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THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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ARTICLE I.

MINISTERIAL TRAINING.*

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The question discussed in this article is not a settled one. As a denomination, it is true, we have attained a standard of opinion and practice, at least as nearly definite, intelligible, and acceptable to ourselves, as any other branch of the visible Church. Yet it is not with us out of the arena of discussion, and we may

*This article had its origin in the one published by the author in this *Review* in Oct., 1871. In that article, which was on the Practical Efficiency of our Church, it was intimated that our efficiency might be increased by a modification of the method pursued by us, in the training of candidates for the gospel ministry. This was stated for the reflection of those concerned, and not for discussion at the time; it was intentionally left for elaboration in a separate article, if any one should feel inclined to take it up. There were some strictures, however, submitted by the editors in a foot-note accompanying that article, which placed the views of the author in a false light, and were calculated to darken the subject itself. To correct such misapprehensions, an explanatory and supplementary note was forwarded for the following number of the *Review*. This note was returned, with the request that it should be enlarged to the dimensions of a separate article. Under these circumstances, the following article has been prepared on a subject, which we have felt disposed to leave with those of larger experience, and who are more directly concerned in the subject discussed.

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say of controversy. It has been approached and discussed with more or less fulness in the religious press at intervals for the last several years; it has been discussed in some of the Presbyteries, and the Assembly itself was overtured on the subject at its last session. It is not with the design therefore of raising a new question, nor of becoming party to a useless discussion, that we approach it. Nor is it with any apprehension that it is likely to become a vexatious question in our Communion. If not altogether agreed, in the principles of our system, we are sufficiently agreed to prevent any decided dissension. And yet there is evidence of a state of mind not altogether satisfied with our system, at least as practised, which should receive consideration, that as far as possible we may be of one mind and one accord in this important matter.

In this article we propose, 1st, to consider the subject of Ministerial Training, proper; and then to inquire, 2dly, to whom this matter is especially committed in our Form of Government; and, 3dly, what is the province of our Theological schools therein.

I. Ministerial Training.

Ministerial Training may be defined as that course of preparation for the gospel ministry determined by the Church for its candidates, by which the scriptural qualifications for this sacred office are revealed (if existing), and are developed to an extent to be edifying, at least to some part of the visible Church of Christ. It is true in the highest sense, that ministers of the gospel are the gifts of the Lord Jesus, the Mediatorial Head and King of the Church. And all the gifts and attainments that fit them for usefulness, are of his conferring, and become effective by his grace. By his power, his Word, his Spirit, and his providence, in such action and coöperation as he pleases, he calls and fits every true minister of the gospel for his work. The Church, however, as his appointed and visible agent, has a part, and a most important part to perform in this matter. God, it is true, calls whom he will to this sacred office, and by the method of his own pleasure prepares them for it. And sometimes, in the exercise of his sovereignty, seems to dispense to a good degree with

the ordinary means of preparation for it. Yet he honors his Church, to whom he has committed this subject, and would have us clearly understand our duty and province therein.

The Church, as the guardian and expounder of the oracles of God, should understand, in the first place, what qualifications are needed as specified in God's Word for the proper discharge of the duties of this office. In the second place, it is manifestly the province of the Church to bring these qualifications to the mind of God's people, and particularly to the minds and hearts of those seeking this office, and to guide and aid such persons in attaining such qualifications. And, in the third place, the Church, as guided by God's Word, is the judge of the existence of the qualifications for the gospel ministry—in other words, of a call to the ministry. She is to say in what degree and relative proportion they must exist in any particular case to constitute a valid and satisfactory call to the ministry; and, under all the circumstances of the case, guided by the Spirit and providence of God she is to decide the question. Under the second of these divisions of the duties of the Church we place the subject of Ministerial Training, which is simply the Church using those means that are calculated to reveal and develop the qualifications for the ministry in the person of its candidates.

In adopting, or in modifying any system of Ministerial Training, it will be readily seen that reference must be had directly to the qualifications to be cultivated and attained as necessary to the gospel ministry. This is the end in view, the object to be attained, and of course the means must be adapted thereto. If there is not a correct scriptural knowledge of the qualifications themselves, there will not be adopted of course such means and measures as are adequate and appropriate to accomplish the desired end. It will be necessary therefore to obtain an intelligent, correct view of these before we are prepared to say what is the system of Ministerial Training best calculated to secure them.

The qualifications which the Scriptures enumerate as necessary for this office, will be found to be enumerated, particularly in the Epistles to Timothy and Titus. As here specified, they may

be stated as including a spiritual and saving acquaintance with the gospel salvation, a respectable Christian character, a blameless life, and a capacity to teach the truths of the Christian religion. These embrace directly or indirectly all the natural and spiritual gifts and attainments that God has ordained as conditions of preaching the everlasting gospel. These we will classify into the *spiritual*, *intellectual* and *practical* qualifications for the gospel ministry.

By *spiritual* qualifications, we mean such an acquaintance with experimental religion, and such attainments in scriptural and gracious knowledge as will render the party a safe guide and counsellor in practical religion. By *intellectual* qualifications, we mean such mental culture and furniture as will enable the candidate to edify the Church, rightly to divide the truth of God, and to convince gainsayers. This requires a good and sound mind, with a system of study to discipline and furnish it. By *practical* qualifications, we mean the power and facility to use effectively the spiritual and intellectual qualifications which are possessed. All qualifications for the ministry are one in their design, and that is to secure efficiency in calling men from darkness to light, in saving their souls from sin and death through the gospel of the Lord Jesus Christ. And of course there must be a respectable knowledge of human character and the power to use it, as a condition of usefulness in the gospel ministry. This classification will cover the scriptural teachings on this subject, and is sufficiently accurate to guide us in the discussion of this subject. Let us inquire, therefore, to what degree our system of Ministerial Training conforms to this classification, and to what extent it is calculated to develop and attain such qualifications in our candidates.

1. The spiritual qualifications for the gospel ministry we place first. We do this intentionally. We should ever regard it as of the highest importance, and as an invariable requirement of those who undertake to be teachers in the Church of God, that they should themselves have a personal and saving knowledge of that salvation they proclaim to others. And not only this. There should be such an acquaintance with the gracious truths of God,

and of the methods of his saving and spiritual operations, as will qualify them to counsel, instruct and guide men in the way of life. Our system of Ministerial Training should be such as to promote, and that directly, personal holiness and gracious knowledge; as of the greatest importance to the minister of the gospel. "Holiness to the Lord" should be written over the portals of our Theological schools, and be marked and honored by those who induct men into the ministry, and by those who are to instruct in our seminaries. It should neither be supplanted, or lowered to a subordinate place. Without this, there is no spiritual perception and realisation of the truth and power of the gospel; and hence no witness can be borne to its saving efficiency; without this, there is no Christ-like compassion for the lost, and no personal sympathy in the spiritual sorrows and joys of God's people; without this, the power of a godly life to enforce the teachings of the pulpit, is lost. A living, healthy, active piety, and this combined with more than usual attainments in gracious knowledge, is the fundamental qualification for the gospel ministry. And of course every system of Ministerial Training should be such as to promote personal piety, and to insure a knowledge of practical godliness.

This qualification is recognised in our Standards and in our practice. There must be an assurance given in the very commencement of a preparation for the gospel ministry, and as a condition essential to even an entrance upon such a course, that there is a personal and saving knowledge of the salvation of the gospel, and a connection with the visible Church; the kingdom of our Lord and Saviour, and a promise of respectable attainments in piety and knowledge. This is the design of the requirements which the Presbytery makes of those who are taken under its care. It must be satisfied of their exemplary piety. And to this end there is an examination of the candidate as to his experimental acquaintance with religion, and as to his motives in entering the gospel ministry. And on this subject the Presbytery should always be satisfied before encouraging any formal steps tending toward the ministry.

To what extent this object, the cultivation of piety, and the

knowledge of experimental religion, is definitely sought in our method of Ministerial Training, it may be well to inquire. In the pastoral letter to the churches in connection with the establishment of our first Theological school in America, is found this clause: "It is to be hoped that we shall never cease to consider vital and experimental religion as the first and most indispensable qualification for the gospel ministry": a truth which should never be forgotten by the Church. Is it kept distinctly in view in the plan of instruction prescribed for our Theological Seminaries, and in all the exercises connected therewith? Is the atmosphere of these institutions preëminently one favorable to the growth of piety and the cultivation of personal holiness? Is the chief design of all the instruction here imparted, to make men apt in dispensing the truth and grace of God to each and every necessity of man's spiritual nature?

This is evidently the prime requisite to eminent usefulness in the service of Christ. The design of the ministry of the Word is not to awaken, to interest, and to develop man's intellectual, but his spiritual nature. And it is not those ministers who are distinguished for ability, so much as those eminent in godliness and spirituality, that God honors in leading men to holiness and heaven. We do not disparage the former, nor mean to assert that the most profound intellect is necessarily a hindrance to the attainment of the most eminent degrees of holiness. But we mean to say that personal holiness and gracious knowledge, which involves the consecration of the whole man, soul and body, to this ministering and heavenly office, is the chief and great requisite for attaining its end, and fulfilling its mission. This should be distinctly realised and definitely sought by the Church of God in all her efforts to prepare men for this work. And no other qualification should ever be sought except as subordinate to this and tributary to it; otherwise it will cease to yield any fruit in the legitimate and distinctive design of this office, the conversion of the ungodly, and the edification of the body of Christ.

2. In the line of the *intellectual* qualifications, as we have classified them, has arisen most of the discussion to which we have

alluded. As a Protestant denomination we may say without presumption, that we have above all others most assiduously guarded the entrance to the gospel ministry from the intrusion of ignorant men, and have attained an enviable distinction by exalting the standard of intelligence and learning for this important office. Nor is there the slightest probability, in view of our past history, the present attitude of the cause of education in the mind of the public at large, and the advance made in this particular by other evangelical denominations around us, that we will ever fall below the spirit and intent of our Standards on this subject. On the contrary, the question has been raised, whether, under these influences, we have not exalted learning as a qualification for the gospel ministry too high.

The scriptural authority for such attainments in learning as our Book requires, is found in such passages as these: "Apt to teach," "able to teach others also," "by sound doctrine to exhort and convince gainsayers," etc. These passages certainly justify the Church in demanding of those who seek this office, mental endowments and furniture which will render them acceptable, and instructive expounders of God's Word, and enable them to maintain the truth against those who oppose it. And it is evidently to carry out this scriptural position and injunction, that our Form of Government has undertaken to say what attainments shall be made, and what trials shall be sustained to satisfy the Church on this subject. That some such requisition is wise and necessary there can be among us no question; and that these parts of trial and attainments in learning which we demand, are such as will be calculated to do this all will agree. The question is as to the *interpretation* and *intent* of this part of our Book, and *what liberty* is granted in its application.

Learning as a qualification for the ministry is certainly made in our Standards very prominent, and more so in our present system of ministerial training. And whilst it is not exalted too high in our Constitution, it has become too distinctive, too invariable, and is made relatively too prominent in our practice, as a qualification for the ministry. It was evidently the design of the framers of our system to furnish the Church a rule by which

we might understand in the general that ministers ought to be *educated* as distinguished from *ignorant* men, and that they must in addition be especially proficient in those branches of study essential to the proper knowledge of the Scriptures; by which, of course, the Church should be satisfied that they were men able to impart their knowledge to others. The design was to provide a ministry both willing and able to fill this office to the edification of the Church, and to the credit of religion. The *specified conditions* were made and they should be construed with reference to this, the manifest intent of our Standards. And whilst of course no palpable neglect of any part of these constitutional requirements should be recognised, there should not be such an invariable and unyielding adherence to every part thereof as subordinates the spirit and intent of such requirements to the letter. The passages of Scripture upon which our constitutional provision on this subject is based are evidently general in their nature, and whilst sufficiently definite to guide the Church, and to secure good and competent men in the ministry, they evidently admit of some liberty in the application. And in the interpretation of our rules on this subject, we should look to such inspired directions as support them, and thence learn their proper intent and purport. We should never construe our formally adopted Standards without such reference, and certainly in solving any question thereon, this should be the final appeal. And if we look for practical examples to those who were inducted into the ministry in the Old and New Testament dispensations, we find many who had not the advantage of what we term a liberal education. And though it may be true that the special communications then made of God to his messengers, may have rendered any such qualification superfluous in some instances, there was evidently room for the use of those acquirements, and that preparation which we now demand. In the history of the Church, too, there have been in every age examples of eminent usefulness and devotion in the gospel ministry among persons who were not possessed of great intellectual attainments, and yet men the validity of whose call to the ministry could not be questioned. Now if this be true, does the measure

of learning we exact exclude any from the ministry whom God has called? Certainly we are not prepared to say that we should place ourselves in such an attitude. For whilst the entrance-way to this sacred and responsible office should never be made such as to encourage slothfulness and ignorance on the part of those who are seeking it, never certainly should it be so exacting as to exclude humble and good men who may become edifying to God's people, and instrumental in leading souls to Christ. We know that the attainments of those who teach must excel those of the taught, at least in those branches of knowledge in which instruction is proposed to be given; and we readily see that attainments in any department of learning will contribute to excellence in an instructor. It is necessary of course that a minister of the gospel have that amount of natural capacity, and those attainments of knowledge in the Scriptures, and in whatever is necessary to a just and intelligible exposition of them, that will render him a good minister of the Word, rightly dividing the truth. And a liberal education is certainly of great value in any calling, especially valuable in the learned professions; and most assuredly, wherever circumstances will admit of it, those who fill the office of the ministry should bring all its worth and power to bear to secure abundant fruitfulness therein. And yet there are many places in the world in which eminent attainments in learning are not necessary, and many men who never can attain them, and nevertheless can be very useful in the ministry. We are not in the habit, for instance, of demanding exact compliance with our rules in this respect, from the heathen natives who seek this office. Such attainments in grace and in knowledge as, coupled with good sense and a sound mind, lead to the hope of usefulness in the ministry is all that is required.

The conclusion we wish to reach on this subject, as that justified and supported by the Scriptures, and the general practice of the Church, is, that we *have a gospel liberty in this matter, which we should neither abridge, nor be afraid to use.* We fully appreciate the value of sanctified learning to the ministry, and heartily approve the standard which we have adopted in our system of

Church government as a rule and method to attain this; but when we place such a restrictive and literal construction on it, that we can have no liberty in its application, we not only make for ourselves a yoke of bondage, but greatly cripple our efficiency. We assume a position which can never be sustained. Learning is of value when properly used, but they that exalt it, in itself considered, are little attentive to its history, or to the career of many of its votaries. God has used it, when sanctified by himself and consecrated to his Church, for the maintenance of the truth and the propagation of the gospel. But the enemies of the gospel have made it the avenue of the most formidable attacks on the religion of our Lord and Saviour. The most dangerous and persistent enemies the Church of God has ever had to encounter have been among the learned men of high intellectual capacity and attainments. And though God has been pleased generally to defeat them upon their own assumed position by the means of sanctified learning, he has often confounded the wisdom and learning of the world, by the faith, love, meekness, and patience, of the lowly of the earth. We should encourage and promote learning as of value in its appropriate sphere, it is true, and we should afford every reasonable facility for intellectual cultivation to those who seek the gospel ministry, but never exalt it to such an eminence as to overshadow other important qualifications for the gospel ministry, or make it an idol for the intellectually proud.

It may be well for us to remember, too, that preparation for the gospel ministry, in the line of *formal study*, may be carried to such an extent as of itself, largely to counterbalance the benefits of an educated ministry. We may expect it, if carried to an extreme, to form a barrier which will intercept many good men in seeking this office, but this is not all. In the cases of those who are inducted into the ministry, there are not unfrequently effects of it that seriously detract from their usefulness. It is well enough for us to know that there is such an extreme, and it is well enough to have some landmarks to indicate where it is. Upon this point we make a few suggestions. *First.* We go to an extreme, if the course of preparation we demand for the

ministry necessitates such an amount of close and long-continued application of mind, as to *impair the physical constitution*. The old adage, *sana mens in sano corpore* is one of great truth and significance. And this, taken in connection with one of higher origin, "much study is a weariness to the flesh," should lead us to be careful, lest in disciplining and furnishing the mind, we so weaken the body as to render it unequal to the task of supporting an active mind and a fervent spirit in the work of the ministry. A man is not half equal to himself with a feeble, impaired physical constitution. And it is true to a greater extent we fear than is realised, that our young men by severe and long protracted study, have their constitutions overtaxed and enfeebled. Whether this is true, because our students are unequal to the study imposed, or because no means are used to preserve and sustain their constitutions under it, is not material. If it is true, it should receive the attention of those to whom this matter is committed. Physical power and capacity of endurance, is capital we cannot afford to loose, and we should carefully protect and preserve the health and constitutions of our students. *Secondly*. We certainly go too far if we exalt learning above holiness and gracious knowledge as a qualification for the gospel ministry. Learning without holiness, is not only "inadequate, but pernicious." And whenever we so exalt it in our practice, or in our estimation, as to make it the one great condition for usefulness in the gospel ministry, we certainly are in error. No amount of knowledge, nor any degree of intellectual discipline and power can of itself render us efficient in the gospel, or save us from spiritual ignorance, weakness, and sin. But of the relative importance of these qualifications we have already spoken. *Thirdly*. We go to an extreme, when our system as practised *yields a type of ministerial character out of sympathy with the people among whom we expect to live and labor*. This may be done by cultivating to an excess a purely literary taste, by forming habits of seclusion which cannot be overcome, by the development of the mind to the neglect of personal religion, by the culture of theoretic speculation and investigation to the neglect of the practical principles of human life and character. Any or all of these

may arise by pressing too far, or by exalting too high the intellectual qualifications which we demand for ordination to the gospel ministry. Such suggestions as these may aid us in defining and regarding the proper line of limitation in this matter. And we repeat, it is important that the system we adopt for securing an educated ministry be not such, as to entail evils that will to a greater or less extent detract from its good results. It is not an unavoidable evil of any system, nor of our system.

We would say in concluding this part of our subject, it is not the intent of anything here said to reflect upon the prescribed rules of our Form of Government on this subject. Such requirements are important in themselves, and necessary to secure able and faithful men for this office. The objection lies against a tendency to misconceive and to misconstrue the real design of these provisions. Instead of maintaining and using these requirements as a wise rule for securing the intellectual qualifications which are needful for the gospel ministry, we are in danger of construing them as if they were a system for securing *eminence in literature and in intellectual cultivation*. Efficiency in the special work of the ministry is the end to be secured, and whenever we are clearly satisfied that this is done it is enough, and all the requirements and qualifications for the ministry are in this very act satisfied and attained. Let us look upon our constitutional provisions upon this subject in this light, and use them with this intent and with the liberty it involves, and yet in no case let us forget or ignore the fact, that those who fill this office must themselves understand the nature and the doctrines of the religions of the gospel, and be able to teach others also.

3. The *practical* qualifications, as we have termed them, for the gospel ministry, are very important. The capacity to use well and wisely the spiritual and intellectual qualifications above mentioned, is most essential to any considerable degree of usefulness. And whilst we may find this power to some degree in the very possession of the spiritual and intellectual qualifications, and though it is to some degree a natural gift, it is nevertheless unquestionably necessary that the power for practical

usefulness and efficiency should be sought and cultivated. We all know by our observation, that it is not every one who is both a good and an educated man that is efficient in this office. There is a deficiency in practical knowledge, in discernment, in wisdom, which renders other qualifications in some instances absolutely useless. Those stewards whom the Lord would make rulers over his household to give them their portion of meat in due season, must be both faithful and wise. They must be as harmless as doves, but as wise as serpents. There must be a respectable knowledge of human character, of its nature, its principles, its laws of action, combined with a power to reach and influence it through the truth of God; for the very design of all religious instruction is to make the truth effectual in the hearts and lives of men. The medical man must not only be proficient in the knowledge of the human system and its diseases, but he must be able to discriminate the presence of particular diseases amid the various circumstances of constitutional temperament and local influences which modify special cases of sickness; and he must know how to reach the disease most effectually by its appropriate remedy with due regard to such attendant facts. In truth, this constitutes the really valuable and skilful physician, and this distinguishes him from the abstract theorist, who, with all his professional knowledge, is often practically inefficient. No degree of proficiency is of service in any avocation without the practical knowledge how to use it. We see this strikingly displayed sometimes in the gospel ministry. We have instances of almost utter failure on the part of those who are without question good men, and who are educated men; whilst, on the contrary, we have cases of eminent usefulness in those who may not be equal to the others in some of these respects, but who have the facility and power of reaching and influencing men by the truth. They know how, when, and where to approach men. And, doubtless, the reason why we are surpassed in certain species of ministerial labor as a denomination, is found here. We are not as well informed with actual human life, with the manner in which men live and act, and with the manner in which they are to be approached and moved; in few words, we do not know as much of

the subject with which we have to deal. It is deficiency here that leads men of the world to laugh at ministers of the gospel for their ignorance and mistakes in practical matters and to say (as we once heard it said) that, taken out of the pulpit they were the greatest blockheads in society. And some ministers, it would seem, esteem it to their credit that they are thus ignorant; as though it were a reflection on their consecration to their work to have this practical knowledge. But our Saviour in selecting the Apostles chose those who were familiar, by actual experience with all the wants, trials, and weaknesses of human nature, and who knew the principles, passions and capacities of mankind, as these are only to be really known by personal contact with men. And we had best not seek to be wiser than our Master, nor count that of little moment, which he evidently recognised as of value.

This capacity for practical efficiency in the gospel ministry, which we designate as one of the qualifications therefor, is in a sense a gift, and in a sense an acquirement. The capacity must be to some extent pre-supposed to make it possible to cultivate it. And that it differs in its native strength and in the degree in which it can be cultivated, as all other capacities, is unquestionable. It is true also, as we have said, that the possession of other qualifications to a certain degree may embrace this, but it does not follow that special attention ought not to be exercised to secure its possession, and to guard ourselves against cultivating any other qualification to such extreme as to shut out or supplant this. This practical qualification of which we speak, will be learned in part by an acquaintance with the principles of our own heart and life under the teachings of the Spirit of God; it will be learned in part also from the portraiture of human character in the Word of God; but it can never be fully attained except in connection with a thorough and personal acquaintance with the human character as learned by actual contact with it in this world. Nor can we ever hope to know how readily to deal with the spiritual maladies of our fellowmen, heal their spiritual diseases, and minister to their wants, till we learn by experience how to approach and influence them. We should take some steps,

therefore, to develop this practical power in our candidates for the gospel ministry, and certainly to avoid any course which will cut them off from the ordinary methods of acquiring a knowledge of the subjects, whose spiritual and eternal welfare it is their life-long business to promote.

It was upon this point, as one affecting the practical efficiency of our Church, that we had something to say in the article in this *Review* for October, 1871, to which allusion has already been made. It was then said that "the student's life which our candidates lead for so many years, and so purely such, does but little to teach them those methods of practical thought and influence which prevail among men, and in fact yields a type of ministerial character in many instances out of harmony with the people to whom they have to minister." "It is certainly important too," as there remarked, "if not positively necessary, that our theoretic principles should be tested in the crucible of experimental life before becoming impervious to such influences. How far it is wise to carry a course of professional education, without such a course of practical instruction certainly deserves attention." And the inquiry was then made, "Can nothing be done to insure in our system a somewhat parallel progress by our students of divinity, in the professor's course in the lecture-room, and in the pastor's work among the people? . . . How to adjust the two, a thorough preparation in the departments of formal study, and at the same time an experimental acquaintance with the methods of practical usefulness, so that both may be attained as equally valuable qualifications for efficiency in the gospel ministry, deserve careful thought by the Church." These words we repeat as meriting consideration, and we quote them furthermore for some explanation.

In the criticism accompanying the above, submitted in a footnote, these remarks were misconstrued, and we presume misconceived. Though we were careful to say that to our mind the end intimated could be attained without seriously modifying our Seminary system, they were treated as tending directly to injure and that seriously our Theological schools, and this by leading students to break in upon their regular course of study during

the Seminary course, "by frequent engagements in supplying vacant pulpits, by spasmodic efforts to advance here, there and every where the interests of religion, and by gadding about in promiscuous society and mingling in the occupations of other men." It is not necessary for us to say that our remarks were not open to any such criticism. It was expressly said that a thorough preparation for the ministry in the line of formal study was to be kept in view, and in no way to be jeopardised, and that the desired end might be attained without any serious modification of our Seminary system. And assuredly we did not intimate in the most distant way that, for any purpose, it would be desirable to break in upon the regular course pursued by students attending our Theological schools for any such purpose, much less to encourage them in "gadding about to fill vacant pulpits," "in cultivating promiscuous society," "in mingling in agricultural, mechanical, and mercantile pursuits," etc. Such conduct is so palpably inconsistent with any method of preparation for the gospel ministry, and in fact with the dignity and gravity of the ministerial character itself, that it is needless, we trust, to assert that no such thing was ever thought of. We did intend however to suggest the propriety of giving more attention in our course of preparation for the ministry, to the attainment of the qualifications for the practical, pastoral work of this office, as equally important with the intellectual qualifications sought in our system of education. Let us dwell upon this matter awhile as one important to our usefulness.

In this department of ministerial qualification there is nothing done by us with intent or system. In the circumstances in which most of our ministers were prepared for this office previous to the adoption of the present system of Theological schools, any special attention to this matter might have been superfluous. Candidates studied with some divine, who was engaged possibly at the time in the pastoral work, who himself appreciated its nature and importance, and who would naturally give many valuable lessons therein, as well as afford to such students opportunities for practical usefulness and improvement. And in fact the opportunity for any high degree of learning was so limit-

ed that there was no necessity for any provision such as we mention. The difficulty then was to secure the book knowledge needful, the practical part of the work there was no danger of neglecting. Now however it is different. Our candidates generally are closely engaged in study at our primary schools, then at our Colleges, and then at our Theological Seminaries, from six to ten years, which must make a decided impression upon them. They must necessarily cease to be a part of active society during this time. They live in an atmosphere that is literary, intellectual, and speculative, and rarely come into the business and domestic associations of the world. But this is just where ministers of the gospel preëminently are to live and labor. And how to identify one's self with such a situation, after spending a long series of years as a student, so as to feel at home with the people, and be an acceptable and useful pastor, is a hard task, and one attained often only after much effort and years in the ministry, if ever. Now, whilst it is true that there will be much that can be learned of practical usefulness, after any special preparation looking to this end, it is certainly unwise to overlook this matter entirely on this account. There should be some reference to it as a part of our system. And in regard to such provision we would say, *first*, that a definite part of the student's time should be set apart, to be spent in this the practical work of the ministry. Doubtless there was reference to this in the long interval allowed between the sessions of our Theological schools. How much time should be given for this object, the proper parties to whom it is entrusted should decide. Some division of time becomes necessary however, from the fact, that in the nature of the case, during the time the student is at the Seminary, this whole time is given to the course of study there prescribed. *Secondly*, such time should be spent by the student of divinity, by the direction of the Presbytery, under the supervision of some pastor in the practical labor of the ministry, learning by experience, and from the pastor himself, the nature of the work in which he is to be engaged, and the best manner of doing it. Something of this kind is done here and

there now, as may be suggested by the student himself, or by the necessities of some needy field. But in the general, such time as is not spent at the Seminary by our Theological students, is regarded as an ordinary vacation. There is no defined system on this subject adopted by our Presbyteries, that our candidates may all be placed in their vacations, so termed, in positions that will be profitable to them as schools of practical knowledge, and in which at the same time they may be useful to the Church. There are many such situations, where great assistance might be rendered to the pastor in conducting meetings for prayer, organising and superintending Sabbath-schools, distributing our religious publications, and preaching in the sense in which it is done at our Seminaries, that is, with the oversight and criticism of some ordained minister. *Thirdly*, this same end should be sought during the period of licensure. Licensure is not tantamount to ordination to the full work of the ministry. It gives the liberty and right to the candidate to preach as a probationer for the gospel ministry. And not until he has proved himself, not only competent to prepare and preach to the edification of God's people, but to take the pastoral oversight of them, to lead them into the paths of righteousness by a Christ-like example, to minister in private to their spiritual necessities, and to rule over them in the Lord; not until this is done are they prepared to extend a call to him, founded on his fitness in full for this office and work. The Presbyteries are authorised to license probationers to the gospel ministry, that the churches may have an opportunity to form a better judgment of the talents of those by whom they are to be instructed and governed, and that the ministry be not committed to weak or unworthy men. And after a competent trial of their talents, and receiving a good report of the churches, they may be ordained to this sacred office. Of course there should be a sufficient period given for the churches to judge truthfully and wisely in this matter, and for the licentiate fully to evince his qualifications and capabilities for the duties of such an office. And in this period, which is anterior to his entrance on the full work of the ministry, and subsequent to the period of special study for the ministry, the licentiate

may especially cultivate the qualification for usefulness in the practical work of the pastor among the people.

We have thus gone over the subject of Ministerial Training: as proposed in the outset, and shall conclude what we have to say, by calling attention to the fact, that the history of those who have been eminent in the service of God in the ministry of his Son, proves them men who combined all of these qualifications. And this is especially true of the fathers and founders of our Church in this country. It is but necessary to recall to memory such men as William Graham, Archibald Alexander, Moses Hoge, Matthew Lacy, John H. Ride, Dr. Baxter, Conrad Speece, and others of their day and class. Many of them were men of marked intellectual strength and cultivation, but this was in subordination to the power of practical piety, and made subservient to God's grace and truth. They were eminently men of *practical* power too; men who wielded a great influence for God and his cause, through their knowledge of human character, and their influence over men. They were men, it is true, whose character received an impress from the period in which they lived and labored, but men whose characters and lives will never cease to be interesting and instructive, and whose memory will be long cherished. For to them we are greatly indebted as a Church. The history of their early training, and their qualifications for this sacred office, as evinced by their trials before the Presbytery and the people, speak a great deal on this subject, and enable us to see the conditions of real efficiency in the ministry of the gospel. It is not "University men" that God has honored preëminently in this work, but men whom he has trained in other literary schools, and by other methods beside those there used.

We are now prepared to proceed to the second general division of this subject as proposed.

II. To whom is Ministerial Training entrusted in our Form of Government?

This is a question of some importance. For to secure the proper degree of attention to this subject, to have it orderly and well done,

it is evidently necessary to understand to whom it is committed. And if it is thus fixed by the provisions of our Constitution, we should seek to preserve the integrity and harmonious working of our system by the proper observance of such provision. If we will turn to Chapter XIV. and XV. of the Form of Government, we readily see that this question is fully and explicitly answered. There we learn, that the whole jurisdiction of this subject, all that pertains to the proper and wise exercise of this important branch of ecclesiastical power, is expressly and exclusively committed to the Presbytery. Nor will any question either the fact or the wisdom of this constitutional disposition of the subject. And in all our places and provisions to promote this interest, if this be true, we should act in direct reference to this fact. We will mention what we conceive to be the right and duty of the Presbytery in the premises, under these constitutional provisions.

1. It belongs to the Presbytery to make the *necessary provision* for Ministerial Training. The trials to which candidates are subjected by the Presbytery, demand that there should be a provision co-extensive therewith for their training. And if there is not at hand such provision as is needed to secure the requisite qualification, which the Presbytery approves, and of which it may avail itself, the right to provide it is inherent in this Court. It is under this implied right that our Presbyteries in the past have established high schools and academies for the prosecution of an education, such as is required in the trials for licensure and ordination. This right and necessity led our fathers to establish schools of this class, which have, many of them, since grown to our present colleges. And when not necessary by special action to provide such schools, it is the duty and right of the Presbytery to encourage such of those already established, as will afford the necessary facilities for such an education, and at the same time will throw around our students a healthful religious atmosphere and a Presbyterian influence. There should certainly be such action as is necessary in this matter, to provide such schools and colleges, and to secure such influences therein as are required by the best interests of our

candidates and of our Church. And the right to do it is entrusted to these courts. And beside this, it is manifestly the part of the Presbytery to provide for the study of divinity proper. This may be done by directing the candidates to some approved divine of its own to be instructed and prepared for trial by the Presbytery, or to such Theological school as it may approve for this purpose. It may be well for us to recall just here the utterance of our General Assembly when adopting the plan of our first Theological Seminary: "The Constitution of our Church guarantees to every Presbytery the right of judging of its own candidates for licensure and ordination; so the Assembly thinks it proper to state most explicitly, that every Presbytery and Synod will of course be left at full liberty to countenance the proposed plan or not, at pleasure; and to send their students to the projected seminary, or keep them as heretofore within their own bounds, as they think most conducive to the prosperity of the Church." There is a principle and right involved in this declaration which is well worth our attention. It shows in what light this subject was received when Theological schools were first founded, and how clearly the right and duty of the Presbytery was understood. It is equally true now. If any Presbytery is expected to patronise Theological schools or any particular Theological school, it should have a direct influence in its control. For certainly this Court owes it to the constitutional trust confided to it, as well as to the interest of religion, to see that such institutions are officered and controlled to the promotion of sound doctrine and evangelical piety, and in harmony with our Presbyterian system; and if this is not possible, immediately to resume its constitutional right and privilege of training its own candidates within its own bounds. Of course it will not be supposed that any such statement is made with any special reference to our present schools. And yet no amount of confidence in special Theological schools or professors should ever lead the Church to overlook the constitutional attitude of this subject, and the primary and supreme control of the Presbyteries therein.

But beside the special training necessary in a literary and

theological course, the Presbytery should see that other qualifications are attained. They must place our candidates for the ministry under such influences, and require such practical religious work, as will develop an active, healthful, and practical piety, as a most essential requisite for this sacred office. Thus they at once train them for active usefulness, and learn at the same time whether they possess these traits and qualifications, which will stand the heat and burden of actual ministerial life. Young men who have only learned of the ministerial office and work in the professor's lecture-room, it is true may and ought to have learned much that is of great service, and that is actually necessary, and yet they know, we may say, little or nothing of what the real and practical work of the ministry is, nor of their qualifications and capacities therein. And something of this should be known, and some qualification for it attained and displayed before ordination to the full work of the ministry. A completion of the course at the Seminary is not all of Ministerial Training nor preparation. A certificate of proficiency from our theological faculties is not licensure. It is to be considered as an assurance of having completed the prescribed course of study preparatory to the ministry, and of proficiency in the branches of learning therein taught, but this is all. The whole responsibility in every case of licensure or ordination devolves on the Presbytery. And it should subject each candidate to such trials as it may deem necessary within the provision of the Book, and to such exhibition before the people of their talents as will satisfy the Church that they are called of God to this sacred office.

2. It is the duty of the Presbytery, too, not only to provide for the training of candidates for the ministry, but also to *super-
vise each candidate in such course of preparation.* This is evidently the design of our custom of taking young men, who are seeking the ministry, "under the care of the Presbytery," that they may be under its guidance, supervision and counsel in prosecuting their course of study and general preparation for this office. And it is the manifest intent of the Constitution, that as soon as such a course is definitely determined on, every candidate for this office shall place himself under care of that Presbytery

to which he naturally belongs. This of course implies, that the candidate shall not undertake himself to say, without consultation with his Presbytery, where he shall prosecute his course of study, but at that Theological school or under that approved divine, which this body shall think best. And it is certainly invading this right of the Presbytery and the province of our Theological Seminaries, for ministers of their own accord, to undertake to prepare young men for the ministry. It may be necessary that such instructions should be rendered by ministers in private, under certain circumstances, but in all cases the Presbytery should be the judge; and only under such a condition should it ever be done or encouraged.

3. It is also the province of the Presbytery, *to judge of the qualifications of those seeking this office, and formally to induct them into it.* After a full and fair opportunity has been given for the acquirement of the qualifications needful for the gospel ministry, such as will enable the student to do himself justice and the Presbytery to form a correct judgment, the candidate shall be subjected by this court to the trials prescribed in the Form of Government for this purpose and such like, till it is satisfied that they are good and faithful men, who are able to teach others also; or, in other words, till they are persuaded that they are called unto the gospel ministry of him who is the Head of the Church. And when this point is reached, the Presbytery, under its solemn obligation as a court of the Lord Jesus Christ, is formally to set apart such candidate to the holy ministry; and he thenceforth is to give himself wholly to these things, that he may be a workman which needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth.

Under this general provision the Presbytery possesses the right of construing the requirements of the Constitution in every individual case of ordination, so as to secure the design of our Standards, and yet not sacrifice its spirit to the letter. The manifest intent of these provisions, taken in connection with the scriptural authority upon which they are based, is to be our guide. It should always demand such qualifications from every candidate as justice to our own system and the inherent impor-

tance of the case demands, and yet it is for the Presbytery to yield the letter to the spirit of these requirements in favor of extraordinary cases, as the Book provides. It shall say in any such particular case, whether it may or may not be done; and what special requirement may be excepted, and in what degree. It is well enough, too, to have some definite knowledge in what cases this may be wisely and safely done.

There is a liberty possessed by the Presbytery here, which, as we have said, it should not be afraid to use, yet it is a right which evidently must be exercised under the guidance of the wisdom of the gospel. Upon this subject we would say, that what we term the spiritual qualifications, are of absolute and the highest importance to the proper discharge of the duties of this office, and can never be excepted. Without a personal acquaintance with the salvation of the gospel, and such knowledge of its nature and truths as will qualify the candidate to be a competent and safe guide to God's people therein, of course he is not qualified for this office. If there is any blemish or any great defect in the Christian character such as will destroy the standing or usefulness of a minister, this also should decide the question. Of the special acquirements in classical and theological studies demanded, if there is such a degree of proficiency as will exhibit intellectual competency and insure usefulness, and yet a deficiency in some part of the prescribed course which is unavoidable under the circumstances, it should not be made an insuperable hindrance to an entrance to the ministry. In such cases some of the studies indicated as desirable, may more properly be dispensed within part or entirely, than others—those we should say, that were less directly necessary to the special demands of the ministry. Those attainments necessary to the understanding of the Scriptures, and a truthful exposition of the same, and all such subjects as are intimately connected with the duties of this office, and contribute directly to usefulness and success therein, should always be required to be possessed to a respectable degree. Purely literary and classical studies can better be dispensed with, than the knowledge of the original languages of the Scriptures, Biblical literature, eccle-

siastical history, theology, or the laws of interpretation. And of course, each case of this kind must stand upon its own footing, and carry its own justification with it. No action of the kind should ever be such as to ignore our recognised standard of qualification, or to reflect upon its merits, as rule for general action. No one, for instance, should ever be encouraged to neglect any branch of these studies, who can by reasonable and proper exertion acquire them all. There is a marked difference between cases that are really extraordinary and these that are only encompassed by some decided difficulties. He that will not take the time and expend the labor to go through the whole course of preparation, whenever it can be done, may well doubt whether he will be found willing to endure the hardness of a good soldier of the cross. And certainly such exceptions should never be made under the plea that the Church will suffer if they are detained for full preparation. This is making a short cut that does not contribute to advancement. Haste to get into this responsible office at the expense of any part of a course of study long recognised as tributary to usefulness and success therein, is of itself a bad omen and should never be encouraged. And yet there are cases which we all would recognise as extraordinary, in which, if not indispensable, it would be unreasonable to require a full and unexceptionable compliance with the letter of our rules on this subject; instances, too, in which we are satisfied there would be decided usefulness in the ministry, and in which there would be no sacrifice of the spirit of our rules, and no precedent established which would give us trouble. In such cases, the liberty mentioned is manifestly to be used, and used without fear or hesitancy, and yet used under the guidance of that spirit of wisdom freely given from above. It might be well for the Presbytery to exercise a little more liberty in directing the studies of such candidates. It is the case sometimes that such difficulties might be removed if the candidate were authorised to study in private with the supervision and instruction of some pastor.

Thus much for the duty and rights of the Presbytery in this

work of training men for the gospel ministry. It is assigned to these Courts by our Constitution. Here let it remain.

Let us consider briefly the last of the topics proposed in this article.

III. What is the Province of our Theological Seminaries in Ministerial Training?

Theology has been a subject of study and of discussion since the foundation of the Church. And, doubtless, in some method and to some extent, instruction has been imparted on the subject in every age. It was the subject of minute and extended discussion and speculation in the schools of the Middle Ages. There was a department of Theology in the Universities of Europe previous to the Reformation; and after the Reformation it was taught and studied as one of the learned professions, just as the profession of Law or Medicine. It was taught simply as a part of the course of a University, which course to be such must cover all the departments of liberal culture and professional training, theology included. But Theological Seminaries, in the sense in which we understand them, schools established by the Church, and under its care, for the exclusive purpose of instructing candidates for the gospel ministry, are of recent date. Such institutions have only been known among us for about sixty years. A writer in the *Presbyterian Critic*, in the days of its existence, remarked on this subject: "that although the period of their existence is more than the lifetime of a generation, it is but a short space in the lifetime of systems, whose lifetime is to be measured by centuries. So that we may regard the system of theological training as still a novelty in our Church. It certainly shows the unsettled relation of a new thing, in some respects, and calls for the watchful heed and correcting hand of the Church, until it is far more matured than now and until we have ampler experimental assurance than now of the safety of its workings." If there is any point in all our system, or in any other system of Church government, where there should be posted a watchful vigilance, with urgent and

solemn injunction to keep an eye ever alive to its nature and movements, it should be at this point. Not only the efficiency of the ministry depends on the influence and instruction imparted at these institutions, but the purity, the power, and the very life of God's truth and Church depend on it. From thence comes the type of Christian activity and belief, that is to characterise and govern our Church in all its history. We do not speak thus as inimical in the least to the system, and much less as questioning in the least the purity, the soundness, or the efficiency of our present institutions. They have done an honored service for the Church of Christ and for our denominational interests. But we cannot but see that they are in a most responsible position, and one that if abused would bring untold evil on the whole Church. It is well, then, to understand the attitude and province of such institutions.

The province of Theological Seminaries, then, is to instruct our candidates in those branches of knowledge which will qualify them to be acceptable and edifying ministers of God's Word, *as the agents of the Presbyteries*. The Presbytery finds that it is "more conducive to the prosperity of the Church," that our candidates should attend these schools, established and sustained for this purpose of instructing candidates for the ministry, and hence sends its students here instead of undertaking to teach them in its own bounds. This Court in the mean time, however, still maintains its supervision and control over its students. We do not mean, of course, that any narrow and suspicious course should be pursued toward our Theological faculties, but as ample and as liberal allowance of jurisdiction should be yielded to these brethren as is needed, and every encouragement given them that is necessary to make their important labor effective for the Church. There should evidently be an understanding of the constitutional attitude of such institutions, and an adjustment of the mutual relation of the Presbytery and its representative in the department of instruction, the theological faculty, that there may be a full and faithful performance of this important work of preparing men for the gospel ministry. There should be a direct and close connection between the two, the nearer the more

constitutional the safer and the more satisfactory to the Church. And to our mind the authority and control which the Church is authorised to exercise over such institutions, is lodged here. And the more nearly we recognise this fact the more fully will this system be understood and sustained by the Church at large, and the more harmoniously will it work. There evidently is a want of unanimity of sentiment and action on this subject, and consequently some want of accord and agreement in the management and patronage of these institutions. This should not be. But not only should the rights of the Presbyteries be recognised in the establishment and control of such institutions, but their inherent right of controlling their students should never be invaded by the theological faculties. The Presbytery alone is the proper party to direct them in their labors, and only by its authority and direction have candidates of the ministry a right to exercise their gifts or conduct any public service, other than that of a private Christian. And certainly it is disorderly for any theological student to go within the bounds of a Presbytery other than his own, and without any consent of such Presbytery, to supply its churches. Such things are done, however, though a positive invasion of the jurisdiction of the Presbytery. Theological faculties are entrusted with all needed authority over these candidates whilst at the Seminary, that may be necessary or conducive to their highest improvement in the course there taught, but nothing more than this; and they have absolutely none as to their location or labors outside of the Seminary.

But, on the other hand, whilst these institutions should not invade the distinctive rights of the Presbytery, the Presbytery should give them, when within their appropriate sphere, every encouragement and support, and fully recognise the important work entrusted to them. Our candidates should always be encouraged to study in our Theological Seminaries, and not in private with our ministers, unless in special cases, and then only by advice of the Presbytery. The Presbytery should not encourage their students, or permit them, *sub silentio*, whilst at the Seminary, to drop off any part of the regular course; and certainly not without consent of the faculty, and that for a good

and sufficient reason. Presbyteries should not encourage their students to leave the Seminary for licensure before the close of full term of such institutions. It is not treating the faculties of such institutions and their work with due respect to license candidates at the close of the second session. It is generally, too, a great injury to the student himself, by subjecting him to the temptation of leaving the Seminary altogether or greatly neglecting the remaining part of the course. And, if possible, the Presbyteries and Seminary faculties should so arrange it that students shall not be compelled to neglect the latter part of their course in attending meetings of Presbyteries to stand their trials. The Presbyteries, too, it seems to us, should always demand, as an item of consideration in licensure, certificates of the student's fidelity and of his proficiency. Some report, it occurs to us, of this kind should always be rendered by the Theological faculties who have been so intimately associated with our candidates, as their religious instructors and guides, to the Presbyteries, and should be always considered by that body in the question of licensure. This would be a bond of union between these parties which would be mutually advantageous, and tend to secure the highest improvement of the Seminary course by the student himself.

It is important that the proper sphere of both the Presbytery and the Theological school be understood and observed, that both may harmoniously coöperate in the work of training men for the gospel ministry; the Theological Seminary discharging a most important part of this work, as the representative and agent of the Presbytery; and the Presbytery giving every encouragement and assistance to these institutions in this labor.

But we must bring this article to a close. If anything has been said which will, in any degree, tend to the clearer perception of this important interest of the Church of Christ, or to the more satisfactory settlement of it in our practice, the author is abundantly repaid.

ARTICLE II.

DR. DABNEY ON IMMEDIATE IMPUTATION.

Though we are taught by many that Turretin is the great Doctor of Calvinistic Theology, and that we are to suspect any innovations since his time as likely to be "another gospel," it is still very gratifying to have a modern form of the great doctrines he so clearly enunciated. We wish to know how these truths, no longer matter of doubt in the Reformed (*i. e.* Calvinistic) Church, have been modified in their presentation by objections and controversies which have arisen in the last two centuries. For there is supposed to be a continual progress in the Church's apprehension of the doctrines of Scripture; a constant approximation to the mind of the Spirit. But this has been the result of many a hard-fought battle over each step in the progress; and the opponents of the truth have been of no little service in sounding to their very foundation the scripturalness of the "form of sound words." One fault common to most of the defenders of the faith is in concentrating their attention upon the doctrine under controversy, and forgetting others with which it must be correlated; which has led them to take too extreme a view of successive doctrines established as orthodox. Every one who did not square himself with their standard, and see the bearing of certain texts upon a doctrine as they saw it, was regarded as a heretic; though in the main his faith and theirs might be identical. Yet how different an interpretation do divines, equally orthodox, now give of certain texts, of which one interpretation was once considered necessary—as for the proof of the divinity of Christ; and how various now are the renderings of passages where unanimity was once a test of soundness.

No doubt one cause of this greater liberality is an increased confidence in the truth as an objective reality, with its own powers of conviction upon honest hearts; and also a greater charity in attributing to an error of the understanding what was wont to be charged against the dishonesty of a heart seeking to corrupt the Word. Hence, orthodox theologians can now differ

upon points where difference of view once marked off the heretic from the sound in doctrine. Chalmers's view of innate depravity would scarcely have been tolerated in the seventeenth century; and his connection between repentance and the works meet for it would have been considered as indiscreetly set forth. There are few things more to be reprehended than the hue and cry against one known to be sound in doctrine, on account of an opinion he may hold which does not agree with what we have been accustomed to regard as a sort of procrustean form of orthodox theology, to which everything must be adjusted. Who does not admire Dr. Thornwell's moderation in thus speaking of certain views of Dr. Breckinridge respecting hereditary and imputed sin? On page 477, of Vol. I, of his "Collected Writings," he says: "We understand Dr. Breckinridge to teach that the native character of man is determined by the natural, and not by the federal relations of Adam; that we are born sinners because Adam, our father, was a sinner and begat us under the law that like must propagate like. We understand him as teaching that inherent corruption of nature is prior, in the order of thought, to the guilt of Adam's first sin, so that unless we were born sinners we could not be involved in his curse." Now it is as plain as can be that if Dr. Breckinridge taught this, (and Dr. Thornwell has confirmed his 'understanding' of what he did teach by appropriate quotations in which our Federal Relation to Adam is called "a legal fiction,") he taught the doctrine of Placæus, which was condemned by the French Synod of Charenton in these words: "Damnavit Synodus doctrinam ejusmodi, quatenus peccati originalis naturam ad corruptionem hereditariam posterum Adæ ita restringit, ut imputationem excludat primi illius peccati quo lapsus est Adam," etc. And yet Dr. Thornwell mildly says: "It is with unfeigned reluctance that we differ from the author upon any subject. We have such profound respect for his judgment that whenever our opinions have not been in accordance with his, we have felt that the presumption was against us, and that modesty and caution became us until we had thoroughly reviewed the grounds of our conclusions. Dr. Breckinridge is no rash thinker, and because he is no rash

thinker we specially regret that we cannot concur with him in his views."

Here is certainly a tremendous growth in the grace of charity since the seventeenth century. But it is perhaps a charity confined to those known to be in the fold of the faithful. Had Mr. Barnes expressed such views, the Synod of Charenton might have been reënacted in 1858.

It is a fortunate thing for a theologian to publish his writings in his lifetime; the criticisms of friend and foe cast so much light on what the author saw with partiality and prejudice, and generally test the usefulness of the contribution so well, that he can either revise with credit to himself, or, like some in the last decade or so, have the satisfaction of knowing that the early oblivion to which he is consigned prevents him from doing any harm. No one can help regretting that Dr. Thornwell did not live to revise his own writings, for a great change can be traced working its way through them when read in the order in which they were written, making some of his latest views on the most important doctrines incompatible with what is maintained in his earlier writings. It is impossible to suppose that so logical a thinker would have suffered such inconsistencies had they appeared together before him, and that he would not have reduced them to a system in which they would be reconciled.

Before noticing these inconsistencies of Dr. Thornwell, let us consider the views set forth by Dr. Dabney in his usual forcible, trenchant manner, upon Imputation. The opinions of such a man as Dr. Dabney must be of interest to the Church with which he is identified, and in which he is recognised as an exponent of her theology. There is no question raised in his "Lectures" upon which his peculiar views have been so clearly set forth as that of the Imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. He arrays himself against Turretin and Dr. Hodge no less than against Placæus and the Arminians; and it almost makes one tremble to think of attacking one who seems so confident that he has carried the positions hitherto deemed impregnable in the Reformed Church.

Dr. Dabney's lectures to his classes in theology, recently put

forth by the students of Union Seminary, were supplementary to certain text-books in which the student was expected to study the subjects lectured upon, and were intended as résumés of the various discussions to which reference had been made, consolidating them, showing their weak and strong points, refuting the opinions of heterodox writers to whom the student was also directed, and finally presenting the Professor's views if different from those generally taught by systematic writers of divinity in the Reformed Church. It is in this way that Dr. Dabney has presented the doctrine of Immediate Imputation; the student is directed to Dick and Hill and Edwards, and required to study Turretin; then comes the reinforcement from the desk (Lectures XXVI and XXVII) presenting the doctrine so forcibly, compactly and fairly, and removing objections so honestly, that one never for a moment supposes that the lecturer's heart is not in it all, and is utterly amazed to find that what must have convinced every one else in the lecture-room has not moved him, and that after all he has rejected that form of the doctrine held by Turretin and Rivet no less than by Princeton and Allegheny.

The point at which Dr. Dabney swerves from the ordinary doctrine is in his answers to the "Objection against the justice of Imputation." He states that objection (on pp. 232, 233,) as follows: "But the grand objection of all Pelagians and skeptics, is still repeated: How can it be *justice* for me, who gave no consent to the federal arrangement, for me who was not present when Adam sinned and took no share in it, save in a sense purely fictitious and imaginary, to be so terribly punished for another man's deed? This is nothing more than the intrinsic injustice of punishing an innocent man for the fault of the guilty. As well might God have gotten up a legal fiction of a federal relation between Gabriel and Satan, and when the latter sinned, dragged Gabriel down, innocent, and even ignorant of any crime, to hell. Against such a plan the moral instincts of man rebel. It is simply impossible that they should accept it as righteous."

He then adds, that so far as he is aware there are five expe-

dients for meeting it: (1.) the Wesleyan; (2.) President Edwards's; (3.) the Realist; (4.) Mediate Imputation; and (5.) Immediate Imputation.

Dr. Dabney is not strictly consistent in his arguments to show that these expedients for meeting the "grand objection" are inadequate. There are two tests by which he tries the "adequateness" of these "expedients;" and they are so entirely different, nay, so opposite in their natures, that for an expedient to stand the test of one is *prima facie* evidence that it will fail of the other. They are the Scylla and Charybdis by which any conceivable device for removing the objection would be wrecked. The one is that the expedient squares itself with the truth of revelation or the facts of consciousness which revelation always implies; the other, that it should not array against itself "the ineradicable intuitions of man's soul;" and while in one sense of that phrase, (in which it is included in "the facts of consciousness" above,) this test is good, yet in the sense in which it is used by him it means nothing less than the rebellion of the natural heart against the sovereignty of God. By the first test the Wesleyan, Edwardean, Realist (so-called), and Mediate theories are tried and found wanting. In the trial of the Wesleyan expedient the incompatibility of these two tests for any one theory is made evident, since it does remove the charge of injustice brought against the imputation of Adam's guilt to us. For if Christ repaired the loss sustained by us in Adam in such a way that each child of his (Adam's) receives "sufficient grace" to make his probation as favorable for salvation as was Adam's, then it is as fair for them as for Adam. If the work of Christ comes in to save the injustice of our being condemned through an involuntary implication in Adam's sin it must be viewed as a necessary part of his federal headship and therefore there is no injustice in the transaction taken as a whole. The inadequateness of this theory therefore does not arise from its failure to meet the objection, for it does meet it, but from its not being according to the Scriptures; and this unscripturalness of the "Wesleyan Answer" is given by Dr. Dabney as the reason that it is inadmissible. And so in regard to the theory of

President Edwards. If it be true that our own personal identity is no less arbitrary than our federal oneness with Adam, then it is no more unjust to punish us for his sin than for our own; the same sovereign fiat that makes me responsible for the sins I committed last year makes me responsible for Adam's sin; therefore, they have the same foundation in justice. And so in regard to that doctrine which, so far as it is anything, is theological Realism: if I really and truly, *i. e.* actually, not putatively and federally, sinned in Adam, then God in punishing me for his sin, did not punish me for his sin so much as for my own; and if I can only get myself and others to believe it, we cannot see injustice in our being punished for our own actual sin. But both these theories, while they do remove the objection above stated, have the misfortune not to be true to facts of consciousness or to Scripture.

Mediate Imputation, however, neither removes the objection nor agrees with Scripture. If I am not punished for the sin of another but only for my own depravity, which comes upon me antecedent to any imputation of guilt, then I am still punished for what it was out of my power to prevent, and the same objection occurs which was brought against my involuntary implication in Adam's sin. It is also unscriptural, for the plain account there is that "by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation," "by the disobedience of one man many were constituted sinners," "by one man sin came into the world, and death (the punishment of sin) passed upon all men, for all sinned; and that this very depravity is itself a punishment, *i. e.* death—(Rom. viii. 8)—"for carnal mindedness is death," τὸ γὰρ φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς θάνατος. Instead, therefore, of its being the sole cause of our punishment it is itself the punishment for antecedent guilt. It is difficult to conceive how any one of logical consistency could accept Mediate Imputation in any measure as meeting this "grand objection," when it only puts it back one step farther, removing it from the judicature of justice to the arbitrariness of a sovereign; or how the shadow of a foundation for it could be given from Scripture. This, Dr.

Dabney himself has shown in proving this scheme inadequate. How he could afterwards so nearly approach it himself is one of the "curiosities of thought."

We must be pardoned for the amount of quotation we shall now make from Dr. Dabney's "Lectures." The fallacies running through his attempt to show that the view of Immediate Imputation, as held by Turretin and the Princeton School, is unsound and sophistical, are so interwoven with nearly every part of his statements and refutations, that an adequate conception of his mistake could only be given by tracing it throughout; and besides, justice demands that all he says in defence of his opposition to this long-received form of doctrine be heard. We shall therefore quote, almost entire, three pages of his "Lectures," in which his views are presented. The divisions into smaller paragraphs, and the numbering of them are not his, but made for the convenience of reference.

He thus speaks of Immediate Imputation, page 235 :

"Sec. 1. In opposition to this scheme, [mediate imputation,] Turretin states the view of *immediate imputation*, which has since been defined and asserted in its most rigid sharpness by the Princeton school. It boldly repudiates every sense in which we really or actually sinned in Adam, and admits no other than merely the representative sense of a positive covenant. It says that the guilt of Adam's first sin is sovereignly imputed to his posterity.

"Sec. 2. Depravity of nature is a part of the *penalty* of death, due to Adam's sin, and is visited on Adam's children purely as the *penal* consequence of the putative guilt they bear. For sin may be the punishment of sin. Very true, after depravity of nature thus becomes personally theirs, it also brings an addition of personal guilt, for which they are thenceforward punished, as well as for actual transgressions. The grounds for this statement are chiefly these two: 1. That Rom. v. 12-20, asserts an exact parallel between our federal relation to Adam and to Christ, so that as the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us, conceived as personally unrighteous, goes before, procuring our justification, and then all sanctifying grace is bestowed working personal sanctification, as purchased by Christ's righteousness for us, so we must conceive Adam's guilt imputed to us, *we being conceived*

as in the first instance personally guiltless, but for that guilt; and then depravity given us, working personal sin and guilt, as the mischievous purchase of Adam's federal act for us.

"Sec. 3. And as the parallel must be exact, if this view of original sin be rejected, then the view of justification must be modified "to suit;" making it consist, first, in an infusion of personal righteousness in the believer, and then the *consequent* accounting to us of Christ's righteousness. But that is precisely the Roman justification. Secondly, unless the justice and reasonableness of the imputation of Adam's sin to us be admitted, we having, so far, no personal guilt, nor actual personal agency in his sin, the reasonableness of the imputation of Christ's righteousness cannot be defended, and justification is rendered impossible."

Before giving his objections to this form of doctrine we must protest against some representations of it in the above quotation. In the last sentence of section 1, he says: "the guilt of Adam's first sin is *sovereignly* imputed to his posterity" according to this view. But is that correct? We hold that the imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin is not "sovereignly" imputed, but imputed as a matter of *justice* to all men, "for that all sinned." (Rom. v. 12.) The natural relation between us and Adam was of sovereign constitution; for God, had he so willed, might have made us as the angels in heaven; the federal relation he established between Adam and his posterity was also of sovereign constitution, for it was an act of God's free bounty to change man's condition from that of a servant under a government purely moral, to that of a son by superinducing the scheme of justification upon that original relation in which man stood as a created moral being. As all orthodox writers have shown, and Dr. Dabney himself maintains, (on page 231,) the limitation of our probation in time, instead of making it co-extensive with our immortality, and the limitation of it as to persons, summing it up into that of an adult in full possession of his faculties, instead of having it to begin with the infancy of each one separately—this modification of the *natural* rights and relations of God's creatures towards him, called the Covenant of Works, was an act of God's free bounty, and therefore could have been withheld. If it were not intrinsically just, God

would not have instituted it. But the federal relation having been instituted by sovereign goodness, the visiting the consequences of such relation upon those represented was a matter of *justice* not of sovereignty. Dr. Dabney, therefore, misrepresents the doctrine in the sentence referred to.

Again, the last sentence of section 2 contains another misrepresentation of the doctrine; (and let it be distinctly understood that we use the term 'misrepresentation' in no evil sense, but that we regard it as honestly made;) we italicised the sentence for easy reference. Now, we are not conceived as "personally guiltless" until the imputation of Adam's sin. We were never conceived to be either *personally* guiltless or guilty; no personal existence of any kind, or personal relation of any kind to the law, was attributed to us. We were, on the contrary, wholly regarded *federally*, as in Adam; whatever was his status, determined our status at any moment during his probation. If we were regarded as innocent, it was not on a personal account, but on account of the innocence of Adam. But we repudiate the word *innocent* in this account of our standing before the law with respect to our probation in Adam. We were conformed to law so long as Adam maintained his perfect obedience—perfect qualitatively, not quantitatively, *i. e.* not a *finished* righteousness. Our probation was not for our character of innocence, but for a change of condition, from that of servant to that of son, which change was ever contemplated as the reward of the obedience of one man—the federal representative of the "seed." We shall notice this misrepresentation again. We only mention it now to protest against it.

And lastly, we seriously object to the word "reasonableness" in the last sentence. It is too indefinite a term, and out of place altogether in a discussion of refined distinctions, where exactness of thought and expression is indispensable.

Dr. Dabney goes on to show how this theory "disregards the objection":

Sec. 1. "As to the great objection against our involuntary federal connexion with Adam, these divines unscrupulously impinge against it, and demand that the moral intuition on which

it claims to be founded, be simply trampled down. Whether this be discreet, or true, or just, the student can easily judge for himself. Surely it is not wise so to represent God's truth, so to sharpen and exaggerate its angles, at the demand of our erroneous dialectics, or overstrained exegesis as to causelessly array against it the ineradicable intuitions of man's soul! Surely there are mysteries enough in this awful fact of original sin, to distress and awe the sensitive mind without seeking gratuitously to exasperate them.

"Sec. 2. And he who insists that the price men shall pay for admitting the orthodox theology is the surrender of their common sense, as they suppose, is practically propagating unbelief. If we are to abdicate our intuitive beliefs, we can no longer reason nor believe anything properly.

"Sec. 3. We must indeed, as we do, demand the unconditional submission of *carnal* reason, and we insist on facts which impinge against it; but not sanctified reason. One object of religion is to purify, rectify, and then employ this reason as a necessary handmaid." P. 236.

One can scarcely believe these lines were penned by a champion of orthodoxy, and could easily imagine them to be extracts from Adam Clarke's "Christian Theology," or "Ralston's Divinity," or "Foster's Attack on Calvinism." Dr. Dabney stated the "Grand Objection" (on pp. 232, 233) in its full force, as quoted above; he now says the "moral intuitions upon which it claims to be founded are simply trampled upon by this theory;" that it "causelessly arrays against itself the ineradicable intuitions of man's soul," etc., etc. To all which it is replied, that if it does require a "surrender of common sense," "an abdication of intuitive beliefs" to admit the orthodox theology because it involves our "involuntary federal connexion" with Adam, then must every honest thinker, who will go to the ultimate principles upon which any theology is based, abandon not only Princeton, but all theology. Cast aside Revelation and build up a theodicy upon a philosophical induction of ALL the facts of human nature—such a theodicy as the mind by its laws is determined to build—and this same awful problem will come up in some form or other if you only go far enough. The Bible alone offers a solution *grounded in justice*,—that the dreadful curse of native depravity

is the curse of a law, "for sin is not imputed where there is no law;" that we are punished by a just God for the sin of one man, Adam. The scriptural solution is preferable to any other because it has fewer difficulties; every other theory requires us to abandon more or less of our primitive beliefs, while the Scripture only demands that we admit this fact of revelation,—that we can be held justly responsible for the sin of one appointed our federal representative by our sovereign Creator, the Judge of all the earth, who will do right. Any system of Deism must account for this most common of all facts of experience—that we suffer for the faults of others, that our destinies are not committed absolutely and severally into our own hands, but that the principle of vicariousness runs through the whole of society. Now here is suffering in abundance "through an involuntary implication" in the faults of others. Account for it under the moral government of a just God so as to reconcile it with the "ineradicable intuitions of man's soul." Unless I become an atheist I must believe that this undeniable fact of experience is reconcilable with the moral government of a just God; and we ask both "carnal" and "sanctified reason," if that is less difficult than punishment for the sin of one who was constituted our federal head by our sovereign God and Creator? In fact, suffering for the faults, sins or crimes of others without any implication in their guilt is more opposed to our "moral intuitions," than suffering for the sin of another in whose guilt the Word of God assures me that I am implicated by a legal relation, instituted by One who had the rightful authority to do so; that is, punishment for the sin of Adam on account of the federal relation existing between us, is more consonant to "our primitive beliefs," to both "carnal and sanctified reason," than suffering where no guilt is imputed. And yet the latter is a far more common occurrence under God's moral government than the former. The former has happened but twice: first, when "judgment passed upon all men" for the sin of Adam, and again when "he was made sin for us, who knew no sin."

There is too much indefiniteness in the terms used in this reasoning quoted above. In the paragraph marked Sec. 3, Dr.

Dabney says that he demands the unconditional submission of "carnal reason," in insisting on facts (of revelation) which impinge against it; but not "sanctified reason." Now can any one so define these two kinds of reason that we may ever distinguish and never confound them, and yet save the whole passage in which they occur from absurdity? We have always been taught that "sanctified reason" submitted to any fact of revelation, simply because it was founded upon a "thus saith the Lord," and that "carnal reason" would not thus submit. However, Bishop Butler says, in his chapter on the Mediatorial system of Christianity,—“the folly of certain objections against the credibility of certain things revealed in Scripture is yet greater, when they are urged, as they usually are, against things in Christianity analogous or like to those natural dispensations of providence, which are matters of experience. Let reason be kept to; and if any part of the Scripture account of the redemption of the world by Christ can be shown to be really contrary to it, let the Scripture, in the name of God, be given up.” Now, according to the conception of "reason" implied in these words, it is difficult to see how the quality of *carnal* or *sanctified* can be applied to it. That great thinker is reasoning with Deists and anti-christians of all sorts; so the "reason" he must mean to be relevant to them, must be such reason as they could and must exercise, if they were honest. The attempt we made above to show that as great objections could be brought against a fact of experience as against the revelation of Immediate Imputation, is expected to have as great force with an honest, fair-minded Deist, as with a Calvinist Christian? We can understand Dr. Dabney when he speaks of a "sanctified heart;" but a "sanctified reason" is beyond our comprehension, if he means anything more than a reason which is willing to take God's Word for any fact of revelation; and if he means that, this whole passage last quoted, about "moral intuitions," "ineradicable intuitions of man's soul," "primitive beliefs," "common sense," etc., is greatly out of place. The case should at once have been remanded to the Word of God. But we must regard it as doubly absurd, when we consider that no difficulty emerges in theology which

has not already emerged in philosophy, and that the only conditions of learning the truth, are the unprejudiced mind, the honest heart, and a willingness to accept as true whatever comes to us, surrounded with no greater difficulties than other things which we do receive as true. And we do not see how such a reason deserved the name of *sanctified*, for it is that which any pagan or unregenerate man can have. If this argument is valid against the doctrine of Immediate Imputation, it is valid against Predestination, against which "the ineradicable intuitions of man's soul" as stoutly rebel. Not having any definite idea of what Dr. Dabney means by "sanctified" reason, we cannot say whether he would consider John Wesley's as sanctified or not. It is very certain that he had a sanctified heart; that he was a man of true piety and humility; and that his reward is great in his Master's kingdom. And there are a few millions of Christians in the world who would affirm that his reason was sanctified as well as his heart. And yet here is the way the "ineradicable intuitions" of his soul rebel against the doctrine of God's sovereign election, which Dr. Dabney so stoutly maintains.

In the CXXIV. Sermon of the edition of Wesley's sermons published by the Southern Methodist Publishing House, we find page after page of such declamation as this about the doctrine of Predestination:

"But just as it honors the Son, so doth this doctrine honor the Father. It destroys all his attributes at once: it overturns both his justice, mercy, and truth; yea, it represents the most holy God as worse than the devil; as both more false, more cruel, and more unjust. More *false*, because the devil, liar as he is, hath never said, he willeth all men to be saved; more *unjust*, because the devil cannot, if he would, be guilty of such injustice as you ascribe to God, when you say that God condemned millions of souls to everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels, for continuing in sin, which, for the want of that grace *he will not* give them, they cannot avoid. This is the blasphemy contained in *the horrible decree* of Predestination! And here I fix my foot. On this I join issue with every assertor of it. You represent God as worse than the devil; more false, more cruel, more unjust. But you say you will prove it by Scripture. Hold! What will you prove by Scripture? that God is worse

than the devil? It cannot be. Whatever that Scripture proves, it never can prove this; whatever its true meaning be, this cannot be its true meaning. Do you ask, What is its true meaning, then? If I say, 'I know not,' you have gained nothing; for there are many scriptures, the true sense whereof neither you nor I shall know till death is swallowed up in victory. But this I know, better it were to say it had no sense at all, than to say it had such a sense as this. It cannot mean, whatever it mean besides, that the God of truth is a liar. Let it mean what it will, it cannot mean that the Judge of all the world is unjust. No scripture can mean that God is not love, or that his mercy is not over all his works; that is, whatever it prove beside, no scripture can prove Predestination." Vol. IV., Pp. 380-385.

This quotation is given to show to what lengths a pious mind can be carried, which comes to the Bible with prejudices and prepossessions of its own, and not with the simple desire to know what God has declared, and with sufficient confidence in his rectitude to know that no fact or doctrine of revelation can be inconsistent with his attributes; and which forgets that, when a doctrine, unmistakably revealed in Scripture, appears to have this inconsistency, the correction is to be made in our prejudices and prepossessions, and not in the Word of God.

Dr. Dabney next proceeds to show that the special reasons on which the Turretin or Princeton form of Immediate Imputation rests are sophistical. And his objections and arguments are founded on the misconceptions of the doctrine which led him into those misrepresentations referred to above:

"The special reasons on which that which is peculiar in this theory rests, are sophistical. The reasonableness of an imputation of Christ's merit to us does *not* depend on the reasonableness of such an imputation of Adam's sin to us as they describe. The simple proof is, (it is amazing it should be overlooked,) the latter was an act of justice, of law; the former, of mercy. Surely it does not follow, that because a gratuitous act of goodness may be reasonable and right, therefore a gratuitous act of severity is equally so! Nor is it of any avail to say that 'Christ was not personally an agent in our *sins* yet the guilt of them was accounted to him'; for this also was a part of the plan of *mercy*, and *he gave his voluntary consent beforehand.*" (P. 236).

This is the same objection brought up by Dr. Breckinridge in

his Theology, ("Knowledge of God Objectively Considered," p. 498.) He says:

"It is infinitely certain that God would never make a legal fiction a pretext to punish as sinners, dependent and helpless creatures who were actually innocent. The imputation of our sins to Christ affords no pretext for such a statement; because that was done by the express consent of Christ, and was, in every respect, the most stupendous proof of divine grace."

Now in answer to this objection, we say, that it is *not* true that "this theory makes the 'reasonableness' of the imputation of Christ's merit to us, depend upon the 'reasonableness' of the imputation of Adam's sin to us, so that the analogy breaks down, as the one is an act of justice, of law, and the other of mercy, of grace;" but the ground taken is, that the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us rests upon the antecedent imputation of our sins to him, and the principle of essential rectitude, of eternal justice, is as much involved in this as in the imputation of Adam's sin to us. *Transference of guilt* is the *cardo præcipuus* of both transactions; and they must be judged, not by their consequences, but by their essential character. The great question is, Can there be any other responsibility for sin than a *personal* one? *i. e.*, can there be in the eyes of the law a real responsibility for any sin or sins but those actually and personally committed, or can one be justly *reus aliene culpæ*? Can there be an *imposed* responsibility for the sin of another, as of Adam's sin upon his seed, or an *assumed* responsibility, as that of Christ for us? And the question is to be decided upon its intrinsic righteousness, its compatibility with the principles of essential and eternal rectitude, and not upon its beneficent or mischievous consequences. And hence the question stands in all its nakedness: Is it consistent with the essential principles of law and justice to impute the guilt of the *actual* sinner, (the personal agent,) to the *reckoned* sinner,—to him who is a sinner only in consequence of that imputation? And we answer Yes! to this question, as Paul answered to the question, whether it was righteous in God for the purpose of election to stand, not of works, but of him that calleth, (Rom. ix. 11, 14-17) for *God has*

acted in accordance with this principle, and that forever settles the question whether it is just or not. "It is amazing" that these divines, who are so eloquent in showing that the salvation of sinners by grace through the redemption of our Lord Jesus Christ was no infraction of the principles of justice, but that "Christ was the wisdom of God," because his redemption was the wonderful plan of saving the guilty and yet satisfying the demands of law and justice, should forget all they say about the *necessity* and *truth* of the Atonement, and talk as if the principle of grace which enters into it, makes the question of its *essential rectitude in the eyes of the law* wholly irrelevant. The keystone that gives strength to the whole arch of this divine scheme for reconciling grace with the inviolable sanction of a broken law, was, that every step of the plan satisfied immutable justice. It is this which makes the gospel the power of God to the salvation of sinners, in that its plan enabled God to save them consistently with his justice. And yet the fundamental principle in the scheme of redemption, and the first step in order of thought and of time, is the imputation of guilt, from "actual sinners," to one who is a "reckoned sinner," *i. e.*, only a sinner in consequence of that imputation. The imputation of our sins to Christ comes before the imputation of his righteousness to us. The "act of goodness was gratuitous" indeed. But the conditions of the act were such that a question of justice had to be decided before it could be performed, and that question was: "Is it compatible with inviolable justice that one can be held by the law responsible for the sin of another?" The next question was: "Who should the party be who would take the *law-place* of the guilty?" The first question had been decided in justice by God's having constituted Adam the federal head of his seed, "for there cannot be unrighteousness with God." (Rom. ix. 13). The second question made the hosts of heaven dumb, because "there was none to help," until God's own arm brought salvation and his righteousness sustained him, and "to the principalities and powers in heavenly places his manifold wisdom was made known."

Now the principle having been decided to be just, it could be

used whenever it could be established by proper authority. But such sovereign disposal of creatures could evidently be made by none but a sovereign God, whose creatorship gave him this control over the works of his hands; for his sovereignty gives him the right to do whatsoever he wills; while the holiness and justice of his nature determine him to will only what is just. Man's consent therefore was not necessary to the constituted relation between him and his federal head; it was a sovereign disposition of himself which could only be made by one who possessed the right of *sovereignty*; and if he could make such disposition of himself it would prove him to be God.

And notice how different an argument from Dr. Dabney's we can now draw from John x. 18. Dr. Dabney uses it to show that the justice of Christ's being made sin for us has his "voluntary consent"—his laying down his life of himself, to rest upon. But, holding that the "entrance of sin into the world, and death by sin" through a federal representation, under the government not only of a just God, but of One whose goodness is unmistakably declared in his works, was the *experimentum crucis* of the principle of imputed sin, we do not see how its justice can be called in question, or can need anything more for its establishment; and therefore we can discover in the words, "I lay down my life of myself," nothing but "his eternal power and Godhead." If the absence of our consent infringes upon the justice of Adam's representing us, then the giving of our consent would confirm it, even as Dr. Dabney asserts in regard to the voluntariness of Christ's death, that it establishes the justice of "his bearing our sins"; and, then, his consent being required for this end, no more proves his divinity than our consent would prove our divinity. But when his consent has nothing to do with the essential righteousness of the proceeding, it stands out singly and alone as the claim of divinity.

Dr. Dabney goes on immediately to say:

"—As to the first reason, drawn from Paul's parallel between Adam and Christ, it is not proved that the Apostle meant the parallel to be technically exact in every point. Such is rarely the case with illustrations; if they have analogy enough to explain.

the one the other, it is enough. Does not Paul himself stop, in the midst of his illustration, even leaving his sentence suspended, to name two important respects in which the parallel was *not* exact? And is there not an inevitable difference as he himself intimates, in the fact that the one federal arrangement was a transaction of *law*, and the other of *grace*? It was enough for his purpose to teach, what I strictly hold, that the first and second Adam were federal heads; and that as we fell in one, we are restored in the other." P. 236.

No one can reply to this so well as Dr. Dabney himself has done on a preceding page (227). He there says:

"1. The great Bible argument for the imputation of Adam's sin is the parallel drawn between Adam and Christ in 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 45-49, and Rom. v. 12-19. I shall content myself with stating the doctrinal results which, as I conceive, are clearly established. In 1 Cor. xv. Adam and Christ are compared, as the first and second Adam. In almost everything they are contrasted. Yet they have something in common; what can this be but their representative characters. In v. 22, Adam is somehow connected with the death of his confederated body; and Christ is similarly connected with the life of his. But Christ redeems his people by the imputation of his righteousness. Must not Adam have ruined his by the imputation to them of his guilt?

"2. In Rom. v. 12-19, it is agreed by all Calvinistic interpreters, that the thing illustrated is justification through faith. The passage is founded on the idea of verse 14, that Adam is the type of Christ.

"3. The very exceptions of vs. 15-17, where the points are stated in which the resemblance does *not* hold, show that Adam's sin is imputed. Our federal union with Adam, says the Apostle, resulted in condemnation and death; with Christ in abounding grace. In the former case, one sin condemned all; in the latter, one man's righteousness justifies all. The very exceptions show that men are condemned for Adam's sin.

"4. In verses 18, 19, the comparison is resumed and completed; and it is most emphatically stated that, as in Christ "many are constituted righteous," so in Adam "many were constituted sinners." Scriptural usage of these terms, proves that it is a forensic change which is implied. Then it follows that likewise our legal relations were determined by Adam." P. 228.

Dr. Dabney has intimated in this passage the right rule of

exegesis—that where a parallel is instituted, and exceptions expressly stated, we must regard the parallel as exact everywhere else, the very mention of the exceptions forcing upon us more conclusively than ever the conviction that the analogy holds in every other point; for if we could go on and make exceptions where the Apostle has made none, we could break down every part of the analogy.

In these quotations, Dr. Dabney implies that wherever the *principle of representation* comes in the analogy holds exactly—“our legal relations were determined by Adam in the same way that our legal relations were determined by Christ.” The difference is not in the *mode*, but in the *results* of the representation; the one was “unto death,” the other was “unto eternal life.” How very remarkable therefore his language, (on p. 236) that because the one federal arrangement was a transaction of *law* and the other of *grace*, there must be an inevitable difference between them; for whatever the difference be, it cannot be in that against which the “Grand Objection” he brings forward, bears. The very point of the Apostle’s argument, summed up in verse 21, is that “grace reigned *through righteousness*.” Dr. Dabney and Dr. Breckinridge think that the element of *grace* makes the question of justice a less important one.

The former goes on to say:

“—But it is urged, that if immediate imputation is rejected, we are necessarily betrayed into the Popish doctrine of justification, which makes inherent personal righteousness precede, and imputed follow. Let us see if this charge may not be at least as plausibly retorted. If we are personally guiltless and sinless till Adam’s guilt is accounted to us, and then (in the order of thought) we receive depravity as the punishment of imputed guilt, a rigid parallelism (such as the other view demands,) must lead to this view of justification, that we are personally unholy and contrasted in spiritual state with our federal head, Christ, at the time of our justification; and afterwards, in the order of causation, we begin to partake of his spiritual life and holiness, as a consequence of his imputed merit.” P. 236–7.

It is evident that Dr. Dabney’s argument *ad hominem* is grounded upon an erroneous statement of Immediate Imputa-

tion. As was said before, we are *not* “*personally* guiltless and sinless until Adam’s guilt is accounted to us.” We had no “*personal* existence;” but were *federally* in Adam. Remember, as Dr. Dabney himself maintains (on p. 228), “our legal relations were determined by Adam.” And the whole question must be discussed as to “legal relations” alone. Whatever our existence during Adam’s probation may be called, moral or legal, or putative, or ideal, it was sufficient to lead the Apostle to say of all men,—ἐφ’ ᾧ πάντες ἥμαρτον, for all sinned. We were never contemplated out of Adam, and therefore had no other relation to the law than the one he had so long as he was acting for us, which was imputed to us as legally or ideally or putatively existing. As to “sinless,” or, as he says on p. 238, “innocent” existence, the doctrine of Immediate Imputation maintains nothing of the kind. We hold that God no more dealt with us as persons in the covenant of works than in the covenant of grace. Had Adam stood we would have been justified on the ground of his imputed righteousness, just as we were condemned on the ground of his imputed sin, and as we are justified on the ground of the imputed righteousness of Christ. Natural birth would have taken the place spiritual birth holds in the covenant of grace. We always were to be saved by the righteousness of another. And we always sustained the same relations to the law which our federal head sustained, both under the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. As Christ was the “Lamb slain from the foundation of the world;” so “grace was given us in him before the world began.”

The paragraph last quoted continues as follows:

“But is that the Reformed doctrine of justification? Nay, verily. I pray you distinguish. As to *personal merit or righteousness procuring our acceptance with God*, we have none at all at the time of our justification, nor ever after. But as to actual spiritual condition, we are *not* spiritually dead and depraved totally at the moment of justification.”

Dr. Dabney here seems to forget that it is our legal relations, our forensic status, which is the subject of consideration, not our spiritual condition; for he proceeds to compare our change of legal

relations in Adam from righteous to guilty as his standing was imputed to us in every moment of his probation, with our change of spiritual condition in Christ,—an objective relation with a subjective state. The parallelism must fail when he regards the two transactions from different points of view; he shifts the question from the federal headship of Adam to the subjective consciousness of the “seed” of Christ; he speaks of what goes on at the tribunal of God, (in the case of Adam,) and then when Christ is spoken of unconsciously remands the case to the sinner’s subjective experience. But let them be compared together consistently throughout, and the analogy will not break down. This error becomes more evident as he proceeds:

“The order of sequence (not that we suppose an appreciable interval of time) is thus fixed by all the Reformed divines, so far as I know. 1. *Regeneration*, in which we begin to share the spiritual life of our head. 2. Saving faith acted by the soul, (with repentance implicitly in it.) 3. Mystical union with Christ constituted; which divides into (a) Legal Union, (b) Spiritual Union. So that when the soul is justified in the Second Adam, it is already spiritually alive in him. We see then that Princeton will have to relinquish the pretence of an exact parallel between our relation to the first and second Adam; or she is in danger of being driven by it into the abhorred result of mediate imputation.” P. 237.

The best reply to this is a correct representation of Immediate Imputation, and a comparison of the two federal arrangements under which that principle works from the *same point of view*. We again maintain that the parallelism is exact wherever the *principle of representation* comes in; only in the *consequences* resulting from the several headships of Adam and Christ is there any difference; and that difference arises not in any breaking down of the principle of Immediate Imputation in either, but from the different conditions under which one and the same principle worked. As Paul shows, in the first Adam it was the law, or principle, by which judgment came upon all men to condemnation; in the second Adam it was the law by which “the grace of God and the free gift in grace abounded into many.” It is the same principle of suretyship that breaks the endorser of a

note in one case, or that insures in another case the commercial success of him whose note is endorsed. Or, it is the same principle of representation that makes the represented enjoy the benefits of good or suffer the curse of bad legislation; the result does not destroy the analogy, or the *identity of principle*, so far as *it* is concerned. The best representation of this doctrine, and such an one as enables us to compare its working death in the first Adam, with its working life in the second Adam, is the account Dr. Thornwell gives of our connection with Adam on p. 561, Vol. I. of his "Collected Writings."

"The Scriptures show that the history of the individual does not absolutely begin with its birth. It sustained moral relations and was implicated in moral acts before it was born. This notion is essentially involved in the notion of a covenant. When Adam was appointed to this office, all his descendants, constituting an unity of body with him, sustained the same relation to the law and God which he sustained. Morally and legally they were in being; their interest in the covenant was just the same as if they had already received an actual-existence. This being so the sin of Adam must have produced the same judicial effects upon them as upon him. Their actual existence was to begin under the law of sin and death, as his was continued under it. God in calling them successively into being must, as the Ruler and Judge of the Universe, produce them in the state to which justice had morally consigned them. The covenant, therefore, explains the fact of their being sinners before they were born, gives them a history before their actual being."

The analogy holds in the case of Christ: the covenantal existence of the seed of Christ was as real as that of Adam. "Morally and legally they were in being." Otherwise how could they be "known," "elected," "redeemed"? The *actual* existence of the seed of Adam which "must begin under the law of sin and death to which justice had morally consigned them," corresponds to the *actual* existence of the saint, as the declared seed of Christ. Actual non-existence of the seed of Adam until brought into being under the law of sin and death, corresponds to the "death in trespasses and sins" of Christ's seed until "quickenened with him,"—to the "darkness," until they were made "light in the Lord": they were, as respects "the

eternal life," which comes upon the seed in virtue of the imputed righteousness of the Head, and until "*created* in righteousness and holiness of truth," as actually non-existent as the seed of Adam before brought into actual being. Spiritual birth corresponds to natural birth; both are *actual* unions with the respective Heads of the two covenants, and made in virtue of the federal union which preceded and determined them.

We know that many ridicule the idea of any other justification than the actual one consequent upon the exercise of faith in Christ, and we do not wish to dispute about words. We do not see, however, how such persons can admit the notion of a redemption of any but the actually existing; for the question, how can they be justified when they have committed no sins, "being not yet born, neither having done any good or evil," implies no greater absurdity than the question, how they can be said to be redeemed, under the same circumstances. This same confusion of the *actual* with the federal, (moral, legal or covenantal) relation and being, lies at the bottom of all Dr. Dabney says upon the want of parallelism between the two federal transactions. However we will not call it justification, but simply state the case as the Apostle stated it: that, viewing believers federally in Christ, it was "by the righteousness or obedience" of him that "it came upon all his seed unto justification of life"—"that they were constituted righteous." His "obedience" having been rendered—his "righteousness" having been wrought out, not for himself, but for them, in the eyes of the law they had an existence of such a kind that they could be represented by him; what Dr. Thornwell has said of the seed of Adam, must be said of the seed of Christ: all Christ's people constituting an unity of body with him sustained the same relations to the law and God which he sustained; their interest in the covenant was just the same as if they had already received an actual existence. This being so, the "obedience" of Christ must have produced the same judicial effects upon them as upon him; and their *actual* existence as members of the *mystical* body of Christ was to begin under "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus which hath made them free from the law of sin and death." Just as

“Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more, for in that he died he died unto sin once, but in that he liveth he liveth unto God;” so likewise they are to reckon themselves dead as respects sin, but as respects God (or unto God) living in Christ Jesus our Lord. (Rom. vi. and viii). It is difficult to see how the parallel could be made more exact than the Apostle has made it.

We all know that the change from death unto life, of the sinner, is one indivisible, instantaneous act, without any succession in time, whatever “order of sequence” in thought theologians may establish. As respects the change in the subjective condition of the sinner into “newness of life,” it is called *Regeneration*; as respects the attitude of his mind or soul towards Christ, it is *Saving Faith* exercised by him; towards sin, it is *Repentance*; as towards the law his change of (objective) relation is *Justification*; viewed as the subject of the indwelling of the Spirit, he is made a member of Christ’s body mystical. Yet this one change so variously considered by us is but the bringing of Christ’s seed into that *actual* existence of “being justified by the righteousness of one,” “of being constituted righteous by the obedience of one,” (Rom. v. 18, 19,) which was the judicial effect of their federal connection with the second Adam; God in calling them “with a holy calling, not according to their works, but according to his purpose and grace, which was given them in Christ Jesus before the world began,” produced them in the state to which justice (to Christ as federal head) had morally consigned them. The *τοῦτο οὐκ ἐξ ἑμῶν, θεοῦ τὸ δῶρον*, (“it is not of ourselves, it is the gift of God,”) of Eph. ii. 8, refers to this whole change, subjective as well as objective. And when the Apostle goes on to say that they were “created in Christ Jesus,” he makes their actual implication in the consequences of Christ’s “obedience” parallel to their creation under condemnation in consequence of the “disobedience” of Adam. *Legal* union with each federal head is therefore prior in order in thought and time to mystical union with one (Christ), or to actual participation in the consequences of that federal union with the other (Adam). So the third step in the “order of sequence,” of Dr. Dabney making legal union follow mystical union, is

manifestly incorrect; to which the Apostle also bears testimony. With him justification is the removal of the barrier of guilt to the receiving of the Holy Ghost. See the whole of 6th chapter of Romans. It is repeated again in the fourth verse of the 7th chapter: "Ye have been made dead as respects the law by the body of Christ, that ye should be married to another even to him who is raised from the dead that we should bring forth fruit unto God." And the order of this sequence must be determined in the actual experience of the believer by the order which God followed in his eternal counsels. As Christ redeemed his people from the curse of the law (*i. e.* procured their justification unto life) that they might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith, so we must (practically at least) recognise our federal or legal relation to Christ before we can be conscious of the Spirit in our hearts crying Abba Father; which it is the Apostle's purpose to establish in the Epistle to the Galatians.

Dr. Dabney goes on to say, in concluding the paragraph last quoted from:

"Do I then adopt the latter?" [Mediate Imputation.] "No: consistency would drive Princeton to it, but not me; for I have never asserted that exact parallel. It [an exact parallel] is not to be expected, when we remember that, as to our relation to the second Adam, we each one have our own personal, previous, existence, as depraved and guilty beings *before* we were brought into actual federal union with him. But as to the first Adam, we had no separate personal existence at all, till we *came* into existence actually and federally united to him." P. 237.

This is the same confusion already noticed. He speaks of an "actual federal union" with Christ. And of "coming into existence actually and federally united to Adam;" which seems to imply that our federal and actual union with him have one and the same commencement. But are we now federally united to Adam at all? He was our federal head only so long as his probation lasted; and it was only during the time he *stood for us* that we were federally united to him. When he fell the probation was ended and the federal relation between us ceased, and he ceased to be any more than any other ancestor of the human

race. This ceasing of the federal relation between Adam and his seed immediately upon his fall is proof therefore that their history does not begin with their birth, but that they sustained moral relations, and were implicated in moral acts before they were born; for there is no other federal head now but Christ Jesus the Lord; and therefore the terms "actual union with Adam," "guilty in Adam," and whatever others imply a federal connection still existing between him and his seed, mean no more than that we are now suffering the judicial effects of the federal union once existing between us. So while it would be hypercritical to find fault with a great deal of this sort of language, we must repudiate the notion that our actual existence is the commencement of our federal union with Adam, which seems to be implied in what is given above; or that our federal union with him of only a few days duration, has any other connection with our *actual existence as his natural seed*, (for that is all "actual union with him" can mean,) than that of being the determining cause in justice of the relations we actually stand in to the law and to God.

Dr. Dabney's next paragraph is to show that "Immediate Imputation is not true to facts":

"This leads me to object, last, that this view of Immediate Imputation is false, in that it represents man as having a separate, indepraved, personal existence, for an instant at least, until *from innocent* it is turned into depraved, as a penal consequence of Adam's guilt imputed; whereas in fact he never has any existence at all but a depraved existence. As he *enters being* condemned, so he enters it depraved. This over-refinement thus leads to positive inaccuracy, as most of man's attempts to be 'wise above that which is written.' It sins in a similar way with the erroneous scheme of Placaeus in a contrasted direction."

Nothing is easier to demolish than a man of straw of our own making. We defy any one to find in "Princeton Theology" such a view of Immediate Imputation as is here presented, and rightly declared false. It has not the shadow of a foundation in Dr. Hodge's elaborate commentary on the 5th chapter of

Romans, or in his lately issued "Systematic Theology," which are standards of "Princeton."

Dr. Dabney then says, that of the two schemes of imputation, Mediate and Immediate, he adopts neither, but prefers to represent the doctrine as "a great obvious *fact* rather than a hypothesis." What that fact is he tells us in these words:

"[1.] That God in his sovereign wisdom, righteousness, and goodness, was pleased to ordain such a natural and *federal union* between Adam and his posterity, making him their representative, that his probation should eventuate for them precisely as it did for him. That is: they were so connected with him legally and naturally, that, into whatever moral condition, and into whatever legal *status*, Adam should bring himself by his act, in that moral, and in that legal condition, all his posterity should be *born*.

"[2.] And as in Adam the change of condition, in both senses, was one whole connected change; so is the sin in his posterity. As in Adam, the first influx of depravity of heart was not visited on him *after* his sinful act merely, and as a penal consequence of it, but accompanied and prompted the act; so in Adam's posterity, *the depravity of heart is as original as the guilt*. In God's eyes they are condemned with their first father as depraved with him, and they are given over to their depravity as guilty with him. And this (in spite of Princeton) is the view given by the current of Calvinistic divines beginning with Calvin himself, down to Dr. Breckinridge." Pp. 237, 238.

The first paragraph which we have marked [1], is only an unusual mode of stating the fact of Immediate Imputation. But it is difficult to see how the form in which it is here presented makes it a *fact* any more than the form in which it is given in "Princeton Theology;" for in that theology it is distinctly and emphatically affirmed that the doctrine is a *fact*, and not a hypothesis. The revised edition of Dr. Hodge's Commentary on Romans is the most clear, elaborate and authoritative presentation of what Dr. Dabney calls "Princeton Theology." On p. 279 of that commentary, in considering the "Doctrine" of Rom. v. 12-21, Dr. Hodge says:

"This doctrine" [Immediate Imputation], "merely teaches,

that in virtue of the union, representative and natural, between Adam and his posterity, his sin is the ground of their condemnation, that is, of their subjection to penal evils; and that in virtue of the union between Christ and his people, his righteousness is the ground of their justification. This doctrine is taught almost in so many words in verses 12, 15-19. It is so clearly stated, so often repeated or assumed, and so formally proved, that very few commentators of any class fail to acknowledge, in one form or another, that it is the doctrine of the Apostle."

And on p. 284 the doctrine is given by Dr. Hodge, just as Dr. Dabney says he "prefers to represent it—as a great obvious fact." "It is said that this doctrine is nothing but a theory, an attempt to explain what the Apostle does not explain, a philosophical explanation, etc. This again is a mistake. It is neither a theory nor a philosophical speculation, but the *statement of a scriptural fact in scriptural language*. Paul says: 'For the offence of one man all men are condemned; and for the righteousness of one all are regarded and treated as righteous.' This is the whole doctrine." Yet Dr. Dabney on p. 237 of his "Lectures" calls "this view of Immediate Imputation false"—an "over-refinement which leads to positive inaccuracy, as most of man's attempts to be 'wise above that which is written.'"

The last sentence in the paragraph from Dr. Dabney's "Lectures" marked [1.] exposes in express terms the error in his speculation, which has already been pointed out—that the legal condition of Adam's posterity commences at birth; whereas their "legal condition" was contemporaneous with Adam's probation as federal representative. And when that probation ceased, their federal and legal union with Adam ceased also, and their moral and legal condition became fixed; and that determined in justice their *actual* condition.

In paragraph [2] he brings up the question, how can a holy being sin? and says, that the first influx of depravity was not merely the penal consequence of Adam's sin, but accompanied and prompted the act. If Dr. Dabney means by "the sinful act" *anything more* than the simple external act of plucking and eating the fruit, (which was only the expression of what was already determined in the mind,) if he means the preceding state

of mind, then he implies that the awful punishment of depravity came upon him by an arbitrary and sovereign infliction of evil on the part of God independent of his desert; it was therefore a calamity, and cannot be deserving of punishment from God any more than could the color of his skin. If he means the *simple external act*, then he speaks unphilosophically, for that has no moral character independent of the state of mind, or heart, or soul, which preceded and determined it, as Butler has shown in his definition of *action*. And, remembering that it was a holy being who committed the deed, it must have been such an act as was compatible with "concreated holiness." It therefore could not imply a previous "influx of depravity." This Dr. Dabney seems to have forgotten. If Adam had recollected himself while in the act, and resisted the temptation, he would not have fallen; on the contrary, as Butler shows in chapter fifth of the first part of his "Analogy," he would have strengthened in himself his concreated virtue as a principle voluntarily chosen; and so far have tended to fix it in his nature as a habit. He was not deserving of punishment therefore until the act was morally determined. It was then that God visited upon him the penalty of withdrawing from him that intimate communion with his holy Maker, which was the necessary condition of his confirmation in holiness. The consequence of this loss of communion with God in the case of an active, moral agent, continually forming his soul to habits of some kind or other, was "the corruption of his whole nature," "he became wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of his soul." (Shorter Catechism and Confession of Faith). The charge that Dr. Dabney brings against Princeton, can therefore be retorted. His view of imputation is "false to facts," and opposed to the standards of our Church.

This false doctrine of his is more apparent in the next sentence, where he says: "In Adam's posterity the depravity of heart is as *original as the guilt*; in God's eyes they are condemned with their first father, as *depraved with him*, and they are given over to their depravity as guilty with him." This is a necessary consequence of his view that the federal and legal relations of Adam's posterity commence with their actual existence

in time. What greater proof could be given of the necessity of searching analysis in theological speculation, otherwise unscriptural doctrine will eventually crop out! What can this be but *mediate imputation*? Paul says, that by the sin of "one man death entered in the world;" that "by the offence of one, many died;" that "the judgment was of one offence unto condemnation;" that "by the offence of one, death reigned by one;" (and carnal-mindedness or depravity is death, Rom. viii. 6); his doctrine is, that guilt is the cause of, and precedes depravity. But Dr. Dabney says, that "depravity of heart is as original as the guilt." One or the other statement must be wrong. Dr. Dabney has not taken the care to notice that *depravity* is a quality or *accidens* of an *actual* existence alone, but guilt is a quality of *imputed* or legal existence as well. We were *guilty* before we were born; we were condemned in Adam, at the same moment in which the judgment passed upon him; but we could not be *depraved* until we were born; *depravity* was the *execution of the sentence of condemnation*. And so when the Apostle says "death passed upon all men," he means the sentence of death pronouncing them guilty; and he does not speak of this death as subjective depravity until he speaks of their actual existence, viz., that death reigned over those who had not sinned as Adam sinned, etc.

Our author says that "this is the view given by the current of Calvinistic divines, beginning with Calvin himself, down to Dr. Breckinridge." That his theory is the same with Dr. Breckinridge's we do not doubt; we have shown that they began in the same fallacy and ended in *Mediate Imputation*, though expressly disavowed. But that it is the view of "the current of Calvinistic divines" we do not believe, because it is not the view of St. Paul, or of our standards which were framed according to the direction of this "current;" and to prove that they, with Calvin, did not hold this view we bring forward the testimony of such scholars as Dr. Thornwell and Dr. Hodge.

Dr. Thornwell once held the same opinion as to what was Calvin's view as Dr. Dabney, and in 1858 thus expressed himself:

"We are aware that the doctrine of Dr. Breckinridge is the

doctrine of Calvin, and that the chapter in our Confession of Faith, of the Fall of Man, of Sin and of the Punishment thereof; may be interpreted in the same sense; but the teaching of the catechisms we take to be clearly and unambiguously on our side. There the imputation of guilt is direct and immediate, and the true explanation of the degraded condition of the human race." Collected Writings, Vol. I., p. 479.

But this opinion he corrected subsequently, and upon "a thorough examination" of Calvin's writings. We must therefore submit to his corrected judgment with the more confidence:

"We insisted then, and we insist now, that the immediate formal ground of guilt is the covenant headship of Adam, that our depravity of nature is the penal consequence of our guilt in him, and that we are made parties to the covenant by the natural relation to Adam. We stated then that Calvin held the doctrine to which we object. We are now prepared to say after a thorough examination of the writings of that great man, that, although he has often expressed himself vaguely and ambiguously, we are convinced that his opinion at bottom was the same as our own." Page 559, *ibid.*

There is a passage in the second volume of Dr. Hodge's "Systematic Theology" which throws light upon this point:

"Placæus and his associates, in order to defend the ground which they had taken, appealed to many passages in the writings of earlier theologians which seemed to ignore the immediate imputation of Adam's sin, and to place the condemnation of the race mainly, if not exclusively, upon the hereditary depravity derived from our first parent. Such passages are easily to be found, and they are easily accounted for without assuming, *contrary to the clearest evidence*, that the direct imputation of Adam's sin was either doubted or denied. Before Arius arose with the direct denial of the true divinity of Christ, and of the doctrine of the Trinity, the language of ecclesiastical writers was confused and contradictory. In like manner even in the Latin Church, and in the writings of Augustine himself, much may be found before the rise of the Pelagian controversy which it is hard to reconcile with the Augustinian system. Augustine had to publish a volume of Retractions, and in many cases where he had nothing to retract, he found much to modify and explain. It is not wonderful, therefore, that before any one openly denied

the doctrine of immediate imputation, and especially when the equally important doctrine of hereditary depravity was openly rejected by an influential party in the Romish Church, the Protestant theologians should apparently ignore a doctrine which no one denied, and devote their attention principally to the points which were then in controversy. Rivet however clearly shows that although not rendered prominent, the immediate imputation of Adam's sin was universally assumed. Principal Cunningham calls attention to the fact that the doctrine of immediate imputation of Adam's sin is much more explicitly stated in the Westminster Larger and Shorter Catechisms than in the Confession of Faith. This he very naturally accounts for by the supposition that the denial of that doctrine by Placæus had not attracted attention in England when the Confession was framed (1646), but did become known before the Catechisms were completed." Pages 208, 209.

We conclude this article by quoting the last paragraph of Dr. Dabney's lecture on Original Sin, pointing out the more distinct form assumed by the errors which are implied in his whole treatment of the subject, and which have already been exposed:

[1.] "Now when we approach the rational difficulties of the doctrine, with this view of it, we find that they are not indeed fully explained; (for the mystery of God's dealings in this thing no mortal can dissipate, and least of all Pelagians and Rationalists,) but they are obviated. The charge of intrinsic injustice is removed; for the case is now so unique, so totally without parallel or illustration, that it is obviously lifted above the jurisdiction of human reason. Hence the human reason cannot convict the transaction of injustice because she cannot comprehend it, or measure it by any experimental standard.

[2.] "You will notice that all the illustrations of the supposed injustice of our condemnation in Adam, are cases in which the moral agent has his own, personal, separate, responsible existence, before the imputation takes place, and *that, an innocent existence, so far as his personal agency went.* Now such an imputation, made without his consent would be unjust.

[3.] "*But such is not our case in Adam.* We never had any previous, separate, personal existence of our own, constituting a legal title to immunity; which title would be violated by God's condemning us in Adam.

[4.] "We had no existence at all; and so no title. For we

do not represent God as visiting guilt and then depravity as its penalty, on us conceived as *a priori* personally innocent.

[5.] "The whole case is this: that God in making Adam "the root of all mankind," should have ordained *the status in which our existence was to begin*, to be in all points determined by Adam's status as settled for him, by his voluntary act. It is a mighty mystery; it cannot be explained; but neither can it be convicted of any injustice."

How the "uniqueness" of the case can remove the charge of injustice it is impossible to see. Justice is not a quantitative principle. An act of injustice may be all the greater for being unparalleled. Justice is an intrinsic quality of moral actions, and moral actions are the objects of that faculty of "human reason" called conscience; which faculty, to see rightly, must, in our present depraved state, be enlightened from above. Our reasons for believing that there can be no injustice in Immediate Imputation are not, as stated above in paragraph [1.], that it is "unique and without an experimental standard," but that God is the Author, and there is no unrighteousness in Him. Nor is the case so "unique" as Dr. Dabney affirms, for though he denies the exact parallel between our participation in the consequences of Adam's sin, and our participation in the consequences of Christ's obedience, the Apostle asserts it so far as Immediate Imputation is concerned, and then argues that the *latter is just*; that God is just though justifying the ungodly; and when the objection is implied that it is unjust for one man to suffer and obey in the stead of another, he argues the justice of "bringing in life" in that way from the fact that God "brought in death" in that way. This, we take it, is the meaning of the *πολλῷ μᾶλλον* the *much more* of Romans, chap. v., verse 15.

We agree with our author when he says in [2.] that the illustrations of this federal transaction, by supposed analogous facts in our experience, are fallacious; but not for the reason he gives: "that in those illustrations the moral agent has his own, personal, separate, responsible existence before the imputation takes place and *that, an innocent existence*, so far as his personal agency went, which would make such imputation unjust." Our reason

is, that under these very circumstances described by Dr. Dabney, we have suffering for the faults, sins, etc., of *others*, where there is no imputed guilt; and that, under the moral government of a Judge who will do right; therefore, *a fortiori*, it must be just where there is guilt, *real* guilt, though imputed. When he says that such imputation would be unjust, by parity of reasoning his argument, (we do not say that he would,) condemns as unjust this *suffering* referred to—*i. e.* where there is no guilt.

Dr. Dabney expressly declares [2] and [3], that if we had an *innocent existence* previous to the constitution of the federal relation between us and Adam, (as he expresses it, “before the imputation takes place,”) such a constitution would be unjust; because it would violate the legal title to immunity possessed by this existence to condemn us in him.” Yet we did have a title to immunity once, which was not the less real because not personal—even so long as Adam stood for us, before his fall and condemnation. *And it was not forfeited by any personal act of ours.* A *personal* innocent existence is not the only title to immunity from punishment. Immunity from punishment is the *right of all who have not sinned.* And if we had not sinned before our actual existence it would be unjust in God to make us begin it depraved. The very gist of the Apostle’s argument in the fifth of Romans, is that there can be no punishment where there is no guilt, and no guilt where there is no sin. If we had never sinned we never could have been condemned or punished. The visitation of depravity is a dreadful punishment. With the Apostle (Rom. v. 14) we hold that if we were born depraved, if “death reigns over us” from the first moment of our *actual* existence, then we were born under condemnation, and therefore sinned before we were born; otherwise the condemnation would be unjust. “Where there is no law there is no transgression, and sin is not imputed where there is no law.”

The principle that lies at the bottom of Dr. Dabney’s view, is the same principle upon which the doctrine of Mediate Imputation rests, viz., that one man cannot justly be punished for the sin of another which is not his own by any personal agency of his in it. His very language is that the innocent existence of a

moral agent, so far as his personal agency goes, gives him a title to immunity which would be violated by his condemnation on account of the sin of another. In a previous quotation he said, "in Adam's posterity the depravity of heart is as original as the guilt." It is evident that the condemnation of a sinner where no *personal* considerations come in (as of depravity of heart) is revolting to his sense of justice; and the condemnation of Christ for our sins would be so but for his unscriptural notion that the element of grace affected the justice of the transaction. Yet we say again as we said against Mediate Imputation, that our having been necessitated by conditions over which we have no control, to arrive at years of discretion with a depraved nature already at work forming the soul to sinful habits which express themselves in acts that accumulate guilt and intensify corruption, is as open to Dr. Dabney's charge of injustice as anything in Immediate Imputation which he has attacked; and yet that is a fact of experience and Scripture testimony. It is only by a sacrifice of logic that he can clear himself of being a disciple of Placaeus. He must surrender his consistency to save his orthodoxy.

It is very evident from Dr. Dabney's presentation of his own views as opposed to "Princeton Theology," that the "passing of death," *i. e.* innate depravity, upon Adam's seed, is there (in his statement) resolved into a sovereign infliction of evil, dependent upon nothing but God's prerogative to do as he wills with his own creatures. The notion that it was a judicial proceeding grounded in justice seems not to be entertained for a moment. He says, "we do not represent God as visiting guilt and then depravity as its penalty, on us conceived as *a priori* personally innocent." Again: "In Adam's posterity the depravity of heart is as original as the guilt." And he sums it all up thus: "The whole case is this: that God in making Adam 'the root of all mankind,' should have ordained *the status in which our existence was to begin*, to be in all points determined by Adam's status as settled for him by his voluntary act." As a logical consequence of this view, with him the important point to consider and defend, is the infliction of evil upon Adam's seed; for it no longer assumes, as

in Reformed Theology, the character of *punishment* in a strictly legal sense, but of an arbitrary dispensation; and hence instead of being regarded as a natural consequent of federal representation, (making federal representation the *cardo præcipuus* of defence) he calls in a "mighty mystery," which "cannot be explained," and removes from it the charge of injustice upon the ground of its being "so unique and unparalleled that it is lifted above the jurisdiction of human reason." He nowhere in these views, which are peculiar to him, represents spiritual death as passing upon all men, "*for that all sinned.*" Now this is one of the very errors for which Placæus was condemned. Dr. Hodge tells us, (Systematic Theology, Vol. II., p. 212,) that it was objected against the doctrine of Mediate Imputation, that "*what the Scriptures declare to be a righteous judgment, it makes to be an arbitrary dispensation.*"

ARTICLE III.

TYNDALL ON THE PHYSICAL VALUE OF PRAYER.

It is gratifying to know that we are approaching a definite understanding of the difficulties in our religion which are in the way of "men of science," as students of physical nature are commonly styled. Let theologians be honest and confess that oftentimes these difficulties have had no origin beyond their own prejudices and self-conceived dogmas, founded in an ignorance of God's revelations in his works as great as their antagonists have exhibited of those in his Word. And there are infidels in science, who would be infidels out of science, and who never care to know more of religion than what its ill-advised friends have most erroneously declared to be essential parts of its doctrines; who hail as the defeat of religion, what is only another step in progress toward truth made by its honest-minded professors. They fail to recognise this fact, that the Christian

religion is a body of objective truths, as independent of the opinions and errors of its professors, as the laws and phenomena of Nature are of the oft-recurring mistakes and misconceptions of those who call themselves "students of Science." Men of science treat with the contempt it deserves the objection which some theologians make against what are now regarded as *facts* in science, "that the inductions of science are worthless, because one generation of her students holds opinions irreconcilable with those of preceding generations." The reply is, that the errors of preceding generations have reduced themselves to absurdity, and if any honest-minded thinker will only qualify himself for an apprehension of the subject, he must of necessity see that these things he doubts are not hypotheses, not theories, but *facts*. But to qualify oneself for apprehending the certainty of the conclusions of a science, is frequently no less a task than acquainting oneself with the whole of that science, *i. e.* becoming a student of it himself. For instance, how few could demonstrate satisfactorily to one who did not believe it, that the sun, and not the earth, was the centre of our system, contrary to the old notion, and his, founded on appearances? To make the matter intelligible to him would involve, instead of argument, an amount of instruction equivalent to teaching him what is the science of astronomy. And so, when we find one who still believes that this earth was brought into its present state in six natural days, and discredits the conclusions of geology, because of the great disagreement between the geologists of different times, and between the opinions of the same geologist at successive times, it can only be replied: "See for yourself;" which practically amounts to, "acquaint yourself thoroughly with the science, see how far it is an induction, fair and necessary, from facts, and then you will be able to distinguish between what are known as only hypotheses and what are known as facts." Now, that which gives this clearness of vision to those who have studied a science, is "the scientific habit of thought," in which is included freedom from prejudice, a readiness to surrender long cherished opinions upon good evidence of their being erroneous; and, what is of more value than all else besides, the common-sense convic-

tion that one's own opinions are of no account whatever against facts, and only serve to bring upon oneself the censure of those who value nothing but truth.

But why should not this be respected in Theology as well as in Science. Men of science should know that it is this very habit of thought which makes fair-minded "students of religion" change their views as to what are revelations of God in His Word, and what are the opinions and prejudices of former ages which have been obtruded therein. In the light of reason, they can no more help believing that Scripture does not teach what is incompatible with truths of science, than they can help believing these truths themselves. And when students of Scripture believe facts in nature which make them surrender old interpretations which have long had weight with them, and thus discover a readiness to accept truth when it costs this self-sacrifice, it is an inconsistency of which those who claim that they have the "scientific habit of thought" should not be guilty, to show no greater respect to their corrected interpretations than to their former, and not to admit that there must be truth in that principle which rules the theologian in his changes of opinion.

That principle is, that the Bible can contain nothing incompatible with truth elsewhere; for its author is the God of truth, and he claims, and to our reason he has demonstrated that he is what he claims to be, the author of nature also. Hence when we find anything in nature which appears to contradict our understanding of what he has declared in his Word, we must conclude that we have mistaken him in one or the other of his revelations of his "Power and Godhead." If our reason can see in nature nothing else than what is incompatible with our previous understanding of a portion of his Word, we must correct our previous understanding, for we cannot believe what our reason tells us is not so.

But should reason be forced to conclude that one of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion is irreconcilable with the whole order of nature, an order as discoverable to reason as the meaning of the doctrine, then the doctrine must be surrendered. We admit all that men of science would ask

us to do; the Bible must stand the tests of legitimate science, and contain nothing irreconcilable with known facts of nature. We believe the strongest evidences of our religion to be its "internal evidences;" and of course to be "evidences," they must commend themselves to our reason.

Prof. Tyndall will therefore see that we agree with him when he says in his article, "Science and Religion," which appeared in the *Popular Science Monthly* for November:

"From the earliest times to the present, religion has been undergoing a process of purification, freeing itself slowly and painfully from the physical errors which the busy and uninformed intellect mingled with the aspirations of the soul, and which ignorance sought to perpetuate."

But, he goes on to say:

"Some of us think a final act of purification remains to be done, while others oppose this notion with the confidence and warmth of ancient times. The bone of contention at present is *the physical value of prayer*. It is not my wish to excite surprise, much less to draw forth protest by the employment of this phrase. I would simply ask any intelligent person to look the problem honestly and steadily in the face, and then to say whether, in the estimation of the great body of those who resort to it, prayer does not, at all events upon special occasions, invoke a Power which checks and augments the descent of rain, which changes the force and direction of winds, which affects the growth of corn, the health of men and cattle—a Power, in short, which when appealed to under pressing circumstances, produces the precise effects caused by physical energy in the ordinary course of things." . . . "Hence it is forced upon his [the scientist's] attention as a form of physical energy, or as the equivalent of such energy."

We accept this representation of the efficacy assigned to prayer as the view held not only by "the great body of those who sincerely resort to it," but as that which the Scriptures give us. The very Power, which Prof. Tyndall says "is in their estimation invoked," is the one the Scriptures explicitly declare to have been invoked by prayer, and successfully. Among many such passages of Scripture a few will suffice as instances:

“Is any sick among you? let him call for the elders of the Church, and let them pray over him; and the prayer of faith shall save the sick, and the Lord will raise him up. The effectual, fervent prayer of a righteous man availeth much. Elias was a man subject to like passions as we are, and he prayed earnestly that it might not rain; and it rained not on the earth by the space of three years and six months. And he prayed again and the heavens gave rain, and the earth brought forth her fruit.” James v. 14-18.

“Hezekiah prayed to the Lord in his sickness. Then said the Lord (to him), I have heard thy prayer, I have seen thy tears, I will heal thee.” 2d Kings, xx. 2, and Isa. xxvii. 1.

That the author of our religion intended us to understand that the importunity of prayer extends to the natural wants of God's people and avails to supply them, cannot be denied unless we charge him with the intent to deceive. And he proved, at least to the satisfaction of many, that he possessed this very power which they invoked in prayer. He healed their sick, he gave them bread in a measure and in a manner out of the power of man to do, he commanded the winds and the seas and they obeyed him. The ground, therefore, of the Christian's belief in the “physical value of prayer,” is his persuasion that he, to whom and through whom prayer is offered, possesses the power which is invoked. Thus it is that miracles and prayer must be considered in the same light. If miracles are absurd and impossible, prayer is absurd and of no value beyond its reflex subjective influence, and that must be evil, since it would be founded in error.

Now there is a mode of thought very prevalent among a certain set of scientific men, (and it is the avowed principle of the Positive Philosophy, as maintained by Auguste Comte, Mr. Mill, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and others,) which makes miracles and the efficacy of prayer, what the latter would call “unthinkable propositions.” We understand Professor Tyndall however as frankly confessing that the theory, upon which the Christian bases his belief in miracles and prayer, “is a perfectly legitimate one,” he “urges no impossibilities in the case.”* But it

* Popular Science Monthly, for Nov., 1872.

is given as the distinctive tenet of the Positive Philosophy "that all events in nature or the universe are governed by invariable laws with which no volitions divine or human can interfere." There is no room for human interference, for its volitions are as much governed by law, as essentially parts of the inviolable "cosmos," as the chain of physical cause and effect upon which it is brought to bear; and hence in the Positive sense, it no more interferes with law than the vegetable and animal life of a planet or a continent interferes with the law of universal evolution. And if there be a God, he is just as limited in his volitions as man, and must stand in the same relation to the laws of nature which he cannot change, and which cannot admit of change without introducing such confusion into this universal order as would involve its destruction. Hence there is no room in nature for the God of the Bible; with a system so unchanging and unchangeable there is nothing either to hope or to fear from his intervention; causes and effects follows each other in fixed and undeviating succession according to inexorable physical laws: and prayer, instead of being an intelligent appeal to a Personal God, becomes a senseless importunity of the forces of nature.

Nor are these views confined to those whom theologians angrily call "scientific infidels." We have met men of science who, with a strong faith in the Bible and religion, yet, could not but regard prayer for rain, or an abundant harvest, or the removal of disease, as idle as would be a prayer for the prevention of an eclipse which was to happen according to laws so well known as to give a prevision of their consequences. The idea of the uniformity and invariability of nature had become so firmly fixed in their minds that what involved its appearing changeable or subject to the caprices of will, became an "unthinkable proposition." To sneer at such a view of nature, as many theologians do, betrays an ignorance of the difficulties of the subject, and can only result in injury to the cause they would defend. So far from a sight of these difficulties in the way of prayer arguing prejudice against divine truth, and being, in the pet cant of these theologians, only an "outbreak of the enmity of the natural heart against God," it is oftentimes the

result of a love of truth so earnest as to overcome the prejudices and prepossessions of a lifetime. And the sincerity and earnestness of these scientific men is proved by their firm hold, notwithstanding these difficulties, upon the first truths of religion—their own spirituality and immortality, and their accountability to a God who is Spirit, and must be worshipped in spirit and truth.

Can any one doubt of the piety and love of truth of the pure and gifted F. W. Robertson, the late incumbent of Trinity Chapel, Brighton? Yet, in the third sermon of the Fifth Series of his sermons, (the American edition,) he frankly tells us that the fact that the universe is a system of laws, inexorable in their operation, and that causes in endless chain of invariable sequence govern all events in nature, precludes the possibility of any special direction or providential ordering of events. He tells us that to have heaved a pebble upon the shore one yard farther than the waves naturally carried it, would have involved a change in the whole of our solar system; that for a rain to come otherwise and at other times than it naturally comes would be in effect an unmaking of the universe; for these forces and operations of nature are so inextricably interwoven, that to change the working of one or more, as would be done in the change of its or their effects, would involve a change in all from the beginning. And he asks such questions as these: "Did the plague come and go according to the laws of health or the laws of prayer? Did the rain fall according to the laws of meteorology or according to the laws of prayer?" etc. Hence, he necessarily concludes that the helpfulness of prayer "consists in bringing the human will into harmony with the Divine will as expressed in the natural laws." The Christian then, can never hope so long as he thinks rationally upon the subject, that his petition, so far as regards these objects mentioned, can be answered; and prayer is therefore a sort of *pious fraud* imposed upon Christians until they have advanced to such a knowledge of the truth as will teach them submission to inexorable necessity! Then, of course, the charge of atheists is true; that the age of ignorance is the age of the religious or *theological*

mode of thought, which must give way as knowledge advances, to the *positive mode of thought*, stated above!

If we take a glass of water, and keep it at the same temperature of the atmosphere of the room we see no moisture on the outside of the glass. But put a piece of ice in the water and the glass is cooled considerably below the temperature of the atmosphere, and we soon see a deposition of moisture which will increase so long as this lower temperature of the glass is maintained, accumulate in drops and run down its sides and wet the cloth it may be upon. We have here combined and correlated the forces of nature under the same conditions under which they are brought to produce the phenomenon of dew or of rain. Science tells us that the atmosphere can only hold a certain definite amount of aqueous vapor in a state of suspension for each and every degree of temperature; and that this amount increases or decreases with the rise or fall of temperature. Raise the temperature, and if water "is present, more will ascend into the atmosphere in the form of invisible vapor; reduce the temperature and all the surplus over that definite amount corresponding to the reduced temperature, will be condensed into a visible form—if the reduction of temperature is slight, into that attenuated form we call cloud, mist, or fog—if great, into drops of water, the size depending upon the greatness and suddenness of the reduction of temperature. In the phenomenon of dew, the surface of the earth takes the place of the glass, its radiation of heat the place of the ice, and the dew itself the place of the moisture on the glass. In the phenomenon of rain, the mingling of two currents of air of unequal temperatures produces an atmosphere of a mean temperature which is lower than can hold in suspension as invisible vapor the moisture carried by both currents. This union takes the place of the ice in the glass; the visible cloud, the place of the deposition visible on the glass, and the rain, of the drops that fall off upon the table. If we were to expose a very large surface of some metal upon the earth and reduce its temperature sufficiently, we could have 'artificial dew,' (as some would say,) whenever we wished, upon this metal. Suppose this raised to a great height above the

earth, and kept at a very low temperature, which involves no other question than one of cost, and then we would have the same condensation of invisible vapor into drops of water. We shall really have produced rain by an 'interference of human volition' in the invariable and immutable chain of cause and effect by which all the phenomena of nature are produced." We know the conditions under which the phenomenon of rain is produced, and we can bring about those conditions ourselves on a scale only limited by our power, or command of means.

No one could pretend for a moment that this supposed method is the only one in which there could be made a sufficient reduction of temperature in the higher regions of the atmosphere to produce rain. Admitting that we may discover means of elevating such a cooling surface of a mile in area as easily as we can now irrigate such an extent of land, yet the advance of science may increase our knowledge of as many and as easy means of reducing the temperature of higher regions of the atmosphere as it has of reducing that of bodies on the earth. And we may discover means of so doing which, nevertheless, would be out of our power to use; our power in no wise keeping pace with our knowledge. We know the forces used to keep the heavenly bodies in their orbits so well that we can predict their places at any time of the year. Once these predictions were not fulfilled in the case of a planet, and from this an astronomer calculated the place of an entirely new planet, which had never been seen or suspected to exist; and the discovery was actually verified by observation. Here were forces whose measure and rule of operation, and their correlation, were so well known that an interference in their results was at once detected, and its cause determined, and yet their control was as far from the reach of man as Uranus is from the earth. Knowledge, therefore, increases our powers wonderfully, indeed to such a degree that our present achievements would appear miraculous to the generations of a few centuries ago. But even if we should become omniscient, while it might make us appear to our more ignorant contemporaries as Paul and Barnabas did to the inhabitants of Lystra,

it never can make us omnipotent. We must be different beings from what we are, not only in knowledge but in power; and that difference is that which obtains between man and God.

Hence all analogy is *for* and not *against* the supposition, that a Being of omnipotence and omniscience can interfere with the successive phenomena of nature, and by a correlation of forces above human power bring to pass what would not happen without that interference. The God of the Christian is such a being. The difference between the knowledge and power, or command of means, necessary to bring about such a correlation of forces as will produce a deposition of the vapor of the atmosphere upon a square foot of glass or metal or earth, and that knowledge and power necessary to produce a like fall of water upon any extent of the earth's surface, is less than the dust upon the balances when man is measured with his Maker. The belief in a Person who has the power to do all that he is invoked in prayer to do, is simply a belief in a God. Theism involves all that "the great body of those who resort to prayer" believe of the Power they invoke. And the denial of the *possibility* of that which prayer involves can only be based upon Atheism. Hence when Professor Tyndall long since denied that his philosophy was atheistic, it was only bigotry and ignorant passion that could charge him with what he expressly disavows in the article referred to above. The same may be said of Professor Huxley, and Dr. Carpenter. According to the *science* of these gentlemen the efficacy of prayer is not an "unthinkable proposition."

These arguments have been the common property of educated men ever since the time of Butler, who took the ground that, "if there was anything in the Bible opposed to reason, in the name of God let the Bible be given up," and, that one of the strongest evidences of its truth, is that God brings about his purposes therein declared, in the way of "natural consequence;" that things divine and things natural are brought about in a way so analogous as to give strong presumption that they have the same author. This argument has been further elaborated, and more directly pointed against the extravagancies of some philos-

ophers of the Positive School, by the Duke of Argyll in his "Reign of Law;" a work which deserves to be bound up together and perpetuated with the "Analogy."

It has been conclusively shown in the Reign of Law that the phrase: "the invariability and immutability of nature's laws" is ambiguous. It cannot mean that the conditions under which the phenomena of nature occur admit of no change, for one object of science is a knowledge of the conditions necessary for particular events that they may be controlled by our will. It must mean, to have any truth in it, that the essential energies of the separate forces of nature are fixed and invariable, that the rule and measure of each individual force is so unchangeable that we can count upon its uniformity of operation in itself considered. But, as is abundantly shown, "there is no event in nature which is determined by a *single individual force*. Whatever is, or happens, is the result of opposing forces nicely balanced against each other. The least difference in the proportion in which any enters produces a total change in the result. And hence that which we at last reach in physical inquiry, is the recognition *not of individual forces*, but of some definite relation to each other in which different forces are placed so as to bring about a particular result."* Now this uniformity of operation of individual forces, this immutability of the laws of nature in the only sense in which the phrase is true, is the indispensable condition of their correlation and adjustment so as to accomplish a definite result, either in nature's operations or man's. So far, therefore, from the immutability of nature's laws *i. e.* of individual forces, (or the invariability of the same combinations or adjustments under the same circumstances accomplishing the same results,) precluding the possibility of her phenomena being affected by divine or human volition, our observation and experience tell us that it is the first and necessary condition of such interference.

Mr. Herbert Spencer has furnished us, in his consideration of the science of Sociology, a good proof and illustration of the

* Reign of Law.

compatibility of the reign of law, in its scientific sense, with interference by volition. The end of this science of Sociology is the discovery of the elementary forces which have a constant influence on human conduct and character. The possibility of the science depends upon the fact, which all who think seriously upon the subject must admit, that there are forces affecting man as a moral, sentient and social being, of fixed and determinate operation, and capable of measurement; and that there are conditions, which must be inviolably complied with, before these forces can be made to operate in the right direction. And the possibility of this science being of any practical use to society, is that these elementary forces which do actually determine, as immutable laws, the course of human conduct in particular directions, can be so combined and correlated that they may be made to operate in the direction we *will*, and which we see to be for the good of society; and so attain results which would never be attained without this interference by human volition upon the natural chain of cause and effect, outside of that chain.

And the inference is natural and *not unscientific*, that if these forces can be used by man to accomplish his beneficent purpose of ameliorating the condition of mankind, he who created them can also use them to accomplish his purposes? And if he has told us, in such a way as to satisfy our reason, that he will do so in answer to prayer, what absurdity is there in the petition "Thy kingdom come," and in believing that this petition includes all that is best and happiest for mankind? In that Book which comes to the Christian accredited as a message from God, it is implied that the beneficent result of the establishment of his kingdom is to be attained by those very means which the science of Sociology recognises as elementary forces in human nature; "for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." Isaiah xi. 1-10.

It is impossible in reading Mr. Spencer's papers on Sociology not to see how unconsciously he confirms the Scripture account of man, and of the only way in which society can be benefitted. In one of his papers he says: "The belief that faulty character can so organise itself socially as to get out of itself a conduct

which is not proportionately faulty, is a baseless belief,"—"the character of the aggregate is determined by the character of the unit." And he then deduces the conclusion that he who would affect society for good must direct his attention to the individual. Now apply this to the effect produced upon heathen nations by colonization and commerce contrasted with that produced among the same people by Christian missions, and see if there is not within reach of Mr. Spencer a science of Sociology ready for use. And we hesitate not to predict that the growth and development of this science of sciences, the centre towards which they all converge, will be in the direction of the Bible. Not that it would be recognised or confessed. But it will only be an instance of the unconscious approach of seekers after truth in Nature to the truth of her Author.

It is an error, pointed out by Christian apologists who follow Butler's line of argument, common to the friends and enemies of religion, to refuse to see God in the natural. But we best follow the example of the sacred writers when we seek not only to discover the divine in the natural, but the natural in the divine. Now there is a great deal in Mr. Spencer's theory of evolution that is true, and in what he maintains as to the result of the working of this great principle;—"that (many) intuitions have originated by slowly organised experiences in the race, which are confirmed and accumulated through hereditary transmission." And hence there is nothing alarming to the friends of religion when that philosopher maintains on scientific evidence, that "man, along with the whole generation of which he is a minute part, is a resultant of an enormous aggregate of causes that have been coöperating for ages." It is only a proof of the prejudice excited by the *men* and not the *thought*, that this very law of nature denounced as atheistic, has been made an argument for the truth of the Bible in a little work called "The Philosophy of the Plan of Salvation." The author has shown how God, in the record of his dealings with the nation he chose as the channel of communication of spiritual truths necessary for salvation, is made to use these very forces which science has recently discovered as operating upon the moral and sentient

nature of man. And none assume greater prominence than the principle of evolution. A deeper meaning is given to the "fulness of time," than many suppose it to have. God had not till then prepared the human race for the apprehension of the plan of salvation; and in that preparation he used natural laws, which are the "expressions of his will."

"God never seems," says Butler, "to do anything without the use of means." And those means are always the proper ones, *i. e.* the *natural ones*. It is easy to run into error from our ignorance of the relation in which God stands to his laws; we constantly find ourselves using language which would seem to imply that he found these forces and laws ready beforehand, and was as dependent upon them for accomplishing his purposes as we are. But why should our ignorance of the relation in which he stands to "these ministers of his to do his pleasure," prevent our recognising his will in their workings, when the same ignorance of the connection between *our wills* and our voluntary movements do not prevent us from recognising these as the expressions of our will? We can no more see, by the senses, our intelligence or will than we can see God; and the same reason which apprehends intelligence and will in other men as the cause of effects analogous to what we produce, can recognise intelligence and will as the only adequate cause which will account for what is accomplished naturally, as in all those instances of design which form data for Natural Theology. If men of science insist, as some appear to do, upon putting the presence of God in his laws to a scientific test, and refuse to believe in him until proof of his existence has been afforded the senses, this mistake can only be corrected by removing their ignorance of what is known concerning the Christian's God. Far less knowledge of theology, than they think our physical well-being requires us to have of science, would teach them the "conditions of the knowledge" of God. "Behold I go forward, but he is not there: and backward, but I cannot perceive him: on the left hand when he doeth work, but I cannot behold him: he hideth himself on the right hand that I cannot see him. Although thou sayest thou shalt not see him, yet judgment is before him, therefore trust thou him."

To pursue the argument farther in this direction would bring us upon the proof of the existence of God, and as that proof is *moral* more than intellectual, it is one with which physical science has nothing to do. The question now is, whether there is anything in the system of nature opposed to the theory that there is a Supreme Will behind natural phenomena; and Professor Tyndall "frankly admits that this theory is perfectly legitimate" in science.

Mr. Spencer in his reply to Mr. Martineau's criticism of his philosophy, tells us what are the difficulties he sees in the way of these forces being controlled by mind: First, "it must be regarded as universally present." "But," he goes on to say, "I must conceive this mind as having attributes akin to those of the only mind I know, and without which I cannot conceive mind at all. The only thing which any one knows as mind is the series of his own states of consciousness. The mind so known to each person, and inferred by each to be present in others, has the essential characters, that its components are limited by one another, and that it is itself localised both in time and space. If I am asked to frame a notion of mind, divested of all those structural traits under which alone I am conscious of mind in myself, I cannot do it. Hence, if to account for the infinitude of physical changes going on in the universe, mind must be conceived as there under the guise of simple dynamics," (*i. e.* as expressing itself by the laws of nature,) "then the reply is, that to be conceived as there, mind must be divested of all attributes by which it is distinguished; and that when thus divested of its distinguishing attributes the conception disappears—the word *mind* stands for a blank." Again: "What happens if we ascribe to the 'originating Mind,' the character absolutely essential to the conception of mind, that it consist of a series of states of consciousness?"

Here the question is at once relegated to metaphysics, and hence does not belong to our present discussion which deals with the scientific (physical) aspects of the question. We can only reply, in passing, that many of the strongest intellects of mankind have founded their argument for the existence and provi-

dence of God, upon the clear conceptions they had of the Infinite and the Perfect. Cousin ranks Descartes and Leibnitz, with Plato and Socrates, in "concluding from the idea of the Infinite and the Perfect, to the existence of a cause of this idea, adequate at least to the idea itself, that is to say, Infinite and Perfect. The difference between Plato and Descartes is, first, that the ideas which in Plato are at once conceptions of our mind, and the principles of things, are for Descartes, as well as for all modern philosophy, only our conceptions, amongst which that of the Infinite and Perfect occupies the first place; the second difference is, that Plato goes from ideas to God by the principle of substance, while Descartes employs the principle of causality, and concludes from the idea of the Infinite and Perfect to a cause also Infinite and Perfect."*

Yet in justice to Mr. Spencer, it must be said that his philosophy *in his own view of it* is not Materialism nor Atheism. These theories together with Theism belong to the region of the unknowable; the truths which the metaphysicians mentioned above clearly saw, and which religion teaches, are not discoverable by the faculties he uses in his researches; and no one expects him to discover them. We cannot hear the sun; we cannot see a noise. The right faculty for the right object. Intuitive reason, no matter how we became endowed with it, alone can know God.

When it is said that "natural laws are the expression of God's will," many scientific minds revolt, because to them such a proposition involves "changeableness and caprice." But let us receive all that is meant, and such a fear would be unfounded. The Christian who receives the scriptural notion of God finds no difficulty in reconciling the most rigid immutability of the forces of nature, and the most perfect uniformity in her operations, with the fact that it is all the expression of his will enforced by power. All the unchangeableness which scientific men attribute to the law of nature falls short of what is ascribed to him, who says: "I am Jehovah, I change not." All the boasted uniformity of nature depends for its order upon that will "with

*Cousin: True, Beautiful and Good. Lecture IV.

which is no variableness, neither shadow of turning." In the fixed and unalterable necessity which attends those operations out of man's power to control or change, we recognise the immutability of Omnipotence, who has declared: "My purpose shall stand and I will do all my pleasure." (Isaiah xlvi. 10). When these men of science declare the necessity of our finding out the laws of nature that they may be obeyed, and thus work out our good, and tell us how remorselessly she grinds the disobedient underneath her resistless power, we think of the warning: "Woe to him that striveth with his Maker." If fickleness or 'caprice' were discovered in nature, we Christians might doubt that God were so intimately connected with it as we believe him to be; her laws and processes could not then be the expressions of a will determined by infinite wisdom, and a prescience of all the consequences actual and possible which may arise from the events which he ordains to come to pass. The necessity and immutability of nature's laws thus become the Omnipotence of an unchangeable and sovereign will. But if this does not, as our experience shows, prevent our controlling, to a great extent, the successive phenomena of nature, what difficulty in conceiving that they can all be directed whithersoever he willeth?

When we interfere with the series of cause and effect discoverable in nature, and put its forces into conditions of combination and adjustment which would not be spontaneously assumed, *i. e.* without such interference on our part, our success is perfect in proportion to *our imitation of nature*. We have to work her forces in a manner analogous to that in which we see them worked by her. The history of science is full of the suggestions man has in this way received and improved upon. The combination of strength and lightness, of so much advantage in engineering, which the tube or hollow cylinder gives, was practiced in nature before it was known to man, and doubtless taught to him there. The Camera Obscura imitates the eye, and the correction of the effect of the difference of refrangibility of the rays of light, by lenses of different refracting power, was actually and confessedly an *imitation of the like in the human eye*. And yet how far short of the perfect mechanism of the eye falls the Camera Obscura.

Hence when we would accomplish anything the like of which is accomplished in nature, it is a triumph of art to do it in such a way as cannot be distinguished from natural operations, and argues a perfect knowledge and a perfect control of the forces used for that purpose. Hence we ask Professor Tyndall, if any result was produced in nature through a combination and adjustment of forces by one who had perfect knowledge and perfect command of them, and who worked upon the principle that the perfectness of a work depended upon its likeness to nature, would he be able to distinguish the result from what was done *naturally*? And we ask, how could he know that it was done by a person, (supposing that person's agency not discernible to the senses,) except upon trustworthy testimony?—which testimony he would be prepared to admit when he found it was not incompatible with scientific truth, but was analogous to all his experience, and was in fact that toward which science pointed. And this is in fact the goal toward which science is striving—to discover how things are done in nature that she may do the same.

Now suppose that there was a Person whose knowledge and power compassed the whole *thesaurus* of nature's means and appliances—her laws or forces, this perfect knowledge would of course give prescience of all events in a system in which chance finds no place and everything is determined by law; all the “alterations of the natural current of events by combination and adjustment of these forces, which he would wish to make, would be provided for by having the intermediate links of causation directed to their accomplishment, which intermediary would of course become part of the system of nature.” There is no absurdity in supposing that these “alterations,” *all within law*, would no more disturb the universal order when made by such a Being, than our interference does, and hence there is nothing in science opposed to this supposition. But how in the name of reason, we would ask Professor Tyndall, could he distinguish these “alterations” from the results which would happen without them, when *both equally happen naturally*?

Professor Tyndall, with that ingenuousness becoming the true

philosopher, says, in the article we are noticing: "It is no departure from scientific method to place behind natural phenomena a universal Father, who, in answer to the prayers of his children, *alters* the currents of those phenomena. Thus far theology and science go hand in hand. But without *verification*," he goes on to say, "a theoretic conception is a mere figment of the intellect, and I am sorry to find us parting company at this point. The region of theory, both in science and theology, lies behind the world of senses; but the verification of theory occurs in the sensible world." Hence he proposes to subject prayer "as a form of physical energy, to these methods of examination from which all our present knowledge of the physical universe is derived."

Professor Tyndall has already told us above that "prayer invokes a power which produces the *precise effects caused by physical energy in the ordinary course of things*." He confesses that "it is no departure from scientific method to place behind natural phenomena a universal Father, who, in answer to the prayers of his children, *alters* the currents of those phenomena." If he refuses to this "universal Father" any other control over these phenomena than that we have, only in a greater degree, and will not recognise that the relation of Creatorship, in which he stands to these laws of nature, make them the direct expressions of his will, then this universal Father is not the God whom the Christian invokes in prayer. There is nothing in science against, and everything for, the theory that these forces of nature are the *energies of God's will*, and that their uniformity of operation—the reign of law in nature—is the result of that will having "no variableness neither shadow of turning." The Christian believes that the law of gravitation is what it is and nothing else, because God so wills bodies to act toward each other; and so of the laws of health, or of meteorology. He furthermore believes that these forces, laws, means, appliances of nature, call them what you may so you exclude none, were created for God's use, not for man's. They are the means whereby he accomplishes all his will. Taking the word "natural" in the only sense intelligible to us, we regard it as descriptive of the *divine mode of acting*; and this understanding of it is implicitly, if not expressly con-

tained in the "Analogy," written a century ago, and therefore is not a shift to evade late conclusions of science.

Self-consistency is a necessary attribute of the Christian's God; he must, from the very excellence of his nature and the infinitude of his attributes, act in the same way under the same circumstances, for that way must always be the best. And so far as any event is like in character or circumstances to another, so far will the way in which God brings them about be alike. Uniformity in nature is the expression of this self-consistency of God. Since there can be no surprises to God, there can be no surprises in nature, everything is provided for before it happens. And this inviolability of natural law instead of being atheistic declares its Author to be him "who knows the end from the beginning."

Hence we must believe that every interference by God in the way of miracle, or in answer to prayer, is *natural*, for the *divine mode of acting cannot change*. *Unnaturalness* can therefore never be the test, whether an "alteration in the current of events on earth" is produced by the "universal Father," if he be the Christian's God. And if any such interference appears *unnatural*, the reason of it is not in the event but in our ignorance of nature; and it is but a revelation to us of higher laws than we were acquainted with. It was *unnatural* to the King of Siam for water to become a solid, and rivers to be covered with ice of sufficient depth to support his elephants. But was the phenomenon unnatural when referred to laws with which other minds were acquainted? Some persons regard with suspicion the notion that miracles belong to the natural; but it is a fear unworthy of a Christian, and closely allied to the atheistic notion, that when we find an event to be natural it is removed from the direction or ordering of God; and will lead us to refuse to refer all the achievements of modern civilisation to the "Giver of every good and perfect gift." All that is necessary to the belief in miracles is that they are effects produced by power so much above man's that he must in reason refer them to God. And if in a future life our knowledge be increased to the understanding of the *way* or *mode* in which they are worked, we may safely

predict that it will be found to be *natural*—analogous to all else in nature. It is an error which should be confined to the ignorant and superstitious, to set more value upon that which is strange and inconstant than upon what is constant and invariable; for if both are expressions of God's will, the latter is far more intelligible to us, and concerns us more than the former; and if we are to deny God, because we cannot see him in the one, it is only a question of improvement in knowledge for us to expel him from the other which we should thus find to be analogous to it.

But if God created these means for his own use, it is also true that he intended that we should use them for the accomplishment of our purposes, and we succeed in the use we make of them, just in proportion to our imitating his use of them. God has been pleased to teach us all we know by experience, that we may govern ourselves by these expressions of his will. We believe that there was a time in the history of our race when God sensibly interfered more than he does now, but there was *sufficient reason* for that. It was to teach man that the ordinary manifestations of God's will were to be regarded, as well as the extraordinary. It could easily be shown that there runs through the whole Bible, an order, of which the law is the gradual lessening of the miraculous, (or the extraordinary manifestations of God's will and presence,) and a corresponding increase of the importance to be attached to the ordinary. Notice the different cycles of this order in which the one shades off into the other. The first, from Abraham to Joseph; the second, from Moses to Saul—the period of the Tabernacle; the third, from David to the Advent of Christ—the period of the Temple; the fourth, from Christ, or rather from his Apostles to the end of their history. Notice especially, how, what was at first done in obedience to the direct and extraordinary expressions of the divine will in miracles and the like, was afterwards left to the love, piety, and zeal of Christians. God seems never to have interfered miraculously without a sufficient reason discoverable to us. He interfered, by miracle, to declare his will as to the reception of the Gentiles, and then leaves the matter with the natural workings of their own minds upon the revelations he had made; and

hence we find nothing miraculous in the Council of the apostles and elders at Jerusalem to decide this question. It was decided *naturally*; as men who logically reason upon the premises laid down for them, and yet the decision was—"that it seemed good to the Holy Ghost," etc.

God appears to have dealt with the human race just as a kind and thoughtful parent deals with his children; in their infancy and ignorance, telling them what they must do and must not do, until they were capable of acting for themselves. But his governance and care was none the less real when it was carried on through means *ordinary to man*, and level with his understanding; for they declared his will as really as did the extraordinary manifestations. And it is his holy and wise will that those who break one of his laws shall suffer the penalty of that law, or of those laws which are involved in the breach, and not of the others which are not concerned; and the wisdom of this arrangement commends itself to our reason; for we can see how, otherwise, inextricable confusion would result and such an inconstancy in nature's operations as would argue that the will behind it was not unchangeable. The Scripture principle is, "whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap." (Gal. vi. 7). Not that the following of the penalty is beyond God's power to prevent. He only declares that it is his will that it follow. But even in this there is room to hope for help from him, which is taught us by the same analogy urged above, and which Professor Tyndall says "is no departure from the scientific method;" and that analogy is, that we are often saved from the effects of our own folly and imprudence by the interposition of human friends, "which extends to the alteration, within certain limits, of the current of natural phenomena," and why may not the "universal Father" do so? It is true that oftentimes it is better for us to suffer the penalty of our folly or ignorance, that we may learn a lesson more valuable to us than deliverance from suffering. And God often teaches us in this way.

Let us consider the test of the physical value of prayer which Professor Tyndall proposed: "That certain patients in a hospital should be prayed for, and certain others under the same

circumstances of disease and medical treatment should not be prayed for, but their recovery left dependent upon the methods of science alone;" that is about the substance of it, as proposed some months ago. If more of the patients who enjoyed the benefit of being prayed for recovered, than of the others, a "physical value" would be given to prayer. There is such a droll extravagance about this that one can hardly treat the subject with due reverence. The only similar instance in history, is where the Pagan was informed that the Bible tells us of God, and having put it to his ear, he then flung it down with contempt, declaring that it told him nothing. There is the same neglect to understand the conditions of the question. The patients who were *not* prayed for and recovered, would be healed by God as much as those who were prayed for and recovered. Nor could the most expert scientist discover, as we have argued above, any difference in the mode of their recovery, if some were cured in answer to prayer, and some merely by the goodness of God, "who leaves not himself without witness in that he does good." (Acts xiv. 17). It would have been as *natural* in the one case as in the other. And as another conclusion from our previous argument, if there were any difference on the one side or the other, it could have been accounted for by *natural causes*, and hence those who will not see God in the *natural*, can never have proof, at least as God *now* deals with us, of a prayer-hearing God. Such proofs, however, as would satisfy even Professor Tyndall, have been given, and the testimony to the same is such as can never be gainsayed. In the evidences of the truth of miracles of healing and the like, performed by the Author of our religion, we have abundant testimony to the fact of the *physical value* of prayer. And therefore when proof is required again, it should be seen how such doubting reflects upon the wisdom and goodness of God, by implying that he had not given to his rational creatures, a foundation in reason for their faith. And from the same principle of self-consistency in the divine nature mentioned above, we must expect such questioners to be met as Christ met them. (Matt. xvi. 1., *et al*). Hence it is seen, that once admit, as Professor Tyndall has done, that the "theory"

upon which the whole of Christian faith is based, is, even scientifically considered, a perfectly legitimate one, and all that such a "conception" involves in regard to prayer stands or falls with the evidence of such a theory; that is, the only question science can consider is, whether there is anything in nature incompatible with the belief of the existence of God.

We shall notice in closing, this remark of Professor Tyndall's, that, "in some form or other, not yet evident, prayer may, as alleged, be necessary to man's highest culture."*

If he thinks that the character of God revealed in Scripture is one worthy of imitation, and will admit, as we are persuaded he will, that for all men to have the character of Jesus Christ would be a blessing, to the procurement of which men of science, who are interested in Sociology, should do all in their power to contribute; and if he does not deny that the moral nature of man is the highest he possesses; then, it will be easy to show how the spirit of prayer is "necessary to man's highest culture."

We call attention to the assimilating influence of prayer, which draws out the regards and affections of the soul and fixes them upon the object it worships. This approach of the soul to a good and holy object of contemplation tends to give a habit of thought and feeling and conduct in sympathy with him whose attention is invoked, just as the contemplation by the mind of the order in nature tends to give that intellectual habit we call "the scientific habit of thought." The Author of our religion therefore taught us how we must approach God—in such a way as to call forth all the best affections of the heart, and make us feel a personal interest in him whom we call "our Father in heaven." He taught us, moreover, that everything which is done naturally is done by our our Father; he taught us to look upon the unerring precision with which nature accomplishes her results as proofs of God's superintendence, and to be therefore an argument for our trusting his care. The unerring instincts of the fowls of the air which lead them to where stores of food are laid up for their nourishment, and the fact that they are not disap-

*Popular Science Monthly, November, 1872, p. 82.

pointed but that the food is found, he called, "God's *feeding* them." The beauty of the flower he called "God's *clothing* it." And this was not figurative but literal. For from it he would have us gather the lesson, that *the same special providence* is around us administering to our necessities; not in the same way, nor by the same means, for we are not birds or vegetables; but our reason and experience take the place of instinct and the laws of vegetation. We are to do what these dictate, and then the intended results following are as truly God's feeding and clothing us as he fed and clothed the fowls and adorned the grass of the field. It is God's accomplishing his beneficent purposes through the means he has ordained for that end. And hence, since we are to see God in the natural workings of the means he used, we are to feel grateful to and dependent upon him, as a child towards its parent. We are to pray, "Give us day by day our daily bread," that we may not be the ingrates who would abuse the goodness of God which caused the sun to shine upon the evil and the good, and sendeth rain upon the just and the unjust; thus silencing forever the question, Why should I ask for what will be given me anyhow? for we are to make a difference between ourselves and the heathen who know not God, though "he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave them rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladness."

This Divine Teacher taught us in his parables that we are to see in nature proofs that God has done such and such things, and that therefore he will act in the same way under the same circumstances. Instead of expelling God out of the universe of Law, he would have us to study it that we may know more of its Author.

Now the Spirit which moves one to live as Christ lived, to have a personal interest in this God of Nature, and to endeavor to imitate him—"to be perfect as his Father in heaven is perfect," is the spirit which finds expression in prayer. "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue,

and if there be any praise," prayer moves us to "think on these things."

It is much to be regretted that these fair-minded and truth-loving men of science do not, on their own account, acquaint themselves with the truths of religion, and find out for themselves what they are. We cordially commend Professor Huxley's advice, in one of his addresses or lectures, "that theologians study physical science more and save themselves from the absurd mistakes they sometimes make." Will these gentlemen take it unkindly if we ask them to do the same in regard to religion, and with the same end in view?



ARTICLE IV.

ON A CALL TO THE GOSPEL MINISTRY.

The first number of the current volume of this *Review* contained an article on this subject written by the undersigned. In the next number there appeared an article reviewing the former and earnestly controverting some of the positions it was designed to maintain. The "Remarks" of this reviewer appear to demand some notice from me; and the importance of the subject and of the questions it involves will justify further discussion.* In attempting this I ask permission, in order to avoid inconvenient and awkward circumlocutions, to write in my own name. This will perhaps be allowed me the more readily in view of the fact that the reviewer made so free a use of my name, and devoted his article almost entirely to an attack on my positions. It will be greatly to be regretted if the discussion of this subject

*It should be stated here that this reply of Dr. Porter was delayed for a considerable time by his ill-health. Since it went into the Printer's hands the sad intelligence has reached us of his death. Our readers will peruse with deep and affecting interest what probably was the last important labor performed by our brother with his pen.—[EDS. REVIEW.]

should degenerate into a personal controversy between individuals. If this should be the case it will not be my fault. In my first article I endeavored, as far as possible, to avoid even an allusion to the views of any one by name. I wish it had not become necessary for me to do otherwise now. I shall seek, however, to write with the meekness and patience and fairness which become me, and which the matter requires, earnestly imploring the gracious presence and power of the Spirit of God, which the reviewer affirms that I disparage and deny.

The reviewer did not intend to be unfair in assailing the article he reviewed or to misrepresent its positions. He is not capable of doing so designedly. But he has undoubtedly had the misfortune of falling into both these errors, and in a multitude of instances. These are so numerous that it will be impossible to specify all of them, and the reader must be trusted from those which may be pointed out to discover the others if he cares to take the trouble. There are two misapprehensions, however, which appear to run through the article and to lead to many of the cases of unfairness and misrepresentation alluded to.

In the first place, the reviewer seems to confound a real, present, personal, gracious agency of the Divine Spirit with that which is direct and immediate; to recognise no distinction between them, and to suppose that when the latter is denied the former is also rejected. It is impossible otherwise to account for the objections he sometimes advances against the article reviewed and the manner in which he represents its positions. If, in any respect, I differ from the ancient faith of the Reformed Church as to the office and work of the Holy Ghost, I do not know what it is. If the views of the article reviewed are inconsistent with that faith, in any particular, I am blind to the fact. It affirms repeatedly that all things in the Kingdom of our Lord, from the least to the greatest, are administered by the Holy Spirit; that when he employs means and instruments in the execution of his work, the power and the efficacy thereof are not theirs but his, and whatever gracious and saving effects attend the use of them, are to be ascribed not to them but to him. The reviewer charges that article with denying the action of

the Spirit in several respects for "the sole purpose" of taking "out of the Spirit's hand any *direct* part in calling men into the ministry, and to diminish also his *direct* influence in regeneration and sanctification;" and that furthermore the design of it all is to exalt the Church and the Word "at the expense of the Spirit." P. 315. The simple truth is that the article so accused maintains a real personal agency of the Spirit in the call, and it does not deny "all direct and immediate action of the Spirit in the call," as is affirmed p. 314. It only denies *one kind* of direct and immediate action of the Spirit therein, viz.: a direct and immediate communication of God's will in the matter. To what extent, if any, the divine Spirit in a call to the ministry puts forth on the soul an immediate and direct influence, similar to that exerted in regeneration and sanctification, and described by Dr. Thornwell in the quotation from his sermon on "the Gospel, God's Power and Wisdom," as that by which he "puts the soul in a condition to receive the truth," I have not discussed or assumed to determine. That is not the point in question. I do not know one orthodox theologian who goes further than I will in the most devout belief of the real, present, personal agency of the blessed Spirit, and of his direct and immediate agency on the souls of men in this sense and in this manner. But I do not believe that in the present dispensation of the Lord's kingdom there is any direct and immediate communication by the Spirit, of knowledge, either of doctrine or of duty. This is the question in dispute. I believe, that in a call to the ministry, the Spirit leads the one called to a knowledge of his duty by the ordinary means and instrumentalities. The reviewer holds that the Spirit makes that duty known to him by a direct and immediate act; which, if it means anything at all different from my view, means that this is done not in the use of means but by an immediate revelation.

This is as good a place as any to notice the accusation of the reviewer against my article as teaching that "the call must not be regarded as other than *natural*." "This word '*natural*' may not be used by Dr. P., but he certainly condemns the term *supernatural* in reference to the call," p. 313. Where, and

when? This charge, so positively and "certainly" made, was so astonishing that I read the article over twice with the special purpose of discovering in what part of it I had given ground for such an assertion. There is none whatever. The truth is, I carefully avoided the use of that word "supernatural" in one way or another, for the reason that it is so liable to be misunderstood, and carries, to so many minds, meanings so different, vague and undefined. The reader will probably agree with me that the effort of the reviewer to explain its meaning, with the aid of Dr. Thornwell, does not accomplish much. I am willing to take either sense of the term he furnishes us, and to say that in that sense I hold the call to be supernatural; and there is nothing in my article inconsistent therewith.

Further, if I had condemned the use of the term *supernatural* in reference to the call, the reviewer might have extended the same charitable interpretation to me which he did to Bannerman, pp. 331, 332. And, in this connection, it may be profitable to quote the testimony of that author in his work on Inspiration, pp. 229, 230. He there speaks of "the ancient doctrine of the Church, that the operations of the Spirit of God are to be separated into the supernatural in the department of miracle and inspiration—the special or extraordinary in the department of grace—and the common or ordinary in the department of nature." "These ancient distinctions, deep and well laid in the truth of the things, which theologians of every shade have recognised, are not to be done away by a play upon words, or a shifting of terms, because it may happen that things that differ are spoken of under the same language employed in different senses."

If Bannerman is correct in these statements, and the reviewer will no doubt admit them, then if I had condemned the use of the term *supernatural* in reference to the call, I would have done so in most excellent company and a plenty of it. According to these distinctions I "certainly" do condemn it.

There is now a more current and popular use of this term, which includes the second distinction noted by Bannerman. In this sense all evangelical Christians hold the call to be super-

natural, as they do all the ordinary dispensations of the Spirit, and I "certainly" agree with them.

In the second place the reviewer appears to confound "conscience" and "consciousness," and the testimony of consciousness with the testimony of conscience or a conviction of duty. This confusion seems to run through his entire article, to give rise to his most earnest and excited objections to my views, and to be the ground of one of the four main arguments he advances against them. Over and over again, in a variety of terms, he accuses me of denying that one called can have any certainty, or assurance, or settled conviction, or testimony of his own conscience, that he is called of the Spirit, whereas I have done nothing of the kind. The fact is I affirmed the contrary, pp. 73-79. And the intelligent reader, by examining the places in my article referred to by the reviewer as giving ground for his objections of this kind, will find that what I ascribe or deny to *consciousness*, the reviewer misapplies to *conscience* and a conviction of duty. It will not be expected of me to give here an explanation of the difference between these two. I took care to guard against confounding them and not to say *conscience* when I meant *consciousness*. The reason for this lies in the fact that the theory of a call which I oppose and the reviewer adopts and defends necessarily makes it to depend on the *consciousness* of the individual as the faculty by which it is known and recognised. The call is direct and immediate, by the Spirit making known to his consciousness that he is called. The conviction of duty, the testimony of *conscience* that he is called, is not the call, or a part of it. It is the result and consequence of the call. Conscience cannot tell him that it is his duty to enter the ministry until he has come to know that he is called. The reviewer himself tells us that this conviction of duty, this testimony of conscience, is one of the *evidences* of a call. It is not therefore the call itself, or one of its constituent elements. And yet one of his chief objections to the article he reviews is that by "making too little of the individual's convictions of his own direct and special call, both the call and the ministry are disparaged," p. 296. Now it was not at all the design of that

article to discuss the *evidences* of a call, or to make much or little of any one or other of them. Its subject was the *nature* of a call. The question was, What is a call to the ministry, what constitutes such a call, or *how* does God call men to that work? The criticisms of the reviewer on this point are therefore altogether aside of the question. If it had been my aim to present the *evidences* of a call, possibly I might have had enough to say of the importance of the testimony of conscience, of a conviction that one is called by the divine Spirit, to satisfy the reviewer and to show that on this point I and the two writers whom he defends, are not so wide apart after all. There is no question as I understand it, about this conviction, the necessity of it, or the strength of it—but as to the way in which it is arrived at, how it is produced. The theory of the reviewer affirms that it is the result of and follows an operation of the Spirit making known to the individual directly and immediately the will of God and designating him to his own consciousness to the work of the ministry. The theory I advocate teaches that the knowledge of the divine will is communicated to him through means and instrumentalities; and the consequent conviction of duty, of a divine call to enter the ministry may be just as clear, strong, assured, settled, and certain in this case as in the other.

This failure of the reviewer to apprehend the distinction of “consciousness” and “conscience,” explains the otherwise unaccountable fact that he could write, p. 297: “Thus the claim of having a settled conviction in his soul, that the fearfulest of all trusts is laid on him by Christ . . . such a conviction is held up by Dr. P. as identical with that claim to inspiration made by fanatics.” “Dr. P. insists that any such testimony as that of a conviction which claims to be the Spirit’s work, and to be recognised as such by the man’s conscience, either is a Satanic delusion, or carries us at once into the region of such delusions. Whoever claims to have such convictions is an enthusiast and a fanatic”—all this, and much more like it, is a most unfair, though doubtless unintentional, misrepresentation. And it is the only foundation for the charge which follows it of a “denial of the spiritual and internal element in the call” and a “low,

rationalistic depreciation of that element as fanatical and dangerous."

It seems incomprehensible how any one who read the article so severely criticised, can affirm that it denies a "spiritual and internal" element in the call, or that there is a real, personal, spiritual agency of the Spirit. As was explained in that article, the question is not as to the fact, the reality, or the degree of that agency, but as to the *nature* of it. That article maintained the view that the Spirit brings the person called to a knowledge of his duty through means; the reviewer holds that the Spirit makes his duty known to him by a direct and immediate operation. And if to reject the idea that the Spirit does directly and immediately communicate to men any knowledge of doctrine or of duty in the present economy of the divine kingdom, is indeed a low and rationalistic view of his work, then must I in truth plead guilty to the charge. For in fact I do reject that idea and regard it as "fanatical and dangerous."

The reviewer correctly says that the heart of this question is as to the part of the Spirit in the matter of the call, and he devotes a large portion of his article to an attempt to prove that I have erred not only on this point, but as to the work of the Spirit in general. It is impossible to follow him through all the labyrinth of what seem to me to be his misapprehensions and misrepresentations in this part of his article. Let the exact points of difference and dispute be clearly understood and kept in mind. The reviewer holds that, under the present dispensation of our Lord's kingdom, the Holy Spirit does by a direct and immediate operation communicate to men the knowledge of truth, of doctrine, or of duty: and this of truth not contained in the written Word of God. P. 314, *seq.* He specifies at least two particulars so made known—a call to the ministry, and the fact of our sonship with God. Now I explained in the article reviewed, that I understand the terms "direct and immediate" to exclude the use of means. This is the plain, well known and accepted sense of the words. And if the Spirit of God makes known to any one a doctrine or a duty directly and immediately, this is a *revelation*. If not, what is it? and what is a revelation? Further,

I took the position, that if God communicates his will through means and instruments to any one in such a way as to impart to his *consciousness* (not to his conviction merely, but to his consciousness,) the assurance that it is God teaching him, this again amounts to a revelation, is a revelation. I cannot understand it as anything else. God sometimes made known his will to patriarchs and prophets by means of an audible voice, but in some way, unknown to us, this was with infallible evidence to them that it was God speaking to them. This was a revelation. The reviewer says, p. 311, "*revelation*" "signifies the immediate and direct communication of God's will to men which is contained in the Scriptures." "Dr. P. would insinuate that it is never used properly except in this strict sense, and that there is in fact no other communication of God's will to men, except by and in this written Word of Revelation. But the Scriptures teach us that the Word itself cannot convince, or convert, or sanctify men; and that the inward supernatural teaching of the Spirit is required in order to any saving knowledge of the truth." "God reveals himself, therefore, not by the Word only, but by the Spirit and the Word." "*Revelation* therefore signifies, in a wider sense than that given above, any communication of his will which God makes to men. And the question between us and Dr. P., is whether or not God can and does communicate, or reveal, his will to those whom he calls into the ministry by any direct teaching of the Spirit. We affirm that he can and does, and Dr. P. denies."

Several remarks need to be made on these quotations. The Scriptures contain the things revealed, and I do indeed hold, with all sound theologians, that there is no revelation of God's will, no revelation properly so-called, other than, or in addition to, the written Word. The enlightening grace of the Spirit is needed to enable men rightly to understand and apply and obey the written Word. But in this teaching of the Spirit he reveals nothing more than what is written, and the effect of his teaching is only the efficacious and saving knowledge and use of the Word contained in the Scriptures, and in this I have always supposed intelligent and orthodox Christians are agreed. I do not believe

that there is "no other communication of God's will to men, except by and in this written Word of Revelation." He may make known his will by many indirect means and instruments. He does so, for example, sometimes by his providence; so also by the ordinary preaching of Christian ministers. When a father teaches his child that God forbids him to lie, God is using this means to instruct the child in the knowledge of his will. But none of these methods of communicating his will can be called *revelation* without confounding all sense of words. And it cannot be said with any propriety that "any communication of his will which God makes to men" is a "revelation." The reviewer admits, and so do I, that if God communicates his will "by any direct teaching of the Spirit," this is a revelation properly so called. The reviewer holds that God actually does this in a call to the ministry.

On p. 315, the reviewer says that in my "zeal to overthrow the doctrine of a supernatural call," I "would like to prove that the Church herself is competent to make her selection of men, and each man whom she calls able, through the Word, to decide his duty, without any direct aid of the Holy Spirit." I never said or dreamed that this could be done without the grace and guidance of the Spirit. Most expressly and repeatedly I affirmed that the aid of that blessed agent is needed, and is granted. Why did the reviewer put in that qualifying term "*direct*"—"direct aid"? I believe in his real, present, personal, and if the reviewer please, supernatural aid. I admit even *direct* aid in Dr. Thornwell's sense of putting the soul in a condition to receive, discern and accept the truth; but in the reviewer's sense of an immediate revelation of God's will, certainly not; and few beside the reviewer, I think, will admit that.

In reference to the reviewer's argument from the admitted fact of a direct act of the Spirit in *regeneration* not much need be said. The old writers were accustomed to include under this term the whole work of Effectual Calling, which all who know the Shorter Catechism, know to comprise several distinct parts. Later writers sometimes apply this name "regeneration," to one of those particulars, to that, viz., described in the Catechism, as

“renewing our wills”—to the change of our moral nature, or the creation of a new heart. This is the direct action of the Spirit distinguished by Dr. Thornwell, and of which it is said in a note to the article reviewed, that it does not communicate any knowledge of truth or duty. This is evident from the very nature and description of it. It is that part of the work in which the Spirit prepares the soul to receive the truth. It is an act of *power*, and not of teaching. It is an act of creation, not of instruction. Hence, as Dr. Hodge says, as quoted by the reviewer, “it affords no place for the use of means.” And while all orthodox theologians hold that this act of regeneration is by the direct and mighty power of God, I know of none who teach that, in the work of effectual calling, the sinner is taught by a direct and immediate operation of the Spirit. They all hold with our Confession of Faith, that for this the Word of God is the indispensable *means*. The appeal of the reviewer to the regeneration of infants, idiots, and the insane, is wholly irrelevant, as the question turns on the *ordinary* dispensations of divine grace, and not those which are extraordinary.

I have nowhere affirmed that the Scriptures are the *only* means used by the Spirit in calling men into the ministry, or in his other acts of administration of the divine kingdom. I affirmed indeed the very contrary, as any one can see. Pp. 84, 85. I do indeed believe, that for the clear and complete fulfilment of his work in the sanctification of his people and their instruction in duty, he always makes use of the Word, and I do not know any one who disputes this.

The reviewer says, pp. 315, 316, “It is simply that he may magnify the Word. But why exalt the honor of the Word as against him who gave the Word?” “It is labor lost to strive at the protection of the glory of the Word as against the Holy Ghost.” These remarks are simply gratuitous. I have done nothing of the kind. While I maintained the use of means by the Spirit in a call to the ministry I ascribed all the glory of every gracious work to the Holy One himself. All the honor and glory of the Word are his. And it may be well to refer the re-

viewer to that testimony, Psalm cxxxviii. 2, "Thou hast magnified thy Word above all thy name."

In what the reviewer has to say, pp. 316, 317, in reply to the position that the Scriptures are the only and sufficient rule and guide of duty, there is somewhat of a mere play on words. He admits them to be the only rule of faith and practice, but denies that they are a "guide." We might say, a rule is a guide. This is its use and purpose. Every one, however, except the reviewer, no doubt understood that I did not exclude the agency of the Spirit using the Word to guide his people. He enables them to understand and apply the Word to the various circumstances and duties of life, guiding them by the Word. If when the reviewer says, "Yet we do need, and in the goodness of God we have a guide whose secret inward monitions are made directly upon our hearts and conduct us in the way we should go," he means immediate suggestions as to our duty, I do not believe it, and regard such a belief as fanatical and dangerous—as I hope, before I am done, to convince others who may take the trouble to follow this discussion through, if not the reviewer himself.

The argument of the reviewer derived from the communication of gifts for ecclesiastical office, is one of the most singular in the whole article. (Pp. 317, 318). He specifies, for example, eloquence, energy, prudence, and what Dr. Thornwell calls the characteristic qualification for the ministry, "the unction from on high." He says "each of these is manifestly the immediate gift of the Spirit." In regard to all but the last, every one else will no doubt say they are partly the result of the nature and constitution of the individual, and partly acquired by the training and teaching by which the providence and Spirit of God form the character and ability of men. The idea of the reviewer would evidently classify them with those miraculous gifts bestowed on the first Christians, but which no one believes in now. In regard to the "unction from on high," we cannot well argue about that until we understand and are agreed as to what it is. If it means an abundant measure of the Holy Spirit present in the soul of the preacher and going forth with his ministrations, as I

suppose it does, then I submit that there are means which we are encouraged to use in order to obtain that precious gift.

I am not so fortunate as to possess a copy of Dr. Hodge's Theology. But in regard to the instances mentioned, of Bezaleel, Aholiab, Joshua, David and others, it seems to be a very simple and natural view to take, if we believe that, so far as their gifts and abilities were not miraculous, they were acquired by appropriate means and training. Bezaleel and Aholiab either had miraculous gifts, or endowed by nature with capacities suited for the purpose they acquired their skill as artisans in the ordinary way. The probability is, that their wonderful skill was due partly to both of these. Joshua had a long and excellent training under Moses. So had David before he ascended the throne of Israel, under the providence of God and the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

The reference to Owen's Discourse on Spiritual Gifts, in regard to this point, by the reviewer, is singularly unfortunate. A correct exhibition of what Owen does say in the very passage appealed to, will show that the reviewer wholly mistakes him. I will give his exact words so far as is necessary:

"It remains only that we inquire how men may come unto or attain a participation of these gifts, whether ministerial or more private. And unto this end we may observe: 1. That they are not communicated unto any by a sudden *afflatus*, or extraordinary infusion, as were the gifts of miracles and tongues, which were bestowed on the Apostles and many of the first converts. That dispensation of the Spirit is long since ceased, and where it is now pretended unto by any, it may justly be suspected as an enthusiastic delusion." (Yet this would seem to be the reviewer's opinion as to the way in which these gifts are attained). "2. These gifts are not absolutely attainable by our own diligence and endeavors in the use of means, without respect unto the sovereign will and pleasure of the Holy Ghost." (The reader will observe that Owen says, "not *absolutely* attainable, without respect to the sovereign will of the Holy Ghost." He goes on to show that whatever may be our natural abilities and diligence we cannot attain them without the special grace of the

Spirit, "who worketh in all persons severally as he will.") And then he adds, "Yet I say 3. That ordinarily they are both attained and increased by the due use of means suited thereunto as grace is also, which none but Pelagians affirm to be absolutely in the power of our own wills." He then proceeds actually to enumerate the means by a due use of which these gifts may be both attained and increased. It appears therefore that Owen teaches exactly the contrary to that which the reviewer understood him to teach.

The reviewer says, I offered no proof that these gifts are bestowed on us in the use of means and instruments, and he supposes I could not offer any. I really did not, and do not now suppose any proof on so simple and plain a point is needed. Every passage in the Scriptures which teaches us to seek for all the gifts and abilities which we may lawfully acquire, and by which we may serve and glorify our divine Master, is such a proof. Directly to the point is that in 1 Cor. xii. 31, "Covet earnestly the best gifts;" xiv. 1, "Follow after charity, and desire spiritual gifts, but rather that ye may prophesy;" xiv. 12, "Even so ye, forasmuch as ye are zealous of spiritual gifts, seek that ye may excel to the edifying of the Church."

The reviewer argues, that inasmuch as we admit a direct and immediate agency of the Spirit in the soul in regeneration and sanctification, it cannot be fanatical and dangerous to hold that the call to the ministry is also direct and immediate. But the direct and immediate agency of the Spirit pleaded for in the two cases is wholly different in nature and kind. In the former case, it is the direct exercise of divine power and might put forth to change the moral nature, and we believe it because the Scriptures plainly teach it. In the latter case, the thing contended for by the reviewer, is the direct and immediate revelation of the will of God to the individual, and we do not believe it, because the supposition of any direct and immediate revelation, in addition to the Scriptures, is contrary to their own testimony and to the faith of the Church, and is "fanatical and dangerous."

Let us re-state the theory of a call to the ministry defended by the reviewer. It affirms that the duty of the individual is

made known to him directly and immediately by the Spirit, in an inward communication of the will of God to his soul. It cannot be denied that this is a revelation, properly so called. This is what we all understand and mean by a *revelation*. The reviewer accepts it as such. He affirms revelations in the call to the ministry, and in the witness of the Spirit to our adoption. And on p. 317, he appears to extend these to other cases. He says: "We do hear his voice saying to us: This is the way walk ye in it." His "inward monitions are made directly upon our hearts and conduct us in the way we should go."

In the article criticised by the reviewer, it was said in objection to this theory of the call; that it opens a wide and dangerous door to fanaticism, superstition, and blind enthusiasm; brings the matter within the region of human fancy and imagination and of Satanic influence; and places the evidence of the call in a state of feeling which prevails among the ignorant and deluded. I do not see how any one tolerably well informed on the subject can question this. Belief in inward and direct impressions, suggestions, monitions, impulses, voices and revelations from the Spirit, has characterised fanatics and enthusiasts and mystics from the beginning, and though not confined to the ignorant and superstitious, has prevailed generally among them. It can be found now in abundance among that class—multitudes of them who pretend to receive these immediate impressions and suggestions and revelations. And if we admit the truth and reality of them in a call to the ministry, or at any other point, evidently we have opened a door for their indefinite encouragement and extension.

In this connection it should be noted, that on p. 319, the reviewer grievously misrepresents me. He says that I affirm, that "to hold that the Holy Ghost ever puts forth a direct and immediate agency on the souls of Christians in ordinary times is a sign of ignorance and the result of ignorance." He refers to p. 87, of my article, as the place where this sentiment is to be found. No such statement is contained there. The truth of the matter is, that in the place referred to I was speaking of the terms "direct" and "immediate." In reference to these words

the remark is made, that in addition to their usual and technical meaning, they are also "properly applied to that peculiar agency of the Spirit which he exercised of old in communicating his will, the knowledge of truth, or of duty, as in the case of the patriarch, prophets, and apostles." Then it is said, "Such an agency as this" (of course *this peculiar* agency just spoken of) "has been held by some to be put forth by the Spirit in the souls of Christians in all ordinary times and for many purposes, but commonly held only in proportion to the ignorance of those who advocate it, or their inability to apprehend truth and to express it with accuracy, exactness and discrimination." That is what I did say, and I am willing to let it stand, and to stand by it, and to let the whole history of the Church be my witness. I said this view of the Spirit's agency has been "*commonly*" held in proportion to the ignorance of those who advocate it—"commonly," not universally; and that leaves room to except from the charge of ignorance the reviewer and a few others.

Before we leave this point in regard to direct and immediate impressions, impulses, suggestions, convictions, monitions, voices, or whatever their advocates may call them, I beg the patience of the reader while I present the testimony of some of the highest authorities in the Church. And we begin with Owen, referring to the very same works of his to which the reviewer appeals, but the design and meaning of which he appears to misapprehend in a very remarkable manner. My edition of Owen is not the same as that of the reviewer, and I have not been able in all cases to verify his quotations. One mistake of his has already been noted. On p. 319, there seems to be another. He says, "Owen, in his 'Reason of Faith,' describes the assurance of faith as 'the work of the Holy Spirit enabling us to believe by a supernatural, immediate revelation of his mind unto us.'" On this, it is to be observed that this work of Owen does not treat of the assurance of faith about which the reviewer is speaking, but of our faith in the Scriptures as the Word of God. Further, the only place in this treatise which I have been able to find that appears to be the one referred to by the reviewer has a totally different meaning from that which he gives to it. By the change

of one little word, it is made to say what Owen never said or meant, if this is the passage quoted. In the first chapter of this work, Owen says:

“That which I shall *first* inquire into is, the way how, and the ground whereon, we come to believe the Scripture to be the Word of God in a due manner.”

“With respect unto the first of these inquiries whereunto the present discourse is singly designed, I affirm that it is the work of the Holy Spirit to enable us to believe the Scripture to be the Word of God, or the supernatural, immediate revelation of his mind unto us.”

If this is the passage referred to, and I can find no other resembling the reviewer's quotation, the reader will observe that he misapplies it to the assurance of faith; omits that which the Spirit enables us to believe; and by substituting the preposition “*by*” for the conjunction “*or*,” wholly changes Owen's meaning. Owen says the Spirit enables us to believe the Scripture to be the Word of God, *or* to believe the Scripture to be the supernatural, immediate revelation of his mind unto us. The reviewer makes him say the Spirit gives a supernatural, immediate revelation of his mind to us.

Owen immediately follows his statement with this: “Some, upon a mistake of this proposition, do seem to suppose that we resolve all faith into private suggestions of the Spirit, or deluding pretences thereof.”

The quotation of the reviewer from this treatise of Owen on p. 306, has no reference whatever to a call to the ministry. It is in regard to “the faith whereby we believe the Scripture to be the Word of God,” as any one can see by looking at the original.

Let us now hear Owen's real testimony as to the point before us. In his Reason of Faith, chapter 4, he says:

“But the matter and subject of the revelation we treat of is nothing but what is already revealed. It is an internal revelation of that which is outward and antecedent unto it; beyond the bounds thereof it is not to be extended. And if any pretend unto *immediate revelations* of things not before revealed, we have no concernment in their pretences.

“Since the finishing of the canon of Scripture, the Church is not under that conduct as to stand in need of such new extraordinary revelations. It doth indeed live upon the internal gracious operations of the Spirit, enabling us to understand, believe and obey the perfect, complete revelation of the will of God already made, but new revelations it hath neither need nor use of; and to suppose them, or a necessity for them, not only overthrows the perfection of Scripture, but also leaveth us uncertain whether we know all that is to be believed unto salvation, or our whole duty, or when we may do so; for it would be our duty to live all our days in expectation of new revelations, wherewith neither peace, assurance nor consolation is consistent.

“It hath so fallen out, in the *providence of God*, that generally all who have given themselves up, in any things concerning faith or obedience, unto the pretended conduct of immediate revelations, although they have pretended a respect unto the Scripture also, have been seduced into opinions and practices directly repugnant unto it; and this, with all persons of sobriety, is sufficient to discard this pretence.”

In the preface to his discourse on “The Causes, Ways and Means of Understanding the Mind of God as Revealed in his Word,” he says :

“By what ways and means he hath provided for the assurance and security of all men, in things of their eternal concernment, and what are those acts of his wisdom and power and grace, which he exerts for that end, viz., that they may both believe the Scripture to be his Word, and understand his mind revealed therein, both according unto what is required of them in the way of duty, so as in both they may be accepted with him, is the design of this and the other forementioned discourse to declare.”

The following noble passage in the first chapter of the same work will command the admiration of every reader, but no one will accuse Owen of a “low and rationalistic” view of the work of the Spirit:

“It is the fondest thing in the world to imagine that the Holy Ghost doth any way teach us but *in and by our own reasons and understandings*. We renounce all *enthusiasms* in this matter, and plead not for any immediate, prophetic inspirations. Those who would prohibit us the use of our reason in the things of religion, would deal with us as the Philistines did with Sampson—

first put out our eyes, and then make us grind in their mill. Whatever we know, be it of what sort it will, we know it in and by the use of our reason; and what we conceive, we do it by our own understanding: only the inquiry is, whether there be not an especial work of the Spirit of God, *enlightening our minds* and enabling our understandings to perceive and apprehend his mind and will revealed in the Scripture, and without which we cannot do so."

In the third chapter, explaining the texts 1 John ii. 20, 27, he says:

"There are but two ways whereby the Spirit teacheth us, nor can any other be conceived. The one is by *objective*, the other by *subjective* revelations; for he teacheth us as a 'Spirit of wisdom and revelation.' The first way of his teaching is by immediate inspiration, communicating new, sacred truths from God immediately unto the minds of men. So he taught the prophets and apostles and all the penmen of the Scripture.

"His other way of teaching is, that we have insisted on, viz., his enabling us to discern, know and understand the mind and will of God as revealed in the Scripture, or as declared in any divine revelations."

The intelligent reader need not be told that, by "*enthusiasts*," Owen and other old writers mean, persons who claim to have immediate communications from the Holy Spirit, to receive direct impressions, suggestions, impulses, voices, monitions, and revelations: and that he and all orthodox interpreters understand by the spirit of revelation, and the teaching of the Holy Ghost given to Christians, that gracious illuminating work whereby he enables us to understand and apply the written Word of God. This is the "subjective revelation" of which Owen speaks, and nothing more.

Few men have ever lived, who, by reason of their great learning and abilities, their personal attainments in piety, and their opportunities of observation, were so competent to judge of this matter, as President Edwards. He writes of it often most earnestly. He had seen the danger and evil fruits of the idea, that Christians now receive direct and immediate communications

from the Spirit, and he frequently refers to it. I will give some of these passages, and they are full of wisdom and instruction.

In his work on the "Marks of a Work of the Spirit of God," Section 3, we find the following:

"Some of the true friends of the work of God's Spirit have erred in giving too much heed to impulses and strong impressions on their minds, as though they were immediate signification from heaven to them, of something that should come to pass, or something which it was the mind and will of God that they should do, which was not signified or revealed any where in the Bible without those impulses. These impressions, if they are truly from the Spirit of God, are of quite a different nature from his gracious influences on the hearts of the saints; they are of the nature of the extraordinary *gifts* of the Spirit and are properly inspiration, such as the prophets and apostles and others had of old: which the Apostle distinguishes from the grace of the Spirit." 1 Cor. xiii.

After showing that these things are not to be expected now, he remarks:

"I would therefore entreat the people of God to be very cautious how they give heed to such things. I have seen them fail in very many instances, and know by experience that impressions being made with great power, and upon the minds of true, yea eminent saints—even in the midst of extraordinary exercises of grace, and sweet communion with God, and attended with texts of Scripture strongly impressed on the mind, are no sure signs of their being revelations from heaven. I have known such impressions fail in some instances, attended with all these circumstances. They who leave the sure word of prophecy—which God has given us as a light shining in a dark place—to follow such impressions and impulses, leave the guidance of the polar star to follow a *Jack with a lantern*. No wonder, therefore, that sometimes they are led into woful extravagance."

In his work on "Religious Affections," Part 3, he discusses at length the difference between any direct impressions, suggestions, and monitions of the Spirit, and his gracious teaching, enlightening, and leading work in the hearts of his people; showing that the former are not gracious and spiritual, are not

to be expected by them, and that the pretence of them has always characterised heretics and fanatics. He says:

“From what has been said, it is also evident that it is not spiritual knowledge for persons to be informed of their duty, by having it immediately suggested to their minds, that such and such outward actions or deeds are the will of God. . . . Such suggestions have nothing of the nature of spiritual light. . . . Thus there was no spiritual light in Balaam, though he had the will of God immediately suggested to him by the Spirit of God from time to time, concerning the way he should go, and what he should do and say.

“It is manifest therefore that a being led and directed in this manner, is not that holy and spiritual leading of the Spirit of God; which is peculiar to the saints, and a distinguishing mark of the sons of God.

“Thus the children of God are led by the Spirit of God in judging of actions themselves, and in their meditations upon, and judging of, and applying the rules of God’s holy Word.

“But this leading of the Spirit is a thing exceedingly diverse from that which some call so; which consists not in teaching them God’s statutes and precepts that he has already given; but in giving them new precepts, by immediate inward speech or suggestion. . . . They do not determine what is the will of God by any taste, or relish, or any manner of judging of the nature of things, but by an immediate dictate concerning the thing to be done; there is no such thing as any judgment or wisdom in the case; whereas in that leading of the Spirit, which is peculiar to God’s children, is imparted that true wisdom and holy discretion so often spoken of in the Word of God; which is high above the other way, as the stars are higher than a glow worm.”

Further on he enumerates a multitude of fanatics and heretics, ancient and modern, who held to the doctrine of immediate suggestions and impressions of the Spirit, and then remarks:

“It is by such sort of religion as this chiefly that Satan transforms himself into an angel of light; and it is that he has ever most successfully made use of to confound hopeful and happy revivals of religion from the beginning of the Christian Church to this day. When the Spirit of God is poured out to begin a glorious work, then the old serpent, as fast as possible, and by all means, introduces this bastard religion and mingles it with the true, which has from time to time soon brought all things

into confusion. The pernicious consequence of it is not easily imagined or conceived of, until we see and are amazed with the awful effects of it and the dismal desolation it has made. If the revival of true religion be very great in its beginning, yet if this bastard comes in, there is danger of its doing as Gideon's bastard Abimelech did, who never left until he had slain all his threescore and ten true born sons, excepting one, that was forced to fly. Great and strict therefore should be the watch and guard that ministers maintains agaist such things, especially at a time of great awakening; for men, especially the common people, are easily bewitched with such things; they having such a glare and show of high religion; and the devil hiding his own shape, and appearing as an an angel of light, that men may not be afraid of him, but may adore him."

In his "Thoughts on the Revival of Religion in New England, 1740," Part 4, we find the following:

"And one erroneous principle, than which scarce any has proved more mischievous to the present glorious work of God, is a notion that it is God's manner now in these days to guide his saints, at least some that are more eminent, by inspiration, or immediate revelation, and to make known to them what shall come to pass hereafter, or what it is his will that they should do by impressions that he by his Spirit makes upon their minds, either with or without texts of Scripture; whereby something is made known to them that is not taught in the Scripture as the words lie in the Bible. By such a notion, the devil has a great door open for him; and if once this opinion should come to be fully yielded, and established in the Church of God, Satan would have opportunity thereby to set up himself as the guide and oracle of God's people, and to have his word regarded as their infallible rule, and so to lead them where he would and to introduce what he pleased, and soon to bring the Bible into neglect and contempt. Late experience has shown that the tendency of this notion is to cause persons to esteem the Bible as a book that is in a great measure useless.

"This error will defend and support all errors.

"This great work of God has been exceedingly hindered by this error; and until we have quite taken this handle out of the devil's hands the work of God will never go on without great clogs and hindrances. But Satan will always have a great advantage in his hands against it, and as he has improved it hitherto, so he will do still; and it is evident the devil knows

the vast advantage he has by it, that makes him exceeding loth to let go his hold.

“And why cannot we be contented with the divine oracles, that holy, pure Word of God that we have in such abundance, and such clearness, now since the canon of Scripture is completed? Why should we desire to have anything added to them by impulses from above? Why should we not rest in that standing rule that God has given to his Church, which the Apostle teaches us is surer than a voice from heaven? And why should we desire to make the Scripture speak more to us than it does? Or why should any desire any higher kind of intercourse with heaven than that which is by having the Holy Spirit given in his sanctifying influences, infusing and exciting grace and holiness, love and joy, which is the highest kind of intercourse that the saints and angels in heaven have with God, and the chief excellency of the glorified man Christ Jesus?”

Referring to the notion of “some that follow impulses and impressions,” that they are following the guidance of God’s Word and make the Scripture their rule, because the impression is made with a text of Scripture, he says:

“This is quite a different thing from the Spirit’s enlightening the mind to understand the precepts or propositions of the Word of God, and know what is contained and revealed in them, and what consequences may justly be drawn from them, and to see how they are applicable to our case and circumstances; which is done without any new revelation, only by enabling the mind to understand and apply a revelation already made.

“If a person has anything revealed to him from God, or is directed to anything by a voice from heaven, or a whisper, or words immediately suggested and put into his mind, there is nothing of the nature of grace merely in this; it is of the nature of a common influence of the Spirit, and is but dross and dung in comparison of the excellency of that gracious leading of the Spirit that the saints have. Such a way of being directed where one shall go, and what he shall do, is no more than what Balaam had from God, who from time to time revealed to him what he should do, and when he had done one thing, then directed him what he should do next; so that he was in this sense led by the Spirit for a considerable time. There is a more excellent way that the Spirit of God leads the sons of God, that natural men cannot have, and that is, by inclining them to do the will of God, and go in the shining path of truth and Christian holiness, from

a holy and heavenly disposition, which the Spirit of God gives them, and enlivens in them, which inclines them and leads them to those things that are excellent, and agreeable to God's mind. . . . And so the Spirit of God does in a gracious manner teach the saints their duty; and teaches them in a higher manner, than ever Balaam, or Saul, or Judas were taught, or any natural man is capable of while such. The Spirit of God enlightens them with respect to their duty, by making their eyes single and pure, whereby the whole body is full of light. . . . And thus the Spirit of God leads and guides the meek in his way agreeably to his promises; he enables them to understand the commands and counsels of his Word and rightly to apply them."

"But to return to the head of impressions and immediate revelations. Many lay themselves open to a delusion by expecting direction from heaven in this way, and waiting for it: in such a case it is easy for persons to imagine they have it. They are perhaps at a loss concerning something, undetermined what they shall do, or what course they should take in some affair, and they pray to God to direct them, and make known unto them his mind and will; and, then, instead of expecting to be directed, by being assisted in consideration of the rules of God's Word, and their circumstances, and God's providence, and enabled to look on things in a true light, and justly to weigh them, they are waiting for some secret, immediate influence on their minds, unaccountably swaying their minds, and turning their thoughts or inclinations that way that God would have them go, and are observing their own minds to see what arises there, whether some texts of Scripture do not come into the mind, or whether some ideas, or inward motions and dispositions do not arise in something of an unaccountable manner, that they may call a divine direction. Hereby they are exposed to two things.

"*First*, they lay themselves open to the devil, and give him a fair opportunity to lead them where he pleases: for they stand ready to follow the first extraordinary impulse that they shall have, groundlessly concluding it is from God.

"*And, secondly*, they are greatly exposed to be deceived by their own imaginations; for such an expectation awakens and quickens the imagination; and that oftentimes is called an uncommon impression, that is no such thing; and they ascribe that to the agency of some invisible being that is owing only to themselves."

These testimonies may be thought sufficient, but I wish to introduce a more modern witness, and to meet more expressly the

reviewer's plea, that the Scriptures do not teach any particular individual his own personal duty to enter the ministry, and therefore a direct and immediate intimation of God's will is necessary. I have remarked that I do not possess Dr. Hodge's Theology; but I have an excellent representative of his views, and those of the old reformed Theology in general—Dr. A. A. Hodge's admirable Commentary on the Confession of Faith. The reviewer may not accord to this work the honor of a standard authority, but the author is a very good representative and witness, and his arguments speak for themselves. I quote from his comments on a part of the 6th Section of the 1st Chapter of the Confession, which is as follows:

“The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture; unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men.”

Most persons would suppose this testimony of our Confession, of itself, sufficient and conclusive. It affirms that the whole counsel of God, *concerning all things* necessary for man's *life*, is either found in the Scriptures or may be learned from them, to which *nothing* is to be added at any time, whether by new revelations or traditions. The reviewer insists that something more is necessary. But let us hear Dr. Hodge's comments:

“This Section teaches the following propositions: 1st. The inspired Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are a *complete* rule of faith and practice; they embrace the whole of whatever supernatural revelation God now makes to men, and are abundantly sufficient for all the practical necessities of men or communities. . . . As a matter of fact, the Scriptures do teach a perfect system of doctrine, and all the principles which are necessary for the practical regulation of the lives of individuals, communities and churches.

“No new revelations of the Spirit are to be expected now, because he has already given us a complete and all-sufficient rule. . . . As a matter of fact, no pretended revelations since the days of the apostles have borne the marks, or been accompanied

with the "signs" of a supernatural revelation. On the contrary, all that have been made public—as those of Swedenborg and the Mormons—are inconsistent with Scripture truth, directly oppose the authority of Scripture and teach bad morals; while private revelations have been professed only by vain enthusiasts, and are incapable of verification!

"Nevertheless a personal, spiritual illumination by the power of the Holy Ghost, is necessary in every case for the practical and saving knowledge of the truth embraced in the Scriptures. This necessity does not result from any want of either completeness or clearness in the revelation, but from the fact that man, in a state of nature, is carnal and unable to discern the things of the Spirit of God. Spiritual illumination differs from inspiration, therefore in that it conveys no new truths to the understanding, but simply opens the mind and heart of the subject to the spiritual discernment and appreciation of the truth already objectively presented in the Scriptures.

"While the Scriptures are a complete rule of faith and practice, and while nothing is to be regarded as an article of faith to be believed, or a religious duty obligatory on the conscience, which is not expressly or implicitly taught in Scripture, nevertheless they do not descend in practical matters into details, but laying down general principles, leave men to apply them in the exercise of their natural judgment in the light of experience, and in adaptation to changing circumstance, as they are guided by the sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit."

If any apology is needed for the number and extent of these quotations, let it be remarked, that there are a good many indications that views are spreading among us in regard to the agency of the Holy Spirit, in no small degree tainted with the odor of the old and dangerous mysticism and enthusiastic errors, and if they are not speedily corrected there is no telling to what they may grow.

The reviewer earnestly objects against the remark found in the note, p. 77, of my article, that the subject of the direct action of the Spirit on the soul in regeneration and sanctification, is not conscious of it, only of its results and consequences. He connects with this an implied denial, which he finds on p. 73, that when the Spirit produces a conviction of duty in the soul of any man by the ordinary means, he ever

imparts to the consciousness of the individual an assurance that it is the work of the Spirit. The reader will note that I said "*consciousness*," not conscience, or conviction. I admit and believe that the Spirit may produce a certain and assured conviction and belief that the work is his. But if this fact be made known to the consciousness of the man, that is a revelation. He may have such evidences and proofs of it as assure him of the fact, but to be conscious that it is the Spirit working in him is another matter.

And as to the direct action of the Spirit on the soul in regeneration and sanctification, who is there that has ever been conscious of that? Who has ever felt that mysterious touch of the divine power on the soul? Of its effects and consequences, of the light and faith and peace and joy and love that follow, multitudes have been conscious, but of that divine act itself, who and when? The nature of it precludes the consciousness of it on the part of the subject. It is an act of *creation*. Is the creature, or can he be, conscious of the creating act? It is the imparting of life—can there be consciousness of the life-giving power? It is a new birth—has the child consciousness of its birth?

The reviewer makes this point the ground of an accusation so grave and serious, and follows it up with so heavy an array of quotations, not one of which has any bearing on the question, that I must refer to some authorities to show that I am not alone in my error, if it is one. And first, let us take Owen. In his work on the Spirit, Book 3, Chapter 1, on the subject of Regeneration, he says:

"And great variety there is also in the perception and understanding of the work itself, in them in whom it is wrought, for in itself it is secret and hidden, and is no other ways discoverable but in its causes and effects."

And in reference to its effects, he adds:

"In the minds and consciences of some, this is made known by infallible signs and tokens. Paul knew that Christ was formed and revealed in him. So he declared that whoever is in Christ.

Jesus 'is a new creature'—that is, born again—whether they know it to be so themselves or no. And many are in the dark as to their own condition in this matter all their days, for they 'fear the Lord and obey the voice of his servant,' (Christ Jesus), and yet 'walk in darkness and have no light.'"

In reference to sanctification, in Book 4, Chapter 2, speaking of the holiness wrought in believers by the Spirit, he says:

"It is not immediately discernible, either by themselves in whom it is, or by others that make observation of it. It lies only under the eye of him by whom it is wrought; only by the fruits and effects of it is it made manifest."

On p. 321, the reviewer refers to Owen's exposition of Eph. i. 17-19, as sustaining his views. But he seems to misapprehend what Owen means by "an internal, subjective revelation." He does not intend by this expression any such revelation as the reviewer contends for in a call to the ministry and the witness of adoption. Owen himself explains it in the place referred to, "But there is an *internal, subjective revelation* whereby *no new things* are revealed unto our minds, or are not outwardly revealed *anew*, but our minds are enabled to discern the things that are revealed already." The kind of revelation advocated by the reviewer, Owen would call an "*immediate, external revelation*," as any one will see who will read him enough to understand his phraseology.

On the same page also, the reviewer says Owen teaches "that it is not simply the effects of the Spirit's operation we are conscious of, but his own indwelling itself." I have read the place referred to twice over and I cannot find any such statement in it. There must be some mistake here. Owen does indeed hold with others that the Spirit himself, and not the effects of his operations, is the seal, unction, and earnest given to his people, but nowhere can I find that he teaches that they are directly conscious of his presence within them. And if this is held by any one, it is a question of wonder how many Christians there have been, and are, whose consciousness so testifies.

Let us now introduce another witness whose majestic presence has not yet appeared in this discussion, but who is worthy to

stand in any company—Chalmers. In his lecture on Romans viii. 16, he says:

“How shall we ascertain that upon us there has been the fulfillment of that promise which is unto faith—even the Holy Ghost, who is given to as many as shall believe? In reply to this, it is most important to observe that his work is visible, but his working is not so. It is not of his operation that we are conscious, but of the result of that operation. We do not see the wind, though we see the impulse and the direction which it gives to many sensible things. And neither can we tell of the Spirit’s agency on a human soul, though the impression which he has made upon it may be quite palpable. We do not see him at work, though we may see the workmanship which he leaves behind him. . . . The Spirit may not be felt in his access to the soul, but his fruits may be recognised in the now holy and heavenly affections of the soul. There is neither a light, nor a voice, nor a felt stirring within, to warn us of his presence; but there may now be a goodness, and a righteousness, and a truth, in the heart which give testimony to his power.”

This will do, and I desire to recommend this admirable lecture, with its wise and sober and scriptural views, to any who may be troubled and distressed by the doctrine of the Spirit’s witness held by the reviewer.

I will add one more authority on this: *Outlines of Theology*, by Dr. A. A. Hodge, Chapter 26:

“The Holy Ghost, by an exertion of creative power, changes the governing disposition of the heart in a manner inscrutable, and by an influence not apprehended by the consciousness of the subject.” “Regeneration is never a matter of direct consciousness to the subject of it.”

On this point, the reviewer appeals to the “*Systematic Theology*” of Dr. Charles Hodge. I have to take the quotations here just as he gives them, but I could not wish for anything more or anything different. He quotes Dr. Hodge as distinguishing “mysticism, which claims immediate communication of divine knowledge and divine life from God to the soul, independently of the ordinary means,” from “the doctrine of spiritual illumination as held by all evangelical Christians. . . .

there is need of an inward, supernatural teaching of the Spirit producing what the Scriptures call 'spiritual discernment.' " What this spiritual illumination and discernment are, as held by orthodox Christians, has been shown by preceding quotations from Owen, Edwards and Dr. A. A. Hodge. Dr. C. Hodge, as quoted by the reviewer, explains the difference of mysticism from this as consisting in three particulars: "1. Mystics have new revelations; 2, through no use of the means of grace; and 3, instead of the Word, their minds are filled with their own imaginings." Now the objection to the reviewer's theory is, that as far as it goes it is identical with mysticism. He expressly affirms as much. On p. 316, he says: "Surely we need not stagger at the doctrine of the sovereign Spirit's immediately operating on the soul of believers to communicate the knowledge of truth and duty." On pp. 319, 320, in reference to the witness of the Spirit to our adoption, he says: "But the Spirit is not tied to the means, and he sometimes sees fit to act immediately. It is an immediate act of the Spirit when he witnesses with our spirits that we are the children of God, for it is not the Word he uses. Our own particular election and salvation is not written in the Word. What the Spirit testifies with our spirits is something they cannot learn themselves from the Word, something the Word does not contain." "Now, if the Spirit sometimes witnesses directly and immediately to believers that they are the children of God, and they can know that it is he that assures them, why should it be held a thing incredible, either that he can and does move on the heart, communicating a direct and special call to the ministry, or that the heart moved on can and does recognise the Spirit in that operation?" On p. 325, the reviewer quotes with approval, from another, this language: "The testimony of the Holy Ghost (to our adoption) is not inferential, it is direct and immediate. The Spirit supernaturally testifies to the believer that he is a child of God. The Word does not declare that this man, A. B., is a child of God; the Holy Spirit testifies to this man, A. B., that *he* is a child of God."

Manifestly we have in these statements the general character-

istic of mysticism as stated by Dr. C. Hodge, and two of the three points in which mysticism differs from the common evangelical faith. They affirm the immediate communication of knowledge from God to the soul independently of the ordinary means—and 1, new revelations; and 2, through no use of the means of grace.

On this point, let the reader also consult Turretin, Locus 15, Quæstio 4, Section 54, where he explains the difference between the doctrine of "immediate grace," as taught by the orthodox, and that of enthusiasts, and it will be found difficult to distinguish the views of the reviewer from those ascribed to those errorists. That entire "Quæstio" is worthy of study, and the reader will see that Turretin repeatedly affirms that the "immediate" action of the Spirit is never without the *Word*.

In regard to the witness of the Spirit, the reviewer must be aware that the view he adopts has never been generally received by Calvinistic theologians, and he is not warranted in founding an argument on the assumption of its truth. The Reformed theology has always been chary of adopting it, and often has opposed it most strenuously. It is sufficient to quote in reference to it the testimony of Dr. A. A. Hodge, in his Commentary on the Confession of Faith:

"The sense in which this witnessing of the Holy Spirit to our spirits is to be understood, has been much debated among theologians.

"Some have maintained that the passage teaches that the Holy Spirit, in some mysterious way, directly reveals to our spirits the fact, that we are the children of God, as one man immediately conveys information to another man. The objections to this view are, that Christians are not and cannot be conscious of any such injection of information from without into the mind, and that, as far as such testimony alone is concerned, we would be unable to distinguish certainly the testimony of the Spirit from the conclusions of our own reasons, or the suggestions of our own hearts. An expectation of such direct communications would be likely to generate enthusiasm and presumption."

In the quotations of the reviewer from Dr. C. Hodge, "as to our being conscious of the inward workings of the Spirit," there

is nothing to sustain his views, but the contrary. Dr. Hodge says "the nature of these experiences, and of the way in which they come and go," and their "character," *prove* that they are due to the Spirit of God. But this is not consciousness. It is inference and reasoning and proof. We know it to be the work of God by a process of logic, and not by consciousness. This appears further, by the illustration used by Dr. Hodge. He says "God reveals himself as distinctly in the workings of our inward nature, as he does in the outward world." How does he reveal himself in the latter? Not to our consciousness. That would be absurd. But to our reason. We perceive, in the outward world, workings, the nature and character of which compel us to infer that they are of God. So we perceive by consciousness, workings, in our inward nature, bearing such characteristics as *prove* them to be a divine work. This is the irresistible conclusion of reason, but to say that we are *conscious* that they are the work of God, is absurd. Consciousness furnishes the materials for the inference, but not that itself.

It has seemed proper and necessary to devote a great deal of space to this part of the discussion in hand having reference to the nature of the agency of the Holy Spirit. It is a vital matter. On the one hand lie the perils of what the reviewer calls "low, rationalistic views," and on the other those of a high mystical and fanatical doctrine. It has been my aim, in reply to the criticisms of the reviewer, to show that he has not correctly apprehended my views on this subject, and that they are in accord with those of evangelical theologians of the highest authority. What I have to say further in reply to his strictures, will have more variety and less prolixity.

Neander's Views.—The reviewer objects that, in regard to the nature of a call to the ministry, I followed in the footsteps of this "great Lutheran Church-historian." In the introduction to my essay, it seemed to be proper to present the general principles received by orthodox Christians as to the nature and constitution of the Christian Church. In doing this I was compelled to follow very closely the line of thought and remark pre-

sented by Neander in one of his histories, just as he had followed other writers on the same subject. To guard against the suspicion of mere plagiarism, I referred to Neander with the remark that his ideas on that subject had long been the common property of the Church. And where and by whom are these principles questioned? They are briefly these: That the Church of Christ is a community, consecrated as a whole and individually to the service and glory of their divine Master; that every member of it is called to do all he can for the prosperity and extension of the Church and the glory of Christ; that whatever gifts any one possesses or can acquire, which can be profitably used for these ends, he is bound so to employ them; and that the gifts which any member of this community may have acquired by the grace and providence of the Lord, determine the kind and measure of the work and service he is called to render in the Master's kingdom. These are not Neander's views. They are the plain teachings of the Scriptures; they surely are, and always have been, the views of all true and enlightened Christians from the beginning. I do not know any who deny or even doubt them.

Now, indeed, it seems to me that these general principles do enable us to settle the question as to the nature of a call to the gospel ministry,—what constitutes such a call, who are called to this work. It does seem to me that, followed out to their natural and necessary consequences, they lead to and establish the views upon this question which my article presented. If we accept those principles we must accept their results. But it does not upset one or the other to say they are Neander's views, and that he is an unsafe guide.

And here I must notice an instance of unfairness on the part of the reviewer in this connection. In language quoted by the reviewer himself, I had said that the Spirit by bestowing "suitable qualifications and abilities" for the work of the ministry on any one, indicates his divine will that that one should perform that work, and thereby designates him both to himself and the Church to that office. Thereupon the reviewer with much emphasis goes on to say: "Thus the ability to preach, as the Church shall be

satisfied that a man possesses it, without any inward conviction of his own that he is called to the work, for that is rather a bad mark—a sign of a fanatic, being a claim to special revelation—this ability to preach, recognised by the people, is all the call any minister needs!" "Every one able to preach is called equally and alike, and equally and alike the Church ought to call all such into the ministry." Now all this, including the inward conviction, the bad mark, the fanatic, etc., is unauthorised by anything in the article reviewed. But the point to be specially noticed is, that I am represented as saying, that an "ability to preach" is "all the call any minister needs." "The ability to preach" is put forward in the place of my own language, viz., "suitable qualifications and abilities" for the office of the ministry. "To be "able to preach" is only one of them. What the gifts and qualifications which are required for the ministry, are, was a question expressly excluded from my discourse, p. 85. as not contemplated in its object.

In this connection, it is fit to notice the reviewer's reply to the argument founded on Paul's instructions to Timothy and Titus in regard to the appointment of bishops or presbyters. This reply is made up of three points. The first is: "These passages are not a description of *preachers as such*, but of bishops or presbyters or rulers, made overseers however by the Holy Ghost." The answer to this is, that we have no minister whose work is only to preach; that the description certainly includes those elders who are called to labor in the Word and doctrine, as well as those who rule; and, that if these passages were not intended to rule and guide the Church in the ordination of ministers of the gospel, then we have no instructions upon that subject in the Scriptures at all. As to the reference to Paul's account of his own ministry, it need hardly be said that he was "called to be an Apostle," and the question in hand is the call of a minister of the gospel. The second point of the reviewer here is, that "the theory opposed by Dr. Porter does not hold up a settled conviction wrought by the Spirit in the candidate's soul as one of his qualifications for office," but as one element of three which demonstrate the call of God. But the reviewer

holds, and he must hold, that the call of God, and that just such a call as he advocates, is the indispensable qualification, condition or requisite, or whatever he may please to name it, for the office. Whatever view of the call we take, we must hold to this. Now the argument the reviewer is trying to meet was, that the Apostle, giving particular and detailed instructions as to what persons are to be admitted to the office of bishop, says not one word about such a call of the Spirit as the reviewer advocates and holds to be indispensable. This is left untouched by this point of his reply. In enumerating the qualifications required, Paul omits entirely the one affirmed by the reviewer to be most essential—not the “conviction” of a call, which has nothing to do with the matter here, but the call itself. But, thirdly, the reviewer replies, “we turn Dr. Porter’s argument against himself; these two passages . . . say nothing about any sort of call at all, whether from the Spirit, or from the Church alone without the Spirit.” But let us see. The theory I advocated is, briefly, that gifts and qualifications for the office, constitute the call to it; in bestowing by his providence and grace such as are suitable for the discharge of the office, the Lord indicates to the person himself and to the Church that he is called to the office; or rather these are the call. Now in these passages the Apostle teaches us what these necessary gifts and qualifications are: that is he tells us what constitutes a call, what is a call, and whom the Church should therefore call and ordain to the office. We find here therefore precisely all the elements of a complete call to the ministry, viz., the possession of the needful gifts and abilities for its duties bestowed by the providence and Spirit of God, and instructions to the Church actually to put such into the office—both the *material* and the *formal* call according to Owen’s phraseology—but of a call according to the reviewer’s theory, not the remotest suggestion.

There is a point, in this connection, derived from the reviewer’s own statements which seems to be fatal to his theory. In regard to *the call* itself, not the *conviction* of a call, which the reviewer properly distinguishes from the call, and regards as one of three necessary evidences of it—this call he affirms to be “direct

and immediate, impressed on the heart by God himself," and made known by "the direct and immediate teachings of the Holy Ghost," p. 314: "He can and does move on the heart, communicating a direct and special call to the ministry," and the heart so moved on "can and does recognise the Spirit in that operation," p. 320. This call, as the reviewer argues at length, is known and recognised by the consciousness of the individual. He tells us that the fact of this call is confirmed by *three* elements of proof; first, the conviction of the individual himself; secondly, the judgment of some congregation; and thirdly, the judgment of the Presbytery. Now it would appear manifest from the reviewer's own statements, and from the very nature of the call which he affirms, that it must be *at once known and perceived by the individual*—else what becomes of his labored argument to prove that the subject of it is *conscious* of it? of the affirmation, that it is impressed on the heart by God himself, and that it is communicated directly and immediately by the Spirit to the soul of the one called? and what becomes of the emphatic remark, p. 291, "He might just as well deny *that God calls*, as deny that the called man *hears and knows that it is God who calls him.*" Now mark, on p. 304, he says "his theory does not assert that the individual's convictions *are always first in the order* of the three elements which evince the call." And on p. 233, "We may not only as individuals signify to any man our impressions that he has the needful gifts and graces and call;" but "a Presbytery may of their own motion signify to any man that they consider him to be called." "The individual's convictions do not necessarily precede those of the Church." I would like to know how all these things are possible; how they can all stand together. How can a Presbytery, or any one else, know that one is called, before he knows it himself, according to the reviewer's doctrine of a call? How dare a Presbytery go before the Spirit and signify to any that they consider him called? The reviewer cannot say that the Spirit has called and the Presbytery perceived the evidences of it, before the individual himself has perceived and heard it; for he affirms that this divine call is perceived by consciousness, impressed on the heart, made known

immediately by the Spirit, and that we might as well deny that God calls, as to deny that the man hears. And on p. 314, in explaining Dr. Thornwell's views, he appears for the moment to regard it in this light himself: "The terms *direct* and *immediate* relate to the question, whether the Church and the Presbytery can certify to any man that he is called, unless he have the inward persuasion of his own conscience also?" This implies that they cannot. But how it is consistent with the statements of p. 233, is not for me to say. On this last page also we find the following, which look as if in a moment of forgetfulness the reviewer unconsciously saw and admitted the truth: "A whole church may urge any man whom they desire to undertake this work." "The call from God is indicated in the being called of the Church."

Owen's Views.—The reviewer objects, first, to the fairness and correctness of the representations I make of Owen's opinions on the call to the ministry; and, secondly, to the weight I ascribe to his authority. I must decline to argue the question, whether I have fairly represented the views of this author, and refer any one who cares to know to the works of Owen himself. As I did not however specify the place where he speaks of the *material* call and the *formal* call, I here refer to his "Discourse of Spiritual Gifts," Chapter 7, first Paragraph: Sermon on Eph. iv. 8, and Sermon on 1 Cor. xii. 11. These admirable sermons, among other good things and great principles, clearly present the view of a call to the ministry which I have advocated. In the latter, he announces the fundamental principle of the whole matter in these terms: "That gifts are the foundation of all church work, whether it be in office, or out of office." "Spiritual gifts are the foundation of office, which is the foundation of work in the Church, and of all gospel administrations in a special manner, according to the gifts received."

In regard to the weight due to Owen's authority, the reviewer surely knows that the title "prince of theologians" was given to him long ago, by those more competent to judge of his merits than I, and has been accorded to him by very many, themselves

masters in Israel. And as to the influence which his views of church order may have had on his opinion in regard to this matter, I do not think an idea can be found in his writings in respect to the power and place of the Church in relation to the ministry to which a Presbyterian will not assent. Besides, he discusses the question of a call to the ministry, not only from the side of the Church, but from the side of the Spirit. His "Discourse of Spiritual Gifts" is intended to prove that the Spirit makes *ministers of the gospel*, and to show *how* he makes them. The venerable Dr. McGill, a competent judge, in a recent admirable article on a question of church order, appeals to Owen's authority, and styles him "the greatest light in the 17th Century."

Calvin's Views.—The reviewer says that I "would fain explain away" Calvin's statement in regard to the call to the ministry. I only warned those who, like the reviewer, are caught by the mere sound of a word, not to be misled by the term "*secret call*" used by Calvin on this subject, and pointed out the fact that he himself explains his meaning in the use of it, and that in a sense entirely different from the one in which the reviewer would have us understand it. And for the correctness of these suggestions any one may examine the language for himself. By the secret call the reviewer means a direct and immediate act of the Holy Spirit making known to the individual his duty. "I mean," says Calvin, as translated by the reviewer, "the good testimony of our heart, that neither from ambition, nor avarice, nor any other base motive, but out of a true fear of God, and desire to edify the Church, we undertake the offered office." The reviewer pays no attention to Calvin's statement a few lines further on, which shows not only his own opinion, but that which prevailed in the Reformed Church: "It is even common to speak of private persons as called to the ministry, who appear to be adapted and qualified for its duties." I am willing to let Calvin speak for himself.

His Example.—I had remarked that the known circumstances and history of Calvin's ministry, give no place to the theory of

a call which I opposed. The reviewer tells us that but little is known "about Calvin's call and ordination." And yet he labors very earnestly to prove that he was called to preach "by a mighty supernatural conviction from the Spirit of God in his heart." How does the reviewer know *that*? The attentive reader will observe that all the reviewer's statements and arguments in this case, only prove that Calvin was powerfully *convinced* that he was called of God to this work—something I never thought of doubting. Of course this conviction was an "*inward* conviction," as the reviewer calls it. There is no other kind of conviction, I believe. But that is not the point. The question is, *how* was that conviction produced in Calvin's conscience? The theory of a call, maintained by the reviewer, affirms that it must have been by the supernatural, direct and immediate agency of the Holy Spirit. I affirm, that well known facts and circumstances in the history of the case show that the Spirit produced that conviction, not directly and immediately, but through the agency and instrumentality of Calvin's fellow-Christians, and especially of Farel. Look at the facts which are known in regard to his preaching in Paris, before he went to Geneva. He says himself of his work there: "I began to look for some retreat, and some way of escape from the crowd; but I was so far from accomplishing my wish that, on the contrary, all my hiding-places became like public schools." Now can any one believe that *then* he was conscious of a direct and immediate call to the ministry by the Holy Ghost? Who can believe that of John Calvin? He was not the man, with such a consciousness in his soul, awful and overpowering, to shrink from the work, and seek a retreat and hiding-place. And it is manifest from his own statement, that it was the call and the urgency of the people that convinced him of his duty and compelled him to perform it. Follow him to Geneva. He was there seeking for a place of retreat, for his "coveted retirement," as the reviewer himself expresses it. Let no man tell us that he was doing so, and all the while carrying in his secret soul the consciousness of a direct and immediate call to the ministry by the Spirit of God. We cannot think this of John Calvin. He intended to stay but

one night in Geneva, called to see Viret, was recognised by Du Tillet and Farel; and then *through the solemn adjurations of Farel* he was convinced at last of his duty—that God called him to stay. If the well known facts and history of the case do not prove this, nothing can be proved. Calvin himself says, “I was at last retained at Geneva, by Master William Farel,” and as quoted by the reviewer, “the terrible threatenings of William Farel, which were as if God had seized me by his awful hand from heaven.” The reader will remember, that the question is not whether Calvin was convinced of his duty, nor whether he was called of God to the work, nor whether this conviction was wrought by the power of the Holy Spirit; but *how* did the Spirit produce it. The theory of the reviewer teaches that he produced it *by a direct and immediate agency in the soul of Calvin, known and recognised by his consciousness.* The view I advocate, teaches that the Spirit produced this conviction in Calvin’s mind *through the agency of Farel*, by Farel’s adjuration and threatenings. What do the well known circumstances and history of the case prove? It is remarkable that the reviewer himself expresses the truth of the matter, when he says, p. 301, that Calvin “gave himself up to the will of God interpreted to him through Farel.” This is indeed surprising. It is all I contend for.

Further, we have a letter from Calvin to Du Tillet, dated “20th October, 1538,” in which he replies to the latter as to *the lawfulness of his call.* But not one word does he say about the consciousness of a call by the direct and immediate agency of the Spirit; much however in regard to the arguments of his brethren, who said to him: “You, who are endowed with such gifts, with what conscience can you decline the ministry which is offered to you.” He tells Du Tillet, “I had seriously pondered the question of setting about the gaining of a livelihood for myself in some private station.” Can we believe that he did so with that awful consciousness the reviewer insists on? He also says to Du Tillet, that he had stated to his brethren the reasons which deterred him from accepting their call, and then adds: “When that was to no purpose, I concluded that I had no

alternative in such a state of perplexity, *but to follow that which I thought was pointed out to me by the servants of God.*" It is scarcely necessary for me to give italics to that last clause, to call attention to the support it gives to my view.

And now, on the whole, I think the reader will agree with me, that the well known circumstances and history of the case authorise me to "adorn my argument" with the "illustrious name" of "the great Genevese."

The case of John Knox.—I hesitate to say anything about this. The "well known circumstances and history" of his entering upon the work of the ministry so evidently support the view of the call which I advocate, that it looks like trifling to comment on them. It is impossible to make them plainer. There is no intimation at all that the Holy Spirit called him to the work by a direct and immediate act communicating to him a knowledge and conviction of his duty, as the reviewer's theory requires. The facts, as he himself states them, show that God brought Knox to a knowledge and sense of his duty to enter the ministry through the means and agency of Rough and other Christian friends. He yielded to this conviction forced upon him by their arguments and appeals with great reluctance and hesitation. Would that have been so with John Knox any more than with Calvin, if he had been conscious of a direct and immediate call by the Holy Spirit? Who can believe that? It is significant that the final appeal which overcame his scruples was in connection with a sermon by Rough, insisting "on the people's power to call whom they would." This is a doctrine the reviewer will not receive, but it appears to have been held by the Presbyterian Calvinistic reformers of that day. McCrie says: "I have little doubt that he (Knox) looked upon the charge he received at St. Andrew's as principally constituting his call to the ministry." The reviewer remarks upon this "McCrie means of course that this charge constituted his *external* call." But what right has he to put this gloss on McCrie's language? Had the Holy Spirit called Knox to the ministry *before* Rough and the others urged him to enter it? Most certainly, according to

the reviewer's theory, they could not dare to insist on it, if he was not called. But on p. 291, the reviewer says "he might just as well deny *that God calls*, as deny that the called man *hears and knows that it is God who calls* him. It is a clear contradiction in terms to say that God calls and commissions a man to preach his Word as his ambassador, and yet deny that he makes known to the individual that he does call and commission him." And on p. 295, in explaining and defending Dr. Thornwell's statement, he says Dr. Thornwell "had in his mind an operation of the Spirit, similar that 'mighty, invincible' one by which he draws sinners to Christ.'" But Knox himself, when his brethren urged him to undertake the ministry "resisted all their solicitations, assigning as his reason that he *did not consider himself as having* a call to this employment." It is evident that God made known to Knox, the fact, that he did call him by means of Rough and the others. The Spirit brought him to a knowledge and conviction of his duty through their instrumentality, and not by a direct and immediate act communicating to him a knowledge of it.

The case of Haliburton.—This is if possible still plainer. It is sufficient to say that, in his *Memoirs*, Part 4, chapter 1, with the fulness and detail of analysis for which he is remarkable, he gives himself an account of the reasons and influences which brought him into the ministry. He enumerates *twelve* particulars. There is not among them the remotest suggestion of any such direct and immediate operation of the Spirit as the theory of the reviewer affirms. They consist almost entirely of providential circumstances, and the exhortations and urgencies of his friends and the Presbytery. At the end of it all, he says: "As the Lord did, by the formerly mentioned conduct of providence respecting me, remove my scruples and clear my mind; so by his countenancing me in my first appearances, not only by supplying me for the work, but making it successful towards the awakening of some, and comforting of others, did not a little confirm and encourage me." Thus did the Lord make known to Haliburton his duty, his call to the ministry,—not by a direct and

immediate operation of the Spirit, according to his own testimony. He is a good witness.

It is apparent that, in this part of his review, the writer lost sight of the point in question in this discussion. All along, in connection with the cases of Calvin, Knox, and Haliburton, he labors to prove that they were brought to a conviction that they were called of God to the ministry. That I never denied, nor the importance of it in the case of every one who enters the sacred office. The only questions between us are, *how* does God call, and *how* does he bring men to a knowledge and conviction of their duty in this matter. On p. 311, the reviewer says: "The question between us and Dr. Porter, is, whether or not God can and does communicate, or reveal, his will to those whom he calls into the ministry, by any direct teaching of the Spirit. We affirm that he can and does, and Dr. Porter denies." I think I have never denied the "can,"—his *power* to do it. Surely I have not so far forsaken "the doctrine both of the Scripture and of our Standards." But I do hold that, in the ordinary vocation of ministers, God communicates to them his will through the means of his providence, the Scriptures, and the Church, and not by the *direct* teaching of the Spirit, nor by *revelation*, in any proper sense of the terms. If the reviewer had kept this question clearly before him he would have saved both himself and me a great deal of trouble.

Dr. Thornwell's Views.—I have purposely postponed this point to the last, on account of a reluctance to discuss it, which I will not disguise—a reluctance springing from reasons which I do not care to mention, though the consequence be that some will misunderstand them.

The reviewer charges me with "misapprehension and consequent misrepresentation" of the views of Dr. Thornwell. The fact is, I did not attempt any formal and regular discussion or representation of Dr. Thornwell's views. After stating as clearly as I could the real question to be considered, and the sense in which I understood the terms "direct and immediate" to be used, I remarked that I "do not indeed know that any among

us *really* hold" that a call to the ministry, by the divine Spirit, is direct and immediate in that sense; but that some "do *appear* to adopt this theory." Afterwards I quoted some expressions from an article written by Dr. Thornwell, and from two other writers, to show that some do appear to adopt it. The truth is I have always been in doubt as to the real meaning of Dr. Thornwell in those expressions. I am more in doubt now than ever, since reading the article of the reviewer. Dr. Thornwell's language appears to teach the theory I oppose. What it does teach, what he meant to affirm by it, seems to be very uncertain. The reviewer gives us two interpretations of Dr. Thornwell's views, one of them his own, and the other from an intimate friend of Dr. Thornwell, and an accomplished theologian, and they are so different as to set all afloat the question as to the true sense of Dr. Thornwell's language. First, the reviewer tells us, p. 295, "He speaks of a 'supernatural conviction of duty wrought by the immediate agency of the Holy Ghost;' but proceeds in the very next sentence to show that he had in mind an operation of the Spirit similar to that 'mighty invincible' one by which he 'draws sinners to Christ.'" But on p. 325, the correspondent called in to aid in expounding Dr. Thornwell's meaning, tells us, "Dr. Thornwell thought that the call to the ministry is analogous to the witness of the Holy Spirit, which he held to be 'direct and immediate.'" But now the operation of the Spirit in the "witness," as explained both by the reviewer and his correspondent, is so different in nature and kind from that he puts forth in the "mighty and invincible" work by which he draws sinners to Christ; that if his agency in the call to the ministry is similar to the latter, it cannot be analogous to the former. I do not suppose there are any of us more competent to explain the real meaning of Dr. Thornwell than these two, and if they differ so widely, I may be pardoned, if I say I do not know what he meant. I can only say what his language *appears* to mean.

Again on pp. 313, 314, the reviewer, in reference to the terms *direct* and *immediate*, tells us Dr. Thornwell meant *two* things by them: "It is evident that Dr. Thornwell used them to sig-

nify, *first*, that the call is *specific*, of this particular man, to this specific work." "A *second* sense in which these terms are used by Dr. Thornwell, is the sense of there intervening as a medium between the conscience of the called and him who calls, *no human agency*." "The call is to be direct and immediate, impressed on the heart by God himself, and not interpreted to the individual only by other men." On p. 327, the correspondent also tells us that the language has two meanings. "In fine, what I conceive Dr. Thornwell to mean, is this: *First*, that the call is *supernatural*, in the sense that it originates with God, and not in the processes of the believer's experience, or in the agency of human beings, either as individuals or as organisations; and, *secondly*, that the call is *immediate*, in the sense that it is directly from God by immediate impressions made upon the man's own mind, and is not dependent upon the testimony of other men, nor derived from any special deliverance of the Word." The incongruity of these two expositions is evident, and the reader will probably think that neither of them, nor both of them taken together, is as intelligible as Dr. Thornwell's own statement. The latter of them has the fault of introducing into the explanation one of the very terms to be explained. It tells us "the call is *immediate*, in the sense that it is directly from God by *immediate* impressions made on the man's own mind." And when two such doctors disagree, a humble disciple may consider himself free to form his own opinion. I understood the language in question, as seeming to mean that, in the call to the ministry, the Holy Spirit communicates a knowledge of his will and the man's duty, directly to the latter, and not through the use of any means or instruments or other agency whatever. Does it not appear to mean that? Is not that what the reviewer understands by it? Indeed is not that the theory of the call adopted by the reviewer?

In a letter quoted by the reviewer, Dr. Thornwell himself says: "My friends sometimes charge me with a spice of fanaticism." And if my article, either expressly or impliedly made such a charge, surely it might be allowed without offence or pre-

sumption. Those who knew him, know well with what kindness, meekness, and respect, he was accustomed to receive objections to any of his views from the humblest of his brethren, and they will not doubt for a moment that he loved and honored the friends who charged him with fanaticism none the less on that account. It was my privilege to be counted among the number of his friends; his memory is as hallowed in my heart as it can be in that of the reviewer; but I do not think it a wrong to that memory to differ from him now, as I did sometimes when the world was blessed with his presence.

The reviewer quotes largely from Dr. Thornwell's discourse on the Personality of the Holy Ghost. I read that discourse twice over just before writing the article which called forth my reviewer's attack—and read it with delight, admiration, wonder, and some doubts—doubts as to whether I correctly understood the true meaning of some parts of it, and whether I could adopt all of its statements in their apparent sense. It seemed impossible to do so without striking from the number of God's children some, many, of the devoutest and holiest Christians the world ever saw. And it seemed equally impossible to reconcile them with the views of other great and eminent teachers of the Church. They can be accounted for, if indeed we must understand them in their obvious meaning, only on the supposition that, as the greatest and best men are liable to do, he was inclined to make his own experience a standard for others and the interpreter of truth.

And now in conclusion, I desire to ask a few questions: Can one called to the ministry have the "assurance" of his call, the "settled conviction," "the mighty supernatural conviction," which the reviewer insists on, *before* some Church has called him, and the Presbytery has approved? Does he need any other evidence of his call than the *consciousness* that he is called by the Spirit, which the reviewer affirms? Can he have any better or higher evidence of it? Can he dare to surrender that evidence for the judgment of others? Can others know or believe that he is called *before* he is himself conscious of this direct and imme-

diatr call by the Spirit? If so, *how* has he been called? *What* is his call? What are the *evidences* of it? If the Lord by his providence and Spirit has bestowed on any, gifts and qualifications suitable for the work of the ministry, for what were they given,—to what end and purpose?

The thoughtful reader, who shall follow out these questions whither they lead, will not fail to see that the reviewer's theory is a cobweb, spun of imaginations, and not a structure built of the solid materials of truth.

The reviewer says, p. 314: "There are two particulars of greatest consequence in which our friend appears to us to forsake the doctrine both of the Scripture and of our Standards." He specifies these: 1. "He denies that the Spirit ever by direct and immediate action communicates any knowledge of truth, either of doctrine or duty." 2. "Again, further, he denies that the subject of the immediate action of the Spirit, whether a sinner being regenerated, or a believer being sanctified, can be conscious of such action." Of course these statements must have reference to the present dispensation of the divine kingdom. I will not deny that these points are "of the greatest consequence," or that I hold in regard to them the views ascribed to me by the reviewer. But whether I or he has forsaken the doctrine of the Scriptures and of our Standards, others will decide for us.

Finally, let me say that this discussion, while turning legitimately on the simple question, whether the Divine Spirit calls men into the ministry, by directly and immediately communicating to them a knowledge of his will, strikes deeper than at first sight would appear. It involves the nature of the ministerial office and its relations to the Divine Master and to his Church—the question, whether the gospel ministry are a "holy order," a distinct class in the Church, or simply brethren of the brethren, of and among them, like them in genus and species, like them servants and disciples, called like them to consecrate themselves and all their gifts to the Master's glory, and doing their particular work, only because he has bestowed on them gifts and abilities for it. I hesitate not to say, that the theory of the reviewer is deeply infected with the virus of the prelatical, sac-

erdotal, apostolical-succession spirit, as was suggested by the writer in this *Review* of October, 1869—with whom the reviewer associates me in his criticisms, and beside whom I esteem it an honor to stand or fall.

ARTICLE V.

A FEW OBSERVATIONS ON THE FOREGOING ARTICLE.*

On every ground, excepting perhaps one, the writer of the foregoing article is entitled most fully to the opportunity which he has claimed of replying to the Remarks on the Call in our number for April last. The one ground which cannot so readily be admitted is, that *we made the attack*. Those Remarks were penned, under the impression that an attack had been made by him, which it was our duty to repel. But it is not necessary to press this point in the least. That the subject is one of importance and of difficulty; that Dr. Porter stands deservedly in the front rank of our ministry; that he considers himself to have been misunderstood and misrepresented in the Remarks;—these considerations, and perhaps it is not improper to add, the private

*This rejoinder to Dr. Porter's second article was prepared before we received the sad intelligence of our loss and the Church's loss in his death. The names *friend* and *brother* have been applied to him throughout this discussion in the fullest sense in which they are ever used. A particular friendship of more than a quarter-century's duration bound us together, and it was never interrupted for an hour. He was eminently worthy to be loved, trusted, and admired. He leaves behind him, in the whole ministry of our Church, no man of broader intellect, combined with more commanding eloquence, thorough scholarship, true-heartedness, and humble piety. His character displayed all these excellencies in a very eminent degree. May the divine Spirit qualify and call many more such men, as Dr. Abner A. Porter was, into the ministry of our Church. J. B. A.

sentiments entertained for him, of mingled respect, esteem, and affection, all unite to demand that he have the fullest liberty to criticise the Remarks. The Observations now to be submitted need not be extensive. Only here and there a point requires to be elucidated, which can be briefly done, and then the question may be left to the reader's judgment. Should it happen however that our friend shall desire to rejoin, he may rest assured of a cordial welcome again into these pages.

1. Our brother was astonished to have it said, that he "certainly condemns the term *supernatural* in reference to the call," and in vain read his article twice over to find where and when. Let him look at the notes to page 80, and it will stare him in the face. He there quotes, as a fair sample of the theory which he denounces as fanatical, Dr. Thornwell's statement that "a *supernatural* conviction of duty, wrought by the immediate agency of the Holy Ghost, is an essential element in the evidence of a true vocation to the ministry."

But now Dr. Porter declares he is willing to take either sense of the term *supernatural* given by the reviewer, with Dr. Thornwell's aid, and to say that in that sense he holds the call to be supernatural; which is so far satisfactory, and removes one supposed disagreement betwixt us out of the way.

2. There is one place, and but one, where Dr. Porter complains that "the reviewer grievously misrepresents" him. The reference made was to his language on p. 78. He is right—he was misrepresented, because he was misapprehended, and the misapprehension was occasioned by the paragraphing and the figuring which appeared together on that page. It is submitted however that the misrepresentation was not so grievous as it would have been if he had not elsewhere in the first article, and also in the Reply, repeatedly charged the theory he was opposing with pertaining in general to ignorant and fanatical people—a charge which has not been made out, and cannot be made out. This leads us to observe:

3. Dr. Porter takes the trouble to quote at considerable length from Owen and Edwards, to prove that there have been many fanatics setting up claims to a supernatural call, on the ground

of "new extraordinary revelations," or "immediate prophetic inspirations," "communicated by suggestions, impulses, voices, monitions, and revelations," and "attended with texts of Scripture strongly impressed on the mind," or "whispers and words immediately suggested or put into the mind." It is not denied that such enthusiasts may abound now, and have at different periods abounded. This class of pretenders were expressly signalled in the sermon, which, reviewed by Dr. Thornwell, has given rise to the present controversy. "Pretensions to the Call, which are not founded upon a real call of God *properly authenticated according to the provisions of his Word*," were arranged into three classes—the third being that of fanatics, "who claim that every one is the sole judge of his own case, and necessarily must be, and that all other evidence, but the convictions of his own mind, is inconclusive and needless." In opposition to such fanatical claims, the doctrine was laid down that the validity of any man's call to preach is to be evinced by three testimonies—that of his own conscience, that of some congregation, and that of some Presbytery. The testimony of the individual that he is called of God, was held to be *insufficient* though *necessary*, and the man a *deceived man* or a *deceiver*, where the other two elements of the proper scriptural authentication of the call from God did not come in. We all know that there are now, and have often been such deceivers, and that the peculiarity of their fanatical claim is, that it will allow no room for any proof, except their own convictions and assertions thereof. But, says Dr. Breckinridge, "if nothing else could be objected to pretensions of this sort, it is sufficiently evident that the principle on which they proceed, defeats themselves—for every child of God is as really called to be a follower of Jesus, as any office-bearer can be to discharge any function for the edification of God's people; and therefore every particular disciple is as much a judge, whether the office-bearer is divinely sent to him, as the office-bearer is whether he is divinely sent at all." The claim of the fanatic is,—and our brother, in his first article, seems to admit the justice of it, (see p. 81),—that if conscious to himself that he is called, he might properly decline to submit his pretensions

to the judgment of the Church, for his call would authenticate itself. But the proper idea of the Church's prerogative would appear to be, that she is to sit in judgment on these professed calls which purport to come directly from God, and that no matter what may be the individual's confidence that he has been directly called of God, the Church may nevertheless reject him as not-called at all. It is urged in the passage just referred to, that if a direct testimony to his call is necessary for the individual himself, similar testimony is necessary for those who are to judge of it, because lower testimony cannot authenticate a higher. This is taking for granted that the pretender has indeed had a direct call which is the very question submitted to the Church for her own separate and independent judgment. Is she is satisfied by her experience of his ministrations that he is called of God, and, also, that he can edify her? She is entitled to judge for herself upon both points, and all the individual's claims are nothing, until confirmed by this testimony of the Church and of the Presbytery. —

This view of the subject makes it very plain, that no part of the testimonies collected with so much care and pains by our friend, have any bearing whatever upon the position he assails, and also that our theory of the call is very far from being that of enthusiasts or fanatics.

4. In his first article (p. 73), Dr. Porter set forth three possible answers to the question, *How* does the Spirit convince one of his duty to preach the gospel? The first, was through a direct and immediate communication of his will by an operation independent of means; the second, was by the ordinary means so used as to impart to the individual's consciousness an assurance that the call is from the Spirit. These two were represented as substantially the same, and involving equally a new revelation, and so constituting a dangerous, fanatical theory. Then on p. 79, we read: "The question is, not whether there is any putting forth of the power of the Spirit in a call to this office; but whether in ordinary cases it is only through ordinary instrumentalities, or also in a direct and immediate operation on the soul." Thus the call was dealt with as being under either view an *ope-*

ration of the Spirit—an exercise of his *power*. But in his Reply, it suits Dr. Porter to make a sharp distinction between the direct agency of the Spirit as involving an exercise of *power*, and as involving *instruction*; and he would fain have the reviewer to fall on the edge of that distinction. The former he admits, but he denies the latter; and he attempts to convict his friend, *first*, of confounding the two; and, *secondly*, of affirming an error in affirming the latter, viz., that the Spirit does directly impart *instruction*. Let us examine these two points:

First, then, as to the charge of confounding power with instruction, the language of Dr. Porter just now quoted, which is a fair sample of his general treatment of the subject makes it sufficiently evident that in his former article he drew no such distinction himself. But,

Secondly, as to his denial of direct instruction, the Reply, notwithstanding this denial which is generally maintained, yet in one place makes an admission which deserves to be signalled. With some warmth it repels what the reviewer said of Dr. Porter's wishing to prove that the Church and the individual could decide the question unaided by the Spirit. "Most expressly and repeatedly I affirmed that the aid of that blessed Agent is needed." "I believe in his real, présent, personal, and if the reviewer please, supernatural aid. I admit even *direct* aid in Dr. Thornwell's sense of putting the soul in a condition to receive, discern, and accept the truth." (See foregoing article, p. 98). Here, then, not only is acknowledged a *direct* exercise of "power," (for the truth *ex hypothesi* is not yet received nor even discerned, and so cannot be a medium in any sense,) but there is also acknowledged here an operation of the Spirit, which would seem to be equivalent to a direct illumination of the soul respecting duty. The question being, Ought I to preach? it is acknowledged that the Spirit does directly put the soul into a condition, that is, does *directly illuminate it*, so as to enable the individual to apply the general principles of the Word to his particular case. This seems to approach very closely to the idea of *direct* instruction. The man reads the Word, but does not there perceive it to be his duty to preach the gospel. Then comes the

Spirit and *directly*, that is without the use of any means whatever, *illuminates the soul* and puts it into a condition to receive, discern, and accept the truth that he is called. Why surely this amounts to a direct and immediate call from the Holy Ghost, for it is he who interprets to the called his call. Just as the Spirit's direct illumination of one's soul as to the fact of his adoption is the direct witness of the Spirit unto him concerning that fact; so here the Spirit, directly and without the use of means, witnesses that one is called to preach, by directly and without the use of means putting his soul in a condition to receive, discern, and accept the truth that he is called. But this is not all. If our friend inculcates anything he does inculcate this: that the Spirit instructs *through* the Word. But there is no special revelation in the Word regarding any particular individual, making it his specific duty to preach the gospel. There is no such declaration, utterance, or precept. The Spirit therefore does not use any special truth as the medium through which he so instructs a man as to call him to preach. How, then, according to our brother, is the truth employed by the Spirit for this end? The general principles are used by him, and the individual is enabled to make an application of them to the special concrete case before his own mind by the Spirit's direct illumination. Manifestly then the Spirit instructs through no special truth, and his illumination, while it has reference to the truth, and is always in strictest consistency with it, is not imparted as to the particular case, *through* the truth, but is *directly* communicated. Now these plain consequences of an admission by Dr. Porter will do pretty well. For they seem to shut him up to agree with us, that no man is to intrude into the sacred office without a call from God, but that as God does not in his Word appoint this and that man to preach, it must be dangerous for any man to hold that he is so appointed without a direct illumination and persuasion from the Spirit thereto.

This will be therefore a good place to press the distinction between the *general* principles and deliverances of the Word and its *special* declarations—a distinction which is vital in the discussion of the question, introduced here by our brother, *How*

does the Spirit convince a man of his duty to preach? The doctrine of the Confession is true, that "the whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his glory, man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture, unto which nothing is at any time to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit or the traditions of men." But while that symbol thus holds up the Word as the perfect rule of our faith and practice, it goes on in the very next sentence to present to us the Holy Spirit as our guide and teacher. And Dr. A. A. Hodge is quoted by Dr. Porter as well pointing out how, while all "public revelations" pretended to since the apostles—as those of Swedenborg and the Mormons—have been inconsistent with Scripture, and of bad moral character; and while "private revelations have been professed only by vain enthusiasts and are incapable of verification," nevertheless a "personal, spiritual illumination by the power of the Holy Ghost is necessary in every case for the practical and saving knowledge of the truth embraced in the Scriptures." Dr. Hodge tells us why this is necessary, viz., our carnal and blind condition by nature. And he adds, that the illumination of the Spirit does not convey any new truth to the understanding, but only opens the mind and heart to the truth already presented in the Scriptures. Then he further proceeds to declare that "while the Scriptures are a complete rule of faith and practice . . . yet they do not descend in practical matters into details, but laying down general principles leave men to apply them in the exercise of their natural judgment in the light of experience and in adaptation to changing circumstances, as they are guided by the sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit."

Now this is a clear and satisfactory setting forth of the truth in question. The Word gives us general principles, but in practical matters it does not descend into details or give us specific rules. Men are to apply the general principles to the practical questions which arise, by the use of their natural judgment and the light of their experience *as the Spirit guides them*. Yes, the Word is our rule, general not specific; but the Spirit is our guide

and teacher. We insist with Dr. A. A. Hodge on this teaching of the Spirit in all matters of practical detail,—it is not *reason* nor *experience* merely, by which we are to apply the general rules of the Word and so order our own steps, but we must have the direct illumination of the Spirit putting our minds into a condition to receive, discern, and accept the truth revealed. We need his guidance. Men cannot dispense with it, first, because (as Dr. Hodge says) they are blind by nature, and their sight is very imperfect also after they are converted, so that they are disabled in either state from making a proper use of the Word, except as the Spirit shall illuminate their minds to understand it; but, secondly, because no rule of faith could by any possibility give us specific directions touching every point of our duty. The world could not contain the books which must have been written, had God thought proper to teach us in written words every particular of what might be his will respecting every one of us. Instead of furnishing the whole world with minute directions touching every particular individual's duty respecting every affair of life, God has chosen to give us a *rule* of faith applicable to all men alike, and then a *guide* to teach the way he should go, to every man who holds that rule in his hand and seeks to learn from it his duty in particular. The Scriptures are in many cases only a general rule of conduct for us—in many cases only a negative rule, instead of being either specific or positive. Dr. Porter seems disposed to evade all consideration of this distinction, but it must be pressed upon his notice. How does the Word teach any man that he in particular is called to preach? How does it teach any minister that he is called to one particular Church rather than another? Or how is any believer to know when he interprets and applies properly the general directions of the Word to his own particular case? It is perfectly certain that the rule of our faith does not furnish us with full and specific directions respecting the way in which we should go in those multitudinous exigencies which demand that we choose between different courses that lie before us. The Word, as Dr. A. A. Hodge well says, does not in practical matters descend to details, but it gives only general principles. Dr. Porter says our

distinction between the Word as a *rule* or as a *guide*, is a "mere play upon words," for a rule is a guide, and that every one but the reviewer knows that he does not exclude the Spirit from using the Word to guide his people. But the reviewer craves to be informed how the Spirit can use Word for guiding us in those numerous cases where nothing specific is said by it touching our duty. Of course the Spirit is omnipotent, but that would suggest that he is not to be shut up to any means whatever. In this case, the Word is clearly not sufficient *in itself*, but we have the ever blessed and Almighty Spirit making it adequate. And it would seem that this must be either in the way of *direct guidance and instruction* as to specific duties, as we have expressed it, or in the way of a *direct illumination of the soul, enabling us to receive, discern, and apply the general principles and precepts of the Word* to the particular case in hand, as Dr. Porter has preferred to express it. The reader is welcome to take his choice between the two statements. What we are concerned to insist upon is, what Dr. Bannerman sets forth so well, (see Church of Christ, Vol. I., pp. 194–199,) that Christ is both the founder and the administrator of his Church, and operates continually in and upon it through his Spirit and his Word. His ordinances are only the channels of spiritual blessings. Having impressed upon his Church a certain character, he does not abandon it to proceed according to the law or nature thus imparted to it, and does not deposit with the Church or in her ordinances a store of grace to be dispensed apart from himself. Most especially he does not leave it for the Church by herself to call his ministers. "He keeps in his own hand all the power and grace, and is ever present directly, and with his own hand, to exercise that power and dispense that grace." None of the ordinances, not even the Word itself, has any power or efficacy apart from the Spirit making use of it, and not even to honor the blessed Word itself, may we exclude the direct agency and operation of the Lord Jesus through his Spirit. Whereinsoever he must supplement the general teachings of his Word by specific guidance, whereinsoever he must enable the soul to receive and apply to concrete cases the general principles given in the Scriptures, we have his

presence and his power to perform for us these necessary things, and so we find his Word and Spirit sufficient for our rule and guide. What we are concerned to insist upon is, (to refer again to the impressive language of Dr. Thornwell,) that the means of grace, Scripture itself included, are all so many ways to the Spirit—the galleries in which his glory shall be seen and his power felt. The means of grace are not laws of grace. The Holy Ghost is a Person, and we stand in need of his personal interposition and personal direction. And this is promised to us in the Scriptures. The Word is not the limit either of his power or of his teaching. Let fanatics on the one hand abuse the Scripture doctrine of the Spirit's guidance, and let rationalists on the other decry it—the one weighs no more with us than the other. Be it ours to walk in the safe middle revealed to us on this subject. The argument from abuse never is legitimate; but it is as applicable to the guidance of the Word as it is to that of the Spirit. Fanatics and imposters wrest the inspired Scriptures to their own deluding, and that of others. Fanatical excesses of all kinds are dangerous and dreadful. Under the cloak of the fanatic, Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light. Yet the foundation of God standeth sure. The seal of the Spirit is no vain delusion, though thousands be deceived by the counterfeit stamp. Let every man look well to his own heart. (See Thornwell's Collected Writings, Vol. II., pp. 362, 363).

But let it now be particularly observed, that the admission made by our friend as to the Spirit's *directly* putting the soul into a condition to receive and apply to concrete and specific cases the general directions of the Word, is precisely what the Confession of Faith appends as a qualifying clause to its statement touching the sufficiency of the Word as our rule of faith and practice. "Nevertheless," says that symbol, "we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the Word." Although the Word is our rule, no man can savingly understand it except by the Spirit's *directly*, that is, without use of means, operating on his soul to illuminate it. Things are *revealed* to us in the Word, but might as well not be

revealed there, unless there be a direct operation of the Spirit on the souls of its readers; this we are all to acknowledge. Accordingly, effectual calling is, in the same symbol, said to be *by the Word and Spirit*; sanctification is also described as *by the Word and Spirit*; and saving faith is said to be ordinarily wrought by the ministry of *the Word through the Spirit*. And Christ is said, in the Larger Catechism, to perform the office of a prophet “in his revealing to his Church in all ages by his Spirit and Word, in divers ways of administration, the whole will of God in all things concerning their edification and salvation.” Thus every where, in our symbols, it is *the Word and Spirit* which are held up together, and yet apart. It is not the Spirit *through* the Word—it is not the Spirit *by* the Word which our Standards refer to, but it is *the Spirit and the Word*, or else *the Word and the Spirit*—not as though the instrument is the equal of the agent, but as though the agent acts sometimes directly and without the instrument; even as in order to our understanding the Word he operates *directly* to illuminate our souls, and even as in divers ways of administration is revealed to the Church in all ages by his Spirit and by his Word the whole will of God in all things which concern their edification and salvation. How could the Larger Catechism more distinctly than in these terms set forth the idea that the Word by itself does not compass the whole teaching of the Spirit, but that by his Spirit and by his Word Christ continuously teaches his Church in all ages the whole will of God respecting all things? And, then, as to the Shorter Catechism, what does it mean by saying that “Christ exercises the office of a prophet in revealing to us by his Word and Spirit the Will of God for our salvation?” If the will of God is revealed to us only by the Word, what for is it added so distinctly that Christ reveals to us *by the Spirit* the will of God for our salvation?

Now were there time and space, it would be proper and perhaps not very difficult to disprove Dr. Porter’s allegation, that the weight of the Reformed and the Puritan testimony is against the doctrine of immediate teachings by the Spirit. But it is time perhaps that both our friend and his reviewer should drop all

human authorities and come to the main question, What does the Word, which is the only and sufficient rule of faith and practice, teach about the Spirit? Is it the doctrine of the Bible that the Spirit never communicates directly with the soul of man, but only through the Scriptures? On the contrary, it asserts that he comes to the sinner dead in sin and unable to hear the Word at all, and directly communicates to him life and light—in certain cases as of infants, idiots, and the insane not making, so far as we know, any use whatever of the Word. It says that he communicates *charismata* for his own service directly to men; for, all these various gifts, both ordinary and extraordinary, are wrought in us by “one and the self-same Spirit dividing to every man severally as he will.” It says that he witnesses to the believer his being a child of God. It says the sons of God are all led by the Spirit of God. It says (by the mouth of our Lord himself), “when he the Spirit of truth is come, he will guide you into all truth,” and “he shall take of mine and shall show them unto you.” Here, then, is the Word, our perfect rule of faith, telling how in certain cases its Divine Author surpasses its limits, does for sinners *directly* what itself cannot do at all, communicates gifts to his servants and light to his followers in a way itself cannot attain, guides them into all truth, and reveals to them things which, with the Word in their ears and before their eyes, they have not perceived nor understood. And thus we are taught in the Word itself that the Spirit operates directly as well as through the Scriptures on the soul of man, so that our guiding is *by the Spirit and the Word*. And now what will our brother do with the Scripture for this confession which it makes that the blessed Revealer is not shut up to the use of it as his means of operation? He cannot call the Scripture *fanatical*, and yet for these same declarations which it makes he applies that term to us.

In conclusion of this observation: The sufficiency of Scripture as the only rule of our faith and practice is a favorite topic with the reviewer, and his classes will bear him witness how much he delights to insist on this grand Protestant principle. Perhaps on no point of his official instructions is he

accustomed to dwell with more earnestness. And therefore Dr. Porter by no means fairly represents the reviewer's position, in saying that he affirms "new revelations." Of course the very last thing any one holding the reviewer's idea of the Call would say is, that it is a "new revelation." Our friend labors hard to fasten that consequence upon the reviewer's doctrine, but it cannot be done. The term *revelation* of course, whenever it is strictly applied, refers to the Word of God alone, but there is no such use of that word in the Scriptures (however our friend may seek to juggle with it) as shuts out the idea from God's Word of the direct teachings of the Spirit. We read that "no man knows the Father but he to whom the Son will reveal him;" and that if in anything we who believe are otherwise minded than the perfect are, "God shall reveal even this" unto us. Such passages, and they are many, suggest the idea of the *teachings of the Spirit* where the Word may have failed to be rightly apprehended, or may not have given positive and specific directions. We read of God's hiding things from the wise and prudent (although they did possess and consult the written Word) and revealing the same to babes who can not be instructed by the Word. We read of things being taught in demonstration of the Spirit—of things the eye hath not seen, nor the ear heard (although the province of the Word is, to appeal to those faculties), but "God hath revealed them to us by the Spirit," which Spirit "we have received, that we might know the things which are which are freely given to us of God." Such is the Bible use of the terms "revealed" and "revelation," and Dr. Porter cannot produce any passages which warrant his peculiar use of these terms. The question in debate was, whether the Spirit ever communicates directly with the soul. The reviewer maintained that he does, and his friend then endeavors to throw odium on that position by charging that he holds to "new revelations," which in the reviewer's apprehension are a very different affair. With our Confession, we reject all "new revelations of the Spirit," but acknowledge the necessity of his illumination and guidance. With Dr. A. A. Hodge we hold that the Spirit's illumination conveys to the understanding no new truth that is

general, while he does guide and teach us in all practical matters as to our own particular duty. And this guidance of the Spirit is far safer than that of our own *reason* applying the Word.

5. Let the state of the question be now fairly considered. Dr. Porter began the discussion by alleging, that "in whatever way such a call [to the ministry] may be described, whether as a conviction of duty, the testimony of the man's consciousness, etc., . . . if it is referred to a direct and special agency of the Spirit, it affirms a revelation," and that "the idea that this call is a direct and immediate conviction or suggestion . . . not referable to the ordinary influences of the Spirit through the rational faculties of the soul and through the use of ordinary means, brings it at once within the region of blind human fancy and imagination, and of Satanic influence." [See pp. 79, 80, 82.] And he proceeded to declare that Drs. Breckinridge and Thornwell held such a doctrine. Now it is not probable, whatever inferences we might draw from his expressed views, that Dr. Thornwell had before his mind the question, whether the call is *mediate* through the truth of the Word, or *immediate* in the sense of not being through that truth. What he *certainly did affirm* directly was the exclusion of all human agency external to the man himself as the necessary medium of the Spirit's call, although *perhaps* he also implied that the call is so far direct and immediate as not to be given through the medium of the Word. These representations of his position will be found to have been made in the Remarks on Dr. Porter's article, pp. 314 and 324. But now Dr. Porter (see p. 133) says definitely that he understood Dr. Thornwell as affirming that the call is direct and immediate in the sense of its being without the use of the ordinary means, and accordingly in this view especially, he applies to it such terms as "fanatical and dangerous." In the course of the discussion he is led to maintain that the Spirit never does *directly* instruct men, but always and only through the medium of the Word. Perhaps there should be expressed here some qualification of the statement that this is what he maintains, because it does not seem perfectly certain what was the precise ground he occupied.

On pp. 98 and 99 of the foregoing article, as well as on pp. 84, 85, of the first one, he seems to allow that the Spirit does communicate with men otherwise than through the written Word, so that he makes it easy to reply to his condemnation of the belief of fanatics in "suggestions, monitions, voices, and revelations of the Spirit," that he himself says that "the heavens above and the overarching firmament" may be used by the Spirit as an "instrument to convince us of our duty," and that the winds may bear us his instructions, and also the stars, also thunderbolts and earthquakes, as well as a mother's voice or as human tears and sighs. (See first article, p. 85).

But probably this precise point of the use of the Word by the Spirit in his calling men into the ministry has been sufficiently considered in the preceding Observation. It is proposed now to drop all further question of the place of the Word in the matter of the Call to preach, that the discussion may be narrowed down to what Dr. Thornwell did certainly affirm, viz., that men are called to the ministry by a direct vocation of the Spirit, which is not mediated through any mere human agency. And now upon this point, how stands the debate between the reviewer and his friend? The former affirms a *direct* call from God, inasmuch as the individual has a conviction of conscience produced by the direct agency of the Holy Ghost. The latter maintains that the conviction of conscience is but indirectly the call of God, being inferentially deduced from the conscious possession of suitable gifts and from the judgment of the Church.

It was said by Drs. Breckinridge and Thornwell that the validity of the call was evinced by the testimony of conscience, and of the Church. They represented the conviction of duty as an element in the evidence of a true vocation, for they were alive to the danger of fanatical pretensions and were perfectly sensible of the Church's title to judge for herself all professed messengers from God. But possibly it might be said in greater strictness of speech, that the conviction of conscience is not so much an *evidence* of God's call, as his call itself. The thing to be evidenced is God's will that this man shall go and preach, and the conviction of conscience that he ought

to preach, is to that man presumptively God's call to him. This conviction is the *direct* call—it is not mediated through any one else. And it is presumptively the work of the Holy Ghost. Now comes the second expression of God's will—the testimony of the Christian people. Strictly speaking, perhaps this also is not an evidence of the call, but an element of the call itself. It is the expression of God's will through the uttered judgment of his people. This is the first element in the *indirect* call—that is, the call as mediated through others than the man himself. Thirdly, there is the testimony of a court. This is the third element in the call, or the second in the indirect call—the expression of God's will through one of the courts of his house. The call is now completed, consisting of the *direct* element of the man's conscientious convictions and the *indirect* elements of the judgment of the people and of a church-court. God's will is now fully expressed *according to the belief of these parties entitled to judge of it*, and the duty of the individual is thus clearly ascertained *to their satisfaction*. The *status quæstionis* may therefore be put thus:

1. *The thing to be proved*, viz., God's will that this particular man should preach—in other words, this particular man's duty to preach.

2. *The proof*—God's call, which consists of, *first*, a conviction of conscience, God's direct call to the man; and, *secondly*, the two-fold judgment of the Church, God's indirect call.

According to this statement of the question the debate is reduced to this point: Whether a conviction of conscience that one should preach may be *immediately* produced by the Holy Ghost, or must always be *mediately* wrought through means and instrumentalities. And now having dropped the entangling question about the place of the Word in this matter, which perhaps may be considered as having been really foreign to the question and as having served only to embarrass it, the discussion is still further narrowed to this single point, Whether a conviction of conscience that one is called to preach may be immediately produced by the Holy Ghost, without the intervention of

human instrumentalities. The reviewer affirms and Dr. Porter denies. This is what Drs. Breckinridge and Thornwell affirmed, and perhaps it is all they did affirm touching this matter, and for this, interpreted by Dr. Porter as a denial of the sufficiency of the Word, he assails their doctrine as fanatical and dangerous. And he maintains that *gifts* and the *Church's appointment* constitute the Call without any direct operation of the Spirit upon the individual's own mind. (See *Review* for January, 1872, pp. 69, 70, 100, 101.)

Let the reader judge now between these conflicting views. Is it indeed true that the Spirit has no direct hand in calling men into the ministry, but that any man may assume the office who infers a call from being conscious of his possessing the needful gifts, provided the Church's opinion of him is also favorable? And is it on the other hand a fanatical doctrine that the man who is truly called to preach must and will feel a supernatural conviction of his duty wrought by the immediate agency of the Holy Ghost? Is it safe to say that an individual, upon his own judgment that he has the necessary gifts may venture into the awful ministry as soon as the Church will call him, but fanatical and dangerous to say that he may not do this without a call directly from the Spirit impressed upon his heart? Is it safe to say that the Church can discern that this or that particular person ought to be in the ministry, and that her appointment (with his possession of the gifts) is the Call, but fanatical and dangerous to insist that, along with the Church's call, there must be the direct vocation of the Spirit? Has the Holy Ghost anything directly to do with the Call to the ministry, or has he not? And if he has, where does his direct agency come in? If it is fanatical to hold that he directly teaches the man his duty in the premises, must it not be fanatical to say that he directly teaches the Church her duty in the premises, and so will not his direct agency in the work of thrusting forth laborers into the Lord's vineyard be altogether denied? And will it not soon come to this that calculations of expediency on the man's part, and on the Church's part, are to form the whole ground-work of a call to the gospel ministry? Now if this be not a low semi-rationalistic

view of the ministry, and be not calculated to fill our pulpits with a generation of men not called of God to the work, a generation of time-servers and preachers without the demonstration and power of the Spirit, then Church History, as it recounts the workings of Formalism and Moderatism, has no solemn warnings for us or those who may come after us.

6. Our brother says that the reviewer confounds *conscience* with *consciousness*, which confusion is the occasion of very much of the difficulty that has arisen. From this complaint, one would expect to find a clear separation betwixt these terms made by the writers who preceded the reviewer in this discussion, and especially by Dr. Porter himself. Now it is perfectly certain that neither Dr. Breckinridge nor Dr. Thornwell was concerned to distinguish carefully between these terms in relation to the call, as the reader may easily discover. As to our brother himself, it must be confessed that he appears to have in most places observed such a distinction, but he has not uniformly done so. The reader will find that on p. 79, for example, (*Review* for January, 1872), "conviction of duty," "testimony of consciousness," "impression fixed on the conscience," seem to be looked upon as various modes of expressing one idea. The question therefore did not properly turn upon any difference between *conscience* and *consciousness*, but between the *directness* or *indirectness* of the call. If it were said that the Spirit makes "an impression on the conscience," or if it were said that he employs "the testimony of consciousness," it was with our friend the same fanatical idea, so long as the Spirit was said to act directly, and not through external means. Now, however, Dr. Porter insists upon the great importance of distinguishing between these terms. Admitting that the Spirit may produce a certain and assured conviction of his calling one to preach, our brother protests that "if this fact be made known to the man's consciousness, that is another matter"—in fact a new "revelation." (P. 115). And this explains the force of a sentence in the first article of our friend (p. 81), where it is said "if the evidence of such a call to his own consciousness be necessary to authorise any one to undertake the work of the ministry, then it is sufficient of

itself, without being submitted to the judgment of the Church. For such a call authenticates itself." The writer proceeds to say the Church could not sit in judgment on a call to a man's *consciousness*, unless she were furnished with like extraordinary testimony, because a lower cannot authenticate a higher testimony. The idea is, that if a man should plead before the Church that his consciousness tells him God calls him to preach, she must admit him to the ministry without question as one extraordinarily called! Indeed! But may not the man be *lying*?—and has not the Church the right and duty of judging for herself respecting his claims? Or, if the man believes honestly that his consciousness tells him he is called, is it therefore certain that his belief is correct?—perhaps he may only be in the position which our friend wishes to put the reviewer in, viz., of confounding terms which differ! Or, suppose that the man is actually conscious of a call to preach, is it proved by this experience of his that it is God who utters the call? The man has had the deepest and strongest possible impression made upon his mind that God calls him into the ministry—is it not conceivable that an evil spirit, instead of the good Spirit of God, is the author of his impressions? Is every honest fanatic inspired, who feels that consciousness tells him that he is inspired? Is every devotee of Satan called with a holy calling, whose mind the devil fills with such a delusion? Is not our friend confounding "consciousness" with an inference which is drawn from a deliverance of consciousness?* It is precisely because there are honest as well as dishonest pretenders to special revelations made to their consciousness that the Church is divinely authorised to judge every man's pretensions to the call to preach,

*"The facts of consciousness are to be considered in two points of view; either as evidencing their own ideal or phenomenal existence, or as evidencing the objective existence of something else beyond them. A belief in the former is not identical with a belief in the latter. The one cannot, the other possibly may be refused. . . We cannot possibly refuse the fact of its evidence [that of consciousness] as given, but we may hesitate to admit that beyond itself of which it assures. . . . The whole phenomenon, as given in consciousness, may be admitted, and yet its inference doubted. . . .

and to refuse many such. When God does really call any man to preach, it follows, of course, that the man will hear the call and will know that it is God who calls him; "the call of God never fails to be convincing,"—so said Dr. Thornwell, and truly; but the converse of the statement he does not utter, viz., that the man who is convinced of his call never fails to be one called of God.

Touching the terms *conscience* and *consciousness* therefore, the confusion is with our brother, who identifies a deliverance of consciousness with an inference from that deliverance? And now it begins to appear why he is so anxious to deny that the believer can be conscious of the Spirit's operation within him. The Spirit is said in Scripture to witness to the believer, and there can hardly be such a witnessing and the believer not be *conscious* of it. Dr. Porter is evidently afraid to admit this, because he fancies that he must then admit what any fanatic may choose to declare that he is conscious of. It is a pity such a ghost as this should scare him from accepting the positive testimony of Scripture, that the Spirit does directly communicate with the children of God, and that they do know that it is he who speaks to their hearts.

And here there is a misstatement of the reviewer's idea (of course not designed by our brother) touching the evidential relation which a conviction of conscience sustains to the call. We are represented (see foregoing article, pp. 94, and 123, 124,) as holding that the conviction of conscience is one of the *evidences* of a man's having the consciousness that he is called to preach—that the *consciousness* of the call is first, and the conviction of conscience second—that the man *knows* first that he is called, and then conscience comes in and tells him that it is his duty to obey the call.

Consciousness is only a phenomenon; the contrast between the subject and the object may be only apparent, not real; the object given as an external reality may only be a mental representation, which the mind is, by an unknown law, determined unconsciously to produce and to mistake for something different from itself; all this may be said and believed without self-contradiction—nay all this has, by the immense majority of modern philosophers, been actually said and believed." Sir William Hamilton's *Metaphysics*, Lecture XV.

Now, let it be clearly understood, what the thing is which is to be proved, viz., that it is God's will this man should preach the gospel. The thing to be proved is, not the consciousness of the man that he is called, but what God wills respecting him—and, of this will of God, the direct proof is, that the man is conscious that God calls him to preach. Now this is substantially the same as to say that the conviction of conscience proves that it is God's will that he should preach. For to say that I have a conviction of a call, and to say that I have a consciousness of a conviction of a call are one and the same thing; just as, according to Sir William Hamilton, to say that I know, and to say that I know that I know, are one and the same. The conviction of conscience therefore is not a proof of the consciousness of a call, but the conscious conviction of conscience is the call itself directly from God to the man. And to hold that a knowledge of the call is mediated through a conviction of conscience does not make the call *mediate*, for the conscience is part of the man himself. But if a demand is made for a stricter philosophical accuracy, and the distinction is pressed between a conviction and a consciousness of that conviction, then the case will stand thus: Not that the conviction of a call proves the consciousness of the call—that is nonsense; but that consciousness witnesses the existence of the conviction, and this conviction is the direct call.

7. Dr. Porter considers it a very good argument against the direct call of the Spirit that its authority must be such as that no church or church-court could presume to sit in judgment upon it, since a lower authority never can authenticate a higher. But he does not hesitate to declare that every man who is conscious of having received the needful gifts has thereby obtained *indirectly* a call to the ministry, which he is bound to obey or incur dreadful guilt. (See the first article, pp. 100, 101). Thus he holds to an indirect call of the Spirit, mediated through an inference from a fact of which the individual is conscious. Here therefore is an indirect call which is fully authoritative, because it is the call of the Spirit, and it is hard to see why Dr. Porter should not insist upon every such individual man's taking on

himself the honor of the ministry without any regard whatever to the Church's sanction. The Spirit has called him—indirectly it is true, yet distinctly and positively. The authority of this indirect call is as full and complete as that of the directest call can possibly be. Such a call, therefore, Dr. Porter should say, must authenticate itself. There can be no need of submitting it to the judgment of the Church, and every man accordingly may be sole judge of his own title to the ministerial office. Such is the sweep of Dr. Porter's logic as it bears upon his own views of the call—it sanctions the pretensions of the wildest fanatic who ever raved. His indirect call of the Spirit through gifts, is as real and authoritative as our direct call of the Spirit. It can with no more propriety be submitted to the judgment of any inferior authority. Thus the argument forged by him against our position, if it has any force, must operate to destroy his own theory.

8. In his Reply to the Remarks, Dr. Porter seems unwilling to admit that he had directly charged Dr. Thornwell with the theory which he condemned as dangerous and fanatical. He is entitled of course to say in what sense he designed to be understood. Had this sufficed him, it would have been proper to say no more on that point. But he proceeds with an endeavour to demonstrate that what Dr. Thornwell said is really too dark to be understood, and to assert that the reviewer and his correspondent give incongruous expositions of Dr. Thornwell's language, so that it is plainly exhibited as obscure and confused. That there is no incongruity in these expositions, and that the thing expounded is not a confused statement, will both appear to the reader, who will examine what is quoted from Dr. Thornwell on pp. 293, 294, of the Remarks. It will be there discovered, that the reviewer and his correspondent were both of them warranted in the expositions which our brother says are incongruous. Dr. Thornwell there himself makes the comparison of the call in one aspect of it, that is, in its *mighty, invincible power*, to the Spirit's drawing a sinner to Christ; but, in another aspect of it, that is, in its *direct and supernatural certainty and force*, to the Spirit's witness with the believer that he is a child of God. Here, then,

are the two statements which our brother calls "incongruous expositions" of Dr. Thornwell's meaning, but unfortunately for our brother, they are both Dr. Thornwell's own statements. It is in vain our brother endeavors to show that the theory of Dr. Thornwell is dark and incomprehensible, just as he labored in vain to prove that it is fanatical and dangerous.

Dr. Porter pleads Dr. Thornwell's statement in the unpublished letter that his "friends sometimes charged him with a spice of fanaticism," as excusing him "if his article either expressly or impliedly made such a charge." When it is considered that this charge, whether expressly or implicitly made, was in the strongest terms, and to the widest extent, and in the most public manner, this plea, from what might be said privately and face to face to Dr. Thornwell himself, will hardly be accepted. But what signifies any such *conditional* statement? Why not either a complete denial, or a complete acknowledgment in the premises? Indeed, to say no more about the bearing of the first article, what is the significance of the whole of the second? What signify particularly all the extracts from Owen and from Edwards about enthusiasts and fanatics, if they do not signify that the theory which Dr. Porter opposes—Dr. Thornwell's theory—tends that way? We say "Dr. Thornwell's theory," for the reviewer brought forward no theory of his own. If he said any thing different from the doctrine he undertook to defend, it would have been easy of course for Dr. Porter to point it out. But probably nothing could be signalled as added by the reviewer; for whatever things our brother would point out in the Remarks as extreme, he would doubtless acknowledge are all held forth by Dr. Thornwell in that "Discourse on the Personality of the Spirit," which Dr. Porter read "with delight, admiration, wonder, and some doubts," but which he passes over in the fewest possible words. One satisfaction the reviewer certainly has, touching his defence of Dr. Thornwell's theory, and that is, that whereas his friend began with expressions which seemed to be very confident ones concerning the bad character of the theory in question, he is now ready to profess that he always doubted as to the real *meaning* of it, and doubts now more than ever.

9. Numerous cases where our brother differs with us have been passed over without notice in this rejoinder. It will be seen, for example, that we give different representations of what Owen and other eminent authorities have held on the question under debate. It has not appeared worth while to say any thing more as to the opinions really held by these great men: *first*, because any reader who desires can generally get access for himself to these works, and so can compare our opposing statements; and, *secondly*, because after all it is not a question of human authorities, but of the divine testimony. Still further, it will be noticed that Dr. Porter construes the history of Calvin, Knox, and Haliburton, very differently from the reviewer. Let the reader compare the contradictory representations for himself. It is deemed necessary to make but one point relative to both Calvin and Knox. Our brother regards it as incredible that either of them should have been conscious of the direct call of the Spirit without immediately obeying it, or that Calvin, after obeying the call and preaching publicly in Paris for a time, should shrink from the work and wish to retire. He "cannot think this of John Calvin." Similarly he asks: "Who can believe" the like of John Knox? Now we profoundly venerate both these Reformers; but we find no difficulty in believing them to have been men and not gods. The hesitancy felt by Jonah, and Jeremiah, and Moses, might be felt by Calvin or Knox. Dr. Thornwell said that he resisted long his call into the ministry. The various administrations of the Spirit may be in different degrees of strength in the case of different men and perhaps of the same man at different periods. We make also one point as touching the case of each of these Reformers by itself. *First*, as to Knox's history: Dr. Porter errs in saying that the reviewer denies the people's right to call whom they will—there is no point clearer; nor does the reviewer see any inconsistency between the Spirit's dealing directly with Knox's conscience, and yet causing the final appeal which shall overcome his scruples to be in connection with John Rough's sermon on the people's right to call. *Secondly*, with reference to Calvin and Du Tillet: Our brother surely cannot have examined himself the correspondence

or he could not speak of it as he does. In the very letter referred to, as not containing "one word" from Calvin about his consciousness of a call, etc., he says: "If there was any ground to dispute my call, I believe that you have got no such reasons to impugn my ministry, but *the Lord has furnished me* with more firm and stable ones for my confirmation. If you entertain some doubt about that, it is enough for me that it is quite clear *to my own satisfaction.*" He also in the same letter begs his friend: "Allow me to follow the rule of my *conscience,*" and expressly refers to *Jonah's case*, and his fear of the Lord's *finding him out* as he did the prophet. There is a previous letter of the same correspondence, dated July 10, 1538, in which the great Genevese says, that when he first entered on the work at Geneva, he "*discerned the calling of God which held*" him "*fast bound,*" and expresses his "*assurance*" in the continued "*guidance of the Lord,*" upon which he felt that he could more safely rely, than "*upon his own judgment.*" Calvin has no tincture of Rationalism in his creed—he does not lean on *his own judgment* in the things of God. Neither does his creed smack at all of Popery, nor yet of Independency—he does not implicitly rely on the judgment of *the Church.* But it is to *the Lord* he chiefly looks for direction in reference to questions of duty—the Lord by his Spirit and his Word.

10. In the close of his article, and indeed in the very last sentence, Dr. Porter introduces a new view of the theory opposed by him, declaring it to be "deeply infected with the virus of the prelatival, sacerdotal and apostolical-succession spirit." This is a most unexpected and extraordinary utterance. Hitherto our condemnation has been that of the *fanatics* and *mystics*—now as our brother is about to lay down his pen he launches this new thunderbolt! The first impression made by this charge was, that our friend was joking—and the next, that he must count *fanaticism* and *mysticism* attributed by him previously to the reviewer to be not quite so bad as *semi-rationalism*—the charge we had insinuated against his theory; and must therefore intend to throw in this additional accusation against our doctrine just to be even with us! Nor has the most careful reflection enabled us

to discern any serious foundation for this charge. Surely history does not exhibit, if we have rightly learned its lessons, any actual alliance, in general, of fanatics or mystics with prelacy, sacerdotalism, and apostolical succession. Those who abounded in the twelfth century, and again in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were, generally, enemies, not friends, of the Papacy. And then the philosophy of the case would seem equally with the history of it to contradict Dr. Porter. What is the favorite and leading idea of prelacy and sacerdotalism and apostolical succession? It is that the Church has a deposit of knowledge, power, and grace, in her hands, with authority to use and administer this deposit herself, (see Bannerman's Church of Christ, Vol. I., pp. 206-210); but the Scripture doctrine is, that Christ is the administrator no less than the founder of his Church. Accordingly the theory defended by us is, that the Head of the Church himself calls whom he will into the ministry. So far from our sympathising with apostolical succession, the idea which we hold forth is, that the Holy Ghost directly deals with the individual consciences of true ministers, and that the chief ground of their right to preach is not any external thing whatsoever, but the inward and supernatural and direct call of the Spirit. We exalt the spiritual; but prelacy and sacerdotalism and apostolical succession exalt the external. And Dr. Porter himself insists that the call comes *from the Church*, or at least *through the Church*, and not *directly from the Holy Ghost*. Christ did directly call men to bear rule in his house while he was on the earth, but now in his absence the Church calls in his stead, and not the Spirit! In the matter of the Call then, the Church, and not the Spirit, is the Vicar of Christ! Let the reader look at Bannerman's Church of Christ, Vol. I., pp. 83-90, and see how cosely this view approximates to that of the Church of Rome. So then what we, in this discussion with our brother, insist upon, is the *Spirit's* part, and what he insists on chiefly is the *Church's* part. The reader may decide whether of the two views is the more consistent with "prelacy, sacerdotalism, and apostolical succession."

To conclude: All which the two writers, who have been devoted,
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fended in this review asserted, was simply that every true minister is called of God, and feels more or less confidently assured of it. They urged that men cannot make ministers. They said it is not safe nor right to persuade all who seem to have the needful gifts that they ought to preach; and they said that no man may preach unless he feels God's commission certified to his heart. What they insisted on, was simply that the called will feel his call with a more or less deep and strong assurance wrought within his mind by the Holy Spirit. They held, that when God calls, the called man will hear and will know that God calls, nor will he be able always to resist the call. Upon this comes our brother and avers that here is a dangerous and fanatical claim to "new revelations of the Spirit," and that to say that the Holy Ghost can impress upon the mind a conviction of duty, and the man be conscious that the Spirit does call him is of the Evil One himself! The call to preach is not from God directly or immediately, nor is it individual and specific, but it comes always through the Church, and is for every man who has the needful gifts and qualifications! Let the reader judge between these conflicting theories, and especially let him revert to the two passages quoted from Drs. Breckinridge and Thornwell as the foundation of the serious charges made against their theory—let him revert to those passages now, after this long discussion, and say if they really do contain anything that is very bad or very dangerous.

For ourselves, we are profoundly impressed with the belief that their theory of the call is not only true, but very important to be urged at the present time. We are just now in far more danger of the rationalistic than of the fanatical extreme. The doctrine of the Spirit is far more hateful to this worldly age than even the doctrine of the Church. The tendency of our times sets more strongly towards a cold materialism than towards even the pseudo-spiritual—certainly with thoughtful and leading minds. There is too much tendency with many to persuade men into the ministry, as an affair of mere human calculation and expediency. Perhaps with some of the *persuaded* there may be a disposition in these times of pecuniary pressure amongst us to

seek the ministry for a livelihood. There is too great eagerness with many to usher all who have gifts—sometimes alas! in very moderate quantity—into the service of the Church. We do want more, yes, many more ministers, but we want none whom the Church shall herself make. It is not the call of the Church, it is not the possession of any natural gifts which ought to move any man to engage in this work, but the call directly from the Spirit. It is men whom the Lord himself sends that we want to see running with his message to dying sinners. It is the Lord himself we desire to have thrust forth the laborers into his harvest.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Present Issues; or, Facts Observable in the Consciousness of the Age. By Rev. ROBERT WITHERS MEMMINGER, Protestant Episcopal Church, Diocese of South Carolina, U. S., Author of *What is Religion?* Philadelphia: Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger. 1873.

The introduction to this book we read with great interest, and were prepared for something better, but have been disappointed. The vestibule is bigger than the building. The book contains some excellent things, but its distinctive views are crude, superficial and erroneous. In the chapter entitled "Universalism and Calvinism," the author affirms that "Universalism is the natural result of Calvinism," on this ridiculous ground: Calvinism represents God as fulfilling his purposes, Universalism does the same; therefore, the latter is the "natural result" of the former! For the same reason, every theological system, save Pelagianism, may claim to be the offspring of Calvinism. The Monoistic principle, he contends, conducts to Pantheism. The Divine supremacy over the realm of mind is inadmissible, else the mind of man is no other than the mind of God, and Pantheism absorbs the whole. "In God we live and move and have our being"—according to him, is false; for, thus, there could be no "we." It is not *I* that will and act, if God works within me both to will and do. Because the Divine power is essential, as the substratum, to every thought; because (as the old philosophers and theologians expressed it) the *Divine Concursus* is necessary to every exercise of the mind; therefore, according to this author, human personality, agency and responsibility cannot exist. If the mind of man be not independent, it cannot be free; nay, it cannot *be*. Independence or annihilation is the only alternative. He does not see that necessity and liberty are perfectly compatible; that Calvinism embraces the concurrence of the Divine and human agency, the sovereignty of God with the freedom of man; that the orbit in which the mind revolves

is not impaired or contracted, is none the less perfect and complete, because constantly influenced by that Central Sun that "lighteth every man that cometh into the world;" nay, is perfect and complete only on that account. He does not see how God can have so much power, as to constitute a creature free, and regulate and control its freedom, without damaging and destroying his own workmanship!

He dares to utter the impious sentiments of the boldest Pelagianism, which he considers the only refuge from the jaws of Universalism: "Man is a free agent, endowed with a free will, which can set itself up in opposition to God, and can resist even him, and successfully, so far as concerns *its* control. God can control the person, he cannot control the will; he can hold him in subjection to his power, but he cannot bring the will to voluntary subjection under him." "God has done, and is doing, all that can be done, in order to secure the salvation of all men; but it cannot be, because *man will not.*" "From various causes, it happens that men will not let God save them." "According to our statement of the doctrine, God would, if he could, save all; but he cannot; therefore he saves all he can. He saves as many as he can; he damns as few as he can."

All this is directly in the face of God's own Word: "Who hath resisted his will?" "Who maketh thee to differ?" "He maketh us willing in the day of his power." "Of his own will begat he us with the Word of truth." "Born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God."


According to this writer,

"Heaven but persuades: Almighty Man decrees:
Man is the maker of immortal fates."

He coolly declares that "the salvation of the great mass of the world *is an impossibility.* This state of things is due to man's condition as a free agent." If so, then Free Agency is man's greatest foe. He is the slave, the helpless victim of Free Agency. And if Free Grace cannot triumph over Free Agency, then Free Agency is the greatest curse that was, or can be, inflicted upon man!

Commentary on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle, to the Hebrews.
By WILLIAM S. PLUMER, D. D., LL.D., Author of *Studies in the Book of Psalms, Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans, The Law of God, The Grace of Christ, The Rock of our Salvation, Vital Godliness, Jehovah Jireh, Earnest Hours, etc.* New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Company. Pp. 559. Royal 8vo.

This, which is the last publication of Dr. Plumer, is of the same family with his *Commentaries on the Psalms* and *The Epistle to the Romans*. They do not belong to the class of critical and philological expositions. The original text is not exhibited, nor philological disquisitions indulged in, nor are the Syriac, Ethiopic, Arabic and Latin versions, and the Greek and Latin fathers quoted in the original, as is done in commentaries addressed to scholars, and, sometimes, for parade merely of learning. All is written in plain English, so that no unlearned reader is repelled by the bristling words in other than his native tongue, which works, meant for the eye of the scholar alone, are wont to contain. For the great class of pious readers, these books are all the more useful for this, and are profitable, like the sacred books which they are meant to illustrate, "for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." They abound in apt quotations from the best commentators that have preceded him, wrought skillfully, with due acknowledgment, into the current of his own exposition, and in doctrinal or practical remarks, so as almost to make many commentaries wrapped up in one. The doctrine is sound, as was to be anticipated, and the practical applications are abundant, pertinent, and often striking by the manner and diction in which they are expressed. The volume, like that on the Romans, with which it corresponds, is presented to us in large type, and in the best style of the printer's art.



THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

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APRIL, MDCCCLXXIII.

ARTICLE I.

HODGE'S SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

Systematic Theology. By CHARLES HODGE, D. D. Charles Scribner & Co. 3 Vols., 8vo.

We have here this long-expected work at length completed in three portly volumes, royal 8vo.—They are handsomely printed on firm, white paper of excellent body; but they are bound in flimsy muslin, in the flimsiest style of that despicable binding. Why will our modern publishers give the most weighty and enduring works to the public, in a dress appropriate only to some worthless fiction, to be quickly (almost as quickly as it deserves) worn out and thrown away? This outrage upon the rights and the tastes of readers is aggravated by the fact, that the publishers have doubled the prices of their books upon us within the last ten years. Is double pay, for shabbier work, to be one of the signs of modern progress? So it seems.

Our general verdict upon the work of Dr. Hodge may be expressed very fairly, by saying that it is such a book as the Presbyterian public expected of him; for that public has been long accustomed to recognise, and, whenever writing upon a subject in his own proper department, to value very highly Dr. Hodge's characteristics. We find the work then, learned, perspicuous, nervous, dogmatic, and orthodox. The doctrine which it asserts is dis-

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tinctly Calvinistic, without being ultra-Calvinism. One of the most noticeable characteristics of the work is the fulness of its refutations of the Materialistic and Atheistic infidelity on the one hand, and of the Pantheistic speculations on the other, which are the banes of the recent movements in science. It seems apparent that the book has been enlarged, and the range of discussion widened, for the special purpose of dealing with these forms of scepticism. Among the other characteristics of this treatise, which present themselves to a cursive examination, may be noted the following:

1. Dr. Hodge asserts that our knowledge of God is "intuitive," and then argues for the proposition that there is a God. This argument, ignoring the usual theistic method in a manner rather marked, relies chiefly upon the ethical *phenomena* of the soul, from which it reasons with unusual fulness and force.

2. Those who have had the privilege of Dr. Hodge's conversation, are aware that the denunciation of the claims of philosophy to be a true science, has been rather a favorite topic with him; and this opinion is not obscurely indicated in his *Theology*. Yet we know of no standard Reformed treatise, which makes so much use of philosophy, or contains so large a proportion of philosophical speculation.


3. The author, under many heads of divinity, displays the multifarious forms of error with more fulness than his own views of what is true.

4. If we might judge by the author's citations, in what directions his theological reading chiefly lay, we should conclude that German heresy, in its different forms, had received more of his attention than any other department, orthodox or heterodox. Next would come the works of the Continental Protestants, Lutheran and Reformed. The teachers and leaders of Scotch and Scotch-Irish Presbyterianism are very scantily noticed; and, so far as we now remember, there is not a single reference to the theology of the Anglican Church, or its great masters, to intimate that the author had ever heard of them. So American theology appears chiefly in the names of its heresiarchs, and for purposes of refutation.

5. Another marked peculiarity of the system is, the authority which it gives to the evangelical *consensus* of the children of God of all denominations, as presented in their hymnology, prayers, and devotional writings, rather than their technical and controversial. The author seems to elevate this almost into an authoritative, Protestant *tradition*. Discarding the folly of an infallible tradition in the bishops, through an apostolic succession, he claims that true believers (not in virtue of any ritualism or sacramentarian superstition, but in virtue of their effectual calling,) are all infallibly taught of God. Hence, so far as we can discriminate the true from the spurious believers, and eliminate the modifications induced on their spiritual consciousness by accidents of training and prejudice, we have in the consciousness common to them all a correct representation of revealed truth. This source of authority, obviously, should be appealed to with great caution. That it cannot be made a "rule of faith," coördinate with the sacred Scriptures, is very plain from this fact, that the parties to any debate would never agree as to the extent to which the qualifications should be applied, which are stated above.

Since we have commended the general orthodoxy of this work, the points must of course be very few upon which we should feel constrained to dissent from the author's conclusions. We propose, with this cursory view of the merits of his work, to confine our remaining remarks to but two points of doctrine. The first, considered by us in a single aspect, is a point, to our apprehension, both intricate and important, and we venture to dissent from Dr. Hodge with diffidence; the more, because his views are supported by not a few of the great Reformed divines. And indeed his statement and arguments on the point we design to bring into debate are, in some respects, safer and more moderate than theirs.

In Vol. II., p. 254, 255, the specific seat of original sin in man is discussed. First, the erroneous doctrines are discarded, which place it primarily in the body, or in our senses and animal appetites. The author then proceeds: "A third doctrine is, that the heart considered as the seat of the affections, as distinguish-



ed from the understanding, is the seat of natural depravity. This doctrine is connected with the idea that all sin and holiness are forms of feeling or states of the affections. And it is made the ground on which the nature of regeneration and conversion, the relation between repentance and faith, and other points of practical theology are explained. Everything is made to depend on the state of the feelings. Instead of the affections following the understanding, the understanding, it is said, follows the affections. A man understands and receives the truth only when he loves it. Regeneration is simply a change in the state of the affections, and the only inability under which sinners labor, as to the things of God, is disinclination. In opposition to all these doctrines, Augustinianism, as held by the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, teaches that the whole man, soul and body, the higher as well as the lower, the intellectual as well as the emotional faculties of the soul, is affected by the corruption of our nature derived from our first parents."

This extract not only presents the point we wish to debate, but gives us also a very characteristic specimen of Dr. Hodge's method as a debater. Under an appearance of simple, Saxon straightforwardness, he most adroitly modifies, and by modifying, disparages the view he designs to assault; and gains credit for his own by associating it with unquestioned truth, and claiming for it, with a quiet dogmatism, the uniform adherence of the orthodox learned. He seems to suggest that his answer to the question, Where is the specific seat of depravity? is that of Augustinianism, that it is *the soul*; whereas, the view which he really argues is, that the ultimate seat and source of depravity is in the intellect as distinguished from the will. This is clear from the tenor of his arguments, as will appear. It is clear from his subsequent teaching on Regeneration. Manifestly, wherever we place the ultimate seat or source of depravity, there also we must place the primary, quickening touch of regeneration. Now, in Vol. III., p. 17, while we find Dr. Hodge saying: "It is the soul which is spiritually dead; and it is to the soul that a new principle of life, controlling all its exercises, whether of the intellect, the sensibility, the conscience, or the

will, is imparted;" we see him add these words: "In the order of nature, knowledge, or spiritual discernment is *antecedent* and causatively related to all holy exercises of the feelings and affections." These words disclose his real theory; and this is the theory which he really holds and argues, in the place first cited; there coolly assuming that it is the theory of the Reformed Confessions and divines. These do indeed teach that "the whole man" is depraved, and that the soul, more specifically, is the seat of depravity; but we are yet to learn that they unanimously, or even generally, countenance this peculiar theory of Drs. Hodge, Alexander, and Dick, which makes the intellect, as distinguished from the will, the ultimate source of depravity in man. Take, by the way, this, from a doctrinal declaration of the Reformed Church of France, at the National Synod of Alençon: "Nor doth he only, powerfully illuminate the understanding by the Holy Ghost. But by the effectual power of the same spirit of Regeneration, *he pierces even into the inward recesses of their souls, opens the heart, and infuseth new qualities into their will.*" This plainly teaches, that the evil *habitus* of the sinner's will, is not only distinct from the blindness of his understanding, but is a more interior evil. So the familiar words of our own Confession, on Effectual Calling, tell us that God not only "enlightens our minds in the knowledge of Christ," but also "renews our wills." The latter work, surely, is not a mere natural consequence of the former?

So when Dr. Hodge would describe the doctrine he seeks to overthrow, he suggests that its advocates believe the soul is depraved or regenerated, not as a *monad*, but by parts or faculties. They hold no such thing; they only dissent from his order of causation between the soul's respective faculties, in their depraved, or their sanctified actings. He represents them as reducing all sin and holiness to "forms of feeling or states of the affections." What they really teach is, that sin or holiness, in its last analysis, is a wrong, or a right *habitus* (not *consuetudo* merely) of the will; which *habitus* is rudimental cause, or regulative principle of all the "forms of feeling." He charges upon them that the "only inability" they can consistently hold, is

“disinclination” to the things of God. They hold that the root of inability is in this hostile *habitus* of the will, out of which as a source all “disinclinations” to duty arise; and that blindness of mind is also a consequent part of the sinner’s inability, so real as to require divine grace to remove it. Is not this the analysis of the best and greatest of the Reformed divines; as Turretin?

But we beg leave to re-state our view in our own way, instead of Dr. Hodge’s. The soul is a unit, a *monad*, not constituted, as material things are, of parts, or members; but endowed with faculties which are *distinct modes of its indivisible activity*. These, according to the psychology of the Bible, and of common sense, fall into the three divisions of intelligence, will, and sensibility—the latter class being passive powers. By the word “will,” in this discussion, we mean, not the specific power of volition, but that which the Reformed divines and our Confession mean by it, the whole active powers of man’s spontaneity; what Sir William Hamilton terms “the conative powers;” *i. e.* the whole faculty of active desire and purpose. While the soul is simply passive only in its sensibilities, and its functions of intelligence are its own self-directed functions, yet it is by its will, or conative powers, that it is an agent, or puts forth its spontaneity. Now, the soul is depraved as a soul; and is regenerated as a soul; not by patches or parts, seeing it has no parts. But we conceive that this obvious fact is entirely consistent with the proposition, that sin (or holiness) affects the soul as to one of its faculties more primarily than the others. And let us remark here once for all, that it is entirely inconsistent in Dr. Hodge, to object the simplicity of the soul to those who think, with us, that sin affects the soul rudimentally in the faculty of will, and consequentially in those of understanding and sensibility; when he himself teaches, *vice versa*, that sin affects it rudimentally in the faculty of intelligence, and consequentially in those of will and sensibility. For, if the fact that the soul is a unit refutes us, it equally refutes him. Both opinions would in that case be out of the question equally, and the debate impossible. Again: Dr. Hodge, and those who think with him, dwell much on the com-

plexity of the soul's acts, as involving at once two or more of its faculties or modes of function. They tell us, that an act of understanding accompanies every act of desire or choice. True. But they themselves go on to assert a relation of causation between the intellective element and the conative element, as to the production, or rise of the concrete act of soul. Why, then, may not we assign a causative relation to the one or the other of these two elements, as to the moral quality of that concrete act of soul? We shall find the divines we indicate, (as Chalmers, A. Alexander, and Hodge,) when hardly bestead to sustain their peculiar views on this point, resorting very freely to the statements, that the soul is a unit; that it is depraved or regenerated as a unit; that it acts as a unit; that it performs one concrete function often through two or more faculties, which act not separately as members, but only distinguishably as modes of function. We repeat, all this is granted; but it is irrelevant. For it would, if it proved anything in the case, as much preclude the one causative order, as the other. It would be as unreasonable to say "the understanding guides the will," as to say "the will sways the understanding." Let this be remembered.

We have thus disencumbered the issue which we wish to examine. It is this: In defining depravity, are we to place the rudimentary element of the sinful nature, in the blinded understanding, misleading the spontaneity, and thus qualifying the soul as a whole morally evil? Such is the view of the divines named. Or, are we to find it rudimentally in the perverted *habitus* of the will, causatively corrupting and blinding the understanding, and thus qualifying the soul as a whole morally evil? Such is our understanding of the Scriptures, and the Reformed theology. The question is, as we shall see, not a mere psychological curiosity, but has important consequences. If the opinion of Dr. Hodge is correct, then regeneration is primarily illumination, and secondarily and consequentially, revolution of will. If our opinion is right, then regeneration is rudimentally and causatively revolution of will, and consequentially illumination. And, moreover, if Dr. Hodge's opinion is the true one, it would be more consistent for him to teach with Dr. A. Alex-

ander, (Thoughts on Religious Experience, Chap. VI.), and with Dr. Dick, (Lecture 66th), or even with Claude Pajon of the French Church, that the Holy Ghost operates only mediately, through the truth, in revolutionising the will. If our opinion is the true one, then it is consistent to teach, with the French Reformed, and the whole current of the great Reformed divines, that the Holy Ghost operates not only mediately, but also immediately and supernaturally, in revolutionising the will. On this point, Dr. Hodge is in one place (Vol. III., p. 17,) consistently erroneous, as it appears to us; but in Vol. II., under the head of "Efficacious Grace," he emphatically and largely teaches what is inconsistently correct. For he there asserts a regeneration by immediate grace, in the strongest and most satisfactory form; and even declares himself almost ready to say with Owen, against Dr. Alexander and the Reformed European divines, that it is a '*physical*' effect of supernatural grace.

But that we may do no injustice, let us distinguish. Among those who explain depravity and regeneration by the theory, that the understanding universally leads the will there appear to be four grades of opinion. The lowest is that of the Pelagian, who denies all evil *habitus* of will, regards regeneration as a mere self-determination to a new purpose of living, and holds that it is wrought simply by the moral suasion of the truth. This virtually leaves out the Holy Ghost. The second is that of the Semi-Pelagian, who holds that the will is not indeed dead in sin, but that it is greatly corrupted by evil desires, cares of this world, bad example, and evil habits, [*consuetudines*, not *habitus*]. Hence gospel truth never engages the soul's attention strongly enough to exert an efficacious moral suasion, until the Holy Ghost calms and fixes the mind upon it by his gracious, suasive influence. The truth, thus gaining access to the soul, regenerates it. The third class, disclaiming all Semi-Pelagianism, hold that the truth ought to, and would control the will, if clearly and fully seen; but that in virtue of the natural blindness of the understanding (which they regard as the source of depravity) the truth cannot be thus seen, until the mind is divinely illuminated; and this illumination, a true, gracious, spiritual and

efficacious work, is regeneration. As soon as that is done, the truth spiritually seen, revolutionises the will by its natural power; for the will must always follow the prevalent dictate of the understanding. Such was most probably the scheme of Claude Pajon. The fourth class is that of Dr. Alexander, Dr. Dick, and we presume, of Dr. Hodge. Holding that the rudiments of our depravity are in the blinded understanding primarily, and in the perverted will derivatively, they also hold that illumination is regeneration; but they add that, in order for this illumination, a supernatural operation on the mind itself is necessary. And that operation is the causative source of conversion. This distinguishes their scheme from that of Pajon. This also saves their orthodoxy; yet, we repeat, it seems to us an inconsistent orthodoxy, in one particular. We ask them: Is that immediate operation of the Holy Ghost—that prerequisite of illumination—the sovereign and immediate revolution in the *habitus* of the will? And they answer, No: for that would imply the view which we hold, and they disclaim it, as to the radical source of moral quality in the soul. What then is the operation? They reply: We do not know; it is inscrutable, being back of consciousness. But to us it appears, that if illumination of the understanding is the whole direct efficiency of the Holy Ghost in regeneration, it is more natural and consistent to stop where Pajon stops, with a mediate conversion through the truth.

The second doctrinal application must be, to determine the nature of faith. If intellectual blindness is the ultimate trait of depravity, and supernatural illumination is the essential work of regeneration, then faith, which is the characteristic action of the soul as regenerated, and instrumental organ of its redemption, must be a simple belief of the truth. But if our view is held, then regeneration is primarily a sovereign, immediate revolution of the will (having illumination as its divine attendant) and faith is a receiving and resting upon Christ for salvation. Dr. Alexander is thoroughly consistent. He says boldly: Yes, saving faith, separated from its adjuncts, is simple belief of truth. It differs from historical faith, saith he, not in the *nature*

of the function of mind, but in the *degree of strength* with which the mind of the renewed man grasps the gospel truth. The man of dead faith accepts intellectually the same truths which sanctify and save the believer, but with too unsteady a grasp. When he is reminded that man "believeth *with the heart* unto righteousness;" and that the gospel's essential proposal is rather of spiritual good to the choice, than of speculative truth to the assent, he resorts again to his plea that the soul is a *monad*. Intelligence and choice, he argues, are but two modes of function of this unit soul. May not the two functions be differentiated only objectively? There is no moral appetency or choice without intelligence. May not all the difference between the soul seeing, and the soul choosing, be the objective difference? May not the function of intelligence be as essentially a moral one, as that of appetency and choice; be, in fact, the same function? This strikes us as exceedingly subtle and ingenious. Indeed, he stands, to our apprehension, unrivalled in such *acumen*. But it is erroneous. The soul is one; yet its modes of function are truly more than one; and they are differentiated subjectively, as well as objectively; truly, as well as seemingly. An apparatus to measure caloric is a thermometer. An apparatus to measure moisture is a hygrometer. The latter could not become a thermometer, merely by being applied to the measurement of caloric. The difference of the two objects is great enough to require an essential difference of mode in measuring the two. So it is obvious to common sense, and to consciousness, that while moral desire and choice are intelligent, choice and desire are not intellection, and intellection is not choice. The evasion is vain; and Dr. Alexander's definition of faith as simply belief of truth, while consistent with his and Dr. Hodge's premises, is defective and unscriptural. Here we might appeal to the arguments usually advanced by theological text-books, to show that according to the Scriptures, faith is an act of the soul performed both by the will and the intelligence; but, to the well-informed reader, it would be superfluous.

Dr. Hodge, on this point, departs from the teaching of his venerable predecessor with a fortunate inconsistency. In defin-

ing faith, he tell us, first, that the rudimental idea of the word, in both the sacred languages, is *trust*; secondly, that religious faith, in its generic aspect, is conviction of the truth on divine testimony; and, thirdly, that saving faith is, specifically, both assenting to and embracing the gospel promise on the authority of that testimony. We give, not his precise words, but his abbreviated thought.

The third point of doctrine involved in this debate, is the relation of faith and repentance. If the rudimental element of depravity is blindness of mind, and regeneration is primarily illumination, then faith should be defined as assent to gospel truth simply, and repentance should be defined as the consequence of saving faith, and invariably subsequent to it. To this last point Dr. Hodge would assent. But if our scheme is the true one, that depravity is rudimentally a perverted *habitus* of will accompanied by a consequent blinding of the mind, and regeneration is primarily an almighty revolution of the will resulting in illumination, then faith is a "receiving and resting upon Christ for salvation," ("with the heart man believeth unto righteousness,") and *μετάνοια*, or a turning of the heart from sin to God is implicitly involved in the specific act of saving faith. And this we believe to be the teaching of the Scriptures. Let us not be misunderstood; we know that every moral emotion implies, as its condition, a corresponding act of intelligence; so that there can be no godly sorrow in the heart, where there is no light in the head. We suppose that what Dr. Hodge calls "generic faith," conviction of truth on divine testimony, is implied as *a priori* in evangelical repentance. But, on the other hand, some affection of godly sorrow is implied in the specific action of saving faith, embracing Christ for salvation. For saving faith receives his salvation, not as a speculative truth to be assented to, but a spiritual good to be embraced. Will the soul embrace it, except as it values and desires it? Surely not. Hence this appetency of the will for salvation prompts the faith. And what is this appetency, but *μετάνοια*? For, as our Confession hath it, faith embraceth Christ "as he is offered to us in the Gospel." But he is offered to us as a *Saviour from sin*. He

who embraces him must do it therefore, because, feeling sin to be an evil *per se*, he desires deliverance from it, and not from its penalty merely. But that feeling, we repeat, is *μετάνοια*, at least in rudiment. It thus appears, that the essential difference between saving faith on the one hand, and historical or temporary faith on the other is, that the first has repentance implicit in it as its *a priori* condition. When we say this, we do not at all deny, that faith also reciprocally stimulates repentance. Nor do we deny that from the moment faith begins to work, hope, gratitude, and love, in view of the cross, become new and powerful incentives to repentance, and thenceforward characterise it with new tenderness. Such seems to us to be the representation of the Scriptures. See those numerous places in the Old Testament, where "to turn" (שׁוּב) is the instrumental condition of salvation, (as "believe" is, in the New Testament), as Ezek. xviii. 32; Jer. xxxi. 19. See also those like Acts ii. 38, where the Apostles seem to be as willing to answer the question, What must be done in order to be saved? with "Repent," as with "Believe." How are these answers to be explained? Are there two different ways for sinners to be saved? Surely not. Then, repentance and faith must be much nearer the same thing, than those represent them, who make repentance an emotion, and faith a mental conviction. We can only explain them by saying, that both involve a function of the regenerate will, and that repentance is implicit of faith. Again, is it not significant that, in so many places where the two are mentioned, repentance is named first? Mark i. 15; Acts ii. 38 ("baptism for remission" expressing faith); Acts v. 31; xx. 21. Lastly: The Scriptures expressly speak of faith as prompted by repentance, or as conditioned on it. Matt. xxi. 32: "And ye, when ye had seen it, *repented not afterward that ye might believe him.*" So in 2d Tim. ii. 25: "In meekness instructing those that oppose themselves, if peradventure God will give them *repentance to the acknowledging* of the truth." So, again, God traces the unbelief which is the opposite of faith, to the hatred of the good as its cause. 2 Thess. x to xii; and Rom. i. 28. That hatred is the opposite of repentance.

We may be reminded that it is a peculiarity of the Arminian theology, that they make repentance precede faith in the order of production. This is true; but they make both repentance and faith precede regeneration; and therein is the dangerous feature. Let us say, with the Scriptures, that repentance and faith are both the exercises of a regenerate soul, and of none other; this danger will then be gone.

Having thus shown the theological results of the question under debate, we return to it in order to present the more immediate arguments, logical and scriptural, for our view of that question. The sketch which we have presented, of its bearings upon the four doctrines of Original Sin, Regeneration, Faith, and Repentance, contained, unavoidably, several anticipations of these arguments. The careful reader will be able to make the application of them for himself; and we will avoid repetition of them as far as is practicable.

When we distribute the powers of the soul under their three heads of intellect, will, and sensibility, it seems obvious to mature reflection, that depravity and holiness have their primary seat in the will as related to the intellect and sensibility, rather than in the intellect as related to the will. It is *the soul*, and not a faculty separate from the soul, which is depraved or sanctified; yet this diseased or healthy state of soul qualifies it as to its function of spontaneity primarily, and of intellect and sensibility consequentially. In support of this, we advance this simple argument. By its function of intelligence the soul *sees*; by its will it *acts*. Some philosophers have disputed the justice of our making the conative powers the *active* powers of the soul; and they say that the soul as truly acts, in conceiving, or judging, as in desiring or choosing. This is ambiguous. True, the soul, in conceiving and judging, *is performing a function of its own*; but it is not therein intrinsically exerting its spontaneity. The sophism is here: When the soul conceives or judges, there is an exercise of its spontaneity, oftentimes, *in directing its attention by will*, to a particular object of conception or judgment. But that directing of the attention is not strictly cog-

nition; it is a function of the conative powers accompanying cognition. Set aside this, and it will be evident to any man who examines his own consciousness, that cognition is not *an act* of the soul in the sense in which the conative functions are; and that is the sense of this argument. Now, does not common sense teach us, that moral responsibility attaches to those acts and states of soul which it puts forth from itself, by its spontaneity, more primarily than to those with which it is affected by causes out of itself?

Dr. Hodge, in one place, attempts to show, that moral responsibility does not primarily qualify our acts of spontaneity, but rather our acts of intelligence by this view: Brutes and maniacs have spontaneity, but they have no moral quality. Why? Because their spontaneity is irrational. It is only when you have intelligence guiding spontaneity that you find moral quality. We reply: The fact is as alleged. The presence of intelligence is a condition requisite to moral action. But that this is short of proving the intelligence to be the primary seat of the moral quality, appears very simply thus: The presence of conative power is also a condition requisite to moral action. Dr. Hodge would doubtless admit that a mere power of conceiving notions, without dispositions, preference, or choice, could not be *a person* at all, nor have character. Yet Dr. Hodge would not admit that the conative function was the seat of the moral character. Now, we ask: What is it that completes our idea of personality? It is will. Cognition, merely as such, abstracted from acts of voluntary attention (which may, or may not attend it,) is an involuntary function. Witness the fact, that multitudes of percepts and concepts affect our minds, without any movement of desire or volition whatever; the former from objective sources, the latter from the instinctive law of suggestion. *This* is the decisive feature which, according to common sense, forbids our regarding the cognitive acts of the soul as those by which it is primarily qualified with moral character.

This naturally introduces to our notice another attempt, which our author makes, to argue his view, from the fact that men are morally responsible for their opinions and beliefs. He

says: That to make the will the primary seat of moral character involves the vicious conclusion, that intellectual belief is irresponsible; a proposition contrary to all Scripture and sound ethics. This instance, when examined, will be found against him. The truth is, that some of our opinions and beliefs are morally indifferent; for many of them we are strictly responsible. And these last are precisely the opinions *which involve a moral element*. No man becomes more *virtuous*, by ascertaining that the two angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal. But a man does become more *vicious* by persuading himself that trust, obedience and gratitude towards Christ are not his duty. Now, when the sceptic comes, and argues that he is not responsible for any opinion heartily adopted, because intellectual conviction is the involuntary consequence of evidence seen; how do we refute him? By showing that *no morally erroneous conviction could be heartily established, without an immoral, voluntary cause*. This is the true, analytic answer to his licentious inference! So that these very cases confirm our view; that the moral character of our intellectual convictions (of which many do have such character) has its source in the voluntary states and acts of the soul.

The view we contest, on the other hand, seems to endanger the destruction of our responsibility, by making sin an involuntary result of intellectual conditions. For such are man's moral intuitions, that, if he is taught that a certain action was the regular, certain, and involuntary result of a mental view with which neither disposition nor choice could have anything to do in such a sense that, the mental view being what it was, the action must still have inevitably been what it was, no matter how right the feelings, disposition, and choice may have been; he will certainly answer: "Then the agent cannot be blameable."

Dr. Alexander criticises those, who argue our conclusion from the assertion that the action of the will is moral, and that of the intellect is not; and who call the will the "moral faculty" in man. He remarks very correctly, that this is erroneous, that neither intellect nor will is the "moral faculty" in man; for not one in a hundred of the acts of either have properly any

moral character. The ratio is probably stated too strongly. He then adds that there is a third faculty, which alone deserves to be called "the moral faculty;" and that is *conscience*. We conceive that Dr. Alexander might have increased the plausibility of this part of his argument very much, by proceeding to argue, as he does in his "Moral Science," that conscience, so far as it is a judging faculty, and distinguished from its emotional element, which is secondary, is itself a function of the intelligence—a rational function. He might then have put his conclusion thus: "Conscience is the true and only moral faculty in man. But the judgments of conscience (the rudimental part of its function) are rational; therefore the reason is the true seat of sin or holiness." This would have been consistent. Yet it would have laid him open to this refutation: (which is also implicitly in his own statement) that therefore the moral goodness of a good man is primarily in this, that he has a *true conscience*; and the moral badness of a bad man primarily in this, that he has a *false conscience*. That is: it would follow from Dr. Alexander's view, that the opposite moral states of the two men were primarily in their opposite moral judgments. But now, *it is not true*, that good and bad men always, or even generally, have opposite moral judgments. The two men probably have the same judgments of conscience in the main; and the difference mainly is, that the good man *obeys*, and the bad man *disobeys* those common judgments. It is true, that conscience is the faculty, which is our moral guide; but then our moral quality as persons is in our conformity or enmity to that guidance. *What is it, in us, that is conformed or opposed to that guidance? Primarily, the will.* And this brings our debate, it appears to us, up to that scriptural test, which is the decisive one. It so happens that the Holy Ghost has given us an exact definition of the idea of sin. *Ἡ ἀμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία*, (1 John iii. 4,) which our Catechism imitates. The *νόμος*, the standard is, first, the law of our moral nature written on our hearts by our Creator; and, secondly, his revealed precepts taught to our intellects. The sin consists, according to St. John, in lack of conformity to that standard. We repeat the question: What is it in sinful man which is not

conformed to that standard? Every sinner's consciousness answers; *partially the reason*, but *chiefly and primarily the will*; and thence consequentially, the animal appetites and bodily members. The soul has three classes of powers: the intellectual, the conative, and the passive sensibilities. These last are passive powers—*susceptibilities*, rather than *faculties*; hence the root of sin cannot be primarily in them; for they are acted on, rather than act. The first, the intellectual powers, by their moral judgments, furnish us the standard of reference; and our rational intuitions are, that so far as conscience (the rational faculty applied to moral objects, accompanied with its peculiar sentiment of approbation and disapprobation) is correctly informed by God's precepts, and is not misinformed by the will, this conscience is the correct, and the imperative standard of right and wrong. There remains, then, the second class of powers, the conative, the will; in which must be found the spring of personal, moral character; of good character, if the will is conformed, of bad character, if it is opposed to the rational standard. This scriptural view is confirmed by one remark: Let any one collect as many as he can, of those acts of men, to which the Scriptures and theologians appeal, as *a posteriori* proofs of native depravity, and he will find that they all fall under this common predication—that in them the will opposes itself obstinately to the soul's own moral judgments. This, in fine, is the analytic statement of that universal fact, in which the moral disorder and ruin of man's soul manifests itself.

The reasonings which we have attempted to answer seem to us to involve this illusion; that because man is a reasonable agent, his spontaneity is but a modification of his reason. But is this so? Is not this sufficiently refuted, by the fact which Dr. Hodge cites against us; that other creatures have a spontaneity, which have no reason? In truth, spontaneity is an ultimate fact of human consciousness, and an ultimate power of the soul, as much so as reason. It is coördinate in primariness and simplicity with the power of reason. It has its own original *habitus*, its "disposition," which re-acts on the reason as truly

as it is acted on. Against this view some may cry out: "Then the action of a man's spontaneity might be no more a rational action, than the pulsation of his heart!" We reply: The instance is unfair; because the will is not a separate member, like that muscle called "heart" in the body; but it is a mode of function of the soul, a spiritual unit. And that soul which wills is a *rational unit*. So that all action of will is the action of a rational agent. But we concede that spontaneity is sometimes unconsciously irrational; and *that is lunacy*. Oftentimes it is contra-rational; and *that is sinfulness*. Sometimes, by God's grace, we find it truly conformed to reason; and *that is holiness*.

But the favorite plea of the fathers who differ with us, is that it is the recognised doctrine of all sound philosophers, that the will follows the prevalent judgment of the intellect. They say: "Man feels as his mind sees; the view of the mind therefore must direct or govern the feeling; and the prevalent last judgment must decide the will." It is from this statement Dr. Hodge infers that depravity and holiness must be ultimately traced to the intellect; Dr. Dick infers that the revolution of the will, in effectual calling, is the natural effect of true illumination; and Dr. Alexander infers that a faith which is simply full conviction of the truth is all we need to make the soul embrace salvation and duty. This psychological law we fully admit: it is what defines man as a reasonable agent. That is, granted that the prevalent judgment of the intellect be of a given nature on a specific subject, then the feeling and choice of the soul on that subject will of course correspond. But the analysis stops one step too short. Whence the kind of view and judgment which the intellect is found to have on that given subject? Is it always of a purely intellectual origin? This is tacitly assumed, but erroneously. Let the subject be one of a moral nature, involving an object of choice or desire, and it will be found that *there*, the heart has taught the head; the opinion is the echo of the disposition; the power of spontaneity, coördinate with that of intelligence, has announced its own original *habitus*. Let us explain: A child tastes experimentally, candies, sweetmeats,

honey, sugar. In each case his palate is gratified. On this similarity of power to gratify the palate, his mind constructs a generalisation, forms the class of "sweet things," and concludes the general judgment: "Sweet things are good." Now, this general judgment may be as truly and purely accounted an intellectual process, as the arithmetical one that a larger subtrahend must make a smaller remainder, And it may be said that, in every subsequent desire and purpose to seek the "sweet things," the child's will follows this intellectual judgment. Very true. And yet it is none the less true, that the judgment is itself a generalisation of a series of acts of appetency; the mere echo of the instinctive verdict of an animal appetite. So that in its last analysis, the causation of the choice is traced up, through the intellect, to a law of the spontaneity.

We shall be reminded that the instance we have chosen gives us only an animal appetite, a phenomenon of animal spontaneity; whereas the thing in debate is moral emotion and choice, which is always rational emotion and choice. This we fully admit, and we advance the instance only for an illustration. Perhaps it is a clumsy one. But has not the will as real, and as original, appetencies, as the palate? When we call the former rational, moral desires, what do we mean? That disposition is nothing but a modification of thought? We apprehend that our meaning is this: the intellect is *the faculty by which* we conceive the object of the moral appetency; as, in the case of the animal appetite, the nerves of sensation are the *medium* by which we perceive the sweet object. Yet in the moral *phenomenon*, there is an original disposition of will, which is as truly a spiritual appetency, as the bodily appetite is an animal appetency. If we are correct in this, we shall find that the judgments generalised in the mind, as to the desirableness of moral good or evil, however purely intellectual, when abstracted from their source, are yet but the echoes of the original, or regenerated appetencies of the will. Let us now apply this analysis to the sinner's conversion. Why does the renewed sinner embrace Christ as a Saviour from sin, by his faith; and new obedience instead of sin, by his repentance? Because his understanding, illuminated

by grace, now judges clearly that salvation and new obedience are not only the obligatory, but the preferable good. Such is our brethren's answer; and we fully assent. Were it not so, the new choice would not be rational, and so, not spiritual. But now, one question more: How came this illuminated intellect to judge the salvation from sin, and the new obedience, the preferable good; when the original, native disposition of the will was to prefer the sin, and dislike the obedience? It was only because the Holy Ghost sovereignly revolutionised the disposition of will. *This* was the primary cause; illumination the immediate consequence; and faith and repentance the practical result. Thus the profound Paschal, (*Pensees*, 1re Partie. § III): "God alone can put divine truths into the soul; and by the mode which pleases him. I know he hath willed them to enter from the heart into the mind, and not from the mind into the heart, in order to humble the proud power of reasoning, which presumes to be judge of the things the will chooses, and in order to heal this infirm will, which has wholly corrupted itself by its unworthy attachments. And hence it results, that while in speaking of human affairs, men say: One must know in order to love, which hath passed into a proverb; the saints on the contrary say, in speaking of divine things: One must love in order to know."

But the decisive appeal should be, not to philosophy, but to the Scriptures. These would seem to sustain our view in a multitude of places; where sin and depravity are traced to an "evil heart," a "hardened heart;" and holiness to a "pure heart;" or where regeneration is a cleansing of the heart, a giving of a fleshly heart. But we are reminded that the Hebrews, and after them the New Testament writers, use the word "heart," in a comprehensive sense, equivalent to that of "soul," or "inner man." We are pointed to the numerous places in which the functions of intellect are referred to the "heart," as in the phrases, "an understanding heart;" "blindness of heart;" "thoughts of the heart;" "laying up (*scil.*, a remembrance) in the heart." Thus it is sought to prove that all the declarations of the Scriptures about "a good, or an evil heart," may mean no more than a

good, or an evil mind, or soul. Now, upon this class of passages, we remark, that the word "heart" is used with great frequency in the Scriptures. Its first literal meaning is, the corporeal organ; and its first tropical or immaterial meaning is, the feelings, desires, and volitions of the soul. Thence it means, secondly, the "inner man," regarded from the point of view of that which is invisible, enclosed within, as the bodily organ is. Thus, in 1 Pet. iii. 4: "Let the adorning" (of the Christian woman) "be the hidden man of the heart." Thirdly, "heart" hence comes to mean soul, the Spirit which feels; and it has this meaning often when the soul's cognitive function is the thing predicated. But it should be noted, that *this occurs usually when the subject of thought is moral*; as in the classical text, God saw that "every imagination of the *thought of man's heart was evil.*" Now, the extensive use of the word "heart," for "soul," the agent which feels and thinks, must certainly be explained by admitting an intimate relation between these two faculties; and a relation especially intimate, when the objects of thought and feeling are moral. But does this fact authorise our brethren to say that the Scriptures intend to assign right thought as the source of right feeling, instead of the reverse? Hardly. Were we to seize upon this phrase, "a feeling mind," in their writings, to prove that they meant to teach that feeling is the source of intellect, they would demur. Then, the counterpart phrase, "a thinking heart," does not imply that thought is the source of feeling. It only implies an intimate relation of the powers of thought and feeling.

But there are Scriptures which not only do this, but do also assign an order; and with reference to moral objects, the order of relation is *from the heart to the head*. Here we claim all the texts already cited touching the relation of repentance to faith. We claim also, Mark iii. 5, where Jesus disapproved the Pharisees' theory of Sabbath observance; and this because he was "grieved at the hardness of their heart." So, in Eph. iv. 18: Gentiles "have the understanding (*διάνοια*) darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness, (or hardness, *πώρωσις*) of their

heart." Here the Apostle distinctly traces sinful ignorance to the heart for its source. Nor can this be evaded by saying that heart here means "soul," "mind." For this would be flagrantly violent exegesis: When the Apostle has designedly introduced a distinct reference to the state of the cognitive faculty, by his own, most discriminative word, *διάνοια*; and then, evidently designs to refer to the conative faculties of the soul, by the recognised word for them, *καρδία*; will any one say he shall not teach what he aims to teach? Had he still meant "understanding," we presume he would have still said "*διάνοια*," in the last member of the verse. Permit such interpretation, and next, *we* shall meet this fate, viz.: That when we are trying our best to say, that in spiritual things, "the heart leads the head;" we shall be told: "No, you do not mean that; you use the word 'heart' in the comprehensive sense of 'soul;' you mean that the head leads the head!"

We are also referred to many passages, where, as our brethren understand them, regeneration is described as illumination, and depravity as blindness. "To turn them from darkness to light." "God," says Paul, "was pleased to reveal his Son in me." "The eyes of the understanding being enlightened." "Sanctify them through thy truth." "Renewed in knowledge after the image," etc. "God hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God, in the face of Jesus Christ." We reply that regeneration doubtless includes illumination, as an essential and glorious part thereof. But it is a different thing to say that regeneration is only illumination. Should we force these Scriptures to assert the latter, we should only make the Bible contradict itself, when it describes a quickening or revolutionising work of divine grace, which is in order to illumination, and therefore prior in causation.

We are thus led back to that application of our theory, which is at once its best illustration and most important use; its bearing upon the doctrine that the Holy Ghost in regeneration operates, not only mediately through the Word, but also immediately and supernaturally. This Drs. Hodge and Alexander stoutly and sincerely assert, along with all sound Calvinists.

What we claim is, that we can assert it more consistently than they, with their peculiar theory of sin and holiness. For, to repeat, if sin has its rudimental seat in the intellect, then the quickening which begins the conversion from sin, must operate in the same place. If blindness of mind is the radical source of moral error, light is the proper remedy; and that light is revealed truth. That blindness too, is spiritual blindness, for the sinner is not a lunatic; he is in possession of his natural faculties, and can perceive secular and scientific, and even some moral truths. From this point of view, it appears to us, the theory of Claude Pajon that the Holy Ghost needs to operate only through the truth, in producing spiritual vision, is more consistent than the orthodox one of Drs. Alexander and Hodge. Dr. Alexander referring to Ps. cxix. 18: ("Open thou my eyes that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law,") justly remarks, that two things are needed to effectuate actual vision in a blinded eye; first, the surgeon's agency restoring the faculty of vision; and, secondly, the presence of light, the proper *medium*. Now this is a just thing for us to say, but not for him; because he cannot explain what it is, that the spiritual surgery needs to remove from the intellect, in order to the admission of the *light*. For he does not hold to a corruption of will as cause of the darkening of the mind.

The theory of Pajon, and its rejection by the Reformed divines are so instructive in this connexion, that we beg leave to state it more fully. Chauffepié (Historical and Critical Dictionary) gives full and authentic explanations, often in the words of that distinguished divine. Pajon repudiated the phrase, "mediate operation," which his adversaries applied to his doctrine; and preferred to state it thus: "Regeneration is one sole and the same act, which should be referred to the Holy Ghost as principal cause, and to the Word, and other means of grace, as organs, of which he serves himself to act on us." In a private conference with the distinguished J. Claude, Messrs. Lenfant and de La Bastide, in Paris, Pajon explained himself in the following propositions: 1. Men are born sinners. 2. This original sin is strengthened by all actual transgressions, until God converts

them. 3. This corruption is too deep for any sinner to be converted, without efficacious grace working in him to will and to do. 4. The efficacy of this grace is not dependent on the self-determination of the man, but is in the grace itself, and is invincible. 5. This grace is not merely an exterior, but an *interior light*, penetrating the understanding, necessarily filling it with knowledge of the true good, *which knowledge necessarily leads the will from the world to God*. 6. Although this grace is invincible, yet the conversion which it works is a movement of the man's free-will; because the will is drawn or necessitated to follow the gospel precepts *only by this gracious knowledge of our true good*. So that it is possible the man might resist it if he chose; but it is impossible that when this grace is applied he shall choose to resist. 7. In giving us this knowledge of our true good, which necessarily works our conversion, the Holy Ghost usually employs the ministry of the Word; which is, for that reason, called the "seed of our regeneration" and "ministration of the Holy Ghost. 8. Besides the Word, God also employs providential means, (as *e. g.* good examples, chastisements, removals of temptation, etc.,) all of which, along with the Word, God so dispenses as to make them efficacious organs, in each given case, of conversion.

It was this statement of Pajon, from which M. Claude and his friends, after mature reflection, dissented, as virtually involving the Pelagian errors of moral suasion, mediate foreknowledge, and universal call; and as contrary to those Scriptures which, like Acts xvi. 14; Ps. cxix. 18; Eph. i. 17, 18, teach that God performs on the heart an immediate, sovereign work, which is *in order to the entrance* of saving truth. Two or three Provincial Synods, the Government not allowing any National Synod to meet, joined in this condemnation. We add to this point, so justly taken, these other testimonies: Jer. xxxi. 33; Ezek. xxxvi. 26, 27; Luke xxiv. 45.

We argue, secondly, against this conception of depravity and regeneration, and in favor of the immediate agency of the Holy Ghost, that were the former scheme true, (even as set forth by Dr. Dick,) faith would be in order to the regeneration of the

will. However he might eliminate any sequence of time, if "this gracious knowledge necessarily leads the will from the world to God," it remains clear, that faith as cause must precede this first renewal of the will. But the Scriptures make faith the *fruit* of renewal.

Thirdly. The analytical exposure of the absurdity of the Pelagian scheme, regeneration by moral suasion, results ultimately in this, namely: that the state of disposition determines *a priori*, whether any given object presented to the soul shall be of the nature of objective inducement or not. Moral suasion is that influence over the will, which objects of natural or moral excellence, presented from without, are supposed to have as inducements to right feeling and choice. Now, any object whatsoever is not inducement to any being whatsoever. One cannot attract a hungry horse with bacon; nor a hungry man with hay. Whether the object shall be inducement, depends upon its relation to the existing appetency of the being to be influenced. And that state of appetency is obviously related, as cause, to the influence of the inducement as occasion. Hence, if the sinner's will is naturally indisposed and disabled to all spiritual good, that good cannot exert moral suasion over that will; for the simple reason that the effect cannot reverse its own cause. Such is the argument; and it is exhaustive. But now, who does not see that this analysis proceeds upon our theory: that the will has its own disposition, original, characteristic? If the *habitus* of the will is nothing else than a modification of the intelligence; and the sinner's intellect is adequate to the mere intellectual apprehension of moral truth, (as it is,) we see no reason why moral suasion might not be expected to "lead the will necessarily from the world to God."

Fourthly. Dr. Hodge expounds, with peculiar force and fulness, the solemn fact, that there is a "common grace" of the Holy Ghost (which is not "common *sufficient* grace") convincing men of sin and misery up to a certain grade; but not renewing them. Now this partial, spiritual light in unrenewed minds must be correct light as far as it goes; for it is the Spirit's. Yet it does not even partially subdue the enmity of those minds to God and

duty. The usual effect is to inflame it. See Rom. vii. 8, 9. It appears then, that light, without immediate grace revolutionising the will, does not effect the work. Nor is the evasion just, that this conviction of duty inflames the carnal enmity, only because depravity has made it a distorted and erroneous view of duty. We assert that convicted but unrenewed souls fight against God and duty, not because he is misconceived, but because he begins to be rightly conceived. There is of course distortion of mental view concerning him as long as sin reigns; but he is now feared and hated, not only because of that error of view; rather is he the more feared and hated, because the sinful soul now begins to see him with less error, as a sovereign, holy, just, pure Being.

Fifthly. We infer the same view of sin and new birth, from the regeneration of infants. They cannot be renewed by illumination, because their intellects are undeveloped. Yet they are renewed. Now we grant that there is a wide difference in the circumstances and means of their redemption, and that of adults. Yet are they delivered from a state of original sin generically the same with ours'; and delivered by the same Redeemer and Sanctifier. Must not the method of the renewing power be the same intrinsically?

Lastly. This view gives us a consistent *rationale* of that impotency of the natural man to receive the things of the Spirit of God, which are foolishness unto him, described in 1 Cor. ii. 14, and elsewhere. This impotency, too plainly exists. Dr. Dick cannot define wherein it consists. See his 66th Lecture. Does it consist in the absence of any substantive revelation, which the believer gains? No; this would be perilous fanaticism. Does it consist in the hiding of any esoteric sense of the Word, to which the believer has the key? No; this would be Origenism. Does it consist in the loss of a cognitive faculty by the fall? No; that would suspend his responsibility. Whence this impotency? They have no answer.

But we have one. The will has its own *habitus*, regulative of all its fundamental acts, which is not a mere modification of the intelligence, but its own coördinate, original character; a simple,

ultimate fact of the moral constitution. Hence an inter-action of will and intellect. On moral and spiritual subjects the practical generalisations of the intellect are founded on the dictates of the disposition of the will. But now, these practical judgments of the sinner's understanding, prompted by the carnal disposition, contradict certain propositions which are premises to the most important gospel conclusions and precepts. No wonder then that such a mind cannot apprehend them as reasonable! For example: The sinner's real opinion, taught by a carnal heart, is, that sin in itself, apart from its penalty which self-love apprehends as an evil, would be the preferred good. A gospel is now explained to him, proposing deliverance from this sin, through the instrumentality of faith. But the plan postulates the belief that the sin is *per se* so great an evil, that deliverance from it is a good greatly to be desired! No wonder then that as this postulate breaks upon the understanding of the sinner, he is obfuscated, stumbled, dumb-founded! He is required to act on a belief which his carnal heart will not let him believe. His action, to be reasonable, must assume sin to be hateful. But he loves it! He feels that he naturally loves it, and only hates its consequences. "He cannot know the truth, for it is spiritually discerned." Were a sprightly child allured to approach the reader by the promise of "something good," and told that he should have it upon holding out his hand for it; and were he to perceive just then, that the thing you held out was a nauseous medicine, of whose utility to himself he was ignorant, he would be struck with a similar "inability." There would be a sense in which he would become unable to hold out his hand even: he would not know how to do it. He would stand confused. Now this child is not becoming idiotic, but his native appetencies repel that which you propose as an attraction; and hence his obstinate apprehension of the unreasonableness of your proposal.

Thus, as it appears to us, the simple psychology, which is assumed in the Bible, is found to be the truest philosophy, and throws a flood of light upon the doctrines held in common by us, and by the respected fathers whom we review.

The only other point we discuss is at least as intricate as the one just attempted, and even more abstract, technical, and limited. But for other principles which have been connected with its discussion, chiefly through exaggerations and confusions of thought, it would indeed lie within very narrow bounds, both of extent and importance, in so far as it is debated among Calvinists. It is Dr. Hodge's doctrine of Immediate Imputation of Adam's sin to us. Vol. II., Chapter VIII. The questions drawn into the discussion are the relations of the divine sovereignty and righteousness; the rudimental idea of sin and criminality; imputation; justification; our union to Christ; God's providence in visiting the sins of parents upon posterity; and the rights of man's reason in problems where the divine righteousness is a party. Dr. Hodge strongly advocates the theory adopted by Turretin: It is, that in the order of causation, the imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin on men precedes, transferring that guilt upon them conceived as at first otherwise innocent and guiltless; whereby a privative moral corruption of soul is, by God, visited on Adam's children as the penalty of that imputed guilt, and, in the first instance, of it alone. From this view we to a certain extent dissent. The reader of Dr. Hodge's present work will find it stated more moderately than in his previous ones. There is a pleasing absence of that imperious dogmatism, which characterised his earlier polemics on this favorite point: such as his review of Dr. Baird's "Elohim Revealed." But his theory is the same.

We are of course not oblivious of the difficulty of getting a considerate hearing against a speculation adopted by Turretin and Hodge, and sustained—though, as we shall show, to a very limited extent—by Dr. Thornwell. The last is himself witness, (See Review of Breckinridge,) that our Confession of Faith does not speak in favor of that speculation. Nor has it any direct Scripture support, being but a human inference from a peculiar interpretation of a much-contested passage in Romans v. We shall therefore presume that an humble minister in the Presbyterian Church, who recognises no infallible standard but the Bible, and has bound himself by no doctrinal covenant but

our Confession, may credit his brethren with enough independence not to permit Turretin or Hodge to do their thinking for them. We shall certainly claim this liberty, especially when we recall some specimens of erroneous thinking which they have given us: as Turretin's labored opposition to the Copernican system, and his adoption of the latent Pantheism of the Dominican theory touching God's providential *concursum*; or Dr. Hodge's views of Popish Baptism, the "Idea of the Church," and subscription to our Creed, which were such as to compel the dissent of almost all his own denomination.

As in the previous discussion, so here we shall find the history of the question instructive. The French National Synod of 1645, at Charenton, found it necessary to adopt the following enactment against Joshua De La Place, or Placæus, a theological professor in Saumur. Quick's Synodicum:

"There was a report made in the Synod of a certain writing, both printed and manuscript, holding forth this doctrine: That the whole nature of original sin consisteth only in that corruption which is hereditary to all Adam's posterity, and resides originally in all men; and denying the imputation of his first sin. This Synod condemneth the said doctrine, so far as it restraineth the nature of original sin to the sole hereditary corruption of Adam's posterity, to the excluding of the imputation of that first sin by which he fell. And it interdicteth, on pain of all church-censures, all pastors, professors, and others, who shall treat of this question, to depart from the common, received opinion of the Protestant Churches, who (over and besides that corruption) have all acknowledged the imputation of Adam's first sin to his posterity," etc.

Placæus, to evade the implied condemnation of this decree, afterwards said, that he only disputed "an antecedent and immediate imputation" of Adam's guilt; but admitted "a mediate and subsequent imputation," through the criminality of each man's own inherent corruption. This, many of the Reformed conceived as a virtual denial of that imputation; inasmuch as they supposed Placæus to mean, that men are virtually made obnoxious to penalty only on account of their own corruption. But, on this history, several very instructive remarks are to be

made. One is, that no National Synod of the French Church pursued Placæus either with discipline, or any further legislation. This would seem to imply that his explanation was held sufficient by the supreme Church-court, though very unsatisfactory to his antagonists, and especially to Andrew Rivet, their leader.

The second remark is, that this ill-starred distinction, and this pair of ambiguous terms for expressing it, *were the invention of Placæus*; they were no part of the theology of the Reformers. So far as we know, they were never heard of before. So says the *Princeton Review*, (October, 1839). The distinction was evidently a *ruse*, adopted by him, to shelter himself, and entrap his accusers. Had they been discreet, they would not have been misled by controversial heat to step into the trap thus prepared for them by one whom they themselves charged with *mala fides*. They should have refused the ensnaring distinction in both its branches, and should have asserted, with the Synod of Charenton, and all the previous Confessions, neither an "antecedent immediate," nor "mediate consequent" imputation, but simply a true and proper imputation of Adam's sin. The distinction is like that of Supralapsarian, and Infralapsarian, an attempted over-refinement, which should never have been made, which really explained nothing in the decree, and which only led to corollaries dishonorable to God. We state briefly the grounds of this assertion, as a foreshadowing of our train of discussion.

The alternative adopted by Placæus is incorrect, because, like the Arminian scheme, it offers the fact that God should have extended the law, "Like begets like," to man's moral nature and will, as an explanation of the fact. Natural laws are of God's institution and sustentation; what they effect, he ordains. The question therefore recurs: On what judicial *basis* did this ordination, to propagate hereditary depravity in men, rest? Secondly: Placæus' scheme is false to the facts of the case, in that it represents God as though he conceived of Adam's posterity as having an antecedent depraved existence, at least for a moment, before they passed under condemnation; whereas the Scriptures tell us they are *born condemned*. See Eph. ii. 3. The

opposite alternative is untenable, not only because it encumbers the doctrine of original sin with unnecessary difficulties, when the unavoidable ones are, in all conscience, serious enough; but because it connects itself with erroneous views of justification, and the mystical union to the second Adam; and especially that it also is false to the facts of the case. It represents man as having a separate, undepraved, personal existence, for an instant at least, until; *from innocent*, it is turned into depraved by God's act, as a penal consequence of Adam's guilt imputed; whereas, in fact, man now never has any personal existence at all, save a depraved existence. As he enters being condemned, so he enters it depraved. This over-refinement therefore leads to an inaccuracy, which is the counterpart of that resulting from the opposite scheme. Now, when both of the alternatives, in this attempted distinction, lead thus to error, the argument is as strong as can well be conceived, to show that the distinction should never have been made.

Will the stringency of this argument drive any advocate of immediate imputation, so called, to deny that this scheme involves the conception of Adam's posterity as penally made depraved from undepraved, on the exclusive ground of imputed guilt? If that denial could be substantiated, we should have, so far, no ground of difference with him. But it cannot. If his "immediate precedaneous imputation" only meant a true and proper imputation, we should be agreed, so far. But it does not. This is obvious from the logical order of thought. In that order, (though perhaps not always in the order of a temporal succession appreciable by our senses,) every cause goes before its effect. If imputed guilt is the sole cause, and depravation, the penal effect, then, in that sense, the recipient must have the imputation before the depravity. What else does "immediate precedaneous" mean? Again. The friends of immediate imputation went along with us very sociably, in charging the exact counterpart as a result of Placæus' theory; that it would follow, the soul must be first personally depraved in order to become guilty. "What is sauce for the goose, is sauce for the gander." Thirdly: Turretin fully asserts, and Dr. Hodge favors "Creation-

ism." Now, if God creates the soul, it must be created innocent; for a holy God cannot create depravity. Hence, there must be a conceivable instant, as this soul passes from its Maker's pure hand, into the putatively guilty human person, in which instant it undergoes the penal transition from innocent to depraved. And lastly: The advocates of the scheme consistently make an express admission of what we charge. Chalmers' Theological Institutes, Vol. I., page 485: "We have been all dealt with as sinners, and *this anterior to any personal or actual sin of ours.*" "We have *been made corrupt*" (he means, *turned into corrupt persons*), "because we had sinned in Adam, and so are held guilty as he was, and treated accordingly." Page 486. So on page 497: "Or rather, if we speak according to the order of cause and effect, or the natural precedency of guilt to punishment, we have been held so *anterior to infancy.*" So Thornwell, Vol. I., page 346: "Hence, in the order of thought, his sin must always be conceived as imputed before they can be conceived as depraved." Page 347: "Hence the Scriptures teach explicitly, that we are first charged with the guilt of Adam's sin, and then, as the legal consequence, are born with natures totally corrupt." Page 349: They "*are still personally innocent, while putatively guilty.*" Hodge on Rom. v. 13: "It" (the penalty) "comes on men before the transgression of the law of nature, or even the existence of inherent depravity." Theology, Vol. II., page 210: "The guilt, in the order of *nature and fact, precedes the spiritual death*, which is its penal consequent." Page 203: "Penal evils . . . come upon all mankind *prior to anything in their state or conduct* to merit such infliction." Can anything be plainer? Shall we be told that these writers also say, and imply, that putative guilt and corruption are simultaneous in origin; as the Scriptures say? Very likely. That is to say, they contradict themselves; a very natural result, when good men are betrayed into a position contrary to Scripture.

Let us repeat, that it is only against the peculiarity of Dr. Hodge's doctrine as thus evolved that we have any debate. And it is in this sense that we firmly assert, it is not the peculiarity

of the Reformed theology, but an exaggeration into which a few of its distinguished names have been betrayed. Any impartial mind examining Rivet's *Consensus*, sees that, as supports for the peculiarity above depicted, his array is a failure. The Reformed Confessions all assert an imputation of Adam's guilt; as does the decree of Charenton; but as to the point to which we except, *not one* speaks in favor of Dr. Hodge's position. A few theologians, like the supralapsarian Beza, sustain him explicitly; the great current, like Calvin, stop short of, or even repudiate his peculiarity. Passing to more recent times, we find Stapfer, the great Edwards, and Breckinridge, against Dr. Hodge. The two first of these may show how much more of assertion than of research we meet upon this subject. Dr. Hodge has said that Stapfer and Edwards adopt the vicious theory of Placæus; and many others, echoing Dr. Hodge, say the same; but *all erroneously!* Let us hear the men themselves. Stapfer's *Polemic Theology*, Vol. IV., Chapter XVII., §78. Note: "The whole of the controversy they" (adversaries of the doctrine of original sin) "have with us about this matter, evidently arises from this, that they suppose the *mediate*, and the *immediate* imputation, are distinguished one from the other, not only in the manner of conception, but in reality. And so indeed they consider imputation only as *immediate*, and abstractedly from the mediate; when yet *our divines* suppose that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Therefore I CHOOSE NOT TO USE ANY SUCH DISTINCTION, or to suppose any such thing, in what I have said on the subject; but have only endeavored to explain the thing itself, and to reconcile it with the divine attributes. And therefore *I have everywhere conjoined both these conceptions concerning the imputation of the first sin, as inseparable*, and judged that one ought never to be considered without the other. While I have been writing this note, *I have consulted all the systems of divinity* which I have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine opinion of our chief divines in this affair; and I found they were of the same mind with me," etc. Edwards, Part IV.,

Chapter III, Original sin, says: These things "said by Stapferus, are in several respects to the present purpose."

Another weighty protest against the exaggeration of Dr. Hodge, appears in a large body of Calvinists, represented by Dr. S. J. Baird, Dr. W. G. Shedd, and the venerable father Augustine, (to whom Dr. Thornwell finally gave in his virtual adhesion,) whose views Dr. Hodge repudiates as Realism. These hold, as we do, a true and proper imputation; but they are so unwilling to accept the peculiarity of the theory of Rivet, Turretin, and Hodge, that to avoid it, they resort to the theory of "generic identity." The race sinned in Adam, because the *whole nature* was in him when he sinned; and we each have that *same nature*, and so, each one truly and literally sinned in that first sin. The nature they define as an *entity*, but not a *substance*, being, namely, the aggregate of all the moral and intellectual *forces* transmitted by generation, and qualifying each person of the race as a moral agent. We have no mission to defend this theory, not holding its peculiar feature. But it cannot be called *Realism*. It expressly says that the nature, as separated from each individual, is neither substance nor person, yet not a mere abstraction. It may be unintelligible, but it is not Realism; for the corner stone of that theory was, that generic ideas are *Res*. We are only interested in the scheme of 'generic identity, as a protest against Dr. Hodge's peculiarity.

As another witness to the true complexion of the doctrine in the Protestant Theology, we quote D. G. Sohn, (Professor in Heidelberg, 1590,) commended by Dr. Archibald Alexander, as a representative of orthodoxy. Commenting on Rom. v. 12: "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin," he says: The Apostle "does not mean merely that Adam had become a sinner, but that 'it had come upon all his descendants, that is, upon all the men in the world; for he does not say in this place that *guilt* had entered, but that *sin* had entered into the world. And this is not left to be inferred, but is expressly asserted in the same verse: 'in whom all have sinned,' or, 'for that all,' etc. Moreover, when he declares that all are subject to death and condemnation by the sin of one, it is a just infer-

ence that they are all partakers of his sin, and are born in a state of moral pollution. In the 19th verse, it is said: 'By the disobedience of one many are constituted sinners.' Now to be constituted sinners, includes the idea not only of being made subject to the penalty, but partaking of the nature of sin; for they who are entirely free from the stain of sin, cannot with propriety be called sinners. . . . Infants are depraved, 'children of wrath,' and guilty on account of their own personal depravity."

Vogelsang, quoted by De Moor, Commentarius, Vol. III., page 275, says: "Certe neminem sempiterna subire supplicia, propter inobedientiam protoplasti, nisi mediante cognata perversitate."

Marckius, in De Moor, says: If Placæus meant nothing more by mediate imputation, than that, "hominum natorum actualem punitionem ulteriorem non fieri nudo intuitu Adamicæ transgressionis, absque interveniente etiam propria corruptione, et fluentibus hinc sceleribus variis, neminem orthodoxorum possent habere obloquentem." But that is just what Calvin, Stapfer, and their company, do mean, and nothing more.

Let us add a testimony from among the Westminster divines. Samuel Rutherford, in his "Trial and Triumph of Faith," says: "And truly it is bad divinity for Dr. Crispe to say, 'As we are real, actual sinners in Adam, so here, God passeth really sin over on Christ. For we sinned intrinsically in Adam, as parts, as members, as being in his loins; and *we are thence 'by nature children of wrath.'* Eph. ii. 3: But it is blasphemy to say that our blessed Saviour sinned intrinsically in us, or that *he is a Son of God's wrath, for sin intrinsically inherent in him* as it is in us"—the latter being Rutherford's conception of our sinning in Adam.

But our most explicit witness is the greatest—John Calvin. Dr. Thornwell first gives him up, and then, on grounds of inference, claims him. We indulge in no inferences as to what is meant; but cite his express words. Dr. Hodge apologises, that some of the Papists pushed the putative element of original sin so exclusively, that the Reformers of Calvin's day were constrained to exaggerate the hereditary element to restore the

balance; and that thorough discussion and analysis had not then taught them the bearings of the question between mediate and immediate imputation. *Je me moque de tout cela!* Calvin did not exactly know what he was about, quoth 'a! Let us see whether he does not look the matter fully in the face, and give an intentional and intelligent decision. In his Commentary on Romans v. 12, "*Sin entered into the world,*" we read: "Observe what order he places here; for he says that sin preceded, death followed from it. For there are persons who contend, that we are ruined by Adam's sin in such a way, as though we perished by no fault of our own; thus, as though he only had sinned in us. But Paul affirms distinctly that sin is propagated in all who pay its penalty. And he then urges that more closely, when a little after he assigns the reason why all Adam's posterity is subject to death's empire. To wit, saith he, because we all have sinned. That '*peccare,*' moreover, signifies to be corrupted and vitiated. For that natural depravity which we bring from our mother's womb, although it yield not its fruit so quickly, is nevertheless sin before the Lord, and deserves his vengeance. And this is what is called original sin. For as Adam at his first creation received the endowments of divine favor as well for himself as for his posterity; thus, upon apostatising from the Lord, he corrupted our nature in himself, defiled, depraved, ruined it; for when fallen from God's likeness, he could only beget a seed similar to himself. We therefore all sinned, in that we are all imbued with natural corruption, and so unrighteous and perverse."

So, on verse 15, Calvin says: "What the Apostle delivers, 'perished through the offence of one,' understand thus: that corruption is transfused from him into us. For neither do we thus perish by his fault, as though we were ourselves without fault; but because his sin is the cause of our sin, Paul ascribes our death to him. Our sin I call what is inborn in us," etc. On verse 17: "For if by the offence of one," he says: "Moreover, it is important to note here two differences between Adam and Christ, which the Apostle did not thus omit, because he deemed they should be neglected; but because it did not at all concern the

present argument to enumerate them. The first is, that in Adam's sin we are not condemned through imputation alone, as though the penalty of another man's sin were exacted of us; but we thus sustain its punishment, because we are also guilty of fault, so far, to wit, as our nature vitiated in him, is involved in guilt before God. But through the righteousness of Christ, we are restored to salvation in another mode. For it [Christ's righteousness] is not thus held to be accepted by us, as though it were within us, but because we possess Christ himself, bestowed upon us by the Father's generosity, with all his benefits. Accordingly, the 'gift of righteousness' signifies not a quality with which God imbues us, as some erroneously interpret, but a gratuitous imputation of righteousness. For the Apostle is expounding what he understood by the word *grace*. The other difference is, that the benefit of Christ does not reach to all men, as Adam involved his whole race in condemnation. And the reason is at hand; for since that curse, which we draw from Adam is derived into us by nature, it is not surprising that it embraces the whole mass. But in order to come to a participation of the grace of Christ, we must needs be inserted into him by faith." Calvin repeats the same view under verse 19th.

The grounds upon which Dr. Hodge rests his peculiar theory, against Calvin and the current of the Reformed divines, may be included in two. He assumes that the imputation of Adam's sin to us must be not only a true imputation—which we fully admit—but that it must be exactly identical, in all its circumstances, with the imputation of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us. He assumes, secondly, that the correct interpretation of Rom. v. 12–21, demands his peculiar view, the exact identity of the two imputations granted. And he argues his interpretation chiefly from the premise of that identity; thus reasoning in a circle. Now, as to this much belabored passage, we are free to say, that Calvin's exposition seems, on the whole, founded on the truest insight into the Apostle's scope, and the fairest and most scholarly. But we have no theoretic motive to reject Dr. Hodge's exposition; for his exegetical conclusions contain nothing inconsistent with our doctrine. But we shall show that

the doctrinal use which is attempted to be made of the passage, is not only unnecessary to the analogy of the faith, but untenable and self-contradictory.

Dr. Hodge would ask, Whether the covenants of works and of grace are not both grounded in the principle of imputation? We reply, *Yes*. And Whether we can deny it in the one, without overthrowing the other? Again we answer, *No*. But stay; we do not concede his postulate above. It is a principle fundamentally involved in both covenants, that under the government of a sovereign and righteous God, guilt may be justly transferable from one moral agent to another, *under certain conditions*; but not therefore under *any conditions whatsoever*. We have never seen a system which denied the latter. Dr. Hodge concedes it. Vol. II., page 196. Turretin, Loc. IX., Ques. 9. Let us suppose that when Satan fell, Gabriel had been far distant, in the holy and perfect performance of the mission of love entrusted to him by his divine Master; and that when he returned, he had been told that he must be cast into hell for the sin of Satan, because it was imputed to him, while there was no tie of race, nor dependency between them, and he was not consenting to, or even cognizant of the sin. Does any one hold that the righteousness or benevolence of our God could justify this dispensation? We can only say, that were we to meet with a man who held thus, we should certainly not attempt to reason with him. That is a case in which the conditions of a just imputation are certainly lacking.

Let us suppose again, that Achan's children had been personally as holy in nature, and conduct, as Adam was before he fell, does any rational man suppose that they would have perished under the law of Exodus xx. 5. These instances, ordinary and extraordinary, where God visits the iniquity of fathers upon the children, are cited by Dr. Hodge, as though they implied this, and were identical with the case of Adam and his posterity. And yet Dr. Hodge knows that all Calvinistic doctors teach that the two cases present only an *analogy*, and not a perfect *parallel*. A parent now is not a federal head under a covenant of works. Our relation to our fathers is not identical with our

relation to Adam; the guilt of their sins is not imputed to us precisely as Adam's first sin is. Yea, we are taught that the guilt of none, even of Adam's sins after the first, is thus imputed to us. In this visiting of parents' sins on posterity, we have a different case, of just imputation yet requiring different conditions. The children must be already sinners—already personally obnoxious, at least for inherent depravity, to God's holiness. Moses tells us, Exod. xx. 5; Deut. v. 9, that this visiting of parents' sins is upon the third and fourth generations *of them that hate God*. Our Saviour (Matt. xxiii. 32–35) teaches the same; telling the Pharisees that their “filling up the measure of their fathers” was the condition of their inheriting the penalty of all the righteous blood shed from Abel to Zacharias. The prohibition in Deut. xxiv. 16, proves the same thing; human magistrates might not put the children to death for the fathers' sins. Is it said, that God still did it, as in the case of Achan's, and Saul's posterity? True; and the explanation exactly confirms our argument. A magistrate may not slay a criminal's children, because, to him, in the limited sphere of his jurisdiction, they are not offenders. But God may; because in his wider sphere of judgment, they are sinners. God never does injustice “that good may come;” but when the righteous ends of his providential rule dictate it, he justly makes sinful children suffer with sinful progenitors. While the penal infliction is occasioned by the progenitors' crimes, yet a community of sinful character between the children and them is the condition requisite for a righteous imputation in these cases. The latter point Turretin reluctantly teaches, against the interests of his own erroneous logic. Loc. IX., Ques. 9. Thus we find in this extensive class of providences cases of what Dr. Hodge deems, and correctly deems, true imputation; but the conditions are not identical with the imputation of Adam's sin to us.

We approach the issue more nearly in our third case, that of the imputation of our guilt to Christ. This Dr. Hodge would make his strong point, urging that if we do not admit his exaggerated view of immediate imputation, we cannot admit the imputation of our guilt to Christ. And, since there is no other

way of justification for sinners, he intimates that the man who will not go all lengths with him, cuts himself off from all hope of heaven! Does not this appear to be the very wantonness of dogmatism, when we remember that the Scriptures expressly make two cardinal differences between the conditions of the imputation in Christ's case and in Adam's? In the case of the imputation of our sins to Christ, Dr. Hodge urges that the guilt of that which was purely and solely *peccatum alienum*, is transferred to Christ, on the ground of a community of nature, without his having a particle of personal depravity or sin common between him and the sinful race. True; but the Scriptures tell us, the propriety of it was grounded in two other conditions also, totally peculiar. *Christ volunteered to assume the penalty*; he having, what no creature could have, autocracy of his own being and powers, authorising him to make the voluntary offer. Will any one be rash enough to say, that a community of nature alone would have ever prompted the sovereign holiness and justice of the Father to lay the load of imputed guilt on the God-man, his co-equal Son, if *he had dissented from the sacrifice*? Again we say: that with such a man, we should not dream of reasoning. Every system of theology we ever read, treats Christ's voluntary consent as an essential condition. He says so himself in John x. 18. Dr. Thornwell in his admirable Missionary sermon on that text, says—"It" [Christ's covenant of redemption] "*binds, not by virtue of a right to command, but by virtue of a consent to obey.*" See also Butler's Analogy, Part II., Chapter V., §7: "Nay, if there were any force at all in the objection," [that vicarious sufferings cannot be *just*,] "it would be stronger in one respect against natural providence than against Christianity; because under the former we are in many cases commanded, and even necessitated, whether we will or not, to suffer for the faults of others; *whereas the sufferings of Christ were voluntary.* The world's being under the righteous government of God does indeed imply that finally and upon the whole, every one shall *receive according to his personal deserts*; and the general doctrine of the whole Scripture is, that this shall be the completion of the divine government." So concludes Chalmers—honest man!—

against the interests of his own false logic. See Institutes of Theology, Vol. I., page 498: "For there is an element in the latter [Christ's] which does not belong to the former imputation. *Christ was willing,*" etc. See also Owen on Justification, page 194: "And this *voluntary sponson* was one ground of the imputation of our sin to Christ. He took on him the person of the whole Church that had sinned, to answer for what they had done against God and the law. Hence that imputation was *fundamentaliter ex pacto, ex voluntaria sponione*; it had its foundation in his voluntary undertaking," etc.

The other essential difference between the two cases of imputation is, that pointed out by the Apostle in Rom. v. 16-19, and Rom. vi. 23: The one was a transaction of strict judicial righteousness; the other of glorious free grace. "The judgment was by one to condemnation; but the *free gift* is of many offences unto justification." God displayed liberality in proposing to lift Adam and his race from the condition of servants to that of sons forever, on the easy terms of a temporary obedience. So the covenant of grace involves a vicarious obedience and sacrifice, by which the law is satisfied, while its captives are ransomed. But the Scriptures still correctly say, that the first covenant was a transaction of law, the second, of grace. "For Moses describeth the righteousness *which is of the law*: that the man which doeth those things shall live by them." Rom. x. 5. "And if by grace, then it is no more works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace." Rom. xi. 6. Now can any righteous judge be imagined, who would allow himself equal latitude in his judicial convictions, with that he allows himself in his acts of beneficence? Would not every such judge answer, that *in condemning*, he felt himself bound by justice within the strict merits of each case; but that, in his benefactions, he was accustomed to give way to the generous impulses of his heart, provided no principle of righteousness inhibited him, and to bestow more than the recipients could claim of right? It may be praiseworthy to dispense blessings above the deserts of the beneficiaries: it cannot be other than injustice to dispense penalties beyond the deserts of the cul-

prits. Here then is a second essential difference between the two Adams in the two covenants. While there is a true and proper imputation in each case, this prepares us to expect a difference in the circumstances conditioning them.

There is still another difference in the two cases not mentioned by Calvin. In the case of the first Adam, the representative's action as federal head preceded the sin. In the case of the second Adam, the sin preceded not only the action of Christ as substitute, but preceded even the constitution of his person. We may find that this circumstance will have to be regarded in our adjustment. Lastly, there is the difference pointed out by Calvin: The imputation of Adam's guilt goes with the blood; all who are naturally descended from him share it. The federal connexion with Christ does not go with the blood: it is limited to believers; and its benefits applied through faith, which is an intelligent, voluntary act of the beneficiaries' souls. We may find that this circumstance will have to be regarded in our adjustment.

To Dr. Hodge's second line of argument, then, for immediate imputation in his peculiar sense of it, we have several answers. The argument is: That we must make an *exact parallel* in all particulars between Adam and Christ; that if we do not represent God as visiting the penalty of corruption on Adam's posterity solely at first for his imputed guilt, they being conceived as otherwise initially guiltless and sinless, we must be consistent, and represent justification as first, in order of thought, an infusion of inherent sanctification, and thereupon, secondarily, an imputation of the righteousness of Christ's satisfaction. But this is *precisely the Popish theory of justification*. Now, the first answer is, that the Apostle did not mean to institute an exact parallel in every circumstance between Adam and Christ. Both are federal heads: from both there is an imputation, and a proper one. But the imputations are inevitably differentiated, in some conditions, by the differences of the two cases. Of these, the Apostle mentions some. Calvin suggests others. And among these, he expressly asserts that very difference which Dr. Hodge denies, between imputation of sin and imputation of

righteousness, and expressly repudiates that Popish theory on the latter point, which, Dr. Hodge says, any one in Calvin's position is bound to accept. We differ from the Princeton divine in remarkably good company.

But our second answer is, that an assertion of the exact parallel which Dr. Hodge wishes to establish, will inevitably lead to erroneous results, which he and every other Reformed divine must anxiously repudiate. If this is the order of thought in immediate imputation; that we, conceived as otherwise personally sinless and guiltless initially, receive Adam's guilt by imputation, and then inherent depravity as the penalty, at first, of that alone; then the theory of justification which must result from a rigid parallelism, must be this: That we are personally depraved and dead in trespasses and sins, at the epoch of our justification, and afterwards, in the order of causation, we receive quickening grace, as the first fruit and effect of justifying righteousness imputed. But as justification is instrumentally by faith, faith must be in order to justification, and of course *in order to quickening!* That is, the sinner has true faith first, and is regenerated afterwards! Every one who has a *modicum* of theological knowledge knows that this is precisely Arminianism. A moment's reflection shows that it is inevitable synergism. Every Calvinist distinguishes between inherent and legal righteousness; as does Dr. Hodge excellently well, Vol. II., page 195. As to the merit of a personal inherent righteousness *worthy to procure our acceptance before God*, we have none at all at the time of our justification, *nor ever after*. But as to subjective condition, the believer is not spiritually dead at the instant of justification. All the Reformed divines, so far as we know,* with Dr. Hodge, fix the following order of sequence. 1. Quickening of the dead soul, or regeneration in its strict sense, by which Christ's spiritual life and holiness are initially implanted.

*Calvin's Institutes, Book III., Chap. XI., §10. Owen on Justification, Chap. IX., pages 236-7. Boston's Fourfold State, pages 195-6. Turretin, Loc. XV., Ques. 15, §4. Ridgeley, Vol. III., pages 45, 47. Confession of Faith, Chap. X.; Chap. XI., first sentence; Chap. XIV., §1; Larger Catechism, Ques. 66, 67, 69.

2. Saving faith is exercised. 3. The union to Christ is thereby constituted, which divides into legal union, and spiritual union. As we are legally united to him, we are justified; as we are spiritually united, we "convert," (Isaiah vi. 10), and the work of sanctification proceeds in us. We thus see that Dr. Hodge must relinquish the theory of an exact parallelism, or he finds himself in a *dilemma*, whose two horns are Arminianism, and the scheme of Placæus; both abhorred by him and by us. We advise him to retreat from his exaggeration, and find the safe position alongside of John Calvin and the great current of Reformed divines, with his humble reviewer. It is too late for him to escape the dilemma; by pleading that the only thing discussed in Rom. v. 12, etc., is the legal relation of the two Adams to their federated bodies, and that the spiritual relations should be left out of the debate. *Leave them out then*, and nothing can be proved from this passage, against our view, or for Dr. Hodge's. We repeat: if the spiritual and subjective relations of the represented to the representatives are out of the debate, this whole argument is as irrelevant for Dr. Hodge, as for us. But he will not leave those relations out, he cannot, they must come into the argument, and then it is in our favor.

For, thirdly, if there is in every particular an exact parallelism between the two cases of imputation, then it must hold in this: that *both are conditioned on a parallel union* between the represented and the representatives. In *this* particular we claim the parallel; Dr. Hodge cannot demur; because he says there must be a parallel in *every* particular. Here then, for once, shall we travel together sociably? Let us see. Dr. Hodge says, Vol. II., page 196: "The ground of the imputation of Adam's sin, or the reason why the penalty of his sin has come upon all his posterity, according to the doctrine above stated, is, the union between us and Adam." Also on page 211: "These consequences come on his posterity in the same order," (as on Adam); "first, the loss, or rather destitution of original righteousness; and secondly, corruption of nature; and thirdly, exposure to eternal death." So also Thornwell, Vol. I., page 346: "If there were not a real unity between Adam and the race, the covenant of works

could not, by an arbitrary constitution, treat them as one." One application which we make of this excellent doctrine, is to explain the valuable and instructive remark of Jonathan Edwards: that we should so conceive of our sin and fall in our federal head, according to our close, natural and federal union with him, as to place the two elements of inherent depravity and guilt in the same relation in ourselves, and in him. This Dr. Hodge expressly admits, as we have thus seen. Now common sense tells us, that when a holy creature committed his first sin, the depravation of his heart and the falling under guilt were, temporally speaking, synchronous; but that, causatively speaking, the depravation, or subjective corruption, must precede, and the guilt follow. The reason is plain: It is sinful acts which incur guilt. But the character of acts is decided by their intention, to speak popularly; decided by their subjective motive, to speak philosophically. The thing which qualified Adam's act in plucking the forbidden fruit as evil, was the evil emotion that prompted it. But in the order of causation, motive precedes volition. This is but to say, that a holy being cannot perform an unholy act; he must begin to become unholy in order to do so. Any other view is simply absurd. It is very true, that after Adam became a customary sinner, the series of sinful acts fostered the sinful disposition; yea, that his very first wrong act gave an impulse to the wrong affection which prompted it. But the other truth remains; that a sinful act must imply a sinful motive as *a priori* to it in the order of production. We can scarcely imagine that any one will be so thoughtless as to object that this would represent God as bringing the penal evil of subjective corruption on Adam before he found Adam guilty. The answer is too plain: That it was not God who did it; but Adam brought it on himself. That is to say, God did not corrupt Adam; he corrupted himself. Having found this order of relation between Adam's first corruption, and his first guilt, we have the authority of both the rival parties to this discussion, for saying, we should find the same order in the case of his posterity. That is, we should describe them as temporally guilty when corrupted, and corrupted when guilty; and causatively, in the initial deter-

mination of matters, guilty because corrupted, rather than corrupted because guilty.

We proceed now to apply the concession of a union between Adam and his posterity in another point of view. All are agreed that the imputation of Adam's guilt is conditioned on our natural, as well as our federal union with Adam. Now we raise the very simple question: *In what nature* are we united to Adam; his holy or his fallen nature? Will any one say, In both? Then, we must have had a literal preëxistence for six thousand years! For, let the reader notice: the question is about our *natural union* with Adam, not our federal. *We are naturally united only to Adam fallen.* For he had already fallen before he had posterity; all divines agree that, if Adam is redeemed, his regenerated holiness does not federally concern us; that is not his natural, but his supernatural quality. There is, then, no moral nature of the first Adam to which we can be naturally united, save his fallen nature. To this emphatically agree the Scriptures. Gen. v. 3: "And Adam begat a son in his own likeness, after his image, and called his name Seth." 1 Cor. xv. 48, 49: "As is the earthy, such are they also that are earthy. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly." "Put off . . . the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts, and put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." Eph. iv. 22-24. These words, in requiring conversion, allude to the two unions; the first, corrupt; the second, holy. Compare Col. iii. 9, 10. Our opponents have expressly conceded—not bethinking themselves what they were conceding—that the imputation of Adam's guilt to us, is conditioned on a *natural* and a federal union. Now it turns out that the one of these conditions is a union in a depraved nature. It is too late for them to recoil. We forewarned them, that there was a *difference of fact* between the first Adam's covenant, and the second Adam's; that the first representative was before the sin; but that the sin was before the second representative. We now see, that a difference of adjustment, in this particular, is inevitable from that fact.

It is vain for Dr. Thornwell to seek escape from this conclusion, by saying that each individual sinner of us has had a federal existence before we were conceived; that we bore a covenanted or legal relation before we existed. If this language means anything more than a reference to the divine foreordination and foreknowledge about us, it is incorrect. Common sense will decide, with us, that nothing can be truly related until it exists: a nonentity cannot be party to a relation! Before we individually began to exist, each of us was nonentity, save in the foreordination of God viewing us as *in posse*; and before we began to exist, the only true relation connecting each of us individually with Adam (or with anything else) was the one subsisting in God's prescience and purpose. Let the clear, convincing language of the Confession of Faith, touching the counterpart subject of justification, illustrate this statement. Chap. XI., § 4: "God did, from all eternity, *decree to justify* all the elect; and Christ did, in the fulness of time, die for their sins, and rise again for their justification; nevertheless *they are not justified until* the Holy Spirit doth, in due time, actually apply Christ unto them." By parity of reasoning, we hold that God did, from all eternity, decree to condemn all men descended from Adam by ordinary generation; and that Adam did, some time after his creation in holiness, sin and fall for them, as well as for himself; nevertheless, individual fallen men are not condemned in him until such time as their existence doth actually unite them to Adam. And then it is a corrupted Adam to whom they are united.

Can any escape from this be gained by saying that the whole covenant of works ceased, and was revoked as soon as Adam broke it once; and that the legal union of subsequent men must therefore have been before that date? The premise is expressly untrue, tried by Scripture or common-sense. The statement is precisely as preposterous as this: "A given murderer broke the statute of murder at a given time; and consequently that statute was thenceforward abrogated and wholly revoked as to him, as a legal covenant." We presume that when hanging-day came, the murderer would be very much mystified to know under

what law he was to be hung, on that theory! How could that statute hang him, if it was abrogated as to him? No; the simple truth is, it has not been abrogated by his breach of it; but abides in full force over him in its condemning power, only, it has ceased to be a possible rule of justification for him. See Rom. iii. 20. So the broken covenant of works is still in force over Adam's race *as a rule of condemnation*. It is for that reason, that "*we are all by nature children of wrath, even as others.*" *God's elect* are born under the force of that covenant as a rule of condemnation, "even as others." It passes human wit to see how, if the covenant of works were wholly revoked as soon as broken by Adam, sin is still imputed under it in "this year of grace," 1873; how in the "year of grace," 1, our Lord Christ was placed under both its preceptive and penal terms as a surety; and how, in thirty-three or four years thereafter he so repaired and fulfilled it, as thereby to purchase for the elect the very "adoption of sons," which that covenant had first proposed to Adam. See Gal. iv. 5: "These be the two covenants: the one from Mt. Sinai, which gendereth to bondage, which is Agar. For this Agar is Mt. Sinai in Arabia, and answereth to Jerusalem *which now is, and is in bondage with her children.*" Does not every Reformed expositor explain, that the Sinai covenant, as perverted, broken, and misapplied by legalists, reverts into the *covenant of works*? We never heard of any other way of explaining the Epistles of Romans and Galatians. They uniformly represent, that there are two covenants, and only two: of works, of grace; that all men are born under the first, and *born condemned, because they are born under it*, its breach in Adam having rendered it a ministry of condemnation; that we all live under it, until, by union to the second Adam, we pass under the other, the covenant of grace. The epoch of transition is, when we are effectually called, and believe. Rom. vii. 6: "But *now* we are delivered from the law," etc. *When?* When we are "married" to Christ. The truth remains, then, that our natural union to Adam is a union to a corrupted nature; and it is confessed on all hands, that such union is one of the essential grounds of the imputation of his guilt to us. We return then

to that view of this imputation presented by Calvin in the citations given above, as the consistent one.

But Dr. Hodge, following Turretin, urges, that unless we accept their strained view of immediate imputation, we really get no imputation at all. The whole *residuum* is, that men are punished in no sense for Adam's sin; but exclusively for their own concurrence of will and conduct in that sin. Now we reply to this: First, it is strange that so large a number of the greatest, clearest, and most orthodox minds, like Calvin's, Vitringa's, Stapfer's, Rutherford's, Edwards', should have deceived themselves with so sheer a cheat, and should have supposed that they had a true imputation, when there was none. They teach that a community of evil nature is the concurrent condition of this imputation. Dr. Hodge's charge is, that it excludes all real imputation. Let us see. We reply, secondly: All the reformed divines agree that the mystical union with Christ, establishing a community of spiritual life with him is the essential concurrent condition for the imputation of his righteousness. Here is the parallel case. Do they, does Dr. Hodge, therefore concede that there is therefore no proper imputation of Christ's merits; and that believers are justified after all on account of the infused spiritual life? Not one of them. In the other case, the imputation of our sins to Christ, it is conditioned on his natural union with the race, and his optionary assent. But no theologian ever argued thence, that the real transference of guilt was obscured or lost, and that Christ was really punished on account of his act in consenting to assume humanity. The view of the Reformed Churches is plain enough as to original sin; it makes the elements one coëtaneous complex. The Shorter Catechism says: "The sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consists in the guilt of *Adam's* first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature," etc. The word guilt here must be intended by the Westminster Assembly in the sense of "potential guilt," including the idea of criminality; for it is a part of a "*sinful estate*." Actual guilt alone,

mere obligation to penalty for "*peccatum alienum*," is no "sinfulness of estate."

The doctrine of original sin is acknowledged by all divines to be difficult, mysterious, and awful. It is liable to cavils which are hard to explode, at least with such a full solution as will satisfy the unrenewed mind. The objections to the righteousness of such a dispensation, as we suppose, may virtually be resolved into two; one aimed against the justice of God's providentially placing us in our subjective condition; the other, against the justice of his imputing to us Adam's guilt. Under the first head, it is argued that it cannot be just to hold us guilty for a state which is natural, nor for any actions necessarily flowing therefrom; seeing it was not selected for us at first by our own choice, but imposed from a source above or before our wills. To this cavil we shall not now advert, farther than to approve the positions of Turretin and Hodge: That this corrupt estate, while not the result of an act of personal choice by us, is yet voluntary in us, in the sense of being *spontaneous*; and that this being so, our reason always holds a moral agent meritorious for what he spontaneously is, without asking how he came to be such; as witness our judgments touching God, eternally and necessarily holy; angels, created holy; and Satan fallen, we know not how. Under the second head, it is argued, that it is intrinsically unjust to punish one creature, without his consent freely given, for another's act. And this is the great cavil, hurled perpetually at our doctrine by Rationalists, Socinians, Pelagians, modern Papists, now usually semi-Pelagian; and, in a word, by every unbelieving mind. Here are specimens of the way they put the cavil: "Suppose a murder done, by a man over whom you could have no control in your absence without your approval; suppose that the magistrate was about to hang you along with the murderer, on this fiction of imputed guilt, and against your earnest protest! Could any sophistical refinement make you regard it as anything else than a monstrous iniquity? Such appears the orthodox theory of original sin." We give the cavil, not as our own, but as the unbeliever's.

Now, the last objection we urge against Dr. Hodge's presentation of immediate imputation is, that it is *unwise causelessly to exasperate a difficulty*, even seemingly besetting the truth. We have shown that this exaggeration of the angles of the doctrine is *causeless*. The logical and exegetical necessities by which Dr. Hodge supposed himself constrained are imaginary. The 5th of Romans does not demand it. The imputation of our sins to Christ, and of his righteousness to us, the great corner stone of our salvation, does not require it. Then why increase the ground of cavil causelessly?

We remark that all the writers, who incline to the extreme theory of imputation, betray a profound sense of the difficulty involved, by their anxious resort to expedients to evade it. But their expedients, if they satisfy themselves, do not satisfy each other. That adopted by Turretin (Loc. IX., Ques. 9, § 14) and by Dr. Hodge, Vol. II., page 211, is as follows:

“The punishment which Adam's sin brought on us, is either *privative* or *positive*. The former is the lack and privation of original righteousness; the latter is death, both temporal and eternal, and in general all the evils which are sent upon sinners. Although the second, from the nature of the thing always follows the first, except the mercy of God intervene, nevertheless it should not be confounded with it. As to the first, we say that Adam's sin is imputed to us *immediately* for the privative punishment, because it is the cause of the privation of original righteousness, and so ought to precede the corruption, at least in the order of nature; but, as to the latter, it may be said to be imputed *mediately* with reference to the positive penalty, because to that penalty we are not obnoxious, except after we are born and corrupted.”

Dr. Thornwell shall answer this evasion for us. Works, Vol. I., page 333: “This theory” “takes it for granted that there is no contradiction to God's holiness in treating a being as a sinner who has never sinned, but there is a contradiction to his holiness in making him a sinner. But where is the difference? Suppose the being as coming from the hands of God is in fact spotless, how can he be treated as a sinner? If not treated as

a sinner, then there is no guilt; and, if no guilt, then no need of withholding original righteousness."

"In the next place, to be destitute of original righteousness is sin. That a moral, rational and accountable being should exist without a disposition to love God and to reverence his holy law, is itself to be in a positively unholy state. Want of conformity with the moral law is as truly sin, as open and flagrant transgression. When these very men are arguing against the doctrine of the Papists, they insist upon the impossibility of an intermediate condition betwixt sin and holiness; and yet when they wish to explain the mode of the propagation of sin, they distinguish between simple nature and the moral qualities which perfect and adorn it. I do not see, therefore, that this theory obviates any difficulty at all." So far, Dr. Thornwell.

This is unanswerable. It shows that Turretin, under the stress of the difficulty which his exaggeration had raised for him, resorted to one of those very Pelagian principles, which he himself explodes so completely. In addition we object, that if "from the nature of the thing," the positive depravation "always follows" the privative or negative, then in immediately visiting the latter on the exclusive ground of *peccatum alienum*, God has virtually visited the latter also. If, "from the nature of the thing," the man who is pushed over the edge of a precipice always goes to the bottom, then it seems to us, that he who pushed him over also broke his bones.

The expedient adopted by Dr. Baird in his *Elohim Revealed*, is that which Dr. Hodge classes, with others, as substantially realistic. As stated by Dr. Thornwell, (Vol. I., page 561,) it is, "that we had a being in our substance, but not in our persons, which has determined the attitude of that substance." Of this he remarks, "that it removes the difficulty, but it substitutes a greater one."

Of himself, Dr. Thornwell says, page 334: "I confess that to me the whole difficulty lies in what to these divines presents no difficulty at all—in the imputation of guilt." It is, after he looks this doctrine steadily in the face, that he feels himself constrained to seek a solution of this difficulty, in substantially the

same theory which a few years before he had condemned in Dr. Baird. On page 349, 350, we find these words: "On these grounds I am free to confess that I cannot escape from the doctrine, however mysterious, of *a generic unity in man as the true basis* of the representative economy in the covenant of works. The human race is not an aggregate of independent atoms, but constitutes *an organic whole, with a common life* springing from a common ground." . . . "There is, in man what we may call a common nature. That common nature *is not a mere generalisation of logic, but a substantive reality.*" . . . "As then descent from Adam is the exponent of a potential existence in him, as it is a revelation of a fact in relation to the nature which is individualised in a given case, it constitutes lawful and just ground for federal representation." Here, after all, the stress of the difficulty on Dr. Thornwell is so great, that he adopts a theory even more realistic than the one he had refuted. Dr. Baird never said that human nature was "*a substantive reality.*" He said that it was an entity, but not a substance, and defined it as the aggregate of all the constitutive moral forces of man's *essentia*, which are transmitted by generation from our first parent. Thus, in this case, Dr. Thornwell answers Dr. Thornwell. He convinced us, in his earlier publication, that the notion of a substantive, generic unity is deceptive; and we have the misfortune to remain convinced. True; Adam was "the root of all mankind." There is between us and him an all-important community of race and nature, which is one of the essential conditions of imputation, as our Confession states. But that the nature, apart from each person who has it, is a moral entity, we see not; still less, that it is a personal entity; and does not responsibility for guilt require personality in its subject? If this generic unity is so substantive, it connects us equally with Christ; and why do we not obey and atone in him, as essentially as we sinned and fell in Adam? And why is not the imputation of Christ's righteousness also as universal as the nature?

The rational difficulty presented by our adversaries recurs, then. We are compelled to consider the question, Whether such an imputation, without our complicity or consent, is not inevi-

tably unjust. It has been Dr. Hodge's wont to override that question. Is this right? Is it wise? The answer is: "God does it, therefore it must be right." To this "short method" there are two objections: 1. It is not so certain that God does it, seeing that Dr. Hodge can quote no express Scripture, nor even any human creed, to prove it; but only his own inferences. 2dly. If a thing is *impossible to be right*, then any man's saying that God did it would be a demonstration that that man misrepresented God. Let us state a few of those propositions in which all the Reformed divines agree. Revelation is to be accepted, though it teach mysteries entirely *above reason*. But it could not be accepted, if it taught inevitable contradictions, which are *against reason*. For no man could believe, were he to try, against those intuitive laws of thought which constitute him a thinking and believing creature. But in applying this criterion to revelation, these *caveats* must be observed: The Scripture proposition which is accused of outraging reason must exist in express terms; if it is only a human inference, it may be that the fallible expositor, and not the Scripture itself, is responsible for the outrage. Secondly, the rational conviction outraged must be a primitive, necessary, and universal judgment of the reason; because, if it is only an inferential conclusion, the source of collision may be in the fallible reason, and not in the infallible book. Thirdly, the mind which presumes to charge such inevitable contradiction on the Bible should be a sanctified mind, not arrogant and hostile to God and his truth, but holy, humble, and enlightened by God's Spirit. The carnal man receiveth not the things of the Spirit: they are foolishness unto him. But we repeat: provided these conditions are observed, the occurrence, not of a mystery above reason, but of an inevitable self-contradiction against reason, necessarily releases the mind from the obligation to believe. See Turretin, Loc. I., Ques. 10. One would suppose that a moderate tincture of theological knowledge would secure the admission of these familiar rudiments of the science; but we cite authority, lest some may suppose us to utter, even in this alphabet of admitted principles some dangerous novelty.

Now the advocates of the greatest theological absurdities never, in fact, assail these principles. Their plea is, that their favorite propositions are only mysteries, and not contradictions. Thus the Papist seeks to excuse *transubstantiation*, the old-school Lutheran *consubstantiation*, the Mercersburg school, the *spiritual, yet literal communion* in Christ's corporeal body, which yet is not ubiquitous. Along this line, whether the dogma is only a mystery above reason, or a contradiction outraging reason, have been fought all the battles of superstition. The discrimination should always be made with caution and deliberation.

But may not that, which would it be wrong for man the creature to do, right in God the infinite Sovereign? The equally plain answer of the alphabet of theology is: Sometimes, but not always. God's infinite wisdom, proprietorship, and sovereignty often render it right and holy for him to exercise a breadth of discretion *in applying righteous principles of action*, which we could not presume on without crime. But his own glorious perfections ensure that, however sovereign, he will never act on a *principle intrinsically wrong*. And while we admit a wide, almost an infinite difference arising out of God's perfections and sovereignty, between the boundaries of his righteous discretion and ours, in details; yet we must hold that the righteousness enjoined on us in his precepts, and written by his creative hand in our consciences, is *identical in its intrinsic principles* with his righteousness. This is manifest: because otherwise we and God could never understand each other as ruler and subject; because man was made in his rational and moral image, and is restored towards it by sanctifying grace; and because he tells us, that *our holiness is to be in imitating him*. Let us, then, suppose a case where a given action would be intrinsically wrong in principle no matter how details of its circumstances might vary, where such was the unavoidable, intuitive, primary judgment of the unbiassed human conscience; then, in that case, we pronounce that God's perfections make it as impossible that he should do that act, however sovereign, as that it should be right for us to do it. And that is so plain,

that it is almost a truism. If any man, professing to be a doctor or a prophet, told us that it was our duty to believe God had done that act and made it right for himself to do; our consistent answer would be: "Then you, Mr. Prophet, have rendered me absolutely incompetent to have intelligent knowledge of moral perfections in God, and of moral obligations on me; you have de-rationalised me; I am now, on your basis, just as suitable a subject of religious relations as the horse I ride." For what can be plainer than this: that if the very ground-principles, which are the constitutive norms of our moral judgments, are contradicted, an intelligent, moral judgment becomes, for us, impossible?

Now the unbelieving rationalist says: that if Dr. Hodge's theory of imputation were true, we should unquestionably have just such a case. He claims that the injustice would be as inevitable, as though a peaceable, righteous citizen of a commonwealth were hung under its laws, for the putative guilt of another man over whom he had no control, of whom he had even no knowledge, who had murdered a person without any consent or complicity whatsoever on his part. The rationalist claims accordingly, that it is impossible God should have made such an imputation. The reader may ask, whether on this point we hold with the rationalist? We reply explicitly that we do not. That is to say, while we regard it as unnecessary, rash, and incorrect to dogmatise with Dr. Hodge upon it; we regard it more rash and incorrect to dogmatise with the Rationalists upon it. But such appears to be the jealousy of some of the advocates of the exaggeration which they call immediate imputation, that they will hardly venture to admit an intrinsic unrighteousness in the case of secular imputation which the Rationalist cites above, lest they should compromise their favorite speculation. And yet God does not hesitate to denounce the intrinsic unrighteousness of such an act of secular government. See Deut. xxiv. 16. So far we have good countenance.

Now, to return, while we will not dogmatise with the rashness of the unbelieving caviller, upon this point, we cannot but believe that his difficulty is needlessly and rashly enhanced by

the dogma which we criticise. The great advantage of Calvin's view of the matter—in other words, of the scriptural view—is this: that it takes the imputation of Adam's sin manifestly out of that category in which the Rationalists' illustration puts it; and in which, *if it really belonged there*, its unrighteousness would be inevitably self-evident. Calvin's view shows that the illustration does not contain a true parallel, and is therefore inconclusive. Calvin's view lifts the case of imputation of Adam's sin into a category where it stands by itself, and is wholly unique; where it has no illustration whatever among the usages of secular governments, whether just or unjust. Surely that is a solid advantage! For while our view leaves original sin enveloped in a mystery, which—as Dr. Thornwell declares—no man will ever solve in this world, it places the doctrine in a *status* where no man can convict it of intrinsic, self-evident injustice. And *then comes in* the legitimate application of the devout principle, acquiescing in our unavoidable ignorance, and saying: "Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight." This advantage, attending Calvin's view, appears in two ways: First, man reasons chiefly by parallel instances. His reasoning is comparison. Consequently, where there is no parallel, while he may not comprehend, he cannot convict. The case is above his grasp; he has no scales in which to weigh it. Secondly, the case of original sin, as stated by Calvin, differs as to the essential trait, wherein the caviller finds, in the case of his pretended parallel, the self-evident injustice; and Dr. Hodge's view seems to concede the presence of that trait and the correctness of the parallel. Suppose the peaceful citizen charged, under human laws, with a putative guilt of a murder to which he had not consented. Every thoughtful mind sees the line of argument on which wise counsel would defend him. The argument would be: "May it please the Court, our statute of murder, under which my client has lived and is now tried, has its alternative sanctions: To him who murders, it threatens death; to him who respects the life of his fellow-men it promises immunity. That statute is of the nature of a covenant with the citizens. Now, here, may it please your Honor, is our impregnable ground: MY CLIENT HAS:

PERSONALLY KEPT THAT COVENANT. *He has thereby earned, and is in possession of an existing title to immunity, with which he was invested, by virtue of his innocency, before this murder was committed, and therefore he can only be divested of it by his own personal, criminal act, or his own consent.*" Now this is impregnable. But let us represent the imputation of Adam's guilt as the Scriptures do, and the sinner condemned in Adam has no such argument to use. He does not approach the judicial issue clothed with the existing, personal title to immunity, derived from a previous innocency of personal existence under the covenant of works. For, previous to his condemnation in Adam, he has no innocent existence personally, not for one moment, not even in the metaphysical order of thought; for he has no actual existence at all. He enters existence corrupted, as he enters it guilty. He enters it guilty, as he enters it corrupted. This is the character of the federal union between him and Adam; that Adam's conduct should determine for his posterity precisely this result, namely: that their personal existence should absolutely *begin* in that moral estate, and under that legal relation, which Adam procured for himself; that the two elements of this result should be mutually involved, and coëtaneous, as they were personally, in Adam. (This statement is strictly correspondent to the revealed facts. And now, this is its advantage: that it leaves the sinner fallen and condemned in Adam, no pretext to complain that he has been stripped of a personal title to immunity by thus bringing him under putative guilt and inherited depravity; for he had no such personal title to be stripped of, seeing he has had no personal existence prior to the depravity and guilt. This dispensation of God then remains unique, without any exact parallel in human events, solemn, mysterious; but it is placed where it is impossible to convict it of any injustice. Why God should ordain such a federal union in his righteous sovereignty, which he foresaw would result in the determination of a depraved and condemned individual existence for a whole race of creatures, none should presume to speculate. We see that he has done so. We can only perceive this ground of propriety for it in the light of natural reason; that it appears to be

the most natural constitution for a company of creatures united to a first parent by that tie of race and propagation, which is so fundamental a feature of humanity, and, comparing us with God's other rational creatures, so peculiar a feature of our existence.

ARTICLE II.

GNOSTICISM AND THE RELATION OF THE CHURCH
TO HERESIES.

That remarkable mixture of philosophy and mysticism to which Church historians apply the term Gnosticism is one of the strangest phenomena in the history of human opinions. Springing into life at that period when the introduction of Christianity had given an extraordinary impulse to thought to aspire to higher attainments than had ever been reached under the nature-religion of Paganism, it transcended the bounds of sober rational investigation, and soared away into the unknown regions of the infinite and the absolute. It was an attempt to bring the high and inexplicable problems of the supernatural under the dominion of reason by the aid of Grecian philosophy, united with a mystic, oriental theosophy. Through the pride of intellect congenial to fallen man, it boldly undertook to solve by efforts of speculative reason the abstruse questions of the origin of being, the relation of the infinite to the finite, how God who is a Spirit can be the author of the world which is matter, the origin of moral evil, and how to reconcile the imperfections of the world with the perfections of God. The Gnostic despised, as an inferior intellectual point of view, that humility produced by faith in the revealed Word of God, which practically vanquishes all doubts arising from such sources, and reconciles the mind to remain ignorant where knowledge would contribute neither to our happiness nor our moral advantage. Such a blind implicit faith might satisfy the aspirations of the vulgar who could not rise

above the level of an unreasoning assent. But there was a higher gift or faculty belonging to the men of intellect, the *gnosis*, by which they could pass beyond the external appearances of things, and penetrate into their hidden essence. This was the controlling idea underlying the various systems into which Gnosticism divided itself. It was an aristocracy of knowledge, grounded upon a philosophy of religion, which was made up of chosen elements taken from Plato's philosophy, Jewish theology, and oriental mysticism.

The purpose of this paper is not to give a detailed account of the various sects of Gnostics, nor to attempt to eliminate the grains of truth that lay concealed under the mist and fog of their complicated systems. Neander, in the 1st volume of his "History of Christianity and the Church," has given the most elaborate and exhaustive account of Gnosticism of any writer to whom we have had access. Through three or four hundred pages he conducts the reader, presenting him with a profound analysis of the different Gnostic families, until, bewildered by the minuteness of his details, one begins to feel as though he had been led into the Egyptian labyrinth, whose intricate windings and convolutions never end. And when he emerges, his imagination is so crowded with forms of æons, hyles, demiurges, emanations, pleromas, syzygies, *et id omne genus*, that he scarcely knows how he entered, what he saw, or whether he saw anything at all. Whoever may wish to go fully into the subject of Gnosticism, exhaust all its profundities, and explore all its intricacies, climb all its heights and descend all its depths, is recommended to the 1st volume of Neander's History. Let the aim of this writing be the less adventurous attempt to characterise:

1st. The Theology of the Gnostics.

2d. Their Philosophy.

3d. Their influence upon Christianity, together with a glance at the relation of heresies in general to the life of the Church.

1. The Gnostics held what may be termed a species of Pantheistic dualism. They believed in the existence of two coëqual,

coëternal principles—one good, the other evil. The Supreme Good dwelt in the pleroma. He did not create the world, that being the work of the demiurge or artificer, who was an evil and inferior being. By spontaneous action the Supreme Good produced from himself a succession of spiritual beings called *æons*, to whom he committed the affairs of the world. A principal one of these *æons* was Christ, who came to earth to reveal the truth to men. He was only a phantom or incorporeal being, who could not partake of human nature, because, partaking of matter that nature was essentially evil. His office was to counteract the demiurgus and repair the mischief he had caused. This demiurgus was the god of the Old Testament, the god of the Jews, and was not Jehovah, the God and Father of the Lord Jesus Christ. Christ and the Holy Ghost were two coördinate *æons*, one of whom only, Christ, came forth from the pleroma to effect the work of redemption; while the other, the Holy Ghost, remained in the pleroma with God. Now Christ, having come to deliver man from the dominion of the material element, could not partake of humanity without contracting its defilement and surrendering the divine nature he brought with him from the pleroma. How could he be the Redeemer, if the hylic principle, from which he came to set man free, were united to his own nature? He must, however, incarnate himself in an ethereal body of the finest mould, which was so wonderfully constituted that it could be visible to outward sense, and yet exist in a way altogether different from other bodies. This ethereal Christ came upon the earth and founded the kingdom of the Messiah promised by the prophets. The sufferings of this ethereal Christ purify the heart, eject every malign spirit, and fit us to return to God in the pleroma.

Gnosticism divided all beings into three classes—the *hylic*, the *psychic*, and the *pneumatic*; or the material, the animal, and the spiritual. The first were incapable of knowledge, and perished inevitably both soul and body; the second occupied a middle ground, and might be saved or lost according as their actions were good or bad; while the third, among which the Gnostics included themselves, were incapable of being lost.

Such is a brief summary, compressed from the lengthened exposition of Neander and Professor Burton. As taught by Basilides, Valentinus, and Marcion, it seemed to rest upon a deep-seated consciousness of the existence and power of evil, as pre-supposed in the Christian doctrine of redemption, and prompted to earnest desires and efforts to attain the freedom from sin underlying the doctrines of justification and sanctification. The great facts of man's depravity, and the necessity of Christ's redemption, were not articulately rejected, and yet were only dimly comprehended under a cloud of vain speculations; and, in their efforts to construct a body of divinity, they branched off into a thousand errors. The ground-plan was laid in truth, but the superstructure incorporated a thousand conceits, which were the offspring of proud reason profanely "intruding into those things which it hath not seen, vainly puffed up by a fleshly mind." Such a theology is without a parallel in the history of religion. It is a reaction against Judaism, but falls immeasurably below it in the simplicity of its creed, the sublimity of its doctrines, and the consistency and credibility of its facts. What comparison is there between the self-existent omniscient Jehovah of the Jews, and the inert, dreamy contemplative Bythos of the Gnostics?—between the Almighty Creator who spoke and it was done, commanded and it stood fast; and the demiurgus, who is in a perpetual conflict with matter, seeking to subject it to his own ideas, but never able wholly to overcome its resistance? Judaism reveals to us the Lord Jehovah creating all things by the word of his power, the Angel of the Covenant granting to the patriarchs sublime theophanies to enlighten their darkness and stimulate their faith, and the Holy Ghost breathing into the prophets words of wisdom and thoughts of power that have animated a thousand generations. Judaism marshals before us a grand panorama with Jehovah upon his throne, stooping to discipline into obedience a refractory nation by the instruments of his grace that they may become partakers of his love—promising to the world a Messiah who would repair the injuries of the fall, and imparting to the penitent the benefits of his reign through the medium of sacrifice, and a Holy Ghost

speaking to the minds of prophets and kings the words of eternal truth. Subordinate to these blessed Three are innumerable angels, strong and bright, who go on errands of mercy and of wrath to execute the behests of the Eternal—a divine code, precepts, and hymns, and the biographies of many who illustrated its teachings by the purity and uprightness of their lives. This is Jewish theology. What can Gnosticism show that will compare with these things? It rebelled against a system, in comparison with which its own is as midnight compared with noon. Its theology is but a modification of the mythology of Greece and Rome. With the exception of a few rays stolen from the Sun of Righteousness revealed by Christianity, it stands upon an equality with Parsism, the mystic theology of Buddha, and the allegorical dreams of the Cabbala.

2. The theology of the Gnostics being so unsatisfactory, we need not be surprised to find their ethical system equally faulty. For the moral philosophy of a sect will follow the type of its theology. A vicious theology cannot furnish material for a sound morality. The morals of Greece and Rome never rose above their defective theologies. —Religion is the foundation of morals, and where the one is corrupt, the other cannot be pure. Neander points out one principle underlying Gnostic morality that gave it its prevailing type, viz., *asceticism*. It was a fundamental tenet of the Gnostic creed that matter (hyle) was essentially vicious, and, therefore, to be emancipated from its control was an object of primary importance. They ignored the Pauline doctrine of justification by faith, and exalted mere bodily maceration to the dignity of a meritorious action. The spirit must be delivered from the influence of the body so that it might act as freely as though the body were not. Upon the principle, that this world, and all that was material, was the work of the demiurge, and was only an obstruction to the development of the spirit into a higher life, the Gnostics easily came to the conclusion that everything external was a matter of indifference, and that the loftier natures—the *pneumatikoi*—could indulge in any lust with propriety. “Let us conquer lust by indulgence,” said these bold spirits, “for it is no great thing for

a man to abstain from lust who knows nothing about it from experience. "The greatness lies in not being overcome by it when clasped in its embrace." Being under the discipline of pure spirit, and seeking to withdraw themselves wholly within the circle of contemplation, they despised the restraints of external positive institutions. And thus, by compressing the propensities of human nature within the narrow channels of a rigid austerity, they instigated a rebellion among the passions which caused them to overleap all barriers and assert their liberty upon the ruins of all law. Asceticism fosters within its bosom the very germs of licentiousness. While it professes to extirpate the elements of depravity from man's nature, by hedging up all the avenues through which it may find an exit, it lays the foundation for an ebullition that, by its accumulated force, will override all restraints. Outraged nature will assert her rights and snap asunder the cords with which ignorance and superstition have bound her. Currents may be dammed up for a time by artificial embankments, but the collecting of the waters is only a preparation for an inundation that *must* come, and when it does come it will be the more desolating in proportion to the time it was kept confined.

Christ's incarnation is an unanswerable argument against the false views of asceticism concerning the inherent viciousness of matter. He was a pure Spirit, but he took upon himself a garment of our inferior clay that he might render us susceptible of the divine life which he possessed in common with the Father. Now had sin entrenched itself in the forms, any of the forms, which matter assumes, it could not have been taken up by the Saviour without involving himself in its pollution. Had sin been an inseparable property or adjunct of the non-spiritual, so that *its* absence would have implied the non-existence of the former, Christ must have assumed, not a constructive, imputed *theological* guilt, but a personal actual defilement. But this both reason and revelation forbid; therefore matter is not inherently vicious, and the substratum of ascetic philosophy gives way, and brings the superstructure to ruins. The Bible alone can furnish the principles of a correct system of ethics, but since

the Gnostics arrogated to themselves the liberty of retrenching, interpolating and rejecting whatever in it did not coincide with their theories of the *Gnosis*, their morals could not be other than a confused, lax system of human opinions, in which truth and falsehood were distinguished only by accidental circumstances. Marcion, the most practical and consistent of the Gnostics, prescribed to his followers the most rigid routine of fastings and bodily mortifications which he collected from mutilated portions of the true Gospels and other Apocryphal writings which he claimed to be divine.

3. The influence upon Christianity exerted by this elaborate and widely diffused system of error was of course deleterious in the extreme. It warped the creed and corrupted the worship of the Church for centuries. Putting an exaggerated value upon mere knowledge in religion, it tended to bring into contempt those external forms of worship without which religion cannot be maintained on earth. And in the efforts which the Christian consciousness put forth to free itself from its fetters, opportunity was found for other aberrations to creep in and foist themselves upon the faith of the Church. Montanism, which exalted to undue elevation the *charismata* of the early Church, incorporated many elements of Gnosticism, and cultivated a fanatical longing after martyrdom. It confounded together the fundamental principles of Judaism and Christianity, by inculcating the dogma that priestly functions were common to all Christians, and that the kingdom of God was an association of persons in all of whom dwelt the spirit of prophecy. Thus it presented in itself the double character of a heresy and a schism. Arianism likewise bears unmistakable evidence of a Gnostic origin. In it the Divine Logos was only an inferior æon or emanation from the Father and used by him as an instrument in creating and governing the world. The same is true in regard to the heterodox opinions concerning the Holy Ghost and the relations subsisting between the persons in the Godhead.

Although Christianity succeeded in overthrowing this many-sided heresy in which the extremes of human speculation met and coalesced, yet it was not until many of its Pantheistic and

dualistic modes of thought became engrafted upon the minds of many of the Church's members. Nor has its influence entirely ceased down to the present day. For though the distinctive tenets of the great Gnostic schools are long since exploded, they originated a rash and unwarrantable method of speculation which still evinces itself in the rationalising tendencies now current throughout Christendom. The Gnostic mode of philosophising and interpreting Scripture may still find analogies in German Pantheism, and the scientific theories of English and French infidels.

The history of sects and heresies, says Mosheim, is very obscure, indeed the most obscure part of ecclesiastical history. The existence of heresy is a very instructive fact. It has done more to retard the progress of Christianity than all the external opposition which it has encountered. The many fierce and prolonged persecutions to which Christians were subjected, exerted a feeble opposition to Christian expansion compared with the might of the obstacles which heresy threw across its pathway. Indeed it is a question, whether persecution retarded the spread of Christianity at all, since, like the camomile flower, the more it is bruised the more widely it diffuses its aroma; while, on the other hand, heresy superinduces a moral asphyxia, which tends to reduce it to a state of torpor and exhaust its life by destroying its unity.

It was a profound remark of the Apostle Paul, that "there *must* be heresies in order that they which are approved may be made manifest." Though an evil of deadly tendency, there exists for it a necessity in the present constitution of things. It grows out of the fundamental fact of the existence of evil. There is in the government of God a mixture of good and evil. This is not the result of necessity, for then God must be its author, but rather the result of freedom. The will is free, and evil results from the abuse of that freedom. Now since the will is free, there must be "heresies," that is, differences of opinion, (*αἰρέσεις*). But differences of opinion among men do not constitute the notion of heresy. Paul did not mean to reprobate a want of unity in the determinations of different minds. But the fun-

damental notion of heresy is *differing in opinion with God*. It is *taking up* a different belief from that promulgated by the Supreme Author and source of truth. Hence heresy, whether it means a sect, or opinions which lead to the formation of a sect, always implies that which is evil. It is setting up man's reason in opposition to the will of God. For this there can be no necessity, that is, no absolute necessity, but there is a moral necessity arising from the present constitution and course of nature. While men continue men, endowed with free wills and conflicting passions and appetites, there will be aberrations from the truth. Out of this necessity the wisdom of God evolves many beneficial results, so that the existence of evil is made to subserve the interests of good. By it that which is approved is often made to appear.

Let us trace then, briefly, the wisdom of God in educing good results from the various heresies which have disturbed the Church in all ages.

(1.) The tendency of heresy is to schism. When one has taken up a new opinion his disposition is at once to separate. He draws off and sets up a new sect, and begins to proselyte adherents to his views. Instead of wondering at the number of heresies that arose in the first and second centuries, we should rather wonder that there were not many more. During the lifetime of the Apostles, for example, the spread of Christianity in many countries, was due to the personal efforts of those private individuals who had embraced the gospel, but were imperfectly instructed in its principles. The Apostles themselves were for the most part stationary. They became settled pastors or teachers in cities, or sections of country where their personal influence and supervision were circumscribed within narrow limits. All the Apostles became located bishops, or stationed teachers in some particular locality, except Paul, and he did not travel during fifteen or twenty years of his apostolic life. After his conversion, he spent three years in Arabia, and fourteen more elapsed before he entered regularly upon his missionary tours. And even when they did travel, they did not for a time go out of Judea, or at least Asia Minor. But during all this

time Christianity was making progress in different countries by the intercommunications of private persons who possessed neither the intelligence nor the official authority to correct any aberrations from the truth which might arise. In the different cities, to which the knowledge of the gospel would be thus carried, there would doubtless be artful and designing men who would take such doctrines as suited their fancy and accorded best with their preformed opinions and unite them to form a creed. This occurred doubtless in many places, and there being no official authoritative teacher to counteract these errors, the result was that heresies arose and spread. We can easily understand how this might be the case, especially among the numerous nations represented at Jerusalem on the day of Pentecost. Some twenty different dialects were, on that memorable day, made vehicles for carrying the tidings of the gospel to ears all unused to such truths. Now, if we consider the state of learning and philosophy at that time, and the eagerness of men to hear and to tell some new thing, it is not at all wonderful that there should be diversities of creeds constructed, by uniting Christian doctrines with the tenets of the schools then flourishing in different parts of the world. The appearance of these creeds and heresies would have the effect to stimulate the human mind to investigate and examine their relative merits. Prior to the advent, the mind was under the spell of Pagan superstition. Darkness covered the earth, and thick darkness the people. It was a time of general ignorance in regard to matters of religion; and when gospel light fell in upon this darkness, it did not dispel it all at once, but produced a species of intellectual twilight in which men could not see their way clearly. Some took one track of thought and some another, all meanwhile led on by a common desire to attain to something which the nature-religion of Paganism had never enabled them hitherto to reach. In this competition and struggle for truth new ideas were evolved, and men were encouraged in their pursuit of intellectual and moral instruction. Though there were mistakes made and erroneous views adopted, the result, upon the whole, was an advance upon former attainments and a mutual sharpening of those faculties in the

use of which man achieves his noblest victories. The propagation of error is of course not a good in itself, but in all those heresies there were some grains of truth, half-truths, truths seen and grasped only on one side or in disproportion to other truths to which they stood related. Or they were the irregular developments of true principles improperly applied or overshadowed by predominant falsehood. Heresiarchs were always men of strong convictions, earnest and often honest, but mistaken. They were men who were smitten with the love of truth, and willing to endure hardship in its defence. They took their departure from some imperfectly comprehended truth, where there was room for difference of opinion without wishing to destroy any well-defined or generally received doctrine. Manes grasped the tenets of Zoroaster with a firm conviction of their truth, and in default of the clearer and purer teachings of Christ and the Apostles, laid firm hold of these as approaching nearer the ideal of truth than anything with which he was acquainted. When he heard the doctrines of Christianity he was charmed with their beauty and labored to perfect his own system by engrafting on it these precious exotics from a foreign soil. His error was not so much hostility to truth as the misapplication of truths but imperfectly enthroned in the consciousness. Arius denied the divinity of the Logos, not through hatred of the doctrine itself, but because of his inability to adjust it into harmony with other doctrines more clearly revealed and more firmly grasped by his understanding. And the very fact of these heresies springing up caused the orthodox doctrines to be more clearly defined and more correctly apprehended. We are indebted to the discussions called forth by this heresy for the clear and satisfactory statement of the doctrine of the Trinity as now held by all orthodox Churches.

(2.) The Bible being the Word of God is evidently the touchstone of all religious opinions. To it all heresies must be brought, and by it every doctrine is to be tried. Nothing can be condemned as heresy which cannot be clearly proved to be inconsistent with its teachings by a fair and just interpretation. Now the interpretation of Scripture is to be performed by the human

understanding illuminated by the Holy Ghost. Where the meaning is plain and obvious all believers agree, and any departure from that plain and obvious meaning must be branded at once as heresy. But where the sense is involved and less easily ascertained, where there is room for honest difference of opinion as to its purport, great caution is needed lest an opinion be condemned as heresy, which only disagrees with what is *believed to be* the meaning, rather than the meaning itself. An opinion which does not coincide with another opinion as to the true interpretation of a given passage surely cannot be condemned as heresy, lest human opinion be made the criterion of human opinion, and man be invested with an authority that belongs only to the infallible Word of God. There is abundant proof in the history of the Church that this has been done, and opinions have been denounced as heretical because they did not harmonise with what other men believed to be the true meaning of the Scriptures. Thus the question of heresy often turns upon a question of interpretation, and, as interpretations differ at different times and among different classes of minds, what was heresy in one age ceases to be such in another. The history of Galileo is a striking illustration of this point. It was heresy in the sixteenth century to believe that the earth revolved around the sun, because it militated against the received interpretation of certain passages which it was thought taught the immobility of the earth. Since that time, however, the opinions of men have changed, and with it comes a change by which heresy passes over into orthodoxy. But it is an egregious error to suppose that the interpretation of Scripture is a nose of wax to be shaped to suit the shifting current of human opinion. Scripture has but one meaning and that is the true meaning, and when that true meaning is missed we have lost our touchstone for testing the orthodoxy of creeds; we lose our vantage ground and no longer possess the right to denounce as heretical what does not accord with our beliefs. Yet, while we admit and strenuously contend that all men are fallible and liable to mistake the sense of Scripture, we do not open a door for the justification of all kinds of belief and permit heresy to retreat under the cover of a

plausible platitude. Men are fallible and councils err, yet this does not confer upon every man the right to believe what he pleases. This is a very convenient plea, but it is neutralised by another principle, which carries with it a weight and authority that cannot be set aside, viz., the *uniform steadfast faith of the Church catholic*. By this we circumscribe the right of every man to believe what he pleases, and set aside the plea under which heresy might take refuge arising from the fallibility of men and councils. Christ promised to be with his Church to the end of the ages, and that where two or three are met in his name, there he is in the midst. Now the uniform belief of the Church in all ages possesses the force of law; it is the expression of Christ's will, and the dictate of the Holy Ghost, fixing and establishing the true interpretation of the Word with regard to fundamental doctrines; so that to differ from that uniform belief, is to differ, *quoad hoc*, from the will of Christ as expressed through the voice of his Church. He will not suffer his Church to fall into error upon vital points and persist in it from age to age; otherwise the very idea of the kingdom of God is subverted, and the Church becomes as vacillating as human opinion.

To this universal belief, this uniform faith of the Church of God in all ages, we bring human opinions, and test their orthodoxy, where the interpretation of Scripture is not plain and unmistakable. To this law and testimony they must come, and if they speak not according to this rule, it is because there is no light in them. Nor has any man the right to object that we try him by a human standard, for this is not merely a human standard, but an authoritative law, evincing its truth and justice through the uniformity of the Church's belief. What is bound by this law on earth is bound in heaven, and what is loosed by it here, is loosed there. After certain other preliminary steps have been taken to reclaim an errorist, then, says our Saviour, "*tell it to the church*," and if he will not hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican."*

*It appears to us that some of our correspondent's expressions touching the weight of *uniformity* are quite too strong, and inconsistent with the

(3.) Whence this uniform steadfast faith of the Church? How has she reached this firm confidence in the soundness of her interpretation of the Word of God? Is it a figment of theologians or a veritable law of the Church's life? It is the antithesis of error, and has been reached by a victorious conflict with heresy. It presupposes heresy, and is the Church's constant protest against it. It is the spiritual power she has acquired through her conflicts with her foes. A nation becomes great and glorious, not by ages of uninterrupted prosperity or centuries of undisturbed repose, but by vigorous resistance to those who would dismember her polity and undermine her resources. The union and coöperation of a people in which their chief strength resides presuppose and imply external foes. This outward opposition acts as a check upon internal dissension, and compresses all the elements of power into one united and compact body. The presence of an enemy, whose purpose is to divide and conquer, strengthens the arms of a government by suppressing those incipient discords which undermine and dissipate its power. Outside pressure promotes strength by inducing caution and encouraging vigilance. It is the easy relaxation of undisturbed prosperity, and the supineness caused by no danger threatening that afford opportunity to a wily foe to enter and disintegrate by sowing the tares of discord. Though a nation may grow in all the elements of external prosperity, by developing its material resources and handling its capital skilfully, its moral growth is largely dependent upon the outside influences directed upon it, and the nature and degree of the opposition it has to combat. Analogous to this is the relation which the Church of Christ has sustained towards the various heresies by which it has been assailed. Her attitude has been that of oppugnancy, and no one but her divine Head can tell how much her power, life, and progress, have been promoted by the unwearied efforts of heretics to disturb her unity and neu-

true Protestant doctrine of the right of private judgment, though we would by no means say that "every man has the right to believe what he pleases." We think also that what he says of the Apostles on page 233, cannot be sustained.—EDS. S. P. REVIEW.

tralise her testimony. The good results which, by the blessing of God, have been developed from this conflict with error, are visible through the whole line of ecclesiastical councils from the first Christian Synod held at Jerusalem, A. D. 50 to settle the relation of Mosaic ceremonies to Christian worship, down to the Councils of Nice, Constantinople, Ephesus, Chalcedon, etc., etc., where her orthodoxy was fully defined, and, afterwards, down through the various German, French, and English Synods which have settled the orthodoxy of Christendom. Each council was only the occasion of her gathering up, and professing before the world the conclusions she had reached and the points she had settled in her debate with heretics. In the intervals between each one she was gathering strength, conceiving the truth more and more clearly by reason of controversy, and shaping her faith into distinct propositions until, when she had fully comprehended the teachings of the Holy Ghost, she would call a council and publish it to the world. So that the present uniform faith of the Church catholic, is the matured conclusion to which she has been conducted by the Holy Ghost in her struggles with heresy. Heresy has been overruled. Instead of undermining the Church's faith and loosening her grasp on the truth, it has stimulated her exertions, prevented her from lapsing into apathy, and caused her to define her creed with a clearness and unanimity that command the admiration of the world. The thorn in Paul's side, the messenger of Satan sent to buffet him, was wrested from Satan's hand by a higher power, and made to teach Paul patience and reveal to him the all-sufficiency of God's grace. So the Church's sides have been often pierced by thorns of false doctrine. Arians, Pelagians and Socinians have denied her most precious doctrines and pierced her heart with many sorrows, but their weapons formed against her have rebounded against themselves, and to-day she stands erect and firm with the sword of the Spirit in her hands, and her feet upon the necks of their exploded errors.

There must needs be heresies, and there will be heresies till the end of time. Like the Lernæan Hydra, whose heads when cut off were replaced immediately by others, till at last the fire applied by Hercules seared the parts and prevented fresh

growth, heresy, though beaten down in one point, will spring up in another. This Hydra has infested the territory of the Church from Simon Magus till now. Each new form is but the outcropping of the same principle of evil that has existed from the beginning.

The faith of the Church has been wisely cast into the form of creeds and confessions as the most successful mode of combating heresy. Nor does it appear how the purity and integrity of the truth could have been vindicated without this expedient, which, if not the suggestion of the Divine Spirit, has at least the sanction of apostolic precept and the approbation of all Christian antiquity. The Apostles' Creed, though not drawn up by them, contains a summary of the doctrines they taught. The Athanasian and Nicene Creeds are restatements of the orthodox faith, with special reference to particular heresies by which fundamental doctrines were assailed. The influence which these formularies—"forms of sound words," as Paul would call them—have exerted upon Christianity and the world is beyond calculation. They have stood as bulwarks against the attacks of errorists in all ages, until they have become so interwoven with the Christian consciousness of the world that their existence to the end of time may be safely predicted. The Apostles' Creed is instilled into the heart of infant piety all over Christendom, along with the earliest conceptions of religious truth, and forms the substratum of all the orthodoxy in existence. "The Nicene Creed," says Butler, "still retains its hold on the mass of Christendom, and in the Churches of the East the very letter is regarded with a superstitious reverence. In the unchangeableness of its formula the Eastern Churches see something divine. The recitation of the creed is always the culminating point in their liturgical services. The Emperor of Russia repeats it at his coronation. The great bell in the Kremlin at Moscow rings when it is pronounced. It is worked in pearls on the robes of the dignitaries of the Church." This superstitious reverence for its form, only serves to show how deeply imbedded in the hearts of men it has become, and the incalculable advantage they conceive it has rendered to the cause of truth. In the Reformed

Churches Confessions have been added to these creeds in order to rescue them from the corruptions which medieval superstition had engrafted upon them. These modern Confessions of Protestant Christians are but continuations, reiterations, of the Church's testimony against heresy and renewed attempts to preserve pure and entire those venerable creeds in which her primitive faith was enshrined.

The opposition to creeds which some modern sects have raised, must itself be classed among the heresies against which the Church must ever loudly testify. Do they infringe Christian liberty? What liberty is wanted by these anti-creed men? Liberty to impugn the doctrine of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the Church, under whose guidance her faith has been eliminated and clearly defined? Do they want liberty to charge the Church with error, and hold her up to reproach as enslaving her children by enjoining upon them obedience to formularies which are the offspring of ignorant and ambitious men? Let them first show that the uniform faith of the Church as expressed in her creeds is false and mistaken. Let them show that the Apostles' Creed, the Athanasian and Nicene Creeds, are but human inventions to shackle the freedom of Christians and keep them in bondage. Such a liberty as that for which they contend, is not the liberty with which Christ invests his disciples, but a lawless license which spurns all restraint, and would subject even the oracles of God to the irreverent claims of unsanctified reason. The argument may be retorted against the opponents of creeds. The construction of sound orthodox creeds is an exercise of Christian liberty and designed to maintain it. The fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion lie scattered through the Bible, interwoven in biography, poetry, parable and epistolary correspondence, without relation or connection, logical order or dependence—like pearls scattered over the bed of the ocean, and the Church, under the influence of the Holy Ghost, and in the exercise of that discretionary power which inheres in her as a divine-human institution, takes the *liberty* to gather these doctrines and arrange them into a logical system—to string those pearls together on one string. This she has the power to do

under the apostolic precept that all things be done decently and in order. Now the enemy of creeds denies her this liberty granted by the 'Apostle, and compels her to leave the pearls scattered and require her children to search and find them without her help, each one as best he may. According to him, she cannot collect the spiritual truths that lie promiscuously in the field of Scripture, but must let each one collect for himself, otherwise she infringes his liberty. Creeds do not profess to have gathered *all* the truth that the Scripture contains. There is more in the Bible than in any creed under the sun, and the man who can gather more from it than is expressed in the creeds is at liberty to do so. But let no one say that the collecting of great and vital doctrines and presenting them in a connected, striking, impressive view to those who might not otherwise see them,—let no one call this an infringement of Christian liberty. The Church presents these to the world, and then bids every man search the Scripture and discover as many more as he can.

Nor is the formation of creeds any reflection upon the sufficiency of Scripture as a rule of faith and practice. A creed that deserves the name, is neither an attempt to add to, nor to take from, the complete rule of faith contained in Scripture. If it be an orthodox creed, it simply takes from the Scriptures *what they teach*, and arranges it in a simple, natural order, so as to render it more easily comprehended, and more ready to be employed by the faithful in their conflicts and temptations. It gathers and puts into their hands the weapons which grace has provided. Grace has filled the cup (to change the figure), and the Church, by her creeds, holds that cup to the children's mouths. Nor is it any reflection upon the wisdom of the Scriptures that truth was not revealed therein in exact logical creed-like forms. The Bible ignores all appearance of artificial arrangement. It knows nothing of those precise, methodical, straight-laced forms which characterise the works of man. There is in the Scriptures a sublime *abandon* which repudiates the technicalities of mode, measure, time, and place. Its truths, like the bounties of nature, are thrown out with a lavish profusion that leaves the impression of illimitable abundance that no

modes or forms can contain. The disconnected manner in which sublime truths lie scattered throughout revelation, is one of the marks of its divinity which the collection of them into formularies of faith by no means intends to deny. This grouping of truth has been discovered in the Church's warfare with error to be necessary. It is a massing of its forces which the devices of the enemy have rendered expedient. Had men not tried to corrupt the faith this species of tactics had not been so necessary, but since there have been from the earliest times false prophets among the people, and false teachers who privily brought in "damnable heresies," this method of defence has been found most successful in resisting them.

The sum of the whole matter then is this: The existence of evil has given rise to heresy, the existence of heresy led to the formation of creeds and confessions, and these have contributed mightily to the conservation of truth among men. The efforts of enemies to rob the Church of her legacy of true doctrine, caused her to deposit it in the shrines of creeds and confessions from which they have never been able to abstract it. Nor will they ever be.

With a few words of warning to ministers of the gospel this discussion shall end. It is an instructive fact, that the worst heretics who have ever distracted the Church were ministers and teachers of religion. Private members have seldom given her trouble in this way. Those who were set for the defence of the Gospel have generally been its worst betrayers and corrupters. Arius was a presbyter of Alexandria. Pelagius was a theological professor, and both the Socinuses were religious teachers. The same is substantially true of modern heretics. This fact loudly proclaims the importance of ministers being well indoctrinated in the faith of God's Word. They should be rooted and grounded in the love of it, so that they may be able to comprehend with all saints, what is the breadth and length and depth and height, and to know the love of Christ which passeth knowledge, that they may be filled with all the fulness of God. If they are thus grounded and settled in the faith, and not moved away from the hope of the gospel, they will be able to present

both their flocks and themselves holy and unblamable and unreprouvable before the Lord Jesus when he shall appear. Heresies are abroad and have exalted themselves into the high places of the Church; wherefore let ministers beware, hold fast the form of sound words, and contend earnestly for the faith once delivered to the saints.

ARTICLE III.

RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADAM'S SIN.

——— *Διὰ τῆς παρακοῆς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἀνθρώπου ἁμαρτωλοὶ κατεστάθησαν οἱ πολλοί.* Rom. v. 19.

——— “By one man's disobedience many were made sinners.”

A great and important truth is expressed in the aphorism, “That cannot be God which can in all be comprehended by man.” From which also the corollary is obvious, that a divine revelation may, and probably will, contain much that, to human reason, appears unintelligible. In the physical sciences, and even in mathematics, are truths which, but for proofs foreclosing the possibility of doubt, would be thought self-evident absurdities. Still more, it is probable, must this be the case in the moral kingdom, because questions of right and justice, when applied to the divine government, often require a comprehensive survey of the subject in its connections, dependences, and distant results quite beyond the grasp of any finite intelligence. Man in this world, encompassed by darkness on every side, is like a glow-worm on some broad Western prairie, which sees the grass-stalks and other objects within its illuminated inch of horizon, while the vast expanse around is shrouded in impenetrable night.

Still there are truths which man does certainly know; principles which cannot be false, and which any pretended revelation contradicting would disprove itself. If this were not so, there could be no certainty in regard to anything, and we should be left a prey to universal scepticism. In a short essay like this,

we can undertake no analysis or full enumeration of such fundamental principles, though it may promote perspicuity to indicate them partially in brief and general terms: 1. There are the truths of mathematics, or the necessary relations of finite quantities. To question these, is to deny in one form what is admitted in another. 2. Metaphysical or psychological truths, such as personal identity, the truth of consciousness, the reality of time, space, and the external world, the existence of causation, the actuality of experience. 3. Moral truths, as that God (his existence assumed) cannot lie; that the difference between good and evil is real and essential; that benevolence is good, and malice evil, etc. The axioms in the two latter classes, if not in an absolute sense self-evident, are at least so far certain that no proposition which really contradicts them can receive the assent of any properly constituted mind.

But there is an almost illimitable domain of probable opinion; of inference more or less precarious, in which the grounds of belief vary in every degree from the lightest surmise to what the mind, in a popular sense, accepts as absolute certainty. In questions of this class there is generally no formal reasoning; but the mind, surveying the facts, judges by an instinctive tact, a quick, spontaneous discernment derived from past experience. This is the great regulative principle in the conduct of life; and being adjusted to the sort of contingency which pervades human affairs, fulfils its office with a ready efficiency and universality of application which the slow deductions and limited range of logical reasoning could never attain. Still, however, its value is restricted to cases having a true analogy to those of former experience, of which the faculty itself is a very incompetent judge; for it is liable to be deceived by a general resemblance veiling an essential difference,* and may thus mislead the mind into errors of the greatest magnitude. In morals the case is even worse; for there the instinctive judgment is a sort of sentiment, often vitiated by prejudices to which the loose customs and maxims of the world have given birth, and which cannot, as in other cases, be brought to the crucial test of experience. It must therefore be precarious, even beyond the degree insepa-

rable from other probable conclusions. Yet such fallacious judgments in regard to the truths of revelation are made with very great confidence. We have heard an intelligent man protest, with warmth and earnestness, that the *partiality* of preferring one to another where neither had any claim, as in the parable of the vineyard laborers, was unjust and immoral. So too Godwin, in his "Enquirer," strongly condemns, as an unworthy and impious sentiment, the gratitude expressed by the child in one of Dr. Watts's hymns, because,

"Not more than others I deserve,
Yet God has given me more."

In every argument, therefore, impeaching Christian dogmas on moral grounds, it seems especially requisite to search narrowly into the premises, and detect the silent, prejudiced assumptions which bias the judgment.

Another department of probable opinion is, that branch of mathematics called the calculus of probabilities. But this is not applicable to religious dogmas, both, because the proper data can never be ascertained so as to form any secure basis of calculation, and because, if they could, the conclusion would still be only probable, and therefore insufficient to cancel the force of positive evidence.

Then there a boundless sphere of actual and possible truth entirely above and beyond the province of reason, as to which the mind cannot, or at least should not, have any belief, except what rests on revelation. We refer especially, but not exclusively, to existence after death, and to the invisible world of spirits. It is superfluous to say that speculations in these regions can avail nothing against revealed religion.

Leibnitz, we think, has somewhere said, that though the Christian philosopher is not required to free Revelation from difficulties and paradoxes, yet he is bound to show the fallacy of any argument which pretends to prove it incompatible with axiomatic or demonstrated truths. In this we fully concur; for such contradiction, if really established, would prove that the revelation, of which the reputed tenet forms an integral part, is

false. But if the adverse argument leaves it in the region of merely probable opinion, without showing that it contradicts either some certainly known truth, or some axiomatic principle like those before enumerated, the Christian advocate is discharged, both because a divine revelation must almost necessarily embrace doctrines which to human view are paradoxical, and because the standard of probability assumed can have no certain application beyond man's restricted range of thought and action.

With these preliminary remarks, we proceed to consider briefly the great Christian dogma of man's responsibility for the sin of Adam.

We assume the doctrine of the New Testament to be, that Adam was put on probation as the representative of the human race, who in consequence of his fall were treated by the Deity as guilty, and laid under a penal decree. The text prefixed to this article is very explicit. So are the following, all from the 5th chapter of Romans: "If through the offence of one many be dead"—"the judgment was by one to condemnation"—"by one man's offence death reigned by one"—"by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation." These appear to us to show clearly the representative character in which Adam stood his trial.

We differ, totally, therefore, from those who deny that man is condemned or punished only for his own actual sin; and who, while admitting his natural propensity to evil, hold that it involves no penal guilt, but is rather a palliating circumstance which should be considered in estimating the merited retribution; thus making his depraved nature an extenuating plea, instead of a ground of humiliation and repentance. Nor does the assumption, that the race sinned *impersonally* and *unconsciously* in their progenitor come better recommended; for it seems contradicted by v. 14, which states that death reigned over those who "had not sinned after the similitude (*ὁμοιώματι*—likeness, or mode,) of Adam's transgression." Besides, we suspect those who speak of sinning impersonally would find it impossible to affix any intelligible meaning to the terms they use, and if they sinned unconsciously, ought not that to plead exemption from punish-

ment? If a man is so bereft of reason as to be unconscious of his acts, he is not in human law held responsible, on a principle of justice which to us appears of universal application. Nor yet will the notion ascribed to Origen avail to cast on Adam's posterity the actual transgression for which the penalty is borne—that human souls had a previous existence in which they sinned, and were sent with guilty natures to earth for farther probation. It has no word of support in the Bible, which, on the contrary, declares that the condemnation was the consequence of Adam's transgression, and not of their own sin.

Our position then is, that Adam was placed on trial for himself and all his posterity, and that having fallen, the entire human race was in consequence condemned and punished as guilty; and it is hardly too much to say that no other dogma of our religion gives so great a shock to the reason and moral sentiment of men as this. "What can be more cruel and unjust," we may suppose an objector to ask, "than to punish the innocent for the act of the guilty? We can find no moral truth more axiomatic than that which is renounced and defied by such a cause. The analogies sought in human affairs utterly fail. If the child is bound by the act of the father, it is for his benefit and protection; and the occasional hardship is but the result of rules which, like all human contrivances, blend partial evil with the general good. But in this case, and every other like it, the essential element of guilt imputed is absent. Nor is the analogy to punishments entailing grief and shame on the offender's family more satisfactory. Then the penalty is designed solely for the guilty, and the evil to others is incidental, springing from relations the issues of which the law cannot control. Even confiscation and attainder of blood, though expressly designed to act upon the offspring, have no true analogy; for admitting the justice which some might deny, no guilt is imputed to the offspring, but the culprit is punished through them by means of his family affections and pride. So in war, when an outrage provokes reprisals, the victim suffers for another's crime, but not as guilty; nor is he, rightly speaking, punished, but the perpetrators, or their rulers, are punished through him. Besides, in

every such case, men are constrained to inflict collateral suffering, by a necessity which they think the end imposes, and without which the act would be a barbarous outrage; but the Almighty is fettered by no such hard conditions—in short, we cannot believe that dogma is from heaven, or that any religion encumbered by it is true.”

In answer to this formidable objection, which we have endeavored to state without diminution, it will suffice to show that no fundamental truth of the character of those before enumerated is necessarily contradicted by the doctrine in question, but that for aught we see, it *may* consist with the infinite and perfect attributes of the Deity, though by what specific reconciling scheme we may not undertake to affirm.

We might indeed rest the case simply on the ground so often taken, that Adam's fall, it may be, proves that all mankind would have sinned as he did, if similarly tried. God, it is true, needs no such proof, but judges the character, and measures all to which it tends, without reference to outward conduct. But his universe contains innumerable finite beings to whom he has entrusted, within certain limits, intellect, moral sense, and automatic choice and action. To these evidence and rational motives are necessary, and it is impossible for us to conjecture to what extent they may be supplied by the great moral drama, which was exhibited in the garden of Eden. In that grand assize which we read will be held at the close of this world, when the Deity will unveil to angels and men the principles on which his government of mankind has been conducted, it may then be demonstrated, by means of Adam's fall, that every individual of his race would have sinned as fatally as he did, if each had been subjected personally to a similar trial. As the properties developed by the chemist's experiments on one mass are proved true of all similar substances, so the community of nature in the human race might, from the result in one case, evince a like certain consequence in all. In using this illustration, we do not consider man as an inert mass passively moved by external forces. Whatever freedom of action and of will it is possible to conceive, whatever men or angels have ever exercised, of such

freedom, we concede to him a portion. Yet, without disparaging this liberty, to those whose intellectual vision shall have been purged to enable them to discern the truth, Adam's conduct may demonstrate the apostacy of all the race as absolutely certain under the same conditions. Nor is the hypothesis gratuitous. If we ascribe, what it is blasphemy to doubt, justice to the Deity, it would seem to follow from his penal decree that mankind had thus been proved to be guilty—guilty potentially, if not in act; guilty of that abuse of entrusted powers which would infallibly have ensued from opportunity. The language of St. Paul, we think, favors this view. He speaks of mankind as being, in consequence of Adam's fall, treated as sinners (*κατεστάθησαν*—appointed or determined, not *made*, as in our version,) with death and condemnation resulting. But if such be the certain consequence, what possible injury was done to man in holding him tried in Adam's probation? And if no injury, then no injustice. Any disposition to insist that equity required a trial of each for himself, must proceed from the assumption of a possible difference in the result; but that is excluded by the supposition.

But the case does not end here: From what we know of human nature, as well as what the Bible teaches of the divine attributes, we are allowed to believe that mercy may have mingled with judgment in decreeing mankind to be tried in their prototype and not in person. In illustration of this view, we will offer a few considerations, which may possibly also serve to suggest how impotent the mind is to deal with the moral questions involved in the case.

Let us suppose that two men of similar character go out with intent to steal. One actually commits the offence; the other finds no opportunity. What now is the difference in guilt between the two? None whatever, a generous impulse might respond: the intention, not the act, constitutes the guilt; and in that they were equal. But the conclusion may not be free from doubt. In character and general purpose, it is true, there was no difference; but in one case the wish assumed a more definite shape, and was followed by that earnest, excited volition which

accompanied the act. As intenser evil passion imparts to crime a deeper malignity, so the greater earnestness of feeling and purpose in the case supposed, may have made the actual commission more guilty than the previous general purpose. But what exact rule of measurement should be applied we are unable to determine. Suppose again two men of equally weak and unsteady principles, neither of whom has any guilty purpose, but one encounters temptation and yields, while the other is kept from it, and therefore escapes. The actual guilt of the former is not shared by the other; but if he too would have sinned in the same way under like circumstances, to what extent is he better, or more entitled to exemption from punishment? Their characters, indeed, are the same, and in that aspect neither is to be preferred; but the act of one, though equally significant as to both, we think must establish a difference in the degree of criminality. Advance now a step farther. Suppose two men of equal though different moral characters, but one of narrow and ill-cultivated intellect, which shields him from some temptation to which the other's higher cast of mind exposes him, who therefore commits a crime; then, while the latter is punished, is it certain that the former should escape all responsibility for the guilt he would have incurred but for his mental incapacity? Or, even suppose his character less corrupt, but less so only because his mind is weaker, does justice require that all consideration of what he would have been with more intellectual power should be excluded?

We might multiply examples; but these will suffice to suggest the difference between actual and potential guilt, between absolute and conditional character, as well as the impossibility of finding any accurate measure of comparison in respect to them. Still, however, we think it is not difficult to see that those committing criminal acts are more guilty than those who merely would have committed them if subjected to the same temptations. On this ground then we think mankind may have gained, and perhaps very greatly, by the vicarious trial.

But there is another consideration of probably not less importance. We cannot tell how far the man who forbears to sin

merely for want of opportunity, is less guilty than the man who finds opportunity and does sin. But we believe, from what we know of human nature, that a more rapid deterioration of character will probably follow in the latter case than in the former. Nor must this difference be ascribed wholly to the difference in guilt. Suppose two men, of like characters as before, the first of whom, under the impulse of passion, kills a man; the second, under a like impulse, snaps his pistol, which fails to fire, and thus he is preserved from homicide. Here the guilt is the same, since the act, so far as dependant on the men, was consummated in each case; but the effect upon the character will probably be very different. In one case the completed crime will render the repetition more easy, and is far more likely to introduce a reckless career of sin; in the other, the abortive attempt will occupy a less prominent place in the mind, and be less apt to form a central point around which future bad passions will marshal themselves. Bacon illustrates a similar principle by what he calls an "evil-favored instance" taken from Machiavelli; that "for the achieving of a desperate conspiracy, a man should not rest upon the fierceness of any man's nature, or his resolute undertakings; but take such a one as hath had his hands formerly in blood."* In his case probably there will be no tremors of conscience, no shuddering recoil in the hour of trial. The first false step renders the second far more easy. That fatal facility of repetition is often the most deplorable result of "a single step into the wrong." And even if no second crime follows the first, the effect is still apt to be very disastrous. It seems a law of our nature, that mental emotions, to produce their full effect, must ally themselves with something definite and concrete. We cannot easily realise even deep sorrow through which we have passed, without recalling some act, some incident, some word spoken, or some other circumstance which association has connected with the feelings of that period. And when recalled, it serves to waken again the slumbering emotions that time might seem to have extinguished. So with the first crime,

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especially if of a nature to impress the imagination. It rises again and again in the memory, and (unless when repentance follows) each time with a partial renewal of the bad passions which originally prompted the deed. Then the evil desires and half-formed purposes which before floated vaguely through the mind, and left no very definite traces, now cluster around the fatal precedent, and drawing strength and nourishment from its substance, grow more and more into a power which usurps the dominion of the soul. Thus the bad act may be a point from which the course tends with an abrupt declivity downwards.

If the views we have offered are just, it follows that mankind may have gained, and probably did gain, in being tried through their substitute, these two important advantages: 1. The penal guilt charged was less, in that undefined degree which distinguishes the undeveloped issue of a germinant evil principle from the actual commission of sin. 2. The character escaped that disastrous, and perhaps hopelessly reprobate, degree of apostasy which might have followed such an act of rebellion as that of our first parents. In saying this we pass no sentence on them. We do not know how far special grace may have interposed in their case to arrest the consequences; but we speak merely on such probable hypothesis as we think admissible in reference to our race.

As bad then as our condition actually is, ushered into this world of temptation and sin with depraved propensities which we cannot extinguish, and corrupt natures which we are powerless to ameliorate, it might have been incalculably worse if the principle implied in the objections to the doctrine we have considered had been that adopted by the Creator in his dealings with mankind. Designing to form an intelligent race of moral beings, and as essential to the character, to place good and evil before them, with liberty of choice, and so with the contingency of standing or falling dependent on themselves, two courses were open: either to subject each individually to some specific trial, or to select one as the representative of the rest. He chose the latter, and the result was the fall of man with all its interminable issues of evil. But if that result proved that each, if

tried for himself, would have fallen in like manner, while by the substitution the guilt of rebellion was of a lighter dye and involved less terrible consequences, then certainly we know not what we do when we murmur against the divine appointment in this respect as hard or unjust.

ARTICLE IV.

THE REFORMED CHURCH IN AMERICA.*

I. HISTORICAL SKETCH.

In no country of Europe were the doctrines of the Reformation received more readily and cordially than in the Netherlands, and in none did they spread more rapidly. Providence had prepared the soil for the reception of the good seed, and it quickly sprang up and produced abundant fruit. There had long been a spirit of liberty among the people, the arts had made great progress, commerce was flourishing, and classical studies were earnestly pursued; Erasmus, of Rotterdam, had published the Greek Testament, and also his satires against the clergy, and his exposure of the corruptions of the Romish Church; Christian scholars, like Agricola and Wessel, of Groningen, had studied the Scriptures and attained to such clear views of evangelical doctrine, that Luther declared that men might well charge him with having derived his views from the writings of Wessel, which however he had not seen until after his own mind had been enlightened. "If," said he, "I had read Wessel, before I began, my opponents would have imagined that I had derived every thing from him, so entirely do we agree in spirit."

*This article was prepared at the request of the Editors of this Review. Its author is a Professor in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church, and moreover was for many years Stated Clerk of their General Synod, and therefore is perfectly conversant with the subject of which he treats.—EDS. S. P. REVIEW.

A century earlier the "Brethren of the Common Life," of which Gerhard Groot was the founder, and Thomas à Kempis a member, had done much of this work of preparation. They were devoted to the study of Scripture, to education, alms-giving, and visiting the sick and poor. They multiplied and circulated copies of the Scriptures, and by their simple and self-denying lives and practical beneficence, prepared the way for the reception of the full and clear statements of truth afterwards made by the Reformers.

Thus it came to pass, that when the doctrines of Luther were proclaimed, thousands at once received them. Although the fires of persecution were kindled, and the land was drenched in blood, yet "mightily grew the Word of God and prevailed." On account of the persecution, those who received the evangelical views were obliged to meet secretly, and it was long before they were able to unite in a general church organisation. Their assemblies called themselves the "Churches of Christ sitting under the Cross." As such they convened by their delegates in a Synod at Wesel on the Rhine, in Rhenish Prussia, in 1568; and adopted rules of Church Order, which were ratified and modified by successive synods down to, and including, the Synod of Dordrecht in 1618-19.

It was immediately after the meeting of that Synod that the Dutch West India Company sent a band of colonists to Manhattan Island to form a permanent trading settlement. They laid the foundations of New Amsterdam, now the city of New York. These colonists were not refugees from oppression or persecution, but they came hither to better their temporal condition. But the West India Company did not consider that their colony was completely organised until it had the ministry, the ordinances of religion, and the regularly constituted Church. The schoolmaster, who not only taught the school, but also conducted worship, reading the prayers and creeds, came at once, and also "Visitors of the Sick." Very soon the first ordained minister of the gospel was sent, and the colonists possessed the full church privileges which they had been accustomed to enjoy at home. The same policy was pursued by the East India Com-

pany in regard to the Colonies planted in the East. The church went with them, and instructions were given that efforts should be made to bring the surrounding heathen to the knowledge and reception of the Christian religion. Missionary efforts of that sort were here made, especially by the church at Albany, and the names of a number of Indian converts are found on the records of that ancient church.

This branch of the Reformed Church brought to this Continent so early in the seventeenth century, even 250 years ago, is to-day one of the smallest denominations in the country. This has often been attributed to a lack of Christian zeal and enterprise. But every one acquainted with her history knows that great progress was an impossibility, and confinement within narrow bounds a necessity. Her history, from the beginning until the opening of the present century, is the history of a struggle for life. Progress was out of the question. The following facts must be considered:

1. The surrender of New Netherland to the British was made when New Amsterdam contained only 1,500 inhabitants, and there were only five Dutch churches in the province. From that time the Episcopal, or as it was popularly called the English, Church had all the advantage that the connection of governmental officials with it could give it. Besides, immigration from the Netherlands then ceased almost entirely, and that source of increase was dried up.

2. The Dutch language was used in public worship, catechising, etc., in all the churches, without a single exception, for at least 140 years. This made increase from those who used the English tongue, that is, almost all the people beside the Dutch, an impossibility. Growth of the churches could not outstrip the slow increase of the Dutch settlements. The door was closed against all English-speaking Calvinists, Scotch and Irish Presbyterians, Congregationalists, etc. The first sermon preached in the English language in a Dutch church in this country, was preached by Rev. Dr. Archibald Laidlie in the Middle Dutch church, now the Post Office, New York city, on the 15th of April, 1764. But the English language did not come into

general use in the churches until after the opening of the present century. This delay not only hindered many from coming into the Church, but caused the loss of many baptized members and others who were educated in English. The agitation of the question of the introduction of English preaching produced bitter controversy, from which the lovers of peace retreated into other communions. And when at last the step was taken, and English was introduced, many attached to the language of their fathers, took their leave and went to the Episcopal Church, saying, that if it must be English, it should be English.

3. The same period was occupied with struggles for organisation. There was no Classis (Presbytery) in this country. The churches and ministers all belonged to the Classis of Amsterdam in Holland. There were therefore serious difficulties in the way of the exercise of discipline—there was no body that could ordain ministers—vacant churches were obliged to send to Holland for pastors—students of theology were compelled to go to Holland, to study in the Universities, and be there ordained. The ministers here were not allowed to teach theology, nor would the people, with their ideas of ministerial education, have approved of it. But in due time the questions of independent organisation and ministerial education had to be met. The inconveniences and hardships connected with the state of things became intolerable.

Then two parties arose called the *Coetus* and *Conferentie*, and which may be designated the progressive and the conservative. The *Coetus* contended for the organisation of a Classis, and the establishment of an institution for educating ministers. The *Conferentie* opposed these measures. The controversy between these parties was bitter and protracted, and the Church was brought to the verge of destruction.

Then John H. Livingston, who had gone from this country to the University of Utrecht to pursue theological studies, was called to be one of the pastors of the Collegiate church in New York city. Through his instrumentality, the parties were brought together in a convention, in 1771, at which the breach was healed, what were called "Articles of Union" were adopted,

and independence of the Classis of Amsterdam secured with the consent of that body. Yet full ecclesiastical independence and organisation were not attained until about twenty years later, when the General Synod was formed to meet triennially, and subsequently annually, and a Constitution was adopted for the ordering and government of the churches. Since that time the Church has established her institutions, and various agencies for carrying on her work as a Church of Christ. Opportunities lost by reason of the difficulties referred to could never be recovered. Yet there has been growth, not rapid but sure and steady.

II. DOCTRINAL STANDARDS.

The Reformed Church, though fully believing that Holy Scripture is the only authoritative and infallible rule of faith and practice, yet has her doctrinal standards which are in substantial agreement with those of the other Churches of the Reformation, and to which her ministers have ever been required to subscribe.

They are threefold: 1. The Belgic Confession. 2. The Heidelberg Catechism, with its abridgment called the *Compendium*. 3. The Canons of the Synod of Dordrecht.

The Belgic Confession consists of thirty-seven Articles, and was composed in 1559 by the Belgian martyr, Guido de Bres. It was sent by him for examination to Adrian Saravia and John Calvin, and it was approved by them. Calvin, however, advised that the churches of the Netherlands, rather than adopt a separate Confession, should accept the one that had just been received by the French churches. But they preferred the Confession of De Bres, and it was adopted by their first Synod held at Wesel in 1568, and confirmed by subsequent synods.

The Heidelberg Catechism was prepared in the Palatinate by Olevianus and Ursinus of the University of Heidelberg, by order of the elector, Frederick III., and was received at once with extraordinary favor by all the Reformed Churches of Europe, and was immediately translated into many languages. In no country was it received with more favor than it was in the Netherlands. The Synod of Wesel adopted it in 1568, and it has

ever since been a standard of doctrine, and a favorite symbol of faith in the Church of Holland. The abridgment of it, called the *Compendium*, was made for the purpose of the instruction of the young preparatory to their admission to the Lord's Supper.

This Confession and Catechism constituted the standards of the churches in the Netherlands until the time of the Synod of Dordrecht, 1618-19. Its canons, condemnatory of the views of the Remonstrants or Arminians, and explanatory of the five points in controversy with them, have since that time been subscribed by professors of theology and ministers of the gospel in America, as well as in the mother country.

The Catechisms of the Westminster Assembly have also been endorsed by the General Synod, and allowed to be used for catechetical instruction, and are to a great extent used in the churches. The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (North) has reciprocated by formally approving of the Heidelberg Catechism.

III. GOVERNMENT.

1. *The Consistory.*—The Form of Government is Presbyterian, after the Genevan pattern. The local church, which is the original source of power, is governed by a *Consistory* composed of the pastor (if there be one), ruling elders, and deacons. The pastor is president *ex officio*, and is, in the government of the church to which he ministers, a ruling elder. The number of elders and deacons in a church is usually equal, but this is not necessary. The elders, together with the minister, constitute the spiritual court, answering to the Session in the Presbyterian Church, and have sole authority in all spiritual matters. They admit members to baptism and full communion, and dismiss them to other churches, watch over the doctrine of preachers, and the conduct of the members of the flock, assist the pastor in performing visitations, exercise discipline, restore those who have been cut off, and appoint one to represent them in the *Classis*, which is the next higher body, and which corresponds to the *Presbytery* in the Presbyterian Church.

The special work of the deacons is to look after and provide

for the poor, especially the members of the Church. Their office embraces two things, the collection and the distribution of alms. They are expected to visit the poor, and not only to minister to their bodily wants, but to give them such spiritual advice and comfort as they may need. Elders and deacons should meet separately for their separate work, and keep minutes of their proceedings respectively. The term *Consistory* was, in Holland, applied to the spiritual court only, composed of the minister and elders. In this country the elders and deacons are joined together in one board as trustees, or a body corporate, having charge of all the property and the temporal affairs of the church, and all have an equal voice in the calling and dismissal of a pastor.

Elders and deacons are elected to serve the limited term of two years. They are divided into two classes, so that one-half of the number may be chosen annually. This system of choosing elders and deacons for a limited term was at first universally adopted by the Churches of the Reformation that chose the Presbyterian form of government, including the Church of Scotland, as the First Book of Discipline shows, and it is still adhered to on the Continent.

This has sometimes been called the *rotatory* system, but not fairly, for there is no rotation demanded by it. It is not understood that every male member must have his turn in holding office, any more than that every respectable citizen should have his turn to go to Congress, because its members are chosen for a term of years. Vacancies are filled by a fair election, and it is competent for a church to reelect an elder or deacon immediately, and for an indefinite number of times in succession. It has sometimes happened that a man has been continued in the office of elder by reelections for many years, even to the day of his death. The merits of the system have been very thoroughly discussed, and all the objections to it have been frequently presented. If it be allowed, as is generally done, that it is not contrary to the Word of God, nor inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Presbyterianism, the expediency of it remains as a fair subject for consideration. To its advocates it

seems, when rightly used, (and the putting of new men into vacancies, as a matter of course is not insisted upon,) to secure the benefits of permanency and of change alike, and that in the most quiet and peaceful manner, and without the possibility of doing injustice to any one. If, in any particular case, continuance in office is desirable, there is an opportunity to secure it; if, on the other hand, change is in any case desirable, there is an opportunity to secure it. If a new man comes into a church after its complete organisation, who is admirably qualified to be an elder, he may be chosen to fill a vacancy that by the working of the system must soon occur. This plan is also calculated to give the largest number familiarity with and an interest in church affairs, and those who have had the responsibilities of office themselves, are more likely than many others to give sympathy and support to those on whom they now rest.

Perhaps it is impossible to find a church in which, at some time or other, there has not been an elder, of whom it was desirable to get rid, but yet against whom no charge, seriously affecting his doctrine or life, could be sustained. He may be notoriously unacceptable to the people, but he is bound to magnify his office and remain in it, and the more that he is advised to resign, the less disposed is he to do it. Perhaps being chosen for life, he makes it a matter of conscience not to abandon the post in which the Lord and his Church have placed him.

A case of this sort is provided for in the "Form of Government of the Presbyterian Church," as follows:

"Yet an elder or deacon may become by age or infirmity incapable of performing the duties of his office; or he may, though chargeable with neither heresy nor immorality, become unacceptable in his official character to a majority of the congregation to which he belongs. In either of these cases he may, as often happens with respect to a minister, cease to be an acting elder or deacon. Whenever a ruling elder or deacon, from either of these causes, or from any other not inferring crime, shall be incapable of serving the church to edification, the session shall take order on the subject, and state the fact, together with the reasons of it on their records; provided always, that nothing of this kind shall be without the concurrence of the individual in

question, unless by the advice of Presbytery." Form of Government, Chap. XIII.

Probably the cases in which relief has thus been obtained have been very rare. Usually congregations would rather bear the evil, than take measures that would be sure to agitate the church, and cause, to some extent at least, ill-feeling. By the system of the Reformed Church, such elders, as others, go out of office in due time, and they need not be reelected. They go back among the private members of the church, and others take their places by fair election.

At the same time, it must be remembered that elders and deacons do not, when succeeded by others in office, become *mere* private members. They have no longer a place in the ruling Consistory, it is true, but they are members of what is called the *Great Consistory*. This is composed of all those who in any church have ever served as elders and deacons, and is resorted to by the acting Consistory, for advice and counsel, whenever "matters of peculiar importance occur, particularly in calling a minister, building of churches, or whatever relates immediately to the peace and welfare of the whole congregation." It is true that they can only give counsel which may be accepted or rejected, but it is usually followed as given by "those who, from their numbers and influence in the congregation, may be supposed to speak the language of the people, and to know what will be most for edification and peace."

Besides this, they may be appointed as delegates to the higher bodies, as the Classis (Presbytery) and the Synods. This is often done. It is by no means rare to find those who are not at the time acting elders, yet prominent members of the General Synod. They are called to serve the Church in her general interests; they are members of the Boards, and the Synod places them on important Committees. Thus they are never lost sight of, but the same use is made of them by these higher bodies, as if they were at the time members of the ruling Consistory.

There are three different modes of electing elders and deacons. According to the first, the Consistory elects successors to those

whose terms of office are about to expire, and the names of the persons chosen are published on three successive Lord's-days to the congregation for their approval. If no lawful objections are made, they are considered as approved. If objections are made, they are examined by the Consistory.

According to the second, the Consistory presents double nominations, and from them the election is made by the members in full communion.

According to the third, the communicants make nominations and hold the election without interference from the Consistory.

If any one of these modes has been practised in any church for a long time, it can be changed only with the consent of the Classis.

2. *The Classis.*—The next higher ecclesiastical body is the *Classis*. This corresponds with the *Presbytery* in the Presbyterian Church, and is composed of the pastors of the churches within certain bounds, together with an elder from each church delegated by the Consistory. There are also usually some ministers without charge connected with the *Classis*.

A *Classis* cannot be constituted with less than three ministers and three elders, so that three churches at least must be represented.

The powers of the *Classis* are thus defined by the Constitution:

“*Classis* shall have the power of approving or disapproving calls; ordaining, suspending and deposing ministers, or dismissing them when called elsewhere. They shall have the power of forming new congregations, and determining the boundaries of congregations when such boundaries are contested; of continuing combinations of two or more congregations; the dissolution and change of the same; and a general supervising power in cases of appeal over the acts and proceedings of the Consistories within their bounds, which relate to the spiritual concerns of their particular churches, and the conduct of any of the officers thereof.” Constitution, Chap. II., Art. 3, §2.

The *Classis* meets statedly twice a year, and at the spring session adopts a report on the state of religion which is sent to

the Particular Synod. At the same meeting it appoints delegates to the Particular Synod and nominates delegates to the General Synod which are to be confirmed by the Particular Synod.

In dismissing a minister from his congregation the Classis acts upon a report made by some minister who has by invitation superintended the proceedings of the Consistory in the case, and also upon the instrument of dismissal countersigned by the aforesaid superintending minister.

As a substitute for an ancient system of oversight and visitation by the Classis through Committees, the following questions are now annually proposed in the Classis, to every pastor and elder :

1st. "Are the doctrines of the gospel preached in your congregation in their purity agreeably to the Word of God, the Confession of Faith, and the Catechisms of our Church ?

2d. "Is the Heidelberg Catechism regularly explained agreeably to the Constitution of the Reformed (Dutch) Church ?

3rd. "Are the catechising of the children and the instruction of the youth faithfully attended to ?

4th. "Is family visitation faithfully performed ?

5th. "Is the 5th Section, Second Article, Second Chapter, in the Constitution of our Church carefully obeyed ?"

The Section referred to by this question is as follows :

"The particular spiritual government of the congregation is committed to the ministers and elders. It is therefore their duty at all times to be vigilant, to preserve discipline, and to promote the peace and spiritual interest of the congregation. Particularly before the celebration of the Lord's Supper, a faithful and solemn enquiry is to be made by the President, whether to the knowledge of those present, any member in full communion has departed from the faith, or in walk or conversation has behaved unworthy the Christian profession; that such as are guilty may be properly rebuked, admonished or suspended from the privilege of approaching the Lord's table, and all offences may be removed out of the Church of Christ."

6th. "Is the temporal contract between ministers and people fulfilled in your congregation ?"

3. *The Synods.*—These are Particular and General.

The *Particular Synod* embraces a certain number of classes, and is constituted by delegates appointed by the classes. Each *Classis* appoints a delegation of four ministers and four elders.

The powers of the *Particular Synod* are thus defined by the Constitution :

“To the *Particular Synod* belongs exclusively the power to form new classes—to transfer a congregation from one *Classis* to another—to exercise a general supervising power in case of appeal over the acts and proceedings of the classes within its bounds, and have cognisance of such matters as appertain to the spiritual welfare of all the churches within its jurisdiction.” Constitution, Chap. II., Art. 4, §2.

This body meets annually and sends its report on the state of religion to the *General Synod*.

The *General Synod* consists of three ministers and three elders from each *Classis*, who are nominated by the classes and confirmed by the *Particular Synod*, and meets annually in stated session. Its powers are thus defined by the Constitution :

“The *General Synod* shall have original cognisance of all matters relating to the theological schools, the appointment of professors and their course of instruction, the appointment of superintendents of said schools and the regulations thereof; and shall possess the power of regulating and maintaining a friendly correspondence with the highest judicatories or Assemblies of other religious denominations for the purpose of promoting union and concert in general measures, which may be calculated to maintain sound doctrine, prevent conflicting regulations relative to persons under church censure by the judicatories of either denomination, and to produce concert and harmony in their respective proceedings to promote the cause of religion and piety.

“To the *General Synod* belongs the power to constitute *Particular Synods*, and to make any changes in the same, to exercise a general superintendence over the spiritual interests and concerns of the whole Church, and an appellate supervising power over the acts, proceedings and decisions of the lower assemblies relating to Christian discipline or the interests of religion, and the general welfare and government of the Church.” Constitution, Chap. II., Art. 5.

The classes and synods are in judicial cases courts of appeal. The decision of the General Synod in any case is final.

IV. WORSHIP.

The Reformed Church in the Netherlands, like all other branches of the Reformed Church, very early adopted a Liturgy, and used it, allowing at the same time much liberty to the officiating minister. This Liturgy has been retained by the Church in this country. But here, as there, great liberty is allowed in the use of it. The forms of prayer for ordinary public worship are not used at all by the ministers, unless as models for their guidance. Each minister composes for himself his prayers, and prays according to his ability.

But the Constitution has established an order of worship, which is as follows: 1. Invocation. 2. Salutation. 3. Reading the Ten Commandments, or some other portions of Scripture, or both. 4. Singing. 5. Prayer. 6. Singing. 7. Sermon. 8. Prayer. 9. Collection of Alms. 10. Singing. 11. Benediction. The order of the afternoon and evening services are the same as the morning, with the exception of the reading of the Commandments, and the last service is concluded with the singing of the Christian doxology previous to the benediction.

It also requires certain occasional forms to be used, and their use accordingly is universal:

1. One for the baptism of infants.
2. One for the baptism of adults. These contain a brief exposition of the doctrine, with questions, and suitable prayers and thanksgivings.
3. One for the administration of the Lord's Supper, which contains an exposition of the doctrine of the supper, admonitions, prayer, thanksgivings.
4. One for the ordination of ministers of the Word, and which is also used for installation services, [containing an account of the office, with prayers, and charges to the pastor and people.
5. One for the ordination of elders and deacons, in which the

nature and duties of their respective offices are set forth, with prayers, and charges to them and to the people.

6. One for the public excommunication of an incorrigible offender.

7. One for the re-admission of the excommunicated when professing penitence.

V. PECULIARITIES.

1. *Position of Professors of Theology.*—These hold a distinct office in the Church, and are appointed by a majority of the votes in the General Synod. The professor becomes directly amenable to the General Synod for his doctrine, mode of teaching and moral conduct. He cannot, while in office, have the pastoral charge of any congregation, nor can he be a member of any ecclesiastical assembly or judicatory, whether it be Classis or Synod. But as a minister of the gospel, he may preach and administer the sacraments in any congregation, with the consent of the minister or Consistory. He may resign his office after six months' notice of his intention to do so.

2. *Public Exposition of the Catechism.*—This is in addition to the catechising of the children and youth, which has always been strongly insisted upon in the Reformed Church. The Heidelberg Catechism was, immediately after its first publication in the Palatinate, divided into fifty-two parts called *Lord's-days*, and it was ordered, that on every Sunday one of these should be expounded at one of the ordinary public services, so that the whole Catechism might be explained to the entire congregation once every year. The churches in the Netherlands also adopted this custom and it was made a law by successive synods, which was obeyed, not only in the Netherlands, but by the ministers in this country.

In the present Constitution of the Church is found the following requirement:

“Since it is deemed of the highest importance that there should be regular instruction on the great articles of the Christian faith, in order to preserve the truth, and to promote the prosperity of the Church, every minister shall in the ordinary

morning or afternoon service on the Lord's-day explain the system of the Christian doctrine comprehended in the Heidelberg Catechism adopted by the Reformed Churches, so that, if practicable, the explanation may be annually completed, but shall never be extended beyond the term of four years. The several classes shall at their stated meetings preceding the annual meeting of the General Synod make strict enquiry, whether the preceding part of this Section has been fully complied with by every minister, and if any minister shall be found deficient without sufficient reason, the Classis shall inflict such censure as they in their wisdom may judge the omission to merit; and the several classes shall make a full and faithful report of the result of their inquiries and doings on this behalf to the Particular Synod." Constitution, Chap. II., Art. 2, §13.

It is also expressly stipulated in every call that the minister shall "explain a portion of the Heidelberg Catechism on the Lord's-days agreeably to the established order of the Reformed (Dutch) Church." To this contract the minister becomes a party when he accepts a call, and must of course perform his part of the contract if he would maintain a good conscience.

Moreover it is a law that commends itself as calculated to build up a ministry and people in sound evangelical doctrine. It would not be the worst thing that could happen to the Presbyterian Church, if every minister in it were thus publicly to expound the Westminster Catechism. Now the Heidelberg Catechism is peculiarly adapted to this very work, for it is not like the Westminster a severely scientific system of Didactic Theology, admirable for its precise definitions, and concise statements of theological truths, but is experimental, being in the form of a confession of one's personal faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. Its key-note is found in its first question and answer, which are as follows:

Ques. "What is *thy* only *comfort* in life and death?"

Ans. "That I with body and soul, both in life and death, am not my own, but belong unto my faithful Saviour Jesus Christ, who with his precious blood hath fully satisfied for all my sins, and delivered me from all the power of the devil, and so preserves me, that without the will of my Heavenly Father, not a hair can fall from my head; yea, that all things must be subser-

vient to my salvation; and, therefore, by his Holy Spirit he also assures me of eternal life, and makes me sincerely willing and ready henceforth to live unto him."

3. *Licentiates or Candidates for the Ministry.*—Students of theology are required to pursue their studies in the theological schools established by the General Synod. A college diploma or satisfactory literary acquirements are necessary in order to obtain admission into these schools. The course of study embraces three years, and this is imperative. No Classis may license a student who cannot furnish a professorial certificate that he has pursued his studies in one of these seminaries for that length of time. During his connection with the Seminary, he is under the care of its Board of Superintendents, and at the close of each year is examined in their presence in the studies of the year. After the final examination, if it has been sustained, he is recommended by them for the professorial certificate, which entitles him to an examination by the Classis. Until this time the Classis has no jurisdiction in his case.

At his examination for licensure, it is required that an officer of the Particular Synod, called a *Deputatus Synodi*, be present. An examination cannot go on without the presence of such officer. His duties are thus defined:

"Every Synod shall appoint a *Deputatus Primarius* and *Secundus* from each Classis within its bounds, whose duty it shall be to superintend the examination of students in theology and candidates for the ministry, to add a solemnity to the important work, and see that no undue liberty, superficial proceedings, or unnecessary rigor be practised. And it shall also be their duty as Commissioners of Synod, to advise, exhort, and endeavor to persuade the Classis in all that respects the strict fulfilment of the important duty of examinations; but they are not invested with any authority to arrest the proceedings of any Classis who may act contrary to their advice; neither may they vote upon any question respecting any candidate that may be examined; but they are to keep regular minutes of the proceedings at their different examinations where they are present, and impartially report to the Synod whatever they may judge improper or wrong." Constitution, Chap. II., Art. 4, §4.

VI. PRESENT CONDITION.

From the reports for the year 1872, we learn that the number of ministers is 509; of churches, 491; of families, 41,335; of communicants, 64,214; contributions for benevolent and religious purposes, \$357,216.86; for congregational purposes, \$1,066,492.45.

There are four Particular Synods, and thirty-four classes.

The majority of the churches are in the States of New York and New Jersey. The others are in the States of Pennsylvania, Michigan, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin.

There is: 1. A Board of Education for the assistance of indigent young men while preparing for the ministry, the receipts of which amounted to \$14,263.17, exclusive of interest on invested funds. 2. A Board of Domestic Missions, having under its care 88 churches and stations, and 86 missionaries; receipts, \$35,478.01. 3. A Board of Foreign Missions, having under its care the missions in China, India and Japan; receipts, \$65,173.26. 4. A Board of Publication, for the publication and distribution of books and tracts, and which has its Depository at 34 Vesey Street, New York city. Also a Church Building Fund to aid feeble churches in erecting houses of worship; a Widow's Fund, and Disabled Minister's Fund.

Through the efforts of the Coetus party a charter for a college was obtained in the year 1770. The object is thus stated in the instrument: "More especially to remove as much as possible the necessity our said loving subjects have hitherto been under, of sending their youth intended for the ministry to a foreign country for education, and of being subordinate to a foreign ecclesiastical jurisdiction." This College was named Queen's, and was located at New Brunswick, New Jersey. Its name has since been changed to Rutgers', and it is at the present time in a flourishing condition, under the Presidency of Rev. Wm. H. Campbell, D. D., LL.D. The State Agricultural and Scientific School is connected with it.

By its side is the Theological Seminary established by the General Synod, and for which ample accommodations have been

provided by generous members of the Church; as dormitories, chapel, reading-room, gymnasium, etc. The faculty is composed of:

Rev. Samuel M. Woodbridge, D. D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Government.

Rev. John DeWitt, D. D., Professor of Biblical Literature.

Rev. David D. Demarest, D. D., Professor of Pastoral Theology and Sacred Rhetoric.

Rev. Abraham B. Van Zandt, D. D., Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology.

At Holland, in the State of Michigan, is located Hope College, which is under the Presidency of Rev. Philip Phelps, Jr., D. D., and connected with which is a Theological school, in which Rev. Cornelius E. Crispell, D. D., is Professor; and the Professors in the College, and others, serve as Lectors in the various branches of Theology.

The *Christian Intelligencer* is, as it has been for many years, the religious weekly of the denomination. The Boards publish an excellent semi-monthly, called "*The Sower and Gospel Field.*"

VII. CHANGE OF NAME.

The following statement is made by authority of the General Synod in a prefatory note to the present Constitution:

"In the year 1867, the Reformed Dutch Church, which is named in the following pages, dropped from its ecclesiastical name the word 'Dutch,' which was first formally assumed therein in the year 1792; and added the words 'in America,' so that the said Church might thenceforth be known as 'The Reformed Church in America.'"

ARTICLE V.

THE LAW OF THE TITHE, AND OF THE FREE-WILL OFFERING.

Avara mens hominum decimarum largitati non consentit.—*Alcuin.*

Væ tibi, flumen moris humani, quis resistet tibi? quamdiu non sicca-beris?—*Augustine.*

Veritas est, cui præscribere non potest, nec spatium temporum, nec patrocinatio personarum, nec privilegium regnorum.—*Tertullian.*

Adversus veritatem, nulla valet consuetudo, nulla temporum præscriptio.—*Voetius.*

Cry aloud, spare not; lift up thy voice like a trumpet, and shew my people their transgressions, and the house of Israel their sins.—*Isaiah.*

Jesus Christ, upon whose shoulders the government is; whose name is called Wonderful, Counsellor, The Mighty God, The Everlasting Father, The Prince of Peace; of the increase of whose government and peace there shall be no end; sitteth upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and justice, from henceforth, even forever. A mighty king, he has the infinite One for his confederate, heaven for his throne, earth for his footstool, and the universe for his inheritance. His royal sceptre is owned and honored in all worlds; many crowns encircle his august brow; his countenance outshines the sun; his glittering vesture hath inscribed upon it his majestic title, *King of kings and Lord of lords*; his omnipotent sword is girded upon his thigh, and his enemies shall lick the dust. The great design and end of this vast empire is the Church, the greatest of God's creations, the heart and centre of all dispensations, whose influences will be felt throughout all worlds, for eternity. "Christ is Head over *all* things to the Church, which is his body, the fulness of him that filleth all in all." Upon the stability, progress, and triumph of this kingdom, depend the welfare of the universe, and the glory of God. That its maintenance should be a contingency, that it should have no fixed revenues, or that a certain and permanent method of support should not be prescribed by him, who "sitteth upon

the throne of David and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it, even for ever," would seem to be inexplicable indeed; and not in keeping with the character of that Great King, who is jealous of his glory, and who will preserve in the minds and hearts of his subjects a deep sense of their dependence upon, and subjection to him, and to all the ordinances of his kingdom; and who characterises as an abomination the devices of men in the worship and government of God. And yet, a difference of opinion exists as to there being a uniform mode of support, unchanged through all the changing dispensations of the kingdom of God.

Three theories obtain respecting the right method of sustentation of the New Testament Church and Ministry:

1. *Alms*—This opinion was introduced by the Waldenses, in consequence of the abuses that prevailed in the Romish Church; and is still held by them: one-third of their contributions being given to their ministers, one-third to their missionaries, and one-third to the poor.

2. *Competent Maintenance*.—This opinion is held by the Church of Rome, as Bellarmine declares. It originated with Popery. The Man of Sin having grown to such an incorrigible pride and license, as to usurp all rights, and do all things after his own pleasure, being beyond the control of prince or emperor, began to change the ordinance of tithes, first by exemptions, then by appropriations, transferring them from one to another. In the schism between Popes Alexander III., and Victor IV., the former prevailed by force and perfidy. Of him it is testified: "Cistercienses, Hospitalarios et Templarios decimarum solutione exemit." Before his day, John XV., who became Pope, A. D. 985, gave the like privilege to St. Benet's Monks at Casinum, as Leo Marsican affirms in these words: "Hoc ultra Johannem Duodecimum, etc., in suo privilegio auctoritate Apostolica addidit, nulli Episcopo licere ab ullo ex populis monasterio subjectis, vel a quibuslibet ubique terrarum ad se pertinentibus Ecclesiis, decimas vinorum seu oblationes defunctorum qualibet occasione percipere." To uphold these sacrileges and usurpa-

tions, the Popish canonists were first corrupted; who, ignoring the first and chief end of tithes, viz., *a tribute due to God*; and insisting only upon the second consideration, viz., *that of being a maintenance due to ministers*; gave to the Pope, as sovereign disposer of the revenues of the Church, power to alienate, commute and appropriate them, as he thought fit. As long as tithes were owned to be *jure divino*, the Pope's alienations might be disputed. Therefore, the Schoolmen framed the convenient distinction, *that the divine and moral law extended only to a competency for the ministry, but as to the determinate quantity of a tenth, this was only of ecclesiastical institution*. Thus, Aquinas: "Pertinet autem ad jus naturale ut homo ex rebus sibi datis a Deo aliquid exhibeat ad ejus honorem; sed quod talibus personis exhibeatur, aut de primis fructibus, aut in tali quantitate, hoc quidem fuit in veteri lege jure divino determinatum; in nova autem lege definitur per determinationem ecclesie, ex qua homines obligantur ut primitias solvant secundum consuetudinem patrie, et indigentiam ministrorum ecclesie." Summa. Quæst. LXXXVI. "Sic ergo patet quod ad solutionem decimarum homines tenentur partim quidem ex jure naturali, partim etiam ex institutione Ecclesie; quæ tamen, pensatis opportunitatibus temporum et personarum, posset aliam partem determinare solvendam." "Ad secundum dicendum quod præceptum de solutione decimarum, quantum ad id quod erat morale, datum est in Evangelio a Domino, ubi dicit Matth. x. 10: "Dignus est operarius mercede sua"; et etiam ab Apostolo, ut patet 1 Cor. ix. *Sed determinatio certæ partis est reservata ordinationi Ecclesie.*" Summa. Quæst. LXXXVII. So also, Peter Dens, whose "Theology" is the Text-Book of Rome: "Quo jure Decimæ debentur Ministris?"

III. R. Distinguendo: si considerentur Decimæ quoad substantiam, id est, in quantum præstant necessariam vitæ sustentationem Ministris Ecclesie, in tantum debentur jure naturali et divino. Illud docet Apostolus ad Cor. 9, v. 14: "Deus ordinavit iis, qui Evangelium annuntiant, de Evangelio vivere": probat idem ex ratione dicens: "quis militat suis stipendiis unquam?" etc.

IV. Si Decimæ accipiantur secundum quotam illam seu dici-

nam partem, eatenus debentur jure solum Ecclesiastico juxta consuetudinem receptam; quomodo in hac patria manipulus non nisi undecimus dari solet; alibi minor.

V. Objiciuntur varii Canones asserentes Decimas jure divino deberi: sed respondetur quod illi Canones intelligantur de Decimis secundum substantiam; vel quod illa determinatio Ecclesiasticæ decimæ partis habeat fundamentum in jure divino L. V.; quæ Lex jam cessat." *Theologia*, Tom. IV., Quæstio VI., N. 71.

So, likewise, Bellarmine: "Facile enim doceri potest, esse de jure naturæ et divino, quod aliquid solvant laici sacerdotibus, et preterea de jure ecclesiastico, ut in quod solvitur, sit pars decima." "Deus, ussit decimas Levitis dari; quæ quidem præcepta licet non obligent Christianos, ut judiciala erant, obligant tamen quatenus moralia, id est, quod pars aliqua fructuum sit sacerdotibus danda." "Quartus error est multorum Canonistarum, qui contendunt decimas, etiam quoad determinationem quantitatis, esse de jure divino, nec posse ulla humana lege aut consuetudine aliam statui quantitatem." "Præceptum Legis Veteris, quoad illam determinationem, non erat morale, nec proprie cæremoniale, sed judiciale, ut Alexander docet, et B. Thomas, quos omnes Theologi sequuntur." *De Controversiis*, Tom. II., Lib. 1, Cap. XXV., Ed. 1601.

3. *Tithes*.—This is the unanimous judgment of the Fathers, and the voice of the Church uncontradicted for more than a thousand years.

We shall show that the 1st and 2d theories are groundless, and that the 3d only is scriptural.

1. That *Alms* are not the proper support of the Ministry the Apostle shows: "Who goeth a warfare any time at his own charges? Who planteth a vineyard and eateth not of the fruit thereof? Or who feedeth a flock, and eateth not of the milk of the flock?" 1 Cor. ix. 7. If the soldier, the shepherd, the husbandman, may claim their wages, not as matter of charity, but as matter of justice, so too may the minister claim his maintenance as his due. To deny his maintenance, is injustice. But if injustice, then he has a right and part in the goods of the

people. For justice gives to every man his own, and not that of another. Whence, it is evident that a minister has a right and part in the goods of his people. To take this, therefore, is not to take alms, but to take his own. Again: The laborer is worthy of his wages. No one would say that the beggar is worthy of alms. Now, if the laborer be worthy of his wages, then he may justly challenge it, not beg it as alms. For if wages, it is due by justice. But alms are not due by justice; otherwise, there would be no difference between justice and charity. Therefore, if alms, not wages; if wages, not alms.

2. The theory of *Competent Maintenance* receives no countenance from Scripture, either by positive precept, or by necessary inference. The passage which tells us, that they who preach the gospel should live of the gospel, recognises the same proportion as due to ministers under both the Old and New Testaments. This "competent maintenance"—which is only alms after all—is something very different from the ordinary maintenance of ministers, for it was never practised in any age. In the patriarchal age, tithes were paid. In the Mosaic age, tithes were paid. In the apostolic age, more than the tithe was paid. If this competent maintenance be ordained by God, then it is tithes; if by man, it is not God's ordinance, and the sooner the inventions of men are abandoned by the Church of God, the better.

3. The only remaining theory is the scriptural one, that tithes are appointed by God to be the support of his Church and ministry in every age. We shall show this, and first, that tithes are not of Levitical origin, not Ceremonial, not Judicial, but Moral, and so binding on every age and observed by every people.

(1.) Tithes are not of Levitical origin, but were instituted long before, even from the beginning. The Levitical law itself shows that they did not originate with it, for in its very first mention of them, it shows the ground of the institution to be of such nature, that it cannot be temporary or local, but must be permanent and universal. The words are these: "All the tithe of the land, whether of the seed of the land, or of the fruit of

the tree, *is the Lord's: it is holy unto the Lord.* And concerning the tithe of the herd, or of the flock, even of whatsoever passeth under the rod, *the tenth shall be holy unto the Lord.*" Lev. xxvii. 30, 32. In these words, there is neither institution* nor assignation, but a simple declaration of the Lord's universal right. This proposition, "All tithes are the Lord's," is in no way Levitical, but contains a perpetual truth. The words, "Holy to the Lord," interpret the former, and show in what sense "tithes are the Lord's," not only in respect of a general duty, or in respect of his power, but because the immediate right to tithes is not in man, but in God only, for that which is holy to the Lord is separate from man, and man's use. In such things, man has no right whatever. Therefore, if a man keep tithes from the Lord, this is a clear case of theft, usurpation, and sacrilege. Whatever is consecrated to God, is ever after execrable for man to touch. And this is the meaning of the word *cherem*, which is used in Lev. xxvii. 28, and in Joshua vi. 17, which word includes both consecration to God and execration upon man. Tithes being consecrated to God both before and after the Levitical law, must, of necessity, bring this execration upon all that turn them from their consecrated use.

The assignation of tithes to the Levites is a distinct thing, and is found in a different place, viz., Numbers xviii. 21: "Behold, I have given the children of Levi all the tenth in Israel for an inheritance, for their service which they serve, even the service of the tabernacle of the congregation." The reason of this assignation is given: their service at the Tabernacle. This assignation is Levitical, and continues so long as the service of the Levites continues: when this ceases, tithes shall no more be Levi's, but tithes shall be the Lord's. Thus, the assignation to Levi pre-supposes the perpetual right of tithes to

*Nullus ita etiam ritus, aut ceremoniæ, quibus æque ac vocibus homines inter se loquuntur, aliquid significat, nisi postquam notum est ac usitatum, ut tali ritu talis res significetur. Quocirca res ipsa docet, aliquam institutionem debuisse præcedere, uti sacrificiorum, ita hujus, ut ita loquar, mercedis sacrificantibus debitæ." Fabricius, *Tractatus Philologico—Theologicus de Sacerdotio Christi.*

belong to the Lord—a right which none can challenge. They are his, not in the same general sense in which all the beasts of the forest, and the cattle upon a thousand hills are his, and in which the earth is his, and the fulness thereof is his, for, in that sense, the nine parts are his, as well as the tenth; but in a special sense they are his. He has an immediate right and property in tithes, distinct from the respects of duty, power, and providence, in which all things else are his.

(2.) Tithes are not Ceremonial, whether we consider the ceremonies before, or under, the Levitical law. Sacrifices were in use before the law. But between tithes and sacrifices a difference exists as to property and design. Sacrifices became the Lord's, when offered to him, but not before. Till then, man had the right in that which he sacrificed. But in tithes, man has no right, because all tithes are the Lord's. In sacrificing, man offered of his own to God, which, if not offered, continued his own. But in paying tithes, man gives nothing of his own to God, but only renders to God that which always was his. In not sacrificing, godliness is violated; but in not paying tithes, both godliness and justice are contemned. Now, a ceremony consists, not in giving to God what is his, but in giving to God what is ours. If men give to God honor and praise and glory, this is no ceremony; they but give him what was ever his right. But when through rites and ceremonies they honor him, they give him both what was his and what was theirs. Tithes and ceremonies differ also as to design. The end of ceremonies is to signify something; the end of sacrifices was to signify the Great Sacrifice upon Calvary. But the end of tithes is the maintenance of God's Church and ministry; and this shows that tithes are no ceremony. The same thing was shown when Levi paid tithes in Abraham. For, that cannot be a Levitical ceremony, which is contrary to a Levitical ordinance. But for Levi to pay tithes, is contrary to a Levitical ordinance, which requires that tithes should be paid to Levi. Therefore, when Levi paid tithes in Abraham, he paid them not as a Levitical ceremony.

(3.) Tithes are not Judicial. This opinion was first broached

by the schoolman, Alexander Hales, and subsequently held by Thomas Aquinas, ("whom all theologians, follow," says Belarmine,) whence it came to be the accepted doctrine in the Church of Rome, that Tithes are Judicials. But it is evident that the patriarch Jacob did not so consider them, for he offered tithes *in a vow* to the Lord, which is proper for things moral, or things ceremonial, (such as draw to some moral duty,) but not for things judicial. The reason is, vows are a part of God's worship, but what is judicial belongs not to the worship of God, but to the civil government of men. No holy things are judicials. But tithes are holy things—separated from common use to the Lord. Therefore, tithes are not judicials.

(4.) The last proposition, which is the scriptural one, is, that tithes are moral, by divine institution. The sanctifying of a seventh day, and the sanctifying of tithes, are things moral, by divine institution. Why the *tenth* should have been chosen—whether, as some have thought, because it is the completion of all single numbers, and the first number of *increase*—we may not be able to determine. But that it was chosen by God to be peculiarly his own; his portion in man's substance, is clearly taught in the Scriptures. And the moral uses of this appointment are indispensable to man. And the moral benefits it confers are inestimable by man. There is no one in whom fallen man is so indisposed to trust, as in *his God*. Faith in God was a principle lost by the fall. To live upon God, is not now natural to man, but to live upon the creature, is. Idolatry is now rooted in his very nature. Entire dependence upon the creature has taken the place of entire dependence upon God, and the creature has now become his god. Hence, faith in God is now a supernatural principle, restored only by the almighty power of the Spirit. And for the maintenance of it, amid the constant tendencies of the old nature to an idolatrous trust in, and worship of, the creature, constant discipline by the providence of God, with constant supplies of his grace, is necessary. Therefore, God, in his all-wise dispensations, has required from us continual proofs of our dependence upon him, even as to our subsistence and the necessaries of life. Thus he commanded

Abram to quit his country, and his father's house, and to travel into a strange land, where he gave him none inheritance, no, not so much as to set his foot on, but made him depend wholly upon his providence to support him. And so, he and his descendants, Isaac, Jacob, and the twelve patriarchs, lived as strangers and pilgrims upon the earth. Thus, too, the children of Israel were led through a waste and barren wilderness, where, for forty years, God fed them with manna from heaven, and brought water out of the flinty rock, that he might make them know that "man doth not live by bread only, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live." To keep them continually dependent upon him, sufficient manna for one day only was given. And they who, whether from covetousness, or distrust of God, or prudent thrift, kept of it till the next day, found that it did not profit them, for it bred worms and stank. (And so, our Lord has instructed us, as the Israelites in respect to their daily manna, to pray for no more than the bread of one day: "Give us this day our daily bread;" and to trust him for the morrow.) Thus, too, when the Israelites were settled in Canaan, several statutes were given them, the design of which was to signify their absolute dependence upon God, and to evince their perfect trust in him. Thus, thrice every year, all the males throughout the nation were commanded to go up to Jerusalem to attend the solemn feasts there; thus leaving all their frontiers unguarded and exposed to the attacks of the hostile nations around them; which were aware of this regulation and of the times of these feasts. But, for their security, God commands them to depend wholly upon his promise: "Neither shall any man desire thy land, when thou shalt go up to appear before the Lord thy God, thrice in the year." Ex. xxiv. 24. Here God promises, not only that none shall invade their land, but that none shall even *desire* to do it at those times, though all the rest of the year they were at war with them! And agreeably to this promise, it happened, that whilst this regulation was observed, they were never invaded. Again: Every seventh year was to be a Sabbath. They were neither to plough nor sow, neither reap that which groweth of itself. And

to the inquiry, "What shall we eat the seventh year?" God's answer was: "I will command my blessing upon you in the sixth year, and it shall bring forth fruit for three years. And ye shall sow the eighth year, and eat yet of old fruit until the ninth year; until her fruits come in, ye shall eat of the old store." And if they should take God at his word, and trust in his promises, then does God assure them of a double blessing: complete protection from all their enemies, and full supply of all their wants: "Wherefore, ye shall do my statutes, and keep my judgments, and do them; and ye shall dwell in the land in safety. And the land shall yield her fruit, and ye shall eat your fill, and dwell therein in safety." Lev. xxv. But if they would not trust God, then he threatens that second causes wherein they trusted should not help them, and that he, who commands all the courses of nature, would by his providence signally punish them. And if they should neglect to keep the Sabbatical year, then God threatens that he would banish them from the land, which should then enjoy its Sabbaths and have the rest he had appointed it: "Then shall the land enjoy her Sabbaths, as long as it lieth desolate, and ye be in your enemies' land; even then shall the land rest and enjoy her Sabbaths. As long as it lieth desolate, it shall rest; because it did not rest in your Sabbaths, when ye dwelt upon it." "The land also shall be left of them, and shall enjoy her Sabbaths, while she lieth desolate without them: and they shall accept of the punishment of their iniquity; because, even because they despised my judgments, and because their soul abhorred my statutes." Lev. xxvi. How signally was this threatening fulfilled upon the Jews! For 490 years they failed to observe the Sabbatical year. Thus, seventy Sabbatical years were neglected by them. And for seventy years were they kept captive in Babylon! as it is written: "To fulfil the word of the Lord by the mouth of Jeremiah," (by whom God had threatened the same) "until the land had enjoyed her Sabbaths; for as long as she lay desolate, she kept the Sabbath, to fulfil threescore and ten years." 2 Chron. xxxvi. 21. These statutes given to God's ancient people, were designed to accomplish the same ends which God aims at in all

his people in every age: drawing them off from the creature, and drawing them up to him; drawing them from trusting in and worshipping of idols, to trusting in, and worshipping of, the living God. To prevent their relapse into idolatry, to which they are ever prone, constant restraints are necessary, and constant mementoes are furnished of their constant dependence upon God, and their constant obligations to him. A *life of faith* requires the *constant exercise of faith*. And so God disciplines us with regard to our substance, as well as our time, and reserves to himself, at the least, one-tenth of our substance, and one-seventh of our time. Unbelief is the root of covetousness; faith, the root of obedience and charity; and Sabbaths and tithes are the discipline of faith. The objection urged by many to the tithe, "that it is too much to give to God," proceeds from distrust of God, and dependence upon means. But God will have us know that our worldly prosperity is more to be attained by the observance of his commands, than by our endeavors, or skill; and that it is his blessing only which giveth increase and maketh means effectual. This was wonderfully exemplified in the insensible multiplication of a few loaves and fishes by the blessing of Christ, by which thousands were fed. And it is that same blessing that, in every thing, giveth increase; though men perceive it not, but deem all to be the effect of their own industry and skill, and so they *sacrifice to their net*, as though by it their portion was fat, and their meat plenteous. This fearful sin of *distrusting God* has brought after it his terrible judgments. Thus he punished the Israelites for murmuring for want of water in the wilderness, even when they were ready to perish. Their sin was "the limiting the Holy One of Israel," and their punishment was grievous. Again, when this people were discouraged, notwithstanding the command and the promises of God, from entering the land of Canaan, by reason of the evil report of the spies, the heavy curse was passed upon them, that all of that generation—the two believing and courageous spies excepted—should perish in the wilderness. And for this sin Moses fasted and prayed as long as for the idolatry of the golden calf, even forty days; to show that the sin of dis-

trust of God is as heinous as that of idolatry itself. And doubtless this is the reason why covetousness is called idolatry; for the covetous man trusts in his riches, and trust being the highest act of worship, consequently, we make that our god wherein we trust. What happened to the Israelites, the Apostle tells us, "happened unto them for ensamples: and they are written for our admonition, upon whom the ends of the world are come." 1 Cor. x. 11.

It has been well said: "Of all the principalities in hell, there is none like *Mammon*, who dares rival God to his face; there is none who has rebelled with that success, and made such havoc of the souls of men."

To counteract these dominant principles of our fallen nature, unbelief, covetousness and idolatry, God has mercifully instituted for man's good, as well as his own glory, the ordinance of the tithe: An ordinance binding upon man, as man, and observed from the first, and in every age, and by every people. The acceptance of Abel's sacrifice of the firstlings of the flock, showed that God had enjoined upon the family of Adam the offering of *the first* of whatever was possessed, and that the command, "Honor the Lord with thy substance, and with the first-fruits of all thine increase," was observed from the beginning. For Abel's offering was the offering of "faith." And faith requires a divine command for its foundation. That Abel's offering was a tenth is exceedingly probable, from the fact, that this was the proportion established in the patriarchal age; and also from the absence of any record of the first institution of the ordinance; which institution must have preceded the first mention of its observance.

This first mention we have in Gen. xiv. 20, where Abram gave Melchizedek "tithes of all." Respecting which, the Apostle says, (Heb. vii. 4): "Consider how great this man was, unto whom even the patriarch Abraham gave the tenth of the spoils," (as our version has it). Had it been a *free gift* from Abram, it would have proved his greatness above Melchizedek's, for the giver is greater than the receiver. But when anything is paid as a *tribute*, it proves the receiver to be greater than the payer.

Therefore, unless Abram paid tithes to Melchizedek as a tribute due to him, the Apostle's argument is not only inconclusive, but it proves the contrary of what he affirmed. But that Melchizedek, who as priest blessed Abram, was in his official character superior to him, is evident from the words of the Apostle: "Without all contradiction, the less is blessed of the better." The Greek word is worthy of notice: 'Melchizedek *tithed* Abram,' *i. e.*, put him under tithe, or exacted it as his due. That he did this as priest, and not as king, (as some teach,) is evident, for what tribute did Abram owe him as king of Salem? And how did Levi, in Abram, pay tithes to the king of Salem? Did this make Abram's posterity, the nation of the Jews, subjects to a foreign king? And why should Levi be said to pay tithes, more than any other of the posterity of Abram? If kings exacted a tenth, by way of tax, (as the Confederate Government did,) this is not *the tithe of God*, which could be given only into the hands of priests. The Apostle's argument points exclusively to Melchizedek's priesthood, the superiority of which over Aaron's he evinces. He shows that our Saviour is a priest of this order. He does not say that Christ was a king, but a priest, after the order of Melchizedek. Abram's prompt payment of tithes shows that it was understood before that age that tithes were due to the priests. For otherwise, Abram could not have payed them under that notion; which the Apostle says he did. Dr. Murphy, in his Commentary on Genesis, well observes: "We have here all the indications of a stated order of sacred rights, in which a costly service, with a fixed official, is maintained at the public expense, according to a definite rate of contribution. This act of Abram, though recorded last, may have taken place at the commencement of the interview. At all events, it renders it extremely probable that a sacrifice had been offered to God through the intervention of Melchizedek, before he brought forth the bread and wine of the accepted feast."

That Abram paid tithes of all his property, and not of the spoils, is evident from what the Apostle, in Heb. vii. 9, says: "Levi also who receiveth tithes, paid tithes in Abraham." Then, such tithes as Levi received, such tithes he paid in Abram.

But, 1. Levi did not receive tithes only of the spoils. Therefore, he did not pay tithes only of the spoils. If Abram paid tithes only of the spoils to Melchizedek, why compare this one action only, to the Levitical tithes which were paid every year? And how could Melchizedek's priesthood be superior to Levi's, if the latter received tithes of all men and of all things, and the former of one person only, and but once, and of spoils only?

2. Levi did not receive tithes of the spoils.* Therefore, if Levi did not pay other tithes, he did not pay any. And so, it would not be true that Levi paid tithes in Abram; for, he could not

*He had "no part nor inheritance with the people." "Spoils" are not mentioned among their portion according to law. And were never given, as Jewish writers unanimously agree, except in the case of Midian, where God's vengeance was executed upon a land that was not theirs. In the land of Sihon, Og, and others, which God made over to them, they gave not to priests and Levites anything thereof. Dr. Owen observes: "Spoils were not tithable by law. For if the places taken or destroyed in war were anathematized, as Jericho was, and also Analek, no portion was to be reserved, under a pretence of sacrifice, or any other sacred use; as Saul found to his cost. And if they were not anathematized, all the spoils were left entirely unto the people that went to war, without any sacred decimation. So the Reubenites and the Gadites, at their return over Jordan into their own land, carried their rich spoils and cattle with them, no tithe being mentioned (Josh. xxii. 8), although there is no question but many of them offered their free-will offerings at the tabernacle. And when God would have a sacred portion out of the spoils, as he would have in the wilderness out of those that were taken from the Midianites, to manifest that they fell not under the law of tithes, he took not the tenth part, but one portion of five hundred from the soldiers, and one of fifty from the people. (Num. xxxi. 28-30.) Wherefore, the giving of the tenth of the spoils was not from the obligation of any law, but was an act of *free-will* and choice in the offerer. But yet there was so great an equity herein also, namely, that God should have an acknowledgment in the fruits of those successes which he gave in war, that out of the spoils of his and his people's enemies, David made his provision for the building of the temple. And the captains of the host that went against Midian, after a tribute was raised for the Lord out of the spoils, according unto the proportions mentioned, when they found the goodness of God in the preservation of their soldiers, whereof there was not one lost, they made a new voluntary oblation unto God out of these spoils. (Num. xxxi. 48-50.')

have paid tithes of spoils, which, as *Levi*, he never received nor paid.

3. Abram did not pay any tithes of the spoils. (1.) It is said, that Abram lift up his hand to the Most High God, possessor of heaven and earth, that he would not take so much as a thread or a shoe-latchet of that which was taken; which he yielded to the king of Sodom, after distributing to Aner, Eshcol, and Mamre, his confederates, their portion. He would not account any part thereof his own, much less would he lay claim to the portion of his confederates, which he must have done if he paid tithes of *all* the spoils. Calvin justly observes: "Since it is improbable that he should have been liberal with other persons' goods, and should have given away a tenth part of the prey, of which he had resolved not to touch even a thread, I rather conjecture that these tithes were taken out of his own property." (2.) The word translated *spoils*, ἀκροθίνιον signifies *the top of the heap, i. e., the best or choicest parts*; hence, 1st. *The first fruits of the produce of the ground*, which were taken from the top of the heap, and offered to God. 2d. And, in after times, a second sense: *The choicest of the spoils of war.* (Ἀκροθίνια, primitiæ, quasi, τὰ ἄκρα θίνος, summitates acervi: quod primitiæ ex summo acervo sive summitate acervi excerpi soleant. Proprie autem primitiæ frugum, secundum quosdam. Item pro primitiis manubiarum quæ diis offeruntur." Scapula. "Ἀκροθίνιον, proprie, 1. Summitas acervi frumenti. 2. Primitiæ frugum, quæ Deo offerebantur. 3. Ἀπαρχαί dicuntur primitiæ quælibet omnium aliarum rerum, quæ Diis dantur, maxime prædæ et spoliolum." Schleusner. "Ἀκροθίνια. It denotes that which lies on the top of the heap of corn (θίς), the finest of the wheat; and then (improperly, according to the scholiast to Euripides,) the chief or finest portions of the spoils of war which were dedicated to the Deity." Delitzsch.) The translating the Apostle's word, *spoils*, is a late device. It was not so understood in former times. Jerome translates it, "De precipuis." Isidorus calls it "Decimas substantiæ." Clemens Alexandrinus exhorts a believer to present an ἀκροθίνιον to God. No one would understand that *spoils* were meant here. Mr. Selden admits that it also signifies *first fruits*,

or the chiefest parts sacred to the gods among the Gentiles. The word signifies, *the best of a man's goods*. And Abraham did what Abel did, viz., offered the best of his goods to God. And the probability is strong that Abraham did this every year. For he had as much reason to show his gratitude and obedience to God, one year as another. Nor would distance of place be any hindrance to the performance of his duty. For Abraham dwelt at Hebron, over against Sodom, and Melchizedek dwelt at Jerusalem, (which, according to Josephus, was Salem,) both being in what was subsequently the tribe of Judah, and not far apart; and the reverential spirit which characterised the father of the faithful would prompt him to the regular acknowledgment of his obligations to the God of the covenant, his shield and exceeding great reward, and to the due support of the ministry of Melchizedek, priest of the Most High God. He was a most extraordinary and wonderful priest: priest, not of one age, not of one nation, not of one religious society, but of all ages, of all nations, priest of the Universal Church, priest of the whole world; without predecessor, without successor, "made like unto the Son of God, he abideth a priest continually." He was the type of Christ, *the representative of the Christian dispensation*, even before the Jewish came into being. To him, Abraham paid tithes before he became a Jew. And in Abraham, Levi also paid tithes. Thus, the Patriarchal Church, in Abraham, and the Jewish Church, in Levi, unitedly paid tithes to the Christian Church, in Melchizedek. Thus, Gentiles and Jews were, in a figure, one in Christ, even then. Melchizedek already possessed the land, Canaan, which was Abraham's only in promise; and was officiating at Jerusalem, as prophet, priest, and king. Thus, Christ, through his representative, already held the land of promise, long anterior to Joshua; and discharged his mediatorial offices in Jerusalem: "In Salem also is his tabernacle," Ps. lxxvi. 2—the symbol of the gospel rest and kingdom, and of the higher rest and kingdom of heaven, into both of which believing Jews and Gentiles enter, and are blessed by Christ, as kings and priests forever. To this extraordinary priest, Abraham and Levi paid "tithes of all" their estate. The priesthood

of Melchizedek has never ceased, but "abideth continually," being *fulfilled* in Christ's. And as tithes were paid to Melchizedek, a perpetual priest, only as the type of Christ, so, it follows, they are due to the great Antitype continually. Thus says the Apostle: "And here men that die receive tithes; but there he receiveth them, of whom it is witnessed that he liveth." Heb. vii. 8. But how does Melchizedek still live as a priest, and receive tithes, save in Christ? And therefore *Christ, who liveth, still receiveth tithes*. If tithes are to be paid to him that liveth forever, they are ever to be paid; so that as before the law they were paid to Christ, so too, after the law, they are to be paid to Christ, who liveth forever. If Christ *receiveth* tithes, then he has not abrogated them; then he has confirmed them, not only negatively, by not forbidding them, but positively by approving the payment of them, and himself now in heaven ever living to receive them. It is a gross mistake to suppose, as some do, that the Apostle, in these words: "The priesthood being changed, there is made of necessity a change also of the law," Heb. vii. 12, intimates the abrogation of the law of the tithe. The Apostle shows that the rites and ceremonies peculiar to the Levitical economy cease, being fulfilled in Christ. Aaron yields to Jesus, who is a priest forever, after the order of Melchizedek; and the priesthood of Melchizedek is not changed, but abideth forever, and to this priesthood tithes forever belong. "The mutation of the priesthood indispensably requireth the change of the law, *i. e.*, the legal dispensation of the covenant of grace, and the bringing in, with another priesthood, a better hope; even the covenant of grace in the gospel dispensation of it." Pool. There had been a change, though no abrogation of the law, respecting the payment of the tithe, when the children of Israel came out of Egypt. Previously, they had been paid to the first-born; afterwards, to the tribe of Levi. Now, again, a change is made, and they are paid, and to be forever paid to an unchangeable priest, even Jesus, priest forever, after the order of Melchizedek. "Seeing our Lord remaineth forever a priest, after the order of Melchizedek, why should not tithes belong unto him, and in him, to those who, in his stead,

exhort us to be reconciled to his Father?" Assembly's Annotations.

Other examples are given of the observance, in the patriarchal age, of the universal law of the tithe. Jacob vowed a tenth to the Lord: "Tithing, I will tithe it to thee," Gen. xxviii. 22; importing frequency and exactness in making this payment. Since God gave him the increase, not of one year only, but of every year, and he had vowed to give unto God the tenth of all that he should give unto him, therefore the yearly reception of new gifts bound him to acknowledge them by a yearly tithing. "Cum autem loquatur de *omni quod Deus sibi daturus esset*, et quicquid deinde quoque in Canaane acquireret, Dei quoque munus esset, vix ambigerem, eum hoc pietatis exercitium et in posterum continuasse, et decimam reddituum partem annuatim eidem fini impendisse. Idque tanto magis, quo magis talia pietatis officia non ad unum tempus debent esse restricta, et ipse hoc cum aliis, perpetuo sine dubio duraturis, conjunxit, ut, quod Jehova sibi *futurus in Deum*, et *lapis ille in locum publici conventus et cultus*, quamdiu ipse nempe in hujus loci vicinia degeret. Ad alletum quod spectat, sine dubio decimatio hæc Deo facienda in eo sita fuit, ut decimam illam partem cultui et gloria Dei, et secundum ejus voluntatem, pie impenderet. Quod facile patet fieri potuisse, partim Deum sacrificiis pie colendo, partim sumtus ad promovendum cultum publicum quocunque et jam modo id fieri posset." Ikenius. *Dissertationes Philologico—Theologicæ.*

It is a weak objection, that the tithe could not have been obligatory, as, if so, it would not have been the matter of a vow. It was a usual thing to vow the performance of necessary duties; as when good men vowed to watch over their words, and to keep God's law. Thus, Hannah vowed her first-born to the Lord—which was however due to him before by express law. (Ex. xiii. 12.) The people were bound to serve the Lord in the time of Asa, no less than at other times, yet they made a covenant, and sware to serve the Lord. David was bound, without oath or vow, to keep the righteous judgments of the Lord, yet he bound himself thus: "I have sworn, and I will perform it, that I will

keep thy righteous judgments." "Thy vows are upon me, O God; I will render praises unto thee, for thou hast delivered my soul from death." So, Jacob vowed the Lord should be his God, on the same condition on which he vowed to give tithes. The previous obligation did not, in the one case, render unnecessary the vow, and why should it in the other? Chrysostom considers Jacob's vow to be a striking manifestation of his faith, as it was made upon the *promise* of God simply, not upon its fulfilment, showing how confident he was of the performance.

Abraham gave tithes, in acknowledgment of God as "possessor of heaven and earth," and Jacob, as "giver of all that he had." The reason being not ceremonial, peculiar to one nation, but moral, shows that the duty is obligatory on all. And so, we find that the obligation of the tithe was universally acknowledged by Gentile nations. The Carthagenians, a colony of Phœnicians, brought this custom with them from Tyre, to which city they were accustomed to send their tithes by one clothed in purple and priestly robes. Diodorus Siculus relates, that becoming rich, they neglected to send to Hercules of Tyre *the tithe of all their profits*, as they were formerly wont to do, until their misfortunes led them to repent, and to send it as before. The ancient Grecians observed this rite. The learned grammarian, Didymus of Alexandria, testifies to the universal custom of tithing by the Grecians. He says that *δεκατεύσαι*, to pay the tithe, was *καθίερων*, to sanctify, to consecrate to a divine use: *ἐπεὶ δὴ περὶ ἔθους ἢν Ἑλληνικόν τὰς δεκάτας τῶν περιγινόμενων τοῖς θεοῖς καθίερων*: it was a Grecian custom to consecrate the tenth of their increase to the gods.

Xenophon relates that Agesilaus made so profitable a war in esser Asia, that in two years' time he sent to the god at Delphos a tithe worth more than one hundred talents. Xenophon himself, with his captains, after their expedition into Asia, consecrated the tithe of their gains to Apollo and Diana, built a temple to the goddess, and supported the worship with tithes. And near the temple, he set up a pillar with this inscription: *Ground sacred to Diana. Whosoever possesseth it, let him pay the tithe of his yearly increase, and out of the remainder main-*

tain the temple. If he neglect this, the goddess will require it. Cræsus, to prevent the spoiling of Sardis by the victorious troops of Cyrus, induced the latter to publish among his soldiers, "that the tithe of the city must necessarily be given to Jupiter;" whereupon, they dared not touch a single thing!—a striking proof that the conviction of the sacredness of tithes was so deeply rooted in men's minds, as to stay the hands of victorious soldiers from pillaging a rich and noble city! Porphyry affirms that it was a very ancient Attic law, "That all the inhabitants of Attica should worship the gods according to their estates, with first-fruits and offerings of wine every year." The same author relates, quoting from Hesiod, one of the oldest poets, that the gods had utterly destroyed an atheistical people called *Thoës*, because they paid no first-fruits as they ought to have done. By "first-fruits," Porphyry shows that he means tithes. So also do Dionysius Halicarnascensis, Maximus Tyrius, Pliny, Philo Judæus, and many other writers, civil and ecclesiastical, designate tithes by "first-fruits." Mr. Selden confesses that the first-fruits were paid in the proportion of a tenth part, so that "first-fruits" and "tithes" became synonymous. The Romans also observed this practice. Paulus Diaconus, quoting from Festus, says: "The ancient Romans offered every sort of tithe to their gods." Diodorus Siculus says that Lucullus, the richest Roman of his time, taking account of his large estate, offered all the tithes to the gods. The Pelasgi being punished with a barren year for the neglect of this duty, removed the judgment by vowing the tenth of all profits to the gods, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus states. Pliny states that the Arabians paid tithes of frankincense to the god Sabis, and that the Ethiopians paid tithes of cinnamon to their god, Assabinus; and this they observed so strictly, that it was not lawful for the merchants to buy or sell any of their goods, until the priests had first taken out the tenth for their gods. Mr. Selden, unfair and unscrupulous as he is, is constrained to admit, that "the Gentiles were very devout in giving of their *yearly* increase to the honor of their deities."

Here, then, we have the universal recognition by the nations

of the obligation of the tithe. In the language of the learned Montacutius: "Instances are mentioned in history of some nations which did not offer sacrifices; but in the annals of all times, none are found which did not pay tithes."

We come now to the consideration of tithes under the Levitical dispensation. Previous to the giving of the law from Mt. Sinai, the first-born in every household was the priest of the family. At the giving of the law, a change was made, and the tribe of Levi substituted for the first-born. Num. iii. 40-45. As there was a change in the priesthood, so also in the payment of tithes. From this time they were expressly set apart for the support of the Levites: "And the Lord spake unto Aaron, thou shalt have no inheritance in their land, neither shalt thou have any part amongst them; I am thy part and thine inheritance among the children of Israel. And behold, I have given the children of Levi all the tenth in Israel for an inheritance, for their service which they serve, even the service of the tabernacle of the congregation." Num. xviii. 20, 21. A tithe of this tithe was due from the Levites to the priests, Num. xviii. 25-28, who, ordinarily, bore the proportion of a fourth to the other classes of the Levites. This priestly tithe is never called the second tithe, but *the tithe of the tithe*. Besides the Levitical tithe, there was a second, and a third tithe. The second, of corn, wine, oil, herds and flocks, was expended in sacrifices, to be eaten "before the Lord, in the place which he shall choose to place his name there." This was to be taken to Jerusalem in kind, or, if too far, it was turned into money and laid out at Jerusalem, for oxen, sheep, wine, or for whatever else they pleased. Deut. xiv. 22-27.* The third tithe was levied every third year, and appropriated to the support of the poor. Deut. xiv. 28, 29. The two first tithes, the Levitical and the festival,

*"Let those that live as remote as the bounds of the land which the Hebrews shall possess, come to that city where the temple shall be, and this three times in a year, that they may give thanks to God for his former benefits, and may entreat him for those they shall want hereafter; and let them by this means maintain a friendly correspondence with one another by such meetings and feastings together; for it is a good thing for those

are admitted by all writers. But the third, the poor tithe, is disputed as a distinct tithe. Some, as Scaliger and others, make the poor man's tithe the same as the first, but appropriated every third year to the poor. Many, both Jewish and Christian antiquaries, as Maimonides, Selden, Ainsworth, and others, think that the tithe for the poor was the same with the second, or festival tithe, which was given every third year to the poor. Thus, both these contend that there were but two tithes. A careful examination of their reasons has led us to regard them as inconclusive, and to agree with those Jewish and Christian theologians, Rabbi Hiskuni, Rabbi Bechai, Spencer, Comber, and others, that there were three distinct tithes, and that the third year is called "the year of tithing," Deut. xxvi. 12, because in that year a new tithe, above and besides the others, was paid together with them. This opinion is supported by the authority of Josephus, who represents Moses as saying: "Besides those two tithes which, I have already said you are to pay every year, the one for the Levites, the other for the festivals, you are to bring every third year a third tithe to be distributed to those that want, to women also that are widows, and to children that are orphans." Antiq., Book IV., Chap. VIII. In accordance with this, Tobit speaks expressly of a third tithe, saying, *καὶ τὴν τρίτην ἐδίδονν οἷς καθήκει*, and the third tithe I gave to those to whom it belonged. Tobit i. 7. The second tithe, only, was redeemable. The first, that due to God, and by him given to the Levites, was incapable of commutation or redemption. Abarbanel rightly observes on Lev. xxvii. 31: "Non debent hæc intelligi de decima prima, quippe quæ Levitarum est, et redimi nequit, sed de secunda quam Hierosolymam deferunt." If the second tithe was redeemed, it could only be by "adding thereto a fifth part," Lev. xxvii—a fifth of the estimated value was to be added to

that are of the same stock, and under the same institution of laws, not to be unacquainted with each other; which acquaintance will be maintained by thus conversing together, and by seeing and talking with one another, and so renewing the memorial of this union; for if they do not thus converse together continually, they will appear like mere strangers to one another." Josephus. Antiq., Book IV., Chap. VIII., §7.

the amount, in case of redemption. And this was done, as Abulensis says: "Ne Judæi sæpius tentarent redimere, adeoque retinerent decimas."

As the Mosaic law does not define what things are subject to this tithe, but simply says that it is to consist of both vegetables and animals, (Lev. xxvii. 32, 33,) the Jewish canons enacted that, as to the produce of the land, "whatsoever is esculent, though still kept in the field and derives its growth from the soil, is tithable; or whatsoever may be eaten from the commencement to the completion of its growth, though left in the field to increase in size, is tithable, whether small or great; and whatsoever cannot be eaten at the beginning, but can only be eaten at the end of its growth, is not tithable till it is ripe for food." (Mishna.) It will be seen that this definition embraces even the smallest kitchen herbs and aromatic plants; and that it explains our Lord's remark, that tithe was paid of mint, dill, and cummin, which he however did not condemn, but, on the contrary, said "these things ought ye not to leave undone." "This is the general rule about tithes: Whatsoever serves for food, whatsoever is kept, (that is, which is not of common right,) and whatsoever grows out of the earth, shall be tithed." Lightfoot.

Over and above the tithes, and the forty-eight cities for them to dwell in—thirteen of which were set apart for the priests—and lands, which were a thirtieth part of the land of Canaan, the Levitical ministry had many emoluments and perquisites pertaining to them, which greatly increased their revenue. Maimonides reckons them up in this order: 1. The flesh of the sin-offerings, whether fowls or beasts. (Lev. vi. 25, 26.) 2. The flesh of the trespass-offerings, (Lev. vii. 6); both which are reckoned as part of the priests' maintenance, by Ezekiel. (xliv. 28, 29.) 3. The peace-offerings of the congregation. (Lev. xxiii. 19, 20.) 4. The remainder of the *omer*, or sheaf-offering, which was yearly made at the Passover. (Lev. xxiii. 10, 11.) 5. The remnant of every meat-offering that was offered unto the Lord. (Lev. vi. 16.) 6. The two loaves that were offered at the feast of Pentecost. (Lev. xxiii. 17.) 7. The shew-bread, consisting of twelve loaves set before the Lord in the temple on every Sabbath, and after-

wards on the Sabbath taken away, and divided among the priests that officiated. (Lev. xxix. 9.) 8. The leper's log of oil. (Lev. xiv. 10, 11.) 9. The wave-breast and heave-shoulder of the peace-offerings. (Lev. vii. 31, 34.) 10. The heave-offering of the sacrifice of thanksgiving. (Lev. vii. 12, 14.) 11. The heave-offering of the Nazarites' ram. (Num. vi. 17-20.) 12. The firstlings of the clean beasts. (Num. xviii. 18.) 13. The *biccurim*, or first-fruits of *un-wrought produce*, which were brought to Jerusalem every Pentecost, and there divided among the priests. (Num. xviii. 13.) They were of wheat, barley, grapes, figs, pomegranates, olives, and dates; and this offering contained about the fiftieth part of such produce of the land. 14. The *trumah*, or great heave-offering, which contained about the fiftieth part of the *wrought produce* of the fruits of the earth. (Num. xviii. 12.) Of both these, the Hebrew doctors say, that a *good eye* (*i. e.*, a liberal man,) gives a fortieth part; an *evil eye* (*i. e.*, a niggard,) gives a sixtieth part; and so, the medium, the fiftieth part, may be computed to be that which was given for the whole. 15. The cake, which every man annually offered of the first of his dough. (Num. xv. 20.) 16. The first of the fleece of the flock. (Deut. xviii. 4,) which was, like the *biccurim* and the *trumah*, about a fiftieth part of the whole. 17. The shoulder, the two cheeks, and the maw, of every beast that was killed for common use; for the text, Deut. xviii. 3, cannot be understood of sacrificing, as our version has it, but should be translated: "And this shall be the priests', due from the people, that kill any beast, whether it be ox or sheep," etc. And the constant sense of the Jews, as well as their practice, was agreeable thereto. (The same interpretation is given by the learned Henry Ainsworth: "*Slay a slaughter, i. e.*, kill any beast for common food. The original word generally signifieth no more than to kill a beast, as is noted on Gen. xxxi. 54; and in special, to kill for sacrifice unto God. But the large meaning is here to be chosen; for it agreeth not with the former laws in Leviticus touching sacrifices, that the priests should have the cheeks, etc., and the general exposition of the Hebrews is, that this is meant of common meats.") 18. The redemption of the

first-born, (Num. xviii. 6,) which was the price of five shekels of the sanctuary for every first-born son, (of the mother, not of the father,) to be paid as soon as the child was a month old; which came to about two dollars and fifty cents. 19. The firstlings of the ass, which was to be redeemed with a lamb. (Ex. xxiv. 20; Num. xviii. 25.) 20. The restitution of that which was stolen from the stranger, or the proselyte, who being dead, or gone out of the land, had left no kinsman behind that might receive it. 21. The devoted things, (Num. 18. 4,) such as were devoted to no specified sacred use. The skins of the sacrifices which were offered at the temple, (Lev. vii. 8,) and every week divided among the officiating priests, and which were of considerable value.

Besides all these, the share which the Levitical ministry had in the second tithes, and in the third tithes, must also be taken into account.

The following table presents a view of the amount of income annually paid by every Jew; not including, however, the free-will offerings, and several other offerings specified above:

An entire crop, supposed to yield,	-	-	-	-	Ephahs, 6,000
Deduct, 1st. The corner unreaped,	-	-	-	100	
2d. The Biccurim,	-	-	-	59	
3d. The Trumah,	-	-	-	116	
				<hr/>	
				275	
These deducted, there remain	-	-	-	-	5,725
Deduct, 1st. The Levites tithe,	-	-	-	572	
2d. Tithe for feasts,	-	-	-	515	
				<hr/>	
Deduction for first and second tithes,	-	-	-	1,087	
Which deducted out of 5,725, leave	-	-	-	-	4,638
Deduct, every third year, tithe for the poor,	-	-	-	463	
Leaving for the husbandman,	-	-	-	-	4,175

So that the *entire* yearly contribution of the Jew must have exceeded one-third of his income.

Such then was the provision made by God for the support of the Levites,* the ordinances of religion, and the poor.

*When first appointed, the Levites were 8,580, the 302d part of the people. Under David, they were 33,000, (from 30 years upward,) 187th

“They that suppose,” says Lightfoot, “that the tithes under the law were paid only at the temple, and to maintain the priests in the ceremonious worship there, and, upon this conceit, look upon them only as Levitical, are far deceived; for as some were indeed paid at the temple upon such an account, so others, and that the greatest part, were paid to the priests and Levites in their forty-eight universities, (Josh. xxi,) to maintain them whilst they were studying there, to enable them for the ministry, and to teach the people, for which they were designed, (Deut. xxxiii. 10; Mal. ii. 7.); and when they were dispersed through the land, into the several synagogues to be ministers in them, tithes were also paid for their maintenance there.”

Hooker, in his *Ecclesiastical Polity*, well observes: “Touching the quantity of this general sacred tribute: whereby it cometh to pass, that the meanest and the very poorest among men, yielding unto God as much in proportion as the greatest, and many times in affection more, have this as a sensible token always assuring their minds, that in his sight, from whom all good is expected, they are concerning acceptance, protection, divine privileges and preëminences whatsoever, equals and peers with them unto whom they are otherwise in earthly respects inferiors; being furthermore well assured that the top, as it were, thus presented to God, is neither lost, nor unfruitfully bestowed, but doth sanctify to them again the whole mass, and that he by receiving a little undertaketh to bless all. In which consider-

part of the people. At that time, the Israelites numbered about 2,414,200; to which add, for the mixed multitude, 100,000, and, for the tribe of Levi, about 45,000; making the total, 2,559,200. On the return from Babylon, the Levites numbered 4,620; of these, 4,289 were priests, and 331 Levites. Of the 24 courses of the priests, there were then only 4 remaining; the rest being extinct, or remaining in the land of their captivity. Jewish writers say that the 4 families which returned, divided themselves into 24 courses as before, and also took the same names they had, when settled by King David—such as Joarib and Abia, etc., although none of their posterity were in being then. In the time of Christ, these 4 grew to be 5,000 in each family, 20,000 in all. The Levites probably were as many.

ation, the Jews were accustomed to make their tithes *the hedge of their riches*. Albeit, a hedge doth only fence and preserve that which is contained; whereas, their tithes and offerings did more, because they procured increase of the heap, out of which they were taken. God demandeth no such debt for his own need, but for their only benefit that owe it. Wherefore, detaining the same, they hurt not him whom they wrong; and themselves, whom they think they relieve, they wound; except men will haply affirm, that God did by fair speeches and large promises delude the world in saying: 'Bring ye all the tithes into the store-house, that there may be meat in my house,' (deal truly, defraud not God of his due, but bring all,) 'and prove if I will not open unto you the windows of heaven, and pour down upon you an immeasurable blessing.'"

The views of the following renowned Jewish theologians reflect faithfully the national sentiment. Maimonides says: "Qui fructus suos comedit necdum decimatos, is divinitus infligendæ morti est obnoxius." "Qui non decimatos fructus suos comedit, perinde est, ac si morticina et discerpta comederet." Jarchi, commenting on Num. v. 10: "And every man's hallowed things shall be his: whatsoever any man giveth the priest, it shall be his," says: "He that detains the tithe, so that it is not given in the due season thereof, in the end his land shall yield him but the tithe of that it used to yield, agreeable with that sentence of St. Austin: 'Si tu decimam non dederis, tu ad decimam revoceris.'" Rabbi Bechai thus comments on Deut. xiv. 23: "If thou pay the tithe, it is thy corn; if not, it is my corn. If thou pay the tithe, it is thy wine; if not, it is my wine. For it is said in Hosea ii. 9: 'Therefore I will return, and take away my corn in the time thereof, and my wine in the season thereof.'" In his comment on Deut. iv., he illustrates by a parable: "A certain rich man had land, which yearly bare him a thousand measures of corn, whereof he duly paid an hundred for the tithe. At his death, he gave his land to his son, with a charge to do the like in tithing, as he had done before him, which he did the first year after his father's death; for the land brought forth a thousand measures as before, and he gave an hundred

thereof for the tithe. But the second year, he, having an evil eye, began to think with himself, that the tithe was a great matter, and therefore he forbade the laying out of it. The next year after, the increase of that field was much diminished, and it afforded but an hundred measures in all, in regard whereof he was exceedingly grieved and discontented. His neighbors therefore, hearing of this, came unto him, clothed in white raiment, to make merry with him, and to comfort him; to whom he said: 'It seems to me that you solace yourselves and rejoice at my loss.' But they answered him: 'Should we be grieved for thee, that hast brought all this evil upon thyself? Wherefore, then, didst thou not set forth thy tithe duly, as thou shouldest have done? Consider how, that when the land came first into thy hand, thou was the husbandman, or owner thereof, and God Almighty the priest; for the tithe was his part to dispose of. But now, forasmuch as thou hast not set forth his part unto him, God is become the householder and owner of the ground, and thou the priest; for thy field doth not yield as it yielded before, a thousand measures, but he hath set apart for thee an hundredth measure. And this is that which is written: 'And every man's hallowed things shall be his;' that is to say, when he divideth not as he ought, he shall have nothing himself, but the holy things, that is, the tithe. And for this cause our wise men affirm, he that withholdeth his tithe, in the end it will come to pass, that he himself shall have nothing but the tithe; as it is written: 'Ten acres of vineyard shall yield one bath, and the seed of a homer shall yield an ephah,' (Isa. v. 10,)—that is, the tithe, for an ephah is the tenth part of an homer.'" Again, on Malachi iii., he says: "Although it be unlawful to prove or tempt the Lord; for a man must not say, 'I will perform such a commandment, to the end I may prosper in riches,' for it is written: 'Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God;' yet there is an exception for payment of tithes and works of mercy in this text. And for proof of a blessing following the performance of this command, Ralbag refers to 2 Chron. xxxi. 10: 'Since the people began to bring the offering into the house of the Lord, we have eaten and have been satisfied, and there is left an

abundance, for the Lord hath blessed his people, and this abundance that is left.' ”

Some have supposed that the obligation of the tithe was temporary only, because the institution in which it was embodied partook of a typical character. But, 1. This is to overlook the fact that the tithe did not originate in the Levitical economy, but was appointed long anterior to it, even from the beginning, and was universally observed both by the Patriarchal Church, and by Gentile nations. 2. The fact of an obligation—as Mr. Thorburn justly observes—being embodied in an institution of a typical character, merely proves that the form of it was designed to undergo a change. The Sabbath, public worship, prayer, was enjoined under the Mosaic dispensation, as well as tithes. If the temporary character of that dispensation has dissolved the obligation of the latter, why not also that of the former? If the proportion of the tithe for the New Testament ministry be too great, as some say, then it must be because of the superiority of the Levitical priesthood in one or all of these respects: 1. The Work. 2. Qualifications. 3. Dignity. 4. Expenses. 5. Number of Officers. 6. Others besides ministers provided for. 7. Or, that the ancient regulation is unsuitable, because there are preferable methods of support now. 1. As to *the Work*. The priests were required to travel to Jerusalem, to engage in the service of the temple. But there were twenty-four courses, and each served but a week at a time, and were required to be at Jerusalem only twice in the year, and were well provided for while there. These courses were sub-divided into seven classes, each class served its day; so that no priest served more than two days in a year, excepting at the greater festivals, when all appeared. At home, they officiated on Sabbath in the synagogue, and instructed the people in the knowledge of the law during the week. And if ample provision was made for them, for the efficient discharge of these duties, much more is it due to the gospel ministry, whose field is the world, and not one land only; and who are required to be able ministers of the New Testament, approving themselves as the ministers of God, “in labors, in watchings, in fastings; by pureness, by knowledge, by

long-suffering, by kindness, by the Holy Ghost, by love unfeigned, by the Word of truth, by the power of God, by the armor of righteousness on the right hand and on the left;" defending the Word of God against the assaults of infidelity in its protean forms, especially against philosophy and science, falsely so-called; and, as pastors, watching over and ruling the flock of Christ, as they that must give account. 2. As to *Qualifications*. It is true that of priests were required not only natural, but also intellectual and spiritual qualifications; but these in a higher degree are demanded of the gospel ministry, as the work devolved on them plainly shows. 3. As to *Dignity*, the Levitical ministry is far excelled by the gospel ministry. "If the ministration of condemnation be glorious, much more doth the ministration of righteousness exceed in glory. For even that which was made glorious, had no glory in this respect, by reason of the glory that excelleth. For if that which was done away was glorious, much more that which remaineth is glorious." And must a ministry of superior dignity yield to one that is inferior, as to the provision made for its support? God supported the Jewish Church in the wilderness by a miraculous agency. But when he had secured to his people the possession of the Promised Land, he caused, by his express authority, his visible Church to be supported through the instrumentality of human means. In like manner, God supported the Christian Church for a certain period by his supernatural power, to show that the Christian dispensation was of God, not of man. But when he saw meet to withdraw his miraculous agency from the Christian Church, he caused it to be supported by the same human means, and on the old, established principle. 4. As to *Expenses*. These were far less under the Old Testament, than under the New. All priests were provided for from infancy; their education provided for; their expenses incurred by their journeys, and otherwise, all provided for. It is different with the candidate for the Christian ministry. The previous expenses, and frequently the subsequent expenses, of living, and education, are all borne by himself. The objects, too, for which offerings are required under the present dispensation, involve more

expense than did the maintenance of the temple worship. An injunction is also upon the ministers of the gospel, to be "given to hospitality." The greater expenses, then, of the Christian ministry call for, at least, as ample provision for their support, as was required by the Levitical priesthood. 5. *Number of Officers.* Under King David, the Israelites exceeded two and a half millions. The Levites varied from 22,300 at their institution, to 38,000 in David's time. Average of priests, 8,000. Giving thus 1 Levite to 66 Israelites. The population of the world is estimated to be 1,381,000,000. (Professor Schem's statistical tables.) The entire evangelical, Protestant ministry of the world number, probably, about 60,000. Protestant missionaries, about 7,600; of whom about 4,000 are ordained ministers; in all, about 6,000 preachers. Deducting these 6,000 missionaries from 60,000 ministers, leaves 54,000 ministers for the 381,000,000 of Europe and America; or 1 minister to 6,055 souls. Whilst 6,000 ministers are assigned to the 1,000,000,000 of Asia, Africa, and the isles of the sea; or 1 minister to 166,666 souls! And *thus* does the Church obey the command of her divine Lord: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature!" No wonder, that her insulted king has poured his curse, instead of his blessing, upon her! The great end for which the Christian Church is constituted is, in the name and stead of her ascended Head, to act unceasingly the part of an evangelist to all the world. And this is the appointed condition of her success. An evangelistic Church is a flourishing Church; and a Church which drops the evangelistic character, speedily lapses into superannuation and decay. The cessation of its activity is the cessation of its prosperity. If it ceases to be evangelistic, it will ere long cease to be evangelical, and then it ceases to be a Church of God. Not to advance is to recede, and to continue to recede, until it becomes extinct. Let the aggressive feature vanish, and the conservative feature will one day vanish too, for there will be nothing left to conserve. If, instead of extending the triumphs of Protestant Christianity over the realms of Paganism, she cast aside her weapons of aggressive warfare, and settle down in inglorious

ease, to enjoy the conquests she has won, what will be the consequence? Her active energy, denied a suitable outlet in aggressive efforts beyond her domain, will find ample vent for itself in fomenting intestine discords and divisions within her borders. She becomes a poor, torpid, shrunken, shrivelled, distracted thing. And the cause of it, is the blight and mildew of Jehovah's displeasure, on account of a neglected and unfaithful stewardship. Dishonoring her high commission, she is dishonored by her Head. Not active abroad, she suffers at home. And so it has happened, that sending forth a shamefully inadequate supply of ministers abroad, she makes a shamefully inadequate provision for the great majority of her ministers at home. Requiring a far greater number of ministers, proportionably, than did the Levitical Church, she makes, absolutely, far less provision for the few she has, than it did. Dr. Chalmers well observes: "There might important lessons be drawn from the largeness of the proportion which God here commanded, (Ex. xiii. 1-7,) both of the people and the animals, for his own special use and service; or for being set apart in some way or other to himself. The first-born bear a ratio to the whole, approaching to the tithe which he also claimed of the fruits of the earth, or even to the seventh, which he specified as his own share of our time—not a large proportion, certainly, when measured by his own absolute rights—for he is Lord of all, both of ourselves, and of all that belongs to us—but large, when measured by the natural inclination of man to consecrate what he has unto God. Look at the encroachments ever making on the Sabbath, so as to abridge the really consecrated time; or at the miserable allowance which either the voluntary, or even the national, system would make for the support of religion, so as to abridge the consecrated wealth; or at the wholly inadequate number set apart and maintained for ecclesiastical services, so as very greatly to abridge the consecrated persons." "Chalmers's Daily Scripture Readings."

The remarks of Dr. John M. Mason are worthy of all consideration: "The primitive churches never permitted themselves to suffer for want of laborers. Their spiritual advancement was

in their eyes infinitely more valuable than all the pelf which the maintenance of their ministers required. Look over the Acts of the Apostles, and be astonished at the abundance of help which the churches then enjoyed. *Our* economical plan is to make the pastor do the work which was anciently done by three or four, and the very natural consequence follows, the work is badly done, or the workman is sacrificed. The conclusion is almost self-evident: if congregations will stint themselves in workmen, they must have their work spoiled; and if the work be done at all, they must kill the mind or body of the workman; and sometimes both. Let them not deceive themselves. If they impose hardships which God never commanded, they must expect to go without his blessing."

6. *Others besides Ministers* provided for. But this obtains in the New Testament Church, as well as in the Old. Elders that rule well, are to be "counted worthy of double honor," or a double portion, or maintenance. The obligation to provide for faithful elders and faithful deacons was recognised by the primitive and by the Reformed Churches; but "the poverty of the Church being such, there is no maintenance or benefice annexed to these offices," was the plea, as Pardovan's Collections state, why the obligation was not met. The right, however, of these officers to such maintenance, was unquestioned. Calvin, in his comment on 1 Tim. v. 17, says: "We may learn from this, that there were at that time two kinds of elders; for all were not ordained to teach. The words plainly mean that there were some who 'ruled well' and honorably, but who did not hold the office of teachers. . . . But, in order to show that he does not recommend masks, he adds, 'who rule *well*;' that is, who faithfully and laboriously discharge their office. For, granting that a person should a hundred times obtain a place, and though he should boast of his title; yet, if he do not also perform his duty, *he will have no right to demand that he shall be supported at the expense of the Church.*" The Church of Scotland, in her *First Book of Discipline*, recognised the obligation and fulfilled it: "As for the church-rents in general, we desire that order be admitted and maintained amongst us, that may stand with the

sincerity of God's Word, and practice of the purity of the Church of Christ. To wit., that, as was before spoken, the whole rent and patrimony of the Church, excepting the small patronages before mentioned, may be divided into four portions; one thereof to be assigned to the pastor for his entertainment and hospitality; *another to the elders, deacons, and other officers of the Church*, such as clerks of assemblies, takers up of the psalms, beadles, and keepers of the church, so far as is necessary; joining therewith also the doctors of schools, to help the ancient foundations where need requires; the third portion to be bestowed upon the poor members of the faithful, and on hospitals; the fourth for reparation of the churches, and other extraordinary charges as are profitable for the Church, and also for the common weal, if need require." Chap. XII., §12. In like manner, the Reformed Church of France, the Church of Holland, and the Churches of the Reformation, generally acknowledge the right of elders and deacons to proper maintenance. Dr. King of Scotland gives the following just view of the passage in Timothy: "Faithful elders are so far identified, as they all rule well; and so far they differ as only some labor in the Word and doctrine. The Apostle claims a sufficient pecuniary acknowledgment for elders who rule well. But let it be observed that he does not claim it for all of them equally. He requires it especially for them who labor in the Word and doctrine. If any simply ruled well, they were to get liberal remuneration; but if any, in addition to ruling well, also labored in the Word and doctrine, they were to receive a *specially* ample salary, since they devoted themselves more entirely to the Church—spending and being spent for its sake." Did the same spirit animate the Church now, which characterised the primitive Churches—whose "spiritual advancement was in their eyes infinitely more valuable than all the pelf which the maintenance of their officers required"—what marvellous progress would she not make, in seeking first the prosperity of that kingdom, on whose welfare depends the welfare of the world! But that spirit of covetousness which leads her to defraud the teaching elder of his due, leads her to defraud also the ruling elder and the deacon of

their due. The consequence is, she is cursed with a *cheap* eldership: (as well as, to a great extent, with a *cheap* ministry,) men, for the most part without training, without qualification, ignorant of the nature, the constitution, and the administration of that kingdom in which they are rulers! raised to the elevated office, and bearing the honored title of "pastors," "presbyters," and "bishop"! for such are the ruling elders of the Scriptures. How many look upon their office as a mere human appointment, whose duties they may discharge only as inclination prompts or leisure permits! How general is the notion, that by serving the communion-table, (a duty which does not belong to them,) by attending upon the meetings of session, and occasionally on other ecclesiastical bodies, they have exhausted the duties of their office! How large a number are found treating as a sinecure, and exposing to the contempt of the Church and the world, the highest office on earth, to which they have been called, if called at all, by the Holy Ghost! And for which aggravated guilt, both they and the entire Church are responsible to God. Of those who are concerned for the maintenance of their "rights," how few are there who understand the just metes and bounds thereof; whilst the majority of such, in their ignorance and conceit, assume it to be their vocation to take oversight of the minister, instead of the flock, and are as willing to discharge the duty of the Presbytery in this respect, as they are to neglect their own. But sticklers for rights must also be equally sticklers for duties. For it is idle for any to dream that their rights will be respected whilst their duties are trampled under foot. Faithful elders are incalculable blessings to the Church. The diligent discharge of their duties will do more than aught beside to recommend the symmetry, the beauty and the power of the Presbyterianism of the Scriptures. The gratitude of the Church will be forever due to those who open, and widen, and deepen the channels for those streams of living water which gladden the city of God. Angels contemplate their radiant career with admiration; and Jesus, from his illustrious throne, looks down upon them with delight; and when the chief Shepherd shall appear, he will confer upon them a crown of life.

But if the Church is worthy to receive these ascension-gifts of her divine Head, she will show her appreciation of the same, by joyfully according to them that "double honor" which the Scriptures require.

We have now shown that in no respect was the Levitical priesthood superior to the Christian ministry, and entitled to a larger measure of support, whether as to work, qualifications, dignity, expenses, number, and others besides ministers provided for. But it may be said, that the ancient regulation would be unsuitable now, because of preferable methods of support. What are these? Voluntary offerings? Or pew-rents, or tax upon worshippers? As to the first they have proved a failure—and proved to be such by the accumulated experience of the past. Facts, indisputable facts, have settled that point—and their name is *legion*. How many Christians contribute, what every Jew did, more than one-third of their income? To what disreputable expedients do "Christian" men and women resort—fairs, tableaux, even lotteries—to build a house of God, or to eke out a miserable pittance to a half-starved minister of God, called a "salary!" The victims of voluntaryism are numbered by thousands and tens of thousands—a Babel monument, "whose top would reach unto heaven." As to the second method, the pew-rent system, it is not only unauthorised by, but inconsistent with, the principles of the gospel. That gospel was especially designed for the benefit of the poor. "Hearken, my beloved brethren, hath not God chosen the poor of this world, rich in faith and heirs of the kingdom which he hath promised to them that love him?" But the pew-rent system leads to the disparagement of that very class who are the special objects of the divine regard. For "if there come into your assembly a man with a gold ring, in goodly apparel, and there come in also a poor man in vile raiment," it leads to its being said to him "that wareth the gay clothing, sit thou here in a good place; and to the poor, stand thou there, or sit here under my footstool." This system has interposed an unholy barrier to the ordinances of religion, by banishing thousands and tens of thousands

of the poor from the house of God; and thereby preventing the permanent, the crowning demonstration of the divine origin of Christianity from being given: "*To the poor the gospel is preached.*" It is one chief cause of the enormous spiritual destitution which exists throughout the land, and of the moral and spiritual evils which prevail among the lower classes of the community. This system is also inconsistent with the honor of the great Head of the Church. As it has been well remarked: "When church-funds are raised by pew-rents, which are like licenses to worship and to hear the gospel; or are raised by collections which rise and fall in amount in proportion to the eloquence of popular preachers; or are raised by subscriptions which are not unfrequently extorted from unwilling contributors, by the energy and personal influence of zealous collectors, the Lord's dignity in the matter is compromised, his honor is wounded by the mistakes of his friends."

It cannot, then, be shown, that the ancient regulation of the tithe has been superseded by preferable methods of sustentation now; for, as we have seen, there is no comparison, but contrast only, between these devices of man, and the institution of God. As there is no evidence, then, that tithes were ever intended to cease—as all the presumptions are in favor of their continuance—it is just to conclude that they were designed to be of perpetual and universal obligation. Mr. Gladstone, in the spirit of Bishop Butler, justly observes: "To constitute a moral obligation, it is not necessary that we should have a positive command. Probable evidence is binding as well as demonstrative; nay, it constitutes the greatest portion of the subject-matter of duty; and so a dim view of religious truth entails an obligation to follow it, as real and valid as that which results from a clear and full comprehension—as real and valid, although it be true that different degrees of guilt are incurred by the disregard of the one or the other." Dr. Owen's forcible words deserve to be considered: "To oppose that order of things God has established by his providence, agreeably to his Word seems to be a fighting against God and his Anointed. The payment of tithes: 1, Before the

law; with 2, The like usage among all nations living according to the light of nature; 3, Their establishment under the law; 4, The express relation in gospel appointment unto that establishment (1 Cor. ix. 13, 14,) do make that kind of payment so far pleadable, that no man without being able to satisfy that plea, can, with any pretence of a good conscience, consent to their taking away."

The perpetuity and universality of the obligation of the tithe, *as due to God*—to Christ, the Priest, after the order of Melchizedek—has already been *demonstrated* from the patriarchal economy, as explained by the inspired Apostle. Under the Mosaic economy, Christ bestowed the tithe, and much more than the tithe, upon the Levitical Church and ministry. The Levitical economy, of itself, furnishes a strong probability, as we have shown, that the tithe, and much more than the tithe, should be paid to the Christian Church and ministry. Nay, that the claims of the latter far transcend its own. Such also is the decision of the Master himself: "Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil. For verily I say unto you, Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or one tittle shall in no wise pass from the law till all be fulfilled. Whosoever therefore shall break of these least commandments, *and shall teach men so*, he shall be called the least in the kingdom of heaven; but whosoever shall do and teach them, the same shall be called great in the kingdom of heaven. For I say unto you, That except your righteousness SHALL EXCEED the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, *ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven.*" The Christianity of the New Testament, instead of relaxing or diminishing the claims of the Christianity of the Old Testament, enlarges and strengthens the same. And is it not equitable, that obligation keep pace with privilege? Shall the New Testament far surpass the Old, in every thing—save in the important grace of giving? Are Christ's kings and priests to sit upon their own thrones, and present their offerings to themselves—converting Christian liberty into carnal license? Is there to be no progressive conformity to God? Shall not every succeeding dispen-

sation of Christianity be marked by increased nearness to God, and the sentiment of every Christian be:

“Still, all my song shall be,
Nearer my God to thee, nearer to thee ;”

until the dispensation of glory finds all perfectly united to him, and God is all and in all? What! can a *Christian* complain—can a *man* complain—that the best and the most of his substance should be given to God? Is it allowable among men, for servants and stewards to give to the master the less, and keep the greater? And is it unreasonable, that man should give to that great Being, for whom he was made, and in whom he lives, and by whom he was redeemed, the greater portion, and receive from him the lesser? Hear the law of the new dispensation: “A new commandment I give unto you, That ye love one another; as I have loved you, that ye also love one another.” (Not that the loving one another, was the new commandment, for that was as old as the race itself; but the loving one another “as I have loved you”—love manifesting itself *in the form of sacrifice*, leading them to lay down their lives for others; making Christ’s love the model and standard of their own. Formerly, they were to “love their neighbor as themselves;” now, they are to “esteem others *better* than themselves.”) “For ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might be rich.” “Hereby perceive we the love of God, that he laid down his life for us: and we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren. But whoso hath this world’s good, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?” “Freely ye have received, freely give.” “If we have sown unto you spiritual things, is it a great thing if we shall reap your carnal things?” “I beseech you, therefore, brethren, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy, acceptable unto God, which is your reasonable service.” “For the love of Christ constraineth us; because we thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead; and that he died for all, that they which live should not henceforth live

unto themselves, but unto Him which died for them, and rose again." "None of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord; and whether we die, we die unto the Lord: whether we live therefore, or die, *we are the Lord's.*" "*Ye are not your own; for ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body and in your spirit, which are God's.*"

Do these Scriptures permit a Christian to give less—not less than the tenth, simply, but less than what the Jew gave, *the third* of his income? The presumption being, as already shown, against them, the burden of proof rests on those who deny the obligations of the Christian to be as extensive as those of the Jew. It has been attempted to parry the force of the argument by the vain pleas: That Christ himself, when on earth, never received tithes: and that he directed the Twelve that they should carry neither gold nor silver, but to depend on being provided with meat and drink, from house to house, (Matt. x., Luke x.,) by those whose hearts were opened by their ministry; and that this was the law laid down for his disciples for all time. As to the first plea, it is evident that Christ, *as a Jew*, could not be a priest, to receive tithes, for he was not of the tribe of Levi, to whom alone tithes belonged; being given by Christ himself as the Head of their theocracy. As to the second plea, it is equally evident, that the Twelve were sent forth, as Jews, to their brethren the Jews, to announce the new dispensation of the kingdom of heaven. They had, as yet, no recognised official position; not until the day of Pentecost, when being endued with power from on high, they stood forth as the Apostles of Christ to witness unto him. In the meantime, it was by a special interposition of his providence that he effected their support. But in the evening before he was betrayed, Jesus said, referring to these former instructions: "But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip;" showing that it was not intended by the former charge to debar his ministers from their appointed maintenance. The trivial objection we will dismiss, with the answer of Calvin: "We must not think therein a

standing law prescribed to all ministers, while the Lord is commanding the first preachers of his doctrine what they were to do for a while; which piece of ignorance hath so far deceived many, that they would reduce all ministers without distinction to this rule."

So far was Christ from giving any deliverance repealing the ancient law established by himself, that we find him, whilst reproving the Pharisees for omitting the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy and faith, *commending the scrupulousness with which they paid their tithes*: "*these ye ought not to leave undone.*" And more than this, he enjoined upon his disciples, that *their righteousness should exceed the righteousness of Scribes and Pharisees*. But if Christians consecrate only a tenth of their income to God, so far from exceeding, they fall far short of the righteousness of Scribes and Pharisees, who gave annually more than a third of their income to God. Again: It has been supposed from the fact that a community of goods obtained in the infant Church in Jerusalem, and from the absence of any mention of the tithe, that this ordinance was no longer observed. But it is not said that Jews who had become Christians ceased to attend to this duty, and no one may impute it to them. If they brought in their incomes for a time, it must have been after separating the Lord's tenth at least, for Jewish Christians could not lawfully give that to the Apostles. It belonged by God's gift to the Levites as long as the temple was permitted to remain, and their services were required, accordingly, there. The Apostle, in his Epistle to the Hebrews, says: "*Levi also who receiveth tithes*"—the present tense;—showing that up to this time, the destruction of the temple and the overthrow of the Levitical priesthood, had not taken place, (which did not indeed occur for six years afterwards.) Only by a special revelation could tithes have been transferred from the Levitical priesthood to the Christian ministry—which was subsequently given. (1 Cor. ix. 9–14.) In the meantime, in the interval during which the Church was gliding from the old dispensation into the new, the Apostles offered no unnecessary violence to the prejudices of Christian Jews, where no sacrifice of

Christian truth or principle was involved, but patiently instructed the disciples respecting the transition of the Church from a lower to a higher and more spiritual and glorious economy, as the Epistle to the Hebrews evinces; continuing however to frequent the temple, until, it having fully served its purpose, the time came for its complete and permanent removal by providence. Further: There is no mention of having all things common, except at Jerusalem, and that for a time only, for soon all were scattered thence. This was done by Jews only, who, on embracing the gospel, were informed that the destruction of their city and nation was at hand. And therefore they sold their estates beforehand, and put them to this use, so far at least as there was need; which was also necessary to be done both for the support of the gospel in Judea, and for the dissemination of it among the Gentiles. But this was not designed as a precedent, or an example for after times, nor was it ever proposed as such to the churches by the Apostles. The collections subsequently made among the brethren in different places for the suffering saints in Jerusalem, show that each man was retaining the use of his property. For, every man was expected to give as God had prospered him (1 Cor. xvi. 2); not each congregation called on to contribute out of a common treasury. It is true, that in Church history we find Justin Martyr, Irenæus, and Tertullian, speaking of Christians having all things common, but this was during periods of persecution, when many were destitute, and the resources of all were required to supply the necessities of each. But, for what purpose do any bring forward the supposed expansion of the rule, from giving a tenth to the giving of all, as an objection to the perpetual obligation of the law of the tithe? Are those who urge this objection, sincere? Then, are they willing to lay down at the feet of church-officers all that they receive?

Whilst such zeal and liberality continued, what reason was there to urge Christians to give a tenth, who gave a great deal more? Mr. Selden himself confesses this: "So liberal in the beginning of Christianity was the devotion of believers, that

their bounty to the evangelical priesthood far exceeded what the tenth could have been." It had been little to the purpose, indeed, to have had tithes of annual increase paid, while that most bountiful devotion of good Christians continued in frequent offerings, both of lands and goods, to such large value." And this, too, after paying to the Levitical ministry their due. Neander observes: "The first Christian community constituted one family, and the force of the newly-awakened feeling of Christian brotherhood, the feeling of a common grace of salvation so powerfully outweighed all other personal and ordinary feelings, that it brought every other consideration in subjection to this new and important relation." The observations of Baumgarten are worthy of consideration: "The common participation in the Holy Spirit, which within the circle of the faithful, must have created a feeling of family in the highest sense, would, and necessarily did, cause not only human selfishness, but even the divinely ordained principle of property to yield to a true and actual community of possession. A condition of want was within this circle an inequality not to be borne, and, naturally, least of all by those who had tangible possessions, such as houses and lands. With these, under the influence of the feeling of common brotherhood, it became, as it were, an inner necessity to remove such a striking and offensive inequality, by relieving those who were in want. Not for a moment, that thereby the external disparity was externally and mechanically got rid of—but on every occasion, it is said: "they parted to all according as every man had need." One would have thought that these words did intimate clearly enough the degree to which this external equalisation has been carried; but Baur and Zeller absolutely persist that what is meant is, that in the community at Jerusalem all rights of property were, in the strict sense of the word, abolished. He, however, who asserts that *ὑσσοι* must be understood as implying that even every father of a family, who possessed a house or a field for the necessary maintenance of his family, is to be included among these *κτῆτορες*, and who thus designedly fortifies himself against the inference to be drawn

from other passages of the same author which explains the word *ὅσοι*—the object of such a person cannot be to furnish a commentary, but rather to produce a mystification.”

We come now to consider the New Testament law for the support of the gospel ministry, as contained in 1 Cor. ix. 13, 14: “Do ye not know that they who minister about holy things, live of the things of the temple? and they which wait at the altar are partakers with the altar? Even so hath the Lord ordained that they who preach the gospel should live of the gospel.” The altar had a large revenue. Tithes and other offerings *belonged* to it. And the priests did partake with it, did live of it, as matter of right. Else there had been no certain, settled maintenance. But there are no priests now, under the New Testament. Hence the propriety of the necessity of a New Testament statute for ministers of the gospel. And here we have the ordinance. *The Lord hath ordained.* What? *That they who preach the gospel should live of the gospel.* (Ἐκ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου. “Ἐκ,” *from, out of, out of the gospel's treasury.*) How? *Even so—οὕτω, in the same way:—“Ad hunc modum.”* Scapula. “Hoc modo, ad hunc modum, hac ratione.” Schleusner. “In the same or like manner.” Parkhurst. *In the same way as priests lived of the altar.**

What revenue then has the gospel? A revenue similar to that of the temple. Else, it is not “even so,” as the Apostle makes the comparison. But the revenue of the temple consisted, in the first place, of tithes and other offerings, and, in the second place, of free-will offerings. Now, if the gospel has none but

*“Οὕτω καὶ ὁ Κύριος διέταξε τοῖς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον καταγγέλλουσιν, ἐκ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ζῆν. Those who so interpret these words as if *εὐαγγέλιον*, in the last place, were taken in no other sense than it was in the first, namely, to note the function or calling of ministers, (as if the sense were no other but that the ministers of the gospel, whose calling it is to preach the gospel, should get their living by their calling of preaching the gospel,) make St. Paul the author of a lame and inconsequent similitude, whose *apodosis* answers not to his *protasis*. For what an *οὕτω*, what an “even so,” or analogy, would this be? The Levites lived of the holy portion or revenue of the temple, as their *ὀψώνιον*, or wages; even so the ministers

the last, how is it "even so" as the temple? If the gospel has nothing as *of right*, which it can *claim*, how is it "even so" as the temple? If the priests of the temple were sure of a tenth, and much more, and the ministers of the gospel not sure of a hundredth or thousandth part, or of any part at all, how is their provision "even so" as that of the priests of the temple? Did the Lord "ordain" that every man should pay what he pleased? But law that imposes no obligation is not law. Then, the "Lord's ordaining" amounts to nothing—as it has *practically amounted to nothing in the case of hundreds of half-starved, and starved-to-death, ministers of the gospel.* The Lord, then, ordained tithes to the altar, and nothing to the gospel. What comparison then betwixt the altar and the gospel? The same as betwixt *tithes* and *nothing!* How then did the Lord ordain a maintenance for the ministers of the gospel, *EVEN SO* as for the ministers of the altar? There is no coherence, no comparison, no argument, no good sense, to be made out of this passage, unless we admit that the Lord has "ordained" *tithes* under the gospel as well as under the law. In the Apostle's days, there was no dispute as to whether tithes were to be paid. *Nor could there be any, at any time; for, to Christ, the priest after the order of Melchizedek, tithes were ever to be paid, for he ever liveth to receive them.* The only dispute that could be, was, *To whom shall they be paid?* To the priests of the temple, so long as there was a temple, and a service. But after that, to whom? That same Apostle who so plainly affirmed, and powerfully demonstrated the abrogation of the Mosaic economy, as a typical institute, IS DIRECTED BY THE

of the gospel must live by their calling and function. The priests were maintained out of the share they had of the offerings of the altar; even just so the ministers of the gospel must live by their function of preaching the gospel. May not any one see that the apodosis answers not the protasis? For that speaks of the wages, this of the service for which wages is due. Well, therefore, as in the protasis the wages was compared with the work, so must it be in the apodosis too; and *ἐκ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου ζῆν* must here express the wages, as *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον καταγγέλλουσιν* doth the work." Mede's Works, Book 1, Discourse 21.

SPIRIT TO PROCLAIM TO ALL AGES AND GENERATIONS OF MEN THE UNIVERSAL AND PERPETUAL ORDINANCE OF THE EN-THRONED SAVIOUR, THAT WHAT FORMERLY BELONGED TO THE ALTAR, NOW AND FOREVER BELONGED TO THE GOSPEL; AND AS THE FORMER SUPPORTED ITS PRIESTS BY TITHES AND OFFERINGS, EVEN SO—IN THE SAME WAY—THE LATTER SHOULD SUPPORT ITS MINISTERS FOREVER.

[*To be Continued.*]

CRITICAL NOTICES.

“*Discourses at the Inauguration of the Rev. A. B. Van Zandt, D. D., as Professor of Didactic and Polemic Theology in the Seminary of the Reformed Church in America, at New Brunswick, New Jersey.*”

This very neat pamphlet of fifty-six pages, (printed by the Board of Publication of the Reformed Church,) contains three discourses: The first, a sermon by the Rev. Dr. Elmendorf; the second, a “charge,” by the Rev. Dr. Stitt; and the third, Dr. Van Zandt’s inaugural, a capital production, to which the other two constitute an elegant introduction. We do not often, in these pages, by any other means than a recital of their titles, invite public attention to mere *pamphlets*, however interesting their contents. Any importance which may attach to them is usually of an ephemeral character, and their contents are commonly confined to a narrow circle of influence. We venture to make an exception in the present instance.

This journal represents a large class of thinkers who are particularly alive to the current history of theological education, and who are accustomed to observe with interest the movements in this direction of great bodies of Christians. The “Reformed Church in America” has always been an object of regard on the part of Presbyterians outside of its ecclesiastical limits; but possesses at this moment features of special interest for our own

denomination. Because of this newly-awakened interest, we publish in this number of the *Review* an article (prepared at our instance by one of the most esteemed divines of that Church) relating to its history and usages—the publication of which additionally inclines us, as a kind of supplement to it, to make marked mention of the recent inauguration services at New Brunswick. These services resulted in placing in the chair of theology, in the richly-endowed Seminary of our sister Church, a man whose name, we are free to say, is quite as dear to many of our own people, as it deservedly is to the mass of his own. Most of our readers are familiar, we presume, with the character and services of the Rev. Dr. A. B. Van Zandt. He has long been distinguished as an eloquent preacher, an accomplished scholar, and a devoted Christian; it gave rise, therefore, to feelings of real satisfaction throughout a wide circle of orthodox believers, when his Synod, by his elevation to the conspicuous position he now, in the ripeness of his years, occupies, conferred upon its Seminary, and upon the cause of theological education, so signal a benefit. May all the parties concerned be long permitted to enjoy his valuable services in a department of labor which he is so well qualified to enrich!

Did our limits allow the indulgence, we would be glad to notice, at some length, the peculiarities of Dr. Elmendorf's admirable sermon, and of Dr. Stitt's well-considered charge. But we must forbear, being compelled to hasten to a sketchy view of the new Professor's address, as, from the official position of the speaker, more immediately affecting the cause of sound doctrine. Nor have we the space in which to present our readers with much more than a faint outline of this judicious and nervous exhibition of its author's views touching the grave matters he is engaged in handling. The chosen subject is: "A Biblical Theology—its Method and Progress." After a brief and felicitous introduction, the discussion is opened by a measurement of the field to be occupied: "To the department of the Didactic and Polemic Theology belongs the scientific statement of received truth, in its logical relations, together with its defence against opposing errors and heresies." Having expand-

ed this statement, so far as to connote its principal term, "truth," and to declare that the theology which has to do with it, is, in its broad sense, of universal extent, and carries in its "infallible conclusions" those principles "which underlie all phenomena and harmonise all relations," the Professor proceeds to treat of "investigation in theology," as to its scientific method, that of induction. In illustrating the points which gather about this head, occasion is seized for referring to the supposed conflict between science and revelation, and for showing that true science has, and can never have, a feud with inspiration: "It is a weak device of the enemy, to represent an antagonism in order to create it. And it is the part of unwisdom, for the friends of religion either to fear or to flout the discoveries of science. Her achievements are written in imperishable results, and all who love the progress of the race will bid God-speed to her well-directed research. But, when tortured nature shall have yielded her last response to the interrogatories of science, there will yet remain those problems to be solved concerning which nature is silent; and in the presence of which only revelation can take up the fallen clue, and witness to her divine origin and authority, by guiding the bewildered inquirer through the labyrinth of doubt and uncertainty to the knowledge of a personal God and Father, and the way of salvation through his grace. But, we should do injustice to theology, if we claimed for its teachings no higher office than that of supplementing the discoveries of natural science and philosophy." We cannot trace these reflections farther. They altogether strike a high note and a true. The inductive method is now viewed in the light of its utility, the "ultimate test and grandest illustrations" of which are found "in its application to theology." To the objection that Christian theology should be excluded from the circle of the sciences, on the ground that "its materials are not gathered by observation and experiment, but are given immediately by revelation," a fine answer is made, at the close of which occur the following sentences:

"Thus we arrive at the true idea of a Biblical theology. It is not a system of dogmas, arbitrarily assumed, or implicitly

received, and for the defence of which texts are to be gathered and marshalled, and strained and twisted, until the tortured record yields up a meaning that can be made to square with the doctrine. The cardinal principle of the Reformation, which afterwards wrought also the emancipation of philosophy, was the rejection of human authority and the right and responsibility of private judgment. In the sense originally intended by the phrase, 'The Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants.' But, in their investigations of truth, Protestants do not start even with the assumption that the Bible is true. The theologian is not bound to assume anything, except those fundamental laws of the human mind which must be admitted before reasoning can begin or discovery is possible."

After settling the imaginary quarrel as between science and theology, and arriving at the true idea of both, our Professor discusses the important distinction betwixt "the use of reason as an interpreter of Scripture, and its perversion when it is made the arbiter of truth." This whole line of thought which, in its wide course, has indicated both the materials and the method of theological inquiry, terminates in inferring "the nature and elements of *true progress* in theological science." We will quote here more at large:

"A 'progressive theology' is one of those popular phrases which, by a constant iteration, with divers and discordant meanings, or with no meaning at all, rapidly degenerates into cant. From its frequent abuse, as a convenient cover for all sorts of theological absurdities, this phrase has come to be regarded with suspicion by conservative thinkers. And yet, in its true sense, it is an apt expression of a desirable and necessary movement. The history of theology is the history of progress, nor can it be supposed that the whole field of inquiry has already been explored, and every question been subjected to so exhausting a scrutiny as to leave no ground for its revision—no possibility of a modification of results with a nearer approximation to truth. If there is danger that speculation will become erratic, and a craving after novelties become chronic and destructive, there may be danger on the other hand, that conservatism will become stagnation, and authority usurp again the place of intelligent research and responsible judgment. With improved apparatus, consequent upon the advance of those sciences nearly related to interpretation, the sacred text becomes daily more luminous.

Portions of it, long neglected, assume a new importance from a clearer insight of their meaning and connections, and a broader comprehension of the grand scope and miraculous unity of the whole. As the relations of truth are better understood, its doctrines arrange themselves in logical order, and out of the seeming chaos of disjointed dogmas grows up a coherent system, symmetrical and complete. For what has already been attained in this direction we owe more than can be expressed to the pious labors and eminent learning of the past. And it is the height of empiricism to ignore its results, or contemptuously discard its established conclusions. There is a manifest divine providence which has guided the Church through all the great epochs of her theological development. And that same God who gave the written Word, in successive accretions to the canon, as his purposes were unfolded in the history of redemption, until he had closed the Book and sealed it with his anathema, in like manner has led on the bride of heaven to the understanding of her charter, as the exigencies of her condition demanded the support and consolation of its truths. And in like manner he will lead her still, with ever-increasing apprehension of its significance and value, until the light of the written Word shall give place to the light of his presence, who 'in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.'

"Thus there is a development of doctrine, a 'progressive theology,' but it is wide as the poles from that modern theory, which is the convenient invention and favorite refuge of errorists. It is one thing for the Church, under the discipline of divine Providence, and urged by her own needs, to be brought to a more earnest and thorough research into the meaning of Scripture, and into a deeper insight and more exact definition of its doctrines; and it is another and very different thing, under pretext of 'development,' to project these doctrines on to conclusions outside of the record, overlaying the truth with human additions, and making it void with doubtful speculations. We cannot abandon the fundamental principle that the Scriptures contain all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge, and are always the ultimate and infallible standard, without casting ourselves adrift upon a shoreless sea, to be driven by every wind of doctrine, through the rayless gloom of never-ending uncertainty. All truth is in the Bible; but is there like treasures hid in a field, and that field is so vast, and those treasures so abundant, that the research of all ages, so far from exhausting, will only develop new stores of wealth as new exigencies arise. Thus there is, and ever must be, 'progress' in theology. But it is

not by the accretions of new truth which the mind is able to evolve from the germs of revelation, but by that clearer apprehension of the relations, significance, and power of truth already given, by which the Church, under the guidance of the providence and Spirit of God, comes ever to a deeper consciousness of the exhaustless treasure she possesses in the written Word."

Having defined the limitations that justify the notion of a progressive theology, Dr. Van Zandt proceeds, with great judgment, to place on the ground of these very limitations, "the high estimation and continued use of creeds and confessions, those symbols and systems of doctrine in which the Church from the earliest days has sought to express and embody her faith." We had intended to reprint his excellent observations on this point, but are forced to omit them.

It will now appear that a striking and commendable peculiarity of this able address is, that it deals with the principles of theological science as it bears upon modern error. The fact is hereby evinced, that Dr. Van Zandt is equal to the demands of his important chair, in its connection with those present and like issues with reference to which the out-coming preachers of the Word ought to be thoroughly informed.

"The New Testament Quotations, Collated with the Scriptures of the Old Testament, in the Original Hebrew and the Version of the LXX.; and with the other Writings, Apocryphal, Talmudic, and Classical, cited or alleged so to be. With Notes, and a complete Index. By HENRY GOUGH. London: Walton & Maberly, Upper Gower Street, and Joy Lane, Paternoster Row. 1855." 300 pp. 8vo. With 38 additional pp. in Notes and Index.

We had long dreamed of some such volume, and can now speak from experience of its value. It is an inexpressible convenience in studying the book of Romans. You first look up the passage of the New Testament in the index, and are there referred to the page of Mr. Gough's book, which presents in one view, in the left hand column, the unpointed Hebrew text in large beautiful letters, like those of the Bagsters, and beneath

the Hebrew, in the same column, the authorised English Version; and, in the right hand column, the text of the LXX., with an English version of the same placed below it. Where the citation is alleged to be from an Apocryphal or Rabbinical writing, the Apocryphal or Rabbinical writing takes the place usually occupied by the Hebrew in the left hand column. Two, three, or more distinct passages of the New Testament are given in this way on a single page, with large type, margins, and interspaces; the section containing one passage of the New Testament with its parallels being separated from the preceding and succeeding sections by a black line running horizontally across the page. At the foot of each *section* there are somewhat copious, and very learned, and often useful notes on the various readings of the different writings presented, as well as on certain other points of interest connected with the text history, or interpretation of the passage cited, or of the Greek citation, or of the Greek or English translation. The book is a treat to the eyes, and is easily handled.

“*The Southern States since the War.* By ROBERT SOMERS. With Map. London and New York: Macmillan & Co. 1871.”
284 pp. 8vo.

This is a valuable contribution to the book-shelves. Mr. Somers is a highly intelligent Englishman, who gives in these pages the fruit of a twelvemonth of travel through the Southern States. It is gratifying to receive so able and complete a confirmation of the statements we are wont to make ourselves, from the mouth of an unprejudiced foreigner. The purpose of the volume is to give as the result of a “not too hurried tour of the Southern States,” an account of their condition under the new social and political system. This task is accomplished in thirty-nine interesting chapters. Mr. Somers is a practical observer and economist, rather than a picturesque tourist; although there are now and then lively episodes and fine descriptive touches in his book. The style is, generally speaking, plain and sober, rather than sprightly, or specially engaging; but it is exact and

effective, and often precisely suited to the object had in view. The tone throughout is moderate, at times almost indifferent; and nothing is seen *couleur de rose*, with the single exception of certain phases of landscape; but the judgments expressed are in nearly every instance favorable to us. There is a good description of the Potomac scenery near Washington, of Mt. Vernon, of the woods of Virginia, and of Richmond. Other tourists have far exceeded Mr. Somers in their laudations of the city of the James, of which he must have had but a glimpse. He speaks however of stately streets, a pleasant west end, etc., and extols the Tredegar and other works. Mr. Somers was much taken with the quality of the stock at the State Fair. One of the few highly-colored pictures, is that of the pines of North Carolina blazing in the dazzling golden splendor of an autumnal sunrise. Several admirable chapters are devoted to Charleston and South Carolina. Here is a specimen: "Charleston, like Boston—for a good comparison there is nothing like the antipodes—has an English look about it. The old city has not fallen into the parallelogram formation as the cities of the United States in general. The inhabitants still cast many a fond look towards the old country, and contrast the present misrule with the time when the laws of England were the laws of South Carolina." There is in this book a true account of the Ku Klux Klan. There is also an honest picture of the condition of the negroes. After giving a picture of the state of things in South Carolina, the writer adds these weighty words: "I allude at this length to political affairs in South Carolina, because it is very obvious that a system of government resting almost wholly on the votes of the negroes is not a desirable state of affairs, as regards either the State itself or the general interests of the Union. It destroys confidence in the integrity and stability of the administration, prevents the investment of money, and renders impossible that hearty coöperation of the public authorities with the substantial people of the State, which is so essential to the interests of all classes of the community." Yet Mr. Somers speaks hopefully of the future, and we really believe with good reason. Out of all this evil, a merciful Providence, we trust, will

educe good. Material interests are evidently and largely prosperous in many portions of the South, and (as we can assert from personal knowledge) of oppressed and misgoverned South Carolina. More corn and cotton is produced, more horses, mules, and oxen, owned and worked, and more money handled by farmers, merchants, and lawyers, etc., than at any time since the war. We have been credibly informed that several hundred thousand dollars are on deposit by our farmers in the savings banks in this city. We have a fertile soil and a healthful and pleasant climate. The negro is neither an angel, nor a devil, but a man. A simple, docile, affectionate race, there always were, generally speaking, the most kindly relations between them and the white race, and there will be again, through the blessed influences of the gospel, as soon as the rule of thieves can be brought to its termination. We want only a few thousands of white immigrants from the North and from Europe, honest and industrious citizens, to give to intelligence and character its proper influence in the direction of our State affairs, and then South Carolina will be herself again—herself, but purified by the fires of the furnace she has been passing through. So much for this little State, for whom this friendly foreigner has kind words to speak.

Several good chapters are also devoted to the State of Georgia. Mr. Somers was pleased with Augusta and Savannah, and sets the Broadway of Augusta before that of its New York namesake. "The town," he says, "has a 'Broadway,' before which the imperial street of New York must, all circumstances considered, hide its diminished head." He was also pleased with Macon, especially its trade and capabilities; but he goes into raptures (English raptures) over Columbia, S. C., the town which Gen. Sherman burnt after it had been surrendered to him.

The subject of cotton is a principal one in the regards of this shrewd advocate of English immigration, and there is no end to what he has to say of the planting, picking, ginning, traffic, manufacture, and of the cotton interest generally. He also seems to be something of an authority in relation to agriculture and manufactures, considered in themselves and in their pecuni-

ary aspects, as well as in the large, scientific, and politico-economic view of these matters.

Much attention is paid to the geographical and geological features of the country everywhere. The gold and copper veins of upper Georgia come in for a share of notice. Much, and what is commonly favorable, mention is made of the Southern railway system and railway interest. He complains however of the obstruction at Atlanta. The out-look for this town he thinks good. The Granite Mountain near Atlanta is carefully and geologically described as one of the striking curiosities of the State. The hammer of the scientific explorer also falls upon the crags of Lookout Mountain, and the whole region round about and including Chattanooga is made the subject of an interesting chapter. Mr. Somers was much charmed with portions of the rural landscape in Tennessee, and here indulges in some romantic word-painting. He did not penetrate into the incomparable blue-grass country of Kentucky, going only so far as Louisville; and then dashing off to Cincinnati, whence he returned to Washington. In the meanwhile, though, he had seen a great deal of the States of Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, of which he gives his readers forcible and graphic descriptions. The account Mr. Somers sets down of New Orleans, and the Father of Waters, is perhaps the most lively and readable part of the book. Every opportunity was constantly sought and enjoyed of obtaining his information, if not at the fountain-head, yet at the best sources available. Several "carpet-bag" governors are photographed, and leniently, but in some instances not very favorably, dealt with. Mr. Somers heard Mr. Jefferson Davis speak at the State Fair near Richmond, and confirms the other reports of his nervous eloquence. He also speaks of Mr. Davis's extraordinary popularity among the blacks. The Senate at Richmond reminded him a little of the House of Lords; and the Lieutenant-Governor, and Mr. Speaker Hauger, each comes in for a certain amount of delicate praise. We regard the work now under review as perhaps the very best work of any recent foreigner on the Southern States.

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JULY, MDCCCLXXIII.

ARTICLE I.

AN EXAMINATION OF CERTAIN RECENT
ASSAULTS ON PHYSICAL SCIENCE.

Theological Education. A Memoir for the consideration of the General Assembly of 1866, in Memphis. *Central Presbyterian*, Oct. 3, 10, 17, 24, and 31, 1866.

Memorial from the Rev. Robert L. Dabney, D. D., on Theological Education. Presented to the General Assembly at Mobile, May 21st, 1869.

Syllabus and Notes of the Course of Systematic and Polemic Theology taught in Union Theological Seminary, Virginia. By R. L. DABNEY, D. D. Published by the Students. Richmond: Shepperson & Graves, Printers. 1871.

A. Caution against Anti-Christian Science. A Sermon on Colossians ii. 8. Preached in the Synod of Virginia, October 20, 1871, by ROBERT L. DABNEY, D. D. This sermon is printed by request of Lieutenant-Governor John L. Marye, Major T. J. Kirkpatrick, George D. Gray, J. N. Gordon, F. Johnson, and others, elders of the Presbyterian Church. Richmond: James E. Goode, Printer. 1871.

The "Memoir" on Theological Education published in the *Central Presbyterian* as intended for the consideration of the Memphis General Assembly, was not brought to the notice of that body; but in a somewhat modified form was presented as a "Memorial" to the General Assembly which met at Mobile in

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1869. It was respectfully received by the Assembly, but was not read. On the recommendation of the Committee on Theological Seminaries, it was referred to the Faculties and Directors of the Columbia and Union Theological Seminaries, with the request that they report the results of their deliberations to the Assembly of 1870. The Columbia Faculty prepared and submitted a report; but nothing was ever brought before the Assembly on the subject, until at last, in 1872, a committee to which it had been intrusted was at its own request discharged. The titles of the other two publications named sufficiently indicate their general nature.

In these Memorials, Lectures, and Sermon, their author, the Rev. Dr. Dabney, Professor of Theology in Union Theological Seminary, has been keeping up for a number of years an unremitting warfare against Physical Science. In the weekly journal, in a memorial presented to our highest ecclesiastical court, in lectures to those who are to be ministers in our Church, in the stately volume now published which contains the substance of these lectures, in a sermon preached before the large and influential Synod of Virginia, a sermon which at the request of leading gentlemen in that Synod has been sent forth in printed form to thousands who did not hear it delivered with the living voice—in all these and in other ways he has been sounding forth the alarm, calling upon the Church, as far as his voice and pen can reach, to rise in arms against Physical Science as the mortal enemy of all the Christian holds dear, and to take no rest until this infidel and atheistic foe has been utterly destroyed. With the exception of a notice of the sermon published in the *Central Presbyterian*, not a word has been publicly uttered in opposition to his views during all these years; and therefore it would not be strange if they should come to be regarded by multitudes as the doctrines of our Church and of Christianity universally, seeing they are proclaimed with such persistent earnestness, by one occupying so high an official position in the Church, and almost without being called in question. Looking upon Physical Science, as Dr. Dabney does, as “vain, deceitful philosophy,” by which “incautious souls are in danger of being

despoiled of their redemption," he deserves commendation for his zeal in seizing every opportunity and every channel of access to the minds of men to warn them of their danger, and thus to endeavor to save them from being despoiled of eternal life by Physical Science. Whether this commendation should be confined to his zeal, and whether it may not be a zeal without knowledge, can better be determined after a careful examination of his teachings.

Believing that Dr. Dabney's views respecting Physical Science, as set forth in these writings, are not only not true, but also dangerous, because certain to lead to the rejection of the Sacred Scriptures so far as he is here regarded as their true interpreter, the writer feels impelled to utter his dissent, and to attempt to show that true Christianity does not allow us to accept such championship. To one who believes firmly in every word of the Bible as inspired by the Holy Ghost, as the writer does with all his heart, its truth is too precious to allow him to be indifferent to a professed defence of this truth which is based upon principles which must inevitably lead to its rejection. It is with the sincerest reluctance that an examination of these principles is now entered on, seeing the result must be to prove them wholly erroneous and fraught with peril to all who adopt them and logically follow them to their necessary results. It would be vastly more gratifying to coöperate with Dr. Dabney in defending the truth against assaults from without; but external assaults against our impregnable citadel are harmless in comparison with these efforts on the part of those within, which, if it were possible for them to be successful, would undermine its walls and tear up its foundations, reducing the fair and hitherto unshaken structure to a mass of shapeless ruins. Hence there seems to be no course left but for the truth's sake to show the unsoundness of Dr. Dabney's opinions, however much the writer would prefer to stand by his side making common cause with him against error wherever found.

Dr. Dabney's attacks on Physical Science in the different publications named, are not made in the same order; hence in the present examination of their real strength, they will be taken

up without special reference to the order followed in any one of them.

In the Sermon, before reaching the main subject, Dr. Dabney refers to the sad consequences of the fall of man; and with the intention of preventing our belief in Physical Science, insists that fallen minds can never reach results free from uncertainty and error, except in the "exact sciences of magnitudes." He says:

"Every Christian should be familiar with the fact that the human mind, as well as heart, has been impaired by the fall. Men, 'so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body.' From the nature of the case, the misguided intellect is unconscious of its own vice; for consciousness of it would expel it. Its nature is to cause him who is deceived to think that error is truth, and its power is in masking itself under that honest guise. Why, then, need we wonder that every age must needs have its vain and deceitful philosophy, and 'oppositions of science, falsely so-called?' And how can the Christian expect that uninspired science will ever be purged of uncertainty and error, by any *organon* of investigation invented by man? Even if the *organon* were absolute, pure truth, its application by fallen minds must always insure in the results more or less of error, except in those exact sciences of magnitudes, where the definiteness of the predications and fewness of the premises leave no room for serious mistake." Sermon, p. 1.

He then illustrates these principles by referring to the admitted fallibility of Church courts, and justly extols the Prophet and Teacher, Christ, as an infallible guide.

In all that he says on this point, there is some truth; as, indeed, there is always some truth in every dangerous error. But before settling down in despair of ever being able to gain uninspired knowledge, before yielding to the agony of universal doubt with regard to everything except mathematical truth, it becomes us to inquire whether these are true principles, or errors rendered dangerous to the unsuspecting by the intermixture of truth which they contain.

Perhaps the easiest way to see that Dr. Dabney misapplies the doctrine of the fall is to observe that if we embrace the scepticism which he recommends as to the results of the applica-

tion of our God-given reason to the works of God's hands, we must be equally sceptical as to God's word. The Sacred Scriptures, we assert and believe, are absolutely true in every part; but are not the facts presented to us in God's works, which "uninspired" science investigates, equally true? When it is admitted that the facts in themselves are absolutely true, but that we are so liable to misunderstand their real meaning that we cannot trust our conclusions, we ask wherein we are differently situated with reference to the Holy Scriptures. Our minds are equally fallen when we inquire into the meaning of statements in the Scriptures, and when we inquire into the meaning of facts in nature—that is, in God's material universe; and if we must regard ourselves as incapable of arriving at a knowledge of the truth, if we must be sceptics in the one case, we must be in the other also. It is to be observed that Theology is as much a human science as Geology or any other branch of Natural Science. The facts which form the basis of the science of Theology are found in God's word; those which form the basis of the science of Geology are found in his works; but the *science* in both cases is the work of the human mind. The Bible was indeed given specifically for the instruction of man, while the material universe was not so directly created for this purpose; and the lessons taught in the Bible are of infinitely higher value than those which we learn from nature; but still the science of Theology as a science is equally *human* and *uninspired* with the science of Geology—the facts in both cases are divine, the sciences based upon them human. Unless, therefore, we are ready to give up the certainty of our knowledge of the great central truths of Theology, we must reject the suggestion that we can never become certain of anything in Geology, or other branches of Natural Science. With such grounds for thinking that Dr. Dabney misapplies the doctrine of the fall, it is not necessary to show that it is clearly implied in a large part of the Bible's teachings that we are capable of gaining a knowledge of the truth by the use of our reason.

It is singular that Dr. Dabney should have fallen into this error, since he has so properly condemned it in his Lectures.

Speaking of Natural Theology, which is the science that treats of the nature and attributes of God as revealed in the same works which all Natural Science investigates, Dr. Dabney says: "Some old divines were wont to deny that there was any science of Natural Theology, and to say that without revelation man would not naturally learn its first truth. . . . These divines seem to fear, lest, by granting a Natural Theology, they should grant too much to natural reason; a fear ungrounded and extreme. They are in danger of a worse consequence: reducing man's capacity for receiving divine verities so low that the rational sceptic will be able to turn upon them, and say: 'Then by so inept a creature, the guarantees of a true revelation cannot be certainly apprehended.' . . . Some profess to disbelieve axioms, as Hume that of causation; but this is far from proving man incapable of a natural science of induction." Lectures on Theology, p. 6.

Dr. Dabney here so satisfactorily disproves the doctrine of his Sermon that we might perhaps safely leave this point without further remark. But as he intimates in the second paragraph that we have "infallible guidance" in the one case which we lack in the other, this intimation must be briefly noticed. The question will not be discussed whether the heathen are really "without excuse" for having failed rightly to apply capacities which they do not possess, or whether "the invisible things of God from the creation of the world" can be "clearly seen" by unregenerate men without the guidance of the Holy Ghost. But granting that our reason could not form one correct judgment on any subject without divine guidance, would Dr. Dabney maintain that God denies this guidance to his children when they devoutly seek it in the investigation of his works? Do they become orphans, do they forfeit their right to their Father's guidance, when they seek to know more fully how the heavens declare the glory of God, how the firmament sheweth his handywork? when they eagerly listen as day unto day uttereth speech, and strive to gain a fuller measure of the knowledge which night unto night showeth, though there is no speech nor language, and though they utter no audible voice? Surely he would not take

this ground. Let us not fear to "speak to the earth," for "it shall teach us;" even "the fishes of the sea shall declare" the truth to us. If indeed the "Lord rejoices in his works," and if he would have us "sing praise to him as long as we live," contemplating his glory as reflected in them, he will not refuse us his fatherly hand as we walk forth seeking to drink in more and more of the wisdom in which he has made them all, or to see more and more clearly the value of the riches of which his earth is full.

Thus it appears that there is no reason why we should be blighted by the cheerless scepticism which Dr. Dabney inculcates; on the contrary, we can with certainty know something, and as loving children we should labor to know much, of the glorious workmanship of our heavenly Father, of the wonderful creation which he has brought into existence through his Son.

After his attempt to show that we can know nothing with certainty except mathematics and the Christian religion, Dr. Dabney endeavors to excite hostility against Physical Science by showing the wicked and dangerous character of something else which has nothing whatever in common with Physical Science. He very correctly describes the vain and deceitful philosophy against which the Apostle Paul warns the Colossians, as "a shadowy philosophic theory—a mixture of Oriental, Rabbinical, and Greek mysticism, which peopled heaven with a visionary hierarchy of semi-divine beings, referred the Messiah to their class, and taught men to expect salvation from their intercession, combined with Jewish asceticisms and will-worship." He says further, that "the Apostle solemnly reminded them that this philosophy was vain and deceitful; and, moreover, that the price of preferring it to the Christian system was the loss of the soul." All that he says on this point is very true: the vain philosophy condemned had no observed facts for its basis, and even its assumptions were not connected together by principles according to which right reason acts; therefore it should be rejected by all who love the truth. And as it was not only not true, but was also deadly in its effects upon all who embraced it, inasmuch as it taught them to look for salvation elsewhere

than to the only Saviour of mankind, the warnings against it could not be too earnest.

But how does Dr. Dabney apply all this to the subject of his discourse? In a most remarkable way—by nicknaming physical science “vain, deceitful philosophy.” Although the false and deadly philosophy which is spoken of by St. Paul confessedly had no observed facts for its foundation, while physical science is based exclusively upon facts which any one may verify for himself; and although in the former case the fantastic guesses were woven into a fanciful and visionary scheme in defiance of reason, while physical science arranges its facts and deduces inferences from them in accordance with intuitive principles which are believed by all—yet Dr. Dabney warns us against physical science because the philosophy which was seeking to spoil the Colossians was vain and deceitful! It is as if one should prove to us the deceitful and deadly character of the Christian religion by depicting to us the abominable rites of some ancient Pagan religion, or the absurdities and atrocities of false religions which still enslave myriads of our race in the dark places in the earth. It is even worse; for there is no religion so utterly false that it does not contain some truths taught by Christianity; but physical science has not one single point in common with that with which Dr. Dabney classes it. He could not possibly have made a greater mistake than he has done in regarding as similar two things which are so utterly unlike.

Dr. Dabney concludes his introduction, which is devoted to exciting prejudice against physical science, as follows:

“The prevalent vain, deceitful philosophy of our day is not mystical, but physical and sensuous. It affects what it calls ‘positivism.’ It even makes the impossible attempt to give the mind’s philosophy a sensualistic explanation. Its chief study is to ascertain the laws of material nature and of animal life. It refers everything to their power and dominion; and from them pretends to contradict the Scriptural account of the origin of the earth and man. Does it profess not to interfere with the region of spiritual truth, because concerned about matter? We find, on the contrary, that physical science always has some tendency to become anti-theological. This tendency is to

be accounted for by two facts: One is, that man is a depraved creature, whose natural disposition is enmity against God. Hence this leaning away from him, in many worldly minds, perhaps semi-conscious, which does 'not like to retain God in its knowledge.' The other explanation is, that these physical sciences continually tend to exalt naturalism—their pride of success in tracing natural causes, tempts them to refer everything to them, and thus to substitute them for a spiritual, personal God. Again, then, is it time for the watchman on the walls of Zion to utter the Apostle's 'beware.' Again are incautious souls in danger of being despoiled of their redemption by 'vain, deceitful philosophy.'" Sermon, p. 2.

In this paragraph it is correctly stated that the chief study of natural science is "to ascertain the laws of material nature and animal life." Beyond this there is hardly an accurate statement in it. It is true, indeed, that the students of this science do use their senses to ascertain facts; they do not invent them, or guess at them, as we shall hereafter see is Dr. Dabney's habit when he is acting the part of a natural philosopher. If it is meant by "sensuous" and "sensualistic" that the senses are used in observation, then no objection can be made. But if, as many readers would understand them, these words are intended to convey a meaning involving the condemnation of physical science, nothing could be more inexact. Further, his statement that it "makes the impossible attempt to give the mind's philosophy a sensualistic explanation," is equally without foundation. It is doubtless true that students of physical science have made the attempt here attributed to them; just as leading Presbyterian theologians, personally known to Dr. Dabney, have taught that "every obstacle to salvation, arising from the character and government of God, is actually removed, and was intended to be removed, that thus every one of Adam's race might be saved," and that "the Father covenants to give to the Son, 'as a reward for the travail of his soul,' a *part* of those for whom he dies." But as this is not the doctrine of Presbyterians, so physical science does not undertake to "give the mind's philosophy a sensualistic explanation," even though some scientific men may have attempted this impossibility. On the contrary, the leading

representatives of natural science maintain that the connexion between mind and matter lies wholly beyond the limits of that science; that it does not now know, and it can never hereafter know, anything concerning this subject. The doctrine of scientific men was well stated last August by Professor Du Bois-Reymond, a leading professor in the University of Berlin, in a discourse before the German Association of Men of Science assembled at Leipzig. No one who knows this eminent man of science will suspect him of an inclination to claim too little for Natural Science, or anything at all for Revelation. He says: "That it is utterly impossible, and must ever remain so, to understand the higher intellectual processes from the movements of the brain-atoms, supposing these to have become known, need not be further shown. Yet, as already observed, it is not at all necessary to refer to the higher forms of mental activity in order to give greater weight to our arguments. . . . In this we have the measure of our real capacity, or rather of our weakness. Thus our knowledge of nature is inclosed between these two boundaries, which are eternally imposed upon it: on the one side by the inability to comprehend matter and force, and on the other to refer mental processes to material conditions. Within these limits the student of nature is lord and master; he analyses and he reconstructs, and no one knows the boundaries of his knowledge and his power; beyond these limits he goes not now, nor can he ever go." *Ueber die Grenzen des Naturerkennens. Zweite Auflage, pp. 27-29.* Thus modestly and truthfully is the real position of science set forth.

It cannot fail to be the cause of amazement as well as of deep regret, that Dr. Dabney should maintain the position which is to be next noticed. Having taught that we can never arrive at any certain knowledge of nature, that physical science is vain and deceitful philosophy ready to despoil incautious souls of their redemption, he caps the climax by asserting that "physical science always has some tendency to become anti-theological" (Sermon, p. 2); that the "tendencies of geologists" are "atheistic" (Lectures, p. 178); that the "spirit of these sciences is essentially infidel and rationalistic; they are arrayed, in all

their phases, on the side of scepticism" (Memoir in *Central Presbyterian*, October 31, 1866); "this is, therefore," he says, "the *eternity of Naturalism—it is Atheism*. And such is the perpetual *animus* of material science, especially in our day" (Lectures, p. 179). If he had confined himself to saying that "the tendency of much of so-called modern science is sceptical," (Sermon, p. 5,) he might easily have substantiated this assertion. But from the passages quoted, it is seen that he maintains no such partial proposition; he does not limit himself to the assertion that "much of *so-called*" but not real "modern science is sceptical," but boldly proclaims that "the *spirit* of these sciences is *essentially* infidel and rationalistic;" that "they are arrayed, *in all their phases*, on the side of scepticism;" that "their *perpetual animus*" is towards "*atheism*." What assertions could be made more damaging to belief in the Scriptures which are the source of theology, and in the existence of God himself? What frightful consequences must necessarily flow from the general reception of Dr. Dabney's teachings on this subject! That a firm believer in the Bible could say that the systematic study of God's works always tends to make us disbelieve his word, and even his existence, would seem incredible but for the sad evidence here presented. In such an opinion of God's works may perhaps be found an explanation of the contemptuous scorn of the epithets which Dr. Dabney employs in speaking of the "musty" and "rotten" fossils. Sermon, pp. 7 and 19. Should we not instead listen to the words, "Remember that thou magnify his work which men behold;" and see in these "musty" "rotten" fossils rather the "medals of creation," and from them and all the other wonderful things which God has made, reverently and humbly learn his glory and power?

Surely the statement of Dr. Dabney's teaching on this point carries with it its own refutation, so as to render further arguments to refute it unnecessary. It has often before been asserted that "ignorance is the mother of devotion," but this has been repelled as a slanderous attack upon our faith made by the unbeliever; it could not have been anticipated that it would receive such support from an enlightened teacher of our holy and true religion.

The "two facts" by which Dr. Dabney would account for the supposed evil tendency of physical science—depravity and pride—are of universal application to all men, whatever their pursuits. Those who study natural science, equally with metaphysicians, theologians, lawyers, physicians, farmers, etc., are *men*; and men unrenewed by the Spirit of God have a "natural disposition which is enmity against God." So "pride" is among the "evil thoughts which proceed out of the heart of men." And since students of physical science are men, whatever may be truly said of the human race may be said of them. But what right has Dr. Dabney to single out this class and represent it as made up of sinners above all other men? It would be just as fair and as true to assert the anti-Christian tendency of a careful study of the Bible, of theology, and of the evidences of Christianity, and to attempt to prove the assertion by quoting the example of Renan, De Wette, Ewald, Theodore Parker, Strauss, Baur, and a host of others like them, as it is to assert the anti-theological and atheistic tendency of the study of physical science because infidel sentiments may be found in the writings of some diligent students of nature—it would be no more fair or true, and no less. It is very strange that it should have escaped the notice of Dr. Dabney that the dangerous tendency is not at all in the study, but wholly in the student.

Having shown, as he supposes, that physical science never can reach undoubted truth and that its study in various ways endangers the soul's salvation, Dr. Dabney proceeds in his Sermon to enumerate some of the "continual encroachments" which "physicists" are "making upon the Scripture teachings." He says:

"I perceive this in the continual encroachments which they make upon the Scripture teachings. Many of you, my brethren, can remember the time when this modern impulse did not seek to push us any farther from the old and current understanding of the Bible cosmogony, than to assert the existence of a Pre-Adamite earth, with its own distinct *fauna* and *flora*, now all entombed in the fossiliferous *strata* of rocks. * * *

"But now, we are currently required by Physicists to admit, that the six days' work of God was not done in six days, but in six vast tracts of time.

“That the deluge did not cover ‘all the high hills which were under the whole heaven,’ but only a portion of central Asia.

“That man has been living upon the globe, in its present dispensation, for more than twenty thousand years, to say the least, as appears by some fossil remains of him and his handiwork; and that the existence of the species is not limited to the five thousand nine hundred years assigned it by the Mosaic Chronology.

“That the ‘nations were not divided in the earth after the flood by the families of the sons of Noah;’ and that God did not ‘make of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth;’ but that anatomy and ethnology show there are several distinct species having separate origins.

“That God did not create a finished world of sea and land, but only a fire-mist, or incandescent, rotating, nebulous mass, which condensed itself into a world.

“And last, that man is a development from the lowest type of animal life.” Sermon, pp. 3, 4.

Before examining in detail the points embraced in this enumeration, it may be remarked that the Synod of Virginia, before which the Sermon was delivered, must have contained many patriarchs of almost antediluvian years, since their memories reached back to the time when only one of the alleged “encroachments” had been made. Bishop Stillingfleet, in the seventeenth century, maintained the opinion that the flood had not “been over the whole globe of the earth;” more than sixty years ago both the development hypothesis and the nebular hypothesis had their vigorous supporters; and for ages the antiquity of man has been believed by some persons to be greater than the commonly received Mosaic Chronology would allow. Hence, Dr. Dabney either had many most venerable patriarchs among his hearers, or else he was attributing to them no small amount of ignorance as to the extent of this “modern impulse,” in a way which was not very flattering to their intelligence.

It is not a little surprising that Dr. Dabney, supposing him to have some acquaintance with physical science, should have erred so signally in this formal statement of what he regards as the teachings of science. He is right as to the first point—geology does teach, as proved beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt, that the earth was in existence for at least more than a week

before Adam ; and this pre-Adamite time may be subdivided into six, or sixty, or any other number of tracts, without affecting the geological truth. But when it is divided into six parts, it is not geology that makes the division, but interpreters of the Bible, who think (erroneously, in our opinion) that the narrative in the first chapter of Genesis refers to certain periods of geological history. But science does not "require us to admit" one other proposition here presented. We do not say that certain scientific men have not made the statements in question ; they have done so, just as certain Christian theologians have taught that bread is every day changed into the real body of Christ, that Jesus Christ is not God, that God will not punish sinners, that the Bible is not inspired, etc. But what would be thought of one who would caution us against believing in the Christian religion, and who would enforce the caution by the statement that "we are currently required by Christian theologians to admit" these doctrines? We are now concerned only with Dr. Dabney's similar statement as to the teachings of science—not even turning aside to inquire as to the amount of possible truth in each or any of the propositions.

The question as to the extent of the deluge is one of Biblical interpretation, and does not belong to any department of natural science. It is true that, if the Bible narrative leaves it undecided, natural science may be able to help us to determine which interpretation is the more probable ; and we may properly ask its help, just as we may ask the help of geography in deciding the situation of Melita, if it is not clearly pointed out in the narrative of Paul's shipwreck on the coast of that island.

How long man has been living upon the globe, science has not yet succeeded in determining. This question has been under discussion amongst scientific men for a long time ; and within the last twenty or thirty years many facts have been observed which may aid in answering it ; but no conclusion has yet been reached which commands the assent of the scientific world, and which can therefore be regarded as taught by science.

Further, science does not teach the plural origin of the human family. It is true that many eminent men of science do main-

tain that there are several distinct human species ; but there are many others, of at least equal eminence and authority, who maintain the unity of the human species on purely scientific grounds. Not to refer to others, a recent writer, whose rank as a scientific man is shown by his position as President of the French Academy of Science, M. de Quatrefages, has written an admirable work to prove this unity on these grounds. (*Unité de l'Espèce Humaine*, 1861.) But it is hardly worth while to proceed with the proof that the plurality of origin is not taught by science when Dr. Dabney tells us in almost the next paragraph that science teaches that not only all men, but all animals of whatever grade, have a common origin !

That science does not teach the nebular hypothesis, is sufficiently evident from the use of the term "hypothesis." "Hypothesis" is exactly equivalent to "supposition;" and by speaking of Herschel's and Laplace's suggestions as to the possible origin of the universe as a "supposition," scientific men have shown their great care to avoid having these suggestions regarded in any other light. Of course Dr. Dabney knows the meaning of this anglicised Greek word ; and therefore it is surprising that he should represent "physicists as requiring us to admit" what they are careful to call a mere "supposition." He is fully aware that this is the term applied, as he shows by his own use of it in his Lectures and Sermon. Lectures, p. 178, line 33 ; Sermon, p. 10, line 25.

Similar remarks would apply to the last item in Dr. Dabney's enumeration of anti-Christian errors—the development hypothesis. But to prove that "Physicists do not require us to admit" this supposition, it may be enough in this instance to quote the following truthful observations from Dr. Dabney's Lectures : "The attempt to account for them" (namely, "the beginning of *genera*") "by the development theory (Chambers or Darwin), is utterly repudiated by even the better irreligious philosophers ; for if there is anything that Natural History has established, it is that organic life is separated from inorganic forces, mechanical, chemical, electrical, or other, by inexorable bounds ; and that *genera* may begin or end, but never transmute

themselves into other *genera*." Lectures, pp. 17, 18. Surely this is conclusive on this head.

It thus appears that the only "encroachment which physicists make upon Scripture teachings" is in their doctrine that the world was in existence at least ten days or a fortnight before any human being. This they certainly do teach. We say ten or fourteen days, because it makes not the slightest difference, as regards the supposed "encroachment," whether the pre-Adamite earth existed only ten days, or ten thousand million myriads of centuries. The "encroachment" is as great when it is shown that the earth existed six days and five minutes before Adam, as if the longest time were admitted that could enter into the imagination of man. Hence is manifest the irrelevancy of all discussions relating to the length of time during which the pre-Adamite earth existed, after the fortnight or the six days and five minutes have been admitted or proved. Whether the doctrine of geology, that the earth was in existence at least a fortnight before man, is an encroachment upon Scripture teaching, or upon a old and "current [mis-]understanding of the Bible, will not be discussed here. The doctrine itself is very easily proved; and it is also very easily proved that it is vastly more reasonable to believe both the Bible and geology to be true than to disbelieve either. While not disposed usually to rely upon mere authority in scientific matters, and, as perhaps need hardly be said, not inclined ordinarily to accept Dr. Dabney as the highest geological authority, yet in this case it may be best to prove the geological heresy in question by accepting his teachings respecting it. In Lecture II, on the "Existence of God," he asks, "Can the present universe be the result of an infinite series of organisms?" He shows that "metaphysical answers" to the error of those who would reply affirmatively to this question are "invalid;" and then proceeds to give "the true answers to the atheistic hypothesis." The fifth "true answer" is: "(5.) Science exalts experience above hypothesis even more than testimony. Now, the whole state of the world bears the appearance of *recency*. The recent discovery of new continents, the great progress of new arts since the historic era began, and the partial

population of the earth by man, all belie the eternity of the human race. BUT STRONGER STILL, GEOLOGY PROVES THE CREATION, IN TIME, OF RACE AFTER RACE OF ANIMALS, AND THE COMPARATIVELY RECENT ORIGIN OF MAN, BY HER FOSSIL RECORDS." Lectures, p. 17. Surely after reading this decisive testimony, which we have sought to make duly prominent by capitals, no one who regards Dr. Dabney as a safe teacher can hesitate to accept the only doctrine which is really taught by science among the "encroachments" enumerated by him. But is Saul also among the prophets? is Dr. Dabney also among the geologists? So it would appear. The difficulty does remain, it must be admitted, which it is not for us to attempt to remove, of explaining how he can, consistently with fairness and logic, on page 178 of his Lectures maintain that the "tendencies of geologists" are "atheistic," and on page 17 prove the existence of God by the teachings of these same atheistic geologists.

We have stated that the hypothesis of Herschel and Laplace, that the matter of the universe once existed in a nebulous condition, is not taught by science as an established truth, but is still held only as an hypothesis; and perhaps it can never be either completely proved or disproved. But suppose we should believe it to be true, how would this belief "encroach upon Scripture teachings?" As soon as the earth is shown to be older than Adam by ten days, and this is perceived to be not contradictory of Scripture teachings, it becomes a matter of no consequence as regards the interpretation of the Bible how much more than ten days the time may have been. Nor does it concern us as students of God's holy word *how* he created the world—whether he "created a finished world of sea and land," (whatever that may mean,) or nebulous matter which he endowed with properties such that it would pass through successive changes until it reached the condition in which we now see it. Is God less truly the Creator of the magnificent oak which to-day adorns the forest because he did not by a word bring it into its present condition, but endowed the tiny acorn with the wonderful properties that caused it to become the stately tree which

we behold? And is he less truly the Creator of this oak than of the one that produced the acorn from which it sprang? And are we dishonoring God or trying to exclude him from our thoughts, are we practical atheists, when we trace with admiring awe the laws by which he produces the development of the embryo into the full-grown organism? If not, how are we atheists, or how are we dishonoring God, if we suppose he may have brought the universe into its present state by a gradual process instead of by an instantaneous act? If it be replied that we thereby deny the truth of his word, the answer is: His word gives us no information on the subject; it informs us that he created the world, but it does not tell us *how* he created it. Until it is proved that his word teaches the method as well as the fact, there is no reason for regarding the nebular hypothesis as dangerous or atheistic, merely because one of those who first suggested it was an unbeliever—"the atheistic astronomer, La Place." Sermon, p. 10.

It is in connexion with this hypothesis that we first have occasion to observe Dr. Dabney on the field as a physical philosopher. He certainly exhibits great boldness, and is ready to break a lance with all comers. But we are apprehensive that he has proved neither his lance nor the joints of his harness. With a single touch of his spear's point, he flatters himself that he has unhorsed this hypothesis, and has made its bloody remains roll lifeless on the turf. He tells us that "Lord Rosse's telescope has dissolved the only shadow of a probability for it, in resolving the larger *nebulæ*." (Lectures, p. 178, and Sermon, p. 10.) This statement will no doubt create great surprise, if not amusement, in the minds of all who know that while Lord Rosse's telescope resolved some *nebulæ*, many others have been brought to view which show no sign of being resolvable. The surprise will be all the greater to those who have really studied the reasons for thinking that the hypothesis may be true; and who therefore know that, although *nebulæ* in the sky may have first suggested the hypothesis to Sir William Herschel, the reasons in its favor would be almost if not quite as strong if every nebula should be seen to consist of completed stars. And although the Lectures

and Sermon are dated 1871, their author does not give any indication of his having heard of the amazing discoveries of Bunsen and Kirchhoff about fifteen years ago, or of the applications of the spectroscope with which they have enriched the world—an instrument by which not only the chemistry of the heavenly bodies can to some extent be ascertained, but by which incandescent gases—nebulous matter—can be distinguished from solids and liquids. Therefore, though Dr. Dabney's demolition of the nebular hypothesis may be satisfactory to those patriarchs who can remember when it did not exist, it will be necessary now to use other arguments. Ancient weapons are of no avail in modern warfare; and the mediæval armor of the most gallant knight is no protection against a conical ball projected from the chasseur or needle-gun.

Closely connected with Dr. Dabney's erroneous statement of the teachings of science, and with the errors into which he is betrayed by his want of acquaintance with physical science, are his groundless assertions respecting the aims and motives of students of science. In his Lectures, he says :

“TENDENCIES OF GEOLOGISTS ATHEISTIC.—Again; why should the Theistic philosopher desire to push back the creative act of God to the remotest possible age, and reduce his agency to the least possible *minimum*, as is continually done in these speculations? What is gained by it? Instead of granting that God created a KOSMOS, a world, they strive continually to show that he created only the rude germs of a world, ascribing as little as possible to God, and as much as possible to *natural law*. *Cui bono*; if you are not *hankering* after Atheism?” Lectures, p. 178.

In his Sermon, he says :

“And I ask, with emphasis, if men are not in fact reaching after *atheism*; if their real design is not to push God clean out of past eternity; why this craving to show his last intervention as Creator so remote? Why are they so eager to shove God back six millions of years from their own time rather than six thousand? Is it that ‘they do not like to retain God in their knowledge?’ It is not for me to make that charge. But have I not demonstrated that the validity of their scientific logic, in reality, gains nothing by this *regressus*?” Sermon, pp. 16, 17.

It is to be earnestly hoped that no one who is inquiring as to the truth of Christianity will regard these as the means by which that truth is maintained. The world must always suspect the justness of a cause when its advocates resort to virulent abuse of their opponents by attributing to them unworthy motives. Not by such weapons can our holy religion be defended. Every student of science who is worthy of the name the world over, will reject with indignation the imputation here made of such designs; and no more fatal stab could be given to Christianity, wherever Dr. Dabney is regarded as its faithful representative. The geologist is guilty of no such crime against the sovereign majesty of truth as is here laid to his charge. He examines the materials of which the accessible part of the globe is composed, he studies their arrangement, he investigates the laws by which God brings about such arrangement of such materials; and then he accepts as true the conclusions to which he is in this way led. He does not undertake to determine beforehand what the conclusion shall be, and then ransack nature for seeming facts to defend his opinion; he does not dictate to God what his works shall teach; but asking only what is true and indifferent to all else, he goes forward cautiously, yet fearlessly, and accepts as true whatever the phenomena of nature combined according to the God-given laws of his mind may require. The true student of nature does just what is done by every true student of the Bible who believes, as he should do, in the plenary inspiration and consequent truth of that holy volume. Such a one does not go to the sacred word for proofs of his preconceived opinions; he seeks cautiously, yet fearlessly, to know what is taught, and that he accepts with unquestioning faith. Just so far as any other method is adopted in either case, just so far is there manifest dishonesty. That there are those who profess to be students of nature who are merely narrow-minded partisans, indifferent to truth and eager only to support what they wish to be true, may well be believed in view of the number of those who profess to be students of Scripture who are of similar character. But Dr. Dabney does not limit his charges to these. He is indeed charitable enough to say that he does "not charge

infidelity upon all physicists." Sermon, p. 5. But of course in his opinion it is only by being illogical that they can be believers; for he insists in his "Memoir" on "Theological Education," as we have seen, that the "spirit of these sciences is essentially infidel and rationalistic; they are arrayed, in all their phases, on the side of scepticism." Hence, nothing but the want of mental capacity can preserve one imbued with their spirit, as every true student of nature is, from being an infidel and rationalist.

This charitable admission that all physicists are not infidels, does not extend to all who profess that they are not; for Dr. Dabney tells us that many who really "disclaim inspiration" are base enough to "profess a religion which they do not believe." He tells us not merely that many students of science are infidels, as might be expected if his assertions respecting its spirit and tendency are correct, but that many of them are hypocrites as well. He says:

"We have the explicit testimony of an eye-witness in the scientific association of the year (held at Indianapolis), that the great majority of the members from the Northern States openly or tacitly disclaimed inspiration; and this, while many of them are pew-holders, elders—yea, even ministers—in Christian churches. When asked why they continued to profess a religion which they did not believe, some answered that the exposure and discussion attending a recantation would be inconvenient; some, that it would be painful to their friends; some, that Christianity was a good thing for their sons and daughters, because of its moral restraints." Sermon, p. 6.

Does Dr. Dabney think he has sufficient evidence to sustain charges so grave? Surely his evidence ought to be very decisive before he permits himself to say from the pulpit and to publish to the world that many "pewholders, elders, even ministers, in Christian churches" are living and acting a lie. If indeed he has the "explicit testimony" of which he speaks, he ought fearlessly to declare what he knows and to prove it to the world, that the mask may be torn from the hypocrites whom he describes, and that all true men may be on their guard against them. But if he has been betrayed by warmth of zeal into an unconsidered

assertion, he surely will lose no time in retracting it. As he states the evidence, it certainly does not seem sufficient to convict the culprits arraigned. The "eye-witness," it would seem, must have inquired of each of the members of the American Association for the Advancement of Science which met at Indianapolis as to his belief in our religion, and must have received as a reply from many of the ministers of that religion and elders in Christian churches that they did not believe it; whereupon the "eye-witness," naturally enough amazed, must have inquired as to the cause of this hypocrisy, and then the different causes were assigned which Dr. Dabney mentions in his Sermon. Without this examination or a similar one, the statement could not be justified. Now, the probability that the "eye-witness" pursued no such course, and that the hypocrites in question would not so readily proclaim their baseness, is so strong, that we may be pardoned for failing to give full credence to testimony so indirectly reaching us. Let it be hoped for the sake of all concerned that this charge will be either substantiated or speedily withdrawn.

From the importance attached by Dr. Dabney to the alleged attempt to push "back the creative act of God to the remotest possible age," to "shove God back six millions of years" or more, it might be supposed that the firmness of our belief in God as Creator varies inversely as the length of time which has elapsed since he began to exercise his creative power. Otherwise it is very difficult to understand on what ground he objects to the student of science going back as far as facts or even probabilities may lead him. As regards any supposed contradiction of Scripture, the contradiction is as complete when we admit with Dr. Dabney "the comparatively recent origin of man" (Lectures, p. 17) as when we suppose that he originated the matter of the universe more millions of years ago than human arithmetic can numerate. Therefore it is hard to see why he lays so much stress on this point, when he himself teaches the geological doctrine at least far enough to involve the only supposable contradiction; unless indeed, as before suggested, it is because the law of this belief is like the law of attraction of gravitation, which diminishes as distance increases. But is it

true that we to-day believe less firmly in a Creator than we did yesterday, or than the men of last century, or the men of two thousand years ago, or of the days of Methuselah? And if a thousand million centuries hence, we shall be permitted to examine some part of God's creation now in existence where changes are in progress which are leaving indications of the time they occupy, and as the result of this examination we shall say that here is evidence of the lapse of some millions of years, must we expect some future Dr. Dabney to attribute to us "insane pride of mind" (Lectures, p. 178,) "rationalism," "infidelity," "atheism"? Will the evidence of creative power and wisdom be then less clear than it is now, or than it was when first the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy? Hence, apart from the fact before stated, that true students of science do not desire to "shove God back," but desire simply to know the truth, it is reasonable to suppose that they are endowed with at least sufficient intellect, however dishonest, to see that, if they wish to promote atheism, it cannot be done by any amount of "pushing" or "shoving" in the manner and in the direction attributed to them by Dr. Dabney in his Sermon and his Lectures.

We have already alluded to Dr. Dabney's use of the terms "sensuous" and "sensualistic" in connexion with physical science in a way fitted to excite groundless prejudice against it in the minds of those who are likely to be reminded of "earthly, sensual, devilish," on hearing the words, and who do not know there may be a sense assigned to them which would convey a very different idea. He may have intended no injustice in employing the terms in question. But he has been more unfortunate in using the terms "naturalist," "naturalistic," and "naturalism." On pages 12, 15, and 16, of the Sermon, and pages 176 and 177 of the Lectures, he properly applies the first two of these terms to the investigation of facts and the drawing of inferences from them in accordance with the intuitive belief in the law of uniformity; but on pages 18 and 19 of the Sermon, and page 179 of the Lectures, he uses them all in a way which conveys a totally different meaning. He says:

“The best antidote, my hearers, for this naturalistic unbelief is to remember your own stake in the truth of redemption; and the best remedy for the soul infected is conviction of sin. ‘Beware lest any man despoil you through a vain, deceitful philosophy.’ Of what will they despoil you? Of a divine redemption and a Saviour in whom dwell the divine wisdom, power, love, and truth, in all their fulness; of deliverance from sin and guilt; of immortality; of hope. Let naturalism prove all that unbelief claims, and what have you? This blessed Bible, the only book which ever told perishing man of an adequate salvation, is discredited; God, with his providence and grace, is banished out of your existence. . . . Naturalism is a virtual atheism; and *atheism is despair*. Thus saith the apostle: they who are ‘without God in the world’ are ‘without hope.’ Eph. ii. 12. Young man, does it seem to you an alluring thought, when appetite entices or pride inflates, that this false science may release you from the stern restraints of God’s revealed law? Oh, beware, lest it despoil you thus of hope and immortality. . . .

“Look back, proud Naturalist, upon history; your form, and all other forms of scepticism, have been unable to hold their ground, even against the poor fragments and shreds of divine truth, which met you in Polytheism, in Mohammedanism, in Popery. Man, however blinded, will believe in his spiritual destiny, in spite of you. Let proud Naturalism advance, then, and seek its vain weapons groping amidst pre-Adamite *strata* and rotten fossils. The humble heralds of our Lord Christ will lay their hands upon the heartstrings of living, immortal man, and find there always the forces to overwhelm unbelief with defeat.” Sermon, pp. 18, 19.

In these passages, the modern meaning of the term “naturalist” is entirely lost sight of; and Dr. Dabney could justify the amazing assertions and warnings uttered only by saying that the words as used some hundreds of years ago had the signification which he here wishes to convey. It is true that centuries ago it would have been proper to say that a “naturalist” was one who held the doctrine of “naturalism” taught by Leucippus, Democritus, and others, among the ancients, and by some unbelieving philosophers of later days. That “naturalism” was “virtual atheism,” indeed it was professed atheism; for it attributed the phenomena of nature to a blind force acting necessarily. But the ancient “naturalist” and the modern “natural-

ist" have nothing in common. How, then, can Dr. Dabney justify his passing from the modern meaning of these words to the ancient and obsolete one, without giving his readers and hearers notice that he had done so? If he were to say that he uses them in the same sense throughout, and that he intends to assert that the "naturalist" of to-day is one who embraces the "naturalism" of the atheist, he would take a position to which the self-respect of a modern naturalist would forbid any reply to be made.

Perhaps the whole difficulty on these points arises from Dr. Dabney's utter failure to recognise the province of natural science. That he is not aware of the limits of this province is very evident from the following passages:

"Does the professor of natural science say of geology, that because the fact which it attempts to settle by empirical deduction, is the fact of a creation, the work of an omnipotent agent, therefore in the very approach to this question the validity of such deductions fails, and all such speculations are superseded; because this fact of a supernatural creation, if it has occurred, has transcended all natural law?—Does he hence briefly infer, as I do, that such speculations about the mode and date of creation must, by a logical necessity, always be incompetent to natural science, no matter how extended?" Memoir, October 31, 1866.

"Because geology is virtually a theory of *cosmogony*, and cosmogony is but the *doctrine* of creation, which is one of the modes by which God reveals himself to man, and one of the prime articles of every revealed theology." Lectures, p. 175.

It is a grievous mistake on Dr. Dabney's part to suppose that natural science has anything whatever to do with the "doctrine of creation." If he should become acquainted with geology, he would learn that it is not a "theory of cosmogony," either virtually or really. The truth is that natural science is neither Christian nor anti-Christian, neither theistic nor atheistic, any more than the multiplication table. When we can speak of a Christian law of gravitation, or an infidel law of definite proportions, or a rationalistic order of succession in the strata composing the accessible part of the earth, then we shall be able to speak of Christian and atheistic natural science, and not until then. For

what is natural science? Dr. Dabney gives us a sufficiently good description when he says: "Its chief study is to ascertain the laws of material nature, and of animal life." Sermon, p. 2. (Dr. Dabney does not profess to be defining natural science here, but is describing what he calls "the prevalent vain deceitful philosophy of our day;" but this is merely his not very flattering way of speaking of what others mean by natural science.) Accepting this description, then, is it not clear that the consideration of creation is necessarily excluded? For what are "laws of nature?" Dr. Reid replies, as almost every other philosopher would do, that the "laws of nature are the rules according to which effects are produced." Accordingly, the student of natural science, by experiment and observation, seeks to learn what these rules are; he watches the order of sequence in nature; and thus he gains the knowledge he desires—in no other way can he gain it. This knowledge cannot pass beyond what may be observed. And it is only the order of sequence in nature that can be observed. Hence everything that lies beyond the observable order of sequence lies beyond the province of natural science. Now, how will natural science proceed to ascertain either the fact or the mode of creation? Can the order of sequence in creation be observed? Has man ever been able to see what the regular steps in that process are? If not, all "speculations about the mode of creation must always be incompetent to natural science," as Dr. Dabney rightly says.

In like manner, all speculations as to the origin of forces and agents operating in nature are incompetent to natural science. It examines how these operate, what effects they produce; but in answer to the questions, Is there a personal spiritual God who created these forces? or did they originate in blind necessity? or are they eternal? natural science is silent. It humbly declares that such questions transcend its highest powers; it shows what truths it has gathered, and with free hand delivers them over to a higher philosophy or to natural theology as useful materials with which to construct arguments demonstrating the being and wisdom of a personal God; but such demonstra-

tions lie wholly beyond its humbler sphere. And should any one, whether theologian or student of natural science, infidel or Christian, represent his discussions respecting the existence and attributes of God as belonging in any way to natural science, it would show clearly that he has yet to begin to learn what its rightful province is. And it would be as unjust to hold science responsible for the infidel views respecting the Bible and its teachings proclaimed by a Vogt, a Moleschott, a Büchner, a Tyndall, or a La Place, as to hold the Bible responsible for the astonishing views respecting natural science proclaimed by Dr. Dabney.

While natural science is itself incapable of inquiring into the origin of the forces which produce the phenomena it studies, and while it is impossible for it to be either religious or irreligious (anti-religious rather) any more than mathematics, or grammar, or logic, or farming; yet by the truths which it brings to light, it not only enables natural theology to illustrate the wisdom and power and greatness of God as nothing else can, but also illimitably expands the significance of multitudes of passages in the Scriptures where the meaning is already clear, and sometimes aids in gaining a clearer insight into that meaning where it is obscure. To the most ignorant peasant the heavens declare the glory of God; but in how infinitely higher a degree to the astronomer, who knows something of the real magnitudes, motions, constitution, and relations of the heavenly bodies. And the earth showeth his handywork to the stupidest savage; but with what vastly greater clearness and impressiveness to the geologist, who knows, however imperfectly, at least some parts of its wonderful past history. Every department of natural science sets forth truths which must fill the loving heart of the child of God with new emotions of admiration and reverence towards his Father whose thoughts he sees expressed in his works. But on the other hand, the scoffing unbeliever may pervert the truths discovered by natural science, just as the unbelieving farmer may pervert the fruits of his successful labor by using them to promote every kind of wickedness. It would hardly be proper, however, in this latter case, to begin a series of sermons, memo-

rials, etc., cautioning the Church against anti-Christian corn and cotton.

That natural science is neither atheistic nor Christian in itself, may be seen further from the fact that the results reached are not in the slightest degree affected by the religious views or character of its students. Two chemists, the one an atheist and the other a Christian, who study side by side in a laboratory and examine the same substances, will see the same chemical changes and arrive at a knowledge of the same laws. Their religious differences will have no more effect than the differences in their stature or the color of their hair. So if they go to the mountain's side as geologists, they will see the same strata in the same order filled with the same fossils, and they will draw the same conclusions from what they see. Perhaps when the atheist retires to his study, and, putting off the character of student of science, begins to discuss the origin of things, he may say that he believes that the fossils he had seen are the result of a fortuitous concourse of atoms, and that the order and constitution of the strata are one of the possible combinations brought about by blind chance. And the Christian, in like manner, when the glorious workmanship of God is no longer before his eyes, may strive to persuade himself that the forms which he had seen had never been parts of living beings, but for some reason unknown to him had been created as they now are by the God whom he had just been worshipping as the God whose truth endureth for ever, and of whom he had exultingly exclaimed: "The word of the Lord is right; and all his works are done in truth." But when again atheist and Christian return together to their investigations in the light of day, the former is as far from uttering his absurdities respecting the power of chance as the Christian from repeating the horrible thought that perhaps the God of truth had created these fragments of bone, and shells, and decayed wood, and dead leaves, in the condition in which they are now before him. But we are not left to speculation as the only means of reaching the truth on this point, when we see the Christian Newton and the unbeliever La Place teaching the very same astronomical truths, and when we see that in every branch

of science the same results are reached, whatever the religious views of the investigators. Even among the hypotheses outside of the ascertained truth, by which every branch of science is surrounded, no line could be drawn which would separate Christians from infidels, any more than one which would separate Americans and Frenchmen from Germans and Englishmen.

Dr. Dabney's argument, which is next to be noticed, is that on which he lays most stress to prove that there can be no certain conclusions reached respecting the antiquity of the globe and similar questions. It is this: "The admission of the possibility of a creation destroys the value of every analogy to prove the date and mode of the production. The creative act (which, if it ever occurred, may have occurred at any date, when once we get back of historical testimony) has utterly superseded and cut across all such inferences." Lectures, p. 177. The remarks above made with reference to the universal scepticism necessarily resulting from Dr. Dabney's effort to show that we cannot possibly reach the truth because we are fallen beings, here apply with special force. If we adopt his principle, we shall be sure not to believe anything. But since he speaks of it as the most vital point in his argument, it is proper that it should now be stated more fully. He says:

"Finally, no naturalistic argument from observed effects to their natural causes, however good the induction, have any force to prove a natural origin for any structure older than authentic, human history, except upon atheistic premises. The argument usually runs thus: We examine, for instance, the disposition which natural forces now make of the sediment of rivers. We observe that when it is finally extruded by the fluvial current into the lake or sea where it is to rest, it is spread out horizontally upon the bottom by the action of gravity, tidal waves, and such like forces. The successive deposits of annual freshets we find spread in strata, one upon another. Time, pressure, and chemical reactions gradually harden the sediment into rock, enclosing such remains of plants, trees, and living creatures, as may have fallen into it in its plastic state. The result is a bed of stratified stones. Hence, infers the geologist, *all stratified and fossil-bearing beds of stone have a sedimentary origin*, (or other such like natural origin). Hence winds and waters must have been moving on this earth, long enough to account for all

the beds of such stone on the globe. Such is the argument in all other cases.

“Grant now that an infinite, all-wise, all-powerful Creator has intervened anywhere in the past eternity, and then this argument for a natural origin of any structure, as against a supernatural, creative origin, becomes utterly invalid the moment it is pressed back of authentic human history. The reason is, that the possible presence of a different cause makes it inconclusive....

“It may be asked: ‘Must we then believe, of all the pre-Adamite fossils, that they are not, as they obviously appear, organized matter; that they never were alive; that they were created directly by God as they lie?’ The answer is: That we have no occasion to deny their organic character; but that the proof of their pre-Adamite date is wholly invalid, when once the possibility of creative intervention is properly admitted, with its consequences. For the assumed antiquity of all the rocks called sedimentary, is an essential member of the argument by which geologists endeavor to prove the antiquity of these fossils. But if many of these rocks may have been created, then the pre-Adamite date of fossils falls also. Moreover, when we are confronted with an infinite Creator, honesty must constrain us to admit, that amidst the objects embraced in his vast counsels, there may have been considerations, we know not what, prompting him to create organisms, in numbers, and under conditions very different from those which we now term natural. After the admission of that possibility, it is obviously of no force for us to argue: ‘These organisms must have been so many ages old, supposing they were produced, and lived, and died, under the ordinary conditions known to us.’ This is the very thing we are no longer entitled to suppose.” Sermon, pp. 12, 13, 14.

“Our modern geologists find that wherever stratified rocks are formed, since the era of human observation, the cause is *sedimentary action*. They jump to the conclusion that therefore the same natural cause produced all the sedimentary rocks, no matter how much older than Adam. I reply: ‘Yes, provided it is proved beforehand, that *no other adequate cause was present*.’ Unless you are an atheist, you must admit that another cause, *creative power*, may have been present; and present anywhere prior to the ages of authentic historical testimony. Thus, the admission of the theistic scheme absolutely cuts across and supercedes all these supposed natural arguments for the origin and age of these structures.” Lectures, pp. 175, 176.

“OBJECTION FROM FOSSILS ANSWERED.—Another objection, supposed to be very strong, is drawn from the fossil remains of

life. The geologists say triumphantly, that however one might admit my view as to the mere *strata*, it would be preposterous when applied to the remains of plants and animals buried in these *strata*, evidently alive thousands of ages ago. The reply to this is very plain, in two ways. First: How is it proved that it was thousands of ages ago that these fossil creatures, now buried in the *strata*, were alive? Only by assuming the gradual, sedimentary origin of all the *strata*! So that the reasoning runs in a circle. Second: Concede once (I care not where in the unknown past) *an almighty Creator of infinite understanding*, (as you must if you are not an Atheist,) and then both *power* and *motive* for the production of these living structures at and after a supernatural creation become infinitely possible. It would be an insane pride of mind, which should conclude that, because it could not comprehend the motive for the production, death, and entombment of all these creatures under such circumstances, therefore it cannot be reasonable for the *infinite mind* to see such a motive. So that my same *formula* applies here also. Once concede an infinite Creator, and all inferences as to the necessarily natural origin of all the structures seen, are fatally sundered." Lectures, pp. 177, 178.

Before discussing the main argument presented in these passages, it will be proper to notice two questions incidentally introduced. The first is Dr. Dabney's statement when speaking of fossils, that "we have no occasion to deny their organic character." It is very difficult to see what he can mean by this statement; for his whole argument rests on the supposition that the fossils may have been created as we find them. He says: "If many of these rocks may have been created, then the pre-Adamite date of fossils falls also." But if the rocks may have been created with the fossils in them, then certainly we are very decidedly "denying their organic character." It may be presumed that even Dr. Dabney would not wish to be understood as representing God as thrusting the fossils into the previously-made rocks, after the death of the animals and plants of which the fossils are the remains. But perhaps it would be rash to say that any one does not mean this who can believe that God may have directly created the fossil-bearing rocks at all. He is clearly right in one particular—that the only way to escape the conclusion that the fossils are pre-Adamite is to assume the

“possibility of creative intervention.” But he cannot assume this without so far forth “denying their organic character.” It surely would have been more consistent with logical propriety if he had not sought to escape the consequences of the assumption of creative intervention by saying we have no occasion to deny what is by that assumption directly denied.

The next preliminary point is Dr. Dabney’s anxiety to escape the consequences of his principles by insisting again and again on restricting the range of natural science to the period embraced within human history. Now our belief in the laws of nature has nothing whatever to do with human history. He himself teaches the truth on this point very clearly in his second and sixth Lectures. He says: “*It is not experience* which teaches us that every effect has its cause, but the *a priori* reason. Neither child nor man believes that maxim to be true in the hundredth case because he has experienced its truth in ninety-nine; he instinctively believed it in the first case. It is not a true canon of inductive logic that the tie of cause and effect can be asserted only so far as experience proves its presence. If it were, *would induction ever teach us anything we did not know before?* Would there be any inductive science? Away with the nonsense!” Lectures, p. 15. (The italics are Dr. Dabney’s.) “It thus appears that this intuitive belief [that ‘every effect has its own cause, which is regular every time it is produced,’ page 53,] is essential beforehand to enable us to convert an experimental induction into a demonstrated general law. Could anything more clearly prove that the original intuition itself cannot have been an experimental induction?” Lectures, p. 53. In these passages he very clearly and correctly sets forth the exact truth. The fundamental beliefs in natural science are intuitive; they are entirely independent of experience, which, when recorded, becomes human history. Dr. Dabney would have been more logically accurate, if in this crusade against physical science he had adhered to his own teachings in his second and sixth Lectures.

Let us now endeavor to ascertain whether it is true that creative intervention supersedes and cuts across all inferences such

as the student of God's works draws respecting the formation of fossil-bearing layers of rock. Of course every believer in a personal God believes that he can produce in an extraordinary way just such effects as he ordinarily produces by the usual laws by which he governs his material universe—the laws of nature; and every believer of the Bible believes that he has often done so. The numerous miracles recorded are suspensions of the laws of nature as we know them, deviations from the ordinary "rules according to which effects are produced." It is not necessary here to inquire whether miracles are "violations" or "suspensions" of the laws of nature, or are the regular results of other and higher laws of nature than those with which we are acquainted; for whatever view may be held respecting their character, all would agree that they are at least deviations from the ordinary order of sequence. Now, does this admission that effects have been produced in such unusual ways vitiate all inductive science, which is certainly based upon the belief in the uniformity of the laws of nature? Does the admission that fire on some occasions has not burned, render us incapable of believing that fire does burn? Does it vitiate all conclusions based on this belief? We can best learn what common sense and the right use of reason teach us by examining a few cases in detail.

On one occasion, at a marriage festival, wine was presented to the guests, which was pronounced to be of excellent quality—it was real wine. Had one of the guests been questioned as to its origin, he would unhesitatingly have said that it was the expressed juice of the grape. But by unexceptionable testimony, it could have been proved that it had been water a few minutes before, and had never formed part of the grape at all. Now, in view of this fact, according to Dr. Dabney's reasoning we are forever debarred from concluding that wine is the juice of the grape unless we shall have first proved the absence of God's intervening power. Is this the dictate of common sense?

One of the laws of nature with which we think we are best acquainted, is, that fire burns, and that it consumes wood, flesh, or any other organic substance. And yet, once a bush burned with

fire, and was not consumed. On another occasion, there was a burning fiery furnace, exceeding hot, which had no power over the bodies of three men who were cast into it, and could not even singe a hair of their head. Now, with regard to our daily application of the law that fire burns, Dr. Dabney would have us remain in perpetual doubt; he would tell us that "honesty must constrain us to admit, that amidst the objects embraced in his vast counsels, there may have been considerations, we know not what, prompting him" to give to fire the next time we wish to kindle it on the hearth properties "very different from those which we now term natural"—in short, such properties that it will no longer burn. He has done so in the past; and "after the admission of that possibility, it is obviously of no force for us to argue": This wood must burn, and roast so much flesh, etc., "under the ordinary conditions known to us. This is the very thing we are no longer entitled to suppose." Sermon, p. 14. We must first "ascertain the absence of the supernatural," before we can be sure that fire will produce the effects we had been anticipating. In like manner, we cannot be sure that every rod we see will not change to a serpent; that iron will not swim upon water, or that we cannot walk upon water, or that water will not stand in heaps as a wall; we cannot be sure that an inscription on a stone tablet in the grave-yard is the work of human hands; we cannot be sure that the strangers we meet were not dead at one time; for we cannot have forgotten the rods of Moses and Aaron, the passage of the Red Sea and of Jordan, the axe of Elisha's pupil, or the writing on the two tables of stone; we cannot have forgotten the son of the widow of Nain, and Lazarus, and Jairus's daughter, and the Shunamite's son, and others who were dead but afterwards came to life.

What conclusion must every right-thinking person reach from the examination of these instances? Must he not insist on believing that wine is the juice of the grape, except where the contrary is proved by competent testimony? He cannot give up his belief that fire burns because it has not always done so—he will not wait to have the rule further proved, he reasonably asks that the extraordinary exception shall be proved; he believes that water

as long as it has existed and shall exist, has had and will have its present properties, but yet is ready to believe any proved exception; he is not afraid to say that he knows that not one of all the human beings he has seen during his whole life was ever dead, while he readily accepts the evidence which informs him that there have been exceptions to the ordinary law of mortality.

Is it not clear, then, that the rule cannot be that on which Dr. Dabney insists—that we must be able to prove the “absence of the supernatural” before we have a right to attribute an effect to the operation of God’s ordinary laws? On the contrary, are we not required by the very constitution of mind which God has given us, to believe that every effect we see has been produced by God’s ordinary laws, until we have valid testimony to the contrary?

If we adopt Dr. Dabney’s principle, we are at once landed in absolute and complete scepticism—we cannot know anything whatever with certainty; we are condemned to perpetual torturing universal doubt. It is true he seeks to escape this conclusion by what he says of “authentic human history;” but it has been shown that history has nothing to do with the laws of belief. The possibility of proving the truth of the Bible is at once destroyed. A copy of the Bible is placed before us, documentary and other evidence is submitted to show its genuineness; but how can we tell that this is a book, or that these are really documents? We have been taught that for some reason unknown to us God may have created skeletons that never belonged to animals, shells that were never inhabited; that he may have created the world just as we see it with all the numberless minute marks of having been produced by processes which he has permitted us to learn and forced us to believe—marks which prove just as clearly that these rocks with their fossils were produced by these processes as that this Bible consists of sheets of paper manufactured by man, with marks upon them which seem to us to be letters and words and sentences printed by man. But since, as Dr. Dabney says, it is possible that the rocks may have been created, notwithstanding these minute marks of not having been created, we must equally admit that that which seems to be a

Bible with its supporting testimony, may equally have been created, and has no such meaning as we must have believed, until Dr. Dabney taught us better. Once admit this principle, and we are landed in scepticism in comparison with which that of Hume, or Berkeley, or Pyrrho, was confident belief.

Dr. Dabney frequently insists that his argument must be admitted by all who are not atheists. Is it not rather to be feared that all who accept his exposition of the theistic argument, will be driven towards the denial of a God, certainly of a God of truth? Speaking of rocks called by geologists sedimentary, which includes the entire fossil-bearing series, he says: "The admission of the theistic scheme absolutely cuts across and supersedes all these supposed natural arguments for the origin and age of these structures." Here the choice is presented: Either believe in a God who may have created these rocks in such a way that they are certain to deceive you; or else deny the existence of such a God. If the denial of *such* a God is atheism, little is hazarded in expressing the opinion that all who know aught of the earth's structure are *atheists*—they can and do believe in no such God. But they can and great multitudes do believe in and love the God of the Bible, all whose works are done in truth; and they are too jealous for the honor of his name calmly to hear attributed to him the possibility of such gigantic, unlimited deception, and especially when this is done in the house of his friends, and in that which is intended as a defence of his glorious and true word.

It is quite possible that Dr. Dabney's opposition to physical science arises from his want of acquaintance with it. In this opposition he is unhappily the representative of but too many who have in all ages claimed to be defenders of the faith; and familiarity with the thing opposed has never been a characteristic of those whom he here represents. This want of acquaintance with its real value may also account for his determined efforts to exclude it from the course of study to be pursued in theological seminaries. In his *Memoir on Theological Education*, his *Memorial*, and his *Lectures*, he strenuously insists that it should be rigorously excluded from such a course. He says:

“In conclusion, the relations of those sciences (as geology) which affect the credit of inspiration, would be studied by divinity students, on the right footing. It is desirable that at least a part of our clergy be well informed upon these subjects. But to make the study of them therefore a part of a divinity course, in a school strictly ecclesiastical, appears to me extremely objectionable, for several reasons.

“First: when thrust thus into a divinity course, the instruction upon these extensive and intricate sciences must needs be flimsy and shallow, a mere sketch or outline. The result will be that our young ministers will not be made natural historians; but conceited smatterers in these branches of knowledge. There is no matter in which Pope’s caution should be uttered with more emphasis.

“‘Drink deep; or, taste not the Pierian spring.’

“The great lights of those sciences, armed with the results of lifelong study, are not to be silenced, if perchance infidel, by a class of men who make it a by-play to turn aside from their own vocation, and pick up a scanty outline of this foreign learning. These clerical smatterers will only make matters worse, by displaying their own ignorance; and their so-called defences of inspiration will provoke the contempt and sneers of their assailants. If Christianity needs to be defended against the assaults of natural science, with the weapons of natural science, it must be done by competent Christian laymen, or by the few ministers who, like Dr. Bachman, are enabled to make natural science a profound study. Let our Cabells defend the “unity of the race,” while our pastors preach the simple gospel.

“Second. The tendencies of such a course will be mischievous, as to both the professor and his pupils. The latter will be found more inclined to mere human learning, and to the conceit which usually attends it, and which always attends a small degree of it; babbling the language of geology and ethnology, with a great deal more zest than they recite their catechism. The professor will be found, in nine instances out of ten (mark the prediction,) wounding the very cause he is bound to defend, by diligently teaching some scheme of his pet science, which involves a covert infidelity. Again; we solemnly declare, that it will be found that the most mischievous scepticism, and the most subtle doctrines of anti-Christian science, will be just those propagated from these church schools of natural science; and after a time, the Church will have more trouble with her defenders, than with her assailants. For the spirit of these

sciences is essentially infidel and rationalistic ; they are arrayed, in all their phases, on the side of scepticism. Memoir, *Central Presbyterian*, October 31, 1866.

“Without presuming to teach technical geology (for which I profess no qualification ; and which lies, as I conceive, wholly outside the functions of the Church teacher), I wish, in dismissing this subject, to give you some cautions and instructions touching its relations with our revealed science.” Lectures, p. 173.

Who could have expected, after these protests against the introduction of physical science into the course of study to be pursued by theological students, that Dr. Dabney himself should forthwith proceed to teach it from his own theological chair ? Equally unexpected is the introduction of so much of physical science, as he understands it, into a sermon in which he says, “It is not necessary for the theologian to leave his own department, and launch into the details of these extensive, fluctuating, and fascinating physical inquiries ; nor shall I, at this time, depart from my vocation as the expounder of God’s word, to introduce into this pulpit the curiosities of secular science. We have no occasion, as defenders of that word, to compare or contest any geologic or biologic theories. We may be possessed neither of the knowledge nor ability for entering that field, as I freely confess concerning myself.” Sermon, pp. 7, 8. But surely after confession, it was not necessary to prove and illustrate it by specimens of what he would teach as natural science ; and it could not have been expected that so much of the Sermon should be taken up with what he well terms “*curiosities* of secular science.”

That those who are to be defenders of our faith should carefully study natural science, Dr. Dabney proves, first, by his direct assertion respecting geology, “THIS SUBJECT MUST CONCERN THEOLOGIANS.—1. There must always be a legitimate reason for church teachers adverting to this subject” (Lectures, p. 173) ; secondly, by his own example in teaching his students as shown in many of his Lectures, but especially in Lecture xxi. and its Appendix ; and lastly, by the sad effects of undertaking to teach that for which he is obliged to “profess no qualification.”

If we examine the character of the natural science which he teaches, we may be able to discover still more clearly the reasons why he opposes it and regards its conclusions with distrust. Let us begin with a sample of his botany. Speaking of the trees of Paradise, he says :

“But now a naturalist of our modern school investigates affairs. He finds towering oaks, with acorns on them ! Acorns do not form by nature in a day ; some oaks require two summers to mature them. But worse than this : His natural history has taught him that one summer forms but one ring in the grain of a tree's stock. He cuts down one of the spreading monarchs of the garden, and counts a hundred rings. So he concludes the garden and the tree must be a hundred years old, and that Adam told a monstrous fib, in stating that they were made last week.” Lectures, p. 176.

Now, compare this with real natural history. Dr. Dabney *supposes* the oaks in the garden of Eden had acorns hanging from their boughs ; he *supposes* that on cutting one down, the section would show a hundred rings. How does he know these things ? He does not know them ;—he *guesses* at his facts, and then proceeds to reason upon his fanciful guesses. The real naturalist on the other hand does not begin his reasoning until he knows what the facts are. As to the oaks in Paradise, he candidly confesses he does not know whether there were acorns on them or not, or whether the cross section of one of them would have shown a hundred year-rings or not ; and he has too high a regard for true science to base any part of it on guesses. He might add that his observation of facts has led him to refer the rings seen in trunks of trees to more or less complete cessation of growth, which cessation in our climate occurs once a year ; but that he cannot apply this knowledge to the trees of Paradise. If asked what must have been the appearance of the cross section of a Paradise oak, he will doubtless say he does not know, and that he thinks it likely that Dr. Dabney does not know either ; but if he must express an opinion, he thinks that, as all the marks he has ever seen on any plants indicate the truth, so God did not impress any marks on the trees of Paradise to deceive either Adam or his posterity ; that the God of truth did

not create scars, or broken branches, or chips, or stumps, or decaying logs, or anything else to lead astray those whom he created in his own image.

Let us next take a sample of Dr. Dabney's physiological chemistry, a branch of science to which he seldom refers. He does not present his "law" as anything more than a "surmise;" but he asserts, notwithstanding, that it is not without "plausible evidence." He says :

"Let me assume this hypothesis, that it may be a physiological law, that a molecule, once assimilated and vitalized by a man (or other animal), undergoes an influence which renders it afterwards incapable of assimilation by another being of the same species. This, indeed, is not without plausible evidence from analogy; witness, for instance, the fertility of a soil to another crop, when a proper rotation is pursued, which had become barren as to the first crop too long repeated." Lectures, Part II., pp. 275, 276.

He here violates two fundamental requirements of true science; namely, first, that in framing an hypothesis, the causes assumed must be known to exist—must be real causes; and second, that the phenomena to be explained must also be known to exist. Now, in this case, he guesses at his cause, and guesses at the facts to be explained; and still further, guesses most amusingly at the evidence by which he sustains his surmise—the source of the advantage resulting from rotation of crops. Is it any wonder that Dr. Dabney should have little respect for physical science, when he thinks this is the way it investigates nature and undertakes to discover laws and causes; when such "plausible evidence" as he adduces may be taken as sober argument?

But it is chiefly geology that he attacks and casts out as "atheistic." Let us therefore examine Dr. Dabney as a geologist; for notwithstanding his modest disclaimer, he comes forward as a teacher of this science. Here is a sample of his instructions on the subject:

"Lowest in order and earliest in age, are the primary rocks, all *azoic*. Second come the secondary rocks, containing remains of life *palæozoic* and *meiocene*. Third come the tertiary rocks

and clays, containing the *pleiocene* fossils. Fourth come the *alluvia*, containing the latest, and the existing genera of life. Now the theory of the geologists is, that only the primary azoic rocks are original; the rest are all results of natural causes of disintegration, and deposition, since God's creation. And hence: that creation must have been thousands of ages before Adam.

"a.) Because the primary rocks are all very hard, were once liquid from heat, and evidently resulted from gradual cooling," etc. Lectures, p. 170.

In order that Dr. Dabney's geological subdivisions may be the more easily compared with the subdivisions made by those who are acquainted with geology, the two are here presented side by side—giving the geological classification which really comes nearest to the one intended by the teacher under examination:

DR. DABNEY.	REAL GEOLOGY.
4. Alluvia—Existing genera.	4. Cainozoic { Recent. Pleiocene } Tertiary. Meiocene } Eocene }
3. Tertiary—Pleiocene.	3. Mesozoic.
2. Secondary { Meiocene. Palæozoic.	2. Palæozoic.
1. Primary or Azoic.	1. Azoic.

The difference between Dr. Dabney's classification and real geological classification becomes apparent on comparing the above. He regards the secondary as embracing the whole of the palæozoic and a subdivision of the tertiary; and the tertiary as equivalent to one of its parts. It is as if he had given us this geographical definition: "The bodies of water on the surface of the globe are oceans, gulfs—including the Caspian Sea—lakes, and the Appomattox river." He is no more fortunate in his statement of the "theories of geologists." For they do *not* hold that the "primary azoic rocks are original"—the azoic rocks belong to the sedimentary stratified layers which are certainly not original, but in which either no traces or very doubtful traces of life have been found. Nor do they hold that they "were once liquid and evidently resulted from gradual cooling." It is true that rocks so formed are "azoic," that is, they do not contain the remains of plants and animals; but the term

“azoic” in geology has a technical signification, as one acquainted with the science would have known. When you look at Mont Blanc and the neighboring mountains, or still better when you stand on the Gorner-Grat and look at the magnificent range before you, including the Cima di Jazzi, Monte Rosa, the Twins, the Breithorn, and the Matterhorn, you see mountains which are white—very white indeed. But what would be thought of the geographer who would gravely inform his pupils, utterly forgetful of the claims of New Hampshire, that the White Mountains are in central Europe along the northern border of Italy? This is precisely similar to what the “geologist” has done, whose claims are now before us. But it cannot be necessary to continue this examination; it is perfectly evident that the profession of want of qualification to teach geology had reasons for being sincere, and ought to have restrained from every attempt to exercise that function. The only thing to be added here is the recommendation that, before a second edition of the Lectures shall be issued, the author learn what naturalists mean by “genera;” for in a large number of cases he employs the term “genera” where one acquainted with natural history would have used “species.”

In view of these specimens of Dr. Dabney’s scientific attainments, which prove that he is acquainted with neither the methods nor the ends of physical science, with neither its facts nor its principles, is it not reasonable to hesitate to accept his opinions and conclusions respecting that science? Why should his warnings against it be heeded, when he knows neither what it is nor what it does? They should not be heeded, any more than the warning uttered by Professor Tyndall that we should not believe what God has told us of himself as a hearer of prayer because natural science has not been able to discover how he hears and answers.

In the following passages, Dr. Dabney complains of the unreasonableness of geologists in resenting the animadversions of some theologians:

“Not a few modern geologists resent the animadversions of theologians, as of an incompetent class, impertinent and ignorant.

Now I very freely grant that it is a very naughty thing for a parson, *or a geologist*, to profess to know what he does not know. But all logic is but logic; and after the experts in a special science have explained their premises in their chosen way, it is simply absurd to forbid any other class of educated men to understand and judge their deductions. What else was the object of their publications? Or do they intend to practise that simple dogmatism, which in us religious teachers they would so spurn? Surely when geologists currently teach their system to *boys* in colleges, it is too late for them to refuse the inspection of an educated class of *men*. When Mr. Hugh Miller undertook, by one night's lecture, to convince a crowd of London mechanics of his pet theory of the seven geologic ages, it is too late to refuse the criticism of theologians trained in philosophy!" Lectures, p. 173.

Some distinctions ought surely to be made here. It can hardly be fairly said that it is the animadversions of theologians as an "incompetent class" that geologists resent. No geologist can forget that many of these "parsons," as Dr. Dabney calls them, have been and are most accomplished members of the geologist "class"—as for example the recently deceased Sedgwick, and Buckland, and Hitchcock, not to mention a multitude of others. It is not theologians as a class, but individual theologians who are ignorant of the subject discussed, whose animadversions are not always treated with very great respect. Dr. Dabney himself acts just as those do of whom he complains, when he says that he "freely grants that it is a very naughty thing for a parson, *or a geologist*, to profess to know what he does not know." Every science has a right to claim that, if judged, it shall be judged by those who know what it is. And if "theologians trained in philosophy" refuse to learn what "*boys* in colleges" can understand, and then denounce as atheistic those who have acted otherwise, it is certainly "a very naughty thing."

It must be apparent to all, then, that it is of great importance that theological students should be instructed with reference to the class of questions under consideration. Not that such topics should be discussed in the pulpit; but neither should Hebrew Grammar or the details of Church History be discussed there;

and yet Hebrew Grammar and Church History must be studied by theological students. Nothing should ever be preached from the pulpit except the gospel. But if the candidate for the ministry cannot be adequately instructed elsewhere on the points in question, it must be the duty of the Church to provide that instruction in her training schools. And Dr. Dabney ought not so strenuously to object to such provision, merely because he has not himself felt called upon to seek and obtain accurate knowledge with reference to these subjects. There never was a time when it was more imperatively necessary that all teachers of our religion should be well acquainted with natural science. It is in the falsely-assumed name of this science that fierce attacks upon vital truth are made. The defenders of Christian truth, ignorant of the difference between true science and the errors uttered in its name, greatly err if they think they can effect anything by proclaiming that the "spirit of these sciences is essentially infidel and rationalistic," and by denouncing as atheistic what every reasonable man must believe. They thus merely expose themselves to derision. This might be of slight consequence, but for the fact that inquirers after the truth of Christianity may be led, in their summary rejection of such arguments, into an error similar to that made by some "theologians," namely, that of confounding the untenable defence with the thing defended.

Is it not worth while to consider whether the past history of the Church of Christ does not sufficiently illustrate the divine power of the truth to survive such defences? That history in this respect is a very sad one. In the fourth century, Lactantius was one of the foremost of these defenders. The third Book of his "Divine Institutions" treats of the "False Science of Philosophers." In the twenty-fourth chapter of this caution against Anti-Christian Science, he asks, speaking of the infidel doctrine that there are antipodes: "Who is so silly as to believe that there are men whose feet are higher than their heads? . . . that crops of grain and trees grow downwards? that rain, snow, and hail fall up toward the earth? . . . We must explain the origin of this error also. For they are always

led astray in the same way. When they have assumed a false principle, influenced by the appearance of truth, it is necessary that they follow it out to its consequences. Thus they fall into many ridiculous errors. . . . If you ask those who defend these wonderful statements, how it happens that all things do not fall into the lower part of the sky, they reply that it is the nature of things that heavy bodies are borne toward the centre, and that all things are connected with the centre as we see the spokes in a wheel. . . . I do not know what I should say of these persons, who, when they have once gone astray, constantly persevere in their folly, and defend their vain statements by vain reasons." Passing by similar teachings on the part of Chrysostom and many others, in the eighth century Virgilius of Salzburg was publicly condemned by Pope Zacharias for maintaining the existence of the same antipodes; and centuries later, it was taught that the hypothesis of an antipodal region is "inconsistent with our faith; for the gospel had been preached throughout all the habitable earth; and, according to this opinion, such persons (the antipodes) could not have heard it," etc. Every one knows how the astronomical truths again brought to light by Copernicus and confirmed and illustrated by Galileo were received by multitudes of theologians who set themselves forward as special defenders of the faith; and that, not only by the Roman Catholics, but by leading Protestants as late as the seventeenth century. In the same century it was maintained, just as it now is, that "God at the beginning of creation caused coal, vegetable and animal forms, to grow in the rocks, just as he caused grass and other plants to grow upon the earth;" and that opinions contrary to this "are partly atheistic, partly ridiculous, and without foundation." But this sad history has been followed far enough. Christianity based upon a firm belief in the Bible has survived it all. Surely it would be difficult to give a stronger proof of its truth than that such defences have not caused it to be utterly rejected. The similar defences made by Dr. Dabney will be alike powerless to destroy the Bible; but is there not danger that many persons, taking it for granted that he would not place

unnecessary obstacles in the way of belief in the Bible, may think it necessary either to adopt his principles or reject Christian belief? and finding it repugnant to right reason and common sense to accept what he teaches on these points, may thereby be led to reject the sacred and true Scriptures?

It can hardly be necessary to examine minutely what Dr. Dabney says further on these topics; as, for example, the reasons he adduces to support his statement that "the assumption that henceforth physical science is to be trusted, and to be free from all uncertainty and change, is therefore simply foolish." As one proof of this, he alludes to the "deep sea soundings which have lately" been made, as showing that "formations determined (as was asserted) to be older and newer lie beside each other in the ocean contemporaneously"—all of which evinces an utter misapprehension of the real import of the discoveries in question. He further refers to the changes in chemistry as illustrating the untrustworthiness of science. It would be tedious to go into details here on these points; it is enough to say that if the conclusions of physical science are to be rejected on such grounds, we must also reject the Bible because opinions vary as to whether the Book of Job was written by Moses or not; because the exact time when this book was written has not been ascertained; and because it has not been decided in the theological world whether Moses, under the guidance of the Holy Ghost, compiled the Pentateuch from previously existing documents, or under the same guidance embodied in it the traditions handed down from father to son without being committed to writing, or wrote words immediately dictated to him by the Spirit. Dr. Dabney's objections bear the same relation to belief in physical science that these objections would do to belief in the Sacred Scriptures.

Such warnings against science are not new; and unhappily it is not new that they are uttered by theologians, who ought all to be the most earnest promoters of knowledge of every kind, as multitudes of them have been. It is painful that in this day as well as in that of Lord Bacon, there should be theologians who deserve the rebuke so sternly administered by that master

of thought. Let his words be again heard, and let them be heeded by all who profess to love the truth. In his immortal work on the Advancement of Learning, he says :

“In the entrance to the former of these, to clear the way, and, as it were, to make silence, to have the true testimonies concerning the dignity of learning to be better heard, without the interruption of tacit objections : I think good to deliver it from the discredits and disgraces which it hath received, all from ignorance, but ignorance severally disguised ; appearing sometimes in the zeal and jealousy of divines ; sometimes in the severity and arrogancy of politicians ; and sometimes in the errors and imperfections of learned men themselves.

“I hear the former sort say, that knowledge is of those things which are to be accepted of with great limitation and caution ; that the aspiring to over-much knowledge, was the original temptation and sin, whereupon ensued the fall of man ; that knowledge hath in it somewhat of the serpent, and therefore where it entereth into a man it makes him swell ; ‘*Scientia inflat :*’ that Solomon gives a censure, ‘That there is no end of making books, and that much reading is a weariness of the flesh ;’ and again in another place, ‘That in spacious knowledge there is much contristation, and that he that increaseth knowledge increaseth anxiety ;’ that St. Paul gives a caveat, ‘That we be not spoiled through vain philosophy ;’ that experience demonstrates how learned men have been arch-heretics, how learned times have been inclined to atheism, and how the contemplation of second causes doth derogate from our dependance upon God, who is the first cause.

“To discover then the ignorance and error of this opinion, and the misunderstanding in the grounds thereof, it may well appear these men do not observe or consider, that it was not the pure knowledge of nature and universality, a knowledge by the light whereof man did givenames unto other creatures in Paradise, as they were brought before him, according unto their proprieties, which gave the occasion to the fall ; but it was the proud knowledge of good and evil, with an intent in man to give law unto himself, and to depend no more upon God’s commandments, which was the form of the temptation. Neither is it any quantity of knowledge, how great soever, that can make the mind of man to swell. . . And as for that censure of Solomon, concerning the excess of writing and reading books, and the anxiety of spirit which redoundeth from knowledge ; and that admonition of St. Paul, ‘That we be not seduced by vain philosophy ;’ let

those places be rightly understood, and they do indeed excellently set forth the true bounds and limitations, whereby human knowledge is confined and circumscribed; and yet without any such contracting or coarctation, but that it may comprehend all the universal nature of things. For these limitations are three: the first, that we do not so place our felicity in knowledge, as we forget our mortality. The second, that we make application of our knowledge, to give ourselves repose and contentment, and not distaste or repining. The third, that we do not presume by the contemplation of nature to attain to the mysteries of God. . . . And as for the third point, it deserveth to be a little stood upon, and not to be lightly passed over: for if any man shall think by view and inquiry into these sensible and material things to attain that light, whereby he may reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, then indeed is he spoiled by vain philosophy: for the contemplation of God's creatures and works produceth (having regard to the works and creatures themselves) knowledge; but having regard to God, no perfect knowledge, but wonder, which is broken knowledge. . . . And as for the conceit that too much knowledge should incline a man to atheism, and that the ignorance of second causes should make a more devout dependence upon God which is the first cause; First, it is good to ask the question which Job asked of his friends: 'Will you lie for God, as one man will do for another, to gratify him?' For certain it is that God worketh nothing in nature but by second causes; and if they would have it otherwise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were in favor towards God; and nothing else but to offer to the Author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie. But farther, it is an assured truth, and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the mind of man to atheism, but a farther proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion; for in the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there, it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of Providence; then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair. To conclude therefore, let no man, upon a weak conceit of sobriety, or an ill-applied moderation, think or maintain, that a man can search too far, or be too well studied in the book of God's word, or in the book of God's works: divinity or philosophy; but rather let men endeavour an endless progress or proficiencie in

both ; only let men beware that they apply both to charity, and not to swelling ; to use, and not to ostentation ; and again, that they do not unwisely mingle or confound these learnings together." Pp. 7-13.

The remark made at the outset, we would repeat in closing this examination of Dr. Dabney's assaults, that it would have been vastly more gratifying to have stood by his side defending sacred truth, than it has been to point out the deadly character of his teachings. Nothing but a sense of duty, requiring the exposure of these errors that the truth might be upheld, would have been a sufficient motive to perform a task in many respects so painful. His design is most praiseworthy—the defence of Christian truth. But unfortunately, zeal and laudable intentions are not enough if unaccompanied with the requisite degree and kind of knowledge. The most zealous and patriotic soldier whose sight is defective, may mistake a friend or a non-combatant for an armed foe.

It affords us real satisfaction, before we close, heartily to commend one caution uttered by Dr. Dabney, namely, the deliberation which he enjoins on pages 173 and 174 of his Lectures, where he says :

“ DELIBERATION ENJOINED.—Let me urge upon you a wiser attitude and temper towards the new science than many have shown, among the ministry. Some have shown a jealousy and uneasiness, unworthy of the stable dignity of the cause of inspiration. These apparent difficulties of geology are just such as science has often paraded against the Bible ; but God's word has stood firm, and every true advance of science has only redounded to its honor. Christians, therefore, can afford to bear these seeming assaults with *exceeding coolness*. Other pretended theologians have been seen advancing, and then as easily retracting new-fangled schemes of *exegesis*, to suit new geologic hypotheses. The Bible has often had cause here to cry, ‘ Save me from my friends.’ Scarcely has the theologian announced himself as sure of his discovery that *this* is the correct way to adjust Revelation to the prevalent hypotheses of the geologists, when these mutable gentlemen change their hypothesis totally. The obsequious divine exclaims : ‘ Well, I was in error then ; but now I have certainly the right exposition to reconcile Moses to

the geologists.' And again the fickle science changes its ground. What can be more degrading to the authority of Revelation! As remarked in a previous lecture, unless the Bible has *its own* ascertainable and certain law of exposition, it cannot be a rule of faith; our religion is but rationalism. I repeat, if any part of the Bible must wait to have its real meaning *imposed upon it* by another, and a human science, that part is at least meaningless and worthless to our souls. It must expound itself independently; making other sciences ancillary, and not dominant over it."

Of course it is only the injunction of deliberation that is here commended, without any expression of opinion as to the tone and style in which it is conveyed. The main thought is so important that this article cannot be better concluded than by repeating it in the words of the late distinguished Sir John Herschel:

"Nothing, then, can be more unfounded than the objection which has been taken, *in limine*, by persons, well meaning perhaps, certainly narrow-minded, against the study of natural philosophy, and, indeed, against all science,—that it fosters in its cultivators an undue and overweening self-conceit, leads them to doubt the immortality of the soul, and to scoff at revealed religion. Its natural effect, we may confidently assert, on every well constituted mind, is and must be the direct contrary. No doubt, the testimony of natural reason, on whatever exercised, must of necessity stop short of those truths which it is the object of revelation to make known. . .

"But while we thus vindicate the study of natural philosophy from a charge at one time formidable from the pertinacity and acrimony with which it was urged, and still occasionally brought forward to the distress and disgust of every well constituted mind, we must take care that the testimony afforded by science to religion, be its extent or value what it may, shall be at least independent, unbiased, and spontaneous. We do not here allude to such reasoners as would make all nature bend to their narrow interpretations of obscure and difficult passages in the sacred writings: such a course might well become the persecutors of Galileo and the other bigots of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, but can only be adopted by dreamers in the present age. But, without going these lengths, it is no uncommon thing to find persons earnestly attached to science, and anxious for its promotion, who yet manifest a morbid sensibility on points of this kind,—who exult and applaud when any fact starts up ex-

planatory (as they suppose) of some scriptural allusion, and who feel pained and disappointed when the general course of discovery in any department of science runs wide of the notions with which particular passages in the Bible may have impressed themselves. To persons of such a frame of mind it ought to suffice to remark, on the one hand, that truth can never be opposed to truth, and, on the other, that error is only to be effectually confounded by searching deep and tracing it to its source. Nevertheless, it were much to be wished that such persons, estimable and excellent as they for the most part are, before they throw the weight of their applause or discredit into the scale of scientific opinion on such grounds, would reflect, first, that the credit and respectability of *any* evidence may be destroyed by tampering with its *honesty*; and, secondly, that this very disposition of mind implies a lurking mistrust in its own principles, since the grand and indeed only character of truth is its capability of enduring the test of universal experience, and coming unchanged out of every possible form of *fair* discussion." Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, pp. 6, 7, 8.

ARTICLE II.

MISSIONS TO THE ORIENTAL CHURCHES.

History of the Mission of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the Oriental Churches. By Rev. RUFUS ANDERSON, D. D., LL.D., late Foreign Secretary of the Board, in two volumes. Congregational Publishing Society, Boston, Mass. 1872.

These volumes constitute the second of a series of histories of the different missions that have been carried on by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in various parts of the unvangelised world during the present century. The venerable author, now more than three score and ten, was Secretary of that Board for more than forty years, and of consequence, had more to do in founding and shaping their general course than any other man, dead or living. During the earlier periods of these missionary operations, the Presbyterian Church

in both its branches, the Congregational and the Dutch Reformed Churches were all united in sustaining and carrying the work forward. Each one furnished means and agents freely without regard to the particular fields in which they were to be employed. As far back as the year 1837, the Old School branch of the Presbyterian Church withdrew from this union and established missions of their own. Some years later the Dutch Reformed Church followed their example and commenced anew a work of missions on their own responsibility as a Church of the Lord Jesus Christ. Two missions, however, one in Southern India and the other in China, were transferred to the Board of the Dutch Church at the time of its separation. From that time until 1870, the whole of the work that had been undertaken on the responsibility of four branches of the Church, was sustained by the joint efforts of the Congregational and New School Presbyterian Churches. The reunion of the two branches of the Presbyterian Church in 1870, left the American Board the sole proprietors and occupants of the original work. By an amicable arrangement, however, a number of their missions were transferred to the care of the Board of Missions of the re-united Presbyterian Church, those particularly in Syria, in Nestoria, on the Western Coast of Africa, and several of those among the Indian tribes of North America. In consequence of these additions to the work that had previously been undertaken by the Old School branch of the Presbyterian Church, as well as the augmented pecuniary resources resulting from this re-union of the two bodies, the Presbyterian Board was placed at once abreast, if not ahead, of the American Board, both as to resources and the extent of the work in which they are respectively engaged.

Previous to the transfer of the missions just mentioned, the work of the American Board had expanded itself into immense proportions; too large, one might be tempted to suppose, to be managed by any one missionary organisation. It had missions among a large number of the Indian tribes of North America; in the Sandwich and Marquesian islands; in Western and South-eastern Africa; in Eastern Europe; in Syria and Palestine; in Western, Central, and Eastern Turkey; on the Western borders

of Mesopotamia; in Western Persia; in Western and Southern India; on the Island of Ceylon; in Southern and Northern China; and more recently in Japan and several of the Papal States. It is obvious to reflection that none but a mind of extraordinary endowment could have grasped and controlled an enterprise of such vast proportions and such almost endless details. But this our venerable author did for a period of nearly fifty years, and with undoubted and eminent success. In the good providence of God, he is permitted to spend the closing years of his life in quietly recording the interesting details of this work, and thus not only living over again his own life, but furnishing facts and experience that will be of incalculable value as long as the Church is engaged in disseminating the knowledge of the gospel among the unevangelized nations of the earth.

No portion of the earth comprises within itself so great a variety of races, languages, or different forms of religion as the Turkish Empire, and especially is this true of Asiatic Turkey. Here Turks, Greeks, Arabs, Koords, Jews, Syrians, Druzes, Armenians, and Nestorians, mingle together in almost every community, and yet each one retains its own language, its own religion, its own costume, and its own nationality as distinctly as if they lived in remote localities. Islamism is, of course, the predominant religion of the realm. Interspersed among this Moslem population, however, there are various sects of nominal Christians, differing very much among themselves, but alike in this, that none of them have retained any of the essential elements of what may be called true, evangelical Christianity. Among these nominally Christian sects may be mentioned the Greeks, Maronites (adherents of the Church of Rome), Syrians or Jacobites, Nestorians, and Armenians, as well as a large number of Jews. All of these sects, like that of the Church of Rome, have overlaid the truth of the gospel with so much of human tradition, as not only to have almost extinguished its light, but to have, by the same course, well nigh forfeited all claim to be regarded as branches of the Christian Church at all. These Christian sects, including those in European Turkey, amount in population to 12,000,000, or nearly one-third of the

whole empire. The adherents of the Greek Church are far the most numerous, especially if those who profess this religion in European Turkey are taken into the account. The Armenians are next in point of numbers, and may be found in all the cities, towns, and villages of both divisions of the empire, but particularly in Asiatic Turkey, where it is supposed they amount to 2,000,000. They are not only numerous and widely scattered, but wherever found are known to be active, enterprising, and influential. The Nestorians do not amount to more than one or two hundred thousand, and are to be found mainly in Western Persia and the mountains of Eastern Turkey. The Maronites are to be met with mainly in Syria and the mountains of Lebanon, but great efforts have been made, especially of late years, by the Church of Rome to extend its influence even to Mesopotamia. The Jacobites are the least numerous of all these sects, and are confined in a great measure to the southeastern portion of the Empire.

The whole field of missionary operations in Asiatic Turkey has usually been characterized in the Annual Reports of the American Board under the heads of seven separate missions, viz.: Mission to the Greeks, Mission to the Jews, the Syrian Mission, the Mission to the Armenians, the Nestorian Mission, the Assyrian Mission, and the Mission to the Mohammedans. This last mentioned is more prospective and preliminary than in actual progress. That to the Armenians is the most important and extensive of them all, and of late years has been subdivided into what are now known as the Missions of Western, Central, and Eastern Turkey. The Mission to Syria, (including Palestine) is the oldest of all these missions. Its history covers a period of fifty-two years, dating back to the times of Fiske and Parsons. The Greek Mission covers a period of forty-four years; the Armenian, forty-one years; the Nestorian, thirty-eight; and the Assyrian, about ten years. The Jewish Mission was continued for a period of thirty years, and was then transferred to the English and Scotch Jewish Missionary Society, which was then more extensively engaged in this particular department of the work. About the same time the Greek Mission, espe-

cially that branch of it in Greece proper, was given up, except that Jonas King was permitted to continue his labors under the direction of the Board until the close of his life, which occurred only a few years since. Neither of these missions can be regarded as successful. Up to the time referred to, as was the case in the days of Paul, the gospel still continued to be a stumbling block to the Jew, and to the Greek foolishness. The average period of the history of the other missions, all of which have been eminently successful, amount to about the third of a century, a fact that should be kept distinctly in mind as we endeavor to form a just estimate of the actual results that have been brought about by these earnest and protracted efforts.

The plan originally adopted for restoring a pure and living Christianity to this portion of the earth, seems to have been characterised by great wisdom and extraordinary foresight from its very incipency. In the first place it was clearly foreseen, that it would not be possible, humanly speaking, to make any salutary impression upon the minds of the great mass of the Moslem population, except by restoring a pure and living Christianity to these nominally Christian sects interspersed among them. But in the existing state of these sects, they were a hindrance rather than a help to the introduction of a pure gospel. Given up as they were at the time to ignorance, superstition, and intolerance, they did a great deal to disparage the cause of truth in the eyes of the Mohammedan population. Still it was felt that if a pure spiritual life could be infused into these dead forms, they would become the most effective agents that could be employed in imparting the same blessings to the surrounding masses. Indeed there was no other way of reaching or influencing the Mohammedan minds, so intolerant and bigoted have the Mohammedans always shown themselves to be. It was a wise arrangement, therefore, to commence operations in the first instance among these Christian sects.

Another feature in the original plan, whether wise or not, we shall not undertake to determine, was to refrain from all attempts to change or revolutionise the prelatical character of these corrupt churches. All that was to be aimed at was to infuse new life

into these existing outward forms. It was thought, perhaps, that any efforts, especially in the earlier stages of the work, to revolutionise the form of church government, would not only provoke unnecessary and violent opposition, but might defeat all the plans contemplated for raising them to a higher standard of vital Christianity. This policy, right or wrong, was faithfully adhered to, until the bitter and unrelenting persecutions of the ecclesiastical authorities of these churches, made it necessary to draw off all converts to the evangelical doctrines and form them into a separate Protestant sect, so that they might be recognised and protected by the general government, both in their civil and religious rights.

Another feature in the early prosecution of this work was the translation and circulation of God's word, as well as other religious books and tracts, into all the various languages of the country. The early resort to the use of the press, as well as the continued use of it in the subsequent stages of the work, was a matter of necessity, as well as a measure of prudence and foresight. A very large proportion of the people were not only familiar with letters, but they were addicted to a less or greater extent to religious controversy. At the same time, when the missionaries first entered the field, the principles of toleration were but imperfectly understood, and it was no little peril for a foreigner to attempt to preach the gospel in public; so that the dissemination of the printed page was almost the only means left them for reaching the minds of these bigoted classes. The word of God was translated, at different periods and by different members of the mission, into the Modern Greek, the Græco-Turkish, (the Turkish language printed with Greek letters,) Ancient Armenian, Modern Armenian, Armeno-Turkish, (the Turkish language printed with the Armenian character,) Arabic, Arabo-Turkish, (Turkish language in the Arabic character,) Hebrew, and Hebrew-Spanish, and the Modern Syriac, the language spoken by the Nestorians. Here are ten separate languages, into which the word of God has been translated in whole for the first time, or been retranslated, at scarcely less expense of labor than would have been required for a first translation.

If the missionaries had accomplished no other object by their residence in Turkey, they would have reared an imperishable monument to their memories, even in this single department of labor. The fruits of the dissemination of the printed word have already showed themselves in very many ways, and, no doubt, they will appear still more abundant in the great spiritual harvest that is yet to be reaped in this portion of the earth.

But if the wisdom and foresight of the original projectors of this great enterprise was remarkable, not less so must be acknowledged to be the skill, the energy, the piety, and the indomitable courage of the men who have carried it into execution. When the Apostles of the Lord Jesus first entered this same field, they were confronted by a two-fold enemy, Judaism and Paganism. But our modern missionaries had to face a more formidable array of antagonists. Judaism was still there, and had lost none of its obstinacy or hatred for Christ. Islamism, the reigning religion of the realm, was a far more formidable foe to the cause of truth than any of the known forms of ancient paganism. Besides these, there were not less than five forms of nominal Christianity, which, though constantly at strife with each other, were all united in one common sentiment of hatred to pure Christianity. None but men of strong faith and earnest piety would ever have thought of entering the lists with such formidable enemies. But such were the men who not only ventured upon the undertaking, but have maintained it with unswerving purpose, except where God, by his providence, has called them away, to the present day, and with results such as none but the eye of Omniscience can fully trace. It may seem almost invidious to give prominence to the names of individuals in that noble band of brethren who have labored in this great cause. But we cannot reconcile it with the feelings of veneration which we entertain for many of them, not to record their names even in this cursory review of the Mission. To say nothing of the venerable men who are still engaged in the work, as Drs. Hamlin, Schaufler, Calhoun, Thompson, VanDyck, Jessup, Riggs, Bliss, Wood, Scheider, and others, or of those in the bosom of our own Church who have rendered important service in

this great cause, as Adger, Houston, Leyburn, and Johnson, we cannot refrain from expressing our profound regard for the memories of those of this noble band who have been taken to their rest in heaven. What friend of Missions is not already familiar with the names of Goddell, Dwight, Temple, Eli Smith, Bird, Perkins, King, Grant, Merrick, Stoddard, and others of scarcely less prominence? If the Church of Christ, since the days of the apostles, has ever comprised a company of Christian ministers of greater self-denial, of more earnest piety, of more thorough scholarship, or of more entire consecration to the interests of the Redeemer's Kingdom, we scarcely know who they are. Whatever may be said or thought of the rationalistic tendencies of the New England mind of the present day, or the general prevalence of materialism among the great mass of that people, it cannot be denied that the generation which gave birth and training to these holy men, as well as others of not less worth and prominence in other portions of the great missionary field, must have been imbued with no small measure of true evangelical piety. Equally as much might be said in relation to many of the noble Christian women who have done their full share in the promotion of this great cause. Our readers are already familiar with the memoirs of a number of these, and it is not necessary for us to dwell upon their worth or the important service they have rendered in the promotion of the social and religious welfare of the country. Of a single one of these, Miss Fidelia Fisher, our venerable author after speaking of her remarkable endowments of mind and moral worth, remarks in relation to her religious character: "She seemed to me the nearest approach I ever saw, in man or woman, in the structure and working of her whole nature, to my ideal of the blessed Saviour, as he appeared in his walks on earth."

It is utterly inconsistent with the scope and design of this article to attempt even an outline of the history of these missionary operations, extending as they do over a period of a half century. Those who wish for more thorough information on the subject are referred to the volumes under review. They are worthy of the careful perusal of every friend of missions, and

we heartily commend their perusal to all such. Taking a general survey of the work, we find, as might naturally be expected, that it has been characterised at different periods of its history by great variety of condition and circumstances. At one time all is darkness and discouragement; at another the sunlight of hope and prosperity beams brightly upon it. At one moment the missionaries are almost tempted to think that God has left them to work in their own strength; and then again and perhaps very suddenly, his hand becomes almost visible in removing difficulties and overcoming opposition. To-day they are threatened with banishment or martyrdom; to-morrow they find their work more thoroughly established in the hearts and affections of the people. If in one emergency the representative of a European government is found intriguing against their peace and prosperity; the next day, perhaps, the representative of a more friendly government interposes more effectually in their behalf. If the hierarchy is filled with rage and denounce them in the bitterest terms; the people evince but the deeper interest in the precious truths they proclaim. If at one time the Spirit's influences seem to be almost withdrawn; at another they are poured forth in such great abundance and power as to leave no doubt of their being in the path of duty, or of their laboring for the promotion of a cause which is infinitely dear to the heart of the great Redeemer. But, notwithstanding all these variations in the outward condition of the work, it has nevertheless made steady and constant progress. If its fruits have been more manifest and abundant during the last twenty years, the previous thirty years of preparatory labor was not less important or indispensable to its ultimate success.

The work, at different periods of its history, was characterised, as might naturally be expected, by scenes of very bitter persecutions—such as have a full counterpart only in the persecutions of the early Church. These persecutions were instigated by the ecclesiastical authorities against all of their people who embraced the evangelical doctrines, whether they left their communion or not. This became preëminently the case in the Armenian Church, where proselytes to the true faith became numerous and

were zealous for the cause of Christ. But the persecutions of the Church became proportionately violent, which forced the missionaries, not only to abandon the original plan of forming no new sect, but also made it necessary for these new converts to organise a Protestant denomination—protesting, however, not so much against the errors of the Romish or Greek Church, as against those of their communion. Not only was it necessary to establish this new Christian denomination, but it was equally necessary to get the sanction of the Sultan, that it might have a civil head through which it might be governed and be protected as all the other sects in the empire are. The missionaries were aided in getting a firman for this purpose by the earnest and persistent efforts of Sir Stratford Canning, Minister Plenipotentiary of the British Government to the Ottoman Empire. This measure had the effect of putting an end to the persecutions of the Armenian Church, as it made it possible for any individual member of its communion to transfer its civil and ecclesiastical relationship to the Protestant body without the risk of the loss of property or personal violence. Five years subsequent to this, in the year 1855, another firman was obtained from the Sultan, and mainly by the efforts of the same distinguished Christian gentleman, called the *Hatti Humaioun*, by which, not only was the death penalty for apostacy from the Moslem faith abolished, but which established free toleration for all religions throughout the whole empire. This was undoubtedly the most important event, so far as the social or religious welfare of the country is concerned, that has ever taken place in the history of the Ottoman Empire. It was perhaps the turning point in the great religious change that is to come upon that land, and ultimately upon all the other Mohammedan nations of the earth. It is possible that the Sultan himself had no right conceptions of the actual results that would necessarily flow from this measure. Whatever may hereafter be his personal views and feelings on the subject, he will be held to his own act by the powers of Europe. This wonderful interposition of divine providence—for it can properly be regarded in no other light—is the more remarkable, as it resulted directly from the

bitter persecutions that were waged against God's own people, verifying the truth of his Word, that "the wrath of man should be made to praise him."

As to the results that have been achieved in this great empire by the persistent and self-denying labors of the missionaries, none but the eye of Omniscience can trace them in all their varied ramifications, or to their fullest extent. Those that are visible to the human eye, in the number of converts, in the outward moral reformations that are observable in certain communities, in the multiplication of institutions of learning, the extended circulation of the Word of God among all classes, the growing desire for religious knowledge, and the organisation of Christian Churches, do not after all afford a true guage of the real results that have been achieved. Influences may be at work beneath the surface of human observation, of which we have now no idea, and which may at any time burst forth with astonishing power. The good seed may be vegetating in thousands of hearts that is to bring forth such a spiritual harvest as has never before been witnessed by the children of men. The leaven, that is to leaven the whole lump, is already working, and no one knows how soon a complete change may be wrought in the entire moral, social, and religious condition of this heretofore dark and benighted nation.

The known results that have taken place, though not an exact criterion of what has really been accomplished, are nevertheless such as to inspire lively hopes in relation to the future. In relation to the circulation of religious truth, through the medium of the press, the author remarks, that in the year 1870, ten and a half millions of pages were issued in the Armenian, Armeno-Turkish, Græco-Turkish, and Bulgarian languages, and that nearly three hundred millions of pages have been issued by the mission since the commencement of its operations—making an average of seven pages and a half for every soul in the empire, without taking into account what has been done by the presses in Syria and Nestoria during the same period. Surely those who believe that God's word will not return to him void, must see that a broad foundation for good is laid in this one depart-

ment of labor alone. But the preaching of the gospel, especially during the last twenty years, has been attended with the most marked and encouraging success, as may be seen from the fact that the country is now being dotted all over with Evangelical churches. They are to be found in Constantinople, and in its surrounding towns and villages; along the eastern and north-eastern borders of the Mediterranean; in Syria and the mountains of Lebanon; along the banks of the Euphrates and the Tigris; in western Persia and the mountains of eastern Turkey; along the southern borders of the Black Sea, and, to a less or greater extent, through all the central regions of Asia Minor. These churches, of which there are nearly one hundred, vary in membership from thirty or forty to one hundred, and one hundred and twenty-five. In the city of Aintab there are two separate organisations, each of which embraces more than one hundred members. Most of the churches have not only attained to a standard of self-support, but they are supplied in part or whole by native pastors or licentiates. It is also a most encouraging feature in the history of these newly-formed churches, that they are concerned for the spiritual welfare of their fellow-men, and have already organised missionary associations for the purpose of extending the blessings of the gospel to the multitudes around them.

Progress in the educational department of the mission has not been less encouraging. The Armenian mission alone reported at the close of last year as many as one hundred and forty-five common schools in connection with their various stations, which embraced between six and seven thousand pupils; ten seminaries of a high grade for girls, in which there are about two hundred and fifty pupils being prepared for the work of teaching; nine training and theological schools and classes, in which there are more than one hundred and fifty young men being fitted for the work of the ministry; whilst there are already in the field of active labor as many as one hundred and three native pastors and licentiates. The whole number of laborers in the field, American and native, is nearly five hundred. The Presbyterian Board reports similar progress in the Syrian and

Nestorian missions. Besides these extended educational operations carried on by these two missionary boards, two large first-class colleges have been established by the bounty of private Christians—one in Constantinople, and the other in the mountains of Lebanon, in which are gathered hundreds of young men of all the varied nationalities of the country, and who are not only pursuing extended literary and scientific studies, but are having their minds imbued at the same time with the elements of evangelical truth.

It must be obvious to reflection that the various forms of error and false religion, which have so long afflicted the Ottoman Empire, must ere long crumble to nought before the combined power of these mighty agencies. There are not wanting, even now, signs of the near approach of a great change. Persecution, if not entirely checked, is rapidly losing its terrors; the gospel is now preached without let or hindrance in almost every portion of the empire; scores of men and women, who were once bowed down under an insupportable load of superstition and ignorance, have been emancipated and are now open witnesses for the truth as it is in Jesus; the printed Word of God has found its way into numberless households, and is silently exerting a powerful influence over all classes of society; the Mohammedan, in many cases, is not only showing that his confidence in his own creed is shaken, but he perceives that the religion of Jesus is beginning to show itself in a different and far more interesting character than that in which he had formerly contemplated it; whilst thousands of the former adherents of nominal Christian sects are being convinced that they have heretofore been following the traditions of men instead of the teachings of Jesus. In view of all these great and marvellous changes, it is no undue stretch of the imagination, but a well-grounded expectation, that, if God continues to favor this work in the future, as he has done in the past, in less than fifty years from the present time, if not by the close of the present century, Turkey will no longer be designated as a Mohammedan, but as a Christian land. And when Turkey casts aside the religion of the false prophet, Persia and every other Mohamme-

dan power in the world will be prepared, with the blessing of God, to follow her example.

There are two topics growing out of this discussion of a more general character to which we wish to advert before closing this article. One of these relates to the particular mode by which this mission has been conducted, especially during the latter portion of its history. In the earlier stages of its history, like all other contemporaneous missionary operations, it was conducted on what are now almost universally acknowledged to be erroneous principles. Churches when formed, instead of having their new-born life carefully developed and strengthened by exercise, were treated like nurslings, and in most cases for an indefinite length of time. They were kept under the fostering care of the missionaries themselves, because it was thought to be too solemn and responsible a burthen to be laid on the shoulders of native pastors. For the same reason great reluctance was manifested about appointing elders and deacons for these churches, overlooking the important fact, that training was just as necessary to make good elders and good deacons, as it was to make good private members of the Church. Government in these churches was exercised almost entirely by the missionaries, so that very little opportunity was afforded them, either to become acquainted with the principles of church government or to understand their practical working. At the same time, as the missionaries derived their support from the churches they had left in their native land, little or no occasion was afforded for drawing out the benevolence and self-denial of these native churches in the way of supporting the institutions of the gospel. The gospel was preached to them without charge, and schools were maintained with little or no cost or trouble to themselves. No course could possibly have been more injurious to their piety, or more repressive of their growth and energy. A dependent, inefficient and eleemosynary spirit was the natural fruit of this kind of nurture, and no wonder that many, in view of the miserable inefficiency of these churches, looked upon the conversion of the world as almost a forlorn hope. Our venerable author was the first to see, that this was not only an unwise and injurious

course, but that it was totally at variance with the teachings of the Scriptures, as well as the example and policy of the great Apostle to the Gentiles. He set to work at once, so far as the missions of his own board were concerned, to rectify these mistakes and retrieve as far as possible the losses that had been incurred. He insisted that the missionaries should regard themselves in the light of evangelists, and regulate their course accordingly; that the best and most suitable men in these newly-formed churches should be instructed and inducted into the pastoral office as speedily as possible; that elders and deacons, imperfect as might be the materials out of which they would have to be taken, should be elected, nevertheless, and be put in the exercise of their respective offices; that the churches should be made responsible for the support of their pastors, and, as far as possible, furnish the means for the education of their children. Of course the training of young men for the ministry, the translation of the Word of God, the general supervision of the churches for a time, and other kindred duties, would be retained by the missionaries, who alone are adequate to such duties. This change in the management of the work was not effected without strong opposition, but it is now almost universally conceded that it is the only wise and scriptural plan. The effect of this change of policy upon the missionary churches has been marvellous. In consequence of having their benevolence and their self-reliance brought into full exercise, they are not only evincing extraordinary capacity for enlarging and extending the Redeemer's kingdom, but they are furnishing examples of liberality and self-denial that might well be imitated by the very churches, through whose instrumentality, they themselves were first gathered into the fold of Christ. We see, at the same time, how comparatively easy it will be to evangelise the world, if these new church organisations are brought into full coöperation at once. They can do much more to evangelise the heathen masses around, than we can who live at the extremities of the earth. Much may be learned, in the light of this subject, as to the management of the domestic missionary work. No doubt many of what we call feeble churches within our own bounds

have been greatly injured by having been helped too much. No individual church can be in a healthy condition, or subserve the great end for which it was organised as a church of Jesus Christ, without having its benevolence and self-denial duly exercised. The strength of any church depends upon the exercise of these and other kindred graces; and if it is aided in doing what might be effected by its own energies, it inevitably falls into a state of miserable weakness and dependency.

The other point to which we wish to advert, is, that the history of these missionary operations furnishes a satisfactory illustration of the way and the means by which this great outlying heathen world is ultimately to be brought under the power of Christianity.

The magnitude of the undertaking, compared with the apparent feebleness and inefficiency of the means appointed for its accomplishment, has not only caused infidels to ridicule the expectation, but has puzzled even Christian men to see how it could be brought about. Of course the reflecting mind sees ample resources in the almighty power of God to bring about any purpose he has ever made known to the children of men. But in kindness to our weak faith, he furnishes us facts in connection with these very missionary operations by which we ourselves can understand how this great object is to be attained, and, perhaps, at no very distant day. Dr. Anderson has remarked, and no doubt after very mature consideration, that it will not probably be necessary to send any more American missionaries to the Armenians. The cause of Christ has already gained such a firm footing among that people, that they will probably need no more aid from the outside Christian world. The leaven of grace is already pervading the whole mass. God's word has gone forth among all classes of men, and it will not return to him without having accomplished the purpose for which it was sent forth. Between seventy and eighty Evangelical churches have already been established among this people, and these churches are putting forth extraordinary efforts, not only to bring the whole of their own people under the influence of a pure Christianity, but are concerting measures for impart-

ing the same blessings to the millions of Mohammedans around them. Hundreds of young men are already educated, or are in process of education, for the work of the ministry. Colleges and theological seminaries have been established in sufficient numbers to supply all the present demands of the work, and they can easily be so enlarged as to meet all the future wants of the entire field. Here, then, after a period of about the half of a century, through the agency of not more than one or two hundred missionary agents, and at an outlay of not more than two or three millions of dollars, the Christian religion has been so thoroughly established in one of the most unpromising sections of the earth that it can now be left to maintain itself, and, with God's blessing, will eventually work out the complete evangelisation of the whole country.

ARTICLE III.

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND CURRENT THOUGHT.

Addresses at the Induction of Rev. Francis. L. Patton into the "Cyrus H. McCormick Professorship of Didactic and Polemic Theology" in the Presbyterian Theological Seminary of the Northwest. Printed by order of the Board of Directors of the Seminary. 1873. 8vo. Pp. 70.

It would seem more decorous that some one of the authorised champions of Didactic Theology, adorned with the scars of many battles, should undertake the review of the pamphlet whose title-page is given above. But the standing reproach of our Southern Church, is the fact that so many able pens are reposing in inglorious idleness within her wide boundaries. And it is a special reproach, that topics of universal interest and unspeakable importance, like that at the head of this article, should be relegated to unpracticed thinkers for discussion. In the present case, however, the task is easier of accomplishment, because Mr.

Patton has compressed within the narrow limits of his Inaugural Address, suggestions that may be readily amplified into volumes.

The pamphlet contains three addresses. The first is the Formal Introduction by the President of the Board of Directors—the Hon. Samuel M. Moore. The second is the charge to the new Professor, delivered by Rev. R. W. Patterson, D. D.; and the third is the Inaugural of Mr. Patton. His theme was “Christian Theology and Current Thought,” and the present purpose is to follow the line of discussion he adopted, and to enlarge a little upon certain portions of his able address, where he has contented himself with brief suggestions, instead of elaborate argument. Indeed, the striking peculiarity of this address, is the compression of many years of patient thinking into less than fifty pages of print. One can see, on every page, bristling all over the theme, the sharp points of concrete deductions that have been elaborated from abstract theories, through many days and nights of laborious study.

The method of argumentation adopted will be indicated by Mr. Patton's opening paragraph: “Theology must vindicate its right to a place in the peerage of science, or its advocate will be regarded as one who, in these days of needle-guns and railroads, is making a dogmatic stand for flint-locks and stage coaches. The dogmas of theology must be seen to stand in vital relation with human conduct, or they will be treated as fossils worthy only of a shelf in a cabinet of antiquated opinions, and valuable only for the light they throw on the history of human progress.” He then proceeds to divide his topic as follows: “Christian Theology, as related to Secular Science; as Exclusive; as Formulated; as Progressive; as Symbolical.” P. 24. And in the discussion that follows, it is probable that present limits will only allow an examination of the first of these five divisions.

I. It is neither possible nor desirable that the Church should shrink from this discussion. One of the most astounding developments of a time-serving age, is the willingness manifested here and there to ignore the vital questions that affect the relation of revealed truth with human progress. There are theologians

of large reputation, who openly advocate the total rejection of known facts in physical science, lest these should be found arrayed in opposition to the revelation of God; or, to speak more accurately, they discountenance the Christian student from investigations in the vast field of natural phenomena, lest some plant or mineral should be discovered, boldly contradicting or denying the power and Godhead of Jehovah! Under their teaching, the Christian student is directed to shun the wonderful revelation of God, in the traces of organic life that mark the progress of past ages; to flee appalled from the record God has written upon the very frame-work of nature, lest some devilish ingenuity of science should distort these magnificent proofs of his power and wisdom, into a denial of Mosaic cosmogony! In opposition to this puerile theory, hear the manly utterance of Mr. Patton:

“Theology, as didactic, occupies a well defined area. It does not profess to teach botany, to decide doubtful questions in geology, to account for the origin of species, to discuss rival schools of ethics, or adjudicate between conflicting systems of psychology. Theology, as apologetic, on the other hand, touches secular science at a great many points, and the theologian is brought face to face with scientific hypotheses, and becomes of necessity a party to controversy.”

Nothing can be clearer than this statement. There is no possible evasion of the debates that must arise, between an unbelieving world, and a God-instructed Church. And as the world advances in knowledge, gaining each step by patient scrutiny of physical phenomena on one hand, and by fair inductions from facts in mental phenomena on the other, it is eminently proper that the Church should measure the true character of these attainments. It is the peculiar province of the Church to answer the old question: “What hath God spoken?” It is as really the province of the Church to answer the kindred question: “What hath God wrought?” And in order to bring scientific hypotheses to the test of God’s Word, the theologian must investigate the hypothesis. In order to find the unfailling

accord betwixt God's Word and God's works, the Christian must search both revelations.

In general terms, it may be noted first: That God cannot contradict himself. If he has really revealed in his Word anything like a formulated system of natural science, it is not possible that any discoveries of his creatures can contradict his authoritative announcements. For example: It is not credible that the Bible should formally teach that the sun moves round the earth, instead of the known fact that the earth revolves around the central luminary. The miraculous interference with the course of nature, when Joshua destroyed the Amorites, "and the sun stood still and the moon stayed," does not come in conflict with the Copernican system, even in the form of statement, although this very account has furnished the foundation for many infidel sneers. It is the record of God's miraculous interposition for a specific purpose, and the most rigid analysis of the narrative only yields this fruit, to wit: That the Maker of sun and moon and earth, and of the laws that regulate their revolutions, suspended those laws at his sovereign pleasure. The agonising effort to torture the account out of its obvious meaning, to meet the demands of later astronomical knowledge, is simply absurd. The astounding truth is, that the statement accords accurately, with the now known fact of the earth's rotation; because the arrest of *both* sun and moon, "the one upon Gibeon, and the other in the valley of Ajalon," was the precise effect produced by the arrest of *the earth's revolution on its axis*. It is not impossible that Joshua knew as much as Galileo, and upon this postulate theology may safely repose. It would seem that the inspired writer had gone out of his way simply to anticipate the muttered heresy of Galileo—"the earth moves!"—because there is no other conceivable reason for mentioning the moon at all! So the trepidation of the monks of the seventeenth century anticipated the terror of those theologians of the nineteenth who fall into spasms of holy horror upon the discovery of a well-defined fossil in the old red sandstone. Whatever marks of progress or development there may be found throughout the

thick-ribbed strata of the earth's crust, have been written thereon by the finger of God, and it is both foolish and wicked to dread in these a contradiction of truth written by the same finger upon the pages of his Word.

Notice again, that God has so constituted humanity, that man cannot believe a known lie. The mere statement is sufficient and does not admit of discussion. Man may be deceived, and made to credit that which is false, but when the falsity is revealed the credence dies. The avenues through which knowledge reaches the soul are numerous and divergent, and none of them, save one, convey knowledge in a direct line. What God reveals *directly* to man, comes to him in a positively straight line, from the mind of the Infinite to the apprehension of the finite, as for example: the revelation of Christ in the believer, as the hope of glory. But God reveals many truths mediately, and the density of the media may cause the deflection of the ray. It is a ray of pure light, because all truth is from God; but it may be polarised, even in its passage through or its reflection from the surface of the crystal. Of course, admitting the existence of God, and admitting the intelligence of man, direct revelation from the former to the latter is the most certainly true and infallible. Hence, logical induction is a more erratic avenue, or rather, a less direct method for the acquisition of knowledge, because of the possible acceptance of doubtful postulates, and, therefore, *possibly* faulty.

Another means of acquisition, is through the testimony of the sensuous organism. The senses are the messengers that bring to the mind their reports of the phenomena of the external world. "The evidence of the senses" is popularly called the ultimate test to which all theories must be subjected. But philosophers know that these messengers are not to be trusted implicitly. Their testimony is not always concurrent, and if they contradict each other at all, their report may not be received as final. If you place a bullet in the left palm, and then, with closed eyes, manipulate the bullet with the first and second fingers of the right hand, *crossed*, you will feel *two* bullets, though there is really but one. Open your eyes and you will

see but one. Optical illusions are frequent, without organic lesion. And, after all, it will not do, even for Darwinianism to lay too much stress hereon; because the lower animals, "from which man has been developed," possess all of these faculties in a far higher degree. The pointer can find the partridge that would elude the search of all the men in the world.

There are other methods by which man *knows*, and it will suffice to instance but one more. Man knows certain truths by the testimony of other men, as positively as by any indirect method. Not one man in a thousand of those who read these words, has any other proof of the existence of the nomadic tribes of Greenland, and yet not one man in a million can be found, who has the slightest doubt on the subject. The most of the knowledge that is in the world rests upon precisely this foundation. And, given the competency and credibility of the witness, it is not possible for man to withhold his credence of facts so communicated. A mariner discovers a coral reef in mid-ocean, and reports the dangerous fact; and no other mariner in the world will dare to sail his ship near the locality indicated. The latitude and longitude are carefully noted, and the spot is marked on all the charts used by navigators, and believed on as implicitly as men believe in the existence of Australia. The dimensions of the fact do not alter the case. There are multitudes of physicists, who have never seen the delicate tracery of the fern leaves of the carboniferous, or the gigantic remains of the saurians of the oolitic systems, yet they entertain no shadow of doubt respecting their existence.

Gathering up these points, notice that the Christian asserts first: That he knows the truth of the gospel upon the testimony of God directly communicated by the Holy Ghost. The infidel promptly rejects this statement as a delusion or a sham. Yet his objection is not well-founded, because certain truths of Revelation can be known subjectively, not otherwise. There is no perfect analogy in nature; but the babe that reposes upon its mother's breast, in peaceful slumber, has an apprehension of the mother's love that does not come by testimony of the senses, by logic, or by witness-bearing. And this example may

serve as an illustration. It is the feeble shadow of a glorious substance. The rest of the mature saint in the ineffable and distinguishing love of God, is a more unmistakable experience than that of the infant of days, and it happens to be just the subjective reality that cannot be reached any otherwise than by the direct touch of God. And the most that the unbeliever can say in opposition, is, that he has no such personal experience.

The saint asserts secondly: That the highest logic of the schools is not so sound as his. He contends that the power and Godhead of Jehovah are written upon all the phenomena of the universe. By means of the severest logic, he demonstrates all that the Scriptures reveal of the general beneficence of God. The scientist proceeds by stately progress, from the developments in the universe of to-day, through multitudes of changes and transitions, through vast cemeteries of extinct forms of life, through the misty realms of "natural selection," through the acute logic of Cartesian philosophy, and the howling waste of Positivism, through the maddening jargon of transcendentalism, until he is finally lost in the "original" firemist. But the saint can accompany him every step of the long journey, and, by superior logic, passes the protoplasm and nebula and behind them—finds God! As pure logic, which is the better? And upon this point Mr. Patton's address is peculiarly happy: "Christian theology has a right to be recognised as an element of human knowledge. And when men refuse to recognise God as Ruler and Revealed, they lack the true inductive spirit. It is not scientific to adopt a theory covering a class of unexamined facts which the theory will not explain. A theory which meets a protest in a persistent personality, which has no explanation of moral convictions, no answer to the claims of Scripture, no mode of accounting for the origin and growth of the Christian Church, is surely not a satisfactory theory of the universe. The theist, however, finds himself in possession of a consistent faith. He accepts his personality as a fact, the laws of belief as veracious, and moral intuitions as obligatory. Belief in God is the necessary result of the constitution of his nature. Revelation does

not surprise him, and because attested is accepted. Its pages throw light on the genesis of man, the origin of marriage, the permanence of species, and they have scientific value. It is surely more likely that the theistic hypothesis is true, and that a theory which is at war with the universal beliefs of mankind, and which stands only by wholesale discredit of testimony, is false. If probability were conceded to be the guide of life, and if, as the advocates of an improbable hypothesis, the men alluded to did not assume the attitude which justifies scepticism on the ground of the barest possibility, theism would be the unanimous faith of the world.

“May we not hope, however, that the time is coming, and is not so far away, when the student of physical science will see that theism furnishes the material for the widest and the safest induction, and that he is the true philosopher who reads the universe as the written thought of God, and under the two categories of God in nature, and God in history, subordinates all knowledge?” Pp. 31, 32.

Lastly, upon this point, the Christian asserts that he has better and more credible testimony to the truths of his faith, than the unbeliever can find to substantiate his denial. A very large part of Bible history, especially that which deals with the establishment of the Christian system, is corroborated by profane annals received without question by the whole civilised world. The birth, life and death of Jesus of Nazareth, are facts so stubbornly true, that infidelity has been compelled to write commentaries thereon, to explain away much that is mysterious, and to dissipate the delusions of faith. Indeed modern infidels, denying the brutality of Paine and Voltaire, even speak in respectful terms of the Founder of the Christian superstition and acknowledge the splendor of his human life. Now the saint affirms that Paul is a better witness than Renan; that John is more trustworthy than Strauss, and that, in addition to “the more sure word of prophecy,” the testimony of men who saw Jesus before and after his passion, who heard his voice, and who spent their entire lives in his service, and who died rather than deny him, is more indisputable proof than all the vagaries of

doubt. Here is presented at once the "testimony of the senses," and the persistent testimony of witnesses whose career is a part of the world's history. On the other side is presented a theory, or a bundle of theories, charging possible delusion or possible fraud, which however, never rise above blank negations, and have never taken concrete form as a system of belief.

In the analysis of his first division, Mr. Patton says: "It is useless to deny that scientific conclusions are gaining ground, which are in open conflict with the Bible. Nor is it the wisest policy for Christian apologists to announce their readiness to show the possible harmony of these hypotheses with Revelation. This is only a respectable way of beating a retreat. It is to fire and fall back. The true course is to give up, or make a stand. And the theologian is bound to protest against those conclusions in secular science which *ignore, contradict, or exclude* Christian theology."

Concerning the first, he asserts: "The facts of science are corroborative of theism. The uniformity of nature, the unity of force, the unknowable power which baffles analysis are in exact correspondence with the Scripture doctrine of one personal God; and it is unseemly for men who confess their ignorance of the agency which is behind phenomena, to scout theism without study. Nescience has no right to ridicule faith." Concerning the second, he says: "Christian theology proceeds on the assumption of a revelation. The Bible must expect free handling, and win confidence by standing scrutiny. Scientists have the right to show, if they can, that its claims are not established, or to break down its authority by proving it false. But this cannot be done by confronting it with an improved hypothesis. The attempt is made, notwithstanding, to displace the teachings of Scripture by hypotheses which are not only unproved, but which, in the nature of the case, are unprovable. It surely does not require much penetration to see that there is a wide *hiatus* between the proposition man *may* have developed out of a monkey, and the proposition man *must* have so originated. The chasm between the *may-have-been*, and the *must-have-been*, is to be spanned before there can be a strong case against the

Bible." Concerning the third, he says: "In the hands of the physiologist, the thinking subject is reduced to zero. Thought is as mechanical as digestion, and one is as moral as the other. The idea of God becomes a delusion; religion a farce; and the only thing man has to look forward to is a coffin and a grave. Such is the effect of mere phenomenal studies, that men have come seriously to believe that matter can develop into conscious life; can invent the hypothesis of God; can assert that it is mind, and persistently challenge refutation; can believe that its actions are voluntary, though in reality as mechanical as the motion of a clock; can believe that it shapes its conduct in accordance with the will of its hypothetical God; can be the subject of emotions which irresistibly suggest immortality, and that, on the strength of a belief in an immortal life, it can foster hope and listen to entreaty. There are men who, denying God, mind, personality, will, can believe that matter has developed these conceptions and has been the dupe of itself, that human history has been a wholesale cheat, and that the agencies which have revolutionised States and written poems; which have won victories and discoursed philosophy; which have made laws and painted Madonnas, are resolvable into the forces of chemistry and magnetism." Concerning the attitude of theology with reference to these three categories, he says: "It would appear, then, that the dispute between secular science and Christian theology cannot be settled by a policy of non-intrusion. There was a strife between the herdsmen of Abram, and those of Lot, because they stood on common ground, and the conflict between Scripture and science comes of their dealing with the same questions. The dispute, unlike the patriarchal one, cannot be settled by a re-distribution of territory, for physical science, as we have seen, with a greediness exceeding Lot's, claims undisputed possession of the entire realm of knowledge.

"As little can we accord with the sentiment that theologians have no right to scientific opinions. To do so would be to allow that the theist repeats his creed and says his prayers under scientific sanction. If a man knows it is day, he need pay little attention to him who avers it is night; and if a man knows, on

God's authority, that Adam was made in the likeness of God, he may answer Darwin with an indignant negative." Pp. 25-30.

One would think this statement disposes of the theory of "non-intrusion."

II. It remains to notice the attitude of theology with reference to true science, as all the foregoing has treated mainly of an antagonism between the revelation of God, and "science, falsely so called." As asserted in the outset, it is not possible that the revelation God makes to man in his works, contradicts the revelation God makes to man in his Word. And it is not possible that God should require human credence to that which is untrue. In so far as there is conflict, it originates with such scientists as make assaults upon revelation. Didactic theology makes no attacks upon science, and apologetic theology only essays to repel hypotheses that have no foundation in truth. If it were not for the inherited depravity of the race, which prompts the utterance from the heart of the fool,—“no God,”—there could be no such antagonism. Atheistical philosophy in all its schools is still a unit in the no-God theory; while its professors disagree in some essential particular upon all other theories. Each one is a solitary knight-errant, with some strange device emblazoned on shield, and some fantastic peculiarity in offensive weapons, travelling in a separate by-way; but all in search of a common enemy. But it is a fatal mistake to suppose these have monopolized all the learning of the world. Fair science has many votaries whose primal allegiance is to the God she helps to reveal. Here and there she has worshippers who spend years of patient toil in her service, unravelling her mysteries with microscopic accuracy; travelling upward through long chains of causation, and investigating with rare fidelity each new discovery of her multitudinous laws. Their contributions to the world's stores of knowledge are of inestimable value, whenever they succeed in defining the connexions, gradations and dependencies of scientific verities. But the fatal animus—the God-hatred—of which they are perhaps unconscious, leads them beyond the sure foothold of verity, and out

upon the shifting sands of speculation, where they construct hypotheses from which they carefully exclude the thought of God. "This their way is their folly, yet their posterity approve their sayings!" The contest is not between theism and science, but between theism and atheism. And science does not make atheists, though these may make science their God.

Before entering upon the investigation of possible accordanee betwixt Scripture truth and admitted facts in physics and metaphysics, it is important to define the status of both. Theology, if anything better than a myth, is necessarily the topmost science. It is not upon the defensive as popularly supposed. On the contrary, it boldly challenges all other systems to stand and answer its demands. It rests upon the awful authority of God. It deals with the eternal interests of man. It goes far beyond the highest flights of any other science, because it professes to solve questions touching the being and attributes of God, which science is not competent to discuss. It goes backward through the long sequence of causation, through the orderly operations of wise and beneficent law, until it finds the Law-maker, and then unfolds the mysteries of a Past without beginning. It goes forward with assured step, through the possible ages of coming time, and passing the outer limit of time, writes the history of a future that knows no ending. To compare a system of such amazing pretension, with any other system in the wide universe, is to be guilty of unspeakable absurdity.

Beginning with physical science, notice the unaided deductions of philosophers in astronomical investigations. They have found certain forces in nature to which they have given names; have measured their extent, and decided upon their correlations. They have detected aberrations in the revolution of Uranus, and correctly inferred the presence of a far-distant planet of huge bulk, whose attractive force could alone cause the disturbance. Accordingly they discovered Neptune. They find perturbations in the revolutions of Jupiter's satellites, and infer a disturbing cause, and careful search revealed a multitude of asteroids. Now the extent and accuracy of previous knowledge are

demonstrated by the fulfilment of LeVerrier's prediction, and this illustration is forcibly applied in Mr. Patton's argument thus: "The way to reach a safe conclusion respecting any scriptural theme, is to undertake an inductive examination of the Scriptures. Theology, in this sense, is an inductive science, and theologians employ the inductive method. It is idle, however, to say that deduction has no legitimate place in theology. 'The truths of Scripture,' says Canon Liddon, 'are not so many separate, unfruitful, unsuggestive dogmas,' and the theologian has as good right to argue from one doctrine the truth of another, as LeVerrier had to infer from the perturbations of Uranus the existence of an unknown planet. LeVerrier's prediction was fulfilled in the discovery of Neptune, and theological inferences, we allow, need the verification of Scripture-proof." Pp. 47, 48.

These illustrations are selected for a double purpose. First: To show that nothing in the scientific discovery impinges upon the system of Christian theology. Astronomers may go onward with their investigations, and reveal forty new planets in the abyss of space, and the doctrine of God's creative power is rather strengthened than harmed. Second: To show that their inferences may be literally inaccurate, though every step of their inductive reasoning may be true. Thus, in the latter illustration, the logical necessity was to find *one* planet between the orbits of Mars and Jupiter. Instead of this, the telescope revealed more than a hundred asteroids, which later authorities have declared to be the fragments of one large body, shattered by some internal convulsion. Whether or not this latter theory is true, makes no difference; the point established being the possibility of error in the details of the deduction. The laws of Kepler, and still more recent discoveries, relating to the relative distances of the planets from the central sun, only tend to show the orderly arrangement of forces, whereby God governs the material universe. It is not credible—it is not in the power of the human mind to conceive, that chance, or any law evolved from insensate matter could have so arranged that the *square* of a planet's revolution should be in proportion to the *cube* of the

planet's distance from the sun. The "Cosmos" of Humboldt, wherein no acknowledgment of Divine agency is found, still demonstrates with irresistible energy, that only God could bring cosmos from chaos.

There can never arise a controversy between astronomy and theology.

Before quitting this class of examples, notice how short the step is from solid fact to untenable hypotheses.

Science has revealed certain facts concerning the great planet of our system, such as the period of its revolutions, the uniformity of its seasons, because of the perpendicularity of its axis to the plane of its orbit, the number and size of its satellites, and many other admitted truths. A short stride from these known certainties, leads to the uncertain inference that a planet so furnished must be inhabited. The presence of water and atmosphere, the attendance of moons so distributed as to secure light by night to all parts of its grand surface, and its magnificent proportions, more than a thousand times the dimensions of our little globe, induce the second inference, that its inhabitants are superior to those of earth. Then the specific gravity of Jupiter being 1.30 (against that of the earth, which is 5.48,) induces a third inference, to wit: That its inhabitants must possess a material organism entirely different from any animal life of which we have experimental knowledge; and so, the fourth inference: The dwellers on its huge bulk must be an intermediate race between men and angels. Here is an inductive process, rudely sketched, which will serve as a fair type of *all* hypotheses constructed by those who abandon true scientific principles. Granting the first step in the above process, the rest may be said to follow by lawful induction, and therefore theology and true science both take issue at the first step.

The other side of this topic relates to metaphysical phenomena, and in this wide domain, the assaults upon revealed religion are far more insidious, and far more persistent than any that are made by physicists. In the nature of the case, psychological facts are more difficult of proof, and more latitude is necessarily allowed to inductive methods of argumentation. The latest

challenge from unbelieving science, refers to the potency of prayer, and the Christian is invited to prove the truth of his dogma, which connects petition and answer, by announcing the former beforehand, and by producing the latter as the result.

In so far as this demand relates to psychological facts, it is entirely out of place, because here are no phenomena, in the true sense of the term, for investigation. A large part of the fruits of petition are matters of individual experience, and afford no possible proof except unsupported testimony. The limits that are popularly supposed, even in the Church, to hedge up the exercise, are more stringent and exclusive than any that God has revealed, because he has promised more than men believe he will fulfil. But there are certain undoubted limits, which are laid down in all sound standards, and the most exclusive of these is that which stipulates that the petition shall be "for things according to the will of God." Now, ordinarily, man cannot know that he is praying within these limits. For example: He may supplicate the throne of grace for deliverance from a thorn in the flesh, and pray with reiteration. All the known stipulations are met and provided for, excepting the secret purpose of God in the individual case, and just there the exact petition fails. But the answer comes, albeit the *form* of it does not accord with the *form* of the plea; and this is not an afterthought of theologians, but as a doctrine, is synchronous with the precept enjoining the duty of prayer. Moreover, the precise answer, as in a prayer for restoration to health, affords no proof of prayer-power, because the *vis vitæ* may have wrought the cure independently of special, divine power. So the demand is eminently unreasonable. It is not probable, however, that Christians will pray any the less—

1. Because the secret experience of believers all over the world, and in all ages, is, and has been, such as to encourage them in this exercise. If you ask for the proof-tests upon which they rely, you cannot get a satisfactory answer. They may say: "One thing I know, that whereas I was blind, *now* I see." But this unphilosophical reply is enough for *them*, albeit false science scouts the evidence. They could not furnish the proof demand—

ed, even if the connexion betwixt petition and answer were invariable and infallible. Because they cannot so lightly deal with an awful reality, like that of communion with God, as to play with it in answer to an infidel challenge.

2. Because the relation subsisting betwixt Creator and creature, involves an attitude of recumbency on the part of the creature. The idea of dependence is wrapped up in the fact of creation, and the universal experience of humanity endorses this statement. It is not good logic to resist the universal instinct of a race of beings, and probably it is demonstrable that praying is as normal an act of the psychological, as blood circulation is of the physical organism.

3. But the "chain of causation," from the conception and utterance of the petition, to the receipt of the thing sought, is not wholly beyond the apprehension of humanity. And the most ready way to get the sequence before the mind, is by an illustration from the revelations of physical science. Fifty years ago, the thought of communicating intelligence over thousands of miles of space, on the instant, would have been received by the world as the drivelling of insanity. But to-day the fact is not only accomplished, but even illiterate men have some vague idea of the *modus operandi*. It is well known at least, that the telegraphic writing is done, by breaking and restoring the circuit. Whatever the subtle fluid may be, by whose agency the thing is accomplished, this much is known: the electrical stream is cut off for the instant, and then the obstacle is removed, and in the act of suspension the character is made. An operator in New York sends a message to an operator in New Orleans, by alternately opening and closing the circuit, and no result is produced until the electric spark *returns to the spot from which it started*. It goes to New Orleans, across wide rivers, over lofty mountains, through forests, and returns, not by the wire, but by the earth, finding its way in a direct line to the starting point, and so completing the circuit. Wherever there may be a flaw or a failure, it is certainly never in the return journey. The wire may be broken, the insulation imperfect, the battery defective, or the complicated instrument mani-

pulated by the operator, may be out of order, but the great conductor—the earth—is always certain and prompt. And if the appliances within the control of the electrician are properly managed, the inscrutable and infallible laws of nature completes the operation. Everything within the power of the sender of the message is above the surface, and visible the entire length of the journey. Everything relating to the return of the current is hidden from mortal vision, and, except by inference, eludes mortal scrutiny.

Thus the prayer goes from the heart of the believer to the great throne. Theological science has unfolded all the manipulations, from the prayer-sender, to the ear of God. The prerequisite of faith, the thank-offering for past gifts, the rule of desire as defined in the Word, the confession of sin and ill-desert, which acknowledges the thing sought to be a gratuity, and the submission of the soul to the will of God—all these are but the voltaic battery, the chemical acids, the poles sustaining the wire, the wire, and the insulations; and the return current from the Prayer-Hearer, is the answer of peace to the soul of the petitioner. And the return is as certain, by the inflexible law of theological science, as the return of the electric current. The analogy is very striking in all its parts. Success in either case depends upon the fidelity of God, and his faithfulness is unchangeable, either in the operation of the natural law which makes the earth a sure conductor, or the operation of the gracious law which eternally connects the sure answer with the true prayer. On the human side, all the appliances are visible or knowable and manageable. On the divine side, there is no security save the word of Him whose names are Faithful and True! It were as wise for the theologian to deny the facts of telegraphy because he cannot see the earth current, as for the scientist to deny the power of prayer, because he cannot see the answer coming from God.

III. Thus far it is proper for man to argue, but any attempt to penetrate impenetrable mysteries, must be both foolish and profane. There are two principle classes of assaults upon

theology which have been briefly noticed. First: The attacks of infidel physicists, who attempt to annihilate Revelation by the production of stubborn facts collected from the vast material universe. They have explored the heavens and the earth; with the telescope resolving dim nebula, scarcely visible to the unaided eye, into galaxies of glorious suns. And with the microscope, they have laid bare many of the long hidden mysteries of animated nature, transforming the motes in the sun-beam, or the animalcula of the water drop, into multitudes of ferocious beasts of prey. And they have dug deeply into the bowels of mother earth, and brought to the surface the remains of organic life, arranged them in classes and genera, and proclaimed their ages as beyond the powers of human computation. The argument, stripped of verbiage, is, that the book which has failed to notice these stupendous verities cannot be a divine revelation.

Secondly: There is another class of opponents whose assaults are purely metaphysical. A writer, who would maintain his self-respect, must use respectful terms in his controversies, and this excellent rule should always be before the mind of the Christian, who encounters the shadowy, impersonal nonentities of transcendentalism. These are their own selected titles, and they are just. What form of argument may theology take in answer to the denial of a personal God, when this denial is based upon the denial of any or all personality? You cannot argue with a myth. You cannot address appeals to something, which says it is nothing, and that both you and it, and God, and nature, and life, and death, are all parts of one phantasm. Let any one, who has no dread of madness before his eyes, pursue one of these German thinkers from his premise to his conclusion, and if reason is not dethroned in the process, he will have had it demonstrated that he has neither identity nor existence. The God of his worship will be resolved into a hypothesis, and the end of his career, the destruction of a shadow.

Between this extreme of absurdity, and the wisest of Unitarian philosophy, there are, of course, many gradations. But the sum of them is stated in a brief sentence: Because

Christian theology revolves around a divine and a crucified Redeemer, it cannot be a revelation from God.

And thus the conclusion is reached, and Christian theology assumes its true aggressive attitude. It announces a few facts in logical order: The existence of God; and, therefore, creative energy. The creation of man; and, therefore, his subordination. The rebellion of the creature; and, therefore, the lapse of the race. Perhaps all of these facts are demonstrable from pure logic, and confirmed by Revelation. But there are some other facts which are unfolded from the depth of the wisdom of God, and these relate to the restoration of a ruined race to the favor of God. And here begins the "mystery of godliness." God manifested in the flesh, to work out the inscrutable problem: To be a just God and to justify the sinner.

While the highest powers that God has conferred upon humanity could never compass this appalling problem, the little child can apprehend the blessed solution: Christ came and assumed the nature of the lost race. He took the law-place of the law-violator. He wrought out a righteousness to cover the deformities of sin. He died under the curse of the law, and the saint died in Him, and therefore, as Paul argues,* the business of the saint is to live unto Him who died for, or instead of him, and who rose again. That is to say: "If Christ died, the saint died; and as the saint died in Christ, so did he rise in Christ," and his life is a life that is hidden with Christ in God. And as no mind can be imagined to win such gifts as these, they are revealed as gifts from the sovereign Father of lights.

In the face of this revelation, what does it matter, whether the fossils of the earth's strata are aged six thousand years, or six thousand unmeasured cycles. They are not so old as God, and they shall perish while he endures. And while the progress of geology may fix the dates and periods of all the changes that may be found on the planet, they can only help to demonstrate the power and Godhead of Jehovah.

*2 Corinthians v. 14, 15.

And thus theology, in the Mosaic cosmogony, is brought face to face, with the frightful bugbear of geological science.

The attempts at reconciliation that have been propounded are numerous. Notice a few of them. First: It is suggested, that the marks of age indelibly written upon the "pre-historic earth," are so many delusions wherewith God tries the faith of his people. As the revelation in his Word must needs be true, the apparent revelations in the earth's crust are false. If Moses asserts that the earth, just as it stands, was begun six thousand years ago, and completed in its present form in six days, then the deductions of geology are necessarily untrue. The fossils that are apparently the remains of organic life, were created by God in their due order and rank, and then by some extraordinary convulsion of nature were exterminated as the earth emerged from chaos. Arguing simply upon the power of God, this is conceivable. But arguing upon the truth of God, it is incredible. Because the indubitable tokens of growth, development, and decay, could not be produced in a day, unless God had contradicted all the orderly laws of progression which he had ordained.

The second suggestion is, that God created these enormous fossils, already extinct. That is: that God made mammals, fully matured, that had never brought forth their young; and while numberless tokens abound to prove the long habitation of these creatures upon the pre-Adamic earth, the teaching of theology is, that God made them as so many sham animals, to astound the thinkers of all subsequent ages. This proposition is simply monstrous. Going a step lower into the carboniferous system, the great coal-beds of the world all bear the marks of successive growth, and the certainty that these are vegetable remains is as firmly established as any fact in nature. Yet it is gravely suggested that God made these stores of fuel for the use of man, just as man finds them, and the hundreds of species of ferns abounding in the earth's black cellars, are either there by accident, or stamped upon the coal formation with no possible object by the creative hand of God!

A third suggestion is, that the "six days of creation" were really six ages, whose length cannot be computed, and that the dawn of the seventh cycle ushered in the present order of beings to take possession of the completed earth. But insurmountable difficulties beset this hypothesis, chiefly the want of synchronism betwixt the revelation of Scripture and God's other revelation, in the "testimony of the rocks."

A fourth hypothesis boldly asserts that Scripture does not deal with preAdamitic events at all. The Bible is the gift of God to man, and treats of his creation, his fall, and his restoration. There is no conceivable connexion betwixt the history of pre-Adamic creature, and the career of a single immortal soul; and there was no more reasons for reference to the trilobites of the Silurian epoch, than there was for reference to voltaic electricity.

Now what is the theological value of these various hypotheses? Suppose they are all false, or that any one of them is true, what moral question is involved in them? The answer appears equally simple and satisfactory.

The partition of the time of creation into six epochs, or cycles, or days, seems to have no possible theological reference or application, except to the establishment of a seventh. The six were in order to the seventh, and as God "rested" when the six were completed, he enjoined upon the race the perpetual observance of the seventh day, and the devotion of its hours to his worship. In the Decalogue the Sabbath is made to stand upon this foundation, and its sanctity depends upon the fact, that God rested—ceased from his work, which had been continued through six successive periods. And in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Christian Sabbath is shown to rest upon the same foundation, namely: The cessation of a work, and the entering into a rest. "For he that is entered into *his* rest, he also hath ceased from *his* own works, as God did from his." (Heb. iv. 10). "There remaineth therefore a keeping of a Sabbath to the people of God," (Heb. iv. 9), and this Sabbath-keeping is obligatory upon the followers of Christ while time endures, because Christ

entered into his rest on the first day of the week. His work was not completed while he lay in the tomb of Joseph. But at the end of the old Sabbath, and at the beginning of the new, the triumphant song of the heavenly host was heard: "Lift up your heads, O ye gates, and be ye lifted up ye everlasting doors, and the King of glory shall come in!" Nevermore did God perform a creative act, since the beginning of the seventh epoch. Nevermore did Christ endure a pang, since the great stone was rolled back from the door of the sepulchre.

The Christian Sabbath was not ushered in by any previous subdivision of time. It is the memorial of Christ's resurrection, and therefore of his perfected work. It is called "the Lord's-day" in Presbyterian standards, and is kept in his honor. Nevertheless the obligation to keep it holy, rests upon the command of God as specified in the Decalogue; yet in the Larger Catechism its relation to the six days of creation is one out of four reasons assigned for its observance. And this reason is stated to be "the example of God," which of course only applies to the fact of "rest," and not to the foregoing fact of work. Indeed, the obligation to *work* rests upon the announcement in the garden—"in the sweat of thy face, shalt thou eat bread," which was afterwards amplified in the fourth commandment. But the obligation to *rest* is based upon the cessation of God's creative work, and would have been as binding if this work had lasted through ten days, or ten unmeasured ages. The Sabbath is hallowed, not because God wrought six days; but because God *did not* work on the seventh.

If dogmatic assertions were proper on either side of this discussion, it might be asserted that the need for the rest of one day in seven is written upon the physical and moral and mental nature of man. It is demonstrable that the non-observance of this regularly recurring rest, entails a penalty which cannot be escaped, by changing the hebdomadal period. The French atheists, who essayed to establish the tenth day for repose, might as well have enacted a law adding to the hours of the earth's rotation. It was an assault upon God, in its animus, but it

was an outrage upon nature in its operation. And the curious fact of hebdomadal observance, all over the surface of the earth, as recorded in "Gilfillan's Sabbath, (which is the highest authority on this topic,) will close this argument, though it may be noted, in passing, that the lunar changes from the new moon to the last quarter have been a constantly recurring septenary phenomena since the creation.

"There are certain observances which have prevailed to a wide extent, as well as from an early period in the heathen world, and which, as bearing an affinity greater or less to the Sabbatic institution, may be considered as affording striking testimony to its primeval origin. These are threefold: appropriation of periodical days to religion, and rest from ordinary labor; the division of time into weeks; and the ascription of special importance to the septenary number.

"Traces of sacred days of some sort, though varying in frequency in different countries, may be discovered in many Pagan nations, the exceptions being limited to certain tribes sunk, like the aborigines of New Holland, to a very low point in the social scale.

"The Phoenicians, according to Porphyry, 'consecrated the seventh day as holy.' Before Mohammed's time, the Saracens kept their Sabbath on Friday, and from them he and his followers adopted the custom. It is stated by Purchas, that the natives of Pegu had a weekly day on which they assembled to receive instruction, from a class of men appointed for the purpose. The Pagan Slavonians held a weekly festival. In the greater part of Guinea, the seventh day (Tuesday) is set apart to religious worship. It would appear that the Chinese, who have now no Sabbath, at one time honored the seventh day of the week.

"Among the ancient Persians, the eighth was the festal day, the calendar of the Magi having this day marked in it as holy. The old Roman week consisted of eight days, and every eighth day was specially devoted to religious and other public purposes, under the name *Nonæ* or *Nundinæ*, so called from the Roman practice of adding the two *nundinæ* to the seven intervening and ordinary days; in the same way, as in Germany, and in our own country, the expression, 'eight days,' is used for a week, and as the French and Italians call a fortnight *quinze jours*, and *quindici giorni*, respectively. The people of old Calabar observe an eighth-day Sabbath, termed *Aqua-erere*. Humboldt refers to an

ancient law which required the Peruvians to work eight consecutive days, and to rest on the ninth."*

Mr. Patton concludes his address as follows: "I entered the ministry when the parted waters of American Presbyterianism were so near their point of junction, that I belong far more to the Presbyterianism of to-day than to any antecedent Presbyterianism; and I come to my present post with the deep conviction that these waters, (unlike the streams of the Ottawa and the St. Lawrence, where the blackness of the one and the brightness of the other preserve the individuality of each,) not only flow in the same channel, but have lost their identity in that greater stream which their union makes. I desire, as best I may, to serve our beloved Church, in discharging the duties of the position to which I have been called. And may God, for Christ's sake, equip me for the work he has given me to do."

A word or two must be spoken anent this peroration, which may have been appropriate enough in Chicago, but which might not endure a very searching analysis. In the first place, the "Presbyterianism of to-day" is not monopolised by the Northern United Church. There are some other types on this continent that cannot flow in the same channels. In the second place, the figure employed does not suit the history of the confluence referred to. Both streams were somewhat turbid, and hence the junction. Ostensibly, they united on the standards (with large latitude of interpretation), but the professor of Church history a century hence, will probably say that the attraction which brought the two streams into one, was their common abhorrence of another body of believers, who could not join them in their new psalm: "We have no king but Cæsar!" And having entered this mild protest, a far more pleasant duty remains: to congratulate the Northern Church upon the possession of two teachers of theology occupying the two most important posts within her bounds, whose work will abide while time endures. Other of these gentlemen have been recently called from

*The Sabbath, by Rev. James Gilfillan, Sterling Scotland. Amer. Edition. Pp. 357, 360.

the pastorate of large congregations, in the immediate vicinity of the nation's metropolis. A little more than a year ago, the Rev. Dr. W. H. Hornblower was called from the First Presbyterian church, of Paterson, New Jersey, to the chair of Pastoral Theology, at Alleghany. And now the Rev. Francis L. Patton has just been called from a flourishing church in Brooklyn, to the chair of Didactic Theology in the Seminary of the Northwest. And just here is the best promise of the purification of the united stream. The students who come into the ministry from the teachings of these brethren, will surely belong to the Presbyterianism of Paul, of Augustine, of Calvin, and will bring no little aid to the final confluence of Christian Theology with Current Thought, when these shall unite in ascriptions of praise to the King of kings. The votaries of science are not hindered in their progress by the spread of the gospel. And as the world grows in knowledge, so shall it grow in grace, and the postulates of finite wisdom shall resolve into the axioms of divine philosophy. And so it shall come to pass,—amplifying Mr. Patton's figure,—that restored humanity shall witness a glorious confluence. Like the four streams that watered the garden of Eden, these, Didactic Theology, Apologetic Theology, Physical Science, and Psychological Science, shall flow together and be known as the river, whose streams make glad the city of God. And, then, looking back upon the now inexplicable problems of time, it will be found that all of them had but one solution, to wit: the essential manhood, and the eternal Godhead of Jesus Christ Jehovah.

ARTICLE IV.

PROOFS OF DIVINE EXISTENCE FURNISHED BY
NATURAL RELIGION.

Our position is, that we cannot gain a knowledge of the existence and perfections of the Deity, except from the Scriptures; that the most solid ground of our belief in God is his own testi-

mony, delivered in the Bible, and certified to us by many infal-
lible proofs, that it is his word; that Revelation is in the
spiritual world what the sun is in the material system, the prin-
cipal fountain of light.

When we apprehend God as revealed in the sacred volume, we
are prepared to interpret nature, and behold in the physical
and moral world a manifestation of him. He that surveys the
system of nature without the light cast upon it by Revelation,
is in a condition similar to that of the eunuch, when, sitting in
his chariot, he read in the book of Isaiah. Philip, by divine
direction, drew near, and inquired: "Understandest thou what
thou readest? And he said, How can I, except some man
should guide me? I pray thee, of whom speaketh the prophet
this? of himself, or of some other man?" Instructed by Philip,
he perceived the truth, believed on Jesus Christ as the Son of
God, and was baptized.

In like manner the understanding may contemplate the works
of nature, but is forced to say: Of whom do these works speak?
of themselves, or of some other Being as their author? Do
they proclaim their own eternal order? Were they disposed by
chance? Were they arranged by an intelligent architect or
artist? Are they an evolution or emanation from a Supreme
Being, an efflux like light from the sun? Are they parts of the
divine essence, God and nature being one and the same? Were
they produced by a creative will, an omnipotent Maker, who
caused them to exist, and disposed all things in such admirable
order and beauty?

The imperfect, feeble, darkened mind of man is compelled to
say, with the Ethiopian chamberlain, How can I understand
the book of nature, except some one should guide me? How
can I comprehend her characters? How can I know the origin
of the world from a contemplation of it, or be assured that it
reveals a divine Author and his perfections, unless assisted by a
competent teacher and interpreter? Truth may be inscribed on
every page of this volume, but the language of nature must be
learned before her writing can be read, and the meaning under-
stood.

But as soon as God speaks in his Word, and declares that he is the former of all things, the world is lighted up with a new radiance, and testifies, with a clear and loud voice, of its Author. His image is seen in it as in a mirror. Everything in heaven and earth, every globe of light and rolling sphere, every tree, leaf, and flower, every beast, bird, fish, insect, and creeping thing, and above all, man, in his wonderful formation, seems to say, God made me. It invites attention to itself as his handiwork. It says: Look at me, examine my structure, consider my production, form, growth, life, action, motions, and the laws of my existence, and behold an exhibition of the power, wisdom, goodness, and beauty of the Creator.

It has, however, been a custom of philosophers and theologians to undertake to prove the existence of God by a chain of reasoning founded on the facts and evidences of natural religion. There are minds that like this kind of argumentation, and seem to prefer a logical demonstration of God's being, made by reason operating with the materials furnished by itself and by external nature, to a believing reception of this truth on divine authority and testimony. Let us then examine the arguments commonly adduced to establish the doctrine of divine existence, and see what validity and force they possess.

An attempt has been made, by two or three different processes of reasoning, to prove the necessary existence of God. The ground taken is, that there is an infinite, eternal, necessary Being, that is: a God existing of necessity, and prior to all other things.

One advocate of this view—Dr. Samuel Clarke—argues, that, inasmuch as there is a First Cause and Original of all things, he necessarily existed before them. But this is simply an endeavor to account for the being of God, after assuming that he exists, or inferring this truth from the existence of other beings, which are ascribed to him as their Author. We can form no definite conception of necessary existence, and are liable to understand necessity in the sense of fate, older and more powerful than God, and the cause of his existence.

Others, such as Plato, Des Cartes, and Leibnitz, deduce the

necessary existence of God from the idea and possibility of perfect being. Plato taught the doctrine that whatever exists in fact and reality, previously existed in idea; that ideas are the images and types of actual, real beings, things, forms, and substances; that there is an ideal, intellectual, invisible world lying back of the real, sensible, visible universe, being manifested and actualized in it. For example: the idea of man exists first, and is then expressed in a real man composed of body and soul. The idea of a horse or other animal, of a tree or plant, of a house, painting, statue, or any work of art, first exists, and is then represented in an actual being, thing, or form exactly corresponding to the idea. Applying this theory, either in its original or a modified form, to the subject of a Deity, certain philosophers have argued that the idea of Perfect Being exists, and that it is possible for such Being to exist; and that the idea and possibility of Perfect Being must of necessity be realised in the actual existence of such Being. But there is no logical connection between the premise, supposing it to be true, and the conclusion. There are ideas and ideals, creations of the imagination, and numberless thoughts, fancies, and plans in the mind of man, that never find expression in any form or work of art. There may be a world of ideas, without being realised in a world of fact. And there might be the idea and possibility of Perfect Being, without the actual existence of such Being.

Others reason in this way: That the sensible world, including the heavens and earth, and all that in them is, exhibits the characteristics of motion, change, dissolution, and perishability. It is a shifting, moveable scene or panorama, unfixed, inconstant, and unstable. Things come and go, appear and vanish, flourish and decay, live and die, are continually in motion and undergoing change. Hence, all that makes up this system is phenomenal and changeable. But the mutability, motions, and revolutions apparent in the material universe must be owing to some cause separate and distinct from themselves, and this cause must be distinguished by opposite characteristics. The finite implies the infinite; the temporal implies the eternal; the contingent, or that which happens, implies the necessary, or that which does

not happen; that which is movable, changeable, and variable, implies the fixed, immovable, and immutable; that which is mortal and perishable, implies the immortal and indestructible. There is, therefore, a necessary, infinite, immutable, and eternal God.

In our judgment, this view has truth and force only to this extent, that the human mind is so constituted that, on beholding effects, it demands a cause. When, therefore, it perceives the frame of nature, with its laws, motions, facts, and phenomena, it ascribes the origin of it to some cause. In some cases, the understanding may conclude that there is a necessary, immutable, and eternal Being, from whom the universe came. Yet, other minds, unaided by revelation, do not reach this conclusion. Ever since men began to cultivate learning and philosophy, to speculate and reason, to inquire after truth, a class of intellects have gazed with profound interest on the mysterious world around them, and have labored to find out the cause and origin of it. But how widely different have been their reflections, reasonings, and deductions! How various the speculations, how numberless, contradictory, and inharmonious the theories with reference to this subject! Some have been atheists. Some have asserted the doctrine of chance. Some have advocated the eternity of matter and of mind. Others have confounded God and nature, cause and effect, the one and the many, comprehended all things under a common name, and maintained the doctrine of Pantheism. Indeed, without revelation, and reasoning from the history of pagan philosophy in ancient times, it seems impossible to disprove the eternity of matter, either in atomic particles, or in the existing order of the universe. All of the ancient philosophers, without exception, believed that the materials of which the world is formed, existed from eternity.

Aristotle, one of the greatest intellects of antiquity, inclined to the belief that the present order of the universe had eternally existed. And many others, who taught the existence of a Supreme Mind or Intelligence, had no higher conception of God than of a powerful and skillful artist, who worked upon materials already existing, fashioned them into shape and form, adorned

and beautified them, and arranged all things in a regular and orderly system.

We attach, therefore, little importance to modes and processes of reasoning, designed to prove the *necessary* existence of God. Whether he necessarily exists from any ground or reason whatever, it is beyond the scope of the human intellect to determine and demonstrate.

The most conclusive and satisfactory method of proving the existence of a Supreme Being, is to collect the marks and evidences of design in the works of nature, and in the mental and moral constitution of man, and draw from them the inference, that those effects were produced by an intelligent Author.

Were we to undertake to prove there is a God, we might reason in the following manner :

First. Every man is conscious of his own being. He knows that he thinks, feels, and wills, and that his mind performs these operations—not his body. Yet, by means of bodily members and organs, as instruments, his spirit is able to exert its will and power, and execute works that manifest intelligence and design. We begin with what we are and what we do. Consciousness, and the knowledge of our own performances, are the basis of our argument ; the starting point in the process ; the first chain in the link of reasoning to demonstrate the existence of a Deity.

Secondly. Every man perceives and knows that there are other men like himself, constituted as he is, possessing similar faculties of mind and organs of body, distinguished by like properties and characteristics, physical and mental. Every man is convinced by observation and testimony, that he is capable of performing works of design and art. He can produce effects that exhibit intelligence, contrivance, and power. Man, therefore, is a constructive, and, in a limited sense, a causative being. He can contrive and execute, invent and make, design and manufacture, form ideas and express them in various and manifold ways. He is an inventor, a workman, a mechanic, an artist. He can build a house, make an axe, spade, and plough, frame a clock, watch, piano, and organ, fabricate articles of jewelry, perform every kind of carpentry and cabinet work, construct a

printing press, steam engines, the machinery of mills and factories, and operate them. He can carve a stone, paint on canvass, write histories and poems, produce musical compositions, and sing in a melodious style. We behold, in great number and variety, the works of man, displaying understanding, ingenuity, skill, and power. They are effects, of which he is the immediate and proximate cause.

But is not man competent to produce all the effects which we behold in the universe? No. Because consciousness, reason, and experience prove that there is a limit to his power and operations, and that while he can do many things, even great and wonderful, there are others that transcend his capacity. He cannot make a living organism, produce new species of plant, create a world, or cause the motion of the heavenly bodies. Our conscious weakness, an intelligent comparison of our mental and physical powers with the magnitude and difficulty of such things, and the knowledge derived from experience, satisfy us that while man can imitate, he cannot originate or perform the works of nature. They are operations beyond the reach of his art. They are too vast, complicated, and delicate to be wrought by his hands. They are pervaded with laws and springs of action, framed with a mechanism, distinguished by properties, characterised by magnitude, form, number, variety, embellishment, beauty, and perfection, that far surpass the achievements of human agency. Yet the works of nature exhibit manifold and striking proofs of knowledge, contrivance, and power. We therefore infer that, as works of art are the effects of man's intelligence, skill, and power, so those of nature were produced by an intelligent author. This agent is evidently superhuman. His works reveal that he is exceedingly great, powerful, and wise; that there are no bounds to his knowledge and power. He is God, the Creator of all things.

We reach the same conclusion when we observe the marks of design in the human soul. By the study of this invisible, incorporeal substance, we acquire a knowledge of its structure, qualities, and operations. We see in its constitution, faculties, affections, principles, habits, and laws of action, the impress of

a creative intelligence, as distinct, deep, and legible as in the visible forms and material bodies that we behold. The mind or soul includes the understanding, affections, will, and conscience. It possesses intellectual faculties, social and moral feelings, desires and passions, voluntary powers, and a moral attribute, a self-knowing, self-judging capacity, termed conscience.

The powers of the understanding are: Perception, reflection, memory, abstraction, judgment, and imagination. The intellect is also characterised by curiosity, association of ideas, and habit.

In the heart are the affections of love, hatred, joy, sorrow, hope, fear, desire, aversion, anger, pity.

The will is that faculty of our nature which exercises choice and determination; consents or refuses; prefers or rejects; inclines to, or is averse from an object. It is that which decides, and executes the purposes of the mind.

Conscience is the faculty that sits in judgment on the moral actions of a man, whether they be the thoughts, feelings, and exercises of the heart, or words and external deeds. All things within and without, that have a moral nature, are under its judicial inspection and authority, and subject to its decision. It impels to, or warns against every moral action, the performance of which is meditated, and passes sentence upon every work, as right or wrong, after it has been done. It approves or condemns, producing satisfaction, peace, and joy, or exciting remorse, pain, and distress, the dread of divine anger and future punishment.

Such is an outline of the soul, a summary exhibition of its constitution and properties. But it is a world in itself, full of interest, a scene of life and activity, a thing of curious and beautiful formation, and displaying, in the highest degree, marks and evidences of design. If the body of man is a skilfully constructed and wonderful work, his spirit is a still more admirable and exquisite contrivance. What an amazing combination of powers and qualities in the soul. The result is, an intellectual, emotional, voluntary, conscientious moral being—man. The mind is surely the production of an intelligent author, no less than his corporeal frame. The Being that made it must also be

a Mind or Spirit, but infinitely surpassing it in qualities and excellence.

There is a third aspect in which man may be viewed, viz., the union of his spirit and body, and the animal life, with its action and manifestations, that is the effect of this union. How wonderful is the connection between mind and body, and what an infinite number and variety of consequences flow from it. The greatest of these is physical life, which is a thing of inestimable value, a treasure exceeding all the riches of earth, a source of unspeakable enjoyment. "All that a man hath will he give for his life." By virtue of this union, the mind communicates with the external world, and receives impressions and ideas from it. Through the eye, ear, nose, by means of taste and touch, it perceives sensible things, and gains a knowledge of them. Through the body, particularly the hands, the mind also acts on the outward world, subdues and governs it, makes it a servant and minister to itself, employs it for various purposes, ends, and uses. Man feeds and clothes his animal frame, shelters it from rain, snow, wind, and storm, protects it against excessive heat and cold, and adapts himself to the varying conditions of place, climate, and circumstances. In ten thousand different ways he provides for his own physical comfort and mental gratification. The whole earth, and to some extent, even the heavens, are rendered tributary to his instruction, improvement, and happiness. A still more excellent and wonderful effect of this union is, that man can converse with his fellow-man. He can communicate thought, express feeling, affection, desire, and all the operations of the heart, perceive and interpret a reciprocal manifestation of such exercises by others. What a glorious power is speech, ability to utter articulate sounds, to employ words as signs of ideas. In how many ways may the inner spirit be expressed through the body. The result is, that men are capable of society, fitted for communion and intercourse with one another, and are able to accomplish the ends, receive the benefits, and taste the joys of social organisation. Nor does man, in his wonderful achievements, act, like the bee, ant, and beaver, merely from instinct, but in the exercise of reason, intelligence, free-

dom, and choice. When contemplated in this light, therefore, man bears witness that he was formed and constituted as he is by an all-wise Creator.

We thus argue from effects to a cause. We seek to know what produced the effects with which we are acquainted, and from the manifest marks of wisdom and design which they display, we are led to the conclusion that they are the works of an intelligent Being, and demonstrate the existence of God.

This is substantially the method of reasoning pursued by Socrates, when he sought to prove that there is a rational, wide, and powerful Author and Governor of the world. He did not view the universe as self-made, the product of chance, or disposed in its present order and forms of being by any unintelligent principle or power, but as an effect accomplished by the will of a personal agent, who exhibits wisdom and contrivance in his operations. The following account of his doctrine, and the way in which he arrived at it, is given by Xenophon, and is here produced in the language of another :

“From the observation of the facts of nature, and from the contemplation of the wonderful wisdom and constant order every where conspicuous in the universe, combined with a most accurate study of the minds of men, Socrates sought to know the Author of all things, his nature and perfections. He firmly believed and eloquently taught, that *God is an intelligent being, rational and wise, a most excellent intelligence, the Governor of the world, and the parent of the human race.* This faith and doctrine were established on reasonings such as these:

“I perceive,” he says, “in myself an intelligent nature, which we call mind and soul. I perceive when I do any thing in reference to a certain end, that I do it for no necessity or chance, but from a certain intimate energy of my mind, which in its thought has foreseen this end, and controls and directs the actions by which I endeavor to attain it. Hence when I perceive other men resembling myself in form, and manner of living and acting, I understand that their actions also have respect to some end, in like manner proceed from an intelligent nature, which dwells in their bodies, and governs them. When there-

fore I see an excellent poem, or a picture, or a statue, or any other work of art, skilfully wrought, I affirm that they are not the work of chance; nay, I cannot but believe that they are the workmanship of some artist, whose intelligence, manifesting itself in this, his work, I wonder at and admire. And the more eminent the skill of which any work bears the marks, the more apt the consent of all the parts to some excellent design, so much the greater I hold to be the intelligence of the artist. If, therefore, in the contemplation of the world, and its parts, there is found a conspiring and convergence of an infinite number of things, of the most diverse kinds, to the accomplishment of most noble results, a plan and ordering of events and circumstances, so many, that should the wisest of mortals wish to ascertain them, an endless series of ages could find no limit to his inquiries; does not right reason compel us to acknowledge that the world also sprung from the power and will and wisdom of some mind, and that too a most eminent mind, and that these immense bodies, arranged throughout the universe, move and maintain their order, under the guidance of a most wise Governor?"

Referring to the human body, and the evidences of design in its different parts, he says: "Can we doubt that some being endued with intelligence and wisdom, has made man? Reason forbids; and the very nature of things compels us to confess that all this universe exists by the power of some intelligence."

He next alludes to the soul: "The consideration of our own being may also, in another way, persuade us that besides our own mind, there is, far higher than man, another mind, which ought to be judged the fountain, as it were, of human souls. For as those particles of earth, of fire, of water, the harmonious combination of which is our body, are separated from that vast mass of matter that lies without and around us in nature; so we ought not to imagine that the soul only, by some chance, we know not how, became united with the body, no other soul existing but that of man, but rather to believe, from the analogy, that there is likewise, besides our own, some infinite mind, from which, as from a fountain, the minds which inhabit these bodies are separated and derived."

It may be thought by some, that the discoveries and attainments in the knowledge of God, made by Socrates, are inconsistent with the view that the Deity can be found and understood only as he is revealed in the Scriptures.

But while we admit all that Socrates taught, and admire the penetration and wisdom of his mind, yet, after all, we can gain from his instructions but a partial, incomplete, imperfect notion of the Supreme Being. It is very doubtful whether he had the idea of God as a Creator and First Cause of all things in the sense that we hold this doctrine. He indeed speaks of God as the Author, but more commonly as the Governor of the world, and seems to have entertained the opinion that he is nothing more than the Architect of nature, a divine artist, who arranged the order that prevails, and skilfully moulded the forms of being that exist. A certain author observes: "Though he taught many things excellent, noble, and true; yet not only are the same things found again in the sacred writings, but placed in clearer light, and accompanied by many other truths, more closely connected with the true happiness of man, of which no traces can be found in Socrates."

Besides, Socrates speaks sometimes of God, in the singular number, and sometimes of Gods, in the plural; and seems, on this subject, to be confused, wavering, and in the greatest uncertainty. He may have believed there is one Supreme Divinity, the Creator, Preserver, and Governor of the world; and, also, there are many deities of an inferior order. For he not only, in his inner spirit, worshipped one God, but he publicly adored the gods of his country, offered sacrifices on their altars, and paid vows to them in the temples, and observed the forms of religion sanctioned by the law of the State and by popular custom. He is, therefore, a blind, unsafe guide in religious doctrines and duties. For the Scriptures teach that there are no gods besides Jehovah, and that he alone is to be worshipped.

Other Greek philosophers, such as Plato and Epictitus, followed the same course of reasoning. They point out the evidences of design in the material world, and in the body and soul of man, concluding that "these things prove the existence of an

artificer, since things carrying such marks of contrivance could not exist spontaneously, and without design."

The celebrated Roman writer and orator, Cicero, in his work "Concerning the Nature of the Gods," seeks to establish the existence of an intelligent Deity or deities, first, from the order and course of nature, and then from the constitution of the human mind.

Among English writers, who have treated of this subject, and pursued this chain of reasoning, endeavoring to demonstrate the existence and perfections of Deity from the works of nature, and the intellectual and moral constitution of man, may be mentioned Archdeacon Paley, Dr. Chalmers, and Lord Brougham. Paley confines his argument and illustrations to the physical world, while the others go beyond this department, and explore the inner nature of man.

Paley's fundamental proposition is thus stated: "Wherever we see marks of contrivance, we are led for its cause to an *intelligent* author. There cannot be design, without a designer; contrivance, without a contriver; order, without choice; arrangement, without any thing capable of arranging; subserviency and relation to a purpose, without that which could intend a purpose; means suitable to an end, and executing their office in accomplishing that end, without the end ever having been contemplated, or the means accommodated to it. Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply the presence of intelligence and mind." The mechanism of a watch exhibits contrivance, as well as skill in its construction, and proves an intelligent maker. The same is true of other works of art. But the works of nature far excel the productions of man, reveal, in a much higher degree, wisdom and design, and therefore we conclude they were formed by an intelligent Creator.

Lord Brougham, in a discourse on natural theology, while admitting that matter and external nature afford abundant facts and arguments to prove a designing author, enters the world of mind, and draws evidences of divine existence from that source. He affirms that mind is a substance or reality, as well as matter.

Indeed, the existence of mind is proven by evidences not only as strong and full, but even more certain and complete, than those upon which we believe in the existence of matter. It follows, therefore, that the constitution and functions of the mind are as much the subjects of inductive reasoning and investigation, as the structure and actions of matter. The mind, equally with matter, is the proper subject of observation, by means of consciousness, and the phenomena of mind afford as decisive proofs of design as do the phenomena of matter. He then analyzes the soul, unfolds its structure, faculties, feelings, moral qualities, and laws of action, and shows that it bears evident marks of reason and design, which proves that it is the work of an intelligent and spiritual Author.

In confirmation of the wisdom, force, and conclusiveness of this method of reasoning to demonstrate the existence of God, we find that the sacred writers teach us to behold a manifestation of the Deity in the works of nature and in the soul of man. In order to impress the minds of men with the existence and attributes of a Supreme Being, they direct attention to the external, visible world, and to the spirit within. Near the close of the book of Job, God himself is introduced as a speaker. He seeks to impress Job with his own majesty, excellency, power, purity, and wisdom, and for this purpose, he brings forward the works of creation and providence as displays and witnesses of his glory. He also says :

“ Who hath put wisdom in the inward parts ?
Or who hath given wisdom to the heart of man ?”

Many of the Psalms, such as the 8th, 19th, 29th, 104th, 136th, 147th, and 148th, speak of God's power, wisdom, excellence, and glory as manifested in the heavens and earth, and their inhabitants. Isaiah instructs us to behold his majesty, omnipotence, and independence in the starry firmament. Contrasting Jehovah with idols, Jeremiah declares :

But the Lord is the true God,
He is the living God, and an everlasting King.
He hath made the earth by his power,
He hath established the world by his wisdom,
And hath sketched out the heavens by his discretion.

In the book of Amos it is written :

For, lo, he that formeth the mountains, and createth the wind,
And declareth unto man what is his thought,
That maketh the morning darkness,
And treadeth upon the high places of the earth,
The Lord, the God of hosts, is his name.

Again :

Seek him that maketh the seven stars of Orion,
And turneth the shadow of death into the morning,
And maketh the day dark with night,
That calleth for the waters of the sea,
And poureth them out upon the face of the earth :
The Lord is his name.

In Acts xiv. 15-18, it is related that when the people of Lystra and the priest of Jupiter, were about to offer a sacrifice and pay divine honors to Paul and Barnabas, they earnestly protested, saying: "We preach unto you that ye should turn from these vanities unto the living God, which made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are therein." In declaring to the Athenians the unknown God whom they ignorantly worshipped, Paul did not employ speculative reasoning and metaphysical arguments, after the manner of some philosophers both ancient and modern, but affirmed God to be the maker and Lord of all things, and that he is everywhere present in his works, which bear witness of him. In Romans i. 20, it is expressly said, that there is a manifestation of God in the system of nature; that his visible works clearly reveal his invisible nature and attributes, and that the Gentiles, destitute of a written revelation, are without excuse for not perceiving and glorifying him as thus discovered. "For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead."

To sum up this argument, I restate it in the following manner :

We are each conscious of his own existence—conscious that he possesses a thinking, designing mind, and executive will. We can produce effects, of which we ourselves are the cause. They are our personal acts and works. Other men can do the same.

Here we obtain the idea of causation, which lies at the foundation of all reasoning and philosophy. We get it from consciousness, observation, and experience. We find the cause of works of art in man. We then search for a cause of all the effects which we behold in nature and in the human soul. We conclude that these effects were produced by a rational, allwise and most powerful Being. We are thus conducted by investigation and reasoning to a great first cause, which is God.

In the language of Thornwell: "Unless, therefore, our reason is a lie, there is a God who made us and ordained the order which constitutes the beauty and glory of the universe. These heavens and this earth, this wondrous frame of ours and that more wondrous spirit within, are the products of his power and the contrivances of his infinite wisdom. External nature, to reason in her normal state, becomes an august temple of the Most High, in which he resides in the fullness of his being, and manifests his goodness to all the works of his hands. Nothing is insignificant, nothing is dumb. The heavens declare his glory. The firmament showeth his handiwork. The day elicits from the countless multitude of beings revealed by its light a tribute to his praise; and the night, with its array of planets, suns, and adamantine spheres wheeling unshaken through the void immense, utters a sound which is audible to every ear and intelligible to every heart. Science, when it has conducted us to God, ceases to speculate and begins to adore. All the illustrations which it has gathered in the fields it has explored are converted into hymns, and the climax of its inquiries is a sublime doxology."

ARTICLE V.

THE FAMILY IDEA OF THE CHURCH.

God has always had a visible kingdom upon the earth. He has never given up our race to the possession of the enemy, but has always reserved to himself a people to serve him.

The essential principles of the organisation of this kingdom have

always been the same. His infinite wisdom has prevented him from making any mistakes in the manner of its constitution. He has never, therefore, been compelled to change.

The kingdom has ever had the same sovereign, Jehovah; the same subjects, the families of his professed people; the same rule of government, the divine will; and the same essential privileges, symbolised in sacraments, justification and sanctification. "There is one body, and one Spirit, even as ye are called in one hope of your calling. One Lord, one faith, one baptism."

In consistency with this unity, there has been a progress, an unfolding of principles, a development of plan. It has always been, however, in entire harmony with the original, germinal idea. This development is seen in the sovereign of the kingdom. He is first revealed to us as God, either as essentially considered or as the father. When the fulness of the time was come, the Son manifests himself as the head over all things to his Church. Finally, the Spirit is revealed, under whose blessed regency it is our exalted privilege to live.

The law of the kingdom has not changed, but has been greatly developed from its original form. This is strikingly seen in the Sermon on the Mount. The law always said: "Love your neighbor." Its highest form was manifest in the New Commandment of the Master, "That ye love one another, *as I have loved you.*"

The privileges of the kingdom, as enjoyed by us, are, in all essential respects, just the same that Adam, and Abel, and Enoch possessed. But justification and sanctification, with the blessing that flow from them, are to us more explicit and less implicit than they were to them. They have grown wonderfully in the manner of their revelation to us.

The same truth is illustrated in the divinely ordained conditions of reception into the kingdom. Faith in God has always been the essential requirement. Since the fall, this trust must be a penitential one. Since the incarnation, it must be a contrite faith in the Son of God, as the vicarious, atoning Saviour of the soul.

So, lastly, we find the essential unity developed in the subjects.

of the kingdom. The Church was originally patriarchal, then national, and now universal. This is, however, but an evolution. The germ is the family. First, we have the individual patriarchal family. It then expands into a nation of families. It has finally grown into a race of families.

THE FAMILY IS THE GERM, THE INTEGER, THE MODEL OF THE LORD'S CHURCHLY KINGDOM.

In the antediluvian period, this is seen in the original Church planted in the family of Adam, and perpetuated in the families of Seth. Cain showed himself to be without faith, a murderer and a liar. He was a subject of the rival kingdom of Satan. Seth was "appointed," as Eve believed, in the place of faithful Abel to continue the "royal generation." In the fifth chapter of Genesis, we have given to us the census, by families, of the "sons of God," or the true subjects of his kingdom, from which the lineage of Cain is excluded.

The patriarchal period was but a continuation of the antediluvian. The family of Noah is the connecting link. Ham and Japheth are excluded, God promising to "dwell in the tents of Shem." In the eleventh chapter we have another catalogue of the families of the faithful, in a direct line from Shem to Abraham, "the father of all them that believe." To him, in a solemn covenant, Jehovah grants all the privileges of the Church, guaranteeing them to him and to his seed after him. So it comes on down in a regular line in the families of Isaac and Jacob. Ishmael, the children of Keturah, and Esau are all rejected.

The Jewish period is now ushered in. All of Jacob's sons, with their families, are accepted. These having grown into a people, numbering six hundred thousand armed men, the simple patriarchal system was not sufficient. They needed a development of the idea to organise the separate families into a general assembly, a national Church. But the family idea is by no means abandoned. It is retained in all its integrity. Here we see the individual families organised, as before, into patriarchates. The patriarchates organised into the twelve family tribes.

We see the elders still ruling as heads of the families ; the general assembly being composed of seventy elders representing the patriarchal presbyteries of the nation. We see the passover, a national a religious, a family institution. We see every proselyte either incorporated into a family, through which he holds his connection in the Church, or, if himself a head of a household, bringing his family with him. We see Canaan, the type of the blessings of the kingdom, owned and inherited, as an inalienable right, by families. Add to all of these pregnant facts, the curses denounced by Jehovah upon the apostate families, Jer. x. 28 ; Zech. xiv. 17.

In the days of the patriarchs, the Church was wrapped in the swaddling bands of its infancy. During the Mosaic dispensation, it passed the immature and formative period of its youth. Upon the day of Pentecost, it first attained its majority and entered upon its divinely ordained mission to subdue the world to its Lord. No longer merely patriarchal, no longer merely national, it proclaimed itself the universal kingdom. In this enlargement, the germinal idea is not destroyed. It simply receives a wider field for its manifestation. The Church is now a race of families, or, at least, is seeking to become so. That this is now the primal form of the Church will appear from several considerations. Peter, commissioned to inaugurate the new dispensation, tells us plainly, on the day of Pentecost, that God had neither forgotten nor abrogated the original family covenant. Acts ii. 39. We are expressly told that whole families were at once admitted into the Church, as in the typical cases of Lydia, the Philippian jailer and Stephanas. What is, perhaps, more striking to some minds than these significant facts, we read in several places of family churches, as the family church of Aquila and Priscilla, Rom. xvi. 5, and 1 Cor. xvi. 19, the family church of Nymphas, Col. iv. 15, and the family church of Philemon, Phil. 2. Finally we recall to mind the gospel as announced to Abraham, under the present dispensation being fulfilled, "In thee shall all families of the earth be blessed."

It is surely an important fact in this connection to recall to mind that for twenty-five hundred years, nearly one-half of the

entire history of the race, the Lord had no other Church or kingdom except as it existed in the individual families of the chosen generation. Each enlargement since that day has been of a character not to interfere in the least with this original form of the Church. The Mosaic and Messianic dispensations present to us the Church, no longer as isolated, independent families, but as organised into a symmetrical government with the family as the unit of integration. We believe that when our Lord shall clothe Zion with her millennial glory, this sin-stricken race of ours will be found to be composed, from Dan to Beersheba, of happy Christian households, from whose hearthstone altar there shall daily arise the incense of the morning and evening sacrifice.

Every Christian family has all the essential elements of a Church of Christ. It has the head of the Church as its acknowledged Sovereign. It has the divinely revealed constitution of the Church as the law of the household. It has all the citizens of the kingdom, father, mother, children, servants. It has the divinely recognised official element of the Church, in the father, who combines in himself the several ministries, of instruction, of ruling, of worship, and of providence. It celebrates statedly the several services of the Church, consisting of instruction, prayer, and praise. It enjoys all the privileges of the Church, the sacraments and the more glorious realities that are signified by them.

Every particular congregation is an organised aggregation, divinely warranted, of a number of family churches. So the Master looks upon it, and so should we regard it. Where God's people associate themselves together for the purposes of public worship, they come not into union as separate individuals. Their individual connection with the kingdom is through the family. This is their private, personal tie to the Church. So far as their own spiritual interests are concerned, there is a sense in which this connection is all that is necessary. But man, the Christian, lives not for himself alone, nor simply for those of his own immediate kindred. He sustains sacred relations to his neighbors and to the world. Growing out of these wider ob-

ligations, he is led to form, by God's permission and command, parochial, provincial, and national ecclesiastical associations.

The first of these is the parochial, for Christian efficiency in the immediate vicinage. This is not, *de jure*, an association of individuals. It is a congregation of Christian families, "of professing Christians, with their offspring, voluntarily associated together for divine worship and godly living." It represents in itself and controls the families which compose it. The provincial assembly is a gathering together of representatives of the particular congregations. The national body is made up of representatives of the provincial; and the ecumenical, which is yet to be, will represent the several national assemblies. It is a system divinely perfect, adapted to an individual, a family, a neighborhood, a province, a state, a nation, or a world.

The family is the integer of the Lord's kingdom, the organised Church upon the earth. This is, if we mistake not, a pregnant fact. Let us observe a few truths which legitimately issue from it:

I. The *citizens* of the kingdom are *all* those attached to the *Christian household*, father, mother, children, servants.

The Bible is pervaded with this truth. In the Eden Church, Adam and Eve, the original pair, constituted the worshippers. The covenant there made, and there, alas! broken, was a family covenant, embracing the race in its issues, whether of life or of death. The protevangelion announced that the seed of the woman was to bruise the serpent's head. This sanctified every child issuing from a pious parentage; for, whether male or female, who could tell whether it would not prove to be the mother of the expected Deliverer, or the very Messiah himself?

Cain, Abel, and Seth, were all included in the kingdom, until the first born, by transgression, fell, and was, by God himself, expelled.

We find that when the race apostatised to such a degree that justice demanded its destruction, the seed corn of the perpetuated Church was found in a single pious family. So not only the "perfect" Noah, but his wife and children also entered the ark—the symbol of the Church of the redeemed.

When Lot, as another typical case, was rescued from Sodom, his wife and daughters (it seems that he had no sons) were included in the gracious plan of deliverance with himself. All of them, but two daughters, having despised the privilege, were left to the consequences of their own infatuation.

In that memorable transaction recorded in the seventeenth chapter of Genesis, we have a most solemn renewal of God's gracious covenant, formerly made with Adam and Noah, as the natural heads of the race. The race, having now twice, with almost entire unanimity, rejected the privileges of this promise of the Father, he wisely determined to reject it, and to select for himself a spiritual seed to serve him. So Abraham was called from a land of idolatry, separated from his apostate kindred, and constituted by Jehovah the spiritual head of the elected race. To him as such the promise was made, which constitutes the covenant of love, whose gracious provisions we, his spiritual children, this day enjoy. To Abraham, the Lord said, as many as eight times during this particular transaction, that the covenant was not with him as an individual, but that it embraced "Sarah, his wife," "his seed," "those born in his house," and "those bought with his money."

When the "seed" had grown into a nation; when it had been hardened in the slavery of Egypt; when it had been rescued from its bondage and had been subjected to a further disciplinary education in the wilderness, and was now ready to enter the promised land; there occurred, as given by Moses, in the twenty-ninth chapter of Deuteronomy, another typical transaction. Let him describe it: "Ye stand this day, *all* of you, before the Lord your God; your captains of your tribes, your elders, and your officers, with all the men of Israel, your *little ones*, your *wives*, and thy *stranger* that is in thy camp, from the *hewer of thy wood* unto the *drawer of thy water*: that thou shouldest *enter into covenant* with the Lord thy God, and into his oath, which the Lord thy God maketh with thee this day."

When we examine the teachings of the New Testament, there are three passages, any one of which indicates clearly that this original constitution was not changed. When the mothers

brought their infants to the Lord, he not only rebuked those who forbade them to come, he not only took them into his arms to symbolise their participation in the blessings of his grace, but moreover made the distinct statement that the divine or *heavenly kingdom was composed of such little ones*. In this passage, as in all others, the kingdom of heaven is the Church of the Lord upon the earth.

Again, as we have already observed, Peter, ushering in the new dispensation with his inaugural address, announced to those, who had been reared in the family churches of the old economy, that the promise was still to them *and to their children*.

Equally significant with these is the teaching of the inspired theologian, as given to us in the seventh chapter of his first Epistle to the Corinthians. He says: "The unbelieving husband is sanctified by the wife, and the unbelieving wife is sanctified by the husband; else, were your children unclean; but now are they holy." This is a clear assertion, that *the faith of either parent makes the family a sacred household*. It consecrates, ecclesiastically, the other parent and the children.

II. *All the members of the Christian household, being citizens of the heavenly kingdom, are entitled to the enjoyment of all its spiritual privileges.*

These privileges are of two well defined classes:

1. Legal. By the transgression of the law, man made himself liable to its penalties. He became guilty. As such, he was condemned to the forfeiture of God's favor, and to the suffering of his eternal sovereign displeasure. This is surely a severe "bruising of his heel." The "seed of the woman" was to recover this by "bruising the head" of the destroyer. This was done, as we know, by the infinitely gracious act of substituting himself for his offending people, receiving the justly awarded penalty vicariously upon his own person, and procuring for them a legal righteousness which would meet the utmost demands of the holy law. All this is accepted by our offended Sovereign, as having been done for us by our representative, and, in virtue of it, a legal sentence of *justification* is rendered in our favor, by which we are absolved from all penal demands, and

completely restored to a state of legal righteousness in the kingdom of Jehovah.

2. Moral. By justification, the legal status of the elect is made one of perfect innocency. Against them justice can have no claim. Indeed justice is pledged to their fullest protection in every legal right. But the elect are still personally sinful, depraved. Justification, in itself, does not affect their personal character, but only their legal standing. But God's perfect government cannot endure the paradox of legal righteousness and moral depravity in its citizens. So the heart in being justified is also regenerated and made the indwelling of the sanctifying Spirit, by whose purifying influences it is to be made meet for the inheritance of the saints in light.

Thus legal and personal holiness are the two great privileges of real citizenship in the kingdom of heaven.

These belong, of right, to every member of every Christian family. We say this simply, because the King has said it, with all the solemnity of a covenanted royal promise. He said it to Abraham, with repeated affirmations, "I will be a God to thee and to thy seed after thee." He wrote it with his own finger on the stony tablets of the Sinaitic covenant, "I am a jealous God, keeping mercy for thousands of generations of them that love me." He commissioned his servant Peter to announce authoritatively on the inauguration day, "The promise is to you and to your children." He directed the apostle of the Gentiles to declare that he regarded the children of pious parentage as holy. Upon these declarations, we reëfirm that all the inestimable privileges of citizenship rightfully belong to every member of the godly household.

They are theirs of right; are they theirs in actual possession? This is quite another question. My father may leave me an inheritance of wealth, but I may refuse or neglect to claim it. If we mistake not, this is just what a vast number of God's people are constantly doing. Fathers and mothers are enjoying the privileges of citizenship, a justifying and sanctifying righteousness. The same belong to their children as a promised blessing from the Master. These parents, however, either refuse to

believe it, or neglect to claim it for their children. They have no realisation of the sanctity with which God regards the family covenant. Their offspring are to them but as the issue of 'the uncircumcised Philistines. They seem to think that justification and regeneration are impossible in infancy; that their little ones must be suffered to grow up with God's curse resting upon them, with unchecked depravity within them, until, after some years of service to Satan, they shall be converted to the Lord. We believe nothing of the kind.

But, on the contrary, it is our faith, that if believing parents would precede the very conception and birth of their children with a consecration of them to the Lord; would, upon their introduction to the world, solemnly renew that dedication, and, in faith, claim for them the blessings of the covenant, that every one of them would be legally justified and morally sanctified from its mother's womb, and thus never have an experience outside of the covenant of grace. We devoutly believe that the only reason this is not true in every case, is due to parental delinquency in failing to claim the divinely promised spiritual birthright of the child.

This is the Lord's chosen way to perpetuate and extend his Church. It is a growth from within, like the mustard seed. It may, here and there, pick up one and another, according to the election of grace. But the regular, normal mode of increase is through the multiplication of Christian families, the blessings descending from generation to generation in an ever-growing ratio.

III. The members of the family church are entitled not only to the spiritual privileges of the kingdom, but also to those *ordinances* in which they are symbolically set forth.

Those spiritual blessings we have already learned are a legal justification, through the vicarious satisfaction rendered to the law by our Saviour, and a moral sanctification wrought within the soul by the purifying Spirit. These gracious gifts were enjoyed by the family of Adam and by every pious household since.

On account of the soul's connection with a material body, man has ever needed the aid of an outward symbolism to embody and bring sensibly before him spiritual realities. While a few may school themselves to such habits of abstract thinking that to them these outward aids are not so essential, to the mass of believers they are indispensable. These sensible signs of spiritual truths are known as sacraments.

They are, and always have been, of two great classes, corresponding to the spiritual blessings which they are designed to typify. There are sacraments of atonement or justification, and there are sacraments of purity or sanctification. The information which God has given us of the patriarchal age is quite limited. We know that the organisation of the Church was confined to the family, and that the mode of worship was correspondingly simple. There were undoubtedly sacramental rites of both classes.

1. Of justification, there were the *rainbow* and the offering of bloody *sacrifices*. Abel's firstling represented to him the Lamb of God, his own vicarious substitute. In the shedding of its blood, he saw God's plan of saving sinners, by laying their sins upon a sinless, suffering substitute. In this way, his justification through faith in Christ was symbolised to him and to every patriarchal Christian.

2. Of sanctification, there were *washing* and *circumcision*; the former probably, Gen. xxxv. 2, the latter certainly, Gen. xvii. 10. Both of these rites were typical of moral purity; for in each the putting away of the filth of the flesh clearly figures the cleansing of the heart.

In the Mosaic or Jewish period, the Church passed through the most complicated stage of its existence. Its system of ceremonialism was gorgeous and extensive. In it we find a reference to the legal and moral phases of redemption. One set of ceremonies brought before the Jewish mind the atoning Messiah. Another set forth, with equal vividness, their need and the assurance of spiritual renovation.

1. The legal or justifying sacraments were the numerous.

bloody *sacrifices* and the yearly *passover*. These ceremonies were not only foolish, but cruel, if they did not embody some essential spiritual truth.

2. The moral or sanctifying sacraments were, as in the patriarchal age, *circumcision* and divers *washings*.

The sacramental changes made in passing from the patriarchal to the Jewish age were, as we perceive, very slight. The principal difference lies in the multiplication and public administration of the sacraments already given.

That these ordinances were religious, and not civil, is seen from the fact that they antedate the incorporation of the Church with the Jewish nation. It is manifest, moreover, from repeated and clear statements of the Scriptures.

1. As to the sacraments of justification, sacrifices and the passover, a few passages will suffice. The former were offered by religious priests, and are constantly styled "offerings unto the Lord." The latter, at its original institution, Exod. xii. 11, is called the "Lord's passover." Deut. xvi. 2, they are directed to "sacrifice the passover to the Lord their God." 1 Cor. v. 7, 8, is quite explicit, "For even Christ, our passover, is sacrificed for us."

2. As to the sacraments of sanctification the proof is no less clear. There is no question as to the washings. They were manifestly religious lustrations. As to circumcision, there is no difficulty in showing it to be a religious ceremony. It was the seal of a religious covenant between Abraham and Jehovah, Gen. xvii. 11. It is constantly used with reference to its spiritual meaning, Deut. x. 16, and the people of God are exhorted to "circumcise the foreskin of their heart. Deut. xxx. 6, the promise is given that "the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, that thou mayest live." It is frequently so used by Jeremiah iv. 4; vi. 10; ix. 25, 26. Col. ii. 11, is a similar passage, "In whom also ye are circumcised with the circumcision made without hands, in putting off the body of the sins of the flesh by the circumcision of Christ." Rom. iv. 11, puts the question beyond dispute. Abraham "received the sign

of circumcision; a *seal of the righteousness* of the faith which he had yet, being uncircumcised; that he might be the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised." It is, however, not at all essential to our argument to prove circumcision a religious rite. In fact, it would relieve a partial difficulty, could it be shown to be wisely national.

In the present Messianic dispensation, there is simplicity of organisation and of worship. The sacramental element is retained, but not in the profuse abundance of the preceding period.

1. There is now but one sacrament of righteousness or justification, a sacrificial feast, the *Lord's Supper*, in which the broken bread and poured wine evidently set forth Christ as sacrificially crucified amongst us. It is a ceremony of great simplicity. 2. There is also, for this period, but one sacrament of holiness or sanctification, washing or *baptism*.

The change from the former periods is more apparent than real. The original sacrament of justification was the bloody sacrifice. To this was added, in the middle period, the paschal feast, which contained, however, the sacrificial element. The final form of the sacrament is a sacrificial feast, a figurative though not real sacrifice. This final change was doubtless made for two sufficient reasons: (1). To accommodate the sacrament to the more spiritual and simple economy of the gospel; and (2). To do away with the shedding of blood, as the great Antitype has already shed his blood for the remission of our sins. The sacrament is no longer prophetic, it is now commemorative. *The essential sacrificial idea is found in all its forms.* So it has always been substantially the same.

The original sacrament of sanctification was doubtless washing. Its appropriateness and the generality of its practice in the different forms of religion which have prevailed among men seem to point to this fact. Religious washings prevailed in ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome. The earliest mention of it in the Scriptures is in Jacob's injunction to his family church after his return to Canaan. As a part of the preparation, suitable to the consecration of God's altar at Bethel, he bids his family to wash themselves. There are other cases recorded before the introduc-

tion of the Sinaitic dispensation. Circumcision was introduced as an additional sacrament of purification in the renewal of the covenant with Abraham, and was accordingly practised during the last four hundred years of the patriarchal dispensation.

During the Mosaic period these two sacraments were continued unchanged, perhaps except in the frequency of the religious washings.

When the "last days" were ushered in, circumcision was dropped, and, in accordance with the simplicity of the gospel, instead of the "divers baptisms" of the old economy, we have a single washing as the perpetuated sacrament of holiness. The change, therefore, from the beginning has not been great. Indeed we may say that we have the moral sacrament now just as Adam, Noah, Abraham, and Moses, enjoyed and practised it. It has *always been the use of water upon the body to symbolise the purification of the soul.* Circumcision was a more bloody episode in the economy of the kingdom.

Under all dispensations, these sacraments, of both classes, have been the common privilege of the entire Christian household, father, mother, children, and servants.

The sacraments of the patriarchs were sacrifice and washing. There was no limitation of either to parents or to children to the exclusion of each other.

The sacraments of the law were sacrifice and the paschal supper for one, and washing and circumcision for the other. There is no question as to the legal sacraments. Though it is probable that the father usually sacrificed for the family, yet it is certain that the whole household partook of the sacramental supper. Of the moral sacraments, washing was administered to all, indeed to the very house itself and its furniture. Circumcision however was limited to the male portion of the Church. This is a seeming exception to our italicised statement above. It is, however, only apparent. The sacrament of justification was administered in one of its forms, the supper to the entire family. So the sacrament of sanctification in one of its forms, washing was administered to the entire household.

Just here the question arises, Why were women not circum-

cised? The reason commonly given is, that they were not physically adapted to it. This is perhaps not true; for we know that some African races, Abyssinian Christians, and Mahomedans, have practised female circumcision. The great prophet of Islam says that it is an "ordinance for men, and honorable for women." At any rate, this answer is not fully satisfactory, because the question recurs, Why did God appoint a sacrament for his Church, of which only one-half of the race could partake?

We may not fully understand the reason, God often does things which are to us incomprehensible. We know that for all his acts he has a sufficient reason, though we may not be able to discover it. The following thoughts suggest themselves: 1. According to the Scriptures, as we have already seen, man is the head of the woman and her representative. 2. This sacrament was an outward symbol of inward purity. The important fact was the inward state, from which woman was not debarred. 3. The important, and to our mind satisfactory, consideration is, that there was another sacrament of sanctification, under the patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations, when circumcision was practised. Every religious lustration was a sacrament of holiness. Of these women participated. Women did not *personally* partake, ordinarily, of sacrifice, one of the sacraments of justification; nor of circumcision, one of the sacraments of sanctification. They *representatively* participated in both; and they personally partook of the other two sacraments, the passover for justification, and washing for sanctification.

In the present period of the Church, there is, as we have seen, but one sacrament of each class, the sacrificial supper for righteousness, and washing for holiness. Both of these are certainly as old as Moses. It is morally certain that they are both, in spirit, as old as Adam. Since the days of Sinai, at least, these have been recognised family religious sacraments, of which up to the time of Pentecost, at any rate, the entire household partook.

We now assert that they are *still family ordinances*, of which it is both the privilege and the duty of every member of the

Christian household to partake. The following facts collected from what we have already said, are to us determinative of the question:

1. From the giving of the law to Pentecost, no one doubts the admission of all to the paschal supper, and to the baptisms of the old economy. Where is the passage in the New Testament, which, either directly or by fair implication, forbids a continued family participation? It cannot be found.

2. Matth. xix. 13-15. Our Lord here declared that the citizens of the Messianic kingdom are children. If children are such, they surely should have the privileges of citizenship.

3. Matth. xxviii. 19, 20. This is the great commission announcing the fundamental principles of the new economy soon to be inaugurated. In it, the Master directs his apostolic servants to disciple the nations. In this work two things are necessary. He gives them in their order. (1). Baptise them into the name of the Trinity. (2). Teach them. Such is the true conception of the Church's growth. Baptise the children, and then teach them the Christian doctrine and life.

4. Peter was the master mason to lay the corner-stone of the Christian temple. In that corner he put, by the divine direction, this foundation-stone, "the promise is unto you and to your children."

5. In several places, we are told that upon the faith of the head of the household, the entire family were baptized as in the Church.

6. The interesting passage, 1 Cor. vii. 14, is of decisive importance. It clearly teaches the sacredness of the Christian family, and, by necessary implication, their right to all the privileges of the Church.

7. Finally, in consulting the records of the Church, we find that from the earliest days, from the apostolic age, the sacrament of sanctification, at least, was administered to all the family.

These facts ought to leave no reasonable doubt on the mind of the candid and intelligent, that the sacraments belong to the family Church, and are to be administered to all of its members.

A special question suggests itself here for careful examination, Ought the entire Christian family to partake of the Lord's Supper?

The creeds and the practice of the Christian world answer this question in the negative, and the following reasons are usually given for the judgment:

1. The supper requires for its proper participation a spiritual preparation, to which the young child is not adequate. 1 Cor. xi. 28. To this, however, we might suggest: (1). The requirement of self-examination is made only of those who are capable of meeting it. So it was of circumcision and the passover, under the old economy. There was for adults a spiritual preparation necessary for the proper reception of all the Old Testament sacraments. This, however, did not forbid their reception by children. (2). Such a principle would forbid baptism also to infants. A spiritual preparation for this is clearly required in the Scriptures. Acts ii. 38. Before Philip would baptize the eunuch, he required him to confess that he believed with all his heart.

2. The sacraments were not universally participated in, under the old economy. Women were not circumcised. Women and children did not, as a usual thing, sacrifice. As some of the old sacraments were partial, so one of the new may be.

With reference to this, we must not forget that women and children partook, in some form, of both classes of the sacraments, those of justification and those of sanctification. If the women were not circumcised, they engaged in religious washings, which were, symbolically, the same. If the women and children did not ordinarily sacrifice, they did partake of its sacramental equivalent, the passover.

Under the present dispensation, there is but one form for each sacrament, and so it would seem that all should partake of both.

3. It is further urged that the supper is too solemn an ordinance to be lightly celebrated. It must not be made a common family meal. This was the very mistake of the Corinthian Church. 1 Cor. xi. 20-22.

This is certainly true. It must not be made an ordinary meal. Its religious character must never be forgotten. Children of

irregular, immoral lives should not partake. By such conduct they forfeit their birthright privileges under the covenant, as Cain and Esau and many others did. The same, however, is true of adult communicants. Let the same tests be used for each, so far as applicable.

In addition to what has already been said, there are certain other considerations, which render it probable that the Christian world may have made a practical mistake in its position of exclusive adult communion.

1. We can conceive of no objection against family participation in supper, which does not equally lie against family baptism.

2. The supper is, as we have seen, but a continuation of the passover. Of it, the entire religious household partook for fifteen centuries. Where is the authority for the exclusion of a part of the family now? We cannot find it.

3. The ground of the admissibility of children to the sacrament of justification is the same as that upon which the sacrament of sanctification is administered to them. In either case, it is not on the score of their personal merit, but upon the gracious promise of God to the *faith of their parents*.

This, as we know, is the reason why we can administer the sacraments to the children of believing parents only. Faith is undoubtedly required for their proper reception. But God, in his love, accepts the faith of the representative head of the family, so long as the child is legally represented by its parents.

He, moreover, graciously promises that those spiritual blessings, which are thus sacramentally set forth, shall be given to the children of parents, who have hearts to ask it and to look for it.

4. The whole family idea of the Church seems to lead to the same conclusion.

The Christian world, it is feared, has lost sight of the family idea to a great degree. Our Christianity is not sufficiently private and domestic. It is too exclusively public.

5. The practical effect of the exclusion of our children from the supper is, in its influence on parents, to cause them to regard their offspring as spiritual aliens, and thus to weaken the sense

of parental responsibility; in its influence on the children to deprive them of a powerful stimulus to duty.

With both parents and children, baptism is a thing of the past. They need the moral stimulant of the perpetual, regularly recurring sacrament, the supper.

Before entering upon our fourth point, there is another question as to the sacraments, upon which this discussion sheds to us a convincing light. It is one of the vexed questions of Protestantism; a point which, we venture to say, has assumed in our theological literature a far greater than its Scriptural importance; a point which has awakened much uncharitable feeling, and has wasted much precious time. It is the particular manner of administering the sacrament of sanctification. The Scriptural doctrine seems to us quite simple:

1. It is a sacrament, an outward rite symbolising a spiritual truth.

2. The truth symbolised is the regenerating, sanctifying work of the Spirit.

3. The symbol is the use of the purifying element upon the body.

4. The manner of its application, as to quantity of water used, part of the body to which applied, attitude or action of the body when administered, is a question of no essential importance whatever. Several modes were doubtless practised under the old economy. The ablutions of the priests usually consisted doubtless in a bathing of the entire body. We are told that the molten sea, which is estimated to have held over twenty thousand gallons, was for this special purpose. 2 Chron. iv. 6. In addition, they were accustomed to wash their feet and hands only in their frequent approaches to the altar. Exod. xxx. 18-20. To ceremonially purify an unclean vessel, contaminated by a dead animal, it was required to be soaked, as it were, in water. Lev. xi. 32. In the purification of the leper, his clothing and himself were to be thoroughly washed, and the water of purification was to be seven times sprinkled upon him. Lev. xiv. 7. In the consecration of the Levites, they were to shave themselves, wash their clothing, and the water of purifying was to be sprinkled

upon them. Num. viii. 7. For general ceremonial uncleanness, a water of separation was prepared by the use of the ashes of a red heifer. It was "a purification for sin," we are told. This was to be sprinkled upon persons, tents, and vessels, as a sacrament of cleansing. Num. xix.

5. As a symbol of the Spirit's work, any mode usually practised is proper, though pouring of the water seems the most appropriate.

IV. The *government* of the kingdom is a patriarchal or presbyterial and representative one.

1. The administration of government, civil and ecclesiastical, is by the great King committed to the father as the head and representative of the family. To the original pair this fact was announced in the sentence passed by Jehovah Elohim upon Eve, "Thy desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee."

The original covenant was made with Adam; it was renewed with Noah, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as the legal contracting parties representing those who were brought under its obligations and made the inheritors of its promises.

The inheritances of the tribes in Canaan were assigned to them "according to their families," and the families were designated by their legal representatives, the patriarchal head. The only exception to this proves the fact very clearly. The males in one branch of Manasseh's descendants became extinct in Zelophehad. This was true at the time of the division. As the allotment was made to the males, it seemed as though this branch would be cut off from its proper inheritance. To prevent this, a special exception was made in its favor; so that, as there was no patriarch to represent them, the heritage passed immediately to the daughters.

The sacrificial offerings were made by the father, not for himself alone, but as the recognised agent acting for his entire household. All the exercises of public worship were performed by the father. Every first born male, the natural head of his family, was consecrated to Jehovah. This claim we understand to be based in the Lord's proprietorship in the entire race, of

which these were the most fitting types. Every male was required to make a solemn presentation of himself three times every year before the Lord in his tabernacle or temple. This was not an individual transaction. It was a vicarious act, the adult males representing the females and minors.

To illustrate how the entire family was regarded as represented in its head, observe the awful history of Achan. In the first place, notice how he was discovered. The tribe was first designated; then the first patriarchal branch; then the next subordinate family division; then the particular household; and, finally, the individual culprit. It shows most clearly the family organisation of society. Now note the punishment of the criminal. It was a dreadful execution by stoning and burning. In it Achan was not alone involved. In the head, the whole family was considered to have sinned, and so "his sons, and his daughters" suffered the same direful punishment.

The supremacy of the husband and father is, in strong terms, re-affirmed in the New Testament. "Wives, submit yourselves unto your own husbands, as unto the Lord. For the husband is the head of the wife, even as Christ is the head of the Church."

2. In the human administration of the divine government in the Church there are several distinct ministries to be filled. If we mistake not, they may be all comprehended under four heads: 1. The ministry of *instruction*. 2. The ministry of *worship*. 3. The ministry of *authority*, or ruling. 4. The ministry of service, or of the *tables*.

We have already seen that these ministries are all filled by males. Let us observe the special arrangements for the three dispensations of the Church.

The *patriarchal* period stretches from the creation of Adam to the rearing of the tabernacle in the wilderness, over twenty-five hundred years. Nearly one-half of man's existence upon the earth. During all this time, there was no organisation of the Church outside of the elect patriarchal households. The Church was the family. The family was the Church. There was, so far as we are told, no combination of these family churches into congregational churches.

The several ministries of the Church, teaching, worship, ruling, service, were all lodged in the patriarchal head of the family. He was Jehovah's chosen agent for the exercise of his authority and for the communication of his truth. He was the leader of the worshippers in presenting their devotions upon God's altar. To him pertained the duty of providing the necessaries for the service of the Lord.

The *Mosaic* economy extends from the wilderness to Pentecost, a period of about fifteen hundred years. The Church was now organised into tribes and into a nation. The primal family organisation was not abandoned. It was retained in its integrity, and made the basis of the development into a broader association. We still have the family Church, the family government, the patriarchal ministry.

As these families were grouped into tribes, and the tribes further generalised into a nation, there were introduced officials to correspond to this enlargement. We find, in addition to the patriarchal ministry, a tribal and national ministry. For the offices of instruction, we find a line of *prophets*. For the priestly functions of worship, we see the *family of Aaron*. For the ministry of discipline or authority, we have an assembly of seventy *elders*, as the chief council, with subordinate, local, patriarchal presbyteries. For the ministry of the tables, to provide for the public worship, we find the *Levites*, of the three families of Gershon, Kohath, and Merari, and the Nethinims.

During this dispensation we see a separate class of officers for each function of the Church's ministry.

It should be observed, moreover, that these officers of all classes, were patriarchal presbyters or elders.

Under the *Christian* dispensation, the Church has received a still further enlargement. It is no longer tribal, or even national. It has become general, it belongs to the race.

This fact has modified its administration. Contrary to an *a priori*, superficial judgment, it has simplified rather than complicated its economy.

As in the prior development, the family organisation is not abandoned. It is yet retained, and made the foundation for an

organisation which is to include the race. The family churches with their legitimate officers are the integers of the universal Church.

The families are now classified into congregations. The congregations are collected into presbyteries. The presbyteries are arranged into synods. This generalisation may be carried on till it becomes co-extensive with the race.

In its present dispensation, the Church has but two classes of officers to discharge all of its necessary ministerial functions. The first class are known as pastors, teachers, ministers of the word, ambassadors, bishops, elders, preachers, etc. The others are called deacons.

The elder, the bishop, and the pastor are one and the same officer in the New Testament economy. The first title is the designation of rank or authority. The other two are expressive of the duties pertaining to the office. That the office is one is manifest from the whole tenor of the New Testament, as well as from several special passages. In the well-known charge given by Paul to the officers of the Ephesian Church, recorded in the twentieth chapter of the Acts, they are officially styled *elders*, and as such are enjoined to discharge their *episcopal* and *pastoral* duties. All three terms are thus used with reference to them.

Again, the epistles of Timothy and Titus, which give detailed instruction as to the Constitution of the Church, contain also special directions as to its officers. In the third chapter of the first pastoral to Timothy, the two permanent offices of the Christian Church are designated as those of the bishop and deacon. There is no mention of any other. Shall we conclude that the office of the elder was not to be recognised as permanent? No. Because it is specially spoken of in other places, as 1 Tim. v. 1, 17, and Tit. i. 5. The elder then must be regarded as a bishop or as a deacon. 1 Tim. v. 17 shows him to be a bishop.

We may ask: Is there any distinction recognised amongst this class of officers? None except that which obtains among officials of co-ordinate rank. We learn from the inspired records that each Church, like the Jewish synagogue, had its presbytery

of elders. See Acts xiv. 23; xx. 17; Titus i. 5. In the passage already quoted, 1 Tim. v. 17, they are apparently divided into two sections: 1. To rule simply. 2. To rule and to labor in word and doctrine. As the Jewish synagogue had a presiding officer over its bench of elders, so the present parochial presbytery has a superintending pastor, who stands among them *primus inter pares*.

We must say, as we pass, that we do not think that our form of government presents these officers in an entirely unexceptionable way. It makes the bishop or pastor a different officer from the ruling elder. Chaps. III and V. We know no authority for this in the inspired Constitution. It further has the appearance of degrading the elder's position by not including him seemingly in the necessities of a quorum. Chap. X., sec. 7. Again, it is to us quite questionable whether it was proper to join the ruling elder and the deacon in the same formula for installation and ordination. The right place for the elder is with his co-ordinate, the chief pastor. Chap. XIII.

The functions of the religious ministry we have already ascertained to be four: Instruction, worship, authority, and service. Which of these pertain to the eldership, and which to the diaconate? The ministry of instruction; the ministry of worship, the ministry of authority all belong to the elder.

The ministry of service, or, as it is perhaps better known, the ministry of the tables, belongs to the deacon. It is his province to serve, or provide for the table of the Lord, the table of the congregation, the table of the chief pastor, and the table of the poor.

The Church as a private organisation has its home in the Christian family. It works upon the public through parochial, provincial, and national assemblies. The father combines in himself all the functions of the religious ministry in the domestic private Church. The elders and deacons are officers of the public organisation. How are they chosen?

1. They should be family presbyters. One of the special qualifications divinely required for the proper filling of each

office is the headship of a family and the judicious discharge of the duties growing out of that position. 1 Tim. iii. 2, 4, 5, 12.

2. In our judgment, they should be chosen by the family presbyters of the congregation of the vicinage. Any limitation of the privileges of suffrage, either in Church or State, is very unpopular in these days. We have our convictions, and these we must express whether shared by few or many. We will briefly give the reasons of our belief upon this point.

(1). God, in his infinite wisdom, has made man the ruling element in society. This he has distinctly stated in the early and the late revelations of his will. He then is the repository of God's authority upon earth, whether in civil or ecclesiastical society. It is a high honor, but involves a dread responsibility.

(2). There are direct and positive prohibitions of all public presentations on the part of woman. She is required to be silent in the Church; she is not permitted to speak; she is not suffered to teach, nor to exercise authority. 1 Cor. xiv. 34-35; 1 Tim. ii. 11-12.

(3). The representative idea runs through the divine economy. Adam represented his posterity. Christ represents us, his people. The tribe of Levi represented the other tribes in religious worship. The whole system of Church government is representative. The parochial presbytery represents the electors of the congregation. The district presbytery represents the parochial presbyteries. The general presbytery represents the provincial presbyteries. So the father, the husband represents his family church, and is its divinely appointed elector in the constitution of the congregational Church. The parochial presbytery thus represents the family churches of the congregation, the integers of the ecclesiastical organisation.

The writer of the present article was criticised as having a tendency to congregationalism, because in a pamphlet published by him some years since on our *Church Constitution*, he took the ground that the people of God were the fountains of power in his Church. These critics asserted quite triumphantly that all ecclesiastical rulers represent the great Head of the Church,

as the supreme source of authority. This assertion is most assuredly true, but does not at all affect the position of the writer. Authority has its divine and its human aspects. All authority in the State is representative of the King of kings—this is its divine phase. In a republic, it is exercised in the name of the sovereign people—this is its human relation. All power in the Church is legitimate only as it bears the seal of the only King in Zion—such is its divine aspect. All power in the Church, the King has committed to those family heads, whom he regenerates and thus qualifies for citizenship in his kingdom. All ecclesiastical authority, therefore, in its human phase, is patriarchal, presbyterial, popular, representing the individual converted electors of the commonwealth of Israel.

Gathering up the results, we have found the family the integer, the model of the Church. From this generic truth we have obtained several special ones. All members of the Christian family are members of the Church. All members of the Christian family are entitled to the spiritual privileges of the Church. All members of the Christian family are entitled to the sacraments of the Church. Finally, the government of the Church is patriarchal, presbyterial, representative.

NOTE.—The article on the Law of the Tithe, the first part of which appeared in the last number of this *Review*, proved to be too extensive to be completed in the present number. The author, preferring not to wait for this comparatively slow process of publication, has had the entire article printed in pamphlet form. Those of our readers who desire to see the remainder of this able and learned discussion, we would refer to the writer, the Rev. A. W. Miller, D. D., Charlotte, N. C.—EDITORS S. P. REVIEW.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

Reason and Redemption, or the Gospel as it attests itself. By ROBERT BAKER WHITE, D. D.—“Thy word is truth.” Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1873. Pp. 351. 8vo.

The design of this volume is to show that the plan of redemption, unfolded in the Old and New Testaments, attests itself. If redemption be true, our whole religion is divine, and the volume in which it is disclosed is inspired. No great learning or research, or talent is necessary on our part for the discovery of its truth. It blazes out at once on the soul, so that the simple cottager, the Indian in his wigwam, and the negro in his hut may understand what that plan is, and that its origin is divine, as well as he that has pondered the pages of Plato or handled the tomes of Aquinas.

Such is the design of the volume before us, as described by its author. We remember to have heard some few years since the kernel of this argument presented by him in a sermon from the pulpit. It struck us then with unusual force, and we are glad that he has since set it forth in its proper proportions and given it to the public, with those graces of style of which he is so capable, and in a volume so attractive.

Redemption is the central thought of the whole Scriptures. It is that which makes them distinct and different from all other writings, from every other code of law, or system of religion or morals. It is that in which their divine origin shines conspicuously forth.

The sinfulness and guilt of man, and his responsibility to his Creator is the universal dictate of conscience. There is nothing that man can do which shall constitute a ground for pardon. Natural religion, and human reason cannot reconcile divine justice with divine mercy. But the plan of redemption does. It then was no out-birth of human reason, but a revelation from God. It alone suggests the possibility of pardon. Human

reason knows nothing of it. Without the renewal of man's moral nature he must be forever sinning, and forever miserable. The plan of redemption proposed in the Scriptures—this plan alone secures this moral renovation to all who seek it. Natural religion does not. Redemption is the necessary *complement* of that which is taught us by the light of nature. As we approach the Scriptures we see the scheme of redemption emerging from the mists of the earlier ages, becoming brighter and clearer through a succession of witnesses until it culminates in the cross of Calvary. No collusion of these witnesses through so many generations can for a moment be supposed. A divine hand and that alone has conducted it to its consummation. The grandeur of the scheme so far above the proudest products of human genius, the new and rational views of the divine perfections and providence, the new light it sheds upon the moral law, upon human guilt and the nature of sin, the moral influence of the doctrines of Christ crucified, of Christ's divinity and incarnation, of the doctrine of justification by faith only, the disclosure redemption makes of the nature and influence of faith, the light it sheds upon man's responsibility for his religious belief, the practical influence of the doctrine of redemption on the moral, intellectual, and political interests of mankind; these are the running topics of the first fifteen chapters of this volume. In them we had marked many passages, as discriminating as they were chaste and beautiful in their style, which it might be proper to quote were we reviewing formally the volume before us.

In the 16th and 17th chapters the author shows that Christianity is the *true*, because the *best* religion, by contrasting it with Atheism, Pantheism, Deism, Judaism, Paganism, Mohammedanism, and Swedenborgianism, which, as it claims to be founded on *new* revelations, forms a brief appendix to the foregoing.

In the 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22d chapters the author encounters and overthrows the objections to divine revelation, on the ground of the mysteries found in it, which are no greater than those found in nature itself and the religion of nature, nor

greater than those involved in the various sceptical theories which infidelity has proposed. On the other hand, these mysteries exercise and invigorate the understanding, are subservient to our highest moral improvement, and are expected in a revelation from heaven. "To know all mysteries, we must cease to be men, and become divine." "The mysteries of God's word are but an excess of light." The difficulties of revelation are next encountered, such as the doctrine of the Trinity, the theories of geology, a science which, so far as it is such, confirms the Scriptures, shows that miracles are possible and credible, and renders extremely probable the coming destruction of the world by fire of which the Scriptures speak. The unity of the human race is next discussed, the alleged antiquity of even the origin of species, and the Darwinian theory of the descent of man, so lately and popularly caricatured in the *Mardi Gras* saturnalia at New Orleans. The astronomical objections to the doctrine of redemption are next passed in review, and the limited influence of this doctrine, as yet, on the family of man is shown to be consistent with the methods of divine providence, which employs in all other things, long periods of time in the accomplishment of its purposes. The next objection which is rebutted is that founded on the salvation of bad men, so adjudged by human law, and the substitution of the innocent for the guilty, in the vicarious atonement, in the course of which the imputation of the guilt of the first man is established from the light of nature. The last formal objection discussed is the alleged impossibility of miracles. Then follows a chapter on the system of Utilitarianism as held by different men, from Aristippus and Epicurus of old, to Archdeacon Paley of the present century, which, though embraced by some devout and able theologians, has led in some cases to a positive rejection of the Christian religion. The future of redemption in the Millennial period yet to come is the subject of the 25th chapter. The two last are occupied by the objections urged to the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures.

It was to have been anticipated that the evidences of a divine revelation would cluster most numerous around its great cen-

tral truth, the doctrine of redemption. As around the person of the king, his most trusted and valiant soldiers are gathered, whether he presses upon the front of his enemies or in confident security awaits their attack, so is it with this right royal doctrine, around which all other truths of revealed religion revolve as their sun and centre. The author of this volume has wisely availed himself of this fact, and produced from this as his vantage ground an irrefragable argument for divine revelation. It belongs to the internal rather than to the external evidences of the sacred writings, and though briefly adduced, it has not been so fully dwelt on by other writers with which we are acquainted. He has brought into contribution his acquaintance with a wide circle of authors, on this and the numerous kindred topics which lay along his pathway, and has expressed his views in a style at once polished and engaging, and often of singular beauty. The book deserves, and we hope will receive a wider circulation than often falls to the lot of our Southern authors.

Proceedings connected with the Semi-Centennial Commemoration of the Professorship of REV. CHARLES HODGE, D. D., LL.D., in the Theological Seminary at Princeton N. J., April 24, 1872. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph & Co., 770 Broadway, corner of 9th street. Pp. 128. 8vo.

It is given to very few of the truly great and eminent and useful, to live such a life and accomplish such a work as that of the distinguished Professor, in whose honor these interesting proceedings were had. To have taught in one of the chief schools of the prophets for fifty years; to have assisted in the education of twenty-seven hundred Presbyterian ministers, who have carried the Princeton theology all over this country, and into many foreign lands; to have conducted, for forty years, a most influential and useful organ of truth in the shape of the *Princeton Review*, and to have been the actual writer of many of its most valuable articles; to have published a number of truly learned and thoroughly sound commentaries on different books of Scripture which are deservedly held to be standards of authority amongst all the orthodox in every church of every

land; and, finally, to have put forth in his green old age three noble volumes of Systematic Theology—the ripe and rich fruits of his half century of reading, meditation, and prayer, and the fullest and grandest exposition and defence of the doctrines of grace which this age has produced; all these achievements taken together constitute a most extraordinary record of service done for the Lord and his Church.

This interesting volume consists of three parts: The *first* gives a preliminary statement concerning the occasion; the *second* gives a report of the addresses made; the *third* records the correspondence held regarding this remarkable celebration. The whole taken together is what no lover of sound theological training could peruse with indifference, and what every Princeton student must read with intense satisfaction.

In one part or other of these proceedings most of the Theological schools of this country of various denominations, and a number of the colleges, were heard from, whilst there were also presented the salutations and congratulations of several theological faculties across the ocean. A large number of eminent ministers and professors were present in person and took part in the proceedings. But of the numerous speeches made on this occasion, some of them very eloquent and beautiful, the one which would be apt to interest the reader most, is the brief, simple, manly, modest, humble, touching response made by Dr. Hodge himself to the address of the Directors and Trustees, through Dr. Boardman. It may be well said, that the labors of his life do him honor, but that such a speech as that in such circumstances proclaim him *truly great*.

One of the most interesting items in these records is the fact, that in the brief space of time, between the first suggestion and the actual celebration, very nearly \$50,000 was collected towards the endowment of a "Charles Hodge Professorship" in the Seminary, and of a purse also of over \$15,000 as a present to the venerable and beloved teacher.

And yet there is one department of sacred truth in which Dr. Hodge does not shine. The doctrine of the Church he has not illustrated with much success. Either his mind is so constructed that

it refuses to deal with the concrete, or else the fact of his having been, from the very first, a Professor immured in the Seminary unfits him to handle what is practical. Not only did he oppose the high, just and consistent ground which the Church took in 1845 respecting the invalidity of Romish baptism; not only has he denied the necessary distinction made by our standards and in the Scriptures, between the Church as visible and as invisible, refusing to the former the possession of the promises and other prerogatives of the Church and so diminishing the importance of Church order; but, on almost every question which, during his life-time, has separated the *slack* from the *strict* Presbyterianism, he has been found coöperating with the former, and against the latter. Denying, and even sometimes ridiculing the idea of divine right for any system of church government, he has formally insisted on discretionary power vested in the Church to make laws and regulations for herself. Accordingly he has not scrupled to insist that the Church may appoint other organised bodies to do her own work, which has appeared to many to be fatal to the Presbyterian doctrine of the courts. And in like manner he has always denied the full and just rights of ruling elders, who are in fact the only scriptural members of those courts. Dr. Hodge's doctrine of the elders is, that *they are not presbyters*, and so Dr. Cunningham (see Historical Theology, Vol. II., p. 547, note,) identifies his view of the subject with that held by Dr. Smyth of Charleston. Other items might be added to this list of blots on the eminent Professor's reputation as a *Presbyterian*. Were it strictly proper to distinguish between *Calvinism* and *Presbyterianism*, we should certainly go as far as any who spoke at the late celebration, in according to Dr. Charles Hodge preëminence amongst all living representatives of the former, whether on the one, or on the other side of the Atlantic. But, as his honest and sincere admirers, we never shall cease to rejoice that he did not commit the error of publishing his Church Doctrines, along with his Systematic Theology.

The Theology and Theologians of Scotland, chiefly of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: Being the "Cunningham Lectures," for 1870-'71. By JAMES WALKER, D. D., Carnwath. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38 George street. 1872. Pp. 190. 8vo.

A poor, half-witted man in the North of Ireland, nearly one hundred years ago, was accustomed to wander over the country, and the people were in the habit of freely sharing with him their oat-meal porridge and milk. His peregrinations on foot gave him a very keen relish for this admirable dish, which he esteemed as well nigh *royal fare*, and he would say, as he eagerly supped, "If I was a king, I would have king's meat—cream parritch and cream *to them*"—that is, oat-meal boiled in cream and then cream poured over it at the table.

We have devoured Dr. Walker's six "Cunningham Lectures" with as much delight as "cream porridge and cream *to them*" could have afforded the poor wanderer of Erin. In more modern parlance, they have been to us like *strawberries and cream*. They constitute a volume to be read over and over again by the deep and earnest student of the doctrine of Church Government, and of Historical Theology. The author is thoroughly acquainted with his subject. The book abounds with the most valuable information about men and things in Scotland during the two centuries preceding the present. The reader feels persuaded more and more at every page that he is following a competent and also a trustworthy guide. Nothing is exaggerated, nothing rashly expressed. Dr. Walker distinguishes constantly and carefully. And his style is so simple and earnest, so lively and piquant, that one is not soon weary of the repast set before him—the cream is rich, but the acid of the strawberries at once requires and corrects that.

The "Cunningham Lectureship" was founded by William Binny Webster, a gentleman connected with the Free Church. He gave to the General Trustees of that Church £2,000 sterling, the income from which should go to the minister or professor (usually of the Free Church) who should be appointed lecturer by a council provided for—the appointments are for not

less than two, nor more than three years. The lecturer chooses for himself any subject within the range of apologetical, doctrinal, controversial, exegetical, pastoral, or historical theology, including what bears on missions, home and foreign. The lectures, not fewer than six in number, are to be delivered publicly at Edinburgh, at some time immediately preceding the expiry of the appointment, and in the presence of the professors and students of the New College; and then the lecturer is bound also to print and publish, at his own risk, not fewer than 750 copies of the lectures within a year after their delivery, and to deposit three copies of the same in the library of the New College.

These six lectures of Dr. Walker are the Fourth Series of the Cunningham Lectures. Principal Fairbairn's Revelation of Law in Scripture constituted the Third Series, and Professor Buchanan's Doctrine of Justification, the second. What the First Series was we are not able to state. This mode of doing honor to the name and memory of Cunningham is eminently proper. And great must be the profit of it to the good cause. There is no better way of using money than to make it conduce to the culture and spread of Christian learning, and especially concerning Presbyterian doctrine.

The first of Dr. Walker's lectures is his *Survey of the Field*. Beginning with Knox and Melville, he gives a running account of all the chief theologians of Scotland, down to about the middle of the eighteenth century. No Presbyterian can begin to read this lecture without going through it all. The details are positively charming. The second lecture is on the Atonement—its Necessity, its Nature, and its Extent. We are presented with the views which were held by Rutherford, Patrick, Gillespie, and Fraser of Brea, on the one hand, and by Boston and the 'Marrow Men' on the other. Lecture the third is on *Predestination and Providence*, an extremely able and learned discussion. In the fourth lecture we have a most profound and searching examination of the difficult question of the *Visible Church*, and especially of the *Nature of Schism*. The *Headship of Christ*, and *Erastianism*, form the subject of lecture the fifth, and there is not one of the series which has more value or in-

terest. The sixth lecture examines *Present Misrepresentation of Scottish Religion*. The charges made against it are three: 1. It is a gloomy system. 2. It deals only in speculative dogma, the personal Christ being excluded from its consideration entirely. 3. It is just Sabbatarianism. The vindication is very complete, and it furnishes very delicious reading. Mr. Buckle, author of the *History of Civilisation*, has a good deal to say on the first point, and Dr. Walker convicts him of blunders which are indeed, as he says, "a scandal to our modern literature." We know of no uninspired writing we should rather put into the hands of a foe of Presbyterianism, by way of overcoming his prejudices, than this sixth lecture of Dr. Walker's—nor, indeed, does any uninspired writing occur, to our recollection, just now, which a friend to Presbyterianism would be likely to find, either more pleasant or more profitable, than the whole of this volume taken together.

The Tercentenary Book, commemorative of the completion of the life and work of John Knox, of the Huguenot martyrs of France, and the establishment of Presbytery in England, containing an account of the "Tercentenary Celebration" as observed by the Presbyterians of Philadelphia, November 20, 1872; the oration of PROF. S. D. WILSON, D. D. LL.D., and Historical Papers of the REV. R. M. PATTERSON, the REV. J. B. DALES, D. D., and the REV. JAMES McCOSH, D. D. LL.D., with an introduction by the REV. HENRY C. McCOOK. Illustrated. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, No. 1334 Chestnut street. Pp. 232. 12mo. 1872.

Presbyterianism three hundred years ago. By the REV. WM. P. BREED, D. D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp 237. 12mo. 1872.

Both these books are successful and creditable attempts to commemorate great events which must ever possess a lively interest for all Presbyterians. We give the preference to the latter, and amongst other reasons, because it does not contain anything that will be offensive to Southern Presbyterians. Only two statements by Dr. Breed seem to call for any criticism. The

first affects the office of ruling elder—the second that of the minister. The first will be found on page 12, where parity is not put on precisely the right ground and injustice is accordingly done to the eldership—and yet the statement made on this point is far better than in the other volume; the second does injustice to the minister as though he were not a true and proper representative of the people. It is to be found on page 13, where Dr. Breed borrows from Dr. Hodge a very defective setting forth of what Presbyterianism is. Especially is the statement to be objected to that “the people have a substantive part” in the government of the Church. If the meaning is that they have any direct part it is manifestly untrue. But if the meaning is that the government is in the hands of representatives of the people then the proper statement would be that the people have the whole of it and not merely a part. For both classes of Presbyters are *representatives of the people* and only as such have ministers any right to sit in Church courts. Presbyterian Church government is representative government—not in part but *in toto*.

With these two criticisms we are prepared to commend this little volume in the strongest terms to every member of our Church and for all our Sunday-schools.

The other volume has its merits, but in sundry particulars is not satisfactory to us.

1. The doctrine of parity is distinctly made to apply only to the ministry; (See pp. 181 and 212); whereas the Presbyterian doctrine is that all Presbyters are equal *as such*. The minister is superior, of course, to the elder as he is teacher but *quoad* the power of rule all presbyters are equal. One of the places referred to above gives us the defective statement of mere ministerial parity as it is made by the eminent Dr. McCosh of Princeton College. We had supposed him a better Presbyterian than here appears. He professes to state the doctrine of the Reformed Churches and especially of Calvin. But who ever will carefully read the 11th chapter of the fourth book of Calvin's Institute will see that Dr. McCosh does not correctly apprehend him on the subject of parity. Dr. William Cunningham (His-

torical Theology, Vol. II., pp. 518, 519) exhibits a better acquaintance than his distinguished compatriot with what Calvin and the Reformed Churches really taught respecting this matter.

2. This volume tramples on the testimony for orthodox theology made by the Presbyterian Church in 1837. That notable vindication by our fathers of the doctrines of grace is stigmatised (see p. 173) as a "contest which excited the feelings of our ministers and people, and consumed power that should have been used in aggressive work upon the world." The crime of "*exciting the feelings*" may be charged on the Protestant Reformers of the sixteenth century and on the confessors, martyrs, and apostles of the early Church. And "consumption of power" has been, of course, incidental to every controversy of truth with error. But shew us any better way for the Church to *consume power* than in witness-bearing for the truth. This talk about aggressive work upon the world as being more Christian than contending for the faith is just the cant of the New School issuing now through the Philadelphia Board of Publication's press—we could wish that it were never heard in the columns of any Southern Presbyterian paper. However, whenever, by whomsoever uttered, it is not the truth. Here is a book put forth to celebrate the tercentenary of Knox, of the Huguenot martyrs of France, and of the first Presbyterians of England—all three parties worthy to be commemorated just because they manfully bore witness to the truth at whatever cost, and occasion is here taken, to sneer at as glorious a kindred testimony for the truths of the gospel as ever was made, in a time of peace and in a free country. One must recall what our Lord said to the Pharisees who garnished the tombs of the prophets, but killed and crucified apostles preaching the same truths for which they had suffered.

3. Of course this little book from the press of the Northern Presbyterian Church must needs give utterance in some form or other to the sentiment of "loyalty"—as, for example, when speaking of Witherspoon, it gushes forth in terms like these: "That towered among his fellows in almost unequalled splendor whether he be viewed as a herald of the cross, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, or as President of the College of

New Jersey!" A common herald of the cross might not be comparable to the President of Nassau Hall, but throw in the additional weight of his signing that celebrated political manifesto, and you may then put the preacher of the gospel alongside of the President of a College! The late Northern Assembly at Baltimore resolved that it is appropriate and expedient for that Church, *as such*, to take part in celebrating the Centennial of American Independence. Previous Assemblies have often set forth in glowing terms how devoted their Zion is to the "best government the world ever saw." In her duty to King Jesus she may have failed often, but to the American Cæsar, never! Whatever other graces of the Spirit that Church may have to confess herself deficient in, she can, and she does, boast a spotless and a perfect record as to this prime virtue for churches. Accordingly this little Northern Presbyterian Tercentenary, got up chiefly in Philadelphia, which is the focus of the zeal for celebrating the Fourth of July Centennial, might well be expected to anticipate the zeal of the late Assembly, and to glorify the patriotism of the Philadelphia Presbyterians, first in 1776, and then again in 1861. Of course there is some trouble in consistently dealing out to *rebels* at the first period, praise, and at the second, the opposite commodity. But the glow of popular sentiment is not favorable to nice discriminations. Political parsons throwing up their hats and sounding out hurrahs for the colonies, fighting disloyally against their king an hundred years ago, may yet construe into very grievous offenders, all by whom "the Government was struck at" eleven years ago, (see pp. 168-170) without being able to point out any difference whatever between the resistance to tyranny, the just defence of constitutional freedom in the one case and in the other.

As to the "ungloved hand," and the "affectionate embrace" for the "alienated brethren of the South," and the binding "the Church as well as the State in a heart-unity more thorough than ever, our sole difficulty is, that we have no confidence in union where there is not a basis of principles held and maintained in common. We cannot accept Old and New School

doctrines as one and the same. We cannot hold that Christ is to share with any Cæsar in the loyalty of his bride. The trouble is, that *our principles* do not sit so lightly upon us as upon our loving brethren of the "ungloved hand." The "rebels" of eleven years ago, who have never repented nor pretended to repent, ought not to be receivable into any "heart-unity" at all. The Church that justified the sin of "slavery" and still justifies it, ought not to have "affectionate embraces" proposed to it. Black is not white, truth is not a lie, and a true union is no sham. The Northern Presbyterians certainly have not our *confidence*—we do not understand how it can be true that we possess their *love*.

At the same time we are never found lamenting nor complaining of this state of things. It would seem that the Southern Church possesses the quiet assurance that it can live and work and prosper, and enjoy the acceptance and favor of the Master without union with the Northern. The title given to us in this book of "lost tribes of the Presbyterian Israel" we feel sure was not intended to be unkind by Dr. Field (p. 53), but we do not accept it as in any aspect justly descriptive. We are not *lost*, for we have not strayed, but are following the footsteps of the flock and its Shepherd. We are not *lost*, for we know exactly where we are and on what ground we stand—the same ground where our fathers stood so long. We are not *lost*, for God is in the midst of us, and we see the pillar of cloud and of fire. It is not their numbers nor their wealth that can make the Church of the North to be strong, nor is it our littleness in these respects that can make us weak. The life of the Church, says Calvin, is *doctrine*. The question as respects every Church is, What is she witnessing? The serious charges which we bring against the Church from which we have been separated are, that she has forsaken the testimony of our fathers of 1837, that she has trifled and is trifling with the crown rights of our King, and that in a new-born and fanatical zeal for union she is now clamoring for it with those whom she has many times denounced for errors which are yet unrepented of. Such are some of the barriers which must keep us separate from them.

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ARTICLE I.

FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH.

Philippians i. 1, 2: Paul and Timotheus, the servants of Jesus Christ, to all the saints in Christ Jesus which are at Philippi, with the bishops and deacons: grace be unto you, and peace from God our Father, and from the Lord Jesus Christ.

Macedonia, of which Philippi was one of the chief cities, was conspicuous among the ancient nations as the kingdom of Alexander the Great. According to Daniel's interpretation of Nebuchadnezzar's dream, Macedonia was represented by the brazen part of the great image, and destined to be the third of the four universal kingdoms, that should precede the kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Philippi was distinguished in profane history for the decisive battle between Mark Antony, Octavius, and Lepidus, the friends of Julius Cæsar, and the exponents of imperial power, on the one side; and Brutus and Cassius representing the Roman Senate, on the other. In ecclesiastical history, it is also celebrated as the seat of the first Christian Church in Europe. This Church was founded by the Apostle Paul, who was attracted thither by the vision of a man of Macedonia calling to him, in these words: "Come over into Macedonia and help us." The apostle went to Philippi, and began the work of founding a

Church, by the baptism of Lydia and her household, and concluded it by the baptism of the jailor and his family.

We have chosen these words as the foundation of a discussion of this question: What was the form of government of the churches organised by the apostles? because, in our opinion, the nature of the primitive organisation may be understood by a correct knowledge of the constituent elements—"saints, bishops, and deacons."

Preliminary to a discussion of the form of government of the apostolic Church, it is pertinent to inquire, by what authority was the community of disciples organised into a visible Church? The importance that any Christian will attach to the matter of church government will depend on the answer to this question, for if it was by the authority of our blessed Lord that it was organised according to a definite plan, then his rights as King, and our loyalty are so involved, as will insure due consideration and obedient action on the part of his friends, "for "ye are my friends if ye do whatsoever I command you."

The Lord Jesus, as Mediator, has founded a kingdom in this world, which he claims the right to name, to govern, and to protect. As all government is administered by legislative, judicial, and executive officers, the Holy Spirit dictates to the Church this appropriate ascription: "The Lord is our Law-giver, the Lord is our Judge, the Lord is our King." The exercise of this authority by Jesus of Nazareth was resisted by the unbelieving Jews, who regarded it as blasphemy to speak of changing the customs that Moses delivered to them. Indeed, it was the assertion of this claim to be the King of Israel, and to regulate his spiritual kingdom that provoked the Jewish rulers to take away his life. This was the main charge against him. He did not deny this to Pilate, when that Roman governor asked him if he was the King of the Jews. This gave force to the artful appeal, (although our Lord had said that his kingdom was not of this world,) "if thou let this man go, thou art not Cæsar's friend; for he that maketh himself a king, speaketh against Cæsar." This royal claim gave significance to the purple robe, and the thorny crown, which in mockery they put upon his sacred person, and the affected homage with which they

derided him; and this was the accusation written in three languages, and nailed above his head: "This is the King of the Jews." All authority over that kingdom, which has been brought into existence by his mediation, is his, and the Church was originally organised according to his will. The whole of Christianity is of divine origin, and has emanated from him, "whose divine power has given to us *all things* that pertain to life and godliness."

It is not pretended that the Lord Jesus, during his personal ministry on earth, made those changes by which the present dispensation is distinguished from the former. We do affirm, however, that he did it in the same manner that he gave the written revelation of his will, which completes the inspired volume. He employed the agency of men, whom he chose, instructed, inspired, and commissioned for these purposes. The terms of the commission are in these words: "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them *to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you*, and lo! I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." The apostles were directed under what form to organise the Church, as well as what doctrines to teach, and what facts to narrate. Hence the Church is said to be "built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone." The Church at Philippi, for example, was organised as truly according to the will of our Lord, as if he had done it in person. And so of all the apostolic churches. Hence, in the Epistle to the Corinthians, it is said, "*God hath set some in the Church, first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healing, helps, governments, diversities of tongues.*" In the Epistle to the Ephesians, it is said *Jesus Christ* "gave some apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, and some pastors and teachers." In the Acts of the Apostles, the elders of Ephesus are said to have been constituted overseers over the Church *by the Holy Ghost*. The ordinary no less than the extraordinary officers in the apostolic churches were the gifts of this Triune God, and the organisation developed was the

product of divine wisdom and goodness, and for the purposes intended cannot be improved. This organisation, animated by the Holy Spirit, is the "body of Christ."

The names of saints, bishops, and deacons, are peculiar to the Church, they are competent for all its legitimate purposes, and constitute an organisation different from any other beyond the range of a divine revelation. The Church is no voluntary society—no creature of earthly potentates—no child of human policy—but an organisation under a divine constitution, binding the consciences of the King's subjects, developing and exercising that faith which "stands, not in the wisdom of man, but in the power of God." The Lord has judged this government necessary to give the Church an organic existence—to protect its honor and its life—to indicate that its author is not a God of confusion, and, as a standing rebuke to the spirit of anarchy, dissolving society into its elements; like those chemical agents which in the processes of decomposition often set at liberty destructive poisons, such as, in their combinations, are most necessary, useful, and salutary.

The imitation of apostolic precedents, and obedience to apostolic directions, would preserve a uniform organisation in the midst of all the changes of this changing world. A correct interpretation of the Word of God makes it obligatory on all subsequent ecclesiastical authorities to ordain elders in every city, as it was on Titus who received an inspired charge to do so. The example of Paul and Barnabas in ordaining elders *in every church*, while engaged in the work to which the Holy Ghost had called them is as authoritative a precedent as the imposition of hands, or the administration of the sacraments. The Epistle to the Philippians, in which saints, bishops, and deacons, are recognised as the constituent elements of that apostolic Church, presents to us a model for the organisation of all Christian churches. The design of giving the qualifications of elders and deacons in the Epistles, is to guide the Church in the choice of these as the only permanent officers by divine authority. The government of the apostolic churches, whether organised by Paul, Peter, James, or John, was uniform, because they were guided by the

same divine will. Saints, bishops, and deacons, were familiar words throughout the whole primitive Church with a uniform meaning. There seems to have been no divisions in reference to the constitution of the Church. How happy for the Church and for the world, if this satisfaction with a divine constitution had continued! What schisms, corruptions, and persecutions would have been prevented! What pages of history that excite only shame would never have been written!

The design of Christianity in all its parts, including the organisation of the Church, is to change the world, and not be changed by it; to bring the world up to its healthful elevation, and not degrade it to the level of the desert wastes and pestilential marshes of this world. The apostle who in his social intercourse, and in things indifferent became all things to all men, and manifested a conciliatory temper, exhibits his uncompromising fidelity with reference to divine things in his Epistle to the Corinthians, when he says: "For this cause have I sent unto you Timotheus, who is my beloved son, and faithful in the Lord, who shall bring you into remembrance of my ways which be in Christ, as I teach *everywhere in every place.*" There is a blameworthy departure from the primitive constitution of the Church, where saints, bishops, or deacons are wanting, or where more than these are found, or where these names have been perverted from their original import, or where other names unknown to apostolic times have been introduced.

Let us now investigate by the light of divine truth the nature of the elements that constituted the Church at Philippi. These consist of three classes and only three—saints, bishops, and deacons.

Who were the saints? This word is often used in the Scriptures both of the Old and New Testaments to designate the people of God. It is not necessary by a reference to particular texts to prove what will be so readily admitted. It may be proper, however, to observe, that this name is not applied to them because they are sinless in nature and conduct, which the word *αγιος* or holy sometimes imports; but because they are separated, devoted to the worship and service of the Holy God,

usually by some external sign of such a consecration. In this use of the word Canaan is a holy land, Jerusalem is a holy city, the temple a holy place, and Israel and Christians a holy people. But this word has not escaped a perversion from its primitive use. The Church of Rome has restricted it to persons that it deems of preëminent sanctity. By an act of the Church it makes such persons saints, canonises them after death, announcing that they are worthy of a kind of worship, and from whom, as being peculiarly influential in the world of glory, special favors may be sought. From this catalogue of saints Abel, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, Moses, Daniel, not to speak of multitudes of others in more modern times, of whom the world was not worthy, are excluded. In the apostolic Church all the people of God were saints.

It has also been perverted from its inspired usage by restricting it to those who are old enough to make a personal profession of their faith. The apostle applies it to the children of believers as well: "else were your (τεκνο) children unclean, but now are they (αγια) holy." The saints then who composed the Church at Philippi, were the body of professed believers in the Lord Jesus Christ, and their children, who were pronounced fit subjects of the kingdom of heaven by the King, and recognised as such in several of the apostolic epistles to the churches.

Another element of the Church at Philippi was the bishops. Who were they? We shall err if we suppose that they were a superior order of ministers who had jurisdiction over the churches in a certain district. The text which reveals the fact, that at Philippi there was a *plurality* of bishops in the same Church, also makes it plain that a change has taken place in this part of the apostolic constitution. In its primitive use this name was applied to those officers of each church who were also called elders, and who were the rulers in the church.

In all cultivated languages there are words having such a similarity of meaning that they are called synonyms, and one is used to define the other. For example: In words expressive of authority, legislator and law-giver, judge and justice, monarch and king, are of this kind. Now in the New Testament, bishop

and elder are synonymous, and represent precisely the same officers. Bishops are elders, and elders are bishops. The evidence of this may be found in almost every place where the word bishop occurs. If we refer to the interview between Paul and the *elders* of Ephesus recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, in addressing these *elders*, the apostle says: "Take heed to yourselves, and to the flock over which the Holy Ghost hath made you (*επισκοπους*) *bishops*."

Another evidence of the same thing may be found in the Epistle to Titus: "For this cause left I thee in Crete, that thou shouldest set in order the things that are wanting, and ordain *elders* in every city, as I had appointed thee, if any be blameless, the husband of one wife, having faithful children, not accused of riot or unruly, for a *bishop* must be blameless." The whole force of this conclusion, introduced by the conjunction "for," depends on the identity of the persons called elders in the first part of the sentence, and bishop in the latter part of it.

An additional evidence may be seen in the Epistle of Peter. "The elders that are among you I exhort, who am also an elder—feed the flock of God which is among you (*επισκοπουντες*) exercising the office, function or authority of a bishop."

Considering the few times that the word bishop is used in the New Testament, it would be strange, if it were not intentional with a view to the future, that the Holy Spirit should have so carefully exhibited the identity of the bishop and elder.

What was the nature of the office? The bishops or elders were the rulers in the churches organised by the apostles. The elder from the earliest periods of Jewish history had been a ruler, and as an elder nothing but a ruler. In the synagogue, which like our churches were erected throughout the Holy Land, and in which it was our Lord's custom to worship every Sabbath-day, and where the apostles preached so long as they were permitted to do so, and which with some changes in the sacraments, would probably have been retained as the Christian churches if the Jewish people had received their king, the elders were the rulers, and had distinguished seats assigned to them similar to what John saw, when he had a vision of the

throne of God, and around it twenty-four seats, upon which were sitting twenty-four elders.

Every reference to elders in the New Testament shows that originally they were the rulers in the house of God. In the apostle's charge to the elders of Ephesus, he says: "Take heed to yourselves and to the church *over which the Holy Ghost hath made you overseers.*" In his Epistle to Timothy, he speaks of the "elders that *rule well.*" In the qualifications of an elder is this "that ruleth well his own house," and the reason assigned is, "if a man know not how to rule his own house, how shall he *take care of the church of God?*" The Apostle Peter exhorts elders to act the part of a shepherd to the flock of God, "*taking the oversight, not by constraint, but willingly, neither as being lords over God's heritage.*" Certainly no truth can be better established relative to the government of the primitive Church than that elders were the rulers, and that they were called also bishops, as those who proclaimed the gospel were called both preachers and ministers of the Word.

How many of these rulers were assigned to each church? As no definite number is revealed, we infer that this matter must be regulated by the size of the congregation, and the number of persons in the church qualified to discharge the functions of the office, for the good of the church, and the glory of God. To guard against an accumulation of responsibility and authority, however, as well as to secure the benefit of united counsels and influence, a *plurality* of these rulers is required by the example of all the apostolic churches. This epistle to the church at Philippi is addressed to the saints with the *bishops* and deacons. In Acts xiv. 23, it is recorded as a part of the missionary labor of Paul and Barnabas in carrying out the work assigned them by the Holy Ghost, that they ordained *elders in every church*, although these churches must have been of various sizes, some perhaps not too large to meet in a private house. From Miletus Paul sent for the "*elders of Ephesus.*" Titus was charged to "*ordain elders in every city.*" The Apostle James says: "If any man be sick, let him send for the elders of the church." What church? Certainly the one with which he worships. He

is directed to send, not for the elder of the church, nor for the elders of the churches, but for the elders of the church. The command to all the churches is to "obey *them* that have the rule over you," in which it is expected that every church will have more than one ruler. In view of this accumulated evidence, is it not without doubt the will of our King that church-power should not be exercised by one man, but by the joint counsels and judgments of a plurality of wise and good men? It was not without a purpose that when the Lord sent forth the apostles, and the seventy afterwards, he sent two of them together with equal responsibility and authority. It is not without significance, that when Samaria had received the Word of God, the believers received the miraculous gift of the Holy Ghost, when Peter and John jointly had laid their hands upon them; that when the seven deacons were to be ordained all the apostles united in imposing hands; that when Paul and Barnabas were to be set apart for a certain mission, three other prophets and teachers concurred in the act of imposing hands; that when Timothy was ordained, although the apostle in the exercise of the extraordinary power committed to him was competent to act alone, yet for example's sake, he associated others with him that it might be done in the most approved manner "by the laying on of the hands of the presbytery." The design and effect of all this is to vest all church-power in the hands of a plurality of officers of equal authority.

This leads us to consider the question, whether in the primitive Church there was any regular and permanent ruling officer superior to the elder? If we consider the nature of church government, we shall see that there is no necessity for any higher order of rulers than bishops or elders. Elders are fully competent to perform all the acts of government required of the Church, or permitted to be exercised by it. The Church has no legislative authority, for all the laws and ordinances have been enacted by its King, and the Church has no right to change the statute book in any particular. The executive functions in an organisation, constituted as the Church is, neither requires nor allows a magistrate with the sword to enforce its authority by

corporeal punishments. The principal duties of church officers, then, are of a judicial character. Now it will always be more satisfactory to all parties, when the judgment of more than one decides a matter; and a decision by elders will always have this advantage, that it must include the judgment and learning of him, who, if he did not act as a ruler of superior authority, would be one of the presbyters.

But let us examine the record and see if there was any authority or rule in the apostolic Church designed to be permanent, that was superior to that of the bishops or elders. If the church of Philippi had any other officer except the bishops and deacons, what was he called? By what name was he distinguished? Why did not the apostle address him also? Would not the courtesy which the apostle enjoins as a Christian grace, and of which his life affords so many examples, have induced him to recognise this other officer, especially as possessing a greater official dignity? Seeing that Paul was recounting the names of the officers of the church at Philippi, and addressing them as such, is it not evident that there was no other officer there, either superior or inferior to the bishops and deacons?

There are in the epistles an enumeration of the qualifications and duties of church officers, and only those of bishops or elders, and deacons, are given. This is an unaccountable omission if there were, or if there ought to be any officers in the church except these. Those churches which, since these days of primitive purity have elevated an order of prelates superior to the elders, have been compelled, not only to borrow one of the names of the elders, but to read that Scripture at their consecration which the Holy Spirit dictated for the elders, and those who are called on to choose and ordain them. Can any suppose that there was an order of rulers that needed no divine counsel, or that when the Holy Spirit is giving suitable directions to classes of officers, that there was still another that was intentionally or unintentionally overlooked?

There are also several commands addressed to the Christian people to honor and obey those who are appointed to rule over them. But now if elders, while they are the rulers of some, are

by divine authority subject to an order superior to them, why is it that when they are reminded of their authority to rule, and of their duty to rule well, there is nowhere any command or exhortation addressed to them to honor or obey an order of rulers superior to them by divine appointment?

And, finally, on the supposition that there was an order of rulers in the Church superior to the elders, there is an incongruity in Peter's charge to them to rule, but not as lords over God's heritage. They could hardly attain this lordly and imperious style of authority, if there were rulers of superior jurisdiction to whom they were responsible, who had the power, and who, out of regard to their own rights, would have the disposition to curb this ambitious tendency. This charge of the apostle would be most appropriately addressed to those rulers who had the highest authority in the Church, because they had the greatest temptation and facility to abuse it.

If the authority of bishops or elders, considered as the ordinary and permanent rulers, was not supreme in the apostolic Church; whose was? The Church of Rome answers, that St. Peter was superior to all the apostles, and that his supremacy has been transmitted to the Roman pontiffs, his successors, and the vicars of the Lord Jesus. It is not necessary at this time to examine this theory in its various bearings, for the proclamation of its logical consequences is even now raising such a storm, that under its pressure the Vatican shakes to its foundations. The poison of such an error would put an end to the life of any organism in which it circulates.

But as an argument on the government of the Church would be defective that overlooked this theory altogether, let us examine the single point of the primacy of Peter, for if this cannot be established all that rests upon it must fall. The supremacy of Peter is asserted on the ground, that our Lord, on a certain occasion, said to him: "Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church." Let us admit the correctness of the interpretation that makes Peter the rock to which our Lord refers. But the conclusion to be drawn from these words will be different if we regard them as addressed to Peter exclusively,

or as addressed to him as the representative of his fellow-apostles, and in conjunction with them. If we restrict it to him as the the Church of Rome does, then we must expect to find him alone in the foundation of the visible Church; but if it was said to him as one of the twelve, to all of whom it was equally applicable, then we shall find the other eleven equally in the foundation with Peter. Now hear the decision of this matter, by the Holy Spirit, in the Epistle to the Ephesians: "Ye are built upon the *foundation of the apostles* and prophets, Jesus Christ himself being the chief corner-stone." All the apostles are equally in the foundation, without any distinction, and the only thing more conspicuous than all of them together is the corner-stone, which is Jesus Christ. In the book of Revelation, where the wall of the holy city, the new Jerusalem, was exposed to view, it had twelve foundations, and in them the names of the twelve apostles of the Lamb, without any distinction in favor of Peter. Equally pertinent is the testimony of the Spirit in the Epistle to the Corinthians: "God hath set some in the Church, first apostles," without distinction, and not "first, Peter," as the theory claims.

Another fact which the advocates of Peter's primacy adduce is, that the Lord gave the keys of the kingdom into his hands in these words: "And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." The other apostles, equally with Peter, had this authority conferred on them, as we learn from John xx. 22, when addressing the twelve, he said: "Receive *ye* the Holy Ghost, whosoever sins *ye* remit they are remitted unto them, and whosoever sins *ye* retain they are retained." Again, in Matt. xviii. 18: "Whatsoever *ye* shall bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever *ye* shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."

Indeed, our Lord, so far from encouraging any such distinction among his apostles, took several opportunities to express his disapprobation of the ambitious spirit that aspires to or creates such distinctions, often reckless of the manner in which it is

accomplished. On one occasion, James and John, two favorite apostles, accompanied by their mother, came with the request that they might occupy the highest positions in his kingdom. This naturally excited the indignation of the ten, among whom was Peter, and Jesus, to remove all occasions for such scenes of earthly passion, and disgraceful intrigues from his Church, called his apostles to him and said: "Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them; *but it shall not be so among you.*"

On another occasion, as we learn from Luke ix. 46, there arose a reasoning among them which of them should be greatest. If it had been his will that any of them should be elevated to a position of authority superior to the rest, these were favorable opportunities to decide the case, and stop these contentions. He did decide it by rebuking their strife, but not by elevating any one of them to a position superior to the others.

On still another occasion, near the close of his life, as we learn from the same evangelist, chap. xxii. 24, there was a strife among them which should be accounted greatest, which he again rebuked. Up to this time none among them had obtained the coveted primacy with his consent, or in the judgment of the contending brethren, and Peter among them.

In aftertimes, Peter did not exercise any authority that was not exercised by the other apostles, for if the gospel of the circumcision was committed to him, the gospel of the uncircumcision, a wider and not less important field, was committed to Paul, who, when Peter was to be blamed withstood him to the face. If Peter, James, and John, because of their superior mental and moral qualities seemed to be pillars, and might be called in this sense chief apostles, yet Paul, who because he persecuted the Church was the least apostle, was not a whit behind them; and this is important enough to be *repeated: for in nothing* am I behind the very chiefest apostles, though I be nothing." The primacy of Peter, much less the doctrine that the popes are his successors as supreme and infallible rulers of the Church, has no foundation in reason or Scripture, but it is the offspring of imposture and superstition.

In reply to the question, What authority designed to be perpetual was supreme in the apostolic Church, if that of the bishops or elders was not, the Anglican Church says the apostolic authority was supreme, and has been transmitted to an order of rulers who have succeeded them, not called apostles now, but bishops; and that the Christian ministry is limited to those who have been ordained by these prelates; and that the small but respectable fraction of Protestant Christendom that acknowledges their jurisdiction, constitutes the whole Church of Christ—the balance not being permitted to indulge any hope of salvation, except that precarious one that may be derived from the uncovenanted mercies of God. This theory ought by all means to be capable of exhibiting a clear demonstration of its truth; for devoid of this, it has nothing else to recommend it to a Christian mind. It is a singular fact, that the most intolerant claims usually have the least reason to sustain them, and that bigotry is in inverse proportion to scriptural truth and Christian feeling.

We shall take no advantage of the origin of this theory as Anglican, which is familiar to every student of English history, and especially that part of it which records the rupture between Henry VIII. and the Pope, but we shall test it by the fundamental law of our Lord's kingdom, and treat it accordingly, notwithstanding its pretensions on the one hand, or the doubtful legitimacy of its Protestant birth on the other.

Of this theory we admit the supreme authority of the apostles, but we deny that that apostolic authority has been perpetuated, and affirm that the authority which was designed to continue in the church was vested in the bishops or elders.

None will deny that there were extraordinary officers in the primitive Church. There were prophets, workers of miracles, speakers, and interpreters of tongues, and superior to all these, because possessing all these extraordinary gifts, were the apostles. As it is not pretended that prophets and other extraordinary teachers have had successors, it is evident that the apostolic office as such had no successors.

This will appear if we consider the essential elements of the

apostleship. No man could have been an apostle in the primitive Church, who was not appointed directly *by the Lord Jesus himself*. That this was the case with the original twelve is plain from the history of the transaction in the gospels. When Judas fell from his apostleship by his transgression, before the apostles commenced the work assigned to them, and when the Scripture made a special provision for filling his place, in these words: "his bishopric let another take," which was not done when James was put to death, the Apostle Peter and the rest of the disciples refer the case to the Lord in these words: "Show, O Lord, which of these two *thou hast chosen*." The Apostle Paul says of himself, "an apostle, not of man, nor by man, but by Jesus Christ and God the Father." He was born out of due time; that is, he was not designated to the apostolic office when the others were, but yet he received his commission directly from the Lord, and commenced his apostolic labors without conferring with flesh and blood, or seeing those who were apostles before him.

Again, it was an essential qualification of an apostle that he could testify from the evidence of his senses that Jesus Christ had risen from the dead. The resurrection of our Lord was the crowning proof that he was the Son of God: "If Christ be not risen then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." It was deemed necessary by our Lord that there should be eye-witnesses of this great event, who were willing, if necessary, to seal their testimony with their blood. This was so essential to an apostle that no man could be an apostle who was not a witness. On one occasion the Lord said to them: "*Ye shall be witnesses* unto me both in Jerusalem and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth." The apostles understood this to be a necessary part of their office, for say they to the Jews: "*We are witnesses* of all things which he did both in the land of the Jews, and in Jerusalem, whom they slew and hanged on a tree him God raised up the third day and showed him openly, not to all the people, but unto *witnesses chosen before of God, even to us* who did eat and drink with him after he rose from the dead, and he commanded us to preach unto the people and to testify." When to fulfil the Scripture it be-

came necessary that a successor should be appointed in the place of Judas, the choice was restricted to those who were eye-witnesses—"must one be ordained to be a witness with us of his resurrection." If at the beginning there could be ordained only one successor to the apostles, and that according to a special divine warrant limiting this successor to the place left vacant by Judas Iscariot; and if this one sole successor must be an eye-witness of our Lord's resurrection, how can there be any successors since that time without a similar warrant or this indispensable qualification? The Apostle Paul, in vindicating his claim to the apostleship, which might be questioned because of the delay of his appointment, asks: "Am I not an apostle? Am I not free? Have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord?" In speaking of the witnesses of our Lord's resurrection, and having mentioned all the apostles, he adds: "Last of all he was seen of me also, as of one born out of due time." With this in his view, will any man be so rash as to say that in the Apostolic Church a man was eligible to the apostolic office who was not a witness of our risen Lord?

Besides this, all the apostles were so inspired as to become the organs of the Holy Ghost, according to the promise of the Lord that he would send the Holy Spirit, who should lead them into all truth, and should bring all things to their remembrance that he had said unto them. Their writings were and are authoritative throughout the whole Christian Church, as the word of God. The reason assigned for commending the Thessalonians is equally applicable to Christians everywhere, "because when ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth the word of God." There was no apostle that the Holy Ghost did not thus employ to teach the will of God in matters pertaining to his kingdom, and he has recognised no successors since their death by communicating to them original revelations, but an anathema is recorded on the last page of the inspired volume against any who shall subtract from or add to the writings of these secretaries of the King.

Another indispensable qualification of an apostle was the possession of miraculous gifts and powers, which were "the signs of

an apostle," distinguishing them from "false apostles." Others besides the apostles exercised these supernatural powers, but there was no apostle that was not able to exhibit these divine credentials which mankind had a right to demand of those who claimed to be ambassadors from God. Can any pretended successors exhibit similar credentials?

Finally the apostolic authority was not limited to one Church, nor to one diocese, nor to one nation, but was equal throughout the whole Church. Their jurisdiction was not limited. The care of all the churches was upon them. Their apostolic epistles and authority were not bounded by geographical lines, but their field was the world, and being guided by the Spirit their action was harmonious. Any successors ought to have similar jurisdiction. The truth is the apostles were extraordinary officers, selected by the Lord himself, for purposes of an extraordinary character. They were limited in number although ordained with a view to the necessities of the whole world, so far as their peculiar office was concerned. They were endowed with supernatural qualifications, having equal jurisdiction everywhere. As apostles they have no successors, but, as the original distributors of the alms of the Church, they have been succeeded by the deacons, and, as rulers, they have been succeeded by the bishops or elders, and as preachers they have been succeeded by those faithful men who, set apart by the imposition of the hands of the Presbytery, have echoed the same truths that were first sounded through the world by apostolic voices.

But although the apostolic office in its entirety cannot be transmitted, may we not distinguish between what was ordinary, and what was extraordinary in their office and authority? Surely we can. All kinds of authority that were necessary to organise the Church according to our Lord's wishes were vested in the apostles. They at first exercised all the various functions that were subsequently distributed to different classes of officers. They at first distributed the alms of the Church, but when through the increase of the Church this became burdensome, and interfered with duties that they deemed more necessary for them to perform, for example's sake, they ordered an election of dea-

cons by the people, and ordained them, and the deacons then became their successors in this part of their office and as a general thing the apostles ceased to serve tables.

The apostles were also elders or rulers in the Church. They call themselves such. When they organised churches, in all of them they ordained a plurality of elders, who thus became their successors as the rulers of the church, some of whom labored in the word and doctrine. Now, this exhausted all the ordinary authority of the apostles, and hence all the churches, like that of Philippi, had only these two classes of officers—the bishops or elders and the deacons, both of whom, in their respective spheres, are the successors to the apostles.

If there was any other function, not extraordinary, what was it? If there was any other officer, what was his name? There were numerous opportunities in the history of those early days for him to appear and his name to be called. The apostles call themselves elders. Why they should do so in preference to calling themselves by the name of a higher class of rulers that are supposed to exist cannot be satisfactorily explained, except because there was no such ruler. The Council of Jerusalem, which met to consider and determine the most important matters to the Church at large, was composed of apostles and elders. Can any man assign a reason for the exclusion of an order of rulers superior to elders from that important council? Does any man say it was because they had not yet been ordained? Adopt that as the true reason. They had not yet been created, and more, they never were created by apostles. Apostolic hands never rested on the heads of but two kinds of officers—the bishops and deacons. The Apostle Peter says: "The elders that are among you I exhort, who am also an elder, and a witness of the sufferings of Christ"—the elder representing the ordinary and perpetual ruler in the Church, and the witness representing the extraordinary and temporary authority of the apostleship.

In order to find the wished-for class of rulers now represented by prelates, this method of reasoning is resorted to: When the apostles had organised the churches with their bishops and dea-

cons, the apostles still continued with an authority superior to that which they had conferred on these bishops and deacons, and this authority which was retained by them is now represented by that exercised by the prelates. This is a sophism, as will appear from the fact that not only prelates, but so many other ranks of rulers, may be introduced through this wide door, as will be no less destructive to prelacy than to presbytery. Let us suppose that the apostles ordained an order of rulers now represented by prelates, did not the apostolic authority still remain with the apostles superior to that which it is supposed they had conferred on the prelates? And so in like manner with reference to any rank of rulers that may be supposed. All may obtain a warrant by this convenient logic. The argument proves too much, and will overturn every form of church government. There must be a stopping place. Where is it? Where the Scripture history determines it to be. The apostles were extraordinary officers endowed with all church power to organise the Church as the Lord wished it to remain, and after these apostles had distributed the power vested in them to the deacons and bishops, the distribution of power ceased, and that which remained with the apostles was that extraordinary power which they could not confer.

The deacons being the successors of the apostles for distributing the alms of the Church, the apostles rarely exercised the functions of this office within the limits of organised churches. In like manner the bishops or elders being the regular successors in all that pertains to the government of the churches, the apostles very seldom interposed their authority within these churches, or over the consciences and private judgment of their fellow-rulers. They would not determine the question respecting the observance of the Levitical law without the concurrence of the elders who had been ordained to rule. Paul would not exercise his authority over Mark when he would depart from him, nor over Barnabas when he insisted on taking Mark contrary to Paul's wishes. He would not expel from the church of Corinth the incestuous person, but having given his inspired counsel submitted the case to the regular authorities of the church. In

like manner, John does not send his sentence to be executed by the seven churches, but commends or censures the ecclesiastical authorities accordingly as they had ruled well or badly. The Apostle Paul says, as touching our brother Apollos, "I greatly desired him to come unto you, but *his will* was not at all to come at this time, but he will come when he shall have convenient time. This deference to the constituted authorities in the churches, and to their fellow-presbyters by the apostles, is significant of the fact, that churches with their elders and deacons were competent to manage their own affairs, and that no individual authority ought to control the action of presbyters.

Although the name of no order of rulers in the apostolic Church, except bishops or elders, *can be found*, and this fact is fatal to the theory which supposes such an order to exist, yet it has been imagined that Timothy at Ephesus and Titus in Crete are examples of this imaginary order of rulers without a name. But there was no ruling authority conferred on or exercised by these young men that elders are not competent to perform. How strange that where there is a known order of rulers, all acts of authority should not be referred to that class, without rather seeking to create a new class of rulers to the injury of the Church. Let us rather learn from the history of Timothy and Titus what acts a presbyter or bishop is competent to perform, not usually by himself, but in conjunction with his fellow-presbyters.

It must be remembered that there were elders in Ephesus ruling over the church by the authority of the Holy Ghost before Timothy went there, and the apostle by no means teaches this young man to disregard the government established there by such high authority. The whole difficulty originates in overlooking the fact that this is a personal epistle, and that in such epistles an individual is addressed in the singular number, although others may be associated with him. For example: the Supreme Court of Georgia consists of three judges all equal in authority, although one presides. Let us suppose a man to be elevated to that bench whose father was still alive—a man of wisdom and experience, and who is anxious that his son should

adorn the elevated position. He writes him a letter on the authority, duties, and responsibilities of his office, and exhorting him to a faithful discharge of his duties. Now the style of address to him personally, and in the singular number, just as much proves that he is the only judge on that bench, as the Epistle to Timothy, Paul's beloved son, proves that he was the only ruler of the church in Ephesus, when we know from another source that several other bishops had been constituted jointly rulers of that church. When the apostle says to Timothy, "lay hands suddenly on no man," this no more proves that he alone imposed hands in ordaining ministers, than when he says "preach the Word" implies that no one else in Ephesus proclaimed the gospel or ought to do so.

There is nothing so strange in the presence of Timothy at Ephesus, or Titus in Crete, as to require the theory that they were the prelates of those respective dioceses in order to explain it. The Scriptures afford a simpler explanation. The apostles were accustomed to associate with them other ministers who thus not only assisted the apostles, but also became better instructed in the doctrines and ways of the apostles. We learn that Barnabas, Mark, Silas, Sopater, Aristarchus, Secundus, Gaius, Timothy, Tychicus, Trophimus, and others, were at different times Paul's companions. Then, as books were rare and could not meet the exigencies of the recently converted communities, these experienced ministers were sent to important points which the apostle was unable to visit at that time. Timothy was not the only one that was sent to Ephesus, nor was Ephesus the only city to which Timothy was sent. In the Epistle to the Ephesians vi. 21, the apostle says: "But that ye also may know my affairs and how I do, Tychicus, a beloved brother and faithful minister in the Lord, shall make known to you all things, whom I have sent to you for the same purpose that you might know our affairs, and that he might comfort your hearts." In Philippians ii. 19-25, he writes: "But I trust in the Lord Jesus to send Timotheus shortly unto you, that I also may be of good comfort when I know your state; . . . but you know the proof of him that as a son with the father he hath served me in the

gospel." In 1 Thess. iii. 2: "And sent Timotheus, our brother and minister of God, and our fellow-laborer in the gospel, to establish you, and comfort you concerning your faith." In 1 Cor. iv. 17: "For this cause have I sent unto you Timotheus, who is my beloved son, and faithful in the Lord, who shall bring you into remembrance of my ways which be in Christ." Does Timothy's mission to Philippi, to Thessalonica, to Corinth, prove that he was the prelate of those dioceses? No more does his temporary sojourn at Ephesus prove that he was the ecclesiastical ruler of that city. We say *temporary* residence, for the apostle writes to him: "Do thy diligence to come shortly unto me," and repeats it: "Do thy diligence to come before winter." And to Titus he writes: "When I shall send Artemas unto thee, or Tychicus, be diligent to come unto me to Nicopolis, for I have determined there to winter." With these facts, and others recorded in the epistles of the same purport, is there any necessity or reason to suppose that Timothy was the prelate of Ephesus, and Titus of Crete, in order to account for their presence in those places?

As the bishops or elders were the rulers of the Church under the apostolic constitution, a question arises, Whether there was any other function inseparably connected with their office besides that of ruling? The reason for this inquiry, is, that some contend that all bishops or elders were regularly ordained ministers of the gospel. We affirm that all ministers of the Word were elders, but that all elders were not ministers of the Word. Hence there were two kinds of elders, all being rulers, and some of them being also preachers.

That the functions of ruling and preaching were not so inseparable as that every ruler was of necessity a preacher, will appear from the following considerations. In the synagogue all the rulers were not ministers of the Word, but only those who were, are called chief rulers;—not because they exercised a higher degree of authority, but because of the double functions which they exercised.

As it was usual in the apostolic churches to have a plurality of elders, it would have the effect to delay the organisation of

churches, or else devolve the duty of preaching on incompetent men, if all elders must of necessity be ministers of the Word.

The argument of the apostle in Rom. xii. 6-8, shows that the foundation for the various offices in the Church, is the bestowment of a diversity of gifts by the Holy Spirit. Now, as the gifts of ruling and preaching are not identical or inseparable, so neither do the officers who exercise them always exercise both or neither. He says: "Having gifts differing according to the grace that is given us, whether prophecy let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith, or ministry let us wait on our ministering, or he that teacheth on teaching, or he that exhorteth on exhortation, he that giveth let him do it with simplicity, he that ruleth with diligence, he that sheweth mercy with cheerfulness." The employment of talents is expected only from those to whom the talents are given. The Lord requires according to what a man hath, and not according to that he hath not. If the Lord does not always give the capacity to rule and preach unitedly, the Church would suffer injury that required all elders to do both. According to this argument of the apostle, as a man may have the gift to exhort who may not have the gift to prophesy or teach, so also a man may have the gift qualifying him to rule who is not qualified to perform the duties of a prophet, or a minister or teacher. If the Lord calls a man into the Church at a time of life when it is too late for him to change his profession, or who on many other accounts is not able to preach the gospel, but is well qualified to serve the Church as a ruler, it is in harmony with the apostolic principle here developed that he may do so.

In 1 Cor. xii. 20, there is an enumeration of the extraordinary and ordinary officers in the apostolic Church, "first apostles, secondarily prophets, thirdly teachers, after that miracles, then gifts of healing, helps, governments, diversities of tongues." The propriety of mentioning these separately, is, that there were examples of persons who officiated in one capacity alone. Although sometimes two or several of these offices were united in the same person, as an apostle was also a prophet and ruler, yet

there were rulers who were neither apostles, prophets, teachers, or workers of any kind of miracles.

Again, in Eph. iv. 11, where the different kinds of preachers are enumerated as apostles, evangelists, pastors, and teachers, bishops or elders, and deacons are not included. Why? The simplest answer is doubtless the correct one, that they were not as such ministers of the Word.

And, finally, in 1 Tim. v. 17, it is written: "Let the elders that rule well be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine." The natural interpretation of this text is, that there were two kinds of elders, some that only ruled, and others that both ruled and preached. Another interpretation, however, is given, in which the distinction is not between those who ruled, and those who both ruled and preached, but between those who both ruled and preached, and those who preached laboriously. But this requires a very important modification of the passage, thus, the elders that rule and preach well count worthy of double honor, especially those who *labor* in the word and doctrine. There are serious difficulties in the way of this interpretation.

If it was the duty of every elder to preach as well as rule, and if preaching was the more important function, we can hardly believe that the apostle would commend as worthy of special honor those who performed the least important of their duties well and neglected the most important. This is not according to the analogy of Scripture. But if it was the duty of one class of elders to rule only, he that did this well could be commended, and if it was the duty of another class to preach as well as rule they would be worthy, being faithful in both, of higher honor for their works' sake.

The interpretation contended for destroys the distinction altogether, if we suppose the commendation to apply to those who were faithful in their official duties, for it is difficult to see any difference worthy of special commendation between the elder that rules and preaches well, and the elder that rules and preaches laboriously.

The word *labor* in such connections indicates the direction rather than the comparative degree of effort. If I say of one man he labors in the farm, and of another he labors in the counting-house, and of another he labors in the study, although a commendable diligence is implied, yet the direction of the efforts put forth is what is uppermost in the speaker's mind and expressed by the language. The most natural interpretation and the one most in harmony with the analogy of Scripture, is that which understands the elders of the Christian Church, like those of the synagogue, to be divided into two classes, and commends those whose duty it is to rule if they rule well, and more emphatically commends those whose duty it is both to rule and preach, provided they not only rule well, but are diligent in publishing, explaining, defending, and enforcing the truths of the gospel—the one class as faithful in the discharge of their duties as rulers, and the other class as faithful in their double duties of ruling and preaching.

We have dwelt so long on the nature of the bishops or elders, that our time will permit us to say but a word respecting the last mentioned element in the primitive Church intended to be permanent. The reason for the appointment of the deacons is so fully set forth in the Scripture history, and the qualifications for the office in the Epistle to Timothy, that there is no necessity for much argument on this branch of the subject. These officers were appointed to hold and disburse the alms of the Church. It is a sign of a healthful apostolic condition when the deaconship is not a sinecure. The duties of a faithful and earnest diaconate, if imposed on the ministry would, as originally, be a burden that would interfere with their duties of prayer and preaching. It is a cheering sign, when the deaconship is like a living fountain, constantly replenished by those silent and invisible processes which enables it to send forth sparkling and refreshing streams; for, as in nature, the streams that flow forth and bless are invisibly evaporated, condensed, and returned to the fountain, so there is a similar beautiful circle meeting in the deaconship according to the promise: "Give, and it shall be given you;" "he that watereth others shall be watered himself."

It is not strange that some of those who had been elected deacons should at a subsequent period of their history be found in the ranks of evangelists and pastors,—“for they that have used the office of a deacon well, purchase to themselves a good degree, and great boldness in the faith, which is in Christ Jesus.” The general import of this language is, that fidelity in the deaconship merits a higher position in the Church, for there is room for the promotion of a deacon, but there is none for the advancement of the elder who already occupies the highest position of authority in the Church.

Having seen that the full and perfect organisation of the apostolic churches consisted of saints, bishops, and deacons, it is important to inquire whether there was any bond of union among the separate churches, or were they independent of each other, and subject to no control beyond the jurisdiction of their own organisation? Were they like detached limbs and organs, or were they like limbs and organs united together as well as to their Head, forming a body symmetrical, compact, and strong? As we have observed that the principal function of ecclesiastical authority is to interpret and apply the law of Christ, which is a judicial function, it is just as necessary for the purity and welfare of the Church that individual churches should be responsible to some tribunal, as that individual Christians should be responsible to the rulers of their own congregation. The experience of mankind has demonstrated the necessity of courts of superior jurisdiction, of review and control, to which parties who are dissatisfied with the decisions of inferior judicatories can appeal. The Church under the former dispensation had such a system, beginning with the rulers of the synagogue, and rising up to the august court of the Sanhedrim. Early in the history of the Church, under the present dispensation, it is made evident that this wise system is to be by divine authority continued. The question arose in reference to the constitutionality of the Levitical law under the new dispensation. The apostles were competent to determine this question, but in order to give their sanction to a system which was to be so full of benefit to the Church when they should be taken away, they referred the

question to a body of delegates to meet at Jerusalem with them. The decrees of that synod or council were sent down to the churches and were binding on all of them.

Under the best form of government administered by fallible men, mistakes will occur—the result not of defect in the form of government, but the imperfect character of those who administer it. The evils will be greater to the Church when a worse form administered by the same fallible men is adopted.

The government of the primitive Church was not in the hands of the congregations. They had the right to elect their rulers, but they were required by the apostolic constitution to elect them, and not exercise the functions of those officers themselves. The constitution of the Church being divine the congregation could not change it, but were bound to act according to it. There is a difference between the exercise of authority by the congregation, and by those officers to whom it appertains. There is hardly an epistle in which this distinction between the rulers and the congregation does not appear, and these rulers were the elders and never the deacons. In the Epistle to the Romans, the exhortation to rulers to rule with diligence was not addressed to the congregation, but to those in the congregation, who, by the authority of the Lord, were appointed to exercise all the authority that was permitted to ecclesiastical rulers. In 1 Cor. xii. 28, it is said that God hath set governments in the Church, for while they are elected by the congregation, yet it is bound by the divine constitution to elect them—to refrain from exercising their functions. God sets them, because he provides for their election in the constitution which he has framed, and they are set by the congregation, because by the same constitution they have the right and are under obligation to choose them. Now this language is found in the epistle in which the apostle charges the Church to cast out the incestuous person.

In 1 Thess. v. 12, it is written with earnestness: “And we beseech you brethren to know them who labor among you and are over you *in the Lord*.” Those who are described as *over them in the Lord* are church officers, as distinguished from civil rulers. And these church officers are such by the Lord’s

authority. And the duty required of the Christian people of knowing them, is to render to them the honor which officers deriving their authority from such a source are entitled to. In Heb. xiii. 7: "Remember them which have the rule over you, who have spoken unto you the Word of God." The honor due to those elders that labor in the word and doctrine is here particularly referred to, but in verse 17th the apostle says: "Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves," which includes the ruling elder as well. To give the weight of his apostolic character to this constitution of the Church, and to set an example of respect to all those who hold office under it, he writes in the 24th verse: "Salute *all them* that have the rule over you." Congregationalism, which has no rulers distinct from the congregation, cannot perform the Christian duty required by these repeated commands, and consequently loses the benefit to be derived from such officers, and the cultivation of the virtues here enjoined. It cannot preserve uniformity of doctrine, for it is not bound by the decrees of the apostles and elders assembled together. It is easy for an irresponsible minister to teach, and for an irresponsible Church to hold what doctrines they please, and hence every shade of religious belief may be found under this convenient form. Every religious teacher, whose erratic mind disdains control, will be apt to take refuge where he is restrained by no creed and responsible to no tribunal. This unregulated freedom is destructive to all that class of Christian virtues that manifest proper subjection to authority. It engenders a spirit of insubordination which too often overleaps the limits of reverence. Being a departure from the wise constitution that God ordained, it is not strange that experience should discover glaring defects in its practical working. This may not be very evident so long as churches are small, but when they become large the advantages of the representative system of the apostolic Church commend themselves to the approval of thoughtful and practical men. Mr. Spurgeon has found the congregational system unwieldy in his large Church, and has wisely and piously restored the constitution of the church at Philippi, with its bishops or elders, and deacons.

The organisation and government of the Church is a means to an end, or rather a variety of ends that cannot be so successfully accomplished without an organisation as with one, and cannot be so well accomplished by any other form of organisation as that which the apostles were required to adopt in founding the Church under the present dispensation. All these ends may be summed up in that of preserving and propagating the truth as it is in Jesus. This is expressed by the apostle in his Epistle to Timothy, when he speaks of his design in writing to him, that Timothy may know how to behave himself in the house of God, which is the *Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth*. There is an adaptation between the government of the Church, and its mode of worship, and system of doctrine. Prelacy has ever manifested a tendency towards a ritual more in accordance with the genius of the former dispensation than of this. Days, vestments, and conventional rules not provided for in the charter are insisted on with intolerant zeal. Multitudes of conscientious and faithful ministers were at one period deprived, for no other reason than that they demanded liberty where Christ was silent. Meanwhile prelates who impugn the inspiration of the Scriptures have been retained. It is very difficult for the great doctrine of justification by faith alone, and its kindred doctrines of grace, to maintain their prominent position in the midst of so many forms with so much value attached to them, as is expressed in the "act of uniformity." This Levitical spirit gives a coloring to the whole system. The preaching of Him who was "without form and comeliness" in the eye of the world is subordinated to the ritual—the preacher is transformed into a priest—the commemorative sacrament of the Lord's Supper is converted into a sacrifice—the table on which the sacred symbols rest, into an altar, around which the people kneel as if the sacred elements had been changed into the very body and the blood of the ascended Lord.

On the other hand, the tendency of Congregationalism is to affect too much independence of all authority human or divine, and make reason alone the arbiter, and not the interpreter, of the inspired Word. Hence there is very little uniformity in re-

spect to even those things that are revealed for us and our children.

Between these two extremes the Presbyterian form of government, when untrammelled by civil interference, has been characterised by a simple and decorous, yet free performance of the different parts of worship instituted by the Lord, and by a zeal for those doctrines that are revealed in the Word of God. The Christian life is regarded to be the offspring of the truth, and nourished by it under the efficient agency of the Holy Spirit.

As we have maintained that the essential principles of Presbyterian church government are those upon which the Church was organised by the apostles, does it follow that there is no salvation in any other organisation, or that those outside of her pale must trust in uncovenanted mercies? By no means. The Church as it appears to the eye of man does not correspond with the Church as it appears to the eye of God. As under the former dispensation he was not a Jew which was one outwardly, neither was that circumcision which was outward in the flesh; so now he is a Jew which is one inwardly, and circumcision is that of the heart in the spirit and not in the letter, whose praise is not of men, but of God. The Lord knoweth them that are his, and the exact line of demarcation shall not be drawn, and the separation take place until the angels shall be charged to sever the righteous from among the just. Repentance toward God, and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ, and not external church relations, however important, bring a man within the scope of the covenant which promises eternal life.

Does it follow that the Presbyterian Church, because so nearly conformed to the apostolic Church, is the only visible Church whose ecclesiastical acts are valid, and that the rest of the Christian world are outside of the visible Church? By no means. As we are not prepared to determine exactly what degree of personal imperfection is inconsistent with a state of grace, so we are not prepared to determine infallibly what precise degree of corruption in the concrete excludes an organisation from the pale of the visible Church, and makes it a synagogue of Satan. While it is our duty to defend the faith once

delivered to the saints, and the simple worship practised by the apostles, and the primitive constitution of the Church, yet it is not our duty to be hasty in judging others—or violently to disturb the unity of the Spirit, or to forbid others that do not follow with us to cast out devils. So long as any communion proclaims the truth as it is in Jesus, and has the attestation of the Holy Spirit, we shall recognise their ecclesiastical acts as the acts of elders, though called by another name and acting irregularly, leaving to time and divine providence the results of this conflict of opinion. But this we believe and say that every religious error like vice, is of the nature of disease, which sooner or later will manifest its morbid character, and which must be thrown off by the recuperative energy of the afflicted system, or in time it will extend to all the organs of the body, and terminate in death.



ARTICLE II.

THE MORAL AND RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF LOTTERIES AND OTHER MODES OF GAMBLING.*

The intelligent observer of passing events scarcely needs to be reminded of the steady and alarming increase of late years in the patronage extended by our people to the various lottery schemes, public and private, which, under the pretext of humanity, charity, and religion, threaten to deluge the land with a

*While not formally a review of any treatise these pages refer to several previous publications: 1. Green on Gambling; Zeiber & Co., Philadelphia, 1847. 2. Essay of Richard Hey, Esq., LL.D., Cambridge, England, 1812. 3. Pamphlet by Job Tyson, Esq., "On the Great Evil and Wide Extent of Lottery Schemes in the United States;" published by citizens of Philadelphia, 1833. ("Smyth Library," Columbia, S. C.) 4. History of Playing Cards, by the Rev. Edward S. Taylor and others; John Camden Hotten, London, 1865. 5. Complete Works of John M. Mason, D. D., Vol. III., pp. 265-316; Edition of 1832, New York. It is matter for regret to the writer that his efforts failed to secure, for his perusal, Dr. Junkin's treatise on the Lot, now out of sale.

tide of avarice and crime like that which excited the just fears of men forty years ago. It was then that the "Great Union Canal Lottery" in Pennsylvania, and other such abominations, swindled the credulous out of millions of money, and created such an amount of domestic distress, of fraud, thieving, forgery, bloodshed, and suicide, that there arose a loud and universal cry against them, resulting in their suppression, and inducing most of the States to pass prohibitory statutes against these prolific fountains of vice. How much of the present revival of lotteries may be due to the same widespread decline in morals to which the country is indebted for the Credit Mobilier and kindred schemes for promiscuous plundering and speculation, it does not fall within the scope of these pages to discuss. But the fact itself is flagrant—the railway traveller meets it in the shape of "prize candy," a villanous paste compounded of flour and sugar, which would be unsalable but for "prizes" of brazen "jewelry" and fractional currency which serve to corrupt the morals of children, and at the same time to poison their stomachs. Proprietors of leading newspapers, like the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, for example, catching the cue, it may be, from these newsboys, seek to enlarge their subscription list, by offering a "grand prize" of \$5,000, say, for which subscribers are permitted to draw lots, at some time during the year. Enterprising dealers in dry goods view with dismay counters and shelves piled with fabrics likely to be thrown out by capricious Dame Fashion before another season; but all fears vanish at the happy suggestion of a "gift-prize." Forthwith handbills are struck off announcing that "Messrs. ——— & Co., gratefully appreciating the liberal patronage of a generous public, have resolved to distribute the following gifts among their friends. Tickets to be given with each bill of goods sold amounting to ——— dollars, which will entitle the holder to a chance at the drawing." The *grateful* Messrs. ——— & Co., have not miscalculated. Hosts of feminine wants, unsuspected hitherto, or else peremptorily dismissed on the ground of "hard times," now become intolerable. The fair customers, who are both game and gamblers,

throng the "dépôt of fashion." The suspected fabrics disappear, as snow from the hedge. And the shop-man,—

"So child-like and bland,"

coolly reimburses himself for this "grateful appreciation" of public patronage by pocketing the extra charges.

But of course the public-spirited and enlightened citizens who look after our internal improvements, following the example of their predecessors in the first third of this century, take note of this patent method of turning the "small vices" of men to a good account. And so under their skilful management lottery schemes are employed to furnish amphitheatres and the general outfit of fair grounds for agricultural exhibitions, whose chief attractions are henceforth to be horse-races and betting. A wealthy city demands a public library in order to cultivate the intellect and improve the morals of her people. And as her millionaires have better uses for their money, recourse is had to "grand gift concerts" manipulated of ex-governors. And so the library is paid for by the hard-earned wages of inexperienced apprentice boys and uneducated mechanics, whose ignorance of mathematics conceals from them the wholesale pillage of their joint subscriptions to benefit the public. Wide regions of the war-wasted South are greatly in need of trust-worthy laborers to till her idle fields. And the lottery is invoked again, but with no other result, so far as known, than angry surmises about the disposal of the funds, and a further impoverishment of our poor, deluded people. Patriotism sighs at the thought of Confederate heroes sleeping in foreign graves liable to desecration by aliens and enemies; but the money to bring their precious dust to the land for which they died can only be had, it seems, by the same, all-powerful machinery, and a "General" is found willing to give the respectability of a gallant soldier's name to the thing.

This is something considerable; but it is not all. The vice "grows by what it feeds on"—private trade and public enterprise, candy boxes, journals, shops, agricultural fairs, libraries, immigration schemes, and Confederate monuments, cannot satisfy its insatiate appetite. It must be permitted to lay a defiling

hand upon the white robes of charity and religion also. We have heard with shame of tickets for church raffles hawked about for sale by pretty, young girls, in palpable violation of the law of the land. But we were hardly prepared for the announcement of a grand church, to be built at the cost of \$200,000, by the sale of lottery tickets! And we sympathised heartily with the *Religious Herald*, the able organ of our Baptist brethren at Richmond, Va., which, while relating the astounding proposal, in a burst of honest indignation, reminds these would-be church builders, that the Holy One of Israel has expressed his abhorrence for unclean sacrifices, by forbidding men to bring the price of a dog or the hire of a harlot into his sanctuary. It is well that religious people give heed to the mild, but telling rebuke of Governor Washburn, who in a recent message to the legislature of Wisconsin uses this language, which we are glad to see copied by various religious journals:

“Even the Church (unwittingly, no doubt,) is sometimes found doing the work of the devil. Gifts concerts, gift enterprises, and raffles, sometimes in aid of religious or charitable objects, but often for less worthy objects, lotteries, prize packages, etc., are all devices to obtain money without value received. Nothing is so demoralizing or intoxicating, particularly to the young, as the acquisition of money or property without labor. If you can devise some law to break up these practices and bring them into discredit, you will deserve the thanks of all good people.”

These words sound like the strokes of a friend, which are said to be better than “the kisses of an enemy.” The growing evil must be resisted by the combined efforts of the pulpit and the religious press. As for the secular journals, we grieve to find them generally the well-paid allies of the demoralising practice. Our reading has made us acquainted with one only among them all—a New York paper referred to without name in an exchange—which boldly denounces it. And let the pulpit contend against it, knowing that *communicants* in our churches, whether from ignorance or greed after filthy lucre, are being seduced by it.*

*The opinion of intelligent men as to the morality of “church raffles” (or lotteries), may be seen from an incident related to us by one of the origi-

It is with the design of promoting a more general and thorough discussion of this subject in its relation to Christian morals that we take up our pen, hoping that the results of patient thought, corrected by reading, and conference with abler brethren, may render some service to those who want the time or the opportunity to investigate for themselves. The task has been further commended to the writer, by the conviction that a thorough discussion of lotteries and gambling is not accessible to the readers of this *Review*. For having free access to three of the largest public libraries in the South no such treatise has been

nal parties since writing the above: Two clergymen of a certain Church, (not the Roman Catholic), upon meeting a gentleman on the street of one of our western cities not long since, accosted him in the most friendly manner as an acquaintance of long standing, when one of them, laying his hand familiarly upon the young man's shoulder, turned to his superior and remarked: "B—p, this is one of our boys" (he had *not* however been brought up in that Church) "whom I have long tried to get into the fold. I turn him over to you." The other, famed far and wide for his winning address, replied: "I accept the trust. Mr. F., a class is to be received into the church at such a time, join them, and be admitted," (naming the peculiar way). "Excuse me B—p," the young man replied, "I am not prepared for the step." "Ah, that is the result of your erroneous education. Come into the Church first, and get to be good afterwards." "No, B—p," the young man insisted, "I am unfit for the Church." "Come along; I'll take you as you are," persuasively said the ecclesiastic. Whereupon, the young gentleman, perhaps feeling that the point was being pushed too far, replied: "I am worse than you think me. I both drink and gamble;"—and mischievously enjoying the surprise occasioned in his reverend friends, he added: "You can judge for yourselves, gentlemen. Not long ago I went into a certain house in this town and, after drinking champagne at 50 cts. a drink, until I felt it, I was persuaded to spend the rest of my money (\$10) in a raffle. If that is not drinking and gambling, I don't know what is. And, B—p, *it was to aid in building one of your churches,*"—(naming the church). The young man was assured with becoming dignity that such proceedings were very displeasing to his interviewer. But as they have not been discontinued, (which the world believes he has ample power to require), the young man (sad scamp that he is!) is left to infer that the reverend gentleman made a slight mistake—the fact being, that *being thus reminded* of "such proceedings" was the really disagreeable thing. Alas, alas! we fear that the young man is unfit to be in the Church, since he cannot see that the end justifies the means.

found. Valuable material for it might be supplied by the publications already named. But the facts must be shaped by another hand, and combined with a more thorough discussion of the standard of Christian ethics in its applications to this vice. The treatises of Green, Hey, and Tyson, are arguments against gaming, based upon the evils which are found by experience to flow from it. The first may be regarded as the confessions, in the form of narratives from real life, of a reformed gamester, who saw much of what he tells in his homely way. In Hey, who was a Fellow of Cambridge, England, we find a more orderly discussion of the subject under the several heads of evils inflicted upon property, temper, and health. While in Tyson's Essay we have an array of facts, showing the misery, idleness, and crime, engendered by the great lottery schemes which became so popular during the first thirty years of the present century. Among these, the "Great Union Canal Lottery," drawn by authority of the legislature of Pennsylvania, as an aid to internal improvements, was the most conspicuous in its widely diffused injury to public morals. It was presented by grand juries as a nuisance, and finally suppressed by the legislature. The object of Mr. Tyson is to show that of all forms of gaming the lottery is by far the most pernicious, because it reaches such a wide circle of victims, multitudes of whom are led by its influence to lose character, property, and happiness, who otherwise bade fair to live and die peaceable and inoffensive members of society.

In searching for information as to the history of gaming, as practised among various nations and in different periods we have been led only to the most meagre results. The lottery, it seems, as a means of public revenue to the State was brought from Venice to France, and through France into England, in the fifteenth or sixteenth century. From the mother country it passed over into the United States, lottery tickets being sold by public authority, and a certain proportion of the proceeds retained for works of "internal improvement;" while the remainder was distributed by lot as prizes among the ticket-holders. The public benefit thus reaped we shall examine further on.

Meantime, most of us are aware that the French Government has continued to derive a revenue from the licensed gambling houses which are under its supervision and control. The results there have always been frightful, culminating in an average, says a French writer, of one hundred suicides a year. Similar consequences have followed in Italy. And in London, about the year 1800, says Mr. Tyson, a Government scheme was formed, with prizes of \$250,000 and \$500,000, which tempted multitudes to such desperate ventures that the night of the drawing was signalled by *fifty* suicides! The universal horror at this bloody tragedy caused a temporary cessation of governmental lotteries. But the ministry, feeling the need of the revenue of about \$5,000,000 per annum derived from lottery schemes, (it was the period of the Napoleonic wars when the Government was hard pressed for money), again endeavored to revive them, with every possible restriction to guard against the fearful evils. The experiment proved an utter failure. The British Government had not the power to get the revenue without incurring the guilt of inflicting direful injuries upon its own subjects. And so at length the pressure of public opinion forced the Government to discontinue them altogether. The experiment has its lessons. The German Governments have long drawn large revenues from the public "kursaals" at Baden-Baden and other watering places, whose gross immoralities are a scandal to Christendom. It is a pleasing omen of the Empire, to notice that steps have been taken for the suppression, at an early day, of these shameless dens of iniquity.*

*We append an item from the *Charleston News and Courier* of a late date, showing how the money oozes out of our cash-boxes to aid in protracting civil war in Cuba:

"The lucky lottery ticket-holder in Philadelphia has been the unconscious agent of awakening an unusual curiosity concerning the workings of the Havana Lottery. At present the lottery consists of 30,000 tickets, at \$20 each, making a total of \$600,000 collected by the Government at each drawing. But only \$475,000 of this amount is distributed among the ticket purchasers, as the Government takes \$125,000, or twenty-five per cent. of the whole, as its share of the business. About one ticket in thirty-seven draws a prize, and tickets not presented within a year are no longer valid,

The writer's attention was called by a learned friend to the information given as to gambling among the Greeks and Romans, by the patient researches of the accurate German scholar, Becker, into the life and manners of the classical peoples. For Becker's references to original sources, the reader is advised to consult his complete little volumes "Charicles," and "Gallus." But from his statements it may be safely inferred, we think, that the vice of gaming, at least in its modern proportions, was comparatively unknown in the better days of Greek and Roman history. The Grecian youth were content, in their primitive simplicity, to rear fleet horses for the Olympic course, and to train their own bodies with infinite care and self-denial, stimulated by the love of glory alone. And the victor's reward was a wreath of ivy, or of parsley-leaves, and an honorable mention in the odes of the poets. Statesmen encouraged these national contests, because they furnished, against the time of war, a most efficient infantry and splendid bodies of cavalry. To see how far these simple-minded Greeks were behind our enlightened utilitarianism, one has only to compare with this the published accounts of our modern horse-races, prize-fights, and cock-pits, where it is plain enough that "money answereth all things." And in excuse of the Greeks, it should be remembered that they lived before the era of the Parson Beechers, who go about

the Government earning another handsome sum every year from unclaimed prizes. Out of the 30,000 tickets about 15,000 were sold in Havana; 4,000 in Mexico and Guatemala; 2,000 in Central and South America and the West Indies, and 9,000 in the United States. The latter were again subdivided as follows: New York took 5,000; Boston and New England, 1,000; San Francisco and the West, 1,000; New Orleans and the South, 2,000. The sale of tickets for island consumption is decreasing, but it is increasing for the United States. For the purpose of carrying on the Spanish Government and the war, the people of the United States purchase 9,000 tickets for eighteen drawings per annum; this is equal to 162,000 tickets at \$20 each, making \$3,240,000, of which the Government receives twenty-five per cent. directly, or \$810,000, the ticket-holders running their chances for the remainder of their outlay, and receiving a larger or smaller premium. As only six large prizes are given, 29,994 people are disappointed every drawing; six out of 30,000 get a respectable prize, which generally finds its way back again to the coffers of the island treasury."

preaching the gospel of mammon from the text: "It takes a man to make money, and money to make a man."

Roman law prohibited all gaming for money, unless "ubi pro virtute certamen fit,"* the Roman usage of *virtus* suggesting, if not warlike accomplishment, at least an acquired skill which might be used in the public service. In the decline of the Republic and under the Empire this law was violated, and often nullified practically by the indulgences of the emperor themselves. At other times it was revived and rigidly enforced. But it was amid the universal license of the Saturnalia alone that all restrictions were removed. This law found its way into the early English codes, and testifies strongly of the vicious tendencies of gambling.

In the curious volume, "Cards and Card Playing," edited by an English clergyman devoted to antiquarian lore, an allusion is made to this vice as practised among our near kinsmen in ancient India, which might help out Darwin's theory of "inherited traits" if he knew it. The author cites the poem of Mahabharata, which represents Yudhister and his royal brothers losing at play not only their treasures, but their kingdoms also, although accounted models of royal wisdom. The same writer furnishes, in an extract from Montforts' "Voyage en Chine," (1854), a more recent account of the ravages of gambling among the Chinese—"Gaming is the ruling passion of the Chinese. No sooner does the artisan touch his scanty wages than he rushes off to play, without troubling himself to consider whether he thereby risks the necessaries of life. It is with them a perfect *mania*, which presents a curious contrast to their usual sordid avarice. † Moreover, it is by no means the lower class of the Chinese only who are thus imbued with the passion for play. Rich and poor,

*See "Gallus," Scene X., p. 501.

†Is not the contrast rather between two opposite phases of the same passion? For what is the main inducement to play but avarice?—It may be termed *avarice run mad*. No national trait appears more prominently in carefully considered accounts of this remarkable people than that "love of money which is a root of all evil;" and none seems to hold out more stubbornly against the gospel, not even their insufferable vanity and prejudice.

laborers and merchants, all are gamesters, and frantic ones too. And no people possess such means for gratifying their desires; with them anything will do for a game, provided there is a chance for winning and losing so as to keep the balance even. Games which with us are left to children, with them are played with avidity at any age. This does not hinder them from having games like ours, of a more piquant kind, where a stroke of good luck may double one's fortune, or an unlucky turn produce a correspondingly calamitous result. I have seen houses at Amoy quite up to the mark of the most scandalous of our" (*i. e.* Parisian) "*hells*;" and what surprised me much, I discovered in the jargon of these players of the far East the same humorous and figurative expressions which we remark among our own."

A most instructive section in this quaint volume furnishes some account, drawn by the author from the letters, memoirs, etc., of the period, of that epidemic mania for gambling, which, breaking out in France among the nobles in the reign of Louis XIV., continued to rage with consuming fury until king and nobles were overwhelmed by the great Revolution. This passion for play was carefully fostered by the scheming Cardinal Mazarin, whose deep-laid design it was by every means in his power to weaken the influence of the nobility, to destroy their resources, and dissolve their ties to the people, that upon the utter ruin of feudalism he might securely lay the foundations of that gigantic despotism, in which the king might say with full effect, "Je suis La France." The scheming monk succeeded beyond all human calculation, and gaming-tables were prominent among his instrumentalities. New games were devised and introduced from abroad. The royal residences at Marly and Versailles were converted into veritable gambling "*hells*," in which the Cardinal and the "Grand Monarque" himself officiated as the masters of ceremonies. The nobility left their rural domains and thronged more and more the centres of fashion and play. Estates melted away at the gaming-table. Duels and suicides were multiplied. Low-born gamesters were freely admitted to the king's favor for no other merit but skill at cards. Women vied with men in their extravagant devotion to play, and it was

only too plain that their virtue declined as their passion for play swelled higher. King Louis may be taken as an example of the debasing and hardening influence of gaming, when upon the death of his brother, and afterwards of his grand-children, yea, while their remains were yet lying unburied in the palace, he made particular request that the visitors should resume their places at the card-tables without being interrupted by what had occurred! And among the last acts of his tyranny was forcing his beautiful, young kinswoman, the Duchesse de Berri, then bowed down by domestic grief, to come forward and take part in the play. Louis le Grand seems to have used gaming as a trick of state entirely, but not so the Cardinal, who was so passionate a gamester that he actually breathed his last in the very act of directing one to play for him, as his strength was too far gone to allow of his holding the cards. The game had only been suspended long enough for him to receive the last offices of the Church, which sent his sanctified spirit into paradise. It deserves to be remembered as a fitting sequel, that the Cardinal's beautiful niece, the Duchess of Mazarin, was among the most conspicuous victims of his scheme, for she lost in play not only the immense fortune of twenty-five millions which he had bequeathed to her, but her character also. But warnings like this were unheeded by the doomed nobility. The poison did its work thoroughly. The keen strokes of satire even could not awaken the dormant sense of shame in their besotted minds. "The deep-laid scheme of Mazarin had succeeded;" says our author, "frenzied gambling had deprived the nobility of any interest in France or its welfare; cards had killed conversation, and murdered political life." The nobles were bankrupt revellers, unknown to their tenantry and unloved. The king *was* France—despotism was absolute. But the end was not yet. Oppression and debauchery waxed worse and worse until an outraged and infuriated people, chanted the Marseillaise Hymn beneath the guillotine which dripped with noble and with royal blood. Years pregnant with great events have rolled by, but the throes of that volcanic spasm continue to convulse the limbs of poor, dismem-

bered France, while every throne in Europe has trembled with its vibrations. It is an instructive lesson to notice among the influences helping to bring on this terrible outbreak, the demoralising passion of play. The author's position is amply sustained by the statements of eye-witnesses, whose words he cites.

Gambling, our author goes on to observe, was a prominent feature of society in England during the period of the Restoration—the blackest page in her history—when the depraved heart of man seemed resolved to indemnify itself fully for the severe restraints of the Puritan supremacy. It was the age which saw the invention of whist. “I can never forget,” says the pure-hearted Evelyn, “the inexpressible luxury and profaneness, gaming and all dissoluteness, and, as it were, a total forgetfulness of God, (it being Sunday evening), which this day se’nnight I was witness of: the king sitting and toying with his concubines, Portsmouth, Cleveland, Mazarine, etc.; a French boy singing love songs in that glorious gallery; whilst about twenty of the great courtiers and other dissolute persons were at basset round a large table, a bank of at least £2,000 in gold before them.” This was Charles the Second's last Sabbath night. He died on the next Friday. The picture serves to show how naturally and inevitably the triad of social vices go together—gaming, wantonness, and drink.

With this meagre but suggestive sketch of gaming habits in different periods and among various peoples, let us turn to the task of testing the moral aspects of it by the standard of Scripture.

And in the very outset we encounter this remarkable fact, that the Scriptures contain no express deliverance as to the moral complexion of playing for money or its equivalent. For, leaving out of course the solemn appeal to God's arbitration in such instances as the division of the Promised Land among the tribes by his express direction, the only mention of anything approaching to gambling alluded to in Scripture, seems to be the Roman soldiers casting lots under the cross for the possession of Christ's seamless robe, (see Ps. xxii. 19; Matt. xxvii. 34, etc). In this

case the bare fact is noted as among the circumstances expressive of Christ's deep humiliation. No comment is offered by the prophet or by the evangelists upon the general question of the lawfulness of gaming, and none is expected by the reader who reflects at all upon the overpowering interest of that crucifixion-scene. The silence of Scripture, as to the existence of gambling among the Hebrew people elsewhere, while copious allusions are made to popular vices generally, might be explained by the reasonable supposition, that gaming was unknown among that primitive race. The reasonableness of this supposition appears, when we consider how much had been done by the Mosaic legislation to repress the passion of avarice. And it may be, too, that the sacredness attaching to the Lot, as a recognised mode of direct appeal to God, helped to prevent its employment for purposes of gain or amusement. Of the bearing of this use of the Lot among the Israelites upon "games of chance" now, we shall have occasion to speak further on. But this absence from Scripture of an express condemnation of hazarding money upon play shuts us up to the alternatives, either to acknowledge its lawfulness, or else to seek its condemnation upon the sound Protestant principle recognised in the Westminster Confession of a "good and necessary consequence" from Scripture. The flagrant evil of the thing cannot be reconciled with the supposition of innocence, nor can the guilt of it suffer us to doubt that it is condemned in that Book, which reveals completely "what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man." The probability is strong, that if we do not somewhere find in Scripture an indisputable warrant for its condemnation, the fault is ours. But let us make the appeal, remembering that we cannot expect an explicit decision for every possible detail of human life and manners, as they appear in different lands and under diverse forms of civilisation. And this is, indeed, one of the unspeakable advantages of the scriptural code of casuistry, that instead of attempting to follow us into all the possible details of life, and thus bewildering the mind with endless discriminations, it gives us instead general principles capable of ready application by honest and humble minds to a thousand cases; excel-

lent models being meantime given to guide us in the application of the principle to analogous cases.*

In our attempts, therefore, to apply the standard of Biblical morality to the practice of gambling, we are free to follow one

*The thoughtful reader will not fail to see at once the parallel between the argument based upon Scripture in condemnation of gambling, and that used by our Church among others against certain "worldly amusements," whether or not with equal success, it is not necessary here to inquire. The fact is, however, that Scripture furnishes no comment upon social dancing or the theatre. In the Old Testament we have repeated allusions to certain bodily motions intended to express the intensest emotions of joy, usually, if not in every instance, of a religious character. These bodily motions were termed "dances," and the inspired Psalmist calls upon his brethren "to praise God in the dance." But every one possessed of the slightest acquaintance with Hebrew customs as represented in Scripture, knows, of course, that the *manner* of performing these sacred "dances" were as diverse from the fashionable amusements of to-day, as are the motives of those engaged. No instance is recorded in Scripture of men and women dancing together, unless it be in allusions to idolatrous riotings, as some think. Hence the impertinence of Dean Alford's note upon the "music and dancing" in the parable of the Prodigal Son, (Luke xv.), if he means a definite application to social customs among us. In fact, David's dancing before the ark is the only clear case of such action on a man's part, and Michal's scornful criticism implies that it was considered by her as unmanly as well as unkingly conduct. The criticism showed how truly she was Saul's daughter, blind to the significance of the occasion. The instance of Salome dancing before Herod is nearly allied to the "ballet," and passes under silent condemnation, along with the revelry of the adulterous court. We may safely assume that no instance of social dancing, as we see it, could arise under the customs of Oriental life. The same is true of the Greeks. And even at Rome where social customs approached nearer to the modern style, dancing was *tabooed* in good society as one can see from Cicero's remark, to the effect that no man danced unless he were drunk or crazy. The same observations apply to the theatre, with this addition, that in the apostles' time the stage was so completely identified with Pagan superstition and allusions to mythology, that, as a matter of course, Christians would be kept away. Besides, the "filthy communications" found to be subversive of good morals then, as now, were frequent themes of apostolic counsel.

So much by way of showing the parallel. No opinion is offered as to the relative conclusiveness of the argument in the two cases; nor as to the best method of dealing with these "popular amusements" in church courts.

or both of these two methods, viz.: (1.) By analysing the act itself, we may undertake to detect an element in it which palpably violates the letter of the law as it is summarily expressed in the ten heads of the decalogue; or (2), without such analysis being attempted, we may show from experience that the habit uniformly *injures men*. And if this charge be made good upon sufficient evidence, the practice is condemned *by the law of love to our neighbor*, which is the essence of the six commandments of the second table of the moral law.

1. In order to make the case clear beyond reasonable exception, we shall give in brief outline the facts by which experience establishes the sin and evil of gaming, on the ground that it inflicts injury, deep and serious, upon men, wherever it has been tested. And, under this head, it is well to refer the reader to the account furnished of the influence of gambling upon French society in the period preceding the great Revolution. But the evidence is before our eyes, showing beyond all question that the habit is constantly resulting in the ruin of men as to their character and property. For this obvious reason, it has been generally made unlawful by the statutes of civilised countries. The professional gambler is everywhere recognised as among the most vicious characters in society, devoid of honesty, and insensible alike to the ties of humanity or the claims of affection. The intelligent observer can witness the experiment in actual process. He can watch the gradual transformation of a kind-hearted youth, into the cold, unfeeling hawk, whose greedy eye and ravenous beak know nothing of pity for the inexperienced prey that falls within his clutches. It is true that drink and lewdness go hand in hand with gaming in producing the desperate villain, who is recognised as a beast of prey, cruel as the tiger and remorseless as the hyena. And this fact, that gaming in its unfettered state brings a man into contact with these other depraving influences, would be enough to stamp the habit as unlawful to one who abides by the code of Scripture. As one has well expressed it in that nervous language of which he is a master: "If it could be shown that my engaging in the harmless act of picking up pins would expose me to such depraving associations

as gaming, when left free to drift on in its own current, does, then I should sin against God by picking up pins." But facts show that not only the associations of gaming, but the *habit itself* exerts a depraving influence upon character. There are gamblers who have the self-command to steer clear of these associate vices, and yet are, if possible, the hardest wretches of the tribe, dead to the claims of God, of humanity, and of home—Ishmaelites, whose hand is against every man. The habit injures men in mind, body, and estate, and is therefore condemned by the law, which commands us to love God with all our heart, and our neighbor as ourselves.

Especially is the Essay of Mr. Tyson rich in facts establishing this point. He quotes at large from the sworn testimony of competent witnesses taken by a committee of the British Parliament, in 1808, showing that theft, forgery, murder, suicide, want, beggary, and domestic broils, all grow out of it; the cases being plainly traced back to this cause, and the corroborative statements of the parties given in full. Mr. Tyson's Essay is an attack upon legalised lotteries, on the ground of injury done to citizens. It was called forth by the ravages made in domestic and individual happiness by the gambling mania consequent upon the great schemes of the first thirty-three years of this century. He cites the records of criminal courts, the confessions of felons, the letters of eminent men, and the statements of the public press, all of which concur in the verdict, that developed gambling is ruinous to the morals, the finances, and the happiness of society. And of all kinds of gaming, he shows public lotteries to be the most injurious, because through disguising the evil motives of gambling under a show of benevolence, they reach an immensely wider circle of victims; multitudes of whom, but for these lotteries, bade fair to live and die peaceable citizens, who, through their seductive influences, have been set upon courses of vice, which in hundreds of instances result in crime and involve whole families in ruin. Surely one needs only such an exposure of the fruits of gaming to see that it is irreconcilably opposed to the law of God. And what was thus wrought out flagrantly under sanction of legislative enact-

ments in London and in Pennsylvania forty or fifty years ago, is now being produced more secretly under all the constraints of human law. The records of our courts still show that many a youth can look back from disgraceful flight or a felon's cell, upon the hour which began his ruin in a game of cards, or the small venture at the race-track.

Mr. Tyson deserves a patient hearing from all who propose or patronise "charity lotteries," when he shows the cruel inequality with which they distribute the burdens of this most uncharitable charity among the different ranks of society. It is, as he justly argues, not the rich, who can be most readily persuaded to incur the hazard of these so-called schemes of benevolence. The educated mind can detect the snare at a glance. But it is the inexperienced apprentice lad, the over-worked sewing women, the poorly paid clerk, or the journeyman mechanic, who can be most readily persuaded to risk their hard-earned wages in the hope of attaining to sudden wealth. Take as an instance of cruel deception, this heading in immense figures at the head of the advertisement of the Louisville Library Scheme, "\$100,000 for \$10!" The cruel deceit of such an offer is that, like the infernal tempters in Macbeth, it

"Keeps the word of promise to our ear,
And breaks it to our hope."

To speak plainly, but without unkind feelings to any one, (it being our purpose to discuss measures rather than men), we cannot see how such dealing can escape the charge of fraud. The qualifying facts are *studiously and of set purpose* kept out of sight, with the certainty that hundreds interested have no means of discovering them. It is to our mind perfectly parallel with the horse-jockey's cheat, when he says not a word of the fatal defects in an animal, well knowing that you cannot discover them, and so ignorantly take him as sound. Ignorance of those qualifying facts is essential to their obtaining money. For it is certain that no man who possesses common sense would venture the money so essential to the comfort of himself and family if he once comprehended the aggravated risks incurred by taking chances in charity lotteries. We are under obligations to Pro-

fessor William Carroll, the accomplished head of an excellent high school for girls in Memphis, Tennessee, for the following calculation of the real value, when tested by rigid mathematical calculation, of a ticket in such a charity lottery. He says:

"In order to show the ruinous effects of lotteries, let us analyse the probability of loss, which results from the relative number of prizes and blanks. The principle of Ternary combinations is the one engrafted upon nearly all the schemes of the present day and the number upon which it is based is 78. The number selected determines the number of Ternary combinations and consequently the number of tickets to be sold. The number of Ternary combinations, of which the number 78 is susceptible, is 76076. At the usual price, \$10 a ticket, the aggregate value of the tickets would be \$760,760. Usually about twenty per cent. is expended in publication and in the payment of agents, and about fifteen per cent. is reserved for the benefit of the enterprise or for charitable purposes, when such is the object contemplated. I notice that in the Library Gift Concert, Louisville, Ky., the sum set apart for expenses and for the benefit of the library is fifty per cent. In the case supposed, after deducting fifty per cent. there would be left \$380,380 to be distributed among ticket-holders, when the same ticket holders have paid in \$760,760. In the aggregate they are compelled to lose half their money.

"Suppose a scheme with prizes as follows:

"One grand cash prize,	\$80,000
" " "	40,000
" " "	20,000
" " "	15,000
" " "	8,000
" " "	4,000
18 cash prizes, at \$1,000	18,000
40 " " 500	20,000
60 " " 400	24,000
100 " " 300	30,000
150 " " 200	30,000
400 " " 100	40,000
5,138 " " 10	51,380
<hr/>					<hr/>
5,912					\$380,380

"Now the question arises, what chance has a purchaser of a ticket in a lottery of this kind of drawing one of the grand cash

prizes? The chance of obtaining the 1st prize is one in 76,076; the 2d, one in 38,038; the 3d, one in 25,358; the 4th, one in 19,019; the 5th, one in 15,215; and in the 6th, one in 12,679.

“Aside from the baneful effects upon the religion and good morals of a community, and looking at lottery schemes in a business-point of view, what folly to engage in an enterprise when the chances of loss almost amount to a certainty! Would a sane man invest money in a mechanical or mercantile enterprise, when the prospects of success were so desperate?”

Such is the value of an investment in the “charity lotteries,” so highly commended by an ignorant, or else a bribed press. And to these frightful figures we must add, upon direct and trustworthy information, that the managers frequently arrogate to themselves the right still further to sacrifice the interests of ticket-holders, (many of whom are incapable of detecting the injury), by arbitrarily arresting the process of distributing the prizes promised in the advertisement, when only a small proportion of the chances have been tested; and thus saving a large additional sum for the “charity” in hand, by multiplying the chances against drawing a prize as much as *sixfold* upon the above calculation of Professor Carroll! Of course such a palpable breach of faith in those who handle trust funds is never to be excused; and the only palliation for thus wronging the helpless, to which we can listen however indignantly, is that the funds so alienated have not been taken for private gain. The managers cheat, but not for their own profit. It is shameful that the proper officers of the Commonwealth allow such frauds to be perpetrated upon ignorant and defenceless people under the shadow of a legal enactment. A friend who watched the results of a recent drawing, mentioned to the writer a painful feature of public lotteries, which forever condemns them as charitable agencies. A large proportion of the ticket-holders were inexperienced boys, or laboring men who could least of all afford to contribute to the public enterprise aimed at. And it was only too plain that many went away to drown their disappointment in the neighboring grog-shops, or, perhaps, to mend their “bad luck” in a keno den. Let others think as they will of these

“public enterprises,” we can never see such fair grounds or libraries without being painfully reminded of the poor families who were deprived of their meagre comforts, and of lads tempted to a course of dissipation and crime, that others might enjoy such privileges.

Mr. Tyson's pamphlet gives instances to prove the terrible extravagance of lotteries, viewed as schemes of public finance. Of these instances, we select the “Great Union Canal Lottery” already alluded to as the occasion of so much distress and crime forty years ago. The Legislature of Pennsylvania authorised this scheme in 1811 for the purpose of raising \$340,000 for the construction of the Union Canal. But after it had been operated for twenty-two years with infinite mischief to the community, Mr. Wallace submitted a report to the Legislature in 1833, showing that lotteries had been drawn *to the astounding sum total of \$26,562,947, and yet without raising the comparatively trivial sum of \$340,000 required for the canal!* (See Tyson's Essay, pp. 9 and 10, and note).

Unfair dealing is an essential feature of all gambling establishments, as a clever writer in the *Eclectic* for September, 1872, triumphantly demonstrates. And even the seemingly small advantage of $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $2\frac{1}{2}$ per centum in their favor, (as the German *Kursaäls* admit,) is amply sufficient when immense sums are handled to insure them against occasional heavy losses, besides paying burdensome taxes to the Government and enriching the “bankers.” We may hail it as the fruit of Bismarck's elevated statesmanship that the German Governments have determined to sacrifice revenues which make them partners in that widespread demoralisation resulting from gambling, which has given to Baden-Baden its unenviable notoriety.

Surely enough has been said under this head to demonstrate our point, that, tested by its known consequences in different ages and countries, gaming for money is sin against God and crime against man. And further, that of all kinds of gaming the most baneful is the lottery, because it covers up the vice under a show of public benefit and charity, thus becoming all the more surely a “school of gambling” to multitudes, who there

begin a course of idleness, profligacy, and crime, that renders them a curse to themselves and a pest to society.*

And this proves how truly wise and scriptural is the position of our Church speaking through the General Assembly. (Minutes of 1818, as cited in Baird's Digest, p. 805). "The vice of gambling has also been forced upon our attention. We indeed hope that few or perhaps none of our actual professors have indulged themselves in the practice of what they consider as gambling. But perhaps there are some addicted to this practice who have evinced a predilection for our Church, and who are not unwilling to receive a word of admonition from us. Such we would earnestly exhort to consider, in the most serious manner, the consequences of the course they are pursuing, and the awful lessons which the experience of the world is every day exhibiting on this subject. But it is our duty further to testify, that all encouragement of lotteries and purchasing of lottery tickets; all attendance on horse-racing, and betting on such, or any other occasions; and all attempts of whatever kind to acquire gain, *without giving an equivalent,*" (italics ours), "involve the gambling principle, and participate in the guilt which attaches to that vice." Nine years later (Minutes of 1827) the Assembly felt called upon to protest again: "Gambling, that infatuating and destructive vice is still maintaining its accursed sway over thousands of its hapless victims.† By this remark we intend to condemn the practice of gambling by lottery, which, under the sanction of legislative patronage is, in several places within our bounds, encouraging a wild spirit of speculation, paralysing industry, and carrying disappointment, poverty, and sorrow into many habitations." The Minutes of 1830, (about which time the gambling mania had attained its height), represent the As-

*It does not lie within the scope of this paper to apply this fundamental principle of Christian ethics to the liquor trade in all its branches. But it is needless to say how important such an application must be at the hands of every one who receives Jesus Christ as Law-giver and as Judge—and equally so, whether he proposes to deal by the dram or by the cask.

†In these strong expressions the reader will recognise allusion to the lottery-mania which brought ruin to so many families during the first third of the present century.

sembly as enjoining the Presbyteries to require Sessions to proceed to discipline members who took part in gambling and thus to save religion from reproach.

2. Having thus shown the irreconcilable repugnance between gambling, and the law of love to our neighbor, which is the essence of duty as between man and man, the inquiry remains, whether we can proceed a step further, by signalling the precise point at which it traverses the Decalogue. It is always well to be able to present such important subjects in as many points of view as we can.

Most of us are aware that many of our ablest casuists, of whom Dr. John M. Mason is a representative, hold that all "games of chance," so-called, are liable to the charge of profaneness, and thus fall into the list of sins forbidden in the Third Commandment. They hold that the drawing of lots is of the nature of an appeal to God's direct intervention. The Lot is thus a mode of divine revelation, and is grouped under the comprehensive term, "the *name* of the Lord thy God." According to this view, while gambling, *i. e.*, drawing lots for money, may aggravate the sin of a profane appeal to God, yet the sin is shared to an alarming degree by games of chance which are only played for amusement. Let the view be stated in the words of an able advocate, who has expressed it briefly and forcibly, referring us to Dr. Mason for the arguments:

"1. I am very clear," he writes, "that the relation of the Lot to the providence of God lies in the nature of things, and consequently is always the same. Whatever has been at any time a lawful or unlawful use of it, is a lawful or unlawful use of it now.

"2. I believe this relation to be the same as that of the oath. The difference lies only in the aspect in which God is regarded. In the Lot, God is considered as 'Providence,' as the Disposer of events; in the oath, as the Judge and Avenger. Both are to be used on occasions only of great solemnity and importance, when a decision must be had, and can be obtained in no other way than by a direct appeal to the Searcher of hearts, and the Sovereign Disposer of events. Both are to be used in

the spirit of worship, and any other use is profane, that is, is taking God's name in vain.

“3. I am obliged, therefore, to believe that the use of the Lot in games of chance is a profane use of it. The player may not *mean* so, but neither does the profane swearer mean so. The very core of the sin in both cases is that God is *not* thought of; his name is taken lightly or ‘in vain.’

“4. In playing for money (in gambling) the sinful excitement is increased, and in the case of professional gamblers is still further exasperated by the greed for gain, but the sinful excitement originates in the appeal to the providence of God, in an unlawful way. The stake aggravates the sin, but it is by no means the whole of it.”

So say other friends, from whose opinions we have not ventured to differ without patient and protracted reflection. This view, so far as we know, found its first advocate in Dr. John M. Mason, who discusses the matter elaborately. (See Works, Vol. III., pp. 265–316). But it seems to us to labor under two defects—*first*, in overlooking the change in the functions of the Lot since the cessation of oracular communications; and, *secondly*, in failing to see that what this theory of “direct appeal to God” really implies is, not that simple providential control which leaves it on the same level as other natural operations and human actions, but a peculiar and exceptional one, which, indeed, puts it into a similar position to that of the “Urim and Thummim” of the high priest's breast-plate—an instrument for supernatural revelations.

These misconceptions appear again and again throughout Dr. Mason's discussions. As when he defines the Lot to be “an action intended to decide a point without the aid of human skill or *power*,” and having assumed that the act is “without the aid of human skill or *power*,” he proceeds to try several alternative suppositions, as “other creatures,” “or chance;” upon rejecting these suppositions properly enough he reaches, *suo modo*, the direct agency of God. And in the conduct of this argument he unhesitatingly employs arguments drawn from ordinary providential control, on the one hand, and from the ancient use of

the Lot as recorded in Scripture, on the other, to confirm his position, as if the ancient use were only in the course of ordinary providence. But the double misconception appears when we put parallel cases. If the relation of the Lot to God's power be only of that general kind, termed providential, in virtue of which "God preserves and governs all his creatures and all their actions," then what is true of one is true also of the other; if the use of the Lot, in virtue of this relation, is *profane*, except upon "occasions of solemnity and importance only," then it is equally profane to perform other acts except under the same circumstances. To illustrate, we use the example of target-practice for amusement. To fire the loaded needle-gun produces results as far beyond "human power" in some respects as casting dice. Am I authorised to amuse myself by target-shooting? Not, according to Dr. Mason, if the relation of this act to God's power be the same as that of casting lots. His argument from that providence which "lies in the nature of things" is an "ignoratio eleuchi." We see no escape from the dilemma which would rigidly prohibit all amusement or the abandonment of Dr. Mason's position of a relation "*in rerum natura*." Is the *present* relation of the Lot to providence diverse from that of other natural operations and human actions? Let him prove it that can. The parallel between drawing lots (as by casting dice, say,) and firing the rifle is complete so far as our argument requires it. Both result in consequences beyond our control. Both are *human power acting through machinery*, more or less complex. And they are examples of a wide class of human actions whose results, when once they are performed, lie beyond our control. In fact, of what action is it not true?

And this statement relieves our view of all embarrassment from the difficulty suggested by a learned friend in conversation: "You introduce the hypothesis of infidel science; certain 'laws of nature' which carry out effects beyond human agency." Well, there *are* certain "powers of nature," distinct, on the one hand, from man's will, and, on the other, from God's will. These *natural powers*, whose action and reaction, constitute the

“laws of nature,” (*i. e.*, “the ordinances of the heaven and the earth”), originated in, and are controlled by, the will of the Personal God. The “Kosmos” implies: (1), creation of elements endowed with power so act thus and so; and (2), the orderly disposal of these elements in definite positions in space, so that the various actions and reactions may produce pre-determined results. These seem to be the acts of God as the Originator of elements, and as the Architect of the Kosmos. But this is not atheism. It does not imply self-origination (if that be not a *self*-evident absurdity), or self-existence, or self-control. It is entirely consistent, as Professor McCosh, among others, has shown, with the inspired truths, “for in him we live, and move, and have our being . . . doing his pleasure among the armies of heaven and the inhabitants of the earth. . . . By him all things consist.” In the case of the needle-gun or the dice-box, the human will uses, besides its own more complex and wonderful body, a piece of machinery which exercises more or less influence on the result. This is all. There is no “*tertium quid*” arbitrarily brought in, or ignorantly implied. —The action is *human*. But, of course, human under relations to God’s power; and relations of infinite moment. Not such as make one or the other an oracular response from Jehovah; but such as constitute both, elements in that mighty web upon which God is weaving patterns of his own designing;—only we on earth see, for the most part, the *wrong side* of the glorious picture, which throughout eternity we are to study and to admire, *rectis oculis!* O beatific vision! “*What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter.*” But in this tapestry of Providence, all actions human and all operations natural are alike. Casting lots does not differ from target-practice—a world in combustion from the fall of a sparrow.

This drives us to the second and kindred source of confusion in Dr. Mason’s argument, *viz.*, the fact of a special use of the Lot in cases recorded in Scripture, in virtue of which it was the instrument of oracular responses from God, *infallibly* assuring men of his decisive voice in matters of doubt. The instances are too familiar to require mention: the division of Canaan

among the tribes, the choice of Saul to be king, the detection of Achan's theft, and of the heroic Jonathan's disobedience in tasting the honey, etc., etc. The last of these historic instances is the casting of lots to determine who should succeed to the vacant "bishopric" of Judas Iscariot.* It is not, of course, our purpose to attempt the impossible by undertaking to show wherein precisely lay this peculiar relation of the Lot, in its oracular function, to God's providence. Who shall draw the dividing line between natural operations and the Divine will? And as for the out-goings of God's power, the one answer made to Nicodemus suffices for all—"The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh or whither it goeth; so"——. In our present state, and for aught we know to the contrary, to all eternity, it is enough for us to apprehend with some clearness the *facts* of God's agency; the explanations we must adjourn to a more convenient season, for now we see through a glass darkly. But the fact of this peculiar use of the Lot is, we think, clearly implied, in the results produced, to which no parallel is, so far as we can learn, now attempted. The division of the Promised Land was of the nature of an infallible oracle, indicating to the several families of Israel the bounds of their habitation. Of this the evidence was at hand in the venerable prophecy of the dying patriarch, Jacob. And in the case of Saul's election the same proof was furnished in Samuel's previous knowledge. The detection of Achan and of Jonathan by lot was, of course, attested by the facts. And as to the question of a special appointment of the Lot to this extraordinary function, the evidence furnished by Lev. xvi. 8, and Num. xxvi. 55, is, at least, as clear, as that for the divine appointment of sacrifices. The discontinuance of this extraordinary use of the Lot is made clear by a cessation of the extraordinary results. Besides this, we have a

*Most are aware, of course, that the propriety of this proceeding on the part of the apostles has been questioned—gratuitously, as we believe. But for some judicious remarks upon the Apostolate of Matthias we must refer to Professor Alexander's excellent Commentary on Acts i.

general inference which commends itself as an indisputable maxim of Protestant theology, that with the completion of the canon of Scripture terminate all extraordinary phenomena, whose office it was to supplement and to confirm the forthcoming Rule of our faith and practice. The sun having arisen in his full-orbed majesty the stars retire. If pressed to explain such Scriptures as Prov. xvi. 33, xviii. 18, we cheerfully comply by stating our conviction of their double application. As applied to one set of phenomena, viz., the oracular function of the Lot, they allude to transient effects, which have ceased forever. But in their allusion to the general truth of God's providential agency in and control over all contingent events—if this allusion be understood—they state facts equally true of all time and of all things. And in this respect a notable parallel is found in one context, (Prov. xvi. 1): "The preparations of the heart in man, and the answer of the tongue, is of the Lord." But perhaps a more complete parallel is found in such texts as Matt. x. 19, 20, where *supernatural inspiration* is promised to the apostles, and *divine illumination*; not inspiration, either in the Romish or in the Quaker sense of it, seems to be implied for their successors.*

*It has been suggested that our position with regard to the Lot, must interfere seriously with the significance of an oath. But we cannot see how it should. The *lawfulness* of oaths is clearly recognised in Scripture (*passim*.) We need no better authority than the example of Christ, (Matt. xxvi. 63, 64), and of Paul, (2 Cor. i. 23), where all the essentials of an oath are found, as administered by authorities, political or ecclesiastical. This sweeps away all foundation for the Quaker theory. As to the imaginary parallel between "appealing to God" through the Lot, and in an oath, we are persuaded that the comparison will not hold. For in the one case we call upon God to answer our implied question, by an extraordinary use of our bodies—we *ask an oracular response*, which is of the nature of a new revelation; in the other case, we simply *assert to men* our consciousness that the "Searcher of hearts" is now looking upon us, and taking note of what we utter, with the purpose of punishing us if we lie. The parallel would obtain, did the oath imply, which it does not and cannot, that God will, in any way, *assure our hearers of the truth or falsehood of what we speak*; at least before the solemn disclosures of that day when the secrets of all hearts shall be revealed.

We have enlarged somewhat upon this point, not only for the sake of its bearing upon the topic under immediate discussion, believing that this charge of profaneness is generally insisted on to the detriment of the more obvious and true objection to gambling; but also because it deserves examination from its relation to the guidance of Christian life; that is, *How can we utilise this most valuable agency to settle matters of fact and of opinion?* We cannot see the authority for rigidly confining its use, on their theory, to cases in which "a decision must be had, and can be obtained in no other way than by an appeal to the Searcher of hearts, and Sovereign Disposer of events." This is Dr. Mason's position. It seems at first sight to have been exemplified, as Dr. Mason intimates in *one* instance in Scripture, the selection of Matthias by lot. Here Peter, as spokesman of the apostles, lays down, as authoritative, the necessary qualifications of an apostle; and two having been found possessing these qualifications, they appeal to God to select by lot, as he did between the two goats, (Lev. xvi. 8). Now, was Peter inspired to say what he did, and were the apostles sure without this as to whom God had chosen? As to other cases, such as Saul's election to the throne, Achan's detection, and Jonathan's, of course no absolute impossibility of using other means can be proved amid the concurrent and overlapping phenomena of the "divers manners" (Heb. i. 1,) in which God's pleasure was sought and obtained. The only probable solution of this arbitrary selection between the various modes of revelation, is that suggested to account for the variation of the details observed by our Saviour in working his miracles, viz., to show that his power was tied to none. It has been suggested to us that the comparative uselessness of the Lot as a means of obtaining Divine arbitration, on the showing of Dr. Mason, makes against the claim. We do not hear of our brethren ever submitting an important matter to the decision of the Lot. This is very different from the practice of Joshua, Samuel, Saul, and the apostles. Nor do we see how it is to be accounted for, upon the supposition, that "whatever was a lawful or unlawful use of it, is a lawful or unlawful use of it now." Why not utilise this oracle which proved so helpful in other

days? And in this connection it deserves to be remarked, that the cases to which Dr. Mason limits the use of the Lot as an appeal to God's direct arbitration, can never yield evidence confirmatory of his theory. And in this respect they stand in strong contrast to the efficacy of prayer. For while we may not adopt arbitrary tests proposed by Professor Tyndall—tests which violate the fundamental conditions of Christian supplications—yet the normal exercise of prayer yields evidence of its value. We can say with the Psalmist, "I love the Lord because he *hath heard my prayer.*"

If the Lot can be used as a means of securing a response from God now, as it once was, wherein did Mr. Wesley err in appealing to the Lot to settle his doubts as to the opposing systems of Arminius and Calvin? We are not so sure that his use of it can be convicted of error on this theory.* The reply of course would be, that we have the Scriptures by which to decide such questions. Yes; but Mr. Wesley contended that

*We are indebted to a friend for the reference to Brown's "Inconsistencies of Arminianism," pp. 413-419; where a full discussion is given of Wesley's tossing the shilling, to determine whether he should preach Calvinism or Arminianism. The charge was originally brought in Toplady's "Letter to Rev. Mr. John Wesley," dated "Westminster, March 26th, 1770," in these words: "And why should you, of all people in the world, be so very angry with the doctrines of grace? Forget not the days and months that are past. Remember that it once depended upon the toss of a shilling, whether you yourself should be a Calvinist or an Arminian. Tails fell uppermost, and you resolved to be an Universalist," (*i. e.*, as to the design of God in making the atonement): "It was a happy throw which consigned you to the tents of Arminius," etc. See Toplady's Works, edition of J. Cornish & Sons, p. 721. It is not necessary to our purpose to establish the authenticity of this remarkable transaction, but Mr. Brown correctly observes that it is vouched for by this high contemporary authority, and was never denied by Wesley, or by his friends during his lifetime, though ample opportunity was given, and allusions were made to Toplady's officiousness in collecting and publishing anecdotes of Mr. Wesley. And moreover, it is in keeping with Wesley's well known habit of casting lots in various ways to determine difficult questions. See "Arminian Inconsistencies," as above, for references to the Biographies of Wesley and of Whitefield, to show this.

he *had* sought light, and with prayerful agony. Toplady's Letter mentions that Wesley had confessed his great anxieties and his inability to come to a satisfactory decision;—a confession, which does him credit. In his acknowledged inability, he went to God to obtain a decision. And not unlikely his confidence in the infallible accuracy of the Lot helps to account for his intemperate opposition to Calvinism ever afterwards. We cannot see that Wesley misapplied the Lot, on the theory of its continued lawfulness; for he claims to have sought information anxiously from Scripture, as elucidated in the leading Theologies. But in his case without a comfortable result. The decision seemed to be demanded of him; and he appealed to God, *as he thought*, but the result was error!

So much for the scriptural warrant for using the Lot as a mode of securing God's decision. Now as to the Confession of Faith, (see 2, 113th of Larger Catechism), it is our candid opinion that its language is perfectly in keeping with what we have written. "Sinful . . . lots" are set down among the violations of the third commandment. But when we seek to interpret the precise shade of meaning intended by the general term "sinful," the only proof-text cited is Haman's casting lots to determine the "lucky day" for his wholesale vengeance upon the Jewish people. If he appealed to the true God intentionally, the sinfulness of his act is like that of the murderer who should pray God to aid him in his fell purpose—it is blasphemy. If he sought guidance from the stars, as is probable, or from the "mysterious powers above us," his sin was identical with that of the profane gipsey, who tells fortunes with cards, a proceeding that tends to put contempt upon all religion. And while it is true that "games of chance," as an amusement, may not be sinful, yet a parallel for Haman's sin is found, as suggested by our correspondent, in the conduct of many gamblers, who look upon their games as being controlled by supernatural influences, in such a sense as that the player's conduct brings upon him the smiles or the frowns of "Fortune." In such cases of course the player's intention constitutes a sin where none of that kind is necessitated by the nature of the act. Some curious instances

of this grovelling superstition and profaneness are given in a cleverly written article copied by the *Eclectic*, for September, 1872, from the *Cornhill Magazine*. Rules for the player's guidance are cited from Houdin's "Trickeries des Grecs dévoilées," which is a sort of "gambler's handbook;" among these certain directions are given for the repression of the passions of anger and exultation, not upon the obvious grounds of their leading the player to hasty ventures beyond his means, but for the superstitious ones that "the demon of bad luck pursues the passional player," and that "Fortune does not like people to be over-joyed at her favors and prepares bitter deceptions for those intoxicated by success," etc., etc. And that such language is not resolvable into mere tropes the writer proves very clearly. The profane creatures actually consider their conduct at play to be under the surveillance of a Deity who rewards them for being consummate scoundrels! And we add, that the behaviour of gamblers at the German Kursaals upon the advent of a "star," and the language in vogue during the lottery excitement in this country forty years ago, cited by Tyson, testify to the same prevalence of superstition. But if our argument is sound, these profane conceits arise from the *person*, and not from the thing done. This opinion is based upon Paul's principle about "meat offered to idols," 1 Cor. viii. So that "games of chance" may be used without profanity. The use of lots in filling out a list of jurymen, in dividing inheritances, or in selecting examples from among a large class of criminals, are to be regarded, not as solemn appeals to God, but as convenient methods of so modifying human action as to eliminate, as far as possible, the possibility of fraud or partiality.

Having thus, as we think, cleared the ground of obstructions, we are now prepared to show that gambling necessarily contains in it an element of dishonesty, because as stated by the General Assembly, it is a mode of getting gain without giving an equivalent. We attach the more importance to this effort to get rid of Dr. Mason's theory, erroneous in our opinion, and of adhering rather to the wiser course marked out in the deliverances of our Assembly already quoted, from the observed failure in the effort.

to impress even the best classes of our congregations with any definite conception of the profaneness of games of chance, whether played in moderation for amusement, or as a means of gambling; and perhaps one cause of this difficulty lies in the undue importance, necessarily attributed by the theory, to the sinfulness of gambling by cards or by dice, over gambling in other ways, as by horse-racing, shooting-matches, cock-fighting, or prize-fights. Now experience does not seem to warrant such a wide discrimination as Dr. Mason and our correspondent call for. Dr. Mason lays all his stress upon gambling by the Lot, and hardly alludes, if at all, to other modes. If the *gravamen* of the charge against gambling by the Lot is its blasphemy, and "greed for gain" (theft, we say,) is only an aggravation of the main evil, why does not experience show it? We see no such marked difference, (unless it be in public lotteries, as above stated, and *this* is fully accounted for, we think, without Dr. Mason's theory); and experience seems to show that, while horse-racing takes rank next to lotteries in wastefulness and in leading large numbers of our better classes into temptation, perhaps the prize-ring and the cock-pit exceed all other forms of gambling in engendering low and filthy habits.

This ground, of charging theft or robbery upon gambling of all kinds, is taken by the Larger Catechism. See Question 142d. It has been of course strenuously denied; and among others it is interesting to observe that Paley (Political Philosophy, Chap. VIII.,) fails to realise the full extent of the moral evil, though what he has to say exposes such incidental frauds as we have alluded to in the management of "benevolent lotteries." Paley maintains that one player (in this case the managers) act dishonorably if they take any advantage in the game, which the other party does not concede. And in this case, of course, the ticket-holders, being hopelessly deceived by the delusive promises of agents and managers, which they cannot understand in their true sense. The withholding of the *qualifying facts*, as above remarked, with the knowledge that the purchaser is deceived, is a case of constructive fraud. The charge is as clearly made out as when the horse-trader sells me a diseased animal, knowing that I have

no means of detecting the disease and consequently buy him for sound. Of course, the maxim—"Every man must look out for himself," is, in such an application, simply monstrous.

It is inadmissible to plead in defence of this spoliation, that it is an act of self-defence, or that it is on a par with reprisals in war. The two pleas are quite different from each other, and would be inconsistent as alternatives offered by the same party in his own self-defence. But the appeal will not hold to a justifiable self-defence, (as when I kill an assailant to save my own life), because in this case the taking of my neighbor's money at play goes beyond the limits of self-defence. Suppose it should be clearly established in court that A. had steadfastly manœuvred to induce B. to attack and then should shoot him down in the act? This would certainly modify the verdict of "justifiable homicide," which he claims from the judge and the jury. And to the gambler we must say, your defence must be withdrawal from the hazard, and not spoliation of your neighbor to keep him from despoiling you. And so without stopping to question, as we very well might do, the parallel between reprisals in war by belligerents and reprisals by individuals who cannot levy war, we meet the plea, by saying that there is always a wrong in war. Either the party declaring war does it without sufficient ground and is responsible for the evil done, or else having good cause the other party is responsible for the wrong and its consequences. And in neither case can reprisals be justified except as they are necessary to end the war and thus to redress the wrong. While of course either party at play can stop the wrong, (B. trying to take A.'s money), by withdrawing from the game, which it is his duty to do.

Such studied concealments must, as Paley intimates, take rank with the tricks of the professional expert. It is of the same nature as a false deal of the cards, and the agent or manager, who, by the aid of delusive promises made in the advertisement, entices the ignorant and poor to pay in their pittance, is guilty of a cruel fraud. It is unlawful spoliation.

But we are prepared to go further than Paley, with his defective theory of the origin and extent of moral obligation, was

naturally prepared to go. Apart from these collateral frauds which fearfully aggravate the wrong of gambling, as usually carried on, we are prepared to assert that every such act is a violation of the law of property, as laid down in the eighth commandment. It is despoiling him of his goods without *lawful equivalent*. The difference between theft and robbery, both of which are condemned by this law, being that robbery implies usually a show of violence, while theft generally includes the thought of concealment. It is because of the danger to human life that robbery and burglary are punishable with death. But so far as the main point is concerned (property), theft and robbery are as one.

The rules or conditions of gambling make no pretence to the act of *giving* away one's money, whether from considerations of pity or of love. They manifestly claim to partake of the nature of a *contract*; and hence Paley very properly sets them down under the heading, "Contracts of Hazard." The question is, therefore, whether viewed as a *contract*, gaming can be pronounced a valid and lawful transfer of property, as seen from a scriptural stand-point. The two arguments urged by advocates of gaming to show the lawfulness of it, (all accessory cheating, whether in words or actions, being excluded), are: 1. The mutual consent of the parties to abide the issue of the game. 2. The equivalent given by the winner in the shape of equal chances at the stakes, and the entertaining excitement of play.

The reply is, that the *mere* fact of a "mutual consent" is not sufficient in the eyes of law, human or divine. Take the case of a child, or person "non compos mentis," who parts with his golden "eagle" for a tin-trumpet. Here the judge can clearly ascertain that the grounds of the consent, freely given, are insufficient. The "bargain" is therefore unhesitatingly annulled. That is, the law takes cognisance of the *grounds* of the consent of parties, and, when clearly seen to be unjust to one party, orders the cancelling of the contract. The extreme case illustrates the principle. Now just where human law stops short in its inquiry into motives, (not here in this case, however,) let us remember that the Searcher of hearts is bound by no human limitations. The province of *motive*, which is essential to moral

government in its perfection, is necessarily perilous ground for the human judge, then he must needs use the feeble instrument of logical inference to find out something of the "intents of the heart." But to the all-seeing eye of God this impalpable world of motive is as clear as the unclouded landscape to the eagle's piercing ken: "For all things are naked and open to him, with whom we have to do." He discovers our motives, not as we do one another's, by the slow and fallible process of deduction, but by the infallible act of a perfect intuition which comprehends in its unrelenting grasp the very "imagination of the thoughts" of men.

"O wondrous knowledge, deep and high!
Where can a creature hide?
Within thy circling arms I lie,
Enclosed on every side."

Christian ethics emphatically condemn the selfish and savage reasoning of Cain: "Am I my brother's keeper?" by substituting for it: "*Thy neighbor as thyself.*" In that view I am bound to consider the ground of my neighbor's consent to abide the issue of the game, as well as my own. And when I see that it is based, in either of us, upon unjustifiable grounds, I am bound by the law of Christ to save him, as well as myself, from the treacherous quicksand. The gamester's motive is either compounded of ignorance and greed after gain, or else it is simple avarice, an unholy coveting of my neighbor's property. The "contract," so called, is invalidated and annulled by this unholy motive. Every transaction in which gain is had (or sought after) without a fair equivalent, is *stealing* or robbery, in God's sight, let men call it by what name they will. "It is despoiling my neighbor unlawfully of his goods, and aiding him to attempt the same iniquity. O what a terrible overhauling of these "bargains" and contracts may we confidently expect in the last day! And what havoc would the steady application of this scriptural law, recognised, indeed, but, because of human weakness or sin, carried out most imperfectly here. Such as it is, however, in its human shape, it is the earthly analogon of the heavenly and divine reality. *Motives lie at the root of all actions*

and must be taken into the account, even of short-sighted human judges.

As to the second argument in justification of gambling in its essential form, *i. e.*, when "unfair dealing" is rigidly excluded, (which is rarely if ever the case), that "the winner gives an equivalent in the even chance to win, and in the entertainment of play;" the first "equivalent" is swept away by the consideration of unholy motives. Translated into plain terms it is: "I repay you for taking away your property unjustifiably by giving you the opportunity of taking mine on the same wicked terms." And as to the second plea that the "entertainment of play" fairly compensates the losing party, the reply is, that it adds to the injury done him and aggravates the wrong which it professes to heal. This "entertainment" arises from an excitement which is both unholy and unhealthful. Experience proves it to be a consuming fire, which once ignited burns up all that is "lovely and of good report" in human character. It disorders the nervous system, and awakens or else intensifies the craving for deadly stimulants. It irritates the combative propensities and thus leads to bloody affrays. It leads men into vile associations and low company of both sexes. It wins him away from the purifying pleasures and duties of home—in a word it implants disease, physical and moral, in every element of his being. And thus I repay him for the money I take from him in play! This is the natural tendency of things, and, therefore, these are consequences for which I am justly accountable. If, as sometimes happens, my companion in play resists to a greater or less extent the evil tendencies that I help him to exercise, of course, I am entitled to the same consideration as the incendiary who kindles the fire in his neighbor's house, with the known risk, at least, if not the intention, of burning him in it with his helpless family; but the fire is happily extinguished by a fall of rain, or else dies out of itself from the incombustibility of the house. It is a case of arson. We do not say that he will be punished to his full desert by poor, defective human law, administered by fallible men. But we can anxiously surmise what his chances for escape are at the hands of that true "*higher law,*" which proclaims

that rash and uncontrolled anger is constructive murder; and unholy lust is adultery. *Væ victis!*

It had been our purpose to attempt some application of these principles of divine morality to some of the phases of commercial speculation, but, alas! the field is wide, duties press upon us—“*tempus fugit.*” We only add that we consider that new department of the banking business known as life insurance, which has shot up into sudden and growing importance fairly able to stand an appeal to the principles of morality. The contract of a life insurance policy may be considered to partake of a double nature. On the one hand it is a financial investment which is as much *self-supporting* as any other form of banking. Its revenues are adjusted by impartial application of the laws of mortality, (which are not of course to be understood in the absurd sense of atheistic entities, but as facts of observation springing from natural causes under the beneficent guidance and control of the God of providence). These revenues are invested, after deducting the necessary expenses of the machinery as in other banks, for the benefit of subscribers who are the stockholders. The man who applies for a life policy expects to pay for what he gets, if he reads honest statements freely circulated by various companies. The reasonable expectation of both parties is, that a sufficient subscription will be paid in to cover the whole amount of the claim at the expiration of the time.* If this time extends through “the term of natural life,” it is a *reasonable probability* based upon an induction of particulars. But besides this purely financial side, life insurance claims another element, viz., that of *benevolence*, like that feature so often embodied in other copartnerships, which provides that, in case a partner dies before the time set for the dissolution of the firm, his heirs shall receive a certain just proportion of the profits realised before that date. The policy-holders of insurance companies are in fact—and it is so explained—*copartners in a banking scheme*, which combines financial security with wisely regu-

*This is directly the reverse of the gambler's expectation, whether he holds lottery-tickets or cards. His hope and desire are to obtain what he does *not* pay for; and that frame of mind is the sin of gambling.

lated humanity. There is, therefore, no occasion for the unfair comparisons sometimes heard, between gambling and life insurance. This of course presupposes that the contract is not invalidated by incidental fraud in the contracting parties as by concealment of disease, by insuring with intent to commit suicide; or by fraudulent application of investments. And the same general statement holds good of the kindred business of fire and marine insurance, *mutatis mutandis*.

We conclude this discussion by reiterating with an emphasis that comes from a painful observation of the accruing evil, that the Church must keep her garments unspotted if she does not wish to incur the contempt of men, and the righteous wrath of God. Her policy is, Touch not the unclean thing. "Can a man take fire in his bosom and not be burned? Can one go upon hot coals, and his feet not be burned?" It is impossible. Let the watchmen on the walls take the alarm and lift up their voice like a trumpet, if they would be found without the blood of souls in their skirts. And if neither the press nor the pulpit will do their duty in keeping back the tide from us which brought poverty, sorrow, and heart-burnings, into so many homes in this country forty years ago; if we are to be threatened through the mistake, or the pretence of ignorant or of designing men, with scenes such as those that marked the dismal night of the great Government lottery in London, when *fifty* wretched suicides testified in mute eloquence to the depraving influences of gambling in this form; then let faithful magistrates take it in hand and prosecute the first citizen, man or woman, who in flagrant violation of public law offers for sale tickets for a "church raffle."

ARTICLE III.

THE CAUTION AGAINST ANTI-CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
CRITICISED BY DR. WOODROW.

In May, 1869, (not 1866,) I addressed a memorial on theological education, not to the General Assembly, but to the Committee on Theological Seminaries. Called by the Church and Assembly to this work almost from my youth, I had devoted sixteen of my best years to their service as a teacher in one of the Assembly's schools of divinity. I was conscious that I had studied this great interest, and engaged in this labor, with all the zeal and attention of which my feeble powers were capable. It was obvious that our system of Seminary instruction was still, notwithstanding its valuable fruits, in several respects experimental. It had been borrowed, by Drs. A. Alexander and J. H. Rice mainly from Andover, then the only institution of this precise nature in America, for Princeton and Union Seminaries. But Andover was Congregational—we are Presbyterians. I saw that there was danger, lest features borrowed by these beloved fathers provisionally, should by unquestioned usage, harden into fixed precedents, (which they never desired,) when perhaps time might show that these features were unsuited, or not best suited to our policy and principles. As our Church was then, in God's providence, passing anew through a formative state, it seemed the right time to discuss these points of Seminary management. Who should evoke that discussion, if not the men to whom the Church has entrusted the business? I, though not an old man, was very nearly the oldest teacher in divinity in the service of the Church. Now, I might have sought moral support for my views by manoeuvring to get some faculty, or colleague, or my Presbytery, or my Synod, or a majority thereof, to "father" them, in the form of an "overture" to the Assembly. But as I desired to speak out my whole mind respectfully, yet honestly, I preferred to have my views go before the Assembly unsupported by factitious props, and let

them receive only that assent to which their intrinsic merit might entitle them.

The memorial was not read in the Assembly of 1869, but was referred to the faculties and directors of Columbia and Union Seminaries, going first to the former. The authorities at Columbia disapproved all my views. The papers were then mislaid for a time among the officers and committee-men of the Assembly; I know not how. Finally another Committee of the Assembly reported, without ever having met as a Committee, or having seen my memorial advising that the subject be finally dropped, on the single ground that so decided a dissent of one Seminary would make it improper to attempt any improvements, whether valuable, or not. Thus the paper was consigned to "the tomb of all the Capulets;" and I was refused a hearing, when neither Church nor any of the Assemblies knew anything whatever of my recommendations, save from the version of my opponents. Had I demanded the privilege of dictating my views, this reception would have been just. But the humblest servant expects a *hearing*, when he comes to the most imperious master, in the spirit of humble zeal and fidelity, to inform that master of the interests of *his* property entrusted to the servant's care. That mere hearing was what I asked for; and only for my masters' good; not my own; (for the only result to me, of the adoption of my views, would have been increase of toil and responsibility,) but even a hearing has been refused me.

This, however, is a digression. One of the points made in this forgotten memorial was an objection to the introduction of chairs of natural science into our Seminaries. These sciences, and especially geology, have been so largely perverted to the interests of unbelief, that sundry friends of the Bible, in their uneasiness, came to think that our Seminaries should be provided with chairs to teach these sciences in their relation to inspiration, to all the pastors of the Church. I recognised the danger, but dissented from this mode of meeting it on three grounds which still seem to me perfectly conclusive. One was, that the amount of instruction which could be thus given on these intricate and extensive branches of knowledge, in con-

nexion with the arduous studies of a three years' course in divinity, would usually prove inadequate to the end proposed; whence I concluded that the defence of inspiration against the perversions of these sciences, would be better left to learned Christian laymen and to those pastors and teachers whose exceptional talents and opportunities fitted them for going thoroughly into such studies. My second point was, that the study of modern geology, especially, is shown by experience to be seductive, and to have a tendency towards naturalistic and anti-Christian opinions. Some, of course, must master these matters, notwithstanding any dangerous tendencies; but it would be more discreet not to place the Christian men especially devoted to these seductive pursuits, in the very schools where our pastors are all taught; and not to arm them with the Church's own power and authority for teaching an uninspired and fallible branch of knowledge *ex cathedra*, to all our pastors. Because, should that happen among us, at some distant day, which has so often happened to others, it would be far more detrimental to have the defection in a citadel of the Church than in an outpost. To show that I was not insinuating any doubt of any living man, I added: "*The undoubted soundness of all our present teachers and clergy, and their unfeigned reverence for inspiration, now blind us to the ulterior tendency of such attempts. It may be two or three generations before the evil comes to a climax.*" My third argument was the most conclusive of all. It was grounded in the fact that our Church and all its ecclesiastical powers are founded upon a doctrinal covenant—our Confession and Catechisms. Hence, I argued, the Church cannot by ecclesiastical power teach her presbyters *ex cathedra* in her Seminaries, (which, if they have any right to exist at all, are ecclesiastical institutions,) a set of opinions which are clear outside of our doctrinal covenants. And this was the more conclusive, because it was morally certain that any theory of adjustment between geology and Moses, which would be taught by any modern geologist, would contradict the express terms of our doctrinal covenants as they now stand. For each of these schemes of adjustment postulates the existence of a

pre-Adamite earth and living creatures; but our Confession, Chap. IV., Sec. I., expressly asserts the contrary. Now, this being the case, and some of our ministers holding one, and others holding a contrary scheme of adjustment, and others again, being like myself, committed to none, it must follow that, sooner or later, the attempt to inculcate one of these schemes by ecclesiastical authority must lead to strife among ourselves. How soon has this been verified! Dr. Woodrow's groundless apprehension, that I was seeking to inculcate a different scheme from his, has already verified it! Now, we do not regard our Confession as infallible. But it is our doctrinal covenant; and we are surely right, therefore, in expecting at least thus much, that those who believe they have detected positive error in it, ought candidly to move the Church to agree together upon the correction of that error; and they are the proper persons to show how to correct it, if they can.

But meantime, Judge Perkins had endowed a chair of "Natural Science in connection with Revealed Religion" in Columbia Seminary, and Dr. Woodrow was its incumbent. Is this critique his retaliation for my presuming to exercise my right of dissent? I carefully removed all provocation, by making, as I have recited, a most express and honorable exception in favor of him and all his colleagues and pupils. It will appear in the sequel, as though he were bent upon excepting himself from the benefit of my exception, and verifying in his own case the caution which I was too courteous to apply to him.

The first criticism which I notice is, the charge that I disallow and reject all physical science whatever; and that I do it upon the implied ground that Revelation can only be defended by disallowing it all; thus virtually betraying the cause of the Bible with all intelligent men. This misconception of my aim will be so astonishing to all impartial readers, that perhaps they will be slow to believe Dr. Woodrow has really fallen into it. Hence I quote a few of his own words. *Review*, p. 328: "Dr. D. . . . has been keeping up for a number of years an unremitting warfare against Physical Science." [There must be a good many remissions when Dr. W.'s zeal can find but three blows in seven

years.] Page 333: "Dr. D. endeavors to excite hostility against Physical Science," etc. Page 336: "Having taught that physical science is vain and deceitful philosophy," etc. Page 337: "If he had confined himself to saying that 'the tendency of much of so-called modern science is sceptical,' he might easily have substantiated this assertion. But he maintains no such partial proposition," etc.

But this is precisely the proposition which I do maintain; having stated and defined it precisely thus in my own words. I presume that Dr. Woodrow is the only reader who has so misconceived me. My *last* and chief publication, the sermon in Lynchburg, is entitled, *A Caution Against Anti-Christian Science*. Why may I not be credited as understanding and meaning what I said? Dr. Woodrow exclaims, as he cites from my own words, my respectful appeal to the physical science of Drs. Bachman and Cabell, or to the refutation of the evolution hypothesis of Darwin, etc., by Agassiz and Lyell, or to the proof of actual, new creations of *genera* by fossil-geology: "Is Saul among the prophets?" Why may it not be supposed that I was not an ignoramus, and so, was consistent with myself, and knew what I was saying? The anti-Christian science which I disallow was here expressly separated from this sound physical science. But again: In the introduction of the sermon I hasten to separate and define the thing I attack. On page 2, I tell my readers that it is the "prevalent, vain," physical philosophy. Now every one knows that it is the materialistic philosophy of Lamarck, Chambers, ("vestiges,") Darwin, Hooker, Huxley, Tyndal, Herbert Spencer, Büchner, which is now the "prevalent" one. That is, these and their followers, like the frogs in the fable, who made more fuss in the meadow than the whole herd of good bullocks, are notoriously "prevalent" upon the surface of the current literature. It is these whom people called "intelligent," now usually read in the journals of the day. They hear of Darwin and his friends a thousand times, and do not hear of Dr. Woodrow's sound and safe science at all. I presume that there was not a gentleman in my audience in Lynchburg who did not see that I opposed these materialistic

physicists, and them alone. I further defined the thing I opposed as that which affects "positivism;" which attempts to construct a "sensualistic" psychology; which refers every thing, as effects, to the laws of material nature and of animal life. One would think that the materialistic school of Darwin, Huxley, etc., was in these words defined beyond the possibility of mistake to the well-informed hearer. All such would moreover clearly understand me as meaning these, because they knew that I knew it was precisely this school of physicists which was making nearly all the noise and trouble in the popular literature of the day, described by me in subsequent passages of the sermon.

But Dr. Woodrow, rather than give me the benefit of my own definition of my own object, on page 335 of his *Review*, launches out into the most amazing misunderstanding and contradictions. Indeed the passage is to me unintelligible, except that his astounding denial of the attempt made by the followers of Hume, and of Auguste Comte, to give a "sensualistic" explanation of the "mind's philosophy," betrays the fact that he has wholly failed to apprehend what I was speaking of. Had I learned manners in the school of Dr. Woodrow, I should here be warranted in retorting some of his very polite language on pages 368 to 370, and "prove that *he* is acquainted neither with the method nor the ends of" *mental* "science;" that he "has refused to learn" about the history of psychology "what boys in colleges can understand," or that he "is ignorant of the difference between true science" of mind "and the errors uttered in its name," etc., etc. But instead of doing so, I shall simply beg Dr. Woodrow's attention to some very familiar facts in the history of philosophy, which I trust will enable him to see my meaning. Be it known then, that especially since the days of Hartley in England, and Condillac in France, there have been in those countries, schools of philosophers, whose main characteristic is, that they ascribe to the human mind no *original* functions save those of sensibility and sense-perception. They deny all *a priori* powers to the reason, and disbelieve the existence, in our thinking, of any really primitive judgments of

reason. They teach that all logical principles are empirical. They hold in its sweeping and absolute sense the old scholastic maxim: "*Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu.*" The consistent result of so false an analysis was foreseen to be materialism; and so it resulted. Now, the term employed to denote this school of psychology, from the days of the great and happy reaction under Royer Collard and others in Paris, and Emmanuel Kant in Königsberg, was *sensualistic*, (sometimes spelled by the English philosophers, as Morell, *sensationalistic*,) and the name is appropriate, because the school sought to find all the sources of cognition in the *senses*. This common error characterised the deadly philosophy of Hume, the scheme of Auguste Comte, termed by himself *positivism*, and the somewhat diverse systems of Buckle, John Stuart Mill, and of Darwin and Huxley; who, while disclaiming *positivism* in that they do not adopt some of Comte's crotchets, yet hold this main error, and consequently reach, more or less fully, the result, blank materialism. One of the worst characteristics of the type of physical science now so current through the writings of these men, is the union of this "sensualistic" psychology with their physical speculations, whence there results almost inevitably a practical atheism, or at least a rank infidelity. I hope that Dr. Woodrow is now relieved, and begins to see what was the "anti-Christian science" which I opposed in my sermon and other writings.

I will now add, that at the end of last April, (two months before the publication of Dr. Woodrow,) he did me the honor to write me very courteously, at the prompting of a good man, a friend of peace, notifying me of his intended critique. I wrote him, the first of May, a polite and candid reply, in which occurred the following sentences:

"REV. AND DEAR SIR:

"Your courtesy in advertising me of your article deserves a thankful acknowledgment. I beg leave to tax your kindness with a few remarks before you finally commit your MS. to the press. The few words which passed between us in Richmond showed me that I had not been so fortunate as to convey the real extent and meaning of my views to you. This misconcep-

tion I will make one more effort to remove, in order to save you and the public from discussions aside from the real point. . . :

“I conceive that there is but one single point between you and me, which is either worthy or capable of being made a subject of scientific discussion. It is this: I hold that to those *who honestly admit a Creator anywhere in the past, the a posteriori argument from naturalness of properties to a natural (as opposed to a creative or supernatural) origin of the structures examined, can NO LONGER BE UNIVERSALLY VALID.* That is, really, the only point I care for. Now let me appeal to your candor to disencumber it of misapprehensions and supposed monstrous corollaries, and where is the mighty mischief?

“But (you may say) Dr. Dabney is understood as holding the above in such a sense, as to involve the assumption that all save the ‘*pleistocene*’ fossils are shams; that is, that the older fossil remains of animal life never were alive, but that God, in creating the world, created them just as they are, probably for the purpose of ‘humbugging’ the geologists. Now, I have never said nor implied any such thing, and do not believe it. *Search and see.* You may return to the charge with this inferential argument; that the doctrine means this, or else it has no point to it. *It does not mean it* in my hands, and I will show you what point I think it has. Let that ugly bugaboo, I pray you, be laid.

“Again: You will find, if you will search my Notes and Sermon, that I have not committed myself for or against any hypothesis held by truly devout, Christian geologists. I have not said that I rejected, or that I adopted, the older scheme of a pre-Adamite earth, as held by Drs. Chalmers, Hodge, Hitchcock, etc. I have not committed myself for or against the hypothesis of Cardinal Wiseman, and Dr. Gerald Molloy of Maynoote. No man can quote me as for or against the ‘uniformitarian’ scheme of Sir Charles Lyell, as compared with the opposite scheme of Hugh Miller. As to the other propositions advanced in my Notes and Sermon, I presume they can hardly be made the subjects of scientific debate between us, even if of difference. We shall hardly dispute whether sham-science, disparaging Moses, is, or is not, wholesome reading for the children of the Church. We shall hardly differ about the propriety of carrying that solemn conscience into physical speculation which sinners usually feel when they come to die. It can hardly be made a point for scientific inquiry, whether your larger or my smaller admiration for the fascinating art of the mineralogist is the more just.

“The only real point which remains then, is my humble attempt to fix the ‘metes and bounds’ of physical *a posteriori* reasonings when they inosculate with the divine science. Obviously, atheistic physicists wholly neglect those metes and bounds. Obviously again, many theistic physicists (as Hitchcock, *Relig. of Geol.*) dazzled by the fascination of facts and speculations, are overlooking those metes and bounds. Now, that inquiry may proceed in a healthy way, and the ground be prepared for safe hypothesis, it is all-important that a first principle be settled here. I offer my humble mite, by proving that, to the theistic reasoner, (I have no debate here with atheists,) *the proposition cannot hold universally true that an analogous naturalness of properties in a structure proves an analogous natural origin.* I do not care to put it in any stronger form than the above.

“But when cleared of misconceptions, this proposition, to the theist, becomes irresistible. Geologists” (meaning of course the ones defined in the previous paragraph) “refuse all limitations of analogical, *a posteriori* arguments, claiming that ‘like causes always produce like effects,’ which, say they, is the very corner-stone of all inductive science. But the real proposition they employ is the converse of this, viz.: ‘Like effects always indicate like causes.’ Now, first, must I repeat the trite rule of logic, That the converse of a true proposition is not necessarily true? Secondly: The theist has *expressly admitted another cause*, namely, an infinite, personal Creator, confessedly competent to any effect he may choose to create. Hence, the theist is compelled to allow that this converse will not hold universally here. Thirdly: A wise Creator, creating a structure to be the subject of natural laws, will *of course* create it with traits of naturalness. Hence, whenever the mineralogist meets with one of these created structures, he must be prepared to find in it every trait of naturalness, like other structures of the class which are originated naturally. Fourthly: To the theist this argument is perfect, when applied to all vital organism. The first of the species *must* have received from the supernatural, creative hand every trait of naturalness, else it could not have fulfilled the end for which it was made, viz., to be the parent of a species, and to transmit to subsequent generations of organisms the specific nature. And, fifthly and lastly: To deny this would compel us still to assign a natural parent, *before the first created parent*, of each species of generated organism; which would involve us in a multitude of infinite *series*, without causes out-

side of themselves. But this notion science herself repudiates as a self-contradictory absurdity. etc.

“*What use* is to be made of this conclusion, if admitted? First, to save us from being betrayed into some theory of cosmogony virtually atheistic. Secondly, to make you and me, those who love geology, and those who are jealous of it, modest in constructing hypotheses. To remind us, when examining the things which disclose ‘eternal power and Godhead,’ how possibly we may have gotten into contact with the immediate *Hand*, who ‘giveth no account to any man of his matters.’

“Very faithfully, yours,

“R. L. DABNEY.”

As to my argument in this letter, on the main point, we shall see anon. Now, of course it was impossible for me to foresee the amazing misapprehensions into which Dr. Woodrow had fallen. But had I been prophet enough to foresee them, I could hardly have chosen terms more exactly adapted to remove them, and to demonstrate that I did not attack all physical science; that I did not recommend universal scepticism of all but mathematics and the Bible; that I did not teach God had created a lie in putting fossils into the rocks, etc. But probably it did not avail to change one word; Dr. Woodrow was not to be thus balked of the pleasure of printing a slashing criticism of one who had given no provocation to him. Leaving it to the reader to characterise this proceeding, I would only ask, if I was not entitled to the benefit of my own exposition with the public. May I not claim the poor right, never denied even to the indicted felon, of speaking my own speech and defining my own defence. Had Dr. Woodrow deemed my statements in my letter inconsistent with those in my Sermon, he might at least have given me the benefit of a change towards what he considers the better mind.

I shall be reminded that the misconception of my scope was justified by such language from me as this: “The tendencies of geologists are atheistic.” “These sciences are arrayed in all their phases on the side of scepticism,” etc. These statements are all true, and consistent with my high respect for all true physical sciences. All of them are arrayed, by some of their

professed teachers, on the side of scepticism. Or, as I defined my meaning in the Sermon, page 2, these sciences of geology, natural history, and ethnology, now exciting so much popular attention, "always have some tendency to become anti-theological." I believe this to be true. They always have this tendency, but not always this effect. A tendency is a partial *drift* towards a certain result. It may exist, and yet in a multitude of cases, it may have no effect, because countervailed by opposing tendencies; or better still, opposing causes. Thus it appears clearly to be the doctrine of Scripture, that the possession of wealth always has, with frail man, a *tendency* towards carnality. Yet, all rich Christians are not carnal. Witness Abraham, the father of the faithful, yet a mighty man of riches; and the prince of Uz, Job. Hence a good man may, for valid reason, own riches, and may even seek riches. Yet, until he is perfectly sanctified, their pursuit is doubtless attended with a certain element of spiritual danger. If he does his duty in prayer and watchfulness this danger will be counterpoised and he will remain safe. Now it is precisely in this sense that I hold these studies always to have some tendency to become anti-theological. Yet it may be even a duty to pursue them, prayerfully and watchfully; and many good men, like Dr. Woodrow, may thus escape their drift towards rationalism, though like Abraham, acquiring great store of these scientific riches.

I assigned as I thought, very perspicuously, the reasons of this tendency. First: It is both the business, and the boast of physical science to resolve as many effects as possible into their second causes. Repeated and fascinating successes in these solutions gradually amount to a temptation to the mind, to look less to the great First Cause. The experience of thousands, who were not watchful and prayerful, has proved this. Again: Geology and its kindred pursuits have this peculiarity, that they lead inquiry full towards the great question of the *Αρχη*, the fountain head of beings. Now let a mind already intoxicated by its success in finding the second causes for a multitude of phenomena which are to meaner minds inexplicable, and in addition, secretly swayed by that native hostility, which the

Scripture declares lurks in all unconverted men, "not liking to retain God in their knowledge," let such a mind push its inquiries up to this question of the beginning of beings, there will be very surely some anti-theological tendency developed in him. Is it asked why all other human sciences, as law, chemistry, agriculture, are not chargeable with the same tendency? The answer is: Because they do not come so much into competition with the theistic solution of the question of the origin of things. Is it denied that geology does this; and are we told that Dr. Dabney has betrayed his scientific ignorance, by supposing that geology claims to be a cosmogony? Well, we know very well that Sir Charles Lyell, in the very outset of his "Principles of Geology," (London, 1850,) has denied that geology interferes with questions of cosmogony. And we know equally well, that if this be true of his geology, it is not true of geology generally, as currently obtruded on the reading public in our day. I thought that "cosmogony" meant the genesis of the cosmos; that cosmos is distinguished from chaos. So, when modern geology, in anti-theological hands, (which are the hands which rather monopolize geology now in our periodicals, viz., Huxley, Hooker, Tyndal, Büchner, etc.,) undertakes to account for the *origin of existing structures*, it is at least virtually undertaking to teach a *cosmo-gony*. In this judgment I presume all men of common sense concur with me. "Geology *ought* not to assume to be a cosmogony?" Very true; and I presume Dr. Woodrow's does not. But unfortunately, in this case, the frogs out-sound the good, strong bullocks. It is the assuming, anti-theistic, cosmogonic geology of which the Christian world chiefly hears; and *hence my protest*.

On page 352 Dr. Woodrow says: "All speculations as to the origin of forces and agents operating in nature are incompetent to natural science. It examines how these operate, what effects they produce; but in answer to the questions: Is there a personal, spiritual God, who created these forces? or did they originate in blind necessity? or are they eternal? *natural science is silent.*"

That is to say: Dr. Woodrow's natural science is silent. But

is Drs. Darwin's and Huxley's natural science silent about them? Notoriously it is not. When these men endeavor to account for existing beings by "natural selection," a physical law as the "original force" and "operating agent;" when *many* recent writers endeavor to use the modern doctrine of the "correlation of forces" for the purpose of identifying God's power with force, *their* natural science does not behave at all as Dr. Woodrow's behaves. And *this is our quarrel with them*. Nor can we assent fully to Dr. Woodrow's view, that true natural science "is silent" about all these questions. She ought not to be silent. Her duty is to evolve, as the crown and glory of all her conclusions, the natural, teleological argument for the being, wisdom, and goodness of a personal God. Such was the natural science of Lord Bacon, of Sir Isaac Newton, of Commodore Matthew Maury.

It is urged, I should not have said these physical sciences have an anti-theistic tendency; because, where men have perverted them to unbelief, the evil "tendency was in the student, and not in the study." This, I reply, is a half-truth. The evil tendency is in the student *and* the study; I have shown that the study itself has its peculiar elements of danger. But I might grant that it is in the student, rather than the study; and still assert the generality of this lurking tendency. For, the quality in the student, which constitutes the tendency is, alas! inborn, and universal among the unrenowned, namely: alienation from God—a "not liking to retain him in the knowledge"—a secret desire to have him afar off.

And now, when we turn to current facts, do they not sorrowfully substantiate my charge against these perverted sciences? Every Christian journal teems with lamentations over the wide and rapid spread of unbelief flowing from this source. Such men as Dr. McCosh fly to arms against it. Such men as Dr. Woodrow have so profound an impression of the power and audacity of the enemy, as to be impelled to wage the warfare continuously, even in an inappropriate *arena*. It is notorious that these physical speculations have become, in our day, the common, yea, almost the sole sources of scepticism. We have

infidel lawyers and physicians; but they are infidels, not because of their studies in jurisprudence, therapeutics, or anatomy; but because they have turned aside to dabble in geology and its connections.

But we see stronger, though less multiplied, instances of this tendency, in the cases where it sways devout believers to positions inconsistent with their own faith. Thus, Hugh Miller was a good Presbyterian, the representative and organ of the Scotch Free Church, yet he was misled by geology, to adopt a theory of exposition for the first chapter of Genesis, which Dr. Woodrow strongly disapproves. And Dr. Woodrow, though "believing firmly in every word of the Bible as inspired by the Holy Ghost," is betrayed in this critique, by the same seductive "tendency," into two positions inconsistent with his sound faith. This will appear in the sequel. In this connexion a remark should also be made upon the attempt to veil the prevalence of unbelief in America, by condemning my reference to the reported sentiments of many members of the Indianapolis meeting of 1870. He thinks it quite slanderous in me to allude to the published testimony of an eye-witness, without having required that person to put these slandered members through a very full and heart-searching catechism, as to all their thoughts and doings, and the motives of them. Somehow, I find my conscience very obtuse upon this point. Obviously, I only gave the published testimony of this reporter for what it was worth. That I was clearly entitled to do so, seems very plain from this fact: that he (and I know not how many other prints) had already *given it to the public*. He had made it the public's; he had made it mine, as an humble member of the public, to use it for what it might be worth. The currency given to the statement, by its mention in my poor little sermon, was but as a bucket to that ocean of publicity into which it had already flowed, through the mighty Northern press.

The second point requiring correction in Dr. Woodrow's critique is the equally surprising statement, that I inculcate universal scepticism in every branch except the Bible and mathe-

matics. Here again, his mistake is so surprising, that it is necessary to state it in his own words. Page 330, of *Review*: "He," (Dr. D.) "*recommends scepticism* as to the results of the application of our God-given reason to the works of God's hands." Page 331, I am represented as teaching that "we must regard ourselves as *incapable of arriving at a knowledge of the truth,*" and, farther on, "that we *can never become certain of anything* in geology or other branches of natural science." I am represented on page 332, as claiming "that our reason *could not form one correct judgment* on any subject without divine guidance." On page 338, I am represented as attempting to show that "physical science *never can reach* undoubted truth." On page 337, I am made to teach "that the systematic study of God's works always tends to make us disbelieve his Word." Whereas, the very point of my caution is, that the sort of pretended study of God's works which makes so many people disbelieve his Word, *is not systematic*. That is, it is not conducted on a just system.

There is, then, no mistake in my charging this misrepresentation, that the Reviewer really does impute to me a sweeping disbelief of *all* that physical science teaches, except in the "exact sciences." And neither is there, with the attentive reader, any mistake in the verdict that this charge is a sheer blunder. The very passage quoted to prove the charge from my sermon, disproves it in express words. I state that "the human *mind*, as well as heart, is *impaired* by the fall," not destroyed. (I do not go any farther, certainly, than our Confession. Why did not Dr. Woodrow assail and ridicule that?) Again: "The Christian need never expect that uninspired science will be *purged of uncertainty and error,*" etc. The metaphor is taken from therapeutics, in which a "purge" is given with the aim of bringing away certain morbid elements bearing a very small ratio to the body purged. And still more definitely, I say: "Even if the *organon* were absolute, pure truth, its application by fallen minds must always insure in the results *more or less of error,*" etc. On page 8 of Sermon, I add, speaking of the industry and ingenuity of the infidel physicists themselves, that even "*they*

have deduced *many* useful conclusions." Dr. Woodrow remarks, very simply, p. 331: "It is singular that Dr. Dabney should have fallen into this error," etc. Yes; so very singular, as to be incredible. And I presume that he is the only attentive reader of my words in America, who has "fallen into the error" of imputing this error to me. As Dr. Woodrow says, I condemn it in my Lectures. I repudiate it by honoring certain learned votaries of physical science. I repudiate it by appealing to certain well-established conclusions of physical science. I expressly limit my charge of fallibility in physical science, to the presence of "*more or less of error*" mingled with its many truths.

But as Dr. Woodrow's misconception evinces that it was possible for one man to fail to understand my position, I will state it again with a plainness which shall defy a similar result.

The perverted physical science which I oppose, contradicts revelation. We believe that the Bible is infallible. Now, my object is to claim the advantage for the Bible of infallibility as against something that is not infallible, in any actual or possible collision between science (falsely so called) and the Scriptures. This is plain. Now as Dr. Woodrow and all the good people for whom I spoke, believe, with me, that the Bible is infallible, all that remains to be done, to give us this advantage, is, to show that physical science, and especially anti-Christian physical science is not infallible. Where now is the murder? Does Dr. Woodrow wish to assert that these human speculations are infallible? I presume not. Then he has no controversy with me here. That obvious and easy thesis I supported, by noting, first, that while the Fall left man a reasonable creature, the intellect of his sinful soul was no longer a perfect instrument for reasoning; and we may expect it to be specially imperfect on those truths against which the prejudices of a heart naturally alienated from God are interested. Then, alluding to the fact that these infidel physicists usually assume the arrogant air of treating their science as certain, and the Bible as uncertain; and alluding to the claim that however fallible the ancient and the mediæval physics, the adoption of the inductive method has now

made the conclusions of modern physics certain, I proceeded to contest that claim in part, asserting that we must expect some error still in modern physics. This I proved (a), by the principle, that ancient and modern men are of the same species, and so should be expected to have the same natures and infirmities; but modern physicists convict their predecessors of a number of errors, whence it is arrogant in the former to assume that posterity will not convict them of any. I showed (b), that it was not true the inductive method was first invented and used in science from Lord Bacon's day, because Aristotle is said to have described the method; and whether *any* logician described and analysed it or not, nature had taught men of common sense, in all ages, to make some use of it. I asserted (c), that even the inductive method had not saved modern physics from all error, perfect as that method might be, because in fact modern physicists do not always stick to it faithfully; they sometimes, at least, yield to the same temptations which seduced the mediæval physicists. I showed (d), that modern physics had not yet reached infallibility, because *it is still correcting itself*. And I remarked (e), that infallibility could be approximated in the exact sciences only, in pursuing which, the fewness of premises and exactness of predications may, by the help of care, bring entire certainty within the reach even of fallible intellects. Now, a great many scholars have concurred with me in applying this name, "exact sciences," to the knowledge of magnitudes and number. They must have thought that the others were in some sense "inexact sciences." Yet they never dreamed they were guilty of recommending *universal scepticism of everything save the Bible and mathematics*. I presume they thought thus: That these "inexact sciences," true sciences to a certain extent, notwithstanding their inexactness, should be valued and should be used as far as was safe, but should be pressed with caution, and especially that they should be modest when they came in competition with exact science or infallible revelation.

Now Dr. Woodrow would reply, at this showing of the matter, that I must be clear, before I required the "inexact science" to succumb to the theological proposition, that the

latter was indeed God's infallible meaning, and not merely my human supposition about it. I grant it fully. And I take him to witness that I did not require my hearers to commit themselves to the interpretation of the Westminster Assembly, nor to that of Dr. Pye Smith, Chalmers, etc., nor to that of Mr. Taylor Lewis, etc., nor to my own interpretation of what Moses really meant to teach about the date and mode of creation. I did not even intimate whether I had any interpretation of my own. Indeed, I behaved with a reserve and moderation which, for so rash a person, was extremely commendable. But I must claim another position: I must assume that Moses did mean *something*, and when we are all honestly and certainly convinced by a sufficiently careful and mature exposition, what that something is; then we have the infallible testimony of the Maker himself, and fallible human science must bow to it.

But from Dr. Woodrow's next step I must solemnly dissent. It is that in which he degrades our knowledge of God and redemption through revelation to the level of our fallible, human knowledge of the inexact physical sciences. He is attempting, page 331, to refute my inference from the fall of man, (which he misrepresents as a commendation of absolute scepticism,) to the imperfection of his speculations. To do this, he claims "that *theology* is as much a human science, as geology or any other branch of natural science." "The facts which form the basis of the science of theology are found in God's Word; those which form the basis of the science of geology are found in his works; but the *science* in both cases is the work of the human mind." To ensure us that he is deliberate in propounding this startling doctrine, he repeats: "Still the science of theology as a science is *equally human and uninspired* with the science of geology; the facts in both cases are divine, the sciences based upon them human." He then proceeds expressly to extend this *human and uninspired* quality to "*our knowledge of the great central truths of theology!*"

The grave error of this is unmasked by a single question: Is then the work of the geologist, in constructing hypotheses, inductions, inferences, merely hermeneutical? All that the stu-

dent of the divine science properly does, is to interpret God's words, and compare and arrange his teachings. Is this all that geology undertakes? The world had to wait many centuries for a Kepler and a Newton to expound the laws of the stars; God tells us himself that his Word is for his people, and so plain that all may understand, and the wayfaring man though a fool, need not err therein. Again, this degrading view of theology misrepresents the reality. The "facts of geology," are simply phenomenal, material substances. The facts of theology, which Dr. Woodrow admits to be divine, are *didactic propositions*, introducing us into the very heart of divine verities. "God is a spirit." "The Word was God." "The wages of sin is death." "Being justified by faith." Here are the matured and profoundest truths of the divine science set down for us in God's own clear words. Does he teach the laws of geology thus? This difference is too clear to need elaboration. Once more: The critic's view, whether right or wrong, is unquestionably condemned by his Confession of Faith and his Bible. The former, Chap. I., § 5, says: "Our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the Word in our hearts." And Chap. XIV., § 2: "By this faith a Christian believeth to be true whatsoever is revealed in the Word, *for the authority of God himself speaking therein*," etc. The Scripture says: An Apostle's preaching "was not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in demonstration of the Spirit and of power; that your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God." (1 Cor. ii. 4, 5.) The apostle John promises to Christians, (1 John ii. 20 and 27): "But ye have an unction from the holy one; and ye know all things." "The *same anointing* teacheth you of *all things*, and is truth, *and is no lie*."

Dr. Woodrow, perceiving how obnoxious his position might be shown to be to these divine principles, seeks an evasion in the claim, that the children of God are as much entitled to ask and enjoy spiritual guidance when they study God's works, as when they study his Word. He reminds us that the heavens declare

the glory of God, etc., and asks whether Christians forfeit his guidance when they seek a fuller knowledge of that glory in the heavens and the firmament. Unfortunately for this evasion, we have to remind him of a subsequent page of his essay, where he heaps scorn upon the idea that physical science has any theological tendency, and declares that it is only ignorance which ascribes to it either a pro-Christian, or an anti-Christian character. The physicist, then, is not seeking God's glory in his study of *strata* and fossils; if he does, he has become, like Dr. Dabney, unscientific; he is seeking only "the observable sequences" of second causes and effects. Farther, the physicists whom I had in view never seek God anywhere, never pray, and do not believe there is any spiritual guidance, being infidel and even atheistic men.

If, then, the "science of theology" is as human and uninspired as the science of geology; and if, as Richard Cecil has so tersely expressed it, the meaning of the Bible is practically the Bible; the ground upon which we are invited in the gospel to repose our immortal, irreparable interests, is as fallible as geology. How fallible this is, we may learn from its perpetual retractions and amendments of its own positions, and from the differences of its professors. Is the basis of a Christian's faith no better? Is this the creed taught to the future pastors of the Church by Dr. Woodrow? As was remarked at the outset, when we predicted such results in the distant future, from the attempt to teach fallible human science in a theological chair, we still-courteously excepted Dr. Woodrow from all applications of this caution. The reader can judge whether my critic has not deprived himself, in this point, of the benefit of this exception, and verified my prophecy two generations earlier than I myself claimed.

The third general topic requiring my notice in this critique, is, the outspoken charge of culpable ignorance. It is said, page 368, that I am "acquainted with neither the methods nor the ends of physical science, with neither its facts nor its principles," etc.; and of this assertion many supposed specimens are

given, served up to the reader with the abundant sauce of disdain and sarcasm. On this I have, first, two general remarks to make. If it was only intended to prove that I am not a technical geologist, like Dr. Woodrow, (which is not necessary to enable a plain Christian to perceive and resist the tendencies of infidel physics) this end might have been quickly reached, without fifty-two dreary pages of criticism, by quoting my own words, Sermon, page 8: "We may be possessed neither of the knowledge nor ability for entering that field, as I freely confess concerning myself." The other remark is, that all these specimens of imputed ignorance would have been passed over by me in absolute silence, did they not involve instances and illustrations of important principles. For I presume the Presbyterian public is very little interested in the negative of that question: "Is Dr. Dabney an ignoramus," the affirmative of which Dr. Woodrow finds so much interest in arguing.

But it is asserted that I understand "neither the methods nor the ends" of physical science, because I speak of some such (professed) science as "anti-Christian," and suspect it of atheistic tendencies. Page 353: "Natural science is itself incapable of inquiring into the origin of forces . . . and it is impossible for it to be either religious or anti-religious." Page 354, it is claimed as a "fact," that the "results reached are not in the slightest degree affected by the religious character of its students." Page 351, I am criticised for asking whether the theological professor of "natural science in connection with revealed religion" traces geologic forces up to a Creator, and it is charged as a "grievous mistake to suppose that natural science has anything whatever to do with the doctrine of creation." Well, I reply, if even a mere physicist had not, we presume that a Christian divine, put into a theological school to teach the Church's pastors the "connection of natural science with revealed religion," ought to have something to do with that "connection." This, as the attentive reader will perceive, was the question in that passage of my writing. Hence it is a sheer error to cite this place as proof of an "utter failure to recognise the province of natural science."

But in truth, physics, simply as natural science, have a theo-

logical relation; these studies deal with the very forces, from whose ordering natural theology draws the *a posteriori* argument for the existence of a Creator. It is not a "fact," that these studies are unrelated to the religious views of their students. Were this so, it would not have happened that a Newton always travelled by astronomical science to the recognition of a God; and a La Place declared, as the result of his *Mechanique Celeste*, that a theory of the heavens could be constructed without a Creator. It would not have happened, that while Dr. Woodrow always traces natural laws up to the great First Cause, Dr. Thos. Huxley should see in Darwin's physical theory of evolution by natural selection a perfect annihilation of the whole teleological argument for the being of a God. Dr. Woodrow says in one place, that because the business of natural science is with second causes, it has no business with first causes. (Because the fisherman is at one end of the pole, he has no business with the hook and the fish that are at the opposite end of the line!) Fortunately, on pages 343 and 344, Dr. Woodrow himself contradicts this error. There he defends his view of a creation by evolution, by claiming that the structure produced by second causes is as truly God's creation as a first supernatural structure could be. If that is so, then the study of the second cause is surely a study of a creation, and so of a Creator. So also Dr. Woodrow's friend, Lord Bacon, contradicts him, and justifies me in the very place quoted, (*Review*, page 374): "It is an assured truth and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the mind of man to atheism; but a farther *proceeding* THEREIN *doth bring the mind back again to religion*; for in the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves unto the mind of man, if it dwell and stay there it may induce some oblivion of the highest cause," (just the "tendency" towards unbelief, described by me); "but when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the dependence of causes, and the works of Providence, then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature's chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair." Thus,

according to Bacon, natural science has a religious relationship. What is it indeed but hypercriticism to object to the phrase, "anti-Christian science" and the like, that natural science is properly neither Christian nor anti-Christian? when everybody but the critic understood that the terms were used in the sense of "natural science perverted against religion." So fully are such phrases justified by use, and so well understood, that Dr. Duns actually entitles his gigantic volumes on Physical Science, "*Biblical Natural Science*." What a target, in that title, for such objections?

On page 372, the Reviewer finds an evidence of ignorance in the passing allusion which I made to the new questions touching the relative order of *strata* raised by the results of recent deep-sea soundings. "All of which," declares Dr. Woodrow, "evinces an utter misapprehension of the real import of the discoveries in question." That is to say: Dr. Woodrow happens not to be pleased with that view of the import of these recent discoveries which I advanced, derived from competent scientific sources. Therefore the apprehension which happens not to suit him is all "misapprehension." We shall see, before we are done, that it is rather a permanent illusion with the Reviewer, to account that his opinion is true science, and true science his opinion. But we beg his pardon; we do not purpose to be dogmatised out of our common sense; nor to allow the reader to be dogmatised out of his. Let these facts be reviewed then in the light of common sense. It is the current theory of Dr. Woodrow's friends, the geologists, that the stratified and fossil-bearing rocks are the result of the action of water, formed of sediment at the bottom of seas and oceans, and then lifted out of the water by upheavals. Now geologists have assigned a regular succession of lower and upper, and uppermost, to these *strata*; determined, as Lyell remarks, by three guides: the composition of the *strata*, the species of fossil life enclosed in them, and the observation of actual position, where two or more of the *strata* co-exist. Now then, should some new upheaval lift up the bottom of the North Atlantic, for instance, what is now the surface of the sea bottom, would, immediately after the upheaval, be the top-*stratum* of the

land upheaved. But the deep-sea plummet and the self-registering thermometer have proved, that species of animal life hitherto determined by the rules of stratigraphy to be *successive*, are in fact *cotemporaneous* now on the sea bottoms, and considerable differences of temperature (determining different species of aquatic life) are found, unaccountably, in neighboring tracts of the same ocean at depths not dissimilar. Is it not evident that, in case of such an upheaval, we might have, side by side, formations of equal recency? But geologists would have decided, by previous lights, that they were not equally recent; that one was much older than the other. The prevailing stratigraphy may, consequently, be very probably wrong. Let the reader take an instance: Microscopists have been telling us, with great pride, that English chalk is composed in large part of the minute shells of an animalcule, which they name *Globogerina*. They say that the cretaceous deposits rank as *mesozoic*, below the *pliocene*, *eocene*, and *miocene* in order, and consequently older in origin. That is, Sir Chas. Lyell says so, in his most recent work, (if he is any authority with Dr. Woodrow.) But the microscopists also tell us, that the slime brought up from the depths of the North Atlantic by the plummet, of a whitey-grey color when dried, is also composed chiefly of the broken shells of the tiny *Globogerinae*, many of them so lately dead, that the cells still contain the jelly-like remains of their organic parts. If this is true, then chalk-formations *are now making*, and should an upheaval occur, there would be a chalk bed as really new, as post tertiary, as the bed of alluvial mud on the banks of New Foundland! May it not be, then, that some other chalk-beds, on or near the top of the ground, may be less ancient than the established stratigraphy had claimed? Such was our point touching these deep-sea soundings; and we rather think that sensible men will not agree with Dr. Woodrow that it can be pooh-poohed away. But as we are nobodies in science, we will refer him to a testimony of Dr. Carpenter, of London, late President of the British Association, who is recognised as perhaps the first physicist in Great Britain. He says:

“Whilst astronomy is of all sciences that which may be con-

sidered as most nearly representing nature as she really is, geology is that which most completely represents her as she is seen through the *medium* of the interpreting mind; *the meaning of the phenomena that constitute its data being, in almost every instance, open to question, and the judgments passed upon the same facts being often different, according to the qualifications of the several judges.* No one who has even a general acquaintance with the history of this department of science, can fail to see that the geology of each epoch has been *the reflection of the minds by which its study was then directed.* "The whole tendency of the ever-widening range of modern geological inquiry has been *to show how little reliance can be placed on the so-called "laws" of stratigraphical and palæontological successions.*"

Abating the euphemism, Dr. Carpenter seems as bad as Dr. Dabney. He will soon require the chastisement due to the heresy, that the Woodrow opinion is not precisely the authoritative science of the case. His testimony is peculiarly significant as to the worthlessness of "the so-called 'laws' of stratigraphy," because he had himself been especially concerned in the examination of this chalk-mud from the deep-sea soundings.

Dr. Woodrow sees proof of ignorance of even the nomenclature of natural science, in my use of the word *naturalism* to describe (what he obviously apprehends I designed to describe) that school which attempts to substitute Nature for God as the ultimate goal of their research. The very passage quoted from my printed Notes by him defined my meaning. "This therefore," (meaning obviously the unwillingness of this school to recognise any supernatural cause back of the earliest natural cause) "is the eternity of naturalism; it is Atheism." Dr. Woodrow thinks this an antiquated and therefore an improper use of the word. On both points I beg leave to dissent. If I need an expressive term, why may I not revive an ancient one, if I define its sense? Is not this better than coining a new one, and being obliged to define that? But my term is not antiquated. *Naturalismus* holds its place to-day in German lexicons; and Webster (surely he is "new-fangled" enough) gives the word in my sense. But the concrete noun, "*naturalist*," ought to be used in the sense of a *student of nature*; not:

in my meaning of an *advocate of naturalism* (in my evil sense.) So it is usually employed. But in the only place where I use it in the bad sense, I distinguish it sufficiently by the epithet, "proud naturalist," whose theory of nature is a "form of scepticism." Here again I am comforted by the belief that Dr. Woodrow is the only man in America embarrassed by my nomenclature.

On page 339 of the *Review*, supposed evidence is found, that I believed, in my ignorance, that the idea of a pre-Adamite earth was first suggested within the memory of the older members of the Synod of Virginia; and a great deal of rather poor wit is perpetrated as to the age of these members. Having read, for instance, the introductory chapters of Lyell's *Principles of Geology*, twenty years ago, in which quite a full sketch of all the speculations about this matter is given from ancient times, I was in no danger of falling into that mistake; nor did I give expression to it. My brethren doubtless understood the words, "this modern impulse," in the sense I designed, namely: as a popular impulse, given by the comparatively recent diffusion of geological knowledge, and felt in the minds of the people. And it is substantially true, that just one generation ago, it had not generally gone farther in the speculations then prevalent among Americans, than the claim of a pre-Adamite earth in such a sense as might be reconciled with the Mosaic cosmogony upon the well known scheme of Dr. Pye Smith. Since that day many other and more aggressive postulates, standing in evil contrast with the first and comparatively scriptural and tolerable one, have been diffused among our people by irreligious men of science. Some of the latter I also enumerated; intimating that, while we might, if necessary, accept the first, along with such sound Christians as Dr. Pye Smith, Dr. Chalmers, and Dr. Woodrow, *all of the latter* we certainly could not accept consistently with the integrity of the Bible. So that my charge of anti-Christian character was, at least to a certain extent, just, against this set of physicists.

Another evidence of my ignorance, upon which Dr. Woodrow is exceedingly funny, upon pages 367 and 368, is my classifi-

cation of the rocks: as lowest and earliest the *primary* rocks all *azoic*; next above them, the *secondary* rocks, containing remains of life *palæozoic* and *meiocene*; third, the *tertiary* rocks and clays containing the *pleiocene* fossils; and fourth, the *alluvia*. Dr. Woodrow then presents a classification, which he says is "REAL GEOLOGY;" differing from the brief outline I gave, chiefly (not only) by using more subdivisions. The meaning of the assertion, that this is the "Real Geology," it must be presumed, is: that this is Dr. Woodrow's geology; for his classification is not identical with Dana's, or Lyell's, any more than mine is. But it is not true that Dr. Dabney "comes forward as a teacher of this science." In that very lecture I state expressly that I "do not presume to teach technical geology." My avowed, as my obvious, purpose, was only to cite the theory of the geologists, in its briefest outline, unencumbered with details and minor disputes of its teachers among themselves, sufficiently to make my argument intelligible to ordinary students of theology. For this object details and differences were not necessary, and I properly omitted them. Dr. Gerald Molloy, of Maynooth, (a writer of almost unequalled perspicuity and intelligence), with precisely the same end in view, goes no farther in the way of classification, than to name, as his three divisions, *igneous*, *metamorphic*, and *aqueous* rocks. Here is a still greater suppression of details. Dr. Woodrow may now set this exceedingly rudimentary division over against his detailed "Real Geology," and represent Dr. Molloy also, as ignorant of what he speaks of.

But, it is presumed, Dr. Woodrow would add, that my rudiments of a classification were partly wrong, namely: that I call the igneous rocks (granite, trap, etc.) *primary*, and that I apply the term *azoic* to all rocks devoid of fossils; whereas it has seemed good in the eyes of the Woodrow-geology, [the only "real geology,"] not to call the igneous rocks *primary*, and to restrict the term *azoic* technically to a very small segment of the *azoic* rocks, viz., to the sedimentary rocks which have no fossils.

Well, the Woodrow geology is entitled to choose its own no-

menclature, we presume; and so are the majority of geologists, who differ from it, entitled to choose theirs; and I have a right to follow that majority. Dr. Woodrow, as he intimates, chooses to follow Sir Chas. Lyell in his crotchet of refusing to call the "igneous" rocks "*primary*." (The latter uses the word "*primary*" as synonymous with the palæozoic group.) But Dr. Woodrow also knows, that this freak of Lyell's is prompted by a particular feature of his "*uniformitarian*" scheme, and is a *departure* from the ordinary nomenclature of the earlier geologists. He knows also, that many geologists apply the term *azoic* to all the crystalline rocks, and not to the non-fossiliferous *strata* of sedimentary rocks only. Thus, Duns, "following competent men of science," divides thus: 1st, *Azoic*; 2d, *Primary*, equivalent to the palæozoic; then, *secondary*, equivalent to the mesozoic; and fourth, *tertiary*, or *cainozoic*. So Dana states his division thus: "I. *Azoic* time. II. *Palæozoic* time. III. *Mesozoic* time. IV. *Cainozoic* time. V. The age of mind." And what can be more true than that the igneous rocks, ordinarily styled *primary*, may be also termed *azoic*; when *the absence of fossil remains of life in them* is at least as uniform and prominent a trait in them as any other? But the reader will feel that this is an exceedingly small business.

The specimen of ignorance which amuses Dr. Woodrow perhaps most of all, is my notice of some geologists' "*nebular hypothesis*," criticised on pages 344 and 345 of the *Review*. This idea (that our solar system was, first, a vast mass of rotating, incandescent vapor, and then a sun and a set of planets, of which the latter, at least, had been cooled first to a molten liquid, and then to a solid subsistence on their surfaces,) is said to have been suggested first, by La Place, as a mere hypothesis; and the only seeming fact giving it even a show of solid support, was the existence of those faint, nebulous spots of light among the stars which no telescope had as yet made anything of. Now every one who reads infidel books of science observes how glibly they prate of this supposition, as though there were some certainty that it gave the true origin of our earth. Meantime, Sir William Herschell first, and then Lord Rosse, applied more powerful

magnifiers to them. The effect of Herschell's telescope was to resolve some of the *nebulae* into distinct clusters of stars. He then divided them into the three classes of the *resolved*, the *resolvable*, and the *unresolved*, suggesting that a still more powerful instrument would probably resolve the second class. Lord Rosse has, in our own day, constructed a still larger reflector, and the result is, that more of the *nebulae*, when sufficiently magnified, are now seen to be clusters of stars. Now, must not every sober mind admit with me, that "the chief ground of plausibility is thus removed" from the atheistic supposition? The probability is, that the other *nebulae* are, what all are shown to be, which have been resolved. Then the evidence of fact is lacking, that the heavens ever contained planetary matter in that form. For the only other luminous and nebulous bodies known to astronomy are the comets, and they evidently are not cosmic or planetary matter, *i. e.*, not matter which can be cooled into a solid as large as a world, because, however vast their discs and trains, their quantity of matter is so amazingly small that they produce no appreciable perturbations in the orbits of the planets near them. But Dr. Woodrow exclaims, that the newly discovered *spectroscope* has taught us the chemistry of the heavens, and has shown that some *nebulae* are incandescent gases. Well, let us see about this *spectroscope* of which we have heard a great deal these latter years. One thing which we have heard, is the following sensible caution from Dr. Carpenter. Speaking of the assumption founded on the *spectroscope*, that the sun's chromosphere is incandescent hydrogen, he says: "Yet this confidence is based entirely on the assumption, that a certain line which is seen in the *spectrum* of a hydrogen flame, means hydrogen also, when seen in the *spectrum* of the sun's chromosphere. . . . It is by no means inconceivable that the same line might be produced by some other substance at present unknown." Dr. Carpenter then proceeds to administer a similar caution to Dr. Huggins, one of the professed authorities with the *spectroscope*. Such is the scepticism of England's greatest physicist about its revelations. But to be more particular: Its friends tell us that the *spectra* of luminous rays passing from incandescent solids

through a gaseous *medium* have certain dark lines in them; whereas, when the incandescent gases are themselves the sources of the rays, the *spectra* have the cross-lines in different places. Now hear how Dr. Roscoe tells this story of Dr. Huggins, about the *nebulae* in the spectroscope, in the great work of the former on *spectrum analysis*. "He," (Dr. Huggins) "instead of having a band of light intersected by dark lines, indicating the physical constitution of the body to be that corresponding to the stars, found the light from this *nebulae* consisted simply of *three insulated bright lines*," etc. The sober reader will be apt to think with me, and with Dr. Carpenter, that so minute a result, and so unlike the other results of more distinct *spectrum analyses*, gives no basis for any conclusion whatever. And this will be confirmed when he hears Mr. Lockyer, another friend of the *spectroscope* say: "The light of some of those *nebulae* visible in a moderately large instrument has been estimated to vary from 1-1,500 to 1-20,000th of the light of a single sperm candle consuming 158 grains of material per hour, viewed at a distance of a quarter of a mile. That is, *such a candle a quarter of a mile off, is twenty thousand times more brilliant than the nebula!*" Let the reader now consider what likelihood there is, that any art can ever separate all the stray beams of other light diffused through our atmosphere, from this almost infinitely slender beam, so as to be sure that it is dealing with the rays of the *nebula* alone. But a *microscopic shadow* of this almost invisible ray, is the "conical ball of the chassepot gun" on which Dr. Woodrow relies, to pierce the solid steel of common sense! This is, to our view, shooting with rays of "moonshine," in the thinnest of its metaphorical senses.

The last of these specimens is that noted on page 366 of the *Review*. I had shown that the first structures made by God, though supernaturally produced, had every trait of naturalness. This was then illustrated by me, by reference to one of the trees of paradise. To this Dr. Woodrow makes the very singular objection, that I ought not to found scientific arguments upon surmises! He overlooks the simple fact, that this surmise about the tree of paradise with annual rings, *was not my argument at*

all, but only my illustration of it! Had he read the previous paragraph of my "Notes," or pages 13 and 14 of my Sermon with attention, he would have found *there* my argument, founded, not on *suppositions* about a possible tree or bone, but on impregnable principles of natural science itself. Does not Dr. Woodrow know, that every parable is, in its nature, a supposition? Yet parables are excellent illustrations. When Jotham, the son of Gideon, in the 9th chapter of Judges, answered the men of Shechem with his parable of the trees, Dr. Woodrow would have put this reply in the mouths of Abimelech's faction: That Jotham was exceedingly illogical, for the reason that the actual utterance of words by olive and fig trees, vines and brambles, was a "phenomenon not known to exist."

On page 335 of his *Review*, Dr. Woodrow prepares the way for his charges of ignorance and inconsistency against me, by the following illustration: "Just as leading Presbyterian theologians, *personally known to Dr. Dabney*, have taught that 'every obstacle to salvation, arising from the character and government of God, is actually removed, and was intended to be removed, that thus every one of Adam's race might be saved,' and that 'the Father covenants to give to the Son, as a reward for the travail of his soul, *a part* of those for whom he dies.'" To many readers, it has doubtless appeared unaccountable that so "far-fetched" an illustration was sought. The clerical readers of the *Southern Presbyterian Review*, and the *Southern Presbyterian*, can easily recall the clue of association which suggested it. They will remember that nine and a half years ago, these two periodicals, which have now been made the vehicles of the charge of scientific heresy against me, contained articles which insinuated against me the very charge of theological heresy, viz., an indefinite design in Christ's atonement, which is here introduced, by Dr. Woodrow, as an illustration. [The occasion of that charge was my action, in obedience to the General Assembly as chairman of a Committee for conference and union with the United Synod of the South. That Committee proposed to the Presbyteries a declaration of doctrinal agreement, of which I happened to be the penman. The conductors of the

two presses in Columbia, opposing the union, sought to prevent it, in part, by criticising the orthodoxy of the doctrinal propositions, and intimating the doctrinal unsoundness of them and their writer in no indistinct terms. True, this intimation remained without effect, as might have been supposed, when aimed equally against the orthodoxy of my obscure self, and of such well-known and learned Old School theologians as Dr. Wm. Brown, Col. J. T. L. Preston, Dr. J. B. Ramsey, and Dr. McGuffey—the last two concurring as informal members of the Committee.] We see, when reminded of this history, how natural it was that Dr. Woodrow, seeking for a biting illustration, should recall this one. And the clerical readers of the *Review* have doubtless, almost as naturally, understood him as insinuating that “the leading Presbyterian theologian, personally known to Dr. Dabney,” was no other than Dr. Dabney himself. If the words bear this construction, all I have to say is, that I never wrote or uttered the statements enclosed in the quotation marks.

But I find these very words ascribed by Dr. B. M. Palmer, in a controversial piece against the United Synod, to Dr. H. H. Boyd, a distinguished minister of that body. Doubtless, Dr. Palmer quoted them correctly. Grant now, that the insinuation against me, which seemed to lie so obviously in Dr. Woodrow's reference, was not intended by him, and that he also meant to designate Dr. Boyd; the question recurs, Why was so peculiar and remote an illustration selected? The only answer is this: That an intimation of Dr. Dabney's untrustworthiness might be given, from his intimate association with a theological comrade, so erroneous as Dr. Boyd was esteemed at Columbia. To this again I have to say, that Dr. Boyd was not “personally known” to me; that I never spoke to him save once, on the steps of a hotel, as I was passing to the cars; that I never heard him preach, nor read one line of his theological writings, save the few quoted by Dr. Palmer, and thus had no personal knowledge of his unsoundness or orthodoxy. My whole knowledge on this point was a statement received through acquaintances, which I believed to be authentic, coming from Dr. Boyd himself. And

that statement was, that when our Lynchburg Declaration appeared, Dr. Boyd, counselling with his own brethren in his Presbytery, earnestly advised them to accept the union on those terms, although, as he declared, that joint Declaration was, in his view, purely an Old School document, and distinctly condemnatory of whatever was peculiar in his own theological views. For, he said, the best interests of the churches demanded union; and inasmuch as his brethren were doctrinally already upon this Old School platform, he did not desire selfishly to gratify his own peculiar doctrinal preferences, at the cost of obstructing their comfort and usefulness; his points of difference from the platform not being, in his view, vital.

The fourth, and far most important vindication which remains, is of the fundamental position of my Sermon on Anti-Christian Science. That position has been seen by the reader, in the extracts given in this reply (pages 545-8 above) from my letter of May 1st, last to Dr. Woodrow. That position may be thus re-stated: The structures of nature around us cannot present, by their traits of naturalness, a universally demonstrative proof of a natural, as against a supernatural origin, upon any sound, theistic theory. Because, supposing a Creator, originating any structures and organisms supernaturally, he also must have conferred on his first things equal traits of naturalness. Hence, should it be found that this Creator has uttered *his testimony* to the supernatural origin of any of them, that testimony fairly supersedes all natural arguments *a posteriori* from natural analogies to a natural origin. My arguments for this position are briefly stated in those extracts inserted above (pages 545 to 548.) The reasoning, though brief, will be sufficient for the candid reader, and I shall not weary him by repeating it.

But Dr. Woodrow, *Review*, pages 365 and 366, impugns one of my points. He will not admit it as proven, that a wise Creator, producing a first organism to come under natural law, and be the parent of a species of like organisms, must have made it natural. He says, "he does not know, and he thinks it likely that Dr. Dabney does not know either." And he pro-

ceeds very facetiously, to speak of my imagination about the rings in the tree of paradise as the sole basis of my argument. The tree was only an illustration. That basis I will state again. If theism is right, as Dr. Woodrow believes, then the Creator is doubtless voluntary, knowing, and wise. While it is often very unsafe philosophy to surmise that the creative mind must have been prompted by this or that *final cause*, it is always very safe to say that he was prompted by *some* final cause, and that a consistent and intelligent one. For this is but saying that he is wise, and what he has effected is a disclosure of what he designed to effect, so far as it is completed. Now, God, in producing his first organisms by creation, must have designed them to exist under the reign of natural law; because we see that he uniformly *places them under that law*. That is to say: What he does is what he intends to do. But natural law could not govern that which remained contra-natural in qualities as well as origin; therefore God must have created his first organisms, while supernatural in origin, yet natural in traits. This argument is, if possible, still more demonstrative when applied to the first living organisms, vegetable and animal, because these were made by God to be the *parents of species* propagated by the first, and thenceforward in successive generations. Now, not only does Revelation say that these supernatural first organisms "yielded seed *after their kind*," natural science tells us most clearly, that the true notion of propagation, perpetuating a given species, is the parents' conveying into the progeny all their own essential, specific qualities. So true is this notion, that the most scientific definition of *species* is now stated substantially thus by the greatest living natural historians. A given species *denotes just that aggregate of properties which every individual thereof derives by its natural propagation*. Hence it is certain that the first organism (supernaturally produced) possessed every essential quality natural to its species; otherwise it could not have been a parent of species.

Suppose then, that by any possibility, a physicist should examine the very remains of one of those first organisms, he would find in it the usual traits of naturalness; yet he could not infer

thence a natural origin for it, because it was a *first thing*. Hence it is concluded, with a mathematical rigidity, that, granted a Creator anywhere in the past, the argument from naturalness of structure to naturalness of origin *cannot be universally conclusive*. And supposing the structure under examination to be one of which Revelation asserts a divine origin, then, in that case, this testimony of the Almighty Maker absolutely cuts across and supersedes the opposing inference from natural analogies. Such was the doctrine of my Notes and Sermon. Dr. Woodrow seems to conclude that, in such a case, God's workmanship would teach a lie, by seeming to be natural in origin, when it was not. The solution of his embarrassment is simple. It is not God who teaches the lie, but perverted science going out of her sphere; and that this question of *αρχη* is out of her sphere, Dr. Woodrow has himself taught with a fortunate inconsistency, on page 352 of his *Review*.

But as I know nothing about science, I beg leave to fortify my position by three scientific testimonies. The first shall be that of Dr. Büchner, the German materialist and Atheist. He declares in a recent work, that the ideas of *God*, and of *science*, are incompatibles; in this sense, that just to the degree a divine action is postulated, the conclusions of science are to that extent estopped. Now, what is this but confessing that the only evasion from my argument is Atheism? The second testimony shall be from a more friendly source. Dr. Carpenter, in the inaugural speech referred to above, uses the following closing words. When we make allowance for a certain *euphemism*, prompted by his attitude, as president of a body purely scientific, many of whose members are avowed infidels, and by the occasion of his speech which was wholly non-religious, we shall see that his testimony is very decided. After showing that every physical law, correctly interpreted, tells us of one, single, almighty, intelligent Cause, the supreme, spiritual God, he says: "The science of modern times, however, has taken a more special direction. Fixing its attention exclusively on the *order* of nature, it has separated itself wholly from theology, whose function it is to seek after its cause. In this science is fully

justified." . . . "But when science, passing beyond its own limits, assumes to take the place of theology, and sets up its conception of the order of nature as a sufficient account of its *cause*, it is invading a province of thought to which it has no claim; and *not unreasonably provokes the hostility* of those who ought to be its best friends."

The third witness is Prof. F. H. Smith, who fills the chair of Natural Science in the University of Virginia. His long experience, vast learning, subtle and profound genius, and well known integrity and caution of mind, entitle his scientific opinions to a weight second to none on this side of the Atlantic. He makes, in two letters to me, the following statements:

"The transcendent importance of the subject of the letter with which you lately honored me, forbade any response, which was not deliberate.

"The 'naturalness' of the new-created world is, in my judgment, conclusively established in your recent letter to me. You wholly demolish the argument of the infidel, who deduces from such continued and uninterrupted naturalness, the eternity and self-existence of nature. To me it is simply inconceivable, that the physical world should have ever borne marks of recent creation, or that it shall ever present signs of impending annihilation. Nay, granting the existence of such inconceivable signs, I do not see how we could interpret them. If they were possible, they must be unintelligible.

"The beginning of a universe, regulated by mechanical laws, must have been some 'configuration,' to which it *might* have been brought by the operation of the same mechanical laws from an antecedent configuration, mathematically assignable. I undertook to illustrate this truth to my class last session, by this simple example: The undisturbed orbit of a planet is an ellipse, described with a velocity periodically varying by a definite law. The planet passes any given point of its orbit with the same velocity, and in the same direction, in each recurring round. If it were arrested there, and then projected with that velocity in that direction, it would resume identically the same orbit. The actual motion at each point of the orbit is, therefore, the necessary projectile motion of the new-created planet at that point. Hence, wherever created and projected, its initial motion *might* have been the result of centrifugal action. Thus the elliptical circulation presents no marks of a beginning or of an end. As

regards the terms of its existence, the phenomenon is dumb. The lesson it teaches is not the shallow sophism that it has no beginning or end; but that whatever information we derive on these points, we must seek from a source other than nature.

“When this great truth was first apprehended by me, it filled me with the glow of a new discovery. You may smile at the confession; for to one well acquainted with the history of philosophy, the statement may appear to be one of venerable antiquity. Indeed, I found it myself, subsequently, ably set forth in an article* on geology, which appeared in the *Southern Quarterly Review*, (Columbia, S. C.) in 1861. I believe that Mr. P. H. Gosse, a British Naturalist, advanced substantially the same idea in a book quaintly called ‘*Omphalos*’; the name and key-note of which were suggested by the probable fact, that Adam had a navel, though he was never united to a mother by an umbilical cord.”

“Be the history of the doctrine what it may, none the less acceptable and timely is the irresistible logic by which you have established it. Most heartily do I agree with you in affirming that the formula, ‘Like effects imply like causes,’ fails for the initial state of the world, and cannot, therefore, logically be used to disprove a beginning,” etc.

“All the astronomer’s statements,” (calculating possible past or future eclipses,) “as to the past or the future, are limited by the qualification, either overt or covert, *nisi Deus intersit*.”

We claim, that a case of what lawyers call “circumstantial evidence,” in a court of justice, is a fair illustration of the logical rules which ought to govern in all these hypothetic geological arguments to a natural origin for given structures. The science of law has exactly defined the proper rules for such evidence. These rules require the prosecution to show that their hypothesis, viz.: the guilt of the man indicted, not only may possibly, or may very probably, satisfy all the *circumstantiæ* which have been proved to attend the crime, but that it is the *only possible hypothesis* which does satisfy them all. And the defence may test this in the following way: if they can suggest *any other hypothesis*, invented, surmised, or imagined, even, which is naturally possible, and which also satisfies all the circumstances, then

* An article which appeared anonymously, but was written by R. L. Dabney.

the judge will instruct the jury that the hypothesis of guilt is not proven, and the accused is acquitted. Such is the rule of evidence to which logical science has been brought by a suitable sense of the sacredness and value of a human life. Now, the conditions of scientific *hypotheses* are logically parallel; *they are cases of "circumstantial evidence."* Suppose, then, for argument's sake, that some such hypothesis, in the hand of an infidel physicist, should put our Bible upon its trial for veracity. It is the time-honored belief of the Christian world that the truth of that Bible is the only hope of immortal souls. Surely the issue should be tried under at least as solemn a sense of responsibility, and as strict logical requirements, as an indictment against a single life!

But, I carry this parallel further. Grant the existence of a Creator God, "of eternal power and godhead," then we of the defence *have always the alternative hypothesis*, which is always naturally possible, viz.: that any original structure, older than all human observations, which is brought by anti-Christian science into one of her "circumstantial" arguments, may possibly have been of direct divine origin. Hence it follows, that should, perchance, the Bible contradict any scientific hypothesis of the origin of things, science is incapable, from the very conditions of the case, of convicting the Bible of falsehood upon such an issue. [The thoughtful reader can now comprehend the polemic prejudice which prompts Büchner to say, that the very idea of God is an intrusion into the rights of science; and Huxley to argue that the evidence from design for the existence of a God is annihilated by the evolution scheme of Darwin. These infidels have perspicacity enough to see that the theistic position vacates their pretended scientific deductions as to the origin of structures and organisms.] Let us explain. A murder has been committed in secret; there is no parole testimony, apparently, to unfold the mystery. The prosecutors therefore proceed, with exceeding industry, care, patience, and ingenuity, to collect the materials for a circumstantial argument, to fix the guilt upon Mr. X. Y. Z., against whom a vague suspicion has arisen. These lawyers note even

the most trivial matters, the direction of the shot, the smell of gunpowder upon the garments of the corpse, the scrap of blackened paper which formed a part of the wadding of the gun, and a thousand other circumstances. They weave them into their hypothesis of X. Y. Z.'s guilt, with a skill which is apparently demonstrative. But there now steps forth a new witness, named L. M., and testifies that *he saw* the murder committed by another man, named A. B., who had not been hitherto connected with the event. Now, there is, naturally, no antecedent impossibility that A. B. might commit a murder, or this murder. Let us suppose that such was the case. Every lawyer knows that the issue would now turn *solely upon the competency and credibility* of L. M. as a witness. If the prosecution desire still to sustain the proposition that X. Y. Z. is the murderer, they now have but one course open to them; they must successfully impugn the competency or credibility of L. M. If they admit these fully, their case against X. Y. Z. is naught; their circumstantial hypothesis falls to the ground, without a farther blow. That hypothesis was exceedingly plausible; the antecedent probabilities of its truth were great, or even almost conclusive? Yes. Still, if L. M. is true, they now conclude nothing. They show that X. Y. Z. *might have killed* the murdered man. L. M. shows that *actually he did not*. The conditions of the argument of infidel science against the Bible and the creative agency of God, are exactly parallel. Their hypothesis may be, naturally speaking, every way probable; but the Bible comes in as a parole-witness, and testifies that God, and not nature, was the agent of this given work. Now, we believe that the Bible is a competent and credible witness. Hence its voice supercedes the "circumstantial evidence" here.

It is complained, that when we thus refuse to allow the maxim, "Like effects imply like causes," to thrust itself into competition with the testimony of Revelation upon these questions of first origin of the world, we deprive mankind of its use in every scientific induction, and in all the experimental conclusions of practical life. Dr. Woodrow is not satisfied with the reply, that within the sphere of natural induction, where we are entitled to

assume the absence of the supernatural, his canon is valid. He attempts to quote me against myself, as saying, on the 15th page of my Notes: "*It is not experience* which teaches us that every effect has its cause; but the *a priori* reason." Very true. Intuition, not mere experience, teaches us that every effect has *its* cause. That intuition is: "Had there been *no cause*, there would have been no effect." Had my doctrine been attended to, as developed in my 6th Lecture, these words would have been found on p. 49: "The doctrine of common sense here is, that when the mind sees an effect, it intuitively refers it to *some cause*." For instance, when we come upon a stratified rock, intuition necessarily refers its existence to *some cause*, either to God, or to watery action, or some other adequate natural agency. But the question is: *Which cause?* If we are practically assured of the absence of the supernatural cause, then of course we must assign the effect to one or another natural cause. But *if we have good reason to think that the supernatural cause may possibly have been present*, then the attempt to confine that effect to a natural cause, upon the premise, that "similar effects imply the same causes," obviously becomes an invalid induction. Now, should it appear that Revelation testifies to the presence of the supernatural cause at a given juncture, that would be good reason to think, at least, its possible presence; and then the naturalistic induction becomes invalid. It obviously comes then into that class which Bacon stigmatises as worthless for the purpose of complete demonstration, under the term, "*Inductio simplicis enumerationis*." Nov. Organum. Lib. I. § 105. *Inductio enim, quæ procedit per enumerationem simplicem, res puerilis est, et precario concludit, et periculo exponitur ab instantia contradictoria,*" etc. Yes; in the case in hand, the *instantia contradictoria* would be the instance of a supernatural origin, competently testified by Revelation. Hear even the sensualistic philosopher, Mill. (Logic. p. 187.) "But although we have always a propensity to generalise from unvarying experience, we are not always warranted in doing so. Before we can be at liberty to conclude that something is universally true because we have never known an instance to the contrary,

it must be proved to us, that if there were in nature any instances to the contrary, we should have known of them," etc. This is, so far, sound logic. But now, should it be that the Bible testifies to structures supernaturally originated in a pre-Adamite time, it is obvious that we should *not* have known of them, for the simple reason that no human witness was extant. The universal reference of all structures to natural causes would be, according to Mill himself, in that case, the very induction we "were not warranted" in making. What can be plainer?

Dr. Woodrow cites as an instance the wine made of water by Christ, at Cana. He says, p. 359: "Had one of the guests been questioned as to its origin, he would unhesitatingly have said that it was the expressed juice of the grape. But by unexceptionable testimony, it could have been proved that it had been water a few minutes before, and had never formed part of the grape at all. Now, in view of this fact, according to Dr. Dabney's reasoning, we are forever debarred from concluding that wine is the juice of the grape, unless we shall have first *proved the absence* of God's *intervening* power," etc. I reply: Not so. My position is, that we would be "debarred from concluding" that a given vessel of wine "was the juice of the grape," in the particular case where "unexceptionable testimony" had "first proved the PRESENCE of God's *intervening* power." This one word removes all the confusions and misconceptions of the subsequent pages of his critique. Indeed, I desire no better instance than Dr. Woodrow's admission touching this wine of Cana, to exemplify my view. Any sensible man, drinking good wine under ordinary circumstances, would of course suppose that it came from grapes. But if competent testimony showed that, in this case, a miracle-worker had been present, who had infinite power, and a benevolent motive, to make *this wine* without grapes, his good sense would not lead him, admitting the testimony, to argue that this must also have come from grapes, because all natural wine uniformly comes from that source. And my position is precisely parallel. We examine numerous structures, whose beginning we did not ourselves see, and they all wear, seemingly, the appearance of full and equal

naturalness. We were about to ascribe them all, very naturally, to a natural source. But should "unexceptionable testimony" come in, asserting that some among them had a supernatural origin, we should then conclude precisely as the man of "common sense" at Cana had to conclude: That *in this particular case, the inference from naturalness of qualities to a natural origin, did not hold.* This is all I have ever asked. Dr. Woodrow concedes it.

But he argues that if I hold on this ground, that there never was any pre-Adamite earth, (as he understands me to hold,) then I must also hold that the fossils, in all deposits older than the Adamic, are a species of shams; that they never were alive; and that the existence of these portions of matter would be absolutely unaccountable. Indeed, he thinks I should be driven to the belief, that the visible works of God are a lie; which is as disastrous as believing his Word a lie. But if, on the other hand, I do admit an earth existing one fortnight before Adam, the Scriptures are, upon my view of them, as fatally impugned as though an earth had existed a million of years before Adam. Hence, he thinks my main position would be useless, were it not false. Let us inspect the two horns of this cruel dilemma. As to the first: he will not allow me to say of the fossils, "We have no occasion to deny their organic character." He thinks my "whole argument rests upon the supposition that the fossils may have been created as we find them." He cannot see what else I mean by saying that if many of "these rocks" may have been created, then the pre-Adamite date of fossils falls also. He can only understand it in this way: either that the fossils never were anything but rock, or that God thrust them into the rocks after they had died, and after the rocks were made, which would be very preposterous.

Had Dr. Woodrow attended to my meaning, when I spoke of many of "these rocks" as possibly created, he would have understood me. He seems to suppose that I meant the fossiliferous rocks. In fact, I was speaking of the stratified but *non-fossiliferous* rocks—the *azoic* of his nomenclature. That geologists recognise quite a large mass of these, is plain from the

fact that they have a separate division and name for them. Now they teach us that these *azoic*, but truly stratified rocks, were the work of the same sedimentary action which has through long ages produced the fossiliferous stratified rocks. I trust my meaning will now be seen. It is this: Suppose it should be found that Revelation testified these *azoic* sedimentary rocks (so called) were not growing through long ages by deposition from water, but, along with some other things, were made by the almighty word of God. If that were granted, then the "law (so called) of stratigraphic succession," as established by geology, are without adequate proof; and it again becomes an open question (to which Scripture may possibly testify) when and how the living creatures, which are now fossils, did live; and when and how the deposits containing their remains were formed. I say, in that case, the geologists' present arrangement of stratigraphical succession is unproved. As I have stated, the *data* from which they claim to have settled this order (proving as they suppose that some fossils are such ages upon ages older than some others) are of three kinds: The observed order of *strata* where they are actually in juxtaposition; the kinds of organic life they contain; and the material and structure of the *stratum* itself. Now, in the case supposed, this last *datum* has become inconclusive. One stone is lost from their arch of evidence, and the whole arrangement of the stratigraphic succession becomes unsettled. For the reasoning in support of it now involves a vicious circle. For instance: The geologist has concluded that the non-fossiliferous clay-slate is a very old stratified rock, because without fossils. Again, he has concluded that a certain species of fossil life is old, because formed in some *stratum* very near that very old slate. Then he concludes that some other *stratum* is also old, because that old species of fossil is found in it. But the basis of all these inferences is lacking in the case I have supposed, and the reasoning proceeds in a circle.

The other horn of the dilemma made for me is equally unstable. It was urged that if I had to admit the existence of an earth one fortnight older than Adam the interpretation placed on the Scriptures by the Westminster Assembly is as violently

outraged as though that pre-Adamite earth were millions of years older than Adam; whence Dr. Woodrow supposes it to follow that my main position, if it were not false, would be useless. I have shown that it is not false: I will now show that, as with Prof. F. H. Smith, with so many other learned men, judges, it is of vital use, after we admit a pre-Adamite earth. Its use is, that it alone can save Dr. Woodrow and us from an endless *regressus* into a naturalistic atheism. Let us review that naturalistic argument, as the evolutionists and the atheist Büchner insist on using it, and as Dr. Woodrow claims it ought to be used, untrammelled by my position. The maxim, "Like effects imply like causes," must be pushed, say they, universally: if restricted by my rule, the very basis of experimental science is gone. But now, theism says that there were first things, somewhere in the past, created, and not evolved naturally. There was a first man, not naturally born of a mother, but created, the father of subsequent men. Yet this first man must also have been *natural* in all his organisation, in order to be the father of men. But had these physicists subjected his frame to their experimental investigation, they would have concluded that, because his organisation was natural, his origin must have been natural. He, therefore, by their logic, was not the first man, but had a natural father. Who does not see that the same process of reasoning applies equally well to that supposed earlier man, and then to his father? Who does not see that the same logic, consistently followed, runs us back into an infinite natural series, without any first term, or first cause? Dr. Woodrow, then, must cease to oppose my doctrine, in order to save himself from the infidel evolution theory. And the evolutionist must accept my doctrine, in order to save himself from that absolute "eternity of naturalism, which is atheism." But if my doctrine is squarely accepted, then, on every question of the *αρχη* of things, of *the when* and *the how* of the origin of nature, the testimony of Revelation properly and reasonably supersedes all natural inferences contradictory thereto, when once that testimony is clearly understood.

But *how* should that testimony of the Bible be understood?

It would appear that I have been much misapprehended here, in spite of the caution with which I refrained from dogmatising on this point. It has been supposed that my whole argument involves the assumption of that sense placed upon the Mosaic record by the Westminster Assembly, totally denying a pre-Adamite earth. I will therefore attempt to place my meaning beyond possible misconception. I say then, first, that I *have not postulated* the interpretation of the Westminster Assembly as the true one, and that I have not asked any one to commit himself to a denial of a pre-Adamite world in all forms. It may very well be, that the science of Bible-exegesis is not yet dispassionate and mature enough on this point to authorise us to commit ourselves finally to *any* exposition of it, as I am very sure that such a final decision is not at all essential to our defence of the integrity and supreme authority of Revelation. And it may also be true, that the inquiries and conclusions of geology are not yet mature enough for it to venture on the construction of a scientific theory of that point. I say, secondly, that if the supposition be made for argument's sake, that the interpretation of the Westminster divines turned out some day to be the only scriptural one—the only one faithful to the inspired text—then my principles would still enable me to uphold the full authority of my Bible, reasonably, consistently, and philosophically, notwithstanding the seeming, natural analogies for an older date of the world. Note, dear reader, that I do not make that supposition, and I have no craving to do so. But let us, for argument's sake, look at it, as one may surmise it to return upon us. Suppose, I say, that after all the *pros* and *cons*, friends and enemies of Moses' inspiration should settle down to this conclusion, that his language can in fairness mean only what the Westminster divines supposed, viz., that there was no pre-Adamite earth at all. Let us suppose that, while honest reverence led believers, like Dr. Woodrow and me, to this conclusion, that *all* the "scientists" had also settled down to the same, so far as to say, (disdainfully), "Your Moses, obviously, can mean nothing but that, if he means anything; and it is therefore *we* reject him totally." Let us also represent to ourselves

by what plausibilities a person who, like Mr. David N. Lord, holds this view, would support his assertion, that to this issue the universal opinion must come at last. He would remind us, that the great body of Christians certainly understood Moses so, while unbiassed by the *stress* of this geological view; that while a few of the fathers and the Reformers understood Moses differently, yet, the new interpretation (as he would call it) was in fact suggested and dictated by that geological stress, which was a little suspicious; that the Christian geologists, when driven by that stress, are vacillating and contradictory in their exegesis, which is again suspicious; that the Westminster divines, while probably very poor geologists, were exceedingly able and faithful expositors; and especially, that *Moses' enemies are coming more and more openly to the position, that no such new interpretation can save his credit for inspiration.* Our imaginary expositor certainly has the facts with him on this last point. The tone of the scientific infidels is changing in this direction, manifestly. Formerly they studied decency, and professed to be quite obliged to the Pye Smiths and Chalmers, who saved the consistency of the venerable Book with their science, by means of the new interpretation. But now their *animus* is very different. They disdain to trouble themselves about these old literary remains of "Hebrew barbarians" and ignoramuses. No sense placed on them is of any importance to the scientific mind. Let the Westminster sense be the true one, (which they think is most probably the only consistent one, for the man who is fool enough to believe in the documents), these "scientists" easily disencumber themselves, by kicking the whole aside as rubbish. Such is Huxley's mode, for instance.

Suppose now, for argument's sake, that we should at last be all compelled to settle down upon the Westminster construction. Then I, from my position, could still save my Bible, and do it consistently. Dr. Woodrow could not. I could say this Bible is established by its own, impregnable, independent evidences, moral, prophetic, historical, miraculous, to be a competent and credible witness to the supernatural agency of an Almighty Creator. I could say this Omnipotent agency is competent to

any result whatsoever. I could bring in my position, that in such a case the divine testimony logically supersedes the circumstantial evidence for a natural hypothesis, no matter how plausible; and my conclusion would not be superstition, but true logic and true science. If the unbelieving geologists thrust at me his difficulty about the seemingly ancient fossils, I could say, first, that the Divine Witness does not stand in need of an explanatory hypothesis from man to entitle him to be believed. I should say, secondly, that it was always possible that Infinite Wisdom might find a motive, and Infinite Power a means to effectuate results very unaccountable to my mind. It might be, for instance, that this Omnipotent and Infinite Wisdom, working during the six days, and during the long antediluvian years, during the flood, and during the years succeeding, in times and places where there was no human witness, saw fit to construct these *strata*, and to sow them with vegetable and animal life with a prodigal profusion now unknown; and to hurry the maturing of *strata*, and the early death and entombment of these thronging creatures, with a speed very different from the speculations of geology; and all for profound motives good to His infinite wisdom, but beyond my weak surmises. I might also add, that possibly this is what Revelation meant, when it said, (Gen. i. 20): "God said, let the waters bring forth *abundantly*," etc. I might point to the fact, that such a divine working would not be wholly unwonted; that, for instance, he causes thousands of embryos of animal life to be produced and to perish without their proper development, for one that grows; that he sows the earth prodigally with vegetable germs which, if they ever sprout, sprout only to perish; that he sheds millions of rain-drops, such as are adapted by nature to water the herbs upon the barren wastes of ocean; that he gives to millions upon millions of flowers in the wilderness, destined only to be cropped by the irrational brute, the same æsthetic arrangement of color, shape, and perfume, which he has conferred on the flowers of our gardens, for the purpose of giving to rational, observing man, the thrilling pleasures of taste. Why this seeming, prodigal waste? It is no duty of mine to account for it. But God acts so! So, if he

had told me that he had done a similar thing at the world's creation, I should be ready to believe it. But *I should believe it on the authority of God's express testimony, not on the strength of a mere hypothesis and a set of analogies which I have just described.*

I repeat again, I have no mission at this time to assert this Westminster construction of Moses as the only true one. It may be asked, Why then do I argue its possibility? Why did I, in my former arguments, seem to imply that this might be the issue between the Bible and science? I answer: Because I wished to illustrate the full value of this saving principle, by showing how, even in that aspect of the debate, it would defend us against infidelity.

And now I close. I beg the reader's pardon for detaining him so long, excusing myself by the honest plea, that my chief object is, not the vindication of any poor credit I may personally have, but the exposition of vital principles, which will, sooner or later, be found precious to all Christians. As against my rigid critic, my purpose has been solely defensive; and if my haste or carelessness has let slip one word, which to the impartial reader savors of aggression or retaliation, I desire that word to be blotted from memory. None can accord to Dr. Woodrow more fully than I do, the honor of sincere devotion of purpose to the truth; or can join more cordially than I do, in the wish, that he may soon return home with recruited energies and prosperous health, to the work of defending truth.

ARTICLE IV.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1873.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

The number of Commissioners present during the sittings of the General Assembly at Little Rock, Arkansas, was over one hundred—making one of the largest Assemblies since our or-

ganisation. This extraordinary attendance, at a point so remote from the great centres of wealth and influence in our Church, is due, no doubt, to the fact that the facilities for travel to Little Rock have been greatly improved during the last few years, making that city accessible now by rail with all parts of the country east of the Great River; and also to the fact, that our Assembly has never before held a session on our Western frontier; and so every delegate appointed felt a natural curiosity to see those distant regions of country, and the rising towns and cities of the far West; about which, just now, all the rest of the country feels more or less concerned, and to which all eyes are turned. The Richmond Assembly showed a good degree of practical wisdom in selecting Little Rock. It was an experiment, and it was a success. We know now that our Church can hold the sessions of her highest court anywhere she may choose within her broad domains without any apprehension that her interests will be hazarded by being permitted to fall into the hands of delegates either few or feeble because of the location. One fact, which is considered worthy of mention as a very striking feature of this Assembly, was the unusual number of young men, full of zeal and energy, and this explains the circumstance, that from the very opening to the closing of the sessions, no one, at any time, appeared to feel that he could *lead* the body. None had any pet theory to put forward, none had any past, public record to look after as a base line of observation for future action. Every man spoke frankly, acted freely, and moved independently; and no one looking over the Assembly could have doubted for one moment that these men had come together to look after the interests of the kingdom of the Master. They looked like earnest, working men who would be willing to endure hardships and privation for the cause without a murmur. It was also pleasant here and there to see a venerable father, though they were few, either as ministers or ruling elders; and now and then to hear them speak forth their experience as the word of that matured wisdom which comes of much labor and toil in the Master's cause. Their grey hairs and care-worn expression in some cases were unquestioned tokens of

the fact, that hard work and indefatigable labor had brought on premature age, and that they were thinking and laboring more for the rewards of immortal life than the pleasures or riches or honors of earth. They reminded us, as we looked into their faces, of some rivers we have seen flowing through heavily timbered lands, darkened a little by shadows of earth, but still reflecting the brightness of heaven.

OPENING SERMON AND ORGANISATION.

Rev. Thomas R. Welch, D. D., the Moderator of the last Assembly, opened this Assembly on the 15th day of May, in the large and beautiful new church in Little Rock, of which he is the pastor, with a sermon from Acts i. 8. We felt a decided pleasure and peculiar satisfaction, as we listened to this excellent man of God unfold and enforce this Scripture with remarkable simplicity, excellency, and power. It was a most thorough exposition of the great principles and duties of the Church and her ministry under the New Testament dispensation. Had it not been that we are opposed to publishing such sermons with the *imprimatur* of the Assembly, we should have risen up in our seat and moved that the Committee of Publication be ordered to publish this discourse in pamphlet form for general distribution. We say we are opposed to publishing opening sermons by the authority of the General Assembly, for this reason amongst others, that as a general thing, by the time a man reaches distinction sufficient in our Church to secure to him the Moderator's chair, he has some theory or notion or hobby which he would like to see adopted and carried out by the whole Church. So nine times out of ten the retiring Moderator will seize upon this occasion to make his sermon the channel through which to impress the Church with his own peculiar views; and the particular notions held and advanced may be touching those very questions about which there is a wide diversity of opinion in the Church. Dr. Welch happily avoided that error over which other men, older and more distinguished than he, have stumbled. If he has any croquet, he had the good sense and sound judgment to waive it for the time, and gave us a sermon which was rich in

gospel truth and calculated to make glad the heart of every man who has ever tasted of the waters of life flowing rich and full from the fountain of grace.

On the second ballot, Dr. Henry M. Smith, of New Orleans, was chosen Moderator. The wisdom of this choice was soon made manifest to the whole Assembly, by the prompt, impartial, and accurate manner, as well as most excellent good humor in which he discharged the duties of this responsible office. In the choice of a man to fill this highest office in our Church, several things are to be taken into consideration. In the *first* place, the ideas held by us of the parity of our ministry should make us to understand, that any man, who may be a commissioner to this high court, is thereby adjudged to be entitled to this distinction if the Assembly should choose to confer it upon him. But while this is the case, there are certain qualifications for an executive officer which are not found in every man, for all gifted men are not gifted alike; and this being the case, the General Assembly should never fall into the egregious blunder of taking into consideration everything except the right thing, in selecting a Moderator—choosing a man sometimes, because he is an old man, or because the Church in his general region has not been thus honored for a good while, and thereby claims to be entitled to the honor. This distinction should always be conferred upon some man who has done real service to the Church, and can also add thereto a *peculiar fitness and qualification for the position*. In the *second* place, it ought to be a settled principle of the Church, never, for any reason, to confer this honor upon the same person a second time, however worthy or peculiarly well qualified he may have shown himself to be. It will be a sad day for the Church, should the time ever come, when her material is so scarce that she must work over again some of that which has already been wrought up to the high places of honor and distinction.

The Committees for the most part were well constituted, but appeared a little slow in getting down to their proper work. They were large in numbers both of ministers and elders, which appears to us to be the true idea of constituting these Commit-

tees. It puts every man to work at the very beginning of the Assembly and makes some good proportion of the body well acquainted with all parts of the work to be done. It interests all parts of the Church in every matter of concernment to the whole, and generally nobody is dissatisfied, nobody is slighted, nobody is over-worked. Every thing being properly digested in the committee-room and brought forward in a clear light before the body by concise and well written reports, a great deal of time is saved to the Assembly, whose sessions are almost always short and limited. It delivers the body from a number of motions and amendments which generally have no other effect than to tangle and confuse the business, and, above all, it frees the body from a vast amount of useless speech-making, all of which things are of vast importance in an Assembly which convenes for business and not for rhetorical display.

CORRESPONDENCE WITH OTHER BODIES

Very early in the meetings of the Assembly, it was announced that Rev. Chas. H. Stitt, D. D., the corresponding delegate from the Synod of the Reformed Church in America, was present. He was introduced by the Moderator in suitable manner to the Assembly. Dr. Stitt's reception by the whole body, and the individual members of the Assembly, was of the most cordial kind. There are good reasons why our Church should embrace every opportunity to show how kindly she feels towards that Church, which being sound in doctrine and consistent in practice has manifested its cordial sympathy with us in times of sore trial and deep distress. Dr. Joseph R. Wilson, the delegate from our Church to the Reformed Synod, made his report to this Assembly, in which he said:

“Whilst I was careful to say that I carried with me from the Assembly I represented, no authority to propose terms of organic union, I ventured to express the hope of a closer alliance than now exists between the two bodies, should a benignant Providence open the way thereto. The utterance of this sentiment produced a deeper impression than I could have foreseen; and, in view of it, a committee was appointed (unanimously, I believe,) to take into consideration the subject thus suggested, with instructions to report to the Synod of 1873.”

Dr. Wilson also presented a communication from the General Synod, touching this same matter, from which we make the following extract:

“Whereas, so formal an overture from so large and respectable a body of kindred faith and order is deserving of the most courteous attention:

“*Resolved*, That a committee of five ministers and three elders be appointed to consider carefully the matter of the desirableness and feasibility of the proposed relations, and report thereon, if possible, to the next General Synod.”

The matter was referred to the Committee of Foreign Correspondence of the Assembly. That Committee reported the following paper to the Assembly on the day following, which was unanimously adopted by a rising vote of the Assembly:

“Whereas, in a paper officially communicated, the last General Synod of the Reformed Church in America has notified this General Assembly of the unanimous appointment of a committee to consider carefully the desirableness and feasibility of establishing closer relations with our Church;

“Whereas, The Assembly regards said notification as indicative of a desire on the part of that venerable Synod to enter into closer relations if the way be clear;

“Whereas, This Assembly on its part cordially reciprocates this feeling, and knows of no more effective method for ascertaining whether the two bodies are prepared for a nearer connection than the method of conference; therefore,

“*Resolved*, That this Assembly do now appoint a committee, to be composed of the following named ministers and ruling elders: Rev. B. M. Palmer, D. D., Rev. Joseph R. Wilson, D. D., Rev. William Brown, D. D., Rev. R. K. Smoot, Maj. T. J. Kirkpatrick, William Henry Smith, Gen. A. M. Scales, whose duty it shall be to confer with a similar committee, if appointed by the General Synod of the Reformed Church, for the purpose of ascertaining in what manner such more intimate relations may be established, and what ought to be the nature and extent thereof, and report the result to the next General Assembly.

“2. That the Stated Clerk be directed to forward a copy of this paper to the General Synod of the Reformed Church, to meet in New Brunswick in June of this present year.”

A proper sense of delicacy and propriety suggest that we should await the action of this Committee, and cautiously abstain

from saying a word until their report is made and the Church hears what they have done in the premises. And the propriety of silence on our part is all the more necessary and imperative, as the present writer constitutes one of the Committee. Yet we think it proper here to say, that the Committee of Foreign Correspondence, and the whole Assembly, understood the meaning to be conveyed by the words "formal overture," as used by the General Synod, in altogether a different sense from that in which the same expression is used in the courts of our own Church. That is to say, the General Synod did not mean to convey the idea, or produce the impression that the Presbyterian Church had laid before them, by "formal overture," a subject for their official consideration, but that the remarks of our delegate had opened up, or disclosed to them, a state of feeling which actually existed among the members of our Church.

Delegates were present from the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, and the Associate Reformed Synod of the South. They were received cordially, and made appropriate addresses, which were responded to in a suitable manner by the Moderator. Official information was conveyed to the Assembly, that two distinguished gentlemen were deputed by the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, to bear the kindly sympathies and fraternal regards of that body to this Assembly. These gentlemen, however, did not appear in person, but sent instead a very cordial letter, which was duly responded to by our Assembly, and the selection of a suitable commission to represent us before that body was intrusted to a committee, consisting of the Moderator, Stated and Permanent Clerks, with the largest discretion of power in the selection of the same. This is the first kindly notice which has been taken of our Church as a separate and distinctive organisation by any of the numerous Presbyterian kinfolks which we have across the waters. We have been treated heretofore more like a poor boy of rough manners and uncultivated speech, but of kindly heart and good intentions, is sometimes treated by his cultivated and wealthy cousins who live in the city and see more of the world; that is to say, we have been just a little snubbed by them. We are truly sorry that these

gentlemen could not be present at our Assembly and mingle freely with our members; no pains on our part would have been spared to make their visit pleasant. But as they found it impossible to attend, we take the liberty here in advance of any commission, to say to them in this informal sort of way, that we hold the body from which they proceeded in very high esteem, and fully reciprocate the feelings which prompted their appointment. We further hope that the correspondence thus happily inaugurated may lead to a better understanding of our Church as a separate organisation, and the means and spirit with which she hopes to accomplish her distinctive mission in the earth.

EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE.

It may not be amiss just here, to mention another incident touching this question of correspondence with other bodies, which we have looked upon as a mere straw, telling how some gentlemen in our connection, and many more out of it, would like to see the wind blow. It is this: Somebody had sent a large package of pamphlets printed on cheap paper to the Assembly to be first distributed among the "brethren" and carefully read and studied by them, so that they might get light and be prepared to act in the contingency of a coming postulate. These were accompanied by a circular letter, which was to be read and was read, in a formal manner, by the Stated Clerk, inviting the Church, through this high court, to appoint and designate twenty-five chosen men to represent our Church in the "World's Evangelical Alliance," to be convened in New York city in the month of October of the present year. This budget of matter was all referred to the Committee of Foreign Correspondence, to be by them taken into mature consideration and reported on at their earliest convenience. The Committee had no difficulty in reporting at once; for they could not find one single reason for reporting favorably to the appointment, whilst there appeared to be numberless reasons for discarding the whole matter as inappropriate and really out of the province of the Assembly's jurisdiction. The report gave rise to quite a lively discussion, in which many brethren appeared to see the whole matter very

differently from the light in which it appeared to the Committee, and even ventured to suggest that the Committee had not seen it in any true light at all, but that all the way through their report there were internal evidences that they had been groping in darkness; in short, had brought in a very ugly report. After much speech-making about the "Evangelical Alliance," and various misinterpretations of that sacerdotal prayer of our great High Priest in the 17th chapter of John's Gospel, the Committee were forced to the conclusion that the advocates of the measure proposed in the circular letter, and reported adversely to by the Committee, were somewhat in the fix of the prophet, when he described his vision as one in which "the light shall not be either clear or dark." The Committee's report was opposed by two classes of members. The first was headed by that excellent brother, the Rev. Allen Wright, of the Indian Mission. He most earnestly desired the Committee's report tabled, and favored the notion, that the Assembly should embrace the occasion to send delegates to this grand evangelical convocation. He was followed and supported by our urbane and sprightly friend, Rev. W. H. Adams, of Charleston, S. C., whose speech was a sharp overhauling of the Committee, for bringing in a report which, being somewhat destitute of diplomatic phraseology, read a little plainly and bluntly, but nevertheless was quite a clear statement of the matter in hand. The second class, led by the Rev. Geo. L. Leyburn, of Virginia, and elder Joseph Hardie of the Synod of Alabama, opposed the report of the Committee, and likewise opposed the sending of delegates. They were of the opinion that our Church ought not to be represented there, but they did not think we ought to state our reasons so fully and strongly as they were set forth in the preamble to the Committee's resolutions. These brethren struck the middle course between the two, and, as is usual in such cases, it carried the Assembly. The amendments offered by them prevailed, and the Assembly, like a wise and prudent body, refused to send delegates, but kept the reasons to itself, under a broad, but modest, plea, in the significant words: "Yet inasmuch as it has not now before it *data* sufficient for the full understanding of the character and purposes

of the Evangelical Alliance, and the extent of the authority claimed for it and its 'National Branches;' therefore, resolved, That the General Assembly deems it inexpedient to appoint delegates to attend the approaching meeting of the Evangelical Alliance in New York; but expresses the sincere hope that the Spirit of grace may preside over all those deliberations, that all its proceedings may redound to the glory of God, in the advancement of our common Christianity."

This was, perhaps, the best that could be done under the circumstances. If, however, we were inclined to say anything further about this matter, it would be, first, that according to the best of our recollection, at the very time when the Committee were roundly charged with not knowing much about this matter, the chairman of the Committee took the floor and read extensively from the printed documents of the "Alliance," and, referring to its constitution, endeavored to impress upon the minds of the members that it was a feature of that Constitution, that no religious denomination would be officially represented in its meeting, and that if delegates should appear there and claim to be officially sent by our Church, they would be excluded and the Church laughed at for her blind folly and innocent presumption; and, secondly, that our Church should be very slow in the future about rushing into correspondence and fraternal greetings and diplomatic salutations with every organisation of a religious character which might desire to correspond with us, under the pretext, that, if we refuse, somehow or other we will be doing violence to somebody's conscience.

CONFERENCE ABOUT CORRESPONDENCE.

Beyond all doubt our Church is to be beset again and again on this very question of correspondence, and we shall be compelled to meet it however reluctant we may be to do so. For our part we do not hesitate to say, that we are growing more indisposed every day towards the whole thing, especially whenever advances come from a body whose official acts have been habitually offensive to us as a Church. We have several reasons which we consider weighty enough to put this matter to rest

without any further trouble or delay on the subject. The reader cannot fail to see that we are alluding to the Northern Assembly's fresh proposals to confer with our Church. It does not require a committee to develop the fact, that there is sufficient reason to distrust any overtures they are likely to extend to us in the present actual posture of affairs in that body. That Church has made three things very plain: first, it does not intend to repeal or change any of its deliverances concerning us; secondly, it does not intend to yield up its claim to make such deliverances again whenever it may choose to do so; thirdly, it proposes to open fraternal correspondence with the avowed desire and sole purpose that it shall ultimate in organic union. Now if they be honest, no conference of committees could make these matters any plainer than they are already made, or change the mind of that Church on either one of them. So upon the presumption that they are honest, it is evident that there is no need of a committee. At the same time, the keeping of a good conscience before God and men requires, that if we do not want organic union we should avoid doing anything upon our part which will look to them like favoring it. The appointing of a committee to meet their committee, will look that way, for that is the thing to which they are looking and for which they are longing. It would entangle us in needless complications; it would divert our people and our churches for a whole year or more from the singleness of our work. And, above all, it would be deceptive upon our part, when we remember what they would be led to expect from such actions. Let us not forget that sooner or later the deceiver is always the loser. The most direct, effective and Christian method for us to adopt is a square refusal to appoint any committee, dismissing in this way the whole subject. But we are asked, "If we decline, will they not have outgeneralled us? and what will the outside world say of us?" Such things should never stand for one moment in the way of men whose solemn duty is to please God and not men, dealing always honestly, squarely, and frankly, before the world, utterly ignoring the strategy of generals and the diplomacy of politicians. In our boyhood days, away down in West Tennessee,

there was quite a neighborhood commotion produced after the following manner: A rather elderly maiden lady, Miss Betsy, of a genial and social nature, and withal very fond of corresponding with young gentlemen, managed to open correspondence with a country boy of honest heart and simple manners, named James. At first James was somewhat disinclined to go into the correspondence, but was finally inveigled into it from a fear that "folks would say" he had treated the lady's advances rudely. James had never intended any thing like *union*, but Miss Betsy had started out with that avowed purpose, and the matter being fairly opened she did not intend to be foiled. James undertook to draw off, and Betsy brought action for breach of promise: the evidence was against the young man in the public estimation. James said he had never intended anything like *union*, and had only entered upon the correspondence to show that Miss Betsy should not put him to disadvantage before the people of the neighborhood. But the people of the neighborhood, pretty unanimously concluded, that James had played the fool and acted very badly to enter into the correspondence at all, if he did not intend any thing serious, when the lady had started out with that manifest purpose. So, poor James, by his want of independence and manly action, incurred the censure of that very public opinion which he had tried so hard to win. May not this little incident serve to point a moral with brethren who think we ought to appoint a committee for fear *they* will put us to disadvantage if we do not?

THE REVISED BOOK OF DISCIPLINE.

The report of the Committee on Revision was read by the Assembly on the third day of its sittings. In this report, the Committee, through their chairman, the Rev. Dr. Adger, made a very clear and concise statement of what seemed to be the proper course for them to pursue in this matter, and referred the whole question to the Assembly, to be disposed of by that body as might seem to it best. A special committee, with the Rev. F. H. Bowman as chairman, was appointed, to whom this report, and the various reports from the several Presbyteries, on

the Revised Discipline, were referred, for the purpose of comparing and classifying the same, and bringing before the Assembly, in some proper form, their several actions. This Committee submitted to the General Assembly substantially the following facts: It appeared that forty-seven Presbyteries of the fifty-seven in the Church, had sent up certified reports of their action.

(1.) Out of this number, fifteen had, without any conditions whatever, or comment or criticism, decided to adopt the "Revised Rules as they now stand."

(2.) Five have adopted, with proposed amendments.

(3.) "Seven approve the Book; but on grounds of expediency they declined to adopt it."

(4.) "Three substantially approved," but asked the suspension of the work, and the discharging of the Committee.

(5.) Nine reject, and ask an indefinite postponement.

(6.) One "*non liquet*."

(7.) Four reject, and wish the subject dismissed indefinitely.

(8.) "One declines to adopt," but asks that the changes be added as amendments to the present Book.

(9.) Two express no opinion, "but ask an indefinite postponement."

From this collation by the Committee, it appears that out of the forty-seven Presbyteries, thirty approve the work of revision and the "Revised Rules of Discipline." The fidelity of the Committee in their work was commended. The Rules of Discipline as revised, with all criticisms and amendments proposed by Presbyteries, were lodged with the Stated Clerk of the Assembly, to be kept in the archives for future use or reference. The work of revision was suspended, and the Committee discharged. The other portion of the Book of Church Order, viz.: the Revised Form of Government, was disposed of in the same way for the same purpose.

Looking at the matter as it now stands, we cannot but express a regret that the two classes of men in the Church, the tender-footed and the profoundly indifferent, so trot together in this ecclesiastical harness as to defeat those who are deeply concerned for a better state of things in our Church touching the question of

discipline. We need no better evidence of the sad and lamentable condition of the Church on this subject, than the fact that, after so long a time agitating the question, there are ten *venerable* courts of the Church which have not condescended to notice one of the most excellent, thorough, and exhaustive productions ever offered to the Church on the subject of discipline. The state of the case, we fear, is getting very much worse from time to time. The present system is so utterly imperfect that it is about no system, and the way discipline is administered most generally, amounts to a perversion of the whole thing. Good men have long ago grown sick at heart, when they take a survey of the situation and the wicked scoff at the Church, when she talks gravely about her discipline. For her purity as well as her peace and unity we consider the proper exercise of discipline of the utmost importance. The soundness of her doctrine can never be maintained, unless the purity of her discipline is preserved according to the scripture idea. That idea is that discipline bears some sort of relation to the threatenings of God's law quite as pointed and significant as the relation borne by the sacraments to the promises of the gospel. One difficulty, which, we believe, stood in the way, is that ministers and elders, not exactly discerning this fact, felt that they had not the time from other duties and labors to sit down and carefully compare these two books (the old and the new,) in order that they might reach definite and sound conclusions of their own in the matter. Or if they had the time, the work appeared too arduous and the labor too great.

The Committee on Revision have reason to congratulate themselves that a majority of the whole Church has approved of their work and stand ready to make it the law of the Church; and all the more so, because the Presbyteries which have adopted it are able to give a reason for the proposed changes, pointing it out in the superior excellency, beauty, and truth, of the Revised Book. Yet a source of regret is, that part of this very number are willing to yield up, or waive, the whole matter upon that which is always an uncertain ground, *expediency*,—and yield up this deep conviction, too, to those very fathers and brethren who

have shown little disposition to tolerate the question, and would neither hear nor examine with any degree of patience the reasons which the advocates of the Revised Book were able and willing to give for the changes which they asked. The cry came up that they were weary of the agitation of these questions, and wanted the Church to have rest. Without having ever thoroughly considered the issues involved, they solemnly asked the Assembly and the Church to dismiss the whole subject upon the flimsy plea that such agitation would mar the peace of the Church. They seem to have forgotten that agitation is a source of purity and health quite as often as it is a disturber of the peace. They appear not to have seen that, as the ocean purifies itself by its own agitation; or the atmosphere, by its agitation, lifts the hazy fog from the valley and lets in the sunlight; and the forest tree, by the agitation of its branches, sends its roots deeper and fixes them firmer between the rocks; so the Church of God, must sometimes, by agitation, purify herself, clear up the haziness that hangs round her discipline, and fix the soundness of her doctrine deeper in the hearts of her people.

LICENTIATES AS ITINERANTS.

On the fourth day of the Assembly's proceedings, Dr. Welch as chairman of the Committee of Bills and Overtures, reported two overtures on this subject: No. 8, from the Presbytery of Tombeckbee, asking the Assembly to ordain a rule requiring all licentiates to spend the first year in itinerant or missionary labor, except in extraordinary cases; No. 9, from the Presbytery of Muhlenburg, asking that they be required to spend at least two years in such labor before becoming settled pastors of any particular charge. Two reports were presented. The majority report recommended action against the adoption of the rule. A minority report, signed by Rev. R. K. Smoot and elder W. O'N. Perkins, was presented, recommending that the rule be established. A question of order arose, on a motion to adopt the minority, as to which had the precedence. The Moderator decided in favor of the minority report. Dr. Welch argued against the adoption of the report in a speech of great power,

though very short, and we think it was his speech which defeated this measure. He laid down and argued four propositions: 1st, it would be contrary to our Form of Government; 2d, it has already been settled; 3d, it asks the Assembly to give the Presbyteries a power which they already possess, or if they do not possess, the Assembly cannot give them; and 4th, it would be unwise on many grounds. He was followed by Rev. J. H. Martin, Rev. F. N. Whaley, Dr. Wm. Brown, and Rev. W. H. Adams, all sustaining the position taken by Dr. Welch. The minority report was advocated by Rev. J. H. Leps, Rev. R. K. Smoot, and Rev. A. Pickens Smith. The speech of the last named was one of peculiar power and force and made a very fine impression on the Assembly. His first proposition was, that the adoption of such a rule would be of inestimable benefit to the young man. His second proposition was, that it would be of the greatest benefit to the vacant and feeble churches. His third proposition was, that it was in keeping with the spirit and genius of our Presbyterianism. The minority report was rejected, the overture lost, and the report of the Committee adopted.

It must be evident that the mind of our Church is turned to this question to an extent which deserves our attention. Last year, at Richmond, one of our largest Presbyteries petitioned for this same rule and the Assembly refused to grant it. So far from being satisfactory, we find that two other Presbyteries come up to the Little Rock Assembly, asking the same thing.

It appears to us that the overtures should have been answered in the affirmative. We believe that which was asked by these Presbyteries is in keeping and perfect accord with the spirit and practice of the New Testament. The Church under the present dispensation began her great work in this way. Her men were first sent out to go from town to town, from city to city, from place to place, to preach the unsearchable riches of Christ. They were itinerants or evangelists. But there is no proof in the Scriptures that they were all ordained. They did the itinerant and missionary work of the Church most generally before receiving ordination, and some who were most useful and most

fruitful as evangelists were never ordained at all. The error which we conceive to be at the bottom of this refusal, is to be found in the fact that the opinion prevails, that a licentiate cannot perform the full work of an evangelist.* To obviate this we have fallen into the habit of ordaining men *sine titulo*, and thus sending them forth as itinerants or evangelists. There is no scripture warrant for any such procedure, any more than there is for a church calling a man as stated supply, and both of these notions ought to be discarded, and the practices growing up out of them abandoned. Paul, the great apostle, did not enter upon the full work of the ministry for seven years after his conversion. Part of this time he spent with Ananias, part in the desert of Arabia, but most of it he spent as an evangelist, and assistant to Barnabas. The whole Church doubted the sincerity of his conversion and the genuineness of his call, and would not receive him into full fellowship in the ministry till, by the fruits of his labors as an evangelist, he had placed his divine call beyond all doubt. This view is sustained by himself in his forcible and unanswerable argument in his letter to Timothy, that by the work of an evangelist we make full proof of our ministry. The order of the Scriptures is, that men shall first evangelise and then settle as pastors. So Paul with his great discerning powers of intellect, his cogent logic, his magnificent powers of argumentation, gloried in the fact that he did the itinerant work as an evangelist. Apollos, with his glowing and burning eloquence, and Mark and Barnabas and Timothy and Titus and Silas, were all itinerants before settling as pastors, and some of them never settled at all. If there is a single exception in the New Testament, we do not now remember it; while Luke, with his chaste and elegant scholarship, was an itinerant or evangelist, who never received ordination at all, and the same is probably true of John Mark. We believe it is also in keeping with the spirit and genius of our whole system. It is implied in our standards and should be carried out in prac-

*If a mere licentiate cannot perform the full work of the pastor, how can he do the same in respect to the evangelist, who is of course quite equal to the pastor?—EDITORS S. P. R.

tice. There is a very plain and simple way in which this can be done. The young men can be used for this purpose under the guidance of the Presbytery. It would certainly be no infringement of their liberty, for when a young man is licensed to preach he promises *obedience* to his brethren in that *particular* Presbytery. But it is a well known fact that this truth is being lost sight of by many. Young men get their licenses, hunt their homes, make their arrangements to settle, and then *notify* the Presbytery of the fact, simply by asking that they may be transferred. A refusal of this on the part of the Presbytery is construed by licentiates and people into an unwarrantable interference. The Presbytery is the power which makes and unmakes the minister. It grants the license; it ordains and installs; it constitutes and dissolves the pastoral relation. And yet with all this specific prerogative, the tendencies are to ignore its jurisdiction in questions of location. Some ministers have gone so far as to accept calls and move to their new fields independent of Presbytery, and in other cases churches have become offended when the ministers whom they wanted would not go, because Presbytery said they should not. We think that the refusal upon the part of the Assembly to grant this request, only serves to strengthen these tendencies. The refusal of the Richmond Assembly, last year, to grant the request of Nashville Presbytery was peculiarly unfortunate, and has in our estimation worked much harm. That deliverance is not clear. The whole of the last two clauses is entirely foreign to the question which it pretends to answer, (see page 156, Minutes of 1872). It has made the impression upon the minds of many that the Presbytery has not the right to control the minister and licentiate and specify their fields of labor. It was claimed that young men are licensed to preach the gospel wherever God in his providence may call them. But the answer to this is, Who is to determine that question? Does not the whole genius and spirit of our system teach us that the Presbytery is the very power to settle that question? The people may ask it, the young man desire it, and the girl he is to marry may make it a *sine qua non*, but is not the decision of the whole matter in the hands of the Presbytery?

Nothing appears more clear from our standards, and yet nothing is made more obscure by the Richmond action, which was repeated at Little Rock, *because* it had been done at Richmond the year before.

It is presumed in these deliverances that an effort is being made to set aside the "frame of our whole system, by retarding the settlement of pastors." But the facts are, there is nothing in either one of these three overtures intended to make any such impression or produce any such results. Just the opposite is aimed at, and just the opposite would be the result. This is the way to save and strengthen our feeble churches. In many cases a salary sufficient to support a young man can be raised by combining feeble churches which would otherwise die out. The licentiates may build them up, grow with their growth and strengthen with their strength. This kind of work would lay the foundation for a vigorous constitution as well as a useful ministry. Having a knowledge of books they would thus get a knowledge of men. This would be a realisation of Paul's grand thought in Romans xv. 20, building on no other man's foundation. It has been feared that the inexperience of young men would work against the practice. But the answer is, that Paul took Timothy and Titus and *first led* them into the evangelistic field, just as Barnabas had led him, and then brought them to the full work of the ministry. So the licentiate could go forth under the supervision of some designated minister, make trial of his gifts, and afterwards go into the pastorate. There is need to have work done by our Church that the settled pastors cannot do. The young men can be made effective in this way. Our Church just now is in danger of running into an unwarranted extreme on the question of settled pastors, to the neglect of the itinerant work. Almost every young man in our Seminaries is looking for a pastoral charge, when every thing which would tend to his good and the good of the whole cause, when viewed from either the scriptural theory, or practical results, would require that he should spend a few years, at least, as an itinerant missionary. When the authority is once clearly asserted, and the Assembly confirms it, the Presbytery and the licentiate

will better understand it, and the Presbytery can always use its discretion. But the way in which the matter now stands, the peculiar answers given by the concentrated wisdom of two General Assemblies, necessitates the deliverance of another at some future time, which we hope may be something more clear and less indefinite.

EVANGELISTIC LABOR.

A most excellent report was read on behalf of the Committee on Evangelistic Labor, by Rev. L. C. Vass, chairman of that Committee. What we had to say about the office and work of the evangelist, has been said under the previous head, though not as fully as we might discuss it, if we had more space. That the technical sense in which it is generally understood, that an evangelist must be an ordained minister, is not the scripture sense, we think we have clearly shown. Whether the report of the Committee was prepared before or after the discussion of the Overtures, Nos. 8 and 9, we are not prepared to say. But if any of the members of the Assembly, who voted against those overtures, and then voted for this report, should have the patience and do us the kindness to read this article, we would like to call their attention to one feature of this report. And we are all the more urgent about the matter, when we remember that the report on evangelistic labor passed the Assembly by a unanimous vote. It will be remembered that those overtures asked the Assembly to ordain a rule whereby the Presbytery might assert her power over her licentiates and require them to spend one or two years in the itinerant or missionary labor before settling as a pastor. The Assembly declared by such action "the whole frame of our system would be set aside." Now, what we wish these gentlemen to note is, that in voting for this report they have recommended the Presbyteries to do a thing which comes equally as near "setting aside the whole frame of our system," as any thing asked for in those overtures could possibly have done. After urging upon the Presbyteries the importance of employing "at least one evangelist for all his time," the report proceeds in these significant words: "We

would also recommend the practice of some of our Presbyteries, who employ licentiates, whenever it is in their judgment expedient, for the first year or two in missionary fields, and who also give work in destitute places to their candidates during their vacations," (see page 316, Minutes of 1873). We commend the prudence and good judgment of our excellent friend, Rev. Mr. Vass, in putting into his able report, and getting it through the Assembly, *by a unanimous vote*, much of that thing which we most signally failed to do, even though backed up by all the ability, energy, and shrewdness, of our genial friend, A. P. Smith. And these gentlemen will notice the report leaves the matter in the power and judgment of the Presbyteries whenever they deem it expedient. We hope that the thing feared so much by the Richmond Assembly, and referred to, and re-affirmed by this Assembly, that leaving of licentiates in the hands of the Presbyteries to be worked a year or two in "missionary fields," whenever "in their judgment" it may be "expedient," will not be considered "an attempt to retard the settlement of pastors." While we sat and listened to the deliberations on these resolutions, we were not a little amused when the range of discussion took this turn: a motion was made "to strike out that part which advised the Presbyteries to employ licentiates and candidates in missionary work." But Mr. Vass replied, that, "to strike out would imply that the Assembly was opposed to the Presbyteries exercising the power of employing, in missionary work, our candidates." This put an extinguisher upon all objections, and the agitated Assembly subsided into unanimity.

It will be seen from reading the reports on this subject, that it appears to be the fixed purpose of the Assembly, to reduce the evangelistic work to a systematic method, and give it a due prominence in the great work of the Church. It is thus brought upon a level with the Sustentation scheme by being made a part of it, and so deserves the hearty coöperation of all our Presbyteries. We take it that no man questions the demand for the scheme, and the same reasons which demand its existence, reach far enough to make an equal demand for thorough and hearty coöperation upon the part of all the Presbyteries. The blended

unity of the work gives it strength and power, symmetry, and beauty. It preserves harmony and prevents discord and confusion. It is presbyterial, sound, scriptural. It places the General Assembly in her proper and legitimate sphere of action, while at the same time it preserves the well defined rights and prerogatives of Presbytery. It shows forth the faith that we have in the scriptural order of our government by the systematic and united work through which we develop that faith.

POWERS OF CHURCH COURTS AND METHODS OF BENEFICENCE.

We believe as strongly as any man in the limited and defined powers of the General Assembly, and, because we do believe this, we are opposed to that notion that the General Assembly has no powers at all. And it is just as fatal to the interests of the Church to overlook these as it would be to infringe upon the inherent rights of the Presbyteries. The principles which we have to state here apply with the same force to all the enterprises of the Church. We hold that Presbytery is the *original source* of power in the church courts. We further hold as undeniable, because fundamental, that all the Presbyterian congregations in our connection form one church, and when that one church is gathered together, by delegated representation, into one General Assembly, that Assembly has vested in it all the powers of the whole Church, in all matters pertaining to its general welfare, which any Presbytery has over its own constituent elements. The General Assembly when properly constituted is a court of Jesus Christ, for its legitimate work, as much as Presbytery or the court of session. It is nothing less than the *General Presbytery of the whole Church*. The source of its power is the divinely inspired Word of God. The constitution of the Church under which the Assembly works is simply the codification, systematising, and defining of these powers as they are found to exist in that Word. This is Presbyterianism according to the theory, as we understand it. It is Presbyterianism according to the divine idea of the Church in its concrete form. It is Presbyterianism according to the historical workings of the Church, from the day that Francis Makemie, in

1681, planted the first Presbyterian church in this country, on the shores of Maryland, down to this good hour in which we write. The leaven of Independency crept into our Church very early, it is true, by the admission of Rev. Jedediah Andrews and his Independent congregation. Yet there has ever been a sufficient amount of true Presbyterianism to rise up and assert our principles, and put forth its exertions to carry them out, albeit there has always been a lingering remnant of that Independency to harrass and perplex us in many of our undertakings. It reminds one of the chills and fevers in the malarial districts of the country—when you think you are entirely rid of them here they come back again on the seventh, fourteenth, or twenty-first days, unfitting the patient for any thing he may undertake. Just so, when we had supposed that the question was settled, and our people would understand the relations and bearings of all the church courts and their distinctive rights and well defined spheres of action, here comes a Presbytery, and there comes a Synod, rising up and talking about working their own schemes independently of the Assembly! There can be but one object in having a General Assembly, and that object is to accomplish the work of the Church among the children of men. This work is comprehensive, constant, and far-reaching, and should have the constant, united, and unbroken coöperation of all the Presbyteries. And those who oppose it, and attempt to strip it of its rights and prerogatives and vest these in synodical and presbyterial schemes, and thus cripple and hamper its movements, and, in many cases, defeat its purpose by their refusal to coöperate, and cut short the means till the supply is not adequate to the demand, should not complain if they are held to account for all the failures which follow. We believe that the Church constituted according to the Presbyterian idea is adequate to do the whole work for which she was set up in the earth. She has been divinely ordained to do something, to accomplish some purpose, to reach some end, and we believe that the means in her power will always be adequate to that end. And not the least among them all is the method by which she is to raise money to carry forward her grand schemes of Missions, of Sustentation,

and Evangelisation. The very order of our Church beginning away down at the deacon, and rising in systematic gradation till it culminates in the General Assembly, presents a method most perfect and thorough by which the people of God in our communion can do effectually whatever they are willing to do. It will be seen that this method, if we are correct, enters into and constitutes a fundamental part of her very nature. But it cannot reach its full development and extent in either session, presbytery, or synod. If it could, there would be no need of a General Assembly. The grace of contributing of our substance to the various enterprises of the Church, is a standard by which the piety of any individual Church may be as accurately graduated as by any other one of the infallible proofs which Christ has given us of a true Church. The observing the sacraments of the Supper is not more binding on us as a part of that outward means by which we worship God and show our faith in Christ, than is giving. And the Church which will give nothing, has just as signally failed in producing the proper evidence of being Christian, as the Church which will refuse to celebrate the Supper. They bear a like relation in the public worship of the Church. This prepares us for answering two questions which we so often hear presented. The first is: "When will this thing stop? Are we to be always giving?" We answer, surely, yes. As God shall prosper you, you are to give, and give cheerfully, and you shall no more think of ceasing to give, than to think of ceasing to worship God in any other one of the constituent elements of that worship. The second question is: "Are not a large number of our churches feeble, and the recipients of the charity of our larger churches—should *they* give?" We answer, yes. What church, so feeble, or so few in numbers, that it would consider itself excused thereby from celebrating the Lord's Supper. As long as it is our blessed privilege to enjoy the one, it is our solemn duty to do the other. What we need, then, is, that our Church shall give this theory a practical side in its application to these enterprises of the Church committed by the General Assembly to her various Committees of Sustentation, Foreign Missions, and Evangelisation. We need that this

method should be completely executed. We need that the whole Church in her organised capacity should steadily go forward. To do this she must be constantly calling upon her people to do their duty, just as she is required to do hers. Every effort should be made upon the part of ministers and sessions of churches, in the congregation, and among the able and wealthy members, to instruct and lead and bring the people into the way of giving. Not in separate, congregational, or presbyterial, or synodical schemes, but through the whole Church as an organised power of God in the earth, for spreading the light of divine truth and saving the souls of lost men. Any other theory, and the Church, as an organised body, will pass rapidly into dissolution, and all her enterprises be emasculated and her pretensions rendered worthless.

ASSEMBLY'S TRUSTEES AND EXECUTIVE COMMITTEES.

The relation between the Executive Committees and the Board of Trustees of the Assembly gave rise to more discussion than any other subject before the Assembly during its sittings. It came up on the report of a committee of ruling elders, mostly lawyers, to whom the question had been referred. Their report was advisory in its nature, recommending a series of resolutions, prefaced by a modest, chaste, and well written preamble, (see Minutes 1873, page 319). The resolutions may be summed up in about the following words: 1st. Orders the Trustees to pay over the Kennedy and Park funds to the Committee. 2d. Reserves to the Trustees, bequests which are uncertain as to their purposes, till the Assembly convenes. 3d. Orders the Trustees to pay over at once all donations, the uses of which are certainly known. 4th. Orders that all donations, of less than three thousand dollars, shall be paid at once to the Committees when the object is known, but not the *manner* of its use; but all amounts over three thousand dollars shall be retained by the Trustees, and only the interest paid over, till the Assembly shall dispose of the principal. 5th. That in all other cases, the Trustees shall retain and control the funds till instructed by the Assembly

as to what disposition to make of them. The 6th establishes the Committee for the purposes recited in the first section of the Act of Incorporation, and ratifies and confirms all the Committees have done heretofore with the Assembly's sanction. The first, second, and third resolutions, passed the Assembly with but little discussion. When the fourth was reached, the discussion became quite animated, and consumed a good part of two days. Rev. J. D. Thomas, Judge Perkins, and M. A. Candler, Esq., advocating the passage of the resolutions; while Rev. F. H. Bowman and Rev. J. S. Moore, with Rev. Dr. Brown, opposed its passage. The amount proposed in the original resolution was *one thousand* dollars, but, on motion of Rev. Dr. Brown, it was made *three thousand*, as Dr. Brown said, by way of compromise. Mr. Candler made an argument of considerable length and ability. He took the position—a very strange one indeed from his side of the question—that this was simply the question of Boards or no Boards, and then asked the question, “Shall we have bodies legally independent of the Assembly?” He maintained the further position that these Committees of the Church could legally own no property and hold no money. He argued that to grant the Committees the power to use the moneys donated to the Church, when the donor had not specified the manner, even though the object was specified, would be the abandonment of those principles which had been settled, and the establishment of that policy which had been condemned by the Assembly of 1861, after two days debate. There can be no question but what the speech of Mr. Candler carried this fourth resolution through the Assembly.

In writing an article like this, it is not necessary for us to go into anything like a full discussion of the questions germinal to the Executive Committees of the Church. But this we may say, that the Church can have no other object in the establishment of these Committees, than that they may do in the most efficient manner that work which is properly and legitimately her work. No one we presume will question the power of the General Assembly to appoint these Committees, and clothe them with just such power as she may choose—power to *handle and conclude*

all matters pertaining to their proper work, and when this is done, to report the same to the Assembly for review and control. When they are once established, they are constituent parts of the incorporated Church, and by virtue of this fact they continue the powers-vested in them to do the will of the Assembly. They possess, under rules and by-laws, the power of the General Assembly touching the several objects for which they are constituted during that interval from one Assembly to another. If it is the will of the Assembly to carry on a work of Foreign Missions, for example, then that work falls into the hands and under the control of that committee, for it is a coördinate branch of the incorporated Church, and it has a right under the charter to *go forward and conclude* its work, or any part of it, and report for approval or otherwise to the Assembly what it has done, as well as to recommend to the Assembly what may be done. That committee can handle money, hold property, as it does now at Hangchow and Campinas, establish mission points and schools, or do any other business which the Assembly can do touching the same matters. If any gift shall pass into the hands of the Trustees for the use of the Committee of Foreign Missions, then "it shall be good and effectual to pass" to that Committee. It will be lawful. The Trustees are not justified in refusing to pass it. It is part and parcel of the powers of that Committee to go and demand it of the Trustees, the donor having mentioned the object of his charity—Foreign Missions—who will say that the Board of Trustees shall not pass it over to that Committee? If there is a supposable state of case in which funds donated may be withheld, it is not touching the funds committed to the Board of Trustees, whenever the donor shall mention the object of his charity. For when the particular charity is mentioned, then it shall be good and effectual to pass to the Committee of that charity. There can be no good reason for withholding it, and whenever the reason ceases, the law ceases. By the passage of that fourth resolution, the General Assembly has done what we believe she did not intend to do, and what we think will be rescinded, changed, or modified very soon by another Assembly, or if not, our Committees are crippled and hampered and their

usefulness very much impaired. That resolution places the Board of Trustees above the Executive Committee, and establishes a state of case not contemplated by the position originally taken by the General Assembly of the Church. It would have been far better to incorporate the Committees—all of them separately—than to have thrown such cramping restrictions around them, touching the use of the funds donated to their several fields of action, simply because the manner of that use was not designated by the donor. We are not so certain any way if that would not be the better and most effective method of carrying on the real work of our Church. For, in our mind, it has never been a question, as to whether the Committees should be incorporated? but whether there should be another body between the Committees and the Assembly, and whether the Committees should be responsible to that third body, or whether they should be directly responsible to the Assembly upon its floor and before its bar. To set up between our Committees and the Assembly any third body, is precisely and exactly to go back to the old Board system.

We say we are of the opinion that the Assembly did what it was not its intention to do. For it appears to be a conceded fact, that the settled policy of the Church is not to accumulate endowments, but to depend for the supply of each year upon the charitable gifts and donations of the Church during the year. No General Assembly has ever presumed to make any express provision for the expenditures of the year to come, since we have been a separate Church, for the simple reason that it was understood to be in the power of the several Committees to use the funds in their wise and prudent discretion as rapidly as they came in. When money is left for purposes of endowment, of course it passes directly to the object for which it was left by the donor. Now, whether we trust the Committees with one dollar or three thousand dollars, the principle is the same, and in proportion as you cramp the principle involved in this matter, you cramp the Committees. It was argued by the Rev. W. J. Keith, of the Synod of Georgia, that we had better go back to the old Boards than to have a constant agitation of these mat-

ters, but he must know that the old system would be no remedy, for that would keep up perpetual agitation. He must further know, that the system of the Assembly's Committees can produce no agitation or jar, but it is only when an effort is made to cramp that system that such is the result. The whole discussion showed that the Assembly was sensitive about a permanent fund of any kind—they feared it. The advocates of this fourth resolution used and pressed that argument against the incorporation of the Committee of Publication. And yet this resolution establishes a *tertium quid* between the Committee and the Assembly—the very vice of the old Board system, and squints also at *permanent funds*, when it subordinates the Committees to the Trustees, and empowers the Trustees to invest the funds and pay over only the accruing interest instead of the principal. The true theory of our Church is this: 1st, never to have a permanent fund from which to supply a demand arising out of contingent wants; 2d, to have as far as we can a permanent fund, or endowment, for the supply of those wants constantly arising, but which are of such a permanent nature as to be subordinated to some settled rules, and which are capable of being ascertained in advance. All the enterprises of our Church fall naturally, and readily, under the one or the other of these two conditions. If every General Assembly will keep these facts before their minds and properly classify the various enterprises of the Church, none of that danger and constant agitation so much apprehended will ever arise.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

In concluding this brief and imperfect review of the Assembly's proceedings, for there were *many* matters of which we would like to speak, not alluded to here, we say frankly that several things were done which we would have gladly seen left undone. But, as a whole, we think many evidences were given of the growth and prosperity of our Church, of her soundness in doctrine and vigorous activity, which are calculated to make all our hearts glad. We have made frank and open observations on the deliverances of the body just as they appeared to us, and

as it seemed fitting and legitimate to do. We have been impressed with the fact that no Assembly can do all that may be expected of it, and if this one has not come up to the expectations of some in all its deliverances, it has certainly not fallen behind many others, either in the work executed or the spirit and manner in which it was done. Those gentlemen from whom we have differed most widely, and concerning whom we have spoken most plainly, are among the number whom we learned, in the few days we were with them, to respect for their ability, candor, and courage, and to love for the many traits of character which marked, no less the honesty of their purpose, than the goodness of their hearts. Few General Assemblies have ever met, whose discussions were more earnest and animated, and few have ever parted whose members separated with more regret and tender and affectionate regard for each other.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

The Adoption of Sons, its Nature, Spirit, Privileges, and Effects; a Practical and Experimental Treatise. By THOMAS HOUSTON, D. D. Alex. Gardner, Paisley; Houston & Co., London; C. Aitchison, Belfast, etc., etc. 1872. 16mo., Pp. 258.

We feel like extending the right hand of Christian fellowship to our brother across the waters, and giving him a cordial grasp, for this most excellent treatise on this most precious theme. We rise from its perusal, feeling that we have been communing with one who has a deep, experimental knowledge of his subject, as well as a complete, theological mastery of it. Without being doctrinal, it is saturated with doctrine. Each chapter is like a prism, reflecting all the colors of that time-honored creed, which shines with the undimmed brightness of the sun in the firmament of truth. It is such practical works as this, presenting a great fundamental doctrine on all sides, that discloses, to the

general reader, the beautiful unity and harmony of the Calvinistic system, perhaps more distinctly and satisfactorily, than learned theological discussions. Yet, on every page, we find clear, sharp, precise statements, which evince a logical mind, careful study, and unwavering conviction. It is evidently not the hasty production of a youthful mind, or of a novice in religious experience. It is the ripe, mellow fruit of a mature tree—the autumnal harvest, which is the result of long, faithful, and laborious culture, in the sunshine of a happy Christian experience, under the refreshing showers of divine grace, amid frequent storms of adversity and conflict.

The theological student will find this little treatise replete with valuable suggestions. The scriptural doctrine of the Fatherhood of God is clearly and strongly set forth, in contrast with the philosophic errors of *Robertson*, *Maurice*, and others, who teach that God is the Father of all mankind alike, and that all are equally his children. “The doctrine which these theologians assume,” he justly remarks, “strips God of some of his essential perfections—is wholly opposed to the doctrine of original sin—denies the atonement of Christ in any proper sense of the term, and the eternal punishment of the wicked. It is, besides, brought forward by its leading abettors to support their favorite dogma of universal restoration.” In exhibiting the Fatherhood of God in relation to the several persons of the Trinity, he shows, in opposition to a common, erroneous impression, that this term is applicable to the whole Godhead, as well as to the First Person “in his economical relation.” It is the Triune God, who is “our Father.” The chapters on the Fellowship of the Adopted Family; their Future Manifestation, and Happiness; and the Practical Uses of Adoption; will be read with peculiar interest and profit. We know of no work on this subject which is so thorough and exhaustive, and, at the same time, so practical and popular in its treatment. We cordially recommend it as a valuable aid to devotion. He must have a barren experience, indeed, who can read one of these stirring chapters without a prayerful impulse. The abundance of appropriate Scripture quotations adds greatly to its devotional effect. Like refreshing

streams, they are flowing everywhere through these green and fruitful fields. Nor are they mechanically let in to fill artificial channels, but gush out as naturally as springs from the hill-side.

The only objection, any modern reader will be likely to raise against this charming volume, is the simplicity, and straightforwardness of its style. The writer is too much in earnest to belittle his great theme with sensational word-painting. The diction is sufficiently elegant and scholarly to satisfy the most fastidious reader, whose heart is in sympathy with this delightful theme.

We would greatly rejoice to see this valuable treatise extensively circulated in our own country. It will, doubtless, interest many of our readers to know that Dr. Houston is an old and intimate friend of the late Dr. Smyth.

A Manual of English Literature: A Text-book for Schools and Colleges. By JNO. S. HART, LL.D., Professor of Rhetoric, and of the English Language and Literature in the College of New Jersey, and late Principal of the New Jersey State Normal School. Philadelphia: Eldredge & Brother, No. 17 North Seventh Street. 1872. Pp. 636, large 12mo.

This we judge to be a work of the highest merit. It is designed to be a text-book for schools and colleges, the whole of it to be read by the student, but the chief things, in large type, to be made the subject of recitation. It is also designed to be a book of reference, and it is full of the most valuable information. All this mass of historical, biographical, and literary statements are arranged in systematic order, and with the aid of a good table of contents, and a full index, it is easy to get at every item. We shall place this volume on our most convenient and accessible book-shelf, for we expect to make constant use of it.

The method of grouping adopted by Professor Hart, is to associate authors with some conspicuous reign or other great public event, also placing the main body of authors around some one great author who stands most strikingly connected with that period of history. Then there are minor juxtapositions of

poets with poets, historians with historians, theologians with theologians. The reader is to understand that the present manual takes no note of American literature at all, but confines itself to the authors of Great Britain alone.

The work comprises sixteen chapters on the following named topics: 1. English before Chaucer. 2. Chaucer and his contemporaries. 3. Early Scotch poets. 4. From Chaucer to Spenser. 5. Spenser and contemporary poets. 6. Shakespeare and the early dramatists. 7. Bacon and contemporary prose writers. 8. The English Bible, and other Public Standards of Faith and Worship. 9. Melton and his contemporaries. 10. Dryden and his contemporaries. 11. Pope and his contemporaries. 12. Dr. Johnson and his contemporaries. 13. Cowper and his contemporaries. 14. Sir Walter Scott and his contemporaries. 15. Wordsworth and his contemporaries. 16. Tennyson and his contemporaries.

Having been present many years ago when Professor Hart graduated at Nassau Hall, and heard him deliver his eloquent valedictory to the class about to leave College, we have watched his course in life with peculiar interest. His educational labors and writings have accomplished a great work for his age and country. We shall look with interest for his other manual—his forthcoming work on American Literature—confident that it will be worthy of the name, and rise superior both to sectional and sectarian influences, and to all others unworthy to be regarded in the republic of letters.

We observe some few omissions worthy to be supplied. There are Boyd of Trochrigg, Brown of Wamphray, and John Livingstone, whose names ought to appear along with those of Rutherford, Gillespie, and Calderwood. This last named author's principal work is said by Professor Hart to be his *History of the Kirk of Scotland*, which may be true in one aspect; but surely his *Altare Damascenum* is important enough to have received at least a passing word. Then, in the period where Boston appears, we look in vain for the great names of Adam Gib, the Anti-burgher; and McLaurin, author of the celebrated discourse on *Glorying in the Cross*, than which there is nothing grander in

the English language. And where their colleagues Ralph and Ebenezer Erskine are introduced, we miss Fisher, Wilson, and Moncrieff, the three other learned writers, who founded the Secession Kirk. The names of Wordsworth and Ellicott should certainly have been coupled with those of Dean Alford and Dr. Bloomfield; nor should that of Principal William Cunningham have been left out, when Candlish, Fairbairn, and Tulloch were under consideration. And when Seeley's celebrated work, *Ecce Homo*, is introduced, how could Professor Hart forget to speak of the no less celebrated, equally able and eloquent, and certainly more orthodox reply to it, styled *Ecce Deus*?

The Laws of the Kingdom. By J. OSWALD DYKES, M. A.
New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1873. 12mo. Pp. 239.

This excellent work, as announced on the title page, is intended "to form a continuation" of a work by the same author on "The Beatitudes of the Kingdom." Both of these books, as well as a third, not yet published, are commentaries upon the Sermon on the Mount, and the volume before us deals with our Lord's teachings in two aspects. First, as to the "Relation of the New Law to the Old"; and, second, as to the "Law of Secrecy in Religion." Under the first head, our author follows the order observed in the fifth chapter of Matthew's gospel, and devotes separate chapters to the general principle. "Fulfilment, not Destruction," and the illustrations of Christ, viz., the Sixth Commandment, the Seventh Commandment, Oaths, *Lex Tali-onis*, and Who is my Neighbor.

Upon each of these illustrations Mr. Dykes has given a chapter of sound theology and of excellent sense. No one can read his admirable analyses of the prohibitions of the Sixth and Seventh Commandment, without a hearty concurrence in his views. His diction is simple, yet always elegant, and the learning he occasionally displays, is incidentally manifested and never paraded. The chapter upon "Oaths" is specially good, and the true ground upon which profanity and profaneness are forbidden, is very clearly stated. We cannot forbear quoting a

passage from this chapter, in which he speaks particularly upon the apparent prohibition of all judicial oaths, in the Lord's command, "Swear not at all."

"We are now, I think, in a position to judge how far our Lord's teaching forbids all administering and taking of oaths whatsoever. It cannot surprise us that many have drawn that conclusion from such sweeping words as are here employed. We associate the refusal to take a judicial or allegiance oath with Quakerism; but in fact there has rarely been absent in any age of the Church a small section of Christians who held this ground, and numbers of the best fathers of Christian learning have spoken strongly in its favor. (So Chrysostom, Theophylact, Jerome, and others). Moreover, it is unfair to deny that our Lord does set it before his Church as the true ideal of his kingdom, that veracity and trust among his followers should make everything beyond, 'yes,' and 'no,' superfluous, and because superfluous, wrong. That Christian heart, which does not beat quicker at the thought of such a golden future, of such a realm of truth, kept through the fear of God, has little sympathy with Christ."

A little further on, he clearly shows that the administration of oaths in judicial cases is a part of Christian duty, while he constantly denies the use of expletives and imprecations.

The second division, treating of "The Law of Secrecy in Religion," follows the same general system, as suggested in the sermon. It discusses the three applications of the principle, in Almsgiving, in Prayer, (with one Excursus: "The Model Prayer,") and in Fasting.

Upon this last application, we confess that we looked with some trepidation for a trace of ascetic Theology. But we did our author injustice, for upon this topic he is particularly happy in distinguishing between all compulsory, formal or authoritative "affliction of soul," and the fast that is induced by the Christian's private experience. All Lenten observances are swept away with other remnants of Popish superstition, and the Christian is warned to "anoint his head and wash his face," when his own private soul-conflicts have forced him to abstain from food. The prevailing atmosphere of the Church, redeemed and saved, is an atmosphere of joy. Therefore the solitary saint, who has

secret cause for grief, must not obtrude his personal discomforts upon the children of the bride-chamber.

It affords us genuine pleasure to commend this little volume to our readers. It is full of instruction and full of comfort. We do not remember one objectionable phrase in it, or one statement of doctrine from which we have been obliged to dissent.

We need say nothing about the externals of the book, as it is from the press of the Messrs. Carters, who have earned a widespread reputation for the elegance of these publications.

Suggested Emendations of the Authorised English Version of the Old Testament. By ELIAS RIGGS, D. D., LL.D., Missionary of the A. B. C. F. M., at Constantinople. Andover: Warren F. Draper. 1873.

This little volume of 130 pages is probably called forth by the revision, which the common English version is receiving at the hands of English and American scholars. To their consideration are these emendations submitted, and not to theirs only, but more especially to those who are called to the work of translating the inspired Word into other tongues. Dr. Riggs is held deservedly high as a scholar, at home and among his missionary brethren abroad. He is known to us by his *Manual of the Chaldee Language*, which was chiefly taken from the *Chaldee Grammar of Winer*, published at Andover in 1832, and re-published in New York on his visit to his native land in 1858. This publication was made from Winer's *second* edition, an additional Appendix being added on the Rabbinic and the Samaritan Dialects. The third edition of this manual was published in 1866 in New York and London. Dr. Riggs has spent his life in Biblical studies, the languages of the East sounding in his ears, and the customs of the East, less variable than those of the West, before his eyes. These emendations have been suggested by the studies and labors of the last twenty-six years, which have been spent mainly in the work of translating the Word of God into the Armenian and Bulgarian languages, in which not only the original Scriptures, but the best translations of the same were consulted. The translators of the English

version were often obliged to choose, among the possible translations of difficult or idiomatic expressions, those which seemed to them the best. Subsequent research might give the preponderance to other renderings. In Genesis xvi. 13: "Thou God seest me," Dr. Riggs would render, "Thou art the God of my vision." "Have I also here looked after him that seeth me?" he would render, "Do I here see, after my vision?" In vs. 14: "Wherefore the well was called Beer-lahai-roi," he would adopt the marginal rendering, "was called the well of the living God of my vision." xxv. 18: "And he died in the presence of all his brethren," he would render, as the lxx. also did, "and he dwelt in the presence," etc. In Job's description of Behemoth, chap. xl. 23: "Behold he drinketh up a river and hasteth not: he trusteth that he can draw up Jordan into his mouth," he would translate, "If the river (*or* a river) overflow, he hasteth not; though Jordan rush upon his mouth, he remaineth quiet." xxiv: "He taketh it with his eyes: his nose pierceth through snares," he would render, "Can any one take him openly? or pierce his nose in snares?"

The common version of the Scriptures, known as the version of King James, because set on foot by him, though suggested by the General Assembly in Scotland in 1602, and demanded in 1604 by the Puritan divines, to whom he bore a mortal hatred, is deservedly revered by all English-speaking Christians. Yet the translators of the same did not regard themselves infallible. In their "Address to the Reader," they use the following language: "As nothing is begun and perfected at the same time, and the later thoughts are thought to be the wiser; so if we, building upon their foundation that went before us, and being holpen by their labors, do endeavor to make that better which they left so good, no man, we are sure, hath cause to mislike us; they, we persuade ourselves, if they were alive, would thank us." And *we* may well believe, that if those now engaged in the revision of our English version, can make that better which King James' translators "left so good," these translators, "if they were alive," would thank *them*.