and the flight of many of the subjects of Emperor William to our shores proves that the people understand equally well *its disadvantages to themselves*.

There is another view of this subject, which we shall only glance at now. If, under this system in its mildest form, the state attends to the secular education alone of the youth gathered

in the public schools, then it may be expected, as a most natural result from such a system, that the masses have been all the better qualified for doing evil. If, however, the state attends to the religious education also of the children, then the result will be nothing less than the union of Church and State. We shall have an Established Church, with its creed, ordinances, liturgy, and what not, all duly and authoritatively prescribed by the government. The first result would not be favorable to the prosperity of a country that has already put so much power into the hands of her citizens; nor would the second result agree with the spirit of the Constitution of the United States. This instrument, rightfully interpreted, is opposed to the slavery of persons or of opinions; it grants political liberty and freedom of conscience to all who acknowledge allegiance to it; it seeks the elevation of the masses, not by compulsory laws, but by those generous provisions which allow and assist every man in the exercise of his God-given rights, to lift up himself, and to stand in his elevated place, conscious of his dignity and power, and proud of his country. As citizens of a republic like ours, then, can we favor this system of compulsory education, unless we are seeking the erection of a centralised despotism upon the ruins of this government which our fathers have bequeathed to us?

ARTICLE IV.

THE EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE CONFERENCE OF
1873.

The great Protestant convocation which took place last autumn in the city of New York, has made such an impression as would seem to warrant, if not to call for, some notice and memorial of it in the pages of a periodical like this REVIEW. We Americans are accused, and not perhaps without some justice, of being a sensational people—though the imputation might lie also somewhat against our trans-Atlantic kinsmen who bring the charge against us. But making any due deduction on this score, in forming our estimate of the influences proceeding from it, the Conference was certainly, in some respects, a great success. No religious occasion ever made such an impression on the intelligent population of our great, driving, hurrying, commercial metropolis, and on the larger public of our country, if we might not say of the Protestant world. Such a paper as the *New York Herald*—not very religious in its character, and willing to conciliate Roman Catholics and infidels—remarked, in regard to it: “This Evangelical Conference will mark an epoch in the history of this country. In the far distant future it will be remembered as a distinctive landmark; and it may be that, to the open discussions of these meetings, and the free ventilation of difficult questions in the fine free air of this republic, it will be possible to attribute some of the blessings of that happier time to which the Christian Church has reason to look forward.” Such veteran and respectable journals as the *Journal of Commerce*, the *Evening Post*, and the *Commercial Advertiser*, besides the *Express*, *World*, etc., spoke of the affair in like terms of respect; and the *Tribune* occupied its columns, during the ten days of the Conference, with full reports of its doings and productions.

The most sober and conservative of our religious papers, too, throughout the country, so far as we know, united in a most favorable expression of their impressions. A like impression seems to have been produced abroad, both by the essential features of

the occasion, and by the incidentals of American hospitality, and the energy and liberality displayed in the conduct of the occasion.

The effect of it was equally visible and remarkable in the feeling which it excited on the part of opposers. The *Freeman's Journal*, and other Roman Catholic papers, though professing to regard this Protestant demonstration as one of not much potency, were much exercised, nevertheless, in regard to it; while "High Church" Protestants, and outright infidels, exhibited a sympathetic dissatisfaction. This coalescence of heterogeneous elements, drawn together by a common force, was more extraordinary than the union exhibited in the Conference which these parties, forming the un-"holy Alliance" of opposition, affected to sneer at. One morning, during the Alliance sessions, there appeared in the *Herald* a communication from some High Church Episcopalian, deprecating the doings of the occasion, and specially the procedure of the Dean of Canterbury, whose participation in the communion at Dr. Adams's church had taken place the Sunday before. The very next article in the *Herald* columns was a communication of the vilest infidel stamp, entitled "Is the Alliance a failure?" in which the writer argued as one who had well studied Voltaire and Paine, and imbibed their spirit, to show that the Alliance was a failure, because Christianity itself is such. Whether the editors designed it or not, the juxtaposition of the two articles was a good satire upon the first one. The *Herald* itself undertook, on some points, to criticise the Conference. On the morning after the day on which the body had employed itself on topics relating to the Papacy, that paper came out in an article which perhaps indicated the broad, facile indifferentism of its Christianity, gravely stating that, on the day preceding, the Protestant divines in council, had made their grand assault on the Roman Church; and proceeding to give said body of divines a lecture on the impotency of all such attacks on the moss-covered towers of the Roman hierarchy—"the oldest bulwarks," the *Herald* suggests, "of the Christian faith"—which postulate, however, all Oriental Christendom would utterly and truly deny.

The American Branch Alliance was organised in the United States soon after the establishment of the general one, and prin-

cipally through the exertions of that excellent man, Dr. R. Baird. But everybody was not so conservative as Dr. Baird. The anti-slavery agitation, which was then making all waters turbid, got into that body; and though all Northern men did not then sympathise with the abolition movement, the organisation was broken up, and so remained until after the war. In the year 1867, it was revived, and is now in active and efficient existence. Nothing appears in its constitution that can create any difficulty on the part of any of us in coöperating with it. Nor has there been anything in its proceedings to give it a sectional character. In fact, there is little temptation or occasion for it now; and there has seemed to be a disposition on the part of those most concerned in it, to extend the hand of cordial brotherhood toward their Southern brethren.

The recent Conference was the first meeting of the Alliance in the twenty-seven years of its existence that has been held in America. Its activities and usefulness, in most respects, find their field more in the "Old World" than on our continent. Besides this, certain circumstances that occurred in connection with one of the first meetings of the body—in which the Alliance itself, however, as such, never participated—in regard to slavery—alienated from it the feeling of almost the entire body of the Southern Christian people of this country. Even since the close of our internal war again brought us into communication with the outer world, we have known little of its position and course on subjects of painful interest and memory to us.

The circumstances just referred to have operated to keep most of us in America, and especially in the Southern States, from knowing much about or feeling much interest in the Evangelical Alliance; and the writer of the present article is obliged to confess that, in going to be present at its meeting in New York, he went as a mere spectator; and if not with any distinct feeling of distrust, yet without that feeling of confidence which must have a knowledge of the case for its foundation. And any one can see how hard it is to manage such an association so as to steer clear of difficulties and abuses, and make it work out good results. But as the operations of the Alliance have hitherto been

so much out of view to most persons among us, we will now give something of its history. This, under an organised form, dates from the year 1846. But, as claimed by the Rev. Mr. Davis, Secretary of the British Branch Alliance, "preparations were quietly but surely going on" for twenty years previous. In Liverpool, ministers of various denominations had been in the habit of coming together annually for united prayer; and a sentiment began to be more and more developed, in various Protestant countries, pointing to "a union of evangelical Protestants, for fraternal recognition, mutual aid, and the spread of the gospel in all lands;" which words briefly but clearly describe the objects and character of the association as it now exists. A "Conference" of ministers of different branches of the evangelical Church, held February, 1843, at the Wesleyan Centenary Hall, London, expressed itself in favor of the suggestion; and at a great public meeting at Exeter Hall, in June of the same year, the greatest enthusiasm manifested itself in favor of it. A meeting held at Edinburgh, in July following, in connection with the celebration of the bi-centenary of the Westminster Assembly, in the sentiment and feeling elicited on the occasion, gave an important impulse to the movement. A gentleman present ("the late John Henderson, Esq., of Glasgow,") was so much impressed by what he heard on the subject, that he conceived the idea, which was soon carried into effect, of procuring the publication of a volume containing essays on the subject, from the pens of pious and eminent men. This gave, as says the British Secretary, greater "point and force to the proposal, emanating," as he thinks, "from the Rev. Dr. Patton, [Sr.,] of America, for an Œcumenical Conference, to be held in London. The sentiment of Protestant Christendom showing itself favorable in all directions, the necessary steps were taken, and the proposed Conference, composed of delegates, 800 in number, from different countries, including Great Britain, and belonging to the various evangelical bodies, assembled in London on the 19th of August, 1846; and at its fourth session adopted a resolution in favor of forming an Evangelical Confederation," which should "afford opportunity to members of the Church of Christ of cultivating brotherly

love, enjoying Christian intercourse, and promoting such objects as they might thereafter agree to prosecute together ;” and the confederation was accordingly formed under its present name. The occasion is stated to have been one “of fervent prayer and praise, and of hallowed intercourse.”

With us, in these Southern parts of our country, it detracts from the pleasant interest which we would feel in the London Conference, that on this occasion the British members took such a course in regard to the reception of slave-holding persons in the body, as excluded all who came from our Southern States, and led, if we remember rightly, to the presentation of a protest, signed by Dr. R. Baird and most if not all the Americans who had gone to attend the meeting. But we believe the exclusive action was only an assumption on the part of that portion of the members above indicated, and that the Alliance never took any formal action on the subject. It certainly has nothing pertaining to it in its “basis” of union ; and, besides the fact that certain matters are now “dead issues,” every kind and appreciative disposition seemed to be exhibited in the late Conference toward brethren of the South.

The formal establishment of the Alliance was followed by the institution of branch organisations in various parts of the world, including one in this country, with some local auxiliaries. The very first meeting was attended by representatives from all parts of the world where Christianity has been planted ; and this has been more largely the fact in its subsequent meetings.

The formation of this Christian confederation was followed by its first regular meeting as a Council or Conference, which took place in London, during the great World’s Fair, held there in the autumn of 1851. It was composed of more than 300 foreign delegates, some from places as distant as the Cape of Good Hope, the East Indies, and China—beside the large number from different parts of the United Kingdom. At this meeting, the general course of proceeding was adopted which has been subsequently followed, essays being read, and addresses made on topics appropriate to the objects of the Alliance, prepared by learned and able men ; statements being made, and information produced as

to the progress of the cause of Christ, and the obstacles to it, in various parts of the world, and meetings being held throughout for Christian intercourse and social devotion—all with happy effect.

We give below the platform on which the Alliance was formed, and on which it now stands, as it is included in the Constitution of the American Alliance as reëstablished in 1867. Though out of time as to the latter, it will be satisfactory to us, in some respects, to see all together :

THE BASIS OF THE AMERICAN EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE.

Resolved, That in forming an Evangelical Alliance for the United States, in co-operative union with other branches of the Alliance, we have no intention or desire to give rise to a new denomination or sect ; nor to effect the amalgamation of Churches, except in the way of facilitating personal Christian intercourse and a mutual good understanding ; nor to interfere in any way whatever with the internal affairs of the various denominations ; but simply to bring individual Christians into closer fellowship and co-operation, on the basis of the spiritual union which already exists in the vital relation of CHRIST to the members of his body in all ages and countries.

Resolved, That, in the same spirit, we propose no new creed ; but, taking broad, historical, and evangelical catholic ground, we solemnly re-affirm and profess our faith in all the doctrines of the inspired word of God, and in the *consensus* of doctrines as held by all true Christians from the beginning. And we do more especially affirm our belief in the *Divine-human person* and *atoning work of our LORD and SAVIOUR JESUS CHRIST*, as the only and sufficient source of salvation, as the heart and soul of Christianity, and as the centre of all true Christian union and fellowship.

Resolved, That with this explanation, and in the spirit of a just Christian liberality in regard to the minor differences of theological schools and religious denominations, we also adopt, as a summary of the *consensus* of the various evangelical Confessions of Faith, the Articles and Explanatory Statement set forth and agreed on by the Evangelical Alliance at its formation in London, 1846, and approved by the separate European organisations ; which articles are as follows :

“ 1. The divine inspiration, authority, and sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures.

“ 2. The right and duty of private judgment in the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures.

“ 3. The unity of the Godhead, and the Trinity of the Persons therein.

“ 4. The utter depravity of human nature in consequence of the Fall.

"5. The incarnation of the SON OF GOD, his work of atonement for the sins of mankind, and his mediatorial intercession and reign.

"6. The justification of the sinner by faith alone.

"7. The work of the HOLY SPIRIT in the conversion and sanctification of the sinner.

"8. The immortality of the soul, the resurrection of the body, the judgment of the world by our LORD JESUS CHRIST, with the eternal blessedness of the righteous, and the eternal punishment of the wicked.

"9. The divine institution of the Christian ministry, and the obligation and perpetuity of the ordinances of Baptism and the Lord's Supper.

"It being, however, distinctly declared that this brief summary is not to be regarded in any formal or ecclesiastical sense as a creed or confession, nor the adoption of it as involving an assumption of the right authoritatively to define the limits of Christian brotherhood, but simply as an indication of the class of persons whom it is desirable to embrace within the Alliance."

The second Conference was held in Paris, in the year 1855, advantage being taken, in consonance with the wishes of the French brethren, of the great World's "Exhibition" held there during that year. This contributed to make the attendance large, the number of members being as many as twelve hundred. It added to the interest of the occasion, that this Conference was held in a Roman Catholic country, in a city that is so much of an oecumenical capital as Paris. Many persons will remember the fact, generally published at the time, that in connection with the grand exhibition of arts and manufactures, there was a depository established for the occasion by Protestants, of Bibles and religious publications of every sort, in the different languages of the world, for exhibition, sale, and gratuitous distribution. The most prominent subject before this Conference, was religious liberty; and an able report being brought in by a large committee, in which many different countries were represented, a course of practical measures was entered upon, which has subsequently led to some good results in promoting toleration. On two occasions during the Conference, the Lord's Supper was administered, and the words of institution were pronounced in the administration in six different languages.

The third in the series of Conferences, took place at Berlin, in 1857. Frederick William IV., the then reigning sovereign of the

leading Protestant power on the continent of Europe, had manifested an interest in the Alliance hardly surpassed by that of any private individual, and had even, by private communications and a royal message, invited the body to hold its next general meeting at his capital.

The Berlin Conference opened with devotional services on the 9th of September, at the "Royal Garrison Church," which continued to be used by special permission of the King; and for nine days the sessions continued, with the attendance of a large number of the most illustrious men of Protestant Christendom, and with a high degree of interest. One of the pleasant interludes was a visit, by the royal invitation, to the King. On Friday, the 12th, special trains went to Potsdam about 6 o'clock p. m., with some 1,200 Alliance members and visitors, who, after an elegant repast, were presented to the King and Queen. In answer to a brief address by the chairman of the German branch, the King responded in truly Christian words, and with emotion: "I have always felt the most earnest desire to promote such a union among Christians. Hitherto it has appeared impossible; but now I rejoice in seeing it. The first step is taken. The first days of this Conference are passed, with the joy and blessing of the Lord. My wish and most fervent prayer is, that there may descend upon all the members of the Conference, an effusion of the Spirit of God, such as fell upon the first disciples." Remarkable words, these, to come from a successor, and one sharing the blood, of the great but irreligious Frederick II! It was remarked by the present King William, in his communication to the late New York Conference, that this was "the last public act" of his deceased brother. And, while we must deprecate an undue reliance on the favor and aid of the great of this world, for the furtherance of Christ's kingdom, we are reminded by such instances as this, of the prediction of "kings and queens" as acting the part of "nursing fathers and nursing mothers" to the Messiah's Church.

That land of romantic beauty, Switzerland, and its literary and religious capital, Geneva—a country and a capital so illustrated by the historic association which connects them with the great

Reformation—received, in 1861, the next visit of the Alliance. It was opened 2d September, in St. Peter's Cathedral, with the reading of John xvii., and the hymn, "*Grand Dieu, nous te benissons,*" and other appropriate services. Among those present at this meeting, beside Merle d'Aubigné, Gaussen, Malan, Col. Tronchin, and others, from Switzerland itself, were Monod, De Pressensé, Grandpierre, Prof. Cuvier, from France; Baptist Noel, Earls Roden and Cavan, and Sir C. Eardley, from England; Drs. Guthrie, Cairns, and Thomson, from Scotland; Prof. Gibson and Dr. Urwick from Ireland; and Drs. R. Baird and Sawtell, from the United States. The relations of Calvin to the Reformation was the appropriate subject of one of the documents prepared for this meeting. An interesting feature of the occasion was the numerous open-air meetings—quite novel in that part of the world—held for the promotion of religious feeling among the masses, which were addressed in their own language, by various foreign visitors, and not without a visibly happy effect. The Lord's Supper, at the close of the Conference, is spoken of as having had a peculiarly eucharistic as well as international character.

The good "burgher" city of Amsterdam was the place of the succeeding Conference meeting, which was held there by invitation; and it was very meet that the little country and people whose name has been illustrated so gloriously by their doings and sufferings—so nobly portrayed by some American historic pens—in their long struggle in behalf of freedom and the Protestant faith, should be honored by a visit from such a body. On Sunday, August 10th, 1867, the inaugural service took place in the large cathedral church, which, notwithstanding its name, still retained, of "New Church," was first built in 1408, and therefore was long used for Roman Catholic services. It was now crowded to overflowing by 4,000 people. The hymns sung at the services of this Conference were printed, in parallel columns, in Dutch, German, English, and French. The feeling and effort of the pious Hollanders gave this Conference a peculiar and eminent character, in making the occasion one of immediate spiritual benefit to the community in the midst of which its sessions were

held. Twice the regular proceedings were suspended, and the great Park Hall was filled with a concourse of people, who were addressed on gospel themes and exhorted to adhere to the pure faith of their fathers. Still further, in various places of assembly through the city, crowds of poor people, and even some of the outcasts of society, listened to proclamations of gospel truth from Christian strangers, these being interpreted wherever necessary; and the effort was extended even to the soldiers. After the conclusion of the Conference by the celebration of the Communion, the members with visitors attended, by invitation, the annual gathering of the Dutch Missionary Societies. At the village of Vogelensing, a half-hour's distance by rail from Amsterdam, in a beautifully wooded park belonging to a private individual, some 20,000 persons spent the day in listening to addresses from the missionaries and others, on the world-work of the Church of Christ. Beside the provision which had been made of refreshments for the company at large, the proprietor, Mr. Barnaart, opened his house, with a princely hospitality, to the foreign delegates and their families.

At this meeting, the invitation was given, on the part of the American Branch, just reëstablished, that the Alliance should hold its next meeting this side the Atlantic. The invitation was agreed to with a degree of enthusiasm. The interference of various causes, especially the Franco-Prussian war, delayed this meeting until the past autumn.

We have given this sketch, not only as the history of a great religious movement of our age, and because the several Conferences exhibited so much that is of interest, but for the reason that the history of any institution sometimes shows its character as well as anything else, if not better. In the course of its existence, up to the period to which the present sketch has brought us, it had been the means, through a recommendation of the British Alliance in a meeting held at Manchester in the first year of the general body, (probably, therefore, in 1852,) of setting on foot the annual observance of a "week of prayer," the suggestion of which was afterwards repeated by some of our foreign missionaries, and which is extending to such a degree, and exciting in-

creased interest over the Protestant world, as a happy season of occasional reunion among Christians "who hold the Head," and as a grand concert of prayer for the world. From the Alliance movement, too, there has sprung up in Great Britain, the Turkish Missions-Aid Society, the German-Aid Society, the Continental Committee for Toleration, etc.; while it is claimed, in the historical paper presented at the late Conference by Mr. Davis, Secretary of the British Alliance, as to two important objects, "that the Madias in Florence; Matamoros and his fellow-Protestants, and Julian Vargas, in Spain; the missionaries and Turkish converts in Constantinople and other parts of the East; the Baptists in Germany, Russia, Sweden, and Switzerland; the Nestorians in Persia; the French missionaries in Basuto Land, South Africa, as well as English missionaries in New Caledonia; the Lutherans in the Baltic Provinces of Russia, with others, have proved the value of Christian sympathy and the efficient aid which the Alliance, through its various British and foreign organisations, can render to our fellow-Christians throughout the world. The efforts of some of our Continental branches with reference to the observance of the Lord's Day in their own land, have also been signally blessed. In Prussia, labor in government works on Sunday, and the assembly of the militia on that day, have been stopped. In Switzerland a large number of manufactories have been closed, and the postal authorities are giving the whole or part of their employés rest on that day."

It will be seen, from quotations made in this article, that the Alliance has acted, and most wisely, on the principle of bringing together individuals as such, in its organisation, and not an official representation of denominations or ecclesiastical bodies. The Moravian Synod, it is true, and some other European Church Councils, have expressed their good feeling toward it, but it was a voluntary expression on their part.

It was, therefore, with its principles well settled and understood, that the sixth Conference meeting took place, of which we have now, in more of detail, to give an account. It is a fact which might give the more hope of good from them, that the General Alliance meetings were themselves, to a large extent,

made the subject of prayer by its members and supporters, in various countries. At a meeting of its French and Swiss friends, held in Geneva, an address was adopted and forwarded to the American Alliance, signed by the lamented Dr. Merle d'Aubigné and other well-known names, expressing the wish and prayer that the approaching Convocation in New York might be "*pour l'Eglise de Christ une Pentecote nouvelle.*" All complications and difficulties arising from the conflict between the two great continental powers, which had postponed the Conference meeting for a year or more, were now out of the way. The meeting took place with almost the entire world in a state of peace; and as being held in the "New World," it was looked to by Christians in the "old" hemisphere with somewhat peculiar interest. And it is not too much to say that the expectations of the brethren from beyond the waters, as well as the hopes of brethren on this side, were more than realised.

The number of foreign delegates (according to a printed roll,) was as follows: from Great Britain, 75; the British Provinces in America and the West Indies, 56; Continental Europe, (to Italy,) 32; Greece, Turkey, Persia, and India, 9; making in all, 172. Another list, (perhaps later,) we observe, makes the number nearly two hundred. The delegates from the United States Alliance and its branches, numbered 280, to which are to be added upwards of eighty invited corresponding members from different parts of this country, (including several from the South,) and a number of foreign missionaries, besides some that appeared as delegates. The grand total of these divisions of the body was about six hundred and thirty. This is a smaller number than some of the former Conferences could show; but, considering that two of them had the advantage of being held along with the great world-exhibitions, and that this was held in a country so removed from the greater part of those represented in the body, the present meeting, even on the score of attendance, may be regarded as having been as great a success as any of the preceding. In case it be a matter of curiosity to any of our readers to know in what proportion the foreign denominational bodies furnished the membership of this Conference, (no denomination being represented

as such,) we would state that, according to a classification in the New York *Evangelist*, of the British members enrolled at the first sessions, the number of Congregationalists or Independents was 27; of Episcopalians, 21; of Presbyterians, 21; of Baptists, 5; Wesleyans, 7; beside some not known. The Continental members, of course, almost all belonged to the Lutheran and other "Reformed" Churches, all kindred to our own. By far the larger part of the American representation consisted of persons belonging to the Congregational and the various Presbyterian bodies, including the Reformed (Dutch) Church. This part of the membership included a considerable number of Lutherans, as well as a respectable number belonging to the Episcopal and other evangelical denominations of this country. They not only shared, all of them, in the composition of the body, but, through ministers and others coming from amongst them, appeared in the various discussions and religious services of the occasion.

Never, probably, has any religious convocation held on this continent drawn together so large a number of the most eminent divines of the different branches of the Church of Christ in this country, many of them grey-haired veterans in the Lord's service.

A building far above the new Bible-House, and beyond what were within our own memory the limits of the city, had to be selected as a central and convenient place for the Alliance sessions, the hall of the Young Men's Christian Association building, corner of 4th Avenue and 24th Street, being occupied in most of its sittings. But the vast number of persons of the city and from all parts of the country attending the meetings, rendered it necessary, on many days of the Conference, to open for their accommodation various churches and public halls, where addresses were made as at the central place of assemblage, and sometimes an address or the reading of a document repeated to a different audience. A 9 o'clock morning meeting for devotional services, held at the Madison Square (Dr. Adams's) Presbyterian church, was a happy and profitable daily reunion and preface of the day's common exercises. These latter were conducted according to a programme, copies of which, for the day, were circulated to the audience

from day to day. Beside services of prayer and Scripture reading in the order of the Conference sessions, occasional singing varied at intervals the graver employments—a small selection of hymns, in handbill form, being distributed for the purpose; and it was a good feature of the occasion that only such hymns and tunes were used as were both choice and familiar. No one who was present can forget the effect when such hymnal utterances as “From all that dwell below the skies,” or “Jesus shall reign where'er the sun,” to “Old Hundred,” or “Rock of Ages,” or “Blest be the tie,” or the “Coronation Hymn,” rose from hundreds, and sometimes more than hundreds, of voices and Christian hearts; or the demonstration that it afforded in favor of real hearty congregational singing, in distinction from the modern fashion of worshipping God in the sacred and delightful service of sanctuary song, albeit with very select and refined and artistic performance by a proxy corps, stationed in an end gallery.

Upon a review of the occasion, we cannot but think that the programme committee ran a risk, at least, in making the exercises of the Conference so numerous and continuous as they were; for beside the Sabbath services in various parts of the city, and the Alliance Sunday night meetings, three sittings were generally held on each of the other eight days, after the morning devotional meeting just spoken of. But it is itself a remarkable testimony to the character of the productions of the occasion that, being so many and so crowded into the hours of the successive days, the interest of the audiences did not wear out. This did not seem to be the case; or if it flagged in the least, on any day, it seemed to revive again, and continued to bring the largest crowds to the very last.

The topics were the ordinary ones of former Conferences: Protestant evangelical unity and recognition; the present aspects of Papacy; Infidelity in its various forms, and the relations of revelation to science; Sabbath observance; and the missionary fields and evangelistic work of the Church—being the most prominent. The speeches of the Dean of Canterbury and Bishop Bedell on the first of these topics were remarkable, not so much for the treatment of it, so admirable in itself, as for the sources

from which the sentiments of these addresses came. Everybody knows how nobly the Dean carried out, in practice, the principles he avowed; for he once led the Conference in extemporaneous prayer, besides the more important act of participating in the Lord's Supper as administered at the Madison Avenue Presbyterian church, which he has publicly vindicated and gloried in since his return to England, declaring that he "never took part in anything that more impressed his spirit, or made him feel more of a sense of premillennial joy," adding his regret "that any members of the body to which he belonged should be so narrow in their feelings as not to see that there is *something greater than any particular community or church, and that is the universal Church of Christ*;" saying further, that in the communion spoken of, the very idea of "the Holy Catholic Church" (of the Apostles' Creed,) was carried out. All this was the more significant and important in connection with the fact that the Dean brought with him a letter to the Conference from the Archbishop himself, over whose cathedral he presides, in which, while the latter states that he is not in the membership of the Alliance, he expresses his interest in its designs and operations. The matter is still further illustrated by the letter, which probably every reader of this has seen, from the distinguished Primate of England, in which he playfully refers to the similar case of intercommunion on the part of Dr. Smith's noble predecessor, Dean Alford, at Berlin, and clearly shows his approving sentiment. And all this is the more pregnant, as occurring about the same time that the Sovereign of Great Britain appoints a Church of Scotland (Presbyterian) minister one of her chaplains, and herself partakes of the Communion at the hands of a minister of the same Church. It shows, along with the parallel movement in the Episcopal Church of this country, that, while there is such a development in one portion of the Church spoken of in England and America, of hierarchical and ritualistic principles, there is going on in the same body, and synchronously, a very distinct and strong manifestation of sentiment in the opposite direction. It ought to be stated, as showing that the acts of conciliation and compromise in things non-essential, were not entirely on one side, that in at

least one of the meetings of the occasion, the members of the Conference and the entire audience stood up and repeated the Lord's Prayer, and the Creed was also thus repeated on the same or some other occasion. The Conference devotional services throughout afforded a most happy practical demonstration on the question of the practicability of all evangelical Protestants joining in common worship.

We would be glad to give an analysis of some of the more valuable addresses, essays, and other documents previously prepared and produced before the Conference. Our space will allow of only a few notices; and all of these productions have now been placed within everybody's reach, in ways that we will presently indicate. It may be well here to correct an erroneous impression somewhat disparaging to the interest of the occasion, which may have been made by the language of newspaper reports, in regard to some of the productions referred to, as having been "read," when they were not; a mistake perhaps arising from the fact that they were sometimes furnished the printer as put in writing by the author. The greater part of the subjects brought before the Conferences were discussed in the form of addresses, many of which were pronounced with good rhetorical effect; and wherever reading was done, it was generally done in a manner not much less effective. Some section meetings were occasionally held in which the French and German languages, and in one the Welsh, were exclusively spoken. But these were used only a few times by individuals at the central meetings; enough to suggest how the telling of "the wonderful works of God" and the experience of Christian hearts is to consecrate all the tongues of earth. Most of the foreigners who were appointed to take part in the public central meetings, had the English well enough at command to use it in speaking, more or less perfectly. Some of them spoke it admirably.

Not undertaking, without further study of it, to endorse every expression contained in it, we can say that Dr. Hodge's address on Christian unity was one of the most important efforts of the Conference occasion. The subject, and the mind from which it proceeded, made it so. It was a most lucid and in every respect

masterly exposé of the important topic, and seemed, as one listened to the successive sentences, not so much like the effort of argument as successive oracular-like enunciations which no one could challenge. Dr. H.'s manner, on this occasion, was as ever with him, simple and unambitious, but the delivery was quite animated as to voice and gesture; and this effort of the venerable divine made one think that, at least under the inspiring influences of this great occasion, he had even more than renewed his youth. It made a manifest and profound impression. It was an expression used by Dr. H., in the latter part of his address, in substance, if not in words, that "no one ought to be excluded from Church communion whom God would not exclude," which drew upon him the animadversions of some of the Baptist papers in New York and elsewhere, with complaint against the Alliance for allowing, in this instance, matters of difference amongst the denominations to be introduced on its floor.

The present aspects of the Papacy, including the "Old Catholic" development, occupied the attention of the Conference for a day or two; and various important papers were read, and addresses made, during this specific discussion and at other times, giving important information as to the state of things in the Roman Catholic parts of Europe. Pastor Fisch, of Paris, and others, spoke of an increased tendency in the French mind toward religion—perhaps arising from their late national humiliations—as recently manifesting itself, and in connection with it, a reflux toward their old religion, which he and others who spoke of it styled a "revival of Popery." But it did not appear that the cause of Rome is gaining ground, relatively, in any important degree, anywhere else. The New York *Herald*, in an editorial, spoke of this in a somewhat sneering way, as the grand assault of the Protestant batteries on the moss-covered towers of the oldest Church of Christendom, and the one which had been, from ages long past, the conservator and bulwark of the Christian faith; as if the members of the Conference had looked for a result so like the fate of Jericho, from a day or two of discussion among themselves.

The subject that brought out the widest range of discussion,

and the greatest variety if not discrepancy of views, was the third in the list that we have given, and the one which is now so deeply agitating the mind of intelligent Christendom—the relations of human science to revelation. On this subject, President McCosh, of Princeton, delivered a very ornate elegant address, in which he adhered to old ground, except on one point, which we shall presently specify. Prof. Guyot of Princeton expressed it as his view, that the days of creation spoken of in Genesis, were “works,” or stages, or “steps of the organisation,” without reference (as we understood him,) to exact divisions of time; as the root, stem, leaf, flower, seed, may be said to be the days of the plant. Succession makes the history. Dr. McCosh, in a few remarks following, expressed his agreement with the views of Prof. G., and his belief that the seventh day “rest,” spoken of in the 2d of Genesis, did not come within a limited time, but was indefinite, except (we suppose he would say) in respect to its beginning, or its mere relation of succession to the preceding events. These expressions of sentiment on the part of distinguished and believing men, are here only given as a part of the history of the occasion and the times, without intending to intimate that they were the views of the body generally; for the discussions did not show this. The Rev. Dr. Brown, of Scotland, a grandson of “John Brown of Haddington,” and at different times a missionary in Russia and at the Cape of Good Hope, in an address made by him, avowed his belief in the “hypothesis,” as he preferred to term it, of development as not being inconsistent, in the way that he received it, with the Bible, or with the “Shorter Catechism,” in which he had been early taught, and the leading doctrines of which he topically rehearsed. Dr. Hodge challenged him with the question, “What is development?” Is it an intellectual process, guided by God, or a blind process of unintelligent, unconscious force, which cannot look to any end, or use means toward an end? Dr. B. said he would answer that question by the Shorter Catechism; but added that the question was not as to the fact, but “the how,” of God’s creating all things.

One of the most able discussions of this subject was by the

Rev. Dr. Dawson, Principal of McGill College, Montreal. Principal D. showed himself to be quite thoroughly a man of science, well acquainted with its present ascertained facts. We particularly recommend his speech to all who may possess themselves of the report of it, as worthy of study, for its valuable statements and suggestions. Amongst other things, he called attention to the fact, as having an important bearing on the question of evolution, that the oldest remains of man that are found, instead of showing a very low type, exhibit a finely developed human physique. He declared it as his belief, after investigation, that as yet it could not be established positively that any existing human fossil remains can claim an antiquity beyond what the Bible history seems to assign to man.

But the production which made a greater popular impression than any other of the whole Conference occasion, was the essay of Dr. Christlieb, Professor of Theology at Bonn, Prussia. It was a most masterly effort, containing the substance of some lectures on the subject previously delivered at Bonn, and will give the Professor, who looks like a man yet in the prime of manhood, a name throughout the Christian world. The essay has not only appeared in the printed newspaper reports of the Conference discussions, but has been brought out in separate form, and deserves the widest circulation. It places the subject on the highest, truest Christian grounds, without, as we think, denying to the modern advanced science anything that it can properly claim.

The question of the relation of the Church to the State was one that seemed to produce a slight jar to the pleasant feeling that prevailed to such a degree throughout. The Rev. Wm. H. Freemantle, of London, himself a minister of the English Established Church, made an address which, in its principles and declarations, was favorable to Church establishments; though he granted that some countries, *e. g.*, the United States, might be peculiar and exceptional cases. One of the English speakers who followed him, declared his dissent; but this part of the discussion was pleasantly conducted. It was not quite so much so at one of the simultaneous meetings held on Thursday, in which the Rev. Dr. Curry, President of (the Baptist) Richmond Col-

lege, made an address on Church and State, in very strong opposition to Establishments. At the expiration of the thirty minutes allowed for the precomposed essays and addresses, Dr. Crooks, who presided at this collateral meeting, struck his bell, remarking (in substance,) that, as a matter of courtesy to many of the foreign delegates, to some of whom he knew it was unpleasant, he thought the discussion ought to cease. Dr. Curry seemed somewhat hurt at the supposed intimation of discourtesy, saying that he had been invited, by the Programme Committee, to discuss the specific question which he had treated. But, though called for by some of the audience, he did not proceed. The fault lay with the Committee. We conceive that it was a fault to put this topic in the programme at all, since we Americans need no instruction or conviction on the subject; and it was, as we think, hardly decorous to bring our trans-Atlantic brethren here to receive instruction on the subject from us in public addresses.

In the department of what may be called miscellaneous productions, we may mention, among the excellent ones, the address of the Rev. Dr. Arnot, of Edinburgh, (the friend and biographer, we suppose, of the late lamented Dr. Hamilton,) on "Christian doctrine, as embodied in the Christian life." Dr. A., in his robust form and the cast of his face, as well as in his accent and the sturdy character of his intellect, presents a very decided representation of a man of the true and high Scottish type. Dr. Plumer was once more heard, in the city where in days of yore his voice had sounded for the Tract and Bible cause, in sound words about family instruction, and Dr. Hoge in his interesting setting forth of "the South as a mission field."

A subject was touched upon at one of the meetings, by the Rev. Dr. Simpson, of Derby, England, in his essay on "Modern Literature and Religion," which we regard as one of the most vital, and demanding the attention of the Church everywhere—fictitious literature in Sunday-school libraries. Dr. S. spoke of evils existing; and the Rev. Dr. Ormiston, of New York, dwelt more strongly on them; and it is worthy of mention, that the *New York Evening Post*, the senior editor of which is the poet and eminent literary man, W. C. Bryant, still living at a very

advanced age, expressed its strong concurrence in the sentiments of these speakers, and its conviction of the vast evils resulting from the connection of the two things above mentioned.

The general curiosity, of foreigners as well as others, to hear Mr. Beecher was gratified, in his giving, as well as Dr. Parker of London, (the author of the "*Ecce Deus*,") a discussion of the "Pulpit of our Age"—what it ought to be. Dr. P.'s was a manly, vigorous handling of the subject, in a high style of thought and diction. Mr. B.'s, in our opinion, was decidedly inferior to it. On some occasions the speakers delivered their addresses at more than one of the simultaneous meetings. It so happened that Mr. Beecher came in from another meeting just as Dr. P. closed his speech, in which he had treated "sensational preaching" somewhat trenchantly. The "Brooklyn pastor," probably without knowing this, himself, in the course of his remarks, took up and vindicated that kind of preaching. His egotism would probably, in any case, have prompted this. But many a person felt that, whether with his knowledge or not, he was well chastised beforehand. A certain kind of smartness, a readiness of thought and speech, great self-confidence, with a knowledge of human nature, and a daring audacity in the assertion of novel opinions, with a good rhetorical talent, may give a man a popularity which he does not deserve as a profound thinker or safe teacher. Mr. B.'s speech on this occasion certainly would not give him a high place as a man of ability. He could not let the opportunity pass while he served up the dishes, stale on his table, of "true manhood," "sympathy with humanity," etc., of making a fling at the old theology of his own forefathers, when he painted the picture of the man who, wearied and worried from the toils and cares of the week, has to go to church on Sunday morning and listen to "a sermon on the fall of Adam;" which sneer conveyed the detestably false insinuation that the old doctrine (old as the Bible,) of human depravity and the cognate ones, do not, in the faith and preaching of them foster sympathy with our fallen humanity, the very opposite of which all history and experience have shown to be true.

But not the least interesting part of the exercises of the Con-

ference occasion was the day (Friday, 10th,) given up in various meetings—some at the same hour in different places—to statements and addresses from foreign missionaries. Dr. W. Adams called it “the missionary day” of the Conference. Many missionary gentlemen from this country and Europe, coming from fields as distant as Persia, China, Japan, and Southern Africa, told “what of the night.” Many of the accounts given by them, especially as showing the progress of things within two or three or more decades, were highly interesting and even animating. The New York *Herald*, in the editorial already referred to, spoke of the efforts of centuries as resulting in little or no gain of Protestantism on the Papacy. Protestants may well say that the field has generally not been open to us; the Papacy has, until recently, been protected from our approach by the wall of exclusion which, in most Roman Catholic countries, at its own instigation, were erected from ages gone by for its defence; most Protestant countries meantime allowing them free ingress. The Protestants, too, are the hopeful, confident party, who rejoice in the free field now before them in the Papal countries. But, if the affirmation of the *Herald* holds true, which we do not altogether grant, as to any changes of the relative strength of these parties, it is certainly true that our Protestant Christianity, at the present day, is the great aggressive power of our age; and no one, we think, can cast his eye over the world without feeling that its influence is far more widely and powerfully felt than that of the Romish religion.

So far as the personal representation from foreign fields on this occasion was concerned, it was interesting to see and hear men born in Christian lands, who had been spending in those fields from ten to thirty, if not forty, years. But each of the great divisions of the outside world—that of Oriental nominal Christendom and that of the great heathen world beyond—had a native representative in the Alliance, in Dr. Kalopothakes, who bore an appointment from a small Branch Alliance at Athens, composed of a few evangelical Greeks, with some other resident Protestants; and in Narayan Sheshadri, the converted Brahmin, now a minister under Presbyterian ordination, (as well as Dr. K.,)

having been brought to Christ under the labors of Scotch missionaries. So intelligent, so pious, so efficient men as they both are, they furnished in their own persons the best illustrations of the power and value of the foreign missionary work. There can be no doubt that some of the interest thrown around this Hindoo convert was extrinsic, as arising from his wearing all the time his long Oriental garments and snow-white turban, which, with his dusky face, attracted all eyes to him as he sat on the platform. But the case seemed much more interesting, and even wonderful, when he arose at any time to speak, and in a pure, elevated style of English diction, and with a clear, strong voice, pitched on a somewhat high key, delivered the ideas and facts that he had to utter in a forcible and impressive manner, which, with only a slight foreign touch in the pronunciation, might well compare with the more respectable pulpit performances of English-speaking communities. Narayan Sheshadri was himself the best kind of a proof of what the missionary work can do.

The communications read to the Conference from absent persons, formed one of the not least interesting features of this Alliance meeting. We have already noticed the letter of the Archbishop of Canterbury. One of some length from the venerable Dr. A. Tholuck, of Germany, was read by the Rev. Leopold Witte, who was spoken of as having been a much-beloved pupil of Dr. T. In this paper the eminent champion of the evangelical doctrine in Germany, gives a most interesting historical sketch of its struggles and progress in that land of rationalistic power; and the production is one of greater interest for having in its introduction a short piece of autobiography, in which the venerated writer gives some account of his own early history, in its relation to the great topics discussed in his paper. His pupil and friend who read the document, and who will be remembered by all present at the reading of it, for his attractive face, modest bearing, and the admirable manner in which, notwithstanding his disclaimer, he delivered himself in English, spoke of his preceptor as one to whom even thousands in Germany look as their "father in Christ"—a remarkable and instructive counterpart to what

Tholuck himself says in the paper read, of his intense "longing for souls."

No small degree of interest attached to two of the papers of this Conference, by reason of being posthumous—one from Count Gasparin, of Paris, the other from the great and good Merle d'Aubigné. The latter, which was prepared for the Conference when it was expected to be held in 1870, is addressed directly to the Alliance, and expresses not only his personal interest in it, which had always been active and great, but he delivers himself, in *prégnant* sentences and with a most solemn and tender tone, of his sentiments and counsels in regard to the state of the Church of Christ in our day. His utterances are most worthy of being read, especially as respects the advance of the ministry in the spirit of their work, in regard to which he quotes Calvin's noble words, "*L'Esprit de Dieu doit resonner en leur voix, pour besogner en vertu,*" and the stronger cleaving of believers to Christ as their living Head, not only for their own peace, but for the salvation of the Church. It seemed, while this testamentary paper was heard by the great assembly, as if it was the voice of that eminent servant of God speaking from another world.

Among the communications read, two others deserve to be mentioned as of extraordinary interest—one from Père Hyacinthe, and one from the "Old Catholic Congress," under date Constance, Sept. 12, 1873, and signed by the Bishop, Reinkens, and Prof. Von Schulte, President. The first writes, excusing himself for not fulfilling a formerly accepted invitation to attend the Conference, and says, in the course of his letter, "My ambition, I confess, is still higher than yours. Where you are satisfied with an Alliance, I would desire an organic and vital unity;" by which he means one established on the very broad basis advocated by the "Old Catholics." The communication from the representatives of the latter is itself an extraordinary exhibition of one of the most remarkable developments of our times, when a body of men who have not renounced their name and profession as members of the Roman Catholic body, approach such a Protestant convention as that in New York with the language, "We seize with joy the hand of fellowship extended to us," and the

declarations, amongst others of like character, "Every institution and custom which has crept in, hurtful to true Christian vitality, must be cast out; instead of justification by works, the justification by faith must be brought in;" "we frankly acknowledge that no branch of the Christian Church has exclusive truth," etc. They state that, since the decision at Munich, in 1871, to organise separate congregations, one hundred have been organised in the German empire, with 5,000 members. Whatever we may think of their idea of bringing "into close relations" "the evangelical, the Anglican, the Anglo-American, Russian, and Greek Churches," without a previous great change in some of them, we must certainly rejoice in seeing such a movement as that of the "Old Catholics" towards evangelical faith springing up in the heart of the Roman Catholic body itself. The fact of their speedy expulsion and separation, moreover, is suggestive; for it clearly shows that churches which have so far apostatized as the Roman and the Greek "Catholic" Churches, are never to be reformed in themselves. It is also one of the curious and not insignificant facts of contemporary history, that while there are such tendencies discovering themselves in Protestant countries and Churches toward ritualism and extreme churchism—a resurrection of old carcasses and dry bones, to decorate them with paint, and gold, and silk—there is just an opposite movement among the very persons who have been most thoroughly brought up in the religion of dead forms.

There was a striking interruption in the Conference proceedings on one day, when a telegram was announced from King William of Prussia. But owing, no doubt, to some mistake in the transmission, it proved unintelligible, though obviously designed as a friendly salutation. Dr. Schaff, however, communicated to the body what the great monarch of that great Protestant power of Europe had expressed, in declaring as the King and Emperor had done to him, in an interview at Berlin, that the sentiments in regard to the Alliance, so strongly uttered by his brother, the late Frederick William IV., were his own, and sending his friendly greetings to the coming Conference.

We can only take space, in closing this account of the occa-

sion—which even with its present length requires the exclusion of many things of interest—to say that the Christian feeling of the occasion seemed to rise to its highest pitch in the meetings of the two Sunday nights, which were occupied with addresses and devotional services. The hall of the Academy of Music, which is said to contain 4,000 persons, was filled to overflowing, and other places of meeting had to be opened. And when the vast assembly at the Academy of Music, containing a representation from so many parts of the earth and all branches of the true Church of Christ, joined in prayer, and swelled, with the voices of the thousands who filled the floor and galleries of that magnificent hall, the grand volume of sacred song, especially as they rose and sang, “All hail the power of Jesus’ name,” every Christian heart there probably felt that it was more like the grand congregation above, “of all the nations and kindreds,” etc., and the glorious notes of the anthem and chorus described in the Apocalypse, (Rev. v. 9–14,) than would ever again be realised by most of those present, this side heaven.

We have now given a succinct history of the Alliance, with some sketches of the more interesting discussions and proceedings of the late Conference. The former we have thought would be of some value, in view of the causes heretofore referred to, which have kept the Alliance so much out of our view; and because the history of such an institution will do much toward showing its character. As regards the latter, where more than one hundred and fifty essays, speeches, and documents, were the matter of review, nothing more could be done, even in the space that we have now taken, than to give some brief notices of the more interesting personages and subjects. Full reports are embodied in a volume (price \$5,) published by the Harpers; but they can be had much cheaper, in newspaper form, (for 25 cents,) as printed in an “extra” of the *New York Tribune*. The separate publication, also, of Prof. Christleib’s noble paper has been mentioned.

It gives us pleasure to say that, so far as the writer of this article heard, nothing that could be unpleasant to any one from this quarter, in relation to past and sad difficulties between

“North and South,” was uttered during the whole Conference, by any of the speakers or members from the former. It seemed, in fact, as if pains were taken to avoid anything of the sort. At an early stage of the meetings, Dr. J. Cohen Stuart, (a converted Jew, as we understood,) a delegate from Holland, who, by the way, was much the worst speaker of the whole occasion, made incidental mention of the insurrectionary fiend, John Brown, in a complimentary way: a thing perhaps not so amazing as might strike us at first hearing, when we consider that the North has had the ear of the world, mainly, all the time, and for four years exclusively, and that slavery arrayed the prejudice of nearly all the world against us of the South. As soon, however, as Dr. S. had finished his speech, Dr. Woolsey, President of the Conference, arose and remarked that the Conference must not be considered responsible for everything that might fall from the speakers who should from time to time address it. The remark was no doubt understood by everybody to point at what had dropped in the speech just closed. Not a word, we think, of any such character, fell from any speaker afterwards, except a reference on the part of one of the English delegates to the cessation of slavery in this country.

It is an important statement, which ought to have been made before, that Unitarians and Universalists did not claim to sit in the Conference, but complained of exclusion. The “Basis” shuts them out.

We have spoken of the impression produced in New York itself, by the late meeting. The *Tribune*, after its close, used the following language in regard to it:

“This meeting together—Alliance, as it is properly called—of the representatives of so many differing sects and denominations of Christianity—representatives as well of the culture and scholarship, of the best thought, the noblest endeavor, and the purest living of the universal Christian Church—has of itself set on foot inquiry and provoked thought. Even the men with muck-rakes, whose whole life is in the market they buy and sell in—an intense devotion of a pittance of time to getting a pittance of money—have lifted up their faces wonderingly, and in a dull way asked its meaning; while the brainless crowd, who grovel in sense and live in vacuity, have almost risen to a comprehension of the fact of a

higher life than vegetation, and some purpose in it nobler and more exalted than the eye of sense reveals. Taken out of the realm of the spiritual and moral, and viewed simply as an incitement to intellectual processes, a spur to thought, this Conference has been the most important ever held upon the continent. The subjects it aspired to treat are of infinite moment and universal application, and to their consideration the ripest scholarship and profoundest learning have been brought."

The *Staats Zeitung*, a German paper of New York, remarked upon the difference, in certain respects, between this Protestant convocation and the great Papal one of 1870. And certainly there was even a contrast between the one, with all its outward pomp and prestige, but brooding in secret conclave and issuing dogmas to be received on authority alone, and the other one sitting with open doors, relying for all its power simply on the truth and grace of God, and breathing an atmosphere of far truer and greater love and concord than really prevailed in the Vatican Council, with its boasted but compulsory "unity."

We conclude with the following remarks, which we trust will commend themselves, in the main, to our readers:

I. No humanly devised organisation or scheme, however good in its objects and intrinsic character, is to be allowed to trench upon the true and proper province of the Church, as constituted of God. And no church-member can rightly give to any such organisation or scheme the time, energies, or pecuniary means which are needed to be employed, or which he might employ, for Christ's cause, with any equal degree of usefulness, in connection with the Church wherever he holds his membership.

II. At the same time there may be, and we suppose almost all true and liberal-minded Christians will concede that there is, some ground on which those who belong to Christ's true Church on earth can sometimes meet, to give each other counsel and cheer, and to coöperate in some common efforts for the cause of Christ against common enemies. And if there be such ground for us at least occasionally to occupy, it is none the less valuable to us, but the more so for the very reason that all parts of the Protestant body seem to be coming, more than ever before, into the way of carrying on their various evangelistic efforts through denominational

channels—the Bible Society being the almost only one in which the evangelical body of Christendom now very generally unite.

III. The organisation now before us has most wisely avoided a source of difficulty and danger, in not being constituted, or aiming to be, by denominational representation. It is simply an association of individuals. Something different from this seemed to be indicated by a communication made by one of the officers of Alliance to our last General Assembly; but it was a mistake, which was subsequently corrected. Nor does the Evangelical Alliance, as will be seen from its own statement of principles which we have quoted, pretend to any authority in promulgating doctrine or inculcating Christian duties. Nor does it make it any part of its work to operate for the removal of those grounds of difference on which the denominations respectively stand. It aims to work outside of these. If the late Conference, in its influences, tended to give an impulse to a kind of sentiment and feeling in one of the Protestant denominations of this country, which has since led to a movement of “reform” actually amounting to a degree of schism, this movement, however good as regarded by most of us, was not one for which the Alliance was at all responsible.

IV. The good results of the efforts of the General Alliance in behalf of toleration and of Sabbath observance, have been indicated. They have certainly been of some value.

V. The indirect influence of the Alliance meetings, in the quickening of piety and the deepening of the feeling of world-wide living and effort for Christ’s cause, has seemed to be of sufficient value to justify an occasional œcumenical convocation of the sort.

VI. The public sentiment of the world of Christendom calls on the professing body for more of the manifestation of Christian unity in some way and shape. The ungodly and nominal Christian opposers of the Roman and Greek communions challenge it at our hands. And the very existence of a bastard Broad Churchism may itself be a proper reason for our showing heretics and worldlings something better.

VII. The divergent tendencies which have manifested themselves toward Ritualism and Rationalism, seem to call upon those who adhere to the great fundamentals to renew the declaration of this adhesion, and to strengthen each other to the great conflict now upon us, in their defence.

VIII. We may affirm that there is a yearning, more or less, in every Christian heart, after more of the realisation of the actual unity existing among all true believers. If our differences are not to be solved and merged here on earth, why not, nevertheless, have some enjoyment, at times, in some ways, this side heaven, of "the communion of saints?" It has been the glory of the Presbyterian Church that, while she is so tenacious of doctrine, rightly placing this far above all questions of forms, yet she stands on the grounds of true catholicity, in setting forth in her written creeds that "the visible Church, which is also catholic or universal, consists of *all those* throughout the world who profess the true religion," and that the "holy fellowship and communion" in which the communion of saints consists, are "to be extended to all those who, in every place, call upon the name of the Lord Jesus"—which prescriptions remarkably coincide with the limits to which this Christian confederation extends its membership.

IX. If any one then asks how far we are to countenance and coöperate with the Evangelical Alliance, we answer, first, this is for individuals to determine, and each for himself; and next, that we suppose every Christian may well give this countenance and support, *so far and so long as he sees this institution is well conducted, and produces good results.*

It is a matter of some interest just at this time, to remember that, somewhat as a sort of antithesis to the great Roman "Propaganda," Oliver Cromwell devised the scheme of a Protestant organisation having some of the very features of this one of the Alliance, and that he made some efforts in one line at least in which the latter has been operating, in what he did toward procuring toleration for persecuted Protestants on the continent of Europe. His idea of the scheme referred to was in advance of

his times, and worthy of the man whom one of England's greatest modern writers (Lord Macaulay) has styled the greatest of England's rulers.

We have aimed in this article, with a great deal of labor, to place the Alliance organisation fairly, and as fully as possible in the space we could take for the purpose, within the cognisance of our readers.

ARTICLE V.

EVANGELIZATION OF THE COLORED PEOPLE.

This is a subject which is laid upon the consciences of the Christian people of the Southern States by the Head of the Church, and a work which, without controversy, is preëminently theirs. It is a subject, too, in which they have always felt and exhibited a deep interest. Of the Presbyterian Church in particular, the repeated action of its courts in the past, the labors of its ministry and of its private members, evince the attention and interest it has always awakened among us as a Christian denomination. And whilst we do not profess to have done all that it deserved at our hands, we think we may profess to have felt its claims, and to have sought amid its difficulties to discharge our duty therein with sincerity and fidelity. And whatever knowledge of God's truth and salvation these people possess, which we apprehend is underrated, evidently they have received from the Christians among whom they have lived. They were not a few who gave themselves to this Christian labor almost exclusively, and with a spirit of devotion not often surpassed, whilst the Church of God, in all its branches, has uniformly encouraged and aided it; nor has this labor in the Lord been in vain. It is therefore to us no new subject, or one in which it is needful to awaken an interest; but it is one which, by wise and prayerful counsel, we should seek to comprehend amid its present confessed

difficulties and new complications, and to enter upon in the spirit and in the faith of the gospel.

The relation between the two races, it is true, is greatly altered by the emancipation of the colored people. The ties between them previous to this were of a positive character, and as permanent too as almost any social tie; and these ties of ownership and dependence naturally encouraged kindness and friendship, and invited Christian interest and effort. Now they exist no longer. The races have been put asunder by the arbitrament of the sword, and this separation increased to positive alienation in many instances, by political animosities, engrafted on the natural distinction of the races, and inflamed by wicked and self-seeking spirits. Old friendships have in not a few instances been broken up, and been succeeded by a loss of confidence and positive estrangement. The two races are now fast finding each its own sphere, and these are distinct and different. And when the old homesteads are all broken up, old associations changed, and old friends and friendships dead, there will be nothing of the former intimacy of the two races. Before another generation shall have passed away, all the opportunities afforded by the former relation of the races for Christian activity and usefulness will have disappeared. And it is not without a feeling of sadness that we witness and have watched this drifting apart. There is danger, too, that with it we let go the opportunities that yet remain of benefiting this race, and give up altogether the work which, as Christians, we should do among them. For though altered, there are considerations and claims now existing, which should lead the Southern Church to address itself to this work with energy and with hope. Indeed, there are considerations, and that of the most weighty character, never existing when they were slaves, which bid us enter upon this field of Christian enterprise and labor.

This race is among us, and has been admitted, whether wisely or not it is useless to inquire, to all the rights, responsibilities, and privileges of full citizenship in our common country. And only by enlightening and Christianizing them can we hope that they will understand and discharge these to them new obligations, either with credit to themselves or safety to us. This difficulty is

increased, too, by the instinct of race, which is liable to be a fruitful source of antagonism, political and social, when excited, as it is, by designing men. Nothing can regulate the intercourse of the two races in their different and yet related spheres, like the teachings and restraints of the gospel. Besides, they have, in their present position, opportunities of improved action, of a degree of Christian enlightenment and influence, which they did not and could not have possessed in an estate of bondage. They have, of consequence, within reach, a degree of usefulness in the Christian world, which they never had, probably, in any age of their past history. Not only may they become the principal factors in the evangelization and Christian elevation of their own race in this country, but there is open to them a continent for the exercise of Christian effort and enterprise. There is a growing emigration from this country to Liberia, already a colony of respectable size and prospects. Here is a basis for projecting a most hopeful and active scheme for Christianizing the continent of Africa through the agency of this race, fitted for its work in this country. It may not be long, nor should it be, till colored men are trained and sent out from this country, especially for the missionary work in Africa. Why should not this be prosecuted along with, or as immediately growing out of, their evangelization in the United States? But as imperative on this subject, and beyond which we need not go, we have the great commission of our Lord, "Preach the gospel to every creature," "Disciple all nations." If we have the Spirit of Christ, nothing less than obedience to this command, and a faithful effort to do what we are thus bidden, and in the spirit we are bidden, will satisfy our consciences. This parting commission of our ascended Redeemer, with the coupled assurance, "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world," is the grand inscription which the Christian Church carries on its banners, and under which we go forth conquering and to conquer. In this particular work it is true there are some difficulties of a peculiar and delicate character, which may require much of the wisdom and patience of the gospel, and yet there are corresponding advantages which greatly facilitate the work; for the colored people already have a consider-

ble acquaintance with the Christian religion; they are among us, where they are of easy access, and susceptible to the silent but mighty power of example and social religious influence; they speak our tongue, and they are taught in our schools. So that it is natural and easy, comparatively, to throw into these channels of influence the healing properties of the gospel, and bring them as a race to a state of religious knowledge and improvement, where they would no longer need material aid, but take their place among the Christian people of the world. In addition, as we reflect on the past history of this race, are not Southern Christians constrained to take part in this work by feelings of respect, and even of gratitude, for the past fidelity and good-will which, as a class, they displayed when in bondage to us? They served us for generations past, and with the most remunerative and valuable returns. No people ever made better servants, or ever served with more fidelity and loyalty, and often with the strongest personal attachments to the homes and families of their owners. And no people certainly ever exhibited more peaceableness and kindly consideration for their owners and their families during the prevalence of a civil war, than they; and this, too, when every motive was present to lead them to treachery and insurrection. And even since, when we reflect upon the means used to awaken prejudice toward the whites, and inflame their passions, they have been remarkably free from serious social disorder. There is special consideration and forbearance merited by them from the white people of the South; and, of all others, we should be first to engage in a Christian work whereby we may show them that we cherish no feelings of animosity toward them, and whereby we may hope to foster in them the spirit of mutual kindness and esteem.

But it may be said we have already had this subject under consideration. So we have. But confessedly we have never reached any satisfactory solution of it. We have not proved it to be an impracticable undertaking. In fact, no plan has been adopted which has elicited the approval and active support of the Church. We have but about half a dozen organised churches among the four millions of colored people in the South,

with a few colored members in the churches for the whites. We make no special appropriations for them. There is no ministry laboring specially in their behalf; and in fact, as an organised Church, we are doing almost nothing. Of course there are isolated instances where individual ministers or churches are active, and some of these efforts are attended with a most encouraging degree of success. We say this not as censure, for there need be no surprise that we have found difficulty in dealing with a subject of so novel and serious character. The sudden emancipation of this race revolutionised our entire social system, and was pregnant with results which nobody could anticipate. It was nothing less than impossible to legislate wisely at such a period, and in prospect of the forthcoming wants and conditions of the colored people. The storm through which we had come had not subsided sufficiently for us to see clearly or consider calmly.

We confess that we ourselves have never been satisfied with the action of our Church on this subject. But there has been little evidence of any disposition to reconsider its action until the present. It is to be hoped, as it must now receive the attention of our Assembly, that we may be guided to a course that will be the means of reviving a fresh interest on this subject, and of calling forth the active, concerted support of our whole Church.

In considering this subject, the whole question, it appears to us, turns upon the inquiry, *Shall we attempt to do this work by keeping the colored and the white races together, or shall we treat them as a separate and distinct race*, and so pursue the same course towards them in the work of evangelization as towards all other races which we are seeking to Christianize? The first of these plans prevailed in the counsels of our Church. It was argued that they were already associated with the whites in the same churches, and to retain them in this relation, was to secure to them an educated ministry, the guidance of an intelligent eldership, and the influence and example of an enlightened Christian people. In fact, it was asserted that to attempt anything like an independent organisation, was to remand them to superstition and barbarism. This plan was so modified at length, as to permit the organisation of congregations of colored people un-

der the supervision of pastors or evangelists of the white race, and through them to allow these churches representation in our courts. This arrangement did not anticipate an introduction of the colored people into the office of the ministry, or into any other office, except when in numbers sufficient for a separate organisation. It was not fitted to bring about anything like independent and active Christian exertion and enterprise on the part of the inferior race. They could not hope to reach the degree of education and religious knowledge of the white people; or, under this plan, to enter the ministry except in rare cases; or to occupy any office when ecclesiastically united with the dominant race; or when in office, to have any authority in the higher ecclesiastical courts of our Church. We say that such a scheme was in no wise calculated to inspire a spirit of independent or vigorous Christian activity and usefulness. It was not adopted, indeed, as a repressive measure to deprive the colored race of any rights they ought to possess, or were qualified to exercise, but as the best disposition of this difficult subject. That it was defective, its history too well proves. It awakened no degree of energetic response on the part of either race, and has served no purpose, with the exception probably of keeping together a few congregations which we had already among this people. It involved a condition for its success which it was folly to expect, namely, that a race actually independent, and possessed of every social and civil right that we claimed, should consent to remain dependent and subordinate in their ecclesiastical relation. It was a condition, too, which forever debarred this race, not intentionally so much as in fact, from attaining any degree of usefulness or authority in the Church of God. For, conceal or justify it as we will, no people ever became eminent or efficient to the extent to which they were capable, who were subordinate and dependent upon a superior and dominant race.

It appears plain to the mind of the writer, therefore, that we should confer upon them all the rights and privileges to which any people are entitled in the word of God, and pursue a course toward them that will incite them to seek the best gifts, and will give them the fullest latitude in all honorable and Christian ef-

forts to attain influence and usefulness in the Church of God. We should not demand or desire to see them or any other people placed under any restrictions, or any repressive relations or measures, other than those that God fixes. When they were in bondage, their religious connection with us was determined by the conditions of this relation. Now they occupy the same position of independence as any other race, and we must treat them accordingly. If, therefore, we should recognise this fact in our religious associations with them, the same inquiry recurs—Shall we give them in the Church a position in every respect the same with ours, and still retain them in the same ecclesiastical organisation with us; or shall they be encouraged to form a distinct and separate organisation of their own?

If they and we are to continue ecclesiastically one, under the same spiritual authority and with the same spiritual rights and privileges, shall we have mixed congregations? Shall the two races, commingled in the same edifice, be ruled by mixed sessions, and be ministered to by a white or colored man, as the mixed congregations may elect? This, we believe, has never been advocated by the most ardent friend of keeping the races together. The statement of it is its refutation. Two races so dissimilar, so unequal, and so opposite in many things, could never intermingle in religious bodies agreeably and profitably. The natural differences between the two races makes such a thing impossible. To undertake it would be an exhibition of fanaticism or practical folly, of which we trust no element of our people are capable. They must then be organised into separate congregations, as the plan already in existence among us contemplates; be governed by sessions of their own race; and (upon presumption that they shall be introduced into the ministry as fast as they may be qualified) be ministered to whenever possible by preachers of their own color—all of which would be preferred as certainly and as naturally by them as the like conditions would be by us as a race. Then all that remains to keep the two races together is the conjoint bond and authority of the higher courts, and the only recognition of it is here. And admitting that this even would be agreeable in all its features, what in fact would it amount to?

Why, simply, that in measures affecting either class particularly—and there would certainly be such measures—that class would decide them that might be specially interested, and the other quietly acquiesce. The history of the two races could not be identical, and the necessities of the one would not always be those of the other. This would amount to each race governing itself, which is in fact and really a separate organisation, unencumbered by the dead and disagreeable incubus of a formal unity. And if any question should arise—for example, the propriety of mixed Church schools—that was a question between the races, the unnatural union would be speedily ruptured, and each race would welcome a separate existence as a happy solution of their difficulties. Beside this, there would be of necessity required a modification of our Form of Government, to adapt it in all respects to a race so much inferior in actual cultivation and attainments. This we could not agree to make, without lowering our standards in our own esteem, and making a descent which would be greatly out of harmony with our past history. In fact, the troubles of such an ecclesiastical union between the races, nobody could anticipate or provide for. Let us therefore consider the question of a separate organisation, the only inquiry on the subject that is left us.

In contemplating the necessity and wisdom of a distinctly organised Church for the colored people as the best method of promoting their evangelization and Christian elevation, it may be well to remind ourselves that separation is not schism, neither does it always produce animosity of feeling or imply its existence. We do not, therefore, cast any reflection on our own body, or attach any stigma to those we would propose to send out from us. If two are not agreed, they had better not company together, even though no ill will exists. It is a wise step to prevent disagreement and disturbance, which come of the jarring of heterogeneous and contiguous material, and which can only be avoided when each has play for its own individuality. To encourage a separate organisation, therefore, will not alienate them from us, or put them beyond our influence and assistance; but on the contrary, place them in a position in which we may most effectually encourage, counsel, and aid them, and that without re-

tarding or interrupting our own well-being. Let us observe some of the reasons for such a course, and see whether, with the difficulties attending any other, we are not satisfied that the providence of God opens the way for the satisfactory solution of this vexed question, by organising them into a distinct and separate body of Christians.

First. These two races are socially separate. They have not in the past, nor will they ever in the future, mingle together as one race. There is a difference, and that difference is natural and real, which will always prohibit everything approaching a unification of the two races. This is so palpable nobody denies it. All the avenues leading toward this result are guarded by natural instinct and natural laws, which are dominant and imperative. These cannot be overridden, and have a ground in the very natures which we possess. And it is fool-hardy to run our ecclesiastical arrangements into collision with the well known and long established laws of man's actual history and nature. These differences, too, are such as manifestly prevent the union of the two races, and particularly as they exist with us, in the same ecclesiastical organisation, with the same rights and privileges, without doing violence to the instincts which in both races preserve social separation and distinction. The harmony, the comfort, the efficiency, and the edification of both classes must be seriously interrupted and impaired. The power of religion as a social principle, will be limited and disturbed. The duties of the pastoral office, for example, can never be discharged with the same degree of acceptance and profit where the pastor is of one race and the people of another. There is not that identity and sympathy between them which is necessary to the highest degree of efficiency in this office. In the sessions of our ecclesiastical bodies, too, there would be difficulties from this source, which would make it impossible to harmonise the two elements as the constituent parts of the same body. In our schools of learning, from the lowest to the highest, there would be trouble on the same score. The social difficulties of this question, it seems to us, can be settled only by establishing a separate organisation for each race. This will not debar that kind and degree of religious

intercourse between the races which is agreeable and profitable, and it will not necessitate any which is forbidden by natural instinct.

Second. The races are naturally and by cultivation unequal. The difference between them in point of mind and general culture, as well as in purely religious knowledge and attainments, is such as to require a different practical policy and system of legislation. The same principles must be modified to be made applicable to both races, and practical measures must be often entirely different. It would require, in general, principles of a rudimental kind, and a policy calculated to nurture and develop religious character in its primary forms, when dealing with the colored people. Our system of ministerial education, for example, is perfected with an eye to the wants of an enlightened and educated people. To insist upon precisely the same forms of trial to secure a faithful and competent ministry from the colored race in its present state, would be virtually to exclude them from this office altogether. There must be some wise modification of our specific requirements on this subject, therefore, for the colored people. But no such modification is required for us as a race, nor are we prepared to make any. In the provisions that are made for the support of the ministry, it would not be wise to have the same practical rules for each class. The difference in the habits of life of the two races are such as to make a difference in the provisions for their support advisable. This it would be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to do with satisfaction, if in the same organisation. It would seem that under these circumstances it would be best to let each race, with the measure of grace and knowledge dispensed to it, direct its own course under the guidance of God's word. A race which is decidedly superior in intelligence and influence, will naturally seek to govern one that is inferior; and yet the interests, particularly of a religious character, of the inferior race cannot be appreciated and provided for in this way as by the inferior race itself.

Third. A separate organisation would enlist the interest and support of other Presbyterian bodies than ourselves. It is not to be presumed that the differences which divide the Presbyterian

family among us, would perpetuate themselves in an organisation among the colored race. Some possess a historical origin, some a sectional, and some a more purely doctrinal. However important we conceive them to have been and still to be, as bearing witness against error, and though it may be deemed important that they shall continue, it will not be contended, we presume, by any, that in organising a church which, by a distinction of race, will be separated from all, we should disturb its peace and destroy its unity, and with it impair its efficiency, by forcing upon it the questions which have divided us. These questions they could not fully understand; and if they could, the benefit of such differences, as historical facts, might be obtained without perpetuating them. To place in their hands the honored and revered standards which in substance all Presbyterians adopt, and leave them at peace among themselves and in favor with all other Presbyterian bodies—to do a work among their own race which is even now importuning the Christian world—is certainly the policy which we should pursue. And if a different course be pursued, there must be a want of harmony and coöperation, if no disagreeable conflict, which will retard the work and make it necessarily more expensive. It does appear, therefore, that every effort should be used to secure a degree of harmony and efficient coöperation in this work which will insure the support of all good people in the Presbyterian bodies of this country. This could not be done if they are identified in organisation with any one of these bodies.

Fourth. The colored people themselves greatly prefer a separate organisation.* In fact we may truly say, they demand it; not in a disagreeable sense, but they evidently show that such are their feelings and views on this subject, that nothing else will satisfy them. Whether they have formally and intelligently considered the whole question or not, they know and feel enough, and sufficiently manifest it, to satisfy any observant and considerate mind that this is what they prefer. In fact it is so predominant and decided, that it overrides all denominational preferences they may have. A colored Church with any spirit of life and activity, will absorb the colored Christian element of any community among

us to such an extent, that a question upon this subject cannot longer be entertained. Such a fact is stubborn, and it will inevitably decide this whole matter. It is perfectly useless to reason with it or oppose it. It is a fact which all the circumstances of their past and present relations to us, together with actual race distinctions, have bred and continue to sustain. Under it they have already deserted, as a race, the ministry of the whites, and withdrawn pretty much from our churches. Nor is it by any means certain, that because they are an inferior race, they should be kept under the tuition of the whites in religion. Capability of any kind is not acquired in its highest degree, or even in any respectable degree, without individual and independent exertion. And though blunders and losses may attend such efforts at first, an equilibrium will be acquired by experience, self-confidence and practical knowledge gradually attained, and the foundation for true excellence laid. To support a child when old enough to walk alone, may indeed save it a few bruises, but would soon fill our houses with helpless and worthless youth. Never to trust one who is imperfect in knowledge and self-government, is to insure dependence and inefficiency. It is an instinct of nature to cultivate independence, where it should be exercised, and a wise one. We need not, therefore, be surprised, or condemn as folly the manifest disposition of the colored people to prefer for themselves a separate religious organisation.

Fifth. The experiment of a separate organisation has proved successful where fairly tried. A sufficient number of years have elapsed since their liberation, to allow of some actual trial to be made of the feasibility and wisdom of such a measure. The right to assume an attitude of ecclesiastical independence certainly belongs to any class of people. This the colored people have been led to do. The congregational forms of Church government encouraged it; and to avoid questions of property and discipline, which might array the two classes against each other, it was a necessity in the minds of many. The difficulties did not exist to the same extent in some other denominations as in ours. Hence the disposition toward a separate organisation found exercise, and a respectable element of them exist now as distinct churches.

And though there were follies and excesses in abundance when they first attempted to conduct their own religious services, which might have been expected and were not greater than might have been anticipated of any people in the same circumstances, there has been a degree of improvement, and of success we may say, which establishes the fact that they are susceptible of a separate religious existence.* This experiment, too, has been made not under the most favorable circumstances. The political animosities that have alienated the races, have interrupted and disturbed all kinds of intercourse, and prevented that amount of support and aid which the white race, as a Christian people, might have rendered. It is very manifest, too, that with the present degree of success, they will continue to go forward under the denominational auspices by which they were organised, to become more perfect and influential as separate churches. And these organisations will by degrees absorb the entire colored population. This is only a question of time. And unless we are disposed, yea, determined, not to do anything in this work, but to leave it to itself and to other hands altogether, we must exert our efforts in the line of a separate organisation. This is plain from their current religious history. To question it longer is impossible; and if such a step is justifiable at all, it appears to be in this case. To give it, therefore, a fair trial, under a wise and Christian policy, is all that remains to us; and we are encouraged in this course by the degree of success already attained by those who have adopted it. Let us therefore briefly consider the method of accomplishing this end, the establishment of an independent colored Presbyterian Church.

We may revert to the general principles of evangelization which are given us by divine authority, and through apostolic example, and apply them with such modification as the circum-

* The Bishop of the colored Methodist Church, at a General Conference recently held at Augusta, Ga., reported 14 Annual Conferences, over 600 travelling preachers, and a membership of 70,000. The colored Baptist churches have their Associations in all the Southern States; and the Cumberland Presbyterians (colored) have recently taken measures to organise a General Assembly.

stances of the case may dictate. *First.* The living minister, endowed with authority and commissioned by the Church of God, is sent forth to preach the gospel, to call men to faith in Christ, and repentance toward God. *Second.* The fruits of such ministrations, under the divine blessing, are, as they appear, gathered together and organised into distinct and separate churches. *Third.* These churches are kept under the tuition and control of those establishing them, till they become capable of a separate and self-supporting existence, when, with the word of God, the authority and ordinances of his Church, and with a living and native ministry, they are left under the guidance of the Spirit of Christ, to preserve their own existence and perpetuate their own history. These are principles of divine authority, and they have become well approved in the history of the Church, and they have their application to the subject in hand.

1. In the organisation of a separate Presbyterian Church for the colored people, *evangelists must be appointed to engage in this work, and to prosecute it with all the energy it shall demand.* The nature of this office, as understood among us, is such as the necessity of this work requires. The evangelist may be intrusted with authority to take active measures to bring this enterprise fairly before the minds of the colored people themselves, and enlist the good-will and coöperation of the whites; to gather up and to organise into churches the scattered Presbyterians among this race, and to make some provision for regular religious service among them. There were reported in the Minutes of the Assembly for 1860, as the total number of colored communicants, 13,837. These were almost exclusively in the States now included in the territorial boundary of our Church. How many of these could be found now who recognise their connection with the Presbyterian Church, is very doubtful. Wherever they were found in sufficient numbers, however, they might be immediately organised into a separate church, encouraged to hold religious meetings of their own, under supervision of their elders, aided in building plain and neat houses of worship, and provided with the preaching of the gospel at intervals at least; this latter, whenever possible, from ministers of their own Church and color; but valuable

assistance could be rendered in this service, and in fact in all parts of this plan, by ministers of our own Church. It would of course be most important to enlist the ministry and the churches of our own race in this work. For such organisations among the colored people will need much assistance in the instruction of Bible-classes, in Sabbath-schools, conducting religious services, etc., besides counsel and pecuniary aid. This could be very efficiently rendered by adjoining congregations of our own Church. And whilst it might be necessary, from want of qualification and experience on their part, to use as evangelists at first, almost, if not altogether, men from our own race, it would certainly be desirable to use colored men whenever they could be found of proper qualifications. The power of a native ministry we cannot overestimate in all this work, as valuable in prosecuting the work itself, and in preparing and proving a ministry to whom it may gradually be intrusted. A few of these we have already in the bounds of our Church, and doubtless there are others who are prepared to be useful in the ministry among their own people, and still others who might soon become so under any system which might be adopted as preparatory to the ministry. But even a few, by large circuits, might do a great deal to aid in such an enterprise. They would be most invaluable assistants in this whole work. And whenever, in the prosecution of this work of organisation, there were found a sufficient number of churches contiguous to form a Presbytery with any constitutional propriety, it would of course be done, and these, whenever possible, would be organised into a Synod, and thus the work might be put upon a footing to a greater or less degree self-supporting; and with what counsel and aid might still be necessary, would take its place by degrees among the Presbyterian Churches of our country, to do the work especially among its own race and people, which the Head of the Church would indicate.

2. An additional and most important branch of this work, and indeed a vital one, is that of *raising up a native ministry among them*. This has become a principle of evangelization well established in the history of the Church. Native assistants, and a native ministry, as early as the material is present, is brought

into active exercise in all our missionary operations, as an essential condition to real success. To ignore this in the particular instance we are considering, is nothing less than certain failure. How this is to be done, so as to obtain any number of ministers from the colored people, in their present state of enlightenment, and yet not do violence to our standards, which require a high degree of educational culture, is doubtless a difficulty, and one which has been seriously in the way whenever this subject has been broached. And yet this difficulty must be solved by us. To sever our connection with them abruptly, in order to avoid this, would be very unjust to them and unjust to ourselves. It would be only dodging the difficulty, in truth, and leaving them without the proper knowledge or any experience to provide a ministry for themselves. This course would be fruitful of many serious and evil consequences in their history, and would certainly not be creditable to us. To organise them as they are, into a distinct and independent Church, would be to organise them without a ministry virtually, which, to say the least of it, would certainly be more decidedly in contravention of our system of government, and much more objectionable in itself, than to aid in providing a ministry for them, which, not attaining our standard, would be capable of discharging the duties of this office acceptably to them, and with some practical wisdom and propriety. And even if by slow and uncertain steps, they could reach the point at length of a respectable organisation from their present state, without our aid, they would certainly attain the same end more certainly, more safely, and more speedily, through our counsel and guidance, than alone. They need guidance and assistance in many respects; but particularly do they need it in this important, yea, most important, duty, of providing a faithful ministry from among themselves. That we should become, therefore, positively and earnestly active in securing this end is, to the mind of the writer, as unquestionable and as necessary, as that we should do anything at all for them. In fact, any effort toward organising them into a separate Church, which did not look to providing for this necessity, would be objectionable and comparatively worth-

less. It would be an organism without its most valuable conditions of success.

To provide a ministry for them, would require a modification of our ministerial training, and of our conditions of licensure and ordination, it is true. It would be not for ourselves, however, nor would it in any way reflect upon or interfere with the working of our system, as applicable to ourselves. It would be for a different people, in a different stage of religious development. It would be only analogous to the course we pursue in our missionary fields abroad, and would in no greater degree impair the integrity and wisdom of our standards. In truth, the conditions of the case are such, and the necessity for a modified system of rules in this particular so apparent, that no Presbytery would even now, we apprehend, hesitate to license or ordain any number of colored men who were, to its satisfaction, qualified to instruct their own race in the knowledge of God's word, and lead them in the ways of life and godliness. It is one of those cases in which such a course is without question necessary, and has its justification upon its face. Such modification, however, should be wise and cautious. There should be at the outset, forms of trial for ordination in particular, which would require a respectable degree of mental capacity and cultivation, a creditable knowledge of the Scriptures and of evangelical religion, an intelligent acquaintance with the system of doctrine and church-government of the Presbyterian Church, and all this coupled with a blameless and consistent Christian character. There should be entire satisfaction given that all candidates for this sacred office are qualified to make useful ministers of the gospel among their own people, before they are introduced into it. This modification might be simply to fix a minimum standard for the present emergency, leaving any final and permanent change to be made by them, if necessary, when the organisation was perfected. With such a modified system in the hands of a judicious and active agency, there would be found a number no doubt beyond our expectation, who might be licensed to preach, and who, after a satisfactory probation, and some additional preparation, would become useful in the full work of the ministry.

But this is not all in this direction which is incumbent on us ; there should be special facilities provided to this end. In other words, a school or schools should be established and equipped, which would afford the opportunities for attaining the preparation for the ministry which they may require. This is essential. It will not answer for them any more than for us, to be left to attain the preparation needed, in any way they can, or from any source that may be available. These schools might be established on a basis somewhat similar to our academies of olden time, affording a Christian education at small expense to all of this class who would avail themselves of it, and in addition providing a special course preparatory to the ministry. This would not only subserve the purpose particularly in view, but (which is most important in itself, and invaluable as laying a groundwork for real success in establishing a separate organisation,) it would afford the opportunity of a Christian education to this race, and that of a kind and degree which they now find with great difficulty, if at all. Of course, such schools would pass into the possession and the control of the colored people as soon as they were capable of conducting them.

3. To establish a separate organisation for the colored people, *they must have pecuniary aid.* The dissemination of the preached gospel among them, the support of those who are the active agents in the work of organisation, the erection of houses of worship, the establishment of a school or schools to help them forward in Christian education and to a respectable ministry, all these claims are necessary, and must be responded to ; and even though conducted on the most economical scale, will require considerable pecuniary expenditure, and certainly more than the colored people themselves can supply. To meet this demand, we would say that as a Church there should be a yearly appropriation by us to this cause, and in proportion to its relative claims. It would seem that we should at least be as liberal in seeking to evangelize a race at our doors, and in whom we ought to and do feel a special interest, as we are in sending the gospel to a purely foreign people. It would be a reproach to us if we were not. And we are satisfied that if such a plan were gotten on foot and made to ap-

pear at all feasible, no appropriation would be more heartily made. There are other Presbyterian bodies, it is to be presumed, who also feel an interest in this work, and who would materially aid in its prosecution. And there are individuals, too, in our own Church, and possibly in others, who feel a special interest in this class of people, and who would contribute their labor and liberally of their means. And of course the colored people themselves ought to be taught, among the first practical lessons given them, the necessity of self-help. No pecuniary aid should be so rendered as to militate against the cultivation of this grace among them, as one essential in their history, and essential to the divine blessing. In the matter of pastoral support, particularly, they should be thrown on their own resources as soon as possible.

4. To carry forward such an enterprise, with any degree of vigor and hope of success, *it should be conducted by the Assembly, through an agency of good and faithful men.* It ought to be conducted, without doubt, under the direction and authority of the General Assembly itself. This body represents the whole Church, and as such, every enterprise of this character, which should engage the attention and support of the whole Church, belongs of right to this court. This would secure for it the respectable consideration it deserves, both from our own Church and from other Churches; it would secure uniformity, concert, and definiteness in its conduct; and in general, if done under its direction, it will more likely be done wisely and well. To leave it altogether or chiefly to our lower courts, to aid as they might find it in their power, without any matured plan or countenance from the Assembly, is to neglect and slight the subject itself, and to encourage the same treatment from the Church in general; and it will be attended, with little or no valuable result as our action in the past. To leave it to the colored people themselves, is simply to intrust it to a class who are incapable of it, and it will consequently never be accomplished, if attempted in this way. They will fall in with some other organisation that has some active existence already among them, and we will virtually have discarded the whole work. The Assembly should take the matter in hand as meriting its serious and attentive consideration,

and as the court to whom it pertains, conduct it by its own authority and wisdom. To do this there must be a nexus, a connecting bond through which vitality shall flow to sustain this organization in embryo; till there is capacity for a separate and self-sustaining existence. To meet this want, there should be an active agency intrusted especially with it, and directly responsible to the Assembly. This agency should be endued with all the authority necessary to supervise and control the whole work as the executive representative of the Assembly. Whether this shall be the present Committee of Foreign Missions, or of Sustentation, or one appointed for this special purpose, would depend on the amount of attention it would require. By degrees, under the counsel of such an agency, the colored people themselves could be intrusted with the work, as they became competent for its discharge; and whenever the proper period arrived, the formal connection might be severed, and the separate organization be left alone under the guidance of the truth and spirit of Christ. This would enable us to secure the coöperation of all our lower courts, and in fact all of the ministry and people of our Church, and yet would be conducted as an enterprise by itself, without any complications, and without any disturbance in our own ecclesiastical organism. In the matter of ordination, for example, such an agency might, with all propriety, of itself, or in conjunction with additional ministers or elders, be constituted a Presbytery *quoad hoc*, and so require no action in the premises by our Presbyteries as such. This is the method adopted, we believe, uniformly, in substance, in all similar efforts to evangelize other races. There is no reason to depart from it in this case. If there are good reasons for seeking a separate Church for this race, though locally identified with us, there is the same reason for conducting it from the first so as to keep it distinct and separate. This would take the subject entirely out of the lower courts, avoid any disturbance arising from it, and be the most direct method of attaining the desired end.

We may sum up, in conclusion, our views upon this subject, as follows:

1. This work of the evangelization of the colored people can

only be done by us by organising a separate and distinct Church among them. And this, if to be done at all, cannot longer be postponed.

2. The method of organisation should be conducted by the General Assembly, by an agency of its own. This agency to be of such a kind, intrusted with such authority, and to conduct the enterprise in such a way as the Assembly may prescribe, and to be directly responsible to the Assembly therein.

3. The organisation of such a Church should be actively promoted by evangelists commissioned to labor especially for this class and to this end—preaching the gospel to them, gathering them together into organised congregations, providing for religious services therein, looking out from among them men who may be qualified for the ministry or be prepared for it, enlisting the coöperation of our own Church and race, and awakening an interest among the colored people themselves in this enterprise.

4. In the furtherance of this object, immediate and active measures should be inaugurated to provide for them a native ministry, as essential to its consummation. Any who may possess already suitable gifts and attainments for licensure or for ordination, should be introduced in these spheres of usefulness, by such trials as may appear necessary to secure good and faithful men in this office, and through such agency as the Assembly may appoint. For those who may seek preparation for this office, facilities for ministerial preparation should be provided, to fit them for filling it with acceptance and efficiency among their own class.

5. In carrying forward such an enterprise, all Presbyterians who are interested should be invited and encouraged to coöperate, that such a Presbyterian organisation may include all the Presbyterian element among the colored people in this country in one single and united Church.

What degree of success may be anticipated, if we do enter upon this important Christian work, it is impossible to say. It is not necessary, or best, possibly, that we should raise this question. That it will not be in vain, if entered upon and pursued in the spirit of our divine Master, we are assured; that it will be favored with an encouraging degree of visible success, we have

every reason to believe. Faithful labor for this race has been rewarded heretofore, and will without doubt continue to be. That a Presbyterian Church among them would equal in numbers that of some of the other denominations, we do not expect. But that we may, under God, be the means of organising a Church which, in its material, its influence, and its relative position among the Churches for the colored people, will be both respectable and efficient, we have every reason to hope and believe. If the Presbyterian Church has a mission to perform in the world at all, it has a mission to perform for this race too, it would seem to us, and one which might be as easily indicated. Certainly we have no reason to say otherwise till we have made an honest effort. And if we propose to do this at all, we must do it soon, or the opportunity will be gone.

ARTICLE VI.

A FURTHER EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN RECENT
ASSAULTS ON PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

One of the chief characteristics of the last hundred years has been the amazing activity and diligence with which God's material universe has been studied, and the consequent wonderful increase in man's knowledge concerning the laws and the history of that universe. Doubtless the extent of this knowledge is still very narrow in comparison with what may hereafter be acquired; but it is very wide when compared with what had been gained a hundred years ago. This is so familiar a truth to even the moderately well-informed that it is not necessary to undertake to prove it by entering into details. School-boys' orations are filled with glowing periods setting forth the wonders of the chemistry of the earth and the stars, of the electrical current as it obeys man's bidding, of that history of our globe in which man's creation is one of the most recent modern events. And nearly all that is known

concerning these and kindred subjects has been discovered during the century which has elapsed since 1774. Many of the isolated facts embraced in these branches of science were known long before; and the fundamental principle which underlies all true science—the law of uniformity—has in a certain sense been known since the first day of Adam's life; for it is an essential part of man's nature that he shall believe in this principle. But these facts were only imperfectly understood, and this principle had been only partially applied; so that chemistry, geology, etc., could not in any proper sense be said to exist as *sciences*. The increase in the knowledge of the classical languages and literature which characterised the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries has properly been called the "revival of learning," notwithstanding the fact that there was an unbroken succession of learned men from the age of Pericles in Greece and that of Augustus in Rome to the Medicean age and the days of Bessarion, Agricola, and Reuchlin. With much better reason may it be said that the whole circle of the natural sciences and many departments of physical science have come into existence within a little more than the last century.

Knowledge is power; and when classical learning revived and increased the number of its votaries, it put new power into their hands—power for good or power for evil, according to the character of him who wielded it. In all ages and in all lands those whose minds are, in the language of the Sacred Scriptures, "carnal," and therefore "enmity against God," have far outnumbered those whose souls have been brought into willing subjection to the law of God. So it was when classical learning revived; and the power which it gave was by many turned against the most precious truth—though it was in itself an inestimable good, it was employed in doing the greatest evil. Hence many well-meaning persons, sincere friends of truth, but only imperfectly acquainted with that which they attacked, vigorously assailed classical learning as itself a terrible evil and necessarily opposed to the Christian religion. The name "Humanist"—for so the learned were called—came to be regarded by multitudes as synonymous with "unbeliever" and "scoffer." Human learn-

ing, these good people urged, was to be shunned as that whose tendency was evil and evil only. They overlooked the fact that it was not the learning which was evil, but only the evil use of the learning; that the evil tendency was not in the learning, but in the soul of him who gave it the evil direction. So it has come to pass that we look back at these earnest efforts which were intended to defend what we love most—the revealed truth of God—with pity which is kept from passing into contempt only by our appreciation of the pure intentions which prompted them.

Those who thought they were defending the faith when they attacked learning, were by no means without some appearance of right on their side; and it was just such an appearance as would mislead their pious followers, who knew even less than themselves of the exact meaning of language and the many sides of truth. They could quote God's own word as saying: "Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." "Thy wisdom and thy knowledge, it hath perverted thee." "Knowledge puffeth up." "He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow." "The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God." "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world." How easy to misunderstand these and similar passages as warnings against all human learning! Therefore we should not too sharply reproach these well-meaning men, or fail to give them due credit for their good intentions; though we should not the less deplore the effect of their erroneous teaching that learning and faith are antagonistic—that the friend of human knowledge must be the enemy of God's revealed truth.

In like manner there have been multitudes of good men who from a partial view of the truth have regarded riches as a great evil, and have denounced them accordingly. Many of these have proved their sincerity by literal obedience to the test applied by our Lord to the young man whom He loved: they have "sold all that they had, and have distributed unto the poor;" and then have joyfully spent the rest of their lives in abject poverty. They have failed to perceive that it is not money, but the love of money,

that is the root of all evil. They have heard the words, "How hardly shall they that have riches enter into the kingdom of heaven!" but have neglected to listen to the explanation of them which was at once graciously given: "Children, how hard is it for them that trust in riches to enter into the kingdom of God!"

After this sad history, it cannot surprise us that physical science has been similarly perverted and similarly denounced. As it is unhappily true that the majority of men, even in so-called Christian lands, have not been converted to faith in Christ, so doubtless the majority of those who cultivate physical science are unconverted men. And as some unconverted men have in their assaults upon the Holy Bible employed classical learning and genius and wealth and labor, which are all in themselves good things and to be very highly prized, so unbelieving men of science have sought in their science for weapons against that body of truth which infinitely transcends all other in value and importance.

This has been attended with the usual consequences: as some good men thought that they were verily doing God service by denouncing classical learning, wealth, and other such things, so now some good men are found who honestly think that they are contending earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints when they raise the loud cry of warning against physical science as a whole or in its several parts. Like the worthy men before spoken of, they are perfectly sincere, and they mean well; and their pure aims should receive the just meed of commendation. But their aims, however pure and praiseworthy, do not make true that which is false; and even though good men, prompted by the best motives, shut their eyes to the truth, and diligently labor to destroy it, it is a happy thing that truth is of such a nature that it cannot be destroyed.

The conduct of men of science and learning, on the one hand, who contend that their learning and science are true, and that there is no other truth; and of believers in revelation, on the other, who contend that revelation is absolute truth, and that everything else is false or doubtful—must remind us of the trite but true illustration presented in the story of the contest between the two

noble knights before the shield of silver and gold. Those who open their eyes and are willing to see all that God's blessed light will show them, who walk around the shield and on all sides view its beauties, whether carved in shining silver or in resplendent gold, know that both are right in what they assert, both wrong in what they deny. Let us hope that the real combatants now contending for what each believes to be the truth in science and in religion—for what *is* truth, though only partial—may not have the discovery of the existence of both silver and golden sides postponed until, biting the dust, it shall be too late to use the perfect shield against a common foe.

The deplorable effects produced by these assaults on science are painfully manifest wherever they have been habitually made. Many are accustomed to refer to countries under Roman Catholic influence to illustrate this point. And it is true, as a general thing, that a larger proportion of the Romish priesthood than of the Protestant ministry have been strenuous opponents of learning. In Italy, France, and Spain, the fact that so large a proportion of men of learning during the last few generations have been infidels, may be fairly attributed, to a considerable degree, to this opposition on the part of the Romish Church. The inhabitants of these lands have been taught to regard science as infidelity, its principles as inconsistent with Christianity; hence, when any of them come to see clearly that science is truth, and that its principles are those which necessarily control every act of their lives, they are forced to reject as a fable whatever comes in conflict with it, as their religious teachers tell them Christianity does. This does not render guiltless their denial of the shield's priceless golden side, but it certainly palliates the guilt. But how unutterably sad is this spectacle—the professed guardians of the truth which reveals the way of life, driving to eternal death those who come asking them what they shall do to be saved!

But while we recognise these facts in Romish lands, we cannot as Protestants thank God that in this respect we are not as other men are. We do not forget that it was a Romish court that condemned as infidel the teachings of Galileo; we do not forget that, during a visit to a college in Rome as late as 1856,

one of the professors held up his hands in holy horror when we inquired who was the Professor of Geology—with amazement (perhaps feigned) he asked how we could think that that infidel science could be taught in a college under the immediate control of the Papal government! But we remember also that the Protestant Luther bluntly pronounced Copernicus a fool; that Melancthon went as far as the Romish court in condemning infidel science—that is, the Copernican system; and that the great Presbyterian theologian, Turretin, in his teachings was not a whit behind either. That we may do no injustice, let us further remember that Copernicus dedicated his great work to Pope Paul III., who graciously accepted the dedication; that in later days, within forty years, but while the Papal temporal power was in full vigor, Cardinal Wiseman delivered in Rome his admirable lectures in which he earnestly maintains the truth of the Scriptures and the truth of modern science; and that to-day, in the famous Roman Catholic College at Maynooth in Ireland, the Professor of Theology, Dr. Molloy, does the same thing, showing “that the study of God’s works is not incompatible with the belief in God’s Word; and that it is quite possible to investigate the ancient history of the world we inhabit without forfeiting our right to a better.” While therefore we may on the whole claim for Protestantism some superiority in this matter, surely, in view of the facts just mentioned, that superiority is not so marked as to afford very good ground for vain-glorious boasting.

In Great Britain, in Switzerland, in North America, and in Germany, though perhaps to a more limited extent in the country last named when compared with the great number of its learned authors, there have been numerous writers, both ministers and laymen, who, after becoming acquainted with both sides of the question, have labored faithfully and successfully in showing that Christianity and modern science are not at variance. Some of these writers have no doubt pursued erroneous methods and reached untenable conclusions; but of what can this not be said? The general result of their labors has been most happy—directly, in promoting the reception of the truth; and indirectly, in removing obstacles which would prevent its reception.

But on the other hand, in all these Protestant lands there are not a few religious teachers who are continually bringing railing accusations against natural science—who habitually denounce it in the most sweeping manner as vain philosophy and science falsely so called, as utterly opposed to all the blessed truths made known to us in God's word. From what has been already said, the baleful influence of such teachings may be easily inferred. And the inference drawn is confirmed by facts which may be observed by any who may desire. As we need hardly say, many Christian pulpits are occupied by those who are too well-informed to have any disposition to attack any part of God's truth; but we must confess, from personal observation in this and other lands, that many others combine with the preaching of the gospel the indiscriminating denunciation of all modern science as infidel. Of course no single observer could determine the relative prevalence of such teachings in different lands; but it has been our lot to hear them most frequently from German pulpits; next in frequency come pulpits in the United States, North and South; occasionally we have heard them from the lips of Swiss pastors among their own mountains; and never in the churches of Great Britain. What are the inevitable effects produced by such preaching on all who know what modern science is, but who are seeking instruction as to the truth of the Christian religion? Here again observation would discover these effects to be most deplorable. We number not a few amongst our most honored friends whom nothing could induce to enter a church, because their experience has taught them that if they were to enter, they would not fail to hear themselves pronounced infidels or atheists, along with all others who accept scientific truth. As one of these friends once said to us, when justifying his refusal to attend church, he had not in former years found it beneficial to his moral character or in any way edifying to listen to such falsehood taught in the name of God.

It might be said that the errors thus proclaimed from the pulpit should be allowed to pass by unheeded, and the sound religious truth accepted. But every one knows that in most instances this is not done and cannot be expected. The hearer

will take it for granted that, however ignorant of science the preacher may be, he is at least acquainted with the religion of which he is a professed teacher. When this teacher, professing to speak as God's ambassador, solemnly pronounces religion and science inconsistent with each other, the hearer, knowing the truth of science, rejects religion—and, fearful consequence, loses his own soul. But though the preacher desires beyond all else the salvation of his hearers by bringing them to the knowledge of the truth as it is in Jesus, has he not in such a case helped to prevent the rescue of that soul from eternal death?

It is the truth involved in this terrible question which gives importance to the subject under discussion. It is not a difference about mere words, or a dispute on some doubtful point in science or philosophy, or even such matters as separate one evangelical denomination of Christians from another; all which may be quite important in a certain sense, but which dwindle into insignificance by the side of that with which we here have to do. Assuming, as must be done by all who care to engage in such a discussion, that faith in the Lord Jesus Christ and therefore in the Scriptures which testify of him, means salvation—life everlasting, bliss forever in the presence of God; and that the denial of the Scriptures and therefore the rejection of the crucified Messiah, means eternal death—weeping and wailing and gnashing of teeth, where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched;—assuming this, and the appalling magnitude of the subject is at once seen. Who then can blame those who believe that modern science leads to the rejection of the Scriptures, for the most solemn and earnest warnings against science? And, on the other hand, since we know that these warnings and the teachings connected with them are certain to lead persons properly informed as to the truth of science, but who believe that such teachings fairly represent the Scriptures, necessarily to reject the Scriptures, should we be blamed for strenuously resisting these erroneous doctrines, and exposing their errors with unsparing hand, even though it should bring us into personal collision with those whom we most highly esteem? Should we not most earnestly strive to save all whom we can influence from the

fatal error that they must abandon the science they know to be truth in order to secure the salvation through the Saviour revealed in the Sacred Scriptures?

Under the influence of such feelings and motives as these, we undertook in the number of this journal for July, 1873, a careful examination of certain recent assaults on physical science. These assaults, as seen above, unhappily have not been confined to a single part of the world; but, as our object was wholly practical, we thought it was hardly worth while to examine them in the forms in which they have been presented on the other side of the Atlantic, or even in the remoter parts of the United States. Our hope was primarily to influence those who are connected with our own branch of the Church of Christ; and we therefore chose for examination the views earnestly and continuously set forth by one whom we regard as their ablest defender in our Church. As the promotion of truth was our only aim, we chose the publications of one who could most easily and successfully prove us in error, if we are in error. Most gladly would we accept defeat in all our arguments, if these are not in accordance with the truth of God. Such were our reasons for choosing for examination the numerous publications of the Rev. Dr. Dabney: a gentleman who for talent and zeal and earnestness and many estimable qualities deserves to be highly honored by all who know him; and who is capable of exposing our errors and saving others from injury by them, should we be resisting the truth and endeavoring to lead others astray.

In the article referred to, we attempted to prove that the objections which Dr. Dabney has for many years (in our opinion) been urging against physical science, are without foundation, and therefore that no one should be influenced by him to assume a hostile attitude towards that department of knowledge. We examined his arguments in detail, and think it was made clear that he has gravely erred. Since he is justly regarded as an accurate reasoner on many subjects, we deemed it proper to account for his errors by pointing out his want of acquaintance with science. If a writer is not acquainted with the subject he is discussing, it surely would be unwise to follow his lead—the ante-

cedent probability is that he will certainly go astray, however splendid his abilities or accurate his judgment when exercised upon matters with which he is conversant. Except for this reason, there would have been no propriety in calling attention to Dr. Dabney's want of familiarity with natural science. But when we had to choose between this course, and the giving up of a good reason for warning our readers against following his teachings on this subject, we could not hesitate. When in his "Memoir" published in 1866, he said, "The spirit of these sciences is essentially infidel and rationalistic; they are arrayed, in all their phases, on the side of scepticism;" (*Central Presbyterian*, Oct. 31, 1866;) and in his Lectures, that the "tendencies of geologists" are "atheistic," (Lectures, p. 178;) and when we saw that the general acceptance of these statements by teachers of Christianity, must inevitably drive multitudes to the very soul-destroying infidelity against which he raises the warning cry, we had no option. There could be no impropriety in calling general attention to what is so clear to every scientific reader of his writings—that he attributes "rationalistic," "infidel," and even "atheistic" tendencies to these sciences solely because he is imperfectly acquainted with their methods and aims.

To our examination of his long-continued and oft-repeated assaults, Dr. Dabney published an answer in the October number of this REVIEW. The main point of the answer is perhaps correctly condensed into this—that we misunderstood him; that it was not physical science that he assailed, but the infidel abuses of science, or science falsely so-called. Granting that this may be so, it does not set aside the necessity for our examination; for it was his published words as generally understood that we examined, and not his own conception of their meaning. We do not think we misunderstood* these published words; but if we

*However it may be as to the misunderstanding of his writings generally, we have to confess that we cannot possibly understand the first sentence of his answer, when he says: "In May, 1869, (not 1866,) I addressed a memorial on theological education, not to the General Assembly, but to the Committee on Theological Seminaries." S. P. R., p. 539. This seems to be a denial of something we had said; and yet it cannot

did, we furnished at every step the amplest means of correcting our misapprehensions, by full and fair quotations from the publications on which we were commenting.

We sincerely wish that Dr. Dabney was right when he says he "presumes Dr. Woodrow is the only reader who has so misconceived" his meaning; but he is not. We have conversed with a large number of intelligent persons who have read his various writings; and so far as we remember, all have understood him just as we do, whether agreeing with his views or ours. No doubt he himself believes that he does not oppose true science;

be; for every statement we made was strictly correct. Of course Dr. Dabney cannot mean to disown his "Memoir" on Theological Education which he published, as we stated, in the *Central Presbyterian* in October, 1866. We cannot tell what he does mean.

As to the modified form of this "Memoir" of 1866, namely, the "Memorial" presented to the General Assembly in 1869, we can hardly suppose it worth while to discuss the very minute question which the next seeming denial appears to raise. Rather than argue whether or not sending a document to the committee of a body is the same as sending it to the body itself, or whether or not a document can be sent to a committee except through the body which appoints it, we give up at once. If shelter is needed, we shelter ourselves behind the Minutes of the General Assembly, which show that that venerable body made the same mistake, in thinking the "Memorial" had been sent to it; for it took the liberty of referring it to its Committee, just as if the author had not already sent it there! (Minutes, Vol. II., p. 373.) But we cannot help wondering whether the author meant to deny anything in this first sentence; and if so, what?

We are equally unable to comprehend what he means on page 542, when he says, "Dr. W.'s zeal could find but *three* blows in seven years." We had enumerated *four*. Now we would have to add another, making five, delivered through this REVIEW in July, 1861, in his article on "Geology and the Bible." But such points cannot be of the least consequence in any possible respect. Dr. Dabney could not intend to contradict the statements we made; for he is perfectly aware of their entire accuracy.

Another point which it seems best to speak of in a note, is the author's complaint (p. 540) that in the matter of the "Memorial" a hearing was refused him. We wish to say that we have done what we could to securing him a hearing. More than a year ago, one of our fellow-editors wrote to him, with our hearty concurrence, requesting him to send the "Memorial," that it might be published in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW. To this request the author did not accede.

how could it be otherwise? No honest man can denounce as false what he believes to be true; and in his warfare Dr. Dabney is of course thoroughly honest. If opposition to true science had been attributed to the honored and learned Melancthon, would he not have repelled the charge? Would he not have said it was not the true science of astronomy that he attacked; it was only the infidel system of Copernicus which he "disallowed?" The error is as to what constitutes true science. We cannot but regard Dr. Dabney as erring when he thinks he avoided attacking "sound physical science." He has again and again attacked its objects, its methods, and its results. The very pages on which he exclaims against our misconception of his meaning, prove that we did not misconceive his language, however his language may have failed to set forth his meaning. He asks with some impatience, "Why may I not be credited as understanding and meaning what I said?" "Why may it not be supposed that I was not an ignoramus, and so, was consistent with myself, and knew what I was saying?" (P. 543.) Now, even if the word "ignoramus" were in our vocabulary, we have too high an appreciation of Dr. Dabney's varied learning and accomplishments to apply it to him. No human being can comprehend the whole circle of knowledge; and yet it does not follow that every human being is an "ignoramus." We ought not to be regarded as representing any one as an "ignoramus" when we point out that he is inconsistent with himself. Our whole argument against Dr. Dabney's opinions respecting physical science would be worthless if he is consistent with himself; for he undoubtedly maintains the truth with regard to many subjects, though, as we suppose, not with regard to all. Now, truth is always consistent with itself; error is not. Therefore error may be proved by pointing out inconsistency.

Let us compare a few of the positions maintained, and observe how they endure this test.

1. On pages 543 and 549 the author gives us the two following definitions of the object of his attack:

(a) "The anti-Christian science which I disallow was here expressly separated from this sound physical science. But again: In the introduction

of the Sermon I hasten to separate and define the thing I attack. On page 2, I tell my readers that it is the 'prevalent, vain,' physical philosophy. Now every one knows it is the materialistic philosophy of Lamarck, Chambers, ('Vestiges,') Darwin, Hooker, Huxley, Tyndall, Herbert Spencer, Buechner, which is now the 'prevalent' one." P. 543.

(b) "As I defined my meaning in the Sermon, page 2, these sciences of geology, natural history, and ethnology, now exciting so much popular attention, 'always have some tendency to become anti-theological.'" P. 549.

The author thus first defines the thing attacked as "anti-Christian science," and "materialistic philosophy;" then as "these sciences of geology, natural history, and ethnology." Is he here consistent or not? If he is, he pronounces "geology, natural history, and ethnology" "anti-Christian" and "materialistic philosophy"—that is, he attacks geology, etc., as false. The only escape from this conclusion is in admitting inconsistency, struggle as he may.

2. (a) As just seen, he attacks geology, natural history, and ethnology, because they are anti-Christian and materialistic—therefore not true sciences at all.

(b) He next condemns them as having a "tendency to become anti-theological" because of the success with which they have established their claims as true sciences. For he says, page 549, still speaking of geology, etc. :

"It is both the business and the boast of physical science to resolve as many effects as possible into their second causes. Repeated and fascinating successes in these solutions gradually amount to a temptation to the mind to look less to the great First Cause."

Which of these opposite views does he wish us to regard him as holding?

3. (a) He tells us on page 551 that his quarrel with Darwin and Huxley's natural science is that it "does not behave at all as Dr. Woodrow's behaves"—that is, in modestly keeping silent respecting questions beyond its province.

(b) He then at once says true natural science ought not to be silent about these questions: that it is "her duty to evolve, as the crown and glory of all her conclusions, the natural, teleological argument for the being, wisdom, and goodness of a personal

God." Does there not seem to be some inconsistency here? If our silence is blameworthy, others ought not to be blamed for speaking, but for speaking wrong.

We do not intend here to repeat our demonstration (S. P. R., pp. 351—354,) that all such questions are beyond the province of natural science; but the last quotation shows the grave difficulty in the way of stating a proposition which Dr. Dabney and we could agree in maintaining—we understand language so differently. He supposes that these questions belong to natural science; we suppose that they belong to natural theology—an entirely distinct department of knowledge, in which the objects sought, the fundamental principles, and the methods of reasoning applied, are wholly different from those in natural science. He thinks they belong to some department of physics; we think they form a department of metaphysics. Thus we do not understand language in the same way; and therefore we must continually misunderstand each other.

This difference in the use of language has led to other serious misapprehensions on our part as to what Dr. Dabney meant to say, but did not, or at least did not in the ordinary language of mankind. One of these, which he terms (p. 544) "the most amazing misunderstanding," has reference to the meaning of the same passage of the Sermon (pages 2 and 3) spoken of above. We quoted the entire passage (pp. 334, 335); so that if we misrepresented it, we at the same time furnished the means of correcting the misrepresentation. We understood the passage as referring to physical science, because its author said "physical science"; and he now explains further, as we have just seen, that he meant "geology, natural history, and ethnology." In the Sermon, he proceeds (pages 3 and 4) to speak of "physicists," and to specify the evil things they are doing, namely, asserting the existence of a pre-Adamite earth, limiting the Noachian deluge, maintaining the nebular hypothesis, etc. We thought he thus left no shadow of doubt as to whom he meant; and we criticised this apparent meaning. But now he exclaims (page 544) that we had "wholly failed to apprehend what he was speaking of," and calls our criticism of what he says of physical science and

physicists an "astounding denial of the attempt made by the followers of Hume and of Auguste Comte to give a 'sensualistic' explanation of the 'mind's philosophy.'" He then proceeds to give an account of the mischievous metaphysical speculations of Hartley, Condillac, Hume, Comte, etc.; and ends with the expression of the "hope that Dr. Woodrow is now relieved, and begins to see what was the 'anti-Christian science' which he opposed in his Sermon and other writings." Well, yes; we are relieved—relieved to see that it was the frightful errors of metaphysicians that he was combating, and not physical science at all. But we never before heard these metaphysical speculations called physical science; nor did we before know that Hartley, Condillac, Hume, etc., were "physicists," or had applied themselves to the questions which Dr. Dabney specifies. But this relief does not set aside the necessity for our former criticisms. We criticised what he said, and not what it now turns out he meant. When he said "physical science," how could we tell that he meant metaphysics? When he attacked "physicists," how could we tell that he meant the metaphysicians Hartley, Hume, and their followers? The truth is, the difficulty is not that we did not understand what he said, but that he did not say what it seems he meant.

As to the influence of Comte's Positivism on physical science, the following is the testimony of Huxley, who supports his assertions by references to such men as Whewell and Herschel:

"Here are two propositions: the first, that the 'Philosophie Positive' contains little or nothing of any scientific value; the second, that Comtism is, in spirit, anti-scientific. I shall endeavor to bring forward ample evidence in support of both.

"I. No one who possesses even a superficial acquaintance with physical science can read Comte's 'Leçons' without becoming aware that he was at once singularly devoid of real knowledge on these subjects, and singularly unlucky. . . . Appeal to mathematicians, astronomers, physicists, chemists, biologists, about the 'Philosophie Positive,' and they all, with one consent, begin to make protestation that, whatever M. Comte's other merits, he has shed no light upon the philosophy of their particular studies." *Lay Sermons, etc.*, pp. 154, 155.

Perhaps we ought here to speak of Dr. Dabney's allusion to our correspondence last April and May. We had supposed that

the correspondence was private; but of course we have no objection to its publication. Since, however, part of it has been published, it may not be amiss to publish all of it; so that if it has any bearing on the question under discussion, it may all be before the reader's mind.*

Here are the omitted parts of the correspondence:

“COLUMBIA, S. C., April 26, 1873.

“REV. DR. R. L. DABNEY,

“Rev. and Dear Sir: As I promised during our conversation at Richmond last May, on the recovery of my health last winter I began a diligent examination of your views respecting Physical Science, as expressed in your various publications. I am sorry I am obliged to say that the more I studied the principles which you advocate, the more I became convinced that they are not well-founded; and not only so, but that very great evil must result from their general adoption. To such an extent did it seem to me certain that your assaults on Physical Science must do great harm to Christian belief, which we both regard as beyond all else

*With reference to our letter, Dr. Dabney says, page 545: “At the end of last April, (two months before the publication of Dr. Woodrow,) he did me the honor to write me very courteously, at the prompting of a good man, a friend of peace, notifying me of his intended critique.” On this point we may be allowed to say we did not suppose we were doing anything “very courteous,” as Dr. Dabney says we were, in giving him notice of our intended reply to his numerous (supposed) attacks on physical science. We thought it only fair to do as we did. If it were worth while discussing such a question, it might admit of debate how far true courtesy would allow one to attribute to us this commendable quality in one breath, and in the next breath seek to deprive us of the credit of it by saying that we wrote the “very courteous” letter, not of our own motion, not because we thought it right and fair, but “*at the prompting of a good man, a friend of peace.*” We shall not discuss this question; but we must say, while Dr. Dabney of course believed what he here asserts, that, courteous or not, he is in error as to the fact. If our writing the letter was very courteous, we are entitled to all the credit of it—it was written at the prompting of no one; though heartily approved by friends to whom we mentioned the intention. But in view of Dr. Dabney's closing paragraph, where he says, “If my haste or carelessness has let slip one word which to the impartial reader savors of aggression or retaliation, I desire that word to be blotted from memory”—we are not disposed to say more than that this is one point needing to be covered by it.

in importance and value, that I was constrained to write out some of my objections to your views, and to offer them to my fellow-editors for publication in the SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW, in the hope of counteracting, if I can, what appear to me the inevitable tendencies of your teachings on this subject. My article has been accepted, and will appear in the July number.

“Profoundly impressed with the magnitude of the evils I fear, I have attempted with the utmost plainness to prove you wrong; but not with the remotest intention of wounding you unnecessarily. And, as possibly may be the case, you will desire to prove me wrong, I am sure my fellow-editors will accord all to you that they have done to me.

“I have understood that you are expecting to go to Europe next month. If so, I would be glad to know what your address will be, in order that I may cause advance sheets to be forwarded to you. Of course, if you remain in Virginia, it will be a matter of no consequence, as you will receive the article in the REVIEW. I am expecting myself to sail on the 10th prox. I would be glad to take a few walks with you—say, in the Saarbrueck Coal basin or similar localities—that we might discuss together in presence of what we would see, the validity of your idea that immediate creative power may have produced such things.

“Yours very truly,

JAMES WOODROW.”

The greater part of Dr. Dabney’s reply to this letter is printed on pages 545—548; the following parts are given to complete it:

“I must, in candor, also preface what I have to say with the confession that, should I be convicted of ‘lese-majeste’ against your Queen science, Geology, I cannot palliate it by the plea of ignorance. I have read so many treatises by the leading authors of the different schools, examined so many points, pondered the showing of their exponents so carefully for at least twenty-five years, that I must presume I have the plain *data* before my mind; the only other supposition would be that their own advocates are most incompetent in stating them as they wish them to be apprehended; or that I am of defective intellect. . . .

“Now either that is a demonstration, or I am getting into my dotage. But, if I am, there are a good many more fools besides me. I have submitted this argument to some of the best trained minds in America, *on its own merits*; statesmen, University Masters of Arts, Professors. Dr. ———, for instance, says it is impregnable. I heard him enounce substantially the same conclusion, with that clear cut, yet abstract accuracy for which his mind is so admirable, in about these words: ‘To the theist no *a posteriori* reasoning can reveal an ἀρχη for Nature.’ Dr. ——— is with me, so Dr. ———.

“But I suppose you still suspect ‘a cat in the meal bag,’ and want to

know what it is. What use is to be made of this conclusion, if admitted? . . .

“The report of my journey to Europe is erroneous. I hope that your journey thence will prove a great benefit to your health as well as a great pleasure. I am just recovering from a severe spell of illness; for this reason I hope you will excuse the imperfections of this letter.

“Very faithfully yours,

R. L. DABNEY.”

Dr. Dabney felicitates himself on page 548 on having in this letter chosen terms exactly adapted to remove the misapprehensions as to his meaning into which we had fallen, just as if he had “been prophet enough to foresee them.” Now, we do not wish to disparage his prophetic foresight; but we cannot help saying he here furnishes no proof of it—all that was needed to “foresee” how we would understand him, was merely to consider how any one else (except himself it seems) would necessarily understand what he had published, and shape the *prophecy* accordingly. He next complains that his letter probably did not avail to change one word in our “Examination.” He is quite right; it did not avail to change one word, and that for several reasons. Not to speak of the fact that, in consequence of our desire to see the article correctly printed, it was already in type when we received the letter—it reached us on Saturday, May 3d, and we left home on Tuesday, May 6th—it had no effect, and should have had none, because our object was not to change Dr. Dabney’s views—we hardly dared to hope for that—but to protect from fatal error those who were in danger of being misled by them. Hence, if his private letter had contained a full and fair statement of what we regard as truth, it should not have affected in the least our published examination of his published writings. But the truth is, the letter contains much that it is impossible to receive, notwithstanding his more cautious manner of stating his position.

We ought to say, however, in all candor, that the letter was not wholly without effect on us. In one respect it relieved us no little. Necessary as it had been in the course of our argument to show that the writer was not very well-acquainted with natural science, we could hardly keep from blaming ourselves for having done so; especially in view of the admissions contained in the Lectures, p. 173, “Without presuming to teach technical geology,

for which I profess no qualification ;” and in the Sermon, p. 8, “ We have no occasion, as defenders of that word, to compare or contest any geologic or biologic theories. We may be possessed neither of the knowledge nor ability for entering that field, as I freely confess concerning myself.” We had had the uncomfortable feeling that, as he had himself thus proclaimed his want of acquaintance with the topics in question, it perhaps was hardly proper to prove this to be not merely a seemingly modest disclaimer. But when his statement reached us, that he could not “ palliate his ‘lèse-majesté’ against our queen-science, geology, by the plea of ignorance,” that he had “ read so many treatises of the leading authors of the different schools, examined so many points, pondered the showing of their exponents so carefully for at least twenty-five years”—when this reached us, we were comforted. We felt there could be no ruthlessness in our proving the confessed want of familiarity to be real ; but that with this vast amount of reading, and twenty-five years of careful study, Dr. Dabney must be abundantly able to take care of himself on the geological field. We were conscious of our own inability to profess anything like the same length of time devoted to careful examination of the topics in question.

As to the writer’s remark, that if he has not “ the plain data before his mind,” “ their advocates,” that is, geologists, “ are most incompetent in stating them as they wish them to be apprehended ; or that he is of defective intellect ;”—we have to say we have not observed this incompetence on the part of geologists generally ; students of geology usually have no difficulty in apprehending the exact meaning of the statements made by geological writers. But, if it were germane to the discussion, we would strenuously resist the conclusion to which he would drive us as the only possible one remaining, namely, that he is of “ defective intellect.” This, we insist, is not a necessary inference. As some of the readers of these articles may have experienced the same difficulty, we ought perhaps to point out two possible explanations. One is suggested by the doggerel lines,

“ He that’s convinced against his will
Is of the same opinion still.”

The other is that perhaps the respected writer has confined his study of geology to the reading of books. Now, it can never be learned in that way. Without some personal observation of the phenomena of physical science, the reasonings respecting such phenomena cannot be appreciated. The blind man, though of the highest intellectual capacity, can never understand the science of light, or the deaf man the science of sound; though the former may hear and the latter read masterly treatises on optics and acoustics for quarter of a century. It was the hope that this difficulty might be removed, if it exists, which led us to express the wish that we might last summer have the pleasure of Dr. Dabney's company in some of our walks, that we might together examine some of the facts in the case—as, for example, the mighty series of fossil-bearing beds around Saarbrück in the western part of Germany. As we were disappointed then, we now take the liberty of suggesting that a good beginning may be conveniently made in the study of some interesting dark shales within less than half an hour's walk from Union Seminary, which we examined more than twenty years ago with much satisfaction. We are confident that after a careful study of these and similar facts, he will cordially agree with us in maintaining that the "only point" he says he cares for, cannot have the slightest application to the greater part of geological phenomena; and further, that he will forever repudiate all thought of restricting to the period of "actual human history" the application of the principle that "like effects are produced by like causes."

Dr. Dabney thus states in his letter the only point which he thinks it worth while to discuss:

"I conceive that there is but one single point between you and me, which is either worthy or capable of being made a subject of scientific discussion. It is this: I hold that to those *who honestly admit a Creator anywhere in the past, the a posteriori argument of naturalness of properties to a natural* (as opposed to a creative or supernatural) *origin of the structures examined, can NO LONGER BE UNIVERSALLY VALID.* That is, really, the only point I care for." P. 546.

"*The proposition cannot hold universally true that an analogous naturalness of properties in a structure proves an analogous natural origin.*" P. 547.

He errs when he says that this point is "between" us; there is no dispute between us with reference to it. This is clear from what we said on page 359:

"Of course every believer in a personal God believes that he can produce in an extraordinary way just such effects as he ordinarily produces by the usual laws by which he governs his material universe—the laws of nature; and every believer of the Bible believes that he has often done so." *Southern Presbyterian Review*, p. 359.

We illustrated this principle by reference to the miracles recorded in the Scriptures, which we believe as firmly as we believe any observed facts in nature; and we proceeded to show the bearing it should have upon scientific reasoning. We then demonstrated that the test by which Dr. Dabney would determine when such reasoning is valid—namely, that we must be able to prove the "absence of the supernatural"—is utterly erroneous; and that the true principle is that we are "required by the very constitution of mind which God has given us, to believe that every effect we see has been produced by God's ordinary laws, until we have valid testimony to the contrary." P. 336.

Here, then, is where we agree and where we differ: We agree in believing that which above is called "the only point cared for;" we differ as to its application—Dr. Dabney insisting that the "absence of the supernatural" (Sermon, p. 13; Lectures, p. 177,) must be proved before the law of uniformity may be applied; we insisting that the *presence* of the supernatural must be proved before we are debarred from applying it. We maintain that the former principle leads inevitably to universal scepticism, and that the latter leads inevitably to the knowledge of truth.

This difference is so fundamental that it may be proper to consider it more fully; since it involves the very possibility of natural science, and indeed of almost every kind of knowledge. It is true that Dr. Dabney denies this; for he says, "Within the domain of time, the known past of human history, where its testimony proves the absence of the supernatural, the analogical induction is perfectly valid. And *there* is the proper domain of natural science." Lectures, p. 177. But its foundation principles recognise no such limitations; they do not depend on human

history; they do not stand doubting until the impossible feat of proving the absence of the supernatural shall have been performed. These principles involve the belief that the laws of God are like their Author, who changes not; that the manifestations of His will are like the Father of lights himself, with whom there is no variableness, neither shadow of turning. Those who receive them have gone forward boldly, fearlessly yet cautiously, wherever they have led; and the result is the grand body of natural science which is the glory of the present age. These principles are in no way responsible for the wild rash speculations as to beginnings in which many, both physicists and metaphysicians, have vainly indulged; for it is only by abandoning the safe ground which they afford that the question of origins, of an ἀρχή, can be discussed. The true student of natural science utterly repudiates the idea that such speculations belong to his domain, or that his science can be held responsible for them. Natural science humbly confesses that it cannot find out God, cannot find out the Almighty unto perfection; it does not claim to know who hath laid the measures of the earth, or the corner-stone thereof; or who hath given understanding to the heart—such knowledge is too wonderful for it. But our Father in heaven has graciously communicated to us this knowledge in his Holy Word. And now, thus taught, the believing student lovingly traces his Father's handiwork in every fact and every law made known to him by his science.

Let us test the "only point," on which so much stress is laid, by observing the results to which it leads, when taken in connexion with the other equally insisted on, that "analogical induction is perfectly valid" only where the "absence of the supernatural" can be proved. We examine the partially exhumed cities of Pompeii and Herculaneum; we observe certain structures that seem to be houses built by human hands for human habitation; lines of stones with grooves in them that seem to be paved streets with ruts worn by carriage wheels; shapes which seem to be human skeletons. From this "naturalness of properties" we infer "naturalness of origin;" we say we believe—we know—that these are houses built by human hands; that these

are paved streets and that the grooves are ruts worn by carriage wheels; that these shapes were once parts of living men. We no more doubt all this than if we had seen the builders at work or had ourselves driven the carriages that made the ruts. Yet at the same time we "honestly admit a Creator anywhere in the past;" and we further admit His power to create Pompeii. Now, as we wander through the deserted streets, Dr. Dabney meets us, and gravely bids us exercise more "modesty in constructing hypotheses;" telling us that our "*a posteriori* argument can NO LONGER BE UNIVERSALLY VALID;" and that we may not rely with absolute confidence upon it until we have "proved that no other cause capable of producing B" [Pompeii, etc.], "was present in any case, save A" [man]." "Now, no man who is unwilling to take the blank atheistic ground, can deny that in the cases in hand, another adequate cause may have been present, as soon as we go back prior to historical testimony, namely, *almighty, creative power.*" Lectures, p. 175.

But perhaps he may allow us to feel certain in this case, because we have "historical testimony" that these cities were built and inhabited by man. To this we would reply by asking whether our belief is in the slightest degree affected by that fact. Let the reader ask himself whether he believes any more firmly that the Pompeian houses were built by man because we have historical testimony to the existence of that city. He perceives that this testimony does not in the very least strengthen his previous belief, or his knowledge rather.

Should doubt still rest on any mind, however, we may take as test examples the ruined cities of Central America; or the lake dwellings in Switzerland and elsewhere, concerning which we have no historical testimony. Every one perceives that his conclusions can no more be doubted in these cases than in those of which we have the history written with human pen. We *know* how the foundations of the Swiss houses were constructed, what domestic animals lived with their human inhabitants, what weapons and household utensils they used, as certainly as if we had lived amongst them—Dr. Dabney's principle to the contrary notwithstanding.

But it may still be urged that we have not touched the point—that it is natural properties and natural structures which are under discussion, and not the productions of men. We reply that the principles and mode of reasoning are precisely the same, and the certainty of our conclusions is precisely as strong, whether we are examining a man's house or a beaver's house; whether at Pompeii we are examining charred books or a human skull or a lamp, or a dog's skeleton or the products of the neighboring sea; whether in the Swiss lakes we are examining the cloth made by the lake-dwellers, or the wood forming the piles on which their houses were built, or the shells of the shell-fish which lived in the waters around them. Any one who will bring the phenomena before his mind will perceive that he reasons about all in the same way, and that he receives the carefully-reached result with unwavering confidence. He will not and cannot yield himself to the hopeless scepticism which must flow from his waiting to prove the absence of the supernatural—which scepticism would be exercised equally in the case of the houses, charred manuscripts, and woven cloth, and of the bones and skulls of the lower animals.

It is clear, therefore, that the principle which leads to despairing doubt has no application in such cases as we have now considered. It is equally inapplicable in the study of "musty" fossils in "rotten" strata. In his private letter, Dr. Dabney repels with what we admire as just indignation the belief that the "older fossil remains of animal life never were alive." As to this horrible thought, he says with proper emphasis, "he does not believe it." Now, the geologist reasons in exactly the same way respecting these fossil remains that the archæologist does respecting the fossil cities of which we have spoken, and his conclusions are not more doubtful, and cannot be so regarded by any who are acquainted with the facts on which they are based. Besides the undoubted truths thus reached, there are many problems left unsolved; but this admission no more affects the truths established by geology or archæology, than the same admission respecting mathematics or theology, which must be made by every fair mind, affects the truths taught by those sciences.

Among the geological truths established beyond doubt is one which gives Dr. Dabney much concern, and leads him often to apply his favorite epithet "atheistic" to this class of students of God's works—we mean that this world is more than a week older than Adam. Instead of admitting that some of the "rotten fossils" are very ancient, he speaks of the "unbelieving geologist thrusting at him his difficulty about the seemingly ancient fossils." P. 585. He says—not that he does believe, but—that he could believe, that "it might be, for instance, that this Omnipotent and Infinite Wisdom, working during the six days, and during the long antediluvian years, during the flood, and during the years succeeding, in times and places where there was no human witness, saw fit to construct these *strata*, and to sow them with vegetable and animal life with a prodigal profusion now unknown; and to hurry the maturing of the *strata*, and the early death and entombment of these thronging creatures, with a speed very different from the speculations of geology; and all for profound motives good to His infinite wisdom, but beyond my weak surmises." P. 585. Now to any one who has studied the mighty succession of events recorded by God's hand in the fossil-bearing strata, it would sound just as reasonable to say, when speaking of Pompeii, that "it might be that this Omnipotent and Infinite Wisdom, working during fifteen minutes before noon, and during the long sultry hours of a summer afternoon, and during the twilight, and during the few minutes succeeding, through human instrumentality, saw fit to construct these cities, and to fill them with inhabitants with a prodigal profusion now unknown; and to hurry the completion of the houses and the wearing of ruts in the paved streets, and the early death and entombment of the thronging population, with a speed very different from the speculations of archæology; and all for profound motives good to His infinite wisdom, but beyond my weak surmises." This is no exaggerated comparison. It would require the same credulity, both as to amount and kind, to believe that the fossil-bearing strata have been formed since a week before Adam, as to believe that the history of Pompeii may have been compressed into a single afternoon.

Only a few words more are needed to set before the reader the real value of this "only point" in its application to natural science. The amount of doubt thrown on scientific deductions by the admission that the reasoning in question is not *universally* valid, may be seen from the following parallel cases. It is equally true that our inferences from our mental impressions as to external existence and external changes are not universally valid. For we see, we hear, we taste, in our dreams, when no external objects are present to be seen, heard, or tasted, though we believe them to be present. What then? Does this fact throw a pall of doubt over all our knowledge obtained through the senses? Do we wait until it is proved that we are not dreaming, or that our senses are not otherwise deceiving us? No; we believe in the knowledge obtained through these mental impressions not the less firmly because we know that they are not to be *universally* trusted. So in mathematics, which is generally regarded as the most certain of all sciences, it can easily be proved that no confidence is to be placed in its processes and results, provided it is enough to effect this object to prove the absence of *universal* validity. Let $a^2 - b^2$ be divided by $a - b$; the result is $a + b$. Now let a and b each be equal to 10; then we have 100 less 100, or 0, divided by 10 less 10, or 0; which is of course equal to 0. But we had previously found that the result is $a + b$, or $10 + 10$, or 20. That is, 0 is equal to 20, according to mathematics! Surely whatever leads to such an apparent absurdity must seem to some minds utterly unworthy of confidence. Away with mathematics then! Does any one reason thus? If not, let us not reason thus as to the fundamental principle in natural science. Let us not be induced by Dr. Dabney's "only point" to shut in our own faces the gate which leads to knowledge of God's works. This "only point" on which he lays so much stress is of no consequence in natural science. If scientific reasoning were restrained by such a mere puzzle, the result would be universal scepticism; just as the mathematical example given above would lead us to doubt whether two and two are four; and the psychological puzzle would make us doubt whether we ever see or hear anything. Therefore, if this was all that Dr. Dabney cared for, it was not

worth his while to spend so much time upon it, or to publish so many treatises attempting to explain and defend it. The game was not worth the candle. The principle is true; but it has no proper application in scientific reasoning; and if improperly applied, so to exclude all reasoning except in the impossible case where the "absence of the supernatural" is proved by "historical testimony," it must lead to universal despairing doubt.

There is, then, no reason why we should be disturbed in our examination of God's material universe by the "only point cared for." As we said before, the point is true; but it has no application in natural science. For we are entitled to assume that all natural structures have been produced by God's ordinary laws until the contrary is proved in any particular case. And the burden of proof always rests on those who maintain the supernatural origin. When such origin has been proved in any case, it is thereby put beyond the range of physical science. It is no part of the physicist's business to explain miracles: the natural philosopher cannot tell how Elisha made the axe swim; the archæologist cannot determine the character of the writing on the Tables of the Law; the astronomer cannot explain how the sun and moon stood still in the valley of Ajalon, or how the shadow went back ten degrees on Hezekiah's dial-plate—it is folly to make the attempt. All these miracles, like creation itself, are outside and above all natural science, which studies God's ordinary methods of operation alone. We believe, without the least doubt, that these miracles occurred as stated in the Bible. We have the amplest testimony to the truth of the Bible, and no more doubt its statements than we doubt the intuitive beliefs which its Author has implanted in our minds. We do not perceive any inconsistency in this position. We confess our inability to understand why we should refuse to believe in miracles—effects produced by God outside of His ordinary laws—because we firmly believe in the law of uniformity in all cases where He has given us no reason to think He is acting in an extraordinary manner; nor, on the other hand, can we understand why we should refuse to trust unwaveringly in our intuitive belief in the same law, because we believe that God can work miracles and

has worked them. We believe both equally; just as we believe that God is sovereign and man free. If it is objected that it is logically impossible to believe both the former, we reply we do not find it so any more than to believe both the latter. We do believe *all*, without hesitation or doubt. We have not yet reached that stage of progress which leads us to refuse to believe everything we cannot understand.

In justice to Dr. Dabney, we ought to state that in one passage of his reply (page 579, line 23 *et seq.*) he correctly states the true position as to when the argument from naturalness of qualities is not valid—when there has been “first proved the PRESENCE of God’s intervening power.” And he evidently thinks this is what he has always been maintaining, instead of the dangerous error we have been exposing. We shall not further discuss this point; but in order to allow the reader to judge for himself whether he is right as to what his teaching has been, we give a few more quotations from his writings:

“Hence, third, it follows that, if once a creative act is admitted to have occurred somewhere in the past, it may have occurred anywhere in the past, so far as the deductions of natural science from the marks of natural law upon its products go. In other words, the value of all these analogical inferences as to the date at which, and the mode by which, these objects of nature came into being, are worthless just so soon as they attempt to pass back of the earliest historical testimony. For the creative act, wherever it has intervened, (and who can tell, when testimony fails, where it may have not intervened?) has utterly superseded and cut across all such inferences. Nor can these natural analogies prove that the creative act has not thus intervened at a given place in the past, because the whole validity of the analogies depends on the supposed absence of the creative act. Hence, all the reasonings of geologists seem to us utterly vitiated in their very source, when they attempt to fix, from natural analogies, the age and mode of production of the earth’s structures.” *Southern Presbyterian Review*, vol. xiv., (1861,) pp. 267, 268.

“Wherever the inquirer into nature is certain that the facts he investigates are truly under the dominion of natural law, so far such reasonings are valid. As to the origin and history of nature in the past, they are valid no farther back than we can be assured of the absence of the supernatural; and we know not how such assurance can be gained by us, save by the testimony of human experience and history, or of inspiration.” *Ibid.*, p. 270.

“And that is the sphere of practical inquiry, within the historical past, the present, and the finite, terrestrial future; where we can ascertain the absence of the supernatural.” *Sermon*, p. 13.

“Unless you are an Atheist, you must admit that another cause, *creative power*, may have been present; and present anywhere prior to the ages of authentic historical testimony. Thus, the admission of the theistic scheme actually cuts across and supersedes all these supposed natural arguments for the origin and age of these structures.” *Lectures*, p. 176.

But it is needless to multiply such quotations.

Dr. Dabney decidedly objects to being represented as hostile to physical science; but inasmuch as that which would be left after applying his limitations would be so extremely diminutive, it cannot be of much importance whether he is friendly or hostile to the little remnant he would recognise as *true science*. He tells us plainly he is “jealous of geology,” (p. 548,) and seeks to manifest his contempt for this sublime branch of knowledge by speaking of his “smaller admiration for the fascinating art of the mineralogist.” (P. 546.) The only explanation of this jealousy and contempt is found in the misapprehension of the real character of geology betrayed by speaking of it as the “art of the mineralogist.” Those who know what it is say of it, with Sir John Herschel: “Geology, in the magnitude and sublimity of the objects of which it treats, undoubtedly ranks in the scale of the sciences, next to astronomy.” Or with Principal Dawson: “The science of the earth, as illustrated by geological research, is one of the noblest outgrowths of our modern intellectual life. Constituting the sum of all the natural sciences in their application to the history of our world, it affords a very wide and varied scope for mental activity, and deals with some of the grandest problems of space and time and of organic existence.” Or with Prof. Dana: “Every sphere in space must have had a related system of growth, and all are, in fact, individualities in this Kingdom of Worlds. Geology treats of the earth in this grand relation. It is as much removed from Mineralogy as from Botany and Zoology. It uses all these departments; for the species under them are the objects which make up the earth, and enter into geological history.” Such are the words of these eminent men,

all of them sincere Christians, to whom the Sacred Scriptures as the very word of God are as dear as they are to Dr. Dabney.

We do not think it needful to apologize for our love of geology and the constant delight we find in it. The learned Roman Catholic divine, Prof. Molloy, exactly expresses our views when he says: "Among the various pursuits that engage the human mind there are few so attractive as geology, none so important as Revelation." We do not feel called on to resist this attraction, or to reject or look with cold suspicion on the great body of truth which has been gathered by the earnest labors of thousands of diligent inquirers; whose devotion and heroism in searching after it is second only to that of the pioneer missionaries of the Cross. To attain it they have spared no sacrifices, they have shunned no toil, they have often braved death itself. We are not ashamed to admit that it is fascinating to us, notwithstanding the contempt any one may attempt to cast upon it by professing his "jealousy," his "smaller admiration" of it, or by scornfully speaking of its study of "musty" and "rotten fossils." It is to us inconceivable how an ingenuous mind, open to the reception of all God's truth, should be able to spend long years in studying it, without sharing in the delight we have experienced. God forbid that while we gaze rapturously upon the ineffable glory of the Most High as it shines in the face of His Anointed, we should shut our eyes to the glory—lesser indeed, but glory still—which is reflected from the works of His hands.

In connexion with professions of "high respect for all true physical science," Dr. Dabney justifies and defends his assertions that "these sciences are arrayed in all their phases on the side of scepticism;" he still insists that "these statements are all true." Page 548. His defence is that "all of them are arrayed, by some of their professed teachers, on the side of scepticism"! In his estimation, this latter expression is equivalent to his sweeping denunciation of geologists and the physical sciences contained in the statements just quoted! Does any reader agree with him, or think he has succeeded in his defence? Let the assertions be made, "The tendencies of writers of books are atheistic;" "The art of writing is arrayed in all its phases on

the side of scepticism." Would it be a sufficient justification of these assertions to say: "These statements are all true, and consistent with our high respect for all true authorship. The art of writing is arrayed, by some of its professed masters, on the side of scepticism." Yet this would be exactly parallel with Dr. Dabney's defence.

The use of such misleading language by a single writer, however distinguished, might do no great amount of harm; but these terrible accusations against science are made so often from many of our pulpits and in so many religious writings, that we should not hastily dismiss this point. It is painfully common in these quarters to hear such expressions as "infidel science," "scientific infidels," "atheistic geology," etc., where it is clear that the speaker does not mean the infidel perversion of science, but science itself. And even in cases where one means by "anti-Christian science," as Dr. Dabney says he does, that something "separated from sound physical science" is anti-Christian, such careless and misleading language should be avoided as certain to do harm. We know that these inaccurate expressions—to use the mildest word—in the pulpit and in religious writings, do much to promote infidelity; and therefore one cannot be too guarded in always explaining exactly what he means every time he refers to infidelity and science as in any way connected.

Let the tables be turned, that we may the more easily see how far such language is really justifiable, remembering that it is a poor rule that will not work both ways; or rather remembering the words of our Lord and Master: "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them."

Let these statements, then, be made: "Christianity always has some tendency to oppose and destroy the truth." "The tendencies of Christians are bloodthirsty and murderous." "The spirit of Christianity in all its phases is essentially promotive of lying, fraud, and gross immorality;" "it is arrayed in all its phases on the side of ignorance, superstition, folly, and vice." The perpetual *animus* of Christianity, especially in our day, is to insist on the belief of puerile falsehoods and the rejection of all valuable truth." Now, would any amount of explanation

justify these horrible assertions? Let the reader judge whether they are not true in exactly the same sense in which the following assertions made by Dr. Dabney are true :

“ We find that physical science always has some tendency to become anti-theological.” Sermon, p. 2 “ The tendencies of geologists are atheistic.” *So. Pres. Review*, vol. xxiv., p. 549 ; Lectures, p. 178. “ The spirit of these sciences is essentially infidel and rationalistic ; they are arrayed, in all their phases, on the side of scepticism.” Memoir in *Central Presbyterian*, Oct. 31, 1866 ; reaffirmed, *So. Pres. Review*, pp. 548, 549. “ This is the *eternity of Naturalism—it is Atheism.* And such is the perpetual *animus* of material science, especially in our day.” Lectures, p. 179.

In justification of the above assertions respecting Christianity, it would be of no avail to recount the efforts made by multitudes of Christians during eighteen centuries to destroy the truth ; or to portray the horrors of the Inquisition, or the slaughter of the “ saints whose bones lie scattered on the Alpine mountains cold,” or the bloody persecutions in Holland or in Scotland, or any or all of the murderous tragedies enacted by the Romish and other Christian Churches ; or to narrate the history of Ignatius Loyola and his followers who profess to be the servants of Jesus beyond all other men ; or to point to monkery as it has existed almost from the times of the Apostles ; or to hold up to view that Church which contains the major part of all who are called Christians, with its determined resistance to the entrance of light, and its new dogma of Infallibility. All this would be of no avail in justifying or even palliating the enormity of these expressions. No more can all his apologies serve to justify or palliate Dr. Dabney’s sweeping assertions respecting that grand body of truth, which is only second, though separated by a long interval, to the body of inestimably more precious truth graciously bestowed upon us in the Bible. We know—we do not merely suppose, but we know—that multitudes of upright men, sincere lovers of the truth, are driven from our sanctuaries, and kept from ever returning—alas, to their own undoing—by just such sweeping denunciations of science. We beg, we implore, any minister of the glad tidings of salvation who may read what we are now writing, never again to mingle these cruel and baseless

attacks with the blessed offer of life, and thereby drive to ruin those whom he might otherwise save. Preach the WORD; and do not make it of none effect by joining with it anathemas of that which your most enlightened hearers know to be true.*

* The following points cannot be passed by without notice, and yet they do not directly affect the general discussion; therefore it seems best to dispose of them in a note.

We regret that Dr. Dabney has neither substantiated nor withdrawn the charge which he introduced into his Sermon against the "great majority of members from the Northern States" who were present at the Scientific Association at Indianapolis. The charge was that, although many of them were ministers and elders, yet they confessed that they were hypocrites and liars—that they "professed a religion which they did not believe." Sermon, p. 6. Instead of either withdrawing or proving it, as we had hoped he would do, he tells us "he finds his conscience very obtuse on this point," and calls our remarks "an attempt to veil the prevalence of unbelief in America"! P. 552. He did not inquire into the truth of the statement; he says he found it going the rounds of the newspapers, and therefore was entitled to use it, because it had already been given "to the public"! We shall not discuss the propriety of such a course; but merely call attention to the fact that when in a sermon Dr. Dabney states a proposition and introduces evidence to support it with the preface, "We have the explicit testimony of an eye-witness," the evidence he thus introduces may be nothing more than a wandering newspaper slander, which the slightest examination would show could not possibly be true, picked up from the columns of the "mighty Northern press." P. 552. We trust that this practice may not become common amongst our ministers; we trust that they will not think themselves justified in quoting, as conclusive in an argument in defence of Scripture truth, a slander culled from the *New York Herald* or other representative of this "mighty Northern press."

We are sorry we cannot pass by wholly without criticism the remarks on pages 569—571, in connexion with the reference to the union between the Old School General Assembly and the United Synod. We certainly shall not discuss that union. We loyally accepted the decision of the General Assembly of 1864; and nothing from our lips or pen has done aught to weaken it. But we must say a few words as to the intimation that we have wished to cast doubt upon Dr. Dabney's theological soundness. For this intimation there is not the slightest foundation. So far as we are acquainted with his theological views, we agree with him; and we only wish he could equally agree with us in our scientific views, and help us to stem the tide of error instead of himself swelling it. Of

The next point is one which we had not supposed it would be necessary to discuss further ; for we thought Dr. Dabney would at once accept our views. In his Lectures, Sermon, etc., he seeks to cast doubt on physical science by speaking of it as "human and uninspired," contrasting it with theology as the "divine

the discussion in the *Southern Presbyterian* between the lamented Dr. A. A. Porter and himself, to which he refers, we read scarcely anything on either side ; and this attempt to connect us with it should not have been made. Dr. Dabney further says that we would be understood as "insinuating" that "the leading Presbyterian theologian, 'personally known to Dr. Dabney,' was no other than Dr. Dabney himself." As to this, we say, first, the author should not have spoken of us as "insinuating" anything. Even if he had not been prevented by the general laws of propriety, he must have known that we express plainly whatever meaning we wish to convey—we never "insinuate." For example, when it was necessary to point out his want of acquaintance with certain branches of science, we did it so clearly that we could not be misunderstood—we did not "insinuate" it. Of his statement that we would be understood not only as insinuating, but "insinuating" what we knew to be false—namely, that he was the author of the quotation we made—we have nothing to say except that we think too highly of him to believe that he will not reproach himself far more bitterly than we could wish him to do, when he properly reflects on this intimation. But, in the next place, we cannot comprehend how any one could so misunderstand us. Here is Dr. Dabney's language :

"And the clerical readers of the *Review* have doubtless, almost as naturally, understood him as insinuating that 'the leading Presbyterian theologian, personally known to Dr. Dabney,' was no other than Dr. Dabney himself. If the words bear this construction, all I have to say is, that I never wrote or uttered the statements enclosed in the quotation marks." P. 570.

Our difficulty is increased by the fact that Dr. Dabney immediately afterwards, on the same page, shows that he knew whom we meant, by saying that the words we quoted were the Rev. Dr. A. H. H. Boyd's. We described the author of these words by three marks : 1. That he had used the words we quoted. 2. That he was personally known to Dr. Dabney, and therefore not Dr. Dabney himself, unless we intended to deceive. 3. That he was included among "leading theologians." Now, although the writer knew that the first mark did not apply to him, and that the second should not, it seems he regards the third as so exclusively applicable that the "clerical readers of the REVIEW have doubtless almost as naturally understood us to mean himself"! Now, we do not think the clerical or other readers would misunderstand us as the writer has

science." We showed that the writer in such cases confounds things which are different. We said:

"It is to be observed that Theology is as much a human science as Geology or any other branch of Natural Science. The facts which form the basis of the science of Theology are found in God's word; those which form the basis of the science of Geology are found in his works; but the *science* in both cases is the work of the human mind. The Bible was indeed given specifically for the instruction of man, while the material universe was not so directly created for this purpose; and the lessons taught in the Bible are of infinitely higher value than those which we learn from nature; but still the science of Theology as a science is equally *human* and *uninspired* with the science of Geology—the facts in both cases are divine, the sciences based upon them human." P. 331.

We further showed that we gain a knowledge of Theology just as we do of Physical Science—by the use of our natural reason.

done—that because we said "leading Presbyterian theologians," we could mean no other than Dr. Dabney. Dr. Dabney is certainly a leading theologian; but we did not say "the leading theologian," as he quotes us, in applying it to himself; we said "leading theologians"—and surely there are several others to whom this description applies. •

We employed the illustration with no such motives as are ascribed to us. We were illustrating (page 335) the statement that physical science ought not to be held responsible for everything done by its students, just as Presbyterianism cannot be held responsible for everything done by Presbyterian theologians. Writing in this journal, we drew our illustration from its pages, as likely to be most familiar to its readers; for most of its present readers were its readers in 1864. We therefore quoted from Volume XIV., pp. 302 and 303, doctrinal statements which had two years before been published in a Richmond (Va.) journal by the distinguished Dr. Boyd, which we felt sure must be rejected by Dr. Dabney, who would utterly refuse to allow Presbyterianism to be held responsible for them. We were not in quest of anything "far-fetched," but the most familiar possible illustration of the following argument: If Dr. Dabney and all right-thinking men refuse to hold Presbyterianism responsible for all the teachings of so distinguished and justly esteemed a Presbyterian theologian as Dr. Boyd, then Dr. Dabney and all right-thinking men ought to abstain from holding physical science responsible for all the teachings of distinguished scientific men like Tyndall, La Place, etc. This illustration was surely neither "far-fetched," "peculiar," nor "remote;" if it was "biting," as Dr. Dabney says it was, it was the truth of it alone that bit.

We are disappointed to find that Dr. Dabney has not accepted these distinctions. Instead of doing so, he says :

“ But from Dr. Woodrow's next step I must solemnly dissent. It is that in which he degrades our knowledge of God and redemption through revelation to the level of our fallible, human knowledge of the inexact physical sciences. . . . The grave error of this is unmasked by a single question: Is then the work of the geologist, in constructing hypotheses, inductions, inferences, merely hermeneutical? All that the student of the divine science properly does, is to interpret God's words, and compare and arrange his teachings. Is this all that geology undertakes? . . . The ‘ facts of geology ’ are simply phenomenal, material substances. The facts of theology, which Dr. Woodrow admits to be divine, are *didactic propositions*, introducing us into the very heart of divine verities. . . . The critic's view, whether right or wrong, is unquestionably condemned by his Confession of Faith and his Bible. The former, Chap. I., § 5, says: ‘ Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts.’ ” Pp. 556, 557.

From these passages the reader will perceive that certain obvious distinctions have been overlooked by the writer. The first relates to the nature of theology; the second, to the way we become acquainted with it. He here as elsewhere confounds the Holy Bible and the science of Theology, speaking of them as if they were identical. He fails to see that the truths of the Bible are not the science of Theology, but merely the materials which are used by human uninspired man to construct that science. As we before said, “ the Bible was given specifically for the instruction of man,” to teach “ lessons of infinitely higher value than those which we learn from nature; ” and happily we may profit by these lessons, without knowing even the first principles of the human science of theology. We do not need the science of Botany to enable us to derive profit from the trees of the orchard and the forest: their fruit cheers and nourishes us; their shade refreshes us; with wood from their trunks we build houses to shelter us, and make fires to warm us and prepare our food. So we do not need the science of Theology to enable us to derive profit from that garden of the Lord—the Sacred Scriptures: its leaves are for the healing of the nations; we directly

draw from it the highest nourishment for the mind and the heart; we need no analysis to obtain its richest spiritual food and shelter from all that can harm here and hereafter; it immediately makes known to us the love of God the Father, the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the renewing of God the Holy Ghost; the salvation from sin, and the gift of eternal life—all without waiting for the relations between these precious truths to be pointed out by the uninspired science of Theology. But just as the botanist constructs his science by interpreting relations between the different trees and their different parts, just so the theologian constructs his science by interpreting the relations between the various truths in the Bible. The trees are divine; the Bible truths are divine; but the science of Botany is human and the science of Theology is human. Does this “degrade” theology or the Bible? It is not said, or remotely hinted, that natural science is not infinitely inferior in importance to theological science; but only that in both the facts are divine, the sciences human. Surely this is too plain to need further argument.

There is nothing new to theologians in our views on this point, and we expected them to be adopted as soon as stated. Since, however, they are so solemnly dissented from by a Professor of Theology, it may not be amiss to quote at some length the views of that Nestor of American theologians, who certainly knows the nature of the science which he has for more than fifty years been teaching with such distinguished ability and success:

“The Bible is no more a system of theology than nature is a system of chemistry or of mechanics. We find in nature the facts which the chemist or the mechanical philosopher has to examine, and from them to ascertain the laws by which they are determined. So the Bible contains the truths which the theologian has to collect, authenticate, arrange, and exhibit in their internal relation to each other.”

“What is true of other sciences is true of theology. We cannot know what God has revealed in his Word unless we understand, at least in some good measure, the relation in which the separate truths therein contained stand to each other. It cost the Church centuries of study and controversy to solve the problem concerning the person of Christ; that is, to adjust and bring into harmonious arrangement all the facts which the Bible teaches on that subject.”

“God does not teach men astronomy or chemistry, but he gives them

the facts out of which those sciences are constructed. Neither does He teach us systematic theology, but He gives us in the Bible the truths which, properly understood and arranged, constitute the science of theology. As the facts of nature are all related and determined by physical laws, so the facts of the Bible are all related and determined by the nature of God and of his creatures. And as he wills that men should study his works and discover their wonderful organic relation and harmonious combination, so it is his will that we should study his Word, and learn that, like the stars, its truths are not isolated points, but systems, cycles, and epicycles, in unending harmony and grandeur."

"The inductive method is so called because it agrees in everything essential with the inductive method as applied to the natural sciences.

"First. The man of science comes to the study of nature with certain assumptions. (1.) He assumes the trustworthiness of his sense perceptions. Unless he can rely upon the well-authenticated testimony of his senses, he is deprived of all means of prosecuting his investigations. The facts of nature reveal themselves to our faculties of sense, and can be known in no other way. (2.) He must also assume the trustworthiness of his mental operations. He must take for granted that he can perceive, compare, combine, remember, and infer; and that he can safely rely upon these mental faculties in their legitimate exercise. (3.) He must also rely on the certainty of those truths which are not learned from experience, but which are given in the constitution of our nature. That every effect must have a cause; that the same cause under like circumstances, will produce like effects; that a cause is not a mere uniform antecedent, but that which contains within itself the reason why the effect occurs.

"Second. The student of nature having this ground on which to stand, and these tools wherewith to work, proceeds to perceive, gather, and combine his facts. These he does not pretend to manufacture, nor presume to modify. He must take them as they are. He is only careful to be sure that they are real, and that he has them all, or at least all that are necessary to justify any inference which he may build upon them.

"Third. From facts thus ascertained and classified, he deduces the laws by which they are determined. That a heavy body falls to the ground is a familiar fact."

"The Bible is to the theologian what nature is to the man of science. It is his store-house of facts; and his method of ascertaining what the Bible teaches, is the same as that which the natural philosopher adopts to ascertain what nature teaches. In the first place, he comes to his task with all the assumptions above mentioned. He must assume the validity of those laws of belief which God has impressed upon our nature."

"In the second place, the duty of the Christian theologian is to ascertain, collect, and combine all the facts which God has revealed concerning himself and our relation to Him." These facts are all in the Bible.

“In the third place, the theologian must be guided by the same rules in the collection of facts, as govern the man of science.

“1. This collection must be made with diligence and care. It is not an easy work. There is in every department of investigation great liability to error. Almost all false theories in science and false doctrines in theology are due in a great degree to mistakes as to matters of fact. A distinguished naturalist said he repeated an experiment a thousand times before he felt authorised to announce the result to the scientific world as an established fact.

“2. This collection of facts must not only be carefully conducted, but also comprehensive, and if possible, exhaustive. An imperfect induction of facts led men for ages to believe that the sun moved round the earth, and that the earth was an extended plain. In theology a partial induction of particulars has led to like serious errors.”

“We must be honest here, as the true student of nature is honest in his induction. Even scientific men are sometimes led to suppress or to pervert facts which militate against their favorite theories: but the temptation to this form of dishonesty is far less in their case, than in that of the theologian.

“In the fourth place, in theology as in natural science, principles are derived from facts, and not impressed upon them.”

“It is the fundamental principle of all sciences, and of theology among the rest, that theory is to be determined by facts, and not facts by theory. As natural science was a chaos until the principle of induction was admitted and faithfully carried out, theology is a jumble of human speculations, not worth a straw, when men refuse to apply the same principle to the study of the Word of God.”

“The true method of theology is, therefore, the inductive, which assumes that the Bible contains all the facts or truths which form the contents of theology, just as the facts of nature are the contents of the natural sciences. It is also assumed that the relation of these Biblical facts to each other, the principles involved in them, the laws which determine them, are in the facts themselves, and are to be deduced from the facts of nature. In neither case are the principles derived from the mind and imposed upon the facts, but equally in both departments, the principles or laws are deduced from the facts and recognised by the mind.”

“If the views presented in the preceding chapter be correct, the question, What is Theology? is already answered. If natural science be concerned with the facts and laws of nature, theology is concerned with the facts and the principles of the Bible. If the object of the one be to arrange and systematise the facts of the external world, and to ascertain the laws by which they are determined; the object of the other is to systematise the facts of the Bible, and ascertain the principles or general truths which those facts involve.” *Hodge's Systematic Theology*, pp. 1—18.

The next thing which Dr. Dabney overlooks is the distinction between the knowledge of Bible truth and the saving knowledge of that truth. The first we obtain by the use of our natural reason; the second by means of the enlightening power of the Holy Spirit. Dr. Dabney must be aware of this distinction; he must know that the passages which he quotes from the Bible and the Confession of Faith relate exclusively to the second and not at all to the first. The distinction is set forth with admirable clearness in the Lectures on Theology which have been left to us as so precious a legacy by that master in Israel, Dr. Thornwell:

“I accept the definition now generally given, that Theology is the science of religion; that is, it is the system of doctrine in its logical connection and dependence, which, when spiritually discerned, produces true piety. There is a twofold cognition of Divine truth—one natural, resulting from the ordinary exercise of our faculties of knowledge, and the other supernatural or spiritual, resulting from the gracious illumination of the Holy Ghost. The habit which corresponds to the first, like every other habit of science, is mere speculative knowledge. The habit which corresponds to the other is true religion. The doctrine, to use the expressive analogy of St. Paul, (Rom, vi. 17,) is the mould, and religion the image that it leaves upon the heart, which the Spirit has softened to receive the impression. There is, first, the truth, and that is theology; there is next the cordial and spiritual apprehension of it, and that is the obedience of faith, which is synonymous with true religion. In other words, the truth objectively considered is Theology; subjectively received, under Divine illumination, it is religion. In relation to religion, therefore, Theology is a science only in the objective sense.”

“In the next place, it is not to be overlooked that there is a natural knowledge of theology which is pure science; which rests in speculation; which knows, according to the familiar adage, only that it may know. This natural knowledge is the instrument of spiritual cognition. It is the seed which the Holy Spirit quickens into vital godliness. We must first know as *mèn* before we can know as *renewed* men. Theology, as thus ending in speculation or in theory, can be taught, but religion must be implanted.” *Thornwell's Collected Writings, Vol. I., pp. 36, 37.*

We confess we were greatly surprised that these obvious distinctions in the department of theology should have escaped Dr. Dabney's attention; we were better prepared for his misapprehension of geology which is betrayed by his question which we have quoted above. He is quite right in regarding this question as decisive, “Is the work of the geologist, in constructing hy

potheses, inductions, inferences, merely hermeneutical?" To this no one acquainted with natural science could hesitate a moment to give an affirmative answer: his work is merely hermeneutical. Dr. Dabney of course expected a negative reply; but truth will not permit him to be gratified. Interpretation is the sole work of all natural science, as indeed of all true science.

This question is of great importance as furnishing a complete explanation of a fact otherwise so mysterious. How does it happen that Dr. Dabney and many others among the best men living, in this and other lands, men of thorough learning in many directions, sincerely desiring to reach the truth—how does it happen that such men maintain their present attitude towards geology and natural science generally? Dr. Dabney's question explains it all—they fail to perceive the purely hermeneutical character of natural science. If they were right in the single position that natural science is not purely hermeneutical, their suspicions and assaults and denunciations would be not merely justifiable, but praiseworthy. If these truth-loving men could only see natural science as it is, as the interpreter of nature—of the works of God, they could not and would not assail it as they now feel impelled to do. There have been false interpretations of nature, just as there have been false interpretations of Scripture; but as we do not assail and denounce theological science for the one, let us not assail and denounce natural science for the other. In each case, expose the error, but do not denounce the science.

That we have correctly stated the true character of inductive science, we would suppose to be well known by all, but for the sad proofs to the contrary which present themselves on every hand. Since the days of Lord Bacon, the most familiar name applied to the student of physical science has been "INTERPRETER OF NATURE." As this has been so remarkably overlooked by the respected writer, it may not be amiss to quote here the first aphorism from that immortal work, the "*Novum Organum*, or, True Suggestions for the Interpretation of Nature:"

"Man, as the minister and interpreter of nature, does and understands as much, as his observations on the order of nature, either with regard to things or the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor is capable of more."

The remaining topics must be treated more briefly. We do not intend to repeat the satisfactory reasons previously given why Dr. Dabney's objections to the existence of the chair of "Natural Science in connection with Revelation" in the Columbia Theological Seminary, should not be heeded. But he should not have attributed our criticism of his assaults on science to "retaliation for his presuming to exercise his right" in this respect. P. 542. He has the undoubted right to act as he has done; and we have never thought of objecting to his exercise of it. Columbia Seminary is under the direct control of our entire Church, and every minister and private member has a right to attempt to make it as efficient as possible. The fact that Dr. Dabney is an honored Professor in another Seminary which is not under the control of our entire Church and would not be required to obey the commands of the General Assembly, does not in the least deprive him of his right to attempt through the Assembly to regulate the affairs of that Seminary which is under its control. We have shown that he errs in his opinion on this question; but we do not object to his expressing it. But he cannot be serious in his objections to the chair we occupy in the Columbia Seminary, when he practically from his own chair of instruction shows that his arguments have no influence over his own course. His "most conclusive argument" against teaching natural science in a theological seminary is that, "the Church cannot by ecclesiastical power teach her presbyters *ex cathedra* in her Seminaries a set of opinions which are clear outside of our doctrinal covenants—namely, "our Confession and Catechisms." Until he shows that he is in earnest in this argument, by ceasing himself to teach mental science, which is "clear outside of our doctrinal covenants," in a Seminary, it is hardly worth while to discuss further his objections to our teaching natural science.

Another point we shall not now examine, is the respected writer's failure to understand the real bearing of the recent "Deep-Sea Soundings," which he supposes have cast so much doubt on geology. If we should safely return after crossing the "deep-sea" once more, we hope to place before the read-

ers of this journal the true character of these discoveries; without immediate reference to the present discussion.

We hardly think the writer has been successful in defending his mode of using the term "naturalist," in some cases meaning a student of nature, in others one who embraces "naturalism." We did not object to the term "naturalism," but to the passing from one meaning of "naturalist" to another in a way which must mislead. His defence consists chiefly in proving that "naturalism" is still currently used; but this does not remove the objection we made. If we should be speaking of country residences as "villas," we would not thereby justify our calling the residents "villains;" nor would we be justified in pronouncing one who holds a "dogma" a "dogmatist."

We cannot wholly pass over the writer's defence of his geological accuracy, and his statement that our "real geology" differs from that of Dana and Lyell. He says our classification "differs from the brief outline he gave chiefly (not only) by using more subdivisions," and defends himself by stating that Dr. Molloy only "names as his three divisions, *igneous, metamorphic, and aqueous rocks.*" We did not object to Dr. Dabney's classifications as too brief, but as entirely wrong. Dr. Molloy's is quite right, and resembles Dr. Dabney's in nothing. It is difficult to explain these errors to readers who are not already acquainted with geology; and therefore we are forced to use the plainest illustrations, if we would make ourselves understood. It is quite right to say briefly that America is subdivided into North and South America; but it is wholly wrong to say that it is subdivided into North America, Brazil, Canada, the United States, and Tennessee. Let the scheme which was criticised be examined, and the point of this illustration will be seen. It may seem that this is a matter of no consequence; but if geography were under discussion, would we attach much importance to the geographical arguments of one who would give the last mentioned subdivision of America? This question shows why it is not amiss to quote the following additional illustration of geological knowledge:

“They say that the cretaceous deposits rank as *mesozoic*, below the *pliocene*, *ecene*, and *miocene* in order, and consequently older in origin. That is, Sir Chas. Lyell says so, in his most recent work, (if he is any authority with Dr. Woodrow.)” Page 562.

Sir Charles Lyell is authority with us as to the use of these terms, because he introduced them into the science more than forty years ago. But he never used them in that way. Let the reader observe that the point under discussion here is the historical *order of succession* of the rocks. Let him further reflect what he would think of a historian who should inform him that after the Pharaohs of Egypt came the modern kings of England, the Cæsars of Rome, and the Byzantine Emperors, *in order*. This is precisely what has been done above. In this case the order of succession is everything; and yet we are gravely told that the order is *mesozoic*, followed by *pliocene*, *ecene*, and *miocene*; whereas, Lyell (and every other geologist) gives as the order, *ecene*, *miocene*, and *pliocene*.*

We shall not undertake to defend the geological classification with which we compared Dr. Dabney's, on page 369. He says it “is not identical with Dana's or Lyell's any more than his”! And this notwithstanding the fact that he gravely tells his students, as we saw, (Lectures, p. 170,) that the “secondary rocks contain remains of life *palæozoic* and *meiocene* ;” and that the “tertiary rocks and clays contain *pleiocene* fossils,” which last

*The writer thinks we are impolite when we point out such facts as those above given, and complains of our “school of manners.” P. 544. Now, we cannot agree with him in this respect; we think it perfectly proper. We have never impugned his motives; we accord him the fullest credit as actuated solely by a desire to promote the truth. If it were worth while to discuss “manners,” politeness, etc., we would say that we regard it as perfectly polite for Dr. Dabney to prove us wrong, if he can, either by showing that our arguments are illogical, or that we are not acquainted with the subject; but that it is inconsistent with our “school of manners” to attribute improper motives and designs to an opponent in debate—as, for example, “retaliation,” p. 542; “pleasure of printing a slashing criticism of one who had given no provocation to him,” p. 548; “insinuating,” p. 570, etc. But it is not worth while to say more on this point.

statement is true enough, but then the tertiary contains the miocene also, not to speak of the eocene. If we needed to defend ourselves, all that would be necessary would be a reference to any geological work whatever; but Dr. Dabney has saved us the trouble by quoting on page 566 the subdivisions given by Prof. Duns and Prof. Dana, which correspond exactly with those which we presented. The fact that Dr. Dabney—amusingly enough—made these quotations to prove us wrong, does not render them the less valuable for the purpose to which we here apply them.

We earnestly hope that a further study of these subjects will produce a radical change in the writer's views. It is useless for him to attempt to push back the progress of scientific truth by his "single point" or any number which he may add to it. He cannot construct a mop strong enough to sweep back the ocean of science, however skilful he may be. He is certainly in earnest in wielding such mop as he has. With a shout of triumphant laughter, he dashes it into the wave of spectroscopic discoveries, calling them "rays of moonshine, in the thinnest of metaphorical senses" (page 568); then he plunges into literal masses of water, and resisting the wave of the science of hydraulics, calls to his help "experienced pilots and boatmen of the Mississippi" who "are generally of opinion that the lower strata of water in its channel run with far more velocity than the surface"! *SO. PRES. REVIEW*, 1861, p. 261. Thus he furiously brandishes his mop against each succeeding wave, pushing it back with all his might. But the ocean rolls on, and never minds him; science is utterly unconscious of his opposition. If this were all, the contest would be simply amusing. But it is not all. As has been seen, there are all over the land inquirers as to the truth of the Bible who know more or less distinctly that physical science is truth. Now, we ask again, what effect will be produced upon these inquirers if their religious teachers tell them that the "spirit of these sciences is essentially infidel and rationalistic"? What effect will be produced upon them when they are told by one so eminent and so justly esteemed as Dr. Dabney: "We have infidel lawyers and physicians: but they are infidels, not because of their studies in jurisprudence, therapeutics, or anatomy; but because they

have turned aside to dabble in geology and its connections." P. 552. There are numbers, even among our most learned and most devoted ministers, who share these views which we regard as so inconsistent with the truth and as so fatal in their consequences. We would fain do something to prevent these terrible consequences by persuading all whom we can influence to review the ground on which they base their present opinions; confident that a fair reëxamination will without fail lead to a change of mind.

We therefore again entreat all who will listen to us, by the love of the souls of our fellow men, that they will not continue to represent God's truth the knowledge of which is gained from the study of His works as inconsistent with that which His infinite love and tender mercy bestow upon us in His Word of Life. Let them no longer deceive themselves and mislead others by believing and teaching that physical science is science falsely so-called. But denying and decrying none of the many sides of truth, heartily rejoicing in all, let them with renewed zeal hold up to the view of men the unobscured GRACE AND TRUTH WHICH CAME BY JESUS CHRIST.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Three Lectures on the Church of Scotland, with especial reference to the Dean of Westminster's recent course on that subject, delivered in the Music Hall, on the 24th, 26th, and 31st January, 1872. By ROBERT RAINY, D. D. Third edition. Edinburgh: Jno. McLarin, Princess St., 1872. Pp. 98, 8vo.

These interesting and instructive Lectures have now been two years before the public, but it is not too late to introduce them to our readers, seeing that so many amongst us are cut off from access to the book-markets of the world. It appears that the Dean of Westminster delivered his course on the 12th January, and that Dr. Rainy, Professor of Church History and Polity in the New College, Edinburgh, followed before the month was out with these three Lectures in reply. He said the first duty which Scotsmen owed to an English Churchman coming amongst them, to communicate his impressions of their Church and their Christianity, was to give him a courteous reception; the next was to thank him for all that was friendly either in his criticism or his praise; and the third to sift his statements and his conclusions. That an Englishman should fall into some mistakes about Scotch antiquities and Scotch controversies, was a circumstance both ordinary and natural, which could discompose no one, and Dr. Rainy did not propose to defend through thick and thin the Scots in general, or the Presbyterians in particular. They were men fallible and failing. They were Scotsmen, and therefore when they went wrong, they did it energetically, blowing a trumpet before them, and defying all the world to refute them—yes, and they had “the moral and intellectual physiognomy which the world, favored with many a wandering specimen, knows so well—an ungainly people, wearing their principles in a serious, pedantic way, angular, lumbering, roundabout in their motions, argumentative, inflexible.” He adds that Scotsmen all know one another, and know that these things are true, and ever since the

days of Knox have claimed and exercised the privilege of laughing at one another; but that their strength of conviction and of purpose is not easily shaken either by laughter or by tears.

Dr. Rainy, however, insists that Dean Stanley does not understand Scotsmen and Presbyterians. And what is more, that he has "no sympathetic appreciation of the deeper and the stronger currents of religious life and of doctrinal controversy." He has an eye for the picturesque, both in the physical and in the moral world, and the outside of great religious movements he can describe, but not their inside. "The reason is plain. Dr. Stanley's mind turns ever to the limitations, the compensations, the counterpoises which balance and qualify all assertions, which take away the sharpness of the definition, which temper and assuage the confidence with which it is propounded." But Dr. Rainy adds that "Church history has been mainly made by men of intense convictions, and hardly without the experience of intense conviction shall it be understood or represented."

This appears to us the same as saying what we have often said, and are satisfied is perfectly true, that only a Presbyterian, and a thorough-going one at that, can understand and set forth Church History perfectly. How can one describe the progress of anything which he misconceives at the outset? To represent a development correctly, you must first know properly that original which has been developed. Now, only the Presbyterian rightly conceives of the Church as the kingdom which God has set up in this fallen world, with its doctrine, its discipline, and its worship, all revealed in Scripture; into which kingdom nothing may lawfully be introduced by man. Whatever is not commanded is forbidden. Such is the Presbyterian and the Scriptural idea of the Church; and no author is prepared to describe, or even to comprehend Church History, who does not begin with this conception of the Church. And in fact the sole adequate ground for any proper interest in Church History is simply this, that the Lord having set up His kingdom in the world in the hands of human administrators of its affairs, we want to know what they have done in their folly and sin with this Divine institute.

Accordingly, Dr. Rainy sets forth that in any estimate the

standard employed for measuring is the main point. And he describes the Dean graciously saying, as the events and characters of Scottish Presbyterian history passed before him in review—I am an Episcopalian ; surely you have no strong objection to Episcopacy. And I am an Erastian ; now is it not absurd of you to pretend that there is any great harm in State supremacy over the Church ? And I am a Broad Churchman, and don't believe in many doctrines you believe in ; but surely you will not make any great fuss about these points ! To all this as said by an English Church lecturer to Presbyterians, what can a man answer, that is, a well-bred man ?

The first Lecture of Dr. Rainy is on the relations of Scotch Presbyterianism to the Prelacy introduced into and pressed upon Scotland at different periods. The second Lecture is on the Liberty of the Church. The third discusses Moderatism and the Moderates.

Dean Stanley had endeavored to make out that it was possible and easy for the two systems *to flourish together*, just as now amongst us we hear sometimes of “a liberal and catholic type of Presbyterianism, including in one the generic principles common to Presbytery and Independency.” The Dean said that, actually, Presbytery and Prelacy had flourished together in the latter days of James I., and in those of the First Charles. Dr. Rainy describes, in reply, the devices employed to outwit and deceive the Presbyterians, yet in such a way as to avoid any general collision. Leading and resolute men banished, pliable tools were placed in high positions. Innovations introduced with the assurance that nothing more was intended, these were then made stepping-stones to new changes. The names and forms of Church Courts allowed to remain, the real power was steadily but gradually concentrated in the hands of the Bishops. Then came the explosion of 1637 and 1638, (precisely two hundred years before that one which the amalgamation of Congregationalism and Presbytery brought about among ourselves,) and this explosion swept away the incubus of Prelacy as if a mere nightmare. This was a warning to the Prelatists ; and when, in the darker days of Charles II., Episcopacy revived, there were still greater pains

taken to leave some Presbyterianism, both in government and worship, in those inferior strata of the system which touched most nearly the common life and experience of the people generally, till the sterner elements could be worn out of the country, and things made ready for a safe move in advance. This, says Dr. Rainy, is what the Dean describes as "the two systems flourishing in the closest contact." There is a great deal in a phrase. So Popery and Protestantism have flourished together in Oxford, and so Germany and France flourished together in the closest contact after the siege of Paris ended three years ago. Germany sat on the top of prostrate France and exchanged polite proposals with M. Thiers. Yes, and so Congregationalism and Presbyterianism flourish amongst us in closest contact now that our courts are transformed into mere advisory councils, and church power is made a name, and Presbyteries, churches, ministers, and members all obey rule or obey not, just as they list.

So shadowy was the distinction between the two systems according to the Dean's conception, that he seems to have supposed the Scotch called Prelacy "black," merely "because the prelatic ministers wore black gowns; whereas, we are to take it that those of the other side wore blue cloaks and broad bonnets." Dr. Rainy reminds the Dean that Presbyterians had other reasons tolerably strong for calling Prelacy "black," and assures him none of our ministers ever troubled his head whether his cloak to preach in was *black* or *blue*.

Dr. Rainy acknowledges that in their resistance to Episcopacy, our fathers did sometimes exaggerate the importance of the point in debate. "But this happens in all debates, and is particularly apt to happen when men are maintaining their sincerity under oppression, and are like to be ruined for so doing."

"What may be made of Episcopacy in churches that heartily approve of it, I do not inquire. But what Episcopacy proved to be, as forced on a community that in various degrees disliked it, doubted or denied its authority, and feared its tendency was this—it meant the worst kind of humiliation; it meant the expulsion and silencing of venerated men; it meant the promotion of forward and fawning and lax men to positions in the Church of which they were unworthy; it meant an unhappy, dubious, perplexed state of mind on the part of many worthy and able men,

anxious to make no needless disturbances, yet doubtful, and more than doubtful, whether they were not betraying a noble and scriptural constitution; it meant persistent deception, and manœuvring, and falsehood on the part of leading Churchmen; it meant a state of things in which every influence that is ecclesiastically demoralising was in full play, in which temptation to fawn and cringe was a great ecclesiastical force. Men looked back on it all the more indignant because they felt personally ashamed and humiliated. And their resolution was that they would be finally done with it. Henceforth, by God's help, they were resolved that no institution should be accepted or sanctioned unless it could be made good to the Church's conscience out of God's Word, and set up on that ground, cordially, heartily, and resolvedly. If they said strong things about Episcopacy, and the Dean can produce many such sayings if he pleases, they only, in the language of their own proverb, 'roosed the ford as they found it.' It had been a very bad ford for them."

But it is said the recoil "betrayed them into a narrow and petty position, unfit to be permanently maintained. It is always to be maintained!" All that might tempt us to look askance on Christians who are Episcopalians has long passed away. We have the best reasons for honoring and loving many of them, for they are foremost in the support of all that is good. "All that might tempt us to look askance on such men is past. But all remains that should dispose us to enduring and enthusiastic thankfulness that our fathers upheld Presbyterianism and shut Prelacy out."

Here is Dr. Rainy's account of what Presbyterianism is :

Presbyterianism meant organised life, regulated distribution of forces, graduated recognition of gifts, freedom to discuss, authority to control, agency to administer. Presbyterianism meant a system by which the convictions and conscience of the Church could constantly be applied by appropriate organs to her affairs. Presbyterianism meant a system by which quickening influence anywhere experienced in the Church could be turned into effective force and transmitted to fortify the whole society. Presbyterianism meant a system in which every one, first of all the common man, had his recognised place, his defined position, his ascertained and guarded privileges, his responsibilities inculcated and enforced, felt himself a part of the great unity, with a right to care for its welfare, and to guard its integrity. From the broad base of the believing people the sap rose through Sessions, Presbyteries, Synods, to the Assembly, and thence descending diffused knowledge, influence, organic unity through the whole system. Yes, Presbyterianism is a system for a free

people that love a regulated, a self-regulating freedom; a people independent, yet patient, considerate, trusting much to the processes of discussion and consultation, and more to the promised aid of a much-forgiving and a watchful Lord. It is a system for strong Churches—Churches that are not afraid to let their matters see the light of day—to let their weakest parts and their worst defects be canvassed before all men that they may be mended. It is a system for believing Churches, that are not ashamed or afraid to cherish a high ideal, and to speak of lofty aims, and to work for long and far results, amid all the discouragements arising from sin and folly in their own ranks and around them. It is a system for catholic Christians, who wish not merely to cherish private idiosyncrasies, but to feel themselves identified with the common cause, while they cleave directly to Him whose cause it is. Our fathers felt instinctively that the changes thrust upon them threatened to suppress great elements of good—not mere forms alone, but the life which those forms nourished and expressed. When Episcopacy shall have trained the common people to care, as those of Scotland have cared, for the public interest of Christ's Church, and to connect that care with their own religious life as a part and a fruit of it, then it may afford to smile at the zealous self-defence of Scottish Presbyterianism."

And here is his account of what Episcopacy is :

"But Episcopacy is fated, I fear, to bring other things in its train. From the circumstances of its long history; from the fact of its being established, where it is established, rather on grounds of tradition than of Scripture; from its being associated with festivals, and ceremonies, and like inventions, methods of Church life which rest on the same traditional ground; from its being the link on which hangs suspended a whole system of salvation by Church and sacraments, which depends on Episcopal succession; it follows that wherever Episcopacy comes, the rest presses in behind. Episcopacy led up to Popery, though many a bishop fretted and fought against that result. So, though many a sincere and honest Episcopalian Protestant detests the system I am speaking of, he can never get rid of it. It comes, and it comes not merely as an element or fact, but as a singularly arrogant and imperious force, demanding for itself and its principles a complete ascendancy, and forcing on the Churches where it exists the alternative of submission or of perpetual strife about the very first principles of Protestant truth. It was the perception of this, growing clear to the Scottish mind, that lent more than half its intensity to the revolt of 1638. And the same reason holds still. To keep those superstitions out of our churches, to disembarass ourselves of a world of foolish, mischievous, and misleading practice and sentiment, by the very simple process of holding fast to Presbyterianism, is to gain a greater good by adhering to a lesser good. We value them both; and we know that in the day we resign the one we shall lose the

other. We have no temptation to resign Presbyterianism in our day ; but most devoutly do we thank and praise God Almighty, who gave grace to our fathers to maintain it amid the temptations of theirs. And I repeat that in 1637, when our Church resolved that it would be tampered with by Episcopacy no more, not the system itself only, but the train of accompaniments and tendencies that cleave to it, determined their resolution.

“ Now, when we take our stand against Episcopacy, and against the multitude of things that go with it, in worship and otherwise, it seems to be thought that we betray a small, scrupulous spirit. Why object to this one and this other beneficial and useful invention, graceful, poetic, fragrant with the associations of 1,500 years? Our answer is, that if we once began we should have plenty of small scruples, such as agitate our friends across the border. And the only remedy is either to swallow all that any one plausibly proposes, or else to sweep all these things away in a mass, on the ground that whenever we begin to introduce man's inventions into God's worship and service, we deviate from the true path. Of these alternatives we adopt the second. There is nothing petty or small about it. Like every other principle, it may be taken up and applied in a small, anxious, casuistical spirit. In itself it is large, broad, and manly. We have nothing to say to that immense apparatus of human inventions, we refuse to have anything to do with them, we simply dismiss them all ; and thereby we are rid of a thousand small questions and petty disputes.”

Such are the timely and thoroughgoing representations of our divinely revealed system, which come to us from the old country and the old Church. We add only this observation : that nothing in the history of the Church of Scotland, from its beginning in 1560, is so striking as the persistency of the endeavors of Prelacy to regain and maintain its position amongst that people. Our danger is from the opposite quarter. May the gracious Master help us to stand in our lot and hold up our testimony for his revealed truth, with something like the steadfastness of our forefathers.

The Words of the New Testament, as altered by Transmission and ascertained by Modern Criticism. For Popular Use.
By REV. WILLIAM MILLIGAN, D. D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism, Aberdeen, and REV. ALEXANDER ROBERTS, D. D., Professor of Humanity, St. Andrews. Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark, 38, George Street. 1873. Pp. 262; 12mo.

The object of this book is to give a plain and popular view of

the subject of Biblical Criticism, free from the elaborate details of more scholastic works, and adapted to the comprehension of intelligent men who desire information respecting the text of the Sacred Scriptures, and the methods adopted by those who have devoted their lives to these studies, to ascertain what the original text was, as it came from the pens of inspired men.

The First Part treats with sufficient fulness the facts of the case, such as the causes of various readings in the New Testament, the nature and amount of these variations, its chief existing manuscripts, the ancient versions of the same, the quotations from it found in ancient writers; to which is added a sketch of the history of modern Biblical Criticism. This portion of the work was written by Professor Roberts.

The Second Part treats of the mode of dealing with these facts. Textual criticism is not a mere collection of undigested facts. The search for the original text of the Scriptures, or of the New Testament to which alone this book has respect, is regulated by the same principles of evidence which rule in judicial proceedings in civil courts, and which require that testimonies should be weighed, not numbered. Of these testimonies the chief are the manuscripts of the Greek text. But these must be classified. What we are in search of is the original, the most ancient text. In chapters ii., iii., iv., v., the various steps of classification are pointed out, and it is shown that notwithstanding the enormous mass of evidence that we have as to the New Testament, our primary authorities are reduced to a very small number. Chapter vii. discusses the Principle of Grouping. This arises from the observed fact that in Gaul, Italy, and Africa, there is a type of variation in MSS. seemingly different from that prevailing at Alexandria or Constantinople; that at Constantinople there is a type of text strongly resembling that which prevailed among the Fathers at Antioch in Syria. Chapter viii. treats of the Determination of the Text on the Principle of External Evidence. Chapter ix., of the same on the Principle of Internal Evidence. A general summary is given in Chapter x. This portion of the book is from the pen of Professor Milligan.

The Third Part of the volume is the application of these princi-

ples to important texts of the New Testament in its successive books, Professor Milligan treating of the texts referred to in the Gospel and Acts, and Professor Roberts those of the other books of the New Testament.

The volume is timely. The New Testament Revision Committee sitting at Westminster, aided as it is by scholars in our own country, is attracting the attention of that portion of the Christian world who speak the English tongue and use it in the worship of the sanctuary. Those gentlemen, if they do their work aright, will have first to decide as well as they can, what the original readings of the Greek Testament were, and make the revised version conform to that, rather than to a corrupted text; and the volume now before us will enable the intelligent reader to understand at once the difficulty and importance of the work, and the scholarship and sound judgment it requires. The principles which are applied here to the New Testament, have their application with some differences, to the text of the Old Testament also.

The Historic Origin of the Bible. A Hand-Book of Principal Facts from the best recent Authorities, German and English. By EDWIN CONE BISSELL, A. M., with an introduction by Professor ROSWELL D. HITCHCOCK, D. D., of Union Theological Seminary, New York. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co. Pp. 432. 8vo.

The volume whose title is now given is a more extended and comprehensive work than the preceding. Part I. gives the History of the English Bible in V. chapters, embracing the first 88 pages. Part II. embraces the History of the New Testament in VI. chapters, from page 88 to page 259, treating of The Written Text; The Ancient Version and Printed Text; The New Testament Canon; the Gospel and Acts; The Epistles of Paul; The Epistle to the Hebrews, the Catholic Epistle, and the Apocalypse. Part III. treats of the Old Testament in V. chapters, from page 263—342, embracing the Language, Manuscripts, Versions, and General Textual History of the Old Testament; the Origin of the Separate Books, as the Pentateuch, Joshua, and Judges; Ruth, the Books of Samuel, Kings, Chronicles; Ezra, Nehemiah,

Esther, Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Canticles, and the Prophets from Isaiah to Malachi. The Appendices give a resumé of the leading opinions for and against Revision, and a brief account of the Old and New Testament Apocrypha.

The object of the author has been to popularize these valuable truths and make them easily accessible to ordinary Bible readers, to Sunday School and Bible Class teachers, and yet to exhibit them with such conciseness and completeness as to make the book not unworthy the notice of ministers, theological students, and others who cultivate the higher learning.

Such books as this and the preceding will do much to present that species of learning, which has lain concealed in volumes written for the professional scholar, to the public eye, so that we can no longer exclaim with Wicklif, "O Christ! thy law is hidden in the sepulchre; when wilt thou send thy angel to remove the stone and show thy truth unto thy flock?"

The Structure of the Old Testament. A series of Popular Essays. By the REV. STANLEY LEATHES, M. A., Professor of Hebrew, King's College, London. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., 710 Arch Street. 1873. Pp. 198, 12mo.

Some regard the Bible, not to say the earlier portion of it, as one book so completely that they forget its highly composite nature. Others again through the impulse lately given to critical studies perceive so much of its composite structure that they forget its true and essential unity. But the unity of the Old Testament and of the whole Bible arises out of and subsists under its organic structure.

By the *organic structure* of any body is meant its structure with reference to its parts. It is the relation between the parts and their interdependence which enables us to speak of organic structure. The Old Testament is an organic whole inasmuch as it is compounded or made up of parts or organs. But an organ is a tool and it implies a force to use it and a purpose for which it is used. To say therefore that the Old Testament is an organic structure is to say its parts have a mutual relation as well as each part a distinct purpose, and also, that the adaptation dis-

cernible is evidence of unity of purpose and choice of means, and thus of a Person designing and choosing and acting.

The Lectures before us undertake to point out the tokens or evidences of such organic structure in the Books of the Old Testament. These were written by not less than twenty writers and during a period of not less than one thousand years, and in two cognate but totally distinct languages, the Hebrew and the Chaldee. It is perfectly easy to prove and the author of these Lectures does prove, but we cannot set forth the evidence here, that the Old Testament as an organic whole was in existence 300 years before Christ, which is about 100 years after the production of Malachi, its latest book. And, now looking at the Old Testament as a whole, we perceive that its topics are numerous and its contents various. There are legal documents, sacrificial prescriptions, ritual ordinances, family records, genealogical tables, and historical monuments of the most complete kind. In addition to the history we have poetry—elegiac, pastoral, warlike, devotional. Then there are ethical treatises, moral maxims, speculations as to human destiny, and attempts to solve the mystery of our being. Finally there is a cosmogony which alone of all the cosmogonies of the ancient world now challenges, in the midst of the light of this age, the scrutiny of modern science and gets its challenge answered by the most respectful and earnest examination. In like manner the writers of the Old Testament are of all classes and occupations. There is the king, the priest, the warrior, the sage, the chorister in the temple, the cupbearer in the palace, the chamberlain in the court, the herdsman in the field.

Now our author arranges the existing literature of the Old Testament round four principal characters, namely, Ezra, Isaiah, David, Moses, as historical, prophetic, poetical and legal; and beginning with the latest records ascends up to the earlier ones and undertakes to form some idea of their natural method of growth and to ascertain how far it is right to consider the volume as essentially one. And his conclusion is that every portion of this ancient literature is intimately bound up with every other—the prophecy with the poetry and the poetry with the

history, and all together with the law; and the law not only an integral element in the composition of the Old Testament, but the corner-stone of its internal structure and the firm, essential basis of its organic and indestructible unity.

Heart and Voice: Instrumental Music in Christian Worship not Divinely authorised. By JAMES GLASGOW, D. D., late Fellow of the University of Bombay, late Member of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, and Irish General Assembly's Professor of Oriental Languages. Belfast: C. Aitchison, J. Cleland; Dublin: Robertson & Co., G. Herbert; Derry: James Montgomery, Bishop Street; Edinburgh: Johnstone, Hunter & Co. Pp. 275, 12mo.

This treatise did not originate, says the author, in the discussions about instrumental music which have lately occurred amongst Scotch and Irish Presbyterians, but in his own previous inquiries into the proper interpretation of the Apocalypse. He has sought accordingly to "bring popular ideas to the test of the closest critical investigation of the actual meaning of all Scripture bearing on the subject." He adds: "The more I have studied this question, the more am I convinced that it is of no trifling nature, and not to be satisfactorily settled by public speeches and personal conflicts." His idea is that "light pamphlets cannot go thoroughly into the subject;" accordingly he claims to have examined in this volume patiently and critically "all the places of Scripture that testify on the subject." And we feel confident that every candid reader, whatever may be his opinions on the question discussed by Dr. Glasgow, will admit the justice of this claim and consequently the very great value of his work.

In his introduction the author makes these historical statements: Instruments were never used in Christian church worship for some seven centuries and even down to the 13th century had no official sanction in the Church of Rome. There is no trace of their use in Waldensian worship in past days, and the Free Italian Church does not possess a single musical instrument. The confessions of the Reformed Churches give no sanction to their use. The English Episcopal Church has long employed them, and of late years they have begun to be introduced into

various other Protestant Churches. In the Established Church of Scotland organs have been admitted to some extent. The Free Church has not acceded to their use. In the Irish Presbyterian Church it is much desiderated by some and strenuously opposed by others. He refers also to the Westminster Assembly as declaring "the acceptable way of worshipping the true God is instituted by Himself and so limited by His holy will that He may not be worshiped in any way not prescribed in Holy Scripture." Accordingly the Westminster divines caused the great organs at St. Paul's and St. Peter's in Westminster to be taken down, and the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland wrote a congratulatory letter to those divines, rejoicing among other things that those instruments had been removed and that plain and powerful preaching had been set up in their stead as characteristic features of worship.

Our author divides his work into eight parts. In *the first* he considers the *pre Davidic period*, dividing it into the patriarchal period, the Mosaic period and the period of the Judges. Every text of Scripture that can be supposed to bear on the question is critically and very ably examined.

In part *second* is considered *the Davidic period* and the examination is conducted in the same careful manner of enquiry into all that Scripture sets forth touching that time. Dr. Glasgow maintains that the Levites were never the sole conductors of the Synagogue service, but that they were exclusively put in charge by David of the praise of God in the Temple worship by singing and playing on instruments. And he holds that David was divinely commissioned to set up this kind of public worship, not of course in the Synagogues, where it was never allowed, but before the tabernacle and in the temple. And, moreover, towards the close of David's life he also by divine authority appointed the Levites to have charge of the music instead, as formerly, of the ark and the tabernacle. From 1 Chron. xxiii. to the end of that book we have a full account of this pattern, revealed by the Spirit, which David gave to Solomon for the courses of the Priests and of the Levites in this new service to which they were henceforth set apart. From the first they were "a gift to Aaron

to do service" in the tabernacle, but henceforth they were also in charge of the work of praising and ministering, and that with harps and psalters. Now the argument is that instrumental music being *Levitical* passed away with that dispensation, and not being *of the Synagogue* was not transferred with the other parts of that institute to the Christian Church.

Part *third* discusses *the prophetic period*, and part *fourth* presents us with *Psalmodic criticism*, where the meaning of *Zimmer* and *Psallo* and *Hymneo* and *Neginoth*, *Shigaion*, etc., is fully considered, and the use of the Psalms by Christians discussed.

Part *fifth* brings us to *the Messianic period*; Part *Sixth* presents the arguments for instruments; Part *Seventh, the Replies* to them; and Part *Eighth* quotes *Early opinions* and *Later opinions* on the general subject.

In Part *Sixth* Dr. Glasgow answers the question, "Is the use of instruments in God's house sinful?" with an unhesitating affirmative. "It is no illiberality (he says) to speak the truth and to prove it" as has been done (he says) by Drs. Begg, Candlish, and many other able and sound Presbyterians.


As to the position that we may use in worship whatever is not *totidem verbis* forbidden, he demands, "Where is the verbal prohibition of incense, which is as distinctly as harps recognized in the apocalyptic symbols; of the cross in baptism, signing with the cross, holy oil and water, bodily flagellations, pilgrimages on bare knees to holy wells and places; of monasteries and nunneries, of lighting candles in churches in the day time, of bowing to the East, of turning the back to the people, of wearing ephod, mitre, and chasuble—of the whole ritualistic panorama of what has been called 'attitudes, latitudes, and platitudes?' not one of these or many other inadmissible things is named in Scripture with a *non facies*. If we open the gate for such observances by admitting a thing as merely *not forbidden*, we enter in a labyrinth . . . in which we shall find no end or egress."

As to the plea that the organ is a mere help in worship, he says: "It is put on a level with the tuning-fork. Well, let it do what the tuning-fork does—stop before the singing begins, and

speaking solely for myself, I would no more write against it than against a bell which to some ingenious fancy has seemed to say

‘To call the folks to church in time
I chime.’

“The organ is verily something else than a tuning-fork which only one person hears—the organ with stunning effect thunders all through the song of praise making the vocal and only sensible praise inaudible. If we call that a circumstance we may as well call the singing a circumstance of the reading. If we resolve all into circumstance the acts of worship vanish.”



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ERRATA.—Page 396, second line from bottom, read ayes 59; noes 53.

On page 426, tenth line from bottom, for “is divine,” read *is desire*.

may inquire, what is the material cause of sin, and what is its formal cause? The material cause of the pen with which we are writing, is the steel of which it is composed; and the formal cause is the shape into which the steel has been fashioned, and which makes it a pen instead of an amorphous lump of metal. The present article will be devoted to the former inquiry, namely, What that is in which the quality of morality inheres?

2. It is hardly necessary to prove that sin is a quality, not a substance. Indeed, this does not seem to admit of proof; it is an intuitive conviction. The Gnostics and the Manichæans, according to Hodge—Theol., Vol. II., p. 132—held that it was a substance, an eternal *ύλη*, or matter. The same writer quotes Augustine as saying that “Manes, following other ancient here-

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VOL. XXV.—NO. 3.

JULY, MDCCCLXXIV.

ARTICLE I.

THE MORALITY OF ACTIONS, VOLITIONS, DESIRES, EMOTIONS, COGNITIONS, AND DISPOSITIONS.

1. According to Paley, in his Natural Theology, the best way to introduce a large subject is to propose an individual case. We will suppose, then, that a man takes from another, by force or by stealth, some article of food, not in order to preserve his life or health, but merely to gratify his palate. This is certainly a case of wrong doing; and two questions arise, viz.: What is wrong, and why is it wrong? The ancient mode of statement sounds rather scholastic, but it has the merit of being very precise. We may inquire, what is the material cause of sin, and what is its formal cause? The material cause of the pen with which we are writing, is the steel of which it is composed; and the formal cause is the shape into which the steel has been fashioned, and which makes it a pen instead of an amorphous lump of metal. The present article will be devoted to the former inquiry, namely, What that is in which the quality of morality inheres?

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tics, thought that there were two natures and substances, to wit, of good and of evil." Our own investigations have led us to the opinion that these early speculatists held matter to be the source of sin, a substance of which sin was a quality, or at least an invariable concomitant. Dr. Hodge states, also, that the point of difference between these heresies and the Parsee system, was that the former made the eternal principle impersonal, while the latter exalted it to the rank of a personal being. This view, however, does not appear to be borne out by Neander, nor by the authorities quoted by Giessler. Such is the difficulty of reaching any consistent theory of the wild notions in which the Gnostics and the Manichees indulged. One of the criteria of intuitive beliefs is their universality; and we apprehend that, notwithstanding the *apparent* exception of these early heretics, the suffrages of our race would declare right and wrong to be qualities and not substances.

3. All men would agree that the quality of morality may attach to actions. Some actions have no moral character; for instance, *some* acts of insane persons, though we have never seen a sufficiently guarded statement as to this phase of responsibility. Passing over this question of medical jurisprudence, we assert the truism, that according to the Scriptures, and according to the common judgment of mankind, many acts of free moral agents have a moral character. Actions are commanded; actions are forbidden; we shall be judged for the deeds done in the body.

Yet outward, bodily actions are not the primary seat of morality. The taking and eating of food that rightfully belongs to us, may differ in no particle, considered as an external act, from the taking and eating of food that is not justly ours. Human life may be taken in the phrenzy of insanity, in self-defence, in execution of the law, in the heat of passion, or in cold blood and with malice aforethought; and the verdict of the jury will vary from a pitying acquittal to the sternest condemnation. It is only in a secondary sense that outward actions have a moral character. God punishes evil intentions; and amid all the imperfections of human law, the intent of the agent is largely considered.

We must go from the body to the soul if we would find the proper seat of morality.

4. It is an old saying, that all virtue is voluntary ; and, like many other adages, there is much truth and no little error in it.

The ancient division of the mental faculties was into two departments, the understanding and the will. Different philosophers gave different names to these departments, according to their individual fancies ; but the two-fold division is at least as old as Aristotle. About the time of Kant, in the last century, the three-fold division into intellect, sensibilities, and will, came into vogue ; and on some accounts it is preferable to the older way. But what confusion has it not introduced into speculation ! Formerly, the will included desire, emotion, and affection, as well as choice and volition. Now, it is usually confined to the last two, if not to volition alone. If we do not sedulously keep in mind which of the two meanings of the word Will we are employing, we shall of course make blunders. No less a metaphysician than Jonathan Edwards, seems to have tripped a little from this cause.

The line of partition must be drawn somewhere, if the old domain of the will is to be divided into two parts. Let us put the emotions, desires, and affections under the head of the sensibilities ; and let the volitions and purposes remain under the will. The volitions are those mental acts which immediately precede bodily action ; and the purposes are those which remotely precede both volitions and outward actions. We do not intend to say that these are the only functions of our volitions and our purposes ; but merely to distinguish between the two, sufficiently for the present occasion.

It will be enough to consider whether our volitions have a moral character. Here, again, all men are agreed. Some go so far as to aver that nothing else does have such a character. We will consider their theory presently, but just now we are concerned with the statement and not the argument. It is essential to our statement to advert again to the distinction of primary and secondary, and to say that our volitions and our purposes, too, have only a secondary moral quality. As Alexander has well

shown, the volition may be precisely the same in various kinds of killing. We will to give a blow, to point a gun, to pull a trigger; and the volition is the same, whether we are acting in self-defence, or are executing the law, or are committing murder. Yet the volition in the last case, though not differing intrinsically from a similar volition in the two former cases, bears such a relation to God's law as to constitute it "*vere peccatum.*"

5. Penetrating still farther into the arcana of our nature, we inquire into the cause of our volitions. Our limits forbid us to consider at length the particularly absurd and preposterous notion of the self-determining power of the will. If its supporters mean that the will, the faculty of volition, is under the control of the sensibilities, which sensibilities also were anciently classed under the will; if they mean that one part of the will, in this broad sense, rules over another part, they have a singularly unfortunate way of expressing themselves. But if they mean that the will, in the modern and narrower sense, determines itself, they destroy man's responsibility, and make him intellectually inferior to the beasts that perish. Brutes have a reason for their procedures, even if it be in some cases only the gratification of a blind but useful instinct. But man, under the impulse of this imaginary and disastrous power, would act without any reason whatever.

6. Our volitions are determined by our desires. Hence, we enter the province of the sensibilities: A two-fold division awaits us here. Our desires are fulfilled in action; their direct tendency is to action. If they do not lead to action, it is because they are in some way hindered. A weaker desire is overpowered by a stronger conflicting desire, as a thirst for fame or wealth overcomes a natural love of ease. Again, we may desire things which we have no hope of obtaining, and which we therefore make no effort to obtain. The twig of desire does not bud into volition, or bloom into action. It is otherwise with our emotions. Desire has an outward, emotion an inward look. Desire is objective; emotion subjective. We desire something without, for the sake of the emotion within. The man in our illustration desired the food for the sake of the sensation of

the palate. Desires and emotions, then, divide between them the domain of the sensibilities. We might add a third class of affections, but they are only compounds of desires and emotions; or a fourth class of passions, but they are affections of a vehement type; or a fifth class of appetites, in which the emotions are of the physical kind, called sensations; but this distinction, although founded on a difference, is irrelevant to the issue in hand.

7. The next question, then, is, whether our desires have a moral character? To which we make answer that some have, and some have not. A desire for revenge must be wrong, and a desire to please God must be right; while a desire for ease, for worldly fame, or for riches, would not be considered as in themselves either right or wrong.

To resume our initial example: A desire for food to gratify the palate has in itself no moral quality; and it makes no difference how strong that desire may be. Intensify it a thousand-fold, and it still fails of possessing that peculiar characteristic, just as a block of wood is not metallic; and if blocks of wood be piled up mountain high, they will never become a metal of any kind. So, again, hunger of the most famishing, frantic sort, is not sinful.

In the man, then, who fraudulently took the food, the sin was in the want of due regard for his neighbor's rights, and for the authority of God. This brings us back to the Augustinian theory of sin's being a defect; a theory which that illustrious father adopted as against the Manichean heresy, but which does not cover the whole ground. A desire to please and glorify God, however, has an intrinsic moral quality. It is one of the elements of that love which is required by the first and great commandment. So, also, a desire to rid ourselves of indwelling sin is virtuous, and meets with the approbation of the Holy One.

8. But we have not yet gotten to the bottom of the matter, and never shall do so until we reach the emotions, which are the fountains of our desires. Desire is not ultimate; it is for the sake of something else. Eradicate emotion from our nature, and you eradicate desire along with it. Desire, volition, action, all originate in emotion; that is, either in a positive emotion, or in the

removal of some feeling which is objectionable to us. For instance, the food pleases the palate, or at least assuages the pangs of hunger. Emotion, then, is the very core of our being, and in it, above all else, we find the primary and original seat of morality, so far as the exercises of the soul are concerned. Emotion, desire, volition, and action are the links of the golden chain which binds us to heaven, or the iron one that drags us to hell. The first determines the second, the second controls the third, the third manifests itself in the fourth.

What we have said respecting the desires, we repeat in regard to the emotions, that some of them are right, some are wrong, and some have no moral quality. There is no sin in any enjoyment of the sense of taste, however keen; but there is great sin in not having those feelings towards God and our neighbor which would prevent our gratifying that taste in a fraudulent way.

9. The statement thus far has been brief, but, we trust, lucid. Before proceeding farther, it is proper to pause and consider the views of those who differ with us in the points already made.

First comes Dr. Chalmers, a name that should never be mentioned but with affectionate reverence. Great is our indebtedness to this superb author and thinker, and we should hesitate to dissent from him as strongly as we do, if *he* did not dissent from some of our first American theologians, and also from himself. Besides, while Dr. Chalmers was great and good, truth is greater and better :

" And at thy mystic altar, sacred Truth,
I kneel in manhood as I knelt in youth."

The opinions of this very distinguished man will be learned best from his own words, which we proceed to quote: " We would now affirm the all-important principle, that nothing is moral or immoral which is not voluntary. . . . The first, certainly, of these popular, or rather universal decisions, is, that nothing is moral or immoral that is not voluntary." In illustration of this he supposes a murderer to force a dagger into the hand " of the dearest friend or relative of his devoted victim, and by his superior strength, to compel the struggling and the reluctant instrument to its grasp." " With the one the act was with the will ;

with the other it was against it." . . . The point at which the character of right or wrong comes to be applicable, is the "point where the consent of the will is given." "The essence of crime lies in its wilfulness." "It is for those actions which he himself hath bidden into existence, because it was his will that they should be done—it is not because his desire did solicit, but because his desire did prevail—it is not because his passions and his affections and his sensibilities urged him on to that which is evil, but because his will first fostered their incitements, and then lent itself to their unworthy gratification—it is for this, and this alone, that he is the subject of a moral reckoning." "All crimes that be wilful are tried without benefit of pathology." Pathology, a word borrowed from Bentham, as used in this connection, "will embrace all that we understand by sensations and affections and passions." "We think that Dr. Brown has made a faulty discrimination when he speaks of certain of the emotions which involve in them a moral feeling, and certain others of them which do not. There is no moral designation applicable to any of the emotions, viewed nakedly and in themselves. They are our volitions, and our volitions only, which admit of being thus characterised; and emotions are no further virtuous or vicious than as volitions are blended with them so far as to have given them either their direction or their birth." "Why attach a moral character to the affections, if, independent of will, they take their rise in the organic necessities of our nature?" "So little, in fact, may there be of a moral ingredient in the mere emotion," etc., etc.

The quotations might be multiplied to almost any extent, but these will suffice to show that the author allowed no proper moral character to either desires or emotions. The will, and nothing but the will, has any moral quality. To use an illustration of our own, the acid in a glass of lemonade has no sweetness of itself; the sugar may be said, in loose phraseology, to sweeten the mixture, or to sweeten the acid; but properly speaking, it is only the sugar that is sweet. "The volitions, and the voluntary deeds which come out of them, they are these, and these alone, which form the proper objects of moral censure or moral approbation."

The copper used as an alloy, never ceases to be copper, although it disappears from sight, and might vaguely be said to have become part of a silver coin.

That Dr. Chalmers is not quite consistent with himself, and that some of his expressions cannot be easily reconciled with the above quotations, was due to the exigencies of the case.

10. The other distinguished writer to whom we refer is Dr. McCosh. A benignant Providence has given this eminent educator to America. As he is still living, it would be improper to indulge in encomiums, yet it is a fitting occasion to express the great satisfaction we have derived from his writings, both prior and subsequent to his coming to our shores. We appreciate most highly the services he has rendered in the contest with infidel scientists, and we applaud his standing up for justice as an independent and imperishable attribute of the divine character; and we should regret to have his great name give weight and currency to any erroneous principle in morals. Our quotations are from the eighth edition of his "Divine Government."

"We regard the will as the seat of all virtue and vice. There is an act of the will wherever there is choice, preference, or resolution—wherever the will has adopted or sanctioned any particular mental state—wherever there is wish, desire, or volition. There is nothing either moral or immoral in a mere intellectual act, or in a mere sensation, or a mere emotion, considered in themselves; but whenever the will chooses these, gives its consent to them—*there* virtue or vice may exist.

"We are happy to find our views on this subject coinciding in the main with those of Dr. Chalmers," (whose pupil, we understand, he was.) "We cannot agree with those who, as Cousin and Jouffroy, think that no state of the mind is sinful but a positive volition. If we know that the object is forbidden, and still wish it, still desire it, and are prevented only by certain providential considerations from determining upon the acquisition of it, the act is undoubtedly sinful. If we are restrained by a hatred of sin, the desire is not sinful. It is a wish (then) to obtain, not the object with all its sinful concomitants, but the pleasure, honor, or society, as separated from the object. But if, after knowing the object to be forbidden, or that we cannot obtain it without its necessarily attendant sin, we still continue to long for it, then the very concupiscence is criminal, as the will is giving its consent to its continuance. 'Whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.'"

A long foot-note, beginning on page 311, states some points of dissent from Dr. C. "It is at this point that we differ from Dr. Chalmers."

After referring to Dr. Brown as an "ingenious speculator," whose influence over Chalmers was not beneficial, he proceeds thus:

"Chalmers has hurried in to snatch volition, or the final resolution to act, from the list of mere emotions, and to place it by itself, as a separate mental operation. We are inclined to think that he should have gone further, and taken from the mere emotions not only positive volition, but wish and desire, and placed the whole in a separate department of the human mind, the region of the will, which is the seat of responsibility. We were long sadly puzzled with this whole subject, especially in its bearing upon ethics. We put the question, are mere emotions morally approvable, or the opposite? and we had to answer that they are not. What actions, then, we asked, are moral or immoral in their nature? and we were taught to reply, acts of the will. But may not wishes, desires, and affections be holy or unholy? Here we paused for a time. On the one hand we were inclined to think that affections and desires might be virtuous or vicious. Were not the desires of the Psalmist holy when he said 'My soul thirsteth for God?' Then our Saviour has said, 'Whosoever looketh on a woman,' etc. But on the other hand, wishes and desires, according to the received doctrine, are mere emotions, and can in themselves possess no moral quality. We continued for a time in this painful state of perplexity. We felt relieved beyond measure when the thought occurred that wishes and desires and affections, into which wish and desire enter, are not emotions, but exercises of a higher power. Following out this view, we were constrained to shift the boundary line between feeling and will, from the place at which it has commonly been laid down, but we found that, in doing so, we were drawing the essential distinction, both in a psychological and ethical point of view."

10. On these long quotations, several things are to be said. First, that Dr. McCosh goes a step nearer to what we consider the truth than Dr. Chalmers did. Dr. Chalmers denied all morality to desires. Dr. McCosh cannot coincide with him. Well might Dr. McCosh "pause for a time," before adopting so extraordinary a view. Secondly. Such general propositions as the one that all sin is voluntary, should be very carefully scrutinised. What is meant by *sin*, and what is meant by *voluntary*? If by sin we mean outward actions, then it is unquestionably true that

we are not responsible for any outward action which does not proceed from a volition. This we conceive to have been the original sense of the adage, "*Omne peccatum est voluntarium.*" As thus understood, it expresses the universal conviction of the race of man; but pressed beyond this original sense, it may be made to inculcate serious error.

A more lucid method is to consider the contradictory proposition: "Nothing involuntary is sinful." If by involuntary, we mean *not proceeding from a volition*, then the maxim is true of external bodily actions. A spasmodic contortion of the muscles can hardly be called an action at all, and certainly has no moral character. If the meaning of the term voluntary be extended so as to include our volitions, then again it is true that some volitions are sinful, and that a volition that is not our own, is not our own sin. For instance, if a man were possessed of a devil, and this indwelling devil, by his own volitions, should originate the bodily actions of the demoniac, the volitions might be sinful enough, but would not be the sins of the demoniac. The same may be said of purposes.

At the next step the trouble begins. By common consent, the dividing line which separates the domain of the will into two departments, is drawn just here, leaving the purposes and the volitions to the will, and putting the desires, emotions, and affections in a class by themselves, under some such designation as that of the sensibilities. If the term voluntary means only *proceeding from the volitions*, then desire is involuntary; and if nothing involuntary is sinful, then desire is not sinful. This is the pitfall into which Dr. Chalmers fell; and his doing so is the more remarkable, when we reflect that our volitions themselves do not proceed from volitions, and by the same course of reasoning would not be sinful. But if the term voluntary be so extended as to include our desires, then desire is voluntary, and may be sinful, even if "nothing involuntary is sinful." This was the great step which brought unmeasured relief to the mind of Dr. McCosh.

Thirdly. We honor Dr. McCosh for submitting his intellect to the plain teachings of the Word of God. Trained up in a false theory, he bursts through it, because it does not square with the

Scriptures. If the Bible teaches anything at all, it teaches that desires and affections do have a moral quality. Everywhere God claims our affections; everywhere men are commanded to love him as their highest duty, and are condemned for setting their affections on inferior objects. Surely the great love wherewith God has loved us, is a moral perfection. The contemplation of it fills the heavenly hosts with wonder and delight, and imparts a new thrill to their songs of adoration. How men of piety and discernment, with the open Bible in their hands, have ever failed to see all this, would amaze us, if the whole history of speculation in the Christian Church did not furnish so many parallels. Our fund of amazement has long been exhausted.

We are far from a pietistic decrying of human reason. We admire that freedom from such a spirit which we see in Chalmers and Alexander and McCosh. But on the other hand, the Scriptures are a lamp unto our feet and a light unto our path. In one of our latest interviews with Dr. R. J. Breckenridge, he advanced the thought that fallen man cannot evoke from his own bosom a perfect system of moral philosophy. It is a matter of congratulation, therefore, when any influential and skilful laborer in that department bows to the authority of Scripture, and is willing to reconstruct his philosophical system in order to square it with the Bible.

11. But what of our emotions? Have they no proper moral quality? As Drs. Chalmers and McCosh coincide in saying that they have not, while we are firmly persuaded that they have, it will be necessary to exercise patience and discrimination in the discussion.

We say, then, that some of our emotions do not, and that others do have a moral character. The same is true of our desires. The desire for food, either to appease our hunger or to gratify the palate, is neither right nor wrong *per se*. It may have a *quasi* moral character, if it leads us to commit fraud. So with the desire of pleasure, of honor, of society, instanced by Dr. McCosh. But as we have already intimated, we do not like his analysis of the wrongfulness of such feelings. For example, the desire for property is intrinsically neither right nor wrong,

and, in strictness of speech, never becomes so. A disregard of God's law and of justice, may lead to the sin of fraud. So hunger and thirst may be gratified to the injury of our bodies, and even to the destruction of life; yet, strictly speaking, hunger and thirst never have any moral quality.

But a desire to glorify God is positively holy. A desire to render to all men their dues, distributive justice as it is called, is certainly right. Dr. Chalmers falls into singular confusion of thought, when he arrays principle against emotion. Principle, in his use of the term, is an habitual desire to do right. It is just as really and truly a desire as any other that belongs to our nature. Now, is the desire to do right, because it is right, virtuous? Dr. Chalmers perpetually asserts that it is. His calling it principle does not alter the case. A desire to serve Satan, and to promote his cause on the earth, cannot be free from sin.

The same distinctions apply to the emotions. The pleasure we experience in the gratification of bodily taste, in the enjoyment of society, in the contemplation of the beautiful or the sublime, is never, properly speaking, right or wrong—never. It may have the same kind of *quasi* moral character with a desire, as when our delight in the creature is greater than our delight in the Creator, who is over all, God blessed forevermore.

But it is quite otherwise with joy in God, delight in his holy perfections, and glorying in the Lord who is our strength and our song, who also is become our salvation. Quite otherwise, too, with a rejoicing in iniquity, and in the success of Satan's efforts to ruin men.

It may be admitted that our good and our bad desires and emotions resemble one another *generically*. That is, joy is always joy; but joy in view of God's glory has a very different moral character from joy in view of a triumph of Satan. Edwards, in his masterpiece on the Affections, has shown that no new faculties are implanted in us by regeneration. Not new faculties, but new principles. But this touches on the formal cause of sin, the reason why certain things are sinful or the contrary.

12. What, then, is the testimony of the Scriptures? What are the fruits of the Spirit? Love, joy, peace, etc. Joy and peace certainly are feelings, and the joy and peace of the Spirit are holy feelings. Christ says by the mouth of David, "I delight to do thy will, O my God." The doing of God's will gave him a holy delight. Paul delighted in the law of God after the inward man; *i. e.*, in the exercise of his renewed nature. There is a godly sorrow,* and yet sorrow is an emotion. Thankfulness is an emotion, and is not gratitude acceptable to God? That overwhelming sense of God's goodness which caused President Edwards to spend days in his closet, weeping from unutterable joy and inexpressible complacency in the glory of the Redeemer—shall we be told that after all it had no intrinsic moral quality, because emotion is involuntary, and holiness is voluntary? So, at the dedication of Solomon's temple, when the Levites sang, "For he is good, for his mercy endureth forever," and every God-touched heart felt that he was ineffably, divinely good, was there no holiness in those emotions, welling up spontaneously from the depths of the soul, and neither requiring nor rejecting "the consent of the will?" Jehovah does not appear to have regarded it so; for such was the effulgence of the shekinah, that the priests could not stand to minister at the altar by reason of the glory.

Who can doubt that God is pleased when we come to him, feeling that "it is good to draw nigh to him?" Among all the Psalms, President Edwards has selected the 119th as most fully expressive of the exercises of renewed souls. David speaks of rejoicing in the way of God's testimonies; of delighting himself in his commandments; of his comfort in affliction. The divine word was sweet to his taste; yea, sweeter than honey to his mouth. God's testimonies were the rejoicing of his heart. He was grieved when transgressors kept not the word of the Lord. He rejoiced at God's word, as one that found great spoil. We know not how these testimonies strike other minds; to our own, they present an unanswerable argument. †

* ἡ κατὰ θεὸν λύπη.

† We would cordially recommend to every devout reader, Bridge's Exposition of the 119th Psalm. The author was an evangelical minister in the Church of England, and his work breathes the pure spirit of devotion.

13. This argument from the Scriptures of course has been very brief, and gives only a faint idea of the fulness of the proof that might be adduced. The fact is, that the Bible is saturated with the truth which we have so imperfectly presented. We do not believe that a plain reader of God's word, unbiassed by scholastic theories, ever drew any other inference from its sacred teachings than that our feelings are proper objects of moral praise and censure.

14. This is corroborated by the uninspired hymnology of the Church. Says Charles Wesley, in one of his beautiful hymns,

"Thy love in sufferings be my peace,
Thy love in weakness make me strong;
And when the storms of life shall cease,
Thy love shall be in heaven my song."

He prays for emotions on earth; he will give utterance to emotions in heaven.

Quotations might be multiplied to any extent from such a book; for instance, as Dr. Schaff's "Christ in Song," that treasure-house of ancient, mediæval, and modern praise, of which Dr. Hodge remarks, (Vol. II., p. 591,) "We want no better theology and no better religion than are set forth in these hymns. They were indited by the Holy Spirit, in the sense that the thoughts and feelings which they express, are due to his operations on the hearts of his people."

15. Beside devotional writers, Dr. A. Alexander takes strong ground against Dr. Chalmers. It is rather wonderful, that one reared in that early day, in the Valley of Virginia, and with the limited means of education which he enjoyed in his youth, should have been so acute a metaphysician as Archibald Alexander. We first saw this venerable man in the library of Princeton Seminary. Age had bowed his form, and well-nigh destroyed the melody of his once singularly musical voice. His very unassuming manners, too, scarcely allowed you to feel that you were in the presence of greatness; so that it is only in later years, and from deliberate comparison of him with other thinkers, that we have done justice to his uncommon penetration. Dr. Hodge was his pupil, and, as we suppose, learned from him those great principles of

theology and philosophy of which the pupil has become so illustrious a defender. As against the notion that the will must consent before there is virtue or vice, we quote from p. 186, Vol. II.: "The Protestant doctrine which pronounces these impulsive acts (*i. e.*, of the feelings and affections,) to be of the nature of sin, is confirmed by the consciousness of the believer. He recognises as evil in their own nature, the first risings of malice, envy, pride, or cupidity. He knows that they spring from an evil or imperfectly sanctified nature. They constitute part of the burden of corruption which he hopes to lay down in the grave; and he knows that as he shall be free from them in heaven, they never disturbed the perfectly holy soul of his blessed Lord, to whose image he is even now bound to be conformed."

16. May not Dr. McCosh be quoted against himself, when he says, (p. 303,) "When the conscience declares the action presented to the mind to be good or bad, certain emotions instantly present themselves. Man is so constituted, that the contemplation of virtuous and vicious action—declared so to be by the conscience—like the contemplation of pleasure and pain, awakens the sensibility."

Now, if Dr. McC. will admit, and we do not really see how he can fail to admit, that these emotions partake of a moral character, he will have added greatly to the perfection of his system. Again, Dr. McC. agrees with Bishop Butler in stoutly maintaining the character of conscience as a judge, and quotes from his second sermon on Human Nature: "We cannot form a notion of this faculty without taking in judgment." He himself says, "conscience declares," "declared by conscience." We then have conscience-perceptions. Are they not moral perceptions? Is it not *right* to judge truly of moral subjects? Right to justify the righteous? Right to condemn the wicked? And wrong to do the reverse? Then, if our judgments, in view of certain actions, are *right*, why deny that moral character to the emotions awakened? If it is right to *judge* that any given act of cruelty is wrong, is it not right to *feel* horror at the act? No sense of the word voluntary is wide enough to include the understanding; it would be a misnomer; but the ancient sense of voluntary did

include sensibility. Farther on we will review his very ingenious answer to this. (p. 288.)

17. Among the writers on this side the Atlantic, Jonathan Edwards has given special attention to the Affections. It will be borne in mind that Dr. Chalmers contends that our desires have no original and intrinsic moral character, and that Dr. McCosh dissents from that view. It will be remembered, also, that these two writers agree in denying any moral character to emotions. Furthermore, it will be borne in mind, that the affections are compounded of emotions and desires. Edwards does not dwell upon the distinction between the two elements, but classing them both together, presents the scriptural argument to show "that true religion, in great part, consists in the affections." This proposition is reiterated time and again. Section 4th begins thus: "The holy Scriptures do everywhere place religion very much in the affection; such as fear, hope, love, hatred, desire, joy, sorrow, gratitude, compassion, and zeal." After citing a number of passages under each of these heads, he says:

"I have mentioned but a few texts out of an innumerable multitude, all over the Scripture, which place religion very much in the affections. But what has been observed may be sufficient to show that they who would deny that most of true religion lies in the affections, and maintain the contrary, must throw away what we have been wont to own for the Bible, and get some other rule by which to judge of religion."

"6. The religion of the most eminent saints we have an account of in the Scripture, consisted much in holy affection."

He instances David, Paul, and John. Under the 7th head, he gives our Redeemer as a great example of the same truth.

"8. The religion of heaven consists very much in affection."

But the whole of the first part of this celebrated treatise is devoted to this very question, and we refrain from further quotation.

Dr. McCosh would of course accept a large part of what Edwards says in this connection. Much of holiness and much of sin consists in desire; but no part of either of them consists in emotion.

18. It is necessary, therefore, to select some mere emotions from the various mental exercises mentioned by Edwards. As our emotions give rise to our desires, they ordinarily go together, and one name is given to the two, as Dr. McCosh clearly notes in the affection of love. He quotes approvingly from Dr. Brown: "The analysis of love presents us with two elements—a vivid delight in the contemplation of the object of affection, and a desire of good to that object." Dr. McC., however, proceeds to say: "We do regard it as of great importance to distinguish these two elements. The one may exist, and often does exist, without the other." It is to the "vivid delight" that he denies any moral quality; and this is the precise point in which we would, with great respect to him, dissent *toto caelo*.

But as we are just now concerned with Edwards's view, we select some of the mere emotions. His text is 1 Pet. i. 8: "Whom having not seen, ye love; in whom, though now ye see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory." "There were two kinds of operation, or exercise of true religion—love to Christ, joy in Christ." Now, joy is not a desire. Edwards himself draws the distinction, although, for his purposes, it was unnecessary to dwell upon it. We desire "something not present;" we joy in "something present," that is pleasing to us; but if that present something be very displeasing, we experience grief or sorrow. "The Scriptures speak of holy joy as a great part of true religion. So it is represented in the text." He then quotes from the Old Testament and from the New, as many as ten passages to the point. So again with sorrow. "This godly sorrow and brokenness of heart is often spoken of, not only as a great thing in the distinguishing character of the saints, but that in them which is peculiarly acceptable and pleasing to God."

Compassion, also, is an emotion. It is of course followed by a desire to relieve its object from suffering when such relief is possible. But when help is impossible, and desire dies, compassion, sweet consoler of sorrow, bends over her and weeps! We are exhorted to "rejoice with them that rejoice" in obtained mercies; and to "weep with them that weep" under present and irremovable afflictions. Hence, also, Edwards cites the instance of

Christ's weeping over Jerusalem. Hope, which involves desire, had fled; and for this very reason the tears came from the inmost recesses of the Redeemer's heart. Emotion could no longer manifest itself in desire and consequent effort; now the undying sentiment itself wells forth in streams of pity. This incident is one of the gems of Luke's gospel. As the child of God ponders upon it, he hangs trembling and tearful over the incarnate mystery, over the unfathomable depths of this compassion. Was it the human, or was it the divine in thee, O Christ, thou brightness of the Father's glory, veiled in our flesh? Or did thy two natures ineffably coöperate without composition or confusion?

Dr. Chalmers seems specially averse to allowing sympathy a place among moral exercises; yet "we have not an High Priest that cannot be touched with a feeling of our infirmities," Heb. iv. 15, where the very word sympathise is chosen by inspiration, *μη δυνάμενον συμπαθεῖσαι.*

If, then, our mere emotions, acting without desire, have a moral quality, we see no reason why they should not have it when they are followed by desire. Whether they are or are not thus followed, depends not on the intrinsic nature of the emotion, but very much upon the possibility of our effecting anything to which the emotion prompts us—that is, of course, the possibility as viewed by us.

We have been looking at this subject chiefly from a scriptural standpoint; but descending to the psychological plane, which is not so far above the mists of speculation, we think the case is sufficiently clear. Emotion gives rise to desire, and desire to volition, and volition to action. This view is self-consistent, and makes man a unit. His operations are harmonious. Why does he desire that fruit which he beholds? Because he thinks it is pleasant to the taste. But if, on trial, it proves bitter and nauseous, he throws it disdainfully away. He desires it no more.

We make the emotions the ultimate part of our nature. Such was the view of that profound thinker, Isaac Taylor. Dr. Chalmers himself copiously affirms it in his *Moral Philosophy*. We ask him only to be consistent with himself.

When the question arises why we desire anything, the final answer must be, to gratify some emotion. The character of that emotion descends to the desire. The former is the fountain of which the latter is the stream. We never desire to glorify God until we first delight in him. The delight creates the desire.

We fully endorse Dr. Hodge when he says that our intuitions are a revelation from God. Now, is delight, in view of God's holiness, destitute of all moral character? It constitutes the joy of heaven. We conceive that, of all things in that blessed abode, where brokenness of heart is unknown, it is most pleasing to the Holy One. Do we not *intuitively* believe that it is a holy exercise?

19. Dr. McCosh is, on the whole, more logical and more self-consistent, we take it, than Dr. Chalmers. But it is sometimes a dangerous thing to be logical and self-consistent; such persons are apt to push *ἂ πρῶτον ψεύδος* to extremes; a crack in the foundation runs up to the very top of the wall.

For instance, on page 313 we find this: "There is often, on the one hand, the delight in the object, *the selfish delight*, without the desire of good."

But is all delight selfish? Impossible! Dr. Brown so utterly overthrew that idea, that we are surprised to see it reappear. If it gives us unfeigned delight to see others happy and holy, does that imply selfishness in us? If we are willing to lay down our lives for the brethren, and feel abundantly compensated by the joy of seeing them safe, are we selfish?

Again, nothing seems clearer to a Calvinist than that choice is determined by the comparative strength of our desires. When we desire only one thing, and it is immediately attainable, we proceed at once to volition. If it is not immediately attainable, we form a purpose. But when we desire more than one thing, and the getting of one prevents the getting of another; when, in other words, we have conflicting desires, we *choose*. As, if we are offered our choice of two goblets, the understanding pronounces the golden one more desirable than the silver. If the golden goblet alone were offered, the total amount of our desire would prompt a volition to take it. But when a choice must be

made, our preference is measured by the excess of our desire for the one over our desire for the other. This is plain enough. But the Arminians have feigned a new judge or arbiter, under the old name of the will, and give him authority over the rest of our nature. The will, forsooth, has a self-determining power, sovereign, mayhap capricious; a Norman conqueror, imported from foreign parts, as a ruler over the other estates of the realm.

If our psychological account be correct, our main positions follow necessarily. It is essential to the logical consistency of Dr. McCosh, to interpolate in the process the action of some such power as the Arminians contend for. Let us see. Page 272: "In making this choice, we are no doubt swayed by considerations, but these have their force given to them by the will itself, which may set a high a value upon them, but which may also, if it please, set them at defiance." Page 273: "We maintain that these volitions are not determined . . . by the last act of the judgment, nor by emotions within the mind, as the higher order of British and American Necessarians seem to assert, but by the very nature of the will itself as an independent self-acting power. In this high and important sense, the will may be said to possess a self-determining power; that is, a power of determining its own volitions." Page 269: "So far as the true is preferred to the false, or the right to the wrong, or the pleasurable to the right, it is by the exercise not of the reason, or the conscience, or the sensibility, but of the will. Nor is it saying anything to the point, to declare that the will always chooses the greatest good; for it is the will that determines it in this sense to be good, and the greatest good. The will, no doubt, does prefer the pleasurable in itself to the painful, but it is because it wills to do so."

In consistence with this, he takes exception to a part of Edwards's theory, and tries to show that (page 274, note,) "the older divines, even those of the school of Augustine and Calvin, including Calvin himself and John Owen, agree with him as against Edwards.

On all which we remark:

(1) It is far from our purpose to intimate that Dr. McC. is an Arminian. We suppose him to be in feeling, as well as in the

body of his doctrine, averse to that system. But, to show that his view respecting the emotions of the human soul is unsound, we adduce the logical result of that view, to wit: that his phraseology on the subject of man's freedom is almost identical with that which Edwards condemns in Arminian writers. See section 2d of the treatise on the Freedom of the Will.

(2) The quotation which he makes from Henry's Life of Calvin, (from a letter of Calvin to Pighius,) does not meet the case. Calvin is contending against the notion that the will acts under compulsion from without. "It is not constrained or impelled irresistibly from without, but determines itself by itself." Life of Calvin, Vol. I., p. 497. See, also, p. 499. We imagine that the disciples of Edwards all believe this. According to Dr. Alexander, man has the power of self-determination; his own desires determine his volitions; external things furnish only the objects on which his affections fasten. So Hodge says, (Vol. II., p. 285,) that a man is free when his volitions are "determined by nothing out of himself, but proceeding from his own views, feelings, and immanent dispositions, etc." Again, on page 288, "The will is not determined by any law of necessity; it is not independent, indifferent, or self-determined, but is always determined by the preceding state of mind." But this is leading us too far from our main subject.

In consistence with his other views, Dr. McC. represents "a desire of good, a simple, disinterested desire of good," as belonging to "the region of a higher faculty" than that of the emotions. In our conception of the subject, emotion is seated on the throne and sways the sceptre; desire is the minister, standing below the throne, and executing the royal orders.

We have dissented strongly from Dr. McC., but we trust that we have done so courteously throughout the discussion. Perhaps no one has a higher opinion than we have of his great ability, or considers America more fortunate in securing his services.

20. Will and sensibility having been sufficiently adverted to, it remains to inquire whether the intellect should be included as a part of the *causa materialis* of sin. May sin or holiness be predicated of our perceptions? Do our standards speak the

truth when they charge corruption on our whole nature? And is our depravity, in this sense, *total*, as distinguished from partial? Dr. Hodge's view seems to us the scriptural one. Page 262, Vol. II.: "Everywhere in the Scriptures it is asserted or assumed that the feelings follow the understanding; that the illumination of the mind in the due apprehension of spiritual objects, is the necessary preliminary condition of all right feeling and conduct." "We must know God in order to love him. This is distinctly asserted by the Apostle, in 1 Cor. ii. 14. He there says: (1) That the natural or unrenewed man does not receive the things of the Spirit. (2) The reason why he does not receive them is declared to be that they are foolishness unto him, or that he cannot know them. (3) And the reason why he cannot know them is that they are spiritually discerned. It is ignorance, the want of discernment of the beauty, excellence, and suitableness of the things of the Spirit, (*i. e.*, of the truths which the Spirit has revealed,) that is the reason or cause of unbelief."

He adduces other passages of Scripture to the same point. It is eternal life to know the only true God and Jesus Christ, whom he has sent. The god of this world blinds the eyes of men, that they may perish. But God gives the light of the knowledge of his glory, in the face of Jesus Christ, to the objects of his grace. He sanctifies them by his truth.

In addition to this biblical argument, he says: "The affections suppose an object. They can be excited only in view of an object. If we love, we must love something. . . . To call love into exercise, it is necessary that the mind should apprehend God as he really is. Otherwise the affection would be neither rational nor holy."

This seems to us not only true, but nearly self-evident. Again, on page 255, under the heading, "The whole soul the seat of original sin," we read, (section 2,) "The opposite doctrine assumes that there is nothing moral in our cognitions or judgments; that all knowledge is purely speculative. Whereas, according to the Scriptures, the chief sins of men consist in their wrong judgments, in thinking and believing evil to be good, and good to be

evil. . . . Every exercise of our cognitive faculties in relation to moral and religious subjects, includes the exercise of our moral nature."

This is in full accord with the Westminster Standards. Chap. X., Of Effectual Calling, speaks of ". . . enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly, to understand the things of God." Answer 67, of the Larger Catechism, ". . . savingly enlightening their minds." Answer 31 of Shorter Catechism, ". . . convincing us of our sin and misery, enlightening our minds in the knowledge of Christ and renewing our wills," etc.

With this, too, agrees the view of Dr. Alexander, in his Moral Science, viz., that conscience, like taste, has a double office—to perceive moral qualities and to feel a consequent approbation or disapprobation; and that depravity blinds the mind on moral subjects.

It surely is a moral perfection in God to judge unerringly that right is right and wrong is wrong. Men are condemned for not believing; but if their moral nature were not perverted, they would never be guilty of unbelief. The moral evidence alone would be all-sufficient; and beholding the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, they would respond at once and fully to the Redeemer's exhortation: "Believe *Me*, that I am in the Father, and the Father in *Me*."

It is important to bear in mind, however, the subordination of the intellectual to the emotional part of our nature. The end of the commandment is love. "I have declared unto them thy name," (*i. e.*, made known to them thy true character,) "and will declare it; that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them, and I in them."

21. Last of all, in addition to these active states of the soul, and back of them all, are the dispositions, immanent states, principles, or habits, as they are variously called. There is a reason why men habitually feel and act in one way rather than another; and the common consent of the race refers this to dispositions and states. When we see a man acting uniformly in an amiable way, we conclude that he is blest with an amiable disposition; we say he is an amiable man. In one sense, the *character* of a man

is the sum total of his dispositions; his moral character consists of his moral dispositions; for some of these immanent states have no moral quality, as, for example, a studious disposition.

Now these states of the mind are anterior to exercises of any kind: yet some of them undoubtedly do have a moral character. This has been stoutly denied; and it has been affirmed by way of a theological witticism, that all sin consists in sinning. "Abelard held that nothing was properly of the nature of sin but an act performed with an evil intention." (Hodge, Vol. II., p. 170.) We cannot enter into an argument on this point.

To conclude: Our whole nature is affected by sin; even our bodies are made its instruments; though of course the body is not the true seat of sin, as the Manichees held. But every part of the soul is infected with this mortal malady, and regeneration gives us new dispositions, new views, new feelings and desires, new choices, purposes, and volitions, and new words and deeds. In a word, we are new men in Christ Jesus.

Once more: It is a thing fraught with peril to deny a moral character to anything that possesses sin. If our desires, emotions, judgments, and states are sinful, and we, from some false theory, deny it, on the ground that they have no moral character, or on any other ground, our highest interests are endangered. A genuine Christian experience will triumph over erroneous theories. God's Word and Spirit will lead us in the way to heaven, despite of our speculations; yet the tendency of these speculations may be, all the while, evil and only evil, and their actual effects hurtful, even when not destructive.

ARTICLE II.

THE OUTLOOK OF MODERN SCIENCE.

I. An examination of the popular writings of our scientific leaders, will show that modern science is in an attitude of expectation. There are certain great problems bearing on man's place and destiny which are being eagerly studied and sharply discussed, and scientific men are laboring hard in the expectation of seeing these problems speedily solved. The relations of matter and spirit; the relations of organised to dead matter; the relations of design in the universe to an intelligent God, or to a system of self-evolving natural law—such are some of the important points over which the contest waxes hottest between metaphysics and physics, as between opposing parties of scientific men.

Especially is it true that the advocates of the evolution hypothesis seem to be looking to their system as the ultimate solution of the problem of the universe. Should this hypothesis be established, they will have, as they imagine, in their grasp, the key to all those mysteries by which the mind of man has been so long perplexed. It becomes, therefore, an important question, Whither does this key admit us? Certainly, from our present point of view, the road to which it opens *seems* to lead into dismal and chilling regions. Huxley does not state too strongly the feeling of many who are gazing upon the apparent tendency of scientific research, when he says: "They watch what they conceive to be the progress of materialism, in such fear and powerless anger as a savage feels when, during an eclipse, the great shadow creeps over the face of the sun. The advancing tide of matter threatens to drown their souls; the tightening grasp of law impedes their freedom; they are alarmed lest man's moral nature be debased by the increase of his wisdom." But others go beyond such statements, and boldly aver the conclusions to which they have been led. Thus Mr. Winwood Reade, an enthusiastic disciple of Darwin, in a recent work entitled "The Martyrdom of Man," sums up as follows: "Supernatural Chris-

tianity is false. God-worship is idolatry. Prayer is useless. The soul is not immortal. There are no rewards and no punishments in a future state." And the closing strain of the book is this: "Famine, pestilence, and war are no longer essential for the advancement of the human race. But a season of mental anguish is at hand, and through this we must pass, in order that our posterity may rise. The soul must be sacrificed; the hope in immortality must die. A sweet and charming illusion must be taken from the human race, as youth and beauty vanish never to return."

Before we give way to despair upon hearing such dismal prophecies, let us ask if indeed we have reached yet the "*ultima thule*" of human thought. Is this the end of science? Is this the meaning of life's enigma, which man has vainly striven, through the long ages, to solve? Have we followed the rushing Jordan of man's hopes and aspirations and ever-increasing knowledge, to reach only this dull Dead Sea of utter stagnation? It cannot be denied that this tone of sadness creeps into the writings of some eminent scientists, who, even while shrinking from such conclusions, have few words of hope or comfort for the future. Yet surely the grounds of hope for humanity cannot be all gone. Carlyle says, no less truly than emphatically, "Was man, with his experience, present at the creation, then, to see how it all went on? Have any deepest scientific individuals yet dived down to the foundations of the universe, and gauged everything there? Did the Maker take them into his counsel; that they read his ground-plan of the incomprehensible all, and can say, this stands marked therein, and no more than this? Alas! not in anywise! These scientific individuals have been nowhere but where we also are; have seen some handbreadths deeper than we see into the deep that is infinite, without bottom as without shore."

It does seem preposterous, on sober thought, that after all our waiting and delving and toiling in the mines of knowledge, with an infinite universe lying around, above and beneath us, that in this nineteenth century we have gained such an answer to the problem of life. Have we actually stumbled upon the one great

law which contains in itself the history, the significance, and the end of man's existence, to say nothing of its relation to the universe? "Evolution"—is this to be the Genesis and the Gospel of that Bible which modern science is to give to man? Surely if this be true, if the end is reached, if all that remains is to elucidate, to amplify, and to illustrate this one great law, this seems but a poor result as the reward of all the deep unutterable longings and strivings of mankind, through all the by-gone ages. We may well exclaim, as we reach such a conclusion,

"Great God! I'd rather be
A pagan, suckled in a creed outworn,
So might I, standing on this pleasant lea,
Have glimpses that would make me less forlorn."

But without useless declamation, let us inquire whether there be any possibility of escaping such a desolate ending, as the result of advancing knowledge. The one mistake, constantly made in this feverish, speculative age, both by theologians and men of taste, is *haste*. The one lesson to be learned and practised is *patience*. Tyndall says: "This waiting for the statement of the two sides of a question, implies patience. It implies a resolution to suppress indignation, if the statement of the one-half should clash with our convictions, and not to suffer ourselves to be unduly elated if the half-statement should chime in with our views. It implies a determination to wait calmly for the statement of the whole before we pronounce judgment, either in the form of acquiescence or dissent."

Let us glance at the manner in which this warfare is too often carried on between the partisans of theology and of science.

The scientific investigator discovers a certain set of *facts*; facts learned slowly and patiently, by observation and experiment, and deserving, as he well knows, the notice of mankind. In order to bring these into a definite system, he constructs upon them an hypothesis, which seems to account for the phenomena. Carefully studying *other facts* of nature, and finding many to confirm and to fall in with his hypothesis, he confides in it at length as true. He may do this on sufficient or on insufficient evidence, but he is honest and earnest in seeking for the truth. But no

sooner does the hypothesis assume the importance of a theory ; no sooner is it invested with probability, than some of its overzealous advocates, leaving the beaten track of science, rush to the most far-reaching conclusions. The theory is pushed forward among other theories ; the facts are arrayed as contradicting other facts ; and in the light of the new discovery, many of the old landmarks seem in danger of being obliterated.

On the other hand, the metaphysicians and theologians, sometimes but half-informed, either as to the theory or the facts, accept, without question, the conclusions which scientific men propound. They also draw the most dismal pictures as illustrating the final result of such scientific teaching ; they attack fiercely the hypothesis ; and perhaps, in their too ardent zeal, even attempt to throw ridicule on the theory, or discredit on the facts. Really, at times, the tone of contempt and of opposition assumed by some ill-informed opponents of the discoveries and theories of modern science, brings up reminiscences of monkish suspicion and mediæval narrowness. They gaze on the spectroscope, the microscope, and the scalpel, with the horror of some mitred bishop or abbot contemplating the retorts and crucibles of alchemy, or the crabbed formularies of the black art.

The evil of such opposition is, that it begets or fosters a spirit of scepticism. Honest doubters, finding the guardians of revelation attempting to discredit facts, plain, simple, and certain—answering in a sneering tone of ridicule, theories which scientific men treat at least respectfully—cannot help feeling their faith shaken ; and they become impatient when such an attitude is assumed by the Christian apologists. No sound and healthy mind dreads the increase of light, or fears for the truth of God in the conflict of opinions. But there is fear lest doubting, unsettled minds be broken from their moorings, and drifted away upon a sea of darkness and unbelief. Truth is precious, indeed ; but let us never forget that the souls of our fellow-men, with their hopes and fears—aye, even in sin and darkness—are precious, also ; precious even in God's sight. The duty of the Christian, strong in faith, is to strengthen his weaker brethren. God's truth needs not the help of his arm to uphold it. But he can

speaking words of comfort and of good cheer to those who are perplexed and darkened in their search for truth. It is patience that we need for the full interpretation and final harmony of the mighty and wondrous voices by which God speaks to the soul of man. Truth-loving men are seeking the harmony of *all* these voices, not the *silence* of any one of them.

II. In considering the relation of scientific to religious systems, there are certain points which are to be decided in succession.

When the natural philosopher brings forward some new law or some new theory for the consideration and acceptance of the world, the first important question is, Are the *facts* on which the hypothesis is built, sufficiently established?

If there is any doubt as to the facts, scientific men will pay no attention to the hypothesis; but if the facts have been clearly ascertained, the next question is, What is the value of the hypothesis drawn from an induction of these facts? To attempt to discredit the facts is to open the flood-gates of skepticism; to be afraid of examining the hypothesis, is to seem fearful lest one truth may be found to contradict another. Let the scientific men grapple with the hypothesis, they will deal with it according to its true merits; and if it be true, it will ultimately take its place as an accepted scientific theory, in spite of the fulminations of the Vatican or the artillery of Protestant divines and metaphysicians. But should the hypothesis be established as true in the light of all the evidence that can be collected, it does not follow that all the sweeping conclusions—so hastily propounded by scientists, so hastily accepted by theologians—are true. The *relations* of the newly established theory to certain other great truths do not become clear all at once. It is some comfort to remember that ere now it has happened that the whole system of religious truth has been staked on the establishment or overthrow of some purely scientific question. Yet the question and the system are moving harmoniously side by side to-day, somewhat to the discomfiture of those on either side, who prophesied the downfall of one or the other. It is one thing to establish a scientific theory, it is another thing rightly to co-ordinate that

theory with other truths already established; and it is during this adjustment of truths that so much jarring and clashing take place. And it is just here that Christian thinkers find cause of complaint against the scientific dogmatists. Scientists claim that thorough scientific training is necessary in order to appreciate the significance and bearing of the facts and processes of nature. This may be readily conceded; but does it imply that a rigid process of deduction from purely physical phenomena must set aside other fixed and certain principles of man's nature, or ignore other facts of the universe? Granting that the scientists are the proper men to decide as to the truth or error of any scientific hypothesis, does it follow that we must at once ignore every fact, every feeling, every complex problem of humanity which does not find its explanation in the hypothesis? Really, this is substituting for Rome, with its claim to infallibility, an infallible academy of science.

The establishment of a scientific hypothesis, as a highly probable theory, does not, at once and of itself, determine the meaning or value of other truths, (a thesis if you will,) which have been established on other and sufficient evidence. As a traveller advances into some mountainous country, it frequently happens that the lofty peak to which he is making his way is quite hidden by some smaller mountain, hitherto unnoticed, which now obstructs the view. Yet surely it would be folly for him to turn back, or to conclude that the first peak was only a summer cloud which has melted into thin air.

The position of the Christian apologist in this age is briefly this: Christianity rests upon certain fundamental truths implanted in the constitution of man and harmonizing with the most patent facts of life. These fundamental truths lie equally at the basis of every human system of philosophy, of religion, or of science. Modern infidelity is busily attacking these foundation stones, but as it cannot deny that they are *there*, it attempts to undermine them by showing *how* they came to be there. The most daring attempt of human thought in our day is to *get outside itself*, by explaining the origin and growth of the fundamental truths from which all human thought must spring.

Under the plea of modesty, and of due regard for man's limited faculties, this philosophy is erecting a system virtually as transcendental, because as far beyond the reach of consciousness, as any German intuitionism or Platonic preëxistence. Upon this basis of fundamental truths Christianity erects a solid and substantial fabric of facts; facts, not merely of past history, but of continuous experience, and of constant testing. The charge which Christians bring against all purely physical theories of the universe is that such theories not merely fail to explain the *facts* of Christianity, but that they ignore those facts altogether. Scientists may say, "We have collected an immense number of facts; we have constructed a highly respectable theory, which explains a multitude of these phenomena, and binds together under one comprehensive law those which seemed most widely separated. Therefore, we need not go beyond this law, nor do we care to bring in any metaphysical or supernatural causes to account for the existing order of things."

But the real question is this: Can we get rid of these troublesome facts which do not fit smoothly into any such theory; and which so obstinately refuse to be lost sight of, or to be set aside as worthless? A true and satisfactory answer to man's eager investigation of the meaning of the life he passes here on earth, must take account of *all* the factors which make up his experience. However true and valuable a law may be which binds together many widely sundered phenomena, it cannot be accepted as a final solution so long as certain great and powerful truths, involved in man's very existence, are left out of the account altogether.

For, be it noted, these facts, so completely ignored by many scientific men, are not of slight importance, nor without practical efficiency. They are the mightiest powers which move upon the soul of man; they are awful forces, which can wreck or save his earthly life, according as they are neglected or regarded. In taking them away, the effect is not simply the removal of an intellectual prejudice, but the character is unhinged; the aspect of the universe is changed; the motives, which above all others, hold sway in the human heart, are removed at one fell swoop;

the hopes, the longings, the affections that ennobled his nature and lifted him above the dust of the earth, are crushed and gone for ever! No wonder, then, that those who cling to such hopes as man's noblest heritage, who cherish these beliefs as the prophecies of all that makes life desirable, are earnest or even over-zealous in defending them.

But while we do battle manfully for our religion, let us so arrange our defences as to help our perplexed fellow-men, and not to add to their doubts and fears. The true defence of our Christian religion must consist not in outcries against the conclusions of science; not in useless attacks upon its facts or its processes; not in insinuations against its value or its claim to our respect. Rather let the theologian and the Christian philosopher hold up to view the reality of the great principles on which their system is reared; let them strengthen, by diligent research and patient investigation, the outposts of revealed religion. Especially let all who wish to see Christianity proven to an unbelieving world, be careful "to adorn the doctrine of God their Saviour in all things." The pure and holy life, the blameless example, the steadfast adherence to the will of God, the manifestation of the spirit of Christ, the triumphant death—these are the best evidences of the reality of the Christian life.

There is no cause for fear that the law has been or ever will be discovered which shall unfold at once all the mysteries of the universe; that the light of advancing knowledge will drive away the fairest hopes and noblest aspirations which cheer the heart of man. Advancing knowledge will expand, and not contract, our mental vision. Science, rightly and reverently interpreted, must swell to a deeper and clearer tone, the grand harmony of nature.

Still, all the facts and laws and mysteries of the universe shall be found to encourage and to ennoble the soul of him whose heart is fixed, trusting in his God. Still, the deepest wants of the human soul will be answered, not by the voices of nature alone, but by the word of God. Still, the noblest power of man's soul remains, not the partial knowledge which rests upon its scanty experience and its limited observation, but the faith which looks beyond "the things seen, which are temporal," to "the things unseen, which are eternal!"

ARTICLE III.

OPIUM SMOKING AND THE CHINESE.

This is a subject of great importance, whether considered as a political, a social, or a moral evil, and we ask the attentive perusal of this article by every one into whose hands it shall fall. It will be seen that it involves gospel lands as well as the interests of this benighted people, and is worthy the attention of the Christian and the philanthropist.

Opium is not indigenous to China. It is said that it is mentioned in the Chinese Herbal, which was compiled two centuries ago. The growth of the poppy, from the juice of which opium is made, was not till lately extensive in the Middle Kingdom. It is grown principally in India, and is brought to China in chests or large boxes, of about 140 lbs. each. These chests have forty divisions, in each of which is a ball of opium wrapped carefully in poppy leaves.

To be prepared for using, it is boiled in brass pans till it looks like black molasses. Passing along the street, one recognises at once the places where it is prepared, by the rising fumes of the opium. From these places it is bought and consumed at the opium shops.

Pictures in foreign lands have been drawn of the Chinese smoking opium, representing them as sitting down and smoking as tobacco smokers do. But the manner of smoking is as different as the substance consumed, and as its effects. The opium smoker always lies down, and gives his whole attention to the process.

The opium shops are the most wretched of places. A dirty curtain generally hangs in front of the door. Inside it is dark and smoky. The odors are sickening. On each side are Chinese beds, which consist of a bed-bottom, (made of a wooden frame and thread-work between,) resting upon benches or a frame-work at the head and foot; on it a piece of matting and a hard pillow. Upon each of these reclines a man with a ghastly face, his pipe in hand, and a lamp by his side.

The pipe, or "opium pistol," as it is called, consists of a straight wooden tube, eighteen inches long, with a brass bowl near the end of it, which is conical-shaped, nearly flat on the top, with a small hole in it; the bowl about the size and shape of an egg mashed nearly flat at the larger end. The opium being bought according to the quantity desired to be used, a small piece is placed on the hole with a small iron, and this is held in the flame of a lamp. It is necessary to have a flame, and not a mere coal or taper. One or two long draws consume it. Then follow the most delightful sensations, and the poor deluded one is borne away into dream-land. Some, after smoking, sleep for two or three hours; others, who have business, only for a short time.

Many of the rich prefer to smoke it at their own homes, and some have an apartment arranged for the purpose. The process of "treating" is carried on extensively; and probably there is no way, in any country, in which friendly salutations are more frequently exchanged. To meet a friend along the street, and propose to him to take a smoke, is the height of good manners, and the two will recline with faces opposite, and thus while away an hour in ethereal pleasure. At first the man is exhilarated, but heaviness soon ensues.

The habit is fixed, not by the amount taken, but by the *regularity*. If opium is smoked at irregular intervals, the habit may not be formed for some time; but if it be taken daily, at a stated hour, in three weeks, or two months at most, the *habit* is fixed; the man is a life-slave. Think what would be the condition of our country, if a man could be made a confirmed drunkard in the space of two months!

Why do the Chinese smoke opium? We reply by asking, Why do men drink whiskey? Opium is an hundred-fold more alluring. To be borne away into elysian fields; to have all the cares of earth dispelled in a moment; to enjoy sweetest raptures, is surely enticing. To cure sorrow is the usual cause. The country has been desolated by a war, and here the sufferer for a time finds relief. One is racked with pains, which a friend suggests that smoking opium a day or two will heal. To cure the toothache, often a sufferer begins to smoke opium. This panacea for every ill

is universally recommended. Boys think it manly to ape their elders ; and often, by lighting the pipe for father or grandmother, they learn. Friends lead friends, for how can a friend refuse ? As Paul says : " They not only do the same things, but *have pleasure* in them that do them."

It is a costly vice. The amount actually expended is from six to fifty cents per day. But we must remember the money-rate in China. Carpenters, as a medium-class, earn 18 cents per day ; school-teachers, \$3 or \$4 per month ; clerks, \$4 or \$5 ; servants for the Chinese, (foreigners pay more,) 75 cents per month and their food. Now, of a Chinaman's food, rice is the staple. A Chinaman eats rice morning, noon, and night ; a few vegetables and occasionally a little meat. To take a meal is to " eat rice." The maximum of rice eaten by a strong man is thirty-four cash (thirteen cash make a cent,) per day. A very moderate smoker uses sixty or seventy cash per day ; one hundred cash is the average, though often from three to four hundred. Many, from affluent circumstances, become street beggars. The rice shops are few, compared to the opium dens.

The estimate, however, cannot be made in dollars and cents ; it is above figures. The opium smoker is almost unfitted for business. When immediately under the influence, he is spurred on to activity ; without it, he is paralysed, and shortly rendered unable to think or to perform any labor. Terrible, indeed, are the tortures of habituated opium eaters, who have been deprived of it for a day or two.

Almost unmistakably you can point out the opium smoker. There is nothing to which we can compare his looks, except the clay eaters of the sand-hills. The man has a pale, sallow, yellowish skin, is stooped like a consumptive, and his shoulders so perched up that the Chinese speak of him as having " three heads." By glancing at the forefinger of the right hand, which becomes blackened by filling his pipe, you have certain proof. He has a trembling hand and shaky fingers, and, in general, the looks of a debauchee. In the last stages, the fatal diarrhoea sets in, and as the whole system has been saturated with opiates, there is no escape from the monster, death.

A sight of one of these poor wretches would touch any heart. You walk on the wall with a friend; a man drops down on his knees before you, and tells you if you don't help him he will commit suicide. He lives in a distant city; has pawned all his clothes for the vile article; he has a little raw opium, which he will eat and die. Thus daily you meet the most pitiable objects. All self-respect is gone. Tattered garments are the covering of the opium-smoker. One of the most effective ways of giving the Chinese an idea of the tortures of the lost, is by the "opium-thoughts," as they describe the inexpressible longing for its smoke. The sensation of gnawing in the stomach, when deprived of the drug, is described as being like the tearing of its tender coats by the claws of an animal of prey.

If the man is rich, and has an abundance of nourishing food, he seems to escape many of the bodily evils mentioned. But then only one opium smoker in ten or twenty has wealth.

The wretchedness in families, which is entailed upon the Chinese by this vice, cannot be told. With the greater part of the population, there is a struggle for life. It must be so where the country is so densely peopled. At best they can eke out but a scanty subsistence; but when the greater portion of their living is spent in purchasing "vile dirt," what must the poor family do? The children are often made to engage in the most degrading work, in order to bring their gains to the father. Little of this inner life comes under the the foreign eye; but look at the drunkard's wife and ragged children, and behold the outlines of the picture.

The influence on the next generation cannot be estimated. It far more unnerves a man than the practice of intoxicating drinks. If an early death does not follow to the offspring, from its enfeebled influence, a life of insignificance will.

Opium and whiskey have often been compared. It is hard to conceive of any evil more fearful than intemperance in America; but as between opium and whiskey, the Chinaman would tell you that opium is the greater curse. It may be said, however, that drunkards here are less numerous, and generally seen only in the cold weather.

Drink makes a man furious; the fires burn; he is cruel even to his loved ones; he seeks broils and conflicts; delights in blood; he is a madman. Again, the man under the influence of drink becomes a hog, and wallows in the mire; but then the next day he washes himself, and becomes a rational being, and perhaps it is a long time before he again becomes a brute.

The opium smoker is, on the other hand, gentle; softened down, you might almost say, to rottenness; but then, when once within the encircling folds of this anaconda, there is no escape; he is a slave till death.

“The opium smoker is debased alike in his own estimation and in that of others. He has in every instance the conviction that it is an evil and a bitter thing. He knows it from his own painful experience, from the effects that it produces on those connected with him, and from the ideas entertained of it by the generality of his countrymen. He is consciously degraded by it, and its commonness or its long indulgence in no wise alters the facts of the case. Whether arising from this cause in particular, or from the influence that the use of the narcotic has upon its victim, there is no doubt the opium smoker vitiates, corrupts, and destroys his moral character. It is deadened, seared, and perverted by the habit. It is a vice, in the fullest sense. All who come in contact with the partaker of it, are made aware of it. Under the stimulus or want of the drug, a man will commit the wildest and most atrocious deeds, or he will resort to the meanest and most cowardly acts, that equally lower him in the scale of humanity. He loses his moral balance by the habit into which he has fallen, and the bad qualities of his natural heathen heart are intensified and blackened by its means. Untruthfulness, deceitfulness, treachery, and cruelty are the characteristics of the opium-smoker, and to a degree far greater than in ordinary instances. No real friendship can be formed with him. He has so debased himself in this way, that he is in fact a different man in his own eyes, and the eyes of others, from what he once was. If sin in any form has a deteriorating or debilitating effect, opium smoking proves itself to be exceedingly sin-

ful in this manner. Few ever truly recover from it, or are restored to their original position."

Not one word can be advanced in defence of opium smoking. It is not useful as a medicine, as is often pleaded when brandy is recommended; but whether occasionally or habitually used, it is always a curse.

The Chinese have in some things a very keen sense of right and wrong. Conscience, which is to them Jehovah's law in their hearts, is upon some points bright enough. The most abandoned smoker will acknowledge his great sin; he knows his shame; he loathes himself.

An opium smoker cannot be received into the Church of Christ. It would make the gospel to the Chinese a stench in their nostrils, like the heaps of frogs in Egypt. Many apply to the different missions, but the terms of discipleship are laid down precisely; it must be given up. Few do it. The name of Jesus must not suffer reproach. This is perhaps the most frequent cause of church discipline. This vice is the main obstacle to the progress of the gospel. Daily are missionaries reproached with the charge; "You foreigners who offer this religion, have brought opium to this land; and it is you who bring all this misery on our people."

It will be well, then, right here, to take a historical glance at the introduction of opium into China. Here lies the core of the guilt. It is said that one hundred years ago the importation amounted only to one thousand chests. The East India Company, some years afterwards, made efforts to introduce it, and established a depot off the coast of Canton. In 1800 the Emperor issued a proclamation, calling upon the people not to exchange the commodities of the Inner Land for the "vile dirt" of the foreigners. In 1820 the trade had become considerable, but during all these years was carried on by smuggling.

In 1834, the charter of the East India Company, which had hitherto held undisputed sway over eastern waters, expired, and as the trade passed into individual hands, it greatly increased. The English Government appointed Lord Napier as superintendent of British trade at Canton. He was considered as the "bar-

barian eye" by the Chinese. The foreigners who came to their shores were all considered as coming to pay tribute to the great Emperor. The races surrounding China, the Monguls and Tartars, all regard the Emperor as the great Khan, the vicegerent of heaven; and there can no more be two such khans, than there can be two suns in the heavens. All were supposed to "range themselves under the renovating influence of the glorious sun of the celestial empire." The English embassy expected to be received as they were by other nations, and the treatment they met with then was among the first causes of the opium war of 1840.

The great traffic was in opium. There was a fleet of foreign smugglers just off the coast, bringing an article a Pagan government abominated. Although some of the native officials connived at the smuggling, yet the most infallible proofs can be given that the Chinese Government, from 1800 to 1840, tried to stop the trade. Commissioners from Peking were sent for the purpose. A long experience of the baneful effects of opium upon mind, health, and property, and the annual drainage of millions, was thought sufficient to make it a subject of legislative enactment. "The highest statesman and the debilitated, victimised smoker, alike agreed in their opinion of its bad effects, and both were pretty much in the position of the miserable lamb in the coil of a hungry anaconda."

For some years smuggling was carried on so extensively, that the government and the foreigners were in continual dispute. The imperial court took the sense of the people as to the abolition of the trade, and with one voice they urged that it be stopped. Arrests, fines, tortures, imprisonments, showed that the government was determined to eradicate the evil. It was reported that the Emperor, when speaking of the dreadful effects that opium had brought about, paused and wept, and said, "How can I die and go to the shades of my imperial father and ancestors, until these direful evils are removed!"

In 1839 the Imperial Commissioner at Canton ordered all opium to be given into his hands. The foreigners subscribed 1,000 chests, but this was not sufficient. During the deliberations, the foreigners were shut up in their quarters, with little

food, and their servants left them. They all signed a pledge, "not to deal in opium, nor attempt to introduce it into the Chinese empire." Many afterwards broke it.

Capt. Elliott, then Superintendent of Trade, in behalf of the British Government, ordered all opium to be delivered to him. Twenty thousand two hundred and eighty-three chests were by him turned over to the Chinese. Its price was about \$11,000,000. This was destroyed by the Chinese Government, by being mixed with lime and salt-water, and drawn off at low tide.

Here was the origin of the war. It cannot be held that this was the *only* cause, for the supremacy the Chinese maintained over all who visited their shores, could not be suffered. Semi-civilised nations, as Turkey and Persia, cannot be allowed to have control over the persons of foreigners. And further, as one-third of the world was shut out from the rest, it is a question whether it is not right to *compel* them to open their doors.

Still the cause was OPIUM. The debate in the British Parliament turned almost wholly on the opium trade. Assertions were made that the Chinese Government was insincere in its attempts to suppress this trade. The Indian Territory also was particularly favorable for raising opium. The million and a-half sterling revenue, it was likewise argued, would be lost.

When the treaty of Nankin was made, at the close of the war in 1842, by which the five ports were opened, four or five Chinese officials held communication with the English. They asked, "Why will you not act fairly towards us, by prohibiting the growth of the poppy in your dominions?" The answer was, "Your people must become virtuous, and your officers incorruptible, and then you can stop the opium coming into your borders." And further: "Other people will bring it to you. If England were to stop the cultivation of the poppy, it would not check the evil; *you cannot do better than to legalise it!*" What an opportunity to represent Protestantism before Paganism!

The Government still refused to legalise it. It is said that the Emperor replied to her "Most Gracious and Religious Majesty," Queen Victoria, "It is true I cannot prevent the introduction of the flowing poison; gain-seeking and corrupt men will,

for profit and sensuality, defeat my wishes ; but nothing will induce me to derive a revenue from the vice and misery of my people." For twenty years foreigners still smuggled opium into the country. In the Shanghai harbor, the opium-hulks (which are old vessels built up with a half house-body,) lie near the shore, an eye-sore to all well-meaning people. It continued thus till 1862, when, during the last war, Peking, being in the hands of the English and French, the summer-palace burned, and the Emperor having fled, at the point of the bayonet OPIUM WAS LEGALISED.

O England! the bulwark of Protestantism, this foul stain will ever remain the shame of the nineteenth century!

When the five ports were opened in 1842, at the close of the "Opium War," (as it is justly called,) missionaries came to China; but the connection between that event and opium has been one of the most terrible barriers to the progress of the gospel. Oh! how many men of God have mourned because of this great curse! They have plead with those that brought it here; but all to no effect. During the first years after the treaty, missionaries were considered opium agents. The Chinese know nothing of geography; they only know that opium is foreign, and foreigners are foreign. Daily we are asked if opium is raised in our country; if our people smoke it. They are surprised to find that they stand alone in this among the nations.

A few days ago, in a chapel in this city, a man spoke to a missionary, and told him that "foreigners were worse than the natives, because they brought opium here." He was asked, "Which were the worst, those who brought it, or those who smoked it?" The Chinaman replied, "Well, four-tenths of the blame is ours, and six-tenths is yours."

No sect, no superstition presents such an obstacle as opium. The question is continually asked, "You come from a foreign land to preach, but why do you bring opium?" Because of this, they account all efforts on our part as hypocrisy. They judge our doctrine by the fruits of this foreign tree, *opium*. *This* is the Great Wall of China. Let not scoffing opium dealers ask, Why are the results of missionary labor so meagre?

And look at the numbers brought under its influence ! It is true that opening the ports was the introduction of Christianity. *Ten thousand have been made the servants of Christ ; the slaves of opium are ten millions !* It is the master of all classes ; the rich and the poor ; the high and the low ; the old and the young ; the men and the women ; the prince of blood and the beggar ; the priest and the devotee ; the soldier and the robber ; the scholar and the boatman. Our teacher states that five out of ten in this city smoke. The proportion is much less in the country. The rich man goes out to spend the evening, and smokes with his host. The sedan-bearers sit at the door in the cold, and they must seek an opium den. Boatmen, as their craft moves forward, and workmen at the close of the day's labors, love to indulge.

As we sell books, the number of opium smokers that buy is surprising. When at a desolated little city below here, where business was almost destroyed, it seemed to us that nearly all the population were opium smokers. Nearly all of the teachers of foreigners are of this class.

But what is the rate at which this vice moves ? Twenty years ago opium shops in this city were a mere handful ; now they are variously estimated at from three thousand to eight thousand ; then the smokers were few ; now their name is legion. The evil is on the rapid increase. The proportion is geometrical. About fifteen years ago the imports were sixty-seven thousand chests : five years ago, eighty-nine thousand ; now probably nearly one hundred thousand chests. Thus, at its common price of \$800 per chest, the country is drained of seventy or eighty millions of dollars. To England alone this is a profit of twenty or thirty millions.

Yet more fearful, the plant, which was a half century ago scarce known in the smallest section, is now becoming extensively grown over the empire, especially in the northern parts. Missionary travellers from Peking to Shanghai tell us the fields of the poppy are wide. The fairest sections of this productive land are to be yielded to this vilest of substances.

The officials who, with all their retainers, are perhaps the most abandoned of smokers, frequently issue proclamations about opium, but all like the chaff before the wind.

It may be remarked that the cases of attempted suicide to which we are so frequently called to administer, are from eating the raw opium. An emetic and keeping the person in motion, generally suffice to save life.

If within one generation the number of opium smokers has rapidly risen to ten millions, may we not fear that in another thirty years the numbers will rise to fifty or even to one hundred millions? What will be the number within one hundred years?

The Indians of America, the Sandwich and South Sea Islanders, melt away before advancing civilisation. Has Satan devised a scheme for the destruction of this people?

To those who look at the dealings of Providence, the question arises, why does the Governor of nations allow this? We must bow. May not his design be to humble the pride of this great people who, for so many thousands of years, have apostatised from their Creator? Alas! is it here only that heathenism meets its due? Fearful, guilty nation, is this thy doom, to melt away with advancing centuries, beneath this withering, blighting curse? Behold how God deals with those that fear not him!

But is there no help? There are some few "opium-medicines," but they consist mostly of morphine, and merely help the poor man to break the force of the fatal habit for a time. Few finally succeed. There is no real victory, and no healing but what the gospel gives.

In this city there is an opium hospital, supported by subscription among the natives, and here some are kept for months, and their food furnished.

Perhaps a voice raised by American Christians might have some influence in checking the evil. The fountain-head is India. England rules this country. The Chinese are children, and the only hope is to keep the evil from them.

The numbers who are engaged in the opium trade are not great, but behold the desolation they have wrought! O! that God "would put a hook in their nose and a bridle in their lips, and turn them back by the way by which they came!" "Let destruction come upon them at unawares; and let their net which they have hid catch themselves; into that very destruction let them fall."

ARTICLE IV.

IN WHAT SENSE ARE PREACHERS TO PREACH THEMSELVES.

There are two questions that are quite distinct. 1st. What is the power of *preaching*? and 2d. What is the power of *preachers*? The one refers us to preaching, considered as a divine ordinance; the other to preaching considered as to its instrumental agency. This agency is, so far as it possesses visibility, entrusted to men, who are to wield it, in God's name, each according to his own idiosyncracies of mental and moral character. The preacher's power over those to whom he addresses the word of salvation, (whilst, indeed, it could be nothing—certainly nothing very valuable—were he not sent and sustained by the Almighty, whose servant he is yet,) greatly depends upon what *he himself is*. That is, there is a sense in which the preacher preaches *himself*. He is more than a mere *instructor*. His work does not terminate in the mere act of imparting information, of opening up truth, and causing people to know what they were before ignorant of. If he stopped here, there might be no necessity for his office; *books* could convey instruction as well, or better, and a general distribution amongst men of plain treatises upon religious subjects, might probably take the place of the living teacher. Indeed, the inquiry has been started in certain quarters, where now is the *use* of so much public preaching, seeing that the *press* is so active in sending forth ever-increasing multitudes of cheap printed volumes, whose pages teem with all the knowledge of Scripture that is needed by the reading masses? The answer to this query is not alone to be found in the fact that there are many who *cannot* read, and therefore must be orally taught; or in the very different fact that *God having instituted preaching* as the means for drawing souls to himself, will own only his own ordinance in effecting this great result. The truer and profounder answer is, that they who favor this suggestion altogether mistake the *nature* of a preaching office; regarding it as nothing more than a *teaching* office. They leave *this* entirely out of the ac-

count, viz.: that the preacher is a man who employs sacred truth as a vehicle through which he brings *his own peculiar distinctive self* to bear upon his fellow-men. That truth is with him not mere knowledge, but this knowledge woven into his own experiences, and it is these *experiences* which he seeks to impress upon others in a way that shall make them their experiences as well. He publishes salvation as he himself understands it, and as he has come to understand it thoroughly by having imbibed it into his own soul. Hence he says, "I *believe*, therefore I *speak*." From the storehouse of his own convictions he strives to convince. It is these convictions that constitute him a preacher at all; and in proportion to their warmth and strength is he a *mighty* preacher. Is it not so with all oratory? Why do men ever address other men in public harangue—and how do they do this successfully—unless it be because, rising higher than mere lesson-mongers, they are prepared to inject *themselves* (in whom the truths they teach have become inwrought as so much living force,) *into their auditors*. Accordingly, the demand for orators never ceases, notwithstanding that they may have nothing new to tell; and never can cease until *sympathy* shall fail as a power that brings minds together and moulds them into the pattern of the strongest. Much of the power of the *preacher* is, then, to be found in this, that he is himself a reproduction of the truth he utters; its reproduction in personal form. He is supposed to have it within himself as a living reality; a glowing enthusiasm; a fresh kindling by the Holy Ghost; and so he moves upon his audience with something of the force of an original revelation. It is not Christ *only* that he preaches, but Christ *in him*; and this gives to his preaching a vital energy which the dead letter of a book—even though that book be the Bible—does not and cannot possess.

It is well for us to understand, if we can, that every true preacher is thus a power independently of the power of his *theme*; or rather is a power *added* of that of the mighty theme which is supposed to possess him. He is that theme, *plus himself*, and the whole weight of his oratory which the theme inspires. Think of some preacher—say Thomas Chalmers—and try to account for the effects he produced upon all, the cultivated and the unlettered

who heard him. What was it that swayed them? His massive form—his broad, beaming face—his thunderous voice—his active gesticulation—his argument—his wealth of illustration—his passion—his benevolence—his lofty piety? It was all these qualities and circumstances combined. It was not his statements of truth; they are as well stated in his writings, which produce no such effect upon the mind. It was the *preacher* pouring forth his own interior self, after that self had been filled with the knowledge, and fired by the love of truth, and who was instinct with the purpose to convey to others *what he knew and felt, and as he knew and felt*. Or, take a higher example: that of our blessed Lord. Undoubtedly his personal presence produced an effect which his sayings abstractedly studied never could produce. The *utterer* was more than the *utterance*. The soul which he gave to his words told where the words themselves would have fallen unheeded. It was when these were accompanied by those tones of voice which thrilled with so deep an affection for men, and so high a reverence for the eternal Father—by these meltings and flashings of the eye, which betokened a fountain of light and flame within—by the whole manner and grace displayed in the gentle but yet lordly carriage of this Prince of orators—it was when Christ's words were thus attended and enforced by the living speaker, each one of whose thoughts was *a part of himself*, that the officers of the Sanhedrim, who were sent to arrest him, were compelled to return, astonished, saying, "*never man spake like this man.*" The *man* impressed where the doctrine could not. The same is true even when the preacher is a very common man, like any of ourselves. The instance of the Saviour places before our minds the idea we are endeavoring to express in the largest view; but similar instances, though on a far smaller scale, are every day being witnessed. We know how it was in England, when the immediate followers of Wesley, many of them without literary cultivation, stirred the hearts of thousands wherever they went with the gospel on their tongues. Their speech was rude, but the speakers were identified with their subject. They spake *themselves* to the people, and brought multitudes of them into conformity, so to speak, with their own personality; so that the

type of that day's piety was the type which the *preachers* presented ; a piety somewhat distorted, it is true ; but yet, such as it was, it was what came from the power of the men who proclaimed it in the form of their own consuming love for Christ. It was *their conception* of the Lord Jesus Christ that they preached ; and that conception became the common property of myriads. In point of fact, then, no two men preach precisely the same gospel, provided their preaching is in all earnestness, and not merely as a bundle of cold dogmas. Paul did not preach it exactly as did Peter—nor John as did James. These all felt it intensely—but each felt it in his own way ; we mean as it was moulded in his own peculiarities. It is so still. Although Christ must be regarded as always one and the same, it does not follow that whoever preaches him must present in all respects the very same Saviour. To use the illustration of another : “ You might just as well say that the sun being always one and the same, whatever *flower* showed the sun's work must look the same. When you look at the flowers, you will see some red, some blue, some yellow, some humble, some high, some branching. Endless is the work the sun creates ; but every one of the things which it creates reflects its power and teaches something about it. It takes a thousand men's experience, all brought into one ideal, to make the conception of our Lord. You may read what Paul wrote about him, or Matthew, or Luke, or John ; and the impression produced by either of them is fragmentary ; it is presenting *some things* out of the infinite, as he was made to see them. So, when, under the gospel, men are made preachers, God works in them a saving knowledge of himself, gives them a sense of the sympathy between God and man, of the spiritual love which appeals from the infinite to the mortal ; and then says to each of them : ‘ Take this revelation of Jesus Christ in you, and go out and preach it. ’ According to the structure of your understanding, your emotive affections, the sentiments of your own soul ; go and preach to men for the sake of making them know the love of Christ Jesus—and you will have a power in you, if attended by the Holy Ghost, to make that preaching effective. . . . It is your office, as preachers, to take so much of Christ as has been digested into

your own spiritual life; and with that strike! with that, flash! with that, burn men." "It is historically true, that Christianity did not, in its beginning, succeed by the force of its doctrines, but by the *lives* of its disciples." It must *always* be so; and, inasmuch as these lives are supposed to be paramount in the preaching class, it is mainly by the power of what religion, of what practical godliness, of what personally absorbed divine truth dwells in them, and comes out from them, in their utterances of it by example and by word, that the world is moved heavenward. When, however, we say there is a sense in which every effective preacher is effective in proportion to the extent in which he preaches *himself*, you will observe that this statement must be taken along with a warning. We have already intimated *what self* it is that he must employ as a power: that self, namely, which has *Christ* wrought into it. Has, then, every man a number of selves? Certainly he has. Paul, *e. g.*, in the 7th of Romans, speaks of at least *two* selves as belonging to him; one the old, the other the new. But both that old and that new self has, in a Christian, several sides or aspects; their variety depending upon constitutional singularities. Without stopping to speak of these at length, it is sufficient to say that the *old* and *new* man—these *antagonistic* selves—are only too apt to change places, in preachers as in other men; and as sure as they do, the power is gone from their preaching. The true preacher is the *new* man of his soul, which alone carries Christ, and which alone can *proclaim* Christ as the object of faith, the hope of salvation; because it is only this new man that can truthfully say, "for me to live *is* Christ." To this heaven-born man belongs the Samson's hair, which, if shorn off in the Delilah's lap of the old man, deprives it of all its strength. Our point is, that *self-preaching* is, in the meaning we are now attaching to the phrase, far removed from *self-seeking*, from all *egotism*, and from whatever in personal ambition it may be which leads a person to obtrude his own opinions, or his own dogmas, as a substitute for the gospel. It must never be forgotten that nothing has saving power over men, *except the gospel*. But then there is this added thought, that the gospel has then its *maximum* power when he who publishes it

does so out of the fulness of *his own* heart; *i. e.*, when he gives it the tongue of *his own* earnest persuasion of its truth; not *another* man's persuasion, but *his*. In other words, preaching is not an *imitative* exercise. Every preacher is to regard himself as an *original* exhibitor and enforcer of the terms of human salvation; a channel of gracious speech, markedly different from every other. He may, if he please, take another preacher for his *model*, but ought not to do so in any such way as shall deprive him of the advantages of his own individuality. He must still employ whatever characteristics of mind or manner are exclusively his own. He, indeed, *will* do so, if he be true to his calling; a calling which summoned *him*, and not *another in him*, to the sacred desk.

Let us extend a little the subject in hand. Every candidate ought *practically* to consider it, in reference to his studies preparatory to his entrance upon the actual work of the ministry, and every preacher in view of his studies when he shall have been inducted into his great office.

Our first remark, then, is, that it will be his duty to make the *most* of himself, in direct reference to his sacred calling. If he himself is to be a power in the pulpit, certainly he cannot take too much pains to *perfect* this power. It probably is because ministers—young ministers especially—are so commonly urged to regard themselves as mere nothings—as humble instruments whose humility requires them to esteem their own endowments in the light of a *snare* rather than in the light of a substantial and positive force—that they are accustomed to put forth only feebly what they really are, and to make little or no effort in the way of asserting their efficiency. We are, as truly as any one can be, a foe to ministerial arrogance, and would be far from advising any preacher to think of himself more highly than he ought. But modesty as men is one thing, and timorousness as preachers is quite another; and all are timorous who fail to perceive that they, in themselves, are an influence in the Church and the world. *Believing* that they are weak, they become weaklings indeed. Assuming, then, that the preacher is to be a positive agency for good in the hand of God, 1st, because he is a Christian; 2d, be-

cause he is set apart as a Christian *minister*, what ought he to strive after? Why, to make of himself all that it is possible for him to become, *in the direction of his immediate calling*. Remembering that it is *he* who preaches, not some one else through him; reflecting that the Holy Ghost has chosen *him*, and not, in him, some one else whom he might be supposed to represent; it must be felt by each chosen ambassador for Christ, that it is *he* who shall accomplish the enterprise he is set to achieve; the enterprise of saving souls and edifying saints within the sphere appointed to him. *He* is God's spokesman—and *he* it is who is to impress the people whom he addresses with the lessons of eternal life. Accordingly, as he is, so will they be likely to be; a sentiment that expresses, in another form, the familiar saying, "like priest like people." Let each, then, make himself a principal study—just as an aspiring mechanic studies, in order to perfect, the parts of his chief tool. The board is planed well or ill in the proportion in which the plane is good or bad. A perfect plane—ordinary skill being assumed—brings forth a faultless surface upon the subservient wood. *Ourselves* are our chief tool in all the labor we perform; and in the results of that labor ourselves are necessarily reproduced. Thus we come back again to the principal thought of this article, and venture to say once more to all preachers: preach *yourselves*—but now with this addition: preach yourselves in a constant progress of improvement. You have deficiencies; mental, moral, spiritual; physical, too, it may be. Take these in hand—find out precisely what they are—proceed to remove them, and to substitute in their stead, so far as you can, the corresponding finish. In other words, be not content until the workman is worthy of his work. Become those *living* epistles of which an apostle speaks, to be known and read of all men—so that the dead letter may seem as if raised to life in your speech, in your example, in all that you *are*, as the servants of God. Thus will you be, each, the power you were *intended* to be by him who chose you as his heralds of peace. The *preacher* is more of a sermon than any or all of his worded deliverances. Those deliverances are, indeed, almost powerless unless they display the *man* who utters them; unless they thrill

with an energy derived from what *he himself* is, and burn with a fire which proceeds from his own soul, kindled by intelligence and piety. Turn it which way we will, the conclusion is always before us, the preacher's preaching is just another form of *himself*; *i. e.*, if he does *his own thinking*; exhibits no emotions that he does not actually *feel*; and presents divine truth, not as a bundle of opinions which orthodoxy has agreed upon, but as so much vital blood that has been made to course in *his* veins, and therefore takes the form of his own *Christian life*. It is these *live* men whom God supremely calls; men who have *eaten* the word, as a prophet did, and into whom it has passed to become a perpetual throb in their hearts; so that when it comes forth again, it will proceed upon its errand, bearing the warmth of their innermost experiences; those experiences wherein are traced the musings which continued until they could find vent only in fire; the fire that burns quickly into other souls, melts where it burns, and remoulds where it melts.

Another remark is hereby suggested. We have said that, in order to true and high efficiency, the preacher must study himself. He is, indeed, expected to weary himself among Hebrew roots and in exploring Greek meanings; to extend his knowledge of Church History and Government; to knit together, in a comprehensive system, the doctrines of salvation by a course of didactic and polemic theology; and to discover those principles of sacred rhetoric which shall enable him properly to reproduce, upon the actual field of his ministry, what he shall have acquired. Nothing is more important than a diligent use of his time in the effort to utilise his whole opportunity for study and research with respect to all these grave matters. But how is he best to direct such a prolonged effort, in order to reap the fullest advantage in view of what is before him in his official life? In other words, what is the true *use* of all his various studies? Is it his object to gain knowledge? Surely, yes. Is it his further object to discipline his understanding? Unquestionably this, too. Is this, however, the whole? We do not hesitate to say that the importance of abstract knowledge and of mental culture, is exceeded by the necessity imposed upon the man of making what he is evermore ac-

quiring, a *part of himself*, in the strictest sense of these words. The achievements of a student are usually spoken of as supplying him with so much mental *furniture*. We dare say that in the cases of most students this word is judiciously chosen. Their minds are so many rooms, in which, like apartments in a dwelling, they have placed a good deal of suitable furniture. These rooms are sometimes, it may be, comparable to parlors wherein you find whatever is pleasing to the eye and soft to the touch; sometimes to those portions of the home where things useful rather than ornamental are collected. But our complaint as to this word, "furniture," is that it does not rightly designate the true results of learning. Furniture is something that is not necessarily identified with the room where it is placed. It is by no means an inseparable portion of the chamber or the house; to such an extent that the destruction of the one would be the inevitable ruin of the other. Every cultivated mind does, indeed, possess a portion of such furniture, which is movable, which can be disposed of, and forgotten. In the crowds which people his memory, there are many items of knowledge that are present only incidentally, or as temporary guests—and which he may or may not make use of, as one may of a table on which he leans for a moment, or of a chair on which he reposes a little, or of a servant whom he despatches on some present errand. But within this circle stands *himself*, the master of all these externals. What, however, constitutes *himself*? He is the *product* of his studies—the *excellent* product, if he has studied wisely and well. What he has read, and heard, and pondered, has entered into his very composition, mental and moral; has *blooded* him, so to speak, through all the veins of his being, and now give to his judgment whatever vigor it has, to his thoughts whatever vitality, to his imagination whatever colors they possess, and to his career whatever usefulness it exhibits. It is not therefore mental *furniture* that he has acquired, but *mind itself*. Not merely are his original powers enlarged and improved by the healthful exercise they have had; they are *recreated* by being poured into a different mould, and restamped by a different image. The man and his acquirements have become *assimilated* by the operation of the laws of that mysterious or-

ganic chemistry which reign in the world of soul. Such ought to be the final cause of all the preachers' intellectual labor. He is to pursue theology in all its branches, not only that he may acquire the knowledge of doctrine, or become acquainted with the history of opinion with reference to doctrine. This is needful. Far more needful is it that he take what he has learned *into himself*, in such a way as that no longer is it something external, but internal; not the mere crudities of tabled food, but that food digested into inward life; so that he is enabled to say, "these doctrines are mine; are *myself*; these opinions are also portions of me—not what I have been taught, but my own thinking—not what has been pumped into me, but *my pump*, out of which I give forth my very personality. It is only thus, it seems to us, that he can make any real progress; by weaving all threads into the warp and woof of his own existence; the resulting pattern being himself; the living doctrines in an original spring. When such a man preaches, he cannot but preach himself in a manner that shall be felt in a degree proportioned to the extent in which the truth and he are *one*. His words, his gestures, his changing countenance, his tones of voice, his whole bearing in the pulpit, will declare at once the fixedness and the warmth of his convictions, as convictions that ought to be those of all others. Who, indeed, would be a preacher, unless he were conscious of the transformation which has constructed him, in his measure, into the Saviour he proclaims; so that he pleads not only the cause of God, but his own cause as well? Is not every minister a redeemer of men; a small specimen of what his Lord is on the largest scale? As such, in imitation of Christ, he toils, suffers, and is crucified for the world!—"counting not his life dear unto himself, so that he may finish his course with joy and the ministry which he has received of the Lord Jesus, to testify the gospel of the grace of God." And although Paul did indeed say, "we preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus our Lord, and ourselves your servants for Jesus' sake," yet he adds, "for God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give (in order that we may thus give) the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ."

The apostles did not preach themselves in the offensive sense that the Judaizers of that day did, as if *potential* salvation was with them, but they preached themselves as the bearers of that light which, as it shone from their persons and discourses, was all one with the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. God had clothed them with the gospel radiance, not as if they were so many *suns*, and thus independent fountains of light. They were, nevertheless, those sources of light which, like the planets, borrowed the beams that made them *exactly like* their supreme original; and their office was, accordingly, to illuminate the earth's night in the absence of him who appointed them his light-bearers. So that Paul could also say: "Brethren, be followers together of *me*, and mark them which walk, so as ye have *us* for an ensample."

We care not further to expand these hints. Let them be taken for what they are worth; and, properly understood, we are bold to say they are worth much. They serve our present object at least, which was, in a way somewhat different than has been attempted heretofore, to display the power that *preachers* have, or may have, when fully absorbed by their theme and in their work, and thus to justify God's calling of men to go forth in the effort to achieve salvation for a lost world. We leave it to every one's own intelligence, not to misunderstand what has been suggested—as if we were teaching the preacher to aim at the utmost effort of *self-assertion* for selfish ends. Our whole thought is: become what you preach, and then preach *Christ in you*, the hope of glory. So will each one be a separate power in the midst of his generation, for everlasting good.

ARTICLE V.

AN EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN HYPOTHESES
CONCERNING PERCEPTION AND SENSATION.

No discussions, probably, have ever excited greater interest amongst psychologists than those which have for their end to determine the precise character of that act by which we have, or suppose that we have, a knowledge of the external world.

The first topic connected with this general subject to which we would call attention, is the question, *whether we have an immediate knowledge of a material world.*

To the great mass of mankind, no question seems easier to answer. Were it left to be decided by a vote, we should have an overwhelming majority in favor of the affirmative. On the other hand, amongst philosophers, scarcely anything has raised more doubt, or given birth to more perplexity. The result is, that there are very few of those who have made an especial study of the subject, who have not arrived at the deliberate conclusion that we have no immediate or direct cognition of matter. Those who allow any knowledge whatever of a material world, contend that it is known only mediately, by and through ideas. These philosophers are known as hypothetical realists, inasmuch as, in their creed, the reality of a material world, as distinguished from the world of ideas, is only an hypothesis; while the very small minority who have vindicated the popular conviction, are called, in contradistinction, natural realists.

The inquiry here is a pertinent one, what importance are we to attach to the almost universal suffrages of the learned? Are we to surrender our irresistible conviction to their opinion? Are we to yield the point to their superior gifts and their more intense and thorough investigation? Or shall we raise the standard of rebellion against authority and say that though hypothetical realism may be very good metaphysics, it is not common sense?

This latter course is, we presume, practically the course of all. It may well be doubted whether this is not the thought of even the hypothetical realist himself, as he walks forth upon the green

earth, or handles what he chooses to call ideas, but what his more ignorant neighbors take for realities. It would require, not a "slight," but a very strong "tincture" of philosophy to hold in abeyance the instinctive conviction of the mind, in the presence of nature, that we have a direct knowledge of material objects.

Let us not linger here, however, dallying with such considerations as these, but pass with the philosopher into his sanctum, where the obtrusive world is found to be less troublesome, and learn from him there, why he feels constrained to deny what all men naturally believe. Let us, moreover, make up our minds definitely, that we shall lose nothing by accepting the truth, whatever it may turn out to be. But let us wait for proof, without which we should bow before no authority. Upon what grounds, then, does the hypothetical realist feel constrained to reject the seemingly unequivocal deliverance of our senses?

Does he undertake to decide the question by an appeal to experience? Then he must show us that a more accurate analysis of the phenomena of perception evinces that what we mistake for a cognition of matter is not such, but the cognition of an immaterial idea. But in order to reach such a result, there must be a discrimination of what is an apparent cognition of matter but no more, from a real one. The only way in which this can be done, is to bring before the mind both these cognitions; for, according to the teachings of these same philosophers, no two things can be discriminated without a knowledge of both. It would be necessary, then, to allow to the mind the very cognition in question, before it could be proved by our experience that what we mistake for it is not really such. To claim that the dogma can be thus ested, is to surrender it unconditionally.

If, then, the hypothetical realist would correct our ignorance he ought to be able to appeal to another test than this. And this he claims to be able to do. Indeed the method by experience is a very contemptible thing in the eyes of the majority of those who have undertaken to settle questions of this character. They have a more excellent way than this, and that is the *a priori* method.

Let us examine its application to the point in hand.

It promises no such half-way results as that "mind *does not* know matter directly." It yields a necessary principle instead. "Mind *cannot* know matter directly." In order to the establishment of such a proposition as this, we must be able to trace it to intuitive principles or axioms to show that it follows, by necessary consequence, from them. The question now arises, to what intuitive principle or principles—to what axiom or axioms—can this sweeping statement be traced?

In answer, it may be said that by one and another philosopher, five different axiomatic principles have been supposed to justify this proposition. Of these, however, only one has been very potent. Since it has been deemed satisfactory by the great majority, it seems to be more worthy of consideration than any of the others. The principle in question is this: "No substances, entirely dissimilar, can affect each other directly." All who accept this proposition, and, at the same time, regard mind and matter as substances essentially dissimilar, are compelled, by the laws of thought, to conclude that "mind cannot know matter directly." There is nothing left us but to accept the conclusion, or question the principle which justifies it.

If we become so rash as to ask for proof of the proposition that "substances entirely dissimilar cannot affect each other directly," we are upbraided for our folly in demanding proof for a necessary truth. But if this be a necessary truth, its contradictory must be absurd. Its contradictory is the proposition, "some substances, which are entirely dissimilar, can affect each other directly;" and the question to be determined is, whether it is seen, either directly or by its consequences, to involve an absurdity. We dare say no one finds it impossible to construe it, in thought, as true. Indeed, the very conviction of mankind under discussion, cries out with many voices, and says it is true. Besides, there are innumerable analogies in nature which seem to indicate unequivocally that the more different any two things are, the more easily do they affect each other without the mediation of anything else. This being true, until some one shall condescend to prove that it leads necessarily to absurdity, we think all unbiased minds will refuse to accept its contradictory as an axiom.

It would seem, then, to be too much to demand that we surrender the witness of our senses, repeated a thousand times every day, at the beck of a pseudo-axiom, simply because it has been supported and defended by great names in philosophy.

We pass now to another question, concerning which the popular opinion is just as positive and fixed, but which opinion is even more earnestly contradicted by the deliverances of philosophy. The question referred to is, *whether the mind has any immediate or direct knowledge of objects distant from it in space.*

We must not here expect to find philosophers ranging themselves as before; for of those few who, in the other dispute, were the champions of the popular conviction, almost every one deserts at this hard saying, and takes his place in the opposing ranks. Even Sir W. Hamilton, the great defender of natural realism and apostle of common sense, answers emphatically in the negative, and thus turns his back upon that same popular belief to which he had so confidently appealed against the hypothetical realists.

In pursuance of our determination to receive nothing upon authority, it becomes us to ask again for the grounds upon which a direct knowledge of distant objects has been denied to the mind. We must point to *a priori* arguments here, as before, by the use of which the effort is made to demonstrate that such knowledge is, in the very nature of the case, impossible. And again we meet with a so-called axiomatic principle which is supposed to settle the question. This is nothing else than the brocard, "nothing can act where it is not." The assertion that the mind can know nothing directly, which is distant from it in space, is but a specific application of the general principle.

This maxim, that "nothing can act where it is not," or, as it has been differently expressed, "*actio in distans* is impossible," has played a conspicuous part, in times past, in the speculations of physical philosophers as well as those of metaphysicians. Sir Isaac Newton, for instance, regarded it as a sure mark of the absence of a competent faculty in philosophical thinking, that one should not regard it as absurd that "one body may act upon another at a distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may

be conveyed from one to the other." But notwithstanding so decided an opinion from so great a man, let us see whether we can escape the admission, even in the case of brute matter, that action at a distance is not only possible but actual.

If we, under the guidance of the physicist, study the inner structure of masses of matter, we learn that they are made up of atoms, no two of which are in absolute contact. For if they were in absolute contact, the bodies so composed would be absolutely incompressible. But there are no such bodies. In addition, the phenomena of cohesion and elasticity prove that these atoms attract and repel each other, at certain fixed distances. Let us now imagine two atoms brought within the sphere of each other's repulsion. They are not in absolute contact; otherwise they could not be brought nearer to each other, which, however, can be done. The question is, how do these atoms act upon each other, over the interval which separates them? We either have here a case of "*actio in distans*," or there is something else between them, "by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to the other."

This latter alternative has been chosen. An extremely attenuated and highly elastic form of matter, called "*ether*," is supposed to occupy the interval and mediate between the atoms. But this ether, being elastic matter, must also be made up of atoms, between which there are intervals. Now, how do these ether atoms act upon each other over the relatively immense distances which separate them? Shall we hypothecate another ether more subtile, by and through which the action of the grosser ether atoms may be conveyed from one to the other? Then may we go on to infinity. Shall we, in despair, cast the burthen upon *force*, an immaterial agent, and leave it to do the work? But where resides the force? In the atoms themselves? Then it acts across the interval between them, and we have "*actio in distans*." Does it occupy an intermediate position? Then it acts, at a distance, upon the atoms, in either direction. Is it diffused between the atoms? Then it is extended. But that which is extended in space is material, and is made up of atoms, between which there are intervals. So that we have returned to the

point from which we started. If we give up the rigid atom, and substitute the conception of a "centre of force," we gain nothing; action at a distance clamors still for recognition.

Now, if it be true that "inanimate, brute matter," can and does act at a distance, with naught to mediate that action, who shall say that mind—active, living mind—that which of all finite things most faithfully shadows forth the ceaseless activity of the Infinite—who shall say that mind cannot know aught at a distance?

But, further, there is a difficulty of no slight importance in the way of those who, while they maintain that we have an immediate knowledge of matter, deny that the mind can know that which is distant from it. The difficulty lies in seeing how it is possible to say that the mind can directly apprehend extension, which is implied in the cognition of matter, without knowing, at one and the same time, that which occupies more than one point in space. Extension cannot be thought at all without conceiving two points, at least, as out of each other; that is, separated from each other. Hence it cannot be directly cognised, or perceived, without a direct cognition of at least two points as out of each other. But extension is an essential quality of matter. Therefore the same cognition is imperative in order to a direct cognition of matter.

There is only one supposition which can relieve this difficulty, and that is, that the mind can be present at more than one place at the same time. This relief has been seized upon by the philosophers in question; and hence they have promulgated the doctrine that the mind is all in the whole, and all in every part of the animated body, and therefore can know it as extended. We quote the language of Sir Wm. Hamilton upon this point: "There is no good reason to suppose that the mind is situate solely in the brain, or exclusively in any one portion of the body. On the contrary, the supposition that it is really present *wherever we are conscious that it acts*—in a word, the peripatetic aphorism—*the soul is all in the whole, and all in every part*—is more philosophical, and consequently more probable, than any other opinion. It has not always been noticed by those who deem themselves the

chosen champions of the immateriality of the mind, that *we materialise mind when we attribute to it the relations of matter*. Thus we cannot attribute a local seat to the soul without clothing it with the properties of extension and place; and those who suppose this seat to be but a point, only aggravate the difficulty."

It will be noticed that we have here an hypothesis to account for the fact that we know different parts of our own bodies, in the same instant of time; and an argument to prove the necessity of the hypothesis. This argument consists of two allegations. The first is, that it is more philosophical to suppose that the soul is where it acts, than that it acts at a distance. The second is, that we materialise mind when we attribute to it a local seat; and this we are said to do when we confine it to one part of the body.

Now, as to the first of these, it is true only upon condition that it can be shown that nothing can act at a distance. Then it cannot be more philosophical to say that the mind is always where we are conscious that it acts than to admit that it may act where it is not. As to the second, that we materialise mind by giving to it a local seat, and thus attributing to it relations in space, it would seem that this could be of value in the present case, only provided that the hypothesis proposed did not attribute to the mind relations in space. But, in the language of the hypothesis, the mind is "*all in the whole and all in every part*" of the body. It is *in* the body, then, as contradistinguished from being *out* of it. Now, if it can be said to be in the body, and not out of it, it stands related to the extension of the body. And the relation sustained to the extension of the body is different from that sustained to the extension outside the body. The truth is that to deny that the mind has any relations in space, implies the assertion that it is *nowhere*. But these philosophers are so far from allowing that the mind is nowhere, that they tell us that it is all of it *in* the body! How the "aggravated difficulty" of asserting that the mind is confined to a point is relieved by an hypothesis which confines it to a definite portion of space, we cannot imagine.

Moreover, let it be distinctly borne in mind that all who be-

lieve in the immateriality of mind, must regard it as an extended monad. How it is possible for it to be in more places than one at any given instant—how, while it is all in the head, it is also, all of it, in the hands and the feet—this hypothesis does not inform us. To most minds, we make bold to assert, such a supposition involves a flat contradiction. The difference, then, between saying that the mind is all in the whole and all in every part of the body, and that it is confined to some one place or position, is not that the former attributes to the mind no relations in space, while the latter does, but that the former attributes contradictory relations to it, whereas the latter does not.

We are aware that a similar mode of speaking is in use, with reference to the divine Omnipresence. It is not our purpose to apply to it the same canons as to that concerning the human spirit. There is clearly this difference, that no theologian has ever taken upon him to assert that the Divine Being, though all of him present at every point within a certain definite extension, is not present, in the same sense, to points outside that extension. To make these two assertions, and supplement them by a third statement, that he bears no relations whatever to space, would be to make the two cases parallel, in which event, it seems clear we should have a contradiction.

Having now seen that it is irrational, and therefore unphilosophical, to maintain that the mind can have an immediate knowledge of that which is extended without, at the same time, having an immediate knowledge of that which is distant from it in space, we come to consider *whether we have an immediate cognition of objects outside of and at a distance from our own bodies.*

It is scarcely necessary to state that here again popular conviction and the deliverances of philosophy are in direct opposition to each other. Sir Wm. Hamilton earnestly maintains that “the primary qualities”—and be it understood that he holds that only the primary qualities can be immediately known—“the primary qualities of *things external to our organism*, we do not perceive, *i. e., immediately know.* For these we only learn to infer from the affections which we come to find that they determine in our organs—affections which, yielding a perception of organic exten-

sion, we at length discover, by *observation and experiment*, a corresponding extension in the extra-organic agents." (Reid's Works, p. 881, Note D*.) Passages to the same effect might be multiplied, but this is unequivocal, and therefore sufficient.

But why should we accept this statement of the philosopher? The answer given to this question may be briefly stated, and is to this effect: that we cannot know directly or immediately anything as extended, except as we localise in it a sensation or sensations. We quote again from the same author: "Sensation proper is the *universal condition* of perception proper. We are never aware of the existence of our own organism, except as it is somehow affected, and are only conscious of extension, figure, and the other objects of perception proper, as realised in the relations of our sentient organism as a body extended, figured, etc." Again: "Sensation proper is the *conditio sine qua non* of a perception proper of the primary qualities. For we are only aware of the existence of our organism, in being sentient of it as thus and thus affected; and are only aware of its being the subject of extension, figure, motion, etc., in being percipient of its affections as like or unlike, and as out of, or locally external to, each other." (Reid's Works, p. 880.)

Before proceeding further, it is necessary to determine the exact signification of the term *sensation*, as it is used in these passages.

Locke, and other philosophers before Reid, employed the word to indicate the entire process by which the mind, through and by the senses, takes cognisance of the external world. In this usage, it included not only what is now known as sensation proper, but perception proper also. It is scarcely necessary to say that it is not used, in this sense, in the passages which have just been quoted.

Dr. Thos. Reid sharply distinguished between sensation and perception. In his philosophy, "sensation is a simple and original affection of the mind," having no localisation in the body. Rising into consciousness, when an external object is properly correlated with an organ of sense, it becomes the "natural sign" by which the mind is enabled, in a manner utterly inexplicable,

to conceive the external object as endowed with such and such qualities. This latter—the conceiving the external object—he calls perception.

Sir W. Hamilton, though laying out his strength to prove that Reid was a natural realist, could not fail to see that such a doctrine as that just stated affiliated his great countryman very closely with the hypothetical realists. He, therefore, explicitly declares that he does not use the term in this sense. “On the contrary,” says he, in distinguishing his usage from that of Reid, “On the contrary, I hold that sensation proper being the consciousness of an affection not of the mind alone, but of the mind as it is united with the body, that in the consciousness of sensations *relatively localised* and reciprocally external, we have a veritable apprehension, and consequently an immediate perception of the affected organism as extended, divided, figured, etc.” (Reid’s Works, p. 884.)

Another point which it is important should be settled at this stage of the discussion, is to which of the three classes of mental phenomena, viz., cognitions, feelings, or conation, sensations are to be assigned.

Sir W. Hamilton settles this question for us in his forty-fifth Lecture on Metaphysics. He there assigns them to the class of *feelings*, and distinguishes them from the other species of feelings—the emotions—in that they are localised in the body, whereas the emotions are not.

We may, then, define sensation, in the Hamiltonian and proper sense of the term, to be *a feeling localised (more or less definitely) in the sentient organism or body.*

Now, if this definition be accepted, and, at the same time, it be true that we perceive or directly know as extended-only that in which we localise sensations, it follows irresistibly that we cannot immediately cognise any thing as extended outside our own sentient organisms.

The simple question, then, is *whether a localised feeling is the universal condition of perception.* If the affirmative be established, it must be admitted that we cannot know immediately ob-

jects outside our organism. If it be not established, the main question is relegated to the test of experience.

Our first step is to find out what are the teachings of philosophy as to the relation between *cognition and feeling*. Wherever we turn, we find but a single opinion; and that opinion is best given in the words of the author from whom we have cited the preceding passages. "The faculty of knowledge," says he, "is certainly first in order, inasmuch as it is the *conditio sine qua non* of the others;" *i. e.*, of the feelings and the conations. Again: "The order of these is determined by their relative consecution. Feeling and appetency suppose knowledge." This language clearly means that, given any particular feeling, we must admit that, in the order of nature, it was preceded by a corresponding cognition. This view of the relation of cognition and feeling, we think we may presume to say, cannot fail to commend itself to the mind of any one who has a competent knowledge of the subject. Now it would seem that one of the three following propositions must be accepted, and, by consequence, the other two rejected. Either,

1. Perception and sensation are not, respectively, cognition and feeling; or,

2. A given cognition is not always antecedent in the order of nature to, the *conditio sine qua non* of, the corresponding feeling; or,

3. Any given perception is antecedent in the order of nature to, the *conditio sine qua non* of, the corresponding sensation.

But it has already been shown that Sir Wm. Hamilton, in one portion or another of his work, and as it suits the end in view, denies them all. In other words, he maintains that any given cognition is antecedent, in the order of nature, to the corresponding feeling, and that any given sensation (a feeling) is antecedent in the order of nature, to the corresponding perception, (a cognition.)

We have very earnestly endeavored to see if, in any possible way, the apparently flat contradiction involved in maintaining that cognition is the condition of feeling, and sensation the condition of perception, can be removed. The only possible way of

reconciliation, though one which, so far as we are aware, has never been proposed, would be to fall back on Hamilton's peculiar doctrine of consciousness. All who are familiar with his writings will remember that he regards consciousness as a genuine faculty. All our mental phenomena, according to his system, whether they be cognitions, feelings, or conations, are specific products of the mind, containing one common element, that of consciousness. This element, which, so to speak, underlies all the mental phenomena, might be said to be antecedent, in the order of nature, to them all, and by consequence, to the sensations. Now, consciousness, according to Hamilton, is of the nature of cognition. Every sensation, then, might have cognition (*i e.*, consciousness,) as its condition, and still be the condition of the corresponding perception. This would, probably, be satisfactory to those who accept the Hamiltonian doctrine of consciousness.

But let us see what is involved in making consciousness the genus of which the other mental phenomena are the species. We suppose that no one will undertake to deny that the species contains, as an essential element, all that is contained in the genus. Now, if the feelings be a species of which consciousness is the genus, then the feelings, containing essentially all that consciousness contains, must be pronounced to be cognitions, because, according to Hamilton's own statement, consciousness is of the nature of cognition. So, also, acts of will shall turn out to be essentially cognitions. This doctrine of consciousness, then, destroys the distinction between the three classes of mental phenomena. Instead of cognitions, feelings, and conations, we have cognitions, cognitions, and cognitions! Either this conclusion must be admitted, or the doctrine that consciousness is a generic faculty must be given up. To offer the above plea, then, only transfers the difficulty one step further back, and leaves it insuperable as before. It would seem, therefore, that we are shut up to one of two conclusions; either cognition is not the universal condition of feelings, or perception is the universal condition of sensation. The former of these cannot be admitted, therefore the latter must. That is, so far from sensation's being

the *conditio sine qua non* of perception; perception is the *conditio sine qua non* of sensation.

Just at this point, in order to prevent possible misunderstanding, it may be well to state that there is no intention whatever to deny that there is a *conditio sine qua non* of every act of perception. The only thing denied is that sensation is that condition, inasmuch as the relation is just the other way. It would be the height of folly to undertake to maintain that the mind, while in the body, cognises external material objects independently of all modifications of the organs of sense. On the other hand it is a fact, beyond all doubt, that there is physical modification of the appropriate organ as the condition of every act of perception. Now it is true, that some thinkers have abused language to the degree of calling this bare physical modification a sensation. This, however, deserves no notice. What is denied is that the physical modification is translated into a *felt* affection of the organism, in order to the cognition of that organism as extended.

Notice, further, that this statement does not imply that the perception is *chronologically* antecedent to the sensation. There is no doubt but that the perception of the organism, as extended, and the recognition of the feeling which is localised in it, are chronologically coincident. The only question is, whether the having the feeling, does not imply a knowledge of the locality in which it is recognised. It is the affirmative of this question which has been maintained.

Having now seen that it cannot be maintained, in consistency with the teachings of sound philosophy, that sensation is the universal condition of perception, it follows that no valid argument can be drawn from this source to prove that we cannot have an immediate or direct knowledge of distant objects.

Let us now confine our attention to the sense of *light*, which is, by all psychologists, admitted to be superior to the others in its perceptive powers, and see how the phenomena of vision have been explained by those who deny an immediate knowledge of the distant.

It will be admitted, on all hands, that we know objects by

vision only as they are colored.* What is color, then? If we turn to the philosophers, they will tell us that it is a sensation. "Color, in itself, as apprehended or immediately known by us, is a mere affection of the sentient organism; and therefore, like the other secondary qualities, an object not of perception, but of sensation, proper. (Hamilton's ed. of Reid's Works, p. 885.) That in bodies which is the cause of the sensation is occult, unknown. Light, reflected from an object, falling upon the retina of the eye, produces sensations in it. These sensations, being recognised as out of each other, become the condition of the perception of that portion of the *sensorium* of which they are the affections. This is the sum total of the immediate or direct cognition. Afterwards, we learn by "*observation and experiment*," that these sensations, recognised as out of each other, imply the extension of external objects to which belong the occult quality which is their cause. Now the simple point to be determined is, *whether color is a sensation in any sense consistent with natural realism.*

We have already had under discussion the teachings of those who deny to the mind any direct knowledge of the external world. All these philosophers interpolate a *tertium quid* between the mind and the external object, which, rising into consciousness, enables the mind to form a notion of the object. Some of these philosophers call the *tertium quid* an "idea;" others call it an "*impression*." Reid, in his effort to distinguish his doctrine from a grosser form of hypothetical realism, called the *tertium quid* a "*sensation*." Many eminent hypothetical realists have used the term in the same way. Not to mention others, Dr. W. B. Carpenter, in his recent work on Mental Physiology, defines sensation to be "that primary change in the conscious ego, which results from some change in the non-ego, or external world—this last term including the bodily organism itself." Color, in this sense, being a *tertium quid* through and by means of which the mind gets an indirect knowledge of external objects, stands on a level with all other "ideas," "impressions," or "sensations,"

* It will be borne in mind, that in the psychological sense of the term, color embraces not only the prismatic hues, but also all modifications of light and shade.

which give us a mediate knowledge of the external world. This being true, no natural realist can regard color as, in this sense, a sensation.

That misuse of the term which would make it convertible with an *unfelt* physical modification of the organism, is sanctioned by no psychologist of whom we have any knowledge. And if it were, a sufficient answer to any one who would apply it here would be, that such a sensation is just as "occult" in the organ of vision, as its cause in the external object. It differs only accidentally from color in the distant object. So that the physical modification of a leaf, which is the cause of the physical modification in the organ of vision, might just as properly be called a sensation.

The only other possible sense in which color may be called a sensation is that already mentioned—a feeling localised in the sentient organism. The only point remaining to be settled can be settled only by an appeal to experience. We venture to assert confidently that *no one, under normal conditions, ever recognises color as a feeling localised in the eye.* It is freely admitted that a very bright color, seen by a very powerful light, produces a feeling in the eye. The physical agitation of the organ is, under these circumstances, violent enough to make itself *felt*; but it is never felt as *color*. It is felt as *pain*; and the pain may be so great as to destroy the perception of the color altogether. Under normal conditions, that is, when the organ is sound and the light not too intense, there is no sensation whatever connected with vision, unless we lug in the purely muscular sensations attendant upon the movement of the balls in their sockets, and the adjustment of the lenses. If, then, there be no sensation connected with normal vision, is there anything which we are conscious of cognising directly, or can become conscious of so cognising, as between our minds and the distant object? It is admitted universally by those who have an adequate acquaintance with the subject, that the inverted images upon the retinae are not directly cognised, nor can be. There is nothing left to be cognised, so far as we can learn, except the molecular motion of the retina, the optic nerve, and the optic ganglia. But this

molecular motion is itself hypothetical. Its existence is *supposed* to account for phenomena which cannot otherwise be accounted for. What, then, do we know by vision? We either know nothing, or we know the distant object directly.

Let it be emphatically stated again, that there is no denial of the fact that there are physical antecedents to the act of perception by vision. Those physical antecedents cannot be dispensed with; but they do not become objects of perception. The first of the knowledge of which we have a consciousness, is that of the distant object. That is always known immediately or directly, between which and the mind there cannot, by any direct effort, be detected anything else which implies its existence—where there is no term, in the psychical series, before the cognition of an object as distant, that distant object is known immediately.

We are prepared to have some one object that knowledge is not properly called immediate in cases in which even a physical modification of the organ of sense, or other term in a physical series, stands between the mind and the object. In reply, we have only to say that there is no such thing as immediate knowledge, if all that knowledge is to be called mediate of which a physical modification stands as the *conditio sine qua non*. Not the simplest axiom can be cognised as true without a definite brain modification as its antecedent in the order of nature.* If it be admitted that the cognition of distant objects is no less immediate than that of axioms, no one shall care to debate the question further.

But it is further objected, that we are frequently deceived as to distant objects, which would not be the case if our knowledge of them were immediate.

In answer, it may be said that it has not been asserted that all the knowledge of distant objects which we ever attain is immediate. The truth is, that by far the greater part consists of acquired perceptions. These acquired perceptions are very numerous, and result from a facility, arising from constant practice, of

* This statement will be understood as applying only to our present estate. To infer from this fact that in no estate can the mind think without physical concomitants, is logic which we do not endorse.

adding to the product of direct perception by one sense, that which, by the simultaneous use of our other senses on other occasions, we have found uniformly associated with that product. We take what we immediately perceive as the sign of much more which we have known to be associated with it on previous occasions. This is the secret of the illusion produced by spectroscopic views. Distance, size, shape, are all referable to this head.

But it must be admitted that there are spectral illusions which occur under such circumstances that it can be demonstrated that there are no corresponding external objects whatever. These may be divided into two classes. First are those in connection with which there are no modifications whatever of the retina or optic nerve. Sir John Herschel, in one of his "Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects," gives an excellent illustration of this class of illusions. He tells us that "he was subject to the involuntary occurrence of visual impressions into which geometrical regularity of form entered as the leading character." Dr. Carpenter attributes this appearance to "impressions conveyed down to the sensorium from the cerebrum," just as it is the case with our dreaming that we behold visible objects. These spectral illusions, of which examples might be multiplied, differ only accidentally from dreams. They are therefore not instances of perception at all, and are not to the point in this discussion.

The second class of spectral illusions are those corresponding to which there is no external object, but which arise when the organ of vision is modified artificially or abnormally. An illusive perception of light may be produced by an electric current, or by mechanical pressure on the ball, or by a diseased condition of the organ. Now, it is contended that if the perception of objects external to us were immediate, it would be impossible to impose upon the mind these *bogus* flashes of light as though they were objective realities. In other words, so far as we are capable of immediate knowledge, we are not capable of deception. With reference, then, to whatsoever class of objects we are capable of being deceived, we have no immediate knowledge. But let us see what is the result of an abnormal modification of the cerebrum

corresponding to the abnormal modification of the organ of vision which we have just been considering. The madman, by reason of a derangement of his cerebral functions, mistakes for intuitive principles propositions absolutely false. If, now, the fact that we are deceived as to distant objects, by reason of an abnormal physical modification of the organ of vision, proves that we have no immediate perception of distant objects, under normal conditions, then the fact that, by reason of an abnormal modification of the cerebrum, the madman is deceived as to intuitive principles, should prove that we have no immediate cognition of such principles. But since no one is willing to admit the force of the latter argument, no one should allow any force in the former.

There is a fundamental error which underlies all such objections as these we have been considering. It is the assumption that immediate knowledge is convertible with absolute certainty. It confounds knowledge obtained by no process of which we can become conscious, with knowledge connected with the acquisition of which there are no adjuncts which may introduce error. But let it be understood and admitted, as truth demands that it should, that we have no knowledge whatever, in this present estate, which is not dependent for its validity upon the normal exercise of the cerebral functions. There needs nothing more than an interference with these functions to destroy utterly the validity of that which we may still rest upon implicitly. If any one is disposed to quarrel with such a representation, he quarrels not with the present writer, but with science and the facts which it arranges and interprets.

ARTICLE VI.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1874.

The last General Assembly met at Columbus, Miss. Many of the members, especially from the more northern Synods, felt that the place was too far south, or the time too late in the season, as the weather was intensely hot. But the meeting occurred in the midst of a protracted drought, and the discomfort was increased by the disproportion between the size of the body and the building in which all its business was transacted. There was no straitness, however, in the hospitality of this small but beautiful city, whose cultivated people seemed to throw widely open both their hearts and their elegant homes to the members of the Assembly, both regular and lobby—and yet we think it was the prevalent opinion that these meetings ought to be held in our large, if not our central cities.

ORGANIZATION.

The attendance was large and prompt. There were 66 ministerial commissioners present, and 56 ruling elders. A full representation would have embraced 70 of each class. Only two Presbyteries were entirely unrepresented, and both of these lie in the Foreign field. This fact shows that there is life in our Church, and that the blood circulates throughout our whole system.

The opening sermon by the Moderator, Dr. Henry M. Smith, on Isaiah xliii. 12, was able and appropriate, exhibiting the Church as a witness bearer.

In the process of organisation we were made to feel a delightful sense of growing strength in the accession of all the Presbyteries constituting the Old School Synod of Missouri. Their reception was a thrilling scene. The faces of these commissioners were new to many of us; but we knew their names and their noble history, and we recognised them as full-blooded kinsmen in the faith and in the testimony we have been called to bear for our King and his truth. And the pleasure of this reception was not

a little enhanced by the reflection that while we had long loved them, and longed for them, we had not sought them, nor *manœuvred* to bring them in. We felt assured, that though slow in coming—slow from the best of motives on their part—they came at their own motion, and with warm hearts for God and his truth. We could well understand why their honored spokesman, Dr. Yantis, found himself for once unable to speak, when called on to answer the welcoming address of the Moderator. The occasion had in it emotions too profound for words, as well as too much reality for dramatic acting. From that moment no one would have suspected that they had not always been of us.

Missouri was honored by the election of Dr. Farris to the position of Temporary Clerk, and subsequently by the choice of St. Louis as the place for the next meeting, all other nominations giving way at once to this.

There were three nominations for the Moderatorship. Rev. J. L. Girardeau, D. D., of Charleston, was chosen on the second ballot. We note it as rather unusual and unnecessary, that the lowest name on the first ballot was dropped before the second vote was taken. Such an expedient is generally reserved for a dead lock in an election. It was too hastily employed in this instance. Dr. G. was elected against his own protest. He was certainly the most modest Moderator we ever saw in the chair—but he made an admirable presiding officer. If he failed to rule with dogmatic self-assertion, which some regard as the prime qualification for such an office, he more than made up for it by the clearness with which he stated the grounds of his decisions, and the fairness, the courtesy, and the Christian urbanity with which he treated all the members. His responses to corresponding delegates could not be excelled. He carried out faithfully a rule by which every commissioner is made a working member—placing each one on some committee—at the same time securing in each committee the requisite amount of experienced ability. The only thing needed for the complete success of this part of the organisation, was *time to work*. We were surprised to find even some of the older members ignoring this necessity, by constantly opposing motions for recess and adjournment, and striving to keep the

whole Assembly almost constantly in session. It is the verdict of experience in all deliberative proceedings, that the safest and most satisfactory results are reached in the committee-room; and that the surest way to dispatch business is to give ample time to these small bodies of selected men to consider, calmly and freely, in private, the matters for which they are made specially responsible, and to mature them as thoroughly as possible before submitting them for general consideration. As it was, the members of the committees of the late Assembly, feeling (and justly, too,) that they could not absent themselves from the public sessions of the body, were forced to meet at inconvenient and unfavorable times, and to protract their labors far into the night, and yet were unduly hurried in their conferences, so that at last they became objects of public sympathy.

The organisation was completed by the creation of the Presbytery of Hangchow, in China, and the admission, by courtesy, of Rev. J. L. Stuart, a member of it, and then present, to a seat in the body. This act produced a temporary uneasiness in the minds of some, who feared lest it might be construed as sanctioning a fearfully bad precedent found in the history of a certain General Assembly. But when it was considered that this Presbytery was formed of missionary material in a foreign land; that all our missionaries and their churches have been placed under the control of the General Assembly; that a Synod cannot erect a Presbytery outside of its own bounds, and there being no Synod of our Church in China; and that this is therefore a peculiar and extraordinary case, and could not be pleaded as a precedent in the establishment or dissolution of Presbyteries within our territorial limits, that uneasiness was entirely removed.

SUSTENTATION.

The eighth Annual Report of Sustentation was presented by Rev. R. McIlwaine, the coördinate Secretary. It contains special mention of the liberal assistance given by the Southern Aid Society in New York, to the amount of \$5,525 during the year. The receipts from other sources amount to \$25,249.05; and yet the contributions from our churches were less than the

previous year, by \$4,577.15. There was, however, an increase of \$4,020.05 in the contributions to the Evangelistic Fund—raising that fund to \$6,691.41. They repeat the sad story of a year ago, that less than half our churches contribute to Sustentation. The report urges the faithful and systematic visitation of the churches by Presbyterial Commissions, as already recommended by the Assembly, and also insists upon the full coöperation of *all the Presbyteries* in the work of the Assembly's Committee. Where the general and the local claim are placed side by side, the former invariably suffers.

There has been progress in ministerial support. In 12 Presbyteries there has been an increase in pastoral support; in 4 a decrease. Of salaries under \$600, there are 21 fewer than last year; of those between \$600 and 800, there is an increase of 15. "The whole number reported as receiving under \$800 in this year, 220, against 226 last year." While this statement is encouraging, it shows the need for persistent effort to raise all the salaries to the Assembly's minimum. The report urges a strict construction of by-law 3, which discourages appropriations to ministers engaged in secular business, and also of that portion of the same by-law which is called the *five year rule*. 180 ministers in 46 Presbyteries have received appropriations during the year, and 35 church buildings have been aided to the amount of \$4,742.50. Five hundred dollars have been paid for work specially devoted to the colored people.

There have been 24 *evangelists* employed during the year. 23 Presbyteries coöperated with the Assembly's Committee in this work. 382 churches have contributed, being an increase of 234 over last year. The report strongly urges the importance of evangelistic labor to the progress of the Church.

The *Invalid Fund* has received \$9,171.99, (an increase of \$1,076.37 over the year before,) from 530 churches, (171 more than gave last year.) \$8,380 have been paid to 16 aged and infirm ministers and 66 families of deceased ministers.

The *Relief Fund* shows only 88 names, of which only 22 are the names of churches. It is hoped that the modifications of this

scheme, adopted by the Assembly, will secure the confidence of the whole Church, and be made efficient by general coöperation.

There was but little discussion of this report, in part for want of time and in part from an indisposition to disturb plans which have not yet been fully tested. The following was the action of the Assembly :

1. The Assembly records its profound sorrow that there does not appear evidence of that increase in the contributions of our churches to the vital enterprise of Sustentation demanded by the repeated and earnest recommendations of this highest court of the Church, the necessities of our feeble churches, the insufficient compensation of our ministers, and the increased membership of our whole communion.

2. To the Southern Aid Society of New York, this Assembly tenders the expression of its grateful acknowledgments for its very timely and generous donation of \$5,525 for disbursement by our Executive Committee of Sustentation, for the object already named, and the Co-ordinate Secretary is hereby directed to communicate this action to that Society.

3. The evident religious discretion and impartiality of the Executive Committee, call for the commendation of this Assembly, and entitle that Committee to the full confidence of all our subordinate courts, ministers, and people.

4. The Assembly labor under the painful conviction that the continued, and, in some cases, increasing pecuniary weakness of many of our churches, aid to which, under the "five year rule," (By-Law No. 3,) must soon be materially diminished, and finally withdrawn, will result in disastrous consequences to such churches, their faithful members, and their families. In this view is found an additional and potent consideration to quicken the efforts of our subordinate courts, ministers and people, in providing for supporting able evangelists. For as the "five year rule" may not be set aside without endangering the whole interests involved in the Sustentation scheme, the only relief for the feeble churches is to be found in the provision of evangelist, to whose care and ministration they may be ultimately committed. And it should be felt by all concerned to be a most tender trust, and a most solemn duty to supply *all* our people, however feeble their ecclesiastical organisations, and however isolated, as to church relations, their homes with some of the "ordinary means of grace."

5. Highly gratified as the Assembly feels in the increased contributions to the Invalid Fund, and the increase of subscribers to the Relief Fund, both of which enterprises appeal to the confidence of our judgments, and the sympathies of our hearts with which the needy among our ministers and their bereaved families are regarded, the Assembly re-

iterates the earnest commendations of its predecessors in respect to both enterprises.

6. The Executive Committee of Sustentation is hereby authorized and directed to prescribe an additional condition on which ministers may become subscribers to the Relief Fund, viz.: "Whenever any minister, for himself, or any church, or other party for him, proposes to subscribe to this fund, there must be furnished to the Committee satisfactory evidence that such a minister enjoys ordinary good health."

7. To the overture of the Presbytery of Macon, the Assembly replies: (1) Rule 4th By-Laws of Committee of Sustentation applies solely to the funds contributed for evangelistic purposes. (2) All such funds (for evangelistic purposes) made within the bounds of any Presbytery cooperating with the Assembly's Executive Committee of Sustentation, must, by Rule 4th, (By-Laws Executive Committee,) be sent to that Committee. (3) The Assembly cannot recognise any "church," or "group of churches," of any Presbytery, refusing or neglecting to cooperate with the evangelistic department of the Executive Committee of Sustentation, as entitled to aid from that Committee.

FOREIGN MISSIONS.

The thirteenth Annual Report of Foreign Missions was presented by Dr. J. Leighton Wilson, the Secretary. Ten new missionaries have been sent out. Two new missions have been established; one in Northern Mexico and one in Greece. Our whole force consists of 21 ordained ministers, of whom 5 are natives of the countries in which they labor; 24 assistant missionaries from this country, and 14 native helpers; in all, 59.

The report gives a detailed account of the progress and present condition of the various missions, viz.: the Cherokee, Creek and Choctaw, natives; Northern Mexico, United States of Colombia, Northern Brazil, Southern Brazil, Italy, Greece, and China; and shows that they are all in a hopeful condition. Progress is the watchword of the Committee. God's providence has opened new fields, and his grace has prompted the offer of laborers. They have been constrained to go forward. To have failed to send out the ten recruits furnished during the past year, would have dampened the ardor of all those in the field, dispirited the Church, and displeased the Master. When the report tells us that 'there is an urgent and imperative necessity for sending out the present

year at least ten more laborers, to reinforce the different missions," and that they are receiving constantly the offer of Christian men and women to give their lives and services to the work, we are left in no doubt as to the duty of the Church, and feel that the call for an increase of contributions, over last year, of \$10,000 or \$12,000, must meet with a ready and even grateful response from all our people. It is a sad fact, that the contributions of the churches last year, have not kept pace with the growing demand. Two hundred indeed have been added to the number of contributing churches, but the contributions from the Sabbath-schools decreased \$820.51.

The action of the Assembly upon this report was in full accord with its appeal, and we hope will be found to express the views of the great body of our people. The subject only needs to be fairly presented to the hearts of our church-members, to enlist their sympathy and prayers, and to secure from every one at least a small contribution. If a collection were taken up in each of our churches, the Committee would not need to ask for more funds. The following are the resolutions of the Assembly.

Resolved, 1. That the signally successful issue of the operations of the Committee during the last ecclesiastical year, as attested by the continued lives and health of our missionaries, by the enlargement of the sphere of our work—by the spirit of consecration which has been largely baptizing our youth of both sexes—by the cases of hopeful conversion which have occurred at our mission stations—by the multiplication of Christian schools and the remarkable favor with which they have been regarded by the populations among whom they have been established—and especially by the fact that with a corps of fifty-nine laborers, the Committee close a year of extraordinary financial embarrassment without a dollar of debt, indeed with a balance of over \$2,000 on hand. Such an issue, constituting as it surely does, a complete and marvellous success, creates an occasion for unusual gratitude to the God of all grace, and may safely be interpreted as a special benediction from the Head of the Church upon the humble endeavors of his servants to make his kingdom co-extensive with the world.

2. That the Church has abundant reason to be satisfied with the judicious and economical administration of the Executive Committee, and with the fidelity and discretion of its missionaries. Through the blessing of God upon the labors of its officers, a great success has been achieved. It is necessary, however, at this point, to remind the Church

that its very success becomes a ground for apprehension and peril. In this work the horizon widens as we advance. Each new laborer who enters the field creates a necessity for the presence of another. Missions, as they are established, require continually to be reinforced. The ten recruits who were sent abroad last year, have only made it apparent that at least ten more will be required to follow them the present year. "There has scarcely been a letter received at the office for the last six months"—the Secretaries state—"that has not called for help." "For the want of such help," they add, "some of our missionary brethren are bearing up under burdens that cannot be much longer borne. If they should be crushed before the needed help arrives, then some of those missions which have been so auspiciously begun, and which bear such strong marks of the Saviour's approval, may have to be given up altogether." The very prosperity of the enterprise, it may thus easily be seen, makes its condition eminently critical. Its salvation consists in a vigorous prosecution of it. It is impossible for the Church to pause, or recede. As the report of the Executive Committee almost pathetically states the case—"the great Head of the Church, by his Spirit and providence, commands us to go forward; the heathen are saying to us, through our own representatives among them, "come over and help us;" our young men and our young women are saying, "here are we, send us;" and now the only question to be settled is, can the churches be relied upon to furnish the necessary means? To this question shall we, dare we, say no? The Assembly therefore earnestly and solemnly advertises the Church of the exigency in which this holy cause is involved, and implores the congregations and individuals under its jurisdiction, to rally to its rescue, and by an increased devotion of heart and treasure, to lift it, year by year, to higher stages of success. The humiliating confession recorded in the Committee's report, "the contributions to this cause have never yet amounted to an average per member of half a dollar," should never again be written.

3. That the valuable results which have followed the circulation of the monthly periodical, *The Missionary*, in quickening the interest and augmenting the liberality of our congregations in reference to this cause, demonstrate the necessity of extending that circulation; and the sessions of our churches are urged to make it a special object to introduce it into every family.

4. That there is gratifying evidence of an increased observance of the Monthly Concert; and in the confidence that in proportion as the missionary is prayed for, he will be loved and supported, the churches under our care are exhorted to maintain heartily this important institution.

5. That the Assembly appreciates the force of the scruples which have deterred the Executive Committee from embarking in the attempt to found a mission among the Jewish race; and while cherishing the hope

that the way may ultimately be opened for our Church to take part in the effort to restore "the lost sheep of the house of Israel" to the Shepherd's fold, yet, in the absence of a clear call at the present time to engage in that effort, would limit its agency to the dissemination of such information, through the columns of *The Missionary*, or otherwise, as may educate the mind of our people to a proper apprehension of the claims of that work.

6. That the view of the complex relations of our missionaries, as being partly under the control of their Presbyteries and partly under that of the Assembly, through its Executive Committee of Foreign Missions, as that view is presented in the leading paper of *The Missionary*, for May, 1874, meets with the approval of the Assembly, as indicating the only policy possible in the anomalous circumstances in which the foreign missionary is placed.

7. That the Committee of Foreign Missions for the following year be constituted as follows: Rev. J. Leighton Wilson, D. D., Secretary; Rev. Richard McIlwaine, co-ordinate Secretary and Treasurer; Rev. George Howe, D. D., Rev. Joseph R. Wilson, D. D., Rev. D. McQueen, D. D., Rev. A. W. Miller, D. D., Rev. J. B. Adger, D. D., Rev. J. H. Bryson, Gen. F. W. McMaster, J. M. Davies, Esq., and J. Adger Smythe.

PUBLICATION.

The Annual Report of Publication was presented by Dr. E. T. Baird, the Corresponding Secretary. The report of the Standing Committee on this subject embodies so fully the history of this agency during the year, and presents so clearly what is now the verdict of the Church in regard to the charter, the purchase of the new building, investment in stereotype plates, etc., that it will be sufficient to republish that paper, which was adopted almost without discussion. The very full presentation of the leading points in the newspapers of the Church, seems to have satisfied the minds of all.

The Committee to whom was referred the Annual Report of the Executive Committee of Publication, report to the General Assembly as follows:

1. The work of the Committee during the year has been prosecuted by the Secretary and others with ability, fidelity, and prudence.

2. The business of the Committee experienced the effects of the great financial derangement of the country, felt by all other kinds of business, but without permanent damage, the net profit of the year being \$3,683.70, and the increase of business assets (including this profit and \$1,527.33

added by the churches to the endowment,) being \$5,211.03. The sales during the year were \$32,082.64. Donations from the churches and other sources for general purposes, \$7,552.59, and for the Publishing House, \$9,235.97. Grants of books and tracts by the Committee, \$5,751.98. The amount of business assets is now \$46,917, and of the business capital or Endowment Fund, \$38,668.69; of which, however, more than 21,000 is in permanent stock, including stereotyped plates and store fixtures, leaving a little over \$17,000 for the ordinary business.

3. The Committee's issues from the press during the year were: Bound Volumes, 20,250; Tract Volumes, 20,000; Catechisms, 52,500; Psalms and Hymns, 7,500; Tracts, pages, 1,400,000; Envelopes, 450,000; Circulars, 55,700; Tickets for Sabbath-schools, 1,000,000; Choctaw Hymn-Books, 2,000; Choctaw Spelling-Books, 2,000; Choctaw Catechisms, 2,000; Class-Books, 1,000; *Children's Friend*, semi-monthly edition, 24,500; monthly edition, 3,500; *Earnest Worker*, 3,400, weekly; Lesson Papers, 7,000, weekly. Two new works of special value were brought out during the year, "The Spiritual Kingdom," by Dr. Ramsey, and the "Book of Hymns and Tunes." The latter your Committee believe to be a book of unusual excellence, meeting a conscious want of the Church. The Executive Committee also acknowledge the presentation, by Dr. Stuart Robinson, of the stereotyped plates of his work, "Discourses of Redemption;" and by Dr. Grasty of his "Memoir of Rev. Dr. Samuel B. McPheeters."

4. The work of colportage, which has been committed by the Assembly wholly to the Presbyteries, has been successfully conducted by a number of the Presbyteries, and other Presbyteries have resolved to begin it; but the number of these Presbyteries is small, relatively, to those that have done nothing in this work.

5. The Executive Committee, acting under authority conferred by the last Assembly, having obtained a charter from the Legislature of Virginia, have organised as a Board of Trustees, and accepted the charter; thus making it secure so far as it may be judged proper by the Assembly to use it; but have not yet placed the property of which it has charge in the legal custody of the corporation; continuing to hold the property and to do its business as heretofore, and awaiting final instructions from this Assembly. Your Committee is of opinion that this measure has been wisely taken, to remove great inconvenience in the transaction of the business of the Committee, to enable the Committee to receive devises or bequests in Virginia, and to prevent failures of devises or bequests which might occur without the incorporation of the Committee. We judge that there is no reasonable ground for apprehension of the corporation becoming independent of the Assembly, as members of the corporation must be members of the Assembly's Executive Committee, who are appointed and removable by the Assembly. We are further of

opinion, after careful consideration, and using the most satisfactory sources of information, that the charter obtained is valid, and that there is not the shadow of a ground for distrust or question of the safety to the Church of all the property that may be covered by it.

6. Your Committee regard with some solicitude the incumbrance of the Publishing House, purchased under instructions by the last Assembly, with a debt of about \$35,000; believing it to be unwise, ordinarily, as a principle of business, for an enterprise to incur a debt of such large proportion to its means, and in considerable part for investment and income apart from its business. The largeness of the debt the Executive Committee ascribe, we think justly, to the extraordinary financial crisis during the latter part of last year, and to the great inclemency over nearly all the South, of the day appointed by the Assembly for a special collection for the building—which had the effect of thinning the congregation, causing the collections to fall short of the reasonable expectations of the Committee and of the Assembly. While we think there is some ground for solicitude, and the purchase, if now a question before the Assembly, with such an insufficient response from the churches, from any cause, it might be judged ought not to be made; yet, in the circumstances, the reasons for endeavoring to hold the property appear to us conclusive. The time is not distant, we trust, when, with a continued increase of the business, the whole of the property will be required for the business, and none of it be continued as an investment for income. The response of the last year, we believe, is not to be taken as the judgment of the Church that this important branch of its work is not to be advanced to proportions corresponding to this purchase; and with renewed recommendation by this Assembly, our people, we think, will respond liberally with means for completing the purchase, or diminishing the debt.

7. Your Committee have had under consideration measures to be suggested to the Assembly for the relief of the Secretary, Dr. Baird, from some of his increasing and oppressive labors, under which, we have learned with regret, his health has begun to suffer. If it shall be the pleasure of the Assembly to appoint another Secretary for the Committee of Education, and release Dr. Baird from the duties of that office, as recommended by another Committee, nothing further, probably, will be required. Should the Assembly, however, judge that Dr. Baird cannot be spared from that work, we recommend that the Assembly direct the Executive Committee of Publication to furnish him such assistance as will give him the required relief.

Touching matters referred by the Executive Committee to the Assembly for instruction, and others requiring an expression from the Assembly, your Committee recommend the adoption of the following:

1. The General Assembly approves the organisation of the Executive Committee under the Act of incorporation obtained from the General

Assembly of the State of Virginia, and orders the Committee to put the property of which it has charge in the legal custody of the corporation.

2. The Assembly recommends to all the churches to make collections for the Publishing House Fund on the first Sabbath of December next, and especially commends this important enterprise to the liberality of persons of means.

3. The Assembly advises the Executive Committee to make no further investment in stereotyped plates, except books demanded by Church necessities, or known to be of great demand.

4. The Executive Committee are authorised to make such arrangements as may appear best to them, with Rev. A. J. Witherspoon, of New Orleans, for the sale of their publications and the collection of funds, provided the expenses of his labor shall not exceed the amount of profits upon sales of publications made by him.

5. The General Assembly earnestly urges upon all the Presbyteries the work of colportage; it commends the books of the Committee to the churches and the people; and especially recommends to pastors and sessions, for Sabbath-schools, the books of the Committee suitable for Sabbath-school libraries, and the papers of the Committee, the *Children's Friend*, and the *Earnest Worker*.

6. The Assembly specially call attention to the new "Book of Hymns and Tunes," and recommends its use in all our churches and families.

7. The following persons shall constitute the Executive Committee of Publication for the ensuing year: Rev. E. T. Baird, D. D., Secretary; Charles Gennet, Treasurer; Revs. M. D. Hoge, D. D., Wm. Brown, D. D., Charles H. Read, D. D., T. L. Preston, D. D., W. A. Campbell, and ruling elders Hon. W. F. Taylor, E. H. Fitzhugh, B. R. Welford, and Robert Ould.

EDUCATION.

Dr. Baird also presented the 13th Annual Report of the Committee of Education. The paper presented by the Standing Committee and adopted by the Assembly is as follows:

The Committee to whom was referred the thirteenth Annual Report of the Committee on Education, have had the same under careful consideration, and beg leave to offer the following report:

The Secretary states that since the organisation of the Committee there has been no year of its history which has been attended with so many circumstances to cause anxiety and produce painful mortification. The year commenced with a deficiency of \$2,900. The Assembly at Little Rock appointed a special collection in June, and circulars were issued accordingly, but little attention was paid to them. The consequence was that a number of students became discouraged, and determined not

to return to the College or Seminary, but to engage in some business by which to make money, to resume their studies without embarrassment. Fewer students consequently have sought aid from the Committee during the past year than on some previous occasions. The number varies but little from the number aided last year. On account of the financial stress, the regular collection in November was very small, aggregating less than \$2,000. This amount was supplemented by the Secretary issuing a brief circular, calling the attention of the churches to the appalling result. Some money began to flow into the treasury, and the Committee were able to pay at about the usual times the first and second instalments of the appropriations to the students. But with that the flow of the money into the treasury ceased. Again the Secretary issued a circular to the pastors to bring the subject before the Church during the week of prayer. This brought temporary relief, but not enough to meet all the requirements of the case.

Several facts require the attention of the Assembly: 1st. There was a deficiency last year of \$2,900. 2d. A number of students have left the Seminary or College, and resorted to secular business to support themselves. 3d. A collection was taken in June and one in November, and additional appeals made through circulars subsequent to the November collection, and again during the week of prayer. In the language of the report, "The Committee, through circulars issued by the Secretary, has exhausted its ability to urge this matter on the attention of the churches." The fourth fact to which we would call the attention of the Assembly is, that after all these urgent appeals, there is a deficiency of \$4,000.

These are painful facts, and the Executive Committee calls the special attention of the General Assembly to them, that it may devise such measures as the exigency of the case demands. While your Committee feel at a loss to know what remedy to apply, or what system to recommend, one thing seems clear to us, viz.: that the present plan of simply issuing circulars will not accomplish the end desired. It will never do for the Church to go in debt or fall behind. And it will never do for those who are willing to preach the gospel to be diverted therefrom for the want of assistance in their preparatory course. We think also that the practice of making special appeals to the churches is calculated to prejudice them against the cause so frequently brought before them. In our judgment one collection a year for each of the great causes of our Church, is all that ought to be taken. The Secretary and the Executive Committee have faithfully done all that they could do, through appeals and special collections, and yet the result is not adequate to the wants of our candidates. The Secretary further states that the calls upon your treasury will probably be larger during the ensuing year than the past. In view of the whole case, two courses are open to the Assembly, viz.:

- (1). To abolish the Committee of Education altogether, and throw the

support of the candidates upon the Presbyteries; or, (2d). To separate the causes of Education and Publication, elect an additional Secretary, and locate him at some central point in the West.

In conclusion, we would recommend to the Assembly for its adoption the following:

1. That we have examined the Minutes of the Executive Committee, and recommend that they be approved.

2. Presbyteries are urged to require of each candidate a semi-annual report to Presbytery of all funds received by him from the Assembly's Committee, or from church collections; and to request the Professors of the institutions in which their candidates are pursuing their studies, sessional reports of their character, diligence, and proficiency in their studies.

3. The General Assembly would call the attention of all the Presbyteries to the noble example of Bethel Presbytery, S. C., in raising \$1,600 during the past year, for the support of its six candidates for the ministry.

4. That the Executive Committee of Education shall be located at some central point in the great Western field; and it shall be the duty of the Secretary, in addition to visiting the Presbyteries and Synods for the purpose of raising funds, to act as a medium of communication between our candidates and the Presbyteries, for the purpose of securing prompt and remunerative employment for our candidates during their vacations. We know of no man more efficient and suitable for this work than the present Secretary, and we would be glad to see his great energies, experience, and wisdom fully engaged in this *pre-eminently important* work of beneficiary education. With the deficiency that is now upon us, we will need, during the coming year, from \$25,000 to \$30,000.

5. The Presbyteries are urged to impress upon the chairman of their Educational Committee the necessities of this cause, and instruct them to inquire of each church, once a year, whether a collection for this cause has been taken, and if not, to give a reason for the neglect.

6. That the Concert of Prayer on the last Thursday in February, be observed by all our people for the outpouring of the Holy Spirit on the youth of our churches, and all our institutions of learning, and for God's blessing on this cause.

[After it had been determined to remove the Committee to Memphis, the following was adopted:]

7. That the following persons be elected the Executive Committee of Education for the ensuing year: Rev. John N. Waddel, D. D., Secretary; James Elder, Treasurer; J. O. Stedman, D. D., Rev. W. E. Boggs, Rev. E. M. Richardson, Rev. A. Shotwell, M. P. Jarnagin, B. M. Estes, J. B. Griffing, W. W. Armstrong, A. C. Ewell.

8. That all books and papers be transferred from the former Executive Committee to the Committee here appointed.

The discussion turned mainly on the proposition to separate the agency for Education from that for Publication. All felt that something must be done to revive the interest of our churches in the education of candidates for the ministry; some doubted whether a change of locality, even, with the undivided time and strength of a Secretary for this object, would accomplish the end; but all agreed to make the experiment, the former Secretary and other members of the Committee heartily concurring. *Memphis* was chosen as the place, and *Rev. J. N. Waddel, D. D.*, Chancellor of the University of Mississippi, a man eminently qualified, by his high character as an educator, and his matured experience, was chosen Secretary, without opposition.

THE COLUMBIA SEMINARY.

The subject which occupied the largest share of the time of the Assembly, and was most earnestly discussed, was one which, we have no hesitation in saying, ought never to have crossed its threshold—a question of discipline which had arisen between the students and Faculty of the Columbia Seminary. The Assembly accepted the general control of this institution, transferred to them by the Synods of South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, in 1863. It has appointed a Board of Directors, filled vacancies in the Faculty, and given it a constitution. This constitution is explicit, and contains every provision necessary to guide both Directors and Professors in executing their trust. It certainly makes them responsible to the Assembly for the faithful discharge of their specified duties. But its very terms, as well as the acknowledged necessities of the case, plainly leave all matters of detail, such as the daily routine of instruction, the time and place of the various exercises, and the general control of the students, to the discretion of the Faculty. What institution of learning was ever attempted to be managed in any other way? When we learned, therefore, that it was proposed to bring before the General Assembly a matter of discipline involving the question whether the students were under *obligation* to attend upon a weekly religious service appointed by the Faculty, we at once

replied that such a question could not be entertained by the Assembly. The idea of such a thing was wholly new to us. Under the precedent now set, any student, not to say Professor or Director, could agitate each successive Assembly, by throwing into its proceedings any imagined grievance, by calling it oppressive or tyrannical, and thus annoy this body and consume its precious time, to the injury of important interests, even by petty personal complaints. If the Church cannot entrust all such matters to the Faculty and Directors, they had far better not attempt to manage such an institution. It is with no disrespect that we say a General Assembly is not competent to this sort of supervision and control; not for the want of intelligence or uprightness, but because it is simply impossible to put them in full possession of all the grounds on which a Faculty acts in such cases. They are therefore left either to decide a special case on general principles or partial facts, or to be confused and perhaps warped by a thousand flying rumors. The discussion of this subject in the late Assembly is a sad, but, we think, a very conclusive proof of the correctness of our position. We admit that cases might arise of such a grave character, and vital to the success and even life of such an interest, which would compel a resort to the authority of the Assembly—and it was attempted to be shown this was one, but we think unsuccessfully. It is easy to give a factitious importance to small and non-essential points, by allying them to fundamental principles. In this case it was not proved that the constitution, nor the law of the Church, nor the law of God, nor the natural rights of conscience had been violated, either by the appointment in question, or the manner of its enforcement.

The constitution expressly provided for the appointment of Sabbath-day services in the chapel *whenever desirable*. The indefiniteness of the word *desirable* indicates the largeness of the discretion given. A hundred circumstances might enter into the consideration of such a question.

But the public discussion did not turn on the propriety of the appointment, but on the obligation of the students to attend. One would naturally think these to be correlative—and surely if the

pledge of the students to observe all the lawful regulations of the Faculty, and attend all the exercises they appoint, and the current language of all the articles of the constitution relating to the students mean anything, they mean that a solemn obligation binds them to attend all these exercises while they remain in the Seminary—that to refuse is rebellion against lawful authority, and that if they cannot conscientiously obey, they should not have entered; and if they had done so in ignorance, they should at once retire. So apparent were these views made in the discussion, that the effort to justify the students gradually lost ground, and the question became, not what *is* the law, but what *ought* the law to be? and forthwith the majority voted to change the law. As it now stands, no matter how desirable Sabbath services in the chapel may be, no student is required to attend. The law on the subject has dwindled into a mere permission to the Professors to hold the service. The students are left to their own will whether to attend or not.

We do not say that every arrangement of the Seminary should be obligatory in its character, and that no liberty of action should be allowed. But we do say that when the Church has committed the intellectual and spiritual training of her candidates for the ministry to a body of men selected and appointed for the purpose, under a constitution which requires these men to appoint and conduct both scholastic and spiritual exercises for the training of these students, it is the province of these men, the Professors, to see to it that all the students attend regularly upon all these exercises. No one pretends that recitations and attendance upon lectures should be optional. The Faculty are just as responsible for such devotional exercises as they see necessary and profitable, as they are for teaching Hebrew or Church History. All agree that spiritual is more essential than intellectual training. The constitution devolves the latter upon the Faculty no less than the former. They are the proper persons to provide it, or they are unfit for their office, no matter how great their learning. The experience of Seminary life shows that theological students need it as much as the average of church members. It is mere sentimentality, or else it is flattery, that places them

above this need ; and it is not a considerate love for them which would leave this part of their training to their own judgment and will. The Faculty at Columbia profess to have based their course, in requiring the attendance of the students at the chapel on Sabbath morning precisely on this ground. We are bound to believe them. Certainly we will not admit that they were guilty of "an unwarrantable and outrageous assumption of authority." They simply used the discretion given them in carrying out the requirements of the constitution. And they could not be even constructively condemned, without changing the constitution.

The serious part of the matter is, that they were condemned in this very way. Whatever may have been the intention of the majority, the Assembly did, in effect, sustain the students and condemn the Faculty ; they sustained one Professor and condemned the other four ; they sustained one member of the Board of Directors, and condemned all the rest. The effort to prevent such a construction will not avail. The Church and the world will persist in this construction. The friends of law and order all over the country are mourning over this action, as giving countenance to the spirit of insubordination and of disrespect to authority, which is so rife in our day, and which threatens all we hold dear. And very many friends of our beloved Seminary are weeping over it as dealing a well-nigh fatal blow to that cherished institution.

The Assembly had refused to remand the students to the pastoral care and control of the Faculty, and adopted the following resolutions, offered by Col. Collier :

Resolved, 1. That the General Assembly hereby express its entire confidence in the Faculty of Columbia Seminary.

2. That the General Assembly respectfully recommends to the Faculty, that in the event services in the chapel on the Sabbath be deemed desirable, the attendance on said services, on the part of Faculty and students, be voluntary.

The first of these resolutions was adopted unanimously. On the second the vote stood, ayes 64 ; noes, 51.

Dr. Pratt gave notice that he and others would enter protest

against the action of the Assembly, as contained in these two resolutions.

This action of the Assembly was immediately followed by the resignation of Drs. J. R. Wilson and J. B. Adger, as Professors in the Seminary.

The protest of Dr. Kirkpatrick is as follows :

The undersigned respectfully offer for record this their protest against the latter of the two resolutions which were appended, by way of amendment, to the report of the Committee on Theological Seminaries, and, by a small majority, adopted by the General Assembly. The grounds of protest are :

1. By the adoption of the resolution, the General Assembly has set an example of dangerous tendency. The difficulty in the Seminary at Columbia, which was made the occasion for the resolution, was one of discipline merely, such as came within the authority and control of the Faculty of the institution. Under the constitution and laws prescribed by the General Assembly for the government of the Seminary, they were competent to do whatever the case required. They were equally competent in respect of their moral qualifications, their intelligence, prudence, and piety ; otherwise this Assembly could not have adopted, by a unanimous vote, a resolution declaring its confidence in them. Or, if the Faculty were deficient in either of these particulars, surely the Board of Directors must be held sufficient, both in authority and wisdom, to supply such deficiency by their counsel and advice. For the General Assembly to allow itself to be invoked for the purpose of settling matters pertaining to the internal discipline—the mere police—of the Seminary, when this has been so amply provided for in the authority and duties assigned by the constitution to the Faculty and the Board, is in our view at once unnecessary and incompatible with the proper dignity of the body. Then the trouble and loss of time involved in such a task, would render it an intolerable burden on the Assembly. We appeal to the experience of the present Assembly for a confirmation of this position. This is the first occasion since the establishment of Theological Seminaries, that so disagreeable a work has been imposed on the highest Court of the Church : we fear that under the impulse and protection of the precedent now set, it will not be the last.

2. The resolution referred to, the circumstances in which it was adopted being considered, is in its practical effects subversive of the wholesome and needful discipline of the Seminary. Certain students refused to obey a regulation which the Faculty made. To our minds it is perfectly clear that the Faculty had full authority, both from their general pastoral relation to the students and from the express terms of the constitution of the Seminary, to make the regulation in question. They

deemed it advisable with a view to the spiritual welfare of the students; and such being their opinion, they were bound by their obligations to the Church and their "oath of office," to make it; and if to make it, then to enforce it by the exercise of all legitimate authority. The General Assembly has now adopted a resolution which is susceptible of an interpretation, and we believe will receive an interpretation, favorable to the students and adverse to the Faculty in the issue between the parties. It suggests to the Faculty, very respectfully and kindly indeed, but still, under the circumstances of the case, very significantly and potently, that they yield to the demand of the students in the point, and the only point, with respect to which the students had assumed an attitude of persistent disobedience. Of course such a suggestion from this body will be regarded by the Faculty as having the force of an order to them. It will be regarded by the students as a victory on their part in a contest in which their feelings were warmly enlisted. It seems to us that the certain effect of this action of the Assembly must be to weaken the authority of the Faculty, and to render the exercise of discipline in the Seminary a matter of extreme difficulty, if not of utter impossibility.

3. The ground on which the students above referred to placed the vindication of their conduct in resisting the authority of the Faculty, as appeared from letters of those students on record and laid before the Assembly, and on which their conduct has been defended, and even justified, in the discussions on the floor of this Assembly, does, in our opinion, involve a principle in ethics and in religion unscriptural, unsound, and eminently dangerous. That principle is, that one's own scruples of conscience will absolve him from the obligations of his most solemn promise, or oath, voluntarily made. These students had made and subscribed a pledge to obey the laws of the Seminary as long as they remained members of the institution. They sought to remain members of the Seminary, although confessing that they had disobeyed the regulation of the Faculty above referred to, and declaring their purpose to continue to disobey it. Their excuse for this was, that to their view the requirement of the Faculty was an invasion of the right of private judgment and of conscience. To some it might seem strange that so much room and occasion for conscientious scruples should be found in a regulation which simply required, even when most rigorously construed, that as students in a Seminary, for the training of ministers of the gospel, they should attend a Sabbath forenoon's service of public worship conducted by their own Professors, in their own chapel—attend there and then, even though this should deprive them of the privilege of attending at that particular hour the services in a church in the city, in or near which the Seminary is situated, which they had previously been accustomed and may still have preferred to attend. But passing by this, we wish merely to say that whilst freely and fully conceding that

these young brethren, respecting whom we have from the Faculty accounts in all other particulars favorable, pursued a course which at the time they thought right, they labored under a grave mistake as to the duty which an enlightened conscience would have dictated. That duty was to have promptly, quietly, and respectfully withdrawn from the Seminary when they discovered that they could not conscientiously obey a regulation made by the Faculty; not to remain there in a position of open defiance of authority, and compel the Faculty to proceed to sterner measures of discipline. We mention this not with a view of placing on record any censure of these young brethren, from whose labors in the gospel we pray and trust the Church may yet derive many benefits, but for the purpose of making plain the ground of our protest against the perverted view of the office of conscience under which they appear to have acted, which has been urged in their defence on the floor of this Assembly, and which, we fear, however little such a result is intended, has received and will receive no slight encouragement from the action of this body. That perverted view is the doctrine commonly designated as the "Higher Law." We deem it neither proper nor necessary to do more than name it.

4. Forbearing to speak of the embarrassment which this action of the Assembly will create in the Faculty and Board of the Seminary, or of the sad consequences to that beloved institution, some of which have already manifested themselves, and which we are painfully impressed with the conviction must follow from it, we add only that in nothing set forth or intimated in this protest, do we design any question or imputation of the motives of the majority of the Assembly by whom the resolution complained of was passed. We think they were mistaken in judgment; we have no doubt they were conscientious in their act.

Very respectfully submitted.

Signed by J. L. Kirkpatrick, J. Stephenson Frierson, H. T. Morton, E. M. Richardson, L. D. Stockton, George A. Hogsett, C. H. Robinson, R. L. McMurrin, T. G. Culp, J. W. Pratt, Robert L. Breck, S. J. Bingham, R. R. Spann, R. S. McAllister, T. Stringer, Joseph B. Stratton, Hillery Mosely, William Hall, George W. Ewell, A. H. Phillips, J. A. Kimmons, Joseph A. Waddell, J. H. Hill, J. T. Walsh, D. H. Bishop, B. L. Beall, A. A. Dickerson, J. Simpson Frierson, W. A. Campbell, T. C. Barrett, B. M. Smith, (Ark.) R. P. Farris, E. V. Conway, A. H. McClintic, W. K. Marshall, R. H. Watkins, Wm. Dinwiddie.

Dr. Alexander Martin was elected to fill the chair of Church History and Government.

FRATERNAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE NORTHERN GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

This subject was brought up by a communication from the Northern Assembly of last year, received after our adjournment,

proposing "closer and more fraternal relations;" and also by overtures from the Presbyteries of South Alabama and Chesapeake, looking to "such measures as shall be best adapted to promote friendly relations and fraternal correspondence."

One majority and two minority reports were submitted. The first simply recites the history of past negotiations on this subject, and proposes the appointment of a committee, without instructions, to meet a similar committee of the Northern Assembly, and to "enter fully into conference concerning the removal of those causes which have heretofore prevented fraternal relations between the two Churches;" but to prevent misapprehension on the part of our own people or others, the explicit statement is made that "an organic union with the Northern Assembly is not contemplated in this action." This report was adopted by a vote of 79 to 33, and the following committee appointed: Rev. Wm. Brown, D. D., Rev. R. P. Farris, D. D., Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D., Judge J. A. Inglis, and Hon. B. M. Estes.

A protest against this action was admitted to record, of the same tenor as one of the minority reports, which opposed the appointment of a committee, on grounds which are briefly summed up in the conclusion of the protest, as follows: "Because it (this action) contravenes the duty we owe to the precious principles which were entrusted to us to maintain and to defend; because the reasons proposed in the overture of the Northern Assembly, are not sufficient to justify any change in our relations to that body; because it tends to misrepresent the real position of our beloved Church before the world; and because it tends to promote doubt, agitation, and discord among our people." This protest is signed by 23 members of the Assembly.

The debate on this subject developed two facts: 1. That our Church is a unit against organic union with the Northern Assembly. It is not denied that there are a few sporadic exceptions—but they are so few as not to be appreciable. 2. That the real obstacle to fraternal correspondence with the Northern Assembly is not one of feeling, but one of principle. We hesitate, not because of petulance, nor an unkind, unrelenting, unforgiving spirit, but simply because we are not willing to surrender our

testimony to the great principles which gave origin to our Church as a distinct organisation, and we dare not compromise them. We have submitted to the imputation of uncharitableness and obstinacy rather than even to risk a seeming abandonment of a position which we assumed not in anger but in sorrow, and which we have maintained with the calmness of assured conviction.

But it is not becoming in us to re-open the argument of this case during the pendency of this *conference*. We shall hear from the Northern Church through their committee, and they and the entire Christian world will hear from us through our committee. Let the matter rest till then.

CORRESPONDING DELEGATES.

The Cumberland Presbyterian Church was represented by Rev. J. L. Cooper, and the Reformed Church by Rev. A. T. Stewart, D. D., who brought the cordial greetings of the bodies sending them, and gave interesting and encouraging accounts of their progress; and were responded to by the Moderator, in most appropriate terms.

COÖPERATION WITH THE REFORMED CHURCH.

The General Assembly of 1873 appointed a Committee of Conference to meet a similar committee of the Reformed Church, if such should be appointed, for the purpose of ascertaining in what manner more intimate relations may be established between the two Churches, and what ought to be the nature and extent thereof. The committee consisted of Drs. B. M. Palmer, J. R. Wilson, and Wm. Brown, Maj. T. J. Kirkpatrick, W. H. Smith, and Gen. A. M. Scales. The two committees met in New York on the 27th February, and their deliberations were marked by the prevalence of harmony and brotherly love in a most happy degree. They agreed on a plan of coöperative union, which was submitted to our recent Assembly, and as it is a document of permanent value and of general interest, we give it entire.

The General Synod of the Reformed Church in America, and the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States, in providing a plan for more intimate communion and co-operation between

these Christian denominations, judge it to be a suitable occasion for making the following declaration :

First. That the standards of doctrine in both Churches have always been recognised as orthodox expositions and noble monuments of the faith professed by the Reformed Churches to which they belong ; that is to say, for the Reformed Church, the Belgic Confession, the Articles of the Synod of Dort, and the Heidelberg Catechism ; and for the Presbyterian Church, the Confession of Faith of the Westminster Assembly, together with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms. And in forming closer relations with each other, it is with the solemn purpose of striving together, in strengthening our hands to uphold the doctrines of these venerable symbols, and in maintaining them in the plain sense in which they have been received and interpreted from the first.

Second. Should anything be found in the proceedings of either of our bodies in times past which might be regarded as inconsistent with the principle that the Church of Jesus Christ is a spiritual kingdom, and not secular or political, and that ecclesiastical courts are to handle and conclude only ecclesiastical matters, such action shall not be pleaded as a precedent in anything connected with the scheme of co-operation herein provided for.

Third. That the close agreement between the doctrinal standards of the two Churches, and the general agreement of their forms of government and rules of discipline, together with their steadfast adherence to the same, present a solid and satisfactory basis of strong mutual confidence, which confidence has been much confirmed by their recent intercourse and experience of fraternal sympathy and kindness.

Fourth. That we fully recognise it to be the duty of the followers of our Lord Jesus Christ to seek and embrace all proper means of manifesting such degree of unity in the faith of the gospel as may exist among them, and that this unity may, in our view, be effectually manifested by us in the absence of outward ecclesiastical uniformity, with which it ought never to be confounded, and which ought never to be purchased at the cost of truth.

While some considerable obstacles are found, for the present, to the formation of an organic union between these denominations, yet, cordially agreeing in the above declaration, we have good reason to believe that the way is happily opened, under the guidance of God's Holy Spirit and holy providence, for such intimate co-operative alliance as will prove comfortable and useful on both sides.

The provisions of this plan shall embrace the following particulars :

I. With a view of expressing more emphatically the unity now existing, as well as promoting it still further, instead of the former system of delegates, a delegation consisting of two ministers and two elders shall be sent annually from the General Synod to the meeting of the General Assembly,

and a similar delegation from the General Assembly to the meeting of the General Synod ; which delegations shall be expected to sit and deliberate throughout the sessions of these bodies respectively, endeavoring especially to further all those interests in which the two Churches co-operate.

II. A vacant congregation shall be at liberty to call a minister from either of the Churches, according to the order established in that Church to which he may be called, and he shall conform to the order of the Church to which he is transferred.

III. When particular churches of either body are in locations much more convenient for a connection with a Classis or Presbytery belonging to the other, it is recommended to them to seek a transfer in such a way as shall be in conformity with the regulations of both denominations ; and whenever it may be deemed advisable for students of theology of either body to pursue their studies in institutions of the other, it will be regarded with hearty approbation by both. And students who have pursued a full course of study in the Theological Seminaries of either Church, shall be placed on an equal footing before the Presbyteries and Classes of the other.

It is believed that a valuable co-operation may be secured in regard to most of those schemes of benevolence in which both Churches are engaged. As the extent to which this may be most judiciously carried can be ascertained only by careful conference and experiment, many of the details must be left for future agreement. The following is adopted as indicating what may be initiated at the present time :

(1.) In regard to *Foreign Missions*: We express the idea that it will probably most promote the glory of God that there should not be separate denominational interests permanently established, where our missions are or may be planted within reach of each other, but that the establishment of one united Church should be encouraged. It deserves to be carefully considered, whether in the whole work of Foreign Missions, a complete fusion be not advisable. It is therefore agreed that the entire subject shall be referred to the Board and Committee in the two Churches having charge of these interests, with instructions to devise plans, if deemed practicable, in accordance with these suggestions.

(2.) In regard to *Domestic Missions*, especially in the aspect of *Evangelistic Work*. It is judged expedient to refer this whole subject also to the appropriate Board and Committee of the two Churches, for their consideration, as provided for above in the matter of Foreign Missions. It may be suitable, however, to declare at this time our conviction of the great importance of this work in both Churches, and especially of that form of it which presents itself within the bounds of the General Assembly in behalf of the large and needy colored population.

(3.) In regard to *Publication*. It is agreed that each Committee or

Board shall furnish the other with its publications, and the two publishing houses shall act as depositories, each for the other, as far as practicable. But the details of this arrangement, and the commercial terms, shall be left to the Board and Committee having charge of these interests: This whole matter also is referred by the General Synod and the General Assembly to the appropriate Board and Committee, to consider whether the two Agencies may not be fused into one.

It is further agreed that the General Synod and the General Assembly shall continue these negotiations so happily begun, through a Committee of Conference appointed by each, who shall be jointly instructed to receive, by January 1st, 1875, the plans prepared by the Boards and Committees hereinbefore provided—with a view to modify as far as necessary, and harmonise them all in one comprehensive scheme of co-operative union, which scheme shall be submitted to the Synod and to the Assembly respectively, at their annual session in 1875.

The provisions of this agreement, or any parts thereof, shall be in force from the time of their adoption by both the General Synod and the General Assembly.

In concluding their labors, the joint Committees of Conference desire to place on record their grateful recognition of the divine favor, as evinced in the pervading power of heavenly love by which all the members present have manifested throughout the utmost fraternal confidence, and have conducted this Conference to a harmonious issue.

This plan was adopted by the Assembly, with the single exception of reducing the number of delegates to one minister and one ruling elder. In accordance with the plan, all matters relating to the details of coöperation were referred to the Committees of Education, Publication, Foreign Missions, and Sustentation, who are to “report as soon as practicable to this Committee of Conference hereby re-appointed;” and “the Committee are to consider and digest the information so obtained, with a view to continue the conference to such an end as shall be most to the glory of God and the interests of both denominations.” We are happy to learn that the plan has been adopted by the Synod of the Reformed Church. As this coöperative alliance has not yet assumed a definite or fixed form, it would be useless to speculate as to its practicability and value. But whatever may be the formal result of these negotiations, it is a matter for devout thankfulness that it has already brought the hearts of these two Churches

closer together, and has developed a unity of sentiment even greater than the most sanguine supposed to exist.

THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION.

An overture from the Presbytery of Augusta complained of serious defects in the present system of theological education, and asked for the appointment of a committee to make provision for certain specific changes. The Committee of Bills and Overtures reported against the expediency of such action, but after considerable discussion, the Assembly determined to appoint the committee. The Moderator placed on that committee, Rev. B. M. Smith, D. D., Rev. Geo. Howe, D. D., Rev. C. A. Stillman, D. D., Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D., Rev. Stuart Robinson, D. D., and Rev. J. L. Kirkpatrick, D. D., to report to the next Assembly.

It was urged in the discussion that this movement, though appearing in different quarters, could be traced to one source, and that therefore there was no general dissatisfaction with the present methods of theological training. But it was made apparent that this dissatisfaction has arisen with various persons, and in different parts of the Church, spontaneously, and has been growing. Attention was called also to a similar state of feeling in the Northern Church, which had led to the calling of a convention of theological teachers, who had discussed the subject under various heads. An attempt was made to suppress this movement, by the cry of "*agitation!*" But the Assembly was not deterred from taking measures to inquire carefully into all the alleged defects of the present system, and to examine candidly all the proposed changes. To affirm that no improvement can be made, is too much for conservatism itself. To refuse to inquire into the practicability of improvement, or even to admit the need for it, will not satisfy the Church. Nor do we see any danger of convulsing the Church in a carefully considered effort to make the training of our ministers more thoroughly effective and practical, which seems to be the chief demand of the times. At least agitation is better than stagnation. Sometimes good methods lose their force through age and a tendency to move in an ever-deep-

ening rut ; and some modification is needed to awaken new interest and stimulate to increased effort. If we find that there is a method by which we can train a ministry of more thorough and independent thought, of more life and activity, and capable of closer and more ready access to the people, by all means let us adopt it, if it revolutionises all our present plans, and even requires a new set of men to carry it on.

AN AFRICAN PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH.

The ecclesiastical relations of the freedmen is a subject which has for several years engaged the anxious thought of the Church. It has proved a very perplexing topic. The desire for the spiritual welfare of this people is too deeply implanted in our hearts for us to consent to give up our interest and our efforts in their behalf. But we have been embarrassed by their new position, their new views and feelings, and the influence of other parties. It was believed neither expedient nor practicable to continue them in their old ecclesiastical relations. Nor would they be satisfied with perfect equality with the whites in our congregations and church courts. Their instincts lead them to a separate organisation and separate religious services. On the other hand we feel that they are far from being prepared for such a position, and that to give them up to themselves entirely and suddenly, is to give them up to ignorance, superstition, and ruin. Hence, the mind of our Church has been oscillating between the two plans, until we see that the time has come for us to adopt some definite policy, if we are to do anything for this class.

It is remarkable that overtures came to the late Assembly from the four quarters of the Church, viz., from the Presbytery of East Hanover, and the Synods of South Carolina, Mississippi, and Memphis, all pointing in the same direction—asking the Assembly to take measures for organising the colored members of our Church into a separate body. We trust this unanimity, following years of careful consideration and discussion, indicates the finger of God pointing to the true solution of this problem. The debate in the Assembly, if debate it can be called, which involved no dispute, and issued in no division, was calm, brief, but earnest. The report

which recommended the adoption of the plan proposed, and entered somewhat into the details of that plan; was adopted unanimously, as follows :

Overture No. 8 is a paper adopted by the Synod of South Carolina in November, 1872, and which was providentially hindered from being laid before the General Assembly which met at Little Rock last year. It declares that, "in the judgment of the said Synod, the way is clear (the General Assembly concurring,) for our ministers to assist the colored people to organise themselves into Presbyterian churches, separate from our Presbyteries, with the understanding that they may look to us for religious instruction, as far as we can furnish it, until God, in his providence, shall raise up competent ministers of their own to lead them in the right way."

In view of the above, and to promote harmony of view and action in the whole Church, the Synod overtures the Assembly to reconsider the plan recommended by the Assembly in 1869. This action of Synod was reaffirmed at their next meeting.

Overture No. 9 is a memorial from the Presbytery of East Hanover, asking the Assembly "to take order, as far as practicable, for organising the colored members into a separate ecclesiastical organisation," this being, in the judgment of Presbytery, the best solution of difficulties supposed to be connected with the plan of having both races associated in a common organisation; it being also the plan which is most acceptable to the colored people themselves, and which, moreover, experience has shown to be most successful. Presbytery invites attention to a paper to be presented to this Assembly from the Synod of Mississippi, in which these views are more fully presented.

Overture No. 10 represents that, in the judgment of the Synod of Memphis, our Church can most efficiently promote the spiritual interests of the colored people by organising them into a separate Church; and that it is our duty to initiate such work at the earliest day. The Assembly is thereupon overtured to provide a plan for the use of our Presbyteries in prosecuting such a work, and is also requested to pledge the Church to assist the enterprise with whatever counsel, instruction, or pecuniary aid may be in our power.

Overture No. 11 is a memorial from the Synod of Mississippi, reciting the action of the Assembly in previous years with a view to evangelise the colored people. It sets forth that the several acts of the Assembly's past legislation indicate that the sentiment of our Church has been steadily moving in this direction, and that a natural instinct leads the colored people to desire a separate organisation; and that the most hopeful prospect of usefulness to them is that which can best assist them in the process of self-development upon which they have entered. Such being the

case, the Synod asks the Assembly to consider that the policy of advancing the work of evangelization among the colored people, by aiding them to secure separate organisation and a ministry of their own, is simple, natural, and flexible; and further asks the Assembly to enact such legislation as will enable Presbyteries and churches to carry these suggestions into effect.

These overtures, coming at the same time from venerable courts in sections of the country so widely separated, clearly indicate that there is no disposition to relax our activity in the work of securing the blessings of the gospel for the colored race. On the contrary, from all parts of the Church, the Assembly is respectfully urged to provide means for prosecuting that work with greater vigor and success. There is also a striking unanimity of sentiment in reference to the best method of accomplishing these results.

We recommend, in answer to these overtures, that

The Assembly acknowledges with profound satisfaction the Christian zeal of our Synods and Presbyteries in behalf of this important work.

The Assembly approves the sentiment of those venerable courts; that, in further prosecuting this work, it is desirable in every respect to avail ourselves of the additional light which experience has thrown upon this important question. The action of 1869 is therefore hereby amended by the adoption of the following plan, to wit:

1. Presbyteries and sessions are recommended to encourage and aid in the formation of colored churches, having ruling elders duly chosen by the people, to be regularly ordained and installed by said sessions and Presbyteries, with the view to form these churches in due time into Presbyteries, as convenience may dictate.

2. When two or more of such Presbyteries shall exist, they may unite to form a Synod. As was the case in our own history, this may for a time continue to be their highest court. A time, however, may arrive, when, from the increase in the number of its churches and Presbyteries, said Synod may find it expedient to divide, and combine in a General Assembly.

3. These churches, though under the government of their own Presbyteries, must at first and to a large extent be dependent for instruction upon our own ministers and Presbyteries, until colored preachers can be obtained. It is therefore recommended that, for the present, Presbyteries, through committees appointed for that purpose, take charge of the preliminary education of candidates. Meantime the Committee on Sustentation are requested to take into consideration the best method of providing training for the colored candidates for the ministry, and report thereupon to the next Assembly.

4. We recommend to our Presbyteries a hearty co-operation with their's in seeking from amongst them men of approved piety, whether old or

young, who are suited to the work of the ministry, and institute such measures as may seem best for their instruction. It may be sufficient for the present emergency that the candidates be instructed in the doctrines of grace and in the principles of Church order, as set forth in the Holy Scriptures and in our standards, in order that, as soon as practicable, they may be sent forth to minister in the Word.

5. We further recommend that our churches and people assist these infant organisations whilst they are struggling toward complete development, aiding in the establishment and instruction of Sunday-schools, and contributing to the erection of plain and modest houses in which to assemble for the worship of God.

6. To further these objects, a separate fund shall be established, to be called "*The Colored Evangelistic Fund.*" This fund shall be administered by the Sustentation Committee, and that Committee is requested to invite contributions to their funds from all persons who are favorable to the work of evangelizing the colored people of the South, and favorable to providing them with an educated ministry of their own.

7. Presbyteries engaged in this work are authorised to enter into correspondence with the Sustentation Committee, and to request such aid and co-operation as their necessities may require, and as the condition of the fund may enable the Committee to give.

GENERAL PRESBYTERIAN COUNCIL.

The following paper, offered by Dr. H. M. Smith as a substitute for the report of the committee on this subject, was adopted by a vote of 42 to 34:

In answer to the overture from a Committee of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, and from ministers of other Presbyterian churches, touching a conference of representatives of the various Presbyterian bodies throughout the world, with a view of "coming into formal communion with each other, and of promoting great causes by joint action," this Assembly respectfully submits that we most cordially sympathise with every desire to advance the interests of the Redeemer's kingdom. Nevertheless, in forming relations with other bodies, we are to be governed by our recognised principles of government. We must therefore respectfully decline this request, since, in our judgment, Church courts, as such, cannot recognise the principle of an irresponsible alliance. The only question we can properly consider, is the principle of co-ordination with courts constituted according to our "*Presbyterian Form of Church Government.*"

We regard this action as eminently wise. Experience teaches the danger to a Church of entering into alliance with other bodies of men not responsible, by which we may become committed to principles and measures we dare not approve.

COMMISSIONERS' AND CONTINGENT FUND.

A plan was adopted to equalise the expense incurred by attendance on the General Assembly. Each Assembly is to assess this expense upon the Presbyteries according to the number of church-members. Each Presbytery is to assess its own churches, as they may deem best—collect the amounts at their Spring meeting, and forward them to the Assembly. The apportionment of each Presbytery, and the bill of the travelling expenses of its commissioners, to be presented to the Standing Committee of the Assembly on this subject as early as the fifth day of the sessions. The Standing Committee to reserve from the amount received, enough for the contingent expenses of the Assembly; to audit the bills of the commissioners, and pay the *pro rata* as far as the funds received will permit. If there be a surplus, it goes into the treasury of the Assembly. To avail themselves of this plan, Presbyteries must contribute their full proportion. Each contributing church is entitled to a copy of the Minutes. These are the principal features of the plan, which goes into immediate operation. It is estimated that ten cents per church-member will meet the demand, and that is the apportionment for next year. This will be a great relief to the Presbyteries remote from the usual places for the meetings of the Assembly, and certainly a very light burden on the rest.

CAN ONE ELDER CONSTITUTE A SESSION?

A decision which needs to be noted, made by the Assembly, is, that in no case can one elder constitute a session.

BAPTIZED CHILDREN.

The Assembly adopted a report which directs: 1. That a distinct register of baptized but not communicating members be kept by each session. 2. That this class be dismissed with their

parents on removing from one congregation to another. 3. That in other cases they shall be dismissed, in this capacity, at their own request.

To some Presbyteries this is no new thing. It is a mere direction to recognise the actual position of this class of church-members. The report contains no reference to discipline.

SABBATH-SCHOOLS.

The report on this subject was based on statistics furnished by 45 of our 57 Presbyteries, embracing 1,374 churches, but only 760 Sabbath-Schools. These have 6,844 teachers and 52,821 scholars, and have contributed for various objects, \$31,022 during the year. About two-thirds of the schools are under the control of the sessions; many of the others are Union Sabbath-schools. The attendance of ministers and elders is becoming more common. The report recommended that ministers and elders identify themselves as closely as possible with these schools; that the supervision and control of sessions over Sabbath-schools should be exercised even in the minutest details, and that the Assembly reiterate its former recommendations favoring Sabbath-school conventions, teachers' meetings, colored Sabbath-schools, the coöperation of the children of the Church in the work of missions, and special preaching by ministers to the children of the Church and Sabbath-schools. All this part of the report was adopted without opposition.

The report also recommended the publication in the *Children's Friend* and the *Earnest Worker* of the "International series of Sabbath-school Lessons;" but the Assembly adopted the following resolution as a substitute for that part of the report:

Resolved, That the Assembly respectfully declines the request of the overtures, and direct the Committee of Publication to pursue the course hitherto followed in the selection and exposition of the Sabbath-school Lessons.

The Assembly subsequently took still stronger action on this subject, by adopting the following resolution:

Resolved, That the General Assembly discourages the use of the International series of Sabbath-School Lessons.

The principal argument urged in favor of publishing the text of the International series in our Sabbath-school papers, is the fact that many of our Sabbath-schools have already adopted that system, and that it was desirable to furnish such schools with expositions in conformity with our doctrinal standards. But it was urged in reply, that we have in this new system no guaranty that all parts of the Word of God will be embraced in the series of Lessons—that there is danger of its avoiding what we regard fundamental truth, to accommodate all the various denominations which are using it, and thus tending to place our Sabbath-school instruction on the neutral ground of the American Sabbath-school Union.

We have thus passed over in review almost all the proceedings of the last General Assembly, very imperfectly indeed, but we hope with fairness and candor. As the measures of even this highest and most venerable of our Church-courts are discussed in the body itself, with the most perfect freedom, even by the humblest of its members; and as we are to expect differences of opinion to exist during the debates, and to be expressed at the close by votes, at times almost equally numerous on the two sides of each question, it seems legitimate that the decisions of the body may be freely canvassed after the adjournment by those who feel a deep interest in them. We have exercised this right, not to weaken authority, nor to cultivate dissension, but to vindicate the truth and to promote what we conceive to be the highest well-being of the Church.

ARTICLE VII.

JEAN CALAS, THE MARTYR OF TOULOUSE.

Histoire des Eglises du Desert, par CHARLES COQUEREL.
Paris, 1841.

*Histoire des Pasteurs des Desert, depuis la Revocation de
l'Edit de Nantes jusqu'a la Revolution Francaise, 1685—1789.*
Par NAP. PEYRAT. Paris, 1842.

*Œuvres Complètes de Voltaire, en tomes 93, 1785. Tome
trente-sixieme. Traite sur Tolerance, a la occasion de la
mort de JEAN CALAS.*

The story of the sufferings of the Huguenot ancestors of so many worthy families which now occupy this American soil is always interesting to their descendants, and indeed to the whole Church of God. For an entire century the proscription of two millions of the citizens of France had made no impression upon the public opinion that controlled its affairs. Their martyrs ascended funeral piles and scaffolds, and no voice of humanity was found pleading in their behalf. They died in the full blaze of day, in the presence of assembled crowds, at the most famous period in the history of France; or as prisoners immolated in silence, in darkness, or in the gloomy cells where they were confined. Their groans were held in remembrance only by their brethren of "the desert," their sacrifice was known only to God. This iron wall of prejudice must be thrown down. And he "who moves in a mysterious way his wonders to perform," and chooses his instruments as he pleases, made use of the fanaticism of a persecuting Church and its terrible crimes, and of the infidel Voltaire,—of his natural sympathy for suffering humanity, and his hatred of priestly domination, and of religion itself—to bring about this result and to establish the toleration of the dissenting sects of Protestantism in Catholic France.

Jean Calas was a prosperous merchant, who had been engaged in the East India trade at Toulouse in the south of France for forty years, and had always enjoyed an unblemished reputation. He espoused in 1731 Anne Rose Cabibel, born in England, of

refugees of noble descent from Languedoc. He had six children, Mark Anthony, Jean Pierre, Louis, Louis-Donat, Anne Rose, and Anne Calas. The only domestic in the family was Jeanne Viguire, who had grown old in their service. She was a devoted Catholic, and had contributed much to the conversion of the third son to the Romish faith, without having lost by this in any degree the good will of the family she served. Mark Anthony, the eldest son, was a young man of excellent education, but high spirited, and at the same time of a moody and melancholy temperament. He was not contented to occupy a position behind the counter of his father, but had aspired to the bar, all access to which was closed against him, because he could not furnish a certificate of catholicity, which the requisitions of the laws and the fanaticism of the magistrates alike required. He could not bring himself to follow the example of his second brother and abjure a religion which stood in the way of his fortune, and furtively forsake the parental roof. This Louis Calas had done; the bishop had declared himself his protector and demanded of the outraged father a pension for his support, which was promptly and even cheerfully paid. The ungrateful conduct of Louis, who requited the kindness of his parents with the blackest ingratitude, filled the heart of Mark Anthony with the profoundest indignation. Far from following his example he formed the purpose of going to Geneva to study for the ministry, and on his return to exercise in France, the perilous functions of a "pastor of the desert." He communicated his project to his friend, Mr. Chalier, advocate of the parliament of Toulouse. This city had but recently witnessed the execution of the pastor Rochette, and the decapitation of Coummel, Sarradou, and of Lourmade, all in the prime of life. "My dear friend," says the advocate, "it is a bad business, one which leads only to the gallows." The project of the young man was abandoned. Every avenue to more congenial pursuits seemed to him closed. His melancholy increased upon him, and was nourished by the stoicism of Seneca, and the scepticism of Montaigne. He was heard while even at his father's counter rehearsing the monologue of Hamlet: "To be or not to be, that is the question." He had a glimpse, even then,

doubtless, of the abyss into which his fatal project was about to precipitate the worthy family to which he belonged.

On the evening of the 13th of October, 1761, Francis de Lavaïsse, a young man of about twenty years of age, son of a celebrated advocate of Toulouse, returning from Bordeaux whence he had been summoned by his father, to meet him at his country seat at Caraman, by chance passed by the store or shop of Calas, between whose family and his there had long been ties of friendship, and was invited by Calas, with whose children he was on terms of intimacy, to share with them their evening meal. The young man consented to do so. The company was composed of Mr. and Madam Calas, their two older sons and the young traveller. After the dessert was finished, Mark Anthony left the table, with a countenance and air which was profoundly pensive and sad. As he passed through the kitchen the aged servant said to him, "Monsieur come close to the fire." He replied: "Ah! je brûle," "I am on fire now." He descended the stairs. About 10 o'clock Lavaïsse retired and Jean Pierre Calas, lighted him down with a torch. What was their horror when passing before the inner door of the store, they found a corpse suspended between the two leaves of the folding door which was half opened. It was the body of the unfortunate Mark Anthony. "Oh, my God"! "Oh, my God"! they exclaimed. The father ran down and the mother, whom they had remanded back, and from whom they had attempted to hide the frightful scene. They threw themselves upon the body of their son, endeavored by all the means and appliances they could command to restore to him the breath of life, but their tender efforts and the skill of a surgeon whom Lavaïsse had called were fruitless. He had been hanging for two hours, and every spark of life was extinguished.* The unfortunate parents thought then only of

*"The two beams of the folding-doors were drawn towards each other, the bar used to secure them was placed on their top, a cord with a running-noose was around his neck, and my unhappy brother was hanging in his shirt only, his hair smoothed, his clothing folded up upon the counter. My father embraced his dead son; the cord yielded at the first effort; one end of the bar slipped from the valve of the door on which it rested, the body lifted by my *father*, no longer holding it secure." *Memoir of his brother, Donat Calas. Voltaire, Vol. 36, pp. 126, 127.*

preventing all suspicions of suicide, and of saving the family and their son from this stigma, and his body from being dragged on a hurdle, and treated with ignominy. A crowd attracted by their cries enhanced their distress, and a guard was stationed at the gate. The (capitouls,) magistrates, Lisle de Brive, and David de Baudrigue soon arrived and were convinced of the fact of suicide, and were about retiring, when suddenly a voice from the crowd cried out, "Calas has killed his son, out of hatred to the Catholic faith which he was to embrace to-morrow." This cruel conjecture was greedily caught up by the populace. passed with rage from mouth to mouth, and reached the ears of the magistrates. It was seized upon by the fanaticism of Baudrigue. He resisted the reasonings of his colleague saying, "I take it all upon myself." And without any of the usual formalities of an inquest, he caused the entire family of Calas, the young Lavaïsse, the servant, and the body to be transferred to the capitol. Pierre Calas left a light in the corridor. "Extinguish it," said the alderman with a bitter smile, "you will not return here soon." By a strange irregularity, he drew up the process-verbal, which ordinary good sense and the rules of procedure required to be done at the house without any displacement, and the accused were immediately thrown into prison.

Toulouse was largely peopled by a nobility and a magistracy, by monks and friars, and was still, by its fanaticism, a city of the middle ages. This dominican city was about to celebrate its second centennial festival, which had been instituted in commemoration of the massacre of 4,000 Protestants. In an instant Toulouse resounded with a thousand alarming conjectures, which circulated everywhere, and were received as indubitable facts. It was said that four heretics had assassinated their son, their brother, their friend, because he was about to abjure Calvinism on the next day. It was added that he was to enter the Society of the White Penitents, or of the Jesuits; the name of his catechist, his converter, was mentioned. It was affirmed that the Protestants were obliged, by their religious creeds, to put to death their unbelieving children. Fathers were to knock down the victims, and strangle them in the darkness. The murder of

Mark Anthony had been resolved upon the 13th of October, in a conventicle held in the parish of Daurade. Lavaïsse, who arrived that day from Bordeaux, was to be the executioner. These vague rumors took shape in the official publications of the aldermen. The Archbishop coming to the aid of the magistrates, issued a *monitoire*, or charge, summoning all Catholics to reveal to the courts of judicature what they knew of the guilt of Calas. Baudrigue appeared before them, accompanied by a hangman by profession, who, after an examination of the fatal doorway, gave his evidence as to the impossibility of a *felo de se*. The murder of Mark Anthony was then regarded as indubitable. The city council ordered the body to be provisionally interred in the cemetery of St. Stephens, in consecrated ground. The people received the decision of the magistrates with enthusiasm, and prepared for the body, which otherwise would have been thrown to the dogs, those funeral rites which are consecrated to martyrs. Forty priests, the White Penitents, the whole multitude, with wax tapers, banners, and hymns, escorted the remains with solemnity from the capitol to the cathedral.* The following days the cordeliers and the penitents renewed the funeral services in their chapels, to which deputations of all the monastic orders flocked. The nave was draped in white, the symbol of innocence. On a magnificent catafalque was seated a skeleton, procured from some surgeon, representing the victim, one of whose bony hands held an open scroll, on which were written the words, *Abjuration of heresy*, and the other a palm, the emblem of martyrdom. The priests pronounced his apotheosis, the people invoked it, and believed his miraculous virtue to be proved. These were the terrible preparations which preceded the sufferings of a virtuous and loving father, and one of the purest of men.

The council condemned Calas, his wife and son to the ordinary and extraordinary question, and Lavaïsse and the servant to be present at the torture on the 18th of November, 1761. Of

* There were at this time in Toulouse four fraternities of Penitents—the white, the blue, the grey, and the black. They wore a long hooded cloak, with a masque of the same color, pierced with holes for the eyes. *Volt.*, xxxvi., p. 131.

all the judges, one only declared them innocent; it was the assessor, Carbonnel.

The unfortunate sufferers took an appeal to the Parliament of the Tournelle. This arrested the sentence; but though ordering a new investigation, they adhered to the vicious procedure of the council. It ordered a new publication of the *monitoires*. This state of things endured for three months, the prisoners confined meanwhile in dungeons, loaded with irons and guarded by sentinels. This rigorous treatment did not alter the constancy of Calas, the resignation of his companion, the firmness of their son, the fidelity of their aged domestic. Lavaïsse showed throughout all a devotion truly sublime. His father conjured him to make avowals to save his own life, and to detach himself from the fate of a family condemned by the voice of the public. "My father," said the noble young man, "I will not betray the truth. The family of Calas is innocent. His virtue becomes more dear to me in his misfortune." The best advocates of Toulouse in vain analysed, destroyed, and showed the absurdity of the testimony of the physician, of the executioner, of the hearsay statements begotten of the fanaticism of the people. The court resisted the powerful and skilful argumentation of the eloquent advocate, Sudre, and the impassioned appeals of the two advocates, Lavaïsse, the father and brother of the young man accused. Sudre produced a document from the pastors and professors at Geneva, certified by baron de Montpeyrour, resident of France for that city, to the effect that no Synod had ever approved the declaration that a father was bound to immolate his apostate son. Paul Rabaut raised his voice from the depths of "the desert," and put forth his "CALUMNY CONFOUNDED," with this epigraph: "If they have called the master of the house Beelzebub, how much more they of his household." (Matt. x. 25.) It was uttered in tones of the most eloquent indignation against the false charges and cruel proceedings which were on foot.

This did but exasperate the judges. It injured Calas, and put in peril the life of the intrepid pastor of the desert. This document was ordered to be torn in pieces and publicly burned on the steps of the palace. This sentence was executed at the moment

when Calas, loaded with irons, was borne for the last time across the court which separated his prison from the tribunal. These archers, this registrar, this executioner, these flames, all this pomp of an *auto de fe*, troubled the old man, who, in his dismay, thought he saw his own funeral pile. In his emotion, he could only make to his judges this one response: "I am innocent." Everything demonstrated his innocence; his virtue, his reputation, his age, his infirmity of body, and the fidelity of his domestic, and the devotion of Lavaïsse, the victorious eloquence of Sudre, and the irresistible attestation of the Church of Geneva. What could they oppose, these judges, to this imposing accord of nature and reason, which pressed them with its hundred voices? A cry proceeding from the mob, the absurd report of a surgeon, the infamous opinion of a hangman. It was on this deplorable foundation that, after long debate, out of thirteen judges, the majority of eight voices against five, condemned John Calas, as convicted of homicide, to submit to the ordinary and extraordinary torture, to be broken alive, to expire, two hours after, upon the wheel, and then to be burned, on the 9th of March, 1762. This court could not render an impartial verdict. Two members had formally approved of the *glorification* of Mark Anthony; a third had expressed himself beforehand that Calas was guilty; a fourth, Laborde, who had retired during the trial to his house in the country, had returned purposely to condemn him. One judge alone, LaSalle, declared Calas to be innocent. He blamed the irregular proceeding of the *Monitory*, of the funeral pomp accorded to the dead. He alleged that it was contrary to every natural and moral presumption that a father should be the murderer of his children. "Ah, monsieur," said one of his colleagues, furiously, "you are all *Calas*." Ah, monsieur, replied LaSalle, you are all over *people*. It is much to be regretted that by false delicacy he thought it his duty to excuse himself. He might perhaps have restrained his colleagues, and justice, blinded by fanaticism, might not have had to groan over one of its gravest errors.

On hearing the horrible sentence, the old man nerved himself for death. They had hoped that the torture would extort from

him the avowal of his crime and the names of his accomplices. "Where there is no crime there are no accomplices!" he answered. "I have never put my son to death, nor caused him to be put to death. I am innocent of this abominable and unheard of crime; the others are equally innocent." Bourges and Caldaques, two worthy dominicans, ascended with him the fatal cart. That he should make the *amende honorable*, they conducted him for a long time, candle in hand, and half-stripped of his vestments, from street to street and church to church, and at last to the scaffold. The serene old man saluted those of his acquaintance whom he recognised, and waved them his adieus, saying constantly to the people, "*Je suis innocent*," "I am innocent." At the foot of the scaffold, Bourges pressing him in his arms, conjured him to avow his crime. "How, then!" he cried, "can *you* also believe that a father could put his son to death!" Till that moment, the crowd were cold and sullen. But when they saw the noble countenance of the victim, his visage tranquil and venerable at the very sight of his suffering, when they saw the executioner making his preparations, all traces of hate and fanaticism disappeared, and tears, sincere though tardy, flowed down from all eyes. At the first blow of the massive iron he uttered a feeble cry, and received all the rest without breathing a sigh. Placed then upon the wheel to languish there till he should die, he shortened the eternal moments by throwing himself into the arms of God, praying for his judges, saying with enfeebled voice, "without doubt they have been deceived by false evidence." The second hour of his martyrdom had expired. Father Bourges addressed him these last words: "My dear brother, you have but a moment to live. By that God whom you invoke, in whom you hope, and who died for you, I conjure you to render glory to the truth." "I have said," answered Jean Calas, "I die innocent. Jesus Christ, innocence itself, was well content to die by a more cruel suffering. I have no regret for a life whose end has come. God is punishing in me the sin of my unhappy son. He is laying the punishment upon his brother and upon my wife. He is just, and I adore his chastisements. . . . But this young stranger, this child so well born, this son of M. Lavaïsse, to whom I thought to

show a kindness when I invited him to sup with me, how has Providence enveloped him in my disaster!" Then the ferocious alderman, ("*capitoul*"), David Baudrigue, one of the chief actors in this scene, springing upon the scaffold, cried out, "Unhappy man! you see the funeral pile which is about to reduce your body to ashes. Speak the truth." The martyr turned away his head, the executioner gave the last blow, and he expired.* The dominicans withdrew, murmuring, "It is the death of a righteous man! It is so our first martyrs died."

Thus perished, at the age of 68 years, the unfortunate Calas. At the sublime spectacle of a righteous man dying, the populace forgot its fanaticism and lost its ferocity; it was dissolved in grief; it proclaimed the martyr's innocence. A terrible judge, in his turn, he condemned these barbarous judges, and these judges, almost distracted, recognised his innocence, and condemning themselves, abandoned their other victims. They released the unfortunate widow, her faithful domestic, and the generous Lavaïsse. Pierre Calas was condemned to perpetual banishment, as a screen to their own malfeasance in office. But scarcely had he left the city, than he was seized again and conveyed to the convent of the Jacobins, where he was told by the same Father Bourges, *if he would consent to become a Catholic*, his sentence of banishment would be recalled. After a captivity of four months, he succeeded in escaping to Geneva. His two sisters were retained in a convent, but imitated him in his fidelity. The generous brother, Donat Calas, having heard at Nismes of the disaster of his family, had already taken refuge in Switzerland.

* *Breaking on the wheel* was thus practised in France: The criminal was laid upon a frame of wood, in the shape of a St. Andrew's cross, with grooves cut transversely in it, above and below the knees and elbows; and the executioner struck eight blows with an iron bar, so as to break the limbs in those places. He was then unbound and laid upon a small carriage wheel, with his face upwards, and his arms and legs doubled under him, there to expire if still alive. When the time of his torture expired, the executioner *finished* these "eternal moments" of suffering by two or three blows on the chest or stomach, thence called *coups de grace*. This punishment was abolished in France at the revolution.

In that hospitable land, among men of their own faith, this afflicted family sought and found sympathy and protection. It was there that they came in contact with Voltaire. He was greatly moved at the horrible tragedies which had been transacted at Toulouse. He called into his presence the two orphans, whom the historian represents as falling sobbing at his feet, and demanding the rehabilitation of the memory of their unfortunate father, from him who controlled, to so great an extent, the opinions of the age. Partly from motives of humanity, and partly from hatred of the clergy, and partly because the tide was now turning, and he could add thereby to his own renown, he undertook their cause with untiring zeal. He proclaimed and demonstrated the innocence of Calas; he confounded his judges; he appealed to the royal council. He committed this great cause to the celebrated advocates, Mariette, Elie de Beaumont, and Laiseau de Monléon. Madam Calas visited Paris, and the Church, interested like himself in the justification of the martyr, aided the widow, by their contributions, to obtain that reparation, which was after all but a small expiation for what had been inflicted upon her. At the signal which Voltaire gave, magistrates, philosophers, men of letters, became as it were the echoes to his voice. Toleration was the word which was everywhere heard. It was uttered by statesmen in Parliament, by Turgot and d'Alembert in journals. The sufferings of the persecuted Protestants were dramatised and represented with great effect on the stage. But it was not so much the writings of Voltaire and the philosophy of Helvetius and Rosseau, as it was the real drama of Calas, the old Huguenot of Toulouse, which effected these changes. It was this great and crying iniquity which the Allwise allowed to be perpetrated, that brought men to their senses, and gave to the persecuted Protestants the measure of religious freedom they enjoyed. The churches of the desert hardly dared to receive so great a boon from so determined an enemy of Christ as Voltaire, but they adored that God who maketh the wrath of man to praise him, and the remainder of that wrath doth restrain. On the 9th of March, 1765, the royal council unanimously declared Calas innocent; his name was rehabilitated, his sentence annulled, his

goods restored. Louis XV. even imitated the munificence of a great number of men of noble rank of all nations, who rivaled each other in kindness toward the sad family whose misfortune had at least the consolation of exciting an interest well-nigh universal. Madam Calas survived for thirty years the catastrophe which attached to her name a celebrity so sad and so romantic. She died at Paris in 1792, more than eighty years of age. The volume of Voltaire on Toleration contains the original papers of the family of Calas.

The Rev. Jean Louis Gibert, the founder of the French colony of New Bordeaux in the State of South Carolina, had already brought forward his scheme of colonisation in foreign Protestant countries as a relief for the sufferings of the French Protestants, and advocated it with much zeal, as early as this. He left France for England to negotiate with the English Government for the transportation of colonists to Carolina, in 1763, the year after the martyrdom of Calas. His scheme had attracted considerable attention, and it is probable that if the sad event we have described had not wrought a favorable change in the condition of the French Protestant people, through the over-ruling of Providence, a much larger emigration to these shores would have ensued. The colonists whom Jean Louis Gibert transported to Abbeville, S. C., were of the same people with Jean Calas; many of them were his neighbors. Bordeaux, whose name was perpetuated in the "New Bordeaux," in Abbeville, S. C., was washed by the same waters of the Garonne which, nearer their source, watered Toulouse, the city of Jean Calas. Instructive, too, is this history, as to the wrongs which may be judicially inflicted in courts civil or ecclesiastical, when passion and prejudice rule the mind and obscure the vision of the eye within. First impressions often decide even in cases of life and death. The mind is no longer held open and frank, and a judgment is rendered, the consequences of which can never be revoked.

But this spirit of fanaticism! Does it, in this nineteenth century, yet exist? Yes! "There sat next me," says Dr. L. W. Bacon, "at the family dinner-table, (of Father Hyacinthe,) a mild-spoken gentleman, with an expression of patient suffering

on his face, who looked as if he might be sixty years old; he is really forty-two. Persecution and imprisonment at the hands of the Holy Inquisition have consumed his strength and left lasting marks upon his person. And yet this man is in regular standing as a high prelate of the Church of Rome." "It gave me a strange feeling to hear such a story of suffering and cruelty from the lips of a meek Christian clergyman." "It seemed like a leaf out of an old chronicle of the cruel days before the Reformation, such as we see illustrated in the dungeons and *oubliettes* of many an old castle, and in the infernal torture-chambers of Nuremberg, and Ratisbon, and Venice. And yet this was in the year of grace, 1873." And this very year, 1874, John Luther Stephens, a missionary of the A. B. C. F. M., at Ahualulco, in Mexico, at the instigation of the curate, who had preached against him the day before, and said, "The tree that bears bad fruit shall be cut down," was set upon by a mob on the 2d day of March last, who forced the doors of his house, destroying and stealing every thing they found, and was by them brutally assassinated, his body dreadfully mutilated, and his head severed into several parts! And this, on this continent of North America, one hundred and two years after the judicial martyrdom of Jean Calas, of Toulouse! Thus fell a young missionary, only four months ago, amidst high prospects of success, offered up as a sacrifice at the early age of 27 years, by this cruel demon of religious fanaticism.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Strauss as a Philosophical Thinker; a Review of his book, "The Old Faith and the New Faith," and a Confutation of its Materialistic Views. By HERMANN ULRICI. Translated, with an Introduction. By CHARLES P. KRAUTH, D. D., Vice-Provost of the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co., 710 Arch Street. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1874. Pp. 167, 12mo.

Dr. Krauth, in the introduction to this volume, shows that the doctrine of Materialism is the problem of the hour; and that although it has scarcely brought in a new idea, it has attempted to sustain the old ones by a vast accumulation of new facts. The roll-call of great names in the battle against it, shows how great that battle is, and how materialistic is our age. Strauss set out in his younger days to prove, in his "Life of Jesus," that though such a man did indeed exist, the story about him in the New Testament is a string of myths, the concoction of an after-age, in its effort to account for and give an imaginary solution of the origin of Christianity. He "commenced by killing the old schools of Rationalists with his myths, and ends with killing the whole brood of mythical Christians with his 'new faith.'" His new faith utterly rejects the argument for the existence of a God. In his reasonings, if *reasonings* they may be called, he says: "We do not reach a God, but a *universe*, resting on itself, abiding in its uniformity amid the eternal shifting of phenomena." Ulrici, whose review of Strauss is here given, is not a theologian, and does not write from the point of view which a theologian would take, but is Professor of Philosophy in the University of Halle, and is a rare master of the physical and metaphysical sciences. "We are interested in Strauss," he says, solely as a philosophical thinker." "We lay down as a rule or criterion, the principle, that a philosopher who, on essential points, not only puts forth as established truths, assertions which are completely without evidence, and wholly untenable, but contradicts himself

again and again, has no claim to be called a philosopher." On this principle, which will be granted by every *philosopher*, Ulrici proceeds to show that, in spite of his protestation to the contrary, Strauss has no definite aim beyond the destruction of the old systems of faith. The two enquiries, "Are we still Christians?" "Have we a religion still?" Ulrici passes over without examination. But he shows that Strauss's idea of a universe "resting on itself" is an absurdity; for the universe does not "rest," and as a "universe" can have no basis, neither in something else—for if there were something else apart from it, it would be no *universe*—nor in itself; for a basis which bears the existent nature in itself, and is itself the nature which it bears, is like the pig-tail of Baron Munchausen, by which he held himself dangling in the air. And a universe "abiding in its uniformity amid the eternal shifting of phenomena," is a contradiction in the adjective, because that which changes does not remain *uniform*, and because a changing phenomenon, which has not in it an essence which puts forth the phenomenon and changes with it, is *no* phenomenon, but an empty illusion. This alternation, this rising and passing away of the phenomena, moreover, must have a cause, and the cause must be different from its effect. This phenomenal universe, therefore—the only one we know—must have a cause distinct from itself.

As to the origin of religion, Strauss at one time justifies Schleiermacher's derivation of religion from "the feeling of absolute dependence;" at another, discovers that Feuerbach is right in saying "the origin, in fact the very essence of religion, is divine. Had man no desires, he would have no gods." He concurs with Darwin, that man is derived from the ape, either the species now existing, or one that has become extinct. He concurs with him that "the beginnings of moral feeling reveal themselves in the higher animals, not only in the care of their young, but that there is also a feeling of honor and of conscience in the nobler horses and dogs that have been well cared for." He adds, "that the conscience of the dog is not entirely without justice referred to the rod;" but asks "whether the case is very different from the rougher class of men?" "He overlooks the

fact," says Ulrici, "that the whip must be at hand, and that there must be somebody to apply it, if the conscience is to be brought into being or aroused. Man uses the rod on the dog. Who is there to use it on the man? Another man, of course. The first man, then, who employed the rod to arouse a conscience in another, must of necessity have possessed conscience and moral feeling in and of himself, without the aid of the rod. The question inevitably arises, why does one dog never use the conscience-making rod on another dog?" He must show "that the conscience of a dog and the conscience of a man are identical in principle and character." And as to the nursing and feeding of their young, how can this be from moral principle, when it is known, "as in the case of birds, that as soon as the brood is fledged, not only does this care cease at once, but they drive away their young, they enter into the same combat with them as with others for food, all of which furnishes evidence of the purely instinctive character of the whole." Strauss denies that there is any specific difference between the body and the soul. But Ulrici affirms that no chemical changes, and no movements whatever of mere corporeal atoms could give rise to sensation, desires, and thoughts, and bring into existence that which may be properly called life, much less that which we call *soul*. He argues that the Darwinian theory of development knows only of the rise and development of species ever higher and more perfect, from the sponge or the ape up to man. But it should follow, that under other circumstances, retrogressions may take place, and have taken place. "The quadruped, *e. g.*, if a continent which had once been dry, should be covered by vast inundations, will find himself confined to marshy, miry ground, and must actually, under these circumstances, in accordance with this theory, have been turned back into a reptile, and this reptile, if surrounded by great bodies of waters, under the pressure of hunger, would be turned back by degrees, and be compelled to assume the nature of a fish." The difficulties, the contradictions, the assumptions are innumerable. And "every hypothesis is condemned as scientifically untenable, just as soon as it shows that it is unable to explain, or involves itself in hopeless contradiction in the at-

tempt to explain, the phenomena which it is framed and adopted to explain." Such is the hypothesis of materialism. Can an atom of hydrogen, oxygen or carbon, or any mass of them, combine them as you will, reflect itself in itself? Is not this reflection in itself an activity which can be put forth only by a being with soul, or intellect, a being bearing a "self" in itself? A mere organism, or "a machine with self-determination and moral obligation, is so manifest a contradiction in the adjective, that no man who is unwilling to talk of wooden iron, will venture to talk of such a machine."* And thus this writer shows that the new philosophy of Strauss is no philosophy at all, inasmuch as it is a persistent carrying through of a renunciation of all logic.

Truths For To-Day; Spoken in the Past Winter. By DAVID SWING, Pastor of Fourth Presbyterian Church, Chicago. Jansen, McLeod & Company. 1874. Pp. 325, 12mo.

These sermons are likely to attract great attention, not for the amount of solid and massive truth contained in them, but from their finished style and from the notoriety that attaches itself to their author, because of the ecclesiastical proceedings which have been instituted against him. They remind us of the liberal Christianity which was so current in Massachusetts, especially in the region of Boston and under the shadow of Harvard University, some fifty years ago. Religion was then resolved into feeling, chastened indeed, and not violent and demonstrative like that which is exhibited in the rude laboring classes of our Southern region, but expressing itself in classic phrases and ingenious illustration, and giving all accurate doctrinal statements the widest possible berth.

There is the same disposition to caricature the doctrines of Calvinism and the distinguishing doctrines of the Confession of Faith, and, as if there were some peculiar venom in the doctrines of predestination, and divine sovereignty, of a Trinity of persons in the one Godhead, the two natures in the one personality of Christ, of justification by faith alone, and a vicarious atonement, the author seems to keep at a cautious distance from them. Thus the analogies between the scheme of the physical world and this

moral and religious one, both of which proceeded from the one divine author, is lost in these pulpit deliverances. There are rugged mountains, whose jagged cliffs, besides being unsightly when nearly viewed, would be exceedingly wounding to the tender feet obliged to climb them, and differing exceedingly from gay parterres, or yielding, flower-clad meadows, as much as these smooth and beautiful discourses do from the incisive deliverances of John Knox, or the perspicuous and unmistakable utterances of John Calvin. All the vigorous and dominant creatures of earth have their bony skeletons, man himself included. It is only figuratively that he is a worm of the dust, soft and yielding. But where is the spinal column, the backbone and the distinct articulations of this theology, which can give it consistency and stamina to stand erect and move forward in aggressive combat with sin and him that hath the power of death, that is, the devil?

The preacher seems to shrink from the doctrine of a Trinity in the unity of the Godhead. His attempted explanation of it is closely akin to that of Sabellius of old. The Father representing the Godhead and demanding satisfaction to a violated law, the Son participant of the divine nature, offering to meet that law's demand in the sinner's behalf, and the Spirit, equal in power and glory, proffering his divine aid to regenerate and sanctify, either wholly disappear in his representations, or stand far off in misty obscurity and haze. But without these primal truths and the two-fold natures, the Godhead and the manhood in the one personality of Christ, how is the scheme of redemption to be understood and appreciated, or to obtain credence, or to be influential in the human soul? And if, as the pulpit of Prof. Swing proclaims, true religion is a religion of love, where is this religion of love so truly exhibited as in the unfolding of the above named truths, so much put in a parenthesis by him, and so much slurred over. "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten son." "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." "For the love of Christ constraineth us because we thus judge." In these doctrinal truths lies hidden all the energising power of revealed religion, especially when the heart truly receives it under the influences of the Holy Spirit.

When doctrines are hidden under ambiguous expressions, as the *deity* of Christ under the *divineness* of Christ; when creeds, the Apostolic, the Athanasian, the Nicene, the Westminster Confession, in which the Church has expressed the doctrines which it regards settled after centuries of controversy, are set aside, and regarded as things which are decayed, waxed old and ready to vanish away, and a religion of emotion is plead for instead of a religion of truth, it is time for the lovers of sound doctrine which cannot be gainsaid, to take the alarm. The *suppressio veri* is the inculcation of error. Nor will it be persecution (notwithstanding allusions to the days of the inquisition and the rack, which days have, in the Protestant world, passed away,) if the Church shall lift its voice in maintenance of the sound doctrinal truths so clearly proclaimed by Paul the Apostle, and so firmly held by our fathers. Neither rationalism, which denies an objective and authoritative revelation, nor sentimentalism, such as is the offspring of the native human heart, is the religion of Christ our Redeemer.

THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XXV.—NO. 4.

OCTOBER, MDCCCLXXIV.

ARTICLE I.

THE MELCHIZEDEKAN PRIESTHOOD.

In treating of Melchizedek, there are but three corners of the Bible which we need consult. Moses has given us some information about him in the fourteenth of Genesis—he reappears in the fourth verse of the hundred and tenth Psalm, and Paul brings him into view in his elaborate Epistle to the Hebrews. Who was Melchizedek? Extravagant conjectures have been thrown out as to this mysterious personage. Some have contended that he was the Holy Spirit; but this is the height of absurdity. It is preposterous to say that he was the Saviour, for we know who was the mother of our Lord's inferior nature. He could not have been an angel, for we know nothing about angels keeping genealogies. He could not have been Enoch or Shem, because Moses has given us the parentage of these patriarchs. We need not waste a minute upon the negative part of the question, except to say that many persons are wedded to the marvellous. There is an abundance of evidence that Melchizedek was a Jebusite. This, we think, will appear in the sequel of this discussion. The territory eventually given to the descendants of Abraham was early occupied by colonists from Egypt. It would appear from the tenth chapter and fifteenth verse of Genesis, that the eldest son of Canaan planted the city of Sidon, and became the progenitor of the Hittites, Jebusites, and other tribes who

inhabited Canaan, and whose families were spread abroad. Seven clans, tribes, or peoples established themselves within the territory extending from Sidon, on the north, to Gaza and Edom, on the south. No statement is necessary as to the location of Hivites, Hittites, or Perizzites; but that of the Jebusites is important to the subject in hand. From Joshua, fifteenth and eighth, and eighteenth and twenty-eighth, it is certain that the Jebusites took possession of the hill country about Jebusi, and he adds Jebusi is Jerusalem. From the fifth chapter and sixth verse of Second Samuel it is certain that David carried the citadel of Jebus, which became Jerusalem, the home of Jewish solemnities. But in the time of the Judges, and to the conquest of David, the place bore the old name. The Jebusites were not exterminated by the armies of Joshua. A large remnant of that people was left, who occupied Jebus and its environs, and David bought the site of the temple, which he was making ready to build, from a Jebusite; and Joshua assures us that the tribe was not expelled by the Benjamites, though on other occasions Benjamin did raven as a wolf, and devoured his prey in the morning, and in the evening divided his spoils. The descendants of Ham were under a divine malediction, and to a large extent this anathema was fearfully fulfilled. But at one time the Sidonians were possessed of a flourishing commerce, to the prosecution of which they applied their ingenuity in all the arts of navigation. Even in its severity the divine goodness is often made conspicuous. The Bible is a transcript of the divine justice and mercy. Among degraded Jebusites God chooses a man—invests him with the priestly office—makes him a king of righteousness in comparison with all others of his tribe. And why was he thus established? To represent the nations outside of the covenant made with Abraham, and set forth his ulterior purpose to call Gentiles into the blessings of that covenant when Messiah should come. Melchizedek was not a *high* priest, but priest of the Most *High* God. An important distinction, which will be more obvious as we proceed in this inquiry. Paul reproduced him from his obscurity, that like an Egyptian Judge, he might turn the image of Truth to disputatious Jews, set round as that image was with brilliant ornaments.

Some additional light may be thrown on this subject by ascertaining the locality on which Melchisedek performed the duties of his priesthood. Jebus was the place; and had he been a Zemarite, Arkite, or Amalekite, it is probable that the Jebusites would not have submitted themselves either to his priestly rod or his regal sceptre. Towns sometimes change their names. The old name of Bethel was Luz, but the glorious vision vouchsafed to Jacob induced him to call it the house of God. The capital of Palestine has borne several designations. It has been called Jebus—and in the twenty-ninth of Isaiah, the prophet calls it Ariel, or Lion of God, probably because judgments were to go forth from its gates for the punishment of his enemies. In the second verse of the seventy-sixth Psalm, it is called Salem, which, like Solyma, may be considered as its poetical name, for poets are not without a vocabulary. It is now designated as Jerusalem, possibly by the change of Jebus into Jerus, and the appendage of Salem, for Salem was its name when the interview took place between Melchizedek and Abraham, after the return of the latter from the slaughter of the kings. Adrian changed it to Aelia, and Arabs speak of it as el Kuds, the Holy. And indeed it was hallowed ground as far back as the time of its Jebusite king. For he who had spread out the vales by which it was environed—lifted up its mountain summits—started its peaceful brooks, over which poets have dreamed—flushed its concave firmament into blue, and its convex clouds into snow, had overlooked its area and sworn thou art a priest forever, after the order of Melchizedek. The “King of Righteousness” was there, to climb the Hill of Moriah and the Mount of Olives, or descend into its ravines and slake his thirst at its upper and lower wells. He stood alone as a simple priest, without a retinue of attendants—with hills for his altars and lambs for his victims. He was furnished with no magnificent cathedral like St. Paul’s, in England, or St. Peter’s, in Rome, for the Jebusites had no prelates or Popes in the programme of their ecclesiastical polity. We have no data to aid us in determining whether Melchizedek was favored with a prospective view of what Jebus might one day become. It is impossible to speak affirmatively on anything where the

holy oracles are silent. But then we cannot speak negatively on the question, because, though not of record, we cannot tell what God may have made known to this illustrious priest. We are not daring enough to say that God never talked to his Jebusite servant, for he held converse with Abraham, both orally and through his shekinah when it descended to the plains of Hebron. If he spoke audibly to the father of the faithful, why not to the friend of Abraham; and unless God told him, how could Melchizedek proceed to his altar? He must have been called to the office, as was Aaron at a subsequent period. His heavenly Teacher might have said to him, in fulfilling my covenant with Abraham, your friend and mine, his posterity will march from Egypt through the Arabian wilderness. They shall be fed on manna. The clouds will be unlocked, and the granite rocks shall obey the wand of Moses, and send forth their gushing waters. The quails of the Red Sea will hear my voice and wind their swift flight into their encampments. The Jordan shall open its waves before my hosts, and these wicked nations be destroyed. How can we positively decide that this wonderful priest did not become an apt pupil in the lore of heaven? By his faith he may have anticipated the rise of the *temple* on Moriah—the glad crowds that would ascend into that hill of the Lord—the vast assemblies of people who would come from the remotest borders of the land—and the solemn and joyful festivals which would be celebrated on territory at that time subject to his own royal and priestly jurisdiction. In the fourteenth of Genesis an interview takes place between Abram, the Nomadic prince, and Melchizedek, a pair of distinguished personages, at Shaveh, immediately contiguous to Jebus or Salem. The distance from the town was about a mile. It lay north, and was called the King's Dale, the locality in which Absalom reared his pillar spoken of in the second book of Samuel. This was an important interview. That of Hannibal and Scipio, or the one between Alexander and Napoleon, at Tilsit, cannot be brought into comparison. The one between Paul and Peter, which lasted fifteen days, is more like it, as to its influence on the destinies of our race. But in the twenty-second of Genesis we find the record of a remarkable

transaction. Abram was living at Beersheba, when he was commanded to go into the land of Moriah and sacrifice his son. It was to try his faith to its utmost capacity. Many suppose that this typical transaction was enacted on Mount Moriah; but this may be questioned. "Go to the *land* of Moriah, and offer thy son Isaac on one of the mountains that I will then tell thee of." And we should infer from this language, that Moriah was not the mount. There was a hill, elevation, or summit in the land of Moriah, afterwards Calvary or Golgotha, which was to become more sacred than Moriah. The divine finger might have pointed out that spot to his servant, on which his own Son, the great Antitype, was to die; for we incline to think that, as the Bible calls the Lake of Tiberias a sea, it may at times call a slight elevation a mountain. What was to become Calvary, lay outside of Jebus. It was more sequestered, and therefore more likely to furnish a thicket which could entangle the horns of the substitute for Isaac. Abram had been journeying for nearly three days, and being devoted to sacrifice, Isaac was regarded as dead and buried, but he believed in the immediate resurrection of the victim, because he said, I and the lad will come to you again, and might have added, we will return a joyful company to the Well of the Oath. Here are the death, burial, and resurrection of our Lord. Moses does not say whether he saw his friend, Melchizedek, on this solemn mission; but we incline to think that after his faith had triumphantly passed through so severe an ordeal, he informed the Jebusite, and taught him that Shiloh would come, and to him should the gathering of the people be. He might have taught him that the gathering of the nations to his standard meant Jews, Gentiles, Canaanites, and Jebusites, wherever found. Abram saw the day of Shiloh afar off, and exulted. We think that Melchizedek was very much concerned about the call of the Gentiles, for his priesthood certainly represented people outside the pale of Judaism, and was to surpass in influence that of Aaron, to which, indeed, it was entirely antagonistic, as we shall attempt to evince as we proceed in the discussion.

We regard it beyond dispute, that Jebus, or Salem, (for the place went by both names,) was the seat of the Melchizedekan

priesthood. There was the spot on which many a lamb was led to the slaughter, and many a sheep stood dumb before its shearer, and opened not its mouth. They were taken from the captivity, to which they were subjected when sealed for sacrifice. Nor can we doubt that, acting under divine light, Melchizedek was very observant of any speck or blemish in his victims. The law of sacrifice became far more minute and complex in the time of Moses, but Abram understood its incipient principles. In the fifteenth chapter of Genesis, Abram offered sacrifice, which consisted of a heifer, a goat, a ram, a turtle-dove, and a young pigeon. This was a most solemn transaction. It had a meaning. The Chaldean patriarch fell into a deep sleep. He became enveloped in a horror of great darkness. He had forebodings of the bondage which his posterity were to undergo in Egypt; but at the fall of the sun, a smoking furnace and a burning lamp passed between the pieces of his divided offering. That smoking furnace did not consume the children of the covenant, and that burning lamp was to illumine the dark night on which they were to escape from the iron grasp of Pharaoh. Solomon looked back from his palace on this great march of the desert, and exclaimed, "Who is this that cometh out of the wilderness, rearing pillars of sacrificial smoke, perfumed with myrrh and frankincense, and all powders of Egyptian merchants?" The bush had been burning, but was not consumed, and the glory of Israel was going forth as a lamp that burneth. The foliage of the bush had become expanded and more condensed under oppression. We say this rather of that Israel of God, of which this bush was the symbol. The leaves drooped, indeed, in the heat of the wilderness; but then they were often thus in the soft gales of Arabia Felix. Now, can any one believe that Abram observed a politic reticence about these things? Did he forbear from telling Melchizedek that his descendants were to possess the land of Canaan, by the pledge given to Abram, which the Almighty would certainly redeem? The Jebusite no doubt acquiesced in the gift to Abram, for God had taken him out of Pagan darkness, and assigned him the most distinguished niche in the priesthood of the world. Had Melchizedek no tongue in his head? Were Hebron and Jebus so

far apart that he could not catechise Abram about Ur, of the Chaldees, about his call to journey—his adventures in Egypt—what altars he had reared—by what angels he had been visited? Perhaps each of them might have said with truth, “Did not our hearts burn within us when the Angel of the Covenant talked with us under the terebinths of Hebron, or the olive trees of Jebus, or the towering palms of the King’s Dale?” But here we are met by an objection. We have lately seen a suggestion from a respectable source, that the meeting between Abram and Melchizedek, recorded in the fourteenth of Genesis, probably took place at the Salem which fell into the lot assigned to Manasseh after the conquest. If so, our whole theory falls to the ground: There appear to have been three Salems in Canaan. There was one near to Aenon. At Enon, John baptized, because there was water thereabouts; or, according to the Greek, many waters, springs, or rivulets. The quantity of water could not have been his motive for leaving Bethabara. But as he had gone to the ford of the Jordan for the convenience of the two and a-half tribes on the east of the river, it is probable that he thought of nine and a half tribes as furnishing more applicants; and he chose the position, perhaps, more for the benefit of camels than of men, for they required drink. But we do not suppose that Melchizedek made his headquarters at Enon, or that he went over from that place to Shalim that he might congratulate Abram on his return from Hobah, to which he had gone in pursuit of the four petty kings who had invaded the Vale of Siddim. He could have watered his goats at the Kedron or the Siloa brook, the latter of which, in Solomon’s reign, flowed fast by the Oracle of God. It would be a violent supposition that the interview took place at Shalim. But there is another Salem mentioned in the thirty-third chapter of Genesis, in the following words: “And Jacob came to Salem, a city of Shechem, which is in the land of Canaan, when he came from Padanaram, and pitched his tent before the city. And he bought a parcel of a field at the hand of the children of Hamor, Shechem’s father, for a hundred pieces of money.” Jacob set up his altar in the vicinity of this town, but at that time there was nothing to give it any special distinc-

tion, unless the proximity it bore to Shechem, at which Abram had reared his first altar to Jehovah. Shechem is far more distinguished. It lay between the mountains of Gerizim and Ebal—became the burial place of Joseph, and the conversation of our Lord at Jacob's Well with the woman of Samaria, has made the locality immortal. The scenery, as described by Dr. Edward Clarke, Professor of Mineralogy in the Cambridge University, England, is not matched by any within the limits of Palestine. He becomes truly eloquent in that portion of his travels. Jacob seems to have stayed long enough in the vicinity of Shalem to become involved in a deluge of sorrows. But Abram removed to his temporary abode between Hai and Bethel. But his locomotion was still to the South. He became domesticated finally at Hebron. He seems, after his settlement, to have had but slight connection with the North part of the country, except when he went on a hurried expedition in pursuit of Chedorlaomer and his allies. The most distant hint is nowhere given that Melchizedek ever played the part of a king in the Shalem that lay not far from Shechem, or that Abram called at that place on his return from beyond Damascus. But the narrative as presented to us is perfectly simple and intelligible. Lot was not an inhabitant of any place near Shechem. He had parted from his uncle and settled in proximity to the five kings who had been subdued. Had the four kings marauded on Shalem, in the neighborhood of Shechem? Could the goods of Lot have been stowed away so far from where he lived? Could Mamre, Aner, and Esheol, who were confederate with Abram, have been residing at any place so remote from where they usually dwelt? What motive could have induced them to tarry anywhere with the goods and chattels which they had so triumphantly retrieved from the enemy? Abram, instead of delaying anywhere, was in haste to get back to Hebron. He encamps for a while in a dale which at that time belonged to the King of Jebus, or Salem, for the names were convertible. He carries out bread and wine for the refreshment of the weary patriarch. This was a wonderful meeting. The small army of the Hebron patriarch was not yet disbanded. The prominent figures in the picture were the Kings of Salem

and Sodom, and the warrior patriarch just crowned with the wreath of victory, for the shields of earth are the Lord's. The trained bands stood around as witnesses of the scene. They heard the blessing which Melchizedek gave to Abraham, and saw the one who had received that benediction paying tithes to the King of Salem. The King of Sodom had not gone to the war. He and the other four kings had been utterly discomfited; for even the Rephaim, Zuzim, Emim, and Horites had been dispersed and subdued. But the King of Sodom had heard of the return of the victor. He came forth from his hiding-place. He speaks nobly on the occasion, unless we account for his speech from the uncommon courtesy which always prevailed among the Orientals. "Give me the persons," said he, "and take the goods to thyself." The city of which he was king, and the vale over which he ruled, had not then been scorched and burnt by the lightning of heaven. How impressive was the reply of his interlocutor: "I have lifted up mine hand unto the Lord, the Most High God, possessor of heaven and earth, that I will not take from a thread even to a shoe-latchet, lest thou shouldest say I have made Abram rich."

Of what has been said thus far about Melchizedek, this is the sum: He resided in a town which became Jerusalem—he was consecrated a priest by the Most High God—he had no predecessor in his office who could have manipulated him into the priesthood—he derived his authority immediately from the Great Supreme—he had no power to induct any one to a succession, because his office was to be continued only through the person of our Lord and Saviour—that it was an incomparably superior office to that held by Aaron—and that it foreshadowed the divine purpose to break down the middle wall of partition which divided between Jews and Gentiles, and disperse the latter from the court assigned them, both in the tabernacle and temple, into the interior of the whole gospel economy. We proceed, then, to show the superiority of his office. It is not our wish to magnify his person, but his office. It was the habit of Paul, whenever he looked at *himself*, to use a diminishing lens; but when gazing on his office, he delighted to see it looming into infinitude. In his estimation, it was high as the canopy of heaven, solemn as

the day of judgment, deep as the ashes accumulated on the margin of the lake of fire, clear as the milky way, momentous as eternity, rich as the golden city, and beautiful as the paradise of God, and laden with fruits from the tree of life. His extensive travels—his vast labors—his deep afflictions, his severe persecutions, evince that he was honest in a sacred cause. Crowded cities—obscure villages—sequestered hamlets—the isles of the Gentiles—the synagogues of Jews—the cliffs of the Areopagus—the courts of Felix, Festus, and Agrippa—the throne of the Cæsars, bore witness to his impassioned zeal and fiery eloquence. Nor can we doubt the humility of Melchizedek. He was the priest of Jebusite shepherds, husbandmen, and vinedressers. He owned a few goats, we dare say; but we do not suppose that he rode out to the King's Dale in a coach, with a showy coronet, accompanied with a group of outriders. He might have gone on a mule, camel, or swift dromedary; for he must have been in a great hurry to see Abram, after the Vale of Siddim had been overrun by Northern invaders. The ministers of God need not be so much concerned about the place *at* which they labor, as the fidelity *with* which they labor. Is there anything more charming than to read of Erskine laboring at Portmoak, Doddridge at Kilworth, Richmond at Brading, and Oberlin and Neff in the Haute and Vosgian Alps, or Martyn in the Vale of Shiraz, or Campbell among the Caffres, or Morrison translating the Scriptures among the gardens of Macao, in the flowery land of China? Salem was an humble place, but a wonderful though not a supernatural man was its insulated priest. Let us compare his priesthood with the one held by Aaron. Let us look at its antiquity. He was priest of the Most High God nearly four hundred years before Jethrö or Aaron. Antiquity is a great affair with some people; but with God a thousand years are as one day. By his sovereign will he can make his office-bearers when, where, and how he may please. Could Melchizedek and Aaron have been brought face to face, the former might have said to the latter, Why, you are a man of yesterday. We say he *might*, but we do not say he would have been so impolite. Did not the patriarch of Hebron make a low bow to the children of Heth? Melchize-

dek would have done the same thing to Aaron; but had the assumption of the latter been metamorphosed into presumption, the former would not have given up four centuries of time. So, when Presbyterians who are told about Cyprian by conceited Churchmen, they ought to talk about the two hundred and fifty years before that hierarchist obtained his mitre, for priestcraft had an early beginning. Paul says that in his day the mystery of iniquity had begun to work. When Constantine dined his clergy, the fermentation was vinous, but became acetous when he opened his persecutions upon the sects. And who, we ask, gave rise to the sects, except they who introduced human inventions and will-worship into the simple primitive Church? No one pretends to doubt the prophetic and priestly office of Aaron. In the twentieth chapter of Genesis, the designation of prophet is applied to Abram; but this could not have been done in its modern sense, because Abram did not authoritatively foretell future events. And Aaron, as a teacher of the people, may be called a prophet; and there appear to have been such teachers or interpreters of the prophecies in the apostolic Church. Aaron was not a king, but Melchizedek was the King of Salem. He was prophet or teacher of the Jebusites, their priest and regal governor. He therefore bears a threefold relation to his anti-type; and this cannot be said of his antagonistic rival. The three offices seem to trifoliate better in type and antitype; or they trichinate more happily, if we may use an illustration from mineralogy. To this view we add that Melchizedek was prophet, priest, and king, on the very locality where our Lord was to die when the fulness of the times should come. Aaron never saw Salem. He died on Mount Hor, in Arabia Petraea, and it is called Jebel Haroun by the Arabs to the present time. Moses, from Nebo, might have caught a glimpse of the sacred locality, but not Aaron. Melchizedek might have told Aaron, You were made a priest in the wilderness, and in that wilderness you exercised the priestly office; but mine was instituted and continued to my decease, about Moriah, Calvary, Gethsemane, Olivet, Shiloh, and all the sacred localities. Yes, sheep that browsed on mountains destined to become hallowed forever, and lambs that

drank from the cisterns of Salem, were subject to my crosier. Though not a stem from the rod of Levi, my prophetic, priestly, and regal sceptre touched on summits where the palaces of Hebrew kings were to stand, and songs prompted by an anticipated redemption were to gush forth—where the dumb Lamb was to stand before Pilate—and the veil of the temple was to be rent in twain—rocks to be torn asunder—the blue heavens shrouded in darkness—doves to mistake noon for night, and angels to take up the refrain of those dying words, *It is finished*, and disperse them from off melodious harps to the utmost bounds of creation. Aaron and the Jebusite were too far apart, both in space and time, ever to have met in this world. Nor do we suppose that the latter was so high-Church as to have talked to his brother priest after this fashion. Puseyism was not born in his day. It was engendered some forty years ago, at Oxford, and some were sponsors at its baptism, who have since become familiar with the unclean waters of the Tiber, and saluted the slipper of Antichrist. Thanks to the Ruler of nations, that the States of the Church no longer make a part of the dynasty engrafted among the powers of Europe by the cunning of Sylvester I., and the forgeries of Isidore, Archbishop of Seville, but to Italy, their rightful owner. It is our duty to venerate holy places; but that reverence need not degenerate into a fanatical superstition like that which distinguished fiendish crusaders, or like that affected by Russian Czars, such as Paul, Alexander, and Nicholas. But Melchizedek was a holy man, and in our reverence for him something is due to the locality in which he officiated as a priest.

It seems clear from the Bible, that the priesthood of Aaron was established with the ulterior view of making it temporary and intermediate. It was to last its period of time, and then to die and be buried. Its sacrifices were numerous, and its types were often striking. Israelites were taught in this way. The Scriptures are patriarchal, typical, historical, ethical, prophetic, poetical, biographical, doctrinal, preceptive, and are wound up by the loving disciple; but surely in the Apocalypse he talks like a son of thunder. His lightnings, voices, lamps, seven awful trumpets and seals—his falling star and bottomless pit—his mighty

angel, woes, red dragon—his Babylon, winepress, vials, plagues, scarlet lady, fowls, Gog and Magog, and lake of fire, are terrible. They make us turn with delight to his sketching of softer objects, such as his palms, and golden crowns, and cleansed robes, and spotless thrones—his harps and gorgeous city—or where his pencil seems to bury itself in the dense foliage of the tree, the fruits of which encumber the boughs—or when he drowns it in the fountains to which all the holy are led by the Lamb. We would not, for the gold of Ophir, part from any portion of this Bible. We could not give up the types of the Old Testament. We believe that Aaron, his altars and victims, did foreshadow One of whom Moses, in the law and the prophets, did write. But then the oath of God, when speaking of his Son, seems to glide over the Jewish priesthood, for thou art a priest forever, after the order of Melchizedek. Is there no meaning in this solemn declaration? God does not hesitate a moment in his decision. His choice between the two priesthoods is absolute and unconditional. The divine oath does not hover over the tent of Aaron, or lift the curtain that gave ingress to the Holy of Holies—the chest of the covenant—the golden censer—the pot of manna—Aaron's rod that budded—and the tables of the covenant, and the cherubim of glory shadowing the mercy-seat. We may well wonder that the priesthood of our Lord was not fashioned after the one held for so many ages by Aaron and his successors. The oath bars out the claims of the Levite. There must have been some high and profound reason for the arrangement. The censor of Aaron is discarded for the one wielded by Melchizedek. The blossoms and almonds fall from the rod of the Levitical priesthood; that of the Jebusite blooms in fulness and supplants it in the ark of the covenant. The high priest was the ring-leader of the Sanhedrim against our Lord. It was time, indeed, to erase his name from the genealogical record; but it has been done as far back as the time of David; and when Aaron was consecrated, it was no doubt the divine purpose that the priesthood should be changed, and that a great priest should arise after the one order of Melchizedek. According to the Levitical economy, our Lord could not have been an Aaronical priest.

Had he presented himself as a candidate at the temple, his being of the tribe of Judah, would have been an entire disqualification. They would not have washed his hands and feet, and being about thirty years of age, he went to John. He was to be the Priest of the world, and not alone of the Jews. He could not have obtained either the water or oil of the temple; but the Holy Spirit who crowned his head in the appearance of a dove, was infinitely better than a ceremonial unction. But Ritualists will object. Was not the son of Amram a great *high* priest? Did not he wear his ephod—pomegranates and bells on the fringe of his garments—his turban, golden threads, mitre, breastplate, and other appendages? Certainly; but all his paraphernalia cannot stand against the oath of God. Under that asseveration his turban falls from his temples, his threads grow dim, his bells cease to sound, and he stands undressed. He becomes as bare as were his feet. Now it is remarkable, that after the delivery of the law, when Aaron was installed, that Moses, in Exodus, Leviticus, Numbers, and Deuteronomy, frequently calls him priest, to the leaving out of the *high*. In the close of Deuteronomy, the appellation of *high* is used once or twice, and that number alone. And this mode of designating him pervades nearly the whole of the Old Testament. “The priesthood shall be in *you* and your *sons*,” are the very words used in its organisation, and the word is probably employed in a collective sense. Aaron and his sons were a *high* power in Israel. By courtesy the father was *high*. Not order, but jurisdiction, was meant; for, according to prelatists, the Archbishop of Canterbury still keeps himself in the rank of bishop, with a little more jurisdiction than a Diocese. And we think Aaron kept himself in the rank of the priests with an oversight of the sons. The whole institution was a family affair. But we may be asked, could any one of his sons go into the most holy place on the solemn day of expiation? Why, certainly he could, if the so-called *high* priest were sick, or lame, or crippled. Otherwise all Israel must have remained in their uncleanness for a *whole year*. In the sixteenth of Leviticus and in the thirty-second verse, we read: “And the priest, whom he shall anoint, and whom he shall consecrate to minister in the priest’s

office, in his father's stead, shall make the atonement, and shall put on the linen clothes, even the holy garments. And he shall make an atonement for the priests, and for all the people of the congregation." This is sufficiently explicit. But other passages might be produced. As our Lord was of the tribe of Judah, God was pleased to find a prototype of him on territory subsequently dwelt in by that tribe, and there had Judah washed his garments in wine and his clothes in the blood of grapes.

We will now call the mind of the reader to a brief exposition of the one hundred and tenth Psalm. This document is all-important on the object and design of casting off the Aaronical and the adoption of the Melchizedekan priesthood. It was written nearly a thousand years before the advent of the Messiah. It presents a clear view of our Lord's ascension, after he had submitted himself to the infirmities of our nature by drinking of the brook in his way; for like a Hebrew pilgrim, he seems to have been a lone, wayfaring man. But he lifts up his head; that is, he ascends to that glory which he had with the Father before the world began. He is no longer a pilgrim, but has returned a palmer, who has won the victory, having spoiled principalities and powers, and made a show of them openly before the Jewish and Gentile world. Then the Lord said to him who was David's Lord, sit thou at this right hand of mine till I make thine enemies thy footstool. The Jews are enemies, but tens of thousands among them shall wear the easy yoke of the gospel. Gentiles are depraved, sensual, idolatrous, but they shall be subjected to the obedience of Christianity. From my holy hill of Zion the Lord shall send forth the rod of thy prophetic, priestly, and regal strength. Rule thou in the midst of thine enemies. Establish among them thy central throne, thy willing people in the day of intercessory power. Thy converts shall sparkle like the dewdrops of the morning, when the gospel is young and is shedding out the dew of its youth, and Jew and Gentile shall lie down in one fold. The Lord at thy right hand shall strike through kings in the day of his wrath. Men of power will oppose that gospel. It may encounter Herods and Neros, but I will make it triumphant. The Lord shall judge the *heathen*.

He shall fill the places to which thy messages are sent with dead bodies. Jerusalem shall undergo a fearful seige, and its heads or princes shall be wounded. This is a brief summary of the Psalm. It is the egress of the gospel beyond the pale of a pent up Judaism. We ask, then, how came the following words to be introduced into the central verse of that Psalm? "The Lord hath sworn, and will not change his mind. Thou art a priest forever, not after the order of Aaron, but Melchizedek." This settles the question. The Jebusite represented the Gentiles; Aaron the Jews. There is no further necessity for the Levite or his long line of successors. His altars are extinguished—his fires are quenched—his lavers are overthrown—his smoke is dispersed—his victims are released—his sheep may browse—his goats may ramble, for a new order of things will arise, and a new series of ages will begin. The decease of Jerusalem has been accomplished. Judaism was but a vestibule through which to reach the world. Ceremonies must yield to morals, and be supplanted by a simple spirituality. Melchizedek was mortal. He died; but the Priest of Calvary, to whom he stood as antitype, abideth a priest continuously, even forever. The type lives only in his Antitype. There was a long interval between the Jebusite and David. The former had not been thought of since the fourteenth of Genesis. Therefore, David was moved by inspiration to bring him from his deep obscurity, to play a conspicuous part in the conversion of the world. We turn now to the seventh of Hebrews, where Paul makes great use of the oath in accounting for the change in the similitude of the priesthoods. Any asseveration on the part of God must be ratified. He swore that he would give Israel a land flowing with milk and honey. Was not his declaration fulfilled even to the raising up of a new generation that he nursed into blooming youthfulness till the last Jewish footstep was planted on the western banks of the Jordan? We decline any argument to show that Paul wrote the Epistle to the Hebrews. Beside the mention of his beloved Timothy, it carries internal evidence of the masterly way in which Paul always treated Jewish subjects. Professor Stuart, of Andover, thought it was sent from Italy to a church in Jerusalem, and

doubtless it soon reached Antioch, in Syria, and all the Jewish churches throughout the lesser Asia, which seems to have been the *apostledom* of Peter, to the entire exclusion of Rome. We suppose that Melchizedek kept no genealogical records at Salem. There was no necessity, for he had no predecessor in his office. None was to come between him and our Lord; and though the former was a dying man, yet he represented a Priest who was made after the power of an endless life. The effects of his oblation on Calvary were to extend through countless ages. There never was a people so devoted to genealogies as the Jews. Paul says they were *endless*. He had read those enrolled in Kings and Chronicles. The Florentine secretaries, and Magdeburg centuriators, and Hindoo brahmins, Chinese mandarins and papal legates, are nothing in comparison with Jewish scribes. Possibly it was owing to the destruction of some of their records by war that Jews at present cannot designate the tribes to which they belong. Their priesthood, property, and Messiah were to be known by these rolls, which were laid up in the chambers of the temple. Paul knew that the Jews would ask, who is this Melchizedek? He replies, you all know the father and mother of Aaron, and his successors. You have only to examine your registers; but in them you cannot find the ancestry of the Jebusite, though he certainly must have had a father and mother. You are familiar with the descent of your priests through your genealogies; but Melchizedek, according to the Greek, is not genealogised. He is no Aaronical priest, and without a niche in any gallery, either of your patriarchs or priests. But, Paul, you have made the Jebusite an immortal personage. You say that he had neither beginning of days nor end of life, and made like unto the Son of God, abideth a priest continually. Paul's answer: Can't you Jews look into the fifth chapter, and tell from your own Scriptures how long Adam lived, for all the days of Adam were nine hundred and thirty years, and he died? If you will reduce years to days, can't you tell when the father of our race began his life, and when that life came to an end? So of all the ancient men spoken of in that chronological chapter. But you cannot even whisper anything about the nativity or demise

of Melchizedek. And his priesthood abideth forever, because it was lost in the never-ending priesthood of his Antitype. He died like others, but still he overrides all your genealogies. He was a great personage, who ruled in righteousness and peace, and many of your kings were scourges, both to your own people and the petty kingdoms by which they were surrounded. He served under the Prince of Peace, even under him who made peace by the blood of his cross. Aaron was made *without* an oath, but the Jebusite under an oath. Abram received his blessing, therefore he was greater than the one he blessed. He paid him tithes, and therefore he represented the Levitical tribe, who received tithes from the people and then paid them to the priests. Yes, he was a distinguished man. God made him, and gave him all his grandeur. God taught him without the oracle between the cherubim of your temple. The shekinah may have been lowered at Salem as well as at the oak of Mamre.

It is our profound conviction that if this subject be important, it must carry along with it some practical results. We have not written upon it to gratify an idle curiosity, or for the sake of mere speculation. It is plain that this priesthood of Melchizedek, after which the only priesthood in the New Testament is patterned, can in no way be perverted to the seeming support of Popery. Its adherents look rather to the intermediate priesthood of Aaron. But why are Christians so anxious to penetrate into the wilderness of the Scriptures? Is it to see any ecclesiastic clothed in purple and fine linen? No, but to discover the hidden wisdom of God, that the wilderness may be turned into a fruitful field and blossom like the rose. We sincerely wish that intelligent Papists would look into this subject, and they would soon bury the girdle of Aaron, not on the Euphrates, but on the stagnant Tiber. It would require a volume to trace the analogies between Romanism and Judaism. The Papal system has committed that great sin denounced in the eighth chapter of Jeremiah. They have brought out the bones of the kings of Judah, and the bones of his princes, and the bones of his priests, and of his prophets, and of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, out of their graves. And they have spread them before the sun, moon, and all the

host of heaven, whom they have loved, and whom they have served, and after whom they have walked, and whom they have sought, and whom they have worshipped. Aaron has lived a protracted life in that of the two hundred and fifty so-called Popes. Aaron's rod has, with the Papists, swallowed up the one which Melchizedek received under not the oath of man, but the eternal God. There is no likeness or distant resemblance between Peter and the Pope. That might be found out by any man, even in his second childhood. Peter was an active, self-denied apostle. He had no Vatican, with ten thousand rooms in which to reside; no cushions on which to loll; no Tetzels to send abroad; no golden roses to bestow; no carnivals to superintend; no kings to crown; no mules to baptize; no States to govern; no crusades to inaugurate; no edicts to proclaim; no persecutions to engender; no Constantines, Pepins, Charlemagnes, or Bonapartes, or Eugenies to flatter; no holy coats to exhibit; no lying wonders to invent; and no cardinals to hang from the Castle of St. Angelo, as did Leo X. But, say the adherents of Papistry, our Lord spoke great things of Peter. We know he did, in a moral but not a ceremonial sense. Lightfoot, in his *Horæ Talmudicæ*, has expressed the opinion that our Lord, in the binding and loosing, alludes to two Rabbinical schools, one of which bound a letter from going on the Sabbath, but the other loosed or allowed it to be sent. This would have been in the Oriental style of speaking; but we rather think that our Lord alludes to the inherent power in his gospel, which looses sinners who believe, and keeps bound all the impenitent, and which Peter was commissioned to declare. The loosing and binding were not in the man, but in what the man was to proclaim. All the apostles had the same power, and so have the ministry of the present day, and will have to the end of time, for the gospel is either the savor of life unto life, or of death unto death. But, says the Papist, is not Peter a rock, and *the* rock? The water of Rephidim refreshed the Church in the wilderness when Peter was in nonentity, and the Rock that supplied the water was Christ. The Angel of the Covenant was then Head of the Church; but in the view of Papists, he has been supplanted by

a voluntary abdication in favor of the fisherman. Oh no, says the Papist, he only made him his vicar. And did he need a vicar? We trow not. We thought that our Messiah held the keys of death and hell and of the universe. By a mere figure of speech our Saviour allowed him to preach the first sermon on the day of Pentecost, and to open the new dispensation to the Gentiles; that is, to Elamites and other nations. That's all. He gave Peter no key which, used by him, could lock or unlock his kingdom on earth, or the gates of the new Jerusalem. It cannot be said of Peter that he shutteth and no man openeth, and openeth and no man shutteth. This would be to put the vicar above the universal Rector. This is a stereotyped custom with Papists. When they impiously call Mary the mother of God, it is like placing the moon ninety or a hundred millions of miles above the sun. Whereas, the woman in the twelfth of the Apocalypse had the moon of Judaism below her feet, and the Sun of Christianity, with the twelve apostolic stars, over her head. Nor was that woman Mary, as Ignatius Loyola pretended, but the symbolical mother of all Christians who live beneath the rising and setting sun. Poor Mary, what iniquities have been committed in thy name! But the Rock. For fifteen hundred years the curtain hung, which prefigured the incarnation, before the Holy of Holies. The Messiah was veiled to the Jews, and even to his immediate disciples. They were curious to know who this mysterious Nazarene could be, and Peter struck the mighty Rock on which the Church was to rest. He was taught from on high the Sonship of Christ. The Messiah adopts it as a fundamental principle of the new economy, and bestows on Peter the honor of gathering into his kingdom the first fruits of Pentecost, and even the gates of Papistry shall not *eventually* prevail against the Church. But the Papal history is open to the world, and that world can scarcely contain its sanguinary records. Romanism and Judaism are Siamese twins. Any one can see the resemblance in her seventy cardinals, her puffs of incense, her lavers, her festivals, her Nazarenes, her smoking altars, her bigotry, her schismatic spirit as touching the rest of mankind, her complex ceremonies, her music, her dark-looking priests, her Le-

vitical rites. In her incipient organisation in the fourth century, and after the invasion of coarse Goths and fiery Huns, she reasoned after this fashion : Let us pass by that old Jebusite. Here's a piece of the limestone rock on which he offered sacrifice. It's of no account. His rites were very plain. He never could have invented a disgusting mass. His kingdom was so small that he might have hid it into one fold of his robe. But Aaron bore a civil mace over a people numerous as stars or sands on the sea-shore. The Pepin whom the Pope will crown intends to give us the exarchate of Ravenna. Poor Peter ! He only took a half shekel out of the mouth of a fish, and then let the fish go, though it would have served for Lent ; but the Pope can get as many rix-dollars as he may need, and we shall have a joyful time, at least till Luther sends forth his seven thunders from Wittenburg. Such was the reasoning of priests to which the logic of predicted events seems to have historically corresponded. But though God in his mysterious wisdom permitted the hateful system to arise, it is some consolation to know that it is destined to fall. It has lately been wounded ; and may the wound prove mortal, that the nations may hold a jubilee over the ruin of Babylon. The natural heart craves to be saved by *ritualism* at the present time ; but Isaiah says, in awful words, " their webs shall not become garments." If nothing else will avail to destroy the delusion, let ritualistic devotees pray for one preliminary peal of Gabriel's trumpet, that they may ask for that wind which bloweth where, when, and how it listeth, lest they be unprepared for the moment when that magnificent trump shall stop the revolving earth, and summon all its people to appear before the great white throne.

Prelacy, too, ignores the priesthood of Melchizedek. They are so devoted to the prayer-book that many of its ministers are not over-anxious to become very profound divines. Some of them skim the surface of the theological sea ; but if they would descend, like Schiller's diver, they might bring up gems superior to the twelve which blazed in the breastplate of Aaron, for the Holy Scriptures resemble that crystal ocean which the Patmos exile saw before the throne. Some of the low Church are among our dear friends ; but we fear they may get a little higher

unless they lose their grasping after the shadow of apostolical succession. We never knew a man of deeper piety than the Rev. Renel Keith, of the Alexandria Seminary. We always thought ourselves firm Calvinists; but really our Episcopal brother outheroed Herod, and he abode to the last in the same theological stay. He was not averse to Melchizedek, for he was always an hungered after Scriptural truth; and where that led he was willing to follow. His piety was an evergreen; but, like Cowper, he found it often overshadowed by the cypress tree, from a strange constitutional organisation. But in the controversy of Onderdonk and Barnes, we detect quite an inclination in the former towards Aaron. He gives up the argument in the New Testament, save the one drawn from Titus and Timothy. Well, a pair of evangelists who were, from the existing circumstances of the Church, in a state of locomotiveness, could easily be disposed of; but the bishop clings fast to the three orders of the Jewish priesthood, like a pilgrim to his wallet. It is the only collation on which Prelatists can feed; but the Papists pre-occupied the ground, for the Papists manufactured their Pope out of Aaron, and out of Eleazer and Ithamar a priesthood which no man can number; and out of the rest of the Levites, not only a few beardless deacons, but a vast swarm of monks, Eremites, and hermits. Now, we would willingly join issue with either Bishop Hall, of Norwich, or Archbishop Potter, on the question whether the Jewish priesthood consisted of three orders. But it is unnecessary, for Melchizedek stands in their way. He had no compeers in his office—no Levites in forty-eight cities to go out and catch his goats, or lambs, or red heifer; and he had no successor, except One who was the first born to the priesthood among many brethren. God chose that his Son should die at Salem, and he also chose that his representative priest should offer on the same hallowed ground. And when the great victim had waded through his sea of suffering, he chose that all priesthood should come to an end. Even that of Melchizedek was swallowed as a pebble would be in the Atlantic or Pacific ocean. The prototype died, and was buried in the same locality with his Antitype; but the latter conquered, and was buried in the new hewn tomb, and rose

as the great High Priest of our profession; and he is the only Priest in the universe. His sacerdotal robe was deeply dyed, not for himself, but for us, guilty sinners; and any one who repents and believes, under the agency of the Spirit, is welcome to the benefits of his oblation. Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not any longer, for a body hast thou prepared, which Divinity uses as a temple, and mine ear hast thou bored as a willing servant, and as such, lo I come; in the volume of thy book it is written of me that I delight to do thy will, oh God. Corresponding to these views, it is remarkable that priesthood is extirpated from every leaf of the New Testament, except that all the household of faith are moral kings and spiritual priests. The writers of the New Testament would have interwoven the priestly office if they could; for inspiration forbade them to commit that offence against the purpose of God. Therefore, they selected a series of terms in which to state the office of the gospel, as distant as possible from ritualism. Peter was slow to believe in his Gentile vision; and Paul respectfully alleges that he knew not that it was the High Priest of whom he had spoken in language of censure.

But though animal sacrifices have ceased forever—Aaron is sleeping on Mount Hor—Melchizedek in Salem—and even such faithful sons of Judaism as Hilkiab and Zadok are buried—the Old and New Testament are fastened together by a chain which neither man nor angel can rend asunder. All their moral parts are retained. The Bible is one, and but one, like the dream of Pharaoh. The Old Testament must not be laid aside. Not to go beyond the introductory chapters of Genesis, we are indebted to that record for the first beams of light that glimmered over the chaos of creation—for the laying down of its green carpet on the earth—for the birth of the sun, moon, and stars, also—for the institution of the Sabbath—for the early footsteps of Eve on pilgrimage among the flowers of paradise—for the smoke that curled upward from the altars of Abel—for the fall of man from his Eden niche—for the ark that surmounted the convulsions of the deluge—for the flight of the dove across the dreary waters—for the finding of the olive tree and rifling of the olive leaf—for the bow of the promise admired “in all

ages," and sweet patriarchal pictures, the gallery of which extended from Hebron to the wells of Haran. Tell us not that the Old Testament is devoid of beautiful incidents. Is there nothing that strikes the imagination in the pillar by which Israel was led—a wreath of vapor in the morning, but touched each successive night by the tongs of the cherubim? Nothing in the rock of Rephidim, the Corra Lynn of the desert? Nothing in the forty years fall of the manna? Nothing in the song of the well at Beer? Nothing in the landscapes looming before the entranced eye of the lawgiver, and in the crossing of the Jordan? A hundred artistic pencils have been at work on the Hebrew records, and as many poets have sung in concert the passage of the Red Sea—the death of Miriam and the demise of Moses—the ascension of Elijah and the reign of Solomon. Need we name Milton, Gesner, Cumberland, Watts, Montgomery, Buchanan, Racine, Angelo, and Prior? We forbear to associate Byron with any cluster of reverential men.

But further than this. We think that some connection was intended between the priesthood of Melchizedek and the call of the Gentiles. He presided over a people that were doomed to experience the displeasure of God for their sins. Probably many of the Jebusites handed up their children in sacrifice to grim idols in the vale of Hinnom. But Melchizedek had doubtless called out from among them a peculiar people—zealous of good works. If there were no such chosen generation then there was no occasion for a priest either with or without an oath. Melchizedek stemmed the tide of infanticide which was depopulating the land of Canaan. Infant cries had reached the ear of the Lord God of Sabaoth. It may be that there was at least a counteracting influence to this revolting crime. God may have said to the King of Salem, thee only have I seen righteous among these Jebusites, and may have set him apart for the good of a few who had not bowed the knee to the image of Moloch. Shortly after the interview in Genesis between the priest and the patriarch God promised to the latter an innumerable progeny. This may have meant his Jewish descendants in a natural sense and a spiritual offspring among the Gentiles, and we have heard the

call though Abraham be ignorant of us. Palestine was a small country: Its dimensions in length were not more than a hundred and fifty miles and seventy-five in breadth. Voltaire speaks lightly of it as a gift; but in the reign of Solomon it ran from the River of Egypt to the Euphrates. It was remarkable for fertility, its mountains, vales, and numerous brooks and variety of its products, and was large in comparison with the contracted dynasties by which it was surrounded. A country may be too extensive for easy government. Our own by way of example. But limited as was its area, from it were thrown rays of light into Persia, Chaldea, Idumea, and other eastern lands, rays preliminary to the full call of the nations. It has given to mankind the true religion, the divine oracles, the elements of law, a vast amount of early history, exalted views of the triune Creator, and the most sublime strains of poetry and eloquence. Every man of taste will spontaneously acquiesce in the eulogium pronounced on the Scriptures by Sir William Jones. The Jews were not totally destitute of feeling for the idolaters, because they admitted them both as proselytes of the gate, and when they fully adopted their religion, as proselytes of *all righteousness*. Pious Hebrews were not blind to the superiority of their system to all systems of idolatry, and they were certainly favored with dim perceptions of its extension beyond the borders of their own land. Simeon spoke of the Messiah as a Light to enlighten the Gentiles and the glory of Israel, the chosen people. Seven hundred and fifty years before the time of Simeon, Isaiah, the son of Amoz, foresaw the introduction of the nations to all the blessings which would occur to mankind from the advent of the Messiah. On this subject he permits nothing to lull his prophetic harp into repose. His predictions are decided, even to gathering the forces and eating the riches of the Gentiles. Variety of learning, the charms of taste, and invention of arts, could not keep Greece from the worship of mythological deities, nor Rome from falling into the shadows of moral death; and even after the introduction of Christianity the Latin Church and the Greek became apostate, and continue so to the present day. Rome was built on seven hills and so was Constantinople. Thus saith the Lord God, behold I

will lift up my hand to the Gentiles, and set up my standard to the people, and they shall bring thy sons in their arms and thy daughters shall be carried on their shoulders. At that time continents were involved in darkness, whilst Israel had long enjoyed light in all their dwellings. But for eighteen centuries the descendants of Abraham have been wanderers over the face of the earth, and have found no rest for the soles of their feet. Behold therefore the goodness and severity of God: on them which fell severity, but towards thee goodness if thou continue in *his* goodness. Otherwise thou also shalt be cut off. The Jews are still Aaronites, though their fathers often made the hundred and tenth Psalm to resound through their magnificent Temple. They deliberately prefer Aaron to the Messiah and their own ritualism to the oath of the living God, who broke the chain of their Egyptian bondage and planted their fathers a noble vine on the hills and plains of Palestine. We cannot coincide in the opinion of Lightfoot that they are finally and forever excinded. If they would ponder and embrace the priesthood of Melchizedek instead of hugging the rites of Aaron, and cling to their plain synagogues instead of hankering after gorgeous temples, they might speedily be restored to their own land. But if Melchizedek were a more effective priest than Aaron why is he not made more of in the Bible? Was not Adam a man of great importance? Had he no bearing on the destinies of the human family? He sleeps for the most part in the Bible till Paul brings him prominently into view in his epistle to the Romans. Revelation is a system gradually prepared and well adjusted to all its purposes, and according to the forty-ninth chapter and second verse of Isaiah, God saw fit to hide Melchizedek in his quiver that arrows may be taken out of it for the ritualistic errorists of our times.

There are one or two miscellaneous results connected with this discussion to which a bare mention may be given. If the priesthood of Aaron was changed for its supplantation, as Paul alleges, the calling in of the Gentiles, it results that our present missionary operations are of great importance. Are not all nations involved in Pagan darkness Gentiles to us who profess to have

received Christianity? Do we find the system replete with innumerable blessings? Then it is our solemn duty to make it known to all the race of man. For many centuries Israel would not acknowledge us as having any part or lot in the Abrahamic covenant. They virtually said to the people bordering on Palestine, you shall not sit down at our magnificent table. It was in vain to beg even for the crumbs that fell from their repasts. What! shall Gentiles drink at our smitten rocks, and at our wells of salvation? Shall they feast on our pomegranates, and listen to our priestly bells? Shall they recline at our Paschal supper, and join in our great Hallel? Shall they be anointed at our olive-yards, and moistened in the dew of our Hermon, and healed at our Gilead? We admit that many Jews went abroad before they were dispersed under the judicial sentence of him from whom their privileges were derived. They were among the nations, but not of the nations. They stood aloof, attached to their own righteousness, which was of the law, but deplorably ignorant of the righteousness of their Messiah. They wore frontlets between their eyes, but forgot to hide the word of God in their unregenerate hearts. They rejected the Great High Priest for whom the Aaronic ritual, with its myrrh and frankincense, was to flee away. He entered into the holy places not made with hands eternal in the heavens. At his death the veil was rent in the temple whilst the priests were preparing their Paschal lambs. The period of the Messiah's curtained Incarnation had closed, and our Intercessor had passed into the immediate presence of God, where he ever liveth. Saul of Tarsus was a fanatical Jew, but he was brought to the ground and constituted an apostle, for there had been an acceptable offering up of the Gentiles; and after his conversion he thought of propagating the gospel not only in Rome but in Spain. We who call ourselves Christians were made so by means, though divine grace may and often does act above means. We bear a most responsible relation to those destitute of revealed light. Behold the crowded millions of China, India, and Japan, in whose temples and pagodas a false religion is taught from century to century. Look on the map of South America. What do we see but an intemperate priesthood,

a benighted people, and swarms of ritualists. Look on Africa and on her hundred and fifty millions blind to a coming eternity. Behold our own Indians, for whose extermination by massacre our civic Hamans are calling with stentorian voice, that they may rush into their scanty reserves. Papists, Idolaters, Sacramentarians, Ritualists, the apostate Greek Church, Puseyites, Mohammedans need missions.

The question is one fraught with vast importance. Under what priesthood are Christians living, acting, praying, and interceding at the present time? We reply that there is but one Priest in the universe to whom we owe an undying gratitude. He laid down the stupendous price of our redemption, by rendering himself as the willing victim of Calvary. There can be no orders, ranks, or degrees in his adorable Priesthood, nor were there any in that of Melchizedek. The latter was an ungenealogised man, and therefore could have had no successor, but he was the liveliest type of our Saviour known among men. To suppose that he was a divine personage, or that he held a joint priesthood with Christ, or that he was ever brought into a nearer contact with his antitype than a period of two thousand years, would equal the impiety of Papists who make Mary co-redeemer with our Lord. Melchizedek died like any other mortal. The priesthood of Aaron was dissolved. The latter has been supplanted by his antagonistic rival who was called of God in Salem from one of the tribes of Canaan. Ritualists still hold on tenaciously to Aaron and their three order conceits, and at present a simple Christianity has many foes. Scientists are conspiring with ritualists against the life of our religion, for only degrade the internal change of the heart to forms and ceremonies and all are satisfied.

At all events the Presbyterian Kirk in the United States means to keep in the old path, turning neither to the right or left on her way. A few years ago Bishop Potter and others tried to allure us to receive the gift of apostolical succession at the hands of Prelacy. Had he forgotten that we were descendants of men and women too, who at the peril of their lives had signed the solemn league and covenant on the tombstones and cairns of heroic

martyrs. We want no line of pontiffs, no cardinals, no grand lamas, no Jesuits, no archbishops, no priests. We are satisfied with that variety of spiritual titles bestowed upon the ministry in the New Testament, which were not brought out from the chambers of the Temple or from among the archives of the Aaronic priesthood, but from that inspiration which overshadowed evangelists and apostles. Our religion is in the Bible, and men have been reared up to excavate the ruins of Nineveh and Babylon, and who are establishing its authenticity by discoveries strong as proofs from Holy Writ. Presbyterians have long borne witness against all human inventions, and may their testimony ever be unshaken as the mountains and continued to the evening of the world.

ARTICLE II.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY *VERSUS* GOVERNMENT.

With the sincerest respect and love for our fathers and brethren in the Southern Presbyterian Church from whom we may differ, we offer the following brief review of the *principle* involved in the decision of our late Assembly on the issue of *government*, as made between the Faculty and some of the students in our Theological Seminary at Columbia.

However divided the mind of the Church may be as to the righteousness or unrighteousness of the Assembly's decision, all will agree that the question decided was one respecting government—the Faculty claiming the right, under the Constitution of the Seminary, to *govern* the students—the students, that is, some of them, denying this right, at least so far as their *obligatory* attendance on chapel services on the Lord's day was involved. It is quite irrelevant how or by whom these differences were brought to the notice of the Assembly; suffice it to know that they were brought, and the decision of this venerable court invoked. We are all familiar with the decision, and the whole Church knows that however mildly worded and designedly respectful in its tone

toward the Faculty, it is, in point of fact, a decision against the Faculty and for the students. No one will for a moment, we suppose, question the correctness of this inference, seeing that the Assembly granted the students the very thing which the Faculty refused them, viz.: the liberty of *optional* attendance on the regularly appointed chapel services on the Sabbath.

Now it is against the grave principle involved in this decision that many of us, who are loyal in spirit and obedient in practice to all the injunctions of our Church courts, feel constrained to protest, not only because it must necessarily mar the efficiency of our Theological Seminary, but because it lays the fatal axe at the very root of our Presbyterian system.

This decision of the Assembly, when stripped of the drapery of circumstances, means evidently this, that obedience—obligatory obedience, if any prefer—to a constitutional law not contrary to God's word, is or may be inconsistent with Christian liberty of conscience. To prove that this is the veritable meaning of the Assembly's action, we would ask: (a) Does any one believe that that clause in the Constitution of the Seminary, which enjoins or allows the Faculty to furnish the students with the preaching of the Word, when desirable, is contrary to God's Word? We are sure none will claim this. (b) Will any say that the actual holding of divine services on the Sabbath by the Professors, in the chapel, is contrary to the Scriptures? Certainly the students did not so regard it, for they at one time requested it. Neither did the Assembly so view it, because it has not abolished this service, which it would have done, had it been anti-scriptural. (c) Was the appointment of this chapel service by the Faculty during the past year, even under the *peculiar* circumstances surrounding them, *unconstitutional*? The Assembly certainly did not so regard it, for although legislating on this point, it still has allowed this service to remain as appointed by the Faculty, which it surely would not have done, had it been unconstitutional. We may therefore fairly conclude that the Assembly did not consider the appointment of the chapel services, even under the peculiar circumstances, and at the time they were instituted, either unscriptural or unconstitutional. What, then, we

may ask, was the ground of complaint made by the recusant students, and urged in their behalf before the Assembly? Manifestly only this, that the OBLIGATION to obey this Seminary regulation, which was neither *unscriptural* nor *unconstitutional*, was incompatible with their Christian liberty. The Assembly, by its action, has sustained this plea made for the students; and in yielding to this demand of conscience, has really committed itself to the principle, that *obligation* to obey any lawful regulation under any government, is or may be inconsistent with Christian liberty. It is against this disorganising and destructive doctrine that we protest, because it is, in our opinion, both *unscriptural* and too far-reaching in its practical effects; and we feel warranted in declaring that if this decision of the Assembly shall ever come to be regarded by our people as the definite settlement of the principle of government, as between rulers and ruled, it will shock our whole Presbyterian fabric from base to summit. This may seem to some an extravagant assertion; but we beg the reader to remember that Presbyterianism, considered as a system, is no disunited structure, but a "whole body, fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth"—rooting itself first of all in the God-ordained *family*, to be nurtured under its pious discipline—more definitely shown in the visible Church under its divinely appointed rulers—manifesting the reality of its sanctifying power over its subjects, by the ready obedience they pay the civil magistrate, as the power ordained of God—and only complete when it becomes merged into the general assembly and church of the first born in heaven, under the personal rule of the King of Kings. Whatever, therefore, affects any part, more especially a *vital* part of such a body, must affect all its members. The decision of the Assembly affects the discipline or government of this body, and government is vital in the Presbyterian system. It surely cannot be necessary to stop to convince the thoughtful reader of this right or necessity for discipline in the visible Church, seeing that our divine Master has appointed office-bearers for this special work; and since discipline is obviously a very delicate and often unpleasant duty to perform, it is hard to over-estimate any decision by the Assem-

bly involving its essential principles—for every such decision establishes a precedent, which becomes operative in all inferior judicatories. But leaving, for the present, these and kindred considerations which we have thought proper to introduce in order to prepare the way for our argument, we will now give our reasons for dissenting from the Assembly's decision, which we propose to condense under the following general propositions :

(1) This decision is a palpable contradiction of the essential and primary idea of *government* itself.

(2) It is, in *our* judgment, unscriptural.

(3) Its logical and practical tendency is to disorganise and destroy all scriptural government in the family, Church, State, seminaries of learning, and every other society in which men are found in the relation of rulers and ruled.

If any of our brethren shall be offended at the boldness and bluntness of these propositions, and deem it presumption in any one, much more such a *little one* among the thousands of Israel, to sit in judgment on the deliverances of our supreme judicatory, all we can do in extenuating this presumption, is solemnly to declare that no other motive but that of earnestly contending for the faith which was once delivered to the saints, has impelled us to use such *plainness* of speech, and therefore we crave of the reader a suspension of an adverse judgment until he shall have gone with us through the argument, and seen its application.

We will not attempt to wade through the *facts* of this Seminary difficulty, which have already been exhaustively and "*ex cathedra*" set forth in the columns of the newspapers, but with many other sincere lovers of the "school of the prophets," we sincerely regret that the Assembly was not in full possession of all the facts; for if it had been, its decision might have been very different. But even aside from and independently of these facts, we think the Assembly, in its deliverance on this Seminary question, has erred on a vital principle of government; for as we have already declared under our first proposition, "its decision contradicts the *essential* and *primary* idea of government itself." Not to be tedious, we believe that all who will carefully examine into the causes which have brought about the present

prostration and disorganisation of our Seminary, will be convinced that this result is entirely due to the *error* of the students, in the first place; and secondly to the oversight or misapprehension of the Assembly as to the real nature of all "*de facto*" government, which not only *may*, but *must* require the obedience of its own subjects, or cease to be a government, except in name. We would here remind the reader that it is obedience alone which distinguishes government from anarchy; and where obedience is not voluntarily rendered, it must be enforced, or anarchy is the inevitable consequence. Now the ear of the Church has been filled with much talk about this Seminary law respecting attendance on the chapel services on the Lord's day being optional, ought to be optional, etc., which all sounds very nicely and full of sympathy for the poor *oppressed* students, upon whose necks the faculty had planted the cruel and remorseless heel of tyranny; but we shall be greatly surprised if the mind of the Church does not discover the utter emptiness of this sound, when contrasted with the palpable contradiction which this notion of *optional* obedience to any *lawful* regulation under any actual government involves. No law or regulation under any government, we maintain, can be otherwise than *binding* on the subject; for the moment you separate from law the idea of necessary obedience, law ceases to be law, and becomes merely *advice*, which the subject is at liberty to regard or not, as he sees fit. Law contemplates, and is inseparably connected with, the idea of obedience; and how any government can exist on the face of the earth where obedience is left to the option of its subjects, is above our comprehension. Let us illustrate this, for all "*de facto*" governments will furnish us with apt illustrations. Take the government of this or any other State in the Union for example, and we will ask ourselves, what kind of a government we would have if obedience to State laws was left to the option of citizens; that is, obey or not obey, as every one might decide for himself? Would not anarchy be the inevitable result? Does not this principle of optional obedience strike at, yea, and overturn, the very foundations of government? Let us take another illustration, which is equally to the point, and which may be bet-

ter appreciated by some of our readers, because it brings the principle nearer home: We suppose every farmer claims to have some government, at least to the extent of a contract over the laborers in his service. Now, let him make any law or regulation on his farm, not inconsistent, of course, with the terms of his contract, nor at variance with God's law, and leave the matter of obedience to the option of his employèes—what would become of government on the farm? Would there be any? Certainly none on his part; for in this case the employèes have virtually changed places with the employer, as it respects the matter of government, for they do or do not as they please, and the employer has become a cipher in the control of his farm. It appears to us that these illustrations clearly show the truth of our first proposition, that the Assembly's decision, which grants to the theological students the liberty of optional obedience to a constitutional regulation, clearly contradicts the real and primary idea of government. Let us now apply these principles to the Seminary question, as it respects the real issue between the Faculty and some of the students, and which has been decided by the Assembly adverse to the Faculty. The Assembly certainly intended that there should be a real government over its Theological Seminary—not simply an *advisory* oversight by the Professors—not a sham, but veritable government. This we all must allow, when we consider that it has prescribed and published a well defined Constitution, with its laws, by-laws, and penalties, for the express government of this Seminary. But here now arises the difficulty, and a terrible outcry has been raised against the Faculty because they, in all good faith, attempted to carry out one of the provisions of the Constitution. Let us not here lose sight of the real point at issue. The students did not object to having chapel service on the Lord's day, for they requested it. It does not matter how they came to request it; and it is quite irrelevant to say they did it at the suggestion of a member of the Faculty, for his suggestion did not bind or oblige them. What they did was of their own accord, no matter who proposed it, whether a Professor or the "man in the moon." And in truth we have never heard that the students

objected to having chapel service, but only against their being *obliged* to attend, which, they said, conflicted with Christian liberty. Now this *obligation* was the real rock of offence on which these students were so mortally wounded, and which the Assembly has decided to remove. But the question arises, who created this *obligation*? Did the Faculty? Certainly not. Who, then? Why, this obligation, we must believe, arises out of the very nature of the "*de facto*" government established by the Assembly over the Seminary, and which, as we have already said, *must* require the obedience of its proper subjects, or cease to be government, except in name. It does appear to us a contradiction in terms, to say that the Faculty at Columbia, or any other executive power, can make obedience to law "optional." Whatever obligation rested on the students, the government created, and not the Faculty—and this obligation the students freely assumed when they pledged their obedience on entering the institution. But it has been said that this regulation respecting chapel service had never been in operation, and therefore the students, in pledging their obedience to the Constitution, did not promise obedience to *this* regulation. Those who have read the Constitution will consider this a strange inference, to say the least of it; but let us examine it. As there seems to be a question in some minds as to this regulation ever having been practised in the Seminary during its previous history, we are perfectly willing that it should still be considered a *question*, for we maintain that it does not alter the case one whit, even though this regulation may never have been previously executed. Where the Constitution says, "when desirable, the faculty shall furnish the students with preaching," just there it creates a standing permit, or rather injunction, on the Faculty to do this thing when they deem it proper. Suppose the Faculty had never, until recently, executed this injunction, what inference can be legitimately drawn from this, but that it was not hitherto deemed desirable? No one can deny their authority to have made this regulation at any period in the past, for the Constitution gives them this power most expressly; and manifestly the only reason why this regulation has not hitherto and always been enforced, is

because such a thing, in the judgment of the Faculty, was not desirable. But again: some of the students have claimed or assumed to themselves an equal right with the Faculty to determine, under the Constitution, whether these chapel services were desirable or not at the *time* they were appointed. If we are not sadly mistaken, the opinion of the Church has always been that these candidates for the ministry are sent to the Seminary, not as co-executors with the Faculty, of its discipline, but to be under the instruction, guidance, and government of those who have been considered well qualified to teach; and whenever the students become wise enough to direct their instructors, we are sure the Church will not be slow to acknowledge their claims, and will insist that they exchange places with their Professors.

It has also been said that the students were not bound to obey this regulation, because they were not aware that it existed, or that the power to make it was granted in the Constitution they had promised to obey. This plea of ignorance surely cannot be seriously set up as a bar to the performance of their contract, any more than such a plea would shield a man from the payment of the money, who signed a bond for five hundred dollars, thinking it was only fifty. We *ought* to know what we solemnly covenant to do; and if by any means we did not know, even then the good man ought to feel himself bound to conform his conduct to the standard of the Psalmist: "He that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not;" provided, of course, the oath or promise did not contemplate an *unlawful* thing, for such a thing is, "*ab initio*," void. We cannot bind ourselves or others to the performance of an unlawful act. And just here the cry of "conscience" startles us, and some declare that they cannot conscientiously obey this law for chapel service, even though constitutionally brought to bear upon them; and some defend the students on this question of conscience. But we would ask, why not obey this chapel regulation, as well as other Seminary laws, unless *this* regulation be morally wrong? But is this regulation morally wrong? We do not profess to be in full accord with the *teaching* of the age, and therefore we beg to be excused if we cannot see why attendance, yes, obligatory attendance, if that term

be preferred, on chapel service is morally wrong. The old-fashioned way of knowing right from wrong was by testing the matter by the Word of God, as the only infallible rule of faith and practice. This certainly was Paul's rule, for he says, "I had not known sin but by the law." Tried by the Bible, then, was this chapel regulation any greater moral wrong, or the *obligation* to obey it any greater infringement on Christian liberty, than the obligation to obey other Seminary rules? Is it the *being obliged* to worship God at a certain place and fixed time, that is deemed a *trampling* on liberty of conscience? If this be so, then has the Bible, yea, rather say God, the Supreme Ruler, trampled time and again on liberty(?) of conscience, for he *obliged* his people to worship at a certain place, the temple, and at *fixed* times. The principles of right and wrong are eternal and unchangeable; and if it was no violation of liberty of conscience to *oblige* the Jews to worship at a certain place and time, we cannot see why the Christian's liberty should be considered trampled upon, when he is required to do a like thing. But it has been said on this point, "that the Christian dispensation breathes more of the spirit of liberty than the Jewish." We fully concede this, and rejoice to know that there is a "liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free;" but in the name of truth we ask, is this liberty that of the Antinomian, which repudiates all *obligation* to obey law?

But has not the Assembly, in its decision of this Seminary issue, really taken just this ground, viz.: that obligation to obey a law, not anti-scriptural, but, on the contrary, having abundant precedent in the Scriptures, is or may be incompatible with Christian liberty? The plea for the students was substantially this: "Remove the *obligation* to obey this regulation; it is all we ask." Why remove the obligation? Because it conflicts with our Christian liberty—that liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free. The Assembly *has* removed the obligation—and why? Manifestly because the Assembly adjudged that this obligation did infringe on Christian liberty.

And this brings us to the consideration of our *second* proposi-

tion, which is, that the Assembly's decision is, in our opinion, unscriptural.

It is with sincere regret, and we trust "in lowliness of mind," that we declare such an opinion on the decision of so venerable a judicatory; but as it is only an opinion until proven, let us "to the law and to the testimony;" and if they do not sustain it, then "let the righteous smite me, it shall be a kindness; and let him reprove me, it shall be an excellent oil, which shall not break my head; for yet my prayer also shall be in their calamities."

We crave the indulgence of the reader for referring still further, and in this connection, to the question of conscience; but we cannot overlook it, since it has been sounded as the keynote of this whole affair, and has become the pivot on which discipline or no discipline may hereafter turn in the Presbyterian Church. With all due respect, therefore, for the wisdom of the Assembly, we must say, that according to our view of the matter, it has entirely overlooked the fact that there is such a thing as a *scriptural* and such a thing as an *unscriptural* liberty of conscience. These two are readily and often confounded, but may be easily distinguished by the light of divine truth; but only by this means—scriptural liberty considers itself aggrieved when, and only when that which is anti-scriptural is enjoined by a government; unscriptural liberty may defy all laws, human and divine; and it is only necessary to whisper the word *obligation* to rouse it from its lair, for every duty must be left optional, or it tramples upon it. In other words, the *one* agrees with Scripture—the *other* disagrees. Now, in all candor, does the liberty demanded for the students, and conceded by the Assembly, agree or disagree with Scripture? To test this matter truly, it seems to us that we should not draw on the inspired Word for some example of *supposed* analogy, but of doubtful application; but we must bring this liberty face to face with some positive Scripture, which is most directly pertinent, because of its unquestioned meaning and decided bearing on the question involved. We will therefore confront this "liberty" with the positive command of him who is the Lord of conscience: "*Obey them that have the rule over you.*" How do the two agree? Can they be recon-

ciled? Are they not hopelessly at variance—antagonistic, antipodal? Does not *that* liberty granted the students, show its *unscripturalness* by its kicking against Scripture? The command we have quoted is certainly applicable to *all* subjects of every duly constituted and recognised government, and is designed to regulate their behavior towards those in authority over them.* If obedience to our rulers ought to be optional in certain cases, those of conscience, for example, we think it would have appeared in such a command; but lo! the command is imperative, and leaves no requisition of any government, under *any circumstances*, to the option of the subject, and for these very evident reasons: (a) Where no anti-scriptural thing is enjoined, *Christian* liberty of conscience has no right to be, is not, offended, and hence there can be no room for *optional* obedience; for in this case we are *obliged* to obey, or we sin against God. (b) When any anti-scriptural requisition is made upon the subject, he certainly has no more option in this case than in the other; for he *must*, not *may*, obey God rather than man. This notion of optional obedience is obviously contradictory to the very meaning of government, as we have already shown; and it will prove itself to be a destructive and disorganising element, whenever the two are sought to be combined. It certainly finds no favor in Scripture nor in sound morality, which the adversary shall not be able to gainsay nor resist; for whatever is right or lawful in government, we *must* uphold and obey; and whatever is wrong, we *must* discountenance; and there is no choice left us in either case. Does the Bible, then, require us to obey our duly recognised rulers in all lawful things, and leave us no alternative but to obey or sin against God? It does; and so far is it from excusing disobedience on the ground of conscience, it makes conscience the ground of obedience. “Ye must needs be subject, not only for (from fear of) wrath, but also for conscience sake.” Does the Bible, then, conflict with Christian(?) liberty

*We know that this is addressed primarily to those under ecclesiastical authority; but that it is equally applicable to the subjects of every government may be fully inferred from the cognate passages, 1 Pet. ii., 13, 14; Rom. xiii., 1—6.

of conscience? We are constrained to believe, however painful the admission, that it does conflict with *that* liberty demanded for some of our theological students, and granted by the Assembly. Is the Bible wrong, too, on this point? If so, let us boldly repudiate, as now antiquated, the much cherished doctrine of its being the only infallible rule of faith and manners, and let us come to the front, and fully abreast with the spirit of the age avow our allegiance to the *higher* law of conscience. To our mind this question of "conscience" never had any *legitimate* rise or connection with these Seminary difficulties; but it was dragged into this issue, under specious devices of the deceitful heart, to hide a lawless spirit; and like a false "angel of light," it not only misled unsuspecting students, but brandished its sword so vauntingly in the face of our venerable Assembly, that many were awed into undue reverence.

But again: the Assembly, in making its decision, must have had in full view the fact that this appointed chapel service was not the *arbitrary* creature of unofficial persons, but a constitutional law of an established government; and hence, in making attendance voluntary, it really gives a sanction to disobedience to lawful authority; for surely every one must see that, with our Seminary students, attendance or non-attendance on chapel service is equivalent to their obedience or disobedience to a recognised law. If, therefore, they should attend the service, they do so with the full knowledge that they have the sanction of the Assembly to disobey a positive Seminary regulation, if they choose. If they do not attend—disobey the regulation—this is only doing what the Assembly has sanctioned. It is idle to say that ours is a captious interpretation of the Assembly's action; for it is not so in reality, and we have the right to maintain that the *meaning* of the Assembly's decision is its decision. But some will say, Shall not the Assembly interpret its own action, and say what it intended to declare? Certainly. But if not impertinent, we would like to know what would be thought of us, should we say of our neighbor, he is a thief, and when confronted with the charge, reply, we did say you were a thief, but we did not mean by this that you had stolen?

But the record is before the Church, and we will quote it *verbatim*, for the sake of vindicating our exposition of its meaning from any charge of captiousness :

(5) That the General Assembly hereby expresses its entire confidence in the Faculty of Columbia Seminary.

(6) That the General Assembly respectfully recommends to the Faculty, that in the event services in the chapel be deemed desirable, the attendance on said services, on the part of Faculty and students, be voluntary.—*Assembly Minutes*, p. 677.

It is obviously only with the last resolution that we are now concerned, and also only as it applies to the students, for it would lead us too far from our present purpose to do more than barely suggest whether the Faculty ought to be mentioned in such a resolution ; for their relation to the government of the Seminary is purely *executive*, and so long as they cause the laws to be executed, it need be no concern with us what disposition they make of their time and bodily presence. If they supply the students, when desirable, with the preaching of the gospel, this is all the Constitution obliges them to do in the case ; and it is quite supererogatory to refer the executive to the same plane with the subjects of a government ; for, as every one will allow, the relations of the two parties to the government, are very different. But to return to the meaning of the last resolution : We maintain that in case the chapel service on the Sabbath *be instituted*—and it was established as a Seminary regulation when the Assembly made its decision, and was not annulled by said body—then it is as much and as truly a constitutional provision as the attendance on the instructions in Hebrew or Theology—and being a law, it follows that attendance or non-attendance on the part of the students can only mean obedience or disobedience to law. But, as we have already shown, the Bible does not leave obedience to the choice of the subject ; it gives no countenance to voluntaryism in relation to government ; for we *must* obey what is lawful, and disobey what is unlawful, or we sin against God. This principle of voluntaryism contradicts the primary idea of government, which, as we have already said, *must* require the obedience of its subjects, or cease to be. It is equally

at variance with every Scripture bearing on the relation of rulers and the ruled. We know there are some who seek to evade this logical result of the Assembly's action, by attempting to discriminate between a *decision* and a *recommendation* of a judicatory. This, however, will not avail; for in the reply which the Assembly made to the paper of the *protestants*, attention was pointedly called to the fact that "this action complained of is the action of the Assembly, to be respected and observed as such." There is no mistaking, therefore, the meaning of recommendation, as used by the Assembly. Begging pardon for a little digression here, we desire to submit to our co-Presbyters, whether or not recommendations are consonant with Presbyterian government? We think recommendation belongs to an *advisory* rather than a governmental polity—to Congregationalism rather than Presbyterianism—and so, when we hear any of our Church courts recommending, we always think it is because of one of these two reasons; either the court is not sure of its *power* to enjoin, which is fatal to real government; or else of its *right* in the premises; in which case the accused is justly entitled to the benefit of the doubt. No reasonable subject under any government, whether civil or ecclesiastical, will object to its mandates being expressed in governmental phraseology. We like soft words as much as any one, but would hardly expect to find them in the decisions of a court of justice.

But we must hasten to the consideration of the last general proposition, which is, That the practical and logical tendency of the Assembly's action is to disorganise and destroy all scriptural government or discipline in our whole Presbyterian fabric. We cannot, without trespassing on the patience of our readers, go into detail, showing how the application of this new rule of discipline will affect the integral parts of our system, and must therefore content ourselves with the briefest reference to its effect on any discipline of our Presbyteries in future, observing however that the same principle is involved in every case where the reciprocal duties of rulers and subjects are sought to be adjudicated. And now we would like to ask our Presbyteries what they would or could do with the Assembly's decision as a controlling precedent,

should one of our candidates be expelled from some literary college—Davidson for example—for refusing to attend on the regularly appointed chapel services on the Sabbath if he should make the same plea of the theological students, “that this obligation was incompatible with Christian liberty.” Could we discipline him? The cases are perfectly analogous. Both are professedly Christian men—having a common end in view—the only difference between them being one of degree, and our candidate has equal right with the Seminary student to shelter himself under the protecting shield of the Assembly’s decision. But what would become of the government of the College if our Presbyteries should encourage the students to demand such liberty in the name of conscience! Why not make liberty of conscience relieve from obligation to attend morning and evening prayer? But we go still further and say we do not see, how a Presbytery consistently with the Assembly’s decision, can discipline one of its members for the baldest heresy, provided he pleads liberty of conscience. We need not think of going to the Bible to prove the heresy, for has not the Assembly most obviously decided the principle in this Seminary issue, that when conscience and the Bible conflict we must follow conscience? The Bible required the students to *obey*—their conscience would not permit them—the Assembly has decided for conscience and against the Bible. To show that in this statement we do not misunderstand the position of the Assembly, we will ask in all candor, Was not the Assembly’s decision made in full accord with and really based on the declaration uttered by one of its advocates—“When a Christian man pleads conscience he was done—conscience is too sacred to be trifled with; it may be weak, but it is not to be made strong by oppression. He cares not how weak the point is, if conscience is pleaded, he was done.” We have singled out this speech from others, not out of disrespect to the individual who uttered it, but simply because it contains in a nut-shell the burden of the plea which obtained the verdict for the students. We might easily show the logical fallacy of each of these propositions, seeing that it is quite begging the question to cover up under the broad term *Christian* the very and only point of issue, which is the *orthodoxy*

of said conscience; but we prefer to illustrate the doctrine in its practical effects, and we will therefore introduce Professor Swing of Chicago as knocking at the door of Presbytery for admission. Will you receive him? There are thousands who are ready to testify that he is a good, Christian man, and the only objection which any can urge against him (but this is no objection with some of us!) is, that his *conscience* will not allow him to submit to the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church which he once solemnly covenanted to obey, nor to preach the doctrines of its *antiquated* faith. Walk in, Professor. None shall disturb you here for standing by your conscience—when a Christian man pleads conscience we are done! It is downright persecution to prosecute a minister of the Presbyterian Church when his conscience forbids him to preach its doctrines or obey its Constitution! And has our Southern Presbyterian Church come to this! “Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon: lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph.” The decision we complain of manifestly lifts us to the same plane of Broad-Churchism occupied by the Northern Presbyterians, for we are now prepared to lock shields, as they have done, with heretical brethren, under the broad term Christian. Did any in our Assembly design to pave the way for a reunion with the Northern Church? It cannot be idle to ask such a question, for a more decided step in this direction can hardly be imagined. If we cannot, without the cry of *persecution*, discipline and drive out those who are heretical according to our standards, from our household of faith, when they plead liberty of conscience, then we had better publicly announce our “new departure,” and confess that Presbyterianism is a thing of the past. In view of this, who can wonder that bitter tears have been wrung from strong men over this decision of our Assembly? Who can wonder that men of pronounced ability in the Church have openly declared that they would not send their sons, or give their means to support the Seminary, where doctrines logically tending to Broad-Churchism are taught?

But it may be said that we are spending much time in dealing

with supposable cases and crying wolf when there is none to meet. But we maintain that a hypothetical case, if probable and reasonable, may illustrate a principle as truly as an actual case. We too, however, are done with supposable cases, for we have an actual and very sorrowful one for contemplation in our disorganised and prostrate Seminary. Two of its cherished Professors resigned, and from present appearances but little hope of filling the vacancies with competent men—some of its strongest moneyed friends withdrawing their support on the ground that the Seminary has broken loose from its ancient moorings and is now on the treacherous sea of Broad-Churchism—other Professors clinging to the wreck, with what hope they can, which has brought so many and so great spiritual comforts to our storm-beaten and hitherto immovable household of faith. This has been the immediate effect of the Assembly's decision, and the blight has fallen *first* upon this Institution, only because it afforded the first case for the application of the new principle of discipline decided for it. But some will say, Ought the Assembly's decision to have had such an effect on the Seminary? In other words, ought any of the Professors to have resigned their chairs, or those who remain to consider themselves wronged? "*Fiat justitia ruat cælum.*" We do not see how any unprejudiced mind, in view of all the circumstances, can do otherwise than justify the Professors who have resigned and sympathise with those who remain as deeply wronged. For look at it. These men, venerated by the whole Church for their learning and piety—*tried* men, who have done valiant service for the cause of truth, and against whom not even a whisper of detraction had ever been allowed—*these* men have been implicitly condemned by our highest court, and that not upon any charge of failure to meet their obligations as Professors: nor upon any charge of exceeding the power vested in them by the Assembly itself through the Constitution—not upon any charge at all, unless it was their daring to do their duty in spite of the clamors of an anti-scriptural liberty of conscience, and more than this, *without a hearing*. "Doth our law judge any man before it hear him?" We know it has been said that the Assembly gave one of these Professors the privilege of de-

fending himself, but he declined. There are many who fully sympathise with that Professor, who stood on the *dignity of conscientious innocence* before the Assembly, for it would have been exceedingly simple in him to have attempted to defend himself when no charge had been made against him.

We would like to show, if time sufficed, how all of our Executive Committees are interested in the Assembly's decision, for their relation to the Assembly and to their respective duties is analogous to that which the Faculty holds to the Assembly and their peculiar duties. All are alike executive agents of the Assembly, and the decision of any principle affecting one affects all. The Assembly has the right to review the work of its agents and rectify what is amiss, but no right to condemn its agents unless they have been unfaithful to the constitutional obligations devolved upon them.

If the Faculty had been condemned because of their disregard for constitutional requirements—either failing to meet their obligations as Professors, or exceeding their authority as rulers, not a word in their defence would have been written by us, but the *facts* in their case warrant the assertion that in neither of these respects are the Faculty culpable. They did only what the General Assembly in and by the Constitution of the Seminary authorised them to do. The case is manifestly this: A gives to B the management of a certain business, with definite instructions to guide him, and in certain emergencies he is to do thus and so if it seems to him to be *desirable*. B accepts and conducts the business very satisfactorily for a long time; but now in his opinion the emergency anticipated by A arises, and he very properly shapes his conduct according to A's directions in case of the emergency. Now suppose evil effects follow B's modification of policy, who is to be blamed? Certainly not B, for he strictly followed A's directions in case of the emergency. B was only A's agent carrying out his directions before and after the emergency arose. But you will say, "B ought to have had better sense than to have thought the emergency was upon him, while others (some Seminary students for example) saw that there was no emergency." We reply then, that A ought to have had

better sense than to have left it to B's judgment to determine the emergency, and therefore the justly responsible party for all the evil effects is A—Assembly. In view of the considerations now adduced, we repeat the observation, We do not see how any of our Presbyteries, church sessions, seminaries of learning, or any other government, can exercise a wholesome, scriptural discipline over their respective subjects, should they plead liberty of conscience in extenuation of their resistance to *lawful* authority and violation of solemn compacts.

When scriptural discipline ends, pure, orthodox Presbyterianism dies, and with it, so far as we are concerned, the "faith which was once delivered to the saints."

Lastly, we think that the Assembly's decision is unconstitutional, because, although not FORMALLY, still it virtually changes, without the requisite two-thirds vote, that organic feature of the Constitution of the Seminary, which obliges every student in the Seminary to obey all its laws and regulations. The regulation for chapel services is, when announced by the Faculty, as much and as truly a part of the Constitution as any other of its laws, and the students are as much bound to obey this as any other requisition; but the Assembly has released them from all *obligation* to obey it. We have, therefore, two antagonising forces in the same government at the same time—the Constitution *obliging* the students to obedience to a certain law—the Assembly releasing them from *obligation* to obey that law,—a kingdom divided against itself; and the only possibility for harmony is by the removal of one or the other of these opposing forces. The Assembly has removed the obligation from the Constitution. Is not this virtually the repeal of an organic law? Can the Assembly make so radical a change, without disregarding its own Constitution, which conditions all such changes on the two-thirds vote? Is the Assembly independent of its Constitution? Might it not be charged with setting the example of a disregard for constitutional laws?

We are no Cassandra, prophesying evil to our beloved Church, when there is no need of alarm; but we are constrained to see that this Seminary question has been the occasion of revealing

the fact that our ecclesiastical sky is threateningly overcast, for if this is the *fixed* decision of our highest court, and if it really reflects the sentiment of our Church at large, then it needs no prophet's pen to write "Ichabod" on our Southern Church. Her glory, as a law-abiding, covenant-keeping Church, has fled!

ARTICLE III.

RIGHTEOUSNESS, NEW NATURE, AND FAITH.*

In our own testimony to the truth, and in all statements of Christian doctrine, it becomes us to be severe and exacting in applying the tests of scriptural accuracy to our expressions. Our carelessness may do unforeseen dishonor to the truth, and may mislead inquirers into whose hands the testimony falls. It is sufficiently painful to find, as public teachers frequently do, how their most guarded statements are misapprehended by candid hearers or readers. But it is more than painful and humiliating when the misapprehension is due to a laxity of expression into which we have fallen from habit or inconsideration. This is especially applicable to the written and printed testimony of those who are connected with our periodical literature; in which, variety of occasions and briefness of opportunity increase the hazard of inaccuracy. "What is written remains;" and while there is here the responsibility that errors and mistakes may be perpetuated, there is here, also, the advantage that what has been advanced may be reviewed and corrected even if it can-

* It has been our rule for some years past to admit no article to these pages which has appeared elsewhere in print. By particular request, we depart, however, from the rule, in the present case, where the reader will find a reply by the late Rev. James Inglis, of New York, to the criticisms of his theology, which we published in January, 1872. This reply we take from *Waymarks in the Wilderness*, for April, 1872.—[Eds. S. P. R.]

not be recalled—an advantage which one who has any sense of the responsibility will rejoice to improve.

We should be severe in guarding and judging the accuracy of our own expressions, but cautious in criticising the expressions of others. Not that we should hesitate to expose error wherever it lurks, or to point out inaccuracies which may mislead, however innocently they may have been introduced. No one who is to be respected as a witness to the truth will fail to welcome such a truly brotherly office. Even though there may be a suspicion of partisan spirit in the criticism, one who aims simply to testify or teach the truth, will be glad to learn where he has failed, and to know how his language may be misunderstood, even when the views he designed to express are scriptural. While we are to be faithful in pointing out errors and inaccuracies, it still becomes us to be cautious in criticising the expressions of others, in order that we may do no injustice by detaching language from its connections, or misrepresenting its designed application. A failure in this respect, however, will rather prove an injustice to an individual than an injury to the truth. And though a lover of the truth will shrink from perpetrating the injustice upon another, he will find a consolation in this thought when he has been the subject of it.

The attention of friends of truth, both by public and private criticism, has called us frequently to the review of the course of this periodical. Recent attentions of this kind have suggested the remarks just made, and we trust may be profitable both to our readers and ourselves. We have seen, in some of these criticisms, where a want of accuracy may have misled some of our readers on points of no slight importance. On more than one occasion we have had occasion to speak of the manner in which the work of Christ for us has been divided into active and passive obedience, our forgiveness being connected with the one, while our justification is made to depend upon the other. The reaction from this unscriptural representation is an error against which we have urgently testified—that the Lord was our Substitute only on the cross. Yet one of our friendly critics points out this sentence in *Waymarks*, Vol. viii., p. 273: “We have already stated

our objection to the notion of a vicarious keeping of the law, as well as to the distinction which it makes between pardon and justification, and the grounds upon which either of them rest," etc. Though the general aim of the article from which the quotation is made is to oppose the error which limits Christ's work for us to the cross, the passage quoted, and one or two phrases throughout the article, may seem to favor it. That to which we objected was the division referred to. For if you have first of all admitted an active obedience to the law by a substitute as the ground of justification, and that obedience was complete before he reached the cross, on what ground could the curse of the law be inflicted? I have fulfilled the law by my substitute, and have a perfect righteousness. What more does the law demand? This was the objection; and what we designed to urge was, that the condition of man as a sinner and condemned rendered any such righteousness impossible.

The friend who points out the inaccuracy says that "No intelligent believer speaks of being pardoned by Christ's passive and justified by Christ's active obedience." We find a different statement in Dr. Smeaton on the Atonement, who speaks of a "class of divines who ascribe forgiveness to the sufferings, and the right to everlasting life to the active obedience—an unhappy separation, *though countenanced by eminent names*, and by no means to be vindicated." We quote the rest of Dr. Smeaton's paragraph as a clear statement of what we have aimed to teach: "As it is the work of one Christ, it is one atoning obedience; and though we may and must distinguish the elements of which it consists, we may not disjoin them, for the two elements concur to form one obedience. That they cannot be separated appears from many considerations, and especially from this, that in every action there was a humiliation, and in every suffering an exercise of obedience. They both pervade every event in that wondrous life. They were not in exercise at different times, in different actions, and in successive hours. They meet in the same action and at the same time over the entire life of Jesus, from the first moment of his humiliation to the last."

The same friendly critic furnishes examples of the injustice

that may be done to a statement by severing expressions from their connections. Thus, he says, "We find the *Waymarks* speaking currently of faith as a *means of regeneration*;" and it is urged that this language suggests that "this faith begins before the sinner is born again." There was doubtless no intentional misrepresentation, and yet on the very page from which the expression is quoted, it is stated that the word of God is not only "a means, but *the means of regeneration*;" and in the articles referred to, it is maintained that the fact that a man believes is proof that he is born again. "If he does, then we have God's word for it that he is born of God."

Nor is there any contradiction in these expressions; for the Lord, in reply to Nicodemus's question, "How can these things be?" speaks of the Son of Man being "lifted up, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life." "To as many as received him, to them gave he power to become sons of God." "Ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus." If we go back a step, we find that "faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God." Or, to go back a step further, "It hath pleased God, by the foolishness of preaching, to save them that believe." But are these statements of means—"by preaching," "by faith," "by the word of God"—to be arrayed against one another, or do they not bear harmonious testimony to one great truth? In the same article in *Waymarks* this language is used: "While the word of God is the incorruptible seed of the new birth, the means by which the Spirit of God accomplishes his new creation, regeneration is not in any sense a change effected in our ruined nature by the natural influence of the truth which presents new motives, new principles, new aims of life. It does all this, but it would present them in vain to a nature that is incapable of discerning them, or utterly insensible to them, or irreconcilably opposed to them. To be born anew is to be brought into a new life." Afterward, in referring to the question, Where is the point at which life begins? it is remarked, "Jesus stood by the grave of Lazarus, and cried with a loud voice, 'Lazarus, come forth,' and he that was dead came forth." The same cavilling curiosity might demand, At what

point was consciousness restored to Lazarus? Was it before the words fell upon his ear, else how could he hear the call? Was it as the call fell upon his ear? Was it after the words were pronounced? Who would not be shocked by such profane trifling amidst the sublime solemnities of such a scene? We only know that Jesus uttered the call, and he that was dead obeyed. So it is enough for us to have his own assurance, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, the hour is coming, and now is, when the *dead shall hear* the voice of the Son of God, and *they that hear shall live.*"

The design of these remarks is not to maintain the consistency of our testimony, or to defend ourselves from injustice, which is doubtless unintentional. In the personalities of the review, there are mistakes which are the results of misinformation regarding the editor of *Waymarks*. But the correctness of the views taught is unaffected by this; and as it is farthest from our desire to give a name to a system, or gain personal adherents by the advocacy of it, we cannot occupy these pages with an autobiography. Only in justice to our contributors on the one hand, and to the Plymouth Brethren on the other, it is proper to say that no one connected with that sect ever wrote a line for its pages. Our contributors are chiefly "pastors of our Reformed churches," most of them well known, though they do not claim consideration for what they write on ecclesiastical grounds. So far from being "the doctrinal representative of the Plymouth Brethren," while we gratefully own our indebtedness to them, under God, for the testimony they have borne to our standing in Christ and the hope of our calling, we have been constrained to testify against nearly everything in their theology which distinguishes them from the other men of God named in the review which occasions this statement.

Perhaps we should except the doctrine of "the two natures," which Dr. Bonar opposes in terms similar to those employed by the reviewer. The statement of this truth in the form which Dr. Bonar considers so objectionable, did not originate with the Plymouth Brethren. Some two hundred years ago, Dr. Stillingfleet wrote, "In an unconverted person there is but one nature; in a

real Christian there are two natures; the one is called the flesh, the other is called the spirit." Though the doctrine is old as the New Testament, this was probably the first use of the terms "two natures," the use of which has been perpetuated to our day. We first became familiar with them in the tract of J. Denham Smith and in the writings of Plymouth Brethren, and have continued to use them for want of better, as signifying what in Scripture is styled "the old man" and "the new man"—"that which is born of the flesh;" and "that which is born of the Spirit."

It is an easy matter to raise cavils against the doctrine, and easier still to ridicule the expressions "two natures" or "two men" in the Christian. And we own that it is difficult to speak with unflinching accuracy on such subjects. Dr. Bonar says that we "seem to teach that the regenerate man is made up of two persons, two individuals." Then, forgetting that this is the construction which he puts upon our language, he presses us with the very taunts with which infidels have been wont to impeach the morality of the seventh chapter of Romans. Who is responsible for sin committed—the old man or the new man? "It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me." The reviewer of the *Waymarks* makes virtually the same objection. Those who have spoken of two natures have probably used unguarded expressions which may be quoted to justify such a construction of their teaching. Yet they have been careful to disclaim all thoughts of two persons. And may we not venture to say that the difficulty about two conflicting tendencies and responsibilities should be settled in the first place with the statement of Paul's experience in Romans vii., already referred to? Those who press it would do well to remember also, before they carry their ridicule too far, that the old man and the new man—which are two—are in Scripture represented as remaining, the one to be put off, and the other to be put on by the believer.

There is, however, a question which may perplex an inquirer, and which perplexes some who receive the doctrine of the two natures as taught in Scripture and responded to in their own consciousness. The question is, What is my personality—that in

which my conscious identity abides in and through regeneration, and all possible changes in the condition and mode of my existence? Adam in innocence, in his fall, in his regeneration, (for there is reason to conclude that he was born again,) preserved his conscious identity, and will do so through all the glories of eternity. Now, what is that one existing personality—the Adam who lived and died and lives again?

The answer to this question is to be found in the record of man's original constitution: "So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." A variety of views have been entertained regarding the image of God in which man was created, accommodated to the assumption that it was lost by the fall. Some have referred it to the dominion with which he was invested; but in the record, it is rather intimated that it was his creation in the image of God that fitted him for dominion. More commonly it has been regarded as a likeness of moral perfection; but such an image of God must have included impeccability, and a fall would have been impossible. It has been assumed that the image of God was lost by the fall; but this is not taught in the Scriptures. On the contrary, after the flood, the sacredness of human life is affirmed on the ground that man is made in the image of God. (Gen. ix., 6.) James, speaking of the tongue, says, "Therewith bless we God, and therewith curse we men, which are made in the similitude of God." (James iii. 9.)

We understand this statement to signify that God created a conscious intelligence into which he copied his own qualities, limited, of course, by the condition of a creature; so that the attributes, which in God are infinite, have their finite counterpart in man. Were it otherwise, the knowledge of God would be impossible. We know mind in its qualities and action only by consciousness, and revelation could not have conveyed to us a conception of qualities of which we are not conscious in our own minds. The revealed attributes of God are intelligible to us by what we find in ourselves. Wisdom, truth, justice, love, goodness, are intelligible words when used to express the attributes of God, only because they express qualities of which we ourselves

are conscious; though, alas! in a fallen state, that consciousness may be chiefly in the violation of them.

Still more evident is it that without such a correspondence of nature, fellowship with God would have been impossible to Adam. Without this we could have known nothing of the principles of God's moral government, nor could we have been fit subjects of it with moral responsibility. However these principles may be violated, justice, goodness, and truth are perfectly intelligent terms even to depraved men; as the apostle, in arguing the responsibility of the heathen, says, "Their thoughts meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." The conclusive argument is found in the fact of incarnation. "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us." Without this correspondence, God could not have been manifested in humanity. Yet he appeared as a man among men, who said, "He that hath seen me, hath seen the Father."

This image of God manifestly must be independent of bodily organisation; for God, whose qualities are copied, is a Spirit. Something was lost by the fall, and what it was is intimated in the sentence, "In the day thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." The loss was LIFE; not conscious existence; for men, of whom the Lord says, "Ye have not life," in the true and original sense—men who are dead in trespasses and sins, have conscious existence, and all the essential qualities of humanity; fallen man is still man made in the image of God. He lost the God-breathed life which had its sphere in his original relations to God, and which kept all his powers and affections in their proper direction and exercise within these relations. When life and its relations were lost, the powers and affections remained, though they fell into disorder, and went astray from their proper object. Life being lost, corruption followed. They became slaves to a lower nature, and found their objects in a lower sphere. Yet the powers and affections themselves were the same, whether God or the creature were their object and ruler. Again, in regeneration, we receive no new faculties or affections, but we receive life, which gives a new direction and new objects to the faculties and affec-

tions which we already possess, and in which our conscious identity, our proper personality, resides.

In the loss of life, that personality—that *I*—with all its faculties and affections, is said to be “in the flesh,” and obeys it in the lusts thereof. And the doctrine of Scripture is, “that which is born of the flesh is flesh.” No cultivation of it, or of the powers and affections which it controls, can supply the loss of life. There is conscious existence, but the man is dead in trespasses and sins. Regeneration is the communication of life to this man so dead. It is the implantation of something that was not there before. There is a new creation—creation as real as the first. It is not the restoration of the life that was lost; that was gone forever with all its relations. It is unspeakably higher life, with unspeakably higher relations. It is the life which the Son of God has in himself, even eternal life, which he gives to as many as the Father hath given to him. “That which is born of the Spirit is spirit,” said the Lord of this new nature, in contrast with the old, “that which is born of the flesh is flesh.” But personal identity is not disturbed. The conscious *I* remains. No new faculties or affections are communicated; only they have new objects and direction under the control of that Christ-life which has its sphere in the relations of Christ to God-life, which cannot be severed or diverted from its object; for it is eternal life—that is to say, it is impeccable.

This is what we mean when we speak of a new nature, that which is born of God, in distinction from that old nature, the flesh, which is born of the flesh; whether the word “nature” be regarded as the proper word to describe either. They are in no way related, but are contrary the one to the other. The flesh is not transmuted into spirit. We need not shrink from saying something is implanted which was not there before. Life, eternal life, is communicated to the man who had no life, who was dead in sins—life, which has its object necessarily, immutably, and impeccably, if we may so say, in God, and its sphere in new and imperishable relations to God; because the life is Christ-life, and the relations are Christ’s relations to God. This is what we claim to be in its very nature perfect; for no one surely would dare to

say that that which is born of God, or that the Christ-life is "imperfectly holy, but progressively so." Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; for his seed remaineth in him, and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.

But the question remains, Is this new nature implanted beside the old? and has the man who receives it two hostile natures or conflicting principles in him? It will be granted that the life which is given to the man who had no life, is a new thing. It is not the flesh changed into spirit. If so, the only question remaining is, Whether that which was born of the flesh is extirpated when this new life is communicated? The man made in the image of God—the conscious *I*—with all his powers, faculties, and affections, was the servant of sin. He obeyed the flesh with its lusts. The mind of the flesh is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be; he had no life. Now he has received life, eternal life, which has its object in God, and which, therefore, would bring him and all his powers and affections into subjection to God. Here are two controlling principles opposite as enmity is to love, sin to holiness, darkness to light. When the one has sole sway, there can be nothing but sin. It is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. When the other has unhindered sway, there can be no sin. "He cannot sin, for he is born of God." In an unregenerate man we see the former; but in the regenerate man do we see the other? In the unregenerate man sin was alone and unhindered; but in the regenerate man, though he has life, eternal life, the flesh remains to war against it, and that to the very last of a mortal pilgrimage; for the Apostle John says, without any qualification as to the stage of a believer's progress, so long as life lasts, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."

We are challenged for a scriptural proof that the flesh unchanged in its character remains in the believer in conflict with the new and divine life. Not to multiply quotations, we may reply that every exhortation, warning, encouragement, and direction toward a holy life is the proof, and has its corroboration in the experience of every child of God. Ungodly pretenders may

lay hold of the testimony of Scripture to this fact, and pervert it as an excuse for a life of sin. Even a child of God may, for aught we know, have abused his liberty as an occasion to the flesh. Rather a child of God will cherish the testimony of Scripture to the life which he has in Christ, and own it as the ground of the charge, "Let not sin *therefore* reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof." Even when he has experienced the power of that which would bring him into captivity to the law of sin and death, it will only extort the cry, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?"

What meaning would there be in the charge, "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof," if there were no sin seeking to reign, and no lusts to be obeyed? Take any exhortation to personal holiness within the compass of the Bible, and see if it does not imply the same thing. This, however, is far from implying that the believer must go on in sin—"these things write we unto you, that ye sin not"—and far from teaching that the fruit of the Spirit and the works of the flesh must be permanently combined in the Christian. "Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh." Still, this implies that the flesh is there.

We are far from teaching that there is to be no growth in grace and the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ; or that there is to be no progress in personal holiness. On the contrary, there should be a progress which knows no stopping place of perfection in this life. There is, indeed, a blessed hope that "we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is. And every one that hath this hope in him, purifieth himself as he is pure." But every view of this progress and purifying implies the presence of sin in the flesh to be counteracted and resisted, which still tinges and obscures the manifestation to the true life. Surely it is not the new heart—that which is born of God—which needs to be purified, or in which sin is found, so that if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. The growth of a believer is not in satisfaction with himself, but the opposite, an ever-deepening humiliation in clearer

discoveries of what he is in himself. It is not the confession of an unbeliever, or even of a babe in Christ, but of the most enlightened saint: "In me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing." This is the conclusion to which true self-examination leads. For that to which the Spirit of God calls, "Let a man examine himself," is not a search for graces and excellences on which we may rest the conclusion that we are the favorites of God, but evils which, undetected and unconfessed, must bring upon us fatherly chastisement. We are encouraged to the exercise by the assurance, "If we would judge ourselves, we should not be judged."

The only rest and satisfaction for the awakened soul is in Christ and his work for us. The gospel does not come to tell a man that he is a chosen favorite of heaven, and call on him to believe this. What it testifies regarding himself is, that he is a sinner, and to him in that character comes the message, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." His faith is well expressed as a satisfaction with that which has satisfied God for sin. There is rest for his soul, and he comes to that rest only when he is emptied of all self-satisfaction. So that faith is an exalted estimate of God, and a correspondingly low estimate of self. No one can imagine, then, that faith can grow exceedingly by the search for our own excellences. Whatever men may say, the only true rest that the soul can ever enjoy is in Christ, and the only warrant and support of faith is the word of God. So Jonathan Edwards, after he had written a book on *the Religious Affections*, when he came to comfort a soul distracted by a search for evidences, wrote, "One new discovery of the glory of Christ's face will do more toward scattering clouds of darkness in one minute, than examining old experience by the best marks that can be given through a whole year." And for himself he says, "The very thought of joy arising in me, on any consideration of my own amiableness, performances, or experiences, or any goodness of heart, is nauseous and detestable to me."

ARTICLE IV.

CHURCH POWER.*

THE CHURCH OF THE LIVING GOD, THE PILLAR AND GROUND OF THE TRUTH.—1 Timothy iii. 16.

Writing to the Ephesians, Paul says “the Church is built on the foundation of the apostles and prophets.” Calvin points out how this signifies that the Church is founded on *the doctrine* of the apostles and prophets, so that if this foundation of true doctrine be subverted, the edifice itself must fall. So, by this Scripture, Calvin proves that there is no true Church where there is no true doctrine.

But in my text, Paul seems to reverse the figure. He makes the Church now to be the supporter of the truth, instead of the truth being the foundation of the Church. He says the Church is the pillar and ground of the truth. She stands under it like a pillar, and holds it up. She is a beacon-tower, and bears up on high that light which lightens the tempest-tossed, enveloped in darkness and gloom. It is light and not darkness she exalts and sustains—it is truth and not falsehood she holds up and holds forth. Thus, whilst the apostle has reversed his figure, it is still the same truth he is teaching. As Calvin expounds his meaning in this second passage, it answers precisely to the first: “Where lying and falsehood have usurped the ascendancy, there is no Church.” Both texts teach that doctrine is the life of the Church. The one plain and simple mark of a true Church is true doctrine.

* According to previous appointment, this discourse was preached before the Presbytery of South Carolina, in the Presbyterian church at Walhalla, on Friday, the 11th September, 1874. The thanks of the body were voted the preacher, and a copy of the sermon was requested, that it might appear in this REVIEW, and in the *Southern Presbyterian*, and a thousand copies of it in pamphlet form be printed for the use of its ministers, elders, deacons, and church-members. The Presbytery also resolved that when printed, the sermon should be read in every one of its pulpits, on the first Sunday in November, or as soon thereafter as might be practicable.

Still, of course, there is often a true Church where much imperfection prevails, both of doctrine and of practice. And no uninspired man more fully and beautifully than John Calvin has expounded how we must adhere to the Church, howsoever imperfect, so long as she maintains fundamental truth. A perfect Church has never existed on the earth. Such a Church does not now exist, and never will exist, till the final consummation. We must be tolerant of the Church's minor imperfections. We must be submissive to the authority of imperfect churches.

When informed, my brethren, of your appointment to preach on *Church power* before this meeting of the Presbytery, the question presented itself, In what aspect of the subject does this venerable court design to have Church power considered?

In the first place, did they have in their thoughts the old distinction made by Calvin, of three departments of Church power, viz.: the power *diatactic* or law-making, the power *diacritic* or judicial, and the power *dogmatic* or doctrinal?

If this be the aspect in which we are now to consider the subject of Church power, let it be observed that of the *law-making* power very little indeed is possessed by the Church. Her officers are not God's councillors, but only his servants. Not a movement can she lawfully make, not a step can she lawfully take, at her own discretion. She is permitted to act only by divine command. For everything set up by her, she must be able to produce a "thus saith the Lord." In religion, whatever is not commanded is forbidden; for the Word is our only and sufficient rule of faith and practice. "The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture, unto which nothing is at any time to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of man." Our doctrine, our discipline, our worship, are all divine and revealed things, to which the Church can add, from which she can take away, nothing. No more discretion has the Church in regulating those who compose her membership. She can make no new laws to bind their conscience. Neither contrary to, nor yet beside the Scripture,

can she impose any new duties not imposed on men by the Word. On the other hand, she cannot make anything to be sinful which God himself has not forbidden. In fine, the Church has no law-making power, except as to circumstances of time and place, order and decency, which, from the nature of the case, Scripture could not regulate, and which must needs be left, and have therefore been left, to human discretion. All the power which the Church has about laws is declarative and ministerial. Her officers are servants of the Lord, and declare not their own will, but the Lord's, and that only as he makes it known in the Word, which is open to all men, and which every man is entitled to judge of and interpret for himself.

Now, how is it as to the Church's power in declaring doctrine? This certainly is one main office of the Church in this world. She bears testimony to his truth, sets to it her seal, and publishes it as faithful and true. In two forms the Church exercises the power of declaring doctrine: the one as her teaching elders severally proclaim the truth, the other as the ruling elders assembled in her courts, from the lowest up to the highest, are authorised jointly to render deliverances upon all questions of truth and morals which properly come before them. This is the old-time Presbyterian distinction of *several power* and *joint power*, first drawn forth from the Scriptures, by Calvin, accepted and embodied in her standards by the Church of Scotland, and every way fundamental in our system. It is this idea of the minister of the Word having in his single hand the key of doctrine, and so wielding, severally and by himself, the power to open and to shut the kingdom of heaven, which exalts so highly the Presbyterian conception of that office, and makes our Book to say that that office is "the first in the Church, both for dignity and usefulness." It is indeed by very far the first, and because of this several power conferred on it. There is no one-man power of ruling in the Church, but there is a one-man power of teaching. So that the teaching elder, *as he is a teacher*, is superior to the ruling elder. But then there flows also out of this same distinction of several and joint power, the idea of the parity of all presbyters, *as they are rulers*. Presbyterians need not and do not care much to assert the

parity of all ministers or teaching elders *as such*. No great error hangs very much on the denial of that parity. But prelacy and all its deadly consequences flow out of the denial of the equality of all presbyters, *as they are rulers*. Let your church-government be by "*clergy*"—in other and better words, by the *teaching presbyters as such*—and you have taken one long step Romewards by the halfway house of Prelacy. Let your ruling elders be denied to be true and proper presbyters, wielding all the right of rule which teaching elders exercise, and you have taken an equally long step in the same direction. The Scripture teaches that the Lord Jesus sets men apart from worldly cares and avocations to preach his Word, and these accordingly are invested with Church power; but in the matter of ruling the flock he unites with these teaching elders another class of other and different qualifications, who are called ruling elders. And so the teaching elder severally carries the one key of doctrine, and the teaching and the ruling elders together jointly carry the two keys of doctrine and discipline.

Thus to Peter singly the Lord gave power to bind and loose in declaring the doctrines of the Word touching the way of our being justified and saved—and herein Peter stands for every minister of the gospel. He is an ambassador, declaring terms of peace with rebels on the part of his Sovereign, and his words bind heaven for pardon, and loose sinners from condemnation. To all the apostles as a body, including Peter, our Lord gave the same power jointly, and herein the apostolic college stands for every lawful assembly of rulers in God's house.

But it is the diacritic or judicial department of Church power which is chiefest and most important practically. Here the courts of Christ are seen, judging and deciding in all the cases which properly come before them—not declaring so much as *applying* the truth, and so administering the sacred and holy discipline of the Lord's house. Doctrine (says Calvin,) is the life of the Church, discipline its nerves. There cannot, of course, be any healthy life where the nerves of the body are in an unsound condition. A church where discipline is low must languish—and that it is

low in our Church, and in every other Church the world over, is unhappily but too manifest to all the sincere lovers of Zion.

Or, *in the second place*, did Presbytery, when they made this appointment, have in mind still more definitely and distinctly than we have yet considered them, the questions which separate us, on the one hand, from Prelacy, and on the other from Independency, and upon which our Church is seen to stand in the true scriptural middle? Was this Presbytery thinking how the former system just sets one exaggerated ruling elder in the room of the divinely revealed government of the Presbytery; and how at the other extreme Independency will have a direct government by the people, instead of the heaven-descended representative system?

Let us compare the church-government of the Scriptures with each of these two opposite extremes. Under the prelatie system a whole diocese is put into the hands of one Bishop, who governs singly many churches and many ministers. But Presbytery demands that each particular church have set over it a plurality of elders or bishops, and that all elders or bishops be acknowledged to be equal in church rule. The apostles always ordained *elders*, and never one elder over a particular church, just as a bench of elders and bishops ruled each particular synagogue of Old Testament believers. Accordingly, George Gillespie, the great Presbyterian divine of the Westminster Assembly, says: "We boldly maintain that there is no part of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the power of one man, but of many met together in the name of Christ." To set up one of the equal presbyters over the remainder, is the beginning of Popery. And to allow one presbyter alone to do any act of church government whatever, is to subvert the system Christ reveals in his Word. Presbytery, or the government of the Church by a plurality of elders, is the Lord's ordinance; Prelacy, or the government of the Church by one man, is the invention of men. And so certainly true and so plain is this, that Episcopalians ordinarily do not claim to derive their system from the Bible, but from the Bible and the fathers.

Look now at the other extreme. Independency refers everything to the vote of the congregation directly. But Presbytery

teaches that the people shall elect whom they will for elders and bishops to overrule and direct all. Note the difference. Under Independency, the whole company of believers directly govern themselves. The rule is popular—it is of the multitude. Passion and feeling, then, not reason, most naturally will find'sway. But Presbytery commits every affair to tried and trusted leaders, whom the people freely choose to elect as their elders or bishops, and who are set apart authoritatively to this work. Presbytery accordingly is *the representative system*, so much admired, so eagerly desired by the nations. This is the system set up by our Lord in his Church. She is to be ruled by her representatives freely chosen and set apart.

The Presbyterian system of Church government, therefore, stands in the true and safe middle between the two extremes of a despotic one-man power and the wild anarchy of mob-rule. These are strong but just expressions. As for Prelacy, it cannot be denied that historically it formed just one step in the development of Popery. The question was entertained, which of the equal brethren shall be the greatest? Then, in reply to it, there came to the front five great prelates as chief bishops of all Christendom, viz., those of Rome, Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem. And then, inevitably and necessarily, there ensued a contest and a struggle betwixt these five for the supremacy over one another, and out of this contest there at last emerges one, the Pope, triumphant. So teaches Church history; so works human nature. Such is a true and proper representation of the essential nature of Prelacy, which always exalts one over his fellows. But on the other hand, Independency shivers the one body into a thousand fragments, overturning the divinely established order. This is as clearly a human invention as Prelacy; for on the very surface of the New Testament it lies revealed that God hath set teaching elders and ruling elders in and over the Church, and also that his Church is one body. Moreover, on the very face of Scripture it is seen that Christ set up his kingdom on the earth as an organised body, ruled and governed by assemblies of free representatives. The reason why the people do not all come together in one to direct the affairs of the king-

dom, is not simply that they *cannot*, but that they *must not*. That would not be acting "after the due order." The King has ordained that his called and appointed officers shall rule his house. But it is the right of his people to choose freely their own representatives, and they are to rule only in the Lord.

Or, *in the third place*, when South Carolina Presbytery appointed me to discuss Church power, was the question before its mind that of authority against license? Did you mean, brethren, to have me discuss the rule of the parochial Presbytery over its church members, and the rule of the classical Presbytery over its ministers and its sessions, and the rule of the Synod over its Presbyteries, and the rule of the Assembly over the whole Church? Let us then inquire at the outset, What is the ground and reason of this kind of rule? The answer must be, The unity of the Church and the representative character of her government. The whole must govern every part, because the body is one; and the only possible way in which every part can be thus governed, is for each particular church to be ruled by a body of chosen representatives; and then for such primary bodies of rulers to be classed together into different Presbyteries, for mutual government and for convenience of appeals from individuals, churches, and sessions; and then for these Presbyteries to be grouped in like manner under the government of Synods, and these under that of the Assembly. As Dr. Robert Rainy, of the Free Church of Scotland, has expressed it, "From the broad base of the believing people, the sap rises through Sessions, Presbyteries, Synods, to the Assembly, and thence descending, diffuses knowledge, influence, organic unity, throughout the whole system." This, then, is the reason why the Assembly is to rule the Synods, and each Synod its Presbyteries, and each Presbytery its ministers and its Sessions, and each Session its elders and deacons and members of the church. All make one body, and each must submit his mere will to the others, and the whole must in a lawful way, as provided in the Church's Constitution, govern every part, that there be no schism.

Such being the ground of the mutual government where each submits to all, the question next arises, What force belongs to

any decision of the General Assembly? Precisely what is the nature and value of such a deliverance, and how far does it bind every member of the body? The answer is simple, and as solemn as simple. It binds completely and perfectly. For it binds in heaven, and surely it must bind also on earth. The Assembly is our Supreme Court; its decisions our supreme Church law. They are final. We must obey. To refuse obedience is rebellion, and rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft. There is hardly any sin worse than wilfully setting ourselves against legitimate authority legitimately exercised, especially when the authority resisted is that which Christ sets up in his Church. Very conscientiously, therefore, is the Assembly to be obeyed by Synods, Presbyteries, Sessions, ministers, elders, deacons, and private church-members. What it speaks is presumably spoken by the Lord himself. What it binds on earth, is bound in heaven. We dare not refuse or neglect to obey. And equally are we required to give heed to the voice of Synod and of Presbytery and Session. Each of these courts wields the joint power of doctrine and discipline. They teach the truth, and they also apply it to particular cases. It is the Lord's testimony they deliver. What they impose on us legitimately, we must bear. They bring to us the law of Christ's house. To refuse obedience to any of their lawful injunctions, is to rebel against Christ; for they are by him invested with authority.

This consideration renders solemn every meeting of these courts. They are making Church history. They are bearing the keys, and using them. They are opening the kingdom and shutting it. Beware lest you intrude unworthily, that is, without the Lord's call, into the sacred office of a ruler in his house! And you who compose the membership, beware whom you call with the external call to enter on this tremendous work! And you whose constitutional duty it is to send representatives to the higher courts, beware whom you commission! Many have been the erring Synods and Assemblies deciding wrongfully, to the disturbance of the Church's peace and her detriment every way. How can you expect better, if you send men to these high places on the principle of rotation, or of personal favor and friendship, or of honor

and glory, or for the convenience of their being able to travel a little, and see the world, and visit their kith and kin in distant regions? How can you expect better, if you send commissioners to the Assembly, such as you know are not qualified by experience and wisdom and grace, rightly to handle the grave affairs of the whole Church! Oh! speed the day when we shall not be thinking about the honors, but only about the work—when we shall send men to the Assembly, or elect them Moderators, or appoint them on committees, never, never, never for compliment, but only and always to do a service! O brethren! it is earnest work, this work of the Church, and let us be earnest men!

But here arises another question: Are there no limits to Church power? Can these spiritual courts bind us to do whatsoever they may say? Are we not Christ's freemen? The answer is, they can bind us only *in the Lord*; the Word is our only rule of faith and practice. We may refuse obedience when Synods and Assemblies decree things contrary to the Word, or even contrary to the Constitution of the Church. And many, very many times has this thing happened; and often, very often, has it become the duty of Christ's people to resist unjust Church power, as also unjust State power. And resisted they have, even unto death; and so now and forever, a halo of glory encircles their names! Well, but who is to decide for me my duty as to obedience or resistance; who is to say for me whether the Church power is legitimate and legitimately exercised? The question is a grand one, and it has a grand history. The bare repetition of it here this morning, up in these mountains, and in this little Presbyterian assembly, the very statement of this question stirs our blood, and our hearts beat high, and our ears tingle, and our hair feels as if it would rise on end, for we remember the struggles of freedom against tyranny, especially of religious liberty against spiritual despotism, which are immortally associated in the memory of man with this grand and glorious question. But the answer is easy—you are of course yourself to decide for yourself! Sacred and inalienable is the right of private judgment! Leaving out, of course, all such as have spoken by the direct and positive inspiration of the Holy Spirit, you may assert against all

the Doctors that ever taught, against all the Assemblies that ever sat, your birth-right as an immortal and responsible creature of God to freedom of conscience and the privilege of judging for yourself in every question of duty. Of course I am not speaking now of slaves, nor yet children in their father's house, nor yet pupils in a school, nor yet sundry other special classes, such as prisoners, soldiers, and sailors, respecting which various sorts of persons I should have to make sundry qualifications of the position assumed. But speaking now of men in ordinary circumstances, I insist that each has the right and the duty of judging for himself, whether the power in question is legitimate and legitimately exercised. There is one Lawgiver, Christ; there is one law, his Word. To that test I may bring and you may bring every decree of every Assembly. And numerous, indeed, are the occasions when we *may*, nay, *must* refuse obedience, or even silence.

But then, on the other hand, you are yourself very liable to err; and the thing you refuse to submit to may very possibly be altogether accordant with the Word. And hence the necessity of patience and humility and candor and forbearance and docility, and also of being well instructed. Madame Roland, going to the guillotine, cried "O Liberty! how many the crimes committed in thy name." And so, too, in the name of conscience. Conscience is not our rule of practice, any more than it is our rule of faith. We must always go to the Word. But we are each of us entitled to judge for himself about its meaning. Thought and opinion are free. Yet we must take the consequences of our error, if unhappily we form wrong opinions, and act on them. The right of private judgment is a high and sacred privilege, and necessarily involves a tremendous responsibility. Under any moral system, freedom and responsibility are inseparable.

Now, in ordinary times and circumstances, it is to be supposed that what the Church courts ordain is scriptural and constitutional and right. Differing, then, from the body, only as to the expediency of their action, our duty clearly is to yield to our brethren. The authority of the Lord himself binds us to yield;

for he set up these courts, and gave them authority. The Word commands all church members, to "obey them who have the rule over them." But we office-bearers have covenanted to submit to our brethren in the Lord. On this express condition were we put into office, and we are covenant-breakers if we do not obey.

Still further, loyalty to our Church's interests requires us to obey. What can we ever accomplish if we do not coöperate, and how can we coöperate without observing order? Dear to our hearts is the ecclesiastical organisation we belong to. We love *the Presbyterian Church in the United States*, known otherwise as the *Southern Presbyterian Church*. If needs be, we all would die for her. Days of darkness and sorrow those were, indeed, during which she first came into separate being; and linked together are our hearts with the hearts of all her people, as with hooks of steel, by the imperishable recollections of a bloody and dreadful past. Yes, indeed, we are ready to die for the Southern Presbyterian Church! But if willing to die for her, we must also be willing to live for her. And how can we live for her, unless we carry out faithfully her plans, and take part earnestly in all her operations? O brethren, we must conscientiously comply with every lawful requisition of the Assembly, representing as it does this dear Church of ours, even to the laying aside our private predilections and preferences, when they stand in the way. If our way of doing things is not the one which the Assembly has seen fit to adopt, let us by all means see fit to adopt the Assembly's way, unless we believe some great principle is violated thereby, and are very sure that we are not mistaken about it. In what other way can the Church's organic life be fully eduved? How else can all the vigor of the whole body be combined and put forth effectively in the accomplishment of its appointed work? So, too, we all love the Synod of South Carolina and this dear old Presbytery of the same name, and of which this present meeting is the one hundred and eighty-eighth sessions. Well, then, let us combine and coöperate together in loving obedience to the authority of Christ in this court of his. It is for our interest as a Church to do so. Any other course is suicidal. Every man cannot have his own way. Every one should wish the Lord's

will to be done and the Lord's way to be followed; and the Lord's will and the Lord's way will ordinarily be found in the plans of Presbytery. If you do not believe that this is so, take up your staff, O wandering pilgrim brother, walk out of this Presbytery and our Church, and travel on your way until you find your own proper ecclesiastical home. For you are not at home in our Church. You are not a Presbyterian, and ought not to claim to be one. Because to be a Presbyterian is to believe that the Lord has ordained his Church to be governed by Presbyters in Presbytery assembled. But if you do believe this, then act accordingly, and strive in harmonious coöperation with your brethren to forward the kingdom of our Lord. United, harmonious, and earnest, we can, with his blessing, accomplish a great work. Dis-united, discordant, disobedient, each man choosing his own way, every enterprise of our Church must fail, and the body be covered with shame.

Bear with me whilst I indicate some few particular manifestations of the doubts which exist and prevail amongst us as to the reality of Church power.

1. Take the relation of the Presbytery to its licentiates. What is licensure but one of the steps taken in the trials of a candidate? Can one be licensed without promising to obey the Presbytery? Can a licentiate, except by the leave of Presbytery, remove without its limits? May not Presbytery, for reasons satisfying itself, recall, without trial or other ceremony, the license it has given? Does not the Book expressly refer to "reports from the churches," concerning its licentiates? Is it not right and proper that Presbytery should call for reports *from* as well as *concerning* them, at every stated meeting? Shall Presbytery look after its ministers and churches, and demand reports from and concerning each of these, but take no special oversight of its licentiates? And can it be right and proper for licentiates to enter into arrangements for serving churches without seeking the sanction of the Presbytery for these arrangements? And now does not the fact that there is any room for asking such questions as these, indicate the existence amongst us of a strong tincture of Independency?

2. Take the relation of the Presbytery to its churches. Have our vacant churches the right to make arrangements with any minister or licentiate they may choose to supply them, without the permission of the Presbytery? When Presbytery requires ministers, licentiates, sessions, and churches, all to submit to its regulation and control in this matter, does it thereby encroach on the rights of either of these parties? And here, again, I ask whether the fact that there is any room for such questions to be asked amongst us, does not point to the prevalence of some elements of Independency in our body? If we were genuine Presbyterians, could any questions like these ever arise?

3. Take the case when Presbytery, in the fear of God, determines upon some plan for overtaking the destitutions within its bounds, and money is needful for its execution. Now, may or may not Presbytery call with authoritative voice upon the churches to sustain the work? The churches are all represented in the Presbytery, and compose a free commonwealth, and the commonwealth requires money to be spent for its advantage. With what kind of voice, now, shall it speak to its churches, over which it bears rule? The voice of entreaty? The voice of suggestion? The voice of advice? The voice of exhortation? Every one of these is authorised and proper and suitable—but can the commonwealth, as represented, go no further? Has the Presbytery no voice of authority? When a certain sum is necessary for her missionary work, or to meet the Assembly's call for its contingent expenses, may not the Christian commonwealth assess the same upon its members? and when it does apportion out the sum in this way—for that is the same thing as assessment—when the Presbytery does thus apportion out the sum, and a church wilfully refuses to meet the call, is not that an act of disobedience, and a proper ground for censure? Is Church power but a name? Are we out and out Independents, or what is far worse, a mongrel breed, half Presbyterian, half Congregationalist?

To conclude: Presbyterianism is order. Speaking generally, you may say it is *doctrine and order*, and both are essential elements of the system. But strictly speaking, our Church name does not relate to doctrine at all, but only to order. Calvinism is doc-

trine, and it is our doctrine. But what makes us Presbyterians is our Church government in the hands of Presbyters. Our doctrine is Calvinistic, that is, Pauline; but our Church government is Presbyterian, that is, by elders. Presbyterianism, then, is not doctrine, but order. And what is order? It is the harmony of liberty and law. It is not the destruction of freedom, but its regulation and confirmation. Presbyterians have always been distinguished for their love of freedom. Rivers of Presbyterian blood have been poured out for it. But then Presbyterians have ever sought to combine liberty and law. As to mere political freedom, of which they have ever been most ardent lovers, what they have always believed in is a freedom either inherited or else otherwise lawfully acquired, and not the mere general "rights of man" or the doctrines of equality. Their Calvinistic theology has ever taught them that a Sovereign God makes differences between different men and nations, and they would not quarrel with his wise arrangements. As to religious freedom, two considerations will be enough to show that true liberty enters into the very essence of Presbyterianism. *First*, it is government never by one man, but always by free representative assemblies. *Secondly*, it is government not by caprice or despotic will, but by a written constitution and law, and that the law and Word of God. Nothing but what is in the Bible can bind the Presbyterian conscience. Our system, therefore, is essentially one of freedom. But see, now, how law enters likewise as of the essence of our system, and harmonises with liberty, for Presbyterians ascribe a real and not a mere nominal authority to their assemblies of elders; and they fortify every decision of these bodies by an appeal to God's Word. Thus does our Church government have regard at once to liberty and law, and thus Presbyterianism is order. It means, as Dr. Rainy says, "organised life, regulated distribution of forces, graduated recognition of gifts, freedom to discuss, [and I add freedom also to act,] authority to control, agency to administer"—"it means, a system in which every one, first of all the common man, has his recognised place, his defined position, his ascertained and guarded privileges, his responsibilities inculcated and enforced." It is a grand system. It is a divine system.

The Scriptures reveal it. The apostles practised it. Early it was corrupted in the Church, and decay fastened upon it; and the ruling elder, its most characteristic feature, passed away into oblivion for ages. At the Reformation the system was exhumed by Calvin and his coadjutors and successors. It prevails widely now in Protestant lands. But it is imperfectly understood and imperfectly carried out, even amongst those called by its name. Many of the narratives from our churches, read here yesterday, confess to the low state of discipline amongst them. And in all our Presbyteries, Synods, and Assembly meetings, we behold the evidences of the imperfect hold which the system has upon us who are office-bearers, as well as upon our churches. The cause is what I just now named—imperfect acquaintance with the system. Still more, the cause is our want of an earnest belief that the system is enjoined upon us in the Scriptures. As Dr. Thornwell used to say, Presbyterians, for the most part, do not believe their own principles. Alas! alas! it is with us generally not a matter of divine right, but merely of human wisdom and expediency.

Brethren of the South Carolina Presbytery! We are living in a slack time. Dr. Rainy well says, “a powerful tide is running in favor of a general relaxation of belief.” The tendency in our day is towards a broad Church, a liberal Christianity, and a progressive gospel; towards the laying aside all strict construction, all peculiarities of principle, and the merging of all distinctions in a mere general and negative uniformity. But God is in his Church and with his Word. He has established his own doctrine, discipline, and worship. Let us give our profoundest reverence to these divine things. God will, in his own time and way, vindicate them all.

ARTICLE V.

VIRUS, MENTAL AND MORAL.

In modern medical science there are enumerated various forms of disease whose chief characteristics in diagnosis relate to their virulent action. It has thus become common to refer to the poisonous character of certain classes of fever; and the technical expressions used in the books appear to recognise some actual *virus* analagous to the bite of noxious serpents. The theory upon which vaccination is advocated, is probably the most striking proof and illustration that can be adduced. The introduction of positive *virus* into the system, and the consequent production of a disease nearly identical with smallpox in a modified form, is the solitary object sought. And the security against veritable smallpox depends upon this identity—this being a disease which men do not have more than once. So the conclusion is reached, that the physical ailment itself is the distribution of a poisonous element throughout the human body, breaking forth in pustules all over it from the crown of the head to the soles of the feet: it is a *virus*, and it constantly threatens *death*.

There are other examples, falling in the line of the same argument. The sting of a wasp and the bite of a cobra, differing in virulence, are both still virulent. They are alike poison; and the symptoms peculiar to poisonous diseases are common to each. Between these two there are numberless gradations—the first being harmless and transient, the last being uniformly fatal. And so in the vegetable kingdom there are degrees of intensity in deleterious power, from the fabled deadly shade of the upas, to the slight wound from the poisonous nettle. In the interval separating these examples, may be found innumerable modifications, having a family resemblance in their hurtful character, yet differing in the degree and deadliness of their effect.

With this slight introduction, the present topic is indicated. Nature is full of wonderful analogies; and, in both sacred and profane literature, the various forms of physical ailment are fre-

quently employed to illustrate those more fatal diseases that affect the mental and spiritual nature of man.

As in the case of curative agencies employed by medical science, careful analysis has revealed, in many instances, the "active principle,"—so, in the opposite direction, investigation has detected the hidden power in harmful plants. For example: the bark of the cinchona, long used in its crude state as a preventive of intermittent forms of disease, has been made to yield its potent principle—quinia—as the ultimate source of its power. And, on the other hand, the *strychnos nux-vomica* has given up to later analysis the alkaloids strychnia and brucine, as the fatal powers that carry death in minute particles.

It is necessary to observe that nearly, if not quite, all poisonous substances, mineral, vegetable, and metallic, are capable of beneficent application. In some schools of medicine, the employment of the more irritant poisons is a noteworthy feature. And it may be demonstrated hereafter that the Creator invested these various departments of His wide domain with their elements of marvellous power in beneficence to the race which has extracted so much of harm from them and their uses.

But it is not so probable that good to man is hidden in the stings of reptiles. There are hints in Scripture of a lapse in the lower animate creation, caused by the fall of creation's lord. And it is conceivable that something analogous to the effect of sin upon human souls may have been wrought upon the nature of the brute creation in the shock of the great catastrophe. The powers that men employ for mutual destruction are undoubtedly powers conferred by God for mutual benefit. The hand which God constructed so curiously and elaborately for deeds of help and kindness, is the same hand that wields deadly weapons, or clutches the throat of an enemy. The tongue wherewith men bless God, is the tongue wherewith men curse each other. And the poison of asps might, perhaps, have been a harmless secretion, if man had retained his domination over the brutes. The healthful pulses, in their normal action, preserve the life of the body; but if unduly accelerated, betoken fever and threaten dissolution. Good, warped from its native

tendencies, is thus transformed into evil, contradicting the plan of creation, and frustrating the purpose of God.

• It does not belong to the present discussion, however, to investigate the causes which have elaborated the virus, but rather to examine its constituent elements, and seek for such antidotes as reason may suggest or revelation unfold.

Inasmuch as mental exercises have a moral quality, and moral questions sustain a constant relation to mind, there is a manifest difficulty in the attempt to divide the subject under review. Yet there is really a logical virus and a theological. Thinkers who are accustomed to discriminative analyses of matters of mind, and matters of affection, dissecting the spiritual organism, separating the nerves of motion from the nerves of sensation, find delight and perhaps profit in their labors. But the results of their efforts affect not the multitude. And the reason, obvious enough, is, that men are accustomed to regard each other and themselves in their integrity, as perfect men, without much scrutiny into the complex character of their organism. The overt act is the thing with which men deal, and not with the locality of the hidden spring, whether it be in the head or the heart. It will doubtless happen, therefore, in the progress of the present discussion, that the specific form of virus examined in any case will be found to pass from one domain to the other. And thus evils that might affect men in their present status, as developed from a mollusk, may be found also to affect men as created by God, and amenable to a revealed law.

On one side of the middle wall of partition, thus suggested, the philosophers who treat all supernatural phenomena with high disdain, are accustomed to regard the outside barbarians who hold to creeds and confessions as so many victims of prejudice and superstition. It would hardly be safe to deny their claims to scholarship, or to decry their intellectual status; because the Church has furnished as many illustrious votaries of science as can be found without her pale. The geologist who calls God his Father, explores the same field, seizes the same facts, and acquires the same knowledge as his unbelieving brother, who traces his descent from some illustrious oyster. Nothing in the

science, and nothing in the methods by which its surest postulates are reached, separates these two students of nature. The difference between them is in the fact that one has investigated *another* science which the other has refused to study. The phenomena of matter are investigated by one set of faculties, the phenomena of spirit by another. The one takes hold of the things that lie within the limits of time; the other fastens upon the tremendous realities of eternity.

It must be remembered that these two philosophers begin their career equally furnished. They have the same powers. According to orthodox standards they have alike lost the knowledge of God, and the ultimate cause of difference is the sovereign pleasure of God, who, of his own will, applied the gracious antidote in one case, while the poison was left to work out its legitimate results in the other. It does not belong to the present purpose to debate this doctrine, which is merely stated to show the logical perfection of the standards. Nor does it concern the argument, whether this difference is in any sense voluntary or not.

But it is important to notice that the damage, both mental and moral, is caused by sin. The loss of the knowledge of God involves the loss of all other knowledge. The man, separated from God by disobedience, suffered in intellectual status, doubtless because sin blinds the mind as well as hardens the heart; and the first point to examine relates to this less fatal consequence of the fall, and the nature of the virus considered only mentally.

The short account given in Genesis is still full enough to reveal the precise direction of the Tempter's assault upon humanity. God has so constituted the race that no member of it, in possession of his mental powers, can believe a known lie. It is not credible that Adam could be deceived by so bold a pretence as that embodied in the devil's proposition, as commonly understood. "Ye shall be as gods," was the prediction. And it would appear that the offence, which lost man his royalty over the lower creation, also gave him an independent status among the intelligences which he had not before. He cut himself loose from

God and took his place among principalities and powers, still limited by the probation which perhaps did not all end with his grievous lapse. And this condition accords with the Scripture doctrine that connects salvation with the voluntary choice of the individual sinner, who, though dead in trespasses and sins, still exercises the functions of life in his acceptance of salvation, even while upheld, prevented, and chosen by God in the exercise of sovereign grace.

It is usually admitted that the angelic host, confirmed in holiness, endured some sort of probation in the interval between their creation and their happy establishment in security eternal. It is also clear that a part of this host kept not their first estate, and these, to-day, within certain inflexible limitations, are wielding vast powers in opposition to God and man. They are the wicked spirits in heavenly places, whose ceaseless warfare against the sacramental host is so clearly described in the Epistle to the Ephesians. A combat with men of buckram would not necessitate the panoply therein enumerated.

Between these two orders—the ministering spirits on one hand, and the dark ranks of the apostate hierarchs “hurtling on the thickly-peopled air” on the other—stand millions of the great race who are the objects of redeeming grace. That the children of men are subject to influence on either side is perfectly clear from the Scripture teachings. And that all the intellectual power of humanity is needful—first, to distinguish between the character of those occult influences; and second, to choose the good and resist the evil—would seem equally plain. It is true that moral power and divine grace are also needful, but these will be considered hereafter.

Therefore the temptation of Adam was the type of Satan's temptations addressed to all of Adam's posterity: a constantly recurring invitation to cut loose from God and the restraints of his government, and to assume the royal prerogative. So the tempting names the adversary has invented always refer to the good there is in independent status. “Free thought” is inscribed on the banners of one part of the apostate host; “Free love” is the watchword of another. And, taking these two for

illustration, look how accurately the virus is revealed in its working. Your free-thinker is notoriously the man who thinks himself as wise as God. He scorns the law that limits thought. Where angels fear to tread, or where they veil their faces with their wings, he rushes in, exploring depths that finite power cannot sound, and scaling heights that are limitless as eternity.

The peculiarity of this poison, mentally considered, is, that it leads the victim into the delusion that such manifestation of boldness and mental power is God-like. Losing sight of the subordination that is proper in creatures, or denying the fact of creation, with sound or logic, he seems to imagine that he is really invested with the domination lost in the fall. And when confronted with appalling manifestations of divine power in the earthquake or the storm, he attributes these to the workings of natural laws alone, whose secret springs humanity will one day discover and control. And so, passing into morals, he concludes, as Jesus walked upon the sea, he also will one day reverse the universal law of gravitation at his will, and that the difference between him and Jesus was only in the possession of superior knowledge on the part of him who bade the storm cease, and who raised the dead. The logical necessity of a divine personality in the Saviour of the world is as completely ignored as the corresponding prerequisite of a divine personality in the Creator of the universe. The mere statement of this bold folly would seem to be all that is required. Yet the world is full of teachers who teach nothing better.

The wisest of the race have also held to the regal place of humanity in the scale of creatures. That God made man upright is one truth, and that he invested him with dominion over the creatures is another. This royalty was lost in the lapse. And the success of the temptation, perhaps, was largely due to the recognised headship of man, who, being crowned with one crown, desired to attain to many crowns. This was the prerogative of a greater dignitary; and probably Satan, whose antagonism is directed exactly against this one potentate, intended the special affront involved in man's attempted usurpation. The adversary specially challenges the King of kings, and his first act on

record was the betrayal of one of those kings, and cheating him out of his throne. And note here, that the throne is to be restored again. The warfare is between Michael and his angels, and the devil and his angels. And the final overthrow of the hosts of darkness will be the signal for the restoration of the kingdoms. "I saw thrones, and they sat upon them." The ceremonies attending that coronation excel in glory.

In the meantime, the working of the virus within the limits of mental philosophy, is, in some form or another, an assumption of equality with God. Either by atheistical or pantheistical theories, God is banished from the universe. Or, God is degraded to the level of humanity—"Thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one as thyself!" And so the old heathen, in their highest refinement, made their gods of concentrated passions or appetites. Or man is exalted, so that he sitteth in the temple of God, proclaiming himself to be God. The most flagrant forms of heresy and paganism have always had their development in in this direction.

As the world grew older, and as ethical questions came to be more universally discussed under the light of the gospel, the virus still ran in the same old channels. In apostolic times, the Godhead of Jehovah Jesus was little questioned; but in the fourth century the Arian heresy took formal shape, and in the sixteenth, the Socinian heresy was distinctly formulated. Between these two came in the great apostasy, which, by the mysterious power of God, has been kept from those soul-destroying errors, although it has deluged the earth with the blood of the saints. And the virus manifests itself in the paganism of the Arian and the profaneness of the Papist alike: the first, denying the Godhead of the Redeemer, seeks to bring him down to creaturehood; the second, adhering to the doctrine of the Trinity as its chief corner-stone, invests a wretched worm of the dust with divine attributes and infallibility. It is the old trick of the same devil. It is the old poison of the same serpent—the cobra-virus, cursing the earth. And while it may be hoped that the victims of Popish superstition, albeit sorely wounded, are still saved in looking upon the divine Lord lifted up, as Moses lifted

up the brazen serpent in the wilderness, it transcends the power of educated Christian charity to hope for the salvation of the Arian. "If ye believe not that I AM, ye shall die in your sins!"

The thing, then, is *virus*. The *virus* is Antichrist. Look at two or three of its manifestations.

I. In the progress of mental science, or in the investigation of the works of God, the peculiar power of the poison is seen. Cultivated men, who would not fall into illogical errors upon any other subject, have formally arrived at this conclusion, to wit: That the cosmos, notable for symmetry, accuracy, beneficence, and power, is no better than the chaos that preceded; that the work presupposes no worker; that change, growth, consequence, relation, presuppose no immutable cause. The cold complacency with which these philosophers ignore the awful realities of revelation is not more remarkable than the quiet scorn with which they dispose of logical deduction. There is no evil in the science they worship, but there is the blinding power of the poison, which prevents the recognition of an ever-present God, and the recognition of abounding truth and grace which illuminate every part of his works.

To illustrate: Suppose you construct an argument in this wise:

"Cause is a substance exerting its power into act, to make a thing begin to be."

An eternal chain of causation is not conceivable. There must needs be a First Cause.

The phenomena of nature reveal design; therefore the First Cause must be wise.

They reveal beneficence; therefore the First Cause must be good.

Whether or not nature would reveal so much, without revelation, does not matter. If the facts of revelation herein accord with the facts of nature, it should be enough to warrant and induce laborious study of the professed revelation. The positive *knowledge* of God does not come through these channels. But in the study of the Word, it is said, the clue to the knowledge

of the being and character of God may be found. In the garden, man knew God by intuitive perception, perhaps; and it may be that the restoration of the lost knowledge is potentially the restoration of the power of intuition.

Now the argument presented above has no force whatever with Tyndall, Huxley, Darwin, and their congeners. It looks very reasonable to the saint, no matter how scientific he may be, and the only reason these cannot see its force is, that the *virus* prevents. The cobra has bitten them, whispering, "Ye shall be as gods!" And they have heeded the flattering promise, and rejected Jehovah Jesus.

II. Another manifestation is found in the Popish apostasy. The grand mystery about this Antichrist is in the fact that God has kept it from denying the Nicene creed. But it has shown the fatal power of the poison breaking out all over the organisation. And of course, the family likeness is observable in the symptoms. Popery professes an equality with God, by making a Vice-Christ of Pio Nono, and of multitudes of bad men who preceded him. Here and there some special monsters, like the Borgias, have shown more of the fiendish malignity than others, but in the long line, profane history finds but few virtues to record. In the canonisation of sinful men and women, and in the claim of papal infallibility, the tokens of the virus is plain enough; but the special mark of dishonor to Christ, and horrible profaneness, is found in the organisation that has dared to call itself by his holy name. And up to this age, nothing in the way of curse, no war, no pestilence, no famine, has ever appeared upon earth to compare in innate hideousness and harmfulness with the Society of Jesus! It seems an orderly sequence that affixes to this dark order, in the obscure prophesies of the New Testament, a special depth of damnation hereafter. "How long, O Lord, holy and true, dost thou not avenge the blood of thy saints?"

III. The previous examples of poisonous doctrine and practice are thus briefly noticed, only to show the similarity of manifestation. The last illustrations, now to be considered, are drawn from the Protestant and so-called Evangelical Church.

As the effect of some poisons, in doses that are not fatal, is to produce dizziness and nausea upon the physical organism, so the effect of some mental virus is to produce a very similar class of symptoms upon the mind. The example suggested here, is in the dialect of the people that are the victims of this milder form of virus; and as recent events have brought an extraordinary outflow from the members of Plymouth church, in Brooklyn, the wonderful uniformity of symptoms is worthy of special notice. There is a known difference between the pure English of New England and the *patois* of the South; and there are decided shades of difference between different specimens of this pure English in different Northern localities. Thus Connecticut has a dialect positively distinct from that of Western New York, and both distinct from that of Boston, where the undefiled English is supposed to grow indigenously. But in Plymouth church they have a shibboleth totally at variance with any other known tongue. Some secular writer has irreverently called it the "gush dialect," and no better name can be imagined, unless it be "the bosh lingo," which another unreached heathen has termed it. Perhaps the union of the two names will give the clearest idea of the structure of this language—"gush," as indicating the astounding volume of it; and "bosh," as suggesting the ineffable nothingness of its most sonorous periods.

That it comes from unmistakable virus is plain, because of the peculiar spirit it displays. It is always mingled with Scripture quotations flippantly, and often blasphemously, employed. The inventor of this "bosh" language is the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher, and his admirers and imitators in all Northern localities are augmenting the stream of sounding phrases, and destroying the structure of the English tongue. It is a queer mixture of German transcendentalism, inane sentimentalism, and higher law philosophy. In so far as ideas are conveyed, they usually tend to atheism, but the boldness of the atheism is hidden by ascriptions of praise to the Divinity they indicate to take the place of the God of revelation. Such expressions as "the rich, warm soil of human consciousness, out of which comes the spontaneous conception of Divinity," are used to show the

superiority of Plymouth theology over the "dogmas of a defunct creed." One of these theologians, writing to a congener for sympathy in the midst of spiritual darkness, says: "Write to me from your inwardness." It is not conceivable to any man endowed with discourse of reason, and accustomed to the accurate definitions of Christian faith, how mortal and immortal beings could indulge in this "hifalutin," without agonising mental retchings.

How much more repulsive to the moral sense of the educated Christian must these foolish deliverances appear, when their drift is indicated. So intolerable was this popular style of preaching to the clear thinker and sound theologian, that Dr. Patton was forced, by the clamours of his own conscience, to inaugurate the controversy that has made his name famous wherever the truth is known and loved. A preacher, called Professor Swing, though it does not appear that he ever professed anything in particular, delivered a series of sermons. In them there was no violent assault upon established doctrines; no formal denial of creed; but merely a string of inuendoes, apparently intended only to bring contempt upon all creeds. He was probably intent only upon preaching Swing, and, except by implication, not antagonistic to Christ. He speaks of the Redeemer's "divineness"—never of his divinity. He refers to the Scriptures as worthy of respect and attention, and scouts their plenary inspiration. And in the trial that followed, forty-five members, out of a court of sixty, pronounced his evil good. The *virus* had tainted the mental and moral organism of three-fourths of his Presbytery. The charges tabled against him were accurately drawn, but the arrows were aimed at a myth. The language of the sermons was in the bosh-gush dialect, and the ideas were so vague and shadowy, that the missiles of truth found no lodgement. No doubt the men who supported Swing in the trial were induced to do so by their reluctance to own their ignorance of his meaning. In sober truth, there is no meaning in his sermons. No man can affirm that he teaches anything. Measured by any work on systematic theology, his utterances cannot be shown to accord with or refute any defined dogma. They just

say nothing, and their heresy is always by implication. This is a deliberate judgment, after a careful and earnest study of five of these published sermons.

In so far as they have come under the notice of the present writer, the sermons of the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher are in the same category. When he is pronounced, which is not infrequently, it is always in relation to some topic belonging to some other domain than theology. Upon political questions, his deliverances have been sufficiently emphatic, and generally on the wrong side. Upon questions of social life and morals, his advocacy has usually been in the wrong direction, and decided. Because the *virus* taints all that it touches. The "bosh-gush" is the chosen dialect, and his numerous hearers and admirers have adopted it with singular unanimity. That he should be called "the foremost preacher of the age," is not so remarkable as that he should be recognised as a preacher at all. If you compare this man, and his numberless imitators, with any famous preachers, such as Edwards, Chalmers, Knox, Melville, Robert Hall, Thornwell, you will be struck with the total absence of the special characteristics for which these men were distinguished; such as logical acumen, unction, orthodoxy, taste, elegance of diction, or eloquence. But the people who are fed upon "bosh-gush," and who like it, cannot be expected to feed upon the books produced by the worthies enumerated above, with any appetite. If you will take Melville's Sermon on the Death of Moses, for example, and compare it with the flimsy, frothy stuff that serves to satisfy the thousands who throng to Plymouth church, you will find that not only two distinct languages are used, but that the *thoughts* of Melville are not capable of translation into the "gush" dialect. Captain Kane tells us that the Esquimaux have no word to express the idea of dirt; the most polished language of modern times has no word corresponding with "home;" and the "bosh-gush" has no expressions that portray the lost condition of the sinner, or the grace and glory of the Saviour. And while Mr. Beecher, implicitly or explicitly, denies every doctrine of grace, he does not teach any other doctrine in their stead.

The "gush" talk lacks solidity and coherence, and nothing can be builded upon it or out of it. *Ex nihilo, nihil fit.*

But the *virus*, which is chemically and mechanically mingled in this stream of "gush," is a positive quantity, and is susceptible of analysis. The language is only the medium for conveying the active principle, or for exhibiting the poison, largely diluted. If the virus be eliminated, the residuum is pure "gush," and is innoxious, distending the stomach, and perhaps producing temporary mental nausea. But the *virus*, albeit taken homœopathically, is destructive of life. And now for the analysis.

Originally, as already intimated, the assault of the tempter, the serpent, the secretor of *virus*, was against the Son of God. And ever since the first injection of the venom into the organism of the human soul, the tokens of the virus, the symptoms of the poison, have had a family likeness. As the Lord Christ is the centre of all things, in heaven and in earth, as all things were created for him and by him, it was reasonable to expect the arch-enemy to make his assault just here.

One says, "Jesus is divine, beyond all death. So am I! All intelligences are a part of God, and God is merely the sum of all intelligences."

Professor Swing, in one of those mendacious productions that he calls "Truths for To-day," takes for his text some words of the Redeemer, and begins his sermon by saying: "It seemed to Jesus that his hearers might misunderstand his former speech, and he, therefore, added these words, etc." Here is the *virus*. Mr. Swing is so intimate with the Lord that he can venture to describe the exact mental process by which the Lord reached his conclusion. And the Lord had been rather hasty in his first utterance, and therefore qualified and amended it. Could human effrontery go further? There must be something in the carnal mind, which is "enmity against God," that specially accords with this flagrant assault upon the majesty of Jesus. And there must be something in the new life principle of the regenerate soul, that recoils with horror from insolent, blasphemous assumption of equality with the Saviour of men.

Hence the vigorous defence of Swing. Hence the vigorous assault of Patton.

The mental damage done by the *virus* is manifested here, by the transformation of the normal emotion of self-esteem into the abnormal emotion of self-conceit. And this emotion assumes a moral quality when it comes into juxtaposition with the law which forbids man to think more highly of himself than he ought to think, and exhorts him to think soberly. There is no pride nor vain glory in the just appreciation of one's own powers, or the manly dignity that asserts its peerage. But these are not the manifestations in the teachers referred to above. There is a sublime effrontery about them that is telling and taking, as it suffices to fix their status with their disciples.

Far worse, however, is the other aspect of the damage. The poison is virulent that robs the Redeemer of his glory. It is the mild form of conceit, broken out into pustules, when the sinner claims equality with the Saviour. And a candid investigation of the sermons of Swing and Beecher will reveal precisely this form of *virus*. In passages where Christ is described, you will always find a labored attempt made to account for his utterances or acts upon purely human considerations. His official relations are only dimly suggested; his Godhead is never emphatically proclaimed; but a substratum of Arian philosophy underlies the deliverances of these false prophets. The difficulty of understanding the human side of the Lord's character engrosses all their powers. The appalling difficulty of apprehending the divine attributes he constantly manifests, is disposed of by a misty reference to his "divineness."

It is suggested here, that the solution of mystery is found in the ignorance of the men who proclaim this false gospel, and the consequent ignorance of those who sit under their ministry. The teachers, notoriously, have had the benefit of no theological training. The truths most firmly believed, and most clearly apprehended by children in evangelical Sunday-schools, are positively unknown to them. The duties enjoined in the moral law, as growing out of relations and as written upon the nature of man, and as enforced by inexorable logical sequence, are

wholly unknown to them. They have constructed another set of enactments, and codified them, and dubbed them with the sounding title of "Higher law." They have discovered a new set for principles, which they call "broad," in contradistinction to narrow orthodoxy. As if anything could be higher than the great throne, or anything broader than eternity!

As indicating the stupefying power of the *virus*, one single illustration, reluctantly brought into view, will suffice. A few years ago, a godless man was shot to death in New York by a divorced, or semi-divorced, husband, whose wife had been living under the protection of the victim. The wounded man was taken to a neighboring hotel to die, and one of those pastors, sorely bitten by the fiery serpent, and emitting poison from every pore, was called in to administer dying grace and consolation. But all that the wounded man desired was the performance of the marriage ceremony, and the legal union of the woman in question with himself. And while Mr. Frothingham officiated, Mr. Beecher prayed, and in his prayer thanked God for the vicious relations that had subsisted "betwixt these two." It was the legitimate outcome of his creed. The decalogue, which was outraged, had been supplanted by the higher law. The prayer was a first-class exhibition of "gush," and therefore the more profane.

The temptation to quote from the limitless supply of "gush" which lies all around, is very strong; but enough has been given to show its general character. But the real business in hand is to study the working of the virus, and to seek for its antidote.

Low thoughts of Christ, then, either by the overweening conceit that raises man to an equality with God, or by the daring profaneness that would bring God down to the level of humanity—in one of these phases it will be seen always.

The only tendency which the Southern Church exhibits, as concerns this poisonous flood, is, perhaps, in the direction of what may be called the "example theory." In the heretical pulpits of the North and West, this is so prominent a feature, in prayers and sermons, that its commonness secures it against special notice. But in the South it is more rare. Some one has written

a book called "Christ our Example." And Arian teachers gladly fastened upon this, as the sole topic upon which they can utilise the revelation of God concerning his Son. Look at the theory a little more particularly.

All that we know of the human life of the Lord is revealed in the New Testament. The addenda of modern theological literature, like Dr. Crosby's work, have no more value or authority than the Apocryphal Gospels. It is not allowable to imagine incidents in that mysterious life. All that the Church should know, the Gospel reveals. But precisely here the adversary exerts his mightiest power. And whenever he can instigate the creation of another gospel (which is not another), he has inflicted positive damage upon the Church.

That the spotless life of the Lord Jesus should be exemplary, is a self-evident proposition. No rectitude of life can be imagined to compare with his life. It is not possible for fallen man to conceive of immaculate holiness, even when he is the subject of the new birth. But the necessity of the case, requiring a lamb without blemish to offer the atoning sacrifice, renders it certain that the Lord was without spot and blameless.

That perfect conformity to God's law is required of all men, is undoubtedly true. Nothing less than perfect and constant obedience will suffice. This is necessarily involved in the giving of the law. It is not conceivable that the law-giver could enact a variable rule. It is not conceivable that God would accept a partial obedience. And as no man is able perfectly to keep this law, righteousness is not possible under *any* law. Nevertheless, the obligation to love God supremely, and to love one's neighbor as one's self, is imperative and incessant. No jot or tittle of the law, as a rule of duty, could possibly be abrogated, because the life of conformity thereto is the normal life of man, as the creature of God and the member of the race.

But the saint attains no salvation by such conformity. There is no salvation possible, except by the blood and righteousness of the Redeemer. The entire scheme of salvation proceeds upon two or three postulates that are undeniable. First, the lost condition of the sinner. He is dead in trespasses and sins. And

it is just as rational to require of a corpse the performance of the ordinary activities of natural life, as to require of the sinner the performance of the activities of the new-born saint. The life-principle of the new man is derived from the vine, of which he is the branch, and until he is engrafted into the vine he cannot partake of the root and fatness. The vital pulses come from a birth that is not hereditary, not an evolution from living germs, at the will of the subject; not begotten of moral suasion from human influences, but a birth that is of God. Of his own will begat He us. Second, this new birth naturally tends to habits of holiness. It sets up an antagonism in the man between the old life principle and the new. The inherited life is "of the flesh"—the derived life is "of the Spirit," and these are contrary the one to the other. And, with all the failures and falls, the saint still makes progress, and at last attains the perfection of holiness, in exact conformity to the moral law. Third, there are no attainments possible, beyond the requirements of this law. Supreme love to God is the superlative degree in the first table. Equal love to the neighbor is the superlative degree in the second.

But the salvation wrought by Christ, so far from being the result of this personal holiness, is really the foundation upon which it is builded. He died for our sins; he rose for our justification. And this death and resurrection are counted for ours, and we are said to die in him and rise in him; and it is simply because his death was our death, and his resurrection our resurrection, that we are exhorted to "live unto him who died for us"—that is, instead of us, "and rose again"—that is, instead of us.

Now, no part of this tremendous performance is exemplary or imitable. And the antidote to the virus is applicable just here. There is such a halo of glory and majesty about this adorable Saviour, that the irreverent use of his name wounds the believer. There is no such word in all the Scripture as "Christ-like," yet Messrs. Swing and Beecher delight in its use. Nearly a quarter of a century ago, a wicked man, breathing threatenings and slaughter, endeavored to incite the slave population of Virginia

to murder. He was apprehended, tried, executed, and canonized! And preachers, from that day to the present, refer to this malefactor as the illustrious imitator of the Redeemer of sinners. Still more recently, a godless man in high station was slain by a crazy fanatic; and in Christian pulpits his life and death were compared to the life and death of the Saviour. Still later, a man who professed no faith in any evangelical creed, yielded up the ghost, and has taken a niche in the Pantheon:

When Sumner died, a public man remarked, "Our country has lost the freest soul it possessed." But from what was that great soul free? Not from God! No! for all the orations of that scholar were founded upon the justice and benevolence of God. Into all his pleadings for slaves in all lands was inserted everywhere the name of the Infinite One and his earthly image, Jesus Christ. Free, then, from what? Only from the earthly, the contemptible, the small; free from the interest that sought gain from the toil of others, free from the power of tribes, free from fear of the opposition of enemies and the frown of friends, free from all the common temptations to dishonor. But here his personal independence terminated, for the great counsel of nations, the wisdom of man from Plato to Franklin, the sufferings of the poor, from the galley slaves of Rome to the Africans in our cotton fields, was an outside force that held his mind and spirit as a mother's arms hold her child. Thus the freest man our country ever possessed seems to have been free only from selfishness and littleness, but not free from the great truths that seem to proceed from God and mankind. There was a great counsel outside of him, reaching up from antiquity, spreading out as it advanced like an Aurora rising up from the horizon in its gorgeous sheen, and before this broad pillar of light he bowed, as Paul before that Damascus beam from heaven, and with Paul said: "Lord, what wouldst thou have me to do?"—*Prof. David Swing.*

Let not the South Church drift into this miserable twaddle and "gush." The Lord Christ came into the world to save sinners, not to set an example. Mere men cannot live his life, nor die his death. And it is profane and irreverent to settle questions of duty by inquiring, "What would the Lord have done under similar circumstances?" He has left a law; and "if ye love him, keep his commandments."

In the few cases in Scripture where the example of the Lord is mentioned, it is hedged about with stringent limitations. In one of the Epistles of Peter, and in an exhortation to slaves to

yield obedience to froward masters, the attitude of the Lord in enduring the contradiction of sinners is referred to, and immediately the awful limitation suggested—"who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree," as if to warn the believer against the profane application of this example. The other case is in the Gospels, where the washing of the disciples' feet is recorded, and where Christ tells them he has set them an example; and the limitation is added—"If I, your master and Lord, have done this, how much more should you, the servants and subjects, minister to each other." Let not the ambassador assume the royal robes or crown.

As against this profaneness in thought or speech, and as against the spread of the virus, God's revealed antidote is enforced, Preach the Word. Preach the whole counsel of God. Insist upon the truths of Calvinistic theology in its most angular forms. Insist upon the true and proper Godhead of Jehovah Jesus. Announce distinctly the dead condition of the sinner, and his consequent helplessness. Glorify God, and not man. Waste no words upon "the rich-soil of human consciousness," but abound in ascriptions of praise to the grace that brings salvation. Abhor all reference to Christ as the "earthly image of the Infinite One," and protest daily against the miserable theories that tend to reduce his divinity to mere divineness, his life to a mere example, and his death to a mere show. It became Him by whom are all things, and to whom are all things, to make the Captain of salvation perfect through sufferings. But let not this inexorable necessity, that made the Saviour of no reputation for our sakes, be so warped by human conceit and human profaneness, as to detract from the ineffable majesty of the King of kings.

ARTICLE VI.

GRADUALNESS CHARACTERISTIC OF ALL GOD'S OPERATIONS.

“ According to our manner of conception, God makes use of a variety of means, which we often think tedious ones, in the natural course of providence, for the accomplishment of all his ends.—*Butler's Analogy, Part II., Chap. IV.*

This sentence is quoted for two reasons : *First*, because it contains a plain statement of the subject of this article ; and *second*, because we intend to employ, in the discussion of that subject, the principles of analogical reasoning expounded by Bishop Butler. We aim to show that GRADUALNESS IS CHARACTERISTIC OF ALL GOD'S OPERATIONS.

The subject is very comprehensive. A mere outline of it will be attempted in this article, the object of which is to show that in gradualness of development, the operations described in the Bible are wonderfully analogous to the operations in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms—to operations now in progress, as well as to those which science proves to have occurred successively, in indefinite periods of past time.

The proposition assumes the existence of a personal God, who created all things, and controls all changes in nature. Its terms, therefore, make a direct issue with sceptics, who assume, as do all materialists, the eternal existence of matter, acted on, modified, and moved by uncreated self-directed forces ; and who deny the necessity of referring material phenomena to creative power and wisdom.

It is proper to observe, also, that the assumption of the existence of one infinite Creator includes, necessarily, in this scientific age, the idea of a single plan of operations, fixed, comprehensive, progressive, and endless—finite in his sight, but designed to be intelligible to his intelligent creatures, as each part of the plan should be developed by him, in successive periods of what we call eternal time—eternity. This sublime conception of a divine plan of operations has been devoutly recognised incidentally

in their writings, by most of the great discoverers in modern science. Sir John Herschel described the motions of the heavenly bodies as under the "prearranging guidance of a design which pervades all nature;" and Agassiz said: "All the facts proclaim aloud the one God, whom man may know, adore, and love; and natural history must, in good time, become *the analysis of the thoughts of the Creator of the universe*, as manifested in the vegetable and animal kingdoms."

Of this design or plan, pervading all space, and comprehending the universe in all periods, this earth was one very small part, and man's occupancy of it for a time was another.

This fact makes it important to form a correct opinion of the earth's true relation to the material creation, and of man's real position in the scale of being. Viewed from a correct standpoint, the earth is a very small planet in our solar system, and man is far superior to the most perfect animal. Yet, within a few centuries, the earth was still regarded as the great mundane centre; and by some natural historians man is erroneously classified with brutes, being placed at the head of the animal kingdom. Now, this is not his true position in the scale of being; for science has slowly proved that he is not merely an animal. There is an immense interval between even savage man and the highest brute. He is really the first of the fourth kingdom; for the line of separation between either the mineral and vegetable, or between the vegetable and animal kingdoms, is less distinct than that which separates man from the highest beast. In at least four characters he is wholly different from all brute creatures. "He can and does control nature. He can read and understand nature. He has a power of self-regulation which we call conscience. He can and does think much about God." Even sceptical men of science admit the force of these marks of man's superiority, and hence he is an anomaly in general systems of classification.

Now, Genesis had been written long before science fixed man's true rank in creation. It tells us that he was created in the image of his Maker; allowed to name all beasts; commanded to *subdue* the earth; given dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth

on the earth ; and made consciously liable to punishment for disobedience to a positive command. Modern science and Genesis concur, therefore, in ascribing to him a separate, peculiar, mixed nature, by which he is allied to animals in material organisation, but so raised above them in mental endowments that he can and does devise means of using the forces of nature, and of subjugating the largest animals, while he manifests a sense of responsibility to a spiritual governor.

And here we may observe that gradualness is implied in this first part of Scripture ; for it contains no intimation that Adam was taught how to subdue the earth or to domesticate animals. The slow process of domesticating animals, of discovering the principles of science, and of inventing machinery, went steadily on, from century to century, and is still in progress, without approximation to completion.

There is neither assumption nor speculation in what has been affirmed. Numerous relics of primitive man and of his works of art have been found in caves and in alluvial rocks and deposits, in many countries ; and all, without exception, prove not only that man appeared in the last creative period, but that he has gradually advanced from the "stone age," through various stages of improvement, to that of modern civilisation. Science and art were not taught by revelation. They are all results of human effort. Created with mental capacity for such efforts, Adam, we are told, was placed naked in the garden of Eden, and required to dress and to keep it. After the fall, he was driven forth, clothed in skins, and commanded to eat bread in the sweat of his brow. In all this there is remarkable harmony in the teachings of history, science, and Scripture. The power of thinking, comparing, inferring, willing, choosing, and executing, entitles man to a separate rank in a fourth kingdom of the material creation.

It is proper to say, however, before proceeding farther, that this characteristic gradualness, which is a part of the original plan of divine operations, and which manifests itself in the Bible, strikes many readers of the sacred record as strangely inconsistent with human conceptions of the majesty of an infinite Creator. Hence, even educated minds, though trained to accuracy

in the deduction of truth from facts, and reared in the midst of numerous instances of gradual development in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdoms, hesitate to believe the Bible, because it ascribes to the same Creator changes of similar gradualness in peopling the earth by the descendants of a single pair, and in accomplishing his purpose of establishing a Church for the salvation of a fallen race of physico-spiritual immortal beings. Such minds (and they are numerous,) are wont to object, that if God had designed the accomplishment of such purposes, he would have put forth the necessary power, instead of employing the tedious agency of secondary causes.

This cause of opposition to the Bible is thus briefly stated, because it presents itself obscurely to many minds—young and unenlightened minds especially—anxious to know the truth. And imbued with modern ideas of civilisation and refinement, they raise the same objection to the slow progress of God's chosen people in arts, sciences, customs, morals, laws, and institutions. Such readers, though ready to admit the superiority of the religion of the Israelites to that of Gentile nations of the same era, yet contend that it fell far short of a just conception of the wisdom and majesty of the Creator of a universe. No one doubts that an infinite being could have created suddenly a finished world, and covered its surface all over with civilised nations of sinless men; but this would have required a radically different plan of operations.

Most of such objectors go through life unknown, and their influence is partial and local; but a few become eminently learned in history, metaphysics, criticism, or science, and assail the Bible in ingenious speculations, drawn from their peculiar studies. The refutation of such speculations has long put in requisition the intellectual resources of the Church, and this will continue to be the chief arena of conflict between Christianity and Scepticism. Hence, Christian men of science and theologians should unite cordially in demonstrating, as far as possible, similarity in character between material operations and those described in the Scriptures. As sceptics have labored long and unsuccessfully to establish discrepancies between physical science and the Bible,

Christians should strive with equal zeal to point out new instances of real harmony between the operations of nature and those recorded in the Scriptures. In no respect, it is believed, is similarity more strikingly manifest than in the gradual development which is characteristic of both.

The subject has occurred to many minds, and has been incidentally referred to by many writers; but it is believed no one has attempted to demonstrate that gradualness pervades the whole plan of divine operations. Edwards's *History of Redemption*—a great conception grandly executed—must have impressed the minds of many of its readers with the general truth, though the writer confined himself to the single purpose of tracing that part which men call the plan of salvation, through all its stages of progress, from its inception to its consummation. Bernard's *Bampton Lectures on the Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament*, contain a fresh, attractive, lucid, and very instructive exposition of the subject. Bernard gives, however, a purely theological view of the gradual progress of revelation by the Saviour in person, not only before his death and resurrection, but also during the forty days before his ascension; and afterwards by the promised Spirit from Pentecost to the close of apostolic utterances in the *Apocalypse*, in which is forbidden addition to the finished revelation. The learned lecturer, full of his sacred theme, and limited to eight lectures of ordinary length, did not connect it, in any way, with a similar progressive development either in the *Old Testament* or in material changes.

In 1871, the Bishop of Carlisle delivered one lecture before the *Christian Evidence Society*, on the *Gradual Development of Revelation*, in which he based his defence of the apparent slowness of its progress, especially in the *Old Testament*, on the evidence furnished by geology of gradualness in all kinds of material operations.

A few instances of gradualness in the operations of nature will now be given, followed by a brief examination of those recorded in the *Bible*. This is the most obvious method, and is best suited to our purpose—a suggestive outline of prominent heads only. A comprehensive view of the whole subject, similar in ex-

ecution to Edwards's History of Redemption, has not been published, and is a *desideratum*.

We shall first adduce the testimony of chemistry, the most exact and pervading of the physical sciences. Chemists enumerate more than sixty elements or kinds of matter—each of which has resisted all efforts to separate it into simpler parts. From gold nothing simpler can be obtained; but it may be made to unite, in certain definite proportions only, with oxygen, chlorine, or some other element, in the formation of compounds. These combinations are results of molecular motions effected by force, controlled by fixed laws. These compounds of mineral elements, formed by physical forces, are the few mineral species which, with water, air, and a few gases, constitute the earth. Some, as silex, alumina, lime, and water, are abundant; others are rare. All are ceaselessly exposed to the action of forces or modifications of force—heat, light, chemical affinity, etc.—and modern science has gone far to prove that not an atom of one of these is ever at rest—that motion is the normal condition of the ultimate atoms of all matter. Change—ceaseless change—is the natural tendency of each molecule of all material things. Each atom—simple or compound, (for atoms are not in contact even in apparently solid masses)—is enveloped in an atmosphere of antagonistic forces, which act on it in the interatomic spaces, and which are ever varying in relative intensity, and tending ceaselessly to produce motion and change.

Chemistry has also demonstrated that four elements—carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen—with minute quantities of about twelve other elements, form, by their union in fixed proportions, all vegetable and animal compounds; and that these compounds, generally very complex, all result from the vital force controlling the action of the physico-chemical forces. The same mineral elements, therefore, are found in the ashes of the products of the vegetable and animal kingdoms.

No animal, however, even the lowest in the scale of being, can *digest* as food an atom of unorganised mineral matter. Though essential to animal as well as to vegetable developement, it must first be organised by some plant before any animal can assimilate

it. Hence the properties of mineral matter, and the primary laws of organic being, necessitate the preëxistence of vegetables to prepare organic food for animals. As time rolls on, mineral elements are changed by vital action into vegetable compounds, vegetable into animal, and these back again, after the extinction of life, into mineral; for dust they are, and unto dust all must return. After the first miraculous act of creating mineral, vegetable, or animal species, each was subjected to the action of the forces and laws essential to the well-being of all; and the progress of the preërranged succession of changes was necessarily slow, according to human conceptions of slowness.

Nor is chemical science now limited to terrestrial operations. It has shown that the few mineral elements which are known to form the mass of the earth, enter equally and perhaps exclusively into the composition of the material universe; and that the same forces, light, heat, electricity, and chemical affinity, like gravitation, pervade all nature. More than twenty years ago, exact analyses had proved that each of the meteorites which had fallen from space to the earth, was composed exclusively of mineral elements known in the earth's crust; and within a few years a marvellous little instrument, the spectroscope, has enabled men of science to prove that earth, sun, and planetary bodies, consist of the same mineral elements, acted on by the same forces, and in accordance with the same chemical laws. This instrument takes the picture of chemical changes too remote to be observed by telescopes; and so the chemical composition of the heavenly bodies has been subjected to numerous exact observations.

We have thus shown briefly the aspect which chemistry presents of the composition of the universe; of the forces that act incessantly on all molecules of matter in even solid bodies, and of the laws that regulate the dependence of animal on vegetable and of vegetable on mineral changes, in order to show that all are necessarily successive and slow, and that all are linked and bound together as parts of one divine plan of gradual operations, ever advancing towards perfection, but never reaching completion.

We now proceed to give illustrations of the subject, each of which will be some terrestrial operation. Of existing species it

is sufficient to remark that each individual mineral, plant, animal, and man, is gradually developed, according to fixed laws of origin and growth, from a minute crystalline point or organic cell, to full size and maturity, subject, however, to various modifications in degree of perfection attained; caused by natural diversities in the action of physical forces, giving rise to individual peculiarities so marked that no two crystals of quartz, or leaves of the same tree, or men in a large army, are undistinguishable. Endless individual variety is, therefore, compatible with specific identity, proving the prevalence of law in the midst of apparent disorder.

Those who carefully observe what is taking place on the earth's surface, cannot fail to perceive the steady progress of two opposite kinds of change, each of which has been in operation since the beginning of the human era, and has slowly produced great results. Let us suppose the planet to have then emerged from some chaotic state, and a new part of a great endless plan, for the display of the Creator's attributes to a spiritual creation, to have then begun. What changes in the mineral structure of the earth's crust have presented themselves?

First. All the physico-chemical forces have been ceaselessly at work, in the decomposition, disintegration, and dispersion of all mineral masses. Subterranean heat, the sun, water, air, chemical affinity, and other forces, causing earthquakes, volcanoes, tornadoes, rain, snow, icebergs, and avalanches, have ever since been actively employed in the demolition, destruction, and removal of all mineral masses—even crystalline granitic mountain chains. The origin of all soils and subsoils may be traced to the protracted action of these causes; and in gullies, railroad excavations, and tunnels in mines, a geologist often sees beds of clay and other masses hundreds of feet thick, which are manifestly the remains of decayed, *rotten* rocks, once solid. Many islands and portions of continents have been submerged; oceans' waves and currents have washed away exposed coasts of many countries; and these causes of change, aided by winds and tides, have covered other portions of country with huge beds and hillocks of

sand, which are in some places already cemented into solid sandstones.

Second. On continents and islands hundreds of volcanoes, generally in chains, have been elevating craters and filling valleys with lava, ashes, or mud; shattering and upturning adjacent rocks; and forcing melted matter into enormous fissures, to be slowly cooled into crystalline basaltic dykes and veins. Hot springs, too, have brought up in solution, and deposited on the surface, vast beds of silicious sinter; and cold springs, charged with carbonate of lime, have formed peculiar beds of limestone—calcareous tufa—covering extensive areas and of great thickness. Torrents of water, from rain and melted snow, have washed gravel, sand, soil, and clay from mountains and hills into rivulets, creeks, and rivers, and by these into the sea, forming deltas near land, and depositing layers of mud on the bottoms of all lakes, bays, seas, and oceans, mixed with the remains of all organic bodies, terrestrial, fluviatile, and marine, with the bones, implements, weapons, and coins of man. To these, icebergs have added annually large quantities of rocky fragments, torn from polar shores. Coral polyps, too, have been forming immense beds of recent limestone. And below all the beds, in oceans and on land, subterranean fires have been at work, solidifying and crystallising some, and fracturing, displacing, or fusing others. All these changes, and others not mentioned, have been advancing the planet from the beginning of the present era, and will continue to act steadily in effecting a planned result—the close of the human and the introduction of a new era.

Having sketched briefly the progress of changes which will result in the gradual formation, during the human period, of a contemporaneous series of rocks, made up of the debris of pre-existing rocks, and imbedding remains, more or less distinct, of nearly all existing animals and plants—rocks strikingly analogous, in magnitude, extent, kind, and origin, to each of the numerous geological formations found in existing continents—we might proceed directly to the examination of gradualness of development in the two great divisions of organic beings.

Before we do this, however, in the higher departments of phy-

sical operations, it is proper to call attention to the fact, even now too much overlooked by many writers, such as Herbert Spencer, that though man's intellectual advance is generally slow, yet, from time to time, it has been greatly accelerated, not by any augmentation of man's mental capacities, but by a corresponding advance in new and improved methods of thought. As no new organ has been added to man's body, so no new capacity has been developed in his mind. Adam's descendants are still mentally and physically the same as Adam was when created and commanded to subdue the earth. But as improved machinery has greatly increased man's ability to employ the forces of nature, so improved methods of thought—great and comprehensive ideas—have marvellously extended the sphere of his mental triumphs. A few examples will illustrate what we mean.

At an early period a few characters, called letters, were devised to represent the simple sounds of the human voice. These characters combined formed the words of written language; hence recorded and transmitted knowledge. The process of improvement in materials and instruments or machinery went on slowly; and now sixteen thousand copies of mammoth sheets, like the daily *London Times* or *New York Herald*, are printed by one Walter press in one hour. Still later came notation in numbers. A few figures, letters, and signs were shown to be capable, by a few simple contrivances in position, of expressing marvellously various and complicated properties of numbers and quantities. Hence the origin of all the great discoveries in pure mathematics. And a foundation was thus laid for exact adaptation of parts by inventors of new and improvers of known machinery and philosophical instruments. By these and applied mathematics, the great ideas of Galileo and Newton and Kepler exposed to human view the mechanism of the heavens, and proved the earth to be, not a great mundane centre, but a unit of an immense number of worlds in infinite space. The method recommended by Bacon, of deducing truth from carefully collected and collated facts only, gave a great impulse to physical research in the higher field of material compounds. These are so complex and so affected by disturbing and varying forces, that observa-

tion alone fails to elicit the true nature of bodies, and of the action in them of the physical forces. A few great minds, as Priestly, Lavoisier, and Scheele, devised the method of simplification—of separating each compound into its *elements*; of ascertaining accurately the properties of each element; of noting the action, in any case of combination or separation of elements, of the chemico-physical forces; and of thus learning the inner molecular nature of any compound. This is the great method of experiment, on which rests the whole structure of modern chemistry and allied sciences. Thus the method of alphabetical combination in Philology; of notation in Mathematics; of observation in Astronomy; and of experiment in Chemistry, brought these and allied branches of knowledge to a state of scientific certainty—to systems of truth—sifted and separated from assumptions and speculations.

Nor were these great ideas—these new methods of thought—results of chance or accident. They, too, were parts of the great progressive plan of creation—of that part of the plan by which man should gradually “subdue” the earth, and exercise “dominion” over its forces. Professor Owen said, when he assumed the chair as President of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, Sept. 22, 1858:

“We are here met in this our twenty-eighth annual assembly, to continue the aim of the Association, which is the promotion of science, or the knowledge of the laws of nature, whereby we acquire a *dominion* over nature, and are thereby able so to apply her powers as to advance the well-being of society and exalt the condition of mankind. God has given to man a capacity to discover and comprehend the laws by which HIS universe is governed; and man is impelled by a healthy and natural impulse to exercise the faculties by which that knowledge can be acquired. Agreeably with the relations which have been instituted between our finite faculties and the phenomena that affect them, we arrive at demonstrations and convictions, which are the most certain that our present state of being can have or act upon. Nor let any one, against whose prepossessions a scientific truth may jar, confound such demonstrations with the speculative philoso-

phies condemned by the apostle ; or ascribe to arrogant intellect, soaring to regions of forbidden mysteries, the acquisition of such truths as have been or may be established by patient and inductive research. For the most part, the *discoverer* has been so placed by circumstances—rather than by predetermined election—as to have his work of investigation allotted to him as his daily duty ; in the fulfilment of which he is brought face to face with phenomena into which he must inquire, and the result of which inquiry he must faithfully impart. This advance of natural as of moral truth has been and is progressive ; but it has pleased the Author of all truth to vary the fashion of the imparting of such parcels thereof as HE has allotted, from time to time, for the behoof and guidance of mankind. Those who are privileged with the faculties of discovery are, therefore, *preordained instruments* in making known the power of God, without a knowledge of which, as well as of Scripture, we are told that we shall err.”

By these and other methods of thought, which may be, in one sense, regarded as divine methods of revealing physical truth “from time to time, for the behoof and guidance of mankind,” man’s intellectual powers gradually enabled discoverers and inventors—“preordained instruments in making known the power of God”—to understand the laws which control even the molecular motions in the interior of bodies, and to devise means of subduing the most potent forces of the earth.

Moreover, the constant practice of these great methods of thought disciplined the human mind for the successful study of the more complex phenomena of the vital force—of living beings. True, the most refined processes of analytical chemistry fail here, because the moment an attempt is made to separate a living being into its elementary parts, the conditions essential to life are destroyed. But even in living nature, the region of Biology, the Creator has not left man to grope his way in hopeless ignorance. Linnæus and Cuvier—preordained instruments of higher discoveries—perceived at last that, in both divisions of living objects, nature presents to skilled observers a most elaborate series of perfect experiments ; and that if we begin with the

lowest germ or cell, and ascend upward in the scale of being, there is, with each addition of some new part, increased complexity without increased obscurity, till we reach the organic structure of the highest type of vegetable or animal life. There is gradual *evolution*, according to fixed laws, which laws fix the characters of species. This is the method of comparison, on which depend the sciences of Comparative Botany, Zoölogy, Physiology, and Anatomy.

We shall give one more illustration of the influence of a great thought on the progress of scientific truth. Fossil remains of plants and animals, many of them perfectly preserved and beautifully distinct, had long been known to occur abundantly, at great depths in mines, and at great altitudes in mountain chains. The origin of these leaves, branches, stems, trunks, stumps, and fruits of plants, and of shells, bones, teeth, scales, fins, claws, hair, eyes, and entrails of animals, was long and vainly discussed.

After Linnæus, Cuvier, and their colaborers, had successfully applied the method of *comparison* to the vegetable and animal divisions of nature's productions, and had shown the gradual evolution of species, in exact accordance with a plan of infinite ramification and expansion, a new, unexpected, and boundless field was opened in which to test the truth of the principle, which lies at the foundation of the comparative sciences. Smith, an English surveyor, affirmed that each of the English formations is characterised, in any of its numerous and widely separated localities, *by peculiar fossils*. This great idea was seized by Cuvier and others, who soon demonstrated the truth of Smith's observation, and showed that it applied equally to all the rocks of Europe. A great impulse was thus given to the scientific examination of rocks, and to the study of their fossils. Numerous collections were soon made, similar to those of living plants and animals. Ample means of exact and varied comparisons were rapidly accumulated in public and private museums and cabinets. And Cuvier and his coadjutors soon demonstrated that nearly all the well-known rocks of Europe contain abundance of marvellously varied species of the fossil remains of plants and animals *which*

are extinct. The only rocks which were found to envelope remains of existing species, are those near the earth's present surface—rocks which we have described as now forming on all parts of the earth's crust. Descending into the rocks, anywhere, in any country, there is found to be an obvious change in the fossils as we descend, showing—demonstrating—gradual creation of new and extinction of preëxisting species, genera, and even whole orders of beings. In the same way precisely that the recent sciences of botany and zoölogy were established by protracted and laborious comparisons of innumerable individuals, resulting in an approximately correct formation of distinct species, genera, families, orders, classes, and divisions of both plants and animals, so, by a similar comparison of individual fossils, they too, were readily thrown into species, species into genera, genera into families, orders, classes, and divisions. The same systems of classification apply equally to both living and fossil beings. Both obviously belong to the same great plan of creation. To the fossil divisions, classes, orders, etc., of animals, many of Cuvier's names apply readily; but, in a vast majority of cases, the names of living *species* are not applicable to any fossils, especially if found in rocks geologically much below the surface. In this way science demonstrated the gradual extinction of old and creation of new species of plants and animals.

Nor did these investigations end in proving that one epoch only of organic existence, the species of which are extinct, preceded the creation of man. Far from it. Many different epochs have been established, each characterised by distinct and peculiar species of organic beings. Hence, Owen, in the address to which we have referred, alludes to numerous pre-Adamic epochs, in these remarkable words: "In regard to the period during which the globe allotted to man has revolved in its orbit, present evidence strains the mind to grasp such sum of past *time* with an effort like that by which it tries to realise the *space* dividing that orbit from the fixed stars and remoter nebulæ." Professor Joseph LeConte calls the epochs through which our planet successively passed "Time-Worlds," and the celestial orbs "Space-Worlds;" and he seems to regard the former as quite as numerous as the

latter. Now what we wish to call special attention to is the scientific *fact*, that during all these past epochs, the same plan of creation has been gradually evolved or developed, with constant "advance and progress," but without any indications of approaching completion. On this point Prof. Owen is very explicit: "Geology demonstrates that the creative force has not deserted the earth during any of her epochs of time; and that in respect to no one *class* of animals has the manifestation of that force been limited to one epoch. Not a species of fish that now lives but has come into being during a comparatively recent period; the existing species were preceded by other species, and these again by others still more different from the present. No existing genus of fishes can be traced back beyond a moiety of known *creative* time. Two entire orders (Cycloids and Ctenoids,) have come into being, and have almost superseded two other orders, (Ganoids and Placoids,) since the newest or latest of the secondary formations of the earth's crust. Species after species of land animals, order after order of air-breathing reptiles, have succeeded each other, creation ever compensating for extinction."

We have seen that a whole *formation* of rocks of all known varieties is being formed gradually in the progressing human epoch; that we can note the changes in an individual of any same species of animal or plant—adult, youth, infant, embryo, and cell; that by cautious comparison, with all the advantages of advanced science and improved instruments, men of science have shown a gradual ascent in perfection of development in species, genera, orders, etc., from the lowest to the more complex forms of animal life in each of the great classes—Radiate, Molluscous, Articulate, and Vertebrate; and that, in like manner, beginning with the simplest forms of vitalised vegetable organisms, and ascending through the long series of experiments prepared by nature for their observation and comparison, hundreds of ardent experts, in the science of Physiological Botany, have showed conclusively increasing complexity and perfection in species, genera, orders, and classes, in each of the great divisions of plants—Endogens and Exogens.

Such was the foundation which had been slowly and securely

laid, on which was erected the great science of Geology, including all the branches of Palæontology.

The successful inquiries of geologists fully verified Smith's conclusion, that each of the great rock formations of England was easily recognised, in any of its widely separated localities, by a peculiar group of fossils, not found in other rocks geologically below or above it. The verification of this opinion, and its triumphant extension to the rocks of France, Germany, Russia, and other distant countries and islands, forced the conviction on the minds of all men of science, that the rocks of existing continents were slowly deposited, by causes still in operation, generally in oceans, during many successive and protracted epochs, in the earth's eventful revolution in its present orbit, influenced as now by sun and moon, atmosphere and winds, oceans and rivers, earthquakes and volcanoes, and all the physico-chemical forces, intensified by subterranean fires. And it was further ascertained, by a diligent application of the principle of comparison to each of the groups of fossils found in the several formations, that, beginning at the earth's surface, and descending through all the sub-divisions of Pliocene, Eocene, Secondary, Palæozoic, and Eozoic, to Azoic (non-fossiliferous) rocks, we find, in any country, gradually increasing simplicity, till, in the Eozoic strata—dawn of life rocks—the lowest species only of animals and plants are found—showing a slow, protracted, gradual, planned advance of the planet to the human epoch—the creation of a new kingdom—physico-spiritual man.

Many other less obvious but equally convincing illustrations of gradualness could be adduced from each of the physical sciences, and especially from Embryology and Palæontology. True, recent recondite researches go far to show that even the most comprehensive generalisations, like Newton's law of gravitation, may be found to resolve themselves into still more far-reaching generalisations; yet, such discoveries, if made, will not change the nature of the evidence of planned operations of force, controlled by a personal, infinite Creator, in effecting *directed* motion; for physical science can never ascertain the origin of matter or of force. The existence of both is admitted by all. When and

how they came into existence, can never be demonstrated. Materialists assume the eternal existence of uncreated matter and motive force; the Bible says: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." Both parties, sceptical and Christian men of science, appeal to evidence to sustain belief; and in the sense of divinely planned creation, involving, necessarily, progression, extension, and expansion, every Christian scientist is a believer in true evolution; but this great doctrine of evolution does not rest on assumption or speculation. It is a necessary inference from an immensely extensive and connected system of scientific principles, from which the human mind cannot withhold assent. Evolution is a fact; the cause or origin of it is an assumption; and Christian scientists, who find in the Bible abundant internal evidence of the divine origin and plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, reverence and adore the God of the Bible as the cause of evolution. *They* reject, of course, the assumption of uncreated, self-directed forces, acting unerringly within minerals and organisms, in the production of uniform results. They reject the hypothetical explanation of evolution by *transmutation*, or selection, and rely on the evidence of a vast accumulation of geological and palæontological facts to prove evolution by gradual extinction of species, and the substitution by direct creation of other species, generally of higher types. The use of the term evolution, in any other sense, by sceptical writers, is, therefore, a deception. Transmutation, by its derivation, describes their theory—the formation of vital organisms by the law of selection, acting within the particles of matter to produce in it a protoplasmic state, then on protoplasm till a specific form is produced, and then gradually modifying certain parts and adding others, thereby slowly transmuting one specific form into another of higher type. This is evolution by transmutation.

Of course the view of evolution which harmonises perfectly the teachings of science and the Bible, rejects, also, the now exploded doctrine, once generally received, that the God of the Bible, about six thousand years ago, in six literal days, first created a "finished" earth, and placed plants, animals, and man on its surface, just emerged from a "void" chaotic state.

It is not our purpose to discuss in detail this erroneous interpretation of Genesis, nor to show, what has long been ably done, that the scientific and Mosaic records coincide in all essential points. We may say, however, that as the description of creation was written in the Bible, not to teach science, but man's duties of faith and obedience, the record was expressed in indefinite general terms, which neither fix exactly the period of man's creation, nor affirm that there was but one creative period. Whatever mode of interpretation we adopt—whether we regard the six days in the Mosaic account as protracted periods, or periods marked by the earth's revolution on its axis, the work was gradual—was not instantaneous; and planned succession characterised the changes from chaotic darkness to order, light, day and night, atmosphere, oceans, and dry land, vegetable life, animal life, and man. As four verbs—to create, to make, to form, and to build—are used in the original Hebrew text, in enumerating briefly these progressive changes, we may fairly assume that one design of the inspired writer was to describe, for man's religious instruction, a remodelling of a preëxisting planet, with the creation of such new species of vegetables and animals as were to coexist with man, in the human epoch. The great object of the Bible was the revelation to man of his Creator's plan of saving fallen man—a free agent—from the guilt and punishment of sinful disobedience. A history of past epochs was certainly foreign to such a revelation. Man had been created capable of deducing the truths of such a history from numerous phenomena preserved in the rocks of each pre-Adamic epoch; and that history has been successfully studied and correctly interpreted, and the results are found in the sciences of Geology and Palæontology.

That the Mosaic account is a brief description of a remodelling of the planet, just anterior to the human era, many expressions in the Bible clearly indicate; and hence this view had been adopted by many, long before geologists proved the antiquity of the earth. We shall briefly call attention to a few of such expressions. In the account of the fourth day's work, after day and night and other effects of such luminaries had been referred to, the sun, moon, and stars were ap-

pointed, "to be for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and for years." These words have, of course, a special reference to man; for he alone is capable of comprehending such purposes in the creation of the heavenly bodies; and we should bear in mind, in studying the fourth day's work, that the word *create* is not used in the Hebrew text, nor in the English version. We are told that "God *made* two great lights; the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night; he made the stars also." And hence, at a late period in the history of the planet, the preordained conditions arose, in which preëxisting luminaries were to serve the new purpose of being "for signs and for seasons, and for days, and for years;" and this specific mention of this purpose was designed, we think, to guard man against idolatry, a sin most explicitly forbidden, like necromancy and divination, at an early period in the gradual revelation to man of the attributes of the Creator.

Recent commentators—Lange, Conant, and Browne, (Speaker's Genesis)—concur in saying the general terms used in Gen. i. 1, 2, denote a period of unknown duration, in which, to human apprehension, the "earth was without form and void." In interpreting these two verses, therefore, we are, in a great degree, left to speculation. It is generally conceded, however, that they are not necessarily connected in time with the third and other verses of the chapter. Astronomy is, perhaps, the only science which can throw any light on the subject. In a recent publication, an eminent theologian says: "Taking those results of Astronomy which involve nothing arbitrary at all, it is almost impossible not to believe that the earth was, at one time, a hot fluid mass, and that it has gradually cooled down and hardened into its present permanent condition."

Granting, as many theologians and other pious writers now do, that the earth was, in some long period after the "beginning," in a state of igneous fluidity, and consisted of the same mineral constituents, which now form its crust and atmosphere, we must admit that dense vapors, impenetrable to solar light, enveloped it; and that the "dark" mass revolved on its axis, without the

changes of day and night—"darkness was upon the face of the deep."

Such a mass, however, revolving in space, must have slowly cooled by radiation, while the vapors of the less volatile bodies liquefied and solidified, and the atmosphere was greatly purified, though still very hot. The dark mass was thus illuminated gradually by the sun, giving rise to the changes which we call day and night. This was probably the period included in "the first day." Gen. i. 3—5.

In Gen. i. 6—8, a continuation of the process is briefly described. As the earth and air cooled, other volatile substances solidified; crystallisation and chemical action went on; watery vapor began its condensation; and finally water, as such, was formed in increasing quantities, and accelerated the cooling of the earth's still heated crust. Thus was water separated into two portions—one as a liquid on the earth, the other as vapor above the open space which surrounded the solid land and fluid water, in the greatly purified atmosphere. This was, we think, the work of "the second day."

In Gen. i. 9—13, a further continuation of the process is described. The earth's crust, by cooling and crystallisation, expanded, fractured, and was elevated in some places and depressed in others. This force of expansion was doubtless aided, as at present, in elevating some and depressing other portions, by the subterranean heat, which still causes volcanic action on a scale of immense magnitude. The elevated portions became dry land, and the waters subsided into depressions, called oceans and seas. Then the physico-chemical forces began their action on rocks exposed to the atmosphere, and soils resulted from their disintegration and pulverisation. In all preceding periods there had been no rain, because the air was saturated with hot vapor and steam, by the heated surface of the revolving mass. The preceding were periods in which "the Lord God had not caused it to rain." Gen. ii. 5. Now, however, rains fell, perhaps copiously, and watered the lichens which covered the rocks, and thus began the preparation of food for animals of a low type. The atmosphere, (firmament,) dry land, soils, rain, and other

conditions, were then ready for the action of the vital force, and it was added with power to control and subsidize the chemical and other physical forces. We are not informed that marine plants were not created, but are told that land plants of a low type were created—"Let the earth bring forth grass," etc. The statement was general, but sufficient to teach man the origin of vital action. Here the transmutationist takes issue with Moses, and labors to show that all the conditions favorable to the production of protoplasm had arisen, and that the vital is but a new modification of physical force. He, too, relies on evidence. The great question, in a scientific point of view, is, Do the facts and principles of true science sustain his hypothesis? The eyes of the true and enlightened friends of the Bible are now being directed to this field of conflict. The contest has been and will continue to be fierce. In this assault on the Bible, great scientists—sceptical scientists—in Germany, England, and America, have united. An assailant always has the advantage in any assault. Sceptical writers have long availed themselves of this obvious truth. Their writings, extensively read and imprudently advertised by theological critics, poisoned the public mind before Christian scientists could adequately investigate the subject and prepare correct replies. The Christian Church has too long relied on human theology, and been content to stand on the defensive. The time has come when a profound acquaintance with the whole circle of the physical sciences is needed by the Church. With this knowledge only can many sceptical hypotheses be successfully assailed.

To the foregoing explanation of the first four days' work, the use of the terms evening, morning, and day, in Genesis, appears to be a serious objection. To many, it seems insurmountable. Such minds forget that they are common English words, used often in various senses in Scripture; that Revelation was not designed to teach history or science; and especially that the institution of the Sabbath follows the account of the six days' work, and precedes a brief recapitulation without the use of evening, morning, and day.

As in nature we find potent forces—volcanic heat, oceanic

currents, resistless torrents, tornadoes, and chemical action—used as means, in the midst of seeming demolition, of causing changes essential to progress in material development, so in Scripture we find other potent moral forces, apparently obstructing but really promoting the full development of that portion of spiritual truth which concerns the future well-being of man.

And if Adam and his posterity were so organised as to subdue the earth by gradual advancement, in the discovery and use of physical truth, why may they not inherit an eternal abode, adapted to the acquisition and enjoyment of spiritual truth? If man is a materio-spiritual creature, does not the reality of the protracted preparation of the earth for the accomplishment of the end of his material existence lead naturally to a belief in the coming realities of a purely spiritual existence? As he has unquestionably made advance in time, can we believe there will be no advance in a coming eternity? As his material part is merely changed—not annihilated—by death, can we believe his spirit perishes—loses its conscious existence, and its capacity to advance in knowledge? Is man a mere animal? Can he divest himself of the expectation of future existence? Is it not an essential part of his higher nature? And if the profoundest men of science admit that natural truth is made known, from time to time, *in allotted portions*, by preordained human discoverers, for man's temporal behoof and guidance, how can they consistently deny the probability at least of a preordained revelation, by human instrumentalities, for man's future spiritual welfare?

The dogma of the recent creation of a finished earth long obstructed the progress of truth, scientific and scriptural. At this period, however, the geologic truth of the slow progress of change in successive past epochs, in which the earth was fitted for human occupation, has accustomed the human mind to the contemplation of a known past eternity, and to look forward, with a firm conviction of its reality, to a future eternity of existence of some kind, in some place connected with this planet.

We have seen that Geology and Palæontology have made legible the vast record, preserved in the rocks, of the earth's past

history; and no scientist now denies that in the bones of the first vertebrate creature—the earliest fish—were found the levers for muscular motion, which levers, by gradual changes, approached nearer and nearer, in the bones of higher vertebrates in succeeding epochs, to the structure of the skeleton of prefigured man. This modern discovery—this great truth of Comparative Anatomy—shows that man's frame was planned cycles of ages before his creation. We know the transmutationist denies this, and ascribes the changes, which he cannot deny, to selection and other natural laws; but as science advances and human theology is corrected and improved, the truth we have stated is more generally received. And as we find in the bones of the earliest fish the type of the frame of the coming man, can we hesitate to admit the immortality of his higher spiritual nature, and the gradual preparation for his future existence in a "holy city, new Jerusalem?"

To feel the full force of such reasoning, we have only to show now not only that physical science and biblical records are harmonious—do not contradict each other, but that they agree perfectly in some pervading characteristics which connect them together as parts of one great design. One of these characteristics in all natural operations is gradualness in progress to the attainment of some important end. Is this true of all the operations described in the Bible? In discussing this part of our subject, we will very briefly examine a few leading propositions.

1. The gradual occupation of the earth by the descendants of Adam and Eve, is plainly taught in Genesis. A discussion of the unity of origin of existing races of men is foreign to our purpose. Its discussion certainly began too soon; and by prematurely agitating the public mind, it caused the adoption of hastily formed opinions, and greatly retarded the progress of truth. Perhaps the time for its decision has not arrived. Its examination requires a profound knowledge of the highest branches of Comparative Science, and a cautious interpretation of the Scriptures. One thing is certain, we think, that when a full, clear, and certain decision of science shall be reached, that decision will harmonise with a correct exegesis of Genesis, as in all past instances

of apparent discrepancies between science and the Bible. Even if human antiquities, history, and science, should finally demonstrate the original creation of several species, at different periods and in different centres, the Christian will find his faith unshaken in the belief that Adam was divinely made the psychological head and representative of all human creatures, for all the purposes of a revelation of spiritual truth, just as Abraham was made the head and representative of Israel, a peculiar people, for a special purpose.

We may say further, that even those who already believe that science has ascertained differences in organic structure, so marked and numerous as to prove the original creation of several distinct species of men, cannot deny the truth of our proposition. If sceptics, they reject the Bible. If Christians, they can only admit that the Bible implies more than we have yet affirmed: that the descendants of the highest, representative, Adamic race will eventually subdue and exterminate the inferior races, and occupy exclusively the whole earth. The almost total disappearance of American Indians—the work of a few centuries—and many other facts favor this view.

As late as the century which preceded the Christian era—a century remarkable for great civil changes and desolating political convulsions—the population of the world was comparatively small; and yet there was then a ceaseless struggle for the means of subsistence. Even now, when wars are less general, pestilences less frequent, famines more local, agriculture more respected, employments more diversified, science vastly more advanced, and machinery greatly perfected, an immense area of land is uncultivated. And though food is more abundant and starvation less common than ever before, the earth is far, very far, from being replenished. Population, civilisation, science, art, abundance, and religion advance together; and the time gradually approaches when the numbers of mankind will be doubled, trebled, quadrupled, without increasing the difficulty of subsistence. During all future periods, however, the weaker races will grow weaker, until finally the highest types will exercise universal dominion. In indicating this future period, Scripture,

history, and science concur. Politicians and rulers, ignorant of the great law of social progress, may seem temporarily to modify and retard results; but they will not be allowed to resist the design of infinite power and wisdom. The Bible no where teaches human equality. From the first, God is represented as selecting, favoring, elevating, thwarting, overthrowing individuals and nations. Progress towards perfection is manifestly a part of the divine plan of human operations. And this brings us to our second illustration—

2. The formation, gradually, of the lineal and legal descendants of a single pair into a peculiar and great nation, for a special purpose. Abraham and Sarah, each of the tenth generation from Shem, the divinely preferred son of Noah, were selected. Terah, Abraham's father, was a patriarch, equal only in race, rank, and circumstances, to other family rulers of that early period in the progress of civilisation and refinement. Abraham, the oldest of three sons, was divinely commanded, he believed, to leave country, kindred, and paternal influence, and to go into a strange country to dwell; and the fulfilment of the divine promise to make his seed a great nation, could not possibly have been foreseen by the writer of Genesis, save by inspiration.

The means employed to mould the descendants of the chosen head into a peculiar people were various, protracted, radical, and efficient. Complete separation from kindred and country; circumcision, which cut them off, from the first, from intermarriage with strangers; famine, which drove Abraham temporarily into Egypt; the destruction of the cities of the plain, and the war which separated him from Lot; another famine, which forced Isaac to dwell temporarily among the Philistines; the weakness of Isaac and the wickedness of Rebecca, which caused Jacob to conceal himself a fugitive twenty years in his ancestral land; the deceit and fraud of Laban, which forced Jacob's return to the promised Canaan; the punishment of Shechem, which made circumcision hateful to neighboring peoples; the sale of Joseph to Potiphar, and his extraordinary rise to supreme control in Egypt; the famine, which drove Jacob and his sons and dependants to Joseph for subsistence; the burial of Jacob by Joseph

and his host in the cave of Machpelah ; the rigorous servitude and complete isolation, for four centuries, of the Israelites in Egypt ; their sudden exodus under Moses into the wilderness of Arabia ; their long and weary wanderings, as an armed band, in the midst of hostile tribes ; their entrance as enemies into a land of fertility and abundance, which they believed had been long promised by the true God to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, and to their seed forever ; their possession of Joseph's remains to be interred near those of his ancestors in Canaan ; the long wars of extermination that ensued ; and above all, the laws, institutions, sacrifices, and religious rites which their deliverer had left for their observance—were all calculated to mould them, the Israelites, into a peculiar people, distinct from all others in manners, laws, civil polity, and religious observances. And it would be easy to show that the general effect of these and of many other causes was strengthened and intensified from the time of Joshua to that of David and Solomon, when Jerusalem became a great metropolis and Israel a great nation—great in numbers, wealth, and military power. The slow progress of this nation, from a period long anterior to the founding of Carthage or Rome to the wars and triumphs of the Cæsars, and that, too, near the centre of Asiatic and European civilisation, forms a strangely interesting and important part of the early history of mankind. And this leads us to notice very briefly :

3. The gradual advancement of this peculiar people, like others of the same race and of the same era, in manners, customs, laws, arts, sciences, and morality—indeed, in all the elements of what we moderns call civilisation. This is an important characteristic of the Old Testament. It is not generally understood or appreciated. Indeed, to persons of morbid or excessive feelings of refinement, it is often repulsive, and they are inclined to deny the inspiration of the volume by an infinitely powerful and holy God. By some, who have not studied the history and laws of social progress in both ancient and modern times—laws still obscurely taught in the writings of sociologists—and by others who are misled by erroneous opinions of the purpose of Revelation, it is regarded an argument against the Bible as the word of God ; for they ig-

norantly assume that if the Israelites had been made the recipients of a revelation of spiritual truth, they would also have been more enlightened than the Gentiles in the several departments of human progress, in literature, art, science, social polity, and morality. It is important, therefore, to state briefly yet clearly some reasons, which show this peculiarity of the Bible to be one proof of its divine authority.

If what has been said be true, that gradualness is a pervading character of all God's operations—that the divine plan is progressive, always evolving new parts, each part tending to the attainment of some great end; and if the gradual occupation of the earth by Adam's posterity, and the formation of Abraham's, after the lapse of centuries, into a peculiar people, for a special purpose, be parts of that plan, why should that people have been more favored than others in things not essential to that purpose, such as social customs and polity, architecture, art, science, morality, and other general results of advancing civilisation? We have shown, also, that in mental and moral nature, as in physical structure, man has been the same in all ages; but we have shown, also, that as a part of God's plan of operations, man's moral and intellectual nature, in any social aggregate, is capable of indefinite though not of rapid or sudden advancement. The sudden attainment, by the descendants of Abraham, of even modern perfection in social arrangements would, therefore, have been a departure from God's general method of procedure. And hence we cannot reasonably regard the defects of that people as a valid argument against the Bible. They, too, exhibited the ignorance, rudeness, and even lewdness of the age in which they lived. And the moral obliquities of even such characters as Abraham, Jacob, and David, are what we should expect to find recorded in the Bible—a simple, graphic, faithful history of one of the earliest civil collections of men, in their progress in self-culture, while receiving a revelation of spiritual truth.

By the divine plan, if we have correctly interpreted the scriptural account, man was placed on the earth with powers that fitted him for constant progress in knowledge of all kinds, except that which was essential to his immortal well-being. The discovery

of this kind of truth only was beyond his natural powers. Endowed with adequate mental powers, he was commanded to subdue the earth, and to exercise dominion over all terrestrial creatures. And as the Israelites were equal to surrounding nations in physical, moral, and mental powers, no valid reason can be assigned for expecting to find, in the scriptural account of their social progress, any superiority to other peoples, in any department of human effort; nor can we expect to find in them complete exemption from the follies, vicious propensities, and immoral practices of other nations of the same race, at the same period in the general progress of human advancement. The Israelites were mere men. They were receiving gradually a revelation of spiritual truth; but that truth was designed for all men, and is freely offered to all. The Israelites, therefore, like other descendants of Shem, were left to domesticate animals, to form social relations, to construct dwellings, to choose employments, to acquire knowledge, to invent machinery, to organise armies, and to wage wars offensive and defensive. Till the time of Moses, they were not divinely taught civil policy or pure morality. Previous to this time, when a government, connected with religious rites, sacrifices, and observances, was divinely instituted, they were only instructed by revelation in the attributes of God and a few truths relative to the Messiah. In being made the depository of a revelation of God's glory in redemption, Israel was preferred to other nations, and, therefore, was gradually and unconsciously moulded into a separate, peculiar body politic.

Hence, to read the Old Testament profitably, we should endeavor to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the situation of Abraham, of Isaac, of Jacob, and of their descendants, in successive periods of their progress in the midst of adjacent nations. In this way alone can we rightly understand and duly appreciate the manners, customs, institutions, foibles, and immoral practices of patriarchs, prophets, kings, and other pious men, whose acts were faithfully recorded, to show the dealings of the Almighty with fallen man, for the edification of all who seek to know him and the principles of his spiritual gov-

ernment. It is unwise to judge of such accounts by comparing them with acts of modern men, who were brought up under the influence of a completed revelation and of a greatly advanced and refined civilisation. The scriptural description of the Israelites in all the elements of human culture is, when carefully examined in the light of modern knowledge, a strong proof of its naturalness and truthfulness, and, therefore, of its being a part of the divine plan of gradual operations. And this leads us to notice, very briefly—

4. The gradual development of Revelation. The Bible begins with a sublime statement of acts and attributes of a spiritual Creator of the universe. That inspired statement is authoritatively made to man, the only intellectual terrestrial creature. He is given dominion over the earth, but is made consciously subject to law, to which law perfect obedience is required; for he is warned that death is the penalty of disobedience to a positive specific command. He understands the prohibition, and reasons with the serpent on the consequence of its infraction. Allowed to act as a free agent, he voluntarily breaks the law, and is punished with the loss of temporal blessings and spiritual life—is made unhappy by conscious guilt. In his distress, the existence of a spiritual foe is revealed to him, and a promise is made of relief through the seed of the woman, which seed should bruise the serpent's head. This is the sum of the revelation to Adam. More than two thousand years he and his posterity labored in vain to please God under a covenant requiring perfect obedience; and the truth was gradually established, that no mere man, since the Fall, can perfectly obey an infinitely holy Lawgiver. The brief scriptural history of this protracted period is a record of genealogies, of sins, of divine punishments, and of human progress. Enoch alone walked with God, and was translated.

After the revelation to Adam of the Creator's attributes and laws, and after the gradual progress of the race for more than twenty centuries in peopling the earth, in domesticating animals, in acquiring knowledge, in improving social policy, and in showing man's inability to conform strictly to a holy law, a fuller revelation was made to Abraham, and a new covenant was made

with him and his seed, requiring *both obedience and faith*. All preceding patriarchal rulers had failed to believe in the promised relief through "the seed of the woman;" and after the deluge and the dispersion of the descendants of Noah, at Babel, great nations, as in Egypt, had overspread the continent, and practised idolatry.

When commanded to leave his kindred and native land, and to seek a country promised to him and his posterity forever, the patriarch Abraham believed, obeyed, left Haran, and was made the human founder of a new dispensation; and to him the promise was again made, at Sichem, in Canaan, which promise was solemnly renewed to Isaac and to Jacob, that in his seed all the *families* of the earth should be blessed—*all*, of whatever country, language, or race. From this time onward, the best men—even Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob—whose faith was strong and who erected altars wherever they sojourned, and worshipped the true God—failed in obedience; and their errors, follies, and sins, though pardoned, were placed in the divine record. Tried severely by famine and galling servitude, they kept the faith more than five centuries, during which their numbers increased; and when their condition seemed hopeless, they were removed, under Moses, from Egyptian bondage, and to him, while leading Israel back to Canaan, the revelation of spiritual truth, incorporated with civil laws and institutions, and with rites and observances typical of the coming Saviour, was greatly enlarged, and recorded with preceding revelations in the Pentateuch. Israel entered Canaan under Joshua, expelled the Canaanites, and occupied the country till the purpose for which they were moulded into a peculiar people was fully accomplished.

The nation—God's Church on earth—being then strong and independent, advanced in knowledge and power; and the sacred record was slowly continued, from time to time, during about seven centuries, by various prophets, from Joshua to Malachi. The student of the progressing narrative notes with admiration the increasing clearness of the prophetic view of the promised Messiah—the seed of the woman, the seed of Abraham, and the seed of King David; and in the pardoned sins of Jacob, Eli,

Moses, David, and many others, such a student rejoices in the perception, more and more clear, of the great central truth of Christianity. "By grace are ye saved, through faith; and that not of yourselves: it is the gift of God."

With Malachi revelation by the Hebrew prophets ended. More than four centuries longer, Israel, surrounded by Gentile nations, equally advanced in human knowledge, went on practising the rites and ceremonies of the Hebrew Church, which had been greatly corrupted by traditions, when revelation culminated in the advent of Jesus Christ, in whom were marvellously combined all the characters foretold of him at different periods by different prophets and under different circumstances.

We have thus traced the gradual development of revealed truth through two dispensations, which together lasted 5,411 years, according to Hales, and 4,004 years, according to Ussher—a very short period in past time, but a very long one in the history of man.

The progress of revelation in the New Testament is rightly divided into five periods, each of which is familiar to the Christian reader. 1. By the Saviour in person, about three years, from his baptism to his crucifixion, as we find recorded in the four Evangelists. 2. By him again in person, after his resurrection, forty days; and it seems strange to many readers that after his varied instructions, during both periods, but before they had been "baptized with the Holy Ghost," (Acts i. 5,) the apostles "asked him, saying, Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom of Israel?" Acts i. 6. And his last words to his still ignorant, doubting apostles were: "It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power; but ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you; and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth." Acts i. 7, 8. And immediately "he was taken up, and a cloud received him out of their sight." The revelation, therefore, was still incomplete. 3. It was continued by the Holy Ghost, through the apostles, beginning at Jerusalem and extending to all Gentile nations, as recorded in the Acts.

4. It was further amplified and explained by the Holy Ghost, through the apostles, in their various epistles addressed to Christians and Christian churches for their guidance and direction.

5. It was completed by the Spirit, to the aged apostle John, as recorded in Revelation. For a lucid, learned, and satisfactory exposition of the gradual development of revealed truth in each of these periods, the reader is referred to the charming little volume by Bernard, entitled *The Progress of Doctrine in the New Testament*.

We could readily adduce other scriptural illustrations of the subject; but as this article is perhaps already too long, we will close with the remark, that we have aimed to prove gradualness in progress to the attainment of an end to be a striking characteristic, pervading the Creator's whole plan of operations, including man's creation, existence, extinction, and redemption; and that the gradual evolution of that plan, in all its successive, connected parts, ever advancing towards perfection, yet never reaching completion, was designed to demonstrate to an observing spiritual universe, that "God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth."

CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Expanse of Heaven: A series of Essays on the Wonders of the Firmament. By R. A. PROCTOR, B. A., author of "Other Worlds than Ours;" "The Moon;" "Light Science for Leisure Hours," etc. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 549 and 551 Broadway. 1874. Pp. 305, 12mo.

Twenty-eight essays make up this interesting and instructive volume. Some of the topics are as follows: The sun; the queen of night; the evening star; the ruddy planet; the prince of planets; the ring-girdled planet; the discovery of two giant planets; whence come the comets? the earth's journey through showers; worlds ruled by colored suns; the king of suns; four orders of suns; the depths of space; the star depths astir with life.

Mr. Proctor is a somewhat celebrated public lecturer on Astronomy. He is the author of a number of other works on this subject, and appears to be well acquainted with the science of which he treats. It cannot be said of him, however, that the "undevout astronomer is mad;" for he constantly leads us up "through nature to nature's God."

As a specimen of the wonders of Astronomy of which our author treats, let us recur to the fact that the stars are of many colors; also, that there are colored pairs of stars, and the pairs usually in strongly marked contrasts, as green and red, orange and blue, yellow and purple. These pairs are double suns, and rule a system of stars together. And their color is real and not imaginary, revealed as such by the spectroscope. The speculations of the author as to the varying light in a star lighted both by a blue sun and an orange one, fill the reader's mind with wonder and delight. Or, let us notice what Astronomy teaches about Sirius, the blazing dog-star of the ancients, the only sun in the universe of which it has been *demonstrated* that, taking light as the measure of the magnitude, he surpasses our sun at the very least one thousand times in volume. Or, let us attend to what is ascer-

tained about Alpha Centauri—the only star whose distance has been measured—namely, that it lies 200,000 times further away from us than our sun. Or, let us consider the fact that with a telescope such as we commonly see in opticians' windows, thousands on thousands of stars are brought to view, which the naked eye cannot perceive, so that the German astronomer, Argeländer, a few years ago, catalogued and charted no less than 324,198 stars, of which 310,000 belonged to the northern half of the star sphere surrounding us.

One of the most impressive views which the study of such works as this affords, is that of the groups and streams and systems of primary suns, all in rapid motion, with galaxies of minor orbs revolving round them, which fill the unmeasurable depths of our stellar universe, and which are all probably inhabited, not of course by creatures like men, but yet by reasonable creatures, who know and worship and serve God. After penetrating, by means of the telescope, to depths exceeding millions of times the distance of our sun, (inconceivable though that distance is,) we find ourselves still surrounded by infinite star depths, which are and must ever remain to us unfathomable. Let us close this notice with the German poet Richter's vision, translated by De Quincy, and quoted by our author :

“God called up from dreams a man into the vestibule of heaven, saying, ‘Come thou hither and see the glory of my house.’ And to the angels which stood around his throne, he said : ‘Take him, strip from him his robes of flesh, cleanse his vision and put a new breath into his nostrils, only touch not with any change his human heart, the heart that weeps and trembles.’ It was done; and with a mighty angel for his guide, the man stood ready for his infinite voyage, and from the terraces of heaven, without sound or farewell, at once they wheeled away into endless space. With the solemn flight of angel wings sometimes they passed through zuharas of darkness, through wildernesses of death, that divided the worlds of life; sometimes they swept over frontiers that were quickening under prophetic motions from God. Then from a distance which is counted only in heaven, light dawned for a time through a shapeless film; by unutterable pace the light swept to them, they by unutterable pace to the light. In a moment the rushing of planets was upon them, in a moment the blazing of suns was around them.

“Then came eternities of twilight that revealed but were not revealed.

On the right hand and on the left towered mighty constellations that by self-repetitions and answers from afar, that by counter positions built up triumphal gates, whose architraves, whose archways horizontal, upright, rested, rose at altitude by spans that seemed ghostly from infinitude. Without measure were the architraves, past number were the archways, beyond memory the gates. Within were stars that scaled the eternities around; above was below, and below was above, to the man stripped of gravitating body; depth was swallowed up in height insurmountable, height was swallowed up in depth unfathomable. Suddenly, as thus they rode from infinite to infinite, suddenly as thus they tilted over abysmal worlds, a mighty cry arose that systems more mysterious, that worlds more billowy, other heights and other depths were coming, were nearing, were at hand.

“Then the man sighed and stopped, shuddered and wept. His overladen heart uttered itself in tears, and he said, ‘Angel, I will go no further; for the spirit of man acheth with infinity. Insufferable is the glory of God. Let me lie down in the grave and hide me from the persecution of the Infinite, for end I see there is none.’ And from all the listening stars that shone around, issued a choral voice: ‘The man speaketh truly; end there is none that ever yet we heard of.’ ‘End is there none?’ the angel solemnly demanded; ‘is there indeed no end? And is this the sorrow that fills you?’ But no voice answered, that he might answer himself. Then the angel threw up his glorious hands to the heaven of heavens, saying, ‘End there is none to the universe of God. Lo! also, there is no beginning!’”

We are reminded by this eloquent extract of the dying words of our Thornwell. With eyes closed and consciousness apparently gone, he cried: “Wonderful! beautiful! nothing but space! expanse, expanse, expanse!”

The History of the English Language, from the Teutonic Invasion of Britain to the close of the Georgian Era. By HENRY E. SHEPHERD, Professor of the English Language and English Literature, Baltimore City College. New York: E. J. Hale & Son. 1874. 1 Vol., pp. 227, 12mo.

There have not been many works upon this subject presented to the English speaking people of the world that have attained any considerable celebrity. And it is rather remarkable that this should be the case, seeing that the English tongue is perhaps the most composite of languages, and furnishes vast fields for etymological research. The present work, besides giving con-

stant references to former volumes upon the same general topic, abounds in original matter, and is full of interesting and valuable information, both new and instructive to the philologist, as well as to the general reader.

The introductory chapter, treating of the Aryan or Indo-European languages, selects those tongues which have entered most largely into the structure of the English, and prepares the way for the more elaborate analysis of our tongue in the succeeding chapters. In this chapter, the Germanic and the Scandinavian, with their subdivisions, are presented as the two branches of the Teutonic family, with which the history is chiefly concerned. The whole of this introduction is specially interesting, as indicating the creation of the composite tongue known as Anglo-Saxon, which our author suggests was formed by the blending of various Teutonic dialects introduced into England by Germanic invaders, with the tongues of British tribes, and more or less admixture with the *lingua justica Romana*.

In the following chapters, the gradual growth of the language is traced through the Anglo-Saxon period, the Norman Conquest, and the development of the English of Chaucer and Wycliffe. The Elizabethan English is carefully examined, and the points of difference between that and the vernacular of the present age clearly distinguished—the history ending with the close of the Georgian era, (1830.) Our author is especially happy in his comments upon the power of the Scripture translations in fixing the character of the language; first, in Wycliffe's translation; and secondly, and more emphatically, in the present authorised version. While the Reformation was in progress, and during the fierce contests between Prelacy and Puritanism, the language of the Word was familiar to those who finally triumphed after that prolonged struggle.

The temptation to give quotations from the book is urgent; but we content ourselves with the reproduction of the closing paragraph of chapter xix., on the "Formation of Elizabethan English," in which the Euphuistic style is fully discussed:

"Euphuism is not, however, a feature peculiar to the Elizabethan age, nor to any particular era of linguistic history; it is constantly repro-

ducing itself in diverse forms and with varying degrees of virulence. The antithetical brilliance of Macaulay is merely 'the Euphuism of the elder day;' and in the discourses of the modern sensational school of divines, we have a strange resuscitation of the incongruities and fantasies of Euphuism, without the redeeming excellences which it attained under the culture of the graceful Lyly and his associates."—Page 164.

The work of Captain Shepherd has been very highly commended by the Professors in various schools—the Washington and Lee University, the University of Virginia, Lafayette, Yale, and Princeton Colleges. As a text-book for the use of students in the higher branches of English literature, it will be found of great value, and it will doubtless win its way into the libraries of all lovers of books. There is every probability that the English tongue is once more in a state of transition—receiving additions from the mystical vocabulary of transcendental philosophy, from the more transcendental and vapid discourses of Northern sensational sermons, from the misuse and misapplication of such words as "reliable" for "trustworthy," "available" for "obtainable," and a multitude of similar English words, transmuted into New English.

The publishers have issued the work in very handsome style of binding and printed with clear type on good paper.

Paradise: The Place and State of Saved Souls, between Death and the Resurrection. By ROBERT M. PATTERSON, Philadelphia. "To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise." Philadelphia, Presbyterian Board of Publication, 1334 Chestnut Street, 1874. Pp. 220, 12mo.

The object of this book is to elaborate and popularise the doctrine presented in the thirty-second chapter of the Westminster Confession of Faith: "The bodies of men, after death, return to death and see corruption; but their souls, (which neither die nor sleep,) having an immortal subsistence, immediately return to God who gave them. The souls of the righteous, being there made perfect in holiness, are received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory, waiting for the full redemption of their bodies; and the souls of the wicked are cast into hell, where they remain in torments and utter

darkness, reserved to the judgment of the great day. Besides these two places reserved for souls separated from their bodies, the Scripture acknowledgeth none."

It is predominantly, therefore, a practical and comforting treatise, although to some extent historical and exegetical. Not conceived of nor handled in a controversial way, the subject is discussed without much reference to the erroneous views which prevail, or any formal refutation of them, but by a direct and positive exhibition of the Scripture testimony. The topics treated of are: Paradise—the word, its meaning and history; the inhabitants of paradise; its place in the universe; the state of saved souls there; their employment; their holiness and their happiness.

We consider it a work eminently adapted to be useful, and cordially commend it to all our readers. The stereotyping is done by our friends Westcott & Thomson, of Philadelphia, in their own style, and the whole getting up of the book is tasteful and pleasing.

Christian Love, as Manifested in the Heart and Life. By JONATHAN EDWARDS, some time pastor of the Church at Northampton, Massachusetts, and President of the College of New Jersey. Edited from the original manuscript, by the Rev. TRYON EDWARDS, D. D. Sixth American edition. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication.

This book contains sixteen Lectures of that distinguished divine of the seventeenth century, who was pronounced as "incomparably the greatest divine and moral philosopher in Great Britain and her colonies." They were delivered to the people of his charge in Northampton, Mass., in 1738. They were apparently designed by himself for publication, having been written out in full shortly before he began his discourses on the "History of Redemption," which he intended should be published. They were selected for the press from his voluminous manuscripts, by Drs. Hopkins and Bellamy, but were never given to the public till 1851, when they were issued by one of his descendants, the Rev. Tryon Edwards, D. D. They bear all the characteristics

of that eminent man, who was as great in the pulpit as an effective preacher, as he was in those masterly productions, such as that *Treatise on the Will*, on which his fame so greatly rests. It is true, in his more abstruse productions his style improves in perspicuity, if this can be, in proportion to the abstruseness and difficulty of his subject. But in these pulpit utterances, his thoughts are well digested, his arguments conclusive, and as deduced from his own experience, and breathing the very spirit of the Scriptures, are well suited to touch the conscience and arouse into action the whole energies of the soul. His work on Original Sin, his Discourse on Justification, his Dissertation on the End for which God created the World, and his Sermon entitled "Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God," will live in our theological literature; and these lectures, which show the staple of his more ordinary pulpit efforts, are not unworthy of his fame. They are founded on that beautiful chapter, the thirteenth of First Corinthians, of which they are a continuous practical exposition.

As a specimen of his method, take the following from his second Lecture on Corinthians xiii. 1, 2. After showing under his first head what is meant by the ordinary and extraordinary gifts of the Spirit, he proceeds to show :

"II. *That the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit of God are indeed great privileges.*—When God endows any one with a spirit of prophecy, favors him with immediate inspiration, or gives him power to work miracles, to heal the sick, to cast out devils, and the like, the privilege is great, yea, this is one of the highest kind of privileges that God ever bestows on men, next to saving grace. It is a great privilege to live in the enjoyment of the outward means of grace, and to belong to the visible Church; but to be a prophet and a worker of miracles in the Church, is a much greater privilege still. It is a great privilege to hear the word, which has been spoken by prophets and inspired persons; but a much greater to be a prophet, to preach the Word, to be inspired by God to make known his mind and will to others. It was a great privilege that God bestowed on Moses, when he called him to be a prophet, and improved him as an instrument to reveal the law to the children of Israel, and to deliver to the Church so great a part of the written word of God, even the first written revelation that ever was delivered to it; and when he used him as an instrument of working so many wonders in Egypt, at the Red Sea, and in the wilderness. Great was the privilege that God bestowed on David, in inspiring him, and making him the penman of so great and ex-

cellent a part of his word, for the use of the Church in all ages. Great was the privilege that God bestowed on those two prophets, Elijah and Elisha, in enabling them to perform such miraculous and wonderful works. And the privilege was very great that God bestowed on the prophet Daniel, in giving him so much of the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit, particularly such understanding in the visions of God. This procured him great honor among the heathen, and even in the court of the King of Babylon. Nebuchadnezzar, that great and mighty and haughty monarch, so admired Daniel for it, that he was once about to worship him as a god. He fell upon his face before him, and commanded that an oblation and sweet odors should be offered unto him, Dan. ii. 46. And Daniel was advanced to greater honor than all the wise men, the magicians, astrologers, and soothsayers of Babylon, in consequence of these extraordinary gifts which God bestowed upon him. Hear how the Queen speaks of him to Belshazzar, Dan. v. 11, 12: 'There is a man in thy kingdom, in whom is the spirit of the holy gods; and in the days of thy father, light and understanding and wisdom, like the wisdom of the gods, was found in him; whom the King Nebuchadnezzar, thy father, the king, I say, thy father, made master of the magicians, astrologers, Chaldeans; and soothsayers; for as much as an excellent spirit, and knowledge, and understanding, interpreting dreams, and showing of hard sentences, and dissolving of doubts, were found in the same Daniel.' This privilege was also the thing which gave Daniel honor in the Persian court. (Dan, vi. 1, 2, 3.) 'It pleased Darius to set over the kingdom an hundred and twenty princes, which should be over the whole kingdom, and over these, three presidents, of whom Daniel was first, that the princes might give accounts unto them, and the king should have no damage. Then this Daniel was preferred above the presidents and princes, because an excellent spirit was in him; and the king thought to set him over the whole realm.' By this excellent spirit was doubtless, among other things, meant the spirit of prophecy and divine inspiration, for which he had been so honored by the princes of Babylon.

"It was a great privilege that Christ bestowed on the apostles, in so filling them with the extraordinary gifts of the Holy Spirit, inspiring them to teach all nations, and making them as it were next to himself, and to be the twelve precious stones that are considered as the twelve foundations of the Church. Rev. xxi. 14: 'And the wall of the city had twelve foundations, and in them the names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb.' Eph. ii. 20: 'Built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone.' And how highly was the apostle John favored, when he was 'in the Spirit on the Lord's day,' and had such extraordinary visions, representing the great events of God's providence towards the Church in all ages of it to the end of the world.

“ Such extraordinary gifts of the Spirit are spoken of in Scriptures as very great privileges. So was the privilege that God bestowed on Moses in speaking to him by way of extraordinary miraculous revelation, as it were, ‘face to face.’ And that outpouring of the Spirit in his extraordinary gifts which on the day of Pentecost was foretold and spoken of by the prophet Joel, as a very great privilege, in those forecited words in Joel ii. 28, 29. And Christ speaks of the gifts of miracles, and of tongues, as great privileges that he would bestow on them that should believe in him. Matt. xvi. 17, 18.

“ Such extraordinary gifts of the Spirit have been looked upon as a great honor. Moses and Aaron were envied in the camp because of the peculiar honor that God put upon them, Psal. cvi. 16. And so Joshua was ready to envy Eldad and Medad because they prophesied in the camp: Num. xi. 27. And when the angels themselves have been sent to do the work of the prophets, to reveal things to come, it has set them in a very honorable point of light. Even the apostle John himself, in his great surprise, was once and again ready to fall down and worship the angel, that was sent by Christ to reveal to him the future events of the Church; but the angel forbids him, acknowledging that the privilege of the spirit of prophecy which he had was not of himself, but that he had received it of Jesus Christ: Rev. xix. 10, xxii. 8, 9. The heathen of the city of Lystra were so astonished at the power of the apostles Barnabas and Paul had to work miracles, that they were about to offer sacrifices to them as gods: Acts xiv. 11, 12, 13. And Simon the sorcerer had a great hankering after that gift that the apostles had of conferring the Holy Ghost, by laying on their hands, and offered them money for it.

“ These extraordinary gifts are a great privilege, in that there is in them a conformity to Christ in his prophetic office. And the greatness of the privilege appears also in this, that though sometimes they have been bestowed on natural men, yet it has been very rarely; and commonly such as have had them bestowed on them have been saints, yea, and the most eminent saints. Thus it was on the day of Pentecost; and thus it was in more early ages. 2 Pet. i. 21: ‘Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.’ These gifts have commonly been bestowed as tokens of God’s extraordinary favor and love, as it was with Daniel. He was a man *greatly beloved*, and therefore he was admitted to such a great privilege as that of having these revelations made to him: Dan ix. 23, and x. 11, 19. And the apostle John, as he was the disciple whom Jesus loved, so he was selected above all the other apostles, to be the man to whom those great events were revealed that we have an account of in the book of the Revelation.”

He proceeds then to show,

“ III. *That though these are great privileges, yet that the ordinary influence of the Spirit of God, working the grace of charity in the heart, is a*

far more excellent privilege than any of them: a greater blessing than the spirit of prophecy, or the gift of tongues, or of miracles, even to the removing of mountains; a greater blessing than all those miraculous gifts that Moses, and Elijah, and David, and the twelve apostles were endowed with. This will appear, if we consider,

1. *This blessing of the saving grace of God is a quality inherent in the nature of him that is the subject of it.*—This gift of the Spirit of God, working a truly Christian temper in the soul, and exciting gracious exercises there, confers a blessing that has its seat in the heart, a blessing that makes a man's heart or nature excellent; yea, the very excellency of the nature does consist in it. Now it is not so with respect to these extraordinary gifts of the Spirit. They are excellent things, but not properly the excellency of a man's nature, for they are not things that are inherent in the nature. For instance, if a man is endowed with a gift of working miracles, this power is not anything inherent in his nature. It is not properly any quality of the heart and nature of the man, as true grace and holiness are; and though most commonly those that have these extraordinary gifts of prophecy, speaking with tongues and working miracles, have been holy persons, yet their holiness did not consist in their having these gifts. These extraordinary gifts are nothing properly inherent in the man. They are something adventitious. They are excellent things, but not excellences in the nature of the subject. They are like a beautiful garment, which does not alter the nature of the man that wears it. They are like precious jewels with which the body may be adorned; but true grace is that whereby the very soul itself becomes as it were a precious jewel.

“2. *The Spirit of God communicates himself much more in bestowing saving grace than in bestowing these extraordinary gifts.*”

These passages, which are taken without special selection, will serve to exhibit the practical character of this little volume, which teaches us that “Love is the first outgoing of the renewed soul to God; ‘we love him because he first loved us.’ It is the true evidence of a saving work of grace in the soul. ‘The fruit of the Spirit is love.’ It lies at the very foundation of Christian character; we are ‘rooted and grounded in love.’ It is the path in which all true children of God are found; they ‘walk in love,’ their protection in the spiritual warfare; they are to put on the breast-plate of love; the fulness and completeness of their Christian character; they are ‘made perfect in love;’ the Spirit through which they may fulfil all the divine requirements; for ‘love is the fulfilling of law;’ and that by which they may be-

come like their Father in heaven, and fitted for his presence; for God is love,' and *Heaven is a world of LOVE.*" Introduction, p. v.

All these points are set forth with that warmth, discrimination, and perspicuity, which mark the writings of this eminent author.

The History of John Dwight, of Dedham, Mass. By BENJAMIN W. DWIGHT, author of "The Higher Christian Education," of "Modern Philology," in two volumes," and of "The History of the Strong Family," in two volumes. Printed for the author. New York. 1874. Two Vols., 8vo. Pp. 1144.

The above named volumes present to those specially interested in them, and to others, a specimen of that marvellous industry which love of family calls forth from those men especially who are of New England parentage. Perhaps in no part of this wide country is there a population so homogeneous, made up so entirely of English Dissenters, the descendants of the old Puritans. There were indeed Scotch and Irish settlers among them, and some who were of the Established Church of England. But these were not of the earliest immigration. Their town records were scrupulously kept from the beginning, preserving the names of the early settlers, and in the earliest times embracing records of the congregation also, for they were religious communities at first, and things secular and religious were in some parts much commingled. It is easier thus to trace family genealogies than in other parts of our country where these matters have engaged the attention in a less degree. A large number of these town histories have been published in New England within a few years. The New England Genealogical Register, in twenty large volumes, and Savage's Genealogical Dictionary, in three large octavos. Historical societies have been formed, and antiquarian and historical libraries created by them. But not to these alone has the author been indebted. An active and broad correspondence was instituted and persistently pushed in every direction, with every member of the family that could anywhere be found, and with postmasters, town clerks, antiquarians, resident clergymen, and

elderly people in many places. And thus through a series of years, with untiring industry, has the information exhibited in these volumes been obtained and reduced to order. The result is, that the whole number of Dwights presented in these pages is 8,105, the descendants of John Dwight, of Dedham, Mass., who came to this New World from Dedham, England, in the latter part of 1634 or beginning of 1635. The celebrated John Rogers, of Dedham, England, had been forbidden to preach. Many of his people emigrated to this country; among them John Dwight and his son Timothy, John Rogers, and others, who came not for worldly purposes, but, like many others, to found "a church without a bishop, and a state without a king." Of the 8,000 or more members of the family, more than half have been females. Of the less than 4,000 males, 1,500 probably died before reaching maturity. The whole number who have been graduated at Colleges and Universities is 409; so that one in every six or seven has been liberally educated. The average period of a generation in this family has been thirty years. As to "length of days," those engaged in agricultural pursuits have lived the longest; next to these were those engaged in the professions; those engaged in mercantile pursuits were next; and those engaged in mechanical pursuits have occupied the last place. Among those occupying public stations, many have been officers in colleges and other professional schools, ministers of the gospel, foreign missionaries, members of legislatures, judges of various courts, authors and journalists, leading men of business, and soldiers and officers in the army and navy. Some of the leading spirits in the South Carolina branch of the family, descendants of the Rev. Daniel Dwight, once a Congregational clergyman, (but afterwards, having taken orders from Bishop Gibson of London, rector of Strawberry Chapel, St. John's Berkeley county, S. C.,) were active in the Confederate service during the late war.

The author of these volumes, the Rev. Benjamin Woodbridge Dwight, Ph. D., had before published a history of the Strong family (his mother's) on a somewhat larger scale, also in two volumes, 8vo., and seems to have found a sufficient solace, without

any pecuniary profit, in the pleasure these researches gave him. "No one," he says, "who gazes with a cold uninterested stare upon a genealogical work, or casts a hasty glance of self-satisfied indifference at it, can gauge at all the patience or benevolence that are needful for its preparation." And yet, "on the family institution rest all the precious things of earth to man. On right and true family-life and family-character, whatever is good among men is absolutely conditioned." "There is an element of romance," too, "native to American genealogies in the past. They cover the heroic age of this country—the hours not only of its cradled promises of greatness, but of the grand nurture also of its maturer years." "And what a birthplace hath this land of ours been of all great political ideas, and of new and high forms of religious thought and effort!"

In signalising the distinct traits of the Dwight family, he says: "It has been marked, as a general fact, by households but of moderate size." They "have been commonly well-to-do in worldly ways, and have been quite inclined, as a family, to liberal culture and professional life." "They have been largely noted for their liberty-loving enthusiasm." "If asked to state what one practical quality beyond any other has characterised them, the author would at once reply, military talent, or that natural executive energy and administrativeness which may be readily applied to the demands of the battle-field, the urgencies of general business, the explorations of studious research, or the comprehensive duties of statesmanship, or of official service to one's country, and which, in whatever field of employment exerted, is in itself one and the same essential manifestation of manly vigor of thought and feeling." Other traits he ascribes to them "of separate individuality of conscience and of conviction, of character and of conduct." "Personal integrity has been their special ornament and honor." "They have not been wont to seek political preferment." "Their strongest natural impulse has been that of a keen, quick, and all-mastering sense of what seems to them to be right in itself, and just to them and to all men." "Of quite a large number of leading spirits in the family, it would

not be too much to say that their love of work amounted almost to a ruling passion."

Thus speaks the genealogist of the family of which he is himself a member. But when we sum up the distinguished names which occur ever and anon in these pages, we are forced to dismiss from our minds the idea of partiality in his judgment.

Of President Edwards, of whom we have spoken in the preceding notice, and whose third daughter was the mother of President Dwight, of Yale College, we have some interesting incidents recorded in the second volume, p. 1038. After his departure from Northampton he was a missionary for seven years among the Stockbridge Indians, during which time he wrote most of the great works which have immortalized his name. We learn that his whole library at his death amounted to 38 folios, 34 quartos, 99 octavos, 130 duodecimos; of his own works, 25 volumes and 536 pamphlets—316 volumes in all, not including pamphlets—and were valued at £83 1*d.* His silver was valued at £37 13*s.* His own MSS. amounted to 15 Vols. folio, 15 4*to.*, and 1,074 sermons. On these the world has set great price. Among his other effects there was inventoried a negro boy, Titus, under the head of "quick stock," the valuation set upon him being £30. In the pulpit he was graceful, easy, natural, and earnest, though having but little action. He rested his left elbow on the pulpit cushion or Bible, and holding his sermon in his left hand, used his right hand almost only for the purpose of turning over the leaves of his manuscript. The first Puritan preachers who came to this country all preached extempore. But the fashion had now changed.

Modern Doubt and Christian Belief. A series of Apologetic Lectures addressed to Earnest Seekers after Truth. By THEODORE CHRISTLIEB, D. D., University Preacher and Professor of Theology at Bonn. Translated, with the author's sanction, chiefly by the Rev. H. U. WEITBRECHT, Ph. D., and edited by the Rev. T. L. KINGSBURY, M. A., Vicar of Eastern Royal, and Rural Dean. New York: Scribner, Armstrong & Co. 1874.

Those who heard the admirable paper read by Prof. Christlieb at the late meeting of the Evangelical Alliance, whose reading was called for over and over again, in different assemblies, will hail with pleasure the larger and fuller presentation of his views in this volume, an 8vo. of 549 pages. It is the work of one who is master of his subject, whose learning, penetration, power, in argument, eloquence, and religious fervor are shown on every page. Its first beginning was in 1863-4, when he delivered to the educated Germans of London a series of public lectures in defence of Christianity, he being at that time pastor of a German congregation in Islington. A second German edition was issued in 1870. The translation before us, which is admirably executed, differs from the edition of 1870 by various curtailments and additions, which it seemed proper to make to adapt it to English and American readers.

Apologetic writings in defence of the Christian faith have to take up new lines of defence as scepticism changes its ground of attack upon the great truths of revelation. The author first shows in expressive language the great breach there now is between modern culture and Christianity, the causes of the breach, its extent, inquires whether this breach can be filled up, and then maintains that it is the special vocation of the Teutonic races to overcome this deep-seated contradiction, from which our age, and most of all, the German people, so greatly suffer. "No single man or generation," says this able writer, "will complete this work. It will be the work of many champions and of many years. But oh, might it be granted me in the present lecture," (his first,) "to have cast into the gulf at least one stone!" P. 67.

This he has done. And in his second lecture, on Reason and

Revelation, embracing Natural and Supernatural Theology, or Revealed Religion, and the relation between them; in his third, on Modern Non-Biblical Conceptions of God, viz., Atheism, Materialism, Pantheism, Deism, and Rationalism; in his fourth, the Theology of Scripture and the Church, viz., Biblical Theism and the Doctrine of the Trinity; in his fifth, the Modern Negation of Miracles, embracing their nature and possibility, their necessity, and whether they still occur; in his sixth, the Modern Anti-miraculous accounts of the Life of Christ, viz., the old Rationalistic, Schenkel's, Strauss's, Renan's; in his seventh, the Modern Denials of the Resurrection of Christ; in his eighth, the Principles of the Tübingen School and their Refutation, he has cast many stones into this chasm, which hitherto has seemed ever widening.

He closes with these impressive words of the great commentator on the New Testament, J. A. Bengel:

“A sceptic is like a traveller who should refuse to cross a puddle or to step over a twig till all were smoothed down and filled up. Who would think such a man wise? Faith takes up all that it can get, and marches bravely onward; unbelief is the direct opposite of this. In studying the Bible we must do like the courier who hurries over posts and hillocks, the nearest way to his destination, and does not first seek to level every clod. That which is difficult comes at last of its own accord. The most important controversies are those which a man finds in his own heart. But these latter,” adds Prof. Christlieb, “point us to the place where Thomas, the doubter even amongst the apostles, had to learn his faith. Only *in the wounds of Christ* can we learn by faith the truth which shall make us free. There only does unbelief, even to this day, learn to surrender, and humbly confess ‘My Lord and my God!’ He who will not seek for the truth there, will never find it. All that we can do for the sceptics of the present day, is to make the way there as easy for them as may be, in order that the sign of Jonah, given by our buried and risen Lord, may be to them a rock of salvation and not of offence.” P. 548.