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THE SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

VOL. XIII.—NO. 1.

APRIL, MDCCCLX.

ARTICLE I.

A FEW MORE WORDS ON THE REVISED BOOK OF DISCIPLINE.

From recent indications we are inclined to think that the tide of prejudice which, at first, set so violently against the Revised Book of Discipline, has begun to ebb, and that the current is now changing in its favor. Objections are daily losing their force, misapprehensions quietly subsiding, and the propriety of the changes becoming more obvious; and although the mind of the Church is not yet fully prepared to adopt the book, yet, the estimate which is now formed of it is very different from that which prevailed a year ago. Even the tone of its assailants is significantly changed; instead of the bold shout of confident defiance with which they at first rushed to the assault, as if victory were as sure as the attack, they have come at length to perceive that there are weapons on the other side as bright and as keen as their own, and that if they succeed in achieving a triumph it will be after a hard conflict, and with strong misgivings as to the inherent righteousness of their cause. In this posture of affairs we have thought that

2 *A few more words on the Revised Book of Discipline.*

an additional impetus might be given to the healthful re-action which has certainly begun, by a few more words in relation to those parts of the New Discipline which are still not free from difficulty, and of which a fuller discussion is needed. We are persuaded that much of the opposition which still lingers in the popular mind is due to misapprehension, that the subject is not completely understood, and that more light cannot fail to be productive of more harmony. We do not know that we can impart this light, but we feel it our duty to attempt to present this subject before others precisely as it lies in our own minds; and if we succeed in getting them to see it with our eyes we shall further succeed, either in bringing them to our conclusions, or in placing definitely before them the points on which we need to be corrected. We shall either set them right, or put it in their power to set us right, and in either case the cause of truth will be subserved.

I. The part of the book which has given least satisfaction is that which defines the proper subjects of judicial prosecution. Many who are prepared to adopt the other changes without modification boggle and hesitate here. They suspect a lion in the way; they seem to fear that in being called upon to abandon a crotchet of yesterday, which perverse logic, and neither reason nor the word of God has foisted into our discipline, they may be ensnared to renounce a portion of that venerable heritage of truth bequeathed to them by the fathers of the reformation. The opponents of the new principle, as for the sake of distinction we will permit it to be called, remind us of two prevaricating witnesses whose conflicting testimony establishes, beyond doubt, that whatever may be the truth, they are wrong. In one quarter it is assailed as a weak and timid concession to libertines, an unmanly shrinking from duty through fear of consequences. In another it is represented as a vain effort to realize the Puritan conception of the Church, in which the wheat is kept separate from the tares, and the tares bound in bundles to be burnt. The new book, accordingly, is at once too loose and too strict—veering equally, and at the same time, to the contradictory extremes of licentiousness and sanc-

timony. Both objections cannot be valid, and the presumption is that it occupies that safe middle ground in which the truth generally lies. This we shall now attempt to show. We shall attempt to demonstrate that the new principle is not only right in itself, but has been universally acknowledged by the Reformed Church, and articulately stated by some of its ablest Theologians. If we can make out these points we shall certainly exonerate the Committee from the charge of introducing novelties, and commend the change to the conscience of the Church. Before proceeding to the argument let us advert, briefly, to the state of the question.

It is not whether baptized persons are members of the Church—that is conceded on all hands; nor is it whether they are bound to perform all the duties of members—that is asserted as expressly in the new book as in the old; nor is it even whether they are subject to the government and jurisdiction of the Church—that also is freely admitted; but the precise question is whether the jurisdiction of the Church is to be exercised over them, as over professed believers, in the way of judicial prosecution. The question is not whether the Church shall assert in relation to them as well as to the saints, the supremacy of the laws of Christ, but whether she shall assert it in the same way. It is purely a question concerning the mode of dispensing her discipline. The new book restricts the mode of judicial prosecution exclusively to professed believers. Its opponents contend that the same mode should be indiscriminately applied to all church members without respect to the profession or non-profession of faith. We wish the state of the controversy to be distinctly understood, as involving not a question concerning the authority of the laws of Christ, but concerning the manner in which that authority should be enforced. This precise elimination of the issue reduces at once to a frivolous parologism all attempts to deduce subjection to judicial prosecution from the mere fact of church-membership. That only necessitates subjection to the laws, but determines nothing as to the mode in which the laws shall be administered. As well maintain that every member of the

4 *A few more words on the Revised Book of Disciplines.*

Commonwealth, whether bond or free, must be tried in the same way and by the same court, as that every member of the Church must be subject to the same form of process. His membership, in itself considered, only brings him under the jurisdiction and authority of the Church. The mode in which she shall exercise her power depends upon other considerations. It is strange that any human being should persuade himself that he was proving subjection to judicial prosecution, when he was only proving subjection to law; and still stranger that any one could imagine, with the language of the new book before him, that the Committee of revision ever meant to exempt any class of church-members from the obligation of performing all Church duties. It is idle to undertake to deduce the mode of treatment from the naked fact of church-membership. The ruling consideration must be the condition of the persons to whom the law is to be applied. Their ecclesiastical status must determine the manner in which they are to be dealt with. The freeman and the slave, though subject to the same law, are very differently treated.

Now we maintain, and the new book maintains, that the profession or non-profession of faith makes such a difference in the ecclesiastical status of church-members, that it would be absurd to apply indiscriminately to both classes the same form of discipline; that the mode of judicial prosecution is proper for believers, but altogether inconsistent with the status of avowed unbelievers. The first question is, what is that status? To answer this question we must revert to first principles. The two classes of which the Church consists are not equally related to the idea of the Church. The class of professors pertains to its essence; that of non-professors is an accidental result of the mode of organization. There can be no church at all where there is no professed subjection to the authority of Christ; there may be a church, and in the millennium, there, perhaps, will be a church in which all are saints. Make every baptized unbeliever a true disciple of Christ and you do not mar the integrity of the Church; remove all who have professed to be believers, and you destroy the Church as

a visible institute. If the non-professing element is not essential to the idea of the Church, the question may be asked, how it gets there at all? The answer is, that it results from the mode of its organization, and the circumstance of non-profession is, in the logical sense, simply accidental. The profession of the parent carries his household with him—the Church, like the state, is composed of families. It is not, as Owen has strikingly observed, “like the kingdom of the Mamelukes, wherein there was no regard unto natural successors, but it was continually made up of strangers and foreigners incorporated into it; nor like the beginning of the Roman commonwealth which, consisting of men only, was like to have been the matter of one age alone.”* If it be asked why the Church embraces the family and is not restricted to professing individuals, the answer is plain. The children of the faithful are the heirs apparent of the promises. God has graciously promised to show mercy unto thousands of them that love Him and keep His commandments; the decree of election runs largely in their loins, and through their faithfulness in rearing a holy seed the Church is perpetuated, and new recruits are constantly added to the communion of saints. They are all incorporated into the Church, because many of them hereafter are to be of the Church. Mankind, according to these principles, is divided into three great classes: 1. The true children of God, among whom alone exists the genuine communion of saints. 2. Those whom we have ventured to call the heirs apparent of the kingdom, to whom pertain, what Calvin calls, the outward adoption, and a special interest in the promises of the covenant. 3. Strangers and aliens, who though not excluded from the general call of the Gospel, are destitute of any inheritance in Israel. This class is properly called the world. In relation to the second class, it is clear that while they are in the Church by external union, in the spirit and temper of their minds they belong to the world. Like Esau, they neither understand nor prize their birthright.

*Works—vol. 20, p. 368.

6 *A few more words on the Revised Book of Discipline.*

Of the world and in the Church, this expresses precisely their status, and determines the mode in which the Church should deal with them.

As in the Church, and in the Church as heirs of promises which they have not yet embraced, they are to be trained to a proper sense of their privileges, to be instructed in a knowledge of their duty, and induced and persuaded by every lawful influence to accept the grace which has been signified and freely offered in their baptism. They have been externally consecrated to God, and the Church is to seek that they may be likewise inwardly sanctified. Her peculiar obligations to teach and to persuade them grow out of their visible connection with her. They are born into her as children, and as children, the great duty she owes to them is to educate them. But in heart and spirit they are of the world. In this aspect how is she to treat them? Precisely as she treats all other impenitent and unbelieving men; she is to exercise the power of the keys and shut them out from the communion of the saints. She is to debar them from all the privileges of the inner sanctuary. She is to exclude them from their inheritance until they show themselves meet to possess it. By her standing exclusion of them from the Lord's table, and of their children from the ordinance of baptism, she utters a solemn protest against their continued impenitence, and acquits herself of all participation in their sins. It is a standing censure. Their spiritual condition is one that is common with the world. She deals with them, therefore, in this respect as the Lord has directed her to deal with the world. They are distinguished from the world by a special relation to the covenant. She deals with them according to this relation by striving to make them comprehend their calling. She presses the peculiar obligations which spring from their baptism, and warns them of the aggravated doom of those who perish with the seal of the covenant on their brows. It is overlooked by those who insist upon the judicial prosecution of this class of members, as if judicial prosecution were the only conceivable mode of discipline, it is overlooked or forgotten that exclusion from the communion of

the faithful *is* discipline. It is an authoritative exercise of power, retaining its subjects in the position which is suited to their character. The teacher who refuses to promote a pupil as really exercises discipline as if he had flogged him for his idleness.

There is, however, a very palpable incongruity in subjecting non-professors to judicial prosecution. As in that mode of discipline the charges must be specific and particular offences signalized, there is a tacit implication that, in other respects, the conduct of the accused is blameless. You single out certain actions and say these are wrong and must be punished. You imply that, but for these actions, the agent might be reputed a worthy member of the Church. Now can the Church hold such language in regard to those whom she knows to be dead in trespasses and sins? Is not their whole life a continued sin? Are not their very righteousnesses abominable before God? Repentance to them is not the abandonment of this or that vice, it is the renunciation of the carnal heart, which is enmity against God; and until they are renewed in the spirit and temper of their minds they can do nothing which the Church is at liberty to approve as done by them. When the body is dead it must be expected to putrify, and it is very idle to be lopping off, one by one, the decaying members, as if you could arrest the progress of dissolution. As the whole state of the non-professing members is unsound, let the discipline of the Church be directed against that state and not against individual transgressions. Let her consign them, by a single word, to the position which universally attaches to impenitence. This general persistent exclusion from the society of the living is a testimony against their nature as well as their acts, and pronounces them, in every view, to be unworthy of the kingdom of God. There is no tacit implication that in any thing they are sound; the whole head is pronounced to be sick, and the whole heart faint, and the whole body full of wounds and bruises and putrifying sores. This judgment is according to truth.

Judicial prosecution is further evinced, in such cases, to

8 *A few more words on the Revised Book of Discipline.*

be frivolous, from the circumstance that the severest penalties which the Protestant Church feels itself authorized to pronounce do not modify the ecclesiastical attitude of the offender. They leave him precisely where he was. There are three forms of censure, admonition, suspension, and ex-communication. The difference between suspension and ex-communication is a difference in degree and not in kind. Ex-communication is more solemn in form, and more permanent and stringent in operation. But in the Protestant Church it never amounts to anathema; it never dissolves the vinculum by which the person, in baptism, is related to the Church and the covenant of grace. It never consigns him to hopeless and eternal perdition.* The only case in which the Church would be at liberty to denounce such a censure would be one in which the party had notoriously sinned the sin unto death. That is the only crime which cuts off from the hope of mercy and the possibility of repentance, and is consequently the only crime of which the Church, in the exercise of her declarative power, is competent to say, that the man is excluded from all the benefits symbolized in baptism, and has become an alien and an outcast. But as God has furnished us with no means of knowing when this sin has been committed, He has virtually debarred us from this species of ex-communication. The highest censure left to us is that of permanent exclusion from the sacraments. To inflict this censure upon a baptized non-pro-

*"Ex-communication differs from anathema in this, that the latter completely excluding pardon, dooms and devotes the individual to eternal destruction; whereas the former rebukes and animadvert upon his manners; and although it also punishes, it is to bring him to salvation, by forewarning him of his future doom. If it succeeds, reconciliation and restoration to communion are ready to be given. Moreover, anathema is rarely, if ever, to be used. Thence, though ecclesiastical discipline does not allow us to be on familiar and intimate terms with excommunicated persons, still, we ought to strive, by all possible means, to bring them to a better mind, and recover them to the fellowship and unity of the Church; as the Apostle also says, "Yet count him not as an enemy, but admonish him as a brother." (2 Thea. iii, 15.) If this humanity be not observed, in private as well as public, the danger is, that our discipline shall degenerate into destruction."—*Calvin Inst., Book iv, c. 12, § 10.*

fessor, after the formalities of a trial in which nothing is proved but what was known before, and that is, that the man is a stranger to Christ, is obviously to leave him precisely where he was before, and that is, excluded from all the blessings of the communion of saints.

The King of France, with forty thousand men,
Marched up a hill and then marched down again.

The baptized non-professor is actually in the very position in relation to the sacraments and communion of the Church, in which ex-communication puts the professing offender. The key is turned, and both are shut out from the inner sanctuary. Voetius, accordingly, puts the non-professing children of believers in the same category in relation to their connection with the Church, as those who are under its censures. He distributes the people in contradistinction from the clergy, into two parts, those who are strictly and properly members of the Church, "*partes proprias*," that is communicants, or believers, and those who are only analogically members, "*partes analogicas*," which division includes the children of the faithful, the fallen, the relapsed, the penitent, the suspended, and all who are under the censure of the Church, as well as three other classes, *audientes*, *catechumeni*, *competentes*, whose interest in religion may justify us in ranking them under the general head of inquirers. In his judgment, therefore, an ex-communicated member was simply remitted to the place of a baptized non-professor.*

If it should be contended that there is an ex-communication which dissolves the *vinculum ecclesiae* without destroying the possibility of repentance, which simply consigns the party to the condition of the unbaptized world, which makes him a heathen and a publican, not morally and socially, but really and ecclesiastically—if we grant that such a censure is conceivable, then it would follow that the offender, upon the profession of his penitence and faith, would have to be re-baptized. If the Church consigned him to the condition of an unbaptized

*Polit. Eccles. Pars I, Lib. 1. c. 1. § 2.

10 *A few more words on the Revised Book of Discipline.*

person, if she really made him a stranger and an alien, then, like every other foreigner, he can only enter her through the door of baptism. Are our brethren prepared to become anabaptists? Are they willing to contend for a species of censure which, to all intents and purposes, nullifies baptism without anathema? It is certain that no Protestant Church recognizes any such penalty. The validity of baptism extends through the whole life, and we are never competent to say that it may not signify and seal the ingrafting of any individual into Christ as long as the offers of salvation are made to him, and therefore we never undertake to remit any human being to the ecclesiastical status he would have held if he had never been baptized. All that we do is to shut out incorrigible offenders from the society of the faithful. If they have been admitted to it, we show cause why they ought to be deprived of the privilege, and proceed to expel them—if they have never been admitted to it, we keep them where they are until they are prepared to come up higher. All this seems plain and natural, and we are wholly unable to account for the zeal which is not satisfied with it. To those who want to try our children in solemn judicial form, we propose the question. After you have convicted and sentenced them, what *change* have you made in their relation to the Church? Where have you put them? If *out of the Church*, how are they to get into it again without another baptism? If they are *still* in the Church, but *of* the world, how does their new situation differ from the old? We crave a solution of these questions from our stringent advocates of discipline. In either case they are excluded. How does the one exclusion differ from the other?

Then we should like to know what conceivable end it is imagined can be gained by judicial prosecution? The offences of such persons bring no scandal upon the name of Christ, because they do not profess to be governed by His spirit, nor to be subject to His laws. They do not defile the communion of saints, because their impenitence has already excluded them from the society of the faithful. There is no danger, on the part of the Church, of incurring the wrath of God, for “suf-

fering His covenant and the seals thereof to be profaned," because the doors have been effectually shut against all who are notoriously impenitent. What, then, is gained? Shall it be said that their guilty condition is more impressively urged upon them by selecting particular manifestations of their evil heart of unbelief, and subjecting them to special lectures on account of these? This is equivalent to saying that, in their case, censure is only a form of preaching. It is a part of the ministry of the word. It pertains to the potestas dogmatica, and not to the potestas judicialis, it is an exercise of the key of knowledge, and not of the key of government. This is to come precisely to the position which the new book maintains, that the Church owes it to these persons to train them, to teach them, to warn them and to persuade them by every motive of the Gospel to repent and believe. The only difference is, that the new book does not confound teaching and government, nor when the design is only to preach does it dispense its sermons in the form of judicial decrees. It does not arraign a man and try him for drunkenness or falsehood, and then, upon conviction, proceed to inform him, as the sentence of the court, that he must repent or perish. All this, it ventures to think, may be said to an impenitent sinner without waiting for special abominations. It is true that government and teaching are inseparably connected, and mutually support each other; the keys of doctrine and power can never be divorced. But still *censures* are specifically different from instruction, and even where they seem to run into one another, as in judicial admonitions, the distinction is not really abolished. Judicial admonition, as a censure, measures the ill-desert of the offender. It is the mildest penalty of the Church, and is to be dispensed only in those cases in which the degree of guilt does not, in the first instance, exclude from the sacraments. It disturbs without destroying the communion of the party with the saints. But admonition, as a lesson, is not the measure of ill-desert. It may pertain to the highest and gravest crimes, as well as to the lowest peccadilloes. Judicial admonition, a baptized non-professor is not in a condition to receive, because he can do nothing whose ill-desert is short of suspension.

12 *A few more words on the Revised Book of Discipline.*

We think we have now said enough to show that the principle of the new book is right in itself, and not an unworthy concession to libertines or puritans. It proceeds on the assumption that the mode of dealing with the members of the Church, as with the members of the State, or any other organized society, must be determined, not by the simple fact of membership, but by the state and quality of the persons. It finds that the status of baptized unbelievers can be exactly expressed by the formula, in the Church and of the world. They are in the Church as prospective heirs of grace, and hence are subject to it as a governor or tutor, that they may be trained, educated, fitted for the inheritance proposed to them. They are in the Church upon a definite principle, the general relation of election to the seed of the faithful, and for a definite end, that they may be qualified to continue the succession of the kingdom. As of the world, they are included in the universal sentence of exclusion, which bars the communion of saints against the impenitent and profane. They are sharers in its condemnation. They are put, as impenitent, upon the same footing with all others that are impenitent. As rejecters of Christ, they are kept aloof from the table of the Lord, and debarred from all the rights and privileges of the saints. Their impenitence determines the attitude of the Church towards them; for God has told her precisely what that attitude should be to all who obey not the gospel. What more can be required? Are they not dealt with, in every respect, according to their quality? We have further seen that there is a manifest incongruity in subjecting this class of persons to judicial prosecution, as it has a tendency to cherish the delusion that, apart from particular offences, their condition is not reprehensible; and in addition to this, the severest penalties which the Church is authorized to inflict would have no other effect but to leave them where they are. Put these considerations together, and is not the new book satisfactorily vindicated? It does not deny the membership of the persons in question, it expressly subjects them to law, to government, to training, to discipline in the wide sense of the term. It only says that they are unfit for that form of discipline which we call judicial prosecution.

To be capable of it they must be professed believers. We close this part of the subject by a familiar illustration. Suppose a commonwealth of free citizens, in which is found a number of slaves, existing in it for the express purpose of being trained for freedom, and on the express condition, that when pronounced duly qualified by competent authority, they should be admitted to all the immunities and privileges of freedom; how should that commonwealth deal with those slaves? Is it not clear that the end for which they are there precisely determines one line of duty? Is it not equally clear that their condition, as slaves, determines their treatment in all other respects, until they are prepared to pass the test which changes their status? Is not this precisely the state of things with the Church and its baptized unbelievers? Are they not the slaves of sin and the devil, existing in a free commonwealth for the purpose of being educated to the liberty of the saints? Should they not, then, be carefully instructed on the one hand, and on the other, be treated according to their true character as slaves, in every other respect, until they are prepared for their heritage of liberty? This is just what the new book teaches. It requires the most scrupulous fidelity in training; every effort to bring these people to Christ. But, until they come to Him, it as distinctly teaches that they are to be dealt with as the Church deals with all the enemies of God. She makes no difference between Jews and Gentiles, when both put themselves in the same attitude of rebellion against Him. She turns the key upon them and leaves them without.

We might take up another line of argument and show that, as the fundamental duty of the Church in relation to these people is to seek their conversion to God, censures are particularly incongruous, as censures are not the seed of regeneration. It is the word of promise, the word of the gospel through which alone we are begotten to the hope of salvation. Faith is allured by grace, and not impelled by penalties. But in our former article we said enough upon this topic. We shall simply endorse here all that we said there, with the solemn protestation

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that we have seen or heard nothing that even modifies our opinion.

But the principle of the new book is not only right in itself; it has received the consent of the whole Reformed Church, and been either directly or indirectly maintained by its ablest Theologians. This proposition may astound some of our readers. The doctrine of the new book has been so industriously represented as a pernicious novelty, that many will, no doubt, be surprised when they come to find that the novelty is really in the principle of the old discipline. The new book only takes us back to the good old paths. The history of the innovation we have not taken the trouble to investigate. It is probable that it arose from some such logic as that which is now pertinaciously employed to defend it. All baptized persons are members of the Church; all members of the Church are subject to discipline; all subjects of discipline are liable to judicial prosecution, therefore all baptized persons are liable to judicial prosecution;—it is likely that a halting sorites of this kind lay at the basis of the change.

In pleading the consent of the Reformed Church, we do not mean to assert that the proposition for which we contend is found, *totidem verbis*, in any of the symbols of its faith or discipline. In an earnest age, and among a people who had been trained to regard attention to the external rites of religion as the mark by which they were distinguished from Heathens, Turks and Jews, it is probable that very few reached the years of discretion without making a public profession of their faith by coming to the Lord's table. In all the controversies concerning church government, and the right of excommunication, the main difficulty was with Erastians and Libertines who, intent upon retaining the prestige of Christian gentlemen without renouncing their sins, denied to the ministers of Christ the power to protect the Lord's table from scandalous intrusion. Two points were strenuously maintained by the reformers. 1. The right of the Church to detain from the communion those who had not the measure of knowledge necessary to discern the Lord's body; and 2. The right of the

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Church to expel from the communion those who, having been admitted, had proved themselves unworthy by heresy or ill manners. The only form in which they employed discipline in reference to those who had never been admitted to the Lord's table, was that of simple detention or exclusion, accompanied by the use of all proper means tending to conversion. Censures, specifically so called, they applied exclusively to professed believers. This point can be abundantly demonstrated from their creeds, confessions and formularies of discipline. It is impossible to read these documents without feeling that when the question was of censures, as dependent upon trial and conviction, the Church had in its eye none others but those who claimed to belong to the congregation of the faithful. When to this is added the explicit avowal of this doctrine on the part of able and influential Divines, the conclusion is absolutely irresistible. The posture of the Reformed Churches upon this subject may be collected from their general conception of the Church ; from their specific teachings in relation to the nature and ends of censures, and from their positive regulations as to the mode in which they should be dispensed.

1. The idea of the Church, according to the reformed conception, is the complete realization of the decree of election. It is the whole body of the elect considered as united to Christ their head. As actually existing at any given time, it is that portion of the elect who have been effectually called to the exercise of faith and made partakers of the Holy Ghost. It is, in other words, the whole body of existing believers. According to this conception, none are capable of being Church members but the elect, and none are ever, in fact, church-members but those who are truly renewed. The Church is, therefore, the communion of saints, the congregation of the faithful, the assembly of those who worship God in the spirit, rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh. That this conception is fundamental in all the reformed confessions, and among all the reformed Theologians worthy of the name, we will not insult the intelligence of our readers by stopping to prove. The Church was co-extensive with faith. As true

faith in the heart will manifest itself by the confession of the mouth, it is certain that the children of God, wherever they have the opportunity, will be found professing their faith in Him; and as there is no method of searching the heart and discriminating real from false professors but by the walk, all are to be accepted as true believers whose lives do not give the lie to their pretensions. The body of professors is, therefore, to be accepted as the Church of Christ, because the truly faithful are in it. The Gospel is never preached without converting some—these will profess their faith, and will vindicate to any society the name of a Church. As to those professors who are destitute of faith, they are not properly members of the Church; they are wolves among sheep; tares among the wheat; warts and excrescences upon the body. The visible Church is, accordingly, the society or congregation of those who profess the true religion; among whom the Gospel is faithfully preached and the sacraments duly administered. And it is simply because such a society cannot be destitute of genuine believers, that it is entitled to the name of the Church. Profession must be accepted in the judgment of men as equivalent to the possession of faith, and the body of professors must pass for saints, until hypocrites and unbelievers expose themselves. Now it is this professing body which the reformed symbols have in view when they speak of the visible Church. The idea of profession is not only prominent but fundamental. A society without this element, whatever else it might be, they would never have dreamed of calling a Church. That this is the true development of the reformed doctrine of the visible Church may be seen by consulting the Institutes of Calvin. In very few of the confessions does any other element enter. The Westminster, and perhaps another, are the only ones in the collection of Niemeyer in which there is any allusion to children; not that their external relation to the Church was denied, but the mind was intent upon the communion of saints, which was not to be looked for by man out of the professing body—and hence, as the real Church was there, that was the sole body that was contemplated. The general aim of discipline was to

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keep this body pure, and that could be accomplished in only two ways : by refusing to admit those who were too ignorant or scandalous to make a consistent profession, and by the reformation or expulsion of those who brought reproach upon the Gospel. Setting out with the idea that the Church is to be found only among professors, that it was and could be detected by the eye of man, no where else; it is intuitively obvious that these professors they must have made the sole object of reformatory and penal measures. They could not have been consistent with themselves upon any other hypothesis.

2. Accordingly, we find that when they treat formally of censures, they define the ends and regulate the degrees in terms which cannot, without unwarrantable liberties, be applied to any but the professedly faithful. The Prior Confessio Basiliensis makes it the design of excommunication to separate the tares from the wheat, in order that the face of the Church might, as far as possible, be preserved free from blemish.* The tares are supposed to be mingled in with the wheat, not growing up in separate and distinct portions of the field—*Zizania sese Ecclesie Christi immiscent*. The case is evidently that of hypocrites and reprobates joined in the same confession of faith and meeting at the same table of the Lord. There is no such mixture on the part of baptized non-professors. They are easily distinguished, and without difficulty detached from the communion of saints. The end of excommunication, in relation to the offender, is his amendment—*emendationis gratia*—which implies that prior to his offence he was in reputable standing and brought no spot upon the Church. Can this be said of those who are avowedly unconverted? In the Heidelberg Catechism,† in answer to the question, how is the kingdom of Heaven shut and opened by ecclesiastical discipline, we are told that the subjects of discipline are nominal Christians, whose life and doctrines are inconsistent with union to Christ. This language, taken by itself, may be applied to the

*Niemeyer, p. 97.

†Niemeyer, p. 449.

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baptized ; they have the Christian name. But it is added that these nominal Christians must be more than once *fraternally* admonished—*aliquoties fraternè admoniti*—and then, if they prove incorrigible, reported to the officers of the Church, in order that, if they still remain obstinate, they may be interdicted from the sacraments and from the congregation of the Church. Surely such language implies that they were not only brethren by the common seal of baptism, but brethren also by a common profession of faith. We do not say that a different interpretation is impossible, but we do say that it is unnatural and forced. In the acts and conclusions of the Polish Synod at Wlodislave,* it is provided, after an enumeration of scandals and enormities which reveal a shocking state of manners, that ecclesiastical discipline in due degrees, *debitis gradibus*, should be used against the perpetrators of such crimes, if any of them should be found in the Churches of Poland. The pertinacious were to be cut off *from the use of the Lord's Supper* and ejected from the congregation *of the faithful*. Obviously the subjects of this discipline were previously partakers of the Lord's Supper and reckoned among the faithful. The same decree occurs again in the Synod of Thorn*, in which the degrees of punishment are varied in the expression, but the impression as to the status of the culprits made still more distinct. They are first to be admonished—then excluded from the Supper—and then excommunicated. There is a decree of this Synod which, at first blush, seems to insinuate that non-professing members were subject to censures—the decree which makes abstinence from the Communion and neglect of public ordinances a penal offence. But as the Reformed Churches always insisted upon a previous examination as the ground of a right to approach the Lord's Table, the neglect in question is the neglect, not of making a profession of religion, but of walking worthy of that profession, after it had been made. It

*Niemeyer, p. 575.

†Niemeyer, 583.

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was the remissness of professed believers, or their apparent contempt of their privileges, which the fathers meant to rebuke. Here, too, it is worthy of remark, the sentence is immediately excommunication. There is no interdiction of the Supper. The inference is that the intermediate step was omitted because the parties were in the voluntary neglect of that Sacrament. If so it would have been omitted in the other cases, if the parties had not been in the use of it. The argument, from the degrees of censure, is, to our minds, very conclusive. We find in all the reformed symbols that they are reduced to three, admonition, suspension and excommunication, and that, as a general thing, they follow each other in regular order. There is no intimation that offenders are not equally subject to all—on the contrary, the language of these documents is nonsense, unless the man who was exposed to one was likewise exposed to the others. He who was admonished, if he proved incorrigible, might be suspended from the Supper. He who was suspended from the Supper, if he continued perverse, might be excommunicated. There were crimes so flagrant that the degrees might be disregarded and excommunication at once pronounced. But still the parties were capable of suspension. It is not only in the teachings of Theologians, but in the formularies of discipline, we find these ever recurring degrees brought out in a manner that renders it absolutely incredible, that the authors of these manuals considered them as applicable only in a divided sense. In the discipline, for example, of the Reformed Churches of France, as given in Quick's Synodicon,* we have in canons xv, xvi, xvii, the process of censure. There are the three degrees. The offender is first admonished, then suspended from the Supper, and then excommunicated; and in the formula of excommunication it is expressly asserted that the other degrees of censure had been used in vain. We defy any man to read these canons and say that the person here excommunicated was not previously a partaker of the Lord's Sup-

*Vol. 1. pp. 81, 82.

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per, that is, a professor of religion. These same degrees occur in our own Directory of Worship, and by the singular grace of God, while we have inserted folly in our book of Discipline, we have been kept from exemplifying it by the prescriptions of this manual. No man can be excommunicated, according to the provisions of our own book, who was not previously liable to suspension. Excommunication is always the penalty of obstinacy, or of crimes so flagrant and shocking that they supersede intermediate measures of reform. In every case the subject is a professed believer. He is one whom it has been found necessary to *cut off from the communion*, and the sentence, which, in the name and by the authority of the Lord Jesus Christ, the presiding judge is directed to pronounce, is a sentence which simply *excludes from the communion of the Church*.* Let the old Discipline, therefore, assert what it may, it is impossible to excommunicate, in the prescribed forms, any but communicating members of the Church. The Directory and the New Book are perfectly at one.

The doctrine of the Church of Scotland is even more unambiguously expressed than that of our own Church. "Church discipline," we are told, "serves chiefly to curb and restrain the more peccant humours of professors"†—a very pregnant intimation that these are properly its subjects. In section 7th of the same title from which this clause has been taken, we have what constitutes a satisfaction for scandal defined. The article evidently takes for granted that he who is required to give the satisfaction is a communicant with the Church. A distinction is made between the satisfaction which "admits the offender unto all Church privileges," and that which stays proceedings for the time. In section 12th it is required that the offender should confess his sin and "declare his sorrow for it, before absolution, *that the congregation may the more cordially re-admit him into their communion.*" How can such language be applied to one who was never in the communion of

*Directory for Worship, chap. x, § 7.

†Pardovan, Book, iv. Tit. 1.

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the Church? But the title, *of the order of proceeding to excommunication*, precludes all doubt as to the status of the offender to be punished. In the sentence itself, "he is shut out from the communion of the faithful, debarred from their privileges and delivered over unto Satan"—and in the distinction betwixt the lesser and the greater excommunication, it is obvious that neither can be employed except against one who has been admitted to the Lord's table.* We quote the whole section below.

If, now, the reader will put together the reformed conception of the essential nature of the Church, their specific teachings concerning the ends and design of censures, and their public provisions for inflicting them upon offenders, we think that he cannot resist the conclusion, that the doctrine of the new book has their sanction. Their language can be consistently interpreted upon no other hypothesis. Not a single note of discord comes from any quarter. From France, Scotland, Holland, and England, wherever the reformed doctrines were planted, and the reformed discipline enforced, we have but one testimony. The Committee of Revision have done nothing more than restore the ancient landmarks. They have followed the footsteps of the flock.

3. Our general conclusion in relation to the reformed Churches is reduced to certainty by the teaching of their most distinguished theologians. From the abundant materials which we have at hand, upon this subject, we shall select, in mercy to our readers, only a few passages, but they shall be from men who, on their own account, as well as on account of their influence in the Church, are entitled to be heard. The first witness we shall cite is Calvin. He is maintaining the nature of spiritual

*The 4th Art., Cap. 80, of our Confession of Faith saith, that for the better attaining the ends of Church censures, the officers of the Church are to proceed by admonition, suspension from the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, for a time, and by excommunication from the Church. The difference, then, betwixt these two censures is: suspension from the Lord's Supper imports that the person so censured is in imminent danger of being excommunicated and cut off from the Church, but be-

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jurisdiction as one branch of the power of the keys, and after having defined its ends in the language of Paul, he proceeds to enforce its necessity. We beg our readers to ponder the following passage :* “As this is done by the preaching of doctrine, so in order that doctrine may not be held in derision, *those who profess to be of the household of faith* ought to be judged according to the doctrine which is taught. Now this cannot be done without connecting with the office of the ministry a right of summoning those who are to be privately admonished or sharply rebuked, a right, moreover, of keeping back from the communion of the Lord’s Supper those who cannot be admitted without profaning the ordinance. Hence, when Paul elsewhere asks, what have I to do to judge them also that are without, (1 Cor. v. 12.) he makes the members of Churches subject to censures for the correction of their vices, and intimates the existence of tribunals from which no *believer* is exempted.” Connect this with his previous definitions of the visible Church†—“as the whole body of mankind scattered throughout the world, who *profess* to worship one God and Christ, who by baptism are initiated into the faith, by partaking of the Lord’s Supper *profess* unity in true doctrine and charity,” &c., and there is no evading the answer which he gives as to the proper subject of Church censures. It is true that, in saying that all believers are subject to discipline, the

fore that heavy and finishing stroke be inflicted, there are further means to be used, such as prayers and admonitions, in order to his reclaiming, 2 Thess. iii. 6, 14, 15 : “Now we command you, brethren, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that ye withdraw yourselves from every brother that walketh disorderly. And if any man obey not our word by this Epistle, note that man, and have no company with him, that he may be ashamed, yet count him not as an enemy, but admonish him as a brother.” Whereas, when a person is cut off by that high censure, he is to be looked on as a heathen man, (Matth. xviii. 17,) upon which the Church ceaseth to be his reprover, they give him over for dead or desperate, and will administer no more of the medicine of Church discipline unto him, 1 Cor. xii. 13 : “For what hath the Church to do to judge them that are without? but them that are without God judgeth.—*Pardovan, Book 4, Tit. vi.*

*Instit. Lib. iv., c. 11, § 5.

†Instit. Lib. iv., c. 1, § 7.

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proposition as to its form does not imply that others are not also subject. But it is equally true that, in all definitions, the predicates of universal affirmatives are distributed, and therefore, in the present case, the doctrine is that believers are the only proper subjects of judicial prosecution. To this must be added, that the whole spirit of the chapter and of the entire discussion concerning the Church exacts this view.

We shall next cite a witness from the Dutch, the celebrated Voet, who died in 1677. In his great work of Ecclesiastical Polity he devotes a chapter* to the consideration of the question concerning the proper object (subject) of discipline.† The

*Pars iii., Lib. iv., Tr. 2, c. 4.

†Hactenus de questione an sit, seu de necessitate disciplinæ ecclesiasticæ. Accedimus nunc ad uberiorem ejus explicationem. Hic primo occurrit Objectum, circa quod occupatur disciplina. Quod distingui potest in materiale et præsuppositum; idque aut remotum, aut propinquum seu mediatum; Et in formale, immediatum, proximum. *Illud* est homo, et quidem fidelis seu fidem profitens, in communionem et confederationem ecclesiasticam actu constitutus. *Istud* est, lapsus in peccatum aut crimen et quidem publicum in prima perpetracione, aut postea publicum factum, ita ut peccatum hic consideretur sub ratione scandali. *Hoc* est, fidelis lapsus, et in eo pertinaciter perseverans post et contra fraternas ac paternas inspectorum ecclesiæ admonitiones ac correptiones. De duobus posterioribus commodè agemus, ubi de causis disciplinæ. Sint ergo de objecto primæ considerationis ista problemata. 1. *Prob.* An in ulla creatura, præter homines viatores, anathema aut censura ecclesiastica sit dirigenda. *Resp.* Neg. contra catachresticum interdictum Pontificiorum, quod definitur, censura ecclesiastica sacramentorum usum, divina officia et sepulturam ecclesiasticam secundum seipsam prohibens. Et dividitur in locale, personale et mixtum: ita ut locale sit quo directe interdicitur locus, ne in eo divina officia audiantur ab in oculis aut extraneis; quamvis personæ loci interdicti possint alibi audire divina officia. Vide Zwarez in 3. Thomæ, ubi de censuris disp. 32, sect. 1 et 2. Et inter Casuistas, Navarrum, Toletum, Bonacinam. Sed refutantur ex iis locis ubi objectum disciplinæ dicitur frater Math. 18, v. 15. 1 Corinth 5, v. 11, 12, 13, et quidem peccator contra correptiones aut monitiones pertinax, Math. 18, Tit. 3, v. 10.

II. *Prob.* An objectum disciplinæ sint amentes, pueri, surdi, muti? *Resp.* 1. De duobus prioribus absolute negatur; quia non recipiuntur inter fratres aut fideles proprie dictos seu in membra ecclesiæ completa. Quod si quis antea fidelis fuerit, et in amentiam inciderit, disciplina coerceri non debet, quidquid tunc absurdi commiserit Pontificii more suo *περατολογούσι* de amentibus et pueris, quod non censeantur interdicti, interdicta communitate; quia non sint capaces doli et culpæ; priventur tamen ecclesiastica sepultura tempore interdicti; hoc sit interdictum locale quod directe afficit locum. Sic Zwarez loco cit. Et ex Casuistis Fillijucius, Sayrus, Baseus. 2. De posterioribus aff. Siquidem in membra ecclesiæ recepti fuerint: uti hoc aliquando fieri posse alibi docemus.

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object of discipline he distinguishes into material and formal. The material object is *man*, and *man under the notion of a believer or of one professing faith*, in actual communion and confederation with the Church. He is further considered as fallen into sin, and sin which, from its having become public, is to be regarded as a scandal. As the formal object of discipline, he must further be considered as pertinaciously persisting in his sin against remonstrances and admonitions. Such is the substance of a passage so directly to our hands that there is no possibility of evading its sense. We give the original below. The meaning clearly is that none are subjects of discipline but professed believers. But as if to cut off all possibility of doubt, he proposes the question, whether those who have been baptized in infancy, and have not made a profession of faith, are amenable to censure. His answer is exactly in the sense of the new book. Though, says he, the antecedents and precursors of discipline—counsels and rebukes—may be applied to them, “*I do not see how it can be proved that discipline, properly so called, (that is, censures upon judicial prosecution) can be extended to them.*” Why? “*Because they have never been received upon a profession of their faith into the confederation of the Church and admitted to the Lord’s Supper*.*”

*III *Prob.* An extranei à fide et ecclesia? *Resp.* Neg. ex i. Corinth. 5, v. 10, 11, 12.

IV. *Prob.* An qui in infantia in ecclesiis nostris baptizati sunt? *Resp.* Hoc video velle scriptorem anonymum, cujus theses de disciplina ecclesiastica olim in vernaculum idioma translatae sub nomine Jacobi Arminii editae sunt: in quo tamen conjectura aut suspicio translatores fefellit. Quod ad hanc opinionem fateor antecedentia et praeambula disciplinae, uti sunt admonitiones et correptiones ecclesiasticae, peculiari cura talibus applicanda: non video tamen quomodo probari possit disciplinam proprie dictam ad eos extendendam: cum nunquam per actualis fidei professionem in ecclesiasticam confederationem recepti ad cœnæ communionem admissi sint. Quomodo ergo ab ea excludentur? Accedit, quod hac ratione ad myriadas hominum, qui ex parentibus Christianis orti sunt et in infantia baptizati, sed ante usum rationis abducti et in Muhammedismo aut Gentilismo educati sunt, censura extendi deberet: quod tamen absurdum videtur.

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To precisely the same purport is the testimony of another Dutchman, Van Mastricht.* “The material object of ecclesiastical discipline,” he tells us, “is an offending brother, that is, one who *professes to be a member of the Church*. The formal object is a sinner, offending either in doctrine, by fundamental heresy, or in manners.” He then goes on to specify different classes of offenders, having in his eye, throughout, none but the professed members of the household of faith.

The next witness whom we shall put upon the stand is no less a person than the venerable Puritan, old John Owen. In his treatise upon the origin, nature, &c., of Evangelical Churches, we find the following passage:† “There is a double joining unto the Church: 1. That which is, as unto total communion, in all the duties and privileges of the Church, which is that whereof we treat. 2. An adherence unto the Church, as unto the means of instruction and edification to be attained thereby. So persons may adhere unto any Church, who yet are not meet, or free on some present consideration, to confederate with it, as unto total communion. And of this sort, in a peculiar manner, are the baptized children of the members of the Church. For although they are not capable of performing church duties or enjoying church privileges in their tender years, nor can have a right unto total communion, before the testification of their own voluntary consent thereunto and choice thereof; yet are they, in a peculiar manner, under the care and inspection of the Church, so far as the outward administration of the covenant, in all the means of it, is committed thereunto; and their duty it is, according to their capacity, to attend unto the ministry of that Church whereunto they do belong.” This is one half of the doctrine of the new book. Let us see how much farther he goes. In chapter xi,‡ he answers the question as to the object of Church discipline.

*Theolog. Lib. vii, c. 6, § 8.

†Chap. 8, Russell's Edition, Works vol. 20, p. 187.

‡Works, vol. 20, p. 233.

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That object, he tells us, "as it is susceptible of members, is *professed believers*, and as it is corrective, it is those who stubbornly deviate from the rule of Christ, or live in disobedience of his commands," that is, those professed believers, for these only he considers properly members of the Church.* One more extract, our readers will pardon us for making, from this venerable saint. It is from the first chapter of the Treatise on the true nature of the Gospel Church,† and it is so full and explicit as to the duties of the Church to the children received into its bosom, that independently of its pertinency to the question before us, it is worth being soberly and solemnly weighed. "Two things may be yet inquired into that relate unto this part of the state of Evangelical Churches; as, 1. Whether a Church may not, ought not to take under its conduct, inspection and rule, such as are not yet meet to be received into full communion; such as are the children and servants of those who are complete members of the Church? Answer: No doubt the Church, in its officers, may and ought so to do, and it is a great evil when it is neglected. For (1.) they are to take care of parents and masters as such, and as unto the discharge of their duty in their families; which, without an inspection into the condition of their children and servants, they cannot do. 2. Households were constantly reckoned unto the Church, when the heads of the families were entered into covenant, Luke xix, 9; Acts xvi, 18; Rom. xvi, 10. 11; 1 Cor. I. 16; 2 Tim. iv, 19. 3. Children do belong unto, and have an interest in, the parent's covenant; not only in the promise of it, which gives them right unto baptism, but in the profession of it in the Church covenant, which gives them a right to all the privileges of the Church, whereof they are capable, until they voluntarily relinquish their claim unto them. 4. Baptizing the children of church-members, giving them thereby an admission into the visible Catholic Church, puts an obli-

*Of. Treat. Ex-comm. Nat. Gosp. ch. c. 10, Works, vol. 20. p. 548.

†Vol. 20, p. 367.

gation on the officers of the Church, to take care what in them lieth, that they may be kept and preserved meet members of it by a due watch over them and instruction of them. 5. Though neither the Church nor its privileges be continued and preserved, as of old, by carnal generation; yet, because of the nature of the dispensation of God's covenant, wherein He hath promised to be a God unto believers and their seed, the advantage of the means of a gracious education in such families, and of conversion and edification in the ministry of the Church, ordinarily the continuation of the Church, is to depend on the addition of members out of the families already incorporated into it. The Church is not to be like the Kingdom of the Mamelukes, wherein there was no regard unto natural successors; but it was continually made up of strangers and foreigners incorporated into it, nor like the beginning of the Roman commonweal, which, consisting of men only, was like to have been the matter of one age alone.

The duty of the Church towards this sort of persons consists, 1. In prayer for them; 2. Catechetical instruction, according unto their capacities; 3. Advice to their parents concerning them; 4. Visiting of them in the families whereunto they do belong; 5. Encouragement of them, or admonition, according as there is occasion; 6. Direction for a due preparation unto the joining themselves unto the Church in full communion; 7. Exclusion of them from a claim unto the participation of the especial privileges of the Church, where they render themselves visibly unmeet for them and unworthy of them."

We think that we have now accomplished the work which we proposed—that we have sufficiently demonstrated that the principle of the new book is right and proper in itself, that it is no pernicious novelty, but in perfect harmony with the general voice of the Reformed Churches, and with the testimony and teaching of the ablest Theologians. The principle, indeed, is in such striking accordance with the spiritual instincts of the Church, that even among ourselves it has been universally adopted in practice, in the very face of the letter of the law. The truth is, the doctrine of the old book cannot be carried

out without the most disastrous results. It would have the double effect of bringing infant baptism into contempt and of peopling the Church with hypocrites and formalists. Why not then make our theory and practice coincide? What the Church needs is not a more stringent discipline in the narrow sense of the term, but a more faithful discharge of the duties of inspection, prayer and training. If her obligation to educate the young for God, to commend them constantly to His grace, to be concerned for their spiritual welfare, if her obligation to labor and intercede for their early conversion and their consistent walk were more deeply felt and more earnestly discharged, we should soon experience the benefits of infant baptism upon a scale that would illustrate the preciousness of the covenant and the riches of the glory of God's grace. In the mean time we may be permitted to repeat what we have formerly ventured to pronounce, that the new book has done a real service in making plain and intelligible to the Church the real status of her baptized non-professing children, and in developing the principle upon which alone they can be consistently dealt with. The theory announced has, at least, the merit of being perfectly coherent, and as it comes to us with the prestige of illustrious authorities, it should not be dismissed at the bidding of idle prejudices or sophistical illusions. The Church may refuse to adopt the amendment; but though no prophets, we have little scruple in venturing to predict that, unless she loses her spirituality and becomes willing to accept a formal regularity of life for the graces of genuine penitence and faith, she never will be brought to execute the letter of the old law. It will stand on our book, a monument of folly as retained—a monument of life as disregarded. We should, perhaps, crave the indulgence of our readers for having dwelt so long upon this point, but the importance of the subject is our apology. The other topics of the discipline can be more rapidly dispatched.

II. The next to which we shall advert is the standard of offences. The old book refers us directly to the Bible, and leaves it an open question, in every instance of prosecution,

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whether the things charged are prohibited or not. The new book refers us to the Constitution of the Church as an accepted compendium of what the Bible is acknowledged to teach. According to the old book we are required to proceed as if nothing were agreed upon; according to the new, we abide by our covenants. It is admitted that our standards are a competent measure of heresy, but denied that they are a competent measure of morality. The reason is, that the fundamental doctrines of religion are few, definite and precise, and therefore easily digested into a human compendium—"the points of Christian practice endlessly varied," and therefore incapable of inclusion in any human manual. If "by points of Christian practice" is meant the fundamental principles of morality, the statement is absurd. They are even fewer than the essential doctrines of Christianity. The Platonists and Stoics reduced them to four—Christian moralists, the most eminent, such as Berkely and Butler, have reduced them to three, truth, justice and benevolence; others have still further reduced them to two, and an inspired Apostle has comprehended all human duty in the single principle of love. If "by points of Christian practice" is meant the concrete cases in which the principles of duty are to be exemplified, these are confessedly endless, and the Bible no more attempts to enumerate them than the standards of the Church. But the cases are as endlessly varied in which Christian doctrine is to be applied to the hearts and consciences of men, and for one question of casuistry, touching a matter of practical duty, every pastor has, at least, a dozen touching the relations of the soul to God, as determined by Christian doctrines. If, then, the principles of morality cannot be mastered without a knowledge of all their diversified concrete applications, how can the doctrine be mastered without a corresponding skill?

And why it should be easier for uninspired genius to contract the doctrine within comprehensive heads, than to contract the morals, it is particularly hard to understand, since in the matter of the doctrine we are wholly dependent upon Divine revelation, while in the matter of morals we have a source of

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knowledge within ourselves. Redemption is, throughout, a supernatural mystery, and all that we know of it, in the language of Taylor, "descends to us immediately from Heaven, and communicates with no principle, no matter, no conclusion here below." The sublime truths which make up Christian Theology are precisely the things which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man to conceive. They transcend alike the sphere of sense and the scope of reason, and in order to be known, they must be revealed by God's Holy Spirit. Moral distinctions, on the other hand, are the necessary offspring of the human soul—there is nothing supernatural about them. Even the heathen are not insensible to their reality and power—and what the Bible has done in relation to them has been to re-publish with authority, and free from prejudice and mixture, and to enforce with new and peculiar sanctions, and to extend to new relations, those eternal principles of rectitude which were originally engraved upon the nature of man. It would seem, therefore, much more likely that the human understanding, without supernatural aid, could construct an adequate compendium of morals than an adequate compendium of doctrine. Surely it is easier to move in the sphere of the natural, without inspiration, than in the sphere of the supernatural. Accordingly there has been comparatively little controversy as to the right, the just, the pure, the honorable, while there have been interminable disputes as to redemption and grace. We regret that any Christian writer should represent the moral virtues as essentially obscure. Their clearness and authority, in a Christian country, are the means by which the conviction of sin is generated, which prepares the heart for the precious mysteries of the Cross. We do not see, therefore, but that the standards of the Church are as complete as to morals, as they are in relation to doctrine. The law of God, as He Himself wrote it upon the tables of stone and proclaimed it from Sinai, is given in the ipsissima verba of the Most High, and the people likely to study our standards are no more blind than the Jews. At any rate, our conviction is very strong that if any man will honestly practise all the duties prescribed in

our catechisms, in the spirit in which they are expounded and enforced, he will not only pass through the world without any just imputation of offence, but will be welcomed at last into the kingdom of glory, as a saint redeemed, purified, perfected. When any of our people find that law too narrow for them, it will be time to look about for a broader commandment.

But it seems that our standards are only *inferences* from the word of God. This, we confess, is news to us. When we assented to them upon our admission to the ministry, we verily thought, within ourselves, that we were assenting to the very doctrines and precepts of the word and not to the ratiocinations of men. We should like to know what are the original doctrines and precepts, if these are only inferences at second hand. If these are not the identical things which the Scriptures teach, but only conclusions which our fathers deduced from them, we would like to have the premises in their native integrity. But if our standards teach precisely what the Scriptures teach, then the explicit evolution of what is contained in them is the explicit evolution of what is contained in the Scriptures, and the man who is condemned by inference from them is condemned by the word of God. The whole question as to the propriety of making our constitution the standard of offences is contained in a nut-shell. The constitution is, with Presbyterians, the accredited interpretation of the word of God. It is not an inference from it, nor an addition to it, but the very system of the Bible. All cases, it is confessed, must be judged according to the word of God. But that word has to be interpreted. If the constitution is what we profess to believe, we have the interpretation to our hand—we have already wrought out for us the only result we could reach, if we made the interpretation anew in every instance of prosecution. Then the new book says, take the interpretation you have agreed on. It is what you will have to come to if you do not take it, and therefore you had as well abridge your labour and abide by your covenant.

But we are further told that our standards were never meant to be a rule of faith and practice—they are simply designed

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as the measure of official qualifications and the basis of official communion. Why on earth then were they ever put in the form of Catechisms? That looks marvellously as if they were intended to *teach* the people; and we had always supposed, until this new light broke in upon us, that the very reason why the Church exacts an assent from ministers and elders to these formularies of faith, was that she might have a reasonable guarantee that, in their public instructions, they would teach nothing inconsistent with the word of God. We have always heretofore regarded subscription as a security for the sound dispensation of the word of God. It is for the sake of the people, whom the Church wishes trained to wholesome words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ, and not simply for the sake of the officers that she inquires so particularly into their life and doctrine. The things which they profess to believe she requires them to impress upon the faithful. Hence our standards are obviously a guide, a rule, a measure of their teaching. They contain exactly what the Church wants all her children trained to understand and to practise. Hence she reduces them to a form in which they can be most conveniently used in the offices of instruction. We do not require young Christians, upon their admission to the Church, to adopt them, for we regard them as pupils to be taught, and pupils are not ordinarily supposed to be familiar with the science which they are appointed to learn. But we do require, and peremptorily require, that all the teachers shall teach only according to this summary, and we do expect that the knowledge in which their hearers are to grow, is precisely the knowledge embraced in these symbols. That the Catechisms profess to give the substance of the word of God, as to faith and duty, is obvious on their very face. They reduce the principal instructions of Scripture to these two heads, and then articulately declare what is taught in reference to each; not some of the things, but the very things themselves, and that in their integrity. They omit only those parts of the Bible which do not fall under either of these categories, but there is no hint that they have only selected the principal points pertaining to the topics they have undertaken

to expound. They have given the whole essence of Bible doctrine and Bible morality.

III. The next subject to which we shall advert is the chapter in the new book entitled "Of cases without process." It provides, in the first place, for that class of cases in which the necessity of a trial is superseded by the circumstances under which the offence was committed, or by the confession of the offender. The question of guilt is a settled one, and the only point which is left to the court is the kind and the degree of censure. The objection lies, as we understand the matter, not against the dispensing with process, but against the extempore nature of the judgment. It is apprehended that, under the first specification, justice may be sacrificed to passion, and a sudden resentment take the place of cool deliberation. We have already said that there are instances in which the language of spontaneous indignation was the only language in which the rebuke could be adequately couched. The punishment should follow on the heels of the offence. The moral condemnation involved in an involuntary burst of honest indignation, would be more powerful than a thousand lectures. Every Society has the power of promptly visiting certain kinds of offences. There are outrages upon order and decency which bring down an instantaneous sentence of expulsion. It is a mistake to confound generous indignation with blind passion—such indignation is the natural sense of justice, and is one of the holiest emotions of our nature. The character of our courts and the rights of defence and appeal are a security against abuse. Under the old book, punishment may follow as promptly upon conviction as under the new. There is no provision for an interval of time between the finding of a party guilty and the pronouncing of the sentence, and it is much more likely that, in the process of a long trial, passions should be excited unfavorable to the calm administration of justice, than when the mind, without vexations and disturbing associations, is brought face to face with guilt. The second specification, under which the cases are likely to be most numerous, is too self-evident to need vindication. Trial is a mockery, where guilt is admitted. The remaining provision

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of the chapter is in relation to the mode of dealing with the self-deceived. The principle which regulates the form is, that faith is an indispensable qualification for admission to the Lord's Supper. The session must judge as to the competency of those to be admitted. Those who make no profession at all are debarred from the table—those whose profession is subsequently discovered to be founded in mistake, are remanded to the condition of baptized non-professors. The key is turned upon them and they are excluded from the communion of the saints. Here is discipline—a lawful exercise of the power to open and shut which Christ has committed to his servants. The exclusion is on the ground of confessed disqualification—a ground which necessitates the sentence. A trial in such a case is absurd, and no other sentence is possible. The statement of the case is its own vindication. But that there may be no mistake as to our own personal opinion, we feel bound to say, while we admit that the new book treats the case as one of discipline, and makes the exclusion a judicial sentence, we, ourselves, are convinced that every man has a right to withdraw from the Church whenever he pleases, in the sense explained in our former article—a right in the sense that no human authority has the right to detain him. As before God, he has no more right to apostatize than to commit any other sin. He is bound to believe and keep the commandments. But men have no commission to force him to do either. If he wants to go, they must let him go. "They went out from us," says the Apostle, not that they were expelled, but they went out of their own accord, freely, voluntarily, "because they were not of us." They found themselves in the wrong place and they left it. The Church of France, in one of its canons, makes provisions for simply announcing the names of apostates. They had gone, and the Church felt that all jurisdiction over them had gone with them. This is our own deliberate opinion. Men may become voluntarily exiles from their Saviour and their Church as well as from their country—but we have not engrafted this principle in the new book of discipline. Of course, where apos-

tates, during the time of their professed subjection to the Church, have committed scandalous offences, they are responsible for the scandal. The injury they have done to its name and character they are as much bound to answer for, as any other offenders, and they are not to be at liberty to plead the right of withdrawal as a cover for their crimes.

IV. We shall say a few words about the right of inquest. The new book asserts that every Church court has the inherent power to demand and receive satisfactory explanations from any of its members concerning any matters of evil report. This is represented as arbitrary, tyrannical and oppressive. In the first place, it is said to be in contradiction to the sacred principle of the common law that every man is to be presumed innocent until he is proved to be guilty. For the life of us we are unable to see in what the contradiction consists? The meaning of the maxim is nothing more nor less than that no man is to be punished until he is convicted, and that no man is to be convicted without evidence. But surely it does not mean that no man is to be *suspected* until he is convicted, and that a man being suspected, the community must feel towards him precisely as it feels to the notoriously innocent. Such a maxim would not only subvert common sense, but annihilate, in every case, the possibility of a trial. It is clear as noonday, that suspicion must precede investigation, and that suspicion does affect the moral status of its object. The man against whom scandalous reports are in circulation, is not upon the same footing, in public estimation, as those whose names are free from reproach. He is injured to the extent of the rumor, and the Church is injured in him. Now these rumors are either true or false. If true, he is entitled to no protection for his character; if false, his brethren should be in a condition to defend him and to vindicate the Church. If true, no injury is done to him by reducing him to the necessity of confession—if false, his good name may be rescued from infamy. In no case can injustice be done him. If he is guilty he deserves to suffer, and if not guilty he is saved

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from suffering. We cannot appreciate the objections. The whole case, to us, is an instance of fraternal guardianship and care.

But whether the principle is tyrannical or not, it has a noble history in our own Church, and has been enacted into law in relation to suspicions of heresy. During the New School controversy, it was strenuously and systematically maintained by the old school party, that every Presbytery had the inherent right to certify itself concerning the orthodoxy of every minister that sought to join it, no matter how clear the testimonials which he was prepared to present. Here was the right of inquest as to doctrine. The assembly solemnly recognized the right, and subsequently made the inquest an imperative obligation. If, in suspicious times, a man coming with clean papers could be righteously subjected to scrutiny in relation to his creed, surely when he himself is suspected, there can be no tyranny in precisely the same process, when the question is one of character. The Old School Convention which met at Pittsburgh, in 1835, in their memorial to the General Assembly, signalize it as their first grievance, that the Assembly of the preceding year had denied to the Presbyteries the right of examining all who applied to be admitted into them, whatever might be their testimonials, and proceed to invoke, in the name of faithful Presbyterians, "a return to the genius of the constitution; a restoration of the right and power of self-preservation; a repeal of the obnoxious act, and a distinct recognition of the inalienable right, in every Presbytery, of examining every applicant for admission into their number, be his credentials what they may, and of rejecting him, provided they think his admission would endanger their own purity and peace." In the resolutions adopted by the Assembly upon this memorial, it was solemnly declared, "that in the judgment of the General Assembly, it is the right of every Presbytery to be entirely satisfied of the soundness in the faith, and *the good character in every respect*, of those ministers who apply to be admitted into the Presbytery as members, and who bring testimonials of good standing from sister Presbyteries, or

from foreign bodies with whom the Presbyterian Church is in correspondence. And if there be any reasonable doubt respecting the proper qualifications of such candidates, notwithstanding their testimonials, it is the right and may be the duty of such a Presbytery to examine them, or to take such other methods of being satisfied in regard to their suitable character as may be judged proper, and if such satisfaction be not obtained, to decline receiving them." Here the whole principle is distinctly asserted, and that by the orthodox Assembly of 1835. The new book only completes the application of the principle, extending it to morals as well as heresy. It is idle to say that the right to examine before admission, and to demand explanations after admission, is essentially different. They are only different forms of the same fundamental right—the right to be satisfied concerning character and soundness. It is worthy of mention, too, that not a single objection has been raised against the provision of the new book which was not urged, with equal vehemence, by the new school against the right to examine. It was extra-judicial—it was arbitrary and oppressive—it violated the maxims of the common law—it was open and flagrant tyranny. The Church was unmoved by these fierce remonstrances then; we hope she will not be seduced by the sophistry and cavils of better men now. The cause is no better, though its advocates are changed.

V. The only remaining topic which claims our attention, relates to the changes in the administration of appellate jurisdiction. In order to the ends of justice, the case should be transferred to the higher tribunal, not only as it was made out by the original parties, but as it was viewed by the court below. The grounds of the original decision must be known and must enter as an essential feature in the new presentation of the case. Now there are three ways by which this can be done. The lower courts can be made parties, as in the present system, or the members of it can be made judges and retain their places as integral elements of the court above—as in the new book—or they can be made consulting judges without the privilege of voting. The objections to the first arrangement are that it

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complicates the proceedings by a new issue—that it makes the members of the lower court attorneys and advocates, and weakens the sense of judicial responsibility under which they deliver their opinions. Their purpose will be more to defend themselves than to consult the merits of the case. The plan has been tried, and universal experience has condemned it. It has wrought nothing but confusion, embarrassment and mischief, and the Church has loudly demanded a reform. Ingenious pleas may be alleged to show that experience is wrong; but experience will be trusted in spite of all sophistry. The man who walks answers every argument against the possibility of motion. The choice then lies between the other two schemes. Both bring the whole case before the court. The advantage of the first is that it preserves the integrity of the court, deepens the sense of personal responsibility in the delivery of opinions, and represses the temptation in the courts below to become partizans and advocates. The only danger which can be apprehended is, that their minds will be biased by self-partiality to cling to their old judgments, and fortified by the ambition of consistency against all new light. The only advantage of the second method is that it avoids this danger. If the danger is real, the Church has to balance probabilities and choose the least evil. The whole question is one of great difficulty, and no expedient can be adopted which is free from objection. We think that, all things considered, the provision of the new book is most in harmony with the nature of our system, and though we cannot promise that it will never be abused, we are persuaded, for the reasons developed in our former article, that in the long run it will most effectually secure the ends of justice.

We are now ready to leave the new book in the hands of the Assembly. We cannot predict its fate—it may be rejected—it may be adopted—or it may be materially modified. Of one thing we are confident, the parts of it which have provoked most opposition are the parts which are least liable to exception. The only point in it which we think wholly indefensible is the anomalous extension of the right of appeal to

parties that are not properly aggrieved. The only point which we think at all doubtful is the constitution of the Courts of Appeal. In all other respects its changes seem to us to be clear and unquestionable. They are founded upon principles which cannot be shaken—and though, through the influence of a sentiment which styles itself conservative, prejudice may rule the hour, and righteous reforms be stigmatized as rash and lawless innovations, the time will come when truth will assert its supremacy, and crotchets give place to reason.

ARTICLE II.

THE RELATION OF ORGANIC SCIENCE TO SOCIOLOGY.*

In my address "On the Principles of a Liberal Education," delivered before the two Societies of the South Carolina College, and published in this Review, July, 1859, I attempted to show the important function of Organic Science and Geology in a scientific course, and of a scientific course in a general course of education. Again, in an Address delivered, May, 1858, at the Athenæum, and published in this Review, April, 1859, I attempted to show the close connection between Morphology (a branch of Organic Science) and Fine Art, a connection similar to that which exists between Physical Science and Useful Art. The present Lecture has been the result of the farther course of my reflections on the philosophy of Organic Science and Geology; in which I hope to complete the argument in favor of the transcendent importance of these subjects in a course of instruction. The subject of the present Lecture, then, will be the intimate connection of Organic Science and Geology with that most important of all sciences,

*Prepared originally as a Lecture to the Senior Class of the South Carolina College.

that science towards which all other sciences point as their final end and object, viz: the "*Science of Sociology*"—the science of human society and human improvement.

Geology, on account of its claims as an utilitarian science—on account of its close connection with interests of the highest practical importance, *e. g.* mining and agriculture, is now generally recognized as a necessary part of a good education. But the great importance of Organic Science is not recognized, because its utilitarian applications are not obvious or extensive. The importance of this science is limited, in the popular mind, to its distant connection, through human physiology, with medicine. Perhaps, in the minds of some, it may extend to the study of insects injurious to vegetation, or of useful and noxious plants. According to the popular philosophy, the man who earnestly studies any other plants than the cotton and cabbage plant, or any other insects than the boll-worm and tobacco-worm, and the like, is at least very eccentric, if not insane. The great importance of this branch of study in a general course of instruction, as a means of training the youthful mind; the body of noble truth and elevating ideas which it contains; and more than all, its philosophic and therefore, finally, its *practical* connection with the highest concerns of life—with Fine Art on the one hand and Social and Political science on the other, is not even conceived by the popular mind and but dimly seen even by a few philosophic thinkers. Let us then attempt to show the relation of Organic Science and Geology to Social Science.

I have, on several occasions, drawn attention to the law of development of the different branches of science and to the manner in which they are built up, one above the other, in regular succession, the order being Mathematics, Mechanics, Physics, Chemistry and Organic Science, including Geology. I have endeavored, in my inaugural, to show the absolute necessity in the nature of things of this order of succession in historic development, as well as in a course of education, seeing that this is the order, both of mutual dependence and of increasing

complexity. I will, however, add a few words to what I have already, on other occasions, said on this subject.

There are certain fundamental ideas and characteristic methods belonging to each department of science. The fundamental ideas of Mathematics are *number* and *quantity*, and its characteristic method the "*method of notation*" or use of symbols. The fundamental idea of Mechanical and Physical Sciences is *force*, and that of Chemical Sciences *chemical affinity*; and the characteristic method of both is the *method of experiment*. The fundamental idea of Organic Science is *life*, that of Geology, *historic developement*; and the characteristic method of both is the *method of comparison*. Under each of these fundamental ideas there are subordinate ideas, called *doctrines* or laws; also, subordinate methods under each general method. Now it is a law that each higher department, besides its own doctrines and methods, includes the doctrines and methods of all below, but particularly of the department immediately below. Thus Mechanical and Physical Science, besides its own idea and method, include, also, those of Mathematics; Chemistry, both those of Mathematics and Physics, but more particularly those of Physics. Organic Science, besides its own doctrines and methods, include those of all the preceding, but more particularly those of Chemistry. Now there is another department of knowledge which I have not included in the above hierarchy—a department higher, more complex, and far more important than all others; but, on account of its extreme complexity, hardly yet assuming the form of a science, though it must eventually do so. I refer, of course, to *Social Science*. According to the law which I have just enunciated, this department, when it assumes the form of a true science, must include, in its wide domain, all other inferior departments, using freely all their doctrines and methods, but especially the doctrines and methods of Organic Science and Geology. As strange as it may seem to some, I am convinced that a really thorough *scientific* knowledge of Sociology is impossible, without a ground-work of complete fundamental knowledge in all other and inferior departments

of science, but especially without a knowledge of Organic Science. What the *peculiar* ideas and methods of Sociology may be, or whether there be any such, it is difficult to say with absolute certainty. The science is yet too imperfect. I believe, however, that there are none such. All its ideas and methods are borrowed from other sciences. Certain it is that the *historic method*, which has been called the characteristic method of Sociology by the Positive philosopher, M. Comte, is not characteristic of that science, as we shall see anon. But whether there are any such characteristic ideas and methods in Sociology or not, the close connection of this science with Organic Science, and the legitimacy of the use of the doctrines and methods of this latter science is, I think, demonstrable.

The fundamental idea of Organic Science, it will be remembered, is that of *life*—of life maintained through an organized structure. The fundamental idea of Geology that of *historic development*. Now are not these, too, the fundamental ideas of Social Science? Is there not a *life* also in human society—a life maintained through *organization*? Is there not also historic development or progress? Are not organization and development as necessary conditions of social as of individual life? Let us analyze the idea of organization still farther. What is an organized animal body? It is a complex body, composed of many ultimate parts, called *cells*, typically similar, but differing in form and varying in function. The infinitely diversified functions of the complex body are parcelled out among the different parts by specialization of function or *division of labor*—and thus each part having but one thing to do, does it perfectly. As a necessary result of this division of labor, there is mutual dependence of parts, so that separation is impossible without injury or death. In one word, we may define Organization to be *the mutual dependence of many parts, performing different functions and co-operating to produce one result, viz: the life of the whole*. Now this is precisely the case, also, in the social body. Here, also, we have a complex body, composed of many ultimate parts (individuals) similar in type, but varying in social function. The diversified

functions of the social body are parcelled out among the parts by division of labor, (specialization of function) and are thus more perfectly performed. As a necessary result of this division of labor arises mutual dependence of parts, so that separation is impossible without injury. Here, again, we have many mutually dependent parts performing different functions, but all co-operating to produce one common result, viz: the life of the whole. In a word, we have a true *organized body*.

But again, as in animal organisms, since the number of ultimate parts (cells) are much greater than the number of functions to be performed, it is necessary that many of these ultimate elements, similar in form and function, should aggregate into *proximate* elements or *organs*—*e. g.* liver, lungs, heart, stomach, kidney, muscles, nerves, blood-vessels, &c.; so, also, in the social organism, and for the same reason, many ultimate elements (individuals) of similar character unite together to form *corporations*—*e. g.* trades, professions, pursuits, &c., and perform similar social functions; thus forming proximate elements of the social body. Thus, as the animal body is composed proximately of *organs*, and ultimately of *cells*, all bound together by mutual dependence arising from specialization of *animal* functions; so the social body is also composed, proximately, of *corporations*, and ultimately of *individuals*—all bound together by mutual dependence arising from division of labor, or specialization of *social* functions.

There are several other subordinate ideas contained in the general idea of life which may be traced also in Social Science. First, there is the idea of growth and development. All living things grow and develop, *e. i.* increase in size and rise in the scale of life and organization. All living things pass through various stages, from the embryonic to the mature condition. In all living things, also, this growth and development takes place by the same means—growth, by the multiplication or reproduction of the ultimate elements or cells—development, by the gradually increasing differentiation of form, and specialization of function of the cells. Now we find the same ideas, also, in social life. Human society grows by multipli-

cation of its ultimate elements (individuals) by the law of reproduction. The social body also passes through successive stages, from the embryonic to the mature condition, in other words, *developes*; and here, too, the development takes place through increasing differentiation and specialization of social function. This point is so important that I must dwell upon it more fully. Let us then attempt to show the identity of all the laws of development in the animal and social body.

First; there is the *great law of differentiation*, of which I have already spoken. In the lowest organisms, and in the earliest embryonic condition of the higher organisms, the ultimate parts, (cells) are all globular in form, and each performs, in an imperfect manner, all the functions belonging to the organism. The cells are similar in form and function, and, therefore, almost independent; so that, in many instances, separation may take place without injury. But in proportion as development progresses, differentiation of form and specialization of function progresses also, until in the most mature condition of the higher animals, each cell has a special form and performs one function only. In the process of development, a certain number of cells take on each a special form, aggregate into an organ called a muscle, and perform the function of *contraction*, and that alone. A muscular cell has actually no other evidence of life but the ability to contract. A certain number of other cells take on another special form, aggregate into an organ of a different shape, and perform the function of sensation, and that alone. These are the nervous cells. And so on for all the functions of the body. As a necessary consequence of this specialization of the bodily functions, the whole work of the organism is performed much more perfectly; but also the independent life of the part is gradually lost, or rather is gradually merged into the general life of the whole organism—the general life of the organism increases by the gradual absorption of the independent life of the parts; until, in the mature condition of the higher animals, the absorption is complete—the part has no life or significance separate from the whole. Thus the parts are bound more and more closely together by

increasing mutual dependence, and separation becomes impossible without mutual injury and perhaps death. So, also, in the earliest embryonic conditions of the social body, the ultimate parts (individuals) are similar in social function; since each man performs all the necessary social functions, though in an imperfect manner. Every man is his own shoemaker, tailor, mechanic, agriculturist, &c. But in proportion as society advances, differentiation of social character, and specialization of social function (division of labor) progresses also, until, in the highest conditions of society, each man is confined to the performance of a single social function. The necessary result is, that all the social functions are performed much more perfectly; but, at the same time, the independent life of the individual is, in a measure, merged into the general life of the community by gradually increasing mutual dependence. It is true, the idea of organization is never completely carried out in social life. It is true, (for reasons which we will point out in the sequel,) the individual life is never completely merged into the general life; but both the idea and the laws are the same in the two cases.

I have thus, by the "law of differentiation," connected Sociology directly with Organic Science; but perhaps the connection with Geology is even more intimate. In Geology, we have this law illustrated on a still grander scale. The first introduced organisms were, in a remarkable degree, *connecting types*—*e. i.* they united in themselves the characters of several families now distinct and even widely separated, the connecting representatives gradually passing away as the distinct families were successively introduced. Thus, the first introduced vertebrates were *Fishes*—not typical fishes, as we might perhaps be led *a priori* to expect—but fishes combining with their peculiar fish characters, others which allied them to the class of reptiles, or even to mammals. The first introduced land plants combined the characters, of now widely distinct families, in such a remarkable degree that botanists are still at a loss where to place them in their schemes of classification, based upon the study of living plants alone. The same may be said of the

first introduced reptiles, birds, mammals, and in fact of geological faunæ and floræ generally. In the earliest faunæ and floræ one class stood for many. The earliest families combined the characters of several families, and stood as their representatives until these latter were separately introduced. The placoid and ganoid fishes, for example, stood, during the whole Palæozoic period, the sole representatives of the vertebrate type, combining in themselves the characters of all classes, and thus prophesying their coming, until nature was fully prepared for their introduction. The plants of the coal period stood as the representative of both Cryptogam and Phenogam, until these two ideas were separately and more distinctly expressed by the subsequent introduction of the typical forms of these two classes. It is as if nature had first sketched out her work in general forms, and then elaborated each subordinate idea in separate families—as if the problem of organic nature was first expressed in a few comprehensive symbols, and then differentiated.

I cannot leave this subject without drawing attention to the fact, that almost all the endless discussions on the subject of *progression* or *degradation* in the geological history of the earth, as also, to some extent, in human history, has been the result of a misconception, or at least an imperfect apprehension of this great law of developement. Almost all the reasonings on this subject have proceeded upon the false premise (not expressed indeed, but clearly implied) that developement is *simple rectilinear progress*, not only of the whole, but of all the parts. Thus the eminent Scotch Geologist, Mr. Hugh Miller, observing that the fishes of the Old Red Sandstone were not only of enormous size and strength, but also of complex structure, since they combined fish characters with some of the characters of the higher classes of reptiles and mammals, concluded that the law in this class has been progressive degradation. So, also, some writers, observing that the reptiles of the secondary period, and the plants of the coal period, were not only huge in size, but, in one point of view, more complex in organization than their congeners of the present day; have

concluded that degradation rather than progression is the general law ; and even man's fall and degradation has been brought, by some, under the same general law. Now it is evident that these philosophers, by taking too narrow a view of the subject, have confounded degradation with specialization. Confining our attention to these particular families, there might seem to be a progressive degradation ; but viewing them in connection with the whole fauna or flora, as parts of a great and complex organism it is at once perceived that it is differentiation and specialization, not degradation. In all material organization, development of the whole is progressively onward and upward, but the development of the part is subordinate to that of the whole, and may take place in various and opposite directions. Like the branches of a tree, the development of the parts must be estimated, each in its appropriate direction, and not in height only. Thus, in the development of the animal body, the cells starting all from a common point, proceed, each in its appropriate direction. Some are advanced to the dignity of brain cells, and assume the function of controlling all the other cells of the body ; others are compelled to take on the meanest functions. As individual cells, some are advanced and some apparently degraded ; but as parts subordinate to a general organism, there is evidently advance in all. So, also, taking the animal or vegetable kingdom as an organic whole, the separate parts or families, viewed individually, may seem, some to advance and some to recede ; but in connection with the whole organism, there has been unquestionable advance in all. In other words, in every case, in classes or families, progress must be estimated in the direction appropriate to that particular class or family—*e. i.* in the direction of *typical structure*, and not in the direction of complexity of organization. Estimated in this direction, there is no difficulty in perceiving advance in all classes and families, both animal and vegetable.

The second great law of development, is the law of *Cyclical evolution*. The law of differentiation has been generally recognized, though seldom consistently applied, by philosophic writers ; but the second law, which, for want of a better name,

I have called the law of cyclical evolution, has not been distinctly recognized at all, although, I believe, absolutely necessary for a clear apprehension of the true nature of development. Much dispute on the subject of progress in the Geological history of the earth, and more particularly in the history of human society, has been the result of the non-recognition of this law, also. If the imperfect apprehension of the law of differentiation has been the great source of dispute in Geology, the non-recognition of the law of cyclical evolution has been the most fertile of dispute in regard to human history. Here, again, we find the same false premise underlying the dispute, viz: that development is simple rectilinear progress, and may be represented by a simple ascending right line. But we find, on the contrary, that development is an exceedingly complex process. The law of differentiation shows that, instead of a right line, it is an infinitely branching line; and now the law of cyclical evolution shows, that it is not a simple ascending line, but rather an ascending spiral curve. Or perhaps it is better represented as a series of overlapping curves, successively culminating and declining, each rising above the last—a culmination and decline of higher and higher forms successively in time. But as these successive curves overlap one another in time, it necessarily happens that with every advance there is a decline—with every good there is an accompanying evil. The difference between the *ultra conservatist* or *degradationist* and the *ultra progressionist*, is, that the former sees and feels the decline of a principle or a form with which he is familiar, and with which his life has been associated, and forgets the advance of some other principle or form, higher perhaps, but with which he has less sympathy; while the latter only sees the advance in one direction, and forgets the decay in another. The former sees and weeps over the evil, and forgets to be grateful for the good; the latter joyously welcomes the good, and is unmindful of the evil. The philosopher alone sees, both the advance and the decline—both the evil and the good—weighs the one against the other, and gratefully, yet humbly, accepts the difference, if it be in favor of the latter.

This law may be traced in the developement of the animal body, in the developement of the individual human mind, in the Geological history of the earth, and in the history of *human society*; and thus connects together the sciences of Physiology, Psychology, Geology and Sociology. Thus, in the animal body, we have the successive culmination and decline of the *nutritive* functions, the *re-productive* functions and the *cerebral* functions. In the human mind we have the successive culmination and decline of the perceptive faculties, the imagination and passions, and the reflective faculties. In Geology we have the same law, illustrated on a magnificent scale, but, as I think, very imperfectly recognized by Geologists. In the gradual improvement of the physical condition of the earth, from the earliest Geological times until now, it could not be otherwise but that the earth should pass through temporary physical conditions of heat, moisture and light, &c., peculiarly favorable to the developement of certain classes of animals and plants. But as these physical conditions were constantly improving, it necessarily happened that they were adapted successively to higher and higher animals. Thus has resulted the successive culmination of higher and higher classes. Thus, in the animal kingdom, the class of Trilobites and Molluscs seem to culminate in the Silurian period; the class of fishes in the Old Red Sandstone, reptiles in the Secondary, mammals in the Tertiary, while man belongs exclusively to the present epoch. Hence the appropriateness of the names of these periods suggested by Agassiz and Dana, viz: the reign or age of Molluscs, the age of fishes, reptiles, mammals and man. It is important to observe, however, that these successive culminations are mainly in the grosser characteristics of *size and number*, and not in the more refined one of *typical structure*. While the class of fishes culminated in number and size in the Old Red Sandstone and Carboniferous period, yet, in *typical character*, this class have continued to advance. The same is true of the classes of reptiles and mammals. These culminated in size and number, respectively, in the Secondary and Tertiary periods; but in typical struc-

ture or characteristics, they have both, I believe, advanced up to the present time. This reduction of size and strength seems absolutely necessary to the due subordination of classes. When the reign of mammals commenced, the reptiles were reduced in size, apparently because the enormous size and strength of those of the secondary period was altogether incompatible with their due subordination to the higher classes just introduced.

Now the same law of evolution is clearly distinguishable in the history of human society, and I confess I have, myself, learned to distinguish this law in human history by the study of it in the history of the earth. The law may be traced, not only in the *general* civilization of successive epochs, but even in the component parts or principles of civilization. It is not only cycle beyond and above cycle, but also cycle *within* cycle, "wheel within wheel," *ad infinitum*. The law of development of the whole is epitomised in the part—every where the same law is seen. Thus we have the primitive civilizations of the Chinese, the Hindoos and Egyptians, then the civilization of the Greeks, then the Romans, and last, of the moderns—evidently a successive culmination and decay of higher and higher forms. In natural religion we have every where, first, Fetichism, then Polytheism, then Monotheism. In revealed religion we have, first, the Jewish and then the Christian dispensation. In Christianity, again, we have Catholicism, then Protestantism, and, we hope, some yet higher form in future. In Art, we have the primitive (Hindoo, Egyptian, &c.) the Greek, and last the Modern—which, as I have shown elsewhere (see my Lecture on Morphology), is higher in type, though less completely developed in its kind. But observe that, as in Geology, so in Sociology and Psychology, it is a culmination in *strength* rather than in *refinement*. The principle of symbolism culminated in strength in the Jewish dispensation; but is still in a subordinate capacity an important principle in religion, and much less gross than formerly. The principle of chivalry culminated during the middle ages. It has since declined in *strength*, but has gained in refinement. It has decayed in strength, but it has also become less absurd, less extravagant, less affected, more

rational and genuine—in a word, it has become subordinate to still higher principles. So, in the development of the human mind, the perceptive faculties and the imagination decline in strength and vigor as age advances, but they steadily advance in refinement, if intellectual culture continues. If the relish for art is more *intense* in youth, it is, also, more gross. If it declines somewhat with maturity, it becomes also more refined, more discriminating, more truly æsthetic—*e. i.* it becomes subordinated to still higher faculties of the mind.

It is interesting to observe that the idea of development or *progress in human society*, though so familiar to us now, is comparatively of recent origin, and is, evidently, yet very imperfectly understood. The Chinese, the Egyptians, the Hindoos, the Greeks, the Romans, had it not in the sense in which we understand it. None of these could conceive of any higher civilization than their own. None of these dreamed of an onward progress of the whole race, of which their own civilization was but one temporary phase. The Jews had it not. They could not conceive of their religion and polity passing away. Hence, it is not to be wondered at, that they rejected Christ, who preached the unheard of doctrine of the introduction of a new era. It seems to me that the idea of progression, through *cyclical evolution*, was first announced by Christ himself, when he preached that the Jewish ritual must *pass away*, but the *law should be fulfilled*—that the form is temporary, but the spirit eternal—that the form dies, but the spirit lives to take on higher and higher forms. Until that time, the idea of any scheme of religion or politics being a mere temporary phase of civilization, and therefore passing away by the very law of human progress—the idea that the forms of the social body, like the forms of the animal body, are necessarily temporary was, I believe, never even conceived by the human mind. Alas! How imperfectly it is yet apprehended, even in modern times, and by Christians, is sufficiently evinced by the history of both Church and State. The law has ever been *immutable forms*, asserted and maintained by force until violently broken and crushed by convulsion and bloody rev-

lution. The social body, like the crustacean, grows within until the unyielding shell is violently broken and cast off forever, instead of gently yielding and accommodating itself to the internal growth, as in the higher and more perfect animals.

But there is another subordinate idea contained in the general idea of life. It is the idea of *ceaseless internal change*; and that all these complex processes of growth and development of which we have spoken, is the result of this ceaseless change. The animal organism, as I have already said, is built up entirely of cells, as a building is built up of bricks. But as the life of each cell is exceedingly short, the life of the organism can only be maintained through the continual renewal, by the law of reproduction, of the constantly decomposing cells. Thus, the animal body may be represented as the scene of continual warfare between the powers of life and death. As cell after cell is destroyed by death, others are put in their place by reproduction. Thus, while the cells are continually dying, the organism continues to live. If the reproductive force prevails over the decomposing force, the organism continues to grow. So, also, in the social organism. As the life of the ultimate parts (individuals) is comparatively short, the life of the social organism can only be maintained through the continued renewal of these by the law of reproduction. Thus, while the individual dies, the social organism continues to live; and so long as the force of reproduction prevails over the force of death, it continues to grow. Again; in the animal organism, within certain limits, the vigor and intensity of life is in exact ratio to the rapidity of change, or, in other words, to the shortness of *cell life*. So in the social organism, also, within certain limits, the energy of social life seems to be in proportion to the rapidity of change produced by death and reproduction—in a word, to the shortness of *human life*. Patriarchal length of life would certainly be unfavorable to social life and social progress. I say, within certain limits, for, in either case, too rapid change creates a fevered, unhealthy condition of the organism. The organism, therefore, whether animal or social, may be compared to a lake, into which water runs, remains a

while and is again discharged. The water continually changes, but the lake remains. Within certain limits, the stronger the current the purer, the clearer, the fresher the water. If the current is too languid, the water stagnates and becomes unwholesome; if too rapid, it becomes troubled and turbid. Thus we see the cell dies, the individual organism continues to live, the individual dies, the species—the social organism—continues to live. From the mere study of organic and social science, we might conclude that, through the law of reproduction, the life of the species might be eternal. But Geology teaches that there is still a higher and more complex organism, of which species must be regarded as the ultimate parts—that the species dies, also, but the organic kingdom continues to live and develop throughout the inconceivable cycles of Geological times.

We have thus shown that the fundamental idea and *doctrines* of Sociology are identical with those of Biology and Geology. In the next place, let us attempt to show that the *scientific methods* to be used in Sociology, in fact, the methods which have already been most successful in advancing Sociology as a science, are identical with those which are in constant and successful use in Organic Science and Geology.

We have already said that the great and characteristic method of Organic Science and Geology is the *method of comparison*. What *experiment* is to Physics, *comparison* is to Organic Science. Without it, Organic Science would be impossible. The phenomena of *physical* nature are too complex to be understood by simple observation. But, by experiment, the physicist removes one complication after another, until the problem is reduced to its simplest terms; and then only its true nature is understood. So, also, the phenomena of *organic* nature, as expressed in the most familiar higher organisms, are far too complex to be understood by mere observation of these alone. But, in this case, we cannot resort to experiment to simplify the problem. In every organism, but especially in the higher, the forces are so numerous, complex and delicately balanced that we can scarcely touch the organism in the way

of experiment, without destroying the equilibrium, and therefore, the very conditions of the problem—without destroying life, and thus removing the problem beyond the limits of Organic Science into the domain of Chemistry. Thus the application of the method of experiment is extremely limited in Organic Science. But what we cannot do by experiment, nature has kindly done for us. She has, as it were, prepared the experiments to our hands. She has varied the conditions of the problem in every conceivable way, and simplified it to the last degree. She has prepared a *series of organisms*, in which one complication after another is removed until the problem is reduced to its simplest terms. The complex equation of life is, as it were, worked out for us, and all we have to do is to study and understand the work. Such a *series* we have in the animal and vegetable kingdom, *e. i.* in all the animals and plants existing now upon the earth, from the highest, through successive gradations to the lowest: another series in the development of any one of the higher organisms, from the egg to maturity: still another, in the successive faunæ and floræ, in the Geological history of the earth, from the Palæozoic to the present time. The first, I shall call the *natural history series*, the second, the *embryological series*, and the third, the *geological or historic series*. In these three series we have the organic structure, by successive removal of complications, reduced to its greatest simplicity; and at the same time, varied in every conceivable manner, but without, in the slightest degree, affecting its perfect equilibrium. The problem of life is reduced to its simplest terms by various methods, but without destroying the equation. But in order that nothing be left undone, nature prepares *another series* of experiments, in which the perfect equilibrium is more and more disturbed, even up to complete overthrow. In order that we may see *how* the equilibrium is maintained, she disturbs it by taking away one or another necessary element. We see these disturbances in the various forms of disease. This fourth series, therefore, I shall call the *pathological series*.

Now, it is only by extensive *comparison*, in these four series,

that our knowledge of organisms assumes a rational and scientific form. We may, indeed, have an *empirical* knowledge of man, or of any other single species or group of species of animals, by the simple study of that species or group alone; but true *scientific* knowledge of man, or any other species or group of animals, is impossible without thorough knowledge of all organisms, and in all phases of development—in other words, without extensive comparison in the four series mentioned above. It is for this reason that I believe the labors of Agassiz form a very great era—perhaps the greatest which has yet occurred, in Organic Science. To Agassiz is due the credit of first using extensively and fully recognizing the great importance of Embryology and Palæontology as methods of investigation in this science. The introduction of these methods has raised him to the rank, not only of a great scientific man, but of a great *philosopher* and benefactor of mankind. All his discoveries in science, it seems to me, are inferior to this. The discoverer of a great method not only opens the way to a thousand *discoveries*, but to a thousand *discoverers*. Organic Science owes its rank, as truly a philosophic study, to Louis Agassiz. But to return. Let us observe what has been, and must in the nature of things be, the general law of the history of knowledge in Organic Science. We will take as the most familiar, and at the same time the most perfect example, the knowledge of the human body. First, the human organism was studied without reference to other organisms, and a vast body of useful, but empirical knowledge was thus obtained; then other species or groups of species were studied in a similar manner, and similar kind of knowledge of these resulted. As soon as a sufficient knowledge of a sufficient number of groups was obtained, the process of comparison commenced. The urgent necessity of the study of the *lowest animals*, and the great importance of Embryology and Palæontology, as affording several series and the simplest terms of comparison, was now felt. The scientific mind, under the guidance of Agassiz, was, therefore most strongly turned in these directions. Gradually as the result of extensive comparison, reaching to the very

lowest animals and to the very earliest conditions, Embryonic and Palæontological—a true *scientific* knowledge of the laws of organization and life was obtained, and thus the foundation laid for a true *scientific* knowledge of the human organism. Human anatomy only becomes philosophic through *comparative* anatomy; human physiology, through *comparative* physiology.

If we pass now to Sociology, we shall find that its true scientific methods are all derived from Organic Science and Geology. If Sociology ever becomes a true science, it must be by the free use of the great method of comparison. It must commence, of course, with profound study of the social organism as it exists among ourselves. This can only result, however, in more or less complete empirical knowledge. It must then proceed to the study of all other nations in all other times; by which results empirical knowledge of these also. Then must commence the process of comparison in the several series. First, we must compare the highest social organisms with those which are lower and lower, down to complete barbarism. In other words, we must compare nations as they *now* exist, apparently in their mature condition, in various degrees of civilization—the mature social organism in various degrees of perfection or complication. Is this not precisely analogous to the “*Natural History*” series? Second, we must trace each nation, especially the most civilized, from its earliest to its most mature condition, and compare these successive stages with one another; *i. e.* the same social organism through various stages of development. Is not this identical with the *embryonic series*? Third, we must trace the whole *human race* in its development—a development in which the civilizations which have made different epochs remarkable, are the successive terms or phases—and compare these phases with one another. We must compare together the great successive civilizations, or culminations of successive forms, ideas or principles in the whole human race, taken as a developing organism, as *e. g.* the Chinese, the Egyptian, the Hindoo, the Greek, the Roman and the Modern civilizations. Is not this, the Palæontological,

Geological, or *Historic series*, the grandest of all? Fourth, we must compare the social body in quiet, harmonious and healthy action, where all the social functions co-operate for the good of the whole, with the same organism in disease, fever, delirium, in a word, in various degrees and kinds of *revolution*. Is not this the Pathological series? It is true that these methods have not yet been extensively used; but whatever advance has been made in scientific Sociology or in philosophic history (a branch of Sociology), has been entirely due to the use, either consciously or unconsciously, of these methods. As noble examples, I would mention the "History of European Civilization," by Guizot, in which the historic method is freely and successfully used; the Sociology of Comte's "Positive Philosophy," where all these methods are used, more or less perfectly, but under a bias of mind, to be spoken of hereafter, which vitiates many of his results. I would, also, draw attention to the flood of light which has been thrown upon European civilization by the study of the French revolution, as an instance of the successful use of the Pathological method.

Now, as in the human organism the necessities of medical art compelled, first, an empirical knowledge upon which the practice of medicine was at first entirely, and is still in a great measure founded; so, in the social organism, the necessities of Government, industry, &c., compel an empirical knowledge of the organization of our own State or Nation, and upon this purely empirical knowledge Government is almost entirely founded, and industry regulated. This empirical knowledge we call Politics, Commerce, Trade, &c. But, as in the study of the human organism there has gradually arisen, as the result of the application of the method of comparison in the four series, a body of true philosophic and scientific knowledge, which has already greatly improved and will eventually perfect the practice of medicine; so in the study of social organism, also, by the use of the same methods, there has gradually arisen a body of real philosophic and scientific knowledge in Sociology, which has already improved, and will eventually perfect, our practice of Government and industry. This is, in

fact, but one illustration of the general law applicable to all departments of science, and to which I have called frequent attention, that “*Art* precedes Science, but Science, in its turn, perfects *Art*.” There are two principal necessary stages in the developement of every *Art*, viz.: *Art* founded upon empirical knowledge, and *Art* founded upon scientific knowledge. Thus, every *Art* precedes the corresponding Science,—*e. g.*, the art of Metallurgy precedes the science of Metallurgy, the art of Agriculture precedes the science of Agriculture, the art of Medicine precedes the science of Organisms, the *art* of government *i. e.* of social organization precedes the science of Sociology. But in every case, *Art* is finally perfected by *Science*. There is an intermediate stage, however, of which I have not yet spoken, in which Science seems to interfere with *Art*, unless used with great discrimination—in which the human *reason*, yet in an imperfect state, interferes with the truer indications of human *instinct*—in which our yet imperfect Science interferes with our truer and more perfect empiricism, unless used with great caution. This is, to some extent, the condition of Medicine and Agriculture at the present time. In this transition state the art of social organization has been ever since the French Revolution, and from it we are, even now, just commencing to emerge—a state in which *general ideas* and dogmas are introduced into Social Science, but are conceived with a narrowness, and applied with an *absoluteness*, which has resulted in the greatest evils in the present condition of society—evils which threaten the very life of the social organism. As examples of such general ideas, I would mention the dogmas of universal liberty and equality, the right of self-government, of free inquiry, of free competition in labor, &c., &c.; all ideas, true in a certain sense and with certain limitations; but in what sense, and with what limitations, can only be determined by extensive comparison of Governments and social organizations of all kinds, Divine and human, and in all stages of developement, with one another. That society has been long in a transition or critical state—a state characterized by the prevalence of absolute dogmas—a state of an-

archy, intellectual and moral, eventuating in anarchy social, political and industrial, from which we are just emerging by means of a more rational conception of the dogmas just mentioned; and that this commencing change for the better is entirely due to the use of scientific methods in Sociology, is as certain as any thing can be. As a notable example of our gradual emergence into a higher, more rational and less absolute philosophy, let me cite the great improvement of our ideas, of late years, on the subject of the institution of slavery. This improvement has been entirely the result of the use of the method of comparison. It is, therefore, a real and permanent advance in the science of Sociology. The mere blind fanatical opposers of the institution of slavery under all circumstances, are clearly under the dominion and guidance of the absolute abstract dogmas mentioned above as characteristic of the critical or transition period in social philosophy. The use of rational scientific methods must eventually overthrow all such absolute dogmas, by showing the *relative* nature of all human institutions. I am perfectly convinced that, by the right use of the comparative method—*i. e.* by the comparison of human governments and organizations of all kinds and degrees, political, industrial and family, with one another and with the Divine Government, the institution of slavery, as it exists in the Southern United States, may be placed on a scientific basis which is absolutely invulnerable. No one, I think, who has thoroughly grasped the great laws of development, or practised the method of comparison, will find any difficulty in perceiving that free competition in labor is necessarily a transition state; that, as a permanent condition, it is necessarily a failure; and that the alternative must eventually be between slavery and some form of organized labor, circumstances, perhaps beyond our control, determining which of these will prevail in different countries.

The close alliance, both in doctrine and method, of Organic Science with Sociology, is sufficient, I think, to attest the dignity of the former as an object of human study, and in a general way, also, its importance to the advance of the latter sci-

ence. But it may be asked, "if these ideas and methods are already in use in Sociology, of what immediate advantage to Social Science is the study of Organic Science"? It will not be difficult to clear up this point.

Every department of science, as we have already seen, has a method or methods which are called characteristic of that particular science, because there its use is carried to the greatest perfection. The different departments of science may, therefore, be called *schools* of these different methods. If, therefore, we wish to perfect ourselves in the use of any particular method, we must study it in the school of that science in which it is most extensively used. Thus, the "*method of notation*" is used in Physics and Chemistry, as well as in Mathematics. But if we wish to make ourselves perfect in its use, we must practice in the school of Mathematics. So the method of experiment is used in all departments of science except Astronomy, but if we would master this method, we must study its use in the school of Physics. In like manner, if we would make ourselves masters of the method of comparison—the great scientific method in Sociology—we must study it where it is in most perfect use, viz: in the school of Organic Science.

So, also, with reference to the *fundamental ideas* in Science. A clear conception of these can only be obtained by the diligent study of those departments of science in which they are first found—of the lowest and most abstract science in which they are used, and where, therefore, they are sure to be expressed in the simplest terms. A thorough grasp, a clear conception of these fundamental ideas, is absolutely necessary to the right use of the methods of science. How is it possible, for instance, to reason successfully on the subject of number and magnitude, without a clear conception of the idea of number and magnitude, or to practice, successfully, the method of experiment without clear conceptions of the laws of force? And where can this clear conception be obtained, except in Mathematics and Physics, where these ideas are expressed in the simplest manner, and disconnected from com-

plications of all sorts? Thus, also, if we would have a clear conception of the idea of life, of the doctrines and laws of organization and development, we must study them in the school of Organic Science and Geology. Thus it is evident that it is not mere fancy, but a sober and important truth, that the ideas and scientific methods which must be used in Social Science, are best learned in the school of Organic Science. It is true that these ideas have been, for a long time, dimly seen, and these methods imperfectly practiced in Sociology; but the difference between this imperfect, unconscious use, and the conscious rational use, characteristic of true science, is just the difference between the use of Induction before and after the time of Bacon.

But, perhaps, it will again be objected that all I have said only shows a strong analogy between the body animal and the body social or political—an analogy which has always been recognized, and has always formed a favorite theme of speculation for the philosophers of olden times, but which has never resulted in any signal benefit to society. Yes: It is true that such an analogy has always been recognized. It could not have escaped the attention of thinking minds in the earliest times. It is well expressed in the story told by Menenius Agrippa to the mutinous plebians of Rome; in which he showed the absurdity of their conduct, by comparing the condition of Rome to a state of war among the members of the body. It is also admirably expressed by St. Paul in his comparison of the Church with an organized body. But what, I would ask, is analogy but one expression of the universality of law—the unity which exists in nature, and which it is the sole object of science to discover? The mere feeling of this unity, or its perception by the imagination, is *poetry*, and gives rise to metaphorical language; the *dim perception* of the same truth by reason—too dim and illusive to grasp thoroughly, or to put to any practical purpose—is called *analogy*; the *clear rational perception* of the same truth is called *SCIENCE* or *philosophy*. It is a curious, but very interesting and important fact, that while popular knowledge is almost entirely confined to the

highest, most complex and difficult subjects, but at the same time subjects most nearly and intimately connected with the highest interests of man, science has, heretofore, been first and mostly concerned with what is most remote, abstract and impractical, or at least has been least concerned about subjects which have the very highest human interest. The reason of this difference is very evident. Popular sagacity has been most concerned about the highest, most complex and difficult subjects; not because they were highest and most complex, but because they were, also, the most nearly and immediately connected with the most urgent wants of man; while science was first most concerned with what was most remote and impractical, not because they were the most remote and impractical, but because they were also the most simple and general; and she avoids the most important subjects, not because they are the most important, but because they are too complex to be yet reduced to rational form. It will now be seen how important to society is the difference between the two. Popular knowledge is immediately acquired; rational knowledge requires much time. But popular knowledge is temporary; rational knowledge is permanent. Popular does not increase; rational knowledge is progressive indefinitely. Without the former, society could not exist; without the latter, society would not progress. It was necessary that popular knowledge should serve the purposes of man in agriculture, in medicine and in social organization, until rational knowledge, commencing with the most remote, abstract and least directly practical subjects, because, also, most simple and general, and slowly but steadily building upward, had reached successively these subjects. Thus, as one department after another, commencing with the lowest and most remote, and passing upward to the nearest and highest, is brought under the dominion of science, popular knowledge is steadily displaced by rational knowledge; this change taking place last in the most vitally important subjects, because these are, also, the most complex and difficult, and require a complete knowledge in all other lower departments, as a basis. Thus we see the injustice of

the reproach which has been sometimes cast upon science, and which is humorously exaggerated by Dean Swift, in "Gulliver's Voyage to Laputa," that it is least concerned about subjects of the most vital importance to mankind, but devotes itself to the most remote and impractical subjects—a reproach which was necessarily true, to some extent, in the early history of science, but which is now wiped away by the intimate alliance proved between Organic Science and Sociology. We see, also, the injustice of the retort, which science has not been slow to make, that all popular notions are mere error—that science is the only real truth. There is a real truth in both, but science is the more perfect, and therefore the permanent form of truth. Thus it is, evidently, the great object of science to change popular notions and popular analogies into scientific truth. Popular sagacity discerns truth; science puts it into rational form. There is a real truth in popular ideas, analogies, adages, and even in poetic figures, which science is too apt to ignore, and even, perhaps, to ridicule, but which it is the true object and final result of science to confirm, divest of accompanying error, and put into rational form. In fact, science and philosophy, particularly in these highest and most complex departments of knowledge, may be defined as *the rational form of popular wisdom*. Now, my object in this lecture has been, if possible, to bring about this very change—to change the commonly recognized analogy between the animal and social body into a scientific law—to exchange the dim, popular, unproductive idea into a clear, scientific, rational and productive form. The connection between Organic Science and Sociology being admitted, I have attempted to show the exact nature and extent of that connection.

What, then, in a few words, is the nature of this connection between Social and Organic Science? It is the necessary connection which exists between every special and some other more general and fundamental department in the hierarchy of sciences—exactly the same which exists between Astronomy and Mechanics, or between Organic Science and Chemistry; except that Social Science, as we shall see anon, has other con-

nections through man's moral and spiritual nature. Each department of science is, at first, separately built upon its own basis of facts and phenomena, constituting what is called *formal science*; until these phenomena become referred to the more general laws of a more fundamental science, when it becomes a *causal science*. For example, Astronomy, until the time of Newton, was studied without any connection with other departments of physical science—was built up separately upon its own basis of facts and phenomena, but without reference to the cause of these phenomena. Many and beautiful laws were established by Kepler, but these were formal laws only. In the meantime, another and more fundamental science had been perfected by Galileo, viz: the science of *Mechanics*. By the reference of the phenomena and laws of Astronomy to the more fundamental laws of Mechanics, as their cause, Astronomy became, in the hands of Newton, a causal or physical science. So, Social Science has advanced, though in a very imperfect manner, as a phenomenal science, built up separately upon its own basis of facts and laws derived from the study of history. But, in the meantime, another and more fundamental science has been growing up, and is now so far perfected that its connection with the more special science of Sociology is distinctly made out. By reference of the facts and laws of social organization to the more fundamental laws of Organic Science, as a cause, Sociology must eventually become a causal science.

The history of Sociology is, therefore, exactly similar to that of all other departments of science. First, it commences as a mere accumulation of facts or *descriptive Sociology*. This is history, as usually understood—*i. e.* a detailed account of the facts of government, of industry, and of Church organization, &c. Next comes the reduction of these facts to phenomenal laws—and thus arises *formal Sociology* or philosophical History and political Economy. Then comes the last step. The laws of Sociology are referred to the more fundamental laws of Organic Science as their cause, and now we have a true *scientific Sociology*. Such a reference of a special science to the

general laws of a more fundamental science is an immense advance, and always attended with an immense impulse to both sciences, but especially to the science thus referred, as is abundantly testified by the history of science. The great structure of science may, therefore, be represented by a complex system of arches, rising successively one above another. Each column stands, at first, separate and on its own base; but, as it rises, inclines and finally connects above with some stouter and firmer column. From the arch thus formed springs another and more glorious shaft, which gradually arches and connects with some other column, and so on. The highest and most glorious of these arches is that which Sociology forms with Organic Science.

I have thus, I think, established the great importance of Organic Science and Geology in a course of education—importance not only as a means of mental training, (which I have already insisted on in my address, last April, as well as in my inaugural) but also, and still more, as a basis of a true Sociology. But I must hasten to remove an impression which all I have thus far said may leave upon the minds of some. Organic science is a basis of a sound Sociology, but *is not the only basis*. This is the great mistake of the material philosophers of the *Comte school*. The science of human society is broader, deeper, grander and more complex than has yet been imagined by any philosopher who has written on this subject. The fact is, that all departments of human knowledge, scientific or otherwise, converge here. But Sociology differs from other departments of science, in being connected with *two* instead of only one more fundamental department of human knowledge. This shaft curves in two directions, connecting with a column on either side, forming a double instead of a single arch. Man is *spiritual* as well as *material*. Through our material nature Sociology connects with Organic Science, and through our spiritual nature, with Moral Science and Theology. Thus we have three magnificent columns supporting the broad arch of Social Science. In the middle stands the column of history, based upon its own pediment of facts, its

capital supporting the centre. On the one side stands the column of science; on the other, that of moral philosophy, each supporting a wing, and thus giving stability to the whole structure, and together forming the triune arch of Social Science. Now, it will be at once seen that these three columns, thus supporting the arch of Social Science, are identical with the three fundamental departments of human knowledge which I have insisted on in my address on "Principles of Liberal Education." I have there shown that the sum of human knowledge, and, therefore, a complete course of education, is divisible into three great departments, viz: Art, Science and Philosophy—that the basis of these are Classics, Mathematics and Logic—the first passing upward through Literature, Art and History; the second, through Physical, Chemical, Organic Science and Geology; and the third, through Psychology, Metaphysics and Theology. These three columns, when examined at their bases, seem very wide apart. Mathematics, Classics and Logic seem to have no connection with one another. But as we rise, the columns are seen to converge until they meet to form the perfect triune arch of human culture and human knowledge. Already, in Organic Science, in Art and Religious Philosophy, the relation of the three departments begin to be visible, as I have attempted to show in my Lecture on "Morphology and its connection with Fine Art." Where then do they meet? Exactly where they should meet, in the most important of all departments of human knowledge, viz: the science of human society, human progress and human improvement. We have already seen how the scientific course leads upwards, through Organic to Social Science. In the same manner, the art course leads upward through History, and the philosophic course through mental and moral Philosophy to the same point. Thus we may represent a perfect human culture, as three columns rising, curving and converging to meet and support a broad plane, which is the science of human improvement or Sociology in its widest sense.

Now, in the plane of Sociology thus formed, there are, distinguishable, three divisions which are connected, each, directly

with one of the columns. In other words, there are three distinct departments of Sociology—three *fundamental corporations* of the social body—three parts of the *social being* which may, perhaps, be compared to the three parts of the *human being*, viz: the material, the intellectual and the moral natures; each of which is intimately connected with the contiguous column. These three fundamental corporations, or organs of the social body, or subordinate organizations of the social organization, are: 1st. The industrial organization, connected most intimately, through Organic Science, with the scientific column; 2d, the political organization, connected, most intimately, through history, with the art column; 3d, the religious organization, most intimately connected, through moral Philosophy, with the philosophic column. In a word, the three fundamental corporations are the *Guild*, the *State* and the *Church*. Of course, I speak here of the Church, only in so far as it is a human organization—only as related to our temporal welfare—or as a means of improving the morals, and, thus, of promoting the order and well-being of society. It has, of course, a higher signification, as connected with a revealed religion, and related to our eternal welfare. In this capacity, it would be irreverent to compare it with any merely human institution. In this capacity, of the invisible Church, we would bow our heads before it, in silence, as the emblem of the *Eternal*.

Frederick Schlegel, the celebrated writer on the philosophy of History, in a series of articles entitled, "Characteristics of the Age," and published in a political journal, "the Concordia," divides human society into five essential corporations, rising one above the other in the following order, viz: the Family, the Guild, the State, the school (republic of letters), and the Church. I cannot but think, however, that this division, while perfectly true, and from one point of view philosophical, does not represent correctly the natural relation of these corporations to one another, and their relative value. In the first place, the school should not be considered as synonymous with the republic of letters. Literature is a profession,

as politics, or law, or medicine, and, therefore, a *subordinate corporation*. The school should be limited to its usual signification, viz: the organization for the *education* of children and youth. Again, there is an essential difference between the family and the school on the one hand, and the three others, viz: the Church, the State and the Guild on the other. The latter belong to the great or public world; the former to the more confined and private world, which is a *preparation* for the latter. To use an illustration, taken from the natural body, the latter are the three great external and visible regions of the body, the *head*, the *thorax*, and *abdomen*, which, together, make up the perfect body; the former are the *interior organs of elaboration*. The *Church*, the *State*, and the *Guild*, I consider, then, as the three great corporations of society. That, of these, the *Church* is most intimately connected through moral philosophy, with the philosophic course, and the State through History, with the art course, will not be doubted. It is no less evident that the Guild or industrial organization of society is most intimately connected, through Organic Science, with the scientific course. Besides the intimate practical connection, through Mechanic arts, between science and industry, there can be no doubt that a completely organized industrial community, where division and sub-division of labor is carried to the greatest perfection, where the field of each man's social activity is limited to the last degree, and where mutual dependence becomes often painful; there can be no doubt, I say, that such a social organization approaches nearest the ideal of material organization as seen in the animal body.

A complete theory of human society, therefore, can only be attained by approaching the subject of Sociology *from all three sides*. The great mistake which has been made by almost all Philosophers, on this subject, has been that of considering one or the other of these equal corporations superior, or absorbing all the others—of supposing the great field of Social Science connected with only one of the columns of which I have spoken. The Religionist and moral Philosopher is disposed to look upon

the Church as the most essential and fundamental corporation, and upon Sociology as most nearly connected through the laws of Psychology and moral Philosophy, with the philosophic course. The politician and statesman, and, I may add, the people generally, look upon this science as most nearly connected through history with the language course or column: while the scientific and material Philosopher is apt to look upon it as merely a higher and more complex branch of physical and material science. We are all familiar with the first two forms of error. The last and more dangerous form of error is, perhaps, less familiar. It is of late growth, being the natural result of the vast progress of scientific philosophy during the present century. And yet, though so young, it is already, by far the most complete and consistent social philosophy which has yet been brought forward. This philosophy is most completely embodied in the "Positive Philosophy" of Auguste Comte. The plausibility, the wonderful consistency of this philosophy, the astonishing philosophic power with which it is urged, together with the materialistic tendencies of the present age, and, I may add, the immense amount of truth, valuable in the highest degree, which this work contains, render it peculiarly captivating and peculiarly dangerous. I will endeavor, in a few words, to show in what its radical error consists.

The connection of mind and matter, in the person of man, has always been looked upon, by Philosophers, as the mystery of mysteries. These two opposite principles are harmoniously united, every day, before our eyes, in the person of every human being; but the rational expression of this union is impossible. It is like the harmonious union of the logically irreconcilable principles of Divinity and humanity in the person of Christ. On account of this irreconcilable duality of man's nature, there seems to be an essential duality—a fundamental antithesis in human philosophy. There are two logically irreconcilable views connected with every philosophic question related to man. Commencing with the *axioms of Mathematics*, and *faith in the revelations of the material world through sense*, we are led upward, naturally and logically, by the laws

of reason to a purely *material* philosophy. But, commencing with the no less certain axioms of *consciousness*, and faith in the revelations of the *spiritual and supernatural* world through *Scripture*, we build upward by reason, and are led, no less logically and irresistibly, to a *spiritual* philosophy. Here, then, are two distinct and apparently opposite systems of philosophy; both equally securely based upon *axioms* and *faith*, and both equally built up by the laws of human reason. Now, the great problem of human philosophy, the great enigma of human life is solved in the reconciliation of these two opposite views. Like *predestination* and *free agency*, they are both true, but irreconcilable by human reason, at least, in the present stage of philosophy. It is the part of wisdom, therefore, to accept both, and humbly confess our weakness and inability to reconcile them. But the proud reason of man is dissatisfied with any thing short of a perfect and single philosophy, logically consistent throughout. He attempts, therefore, to make a consistent philosophy by ignoring one-half of all philosophy. He settles the dispute about the color of the shield, by obstinately affirming that it has but one side, which is all white or all black. He looses the Gordian knot by cutting it asunder. He solves the enigma of the Sphynx by declaring that there is no such enigma. Thus it happens that one-sidedness, resulting from pride of consistency, is the characteristic of all human philosophy. Thus it is that M. Comte, by ignoring, entirely, our spiritual nature and all the axioms of consciousness, and reasoning upwards from known laws of matter only, attempts to make an universal, and at the same time, purely material philosophy. Now, it is a characteristic of all such one-sided philosophers, that while they are consistent for a certain distance, and to ordinary reasoners, yet, if carried out fairly, to their logical consequences, they always result in hopeless contradiction; and as such philosophy is professedly built upon logical consistency, such contradiction is necessarily fatal. It is in vain that human philosophy attempts to attain, at the same time, consistency and completeness. The alternative seems to be, either to accept irrecon-

cilable duality as a double basis of philosophy, and thus to construct two consistent philosophies which we cannot reconcile—two solid buildings which we cannot unite above—or else rejecting one basis entirely, to attempt to construct a perfect philosophy on the other. In the latter case, we shall, at first, build up solidly and hopefully, a beautiful and apparently a permanent structure; but as we build upward, we are irresistibly carried in the direction of the other basis which we have neglected; until, for want of support, the whole structure which has cost us so much labor and pains, tumbles about our ears. This has been the history of philosophy from time immemorial. A new but partial idea, or a new method is brought forward by some great master, and a system of apparently consistent philosophy based upon it. Disciples are numerous and enthusiastic. Eureka! Eureka! At last the true philosophy is found. But, alas, unsparing criticism carries out the new system to its logical results, and it ends in contradiction. Again, another system of philosophy is started; and the same unbounded enthusiasm, the same unsparing criticism, and the same hopeless contradiction follow in quick succession. This is literally an epitome of the history of human philosophy in every department except science—in other words, of all attempts at universal philosophy: for true science makes no pretension, yet at least, to an universal philosophy—science is, yet, but the philosophy of the *material universe*. The last attempt which has been made at universal philosophy is that of M. Comte. The Positive philosophy of this writer, though founded apparently on scientific methods, though elaborated with consummate genius and skill, though perhaps more beautiful and consistent, and embodying more valuable truth than any other system, forms, I believe, no exception to this general rule. Criticism overthrows this, too, by carrying it to its logical results, and showing its contradiction. As a purely scientific, or material philosophy, it is beyond all praise. Even as a philosophy of humanity it embodies an enormous amount of the most valuable truth, for man is material. But, just here, it begins also to fail, for man is *spiritual* as well as material.

The very fact that it begins to fail, and becomes inconsistent, as soon as it touches man, shows, incontestibly, that man is not purely material—that a purely scientific philosophy cannot solve the enigma of humanity. Let us then attempt to show the inconsistency of Comte's philosophy as applied to man; in other words, of his social philosophy.

We have already seen that animal organization becomes more perfect, and animal life higher, by means of differentiation of form and limitation of function of the integral parts, and consequently by mutual dependence of these parts. We have seen that in proportion as the independent life of the parts is merged into the general life of the whole by limitation of function, in the same proportion the life becomes higher and higher until in the highest organisms the part has no independent life or significance separated from the whole. This, then, is evidently the *ideal* of material organization. Now, if we are purely material beings; if social organization is a purely material organization—an organization founded upon the laws of matter alone, then surely the ideal of animal organization is the ideal of social organization also. * It follows then, that in proportion as the independent life of the individual is sacrificed, or merged in the general life of the community, by limitation of social functions, in the same proportion does society approach its true end; and when the independent life of the individual is entirely lost—the individual will or free agency is entirely sacrificed to the general will, and man becomes a complete slave to society; then the ideal is attained. Does not our best nature shrink back aghast from such a consummation? Is not the approach to it in some industrial communities of England and Belgium, for instance, deplorable in the last degree? This ideal is, happily, impossible to be realized. But what makes it impossible? What but the spiritual nature of man, tending always to individual independence and moral dignity. And why is it that communities organized upon an industrial basis, approach nearer to this ideal? Why, but that in this case, *material wants* form the bond of connection between the parts—that the industrial organization of society

(the Guild) is the most nearly connected through Organic Science with a material philosophy. According to M. Comte (and this is the only consistent doctrine of a purely material philosophy) the individual man is significant only as an integral part of the great organism called human society—man is made, only that society should grow and develop. Whereas, all human history and human consciousness tell us that society is only significant as a means of individual human culture—as a means of restoring the lost image of God in the human soul. I would represent, in a few words, the true state of the case thus: If organisms were mere dead matter, then the science of organization might be reduced to pure physics, and organic laws would be identical with physical laws. But organic laws are physical laws, under peculiar and higher conditions; modified by higher laws; controlled by a higher principle, called life. So, if man were mere animal, the laws and ideal of social organization would be identical with the laws and ideal of animal organization. But, in society, these laws of animal organization exist, it is true, but modified by the higher laws of our spiritual nature; and for this reason, and this alone, the ideal of social organization becomes different.

Again. The inconsistency of the philosophy may be placed in another light. There are two distinct, and in some sense, opposite principles in humanity, viz: the individual or *personal* and the *social*. According to every philosophy, the higher of these two is the social; and society will have attained its end in proportion as the social element preponderates over the personal element. This seems to be the meaning of M. Comte, when he speaks of the highest condition of society as that in which the "*Sociabilité*" preponderates over the "*Personnalité*." When translated into the only consistent language of the material philosophy, this is nothing more than the merging of the individual life into the general life already spoken of. Upon this idea Comte founds a noble eulogium on woman. "This sex," he says, "is certainly superior to ours in the most fundamental attribute of humanity, viz: the tendency to cause to prevail the *Sociabilité* over the *Person-*

alító." It seems to me that M. Comte has touched upon the very "experimentum crucis" by which his philosophy may be tried. If he had thoroughly analyzed the idea he would have seen that it contains a complete refutation of his whole philosophy. For, observe, there are two ways in which the Personal may be subordinate to the Social, one through our *material nature*, and the other through our *spiritual nature*. The former is subordination through *mutual dependence*, resulting from our *material wants*; the latter is subordination through sympathy or *love*, resulting from our *spiritual wants*. The one annihilates the individual independence of life; the other only enhances the dignity of the individual life. Without the former, society would no longer be an organized body; without the latter, society only would exist, for the individual would be of no value except as an integral part of the social organism. Now it is this latter, viz: the subordination of the Personal to the Social, through love—surely the highest attribute of humanity—this is the glory of woman. The other, viz: the subordination of the Personal to the Social through mutual dependence arising from limitation of social function, she is eminently disqualified for, because of the preponderance of her spiritual over her material nature. Man, on the contrary, by virtue of the strength of his material nature, is subordinated to society, principally through mutual dependence, with a necessary partial loss of his independence. Hence the whole organization of society, the Church, (as a material organization) the State, the Guild and all the subordinate corporations of these, is supported entirely by the male sex. M. Comte saw, that in woman, the Personal is subordinate to the Social, but did not perceive that the nature of this subordination is entirely different from that required by a purely material philosophy.

M. Comte is not blind to the disastrous effects of excessive limitation of function; but he deplors this, not so much because it ruins the independent dignity of the individual, but because it is finally subversive of society itself. But why is it subversive of society? Simply because organic sympathy

or mutual dependence is not enough, by itself, to bind together the parts of society—because such excessive limitation destroys the true spiritual sympathy between the classes—because mere dependence, without sympathy or love, is slavery of the worst kind, against which our spiritual nature revolts, and revolution is the result. But how would M. Comte remedy this terrible difficulty, the bane of modern society, and the necessary result, according to a material philosophy, of a differentiation of pursuits? By carrying the differentiation one step further; by making one other distinct class, viz: the class of philosophers, with M. Comte, himself, at the head, whose function, like that of the brain in the animal body, is to control and subordinate all other classes to their respective functions; thus destroying the liberty and free agency of every one except that of the head philosopher himself, whose will is the general will. No less characteristic, and yet perfectly consistent, is M. Comte's explanation of other points connected with our spiritual nature, such as belief in God, the immortality of the soul, &c. For him, humanity is God, and the highest worship is the complete mergence of the individual into humanity; immortality is but the continuance of the effect of our life and effort in the developement of society after our own death; we die as an individual, but the life-force which was embodied in us, dies not, but is merged into the general life-force of humanity, and thus we continue to live *potentially*, while *actually* we are no more. What a meagre substitute for the Christian hope of immortality.

I have thus attempted to show the fallacy of that philosophy which would make Sociology a mere higher branch of material science. I have dwelt longer on this, because it is the latest, and at the same time, the most thorough and consistent, and, therefore, most plausible and dangerous form of error ever presented in any philosophical system. The two other views of the basis of Sociology are still more evidently erroneous. The tendency of the Psychologist is to ignore, too much, the material basis of Sociology, the organic laws which, through our material nature, impress themselves upon the structure and

development of society. So, also, the political philosopher is too apt to cling to mere empirical laws, entirely unaware, or, perhaps, denying the existence of any connection between Sociology and other more fundamental departments of knowledge, particularly its connection with Organic Science. But I have attempted to prove that there is a truth as well as an error in each of these partial views, and that the error of each consists in its narrowness of view—in excluding both the others. Narrow-mindedness, dogmatism, bigotry, pride of our own opinions, these are the sources of almost all the error in this world. The true Philosopher knows that unalloyed error, like unalloyed truth, is very rare. Error is generally limited or distorted vision of truth. The tendency of my own mind is to believe that there is an unconscious wisdom (practical, not theoretical) in the collective humanity, and embodying itself in the forms and institutions of society, far greater than the wisdom of any one man; and that, therefore, it is the duty of the social Philosopher, like the scientific man, in all humility to accept the results of this collective wisdom as *facts in nature*, about which we may reason, but which we cannot change—as *embodied truth*, which it is the duty of the *conscious human reason* (philosophy) only to put into rational formulæ.

While I am convinced, therefore, that social science is equally connected with all the three subordinate courses or great departments, still, I am no less convinced, also, that at the present time the most important results to social science is to be expected from studying it in connection with Organic Science. My reason for believing so, is that science is the simplest, the most complete, and by far the most rational department of human knowledge. It is a law of human progress in knowledge, that the mind is not content, at first, to pass slowly and surely from one point to another, but runs rapidly backward and forward over the whole ground, making a cursory survey sufficient for the practical purposes of a rude and imperfect progress. And then comes science with its methods, and completes the work. The intuitive faculty first makes a

rapid preliminary survey which the rational faculty slowly perfects, by means of its admirable and delicate instruments called scientific methods. Guided by the intuitive faculty or, perhaps, by the rapid and rude use of scientific methods, the human mind quickly constructs a rude, temporary building in which to live, while it more leisurely collects materials and carefully builds a permanent edifice worthy of itself. Now the other two departments are yet in this first condition. In neither of these is the foundation even solidly laid. In neither of these has there yet been any solid, steady progress like that in science. The plane of social science, indeed, rests, and must rest upon three columns, but two of them are yet only in the provisional form, as temporary scaffolding; only one of them has been solidly laying its foundation, slowly and steadily building upwards, calmly, patiently, humbly abiding its time. Two of them, impatient to support the social system, have run up quickly, and have forgotten their true end and mission—have forgotten that they are but temporary structures; the other, less ambitious to connect at once, but mindful that it works for eternity, has slowly, carefully gone onward and upward until, in organic philosophy, it is even now laying the cap-stone which connects it solidly and forever with the over-arching plane which it was intended to support. Is not this a sublime spectacle of Godlike calmness and patience? Does not this, among all human works, approach nearest the type of the *Divine*? Heretofore the scientific department has not borne its share in throwing light upon social science; its tendency, in that direction, was not even perceived; its only benefits to society were supposed to be entirely connected with improvement in the subordinate arts, but not in the great art of social organization itself. Now, on the contrary, it is more solidly connected than any other department with social science, and must not only contribute directly to social advance, but, also, indirectly, by stimulating other departments by its example, and directing their course by its methods.

ARTICLE III.

THE SUPERNATURAL IN THE SCRIPTURES.

In the earlier pages of this Review, a luminous exposition is given of the "office of Reason in regard to Revelation."*

The bare hint of Butler,† and the fragmentary statements of Jeremy Taylor‡ being taken as merely suggestive of the theme, a new field of thought is opened, and our attitude indicated with precision towards a system claiming to be Divine. The distinction is drawn between the natural and supernatural in Revelation; between "truths which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart to conceive, which descend to us immediately from Heaven, and communicate with no principle, no matter, no conclusion here below," and "those truths which are intuitively evident without revelation—or which reason can demonstrate from premises furnished by our natural faculties." To the former class belong "the august mysteries of Christianity;" to the latter, the truths of philosophy and science.

Corresponding to this division of the subjects of revelation, a distinction is made of the use of reason. "The office of reason in the supernatural department of revelation may be positive, but *can never be negative* §—in the natural, it is negative, but only to a very limited extent, if at all, positive.

The subject discussed in the article from which these extracts

* Vol. I., Art. I.

† Analogy, part I., chap. 8.

‡ Ductor Dubitantium. Book I., chap. 2.

§ "There is one exception to this rule. When a professed revelation contradicts itself, or one which is known to be real; then reason has a negative power."—Vol. I., art. I., p. 14. *Note.*

It will be observed that this exception does not include any matter that we shall consider.

are taken, touches the scope of our present essay but in a single, though a vital point. We will confine our attention to the second of the above four affirmations, and endeavour to show that objections to revelation on the ground of its *supernatural* doctrines are not valid.

1. And, in the first place, let us remind our readers of the manifest advantage possessed by the sceptic in urging these objections, it being easy to press a difficulty which, when insoluble, can be rebutted only by a patient accumulation of proofs in favor of the system that presents it. For, as Paschal has observed, "not only is it difficult, but impossible for the human mind to *retain* the impression of a large combination of evidence, even if it could, for a moment, realize the collective *effect* of the whole."

"The truth of our religion (says Bishop Butler), like the truth of common matters, is to be judged of by all the evidence taken together. And, unless the whole series of things which may be alleged in this argument, and every particular thing in it, can be reasonably supposed to have been by accident, (for here the stress of the argument for Christianity lies,) then is the truth of it proved. * * It is obvious how much advantage the nature of this evidence gives to those persons who attack, especially in conversation. For it is easy to show, in a short and lively manner, that such things are liable to objection, but impossible to show, in like manner, the united force of the whole argument in one view." *

Let us bear in mind, however, that though it be easy to raise, flippantly, these objections, and though they impose on the shallow and unreflecting, yet they do not have any real force as arguments, unless a distinct objection be raised on every point in the teachings of revelation, and unless each objection *be absolutely insurmountable* by any rational hypothesis respecting the statement in question.

2. This leads us, in the next place, to inquire what is the

* Analogy, part 2., cap. vii.

value of the supposed presumption raised against any truth by its being implicated with difficulties that we cannot solve. We affirm this presumption to be very small, so small that almost the slightest external evidence will overbear it. This is apparent, every day, in the practical affairs of life. The case stands thus—the conclusion we ordinarily reach is, in itself, and independently of any special difficulties, only a *probable* conclusion, which has been gained by weighing the arguments on both sides. There is a conflict of testimony ; reasons are urged on one side, reasons are urged on the other side ; they may be nicely balanced ; one side may preponderate only a little ; we are compelled to rest in probability, for “ probabilities are the very guide of life.” Now, when we have reached this probable conclusion, we are beset by these difficulties ; but they do not move us ; they cannot outweigh the evidence in which we rest. For example, a criminal is arraigned on the charge of murder ; one witness swears to an alibi, and two others, more trustworthy, to the fact of the murder ; we decide to accept the evidence that finds him guilty. But here rise up the improbabilities of his having committed the deed. The absence of motive, the known benevolence of his nature, the near relationship and reciprocal obligations subsisting between the parties, the prisoner’s air of injured innocence, all tend to rebuke the opinion of his guilt. But all this does not invalidate the positive proof.

So in the case of Christianity ; there are the evidences in its favor ; and there are the objections to *the evidences* which constitute negative arguments against it. After due consideration, we pronounce the proof sufficient and accept the truth of the system ; then we are plied with the difficulties in which the subject itself is involved. Now we insist that these difficulties shall not be allowed to over-balance positive and adequate proof in favor of it.

The case is even stronger than this in favor of Christianity. For consider the peculiar nature of the opposition to it. There is no *argument* against it, properly speaking ; no *positive* evidence rebutting its claims ; no proof in favor of any other

scheme. There is nothing but *objections*, first, to its *evidences*, and then to its *contents*. Should infidelity succeed in showing Christianity to be false, it would not thereby prove any thing else to be true; the conclusion would be a barren negative. It is right that these objections should be thus readily set aside by evidence, for two reasons; first, if the matter be narrowly examined, still greater difficulties will be found to exist on the other side; and in the next place, these objections are based solely on our ignorance; the difficulty simply is that we cannot explain them.

3. We are not disposed to depreciate these difficulties, considered as *difficulties*, for we believe them to be utterly inexplicable by us; they are inscrutable mysteries that no human intellect can solve. But we contend that they are not logical *arguments* against *Christianity*, nor valid *objections* to it. This will be made out, provided we can show that greater difficulties attend its rejection.

What obstacles, then, must he surmount who would pronounce Christianity to be false?

In regard to these very mysteries, he must believe that man has invented what no man can comprehend; that doctrines have been freely proclaimed and widely received for ages, which utterly transcend the highest powers of the intellect.

He must believe that the most exclusive nation in the world devised the only religion capable of universal expansion.

He must believe that a horde of illiterate slaves invented and practised the sublimest worship the world ever saw.

He must believe that a few ignorant fishermen promulgated a system of morals immeasurably more pure and lofty than that of any Philosopher.

He must believe that these rude Gallilæans formed and presented the only ideal of perfect virtue known to man; that their myth is superior in action, in speech, in purity of heart to any personage that ever lived on earth.

He must believe that they devoted themselves, soul and body, to the propagation of falsehoods, without any wordly advantage,

in spite of bloody persecutions, and at the certain peril of eternal woe.

He must believe that this religion, having such an origin, was disseminated by such agents in the face of a world in arms against it, and so successfully that it soon became well-nigh universal.

All this is a thousand times more incredible than any thing that is related in the Gospel; yet all this must be swallowed by every one who rejects the Gospel.

These are some of the difficulties that lie in the way of the whole tribe of infidel speculations; if we were to examine their systems in detail, we would find that peculiar and insuperable difficulties attend each one of them. This, however, we will not attempt.

If, therefore, it be a real objection to Christianity that difficulties attach to it, we cannot relieve ourselves by flying to the opposite conclusion. Now suppose the difficulties on the two sides to be equal, they can do no more than create a suspended judgment; and then the *positive* evidence for Christianity must be allowed to decide the question in its favor. For infidelity *has no positive* evidence to aid her cause; not only is her conclusion a mere negative, but all her arguments are negative in form. Her only weapon is objections; the only result a sceptical doubt; but the obstacles in her way that we have just stated, and the counter presumption that we have thereby raised, *annul* the force of her objections, and leave Christianity with the undiminished support of the positive evidence in its favor.

But, again, as Butler strongly insists, the difference between the nature of the evidence that Christianity presents, and the objections urged by infidelity is very remarkable.

“The evidence which sustains Christianity is all such as man is competent to consider; and is precisely of the same nature as that which enters into his every-day calculations of probability; while the objections spring entirely from our ignorance and presumption. They suppose that we know more of the Divine administration, of what God may have permitted,

of what is possible and impossible, of the ultimate development of an imperfectly developed system, and of its relation to the entire universe, than we do or can know." *

An illustration may be drawn from the objections to miracles. The evidence we have in favor of miracles is that direct human testimony on which we are accustomed to rely every day; the objections are chiefly two, either that miracles are *impossible*, or that they are *incredible*. But nothing except the greatest ignorance, or the greatest presumption could perpetrate such folly; for the first allegation limits the Almighty; the second would compel us to deny a miracle, even though one had been wrought.

There is also a striking difference between the objections urged by infidelity against *Christianity*, and those with which we have plied *infidelity*—a difference that makes strongly for revelation. The former, as we have seen, are merely the expressions of ignorance amazed at the inscrutable ways of God; the latter are precisely such objections as are employed by us in the daily walks of life, and the appeal made by them is to the common principles of nature. For example, we say that on the infidel hypothesis, the existence and the spread of *Christianity* are unaccountable: why? because they would be effects without an adequate cause. Dr. Arnold † tells us that the more he read the "Commentaries," the less could he persuade himself to consider Cæsar as their author. Is this opinion *necessarily* absurd? Is it not possible that there might be sufficient internal evidence to justify a departure from the common belief respecting the writer of those histories? If so, and no one will deny it, then it is not only a valid, but *plain* objection to say that the position assumed by infidelity in repudiating the Divine origin of the Scriptures is untenable, because an examination of their contents renders it incredible that the persons, whose names they bear, were the unaided authors of them.

* Reason and Faith, p. 377.

† Later Roman Commonwealth, p. 250.

Thus we have shown that the difficulties in the way of the infidel hypothesis are greater than those which attach to Christianity—greater in themselves, because they are more numerous, more formidable, and more palpable, and that they are not overborne, as in the other case, by positive testimony.

4. This reply proceeds on the assumption that infidelity is bound to furnish some positive system of truth in place of the religion that it rejects. And this is a fair demand. Man is a religious creature. Religion is not an artificial want, but a prime necessity of his nature. Two lines of proof sustain this; one drawn from his consciousness, the other from the facts in his history. As to the first, man's reason decides in relation to things, not only that they are true or false, but that they are good or evil; this moral sense is an elementary principle of his mind. With regard to much of his conduct he determines that it is wrong; he judges and condemns himself; he judges instantly, instinctively, necessarily. Conscience not only pronounces on his conduct, but also suggests the fear of retribution; he dreads punishment; he recognizes the vicarious nature of conscience, and anticipates a more terrible avenger; he is driven to measures for warding off the expected wrath. These measures constitute his religion; whether true or false, whether pure or corrupt, it is his religion. If man act consistently with the principles of his nature he will be religious. But again, the whole history of our race exhibits man as a worshipper. No nation or tribe has ever been found destitute of all religion—whatever else he may lack, he invariably takes care to provide himself with this. He may live without houses, without clothes, with no food except what he shares with the beasts; he may be destitute of the marriage relation, and of domestic bonds; parental affection may be extinguished, the mother may forget her sucking child; he may be without law and without government; he may have almost lost the noble gift of speech; but still in his ignorance and degradation this groveling savage has a *religion*. He is a *worshipper*—it may be of the sun, it may be of a reptile, it may be of a hero, or yet

of a graven image—but one thing is invariably true of him, he has a God, and after some ritual he adores his divinity.

Hence, it is evident that man is by nature religious, and, therefore, the demand that we make on the Infidel Philosophers is just, that they shall furnish an adequate supply to this universal want of the race. They have no right to exterminate Christianity until they shall have provided a substitute. The multitudes who now rest satisfied with the religion of Christ, if it shall be taken away, cannot remain utterly destitute; their inmost souls will cry out against it; they will seek or invent some other. It is incumbent on these, the wise men of the age, to see to it that the multitude make a proper choice, lest their last state be worse than the first. Again, this being an original necessity of our nature, it is antecedently probable that provision has been made for it by the Creator. These learned men, who claim by intellect and acquisition to be fitted to instruct mankind, are called upon to ascertain and to make known that provision. It is their duty to give us something positive, to agree upon some system which shall be better supported than Christianity by external evidence, and more clearly illuminated by a light from within. We hold them to this. Have they done it? As we have seen, every system devised by them is open to infinitely greater objections than those that lie against Christianity. But another fatal difficulty is, that all their systems are destitute of authority. Now, it is certain that men will not receive religion by force of argument. Such a thing has never happened on earth. Every religion that has propagated itself within the domain of history, has done so under the pressure of an authority which did not merely solicit, but which imperatively demanded obedience. Christianity claims to be clothed with an authority higher than that which has urged on any other religion, even the authority of an infinite and holy God. Infidelity has no authority higher than that of a cloistered student, which, with the mass of men, is none at all. The case stands thus: we have a religion that we think is fully adequate to every spiritual want, and that is supported by what we suppose to be sufficient proof. Cer-

tain men rise and tell us that insuperable difficulties environ it. We reply, that we *must have a religion*, and ask them to show us a better before they deprive us of this. They bring forth their systems; we examine them, and instead of finding them to be the perfect apparatus for the cure of souls that their authors had advertised, they are "so checkered and speckled; pieces of joining so crossly indented and whimsically dovetailed; cabinets so variously inlaid, pieces of such diversified mosaic, such tessellated pavements without cement; here a bit of black stone and there a bit of white, that they are, indeed, a curious show, but utterly unsafe to touch, and unsure to stand upon."

And besides this, they are devoid of proof; they rest upon no evidence except the speculations of the single brain that evolved them. They are wholly incompatible with each other, and mutually destructive. It is necessary to choose among them; but there are no measures of certainty except in determining that all are false; they are alike unsupported by proofs, and alike absurd. Each is the muttering of some dreamer suffering under a midnight incubus; the reverie of a man prostrate in a fit of mental indigestion, brought on by the total neglect of his proper food, the truth of God, and by a voracious devouring of unripe knowledge. These phantasies we are called upon to accept instead of the Gospel.

No! Let us have a religion which at least claims to be divine; let us listen to teachers who speak with authority, and not as the scribes! Let us not descend so low as to accept our religion from a fellow-mortal, who does not even pretend to have come from God! Let us not substitute philosophy for religion, the thoughts of a subtle but perverted intellect for a divine revelation!

5. But aside from these special considerations, let us inquire whether man is competent to raise these objections at all. To what is he objecting? Is it to matters plain, simple and within his reach? On the other hand, it is to sublime and supernatural mysteries; it is to the higher and hidden doctrines of a system professing to descend from heaven. Now is reason

capable of pronouncing against revelation on the ground of these august mysteries? Is it not guilty of a wicked audacity in attempting to lift its feeble protest against these transcendent discoveries? Bishop Butler says that "although objections against the *evidence* of Christianity are most seriously to be considered, yet, objections against *Christianity itself* are, in a great measure, frivolous; almost all objections against it, except those which are alleged against the particular proofs of its coming from God."* If any objections to Christianity be frivolous, they are the very ones now under discussion—objections which oppose themselves to its higher doctrines. For, as was said before, a clear instance of the violation of any common and natural truth would be a valid objection, but it is far otherwise with the supernatural statements; they cannot violate any known truth, because they are confessedly above and without the circle of present knowledge. To quote the language of another, † "to justify a negative judgment upon internal grounds, there must be contradiction to previous knowledge. The very idea of the supernatural involves the idea that its discoveries are new. The field which it occupies is inaccessible to our natural faculties, and having no previous information of the subject it discloses, we cannot condemn it on account of inconsistency with known truth. The revelation, in this aspect, is the source of new ideas, perfectly independent of every other source, and it is to be expected that they should differ as widely from those derived from experience as these, in turn, differ among themselves. When truths beyond the reach of nature are announced upon the authority of God, a new world is opened to reason, a world of invisible realities and mysterious things. All may be strange and unexpected as the scenes of the moon or some distant planet would be to a traveller from earth. Still, as such a traveller would be guilty of great folly in refusing to credit his senses because the appearances before him differed from those

* Analogy, part II., cap 8

† Soc. Pres. Rev., vol. I., art. 1. Office of Reason, &c.

in the world he had left, so reason would be guilty of equal folly in rejecting the disclosures of revelation because they were unlike the discoveries of nature. We are no more competent to say, beforehand, what shall or shall not be revealed than we are to pronounce, independently of experience, upon the species of information which our senses might be expected to supply. The embryo in the womb is as capable of predicting what sort of a world it shall enter, as natural reason of predicting the things of the Spirit of God. Revelation may again be likened to a new sense, unfolding to reason a new field of ideas; and it would be no less preposterous to discredit its testimony because it was different from that of nature, than it would be to despise the information of the eye, because it differed from that of the ear. We have no natural measures of supernatural mysteries, and as they, therefore, cannot contradict philosophy or science, they cannot be judged by the wisdom of men."

6. These objections proceed on false notions of the proper limitation of our faculties. We admit the principle that "the competency of reason to judge in any case, is the measure of its right." Whatever reason is able to do, it has the right to do. It is a question strictly of ability. We deny the competency of reason to raise these objections. An arrogant notion of its sufficiency prompts to these speculations. Humility, the most emphatic dictate of philosophy, as well as a sacred duty of religion, will be the salutary lesson taught by correct views of the bounds within which reason can move.

These mysteries respect God; the difficulties presented by them hinge on their connection with him. Hence, by showing the relations of our knowledge to the Divine Being, we expose the absurdity of these objections, and indicate the legitimate bounds of our inquiries.

We lay it down as a radical truth, that in no such sense as these cavils suppose can we be said to *know God*.

The impossibility of thus knowing Him is *double*; first, as He is *infinite*, and secondly, as He is an infinite *Being*. If we know nothing of Him except that he is *infinite*, we can

demonstrate our ignorance ; and then, in the next place, we can give special reasons why we cannot know adequately such an infinite as He is.

Because He is infinite, we must fail to conceive His *being* and His *character*. In the case of the finite this latter difficulty does not meet us. We can think, separately, the qualities of man, and then embrace them all in a consummate thought, and thus present the true and adequate idea of man. But we cannot fully apprehend the Divine attributes *separately*, much less combine them in one grand conception. The *quality* of the attribute, if we may so express it, is, to some extent, appreciable by us ; but its *infinity*, which is essential to it as a characteristic of God, transports it beyond our reach.

To illustrate—we can think of power and of wisdom, but infinite power and wisdom we cannot cogitate. We can appreciate *love*, but *Divine* love we strive in vain to fathom.

Now, if His nature and perfections be necessarily presented under the character of *infinite*—if the sublime definition be true that “He is infinite and eternal in His being,” and in all His attributes, then it is evident that He stands the great representative of one pole of the *unconditioned*. But not entirely so—for, according to the aphorism of a great philosopher, “the Divinity, in a certain sense is *revealed*, in a certain sense is *concealed*.” “He exhibits himself under certain relations to us ; we only apprehend these relations, we cannot know His nature. We know Him in His relations—we do not know Him in Himself.” “He is, at once, known and unknown.”

“The last and highest consecration of all true religion must be an altar to the unknown and unknowable God”—that is to say, beyond our partial and relative knowledge of God, there stretches out a boundless expanse that we do not and cannot know.

Let it not be said that these relations *condition* God. They only limit and define our attitude with respect to certain manifestations of God, which, whatever else may be true of it, we aver is not the posture of cognition. His thoughts and affec-

tions (so to speak) are not changed or modified by these relations. To illustrate by contrast with man ; the qualities of our nature depend on the relationships that we hold for their existence. For example, the feeling of paternity cannot arise in the heart until a man becomes a father. But God, in giving us the adoption of sons and proclaiming himself "our Father," does not develop any principle of His nature hitherto dormant, but only exhibits what already existed.

In one view of the case then, God is the *unconditioned* ; in another, he is *relatively revealed*.

Under this distinction we propose to show the absurdity of these objections to a system claiming to be Divine, by proving, first, that considered as *unconditioned*, we know *nothing* of Him ; and secondly, that considered as *revealed*, we do not know *enough*.

The *unconditioned* cannot be an *object of thought*.

God is infinite—the infinite and the absolute, as defined by Hamilton, are the species and extremes of the unconditioned. It is a high principle of a correct philosophy that the unconditioned cannot be *immediately* known ; that our knowledge is only of that which is conditioned.

That which is limited by *space*, unless it be absolutely limited, that is, confined to the smallest portion of space possible, is conditioned ; if it be thus *unconditionally limited* it is called the absolute ; if it be unconditionally *unlimited* it has traversed the entire meridian of the conditioned, and stands at the other pole of the unconditioned, and is called the infinite. So, that which is limited by time, unless it be bounded by the smallest possible portion of time, is conditioned. And so, also, that which is comprehended in *thought* is conditioned ; for "to think is to condition." At the two extremes of the range of human conception, stand the infinite and the absolute ; on the one hand that which transcends our powers by its vastness, and on the other, that which avoids our curiosity by its littleness—as by a faint analogy, in the material world, the starry spheres surpass our observation, and the final atoms elude it.

Let it not be supposed, however, that because the infinite

and the absolute, occupy identical relations to thought, they sustain similar relations to existence; nor, on the other hand, because neither of them can be realized in thought, that neither exists. They are contradictories. The doctrine "of contradictories is the highest principle in Logic, it is, that of two contradictories, both cannot, but one must be true." We may not be able to conceive of either, but one may be shown to be false, and hence the other must be true. For example, man's *moral liberty*, and the doctrine of *fate*, are both inexplicable and inconceivable; yet, the latter being shown to be false as traversing our sense of responsibility, the former must be true, though it still remain inconceivable. But further, of these two species of the unconditioned, whatever is true of one, is false as respects the other; for example, if one exist, the other *does not* exist; so that though they bear the same relation to thought, they sustain exactly opposite relations to existence. Now we know, for a multiplicity of reasons, that the infinite exists, hence it follows necessarily that the absolute does not exist. In our thinking, both are arrived at by the law of "mental impotence;" they are negative ideas, and neither can be positively construed to the mind. But the absolute is nothing more than a negative idea, an "imbecility of the mind," while the infinite, beside this relation to thought, has a real and substantial existence among things. Then, on the principle that the knowledge of contradictories is one, it follows that we know as much of the absolute, which is proven to have no existence, as we do of the infinite, *i. e.* nothing.

Let us observe, in the next place, a striking fact which meets us at the outset; amid all the speculations of the world, man has never made any advance in his knowledge of the infinite, whether infinite space, or infinite duration, or infinite degree, or the nature of God—using the term "*nature*" to express the correlation of his attributes, and not the underlying essence, nor the relations of his attributes to us. Indeed, the best among the ancients as, *e. g.*, Aristotle, denied the infinite (unconditioned) to be an object of thought.

Again. In the arguments by which we prove the existence

of God, consider the state of the conclusion reached ; we first establish a negative proposition, and then, by the great law previously adverted to, infer its contradictory. To illustrate by the most direct and the most abstruse :

The argument from design simply enables us to deny the causeless existence of the world, and thus compels us to receive its contradictory, creation, which necessarily involves an intelligent agent. We are placed in a dilemma ; we behold the universe, we must either say that it exists without a cause, or that it was created. To admit the first would run counter to the law of causality which, though variously explicated by Philosophers, is a fundamental principle of our nature ; hence we must affirm the latter.

We cannot conceive either of an absolute beginning or of an eternal existence, and though knowing that, as contradictories, one must be true and the other false, we might not be able to determine between them ; but if the former be shown to be ultimately in conflict with the same causal law, then along with its falseness the truth of the other is proven, for "the knowledge of contradictories is one."

Further. A presumptive argument is afforded by the present state of this question in Philosophy. There are four systems of the philosophy of the unconditioned ; two deny that it can be known, or conceived, viz: the systems of Kant and Hamilton ; of the others, one affirms it to be cognisable, but non-conceivable ; the other, that it is both cognisable and conceivable ; but these affirmations are made on grounds that are demonstrably either false and absurd, or self-contradictory. The first of these two is that of Schelling ; his position is, "that the unconditioned is cognisable, but not conceivable ; it can be known only by a sinking back into identity with the absolute, but is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflection," which are only of the relative and different.

He admits that we cannot apprehend it by the ordinary faculties of the mind, but postulates a higher and extraordinary power by which we realize the absolute. We must lose sight of all we know by consciousness, must lose consciousness

itself, and being transported out of the world, and out of ourselves, we become absorbed into the infinite.

As described by a great critic, "this theory founds philosophy on the annihilation of consciousness, and on the identification of the unconscious philosopher with God." To reach the point where this sublime faculty of intuition shall meet and become identified with the absolute—"by abstraction we annihilate the object, and by abstraction we annihilate the subject of consciousness." But what is his emphatic question—what remains? The condemning answer is—"nothing." And further, this scheme, having destroyed the bonds of nature, utterly fails to connect the finite with the infinite; and so, also, it is unable to show how the knowledge acquired by intuition is conveyed to consciousness.

Thus this doctrine, if tried by common sense, is absurd; if by philosophy, is false; if by religion, is blasphemous.

The next system attempting to afford man a knowledge of the infinite is that of Cousin.

He tells us that we know the absolute, as we know the conditioned, by "consciousness and reflection;" that in the very act of apprehending the finite, our minds rebound and grasp the infinite; thus appears the radical vice of his system, viz: that he construes the finite and infinite as contradictories, whereas they are only contraries. This error vitiates his whole discussion.

But, further, he is plainly self-contradictory. For example, he says, "I can conceive God only in his manifestations, and the signs which he gives of his existence."* This observation is just and true; and we draw from it the inevitable inference that we cannot know God in His infinitude; for, as our author himself says, "in order absolutely to comprehend the infinite it is necessary to have an infinite power of comprehension, and that is not granted to us. God, in manifesting himself, retains something in himself, which nothing finite can absolutely

* *Hist. Phil.*, 2 Series, vol. 1, p. 21. *Note.*

manifest; consequently it is not permitted us to comprehend absolutely.*

Now we take this to be a statement of the truth expressed by us previously, that "God is both known and unknown," and which is shortly after explicitly enunciated by him in the terms, that God is at once the living God, and the God concealed, "*Deus vivus et Deus absconditus*," and it follows irresistibly that it is His infinity which lifts Him immeasurably above our comprehension. But, at variance with all this, our author, on the same page, utters the remarkable and inconsistent declaration, that "we have the most precise idea of infinitude." Now, we feel certain that he cannot reconcile this collision of sentiment without—as indeed he has done—making his infinite nothing more than an indefinite; his absolute but a relative.

But again, he says "God is essentially active and creative," *i. e.* God is an absolute cause, *i. e.* we cannot conceive of Him except as "active and creative;" but action and creation are conditions. Now, the infinite cannot be conditioned; hence it is not as infinite that we can conceive God, *i. e.* the Divine infinity is not an object of consciousness. Thus, in order to connect the infinite with the finite—God with the world—he must condition the infinite, which is a contradiction in terms.

All this, and more, will be found exhibited by a writer already repeatedly referred to, in a review of a work of this author, preceding and introducing the one from which our excerpts are taken. He proves most conclusively that "the restrictions to which Cousin subjects intelligence, divine and human, implicitly deny a knowledge, even a conception of the absolute, both to God and man."

Thus, these two systems fail to subject the infinite to our conception; every scheme making a similar attempt may be fundamentally identified with one or the other of these. Hence

* Cousin's Hist. of Mod. Phil., vol. 1, sec. 5. Note 1, p. 104. See also, Cousin's Elements of Psychology, p. 580.

we conclude that if the unconditioned be cogitable, philosophy has utterly failed to articulate the method ; and this we present as a presumptive argument against its possibility.

In the next place, our ability to conceive the unconditioned *may be tested*.

Let us endeavor to form the conception of the unconditionally unlimited—that which is so great that it cannot be any greater—of a whole that cannot be conceived of as the part of a still greater whole. So, on the other hand, let us strive to realize the unconditionally *limited*—that which is so small that it cannot possibly be any smaller—a part that cannot be conceived of as a whole, embracing other parts. Let us attempt to pursue the infinite divisibility of matter ; or, let us conceive a universe so vast that we cannot add to it another world. We sink prostrate under the superhuman task. In striving to attain to the infinite, we only reach the indefinite—“ than which no two ideas are more opposed.”

Endeavor to think of infinite time ; we add year to year—century to century, millenium to millenium, and at last only reach an indefinite ; for we can still add another period to it, we can double it, we can quadruple it.

But again. We cannot realize a million of years, much less *eternal duration*. We can express, by a few figures, ideas of number which the mind will in vain strive to grasp ; how then shall it embrace that which all numbers fail to convey ?

But again. Suppose the mind able to retain and comprehend these ideas of time, and let it, with every successive act of thought add millions to billions, it is clear that *eternity* alone will afford scope to gather, and to express, the infinite conception. Hence, to say nothing of his powers, the limitations on man's existence debar him from the idea of the infinite. He must, himself, be *eternal* (not simply immortal, because this involves the idea of *beginning*, and of the lack of completion) ere he can compass the idea of eternity.

Think of *infinite space* ; however we enlarge our conceptions of the extent of space, we are still able to think of a surrounding space beyond ; and if we embrace that, a still wider

circle expands; and encompassing that, a still mightier circumference meets us, and we feel that the final periphery must be infinite only because we utterly fail to compass it.

If neither infinite time nor infinite space can be conceived by us, how shall we comprehend *Him* who filleth *all time* and *all space*?

To quote the language of the great Philosopher* whose guidance we have followed for some time, and from whom we now part—"Thought necessarily supposes *conditions*; and as the greyhound cannot outstrip his shadow, nor the eagle outsoar the atmosphere in which he floats, and by which alone he may be supported, so the mind cannot transcend that sphere of limitation, within and through which, exclusively, the possibility of thought is realized."

This closes the evidence for the first proposition—that "God, as *infinite*, cannot be an object of thought."

Bear in mind precisely what we are attempting to show—not that we have *no* idea of God—for as we shall see presently, we have many sublime and blessed ideas of Him. But the general proposition is, that our idea is *inadequate*. This is proven by two lines of reasoning—the one just passed over, which points out a certain quality of the Divine Being, viz: *infinity*, and affirms that we are unable to form any conception of it. To illustrate, we can conceive of *space* and *time*, they are necessary conditions of thought; but of infinite space and of infinite time we cannot conceive. *Infinity* every where staggers us. The inference is that as this characteristic of God is absolutely hidden from us, the clearest view of other features in His nature would still leave Him partly shrouded in mystery; our conception of Him as a great whole, would still be defective.

The argument on which we now enter tends to show that even of so much of His character as we do know, our notion is necessarily *imperfect*—that in this sense we cannot know Him fully.

* Sir Wm. Hamilton. Philosophy of the Unconditioned.

The final conclusion will be, that as in one view He is entirely beyond our reach, and in another only imperfectly known, we are incapable of judging of His character, and purposes, and ways.

We cannot, in any sense, know God *fully*.

We know any thing only *relatively* and phenomenally ; we know nothing absolutely. For example, we know nothing more of matter than its properties ; and only such of these as display themselves ; we know nothing of that of which these are the qualities—nothing of its *essence*. It is only by a psychological necessity that reason affirms its existence ; it is only from direct revelation that faith receives the statement.

And so of mind, we know nothing of it except its qualities, and these only as they are manifested. We know and can know nothing of the substance in which they reside. We can pronounce no judgment on these exhibitions unless they bear some relation to previous exhibitions. Our knowledge of the gravity of matter does not enable us to affirm, or deny, respecting its expansibility ; but our knowledge of its extension fits us to deny its absolute compressibility.

Our acquaintance with the relations of the mind to truth in general, and to moral truth in particular, may enable us to determine whether the judgment and conscience are to be distinguished, or are identical ; but this investigation contributes nothing directly to contravene or establish the facts respecting memory. So, also, we know the Deity only phenomenally, the attributes we ascribe to Him (independently of Scripture) are but generalizations of his various modes of action. We know what He is, only from what He has done.

If, now, He should manifest qualities new and different from any before exhibited, we possess no measures by which to judge of them, or, if in a new procedure attributes formerly known should be developed in connection with others hitherto concealed, we are not competent to pronounce what modification of action this fresh adjustment will entail.

Now, the Gospel is a new and an extraordinary display of

the Divine perfections; hence, we are disqualified from pronouncing against it, either as false or absurd.

The notion that our ignorance of God, and His purposes, is entirely owing to our earthly and fallen state, and that when disembodied and glorified, we shall know these mysteries perfectly, or even approximate a clear conception of them, is entirely assumptive. We yield our opponents too much in admitting it. Philosophy and religion alike rebuke the opinion. Instructed by the one, and armed with the other, we drive our enemies from the out-posts of infidelity, into the very citadel of *Atheism*; for, as a heathen writer says, "a God known would be no God at all."

Our present untoward circumstances are undoubtedly hindrances; but a permanent and immovable barrier is found in the limitation of our faculties; a limitation attaching to us as creatures. We can never fully know, because we shall always be finite. As Christians, we are confident of the correctness of this principle, which we urge resistlessly against our adversaries, because it accords with the statements of Scripture respecting another and higher order of intelligence. Peter, referring to the exhibition of the Divine perfections now being enacted on earth, says, "which things the angels desire to look into;" and Paul, in speaking of the mystery which, from the beginning of the world, had been hid in God, and of the manifold wisdom involved in it, and of the eternal purpose embracing it, declared that all these things are to be made known to the heavenly principalities by the *Church*. It follows from this that the lofty intelligences of heaven are dependent on the transactions of earth for fuller insight into the perfections and nature of God.

Now, while this excludes the possibility of such attainments in the heavenly state as we sometimes dream of, it furnishes important hints respecting the relation of the highest created intelligence to the infinite Being. It is evident from the passages quoted that they do not directly gaze upon and conceive the nature and attributes of God, nor fully comprehend His works and designs; but that by earnest study of the develop-

ment of His plans, they catch glimpses of Him, who, to them, as to all creatures, is unknowable and inconceivable. We also infer that there will be no radical change in our method of acquiring knowledge; we shall possess increased facilities, both by reason of personal improvement, and a more advantageous position, but the conditions of thought will remain essentially the same.

God is infinite; but this is not a conclusive expression of Deity. He is not only infinite, He is also a Spirit; He is not only infinite, but power, wisdom, holiness, justice, goodness and truth are attributes of His nature. True, infinity may be predicated of every thing appertaining to God—His love is infinite, His justice is infinite, His power is infinite, His wisdom is infinite; but infinity does not destroy these qualities; it exalts them, and renders them perfections. God, then, is something else than simply infinite—this is our loftiest idea of Him, *He is God*; that is, by whatever we ascribe to Him as God, other than infinity, He is distinguished from other infinities—space, time, and degree: even as by infinity He is distinguished from whatever is limited.

God is not identical, in our conception, with infinite space and duration; yet they are infinite. Now, in what is God distinguished from other infinities? In two ways—by attributes, and by relations. These, considered as *qualities* and *relations*, we can partially apprehend; considered as *infinite*, we cannot apprehend them at all; and considered as the attributes and relations of *an infinite Being*, our notion must be utterly inadequate.

God is a spirit, and has manifested the attributes of power, wisdom, justice, goodness; these are clearly seen from the creation of the world; being understood by the things that are made; so that men are without excuse in their ignorance and sin. And they are revealed in His word with fuller light, and greater emphasis; and thus impose on us the highest obligations to render the correspondent duties.

We conceive and feel these attributes as substantial and sublime realities; yet we are deeply conscious that our notion

of them falls far below the reality. And the comparatively feeble impressions they make on us, show that they have never been pressed on our minds with their full weight; still these attributes distinguish Him from other infinities, and give us the idea, not of space, or of time, or of degree, but of *God*.

In the next place, God sustains to us the relations of Creator, of Ruler, of Judge, of Saviour, of Father; no other infinite is capable of such relations, and in apprehending these relations, we embrace the distinctive characteristics of God.

It is our glory and happiness that we can contemplate Him in these lofty and lovely attitudes. But we have not exhausted their significance; we do not know all that is meant by these gracious terms. We count not ourselves to have apprehended, but are continually reaching forth unto those things which are before, and pressing toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God. And let us remember that this confession of ignorance is made by an inspired Apostle, who had conversed face to face with the Son of God, who had been wrapt to the third heaven, and permitted to witness mysteries which it was not lawful to disclose. He comes from the immediate presence of God; his spirit radiant like the face of Moses, with celestial brightness, and under the impulse of the Divine Spirit tells us that eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man the things that God has prepared for them that love Him. And this is our conclusion—that we only know in part.

But it may be asked, can we appreciate these relations without knowing Him fully? *We can!* We may know *so much* of Him without knowing all. We recognize the sun as the light of the world, and the centre of our system, and yet Astronomy fails to describe the nature of that glorious orb; and cannot tell whether it be a world on fire, or an opaque body surrounded by a luminous and heated atmosphere, or whether the vast conflagration be supplied with combustible matter by the constant falling in of comets.

The child loves and recognizes its father, but may be utterly unaware that he is a powerful statesman, a profound scholar,

or a mighty captain. It knows his relationship to it; it feels the tenderness he lavishes, but of his great schemes, lofty thoughts, and gigantic labors it is entirely ignorant. So we may know what God is to us, but we do not know what He is in Himself, or even what relations He sustains to other creatures. If the instruments of investigation fail us in the one case, the power of thought may be lacking in the other; if we deny this, we must claim ourselves to be infinite.

If, in conclusion, it be asked why such insuperable difficulties are allowed to baffle us, it may be remarked, in the first place, that it could not have been otherwise. Every created being must be finite; that is to say, no creature can embrace the whole of knowledge, for knowledge is infinite; hence the barrier exists in himself, and though the present obstacles should be overcome, others beyond will meet us; the only change possible would be to remove them to a little greater distance.

In the next place, we can perceive why they are placed at the threshold of our being. They constitute a salutary discipline by teaching us the lessons of humility and human weakness. It is proper that these wholesome instructions should be conveyed to us at the outset of our inquiries, otherwise, man's arrogance, being unimpeded in the beginning of its course, would acquire a resistless force. And, in the next place, were the lessons removed too far from us, but few would reach the point of instruction; the voice of rebuke to human pride would fall upon the ear of a solitary thinker here and there, instead of being sounded in the hearing of every man who thinks at all. As most men derive their notions of the summit of Mont Blanc, not from personal observation, but from, it may be, the exaggerated accounts of more adventurous travellers, so the doctrine of the limitation of our faculties would not be received as an universal truth, but simply as the uncertain report of some philosopher who had been in the clouds.

But while Christianity presents these sublime mysteries in such an aspect as to rebuke the arrogance, and to pour contempt on the pride of the unbeliever, she holds them out to

the true children of God as the objects of their faith, veneration and love. Like the pillar of fire, they illumine the pathway of Israel, but shed thick darkness on Israel's foes.

As the ancient mysteries were carefully shrouded from public gaze, and none but the initiated were permitted to behold their awful secrets; or by a more fit comparison, as only he who was appointed of God, could enter the Holy of Holies, where dwelt the dreadful Shechinah, so, "no man knoweth the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son will reveal him." Thus it is that that marvellous thanksgiving fell so naturally from the lips of Him who stood with little children in his arms, caressing and blessing them, but spurned from his presence the lordly Sadducee, the sanctimonious Pharisee and the haughty Scribe: "I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."



ARTICLE IV.

PRESBYTERIAN PREACHING AT THE SOUTH.

The Presbyterian Church maintains its ancient repute for the soundness of its doctrines, the excellence of its polity, and the learning of its ministry. Its attention to education, and its adaptedness to the religious training of the young, now as formerly, commend it to the favorable consideration of all intelligent persons. Its firm conservatism in these days of novelties in politics, morals and science, gives to it a strong hold upon the sympathies and the judgment of the public. It is still a bulwark against error, and a standard against iniquity. Its government still illustrates the dream of civil perfectibility—strength in administration, with popular representation. It rejoices still in its historic renown. It still points without ex-

ultation, yet with inoffensive pride, to its long roll of patriotic civil reformers, profound theologians, and eloquent defenders of the faith. Its ministry is eminent for piety and learning. Among them are a few who, in all the elements of ministerial greatness, compare favorably with the most distinguished of any previous epoch. Its membership love it with ardent affection, and wait upon its ministrations with profound veneration. Whilst these things are true, yet it does not exert the power that is due to its pure faith, its admirable system of government, and the numbers, wealth, intelligence and other gifts of its membership. It does not lay as strong a hold, apparently, upon the masses as is laid, for example, by the Methodist Church. It does not perform its proper proportion, therefore, of the work to which, in part at least, all Church organizations are called, viz: the salvation of individual souls. If these statements be true, and our inference from them legitimate, no one will question the propriety of an inquiry into the causes of this state of things. If, indeed, affection for the Church, and zeal for its honor, fail to move such an enquiry, the good of men and the glory of God imperiously demand it.

We do not propose to examine into all the causes which hinder the usefulness of our Church. This would be to assume a task for which we are not qualified. They are numerous; we venture to discuss but one. That one lies outside the range of theological or constitutional discussion. We propose to leave the doctrines and the constitution of the Church intact. We have no fault to find with them. What we have to say is offered with a humility that shrinks from dictation, and yet, with a hope that aspires to usefulness. The cause to which we refer is found in the *manner of Presbyterian preaching*. It is deficient in earnestness, and this deficiency is attributable mainly to the habit of writing and reading sermons.

We are aware that we present no new topic for consideration, and freely admit it to be one which has long occupied the mind of the Church, and elicited frequent and able discussion. Indeed, it is not unfrequently claimed to be no longer an open question; and it may be conceded, that a majority of the able

men of our ministry and our judicatories, seem to acquiesce in the idea, that strength in matter, logical arrangement, and scholastic finish are the properties in a sermon which are best adapted to usefulness ; and that these are secured most easily by writing and reading. It will be seen, that this article makes no especial war upon the former of these propositions, but denies the truth of the latter. Not a few, however, of the most able, conscientious, and observing men of this day, Lay and Clerical, condemn the views of the majority. They think that Presbyterian preaching is too cold and didactic ; that it is addressed too exclusively to the intellect ; that it fails to move the heart and arouse the sympathies ; that earnestness of manner is quenched in the abounding waters of formalism, and as a necessary result, men are not converted, and the Church makes no adequate progress. And they go farther, and say that these objectionable things are the result, in great part, of the habit under review. If, indeed, the habit is in the judgment of the Church, engrafted upon the pulpit, then we do not hesitate to say that the time has arrived when that fixed fact should be unsettled. It is unsuited to the exigencies of the times, and to the genius of our people and our institutions. Let no one be alarmed at the idea of innovation. We are not persons "studious of change." Our doctrines, we trust, are to remain immovable as the foundations of the eternal Throne, from which they emanate, and our beautiful constitution as stable as the truth which it upholds. As to forms, habits and usages, they are wisely left to the varying necessities of times, occasions, popular conditions, and localities, although even they are to be touched with caution and forbearance. But it would be a slander upon the Presbyterian system to deny to it a power of adaptation. Such a power is inherent in its fundamental principles. If that were wanting, then indeed it would soon be but the monument of a by-gone glory, a wreck stranded upon the sands of an already receded sea.

It would be more curious than profitable to enquire whence came the reading of sermons. Is it according to the old ways ? In our country it is rather an ancient usage, it is true ; but

still an innovation. Our Saviour gave no literal instructions as to the manner of preaching. His example certainly gives no countenance to written discourses. He wrote nothing, but orally taught a system of religion that has confounded all human philosophy, and triumphed over all human resistance. He had the eloquence, as well as the wisdom and power, of a God, and, therefore, it may be said that his example is not, in this particular, a guide to men. We, however, must believe that infinite wisdom would have adopted just that mode of promulgating the truth of its own revelation, best adapted to the end. And although He caused them to be recorded for propagation and perpetuation, yet now, as then, men are converted by the foolishness of preaching; that is, the foolishness of oral instruction. The old way was to speak out the grand truths of redemption with the plainness, boldness, directness and fervor of one awfully in earnest; the mind filled with conviction, the heart glowing with love, the eye kindled with a holy enthusiasm, the hand raised in emphatic warning, the voice attuned to the varying demands of persuasion, and the whole person instinct with light and life. Such, I imagine, was Noah, great primal type of the true minister, when he preached righteousness and a coming deluge. Such was Peter, when Pentecostal triumphs crowned his ministry, and Paul, when he made to tremble the governor at Cesarea, or shook alike the Mythology of the Greeks at Athens, and the Paganism of the Romans in the Imperial City. Such was Apollos, when he watered the Churches, and the amiable John, when he led the untaught Gallileans to the foot of the cross. Such was Luther at Worms, the Scottish Reformers on the hill-sides, Whitfield, Wesley, and the Blairs and Tennents of our Church Colonial History. The historical argument, we have no doubt, is demonstrative of the fact that those who have done the largest amount of good in all the Churches, have preached the Gospel without the aid of manuscripts. It is not our purpose to trace it. If it be said that the example of the Apostles proves nothing, because they were inspired by the Holy Ghost, we reply that if the manner of their preaching was inspired, about which we presume

not to speak, that manner was given for our instruction. Human nature is the same now that it was in the days of the Apostles, and the means that were effective then, to subdue it to the obedience of the Cross, we have a right to conclude, will be effective now.

To avoid misconstruction, let it be understood that no censure is intended to be cast upon those who read. They act from a well-considered sense of duty, and are among the best men of the ministry. Their praise is in all the Churches. They are trained to a habit from which it is difficult, and in some instances, impossible to depart. Those who are but entering upon the work of the ministry, and others who can preach with equal facility upon either plan, but read from choice, as being more useful and less exacting, may and ought to review this whole subject. The suggestions of this article are intended for Presidents and Professors in Colleges and Seminaries, and others who are, in the providence of God, advisors of students of Divinity—for students themselves, and those who have but recently donned the ministerial harness. We crave the indulgence of grave and learned fathers and doctors. It can do no harm, if no good, for them to know the views of one who does not wear their cloth. Nor is it to be understood that every thing is repudiated as the preaching of the Gospel, except unwritten discourses. Far from it. Various are the agencies ordained of God to draw his erring creatures to Himself. The sacred volume, religious literature, exposition, dissertation, the trials and the triumphs of the Church, providence, nature, art, science, all commend and enforce the religion of heaven. And various, too, are the agencies of ministerial service. The true minister is, in his life and character, a continuous appeal, a perpetual discourse. His daily walk, his private conversation, his whispered councils, his closet labors, the air and attitude of the man, are eloquent testimonials of his fidelity to the injunction of his great commission. Certainly there are times and occasions when written sermons are appropriate. Upon the opening of Presbyteries, Synods, and Assemblies; when peculiarly important subjects are to be

presented to peculiarly intelligent audiences; whenever and wherever it becomes necessary to defend the doctrines of the Church upon authority and with argument; when pastors find it desirable to instruct their people in the tenets of their own communion, and upon all like occasions, the manner of preaching may be safely left to a wise discretion. What we insist upon is, that in the ordinary services of the pulpit, for the edification of saints, and particularly when the claims of the Gospel are presented, and men are to be wooed and won to the allegiance of God, the manuscript should be laid aside, and the herald of heaven should blow the trumpet with unobstructed breath. Writing is a valuable disciplinary exercise, and conduces to accurate thinking and logical reasoning. But writing, even without a purpose to read, should be occasional only; otherwise it might stand in the way of what I propose to show is far better—a habit of thinking, reasoning and speaking, without the aid of pen and paper. If one must needs write, then it seems to me that the need is equally urgent that he burn what is written. With cheerfulness, and, we will add, with gratitude, we concede that earnestness and eloquence are not always incompatible with reading. Some of the most successful servants of the Church, wise, good, and great men, always read. What then? Why, they are eloquent and successful by reason of singular gifts, in spite of the manuscript. But you, O Brother, that have not these gifts, if you would add daily to the Church of such as shall be saved, and multiply the stars in your own crown of rejoicing, and swell the anthem of the redeemed which shall roll around the Throne forever, discard the manuscript!

The following form of words, perhaps, as well as any other, embraces the great theme of all evangelical preaching: Man is a fallen creature, and has by sin incurred the just condemnation of God, yet is recoverable, and can only be recovered through faith in the incarnate Son of the Father. This is the life-time text of the minister. It is wide in its range, as the entire scheme of man's redemption, and awful as his eternal

destiny. Its capacity for amplification is boundless. He is its expositor, its advocate, and its exponent.

Salvation through the mediation of Christ, is the central truth of the Gospel. The Cross is the sign in which humanity conquers. Around this revolves the glorious machinery of redemption. To the Cross all truth and all morals converge. Go where he may in the fields of theological enquiry, if he is called of God, the minister will return ever and anon to the Cross. In it all the mysteries of revelation find, if not a full, a sufficient solution. In its presence, creeds, and dogmas, and formularies, and distinctions, are as nothing. O, the power, the glory, and the mystery of the Cross! Great, too, is the mystery of conversion! A soul saved, through an agency so simple as to be denounced by the wisdom of this world as foolishness. A word, a text, a tear, a sigh, may, by grace, achieve that which all the rhetoric of all the schools is impotent to accomplish—conviction of sin; and then follows, again, by grace, repentance, faith and rejoicing. A sinful man stands confessed a new creature—radiant with the joys of Heaven. The first, the paramount obligation of the ministry, is to preach Christ and Him crucified—to rear the Cross in the vision of all men. He is a swift herald to announce good news—a messenger of mercy, tendering terms to a revolted world. His leading objects are to convince men that they are lost sinners, that they may be saved, and that, among the declared possibilities of God's omnipotence, there is no salvation but in the blood of Christ. We stop not now to illustrate the ineffable solemnity of his vocation. Would that all who read these lines might realize the extent of obligation, the labor, fidelity, responsibility and sacrifice expressed in the exclamation, "Who is sufficient for these things?" We recognize the received opinion that the ministry are called of God, set apart for the work of preaching the Gospel. How called, whether especially, or under that general Providence which appoints alike the fall of a sparrow and the fall of an empire, it is bootless to enquire. It is sufficient to say, that every minister who does the work of his place, is there by Divine appointment.

It is the *sacred* ministry, because his work is sacred. It differs from all the professions among men in this, that he who enters it is, by that act, dead to the pursuits and the good of time, and consecrated to the affairs of eternity. This is the Gospel theory of the responsible status of the preacher. Terrific, beyond all imagining, will be the accounting of those who pervert it to secular purposes; who make the desk a license for licentiousness; who convert the temples of the living God into theatres for the exhibition of profane wit, the agitations of politics, the propagation of a spurious philosophy, and the display of pride, vanity and malevolence. With us it is free from such desecration. A practical construction of this *death* is not that he shall hold no connection with the things of time, that he shall not partake in its innocent joys, in the pleasures of literature, society, and family life—that he shall not regard the high obligations of master, parent and citizen; but this, that all he does, or declines to do, shall have for its paramount object the salvation of souls. To require more, would be to exact of humanity impossible perfectness; and to require less, would be to lower the standard of ministerial obligation prescribed in the Word of God. Although called of God, no one will venture to affirm that he is inspired—in the sense of a Divine communication as to acts, words, attitudes, locomotion, and mode of utterance. Faith is, we know, the gift of God. Conversion is from the Spirit—not from the preacher. Yet, as to the mode in which he shall fulfill his trust, he is a responsible free agent. How the agency of the pulpit co-works with the sovereignty of God is a mystery, in the presence of which it becomes human knowledge to veil its face. Nor does Presbytery interfere to control it. Whether, then, we look to his commission from God, or the Presbytery, he is at liberty to read or not, according to his convictions of duty. The choice is personal, and so is the responsibility. By all the obligations of his high calling, by the sanctions of God's word, by the wants of a dying world, at the peril of his own soul, he is constrained to address his fellow-men just in that way which promises the accomplishment of the largest amount of good.

What is that way? What is it at the South? This question cannot be settled by an appeal to usage, however long continued; to the opinion of departed worthies, however venerated; to convenience, aptitude, taste, or reputation. We live in what is called an age of progress, characterized by new conditions of society, brought about by changes in industrial pursuits, social habits, and modes of thinking. Improvements in Science, and discoveries in Art, have made ours an epoch unlike all others. Society, to one familiar with its state twenty years ago, wears the aspect of a new creation. *It invokes the adaptation-power of the Church.* It calls upon its ministry to determine whether a style of preaching adapted to a world in repose, may not be unsuited to a world in motion.

Dealing now in generalities, the business of the preacher is to defend the truth, to edify believers, and to persuade men to repentance. Whether he addresses himself to one or to all these objects, so far from being an aid, his manuscript is a hindrance. He is to defend the truth against the assaults of infidelity; against the interpolations and false constructions of sectaries and schismatics; against ancient error and modern reforms. To do this effectively, he must bring to his work learning and logic. He must be furnished with the material of successful controversy. He must be an educated man, and skilled in the art of discussion. Suppose that he is all this: is it necessary to an available use of his resources that he write out his argument? Can he not prepare without the intervention of writing? The assumption is that he cannot—or, at least, that he cannot so prepare as to make his preparation reliable when he appears before the people. This enquiry should start at the right point. It should begin at the beginning. It may be conceded that when the habit of writing has grown to be inveterate, he cannot trust to any other preparation. But may not the Student of Divinity, or the recent Licentiate, so accustom himself to merely intellectual preparation, as to make it not only available, but comparatively easy? There is no magic in the grasp of a pen—there is no inspiration in goose-quills or steel-points. But we are told that wri-

ting is an aid to memory. An aid to memory? It destroys the memory, and is made a substitute for it. No faculty is more improvable than memory by use, and none more easily impaired by desuetude. It may be made almost miraculously retentive, or impressionless as water. No wonder that the student, taught from the beginning that writing is indispensable, and following up the instructions of the lecture-room by rigid adherence, when he would preach *extempore*, finds that his memory is weak, that his argument is loose and confused, and his services unimpressive. No wonder that he so covets the confidence and repose of a manuscript. He is comfortable upon it, and his hearers are quite at ease under it. If, on the contrary, he is taught to believe that it is not necessary, and wholly inexpedient, and is instructed persistently in the art of mental preparation—and when he enters the ministry inscribes his thoughts on the tablet of his memory, and by practice acquires the habit of oral argumentation; he need not fear failure. He reposes upon the fidelity of an exercised mind; he is free to display the legitimate attractions of the orator; he has scope and verge for the occasional creations of the moment; he feels the power of intellectual affinity, and with imperial sway he rules his audience. The preparation necessary is not a composition in words. He who is master of his subject, who thinks clearly, is, as to words, already prepared. What we conceive strongly, we are most likely to express intelligibly. Strong thoughts are the parents of apt words. When the mind is thoroughly imbued, and the soul aroused, expression is, with many, almost an involuntary process. A great fact, a grand truth, an ardent desire, an eager hope, or a disturbing fear, does not labor for utterance. The labor of unwritten composition renders it impracticable. Whilst verbal preparation is neither necessary nor desirable, yet exception to this general proposition is to be recognized. Passages of great strength, with a view to the greatest effect, are often increased in brilliancy and power by a studied garniture of words. Let no one under-estimate the power of words. Appropriateness of language is more than a grace—it gives

impressiveness to thought. That preparation, except as above indicated, which seems to be necessary, is a thorough acquaintance with the subject—a natural classification of heads of discourse—arrangement of reasons and authorities under each head, and apt illustrations. Are not all these things possible without writing? They certainly are, in the absence of a preformed writing habit. If writing is indispensable in the Pulpit, why is it that it is repudiated at the Bar, in the Senate, and at the Hustings? It is undeniably true, that the greatest triumphs of eloquence have been achieved without it. Revolutions in opinion, in government and in manners, have been most generally effected without it. When some great truth is to be demonstrated, or right vindicated, or wrong redressed, the orator cannot afford to be encumbered with a manuscript. He demands the full play of reason, imagination, memory, attitude and action. He cannot abide the formal elaborations of the closet. Experience, the uncompromising test of truth, has demonstrated that men are led to conviction and moved to action, so far as the agency of the orator is concerned, by extemporary speaking. It is not opposed to close reasoning, logical analysis, or the skillful handling of facts. If it were, the usage of the forum would be sadly at fault. No class of men deal more in solid argument, nice distinctions and subtle discriminations, than the legal profession. And, whatever may be said to the contrary, none, except the ministry, are called to the discussion of more majestic truths. They use briefs, but rarely manuscripts. Neither Demosthenes nor Pericles unrolled the scroll before Athenian audiences. Cicero wielded the senatorial powers of Rome; Pitt controlled England and the Continent; Webster expounded the Constitution, and led the American Bar; and Patrick Henry precipitated Virginia upon the issue of liberty or death. Yet they read no speeches. When the edification of saints is the object, it would seem that writing is still less desirable. Logical demonstration is not now so much required. The precepts, promises, hopes and rewards of the Gospel are to be exhibited. The conscience is now to be quickened—faith is to be stimulated into greater

activity, and the life to be guarded with increased vigilance. Grace communicated, love bestowed and reciprocated—charity, meekness, humility and good works—are the themes to be considered. The virtues and graces of Christianity belong, in common, to the speaker and his audience. He speaks from the heart, to the heart. He and they are confessed believers. He communes with them in tender expostulation, or grave rebuke, or guarded commendation. In this mingling of the spirit of the teacher and taught, the manuscript has no place. Here, surely, preparation need not assume the formalities of a recorded argument. Suppose it does: then we know that it breaks the chain that unites the hearer and the preacher, chills the sensibilities of both, and leaves the former, it may be, intellectually edified, but religiously unimproved. It proves nothing to reply that Edwards and Chalmers read. Let no man claim them as examples, until he is conscious of having reached their mark in endowments. We are treating of common men—the ministry as a class, not of exceptional giants.

The relative importance of the several kinds of ministerial service, it is not difficult to determine. As already intimated, the chief is the invitation and warning of sinners. Neither the instruction of believers, nor the defence of doctrine, is unimportant. But in our country, doctrinal discussions are relatively less necessary than either the edification of the Church, or appeals to the impenitent. The doctrines of the Bible are to be defended, but are they not better defended through the Press—especially, now that the Press has become almost ubiquitous? The infidel, and the metaphysics of semi-infidel philosophers, are to be met by learning, research and genius, equal, if not superior to their own. This is an imperious obligation, which Christianity imposes upon all her votaries. The pulpit cannot escape from it. And, although with us there are times and localities which call for the vindication of her essential truths at the hands of the living preacher, yet it is our peculiar distinction that this is not often necessary. We are satisfied that there is less infidelity, and less of what might be called perverted Christianity, at the South, than in any part

of the world. There is abounding iniquity, and haughty irreverence, and criminal passivity; but open repudiation of the Scriptures is rare. The business, therefore, of the preacher, is not so much to defend, as to enforce the doctrines of the Church. It is not so much to explain, as to exhibit them—not so much to correct errors of opinion, as to awaken attention to acknowledged truth and obligation—not so much to demonstrate that Jesus is the Son of God, as to induce men to accept the terms of His salvation.

The fact that a majority of hearers prefer it, may fairly stand for an argument in favor of extemporization. Of the truth of this there can be no reasonable doubt. Accustomed, as our people are, to the discussions of the court-house, the legislature and the canvass, and to the popular oratory of the Baptist and Methodist ministry, they do not relish Presbyterian reading. It is immaterial whether this preference is founded in good taste, or is the offspring of ignorance and prejudice. We have to deal with the fact. We need not be told that educated men must be interested in an able discourse, whether it be read or extemporized. We know this to be true. Yet we believe that the larger number of even that class of hearers prefer to listen to an able discourse delivered without the manuscript. Were it otherwise, it would seem to be expedient that the minister accommodate himself, in this regard, to the views of the larger number. It is very important for the Presbyterian Church that the people be brought under the influence of its ministry. Unless it can command the ear of the world, it is in vain that its doctrines are pure, its polity unobjectionable, and its preachers able. To do this, our ministers should become all things to all men. Large congregations are not often homogeneous. The majority are neither savans, professors, nor even graduates, and adaptation is due, not to the few, but to the many.

Irreligious men are not predisposed to listen to the instructions of the pulpit. The enmity which they feel towards God extends to the messages of His servants. They repel the moral overtures, even when they entertain the intellectual demon-

strations of the pulpit. They hear with the mind, whilst the heart is deaf. With wonderful facility, they distinguish between the argument and its moral application to themselves. Few feel as David did, when the prophet said to him, Thou art the man. Now, therefore, it is indispensable that the moral sensibilities of the hearer be aroused. He must be constrained to view both the preacher and himself from a new standpoint. The *attention of the heart*, as well as of the mind, must be secured. This necessity will exist just so long as it remains true, that with *the heart* man believeth unto righteousness.

To awaken and retain attention, it is not only necessary that the speaker should believe what he delivers, but that he should feel it, and appear to feel it. Nothing so conciliates an audience as a perception of the sincerity of the orator. More unequivocal demonstration of this is required of the preacher than of other persons. The idea that preaching is a profession merely, obtains but too generally. When it becomes apparent that he is moved, as by constraint, to preach the Gospel—that his convictions are deep and solemn, and his anxiety for the salvation of men earnest; *when he is seen to feel his message*, then it is that their attention is awakened, and he holds them in command. The mind lies open to conviction, and the heart expands in sympathy. Something of sensibility to divine truth is lost in writing and reading. The fervor of composition cannot be carried into the pulpit. Whilst writing, the mind glows with the heat of its own action, and the writer is keenly alive to the beauty, and grandeur, and adaptation of the word. In the very nature of his organization, this cannot last. Protracted tension stiffens or breaks the bow. When his work is done and laid aside for Sabbath use, exaltation sinks into depression, and he meets his audience with close reasoning and finished rhetoric, it may be, but with the dullness of a professor lecturing upon mathematics. Is it at all wonderful that they listen unmoved?—that they yield the attention of the mind, but feel no consciousness of a sacred relation to the place, the occasion and the subject! Not one hearer in fifty needs to be convinced of any essential truth of Christianity. They are

convinced already,—not *convicted* of sin, but intellectually acquiescent, in the revelations of the Bible. It is a prevalent error to assume the contrary. If they were not, the road to the intellect is in the direction of Calvary. Conversion begins at the Cross. When the preacher addresses sinners, he is a witness, rather than an expounder. He testifies upon the vision of his faith, and he should exhibit, in his solemn emotion and subdued enthusiasm, the fact that he is himself a subject of regenerating grace. No one expects of me to give, upon philosophical principles, a solution of the mystery of faith coming by hearing. Reason cannot account for it. It is enough to know that it is so ordained of God. It is the *tale of the Cross* that wins the heart and takes captive the mind. Who can tell that tale without a heaving breast and a tearful eye? It is through the emotion of the speaker that the Spirit very often visits the soul of the hearer.

Again, the written discourse is, in the judgment of the preacher, the best presentation of his subject of which he is capable, and it is penned with a view to the customary time allowed for its delivery. He has prescribed its exact boundaries. These he may not transcend, and he cannot, therefore, avail himself of such new thoughts as the occasion may require. Irrespective of the condition of his audience, he follows out the previously constructed sermon, and thus he loses, perhaps, the most favorable opportunities of making salutary impressions. If he undertakes to read, and at the same time depart, when he believes it proper, from his manuscript, both the reading and the departures will be weakened. He cannot do both.

If a pastor should read a sermon of Dr. Dwight or Robert Hall, surpassing in ability any thing that he could produce, the exercise would meet with the condemnation of nine out of ten of his people, and repetitions would soon remove him from his place. This result, we all know, would not be brought about by the absence of sound doctrine, an evangelical spirit, logical arrangement, or “pure English undefiled,” but by an universal demand for the living preacher. The people expect not the teachings of the dead, but of the visible minister, enforced

by exhibitions of *his* genius, *his* learning, and *his* love. Now is not something of this dissatisfaction, the same in nature and only less in degree, felt when he reads his own composition ; the thoughts and illustrations of a past week, or month or year ? Is he the preacher who, with spiritual and intellectual vitality, freshly anointed with prayerful preparation, and wrought to a strange capacity by the solemnities of the present occasion, stands before the multitude the pleading advocate of men, and an ambassador for Jesus Christ ? The judgment of the masses is that he is not.

With unfeigned deference we venture to suggest that the strength of the ministry is wasted upon rhetorical elevation. Point and pungency are sacrificed to elegance of style. Admitting, for the sake of the argument, that a finished style is unattainable without writing, the enquiry still remains, how far is that necessary to successful preaching ? It certainly is not indispensable. So far as it is made a substitute for directness, clearness, and vigor, it is decidedly objectionable. And if attention to style ripens into a habit of easy and graceful presentation of commonplaces and platitudes, it is a positive vice. We know that the ministry are the recognized standards of correct taste and elegant scholarship, and that they contribute more to the formation of a sound common judgment of these things than any other class of men. This is as it should be. Yet they are not professors of Belles Lettres. They are the consecrated ministers of the Word of God. Literary execution is, therefore, of secondary importance, and should be subordinated to the master purpose of declaring the glory of God in the rescue of men from the thralldom of sin. In itself, it is not unfriendly to impression upon cultivated minds. The Gospel is not the less acceptable to such persons, because presented without offence to good taste. Nor would we be understood as being willing to dispense with the power of the ministry over education and literature. The abuse, only, of what is in itself good, is what we venture to censure. What is the most enviable literary reputation, compared with the value of a single soul ? It is as the fresco-finish of St. Peters to the

magnificence of its dome. The application of these remarks is, that written discourses assume the form, too frequently, of labored literary productions—and writing involves the sacrifice of ministerial strength to rhetorical finish. The scholar in the closet is naturally prone to perfect, according to the standard of his own taste, the productions of his pen. They are often above the level of the majority, whilst the attention of the educated minority is absorbed in their literary attractions. But the reason chiefly why writing conduces to elaboration of style, is found in the fact, that in writing this is practicable, nay easy, whilst in mental preparation, it is neither easy nor practicable. Finish in detail is scarcely possible without a record. The memory cannot retain innumerable figures, pencillings and carvings.

The most serious objection to reading is, that it is a restraint upon eloquence. It will not do to ignore the arts of the orator. It will not do to fall back upon the sovereignty of God, and say, His truth and His Spirit convert men. They are, indeed, the primary source of regeneration; yet, in the general administration of His government, the Almighty works by means. Preaching is the main agency of conversion, and eloquence is an element of preaching. To expect miraculous interposition, without the use of means, in the work of evangelizing this world, is to entertain a mere superstition. It may be well questioned, whether any one merely human agency has ever contributed, or will ever contribute, as much to the conversion of men as an eloquent delivery. In all the affairs of men it is an engine of prodigious potency. Emphatically is this true in our country. We are a nation of speakers and listeners. We are so by virtue of our free institutions. To deny eloquence to the pulpit, when it rules the court, the camp and the field, is simply absurd. Not assuming that reading is always, and to every intent, incompatible with eloquence, but in fact admitting that it may be sometimes consistent with it, our proposition is, that it always weakens the impression which it is the object of the preacher to make. It does this in various ways. And first, it prevents that excitement of mind which

an eloquent speaker and a large audience reciprocally produce on each other. The waiting, expecting audience stimulates the orator into a pleasurable, self-reliant, creative mood, whilst the visible, earnest, equipped and furnished speaker awakens and fixes their attention, and concentrates their thoughts. They are mutually aroused and attracted. Now, call this relation between the orator and his audience what you please—call it sympathy, or moral electricity, or what not—it is still a potent reality. It is that which every great orator has felt, and every audience experienced. When the Speaker announced “the gentleman from Virginia,” as Mr. Randolph himself relates, he felt that, for a season, he was master of the House—the members were his vassals—they could not, if they would, escape from his wizard power—and genius, and fire, and strength, at once sprang into exercise. And they!—why, they waited and listened, as if they were bound by a spell! “Why,” said a friend to one of the most brilliant and resistless orators of this age, “Prentiss, you mesmerize us.” “Well,” he replied, “it is an affair of reciprocity, for an audience always electrifies me.” These anecdotes illustrate what we mean. And we hold that this thing, just the relation that we have described, speaking after the manner of men, is the truest inspiration of the orator. Does he lose this inspiration by reading? In great part, without doubt! He begins in formality, he proceeds in routine, and he ends in cold propriety. His manuscript comes in contact with the calm intelligence of the house, instead of the visible workings of his intellect. There is no vibrating chord of attraction between them. He is didactically dull, and his audience is freezingly appreciative.

Farther: the reader is obliged to be wanting in those personal attributes of the orator, so attractive to the people of this country, and so influential over a mixed audience—such as attitude, gesticulation, voice, and expression of the face. The effective use of these is acquired by training, but generally, when effective, their use is spontaneous. Their happiest effect is wrought when they unite in adaptation and ap-

propriateness; and this union grows out of the strong conception and strong emotion of the moment. Such union is next to impossible in a delivery from the manuscript. The person is stiffened, the eye—beautiful telegraph of thought!—is fixed upon the paper, or raised, when reading convenience permits, fitfully, upon the congregation; the voice is monotonous, and the hands are engaged in holding, turning and adjusting the voluminous sheets. Gestures there are none, or else tame and awkward, or spasmodic and inappropriate. The speaker looks a puppet, worked by strings and a child's hand, rather than a man, standing between avenging wrath and its victim. His logic may be faultless, his lips may drop pearls of rhetoric, and his words may excite the envy of Trench, but his hearers are unmoved. His argument flows, it may be, in a wide, deep stream, but it is a river of oil. One may gaze upon its placid current, pleased with the dreamy quiet that it inspires, whilst sin is not rebuked, the conscience is not alarmed, death has no sensible proximity, the grave is a misty reality, and the judgment terrorless. Conscious of dullness of manner, there are those, but not here, who seek to supply the want of eloquence by a discussion of sensation topics, and who read a farce whilst they perpetrate a desecration.

By *extemporization*, speaking *ex abrupto* is not meant. It is a vain presumption to rely upon what is sometimes called the inspiration of the moment. The most painful infliction which a people are ever called upon to endure, is to be "broken with words." Nothing can be more ridiculous than for a preacher, however eloquent and learned, to expect to sustain himself without unremitting study, without specific preparation for every occasion. Without it, the originating power of the mind fails, knowledge grows dim and unavailable, memory loses her hoarded treasures, and superficiality marks the man. The lamp must be replenished, or the light grows dim, flickers, fades, and is extinguished. Already has all this been sufficiently urged. Preparation being assumed, these personal attributes are all at the command of the orator, untrammelled

with a manuscript; and who shall say that, to the extent that they are influential, he has not the advantage of the reader?

To all of these views the reply is, that writing is necessary to guard against loose doctrinal statements, mere declamation, and vulgarisms in the use of words and in grammatical constructions. The two first go upon the assumption that accurate preparation is impossible without writing. That assumption, as a mere fact, is denied. If this assumption is not made, then it is said that the preparation involves an amount of labor which will consign the preacher to an early tomb. Again, this assumption is denied. But be it so. What then! Is not the sacred ministry a consecration to martyrdom, if need be! If, in ten years of life, a preacher can do more good without reading, than he can accomplish in twenty with it, by the conditions of his mission he is not at liberty to read. This may be a hard saying in the light of sense, but in the light of revelation it is true. A guarantee against the evils suggested is found in the thorough education and discipline of the Presbyterian ministry, and the general conservatism of the Church. Much of that antagonism to unwritten discourses found among us, is generated by their abuse, in the hands of clergymen of other denominations. Let us make the experiment upon our own ground.

Bad grammar and bad pronunciation are, of course, to be deprecated. A thoroughly trained speaker is not likely to make a lapse in either. Suppose, however, that an able, accomplished man should, in the heat of his great argument, or in the obliviousness of his fervid appeal, perpetrate an error in syntax or pronunciation, is it to be supposed that, on that account, he is to be set down as an ignoramus? Will he be even subjected to criticism? No: his established scholarship would blight the cavil in its germ. He can afford to commit a lapse. He is safe from criticism when he succeeds in fixing attention upon the matter of his discourse—righteousness and a judgment to come. No preacher is so obnoxious to criticism as he whose sermons have no merit but unimpeachable style. No congregation is more prone to be fastidious than

that which is fed with the dainty provisions of literature. The man whose attention is awake to nothing else, is wide awake to small departures from the standards of correct taste. If invited to a literary banquet, he expects the courses to be served artistically. If invited to the Marriage Supper of the Lamb, he is not likely to employ his imagination with the viands of earth.



ARTICLE V.

The Ancient Church: its History, Doctrine, Worship and Constitution, traced for the first three hundred years.
By W. D. KILLEN, D.D., Professor of Ecclesiastical History and Pastoral Theology to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. "Glorious things are spoken of thee, O City of God."—Ps. lxxxvii: 3. New York: Charles Scribner, 124 Grand Street. 1859; pp. 656, 8vo.

This work is distinguished from all other modern contributions to Church History known to us, by the attention which its author gives to the polity of the Apostolic and Primitive Church. Fully one-third of the whole volume is devoted to the direct discussion of these topics, and they are also incidentally referred to, very often, in the other portions of the volume. The Father of modern Church History himself employs far less than a tythe of his large first volume in the elucidation of these themes. Schaff, in his *Apostolic History*, gives to these topics about one-sixteenth part of the whole volume; in his elegant first volume on the *Christian Church*, he despatches these questions in about fifty pages. But when we take up, for example, Gieseler or Guericke, Waddington, Milman or Robertson, all they have to say upon these points is contained in a very few pages, or even paragraphs.

Not only do all the modern Church historians treat these subjects briefly, but some of them are of a very doubtful mind respecting Church Polity. Milman says:

“The primitive constitution of these Churches is a subject which it is impossible to decline, though few points in Christian history rest on more dubious and imperfect—in general, on inferential evidence.”*

Schaff, who has had the advantage of all that “bold and searching criticism of the modern German historians, as applied to the Apostolic and post-Apostolic literature, which has done good service by removing old prejudices and placing many things in a new light;” and who, in his last work, has made “large use of the new sources of information recently brought to light, such as the Syriac and Armenian Ignatius, and especially the *Philosophoumena* of Hippolytus,”† seems to have ended all his researches in a state of considerable doubt regarding some of the main questions of the Prelatic controversy. “The most important and also the most difficult phenomenon of our period (A. D. 100—311), in the department of Church organization, is the rise and developement of the Episcopate.” “There is large room here for critical research and combination.” “Whatever may be thought of the origin and Divine right of the Episcopate,”‡ &c. In his previous work, Dr. Schaff’s position on these subjects was the same equivocal position, although his testimony is, on many points, as clear for Presbyterian principles as it must be admitted to be impartial. Thus, he tells us:

“Church government was instituted by Christ himself in person.” “Church officers were not creatures of the congregations,” “although the people participated in the government of the Church.” “These Church officers are so related to one another that the higher include in themselves the lower, but not the reverse.” “With all their comprehensive authority, the Apostles still regarded themselves always as a collegiate body,” and as “personally representing the Church.” And thus the Apostles, as well as the Presbyters, “controlled the

* *History of Christianity*, Vol. II., p. 274.

† *Preface to Christian History*, p. vi.

‡ *History of the Christian Church*, pp. 414, 415, 421.

people not by force of law, but through their own free conviction." "They never forced any measure upon the Church, but administered the government in active sympathy with them and by their full consent." "In the whole company of saints they saw a family of free children of God." "Primitive Christianity sanctions the *synodical* form of government in which all orders of the Church are represented." "From all tyranny over conscience, from all arbitrary hierarchical despotism, they were infinitely removed." "The name Presbyters or Elders is, no doubt, of Jewish-Christian origin, a translation of the Hebrew זְקֵנִים." "The Bishops of the New Testament are not diocesan Bishops, like those of a later period, but simply congregational officers. This is placed beyond question in every passage in which we meet this title." And "this identity of Presbyters and Bishops was acknowledged by the most learned Church fathers on exegetical grounds,"* &c.

Yet he elsewhere says :

"If we consider that in the second century the Episcopal system existed as a historical fact in the whole Church, East and West, and was unresistingly acknowledged, nay universally regarded, as, at least indirectly, of Divine appointment, we can hardly escape the conclusion that this form of government naturally grew out of the circumstances and wants of the Church at the end of the Apostolic period, and could not have been so quickly and so generally introduced without the sanction, or at least acquiescence, of the surviving Apostles; especially of John, who labored on the very threshold of the second century, and left behind him a number of venerable disciples. At all events, it needs a strong infusion of skepticism, or of traditional prejudice, to enable one, in the face of all these facts and witnesses, to pronounce the Episcopal government of the ancient Church a sheer apostasy from the Apostolic form, and a radical revolution."†

He adds in a note :

"Our position is not dogmatical and sectarian at all, but entirely historical. The high antiquity, the usefulness, and the necessity of the Episcopal form of government in the times before the Reformation, does not necessarily make it of force for all succeeding ages. For we have no passage in the New Testament which presents three orders, or any particular form of Church government (excepting the ministry itself) as essential to the existence of the Church."

Waddington's position may be expressed in two sentences :

"Neither our Saviour nor His Apostles have left any express and

* History of the Apostolic Church, pp. 497, 499, 506, 507, 515, 516, 522, 523.

† Apost. Church, pp. 540, 541.

positive ordinances for the administration of the Church, desiring, perhaps, that that which was intended for every age and condition of man, to be the associate and guardian of every form of civil government, should have the means of accommodating its external and earthly shape to the various modifications of human polity."

This is one of Waddington's principles, or fundamental facts. The other is this :

"It is certain that from the moment in which the early Churches attained a definite shape and consistency, and assumed a permanent form of discipline ; as soon as the death of the last of the Apostles had deprived them of the more immediate guidance of the Holy Spirit, and left them, under God's especial care and providence, to the uninspired direction of mere men, so soon had every Church, respecting which we possess any express information, adopted the Episcopal form of government."*

Robertson, who himself speaks of himself as "an advocate of the Episcopal theory of Apostolical succession," and who is the latest writer on Church History belonging to the established Church of England, devotes just one page and a half to all the questions of the original polity. His position is that

"The Apostles having been, at first, the sole depositaries of their Lord's commission, with all the powers which it conferred, afterwards delegated to others, as their substitutes, assistants or successors, such portions of their powers as were capable of being transmitted, and were necessary for the continuance of the Church." "Those to whom the Apostles conveyed the full powers of the Christian ministry were not the Deacons, nor the Presbyters, but (in the later meaning of the word) the Bishops ; and the existence of the inferior orders, as subject to these, is a simple matter of history."

This is Robertson's theory. He seems to scorn, as quite needless, any attempt to establish it. All that he offers of that sort is contained in the following paragraph :

"Resting on the fact that the Apostles were, during their lives on earth, the supreme regulating authorities of the Church, we may disregard a multitude of questions which have been made to tell against the theories of an Episcopal polity, of a triple ministry, or of any ministry whatever, as distinguished from the great body of Christians. We need not here inquire at what time, and by what steps, the title

* Waddington's History of the Church, vol. I., p. 85.

of *Bishop*, which had at first been common to the highest and the second orders, came to be applied exclusively to the former; nor whether functions, originally open to all Christian men, were afterwards restricted to a particular class; nor in how far the inferior orders of the clergy, or the whole body of the faithful, may have shared in the administration of government and discipline; nor whether the commissions given by St. Paul to Timothy and to Titus were permanent or only occasional; nor at what time the system of fixed diocesan Bishops was introduced. We do not refuse to acknowledge that the organization of the Church was gradual; we are only concerned to maintain that it was directed by the Apostles, and that in all essential points it was completed before their departure." *

Gieseler's discussion of this topic is very short, but not very unsatisfactory. He is clear, that in the Apostolic Church,

"The Elders, (called both Presbyters and Bishops) were officially of equal rank; that the duty of teaching, as an office, was by no means incumbent on them, but the capacity of instructing was a free gift of the Spirit to certain individuals; that there was no longer to be a distinct priestly order; that the idea set forth by Christ of the union of His people with Himself, and with one another, in one joint body, was kept alive by the Apostles; that these Apostles were the external centre point of this unity; that they exercised a general survey over all the Churches, and were co-overseers in every single Church; that the first arrangements in the newly planted Churches, even the appointment of Elders in them, was made by the Apostles themselves; that afterwards the Elders nominated officers with the consent of the Churches; that in newly established Churches Paul sometimes transferred his power to an assistant, and that James stood in Jerusalem quite in the relation of a later Bishop, but without the appellation." †

Neander's position on this subject is that of a very decided support to the *jus Divinum* of Presbyterian Church government, and Guericke follows very closely in his tracks. The former says, that

"A guild of priests having the exclusive care of providing for the religious wants of other men—such a priestly caste, could find no place within Christianity; that no one individual was to be the preëminent organ of the Holy Ghost for the guidance of the whole, but that all were to coöperate, each in his own sphere; that every man who felt an inward call to it might, under the transient inspiration, give utterance to the word in the assembled Church; but that not all the mem-

* History of the Christian Church, by James Craigie Robertson, M.A., Vicar of Bekebourne, in the Diocese of Canterbury, vol. I., p. 7.

† Gieseler's Eccl. History, vol. I., pp. 88-93.

bers of a community were fitted for the ordinary and regular office of teaching; that the inner fellowship demanded for its exhibition an external organization; that some of the members received the gift (charism) of government; that their guidance of the community was performed as a council of Elders, called Presbyters, and also Bishops; that in each town, from the beginning onwards, one single community formed itself under the guidance of a senate of Elders; that the function of teaching, and that of Church government, and the gifts requisite for each, were originally distinguished and held separate from each other; that these functions, however, were united often, but not necessarily and always in the same individual, so that some Presbyters were worthy of double honor; that these rulers were not masters of the community, but conducted all things as their ministers and with their coöperation; that they were elected by the people; that even the Apostles, whose office was peculiar and not transferable, were far from lording it over the faith of which the foundation had once been laid, and which was now to develop itself with freedom, and give shape to every thing by its own inherent power alone."

So much of a constitution for the Church does Neander find in the Scriptures, and the considerate reader will feel the definiteness of these views, and the completeness of the system they summarily set forth. Then Neander tells us that

"After the age of the Apostles, there occur three changes in the constitution of the Church, as follows: 1. The distinction of Bishops from Presbyters, and the developement of the Monarchical-Episcopal Church government: 2. The distinction of the clergy from the laity, and the formation of a sacerdotal caste: 3. The multiplication of Church offices."

Now, taking these seven modern Church historians as specimens of the whole body, let us look again, for one moment, at their various positions regarding Church government. Two of the German writers hold clearly to a system of Church government distinctly revealed in the New Testament, and that system is the Presbyterian, received by them both in considerable fullness. The other two German authors clearly hold to the Apostolic origin of certain principles, which logically conduct to the Presbyterian system, but, strangely enough, they add their historical judgment, also, in favor of diocesan episcopacy as at least indirectly of Divine appointment. Of the English writers, Robertson "rests on the fact that the Apos-

ties were, during their lives on earth, the supreme regulating authorities of the Church," and on the bare averment, without the least attempt at proof, that although "the organization of the Church was gradual," yet it was "directed by the Apostles through Bishops (in the later meaning of the word), to whom the Apostles conveyed the full powers of the Christian ministry." But, on the other hand, Milman holds that the whole question rests on the most dubious grounds; and Waddington, that the Saviour and His Apostles established nothing, but that we find the whole Church to have been episcopally governed from the time of her being first left to the uninspired direction of mere men.

It is not amongst writers of Church History alone that doubt and uncertainty of mind prevail, respecting the whole subject of the order of the kingdom set up on earth by Jesus Christ. Many theologians, and whole schools of theology, also are in doubt about it. The theory of Erastus is, indeed, a definite one, viz.: that all Church power rests in the Christian magistrate, who appoints the form of government for the Church according to his pleasure, and holds in his hands the keys of discipline. So, indeed, the Roman Catholic position (held likewise by some Prelatists) is also a definite one, viz.: that one particular form of Church government is not only appointed, but is appointed as being essential, so that there can be no Church where that form of government is not. This is the theory of the *jus Divinum, with a vengeance*—and the vengeance has always been felt under its sway wherever there was power to inflict it. But there is another theory of the *jus Divinum*, in which there is inherent no vengeance and no spite, and it also is, nevertheless, a definite theory of Church government. It is, that the substantial of Church order are all laid down in Scripture, in particular rules respecting officers, ordinances, courts and discipline, while the circumstantial are also laid down in Scripture, but in general rules of order, decency and edification. This is the *jus Divinum* theory of Church government as distinctly held forth in our

standards.* According to this view of the subject, a Church government is revealed in the Scriptures, just as the other great doctrines of Christianity are revealed there. But the truth on this subject may be discerned by different minds with more or with less clearness, and may accordingly be followed out in practice with a more or less complete obedience by different Churches. A Church may, therefore, hold erroneous views on this subject, leading to erroneous practice, and still be a true Church. Not to receive and practice the doctrine of Church government laid down in the Scriptures, makes an imperfect Church—it does not destroy its title to be considered a true Church of Christ, and to be acknowledged as such by us. We must acknowledge all whom we believe Christ acknowledges, and fellowship all whom He receives. We must be in communion with all who hold the Head, or be guilty of the sin of schism.

But there are other theories held by many which may be called *indefinite*—as, that “God has instituted government for the Church only as He has for the State, having simply forbidden anarchy, but leaving the form of government to the discretion of men.” In other words, that “Christ has left the matter of Church government undetermined, so that Christian societies have a discretionary power of modeling the government of the Church in such a manner as the circumstantial reasons of times and places may require; and that, therefore, the *wisest* government of the Church, for any given age or country, is the best and the most divine.” Again, it is held by many, that the germs of Church order are given in the New Testament, and the early fathers were allowed to fill up the outline. This is a prevailing form of opinion among Episcopalians. Not very different from this is an indefinite theory prevailing extensively amongst Presbyterians, even of the Old School, and which is found to be as much of *jure Divino* Presbyterianism as some of those who hold high places in our Church

* See Confession of Faith, chap. I: 6. Form of Government, chap. I: 3, 6, 7; chap. VIII: 1.

are able to swallow and digest, viz: the theory that the essentials are laid down in the Scriptures, but the details left to be filled up by the Church at her discretion. This theory, like the other two, we call indefinite, for it defines nothing. It does not tell us what are these divine essentials, and what these human details. Can it, indeed, be so that a root shall be divine and the branches, twigs and leaves growing out of it human? Or can it be that the main branches, as well as the root, shall be divine, but the twigs and leaves human?

Now, where this indefinite Presbyterian theory prevails, there is usually felt a great horror of what is called "*High Church* Presbyterianism," which is described as

"A disposition to attribute undue importance to the external organization of the Church—the desire to make every thing relating thereto a matter of divine right, and to insist that no society, however orthodox and pure, can be a Church unless organized in one particular form."

It is argued that

"The institutions of the Christian Church are designed for all nations, ages and portions of the globe. It is inconceivable that any one outward form of the Church can be suited for all these different circumstances. We can readily believe that one style of building and one mode of dress might suit all parts of Palestine, but who can believe that God would prescribe the same garments for the Arabs and the Laplanders? * * * * When we open the New Testament the first thing that strikes the reader is its comparative silence on this subject. * * * * Those Protestants who adopt the *jus Divinum* principle are obliged to substitute conjectures as to what was done in place of positive commands as to what we should do."

And it is declared that

"Not only in Romanists and Prelatists, but even in Presbyterians and Independents, we see manifestations of this disposition, which has a deep root in human nature, to let the external and the visible overshadow the spiritual; to make obligatory what God has left indifferent: to regard as essential, points which are unimportant or injurious; to subject the conscience to human authority; to alienate those who ought to be united; and impede the Church's progress by afflictive and disgraceful schisms." *

* See Bib. Repertory for Jan. 1849, pp. 6, 7.

It has never fallen to our lot to see any such Presbyterians as are here described, nor do we know of any persons in any branch of the Presbyterian Church to whom this description applies. Most especially, did we never hear of any Presbyterians so holding to the *jus Divinum Presbyterii* as to maintain that "no society, however orthodox and pure, can be a Church, unless organized in one particular form." This must be viewed, we suppose, simply as one of those exaggerations of statement to which the wisest men are liable in the heat of argument, or in the haste of composition. We submit, with great respect, the enquiry whether, after all, the evil which calls for rebuke be not really the very opposite of that over-zealous regard for Presbyterian Church government which is thus ridiculed and denounced. Does there not prevail generally amongst Presbyterians too little confidence in the Scriptural authority of the Church polity handed down to them from their fathers in Scotland, who received it from Geneva fresh exhumed by Calvin from that grave where Prelates and Popes had so long kept it buried?

In view of this unsettled state of the question of Church polity especially, we hail Dr. Killen's "Ancient Church" with great delight. We hail the appearance of it, because of the decided views he expresses on all these questions, and because of the full and complete and able discussion of them, with which God has enabled him to favor the Church. Dr. Schaff says that "Presbyterians of the Scotch *jure Divino* school are one-sided and pedantic, too little regarding even many important facts of the New Testament, and either entirely rejecting or distorting the weighty testimony of Church antiquity."* But here is a writer of that one-sided school who ventures to think, alluding, doubtless, amongst others, to Dr. Schaff himself, that the "progress of the Christian commonwealth, for the first three hundred years, recently described by British, German and American writers of eminent ability, is not yet an exhausted subject." "Several documents lately

*Apostolic History, p. 541.

discovered have thrown fresh light on the transactions of the ancient Church. There are, besides, points of view disclosing unexplored fields for thought, from which the ecclesiastical landscape has never yet been contemplated.* We believe this. We are satisfied there yet remains much land to be possessed in this quarter. The field of research has by no means been fully explored. And precisely because we are satisfied that Dr. Killen neither "regards too little" any "important facts of the New Testament," nor "neglects" nor "distorts the weighty testimony of Church antiquity"—precisely for these reasons we are sure his book will be read with advantage by all impartial enquirers. The value of his argument is due to its being derived so entirely from Scripture, and so strikingly confirmed by the most recently discovered illustrations of primitive Church history.

As to one of these, viz.: that of the new recension of the Ignatian Letters, we are confident that every honest mind will acknowledge the ability and thoroughness of Dr. Killen's investigations. In 1845 a new turn was given to the Ignatian controversy, by the publication of a Syriac version of three of the Letters. In 1846, Dr. Cureton, of the British Museum, their editor in England, published his "*Vindiciæ Ignatiæ, or the Genuine Writings of St. Ignatius,*" &c.; and in 1849 his more full discussion of the subject in his *Corpus Ignatianum*, in which he maintains that only the three are genuine. His views are understood to have the sanction of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the English metropolitan, to whom his work is dedicated, by permission. Bishop Pearson's celebrated book in defence of the authority of all the seven epistles, which (says Killen) "few have ever read, but under the shadow of the reputation of which Prelatists have for two centuries been reposing quietly," is thus abandoned by the highest representatives of Prelacy in our day. They are compelled, by the investigations of the British Museum, to confess that about three-fourths of the matter which the Bishop of Chester spent

* Preface of Dr. Killen, p. v.

six years of his mature age in attempting to prove genuine, is the work of an impostor. In 1847 appears Bunsen's work, in letters addressed to Neander, in which the three recensions of the Ignatian letters, Greek, Latin and Syriac, are elaborately compared. He also maintains that the three are the only genuine. His work produces a profound impression, and is considered by many to have settled the question. But our author thoroughly investigates anew this old controversy, and sheds a flood of new light upon it. So far as we can judge, Dr. Killen goes to the very root of the matter, and we strongly incline to say that he takes the only consistent ground. Very significant, indeed, is the past history of these letters. In the sixteenth century, fifteen of them were offered to the world as from the pen of the Pastor of Antioch, but scholars refused to receive them all as genuine, and immediately eight of them were admitted to be forgeries; and then,—as in the case of that other forgery, the Sybilline letters,—a smaller number of them is proposed to our confidence. In the seventeenth century, the seven letters appear in a somewhat altered form, and claim to be the genuine and original copies; but discerning critics again refuse to acknowledge their pretensions. This second apparition, however, piques the curiosity of scholars, and they ransack Greece, Syria, Palestine and Egypt, till at length, in the Nitrian Desert, three letters are found, written in Syriac. There is a new era in the controversy now. It is confessed, even by Prelatists, that four of the seven so long insisted to be genuine are apocryphal, but it is boldly said that the remaining three are above challenge. Bunsen himself acknowledges them, and even Presbyterians of learning acquiesce in his conclusions.* But, says Killen:

“Truth still refuses to be compromised, and sternly disowns these claimants for her approbation. The internal evidence of these three epistles abundantly attests that, like the last three books of the Sybil, they are only the last shifts of a grave imposture.” “Ignatius, in his new dress, has lost nothing of his absurdity and extravagance. The passages formerly felt to be so objectionable, are yet found here in all

* *Biblical Repertory*, for July, 1849.

their unmitigated folly. Ignatius is still the same anti-evangelical formalist, the same puerile boaster, the same dreaming mystic, and the same crazy fanatic. These are weighty charges, and yet they can be substantiated." "It is truly wonderful that men, such as Dr. Cureton, have permitted themselves to be be-fooled by these Syriac manuscripts. It is still more extraordinary, that writers, such as the amiable and pious Milner, have published, with all gravity, the rhapsodies of Ignatius for the edification of their readers. It would almost appear as if the name of *Bishop* has such a magic influence on some honest and enlightened Episcopalians, that when the interests of their denomination are supposed to be concerned, they can be induced to close their eyes against the plainest dictates of common sense, and the clearest light of historical demonstration." "Bunsen rather reluctantly admits that the highest literary authority of the present century, the late Dr. Neander, declined to recognize even the Syriac version of the Ignatian epistles." "And it is no mean proof of the sagacity of the great Calvin, that, upwards of three hundred years ago, he passed a sweeping sentence of condemnation on these Ignatian epistles. At the time, many were startled by the boldness of his language, and it was thought he was somewhat precipitate in pronouncing such a decisive judgment. But he saw distinctly, and he spoke, therefore, fearlessly. There is a far more intimate connection than many are disposed to believe between sound theology and sound criticism; for a right knowledge of the Word of God strengthens the intellectual vision, and assists in the detection of error wherever it may reveal itself. Had Pearson enjoyed the same clear views of Gospel truth as the Reformer of Geneva, he would not have wasted so many precious years in writing a learned vindication of the nonsense attributed to Ignatius. Calvin knew that an Apostolic man must have been acquainted with Apostolic doctrine, and he saw that these letters must have been the production of an age when the pure light of Christianity was greatly obscured. Hence he denounced them so emphatically: and time has verified his deliverance. His language respecting them has been often quoted, but we feel we cannot more appropriately close our observations on this subject than by another repetition of it. 'There is nothing more abominable than that trash which is in circulation under the name of Ignatius.'"—*Instit. Lib. I., c. xiii., § 29.**

We propose, very briefly, to state to our readers the substance of our author's argument on this subject.

According to the current accounts, Ignatius was the second Bishop of Antioch at the time of his martyrdom, and was probably far advanced in life. When Trajan visited the capital of Syria, A. D. 107, Ignatius voluntarily presented himself before him and avowed his Christianity. In consequence, he

* Killen's Ancient Ch., p. 427.

was condemned to be carried to Rome and consigned to the wild beasts for the entertainment of the populace. On his way thither he stopped at Smyrna. The legend represents Polycarp as then chief Pastor of that city. There Ignatius received deputations from the neighboring Churches, and thence he wrote them several letters. From Smyrna he goes to Troas, and thence writes other epistles, including one to Polycarp.

Now, there is every reason to believe that, in the second century, Ignatius was connected with the Church at Antioch, and about the same period suffered unto death for the cause of Christianity; and possibly, also, he was sent to Rome by the chief magistrate of Syria, for Pliny, in Bithynia, was accustomed, at the beginning of the persecution of Trajan, to send Roman citizens who were accused of Christianity to the Emperor himself. Upon some such substratum of facts as this is, has been erected a huge mass of incongruous fictions. For it is much to be doubted if Trajan's visit took place so early as the legend states. It is also difficult to discover any reasonable apology for the fool-hardiness ascribed to Ignatius, of appearing of his own accord before Trajan to proclaim his Christianity. Moreover, the report of his behaviour before the Emperor represents the martyr as totally wanting in the humility of a Christian. And then the story of his transmission to Rome is full of difficulties. He is sent thither that the sight of such a distinguished victim passing through so many cities might terrify the Christians. But we are told he went from Syria to Smyrna *by water*; and then, had he gone by land, the lesson designed for the Christians would have been just one with which they were unhappily already quite familiar. He is represented as being hurried along violently and barbarously from East to West, and yet as remaining many days together in the same place, receiving deputations and writing magniloquent epistles.* And then, strangest of all, though pressed hastily

* The author falls into a small error, in his remarks here, regarding the time Ignatius must have remained at Smyrna in order to have received a deputation from

forwards by the soldiers, and the vessel speedily carried to Italy by prosperous winds, yet is one of these same letters supposed to outstrip the fast-sailing ship, and to reach Rome before himself and his impatient escort!

As to the testimony which accredits these letters, it is not necessary to examine any later witness than Eusebius. But his acknowledgment of the genuineness of the seven letters is of doubtful value, because the correspondence in question bears date two hundred years before his own appearance as an author. Nor is his judgment in such matters acknowledged to have been a very critical one; he published as genuine the correspondence between Abgarus and our Saviour!

Before the fourth century there is only one authority that notices those letters, and that is Origen, who quotes twice, evidently from the Syriac version. Probably Origen first met with them when visiting Antioch, on the invitation of the Emperor's mother, Julia Mammœa, and probably, too, they had just then been fabricated. The epistles wear all the characteristics of the former part of the third century. Ritualism

Magnesia. "Had notice been sent to them immediately on his arrival at Smyrna, the messenger must have required three days to perform the journey, and had the Magnesians set out immediately they must have occupied three days more in travelling to him. And so, with all the precipitation with which he was hurried along, he could scarcely have been less than a week in Smyrna!" We have, ourselves, more than once, travelled the whole distance in seven or eight hours moderate riding.

He elsewhere falls into an error on another subject which we may as well refer to here. "A slave owner (he says) might belong to a congregation of which his slave was the teacher, and thus, whilst in the household the servant was bound to obey his master according to the flesh, in the Church the master was required to remember that his minister was worthy of double honor."—p. 324. Dr. Killen quotes no authority for this statement, and we suppose no authority exists for it, as he makes the statement. Such cases, no doubt, must have sometimes occurred, or that kind of ordinations would not have required to be forbidden as they were in different early councils. The ground on which the prohibition is placed was *that very subordination to the will of another*, which Dr. Killen speaks of, and which the early Church considered to be inconsistent with the duties and obligations assumed by ministers of the Gospel. But his statement seems to imply that such ordinations of slaves were approved and regular, and had the sanction of the primitive Church as such, which, we think, cannot be shewn.

had then supplanted the freedom of evangelical worship; baptism was beginning to be viewed as an "armour" of marvellous potency; the tradition of Peter's founding the great Church of the West was now extensively propagated, and there was an increasing disposition to yield precedence to Rome. It was the greatest virtue then to be subject to the *Bishop*; to maintain uniformity was more than to maintain truth. Celibacy was then confounded with chastity, and mysticism was in place of the knowledge of the Word. Above all, the admiration of martyrdom, which in these epistles presents itself in so startling a form, characterized that period. If presented to Origen by parties interested in the recognition of their claims, these epistles were exactly the documents to impose upon Origen. The student of Philo, and the author of "Exhortations to Martyrdom," could not but admire such writings as these. Moreover, there are other apocryphal writings noticed by Origen, with no intimations of their being spurious works.

It has been attempted to show that both Irenæus and Polycarp, before Origen, noticed these letters; but the author most conclusively disposes of this pretence: and then he dwells upon the strangeness of the fact that no other writer has mentioned them. Asia Minor is moved by the presence of the martyr on his way to Rome, there to die,—Greece catches the infection of the excitement,—the capital itself, with breathless anxiety waits the coming of the illustrious Bishop,—yet no Western father mentions even his letter to the Romans for two or three hundred years after the time of its assumed publication! Where was Tertullian, the scholar and the Montanist too, a resident also for years of the city of Rome, that this document should have escaped his notice? And how is it that Hippolytus, of Portus, within a few miles of the city, conversant with the history of the Church there, and likely to sympathize as much as Tertullian with the rugged and ascetic spirit pervading this correspondence, has no testimony from these letters respecting any one of all the heresies he writes against?

The positive arguments adduced by Dr. Killen against all these epistles, we must merely mention, without stating them fully. They are as follows :

“First. The style is suspicious.

Secondly. They ignore God’s word, which never characterizes any of the early fathers.

Thirdly. The chronological blunders in these epistles betray their forgery.

Fourthly. Various words in them have a meaning which they did not acquire until long after the time of Ignatius.

Fifthly. The puerilities, vapouring and mysticism of these letters betray their forgery.

Sixthly. The unhallowed and insane anxiety for martyrdom, which appears throughout these letters, is a decisive proof of their fabrication.”

We have dwelt at length upon our author’s discussion of this subject because of the great importance which the advocates of the hierarchy have always attached to the testimonies they have quoted from these epistles ; testimonies which now would seem the “worthless coinage of pious fraud.” When Episcopalians are asked to explain by what steps Prelacy (which many of them, like Waddington, admit was not the original form of government for the Church of Christ) came to be established, as we find it was in the latter part of the second and in the third centuries, Ignatius is their great resource. It is he who makes out that the Apostles, or such of them as survived the destruction of Jerusalem, placed a Bishop at the head of each Church, with peculiar powers, as the representative of the unity of the Church ; and so it is he who exhibits Prelates as the true and only successors of the Apostles. And we have, therefore, sketched at some length our author’s argument, in order that the reader may see how little it avails our prelatie brethren to appeal to the first century for any support to their cause. It is not Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, the second of the Apostolic fathers, a disciple and companion of the very Apostles, whose long life closing, indeed, early in the second century, did yet as to its labours and its testimony run

far back into the first century ; it is not this father of the first century from whom they get the testimony they quote so often, but it is from some one of the numerous forgers and falsifiers of the third century !

If Dr. Killen's discussion of the Ignatian letters be an important service for the cause of truth in the Prelatic controversy, his discussion of the primitive constitution of the Church is entitled to be considered such, also, as regards both the Prelatic and the Popish controversies. Let the reader recall the acknowledgement of Milman, (himself a Churchman, Prebendary of St. Peter's, and Minister of St. Margaret's, Westminster,) that "the primitive constitution of the Church rests on dubious and mere inferential evidence ;"—and that of Waddington, (another Churchman, Vicar of Masham and Prebendary of Chichester,) that "neither Christ nor his Apostles left any positive ordinances for the administration of the Church government ;"—and also that of Schaff, not a Churchman himself, but standing (if it can be called *standing*) on the fence between Presbytery and Prelacy, that "the most difficult, as well as important, phenomenon of the primitive period, in respect to Church organization, is the rise and development of the Episcopate." Now, Dr. Killen solves this difficult problem. He explains how the Presbyterian principles, that Schaff finds in the New Testament, give place gradually to the Prelatical ideas whose introduction and progress are such a puzzle for Dr. Schaff. Killen, having recourse constantly to original authorities, traces definitely the rise of the Episcopate, out of which the Papacy was naturally and necessarily developed. And he thus furnishes a fresh, and we think a complete, demonstration of the utter weakness of the historical basis on which the Church of Rome rests her claims.

Upon this point, also, let us present the reader a brief sketch of the course of his narrative and argument.

Two documents of extreme antiquity, and universally acknowledged to be genuine, show to us what was the kind of Church government existing from the close of the first century

to the middle of the second—these documents dating one at each of these periods. The first is the letter of Clemens Romanus to the Corinthians; the second is the letter of Polycarp to the Philippians. Both these letters refer often and plainly to the government of those Churches by *Elders*, and neither of them hints at a government by one man. Had there been a diocesan Bishop either at Rome or Corinth, at the close of the first century, Clement must have alluded to him. Again, had there been one half a century later, either at Smyrna or Philippi, Polycarp must have alluded to him. In Clement, especially, we see a Presbyter of Rome, on the verge of the Apostolic age, personally conversant perhaps with some of the Apostles, honored exceedingly by the Church of Rome, who yet comes forward, and by a silence more expressive than words, contradicts both her assumptions and the less developed ones of Prelacy.

But of course, from the beginning, that all things might be done decently and in order, it was indispensable to have some presiding officer in every Church assembly of the Elders. Starting out with that parity which the Saviour himself ordained amongst them, it was natural that they should preside in turn. And that the Elders in each Church did preside in turn, seems to be indicated in the striking fact of the confusion which exists in the so-called Episcopal succession just where it needs to be sustained, if it is to have any value, by the most decisive and perspicuous evidence. The lists of Bishops, commencing with the ministry of the Apostles, and extending over the latter half of the first century, are little better than a mass of contradictions. The compilers seem to have set down, almost at random, the names of some distinguished men whom they found connected with some of the different Churches, and thus the discrepancies are nearly as numerous as the catalogues.*

* "At Antioch some, as Origen and Eusebius, make Ignatius to succeed Peter. Jerome maketh him the third Bishop, and placeth Evodius before him. Others make them contemporary Bishops. * * * Come we to Rome, and here the succes-

Now, the first step towards a change of the original constitution was to make the oldest Elder successively the permanent Moderator. Hilary, a Roman Deacon of the fourth century, whose works are commonly appended to those of Ambrose, and who is one of the best commentators of the ancient Church, bears explicit testimony to the existence of such an arrangement. His statement is variously confirmed. 1st. The language of the most ancient documents, applied to the primitive Presidents, confirms it. The Bishop is called *ὁ παλαιὸς βίσις*, "the old man." 2d. In none of the great Sees, before the close of the second century, do we find any trace of a young or even middle-aged Bishop; they are usually four-score years old and more. 3d. The wonderful rapidity with which Bishop succeeds Bishop, especially in the earlier part of the second century (long a difficulty with many students of Church history), may perhaps be best accounted for by this theory of the Presidency.

The second step towards Prelacy is taken first at Rome, just before the middle of the second century, when they depart from this rule of seniority, and elect the ablest and most vigorous-minded Presbyter to be their standing President. Valentinus, Cerdo, and other Gnostic Heretics, appear there at that time and give rise to great distractions, and it is suggested that greater powers be given to the central officer, so as to enable him better to cope with these new and dangerous foes. Upon the death of Telesphorus, A. D. 139, who had been President of the Roman Presbytery, Hyginus appears to have succeeded him with new powers. But, beginning at Rome, so far as we can discover, this change appears to have been imitated elsewhere. The same necessity for a stronger ecclesiastical administration appears to have arisen simultaneously at Lyons,

sion is as muddy as the Tyber itself, for here Tertullian, Rufinus, and several others, place Clement next to Peter. Irenæus and Eusebius set Anacletus before him; Epiphanius and Optatus both Anacletus and Cletus; Augustinus and Damasus, with others, make Anacletus, Cletus and Linus all to precede him. What way shall we find to extricate ourselves out of this labyrinth?"—*Bishop Stillingfleet's Irenicum*, quoted by Killen, p. 506.

Corinth, Athens, Ephesus, Antioch and Alexandria, for the errorists seem to have commenced their discussions at all these points as if on a pre-concerted signal. If in these few leading cities the new system inaugurated at Rome were approved, its general adoption would gradually, but surely, follow.

Thus, in an evil hour, the dominant party is tempted to change the constitution of the Church, and to aim at putting down heresy and disturbance by ecclesiastical innovation. Believing, as many do now, that "parity breedeth confusion," and expecting that the "seeds of schism"* might thus be destroyed, they sought to invigorate the administration by giving the presiding officer authority over his brethren—themselves in some cases tainted with the new heresies. Accordingly, also, the principle is now adopted that he should be cast out who would not submit to the Bishop.

The steps of the progress of this modified Prelacy, beginning in the days of Hyginus, are clearly traced by our author from original authorities. The power passes from the Presbyters to their President. He is dignified with additional authority and invested with peculiar privileges, and in a new sense he receives the name *Bishop*, henceforth appropriated solely to him. Amongst many proofs of this kind of change commencing in the time of Hyginus, one of the most striking is from the *Pontifical Book*, a document of great weight in the Romish Church, and ascribed to Damasus, Bishop of Rome in the fourth century. It is a curious passage, out of keeping with much that is in the Book, as it contradicts rather awkwardly the pretensions of the Papacy, and has been, therefore, very puzzling to commentators. Damasus testifies that Hyginus "arranged the clergy and distributed the gradations."

* Killen quotes from Jerome's commentary on Titus these two passages :

"Postquam vero unusquisque eos quos baptizaverat suos putabat esse non Christi, in toto orbe decretum est ut unus de presbyteris electus superponeretur cæteris ad quem omnis ecclesiæ cura pertineret, et schismatum semina tollerentur."

"Paulatim vero, ut dissensionum plantaria evellerentur, ad unum, omnem sollicitudinem esse delatam."

Dr. Killen, taking Hilary and Jerome for the interpreters of this passage, understands it as proving that Hyginus was the real framer of the hierarchy. At a Synod in Rome, he brought under the notice of the meeting the confusion and scandal created by the movements of the errorists, and with a view to correct these disorders, the council agreed to invest the Moderator of each Presbytery with increased authority, to give him discretionary power as the general superintendent of the Church, and to require the other Elders, as well as the Deacons, to act under his advice and direction. Thus a new functionary begins to be created under an old name, and thus a third order begins to be added to the ecclesiastical brotherhood.

This change in the government of the Church, perhaps, gave rise to the journey which Polycarp made to Rome. But although it encountered opposition and remonstrance, the innovation exerted, without doubt, a most extensive influence. For many reasons, such a change at Rome would work powerfully all over the Church. And so, *little by little*, as Jerome testifies, this modified prelacy increased and spread itself. In Smyrna, in Cesarea and in Jerusalem, we know that the senior Presbyter was the President until about the close of the second century, and the Church was there still governed, it would seem, by the "common council of the Presbyters." In many other places, even at a later period, the Episcopal system was still unknown. But its advocates were active and influential. The very efforts of heretics to create division in the Church, helped on these plans and arrangements for strong government and visible union. The *Catholic* system is first heard of towards the end of the second century. Those in communion with the Bishop were the "Catholics;" those out of communion with him were "sectaries" and "schismatics." This Catholic system was an integral part of the policy which invested the presiding minister with additional authority, and arose contemporaneously with Prelacy. At the head of this Catholic system which, of course, could not be a local system, but must spread rapidly over the whole Church—at the head

of it, the Bishop of Rome soon found himself placed by uncontrollable and imperious influences. There is no doubt that by the close of the second century he was acknowledged as the chief pastor of Christendom. Victor, in his dealing with Asiatic Bishops, concerning the Paschal festival, was only striving to realize this idea of the unity of the Church—and it was still this same idea of visible unity which Stephen, sixty years afterwards, was endeavoring to work out in his conflict with the Bishop of Carthage.

Pursuing the history from the second into the third century as it gradually develops itself into the rising Papacy, we come to the time when was written a work of the early church, long lost, but lately discovered, which not only sheds light upon the ancient heresies and the history of philosophy, but also contributes by a few most important testimonies to our better understanding of the condition of the Roman Church in the third century, and also of the state of the Church doctrine at that time.

“In A. D., 1551, as some workmen in the neighborhood of Rome were employed in clearing away the ruins of a dilapidated chapel, they found a broken mass of sculptured marble among the rubbish. The fragments, when put together, proved to be a statue representing a person of venerable aspect sitting in a chair, on the back of which were the names of various publications. It was ascertained, on more minute examination, that some time after the establishment of Christianity by Constantine, this monument had been erected in honor of Hippolytus—a learned and able controversialist, who had been Bishop of Portus in the early part of the third century, and who had finished his career by martyrdom, about A. D. 236, during the persecution under the Emperor Maximin. Hippolytus is commemorated as a Saint in the Romish breviary; and the resurrection of his statue after it had been buried for perhaps a thousand years, created quite a sensation among his Papal admirers. Experienced sculptors, under the auspices of the Pontiff, Pius IV., restored the fragments to nearly their previous condition; and the renovated statue was then duly honored with a place in the Library of the Vatican.

“Nearly three hundred years afterwards, or in 1842, a manuscript which had been found in a Greek Monastery, at Mt. Athos, was deposited in the Royal Library at Paris. This work, which has since been published, and which is entitled “Philosophoumena, or a refutation of all Heresies,” has been identified as the production of Hippolytus. It does not appear in the list of his writings mentioned on the

back of the marble chair; but any one who inspects its contents can satisfactorily account for its exclusion from that catalogue. It reflects strongly on the character and principles of some of the early Roman Bishops; and as the Papal See was fast rising into power when the statue was erected, it was obviously deemed prudent to omit an invidious publication. The writer of the *Philosophumena* declares that he is the author of one of the books named on that piece of ancient sculpture, and various other facts amply corroborate his testimony. There is, therefore, no good reason to doubt that a Christian Bishop who lived about fifteen miles from Rome, and who flourished little more than one hundred years after the death of the Apostle John, composed the newly discovered Treatise."—pp. 344, 345.

This treatise of Hippolytus lets us into the secret that Victor, Bishop of Rome A. D. 192–201, had countenanced the errors of Montanus, and that his two successors, Zephyrinus (A. D. 201–219) and Callistus (A. D. 219–223), held unsound views respecting the Trinity. Callistus, as well as Hippolytus, is a Saint in the Romish breviary; yet the latter describes the former as both a schemer and a heretic. It is very clear, also, that Hippolytus never dreamed of acknowledging Callistus as his metropolitan; but that all Bishops were then on a level as to equality of power. Hippolytus says Callistus was afraid of him, as well indeed he might be of such a man, possessing co-ordinate authority with himself. Yet still it is plain, from various admissions in the *Philosophumena*, that the Bishop of Rome was beginning to presume upon his position.

Dr. Killen makes, also, very good and full use of the discoveries made since the sixteenth century in those long labyrinths under the ground around the city of Rome, called the Catacombs.* These streets, all taken together, are supposed to be nine hundred miles long. The galleries are often found two or three stories deep. They were originally stone-quarries or gravel-pits and were commenced long before the time of Augustus. During the frequent proscriptions of the second and third centuries these "dens and caves of the earth" supplied shelter oftentimes to the Christians at Rome. As early as the second century these vaults became the great cemetery

*From *κατά*, down, and *κύβος*, a cavity.

of the Church. Many of the memorials of the dead which they contained have long since been transferred to the Lapidarian Gallery in the Vatican, and there in the Palace of the Pope these venerable tomb-stones testify to all who will consult them how much modern Romanism differs from ancient Christianity. These inscriptions know no worship of the Virgin. They point only to Jesus. Their tone is eminently cheerful. They speak not of purgatory or of masses for the dead, but describe the believer as having entered immediately into rest. And they give clear proof also that the early Church of Rome did not impose celibacy on her Ministers, for they refer constantly to different Presbyters as holding to the various deceased the relations of husband and of father.

It is not necessary to follow the author through all the testimonies he adduces, from Jerome and others, to the antiquity of the Presbyterian polity. We have sufficiently indicated how he makes good his allegation that the Presbyterian government existed in all its integrity during the whole course of the second century. At the close of that period we meet with a wide spread of Prelacy; and the principle of a permanent priority having been once introduced amongst the originally equal brethren, it was necessarily developed in a still wider departure from the simplicity of the divine constitution of the Church. One brother having become superior to the rest, at several different points, these superiors must needs again contend together for supremacy. And, thus, finally emerges from the din of this unholy strife a supreme Pontiff and a Bishop of Bishops in the capital of Christendom.

But the most valuable service performed for the cause of truth, in this volume, is done in those chapters where Dr. Killen proves that the Presbyterian system is contained in the Scriptures, and was instituted by Christ and His Apostles.

The author remarks, in his preface, that "one of the most hopeful signs of the times is the increasing charity of evangelical Christians." Yet he maintains that no apology is due for the free utterance of his sentiments upon the important questions he discusses. The divided state of the Christian

Church is indeed to be deplored. Barriers to mutual fellowship, and to a real and visible unity amongst the disciples of a common Saviour, are a reproach to the Gospel. We thank God that Presbyterians generally do not set up any such barriers; introduce no tests of communion not ordained by the Lord; acknowledge as true ministers of Jesus Christ all who are called and ordained by any evangelical Church, according to its own rules; and fellowship every Church which holds the Head. We look with intensest satisfaction upon all efforts at union of prayer amongst the different branches of the Church of Christ—and wherever a union of active effort, likewise, is possible, without a forbidden sacrifice on either or both sides, we rejoice, also, in such displays of the charity of the Gospel. Yet, we have no faith in compromises of principle respecting the government of the Church, any more than the doctrine, for we believe both to be divine. Neither would it be a possible thing now, any more than it was in Baxter's day, to unite Episcopacy, Presbyterianism and Independency together, so as to form one common religious government and discipline;* because the principles on which each is founded are diverse. The believers of each must "agree to differ" about this doctrine, as about others, and they must wait and pray for more light from above. In the meanwhile they may kindly and faithfully reason with one another out of the Scriptures, with a view to a better understanding of each other's real position. Every honest effort of this kind is entitled to kind and candid consideration.

When we take up the three forms of Church government above named for a comparison of them together, we find Prelacy standing at one extreme and Independency at the other.

* Owen long and attentively considered Baxter's scheme for uniting all parties in one, and then returned the papers with these words: "I am still a well-wisher to these mathematics:" a reply sufficiently laconic—expressive of his general approbation of the scheme (considered as an effort for peace and harmony), but of his doubts, also, about the calculating process of his ingenious correspondent.—*See Orme's Life of Owen*, p. 287.

To the former there arises at once, and we cannot help feeling it, a very weighty objection, viz.: that it seems to destroy the brotherhood Christ established amongst His ministers, and thus to form just a resting-point on the road towards Popery. Leaving this extreme and glancing at Independency, two things appear to be very plainly made known in the Scriptures, viz.: *first*, that the whole Church of Christ is one body; and, *secondly*, that our Lord, by His Apostles, instituted certain offices, and attached to these offices the powers belonging to them; so that the Church is not immediately to direct her own affairs, but she is directed and ruled by her representatives, her chosen rulers, who are officers ordained of God.

In the middle, between these two extremes, just where truth always lies, you find what is called Presbyterianism—the Scriptural form of Church government. We call it the Scriptural form, because it seems to us that the Scriptures directly reveal all the main features of it, out of which necessarily flow the secondary features. As we said before, the *substantials* of the system are laid down in Scripture, in *particular rules*, respecting the Church herself, her officers, her courts and her discipline; whilst the *circumstantials*, also, are there laid down in *general rules* of order, decency and edification.

First, *as to the Church herself*, the Scriptures plainly teach that she is one body. The Church of the Old Testament was one body, having one worship, one High Priest, and one place of sacrifice. And Paul describes the New Testament Church not as “a loose mass of independent congregations,” but a body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth. Dr. Killen well remarks that,

“While the Apostle does, indeed, here refer to the vital union of believers, he seems, also, to allude to those *bands* of outward ordinances by the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, and those *joints* of visible confederation, by which their communion is upheld, for were the Church split up into an indefinite number of insulated congregations, even the unity of the Spirit could neither be distinctly ascertained, nor properly cultivated.”—p. 250.

Accordingly, Dr. Killen regards the Twelve as

“Representatives of the doctrine of ecclesiastical confederation—

for though commanded to go into all the world and preach to every creature, yet, as long as circumstances permitted, they continued to coöperate. 'When the Apostles which were at Jerusalem heard that Samaria had received the word of God, *they sent* unto them Peter and John,' and, at a subsequent period, they concurred in *sending* 'forth Barnabas, that he should go as far as unto Antioch.' These facts distinctly prove that they had a common interest in every thing pertaining to the well-being of the whole Christian commonwealth."—pp. 250, 251.

This unity of the Church in adjoining provinces was maintained by meetings together of the delegates of the Churches. As to different countries, the communion of saints was kept up also by deputations and letters.* During the lives of the Apostles, there were preachers in whom they had no confidence, managing, by *letters of commendation*, to get access to Apostolic Churches.† All the Churches of that day were, perhaps, more really united than they have ever been since.

So far from all the Churches being independent, we read of all the congregations in Jerusalem, where were myriads of believing Jews, as *the Church in Jerusalem*.‡ So we read of the Christians at Antioch, to whom so many "prophets and teachers ministered," as *the Church of Antioch*. Probably, also, the true reading of the passage in Acts ix.: 31—"Then had the Churches rest throughout all Judea and Galilee and Samaria"—is, "then had *the Church* rest," referring to the Church of Palestine.

So much for the Scripture representation of the Church as not a number of separate congregations, but one united body.

Secondly, *as to officers of the Church*. There are two lists of these officers in two of Paul's Epistles, as follows:

1. Christ "gave some, Apostles; and some, Prophets; and some, Evangelists; and some, Pastors and Teachers."—Eph. iv.: 11.

2. "God hath set some in the Church, first, Apostles; secondarily, Prophets; thirdly, Teachers; after that, miracles; then, gifts of healings, helps, governments, diversities of tongues."—1 Cor. xii.: 28.

* See 2 Cor. viii.: 4, 18, 22. Phil. ii.: 25, 28. Col. iv.: 7-9. 2 Tim. iv.: 9-12.

† See 2 John, verse 10. 1 John, iv.: 1. Phil. i.: 15-18.

‡ The expression is *ποσαι μυριάδες*, how many ten thousands.—Acts xxi.: 20. See, also, Acts xi.: 22; and xv.: 4.

Now these passages evidently mention both ordinary and extraordinary functionaries. When the helps (that is, the Deacons) and the extraordinary officers are left out of these Apostolic catalogues, "it is rather singular (says Dr. Killen) that in the passage addressed to the Ephesians we have nothing remaining but 'PASTORS AND TEACHERS,' and in that to the Corinthians nothing but 'TEACHERS AND GOVERNMENTS.' There are good grounds for believing that these two residuary elements are identical—the pastors mentioned before the teachers in one text being equivalent to the governments mentioned after them in the other." We have long been convinced that this is the true interpretation of the expression "and some, Pastors and Teachers." If the Apostle did not intend to put these into one order, why did he not repeat *some* before *Teachers*, as before all the other officers he names? It is plain, in our apprehension, that he designed to speak separately; first of the *extraordinary* functionaries, that is, Apostles, Prophets, Evangelists; and then, under one category, of the *ordinary*, that is, Pastors and Teachers, or Ruling Elders and Teaching Elders. The ordinary office-bearers of the Apostolic Church, then, were Pastors, Teachers and Helps—or, reversing the order a little, Teachers, Rulers, Deacons.

Again, we read of Elders and Bishops, and these names are interchangeably applied. These are the same officers as the Pastors. There were generally a plurality of Elders as well as of Deacons in every Church or congregation.* But it is by no means correct to say that all the primitive Elders or Bishops were preachers. The Elders were appointed simply to "take care of the Church of God," to be "overseers of the flock," its shepherds, guardians, rulers, its head-men and guides. It was not necessary all of them should have the *charism* of teaching, and they did not all have it; for Paul's language to Timothy shows plainly that there were Elders who did not labour in the word, and yet were worthy of honor, because faithful to their sole duty of ruling. And it is indeed

* Acts vi. : 3; xiv. : 23. Titus i. : 5. James v. : 14.

remarkable, as the reader has probably noticed, how the Apostle, when enumerating the qualifications of a Bishop or Elder, scarcely refers at all to any oratorical endowments. Only one word of that sort is used by him, rendered in English by the phrase *apt to teach*. This does not imply that he must be qualified to preach, for *teaching* and *preaching* are repeatedly distinguished in the New Testament;—but only that he must be able and willing, as opportunity occurs, to communicate sound instruction, and that from house to house. The aged women Paul required to be *Teachers* of good things. All believers are to *teach* and admonish one another. The description which Paul gives of the qualifications of a Bishop or Elder is evidently a description of one called to *rule*.

Still, preaching is the grand ordinance of God to edify saints as well as to convert sinners, and therefore God gave some teachers as well as rulers, and these held the most honorable position in the Church. In the courts of the Church, however, which are assemblies of Rulers, and nothing else, both these classes of Rulers stand on a level, just as in official position and power, each individual of each class is equal to every other of the same class.

All these officers are to be elected by the free choice of the people. Yet, when elected, they have authority in the Lord, and obedience is due to them by the people. They are the Lord's ministers, as well as the chosen rulers of the Church.

Such is the Scriptural account of the officers of the Church.

Thirdly, *as to the courts of the Church*. The Scriptures show that the ruling of the Elders was not singly, as individuals, but jointly, as courts—not as Presbyters, but as Presbyteries. They also show that these courts were some lower and some higher, and, therefore courts of appeal.

The Elders of the Jews had always acted as a body, and appeals from the inferior tribunals to that at Jerusalem were explicitly enjoined.* And obedience was actually rendered

* See Deut. xvii. : 8-10. 2 Chron. xix. : 8-11. Ps. cxxii. : 5

by foreign Synagogues to the orders of the Sanhedrim at Jerusalem.*

Every one of the Apostolic Churches, like every Synagogue of the Jews, had its Elders, and every city had its Presbytery, consisting of the spiritual rulers of the district. Repeatedly, in the Acts, we find "the Apostles" acting together as a court, as "the Presbytery of Jerusalem," ordaining Deacons, exercising discipline, and sending forth missionaries.† Obviously, the same functions were performed by the prophets and teachers at Antioch.‡ Titus is instructed to have Elders ordained—that is, a Presbytery established—in every city. Timothy was ordained by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery. Thus did the Eldership—that is, the Parochial Presbytery, or the Session, the most ancient court of the Church—arise with the first preaching of the Gospel. And the classical Presbytery is also found at Jerusalem and Antioch, and elsewhere, even at the beginning, and this manifestly was a higher court than the former. But can we find any court that was higher still than the classical Presbytery? When at Antioch arose the discussion about circumcising the Gentile converts, there were individuals there present as competent to decide that question, we should say, as any that could be found anywhere—for example, Paul and the Prophets that ministered in that Church. Yet the Christians there acted as the Jews before them would have done—they sent the case up to Jerusalem. There was to be found not only the Presbytery of Jerusalem, but also all the virtual rulers of the universal Church, the Apostles—and also Elders from every country, resorting, as did the Jews from of old, to the Holy City. It is to this body the appeal comes, and is determined by them as the highest court of the Christian Church.

Dr. Killen argues with great force that the Elders of the Church, called together at Miletus by Paul, were not the

* Acts ix. : 1, 2, 14

† Acts ii. : 14, 41, 42; iv. : 4, 32, 33, 35; v. : 14, 42; vi. : 6, 7; viii. : 14.

‡ Acts xiii. : 1, 3.

Elders of Ephesus alone, but of the district around, called together as a Synod or a Classical Presbytery. He reasons from the cause assigned for this calling of them together. Paul would not spend the time in Asia, but was hastening to Jerusalem. Had he merely wished to see the Elders of the metropolis he might have gone to them as rapidly as his messenger could travel. But he was unwilling to offend the other Churches, and he would see them all together by their representatives, and so he sends to Ephesus, and thence by a second set of messages he calls all the Elders of the province together. Our author reasons, also, from the opening words of Paul's address to them, "Ye know from the first day that I came *into Asia* after what manner I have been *with you* at all seasons." The Evangelist informs us that Paul spent only two years and three months at Ephesus, yet here Paul tells his audience that for the space of *three years* he had not ceased to warn, &c. He suggests some other considerations, confirming this view of the matter, but we shall only refer to his quotation from Irenæus. "In Mileto enim convocatis episcopis et Presbyteris qui erant ab Epheso et a reliquis proximis civitatibus."*

As to the fact that Scripture takes so little notice of Christian judicatories, let it be considered that the machinery of the Church's government (as Dr. Killen suggests) did not require to be written down for the heathen to read about, as much as the doctrines and the history of Christianity. It might thus have been only so much the more exposed to the attacks of enemies. Hence its courts probably assembled in secret, both during the very earliest days, and also afterwards, during the persecutions which preceded the second half of the second century.†

* Contra Hæres. iii., c. 14, §2.

† Neander has asserted, as Mosheim did before him, that Synods commenced not until the middle of the second century. The statement is unsupported (says Killen) by a particle of evidence, and a number of facts may be adduced to prove that it is altogether untenable. The earliest writers, who touch upon the subject, speak

But if there be few notices of these courts in the Scriptures, they are sufficiently numerous to give them a Divine warrant, for a single Scripture precedent is as decisive as a multitude. One solitary reference of an appeal from a lower to a higher court, in connection with the other concurrent revelations of Scripture, is all we need to establish the Christian doctrine of Church government by courts of review and control.

Now the power which belongs to these courts, from the highest down to the lowest, is all of it merely *declarative*. They cannot make any laws, they can only expound and declare the laws of Christ—for Jesus is the sole King and Head of His Church.

Moreover, this power is all of it *spiritual*, and none of it civil, or political, or temporal; for Christ's kingdom is not of this world. His Church, in her highest courts, can inflict no penalty but a spiritual one. Indeed, she can there handle no business but what is *spiritual*, that is, strictly *ecclesiastical* and belonging to them as *courts of the Lord's house*. There are to be discussed only those questions which arise out of the relations which men bear to men as members of Christ's Church.

of them as of Apostolic origin—witness the reference to the Synod at Miletus, just now quoted from Irenæus. Cyprian and Jerome are both quoted by Killen to the same effect. Our author also denies that Synods originated in Greece. He brings proof that there were councils held both at Carthage and Rome, before those Greek councils which Tertullian refers to as occasioned about the middle of the second century by the Montanistic troubles. Nor does Dr. Killen treat with any respect the idea that the once famous Amphictyonic Council suggested their establishment amongst Christians. In the second century of the Christian era the council of the Amphictyons was shorn of its glory, and though it then continued to meet, it had long ceased to be either an exponent of the national mind, or a free and independent assembly. And it is not to be imagined that the Christian community, in the full vigor of its early growth, would all at once have abandoned its Apostolic constitution and adopted a form of government borrowed from an effete institute. Synods, which now formed so prominent a part of the ecclesiastical polity, could claim a higher and holier origin. They were obviously nothing more than the legitimate development of the primitive structure of the Church, for they could be traced up to that meeting of the Apostles and Elders at Jerusalem, which relieved the Gentile converts from the observance of the rite of circumcision.—p. 615.

Yet, on the other hand, the power of these courts is a real and living power, given them of God—for they bind on earth and it is bound in Heaven;* and they have the promise of Divine guidance in their bindings.† So much the more ought it not to be prostituted to any but the affairs of Christ's House and Kingdom!

Such, we believe, is the doctrine revealed in Scripture respecting the courts of the Church.

Fourthly: All that has been said of the Scriptural exhibition of Church government, as to its substantial, leads to this final statement—that the system set up in the New Testament for the government of the Church is the *Representative system*. The whole Church is one body; this body is governed by officers of the people's own free choice; these officers meet together for consultation in all their ruling, and rule according to a revealed constitution and laws. They are chosen to act for the Church, but are left free to act according to their own judgment and conscience, guided solely by light from above. This is the *Representative system*, distinguished plainly from Congregationalism, or the direct and immediate government of the people themselves, and distinguished, also, quite as plainly from the government of Prelates.

This government, by representatives, is also to be distinguished from the Deputy system, which prevailed among all the nations arising out of the conquests by the Teutonic races, whereas, only in England and her colonies has the representative system prevailed. Congregationalists hold to popular government; but Presbyterians to government by representatives, who are not *deputies*, that is, as Leiber expresses it, (see *Civil Liberty and Self-Government*, vol. ii., p. 181,) "Attorneys sent with *specific powers* of attorney to remedy *specific* grievances, but representatives, general representatives, that is *representatives from the body at large*, and with the general power of legislation. This is universally now acknowledged to be the

* Matt. xviii. : 17, 18.

† Matt. xxviii. : 19, 20.

most important of all the guarantees of civil liberty." This is the only contrivance which the highest political wisdom has ever found out for "organically passing over public opinion into public law;" for barring "against the absolutism of the executive on the one, and of the masses on the other hand;" for securing an essentially popular government, and yet the supremacy of law; in other words, for securing the united and harmonious existence of *liberty and order*. Milton (expounded in this Review, for June, 1848) "distinctly sets forth the peculiar value of the representative principle in political affairs, when he said it consists in the probability, which it furnishes, that *reason only shall sway*. The danger of democracy is from the ignorance and the passions of the people; of monarchy from the caprices, tyranny or ambition of kings; of an oligarchy, from the selfishness incident to privileged orders. Reason, whose voice is God's will, is much more likely to prevail in a deliberative assembly of men coming from the people, and knowing their real interests as well as their wishes. It is a great mistake to suppose that the end of government is to accomplish the will of the people. The State is a divine ordinance founded on justice, and having great moral ends to subserve. The will of the people is to be done only when the people will what is right. And the representative principle is both a check on their power and a bulwark of their freedom."

"Now these principles, which constitute the glory of modern politics, were found embedded in the Presbyterian system, ages before a representative republic, in the true sense of the term, existed on the earth." Our Church government is not in the hands of the mass of the people, nor yet in the hands of individual officers whom they have appointed, but in the hands of representative assemblies chosen by the people. This it is which distinguishes it from Prelacy on the one hand, and Congregationalism on the other. And it is worthy of special notice that in these free representative assemblies, instituted by Jesus Christ for the rule of His Church, there is provided an arrangement answering precisely to that most important check which, in the freest modern States, is imposed on their popu-

lar assemblies, viz: the principle of *two chambers*, composed of different persons, belonging to different classes or elected for different terms of service. Our courts have both Ministers and Elders, and the one class operates as a check upon the other. So, too, our higher courts are a check upon the lower. Thus is the discovery of truth promoted, and the probability diminished that party-interest or temporary prejudices shall predominate in the result.

We find in the 15th chapter of Acts (verses 4, 6, 13, 19, 22) this very picture of a representative assembly. The Apostles and Elders come together to consider of the matter referred to them from Antioch; all the multitude keep silence while James and the other representatives, after Paul and Barnabas have reported, give their sentence in judgment; and then it pleases the Apostles and Elders, with *the whole Church*, in whose name and on whose behalf they were acting, to send chosen men of their own company, viz: Judas and Silas, with their decree down to the lower court at Antioch. The people not only *could not* all meet for deciding such questions; they *must not*, if they could; they had *no right* thus to meet, or thus to decide. That is not the government set up by the Lord. He established His Church as an organized body, and not a mere crowd or mob of disciples; as an organized body, with her divinely authorized officers, through whom she must always act. It is the Church that does all, it is the Bride, the Lamb's wife, to whom all power is given; but it is not the individual, or private men and women that can tumultuously assemble and intrude themselves, without authority, into duties or work, not appointed of God to be done by them. And so, in like manner, there may not any man intrude himself into the representative assembly of the people, except he be strictly and really a chosen ruler of that people. That assembly is always an assembly of *rulers chosen*. The people may not be governed by any they have not chosen. On the other hand, they may not usurp the government themselves, nor refuse obedience to their chosen rulers.

Now, if the Scriptures do thus reveal that the Church is

one; that she is to be governed by Elders; that these Elders are Representatives; that these Representatives rule and govern her, not singly, but jointly, in free deliberative assemblies, which assemblies are of lower and higher grade, so as to constitute courts of appeal; if the Scriptures do reveal all these substantials of Presbyterian Church government in particular rules respecting officers, courts and discipline, is it a very *hard saying* that Presbyterian Church government is of Divine right? If these four heads of the doctrine of Church government be acknowledged must not the whole system be acknowledged? What more is there in the system besides these four main things? There are only some circumstantials; but these also are of Divine right, because they are necessary for *decency and order*, and we have the Divine command to do all things decently and in order. The government is specifically of deliberative assemblies representing the Church and acting for her edification. Of course it is their right and duty to make all mere circumstantial rules, and every one of those rules has the Divine sanction, if it accord with Scripture. The courts that make them are liable to err, and the Word is always the only standard whereby everything is to be tried. But, when agreeable to Scripture, those rules, even the minutest of them, are of Divine right. They are made by an authority which the Lord Himself set up, and which acts in His name. They proceed from Rulers that have the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven, and have power to bind and to loose on earth, and it is bound or loosed accordingly in Heaven.

We earnestly commend these views to all our Ministerial brethren who have been disposed to make questions of Church government of secondary importance—also to all our brethren of the Ruling Eldership. We likewise commend them especially to all Candidates for the Ministry. If Jesus be our King, and if He have set up the Church as His Kingdom on earth, we may not construe the laws of that Kingdom into matters of minor moment. What we have said on this subject in the foregoing pages, and what Dr. Killen has taught in his book, is the doctrine of our fathers, as laid down in their Confession

of Faith and Form of Government. They confessed it because they found it in the Bible. If good enough for them, it ought to be good enough for any of us, who are in many things their inferiors. As for the charge that these views are bigoted or intolerant, it is a slander. They are perfectly consistent with the most expansive charity. To assert them is merely to assert that in our judgment such is the doctrine revealed in the Scriptures.

Having awarded nothing but praise to Dr. Killen's book thus far, we will say, in closing, that we think his arrangement would admit of more clearness and compactness, and with this solitary censure we commend the work to all our readers, of every class, as exceedingly well worthy of their careful study.

ARTICLE VI.

THE FIRST ADAM AND THE SECOND. *The Elohim Revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man*: By SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D.D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, N. J. Philadelphia: Parry & McMillan. 1860; pp. 688, 8vo.

This book, as its title imports, covers the whole region of revealed Theology. It begins with the creation and ends with the consummation of all things. Exclusive of the Introduction, it consists of twenty-three chapters, and inclusive of the Index, of six hundred and eighty-eight octavo pages. A glance at the table of contents is sufficient to show, that the author deals in "thoughts more elevate," and that the high themes which he discusses, "providence, foreknowledge, will and fate," the primitive and fallen condition of mankind, the nature consequences and extent of sin, and the nature, consequences and extent of redemption, are not discussed in a spirit of vain

curiosity and false philosophy, but with the loyal design that he may "assert eternal providence, and justify the ways of God to men." All the topics which are successively brought before us, and they are those in which the knowledge of God and the knowledge of ourselves are concentrated, are reviewed under the formal notion of a manifestation of the Divine perfections and glory. In the second chapter, we have, indeed, as a key to the title of the work, an articulate exposition of the doctrine, that the design of all God's works, whether of creation or providence, is to reveal Himself. The heavens and the earth are treated as "an incomparable vesture," in which the Divine Majesty arrays itself in order to become visible to men, and this whole outward scene of things, the object of our sensations and perfections, is not regarded as a dark, gloomy, foreign power, but as an illustration of the Divine wisdom, a language in which God notifies to intelligence His own glory. The works are apprehended as so many words of God, and the sense with which they are all burdened is His own eternal power and Godhead. It is in man, however, that Dr. Baird finds the preëminent revealer of the triune Jehovah. He is the image of God. To him, therefore, special attention is given. His moral history is traced from the first moment of his being to the final consummation of the scheme of grace. The plan of Providence in relation to Him is critically canvassed, and the result of the whole is that solid wisdom, that knowledge of God and of ourselves, which constitutes the perfection and unity of our moral and intellectual nature. The author lays out his chief strength upon the doctrine of original sin. This is the central topic of the book. To this every thing else converges; the preliminary account of man's original condition is only an introduction to a just exposition of the effects of the fall, and the subsequent evolution of the economy of redemption is designed to cast its light back upon the nature and extent of the malady of which redemption is the remedy. The book, therefore, might very well have been entitled, a *Treatise of Original Sin*. It opens with a historical sketch of the doctrine in question, briefly recapitulating the state and progress of opin-

ion, from Tertullian to Edwards. The first three chapters, on the Triune Creator, the Eternal Plan, and the Providential Administration, are designed to furnish the key to the subsequent discussion, to lay down the principle which pervades the entire divine economy, and in the light of which all doctrinal truths are reduced to harmony and irradiated with new beauty. The author then enters directly upon the consideration of man, and in the peculiarities of his being, as personal and generic, in his moral and spiritual relations to God, and in the dispensations of Providence which have determined and conditioned them, he encounters those supreme questions concerning the law, sin and death; concerning redemption, holiness and life; concerning, in short, the two great covenants which exhaust the divine dealings with man, that constitute the sum and substance of Christian Theology. In the prosecution of these high themes he has exhibited abilities of no common order. He has endeavored, every where, to find the one in the many, to trace facts to their principles and to reconcile the testimonies of Scripture with the inductions of a sound philosophy. He has no charity for error. From the beginning of the book to the end, he keeps up a running fire against Pelagians and Hopkinsians, whom he evidently regards as the pests of the Church, left, like the remnants of the nations among the Jews, to be pricks in the eyes and thorns in the sides, as a punishment for unfaithfulness in the work of extermination. His eye never pities, nor his hand spares. Wherever he finds an enemy of God and His truth, he never declines the contest, and is quite content to leave the choice of weapons to his antagonist, being equally ready to assail heresy with the sword of the spirit, and science, falsely so called, with the weapons of right reason. That he has done good service to the cause of sound doctrine cannot be denied. His chapters on Providence, the Eternal Plan, the Principle of the Law, the Nature of Sin, and on the various phases of Optimism are singularly happy specimens of judicious speculation. The chapter on Providence, particularly, is entitled to great praise, and though we are not sure that he has done justice to McCosh, and are

quite certain that, in relation to things generated and corruptible, he will find it difficult to excogitate a better theory of identity than that of Edwards, properly restrained, yet, the whole discussion touching the connection betwixt God and His works is sound and Scriptural. It strikes us as a fault of the book that it betrays something of a captious spirit, a tendency to minute exceptions. Dr. Baird detects an error where others can see only a fault of expression, and belabours opinions with great vehemence, which the reader finds it impossible to discriminate from his own. Against Edwards, particularly, he has an inveterate spite. His doctrine of causation, his scheme of identity and his theory of the will, as well as special forms of theological opinion, are made the subjects of severe and biting criticism. In some of his strictures, Dr. Baird is unquestionably right, but in relation to the will, we confess ourselves utterly at a loss to discover the difference, in their fundamental principles, between the doctrines of Edwards and himself. If Dr. Baird's theory is not one of rigid, absolute determinism, we are unable to understand him, and if it is, it is a matter of comparatively little moment, whether the immediate determining cause be called a motive or an impulse, since, in either case, its efficacy is grounded in the nature. What the man is, determines what he does, as clearly, according to Edwards, as according to our author, and no man has given more prominence to innate habits and dispositions as controlling the will than Edwards.

But, without dwelling longer on minor and incidental points, we hasten to the main subject of the book. The light which the author thinks that he has thrown upon the doctrine of original sin, constitutes the distinguishing feature of the work, and gives it whatever claim it may have to special consideration as a theological contribution. He has a theory which, in his judgment, relieves the question of hereditary sin of most, if not of all, its difficulties. He can show how we are born guilty and depraved, without any imputation upon the goodness or justice of God, or any perplexity in the no-

tions of sin and holiness. The whole subject is perfectly clear to his mind, and the design of his book is to make it perfectly clear to the minds of others. Would that his success were commensurate with his aim! The chances are certainly against him. In a matter which penetrates into the lowest depths of human consciousness, which lays hold of the highest interests of the soul, which has agitated the most devout minds, and elicited the most earnest and anxious thoughts of the profoundest thinkers for eighteen centuries, in which all, without exception, have failed, and the more profoundly they have thought, the more intensely they have exclaimed, "Oh! the depths of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out;" on such a subject, the presumption is that no new light has dawned upon the world, either from Scripture or consciousness, to dispel the obscurity which enshrouds it. We have read Dr. Baird's book with no little care, and while acknowledging its merits in other respects, we are constrained to say that, in reference to its main design, its success is no exception to the general rule. He has solved one mystery by the substitution of another, or, rather, buried the mystery altogether in impenetrable darkness. His theory briefly resolves itself into the doctrine of a numerical identity of nature between Adam and his posterity, in consequence of which, his sin is not constructively and legally, but strictly and properly, theirs. The thing which transgressed, and became guilty and corrupt in him, is the very identical thing which reappears in us, and of course brings its guilt and corruption with it. The only mystery in the case is that of the reappearance of the same thing in different forms of personal manifestation. This depends upon the law of generation. Dr. Baird accordingly lays out his whole strength upon that law, as being the keystone of the arch which supports his structure. He endeavors to show that it involves the communication, not of a similar or like, but of numerically the same nature, from the parent to the child. The father, substantially and essentially, though

not personally, is reproduced in the offspring. This is the theory, as compendiously as we can express it, upon which the author has undertaken to solve the problem of the Fall.

Of course, in all this there is nothing new. It is as old as the introduction of realism into the Christian Church. The author himself, in his preliminary historical sketch, has treated us to some rare specimens of this style of thinking, and we have lying before us, from Anselm and the opponents of Roscelin and Abelard, illustrations equally rich of the same type of speculation. When we read Dr. Baird's lueubrations upon a nature, the law of generation, and the relation subsisting between a nature and a person, we almost felt that we had been transported, by some mysterious power of enchantment, across the track of centuries, to the cloisters of mediæval monks, and to the halls of mediæval universities, and were listening again to the everlasting jangles about entities and quiddities, genera and species, which John of Salisbury so graphically describes. Dr. Baird's sympathies are with the buried realism of the past. He has proclaimed an open revolt against the whole spirit of modern speculation, and has endeavored to remand philosophy to the frivolous discussions from which, we had hoped, that Bacon had forever redeemed it. If the proof had not been before our eyes, we could not have believed that, in the nineteenth century, a man was to be found, out of "Laputa or the Empire," who could seriously undertake to solve theological problems by an appeal to the exploded henads of the realists, or gravely attribute a real substantive existence to genera and species. The book is, in this respect, as an American production, a downright curiosity. It is a reaction against the entire current of modern thought, not only in theology, but in philosophy; as formal a protest against nominalism, and the spirit of the inductive philosophy grounded in nominalism, as against the received system of orthodoxy, grounded in the same doctrine. It is, at least, five centuries too late, and five centuries ago it would not have been needed. Realism is dead and buried, and the progress of human knowledge, in every department of inquiry, since the thorough installation of the

inductive method, is a sufficient proof that the death of realism is the resurrection of truth. Dr. Baird has not given his allegiance to realism in the form in which it was maintained by Plato, and in which it first entered into Christian speculation. He expressly denies the separate and independent existence of universals, *universalia ante rem*. He embraces it as it was modified by Aristotle, *universalia in re*. His doctrine is, "that universals are, in a certain sense, realities in nature, but that the general conceptions are merely logical, the universals not having an existence of their own separate from the individuals through which they were manifested." The last clause of this sentence expresses precisely the Peripatetic doctrine as it was commonly understood. The first clause we are not certain that we fully comprehend. When Dr. Baird says that general conceptions are merely logical, does he mean that they do not represent the realities which, in some sense, exist in nature? If so, then no reliance is to be placed upon them. They have only a formal validity, and subjective consistency of thought becomes no guarantee for objective consistency of being. If the universals which we think, are not the universals which exist in nature, it is obvious that we cannot pass from one to the other, or make them the subjects of common predicates. If the universals which we think, are the universals which exist in nature, then how can it be said that our conceptions are merely logical? They evidently have an objective validity. This language, in the mouth of a nominalist, we can perfectly comprehend, and we can, also, understand how a Peripatetic realist can consistently maintain that our general conceptions are derived from individuals and dependent upon them, that they are logical in the sense that they are formed by the logical processes of analysis and comparison, but how he could represent them as *merely* logical, that is, as purely formal, we are unable to perceive. Dr. Baird restricts the existence of universals to a "certain sense." This qualifying clause means, simply, that they are never detached from individuals, that their existence is not separate and independent; but still he makes a real distinction between the particu-

lar and universal, as pertaining to the same object. In every individual thing there are, according to him, two elements—the principle of individuation, or that which makes the thing to be this and not that, or that and not this, and the principle of universality, which determines it to a certain genus. These are not different forms of contemplating the object, or different relations in which its properties and qualities are viewed. They are really different things, as distinct as the persons of the Trinity, and as incapable of being divided. The universal realizes itself in the individual, but is not to be confounded with it. It pervades it, without being a part of it.

In estimating the value of Dr. Baird's contributions, the first thing to be done is to settle precisely his notion of nature. What do we mean when we speak of the nature of a man, of the nature of a thing, and particularly, of a moral nature? We confess that we have experienced no little difficulty in trying to compass the precise sense in which Dr. Baird uses the term. In the first place, he explicitly denies that it can be legitimately used to designate "our conception of the mere aggregate of characteristics belonging to a given substance."* Does this mean, that to signalize the properties of a substance, and to indicate the mode of their co-existence, is not to define its nature? that its nature is something more than the sum and combination of its attributes? If so, he distinctly repudiates the sense in which it becomes applicable to a class-notion, and the only sense in which it can enter into the description of an object. Man's nature does not consist of those qualities and faculties which are manifested in consciousness. It is nothing personal, nothing individual, and nothing even generic, in the sense of an abstraction of what is similar in the consciousness of the race. It is not thought, will, nor emotion, singly, or combined in the unity of a personal subject. Neither, according to Dr. Baird, is the nature something relative and accidental. In this sense it is used by Divines,

* P. 149.

when the predicates *holy* and *sinful* are applied to it. The phrase "moral nature," commonly denotes the possession of the faculties which are necessary to moral agency; while a sinful or a holy nature designates the pervading attitude of the soul in relation to God and the Divine law. There are passages in which Dr. Baird seems to use the term in both these senses. "A moral nature," he says, "is one, the essential characteristics of which are reason, will, the moral sense or conscience."* Again, the nature is used as a synonym of the heart,† and must, accordingly, be taken as the complement of the affinities and tendencies which belong to the soul. It is that which lies at the root of the will, and conditions and determines all its operations. But, with these occasional exceptions, the whole current of his argument requires the sense of prevailing habitude or disposition to be discounted as impertinent. In this sense the idea of a numerical identity of nature in different persons becomes simply absurd. If nature expresses the tendencies or attitudes of the soul, the mode of its existence, or the law under which it exists and acts, it must obviously be numerically different, though it may be logically the same, in the case of every human being. A mode cannot be conceived apart from that of which it is a mode. To be, and to be in some definite condition, are the same thing. Natural or abstract being is impossible. Each soul must, therefore, have its own nature. It may be holy, it may be sinful—it must be one or the other, and its holiness or sinfulness is its own. These terms define the moral character of the particular being. Other souls may also be sinful or holy, and their holiness or sinfulness is also their own. The crookedness of one tree is not the crookedness of another. The posture of the soul is as strictly individual as the posture of the body. We might as well say that the hump-back of two men is numerically the same deformity, as to confound the moral obliquity of one man with the moral obliquity of another. The identity of these relations is simply the similarity by nature of which

* P. 286.

† P. 160.

they are comprehended under a common term. Hence, according to that conception of nature which makes it the moral attitude of the soul, the depravity of A is no more the depravity of B, than the personal qualities of A are the personal qualities of B. A numerical identity of nature, and a personal diversity of existence, are flat contradictions. Discounting both these senses of nature, what other sense remains? Dr. Baird undertakes to enlighten us. In the first place, his nature "is not expressive of a mere abstraction, but designates an actual thing, an objective reality."* This actual thing, or objective reality, is the "sum of the permanent forces which were at the beginning incorporated in the constitution of Adam and the creatures, and which, by their severalty, determine and define the several species of the living things."† Here the realism strongly crops out. Adam's constitution, in so far as he was an individual, is one thing: there is incorporated in it a set of forces which makes the *henad*, humanity, and in that set of forces his nature must be sought. Substances, we are told, "were at the beginning endowed with forces which are distinctive and abiding, and which in organic nature flow distributively in continuous order to the successive generations of the creatures."‡ It is clear, from these passages, that Dr. Baird understands by nature a real entity, active, efficient and powerful, which enters into and conditions the individual, but is not strictly a part of it; a something in which the individual lives and moves, and which is entirely distinct from its own properties or states. Accordingly, he explains our oneness with Adam upon the baldest principles of realism. "Our oneness," he says, "does not express the fact merely that we and Adam are alike, but that we are thus alike because the forces which are in us and make us what we are, were in him, and are numerically the same which in him constituted his nature and gave him his likeness. The body which is impelled by two diverse forces, *x* and *y*, moves in the direction of neither of them, but in that

* P. 150.

† *Ibid.*

‡ P. 148.

of a different force, z , the resultant of the two. Yet is neither of the forces lost, but merely modified, each by contact with the other. The new force, z , is simply x modified by y . So, in the successive generations of the human race, so far as their traits are the result of propagation, so far as they are the offspring of their parents, theirs are but the same identical forces which were in their parents, only appearing under new forms."*

But the crowning proof that Dr. Baird means something more than mere habits and disposition, or an all-controlling generic habit, or disposition, or tendency, or law (for all these terms have been employed to express the same idea), is that he makes the nature the proper and exclusive ground of moral obligation. The person is only a contrivance to reach the nature. The seat of obligation is not the *man*, but his *nature*. "From all this it inevitably follows," says he, "that all the responsibilities and obligations which can, in any conceivable way, attach to a person, must have their ground in the nature, and attach themselves essentially to it. Since, in general, every kind of obligation implies the exercise of some kind of efficiency, and since the moral nature is the only principle of moral efficiency in a person, it follows that all moral obligations must lay hold of the nature, else they are altogether nugatory and void."† If by nature, were here meant the properties of the personal soul, as endued with faculties adapted to moral distinctions, the meaning would be proper enough. But that sense the author has explicitly repudiated. Nature is nothing that constitutes a man—it is only what makes *the* man. To say that he here means moral habits and dispositions would be to make him write the most preposterous nonsense. The nature in that sense is not the subject, but the end of the obligation of the law. It is the very thing which the law requires. To have a holy heart, to love God supremely, to love our neighbors as ourselves; these are the very things which constitute the matter of the command. The

* P. 150.

† P. 249.

very essence of obedience is the possession of a right nature. How absurd, therefore, to say that they are the things bound, or to which the command is addressed. Dr. Baird evidently means, or he means nothing, that behind the personal soul, with its essential cognitive and moral faculties, there exists a mysterious entity, of whose efficiency this soul, with its properties and attributes, is only the instrument. To that entity the law is addressed—that entity God holds responsible in the person—that entity is the substance of the man. The rest is mere contingency and accident. His meaning is put beyond all doubt by the comparison which he institutes between humanity and the Godhead. “A person,” he tells us, “is a several subsistence which is endowed with a moral nature. The word person, is expressive of the severalty, while the phrase moral agent indicates the efficiency of such a subsistence. In the blessed Trinity, each several subsistence is a person, of whom the three subsist in common in one undivided nature and essence. Among the angelic hosts, each one is a several person, having a distinct and several nature. Among men a nearer likeness to God is seen, in a plurality of persons, possessing a several and distributive property in one common nature. The relationship which subsists between men by virtue of their community of nature, is a shadow of the Divine unity, which falls infinitely short of the intimacy and identity which are realized in the blessed persons of the Godhead.”* Now, when it is remembered that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are *the same in substance*, that this is precisely the ground of their being one God, and equal in power and glory, it is obvious that Dr. Baird must mean that the ground of identity with the individuals of the human species, is their possession of a *common substance*. Their community of natures thus resolves itself into community of substance. And as the substance of the Godhead is that Divine Spirit which can be equally predicated of the three persons, so the substance of humanity must

* P. 237.

be that spiriual essence by virtue of which each man becomes a living soul. Adam's soul was the same substance with the souls of all his posterity. The forms of consciousness which this substance has assumed are as manifold and various as the human creatures in which it has been found, but the substance itself remains ever the same. The whole substance of the race was created in Adam—no new human substance has been created since. Man is essentially one spirit. As a dozen chairs made from the same oak are one matter, so a dozen souls sprung from Adam are the same spirit.

We have thus endeavored to elicit Dr. Baird's notion of human nature. We saw that it was not found in any of those properties and affections which constitute the personal consciousness—it was not the habitude or tendency of these properties and attributes to any given mode of manifestation—it was nothing relative or accidental. It is the ultimate ground of personality, the material condition of intelligence, responsibility, and will. It is an efficient power or a complement of forces which absolutely conditions and determines all the activities and all the states of the individual. It is the bond of unity to the whole race. It sustains the same relation to human persons that the substance of the Godhead sustains to the ineffable Three. It is clearly, therefore, the substance of the soul, considered as the substratum or basis of all personal consciousness—as that which contains the forces, the entire sum of the forces, that characterize the human species. Adam and his posterity are one substance; the same spiriual essence which underlay his consciousness, underlies theirs—they are partakers, not of a like, but of a common, nature. This is the doctrine, as far as we have been able to apprehend it. Hence the soul and nature are frequently used as interchangeable terms. For example: "The will is the soul disposed to the active embrace of the affinities which it realizes. It is the nature, viewed in the light of its tendency to give expressions to the aptitudes which it intuitively feels."* Again: "Ed-

* P. 160.

wards has much on this point; but entirely fails to bring out the fundamental fact, that at last, it is the soul itself which endows the motive with the character in which it appears. The *nature* of the transgressor is the cause of his sins."* Throughout the whole discussion upon the subject of the will, *the soul, the nature of the soul, and the moral nature,* are used as equivalent terms. One other passage will close this part of the subject. Considered as being appointed to glorify God and enjoy Him forever, the elements, Dr. Baird tells us, which are of most significance in the constitution of men, are "their moral natures and personality. The word *nature*, we have formerly defined to be the designation of a permanent force, dwelling in a substance. A moral nature is one the essential characteristics of which are reason, will, and the moral sense, or conscience." These faculties, it will be noticed, do not constitute, but characterize a moral nature. They, themselves, are not the permanent, abiding force which is called moral, but only the marks or signs of it. This force, therefore, can be nothing less than the substance of the soul, manifesting its moral peculiarities through these faculties of the personal consciousness, as its organs. The author subsequently adds, "the proper subject of a moral nature is a spiritual substance. In no other mode have we any reason to imagine it possible for it to exist at all."† The substance of the soul, as endowed with the forces which realize themselves in the faculties and energies of the personal consciousness, of which these operations are the signs and characteristics, that substance, as a causal force, which underlies them all, and conditions and determines them all, that substance is the nature. Or if there be any distinction between them, the substance is the ground, and the nature the causal energies which are contained in it. That is, the soul considered as simple being may be called substance; considered as a *cause*, or as endowed with power, it is nature; the word *nature* expressing directly the forces, and substance, that

* P. 160.

† Pp. 226, 227.

in which they inhere. But for all the purposes of speculation the difference is purely formal. A substance to human thought is only the correlative of the properties which manifest it.

2. The next point to which we invite the attention of the reader, as further developing the philosophy of Dr. Baird, and furnishing cumulative proof of the truth of what we have said, is the relation subsisting between person and nature. It is, briefly, that of a cause to its effect. The person is a product of the nature. "It is certain,"* says he, "that nothing may be predicated of the person which does not grow out of the nature. And if this must be admitted, there appears to be no ground on which it can be claimed that the nature, because existing in another person, is entitled to exemption from its essential guilt. The opposite view assumes the absurdity that there may be, and is, that in the person which has a subsistency and moral agency of its own; a competence to responsibility, and capacity to appreciate and experience the power of the law's sanctions, distinct from, and independent of, the nature. Is it said to be unjust to hold my person bound for an act which was committed in the person of another? The objection would be valid, were the person a force to control or modify the nature. But since the contrary is the case, it does not appear reasonable that exemption should be claimed on that ground. In fact, the nature, which was the cause of my person, was there. And as every power or principle of efficiency which is in the effect must have been in its cause, it follows, inevitably, that everything in me, upon which resistance to the apostasy might be imagined, was actually there, and so far from opposing, took part in the treason. We sinned in Adam, and fell with him in his first transgression. The accident of my personal existence, had it then been realized, would have added no new influences to those which were actually engaged, and would not have modified the result, nor changed the responsibility attaching to it. The objection here consid-

*P. 257.

ered strikes at the root of all responsibility, as well for personal as for native sin. If I am not justly responsible for Adam's transgression, because only my nature was efficient in it, then may I, with equal propriety, claim exemption in respect to personal sins, since in them my person is the mere subject of the action, and my nature is the sole efficient cause."

The nature not only generates the person, but the person is only an organization or instrument through which the properties of the nature can be unfolded in action. Without the person, the nature is a power without tools. Its appetencies can find no means of gratification. If it could be conceived as existing at all, which it cannot be, its forces would have to assume the form of a vain conatus. They would be simply strivings after being or manifestation. But the person furnishes them with all that is necessary for a full and distinct realization of their energies. Of course, the person in itself is quite subordinate; and all the rhetoric about its intrinsic dignity and its superiority to things, its essential rights and its ethical importance, is but attributing to the casket the properties which belong to the jewel enshrined in it. Dr. Baird distinctly affirms that the person is but an accident of the nature—inseparable, to be sure, but only an accident—and that its whole moral significance is to be resolved into the nature. It is no great thing, therefore, to be able to say I. It is not the personal subject, it is the impersonal forces which move it, that constitute the real dignity of man. All the faculties which distinguish the being that I call myself—memory, intelligence, conscience and will—are but the organs through which a being, that is not myself, plays off its fantastic tricks. I am a puppet, called into being by this mysterious power, only that it may have something to sport with and develop its resistless forces. Never was a poor demoniac more completely at the bidding of the possessing fiend, than the personal subject at the beck of this impersonal nature. Other philosophers have foolishly imagined that they were going to the very core of man's nature, essentially considered, when they de-

scribed it as *personal*. They have signalized this peculiarity as that which contains in it the ground of every other distinction from the rest of this sublunary world—other beings are *things*, man is a person. It is his nature to be a person. But Dr. Baird sharply distinguishes, though he does not divide, nature and personality. The person is to the nature what the eye is to vision, or the muscles to motion. The following passage is an explicit statement of his doctrine :

“ Whilst, thus, all moral obligations arise out of the constitution of the nature, and lay hold, essentially upon it, the subject against which they are enforced, is the person in which the nature subsists; and this for evident reasons. It is only in the form of a person that a moral nature can subsist. All that is proper to the person, or in any way characteristic of it as such, grows out of the nature, and is designed and constructed as a means for the activity of the nature; so that the person is but the nature embodied in a form adapted to its efficient action. It is the organization through which the nature may meet its responsibilities, by performing the duties demanded of it. Since, therefore, the nature can neither exist, nor, therefore, be responsible, neither recognize nor satisfy its responsibilities, but as it is embodied in a person; and since, to it, as thus embodied, the obligations which rest upon it are, for this reason, by God addressed, it follows that persons are the immediate and only subjects of moral law and responsibility. The nature comprehends all the forces which are proper to the person in which it subsists. Among these are not only included those of which obligation or obedience may be supposed, but those susceptibilities upon which may be predicated the realization of suffering, the endurance of punishment. There is, therefore, nothing in the person of which exemption can be imagined, as apart from the nature. Were it possible to take away the nature and yet the person remain; were it possible to suppose any other forces proper to the person than all its proper forces, then would there be room for the conception, that the person might be irresponsible for the nature, and have a responsibility distinct from it. But, so long as it is true that the moral nature is that which makes the person what it is in all moral respects, and that the only existence of the nature is in the person, it will follow that the attempt to separate the obligations of the nature and of the person is absurd and preposterous. The person is bound under the responsibilities which attach to the nature as subsisting therein, and can be held to no others than such as arise therein. The form of the obligation is, indeed, modified by the accidents of the person; but such accidental forms are always capable of resolution into general principles which attach essentially to the nature.” *

* P. 250.

3. Let us next attend to the law of generation. In Adam, the nature and the person were concreated. He was, in the first moment of his existence, both an individual and the species, a man and humanity. In him the nature of the entire race was created once for all, and from him is propagated by generation, and so descends to all his seed.* But what does the doctrine of propagation involve? "It implies that all the powers and forces which are, or to the end of time shall be, in the living creatures, vegetable and animal, by which the earth is filled and peopled, have their origin in those creatures which were made at the beginning of the world, and were implanted in them thus to be developed and perpetuated in their seed, to the end of time. It is not that the powers which are developed in the offspring have a likeness merely to those of the parent. This would be to attribute the whole matter to a continual exercise of creative energy. But the forces of the offspring are derived by propagation from the parents. Those very forces, numerically, were in the parents, and so back to the original progenitors. And yet it is as undeniable as it is inscrutable, that the entire sum of forces which operate in the living creation, vegetable and animal, were created and implanted in the primeval creatures at the beginning."† Dr. Baird further teaches, that the first man is the efficient cause of the existence of all other men. God made Adam, and Adam made the rest of the race. The whole man, in his entire existence, as spirit and body, is the effect of which generation is the cause. "We take the position," says Dr. Baird, "that the entire man proceeds by generation from the parents. We do not say, we do not mean, that the soul is generated by the soul, or the body by the body. But man, in his soul, body and spirit, is an unit composed of diverse elements, yet having but one personality, in which the soul is the element of universal efficiency. Of that personality, efficient thus, it is that we predicate generation, and, according to the maxim that like begets like, we hold the child, in its entire nature, to be the offspring of the parent.

* P. 256.

† Pp. 144, 145.

The entire race of man was in our first parents, not individually and personally, but natively and seminally, as the plant is in the seed. When Adam was created, among the powers which constituted his nature was that of generation. His substance was made to be an efficient cause, of which posterity, taken in their whole being, physical and spiritual, are the normal and necessary effect. Thus, in Adam and Eve, the human race had not a potential existence merely; but God, in creating the first pair, put into efficient operation the sufficient and entire cause of the existence of their seed.”*

Generation, according to this account, performs two wonders. It first propagates the nature, and next, as the indispensable condition of the existence of the nature, it creates the person in whom the nature is to appear. The person is as truly the effect of the causal energy of the parent, as the communication of the nature. Here there occurs to us a difficulty which we crave to have solved. The nature of Adam and his posterity, we are told, is one, because it descends to us by generation. The essence of generation is to reproduce the same. If, now, the law of generation establishes an identity of nature between the parent and the child, why not, also, an identity of person? If the person is as truly its product as the nature, how comes it that the generated person should be different, while the generated nature is the same? If to generate is to propagate, why not the person be a propagation as well as the nature? Then, again, what is it that generates? Dr. Baird answers, the nature *through* the person. What is generated? The nature *in* a person. What, now, restricts the identity to one part of the product, while that which answers to both parts is active in the production? To us the dilemma seems inevitable, that either every human being descended from Adam is the same person with him, or that the law of generation concludes nothing as to the identity of nature. If a person can beget a numerically different person, we do not see why he cannot beget a numerically different nature. Besides

*Pp. 340, 341.

this, we have a vague suspicion that a cause and its effect are not commonly construed as the same thing. They are certainly, different in thought, whatever they may be in existence. If the cause does nothing more than continue itself, if what is called the effect is only a change in the mode of existence of the cause, a phenomenal variety of being, we crave to understand how the universe can be really different from its Author? Dr. Baird says that Adam is the cause, the efficient cause, of the existence of his posterity. If, now, his causal energy terminates in the reproduction of himself, and they must be one with him, *because* he is their *cause*, the bearing of the principle upon the theistic argument is too palpable to be mistaken. We shall land in but one substance in the universe, the $\delta\nu\omega\varsigma\ \delta\nu$ of the Platonists, and all else will be shadow and appearance.

The reader must have been struck already with the close correspondence between the reasonings of Dr. Baird in relation to the nature of man, and the reasonings of the Pantheists in relation to God. They postulate a great, impersonal, all-pervading ground of universal being, as he postulates a great, impersonal, all-pervading ground of human manifestation; the primal substance of the Pantheist is the life of all that lives, and yet has no life of its own; at the root of every consciousness, and yet without consciousness itself; the radical principle of all knowledge, and yet unable to utter the formula, behold, I know. So Dr. Baird's nature has no separate being of its own, and yet gives being to the man, is without intelligence or selfhood, and yet the basis of them both. The real being of the Pantheist conditions all, while itself is unconditioned; determines all differences, while itself without differences; is the secret of all relations, and yet absolved in itself from every relation. Equally absolute in reference to man is Dr. Baird's nature. And, as with the Pantheist, all that we call creatures are but phenomena of the primordial substance, forms in which it realizes itself, so with Dr. Baird, all human persons are but phenomena of his original nature; the vestments with which it clothes itself in order to become visible, or the instruments it seizes in order to act. The phenomenal manifestations of the

Panthiest obey by the law of developement—those of Dr. Baird the law of generation. Each is a philosophy of one in the many. They both, too, arise from the same process of thought. The highest genus must necessarily absorb all differences, and potentially contain them, while none can be predicated of it. The descent developes these differences in increasing fulness until we come to individuals, which logically are of no value. The void absolute is the logical result of a realism which attributes real existence to genera and species. Beginning at the bottom of the line, we remove difference after difference until we reach undifferenced being—the *εἶς ὅν*. If the genus is real, it developes from itself, as you come down the line, all the varieties of subordinate classes in which it is found. The nothing, in this way, is made to yield every thing. The highest genus, though itself nothing, yet as a genus, contains essentially all properties and all attributes. We have before us a curious illustration of the tendencies of realism to end in nihilism, in an elaborate argument of Fredigesius, which concludes with the famous axiom of Hegel, God equal nothing. The logic is unassailable; the absurdity lies in attributing existence to general names. Once give up the maxim of Nominalists, that all real beings are singular, and the law of classification expresses not only a process of thought, but the order of being, and you cannot stop until you reach an *ens realissimum* which, at one and the same time, includes the whole fulness of existence, and is totally void of predicates—at once a plenum and a vacuum. The argument is short, simple and unanswerable. If a species is a real substance, numerically the same in all the individuals, the genus must be a substance numerically the same in all its species, and thus, in ascending from genus to genus, we extend the numerical identity of substance, until we arrive at absolute being, which is numerically the same in all things, and which, being without attributes, must be both everything and nothing. We are quite confident that all the absurd speculations concerning the absolute, which have aimed to take away from us a personal God, and to resolve all existence into an unconditioned unity of substance are but offshoots of the spirit of re-

alism. The body has been buried, but the ghost still hovers about the haunts of speculation.

While on this subject of generation, there are other difficulties which we would like to have solved. Its law is that it propagates the *same* nature, not a like, but numerically the same nature. Does this nature exist whole and entire in each individual? If so, how can it be found in millions and millions of persons, and yet be only one? How can each man have all of it, and yet all have it at the same time? Upon this point we are like Bottom, the weaver, rather dull of comprehension. Or, is the nature divided? Then each man has only a distributive share, and if, in proportion to the number of heirs, the inheritance is diminished, the last man that is to be, has the prospect of a very slender interest. If, too, original sin grows less with the diminution in the quantum of nature, the race stands a chance of being considerably improved by the very law which has ruined it. How will Dr. Baird solve this problem of the one and the many? He has fairly raised the question, and he ought to have answered it. He has scouted the old doctrine that generation produces sons like their fathers; he ought to have shown us how they and their fathers can both have identically the same nature at the same time, without making that nature manifold, or without dividing it. We wish to see him fairly encounter the question which baffled the genius of Plato, and which Socrates pronounced to be a wonder in nature. It is a question which every phase of realism gives rise to, and when a man in the nineteenth century revolts to that philosophy, he ought to have something to say upon this cardinal matter.

As to the doctrine, for which Dr. Baird contends, of the transduction of souls, we regard it, in a theological point of view, as of very little importance. Holding, as we do, that the child is numerically a different being from the parent, different in substance, different in person, different in nature, different in every thing in which he is distinct, though in all essential respects, precisely alike, we do not see that the doctrine of original sin is relieved of a single difficulty by any theory as to

the mode of the production of the man. No matter how called into being, he is a separate, indivisible moral agent, and he is either mediately or immediately the creature of God. Generation is but the process through which God creates him, and whatever causes, independently of himself, condition his being, are ultimately to be referred to God. If it were wrong to create him under guilt, it is wrong to permit him to be generated under guilt. The only effect which the doctrine of traduction has is to widen the interval between the direct agency of God and the commencement of the soul—but make the chain of second causes as long as you please, you reach God at last, and these determining intermediate influences do not shift from Him the responsibility under which that soul begins to be. They are independent of it, and its state is as truly to be referred to His will, as if He created it at once by the breath of His mouth. Let it be granted that the soul begins its being in a certain state, and the conclusion is inevitable, either that the state in question cannot be sinful, cannot be charged upon the soul as guilt, or you must seek some other ground for the imputation than the mode of that soul's production. The great difficulty is how it comes to be guilty in God's sight, before it had a being, and it is no solution of this difficulty to tell us how it received its being. It is not, and cannot be, responsible for its state, unless that state is grounded in guilt which can be justly charged upon it. If it passes through a dirty channel and becomes filthy, its filth is misfortune, and not sin, unless it passes through that channel in consequence of a sin which can be regarded as its own. Hence we have never felt any zeal upon the question of traduction as a theological problem. If the child is a new being, it is a matter of no moment whether it is created at first or second hand. The guilt or innocence of its state must turn upon quite other grounds than those which determine how it came to be at all. Dr. Baird's hypothesis would solve the difficulty completely, if it were not wanting in one capital condition—the possibility of being true. It implies a palpable contradiction

in terms. It makes a million to be one, and one to be a million. It relieves perplexity by absurdity.

We cannot dismiss this subject without entering a caveat against the repeated representations of Dr. Baird, that the parent is the cause of the child. Stapfer is even still more extravagant in the manner in which he has reasoned upon the causal relation. And they both mean, not material or instrumental causes, but causes strictly and properly efficient. But can such language be vindicated? Consider the parent in the only light in which he has any ethical value, that of a personal, voluntary agent, and is he the maker of the child? Does he produce by a conscious exercise of power, and with a predetermined reference to the nature of the effect to be achieved? Does he act from design, or is he a blind, mechanical instrument? Can he fix the size, shape, bodily constitution, or personal features of his offspring? Can he determine the bias or extent of its intellectual capacities? Has his will, and that, Dr. Baird tells us, is the exponent of the nature, anything to do with the shaping and moulding of the peculiarities which attach to the fœtus? Can he even determine that there shall be any fœtus at all? It is perfectly clear that he is in no other sense a cause, than as an act of his constitutes the occasion upon which processes connected with the vital and material constitution of the sexes, and entirely independent of his will, are instituted, which, under the providence of God, terminate in an offspring which the Almighty has moulded and fashioned according to His will. He simply touches a spring which sets powers at work that he can neither control nor modify. He is only a link in a chain of instruments through which God calls into being, and the organic law through which all the changes take place that form and develop the child is but the expression, in the last analysis, of the efficiency of God. We cannot say, therefore, that the parent is the efficient cause of his offspring. The relation between them is not that of cause and effect, if by cause be meant anything more than an instrument or means. Our parents have no more made us than we

have made ourselves. We are God's creatures, and owe our being to His sovereign will.

The reader has now before him the grounds on which Dr. Baird explains our interest in the sin of Adam. It was strictly and properly ours, as really so as if it had been committed in our own persons. Each man can say, to use language which he has quoted with approbation, "there sinned in him not I, but this which is I. My substance sinned, but not my person; and since the substance does not exist otherwise than in a person, the sin of my substance attaches to my person, although not a personal sin. For a personal sin is such as, not that which I am, but I who am, commit—in which Odo, and not humanity, sins—in which I, a person, and not a nature, sins. But inasmuch as there is no person without a nature, the sin of a person is also the sin of a nature, although it is not a sin of nature." In a single phrase, Adam was every man, and therefore every man sinned in Adam. The very identical thing which makes any one a man, is the thing which apostatized in his great transgression, and, therefore, there is no marvel that it should be held guilty wherever it is found. The rogue is a rogue, no matter under what disguise he appears. The same is the same, and must always continue so; and original sin is, therefore, as necessary and inevitable as the law of identity. The imputation of guilt is disembarassed of all difficulty, for it is nothing more than a finding of the real facts in the case. It finds the race to be Adam, and it simply says so. There is no fiction of law, no constructive unity of persons, no mere relations, whether moral or political. There is simply the naked fact, that every human being did actually apostatize in the person of Adam, in the whole essence of his humanity.

There are some other conclusions which seem to us to follow with as rigid necessity from Dr. Baird's premises as the denial of constructive guilt. In the first place they make every man responsible for every sin of Adam. In every sin his nature was implicated—it was his nature that made him capable of sin or holiness—and his nature is expressed in every determination of his will. Now if that nature passes to his pos-

terity precisely as it was in him, it must pass burdened with all the guilt of all the transgressions of his life. We are, therefore, answerable not for the one offence alone, which seems to have been the idea of Paul, but for all his iniquity. His personal sins cannot be detached from the nature. The person is only the tool of the nature, and, therefore, as growing out of the nature, and conditioned upon the existence of the nature, all his personal shortcomings are really and truly ours. Dr. Baird has recoiled from this conclusion, but the distinction with which he has sought to evade it will not sustain him. "There are two classes of actions which, in this objection, are confounded; but which should be carefully distinguished. Of these one consists in such personal actions as result from the fact that the nature is of a given and determinate character. These, in no respect, change the nature, nor indicate any change occurring in it, but constitute the mere criteria by which the character and strength of its attributes may be known. After their occurrence the nature flows on, unchanged, to posterity, conveying to them, not the transient accidents which have thus arisen from it, but itself, as essentially it is. To this class belong all those sins of our intermediate ancestors, which are here objected to us. These in no wise modify the nature, nor are they fruits of any change taking place in it as inherited by them, but are the evidences and fruits of its being what it is, in the person by whom they are wrought, and to whom, therefore, they attach. The other class consists of such agency, as springing from within, constitutes an action of the nature itself, by which its attitude is changed. The single case referable to this class is that of apostasy—the voluntary self-depravation of a nature created holy. Here, as the nature flows downward in the line of generation, it communicates to the successive members of the race, not only itself thus transformed, but, with itself, the moral responsibility which attaches inseparably to it, as active in the transformation wrought by it, and thus conveyed." *

* Pp. 508, 509.

Here, in the first place, it is explicitly stated, that the only sin in which the nature is active is that which changes its general attitude—perverts it from holiness and God. After it has become perverted it remains dormant, and the person comes forward as a mere exponent of this perverted state. Does Dr. Baird mean to say that the nature is not implicated in *every* sin? If so, he eats his own words, for he has again and again affirmed that the relation of an action to the nature is the sole ground of its moral significance. Besides, how can these actions manifest the nature if they do not spring from it? If the nature is not their cause, how can we determine anything in regard to its attitude from them as effects? Moreover, if the nature always conditions the moral determinations of will, these sins are either not voluntary, or the nature has ultimately produced them. In the next place, the ground of distinction between those moral actions which indicate a perverted nature, but in which it is not itself active, and those in which it is active, is most extraordinary. A man wants to know when his nature is active, and when not? or what actions modify it and what do not? and what is the answer of Dr. Baird? Simply this, that those actions alone directly implicate the nature which change its attitude. The criterion is not in the actions themselves, but in the effect. That is to say, Dr. Baird was anxious to limit the responsibility of Adam's posterity for his guilt to the single sin of his apostasy, and therefore extemporizes a distinction to suit the occasion. He does not show us how it appears that the nature was more active in this sin than in any other—that it was any more self-caused, or that it any more sprang from within. It had graver consequences, that will be freely admitted, but the consequences of an action do not determine its origin. In the third place, we do not understand what Dr. Baird means when he says that the sins of a fallen being do not modify his nature. If his idea is that they do not change its general attitude, that is clear. But surely they increase the amount of guilt and depravity. The blindness of the sinner may daily become intenser, and his heart harder. Are these no modifications of the nature? A man can fall

but once, but surely he may continue to sink lower. He but once turns his back upon God; but surely he can proceed farther in the direction to which he has turned. The body dies but once; but after death it can putrefy. Is putrefaction no modification of its state? Dr. Baird's doctrine, if this is his meaning, is simply absurd. Every sin modifies the nature; it strengthens the general habit of depravity and increases the tendency to repeat itself. There are endless degrees of wickedness and guilt, from the first act of apostasy to the desperate and malignant condition of damned spirits. Guilt accumulates and corruption festers. Hence, every sin which he committed modified Adam's nature. His first turned his face from God, and every succeeding one was a step further from the Holy One. Until renewed, his heart grew harder and his mind darker with every transgression; his guilt increased in the same proportion, and if his nature were numerically the same with ours, his nature must have come to us, not only as it was perverted by the first sin, but as it was modified by every subsequent offence. This conclusion is inevitable until Dr. Baird can specify what relation his nature had to the first sin which it did not have to any other sin. The distinction must not be grounded in the effect, but in the nature of the relation itself.

Another consequence which follows from Dr. Baird's doctrine,—in fact, from every doctrine which resolves the propagation of sin exclusively into the parental relation,—but more stringently from Dr. Baird's notion of numerical identity, is, that Adam, penitent and believing, must have begotten penitent and believing children. Conversion was another change in the attitude of his nature. It, at least, was no transient accident, but revolutionized the nature itself. Under the influence of Divine grace, the renewed nature turned again to God and embraced Him as the portion of the soul. Now, if the nature flows from parent to child, as it is in the parent, and this must be the case if it is numerically the same, then a converted parent must beget converted children. Dr. Baird will certainly admit that if Adam had maintained his integ-

urity his descendants would have been holy; he would have propagated the nature as it was in him. Having fallen, he propagates the nature as it is now perverted, that is, he still propagates it as it exists in him. If, now, he can propagate, as a holy being, and propagate as a fallen being, why not as a renewed being? What is there, we ask, in the new attitude superinduced by Divine grace, that prevents it from being imparted likewise? Or if there be any thing, how that can be numerically the same, which is radically different in all its aspirations and affections? Can a crooked tree be numerically the same with a straight one? Can a holy nature and a sinful nature be one? To state the matter in a very few words: the parent re-produces his nature in the child; his nature is a renewed one, therefore, the child must be renewed. This is the difficulty which never yet has been solved by those who are reluctant to recognize any other relation betwixt Adam and his seed than that of the parent and child, and we suspect never will be.

Having considered the essential principles of Dr. Baird's theory of original sin, we proceed to point out the modifications which, if generally adopted, they would inevitably work in our current theology. And first, in relation to imputation and guilt. Dr. Baird, as we understand him, does not object to the common definition, that guilt is the obligation to punishment, arising from the ill-desert of sin; neither would he cancel the distinction between the moral necessity of punishment, or that which springs from the inherent righteousness of the case, and the legal or judicial necessity which springs from the sentence of the law. To deserve condemnation, and to be condemned, are not formally the same thing. Intrinsic ill-desert Divines are accustomed to denominate potential guilt, or guilt in the first act, it is *dignitas pœnæ*. The judicial sentence of condemnation they call actual guilt, guilt in the second act—*obligatio ad pœnam*. Dr. Baird, however, and in this we agree with him, restricts the term guilt to the ill-desert itself, and makes the judicial sentence only the consequence of that. Hence, in strict propriety of speech, guilt is

the ground, and not the essence, of condemnation—the moral, and not the legal necessity of punishment. He is guilty who deserves to be condemned, whether he actually is so or not. So far, there is no difference of opinion. We also agree with Dr. Baird, that the imputation of guilt is simply the declaration of the fact. To condemn a man is to find or pronounce him guilty, and not to make him so. It is a verdict upon the case as it is, and introduces no new element. But the question arises, upon what grounds is a man pronounced deserving of punishment? And here we are compelled to shake hands and to part from our brother. He explicitly maintains that the *only* ground upon which the ill-desert of an action can attach to a man, is his own personal causal relation to it as its author. This we utterly deny. But we do not maintain, as Dr. Baird seems to insinuate, that a man can be pronounced guilty when the sin is not really his. All that we maintain is, that a sin may be ours, really and truly ours, and therefore chargeable upon us, when we have not, in our own proper persons, committed it; when we have, in fact, sustained no causal relation to it whatever. This is the point upon which we differ: not whether a man can be punished for what is not his own, but whether there is only one way of a thing's being his own. If there is a just moral sense in which an action can be mine, without my having actually committed it, then there is a ground upon which it may be righteously imputed to me, without my being the cause of it. Dr. Baird has no where proved that personal causation is the sole ground of propriety in actions. He asserts it, and confidently assumes it, but no where proves it. His notion is, that where there is guilt there must necessarily be the stain. We admit that guilt springs from the stain, but we deny that it is limited to the person in whom the stain is found. We contend that representation as really establishes the relation of propriety in actions as personal causation; that what a man does by his agent, he as truly does as if he did it in his own proper person. The maxim expresses the common sense of mankind—*qui facit per alium, facit per se*. The whole system of spon-

sorship in society is founded upon it, and no commonwealth could hang together for a single generation, if the principle were discarded. This is the principle upon which the imputation of Adam's first sin to us proceeds. He was our representative; he was our head, our agent, on probation, not for himself alone, but for all who should descend from him by ordinary generation. There can be no question that, if he sustained this relation to us, we are implicated in all that he did in this relation. His acts are ours, and we are as responsible for them as if we had committed them ourselves. "We sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression."

According to this view there is consistency in the language of our standards, when it is said that what is imputed to us, is not our own personal act, nor the act of that which subsequently became ourselves, but the guilt of *Adam's* first sin. It was the one sin of the one man that ruined us. According to Dr. Baird it was no more Adam's sin than ours. The relation of his person to it was altogether accidental—it only happened to express itself through his will—but essentially, it is ours in the very same sense in which it is his. What was peculiar to Adam is not imputed. If there is force in language, or coherence in thought, Dr. Baird totally and absolutely denies that anything personal to Adam is charged upon us. What is now ourselves used him as an instrument. He was simply the paw which the roguish nature used to steal with. We are now the paws with which it continues to practise its villainy—the instruments are changed, but the agent is the same. We leave it to any man in his senses to say whether such an account is reconcilable with the language of the Westminster Formularies. "The sin of Adam and Eve, which God was pleased, according to His wise and holy counsel to permit,"* is explicitly affirmed to be the act, the personal act of eating the forbidden fruit, and the guilt of *this* sin, this personal act, is what is said to be imputed. But, according to Dr. Baird, that specific act could not have been imputed—it was not the act of the nature,

* Conf. of Faith, ch. vi.

but only an accidental manifestation of what the nature had become. It was personal, and not generic. "The action of plucking and eating the fruit was, in itself, as a mere act, a matter utterly insignificant."* "We have shown already that the plucking and eating of the fruit of the forbidden tree was a mere accident, following the heart-sin."† Now, our standards just as precisely assert that *this* was the *very* sin whereby our first parents fell from the estate wherein they were created." "By *this* sin they fell from their original righteousness." Dr. Baird says that they *had fallen before* they committed the deed, and that the deed was only the proof of their fall; the Confession says, that the fall was the *consequence* of the deed, and that the deed was the judicial ground of the fall. It is perfectly clear that Dr. Baird does not teach the doctrines of the Westminster Divines. They held that the personal offence of our first parents was imputed—he holds that only our own offence is imputed. To make it clear that they mean a personal act, they specify the act to which they trace the ruin and condemnation of the race. Dr. Baird says that the race was ruined before that act was committed, and that the act itself "was utterly insignificant, a mere accident, following the heart-sin." They teach that the formal ground of the imputation of the first sin is the representative relation of Adam to his race. Dr. Baird teaches that the formal ground of the imputation of the first sin is that his race committed it. It is imputed to them in the same sense and on the same principle, in which it is imputed to him.

We repeat, therefore, and we defy Dr. Baird to escape from the conclusion, that, upon his premises there is no imputation of Adam's sin at all. It is not as *his*, but as subjectively and inherently *ours*, that we are held responsible for it. Upon the federal view, the sin could not be ours, but as it was *Adam's*, his personal relations to it were absolutely necessary to create our interest in it. He, as a person, and not a nature, was our

* P. 508.

† P. 497.

head and representative; and, therefore, before we can be called to account, it is presupposed that he has acted.

In the next place, Dr. Baird utterly confounds the twofold relations in which Adam stood to the species, as a natural and as a representative head. According to him they are one and the same thing. The truth is, that in strict propriety of language, there is no headship at all. The nature in every case is the same, and the person is a mere channel of transmission. One man stands in the same relation to it as another, and, instead of the parent representing the child, the nature represents itself in both. But, passing over this objection, the parental relation *ex necessitate rei*, according to Dr. Baird, is federal. In the very act of creation, "his Maker," we are told,* "endowed him with a prolific constitution, and in the blessing pronounced upon him at his creation, prior to any of the external actions by which the covenant of nature was formally sealed, he was ordained to multiply; to become of one the myriads of the human race. In all God's dealings with him, he is regarded in this light, as the root and father of a race who should proceed from him. They, by virtue of this derivative relation to him, were contemplated by God, as in him their head, parties in all the transactions which had respect to the covenant. Thus, they sinned in his sin; fell in his apostasy; were depraved in his corruption; and in him became the children of Satan, and of the wrath of God." Hence, to be a man, and to be a covenant head, are the same thing. It is the propagative peculiarity which directly makes the child responsible for the parent, and the parent for the child. God could not have dealt with Adam, but as a federal head. He did not appoint him to the office, but created him in it. "By the phrase, covenant head, we do not mean that Adam was by covenant made head of the race, but that, being its head, by virtue of the nature with which God had endowed him, he stood as such in the covenant. Adam sustained in his person two distinct characters, the de-

* P. 305.

markation of which must be carefully observed if we would attain to any just conclusions as to the relation he held toward us, and the effects upon us of his actions. First, in him was a nature of a specific character, the common endowment of the human race; and transmissible to them, by propagation, with their being. Again, he was an individual person, endowed with the nature thus bestowed on him in common with his posterity. Personal actions and relations of his, which did not affect his nature were peculiar to him as a private person. But such as affected his nature, with him, and to the same extent, involved all those to whom that nature was given in its bestowal on him.* Accordingly, Dr. Baird teaches that the covenant of works was not a positive institution, into which God entered with Adam after his creation, but was the very form, and the only conceivable form, under which such a creature could be subject to the moral government of God. If not a word had been said concerning the forbidden fruit, and no limitation of probation introduced, it would still have been true that the apostasy of Adam would have been the apostasy of his race. His relationship, as a parent, necessarily implicated his seed in all that affected his nature. One more extract will remove all room for doubt.

“ Here, however, it is necessary to enter more particularly into consideration of the manner in which Adam was invested with the functions of a representative. That the cause of that office was the will of God, is not disputed by any who recognize the office. But it is a question how the Creator gave effect to His will in this matter. Was it by a positive arrangement, unessential to the completeness of the constitution of nature, extraneous to it, superimposed upon it, after the work of creation was complete? Or did he so order that the relation between the representative body and its head should be an organic one, a relation implied in the very structure of Adam's nature, incorporated with the substance of his being, and constituting an element essential to the completeness and symmetry of the whole system, physical, moral and spiritual? By many orthodox theologians of the present day, it is held that the representative relation of Adam did not exist until the positive provision was made respecting the tree of knowledge,

* Pp. 305, 306.

when it was constituted by a decretive act of God's sovereignty. We are constrained to take the opposite view, and to maintain, with the older divines, that the relation is as old as the first inscription of the covenant of nature on the heart of man in his creation. We look upon it as the essential element in the parental relation as it subsisted in Adam; the element which gives the family constitution all its significance."—pp. 308, 309.

Now we do not hesitate to assert that this complete confusion, or rather, amalgamation of the federal with natural headship, is a total abolition of the federal, in the sense in which it is taken in the Westminster standards. Their covenant is an institution posterior to creation—an institution proceeding from the sovereign will of God, in which the essential elements of moral government were largely modified by grace. What those modifications were we shall not here specify, as they are unimportant to the point before us. It is enough to say that moral government and the covenant of works are not synonymous, but that the covenant was the special form which God impressed upon it after the creation of man. We say further, that considered simply as a creature, a moral creature, there is no reason to believe that, independently of the sovereign appointment of God, the character and conduct of Adam would have had any legal effects upon the destiny of his offspring. Each man would have been under the moral law for himself, and his fortunes would have been in his own hand. All this is clear, if the covenant was subsequent to the creation. What say our standards? The first covenant is represented as having "*been made with man.*" The inference would seem to be that man was already in existence. This is not language which any one would adopt who intended to describe an innate law or a connatural principle. And although ingenuity may pat it to the torture, and wring out of it an interpretation to suit Dr. Baird's hypothesis, no one can pretend that it is the simple and obvious sense of the words. But let us admit, for the sake of argument, that these words are not decisive, what shall we say to the teachings of the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, in which it is expressly affirmed that the covenant of works *was a special act of Providence*

towards man in the estate wherein he was created. Providence presupposes creation, and here man's previous existence in a definite state is unequivocally affirmed, and the covenant is made with him as a creature existing in that holy and happy condition. The Larger Catechism* recounts first his creation, then his insertion into Paradise, the injunction to cultivate the garden, the permission to eat of the fruits of the earth, the subjection of the creatures to his authority, the institution of marriage and the Sabbath, the privilege of communion with God—all these before it comes to the establishment of the covenant, making it as clear as the sun in the heavens, that the covenant was regarded as posterior to the creation, and as by no means synonymous with that moral law which was confessedly the rule and measure of the holiness that he had as a moral creature. The Shorter Catechism removes all perplexity when it declares in so many words,† that “when God had created man, he entered into a covenant of life with him.” The Latin version is, “After God had created man,” *post quam Deus hominem condidisset*. It is needless to pursue so plain a matter any further. Dr. Baird and the Westminster standards teach an entirely different doctrine as to the covenant, and of course as to Adam's federal headship. One makes both concreated with man—elements of his being as a moral propagative creature, his necessary attitude to God and his posterity. The other makes both the sovereign appointment of God, gracious dispensations of Providence towards him and his race, looking to a good, which, without such an arrangement, he could have no right to expect. In support of these views we are happy to be able to cite an authority which we know that Dr. Baird sincerely respects, and which is likely to have more weight with him than any arguments that we can employ. Dr. Breckinridge has put this subject in its proper light in a work to which Dr. Baird has more than once referred, and referred to in terms which indicate a deserved appreciation of its value.‡

* Quest. 20.

† Quest. 12.

‡ Knowl. God Object., Book v., c. 31.

Whatever, therefore, "the older divines" may have taught to the contrary, it is indisputable that the Westminster Assembly has represented federal headship as an instituted, and natural headship as an original relation, and has clearly distinguished between them. An instituted is not, however, to be confounded with an arbitrary relation. The appointment of Adam to the office of a federal head was not in contempt or defiance of the principles of equity and truth. His natural relations to his race rendered it consistent with justice that he should, also, be their representative. His natural headship, in other words, is the ground of his federal headship. The connection by blood betwixt him and his descendants constitutes a basis of unity by which, though numerically different as individuals, they may be treated as one collective whole. There is a close and intimate union, though not an identity, among the members of the human family. They are one race, one blood, one body—an unity, not like that of the realists, growing out of the participation of a common objective reality, answering to the definition of a genus or a species, but an unity founded in the relations of individual beings. It is this unity, and not the fancied identity of Dr. Baird, that distinguishes the family, the State, the Church, the world. That the human race is not an aggregate of separate and independent atoms, but constitutes something analogous to an organic whole, with a common life, springing from the intimate connection between the parts, is obvious from the very organization of society. There is one unity of nations, in consequence of which national character becomes as obtrusively marked as the peculiarities of individuals. There was one type among the Greeks, another among the Asiatics, still another among the Romans. The Englishman is in no danger of ever being mistaken for a Frenchman, and the Frenchman is not more distinguished from his Continental neighbors by his language than by his habits, his sentiments, his modes of thought. In the narrowest of the social spheres, the same principle is at work, and families are as decisively different by their characters as by their names. These facts reveal that there is a bond among men, a

fundamental basis of unity, which embraces the whole race. What it is we may be unable to define; we know, however, that it is connected with blood. This basis is that which justifies, but does not necessitate, God's dealing with the race in one man as a whole. So that Adam's federal headship is the immediate ground of our interest in his sin, and his natural headship is the ground of the representative economy. Adam stood only for his children, because his children alone sustained those relations to him by virtue of which he could justly represent them. If required to specify precisely what that is which constitutes the unity, the nature and kind of relationship, we frankly confess that we are not competent to solve the problem. We do not profess to understand the whole case. We accept whatever God has thought proper to reveal, and whenever the curtain drops upon His revelation, we lay our hands upon our mouth. In the meantime, although we cannot see the whole reason which is contained in natural for federal headship, we can see that the moral economy which admits of representation is supremely benevolent. If Adam had maintained his integrity, and we had inherited life and glory through his obedience, none would ever have dreamed that there was aught of hardship, injustice or cruelty in the scheme by which our happiness had been so cheaply secured. The difference of result makes no difference in the nature of the principle. Those who object do not remember that the law which made Adam our head and representative, is the law by virtue of which alone, so far as we know, the happiness of any man can be secured. Without the principle of representation, it is possible that the whole race might have perished, and perished forever. Each man, as the species successively came into existence, would have been placed under the law of distributive justice. His safety, therefore, would have been forever contingent. It is possible, that if the first man, with all his advantages, abused his liberty and fell, each of his descendants might have imitated his example, and fallen also. It is possible, therefore, that the whole race might have become involved in guilt and ruin. Some might

have stood longer than others, but what is any measure of time to immortality? Who shall say, but that in the boundless progress of their immortal being, one by one, all may have sinned? It is possible, nay, more, even probable; it is quite sure that this would have been the case with some; that multitudes, indeed, would abuse their freedom and die. But to sin under such circumstances is to sin hopelessly. There can be no redeemer if each man is to be treated exclusively as an individual. If we cannot sin in another, we cannot be righteous in another. If the principle of representation is not to be admitted into God's government, salvation to the guilty becomes hopelessly impossible. Under this principle, multitudes are, in fact, saved, when without it, all might have been lost. Hence, it is clearly a provision of grace, introduced for our good, for our safety, for our happiness, and not as a snare, or a curse. God had an eye to it when He constituted our species a race, connected by unity of blood, and not a mere aggregation or assemblage of similar individuals. He made Adam the root, because He designed to make him the head, the father, because He designed to make him the representative of all mankind. The natural constitution is evidently in order to the federal relation. Both are necessary in order to understand the doctrine of original sin. If we consider Adam merely as our first parent, his act is not necessarily the act of his child. If the paternal relation, such as it now obtains in the species, exhausted his relations to the race, it would be impossible to explain how they can be guilty on account of the first sin rather than any other. Even if it were granted that, as a father, he must propagate his own moral features, his children would receive them simply as a nature, without being ill-deserving on account of them, as a child might innocently inherit a distorted body which the parent had brought upon himself by guilt. The natural relation, therefore, taken as exclusive and alone, is wholly incompetent to bear the load of hereditary sin. There must be something more than parent and child in the case. It is vain to appeal to those analogies in which the offspring share in the sufferings incident to the

wickedness of their fathers. The offspring do, indeed, suffer, but they do not charge themselves with guilt; their sufferings are calamities, and not punishments. There must be some relation, legal and moral, by virtue of which the act of the parent becomes judicially theirs, before they can be penally responsible. This relationship is established in the covenant. That makes the act of their parent their sin and their crime. The two relations together, the natural and federal, explain the whole case, as far as God has thought proper to reveal it. I am guilty because Adam represented me. Adam represented me because I am his child. Birth *unites* me to him, as faith unites me to Christ. The union in each case is the basis of the covenant, and the covenant is the immediate ground of condemnation or acceptance.

That Dr. Baird's doctrine of guilt and imputation is not that of the Reformed Church is susceptible of superfluous proof. We have not space for quotations in detail, but there are several considerations which show that, whatever that doctrine might have been, it could not have been the scheme of Dr. Baird. In the first place, we acquit him of any sympathy with the mediate imputation of Placæus, but did it not occur to him, that the theory of Placæus could never have been originated, had the general sentiment of the Church been that we were actually guilty of the sin of Adam? Mediate imputation is an expedient for establishing a direct personal relation betwixt ourselves and the first transgression. It goes on the supposition that a man can be punished only for the sin which he has really committed. The problem it undertook to solve was, how the sin of another could be made to stand in personal relations to ourselves, and the answer it gave was, that we make it our own by a voluntary appropriation. Now, if it had been the doctrine of the Church that the sin of Adam was actually ours, it would have been ridiculously absurd to cast about for expedients, in order to make us justly responsible for it. No one would ever have dreamed of doubting that a man is chargeable with his own sins. This mediate theory, therefore, is a pregnant proof that the form in which the Church held the

doctrine was one which made us responsible for a crime in which we had no causal agency. In the next place, the bitter and malignant opposition of Socinians, Remonstrants and Pelagians is wholly unaccountable, if the Reformers taught nothing more than that a man was punished for his actual transgressions. This principle could not have been denied without abolishing moral distinctions. In Dr. Baird's doctrine the vulnerable point is our numerical identity with Adam. That being given, guilt and corruption follow as a matter of course. Now, if the Reformers had stated the doctrine in this shape, the opposition would have been to the principle, and not to the consequence. Then, again, the Reformers, almost to a man, asserted the immediate creation, and denied the generation of the soul. Calvin treats the theory of traduction with utter contempt. It received hardly less favor among the divines of France, Holland, Germany, England and Scotland. But the theory of traduction is essential to Dr. Baird's doctrine. It is, therefore, certain that this doctrine could not have been held by the Reformers. These considerations are conclusive. But there is another to be added, which makes assurance doubly sure. The Reformers all taught the imputation of our sins to Christ. Our ill-desert, our guilt, was charged upon him, and yet they never dreamed of the blasphemy of making him actually a sinner. Here, clearly, imputation implied responsibility for crimes on the part of one who was absolutely free from the stain, and who sustained no causal relation to them.

But how does Dr. Baird dispose of this case? Will the reader believe it? By a flat and palpable contradiction of every principle that he has sought elaborately to establish in the case of Adam and his posterity. He retracts his entire philosophy of guilt and punishment. We have never known a more remarkable instance of a theory breaking down under its own weight. He admits that Christ was our substitute; that He assumed our guilt; that He was held responsible for our sins. Was He, therefore, actually a sinner? Was the nature which He had numerically the same nature which apostatized? and was it charged only with its own proper act?

Not at all. Objective imputation does not involve subjective pollution. He simply sustains a relation to His people in which their sins are, "*in some proper sense,*" to be regarded as His. What is this proper sense? The reader will mark the answer.* The substance is, that He was the federal head of those whose sins He bore, and who constituted one body with Him by virtue of, not a numerical identity of nature, but of a spiritual union subsisting between them—the very doctrine for which we have contended. He actually quotes with approbation the sentence of Owen, which is an unequivocal denial of his whole doctrine. "As what He (Christ) did is imputed unto them, *as if done by them,* so what they deserved on the account of sin is charged upon Him." How true that, if you expel nature with a fork, she will return. Dr. Baird is reduced to the necessity of abandoning his whole theory of imputation, or of admitting that Christ was a personal transgressor.

As to the authorities which he quotes in the chapter, *Of the Definition of Guilt and Imputation,* they make nothing for him. They only prove that guilt is inseparable from crime; no one denies that. They prove, further, that a man cannot be punished for a crime which is in no sense his own; no one denies that. But the real point in dispute is, whether there is only *one* sense, that of actual causation, in which a crime may be said to belong to us, and this point his authorities do not touch. Nay, if he had gone further, he would have seen that these very authorities distinctly teach, not only that we *can* sin, but that we *have* sinned vicariously. Then, again, Dr. Baird has quietly assumed that all those expressions by which the Reformers signalized our union with Adam, and represent his sin as ours, convey the idea of an actual participation in his offence. He has confounded union with identity. They clearly meant nothing more than that close and intimate relationship, springing from natural birth, which lies at the basis

*Pp. 606, 607.

of federal representation. To be in him seminally and radically, is not to be numerically one nature with him. It is to be like him and of him. As we have already said, they never taught an arbitrary imputation. They never taught that guilt was unconnected with crime; but they did teach that the crime might *belong* to a man, might be justly called *his*, where he was not implicated in the stain of it. If this is conceded, every passage which Dr. Baird has quoted in the chapter referred to goes for nothing. And that this must be conceded, we think capable of irrefragible proof. Although our limits do not allow us to enter into details, we must be permitted, in addition to the numerous quotations to be found in the popular treatises of theology, to close with one which we do not remember to have seen cited before. It is from the learned and venerable Cocceius. In allusion to the handle which Socinians made of the ambiguity of the word impute, he says: "They explain it to mean that God imputes the sin of Adam by thinking or judging that the posterity of Adam willed, thought, did, what Adam perversely willed, thought, did. Hence they represent God as judging those to be in existence who were only radically in being." That is, the Socinians charge imputation with making the descendants of Adam personally guilty of his sin. This would be to attribute an actual being to those whose existence was only potential. But, adds Cocceius, "*to impute, in the style of Scripture, is to judge that he has done a thing, who has not done it; not to impute is to judge that he has not done a thing, who has done it. To impute is either to condemn or absolve many individuals by one sentence, on account of the conjunction between them.*"* This is exactly our doctrine, the doctrine of the Westminster standards, and of the whole Reformed Church. But it is not the doctrine of Dr. Baird.

Dr. Baird says, "the opinion seems to be entertained by some that the attempt to base our relation to the covenant and

* Sum. Theol., chap. xxx., § 4.

to the apostasy, upon our natural relation to Adam, involves, as a logical result, the doctrine of mediate imputation." He refers to ourselves, but has entirely misconceived our doctrine. We have always held that the natural is the *ground* of the federal relation. The doctrine is explicitly stated in the article referred to. What we objected to was, the idea that the natural relation alone explains our guilt and corruption; that we must receive our nature from Adam precisely in the moral attitude which it occupied in him, simply *because* Adam was our father. We insisted then, and insist now, that the law of generation, singly and alone, the law that like begets like, does not explain even native depravity, let alone guilt, and that if guilt is conceived as attaching to us in the *first instance*, *because* we have a corrupt nature, that is the doctrine of mediate imputation. We insisted then, and insist now, that the immediate formal ground of guilt is the covenant headship of Adam; that our depravity of nature is the penal consequence of our guilt in him, and that we are made parties to the covenant by the circumstance of birth, or the natural relation to Adam. We stated, then, that Calvin held the doctrine to which we object. We are now prepared to say, after a thorough examination of the writings of that great man, that, although he has often expressed himself vaguely and ambiguously, we are convinced that his opinion at bottom was the same as our own.

Dr. Baird exults in the superiority of his theory to the current theology, on account of the completeness with which it solves the difficulties in relation to hereditary sin. We admit, very candidly, that in his case, the only difficulty is in the theory itself. Given a numerical identity of nature transmitted from father to son, and its moral condition in the one is as explicable as its moral condition in the other. The murderer is the same, whether found in a palace or a hovel, and the law seizes him, wherever it finds him, on account of a crime which his change of place cannot modify. But upon the supposition that Adam's children are not Adam, but themselves, that they are new beings, called into existence by the

providence of God, two questions cannot fail to arise, which have always presented difficulties in speculation. The first is, how that which, now and here, begins its being, can begin it in a state of sin, without an imputation upon the character of God? The problem is to make God the author of the man without making Him the author of his sin. The second question is, how that which is inherent, which comes to us from without as a conditioning cause, and not as a self-conditioned effect, can carry the imputation of crime. How, as it exists in us, independently of any agency of ours, it can be contemplated with moral disapprobation, and render us personally ill-deserving? The answer to these questions exhausts the different theories of original sin, and Dr. Baird congratulates himself that he has fairly got rid of them. Confident in the advantages of his position, he has assailed, with spirit and vigor, the stronghold within which Edwards and his disciples have thought themselves impregnable. We really enjoyed the fight, it being, as Lucretius observes, "a great satisfaction to stand in the window of a castle, and to see a battle, and the adventures thereof, in the vale below." We felt all along, that all that was necessary was for them to take the offensive, and very feeble guns would be sufficient to demolish the fortress in which Dr. Baird conceived himself so strong. He may succeed in weakening their defences, but they can utterly annihilate his. Their doctrine has difficulties, but his is an absurdity.

A complete answer to these questions in the present state of our knowledge we hold to be impossible. Until we are put in possession of the entire case, no solution that can be given will go to the bottom of the subject. There will ever remain phenomena which our philosophy does not cover. But, at the same time, we are confident that the solution must be sought in the line of those principles of natural and federal headship which the Scriptures so clearly reveal. These principles show, paradoxical as the thing may appear, that the history of the individual does not absolutely begin with its birth. It sustained moral relations, and was implicated in moral acts before it was

born. This notion is essentially involved in the notion of a covenant. When Adam was appointed to this office, all his descendants, constituting an unity of body with him, sustained the same relations to the law and God which he sustained. Morally and legally they were in being—their interest in the covenant was just the same as if they had already received an actual existence. This being so, the sin of Adam must have produced the same judicial effects upon them as upon him. Their actual existence was to begin under the law of sin and death, as his was continued under it. God, in calling them successively into being, must, as the Ruler and Judge of the universe, produce them in the state to which justice had morally consigned them. The covenant, therefore, does explain the fact of their being sinners, before they were born—does give them a history before their actual being. The only question is, was the covenant just? That depends upon the fact whether natural headship creates an union with Adam sufficiently intimate to ground these judicial transactions. If it does, the mystery is solved. We maintain that it does, but acknowledge very frankly that we do not fully see how. We understand a part of the case, and only a part. The thing which has always perplexed us most, is to account for the sense of personal demerit, of guilt and shame, which unquestionably accompanies our sense of native corruption. It is not felt to be a misfortune or calamity, but a crime. We subscribe to every syllable which Dr. Baird has written upon this subject. Now, how shall this be explained? Discounting all the schemes which deny the fact itself, and construe native corruption into native misfortune, there are but three hypotheses which are supposable in the case. First, we have really had a being antecedent to our birth, in which, by a personal abuse of liberty, we determined and conditioned our mundane history. The second is, that we had a being in our substance, though not in our persons, which has determined the attitude of that substance. The third is, that we sinned in another, whose relations to us were such as to make him morally one with us. The first two hypotheses remove the difficulty, but they sub-

stitute a greater one. Of the two, if we were driven to choose between them, we should prefer the theory of a super-sensible existence. The consciousness of guilt connects it with our persons, and the argument is a short one which concludes from this consciousness to a previous personal existence. Our nature is sinful; it could not have been made so without our act; that corrupting act could not have taken place in time, for corruption begins with our life in time. We must, therefore, have had a transcendent existence, in which we could have conditioned the moral type of our appearance in time. The objections to this hypothesis are unanswerable. In the first place, the notion of a timeless existence is itself utterly unintelligible. Every finite being is conditioned, and conditioned both by time and space; and an intelligible world of real, substantive existences, without temporal relations, is altogether contradictory. In the next place, it is wholly unaccountable, how such a state, signalized by so momentous an act as that which ruined the agent, has so entirely passed from the memory, as to leave no trace behind. Surely, if anything had impressed itself upon our minds, such a condition, so different from the present, and so fruitful in its consequences, could not have failed to be remembered. Add to this the silence of Scripture, or rather the contrary teaching of Scripture, in its necessary implications, and the argument is complete.

The hypothesis of Dr. Baird being no less untenable, we are shut up to the third scheme, which we take to be the scheme of the Bible. We cannot carry human existence beyond Adam, nor Adam's existence beyond that creative fiat which gave him his being on the sixth day. Then and there the species began, and began holy. The Scriptures further inform us when and where and how he lost his integrity. From the time of his disobedience, all the race have borne the type of sin. There has been no holiness in the species from that hour to this, unless as supernaturally produced by the grace of God. It would seem, therefore, that the all-conditioning act which has shaped the moral character of the race, was no other than

the act which lost to Adam the image of God in the garden of Eden. Such seems to be the explicit testimony of Scripture. By one man's disobedience, many were made sinners. Either we are guilty of that act, or original corruption is in us simply misfortune. In some way or other it is ours, justly imputable to us, or we are not, and cannot be, born the children of wrath. But we are guilty; conscience testifies that we are guilty—that our native corruption is sin. But as we did not sin personally, as we did not sin naturally, we must have sinned vicariously. The only alternative is in ourselves or in another. Ourselves are out of the question. Therefore, we sinned in Adam, and our history truly began before our birth. Our appearance in time was not an absolute commencement, but moral relations preceded and determined it. In bringing us into the world sinners, God did nothing more than execute the decree of justice. As to the manner in which God executed that decree, the negative agency of withholding or not imparting the Divine image is sufficient to explain the effect. To be destitute of the image of God is to be in an unholy state, and the want of original righteousness necessitates positive corruption. But still the agency of God, in the production of that corruption, is purely privative and judicial. The case is this: The being to be produced is under the curse, exposed to the penalty of the law. That implies the withdrawal of the Divine favor, as manifested in that highest proof of it, the Divine image; and that implies the dominion of sin. This is precisely the doctrine of our standards. There is, first, guilt; then the want of original righteousness; and then the corruption of the whole nature. This is, also, the doctrine of Calvin, who expressly repudiates natural generation as an adequate explanation of depravity. His words are: "For the human race has not naturally derived corruption through its descent from Adam; but that result is rather to be traced to the appointment of God, who, as He had adorned the whole nature of mankind with most excellent endowments in one man, so in the same man he denuded it."*

* Comment. Gen. iii. : 7.

Dr. Baird deceives himself with an analogy which, as illustrating the unity of the race, is perfectly proper; the analogy of the seed to the plant, and the oak to the acorn. But when an argument is derived from a figure of speech, the figure should be pertinent to the very point on which the argument turns. Here the design is to show that one man has corrupted the race in the way of nature because all have sprung from him. The true comparison, in a case thus contemplating derivative individuals, is not that of an acorn to the oak, but of a parent oak to other oaks which have come from it. God did not, at first, make acorns, but trees, and these trees produced the acorns, and these acorns have perpetuated forests. If, now, an oak in full maturity should drop an hundred acorns, and these acorns grow into a hundred other oaks, the question is, would these hundred oaks be numerically the same with one another and with their parent stock? And would this whole forest die if the parent tree should happen to decay? This is the case which is parallel with Adam and his posterity, and we humbly think that it gives no help to those who can see nothing but nature in the propagation of sin.

But if imputed guilt makes Adam's descendants really and personally corrupt, how shall we exempt Christ from the operation of the same penal consequence? He bare our sins in his own body on the tree, and yet was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners. The judicial displeasure of God did not involve Him in personal sin. But, in the first place, it is overlooked that Christ never existed as a human person. He had our nature, but the person was that of the Eternal Son. In consequence of the intimate relationship of the human nature in Him to the Divine Logos, that nature was pervaded, conditioned and determined, in all its habitudes and in its whole being, by an influence which preserved it not only from sin, but from the possibility of sin. Jesus was what no other man ever was, or ever can be, but as made so by Him, absolutely impeccable. It is a mystery how His divine person, without disturbing His human liberty, or absorbing His human consciousness, or interfering with His human proper-

ties, or diminishing the moral significance of His temptations, could yet make it certain that He should never fail. But the case is even so. It was in consequence of this mystery that the enduring of the penalty by Him was an act of obedience. Others suffer from necessity. He obeyed, achieved an active righteousness, as truly in His death as in His life. As the judicial displeasure of God could not destroy the personal union between the two natures, it could not destroy that life of God in His soul, which is the condition of all holiness. He could not have become a sinner without ceasing to be Divine. His case, therefore, is altogether *sui generis*. In the next place, it is equally important to recollect that he stood as the head of a covenant, as a new beginning of the race, or rather of his seed. *He* was the *representative*, and not those, whose sins He bore. If they had been His head, then the case would have been parallel with the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. But He was not in them—they are not the centre of union—but they are in Him, and He is, accordingly, the source of influence. In the third place, the very nature of His undertaking required Him to be stronger than the curse. The penalty could not crush him, as it buries a creature in death, and therefore he is declared to be the Son of God, with power, by his resurrection from the dead. The case of Christ, therefore, is no manner of exception to our argument, that guilt, resting upon grounds of representative unity, must as necessarily entail a fall to the creature as personal transgression.

We have already intimated that we regard Dr. Baird's account of the covenant as seriously defective. He looks upon it as a natural institution, essentially contained in the moral law, as addressed to such a creature as man. He confounds man's state, considered simply as a moral agent, under a dispensation of moral government, and his state as in covenant with God. We have not space, now, to enlarge upon this error. We shall content ourselves with an exhibition of what we take to be the teachings of Scripture and of our own standards. As a moral creature, invested with the image of God, man was under the law, as a servant, bound to execute his

master's will, with no promise but the continuance of the Divine favor as he then enjoyed it. The condition of his servitude was perpetual innocence. As long as he obeyed, he would remain holy and happy as he was. As soon as he disobeyed, he was to die. His state was contingent, dependent upon his legitimate use, or the abuse of his liberty. As a moral creature, moreover, he was treated purely as an individual, and had no change taken place in his relations, each man as he came into being would have been on trial for himself. Now the covenant of works was a special dispensation of God's goodness, modifying this state in several important respects. Its aim was two-fold, to change the relation of man from that of a servant to a son, and to confirm him indefectibly in holiness, which is the essential notion of life. To achieve these ends, the period of probation was first made definite, and the notion of a completed righteousness or justification introduced. In the next place, the persons on probation were limited, and one made to stand for all, and thus the notion of imputation was introduced. In the third place, the field of temptation was contracted, and the question of obedience made to turn upon a single positive precept, which brought the will of man directly, face to face, with the will of God. Had man obeyed he would have been justified, and as this justification is the equivalent of perpetual innocence, it must have secured it, and man have been rendered immutable in holiness. This subjective change in his will from mutability to impeccability would have been accompanied with an external change in his relations from a servant to a son. This twofold change would have realized the notion of life. Upon this view the covenant is a conspicuous manifestation of the goodness of God. But it is a view totally inconsistent with Dr. Baird's notions of the constitution of man, and, therefore, with him the grace of God retreats before logical consistency.

One more thought and we have done. We regret that the importance which Dr. Baird attaches to the propagative property of man has led him to rank this among the elements which enter into the biblical notion of the image of God. In

the relation betwixt a parent and his child he detects a resemblance to the ineffable relation betwixt the first and second persons of the Trinity, and what is still more remarkable, in our faculty of breathing, he finds a representation of the procession of the Holy Ghost. The last is a pure fancy—there is nothing approximating to an analogy, much less to a resemblance of the things themselves. That there is some analogy in the first case may be admitted, but that is very far from proving that the analogy is any part of the Divine image. Man in his dominion over the creatures, sustains a relation analogous to that of God as Supreme Ruler, but dominion over the creatures is treated in the Scriptures as a consequence, but not as an element, of the image. The phrase has a specific, definite sense, abundantly explained in the Scriptures themselves, and we should neither add to it nor take from it. Least of all should we trust to fancy as its expositor. One thing would seem to be certain, that nothing can be included in it, which is shared by man in common with the brutes. To propagate their species and to breathe, is characteristic of all terrestrial animals, and as in these respects, the dog and the goat stand on a level with man, we are conscious of something like the degradation of a grand subject when we undertake to define the Divine image by such properties.

We shall here pause. We have singled out the prominent parts of Dr. Baird's book, in which we find ourselves unable to agree with him. It would have given us more pleasure to have dwelt upon the many fine features of it which we can most cordially approve. It is by no means a common-place work. The very consistency with which he has carried through a single leading idea, and interwoven it with the texture of a difficult and complicated discussion, shows the hand of genius and the power of disciplined thought. We thank him for his incidental death-blows to popular errors, and we love him for the zeal and heartiness with which he clings to the glorious doctrines of grace. If, in the points in which we have differed from him, we have said any thing personally offensive, it would give us more pain to discover it, than it can give him to read it.

We are conscious that we have written under a strong sense of personal esteem, and we are sure that Dr. Baird will reciprocate the wish, that in relation to the matters in dispute, each of us may seek, exclusively, for truth. We adopt the noble language of Socrates in the Philebus of Plato: νῦν γὰρ δήπου πρὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονεικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἀγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτα ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦτ' ἂν σὺ, τῷ ὀβλιθιστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἀμφω.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. *Commentary on the Pentateuch.* Translated from the German of OTTO VON GERLACH, by Rev. HENRY DOWLING, Incumbent of St. Mary's, Kingswinford. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. Edinburg: T. & T. Clark. 1860; pp. 585, 8vo.

Otto Von Gerlach is a name honored among the truly spiritual portion of the German Church, for the earnest efforts made by that devoted man for the salvation of souls. He was born at Berlin, of a noble family of the Reformed faith, and after finishing the study of law, devoted himself to the service of the Church. He attended the Lectures of Schleiermacher, Neander, Marheineke and Hengstenberg, and having entered the University, pursued the labors of his sacred office with wonderful zeal and energy, full of efforts suggested by a ready invention in the art of doing good. To his pastoral labors and schemes for promoting missions at home and abroad, he added literary pursuits, which took a practical turn, all having a view to the promotion of vital godliness. His first labor in this direction was the translation of Wesley's Sermon on "Awake thou that Sleepest," &c. He also had Richard Baxter's works published in German, and a practical treatise of

Dr. Chalmers, which last appeared under the title of "die Kirchliche Armenpflege." He also edited the chief writings of Luther, with historical comments, and the Scriptures in Luther's translation, with explanatory remarks. This work was published in Germany from 1847-1853, in six volumes. The commentary is of the popular cast, but the four volumes on the Old Testament were intended for persons of education and reflection, though not descending as the scholar would desire into the minutiae of critical study. Of these, the first portion is now published in an English dress. If it shall not add materially to our knowledge of the Scriptures, it will be valuable as showing the views entertained of this portion of the divine Word by an earnest man of another Church and country.

Von Gerlach was sent to England and Scotland by the King of Prussia in 1842, to investigate the plans adopted in those countries for the promotion of religion, and published the result of his researches on his return. In this way his name has become favorably known to our brethren of Great Britain.

2. *Observations on some of the Physical, Chemical, Physiological and Pathological Phenomena of Malarial Fever.* By JOSEPH JONES, A.M., M.D., Professor of Medical Chemistry in the Medical College of Georgia, at Augusta. Extracted from the transactions of the American Medical Association. 1859.

This is the title of an Essay of four hundred and nineteen pages, in the preparation of which much labour and scientific research has been expended by Dr. Jones, and it must serve to advance the reputation which his previous papers had secured for him. The systematic arrangement of the materials, and the elaborate preparation of the tables, manifest a power of discrimination which could scarcely have failed to attain to correct conclusions. With the statement, that this is not the channel through which to give an extended notice of this

highly creditable essay, we commend these observations to the appreciation of scientific men in the Medical profession. The author modestly says that, "if they should result in inducing a single young man to enter this field, with correct views and the right spirit, he will feel that he has been rewarded for his labors."

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3. *Stier's Words of the Lord Jesus*. From the German. Translated by the Rev. WILLIAM B. POPE. New edition. Philadelphia: Smith & English. Vols. 5 and 6.

 4. *Stier's Words of the Risen Saviour, and Commentary on the Epistle of St. James*. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co.; pp. 501.

The first of these volumes embraces the 5th and 6th of the edition of Smith & English, a re-print from Clark's Foreign Theological Library, published in Edinburgh. The second is issued as a supplemental volume of the Edinburgh edition, and contains the comments of Stier on the Words of the Lord Jesus, spoken to Paul, Peter and John after His ascension, and recorded in the book of Acts, the second of Corinthians, and in the Apocalypse. The last half contains the Author's Sermons on the Epistle of James, or rather their substance, as written down after their delivery. He leaves it to the preacher to conjecture how these sketches were or should be filled out, in the living address.

We noticed the previous volumes of this work in our last issue. We have nothing to add, except that in saying that its tendencies were evangelical, we did not mean to say that it was by any means orthodox, according to the Calvinistic standard. Far from it. The author is a thorough-going Synergist. He holds to man's coöperation in his own conversion, and conditions the efficacy of all grace upon the will of the sinner. Of course he repudiates the perseverance of the saints, and the doctrine of total depravity.

5. *Minutes of the Synod of South Carolina at its Sessions in Columbia, S. C., October, 1859, with an Appendix.* Charleston: Steam-power Press of Walker, Evans & Co., No. 3 Broad street. 1860; pp. 98, 8vo.

This document, which we have just received, possesses an unusual value *in the table of Ruling Elders in the Synod of South Carolina*, which is given in the Appendix. Their names and residences are recorded in connection with the names and localities of the Churches they rule over. We call attention here to it, with the hope that similar lists may be gotten up and published in the other Synods, so that in the end, the Church may be enabled to collect together in one volume a list of all these Pastors of the flock. There are not less than 520 of these Pastors in this one small Synod! If they were all of them faithful pastors, what great blessings they might, through grace, confer upon the Church! If they but believed, all of them, that theirs is, indeed, a *high spiritual function*, what a mighty change this one idea would, with God's blessing, produce in the operation of their practical influence all through our bounds!

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6. *The Revival in Ireland: Letters from Ministers and Medical Men, in Ulster, on the Revival of Religion in the North of Ireland, addressed to the Rev. H. GRATTON GUINNESS.* Philadelphia: Wm. S. & Alfred Martien. No. 606 Chestnut street. 1860; pp. 78, 16mo.

The object of this profoundly interesting little volume is to acquaint the American reader with the progress of the great work of grace going on in the North of Ireland. The testimony of the Physicians relates especially to the remarkable physical manifestations attending this work, shewing that whatever may be true of them, those cases are not cases either of catalepsy, epilepsy, or hysteria. Mr. Guinness, himself, says, "as to their being the work of the spirit of God, all

things considered, I think, we should tremble either to assert or deny that they are so, lest we should grieve the Holy Spirit."

7. *Grace and Glory, or the Young Convert Instructed in the Doctrines of Grace, being a Sequel to the Gospel Fountain.* By JAMES WOOD, D.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. No. 821 Chestnut street; pp. 317, 16mo.

This volume is dedicated to the YOUTH OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, and the object of it is to instruct them in the doctrines of Predestination, Regeneration, Repentance, Adoption, &c. The form adopted is that of successive conversations between a father and his son, into which are introduced frequent and pertinent illustrations by anecdote. It appears to be a highly successful effort to do a very important thing.

8. *Lectures on the Epistles of Paul to the Thessalonians.* By JOHN LILLIE, D.D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Kingston, N. Y. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530, Broadway. 1860; 8vo. pp. 585.

This is a beautifully printed volume, doing as much credit to the publishers, by its mechanical execution, as to the author by its critical skill and learning. We have been familiar with Dr. Lillie's New Translation of the Epistles to the Thessalonians ever since its publication, and regard it as a work of very great value. The Lectures before us, though popular in their character, are the results of severe study, and show on every page the ripe scholar and the sound divine. They are written in a style of great elegance, energy and vivacity. They never weary the reader, and even where they fail to convince, they never fail to instruct. The Doctor is a Millenarian, but his views are not chargeable with the extravagance which, we are sorry

to say, has characterized other disciples of that school, both in this country and in Europe. We commend the book to the attention of our readers.

9. *The Divine-Human in the Scriptures.* By TAYLOR LEWIS, Union College. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 530, Broadway. 1860; 12mo. pp. 400.

This book is too important a contribution to Theology to be dismissed with a short notice. It discusses a subject of fundamental importance, one that may be called *the* question of our age. The plenary inspiration of the Scriptures is essential to the certainty of faith. They were written by men—they proceed from God, and the conflicting theories have arisen from the effort to adjust the relations of the Divine and the human in their composition. Mr. Lewis's work impresses us as of one of rare ability. He is an accomplished scholar, and any thing but a superficial thinker. We have not yet read the entire volume, but if we may judge from the parts that we have read, we are induced to think that it is very far superior to any other work with which we are acquainted on the same subject. We may recur to it again.

10. *Lectures on the Book of Revelation.* By Rev. C. M. BUTLER, D.D., Rector of Trinity Church, Washington, D. C. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860; 12mo. pp. 482.

Another beautiful volume from the press of the Carters. These are popular Lectures which we are able to do nothing more than advertise.

We also advertise, by the same publisher, *The Power of Jesus Christ to Save unto the Uttermost.* By the Rev. A. J. CAMPBELL, Melrose; 24mo, pp. 329. The title is attractive, and that is all that we know of the work.

11. *The Historical Books of the Holy Scriptures: Judges, Ruth, I. and II, Samuel, I. and II. Kings, I. and II. Chronicles, Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther. With a Critical and Explanatory Commentary.* By the Rev. Robert Jamieson, D.D., Minister of St. Paul's Parish, Glasgow, Scotland. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien. 1860.

A continuation of the Commentary mentioned in our last issue. The former volume was on the Pentateuch and Joshua. This completes the Historical Books. A brief running comment is what the reader most needs in the rapid perusal of the Scriptures in the common version. This is here found, in a form involving little expense, though printed in a type which is quite too small.

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12. *Benoni, or the Triumph of Christianity over Judaism.* By the Rev. Dr. BAETH, author of "Poor Henry," etc. From the German. Philadelphia: Board of Publication. pp. 127, 18mo.

A story which describes the cruelties of the Inquisition, and the prejudices of the Jew—the hero being a son of Abraham, who dies at last believing in Jesus.

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13. *Annie Leslie, or the Little Orphan.* pp. 107, 18mo.
14. *Arthur Singleton, or What Lack I yet?* By the author of "Broken Cisterns." pp. 249, 18mo.
15. *Calvinism Vindicated.* By THOMAS M. HARRIS, Ruling Elder in the Glenville Church, Va. pp. 36.
16. *The Lord's Day, and the Laborer's Right to its Rest.* By the Rev. W. M. BLACKBURN, Erie, Pa. pp. 44.
17. *Sunday Laws, or Shall the Sabbath be Protected.* pp. 67.

The two first of these little books are pleasant additions to

the Juvenile literature published by our Board. The three last are in pamphlet or tract form, and are called out by the controversies of the times. Those on the Lord's Day and Sunday Laws, are aimed against those doctrines adverse to the observance of a Sabbath, so rife in the cities of the North, to which our foreign emigration, especially from Germany, has given new vigor.

18. *Catalogues of the Princeton, Allegheny, Union, Columbia, Danville, and North-Western Theological Seminaries.*

These annuals give us a very encouraging idea of the prosperity of all these institutions, and of the increased number of Theological Students in the Presbyterian Church. Princeton has 175 Students, 4 Professors, and a Library of 14,847 volumes; Allegheny, 140 Students, 4 Professors, and a Library of 10,000 volumes; Union, 4 Professors, 36 Students, and an Assistant in the Biblical Department, and 4,000 volumes; Columbia, 58 Students, 4 Professors, a Hebrew Tutor, and one Professorship, the Perkins Professorship of Science in its connection with Revealed Religion, not yet filled, and 17,549 volumes in its Library; Danville, 52 Students, 4 Professors, Library not reported. Of the North-Western Seminary, at Chicago, we have seen no Catalogue, but learn that it has in this, its first year, 23 Students. Its Professors are 4 in number.

The Students in the first five Institutions are from the following States: From New Hampshire, 3; Vermont, 1; Massachusetts, 5; Connecticut, 3; New York, 52; New Jersey, 26; Pennsylvania, 127; Ohio, 48; Indiana, 17; Illinois, 8; Michigan, 2; Wisconsin, 4; Iowa, 3; Kansas, 2. The whole number from the Northern States, including the 23 in the North-Western Seminary, 324.

The Southern Students are: From Delaware, 1; Maryland, 11; District of Columbia, 1; Virginia, 38; North Carolina, 14; South Carolina, 22; Georgia, 5; Alabama, 6; Florida,

1; Mississippi, 7; Tennessee, 12; Kentucky, 21; Missouri, 11; Louisiana, 5; Arkansas, 1; Texas, 1; Creek Nation, 1. Total from the Southern States, 158.

The Northern and North-Western States contain nearly two-thirds of the Old School Presbyterian Church, a little more than one-third being in the South. This Northern portion has one Student in the Seminaries above mentioned for every 546 Church members. The Southern portion has one Student for every 585 white communicants. The rising Ministry is nearly as numerous in proportion to the white membership as in the North and North-West, a result which we are happy to have ascertained by a comparison of these Catalogues. Perhaps if the relative numbers studying privately were ascertained, the equality would be perfect. The number of young men from the Old School Church of the South, in the several Seminaries in 1854, was 97. In six years there has been an increase of 60 Students. This is a matter of special thankfulness, while yet there are many Churches throughout these States clamoring for Pastors, and the laborers are too few for the plenteous harvest.

Of the Colleges, Jefferson furnishes the Seminaries with 81 of her Graduates, 63 of them to Allegheny; Nassau Hall 55, 49 of them to Princeton; Centre College 27, 25 of whom are at Danville; Lafayette 21, 17 of whom are at Princeton; Hanover, Ind., 17; Washington, Va., 13; Miami University, 14; Union, 14; Oglethorpe, 11; Davidson, 9. Virginia has one Student in the Seminary to every 379 communicants; Louisiana 1 to every 424; Kentucky 1 to 558; Tennessee 1 to 591; South Carolina 1 to 594; Missouri 1 to 630; Mississippi 1 to 753; Maryland 1 to 762; Alabama 1 to 1,107; Georgia 1 to 1,163; Arkansas 1 to 1,451; Texas 1 to 1,784.

ARTICLE VIII.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

I. AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEWS.—CONTENTS.

- I. *Theological and Literary Journal*, January, 1860. Article I. Dr. Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought. II. Notes on Scripture—Matthew xxiii.—xxiv. III. Christ's Promises, in the Epistles to the Churches, to those who are Victorious. IV. The Indo-Syrian Church. V. Designation and Exposition of Isaiah, Chapters xlix., l. and li. VI. The Book of Judges. VII. Mr. Hequembourg's Plan of Creation.
- II. *Princeton Review*, January, 1860. Article I. Inductive and Deductive Politics. II. The Physio-Philosophy of Oken. III. Classification and Mutual Relation of the Mental Faculties. IV. The Text of Jeremiah. V. Primeval Period of Sacred History. VI. Dorner's Christology. VII. What is Christianity? Short Notices. Literary Intelligence.
- III. *Quarterly Review of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South*, January, 1860. Article I. Masson's Life of Milton. II. Dr. Alexander's Theory of Conscience. III. The Philosophy of the Conditioned. IV. Evangelism. V. The Classic Localities of our Land. VI. German Theology. VII. Brief Reviews.
- IV. *Methodist Quarterly Review*, January, 1860. Article I. The Moral Argument for Immortality; by Rev. E. Thomson, D.D., President Ohio Wes. Univ., Delaware, O. II. Jabez Bunting; by R. A. West, Esq., New York. III. Results of West India Emancipation [First Article]; by Rev. Henry Bleby, Wesleyan Missionary in Barbadoes. IV. Our Lord's Sermon on the Mount; by Rev. W. Nast, D.D., Cincinnati, Ohio. V. Buddhism [Second Article]; by Rev. Heman M. Johnson, D.D., Dickinson College, Carlisle, Pa. VI. Mysticism. VII. Exposition of Isaiah lii., 13–liii.; by Professor J. W. Lindsay, Wesleyan University, Middletown, Conn. VIII. Rome vs. Liberty; by Charles Nordhoff, Esq., New York. IX. Methodism: Suggestions Appropriate to its Present Condition; by Abel Stevens, LL.D., New York. X. Religious Intelligence. XI. Synopsis of the Quarterlies. XII. Quarterly Book-Table.
- V. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, January, 1860: Andover. Article I. The Religious Life and Opinions of John Milton; by Rev. A. D. Barber, Williston, Vt. II. Church Theology and Free Inquiry in the Twelfth Century; by Rev. Seth Sweetser, D.D., Worcester, Mass. III. Limits of Religious Thought Adjusted; by Rev. L. [P. Hickok, D.D., Union College. IV. The Twofold Life of Jesus Christ; by Rev. J. T. Tucker, Holliston, Mass. V. Objections from Reason against the Endless Punishment of the Wicked; by Clement Long, D.D., Professor at Dartmouth College. VI. Hymnology. VII. Editorial Correspondence. VIII. Notices of New Publications.
- VI. *Evangelical Review*, January, 1860. Article I. The Ministerial Office; by Professor D. Worley, A. M., Columbus, Ohio. II. The Shekinah; by Rev. T. T. Titus, A. M., Cabinet, Pa. III. Israel under the Second Great Monarchy; by Rev. R. Hill, A. M., Hagerstown, Md. IV. Baptism of Children, etc.; by S. S. Schmucker, D.D., Professor of Christian Theology in the Theological Seminary, Gettysburg, Pa. V. Does John, 3: 5, refer to Baptism? by E. W. Krummacher. VI. Exposition of Matthew xi.: 12; by A. H. Lochman, D.D., York, Pa. VII. English Lutheran Hymn Books. VIII. Baccalaureate Address. IX. Reminiscences of Lutheran Clergymen. X. The Defence of Stephen. XI. Notices of New Publications.
- VII. *Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, January, 1860. Article I. "Old and New School" Theology. II. Schleiermacher; translated from the German of Profes-

- sor G. Baur, in the *Studien und Kritiken*. III. Justice, as satisfied by the Atonement. IV. Archbishop Tillotson. V. Presbyteries in Foreign Lands. VI. Notices of New Books.
- VIII. *United Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, January, 1860. Article I. The Bible on the Social Relations; by Rev. J. T. Cooper, D.D. II. Review of Letters on Psalmody; by Rev. John T. Pressly, D.D. III. Bible Revision; by Rev. David M'Dill, D.D. IV. The Ancient Church; by Rev. James Harper, A. M. V. The Early Scotch and Scotch-Irish of Pennsylvania; by Rev. George C. Arnold, A.M. VI. The Sabbath Question; by Rev. James Grier, A.M. VII. The United Presbyterian Church; by David R. Kerr. VIII. Short Notices.
- IX. *Mercersburg Review*, January, 1860. Article I. Sketches of a Traveller from Greece, Constantinople, Asia Minor, Syria and Palestine—4. History of the Modern Greek Language and Popular Poetry; by Prof. A. L. Koepfen. II. Churchliness; by Rev. T. G. Apple. III. The Church and Charitable Institutions; by Rev. J. H. A. Bomberger, D.D. IV. The Festival of Adonis; by Prof. Wm. N. Nevin. V. The American Student in Germany; by Prof. N. Porter, D.D. VI. Synodical Church Authority; by Rev. Henry Harbaugh. VII. Cantata Domino; by Rev. E. V. Gerhart, D.D. VIII. Recent Publications.
- X. *The New Englander*, February, 1860. Article I. Mr. Tennyson and the Idyls of King Arthur; by George B. Bacon, Esq. II. American Legislation; by Hon. Wm. Strong. III. Denominational Colleges; by President J. M. Sturtevant. IV. The Reopening of the African Slave Trade; by Rev. William De Loss Love. V. Professor Lewis's New Work, "The Divine-Human in the Scriptures"; by Prof. Martin. VI. The Minister's Wooing—From the Dr. Dryasdust Point of View; by Rev. Leonard Bacon, D.D. VII. Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics; by Prof. William A. Larned. VIII. Prof. Huntington's New Volume of Sermons; by Rev. W. I. Budington, D.D. IX. Notices of Books.
- XI. *The Southern Episcopalian*, March, 1860: Edited by Rev. C. P. Gadsden and Rev. J. H. Elliott. Miscellaneous. Poetry. Editorial and Critical. Religious Intelligence. Obituary Notices.
- XII. *Historical Magazine*, March, 1860. General Department. Societies and their Proceedings. Notes and Queries. Obituary. Notes on Books. Historical and Literary Intelligence.
- XIII. *De Bow's Review*, March, 1860. Article I. The Issues of 1860; by Python. II. James Russell Lowell and his Writings; by A Citizen of Alabama, author of "Longfellow and his Writings." III. Squatter Sovereignty; by Hon. A. F. Hopkins, of Mobile, Ala. IV. Love of Danger and Love of War; by Geo. Fitzhugh, of Virginia. V. Mobile—Its Past and its Present; by Prof. Stueckrath. VI. Emfranchisement of Southern Commerce; by D. H. London, of Virginia. VII. Minnesota—Her Progress and her Bright Future; by Gov. Ramsay. VIII. Usury Laws; by an Alabamian. Department of Commerce. Department of Manufactures and Mining. Department of Internal Improvements. Department of Agriculture. Department of Miscellany. Editorial Miscellany.
- XIV. *The Home Circle*, March, 1860: Nashville, Tenn. General Articles. Poetry. Editorial Department.

II. BRITISH PERIODICALS.

- I. *London Quarterly Review*, January, 1860. 1. The Three Colonies of Australia. 2. Cotton Spinning Machines and their Inventors. 3. China and the War. 4. The Roman Wall. 5. Religious Revivals. 6. Life and Works of Cowper. 7. Reform Schemes.
- II. *Westminster Review*, January, 1860. Article 1. Government Contracts. 2. The Realities of Paris. 3. Ceylon. 4. The Social Organism. 5. Sicily as it Was and Is. 6. Christian Revivals. 7. Italy: The Designs of Louis Napoleon. 8. Contemporary Literature.
- III. *North British Review*, February, 1860. 1. Salon Life—Madame Récamier. 2. Coast Defences and Rifle Corps. 3. Erasmus as a Satirist. 4. The Science of

- Scripture. 5. Austria. 6. Form and Colour. 7. Wesleyan Methodism. 8. Ceylon and the Singhalese. 9. Professor George Wilson. 10. Fossil Footprints. 11. Recent Publications.
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ARTICLE I.

THE WESTMINSTER REVIEW ON "CHRISTIAN REVIVALS."

The maxim of the wise man, that "there is nothing new under the sun," that, "that which hath been is that which shall be," seems to meet its verification in nothing more clearly than in the ever-recurring cycles of opinion. To a philosophic mind, observing the course of human history, nothing seems more clear than that certain forms of opinion held by men in all recorded ages, are continually disappearing, and being re-produced. As the occasions which give rise to these forms of opinion become more fully developed, and their advocates become overborne by counter testimony or argument, the peculiar phase then assumed by these opinions vanishes and is held in abeyance for a time. But as the world rolls on, and the restless activity of human thought evolves new theories, or new combinations of old theories, the exploded sophism is re-constructed, and made to figure on the arena of discussion, until it is again consigned to its temporary obscurity. As an illus-

tration of the foregoing, we mention the opinion, which is found to have made its appearance in successive periods of all time past, and which is in high career at the present day, viz: that the Christian religion, as understood and embraced by its most devout advocates, is a system of mere fanaticism. Even in those early ages of the true Church, whose bond of love, and whose basis of existence was the faith in a coming Saviour, this religion was so regarded by the infidel scoffers of the antediluvian world. The one unvarying aspect which fixes identity upon this opinion in the midst of all its Protean forms of successive development, is the opposition of the rational religion to the religion of the inner spirit. The mere outer vestment varies, but the body abides permanent. The root and origin of it is thoroughly understood from the inspired teachings of Paul: "the carnal mind is enmity against God." It is this which has been operating since the Fall, to array the intellect of man against a system of Divine doctrine which seeks to bring into captivity all the man, in his threefold capacity, body, soul and spirit. The latent innate depravity of man finds a congenial theatre for the full gratification of its hostility to God, in the cultivation of an intellectual religion instead of that which takes hold of the heart. In this system there is sometimes a formal acknowledgment of God, and sometimes even that is withheld. But whatsoever the endlessly varied forms it may present, the contest is one that never ceases between the rational and the true spiritual system of religion. Nor must we be understood to admit, that in the true idea of Christianity, reason is not concerned. On the contrary, it is distinctly maintained that the religion of Christ is as well adapted to man's reason as to his heart; that its conquest over the man is an entire and absolute conquest, and that its rule in man is as cordially welcome to the intellect as to the feelings. Let those who will distinguish between the "theology of the intellect and the theology of the feel-

ings"; but as for us, who belong to the old school, there is no theology of the one which is not for the other as well. If it be a true theology, whatever in it is addressed to the intellect is no less calculated to affect the feelings, and that which brings the feelings into subjection equally commends itself to the intellect. Nevertheless, this is the ground which the enemies of a true and simple faith have ever assumed; that there is a legitimate and "irrepressible conflict" between the religion of reason and the religion of the heart; that the former is the true elevating and refining system, which will prevail as *knowledge* advances, while the last is the religion of the weak and ignorant—the emotional and unintellectual.

The foregoing thoughts have been excited, and their expression has been elicited, by the perusal of an article in the "Westminster Review," which, purporting to be a notice of no less than fourteen different works, more or less touching upon the subject of the various phenomena of religious excitement, is, in reality, a skilfully masked infidel attack upon the spiritual religion of the Bible. Christianity is not now for the first time to acknowledge her obligations to this periodical for notices of her progress, and for comments upon the outer developments of her inner life, which have been to the last degree unfriendly. This is the Review in whose pages it was not long since set forth, that the Missions of the Christian Church had all proved a failure; and now we are presented with an article of like import, to prove that what are known as Christian Revivals, have always been, and are specially, in their more recent manifestation, a failure; or at any rate, that so far as being a genuine work of renewal upon the soul, they are spurious, and utterly undeserving the interest of any well educated mind. No occasion is allowed by this Quarterly to slip, which may be used to wage war upon religion, the religion of Christ. In the conduct of the war, means are unscrupulously adopted which would be regarded as utterly un-

warranted in any honorable contest. In this case, however, it is regarded as legitimate to bring everything available to bear upon the great enterprise of overthrowing the religion of Christ. It is not the less reprehensible in these Reviewers that they fight in disguise. Professedly, the writer on Revivals seems to advocate some religion—to have some respect for the Bible—but pleads for “a process of simplification” in the interpretation of the Sacred Word, and hopes and believes that “the labors of Biblical criticism will have to be extended, and their results diffused before the genuine ore of Christ’s teaching can be wholly separated from the dross of superstition and Scriptural corruptions with which it is still combined.” What this author’s ideas are, in regard to the superstition and Scriptural corruptions which he says are still combined with the pure ore of Christ’s teaching, will appear not only from a careful perusal of his article, but from the assumptions with which he sets out. With an air of oracular authority he speaks of “the doctrine of eternal punishment,” “the theory of a sacrificial atonement,” “the authority of the Old Testament, and by consequence, the doctrine of the fall of man, and the obligation of Sabbath observance,” as “spurious accretions of Christianity,” now rejected and repudiated by “distinguished Biblical scholars,” and therefore no longer to be considered as articles of a pure faith. He even goes so far as to say that the latter part of the sixteenth chapter of the gospel by Mark, (viz: “he that believeth shall be saved, he that believeth not shall be damned,”) is believed by competent judges to form no part of the original text.

One expression of this writer gives us a clue to his real sentiment. He says :

“The poor and illiterate have neither the time nor the power, adequately to examine the history and doctrinal developments of Christianity for themselves. In treating of Christian revivals, therefore, which are confined almost exclusively to these classes, we are

not concerned with the ideal Christianity of philosophers and scholars, but with the actual Christianity as commonly professed and practised by the great body of the Christian world."

As to what he means by "the ideal Christianity of philosophers and scholars," we confess ourselves somewhat in doubt. If the word is used by him here in its occasional acceptation, then it means no Christianity at all. But it is rather to be gathered from the drift and tenor of his article that he means a form of Christianity which rises free and unfettered above the trammels of the Bible, as the great body of the Christian world interprets it. And we think that his closing paragraphs will sufficiently manifest this to be his meaning:

"Equally remote from lazy inaction and morbid excitement is that equable and harmonious exertion of intellect and feeling, which, being entirely compatible with a healthily sustained activity, best exemplifies the true practical religion and the true happiness of man. Ever striving to advance from point to point, he is never satisfied except when, conjecturing new excellencies and discoveries from the vantage-ground of prior attainment, he feels conscious of rising higher and higher in the scale, devising new means to accomplish new ends. His faculties, utterly disproportioned to merely supplying material wants, are infinite in their range; his reason pursues knowledge with self-sacrificing enthusiasm, far beyond the seeming limits of utilitarian advantage, while his imagination and feelings are equally disinterested and boundless. Moreover, that vital essence of our personality—our freedom—without which we should be the helpless sport of nature's mechanism, with no rational motive to exercise our thoughts, and nothing that we could truly call our own, though necessarily limited as it is, is yet susceptible of indefinite extension; for, consisting not of lawless caprice, but of intelligent submission to known conditions, its essence is knowledge—knowledge ever tending to become wider and more perfect. Instinctively felt, and inherent in the very nature of man, the object of an obscure faith, long before it became a philosophical conviction, the idea of human progress and perfectibility may now be said to be the recognized assurance of the scientific intellect; that which was once only a bright reversion in the skies, or a transcendental ideal in the oracles of the priests and the fantastic representations of the poets, has now been practically realized, and eloquently proclaimed by the best and wisest of mankind. And this progress and perfectibility are not restricted to the domain of intellect, but extend to our moral nature, which, when freed from the withering influence of terror, by which it has ever been

oppressed, will assert its inherent dignity and beauty, and its own sufficiency, as the impelling motive of heroic action, as well as an adequate security for the constant presence of justice and generosity in the ordinary transactions of daily life. Under the guidance of the cultivated intellect, each moral action will register itself by a corresponding increase of the moral nature, which, organically enlarged and strengthened, will dominate existence and render moral conduct so habitual as to become seemingly instinctive and necessary; and thus by a spiritual discipline, the rules of which are inscribed alike in our intellectual and moral being by the Supreme Law-Giver himself, we shall be best prepared to enter, without

‘the dread of something after death—
The undiscovered country, from whose bourne
No traveller returns.’”

It is not difficult to discover from this extract, collated with the assumptions of the introduction, what the religious system of this writer is. And the long extract has been given in order that it might be presented in his own words, and that all may judge for themselves as to its essential nature. That there is any Christianity about it, no one can for a moment believe, who understands what is the plain Bible teaching as to that system. For Christianity, as is obvious from the very word, is a system whereof Christ, the Lord, is the sum and substance. His Incarnate life is the record, his words and works are the subject, his doctrines and injunctions give life and energy to the whole. Take these away, then, and what of Christianity is left? Is there one solitary element of the system to be found after it has been subjected to this process of chemico-philosophical analysis? Not one. He begins by speaking approvingly of the lopping away from the teachings of Christ the doctrine of eternal punishment, and of sacrificial atonement, and the repudiation of the old Testament Scriptures, and consequently the fall of man and of Sabbath observance, and he ends by a burst of enthusiasm as regards the true practical religion and happiness of man, making it to consist in the cultivation of the intellect and the enlargement of the moral nature, both of which he obviously considers the unaided work of the man himself, with a com-

plimentary and very slight allusion to the Supreme Law-Giver, who originally inscribed the rules by which man works upon his intellectual and moral nature, and then (as we are to infer) left them to do their work, just as a clock runs its appointed time after having been wound up.

In examining this article, we shall not content ourselves with merely combatting the general position that "*Christian Revivals*" are, as a system, a failure, which is the drift of the author's whole work, but we mean, first of all, to set in their proper light some matters to which he has incidentally alluded as settled principles. We shall hope to be successful in showing that they are not settled as he would have them. The coolness with which he makes assertions as to vital points of Christian doctrine would be startling to one whose faith in these doctrines had always been simple and unquestioning. But we are not now to learn for the first time that it is part of the professional duty of the partizan, who is seeking victory and not truth, to assume as true everything that may promote the interest of his party. This is true in politics, and it is true in Infidelity. We cannot account for the absurdity of certain of this writer's dogmatic declarations, save upon the principle that he is ignorant whereof he affirms, or that he is designedly misrepresenting the truth. If we could feel that he is in the former category, why, then we should charitably go to work and attempt his enlightenment; but as we cannot believe that he is thus an innocent offender, we shall not engage in this discussion in any such hopeless task. In what we may write, therefore, we shall set our utmost limit of hope and expectation to the accomplishment of an humble defence of the truth against a most insidious attack, and a definition of our true position in reference to what constitutes a Christian Revival. We call attention to the following paragraph:

"Simultaneously with the growth of Protestantism, numberless spurious accretions of Christianity, suggested by human folly or duplicity, have been lopped off, and many alledged interpolations and excrescences still clung to by the people as essential parts of the faith, are now rejected by distinguished Biblical scholars."

As this "lopping off" and "rejection" took place "simultaneously with the growth of Protestantism," we might infer that his meaning is that the traditions and superstitions of Rome are now rejected. And to this we have no objection in particular, as a matter of fact. But when, without making the smallest distinction between these things, and some of the doctrines which evangelical Protestants regard as vital to the faith of Christianity, he proceeds to specify the doctrine of "eternal punishment" as discarded by the Rev. F. D. Maurice, late Professor of Theology at King's College; "the theory of sacrificial atonement" repudiated by the Rev. Prof. Jewett, of Oxford; "the authority of the Old Testament, and consequently the doctrine of the fall of man, and Sabbath observance rejected by Rev. Baden Powell; Scripture inspiration renounced by Rev. J. McNaught; and doctrinal religion generally renounced by the Bishop of Hereford," we can no longer doubt that he considers both Popish accretions and Protestant (or rather Bible) essentials alike as specimens of an extinct system, and fossils of a theological period now fast undergoing the burying process by a superincumbent mass of truth. And yet, it seems, according to this writer, the work is not yet done to full satisfaction, as the pure ore of Christ's teaching is not yet wholly separated from superstition and corruption.

In reply to this array of sweeping authority against us, we might ask the question: who are the Rev. Messrs. Maurice, Jewett, Powell, McNaught, and even His Grace, of Hereford, that they should assume, or that their friends in their behalf should assume, that they are to instruct the whole Christian world that it has been, lo! these 1860 years, laboring under a most pernicious superstition and

corruption in believing that the race of man fell in Adam, or that Christ once offered himself a sacrifice to satisfy Divine justice, or that the Old Testament is obsolete in authority, and that the Sabbath is not of perpetual obligation; and, in one sweeping dash, that there is no such thing as an authoritative doctrinal Religion? Who, we repeat the question, are these men? What are the credentials which they can exhibit to overthrow the long-established sway of evangelical opinion, as set forth by the accepted theological teachers of the past and present?

But we call no man master in our creed, and in regard to truth, we make our appeal evermore to the law and to the testimony. And the only point we wish to make in alluding to these remarkable declarations, is to deny that these great truths are in the smallest degree lopped off, rejected or repudiated by the Christian Church. They stand as pillars of the theological temple in every Church on the face of the earth deserving the name of Church of Christ. Not a ray of their heavenly light has been obscured or distorted by any false medium in any one of these Churches. The genuine Baptists, the Methodists in all their divisions, the evangelical Episcopalians, the thirty-five great members of the Presbyterian family, all incorporate these articles in their creed, and their action as Churches, their prayers, their preaching, all set forth, or have inseparably intertwined with them, the great truths which this writer seems so complacently to regard as dead inanities, or corrupt accretions to the true faith. And as to the progressive work of simplification in Biblical criticism, to the results of which he looks forward so hopefully, we may add, that never, at any time in the history of the Church, has the attachment to these great doctrines been so deep and pervading in the hearts of these children of God—in the hearts of the spiritual guides of the people, the authorized teachers of the sacred Word, as well as in the hearts of the people of God themselves, as now. And there is but one

voice heard through all the courts of God's earthly Temple on this subject, and that calls for the Bible, the old Bible, in its ancient purity and unglossed simplicity. We may not stop to demonstrate this truth, and time and space would fail to give the words of the various Confessions of Faith of all these godly companies of the Lord's people, which in their several forms set forth the doctrines here in question. Let it suffice to make the declaration, and to refer to the record which is accessible to the curious who may need confirmation. It is almost a shame for us to trouble the readers of this Review with so many pages of denial of these absurd statements. And the only need for the labor arises from the fact, that its readers are not confined to the class of profound theologians, but that it falls under the eye of many who are not as well versed in the mysteries of infidel strategy and the sources of Christian defence.

This writer is apparently earnest and emphatic on one subject, to which we will now give some attention, and that is, the superhuman difficulties to be overcome by the man who would become "a real Puritan Christian." He divides these difficulties into—1st, Those which arise from the moral precepts of the Bible; 2d, Those which are connected with the doctrines it teaches; and, 3d, Those which present themselves to "the man of secular education, or the student of physical nature," who observes the discrepancy between the facts of the Bible and the facts of science. He states a general preliminary truth in language ingeniously and skilfully selected, and calculated to convey the impression that he entertains a very solemn and deep conviction of Divine truth. Yet, while it may command the respect and ready assent of the superficial reader, the enlightened reason of the intelligent Christian finds in it only the covert announcement of the writer's unbelief in the truth of the matters which he enumerates as difficulties, and the vehicle for the presentation of a mere

sophism. For example: "If the myriads of mankind constituting Christendom really believe that the soul is immortal; that eternal happiness or eternal misery will be allotted to every human being; that the fate of each is dependent on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment on earth of certain prescribed conditions, and that all are in danger of everlasting hell-fire, who have not obtained the assurance of salvation, vouchsafed by the 'Holy Spirit,' it is obvious that no man, woman, or child, ought to rest night or day, so long as that assurance is withheld." And then he quotes from Mr. Angell James, a sentence which is very true in the sense of that good man, and meets a cordial assent from every Christian, but which he quotes to show that the difficulties of coming up to such a standard are super-human, and, as a matter of course, with him, insurmountable. Now, there is in the extract above quoted a considerable amount of truth, accompanying *a sophism*. For, while the great doctrines which he links together here are fully believed and adopted by every one of the many thousands of God's children, and theoretically embraced by many thousands more in Christendom, the fact is, that no one believes the punishment of an eternal hell impends over all who have not attained "*the assurance of this salvation.*" But, in point of fact, what do we find the practical operation of the more solemn truths of the Christian system to be, upon the minds and lives of men? Take for example the great subject of death. Do we not all of us believe that we shall die; that death will end this scene of preparation, and introduce us to the changeless retributions of Eternity? Is there any subject involving in it more tremendous interests to every man, woman and child of the race than this? And yet we do not find that it creates spasmodic excitement, and prevents men from resting day or night. Even Christians, who come as nearly to a realization of the terrible solemnities of death as any other class of men, are not always operated upon by it as this wri-

ter seems to think would naturally be expected if they "really believed, instead of believing that they believed," it to be true. Is it true that men cannot realize eternal truth, in its bearing upon and connection with time, without being thrown into violent mental convulsions, unfitting them for any practical use in this world? Is this the purpose of God's revelation to us? Away with the infidel insinuation! For it is perfectly within the compass of any mind to acquire such a habit of realizing these solemn truths, as to be sensible of their never-ceasing operations upon all the thoughts, words and works; running like golden threads through the whole web of life, ever present, everywhere and at all times supremely influential, and yet to be in a calm, equable, uniform frame, faithfully, usefully and cheerfully discharging the duties of life, without any extraordinary outward manifestations. And if this writer does not know this to be true, it is high time he should examine into the true nature of the religion of Christ, as displayed in the lives of men who, while required and exhorted to be "fervent in spirit, serving the Lord," are expected to be no less "diligent in business," not fanatical and useless. But does it follow from this that men do not believe the doctrines? Not so. These Christians who do not rest "night and day" while this assurance is withheld, are as firmly convinced of the truth of the doctrines as the most enthusiastic devotee can be. They act, too, under the influence of these doctrines, by bringing their whole lives and actions under the constant power of a settled and fixed belief that they must give account to God for their earthly career—they live as those who must stand before the judgment seat of Christ. But, then, we are here surrounded by a thousand circumstances which imperiously demand our attention, and to which the Bible itself requires us to attend, and beings who are imperfect in their faculties cannot devote themselves to more things than one at a time. While, therefore, Christians do and must live

under the abiding influence of these great doctrines, so fearful as this writer regards them, still, they need not be evermore in a state of excitement. The truth is, a religion, such as he seems to think ought legitimately to result from a belief in so horrible a creed, would be a wild fanaticism, as unlike to the true effects of the Christian religion as the torrent of the mountain swollen by a flood to the gentleness and purity of a perennial stream, quietly gliding along through meadows green, and fertilized by its living influence.

There are three classes of men, according to this article, who find it difficult, or rather impossible, to become Christian in what he is pleased to call a puritan sense. There is "the worlding, and the man who follows only the guidance of his intellect, and the man of science;" to these he declares that "the achievement of the strict Bible Christian may indeed seem impossible." And why? First, Because he who, "taking the whole New Testament as an infallible guide, would really follow Christ, must completely crush the natural man." He must, in a sense absolute and unqualified, "renounce the world," although it is "the place of his birth, the home of his affections, the sphere of his activity, and possibly of his ambition and glory." He must believe, literally, that "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven." He must, if he have great possessions, literally and in every case "sell all that he has on earth, giving the proceeds to the poor." And so he goes on, recklessly making mere assertions, and laying down terms of discipleship never recognized by Christ, and stating difficulties that have no existence save in his own brain, and engendered there by the union of a depraved heart and a darkened understanding.

But let us look at the difficulties to be encountered by the man who takes his intellect as his guide. And here we may sum up in brief the long list he presents, by saying

that he enumerates all the elements of doctrine which are implied in the scheme of God's dispensation of grace, beginning with the Fall of man, by which he incurred God's curse even to his remotest posterity, and ending with the work of Christ, a belief and trust in which inures to the everlasting bliss of the true believer, and a rejection of which results in the loss of the soul forever. He then declares that the man who follows only the guidance of his intellect, finds that the trial the intellect has to pass through before it becomes sufficiently humble to realize the Christian faith, is so tremendous that it "may indeed seem impossible." Well, the Saviour himself declares that if a man bring to the study of his word the pride of his intellect, unsubdued by the spirit of grace, these doctrines will be to him as they were "to the Jews—a stumbling-block," and as they were "to the Greeks—foolishness." But there is no impossibility in their reception whatever, provided the seeker comes with the docile humility of a little child. And deeply mysterious and unintelligible as they may seem to the proud understanding of the unrenewed man, whensoever, by the power of the Divine Spirit, he is brought to yield to the teachings of the word of God, there is an illumination shed through the soul, that enables him to see the "glory that gilds the sacred page," and which satisfies him that the Bible is the work of Infinite Wisdom and Love. He can never see this, however, until, by the convicting and converting power of God's Spirit, he feels a personal interest in these doctrines; how, as a descendant of Adam he is a sinner condemned, and impotent to secure his own salvation, and how, while God's righteous Government demands the execution of the sinner, yet His mercy, displayed in the gift of His Son, upholds the honor of that Government and saves the soul of the sinner that trusts in Him.

But the difficulties which are to be encountered by the two classes just mentioned "are far from being the whole,

and men who have received a good secular education, or who are students of physical science, find these difficulties increase enormously, both in number and intensity, in proportion to the extent of their knowledge." And here we cannot forbear, to remark that the manner in which this topic is introduced is indicative of one of two things on the part of the writer. Either he is ignorant of the present state of the discussion which has been going on for many years on the question of discrepancy between the Sacred Record and the facts of physical science; or, being fully aware that these have all been fully, and fairly, and triumphantly met by the ablest and most candid Biblical scholars, he still, with a persistent and inveterate obstinacy, disregards this fact, and proceeds with the enumeration of all these difficulties, just as though they had never been brought to notice and answered by any previous writer, or if they have, that they still remain unmoved in all their original formidable sternness of truth. How often have we heard that astronomical science was fatally at war with the Bible simplicity of expression, in regard to the "rising and setting of the sun," and other heavenly bodies? How often shall it be necessary to repeat the simple and satisfactory answer to this cavil? Does even this writer need to be told that the Bible was never intended to be a text-book of science, beginning with minute definitions, enunciating leading principles, and proceeding by close reasoning in their demonstration, and carefully using only such forms of expression as would be in strict accordance with established scientific terminology? Nay, indeed, may we not ask, if he is not unjust and partial in such censure of Bible usage, while all the world knows full well that even men of science, in their oral communications, as well as in their written treatises, (especially those designed for popular instruction,) adopt the same style of expression themselves? And we beg to know, after all, what connection can be traced between those parts of the Bible narrative which speak of the

phenomena of Nature incidentally, scientifically inaccurate as they may be, and the statement of the great truths of Divine revelation regarding man's lost estate, and the blessed scheme of Redemption ?

As it is not science that converts the soul and makes a man a Christian, let a man study the Bible for its ordained purpose, and the works of philosophers for their designed ends ; let him go to the Word of God to learn the way of salvation, just as he resorts to the text-books of science to learn their principles. And with as much justness might the student of astronomy complain that in the course of the discussion he should find an expression in regard to God's character and attributes, not strictly in accordance, with the fixed forms of theological science and Bible truth, as that the student of the Bible should find fault with an occasional expression in the narrative parts of the Sacred Volume not quite according to the rules of science. And as such a theological blunder in a scientific work would never detract from the value of a treatise otherwise correct and philosophical, why not allow the same rule to apply to the same state of things in the Bible ?

When a certain splendid painting of Apelles was subjected to the criticism of spectators, and when its beauty and excellence was the theme of universal laudation, there chanced to be among the examiners a shoe-maker, whose practised eye detected the deficiency of a single string in the shoe of the figure, which to his low and vulgar taste constituted a fatal defect in this work of art, and may have been to him ample proof of the ignorance and incompetency of the great painter. But others, better trained and more refined, might have readily awarded to this picture the meed of faultless excellence as a specimen of the artist's skill and genius, even though the shoe might have lacked a string. And this classic story furnishes us with another illustration of the presumption of these self-appointed censors of the Bible style. For when the shoe-

maker, emboldened by his success in detecting one failure in Appelles, proceeded to discuss other points of the picture, which were not in the category of the art of St. Crispin, he only shared the fate of the worthy magistrate of Messina, and instead of detracting from the glory of the artist, he only immortalized his own presumptuousness as the unconscious original of the ancient proverbial caution, —“*ne sutor ultra crepidam.*” The criticism of the shoemaker did not bring into discredit the skill of Apelles, nor detract from his glory as the greatest painter of his age. Nor have the carping, cavilling censures of these infidels dimmed one ray of glory that rests upon the word of God, nor thrown one barrier in the way of the humble, devout and earnest seeker after a solution of the great problem, “How shall man be just with God?”

Hitherto in this discussion we have, merely for argument's sake, allowed that the Bible in its expressions is inaccurate, somewhat in the same sense that a work of science may be, and as they often are in regard to sciences incidentally alluded to, not connected with themselves. But we must not fail to bear in mind the fact that there is an immeasurable difference between the usage as it occurs in the respective volumes of God and man. It is an unmerited concession which we have here indicated, when we suppose a possibility of inaccuracy in the divinely inspired Word. There is not the slightest analogy between the alleged inaccuracy of the Bible and the blunders of which many scientific men are guilty, when in a treatise on one science they undertake to speak of another. For, while the God of all wisdom, in wonderful condescension to the race of man, purposely so expresses himself as to be intelligible to the humblest capacity, the human author, in failing to present correctly a principle foreign to his subject, does so through ignorance. We may add that if God had chosen to inspire Moses, and the rest of the “Holy men of old, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost,”

with a knowledge of all the sciences of astronomy, physics, geology, etc., and had He caused them to express themselves at all times precisely as strict scientific accuracy demands, then we can see very readily how difficulties would have arisen in the way of the "untutored peasant," which might have rendered it well-nigh impossible for him to accept the Bible as the word of God. As the matter stands now, there is difficulty to no one. When the ignorant read, they are not startled by learned statements in regard to natural phenomena which seem at war with facts as they appear to them, and so they find no obstacle barring them from entering into the special province over which the Bible presides, the revelation of the way of salvation, where all is clear and unambiguous, and wherein "the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err." When the man of learning and science reads, he has no more right to make a difficulty out of these expressions as found in the word of God, than he has to found upon them a charge of ignorance against his brother savans, who use the same expressions, though they are inaccurate. And we will not so degrade his intellectual capacity, or his common sense and intelligence as to believe he is ignorant of this fact. And what, then, after all, does it amount to? A miserable quibble, utterly unworthy of a truly philosophical critic. The poverty of the resources of this Reviewer is manifested in the very fact that in order to make out a point against the System of Divine Truth, he has found himself compelled to resort to an objection which has been so long exploded that even professional infidels lay no stress upon it in the management of their argument against the Word of God.

But it is sometimes of advantage to the cause of truth to be simple in explanation, and patient in repetition of old, familiar arguments, even at the risk of causing the learned reader to say "I am learning nothing very fast." And so, for the benefit of all concerned, we venture to say to this

writer, who finds that in the case of the "untutored peasant," the only way to account for his ready reception of the Word of God is by attributing it to his ignorance, that we give two reasons, either of which will be more satisfactory to the candid and sincere.

1. One reason for his facility of credence is, we hesitate not to say that not once in a thousand cases does a plain, ingenuous mind ever think of such things as subjects of the slightest reflection. They do not constitute to him objects of either faith or unbelief. He is not reading the Bible with a view to such subjects. He reads it to learn the dealings of God with the race of man; to find out the facts of man's history and the story of his fall, the revelation of God's will in reference to the destiny of man, the statement of the way of salvation, how God can "be just, and yet justify the sinner that believeth;" in short, he reads the Bible for what it proposes to teach, and the points which, in this writer's estimation, would constitute difficulties if he were not so ignorant, are regarded by him as matters of the merest indifference; he does not *doubt* about them, simply because they do not seem to him to have anything to do, either one way or the other, with the great matters of spiritual interest, about which it is the special province of the Bible to give instruction, and about which he is himself most anxiously concerned.

2. But suppose one of these "untutored peasants" should be found who has had the questionable advantage of hearing that these are very strange blunders made by the sacred writers, and by no means reconcilable with the accepted facts of science. There is not a doubt but that, when they are proposed as difficulties to a mind of ordinary strength, unless it be hopelessly predisposed to cavil, the reader will seize at once upon a satisfactory solution of the difficulties, either by referring them to the category of non-essentials, by the very force of his own reflections, or, on a suggestion of these difficulties to a competent instructor, he

will see the perfect propriety and naturalness of the ordinary mode of explanation, by referring the alleged inaccuracies of expression to the necessity of adopting language in accordance with universal usage, even where it does not comport with exact scientific style, and by humbly referring the statement of a miraculous event to the power of God, though to believe it is to do violence to all scientific principles in regard to the laws of Nature.

And it is to be noted that this writer is unfair in another point, in his mode of discussion. For he sets out with arraying before us the contradiction of scientific facts which characterize the Bible phraseology, and before he gets through, we find him including in the list matters purely miraculous. What right has he to take for granted that the miracle of the sun standing still at the command of Joshua, and "hasting not to go down about a whole day," is inadmissible because it is inconsistent with "those wondrous physical laws by which the positions, movements, and order of the bodies constituting the solar system are maintained." We behold in this occurrence, not a violation of the laws of Nature, but a manifestation of the Supreme control of those laws which belong to the God of Nature. If we admit that there is such a Being, surely we must accord to Him the power of controlling Nature, for any reason which to him may seem sufficient. We make a very wide distinction between this, which is a miracle, and the various forms of expression which popular usage requires should be adopted in alluding to natural phenomena. The language used to state the former, we accept as literally true, while the latter is well understood as conventional language, which is not used through ignorance, nor with any intention to deceive, nor does it, in point of fact, ever deceive any one who reads it.

Just so he is guilty of unfairness in intimating that because the rainbow is the result of the laws of refraction and decomposition of light, therefore it is an effort of

credulity to look upon it as "set in the clouds *for the first time* when the waters had subsided." Does the Bible make any such statement as this? Not at all! The words "*for the first time*" are wholly a gratuitous addition to the words of the Sacred Narrative, and this writer should have been careful how he presumed to add words in this way, which have the effect of entirely changing the meaning of the Sacred Text. If he had no reverence for God's Word, he ought to have had more regard for common honesty than to have distorted the intent of the passage so as to deceive. His design is to discredit the narrative, by making it say what it does not say, and then to show that what he makes it state is impossible to be believed, because it is contrary to optics—that is, as refraction and decomposition of light must have produced the same effects from the very beginning of creation, there must have been rainbows always, and, therefore, it could not be true, as he makes the Bible say, that this was the first rainbow that ever was seen, which God makes the token of his covenant with Noah.

We may now attempt somewhat in the same way to dispose of his intimated difficulties about geology, which, though no difficulties to the "untutored peasant," on account of his ignorance, he means to insist upon as real difficulties if the poor fellow only knew it. In the first place, he pays no regard to the matter, as it is not what he is after. In the second place, the facts of geology are not inconsistent with the facts of the Bible, or with its doctrines either. What if it be true that the earth has been the theatre of organization "sixty million years"—the Bible says nothing to the contrary. Because the purpose of its revelation was to narrate the history of human organization, and God's will concerning man, therefore, there was not needed any allusion to any previous organization. And geology does not discover traces of man of higher antiquity than is represented in the Bible. And while there may have been catastrophes of the extinction of life in many previous

organizations, and thus death may have taken place before Adam sinned, yet this is no inconsistency with what the Bible states; since it is only concerned with death as the result of sin upon a race which but for sin would have been immortal. The Bible does not say that there had been no previous instance of the death of other animals; but only that there never had been any human death until sin brought about this awful event.

This learned critic, further, in no doubtful way, charges that the Bible cannot be plenary inspired, because the word "Redeemer" has been substituted for the true word, "Avenger," in the translation of Job's words, "I know that my Redeemer liveth." He, no doubt, thinks that if it were truthfully and verbally rendered "I know that my Avenger liveth," it would be rejected by the devout believer, on the ground that it would change the meaning of the Patriarch's confession. But we rather shrewdly suspect that he is not so well versed in Biblical criticism as he would have us believe, or he would have known that the same great Being who is regarded by the devout believer as his Redeemer, is also represented as his Avenger, and that it matters not at all whether this passage be rendered in the one form or the other; Job doubtless referred to the blessed God-man, who not only redeems His people from the curse and bondage of the Law, from Sin and Satan, but avenges them on all their enemies, accusers and persecutors, especially their spiritual foes. And he ought to know, if he does not, that the translation he advocates, understood in a Bible sense, differs very slightly from that to which he objects; "Avenger," in this connection, being nearly the same as "Redeemer." The Hebrew word גֹּאֵל (goel,) as all Hebrew scholars know, is primarily used of next kinsman, whose office it was to redeem, by a price paid, the sold or mortgaged estate of his deceased kinsman, (Lev. xxv: 25;) and to revenge his death, (Num. 35: 12;) and thus the passage, read either way, is appropriate to Job's

condition, as Satan had been emphatically his accuser and his enemy, and, therefore, it would have been very natural for him to look forward to the Saviour as his avenger. This view is further strengthened by the passage, "And shall not God *avenge* His own elect, who cry day and night unto Him? *I tell you He will avenge* them speedily," etc.

And the "untutored peasant" would find just as little difficulty in the certainty that the passage quoted about the three witnesses, was an interpolation, as he does in his happy ignorance. For he could be told by almost any intelligent friend, two things that would satisfy his mind: 1st, That the Christian world lays no stress on the passage, because they are very ready to admit that there may be a preponderance of evidence against its genuineness; and, 2d, The doctrine of the Trinity, which the passage is regarded as so triumphantly proving, can very well afford to dispense with this part of the proof, as the Bible abounds with "irresistible evidence in other undisputed passages," to establish the doctrine.

And so, also, if he should have his ignorance enlightened by some *benevolent infidel*, who should call his attention to the fact that the genealogy of Christ was traced "through his reputed father, Joseph, up to David, in order that a prophecy might be fulfilled, although he was born of a virgin," any trouble that might distress him in this, would just as readily be removed by the plain statement of the mode of reconciling the apparent discrepancy, which is received as satisfactory by the Christian world, viz: That the prophecy was fulfilled in the fact of Christ's descent from David "through Joseph, his legal father, and through Mary, his real mother"—the first "by law in the royal line of kings," and the second "by direct personal descent," and it was equally as truly fulfilled in His miraculous conception in the womb of a virgin, by "the power of the Highest." So that these illustrations do not prove a single point in favor of the conclusion to which this writer brings

us, that "the less a man knows of the history of the Bible, and the less critically he studies its pages, the more unhesitating may become his faith in it as a supernaturally communicated, and wholly infallible book." We have shown, on the contrary, that though an "untutored peasant" might be shaken for the moment from his simple faith by having skeptical doubts officiously awakened in his mind, the more critically even he studies the Bible, by the aid of others, the more likely is he to be brought round again to his original position, and to have his first convictions confirmed and established. And there is far more hope of such a case, than there is of one who has yielded himself up to the superficial system of infidelity, adopting all its cant slang and thread-bare objections, and who will not allow the Bible and its friends to be heard in defence. We agree with him, that the plain, unlettered reader of the Blessed Volume will embrace, with unquestioning assent, all it teaches, and be arrested by no difficulties, either scientific or critical; but while this may be true, we mean to have it understood that there need be no difficulties in the way of any one, however much he may know of the Bible history, or however critically he may have studied its pages.

With respect to those few scientific difficulties which are selected as representatives of that "vast number of other kinds which embarrass the student of nature when he strives to harmonize the teachings of Science with those of Revelation," we say again, that this writer makes an entirely false issue. He assumes that a man's "Christian duty" requires him to believe what it *does not* require him to believe at all, and we demand of him where he finds the requirement laid down? In what portion of God's word is any man required to believe "that the earth is immovable; that the sun, moon, and stars were created to revolve around it as ministering orbs, giving it light, and dividing the night from the day, and that the starry dome above us is a solid firmament, dividing the waters above it from those

below"? Whenever we read a passage in the Bible, we are bound to interpret it as the manifest design of God, the Holy Spirit, in its revelation, requires we should interpret it, and this design allows, nay, requires, us to have regard, in our interpretation of it, to all our previous knowledge. For example, when we read that God appointed the sun and moon to give light to the earth, as if the earth were the central body of the system, and that these bodies rise and set, our previous knowledge is to be present with us, and therefore we know how to interpret it aright, notwithstanding that some of the words are used in compliance with popular usage. And our Christian duty does not require us to believe what contradicts the clearest principles of science. Besides, we need not find difficulty (if we understand the original languages of Scripture) in the idea of "the starry dome being a solid firmament, dividing the waters above it from those below," since it will appear, from a critical examination of the Sacred Text, that the "English translators, by following the '*firmamentum*' of the Vulgate, which is a translation of *στερωμα* of the Septuagint, have deprived this passage (Gen. i. : 6) of all sense and meaning. The Hebrew word רָקִיעַ (rakeeâ), from רָקַע (rakâ), to spread out, as the curtains of a tent or pavilion, simply signifies an expanse, or space, and consequently that circumambient space or expansion separating the clouds which are in the higher regions of it from the seas, etc., which are below it." (Clarke.)

But that a man's Christian duty does require him to believe the statement of Joshua's arrest of the sun and moon, and that "the shadow went backward ten degrees on the dial of Ahaz," is based upon different grounds, because these are narratives of miracles performed by God. And while there may be many methods of explaining these occurrences, in accordance with philosophical principles, that may seem to be plausible and satisfactory to others, we, for our part, are content to understand both as genuine miracles,

the result of the direct interposition of Divine Power—that in the case of the miracle of Joshua, the sun was caused, *not to stand still*, but to withhold his influence from the earth, so that *it* stood still, and thus the light of day was prolonged until Joshua had time to avenge himself on his enemies; and that in the case of the dial of Ahaz, there was an actual retrogression of the shadow. But by what means it was effected we do not know, nor is it necessary to know. It is sufficient to know that each case offered a suitable occasion for the interference of God, and that He made use of no more power than was needful to produce the result. Joshua required a protraction of the light of day to enable him to pursue his enemies and cut them off before they should be protected from pursuit by the darkness of night, and thus have time to rally and recover, and give battle again. Hezekiah would not have been satisfied with any thing but a miracle to re-assure him, so he chose to have it go backward instead of forward, as this appeared to him to be the more difficult sign to be displayed, and more worthy of the power of God. As to the silence of the Egyptian astronomers about the miracles of Joshua, that proves nothing, as we have proof from writers both heathen and others, that there is no certain history or monument in heathen authors, of any thing done before the historic period of Greece, and the best chronology makes that more than a thousand years after Joshua's time, and all before that is regarded, both by learned heathen and Christian writers, as uncertain, unknown or obscure time. But let us refer the reader to what President Edwards has suggested (*Hist. Redemp.* p. 194), which any man's "Christian duty" may *allow* him to believe:

"With respect to the miracle wrought by Joshua, we beg leave to add, there is no necessity from the text to suppose any real effect wrought on the bodies of the sun or moon, nor perhaps of the earth itself; the most natural interpretation seems to be, that the light of the sun, and perhaps also of the moon, blended with it, was miraculously protracted, not, it may be, on the whole hemisphere, but from Gibeon to Ajalon, and on the adjacent country."

And the reason why history records no such event as the retrogression of the dial, etc., is no doubt owing to the fact that it was merely local, and involved no such derangement of the solar system as would have been extensively observed through the world. In proof of its being local, we have the indirect evidence of the Prince of Babylon sending to inquire respecting "the wonder that had been *done in the land.*"

The scientific man, we repeat, can find no more difficulty or mystery in "the incarnation and crucifixion of Christ, as the only means of redeeming the human race from eternal punishment," than any other man. It is, "without controversy, a great mystery of godliness;" confessedly so. It is so accepted by the whole Christian world, and yet such is its entire consistency and accordance with the character and glory of God, and its adaptedness to the exigencies of the human race, that its mystery is not once to be thought of as a difficulty in its reception as a true and blessed revelation of God's gracious design to save the lost race. It is hardly required of us to add what is among the simplest elements of theological truth, that a revelation without mystery would carry with it no evidence of a divine original. If it be, therefore, a mystery to the geologist, his consolation is that it is so to others as well. And it is a mystery, not because one man's intellect is less vigorous than another's, but it is so by the very necessity of the case—*per se*, because it is one of the "secret things that belong unto the Lord our God." And yet what a precious, blessed mystery has it proved to thousands of the race of man, including astronomers, geologists, and the "untutored peasant," who is too ignorant to see difficulties. Our author finally excuses himself, and relieves us of the further examination of these scientific difficulties, by assuring us that "the few instances given, may amply suffice to show that the secular knowledge [of scientific men] and their Christian faith being in an inverse ratio, Christian revivals among

such men never occur." It will not escape the notice of the observant reader, that this is another instance of this writer's skill in sophistry. For he here states, what perhaps no one would ever deny, that revivals never occur among scientific men as a class. And he might have gone further, and added that revivals never occur among any set of men as a class. We never hear of revivals among politicians as a class—is that owing to their secular knowledge? But he cannot say that the influence of a revival of religion never extends to a scientific man, or to a man whose secular knowledge is large and extensive. If he should undertake to assume such a position, it can easily be refuted by cases within our own experience.

But his true position is not this. Indeed, it might be much easier to maintain that statement, than the point which he evidently aims at, and to which all this array of dogmatical assertions, about the difficulties of becoming a Bible Christian, has been merely introductory, viz: That no scientific man, no man who has a good secular education, no man who takes his intellect for his guide, can be a Bible Christian. This is his meaning when the fog which he has raised so ingeniously around the subject is all cleared away. Having this in his own mind, he cunningly confounds the becoming a Bible Christian, with the influence of what he understands by Christian revivals. Never was there a more glaring illustration of the charge which is often brought against sophistical disputants, that they manufacture a set of premises and then prove their points, by drawing what are, from them, legitimate conclusions, than the whole course of discussion in reference to revivals. It is, from the beginning to the end, an utter misapprehension, or a wicked misrepresentation of the whole subject.

He gives as "a condition of the first importance in order to effect sudden conversions—*ignorance*." Now here, again, if he means one thing, we agree with him in a certain sense, but if he means another, we have nothing in common with

him. If he means by sudden conversion, an enthusiastic, and a fanatical profession of religion, made amid confusion and noise, and with no adequate conception of the infinite importance of the subject, then it may be, as a general rule, true that more ignorant persons are thus brought to a certain form of religious profession, than any other class. But if we are to understand by the term *conversion*, the real work of the Spirit upon the heart, then we say that the inference that "ignorance is a prime requisite" to such conversions, is wholly inadmissible, and we deny his statement that such an "inference is justified by experience." Not an instance to which he refers shows that it is true. What if the first disciples of Jesus were "notoriously unlearned and ignorant men, and their preaching not a result of artificial eloquence and learning?" Does not this writer know that their ignorance and want of training in the schools of human science, were infinitely more than compensated by the personal teachings of the Incarnate Son of God for three years? And yet it is not true that they were all ignorant men. Luke was an accomplished professional man, and his style is highly polished and scholarly. Paul, the Apostle, was brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, a finished scholar in all the wealth of Rabbinical learning, and an adept in the lore of Greece and Rome. And the remarkable fact is, that the most sudden conversion among them all, was that of this chiefest among the Apostles, possessed of more learning than all the rest. It is plain, then, that in the very cases he cites, his inference is shown to be illegitimate, and the truth is just this, that conversion does not depend upon the fact of either a man's ignorance, or his knowledge of the wisdom of this world, and God, to prove this, converted the ignorant fisherman, the learned physician, and the accomplished scholar, and that by the power of the Holy Spirit, "that the excellency of the power might be of God, and not of men." We cannot follow this train of argument through all the dark alleys of distortion and misrep-

resentation used by this writer. For he seems not to make the slightest discrimination between the first pure and holy developments of the Christian Church, and the corruptions of Rome. What possible connection has "the anchorite of the Egyptian desert, and the pillar-saint of Syria," their wretched souls darkened by the oppressive midnight of horrid superstition, with the pure and spiritual operation of Christianity? How—in what possible sense—can they be regarded as representatives of the influence of true religion? In no sense at all. By the time these miserable spectacles were standing like dismal figures on the historic panorama of the world, there had swept over the landscape of Church history a dreary winter, and nowhere could a true manifestation of the heavenly influence of the religion of Christ be witnessed, save among the caves and dens of the Alps, whither the Waldenses had been driven by the rod of persecution. Thither had this writer turned his thoughts, he might have found the true representative of Christianity. And if "the monastic orders were recruited from the ranks of the poor and uneducated;" if "the Christian sect of flagellants, or Brethren of the Cross, which extended over Europe in the fourteenth century," did consist "chiefly of persons of the lower class," this has nothing to do with the subject whatever, as these orders and sects are no more representatives of pure Christianity, than are dervishes or Brahmins. It is the height of ignorance, or of persistent and wilful distortion of this whole subject, therefore, that we should find here confounded in the same paragraph the extravagant superstitions of monks and hermits, with the accepted principles of our religion, which determine us "not to know any thing save Christ and him crucified," and which makes faith all in all.

We refuse, also, to go off with this writer in his eccentric digressions into the amount of intellect and learning among the Methodists, save only to remark how transparent in his double purpose to account for their zeal in reli-

gion on the score of their ignorance, and to salve over this insult by granting that there have been found among them "intellectual freemen, men of genius, of whom the nation is proud." But his argument has wholly failed to prove that ignorance is necessary to conversion, even in the instances cited by himself, for while the labors of Whitefield and Wesley may have resulted in the conversion of thousands of the heathen masses of England sunk in the deepest ignorance (yet not by any means wholly confined to such), we still are met with the stubborn fact, that these men themselves, who were the agents of the conversion of these thousands, were men of "good secular education," and had distinguished themselves by their scholastic attainments when they became converted;—how account for this? Besides, they numbered many among their converts who were among the better and more enlightened classes, and of the highest rank. We encounter, however, one admission on the part of this writer, to which he was forced, viz: that in the revival which has been enjoyed in the United States recently, a larger proportion of the middle and respectable classes was found than usually distinguishes such movements. And as this contradicts his assumption, he proceeds to account for it by referring it to the commercial panic and distress that prevailed simultaneously with this state of religious awakening. Now, it seems to us that this is a total abandonment of the point in hand, for, although he sets out by saying that ignorance is an essential condition to these revivals, he now, after being forced to admit that other classes besides the ignorant were brought under their influence, finds that commercial distress will answer as well as ignorance as an auxiliary. He, however, endeavors to rescue his argument from this difficulty by having recourse to his usual expedient, viz: sophism. For, says he, "How few of the two hundred and fifty thousand who obtained forgiveness for their debts of sin, were of the really educated class, may be conjectured from the exultation with which the small number of cases

adducible of conversion from heresy and infidelity is dwelt on." In the first place, we need not conclude that these cases of heretics and infidels necessarily come from the more educated class. It by no means follows, that a man is highly educated because he is an infidel or a heretic. Indeed, it has been clearly demonstrated by writers on this subject, that the greatest reason why men are infidel in their views, is that they are ignorant of the great truths which they profess to disbelieve. And again, if exultation was manifested on their conversion, it was not because the conquest by the Spirit of God had been gained over the minds of educated men, but over the hearts of those who were so deeply depraved as to deny the Divine origin of the Christian faith. Instead of ignorance, then, being a condition of prime importance in sudden conversions, we prefer to believe, and we think that it can be easily established, that ignorance is the mother of infidelity! And it is a plain case, that the instances enumerated of converted Unitarians and Infidels were narrated with special interest, and dwelt upon with delight, by the Christian writers who took note of the facts, not because they were triumphs of God's grace over cultivated intellects and bold thinkers, but because they had been "*infidel* lawyers," "*infidel* editors," and "hardened *infidels*, seventy-two years of age," and "Socinian ladies, entangled in the ensnaring fallacy of Unitarianism." Let us not lose sight of this fact, that it is not a conditional proposition he lays down, about ignorance being a prime requisite in sudden conversions, but it is a broad and universally applicable statement, that, in order to effect these conversions, "a condition of the first importance is ignorance." That is, the conversions reported as occurring in Christian revivals are only found among the poor and uneducated classes. Consequently, we hold him to this form of his own proposition, nor must he be permitted to deviate from it at all without suffering the consequence of giving up his ground. What, then, are we to

think of a man who, having set out to prove that ignorant people are the only subjects of these revivals, is found making this statement, that the revival in Ireland is *confined chiefly* to this class? "Chiefly" implies not altogether. Well, then, it is admitted by him that they are not *all* ignorant, and if so, how can he say that it is a condition of the first importance that these converts should be ignorant? The fact that one individual of good education is a well attested case of conversion, overthrows his reasoning, and he must go to work and weave some other sophism into his argument in order to account for this exceptional case.

We understand it well enough, and can explain it, if the writer and his friends could only understand and appreciate our explanation. But there are none so blind as those who will not see. The whole matter is simply this: the religion of the blessed Saviour is wisely and graciously adapted to all classes and conditions of men—the wise and the simple, the learned and the ignorant, the man who takes his intellect for his guide, and the untutored peasant, and the man of science—all are alike capable of being impressed by its Divine power. And while we readily admit that among the poor and uneducated class many of its subjects are found, we claim it as the testimony of experience and of history, that the Cross of Jesus Christ has numbered among its conquests some of the brightest ornaments of the scientific world, and some of the greatest lights of the various professions. We have no difficulty in understanding the modified form of his statement, that revivals are *chiefly* confined to the ignorant, for it is true, as here implied, that others besides this class were converted, as is always the case.

His second "condition for effecting a revival, next in importance to that of ignorance, is, that all the members of the Church shall enjoy complete freedom from doctrinal and disciplinal restraint, in order that the laity may coöp-

erate in the religious services, by preaching, mutual exhortation, telling how the Lord has dealt with them, and combining in fervent and long-continued prayer for the salvation of souls." In other words, "the coöperation of the laity and continuous public prayer," constitute the second consideration. But it is not true, as is thus intimated, that these revivals owe their origin to lay coöperation and public prayer, as something extraordinary, and up to the time of their "*getting up*," altogether unknown. The history of the great American Revival of 1858-'59 proves that this writer knows not whereof he affirms. That there was coöperation between the laity and the clergy is true. But it was in the prayer-meeting—the noon prayer-meeting only—a social gathering of Christians for the purpose of prayer and mutual conference, that this coöperation was found to exist. The pulpits were never occupied by any but the regular Pastors, and other duly accredited Ministers invited by the Pastors of the several Churches. And there is no authentic account of ignorant laymen taking upon themselves to perform public service in the Churches. And yet we have had a revival—a glorious revival—and it is still in progress, exhibiting none of the distinctive marks of ignorance and fanaticism which this writer insinuates, throughout his whole article, constitute the chief elements of Christian Revivals.

But let us examine "the third condition which is to be observed in order to effect revivals." He says it is "*that the intellect be rendered inactive, the imagination and emotions being excited, and that the sentiment of fear be especially addressed, and powerfully wrought upon.*" We make one general remark in reply to this assertion, and that is, that while this condition may, and undoubtedly does, result in producing intense excitement, not only on the subject of religion, but on any subject, we deny that it will account for what we understand by a true and genuine revival of religion. Having made this issue with him, so as to leave

no ground for doubt as to the real position we occupy, we wish to notice some of his preliminary remarks, before we proceed to the discussion of the subject. We shall in the sequel be able to show that the whole matter of Christian Revivals has been, either through ignorance or malice, misrepresented. He obviously means to show that, the tremendous effects which were produced by the Apostles in the preaching of the early times, were mainly attributable to the power of fear, arising from two causes, viz: "the unfaltering belief in the doctrine of future punishment," and the belief "that the great drama of the last judgment was near at hand." Now, it is surely competent to ask why this first cause had never produced the same effects on the Jewish nation, when the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments had constituted a prominent point in their system of religious belief during all their previous history? The early Christians did not believe it any more confidently than the devout men of Israel had believed it always under the Old Testament revelation, which is full of this doctrine. But the greater power exerted over the primitive Christian Church, arose not so much from fear excited by this doctrine, as from the fact that this, and all the other great truths of God's revelation, were now set forth in a manner more clear, and in a point of view less encumbered with ceremonial observances, and consequently more simply spiritual. It was illustriously demonstrated to them, that these great principles derived their force and influence from their more immediate connection with the power of an endless life. The temporal and tangible realities of the ancient Theocracy had the tendency to obscure and hold in abeyance the more spiritual aspects of the Divine Government. But now there had been ushered in, with mighty signs and wonders, the Kingdom of Heaven, which its great King announced to be "not of this world," to consist "not of meat and drink, but in righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost."

It was this new spiritual view given to the system of Divine truth, especially accompanied by the personal presence of the Messiah, which invested all the doctrines of the word of God with an interest such as never before had been thrown around them. It was the operation of a principle which is well known among men, that a close contact of things, in themselves important and interesting, gives to many men, for the time, a more vivid impression of their reality.

As to the other assigned cause, viz: "the belief that the last judgment was near at hand," it is wonderful that any one who has read the New Testament with any care, can make assertions so reckless. What proof is there in any part of Paul's writings to show that "he was fully persuaded that Christ would, during his life-time, reappear in his glory to reward his saints, and to pronounce the final doom of the wicked"? Manifestly, none whatever. The passage quoted, "the time is short," is but a solemn admonition of the shortness and uncertainty of life in those perilous times. And so far from Paul's being under any such belief, does not this writer know that he makes it a matter of most earnest exhortation to the church at Thessalonica, (II. Thess., ch. ii., 1-4 vs.) that they should not suffer their minds to be shaken by the false teachings of some among them, "that the day of the Lord was at hand"? And would Paul guard them against this belief, and give them reasons why it could not be true, if he himself were so "fully persuaded" of it?

Then comes another instance of his confounding Romish falsehoods with the principles and practices of the Evangelical Church. What have we, as the friends of true revivals, to do with purgatory, and priestly influence, and indulgences? The belief in these monstrous superstitions may "prevent the fears of faithful Catholics from rising to the revival point," just as they prevent the mass of them from knowing any thing whatever in regard to true spiritual

godliness. But what about protestants? How is it that the belief in future punishment, which is universally held by all of this class, seems in the main so utterly inoperative, and that revivals, which he says originate from this cause, are only occasional? According to his showing, this awful belief, which addresses itself to the fears of men who do believe it, ought uniformly to produce revivals; but this is, in point of fact, not true. We know what he has said about this, that men "only believe that they believe" this doctrine, that they do not really believe it. Now, does not this wear the appearance of child's play, to say in one breath that this belief produces revivals, and then in another to say that the very subjects of the revivals do not believe it?

It is not difficult for us to account for the fact that men who theoretically believe such tremendous doctrines spend their lives in comparative peace. It is owing to that other principle, which this writer discards—*native depravity*—and which the Scriptures designate as "blindness of mind," preventing men from apprehending these solemn truths, because their minds are occupied with the things of time and sense. Nor will they see them until the scales are made to fall from their eyes by the power of the Divine Spirit, who is the agent in all true conversion.

When he says that "the more preachers preach to the reason of their hearers, the less frequently are they convinced of sin," if he means addressing the reason with the truths of the Gospel, he takes ground where we can meet him with a denial based on experience. For this is the kind of preaching which alone will ever convince of sin, under the blessing of the Spirit. But if he means that those scenes of excitement which are so common under the name of revivals, are not to be effected by such preaching, then we have no objection to this statement. We believe, indeed, that one reason why those spurious movements are so frequent, is that the sound, faithful preaching of the

Gospel has fallen into such desuetude in certain quarters, and among certain classes of preachers and hearers. The cases illustrative of the violent effects of terror in producing religious convictions, are all inapplicable to the true and Scriptural work of conversion. And if we should admit that among other emotions excited in certain individuals, fear is one, and that violent bodily exercises also characterize some religious excitements, we must accompany all this by two remarks. 1. These fears and consequent bodily exercises are not essential elements of a true revival at all, but only accidental accompaniments, dependent on physical organization in the first instance, and propagated by that mysterious principle—sympathy. 2. The decision as to the spuriousness or genuineness of the work is not, and never has been, dependent on these things, but on the character of the means used to produce conviction and conversion, combined with the results in each case, tried subsequently by the test of time and experience. Perhaps there never was a more clear illustration of the nature and effects of these bodily exercises, in connection with the march of the glorious and genuine work of the Spirit, than is found in the great revivals of 1739, and onwards, which took place in New England, New Jersey and Virginia. In these revivals we have an opportunity of drawing a clear discrimination between the true and the false. From the records of these revivals, gathered up from the letters of Jonathan Edwards, the Tennents, and others concerned in them, and presented in historic form in the valuable work of Dr. Hodge, (*Hist. of the Presbyterian Ch., part ii., chap. iv.*) and accompanied by comments and reflections of great importance and interest, we attain a very clear and satisfactory view of this whole subject. We see that there can be no difficulty in referring to their true source the extravagances of bodily agitation which occurred. They were then, and they always are, referable to natural causes. They arise from any cause that will

affect the nervous system. Persons of a nervous temperament are most liable to them. They affect *ignorant* people more than any other class. They originate in seasons of general excitement. These affections are just as common under one sort of excitement as another. They are not peculiar to revivals of religion. They are found prevalent only among fanatics—no matter what may be the occasion of the fanaticism—and are not an infallible proof of God's presence. They are propagated by a kind of infection among those who witness them. They are cured by removing the exciting causes, or in addressing the subjects so as to produce "fear, shame, or a sense of duty." It never can be proved that these bodily exercises are produced *only* by "genuine religious feeling." The proper method of distinguishing between these effects of terror on nervous temperaments and the effects of religious feeling, is to consider what departments of the mind are affected. If we find that it is the imagination that is excited, then we may at once decide that these exercises do not proceed from "Divine illumination." But if we find that the "moral emotions" are affected, we may attribute the effects to the influence of God's Spirit. And the incontrovertible proof of this is, that "No such results are recorded as arising from the preaching of Christ or the Apostles." Now, these being facts admitted by the sound and judicious Christian historian, as well as by the contemporary ministers who mingled in these revivals, it will be seen at once that there is on this point no room for debate. We all agree, with this writer, that "natural causes are sufficient" to account for all the extraordinary bodily affections accompanying the great revivals in 1740-'45, and in the beginning of the present century, as well as those which are reported in connection with the Irish revival of 1859. He calls them "alleged miracles." We reply, that no judicious Christian ever regarded them as miracles. To be sure, Whitefield regarded them as the tokens of God's

presence, but Whitefield, we all know, was greatly swayed by his fervent and glowing imagination, and was not always a safe guide; and, being a transient visitor to these scenes, and not a permanent Pastor, had no opportunity of testing them by time. Besides, the Tennents and their contemporaries discountenanced these things. Jonathan Edwards, though at first much disposed to encourage these exercises, as evidences of the direct presence of the Spirit, was led subsequently to change his views entirely, and disapproved of them as earnestly as any one else. All that we have read in regard to "epilepsy, mania and dancing, the jerks, etc.," although connected with the revivals, is to be understood as forming no component part of a genuine work of the Spirit in a revival. But in the account given of these scenes, just bear in mind that they were the effects of nervous agitation in the first instances, and these effects propagated by sympathy through vast multitudes assembled in the same place, and listening to animated and fervent preaching. And it has been well said, that Whitefield, with his unsurpassed powers as an orator, could have produced very much the same effects had he spoken as eloquently on almost any other subject of interest.

The difference between this writer and the advocates of a genuine work of Grace is, that he identifies these exercises with the revival as a necessary and indispensable part of it, while we hold that they are accompanying phenomena, having no necessary connection with such a work, but, on the contrary, oftentimes leading to results greatly to be lamented. We need not follow him, then, in his argument on this topic, as we have no defence to offer in behalf of these extravagances, nor do we claim them as part and parcel of the Spirit's work. We simply say that their connection with these revivals is only an illustration of the truth, sadly testified to by us all, that among imperfect human agents, sin and error is mixed with all the good they effect. Before we take leave of him, however, we

wish to correct some errors which he has committed in his statements, in so far as they relate to the recent religious revivals. Among these statements there may be some that are true, in regard to wild and fanatical works of confusion and disorder, but in the great American Revival of 1858-'59 and 1860, the occurrence of these irregularities formed the exception, and not the rule. The most perfect stillness and solemnity prevailed. The meetings which were most remarkable as revival meetings, were the *Noon Prayer-Meetings*, which, originating in New York, are still observed in a very large number of the principal towns and cities of the Union. So that in this case, at least, the promoters of revivals did not avail themselves of the psychological principle (to the honor of whose discovery this writer seems to be fairly entitled), that "during sunlight the perceptive faculties, and the reflective, which are dependent on them for data, are chiefly active; and that these, reposing during the night, permit the feelings to become most dominant," and hence, he adds, "the promoters of revivals wisely choose the night-time as the period most favorable for putting forth all their strength." On the contrary, they selected that period when the sunlight was at its greatest intensity—noon,—when "the perceptive and reflective faculties," according to him, were "chiefly active." They then "put forth all their strength," which consisted in very short, fervent, pointed prayers and talks, not exceeding five minutes in length, and this meeting to last just one hour. And in this Noon Prayer-Meeting the mighty influences were felt which resulted in these numerous conversions, giving to the whole movement the name of a Revival of Religion, wherein the power of the Divine Spirit was recognized as operating silently, yet most manifestly. Another misrepresentation worthy of notice is found in that portion of his article where he speaks of "the moral and social reforms which revivals induce." False premises here again furnish him an oppor-

tunity of claiming a victory. Assuming that one of the principles of the Christian system is "a renunciation of private property, by having all things in common," he presents this as one of "the practical difficulties of becoming a Christian," which "are quietly ignored in modern times." No doubt his design in this insinuation is to prove that revivals, or even conversions, in ordinary times, would never take place if this, which he calls "a Christian doctrine," were made prominent by the "promoters of revivals." The whole conception of this idea is utterly unfounded, preposterous and absurd. And it is truly marvellous, how he can have the face to say that Christ enjoins—at least indirectly—as a moral obligation on all His followers, "a community of goods." Did any one ever before quote the case of the rich young man, who came to Christ inquiring "what he must do to inherit Eternal Life," as an evidence of this fact? Every body else understands by it, that the Saviour meant to convince the young man of his besetting sin of avarice, and therefore required of him the surrender of the object of his idolatry as the only means of salvation,—an individual case, which is here made out as an injunction to be complied with by all. And what can be more absurd than the statement that the rich man was damned "for no sin but that he was rich"—i. e., that he would not divide out his wealth, and make it common property; and that Lazarus was saved for no reason "save that he was poor"? We ask any candid man to read the account of this case in the New Testament, and see if there is any such interpretation admissible. It would be unworthy of a serious reply, save that the insufferable irreverence, which this infidel writer manifests in this passage for the character of the Divine Redeemer, calls upon us to defend the true principles of His religion. The rich man had a multitude of other sins besides his wealth, and they were all, no doubt, aggravated and intensified by the very luxury in which his wealth permitted him to live.

And, to mention no other, there was the glaring one of a want of charity towards the miserable Lazarus at his gate, left to the compassion of dogs. As to what he says about Whitefield and Lady Huntingdon being slaveholders, even if it is true, we find in this fact no evidence "that revivalist fervor is by no means conducive to clearness of moral perception, and consequently to the highest moral conduct." Whitefield's owning fifty slaves, and bequeathing them to Lady Huntingdon at his death, may, on the contrary, be the result of the highest Christian philanthropy. His journal shows conclusively that the salvation of the slaves lay very near his heart, and the simple fact of his owning them, only gave him a more favorable opportunity of laboring for their souls, since thus no one save himself could control them, and prevent him from teaching them the way of salvation. And hence, very naturally, when he was about to leave them himself, his thoughts turned to "that lady elect, that Mother in Israel, that mirror of true and undefiled religion," Lady Huntingdon, as one who, having the means, would also use them to take care of those slaves. This writer, however, no doubt belongs to the Anti-Slavery Abolition party, who regard all slaveholders as unmitigated sinners, fit only to be punished with the fires of eternal wrath. We cannot, therefore, spend further time with him in arguing this point, as it would be all lost labor. The last matter of noticeable character in his article, is the qualified gratification he expresses at the moral changes produced by the Irish Revival. He admits, because he is obliged to do it, that "drinking, licentiousness, wife-beating, and numerous other crimes, have greatly diminished," etc., but after expressing his belief that these reforms will prove transient, he raises the question, whether the advantages thus derived are of sufficient value to counterbalance the evils, mental and physical, which revivals usually induce. He decides in favor of "religious fanaticism," rather than "blank apathetic ignorance," "if com-

pelled to the painful choice," because even "poor, well-meaning fanatics, who trust themselves to the flickering and ever-varying light of religious frenzy," may guide humanity "a little way out of the dark valley of *intellectual death*."

We, however, do not accept his expressions of gratification at the results he enumerates, as awakening within us the slightest sympathy. We should set aside all the whole system of revivals, if we could see in them nothing more than this writer sees, viz: "revival frenzies," working upon the ignorant, the superstitious and debased, to raise them, "at least one degree in the scale of *intellectual being*." It is because we see in them (and only when we do see in them) the power of the Divine Spirit, enlightening the understanding in the knowledge of the truth of God, and renewing their wills, and persuading and enabling them "to embrace Jesus Christ, freely offered to them in the Gospel," and thus by the influence of faith, uniting them to Christ, causing them to walk in newness of life, and to show an entire renovation of their principles of action in all the relations which they sustain to the world around them; it is for these causes that we rejoice in revivals, and bless God for them, and not because of the unexpected effect which he says is wrought by them, in elevating the lowest class *intellectually*. Religion does, it is true, improve, refine, and enlarge the intellect, but it does this by filling the soul with views of God, eternity, and everlasting life, and thus dissipating its native darkness and ignorance.

We wish to say, as we draw near the conclusion of this paper, that two things are quite clear to our minds, on a deliberate review of this article: 1. The writer is a bitter infidel, who has seized the occasion of the recent religious movement in America and Britain, to pour out all his venom on the Christian religion. Hence his artful array of authority to show that the Bible is obsolete; hence his enumeration of difficulties in the way of becoming a

Christian ; hence his dwelling so eagerly upon the extravagances attendant upon some of these revivals, and his spiteful malevolence and slanderous malignity exhibited towards the Lord Jesus Christ, and his most devoted and eminent followers. 2. He either has no adequate conception of a true revival, or designedly confounds it with fanaticism and superstitious zeal. We think that there is truth in both suppositions ; he is partly incapable of appreciating true revivals, and partly wilful in misrepresenting them.

It remains now only briefly to add our views as to what constitutes a genuine revival of religion—its nature and results—as distinguished from a spurious religious excitement. This need not occupy much time, as we have, in the progress of this discussion, already intimated the outline of our belief on this subject.

The word revival implies two things. 1. That there is a principle of life, which from some cause has become latent and dormant. 2. That this principle of life has by some powerful influence been roused again into energetic action. Now, applying these two principles to the Christian religion, it is found that they meet their illustration in its operation upon individual hearts, and thus through them upon the state of religion in communities. A Christian has within him a principle of spiritual life ; but, under the influence of worldly causes pressing upon him, the spark of vital godliness often becomes buried, and very slightly operative upon him.

But the Spirit of God moves upon him, and by a variety of means and secondary causes awakens his slumbering heart to new zeal, energy and activity in the cause of Christ. It may be affliction ; or it may be losses, crosses, or disappointments that arouse him ; or it may be the blessed ordinances of the sanctuary. But whatever it be, the result is a revival in his own soul. Again, a Christian community, a Church, having the undoubted possession of the true faith, has, under the influence of external circum

stances, yielded to the insidious suggestions of spiritual sloth, and a dearth of the fruits of the Spirit ensues, and a dreary desolation seems to have blighted the prospect. But God sends, in His providence, some agency—a fervent ministry, it may be, or a lay missionary, or a devout elder, and a few faithful praying people, who become the instruments of breaking the torpor, and the Church is revived, and sinners, in answer to prayer, and “by the foolishness of preaching,” are convicted and converted, and “multitudes are added to the Church of such as shall be saved.” That such awakenings should be accompanied by some spurious work is what might be anticipated from the fact that men, imperfect men, are the agents in conducting them. But, nevertheless, there need be no difficulty in discerning between the true and the false. We have a sure and infallible standard to which we may bring these revivals, and that is God’s Holy Word. By that they must stand or fall. “Sanctify them through thy truth—thy Word is truth.” All the results of a genuine revival must, therefore, correspond with those, which, in the Word of God are pointed out as the legitimate fruits of God’s truth. And in deciding this matter we must inquire,

1. What doctrines are taught in these revivals?
2. What is the experience of the subjects of these revivals?
3. What moral effects have succeeded?

1. As to the doctrines taught. These must be, in one comprehensive phrase—the doctrines of grace. Unless the preaching, under the influence of which any revival is enjoyed, be deeply imbued with these doctrines, “it may safely be pronounced a spurious revival.” No conversion may be trusted which is not effected by the Spirit of God, blessing the truth of God to the soul of the sinner. That comprehensive word, *truth*, is a sublime system revealed to us in God’s Word, and consists of the great doctrines of native depravity; the necessity of the new birth by the

Spirit, in order to the possibility of salvation and holy living; effectual calling; justification by faith in the imputed righteousness of Christ; repentance unto life; faith in Jesus Christ; the saints' final perseverance, and the abiding, consoling, and joyful indwelling of the Holy Spirit. A revival of religion, succeeding such preaching as is implied in such an outline of doctrine, will manifest itself to be of a truth from God, and its effects will be such as will honor God and promote His glory. It is not to be doubted, however, that such views are ignored by many who figure in the fashionable periodical excitements of this day, which are called by them revivals. They object to doctrinal preaching very strenuously. They approve of nothing but fervent, vociferous, ranting exhortation. The plan of salvation is never explained. The appeal is made, and the anxious are called on, and sometimes forced, to come forward to "the altar of prayer," without instruction, and the result is, many professions of religion—"bright professions,"—are made, based on no proper knowledge of their relations to God, or of the exercise of faith in Christ. Hence it has grown into a proverb, especially in this South-Western region, that the converts of this season must be converted over again at the next. We conclude, therefore, that we must lay down, as chief among the criteria of our judgment as to the genuineness of a revival, the fact that the preaching dispensed be deeply doctrinal.

2. As to the experience of the subjects of the revival, this of course varies in its "distinctness and strength, the rapidity of succession, modifications and combinations." But, as there is a substantial uniformity in the experience of all true Christians, so the professed converts must realize the characteristics of the true Christian's experience in their own hearts, or the work wrought on them must be rejected as spurious. Is not this reasonable? Is it not in accordance with the principles which govern all other systems?

How do we know that any man is sound in regard to any political question, unless, by conversing with him, or communing with him in his written records of opinion and sentiment, we find that he speaks and writes so as to tally exactly with the true standard of soundness? So in religion, there is a sympathy—a uniformity of experience—which marks all Christians. If, then, we desire to know the condition of a professed convert, let us ascertain whether there has been a conviction of sin experienced, a sense of guilt, and of a want of holiness, a desire to be free from the love, power, and pollution, as well as from the penalty due to sin; a clear view of God's plan of mercy through Christ; a full and hearty assent to and acceptance of the scheme of redemption; an entire trust in Christ for restoration to the favor of God, all accompanied by the indulgence of a hope, more or less bright, of personal salvation. Now, it is not to be supposed that every convert is a systematic theologian. But that he has an experience of the foregoing principles operating upon his heart and life, is beyond all doubt. And unless men who profess to be converted, are possessed of this experience, in a clearer or more obscure degree, there is great reason to fear that they are not "able to give a reason for the hope that is in them;" and it is almost impossible for an enlightened Christian to avoid feeling, with all the charity he may possess, that he stands in doubt of such cases. The many instances of apostacy which are seen succeeding certain religious excitements, in modern times, would be found, on investigation, among those who are strangers to this form of experience.

3. The third element in the discussion of the nature of a revival, is the consideration of the results which succeed—the fruits brought forth in the subjects. Now, it is readily perceived, here, that this is the most satisfactory proof of the genuineness of any supposed work of Grace in any community. For, while it is true that the experience of

all Christians is uniform and identical in its grand outlines, yet it is, after all, impossible to form, at all times and in all cases, correct judgments in regard to the state of the heart, from the mere narrative of the experience. We may misunderstand them—they may be deluded—they may be hypocrites. It is God alone who can judge the heart. But the great Teacher has laid down for us an infallible rule: "By their fruits ye shall know them." Let us ask, have "the formal become spiritual; the proud, humble; the wanton and vile, sober and temperate; the worldly, heavenly-minded; the extortioner, just; the self-seeker, desirous to promote God's glory?" Do the professed converts love the Bible, and the Lord's Day, and His people, and His house, and His cause? Do they daily strive to cease from evil,—have "old things passed away, and all things become new,"—do they show forth their works with meekness of wisdom, and let their light shine around them to the glory of God? If these things be in them and abound, they prove that it is a genuine work that has been wrought upon them. And in connection with this, we may just add, that with these three characteristics of a revival, although there may be mingled some bodily affections and extravagances, while these should not be encouraged, it is certain that the work is genuine, and these accompaniments are entirely non-essential. They are not the results of religious feeling so much as of the effects of the excitement of the nervous system operated upon by fear, or a vivid imagination. But the fact that, amid all else that may be connected with it, these three marks—sound doctrine, Christian experience, and evangelical practice—characterize a revival, is proof of the most satisfactory character that it is the work of God's Holy Spirit.

In looking at the attitude which those assume who, like the writer now under review, confound all religious earnestness and spiritual fervor with frenzy, who view all pretensions to vital godliness as the result of ignorance or priest-

craft, who devote their whole life to sneering and ridicule, and defamation of God's Word and system of Grace, we cannot forbear the indulgence of a feeling of sorrow and commiseration. The prostitution, to such base uses, of noble powers furnished them by the very Being whom they thus dishonor, cannot but be a source of sadness to the thoughtful observer. There is, however, another reflection which arises from a view of such cases. It is, that while all their efforts to disparage the system of Christianity are futile, and every intelligent man regards them as absurd and altogether unworthy a rational being, the irresistible march of Divine Truth—the glorious Gospel of the blessed God—is conquering the world. These men are left far behind—their assaults are impotent, their weapons are pointless. There is no obstacle to the onward progress of Christ's Kingdom which can for a moment retard its advance. And while the mighty work of the Spirit is convincing and converting men all over the earth, and hastening on the Latter-Day Glory, the spectacle presented by the skeptic, vainly attempting to weaken the faith of men in God's blessed Word, would excite derision and contempt on any subject less solemn. But it is with sincere commiseration for their sad condition, that we venture to address to them the stern language of Paul: "Beware, therefore, lest that come upon you which is spoken of in the prophets: Behold, ye despisers, and wonder and perish; for I work a work in your days, a work which ye shall in no wise believe, though a man declare it unto you." Acts xiii. : 40, 41.

ARTICLE II.

THE PASTORAL DUTIES OF RULING ELDERS.

Our denomination is called the Presbyterian Church from the name of its official rulers, who are called Presbyters, and of its tribunals, which are called Presbyteries. We hold that the government of the Church is lodged, *jure divino*, in the hands of Church rulers, whom the Scriptures call Presbyters, or Elders; but that this government is exercised, not severally, as by prelates, but jointly, in Church courts or assemblies, which we hold to be Presbyteries, whether the assemblies be parochial, classical, synodical, national, or œcumenical. Simply as Church governors, we understand the Scriptures to put all Presbyters, whether preaching or ruling, on a parity. There is but one order, namely, that of the Presbyter; there are two officers, namely, that of the teaching Presbyter, or the Minister of the Gospel, and that of the ruling Presbyter, usually among us called the Elder. Hence there are two kinds of power exercised by Church rulers, corresponding in some degree to these offices respectively.

1. There is the *potestas jurisdictionis*, i. e., the power of jurisdiction, which is a joint power, and comprehends every thing which Church courts may do, but which Ministers and Elders, by virtue of office, may not do. Hence, the exercise of discipline in all its grades, all declarative and administrative legislation, including the ordering of the work of ordination and the authoritative designation of the candidate, and all executive authority necessary to the enforcement of the other powers, taking in the whole work of systematic evangelization, appertain to the power of jurisdiction. Here we have no dispute. The duties be-

longing to Ministers and Elders, lawfully associated in Church courts, as Presbyterians contend, are precisely the same, and of course are equal.

2. There is the *potestas ordinis*, i. e., the power of order, which is a several power, and comprehends such things as a Minister or Elder may lawfully and authoritatively perform by virtue of office, but which Church courts may not do. The preaching of the Word, the administration of sealing ordinances, the celebration of marriage, the authoritative blessing of the people, and all pastoral functions, appertain to the power of order. Here originates our present inquiry. All three functions, pertaining to the power of order, without question among us, belong to the teaching Presbyter; since we hold that the higher office includes the lower. But do any of them belong to the Ruling Elder by virtue of office? There is no dispute that all public and authoritative teaching, and the administration of the ordinances and rites which the Scriptures sanction, belong wholly to the preaching Presbyter. So that our inquiry narrows itself down to the pastoral functions. Do these belong to our Elders? and if so, what are they?

There are, doubtless, many duties which belong to all Presbyters, whether Ministers or Elders, which are not laid down as ecclesiastical enactments in our Church formularies; since, being several or personal, and for the most part private, it is difficult to see how they could be enforced, although they belong to the power of order. But, besides, their very efficiency depends, in a great measure, on their free and spontaneous discharge. It is difficult to define these duties under any special title; but in this essay we have called them by the name of pastoral duties. The duties of the Pastors of our Churches, or the pastoral duties of the Minister called to preach, are well understood; and the Church has wisely provided Professors of Pastoral Theology in our Theological Seminaries, by whose lectures these duties are expounded to her candidates for the Min-

istry. Our Ruling Elders have no such advantages; and the Church has been remiss in furnishing them manuals of instruction in regard to the important and scriptural functions of the office to which the Holy Ghost has called them. Scriptural arguments in vindication of the office itself, we have in abundance, able and valuable. But we know of no concise treatise on the subject of this article. Nor do we expect, in the brief space allotted to us, to accomplish any thing which shall supply this *desideratum*. But we venture to hope we may, with the Divine blessing, be able to make some suggestions which may excite within the breasts of our Ruling Elders who may happen to see these pages, a fresh interest in the subject, which we trust may lead them to a new investigation into the extent of those pastoral duties devolving on them. Let us, then, examine briefly the teachings of the Word of God on this important question.

1. The Apostle Paul enjoins it upon Church officers to exercise great circumspection in their conversation and in their conduct, to rule their own houses well, and to cultivate all Christian graces with diligence. It is true these duties are especially enjoined on the Pastor, (1 Tim., 3: 2-7; 6: 11. Titus 1: 6-8,) but, as the very reason is because he exercises a watchful care over the fold, they apply to the Ruling Elder with equal emphasis. Indeed, they are enjoined on the Pastor because he is an Elder, and hence are of direct obligation on Ruling Elders also. They are of essential importance, because, 1st. The ruler who does not cultivate faithfully the graces of the Christian in his own soul is not in a condition to detect the short-comings of the members of the flock of which he is overseer; nor, should he see cause of admonition in a brother, is his own spiritual state such as to enable him to administer it with that spirit of earnest and consecrated zeal which is essential to usefulness in the discharge of the duty; and, 2d. If short-comings in the life of a Church ruler, and inefficiency in the control of his

own household be very manifest, he cannot either usefully or acceptably exercise authority over others. While men are thinking in their hearts, "Physician, heal thyself," and ready to cast up to him the parable of the man with a beam in his eye undertaking to cast the mote out of his brother's—not only his usefulness, but his respectability as an Elder in the household of faith, is gone.

2. All those private and personal duties which Christians are bound to perform toward their fellow-men under the law of charity, are to be discharged, with authority, by Ruling Elders. That is to say, God requires every Christian man, as opportunity offers, to exert an influence for good on those with whom he is brought into contact, in order to lead them, by the blessing of God, to embrace the Gospel. But the Elder is officially bound, by the virtue of his ordination, to seek opportunities of like usefulness to all who are connected with the congregation of which he is an officer, thus watching for souls. Again: All Christians are bound to aid one another to pursue the Divine life, by reproof, exhorting, and thus helping one another; but the Ruling Elder is bound to discharge all such helpful duties with authority, tempered with gentleness and charity. Once more: Every Christian is bound to let his light so shine before men that they may see his good works; but the Ruling Elder is called of God, and by office is bound to become an example unto the flock, and unto those who are without. To be a little more specific. "Every Christian is bound, in charity, to admonish and reprove his brother that offendeth, first privately, and then before witnesses; and if he hear not, to tell it to the Church." (Lev. 19 : 17; Matt. 18 : 15-17.) This a Ruling Elder ought to do, by virtue of his calling, and with authority. (1 Thess. 5 : 12.) Private Christians ought, in charity, to instruct the ignorant (John 4 : 29; Acts 18 : 26); to exhort the negligent (Heb. 3 : 15; 10 : 24, 25); to comfort the afflicted (1 Thess. 5 : 11); to support the weak (1 Thess. 5 :

14); to restore him that falleth (Gal. 6 : 1); to visit the sick (Matt. 25 : 36, 40); to reconcile those who are at variance (Matt. 5 : 9); to contend for the truth, and to answer for it (Jude, v. 3; 1 Peter 3 : 15);—all which are incumbent to the Ruling Elder by the authority of his calling.* These examples and proofs abundantly illustrate the proposition before us, that it is the duty of Ruling Elders, arising from their calling, “to do by authority that which other Christians ought to do in charity; which is their power of order.” †

3. Whilst the Minister who has special charge of a particular Church is fitly called, among the Reformed Churches, the Pastor, by way of eminence, since his whole life is devoted to the one work, yet it is a mistake to suppose that no pastoral duties pertain to the office of Ruling Elder. When the Apostle was addressing the Elders at Ephesus, he exhorted them “to feed the Church of God.” The Greek word ‡ translated “feed,” is derived from the Greek word § translated “pastor,” or “shepherd,” and means, absolutely and radically, “to keep flocks, to be a shepherd,” or pastor; and “metaphorically, to tend, cherish, mind; to take care of, guide, govern.” || But as the principal duties of a shepherd are “to feed and to tend,” it may so be translated, as it is in our version. Hence, it is the duty of the Elder “to be a shepherd” to the flock, “to feed the Church of God”—in a word, to be, not *the* Pastor, but *a* Pastor, to the Church of which he is a ruler. Wherefore, he is bound to instruct the ignorant, to comfort the mourner, to nourish the children of the Church, and, in all the ways by which God gives him opportunity, to edify the body of Christ. Since these duties are all private, pastoral visitation is one of the duties of the Ruling Elder; for it is not possible

* Gillespie's “Assertion of the Government of the Church of Scotland,” Ch. II., last paragraph.

† Ibid.

‡ Ποιμαίνω.

§ Ποιμήν.

|| Liddell and Scott's Greek Lexicon.

that the Ruling Elder should discharge them, unless he sees and knows the people at home—gains their confidence—makes them to see and realize that he truly cares for their spiritual welfare; and thus, having secured the road to their hearts, he may become a friend in need, who is a friend indeed.

4. There is doubtless a special propriety in calling the Minister of a particular Church, *the* bishop of it, for the same reason he is called the Pastor, i. e., by way of eminence. But the title bishop, as used in the New Testament Scriptures, is not the name of an office of the Church; but of a function of the office of Presbyter, i. e., it describes a class of duties. This, even our Episcopal brethren do not deny,* who found their doctrine of Episcopacy on the belief in the perpetuation of the apostolic office, which they claim their prelacy to be. But as the term is used in the Scriptures, it always designates a class of duties pertaining to an office. The word bishop means an overseer, and from its definition, it is evident that the officer, whose duties it describes, must be a ruler; and reciprocally, that a man who is a ruler must, of necessity, take an oversight of those over whom he is called to exercise rule. Hence the Apostle Paul, in the address to the Ephesian Elders, already alluded to, calls them overseers, or bishops. The duties of a bishop, as given in the New Testament, do not belong to the power of jurisdiction; and hence are not brought into exercise in Church courts. They are several, not joint functions. But, at the same time, the duties arising therefrom, are presupposed and must be previously discharged by those who exercise jurisdiction in Church courts. For example: A Church court is under the necessity of exercising discipline. But this must result from the oversight of the flock, in which way alone can the knowledge out of which dis-

* "It is scarcely necessary to remark that in the New Testament, the words *ἐπισκοπος* and *πρεσβυτερος* are convertible." Conybeare and Howison, Vol. II, p. 218.

cipline arises, be ascertained. As the duties pertaining to the exercise of discipline belong equally to every member of a Church court, the duties of a bishop devolve, as well by the very language of the Bible as by the necessity of office, on every Church ruler, whether minister or elder.

5. The Apostle speaks of a certain class of Church officers, which he calls "helps," which are usually understood among the Reformed Churches to be Ruling Elders, although some think these "helps" to be deacons. Taking the former sense, and the designation is most appropriate, since Ruling Elders are appointed to aid the minister, in all suitable ways, in promoting the spiritual good of the flock. We shall have occasion, in another place, to exhibit some of the ways in which Elders may give essential aid to the minister with whom they are associated in the care of the Churches.

That all these duties, or classes of duties, which we have described, belong to Ruling Elders, *jure divino*, is made further manifest, from the fact that, in the primitive Church, there was no distinction between the teaching and ruling Elders, so far as the office itself was concerned. All were then elected and set apart as Presbyters, and the whole Bench of Elders, constituting the Parochial Presbytery, or, as we now call it, the Church Session, divided out the various duties according to the Providential gifts of its respective members. And so the Apostle commands, in Rom. 12: 6-8: "Having then gifts, differing according to the grace that is given unto us, whether prophecy, let us prophecy according to the proportion of faith; or ministry, let us wait on our ministering; or he that teacheth, on teaching; or he that exhorteth, on exhortation"; "he that ruleth, with diligence," etc. And so every man was appointed to discharge those public duties for which he was endowed with gifts; but the more private and personal duties appertained to them all, not jointly, but severally. At the present age of the world, we make the distinction

between teaching and ruling Elders more marked, as a matter of necessity; because, since the original languages of the Scriptures have passed away from speech, it is needful that the Church should know that those appointed to preach have made the acquirements necessary to enable them to expound the Word. In all other respects, the two offices stand with us just where they stood in the Apostolic Church. Indeed, we literally obey the injunction of the Apostle, and remember, in calling men to office in the Church, that we have "gifts, differing according to the grace that is given unto us."

Now, in view of these principles, derived from the Word of God, according to the doctrine of Presbytery, it is very clear that the pastoral duties of Ruling Elders are many and important, viz: 1. All those exemplary and helpful duties of religion, which ordinary Christians discharge under the law of charity, they must fulfil by way of authority. 2. All those functions of office included in the expressions pastor, bishop, and "helps," pertain to them by virtue of office. Let us consider them, now, in a more direct and practical manner.

1. Ruling Elders ought to pray with the people over whom they exercise authority.* The times and circumstances may be determined by the indications of Providence. But, as a general rule, we may say that a Church, where the people do not meet for prayer, is in a languishing condition. The Minister may pray for them, and he may pray with them. But when it is wholly left to him by the Elders and the people, the feeling becomes very strong that the business of prayer is ministerial—that it is the Minister's official duty, because he is employed for the purpose; and that he does it simply because he is paid for it. It has the effect, moreover, of leading persons to go to the House of God, not to pray, but to be entertained by listen-

* We have taken it for granted that all Elders have family prayer—although we have a sad fear that many neglect it.

ing to the prayers of the Minister. The result is, that formal religion and deadness creep in; and however much we may oppose forms in our principles, we derive all their worst effects by our practice. But when the Elders, as the leaders of the people, with an earnest zeal unite with the Minister in trying to develop a devotional spirit among the members of the Church, a new interest must inevitably be created, and a deeper feeling of responsibility be excited among the members for the progress of the Church and the advancement of Christ's cause among them. Hence, the Elders ought to establish prayer-meetings, whether at the usual place of public worship, and all together, or in special districts, may be determined by the circumstances of the Church, and especially its size.

Again: Elders ought to meet with and pray with the members of the Church at their homes, and especially with the widows and fatherless in their affliction, which we are told is an essential part of true practical religion. It may, indeed, be said, such duties also belong to the Pastor, and can be discharged much more acceptably by him. We grant it, but we are now discussing the responsibilities of Ruling Elders, not those of the Pastor. The fact that Pastors have corresponding obligations resting on them, does not exempt the Elder from his, any more than the fact that these duties devolve on the Elder exempts the Minister. But besides: How often can a Minister be expected to visit and pray with each family or person in a large congregation? If he prepare himself, according to his special vocation, to preach the Gospel properly, it is certain that the leaving of this matter to him is very much the same as leaving it undone. But this brings us to say—

3. Ruling Elders are bound, by virtue of their office, systematically and regularly, to visit the members of the Church in their official capacity. The idea that all pastoral visiting belongs to the Minister is false in point of doctrine, as we have elsewhere proved, and is ruinous to the spiritual

interests of a Church. The Pastors of our large congregations find it impossible, in the midst of their other duties, to visit their people oftener than once a year. In smaller Churches, they may, by hard and fatiguing labor, get around twice a year. In order to protect her Ministers against the clamors of unreasonable people, and at the same time to excite Ministers to a careful discharge of their duties, the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland recommend "that ministers visit all the families in their parish at least once a year, if the same be large; and oftener, if the parish be small." Now, if the pastor have no other official way of learning the wants of his people, how can he faithfully administer the Gospel message, or usefully discharge his vocation? Here is seen the utility and manifest necessity of "helps." It is very true, the Elders may say that they cannot accomplish this pastoral visitation, any more than the Minister can. But then, our Sessions ought to be large; and the congregation ought to be divided out into districts or classes, amongst them. Every member of the Session ought to have a certain number of families to visit and care for, as to their spiritual interests; and every member of the Church ought to know which Elder has his special oversight. This arrangement would make this matter of visitation easy for the Elders. The number of families for each would be few. He would in a short time become familiarly acquainted with the families and persons committed to him, and would find it soon becoming a pleasure, instead of a mere duty. And now, how helpful might not such an arrangement as this be made to the Pastor? Whenever his presence was needed in any part of the Church he would have a direct and official way of knowing it. He could ascertain where there was sickness; he could learn of cases of religious concern; he could drop in, unawares, upon the desponding disciple, as an angel visitant;—in a word, the widow, the orphan, the poor, the friendless, the stranger, the isolated female, as well as the

families of the Church, would all be systematically cared for, first by the Elders; secondly, by the Pastor. And then, how much more valuable the visits of the Pastor, made under such circumstances, than, as otherwise they often must be, merely visits of friendship. Now, he would go to comfort, to instruct, to sympathize, to warn, and to pray, when most needed.

Besides, how many pious females are there, living in Christian isolation, who are deprived of the privilege and help of family worship! What a blessed means of grace might it not become to them if the faithful and pious Elder, who should thus be appointed to their special oversight, would frequently call in and have a brief season of prayer with them! But we cannot enlarge on this point. Its advantages are so manifold they will occur to every thoughtful person.

3. As one part of the duties of the Elder is to feed the flock, it becomes him to instruct and to comfort the mourner, as he may obtain grace and find opportunity. In addition to personal interviews and conversation, he may do much in this behalf by circulating the Bible, along with religious tracts and books, among the destitute; and by bringing to the notice of persons able to purchase, such religious books and papers as may be adapted to their spiritual wants. The humble tract, even casually distributed, has brought salvation to many a household; and the desponding Christian has been encouraged, the mourner's tears have been dried, and the backsliding Christian reclaimed, by the pages of the Christian volume brought to his notice at the fitting time; while the zeal of the professing disciple is constantly stimulated by the religious newspaper, through which we learn of the wonders of the grace of God displaying itself among the nations.

Some of our Sessions, in accordance with this idea, make it a rule to keep on hand a good supply of Bibles, tracts, religious books, etc., for the use of its members, at their

own discretion, whenever opportunity offers; and every member is expected to draw from the common stock as occasion may demand. The Congregational Library might be used with a like advantage.

4. The Elders are especially under obligations to care for our baptized youth. By the ordinance of God they are introduced into the Church, to be trained up for His honor and glory. Such means of grace as the adult Christian regularly enjoys in the sanctuary are profitable to children in a degree, even from their earliest infancy; but assuredly they need other and special means of religious culture. The Sabbath School ought to be everywhere employed, under the guidance of our Elders, for their instruction in the Bible, and in the doctrines of the Church, by means of the Catechisms. In like manner, those more advanced in years ought to be collected into Bible classes and instructed by the Elders, wherever God has given them the gifts. So, also, ought the fidelity and zeal of Christian parents to be observed, unfaithfulness to be marked, and the kind word of exhortation given at a fit time, and with a right spirit. Again: The baptized youth, who may be seen to wander from his moral integrity, or falling into temptation, ought to be quickly warned of his danger and exhorted to return. These duties, all so simple and easy of fulfilment, how blessed might they not become to parents and to our baptized youth, when fitly and faithfully discharged! The Elder can see and know these opportunities of usefulness when the Minister cannot, and may thus be blessed of God in checking the unfaithfulness of parents at its first manifestation, and may arrest the downward course of the consecrated son or daughter at the first step.

5. As the discipline of the Church is lodged in the hands of the Ruling Elders, they are especially bound to take that oversight of the Church which lies at the basis of all discipline. In this respect, the wisdom of God, in appointing Elders of the people as Church rulers, is mani-

fest and wonderful. The Pastor, in a certain sense, is isolated from the people, and his very presence throws a restraint around their conduct. This ought not so to be; but, alas, it is too much the case. Hence, he has no personal means of ascertaining the downward steps of the tempted and wayward Christian; and no means at all, except such as are public. But the Ruling Elder, who is one of themselves, if watchful, taking heed to himself and the flock over which the Holy Ghost hath made him an overseer, can see, and, by the blessing of God, may arrest and counteract, the effects of the temptations of the world and the evil one; and may thereby become the means of saving a soul from death, and covering a multitude of sins. Again: The member of the Church who has fallen into sin can hide it from the eye of his Pastor, while his hypocrisy may be known to the public, and may cause the enemy to blaspheme. But the Elder, whose walk is with the people, can see and know every thing, and bring the matter into judgment, thereby saving the Church from scandal, and delivering the name of Christ from reproach.

Not only do these duties properly arise from the functions of the office of Ruling Elder, but Ruling Elders ought to save the Pastor from the necessity of attending to such matters. If the Pastor has first to hear a whisper of evil, and then himself to start around to hunt up the facts, which are always told him with much reluctance and after great trouble, the result is, he becomes odious, and is looked upon as an inquisitor. People fear to see him, lest he come to ask them to turn informers on some one; and he is sure to forfeit the good will of the party implicated, whether found guilty or innocent. Again: If the private exhortation and admonition of members be wholly devolved on him, his presence in the families of his own people becomes a terror to them, but more especially to the young, for they would always be in fear of ministerial censures and official rebukes. But the Elder, as he mingles freely with them,

can speak to them casually, as he may have chance opportunity, without the fear of any such result.

Now, the Pastor's usefulness and success depend almost absolutely, under God, on his enjoying the love and the unquestioning confidence of his people. But all fear drives out love, while it engenders hate. Hence, our experience is, that the Minister who takes the initiative in any case of troublesome discipline, or who allows himself to become the prosecutor of the case, loses his hold on his people thereby, and soon has to vacate his post. But, on the other hand, a slight estrangement from the Elders soon wears off and passes away.

6. As the higher office includes the lower, the duties of Deacons pertaining to the money-tables, wherever this latter class of officers is not existent, belong to Ruling Elders. We do not now refer to the business matters of the congregation, which do not pertain to spiritual functions, but to benevolent funds, designed for the poor, and for the work of evangelization, in its many forms. It is just as certain, in our view, that it is the duty of the Christian to contribute to the cause of Christ, as it is that he ought to pray; nor do we believe he can grow in grace, if he neglect the former, any more than he can if he neglect the latter, and thus the Minister must teach and preach. But the whole matter of inaugurating in practice the teaching of the pulpit, belongs to the Elders and Deacons.

Ordinarily, a Minister ought not to visit his people to raise subscriptions for benevolent objects, nor ought he to go around with an agent among them on any such business. If he does, the result is, the people associate his presence with begging, and whenever they see him with a strange Minister, they involuntarily seize hold of their purse-strings, and begin to draw them tighter. A man, moreover, may have good or bad reasons for refusing to give. If his reasons be good, and at the same time he love his Pastor, he becomes mortified at having to state them to

him. If his reasons be insufficient, such as manifestly arise from the avarice of the heart, or from utter indifference to the interests of the cause of Christ, not only is he mortified at being obliged to give them, but he thinks bad things in his heart about his Pastor, for compelling him to do so. Now, we must deal with the human heart as we find it; and judging by what we know of it, it is very sure this may, and eventually will, excite dislike, engender hatred, and foment discontent. But the Elder or Deacon, being one of the people, can approach them on an equality and with freedom, and they can converse with him with easy familiarity, and without embarrassment.

7. During religious awakenings, the Ruling Elder who carries out these principles in their true spirit may become of immense advantage to the Minister, and may render himself very useful, in bringing persons to the House of God, in seeking out the convicted and interested, in putting suitable books into their hands, in conversing and praying with them, and in leading them to see the Minister, or the Minister to see them. But here, again, it is not necessary to enlarge, as what he have said elsewhere, and on other heads, is equally applicable to the point in hand.

8. All the duties which we have enforced, become especially binding on Elders of vacant Churches. When the instruction of the pulpit is wanting, so much more needful is it that the people should enjoy such means of grace as God has yet left them, in the hands of their board of Elders. It is true, the Elders may not preach, nor administer the sacraments; but they can meet with the people, as our form of government enjoins them to do (see ch. XXI.), and can pray with them and for them; they can read the Bible, and pious discourses suitable for the purpose, and they can sing together the praises of God. And if any one of them have a word of exhortation, let him exhort to the edifying of all. Many evil consequences arising from a vacancy in the pulpit may be averted in this way; the Church can be kept

together, and thus the sympathies of the members may be drawn out for one another, while in answer to their united prayers, they may hope that God will bless them in sending a Minister, on whom they can unite their voices, as the under shepherd, to go in and out before them. Moreover, during a period of vacancy, the Eldership ought to take special oversight of the flock, in reference to the consistency of their lives, and to observe every occasion for the exercise of discipline. Such things ought never to be allowed to rest until a Pastor is obtained. No Minister can feel happy in entering on his pastorate, if he have to signalize his opening ministry by purging the Church roll. Rather let the Elders attend to cases of discipline as they may arise, and thus keep the roll clean, so that the Minister may enter on his work with faith and courage, and pursue it with joy.

It may be objected, that these views are an innovation on the principles of our ecclesiastical polity. But this is a mistake. In the venerable Presbyterian Churches of Scotland and Ireland, the Elders divide the congregations into districts, each Elder having charge of an appointed bounds, for official visitation and special oversight, within which Sabbath Schools, Bible and Catechetical Classes, and Prayer-Meetings, are committed to him; and thus he exercises the very authority, and discharges the very duties, for which we contend. Let us look at this historical point for a moment.

In the First Book of Discipline, ch. 10, sec. 3, it is said that the Elders, at their induction, must be admonished of their office, "which is, to assist the Ministers in all public affairs of the Kirk, to wit: in determining and judging causes, in giving admonition to the licentious liver, in having respect to the manners and conversation of all men within their charge. For, by the gravity of the seniors, the light and unbridled life of the licentious must be corrected and bridled." Now, when the plain reader is told

that the officer designated by the names Presbyter, Senior or Senator, and Elder, is the same, and that all these words mean the same thing—the word Presbyter coming to us from the Greek language, the word Senior from the Latin, and the word Elder from the Saxon—it will be made clear to him, that the principles for which we contend are distinctly, but comprehensively, set forth in the above quotation.

But the Second Book of Discipline is equally explicit in its teachings, and more full in its statements. In chapter 6, which treats of “Elders and their Office,” beginning at the middle of sec. 3, it speaks as follows:

“What manner of persons they ought to be, we refer it to the express word of God, and namely, the canons written by the Apostle Paul. 4. Their office is as well severally as conjointly, to watch diligently upon the flock committed to their charge, both publicly and privately, that no corruption of religion or manners enter therein. 5. As Pastors and Doctors should be diligent in teaching and sowing the seed of the Word, so the Elders should be careful in seeking the fruit of the same in the people. 6. It appertains to them to assist the Pastor in examination of them that come to the Lord’s Table; *item*, in visiting the sick. 7. They should cause the acts of the Assemblies, as well particular as general, to be put in execution carefully. 8. They should be diligent in admonishing all men of their duty, according to the rule of the evangel. Things that they cannot correct by private admonitions, they should bring to the assemblies of the Eldership.”

This quotation is verbatim, but we have used the modern spelling. The rest of the chapter has reference to the power of jurisdiction, which does not concern our present discussion. Certainly, no one can read the above declaration of principles without seeing in it every thing we have maintained in this essay.

In enforcing the above principles, the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland has passed many enactments, all tending in the same direction. In the Collection of Stuart of Pardovan, Book I., Title 6, “of Ruling Elders,” we are told, in sec. 8, that “it is appointed that every Elder have a certain bounds assigned him, that he may visit the same

every month, at least, and to report to the Session what scandals or abuses are therein, or what persons have entered without testimonials; and it were fit that, then, some time were set apart for prayer; and it were also fit that Elders should always keep an exact list of all examinable persons within their quarters, and thereunto put marks to distinguish communicants from the ignorant and scandalous, and the poor and indigent from such as need not." Moreover, in the Compendium of the Laws of the Church of Scotland, p. 335, in enjoining the duty and the manner of ministerial visitation of families, which is to be at the least once a year, it is recommended that the Minister "be accompanied with the Elder of the bounds; with whom he may confer, before they go forth to the work, about the state and condition of the persons and families of these bounds, that the Minister may be able to speak more suitably to their condition and as may be most for edification." Both these enactments certainly concur with the sentiments of this essay. Other extracts could be given, illustrative of the principles and practice of the Church of Scotland, all to the same purpose. But we have given enough. In more recent times, since the establishment of Sabbath Schools, these are committed to the Elder of the bounds, who has charge of the same, in subordination to the Session.

Our principles are certainly no innovation on Presbyterianism, since we have shown that they are entirely in accordance with the primitive and present usages of the ancient churches of Scotland and Ireland;* and, however much we as a Church may have come short of our duty in reference to this matter, we are happy to know that these principles have not wholly been ignored by our Elders. We have known of Sessions of our Church, which have attempted, and that with much success and great benefit.

* The Collections of Stuart of Pardovan are used in all the Presbyterian Churches, both of Scotland and Ireland. All our quotations save one are taken from it.

to carry into effect the foregoing theoretical views; and we have known other Sessions to adopt one or another of the principles of action recommended. We can truly say, we never knew even the attempt to be made without our seeing good as the result. As illustrative of this, we desire here to introduce a short extract, which we have seen in a number of newspapers, but do not know where it originated. The Dr. Richards alluded to is doubtless the late Rev. Dr. James Richards, successively Pastor at Norristown and Newark, N. J., and afterward Professor of Theology at Auburn. These "Facts for Elders" bear the signature of "J. F. T.," viz :

"Some changes for the worse have seemingly taken place in the practical performance of the duties of the Eldership. The day was, when the Elders of the Churches constituted a very efficient band of laborers, doing a great deal more than merely to admit, dismiss and discipline members. The diary of an Elder in one of our leading Churches, under the ministrations of the late Dr. Richards, showed the fact that the Elders divided the congregation into districts, and visited every family without the Pastor. The work was accomplished principally in the *evening*, it being found difficult to meet the members of the different families at any other time. The Elders went two and two, conversing and praying with the people. The apprentices and 'help' were called together in almost all cases, and that class, so much neglected in our day, was faithfully warned. The diary alluded to states the interesting fact, that, by this system, many cases were brought to light which needed the special attention of the Pastor—such as professors in despondency or difficulty, or persons in an anxious or skeptical state of mind. Such cases were reported to Dr. Richards, who had a remarkable tact in dealing with them. It is a well-known fact that very many persons, who need and wish spiritual counsel, are very reluctant to ask it. If they are fortunate enough to be sought out, they will obtain the much-needed counsel; otherwise, they will probably go without it, to their serious injury. In the Church alluded to, I have been told that it was often a matter of surprise to such persons, that the Pastor should 'happen in' so opportunely! They sometimes called it 'a special Providence'—attaching to it the quality of the semi-miraculous, whereas the mercy came through the agency of efficient Elders, who were constantly acting as overseers of the flock committed to their trust. The results, as I have been told, were remarkable, since scarce a communion season occurred without additions from the world. People abroad spoke admiringly of the *Pastor*, as a successful Minister, gathering jewels for Christ. And, indeed, they could not say too much of his searching,

and often *tearful* sermons, with which he moved his great congregation. But, undoubtedly, long before this, it has appeared that the successful ministry of that great man was, in part, owing to the faithfulness of the Elders, all of whom, but one, have 'departed this life, in hope of a better.'

One of the number was noted for the single-eyed service which he rendered constantly in his office of Elder. Some Elders content themselves with visiting the people occasionally with the Pastor, and their visits savor so much of the *official* as to keep them from a close contact with the people. There is no 'happening in' at the right time, not merely to say a word directly on religion, but to show sympathy with this sufferer, to encourage this widow, and to speak a kind word to this child who does his duty at school. The Elder to whom I refer was noted for his industry in business and his promptness in every engagement of life; and yet he was more noted for the holy skill he manifested in using up the "odds and ends" of time, and for making even his times of business occasions for exercising the functions of his office. For instance, he has an item of business 'on the hill,' or 'down town,' and going or returning he would 'just run in' to see 'old Mr. A.,' or to inquire after 'Widow B.'s health,' or to ask Mrs. C. if she did not need a little help in paying her rent, or to drop a word to Mrs. D., whom he saw weeping during the last Sunday's discourse. And so scarcely a day passed in which this single-eyed Elder did not find some opportunity to bear his part in the Eldership, even in the busiest season. He did not make long visits, usually. Very often he would stop at the door, and, with whip and hat in hand, say a 'good morning,' with some good, comforting word, that would be as a perpetual sunbeam in the house after he was gone. And thus he circulated, in this easy and effectual way, through the congregation. There was not a house to which he was not welcome, nor a person to whom he could not speak on the great theme which engrossed his affections. When he died, his brethren lamented over him as an extraordinary worker, and a good man.

"In this case, the Elder was possessed of excellent sense, sound judgment, much intelligence; but at the foundation of his admirable qualities was his piety, and then his practical recognition of the solemn vows he had made when ordained as an Elder.

"I recall the case of another Elder, famous for his efficiency. In him there was no guile, and he had that directness of purpose which often gave him success where greater tacticians would have failed. He had great clearness of mind and power of argument, so that, in determining his own duty, he was not very liable to mistake, and then he could combat the wrong positions of others. But it was not mere intelligence which gave him his power as a spiritual adviser, an exhorter, a comforter, a pacificator. It was rather his ripe godliness, and his appreciation of the vows he had made as an Elder. I have known him to meet, successfully, cases of perplexity which his Pastor could not, and which he ought not, to undertake. Our dear old Elder

would state his views so clearly, so lovingly, and yet so firmly, that the boldest found it difficult to resist him. He, too, died in a good old age; but to this day, those who knew him speak of him with a tenderness which shows how blessed is the memory of a faithful Elder."

No one can read the previous discussion, as illustrated by the statement just quoted, without being sadly impressed with the conviction that our Elders generally come far short of their duty. Indeed, the conviction that such is the case seems to be very general among the Elders themselves, as manifested in the proceedings of various conventions held by them on the subject, and by a corresponding revival of interest in their official work, seen in many places. We thank God for it, and would pray that His Holy Spirit may descend and dwell richly in the hearts of our Elders, so that they may obtain grace to come forth with a fresh consecration to the discharge of their whole duty. What a glorious day would it be for the Kingdom of Christ, could the ten thousand ruling Elders of the Presbyterian Church be aroused to a true sense of their responsibility, and be led to come up to the help of the Lord against the mighty! What wondrous blessings might we not expect from the mighty hand of the God of Jacob, upon our languishing Churches!

In conclusion, let us exhort our brethren of the Ruling Eldership to consider, prayerfully and solemnly, their duty and their accountability. The Apostle commands you to "take heed to *yourselves*," as well as to the flock. This you ought to do, in two particulars. 1st. You are to take heed that you seek the best spiritual gifts, in order to your own fitness for the work. 2d. You are to take heed that sin be not found at your door, on account of a fearful neglect of your ordination vows, as well as of the gifts which God has given you. So, also, you are commanded to magnify your office, which is a common duty of all Church officers. We, who are officers of the Church of Christ, are called of God to discharge duties which He de-

volves upon us, according to our respective offices. Let us, therefore, repent of our sins of short-coming, let us bemoan our want of faith, and, taking fresh courage in the strength of our covenant-keeping God, let us arise and go forth to the work to which He has called us, and let us resolve by His grace to discharge every duty, and to fulfil every trust, looking for the abundant blessing of His spirit, according to His promise.

ARTICLE III.

2D MACCABEES 12 : 39-45; AND PURGATORY
AND PRAYERS FOR THE DEAD.

In the 163d year before Christ the lion-hearted Prince, Judas Maccabœus, in conducting his wars against the Syrian Empire, for the religious and civil freedom of the Church of God, on the occasion referred to in 2d Maccabees 12: 39-45, marched against the Syrian General Georgias, who had assembled a force of three thousand foot and four thousand horse in the Province of Idurrea, of which he was Governor. In the battle a few Israelites were slain; Georgias was taken prisoner, but shortly after rescued again; and when the contest had continued long, and the enemy were weary, Judas called upon the Lord to show Himself their helper and leader of the battle; and, singing psalms in his own language with a loud voice, and rushing unawares upon Georgias and his men, put them to flight, and afterwards, collecting his army, retired to Odollam, a city near by, to purify themselves (as the custom was), and keep the Sabbath day in the same place.

The day following the Sabbath, Judas and his army came to take up the bodies of their brethren who had been

slain in battle, and bury them with their kinsmen in their fathers' graves; and under the coats of every corpse they found things consecrated to the idols of the Jamnites, and although taken out of the spoils of their enemies, it was an act forbidden in the Law. Deut. 7: 1-6, 24-26. When in war the heathen should be delivered by the Lord into their hand, saith He, "The graven images of their Gods shall ye burn with fire; thou shalt not divide the silver or the gold that is on them, nor take it unto thee, lest thou be snared therein; for it is an abomination to the Lord thy God. Neither shalt thou bring an abomination into thine house, lest thou be an accursed thing like it; but thou shalt utterly detest it, and thou shalt utterly abhor it; for it is a cursed thing." A transgression of this sort by Achan, in former times, brought judgment upon Israel, and death upon him. Then Judas and his soldiers saw that this was the cause wherefore their brethren were slain; they therefore praised God for His righteous judgment, and besought Him in prayer that this sin might wholly be put out of remembrance; that is, that God would not remember it against them for judgment. The noble Judas also exhorted the people, with this dreadful example before their eyes, to keep themselves from sin; and, making a collection throughout the army of two thousand drachms of silver, sent it to Jerusalem to provide sin-offerings, there to be offered up for expiating of this offence, that wrath for it might not fall upon the whole congregation of Israel, as formerly it had in the case of Achan. 2d Mac. 12: 33-45.*

In immediate connection with this collection for sacrifices at Jerusalem, the following statement is made concerning Judas: "He sent it," (the silver,) "to Jerusalem to offer a sin-offering, doing therein very well and honestly, in that he was mindful of the resurrection, for if he had not hoped that they that were slain should have risen again, it had been superfluous and vain to pray for the dead. And, also,

* Usher. Prideaux.

in that he perceived that there was great favor laid up for those that died godly, it was an holy and good thought, whereupon he made a reconciliation for the dead, that they might be delivered from sin."—2 Mac. 12: 43-45. This is the famous passage adduced out of this book, and relied upon by the Roman Catholics in part proof of their dogmas of Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead; and as this is the first record appealed to, and this the first time in the history of the Church in which the attempt is formally made to date these errors and foist them into the faith of the Church, they require a brief consideration.

The English translation of the Apocrypha, bound up with the Holy Scriptures, follows the Greek text of the authorized edition of Sixtus Fifth, of 1587, with which the Vulgate does not agree, in the passage before us, either in language or punctuation; but by interpolating the words "*pro peccatis mortuorum,*" in the 43d verse, it makes Judas send the money to Jerusalem "to offer sacrifice for the sins of the dead," whereas the Greek has it "to offer sacrifice for sin;" and, again, by altering the punctuation in the 45th verse, it puts a full stop before the words "it was a holy and good thought," and so, making a 46th verse, connects them with the closing sentence, which, contrary to the Greek, it renders thus: "It was a holy and good thought to pray for the dead, that they might be delivered from sins." Whereas, the full stop in the Greek is after the words "it was a holy and good thought," that is, what Judas had done in the way of having sacrifices offered at Jerusalem was a holy and good thought—a thing most proper to be done. Then follows the closing sentence, marked by the Greek particle, in this place illative, "wherefore, or whereupon, he made reconciliation or expiation for the dead, that sin might be remitted." The Vulgate bends the passage to the support of the dogma of "Praying for the Dead" beyond the allowance of the Greek text. (Dr. Cotton, in his Maccabees, punctuates differ-

ently from the Greek, the Vulgate, and our common Apocryphal translation, with a view, doubtless, to rescue the passage from perversion.)

These criticisms, in the main, were made over a hundred years ago, by Rev. Richard Arnald, in his "Critical Commentary on the Books of the Apocrypha, and Dissertations on the Maccabees and Esdras;" and any one who will be at the pains of examining them will not only see their justness, but upon a careful consideration of the entire passage in the original, from the 41st to the 45th verses, will assent to his conclusion. Says he: "It is most probable that Judas thought of nothing less than Purgatory in this action, for the money sent to Jerusalem was for a sin-offering, to expiate or take away the guilt from the rest of the people. And it is observable, that the sum was a general contribution, according to the appointment. Lev. 4: 13. So that, upon the whole, what was here done by Judas was not for the sake of the deceased soldiers, but for the safety and preservation of the remainder that were living, that the judgment of God might not overtake the rest." Neither Archbishop Usher, nor Dean Prideaux, take any notice of this passage; and we judge that their silence indicates their unfavorable opinion of it.

"It deserves to be noticed," says Dr. Cotton, "that no mention of any such offering or idea, as that which is inserted here, is found either in the Second (the First) Book of Maccabees, chap. 5: 65, or in the Fifth, chap. 14: 4, 5, although the same portion of history is there treated of." And let it be added, that Josephus is, throughout his whole "Antiquities" and "Wars of the Jews," totally silent in respect to any such belief being entertained by the Israelites; and in his admirable summary of the religious faith and practice of his own chosen nation, in his second book against Apion, §§ 15-31, no mention whatever is made of any such doctrines as Prayers for the Dead and Purgatory; neither he nor any of his nation knew any thing of them, nor do we

trace even a shadow of them in all the writings of the learned, but fanciful and allegorical, Philo Judaeus, who was cotemporary with Josephus ; nor is there a solitary passage in the whole Old Testament Scriptures, from Genesis to Malachi, that can be produced in support of them, which candid Roman Catholics admit. Allowing the passage in 2d Maccabees to assert that Judas and his men offered sacrifices and prayers for the dead soldiers slain in battle, for their sin, (which really is not the case,) then prayer for the dead is all it does assert, and not one word does it advance for Purgatory ; the doctrine of Purgatory is not found in it, nor can it be adduced in proof. However, let the passage assert what it may of such dogmas, our conclusive reply is, the Book in which it occurs is Apocryphal, it forms no part of the inspired Word of God, and is destitute of authority in settling the faith of the Church.

But, to dispose of these dogmas, we may show what they are, as held by the Romish Church ; whence they originated ; when they were introduced into the creed of that Church, and, also, that they are without foundation in Scripture, and are gross and destructive errors.

The Decree of the Council of Trent, Session the Twenty-fifth, touching Purgatory, runs thus : “ Whereas, the Catholic Church, instructed by the Holy Ghost, has, from the sacred writings and the ancient tradition of the fathers, taught in sacred Councils, and very recently in this oecumenical Synod, (Ses. 6, Can. 30., Ses. 22, Can. 3.,) that there is a Purgatory, and that the souls there detained are relieved by the suffrages of the faithful, but chiefly by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar, the Holy Synod enjoins on Bishops that they diligently strive that the sound doctrine, touching Purgatory, delivered by the Holy Fathers and sacred Councils, be believed, held, taught, and every where proclaimed by the faithful of Christ. But let the more difficult and subtle questions, and those which tend not to edification, and from which, for the most part, there is no

increase of piety, be excluded from popular discourses before the uneducated multitude. In like manner, such things as are uncertain, or which labor under an appearance of error, let them not allow to be made public and treated of. But those things which tend to a certain kind of curiosity or superstition, or which savour of filthy lucre, let them prohibit as scandals and stumbling-blocks of the faithful. And let the Bishops take care that the suffrages of the faithful who are living, to wit: the sacrifices of masses, prayers, alms-givings, and other works of piety, which have been wont to be performed by the faithful for the other faithful departed, be piously and devoutly performed according to the institutes of the Church, and that what things soever are done on their behalf, from the endowments of testators, or in other ways, be discharged, not in a negligent manner, but diligently and accurately, by the Priests and Ministers of the Church, and others who are bound to render this service." And again, Session the Twenty-second, chapter 2d, on the sacrifice of the Mass being propitiatory as well for the living as the dead: "And, inasmuch as in this Divine sacrifice, which is performed in the Mass, that same Christ is contained and immolated in a bloodless manner, who once offered Himself in a bloody manner on the altar of the Cross, the Holy Synod teaches that this sacrifice is truly propitiatory, and that, by means thereof, this is effected, that we obtain mercy and find grace in convenient aid, if we draw nigh unto God, contrite and penitent, with a true heart and upright faith, with fear and reverence. For the Lord, appeased by the oblation thereof, and granting the grace and gift of penitence, forgives even heinous crimes and sins. For the victim is one and the same, the same now offering by the ministry of Priests, who then offered Himself on the Cross, the manner alone of offering being different. The fruits, indeed, of which oblation, of that bloody one to wit, are most plentifully received through this bloodless one, so far

is this latter from derogating in any way from that former (oblation). Wherefore, not only for the sins, punishments, satisfactions, and other necessities of the faithful who are alive, but also for those who are departed in Christ and who are not as yet fully purified (purged), is it rightly offered, agreeably to a tradition of the Apostles." And again, in the same Session, Canon 3d: "If any one shall say, that the sacrifice of the Mass is only a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving, or that it is a bare commemoration of the sacrifice offered on the Cross, but not a propitiatory sacrifice; or that it avails him only who receiveth, and that it ought not to be offered for the living and the dead for sins, punishments, satisfactions and other necessities, let him be anathema!" And once more, in Session 6th, "On Justification," Canon 30th: "If any one shall say that, after the grace of Justification received unto every penitent sinner, the guilt is so remitted, and the penalty of eternal punishment so blotted out, that there remains not any penalty of temporal punishment to be discharged, either in this world or in the next in Purgatory, before the entrance into the Kingdom of Heaven can be laid open—let him be anathema!" On the efficacy of the Eucharist, in the Catechism of the Council of Trent, Part I., ch. IV., "Of the Sacrament of the Eucharist," Question 50, it is said: "That by the Eucharist are remitted and pardoned lighter sins, commonly called venial, should not be matter of doubt:—sins of which the mind has no strong perception, and in which it has no prevailing delight." And Question 67: "The Eucharist was instituted by Christ for two purposes: one that it might be the heavenly food of our souls, enabling us to support and preserve spiritual life: the other, that the Church might have a perpetual sacrifice, by which our sins might be expiated, and our Heavenly Father, oft-times grievously offended by our crimes, might be turned away from wrath to mercy, from the severity of just chastisement to clemency." And Question 73: "We, therefore, confess

that the sacrifice of the Mass is, and ought to be considered, one and the same sacrifice with that of the Cross: for the victim is one and the same, namely, Christ our Lord, who offered Himself once only a bloody sacrifice on the altar of the Cross. The bloody and unbloody victim are not two, but one victim only, whose sacrifice is daily renewed in the Eucharist, in obedience to the command of our Lord, 'Do this in remembrance of me.'" And Question 75: "The sacrifice of the Mass is truly a propitiatory sacrifice, by which God is appeased and rendered propitious to us." And Question 76: "That such is the efficacy of this sacrifice, that its benefits extend not only to the celebrant and communicant, but to all the faithful, whether living with us on earth, or already numbered with those who are dead in the Lord, but whose sins have not yet been fully expiated. For, according to the most authentic Apostolic tradition, it is not less available when offered for them, than when offered for the sins of the living, their punishments, satisfactions, calamities, and difficulties of every sort."

But this is not all the light we have as to this dogma of the Church of Rome. If we turn to Part I. of the Catechism of the Council of Trent, Chapter VI. of the Fifth Article of the Creed, "He descended into Hell," it is taught, Question 2: "By the word Hell is not here meant the grave, as some have, not less impiously than ignorantly, imagined; but Hell here signifies those hidden abodes in which are detained the souls that have not obtained heavenly bliss; and, in this sense, the word is used in many passages of Scripture—Phil. 2: 10; Acts 2: 24." And in Question 3: "These abodes, however, are not all of one and the same kind; for amongst them is that most loathsome and dark prison, in which the souls of the damned, together with the unclean spirits, are tortured in eternal and inextinguishable fires. This place is also called Gehenna, the bottomless pit—and, in its literal signification, Hell." This is the first of these hidden abodes. "There is, also, the fire of Pur-

gatory, in which the souls of the just are purified by punishment for a stated time, to the end that they may be admitted into their eternal country, into which nothing defiled entereth." This Purgatory is the second of these hidden abodes. "Lastly, a third sort of receptacle is that in which were received the souls of the saints who died before the coming of Christ our Lord, and where, without any sense of pain, sustained by the blessed hope of redemption, they enjoyed a tranquil abode." This third place is "Abraham's bosom." Now, the soul of Christ, after His death on the Cross, descended into Hell—into these hidden abodes; not into the first, which is the true Hell, from which there is no deliverance, but into the second and the third, that is, into Purgatory and Abraham's bosom—to liberate from "Abraham's bosom" the souls of the just who died and were borne there before His advent, and introduce them, through the merits of His passion, into Heaven itself; for none could go to Heaven until Christ should die!—and, also, to liberate from Purgatory the souls of the just who had died indebted to the Divine justice, and were purified in the fire of Purgatory—according to Questions 5 and 6. "Wherefore, until He died and rose again, Heaven was closed against every child of Adam; and the souls of the just, on their departure from this life, were borne to the bosom of Abraham; or, as is still the case with those who have something to be expiated, and die indebted (to the Divine justice), were purified in the fire of Purgatory." And the concluding sentence of Question 6 implies that these hidden abodes are "the utmost recesses of the earth." "He," that is, Christ, "penetrates into the inmost recesses of the earth, that He might transport into bliss the souls most dear to Him, whose deliverance from thence He had achieved."

According to these citations, it appears that Purgatory is a place to which the truly redeemed by Christ go; who, although they have remission of sins, as to eternal punishment, yet are liable to some temporal punishment yet re-

maining upon them, or for some blemishes or defects of venial sins for which they had not repented; and suffer punishment and are purified by fire for the same, for a longer or shorter period, before admission into Heaven itself. Where Purgatory is situated, beyond a general location "in the inmost recesses of the earth," no one presumes to say. And again: That "Prayers for the Dead," these pious dead in Purgatory, are founded on the doctrine of a Purgatory; for prayers avail not for the wicked, who go to Hell immediately, without hope; nor for the just, who die without owing any temporal punishment and without venial sin, and ascend directly to Heaven, without stopping in Purgatory, and consequently need no prayers, being supremely happy. Abraham's bosom being now empty, there are no souls to be prayed for there. It follows, that if there be no Purgatory, there can be no prayers for the dead. And again: That the souls of the pious dead in Purgatory are subjected to fires that are both purifying and penal; but the precise nature of the torments, and the kind, and degree, and continuance of the pains, are left to imagination, which has been stretched to give vividness to the horrors and miseries that dwell there. And lastly: According to the citations, "the souls detained in Purgatory are relieved by the suffrages of the faithful, but chiefly by the acceptable sacrifice of the Mass." The suffrages consist in "sacrifices of Masses," which the faithful procure to be offered, by the Priests, for the dead, for which payment is made in money, or in other forms,—"by prayers," offered by the faithful, or by the Priests for them; "by alms-giving and other works of piety," which are meritorious for the relief of the departed; and by "endowments of testators," or others, for the payment for Masses and prayers by the "Priests and Ministers of the Church, and those who are bound to render this service." The sacrifice of the Mass (which can be offered by the Priests alone) lies at the foundation of the relief of the souls in Purgatory, and all the

suffrages of the faithful turn upon the efficacy of the Mass, and demand it to be offered. Hence, prayers for the dead, so far as they are efficacious, go through the priesthood, and enhance the power and enrich the treasury of the Church. The Church literally holds the key of Purgatory, but is wholly unable to assure the faithful how long the souls of their friends may be detained in that miserable place, nor to what extent they must suffer, nor in what way their suffrages, on their behalf, are applied for their benefit, whether the Lord receives them in the way of satisfaction or intercession. Such are these dogmas of Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead.

If next we inquire whence they originated? the answer is, not from the Scriptures, either of the Old or of the New Testament, as will presently appear; not from the Revelation of God, but from the imagination of man—and this is a matter of history. The ideas of Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead are plainly of heathen origin, and consist of a transfer of the opinions of the Greeks, respecting the state of the dead in their Hades, to Christianity; and its teachings were made to harmonize therewith. The philosophy with which the Church was corrupted, above all others, from the second century after Christ to the sixth, was that of Plato, esteemed by many the wisest of all the ancient philosophers, and who confessed the necessity of waiting for a Divine instructor, who might direct men how to conduct themselves towards God and their fellow creatures. He was born 429 before Christ and died B. C. 347, at the advanced age of 82 years, after having diffused his peculiar tenets with great success. His philosophy, and that of his disciples, was studied and embraced by many of the early Ministers and teachers of the Church, as their writings prove, and in no place was it taught and blended with Christianity more successfully than in the celebrated school in Alexandria. And it deserves to be remembered, in this connection, that for all our knowledge of the doctrines of

the Church, in the first century, we are indebted entirely to the Holy Scriptures; for, with the exception of Clement (who, in his Epistle to the Corinthians, gives no information on the points in hand), all the Apostolic Fathers, as they are termed, wrote in the second century. Dr. Mosheim's remarks on the History of Religion in the second century (vol. I., part II., ch. 3, §§ 1-3) convey the whole truth in respect to the origin of the doctrine of Purgatory: "From this venerable simplicity," i. e., of the Christian system, "insensibly there was a considerable departure: from two principal causes. The first lay in the disposition of certain teachers, who wished to make Christianity appear in harmony with the decisions of philosophy, and who thought it elegant to state Christian precepts in the language of philosophers, jurists, and rabbins, etc. Whoever wishes for an example, need only consider what began to be taught in this age respecting the state of souls when separated from the body. Jesus and his Apostles simply taught that the spirits of holy men, on leaving the body, were received to Heaven; and that those of the wicked were remanded to Hell. And this satisfied the first disciples of Christ, in whom there was more piety than curiosity. But this plain doctrine was materially injured, when Christians were induced to agree with the Platonics and others, that only the souls of heroes, and men of distinguished abilities, were raised to Heaven; while those of others, being weighed down by their sensual propensities, sunk to the infernal regions, and could never attain to the world of light till cleansed from their pollutions. From the time that this opinion began to prevail, the martyrs only were represented and believed to be happy immediately after death; and others were assigned to some obscure region, in which they were detained till the second coming of Christ, or, at least, till their impurities, which disqualified them for Heaven, should be removed from them. From this source, how numerous and how vast

the errors? What vain ceremonies? What monstrous superstitions took their rise?" Plato believed "that souls were cleansed by the torments they endured." His views were adopted by some of the distinguished Fathers, and the errors of Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead may be traced mainly to the influence of his philosophy. Virgil, in the sixth Book of his *Æneid* (B. C. 25), gives a full and graphic description of the heathen Purgatory, and this description is the prototype of all the descriptions of that imaginary place of woes which have since flowed from the pens of Roman Catholic writers, both in prose and poetry. "In the second and third centuries, the notion was broached, of the descent of Christ into the abode of the dead, to announce to the souls of the Patriarchs the accomplishment of His work, and to conduct them with Him into His glorious Kingdom;" also, "the assumption, that the true happiness or the final misery of the departed, does not commence till after the general judgment and the resurrection of the body, which appeared to render necessary the belief in an intermediate state; the soul was supposed to remain there, from the moment of its separation from the body, to the said catastrophe"! Next followed the idea of "purifying fire." The teachings among the divines of these centuries, and onwards to the seventh century, on the state of souls between death and judgment, were various, and unsettled the plain teachings of the Scriptures, and the way was finally prepared for the doctrine of Purgatory. In the subsequent centuries, the conceits of the learned men of the Latin Church (not, indeed, embraced by all) divided *Heaven* into three parts, the visible, or the firmament, the spiritual, where saints and angels dwell, and the intellectual, where the blessed behold the face of God; and *Hell*, first, into Hell proper, where devils and the damned dwell; second, into the subterranean regions intermediate between Heaven and Hell, which were divided into, first, Purgatory, which lies nearest to Hell; second, *limbus infantum*, where

all children remain, who die unbaptized; and third, *limbus patrum*, or Abraham's bosom, the abode of the Old Testament saints to whom Christ went and preached.

The time when the doctrine of Purgatory, with others equally erroneous, was formally recognized in the Latin Church, is a fact in history! "Gregory I., called 'the Great' who was created Pope in A. D. 590, may rightly be called the inventor of the doctrine of Purgatory, if invention it was. On the one hand, he laid down the doctrine of Purgatory as an article of faith; and on the other, he was the first writer who clearly propounded the idea of a deliverance from Purgatory by intercessory prayer, by Masses for the dead, and adduced instances in support of his view, to which he himself attached credit;" and from his day onward, his views were more generally adopted, until, by the Canons of the Council of Trent and the Roman Catholic Catechism based upon them, Purgatory and Prayers for the Dead became dogmas of that Church, to be believed and taught under the penalty of Anathema!*

The fundamental error of the dogma of Purgatory, if we trace its rise *historically*, which we prefer doing, consists in the denial of the Scripture doctrine of the unchanging happiness of the souls of the righteous, and misery of the souls of the wicked, immediately after death. All the errors of a doctrinal kind, touching the perpetual and saving efficacy of the one sacrifice offered by our Lord upon the Cross; the nature of the Lord's Supper; the nature of Justification and Sanctification; the merit of the personal sufferings of sinners to relieve them from punishment; and the purifying nature of fire on redeemed souls, and more besides, have all been bottomed upon this error, and cluster around, and have been shaped to conform to it; and with its destruction they all vanish into thin air.

* Hagenbach's History of Doctrines, §§ 69, 77, 141, 206, 208, 226, 260, and the Ecclesiastical Historians, and their Authorities.

That the souls of men are unchangeably happy or miserable, immediately after death, the following testimony from Scripture will show. First: The whole race, under the covenant of works, fell with Adam in his first transgression, under the wrath of God, and were exposed, by reason of both original and actual sin, to punishment in Hell forever.* “All sin being a want of conformity unto, or transgression of, the law of God, which is holy, just and good, deserves the eternal wrath and curse of God, although all sins are not equally heinous, some by reason of various aggravations being more so than others;” which brings us to this truth, that the duration of the punishment of all sin is eternal, and the nature of the punishment is the same, but the degree of punishment is different, varying with the character of the sin, whether heinous or otherwise; and consequently, the Scriptures, or rather God Himself, the great Judge of all, makes no such distinction between the sins of men, as to call some venial and others mortal—a distinction fabricated to meet the idea of Purgatory, and to furnish subjects for its fires.†

Second: The only and all-sufficient expiation for sin, of every kind and degree, is the blood of Christ our Redeemer. “The blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanseth us from all sin.” By His obedience to the precepts of the law, and His suffering and death for the satisfaction of the penalty of the law on our behalf, He has effected complete and eternal redemption for all His people who believe in Him. Their obedience, or their suffering, no matter how or where rendered, in no way, shape, or form, delivers them from wrath, or forms any portion of their justification before

* Gen. 2: 15-17; Eccl. 15: 21-22; Acts 17: 26; Rom. 6: 23; John 3: 14-36; 5: 24; 1 Cor. 6: 9-10; James 1: 15; 1 John 5: 11-12; Rev. 21: 8-27; Ps. 9: 17; 11: 6; Rom. 1: 18; 2: 6-11.

† 1 John, 3: 4; Rom. 7: 12; Deut. 27: 26; Gal. 3: 10; Matt. 25: 41-46; Mark 9: 42-48; Heb. 2: 2-3; Ezra 9: 14; Ps. 78: 17; 32: 56; Luke 12: 47-48; Rom. 2: 1-29; Heb. 10: 29; James 2: 10-11; Ezk. 18: 4.

God. Christ Jesus performs the whole. So that, when we believe in Him, we immediately pass from death to life; the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us; God justifies us in Him, and lays nothing more to the charge of His elect, nor can they ever more come under condemnation; the law is satisfied for all time and for all sins, past, present, and to come; and we are no longer enemies but children; He is no longer our offended Judge, but our reconciled Father. Hence, to adopt the language of Calvin Inst., Book III., ch. 5 and 6: "Purgatory is a pernicious fiction of Satan, that makes void the Cross of Christ, intolerably insults the Divine mercy, and weakens and overturns our faith. For what is their Purgatory but a satisfaction for sins, paid after death, by the souls of the deceased? Thus the notion of satisfaction being overthrown, Purgatory itself is immediately subverted from its very foundations. The blood of Christ is the only satisfaction, expiation and purgation for the sins of the faithful. What is the necessary inference, but that Purgatory is nothing but a horrible blasphemy against Christ."*

And further, that all this was effected by our Lord once and forever, when He offered up Himself upon the Cross, where His precious body was broken and His blood shed for our sins; neither was He ever more, in any manner whatever, either to repeat this sacrifice of Himself, or to make it, through any ordinance in the Church, a perpetual oblation, to be offered at any time and for any purpose, by either ministers or people! Hence, the perpetual sacrifice of the Mass is an invention of man, and a monstrous blas-

* Isa. 9: 6-7; 53: 1-12; Matt. 1: 20-21; Phil. 2: 58; Gal. 4: 4-5; John 3: 16; 1 Tim. 2: 5-6; 1 John 4: 9-10; John 10: 27-30; Rom. 8: 23-26; 5: 1-11; Prov. 15: 8; Rom., chap. 1, 2 and 3; Gal. 2: 16; 3: 10; 6: 12-15; 2 Tim. 1: 9; Titus 3: 5; Phil. 3: 9; John 14: 6; Acts 4: 12; Jer. 23: 6; Titus 2: 11-14; Rom. 8: 29-39; Col. 2: 9-10; 1 Cor. 1: 30-31; Heb. 5: 9; Eph. 1: 1-23, etc., etc.

phemy. The Lord's Supper is commemorative of the one sacrifice, but is not, in any sense whatever, the sacrifice itself.*

Third: The sanctification of the elect, and their final preparation for Heaven, is purely the work of the Holy Spirit, which He carries on immediately by His own gracious influences upon the soul of the believer; and mediately through the Word or truth of God, which is applied to the soul, as it is read, or preached, or spoken, or remembered; or as it is impressed by the ordinances of God's House, or by the providential dealings of God towards itself or others, and especially in the form of afflictions and fatherly chastisements; and no means of any kind are efficacious independent of the ever blessed Spirit. And the sanctification of the believer, and his preparation for Heaven, is consummated in this world, and in this only; death terminates the work. And, finally, the trials and afflictions to which the Lord's people are subjected, as means of their sanctification, are disciplinary, and not penal, in their nature and intent; they are expressions of a tender Father, made in love to their souls, and not manifestations of the wrath of an angry and unreconciled Judge, searching for the uttermost farthing of the debt of the believing sinner to Divine Justice, when that debt has already been fully and forever paid by Christ, his surety and substitute. Hence, there is no such distinction made in Scripture between guilt and punishment as is contended for; no such view of justification as that the guilt of the penitent sinner is remitted, and the penalty of eternal punishment forever blotted out, yet that there are temporal punishments for sins to be borne by believers, either in this world or in Purgatory in the world to come; even dreadful sufferings, both penal and purify-

* Heb. 9: 11-28; 1 Pet. 2: 24; 3: 18; Heb. 7: 23-27; 10: 11-18; 1: 3; Acts 2: 32-36; John 19: 30; Matt. 26: 26-29; 1 Cor. 11: 23-29; 10: 16-17; John 6: 35-63.

ing, for sins unrepented of, or blemishes still existing at death! Christ has paid the debt, and God, by His providential care over His people, will keep them in life until they are made meet by His Holy Spirit for the inheritance of Heaven, and then death opens the way. No horrid fires are necessary to be kindled around the disembodied spirit, either for its perfect justification or sanctification.*

Fourth: This world is the only place where souls are saved or lost, and that entirely so; and there are but two places to which they go in the eternal world, according to the characters which they have formed in this—the righteous to Heaven, and the wicked to Hell.†

Fifth: Into one or other of these places the souls of men go immediately and unchangeably after death—the righteous into Heaven, the wicked into Hell! Their bodies are raised in the last day, and their souls, that have existed apart, are reunited to them, and then, after the general Judgment, in soul and body, they return to their respective places, to Heaven or to Hell, as before.‡

* Gen. 6: 3; Ps. 51: 5-12; Jer. 4: 4; Acts 17: 14; John 1: 12-13, 3: 3-8; Gal. 6: 15; Eph. 2: 1-5; Col. 2: 13; Titus 3: 4-7; Jas. 1: 18; 1 Pet. 1: 23; 1 John 2: 29; 3: 9; 1 Pet. 1: 22-23; Col. 1: 3-6; Luke 24: 45; John 6: 43-45; Rom. 9: 16; 1 Cor. 3: 5-7; 2 Cor. 3: 14-17; 4: 3-5; Eph. 11: 17-18; 1 Cor. 11: 23-24; Gen. 22: 1-42; 36: 45; 4: 5; Ruth. 1: 20-21; 2 Sam. 12: 7, 13-23; Ps. 57; Jas. 5: 11; Heb. 12: 5-11; Rev. 3: 19; Rom. 8: 18-39; 1 Cor. 11: 32; Ps. 94: 12-15; 2 Cor. 4: 7-18, etc., etc.; Phil. 1: 6; 20: 24; Heb. 9: 27; Eccl. 12: 7; 9: 5-6; Ps. 17: 15; Luke 12: 40; John 14: 1-3; 17: 24; 2 Cor. 5: 1-11.

† Ps. 95: 7-11; Heb. 3: 13-19; John 9: 4; Matt. 7: 13-14; 2 Cor. 5: 10; 6: 1-2; Heb. 9: 27; Eccl. 9: 5-6; 12: 7, etc., etc.; Ps. 139: 8; Job 11: 8; Amos 9: 2; Matt. 11: 23; 18: 8-9; Mark 9: 43-44; Gen. 5: 24; Heb. 1: 5; 2 Kings 2: 1-11; Heb. 11: 8-16; Ps. 73: 24-25; 17: 15; Titus 1: 2; Heb. 11: 24-27; Ps. 57: 87; Num. 23: 10; Prov. 14: 32; Ps. 23: 4; 1 Pet. 1: 4; Heb. 10: 34; Matt. 5: 12; Phil. 3: 20; Col. 1: 53; 1: 3; Heb. 4: 11; 11: 1-22; 2 Cor. 5: 1-8; Matt. 25: 46; Ps. 9 and 17; Prov. 5: 5-7; 27: 9; 18: 15; 11: 24; 23: 14; Isa. 23: 14; Ps. 11: 16; Jude v. 7; 2 Pet. 2: 1-9; Matt. 5: 22; 23: 33; Luke 12: 5; Matt. 10: 28; 5: 29-30; Mark 16: 16, etc., etc.

‡ John 14: 1-4; 17: 24; Phil. 1: 21-23; 2 Cor. 4: 1-18; 5: 1-9; Acts 7: 55-60; Luke 23: 43; 2 Cor. 12: 2-4; Rev. 2: 7; 3: 5; 12: 21; 22: 1-5; Luke

Sixth: There is not one solitary notice of the sufferings of redeemed souls in a Purgatory after death, made in the entire New Testament; not so much as an allusion, which is an inconceivable omission, on the supposition that they were liable to such sufferings; nor has God, who tenderly regards His saints, prescribed any prayers, or offerings, or works, which should be offered or done by living relations, or friends, or Priests, for the benefit or relief of their souls in Purgatory. The whole of this important matter is passed over in perfect silence. The truth is, it has no existence but in the wicked fancies of men. When we die, Christ Jesus "shall reward every man according as his work shall be." Our everlasting state and place of abode are both fixed. "He that is unjust, let him be unjust still; and he which is filthy, let him be filthy still; he that is righteous, let him be righteous still; and he that is holy, let him be holy still."—Rev. 22 : 10-12.

The principal passages of Scripture adduced in proof of Purgatory, by Bellarmin, the chief of the Papal polemic theologians, and by others, may not be passed over, since the Scriptures are the only and sufficient rule of faith and practice, and the invented reasons of men, and opinions of ancient Fathers, and decrees of Councils, early or late, the consent of nations, and the testimony of apparitions, are of no value, independent of Scripture.

The whole Old Testament is given up as furnishing no proof of the doctrine! Nor, be it observed, can the doctrine be fastened upon God's ancient people, while they continued His people. Since the destruction of the civil state of the Church, and their rejection "till the fullness of the Gentiles be come in," they have marvellously departed

12 : 10-16 ; 1 Pet. 3 : 19-20 ; 2 Pet. 2 : 4-9 ; Gen. 3 : 19 ; Eccl. 12 : 7 ; 1 Cor. 15 ; 1 Thess. 4 : 13-18 ; John 5 : 28-29 ; Acts 24 : 15 ; 1 Thess. 4 : 14 ; Matt. 10 : 28 ; Matt. 25 : 31-46 ; Rev. 20 : 11-15 ; etc. etc. ; Jude 5 : 7 ; Acts 1 : 25 ; John 17 : 12 ; Luke 16 : 22-23 ; Rev. 14 : 13.

from the teachings of Moses and the Prophets ; and in no doctrines more curiously and widely than in those which relate to the state of souls after death, and the places of rewards and punishments to which they go, and the nature of both. They hold to the notion of Purgatory, akin to that entertained by the Romanists. For an account of these conceits, gathered in considerable measure from heathen philosophers, reference may be had to "*Basnage Hist. of the Jews,*" Book IV., chapters 30, 31, and 32.

From the New Testament the following passages are adduced, namely, Matt. 5 : 25-26, interpreted thus : The venial sin is "the uttermost farthing;" the "pay" is made up of the sufferings of the departed soul and the suffrages of the faithful who live; and the "prison" is Purgatory. The passage speaks of matters pertaining to this life, not the next, and is a prudent caution, given by our Lord to his disciples, to close our difficulties with men, without allowing them to proceed to injurious extremities; and the spiritual view of it is, we should make our peace speedily with God in this life, while we are on our way to judgment, lest, failing to do so, we perish in the prison of Hell forever—for the wages of sin is death eternal! Matt. 12 : 31-32 : When it is said, "blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come," it is inferred that some sins are forgiven in the world to come, and that can be done no where but in Purgatory, hence there is a Purgatory. But the expression "neither in this world, neither in the world to come," means simply never—"shall not be forgiven him," as it is expressed in v. 31. And the parallel passage in Mark 3 : 28-29, proves this to be the meaning, for it is there said : "But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of eternal damnation." The passage in Matthew, therefore, does not teach that some sins may be forgiven in the world to come. Besides, it has nothing to do with Purgatory, for Purgatory is not a place

where sins are forgiven, but where punishment is endured, where the debts of the believer are finally paid off. Again, 1 Cor. 3 : 10-15 : v. 13, "Every man's work shall be made manifest, for the day shall declare it, because it shall be revealed by fire, and the fire shall try every man's work, what sort it is. If any man's work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward ; if any man's work shall be burned, he shall suffer loss, but he himself shall be saved, yet so as by fire." This is *the strong text*. Hell is fire to try every man's work, and a man shall be saved, yet so as by fire. Now where is this fire ? Say they, the Apostle refers to Purgatory, and the fire is the fire of Purgatory ! The "gold, silver and precious stones" "are good works." "The wood, hay and stubble" are "venial sins," etc. On the contrary, the Apostle, in the whole passage, vs. 1-23, is speaking of the character and responsibility of Ministers of the Gospel, by whose instrumentality men "believe, even as the Lord giveth to every man"—v. 5. They are, in themselves, as to their ability to convert men, "nothing." "God gives the increase." They are to labor faithfully (as "every man shall receive his own reward," "according to his own labor,") to lay the foundation of God's building, "which is Jesus Christ," and build up *the material* of which God's building is composed, namely, believing and redeemed souls, upon this foundation. A Minister, therefore, must look well to his material, even to the character of his converts, that they may be made by the tillage of God's Spirit, and set upon the true foundation, and be as "gold, silver and precious stones" in the building : so that, in the Judgment day, when the souls of men shall be tried by fire, whether they shall be gathered by Christ into His garner or burnt up with unquenchable fire, they may be found worthy, acceptable to God, and be saved ; and not be as "wood, hay and stubble," to be cast out by Christ and burnt up with fire unquenchable. In this manner the fire shall try every man's work, of what

sort it is. If any man's work abide which he hath built thereupon, even upon the foundation Christ Jesus, "he shall receive a reward;" the souls redeemed through his faithful instrumentality shall be his "joy and crown of rejoicing—in the presence of our Lord Jesus Christ at His coming." 1 Thess. 2: 19. On the contrary, "If any man's work shall be burned"—if those who believed under his ministry are rejected in judgment, and are cast into everlasting fire—"he shall suffer loss;" no redeemed souls shall be the joy and crown of his rejoicing: ruined souls and a fruitless ministry are revealed! And what shall become of that Minister himself in that day? The Apostle proceeds, upon the supposition that, after all, he is a converted man; and he adds, burnt are his materials which he put in God's building, "the wood, hay and stubble," "but he himself shall be saved!" How amazing that he should be? How can he be? He answers, "*yet so as by fire!*" Barely saved; hardly escaping that fire himself. The Apostle uses a striking and terrible figure—"saved, yet so as by" or through "fire!" using the same figure with Amos 4: 11: "I have overthrown some of you as God overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah, and ye were as a fire-brand plucked out of the burning; yet have ye not returned unto me, saith the Lord." And again, with Zachariah 3: 2: "Is not this a brand plucked out of the fire?" And yet again, with Jude, v. 23: "Others save with fear, pulling them out of the fire." Such a Minister is saved, pulled, as it were, by the amazing mercy of God in Christ, out of the very fire of Hell! And the Apostle closes with the solemn warning to Ministers: If any man shall defile or destroy the "temple of God," lead the souls astray in whom the Spirit of God dwells, "him shall God destroy;" and, also, to the people, not to glory in men, but consider that all things are theirs for their eternal good, and they are Christ's, and Christ is God's. The passage refers to the trial, in the last day, of Ministers in respect to their labors

and the fruits of their labors, and suits not the notion of Purgatory; for, first, it lacks the distinct assertion of such a place, where the fire is to try men's works, and, also, the time after their death. Second: Purgatory is for purging away—purifying, not for trying: for the souls that go there, upon the supposition, are already tried and condemned at their death, for venial sins, etc., and go there to be purified. Third: The fire of Purgatory is to act upon men's souls, not their works: to purify men's souls, not try their works. Fourth: Purgatory is for certain men only, who die under venial sin; but here the fire is to try every man's work, and so, if the place of trial be Purgatory, then every man must go there. Fifth: Purgatory is for those only who will finally be saved, but the passage intimates that the works of some may be burned and they suffer loss; but in Purgatory no man really suffers loss, but, on the contrary, all his torment is so much gain in the account of his liberation, till the debt is paid. And, sixth: The salvation is not, as is contended for, "by fire" literally: but it is "so as by fire," that is, a difficult salvation; the expression is figurative. Such is the sense of this passage, and it has nothing to do with Purgatory. Again, 1 Cor. 15: 29: "Else what shall they do which are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? Why are they, then, baptized for the dead?" Who are the dead for whom the living are baptized, if they be not the dead in Purgatory? And what is their baptism for the dead, but all the prayers, and alms, and services rendered by the living for their good.

The Apostle here reasons of the resurrection of the dead; of Christ the first fruits, and, by consequence, of them that sleep that are His. He speaks of the resurrection of Christ and all His; hence, in this passage, he uses the plural (as it is in the original) for all the dead of whose resurrection he is reasoning; "else," otherwise if it be so that the dead rise not, neither Christ the first fruits, nor them that die in Him and are His, "what shall they do"—what will

become of them "who are baptized for the dead?" that is, for the *sake of Christ*, the first fruits from the dead, we in our baptism receiving and resting in Him as our resurrection and our life: and for the *sake of our brethren* who have died in Him, we in our baptism approving, embracing and following their faith? "If the dead rise not at all," neither Christ nor His people, why are they, the living, "baptized for the dead," and why stand we in jeopardy every hour, by placing our eternal well-being upon an uncertainty? vs. 30-32, etc. This we believe to be the sense of this passage; and, in as much as it refers wholly to the baptism of a profession in Christ, and to the final resurrection of the body, it has no bearing on Purgatory, which has nothing to do with these things, but with the purifying of souls for Heaven; besides, the sense given to baptism, namely, that it refers to prayers, alms, the suffrages of the living for the souls of the dead, is foreign to the sense of that word in all the Scriptures, whether used figuratively or literally.

And again, 1 Pet. 3: 18-20: "For Christ also hath once suffered for sins—being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit: by which, also, he went and preached unto the spirits in prison; which sometime were disobedient, when once the long suffering of God waited in the days of Noah, while the ark was a preparing," etc. Now, what prison is this but Purgatory? and what spirits are there but those sent there to be purified from sin? The Apostle reasons, that as Christ suffered for us we ought to suffer for him; and warns us by the awful doom of the men before the flood, who would not hear his voice, and, like Noah, believe and be saved. The sufferings of Christ terminated at His death: "He was put to death in the flesh," but that same body was "quickened" into life again "by the Spirit." The resurrection of the body of our Lord is ascribed to God: "Whom God hath raised up, having loosed the pains of death; because it was not

possible that he should be holden of it." It was an act of justice on the part of God, after Christ Jesus had fully and forever satisfied the Law on behalf of His people, to loose the pains of death and set the surety free, and advance Him to His throne and reward at His own right hand in the heavens. Hence, God brought Him again from the dead by His mighty power, and this quickening unto life again was by the operation of that same Holy Spirit, by whose overshadowing power that sacred body was at first conceived and quickened in the womb of the Virgin Mary; and by the operation of the same Holy Spirit shall all the mortal bodies of Christ's redeemed ones be quickened in the last day.

And by or in this same Holy Spirit, he went and preached (as He did through Patriarchs and Prophets), through Noah, (who was called to be a preacher of righteousness, and inspired for this special service,) to the men of the Old World, warning them to flee from coming wrath, while the long suffering of God bore with their disobedience, all the time the ark was a preparing. But they obeyed not, and the flood took them all away, and they *were* (not *had been*) in the prison of Hell, at the time Peter was writing of them. There is no Purgatory here; for Christ Jesus does not go to Purgatory to preach—no preaching is done there, but much burning of souls to purify them; but further, the matter is settled upon the admission of those who hold this pernicious error, that those who were drowned by the flood all died in mortal sin, and hence could not go to Purgatory at all! So much for Purgatory.

Prayers for the Dead, also, perish with the establishment of the doctrine of the unchanging happiness or misery of the souls of men immediately after death; for they can be of no benefit, either for those in Heaven or in Hell, for

* Acts 3: 23-24; 13: 30-34; 1 Cor. 6: 14; Eph. 1: 20; Col. 2: 12; 1 Thes. 1: 10; Heb. 13: 20; 1 Pet. 1: 21; Rom. 8: 11.

they are fixed in their eternal state; and it would be a grievous sin to pray for the greater happiness of the one, and for some mitigation of the pains of the other, against the infinite goodness of God on the one hand, and His infinite justice on the other. Luke 16: 19-31. In the Missal of the Romish Church, on "Masses for the Dead," Masses and Prayers are offered for "all the faithful dead," from the Pope down to the private member, and at designated times, but there is no mention in any one prayer of deliverance from Purgatory; that word is not introduced, but deliverance of the souls "from the pains of Hell, and from the deep lake," "from the mouth of the lion," from "the hands of the enemy." The Lord is entreated to receive the sacrifices and prayers offered for the souls of the departed by the living, so that they may be purged of the stains of earthly contagion, have all their sins remitted, and "through the intercession of the blessed Mary, ever Virgin, and all the saints," and "through our Lord," be received into "the region of Paradise," and admitted "to the eternal fellowship of Him in whom they believed," and "of the saints," and "possess eternal joys." According to the Decrees of the Council of Trent and the Catechism, all these Prayers and Masses are offered for the dead who go to Purgatory. There being no such place as Purgatory. Masses and Prayers for the dead are emptiness and vanity. Beside all this, there is not, in all the Bible, one solitary prayer offered for the dead, and not one doctrine that involves the necessity, nor one command enjoining such a duty.

It is, nevertheless, a fact, that the custom of praying for the pious dead did make its appearance as early as the second century, and prevail extensively, being inculcated by many eminent Fathers, as they are called, first spoken of by Tertullian, A. D. 200; and the custom finally became rooted in the Latin and Greek Churches, and continues in them to the present day, although they differ as

to the reasons why prayers should be offered for the dead. The Greek Church does not believe in Purgatory. The custom owed its origin to imperfect views of the full and entire satisfaction of Christ for the sins of His people; and of the happiness or misery of the dead immediately after death, in Heaven or Hell; to loose principles of interpretation of the Word of God; and to the opinions embraced by the Fathers out of the Heathen philosophies, and to the teachings of heretics. Bingham, in his "Antiquities of the Christian Church," Book XV., chap. III., sec. 16, has collected the various grounds, with the authorities, upon which the Ancient Church prayed for the dead—saints, martyrs, confessors, as well as all others—namely, in brief, not upon the supposition of any Purgatory fire (which, as has already been noted, was introduced as an article of faith in the Latin Church by Gregory First, in the seventh century, for the public prayers of the Churches and the private prayers of individuals prove the contrary,) but prayers were made for all holy men of every sort, from the foundation of the world, and even for the Virgin Mary herself; some of the prayers for the dead were eucharistical, or thanksgivings for their deliverance out of the troubles of this world; they conceived that all men died with some remainder of frailty and corruption, and, therefore, desired God to deal in mercy, and not in strict justice, with them—so prayed Augustin for his mother, Monica; they put a distinction between the perfection of Christ and the imperfection of all other men, the most holy and exalted—Christ being the only person for whom prayer was not then made in the Church; they prayed for all Christians, as a testimony of their respect and love for them, and of their own belief in the soul's immortality; conceiving the souls of saints to be in an imperfect state of happiness till the resurrection, they had respect to this in their prayers for them, that God would finally bring, both the living and the dead, to this blessed state of a glorious resurrection. Such were the general

reasons for this custom ; and the ancients, in addition, held certain opinions concerning the state of the departed that fostered the custom—such as the sequestration of the souls of the blessed in some place out of Heaven, called Hades, Paradise, or Abraham's bosom, where, in refreshment and joy, they expected a complete happiness at the end of all things : Again, that Christ should reign a thousand years on earth before the general judgment ; they, therefore, prayed that the dead might obtain a part in the first resurrection of the dead at Christ's coming, it being reckoned a punishment not to be admitted with the first that should rise to this state of glory : Again, that there would be a fire of probation, not in Purgatory, but at the last day, through which every saint of every age, not excepting the Virgin Mary herself, must pass ; the fear of this purging or baptism by fire, prompted them to pray for the dead : And, finally, some believed that the prayers of the living were of use to procure an addition to the rewards of the righteous, and even to mitigate the pains of the damned, though not effectual for their real deliverance ! This custom, and these reasons and opinions, received the sanction of some of the greatest names among the Fathers, sound and unsound, from the second to the seventh century, in whole or in part ; as, for example, "Hermes Pastor, Justin Martyr, Pope Pius, Irenæus, Tertullian, Origen, Caius Romanus, Victorinus Martyr, Novatian, Lactantius, Hilary, Ambrose, Gregory Nyssen, Prudentius, Augustin, and Chrysostom."

The ancient Greek and Latin Liturgies recognized Prayers for the Dead, and they are treated of in the 41st, 42d, and 43d chapters of the Eighth Book of the "Apostolic Constitutions ;" and into this folly the Jews have fallen since the destruction of Jerusalem and the reign of the Talmuds and Rabbis. In all this custom, and in these reasons and opinions for praying for the dead, we distinctly trace the neglect of the Holy Scriptures as the only and sufficient

rule of faith and practice, and the introduction of philosophy, and human reason, and natural affections, and fanciful imaginations, as disturbing elements, in the place thereof. It is amazing how such errors should enter and maintain their footing in the Church for so many ages. But a distinction may, and should be, drawn between praying for the dead and Purgatory. In the earlier ages of the Church, as is evident, the one did not involve the other. Prayers for the Dead, in these ages, were not offered in view of a Purgatory, and cannot be cited as evidence of the belief of the Church in the existence of such a place. Since the adoption of Purgatory into the faith of the Romish Church, Prayers for the Dead are offered for those only who are supposed to go to that dolorous place; but there being no such place, Prayers for the Dead are a vanity; and upon whatever ground offered, in any age of the Church, being without authority from the Word of God, have been and are, and ever will be, vanity and sin!

ARTICLE IV.

A SUPERNATURAL REVELATION NECESSARY.

In the early ages of the Church, we do not recollect that the question of the "necessity" of a Divine Revelation was ever mooted by the assailants of Christianity. It was a universally received opinion, that the gods had intercourse with men—and, in fact, dwelt amongst them, as the existence of their numerous "Oracles" evinced. But in modern times, and in Christian lands, altogether the most important part of the discussion of the "Evidences" relates to the NECESSITY there is for a supernatural communication from God to man.

It must be confessed, that if it be possible for man to be fully developed, and to attain his highest perfection and happiness, simply and solely under the influence and guidance of the light of nature, then a Supernatural Revelation is *not* necessary, and consequently has not been given. God does not deal in works of supererogation—He does not aid man unless such help is needed. We must put our own shoulders to the wheel before we call on Hercules! But, on the contrary, if it be found that the light of nature is *not* sufficient to meet the moral and spiritual demands of humanity, and to lead to its highest moral and intellectual attainments, then, on the supposition that God is good, and designs the greatest happiness of his creature, man, an unsophisticated reason is compelled to conclude that He, as a kind Father, will provide for man that which is necessary to the fulfilment of the true end of his being, which is to glorify God and enjoy Him forever. The NECESSITY for a Divine Revelation being once granted, it follows that one has actually been given. And this once admitted, the task of deciding as to the precedency of the rival claimants for this high honor is comparatively easy. So that to establish the *necessity* for a Divine Revelation is, in our estimation, by far the most important part of the discussion of the claims of the Bible to be the inspired Word of God. We propose, therefore, in the present article, to give—what may possibly not be new to others of deeper thought and more extensive reading, but nevertheless what is with us—an original argument in favor of the necessity of a Supernatural Revelation from God to man.

Truth is as essential to the growth and well-being of the soul of man, as food is to the body. And that same necessity, if such a term be allowable in this connection, existing in the character of God, the great Father of being, which prompts Him to provide suitable aliment for our physical natures, would also require Him to furnish such food for the mind as is adapted to its development, growth, and

full expansion. Without the ability to grow in knowledge, wisdom, and intellectual strength and capacity, man would be no more than a sagacious brute:—nay, without instincts, without clothing, without natural armor or means of defence and protection, he would be amongst the most miserable of brutes! That man, therefore, should grow in knowledge, and increase in moral and intellectual vigor and strength, is a necessity of the circumstances of his existence; it is, to the eye even of a naturalist, manifestly essential to the fulfilment of the end of his being. Let it be granted, therefore, that God designed man, in his original creation, to be a *progressive* being, growing in knowledge, wisdom, and in intellectual capacity.

The next question to be determined is—what kind of knowledge and culture is most suitable for man, as he is constituted? By examining the comparative anatomy of an animal, we can determine in what element it is designed to live, whether in the air, or earth, or water; and, also, what kind of food is most suitable to its nature, whether flesh, or grain, or grass, or fruits. By examining the soil by the tests of agricultural chemistry, we can readily decide as to what it is best adapted to produce, whether cereals, or grasses, or vines, etc. So, in like manner, by examining man's moral and intellectual anatomy—the soil of his mind—we may find an index as to what kind of seed it is best to sow, and what kind of intellectual food is most suitable to develop the mind, and to enable man to accomplish most successfully the design of his creation.

There will be no difference of opinion—there can be no dispute, as to the fact that man is capacitated to become familiar with the earth on which he is placed, and the physical universe within the range of his senses. Indeed, such knowledge is essential to his continued and comfortable existence in this world. His perceptive organs, his eye, his ear, his hand, etc., are all designed to bring him into immediate contact with physical nature. And he has

other faculties, admirably adapted to reproduce sensations and impressions, to compare, to generalize, and to draw conclusions, and thus to ferret out the secrets of nature, and to become master of what is called natural science. We find, therefore, a mutual adaptation between certain constitutional attributes of man and the natural world around him, insomuch that we cannot conceive what use man would have for certain capacities were there no physical world:—as, for example, what use there would be for the power of vision, were there no light; or that of hearing, were there no sounds; or for the touch, were there no material world. We perceive, then, the adaptation that God has established between the outward world and certain faculties, which we will call, for the sake of distinction, the natural faculties of the mind, which would not, and could not, be unfolded and exercised in the absence of these congenial circumstances. Let it be remembered, therefore, that the mind of man would fail to attain the true end of its being without this natural development. So that there is a *necessity* for these congenial circumstances, insomuch that if we may suppose a being like man, created in some remote part of immensity, where, as yet, there was nothing—where all was without form and void, and darkness was on the face of the deep—it would be reasonable to conclude, *a priori*, that God would create a physical world around him, for the purpose of developing the germinal attributes with which he was endowed.

Let it be granted, then, that, as man is endowed with certain natural faculties—that is, germinal capacities, which the works of nature are calculated to draw out—there is a *necessity* that the works of nature should exist, or that something should exist that would develop these embryon faculties, and that man would be imperfect and fail to accomplish the end of his being without such natural development.

But, further, man has certain *moral* attributes, as well as

natural, which need to be developed and cultivated in order to his protection. And this, so far as we are capable of judging, constitutes the grand distinction between man, made in the image of God, and the brute creation. That brutes possess the same perceptive organs that man does, and, for the most part, in a much higher and more perfect degree, all admit. That they have certain other faculties, memory for example, none will deny; and that some of them are capable of a species of reasoning, of comparing and drawing conclusions, it would be difficult to disprove. But that they possess a moral nature—are influenced by any thing like a conscience—or have any sense of moral right or wrong, guilt or innocence, we have not the slightest evidence to believe. That man possesses these moral and elevating characteristics needs no proof—they are part of his nature—and, consequently, the consciousness of every human being is sufficient, without further argument or evidence, to convince him of this fact. A blind man can have no conception of colors, nor a deaf man of sounds: the fact, therefore, that he can see and hear is proof of the existence of the eye and the ear without further evidence. So, in like manner, the fact that a man may, under any circumstances, feel a sense of guilt or moral wrong, of penitence, faith, resignation, love, spiritual joy, or have an idea of moral justice, holiness, righteousness, spirituality, forgiveness, pardon—we say the fact that man, under any circumstances, is capable of having those moral conceptions and ideas, is proof of the existence of moral faculties, as much so as the sensations of light and sound are proof of the existence of the eye and the ear. All can understand how it would be impossible for a man who was born blind ever to have the slightest idea of color. Equally impossible would it be for him to have the remotest conception of right and wrong, guilt and innocence, repentance and faith, justice and holiness, mercy and pardon, without certain moral faculties, which serve as organs by which such ideas are apprehended.

Let it be granted, then, that man possesses certain moral attributes as well as natural, which, in order to his symmetrical development and the perfection of his being, it is essential should be drawn out and cultivated.

Now, since man confessedly has these moral germinal faculties, the development and cultivation of which is essential to the perfection of his nature, it is reasonable to conclude that the Creator would furnish some suitable means to that end—that is, to their proper development and cultivation. We have already admitted, that if the Almighty were to create a man with eyes, ears, and other perceptive organs, in some remote, void, and empty part of immensity, supposing such a place possible, that it would be no more than reasonable to conclude that a material and sensible world would be created suitable to the development and exercise of these organs; or that he would be removed into the midst of congenial and apposite circumstances. With equal propriety may we conclude, that if God has endowed man with certain germinal moral attributes—which we have already admitted that He has—that He will also furnish something suitable to develop them. On this question we take it for granted that we are of one mind.

The next question to be settled is this: Is the natural world adapted to develop, cultivate and exercise man's *moral* and *religious* nature? or must we look to something supernatural to accomplish this end? Let us, if you please, interrogate nature on this subject.

The account given in the book of Genesis of the creation and early history of man in the Garden of Eden, leads us to infer that it was not the design nor the expectation of the Creator that the natural world should do more than develop man's natural faculties, and that his moral nature would be developed by immediate intercourse with the Almighty or His angels. But, after man's fall and corruption, it was no longer suitable for him, an unholy being,

an enemy, to commune with a holy God; or even for sinless angels to have social intercourse with sinful men. But yet without this, or some substitute for this, man's moral nature must forever remain undeveloped. Does the natural world furnish this substitute? Let us see.

Man has a CONSCIENCE:—What, in the natural world, is calculated to develope and cultivate it? The beautiful and sublime things in nature will develope the taste, but not the conscience. The wonderful mechanism of creatures, from the highest to the lowest, illustrates the wisdom of the Creator, and will extort admiration, but will not develope the conscience. The terrible things of nature, the thunder, the tempest, the earthquake, will awaken fear and dread, and inspire awe, but they do not awaken the conscience to a sense of moral guilt! Here, then, is a faculty, part of our moral constitution, that, whilst its presence is more or less felt in every bosom, yet the natural world cannot develope and direct. And, if the fulfilment of the end of man's being, and his future happiness, depend in any degree upon the development and proper cultivation of this faculty, it is perfectly evident that they must fail without help other than that nature can give.

Again: Man has a sense of HOLINESS, of moral purity, indicated not only by consciousness, but by the baptisms, the ablutions, and purifications of all religions. But what is there in the natural world adapted to develope, cultivate and perfect this idea! It is true that nature is pure in all her varied departments—in her light, her air, her dews, her fountains, her opening flowers; but it is not *moral* purity—it is only physical—and the only lesson that this fact can teach is simply the propriety of bodily purity, common cleanliness, and no more. The moral idea of HOLINESS, the great idea of the Bible, remains wholly undeveloped. If, therefore, the development and cultivation of the idea of holiness be essential to man's perfection, (and it is impossible for him to know God without it,) it is

perfectly manifest that there is nothing in the natural world adapted to accomplish this end. We must look to something supernatural.

Once more : There is in man that which seeks for MERCY and PARDON (shall we call it an appetite for mercy and pardon ?); it is a sense of *guilt*—a feeling of ill-desert on account of sin, so universal that we shall regard it the same as a self-evident truth. Now, as every bodily appetite has something corresponding to it, peculiarly and precisely adapted to meet its demands—the appetite of hunger finds its appropriate food ; of thirst, drink; curiosity, knowledge; the social principle, society, etc.—so it is reasonable to look for something to meet the cravings of our moral appetites. But what in the provinces of nature is calculated to do this—to soothe the agonizing sense of *guilt*, or to gratify the irrepressible cravings for *mercy* and *pardon* ? There is nothing—absolutely nothing ! The laws of nature know nothing of mercy and pardon ! Nature's judges are blind ! In her code every law has its penalty, and every penalty, without mercy or mitigation, is inflicted to the letter, where there is an infraction of her laws ! Natural laws, therefore, do not admit of mercy, reprieve, or pardon ! And the God revealed only by nature, is wanting in the attributes of mercy, compassion and forgiveness.

If, therefore, a sense of moral guilt be in accordance with man's nature, (and he could not feel it if it were not, no more than he could feel hunger without a stimulating appetite,) and if guilty man has within him an instinctive craving for mercy and pardon, (and every man's own breast can testify as to this,) what, in all the wide range of nature, is adapted to meet, to quiet, to soothe, this sense of guilt—to gratify this irrepressible craving for mercy and pardon ? The answer is, nothing—absolutely *nothing* ! If, therefore, it be essential to man's happiness, and the perfection of his being, that these moral outgoings of his spiritual nature should find something suited to meet their

wants and gratify their cravings, he must look to something *supernatural*, since the natural world is confessedly insufficient.

Since, therefore, it is most clearly manifest that IF the development and cultivation of the moral attributes of man be *essential* to his final perfection and happiness, that the works of nature alone are not competent to the end, and, therefore, this part of man's nature must remain undeveloped and uncultivated, or something supernatural must effect this, it becomes of the utmost importance to dispose of the "if," and to decide absolutely whether the aforesaid moral culture *be* or be *not* essential to his best interests.

This now all important question we are constrained to answer in the affirmative, from the following and like considerations, viz :

First: The very fact that God, infinitely wise and good, has made man with a moral nature, leaves it reasonable to infer that the development and cultivation of this moral nature would be for the best.

Second: It is essential to the symmetrical proportions of man's spiritual constitution that his *whole* nature should be developed—his *moral* equally with his intellectual—since, as in the material so in the spiritual world, a being with a part of its organization unduly developed, to the neglect and disparagement of the other part, becomes disproportioned, one-sided, and monstrous !

Third: We take it for granted that intelligent creatures are happy, and accomplish the end of their being in proportion as they resemble and approach the character of their Father-Creator, the fountain head of all excellence : and as God, this Father-Creator, is characterized by moral attributes as well as natural, we conclude that it is essential that man's moral nature be developed with equal step (*pari passu*) with his intellectual, in order to his perfection and greatest happiness ; or, in other words, it is essential to his being in "the image of God." Let it be granted, then,

unconditionally (without any "if"), that the development and cultivation of man's moral attributes *are* essential to his final perfection and happiness.

Let us now see exactly where we stand. We have agreed that the development and cultivation of man's moral attributes are essential to his perfection and happiness, and, also, that there is nothing in the natural world calculated to effect this desirable end. We are, therefore, necessarily left to one of two conclusions: either, *first*, that man, the noblest of terrestrial creatures, will fail in fulfilling the true end of his being, and consequently must be ultimately miserable; or, *second*, that God will, in a *supernatural* way, meet the wants of his moral nature. Which of these two conclusions shall we adopt, since we are under the necessity of adopting one or the other?

Let us, if you please, for the sake of argument, adopt the first, and conclude that, although man confessedly has certain germinal moral constituents, yet that they must, from the necessity of the case, remain dormant and uncultivated, and that, consequently, man must fail to attain final perfection and happiness! Is this our conclusion? Then it devolves upon us to explain this singular phenomenon—we say *singular*, because it is *anomalous*—contrary to God's dealings with all his other creatures! The brute beast seems, so far as we are capable of judging, to accomplish the end of its being; the little bird fills its true destiny; the insect, the plant, nay the least and lowest of God's creatures, are all "very good"—all fulfil perfectly their destiny—and only man, his last and noblest work, fails to accomplish this end!—and that, too, for the want of a provision suitable to meet his moral demands! Is it not singular? and does it not need an explanation? How, then, shall we solve the difficulty?

First: Shall we take the ground that the Creator was wanting in *goodness*, and therefore wilfully, and with malice prepense, so conditioned man that he must of necessity be

miserable? This fills our idea of a devil, but not of a God; such a being is fit only to be hated, not loved! We can not, therefore, rest in this conclusion. Our minds instinctively revolt at such a conception of God—we cannot tolerate it.

Second: Shall we, then, explain the problem by the supposition that God was wanting, not in goodness, but *wisdom*? and that the reason why man's entire nature—his moral, as well as his intellectual—was not harmoniously and happily developed by a suitable provision, was owing to an over-sight in the Creator—a deficiency of knowledge and wisdom? Shall this be our solution of the problem? Then is our God to be blamed for attempting what He had not sufficient skill to accomplish! The very statement of the conclusion does violence to our feelings of reverence! We cannot, therefore, adopt this explanation.

Third: Shall we, then, in the absence of other explanations, attempt to account for this singular phenomenon on the supposition that the Almighty was wanting, not in goodness, not in wisdom, but in *power*, and, therefore, was incapable of perfecting His good and wise designs? Is this our answer to the difficult question? Then is our God to be *pitied*, rather than blamed, for the unfortunate predicament in which His nobly endowed creature, man, is placed! What! pity the Almighty for His want of might and power! The very thought is irreverently absurd!

Now, we demand whether there be any other more reasonable or more probable solution of the difficulty than the aforesaid, viz: a want of goodness, wisdom, or power, on the part of the Creator? Are we satisfied with this? Can we take this as a satisfactory explanation of the strange conduct, if we may be allowed the expression, on the part of God, in not providing for the development and cultivation of man's moral and spiritual nature? Every principle of our bosom revolts at such a horrible conclusion! It is impossible for a sane mind to entertain it for a moment.

We must, therefore, frankly confess our inability to assign any good and valid reason in explanation of the anomalous conduct of the Creator, (supposing it true,) in leaving man wholly destitute of suitable means of developing and cultivating his moral attributes. And as it is utterly illogical to maintain any conclusion without premises, without proof, without argument, without reason, much more a strange and anomalous one, of course it must be abandoned. The only alternative is to adopt the second conclusion, which is, that God will, in a *supernatural* way, meet the wants of man's moral nature. This His goodness, wisdom, and power guarantee, and this we are bound to admit, unless there be some good and valid reason for rejecting it. Can we find such?

In the first place, then, there is nothing *absurd* in the idea. If God sees fit to make a revelation to man suitable to his moral and spiritual wants, He does not thereby contradict Himself, or act in anywise contrary to His nature. He has made no pledge against it; it will not infringe upon any of His attributes, nor will it, so far as we know, run counter to any of His plans or purposes. There is nothing, therefore, in the nature or character of God, that would make it absurd for Him to make a revelation to man.

In the next place, there is nothing in *man's* nature that would debar or shut out a revelation from God. Nay, we have seen that the circumstances and condition of fallen man imperiously demand such a revelation; we have already confessed that it is essential to his perfection and happiness.

In the third place, there is nothing in the nature of the thing itself rendering it impossible or absurd. Nay, there is every reason to believe that, when man was originally created, fully grown and mature, as we must take for granted, since it was impossible, from the very nature of the case, for the first man to have commenced life and progressed up to manhood as the succeeding race has done,

God spake to him, taught him, instructed him; and *this* was a Divine revelation. And if man has *once* received a supernatural revelation from God, this proves that there is no intrinsic difficulty in the thing, and that, if necessity require, he may *again* receive a revelation from God.

And, in the fourth place, if there be nothing in the character and purposes of God preventing a revelation—and nothing in the character and condition of man debarring it—and nothing in the nature of the thing itself rendering it intrinsically impossible and absurd, we cannot conceive any other insuperable difficulty in the way of such a revelation as man's moral wants and spiritual nature require, provided God sees fit to grant it; and His goodness, wisdom and power stand mutually pledged that man's moral and spiritual wants shall be provided for, which, as nature is insufficient, as we have already freely granted, require a SUPERNATURAL provision. This is a Divine revelation—the NECESSITY of which we sincerely believe we have demonstrated, provided we have succeeded in our effort to make plain to the mind of the reader the chain of our argument. The absolute necessity for a supernatural revelation being once granted, the task becomes comparatively easy—certainly sure—of awarding the precedence over all other claimants, from the Veda and Shaster down to the Book of Mormon, to the CHRISTIAN SCRIPTURES.

If the question has suggested itself to the mind of the reflective reader, whilst perusing the foregoing argument, how, if nature alone is insufficient to develop the moral attributes of humanity, can we explain the partial development of these moral constituents (sufficient, at least, to prove their existence) amongst tribes and nations who have not a written revelation? We answer, that is easily explained by the existence of the remains of a traditional revelation, handed down from the first fathers of mankind; and, also, from the influence exerted upon surrounding

nations by the Hebrew Scriptures and Theocracy. The position will stand the test of the most rigid scrutiny, that just in proportion as fragments and particles of this Divine truth have been incorporated into the philosophies and mythologies of Paganism, in *that* proportion has the moral nature of man been developed and elevated. Whilst, on the contrary, it will be found true beyond contradiction, that where this traditional revelation has not penetrated, there the moral part of humanity is wholly undeveloped, and man is but the king beast!

ARTICLE V.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD, AS OBTAINED FROM
SCRIPTURE AND FROM NATURE.

We offer to the attention of our readers—and we hope to commend it to their reason—the following proposition: *The knowledge of God, as obtained from Scripture and as obtained from Nature, will approximate indefinitely, but never entirely coalesce in this life.* Let us not be misunderstood: the folly of supposing that truths ever conflict, can not be committed by any believer in the existence of God; but the harmony of truths in themselves is one thing, and the harmonizing of truths, as imperfectly discovered by man, with those consummately enunciated by God, is a very different thing. The first exists by necessity; the second, as we hope to show, can be approached, but not attained.

One element in the discussion may be very briefly disposed of: there will be no division among the readers of this Review as to the worth or truth of the Scriptures. They are a conveyance, in divinely appointed words, of that which God knows to be true, and which He wishes us to

learn by revelation. Not, surely, of all that is true on any given point, but of so much as the All-Wise Teacher saw fit to communicate *in that way*. And though many difficulties of interpretation remain unconquered, and we are thus left unassured, in certain cases, of the truth that is conveyed, for the purposes of this argument we may consider the meaning of Holy Writ to be fully ascertained, and even demonstrated. Or we may employ these very deficiencies in our argument, *a fortiori*, thus: If the perfect reconciliation of Scripture and Nature would be impossible, even if we knew exactly and every where what the Bible intends, how much more hopeless does the attempt appear, when the sacred meaning is not yet perfectly defined?

As to the other element—the knowledge of God obtained from nature—the words of Paul convey our thought exactly: “We know in part * * * when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.” The phraseology here is striking, and the turn given to the thought quite unexpected. He does not say that our partial knowledge shall be completed, but done away, or destroyed, on the arrival of perfect knowledge. From which it appears, as can, also, be otherwise demonstrated, that imperfect knowledge partakes more or less of the nature of error, and needs correction or replacement, ultimately, rather than simple extension.

Now, if this be true, it involves consequences of signal importance as to the probable results of scientific study, and the true relations of Natural Science to Theology. We propose, therefore, to offer a few reflections upon the imperfections of human knowledge, for the sake of certain inferences, which will appear in their turn.

It is not without an effort, in these last days, that we obtain any adequate impression of the bright audacity that first attempted Science; that set out, resolved to read Nature’s cunningly hidden secrets, and register her unpublished laws. Astronomy was man’s first success; the

ὑπομονή ψυχική of the starry company—the mind-like steadfastness of their recurrences—invited study, encouraged memory, kindled fancy. And yet, how long the old stargazers were baffled as to the system of the heavens; how often they had to “try back” beyond their old opinions, or add a new volume to their theories! To the Astrologer, the stars were living intelligences; to Ptolemy, the jewels on the wheels of crystal spheres; to La Place, the cogs, pinions and balances of a self-regulating engine. Now, we know them, the radiant centres of cosmical influences; their “mystic dance” is threaded in some of the smaller and nearer regions of their infinite array; and we wonder, as well we may, at our own achievements. One might almost say, that if man could have imagined, beforehand, what he was going to know, he would never have dared the mighty adventure.

But if this impresses us in the most ancient, most complete, and, perhaps, most simple of the sciences, what shall we say if we look to its antipode, Organic Science? All previous lines of knowledge interlaced, and that subtle, incessant force we call Life presenting an uneliminable unknown quantity in every equation, it is like trying to braid up the tangled tresses of light in the mountain brook, or to marshal the ripples of the breeze-awakened sea in geometrical forms, to attempt the systematizing and intellectual mastery of the boundless and obscure phenomena it presents.

Yet man has attempted these things; and his victories have been little less than miraculous. Apparent chaos obeys the voice of order, and confesses the eternal supremacy of law; discordances vanish or are reconciled; and the veteran philosopher crowns the toil of ages by graving Cosmos on the pillars of the still unfinished temple. The principles that have been traced here and there are boldly projected upon the universe, like the earth-drawn meridian of the geographer. But the temple is unfinished, and the

projections are often made by fancy, and not by honest reason.

How incomplete the work of science is, and must be, will appear in part from the following considerations.

First: *The imperfection of the instruments employed*—alike the material implements, and the indispensable instrument, language.

If we turn to Astronomy again, we find not only defects in the telescope, but counter-defects. Chromatic and spherical aberration proceed from different causes, and the most natural remedies of the one aggravate the other. True, human ingenuity has, in some measure, compromised the conflicting tendencies, but this is at the expense of increased absorption of light. Now, as it is upon light that the telescope depends for the information it conveys, there is obviously a limit to the possibility of correcting errors in telescopic study, in the very nature of the instrument.

So, again, in order to perfect command of its vast powers, the telescope must be completely *clamped* by the machinery which guides it; but, to prevent vibration, its connection with the earth must be as free and slight as possible. Here, also, plainly, is imperfection made permanent by the conflict of difficulties. They can be obviated with indefinite, but not absolute, success.

These must suffice as illustrations here; they could be largely multiplied, as no one knows so well as the Astronomer. But in microscopy, these tendencies to error, due to the nature of the instrument, are enormously increased. The very power that magnifies the object, magnifies its own errors also. The literary world is flooded with books of physiological and animalcular study; and the pages of many of them teem with monsters which have no existence, save in the distorting glass or the inexperienced eye. In truth, microscopic observation seems to be a sort of divining—a knack developed, by long practice, out of native gift. The language has been quoted to us from a lecture of

Agassiz, that a naturalist must look at least a half-hour through the microscope before his estimates of what he sees are worth any thing at all. And it is notorious, that most eyes fail, and are utterly exhausted, before that indispensable, but wasted, half-hour has been fulfilled.

Not to multiply instances, in all minute questions of duration there is the inseparable—which is also the indefinable—element of the time occupied in impressions upon the senses, and in primary mental acts. We call them instantaneous, and so, for all the purposes of common life, they are; but not for the *perfection* of optical, acoustical, and other such experiments. And, still more generally, we may say that the limited powers of all material objects and resources, while they may to some extent be played off against each other, make a certain amount of imperfection and error inevitable in science.

The imperfections of language, as one of the implements of scientific labor, deserve some remark in this connection. Whatever may be true of some of the spontaneous and (in some sense) instinctive mental processes through which the mind flashes, like the electric spark through a chain, there can be no question that all ordinary voluntary ratiocination is transacted in words. Now, when we reflect, (*a*) that many terms, as invented or applied, contain an unnoticed ambiguity—(*b*) that derivative words carry with them, in some degree, the aspect of their originals—and (*c*) that most scientific names are given in advance of the complete comprehension of the thing named, so that the same mind's impression of the meaning of a term varies unconsciously—we shall have some faint conception of the treachery of that material whereof our intellectual fabric is wrought.

We doubt whether statements so obvious and familiar can require illustration, but it may be well to append a remark or two.

The phrase, "law of nature," is a most signal example

of the first difficulty mentioned above. In natural history, it formerly meant merely a generalized observation; it is now acquiring the signification of a principle of genetic development: in Chemistry, it is a discovered affinity, or a mode of combination: in Natural Philosophy, a tabulated formula of experiences, which may or may not be properly classed together—and so through the whole range of sciences. Now, the misemployment of this single term has vitiated the reasoning of a whole school of thinkers, from La Marck to the author of the “*Vestiges of Creation.*” And to this day, its equivoques make half the battles of secular and sacred science; to say nothing of the capital wrested from it to furnish out the would-be sciences, that are only quackeries, like Phrenology.

The second remark, that derivatives retain something of the peculiar aroma of their originals, illustrates the inaccuracy of reasoning which turns on a partially technical term. Chemistry, Pathology, Mineralogy, Geology, might each and all furnish us examples under this head. A hidden variation in the value of a term would similarly affect the equations of the Algebraist.

The third point, however, particularly invites illustration. Most names employed in science have been conferred in advance of thorough comprehension of the thing named (e. g. the “planets” of the astronomer and the “salts” of the chemist); and thus the meaning of the name has varied with the progress of the student. Think of the boy, Faraday, using the word Light. Its utmost eloquence will only recall to him the splendors of the rising or departing sun, the shimmer of the moonlit sea, the ruby dew-spark on the grass, or the miraculous rainbow crowning the clouds with a sudden glory. As his studies take that direction, and, from one subtle thought and magical experiment to another, he advances to profounder acquaintance with that obscure power, one of whose manifestations under certain conditions is luminosity, how vast a revolution has taken place

in the meaning of the term! And how great the logical importance of the question, whether, in a given investigation, he has employed the original L, or L', or L'', etc.

But if we turn from language as the implement of thinking, to language as the vehicle of thought or knowledge, these difficulties are vastly increased. There is, for example, the difference between the speaker's and the hearer's estimate of the meaning of a word. One may borrow here the odd conceit of a witty, but dangerous, writer of our own day, that there are at least *six* interlocutors in every *dialogue*: there are (1) A, and (2) B, (3) A's estimate of A, and (4) B's estimate of B, (5) A's B, and (6) B's A. So in speech: there is the simple meaning of the word, and the effect upon it of the context; there is, also, the shade of meaning due to the idiosyncrasy of the speaker, A, and and that peculiar to the hearer, B,—matters not appreciable in either case by the other party, though cognizable. Theological controversy has been largely constructed out of these very misapprehensions, but Natural Science has not escaped them. It was our fortune once to hear an intelligent and even scientific gentleman, who was also an unusually good Greek scholar, criticise Lyell severely for introducing into Geology the words Miocene, Pleiocene, and Pleistocene. That eminent *savant* should have known better, he protested, than to have formed, in that manner, the terms which should mark formations less new, newer, and newest. He had not noticed that the two first syllables in each word represented the plural neuter of the adjective, and that the fact declared by those vocables was the less or greater *proportion* of modern shells in the respective formations.

Of course, this difficulty increases rapidly with the subtlety, the originality, and the novelty of the matters treated of. It becomes ever the more difficult to imbed the fleeting, impalpable, arduous conception in words that shall forever after be its own. The scholars dispute at the Profes-

sor's obsequies, as to his intent and opinion on this and the other department of his deliverances. The path of science is measurably diverted by the contest, and by the associations which hang as thick about the terms as swarming bees about their branch. Or, on the other hand, the power of some early student fastens an unhappy terminology on the science he affects, and thus clogs its march or impairs its beautiful exactness.

Further illustration cannot be necessary; evidently, with all the vast, elastic powers of language, it is not a perfect instrument; it enables us neither to think with absolute correctness, nor to preserve our thought in its original identity, nor to transmit it with infallible certainty.

From these desultory observations on the imperfections of the instruments of science, we turn, for a moment, to notice *the necessary incompleteness of human knowledge*. And our rapidly diminishing space warns us rather to indicate, than to follow out, the suggestions that occur.

This incompleteness results, in part, from the vast range of fact to be known. A masterly writer in the *Edinburgh Review*, some years ago, remarked that Chemistry was no longer one science, but ten; and that no student, who understood himself or his work, any longer hoped to grasp them all equally. It was victory enough to have thoroughly possessed one's self of one, and to be tolerably familiar with the facts and principles that were salient in the others. The same thing is true of Geology, Astronomy, and indeed of every full-grown and opulent science. And the difficulty is not, merely, that division of labor is thus made necessary; but that the lines of investigation thus necessarily distributed are not independent. Each is in momentary need of the other.

More striking still is the inherent undefinableness of the particular sciences. The *terminus a quo* of some may be said to be ascertained; in Mathematics, at least, the definitions may be said to constitute such a terminus. But where shall

the *terminus ad quem* of any science be found? Where does Geology cease and Cosmogony begin? Where do Botany and Zoölogy touch? Who has set up the terminal monument of Anatomy, Physiology, Organic Chemistry?

There seems to be an ascertained impossibility of completing some discoveries. Of this Hugh Miller has given us a fine example in his "First Impressions of England," in a passage we wish it were possible to quote in full. Its drift, however, can be gathered from a few detached sentences. "It seems more than questionable whether we shall ever arrive at knowledge approximating to correct, regarding the distribution of ocean and continent in the earlier or even secondary geologic formations. * * * The geology of these older formations, whether Palæozoic or Secondary, cannot be other than imperfect. Any one system, as shown on the geologic map, is but a thing of shreds and patches. * * * The field of the map in each instance resembles one of those dilapidated frescoes of Pompeii, in which by much the greater part of the plaster has fallen from the wall, and we can trace but broken fragments of the future on the detached bits that remain."

Something might be said, also, of the subtilty of the connections of sciences in many directions; and more, of the incommensurability of sensations, organic impressions, and even opinions: but we hasten to call attention to the reflex influence of these omitted or undiscovered truths, or of unsettled questions. What philosopher does not feel that the brake was lifted from the progress of Optical Science, when Opticians agreed at last upon the "undulation," as distinguished from the "emission" theory? Who does not desire a similar settlement, in electric, of the question of two fluids or one? And, to return to Hugh Miller, how many geological problems would solve themselves, if the undecipherable geography could be read? In particular, that very problem he has urged and venturously attempted to dispose of—the origin of the rock-salt beds

in the earth—would doubtless find immediate solution in a complete geological geography.

Here, again, in the necessary incompleteness of Natural Science, and the reflex influence of the hiatus, we find clear evidence that perfect knowledge of nature is approachable, but inaccessible.

The same truth appears again in *the intrinsic imperfections of the mind, the knowing power, itself*. To say nothing here of local mental infirmities, precariousness of memory, weakness and want of balance among the faculties, and other such defects, let us reflect on the inbred necessity for investigating upon the line of a hypothesis, and converting it into a theory. That is to say, a partial, cursory, superficial survey, suggests the principle, to which, by a sort of elective affinity, facts that favor it more or less perfectly are attracted. That principle is no doubt modified somewhat as the accretion advances: modified but not transformed. The facts, as they are in nature, do not and cannot possess and mould the theory. Thus the very plan of the investigation secures one-sided and partial acquisition; insures, also, an opposite theory to correct these partialities and include omitted facts. Thus knowledge advances by a series of fluctuations; its course is not a right line, but a curved and recurved one, crossing the axis, but not coinciding with it. The *humanness* of the stand-point, therefore, involves the imperfection of science.

But we may go farther, and allege that different pursuits develope and bring out different qualities of mind, so that a partial and unsymmetrical education of his powers is the very condition of the student's familiarity with this or the other region of knowledge. The very distinctions that we draw in characterizing our friends, show the spontaneous judgment of mankind on this point. We say of one, that he has a mathematical mind, and of another, that his is a philosophical mind: whereby we not only convey our opinion that these men have certain qualities, but,

also, our impression that they are not equally well furnished as regards certain other powers. Far be it from us to deny that these several forces can exist in one intellect. Fact and philosophy would alike contradict us there. But it is unquestionable that the prevalence is almost invariably with the inductive or the deductive temper of the mind; and that certain pursuits give exercise and growth to one rather than the other of them.

There are sciences whose steps are like the march of great armies—covering whole territories by a comprehensive survey, and possessing them by the sweep of broad truths. Others are minute and microscopic, habitually collecting their formulæ, not from “wise saws,” like the first, but from “modern” and innumerable “instances.” Some find the necessary clue in bold theories—theories, in some cases, sublimely audacious. Such were the Plutonic theory in Geology, and the principle of gravitation as announced by Newton. Others eschew these daring flights, and must feel the solid foundation beneath them every moment.

Now, it is self-evident that the mind which draws in one of these directions must either have a native bent thither, or, yielding to some strong external pressure, must be thereby moulded accordingly. Rare, indeed, can be the exceptions. One Aristotle and one Humboldt must suffice the world for sixty centuries.

We are painfully sensible that this article crosses these vast tracts of thought, as the cannon ball traverses the waves—*ricochét*—glancing along the crests of unentered deeps, and quickly exhausting itself upon the surface. But if we have succeeded in setting in plain view the truth, to us so unquestionable, announced at the outset, we shall have little to regret. The endless bickerings between Theology and Science have discouraged many an ingenuous young thinker, and driven him to abandon the attempt—almost the hope—to enjoy intelligently his Bible and the Book of Nature too; have furnished the forward and too

willing sceptic with his most telling cavils; have bred a jealousy of bold research in the mind of the divine, and taught the sciolist to sneer at the ignorance and bigotry of the clerical body.

The proposition we have laid before our readers removes the assumption that the discrepancies of Science and Scripture are substantive facts, and strips off the disguise of conflict in which ignorance, impatience and bigotry have arrayed the parties. For, clearly, if the two lines of study and discovery approximate, there must have been distance to overcome, and something of that distance must remain uncompassed. To say that in their progress they converge, is to say that they have not yet met. It appears from the course of this discussion that—apart from possible or probable errors of interpretation on the part of Theology—there is reason enough for the dissonance of the two voices in the imperfections of Science: that these imperfections involve an element of error in the interpretation of nature—error that can be pared down, but not extirpated—indefinitely lessened, but not absolutely removed. The discrepancies of which we have spoken, therefore, are simply *the measures of the imperfect approximation* of the two studies; they are purely subjective, and in no wise formidable, except to the presumptuous smatterer in Science, or to the blindly jealous Church.

On the other hand, the friends of truth, of either order, must not hope, by any amount of tugging at the raveled edges of Science, to match them perfectly with the shapely, the consummate patterns of revelation. The piece is not yet recovered which must fill this or the other particular corner; and, until it is recovered, it is idle to force a union which cannot endure, and which more perfect knowledge will assuredly put to shame. This remark might be signally illustrated by a review of the works which have been put forth to reconcile Geology and the Bible, from Granville Penn, or earlier, to Hugh Miller. The ink is hardly dry

upon the paper—the sheets are scarcely stitched in the bindery—when some new discovery reduces the discrepancy and upsets the reconciliation. Geology was once denounced as atheistic; but, in Agassiz's hands, it offers physical demonstrations of the fact of creation as strong as, in Comparative Anatomy, Cuvier has made the exhibitions of design.

It follows, that the proper attitude of Theology towards all disagreement, except that of patent and malignant infidelity, is that of the largest and most friendly tolerance. It was not merely a blunder, that Dean Buckland should have been hunted into insanity by the denunciations of rigid and ignorant orthodoxy,—it was a crime. It robbed the Church of a friend, and a noble heart of its earthly peace. It did more: it proclaimed the conviction of these religious assailants, that the honor of God would suffer from too close and careful a scrutiny of His works. It taught that He must only be looked at in the favorable lights of revelation, if men were to honor Him and trust His Son. Christians might stumble every day at the mysteries of His Providence; but woe to him who stumbled, if stumbling it were, at the mysteries of creation! It diffused a sense of insecurity through the Church, and confessed to the world a weakness that could have no existence, if the Bible were the Word of God. Thus was Christ wounded in the house of His friends.

Shall we never learn that our City hath foundations, and that her Builder and Maker is God? Suppose the extreme case of a demonstration by Science, that our present Scriptures were in error on sundry points that concern the material world; would a Christian of any discernment and intellectual courage surrender his Bible, his Saviour, or his hope of a blessed resurrection, on that account? Surely not. His faith is founded on something stronger and more vital than the minutiae of external or internal evidence. He knows that almost any thing else is more likely than

that the Scriptures are an imposture or a mistake, and while he glories in the minute verifications of their wisdom and truth, which the students of nature continually produce, yet, if such a contradiction should arise, he would cast his arms around the mighty pillar of our hopes, and defy the human interpreters of God's obscurer revelation to remove, or even shake it.

These remarks are the more necessary at present, in view of the momentous decision of the Synods to establish the Perkins Professorship. From our hearts we hail it and rejoice in it, as securing a wider culture to the coming generations of ministers, and as illustrating, by its very existence, the natural friendship of knowledge and piety. But the indispensable condition of any benefit from it, worthy of a moment's consideration, is the general prevalence of a spirit very unlike that which denounces Buckland, Hitchcock, and Hugh Miller as infidels. It must be the general purpose to allow large liberty of independent study; and we are not sure that all our brethren are prepared to exercise the necessary forbearance.

If we prosecute this novel experiment, we must dispose ourselves resolutely to see in daily display the doctrine we have been treating of—*the imperfect, but improving, approximation of Science and Theology*. Unadjusted differences of opinion and belief will appear among the Professors; but nobody must be frightened or impatient about them. Icebergs drift into populous and sail-dotted seas, and breathe fogs for a time; in the end they vanish: and so will these formidable-looking intruders into the seas of divinity.

The style and title of the Perkins Professor might well be, "Professor of the Friendship of Nature and Revelation;" for his work is, virtually, to demonstrate that friendship. Let him not be held to a daily struggle, literally to "evince" a "harmony" that is yet in great part undiscovered. We fear that in any such ill-understood and ineffectual effort, the harmony of the studies would not be *evinced* so largely

as the harmony of the Professors would be *evicted*. For—to return to our sartorial illustration—the edges of *both* the ill-matched tissues must be pulled and coaxed, and drawn awry, to compel a seam; and what will the guardians and dispensers of exegetical and didactic Theology say to such liberties taken with their goods?

On the other hand, what task can be more gracious, more honorable, more delightful, than that of bringing into ever new relief the friendly relations which already exist between Theology and Science—except it be the task of Theology itself? As we write, there rise before us the shadowy forms which habitually represent, in our conception, these two sublime instructors of mankind. First in age, in honors, and in power—silver-haired, benignant, pure—stands the consecrated interpreter of the ways of God to man. There is no fire of passion in his eye, nor clamor of bigotry upon his tongue; but the meek face, like that of Moses, is suffused with heavenly radiance—the inwrought splendor that comes of incessant intercourse with God. His rapt gaze reads off the signals as they shine from Heaven itself. Young and eager Science stands beside him, busied in deciphering the images of the signals as they glitter in the water, or dissolve their blended hues in summer clouds, or mingle with the shadows of the forest. Alike the rashness and the buoyancy of youth are his. A thousand mistakes have not discouraged him; ten thousand partial successes have not satisfied him. His strong young shoulder is ever at the service of his friend, and the hand of venerable wisdom continually guides his steps. The sense of kindred serenely possesses their hearts; the light of Heaven falls like a blessing all around them. For not only Theology, but Science also, is Heaven-ordained. The “servant and interpreter of Nature” is also the creature and pupil of God.

ARTICLE VI.

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF 1860.

I. OPENING SERMON.

In the absence of the last Moderator, the Rev. Dr. W. A. SCOTT, of San Francisco, preached the opening sermon from 1 Cor. ii: 2: "For I determined not to know any thing among you save Jesus Christ, and Him crucified." It was an able, eloquent and earnest discourse on the work of the Ministry. Dr. Scott set forth, with unction and power, the subject, and manner and method of true Gospel preaching, and we feel sure that the whole Assembly were edified by his instructions on this occasion. He expressed, in concluding, his earnest desire that this Assembly "might be known hereafter as the *Praying Assembly*; as the Assembly that was remarkable both for harmony and for fervent prayer—for the warmth of our communion, both with one another and with the Father and His Son Jesus Christ." It appears to us, in looking back upon the Assembly, that, indeed, an eminent degree of the spirit of prayer did characterize the body. And as to harmony, it will be universally admitted to have pervaded most fully the entire proceedings. There was earnest debate, and a clear and decided avowal of contrary views on several points, but the unity of the Spirit in the bonds of peace, we think, was preserved throughout. Good temper and kind brotherly behaviour characterized all the deliberations, from the beginning to the end. It seems to us that the speakers of the last Assembly are all bound to acknowledge that it was a remarkably patient and good natured house.

On several occasions we were amused, as well as gratified, to observe how the wearied Assembly, its mind made up on the points in debate, would cry out loudly for "*the*

question,” as successive speakers rose to deliver themselves, and yet would shortly give up the contest in every case, and let the speakers have the opportunity they craved, of ministering to its enlightenment, until the discussion had resulted in relieving every one who felt a fire in his bones. We believe, in but one case was the previous question called for, and that discussion, the chief one of the Assembly, had certainly been quite protracted. But if the speakers had good reason to be satisfied with the behaviour of the house, perhaps it might be said, with equal truth, on the other hand, that the house had no particular reason to complain of the speakers. The good Lord graciously delivered this Assembly from that plague of deliberative bodies generally, *troublesome members*. We suppose that there was not one individual at Rochester, who either deserved, or acquired, the reputation of being forward to speak on every occasion.

One point made by Dr. Scott, in this discourse, we are not sure that we correctly apprehended. In his account of the Ascension gifts of our Lord, he referred to “Ministers of the word of reconciliation, who, also, are to rule in the House of God, and dispense its ordinances, teaching us the will of God for our salvation.” Quoting the text, Eph. iv: 11–15: “And he gave some Apostles, and some Prophets, and some Evangelists, and some Pastors and Teachers,” etc., etc., etc., he proceeded to say it was “obvious from this passage, that living teachers are set in the Church of God by Divine appointment. At one time they were patriarchs and prophets; then apostles and evangelists; and now they are bishops or pastors and teachers, who are the bishops and overseers of the people.” “As men commissioned by God, the living ministry have authority to preach Christ crucified, and to demand your obedience to the Gospel; they hold the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven; they neither speak nor act for themselves, but in the Master’s name.”

Did Dr. Scott mean to be understood as ignoring the right of the Ruling Elder to the Scriptural title of Bishop and Pastor? Did he mean to confine the power of both the keys—the whole claim upon the people's obedience—to the teaching ministry? Perhaps not;—yet such was the impression made upon our own mind when we heard him, and such is the impression we get now from reading his sermon, as reported in the "Presbyterian." He seems to entertain the same idea of our three highest Church Courts with Dr. Hodge, that they are *bodies of Ministers* into which Ruling Elders are admitted for the purpose of deliberating and of voting—these Ruling Elders not being members in full of the body, but delegated members; and not having the powers of full members, but only those of inferior ones, just as corresponding members are admitted to some rights of these bodies but denied others.* Accordingly, in preaching a sermon to the General Assembly, he addresses the Ministers almost exclusively. He speaks of them alone as the Bishops and Pastors, as well as Teachers, whom Christ gave to His Church. The body he addresses is a body of Ministers, among whom the Elders sit by secondary and not primary right—and of course he need not address any part of his discourse expressly to them!

It is enough to object, for the present, to every such view of our Assembly, or of our Synods and Presbyteries, that it makes them all differ essentially and specifically from our Sessions, whilst our system contemplates all these judicatories, from the lowest to the highest, as essentially the same, being composed of the very same elements. This view makes our Sessions to be bodies of Ruling Elders, presided over by a Minister; but the other Courts, bodies of Ministers, receiving Elders amongst them for certain specified duties, and with certain limited rights. We believe this view to be subversive of our whole form of gov-

* See Biblical Repertory, July 1843, p. 438.

ernment. Our Book represents no one of our Courts as a body of Teachers, but all of them as bodies of Rulers. It is true the Book speaks of Ministers distinctly, and of Elders distinctly, as members of these Courts, but they are both viewed as Rulers when they enter those Courts. It is not because the Minister is a Teacher that he is admitted there, but because he is a Ruler; and it is not the *teaching function*, primarily or directly, that they assemble there to exercise together, but it is the *power of rule*. It is agreeable to Scripture (says our Book) that the Church be "governed by Congregational, Presbyterial and Synodical Assemblies," and then it proceeds to define the powers to which alone these rulers or governors of the Church in all the various Courts alike are entitled.

II. ORGANIZATION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

There never were so many commissioners gathered at the opening of the Assembly before. The votes cast in the election of Moderator amounted to 297, and the number in attendance afterwards rose to 329. The choice of the Assembly for presiding officer fell upon the Rev. J. W. YEOMANS, D. D., of Pennsylvania. He discharged his duty with dignity and impartiality throughout. Perhaps his own personal gentleness and urbanity of manners may have passed by contact into the spirit of the body itself. He contributed, we are sure, very much to the successful despatch of the business of the Assembly, by his firmness in insisting on its observance of its own rules relative to the hours of adjournment. This leads us to remark, that the plan adopted at Rochester, of *short sessions*, has certainly commended itself anew to all who desire to see deliberation and despatch united in the conduct of our business. We do not care to insist upon short sessions during the last few days, and yet in this case the plan was successful even to the end. Meeting at 9 A. M., and spending the first half hour in religious devotions, and adjourning at 12; meeting

again at 3 P. M., and adjourning at 5½—the committees all had time to prepare their business thoroughly, so that the house could easily despatch it. The Judicial Committee, for example, which had five cases committed to it, and found *four of them in order*, were enabled, by having plenty of time allowed them, so thoroughly to understand these cases that they could propose a disposition of every one of them which was fair and just, and, on the whole, acceptable to the parties, and according to which it cost the Assembly not more than half an hour to dispose of all four of the cases! Had the Committee not had full time for their part of the work, the Assembly must have devoted three or four days, at least, to judicial business.

It is not our design to speak of the whole proceedings of the Assembly, but to select the topics which will most interest our readers. We pass on, therefore, to

III. THE DISCUSSION ABOUT THE BOARDS.

This came up, necessarily, in three different ways. *First:* There was a Committee appointed by the last Assembly to consider the expediency of reducing the number of members of the Board of Domestic Missions, and of the removal of the seat of its operations from Philadelphia nearer to the Western field; and to report such other suggestions as are deemed important to increase the efficiency of that Board. Of this Committee, Dr. E. P. Humphreys was chairman, but not present at this Assembly. Drs. Thornwell and Boardman, were the only present members of the Committee. The latter read the Committee's report, which was, necessarily, a patched-up and indefinite affair, inasmuch as the Committee stood equally divided upon the main points they had in hand. We could wish that, instead of uniting in one common report that could mean nothing, they had brought forward two separate reports, each of them presenting, in writing, a clear and definite statement of the views held on that side.

Again: There was a Committee also appointed, by the last Assembly, on the re-organization of all the Boards, and of the Church Extension Committee. Dr. B. M. Smith was chairman, and he induced the present Assembly to enlarge the Committee, so that it might be made to consist of fifteen members.

Thirdly: This same discussion came up, naturally and necessarily, upon the report of the Standing Committee, to whom the Domestic Board's Annual Report was referred.

Coming up in these three ways, on the first Friday afternoon of the session, the discussion ran on with frequent, and some times long intervals, until the second Friday afternoon, when debate ceased, and the vote was taken upon the question of "organic changes." Subsequently to this, other points of the subject were disposed of by vote, without regular debate, several of them on the last day of the session.

The report of the first named Committee was presented by Dr. Boardman on Friday morning. It made no recommendation of any change in the organization of the Domestic Board, because the Committee were divided equally upon that subject. Besides this first point, there were three others reported on by this Committee, two of them favorably, the third, by consent, merely brought before the house for consideration. They were, 1. No change of location of this Board. 2. The abolition of the Executive Committee at Louisville, so that there should be no Executive Committee but the central one; yet advisory committees might be appointed where required. 3. One of the two Secretaries of this Board to be a "*Traveling Secretary.*"

In the afternoon, Dr. Boardman re-stated the points of the report in a new and brief form, which, with Dr. Thornwell's consent, he had given to them during the interval. As thus drawn out, the first point was in the shape of a resolution, that "it is inexpedient to make any organic

change in the organization of the Board of Domestic Missions." In this form the subject was debated, and in this form the question was at last put. We think an undue advantage was generously conceded by Dr. Thornwell, in allowing this form to be given to the really undecided recommendation of the Committee, for it brought insensibly upon the house the influence of the whole Committee against any organic changes. But, however this may be, we know positively that the employment of the term "organic" operated unfavorably for the minority. There can be no doubt that the majority of the Assembly favored changes, the very changes which the minority were urging; the subsequent votes made that unquestionable. But very many of the voters did not consider these changes to be "*organic changes*," and they were not willing to vote that there ought to be any "*organic changes*." Accordingly, they voted thus against the *principle* of changes, although, afterwards, for the actual *practice* of them.

Dr. B. M. SMITH, of Union Theological Seminary, led off the debate. He began by saying:

There are two ways of administering Church government: one is upon the *principles* of Divine government, and the other is by *expedients*, devised of men to meet present emergencies. Upon the former plan, the Church may incur particular inconveniences from time to time, but, in the end, that plan must always be found wisest and best. Upon the latter, the Church may be relieved of present evils, but at the expense of greater ultimate disadvantages. He then traced the history of our Boards as mere *expedients* of men in distinction from the direct action of the Church as such, which is the divinely revealed principle. Boards were a necessary expedient amongst Congregationalists, for their Churches are independent of one another, and of course cannot act together in Missionary work, except through some such contrivance. The Congregationalists had given us many of our best men. These excellent brethren had brought with them into our Church, very naturally, an attachment for Congregational expedients, and this attachment had spread itself, and had spread itself widely, amongst our people. For a long time, voluntary societies had been allowed to do the work of the Church as her agents. When our Church determined to take her work into her own hands, that wide spread confidence in expedients, to which the

Church had so long been accustomed, made it difficult for her at once to adopt the principle of direct action. Moreover, all through her borders the voluntary societies had spread themselves, and they had their honorary members and their corporate members scattered all up and down the land. With a view to cope with them in influence and power, *the expedient* was devised of our also having Boards of our own, with the names of distinguished brethren all over the land held up as members of them. What had been the result? Very good in many respects—but the real good done he claimed as the fruit of ecclesiastical action, imperfect and indirect as it was. The good done he ascribed to the Executive Committees of the Boards, and not to the Boards themselves, for the Boards had always been mere names. Let the Church act herself, directly, through these Committees, calling them Boards if you please, but making them a simple and a real executive agency. He described “the annual farce” of electing the Boards, and how loosely and blindly the members were appointed; men were elected who never attended, could never attend, and were expected never to attend, a single meeting of the Board. Many of the men elected never heard of their election. Once, a dead man was elected! At Buffalo, by mistake, the outgoing class (whom the farce, commonly, just re-elect) were substituted by the class who had only been elected the year before; the mistake was not discovered till after the adjournment, and so the Clerks did for the Assembly what they knew the Assembly intended doing! He adduced facts to show that the larger the Board the less responsibility was felt by its members, and the less attention was paid to their duties. He quoted from a table, drawn up by request of Dr. Humphrey’s Committee, at the office of the Board, to show that in but three of the meetings of the Board during the whole year had there been present 20 members out of the 96 who composed the Board.* He deprecated the “cant” which branded those brethren who desired a simpler organization as “enemies of the Boards,” “agitators,” “innovators,” &c. It was an arrogant claim, by friends of the existing state of things, that only they are friends of the Boards. He spoke earnestly against that false conservatism which would retain its hold upon a present system, however faulty, rather than venture one step in advance. In conclusion, he referred to the happy results which had followed the abolition of the system of agencies, and the holding up to the Church, instead of it, by Assemblies and by Pastors, of the *doctrine of giving as worship*. But the abolition of agencies had long been resisted by some friends of the Boards. Now, the Boards themselves rejoice in the change, for their receipts are actually greater in consequence. So,

* We are not absolutely sure that we state these figures correctly, as we write from memory. The whole table we would like to give to our readers, if we had it. They would see how complete a sham is the whole system of our Boards.

predicted the speaker, shall we all rejoice in the greater good which must result from a return to right principles upon the subject of Boards.

Dr. SPRING, replying briefly to Dr. Smith,

Regretted dissension should be thrown into the midst of us upon a subject so vital and practical. The sentiment of the Church is united on this system. This system is one of the golden, spiritual cords that bind us together, and our union as a Church is one of the bonds that hold this land together, which is now threatened to be torn apart. Our system has done well hitherto, and there are no fears for the future: let us trust God and go forward with it.

Several other speakers also deprecated the continuance of this discussion.

Dr. THORNWELL said:

The Report under discussion exhibits a diversity of opinions as to the most effective organization for the Board. This diversity has long existed, and it is a diversity of opinion, deep, radical and sincere. It has been agitated in the Assembly and through the press. It is curious to notice the manner in which the friends of the present organization have treated the opinions of their opponents. It is not very long since they earnestly insisted that the difference between us and themselves was merely nominal, "mere hair-splitting," the difference merely "twixt tweedle-dum and tweedle-dee." But the obvious inference then was, that they ought to have conceded the change. Suppose those who desire the change are weak, but conscientious; if there be no real difference in principle why not yield to the weak? Why not give up to the conscientious the trifling boon they ask? We do not profess to be strong or large minded, but we do profess to love Christ, and to feel bound to see, so far as in us lies, that the Church does execute His commands; and if you think there is no principle that divides us, why not indulge our conscientious objections?

But *now*, the ground of our brethren is shifted. The difference between us and them is now admitted to be one of importance. It is vital and essential. The things at stake are substance, and not shadow. At first we were mere theorists, advocating what did not differ from the system actually existing; but now the thing that was declared a mere abstraction begins to be viewed as something very dangerous. Moderator, I accept that view of our differences which makes them real and important, and I will proceed to show the *source* of these differences.

The discussion now resumed is deprecated by some of the brethren here as evil, and likely to beget more evil. I do not deprecate it. We are met to discuss great questions that concern the Redeemer's

glory and the interests of His kingdom. We all love the truth, and are equally concerned for the honor of Christ's Kingdom and His Church. We have no by-ends to subserve. I am no party man, but I am thoroughly a Presbyterian, and having come here to deliberate and vote for the good of the Church, I wish to state the grounds upon which my vote shall be cast.

This whole question is but an offshoot from another question dividing the minds of brethren amongst us, and that question is *the organization of the Church itself*. Our differences about Boards spring legitimately from our differences as to the nature and constitution of the Church. There are amongst us those who hold that God gave us our Church government, as truly as He gave us our doctrines; and that we have no more right to add to the Church government, which is Divine, than to add to the doctrine, which is Divine. They hold that while the Church may, of course, employ whatever agency is really necessary to do the work entrusted to her, for that is implied in the very command which enjoins her duty, yet she has no discretionary power to create a new Church Court or judicatory, or body, of whatever name, to stand in her own place.

Others, as wise and as good men as the first, believe no definite form of Church government is of Divine origin, but God has left it to man to organize His Church; and that just as civil government was ordained of God in the general, but man is left to arrange its particular form as may, in his view, best suit particular circumstances. So Church government may be modified according to circumstances—according to human ideas of expediency, at the whims of men. God gave only general principles, and man is to work out of them the best system that he can. Thus, one party amongst us holds that Christ gave us the materials and principles of Church government, and has left us to shape them pretty much as we please. But the other holds that God gave us a *Church*, a constitution, laws, presbyteries, assemblies, presbyters, and all the functionaries necessary to a complete organization of His kingdom upon the earth and to its effective operation; that He has revealed an *order* as well as a *faith*, and that as our attitude in the one case is to hear and *believe*, in the other it is to hear and *obey*. And of one of these parties the motto is, "you may do all that the Scriptures do not forbid;" of the other, "you can do only what the Scriptures command."

There is no use in blinking this question, for we know that this radical difference respecting the Church does exist, and that those of us who hold the opinions first referred to contend that man is not to be the *counsellor of God*, but is to accept the Church as it comes from God, and do what He enjoins. We cannot appoint another co-ordinate body to do the work which God appointed us to do. The General Assembly is, and ought to be held to be, the Board of Missions itself. Christ never authorised us to put this work into other hands. It will be said these views are narrow, but are they not true? They are founded on the *jus divinum* theory of Church government,

which recognizes all the members of this Court as members of it, because God has appointed them to this trust. We contend, Moderator, as sincerely and as conscientiously for the great principles of Presbyterian order as for those of the faith allied to it. The oneness of the Church, its federative unity, is one of these principles. Another is the representative principle, upon which principle it is that any of us are here, and upon which principle it is that all of us are alike here—Ministers and Elders—upon precisely the same footing, as members of this Court. We are all here as Ruling Elders; only rulers can enter into the Assemblies of the Church; we cannot admit here any person that is not recognized as a ruler in the Holy Scriptures. And the Ruling Elder is not here simply by appointment of the people. Both come here as the representatives or chosen rulers of the people, equally of Divine right and authority, and equally entitled to be here as rulers of the Lord's House. And it is in this capacity, as rulers in Christ's Kingdom, that the members of this Court have committed to them, for the Church, that work which they may not delegate to any other body. Is it said that thus I deny the right to any other denomination to call itself a Church of Christ. I do not deny it. A Church may be a true Church though imperfect in its organization, as a man may be united to Christ by a saving faith, yet deny doctrines which I deem essential to the perfection of Christian character.

Here Dr. THORNWELL was interrupted by the hour of adjournment. On the next day, (Saturday, May 19,) he resumed his argument, and recapitulating what he had gone over the preceding afternoon, stated as his fundamental principle, that

The Church has a charter of faith and of practice, and wherever she cannot plead the authority of God, she has no right to act. She has no opinion; she has a faith. She has no contrivances; she has a law. This is the doctrine of our Confession of Faith. Her authority is all ministerial and declarative. She only declares the law of the Lord, and only exercises the powers He gives, and only executes the work He enjoins. No other regulations are left for her to make and to enforce, save those of circumstantial details; and the power to make these is implicitly contained in the general command given to her. It is, also, explicitly given in the precept to "do all things decently and in order." Whatever executive agency is requisite in order to do her appointed work, she can, of course, employ; but she may not go outside of this necessity and transfer her work to another body, to be performed by them.

If this notion of Church power be conceded, and if we correctly apprehend the real nature of Church Courts as Divine institutions, and if we duly conceive of the solemnity and responsibility of all their

action, we are prepared to see how all this bears upon the question of Boards. Now, what is a Board? Have the brethren distinctly conceived in their own minds what it is? I do not ask for the meaning of it, in the etymological sense, as when we speak of a Board of Health, or of Commerce; but in the sense defined in the Constitution of this Board of Missions, as an actual part of the machinery of the Presbyterian Church. I ask for the meaning of the word, as the thing is actually understood among us, and differenced from a simple Committee. What is a Board of this General Assembly?

In the first place: It is an *organism* and not an *organ*. It is a complete body, to which the General Assembly has entrusted a department of the work committed to it. It is a complete whole; all the parts of a separate, self-acting organization belong to it. It has head, body, limbs, hands, tongue, and now they want to give it feet, that as it exists alone, it may, also, go alone. It has a President for its head, with a body of many members; it has an Executive Committee for its hands; and now our brethren propose, by a "Traveling Secretary," to give it feet to travel—to travel over the whole land, and if they could, they would enable it to fly with the wings of the wind.

Now take this body, thus organized and equipped, and wherein does it differ from a Church Court? Talk of it as a mere organ!—a mere hand to be directed and moved and used by the Church! It is a hand that has an arm of its own to move it, and a head of its own to direct it; and, as experience has lately shown, it moves more obediently to its own head than to the Assembly. It is as completely a moral person, with rights and powers to all intents and purposes complete and definite, as any Court in the Presbyterian Church. It stands up, side by side, along with the Courts which Christ has ordained, and we have handed over to it the work we ourselves ought to do. Wherein, I ask, does it differ from a Synod or a Presbytery? The sphere of those may be larger and more varied, but the nature of the power conferred upon this is the same. You say the Board is responsible to the General Assembly; so is a Synod. You say a breath can annihilate the Board; so it may a Synod. The Assembly has as much power over the Synod as it has over the Board, and it can dissolve the Synod just as it can dissolve the Board. In fact, we see the Board standing side by side with the General Assembly itself, as fully officered, as complete in its organization, and even more perpetual in its existence, so far as it regards its component members! What are the Courts of the Church but organisms of the Church, through which Jesus Christ has ordained that she shall act. But in these Boards you have set up other Courts coördinate with His Courts, and as supreme in their own sphere.

Now, sir, the question comes up, who gave you the power to make such coördinate Courts? You say they are confessedly lawful, because mere circumstantial details. These mere circumstances! All this needed to be supplemented to the equipments of our Church!

Then is any other Church as well equipped as ours for the missionary work, for any other Church can append to itself these human contrivances as well as ours! You say it is not forbidden, and is therefore allowed, because necessary. But have we not always boasted that our Church is adequate, *as organized in the Scriptures*, to do all the work required at its hands? Have we not gloried in our polity as complete, with all the muscles, veins, and arteries of a perfect system of life and motion? Have we not said to Congregationalists, you are radically defective in coherency, and have to form societies unknown to the Word of God: and to Prelatists, you have to borrow of us a General Convention of Presbyters? But our brethren have actually formed within our own Church bodies which Independents were driven to form, because their polity is inadequate to the work Christ requires of His people! We are throwing away our birth-right, and putting on the rags and tatters of Independency! Yes! we take up its rags and tatters, and endeavor out of them to patch up something which we offer to Christ and to the world as a substitute for His divinely organized Church! The whole thing is a virtual reproach upon that Divine organization which we profess to have received from the Holy Word, and in clinging to it we pertinaciously repudiate in practice the very Church in which we profess to glory! Is our Church competent or is she not competent to do her work? Is she so organized and so equipped, and so officered, that she can, in the use of her own Courts and her own powers, do what the Master has bid her to do? If not, then openly acknowledge your beggary, and cast about for the best system you can find! If not, then openly acknowledge your impotency, and pronounce your Divine institutions a failure!

In the second place: What is the relation to the Assembly, of the Boards, as thus completely organized? They are the *vicars* of the Assembly. God gave the Church a work to do *in her organized capacity*—she refuses to do that work in that organized capacity, but appoints another organization to do it *in its organized capacity*. The Boards are the *vicars* of the Assembly, and *in its place*. They are the representatives of the Church *as an organized body*. This is, in fact, admitted privately by our brethren, for they hold that in acting through a Board the Assembly acts. They will tell you that the Boards are the Assembly's representatives, doing the work in the place of the Assembly; and they quote the maxim which we admit to be applicable here, "*Qui facit per alium facit per se.*" But, Moderator, who gave the Courts of the Church a right to act *in their organized capacity* by *vicars* or *representatives*? Congress has power to make certain laws: can Congress delegate these powers to another body? Would the country submit to let Congress confer upon a Board of its appointment the power of legislation, for it to go home and take its ease? Now, Jesus Christ has commissioned his Church to carry the Gospel into all the world, and has furnished you in full for the work, and you are, *in your organized capacity*, through your *courts and their own executive agencies*, to carry on that work. And now, can you

come to that Saviour and say: It is too troublesome to do Thy bidding ourselves—too inconvenient to superintend and carry on this work directly with our own executive agency, and in our own organized capacity, as the Church; but here is our *vicar*, here is our *representative*, here is a Board which we have constituted, and to which we have delegated these prerogatives and duties thou didst enjoin upon us?

Can you act in this matter by a *vicar*? Have you a *right* thus to act? You can not; you have no such power conferred upon you, as a Church. And let me, then, remind my brethren that this binding limitation of Church power is what the people of God have always contended for. This was the very point in dispute between the Puritans and the Church of England. That Church maintained that the Scriptures did not forbid the Liturgy, nor the sign of the Cross, nor kneeling at the Supper, nor the gown and surplice, and so these might all be ordained by the Church. But the Puritans contended that none of these is required in the Bible, and so none of them might be imposed. The absence of the grant (they said) is the negation of the power. And what did our covenanting Fathers in Scotland fight for but the same principle, that the Church can claim no power not granted in the Bible? And how did the Popes get their foot upon the necks of the nations, but through this same principle of the Church's having powers not given to her in the Word? And we, sir, to-day, are standing up for the only principle that can keep this Church of ours from flying off out of her orbit and dashing into the orbits of other stars—the principle that the Church has no right to act, except as she has the authority of God for acting!

In the third place: Let us look at the principles of action which have governed these creations and we shall see still more plainly that they are complete organizations, and, also, that they work evil and not good. The practical ends of the Boards have been two. 1st. They aim to awaken interest; 2d. To increase funds. As to the first end, the idea was that there must be a body specially devoted to awakening the missionary spirit in the Church. The missionary spirit was not to be the healthful action of the Church's life, but a substitute for it; something worked up in the Church's bosom by special influences and excitements. There must be a large institution or society in the bosom of the Church, corresponding to the American Board of Missions, and men must be stimulated into missionary zeal by being invested with the honorable distinction of membership. Thus a set of men were selected who were, by this means, to have the spirit of missions kindled *in them*. Now, was not this destructive of the idea that the Church is the body to be interested? Must not this have weakened the general influence of the idea that the Church herself is a Missionary Society, and that every member of the Church is to have a part and to be responsible for a share in the work?

But the other end to be gained was the increase of funds. This was sought to be attained by the sale of these distinctions. Sir, it has been my lot to have part in many earnest debates in the Church

Courts, and I do not know that I was ever yet betrayed into saying an unkind word of any man in the Church, or of any institution in the Church I was called on to oppose. But, sir, every instinct of my nature, and every holy impulse implanted within me by the Spirit of God, rises up with indignation and horror against this principle that men may buy places of honor and trust in this free, glorious commonwealth of Jesus Christ. I do revolt against this paid membership—this entitling of men for money to become consulting members of the Church or of her Boards (which they tell us are the same thing)—this selling distinctions and honors in the Church of Christ, for filthy lucre, when nothing is plainer than that the love of Christ should form the only motive of all our contributions. Whatever shall be the result of this discussion, Moderator, were it in my power I would at least expunge and utterly and for ever blot out this organic feature of our present system, as I hope God will wash out the sin and shame of it in the blood of His dear Son.

But there was, also, at first, and for a long time, connected with this scheme for raising funds, a system of agents, as part and parcel of the same arrangement. The first indication of healthful action in the Church upon this whole subject, was her revolt against the employment of agents to do a work which the Pastors, Elders, Deacons and People were organized into a Church on purpose to do. Slowly and reluctantly, sir, some of the very brethren, who confront us today, consented to dispense with this system. Slowly and reluctantly they were persuaded to rely upon the Church-organization, which the Lord gave us for the collection of the benefactions of His people. But it was done, and the "innovation" proved, as they all now confess, most advantageous. And, Moderator, I look for the time, and I predict that it is not far off, when the Church, acting in the spirit of similar "innovation," shall, with a whip of small cords, drive out all the buyers and sellers from our temple.

Here there was a complete system, a regular and perfect organization, a Church of men by the side of the Church of God, and doing a work committed only to the Church of God. Such is the scheme of the Boards as established in the Presbyterian Church. Moderator, I have confidence in the men who control our Boards, and whilst in their hands we may escape the more serious evils which we dread, yet, even now, there is discernible in the Boards a disposition to act independently of the Assembly. Like Lord Chatham to his constituents, the Boards have been heard to say to the Assembly, "We regard not your *instructions*, for we have too much regard for your *interests*." In worse hands all these evils which we have pointed out would grow worse. The egg of the serpent is harmless, but it contains a serpent. The Boards may be harmless now, but they contain a principle fraught with mischief in the day of trial. It is safer to adhere to the Word and the system we have derived from it, than to be ever consulting the suggestions of human wisdom, and mere expe-

diency. While we stand by principle Christ is with us, but when we forsake our principles we desert Him.

Now, Sir, let us look at the opposite system.

Its *first* principle is, that the Church, in her organized capacity, is a society for all spiritual purposes. Every Church Court is a Board of Christ's appointment, and every Christian is a member of a Missionary Society. We assume this as our cardinal principle. This was the great point in dispute in the New School controversy.

The *second* principle is, that the Church, being a Missionary Society, the measure of its power, in relation to the details of its action, is whatever is *necessary to execute these functions*. To this point we are restricted. Now, what are the things that are necessary for the discharge of the work given to the Church? Three things seem to be essential: 1. Wisdom in council. 2. Efficiency of action. 3. Responsibility. All these ends are answered by a Committee (or by a Commission) appointed by the Assembly, as a *bona fide* organ. The Committee unites deliberation, simplicity and direct and immediate responsibility to the Assembly. Every desirable end can be secured legitimately, without delegating our work to another body, as our vicar in our stead.

But, *thirdly*, the organization must of course look to the raising of funds, and here comes in the idea of systematic giving, of giving as worship, and completes the system. With the machinery of the Church accommodated to its Divine charter, you may confidently trust to the life of the Church, that, by the grace of God, it will answer to the doctrine of giving, as it shall be held up by a faithful ministry. When this doctrine was first held up as a substitute for agencies, our brethren opposed it as an "innovation," and would have clung to the agencies. When we pleaded that systematic giving was to be viewed as a *part of religion*, our brethren still viewed it as a *scheme*—a piece of machinery, and called it "*your plan*." So, now, this doctrine that the Church, in her organized capacity, must do her own work, and not delegate it to vicars, is called by these brethren, "*your theory*." I contend that it is *of God*. We then contended that systematic giving is part of our religion, part of our worship, and a part which cannot be performed by proxy, any more than can prayer or praise. So in reference to the Church's work of Evangelization. She is responsible for it herself, in her organized capacity, and may not undertake to do that work by vicar, any more than she may pray by vicar. And the great need of the Church, is a sense of her *obligation to give*, and her *obligation to work* for her Lord.

Fourthly: The difference between such a Committee and the Boards is seen in the directness of its relation to the Assembly, and in the simplicity of its action. A committee is the very hand of the Assembly, and not the hand of its servant. A *commission* is the *Assembly perpetuated*. It is the living body. The Church acting through her General Assembly, or a commission of the Assembly, which is the same thing; or, again, through a committee of the Assembly, is like a

man that uses his own limbs—limbs with which he was born, and which are *living legs*, forming part of his living body. But the Church acting through these Boards, is like a man with a *cork leg*, fastened on by a strap and socket and buckle, which can never answer fully the purposes of a living limb.

If any one should insist that, nevertheless, the relation of Board and of Committee to the Assembly are of the same general kind, and if we were to grant this, I must still maintain that the complications attaching to the Board are unnecessary, and are, therefore, unlawful. I contend for this limitation of the powers of the Church as an essential principle. It is the legacy of our Puritan and our Covenanting Fathers. The Church can not ordain unnecessary complications of agency amounting to the transfer of her work to *another body*.

My argument is finished, but I must notice some objections.

First: There is the presumption which exists against all change. Our brethren say we must not have "innovation." Sir, we propose no innovation—only a return to Bible principles and Bible practice. Our doctrine is as old as the New Testament—our plan as old as the Acts of the Apostles. Moreover, the Assembly has of late virtually decided that the principles for which I contend are the true development of its life. At Nashville, some of the ablest men in the Church advocated a Board for Church Extension, but the idea of a Committee, though feebly advocated, prevailed. The Assembly decided against these complicated Boards, and took one step towards the simpler and directer organization which I advocate.

Secondly: It is urged, "let well enough alone." O! sir, is it well enough? What do brethren mean? I am no accuser. I do not blame the Boards. They have done as well as they could with this stiff and cumbrous organization. But have they done "*well enough?*" Can any man say that this great Church, in any department of its work, is doing well enough? O! sir, when I think of eight hundred perishing millions abroad, and of the moral wastes of our own country; when I look at the power of the Gospel and the Master's blood to redeem and save, and then think how little progress has been made, I cannot say "let well enough alone." I must put it to my brethren, *is it well enough?* I must urge this Church to inquire if she be not neglecting some power God has given her. She is capable of far higher and more glorious things, and I want her to put forth her own *living hand* directly to this work.

Dr. THORNWELL closed with an earnest appeal to the Assembly to look carefully and prayerfully at this matter, expressing the belief that if the views of himself and of his brethren should prevail it would make a new era in our history. He drew (says the *Presbyterian*) a glowing picture of our future, and concluded with a fervent wish for its

realization, with "amen and amen!" "He closed (says the New York *Observer*) with a thrilling appeal that moved all hearts, holding the Assembly and the thronged galleries in breathless attention, while he summoned the whole host of God's elect to come up to the great work of giving the Gospel to a lost world."

Dr. HODGE said :

If the members of Assembly have been affected as I have been by the eloquence of Dr. Thornwell, their minds have undergone rapid and surprising changes. At one time they have felt that fundamental principles are at stake, that our practice has been always and radically wrong. Again, they must have felt that, after all, this is a mere difference of words, so fine, indeed, that I cannot see the difference; for, after all, what does it amount to? to what, indeed, has it come, when, to our inexpressible relief, he tells us that it is all comprehended in the distinction between the Board of Missions and the Church Extension Committee? He thinks it a *radical* difference. I do not think it worth *that*. [Snapping his fingers.] If this were all, it would not be worth while to spend our time in the discussion.

But, sir, there have been so many things said, which I think that many of this General Assembly cannot endorse, that I feel constrained to attempt a few remarks upon some of them. We cannot receive, and our Church has never held, the High-Church doctrines about organization for which the brethren contend. The Spirit of God dwelling in the Church and guiding her by His Word and providence, in our view, must shape her efforts and her agencies; and, under the dispensation of the Spirit, far more is left to the discretion of the brotherhood of faith than under the ancient economy. But now we are called upon to believe that a certain form of Church government and order, in all its details and with all its appliances for the evangelical work, is revealed in the Word, and that we are as much bound to receive this form as to receive the articles of faith: That *order* is as much a matter of revelation as *faith*. We cannot do it and we *wont* do it. The burden was too heavy for our fathers, and we cannot bear it. Dr. Smith gave us, yesterday, a history of our Boards and of their rise and progress, and in doing so has drawn largely on his imagination for his facts. He insisted that the principles and plans of their organization were derived from New England, and that Congregational influence gave form to the Boards. Brother Smith is a young man—at least not old enough to have personally witnessed the events that resulted in the formation of these Boards, or he never would have ventured to give the theory of their organization which he gave in his speech. He further asserts that their present form was adopted from motives of *expediency*, and under the influence of men who were of New England origin and opinions.

Sir, was ever statement more apocryphal! Can any man acquainted with the real facts believe the statement for one moment? Not at all. Was Ashbel Green a New England man? Was Jacob J. Janeway a New England man? Was William M. Engles a New England man? Was George Junkin a New England man? Was George Baxter a New England man? Were David Elliott, and Elisha P. Swift, and Walter Lowrie, and Samuel Miller, and the Breckinridges, New England men? The whole theory adduced by the brother is historically absurd and preposterous. The truth is, this Church has, from her very origin, acted on the commission, "Go ye and preach my Gospel"—always been a missionary Church. She has, as a Church, sent forth the living minister from her earliest history. It has been her fundamental principle that she was sent to spread the Gospel throughout the land in which her lot was cast, and to commit this work to such of her faithful sons as she might choose. The Church, in her whole history, has acknowledged that this work was laid upon her. But it could not be done by the scattered members of the Church, widely dispersed over a new and extended country. The several congregations and Presbyteries were too sparsely spread out for frequent conference and coöperation; and yet they needed to employ combined effort, that the strong might aid the weak. There was a necessity for a Committee or Board of the Assembly, and one was appointed: but from the apathy of the Churches the work went slowly on, and voluntary associations sprung up all around, and, to a great extent, took the work, and the means of prosecuting it, out of the hands of the Church's Committee; and when the Church proposed to take this great work into her own hands, the friends of Voluntary Societies said the Church has no right to have Boards—she must not sully her hands with such work—her function is to supply the preachers; we will attend to the collecting of funds, and send them forth. And it cost a great struggle before the Church could obtain control of this work, so as to entrust it to the hands of a Board of her own creation and control. Thus, and from this quarter, did opposition to Boards first arise; now it comes from an opposite quarter. *Then* the opposition came from Congregationalism. Now it comes (I say it with great respect for my brother Thornwell) from hyper-hyper-high-Church Presbyterianism. Then we were told that all power is from the people: now, that all power is lodged in the clergy; that Presbyters are all of one order, all pastors, all teachers, all rulers; then it was the theory of the distribution of power; now, of centralization.

But let us look at this new theory of Church authority. Principles are often stated in debate without careful limitation, and I may not correctly apprehend the doctrine, but I understand it to be: 1. That Christ has ordained a system of Church government, not in general principles, but *in all its details*, and that we have no more right to create a new office than a new doctrine or a new commandment of the decalogue, unless we can show a "thus saith the Lord" for it. 2.

That power inheres in the Church, and cannot be delegated, any more than praying or giving alms can be done by proxy; and 3. That all power is *joint*, as opposed to *several*. These are the green withes by which it is proposed to bind the limbs of our Church; or rather, this is the Delilah who is to cut the locks of our Samson, and send him shorn of his strength to be the sport of the Philistines.

Now, sir, our Church never did receive this yoke, and she wont receive it. We believe that all the attributes of the Church belong to the Holy Ghost. He is to be her guide, by His Word and providence, and under the general principles laid down for her guidance in the Holy Word, Ministers, Elders, and *people* are to do the work of the Church, and to their best judgment. She *has discretion*, sir; she cannot be bound.

In opposition to this theory, I have been taught by lips now silent in the grave, but vocal in the General Assembly on high,—and I will never forget it nor cease to defend it while life and being last,—that all the attributes and prerogatives of power in the Church arise from the indwelling of the Spirit, and where He dwells, there is the Church, with authority to do its own work in the best way; and as He does not dwell in the clergy exclusively, therefore the power is not confined to the clergy; but the Church may in her discretion adopt such modes or agencies to carry out the commands of Christ as she deems best. She must be free. She must breathe. The power of the Church is where the Holy Ghost is: but in externals He has given her *discretion*. I glory as much as does my brother Thornwell in the *principles* of Presbyterianism; they are the glory of the land, and are working for the salvation of the world; but one of those principles, and a most important one, is freedom in that which the Bible leaves to the discretion of His people. We must not forget our great distinctive principles—1st, the parity of the clergy; 2d, the representative element—the right of the people to take part, by suffrage, in the government of the Church; and that power, indeed, is originally deposited with the people. And 3d, the *unity* of the Church; that all its members are parts of one great whole, and that all must suffer, and labor and rejoice together; and these are not compatible with the new theory. In regard to what I have regarded as the *High-Church theory*, I call attention to the fact that no Church on earth *has ever carried it out*; and it is an utter *impracticability*. Even the Pope, and the High Church prelatists, in their practice abandon it, and employ such agencies as may best suit their purpose. It is not only inconsistent with the practice of every Church, but especially with those of the Protestant branches. Luther had not this theory, nor even our theory of Presbyterianism; Calvin had it not; Zwingle had it not; Knox, nor any of the Reformers. The theory is emphatically no part of American Presbyterianism; it was never held by the Tennants, Smiths, Blairs, Alexanders, and Millers of the Church. But, above all, the theory is utterly *unscriptural*. Let any man open the New Testament and say if our form of government is there as our *faith* is there? No, sir,

this is making the scaffolding to hide the building; it is making the body the same in value as the soul. I cannot see how any man can say that all the details of our system are in the Bible. The Jewish system in its details was not in the Old Testament. Their yoke was not so heavy as that which these brethren would bind on our necks; and it is preposterous to expect that so heavy a yoke can be received by those whom Christ has made free. This is too great a burden—the Church can't receive it—and we *wont* receive it. Our Christian liberty is not thus to be put in trammels. The shackles are worse than Jewish that they would put on our feet, and then tell us to go over hill and dale and preach the Gospel to every creature. No, I do not find their system in the Bible, but I find just the opposite. Where are our apostles and prophets? Suppose, Moderator, that Paul, inspired by God, as an apostle, sat in your seat! what would he care for our book of discipline, or our form of government? Who would want him to care for them? He would ordain whom he pleased, depose whom he pleased; deliver to Satan whom he pleased. He would decide every thing by the authority that he exercised as Christ's plenipotentiary. He would wait for no decisions of Assemblies.

This system, proposed by our brethren, cannot be carried out in our frontier settlements. Discretion must be allowed to our evangelists; they must have power to form Churches and baptize; they cannot wait to have the whole of our system inaugurated before they can dispense ordinances. Deprive the Church of discretionary freedom, to *adapt* her principles to the exigency of cases as they arise, and you tie her, hand and foot. The Church cannot submit to it—it *wont* submit to it; the Church must have freedom, and she cannot do her work, either at home or abroad, if you keep her thus hampered by a proscriptive system. Ask that venerable man (Hon. W. Lowrie) how this new theory would work in heathen lands. Presbyterianism cannot be at once introduced in all its parts amongst the heathen; the missionary must have liberty of discretion to preach and gather converts, and govern them as best he may until they are ready to receive the Church in its fuller organization. The converted heathen is a babe, unfit for the full responsibilities of a believer. Will you make Elders of infants? Bishops of babes? It can't be done. There is no use of talking about it. The missionary must be a man of sense, and he cannot commit such follies as this.

But this burden to the conscience—to it I will not submit. I *wont* be bound to a *form* of organism as I am to the *faith* of the Gospel. I will not submit my conscience to the *inferences*, even of Dr. Thornwell. [A laugh.] And yet this whole theory, which we are called upon to receive as of faith, is a matter of *inference*. I will not submit to any thing as binding on my conscience, that does not come from God's own lips. The Presbyterian Church will never submit, as long as there is one drop of the blood of her fathers in the veins of her children, to this superlatively High Church order. Will you have deaconesses because the Apostles had them?

[Here the hour of adjournment arrived, but the house suspended the order and requested Dr. Hodge to proceed.]

And finally, this theory is *suicidal*. How are you to have schools, and colleges, and Theological Seminaries, if you must have a Divine warrant for them all? You must abolish all agencies; recal your missionaries; go yourself and do the work of an Evangelist. How are you to have a Board of Directors for a Seminary; or even a President of such a Board? How are the brethren able to serve under such Boards in their Seminaries. Can you find any warrant for them in this Bible? Dr. Thornwell may get it out by an inference, but I cannot find it there. And when he said that the Church Extension Committee is the model of what he wants, I felt as if a soaring angel had fallen down to earth.

If these principles of Dr. Thornwell's kill the Boards, they will kill the Committees, which our brethren would substitute for the Boards. In fact, it is a mere question of arithmetic. A Board or a Committee—one hundred men, or twenty men. And a commission amounts to the same thing. A *commission* and a *Committee*. Where the difference, in the word or the thing? No! no! this doctrine, carried out, instead of making the Church more efficient, will bring her efforts to a dead halt.

This conscientiousness, of which Dr. Thornwell so feelingly speaks, cannot be so serious a thing, after all, as my brother would make it. It is a long time since he began to advocate this theory, and to make its adoption a matter of conscience. Our brethren must have done violence to their consciences, for a long time, for they still work with our Boards, and cooperate under a system which does such violence to their consciences! [Laughter.]

But there is another ground of appeal of our brethren that ought to be noticed. They understand us to say that there is but a small difference between a Board and a Committee. If it is so small a matter, ask they, why cannot you give it up? We cannot give it up without casting reproach upon all that have gone before us—we cannot give it up without abandoning the past. We cannot give it up without yielding to pretensions that we believe to be unauthorized by Scripture. We cannot give it up without sacrificing our Christian liberty! And we will not give it up. The Church has freedom of discretion in selecting the modes of her operation; and to sacrifice this freedom to the claims of a high *jure divino* churchism, which we do not believe to be scriptural, we cannot and will not consent.

At the close of Dr. Hodge's remarks, Dr. Krebs obtained the floor, but gave place to a motion to adjourn, and the Assembly adjourned to meet at 9 o'clock on Monday morning. The rejoinder of Dr. Thornwell to Dr. Hodge did not come on till Monday in the afternoon.

Meanwhile, the Annual Report of the Board of Domestic Missions was the order of the day for Monday, at 10 o'clock. From this report we take several items of particular interest.

1. The number of Missionaries in commission, March 1, 1859, was 408, to which have been added to March 1, 1860, 283, making the whole number 691, and more by 91 than the year previous.

We do not comprehend this statement very perfectly. So much appears clear, however, that there are now 691 Missionaries receiving aid from this Board in their several fields.

2. The whole amount of receipts during the past year was
\$118,904.21

as follows :

From Legacies, - - - - -	\$25,422.11	
Miscellaneous, - - - - -	10,179.91	35,602.02

Leaving for Receipts from Churches, total, - - - \$83,302.19

3. The increase of the year is \$19,231.18, viz: in individual or special donations and in legacies, \$13,052.24; and in contributions of the Churches \$6,178.94.

There has been an average increase in appropriations to the Missionaries of \$13.35, but the people have made an average decrease in the salary of \$7.40, making an average increase of \$5.95.

The total average salary from the Board and the people was \$536.63.

4. The office expenses of this Board and all its different branches for the past year is \$10,620.01; that is, it has cost the Church that much to manage the receipt and disbursement of \$118,904.21. Of this \$10,620.01 there is charged :

To the S. W. Advisory Committee, - - - - -	\$800.50
To the Ex. Com., at Louisville, - - - - -	974.37
To the Pittsburg Agency, - - - - -	286.58
To the office at Philadelphia, - - - - -	6,550.06
Miscellaneous, - - - - -	2,008.50

5. Only 1,705 out of our 3,487 Churches have contributed to this Board's funds; leaving 1,783 which have acted either through other channels or not at all.

Dr. Wm. M. Scott, of Chicago, presented the Committee's report upon this Annual Report of the Board, commending, in very moderate terms, the progress of the past year; and, according to the usual custom, introduced to the

Assembly Dr. Happersett, one of the Secretaries. He said "the past year had been one of *great progress*," and "this Board is the Church's right arm." The Committee's resolutions implied some censure of all the Churches not contributing through this Board; but, the Secretary waxing warm in his address, spoke decidedly on this point, "not half of our Churches have contributed any thing to the Board—1,783 have not given a dollar." The same kind of censure upon the Churches of all those Presbyteries which prefer to attend themselves, directly, to the work of domestic missions in their own proper bounds (many of which are earnest and zealous in this work, and are more and more convinced that this is the true way to carry on the work) is contained in the Board's Annual Report (p. 35), which was distributed in printed form through the house. This report is at pains to present, in a long list, covering whole pages, the name of every such Presbytery in the whole Church, and of every particular Church of every such Presbytery, with an appalling *blank* against its name where there ought to be found the amount given. Thus the Board, once more, in this report, seems determined to insist upon holding up to censure Presbyteries which they positively know to be doing their own work in what they believe to be a lawful and the best way.

The question coming up on the adoption of this report, Dr. ADGER said:

There are two points in it which I cannot approve. The *first* is the censure upon all the non-contributing Presbyteries alike—which has, indeed, been explained away upon this floor, but remains in the Committee's resolutions and in the Board's report. The *second* point is in regard to our progress, as expressed moderately enough by the Chairman, but strongly by the Secretary, to whom we have just listened, and also by my venerable father (Dr. Spring) and others in this Assembly. Upon the question of our present system working "well enough," as upon the whole question of its expediency, I find myself in opposition to brethren whom I honor and love. At the feet of one of these (Dr. Hodge) I formerly sat for instruction, and would, in respect to many subjects, gladly sit there again. But that venerable Professor has been, all his life, immured within Seminary walls, and,

therefore, we cannot look to him for guidance in a practical question like this, of the operations of Boards and of the most efficient methods of developing the charity of the Church.

There is also Dr. Boardman, a *Boardman* in name, and, in fact, one of the very officers of these Boards. You might say that, of course, he knows all about this matter, because he is one of the conductors of the train, and yet a mere passenger in a back car may see what he cannot see, just because he is in front, and a mere outsider may point out ruinous obstructions in the way, which Dr. Boardman may not perceive, just because he is not an outsider. Sir, our brethren at the centre cannot afford to disregard the voice of their friends at the extremes of the Church. We can see some things better than they. And the very fact that it is they who are the drivers of the engine which is under discussion, should make them patient in enduring criticism and objections which are kindly offered.

Now, Moderator, this Board claims to be "the Church's right arm," and to be making "great progress" in Domestic Missions. It tells us, and we hear it all 'round the house, that "we are doing well enough." One of the proofs offered is, that we have missionaries, which is called "an army." Now, of these no doubt many are laboring amongst our old Churches, which are well able to support their preachers themselves. And in so far as this is the fact, I ask you if it is any evidence that we are doing well that so many of our Churches are willing to be helped by missionary funds? Too many, sir, of these old Churches, there are, some of them not very remote from the seat of the Boards, that love to *suck the paps of the Church*, to the withholding of our resources from the destitute frontiers!

You are also told that the receipts from the Churches last year were \$83,302.19. Do you call this doing well for a Church numbering about 300,000 members, with 2,600 Ministers and nearly 2,500 congregations? Why, Moderator, the children of the Presbyterian Church probably spent that much last year for sugar candy! The Ministers of the Presbyterian Church, perhaps, smoked and chewed up that amount more in tobacco! Talk of \$83,000 for Domestic Missions being well enough for our rich Church! Why, sir, over one million of dollars annually would not be too much for her resources—nor would it be too much for her liberality either, if you would approach her in the right way, as you are not now doing.

We are told in the Report, that the Missionaries are receiving an average salary of \$536—now \$1,000 each, is not more than our Church could pay them if they need it, and no doubt many of these men do need it all to give them an economical support. And yet the boast is that we are doing well enough, and are making great progress!

Very much is made in the report of the advance of *contributions from Churches* this year upon the last; and what is it? Why, about \$6,000. And what is that, Moderator, when you consider the numbers contributing, and the great resources of the Church! We talk

of \$6,000, and it seems a great sum, when we name it in round numbers, but look at it the other way, and it looks very small. Here, Moderator, is our 58th Annual Report, and all that we have reported is the paltry sum of \$83,000 from all our Churches! And these brethren will continue to come up here from year to year and "*glorify*" over this amount, and try to persuade us to believe that all is going on well. Before God, I believe, sir, that the language of lamentation befits us, and not that of congratulation.

Moderator, you do not reach the heart of the Church with your present organization. Our brethren at this centre are not in sympathy with its mighty pulsations. You have your power applied at the wrong place. You try to do the work of Domestic Missions by one great wheel at the centre, and what is the consequence? Why there are 1,705 contributing Churches and 1,783 non-contributing Churches.

Let me explain what I mean. The work of Domestic Missions is a two-fold work—it is a work within our established bounds, and a work, also, on our frontiers. This latter requires you to follow our teeming population, as they float over into Kansas, New Mexico, Utah, Dacotah and all those other countries which, as the Secretary very truly said, are calling on this Board to send them Missionaries. There, Moderator, is the great and noble field for our Board of Domestic Missions to operate. There is a work, surely, grand enough and arduous enough to task the energies of the mightiest minds. Now, in addition to this great work, and to the other necessary work of aiding our feebler Presbyteries, *you are undertaking to carry on the business of Domestic Missions throughout all our settled bounds, by means of this Board*, whereas, it can only be done in our whole bounds *by the Presbyteries themselves, operating directly each in its own field*. You might almost as reasonably undertake to do this work in the bounds of each particular Church-session, as in the bounds of each particular Presbytery. That would be an attempt only one degree more absurd than our present attempt. We have a divine system of government. Jesus Christ gives to us a system of Parochial, classical and Synodical Presbyteries, which are all so many wheels within wheels, and each of which is sufficient to do its own share of the mighty work, which is to be wrought out by the whole machine. And the work of each one it ought to be expected to do of itself; but your plan is to do the whole work of Domestic Missions by one big wheel at the centre, made up of about one hundred big men with big names and titles. The consequence is, that many of our Presbyteries and Churches are doing nothing, for they feel that they have nothing to do. I blame your system for this, in part, because you make such a great parade over the work with your great Board, that the Presbyteries are encouraged to feel no responsibility resting on them. There is a mighty Board in Philadelphia to attend to this matter (say they), and so they finish up their other business as soon as they can, and go home every man to his own particular field,

leaving the common domain of the Presbytery for your Board to look after; and look after that common field in all our Presbyteries, the Board never will nor can, and so your system must be changed, or the work remain undone.

We are not all so generous, Moderator, as Dr. Smith and Dr. Thornwell, whose generosity our brethren on the other side are disposed to abuse. They tell you they will cooperate with the Boards if you will have Boards, and then the answer they get is, "your objections to the Boards can't be very conscientious ones." I say we are not all as generous as these two brethren. Many of us hate the origin whence those Boards arose. Dr. Smith did not draw, sir, on his imagination for the history of them. Many who had a hand in framing them at first, and many more who tolerated them at first, were, indeed, Presbyterians, yet these Boards—it is useless for Dr. Hodge to deny it—are Congregationalist in their origin. And we hate the mixing up of Congregationalism with our system. In their own place I love good Congregational brethren as much as any body, but we hate their invention of Boards—as substituted for the Divine arrangements given by Christ to our Church. We want to cooperate with you, but if you insist on your present system we must claim our right to work apart in the way our Lord ordained.

What I would desire the Assembly to do, then, is:

1. To reduce the Boards to an effective size, say seven, or eleven, or fifteen men, so that every meeting may be attended by all the members.

2. Confine the Board first to the work of planting missions on the frontiers, and secondly, of simply receiving and distributing the abundance of the richer, according to the necessities of the poorer, Presbyteries. Free them altogether from all charge of the work within the bounds of any Presbytery.

3. Throw the work of domestic missions, within our settled limits, upon the respective Presbyteries. Let no one of them draw any thing from the central fund that does not first earnestly strive to do its own work. Require each Presbytery to aim first at overtaking its own destitutions, and then at furnishing a surplus for the aid of the weaker Presbyteries. Enjoin upon the Presbyteries and Churches the grace of giving for domestic as for foreign missions.

Let not any say such a change will paralyze the work. Many Presbyteries have made the experiment of bringing the work of domestic missions nearer to the home feelings and home sympathies of their people, and with great success. Harmony Presbytery, in South Carolina, conducts its own missions, and it raises \$2,500 annually. Until three years ago, the Presbytery of South Carolina was in connection with the Board, and raised about \$300 annually. They separated from the Board and undertook the work themselves, and they now raise annually \$1,500, which is but the beginning of what they can and will do.

What I am now about to add, I hope will be taken as kindly as I

mean it. We are acting upon a report of our Committee on the Board's annual Report, which, also, is, of course, before us for approval or censure. I must call the Assembly's attention to the claim set up by the Board on pp. 27, 28. They first state that since 1828, when the Board was reorganized, our Church has increased 17 Synods, 78 Presbyteries, 1,292 Ministers, 1,519 Churches and 133,322 members. And then the Board says of all this, "and let it be remembered that this increase and expansion were mainly effected by the instrumentality of her Board of Missions." Moderator is this true? Is this just? Or, if true and just, would it be modest? Would it be Christian? Does it become this Board thus to ignore the influence and labors of all the Pastors, and of all the Teachers and of all the pious people in our Church, during all this period, and claim that it, "the right arm of our Church," has done all these great things? And ought such a claim as this, thrust thus upon us, again and again, from year to year—ought it to attract no attention from the Assembly? Does it convey to the Church no lesson of warning? Ought she not to watch the development of this arrogant and domineering spirit with seasonable care?

In conclusion, for the sake of our country and the Church, let me implore the Assembly to consider candidly the objections made to the Boards as a system. As to the Church's portion of the case, do but confide in your Divine Church government, and instead of \$83,000, the Church will give \$1,000,000, for Domestic Missions. And as to the peace and happiness of our country, which were made the ground of a patriotic appeal to us, for these Boards, by our venerable father from New York, let me just say that it is not these Boards, Moderator, which are any bond of union for the different sections of this country. No, sir, the people of the United States do not know, they do not feel, our Boards. But they do know, and they do feel, this General Assembly. That, sir, is a bond of this union. Increase its influence, Moderator, by giving it the direct sway, it ought to have, over all these works of the Church—make it your Board of Missions, and let it appoint and direct your Executive Committee, and you will thus increase its power as a bond of union for our whole country.

After some remarks from the Chairman and Hon. SAMUEL GALLOWAY, Dr. ADGER moved to re-commit the report for some modifications of the Committee's language, which motion prevailed, and the report was afterwards adopted as amended.

When the unfinished business, viz: the question of re-organising the Boards, came up, Dr. KREBS agreed to yield the floor to Dr. THORNWELL, who

Desired to say a few words in reply to my illustrious brother from

Princeton. If my respected brother had written out a speech to deliver, before the Assembly, in opposition to my views, he could not possibly have written one which it would better suit me to answer, than the one delivered here on Saturday. He accepts the issues which are the true issues in this case, and has set before us the type of Presbyterianism of which the Boards may be regarded as the natural development. There was a little preliminary skirmishing, which seems necessary before coming to the main issue, and to that let us first attend.

Dr. Hodge has concluded, from my principles, that I *make the Clergy the Church*. I am amazed at the charge, but still more amazed at the logic which sustains it. I have paid some little attention to logic. I once wrote a book which that good brother criticised, in his Review, as having too much logic. I have studied Aristotle, and several other masters in the science, and have, probably, the largest collection of works, on the subject, to be found in any private library in the whole country. But, in all my researches, I never did meet any logic, before, so peculiar as that by which my distinguished brother has deduced from such premises such a charge as he has brought against me. It reminds me of the logic of the hard-shell Baptist preacher, in Alabama, who had announced that, on a given day, he would prove from the pulpit that, in due time, the whole country would become Baptists. Repudiating, as they all do, any previous selection of a text, and making conscience of opening the Bible in the pulpit and taking the first text upon which the eye may chance to rest, and trusting to the Spirit to aid in the exposition, this good brother happened on the text, "the voice of the turtle is heard in (all) our land." It rather stumped him at first, but he soon rallied, and said: "My brethren, you may think there is nothing in this text to prove what I have undertaken, but you will see before I am done. You know what turtles are. Go through the country and you see hundreds lying on the logs, in the ponds, sunning themselves, and as you pass one after another they will 'PLUNGE' into the water. Now a turtle is remarkable for its having no voice of any kind. It is perfectly dumb, and no man ever heard it emit any sound. But, the text says, 'its voice shall be heard in all our land,' and, therefore, the text must refer to the sound it makes as it 'PLUNGES' into the water. And so the text clearly proves that, in all our land, men are to take to the water and turn Baptist." The logic which proves me guilty of abetting a clerical despotism is about as conclusive as this.

Again, my brother has said that my principles are "hyper-hyper-HYPER-High-Presbyterianism," and I must retort that his principles are no, no, NO Presbyterianism, no, no, NO Churchism! His speech, sir, presented us with a little touch of democracy, a little touch of prelacy, and a considerable slice of quakerism, but no Presbyterianism. Surely, sir, Dr. Hodge's statement that the Church is found wherever the Holy Ghost is, cannot be taken without much qualification. Does not the Holy Ghost often dwell in the heart of the soli-

tary individual? But the Church is an organism, uniting many individuals into one body.

Again, the good brother appeals to *authority* for sanction to his views of Boards. We can appeal to Fathers too. There have been martyrs who laid down their lives rather than deny the Divine right to Presbytery. The great author of the second book of discipline, and many others of the glorious men of Scotland, held the views we now maintain. And we have living authorities, too—among whom is one who has no superior, and few equals, in either hemisphere—the great author of the Act and Testimony, the document that separated this Church from error, to whom all Presbyterians are, therefore, under everlasting obligations. But, Moderator, this question is not to be settled by human authority, but by the Word of God.

Again, my brother twits me with supporting the Boards while professing to be conscientiously opposed to the principles of their constitution. Would he have us to be factious? Moderator, I never have said to my brethren, to whom I promised submission in the Lord, "I can't submit, I wont submit." I will submit to my brethren, even where I think they are mistaken, if the submission be not sinful.

The good brother complains that we wish to lay a heavier yoke than the Jewish upon his neck. The burden we want to impose is more grievous than he can bear—he must have liberty. Well, sir, what we bring him is (1.) God's authority, and (2.) God's guidance, and these constitute our notion of perfect freedom.

But it is charged that we regard the body too much, and the spirit too little. So far from this, what we contend for is the true spirit of the scheme of missions and of the organization of the Church. What we prize is the soul of the Church, but of course a soul must do better in a body which suits it. The soul of a man could not act well through the body and organs of a hog, or of an elephant. The spirit of a man needs the body of a man, and so the spirit of the Church needs the true body and organism of the Church, for its complete and perfect action.

The idea of the brother, that if Paul were here he would pay no regard to this Church Court, but act independently of it upon his own authority, filled me with astonishment. Paul surely would not despise order nor condemn the authority which his Divine Master has left in His Church. Sir, we claim to be a true Apostolic Church. Paul is here. All the Apostles are here. We have the very principles they inculcated, and the very order they inaugurated; and would Paul condemn these.

But I made the good brother's remarks the occasion of consulting Paul on this very question before us, and I have his answer. He declares (Eph. iv. ii.) that the Lord, as His ascension gifts, "gave some Apostles, and some Prophets, and some Evangelists, and some Pastors and Teachers," and that "*God has set*" these in His Church, and "appointed helps and governments" for it.

But now let us now pass to the main issue—the Presbyterianism of

my brother from Princeton, and that which we hold to be the Presbyterianism of the Bible and of our Constitution. The good brother, in his account of Church Government, has not signalized one principal element of this Presbyterianism. He named: 1. *The parity of the clergy*. Why, sir, this is not a distinctive feature of *Presbyterian Church Government*. All the Evangelical sects, except the Episcopal, hold to that. 2. He named *the authority of the people*. Why, sir, that, also, is not distinctive of Presbyterianism. The Congregationalists hold that in intenser degree than we do. 3. The Doctor mentioned *the unity of the Church*. And is that peculiar to us? Why, Rome holds that with a vehemence we do not put forth! Such are the three points signalized by the brother as the main points of our system. Look at them, and see what they compose. Is that Presbyterianism? A little of every thing, but nothing distinctive.

Sir, the principles which really distinguish us from other Evangelical Churches are,

1. The principle of representative government—of government by parliamentary courts, composed of Presbyters duly appointed and ordained. A single congregation is governed by the parochial Presbytery; several associated congregations by the classical Presbytery; the whole Church, by a Presbytery of representative Presbyters, from all its bounds. This is the first element that distinguishes us from Congregationalists and from Prelatists—government not by individual rulers, but Assemblies of Presbyters. Do we ignore the people, then? Far from it, the people are there representatively; they are there in Presbyters, all alike of their own choice.

2. The members of these representative Assemblies must be of two classes, belonging to the one order of Presbyters. All of them belong to the one order of rulers, and *only as rulers*, chosen rulers, or representatives of the people, can they appear in these Courts. But they are of two classes, viz: 1. Presbyters who only rule; and, 2. Presbyters who rule and also labor in the word and doctrine. This gives us the second element of our representative government, and answers to the two houses, which are found to be so excellent a help to wise and safe legislation.

Presbyterians, therefore, hold to the *parity of the Eldership*, not only, as Dr. Hodge seems to think, to the parity of the "Clergy," (that is, of the teaching Elders or ministers,) but, also, to the *parity of all Presbyters*, as Presbyters or Rulers of the Lord's House. I take my brother, the Ruling Elder, when I meet him in any Church Court, by the hand, as my brother and my *peer*. As Presbyters, as members of any Presbytery, from the lowest to the highest, we are all perfectly equal in authority, although some of us have another function or office, being ordained to labor, also, in the word and doctrine. Dr. Thornwell then referred to an article in the last number of the *Princeton Review*, as going to abolish and overthrow, altogether, the office of the Ruling Elder and this Presbyterian doctrine of the parity of all Presbyters.

3. A third distinctive feature of Presbyterian Church government is, the way in which it realizes the unity of the Church. It realizes this idea by the *elasticity* of its Parliamentary Representative system. If there was but one congregation on earth, its session would be the Parliament of the whole Church; if half a dozen, the representatives from each, would constitute a Parliament for the whole Church; if a still larger number, the same results would follow. And representatives from all the Churches (or from the smaller Parliaments, which is the same principle,) constitute the Parliament for the whole Church.

Only two Churches on the earth realize this idea of Church unity—Rome and our own Church. But these are the poles apart as to the system by which they realize it. Rome, with her infallible Pope at the head, and with graded authorities extending over the whole earth, one class subservient to another, and all to the Pope, secures a terrible unity—binding all, abjectly, to a single throne. Our system, on the other hand, secures unity in consistency with the most perfect freedom.

Now look, brethren, at the Presbyterianism advocated by the brother from Princeton, and then at that which I have feebly attempted to portray, “Look first on this picture, and then look on that,” and say which of them is the Presbyterianism of the Bible—which is your Presbyterianism. Sir, methought, as the brother portrayed what he called the main principles of our system, that the old Covenanters’ blood which runs in the veins of my brother, your permanent clerk, must have earnestly protested that that was not his Presbyterianism, nor the Presbyterianism of his fathers then in Scotland. I am happy, sir, in being able to say that the system enunciated in the speech of my brother is not the system taught by his colleague who has that department in the Seminary at Princeton.

Dr. HODGE here interposed, with Dr. THORNWELL’S consent, and said that he was unwilling that the few undeveloped statements made by him on Saturday, should be held up, especially in a misapprehended form, as an *exposé* of his views. He had elaborated his views upon that subject in a tract which his colleague (Dr. McGill) approved and used in his classes. He could not permit the impression to go forth uncorrected, that he and his colleague held different views, nor that the delineation given by Dr. Thornwell was a correct delineation of his views. “Moderator,” said Dr. Hodge, “I can agree to every principle set forth by Dr. Thornwell here to-day.” “Do you then mean, Dr. Hodge, to be understood (asked Dr. Thornwell,) as saying that you

hold the Ruling Elder to be a Presbyter?" "I will answer that question (said Dr. Hodge,) if you will tell me whether you hold the Apostle to have been a Deacon." The Moderator interrupted this conversation, by announcing that the hour of adjournment had arrived.

On the next day, the discussion being resumed, Dr. THORNWELL

Disavowed any intention of being discourteous, or of wounding the feelings of any brother in his remarks of yesterday, which produced the interruption. Without reiterating the points already made, he would merely refer to one more, which he had neglected in presenting, yesterday, his view of the essentials of our Church Government. He alluded to the power of the representative Assemblies of Rulers. It was simply ministerial and declarative. They could not make laws for God's people, but only declare and administer the revealed laws of the Lord's house. They have a certain commission entrusted to them, and no power beyond that which is necessary to execute that commission. Now, the ground which he took in opposition to the present organization of our Boards was, that there was an exercise of power *beyond* what the Church was authorized to exercise, in constituting a society separate from the Church for Church purposes. The Board is a missionary society beyond the Church—outside of the Church—a distinct organism, and the Executive Committee is the hand of this Society, not the hand of the Church. Brethren mistook in saying that the *Board* is the executive agent of the Assembly; it is not. It is, in fact, not an executive agency at all. The Executive Committee is the hand of the Board, and the Board stands off as a missionary society, and to it the Executive Committee reports. Instead of creating a *hand*, and an executive agency of the Assembly, we created a *society*, in imitation of the American Board or the American Home Missionary Society, and transferred to it the work of missions. The Board is not expected to do any thing but appoint the Executive Committee and receive its report, adopt it, and then report to the Assembly. Now, by a true construction of our system, the General Assembly *is* the Board of Domestic Missions. The Executive Committee ought to be the hand of the Assembly, and directly responsible to it. But this is not the case. Another organization—a Society whose members are not identical with the members of the Church, and whose officers are not Church officers, is interposed between the active agency and the Assembly which ought to control. What, then, do you want? To abolish the Board and have the General Assembly act as the Board of Missions for the Church, or rather the Church act through the Assembly.

I want the idea to get out amongst our people, that *every member* of the Church is a member of a Board, not appointed by men, but by

God himself. I wish every Church member to feel that, by the fact of his being a member of the Church, he is a member of a missionary society, and that the privilege of membership is bought with Christ's blood, not with money, and that he owes the duty of a member. The Presbyterian Church is a BOARD OF MISSIONS, OF EDUCATION, and of every other effort that the Church ought to undertake. And to lose sight of that idea, or hide it from the people, is to diminish in their minds the sense of responsibility to labor. It is clear, therefore, that to the extent to which we recognize the propriety of organizing missionary societies without the Church, we propagate the notion amongst our people that a man may be a Christian, and yet not a member of a missionary society; whereas, if you adopt our idea, which is certainly the scriptural one, they will feel that membership in the Church is membership of a missionary society, and to pray and give is a part of a member's duty. I care not for the name. Let it be called a Board—a Committee—no matter; but let it be the *hand of the Church*, to collect and disburse her benefactions, and do her work.

What has a Board ever done? You see from the Report of the Board it does nothing. Many of its members never attend. Many don't know they are members, and others don't care. Its meetings are mere matter of form, and the only effect is to make the members of the Board rely upon the Assembly for supervision, whilst the Assembly relies upon the Board, and supervision is defeated.

I desire to ask one or two questions:

1st. Do you believe that the Church will be more efficient in doing her work, with every member of the Church a member of all her missionary schemes, and with the obligation to perform the duties of a member pressing on his conscience, than as things now are?

And, 2d. Is it consistent with the dignity of the Church to be offering membership in her Boards, and certain honors supposed to be attached thereto, for thirty or fifty dollars? Is it not humiliating?

You ask, why make so much ado about so small a matter? It is not a matter of small importance. Moses was as particular to see to every pin of the tabernacle as to the more important points. No point that God saw proper to order could safely be neglected; and we cannot rightly esteem any thing a small matter which God has directed us to employ.

I love simplicity. I love simplicity of organization. God's works are simple; the organization of His Church is sublimely simple; her worship is simple, and just as we seek after complexity of schemes, we depart from his example. I want to see this Church placed in such a position that every member may consider himself a member of a society, part of whose *worship* and whose *work* it is to spread the Gospel. I want to see the entire energies of this Church called out in the Master's service, and I want to get clear of every encumbrance that will retard her progress, or embarrass her energies.

Let me say, in the last place, that great events turn upon small principles. The difference between a Board and a Committee of the

Assembly may seem to be small, but the difference is immense. The one is a separate society, the other the Church's own hand.

When you lay down the proposition that the Church is the missionary agency, you make every Church member a member, and lay upon him the responsibility of doing his duty. Under our present organization we know that is not felt.

Moderator, I have now discharged, according to my ability, a solemn public duty. I have stood up for principles that I solemnly believe to be fundamental in our system, and of incalculable importance to the welfare and advancement of our glorious cause. I love the whole catholic Church; but I love the Presbyterian Church with a fervor and a devotion which I cannot utter, and I do desire to see her put in that position that I believe she must occupy in order to the accomplishment of her mission in pouring the blessings of peace and salvation upon our whole land and upon the nations. I want the Church to come up to this mission in her own proper organization, with her own Assemblies, her own officers, in her own power, executing her commissions herself, without delegating to any outside organization those functions and duties, to perform which is her highest glory. When they ask the people to contribute, let her ministers speak, not in the name of this Board or that Board, but in the name of Zion and her glorious King. Let them ever press the idea that it is not the cause of a Board of human creation, but of the blood-bought Church and her exalted Head.

Dr. THORNWELL closed his long and able argument (says the *Presbyterian*)

With one of those impressive apostrophes, and earnest appeals, which few men can equal; and, although his argument may not have been deemed conclusive by some of his hearers, all felt that his utterances were as honest as they were earnest, and they left a profound impression upon every hearer.

Rev. Mr. Janvier asked, what are supposed to be the particular benefits of the present system? He was prepared, as he thought, to vote three days ago, but he had heard much since that led him to ask what the advantages of the present system were, and he hoped some of those fathers and brethren that had long known the working of our Boards would set forth the reasons why they preferred the present organization.

Rev. Dr. Krebs got the floor, but yielded it to the

Rev. Dr. Hodge. He rose, with great reluctance, and proposed to occupy the time of the Assembly but a few minutes. He rose rather in obedience to the wishes of friends and brethren, than by the impulse of his own mind; but it was, perhaps, due to himself and his position to say a word or two. He said that, on Saturday last, in the few remarks which he made, he did not design to eliminate a theory of the Church, or Church Government. His aim was to show the

impracticability of the proposed scheme and theory, rather than to declare his own. He had uttered three sentences which Dr. Thornwell had held up sometimes in a ludicrous, sometimes in a portentous light, and out of them had constructed, and attributed to him (Dr. Hodge) a theory of Church government which he utterly repudiated. He held no such theory. If Dr. Thornwell's was the sentiment of this house, then he (Dr. Hodge) was unworthy to hold, at the hands of this Assembly, the place in which he had labored for almost forty years—nay, he would be unworthy to be considered a Presbyterian. He had, himself, developed those three sentences into a system of Church government, in a pamphlet, entitled "What is Presbyterianism?" presenting a theory of our system as a divinely instituted, *jure divino*, form of government. That pamphlet has received the sanction of our Board of Publication; it has been circulated by thousands through the land; it has been commended by theologians beyond the borders of our own country more warmly than by our brethren at home; it has been adopted by Dr. McGill and put into the hands of his pupils. I have, therefore, after all, some reputation as a sound Presbyterian.

Permit me, Mr. Moderator, to state, in very few words, what that theory of Presbyterianism is. It involves the following principles:

1. That all the attributes and prerogatives of the Church of God on earth are derived from the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

2. Consequently, that the prerogatives of the Church belong, in the first instance, *in sensu primo*, to the people, and not exclusively to the clergy. This is the great distinctive principle of Protestantism.

3. That these prerogatives are to be exercised through the organs and according to the rules prescribed in the Word of God.

4. That the Holy Spirit dwelling in all the children of God, making them one body in Christ Jesus, distributes gifts to each one severally as He wills. To one he gives the gifts of an Apostle, to another those of a Prophet, to another those of a teacher, to another those of ruling, etc., etc.

5. That of these organs or officers of the Apostolic Church, some were intended to be permanent, others temporary. The criteria for discriminating between the permanent and temporary offices are, 1. The nature of the gifts involved in them. It was plenary revelation and inspiration which constituted an Apostle. If that gift has ceased the office has ceased. It was occasional inspiration which constituted a Prophet; if that gift is no longer granted, we have no longer a class of living Prophets. 2. When there is an express command that a given office should be continued; or, 3. When the qualifications which are to be required in candidates for the office are prescribed, then the office is permanent. 4, and finally, when it can be proved, historically, that an office has, in fact, been continued from the apostolic through all succeeding ages.

6. That the officers thus ascertained to be permanent, are Ministers of the Word, Ruling Elders, and Deacons.

7. That as there is no class of officers above the Presbyteries, no gifts higher than those which constitute a minister of the Word, Presbyters are the highest permanent officers of the Church, and stand all on the same level; all have the same office and the same prerogatives. This is the parity of the clergy. There are no Apostles, no Prophets, and, of course, no prelates.

8. That the right of the people to take part in the government of the Church, is exercised through their representatives, the Ruling Elders. Here is the principle of representation, and here is the foundation of the peculiar character of our Church Courts. They are composed of two elements, a lay and clerical, Ministers and Elders. This representation of the people is first in the Session, then in the Presbytery, then in the Synod, and then in the General Assembly. In all, the Elders have the same right with the Ministers to participate in the exercise of all the powers of the Church—executive, legislative and judicial. They are in our Courts, not by courtesy, not by human ordinance, but of Divine right.

9. That as the Spirit of God dwelling in all believers makes them one body; as the command to obey our brethren in the Lord is not limited to those brethren who may belong to the same congregation with ourselves; as it is not founded on mere proximity, nor on any mutual covenant, but on the fact that they are our brethren, in whom the Spirit dwells, therefore the Church is one; therefore, a smaller part is subject to a larger, a larger to the whole; a Session to the Presbytery, a Presbytery to the Synod, and the Synods to the General Assembly.

This is my Presbyterianism. I am not ashamed of it. I am willing to avow it here and elsewhere, and stand or fall by it. What, then, are the points of difference between this system and that advocated on the other side? That is a question not easy to be answered. The difficulty arises partly from the fact, there seems to be no consistency or agreement between those who set themselves in array against the common doctrine; and partly because it is not easy to catch up every thing that is uttered in the heat of debate. So far as I understand matters, the essential points of difference are these:

1. That Ruling Elders and Ministers, being alike Presbyters, have the same office; all are Bishops, Pastors and Teachers, as well as Rulers. [Here Dr. Thornwell interposed, and said that was not his doctrine.] Mr. Moderator, I cannot pretend to state Dr. Thornwell's doctrine. I state the doctrine which has been advanced and strenuously advocated in different parts of the Church. The point stated is radical, and changes the whole character of our system. But as it is disavowed by Dr. T. I will not dwell upon it.

2. A second point of difference is, that all Church power is joint, and not several. It is all in the hands of Church Courts, and can be exercised only by them. Then, Moderator, you cannot carry out your system. You cannot send out missionaries either to the destitute or the heathen. A missionary goes often alone. He preaches the

Gospel. Men are converted. They profess their faith. They are baptized, and received to the Lord's table. There is no Session. There is no Church Court. The Minister exercises the prerogative to admit to the sacraments. He constitutes the Church, and when Elders are elected he ordains them.

3. The third point of difference is, that all the details of Church government, even to the nails in the tabernacle, are prescribed in the Word of God, either in express terms or by necessary inference. We have no more discretion in matters of government or modes of operation, than we have in matters of doctrine or morals. This was the main, and, so far as my remarks were concerned, the only point. The subject under discussion was the Boards. The Boards were declared to be unscriptural, because not enjoined. No "Thus saith the Lord" can be adduced in their behalf. It is this doctrine against which my whole soul revolts. This, pleading the authority of the Almighty God for the opinions of men; this asserting that the commands of the Almighty extend in externals to the infinitesimally small difference between a Board and a Committee; this is a doctrine to which I am persuaded Presbyterians never will submit.

Dr. KREBS obtained the floor when the question came up again, and expressed a wish that Dr. McGill should define his position, as his name had been involved in this debate. Dr. McGill declining to speak, Dr. KREBS

Proceeded to endorse all Dr. Thornwell's great principles, and all they involve, even to a preference for directly ecclesiastical agency. But he thought they were not logically applicable in Dr. Thornwell's way of applying them. It is the glory of the Church that she receives nothing for which she has not directly or implied a "Thus saith the Lord." But if this principle be so applied as to insist upon an explicit precept for every circumstantial and every detail in the operations of the Church, he must beg leave to dissent. It could not be done.*

He proceeded to notice the argument from the inability of Congress to delegate their legislative authority. Although they could not delegate legislative authority, they could authorize the appointment of a Department of the Interior, or the appointment of Foreign Ministers, or even a Plenipotentiary Minister. Neither do we demit

*The reader will notice that this was not Dr. Thornwell's application of the principle. He said the circumstantials came under the rule, "do all things decently and in order." He did not say there is an "explicit precept for every one of these details." He said the command implied all the *necessary executive agency*, but did not authorize an organism like our Boards, with President, Vice President, honorary members, etc., etc. We think Dr. Krebs ought to have voted with the minority.

our office or authority when we appoint a Board or Committee to carry out the orders of the General Assembly, or to execute certain ministerial functions during the eleven months of the interval between the dissolution of one Assembly and the meeting of another.

In fact, the moment these brethren allow a committee, however small, however direct and immediate the responsibility, that moment they demolish their whole argument. He liked simplicity himself, and if the brethren desired the utmost measure of simplicity, the best way would be to appoint a *single man*, or at most two, to manage each of these great interests of the Church.

He then drew a distinction between the dissolving of a Board and the dissolving of a Synod or Presbytery, to show that the Assembly had more complete power over the destiny of the one than of the other. When the latter is dissolved, its component parts still live, and are attached to some other bodies; but if the Board is dissolved, it is annihilated, its "*disjecta membra*" are scattered to the winds; or, to draw an illustration from the waters, they are seen, "*nantes in gurgite vasto.*" The Assembly has complete control over a Board, it is its creature.

He contended that our present system is as legitimate and normal an outworking of the Presbyterian system as would be any thing in the shape of a Commission or a Committee. And this he said as a Presbyterian; for, although he had not derived his Presbyterian lineage from North Britain, or North Ireland, yet, he could trace it directly to the banks of the Rhine and Palatinate, where *his* Presbyterian ancestors had drawn it direct from Geneva, which the glorious Calvin had made the centre of the Presbyterian world.

What we contend for, Moderator, is, that the Head of the Church has not prescribed the mode of organization and activity, but has left us at liberty to do His work the best way we can, under the general guidance of His Word. The doctrine of our brethren is an invasion of the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free—free from the traditions and commandments of men.

Now comes the practical question: Which is best, a Board or a Committee? A hand growing *right out from the shoulder*, or a hand *attached to an arm*, and connected with the body *by the arm*, and obeying the behests of the *head* and the *heart*. He would notice only some of the points of comparison:

1. A paid membership our brethren object to. And what is it? A pious mother has a beloved son, just consecrated by her in baptism to the Lord; she gives thirty or fifty dollars, and has his name enrolled as an honorary member of a Board. It is a harmless expression of her love to her boy and to the cause.

2. Another objection is the appointment of members all over the country. No little fun has been poked at us members of the Board, on the score of our constituting a fifth estate in the Church:—they say the first estate is *Professors of Seminaries*; the second, *Secretaries of Boards*; the third, *Editors of Religious Papers*; the fourth,

Doctors of Divinity; and the fifth, which many a man aspires to when he cannot get into either of the other four, is the estate of *Members of the Boards*. But the plan just lays hold of a principle of human nature which it is lawful to suborn for good. By appointing men all over the country, the Assembly awakens an interest in the cause in the minds of influential men, and of others whom they can influence.

3. Another objection is to what is called the farce of the election. Any little mistake may be turned into ridicule—but these mistakes are not the fault of the system. So it is not the fault of the system, but of the officers, that some members of the Board do not know that they are members.

Dr. KREBS was here interrupted by the hour for adjournment. In the afternoon he moved that Dr. McGill be *invited by the Assembly* (of which he was not a member) to define his position. The motion passed *nem. con.*

Dr. MCGILL expressed his thanks; stated that Dr. Thornwell was *authorized* to say that he agrees with him in his views of Church government—they are the views he teaches in the Seminary at Princeton. At the same time, he had no sympathy with the application of them made by Dr. Thornwell in regard to the activities of the Church. “I also substantially agree with Dr. Hodge, for I see very little difference between them. I go with Dr. Hodge and with Dr. Thornwell. I have but one remark with respect to any supposed diversity of opinion between my colleague and myself. I confess I read with deep regret an article in the last *Princeton Review* upon the Eldership. I cannot approve that article, and if Dr. Hodge does, *quoad hoc*, there is a diversity of opinion.” Dr. McGill proceeded to express his kind feelings for Dr. Hodge, and his knowledge of the mutual respect and kind feelings entertained by Drs. Hodge and Thornwell for one another.

Dr. KREBS then proceeded with his argument, insisting that by our present arrangements of large Boards the whole land is covered with a sort of net-work, by which the people are drawn to the performance of their duty to the cause. By these admirable arrangements the whole body is pervaded with nerves that sympathize with the centre, and cooperate with it.

He ridiculed the idea of asking the Boards to send up their

minutes and papers for review and control. Said he had no objection to it, except the difficulty of transportation. A small steamboat, a car of Adams' express, or an ox team, would be required to bring them; and, if piled up on this platform, the Moderator and Clerks would all become invisible behind the rampart. And then he would like to see the Committee appointed to examine them at work in the lecture-room. It is about as much as they usually can do to attend to the business as now before them. How they would accomplish the additional labor, he was glad it was not for him to say. If this thing should be attempted, we should have other farces than those of electing members of the Board. Try it, brethren, and I hope you will have, amongst these masses of books and papers, a good time generally.

The time of adjournment came, but a motion prevailed to suspend the rule for adjournment until Dr. Krebs had finished. And he proceeded

To argue from the history of the Boards, and their rise and progress, from 1789 to 1860, that they now were in the state to which the wisdom of our fathers and our own—the experiences of the past—the trial of other methods, and the success of our schemes, had brought them. He appealed to what had been accomplished by the Board system; asserted that the Church never dreamed of being in rebellion against God, or its own Constitution, and urged the importance of abiding by the present system until we were sure of a better. God has given us good prosperity; shall we fling it all in the face of his Providence? Shall we go back to discarded systems? Must we go back and lay new foundations? or, shall we go on to perfection? Shall we cripple ourselves, our Boards and our work, by perpetual vacillation? Shall we not hold to something? We know what we *have*, we know not what we shall get if we go backward. The Church will lose its confidence in you, sir, amid this perpetual agitation. It needs repose. The change proposed will not add funds. Whatever plan we have, we want more of the Spirit of God. We have the altar, the wood, the material for sacrifice; we want fire from Heaven to kindle it. O! for that fire, to warm our own hearts, and that of the Church. Then, brethren, would we see eye to eye, be joined hand in hand, and this glorious system, disparaged as “a wheel within a wheel,” would soon appear as “full of eyes,” spangled with intelligence, and moved as a thing of life, by the Spirit of the living creature that is in the wheels—guided and impelled by the power that governs and directs all providential things and human agencies; and all our plans and systems, whither they shall go, and what they shall do!

Rev. Dr. Henry A. Boardman having the floor, said that the time chosen for the discussion was most propitious, because never, in the history of the Church, had God so signally blessed the operations of

the Boards. We had reason to lament that we had given so little and done so little, and yet, what they had done had been accomplished through the agency of this system. And yet we hear, from a learned Professor in one of our Theological Seminaries, that our system is not in accordance with the Word of God, and that in the establishment of these Boards we are invading the prerogatives of Jesus Christ.

He referred to the division of the Church in 1837 and 1838, and said that the New-School brethren had at length learned by bitter experience the truth of the principles they discarded then, and for which we are now contending.

In reference to Dr. Thornwell, he stated that he was an eloquent speaker, who charmed by his tones; and he hoped it would be said of him, as of one of old, that his voice is as one who plays well upon an instrument, and the people love to hear his words, but they do them not. And so he hoped it would always be, as long as he teaches the doctrines he has advocated here.

As he understood the brother, his doctrine was that the Church was absolutely prohibited by the Great Head of the Church from creating any agency that was not absolutely necessary, and that agency, too, must be of the simplest form.

Dr. Thornwell had said that in creating Boards, we were casting a reproach upon the Saviour. The speaker could hardly credit his hearing—it was an astonishing declaration. They contended for a “Thus saith the Lord” for every thing. Where do they get their authority for a Board in a Theological Seminary? And yet, two of these gentlemen are here as representatives of Theological Seminaries. How do they sleep quietly upon their pillows while these Boards remain?

The speaker referred to the paraphernalia of the tabernacle, and styled the speech of Dr. Thornwell as Levitical in the extreme. He did not believe that Presbyterianism, in all its details, was found in the Bible, although its fundamental principles were. He referred to Dr. Baird's *Assembly Digest* in high terms, and stated that he had carefully examined that book, and from beginning to end he could not find a single footprint or ligament of this High-Church Presbyterianism.

Dr. B. M. Smith dwelt on the unquestionable fact, that a large number of men in our Church have long had serious objections to the cumbrous organization of our Boards. After the Buffalo Assembly, we were told that the question was adjudicated and settled. But in 1855, at Nashville, the question revived, and it seemed to be then settled the other way. Last year the Assembly appointed Committees upon the reorganization of the Boards, although gentlemen there said the question ought to have no further discussion, because it was a settled question. But gentlemen are mistaken—the question must be discussed until the right principles are determined, and the proper and true forms agreed upon. Dr. Smith proceeded to show that, although there had been no attempt at organizing a party, yet there

had been a voluntary and very wide spread opinion favorable to modifying the present organization.

He dwelt on the notable fact, that resistance to modification begins and is led on by men who hold the power, and exercise control.

He had himself had a little taste of official life, in a brief service as Secretary of the Board of Publication, and the result of his own personal observations there was, that the present system is an incubus upon the Church's energies.

His remarks on the origin of our present cumbrous forms had been misapprehended. He had not said that the men who founded our Boards were Congregationalists, but that the interspersion of many men through our Church from Congregationalist Churches had produced a public sentiment among us which led to the adoption of our present system, as adapted to the preferences of such.

The true contest between us and the New School was as to the right of the Church, *as such*, to conduct missions.

Why did not some of the brethren on the other side answer the very pertinent question of the Missionary from India (the Rev. Mr. Janvier), and tell us what are the peculiar advantages of the present system to be set over against all the objections made against them?

Here it occurs to produce a certain paper, prepared in Philadelphia last Monday week, and circulated here. He read the paper. (It was the document of the Executive Committee of the Board of Publication, expressing opposition to any change in the constitution of the Boards.)

Dr. Smith doubted the right of the committee to express any such opinion about matters which this General Assembly only had a right to decide. It was an improper attempt to exert influence upon members. But it was not the first time such influence had been attempted from such quarters; and sometimes even the action of one Assembly had been reversed by another under such influences.

Dr. BOARDMAN interposed to say they had only done that to enlighten Dr. Smith, the Chairman of the Committee appointed by the last Assembly. We knew the gentleman held certain views on this subject, and as, by the constitution of that Committee, he represented the Board of Publication, we wished to inform him of our views.

Rev. Dr. SMITH (bowing respectfully) thanked the Committee for their benevolence—would have acknowledged his obligations earlier had he understood the object of that action. It is, Moderator, but another added to the many marks of the *understanding* and *will* of that Board. But still it is true that neither the Committee nor the Executive Committee of the Board of Publication were asked by this Assembly to give their views.

He said, further, that the arguments used now in favor of these Boards was the same used in defence of the continuance of the "Plan of Union." "Why disturb a plan that has enlarged our Church so much, by bringing Congregationalists into it? Why disturb the Home Missionary Society? Has not it done good?" We replied, it

may have done good, but we want to act as a Church—we want to put honor upon the organization that Christ has given us. We are now asked, why disturb the Boards? Have not they done well? We answer, we want to act more directly as a Church—they have, or rather, their Executive Committees have, done well; but, we believe that the Committees would have done *better*, under the immediate control of the Assembly, without this *tertium quid*, called a Board. And we further say, we are not disturbing the Boards. We ask for no great change—chiefly a reduction of the *number*, and dispensing with paid membership. He would have preferred the name *Committee* of Assembly to Board, but that was matter of small importance.

As to the danger of forfeiting the civil corporate powers of the Boards, there was none—that was a mere bug-bear. He parried the argument of Dr. Boardman, in regard to the *Boards* of Directors of the Seminaries. Dr. Boardman had wondered how we could sleep under a Board of Directors? Very soundly, sir, because our Board of Directors are elected *directly* by the Synods of Virginia and North Carolina. So in Princeton, so in Columbia. They are no more than Committees of the ecclesiastical Courts—the very thing for which we contend. We sleep soundly, sir, and have no bad dreams, as if the incubus of a Board were pressing upon our breasts.

The Rev. Mr. BLAUVELT got the floor, and moved the previous question. The Assembly sustained the call for it. Dr. WHITE called for the *yeas* and *nays*, upon the main question, and they were ordered. The proposition voted on was

That it is inexpedient to make any organic changes in—the Board of Domestic Missions.

The vote stood, yeas 234, nays 56.

Dr. Spring moved the indefinite postponement of the remaining portion of the report.

Dr. Boardman said that in this report he had no more interest, personally, than those around him; but this subject had been so much discussed—the Church so much agitated by it—that he thought it due to all—to the last Assembly, and to the peace of the Churches—to have it definitively settled. He thought the indefinite postponement would be of mischievous tendency. He hoped that after appointing a large Committee, and having a report laboriously and carefully prepared, they would not throw it out of the House.

On Monday, the 28th of May, Dr. Thornwell presented, for himself and others, the following protest against the action of the Assembly with reference to the Boards. It

was admitted to record, and referred, for answer, to a Committee consisting of Drs. Brown, Hodge and White, and Elders Clarke and Buel. The Protest found, with no particular efforts to circulate it, the twenty-six signers whose names are here appended to it. It would have been very easy to increase greatly the number.

PROTEST.

The undersigned beg leave to record their very respectful protest against the decision of the Assembly, touching the expediency of making organic changes in the Constitution of the Board of Domestic Missions. Their reasons are :

I. That said decision is understood by them to imply, that it is not expedient for the Church to conduct her missions by a ministerial agency, directly related and immediately responsible to herself. One organic difference, as they apprehend the matter, between the present system of Boards, and the scheme of Executive Committees is, that the Boards are not expected to do the work themselves, the election of a large proportion of those who compose them is intended to be simply a complimentary distinction, which imposes no obligation, and the bodies when organized are only designed to appoint and superintend the real agents, which do the work. The Board, therefore, seems to us to be an organization within the Church, occupying the place and exercising the powers which belong to her own judicatories.

II. We protest, in the next place, because the decision seems to imply, that it is expedient to concede the right of sitting and deliberating, as honorary members of these bodies, for a pecuniary contribution. This strikes us as an organic feature of the present system.

III. We object, in the third place, to the principle which underlies the Constitution of our Boards, to wit: that the specific grant of a power imposes no precise limitations upon the choice of instruments to execute it. The only things concerning the worship of God and government of the Church left to Christian prudence and discretion, according to our Confession of Faith, are "some circumstances common to human actions and societies." The legitimate construction of this principle, in the case before us, restricts the discretion of the Church, not only to the instrumentality which is most in harmony with her Divine organization, but to the instrumentality which is most direct, simple and efficient. As the Church cannot, upon any conditions, under the plea of this discretion, employ outside associations as her ministers to do her work, no more can she, upon the same plea, create within her own bosom institutions analogous to them.

IV. We apprehend, in the fourth place, that the effect of the vote will be to weaken the Church's impressions of the great fundamental truth, that it is her duty, in her organized capacity, to do the work committed to her. We believe, indeed, that in respect to Domestic

Missions, especially, every Presbytery is primarily responsible for the culture of the field included within its bounds, and should earnestly and vigorously undertake itself to carry on the work throughout the whole extent of its territory; and we hold that in the nature of things it is impossible for any central agency whatsoever to supervise this whole business throughout all our established Presbyteries. And we, therefore, apprehend that this vote will tend to hinder the successful prosecution of Domestic Missions in these Presbyteries, by encouraging them to remit their own proper and necessary duty, to an agency, which, while it seems to supplant them, is moreover utterly unable, and must ever be utterly unable, to perform this work. But, at the same time, we believe that the General Assembly is the proper body to carry on the Domestic Missionary enterprise in all our wide frontiers, now opening so rapidly to receive a teeming population, and that an executive agency of the Assembly is necessary for the conduct of this business; and, also, for the purpose of equalizing the abundance and necessities of our established Presbyteries, that the weak may be assisted by the strong, to overtake their missionary work in their own bounds. And this work of the General Assembly, which is our highest court, and represents, by Divine authority, the whole Church, we hold to be committed to the Church, as such, to be done by her in her organized capacity, and not delegated by her to another body, that it may appoint the needful executive agency by which it is to be accomplished.

V. We protest, lastly, against this decision of the Assembly because it perpetuates a system which obviously does not enlist the sympathies of the Church, nor develop its energies, as is shewn by the comparative insignificance of its results. The receipts of last year, from the Churches, were only some \$83,000, while our Church numbers about 300,000 members! It seems to us that, seeing we have for more than a quarter of a century been operating upon the present plans, with no adequate response from year to year, during all this period, by the Churches, to the demands of this sacred cause, it is high time for us to conclude that our operations fail to touch the springs of the Church's life and activity, and that some changes in the arrangements of our machinery are both necessary and expedient.

In brief, we hold that the Church is required to conduct the work of missions; that she is limited in her discretion to the appointment of strictly executive agencies; that these agents must be directly responsible to herself; and, that any organization which she may institute, not in harmony with these principles, must prove inefficient, and cannot be expedient, because not agreeable to Scripture. Our vote, and this protest, are intended to record our adherence to these principles. If, on the other hand, the decision in question is not liable to the objections which we have mentioned, as having been really based on a different interpretation from ours of the ambiguous words "organic changes;" and if our brethren, in voting against "organic changes," only intended to signify that the Assembly must

continue to act through organs of some kind, and not directly in its capacity of a Court, then we have no objection to the decision against which we have protested. Our brethren of the majority may still agree with us that changes are desirable, only they would call these changes "*modifications*," and not "*organic changes*." Thus interpreted, there is, obviously, nothing in the decision of the Assembly to the prejudice of efforts to improve our system.

J. H. THORNWELL,	ARTHUR M. SMALL,
JOHN B. ADGER,	JOHN G. RICHARDS,
E. T. BAIRD,	HENRY WALSH,
Z. CONKEY,	W. K. MARSHALL,
D. D. MCBRYDE,	JAMES P. McMULLIN,
JOHN F. MATHESON,	A. C. McNEILL,
C. M. ANDREWS,	DAVID McCAW,
GEORGE D. ARMSTRONG,	JESSE CARTER,
JOHN H. RICE,	C. B. HILLHOUSE,
SAML. J. PRICE,	J. H. ALEXANDER,
ROBT. S. McALLISTER,	M. McQUEEN,
B. M. SMITH,	J. SIMPSON FRIERSON,
DAVID H. PORTER,	PHILIP P. GILCHRIST.

On the next day (Tuesday, May 29,) Dr. KREBS offered the following resolutions, which were adopted without debate :

Resolved, 1st. That it shall be the duty of the Secretaries of the Boards to notify the members thereof of their appointment, and of all the meetings of the Boards, whether stated or special, and when such meetings shall be for special purposes, the subject of discussion shall be named in the notice.

Resolved, 2d. That it shall be the duty of the above named Boards to send up to the Assembly, with their Annual Reports, their book of minutes, and the books of minutes of the respective Executive Committees, for examination ; and it shall be the duty of said Committees to bring to the attention of the Assembly any matters in these minutes which, in their judgment, calls for the notice of the Assembly.

Resolved, 3d. That it is not lawful for either of the above named Boards or Committees to issue certificates of life membership to any person, or any testimonial, by virtue of which any person is permitted to sit, deliberate, and vote with the Boards ; but the Boards may devise and grant certificates, or testimonials, of special donations to the class of persons hitherto known as Honorary Members, it being understood and provided that such person can in no sense be allowed, by purchase or gift, to exercise any sort of right or position to deliberate and vote with the members appointed by the General Assembly.

Dr. Thornwell immediately came forward and said, that inasmuch as the resolutions just adopted carried out so very considerably the needful reorganization of our Boards, he would, for himself and others, ask the Assembly's leave to withdraw the protest he had offered yesterday. Leave was granted, in the midst of subdued applause.

The remaining portions of the report on reorganization were taken up on the last day of the Session, and the *second resolution*, viz: not to remove the seat of the Domestic Board from Philadelphia, was adopted.

The *third resolution*, viz: to abolish the Louisville Committee, was earnestly pressed for adoption, by Dr. Boardman, and as earnestly opposed by Rev. J. H. Rice. It was referred to the next Assembly.

The *fourth resolution*, viz: to ordain that one of the two Secretaries of the Board should be a traveling Secretary or Agent, was also earnestly urged in the Assembly by Dr. Boardman, but it was rejected by an overwhelming majority.

On the last afternoon, Hon. Judge Lord, of Oswego, New York, moved the reduction of the number of the Board from ninety-six to forty-eight, the reduction to begin going into operation by the election, at the next Assembly, of twelve new members instead of twenty-four, so that in four years the reduction should be accomplished.

The Rev. Mr. Halliday, of Peekskill, N. Y., objected, on the ground that a large number of the members of the Assembly had already taken their leave, and that the body was on the eve of its adjournment. The resolution was accordingly laid on the table.

We have thus brought to a close our sketch of the debate on the reorganization of the Boards. We crave the attention of the reader now to a few comments upon some points of it, before we dismiss the subject.

1. We repeat that the vote on the first resolution, respecting "organic changes," was no indication at all of the rela-

tive strength of the two sides in debate. We know positively that many were induced, by the mere wording of the resolution, to vote in the affirmative, who yet agreed fully with the minority. It is always an awkward thing to debate a negative proposition, and so it is always both awkward and confusing to vote upon a resolution that is at once negative and equivocal. We are not casting any reflection, of course, upon Dr. Boardman for so wording the resolution, for it was accepted by Dr. Thornwell. Earnest objection was made, however, on the floor, at the outset of the debate, against the form in which it was brought forward. Whose was the fault of its not being possible to get the error rectified, we will not say. All we care about is, to assert that the vote did not fairly exhibit the real opinion of the Assembly, and we think it proof enough of the assertion to refer to the subsequent action of the Assembly, by which three of the "changes" desired by the minority were ordered by the Assembly, and a fourth only tabled on the ground of the close of the session being so near at hand; and by which, on the other hand, two changes desired by the immediate representative of the Boards, were refused to be ordered by the Assembly.

There was some chuckling of the Assembly over this vote when first taken, and there has been some, also, in the *Presbyterian*, and perhaps one or two other papers devoted to the present system, whose editors were not present to understand the real spirit of the body. There may, perhaps, be more of it, although we rather expect the shouts of triumph will not be as loud as they have been on former occasions. We make our friends in Philadelphia welcome to all the satisfaction they can derive from this vote. Another such victory as this will ruin their cause. This is not the first time that the apparent minority have been the real victors in the struggle. We think it must begin to be apparent to all parties, that the question was not for ever

settled at Buffalo, nor at Nashville, against all change of our system.

2. The real question at issue, after earnest efforts by the friends of the present system to keep it out of view, begins to be understood by the Church, viz: Ecclesiastical Action in its simplest, directest, purest form, or Action by a body intervening between the Church and her executive agents. It was really amusing to hear Dr. Hodge insist, in his first speech, as others have done before, that the ground we occupy in this discussion is the very ground formerly maintained by the New School! But, even the New York *Observer*, since the late debate, is able to see and to point out how great is the misapprehension here. "If any one (says its editor) has inferred that the opposition to the system of Boards was meant to indicate a desire to return to the old plan, (that is, of acting through voluntary associations,) the misapprehension is the greatest possible. The opponents of the *Board* system wish to make the agency *more purely ecclesiastical*; they assert the duty of the Church in her organized capacity to do her work, without the intervention of a delegated body, and, more emphatically, without entrusting it to an outside society." Such a clear testimony from this source we hope will be decisive, and that we shall hear no more of this stale device. Our brethren will now cease, we trust, to use their argument *ad invidiam* against us, by thus misrepresenting our ground of opposition to the Boards. If the late discussion had only cleared up this fog, it would have been something gained. Our Church got rid of the voluntary Boards twenty years ago. We trust the day is not far distant when she will have thoroughly worked herself clear of all the substitutions for them, which she has been obliged so long to tolerate. What thanks shall we not send up to her Divine Head, when, through His grace, she shall be seen thoroughly confiding in the instruments He gave her, with her simple machinery ac-

commodated throughout to the sublimely simple principles of the divine Church government He Himself ordained!

3. And here we must introduce a few remarks on the representation which the venerable Professor from Princeton made of those who "set themselves (as he expressed it) against the common doctrine." His first statement about them is, that "there seems to be no consistency or agreement between them"—which, of course, if it were so, would certainly have insured their complete discomfiture long ere this late day.

Dr. Hodge then states the "*first* essential point of difference" between them and "the common doctrine," to be "their making Ruling Elders and Ministers, being alike Presbyters, to have the same office: all are Bishops, Pastors, and Teachers, as well as Rulers." Well might Dr. Thornwell interpose, and say that that was not his doctrine! But Dr. Hodge proceeded to assert that he was, nevertheless, stating "the doctrine which has been advanced and strenuously maintained in different parts of the Church!" Now, we acknowledge his great learning, as perhaps the best read divine of our Church, and of course we would not presume to dispute his declaration that such a doctrine has been advanced and advocated in different parts of our Church. All we dare assert is, that, in our limited reading on this question, we have never met with any such statement. We have, indeed, often met with, and as often accepted, the doctrine (for it is scriptural) that Ruling Elders and Ministers are alike Presbyters; have the same office of the Presbyterate; and accordingly are alike Rulers, and of equal right, as such, in all the Courts of the Church. We have often read, and as often believed, that both these classes of Presbyters are Scriptural Bishops and Pastors. But we never did read or hear of such a theory as that which Dr. Hodge ascribes to some "strenuous" persons in different parts of our Church. We must live and learn.

The *second* essential point of difference, as Dr. Hodge

states, is that "all Church power is joint, and not several." Who they are that teach this doctrine, is, also, unknown to us. But we have often heard, and as often believed, that all power of rule in the Church is joint, and not several. The power of doctrine is several, and not joint, and, therefore, is committed to Ministers individually—but the power of rule is joint. With Presbyterians, no single Minister can ever exercise the power of rule, in the settled Church state. Government, in the settled Church state is, for Presbyterians, always by courts of Elders. "Well, (says Dr. Hodge,) then you cannot carry out your system, because single Missionaries have to exercise the power of rule." Yes, we answer, the Missionary is the Evangelist, an *extraordinary* officer, not belonging to a settled Church state, and having, as all Presbyterians have always admitted, extraordinary powers. The Missionary is an *extraordinary* officer, needed, indeed, even in our great cities, but only in so far as the Church is not settled and established there. Yes, we can carry out our Presbyterian system, which in every settled Church state calls for the Pastor to succeed the Evangelist as soon as a Church is organized, and for the latter to pass on to regions beyond. We can carry it out, though denying to Ministers, in the midst of our settled Churches, the power we all yield to the *extraordinary* officers of the Church in foreign lands and distant frontier settlements.

But one word here upon a kindred statement of Dr. Hodge, in his first speech. When objecting to the "more than Jewish burden," which he alleged Dr. Thornwell would fasten on the Church's shoulders, the burden of a Divinely appointed Church Government—"a burden which, if fastened on her, she would have to carry, over hill and dale, to all the heathen nations," he seems to have all at once strangely forgotten his own language about the people's essential right to a substantive part of Church power; and he inconsistently declares, in the very strongest

expressions, that no converted heathen were prepared to take any part in the government of the Church. The essential right of the people to a share in the government has vanished! Dr. Hodge appeals to Walter Lowrie to confirm his statement that "Presbyterianism can't be introduced at once." "Would you make Elders (he asks) of infants, Bishops of babes?"

Now, of course, the ordinary government of the Church cannot be introduced among any people before there are converts enough from amongst them to be organized into a Church. If this were all Dr. Hodge intended to say, no one could dispute his position. But he seems to have intended to say, that, for an indefinite period after the conversion of numbers of a heathen people, and their organization into Churches, proper Presbyterianism still may not be introduced amongst them. Now this, we are obliged to say, is a position quite equal to some of the other extraordinary things Dr. Hodge has put forth concerning Presbyterian Church Government. It is enough to say, in opposition to it, that *we* have heard Walter Lowrie, and both the other Secretaries, declare that just as soon as any Foreign Missionary of ours has been ready to organize a little Church among any heathen people, he has always found some persons of the little flock qualified to take the place of elders, guides, shepherds, head men and rulers over them. It would be, indeed, strange if this were not always the case. At the very beginning, the Master gave these scriptural pastors to all those little Churches which Paul and Barnabas, or which Titus, those ancient missionaries to the ancient heathen, organized in every city; and would it not be strange, indeed, if he should now cease to do the same for all those little Churches which modern missionaries are organizing amongst the modern heathen?

The *third* essential point of difference, as stated by Dr. Hodge, is, that all the details of Church government are prescribed, either in express terms or by necessary infer-

ence. We accept this statement of our views as a sufficiently correct one. We do hold that the substantial of Church government are laid down in Scripture, in particular rules, respecting the officers, the Courts, the discipline and, also, the circumstantial, in general rules of order and decency. We do hold that the Presbytery, even in its smallest forms, has the keys of the Kingdom committed to it; and not only that, the Church, in all her Courts, possesses, by Divine right, all needful executive authority to carry out her Master's commands, but, also, that whatever regulations these Courts make, are of *jure divino* authority, if in accordance with Scripture. And this it is which invests all the doings of Assemblies, Synods, Presbyteries and Sessions, with so much solemn responsibility. Dr. Hodge makes it an infinitesimally small matter whether the Church transcends the bounds of necessity in constructing her executive agencies. We make it a great matter. His whole soul revolts against the doctrine that the Church is not at liberty to construct new Courts to be her vicars. We believe that Christ's own Court, the General Assembly, is the only Board of Missions that is necessary, and so, the only one that is lawful. We hold that the Church, in her organized capacity, must herself do the work committed to her, through her own executive agency, and that she may not delegate that work to any other organism or body.

4. In his *second* speech, Dr. Hodge repudiated his own brief statement, made in his *first*, of the three "distinctive" features of our Church government, and referred his brethren, for a full and complete exhibition of his doctrine upon that subject, to his little work, "What is Presbyterianism?" We profess to be well acquainted with Dr. Hodge's views on Church government, having carefully studied a great deal proceeding from his pen on that subject, in the *Biblical Repertory*. This work, however, we happen never to have seen or heard of till we read it

after its author's reference to it in the debate. Let us here state, for the information of our readers, many of whom are probably as unacquainted with it as we were, that it is an address delivered before the Presbyterian Historical Society, and published by the Presbyterian Board of Publication. We also crave their patience while we quote a paragraph from this address, and offer one or two remarks thereupon, for which our apology must be the prominence given to it in the Assembly.

“The fourth theory is the Presbyterian, which it is our present business to unfold. The three great negations of Presbyterianism, that is, the three great errors which it denies, are, 1. That all power rests in the clergy. 2. That the Apostolic office is perpetual. 3. That each individual Christian congregation is independent. The affirmative statement of these principles is, 1. That the people have a right to a substantive part in the government of the Church. 2. That Presbyters who minister in word and doctrine are the highest permanent officers of the Church, and all belong to the same order. 3. That the outward and visible Church is, or should be, one, in the sense that a smaller part is subject to a larger, and a larger to a whole. It is not holding one of these principles that makes a man a Presbyterian, but his holding them all.” (p. 7.)

Now, let us look for one moment at these negations, with their corresponding affirmatives, which are thus held forth as the leading and distinctive features of Presbyterianism. Dr. Hodge says, we deny that “all power rests in the Clergy,” and we affirm, on the contrary, that “the people have a right to a substantive part in Church government.” His discussion of these points is quite full and very explicit, and we think we do not misapprehend his meaning. He holds that “Church power vests in the Church herself, and all Church officers are servants of the Church.” We hold this, too, but we add a limitation, omitted just here by Dr. Hodge, viz: that this power vests

in the Church *as an organized body*, with her Divinely appointed Rulers, all whom she, however, herself elects. But, as he goes on, he appears to separate "the Clergy," somehow, to themselves, as having some official power of an independent kind, and what he denies to them is only the "*exclusive*" government of the Church. "If all Church power (he says) vests in the Clergy, then the people are practically bound to passive obedience in all matters of faith and practice, for all right of private judgment is then denied. If it vests in the whole Church, then the people have a right to"—What would the reader suppose ought to follow? A right to exercise this government, *all of it, every whit of it*, through the Divinely appointed office-bearers whom they have freely chosen to represent them. No, this does not follow in Dr. Hodge's statement, but he only says, "a right to a *substantive part* in the decision of all questions relating to doctrine, worship, order and discipline." "The vital cord in our Church (he says) is that the people take *part* in the government." If the people have a right only to "a *substantive part* of the government, the question, of course, arises, who has a right to the *remaining portion*? This question Dr. Hodge, in this address, seems to answer thus: It belongs to the *Clergy*.

Well, then, the people have a right to a *substantive part* of the government, and how are they to exercise it? Dr. Hodge answers that they are to exercise it "through Ruling Elders, who are chosen to do, in the people's name, what they are entitled to do in their own persons," and accordingly he says, "the powers, therefore, exercised by our Ruling Elders, are powers which belong to the lay members of the Church." (See p. 16.)

In his discussion of his second great principle, he appears to make the same distinction between the nature of the clerical power, and that of these *lay Elders*. "Ministers derive their authority from Christ, and not from the people." (p. 38.) "He, and not the people, constituted

or appointed the apostles, prophets, pastors and teachers." (p. 39.) It seems here to be implied, that Christ makes the Ministers, but the people make the Elders. Throughout his whole discussion of this point, and of the *third*, also, Dr. Hodge confines the name Presbyter to Ministers—broadly distinguishing every where between the Presbyters and the representatives of the people.

Now, we say, that all this seems to us simply a mongrel production of Prelacy and Congregationalism, unnaturally and forcibly brought together by the mighty powers of a great mind, intent on constructing a theory. We never heard, at Princeton, such a doctrine of Church Government as this, from the venerable Dr. Miller, the former colleague of Dr. Hodge. And this is not the Presbyterianism of our Confession of Faith and form of government—nor of our forefathers of Scotland. They ascribe no power to Ministers any more than Ruling Elders, *separately from the Church*, neither do they ascribe any power at all, either *in part or in whole*, to the people, except *as an organized body acting through Representative Rulers*; and in that aspect they ascribe it *all* to the people. All the office-bearers, whether Pastors or Teachers, are alike gifts from the ascending Saviour to His Church, *to serve her in administering rule and in declaring doctrine*. And, on the other hand, neither Dr. Miller, nor our Book, nor our Fathers in Scotland, ever viewed the Ruling Elder as exercising powers which the people are entitled to exercise *in their own persons*—that is, which the people, *as such*, and *independently of their officers*, have the right to exercise. They never said, with Dr. Hodge, "The powers, therefore, exercised by our Ruling Elders, are powers which belong to the *lay members* of the Church." They do not speak, as he does, of the Elders as a "*lay element* in our Courts." The Presbyterian doctrine is, that Ministers, *as Rulers*, are representatives of the people *as truly as Elders*, although they have the additional office of teachers; to which, however, also, they must be called

by the Church, and in which, also, they are, therefore, her *representatives, or chosen rulers*. The Presbyterian doctrine is, that Ruling Elders are “properly Representatives of the people,” that is, they are *simply representatives*, chosen to rule, and they are nothing more than mere rulers. They have not the call to labor, also, in the word. The Presbyterian doctrine is, that the Ruling Elder is the Presbyter of the Scriptures. This being denied, as it is by Dr. Hodge, where does he find in Scripture any authority for the people to appoint Ruling Elders to exercise that “substantive part” of the government which belongs to them? Where does he find authority for the introduction of a “lay element” into our Presbyteries? Was this one exercise of that *discretionary* power which he claims for our Church Courts? Did they invent this expedient? And, while Christ constituted and appointed Ministers, was it thus that Elders were constituted and appointed by men?

SERMONS IN BEHALF OF THE BOARDS.

The Assembly unanimously resolved to abolish this institution.

WORK FOR THE BOARD OF DOMESTIC MISSIONS.

Dr. Scott, of California, offered a resolution, which was adopted, calling the Board's attention again and earnestly to the importance of its encouraging the preaching of the Gospel, by traveling Missionaries and itinerant preachers, in the mining regions of the United States and in the other frontier Territories.

NEW SYNODS.

Two new Synods were erected, one to be called *St. Paul*, to be composed of the Presbyteries of St. Paul, Chippewa and Lake Superior. The other to be called *Sandusky*, to be composed of the Presbyteries of Findley, Toledo, Michigan and Western Reserve.

THE COLONIZATION SOCIETY, ETC., ETC.

The last Assembly's decision, that the Church is a Kingdom not of this world, and that she can have no relations with voluntary societies, whether formed for purposes of art and literature, or of secular benevolence or morality, had been pronounced "a new and startling doctrine," and it was expected that an effort would be made to procure a contrary deliverance from this Assembly. Especially was it desired, by many, that this Assembly should be induced to do what the last refused to do for the *Colonization Society*, viz: to recommend it once more to the confidence and patronage of our people. An overture was sent up to this effect from a Synod in the North-West. The agent of the Colonization Society (Rev. Dr. Pinney) also appeared at the Assembly, and for days sought very diligently for an introduction upon the floor, that he might present his cause. A deliverance was also desired by some against the slave trade. Various other outside institutions sought the Assembly's endorsement. Amongst these numerous applicants for our patronage, as an Assembly, comes the *Presbyterian Historical Society*, forgetting, with all the rest, how they all put in jeopardy the peace and harmony of the body, and seeming to be little concerned for that, if they could only make capital for themselves. On behalf of the Historical Society, a kind of half-and-half resolution was reported by the Committee of Bills and Overtures, which was docketed and, we hope and believe, never came up again for adoption. As to the others, the Assembly unanimously adopted the following resolution :

That while the General Assembly, on the one hand, disclaim all right to interfere in secular matters, and on the other assert the right and duty of the Church, as God's witness on earth, to bear her testimony in favor of truth and holiness, and against all false doctrines and sin, wherever professed and committed, yet, in view of the often repeated action of the Assembly, in reference to the subjects above referred to, it is inexpedient to take any further action in relation thereto.

Thus, once more, the fraternal predictions of the New School, that this year we should certainly split up into opposing factions, have failed to be fulfilled. Will they repeat them next year?

DISPOSITION OF PAPERS OF THE ASSEMBLY.

An effort was made to have sundry papers of the Assembly, such as the stated Clerk does not preserve, committed to the care of the Historical Society. The Assembly declined to do this, and appointed the stated and permanent Clerks, with the Treasurer of the Assembly, a Committee to enquire what papers are worthy of preservation, and to recommend a method for preserving them.

CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIANS.

The Assembly resolved to open a correspondence with the Cumberland Presbyterians, by appointing a delegate to their next General Assembly. Dr. Edgar, of Tennessee, was appointed principal, and Dr. McMullen, of Alabama, his alternate.

CHURCH COMMENTARY.

This subject came up by a memorial from the Presbytery of Tombecbee, which was adopted, and a Committee of the friends of the object, from various parts of the Church, was appointed, to report to the next Assembly, on the expediency and practicability of such a design. It was subsequently made their duty to publish their report at least two months before the meeting of the next Assembly.

FIRST PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH, BOSTON.

At an informal meeting of the Assembly and others, the Moderator in the chair, very interesting statements were made about this youthful Church. They have bought out a Unitarian Congregation, who wished to retire from business, and were willing to sell a property worth \$70,000 for

\$35,000. The conditions of the sale are, that the money must all be paid by 1st July, and only \$20,000 had been raised. Over \$2,000 was pledged or subscribed at the meeting. Would that we had the opportunity to buy out all the Unitarian Congregations of Boston, on the same terms! We think New England a most hopeful Missionary field for a Church like ours. We are sure that both her doctrine and order would form an acceptable refuge to many pious souls there, weary of strifes of words and the vain janglings of men of corrupt minds.

FATHER CHINIQUEY IN THE ASSEMBLY.

It was a great privilege to hear this servant of the Lord plead the cause of his suffering brethren. And it was a peculiar satisfaction to us to say to the meeting, that where we lived there was the same God, and the same Holy Spirit, and the same operations of Divine grace, as father Chiniquy had told about, even amongst our servants, the conversion of whom felt very much to us like that of our own flesh and blood; and that as God had within a few weeks past graciously blessed the speaker in the conversion of four of his servants, and he had fifty dollars left, of a thank-offering which he had devoted to the Lord in acknowledgment of His great goodness and mercy, he would now offer it to father Chiniquy's people, and so seek to realize the communion of saints. Our suggestion for the opportunity to be given to others present to contribute, was well received, and about \$2,900 subscribed and pledged that evening, which was increased next day to about \$3,300. A large part of it came from Southern members, the other brethren having, many of them, contributed before.

The Committee of Bills and Overtures, reported one from the Synod of Philadelphia, asking the Assembly to send to the Presbyteries this question: "Shall the clause of the Constitution be stricken out, which forbids marriage with a deceased wife's sister?"

Rev. Dr. Boardman called for the reading of the Overture of the Synod. After which he remarked that the Synod did not presume to say that the clause in the Confession of Faith has not sufficient warrant in the word of God, but there are many who doubt it, and therefore question the propriety of continuing in the Confession an article so doubtful. The Overture came from the old mother Synod. Moved and seconded, that the recommendation of the Committee to send it down to the Presbyteries be adopted.

Rev. Dr. B. M. Smith—He had serious doubts whether any article in the Confession could be altered in this way. A second objection was that it had often been sent down to the Presbyteries, and they had refused to alter it. And in the third place, though the overture came from the old mother Synod, he would not give offence by saying she was in her dotage, but he did not think that considerations of this kind should have any weight. It might not have been the vote of a majority. (Here Dr. Smith gave way to an explanation by Mr. Stevens.)

Rev. Mr. Stevens—Dr. Smith is right. It was laid on the table by a majority when the Synod was full; and when the Synod was thinned off, it was taken up. We were called away on Saturday evening to preach on Sabbath, and by the time we got back on Monday morning the whole was done.

Rev. Dr. Boardman wished to correct or add to Mr. Stevens' historical recollections. He forgot to tell the Assembly that at a full Synod, held in Philadelphia, in the fall of 1858, it was sent up to the General Assembly by a majority of votes.

Rev. Dr. E. T. Baird read from the Digest, to show that when alterations are proposed to be made in the Confession of Faith, then the proposition must come up from two-thirds of the Presbyteries to the General Assembly; but in changes not pertaining to the faith of the Church, but its discipline, the General Assembly may send down to the Presbyteries for the purpose of obtaining their views. In his view, the Assembly of 1842 so decided; or in accordance with the principle. The Assembly has no authority to send down this overture to the Presbyteries, as it implies a change of the faith of the Church.

Rev. Dr. B. M. Smith resumed his remarks, which he had suspended to admit the explanation of Mr. Stevens. The Synod gives as a reason for sending up this overture to the General Assembly, the fact that the scriptural truth of the Article in our Confession of Faith, which it was proposed to expunge, was doubted by many. Our good old mother is a little forgetful. Twenty years ago the mother Synod did not reason in this way. Doubts with regard to the doctrines of the book were not deemed a sufficient reason for changing the book.

Rev. Dr. Hodge thought that Rev. Dr. Baird was mistaken with regard to the Article to which he had referred in the Digest. The minute to which reference was made always remained in manuscript, by some oversight. In consequence, the Scotch mode was adopted,

namely, for the Assembly to send down proposed changes to the Presbyteries.

Rev. Dr. E. T. Baird, by request, read from the Digest the manner in which the Confession and Discipline may be altered.

Rev. Dr. S. J. Baird—Dr. Hodge's statement is correct, with this modification:—The organic law or adopting act of the Constitution, as it stood originally on the records of the Synod, provided that amendments to the Confession, Form of Government, and Book of Discipline, should require the approval of two-thirds of the Presbyteries. This, being on the manuscript records, was soon lost sight of, and a question arose as to the meaning of the provision in regard to the alteration of "standing rules," (Form of Government, Chapter XII., Section 6,) under the supposition that it referred to amendments of the Form of Government and Discipline. This question was decided by the first alteration of the Form, by which the phrase "standing rules" was changed to "constitutional rules." This alteration passed by two-thirds of the Presbyteries, although the requirement of that number was not recognized at the time. This is the only change which has been made on the subject; and, being merely on one point, as to constitutional rules, it leaves the original provision in its integrity, as requiring two-thirds to alter the doctrinal standards.

Question by the Rev. Dr. Hodge—Were the first changes made in accordance with the old provision, that all changes should originate with the Presbyteries?

Rev. Dr. S. J. Baird—I cannot say.

Rev. Dr. Thornwell said it was impossible to discuss the constitutional question at this time; and therefore moved that the whole subject be laid on the table.

Rev. Dr. Boardman would remind the Assembly that the sentiments of the Synod are the views of large numbers in our Church, and ought not to be disregarded. The motion to lay on the table was carried.

REVISED BOOK OF DISCIPLINE.

This was recommitted to the same Committee, with the addition of Drs. Peck, Yeomans, Paxton (and one other minister, whose name we could not learn,) and Elders T. C. Perrin, Scott, Lord, and H. A. Clark, with instructions to print the old and new books in parallel columns, and to send copies for the use of their commissioners to the next General Assembly.

Dr. G. T. Baird moved that the Committee have power, if they deem it proper, to propose a new section, defining the relations of baptized children to the Church, and pre-

scribing the mode in which the government of the Church is to be administered in respect to them. It was adopted.

The Committee is, also, authorized to propose modifications of the Form of Government, such as may be necessary, in order to accommodate it to the changes proposed in the Revised Book of Discipline.

THE ASSEMBLY'S DIGEST.

It was ordered by the Assembly, that \$1,000, additional compensation, be paid to Rev. S. J. Baird, D. D., for his laborious and invaluable services in the preparation of this work.

PLACE OF NEXT MEETING.

The 7th Presbyterian Church in Philadelphia, is the next place of meeting.

DISSOLUTION OF THE ASSEMBLY.

This was accompanied with an earnest vote of thanks by Dr. Boccock, of Virginia, to which Dr. Mellwaine, the Pastor of the 1st Church, Rochester, responded, expressing the regrets of every citizen of Rochester at the termination of the Assembly's visit.

And thus ended a very pleasant, and, we hope, useful meeting of our supreme judicatory.

NOTE.—The following letter of Dr. WILLIAM L. BRECKINRIDGE, Moderator of the General Assembly of 1859, whose official duty it would have been to open the Assembly of 1860 with the usual discourse, had he been present, will account for his absence, and is here inserted at his special request. It was not forwarded to us until the printing of the preceding article was considerably advanced:

DR. BRECKINRIDGE'S DECLINATURE.

OAKLAND COLLEGE, (MISS.) April 23d, 1860.

Rev. Dr. Hill, stated Clerk of the Presbytery of Louisville:

DEAR BROTHER: The *Presbyterian Herald*, of the 12th inst., has brought me the proceedings of our Presbytery, in session at Owen-

boro', on the 5th inst. They make known to me that I was chosen a Commissioner to the General Assembly, and further, that "the Presbytery heartily approves (and request the Commissioners to sustain) the action of the General Assembly of 1859, and also that of 1848, on the subject of the relations of the Church of Christ and voluntary societies, formed for the purposes of art, literature and secular morality."

In the report of the proceedings it is added, that "this resolution called out an earnest and animated discussion, in which its passage was advocated by Messrs. Robinson, Rice and others, and opposed by Messrs. Matthews, Hopkins, Hill and others. The motion was finally adopted without a count."

I recognize the absolute freedom of the Presbytery in the choice of its Commissioners. I acknowledge the right of the Presbytery to see that its mind is represented in the Assembly—whether by positive instructions, or by making known its wishes and controlling the subject in some other way. I disown all claim to a seat in the next Assembly in virtue of my position as Moderator of the last, except such as may arise from the usage of the Presbyteries and the courtesy which is due to the General Assembly, and to a minister who has not forfeited the respect and confidence of his brethren. The duty imposed upon me by the will of the last Assembly, of opening the next with a sermon and presiding until another Moderator shall be chosen, is subject to the pleasure of the Presbytery; and, by the Presbytery, I mean the actual majority in a lawful meeting, whether that majority be accidental or whether it truly express the mind of the persons who properly and usually compose the body.

There is a very clear and wide distinction to be taken between the action of the Assembly of 1859 and that of the Assembly of 1848, cited by the Presbytery. The latter declares that the Church has no power to require of its members the support of the societies in question; while it asserts the right, and, on occasion, the duty, of the Church to favor or oppose them, according to its judgment of their merits. This view of the subject I do heartily approve. I trust that I shall be ready at all times to defend and support it.

But the action of the Assembly of 1859 denies to the Church all right to have any thing to do with such institutions. Believing this view of the subject to be false in its principle, narrow in its spirit, and every way hurtful in its influence, I do heartily condemn it, and I can do nothing under any circumstances to support it. It is plainly in conflict with the sentiments and usages of our branch of the Church from the beginning. I think it has been justly described as setting forth a "new and startling doctrine." I find no warrant for it in the letter of the Divine Word, or in the spirit of the Gospel. I believe that it was inadvertently uttered by the last Assembly without arresting the attention of the body, and now that it has fairly engaged the thoughts of the Church, I do not doubt that it will be disavowed by the coming Assembly. My brethren were not ignorant that I enter-

tain these opinions. They were not uttered in the Assembly, because I was in the Chair, and not on the floor. But they were freely expressed in the Synod of Kentucky, and came into the newspapers through the report of the proceedings of that body, whose mind was very clearly and strongly declared to the same effect. And they have never been concealed in private, while they have not been pressed upon others.

My brethren certainly do not expect me to change them, unless on the conviction of reason. They can hardly expect me to support the opposite of them in the General Assembly. Under these circumstances there seems to remain nothing for me to do, with a becoming respect for them and for myself, but to decline the service to which they have appointed me.

You will be assured that I do this with much regret, while the necessity for it has taken me altogether by surprise. Had any of my brethren intimated to me, before I left them, the purpose which has now been executed, I would have relieved us all of the present embarrassment by declining the appointment in advance—excusing myself to the Assembly as well as I could. It would afford me great pleasure, if the will of God were so, to represent the Presbytery of Louisville in the General Assembly once more before dissolving my connection with it, which must follow my removal to my new and distant home—a connection which has subsisted very happily through so many years. I shall not cease to cherish a deep concern for my brethren in the ministry and for the Churches in this venerable and honored Presbytery.

Peace be to the brethren and love with faith from God the Father and our Lord Jesus Christ. Grace be with all them that love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity!

Will you do me the kindness to give this letter an early place in the *Herald*, that the members of the Presbytery and of the General Assembly may know why I shall not be present to perform the service which the ancient usage of the Church requires of me.

I am, very truly, yours,

WILLIAM L. BRECKINRIDGE.

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. *Lessons about Salvation ; from the Life and Words of the Lord Jesus. Being a second series of Plantation Sermons.* By the Rev. A. F. DICKSON, Orangeburg, S. C. Philadelphia : Board of Publication ; pp. 264, 12mo.

The publication of the first series of Plantation Sermons was a decided success. Their vivacity, their point, perspicuity and adaptedness to the purposes for which they were designed, as well as for the general instruction of those in any condition of life whose minds have not been trained to the abstruse habits of thought, have given them a wide circulation and popularity. It was of consequence, too, to those who had little acquaintance with our colored race, to know in what terms one would address them, and how their attention might be gained and permanently occupied. Endued with a lively imagination, and possessed of a literary taste, it is in the power of the author to express his thoughts with great terseness and beauty. Indeed, there is always a certain sparkling abruptness of manner which engages the attention of the reader. And if there is a frequent descent in these discourses to the colloquial style, it was intended, and judged to be necessary. We hope the writer will have the same encouragement, in reference to this volume, as in relation to the former. The following extracts from his preface will interest the reader :

By far the most impressive and valuable defence of Southern Christianity from the imputation of the uncharitable, is to be found in the vast work of christianization going on among the colored people : a work begun by the conscience and zeal of our fathers, but now widening with unexampled rapidity and success ; a work not surpassed in its fruit by the labors of all of the foreign mis-

sionaries of the Christian world. Nearly all our churches address some portion of the Sabbath services specifically to the colored people; *all* make special provision for their accommodation. But more encouraging still is the fact already alluded to—the vast number of masters and mistresses who gather their servants together, read to them, catechise them, and preside over and assist their worship. Let me avail myself of this prefatory page to offer a few hints to those who seek to be faithful in this matter.

And first: Choose as convenient a time, and as comfortable a place, for their assembling as you can. I mean, of course, convenient and comfortable for them. They are sensitive to cold, to constrained attitudes, and to distracting influences of every kind; on the other hand, the subjects to be dwelt upon are more or less abstract, and therefore arduous to their awkward minds; and your language, simple and familiar as it seems to you, is yet somewhat removed from their colloquial dialect, and so far forth foreign to them. Then you need to make the whole business as inviting to them as possible. A sullen, discontented listener is already lost to any hope of benefit.

Give as much dignity to the occasion, as respects externals, as you can conveniently. If possible, have a building especially appropriated to worship, unless there is some hall in your own dwelling that will answer the purpose. Even then, the other plan would be the best, because it would furnish them a good place for their own meetings, as well as their meeting with you. Insist, kindly and pleasantly, but strongly, on clean dress and cleanly persons. They are even more *impressionable* than *impressible*—to borrow a happy distinction; and the bright Sunday handkerchiefs, and clean white aprons, and shining faces, while they will stir your kindest feelings, will react powerfully upon them. They will feel that they are “in church,” and will put on their best behaviour, and their most reverent attention, accordingly.

It is of cardinal importance that what you do be brightly and cordially, as well as faithfully done. Let them see how pleasant a thing it is to you to teach and comfort and strengthen them. A warm heart and a sunshiny face are cordials to any of us, but to none else so much as to them. Enter the room with a brisk step, and a cheerful smile, and a ready response to those who salute you; and their hearts will be won at the outset.

Do not be afraid to entrust them with parts of the service. As for the singing, the white man must have rare tact and homely skill and power who can lead them as well as they can lead each other. Of course they make occasional mistakes—“raise” a tune of one metre to a hymn of another metre, or commence a tune at the third line instead of the first; but these are almost always the effect of embarrassment from the presence of the white people, and disappear after a few meetings. They are but trifles beside the delightful and often overpoweringly grand bursts of praise and holy song to which they attain. Many of the tunes they have caught from us have been modified in

their edition of them, and have gained not a little in power and vivid expression by the changes.

But even their genius for music is often surpassed by their gifts in prayer. Some of the sublimest petitions, and many of the most pathetic, that I have ever heard, have fallen from their lips. It is not long since a foreigner of large literary attainments and unfeigned piety exclaimed, after hearing their prayers—"It is a kind of inspiration!" It was the inspiration of unaffected and fervent love pouring forth in simple, quaint, and homely diction the yearnings of a pious heart.

They prize such concessions, such wholesome levelings of master and servant before the common Lord and Father of all, very highly; nor have I ever seen them misunderstand or abuse it. And the removing all constraint, and throwing the burden of maintaining order and advancing worship on them, arouses a Christian self-respect, and a sense of the true dignity of an immortal soul, that by God's blessing refines and ennobles the servant, without in the least disqualifying him for his place.

But it is easier to describe than to prescribe. Let me suppose, then, that you whose eye now rests on this page, are a Christian matron and a planter's wife. Or, perhaps you are only the timid bride of last week, just entering upon your exalted position; and only half aware of the high prerogatives with which the reverence and affectionate prepossessions of your servants have invested you. It is the noon of the Sabbath. You remember your walk, yesterday evening, to the "quarters," or negro-houses, as they are often called; how you paused, on your way down, to hear the cheerful songs and light laughter of the field-hands returning in long procession from their toils; how feeble and disabled age had tottered forth to a seat in the open air, to rejoice in a bright look and kindly word from you as you passed along—to remember that simple word, and repeat it, and treasure it up, through all the failing days; how the troops of children laughed with glee at your arrival, lavished their uncouth bows and courtesies upon you, and scampered round the cabins to meet you and do you honor once more. You ended your round at the Hospital, freshly swept for your coming, heard the nurse's reports, cheered up the discouraged or down-hearted ones—for their spirits fail them at once in sickness—and gave the necessary orders for the morrow. Then you read them a few plain verses from the Bible; and as you caught their glistening eyes, and heard the murmured "Amen" and "Yes, Missis," the thought occurred to you, that the well needed this kindness, even more than the sick. And turning it over in your mind, you finally told the nurse and the "driver" that (as there was to be "no church"—*i. e.* no service, to-morrow) they must all come up to the big dining-room in their Sunday clothes, just after dinner. That is proclamation enough; the veriest child, and the deafest ear, will know all about it before the sun goes down.

At your first awaking, this morning, the rude and touching choruses

of their "daylight prayer-meeting" floated in on the still and hallowed air, as they sang,

"Free, oh free, my Lord,
Free from every sin!"

"Shall be over!—shall be over!
All my trials shall be over!"

"Hail, believer, hail!
Hail from the other shore!"

And you reflected, with a heart not unanxious, but your eyes bedewed with thankfulness, on the work you have undertaken. And the freshest and sweetest of your morning prayers were those which praised a Father's goodness for the opportunity, implored His aid for your weakness, and His pardon for your unworthiness of such a privilege, and entreated His blessing upon the work.

The hour appointed them has come at last, and here they are, shouldering their benches or chairs, and hastening to deposit them in good positions, that they may kneel a moment in silent prayer before you begin. Now you enter, looking round kindly and *recognizingly* on all sides; a hundred voices are whispering their salutations, and twice a hundred eyes are flashing welcome and affection on you; while yonder white-headed patriarch rises and speaks out his "God bless you, my young Missis!" with the dignity and pathos of Jacob. Shake hands with him when he is done. His blessing is worth having.

Then say—"I want one of you to start a hymn for me now—one that all know, so that all can sing." You need not fear any confusion; they have their recognized leader of worship, who will take charge of it. And when they "break forth into singing"—"On Jordan's stormy banks I stand," or "When I can read my title clear," or "Jesus, my all, to heaven is gone," join in their hymn, if God has blessed you with a voice at all. Join in with all your heart and power; they will delight in it, and your heart will kindle at it.

Then let one of them lead in prayer, and let them be assured by your posture and manner that it is your worship as well as theirs. You will have to wait a little now before you can begin to read; all the letters are blurred before your eyes. That last tender, importunate plea for "the dear young Missis that is going to teach us" has betrayed you into tears.

When that difficulty is over, read them a short, plain tract, story, or sermon, of fifteen or twenty minutes' length. Read in a clear, cheerful voice, varying its tone, as much as you can, to give expression to what you read. If any word or phrase seems in the least above them, stop and explain familiarly and fully. Be short; rather sacrifice something of the connection, than overtax their attention and interest.

When you have ended the reading, if you know any one of their

favorite hymns, ask for it—or, better still, begin it yourself. If there is time, and they seem interested, indulge them in singing more than once. Then another prayer, and dismiss them for the day. Let them gather about you and shake hands—receive their quaint compliments and expressions of gratitude—let the gentle fervor of a Christ-like heart appear in those last moments. They prize them, and you will be blessed and rewarded by them.

2. *Sermons.* By JOSEPH ADDISON ALEXANDER, D. D. New York: Charles Scribner. 1860; 2 vols., 12mo., 414, 425.

The fame of Dr. J. A. Alexander was not confined to the department of learning covered by the Professorships he filled. One who knew him best, his colleague, Dr. Hodge, has testified to his varied learning and great abilities. "I regard him," says he, "as incomparably the greatest man I ever knew; as incomparably the greatest man our Church ever produced. His understanding, imagination and memory, were alike wonderful. Every thing he did was alike easy to him, nothing he ever did seemed half to reveal his power." There may be something in these eulogistic words due to the partialities of friendship. They are an utterance of the highest human praise, and from the highest authority. The preaching of Dr. J. Addison Alexander was confined almost wholly to the pulpits of Princeton, and the neighboring pulpits of New York and Philadelphia. In these places there was, probably, no preacher listened to with greater profit and enjoyment. While supplying the Church of Dr. Boardman, during his absence in Europe, he drew crowds to hear him, who filled not only the audience room, but the vestibule, also, of the Church, and his preaching was sought after by the most intelligent men, who delighted to listen to the instructions which flowed from his lips.

It is interesting to any reader, and especially so to the student and preacher, to see how the accomplished scholar,

the skillful exegete and the humble Christian, has handled the subjects he has discussed. The natural, yet often peculiarly original, unfolding of his thoughts, the appropriateness of his illustrations, the finish of his style, rising, as it does, into frequent passages of a subdued and chaste eloquence, the application of the truth developed to prevailing errors in philosophy and religion, give a peculiar charm to these discourses. His studies in Biblical literature frequently suggest the special topics he discusses. It must be admitted that some of these sermons would not be well appreciated by a popular assembly of the common people. Such, we presume, were addressed to audiences gathered largely from the schools of literature and theology where he resided. Whatever their character and object, they could never have wearied by undue length. They rarely exceed twenty-one printed duodecimo pages. We are not ashamed to have them compared with the pulpit discourses of the choice scholars of other countries.

3. *Forty Years' Familiar Letters of James W. Alexander, D. D., constituting, with the Notes, a Memoir of his Life.* Edited by the surviving correspondent, JOHN HALL, D. D. In two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner. 1860; pp, 403, 379, 12mo.

The reader of this correspondence no longer wonders at the deep attachment, the respect and fraternal love, felt for the writer by all his acquaintances, nor at the sense of loss experienced when he was taken away. No formal publications of his pen ever impressed us half so much with the extent of his acquisitions, his great good sense, his depth of feeling, his friendliness of spirit, and the flow of good humor, playfulness and pleasantry, which added their charms to his correspondence and conversation, and which, united with his pulpit and pastoral ability, con-

tributed their share to render him so extensively beloved, and so clothed the Church with mourning when he was taken away. And yet, there are opinions on Church order and polity, on slavery, on some controverted points, and various allusions, offensive to one party or another, which are as "dead flies" in "the ointment of the apothecary," whose publication will be regretted by many friends of the lamented author. His own views on the publication of confidential correspondence may be gathered from a remark on p. 353, vol. I., at the bottom, to which the editor of these letters should have taken heed.

4. *The Christian Ethics of Eating and Drinking.* Two discourses. By Rev. WILLIAM T. FINDLEY. Xenia, Ohio: Nicholas & Fairchild. 1860; pp. 120, 12mo.

The theme of these discourses is the text, "Whether, therefore, ye eat or drink, or whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." The author informs us that they are part of a series on several correlative subjects, requested for publication, which request he will probably now accede to, save that he will publish on the specific topics in detail, and separately. He maintains that there is a hygiene superior to that of the mortal body, the hygiene of the soul, the laws of which do not conflict, but harmonize, with that of the body. In illustrating this idea he has occasion to bring forth many suggestions, of force to the conscientious, in reference both to our eating and drinking; which should be for health, and not for pleasure, for our own and others' good, and the glory of God, and not for mere animal enjoyment. He cautions the Christian, not only against wasting his own health and oppressing his own powers, by the pleasures of the table, but of encouraging, by his patronage, those saloons for eating and carousing which minister so much to gluttony and intemperance, and to the decay of public virtue. We do not

suppose, nevertheless, that the author intends to bring back that Saturnian reign, exactly, when men lived on acorns and justice ruled.

5. *Esther and her Times, in a Series of Lectures on the Book of Esther.* By JOHN M. LOWRIE, Fort Wayne, Indiana. Philadelphia: Board of Publication, pp. 276, 12mo.

The Divorce of Vashti; Mordecai Raised Up; Haman, the Magnificent; The Irreversible Decree; Divine Designs and Human Duty; Esther's Noble Resolve; The Sleepless Night; The Exaltation of Mordecai; The Fall of Haman; The Decree Reversed; The Day of Conflict; The Feast of Purim, are the inviting subjects of these twelve lectures. From the slight examination we have been able to bestow upon them, we doubt not they were listened to with pleasure by those to whom they were first addressed, and will be read with profit by others.

From an ancient story of deep interest to the Jewish people, skilfully unfolded, the author has deduced many kinds of instruction, suited to our own times, showing thus that all Scripture—even those portions which have sometimes been questioned, though wrongly—is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness.

6. *The Words of the Lord Jesus.* By RUDOLPH STIER. Vols. VII., VIII. Translated by the Rev. William B. Pope. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. Two volumes bound as one. 1860; pp. 490, 458.

We note the issue of these volumes by the enterprising publishers, who are now able to furnish the entire set to their patrons. Our sense of the merits, and our caveat against the errors of this work, may be found in our preceding numbers.

7. *The Perils of Licentiousness, A Friendly Warning to Young Men.* Written at the request of a benevolent gentleman, who offered a premium for a tract on the subject. The author appropriates the premium to the circulation of the tract, a pamphlet of 44 pp., 16mo.
8. *The Peaks of Otter, a Monograph of the Religious Experience of a Young Man.* pp. 36, 16mo. Flexible covers.

These publications of our Board are designed for our young men, the one a faithful warning against a too prevalent vice, as destructive to the soul as it is to the body; and the other, detailing the experience of a youth harassed with skeptical doubts, and delivered from them by Divine Grace.

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9. *Man, Moral and Physical, or the influence of Health and Disease on Religious Experience.* By the REV. JOSEPH H. JONES, D. D., Pastor of the Sixth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. *Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco.* Ἀδύνατον, κακῶς ψυχῆς ἐκούσῃ, Μὴ οὐ καὶ σῶμα αὐτῆ συνόισειν. Philadelphia: William S. & Alfred Martien, 606 Chestnut Street. 1860; pp. 300, 12mo.

The subject of this book is confessedly one of great importance, and little understood. The action of the body upon the mind is as much a topic of interest to the moralist, the casuist, and especially to him who is entrusted with the cure of souls, as the action of the mind upon the body is to the physician. On the one hand, it is an error of unspeakable magnitude to ascribe the crimes punishable by human tribunals to physical causes, and to hold the perpetrators unfortunate rather than guilty, as is too much the method of many disciples of Spurzheim and of Combe. And, on the other, it is equally an error to ascribe those peculiar states of religious depression, when one is writing

bitter things against himself, drawing down darkness over his own soul, and shutting out the view of a Saviour's love and the pitying mercy of God, and plunging into the depths of despair with a kind of fondness, and a conviction of duty, to moral causes only. It is not the soul as sinning with peculiar wickedness, but it is the body as diseased, the nervous system as disordered, which is oftentimes the cause. Equally so, may it be, in cases of great elation and extatic joy, and enthusiastic, immoderate ardour. The cure is physical, the body is to be cared for, diet, medicine, exercise, hygienic rules and change of occupation and climate, will work a restoration to the diseased soul, which no presentation of truth, no consoling exhortations of even a Paul or Barnabus, could accomplish. Save us, in these conditions, from the inconsiderate and unsympathising ministrations of rudeness and inexperience. Not every zealous Timothy, fresh from the schools where he has heard the truth among many witnesses, though from lips well nigh Apostolic, is competent to deal with such cases. The book before us, we learn from the publishers, was undertaken mainly at the instance of the late Drs. Archibald and James W. Alexander, and is written by one of the older pastors of Philadelphia, who has revolved the subject for many years. It bears the marks of extensive reading, of scholarly tastes and mature experience. We have felt, all our lives, the need of a treatise on this subject, and are glad to find one in this volume of Dr. Jones. It engaged the attention of the earlier casuists of the Protestant Church, but, except occasional articles in our religious Reviews, and an essay by Grant Powers, of New Hampshire, on "the influence of the imagination on the nervous system, contributing to a false hope," (a useful treatise on one branch of the subject, which now, probably, is not to be obtained,) we know of nothing, besides the volume before us, which we can commend to the attention of our readers and our younger brethren in the ministry.

10. "*Right at Last, and other Tales.*" By MRS. GASKELL. Harper & Brothers: New York. 1860; pp. 505, 12mo.

These tales originally appeared in Dickens' "Household Words" and "All the Year Round," and have since been published in book form. The fact of their having been first presented to the public by Dickens, will be a sufficient recommendation to a large class of readers.

11. "*The Three Clerks.*" By ANTHONY TROLLOPE, author of "Dr. Thorne," "West Indies and Spanish Main," etc. Harpers: New York. 1860; pp. 497.

We see this book is entitled "A Novel." We read few such books, and we have not time to give this a perusal. It comes from a house which *should* send forth nothing but what is promotive of public and private virtue. A young friend who has dipped into it seems to have an increasing interest in the volume. For our own sober selves, we can say nothing for or against it.

12. *The West Indies and the Spanish Main.* By ANTHONY TROLLOPE, author of "Doctor Thorne," "The Bertrams," "The Three Clerks," "Castle Richmond," etc., etc. New York: Harpers. 1860; pp. 385, 12mo.

This is from the same author. We now enter with him, not into the realm of fiction, but of reality. Like all Englishmen, he is an Abolitionist, and would, if he could, represent emancipation as a positive blessing to the British West Indies. In spite of all, his testimony does but confirm the fact, that emancipation has ruined the prosperity of these islands, and has conferred no privileges upon the negro, unless it be a privilege to live in idleness and sensu-

ality. The unthrift, and the miserable state of society which exists, cannot be concealed by the author. His remedy is, the importation of coolies from Asia, a perfectly innocent and humane operation, according to him, though it does resemble greatly the substitution, on the same ground of humanity, of African instead of Indian slaves, commonly, but perhaps falsely, ascribed to Las Casas. A portion of the book is occupied with the author's travels in New Granada and Central America. If not always dignified, it is lively in style, and often amusing.

13. *A Mother's Trials.* By the author of "My Lady." New York: Harpers; pp. 400, 12mo.
14. *Cicero on Oratory and Orators.* Translated or Edited by J. S. WATSON. New York: Harpers; pp. 379, 12mo. A continuation of the "Harpers' Classical Library."
15. *Natural History.* For the use of Schools and Families. By WORTHINGTON HOOKER, M. D., Professor of the Theory and Practice of Medicine in Yale College. Author of "Human Physiology," "Child's Book of Nature," etc., etc. Illustrated by nearly 300 engravings. Harpers: New York. 1860; pp. 382, 12mo.
16. *A Smaller History of Greece, from the Earliest Times to the Roman Conquest.* By WILLIAM SMITH, LL. D. Illustrated by engravings on wood. New York: Harpers. 1860; pp. 239, 16mo.
17. *History of Genghis Khan.* By JACOB ABBOT, with engravings. New York: Harpers. pp. 335, 16mo.

We regret that we are able to do no more than give the titles of the preceding volumes. We augur well of the *Natural History* of Prof. Hooker, from the appearance of

the book, the reputation of the author, and the interesting preface, in which his views and purposes are impressed.

The History of Greece is from a pen which has contributed much to unveil to us the antiquities of Greece and Rome, and abounds in appropriate illustrations.

The History of Genghis Khan is, also, from an attractive pen, which has been unwearied in its contributions to the entertainment and instruction of our youth.

18. *The Stars and the Angels*. Philadelphia: W. S. & A. Martien. 1860; pp. 358, 12mo.

This is an able but speculative work. It consists of two parts. The first is a scientific discussion of the structure of the heavenly bodies, with a view to prove that the God of the Bible is, indeed, the very God of nature, and that nature and revelation do not only harmonize, but are the very perfection of harmony and beauty. This discussion evinces great scientific acumen and *daring* speculation, though it is not free from the fanciful. We repel with indignation the author's insinuation that Bible interpreters did or do retreat before the onward march of natural science. The second is a discussion of man's physiological relations to angelic and animal creatures. It is very highly speculative and imaginary. The novel idea, that our Saviour was crucified on Thursday, and not on Friday, is certainly peculiar to our author's fertile imagination. It is not possible, however, for any man to read the book without pleasure and profit.

19. *The Titles of our Lord adopted by Himself in the New Testament*. By Rev. J. M. RANDALL. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. pp. 249, 16mo.

These outpourings of a pious and highly cultivated

mind, are a thank-offering mite cast into the Treasury of the Church, for the manifold mercies vouchsafed by her blessed Head to the afflicted author, who is nearly blind, and who, consequently, had to write them in pencil in a *chiragon*. We heartily join the author in the prayer that it may please the Lord Jesus Christ to accompany their perusal with His effectual blessing.

20. *Science in Theology.* Sermons preached in St. Mary's, Oxford, before the University. By Rev. A. S. FARRAR, M. A. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. 1860; pp. 250, 12mo.

In these sermons Mr. F. evinces very considerable power. He is sound and evangelical. None can fail to be pleased and profited by their perusal.

21. *Drops of Truth from the Fountain of Wisdom.*
22. *Cluster of Fruits from the Tree of Heavenly Wisdom.*
23. *Twyman Hogue, or Early Piety Illustrated.*
24. *Mary Humphrey's or Light Shining in a Dark Place.*

The above are among the recent issues of our Board of Publication. Their perusal cannot fail to please and interest our juvenile readers. Twyman Hogue is an exceedingly pleasant and profitable little book, illustrating the happiness and loveliness of youthful piety. The child-man was certainly a most remarkable child. In him affliction, solitude, meditation, suffering, prayer, produced a more rapid development—an earlier manifestation of the inward power. We read the book with breathless interest and grateful admiration. The whole narrative calls for the

devoutest thanksgiving to the Saviour for the monument of His power and miracle of His grace, which signalized the short but spiritually happy days of this wonderful young Christian hero.

25. *The Status of the Baptized Child.* The Substance of a Discourse preached by appointment of the Synod of Virginia, on the 8th of October, 1859, and published at its request. By the Rev. ARNOLD W. MILLER, Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, Petersburg, Va. Petersburg: Printed by A. F. Crutchfield & Co., Bank street. 1860; pp. 84, 8vo.

The author of this discourse, with that earnestness, sincerity, and ability, which is freely accorded to him, has set forth the views he is constrained to adopt respecting the *status* of the baptized child; his obligations to the Church, and the duty of the Church to him. He maintains, in common with most Pædobaptists: 1. That the infants of Church members are *born* members of the Church. 2. He maintains that the children of professing parents are born members of *particular* Churches, and not of the *Church catholic*. Under this head, and as an inference from it, he holds that the baptized children of the Church are legitimate subjects of discipline, and that after all means used to lead them to comply with their covenant obligations have failed, she is called of Christ to terminate their Church-membership by excommunication. Some suitable age, after they have reached the years of discretion—the age of *twenty-one*, for example, may be selected, at which the connection of these apostates with the Church may be terminated. He differs, therefore, from the conclusions to which the Chairman of the Committee has arrived who have reported “the Revised Book of Discipline,” and which have been set forth in the last October and April numbers

of this Review. The Church has both sides of this mooted subject before them. Truth, we believe, is all that is sought for by either party; and it is to be hoped that a just and unbiassed judgment will be formed by our Church at large, to which the delay in its action and ample discussion will greatly contribute. We will not enter here and at this time upon the arena of this debate, but leave it in the able hands of those who have already embarked in it.

26. *The Nahash Origin of the Black and Mixed Races.* By C. BLAUCHER THOMPSON. St. Louis. 1860; a pamphlet of 84 pp. 8vo.

By a wonderful process of exegetical gymnastics, the author has *proved* (?) that negroes are not the children of Adam; that Adam was created for dominion, and the negro was made his slave-subject in the garden of Eden. "The moving creature that hath life," created on the 5th day, Gen. 1: 20, is an order of immortal intelligences; the TANNINIM and GEDOLIM of verse 21, (in the English version, "great whales,") were the two classes into which this order was divided. The TANNINIM were the apostate angels, the GEDOLIM, sons of the ELOHIM, living spirits, which were breathed into the nostrils of Adam at his creation. There was another order of the *Nephesh Chaiyah*, created out of the earth on the sixth day, verse 24, of a superbrute kind, but inferior to Adam, and placed under his dominion. This was the *Nachash* which tempted Eve. His color was black. He was the ancestor of the negro. Indeed, the word *negro* and *nigger* is from the Latin *niger*, and this from the Hebrew *niggar*, and this from *nagas*, and this from *nachats*, and this from *nachash*, which is translated *serpent* in the English version of Gen. 3: 1. The author's translation of this verse is the following: "Now the *Nachash* (the negro) existed wise above all the field animals

which Jehovah Elohim made, even saying unto the woman, is it so, even that Elohim hath said, ye shall not eat from all the trees of the garden?" "Upon thy belly shalt thou go," etc., he renders, "bending thou shalt go forth, and from the dust procure food all the days of thy life." The author evidently feels himself greatly supported by Adam Clarke's opinion that the old tempter was an *ape*, or an *ourang-outang*. From the two races, through the process of amalgamation in different degrees of blood, has sprung all the different types of intelligent beings now extant upon the earth. We know not in what terms to speak of exegesis so extraordinary. It is one of "the curiosities of literature," which we would commend to the notice of some future D'Israeli.

27. *The Biblical Reason Why: A Family Guide to Scripture Readings, and a Hand-Book for Biblical Students.* By the author of "The Reason Why," etc., etc., etc. Illustrated with numerous engravings. New York: Dick & Fitzgerald. pp. 324, 12mo.

The author appears to have prepared distinct works on the same plan, in the departments of general science and natural history, his object being to popularize the important facts in these several branches, and to communicate them in a catechetical form to those who have no time or taste for severe study. This volume contains many useful and instructive illustrations of the Bible. It does not meet so much the wants of the scholar as of the people. We are sorry to see some errors perpetuated, which a recurrence to the original Scriptures would have rectified. And, in other instances, a more perfect acquaintance with the Biblical languages and literature would have suggested more perfect answers. The writer is evidently of the Episcopal Church, with bearings rather towards Puseyistic ceremonies and vanities.

28. *Memorial of J. Addison Alexander, D. D.* Philadelphia: Martiens. pp. 36, 16mo.

This brief Memorial embraces the excellent sermon of Dr. Hall at the funeral of this eminent scholar and professor, and some other brief notices of the deceased, to meet a public demand until a fuller memoir shall be prepared.

1. *House Jewels, or Maggie Ella Colton and her Brothers.* pp. 100, 16mo.
2. *The Bar of Iron, and conclusion of the matter. A true story.* By the Rev. Charles B. Taylor, M. A., Rector of Otley. pp. 147, 16mo.
3. *Ella; or Submission in Affliction.* pp. 36, 8mo.
4. *The Holidays, and the reasons why they are observed.* pp. 106, 16mo.
5. *Emily Grey, the Orphan, and her kind Aunt.* pp. 153, 16mo.
6. *Ella Graham, or Great Effects from small causes.* By Ally Eldridge. pp. 138, 16mo.
7. *Little Annie's First thoughts about God.* By Nellie Grahame. pp. 87, 16mo.
8. *The Lost Children, or Henry and his Torch.* By the author of "The Widow's Sixpence." pp. 82, 16mo.
9. *Nursery Tales for her little Friends.* By Cousin Martha. pp. 76, 16mo.

The preceding are among the more recent contributions of the Presbyterian Board of Publication, to our juvenile literature. We have been able to look through only a portion of them. "The bar of Iron," illustrates the manifold evils of Intemperance, especially to the working classes. "The Holidays" is an explanation of the reasons

for the observance of Christmas and New Year, the Fourth of July, St. Patrick's, St. Bartholomew's and Thanksgiving day. All are written in a style attractive to the young, and we can testify that the advent of these books has ever been hailed with pleasure by the youthful portion of our households. The lessons they inculcate, we are always sure, are lessons of piety and wisdom.

ARTICLE VIII.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

I. AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEWS.—CONTENTS.

- I. *Theological and Literary Journal*, April, 1860: Edited by David N. Lord. Article I. Dr. Fairbairn's Typology. II. God is Love; by Rev. Dr. Pond. III. Dr. J. F. Berg's False View of the Second Advent. IV. Divine Authority of the Bible, in review of Rev. A. Barnes; by Rev. H. Carleton. V. Designation and Exposition of Isaiah, Chapters lii. and liii. VI. Answers to Correspondents—1. Acts of the Divine Nature in Christ—2. The Desolation of Edom. VII. Literary and Critical Notices.
- II. *Princeton Review*, April, 1860: Edited by Charles Hodge, D. D. Article I. Theories of the Eldership. II. The Dissolution of Empires. III. Sir W. Hamilton's Theory of Perception. IV. Man, Moral and Physical. V. The First and Second Adam. VI. Short Notices.
- III. *Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, April, 1860. Article I. Who is Responsible for the Present Slavery Agitation? II. Pythagoras. III. The American State and Christianity. IV. The Annihilation of the Wicked. V. The Insurrection of the Paxton Boys. VI. Literary and Theological Intelligence. VII. Notices of New Books.
- IV. *The Christian Review*, April, 1860. Article I. The Ecclesiastical Miracles. II. Moral Philosophy. III. Baden Powell on the Immutability of Physical Laws. IV. Dr. Edward Beecher's "Conflict" and "Concord." V. The Doctrine of Romans I: 18-23. VI. The Defence of Socrates. VII. Modern Scepticism and its Refutation. VIII. Book Notices.
- V. *Evangelical Review*, April, 1860. Article I. The Study of the Scriptures; by Rev. J. R. Keiser, A. M., Gettysburg, Pa. II. For the Gifts and Calling of God are without Repentance. III. Language; by D. McConaughy, A. M., Gettysburg, Pa. IV. Baccalaureate Address. V. Imagination. VI. Christian Instruction in our Colleges. VII. The Field and Harvest of Ministerial Labor; by Rev. W. F. Eyster, A. M., Hagerstown, Md. VIII. The Lutheran Church in Russia. IX. The Divinity of Christ; by Rev. R. Weiser, Des Moines, Iowa. X. Reminiscences of Lutheran Clergymen. XI. *Dorpater Zeitschrift*. XII. Notices of New Publications.
- VI. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, April, 1860. Article I. Rothe's Ethics; by Rev. C. C. Tiffany, Derby, Conn. II. Comparative Phonology; or the Phonetic System of the Indo-European Languages; by Benjamin W. Dwight, Clinton, N. Y. III. Exegesis

- of 1 Corinthians 15: 35-44, as Illustrated by Natural History and Chemistry; by Rev. Edward Hitchcock, D. D., LL. D., Amherst College. IV. John George Hamann; by Rev. J. M. Hoppiu, now in Paris. V. Romanism and a Free Bible; by Rev. William Barrows, Reading, Mass. VI. Dr. Nathaniel W. Taylor on Moral Government in the Abstract; by Rev. John P. Gulliver, Norwich, Conn. VII. Notices of New Publications.
- VII. *Quarterly Review of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South*, April, 1860. Article I. Extempore Speaking. II. Rivers's Elements of Moral Philosophy. III. Preachers and Preaching. IV. The Prophetic Messiah. V. The Rev. Ignatius A. Few, LL. D. VI. Evangelism. VII. The Classic Localities of our Land. VIII. Brief Reviews.
- VIII. *Mercersburg Review*, April, 1860. Article I. Constantine the Great; by the Rev. Philip Schaff, D. D., Mercersburg, Pa. II. The Old Doctrine of Christian Baptism; by the Rev. John W. Nevin, D. D., Lancaster, Pa. III. The English Language; by the Rev. Edmond Emerson, Greencastle, Pa. IV. German Hymnology; by the Rev. Thomas C. Porter, Lancaster, Pa. V. Religion and Christianity; by the Rev. E. V. Gerhart, D. D., Lancaster, Pa. VI. What is a Catechumen? by the Rev. Henry Harbaugh, Lancaster, Pa. VII. Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought; by the Rev. E. V. Gerhart, D. D., Lancaster, Pa. VIII. Recent Publications.
- IX. *The Southern Episcopalian*, June, 1860. Miscellaneous. Editorial and Critical. Religious Intelligence.
- X. *Journal of Prison Discipline and Philanthropy*, April, 1860. Article I. The Illinois (new) State Penitentiary at Joliet. II. State Penitentiaries. III. Schools of Industry. IV. Philadelphia County Prison. V. A Remarkable Midnight Convention. Brief Notices.
- XI. *Historical Magazine*, June, 1860: New York—Charles B. Richardson & Co. General Department. Societies and their Proceedings. Notes and Queries. Obituary. Notes on Books. Historical and Literary Intelligence.
- XII. *De Bow's Review*, June, 1860. Article I. Feudalism in America; by J. Quitman Moore, of Mississippi. II. Make Home Attractive—A Treatise "About all things and several others." By Geo. Fitzhugh, of Virginia. III. Relations of the Negro Race to Civilization; by W. W. Wright, of New Orleans. IV. Influences of Climate on Animals and Plants; by J. W. Scott, Esq., of New York. V. American Letters; by J. Quitman Moore, of Mississippi. VI. Milton and Macaulay; by Geo. Fitzhugh, of Virginia. VIII. "Idyls of the King;" by Alfred Tennyson, D. C. L., Poet Laureate. VIII. The Floating Beacon. IX. Shakespeare as Physician and Metaphysician. Department of Commerce. Department of Mining and Internal Improvements. Department of Education. Department of Miscellany. Editorial Miscellany.
- XIII. *The Pacific Expositor*, May, 1860: Rev. W. A. Scott, D. D., Editor.
- XIV. *The New Englander*, May, 1860. Art. I. Humboldt, Ritter, and the New Geography. II. The Power of Contrary Choice. III. Discourse commemorative of Rev. C. A. Goodrich, D. D. IV. Hebrew Servitude. V. Are the Phenomena of Spiritualism Supernatural? VI. Worcester's Dictionary. VII. Common Schools and the English Language. VIII. The Marble Faun. IX. The Crime against the Right of Suffrage. X. Reply to the Methodist Quarterly Review. XI. Book Notices.
- XV. *The Home Circle*, June, 1860. General Articles, Poetry, Editorial Department.

II. BRITISH PERIODICALS.

- I. *London Quarterly Review*, April, 1860. Article I. Labourers' Homes. II. Souvenirs et Correspondance de Madame Récamier. III. Vicissitudes of Families, and other Essays. IV. The Bar of Philadelphia—Washington's Farewell Address. V. Miss Nightingale's Notes on Nursing. VI. Fox-hunting. VII. Recollections of Leslie. VIII. The Budget and the Reform Bill.

- II. *Westminster Review*, April, 1860. Article I. Vedic Religion. II. Manin and Venice in 1848-9. III. The Ethics of War. IV. Plutarch and his Times. V. Austria, and the Government of Hungary. VI. Parliamentary Reform: The Dangers and the Safeguards. VII. Japan. VIII. Darwin on the Origin of Species. IX. Contemporary Literature.
- III. *North British Review*, May, 1860. I. Redding's Reminiscences—Thomas Campbell. II. Quakerism—Past and Present. III. Sir Henry Lawrence. IV. Australian Ethnology. V. Poems by Heinrich Heine. VI. Church and State. VII. The Origin of Species. VIII. British Lighthouses. IX. The State of Europe. X. Recent Publications.
- IV. *Edinburgh Review*, April, 1860. Article I. Commercial Relations of England and France. II. The Youth of Milton. III. Expense of Public Education in England. IV. English Local Nomenclature. V. Civil Correspondence and Memoranda of the Duke of Wellington. VI. De Broglie's Church and Roman Empire. VII. The alleged Shakspeare Forgeries. VIII. Darwin on the Origin of Species. 9. France, Savoy and Switzerland.
- V. *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, June, 1860. The Schoolmaster at Home. Night. Milton. Captain Speke's Adventures in Somali Land.—Part II. Norman Sinclair.—Part V. Scottish National Character. Domitian and the Turbot. Universal Suffrage in Savoy and Nice. The Fight for the Belt. The Balance of Party. Index.

III. FRENCH AND GERMAN PERIODICALS.

- I. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 Mars, 1860. I. La Jeunesse de Mazarin, Dernière Partie, par M. Victor Cousin, de l'Académie Française. II. L'Homme au Bracelet d'Or, par M. Maxime Du Camp. III. La Cavalerie Régulière en Campagne, Souvenirs d'Afrique et de Crimée, par M. le Vte. de Noé. IV. Rivalité de Charles-Quint et de François Ier.—Le Connétable de Bourbon.—III.—Le Siège de Marseille et la Bataille de Pavie, par M. Mignet, de l'Académie Française. V. Un Voyage Dans la Nouvelle-Grenade, Paysages de la Nature Tropicale.—III.—Rio Hacha, Les Indiens Goajires et la Sierra-Negra, par M. Elisée Reclus. VI. La Jeunesse de Phidias, par M. E. Beulé, de l'Institut. VII. Les Statistiques Agricoles de la France, par M. L. Villermé. VIII. Chronique de la Quinzaine, Histoire Politique et Littéraire. IX. Revue Musicale—Les Opéras Nouveaux, par M. P. Scudo. X. Bulletin Bibliographique.
- II. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1er Avril, 1860. I. La Ville Noire, Première Partie, par M. George Sand. II. Décadence Morale du XVIIe Siècle—La Brinvilliers, par M. J. Michelet, de l'Institut. III. Souvenirs d'un Amiral.—La Marine de la Restauration—Les Dernières Années et le Testament d'un Marin, par M. E. Jurien de La Gravière. IV. Léonard de Vinci, D'après de Nouveaux Documents, par M. Charles Clément. V. Une Nouvelle Théorie D'histoire Naturelle.—L'origine des Espèces, par M. Auguste Laugel. VI. Du Crédit des Chemins de fer et des Moyens D'achever le Réseau, par M. Victor Bonnet. VII. Les Armes à Feu au XIXe Siècle.—I.—La Poudre et les Armes Portatives, par M. Pierre de Buire. VIII. Le Roman Contemporain.—Corruption du Roman De Mœurs, par M. Emile Montégut. IX. Chronique de La Quinzaine, histoire Politique et Littéraire. X. Revue des Théâtres.—la Tentation, de M. Feuillet. XI. Bulletin Bibliographique.
- III. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 Avril, 1860. I. L'Angleterre et la vie Anglaise. Les Clubs de Londres, par M. Alphonse Esquiros. II.—La Ville Noire, seconde partie, par M. George Sand. III.—La Politique Coloniale de la France.—L'île de la Réunion, ses Ressources et ses Progrès, les Dangers qui Menacent la Colonie, par M. Jules Duval. IV.—Les Armes à Feu au XIXe Siècle.—II.—L'Artillerie et les Fusées de Guerre, par M. Pierre de Buire. V.—La Poésie Hongroise au XIXe Siècle.—I.—Sádor Petoefi, par M. Saint-René Taillandier. VI.—Guerre de L'Inde.—Episodes Militaires de la vie Anglo-Indienne.—II.—Le Drame de Cawnpore et le Quartier-Général de Lord Clyde, par M. E.-D. Forgues. VII.—Chronique de la Quinzaine, Histoire Politique et Littéraire. VIII.—Revue

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- IV. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1er Mai, 1860; Paris. I.—La Ville Noire, dernière partie, par M. George Sund. II.—Un Voyage Dans la Nouvelle-Grenade, Paysages de la Nature Tropicale.—IV.—Les Aruques et la Sierra-Nevada, par M. Elisée Reclus. III.—Une Réforme Administrative en Afrique.—III.—Des Devoirs Nouveaux du Gouvernement Colonial en Algérie, dernière partie, par M. Albert de Broglie. IV.—Le Monde Alpestre et les Hautes Régions du Globe D'Après les Dernières Recherches de la Physique, par M. A. Maury, de l'Institut. V.—Guerre de l'Inde.—Épisodes Militaires de la vie Anglo-Indienne.—III.—Fin de la Guerre, Reprise de Lucknow, La Chasse aux Rebelles, par M. E.-D. Forgues. VI.—La Comédie Anglaise Sous La Restauration.—I.—Le Public, par M. H. Taine. VII.—De La Renaissance des Lettres Chez les Grecs Modernes.—Les Poètes Zalokostas et Orphanidis, par M. E. Yemeniz. VIII.—Chronique de la Quinzaine, Histoire Politique et Littéraire. IX.—Bulletin Bibliographique.
- V. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 Mai, 1860; Paris. I.—Économistes Contemporains.—Richard Cobden et l'École de Manchester, Histoire de la Liberté Commerciale en Angleterre, par M. Louis Reybaud, de l'Institut. II.—La Reine du Sabbat, Scènes de la Vie des Landes, par M. Eugène Ducom. III.—De la Situation de la France et de la Papauté en Italie, par M. Saint Marc Girardin, de l'Académie Française. IV.—La Comédie Anglaise Sous La Restauration.—II.—Les Poètes, par M. H. Taine. V.—La Turquie, Son Gouvernement et Ses Armées Pendant La Guerre D'Orient.—I.—La Campagne D'Arménie, par M. de Saint-Priest, duc d'Almazan. VI.—Les Révolutions et les Dictatures de L'Amérique du sud en 1859, par M. Charles de Mazade. VII.—La Saison Dramatique. Décadence du Théâtre, par M. Émile Montégut. VIII.—Chronique de la Quinzaine, Histoire Politique et Littéraire. IX.—Revue Musicale, par M. P. Scudo. X.—Bulletin Bibliographique.
- VI. *Revue Chrétienne*, 15 Mars, 1860; Paris. Sommaire: La Doctrine Définitive de Maine de Biran, Ch. Waddington. Madame Récamier, Ch. Secrétan. Les Catacombes de Rome, E. de Pressensé. La lutte religieuse en France au seizième siècle, à l'occasion du livre de M. Dargaud, Ad. Schæfler. Revue du mois.—Les brochures nouvelles sur la papauté et l'opinion.
- VII. *Revue Chrétienne*, 15 Avril, 1860; Paris. Sommaire: Le Concile de Trente, R. Saint-Hilaire. La littérature de la révolution, Eugène Bersier. La doctrine définitive de Maine de Biran, Ch. Waddington. Quelques considérations sur la place centrale occupée par la mort de Jesus-Christ dans le dogme chrétien, Jean Monod. Bulletin Bibliographique.—*Devant la Croix*, par Ch. Juillerat, l'un des pasteurs de l'Eglise réformée de Paris, L. Rognon. Revue du mois.—Les Prédicateurs du Caire.—Le père Félix, le père Minjard et l'abbé Bautain.—Discussion sur l'autorité paternelle.—Un procès dans la Haute-Vienne.—M. Bethmont. Nomination de M. Bois.—D'un récent article de M. Sainte-Beuve sur la critique. Le dernier volume de M. Thiers, Eugène Bersier.
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- IX.—*Studien und Kritiken*. In Verbindung mit D. T. Müller, D. Nitzsch und D. Rothe, herausgegeben von D. C. Ullmann und D. F. W. C. Umbreit: 1860 drittes heft. I. *Abhandlungen*: 1. Beyschlag, zur paulinischen Christologie. 2. Nitzsch, Beiträge zur Erklärung der Rede des Stephanus, apostelgeschichte 7. II. *Gedanken und Bemerkungen*: 1. Buttman über den Gebrauch des Pronomen *ἐκείνος* im viertem Evangelium. 2. Auberlen, die drei Anhänge des Buchs der Richter in ihrer Bedeutung und Zusammengehörigkeit. III. *Recensionen*: 1. Holtzmann, Kanon und Tradition; rec. von Ritschl. 2. Stirn, Apologie des Christenthums; rec. von Dörtenbach. IV. *Miscellen*: Programm der Haager Gesellschaft.

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ARTICLE I.

THE PROTESTANT CHURCH OF FRANCE AND
THE PASTORS OF THE DESERT.

*Histoire Des Églises Réformées de Pons, Gemozac et Mortagne
En Saintonge, Précédée d'une notice étendue sur L'établiss-
ment de la Réforme dans cette Province, L'Aunis, et L'An-
goumois.* Par A. CROTTET, de Genève, Pasteur à Pons.
A Bordeaux : 1841 ; pp. 263, 8vo.

*Histoire des Églises Du Désert chez les Protestants de France
depuis la Fin du Règne de Louis XIV., jusqu'à la Révolu-
tion Française.* Par CHARLES COQUEREL.

“ Plus á me frapper on s'amuse,
“ Tant plus de marteaux on y use.”

THEODORE DE BEZA.

Two vols. Paris : 1841 ; pp. 564, 616, 8vo.

*Histoire des Pasteurs du Désert depuis la Revocation de L'édit
de Nantes jusqu'à la Revolution Française, 1685–1789.* Par
NAP. PEYRAT.

“ Ils tenaient devant le trône, en présence de l'Agneau, vetus
de longues robes blanches ayant à la main des palmes.—D'ou
sont-ils venus ?—De la grande tribulation.—Ils ont lavé leur
robe dans le sang de l'Agneau ; voilà pourquoi ils sont devant
le trône de Dieu, et le servent dans son temple.”

Apocalypse, Chap. vii.

Two vols. Paris : 1842 ; pp. 516, 552, 8vo.

Bulletins de L'Histoire de Protestantisme Francais, Documents Historiques inédits et originaux, XVIe, XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles, de la Société de l'Histoire du Protestantisme Francais. Paris: 1853. &c.

The works whose titles we have placed at the head of this article, disclose that spirit of research which has prompted the Protestant Churches of France in recovering, before they utterly perish, the memorials which yet exist of their heroic and suffering ancestors. Each of the authors claims to have written after a most careful scrutiny of original documents, sought for with avidity, and, in many cases, drawn forth from the concealment in which they have laid for generations. Many, alas, have perished in the flames, to which the rage of persecutors committed every thing, whether trivial or important, traced by the pen of the hated Huguenot. In a former volume of this Review we have given some brief and general account of the sufferings of the Protestants of France, which exiled so many from their native shores, and drove them to seek a refuge in the friendly countries of Europe and in the American wilderness. We are attracted towards the same subject again, not by a desire to repeat the items of their romantic history, which filled with astonishment and sorrow the whole Protestant world, but because these volumes before us furnish us with some new historic facts respecting men who found a home and have left their names among us, and whose worth ought not to be forgotten.

In reference to the first of these volumes, its author, M. Crottet, now resident at Yverdon, in Switzerland, informs us that, being called to exercise the functions of his pastoral office in that ancient country, from which persecution had driven his fathers, he spent the leisure moments of a laborious ministry in the attempt to collect those documents which could throw light upon the history of the Churches that had given him their confidence. In a country in

which the reigning fanaticism carefully strove to destroy every thing relating to an abhorred worship, it was a baffling pursuit, but the reiterated entreaties of parents and distant friends, and the desire of leaving in the hands of his flock authentic testimonies of the zeal, piety and sufferings of his ancestors, urged him on. He gathered around him the old books which attacked or defended their faith, ran over the libraries of his parishioners, and ransacked old chests and secretaries, in the hope of finding some of those writings which their fathers sought to conceal from the eyes of their enemies. He listened to the recitals of the venerable witnesses of the last persecutions, whom he met with, here and there, among the faithful of his own Churches, receiving them with circumspection, and only when they coincided with other reliable authorities. This little work of Crottet we have perused with intense interest, in part because it speaks to us of familiar names. The work of Coquerel is dedicated "to the memory of the French *Pastors of the Desert*, who, in the midst of proscriptions and martyrdoms, sustained by the hand of God, have defended religious liberty and restored evangelical worship to the eighteenth century in the Reformed Churches of our [his] country." It, too, is compiled, in great part, from documents and manuscripts never published. Its publication fulfils a design the author formed many years before, but which he would not have dreamt of undertaking but for the sacred deposit entrusted to him by Madame Rabaut-Pomier—widow of the second son of the illustrious Pastor of the Desert, Paul Rabaut, and sister-in-law of Rabaut Saint-Étienne—of all the manuscripts and letters of her family. The historic and personal papers of Paul Rabaut, and, above all, his vast and precious correspondence with "the Pastors of the Desert," are very abundant, especially from 1750 to 1775. They consist of the acts of the Provincial and National Synods; petitions addressed to the

King, to Ministers, to Intendants; of rough draughts of letters to different administrative and ecclesiastical authorities; of apologetic memoirs in behalf of the Churches of the desert; of lists of those condemned for the faith; of note-books or journals of his private proceedings, or the perils of his ministry; of recitals, more or less extended, of the most notable religious events of Languedoc. His correspondence is composed of all the letters which his colleagues of the desert daily addressed him. In reading them, we see that during these long years Paul Rabaut was the centre and soul of the transactions of the Churches of the desert, not only for the South of France, but for the rest of the country.

The History of M. Nap. Peyrat is dedicated to the *Cevenols*, or inhabitants of the Cevennes, the Protestants of the South of France, children *des Églises sous la Croix*, of the "Churches under the Cross." This part of France was the focus of resistance, the storm-rocked cradle of "the Pastors of the desert;" in their own language, the sacred land of Israel. Peyrat's History is written in a popular, rhetoric strain, is lively and descriptive, presents many noble philosophic views, but is apparently less built on documentary evidence than the preceding. Yet he says that, from his childhood, almost, he had formed the resolution of collecting the half-corroded remains of those times, and those poetic effusions existing in flying leaves, or in the memory, not less fugitive, of the aged. He consecrated his youth to this irksome yet filial labor. He visited the libraries of Paris and Languedoc; he revolved the pages of the communal archives; he collated the popular traditions; he visited, in person, the theatre of the events, the cradle of the prophets, the fields of battle, and, charged with these documents and souvenirs, he has arranged them into this general chronicle of the desert, as a pious and dutiful son collects the scattered bones of his ancestors into a propitia-

tory monument, which he erects to them in the midst of the solitude.*

The *Bulletins* are the annual publications of the Protestant Historical Society of France, of which Guizot is honorary, and Charles Read acting President, the object of which is to collect, preserve and publish, in an authentic form, all documents bearing upon the history of the French Protestant Church.

Out of these materials, were it our purpose to do so, we might compile a complete account of the Protestant Churches of France in their season of intense suffering.

The sixteenth century was an intellectual spring-time, when antiquity regerminated, and from its withered roots bloomed forth the three divine flowers of faith, science and art, whose perfumes intoxicated the world. Protestantism was but the religious element of this universal regeneration. It was the Gospel renascent, coming forth into light from the darkness of the past.

"The Roman Theocracy," says Peyrat, "that gigantic institution of the middle ages, tottered. Every theocracy tends irresistibly to realize, in the social order, the doctrines of the Indian cosmogony, which puts the earth on the back of an elephant, emblem of the sacerdotal power, and this elephant upon a tortoise, symbol of its immobility. But even this immobility excites, by its resistance, the tumultuous outbursts of the human race in its eternal progress. Kings, peoples, the Church, even, rose against the Papacy, and the Papacy offered to the respect of the world neither the genius which establishes nor the virtues which preserve. Bereft of her moral power, she forgot her nature and origin, and to maintain her existence she had recourse to royalty, her mortal enemy. She cried out to Caesar, 'Protect me against the intellect of man!' He answered, 'Consecrate your swords.'

"What, in effect, do we see in the sixteenth century? Despotism every where triumphant; every where public freedom overborne for the advantage of absolute royalty; the Germanic Empire become hereditary; the Emperor dreaming of universal monarchy; Europe in silence before Charles the Fifth; the world ready to bow down be-

* Peyrat, p. ii.

neath a theocracy, to two heads, the Pope and the Emperor; the Empire and the Papacy, ceasing their ancient struggle, uniting the sceptre and the cross, were embracing; fatal embrace, from which the earth had seen a monster proceed, like that which hell in terror beheld born in its lowest abyss from the marriage of Satan and of Sin—the monster, Death! Yes, that death which had devoured the world, reanimated by Christ to no end. Rise, for it is time; rise, then, ye storms that regenerate the [universal] world! And from the midst of their thunders and their whirlwinds, O God, the Saviour, make Thy prophet come forth!

“Luther appeared. He rose with the impetuosity of the Germanic genius, and of that popular principle of which he was the tumultuous organ. All the vanquished heresies of the Middle Ages had remitted to him their vengeance and their triumph. And as the venerable image of those ancestors reappeared on the face of an infant who would consummate their work and their glory, all these sects seemed to revive in him. The warlike audacity of the Taborite of Bohemia, the rustic simplicity of the Vaudois of the Alps, the poetic mysticism of the Albigeois of Languedoc, commingled in his thoughtful Germanic mould, revived in this puissant heresiarch, their universal heir. At his thundering voice all Europe started. All the North, in a burst of unanimous enthusiasm, raised itself up. Its peoples believed that they saw a prophet of ancient days. His eye was an eye of fire, intrepid, lofty. His word, it was the clarion, it was thunder, it was God himself thundering by *his* mouth. By turns imperious, impetuous, ingenuous, and even jovial, terrible as a giant and candid as a child, he regarded himself as nothing but a frail instrument in the Divine hand, which employed it as a tempestuous element in His immortal work. He went forward, he went on, and, playing the lute, smiling at some infant in the cradle, or drinking carelessly his beer with Melancthon, he renovated the world.

“By this colossal tribune of the faith, Christian Europe, unsettled in its foundations, was split in two: Protestant and democratic at the North, Catholic and monarchical at the South. This a unit, resting on the sacerdotal authority; that manifold, and founded upon individual liberty. Catholicism, like the Roman Empire, seated at the capitol, in its majestic unity and its magnificent hierarchies, governing its peoples, blindly submitting to the Pontifical cross. Protestantism, like a camp of ancient Germany, an immense sheep-fold, where swarmed all the thoughtful tribes of the North, different in dialects, habits, governments; warlike, adventurous, restless, and united by the single sentiment of evangelic liberty around the shepherd’s crook of Christ. Such is the secession made by Luther, and its full immediate effect was to render impossible henceforth the two-headed theocracy of the Pope and the Emperor, which menaced Europe. Far from pretending again to an universal monarchy, the successors of Charlemagne and of Gregory the Seventh, dragged on in an insensible but irresistible

decadence, could use the sceptre and the crosier but as old men use the staff of dry reed which conducts them to the sepulchre."*

It is in these eloquent words that Mons. Peyrat spreads out before his reader the state of Europe and the great work accomplished by Luther. He regards it as providential that this stupendous mission was reserved for a Saxon. Between the North and the South, the Teutonic and the Latin race, which God made use of, each in its turn, to civilize Europe, there was a constant antagonism. The Latin or Etruscan mind was essentially material, organizing and immovable. Its tendency was to unity. As Pagan, it founded the Roman Empire; as Christian, the Romish theocracy. The Teutonic or Scandinavian genius is, on the contrary, mystical, disorganizing, vagrant. Its craving is independence. After four or five ages of conflict, the Teutonic genius triumphed over the Empire in the person of Alaric, over the Church in the person of Luther, and substituted by the barbaric hero natural equality for political castes, and by the Protestant tribune, evangelical equality for sacerdotal hierarchies. Luther wrought out, in opposition to the Church of Rome, a revolution analogous to that which St. Paul accomplished against the Jewish Synagogue. Religion passed from the Pontiff to the people, from the temple to the domestic hearth, from authority to liberty, from sterile ritualism to fruitful morality. Protestantism was a revival of the primitive Church, and returned, in respect to doctrine, to the Augustinian theology, and in organization, to democratic election. And the fugitive Platonists of the East preceded the reformers of the West, as Plato preceded Christ. The most brilliant luminary of Greece announced, a second time, the star of Judah, as the aurora does the sun.†

The unpretending, but not less interesting, pages of Crottet, bring before us the reformer Calvin, born at

* Peyrat, p. 2-5.

† Ibid., p. 6.

Noyon, July 10, 1509. He was destined for the Church, and, opportunely for himself, obtained a benefice in early life. By the urgency of his father, who saw in the legal profession a sure passport to fortune and honors, he turned away from former pursuits and repaired to Orleans, where Pierre de l'Etoile taught the civil law. This he did the more readily, as his kinsman and friend, Pierre Robert, better known by the name *Olivétan*, had inspired him with the love of piety and a distaste for the superstitions of the Romish Church. Even here much of his time was devoted to theological pursuits. He was distinguished then, at twenty-three years of age, by remarkable talents, and began to announce the fundamental truths of the Gospel in those families into whose bosom his talents and zeal had introduced him. He then removed to Bourges, to profit by the lessons of Alciati, a celebrated doctor of the law whom Francis I. had drawn to France. Afterwards he fixed his abode at Paris, where, suspected of heresy, he was obliged to flee, and, changing his name to Happeville, he withdrew, in 1534, to the city of Angoulême. He was hospitably received by Louis Du Tillet, the Curate of Claix, who was also canon of the Cathedral of Angoulême, to whom he taught the Greek language, as some reward for his kindness. Here he commenced his celebrated Institutes, spending often whole nights upon it, and too intent upon his task by day to take his regular food. He here drew around him the men of letters, some of whom he led to embrace his ideas of reform. These he frequently assembled together to consult for the interests of truth, and read to them passages of his great work, and availed himself of their counsel and advice. He afterwards fixed himself at Poitiers, pursuing still his studies, and bringing many of those whom his genius and worth drew towards him to a knowledge of the truth. There were, in that neighborhood, excavations called the Grottoes of St. Benoît and of Crotelles. One of these is still called the Grotto of

Calvin. Into this he was in the habit of withdrawing, that he might continue, in safety, his severe labors. To this, also, he conducted those who appeared inclined to piety, and to be earnest inquirers after truth. There he gave them prayers and books which he had written, and there he often bowed the knee with them in earnest supplications.

At Angoulême he had continued to observe the exterior forms of Catholicism. He had even been called to pronounce Latin orations before the assembled clergy in the Church of St. Peter's. At the instigation of Du Tillet, he composed forms of sermons and Christian remonstrances, or exhortations, which he caused to be recited by many Curates of the neighboring localities. It was in the Grotto of Crotelles, at Poitiers, that he first broke the last links which bound him to the Church of Rome. While his friends were around him, listening to his discourse, one of them, Charles le Sage, Doctor Regent of Poitiers, took up the Word, and urged, in favor of the Mass, that it must be true, since it was celebrated in all places where the name of Christ was invoked. "This is my Mass," said Calvin, pointing to the Bible open before him, then—throwing his cap on the table and raising his eyes to Heaven—he cried with the accents of deep conviction, "Lord, if at the day of judgment Thou dost chide me that I have not been at the Mass, and that I have forsaken it, I can say, with reason, Lord, Thou hast not commanded it; behold Thy law! behold the Scripture, which is the rule Thou hast given me, in which I have been able to find no other sacrifice than that which was immolated at the altar of the Cross." The efforts of the reformer did not abide without success. Antoine de la Duguire, Doctor Regent of the University, Philippe Véron, Procurer, Albert Babinot, Doctor of Law, John Vernou, and Rénier, Lieutenant-General of the Seneschal's Court, renounced entirely the errors of Rome, formed themselves into a Church, and celebrated their first

communion in the Grotto of Crotelles. It was agreed that three among them should fill the office of Evangelists, Vernou at Poitiers, Albert Babinot at Thoulouse, Philippe Véron, who changed his name to Ramasseur, and was charged with itinerating through Saintonge, Aunis and Angoumois. A collection made at this little assembly provided for the first expenses of this pious enterprise.

After Calvin was established at Geneva, these three evangelists reported themselves to him for advice and counsel. Many young persons resorted to him there to pursue the study of theology, many ecclesiastics and monks, renouncing their vows and the Church of Rome, resorted to Saintonge, and found refuge in the isles of Ré and Oleron. One of the three evangelists perished in the fires of martyrdom, and many other noble ministers of Christ and private Christians met with the same fate.

It does not suit our purpose to trace the progress of the Reformation, which was carried on in France through years of persecution and sanguinary wars. At length the dynasty of the House of Valois was extinguished, and Henry IV., by the arms of the Protestants, was seated on the throne. They had taken him into their favor in his childhood among the shepherds of Béarne, and had conducted him from victory to victory, to the very steps of the throne. He was obliged to choose between the faith of Rome and that of the Reformation. He decided for the former, perhaps from conviction, more probably from motives of State. He could not do otherwise than guarantee to the veteran warriors to whom he was indebted for his throne their former rights. But it was not till four years after he entered Paris that their almost imperious demands wrested from him the religious and political charter known as the Edict of Nantes. Gaspard de Schomberg, Councillor of State, the historian de Thou, the President Jeannin, Dominic De Vic, Governor of Calais, labored upon it during a year with the illustrious Protestant, de Calignon, and Henry

himself discussed the ninety-two articles with the Calvinistic deputies convoked at Nantes. It proclaimed entire freedom in religion, but proceeded to limit its exercise, on the part of Protestants, by many and burdensome restrictions. It was declared irrevocable in its nature, it was in fact transitory, insufficient for the Protestants, incomplete in its provisions, and productive of only a momentary peace. At the death of the Monarch by the hands of the assassin, the Edict which protected the liberties of the Huguenots more and more lost its power. The Protestant chiefs again resumed their arms, but after terrible conflicts, in which the genius of Cardinal Richelieu was triumphant, they lost, one after another, their fortified towns, Rochelle, Montauban, Montpellier, and Nismes. When Louis XIV. espoused Maria Therese of Spain, the extirpation of heresy was one of the clauses of the contract. A commencement was made by Cardinal Mazarine, who named a commission, taken equally from the two forms of faith, to traverse the kingdom, verify the legal title of the churches, schools and cemeteries, under the perfidious pretext of maintaining the integrity of the Edict of Nantes. This commission shut up the Protestants within the bounds the Edict had enjoined, allowing no more than that Edict had expressly mentioned. All Churches and schools which the growing numbers of Protestants demanded were forthwith suppressed. This was but the beginning of sorrows; severer forms of persecution followed, and ended in those terrible dragonnades which we have spoken of in a preceding number. The ingenuity of the tormentors seems to have been assisted by the powers of darkness. The great point to be gained was to force them to abjure their faith. Among the most intolerable forms of suffering was the privation of sleep. Sometimes the tormentors would sell to their victim the privilege of enjoying it at ten, twenty, or thirty crowns an hour. But no sooner did the purchased slumber commence, than they aroused their miserable victim with the sound of

drums. An old man of Nismes, M. de Lacassagne, tormented thus a long time by fifty dragoons, abjured in the presence of the Bishop. "Soon," says the prelate, "you will find repose." "Alas, my lord," replied the worn-out old man, "I expect repose only in heaven, and God grant its gates, should I reach them, may not be shut against me." Young mothers were bound to the posts of the conjugal bed, and reduced to the alternative of abjuring or seeing their infants perish with hunger. Some succumbed under their maternal love, and professed conversion, for the privilege of suckling their famishing babes, hoping that the infinite mercy of God would pardon the act, and pity the weakness of a mother's love.

At length the Edict which protected the Protestants of France was annulled, amidst the shouts of the Church of Rome. "Take," cried Bossuet, in his funeral oration over the Chancellor of France, at whose demand Louis XIV. cancelled the Edict, "Take your consecrated pens, ye who compose the annals of the Church! Ye swift instruments of a ready writer and a diligent hand, hasten to enrol Louis with Constantine and Theodosius. Let us send our thanksgiving to heaven, and say to this new Constantine, this new Theodosius, this new Marcien, this new Charlemagne, that which the six hundred and thirty fathers said in days of yore, in the Council of Chalcedon, 'You have confirmed the faith! You have exterminated the heretics! It is the work worthy of your reign! It is its distinguishing characteristic! Through you heresy is at an end! God alone could have effected this miracle! King of heaven protect and keep the king of the earth! It is the prayer of the Church, the prayer of its prelates.'" Medals were struck commemorating "the extinction of heresy," and at the *Hôtel de Ville* of Paris a statue of bronze was consecrated "to Louis, the Great, ever conqueror, defender of the majesty of the Church and of kings." The bas-reliefs of the plinth displayed a horrible vampire, enveloping with its large

wings the works of John Huss and of Calvin; intended, in all probability, to represent the demon bearing away the books of the Reformers.* Thenceforward there was no home for the Huguenots in France. Their pastors were exiled. Five hundred Ministers, with their staves and Bibles in hand, passed the frontiers for other lands, and were followed by five hundred thousand of their people. Protestant nations vied with each other in offering them an asylum. Amsterdam alone constructed for its new guests a thousand houses, and gave them a revenue of eighty thousand florins. William of Orange, as the King of Great Britain, created an annual revenue of twenty-five thousand pounds sterling for her soldiers, and fifteen thousand pounds for her merchants. Our own soil afforded them a hospitable asylum, and the new colony of Carolina owes not a little to these persecuted children of the Church.

Of the clergy of the Huguenot Churches of France, who migrated to these shores, we find in the authors whose works are at the head of this article, the names of at least two, especially worthy of mention. One of these is Elias Prioleau, Pastor of Pons, a small town of about four thousand inhabitants, agreeably situated on a small river called la Seugne, in Saintonge. His father, Samuel Prioleau, son of Elisha Prioleau,† *sieur de La Vienerie*, had been Pastor at Jonzac in 1637, and at Niort in 1642, and succeeded Jean Constans, a Minister of singular ability and virtue, with whom he had been associated, as colleague, for some years, and who died in 1650. The

* "In 1793," says Peyrat, "this impious bronze, melted down and transformed into canon, regenerated like France, expiated the scandal of this apotheosis while thundering against her enemies."

† So Crottet. Some American authorities make him the son of Antoine, or Antoni Prioli, who was elected Doge of Venice, in 1618 and died in 1623, and suppose that the orthography of the name was adapted to the French idiom by the son on his becoming a citizen of France.

first years of the pastorate of Samuel Prioleau were passed in tranquillity, but the state of things was changed when the clergy and the Jesuits, who had become all-powerful at the Court of Louis XIV., entered upon their schemes for abrogating the muniments which the Edict of Henry IV. had thrown around the Reformed. One after another, with considerable intervals between, its provisions were infringed, ever under the appearance of carrying the Edict into execution, till the Protestants were deprived of all means of protecting or exercising their ecclesiastical rights. These designs were zealously seconded by d'Albret, who held the seignory in this city. Under these circumstances Elias Merlat, Pastor at Saintes, made overtures for the assembling of a Synod at Pons, to concert means for removing the obstacles interposed to the exercise of the Reformed worship. It met on the 25th of June, 1667, and Prioleau filled the office of Moderator.

Meanwhile, their enemies attempted to deprive this worship, and the Pastors, of all symbols of outward dignity. The title of Pastors was denied them, and they were called simply Ministers of the pretended or self-styled reformed religion, (R. P. R.) They were prohibited from wearing their clerical robes, or to appear in long habits, outside of the houses of worship. The use of bells was forbidden except in garrisoned towns. They were forbidden to sing psalms in public, or at the execution of criminals, or on days of public rejoicing. Funerals could only take place at the break of day or in the early night, and this without any address or exhortation from the Pastor. The National and Provincial Synods were required to forbid Pastors from preaching, except in the places of their residence, cutting off thus from small congregations annexed to others the exercise of public worship.

Samuel Prioleau had permitted to escape him in the pulpit some words which showed his indignation at these procedures. These were gathered up and commented on

with no friendly spirit. Agustin Mayac, the Superior of the Convent of Franciscans, accused the worthy Pastor of speaking evil of the Vicar of Christ, and he was sent to prison. His Church on the next Sabbath assembled in great numbers, and resolved to carry their complaints to the King, through the mediation of the Marquis de Ruvigny, Deputy-General of the Church, near the King. For this purpose they appointed eight men of the congregation, of the highest respectability, all deacons in the Church, to take charge of this affair. These measures were not crowned with success. After an imprisonment of more than a year, Prioleau was condemned, in reparation of his pretended blasphemy, to pay a fine of six hundred pounds, five hundred of which went to the Franciscans for the construction of their Convent, on condition that they should pray on St. Paul's day and St. Peter's for the exaltation of the Holy Church and the Holy Father, the Pope, and should invoke the Lord for the extirpation of heresy.

The Reformed of Pons were harassed perpetually with new vexations. In August, 1678, they were forbidden to have any longer a rector to instruct their youth. The unhappy parents used all proper means of remonstrating against this decree. But it was carried into execution. The schools were destroyed, two of the mistresses of the schools, and others who resisted, were thrown into prison. The most adroit methods were resorted to to gain the pupils of both sexes to the Catholic faith. Maria d'Albret, now Countess of Marsan, founded a Convent, to whose income Louis XIV. also contributed, for the education in the Catholic faith of young girls of the Reformed religion. The conversion of children of seven years of age, by whatever means effected, was declared valid, and it was decreed that the *bastards* of Protestants, for so they called their *children*, of whatever age, belonged to the communion of Rome. The Reformed were inhibited from the holding of civil office, or pursuing any of the learned professions.

The Church of Pons was at length called upon to produce to the Council of State documentary authority for the exercise of their worship, or in default of this, to have their worship interdicted, as had been the case with a multitude of Churches in the realm. Every thing presaged evil. The church of Saintes had been attacked in broad day by a fanatic mob, its doors, windows and seats broken up, and the tiles of the roof removed. The Church of Beaumont, in the neighborhood, was annihilated, and the flocks of Bois and Clan were deprived of their shepherd. The Church of Pons obtained an order from the Provincial Synod for the union of these with their own body, and elected Elders resident in those quarters, who signed the Confession of Faith and the Discipline of the Church, in December, 1682. Two months after, this Church lost its worthy and venerable Pastor, Samuel Prioleau, who died February 17, 1683, having exercised the ministerial functions in the town of Pons for thirty-two years.

Elias Prioleau, whose history is more interesting to us, was called to occupy his father's place by the Colloquy (Presbytery) met at Bazieux on the 4th of May, 1683. With a true devotedness he entered upon the perilous work confided to him. Many of his colleagues, of the neighboring Churches, had been torn from their flocks, under various pretences. Mesnard and Orillard, Ministers of Saintes, were at La Reole, in the prisons of the Parliament of Guienne. In spite of these discouraging prospects, he did not fear to place himself at the head of a Church environed with so many rocks and dangers. He prudently strove with the Elders of the Consistory (Session) to conform to the Royal orders. Proper measures were taken to send the titles of the Church to Paris, and to deposite them with the Marquis of Châteauneuf, that they might be remitted to the Council of State. They caused, meanwhile, to be read in Church, during many consecutive Sabbaths, the act of the last Synod, which excluded from

the Supper those whom fear or worldly interests had induced to abjure the evangelical worship. They distributed *tokens* * to the communicants, which they must present on approaching the Table. Fathers offering children for baptism, and god-fathers and god-mothers, were required to present themselves to the Elders near the pulpit, before the ceremony, and establish, by certificate or otherwise, their membership in the Reformed Church. On days of communion, seven or eight hundred persons partook of the sacrament, alms and collections were abundant, and Church dues were promptly paid, and discipline strictly administered.

But difficulties thickened around this devoted Church and Minister. All the Churches of that neighborhood had been already annihilated. That of Saint Fort had been interdicted, and its fragments were united to the Church of Pons by the provincial Synod held at St. Just, November, 1683. Elders were appointed, as in the other cases, to exercise the functions of their office in that quarter. On the 10th of February, 1684, Du Vigier, Councillor of the Parliament of Bordeaux, charged to take cognizance of the infractions of the edicts and declarations of the King in the department of Saintonge, repaired to Pons, and ordered all the papers which the Consistory might possess to be delivered to him. He associated with himself two monks of the Recollets (of St. Francis), as denunciators, witnesses, parties, registrars or assessors. One, La Roussie, set himself to making extracts from all the sermons of Prioleau that he could hear of or procure, and put them into the hands of the deputy commissary, after he had spitefully distorted them. The other was Augustin Mayac, who, joining his efforts to those of his *confrere*, Du Vigier, was enabled, after an examination

* These were pieces of block tin, of the size of a *sous*, which usually bore on the obverse the comforting words—Luke xii., 22—“Fear not, little flock.”

of eight hours, to collect sixteen heads of accusation against Elias Prioleau. Behold the heinous crimes with which he was charged! "1st. That he had preached at Pons before being established there as Minister. 2d. That he had baptized an infant of Mr. Marchais, privately baptized before by Saunier, the surgeon. 3d. That he had written a letter to M. St. Hilaire, to the address of Sieur Allenet à Saint-Jean, of which the original had been sent to the office of the Commissary. 4th. That the daughters of Abraham Garnier la Crápussille had come to preaching at Pons since the abjuration of their father. 5th. That children of one named Bernard Hoste had come to the Church of Pons since their father became a Roman Catholic. 6th. That children of one named Richard Blanconnier had been conducted to preaching by their mother-in-law since the abjuration of their father. 7th. That a person named Bertin had come to preaching at Pons since the abjuration of her father, and since she herself had become Catholic. 8th. That the wife of one named Boursier, bastard of Mr. Fourestier La Brande, had come to preaching at Pons." Such is the character of the whole sixteen accusations. They could not furnish sufficient ground for a sentence against Prioleau, and he was restored to his flock.

It was, however, only to witness among them the deepest afflictions. The persecution, which had consisted in confiscation and imprisonment, now was carried out in acts of violence and barbarity. The Countess of Marsan signalized herself by an ardent fanaticism. She caused to be carried off, imprisoned, beaten, and maltreated, those who declined conversion. She caused cruelties to be inflicted on persons of every age and sex, but devoted her attention particularly to the kidnapping of children from every quarter. Many men and women succumbed, after three or four weeks in prison. Many, however, resisted successfully, and regained their liberty. Even children sometimes carried their firmness further than one could

dare to hope. Jean de Brung, an orphan, twelve years of age, persisted more than a month, though the domestics of the lady made him submit to a thousand torments. They strove above all to prevent him from praying to God. At last they bethought themselves of the expedient of lowering him with cords into the privies, where they left him suspended, threatening to leave him to die if he persevered. The memphitic vapors he was constrained to breathe wore out his patience. One, named Jacques Pascalet, shut up in the tower of Pons, was thrown into a dungeon, where he could only breathe through a hole. The domestics of the Countess contrived to have the smoke of hay and wet straw penetrate there to suffocate him, and so convert him. This kind of suffering did not destroy his courage, and they conducted him to a chamber, where they made him turn around upon a table, constructed for this purpose, to produce giddiness. This exhausted his strength, and he fell to the ground in a species of *coma*. From this he was aroused by the blows of his pitiless tormentors. He could hold out no longer, but finished by abjuring.

They complained to Du Vigier. He sent them back to the Countess. They next applied to the Parliament of Guienne, and, obtaining no satisfaction, presented their case to the King, but received no response.

Many instances of the like cruelty could be here repeated. The plan adopted by Louis XIV. or his Confessor, the Jesuit, La Chaise, was followed. Missionaries were sent to Pons, with little success. These were followed by another kind of converters. Dragoons were quartered on families, to eat out their substance, and where these failed, they resorted to those manifold tortures of the body which we have recounted elsewhere. At length, October 18, 1685, the revocation of the Edict ordained also the demolition of all the Churches in the realm—the cessation of Protestant worship—required the Ministers to leave the kingdom in fifteen days; required parents to

present their children for baptism to the priests, under the penalty of a fine of five hundred pounds. The following November, the inhabitants of Pons belonging to the Reformed religion, received information of this Edict. The greater part, fearing a continuance of these cruel persecutions, permitted themselves to sign a formula of abjuration which had been prepared in advance. Those who persisted, had the pain of seeing their children conducted to the Mass, their daughters shut up in the Convents of Pons and Saintes, and their sons educated by the Jesuits. Others prepared themselves to quit a country where they could no longer serve the Lord in spirit and truth. Prioleau could not decide to abandon his flock, which was still so dear. He braved the danger, and organized secret assemblies. The 15th of April was the most dolorous day for the Protestants who had resisted all the ordeals of persecution. The house of worship was battered down. While their enemies were laboring at its demolition, Prioleau, who had assembled the people together, addressed them a most touching discourse, which they listened to flowing down with bitter tears.

Such is the account which Crottet gives of the pastor, Elias Prioleau. He adds the following words: "From this moment we are entirely ignorant what was the fate of this faithful minister. Perhaps he was the victim of his zeal and self-devotion, and finished his days upon the galleys of Rochefort, or else, seeing that his presence was a continual danger to those who furnished him an asylum, he took the resolution of withdrawing to a foreign country. However this was, while he was at Pons he did not cease to manifest the qualities and virtues of a true servant of God."

The last conjecture of M. Crottet is right. And we are able to supply the remaining particulars in the life of Elias Prioleau, the Pastor of Pons. He emigrated to South

Carolina, probably early in 1686, bringing a considerable number of his congregation with him. He was probably the founder of the French Huguenot Church in the city of Charleston. His name, and that of his wife, Jeanne Merlat, head the list of French and Swiss refugees in Carolina, who obtained naturalization in 1698.* He married, it seems, the daughter of Elias Merlat, Pastor of Saintes, before mentioned. There are said to be manuscript copies of the productions of Elias Prioleau existing among his descendants, delivered in France as early as 1677, which are characterized by great doctrinal purity, deep piety, elegance of diction, and vigor of mind. Elias Prioleau, the Huguenot Pastor, has left behind him numerous descendants in South Carolina, who cherish his memory and emulate his virtues.†

The Church of Pons was annihilated. It had neither temple nor pastor. The greater part of its members had feigned a conversion far from their hearts. It was in this melancholy situation that they received a long letter from their co-religionists of Saintonge, who had left all, that they might go to a foreign country to find that freedom to worship God denied them in France. This epistle is addressed "To our brethren who groan under the captivity of Babylon, to whom we desire peace and mercy on the part of God."

* A copy of this list is in our possession, entitled "Liste des François et Swisses Refugez au Caroline qui souhaitent d'e [tre] naturalizes Anglois." It was discovered in a parcel of old papers belonging to Henry de St. Julien, who died seventy years of age, in 1758 or 9, and was the youngest son of Peter de St. Julien, mentioned in the list. From a family Bible, still in existence, it appears that a child, whose name is given in the list, was born May, 1694, and died Sept., 1695.

† It was not till Crottet saw Weiss's "French Refugees" that he could satisfy himself as to the fate of Elias Prioleau. He immediately instituted a correspondence with America, through the intervention of some mercantile friends, by whom at length he was put in correspondence with Daniel Ravenel, Esq., of Charleston, who is a lineal descendant of Elias Prioleau, through his maternal ancestors, to whom we are indebted for a copy of the "Liste" above mentioned.

It is a letter full of affectionate advice and faithful rebuke, uttered in eloquence of language and deep sincerity. We imagine it to have been penned by Elias Prioleau, though we have no certain evidence that this is the fact. "We exhort you," say they, "to think seriously with yourselves, and to consider what you will have to answer Him who has ordered you to confess Him before men, if you desire Him to do you the honor of confessing you and acknowledging you before God and before His angels. How can you stand before the seat and tribunal of Him who has commanded you to abandon goods, possessions, houses, wives, fathers, and children, because of His name, promising to restore you a hundred fold? Can you tell Him you have resisted to blood, striving against sin? What have been your sufferings in comparison with those of our Lord Jesus Christ? What can you think when you read these words: 'Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness sake'? You can have no part in this blessedness, since you have renounced righteousness to exempt yourselves from persecution. What can you answer those holy Apostles who have preached to the world a gospel of tears, who have all died in martyrdom, and have prepared their disciples for persecution? What can you answer to our Reformers, who have spared neither vigils, nor sweat, nor blood, to draw us from idolatry and superstition? What have you to say to those happy martyrs, whose children you are, who, for the cause you have lightly abandoned, have suffered the prison, racks, fire, and the most cruel tortures? They have been buried, often for years, in dungeons full of mire, impurities, toads and serpents. Drawn thence, they have made them pass through the fire, have scorched their feet and hands, have taken them alive from the fire, that they might prolong their punishment. Still alive, when they saw their entrails coming forth from their scorched integuments, in the midst of these torments, instead of renouncing God's truth, they blessed His name

and chanted His praises. What can you say to those great workmen, who by their pious travails have raised up this glorious work of the Reformation, which you in one moment have let fall to the earth? How can you bear the reproaches of your happy ancestors, whose goods have been pillaged, who have been persecuted beyond all endurance, and who have transmitted the pure Gospel to their children? In the name of God, my very dear brethren, consider your fault in all its extent, and cry, with a holy compunction of heart, 'Now, brethren, what shall we do?' Your conscience in chains demands for you counsel, and we proceed to give it.

"First, then, be aware of the great peril in which you are. It is that of abandoning God with the heart, after having renounced him with the mouth: for it often happens that God abandons to their reprobate minds those who have had the baseness to betray their conscience.

"At first it will appear to you hard to assist at a service so opposed to yours; the sight of the images before which you see the brutish and the superstitious prostrate themselves, will give you pain; you will endure with difficulty the barbarous language in which you will hear litanies chanted to the honor of creatures, and the dishonor of their Creator; you will suffer yet more when you assist at what they call the sacrifice of the Mass, where they will make you adore the bread; but it is to be feared that, by little and little, you will accustom yourself to all this; that at first you will say, I do not believe in it, and this is enough; that in the end you will find it less bad, and come to regard idolatries as simple superstitions, which are neither good nor evil. It is infallible that this way conducts you to the contempt and hatred of the truth, and from this infallibly to hell: for it is the sin against the Spirit, which will be pardoned neither in this world nor in that to come." We forbear further extracts. This letter, conveyed secretly into all the houses of the Reformed in Pons, whom the fear of tor-

ture had induced to renounce a worship to which they were still attached in the depth of their hearts, moved their consciences. They deplored with tears the weakness which had separated them from the profession of the truth, and took the generous resolution of showing, by imposing upon themselves the greatest sacrifices, that they were the true disciples of Jesus Christ. They organized themselves into secret assemblies, and Crottet has found and given in full one of the prayers composed to be used on these occasions, which breathes a spirit of the deepest humiliation and contrition for their great sin. They now endured imprisonment with fortitude. Many, who persisted in assembling for prayer, were conducted to prison, and condemned to the galleys, as galley-slaves for life. Multitudes left their country, under divers disguises, and emigrated to the Isles of Jersey and of Guernsey, to England, Ireland, Scotland, the North of Germany, and North America. Many parents, to prevent their children from being taken from them and brought up in a false religion, sent them to foreign lands. Two gentlemen of Pons sent each four of their daughters to England, sending them on board the vessel in empty casks, to escape detection.

The people were, at length, deprived of all their Ministers and all the means of education. It was not wonderful if, under these circumstances, and under the irritation of terrible persecutions, there should spring up, in the absence of a clergy who had always inculcated submission to the Government, the spirit of resistance. This, especially, manifested itself in the most southern portion of France. De Baviile, who was the Supreme Administrator of the Province, became known—in the language of the populace—as “the King of Languedoc,” and he was the terror and horror of that unhappy people. Exasperated with their obstinacy, he would ferret out their places of secret convocation, surround them with his troops, charge upon them sabre in hand, or fire into their

crowded assemblies with a discharge of musketry. The most notable of the prisoners were hung on the nearest trees, and others sent to the galleys, where they were chained to their oar-benches in perpetual bondage. At the commencement of the eighteenth century there had been two thousand of these convicts, and among them men of gentle blood and Ministers of Christ, who were more severely treated than highway robbers.

Du Chayla, Inspector of Missions, tore away the beard and eyelids of his victims with pincers, placed live coals in their hands and pressed their fingers together with violence, or covered them with cotton saturated with oil, which he set on fire, and kept burning till the flesh was consumed to the bone. He arrested, on one occasion, a troop of fugitives, and put them in irons, among whom were two young women, of the first families. At ten in the morning of the 24th of July, 1702, forty or fifty men, chanting psalms of praise, knocked at his gate, having come as avengers of blood. They first penetrated to the dungeons of the strong-hold he occupied as his parsonage, and released the prisoners, whom they found swollen through their whole bodies, their bones half broken and unable to sustain them. The abbe Du Chayla attempted to repulse the assailants with a discharge of musketry. One of them was slain. The others set fire to the house, seized the priest, led before him his victims, showed him their contused and mangled members and bodies, and, after this terrible act of accusation, put him to death. Fifty-two wounds were found on his dead body. Thus began the war of the Camisards.

It was different, wholly, from the struggles which had preceded it. In those the gentlemen of France were engaged—under experienced leaders—on tented fields and in regular battles. This was a war of peasants, ignorant of the art of war, without arms—except such as they wrested from their enemies—and obliged to sell their lives

dearly behind the rocks and thickets of their mountains. In the Vivarais, in the high and lower Cevennes, amid their naked peaks—their bristling crests—their horrid precipices—"the image of a world tumbling to ruins and perishing with old age"—they found their strong-holds. The caverns of the mountains served them for granaries, magazines, stables, hospitals, powder-mills, arsenals, and armories. Their government was a military theocracy. For purposes of military discipline, there were captains of tens, of fifties and hundreds. Their chiefs were prophets, acting, as they believed, under a Divine inspiration. Their God was Jehovah; their temple, Mount Zion; their camp, the camp of the Eternal; their people, the children of God. The Church of Rome was Babylon, its priests the priests of Baal; their tyrant, Pharaoh. Religion was their solace; desert and solitary places, sanctified by their tears, and often by their blood, were their temples of worship. All acts of theft and cruelty were punished with the utmost severity. On the field of battle the orders of their leaders were regarded as inspired by God. Their captain, Cavalier, sword in hand, was every where present on the field of death, encouraging, animating his brethren, giving forth the most surprising orders, which were executed with unquestioning confidence, and crowned with surprising success. They believed themselves to hear the Word of God, and went into conflict as if clad with iron. Boys of twelve or fourteen years of age fought like veterans, striking as they could to the right and left. Those who had neither sabre nor musket, did execution with clubs and slings, and the hail of bullets which whistled around their ears, and pierced their hats and sleeves, was not regarded. Their number was never more than ten thousand, but they had a good understanding with many who did not join their ranks, who, by preconcerted signals, warned them of the approach of their enemies, and gave them time for concealment in their impenetrable fast-

nesses. This was continued from 1702 to 1704, but, at length, their leaders accepted conditions of peace, and their struggles were brought to an end.

There now arose a new order of Pastors, who took the place of those whom cruel death or foreign exile had removed from them, the "pasteurs sous la Croix," or "pasteurs du désert;" "pastors beneath the Cross," or "pastors of the desert." *The desert* was a vague term which the Protestants of this period used to conceal the true places from which they wrote, or to designate, in general, their persecuted Church. An attempt was now made, by a man of intrepid courage, wonderful vigor of mind and body, consummate prudence and tact, incorruptible integrity, and surprising knowledge of human nature, united with an agreeable amenity of manners, to reorganize the Huguenot Church. Antony Court deserves the name of Restorer of Protestantism in France. At the age of seventeen years he began to preach to the Churches of the desert. He was endowed by nature with remarkable gifts of eloquence, and, without the advantages of early education, he acquired, during a life of constant study and toil, rare erudition on the many topics to which his attention was directed. Even at this early age he conceived the plan of reorganizing the Churches. To four points did he direct his efforts—to repress the disorders of those who pretended to be inspired; to collect regular religious assemblies; to restore the government of Consistories, Colloquies and Synods; to raise up young Ministers, who should undertake the work of preaching the Gospel amid scaffolds and gibbets, in the spirit of martyrs. In all these things he was wonderfully successful. He traveled through the country, gathering the adherents of the truth together in desolate and hidden places. At first he was able to collect but six, ten or twelve persons, in some gap in the rocks, in some remote barn or open meadow; but at last he had the pleasure of meeting, some-

times, ten thousand souls for the worship of God. Their assemblies were held at night, under the shadow of rocks, or in caves and dens of the earth. A system of secret intelligence prevailed. Letters were addressed to third persons of approved fidelity, and the names of those for whom they were destined concealed in anagrams hard to decipher. Notices of meetings were sent by chosen messengers from place to place, and whispered from one to another. Experienced guides conducted the Ministers, at night, by adventurous and secret routes, concealed often under ingenious disguises, to the place of convocation. Sentinels placed upon the heights, at different distances, watched the approach of troops, upon whom Protestants in the towns and cities continually kept their eye, that they might convey to their brethren information of their movements. The ministers changed their abode each night, and no sufferings to which their adherents were exposed could prevail for their betrayal.

For the education of Ministers for the scattered flock, he established an institution at Lausanne, in Switzerland, which became one of unspeakable importance to the persecuted Church. To sustain it he raised subscriptions in Switzerland, England, Holland, and Germany. He searched out young men who were willing to take upon themselves, to use his own language, the vocation of martyrdom. From the plough, the shops of artisans and merchants, and from any source whence he could draw devoted and talented youth, he gathered them, sent them to Lausanne, and provided for their support till they were prepared for their work, and were initiated into their arduous, dangerous vocation as "Pastors of the desert." It was this Academy at Lausanne which saved the Protestants of France. It continued in existence for three-quarters of a century, and was closed by Napoleon in 1809, who transferred its theological faculty to Montauban. In 1740 this Seminary sent into Saintonge several of its young *Proposans*,

or *Candidates*, who reorganized, secretly, several Churches, and were followed, in 1744, by regular Ministers of the Gospel. In 1745 they received from the same institution three others, Du Bessé, Gounon, called also Pradon, and Jean Louis Gibert. These last three Pastors had no permanent abode. Always on horseback, they itinerated through the cities, towns and villages. After the fatigues of the day they would claim the hospitality of Protestant families known by their zeal, and it was always accorded to them with the liveliest alacrity.

The Protestants of Pons, who had survived the persecutions, were animated with new courage by the presence of these faithful servants of God. At the suggestion of Louis Gibert, who did not cease to visit and electrify them by his warm exhortations, they constituted themselves secretly into a Church. But already the attention of their infuriated enemies had been attracted to this religious revival, and they hastened to take measures for arresting its progress. The three zealous Pastors, and above all Gibert, who seemed the most formidable, were denounced to the magistrates. A price was set upon the head of this eminent Pastor, and the Bishop of Saintes neglected no means by which he might fall into his hands.

The following recital is given by Crottet, taken word for word from a register of baptisms and marriages of the Parish of St. Martin, in which it was inserted, without foreseeing that it would ever come forth from the sacristy, to show the infamous ambushade prepared by the chief of the diocese to take the unhappy Minister by surprise :

“Towards the month of May, 1754, there came to establish himself at Pons, with his wife, a man named Syntier, who appeared to be a person of some consideration. M. Syntier seemed at first a zealous Protestant; he would have no communication with the Catholics, not even for the articles of merchandize for which he had need. The Protestants of Pons gave him their confidence. His wife was brought to bed the beginning of November, and not having brought her infant to the Church, the undersigned, Curate, went with Mr.

Parossier, his vicar, to M. Syntier. He was not to be found. The lady, who was beginning to get about, presented herself, and said her infant was baptized by these gentlemen. The Curate made his affidavit at the Clerk's office, and in consequence of this, the procureur fiscal sent to tell M. Syntier to carry his child to the Church. The next day M. Syntier presented a letter to the Curate from M. the Bishop. It was dated November 18, 1754, and couched in the following terms: '*I have important reasons, Monsieur, to desire that you should not press M. Syntier, your parishioner, to take his child to Church to receive baptism; I pray you, then, to take no further measures in relation to it for three weeks. If the infant is in danger, I have confidential persons who are on the watch, and who will take care to anticipate the time, so as to avoid all accidents. I have the honor, &c.*' Upon this the Curate remained quiet. M. Syntier caused his child to be baptized by a minister. He prayed the minister to dine with him the next day. But the Protestants began to suspect M. Syntier. They saw him make frequent journeys to Saintes. The minister refused to dine with him. In the night M. Syntier had sent to advertise the cavaliers of the marshalsea of St. Genis, by a kind of soldier whom he called his brother-in-law, and who had lived with him about two months. The cavaliers arrived at early dawn at the inn of Petit St. Jean, near the Cross of St. Vivien. A moment after, the minister passed on horseback, accompanied by two persons. The cavaliers mounted promptly and pursued the minister. They overtook him at the cross-road which conducted to Chardon. Those who accompanied the minister put themselves on the defensive, fired upon them, and they, in return, killed one, who was a gentleman of Sainte-Foy. They took another, but at the commencement of the combat the minister escaped upon a gallop, and they were unable to apprehend him. The horsemen charged upon his horse, and garroted another, who was a deacon. They passed by Coudenne and the fair-ground, to conduct him to Saintes. M. Syntier and his brother-in-law went on to identify them. The cavaliers made the semblance of removing to a distance from them, but the Protestants were not deceived. They regarded M. Syntier as a spy. Suddenly M. Syntier and his brother-in-law withdrew, and appeared no more at Pons. Some days after, Madame Syntier also went, escorted by the cavaliers of the marshalsea. It is said that they retired to Rochelle, and there had their child baptized.

"The better to put the Protestants on the wrong scent, some days before this scene, the cavaliers came to M. Syntier's, and seemed to be making diligent search for the child, to take him to Church, but did not find it. The time of the visit was doubtless known. They had sent the infant away, and the cavaliers could not find it.

(Signed)

"FORGET,

"Curate of Sainte Martin de Pons."

M. Crottet had learned from other sources that the night before Jean Louis Gibert's arrival at Pons he slept at the house of an Elder of the Church of Gemozac, by the name of Bugeaud. The gentleman who accompanied him was the Count de Grâce, who was actively employed in establishing the Churches. On leaving Pons, this last had forced Louis Gibert, whose useful ministry he appreciated, to change horses with him. They did not seek to resist the horsemen sent in their pursuit. They refused simply to stop when commanded to do so, and it was then that the balls of the horsemen struck the unfortunate gentleman who rode the horse which had been described to them as the horse of the Minister. This odious attempt discouraged neither the Pastor nor the flock. At the commencement of 1755, Louis Gibert reappeared at Pons, and assembled the scattered members of this ancient Church at the wood of Merlet, in the parish of Tanzac. This reunion was fatal to some who assisted at it, who were seized and conducted to the prison of Rochelle. M. Thomas de Riollet, one of them, who filled the office of Elder, composed during his imprisonment a short address to encourage his brethren at Pons, from which Crottet gives extracts.*

There is another scene, equally if not more striking, which shows the courage and conduct of this noble Pastor of the desert, who ended his days and whose descendants still live in South Carolina.

“The depth of the woods, out-of-the-way places, caverns of the rocks, or the shores of the ocean, served them as temples. It was in these last retreats that they assembled of choice, for there the cruel persecutors could with difficulty hear their songs and prayers, which were drowned by the solemn voice of the winds and waves. Often, by the feeble light of the torch, did they there listen in pious

* Crottet, page 168.

meditation to the reading of the Word of God, which had become their only treasure, or to the touching recitals of the sufferings, firmness, and courageous death of their distant brethren. In spite of the danger, it was sufficient only to announce the presence of a Pastor in a particular place, to see the scattered members of the neighboring Churches run thither. One of the last and most remarkable of these reunions of the desert took place under the ministry of Louis Gibert. One or two days before the appointed time, many of the Reformed arrived from the most distant parts of Saintonge. A generous hospitality was accorded them in the dwellings of the Protestants living near, and of Catholics who had never approved the severity with which they had been treated. But it was not till the next day, and the day of the Assembly, that the mass of the faithful arrived. The richer were borne on little vehicles, or mounted on horses. The others had accomplished long journeys on foot. Gibert, the intrepid Gibert, on whose head a price was always set, was not tardy in reaching his numerous flock. He escaped the pursuit of his enemies, a few days later, only by hiding under the straw, at the house of an Elder of La Salle, named Guillot. To avoid all surprise, it was agreed that they should hold the service, as usual, at night, in the heart of the forest of Velleret, in a place where there was a wide space, called still by the inhabitants, the Combe de la Bataille, in memory, doubtless, of some ancient battle with the English. All was arranged for the celebration of worship. They carried thither the different pieces which composed the pulpit of the desert. This was placed between two oaks. The communion table was arranged in the enclosure of the Consistory, or the place reserved for the Elders. Seven flambeaus, placed at intervals, shed a feeble light over seven or eight thousand persons grouped together in pious meditation. A moment after these preparations, the Pastor, escorted by certain of the faithful, armed for his

defence, ascended the pulpit clad in his ecclesiastical habit. Their arms were then laid aside. At the invitation of Louis Gibert the assembly sang the 84th Psalm, whose words were so appropriate to their present circumstances. But the solemn chant, which reëchoed with such clearness during the silence of the night, gave the alarm to certain enemies of the Gospel, who, suspecting some assembly, were prowling about to discover the place the Protestants had chosen. They hastened towards the Combe de la Bataille, having at their head Bernard, Governor (Tutor) of Prince Camille, of Pons. Gibert did not allow himself to be disconcerted by their presence. He ordered, from the pulpit, that they should seize their persons, disarm them, and place them in the Consistory, that they might convince themselves that their assemblies had no other object than the worship of God. The services then continued without interruption. A considerable number of children, brought from places the most distant, were baptized. Young people of both sexes, who had been instructed by the Elders in the truths of the Gospel, were received into the membership of the persecuted Church, and many marriages were blessed (celebrated). Gibert, in a discourse full of faith and life, touched the hearts of his numerous auditors, and it was while shedding tears of gratitude they took part in the sacrament of the Supper, which some of them had been deprived of for a long time. The meeting continued nearly five hours. Those who had assisted at it then resumed their journey homewards, blessing the Lord for the holy joys he had vouchsafed. But all had not the good fortune to reach their homes in safety. Some had to submit on the way to many persecutions of the enemies of the Gospel, chiefly on the part of the Lord of Semussac and Monsieur Labbé, Captain of the Coast Dragoons. This last, a gentleman of Talmont, slew with his own hand a married lady of La Jaille. The widow Larente, who accompanied her, would have shared the same fate if the

sword of this fanatic had not broken against her corset. This circumstance saved her life." *

After these events, we find this indefatigable Minister still active. He encouraged the Protestants of Pons to secure to themselves a house of worship. They accomplished this by purchasing two houses adjoining each other, removing the separating wall and arranging the interior for religious service. He stimulated the faithful of Saint-Seurin and de Mortagne to construct also a place of worship. This they did, but it was demolished by their persecutors in 1768. He also established a school at Biziterie for Protestant children. Still later we find him engaged in constructing a church at Gemozac. These churches were often barns, at other times dwelling-houses, converted to purposes of religion.† But the Intendant of Rochelle, de Baillon, Councillor of State, ordered all such to be demolished. Martin Pasdejue, of Arvert, for disposing of his granges, or barns, at Avallon, for this purpose, was condemned to perpetual imprisonment in a Convent.‡ Soon there followed a judgment against the Pastor who had occupied the post of danger. A sentence was passed§

* Crottet.

† In the year 1756, the troops which passed by Pons and Gemozac took possession of their houses of religious assembly. On this occasion Gibert addressed a letter to his different Churches, dated May the 3d, 1756, which is given by Crottet, in which he counsels them, out of the love they bear their King, to submit to this oppression, and to meet in their private dwellings for the worship of God; and, for this purpose, to subdivide their congregations as much as convenience may demand. He exhorts them not to spread hangings and tapestries on the ninth of the following month, in honor of the God of the Church or Rome. "Your God is in the Heavens," says the Psalmist, "where he doeth according to His will, and is jealous of His own glory." The Reformed of Gemozac, says Crottet, conformed to the invitation of Louis Gibert, and though there were two companies of dragoons in Gemozac, they spread nothing in front of their houses. Each householder was fined six livres, afterwards reduced one-half, which was placed in the hands of the Church Wardens, to repair the roof of the Catholic Church.—*Crottet*, 221.

‡ Coquerel, II., 228. Also, *Lett. du Past. Etienne Gibert*, in Coquerel, p. 363.

§ July 14, 1756.

by the same Intendant against the Minister, Gibert, "duly held and convicted of having performed the functions of Minister for many years in the province of Saintonge; with having convoked and held assemblies of religionists; with having preached; celebrated the Supper, baptisms and marriages." He was condemned to the gibbet after submitting to this singular procedure. He must be conducted to the principal gate of the Church of Saint Bartholomew, "and there, with head uncovered, on his knees, say and declare, in a loud and intelligible voice, that he had wickedly, and as ill-advised, performed the aforesaid functions of the ministry, to the prejudice of the ordinances of his Majesty." The nephew of the Minister, Stephen Gibert, must assist at the execution of his uncle, and then be conducted to the gallies. The Protestants, Gentelot de Sainte-Foy, and Belrieu de la Grâce, convicted of having accompanied the Minister Gibert, nightly, and of having menaced, with their pistols, the cavaliers who would seize them, were condemned to prison, and Andrew Bonfils was banished. Happily, the persons accused had fled. De Belrieu had died. "His memory must abide suppressed." The Intendant did not fail to take possession of their goods, not being able to seize their persons. This accounts for the note of Paul Rabaut in his journal: "The Pastor, Gibert, is exposing himself greatly in Saintonge." The courageous and zealous Minister survived a long time this barbarous sentence.*

Despairing, however, of finding liberty of worship in his own land, he conceived the project, which could hardly be universally carried into execution, of an extensive expatriation of his fellow-worshippers to foreign countries. His plan was to make this known at Versailles, to show that the way was open, and to hold it up in terror to the Government if the persecutions should recommence.

* Coquerel, II., pp. 228, 229.

Gibert, in the year 1763, left France for England, and negotiated with the English Government for the transportation of colonists to Carolina. His memorial was read in Council July 6, 1763, praying for a tract of thirty square miles on the eastern bank of the Savannah, between Purisburg and Fort Moore. This memorial was for substance granted. By correspondence with his friends in various provinces in France, two hundred and twelve persons, having hastily converted their effects into money, commenced their travels in small numbers from Languedoc, Hainault, and Montrevel, and from the River Loire, pursuing their way in secret, and often by night. On the 2d of August they reach their vessel, and after a stormy passage arrive in England, and collect at their rendezvous at Plymouth. On January 25th, 1764, they set sail from Plymouth, and are twice driven back. On the 22d of February they set sail once more, and on the 14th of April land at Charleston, and are accommodated in barracks furnished by the town. They took the oath of allegiance on the 18th of April, three days after their arrival, at which time their bounty lands, varying from three hundred to one hundred acres each, were assigned them. His Majesty, George III., had taken them under his particular protection, supported them from his privy purse, and ordered that they should be provided for on their arrival. They were to be settled on a township of the best unoccupied land, and absolved from quit-rents for ten years. They sent up a party to explore the country and select a site for a town, who soon returned to make their report. In July, two parties of the settlers set out from Charleston, and reached the place of their destination, in Abbeville District (which was named from Abbeville in France). Another party reached the spot in November. A township was surveyed for them by Patrick Calhoun, including twenty-six thousand acres on both sides of Little River, with a town of eight hundred acres, which they called New Bor-

deaux, after Bordeaux in France, from which some of them came. A palisade fort * was also erected, overlooking the town, as a protection from the Indians, and vineyard lots of four acres each were laid out in the vicinity.

The settlement was commenced under Rev. Mr. Boutiton, one of their pastors, Mr. Gibert having remained some months in Charleston and its vicinity. This Mr. Boutiton was the brother-in-law of Jean Louis Gibert, and officiated, at least occasionally, in clerical services. Mr. Gibert appears, however, to have been regarded as their spiritual leader. They had a regular organized Church, kept a baptismal registry, and faithfully maintained religious worship. Their beloved and noble leader, Jean Louis Gibert, the well-known and distinguished "Pastor of the desert," died in August, 1773, aged fifty-one. His life, though not long, was an eventful one, characterized with great energy and devoted zeal. To have braved the bitter persecutions of malignant enemies for so many years—to have sustained the faith of the afflicted children of "the Church beneath the Cross" in his own native land—to have escaped the snares laid for him there—to have transplanted a colony of those persecuted saints in the American wilderness, where their descendants still reside, and to have watched over this colony during the first years of its existence—was accomplishing far more than falls ordinarily to the most chosen servants of God. The choice library which he brought with him shows his cultivated tastes. It was distributed, after his death, among his descendants, and though his manuscripts, and many valuable volumes, have perished, enough yet remain as memorials of a man to be had in long remembrance. He left a widow and three small children, a son and two daughters. The son died unmarried. His youngest daughter, Louise, who was about six years old at her father's death, married William Peti-

* Fort Bonne.

gru, and was the mother of Capt. Thomas Petigru, of the United States Navy, recently deceased, and of Hon. James L. Petigru, of Charleston, whose family are the only lineal descendants of the Rev. J. L. Gibert. The other daughter married Mr. Thomas Finley, and died leaving an infant son, John Louis. He grew up a young man of great promise, but died while a student of the South Carolina College, and his remains were recently removed by the students of that College to the Elmwood Cemetery, near Columbia, out of respect to an honorable family, and to that distinguished "Pastor of the Desert," of "the Church under the Cross," JEAN LOUIS GIBERT. His nephew, [according to Coquerel, but "his brother," according to Moragne,*] Etienne Gibert, who was also educated at Lausanne, migrated to England, and was Minister of the Chapel Royal. A volume of his sermons, and a book of criticisms on the writings of Voltaire, were there published. Another nephew, Pierre Gibert, was taken to England by Etienne Gibert, and there partially educated. He was brought to this country by his uncle, and became an Elder of the Church at Hopewell, and subsequently of the Church at Willington, and was for several years a member of the Legislature of South Carolina. Another, Simon Gibert, we have met with in history, as Pastor of Bas Languedoc, in France. Peter Gibert was a patriot of the revolution, and is still represented by numerous descendants, among whom are three Ministers of the Gospel in the Presbyterian Church.

* We are indebted for the American history of this family to the excellent address of W. C. Moragne, Esq., delivered at New Bordeaux, Nov. 11, 1854, being the ninetieth anniversary of the arrival of the French Protestants at that place.

ARTICLE II.

THE RESURRECTION-BODY.

A little child receives its father's teachings with unquestioning faith. Its own love is a guarantee of the parent's; and the parent's love is the guarantee of truth. Nor is its trustful axiom, "Whatever my father says is true," in the least impaired, when, after a year or two of progressive knowledge, it begins to ask, "In what sense is it true? and with what limitations?" for, in process of time, it discovers that what was perfectly true to its infantile conception, is not all the truth to be discerned by its maturer reason.

The Church of God, which was once a little child in the knowledge of physics and psychology, though less so, perhaps, than our boastful moderns maintain, and which ought never to be otherwise in spirit, sustains very nearly such a relation to the precious doctrine of the body's final resurrection. Our Heavenly Father told us, long since, in the infancy of our faith, not to be afraid of death,—that it is not what, to the eye of flesh, it seems to be, the end of our bodily being,—that it is only a "sleep," and that after a certain period of repose passed in the grave, these same bodies shall awake to light and to immortal life. Or, if this is not taught in so many words, *it seems to be*; for this is the substance of this teaching, when interpreted according to its first and most obvious meaning. Now, we believe what he says; we believe every word of it; and the more earnest our love, the more firm our faith; but, remembering the rule of our opening childhood, and remembering, too, that language is to be rightly interpreted only by its evident intentions, we are inclined, after having made some little progress in knowledge, to pause and ask, In what

sense is his language true? and with what limitations? Shall we understand it as we did in the simplicity of the world's childhood? Or, conscious that, though children, yet we are, as a generation, "older than our fathers," and possessed of knowledge which they had not, shall we compare this truth with other truths given to us, and thus modify our former conceptions? *All truth* is of God.

We shall better understand the posture of the subject by taking a rapid survey of its history. The doctrine of the resurrection,—one of the sweetest to the pious in prospect of death, and one of the most comforting to those who lay their loved ones in the grave,—is peculiar to the Sacred Scriptures, and belongs almost exclusively to the New Testament. The earliest announcement of it, in such terms as to leave no doubt of its import, is to be found in the language of "the evangelical prophet," where he says (Is. 26 : 19): "The dead even shall live; together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust; for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead." The next, and only other satisfactory passage, in the Old Testament, is in the Book of Daniel (12 : 2): "Many of them [or, the multitude of them] that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake; some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." It will no doubt be painful to many to learn that the celebrated passage in Job 19 : 25–27, beginning with "I know that my Redeemer liveth," and constituting a part of the impressive burial service of the Church of England, cannot be relied upon as a proof text on this subject, since it is given up by the great body of learned men (including Calvin, Grotius, Le Clerc, Patrick, Warburton, Eichhorn, Jahn, and many others,) as not touching the doctrine of the resurrection at all. It is a remarkable fact, and worthy of note by the biblical student, that throughout the Pentateuch and the historical books, not the first allu-

sion to the general resurrection occurs.* What ideas may have been excited by the bodily translations of Enoch and Elijah, or whether any ideas whatever on the subject were entertained for the three thousand years preceding Isaiah's day, we have no means of judging.

Between the close of the Old Testament canon, however, and the opening of the New, the doctrine of a partial, if not a general, resurrection, seems to have become deeply rooted in the minds of the people. We find traces of this fact in a postscript to the Book of Job in the Septuagint, dating at least two hundred and fifty years before Christ: "But it is written that he shall rise again with those whom the Lord raises." Also, in 2d Maccabees, 7 : 14, (written about one hundred and fifty years before Christ, concerning current events,) where one of the seven brothers, martyred by Antiochus, is represented as saying to him, "It is good, being put to death by men, to look for hope from God to be raised up again by Him: as for thee, thou shalt have no resurrection to life."

The Jews of our Saviour's day were divided in their opinions. The Sadducees, who professed to be guided in their faith by the plain letter of Scripture, without regard to traditional interpretations, and particularly to believe in the writings of Moses, who says nothing on this subject, rejected utterly, or at least disputed, the doctrine of the resurrection; while the Pharisees, who professed to believe in "the resurrection of *the just*," (to the exclusion, it would seem, of the resurrection of the wicked,) held at the same time such gross opinions about the continuance in another world of the relations existing in this, as to expose themselves to the just ridicule of their opponents.

In the teaching of our Saviour and his Apostles this doc-

* This does not consist with the declaration of our Lord, quoted by the author himself (see below, page 488), from Luke 20 : 37—"Now that the dead are raised, even Moses shewed at the bush," etc., etc.—[Eds. S. P. R.]

trine occupies so prominent a place that it has constituted an article of faith in every Christian Church from that day to the present. Most of the Churches have contented themselves with using the language of the Apostles' Creed, "I believe in * * * * the resurrection of the dead." Others, however, go farther. The Heidelberg Catechism, published in 1563, says, "*My body* [or, my flesh] also being raised by the power of Christ, shall be united with my soul, and be like the glorious body of Christ." The Synod of Dort, in 1618, representing the Churches of the United Provinces, and of England, Scotland, Switzerland, and other countries, expressed themselves thus: "For all the dead shall be raised out of the earth, and their souls joined and united with *their proper bodies*, in which they formerly lived." But by no Church has the doctrine been enunciated with greater fullness and precision than our own, both in the Confession of Faith and in the Larger Catechism. In the first of these (Chap. 32, Art. 2) it is said, "At the last day, such as are alive shall not die, but be changed; and all the dead shall be raised up *with the self-same bodies, and none other, although with different qualities*, which shall be united again with their souls for ever."

With these time-honored decisions of the Church, Christians generally have appeared to be content. Occasionally, however, men of restless minds, dissatisfied with the grounds on which these decisions have been based, and stimulated by new discoveries, real or supposed, in the physical sciences, have called in question the sense in which we are to understand the Bible doctrine of the resurrection. Among these, the most distinguished for ability, and at the same time for failure, is the late eminent Prof. Bush. In the years 1844 and 1845 he put forth two books ("Anastasis" and "The Soul"), in which he endeavored to prove, first by a "Rational Argument" and then from the Scriptures, that there is to be expected *no resurrection*, either general or particular, in the usually received accep-

tation of the term—that the body to be reunited with the soul, in the future state, is not, *in any sense*, the one committed to the grave, but that it is the psyche (*ψυχή*) or psychical body “which constitutes the inner essential vitality of our present bodies, and lives again in another world, *because it cannot die*,”—that this physical body *is not raised up* from the grave, but is “developed, by a natural law, from the material body at death,”—and that what we are to expect in the resurrection is, not a change to take place at the end of the world, but that at the instant of each person’s death the psyche, or vital principle, “which conjointly (with the intelligence) constitute the essence of the man,” goes forth from the body. The scheme of the unfortunate philosopher was, however, so gross a departure from the manifest teachings of that volume on which the pious rely more confidently than on any deductions of mere reason, that few persons, except himself, appear to have been led away by his error. The theory has in a great measure died with its author.

And yet the agreement among Christians upon this interesting point is more seeming than real. The main doctrine, that there is to be a final, general resurrection, is conceded by many as a plain teaching of Revelation, as well as of the Church catholic; while the question, “With what body shall we come?” involving largely the substance of the main doctrine, is still discussed with great diversity of opinion. Indeed, a close examination of the terms, quoted from the above cited Confessions, will reveal the fact that, admitting, with perfect sincerity, their authority, both theological and exegetical, their indefiniteness is such (perhaps intentionally) as to admit of widely different interpretations.

An ancient Pharisee, for instance, might have said, in the language of the Heidelberg Catechism, *I believe that our bodies being raised shall be united with our souls*; or, in the language of the Synod of Dort, *“The dead shall be raised*

out of the earth, and their souls joined and united with their proper bodies, in which they formerly lived," or, in the language of our own Confession, "*The dead shall be raised with the self-same bodies, and none other;*" and yet it is well known that they held some grave errors in connection, which our Saviour in part corrected, when he said to his disciples, "the children of the resurrection neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God." The grosser forms of this error have long since disappeared from the Church; still its germ manifestly exists, and exhibits itself under many refined, though it may not be harmless, forms.

A second phase in popular opinion has been brought about by modern discoveries in physiology. A few generations back, no one conceived the possibility of a person's having more than one body during his earthly life. But the fact is now universally familiar, that we change our bodies as we do our garments, only not quite so suddenly or so perceptibly; and that in the course of the three-score and ten years allotted to man, the change may occur as many as ten times. The question, therefore, has arisen, *Which of these TEN complete bodies is to be THE body raised up at the last day?*

If it is replied, the last one worn, then there arise other difficulties. This "last body" is known in some instances to enter into the composition of other "last bodies." A ship's crew, for instance, are driven to the horrid necessity of cannibalism. In the course of a few days, one of the men, whose body is composed in part of the "last body" of his comrade, falls a second victim. The process is continued; and finally the remainder of the crew, whose bodies are composed of the compound and recompounded bodies of those devoured, are engulfed in the ocean. Who, by any conceivable mode of reasoning, can disentangle from this hopeless intricacy the "my body" of the Heidelberg Catechism,—the "proper body" of the Synod of Dort,—or

the "self-same body, and *none other*," of our own Confession? It is manifest that, if by these terms we are to understand the *entire last body of each*, the propositions involve an absurdity. Nor is this all. It were easy to show, on sound chemical principles, that the dissolved elements of our material structure escape from the grave, are borne by winds and waters in boundless diffusion over the earth's surface, and become incorporated into thousands of plants, the food of men and beasts, or are received by the lungs into the blood, and thence into the solid structure of other human beings; so that there is probably not an individual on earth whose body is not in part composed of elements that belonged in turn to the last bodies of hundreds, and perhaps thousands, of the race. The thought bewilders.

For this last difficulty, it may be replied, that the resurrection-body will be composed of so much and no more of its former materials as may be necessary to a *consciousness of identity*. We will just take a peep into this part of the subject. The human frame, besides its organized (or, more correctly, its *organizing*) vitality—"the psychical body," or "essential vitality," of Prof. Bush—is composed of certain substances well known to chemistry, the principal of which are carbon, lime, potash, iron, sulphur, phosphorus, oxygen, hydrogen, etc. But can *lime* think? Can *potash* be conscious? Can any aggregation or combination of these inert substances be made to know any thing of identity? Of course not. Then the identification spoken of must be the act of the intelligent *soul*, and not the act of the material body. But what do we mean when we speak of the soul's identifying its former body? That it shall recognize certain long-scattered particles of carbon, lime, iron, etc., as being *the identical* lime and carbon which once composed its earthly house? Scarcely; for every atom of any one substance is so exact a counterpart of every other of the same substance, that, in the reconstruction of the future body, one particle would suit as well as another, and be as

much the subject of identification. It is not the mere matter, viewed in any form we will, that can constitute the body to be finally identified. The mind is not satisfied with any conception of "body," in this connection, that does not include the idea of *vital organism*. But are we to suppose that this essential endowment of the animal nature survives death and continues its existence through the lapse of ages, until evoked from the grave by the returning soul? Assuredly not—at least in the only aspect of the case acknowledged by science; for, if there is any thing in man which seems to come to an end, it is his animal vitality; and if there is any thing in him which is dissoluble, and actually dissolved in the grave, it is his animal organization. The whole structure, so far as the solid and gaseous substances, above mentioned, are concerned, becomes resolved into its chemical elements, and these elements having served one of their many purposes in constituting his material body, are called to serve other purposes, and probably to constitute other bodies, ere the day of the general resurrection. Then, *what* shall be the subject of the soul's identification? So far as we are able to see, it cannot be inert elementary matter. It cannot be the extinct animal organization. The question still is, *What?*

In thus pursuing the subject, under the guidance of human knowledge, we find ourselves getting into deep waters; but still able to touch bottom, and feeling that we have not forsaken "the Rock," let us for security return to where that Rock is more plainly manifest. *What say the Sacred Scriptures on the subject of the resurrection-body?*

The language of the Old Testament has been in part considered. The passage in Job, we are informed by those to whose judgment we bow, is inadmissible as a proof-text, and in referring to the others (Ps. 71 : 20; Ezek. 37; Is. 26 : 19, and Dan. 12 : 2) we ascertain that whatever they may tell us of a resurrection to be expected, they shed no light upon the particular point in question.

What may we glean from the language of Him, who, on all points of truth and duty, spake as never man spake? Selecting only such passages as may give us light, we come first to John 5 : 21-29 : "As the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, so the Son quickeneth whom he will. * * * The dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God, and they that hear shall live. * * * All that are in the graves shall hear his voice and shall come forth ; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life, and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation." In this doctrine of a universal resurrection, we are taught that in the resurrection-body we are to expect something which had been deposited in the grave—which had been regarded as dead—yet which had been so preserved in existence* that it was capable finally of being vitalized and of changing place. Again, John 11 : 11-26 : "Our friend Lazarus sleepeth, but I go that I may awake him out of sleep. * * * Lazarus is dead. * * * Thy brother shall rise again. * * * I am the resurrection (i. e. of those already dead) and the life (i. e. of those who are yet to die); he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live (i. e. in the body), and he that believeth in me shall never die."† In these words of our Saviour we have an instance of that sweet thought (recorded first in Dan. 12 : 2), so often repeated by the early Christians, and even yet embalmed in our word *cemetery*, or sleeping place, that, "In the language of heaven, death is the sleep of the pious," (Bengel,) and we may gather from it the hint, elsewhere more fully expanded, that, as in sleep the vitality is not extinct, but only dormant, and capable of being reawakened, so in death, the resurrection-body, whatever it may be, is not wholly de-

* "The restoration of life to the body is one day to take place, in virtue of the *immanent* principle of the new life which proceeds from Christ." Tholuck in loco.

† Compare this passage with Rom. 8 : 11,—“If the Spirit of Him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken *your mortal bodies* by His Spirit that dwelleth in you.”

prived of its existence as a body, but is only in a state of transitional repose between one period of activity and another. Again, Mat. 22 : 23-33, Mark 12 : 18-27, and Luke 20 : 27-38, on that occasion, when the Sadducees, who disputed the doctrine of the body's resurrection, came to the Saviour proposing that conjectural case of a woman with seven husbands, which the Pharisees, with their gross ideas on the subject, found so difficult to answer, he replied, "The children of this world (i. e. persons in the present life) marry and are given in marriage, but the children of the resurrection (or persons in the future state, after the reunion of soul and body,) neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are *as the angels* (*ὡς ἄγγελοι*, Mat. and Mark) of God in heaven; neither can they die any more, for they are *equal unto the angels* (*ἰσαγγελοι*, Luke 20 : 37). Now, that the dead are (i. e. to be) raised, even Moses shewed at the bush, when he calleth the Lord, the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead but of the living: for *all live unto Him*." The following remark, made by the prince of commentators, quoted above, is worthy of notice here, although out of its appropriate place (Bengel's Gnomon, John 11 : 15): "It is beautifully in accordance with the divine decorum, that we never read of any one continuing dead in the presence of the *Lord of life*." Our Saviour teaches us that God is not the God of the dead but of the living, and that in a certain and important sense the Abraham, and the Isaac, and the Jacob, that are to be after the resurrection, even now live with Him. They are not dead. He also teaches that "the children of the resurrection" shall be "*like the angels*," in this respect, that the relation of sex shall no longer exist; and that they shall be "*equal to the angels*," in this other respect, that they shall not be subject to bodily death, which is equivalent to saying that they shall undergo radical changes in their bodily structure, appetites and liabilities.

Putting together, now, in one connected view the facts concerning the resurrection-body, given to us by our Great Master, we learn :

1. That, at that time, and in that event, known as the general resurrection, there shall emerge from "the grave" a something deposited there, and called "dead ;"

2. That, however, it is not dead, since it "lives unto God ;" but it is in that state which may properly be called "sleep," and from which it can be awakened ; and

3. That the future body shall be radically different from the present body in its structure, appetites and powers, being in these made "like the angels," or "equal to the angels."

And now, with these hints as to the character of the resurrection-body, gained from the lips of The Great Teacher, let us compare the teachings of those who, though infinitely inferior to Him in personal authority, were commissioned to speak in His name, and to unfold more fully His doctrines, under the guidance of the Divine Paraclete.

1. The central thought, imbedded in the language of our Lord to Martha, "I am the resurrection and the life," etc., (that the body laid in the grave is not wholly dead, but that there is an occult vitality kept up some where,) seems to be alluded to in other passages besides that already quoted from Rom. 8 : 11. It is glanced at by the Apostle in Col. 3 : 4, where he says, "When Christ, *who is our life* (both of soul and body), shall appear, then shall ye also appear with Him in glory ;" and also in 1 Thes. 5 : 16, "Christ died for us, that whether we wake or sleep (i. e. whether we are bodily alive or dead), we should live together with Him." The allusion, in these passages, to an extra-natural energy pervading the dead body is, however, so obscure that we only notice it and pass on.

2. The prophetic fact implied in the language of our Saviour to the Sadducees, that very great changes shall take place in the future body, is repeated by the Apostles,

Paul and John, with an important addition which was not possible in our Saviour's day. Christ "shall change our vile body," says Paul (Phil. 3 : 21), "that it may be fashioned like unto His glorious body." "Beloved," says the Apostle John (1 John 3 : 2), "it doth not yet appear what we shall be; but we know that when He shall appear we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as He is." The glorious body of Christ is the type on which our glorified bodies shall be constructed. As he is, so, only in an inferior degree, shall we be. Some persons, in commenting upon this passage, seem to think that they are warranted from it to depict the future body as being one like that which was assumed by Christ in the Mount of Transfiguration, or like that which was seen by John in the Apocalyptic vision. But it is a significant fact, and worthy of being remembered by those who entertain this opinion, that *the same John*, who witnessed the transfiguration, and to whom the glorious vision in the Isle of Patmos was given, says, "Beloved, WE [i. e. you and I] KNOW NOT *what we shall be.*" It is not reasonable, therefore, to hold that the glorious body of Christ, seen in either of these cases, is to be the type of ours. What is to be its shape or appearance, John says, "We know not."

3. The richest mine, however, in which we may dig for thoughts upon this subject is in the 15th chapter of 1 Corinthians. In that is embodied all that is elsewhere implied, and with an eloquent fullness, that leaves upon every mind the sense of satisfaction. But even in this rich mine we must gather humbly and cautiously, for two reasons: First, because it is probably not within the power of human language to describe the things that belong to the unseen world; and secondly, because at the very outset of his remarks upon this subject, "the chiefest of the Apostles," in reply to a supposed trifler, who asks the question, "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?"

says, "Thou fool." But, inquiring cautiously, we find some hints of a most valuable character.

(1.) Verse 36: "That which thou sowest is not quickened except it die." The figure here used, and kept up through most of what is said, is, that *the body is a seed. It possesses an innate vitality.* Its dissolution and alteration of parts, so far from being a real death, is only the prelude and prognostication of a glorious development. This, it will be perceived, is only the repetition, under another form, of the idea expressed by our Lord to Martha, "He that liveth and believeth in me shall never die."

(2.) Verse 37: "Thou sowest not that body that shall be." The body that shall emerge from the grave shall not be the same, except in part—in very small part—with that deposited there. The body placed in the grave is the germ; the resurrection-body is the development of that germ by the addition of elements not found in the seed itself.

(3.) Verse 38: "God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own body." Each human body placed in the ground, like each seed, will be developed according to its distinguishing idiosyncracies. The two bodies (that buried and that raised) shall be the same, just as the seed put in the ground is the same with the stem, leaf, flower and fruit of the mature plant; but they shall differ in substance, configuration, adaptedness, and mode of existence.*

(4.) Verses 39, 40: "All flesh is not the same flesh. * *

* It is possible to find in this language the obscure hint of a future recognition. The idea has been expressed by a learned writer, that every angelic and other heavenly being is a *species* complete in itself, inasmuch as each is a distinct creative product, without parentage or posterity. If, therefore, in the isangelic condition of the resurrection-body we are to regard each individual as a species, complete in itself, it is not impossible to conceive that the specific development of the future body may be so far influenced by the known idiosyncracies of the earthly seed, that each person who knew another in this life should be able to recognize his development in the other.

There are bodies celestial and bodies terrestrial." Not only may the same substance differ in texture, as do the different kinds of flesh, but also in impressiveness of appearance, as do the sun, moon, stars, and earth—which are all material, but as different in aspect as a stone on earth is from a star in the sky.

(5.) Verse 42: "So, also, is the resurrection of the dead. It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption." "Corruption," perishableness, dissolubility, is as true of what is mortal as of what is dead. "Incorruption," the antithesis of this, if construed as the attribute of a material structure, such as seems to be all along implied, is strictly predicable, so far as we can see, of that only which is uncompounded. This idea was no doubt familiar to the mind of Paul, being continually taught in the philosophy of that day. The teaching of the text, therefore, may be that the future body shall be marked with elementary simplicity, possibly constructed of some uncompounded, and therefore indissoluble, substance. It certainly teaches that the body to be shall be imperishable.

(6.) Verse 43: "It is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power."

"Sown in dishonor"—stripped of its majesty as the head of the animal creation; deprived of its glory as a wonderful machine, and rendered offensive to the eye; banished, like a felon, from society, fettered with grave clothes, and condemned to a cell. "It is raised in glory"—released from its prison; redeemed from its fetters; endowed with more beauty and majesty than was possible for it on earth; and become resplendent with the imparted glory of Christ. (Phil. 3 : 21.)

"Sown in weakness." It never was capable of fulfilling the higher behests of the spirit, and now it can fulfil none. "The weakness which belonged to it in life, is perfected in death." (Hodge.) "It is raised in power,"—"instinct

with energy,"—endowed, possibly, with "new senses," * or "with faculties of which we have now no conception," †—a thing of power, not liable to accidents of injury or dissolution, and capable of fulfilling to the utmost every demand made upon it by the immortal spirit.

(7.) Verse 44: "It is sown a natural (i. e. an *animal*) body," consisting of flesh, blood and bones,—a body that *must breathe*, and that without breath must die,—a body moulded by the organic life to suit the necessities of *food, repose, and reproduction*. "It is raised a spiritual body"—one that need not breathe, since it is breath of itself, ‡—a body that never hungers, nor thirsts; that is never weary, nor reproduces its kind; a body that is moulded by the organizing energy within it out of such materials, and wrought by it into such shape, as shall suit the spirit.

(8.) Verse 50: "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." The words "flesh and blood" constitute a paraphasis of definite significancy; and in this passage they are evidently used to mean "the body as now constituted," (Hodge,) or "man, as far as the circulation of the blood quickens his flesh." (Bengel.) The earthly bodies of all, and even of those who are alive at the general resurrection, shall be changed, so that they shall be no longer "flesh and blood," but something *not unfit* for entering the glorious kingdom of God.

This concludes our enquiry into the teaching of the Sacred Scriptures on the subject of the resurrection-body. Let us now, as at a former point, gather into a synoptical view the substance of what we have gained. We learn,

1. That, at the general resurrection, there shall emerge

* Grotius.

† Hodge.

‡ Alluding to the meaning of the original word (*πνευματικον*), translated "spiritual."

from the grave something that had been placed there and regarded as dead.

2. That this dead thing, however, shall retain throughout its repose a vitality, extra-natural and occult, continued in it by Him who is "the resurrection and the life;" in consequence of which its seeming death is called "sleep."

3. That this *dead life* of the body, in its intermediate state, is analagous to that of germinating seed, which dies to live, and which lives in its death.

4. As to the *elements* of the future body; that it shall not consist of "flesh and blood," as our bodies do now; and yet that it shall sustain to its former body the relation which the developed plant sustains to the germ.

5. As to its *form* and *appearance*; that every human body shall be developed according to rules, not made known to us, ("God giveth a body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own body,") yet rules that exist, and in view of which we may conceive a mutual recognition as possible; but that the future body may be no more like the present than a star is like a stone, or than the grain of the harvest field, or the beauty of an opening flower, is like the seed from which it sprang.

6. As to its *qualities* and *capabilities*, that it shall be Negatively,

(1.) No longer corruptible, or liable to decay and dissolution;

(2.) Nor dishonored by wearing the badges of sin;

(3.) Nor inadequate to the desires of the spirit;

(4.) Nor dependent, by reason of its organization, on breath, food, and rest.

Positively, that it shall be,

(1.) Forever indissoluble; by which we may understand, constructed out of some pure, uncompounded substance;

(2.) Endowed with a majesty and beauty unknown on earth;

(3.) Instinct with power,—gifted, perhaps, with new

senses, and capable of fulfilling the utmost demands of the spirit; and

(4.) Moulded by the life-giving energy within to suit the then existing life, as the bodily organisms are now moulded to suit the animal necessities.

Furnished, now, with light, which in a case of this kind must be regarded as incomparably more reliable than any light of mere philosophy, let us revert to the question so abruptly terminated a few pages back, at the words, "What shall be the subject of the soul's identification? So far as we are able to see, it cannot be inert elementary matter; nor extinct animal organization. Then, What?"

Let us enquire *how far we can see*. What is matter? What is animal organization? To what extent is science able to pronounce upon them with such certainty as to demand a modification of the views usually held by intelligent Christians respecting the resurrection-body?

Look where we may through nature, we are impressed with the evidence of two physical coexistences—an object acted upon, and an agent that acts upon it. That object we call matter, and the agent, physical force. These two are ever found in union. We cannot separate them, even in our thoughts, for, when describing one, we are compelled to bring in the idea of the other. Force we define as "the cause of motion," that is, in matter; and matter, we define, (when reduced to its utmost possible simplicity, and its ultimate essential indication) by its "inertia," which means its relation to force. Yet that they are distinct,—perfectly, and even antipodally,—we gather from the very terms of the definition; matter is not and cannot be potential,—for this is the prerogative of force; and force is not and cannot be inert—this is the attribute of matter. Or, if they are to be regarded as being one and the same, it can be only by conceiving them, if such a conception is possible, as *opposite polarities* of the same physical existence. This is a point where our philosophy is perfectly, and, perhaps,

must be for ever, at fault. We cannot penetrate beneath the surface. We know nothing of matter, except by its relations to physical force; and nothing of force, except by its connection with matter. Familiar as they are to our experience, and patent as they may seem to be to our senses, the invariable confession of the profoundest students of physical being is, that, as to their nature, we are in ignorance, almost perfect, concerning both.

Above these, and connected with both, though separated by a nature more sharply defined than either, is a *third something*, in the shape of a high controlling energy, which, because it is not obvious to the senses, is by some regarded as shadowy and unreal. In every instance, however, even the lowest, and where the line of demarcation between it and the inferior kingdoms is faintest, it is marked by these two distinguishing peculiarities, sentiency, or the faculty, in some form, of perception; and a self-determining control, to greater or less extent, over physical force, and through that over matter. This third existence, (if we are warranted in calling it a third, when we know not but matter and force may be only antagonistical phases of each other,) we term spirit; and, in the examples more familiar to us, and at the same time more perfect, than that just described, it is marked by thought, feeling, and voluntary action. How far from being *shadowy*, may be conceived from these high prerogatives. Indeed, the time may arrive when spirit shall be regarded as the only thing substantial, and matter to be the shadow.

Now, by *animal organization* we usually mean that material structure, or that combination of material parts, by which a being endowed with sentiency (if no more) may come into active communication with the world of matter and of physical force. But, looking a little further, we see that "the organization" of a sentient and active being consists usually of a vast assemblage of organs—the eye, ear, heart, etc. Nay more, that the organs are themselves *organ-*

ized, or composed of cells and fibres, each one of which is a distinct organization. And, yet further, that every cell and fibre is constructed out of blood, every atom of which is in itself an organized substance. In view of these facts, how shall we define animal organization? What are we to understand by it? We are lost and overwhelmed, just as we were when peering into the mysteries of matter and force.

There is, however, one little clew still left us. We follow the leading of the fact that the term "animal organization" is as properly applicable to the ultimate atom of arterial blood, charged with its cell-making property, as it is to the whole structure of the animal, and it brings us to what is still more germane to our purpose, that it is as applicable to the *egg*, from which the future animal is developed, as to the future animal itself; and to the central, microscopic *cell* of the *egg*, as to the developing embryo; and as applicable to the embryotic *dot** (discovered by Prof. Agassiz) in the centre of that cell, as to the being developed from the dot.

And now, keeping the eye fixed on this significant "dot"—this incipient point of being—where the future bird, beast, or man lies condensed within bounds almost too narrow for the reach of the microscope, let us remember two or three facts: 1st. That the development, which is to be, takes place "under the influence of *the principle of life*, in connection with which alone any such phenomena are ever manifested;" 2d. That of the nature of this principle, and of the connection between it and the organized structure through which it acts, we are profoundly ignorant; "we know nothing of life, except by the phenomena it manifests in organized structures;" but, 3d. That these

* The writer of this article hopes he does no injustice to the teaching of the great embryologist. He quotes from the recollection of a lecture too eloquent to be easily forgotten.

phenomena "are so essentially different from the manifestations of any recognized physical force, that we are compelled to attribute them to a *special* SUPER-PHYSICAL principle." *

We learn, hence—what is, perhaps, denied by few—that there are forces in nature besides those usually recognized as the physical; and that the *vital* force, in being "super-physical," must be either spiritual or intermediate. But, since it cannot be spiritual, as is manifest from the fact that the vital energy is as much the property of the *tree* as of the animal, we are shut up to the conclusion that there are at least two kinds of force intervening between the thinking, feeling, self-acting spirit, and the dull, inert matter on which the spirit is known to act.

Nor is this all. When we come to scrutinize the framework of our familiar-looking world, we find—what it may be important for us to know in connection with our subject—that it consists, just as the animal body does, of a congeries of power within power, and principle within principle, "*whose foundation is in the dust,*" or, in plain language, which use matter as their basis and the theatre of their action. Matter, considered in its essentials, is so near to nothing, that we can only say of it that it is. Prof. Faraday, who studied it in the atom, (the only true place for learning its essential character)—the solitary atom—supposing one only to exist—and being, of course, without attraction, repulsion, or sensible motion, speaks of "inertia as, perhaps, its only true indication." † It is the super-induced operation of the various forces—gravitation, cohesive, chemical, vital, and others,—that give it its weight, solidity, variety, beauty, and that are to be seen encased one within another, in harmonious glory, like jewel casketed in jewel.

* Prof. Gray, of Harvard University.

† See his Address before the Royal Institution, 1857.

But it is time that this subject, increasing in interest and intricacy as it advances, were brought to its close. Let us, with such light as we have been able to gather from science and speculation, as well as from Scripture, revert once more to our question—"What shall be the subject of the soul's identification?"

We are still inclined to say, "it cannot be inert, elementary matter," but we dare not reject the idea of matter altogether, because we know not what it is, either as to its capabilities or its incapacities. For, so far as we know to the contrary, matter may be susceptible of other laws and other qualities than those revealed to the senses. It is not impossible for it, (and in this conjecture we may find our warrant in the language of our Master to the Sadducees on this very subject—"Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, *nor the power of God*"—Mat. 22 : 27)—it is not impossible for matter to be divested of its gravitation, chemical and other qualities, not essential to its existence, and to be endowed with others better suited to that condition needed by the returning spirit. In this state of ignorance, it is certainly the part of wisdom to leave the subject just where revelation places it.

As to the second point—"the animal organization"—we are compelled, of course, to surrender the idea of animality, but not necessarily that of organization. The very science (physiology) which starts the difficulty in one view of the case, brings, in another aspect, the answer. Organic life is a mystery. Just as, in the case of mineral crystallization, we know not where the formative power resides, whether in some *atom* which rules the rest, or whether in some *law of the mass*, compelling the aggregated atoms to unite in definite shape around a central point; and, also, as in the case, somewhat more complex, of the germinating seed, we know not where lies the vital principle, whether in the carbon, the potash, or the three essential gases, or whether in the organic combination; still, we

do know that the formative principle of the one, and the vital principle of the other, are *some where*; so we may conceive of the principle which is to evolve the future resurrection-body. It may reside in Prof. Agassiz's embryotic *dot*, which, having proved the germ of the animal body in one case, may continue indestructible, and prove the germ of the spiritual body (under a new constitution of matter) in another; and, in the stimulating energies of a higher life, it may rapidly gather round itself, in the great day of resurrection, all that is needful for its expansion, and in the light of Christ's presence, like plants in the sunshine, it may live in brightening beauty for evermore.

There is a third point necessary to the completeness of our subject—the future body as it shall stand related to our consciousness of identity. The universal heart of mankind demands that if there is to be a future body at all, it shall be such that those who knew one another on earth shall recognize one another in heaven. But, if neighbor shall know neighbor, shall not a man recognize himself?

Where there is no other proof, and especially no proof to the contrary, "the will of the people is" usually regarded as "the voice of God." On the subject of a future recognition the Sacred Scriptures say little—that little being all in favor of the common demand. The rich man and Lazarus are represented in the parable as knowing one another from a distance; and Peter, James and John, on the Mount of Transfiguration, seem, by *a sort of intuition*, to recognize Moses and Elias, whom they certainly never saw before.

Still, it is fairly questionable whether the future recognition of self and of each other, so plainly indicated, both by revelation and by natural desire, shall take place in consequence of any likeness such as we now conceive. Even the mother, who lays her babe beneath the clods of the valley, does not expect to meet her darling hereafter as a babe, but in the full maturity of its being; and the man in middle life, who deposits in the grave the body of a

revered parent, does not expect to see hereafter a figure bowed with the decrepitude of age, but one rejoicing in immortal vigor. Thus does popular opinion correct popular opinion, and teach us that the body to be is probably very unlike the body that is.

And this probability is still more confirmed when we combine the teachings of Scripture with the established facts of science. "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God,"—"it is sown an *animal* body, it is raised a spiritual body,"—"the children of the resurrection neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as, like, equal to, the angels of God,"—"thou sowest grain, but (in its germination and maturity) God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him, and to every seed his own body." Now, admitting the natural, and almost necessary, interpretation of these passages, we are taught by daily experience that "every seed hath its own body," adapted to the natural functions necessary for it to perform; and that every animal has its own organization, adapted to its mode of life. So universal is this law of adaptation, that if you give a botanist a flower, he will tell you the kind of fruit its structure is fitted to develope; and if you give a zoölogist a bone from the fore-arm, or even the tooth, of any animal, living or extinct, he will tell you its mode of life. The organization of every known being is suited to its peculiar sphere of existence. Now, under the safe, (and, so far as human science has yet gone, the unerring,) guidance of this law, what figure shall we assign to a being whose corporeal structure is without "blood," and which, therefore, needs no heart to propel that blood, arterial ducts to convey it, or veins to carry it back?—a being whose life is independent of breath, and which, therefore, may be supposed to be without lungs, nostrils, and bronchial tubes?—a being which requires neither food, drink, nor repose, and in whom the wonderful apparatus suited to the functions of nutrition and recuperation are useless? Such an organization is

beyond the reach of our present conception. Vastly sooner might an intelligent caterpillar conceive the unseen glories it shall wear when, bursting its silken coffin and its shroud, it is to appear, no longer a crawling worm, feeding on gross herbage, but a thing of light and beauty, a fluttering gem, that adds brilliancy to the flowers which supply it with its dew.

Faith, hope, natural desire, unite to persuade us that there will be a ready, though it may be, at present, an unimaginable, mode of recognition hereafter. Still, the teachings of science, and the infinitely more reliable hints of revelation, warn us not to conceive grossly of that future state; and especially not to expect there the cumbrous, *earth-bound machines*, which now condemn us to crawl through the dust, and to feed upon its productions; but to picture to ourselves a body suited to that "inheritance of the saints in light," which is described as "incorruptible and undefiled, and that fadeth not away."



ARTICLE III.

Letters of ALEXANDER VON HUMBOLDT to VARNHAGEN VON ENSE, from 1827 to 1858. With Extracts from VARNHAGEN'S Diaries, and Letters of VARNHAGEN and others to HUMBOLDT. Translated from the second German Edition. By FRIEDRICH KAPP. New York: Rudd & Carleton, 130 Grand Street. 1860; 1 vol. 8vo., pp. 407.

Few books have ever been more eagerly received by the reading public than this. Few, we will venture to add, have been read—if any one has read it besides ourselves—with a more grievous sense of disappointment. The world-wide fame of Humboldt, his vast attainments in natural science,

the prominent position which he so long held in the public eye (he was more than ninety years old when he died), the lofty height above the intellectual level of other men on which he seemed to stand, and the apparent simplicity and kindness of his character, all conspired to awaken an ardent interest in the volume before us. When it was announced that his correspondence with his most beloved and confidential friend, for a period of thirty years, would be unreservedly published, the civilized world was all a-gape. Rival publishers contended for the honor (and the profit) of printing it, and poor scholars saved their scanty funds to buy it as soon as possible. At last we have it. And what have we got? The worth of our money? *Not even that!*

The book contains two hundred and twenty-five notes and letters, almost all of them from Humboldt to Varnhagen, on all sorts of occasions, and on all sorts of subjects, from the most trivial to the most serious. There are a few letters from other persons to Humboldt, and occasional extracts from Varnhagen's diary, to illustrate the letters. The latter individual seems to have been a devout hero-worshipper, whose object of homage was Humboldt. He appears to have preserved with a religious zeal, and bequeathed to his niece, every scrap of writing with which his demi-god condescended to honor him, and she, with a yet more ardent devotion, has published it to the world. Every little note on the smallest occasions, such as one friend living in the same city would often send to another—even one to say that he would call to see him at eleven o'clock the next day—is here emblazoned in print for an admiring world. Humboldt was a great man, *awfully* great, some thought. When he spake from his own throne, it was *Jupiter tonans*. And, after all, it may be some relief to know that he ate and drank, slept and was sick, like any common mortal. But what we complain of is, the trouble and expense we are put to, just to find it out. We guessed as much before.

One object of the publication seems to be to let the world know how much Humboldt thought of Varnhagen, his wife, and his niece. Many of the letters contain the most extravagant laudations of these persons, whom we are sure few of our readers have ever heard of before. Let them know now, let the world know, that they were the strictest friends of Humboldt, whom he admired and praised as gifted with the best and noblest endowments of human nature. But if any such vanity entered into the motives for publishing these letters, it has richly wrought its own punishment, in the ridicule and reproaches which it must provoke from the world. No one has any reason to envy the honor this publication will gain for either Humboldt or Varnhagen, while it suggests a new emphasis for that good old English prayer—"Save me from my friends!"

Nevertheless, this book has some value. It contains some things of intrinsic importance in a historical, political and social point of view. But it is chiefly valuable for the revelation which it makes of Humboldt's real character and feelings. It has been often said, with a great deal of sad truth, that every man has two characters, often widely different, in one of which he appears to the world, generally, and in the other to his intimate friends and companions. This is true, to some extent, even of the best and greatest men. No man is, or can be, the same in his relations and intercourse with the world, that he is in the freedom and confidence of private life and intimate friendship. According to the satirical old proverb, "No man is a hero to his own valet." This volume puts us in the position of Humboldt's valet—or, rather, in a position yet better. The valet sees only the worst of the weaker traits of the hero. The confidential, admiring, trusty old friend sees *all*, even the weakness of the hero's strength, the littleness of that wherein he is great. And, with this book in our hands, we know Humboldt as Varnhagen knew him, without being Varnhagen. We see the hero as he saw him, but not with

his eyes. And in the remainder of this article we propose to glean, out of the emptiness and chaff of the volume, some few grains of valuable information to be found in it in regard to the character and feelings of the great man before whose name some bow with a reverence which we fear they never feel towards their God. And, if the testimony which it shall furnish do not tend to exalt the hero, if it appear that proud humanity, even in its loftiest specimens, is, after all, a poor, pitiable thing, if it be proved that man in his best estate is altogether vanity, let the blame fall, where it ought, on the foolish friends who have made it necessary. If any reprove us for assaulting a dead lion, let them remember that somebody flung the carcass upon us, and if we kick it, it is to show that there is no danger in it. In fact, the publication of the correspondence absolves a critic from every scruple of delicacy in his treatment of it, and the preface, written by the editress, Varnhagen's niece, invites, if it does not challenge, any freedom of remark. She says: "The following letters of Humboldt furnish a contribution of the highest importance to the true, correct, and unveiled representation of his genius and character. That they should be delivered to publicity after his death was his desire and intent. * * * Never has he spoken out his mind more freely and sincerely than in his communications with Varnhagen, his old and faithful friend, whom he esteemed and loved before all others. * * * It was a religious duty to leave every word unchanged as written down. I would have thought it an offence to Humboldt's memory, had I had the arrogance to make the slightest alterations of his words. * * * There was but one consideration to be obeyed—the *eternal truth*, for an adherence to which I am responsible to Humboldt's memory, to history and literature, and to the will of him [Varnhagen] who enjoined this duty upon me." "History and literature" will thank her, whether the memory of Humboldt does or not.

First of all, our readers will desire, as we did, to know

what light this correspondence throws on the religious opinions of Humboldt. What did he believe about God, the human soul, man's moral and spiritual relations, the Bible, and eternity? In regard to this enquiry, we have been greatly disappointed in the perusal of the volume. We fully expected, in such a correspondence, to meet with the freest expression of the writer's views on such topics as these. This expectation was heightened by the extract from the sixty-first letter, ostentatiously printed at the beginning of the book, "as its motto," and our second quotation below. But, so far as any thing of a positive character as to Humboldt's religious views is concerned, the testimony of these letters is very meagre. Of this sort we have noted only the following passages: (1.) "'Bruno' (Bauer) has found me out to be a præ-Adamite convert! When I was a boy, the court preachers reasoned in this way: I was confirmed by one of them, who told me that the biographies of the Evangelists were finally manufactured out of memoranda made by themselves during their life-time. Many years ago I wrote: All positive religions contain three distinct parts—First, a code of morals, very pure, and nearly the same in all; next, a geological dream; and, thirdly, a myth, or historical novelette; which last becomes the most important of all."—p. 112. (2.) "Your last favor, doing me so much honor, contains words about which I wish to prevent every mistake. 'You are afraid to enjoy the exclusive possession of my impieties.' You may fully dispose of this sort of property after my not far distant departure from life. Truth is due to those only whom we deeply esteem. To you, therefore."—p. 116. (3.) "It is a source of infinite joy to me to learn that the really very delightful society of the Princesses has benefitted you physically, and, therefore, as I should say in my criminal materialism, mentally also. * * * I still retain your 'Christliche Glaubenslehre,' (a work on the Christian dogma, by Strauss,) I, who, long ago, in Pottsdam, was so delighted

with Strauss's Life of the Saviour. One learns from it, not only what he does not believe, which is less new to me, but rather what kind of things have been believed by those black coats (parsons), who know how to enslave mankind anew; yea, who are putting on the armor of their former adversaries."—p. 122. That contemptuous epithet, "black coats," was quite a favorite with Humboldt and Varnhagen, which they often fling, in this volume, at the clergy. It is edifying to see Humboldt coming down from the serene heights of his superhuman eminence, to catch up the low slang of the vulgar, and use it with such gusto. And yet, to these same "black coats" he was indebted for the privilege of pursuing his favorite natural science, and even for the liberty of reviling them. In the era of the Reformation, when the Protestant clergy staked life and all for the freedom of human thought, and by their heroism secured it, the students of natural science slunk trembling in their dens, or, like Galileo, were terrified into a cowardly denial of what they believed. (4.) "You will observe that my political 'ire' is still the same; that I am always very much attached to this life, having learned from you that, according to Kant's doctrine, there is not much to boast of after our dissolution."—p. 143. On page 194 there is a brief defence of his *Kosmos* against the charge of atheism. But, as in our second extract above, he makes the remarkable avowal that "truth is due to those only whom we deeply esteem," and as he did *not* deeply esteem the world generally, as we shall abundantly show after a little, it may be doubted whether any value is to be attached to the theism or atheism of *Kosmos*. Judging, then, from the quotations we have given, Humboldt belonged to the very lowest class of German infidels. He rejected the Sacred Scriptures as dreams and myths. He was a materialist. He believed that, after death, there is not much, if any thing, to boast of. And it is doubtful whether he held to the existence of a God. This was his bald, blank creed,

or rather no creed—this empty nothing. And we shall see its effects on his own moral and spiritual nature.

But, if the positive evidence of this correspondence as to the religious views of Humboldt is somewhat scanty, its negative testimony is more than sufficient. There is not, we believe, in the whole of it, so much as one reverential allusion to the Divine Being, not one recognition of man's immortality, not one reference to his moral responsibilities, no faith, no *hope*, and, what is very noteworthy, not a particle of *charity*, towards his God or his fellow-men. It is all of the earth, earthy, with a rank smell of the brutes that perish. The world has never seen a more terrible example of the power, which an exclusive devotion to natural science may have, to obliterate wholly the nobler impulses and aspirations of the human soul. In this Humboldt, this *magnus Apollo* of science—the faculty which takes cognizance of the higher moralities and of the relations of man—seems to have been utterly dead; and to him the ideas and affections which exalt us above the dirt of the world, were as if they absolutely were not. In the course of this correspondence, Varnhagen's wife died, then Humboldt's own brother, William, and then his beloved Varnhagen himself. On each of these sad occasions Humboldt wrote a letter. In the one in reference to his dying brother, there is some expression of natural sorrow. In the other two there is little or nothing besides mere miserable compliment and flattery to the living and the dead. In neither is there a thought, a hope, a wish, or even a hint, drawn from any higher source than the low level of time and sense. He had no balm to offer to the bereaved and bleeding heart, other than to praise the lost, and to compliment the survivor. He sees no ray of light shining on the tomb; recognizes no hand of a loving God in affliction; suggests no hope of a better and brighter destiny; and only mocks the soul by enhancing the sense of its bereavement. He writes of the dead like an atheist, a materialist, a heathen. Nay, we

would infinitely prefer Cicero's or Socrates' consolations to Humboldt's. And, if the highest philosophy and science have no other voice to utter at the grave than his, we would gladly exchange them for the superstitions of an arrant paganism.

Our first quotation from these letters is interesting and valuable, as it reveals the origin and history of Humboldt's religious opinions. It appears that in his early youth he was *taught* them by one of the court preachers, one of those same "black coats." "Many years ago I wrote," he says, and then specifies views which are at once recognized as those of the rationalistic theologians of his younger years. It is evident, therefore, that he formed his religious opinions in early life, and, moreover, that *he took them upon trust*, accepting without investigation what were the current doctrines of his time and country, even with the teachers of religion. This unquestionable fact divests his opinions of all the weight of authority which his name might give them, and leaves them to stand in that pitiable attitude so often presented in the history of the world—that of opinions formed without examination by one utterly incompetent to arrive at the truth. And we hazard nothing in asserting that, having once embraced these infidel sentiments, and devoting his life exclusively to scientific studies, Humboldt never reëxamined the grounds of his belief, or even raised the question of its possible error. The truth is, he outlived his time. He came down to us as the relic of another world. The era of his youth was the era of French infidelity and revolution, on the one hand, and of the lowest, most abject form of German rationalism on the other. And in religion he never got any further than the age and generation of his prime. The views which were then almost universal in literary and learned circles, have become nearly extinct, and are found only among sciolists and dreamers, and paltry pretenders to superior illumination. He was like one of the monsters of a former geological era, which

had survived the cataclysms in which its companions all perished, lingering for a space among new beings in a new world. With him, the genus to which he belonged has passed away, or, if it is repeated, it appears only in very diminutive forms, such as our bats and lizards are to the dragons of remote ages.

So much for Humboldt's religious views. Let us look at some other developments of this correspondence. One melancholy and instructive fact which it reveals is, that he was far from being a *happy* man. The world thought he was. On the principles of the world, and if his own creed is true, he ought to have been the happiest of mortals. Before the eyes of the public he presented what appeared to be a striking example of a cheerful, even a gay, old age. His life was, to use a current phrase, a distinguished success. All the great ends which he proposed to himself, or, at least, for which he labored, he achieved. In the field of intellectual effort, to which he devoted his great powers, he attained an acknowledged preëminence. Kings, nobles, and the princes of literature and science, were his friends and companions. The honor and applause which, for the most part, only a distant posterity bestows on great men, were lavished on him before his career was half completed, and never withdrawn to the day of his death. For long years he sat on the very pinnacle of earthly prosperity, enjoying all which complete success and an infidel creed could give him. But, in the overruling providence of a benevolent God, he is made, in these letters, to add his mournful testimony to that of one greater than himself, that "Vanity of vanities! all is vanity!" In 1841 he wrote, "Towards the close of a much troubled life, which has but imperfectly realized its aspirations." In the same year Varnhagen observes, "I have just received a note from Humboldt. He concludes, with significant melancholy: 'The atmosphere to me is gloomy and foreboding. It is hard to be Humboldt, and to be obliged to confess this, at the summit of

honor and in the fulness of glory.' Indeed, he has but little pleasure, and his satirical humor alone can make life here at all supportable to him." Again, in the next year, Humboldt writes: "I live in apparent outward luxury, and in the enjoyment of the fanciful predilection of a generous monarch [the King of Prussia], yet in a moral and mental seclusion," etc.—p. 121. In 1844 Varnhagen writes in his diary: "The Court and its society are to him [Humboldt] like a tavern of habitual resort, where one is wont to pass one's evening, and drink one's glass."—p. 148. Humboldt writes again: "I go for a few days to Sans Souci, where I shall, unfortunately, celebrate my seventy-fifth birth-day. I say unfortunately, because, in 1789, [when he was twenty-five years old] I believed that the world would have solved more problems than it has done. It is true, that I have seen a great deal; but very little, indeed, in proportion to my exactions."—p. 180. The next year he speaks "of the terror of having reached the age of seventy-six years."—p. 195. We have before quoted, "I am always very much attached to this life, having learned that there is not much to boast of after our dissolution." Again, "I am well, industrious, but not cheerful."—p. 261. "Sadness and displeasure of the world have increased in me."—p. 361. All that apparent happiness, then, was unreal. That buoyant gayety which was so charming in the great old man was hollow and deceitful. Underneath it was a sad, disappointed, unsatisfied soul. All he had won, and all that he was, failed to procure happiness. And this Humboldt, "at the summit of honor, and in the fulness of glory," was embittered with the world, angry with his fellow-men, eaten inwardly with melancholy, and terrified by the advance of his years. His most intimate and admiring friend testifies that "his satirical humor alone made his life at all supportable to him." So utterly was it all a failure, that he had no resource to render it endurable, but in that bitter and biting spirit which finds gratification in virulence

towards his fellow-men. And how savage Humboldt was in this respect, we shall see hereafter. What can be more humiliating than this? What a fall it is! How pitiable! We hold it to be an irrefutable demonstration that there was radical error in his principles, and, in consequence, fundamental defect in his character. It is impossible that a man whose faith is right and true, whose character is formed and developed in accordance with it, whose occupations are honest and honorable, as Humboldt's were, and whose life is crowned with prosperity and success, as his was, should not also be happy. To think otherwise, would be to impugn the wisdom and goodness of the Creator and Ruler of the world, or, as the philosophers would say, the laws and order of nature. To say that truth and virtue, taken in their largest and widest sense, will not, as a natural and necessary effect, produce happiness in the soul, make life blessed, and conduct to a serene and cheerful old age, is to destroy not only Christianity, but all faith and confidence in God, in nature, in reason, in instinct, and to land us in a chaos of scepticism and despair most accursed. We have never heard that Humboldt was guilty of any of the vices or crimes which torment the lives of so many men. Our impression is, that his sins were only such as the world thinks consistent with decency and honor. The great age to which he lived proves that his habits were regular and temperate. It is evident that his unhappiness could have had no cause external to his own soul. It sprang up and grew from within. Nor was it the fruit of some unhallowed passion, suffered unrestrained to work its evil there. It was the result of a want, a defect, in the convictions of his understanding, and in the affections of his heart. The elements of religion were utterly wanting in both, and the soul, therefore, in this woeful destitution, could not be satisfied and blessed. No other cause can be assigned for the unhappiness which pervaded and embittered the life of Humboldt but this. And the volume before us, published,

in blindness and folly, for far different purposes, is another most precious demonstration of the fundamental error of his religious belief, and of its utter insufficiency to satisfy the needs of the human soul, or the exigencies of human life. Whatever may be said of the Christian faith, Humboldt's faith *cannot* be true. And, in this connection, a similar most memorable example deserves to be remembered. Goethe, who also lived to a great age, who was Humboldt's superior in intellect and genius, and equally blessed with honor and fame, and worldly success, confessed that during his long life he had not spent four happy weeks. Mournful confession! Crushing evidence that the faith and lives of such men are false to truth and goodness!

In the next place, we will notice a yet more painful and melancholy discovery made by this correspondence. It is found in the exhibitions it contains of what Varnhagen emphatically calls Humboldt's "satirical humor," but what might, perhaps, without too great severity, be called "satanical." We feel that an apology is almost due to our readers for inflicting on them the quotations we shall make; but if any should be required, let it be found in that "*eternal truth*," whatever that may be, of which the editress of the correspondence speaks in her preface. Let it be remembered that Humboldt was living on terms of the most honored intimacy in the most moral, intellectual, and pious Court of Europe, and in the most learned and literary society of the world—in the Prussian capital. His daily companions were the King, statesmen, savans, and theologians, among whom were such men as Tholuck, Hengstenberg, and Bunsen, and others equally great and good. It is on such men and such a society he deals out his vituperations. He says: "What depresses me is the vileness of the society in which we are here living."—p. 29. Varnhagen writes: "Humboldt sneers at Bunsen's little tract, 'The Week of Meditations.'"—p. 114. Humboldt speaks of "this arch aristocratic, utterly bigoted—(and consequently prepos-

terous, nay, stupid)—fanatically anti-French Canitz, with his malicious and vulgar sneers." Varnhagen says himself that Canitz "is honest, strict, and straightforward."—p. 118. Varnhagen, recording a conversation with Humboldt after the latter had returned from a visit to England, says: "Peel pleases him as little as ever; looks like a Dutchman; is more vain than ambitious, and narrow in his views. Lord Aberdeen is invincibly taciturn, without being able to convince people that his taciturnity covers any thing worth saying."—p. 118. In another entry in his diary, he writes: Humboldt "speaks contemptuously of Eichhorn and Savigny, as hypocritical menials, who receive the word of command from Thiele, from Gerlach, and from Hengstenberg." "Love of art and imagination on the throne, fanaticism and deceit all round, and hypocritical exaggeration in matters unworthy of attention."—p. 137. Again: "First he vented his bitter and indignant scorn on the speeches of the King"—"Then he spoke with the utmost contempt of Von Raumer, the Minister of Public Worship and Instruction, of his brutality and insolence, his hatred of all science, his pernicious activity."—p. 282. (Humboldt held a high office in the Court himself.) "The meanest fellow of the whole concern (the ministry) is Privy Counsellor Niebuhr, a low, canting parasite, full of spite and venom."—p. 284. "Dorner and Rothe have been jostled out, and their places are held by the most mediocre and narrow-minded people to be found in all Germany, such as Lange and Steinmeyer; from Hengstenberg's study, through Gerlach, all tends, he says, to ignorance and darkness."—p. 293. Humboldt writes, "The 'Dreamer,' etc., like every thing emanating from this bad party, sick with mental poverty, bears the stamp of cowardly malice!" Varnhagen says: "Humboldt talks of Radowitz decidedly as of a Jesuit, calls him Ignatius, mocks him, and jests on him a long time."—p. 312. "Finally, Humboldt added: 'When a man has the misfortune to be compelled to live

among such wretches as this Gerlach, Raumer, and the rest who have crept into this Court.”—p. 313. “In a box he had a living chameleon, which he showed me, and of which he said, that it was the only animal which was able to direct one of its eyes upwards, and at the same time the other downwards; and that our parsons only were able to do the same, with one eye directed to heaven, and the other to the good things of this world.”—p. 341. Chevalier Bunsen published a work with the title, “God in History.” Humboldt derisively and profanely nicknames him by it.—pp. 385, 386. Such are some of the many instances furnished by this volume, in which the hidden bitterness and wrath of Humboldt’s spirit broke forth in unsparing and unjust abuse of his companions and associates, the leaders of the politics, religion, and literature of his country. They are melancholy disclosures pointing yet more emphatically in the same direction as the quotations we gave under the preceding head of our review, and indicating demonstratively the radical defect in the sentiments, and consequently in the character, of Humboldt. No man whose soul was formed and pervaded by principles of truth and goodness, could breathe forth such venomous abuse on his fellow-men. And, if our readers are surprised that Humboldt could so feel and speak of men with whom he was intimately associated, officially and socially, and with whom, therefore, he must have lived on terms of ostensible courtesy and respect, let them remember that he believed “truth is due to those only whom we deeply esteem.” The less he thought of them, therefore, the more did he think himself justified in concealing from them what he really believed about them. Prince Albert requested from Humboldt a copy of *Kosmos*, and, after reading it, sent him a very civil letter of thanks and compliment. Whereupon Humboldt, in a letter to Varnhagen, most unmercifully ridicules the Prince, with such severity, indeed, that Varnhagen rebukes his friend. But all the while there is no doubt he was as courteous and

respectful to Prince Albert as he knew how to be, outwardly. "Truth is due to those only whom we deeply esteem;" not, therefore, to Prince Albert. Not, therefore, to many. Secretly he could pour forth his scornful sneers and sarcasms and revilings and mockery, and yet publicly pay the profoundest respect and obeisance.

These developments are especially noteworthy, from the fact that those who belong to Humboldt's school of religious opinions make very loud pretensions to a liberal, tolerant and indulgent spirit. They demand the largest charity for themselves, and profess to extend it to all others. Indeed, they appear to think *that* the sum of all virtues, and no offence more rouses their holy wrath than any severity towards the opinions and character of another, especially towards their own, and yet more especially if it comes from a "black coat." It is a very shallow device. And invariably, when we come at the truth, as in Humboldt's case, we find that these liberal-minded preachers of charity are of all men the most fiercely intolerant and uncharitable.

There is a yet graver aspect in which this vituperation of others, so profusely uttered by Humboldt, presents itself. A distinguished student of the import of language (not a "black coat"), says, "terms of abuse and vituperation generally serve rather to convey an impression of the speaker's moral status, than a distinct notion of the exact character and degree of depravity he imputes to the subject of his discourse. This consideration suggests the duty, or at least the expediency, of extreme reserve in the use of words which give the hearer to understand, not that we have cause to believe the supposed offender to be guilty of any specific violation of the laws of God or man, but that we are ourselves in a frame of mind which almost necessarily involves some sacrifice of self-respect, some disregard of that charity which the obligations of both religion and society require us to show towards our fellow-man."—(Lec-

tures on the English Language, by G. P. Marsh.—p. 578.) This is euphemistic. We have never known a severe truth delivered in more gentle terms, or a statement better illustrative of the sentiment it was meant to enforce. But there is stinging truth in it, and it means that the free use of vituperative language reveals what is any thing but creditable to the moral character of the speaker or writer. With the specimens of Humboldt's vituperation which we have given, and this criterion before them, let our readers judge him for themselves.

It is not surprising that Varnhagen caught the spirit of his hero. He writes, pp. 394, 395: "Humboldt sends me with kind lines [mark you!] the work of the Marquis of Normandy on the revolution of 1848. He calls it an indiscreet book, and almost talentless; I call it stupid and perfidious in its contents. He is one of the dullest and most tedious Englishmen ever heard of." * * * "He is a poor fool, but his bad book is good enough to expose the paltriness of Louis Phillippe, the villainy of Guizot, and the pernicious influence of sneaks and sharpers." We were surprised, however, to meet with the following, in a letter from Arago to Humboldt, in 1834, p. 158: "All that I daily see in this vile world of meanness, servility, and low passion; makes me look with indifference on the events with which men are mostly preoccupied." *Tantæne animis cælestibus iræ?* Are these great and wise men, familiar with the most cultivated and exalted circles of society, so disgusted and wrathful with what they see there? What, then, are we to think of the world, and of these men themselves? When "a black coat" uses language respecting his fellow-men that even approaches this in severity, all the liberals and philosophers rebuke him for reviling and maligning humanity.

We give the following for what it is worth: "Humboldt says there is no doubt that Louis Bonaparte is a son of

Admiral Verhuel, and his brother, Morny, a son of General Flahault."—p. 267.

The editress of this correspondence promised us, in the preface, that it would "furnish a contribution of the highest importance to the true, correct, and unveiled representation of the character" of Humboldt. Whatever may be thought of the silly vanity which has led to this unveiling of his nakedness before the world, there can be no doubt that that promise is fulfilled. We have several times quoted that astounding avowal of his, that "truth is due to those only whom we deeply esteem." No man who duly loves and honors the truth, could utter such a sentiment. None who, in his own soul, recognizes the value and glory of truth, can tolerate it. We speak of truth both in regard to theoretical truth, and in regard to practical truth, or veracity. What is more, no man who *knows* the truth could entertain that thought for a moment. For, a truthful soul coming to the knowledge of the truth, must see and feel that excellence and preciousness in it which will seal upon him an obligation to impart that truth to all men if he can. And we hold Humboldt to be self-convicted of ignorance, error, and a want of honesty. Mark, also, the following quotations. Referring to an encomium which he had pronounced on the King in a public address, he says: "In praising that with which the party praised is scantily supplied, we point him to the honorable road, and justify ourselves before the people."—p. 319. "I did not care to disabuse the mind of the one-legged Raumer, as they will leave soon. *Decipitur mundus.*"—p. 372. The first of these extracts indicates a state of moral sense, which would not surprise us in a courtier, who fawned for a livelihood on the favor of a prince, and whose daily business it was to reconcile lying and flattery with his conscience. But in a philosopher, in one who dwelt in the pure heights of science, in a man who was reputed to possess a mental elevation so far above common men, it is amazing and humiliating. The last quotation

lets us know that in Humboldt's opinion deceiving and being deceived was the order of the day, and he did not think it his business to disturb it. Truly, this is to be "unveiled." We examine this dead lion, and it seems rather to be a fox.

With the quotation of three references to the United States, we will close our extracts from a book which has already occupied us too long. In 1856 he writes: "An excellent article, by Laboulaye, on the domestic institution (slavery), and the flagitious Pierce's extension of the outrage upon territory hitherto free, met my eye yesterday," etc.—p. 321. "Most unfortunately, Buchanan will be the next President, and not Fremont, the traveller of great acquirements," etc.—p. 324. "And the disgraceful party which sells negro children, and distributes canes of honor, as the Russian Emperor does swords of honor, and Graefe's noses of honor,—who prove [the grammar is not ours] that all white workmen should rather be slaves than free—have succeeded. What a crime!"—p. 339. Humboldt judged the politics and institutions of the United States as he did religion, at a distance, without any competent knowledge of either. And his opinions on the two subjects are of about equal value, and equally worthless. For his admirers, in the South, at least, we set one against the other.

And now, let the poor old man rest, as we and our readers will also.

ARTICLE IV.

UNITY AND INFALLIBILITY OF THE CHURCH
OF ROME.

Man's thirst for power is insatiable. It is a principle of his nature to be discontented with what he is, and to seek to be what he is not. Advancing from one degree of influence and power to another, he still looks forward to the attainment of some new object of desire. And could he wield all the immense wealth of earth, and subject her entire dominions to the mandate of his sovereign will, the vacuum of his ambitious longings would be a vacuum still—a vacuum of enlarged and enlarging capacity, demanding more imperiously that satisfaction to its peculiar wants which it is never destined to realize. No barrier is sufficient to bound the aspirations of the human soul. Inebriate with the proud honors of the world, man not unfrequently essays to scale the very battlements of heaven in his daring presumption, and to invest his insolence with the attributes of the Deity. And no where do we find this disposition of human nature more strikingly exemplified than in the history of the Church of Rome.

Very early after the introduction of the Christian era—even in the days of the Apostles—this thirsting after power, this ambition for aggrandizement and dominion, began to display itself among the professed followers of Jesus. That such a spirit should exhibit itself among worldlings, is no matter of surprise; but that it should display itself among those who had embraced the religion of the meek, and lowly, and despised, and persecuted, and crucified Nazarene, whose kingdom and maxims are not of this

world, this is a legitimate subject of wonder, and it would be impossible for us to account for it if we did not know that the heart of man is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked. Throughout every age of the Christian dispensation we see more or less of this character invading the Church, and generating the most serious difficulties.

But it is to Rome our eyes must be directed, that we may witness the most rapid and successful development of this character of man in the Church. That city was the metropolis of the civilized world. There was the palace of the Cæsars. There was wielded the sceptre, and from thence proceeded the sword which ruled over and conquered nations. To be a bishop of the Church in the city of Rome, was to be possessed of an ecclesiastical importance, to a considerable extent, proportionate to the political importance of the city. There, temptations were brought to bear upon the bishop or presiding presbyter of the Church, such as no bishop or presbyter elsewhere realized. There, seductive influences, peculiar to the empire city of the world, prevailed. The pomp and affluence characteristic of the principal citizens, the luxury, the avarice, the self-seeking promotions, all contributed to contaminate the minds and hearts of those who officiated there in the name of the Lord Jesus. If controversies of difficult decision occurred any where in the Church, either on the subject of doctrine or discipline, to whom would reference for counsel as likely be made as to the bishop who had his residence in the city to which all political controversies were carried? It is very easy to conceive how the people, every where throughout the Roman empire, familiar with seeking for and resting satisfied with an answer to their political difficulties from the officers of State in the city of Rome, or, rather, from the Emperor, residing there, should also seek for an answer to their ecclesiastical difficulties by an appeal to the principal officer of the Church residing in

the same city. And such was the fact. The city of political superiority became also the city of ecclesiastical superiority. The Bishop of Rome, realizing a preëminence of authority and influence from his location—having a power to decide ecclesiastical controversies which no other bishop of the Church possessed—a power conferred on him from the simple consideration that he was Bishop of Rome, and not because of any original right he possessed to such preëminence—the Bishop of Rome, thus circumstanced, would certainly need a great deal of grace to prevent him from being led astray, or yielding to the control of carnal ambition. He soon began to esteem himself as sustaining the same relationship of dominion and power to the Church, which the Emperor sustained to the State. Flattered by the confidence voluntarily reposed in him, and the umpireship of controversies conferred on him—grown rich by the munificence of the people—and proud of the honors of his station, his carnal ambition becomes dominant, and transforms him from a humble Presbyter, or Bishop, of Christ's flock in Rome to a pretended *monarch of God's heritage*. The *mitre* of the priesthood is assumed as a *crown* on the brow of the Pope; the *Bishop's chair* is converted into a *throne*, and the *shepherd's crook* becomes a *sceptre of universal dominion* in the hands of the successors of the apostolic fisherman.

But this advancement was not obtained at once. It was the result of gradual development. Victor, in the second century, was the first Bishop of Rome who seems to have become conscious of his supremacy. But he was compelled to be careful how he exercised it. And it was not till in the seventh century, when, by the instrumentality of the infamous Phocus, Boniface III. acquired the title of "Universal Bishop of the Church," and the doctrine of the universal supremacy of the Bishop of Rome became a dogma of the Church. It had been contended for by individuals before this time, but now it enters upon the list

of settled controversies. But here advancement in this direction of usurpation did not cease. Ambition prompted still more—ambition, which knew no landmarks in the laws of God or of natural justice; and, as the age grew darker by the night of ignorance, which was settling deep and fast upon the people, and opulence and authority rendered the Bishops of Rome and their confederates more indomitably haughty and aspiring, we see them robing themselves in pretensions still more assuming and dangerous, and early in the eighth century we hear the *spiritual thunderbolts* rumbling from the *throne of “his holiness,”* and see them quell, by their terrible magic, the most violent insurrections of the populace; we hear Pope Gregory II. declare to the Grecian Emperor, Leo Isaurus, that “the nations of the West held St. Peter as a god,” and the Pope himself receives, with ghastly delight, the title of *Arch Druid* from his barbarian converts. Higher and higher do they aspire, impelled by an insatiable thirst for power, until, when almost every light of science had expired, and religion was glimmering with her last living ray among men, and superstition was lighting her dismal orgies throughout the earth—in almost every habitation of the sons of men—they lifted up a bolder hand, and emphatically

“Stole the livery of the Court of Heaven
To serve the devil in.”

Then it was not enough to be known by the single, unpretending title of “Bishop of Rome,” or even by the more magnificent one of “Bishop of the Universal Church,” but the now haughty successors of the lowly fisherman, Peter, are blasphemously addressed, as “*Vicar of Christ;*” “*Lord of lords and King of kings;*” “*God of the earth,*” etc., and it was further maintained that that Church alone was the true Church of Christ and body of genuine believers on earth, in which the universal supremacy of the Bishop of Rome was acknowledged. And,

in evidence of this high assumption, the dogma was laid down, and taken for granted, or as demonstrated, that *unity and infallibility are essential attributes of the true Church of Christ on earth, and that these essential attributes pertain exclusively to the Church of Rome, and hence, that the Church of Rome is the only true Church of Christ on earth.* Thus, syllogistically, the conclusion is made, from the premises, clear as a sunbeam. But we call the premises in question. We hold that they are palpably false in fact, and that the conclusion based on them is, consequently, a sheer violent assumption, without evidence in its favor. We deny that the Church of Rome is a *unit*, and we deny that she is *infallible*, and we appeal to the testimony of history in support of our denial.

If unity and infallibility pertain to the Church of Rome, exclusively or at all, they must, like gravity and inertia in material bodies, have a common centre; unity must centre where infallibility does, and infallibility where unity does. And so the advocates of the Church of Rome contend. They say that her *unity* consists in the acknowledgment of *one supreme, infallible head*, the judge of all her controversies, and her guide in the way of all truth. *One supreme, infallible head!* This single complex term expresses the whole doctrine, in regard to whom both the unity and the infallibility consist. It is a unity of headship, and an infallibility of headship, and hence, the common centre of these distinctive attributes is found to subsist in the headship of the Church, and if this headship were in Jesus Christ himself, we could take no exceptions to the doctrine; but it is not.

And here is a puzzling question for Romanists to consider. What is the *one supreme*—not to say infallible—headship of the Church? Does the Church of Rome unite in such a head? Is she of one mind on this fundamental question? Do her members come from all their various divergencies on other subjects, and converge here? Far

from it. If so, we would grant that, in this particular, at least, she is *united*, or *one*. But here she is hopelessly divided, and her exclusive claims to unity in her headship are preposterous. An association of individuals, under one acknowledged sovereign, becomes one moral or political person. And they are one, because they acknowledge but *one* sovereign, or head. No association of individuals can acknowledge two or more sovereigns, or governing heads, of rival authority, at the same time, and sustain—under such circumstances—their moral or political unity. And how is it with the Church of Rome in this respect? Does she acknowledge but one supreme, infallible head, as a matter of fact? She professes to do so, but does her profession, in this particular, harmonize with the reality? She actually acknowledges no less than *three distinct, infallible heads*, each of which is rival to the other, and, consequently, any one of the three can be acknowledged only at the expense of repudiating the others. One party of her communion contends for the official infallibility of the Pope; another party for the infallibility of general Councils; and a third party denies the infallibility of the Pope, and also that of the general Councils—when without the sanction of the Pope—but contends for the infallibility of Popes and Councils, in their united capacity.

Now, these are, certainly, three distinct parties, or “bodies politic,” in the Church of Rome, each acknowledging a distinct, infallible head, diverse from the others. The Council of Constance, which met in 1414, and the Council of Basil, which convened in 1431, decided that a general Council was superior to the Pope, and that “without destruction of salvation” this doctrine could not be denied. In the sixteenth century, the Council of Lateran, under Julius II. and Leo X., determined that a Pope was superior to general Councils. The former decrees of the Councils of Constance and Basil anathematize, to eternal perdition, the members of this Lateran Council, with their

two successive Popes, for they have been guilty of the denial of the superiority of general Councils. The high Romanists, or Transalpines, believed the Pope to be the supreme, infallible head of the Church, and the low Romanists, or Cisalpines, believed this headship to consist in the general Council, and a very considerable portion maintained that the approbation of the Pope was necessary to render the decrees of a Council infallible, and, consequently, admitted neither Pope nor Council, independent one of the other, as the supreme, infallible head of the Church. Now, where is the boasted unity of the Church of Rome in regard to its headship?

But the chief difficulty involved in this subject of the Church's headship, grows out of the difficulty of ascertaining the precise *locale* of the *infallibility* claimed. All Romanists agree to insist on the infallibility of the Church. But where is that infallibility to be found? This is a question to which they give discordant answers. Is every individual who belongs to the Church of Rome infallible? Certainly not. Then, if *all* are not infallible, what *portion* of them is endowed with this distinguishing attribute? Is the Pope infallible? Some say that he is, and some that he is not. Are general Councils infallible? Here, again, conflicting opinions are entertained. Does infallibility belong exclusively to general Councils, as moderated and approved by Popes? All are not able to answer this in the affirmative. Where, then, within the pale of the Church of Rome, is this extraordinary attribute to be discovered? We want to be introduced to its abode. It is painful to be driven about from post to pillar in a matter of such grave importance. To go from Pope to Council, and from Council to Pope, in vain search for the manifest presence of an attribute so unlike any thing that is human or earthly, is well calculated to make us skeptical of its existence. One would think it could not easily play this vexatious game of "hide and go seek" with us—that, from

its very nature, it would be discoverable without difficulty. A blind man can feel the light of the sun, though he cannot see it. And so, in the midst of the prevailing fallibilities of our race, one would suppose that infallibility would reveal itself as conspicuously and as sensibly as the sun's light, when it beams into the darkness. And it certainly would. If infallibility were the distinctive attribute of the Church of Rome, it would be her radiant attribute which would invest her with a perfection and glory which all mankind could not but behold and confess. And its precise locality would likewise be apparent and indubitable as the locality of the sun in the heavens. But it is not. We search for it, and cannot find it. It is a kind of "will-o'-the-wisp," leading us now here and now there; but we never really approach it. It ever will be a question, as it ever has been—since ever this claim of infallibility originated—whether the Pope, or general Councils, or both united, or, as some have it, the Church in the aggregate, are infallible. If this question could be decided, there would, henceforth, be no difficulty on the subject of the headship. And it is because this question cannot be decided, that there is not *one*, and *only one*, *supreme head* recognized by the Church of Rome. All are agreed that the infallibility of the Church should have its manifest subsistence in its supreme head; but there is no uniformity of opinion upon the subject of this headship. That party of the Church which believes in the personal infallibility of the Pope, recognizes the supreme headship as subsisting, officially, in his person, and he is, therefore, the centre and source of the Church's boasted unity. But those parties which give to infallibility a different "local habitation" from this, recognize different and conflicting supreme heads, according to their various opinions of the *in quo loco* of this distinctive attribute of incapability of error. Let it be decided, then, first, by the Church of Rome, whether her infallibility resides in her

Popes or her Councils, or in her Councils sanctioned by her Popes. Till this question be settled, it is preposterous for her to claim either unity or infallibility.

But the whole history of the Church of Rome is at war with her claims to these distinctive attributes. She is not only not agreed as to the seat of her infallibility, and, consequently, as to her true and proper headship, but she has also been rent into divisions by rival claimants to the papacy, and by opposing Councils anathematizing each other, and presenting the spectacle of the most thorough schism in her organization and spirit.

In the year 1130, the College of Cardinals elected two successors to Honorius II., deceased, to fill the chair of Peter; one party elected Gregory, a Cardinal Deacon of St. Angelo, known in the papal list as Innocent II.; the other party elected Peter, the son of Leo, a Roman prince, who took the name of Anacletus II. Anacletus was supported by the Roman Church in Italy, and Innocent, by the body of the Church out of Italy. The former had his residence in Rome; the latter, in France. Again, in the year 1159, after the death of Adrian IV., the Cardinals were divided into two factions, and one faction chose Rowland, Bishop of Sienna, to the pontificate, who assumed the title of Alexander III., and the other faction selected Octavian, Cardinal of St. Cecilia, known as Victor IV. Frederic I., surnamed Barbarossa, who had quarrelled with Adrian, espoused the cause of Victor, and summoned a Council at Pavia, 1150, which decided that Victor was the true Bishop of Rome—and of the Church Universal. Victor was acknowledged as the supreme head of the Church in Germany and Italy, and Alexander, who was the choice of the majority of the electing conclave, had his papal jurisdiction principally confined to France, where he resided. Victor died in the year 1164, but his place was immediately supplied by the election of one who bore the name of Pascal III. Alexander took encouragement

from certain circumstances and returned to Italy, and contended for the papacy against his opponent, till the arms of the Emperor compelled him to flee to Benevento. Pascal died in the year 1168, and the imperial faction placed John Abbott, of Sturm, in his Chair, under the name of Calixtus III. In the year 1177 the Emperor, who supported the papal claims of Calixtus to this date, concluded a treaty of peace at Venice, with Alexander, and Alexander was, therefore, put in peaceful possession of the Popedom. Here, in the instance under consideration, from the year 1159 to the year 1177—eighteen years—the Church of Rome consisted of two great factions, each faction acknowledging a Pope of its own selection, in opposition to the other, and holding distinct and opposing Councils. Can a Church thus divided, and recognizing separate and rival Popes and Councils, claim, with any kind of consistency, either unity or infallibility as her peculiar attribute? If this be unity, then we think it will be very difficult to prove that unity is not also a distinguishing attribute of Protestant Christendom, as well as Roman Catholic; and if this be infallibility, we think that it will not be an easy task to convict any denomination of professed Christians on earth of fallibility.

Witness, again, the “Babylonish Captivity of the Papal See,” as it is called, when Avignon, in France, was for seventy years the residence of the Pope. The chair of St. Peter was, during that time, transferred from the city of seven hills, and endured a species of exile. Philip the Fair had waged a most bitter contest against Boniface VIII., and William de Nogaret had prosecuted it, in the name of the King, with most desperate determination. Boniface VIII. died, and was succeeded by Benedict IX., who, though very obsequious to the will of the King—in the main—was still unwilling to accede to all his demands. Benedict died in the year 1304, and, in the ensuing year, Bertrand, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, was elected to the

pontificate, and assumed the name of Clement V. This election was the result of the intrigue of the French monarch, but it was the only election made by the conclave. He took his residence in Avignon, and there, as a tool to the King of France, acted in the capacity of the only supreme, infallible head of the Church. Philip demanded that the dead body of Boniface should be disinterred and publicly burned, and that "his memory should be branded with a notorious mark of infamy." But Clement was unwilling to proceed quite so far to gratify his royal patron, and averted this demand by promising in every thing else to be obedient to his will.

Do not these facts militate directly against the pretensions of the Church of Rome, as the one and infallible Church of Christ on earth? After the death of Clement, for two years the electoral conclave were unable to decide upon a successor, because of their division into French and Italian factions. Eventually, the faction composed of the French Cardinals succeeded in placing James D'Euse, Cardinal Bishop of Porto, in the papal chair, under the name of John XXII. Now, where was the one supreme, infallible head of the Church of Rome, the centre of unity and infallibility, during this period of vacancy in the papal chair? Was it in the electoral conclave—the College of Cardinals? They were divided into factions, and were governed by warring sentiments and interests. That could not be the centre and source of unity and infallibility, in which there was no evidence of the existence of either.

And what was the general condition of the Church of Rome during all this period of her seventy years' captivity? Cabals, tumults and civil wars destroyed her peace, cities revolted from the Popes—St. Peter's patrimony itself was invaded and ravaged by the Ghibellines—the papal authority was controverted by not a few of the members of the Church, and all the diligence and exertions of the inquisitors obedient to the Pope, were unable

to suppress the prevailing dissensions,—a beautiful picture, certainly, of unity and infallibility!

Gregory XI. transferred the chair of Peter to Rome in 1376. He died two years after, and the Cardinals, compelled by a violent tumult of the citizens of Rome, who feared that a French Pope might be elected, proclaimed Prenano, Archbishop of Bari, to be Gregory's successor. He is known as Urban VI. Shortly afterwards, however, the Cardinals repaired to Fondi, and there elected Robert, Count of Geneva, to the Pontificate, who assumed the name of Clement VII. But, by a previous election by this same electoral board, Urban VI. was declared to be in the chair. Thus, by the same electoral power, the Church was invested with two supreme heads, of conflicting claims. Both continued to exercise the office and authority of Popes; Clement establishes his See in the Babylon of papal captivity, and Urban occupies his chair in the city of Rome. France, Spain, Scotland, Sicily, and Cyprus, espouse the cause of the former; and the cause of the latter is maintained by the rest of Europe. Each Pope convenes his own Councils and passes his own decrees. Pope condemns Pope, and Council condemns Council. Nothing could give a more decided lie to the pretensions under review, than the state of things adverted to.

Again, we have what is called "the great western schism." For the space of fifty years the Church of Rome had two or three heads at the same time, each implacably averse to his opponent, excommunicating and anathematizing one another, and their respective adherents, in the most unmeasured terms. The French and Italian Cardinals constituted themselves two opposing factions. Urban VI. was succeeded by Boniface IX., and Clement VII. by Benedict XIII., the one residing in Rome, the other in Avignon. Boniface died, and was followed successively by Innocent VII. and Gregory XII.; but Benedict survived during the schism. The two reigning Pontiffs in 1406

were Benedict XIII. and Gregory XII. Various methods were adopted with a view to heal this lamentable schism; but the principal one was what is called the "Method of Cession." Both Pontiffs pledged themselves by oath, if it were necessary to secure the peace of the Church, to resign their offices; but both were guilty of persisting to violate their sworn obligations. And each Pope had a party. The King of France, however, became exasperated with Benedict, because of his refusal to fulfill the obligations of his oath, and caused him to flee from Avignon. The principal Cardinals, then, who had supported Benedict, united with Gregory, and a Council was called at Pisa, on the 25th of March, 1409, for the purpose, if possible, of healing the great division of the Church. In that Council, on the 5th of June, both the reigning Pontiffs were condemned as "*guilty of heresy, perjury, and contumacy, unworthy of the smallest tokens of honor and respect, and separated, ipso facto, from the communion of the Church;*" and on the 25th of the same month, they elected Peter of Candia, as Pope, who took the name of Alexander V. But the condemned Pontiffs were not to be driven thus from their dignity and standing in the Church. Each of them called a Council, and endeavored to resuscitate his lost honors, but in vain. Notwithstanding the efforts which were made to remedy this schism, it was not terminated till in the year 1426, when Clement VIII. resigned his pretensions to the Pontificate into the hands of Martin V., and Martin thus became the sole "Bishop of the Universal Church."

And is it thus that a Church, professing to be the only true Church of Christ and body of genuine believers on earth, in whose communion alone are embraced the family of the faithful, who claims for herself alone the distinguishing attributes of unity and infallibility—is it thus that such a Church must be torn asunder by contending factions in her midst? Is it thus she is involved in the disagreeable necessity of declaring her supreme head, her chosen suc-

cessors to the infallible Peter—the rock on which she is founded—as heretics, perjured and contumacious? Is it thus she is compelled to arraign her Popes, as leaders of factions in her pale, to divest them of their authority, and drive them from her ordinances? What, then, becomes of her boasted unity and infallibility?

But, still further—a Council previously summoned by Martin, commenced its session in Basil, on the 23d of July, 1431, under Eugene IV. The ostensible object of the Pope in calling this Council was, the reformation of the Church. The Council was exceedingly large, and its members soon manifested a determination to play no farce. They saw a crying necessity for the application of some remedy to the numerous evils then preying upon the vitals of the Church, and bringing distress and ruin upon the interests of religion. They, therefore, went to work like men, and the Pope soon began to tremble for his prerogatives. Undoubtedly he was very much disappointed in the character of the Council, and twice he essayed, ineffectually, to dissolve it. So far were the Council from rendering obedience to the decree of dissolution, which had been issued by the Pope against them, that they summoned the Pope himself to appear before them and answer for his conduct. He then positively pronounced the Council dissolved, and summoned another to meet at Ferrara, which was shortly afterwards transferred to Florence. But the Basil Council continued its sessions, and pronounced the Pope contumacious for disobedience. The Pope, in turn, excommunicated the members of the Basil Council, who—by way of rejoinder—on the 25th of June, 1429, deposed him from the papacy, and elected Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, in his room, known by the name of Felix V. Now, whether is Pope Eugene and his new Council, or the Council of Basil and their new Pope, to be recognized as the one supreme, infallible head of the Church of Rome? Pope and Council dissolve allegiance, and the deposed Pope calls another

Council, and the excommunicated Council elects another Pope. Here, then, are two Popes and two Councils; or, in other words, two regularly constituted Roman Churches, each claiming unity and infallibility as their exclusive prerogatives, and denying them to the other.

But the absurdity of the claim under consideration may be made still more apparent, when we appeal to some of the decisions of the Roman Church, through her Councils, upon subjects of doctrine.

On the single doctrine of *image worship* no less than seven Councils have pronounced their decisions, four of which decisions were against the worship of images, and three in favor. The Council of Constantinople, convoked in the year 754; the Council of the West, under Charlemagne, in the year 794; the Council of the East, under Emperor Leo, in the year 814; the Council of Paris, under Louis the Meek, in the year 824; all passed decrees condemning and abolishing the worship of images in the Churches. In opposition to these decisions, the second Council of Nice, convoked in 787; a Council at Constantinople, under the Empress Theodora, in the year 842; and another Council at Constantinople, in 879, approved and established the worship of images in the Churches. But it may be said that the decision of only one of these Councils received the signature of a presiding Pope, and that the decisions, therefore, of that Council alone, are entitled to the recognition of the Church as authoritative and infallible. Admit that Pope Adrian subscribed the decisions of the second Nicene Council, while the decisions of the other Councils were not thus favored. Is that fact sufficient to constitute the decisions of the second Nicene Council infallible, and all the other decisions, for the simple want of this fact, null and void? By what process of intelligible logic can we be conducted to the conclusion that Pope Adrian, a *fallible man*, is able to render *infallible* the previously *fallible* decisions of the second Nicene Council?

For such a power vested in the Pope, we require unquestionable divine authority, and the evidence of history.

But if the Church of Rome is one and infallible, her doctrine on this and on other subjects must always be the same; and if she is the true, and the only true, Church of Christ on earth, it must also consist with doctrines taught by the Apostles, and in the ages of the Church immediately succeeding the Apostles. But we know that images were not permitted in the Churches in the days of the Apostles, nor in those times nearly related to the apostolic era. The first agitation of the subject seems to have been early in the fourth century. Then the Council of Elvira passed a decree by which it was "strictly enjoined that neither paintings nor images, representing the person we adore, should be introduced into the Churches." But not long after, as corruptions began more and more to invade, images or pictures were introduced, in spite of this decree, not that they might be worshipped, but that they might serve as "a kind of book to the unlearned." Bishop Serenus, about the close of the sixth century, made himself notorious by his removal and destruction of the images at Marseilles, and Pope Gregory the Great commended him for his opposition, though he disapproved of the destruction of the images, believing that they might be of use to the unlearned. Yet the Pope was decidedly averse to their worship. Is this the doctrine of the Church of Rome now? Is she consistent with herself in the different ages of her history, or does the infallible truth, during one period, become execrable heresy in another?

But, further—in the year 1215 the fourth Council of Lateran, with the approbation of Pope Innocent III., decreed no less than *seventy new laws and doctrines*, among which was the doctrine of a *physical change in the eucharistic bread and wine*, which is known by the name of *transubstantiation*. This doctrine, then, has the full sign and seal of popish infallibility in its favor. But this was not al-

ways the doctrine of the Church. It was not conceived during several centuries of the primitive history of the Church. During at least the first five centuries, nothing but a moral change was supposed to take place in the elements of the Lord's supper, by virtue of their being set apart to a holy purpose. Paschasius Radbert, in the ninth century, was the first individual who openly avowed and published this most absurd dogma of popery. But it never became a doctrine of the Church till in the thirteenth century, when it was adopted by the Council of Lateran, and approved by Innocent, and made essential to salvation. But, on the contrary, the Church at one time maintained and propagated a very different doctrine. The Church of Rome, therefore, is not the same now with the Church of the first five centuries of the Christian era, and, of course, she is *not one and infallible*.

We might multiply historical proofs almost *ad infinitum*, establishing the absurdity of the Roman Church's claim to unity and infallibility, as her peculiar attributes. We might appeal to her thousands of little Christian *communities*, formed under her jurisdiction, and enjoying the patronage of Popes and illustrious men of the Church; we might review the history of the various mendicant orders which have been chartered from time to time, analyze their peculiar opinions on different subjects, and their modes of living, and their inveterate strifes and enmities against each other; we might produce, at least, the orders of the Franciscans, the Dominicans, the Carmelites and the Augustinians, and present them before the eyes of our readers, clad in their distinctive habiliments, their short and their long gowns, their wide and their narrow caps, their gay trappings and their miserable rags, their riches and their poverty, their motley creed; but we apprehend the picture would be too disgusting to be profitable.

What unity and infallibility are here! The unity is that

of disorganized chaos—the unity of elements that will not, cannot, combine—the unity of principles and practices as variant from each other as the principles and employments of angels are variant from those of the malignant spirits of perdition. The infallibility is that of “the man of sin,” the infallibility of Satan.

Our doctrine is, that unity and infallibility, as attributes of the Church of Christ on earth—his mystical body—centre in Jesus Christ alone. He is the King and Head—the *one supreme, infallible Head of the Church*. In Him, and in Him alone, we are one and infallible. He is the Head of the invisible Church, the only body of genuine believers, whether on earth or in heaven. To build the Church on the *rock Peter*, is not to build on the *rock Christ*. They who please may build on Peter, but “other foundation can no man lay than that is laid, which is Christ.” This is the foundation of the religion of the Bible, and on this foundation it will be eternally secure—“the gates of hell can never prevail against it.”

ARTICLE V.

DAVID N. LORD'S GEOLOGICAL WRITINGS.*

The writings of Mr. Lord, both theological and scientific, have, in some sections of our Church, been received with much favor and confidence. The bold, earnest manner in which he announces his propositions, and the fear-

* We cheerfully give place in our journal to this interesting and able article, and would invite the reader's attention to it; although we do not, of course, pretend to be competent judges of the scientific aspects of it, and although, moreover, we cannot say that we are satisfied with its arguments respecting the meaning of certain places in the Scriptures.

less, confident tone with which he maintains them, are well calculated to secure the sympathy of the general reader. Whatever else may be denied to our author, an honesty of purpose, joined to a deep and abiding conviction of the truth and importance of his doctrines, whether in religion or science, must be conceded to him by all.

His "Theological and Literary Journal," which he has now edited through its twelfth volume, passes under review most of the controversies which have agitated the Church, from within or without, during the period of its continuance. His defence of the truth of the Bible, whenever and however assailed, according to his interpretation of it, is open, manly, courageous. He hesitates not to set his lance and run a tilt with the most practiced knights in every realm of thought. It is not strange, therefore, that in this grand tournament his watchful eye should have occasionally singled out, as a special victim for his keenest lance, the young and somewhat presuming, yet noble and heroic, science of Geology.

The great and unpardonable sin of this young science, in his estimation, is the heresy it teaches touching the antiquity of our globe. In fact, we are justified in supposing that this one sin of geology stands out in this author's mind beyond and above all other heresies, for he places it in the fore front of the catalogue of moral monsters he has slain through the medium of his journal.

The idealistic atheism of Kant; the Pantheism of Swedenborg, Schleiermacher, Schelling and Hegel; the schemes of their disciples, Parker, Newman, Bushnell, Park and Nevin; and the development theory of Neander and Schaff, all occupy in his list the place of but second-rate offences, when compared with this "modern doctrine of geologists respecting the age of the world."* To his essays and

* See our author's notice of the "Theological and Literary Journal," at the close of his *Geognosy*.

reviews on this subject he refers the public, as constituting the first, and, no doubt, in his esteem, the highest, claim of his "Theological and Literary Journal" to popular favor.

The truth is, this monster doctrine must be slain, and no less than five lusty blows are dealt out—with a heavy hand—in one single volume of the Journal. It would be interesting and instructive, perhaps, to pause and examine the scientific skill with which each of these blows were severally directed, and to enquire how much of life could still remain in a thing so much belabored by one so much in earnest as Mr. Lord.

But, without attempting now to examine, in detail, the fundamental principles involved in any one of them, let us glance for a moment at some of the outlines of a single example. While reviewing Dr. Hitchcock's Religion of Geology—in the fifth volume of the Journal—our author takes up his arguments upon the primary condition of our globe, and disposes of its successive links as follows:

In the first place, says Mr. Lord, the earth could not have been created, either gaseous or molten, "in a state of fusion from heat," for that would be "a contradiction to nature." To pass over the philosophy of this case, and interpret its force by the aid of an illustration, it amounts to this: that God could not have created *water, or aqueous vapor*, without doing violence to the laws which he prescribed to himself in the conduct of nature, for no one need be told that water is ice in a "state of fusion from heat." This simple illustration is sufficient for the present.

In the second place, Mr. Lord concedes to Dr. Hitchcock, for the sake of the argument, the creation of his molten world, and then proceeds to press him with a second dilemma, which he regards as equally perplexing with the first, for, even if such a world existed, he says, "the laws to which the matter of the globe is subjected would have rendered the formation of a crust upon such a fiery ocean impossible." Such matter, to condense his

statement, would have cooled, solidified, contracted, and sunk to the centre. On such an earth no crust could have been formed till all below was solid.

It is strange that Mr. Lord, who lays so much stress on facts, as opposed to theories, if he could not see the philosophy of this case, should have entirely forgotten all that has been written on the subject of molten lava, which is but the matter of the earth in the state of "igneous fusion" contemplated by his argument. The facts, as well as the philosophy, involved, are conclusive against him. A few examples will suffice. The Rev. Titus Coan, Missionary to Hawaii, describing, in "Silliman's Journal," the great eruption of Mauna Loa, in 1855, testifies that the immense sea of lava, several miles wide by sixty long, became rapidly incrustated on its surface, and "that the incandescent stream *flowed nearly under this crust like water under ice.*" "We could even tread," he adds, "on a fresh stream of lava only one hour after it had poured out from a boiling caldron, so soon does the lava harden in contact with the air.

Again, in a letter to Prof. Dana, after stating that "for sixty-five days the great summit furnace on Mauna Loa has been in awful blast," in describing his visit to the scene of the eruption, he says: "At night *we slept upon the lava*, above the line of vegetation, with the heavens for our canopy and the stars for our lamps. From this high watch-tower we could see the brilliant fire-works, far above and far beneath us, as the dazzling fusions rushed down its burning duct, revealed here and there by an opening through its *rocky roof.*"

Indeed, Mr. Coan and his companions walked about with impunity over this lava current, examining its deep gorges, that opened down into its glowing fluid depths, while the thin crust upon which they stepped would spring and yield as a pellicle of ice upon the water. Dr. Clark, also, in describing the eruption of Vesuvius, in 1793, testifies to

the same effect. While ascending by the side of the current of liquid lava to the chasm from which it issued, his life becoming endangered by noxious vapors and volcanic stones, "covering my face with my hat," he says, "I rushed upon the lava, and crossed safely to the other side." It would be useless to multiply examples. This is the common record of all who describe molten lava. It solidifies first on the surface, and in one eruption of *Ætna*, it is stated, by De La Beche, that the molten matter was *in motion* even after a lapse of ten years, when, of course, the surface was solidified, and even habitable.

But, in the third place, Mr. Lord, waiving both of Dr. Hitchcock's preceding absurdities—first, that matter may be created molten; and, secondly, that this molten matter may harden at the surface—next urges against his theory a third difficulty, which he regards as no less fatal than the other two, viz: "that such a globe, if it could have solidified at the surface at all, would necessarily, from the want of a disturbing agent beneath, have remained at the geological level at which it was formed, and could not have filled the office, therefore, which his theory assigns, of furnishing, by disintegration, the materials of the present strata." Such a molten globe, Mr. Lord argues, like any other liquid mass, must assume a water level, and in its fiery depths there could be no materials unconsumed, and no gases formed to disturb and upheave its smooth and rounded crust when once solidified: and hence there could be no running streams, no moving to and fro of washing currents, to drift its disintegrated materials into strata.

Such a view seems reasonable enough, but, as in each of the other cases, it is only the surface view; for this cooling globe would gradually contract, and its crust become thus variously contorted and twisted. Add to this the swelling tides of the molten sea below, and, above all, the waters precipitated from the upper air upon the cooling crust, which would soon percolate down to the heat, and be con-

verted into steam, and we have abundant causes for convulsions, earthquakes, and upheavals, disturbing the crust and producing currents every where.

But again: our author generously waives all preceding difficulties, and grants that the molten globe could be created, encrusted, and washed into strata, only to find the fourth link in this ill-omened chain as rotten as either of the others. To him "it is demonstrably certain that at the upheaval and dislocation of the strata, which took place at the elevation of our present mountains, the fragments into which they were broken would have sunk by their immense weight into the floor beneath."

These successive positions show the expulsive power of a foregone conclusion, and lamentably illustrate how the human mind, in its search after truth, may be so far pre-occupied as to exclude from its range the most evident relations, and confound things the most diverse. The radical error of Mr. Lord in this fourth position is, not only the ignoring of all the facts recorded of molten lava, but the confounding, also, of the most marked and evident distinctions between different kinds of fluid matter. He says, that to suppose these fractured and upheaved strata would not immediately sink to the bottom, "is as solecistical and absurd as it were to suppose that if similar masses of granite were thrown upon our PRESENT OCEANS they would swim, instead of sinking till they met a solid base."

There seems to be here no knowledge of the difference between the physical or mechanical properties of water and molten lava—that the one passes suddenly from the state of a perfect fluid to that of a solid, while the other passes gradually through the same fluid, into the hardened condition, retaining, even from the beginning, much of its coherency and buoyant power. In Dr. Clarke's account, to which we have already referred, he gives a statement of the carrying power of a "clear, vivid torrent of lava in perfect fusion," issuing from the very crater of Vesuvius.

He says, "light bodies of five, ten and fifteen pounds weight, made little or no impression on it at the source, but bodies of sixty, seventy, and even eighty pounds, were seen to form a kind of bed on the surface of the lava, and float away with it." This looks but little like our "present oceans." And if such be the power of lava in "perfect fusion," what may we expect when it has become solidified to great depths? In point of fact, upon many large lava currents, miniature mountains, with belching craters and glowing lava streams, are formed all over the hardened crust, constituting one of the grandest and most imposing features of the scene. Facts like these need no comment, and sufficiently answer any speculations Mr. Lord can offer. It must be admitted, that it is not a little amusing to find our author, after all the scientific crudities he has here indulged in, gravely asking, in the conclusion of this discussion, "Had Dr. Hitchcock been involved in the *profoundest ignorance* of chemistry, mechanics, and the gravitating power, could he have fallen into greater or more fatal blunders?"

We thus see with what an unmerciful hand our author deals out his scientific blows. Not content with crushing Dr. Hitchcock's theory, by demonstrating, first, that his molten globe could never have, by any possibility, been created, he proceeds, secondly, as if he would heap Ossa upon Pelion, to show that, even if created, it never could have solidified at the surface, and then, in the third place, he essays, as if he would pile the Andes upon Ossa, to prove that, if solidified at the surface, it never could have been washed into strata; and now, by a grand climax, as if the Rocky Mountains must be heaved upon the Andes, it is "demonstrably certain" that at the upheaval of our mountains the granite masses would have plunged to the bottom, as similar masses thrown into our "present oceans." Thus, as if with *malice aforethought*, he has, at one single attack, slain this offensive doctrine four several times, each

time resuscitating it, that he might slay it again, till it was dead, dead, dead, dead. How much of life it has lost, the reader is left to judge.

We will now pass on for the present, regarding these, perhaps, as intended to be considered only side-blows, designed to do good by the way, while the great object to be attended to was of a more theological and literary, than scientific character. And we adopt this course the more cheerfully, because Mr. Lord has, elsewhere, summoned his entire strength upon this same subject, and, gathering up all his scientific resources, has given us, in the form of a separate and complete book, a systematic *exposé* of his method of annihilating, not only this "modern doctrine" of geologists, but geology itself, as a science. To turn, then, from the various articles in the Journal, written, it may be, with haste for its quarterly issues, to this more matured embodiment of his views—which is, indeed, but a recast, in a more systematic form, of what the Journal contains—is to do what justice to Mr. Lord would seem to demand.

In the Journal he is writing as the editor of a theological and literary periodical, and as it is impossible that one man should be an adept in every thing, his articles may have been offered as the best that could be expected from one unskilled in scientific research, but here he appears before us as the professed scientific teacher, discussing grave scientific questions, and, of course, claims to be tried by a scientific standard. To this standard let us appeal.

Before entering upon the examination of the principles which underlie the various discussions in the volume before us, we will premise of the book itself, that its title—"Geognosy, or the Facts and Principles of Geology against Theories"—sufficiently suggests to the mind that a conservatism which ever appeals to the law and to the testimony, and which carefully distinguishes between facts and fancies, between settled principles and crude vagaries,

is to preside over the entire work. Nothing is to be admitted for the guidance of our faith here but established landmarks—those stubborn things called “*facts*,” and those equally stubborn things, built upon the eternal foundations of truth, called “*principles*.” No mere “theory,” however well received, is to avail us here; it is not even to be thought of, that we should be borne onward—like the gossamer upon his thread—by those flimsy things called hypotheses. The warp and woof of this entire web is to be made of sterner stuff. And so our good people seem to have regarded it. In less than two years from its first appearance, so eager was the public demand, so hearty the approval of its “facts” and “principles,” as to justify a second edition, as like the first as one black pea is like another—not a word added or subtracted—not a fact or a principle found, in the slightest degree, defective—not even another preface to the new edition needed. And, although five years have now elapsed since its first appearance, not a single review, which we have any where heard of, has been attempted by any one.

Truly, this looks as if there might be some foundation for the opinion, which we have heard more than once expressed in high places, that the argument is unanswerable. It might, even, in the minds of some, give a coloring of probability to the statement made by a highly intelligent and well informed clergyman, who gravely maintained that the American Association for the Advancement of Science, at one of its annual meetings, deliberately sat in secret session discussing the possibility of a successful answer to this work, and, after a full and free consideration of the subject, adjourned in hopeless despair! It is true, that no answer, direct and definite, to Mr. Lord’s argument, as a whole, has been attempted by any one, as far as we know; but, whether the true reason is to be found in the suggestions above made, we shall be better able to decide as we

proceed. So much for the antecedents of the work; the conduct of the argument we may now examine.

In his first chapter, our author addresses himself at once to the main subject, which, we have before seen, eclipses, in his estimation, every other in importance and magnitude, viz: "The Geological Theory of the Age of the Earth." Here, like a wise master builder, at the beginning of his work he carefully lays down all the foundation stones upon which he expects to erect his superstructure, and from these he proceeds, as from stand-points, in his second, third and fourth chapters, to point out how utterly irreconcilable is this theory with the teachings of the sacred historian, demonstrating—in passing—to his own satisfaction, that geology is altogether without reliable laws and principles, and is, in no sense, entitled to be considered as a science. In his fifth, sixth and seventh chapters, he enumerates the difficulties of geologists, and in his eighth, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth, discusses their false theories in regard to the sources of materials and the formation of the strata, and in the four concluding chapters elucidates his own views as to how these strata must have been rapidly formed from materials derived from the interior of the earth. Upon all these points Mr. Lord essays to instruct his readers, with an extravagance of language, and an earnestness and decision of manner, that is quite unusual, and which might be readily mistaken as *prima facie* evidence of a thorough acquaintance with all the scientific, as well as religious, principles involved.

We will first examine his right to speak by authority on physical questions: and, that we may the more clearly see his qualifications to perform the task of instructing us upon these grave issues, and thus be enabled the better to determine how far to adopt his conclusions, let us attempt to follow him in a few of his discussions.

In the first chapter of his book, as we have intimated, he lays down the criteria by which geological theories are to be tested, and gives, in succession, six characteristics which must distinguish geological hypotheses and reasonings, in order that the inferences from them, as to the age of the world, may be legitimate. Most of these characteristics, we may admit in advance, are simply truisms. For instance, the first characteristic given is—"They must be consistent with, not contravene, the laws of nature." This proposition needs no defence. It commends itself to the simplest understanding; and, of course, our author adopts it as his guide in all his reasonings; and from such a standpoint we can but anticipate a most luminous and "consistent" exposition of the character and operation of these "laws of nature." We will see. He proceeds to illustrate the meaning of his rule, thus laid down, as follows: "Geologists have no more right to assume that it (the earth) was imbued originally with thousands and millions of times its present sum of heat, than they have to assume that it had thousands and millions of times its present bulk of water, air, quartz, lime, or any other ingredient that enters into its composition." Observe, that our object is not to discuss the truth or falsehood of the hypothesis here laid down, as such. It may be true or not—geologists differ. But, at present, we have only to do with our author's position, that it is inconsistent with the laws of nature. Are we to believe that it would "contravene the laws of nature" for the earth to have been in any past time, in any degree, warmer than it is now? The illustration given evidently includes this thought; for, though it says "thousands and millions of times," yet it is clear that if the laws of nature are violated at all, it is not by the number of times the earth was hotter, but by the fact that it was hotter in any degree, whether twice, thrice, or a million of times. But wherein are any of the laws of nature contravened by the supposition that the earth was warmer, however much or

little, at some previous date, than it is now? Does the economy of nature suffer violence when any thing changes its temperature? Every day's experience can answer this question. As a matter of fact, the earth, and every thing about it, is constantly changing its amount of heat, by receiving it from the sun and other sources, at one time faster, and at another slower, than it is radiated. Uniformity in this particular is contrary to all experience and philosophy alike: so that the hypothesis that the earth, or any of its parts, were ever vastly hotter than at present, cannot be thus settled as absurd in advance, but must be determined by its own proper evidence. That Mr. Lord confounds the mundane with the cosmical features of our earth in this discussion, is evident from his reference of heat to the same category with water, air, quartz, lime, etc. The last belong to our earth alone, and, it is admitted, may not be greatly different in amount now from what they were at their first creation; because, when they are destroyed by the thousand chemical and vital forces, every where operating around us, the elements of which they were composed still remain, and may be again reunited into similar substances. But not so with heat; it has cosmical relations. But an instant ago it may have visited us in the sunbeam, or from a distant star; in the following instant it may be speeding its arrowy flight back into the bosom of unfathomable space, never to return; and, whilst it is probable that there is not in the aggregate a single degree more of heat now existing in its various modifications than when it was first created, the statement can be made only of our entire universe, taken as a whole, while its separate parts are ever changing both their absolute and relative temperature. Thus it will be seen that this first geological rule laid down by our author has been violated, not by the geologists, but by Mr. Lord himself.

Again: in a second attempt to apply this same canon to nature, he says: "It is to contradict the laws of matter, like-

wise, to assume that the world was created in the form of gas." He then proceeds to argue the proposition, as follows: "Matter, with the exception of a few species, such as the elements of air and water, is raised to a gaseous form only by intense heat. But heat is naturally latent. It is developed, or made perceptible, only by chemical action. To suppose the world to have been created in a gaseous form is, therefore, to suppose it to have been created in a condition in which it could not, according to the present laws of matter, have existed, except as a secondary state; or, as a consequence of the action of its elements on each other after they were created. The supposition, therefore, contradicts the laws of heat and the formation of gaseous bodies." If our author had not elsewhere (Vol. V., No. III., of *Theo. Journal*) expressed these same views, even more fully and explicitly, we should have been in doubt whether these words do indeed convey his meaning. We could not otherwise have assumed that one who speaks so confidently upon all matters relating to physical questions could have grouped into one short paragraph so much of error—and error, too, which lies at the very base of a range of geological investigations, and which must entirely unfit its professor for any successful physical research. The gaseous form of matter, argues Mr. Lord, requires intense heat. Heat is naturally latent, and requires chemical action to develop it; therefore, chemical action is necessary to the gaseous form of matter; and hence, as chemical action could not have preceded the creation of matter, matter could not be created gaseous. Such, in a condensed form, is an argument several times repeated in Mr. Lord's geological writings. Let us examine its premises.

First of all, underlying the whole argument, is an erroneous view of the nature of liquids and gases. Mr. Lord says that "intense heat" is necessary to the gaseous form of matter. But he evidently can mean only uncombined or sensible heat, and not latent heat, for this could

hardly be called intense; besides, he says "heat is naturally latent," and if this naturally latent heat could cause the gaseous state, this state could not be said, with any propriety, by Mr. Lord, "to contradict the laws of nature." It is clear, therefore, that he considers the gaseous form of matter as entirely due to that developed, external heat, which can be detected by the thermometer, and is "perceptible" to the senses.

That this is utterly at variance with all the facts and teachings of science, Mr. Lord could have learned from any elementary text-book in physics. That it is this naturally latent heat, and not that which is "developed, or made perceptible," that gives their peculiar form to gaseous as well as liquid substances, is evident from the facts accompanying these changes. A single illustration will explain the case.

Take a portion of ice, and gradually raise its temperature by the application of heat to the containing vessel. The ice will gradually rise in temperature till it reaches the melting point, (32° Fh.) At this temperature it will remain, as additional heat is continually added, till all is reduced to the liquid state. As soon as this point is attained, the temperature again rises gradually, as heat is applied, till it reaches the boiling point, where the ascent of the thermometer is again arrested till all of the water is evaporated, or turned into the gaseous form. Now, what becomes of the heat that is applied to the ice during all the time it is melting, after it reaches 32° ? It does not raise the temperature of the water; it cannot be found by the thermometer; it cannot be detected by the senses. You observe, as the only result of its application, that an amount of ice has disappeared, and a quantity of water been produced—a quantity, too, in exact proportion to the heat that has been lost. And so, also, when the water has reached the boiling point, and steam is formed, the heat that is afterwards added cannot be detected, either in the

water or the steam, by any of our senses, or by thermometric examinations. Here, again, you only observe an amount of steam produced, proportioned to the lost heat. The necessary conclusion is, that this lost, this latent, heat, produced the change, has converted ice into the liquid, and water into the gaseous form.

If further proof be needed that this is the true philosophy of the case, reconvert this steam into water, and this water into ice, and all the latent heat again reappears—is “developed, or made perceptible.” What is thus true of ice and water, is equally true of all substances, while passing into the liquid or gaseous form, so that, universally, as the change to the liquid and gaseous states does not begin to take place till the heat begins to become latent, and the amount of change is exactly proportioned to the amount of heat made latent; and, further, as this gaseous and liquid state is immediately lost when the latent heat is removed, it is clearly demonstrable that the *latent* heat is the cause of the change in question; or, to construct our expression with reference to Mr. Lord’s statement, we would say, that, so far from the development of naturally latent heat being necessary to produce the gaseous form of matter, the development of this latent heat necessarily destroys the gaseous state.

Having thus shown that Mr. Lord’s fundamental idea, which assumes the development of latent heat by chemical action to be necessary to the gaseous form of matter, is an entire misapprehension, his whole argument, with its broad conclusion, of course falls to the ground; and we might dismiss this point in his physics, if our only object was to expose its fallacy. But there are some of the details in the argument which so fitly illustrate Mr. Lord’s method of dealing with physical questions, that we cannot forbear alluding to them.

In the quotation given above, it may be seen with what a bold tread our author marches right onward to conclu-

sions which he had predetermined should be established, trampling under foot every physical consideration which might in any way oppose his progress. For example: of the nature and development of heat, he treats thus summarily—"Heat is *naturally latent*." "It is developed, or made perceptible, *only by chemical action*." Upon these two short, compact sentences, he rests the whole weight of his favorite argument; but, from what department of physics he obtained these supports for the broad superstructure he has erected upon them, it is difficult to divine. We will examine them separately. Suppose it be true, in the first place, as Mr. Lord insists, that heat is "naturally latent;" we have shown that it is this "naturally latent" heat in combination with a substance, that renders it gaseous. Then it follows that, as heat must have been created in its natural state, which is here said to be the latent state, the matter which was created with it, and contained in it, must have necessarily been created gaseous. The very proposition our author is laboring to controvert. In a former argument, according to our author, God could not create water or steam, because they are in the liquid and gaseous states—now, he cannot create ice, because it must contain its quota of that "naturally latent" heat, which prevents the solid, and necessitates the gaseous, condition. How, then, could we have been supplied with that most essential and delightful of all beverages, found in the limpid purling brook? But we only admit the latent to be the more natural condition of heat, to gratify Mr. Lord, and that, as he cannot find another antagonist, like the Kilkenny cats, he may be allowed to devour himself. There is, however, no conceivable pretext, either in nature or reason, for regarding one condition of heat more natural than another. Nature is but the summation of an external manifestation of God's will and way towards the children of men, and that God, who made nature and all her laws, and who, by the energizing word of His power, maintains and upholds

them still, has varied and multiplied uses for this subtle agent, and employed it, no doubt, from the beginning, in all its forms, as infinite wisdom saw would best secure the ends of His providence and the good of His creatures.

The second of those terse and oracular-like sentences upon the nature of heat, quoted above, and upon which our author founds his great argument against the creation of gases, is, that this naturally latent heat is "developed, or made perceptible, only by *chemical action*."

Need any schoolboy be told, in this age of material advancement and physical research, that this statement is an egregious blunder, that heat is as often the cause as the effect of chemical action, and that all the physical forces, indeed, seem to be mutually convertible into each other? Need any common mechanic be told of heat "developed, or made perceptible," without chemical action by friction, by compression, by electricity, by galvanism, by magnetism? It is incredible, that such statements should have passed through two editions of a work claiming to be scientific, upon any other supposition than that it is essential to our author's purpose, and cannot be dispensed with. If chemical action be not necessary to sensible heat, and sensible heat necessary to the gaseous state, the world, so far as Mr. Lord can see, may have been created gaseous, and this monstrous "modern doctrine" of the earth's antiquity triumph. Such a result could not be tolerated. We do not mean that Mr. Lord wilfully perverts the argument, for it is evident that the error is mainly due to a want of acquaintance with the scientific principles involved, although partly, also, no doubt, to a sort of monomania, which makes this offensive doctrine loom up before his mind, out of all just proportion to things around it, and unfits him to see it in its proper relations.

To make this evident, we need only refer the reader to the 114th page of the *Geognosy*, where Mr. Lord, in his zeal to press home the difficulties of the geologists, tem-

porarily forgets his hobby, and so far recovers from his mental obliquity as to flatly contradict all that he has here written about the possibility of creating gases. On that page, in discussing the history of the second day of the Mosaic creation, he begins by the statement that "This great act was the *creation of the atmosphere.*" He then goes on to explain the atmosphere to be the ordinary air, with its reflecting and refracting properties. Can Mr. Lord possibly mean that air is not a gas? Surely, his infatuation cannot run so far. Then, what does all his labored effort about the creation of gases, in this first chapter of his work, amount to? Simply nothing, or less.

We have thus far considered what our author has to say, only under one of the six heads which he lays down as containing the true principles which should characterize geological reasoning; and, after such an exhibition of contradictory positions, and absurd scientific statements, made under one single head, the reader, no doubt, begins to wonder at the antecedents which we have given of our book, and it would not be strange if, ere this, he had begun to suspect, also, the reason that the Scientific Association—if, indeed, it ever noticed the work—neglected to answer it. It cannot be necessary, in order to form a proper estimate, either of our author's fitness for the task he has assumed, or the manner in which he has discharged it, that we should attempt to follow him, after what we have already written, through all his discussion under each of the six rules which he has laid down as tests of scientific accuracy. "*Ex uno disce omnes,*" is a maxim which we may safely follow in the case before us; for while, as in the example we have just considered, each of the rules are, in themselves, with one exception, perhaps, sufficiently evident to be considered axiomatic, yet our author, in his application and illustration of them, never fails to commit blunders as obnoxious to criticism as any we have endeavored to point out. It greatly astonishes one to find a

practiced author six times taking his starting point from such simple premises, and being unable to make two successive steps in the right direction. A blind man in a crooked path could do no worse. We will spare our readers the effort to follow him.

But, as we are now considering our author's *scientific* qualifications for instructing the public, we will select, somewhat at random, from the abundant materials before us, a few additional points from other parts of his book, which may serve to help us to a conclusion. That the tests may not be too severe, we will give the preference to simple elementary questions, such as lie within the range of ordinary observation and intelligence, even where there are no pretensions to scientific scholarship. We have seen what our author thinks of the subject of heat, and how it produces the liquid and gaseous state, and it must not be forgotten that heat is one of the prime agents in effecting geological changes, and that a correct knowledge of its nature is fundamental to a fitness for investigating these changes. He may have found that subject too hard. Then let us question him a little on common air. The atmosphere, it will be admitted, connected as it is, in large measure, with the surface geology of our globe, is a subject sufficiently relevant and simple.

What, then, is his answer, if we inquire why aqueous vapor ascends into the air? "The heat of the sun," he says, "occasioning evaporation in a form *lighter than the atmosphere*, the vapor ascends in an invisible shape."—(p. 115.) Plausible enough, again, as usual, but utterly at fault in principle. The fact that invisible vapor is "lighter than the atmosphere," is not the cause of its ascent. If it were specifically heavier than air, it would still rise. The invisible vapor of the atmosphere is a proper gas, and subject to the laws of gaseous diffusion. In a mixture of gases, or vapors, the specific gravity does not produce or prevent either ascent or descent. The lighter gases will mix downward as well

as upward, and the heavier ones, also, in either direction. Carbonic acid, for instance, is heavier than air, and yet it rises, and is found diffused through the atmosphere at all heights to which man has attained. Indeed, in some sense, a space filled with air, or vapor, is like a vacuum to any other gas or vapor. Introduce water into a jar containing air, and as much vapor will rise into the space as if no air were present; then introduce, in addition, alcohol, ether, and the other liquids, and as much vapor will rise from each as if the jar were entirely empty of the others. The vapors will rise into and fully saturate the space, from top to bottom, without any regard to their respective specific weights. We may add that, so far from the atmosphere assisting vapors to ascend, it offers mechanical difficulties to their ascent, for they will rise faster into a vacuum than when the air is present.

But, lest we may have mistaken Mr. Lord's meaning, when we suppose him to ascribe the ascent of invisible vapors to the presence of heavier air, let us follow him to the next page of the Geognosy. Here he not only reiterates his doctrine, but attempts to establish upon it the interpretation of the second day's work in the Mosaic account of the creation. While arguing that this work was the creation of our atmosphere, he says: "If the atmosphere had been created along with the earth and the ocean, it would be inexplicable that some evaporation had not immediately taken place, and mists and clouds become, in a measure, diffused through the sky."

This is even worse than before. It would be a grievous thing, indeed, if the trustworthiness of our interpretation of Moses rested upon no better support than this philosophy of Mr. Lord. Before, he only ascribed the *ascent* of vapors to the atmosphere, but now "*evaporation*" itself is due to the same. This is really traveling too far from the record to deserve a serious answer. All evaporation takes place most rapidly where there is no air at all. Were it

not for the frequent and important uses which Mr. Lord boldly makes of this blunder, we could not feel justified in considering it further. We have just seen one example;—we will take but one other.

As he settled the second day's creative work with this doctrine, so he disposes, with equal facility, of the first. In answering Dr. Hitchcock's views upon that creation, he says: "But, no less unfortunately for his position, there was no atmosphere in existence to *support the vapors* above the waters, and render such an *accumulation of clouds possible* as to intercept the rays of the sun." Such frequent repetitions, in such important connections, of the same error, each time with accumulating force, can leave no doubt as to the proper interpretation of our author's meaning. In the former cases, the atmosphere was essential to the elevation, and even the existence, of invisible vapors, and now we are informed that its presence is necessary to render the support and accumulation of clouds "possible." From what we have already said, it will be clearly seen that if Mr. Lord's atmosphere (by which he always means the air) were entirely annihilated, producing a perfect vacuum above us, almost immediately an atmosphere of invisible vapors would occupy the vacuum, in which clouds might and would accumulate, to intercept the rays of the sun.

It would be easy to multiply examples of similar misconception and misapplication of the most elementary principles in science, if more were needed to settle the question we are now attempting to solve, viz: the extent of our author's acquaintance with the physical laws and properties of matter most intimately involved in geological changes, and thus his competency to discuss those changes. But it cannot now be needed. We have seen his entire misapprehension of the nature and laws of latent and sensible heat,—of the gaseous, liquid, and solid states of bodies,—of the general conditions of molten lava,—in a word, of almost every thing that is fundamental to a right

comprehension of the great igneous changes which the primary and metaphoric rocks disclose in the bowels of the earth. These must entirely unfit him for any competent judgment in this portion of the geologist's field. We have seen, no less clearly, his erroneous views in regard to the common atmosphere—its nature and capabilities—its relation to evaporation, heat and moisture. These, also, must utterly disqualify him for any proper criticism upon those great surface changes, wrought by the wearing, disintegrating and stratifying influences of atmospheric agents. This must suffice for our present object. Let us next examine, briefly, Mr. Lord's system of geology.

It could not be expected, after such an exhibition of mistaken views upon elementary principles, that much success could attend our author's efforts to give scientific explanations of the varied and complicated phenomena involved in the science of geology. To succeed here, when he has so signally failed in the first principles that underlie the investigations, would be simply impossible. It would be to erect an edifice without foundations—to build a castle in the air. Our readers will not, therefore, look for any effort, on our part, to follow Mr. Lord in all the vain attempts he makes to construct such castles. To examine in detail his misstatements of fact and incorrect geological reasonings and even worse geological inferences, would be to review all the points in the science involving the false physical views we have already considered, which would well nigh cover the whole range of geology. Nor can we suppose it necessary, in the estimation of any one who has followed us in the preceding discussion, that such an examination should be entered into. When our author's premises are wrong, his conclusions must be false, unless a double error puts him right. We will give, therefore, but a few specimens of Mr. Lord's geological views. The first shall be stated as much in his own language as possible, that he may have all the credit of it.

In his *Geognosy* (p. 131), while discussing the difficulties of geologists respecting the elevation of land on the third day of creation, he says: "The whole condition, both of those primitive masses (mountains) and the strata which they uphold, forbids the idea that they have undergone *more than one upheaval* above the lands by which they are surrounded."

Again (p. 171), he says: "The Bible represents that at the deluge the whole earth was overspread by the ocean, which implies that the *mountains and hills were depressed*, and near a level produced between the bed of the ocean and the continents and islands."

And again (p. 169): "The present system of mountains and hills must, indisputably, therefore, have received at least their *main upheaval since the flood reached its height*."

Here are three separate statements. Mr. Lord assures us, in the first place, that the mountains have "never undergone more than one elevation." Then he informs us that at the flood they were "depressed," which, of course, implies a previous elevation; and, again, that after the flood they received their "main upheaval." What, indulgent reader, do you think of these statements? Remember, that Mr. Lord investigates according to the "strictest rules of the Baconian Philosophy." It must strike every one as at least singular, that a practiced writer should thus contradict himself, in the plainest terms, in the space of a few pages. Indeed, our author seems, like a man at sea, drifting without chart or compass, and ready for any port that promises safety. He is evidently sailing between Sylla and Charybdis—the facts of geology on the one hand, and that horrible "modern doctrine" of the geologists on the other. If he admits the facts, he must adopt the doctrine, and hence he plies all his oars, with might and main, that he may not be wrecked upon the one nor engulfed in the other. To admit the many alternate elevations and depressions of the earth's surface, which the

facts indicate, would be to increase the presumption in favor of its great antiquity. This must be avoided, at all hazards, and hence the dilemma into which our author has here fallen. But this is no isolated case. That awful maelstrom, in which he is constantly in danger of being engulfed, has so unsettled his nerves that he is every where running, bolt upright, against some jutting rock.

In his discussion of the coal formation, though sometimes a single field extends over many thousands of square miles, and there are sometimes in one locality as many as one hundred seams of coal, alternating with stratified sandstone and shale, and these seams, too, according to our author, "of pure vegetable matter," still, he can see no presumption in favor of any great time or slow processes; for, he argues, "had they been transported and slowly accumulated there, by streams and currents, charged by detritus from continents or islands, there would have been a large mixture in them of earthy particles, such as now takes place in the deposition of trees, plants and leaves at the mouths of rivers. But no such foreign ingredients are mingled with them. The main beds consist, throughout their whole mass, of *pure vegetable matter*. These facts demonstrate, therefore, both that they were transported from other sites, and that their accumulation, deposition, and the first steps of their fossilization, were accomplished with *great rapidity*."

To his position, that, if they had been "slowly accumulated" at the mouths of rivers, as in the present day, they must have been mixed with earthy matter, we have no objections; but by what process this earthy matter could be excluded, when the transportation is accomplished with "*great rapidity*," Mr. Lord must be left to explain. Our philosophy and observation alike teach us that the swollen streams, which, during freshets, carry down "trees, plants and leaves" to the mouths of rivers with the greatest rapidity, are likewise most charged with mud and mire.

But Mr. Lord sees no difficulty here. He gulps down facts, philosophy and all, and seems to digest them well. The great coal field of the North-West, covering an area of fifty-five thousand square miles, offers no difficulty. If we refer to his Journal, we will find that he fully explains it all. By a sudden upheaval of the waters of the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, the angry floods sweep over the primeval forests of the Rocky Mountains and the plains of the West, on the one hand, and of the Alleghany Mountains and the intervening States on the other, carrying every thing before them, and rushing madly on with all their accumulated weight of uprooted forests, till, by a fearful collision, the surging waves meet and mingle, spend their strength, and deposit their enormous burthen of mingled trees, shrubs, and mud. And thus we have formed to hand, quickly enough, it must be admitted, for any practical purpose, the materials of an extensive coal field, *nicely stratified*, and "the main beds" of which "consist, throughout their whole mass, of *purely vegetable matter!*" When every thing about the deposit—the acknowledged purity of the coal, the fine preservation of the tenderest and most delicate parts of plants and leaves, and the regularity of the strata—shows that the formation must have taken place in quiet waters, such illustrations of the process by which the deposit might be made, are much more calculated to amuse than instruct. It seems as if our author thought that all which could be necessary was that the requisite materials be gotten together, by whatever process might be most convenient, and then, that the mysterious forces of nature would carefully digest and arrange the whole, according to the most approved plan. The whole scheme reminds us of an incident related by Prof. Schluden. "Some years ago," he says, "I was very intimate with the directing physician of a large Lunatic Asylum, and I used industriously to avail myself of the liberty I thus obtained to visit at will the house and its inhabitants. One morning I entered the room of a

madman whose constantly varying hallucinations specially interested me: I found him crouching down by the stove, watching with close attention a sauce-pan, the contents of which he was constantly stirring. At the noise of my entrance he turned round, and, with a face of great importance, whispered, 'Hush! hush! don't disturb my little pigs; they will be ready directly.' Full of curiosity to know whither his diseased imagination had now led him, I approached nearer. 'You see,' said he, with the mysterious expression of an alchemist, 'here I have black pudding, pig's bones and bristles in the same pan, every thing that is necessary—we only want the vital warmth, and the young pig will be ready made again.'" Mr. Lord's illustration, like this, has all the materials, black pudding, pig's bones, bristles and all, but it lacks the vital warmth; there is nothing to arrange the materials so largely furnished to hand.

The fossil animal remains found entombed in the strata of the earth, are disposed of in a no less summary way. To him it is infinitely incredible—when we consider the countless multitudes of wild animals, the innumerable flocks and herds of tame animals, the infinite host of fish, the countless armies of cod, mackerel, and herring, which now inhabit our earth—that the fossil animals should not have been even vastly greater than they are, according to the geologist's reckoning. To him, two or three centuries seems as adequate to their production as fifteen or twenty. The difficulty in accounting for their deposition arises, therefore, not from the greatness, but, rather, from the scarceness, of their numbers. Now, if these vast multitudes of living animals were all preserved in the fossil state, generation after generation, it might be admitted that a comparatively short time would be sufficient for the accumulation of an amount of fossils equal to those found in the strata, though, in other respects, they would still greatly differ. But Mr. Lord cannot be ignorant of the fact that this is far from true;—the vast majority die, decay and pass

away. Not only have they not accumulated within "two or three centuries," but no single species, which has lived within historic times, has any where been found one twelfth of the depth at which fossil remains are deposited; and out of not less than thirty thousand species of animals and plants which have been identified in the strata, only a few hundred species—and those in the uppermost layers—among all the countless multitudes of wild animals and infinite host of fish, to which our author has referred us, correspond to any now living on the globe, or any that has lived during all the recorded history of man. Indeed, the fact that the remains of man himself—his bones and his works of art—have no where been found in the lower strata, constitutes the strongest negative evidence that these strata, with all their fossil contents, were deposited even before man himself lived upon the earth. This is surely a slow state of accumulation, compared with our author's bold statement. For more than twenty centuries we have trustworthy records of the observations of our race upon the earth, and its animals; and, during all this lapse of time, almost nothing has been added to the aggregate thickness of the strata of our globe, and relatively even less to its fossil remains. The entire amount of alluvium deposited since the flood, is not considered one thousandth part as great as the whole fossiliferous rocks. How, then, can Mr. Lord account for the formation of strata six and seven miles deep, with all their teeming dead? His ready invention meets the emergency. Innumerable "*mud volcanoes*" are set to work pumping from the bowels of the earth, and scattering broadcast over its surface all the requisite materials for the task in hand. These materials "are not thrown up from the interior," he tells us, "in the form of lava—as they exhibit no marks of fusion—but of mud, or a liquid tide." "Such a stupendous enginery," he says, "acting with slight intervals at innumerable points throughout the globe, would have been amply adequate to throw the whole materials of

the strata on the surface in fifteen, sixteen, or eighteen hundred years. Such a period would, indeed, seem excessive, rather than too short, for such a work."

Truly, the "enginery" bears some proportion to the "liquid tide" of "*mud*" requisite for the work, but our engineer has made no adequate provisions in his machine for pumping up, in this stream of "*mud*," the huge imbedded fossil Elephants, Megatheriums and Iguanidons, that fill the higher strata, nor the myriads upon myriads—many feet in thickness—of Radiates and Moluscs, which are found in the lower formations. How he gets those intermixed, from top to bottom, with his overflowing deluge of "mud"—issuing, with slight intervals, at innumerable points throughout the globe—or how he secures the time for their propagation, growth and maturity, in such vast numbers, amid such a stupendous enginery, is all left to conjecture.

But what is there in this awful "modern doctrine," so terrible and fearful as to drive our author into such wild and extravagant speculations, rather than adopt its simple provisions? Is it that Mr. Lord is so conservative in his views—so attached to old land-marks—that every thing new or modern must be received with suspicion, as an innovation, or violently opposed, as a heresy? If so, he need not let the sun go down again upon his wrath, either against this "youthful" doctrine, or the youthful science that has espoused it, for the doctrine is as old as the Fathers, and comes down to us from the exegesis of the Sacred Text itself, through theological rather than scientific channels. That geology does teach it, cannot be denied; but, if our young science errs in this regard, it errs with the great Augustin, the good old Bishop Patrick, and the distinguished Chalmers; and thus, even while the dew of its youth is still upon it, it is found coming with its gift to the altar in company with the wise, the good, and the great; and, if the marks of youth and immaturity are

upon it, remember that the impulses of youth are often generous and noble, and that age can never sanctify error.

But Mr. Lord comforts us with an indignant denial of the insinuation that geology is a science at all. This youthful pretender does not even exist. It has never yet been born; has not vital energies of its own, but lies only as an embryonic mass in the womb of the future. Geology has no axioms or principles that are peculiar to itself, as the laws of optics are peculiar to light, and of gravity and motion to the phenomena of the solar system. In chemistry, experiments are made to ascertain what substances enter into composition. In mechanical philosophy, projectiles are thrown into the air, and the laws deduced have been generalized, and employed in the solution of the movements of the solar system. But no analogous experiments are made in geology, by which its laws may be determined. It professedly treats of the nature of the substances composing the crust of our globe, and of the causes and forces to which they owe their present combinations and principles; but these forces, we are told, are not geological, they are "expressly defined to be either chemical or mechanical."

But are not the laws of astronomy mechanical, as well as those of geology, and are they less exact, because not peculiar? Are any of the laws of chemical or mechanical forces less to be relied on, when applied to geology, than when used as principles of other sciences? What astronomer has ascended into the heavens and tossed the worlds about, in direct experiment of the movements of the solar system, to find those "axioms and principles of gravity and motion that are peculiar to itself"? If all the questions in this grandest of the sciences have had to be settled, as our author must admit, upon the basis of experiments performed on the earth, and by the light of those broad physical generalizations which are common to nature in all her walks, is our youthful science to be ostracised be-

cause she, too, ventures to use the light of the torch of truth, furnished by her older sisters? As a point of fact, thousands of experiments have been made with direct reference to geological questions, such as the sources from which, the forces by which, and the time in which, the strata of the earth might have been formed. Philosophy, chemistry, electricity, anatomy, zoölogy, botany, in a word, the whole sisterhood of sciences, have paid tribute to this youngest of the family, cheerfully heaping up their choicest treasures at her feet. The history of artesian wells, by which "the desert is now often made to rejoice and blossom as the rose," as well as the perfection to which scientific mining has attained in all its departments, are illustrations of the truth and practical accuracy of geological science. But the precision with which the palæontologist can tell you the geological formation to which any of the thousand fossils of the strata belong—and especially the skill with which the anatomist, from the single bone of a fossil bird or a scale of a fossil fish, has been able to reconstruct the entire animal, and give its geological position, before it has actually been seen—not only affords some ground for the claim of geology to be considered a science, but really constitutes a scientific marvel scarcely less wonderful than the astronomical feat by which LeVerrier discovered the position of Neptune by the disturbances of Uranus.

It is admitted that geology has its unsettled theories and vague hypotheses; but so has astronomy, and every other science. Mr. Lord admits the doctrines of light, heat, electricity, etc., but seems not to know that these are based upon pure, and even contradictory, hypotheses, upon the claims of which the scientific world has not yet been able to decide. Whether light is a material emanation, or only an undulation; whether heat and electricity be fluids, or not matter at all, but only conditions of matter; whether Du Fay or Franklin be right, are questions involved in every

philosophical explanation of the various phenomena of the sciences. But, if our author still objects that this pretentious young geology is no science—has no principles—and is unworthy to be heard on grave questions, even where the Fathers and many of the great and good men of the Church in every age have led the way, what will he say if it be found that hoar-headed and venerable astronomy is in favor of this same modern doctrine? In a series of astronomical lectures before the Smithsonian Institute, Prof. Caswell gives us the details of a process by which it is proved, by photographic and other measurements, that light could not have come to us from a star of the sixteenth magnitude, as large as Sirius, in less than sixteen thousand five hundred years, and he concludes the statement by saying that there is positive inductive reason for believing that from groups of stars and nebulae, light reaches the human eye “which has been *one hundred thousand years* in its tireless flight from the distant verge of the Universe.” If, therefore, the first verse of Genesis, as Dr. Scott thinks, refers to the whole Universe, visible and invisible, then, as in the beginning, when God created the heaven and the earth, “he made the stars also,” it is clear that that “beginning,” according to astronomy, must have been many thousand years before the creation of man. But, whatever be the testimony of science, in any of her departments, on this subject, our author can abate nothing from his bitter hostility; for this doctrine, he says, if founded on just grounds, “disproves the inspiration, not only of the record in Genesis of the creation, but of the whole of the writings of Moses, and thence, as we shall show, of the whole of the Old and New Testament, and divests Christianity itself of its title to be received as a divine institution.” This is the bold game our author every where plays throughout his work. He is ready again and again to stake the inspiration of Moses, the truth of the whole Bible, and the divine origin of Christianity, upon the infallibility of his own con-

struction of a narrative about which the wisest and best men have ever differed. If his opponents are right, the Bible is false; for, says he, "if it cannot be vindicated from the impeachment offered by the geological theory, it cannot be vindicated at all." The opinion that the matter of the earth has existed longer than Mr. Lord thinks, must be renounced, "or the inspiration and truth of the record God has given us of the origin of the world must be rejected." "No hypothesis can reconcile them; no artifice—if the theory held to be true—can shield the text from the discredit of a consummate error. If that doctrine is true, the record of Genesis cannot be."

Here, truly, is zeal enough to satisfy the most exorbitant demand; but judge ye, friends of the Bible and of truth, whether this "zeal be according to knowledge." It is often the case that a man's worst enemies are those of his own household. And thus the Church often sees her dearest principles—even her chart of life—the blessed Bible itself, impaled upon the rash dogmatism of some Hotspur champion. If Mr. Lord can thus, upon his own *ipse dixit*, jeopard the Bible, to the defence of which he has devoted the best energies of his life, it cannot be thought a strange thing, by the friends of science, that they should find him deliberately engaged, as it were, in a wholesale massacre of all their principles and facts.

It is, indeed, marvellous that Mr. Lord should dash thus headlong into a conflict where Luther paused and Calvin hesitated. Both these great lights, and many others who have blessed the Church and the world, yielded the point upon which Mr. Lord's great difficulty substantially hangs, viz: that "In the beginning," when "God created the heaven and the earth," was a time altogether distinct from and antecedent to the six days of the Mosaic creation. The pious and able author of the "Great Teacher," in his work on the "Pre-Adamite Earth," says, while advocating this view in a note—quoting from several learned

authors—"It is important and interesting to observe how the early Fathers of the Christian Church should seem to have entertained precisely similar views, for St. Gregory Nazianzen, after St. Justin Martyr, supposes an indefinite period between the creation and the first ordering of all things—St. Basil, St. Cæsarius and Origen are much more explicit—to these might be added Augustine, Theodoret, Episcopi, and others, whose remarks imply the existence of a considerable interval between the creation related in the first verse of Genesis, and that of which an account is given in the third and following verses. In modern times, but long before geology became a science, the independent character of the opening sentence of Genesis was affirmed by such judicious and learned men as Calvin, Bishop Patrick and Dr. David Jennings. And, in some old editions of the English Bible, where there is no division into verses, you actually find a break at the end of what is now the second verse; and in Luther's Bible you have, in addition, the figure (1) placed against the third verse, as being the beginning of the account of the creation on the first day."

Such an array of authority is enough to induce any one who does not believe in his own infallibility to hesitate before he stakes the inspiration of the Divine Record, and with it the immortal interests of souls, on a contrary view. And is this all, the astonished reader may ask, that is required of Mr. Lord? Verily, all. This interpretation of Luther, of Calvin, of Chalmers, covers the whole ground that the doctrine of the great antiquity of our earth, which Mr. Lord would reject the Bible sooner than adopt, requires; for, if the creation of the "heaven and the earth" preceded the six days of Moses, as an independent statement, there is nothing in the record that can settle whether the time that intervened was one second, one hour, or one hundred thousand years.

It is no part of our object to enter into a full consideration of the biblical connections of this doctrine of the earth's

antiquity, upon which so much has, from time to time, been written. But, as our author devotes no less than five chapters in the *Geognosy*, and still more in his *Journal*, to the discussion of the religious bearings of his subject, we could not be excused if we omitted them altogether. Let us, then, briefly consider this branch of the subject. Mr. Lord admits that there are two methods by which it is attempted to reconcile the great age of the earth with the Mosaic account. The first, which supposes the days of the creation to be long periods—as, “a day is a thousand years with God”—is simply, in Mr. Lord’s opinion, an insult to the Most High. “It is, in fact,” he says, “nothing less than to impeach the veracity of His declaration in one passage, in order to save His word from a charge of falsehood in another.” And the second, which supposes the six days to be natural days, but that the “beginning” was antecedent to them, is like unto the first—an attempt to clear the word of God from the charge of falsehood, by transferring that charge to himself.” Here we have the same censorious spirit which our author has elsewhere exhibited. But, however objectionable these views may seem to be, it is evident that either scheme of reconciliation is at least as safe as Mr. Lord’s position. To him, if by these or any other means the offensive doctrine be established, the Bible falls; while, to other more judicious friends of truth, who see in their own imperfect knowledge a sufficient explanation of all the discrepancy that appears, whatever may become of this or a thousand other schemes of man’s devising, the Bible, with all its divine, immutable, eternal truth, will still stand. But what reason, it will be naturally asked, can there possibly be in the record to give even a shade of plausibility to a doctrine which is thus said to charge falsehood upon God and His word?

We will examine briefly. Turn to the first chapter of *Genesis*. We will proceed on simple principles, without any attempt to rival the philological skill and grammatical

learning which our author professes. Observe, first, the singular and uniform beginning of each of the creative days. When the first day's work is ended, the creative fiat goes forth, in the sixth verse, "*And God said, Let there be a firmament,*" etc.; thus begins the second day. When this day is ended, the omnific word again goes forth, in the ninth verse, "*And God said, Let the waters under the heavens be gathered together,*" etc.; thus begins the third day. Another day is ended, and once more the word of His power is spoken, in the fourteenth verse, "*And God said, Let there be lights in the firmament,*" etc.; thus begins the fourth day. This day is also ended, and yet again the creative energy proceeds, in the twentieth verse, "*And God said,*" "Let the waters bring forth abundantly," etc.; thus begins the fifth day. And when this, too, closes, the sixth is introduced, in the twenty-fourth verse, with the same unique beginning, "*And God said, Let the earth bring forth,*" etc. Here it is seen that the last five days of creative work are each ushered in with the same peculiar formula, "*And God said.*" Is it not most natural, therefore, to conclude that the first creative day's work begins, also, like all the rest, where God introduces this divine signet. If so, it begins at the third verse, where we are told, "*And God said, Let there be light.*"

Again: it may be urged that the account, in the second verse, of the earth's formless state, seems to be designed only to suggest to the reader that God is now *about to commence* His work of creation, which immediately follows. The chaotic mass seems to be mentioned as the starting point from which the work is to begin. If, then, the first day's creation begins at the third verse, where God's creative fiat first went forth, as in each of the succeeding days, it follows that the earth itself, which is mentioned in the first verse, must have been created previously to the first day. Such is a plain and concise view of the question; and, though simple, it is certainly not so monstrous and

absurd as to induce any one to join Mr. Lord in discarding his Bible as a fable rather than adopt it. Much might be added to enforce this construction. Volumes have been written on the subject, and much learned criticism expended on the original of the word "create," and the small particle which begins the second verse of this chapter; but the very difficulty which has called for so much controversy shows the inherent obscurity of the record, and how vain it is for any one to attempt to cut the Gordian knot by anathemas and dogmatism. The other scheme of reconciliation, which supposes the days of creation to be vast periods, Mr. Lord informs us is so untenable that it is generally rejected by geologists themselves. This is, perhaps, true as to the majority of geologists; but many pious and able cultivators of the science still maintain it; and, as untenable as it may seem to be, we are satisfied that a very slight examination of its claims will show that to believe it will be a thousand times more rational than, with Mr. Lord, to condition our faith in the truth and inspiration of the Bible upon the establishment or non-establishment of this or that scientific dogma. Science may toil on in her laboratories, plunging into the deeper darkness here, and striking out, it may be, a spark of true and genuine light there, till she has eliminated some new mystery of nature; but, establish what she will, or controvert what she will, the eternal truth of God, revealed in His word, remains untouched. The works of nature may illustrate the Book of Revelation, and help to sweep away the cobwebs which human prejudice or folly has gathered over it, but the Book itself stands not nor falls by human science. It is independent of it. True science, of course, cannot contradict it, and may even add a taper-light to this noon-day sun of moral truth; but false science and false theology must, of course, come to naught. When geography first taught that the earth was not flat, but round, a false theology became alarmed. Astronomy suggested that the sun is the centre of our system, and con-

sternation and persecution answered the charge. Geology hints that the globe is more than six thousand years old, and immediately every thing sacred and holy is staked against it. But, come what may—human interpretations may fail—the Bible will still stand, in all its integrity. It may burn like the bush which Moses saw, but it will remain unconsumed.

This “untenable” scheme of reconciliation, which, we have seen, contemplates the creative days as long periods, Mr. Lord confronts, in his discussion of it, with two objections: First, the fact that the narrative in Genesis defines each of the six days as consisting of an evening and morning. Second, the announcement of the institution of the law at Sinai, that in six days the Lord made heaven and earth, and the sea and all that in them is. These two difficulties, in different places, are variously developed. We will have accomplished our object when we have simply glanced at them, so far as to show that, as in the former scheme of reconciliation, the theory they oppose may be reasonably adopted, rather than reject the Bible. The force of the first objection Mr. Lord locates in the apparently literal character of the narrative. This cannot be a figurative evening and morning, he argues, and, therefore, the day cannot be taken figuratively for a long period. In discussing the nature of a metaphor, Mr. Lord tells us that, in order to prove that the words light, evening, morning, and day, are used metaphorically, it must be shown that they are applied to something wholly unlike that which they literally denote.

We submit whether a day *without a sun* does not meet the conditions—is not “wholly unlike” any ordinary day. It will be observed, that by a literal interpretation of the narrative, which Mr. Lord so strenuously maintains, the sun was not created till the fourth day, so that at least three successive evenings and mornings, wholly unlike any that have ever succeeded them, passed away before there

was any sun created to mark their progress. We know that Mr. Lord claims that the sun's creation is recorded in the first verse, and that it took place on the first day, and it was only appointed on the fourth to special offices. But he cannot be allowed, whenever convenience requires, to violate his own principles of a literal interpretation. It would be as easy to find the creation of "light," or of the "firmament," in the phraseology of the first verse, as that of the sun; but, while we have no mention of the sun on the first day, we have a most explicit statement on the fourth. Besides, the fourth day's work is introduced with the same set formula that introduces each of the other creations, "*And God said,*" "Let there be lights in the firmament of heaven." And, as if specially to defeat Mr. Lord's purpose, the creation of this day is twice repeated, for we not only have the usual fiat, but it is again added, "*And God made two great lights.*"

But suppose we grant Mr. Lord's interpretation. He still gains nothing; for, if the sun was not created, but only appointed to certain duties, on the fourth day, those duties were, that he should "divide the day from the night," and be for signs and for seasons, and for days and for years," so that not till the fourth day could we have had a natural morning and evening, as there was not till then, according to Mr. Lord's own construction, "any means appointed to divide the day from the night."

Thus, it seems, that by either interpretation the "evening and morning" of at least the first three days must have been wholly unlike the evening and morning of any ordinary day, and, therefore, by Mr. Lord's own definition, the terms are a metaphor, and, as such, as applicable to the beginning and end of a thousand years as of twenty-four hours.

Besides, the word day, itself, is used in the text in connections where it must, necessarily, mean a very different period from the twenty-four hours which Mr. Lord under-

stands by it. God's own definition is different, for it is said, "And God called the *light* day," and if the light was that of a natural day, it could not have been twenty-four hours, with its evening and morning.

Again, in the fourth verse of the second chapter of Genesis, it is clear that the word day includes all the whole week of creation. But it is evident that the force and meaning of a word, whatever be its usual interpretation, must be mainly settled by its connections, as when we say the "*day* of adversity," the "*morning and evening* of life," or, as in Job, "he shall accomplish, as an hireling, his day." In all such cases the connections show the meaning.

What, then, are the connections of the *creative day* in the Mosaic record? Does it stand in the midst of natural and ordinary events? Was the Spirit that brooded over the waters an ordinary thing? Was the creative *word* that went forth a common articulate sound? Was the work it accomplished a common achievement? Was the Sabbath *rest* that followed like mere human rest? These were all extraordinary—the Spirit of God—the Word of God—the work of God—the rest of God, must be wholly unlike any thing human or natural. And, can the *day* be the only common link in this extraordinary chain? Was every thing else God-like in this marvellous programme, and this alone man-like? To suppose that the day partakes somewhat of the extraordinary character of all its connections, that as it was a *Divine* work and a *Divine* rest, so, likewise, it was a *Divine*, and not a human, day of resting, is the head and front of the offending of this interpretation, and, so far from seeming to be unpardonable heresy, seems, indeed, most natural.

Mr. Lord's second objection to making the creative days long periods, we have seen, is founded upon a declaration in the command for the Sabbath (Exodus xxii.), where it is said, "*For* in six days the Lord made heaven and earth,"

etc. The point of the force of this objection, lies in this: that we here find the six days upon which God wrought, and his seventh day of rest, distinctly urged as a reason for man's observance of the Sabbath. This difficulty has pressed heavily upon the minds of many good men, and, on this account, deserves serious consideration.

Now, what are the points of analogy between God's work and rest, and man's work and rest, as found in the command for the Sabbath, and the reason annexed? First, the *numbers* are the same, *six* days man must labor, and *one* day rest; for, *six* days God labored, and rested *one*. Secondly, the *order* is the same, with man the *seventh* day is the Sabbath, and God also "*rested the seventh day.*" Thirdly, the specified *periods* of time are the same, "*six days shalt thou labor, but the seventh day is the Sabbath,*" is the command; and, in "*six days the Lord made heaven and earth,*" and rested the seventh day, is the reason annexed.

Here, then, is the full breadth of the argument. The analogy would require that the numbers, the order, and the specified periods of time, should all be alike. Now, surely, if one of these, for sufficient reason, may be modified without vitiating the commandment, another may also, for an equal reason. How do the facts stand? In regard to the *numbers* there is no controversy; all admit *six* days of work and one of rest. In regard to the order, the whole Christian Church has abandoned, for a sufficient reason, it is admitted, God's *seventh* day of rest, and observes the first. And now, in regard to the third and last particular, must it be considered *heresy* to adopt an interpretation of the sacred writer which would require our periods of time to be modified also? If we are told that we lack the sufficient reason for this modification, we reply, it may possibly be found in the nature of things, for if God's days were immense periods, then, of necessity, our days must be different from His. The whole controversy, then, turns upon

the character of God's creative days. Neither party can assume this point dogmatically. It cannot be taken for granted that, as our days are short, therefore God's days were short also, for we have seen that the points of analogy, if there be sufficient reason, may and have been modified; and, therefore, notwithstanding our days are short, God's days *may have been* innumerable ages. We must look, then, not to the reason annexed to the fourth commandment, to settle the question of the length of the creative days, but to the connections in the text itself. These we have already sufficiently considered.

By way of further showing how far this argument from the analogy of the case, while it holds in its entire spirit, necessarily fails in its details, it may be proper to remark that the precise length of *our own* periods of work and rest cannot be considered as of the nature of a perpetual moral obligation, founded upon eternal principles that can never change; for the length of our natural days varies with the latitude of the place. At the poles, a day would be six months long. Again: not only has the order been changed by the Christian dispensation, from the seventh to the first day of the week, but from the beginning it was manifestly impossible in the nature of things that the absolute time of God's rest-day should be observed by man. Because, in the first place, if we consider the case in its numerical aspects, the seventh day, upon which God rested, according to Moses, was man's first day of existence, and, counting from that point, the numbers would not correspond; and in the next place, even if God had given man an initial point from which to count, it is clear that as the days begin and end at different points of *absolute* time all over the earth, one man's Sabbath would often end before another's began; for, in traveling round the earth, we always gain or lose, according to the direction, a whole day. And, even when stationary, it is mid-day to the American Christian when it is midnight to the missionary of India. In fact, no

two Christian countries can observe the same *absolute* time as a day of rest. The whole spirit of the command must be found, therefore, in the right proportioning of the time to the duties enjoined, and not in any fancied imitation of God's creative periods. We can imitate God in this, as well as in every thing else, only on a scale proportioned to the vast difference between us;—only as an astronomer can map out the stars that fill the regions of infinite space upon the surface of a ten-inch globe. When it is said, "Be ye holy, for I am holy," is it expected that man shall equal the infinitude of God's perfections? We are commanded to work and rest as He worked and rested; but, for aught we know, His times *may have been* almost interminable ages—ours *must be* of short duration.

Our task is done: and we have learned for ourselves, if our readers have not, that humility becomes all who would approach God in the study either of His works or His word. "His thoughts are not as our thoughts, nor His ways as our ways."



ARTICLE VI.

THE PRINCETON REVIEW ON THEORIES OF THE ELDERSHIP.

Two articles on "Theories of the Eldership," in the *Biblical Repertory* for April and July of this year (which are to be followed by a third), demand our individual attention, and that of some other persons, by the direct attack (we do not use the word in the offensive sense of it) which is made on us by name. These articles have also attracted, and may very justly claim, the attention of the Church. Appearing in the pages of the oldest, and, we will add, also, the

ablest, Presbyterian Quarterly (which has always been the organ of our first established and most trusted school of Theology, and is still published under the distinguished name of Dr. Hodge)—they certainly have come forth under auspices which bespeak for their doctrines and their statements the most respectful consideration. They bespeak the same for themselves by their *paternity*, which could not be concealed for a moment from any educated Presbyterian in the United States. The pen which wrote these pages has written too long and too largely upon these questions of the Church, not to be identified immediately in any one of its productions. Nature designed this author to be an orator, and endowed him splendidly for that office. But, “coveting earnestly” what appeared, no doubt, to him “the best gift,” he has always seemed to aspire at speaking to future generations, rather than the present. And so, preferring to the triumphs of an almost matchless eloquence the toils and pains of authorship, he has given to the Church he loves “the precious life-blood of his master-spirit,” in many a volume and many a page, which have been read, and, we trust, will be read, with profit, long after he shall rest from his labors. What he has written on this particular subject, however, we believe, never has been accepted by our Church as being thoroughly or soundly Presbyterian; and was not formerly endorsed at Princeton. Dr. Miller, if our memory deceives us not, so expressed himself, with characteristic frankness, and, at the same time, kindness, to the author. But now we find him admitted to speak through the pages of the Princeton organ, and not only admitted there, but expressly, yet (in deference, no doubt, to Dr. McGill’s sentiments regarding this article, so manfully declared in the late Assembly,) somewhat moderately endorsed, also.—(See *Repertory* for 1860, p. 562.) “*Tempora mutantur*,” etc. This change is certainly significant, and the Church may well give heed to it. The time was when Princeton, at the hands of the venerable Dr. Miller, repu-

diated the doctrines about eldership of this "respected contributor" of the present Repertory, instead of endorsing them, as now. We are thus reminded of a certain remarkable theory of the eldership, published in 1845, "On the name, nature, and functions of Ruling Elders, being temporary," which was, indeed, fit preëminently to be ranked amongst "*theories*," because the author of it himself acknowledged (pp. 111, 112,) he was "contending against the arrangement and the language and the order laid down" by his own Church, which has "stamped the same perpetuity and sacredness upon the office of Ruling Elder which it attaches to the ministry;" and because, accordingly, the author has never ventured, during a ministry of nearly thirty years, to carry his own views into practice in his own Church. Remarkable, however, as this theory was, and was considered on all hands to be, it has very remarkably been left out of the formidable list of "*theories*" here discussed—it has been strangely omitted from this category of "all the works on the subject of ruling powers, from Dr. Miller's work to the present time," which it was proposed to notice in this "Constitutional argument." * That work made the Elders mere *temporary* office-holders, to give place every year to new "*assistants of the Bishop*," unless reëlected by the people. It made them simple *laymen*—mere lay representatives of the people. It struggled hard to destroy all proof for the Ruling Elder's office from 1 Tim. v. 17: "The Elders that rule well," etc. The Princeton of that day objected to these doctrines, but the Princeton of this day endorses a series of articles from the same pen, although every one of these opinions appears in them with greater or less distinctness, and although, also, it is denied that the Ruling Elder is the Presbyter of the New Testament, or that he has any clear right to the name of Ruling Elder, or

* Another strange and unfortunate omission is that of the little work of Dr. Hodge, "What is Presbyterianism?" We wish all our readers, especially those who are Ruling Elders, to be better acquainted with that address.

even to that of Elder itself!—(Biblical Repertory, 1860, pp. 196, 209, 215.)

We reciprocate, with perfect cordiality, the kind expressions of the Princeton reviewer, and we enter on the discussion to which he has challenged us, as a discussion “not by foes, but friends.” “There is,” indeed, as he says, “no rivalry among us, but for the truth and order of Christ’s blood-bought Church. There is nothing personal or private.” We take up the gauntlet thrown down for us, not in the spirit of a struggle for victory between one man and another man, or between one school of Theology and another school of Theology, but in the spirit of earnest contention for the truth. If we know our own hearts, we love the truth, and, so far as we have attained to any knowledge of it in respect to the doctrine of Church government, we desire to see what we believe to be the truth vindicated and established. We repeat what was said before in this journal: “It is a disreputable fact, that there are many Presbyterians, and Presbyterian Ministers, who are very imperfectly acquainted with the characteristic principles of their own system.” A temperate and kind discussion of the important question respecting which we differ from the Repertory will be, we are persuaded, acceptable, as well as useful, to our Church. In this persuasion we enter on the argument, and in this spirit we hope, with the Master’s aid and blessing, to carry it on. We shall speak always very plainly and distinctly, but never with any design to offend.

Before we proceed to the main discussion, it may be well to signalize some of the many flagrant errors into which our contemporary has been led, in these articles, upon “Theories of the Eldership.” We place foremost amongst these, as being of the least public importance, the misrepresentation, of course undesignedly made, of our own personal opinions in this subject. The Repertory says:

“Dr. Adger, therefore, simplifies the analysis, by denying ‘one order subdivided into two classes,’ and by rejecting, altogether, any office or order of the ministry of the word and sacraments to be of divine institution, and admits only the *work* and *function* of the ministry by such presbyters as are gifted for it. The ministry, therefore, is not a permanent, divine office, having spiritual relation to the whole employment of the ministry, in a person qualified and specially called and ordained thereto, but a work performed by those who were ruling elders, etc. This is a very simple theory, and very confidently set forth by Dr. Adger.” (See Rep., p. 190.)

Other similar statements occur elsewhere. Now, all we care to say is, that this is a theory we never did set forth at all. All this is but unfair and unfounded *inferences* made by an opponent, and ascribed to us as our opinions. This is an old fault of controversy. It does no honor to the pages of the Repertory. We will try and meet the responsibility of all that we have written or said as well as we can, but we cannot answer for what our brethren may put into our mouths.

But from this little personal matter we pass to some errors of the Repertory regarding our standards. Denying that they set forth “one order of Presbyters divided into two classes—the teaching and the ruling Presbyter,” it says:

“They also declare that ‘the ordinary and perpetual, officers in the Church are of *three orders*, and *not one*, viz: bishops or pastors (or presbyters—see chap. IV.); the representatives of the people usually *styled* ruling elders; and deacons.’—Form of Gov. Chap. III.” (Bib. Rep., p. 195.)

We give the italics, marks of quotation and all, as used by the Repertory. Now let the reader turn to his copy of our book, and judge with what fairness this quotation is made. Words are interpolated, unhesitatingly, to suit the “necessities of a theory.”

Again, the Repertory says:

“The order of *presbyter* and its collateral terms, bishop and *pa-*stor, which the advocates of this theory apply to the ruling elder, and to this class of officers, primarily, our standards restrict to minis-

ters, exclusively, and never apply to ruling elders. They recognize, therefore, but one order and one office of presbyters and bishops, and call it emphatically 'the pastoral office.'" (P. 195.)

Now, is it not intended that the reader shall understand that it is *the habit* of our standards to use the term Presbyter in reference to Ministers—that that is the name *commonly given* in them to Ministers, but not applied to Ruling Elders? Does not the Repertory design to make this impression, when it says "our standards restrict it to Ministers, exclusively, and never apply it to Ruling Elders?" But the reader will find, if he examines the whole of our ordinary standards, from one end to the other, that they do not use the term *Presbyter* at all, except in one single case, and that is in the Form of Government (Chap. IV.), where it is employed as synonymous with Elder.

Again, the Repertory states that our standards describe the Ruling Elder as one "*commonly so called,*" but do not "*authoritatively define him to be such.*"—(See p. 196.) Let the reader turn again to his copy of our Form of Government, and see if chapter fifth does not say that the Ruling Elder is "chosen for the purpose of exercising government and discipline," and that this office has been understood by most of the Reformed Churches to answer to the scriptural title of "governments, and of them that rule well, but do not labor in the word and doctrine."

But all this is not enough to satisfy the Repertory's zeal for taking away the honor of the ruling eldership. Having asserted that they are not defined to be rulers, but only *commonly called* such, it now proceeds to nibble away even their right to the smallest part of the name. On page 196, speaking of the standards of the Church of Scotland, from which ours were derived, it states that in those Scotch standards Ruling Elders "are not even called *Elders*, but other Church governors." But this is another mistake. Let the reader look into the Second Book of Discipline, (printed at the end of that work of Stuart Robinson on

“the Church of God,” which we are right glad to see in these articles that the Repertory is willing to commend so highly, and which we hope all its readers will now buy and study,) and he will find the name Elder constantly employed for this class of officers. It is, in fact, the only name given to them, except in, perhaps, four places; in one of which they are called “Elders or Governors;” in another “Seniors or Elders;” in another “the Presbyter or Elder;” and in another “Presbyters or Seniors.”

Again: the Repertory asserts that

“All the Presbyterian standards regard presbyters to be, in 1 Tim. v. 17, as elsewhere, defined to be those who especially, as their chief business, labor in word and doctrine, and yet, also, rule or officiate, and administer ordinances.”—(See pp. 196, 197.)

This means, of course, that, in the judgment of the Repertory, 1 Tim. v. 17 refers only to one kind of Elders, who both rule and teach, and does not relate at all to mere Ruling Elders. This is now the Princeton doctrine! And the assertion is, that all the Presbyterian standards do so understand this text! We ask the reader just to notice the assertion, and then to compare with it our “Presbyterian Standards,” chapter fifth, and see for what purpose they quote, and in what manner they apply, that text. We ask him, also, to look at the Second Book of Discipline, chapter sixth, section ninth, to see how those “Presbyterian Standards” understand and apply that text.

Now these five errors, regarding our own standards and those of the Scotch Church, occur in the space of *one page and a half* of the Repertory’s argument. They are calculated, certainly, to weaken our confidence in the carefulness and accuracy of its other statements and quotations. Let us refer, briefly, to some of them.

The Repertory says: “The theory which identifies Presbyters and Ruling Elders” is “a novel theory of the eldership.”—(pp. 210, 211.) Is this correct? It is as old, at least, as the days of James Guthrie of Stirling, the first

Scottish Martyr for Christ's Crown and Covenant, and he died in 1661, although it is one of the little mistakes of the Repertory to give 1726, that is, sixty-five years after he was executed, as the date of his producing that short treatise of his which is prefixed to Lorimer's work on the Eldership. (See Repertory, p. 234.) We would quote Guthrie's statement of the doctrine of Ruling Elders in full if we had space. Suffice it that, for the special edification of the Princeton Review, we transcribe his reference to the mistake of those

"Who, either out of ignorance or disdain, do call them *lay* Elders, as if they were a part of the people only, and not to be reckoned amongst the officers of the Lord's house, whom the Popish Church, in their pride, and others following them, calls the 'clergy,' that is, the Lord's inheritance, in opposition to 'the laity,' or people, etc., etc."—(p. 16.)

This theory, yet further, is as old as Gillespie and Rutherford, which carries it higher than 1643, when they urged it so hard in the Westminster Assembly, for the Repertory itself tells us (p. 203),

"They labored long and earnestly to introduce their views into the Assembly. Their first form of proposition was, that beside those presbyters who both rule well and labor in word and doctrine, there be other presbyters who especially apply themselves to ruling."

Nay, this theory is as old as the time of Calvin; as old as the time of the Bohemian Brethren, before him, during all their long night of persecution; and, what is equally capable of proof, and with us of infinitely greater consequence, as old as the days of the Apostles.

But the theory is not only "a new theory;"—the Repertory becomes more specific, and declares, to our amazement, that "the theory of one order of Presbyters with two classes was originated by Neander," and that "Dr. Miller accepted and adopted it from him."—(p. 205.) And yet, on page 215, we are told, by this same reviewer, of a portion of his theory which "Dr. Miller received from Owen." And then, finally, on page 217, we find Neander

placed, in respect to the authorship of this theory, "next to Owen, if not above him." Now, taking this Princeton reviewer for our guide, respecting the true origin of this novel theory, what does the reader at length conclude upon the subject? *

* Confused as these statements of the Repertory are upon this point, there is no doubt at all of their entire correctness, as to the fact that *Dr. Miller did hold* this "theory which identifies Presbyters and Ruling Elders." Now, let the reader notice that, in April last, the Repertory goes so far as to state, on page 211, that "the opinion that the reference to a plurality of other officers in the Churches besides Deacons was in every case made to ONE general class with two orders, was, we think, first published by Dr. Miller;" also, on page 225, that, "on Dr. Miller's principle of interpretation, the term Presbyter is *appellative*, and not official;" also, on page 233, that "the *πρωτον ψευδος*, the source of all the difficulty, is in the adoption of this *appellative* interpretation of Presbyter;" also, on page 229, "we regret to find that Dr. Killen has also adopted Dr. Miller's premises, and, with equally unsatisfactory and inconsistent results. No genius—no erudition—no logic—no eloquence—no dogmatism, however authoritative, can bring order out of confusion, unity out of diversity, or harmony out of discord; the premises being fallacious, the conclusions must be untenable, and the building unsound." All this said the Repertory, in April last, about Dr. Miller, and yet, in July last, in the article on Presbyterianism, it delivers itself as follows: "There was no man in the Church more opposed to this theory than that venerable man, whose memory we have so much reason to cherish with affectionate reverence. We do not differ from Dr. Miller as to the value of the office of the Ruling Elder. The only point of difference between him and us relates to the method of establishing the divine warrant for the office. He laid stress on one argument, we on another. That is all. (See Repertory for July 1860, pp. 561, 562.) This is, indeed, amusing. What has become of all the "confusion, diversity, discord, and other equally unsatisfactory and inconsistent results of Dr. Miller's fallacious premises"—what of "his untenable conclusions," and his "unsound building," spoken of in the April Repertory? What are we to think, moreover, of all the objections made to this theory, in the Repertory for July last, (see pp. 560, 561,) as that, 1st. It is entirely contrary to the theory and practice of all the reformed Churches, and especially of our own. 2d. It destroys the value of the ruling eldership, and makes him ridiculous. 3d. It reduces the government of the Church to a clerical despotism—(an objection, by the way, got up only by first misstating the doctrine, to the effect that it makes *Ruling Elders* and Ministers, *all alike* Bishops and Teachers.) 4th. That it is completely revolutionary, depriving the people of all substantive power; what, we ask, are we to think of all these objections, made in April, and then, in different form and style—and, of course, by a different hand—made again in July? The new theory is chargeable with all these bad consequences, according to the Repertory in July, and, according to the Repertory in April, Dr. Miller is responsible, to a

But we find other statements in this Review, about Dr. Miller, which are not correct. It is said (p. 211):

“No man could more correctly and powerfully sustain, in all his arguments against prelacy, the fixed and full meaning of the terms presbyter and bishop, as referring to the office and work of the ministry.”

The cases then referred to, in proof of that Dr. Miller always so employed the term, are taken from his work “on the Primitive and Apostolical Order of the Church Vindicated,” (incorrectly referred to by the reviewer, as his work “on the Christian Ministry,”)—but what all these references, taken together, do prove, is, merely, that Dr. Miller often applied Presbyter—as he well might, and as we all do—to the Teaching Elder. But, repeatedly, Dr. Miller, in that very book, speaks of Ruling Elders as Presbyters. Let the reader look at pages 63, 66, 80, 81, and see for himself with how little warrant the reviewer’s assertion has been made.

Again, it is said that “Dr. Miller’s able and conclusive argument,” and, indeed, every other “standard writer’s argument,” against prelacy, is based, always, upon such a use of the term Presbyter.

“A fixed official application of the terms presbyter, etc., to ministers of the Gospel, in the New Testament, and by the apostolical, primitive and ancient Church, is the chief corner-stone of the whole argument for the claims of Presbytery to be the scriptural and primitive polity of the Churches. It was only, therefore, when Dr. Miller turned his attention to independency, and to the very defective condition of the eldership in our own Church, he was led to adopt Neander’s interpretation, though completely subversive of his prelatial arguments. In his work on the eldership, therefore, we could scarcely know that such a word as presbyter occurred in the New Testament.”—(p. 212.)

According to Princeton, therefore, as she now speaks, Dr. Miller’s book on the Eldership was based on that

great extent, for all these consequences of his “fallacious premises,” and yet the same Repertory, in July, “does not differ from Dr. Miller, as to the nature of the office of Ruling Elder.” *Risum tenentis amici?*

which completely subverted his (we suppose it should have been *anti-*) prelatiic arguments. Alas, for "the venerable man, whose memory we have so much reason to cherish with affectionate reverence," one of the best books he ever wrote is completely subversive of another of his best books! Tell it not in Gath! Publish it not in the streets of Askelon! It is not true. It is only another of the numerous mistakes of the reviewer. Dr. Miller's argument on the Christian ministry is not based on the fixed, official application of the term *Presbyter* to *Ministers of the Gospel*.* He says:

"The true meaning of the word *presbyter*, in its official application, is a *Church ruler or governor*."—(See *Prim. and Apos. Christianity Vindicated*, p. 63.)

He goes on, immediately, to quote numerous passages about *Elders*, and, amongst them, 1 Tim. v. 17, and he says:

"Here, we find officers of the Church who are not recognized in the Episcopal system, but who are always found in the Presbyterian Church, viz: Ruling elders, or those who are appointed to assist in governing the Churches, but who do not preach and administer sacraments."—*Ibidem*, p. 65.)

And in his former work, of which this is "a new and abridged form," Dr. Miller thus expresses his own views respecting the place in the anti-prelatiic argument which belongs to the Ruling Elder.

"In several passages in my former letters, I adverted to the office of ruling elder, and offered some considerations to show that it was instituted in the primitive Church. Dr. Bowden, perceiving that this position, if maintained, would be fatal to his cause, has endeavored, with all his force, to drive me from it, and to persuade his readers

* The reviewer himself, only three pages further on, quotes (p. 215) Dr. Miller as saying to the Episcopalians that in the apostolic age there was so little disposition to stickle about rank or titles, that "the names of office were used without scrupulosity, and with much license;" and yet he here asserts that Dr. Miller bases his argument on the *fixed, official* application of one of these names to *Ministers*! Alas, for Dr. Miller's reputation in such hands.

that no such officer was known in the Christian Church till modern times."—(Miller's Letters on the Cons. and Order of the Christian Ministry, p. 292. Phil. Ed. 1830.)

Such was Dr. Miller's idea of the force of the Ruling Elder, as against prelatists. And surely Dr. Miller was right! It is idle and absurd for the Repertory to say that our strength, in that contest, lies in proving that Presbyter always means Minister; for, *first*, it is not true, and, *secondly*, what Presbyter does mean is much more a barrier against prelacy. From whom did prelates come originally? From ambitious Ministers! Who now are converting (we will not say consciously or designedly) Presbyterian Church government into a hierarchy, by degrading the Ruling Elder into something less than a Presbyter—into a mere "layman"; in the meanwhile, talking continually, just like prelatists, about "Clergy" and "Laity"?—(See Repertory for July, p. 559.) They are Ministers, and some of them, be it observed, Ministers that never have been in active ministerial service, of any kind, amongst the people. Prove that Ministers are in the New Testament, and what harm have you done to prelacy? She holds to Ministers herself. But prove that, according to the New Testament, the government of Christ's Church is in the hands of rulers, many of whom are not necessarily public teachers at all; and prove, too, that, according to the New Testament, these rulers must always meet together and act in a body in their ruling, and you have cut up the hierarchy of prelates by the roots.

The same inaccuracy which characterizes the reviewer's references to Dr. Miller, is to be found, also, in his use of Owen. We cannot stop to quote any thing in proof of our assertion. But we simply remark, that the representation is not just which makes out that we build on Owen, Neander or Calvin.—(See p. 220.) How could this be true, we ask the Repertory, of men who hold to the *divine right* of Presbytery? In its eyes that is bad enough, and it

should not seek to add any other charges to that one. To that one we are willing enough to plead guilty, but let not the Repertory be so hard on us as to make the severe and cutting charge that we build on the authority of great names. There are those who are continually quoting (and sometimes inaccurately, too,) "the Church of Scotland," and "all the Presbyterian standards," and "all the standard authors," but the Repertory knows we are not of that class. We hold to the *jus divinum*.

But well is it for *jure divino* Presbyterians that they are thus independent of the authority of any great names, for the Repertory solemnly and deliberately announces, after long argumentation and quotation combined, that

"No authority, therefore, can be pleaded for any one feature of the theory of the Eldership now put forth under great names and with confident boldness, from Calvin, Neander, or Dr. Miller."—(p. 224.)

And, as to Calvin in particular, we are told by the reviewer that he

"Established an order of Presbyters, who were ALL, as he declared, preachers, and coequal, and upon this is based the Presbyterian character of his polity. His elders were not spiritual officers appointed in and by the Church, and could not possibly have given the name of Presbytery, first introduced by Beza,* to the Presbyterian system."—(p. 223.)

Again, the reviewer says:

"From all we have stated, it is evident how very different were the views of Calvin from that theory to sustain which his authority is pleaded. His presbyters were our pastors or ministers. His elders or *anciens* (for he never uses the title of *ruling elders*) were laymen and appointed by laymen, † etc., etc., and so far from attaching to them the name or Scriptural character, qualifications, functions or responsi-

* We *jure divino* Presbyterians have always supposed the name Presbytery was introduced long before Beza had birth or being, and that the Apostles themselves had some hand in "introducing" it.

† The reviewer here, and in the subsequent extracts, is confounding (apparently without noticing it himself, and without any warning to his readers,) the institution of Elders as Calvin was able to carry it out amidst much opposition and difficulty at Geneva, and as he teaches the doctrine of it out of the Scriptures in his Institutes.

bilities, claimed by this theory for *ruling elders*, he attributes them exclusively to the pastors."—(p. 223.)

Still further: we are told that Calvin

"Always restricted the term presbyter, in its proper official designation, to pastors (who were preachers), as we might largely show."—(pp. 220, 221.)

The reviewer proceeds (quoting, carelessly, of course, what Calvin says expressly of the *Primitive Church*, as though he were speaking of the *Apostolic Church*):

"All, therefore, to whom the office of teaching was committed, they call presbyters, and in each city these *presbyters* selected one (a presbyter) to whom *they* gave the special title of bishop.' It is in this sense he uniformly uses the term presbyter in the *Institutes*, that is, as synonymous with bishop and pastor, as they 'who receive a commission to preach the Gospel and administer sacraments;' who are ministers of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God, 'holding fast the faithful word,' etc."—(p. 221.)

Let the reader notice the positiveness with which these assertions are made, respecting Calvin's *uniform* use of the name Presbyter. Let him also notice how, with equal confidence and positiveness, our contemporary, in its article on Presbyterianism, in the July number, (in which it would seem that Dr. Hodge replies a second time, and in writing, now, to the speech of Dr. Thornwell in the last Assembly, to which he then also employed his privilege of *the reply*)—let the reader notice there how corresponding statements about Calvin's use of the term Presbyter are made with similar positiveness.

"We hold, with Calvin, that the official presbyters of the New Testament were bishops, for, as he says, 'To all who discharged the ministry of the word it gives the name bishops.' But of the ruling elders he adds, 'By these governors I understand seniors selected from the people to unite with the bishop in pronouncing censures and exercising discipline.'* This is the old, the healthful, the conservative doctrine of the Presbyterian Church. Ministers of the word are

* Our contemporary quotes the Latin original of these passages, but we give the English translation of them, as we wish to be read and understood by others in our Church besides Ministers.

clergymen having special training, vocation, and ordination; ruling elders are laymen, etc.”—(See Rep. for July, 1860, p. 562.)

Thus our contemporary, at the mouth of two distinct witnesses, asserts, most positively, that Calvin sustains no one feature of our views—that with him, and in the Institutes particularly, Presbyter is always Preacher or Minister exclusively—and that Elder is only a layman, that is, no high spiritual officer. And, to make good these assertions, some passages are quoted from the earlier chapters of the fourth book of the Institutes. But why did these two learned authorities not look further, and observe Calvin’s language in other portions of that fourth book? For example, what clearer testimony could be given to our whole doctrine, than is to be found in Chapter XI., section I.?

“To this end, there were established in the Church, from the first, tribunals which might take cognizance of morals, animadvert on vice, and exercise the office of the keys. This order is mentioned by Paul in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, under the name of ‘Governments’—(1 Cor. xii. 28.); in like manner, in the Epistle to the Romans, when he says: ‘He that ruleth with diligence.’—Rom. xii. 8. For he is not addressing magistrates—none of whom were then Christians—but those who were joined with pastors in the spiritual government of the Church. In the Epistle to Timothy, also, he mentions two kinds of presbyters, some who labor in the word, and others who do not perform the office of preaching, but rule well.—1 Tim. v. 17. By the latter class, there is no doubt he means those who were appointed to the inspection of manners, and the whole use of the keys.”

Here is Calvin finding, in the New Testament, *one order and two classes of Elders*—Presbyters that are not *preachers*, on the one hand, and, on the other, are *not laymen*, but have a high spiritual function and office, carrying the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and exercising all binding and loosing powers.

Again, what can be a clearer testimony than the following, from Calvin, describing the polity which prevailed in the primitive Church?

“The common and usual method of exercising this jurisdiction was by the council of presbyters, of whom, as I have said, there were two classes. Some were for teaching, others were only censors of manners.”—(*Ibidem*, Sec. 6.)

Here, then, Calvin, who was said to give no support to us, is found tracing up to the primitive Church our *novel* theory of one order and two classes, and of a kind of “Presbyters” that were neither ministers of the word nor yet laymen.

We will produce but one more testimony from the Institutes against the Repertory’s erroneous statements about Calvin’s use of “Presbyter.”

“Here, especially, is there occasion for the vigilance of pastors and presbyters, whose duty is not only to preach the Gospel to the people, but to exhort and admonish from house to house,” etc., etc.—(Book IV., Chapter XII., Sec. 2.)

Thus, at some length, we have pointed out a few of those flagrant errors of statement, and of quotation, into which our contemporary has fallen, with a view to enable the reader to judge for himself how safe a guide is there furnished him in tracking his way through all the difficulties which have been thrown around this subject. The reviewer laments “the confusion, diversity and discord,” which he perceives in all our attempts, even “to state the theory in words.” “Every prophet who expounds it has his own utterance, different, as well as distinct, and, in some cases, even contradictory and antagonistic.” He is quite pathetic about “the confusion worse confounded in which the best men and the brightest minds have involved themselves, and would involve the Church.” Yet, for their personal consolation, “there is palpable evidence that the failure is not in the theorists, but in the theory; not in the analysis, but in the facts.”—(pp. 229, 233, 450.) Similar was the trouble and distress to which Dr. Hodge, also, in the last Assembly, confessed. He also found us “without any consistency or agreement amongst ourselves;” and so, also, he “could not pretend to state our

doctrine." Now, we suppose, the reader who has had patience to follow us all through the foregoing pages, must have discovered where some portion, at least, of all this "confusion" lies. We think he will hardly expect us to return the reviewer's compliment, and say the fault is with the subject, and not those who have undertaken to expound it. We acknowledge our views are confused and contradictory, as these expounders set them forth. Is there not proof enough in the revision just made of the reviewer's statements, that he is not remarkable for accuracy when he quotes the language of others? It is not our design to impugn his honesty of purpose. The "*perfervidum ingenium*" will sufficiently explain all these errors about the Presbyterian standards; and respecting Neander, Owen, and Calvin; and respecting, also, the views of the "theorists" it was intended summarily and absolutely to demolish.

Having thus sought to remove, at least to some extent, the violent presumption against ourselves and our brethren, as mere "theorists" regarding the Eldership, which so eminent an authority as the Princeton Review had raised, by exhibiting how possible it is for that authority sometimes to make mistakes, we are now, at length, prepared to take up the main point in this controversy, viz: the question whether the Ruling Elder is or is not the Presbyter of the New Testament. To this question the reviewer turns our attention at the outset of the discussion. Let us first state, as briefly, but as fairly, as we know how, the positions assumed by him. We begin with the substance of the reviewer's first paragraph, somewhat condensed.

It is not intended to raise the question of the scriptural warrant of ruling elders in the Church—nor of the propriety of the designation ruling elders, in the general meaning of both terms. But it is maintained that the name ruling elder is applicable *only* in the general sense. And it is insisted upon that there is an official sense affixed to the title of presbyter, both in the New Testament and by the early Church, and, indeed, by the Church universal, until long after the Reformation, which official sense of the term is not to be

applied to any but the ministers of the word. And that the true basis of the ruling elder's office is to be found in other terms contained in the Scriptures.—(pp. 185, 186.)

Yet, further:

“The reiterated dictum is not true, that our standards teach that there is one order of presbyters, divided into two classes, the teaching and the ruling presbyter. This is not their doctrine. They recognize but one order and one office of presbyters and bishops, and call it, emphatically, the ‘pastoral office.’”—(p. 195.) “The ministry, according to the Presbyterian system of doctrine and polity, is a distinct ORDER, and not a CLASS under an order.”—(p. 451.) “‘Ruling elders are, *properly*, the representatives of the people, chosen by them for the purpose of exercising government and discipline, in conjunction with pastors or ministers.’ Such is the *definition*. The *description*, as given in chapter three, is that they are those officers who are *usually* (not *universally*) styled (not *are so by divine calling*, and, hence, not by divine right,) ruling elders.* In chapter five it is: ‘This office has been *understood* by a great part of the Protestant Reformed Churches, to be designated in the Holy Scriptures by the title of governments, and (*described in their works as*) those who rule well, but do not labor in word and doctrine.’ We have here, therefore, a formal definition and a full description of ruling elders, and a candid admission that, in regard to the name, and the application of that name, of 1 Tim. v. 17, there has only been a ‘*common understanding*’ (or *opinion*) by ‘*a great part*’ of the Churches. In the definition they are not called ruling elders, and they are not—*here* nor any where else—called *presbyters*, which title is exclusively given to the bishop or pastor.”—(p. 453.)

But, not only they may not be called “Presbyter,” but the very name itself of

“Ruling elder, is neither a scriptural, nor a patristic, nor an original, nor a constitutionally Presbyterian title.”—(p. 209.) “In the standards of the Church of Scotland they are not even called elders, but other Church governors.”—(p. 196.) “Ruling elders are not officially, and by divine assignation, the presbyters of Scripture, who are ministers.”—(p. 462.) “Each session shall send one elder, *only*, to represent that session, and so to represent that Church or people. Dr. Adger, however, is entirely mistaken in adding ‘with the minister,’ as if the people sent the minister to presbytery.”—(p. 454.) “In the case of the minister, the personal call is from Christ, and when recognized and ratified by His existing ministers and elders in

* We are particular here, as always, to give capitals, italics and parentheses, exactly as used.

solemn convention, he is by them recommended to the people. But it is very different with the ruling elders. They are instituted for the special purpose of representing the people. This is the essential character of the ruling elder."—(p. 456.) "The fundamental relation of the ruling elder is, therefore, to the people."—(p. 454.) "He can do nothing officially which the Churches, if supposed to be acting directly, the Church, as a body, could not rightly do."—(p. 457.) "They represent, and cannot transcend, the power ultimately inherent in the people, to whom and for whose benefit they are instituted."—(p. 462.) "They are not, as ministers are, *ex-officio* necessary and constant members of any superior court. They never have been ordained by imposition of hands, nor considered as officially capable of uniting in imposition of hands in the ordination of ministers, by the constitution of any Presbyterian Church in any part of the world."—(p. 462.) "Neither elders, nor deacons, nor people, nor all combined, can, in the ordinary organized condition of the Church, call or ordain to the office of the ministry. They may call a man to be *their minister*, but, if not already in the office, then other ministers must ordain him and install him, with the imposition of their hands."—(p. 457.) "Ruling elders are laymen, that is, they are distinct from the clergy—they are individuals of the people who are not in orders."—(pp. 462, 463.) That they are laymen, simply, is the necessary consequence of their being representatives, for "a representative is one who bears the character, is clothed with the power, and performs the functions, of others."—(p. 463.) "Ruling elders have always been considered laymen in every branch of the Presbyterian Church."—(p. 465.) "The lay character of ruling elders is fundamental to the Presbyterian system. It is this which brings the lay element into our form of government, and imparts voice and power to the people."—(pp. 465, 466.)

This, we hope, will be acknowledged as a fair exhibition of the substance of what is maintained by our opponents. We have not, of course, quoted every position assumed respecting Ruling Elders, but only such as might shew the substance of their theory. For example, when they say "Ruling Elders are not Ministers" (p. 460); or, "The ministry is the highest office, both for dignity and usefulness" (p. 451); we pass over the statement as not peculiar to them, we ourselves saying exactly the same.

There are found, therefore, in the statements copied by us, the following principles, constituting the theory of Eldership now maintained by the Princeton Review.

1. Ruling Elders are not the Presbyters of Scripture.

2. They are not entitled to the name of Ruling Elders, except in the *general* sense of the terms, nor have they a perfectly clear right to be called even Elders, nor is the name Ruling Elder itself either scriptural or constitutionally Presbyterian.

3. Ruling Elders are laymen—individuals of the people not in orders—and can do nothing but what the people might themselves rightly do. They perform those functions which belong inherently to the people.

4. This is the sense in which they are the representatives of the people. It is in this way, and by this means, that the people's voice and power is felt in our Church government. For the special purpose of thus representing the people in the exercise only of powers which it is quite supposable the people might themselves directly exercise, was the office of Elders instituted.

5. There is no two-fold order of Presbyters. There is but one kind of Presbyters, and they are Ministers of the word. These are a distinct order, and are rightly called *clergy*. They alone are *ex-officio* necessary and constant members of the superior courts. There needs not a single Ruling Elder present, in order to make a perfectly regular as well as valid Presbytery or Synod; so many as may be present may sit as individuals of the people, representing the people, but they are by no means indispensable, like the Ministers.

6. Moreover, Ministers must not be viewed as representatives when they meet in the Church courts. It is not the voice of the Church which is heard through them, but their own voice. They go to those courts unsent by any Church in particular, and, of course, not by the Church as a whole. They go thither in their own right. They do not represent any Church in Presbytery or Synod, but exercise a power of their own, and the people take part in this government by the clergy, through those *individuals of*

the people not in orders, whom they send there to represent them. The "Clergy" get their personal call, not from the people, as the Elders do, but from Christ.

7. Accordingly, none but Ministers can make a Minister. The imposition of the hands of Ministers is essential to the ordination of a Minister or "Clergyman," but the imposition of the hands of the Ruling Elder, in the ordination of one of these "Clergymen," would be an unheard-of, unconstitutional and profane thing. Ruling Elders are incapable of such an act—it is above their sphere. Ordination is not the act of the Presbytery, but of the Ministers in the Presbytery. The Ruling Elders can take part in all the preceding acts of the body, respecting the candidate, but in the imposition of hands upon a "Clergyman" it is not to be allowed them to participate.

Now, in controverting these principles (which are all more or less definitely set forth in the article on Presbyterianism, in the July Repertory, and in various other articles of that quarterly, and, also, in Dr. Hodge's little work, "What is Presbyterianism?") we differ altogether from the reviewer as to the standard by which all these principles are to be tried, when he says, "the question between our respective theories is not what is most scriptural and most authoritatively maintained."—(p. 470.) Being *jure divino* Presbyterians, the question for us is precisely what he says is not the question. And this he will find is the question with our Presbyterian readers. The Church, in so far as her quiet has been or may be disturbed by this discussion, will not rest till it can be settled what is the testimony, on this subject, of the word of God? Let the Repertory venture to distinguish, if it so please, between "*what is scriptural* and most authoritatively maintained," on the one hand, and, on the other hand, "*the Presbyterian system*, as it regards Ruling Elders, which Presbyterian Ministers and Elders are, under solemn and covenant engagement, bound to maintain and preserve."—(p. 470.) We

can make no such distinction, nor will the Church make it. The Presbyterian system is what the Scriptures teach about Church government, which is set forth in our book. Confident and positive, and sometimes as untrustworthy as they are confident and positive, appeals to "the Westminster Assembly and the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland, of Ireland, of England, and the numerous branches in Canada, in the United States, and elsewhere," will avail very little against the clear testimony of the Bible. Nor can the decision, even of "large majorities in three of our own General Assemblies," settle this question against the Scripture and our standards, which are drawn out of the Scriptures. It is not "majorities" that are the rule of our faith, but God's words. It is not "majorities" that we have "solemnly covenanted" to follow in all their wrong interpretations of our constitution, but it is that constitution itself, fairly and justly interpreted. An appeal will always be allowed to Presbyterians from the accidental majority of any Assembly to the constitution they have misinterpreted. This is the birthright of us all. The Repertory well knows that Presbyterian General Assemblies have sometimes erred, just like other councils of fallible men. Moreover, the good seed sown in the controversy of 1842-'44 have taken root in many minds, and a new decision by the Assembly might reverse those made twenty years since.

If, then, the Repertory is now willing to abide by "what is scriptural, and may be most authoritatively maintained," we will proceed to prove out of the Scriptures:

First: that there is a two-fold order of Presbyters, and that under this two-fold order, the Ruling Elder is one class of scriptural Presbyters, and that, as such, their presence cannot be ordinarily dispensed with in any court which is a true and regular Presbytery of the Church of Christ.

Here we shall save some time and space by referring to the admissions of the reviewer: "It is not intended

to raise the question of the scriptural warrant of Ruling Elders in the Church.' "The true basis of the Ruling Elder's office is to be found in other terms contained in the Scriptures." This means, we suppose, that it is acknowledged the Scriptures refer to some kind of Church officers besides preachers, when they talk of "governments" and "them that rule." Our brethren admit "governors" and "rulers" that are not preachers. How they can afterwards maintain that these "rulers and governors" are mere "laymen," "individuals of the people not in orders," who "can do nothing but what the people might themselves rightly do," and that "they are not *ex-officio* necessary and constant members of superior courts"—how they can reduce so low the "rulers and governors" they have acknowledged to be given in the Scriptures, is more than we have sense enough to comprehend. But the point is yielded by them that the Scriptures do ordain rulers that are not preachers. And what they would deny is, that these rulers are Presbyters. "Presbyter," they say, is properly "Preacher," and those rulers not being Preachers, are not Presbyters. But Paul shows, in 1 Tim. v. 17, that there were a class of Elders or Presbyters who did not labor in word and doctrine, yet ruled well, and so were worthy of double honor; and, therefore, it is clear, from this one scripture, that what makes the Presbyter is not preaching, but ruling. It is clear, from this one scripture, that the Elder who only ruled is a scriptural Presbyter, and, also, that there are two classes of Presbyters; such as rule, and such as with their ruling connect also their labor in word and doctrine.

What is the meaning of the New Testament Greek title *Presbyter*, denied to Ruling Elders? It means an *Elder*, or an *old man*. What is most naturally suggested by that title? It naturally suggests the idea of the wisdom that counsels, that reflects and decides, that authoritatively rules through its native, its unquestioned, its hereditary, and its prescriptive influence and weight, rather than through its

labors to enlighten others by teaching them. It naturally suggests, not a teaching, but a counselling and ruling wisdom. Moreover, it is a title almost always used in the plural number; it is the *Elders* that are continually found using their wisdom in overseeing and directing others. We can trace the title back through the Synagogues that existed in the beginning of the Christian Church, far away to the remotest period of the Jewish Church, and every where it seems always to have signified, not the office of singly or severally teaching or persuading the people, but of jointly counselling together, and then making known the decision to obedient and submissive followers. And yet the Repertory undertakes to twist this title into Preacher, which it never did mean, in any age of the Church!

Were the Elders of the Jews in our Saviour's days the teachers of the people? One in every Synagogue was a teacher as well as a ruler—sometimes more than one in a Synagogue—but the essence of the Jewish Eldership, that which made the Jewish Elder, was *ruling*.

Were the Elders ordained by Paul and Barnabas "in every Church," and by Titus "in every city," teachers? The Apostles and Evangelists, it would seem, in their missionary tours, generally succeeded in converting at least a few souls in every city, and before leaving the little flock to go to regions beyond, they would organize them into a Church, by ordaining Elders over them. What is it most natural to suppose these Elders were? Is it more probable they would be men gifted with the higher and rarer gifts, or with the lower and more ordinary gifts? Is it more likely they were teachers and preachers, or mere rulers and headmen? Does it not seem most probable that in every little company of thirty or forty disciples, the first ingathering of converts in each town, all that generally could be found when the missionary was ready to pass on, were simply some sober-minded, prudent, humble men, to whom the

oversight or pastorship of the little flock might be left? Is it to be supposed that such a lavish bestowal of the highest gifts was then enjoyed as that in every such little company of neophytes there would be found *several* who were fit to be Preachers? The expression is "*Elders* in every Church and in every city (or village)"—not one, but *several*. We ask if it be the most natural supposition that in every little Church several Preachers would be found or would be needed at the beginning?

Look at the list of qualifications for an Elder or Bishop, prescribed by Paul to Titus and to Timothy, and it will be seen that it is most especially applicable to the ruler, and not the preacher. He must be blameless; the husband of one wife; having faithful children; vigilant; sober; of good behavior; given to hospitality; not given to wine; no striker; not greedy of filthy lucre; patient; not a brawler; not covetous; not accused of riot, or unruly; not self-willed; not soon angry; a lover of good men; just; holy; temperate; one that ruleth well his own house, having his children in subjection, with all gravity, for if he cannot rule his own house, how shall he take care of the Church of God; not a novice; having a good report of them that are without. Here are three-and-twenty qualifications of the *Presbyter* or *Elder*. Are they descriptive of a teacher, or of a ruler? Are they descriptive of a man more or less separated from ordinary life, that he may give himself to reading and reflection, so as to teach the people publicly, or of a man in the very midst of all the avocations of life, and mingling with all kinds of people, exposed to brawlings and fightings, and every kind of temptation and trouble, yet called on by his office to lead a blameless life in the midst of it all, and be a good under-shepherd of the sheep? Along with these three-and-twenty, we find two other qualifications mentioned—one in Timothy, the other in Titus—which are the only ones in the whole combined list having any applicability to Teachers, as such, and they

are not, by any means, exclusively so applicable. The first is, "apt to teach;" the second is, "holding fast the faithful word, as he hath been taught, that he may be able, by sound doctrine, both to exhort and to convince the gainsayers." These gainsayers are such as opposed Titus' doctrine, and he is commanded by Paul to rebuke them sharply, and to speak the things which become sound doctrine. Now, the Presbyters must be men holding fast what they have been taught, so that they may be able to withstand, and also to exhort these gainsayers; they must be apt to teach, going from house to house, and applying the preached word to every individual of their flock.

There are various offices, the names of which are used interchangeably in the epistles of the New Testament, as Presbyter, Bishop, Pastor, etc., all of them described as offices of rule and oversight, but not offices of public teaching. Indeed, so far from its being true that Presbyter and Preacher are synonymous in the apostolic, or even in the primitive, Church, the fact is, that the latter officer soon drove out the former from almost all place and being in the Church. The preaching Presbyter soon grew to be so great, that he left no room for the mere Ruler. The name Bishop, originally common to all Rulers, becomes, at an early period, peculiar to the teaching Presbyter. As early as the commencement of the second century we find this distinctive application and use of a title which certainly was common to all Presbyters in the Apostles' time. Thus came in Prelacy, by the driving out of the Ruling Elder. And yet our brethren flatter themselves that they best contend against Prelacy by insisting on the Preacher only as the true and proper Presbyter, and leaving the Ruler out of the presbyterate! Strange, that they should not discover how they are actually doing the very same thing with the title "Presbyter," which the Prelatists of the second century did with that of "Bishop," viz: confining it to Ministers, and thus robbing the Ruling Elders of what

belongs to them. Instead of their best knowing how to defend our cause in the controversy with Prelacy, they are themselves actually building up a hierarchy amongst ourselves.

We think that we have now proved out of the Scriptures that the Ruling Elder is a true and proper Presbyter, and, in fact, the aboriginal Presbyter. Apostles and Evangelists preceded these Presbyters in the Christian Church; but these Presbyters, Bishops, Pastors, preceded Teachers. After the extraordinary gifts came the ordinary; and of the ordinary gifts, the lower preceded, generally, the higher. Accordingly, we read, when He ascended He gave some Apostles; and some prophets; and some evangelists; and some pastors and teachers. Upon the first organization of every little Church, it got pastors, bishops, presbyters, head-men, rulers. Afterwards, gradually these little flocks were supplied with teachers.

Now, our form of government says: "We hold it to be expedient, and agreeable to Scripture and the practice of the primitive Christians, that the Church be governed by congregational; presbyterial, and synodical assemblies."—(See Chap. VIII.) The very object, of course, of the ordination by the Apostles of several rulers in every little Church, was, that they might thus, as a *council of rulers*, govern and direct them. It was not the government of Independency which the Apostles set up—a government by the people directly; or by the deputies or creatures of the people; or by individuals of the people charged by the people, for convenience' sake, with doing what the people could themselves do. Neither was it, on the other hand, the government of Prelacy which the Apostles set up—a government of "Clergymen," either one or many—a government by men separated, as a distinct class, from the people, and to be called *clergy*, or the *inheritance of the Lord*, which all the Lord's dear people, in fact, are. The Church government which the Apostles set up in all those

little Churches, was before Teachers were given to them all, and so it could not have been a government by Teaching Elders. It was a government by Rulers sitting in assemblies and counselling together. These things being so ordained of the Apostles, who had any right, subsequently, to change the government into a government by "*Clergy*," as it certainly did afterwards become? The Rulers being put in charge at first, each company of their own little flock, when afterwards, gradually, the scattered flocks came to be joined visibly together, in one great Church of each different country or nation, meeting together in the assemblies of their Bishops, how was it that the original right of rule had all been taken out of those hands in which the Apostles placed it? Who was it that had found means to hinder these same Rulers from composing the presbyterial or classical, as they had, from the first, composed the congregational, Assembly? Or, who had found means to thrust them out from the synodical Assembly, where they had the same right to sit as in the classical? Every student of Church history knows how it was done. It was, as Ambrose says, "the *pride* of the teachers, while they alone wished to appear something." Our brethren who now maintain that "only Ministers are *ex officio* necessary and constant members of the superior courts," must beware whose steps they are treading in. They are on prelatie ground. If Ruling Elders are true scriptural Presbyters, they have a right to be in all our courts, for all those courts are assemblies of Presbyters. If the session is necessarily open to them, so is the Presbytery, the Synod and the Assembly, and no one of these bodies is regular without Elders of both classes. But, still further, if these courts are assemblies of Presbyters, none can be in them but Rulers, for Presbyter means Ruler, and not Preacher. As Preacher, merely, no man may sit in any one of these bodies.

We marvel very much that our brethren, even such emi-

nently sensible and learned ones, fail to understand the theory of Eldership they are combating upon this point, of the aboriginal presbyterate of the Ruler. The reviewer, for example, seems to think we thus exalt the Ruler over the Teacher. Not so. He seems to think we deny the Ministry to be a permanent "*office*," and make a mere "*function*" of it.—(p. 190.) But the terms "*office*" and "*function*" are synonymous, in our use of them. We hold Ruling Elders to be Presbyters, with all the rights of the office of Presbyters who rule; but we hold that there is another class of Presbyters, who labor in the word as well as rule. It is matter of record that at first, and for a long time, the Teaching Presbyter was selected from amongst the Ruling Presbyters. Now, he was a Presbyter before he became a laborer in the word and doctrine. It was not his teaching which made a Presbyter of him. It was not his teaching that gave him a place in the Church assemblies, from the lowest to the highest, but it was his being a Ruler. The scriptural Presbyter, Bishop, Pastor, was less than the Teacher. Ruling Elders are less now than Ministers, for the same reason. But, in the beginning, and to this day, they are equal as *Presbyters*, or *Rulers*. Neither of them fills more than one seat, or gives more than one voice, in the courts, and there, in the courts, the Elder may lift up his voice as high as any Preacher of them all. Where the Preacher can *outvoice* the Elder, is in the pulpit, and there only. But to *outvoice* him there, surely, ought to be enough. The theory of the Repertory disparages the Ministry as well as the Eldership, for it implies that no difference at all is put between them by us, when we put between them the mighty power of the office of preaching the Gospel. Let the Repertory but consider carefully the distinction of *several* power and *joint* power, of *potestas ordinis* and *potestas jurisdictionis*, (which, it appears to be intimated on page 228, is a distinction originated by Dr. Breckinridge, but which is as old as the Second Book of

Discipline,) and it must discover that when we ascribe to all the Presbyters of both classes the joint power of rule, we do not make Elders equal to Teachers, because to the latter belongs, as individual Ministers, the *several* power of their teaching office, which does not belong to the former. Every man of these Teaching Elders has the whole of this several power committed to him, and he teaches, as he is taught himself, alone by the Spirit. But the rulers only share between them the power of ruling and governing the Church in her different courts. In all our assertions, therefore, of the rights of Ruling Elders, we are speaking always of their rights in the secondary office of ruling. When we say that ruling is the essence of the presbyterate, and that the Ruler is the aboriginal Presbyter, we only assert that this office arose first in the order of nature and of time. We have never made Rulers greater than Teachers, nor yet their equals—we have never said *Ruling Elders are Teachers*. We complain of this charge as an injustice often done us by the Repertory, (pp. 449, 561, and elsewhere,) and done us, also, by Dr. Hodge, in the last Assembly, when he said the doctrine had been advanced and strenuously maintained by us, that “Ruling Elders and Ministers, being alike Presbyters, have the same office, all are bishops, pastors and teachers, as well as rulers.” We do not believe Dr. Hodge can prove this statement. At least we may, with confidence, demand, on behalf of all the prominent advocates of the “new theory,” where did any one of them ever say the Ruler is a public teacher? What are we to think of such statements from such a quarter? The reader must answer the question for himself; we do not know how to answer it.

We cannot dismiss this first topic of our argument without considering briefly an *objection* of our opponents to this whole reasoning from the Scriptures in favor of the Ruling Elder's right to the name and functions of a Presbyter. It is the very specious objection that the name Presbyter

is applicable to the Ruler only in "a *general* sense," "an *appellative* sense," "a *wide* sense," and not in "the *official* sense." The Repertory says:

"When this theory assumes that, because, in a *general* sense, the term *Elder* may be given as a warrantable translation of the Greek word *Presbyter*, in its official sense during the apostolic age (when the names of office were, it is said, used without scrupulosity, and with much license), that, therefore, it includes ruling elders as now understood, there is a glaring *non sequitur*."—(p. 215.) "Based upon the English or modern version of the Scriptures, and the frequent use in them of such words as *Elder*, for the original words *Presbyter*, and upon the now established use of the official title *Ruling Elder*, it has all the advantage of apparently carrying with its premises its conclusion."—(p. 449.)

Dr. Thornwell himself, in the last extremity, said that he did not hold the new theory.* Then he has no controversy with us, nor we with him, so far as the eldership is concerned. The dispute is reduced to a mere logomachy, if the only question is whether the ruling elder is a presbyter. Dr. Thornwell asked, 'If he is not a presbyter, what right has he in the Presbytery. You might as well (he said) put any other good man there.' It is on all sides admitted that in the New Testament the presbyters are bishops—how, then, are we to avoid the conclusion that the ruling elder is a bishop, and, therefore, the same in office as the minister, and the one as much a clergyman as the other? This is the dilemma in which, as we understood, Dr. Thorn-

* Here we must take the liberty of correcting our contemporary. Who, in fact, was "in the last extremity" at the time referred to, let those present say—but this we affirm, that Dr. Thornwell said, not that he "did not hold the new theory," but that *Dr. Hodge's statement* of the theory (which we have just been complaining of) was "not his theory."

Yet, further: it is our impression that the conversation, subsequently referred to above, neither began nor ended as our contemporary represents. It did not begin by Dr. Thornwell saying what is ascribed to him about the Presbyter. He did not, at that time, certainly, say what is ascribed here to him. This conversation began when Dr. Hodge interrupted Dr. Thornwell, at a particular juncture of the debate, and earnestly declared (what he does not seem now to *stand up to*) that he "could agree to every principle set forth by Dr. Thornwell here to-day." Then it was that Dr. Thornwell asked if Dr. Hodge "would be understood to say that he held the Ruling Elder to be a Presbyter," and Dr. Hodge replied, "I will answer that question, if you will tell me whether you hold the Apostle to have been a deacon." Dr. Thornwell answered, "No." Dr. Hodge rejoined, "But the Apostle says he was a *διάκονος*." And then, the Moderator insisting that the hour of adjournment was come, Dr. Thornwell said, "O, well, we shall see about that to-morrow."

well endeavored to place Dr. Hodge, when he asked him, on the floor of the Assembly, whether he admitted that the elder was a presbyter. Dr. Hodge rejoined, by asking Dr. Thornwell whether he admitted that the Apostles were deacons. He answered, no. But, says Dr. Hodge, Paul says he was a *διάκονος*. O, says Dr. Thornwell, that was in the general sense of the word. Precisely so. If the answer is good in the one case, it is good in the other. If the Apostles being deacons in the wide sense of the word, does not prove that they were officially deacons, then that elders are presbyters in the one sense, does not prove them to be presbyters in the other sense."—(p. 562.)

Now, whether we "base our theory on the English or modern version of the Bible," let the reader of the foregoing argument, from the Greek Scriptures, say. The reviewer, when making this charge, seems once again to have strangely forgotten that he is dealing with men who give to nothing else any weight in this controversy but to the testimony of the very Word of God. The charge comes with an ill grace from one who had admitted that "the term Elder may be given as a warrantable translation of the Greek word Presbyter, in its official sense"—and had yet, in the same sentence, disparaged *the Apostolic age*, as a time "when names of office were used without scrupulosity, and with much license!" The expression is quoted, indeed, from Dr. Miller, but it was not employed in this sense by that venerable Father.

But, let the reader observe that the Repertory says (page 562), that if the only question is, whether the Ruling Elder is a Presbyter, (that is, whether, in some large or loose sense, he is a Presbyter,) then the dispute is reduced to a mere logomachy; for it admits that, in this large sense, he may be called a Presbyter, just as the Apostle is, in the large sense, called a Deacon. On page 450, however, it had said that the controversy, though about words, "is not a mere logomachy, but involves all that is vital in the relations of the Eldership, the Ministry, and the Deaconship." We agree with the last quoted statement of the Repertory, in so far as concerns the Eldership and the Ministry. The controversy between us is no logomachy; nor yet is that an

unimportant difference which prevails between us, as to the point of the *general*, the *large*, the *wide*, the *appellative*, or, on the other hand, the *official*, application of the title Presbyter to Ruling Elders. All that is vital in the relations of the Eldership and the Ministry to one another, and of each to the Church, is involved in this dispute about the sense of Presbyter, as applied to the Elder. If our brethren can make out their case, and show that only in a general, and not in the strict and proper, sense, that title belongs to the Ruling Elder, then, in our humble judgment, the office becomes a mere human expedient, and may as well be struck out of our Church constitution, and the hierarchy set up at once.

Let us, then, carefully notice what is alleged by our opponents on this subject, for it is, indeed, their chief refuge and their stronghold, to which they flee when pressed by our Scripture proofs. Their position is, that the Apostles were, in a wide sense, *Deacons*, or *Servants*, of the Lord and his Church;—the Prophets were such Deacons; so were the Evangelists; so the Pastors; so the Teachers; and so the official Deacons given by Christ to his people; so, indeed, every particular Christian; all were Deacons of the Church and her Lord in the general sense of the term *diakonos*, or *servant*. Now, it is just in a like general sense, and it only in this general sense, that Presbyter is applied to the Ruler. The Apostle, the Prophet, the Evangelist, might all of them be called *Presbyter*, in this general sense of *aged man*, as a respectful appellative, and so the Church “governors,” and they “that rule,” received the name in the sense of a respectful appellative, merely, and not a title of office. But as a title of office, it was given always to preachers of the word only. They only were, officially, the Presbyters.

Now, must not our brethren have been hard pressed when they resorted to this invention to escape from the power of the plain teachings of Scripture? Let the reader mark what consequences this hypothesis must involve for

them. Here is a title, *Deacon*, which has an official sense in five places in the New Testament, where the Christian officer of that name is named, (viz: Phil. i. 1; 1 Tim. iii. 8, 10, 12, 13,) and which in four-and-twenty other places has the general or appellative sense of *servant*, as in 1 Cor. iii. 5, "Who were Paul, and who Apollos, but ministers, (servants, *διδάκονοι*,) by whom ye believed?" or, 2 Cor. xi. 23, "Are they ministers (servants, *διδάκονοι*,) of Christ? (I speak as a fool,) I am more." Here, on the other hand, is a title, *Presbyter*, which has been generally understood to have an official sense in seventeen places in the New Testament, where the Christian officer of that name seems to be referred to, (viz: Acts xi. 30; xiv. 23; xv. 2, 4, 6, 22, 23; xvi. 4; xx. 17; xxi. 18; 1 Tim. v. 1, 17, 19; Tit. i. 5; James v. 14; 1 Pet. v. 1; 2 Jno. 1; 3 Jno. 1;) and which in barely two or three other places has been considered usually to have the general or appellative sense of old man, namely, Acts ii. 17, "Your old men (*πρεσβύτεροι*) shall dream dreams," and in perhaps 1 Peter v. 5, "Likewise, ye younger, submit yourselves to the elder, (or old men, *πρεσβύτεροις*,) and perhaps 1 Tim. v. 1, "Rebuke not an Elder" (or old man, *πρεσβυτέρω*). Now, *our position* is, that the common opinion is correct, and that in these seventeen places the title *Presbyter* is official, and not appellative. But *our brethren say*, on the contrary, that in whichsoever of these seventeen places it refers to the Ruler, it is appellative; is applied in its wide or large sense, and, of course, may be substituted by *old man*. And what is their proof that this is the sense to be given to this title whenever used of the Ruler? Why, it is barely and simply this: *Deacon*, although sometimes an official title, is, nevertheless, frequently applied in the general or appellative sense to Apostles themselves. The reviewer deals very freely in assertions about the large sense of *Presbyter*, as applied to Rulers, but there is no proof and no argument, except this argument from the two-fold use of the word *Diakonos*. But our brethren were under no necessity to

argue from this two-fold use of Deacon, for we were ready to grant such a two-fold use of the name Presbyter, itself. The question is not, whether there be a two-fold use of this word Presbyter, one *general*, the other *official*. We agree on that point. But the question between us and the Repertory is, whether, in these seventeen cases, or any of them, the word Presbyter is to be taken in its general, appellative sense, of old man? What proof, then, we ask again, does the Repertory produce for its statement, that the word, in any of these seventeen cases, is to be so understood? There is none furnished. We are satisfied none can be furnished. Let our brethren make the trial, and undertake to substitute either "Teacher" or "old man" in either of those places, and they will soon see in what difficulty their hypothesis has involved them. Will they say the disciples sent relief "by the hands of Barnabas and Paul to the *Teachers*, or to the *old men*, at Jerusalem?"—(See Rom. xi. 30.) Will they say, "When they had ordained them *Teachers*, or *old men*, in every Church?"—(See Rom. xiv. 23.) Will they say, "Paul and Barnabas should go up to Jerusalem to the Apostles and *Teachers*, or to the Apostles and *old men*, about this question?"—(See Rom. xv. 2.) Will they say, "Let the *Teachers*, or the *old men*, that rule well, be counted worthy of double honor, especially they who labor in the word and doctrine?"—(See 1 Tim. v. 17.) If the position assumed were a correct one, our brethren might surely make either the one or else the other substitution properly and fairly. It is in this way the word *ought to have been translated*, if our brethren are right. What propriety was there in our translators putting in a title where a common noun substantive was found in the original? They did not so in any case of all those four-and-twenty, where the word *Diakonos* has the general or appellative sense of servant, but in all those cases they translated it servant. This hypothesis, therefore, involves a charge against our English Bible, of having frequently made a title out of the word Elder, or

Presbyter, used only in its general or appellative sense of old man. Our brethren, we repeat, were surely hard pressed, when they fled to this refuge. Let us throw their argument into the form of a syllogism, and its true value will be made clear.

1. The words *Deacon*, and *Presbyter*, as employed in the New Testament, are sometimes appellative and sometimes official, in their signification.

2. Out of twenty-nine cases where *Deacon* occurs in the New Testament, five cases are of the official use, and four-and-twenty of the appellative use, of the word.

3. Therefore, out of the twenty places in the New Testament where the word *Elder* occurs, it is never once used officially, in reference to the "Church governors," or "them that rule."

One word more about this objection of the Repertory, and we pass from this topic of our discussion to the next. The reader has observed that it is admitted the Scripture expressions, "Church governors," and "he that ruleth," do denote some kind of rulers in the Church who are not public teachers. Such rulers being admitted by our brethren, how can they make any question that the Apostle is referring to them, when he speaks of the Elders that rule well, but do not labor in word and doctrine? Admitting the existence of such officers, how can our brethren stop short of acknowledging two classes of Presbyters, as referred to by the Apostle in that same passage? They have already made the acknowledgment, and no such futile distinction as that between the *appellative* and the *official* use of *Presbyter* can help them to escape the consequences.

We shall now attempt to prove from the Scriptures,

Secondly, That these two classes of Presbyters are both appointed by the Lord, to do such acts of ruling as the people have no power of right directly to do; they are both alike spiritual office-bearers; both representatives of the

people in the very same sense, namely, of rulers chosen by the people to administer amongst them the laws of Christ, by meeting in parliamentary bodies vested with divine authority to rule, and by acting in those bodies for the Church, to whom the Lord gave them as His and her ministers, or servants.

We find a part of the Scripture proof of these positions in all those passages which have been already quoted as setting forth the history of the first organization of the Church. Rulers are ordained in every little Church from the beginning, and then, subsequently, some of these rulers are also ordained to the work of public teaching. Only one of these two classes teach publicly, but both rule by the same authority. The one has precisely the same power of rule as the other. And to both it is given by the Lord, and not the people. They are both set over the people by the Lord, who did not give the people the right of direct self-government, but ordained, from the beginning, officers to rule them. The rule, however, is plainly set forth in the Scriptures, as that of deliberative parliamentary assemblies. Our Saviour says to his twelve disciples (Matt. xviii.), "Whatsoever ye shall bind on earth," etc.; and, in the same connection, he ordains that after private efforts at removing offences have been tried in vain, they must be referred to those who bind and loose in each particular Church. "Tell it to the Church, and if he will not hear them," etc. Here is Scripture warrant for the congregational assembly, or Church session. So, for the classical assembly, which we call the Presbytery, we have Scripture warrant in what is said of Timothy's ordination by the Presbytery (1 Tim. iv. 14), and in the many different congregations which there must have been in Jerusalem, Antioch, Ephesus and Corinth, being called *one Church*, as in Acts viii. 1; xiii. 1; xx. 17, and in 1 Cor. i. 2. How else were these different congregations one Church, in any sense, segregating them from all the other saints in the

world, as they are segregated in these passages, except in that they were represented and ruled in *one Presbytery*? So, we find Scripture warrant for the synod in Acts xv. Yet, are all these rulers and bodies of rulers* the Ministers or servants of Christ and his Church. All are his ascension gifts to her, and for her service and edification. They serve her in ruling her. The Church is one body, but all the members have not the same office. There are diversities of gifts, but the same spirit. No one can say to the other, I have no need of thee; nay, much more, those members of the body which seem to be feeble are necessary, and so God tempers the body of his people together, that there should be no schism in it. Some are to rule, others are to be ruled, but all are members one of another, and this organization of the body is not of human expediency, but of divine authority.

That both classes of Presbyters have the same right of rule is further proved from Scripture, by divine commands to the Church, of her obedience, in which both seem to be included. "We beseech you (says the Apostle, in Thess. v. 12, 13) to know (that is, to acknowledge,) them that labor among you and are over you in the Lord, and to esteem them very highly in love for their work's sake." What work? That of laboring in the word, and, also, of ruling, or being over them in the Lord.

Both classes are to be counted worthy of double honor (in comparison of the widows indeed, whom he had commanded them just before to *honor*,) if they rule well.—1 Tim. v. 17.

Both classes seem to be included, since neither is excepted, in the command (Heb. xiii. 17), "Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit yourselves, for they watch for your souls as they that must give account," etc.

Still further, both these classes of office-bearers that rule in parliamentary assemblies, must be referred to (because both were existing and acting by divine authority in the

apostolic Church) in all such passages as 1 Cor. v. 4, 12, 13: "In the name of our Lord Jesus, when ye are gathered together," etc., etc. "Do ye not judge them that are within? but them that are without God judgeth." And, 1 Peter v. 1-3, "The Elders that are among you I exhort; * * * feed (or govern) the flock of God which is among you, taking the oversight thereof; * * * neither as being lords over God's heritage," etc.

Once more: the history of the Synod or Council of Jerusalem, proves that both classes of Presbyters are Rulers, in the same sense, and on the same ground, for Elders as well as Apostles imposed the necessary things upon the Churches, and authoritatively determined the decrees. The only reason which can be conceived why the teachers then present, who were actually inspired men, did thus put themselves on an equality with the Rulers, was, (as the London Ministers in their "Divine right of Church government" suggest—see p. 271, American edition,) that they might exhibit a pattern to after ages; otherwise, all this was unnecessary, for how needless for inspired men to reason and dispute on the subject, when the sentence of one inspired man was sufficient for decision. This council, then, is a pattern for our Church courts, and Rulers are to act in them with the same authority as Teachers, and the Teachers appear there only because they have the right to rule, as well as to labor in the word and doctrine.

We think ourselves warranted, therefore, in concluding that the Princeton Review errs grievously, when it proclaims the Ruling Elder to be nothing but a layman. He is, on the contrary, a high spiritual officer in the house of God. It gives us great pain, as Presbyterians, to have our brethren express themselves on this point as they do, both in the second article on Theories of the Eldership (pp. 462, 469), and in the article on Presbyterianism (p. 539), of the *Repertory* for July, 1860. In the one place Elders are pronounced to be "laymen, individuals of the people not

in orders, laymen just as Deacons are laymen." In the other place, it is said, "There are but two radically different theories in this subject. According to the one, the Ruling Elder is a layman; according to the other, he is a Clergyman." What would the London Ministers, who, in those days of old, when the controversy ran so high between the English Presbyterians and Independents, wrote the great defence and exposition of our Church government, just now referred to—what would they say, to hear from such a seat of orthodox Presbyterian learning issue forth what they used to call "Dr. Field's scoffing term of lay governors, or lay elders?" What would they say to hear so continually employed by this leading Presbyterian authority what they called "the groundless distinction of the ministry and people into the clergy and laity, which is justly rejected by sound orthodox writers, as not only without, but against, the warrant of Scripture?"—(See page 130.) With these old-fashioned Presbyterian Divines, we scout the use of all such prelatie distinctions. We object to all attempts, from whatever quarter, to make the Deacon a Ruler in the House of God—yet is the Deacon also an office-bearer, and as such, even he is not to be dishonored by such names and such distinctions as these. He, also, like the very people themselves, is of the Lord's inheritance, as well as the most gifted Teacher. Nor do we acknowledge that, denying the Ruling Elder to be a layman, we must needs make him a Clergyman. The Repertory's analysis is defective—there is another theory, radically different from both those it names, and it is the theory of the New Testament and of our Presbyterian Fathers. It is the theory which the Repertory is endeavoring to confute, that *they* are true Scriptural Presbyters *who only rule* in God's house, and, on the other hand, that some Presbyters not only rule well, but likewise labor in the word and doctrine.

We think ourselves, also, warranted in saying that the Repertory errs grievously, when, denying this true scrip-

tural theory, it really makes the Elder a mere expedient to get the people's voice and power felt, after a Congregationalist fashion, in our Church government. That plain passage of Scripture, 1 Tim. v. 17, respecting which Dr. Owen says, "that on its first proposal, a rational man, who is unprejudiced, and never heard of the controversy about Ruling Elders, can hardly avoid an apprehension that there are *two sorts of Elders*, some that labor in the word, and some that do not;"—that plain passage, where the London Ministers say (page 268) that "the divine warrant for Ruling Elders shines with more peculiar brightness than any where in the Book of God;"—that plain passage of Scripture it seeks, with the most earnest efforts, to expound in some other sense, denying its pertinency at all to this office. But it acknowledges a representative of the people, in the sense of a deputy of the people—one "clothed with the power and performing the functions of the people"—"instituted for the special purpose of representing the people, and, therefore, necessarily one of the people;"—it acknowledges such an officer, "by whom the lay element is brought into our form of government, and voice and power in it are imparted to the people." Where, in the Scripture, does it find this arrangement, there being denied to be any class of Presbyters who only rule, and do not publicly teach? It is found, says the Repertory, in the term "governments," and "he that ruleth." Strange, indeed, that these should refer to some office to whom 1 Tim. v. 17, has no reference or applicability. But, where does the Repertory find, in the Scriptures, the principle that the voice of the people, as such—of the people, *not as an organized body, with its officers*, set up in that organized form by our Lord, but *as people, in distinction from their officers*—where, in Scripture, does it find the principle that this kind of popular voice, this lay element, is to be introduced into our form of government? The Repertory, in its article on Presbyterianism (p. 555),

maintains, indeed, the divine right of the people to take part in the government of the Church, on the ground, (1.) That the spirit of God, who is the source of all power, dwells in the people, and not exclusively in the Clergy; (2.) That we are commanded to submit ourselves to our brethren; (3.) That the people are commanded to exercise this power; (4.) That the gift of ruling is a permanent gift; (5.) That in the New Testament we find the brethren in the actual recognized exercise of the authority in question. *As to the first ground*, we say the spirit of God has ordained no direct exercise of the popular voice in Church government. The election of whom they will for Church rulers belongs, of course, to the people, by divine right, but that is not a *popular voice* in the actual government, for these chosen rulers or representatives are not instructed by the people in any form; are not deputies, but representatives, and exercise their high office as unto the Lord, and this election of Church Rulers as really occurs in the case of Ministers as Elders. No man can be a Minister any more than an Elder, without the popular call. *As to the other four statements*, we say they are just, only in the sense that all the doings of the courts are the Church's doings, because they act for the Church. There is no lay element, whatever, in any part of our government, in the Repertory's sense of it. Nothing of the kind is provided for in the Scriptures. Nothing of the kind is held by our Presbyterian Fathers. The whole theory is a novelty, indeed—an invention of our brethren. The Scripture doctrine, and that received by Gillespie, Rutherford, and our other Scotch Presbyterian Fathers, and held forth in our book (Form of Government, Chaps. IV. V. VII.) is, that the Church is governed—that she is governed by congregational, presbyterial, and synodical assemblies—that those assemblies are assemblies of Presbyters, who are all rulers—that the Pastor (or Minister) is a Presbyter or Elder, as he governs well in the house of God (not as he labors in the word and

doctrine)—that the Ruling Elder is properly (simply) the representative of the people, and not also a teacher—and that he is a representative because he is *chosen to govern*. He is one of that assembly of Presbyters who act for the Church in the government and direction of her affairs. He is her servant and the Lord's servant, to rule the Church for her edification. But he is not elected that he may do the bidding of the Church, nor yet of that portion of the Church which is called *the people*. He represents, as *ruler*, the whole Church and her Lord. He acts for all the interests of the Church, whether they concern office-bearers or people. He labors, of course, in a special manner, for the good of some one Church—but as often as he acts in the higher courts, he considers not the good, much less the pleasure, of his own particular constituency—whether they be regarded as people, or session, or presbytery—but he considers the well-being of the whole body, including all sections, and all orders, and all classes. We think it would puzzle the Repertory to state definitely what it means by its representatives' speaking *the popular voice*, or introducing a *lay element* into our government, in any other way than as we have now described. Surely, it does not mean to say that popular prejudice or passion is to sway the Elder; that he is to be the organ of an individual, or of a clique, or of a mob; that he is to be directed by the will of one man, or of twenty men, or of all the crowd of men, women and children that belong to the Church of which he is a Ruler, so that their voice may directly reach the Presbytery. If this be the Repertory's doctrine, do let it speak it out distinctly, that the Church and her Ruling Elders may understand! And do let it prepare a clear and thorough exposition of the rules and regulations which may be best observed by our brethren of the Eldership in the discharge of these, their new and hitherto unheard-of duties!

We believe it cannot be doubted by any candid examiner of these representations of the Repertory, that they contain

an element which is Congregationalist, and not Presbyterian. In fact, this is, in so many words, its own statement—a *lay element* is to be introduced, by having *laymen, of the people*, members of the courts. “It is precisely because the Ruling Elder is a layman that he is a real power, a distinct element, in our system.”—(pp. 466, 560.) In Dr. Hodge’s little work, “What is Presbyterianism?” this idea is set forth with equal definiteness. The people, as such, as distinguished from the Clergy, are to have a substantive part in the government of the Church. They send men to the Church courts from amongst themselves, who are still laymen; who are invested with authority to do only what the people themselves might directly do; who exercise only the powers of the people, as distinguished from rulers of the people. We say, this is not Presbyterian Church government, either as expounded by Presbyterian authorities, or as set forth in the Scriptures. We say, the Scriptures teach, and our Fathers held, that the Lord Jesus set up His Church as an organized body, with officers appointed by Him to rule her, not according to the popular will, in any direct sense whatever, but only in the indirect and secondary sense, that they, being taken from amongst the people, would fairly consider their real and true interests. They were to do for the people, not whatever the people should wish, but what they might judge, in the fear of God, and in a paternal love for the Church, that the people *ought* to wish. Christ made no promises to the people, in a separate capacity, but all to *His Bride*, as she is an organized body, with divinely appointed office-bearers. Churches were from the beginning, and are now, always organized with Elders over them, and the whole right of the people, as respects government, is to choose whom they will to rule them. Nor can they proceed to this choice of themselves, independently of their existing rulers. They cannot do any thing, as people, apart from their office-bearers—least of all can they take men from themselves, being still mere

individuals of the people, mere laymen, and not ordained to be high spiritual office-bearers, and send them to the Church courts, to exercise "the people's part" of the Church government. We say, this whole doctrine of "the people's part in the government" is unpresbyterian. Our Board of Publication has issued Dr. Hodge's book by hundreds and by thousands, as we were told by him, but we believe that the Church will, upon examination, repudiate this, as a new and unsound addition to the system of our Fathers.

But, if the Presbyterian Church cannot possibly digest this *Congregational* principle, what will it do with a principle introduced by the Repertory, which is the very antipodes of this? The people have a part, a substantive part, of the government; who has the other part of it? *The Clergy*, is the answer given. Dr. Hodge is earnest in his denial "that the Clergy have *all* the power;" part of it, as we understand his book, he will cheerfully yield to them, as Clergy—as of an independent order, and not representatives of the people—but the people must have a substantive part of it.—(See "What is Presbyterianism?" pp. 9, 15, 21.) This, it seems to us, no one can deny, is a prelatie principle. It sets up a hierarchy who exercise powers of rule in their own right, and not as representatives, or chosen Rulers of the people. "It is an entire mistake (says the Repertory, for July, p. 454,) that the Minister is sent to Presbytery by the people. Every ordained Minister is *ex-officio* a member of Presbytery," etc. Granted, of course, that such is the law, but as to the principle of the law, the Presbyterian idea is, that Ministers go to the assemblies of Presbyters because they, also, are Presbyters, or Rulers, all chosen by the people to rule them. In this only true sense of representatives of the people, they, also, are representatives, that is, *rulers chosen to rule the people*. But the idea held forth in the Repertory, and in the little work referred to, is, that the Clergy are, in some sense, an independent body of men, and there is no difficulty in allowing this indepen-

dence, nor in submitting to the rule exercised by them in their own right as Clergy—the only point to be insisted on is, that they do not possess *the exclusive rule*—they have not the *whole government*, but the people must have a part of it, which they are to exercise by sending laymen, like themselves, to deliberate and vote with the Clergy. The Church is governed by a *hierarchy of Clergymen*, yet *individuals of the people, not in orders*, sit with the Clergy, and exercise the people's part of the government! Thus, the theory of Princeton makes our Church government what was well described in this work twelve years ago, as “an odd mixture of an elective aristocracy, the Clergy—and a pure democracy, the people.”—(S. P. R., Vol. II., p. 51.)

It is perfectly logical, that those who hold these prelatie, or semi-prelatie, views, should deny the right of Ruling Elders to lay on hands in the ordination of a Clergyman. For, of course, “the Clergy” are, upon this principle, as truly a separate order of men as Rome herself can make them; the peculiar inheritance of the Lord; his *κληρος*; holier than the people; a priesthood apart by themselves. *Laymen*, of course, can take no part in the ordination of such. Only Ministers can make a Minister—only those who have orders can communicate them to others. There is a mysterious influence which oozes out of the sacred persons of Ministers through the tips of their fingers, when they lay on their holy hands upon the head of any man, and then he, in his turn, can hand down and finger down this *virus* to others after him; and thus, only, is the apostolical succession of true Presbyterian Clergymen to be preserved! If those “individuals of the people,” who have been “introduced” amongst “the Clergy,” only to do “what the people themselves can rightfully do;” if those “individuals not in orders,” were to take part in ordination, which is a sacrament, since it pertains only to the Clergy, it would be a presumptuous and profane intrusion—a dreadful sacrilege!

What we have had space to say in this number has all related more or less directly to the argument from Scripture, by which we sustain our views against the tremendous onset made on them in this leading organ of our Church. In our next number we shall, with the leave of Providence, pursue the reviewer into those Presbyterian authorities he so confidently refers to. And we are not without some faint hope that these favorite weapons of his, which he is somewhat careless in handling, may be wrested from him, and even turned effectually against himself and all who stand with him in this struggle.



ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. *The Land and the Book, or Biblical Illustrations drawn from the Manners and Customs, the Scenes and Scenery, of the Holy Land.* By W. M. THOMSON, D. D., twenty-five years a Missionary of the A. B. C. F. M. in Syria and Palestine. Maps, Engravings, etc. In two volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, Franklin Square: 1859. 2 vols., 12mo.

We have strangely neglected, in previous issues, to notice this work, which had every good claim on our attention. We will now only say, at this late day, that if intimate and thorough acquaintance with his subject, and the most lively interest in it, can fit an author to discharge his office well. Dr. Thomson may be presumed to have performed, to the full satisfaction of his readers, that which he undertook. His style is animated, his descriptions graphic. For the traveller in Palestine, this work is a complete *vade mecum*,

and persons who cannot make the actual journey may, in these pages, imagine themselves making it, and have the pleasures and the profit, without the pains that always accompany it, and the risks which now, especially, would environ strangers in that dear, unhappy land.

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2. *The Eldership. A Sermon preached by appointment before the Presbytery of South Carolina, September, 1859.* By Rev. J. O. LINDSAY. Published by request. Due West, S. C. Due West Telescope Press. 1859; pp. 22, 8vo.

Mr. Lindsay is one of our clearest thinkers, best writers, and most earnest Ministers. To these praises it will do to add that he is one of the truest Presbyterians in our Church—as he might well be, seeing he was raised amongst our Associate Reformed brethren—with whom we desire, most earnestly, that our Church were one, if for no other reason, that we might have the benefit of their *stiffening* influence. Some of us Presbyterians are, undoubtedly, weak in the knees, and deficient of back-bone. This has been said to be especially true of those who are the near neighbors of our Congregationalist brethren in the regions which border upon New England. The Associate Reformed Church, united with ours, would make a body superior, perhaps, to what either of the two is now. We might serve to liberalize them wherein they may now be too narrow in their views, and they to wind us up tighter wherein we may have become too *slack-twisted*. May the day dawn soon which shall see all honest and true hearted Presbyterians one, in name and form, as well as in heart and doctrine!

As for Mr. Lindsay's sermon, we have but to say that it is what might be expected from such a Presbyterian Minister as he is. The excellent and beloved James W. Alexander wrote to his friend, Dr. Hall, May 6, 1844, con-

cerning the Elder question, then rife: "This controversy is working great evil in the Southern Churches." He thought so, of course, from his stand-point of observation. But it was not so. It has not proved so. Great have been and are yet to be, we trust, the advantages to our Church, in the South, of the higher and juster apprehensions of the Eldership, which have thus been awakened. May our Churches at the North, also, not fail of participating in the same!

3. *A Catechism for the Oral Instruction of Colored Persons who are Enquirers Concerning Religion, or Candidates for Admission into the Church.* By the Rev. JOHN L. GIRARDEAU, of Charleston, S. C. Charleston: Printed by Evans & Cogswell, No. 3 Broad street: 1860. pp. 90, 16mo.

This Catechism is the result of several years' experience in the instruction of slaves concerning the faith of Jesus Christ. To hold up Christ, who is the only hope of sinners, white or black, free or bond—this is what it mainly undertakes. It contains, *first*, a preliminary Catechism, complete in itself, of which the design and purpose is to impart to ignorant and yet enquiring souls just and scriptural views of conversion. Many errors touching its nature, and particularly concerning the relation of repentance, faith, and the new birth, to each other, prevail amongst the negroes, as amongst all classes of mankind benighted in sin. The preliminary Catechism aims to correct these in a series of simple, yet most important, questions and answers, which no slave can learn by heart without being furnished with all the intellectual knowledge necessary to his soul's salvation. These questions and answers are simple enough for the most ignorant slave, yet they are deep enough and significant enough for the philosopher and the sage. We have read them over and over, with

admiration, at once of the skill of their author, and of his zeal for the careful training of the colored portion of his charge. We have also felt, as we read them, our heart glow within us with adoring gratitude for the simplicity, and the sweetness, and the sublimity, also, of the Gospel! Let whoso amongst our wise and our great—amongst our educated and our refined slaveholders (the masters, in God's wise and good providence, of the people for whom this little manual was designed)—let whoso amongst them is a stranger to the Gospel, and yet desirous to understand it, get this little Catechism and carefully study these preliminary lessons in a docile spirit, and he shall there learn heavenly wisdom. He shall there find knowledge which none of the ancient classics could impart, even the knowledge of Jesus Christ, who is the true God and eternal life!

There are, *secondly*, some additional lessons, teaching various doctrines of the Gospel. These lessons are made to be ten in number, in order to bring them within the interval of three months between the successive communion seasons of our Churches. The idea is, that the catechumens shall be prepared, during this interval, to make an intelligent profession of the Christian faith.

We predict for this little work very great favor with all our brethren, as soon as it is possible for them to become acquainted with its merits. It seems to us precisely what pastors need for the instruction of negroes seeking admission into the Church. Our dear young brother, Mr. George W. Ladson, who is devoting so much time and strength to the spiritual good of the black population of this town, and whose labors the Holy Spirit seems to own so manifestly, has found it precisely what he has need of in training his catechumens for introduction to the session of the Presbyterian Church here.

This Catechism may be had of Messrs. Russel & Jones, Booksellers, Charleston, S. C. Price 15 cents per single copy.

4. *The Christian Law of Marriage.* By R. DUNNING, Minister of the Gospel. New York: M. W. Dodd, Chambers street. 1857; pp. 30, 8vo.

The object of this treatise is to show that marriage, for a Christian, is always to be *in the Lord*, that is, always and only with a believer in Christ. The author, whom we knew and loved in our College days as a pious man, and who is now, we believe, a New School Presbyterian Minister in the State of New York, declares, speaking, we suppose, for that State and for his Church, that this is "a growing evil at the present day." "It plainly denotes an alarming deficiency in the quality and strength of personal piety. There is much activity in religious things, but the influence of Bible truth on the heart, leading the soul to self-denial, and to opposing whatever may draw it away to the contaminations of the world, is very weak. Our Churches are filling up with members who go to the ranks of the world for their life companions. In some of them, in the country, not very large, are twenty, thirty, and forty members, who have unbelieving partners. Here are forty heads of families exposed to all the neutralizing influences of an unbelieving associate in the religious training of the household." He speaks, also, of cases there, in which, "after having toiled faithfully and cheerfully for her husband and her household during the week, and desiring the refreshing influence of divine worship on the Sabbath," the pious wife of an unconverted husband "is compelled to travel on foot a number of miles, or go without the spiritual food derived from the ordinances of God's house. And this, not because poor in this world's goods, but because her unbelieving companion refuses to attend himself, or allow his team to be employed in conveying her and her children to the sanctuary. Such a course is an outrage on any civilized community, and should receive the full measure of its

indignant censures. It is well known that such are not unfrequent results of these matrimonial alliances," etc.

We do think our old friend is probably right in his views of the wrong and the danger of such marriages—and we also agree with him, that what we have just heard him describe as a frequent occurrence, is an outrage in any civilized community. But is this a frequent occurrence in Northern society, and that, too, *in the country*? Beer-gardens, (see speech of Mr. Drake, noticed below,) we know our Northern friends in the cities are distressed with, and are trying to put down—but do Americans there, in the country places, frequently behave thus to their wives? If this be a true witness, indeed, and we have certainly great personal confidence in our old friend, then we may say once more, as often before, *the South for us*, where even a clever and faithful negro (especially of the older and feebler sort) is usually allowed to ride to Church on Sundays by many a master who is not himself a professed believer.

If we of the South had as many professed book-makers, of the mercenary sort, as the North has, striving, for their own ends, to rouse a crusade against us and the form of our social state, how many things they might easily pick up here and there to weave into an argument, demonstrating the evils of free Northern society. There would be no sort of difficulty in carrying this war into Africa.

5. *The Sunday Question. Speech of CHARLES D. DRAKE, of St. Louis, in the House of Representatives of Missouri, December 21, 1859, on the "Bill to Prevent Certain Practices on Sunday, and for other purposes."* St. Louis: George Knapp & Co., Printers and Binders. 1860; pp. 29, 8vo.

The practices referred to in the bill, and denounced in this speech, are the sale of liquors and the exhibition of theatrical performances in the beer-gardens on Sundays;

also, balls, dances, etc., in the same, where courtezans of the worst kind are employed as female cup-bearers, to wait upon those who resort thither for drink. These are some of the evils to which a part of their European immigration exposes our friends at the North—some of the dangerous corruptions that beset their future and threaten to undermine their institutions. Will that section of our land be able to digest the mass of infidelity and immorality which a large part of that immigration brings with it—to digest it so as to assimilate the mass to themselves, as free and virtuous citizens of a Christian country?

Mr. Drake's bill was a manly effort to put down the evils referred to in St. Louis. His speech was followed by a vote of 69 to 45 in favor of it.

These influences are operating in all the great Northern cities, and help to constitute them, in one aspect, so many "festering sores upon the body politic." There is, however, we rejoice to know, another aspect, and a happier, in which these cities are also to be viewed. They are centres of Christianity, as well as of infidelity and vice.

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6. *An Historical Discourse: On Taking Leave of the Old Church Edifice of the First Presbyterian Congregation in Baltimore.* By JOHN C. BACKUS, Pastor of the Church. Baltimore: J. W. Woods, Printer. 1860; pp. 104, 12mo.

This is another of those commendable efforts to put into print for preservation the elements of the future history of our Church in this country. It has a lively and tender interest for us, on account of our old friendship for the indefatigable and faithful Pastor of the First Church in Baltimore during twenty-five years past. We are also interested in the record of the services and character of Dr. Inglis, the second Pastor of the Church, who served them from 1802 to 1819, and whose son is at present a distin-

guished Chancellor of this State, and a beloved fellow-Presbyter of our Synod. And then the notice of Dr. William Nevins, Pastor from 1820 to 1835, the good man, the faithful servant of Jesus Christ, the kind friend of our early ministry—we have read it with affectionate delight.

This discourse contains a merited tribute, also, to a Christian banker, whose name we delight to honor, for personal as well as public reasons. “To Mr. GEO. BROWN this congregation owes, under God, more, perhaps, than to any other person for its present position in this community. With his name its reputation, influence and usefulness are most intimately identified. Elected a member of ‘the Committee’ in 1825, he served the congregation in this capacity with an assiduity and faithfulness second to no other for nearly thirty-five years. During this last period of the history of the Church now under review, he withdrew gradually from the pressure of active business, and gave himself increasingly to the promotion of those various benevolent enterprises demanded by our age, till he came to be almost universally looked to in all such undertakings. He not only contributed liberally of his large wealth, but also by his counsels and active services. The contributions of this Church to our Boards of Mission, Education, etc., as well as to other benevolent objects of the day, were largely made up of his gifts. And in the work of extending the Church in this city and vicinity, as well as in the more remote parts of our country, to no other person have we been more indebted. The new edifice, especially, will always be identified with his name. Only those, however, who were associated with him in carrying it on, will ever know how much it owes, under God, to his wisdom and prudence, his untiring vigilance, his important encouragement and timely assistance. Present circumstances forbid me to say more, less could not be said in faithfulness to this review.”

7. *Conscience and Civil Government. An Oration delivered before the Alumni of the College of Charleston, on Commencement Day, March 27, 1860.* By Rev. JOHN L. GIRARDEAU. Published by request of the Society. Charleston : Printed by Evans & Cogswell, 3 Broad and 103 East Bay streets. 1860 ; pp. 20, 8vo.

An able and patriotic address, by the writer of the catechism above noticed, upon a subject which no intelligent young man amongst us should neglect to consider or fail to comprehend.

8. *Historical Sketch of the First Presbyterian Church, Fort Wayne, Indiana, with Early Reminiscences of the Place. A Lecture before the Congregation, March 7th, 1860.* By J. L. WILLIAMS. Dawson's Daily and Weekly Times, John W. Dawson, Printer. pp. 27, 8vo.

We thank the author for our copy of this lecture. He has laid, not only the First Presbyterian Church of Fort Wayne, but the whole Presbyterian body, under obligations by his labor. Every such effort to gather up and preserve the items of our early Church history is deserving of hearty commendation.

9. *A Rejoinder to the Princeton Review upon the Elohim Revealed, Touching the Doctrine of Imputation and Kindred Topics.* By SAMUEL J. BAIRD. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111, South Tenth street, below Chestnut. 1860 ; pp. 40, 8vo.

We can only chronicle the appearance of this pamphlet and acknowledge, with thanks, our receipt of a copy. It would hardly be suitable for us to express any judgment respecting it.

10. *History of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland. Condensed from the Standard Work of Reid and Killen.* By the Rev. SAMUEL D. ALEXANDER. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 530 Broadway. 1860; pp. 376, 12mo.

The original work, here presented to us in an abridged form, consists of three 8vo. volumes. The first two were written by the lamented Dr. Reid, Professor of Ecclesiastical History for the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, and formerly Professor of Ecclesiastical and Civil History in the University of Glasgow. Upon Dr. Reid's death, his successor in the office last held by him, viz: Dr. Killen (author of the recent admirable work on the ANCIENT CHURCH) took the papers left by him and completed his unfinished task.

Before commencing his work of abridgment, Mr. Alexander consulted Dr. Killen, and learned that, whilst he had in his possession much new matter which might be incorporated in a new edition, yet from the pressure of his professional duties, and other works upon which he is engaged, it will be impossible for him to undertake the labor of the incorporation, and that, moreover, it is doubtful whether a new edition of the original work, in its present form, will ever appear.

The abridgment thus presented to our Church was prepared by its author at the instance of his brother, the late eminent Professor at Princeton, and we do not doubt will be both a useful and highly acceptable work.

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11. *Euripides. Ex recensione FREDERICI A. PALEY. Accessit verborum et nominum index.* Vol. I. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860; pp. 304, 16mo.

This is a specimen of Harper & Brothers' cheap, accurate and elegant editions of the classics, for the use of schools

and students, carefully reprinted from the best editions. Horace, Æschylus, and this first volume of Euripides, have already appeared. Besides these, there are also now ready Herodotus, Thucydides, Virgil, Cæsar, Sallust, Zenophon's Anabasis, Cicero de Senectute, Cicero de Amicitia, Sophocles, and some others. Messrs. Harper & Brothers will send any of them by mail, postage paid, (for any distance in the United States, under three thousand miles,) on receipt of the money. Price 75 cents per vol.

12. *Services on the Occasion of the Ordination of the Rev. F. P. MULLALLY and the Installation of Rev. J. H. THORNWELL, D. D., and Rev. F. P. MULLALLY, as co-Pastors of the First Presbyterian Church, Columbia, S. C. Sermon by Rev. J. NO. L. GIRARDEAU. Charges by Rev. THOMAS SMYTH, D. D., May 4th, 1860. Published by the Congregation. Columbia, S. C. Steam-Press of Robert M. Stokes: 1860; pp. 44, 8vo.*

An admirable discourse, and touching, affectionate and eloquent charges—all well suited to the most solemn, auspicious and delightful occasion, and well worthy of being printed and published for use and preservation.

13. *A Brief Treatise on the Canon and Interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. For the Special Benefit of Junior Students, but intended, also, for Private Christians in General. By ALEX. McCLELLAND, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860; pp. 336, 12mo.*

A reprint, in much larger and finer type, of the edition of 1850, which was noticed by us in Vol. IV. of this Review.

14. *An Address Delivered on Commencement Day of the Laurensville Female College, June 28, 1860.* By Prof. JOSEPH LECONTE, of South Carolina College. Published by request of the Trustees. Laurensville, S. C., 1860.

Did our space permit, we would have been glad to make large extracts from this discriminating and beautiful address, on the characteristics, sphere and education of woman. For liveliness and ease of style, for delicate appreciation of female character, and for just and philosophical views on education, it is entitled to high praise. We commend it, not only to our female readers, but to parents who have daughters and sons to educate. They will not fail to receive benefit from the hints here given.

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15. *The Divine Purpose Explained, or All Things Decried, yet Evil not Caused nor Moral Freedom Repaired, and the Glory of God the End of All.* By the Rev. GEO. MORTON. Philadelphia: Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111, South Tenth street, below Chestnut. 1860; pp. 310, 8vo.

The author of this book is a Minister of our Church, and the publisher of it one of its best known and most esteemed members. It undertakes the "high argument of vindicating God's ways to man." We have not been able to give the work a careful examination, and we do not like to give our first impressions respecting such a work, whether favorable or unfavorable. Mr. Morton declares that it has been the result of protracted meditation and prayer; the revealed word of God he has made his guide throughout, and he regards the speculations of mere human wisdom to be of little value on such a theme. "If there be any thing in the work not in harmony with the precious word of God, none would repudiate it more readily or sincerely than the author."

16. *Five Years in China. With Some Account of the Great Rebellion, and a Description of St. Helena.* By CHARLES TAYLOR, M. D. (formerly Missionary to China), Corresponding Secretary of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South. New York: Derby & Jackson. Nashville: J. B. McFerrin. 1860; pp. 413, 12mo.

Although the elaborate works of Du Halde and of Pauthier are somewhat familiar to us, and also the volumes which several of the English Embassies and the missions of England and America have produced, yet we have read this description of China and the Chinese with a decided relish. It is a simple narrative of what the author saw and was personally acquainted with, of the manners, customs and religion, of this peculiar people. It is written in an easy, pleasant style, which lures the reader on from page to page, leaving a grateful impression of good humor and benevolence of heart as characteristics of the author.

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17. *Castle Richmond. A Novel.* By ANTHONY TROLLOPE, author of "Doctor Thorne," "The Bertrams," "The Three Clerks," "The West Indies and the Spanish Main," etc., etc. New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, Franklin Square. 1860; pp. 474, 12mo.

Very seldom do we read a novel—but this one we began to look into, and were beguiled into the reading of most of its contents. It is a tale of the famine year in Ireland;—also, of course, a tale of love and the other human passions which make human life what it is, in its mere human aspects. The incidents are somewhat romantic—far less so, however, than real life often is; the moral of the tale is good; and the author exhibits excellent parts for this kind of writing, so far as we can pretend to be judges of the same.

18. *Chapters on Wives.* By Mrs. ELLIS, author of "Mothers of Great Men." New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860; pp. 358, 12mo.

Mrs. Ellis has succeeded in imparting much interest to the subject she has sought to illustrate. Her stories are well told, and show how a noble-minded woman, strengthened and sustained by prayer and faith, can impart courage and decision to her husband, can extricate him from difficulties, can win the confidence of all around her, can circumvent the wiles of the wicked, and can lead many to a saving knowledge of Jesus Christ. "Her price is far above rubies. Her children rise up and call her blessed. Strength and honor are her clothing;" and "her husband is known in the gates." The author does not conceal her attachment to her own, the Methodist Episcopal, Church; but the spirit and tendency of the book, so far as we have read it, is worthy of praise.

19. *The Woman in White.* A Novel. By WILKIE COLLINS, author of "The Queen of Hearts," etc., etc., etc. Illustrated by John McLenan. New York: Harpers. 1860; pp. 260, 8vo.

This is a story (a novel, says the title page,) which those who have read it, speak of as possessing a thrilling interest. It has appeared as a serial in "Harper's Weekly," and must have been read by many. It seems to be constructed on the plan of presenting the narratives of the different parties in succession, like the testimony of witnesses in a court, and to unravel a tangled web of secret crimes, and of the retribution which at length overtook them. If it has a moral, it is that which is more directly expressed in the Scriptures by the pointed warning, "Be sure your sins will find you out."

20. *Outlines of Theology*. By the Rev. A. ALEXANDER HODGE, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Petersburg, Virginia. New York: Robt. Carter & Brothers. 1860; pp. 560, 8vo.

This book tells its own story in the preface. It was prepared, the author informs us, as the basis of extemporaneous theological lectures, delivered to his pastoral charge. He now offers it to his brethren in the ministry, and to theological students, as a syllabus, in the one case, to aid them in their didactic labors among their people; in the other, to guide their studies. The topics are set forth in the form of questions, to which the text gives an answer more or less extended. The questions are chiefly those used by the author's father, Dr. Hodge, of Princeton, with his classes of 1845 and 1846. The author has drawn, sometimes from the published writings of his father, and sometimes from his own class-manuscripts of fourteen years ago; sometimes, also, from his father's oral teachings or conversations. These circumstances invest the pages before us with additional interest. The quotations found in the book are usually from authors the most trustworthy and discriminating, including many whose works have been issued but recently from the press. We do not doubt that these outlines will often be eminently suggestive to the student of theology—will assist him in giving a right direction to his studies, and in enabling him to propose those metes and bounds to the topics he discusses or investigates, which are so necessary to exactness of knowledge. An outline is all that the volume professes to give.

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21. *Rosa; or, The Parisian Girl*. From the French of Madame DE PRESENSÉ. By Mrs. J. C. FLETCHER. New York; Harpers. 1860; pp. 371, 16mo.
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22. *Hannah Lee, or Rest for the Weary.* By the author of "Isabel, or Influence," "Margaret Craven," etc. pp. 211, 16mo.

Katie Seymour, or How to Make Others Happy. pp. 232, 16mo.

Rosalie's Lesson. By MRS. SARAH S. T. WALLACE. pp. 132, 16mo.

Why was I Left? or, He hath Done All Things Well. By MARY MCCALLA, author of "Life among the Children," "Twin Sisters," etc.

The Ulster Revival: An Address to Sabbath Scholars. By the Rev. ROBT. KNOX, A. M., Belfast. pp. 55, 16mo.

These are recent additions of the Presbyterian Board of Publication to their "Series for Youth." They furnish interesting and profitable reading to the children and young people of our families and Sabbath Schools. If the eyes of these should be moistened with the tear of sympathy as they read some of these stories, we should not wonder. And if their hearts should be touched, meanwhile, by the Holy Spirit, and they be led to the Saviour, many will rejoice. We are impressed with the increased usefulness of the Board of Publication in this department of their labors, as well as in the tracts which they have issued of late, several of which supply a want which many have experienced in their desire to benefit others.

23. *Ladies' Southern Florist.* By MARY C. RION. Columbia, S. C.: Peter B. Glass. 1860; pp. 138, 12mo.

Gardening is one of those feminine amusements, or employments, which are largely promotive of taste, health, and happiness. Mrs. Rion has brought together, in a very judicious manner, much valuable information as to the culture of flowers, the result of her own experience and

the experience of others. What especially recommends the little volume is, that it is written by a daughter of Carolina, and that all its instructions are adapted to our climate, are tested by experience, and are eminently clear and practical. We hope the ladies of the South will bestow upon it their patronage, and that the publisher will be fully repaid for the care and taste with which he has brought it out. As a specimen of typography and binding, it is eminently creditable to the press of C. P. Pelham and the bindery of E. R. Stokes.

24. *The Kingdom of God: its Constitution and Progress. A Discourse before the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, by Appointment, at their Meeting in Rochester, New York, May, 1860.* By the Rev. DAVID X. JUNKIN, D. D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Hollidaysburg, Pa. Philadelphia: Published by the Board of Domestic Missions, by order of the General Assembly. 1860; pp. 28, 8vo.

We have only time and space to say, respecting this discourse, that it has the honor of being the last sermon of its kind. Many distinguished men have preceded Dr. Junkin, but he, though last, not least, closes the procession. The Assembly have abolished the institution of sermons before the Boards.

25. *Italy in Transition. Public Scenes and Private Opinions in the Spring of 1860. Illustrated by Official Documents from the Papal Archives of the Revolted Legations.* By WILLIAM ARTHUR, A. M. New York: Harpers. 1860; pp. 426, 12mo.

A lively and truly interesting book, detailing the experience and observation of an English traveler, evidently a

Christian and a clergyman, travelling through Italy but a few months since, and holding familiar intercourse with people of all classes. A longing for national unity, and for political freedom, and hatred of priestly domination, the writer found all but universal.

26. *The Queens of Society.* By GRACE and PHILIP WHARTON. Illustrated by Charles Altemont and the Brothers Dalzeil. New York: Harpers. 1860; pp. 488, 12mo.
27. *Studies in Animal Life.* By GEORGE HENRY LEWIS, author of "Life of Goethe," etc. New York: Harpers. 1860; pp. 146, 12mo.
28. *The True Path, or the Young Man Invited to the Saviour.* By the Rev. JOSEPH M. ATKINSON, Raleigh, N. C. Philadelphia: Board of Publication. pp. 300.
29. *The Death Threatened to Adam; With its Bearings on the Annihilation of the Wicked.* By J. NEWTON BROWN, D.D. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. pp. 29, 16mo.

We exceedingly regret that these books have been overlooked by us in preparing the preceding notices, and that we can barely chronicle their publication in our present issue.

30. *Text-Book of Church History.* By Dr. JOHN HENRY KURTZ, Professor of Theology in the University of Dorpat, author of a "Manual of Sacred History," "The Bible and Astronomy," etc., etc. Vol. I., to the Reformation. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860; pp. 534, 12mo.

The second volume of this work is now preparing for publication, and will bring down Dr. Kurtz's work to the present time.

The lateness of the hour at which this book reaches us prevents our giving it the full examination to which it is entitled. Dr. Kurtz's plan of treating his subject will be understood by the following statements :

In the history of civilization we meet (says Dr. Kurtz) with three successive forms of culture ; the Oriental, the Græco-Roman, and the Germanic. The kingdom of God was to penetrate and unfold itself in each of these in a manner peculiar to each, and thus attain its most complete development. The earliest Church (the Israelitish theocracy) represents its development in the Oriental form ; the ancient Christian Church its development in the Græco-Roman form ; the Modern Church its development in the Germanic form. From this division of the history of the kingdom of God we derive the principle of the division of our Church History, as follows :

I. *Antecedent History of Christianity.*

II. *Primitive History of Christianity.*

III. *History of the development of Christianity on the basis of its original character.*

A. *In the ancient classic form :*

First period, from 100–323, or to the final victory of Christianity over Græco-Roman heathenism.

Second period, from 323–692, or to the completion of the doctrinal development of the ancient Church (680), and the alienation between the Oriental and Occidental Churches (692).

Third period, from 692–1453, or to the taking of Constantinople. Decline of the influence of the ancient classic form of culture on the history of the Church.

B. *In the Germanic form.* 1. *In the Middle Ages :*

First period, including the 4th–9th centuries, or from the founding of the Church among the Germans to the end of the Carovingian period.

Second period, from the 10th–13th centuries, to Boniface VIII., or the age of the papacy, monasticism and scholasticism.

Third period, embracing the 14th and 15th centuries, to the Reformation ; decline of factions prominent in the Middle Ages ; frequent reformatory movements.

2. *In the Modern Germanic form :*

First period, embracing the 16th century, the period of the Reformation.

Second period, the 17th century, the period of orthodoxy.

Third period, the 18th century, the age of deism, naturalism, rationalism.

Fourth period, the 19th century, the age of the revival of a Christian and a Church life (unionism, confessionalism) in conflict with communism, pantheism, and materialism.

ARTICLE VIII.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

I. AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEWS.—CONTENTS.

- I. *United Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, July, 1860: Edited by David R. Kerr. Article I. The Bible and Politics; by Rev. J. B. Johnson. II. Commentary on the Gospel of John; by Rev. James Patterson, D. D. III. The Atonement of Christ; by Rev. William Davidson. IV. Genealogy of the Saviour; by Rev. J. C. Steele. V. Serpent Fascination; by Prof. David Christy. VI. The Rival Dictionaries; by Rev. George C. Arnold. VII. Short Notices.
- II. *Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, July, 1860: Article I. Ante-Revolutionary History of Episcopacy. II. Russia. III. Vincent Ferrara—1. Histoire des hommes illustres de l'ordre de St. Dominic—2. Nicolai de Clemengiis Opera Omnia. IV. The General Assembly of 1860. V. Dr. Bushnell's Sermons.—Sermons for the New Life. VI. The Position and Mission of our Church. VII. Doctrinal Preaching. VIII. Literary and Theological Intelligence—1. Germany—2. France—3. England. IX. Notices of New Books.
- III. *Evangelical Review*, July, 1860: Article I. Melancthon on the Divine Nature. II. The Ministerial Office; by Rev. P. Eirich, Lithopolis, Ohio. III. Our Want and our Duty; by Rev. D. H. Focht, A. M., New Bloomfield, Pa. IV. The Prayer Meeting. V. Baccalaureate Address. VI. Israel under the Second Great Monarchy; by Rev. R. Hill, A. M., Pittsburg, Pa. VII. Exposition of Revelation II: 17. VIII. Notices of New Publications.
- IV. *Methodist Quarterly Review*, July, 1860: Article I. Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought; by Rev. Oliver S. Munsell, A. M., President of Illinois Wesleyan University. II. Life of Plato; by Prof. Godman, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill. III. The "Edwardean" Theory of the Atonement; by Rev. Wm. Fairfield Warren, Boston, Mass. IV. Obligations of Society to the Common Law; by E. L. Fancher, Esq., New York. V. Alexander Von Humboldt and his Cosmos; by Prof. S. D. Hillman, Carlisle, Pa. VI. The Parsees; by Dr. L. P. Brockett, New York. VII. The Divine Human Person of Christ; by Rev. Wm. Nast, D. D., Cincinnati, Ohio. VIII. The American Pulpit; by Rev. Daniel P. Kidder, D. D., Biblical Institute, Evanston, Ill. IX. The Apostles' Creed; by G. P. Disosway, Esq., Richmond, Staten Island, N. Y. X. Foreign Religious Intelligence. XI. Foreign Literary Intelligence. XII. Synopsis of the Quarterlies. XIII. Quarterly Book Table.
- V. *Mercesburg Review*, July, 1860: Article I. Goethe. A Dissertation by Dr. Rauch; edited by Prof. E. V. Gerhart, D. D., Lancaster, Pa. II. Infant Salvation; by Rev. N. S. Strassburger, A. M., Potstown, Pa. III. The Closing Chapters of the Book of Job.—The Divine Sovereignty; by Prof. Taylor Lewis, LL. D., Schenectady, N. Y. IV. Dogmatic Theology.—Its Conception, Sources and Method; by Prof. Moses Kieffer, D. D., Tiffin, Ohio. V. Scientific Discovery in 1859; by Prof. L. H. Steiner, A. M., M. D., Baltimore, Md. VI. Recent Publications.
- VI. *Theological and Literary Journal*, July, 1860: Article I. Sir William Hamilton's Metaphysics. II. Memorial of Joel Jones, LL.D. III. Theories Erroneously called Science and Divine Revelation. IV. The Apostasy and the Man of Sin. V. Darwin on the Origin of Species. VI. Designation and Exposition of the Figures of Isaiah, Chapters LIV. LV. LVI. and LVII. VII. Literary and Critical Notices.
- VII. *The Christian Review*, July, 1860: Article I. The Prayers for Infants in the Apostolical Constitutions. II. Our English Dictionaries. III. The Early Life

- and Conversion of Augustine. IV. Evil Made Subservient to Good. V. Roman Orthodoxy. VI. The Defence of Socrates. VII. Rawlinson's Historical Evidences. VIII. Book Notices.
- VIII. *The New Englander*, August, 1860: Article I. A Hymn and its Author.—Augustus L. Hildhouse; by Rev. Leonard Bacon, D. D., New Haven, Conn. II. Reflex Benefits of the Clerical Office—a Letter from a Country Clergyman to his Responding Brethren; by Rev. Andrew C. Denison, Westchester, Conn. III. The New Planets; by Prof. Daniel Kirkwood, Indiana State Univ., Bloomington, Ind. IV. The Baptists in Connecticut; by Rev. Robert C. Learned, Berlin, Conn. V. The Fine Arts: Their Proper Sphere and the Sources of Excellence Therein; by George McClelland, New York City. VI. The Congregational Policy and a Biblical Theology; by Rev. Joseph P. Thompson, D. D., New York City. VII. Constitutional History of Athenian Democracy; by Prof. W. A. Larned, Yale College. VIII. Original Sin: The State of the Question; by Prof. George P. Fisher, Yale College. IX. A Half Century of Foreign Missions; by Rev. Leonard Bacon, D. D., New Haven, Conn. X. The Princeton Review on Dr. Taylor and the Edwardean Theology. XI. Dr. Dutton's Discourse Commemorative of Charles Goodyear, the Inventor; by Rev. S. W. S. Dutton, D. D., New Haven, Conn. XII. Notices of Books.
- IX. *The Southern Episcopalian*, September, 1860. Miscellaneous. Editorial and Critical. Religious Intelligence. Obituary Notices.
- X. *The Home Circle*, September, 1860. General Articles. Poetry. Editorial Department.
- XI. *De Bow's Review*, September, 1860: Article I. Family History, and the Philosophy of Names; by Geo. Fitzhugh, of Virginia. II. Genius and Industry in their Results; by J. C. Hope, of South Carolina. III. German Literature; by Geo. Fitzhugh, of Virginia. IV. Baltimore—Her Past and Future. V. The Siege of Ismail; by Geo. Fitzhugh, of Virginia. VI. South Carolina—Her State Sovereignty; by Thomas M. Hanckel, of South Carolina. VII. The Dance; by the Editor. VIII. Pictorial Literature. IX. Public amusements and Social Enjoyments. X. Modern Sociological Fiction; by John Pratt, Esq., of ——. XI. Life of Andrew Jackson, by James Parion; by Hon. Wm. J. Grayson, of South Carolina. XII. Plantation Life—Duties and Responsibilities; by the Editor and H. N. McTyeire, of Tennessee. Department of Miscellany. Editorial Notes and Miscellany.
- XII. *Historical Magazine*, September, 1860. General Department. Societies and their Proceedings. Notes and Queries. Obituary. Notes on Books. Historical and Literary Intelligence.
- XIII. *The Pacific Expositor*, September, 1860: Rev. W. A. Scott, D. D., Editor.

II. BRITISH PERIODICALS.

- I. *London Quarterly Review*, July, 1860: Article I. The Missing Link and the London Poor. II. Joseph Scaliger. III. Workmen's Earnings and Savings. IV. The Cape and South Africa. V. Ary Scheffer. VI. Stonehenge. VII. Darwin's Origin of Species. VIII. The Conservative Reaction.
- II. *Edinburgh Review*, July, 1860: Article I. Chevalier on the probable Fall in the Value of Gold. II. Diaries and Correspondence of George Rose. III. D'Haussonville's Union of France and Lorraine. IV. Sir R. Murchison's latest Geological Discoveries. V. The Patrimony of St. Peter. VI. Dr. Vaughan's Revolutions in English History. VII. Mrs. Grote's Memoir of Ary Scheffer. VIII. Prince Dolgoroukoff on Russia and Serf Emancipation. IX. Correspondence of Humboldt and Varnhagen von Ense. X. M. Thiers' Seventeenth Volume. XI. Cardinal Mai's Edition of the Vatican Codex. XII. Secret Voting and Parliamentary Reform.
- III. *Westminster Review*, July, 1860: Article I. Strikes: Their Tendencies and Remedies. II. The Mill on the Floss. III. Rawlinson's Bampton Lectures for 1859. IV. The Post Office Monopoly. V. Ary Scheffer. VI. The Irish Education Question. VII. Germany: its Strength and Weakness. VIII. Thoughts

- in Aid of Faith. IX. Grievances of Hungarian Catholics. X. The French Press. XI. Contemporary Literature.
- IV. *North British Review*, August, 1860: Article I. Recent Discoveries in Astronomy. II. Dr. Brown's Life and Works. III. Scottish Nationality—Social and Intellectual. IV. Colonial Constitutions and Defences. V. Recent Poetry. VI. M. Thiers' History of the Consulate and the Empire. VII. Imaginative Literature. VIII. La Verité sur la Russie. IX. Recent Rationalism in the Church of England. X. Recent Theories in Meteorology. XI. Recent Publications.
- V. *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, September, 1860. A sketch of the Life and Character of Sir Robert Peel. The Romance of Agostini.—Part I. Great Wits, Mad Wits? King Arthur and his Round Table. The Struggle at Melazzo. The Tower of London. Norman Sinclair: an Autobiography.—Part VIII.

III. FRENCH AND GERMAN PERIODICALS.

- I. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1er Juillet, 1860. I. L'Opinion Publique et la Politique Extérieure de la France, par M. Charles de Rémusat, de l'Académie française. II. Progrès et Découvertes Récentes de la Météorologie, par M. Auguste Laugel. III. Lettres Intimes et Entretiens Familiers de M. Alexandre de Humboldt, par M. Saint-René Taillandier. IV. Le Roi Oscar et les Royaumes-Unis Sous Son Règne.—I.—Les Réformes Intérieures, L'Union Entre la Suède et la Norvège, par M. A. Geffroy. V. Hermine, Étude de la vie Bretonne, par M. Max Valrey. VI. Une Nouvelle Théorie de L'Art en Angleterre.—M. John Ruskin, par M. J. Milsand. VII. Les Salaires et les Machines Agricoles a propos de L'Exposition de 1860 a Paris, par M. L. Villermé. VIII. Chronique de la Quinzaine, Histoire Politique et Littéraire. IX. Essais et Notices.—De L'Organisation Civile du Royaume D'Italie, par M. C. Matteucci. X. Bulletin Bibliographique.
- II. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 Juillet, 1860. I. Le Marquis de Villemer, première partie, par M. George Sand. II. Des Moyens D'Expression de L'Opinion Publique Sous la Constitution de 1852, par M. Saint-Marc Girardin, de l'Académie Française. III. La Question de L'Isthme Américain, Épisode de L'Histoire de Notre Temps.—I.—Débuts D'Une Exploration Dans L'Amérique Centrale, par M. F. Belly. IV. De L'Alimentation Publique.—La Vigne.—II.—Les Vignobles de France, la Fabrication et le Commerce des Vins, par M. Payen, de l'Institut. V. La Fantaisie et le Roman Humoristique aux États-Unis, par M. E.-D. Forgues. VI. Le Roi Oscar et les Royaumes-Unis Sous son Règne.—II.—Les Rapports Extérieurs et le Scandinavisme, par M. A. Geffroy. VII. La Réforme et les Réformateurs en Espagne, par M. J.-M. Guardia. VIII. Chronique de la Quinzaine, Histoire Politique et Littéraire. IX. Revue Musicale.—Le Chanteur François Wild, par M. P. Scudo. X. Bulletin Bibliographique.
- III. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1er Aout, 1860. I. Le Marquis de Villemer, seconde partie, par M. George Sand. II. Études Morales.—Le Salaire et le Travail des Femmes.—II.—Les Femmes Dans les Filatures, par M. Jules Simon. III. La Question de L'Isthme Américain, Épisode de L'Histoire de Notre Temps.—II.—Costa Rica et le Président Mora, par M. F. Belly. IV. Les Nouvelles Théories sur le Déluge, par M. Alfred Maury, de l'Institut. V. Un Romancier Pessimiste en Amérique.—Nathaniel Hawthorne (Romance of Monte-Beni), par M. Emile Montégut. VI. La Monarchie Absolue en Espagne.—Les Trois Charles, Les Habsbourg et les Bourbons dans la Péninsule, par M. Charles de Mazade. VII. Du Pessimisme Politique, par M. Charles de Rémusat, de l'Académie Française. VIII. Chronique de la Quinzaine, Histoire Politique et Littéraire. IX. Essais et Notices.—La Princesse Dachkof, par M. le prince A. Galitzin. X. Bulletin Bibliographique.
- IV. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 Aout, 1860. I. Le Marquis de Villemer, troisième partie, par M. George Sand. II. Lamennais et sa Philosophie.—I.—Quelle en est L'Origine, Quel en est le Sens (*Œuvres Posthumes*), par M. Louis Binaut. III. Robert Leslie, Un Artiste Anglais au XIXe Siècle, par M. E.-D. Forgues.

- IV. La Question de L'Isthme Américain, Épisode de L'Histoire de Notre Temps.—III.—San-José et la Société Costa-Ricaine, le Général Jérès et la Convention de Rivas, par M. Félix Belly. V. La Seine Maritime.—II.—Le Golfe Intérieur et les Ports de la Seine, par M. Baude, de l'Institut. VI. De la Liberté Individuelle en France, par M. Lefèvre-Pontalis. VII. Le Budget du Royaume de la Haute-Italie, par M. Bailleux de Marisy. VIII. Chronique de la Quinzaine, Histoire Politique et Littéraire. IX. Essais et Notices.—La Guerre du Liban et L'État de la Syrie, par M. J. Ferrette. X. Bulletin Bibliographique.
- V. *Revue Chrétienne*, 15 Juin, 1860; Paris. Sommaire: Schiller, Ch. Monnard. La Question Religieuse en Hollande, J.-P. Trottet. Henri IV., Paux. L'Académie Française et la Religion, J. Chavannes. Bulletin Bibliographique.—*Histoire du merveilleux*, par M. L. Figuiet, Alfred Vincent. Bulletin du Mois.—Sur quelques faits religieux à l'étranger.—Publications sur la papauté temporelle.—M. Dupin et la liberté religieuse.—Les plus récentes publications historiques.—*Cantique des cantiques*, traduit par M. Renon, E. de Pressensé.
- VI. *Revue Chrétienne*, 15 Juillet, 1860; Paris. Schiller (fin), Ch. Monnard. Bacon et le Matérialisme, J.-F. Astié. Quelques Réflexions sur L'Influence Civilisatrice du Christianisme (*Les Bassoutos*, par M. Casalis), E. Lemaître. Correspondance.—Lettres de MM. Pierson et Trottet. Bulletin Bibliographique. Revue du Mois.—De quelques manifestations du parti dit libéral dans le protestantisme.—Le panthéisme littéraire, à l'occasion d'un article de M. Taine.—De quelques publications récentes.—Le 3e volume des *Mémoires* de M. Guizot.—Un nouveau volume de l'*Histoire d'Espagne* de M. Rosseeuw Saint-Hilaire.—Une brochure sur la liberté religieuse, E. de Pressensé.
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ERRATA .

The reader will please correct the following errors :

Page 580, line 10, for "*by his own Church,*" read, "*by our Church.*"

Page 596, line 6, for "*which the Churches, if supposed to be acting directly,*"
etc., read, "*which, if supposed to be acting directly,*" etc.

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ARTICLE I.

NATIONAL SINS.—*A Fast-Day Sermon, preached in the Presbyterian Church, Columbia, Wednesday, November 21, 1860.*

By REV. J. H. THORNWELL, D. D. Columbia: Printed at the Southern Guardian office.

“And it came to pass, when King Hezekiah heard it, that he rent his clothes, and covered himself with sackcloth, and went into the house of the Lord.”—*Isaiah 37* : 1.

I have no design, in the selection of these words, to intimate that there is a parallel between Jerusalem and our own Commonwealth in relation to the Covenant of God. I am far from believing that we alone, of all the people of the earth, are possessed of the true religion, and far from encouraging the narrow and exclusive spirit which, with the ancient hypocrites denounced by the Prophet, can complacently exclaim, the temple of the Lord, the temple of the Lord, are we. Such arrogance and bigotry are utterly inconsistent with the penitential confessions which this day has been set apart to evoke. We are here, not like the Pharisee, to boast of our own righteousness, and to thank

God that we are not like other men ; but we are here like the poor publican, to smite upon our breasts, and to say, God be merciful to us, sinners. My design, in the choice of these words, is to illustrate the spirit and temper with which a Christian people should deport themselves in times of public calamity and distress. Jerusalem was in great straits. The whole country had been ravaged by a proud and insolent foe. The Sacred City remained as the last hold of the State, and a large army lay encamped before its walls. Ruin seemed to be inevitable. *It was a day of trouble, and of rebuke, and of blasphemy. The children had come to the birth, and there was not strength to bring forth.* In the extremity of the danger, the sovereign betakes himself to God. Renouncing all human confidence, and all human alliances, he rent his clothes, and covered himself with sackcloth, and went into the house of the Lord.

In applying the text to our own circumstances, widely different in many respects from those of Jerusalem at the time referred to, I am oppressed with a difficulty, which you that are acquainted with my views of the nature and functions of the Christian ministry can readily understand. During the twenty-five years in which I have fulfilled my course as a preacher—all of which have been spent in my native State, and nearly all in this city—I have never introduced secular politics into the instructions of the pulpit. It has been a point of conscience with me to know no party in the State. Questions of law and public administration I have left to the tribunals appointed to settle them, and have confined my exhortations to those great matters that pertain immediately to the kingdom of God. I have left it to Cæsar to take care of his own rights, and have insisted only upon the supreme rights of the Almighty. The angry disputes of the forum I have excluded from the house of the Lord. And while all classes have been exhorted to the discharge of their common duties, as men, as citizens, as members of the family—while the sanctions

of religion have, without scruple, been applied to all the relations of life, whether public or private, civil or domestic—the grounds of dissension which divide the community into parties, and range its members under different banners, have not been permitted to intrude into the sanctuary. The business of a preacher, as such, is to expound the Word of God. He has no commission to go beyond the teaching of the Scriptures. He has no authority to expound to senators the Constitution of the State, nor to interpret for judges the law of the land. In the civil and political sphere, the dead must bury their dead. It is obvious, however, that religious sanctions cannot be applied to civil and political duties without taking for granted the relations out of which these duties spring. Religion cannot exact submission to the powers that be, without implying that these powers are known and confessed. It cannot enjoin obedience to Cæsar, without taking it for granted that the authority of Cæsar is acknowledged. When the Constitution of the State is fixed and settled, the general reference to it which religion implies, in the inculcation of civil and political duties, may be made without intruding into the functions of the magistrate, or taking sides with any particular party in the Commonwealth. The relations which condition duty are admitted, and the conscience instantly recognizes the grounds on which the minister of the Gospel exhorts to fidelity. The duties belong to the department of religion; the relations out of which they spring belong to the department of political science; and must be determined apart from the Word of God. The concrete cases, to which the law of God is to be applied, must always be given; the law itself is all that the preacher can enforce as of Divine authority. As the law, without the facts, however, is a shadow without substance; as the duty is unmeaning which is determined by no definite relations; the preacher cannot inculcate civil obedience, or convict of national sin, without allusions, more or less precise, to the

theory and structure of the government. He avoids presumption, by having it distinctly understood, that the theory which he assumes is not announced as the Word of God, but is to be proved, as any other facts of history and experience. He speaks here only in his own name, as a man, and promulges a matter of opinion, and not an article of faith. If the assumptions which he makes are true, the duties which he enjoins must be accepted as Divine commands. The speculative antecedents being admitted, the practical consequents cannot be avoided. There are cases in which the question relates to a change in the government, in which the question of duty is simply a question of revolution. In such cases the minister has no commission from God to recommend or resist a change, unless some moral principle is immediately involved. He can explain and enforce the spirit and temper in which revolution should be contemplated and carried forward or abandoned. He can expound the doctrine of the Scriptures in relation to the nature, the grounds, the extent and limitations of civil obedience; but it is not for him, as a preacher, to say when evils are intolerable, nor to prescribe the mode and measure of redress. These points he must leave to the State itself. When a revolution has once been achieved, he can enforce the duties which spring from the new condition of affairs.

Thus much I have felt bound to say, as to my views of the duty of a minister in relation to matters of State. As a citizen, a man, a member of the Commonwealth, he has a right to form and express his opinions upon every subject, to whatever department it belongs, which affects the interests of his race. As a man, he is as free as any other man; but the citizen must not be confounded with the preacher, nor private opinions with the oracles of God. Entertaining these sentiments concerning the relations of the sacred office to political affairs, I am oppressed with the apprehension, that in attempting to fulfil the requi-

sitions of the present occasion, I may transgress the limits of propriety, and merge the pulpit into the rostrum. I am anxious to avoid this error, and would, therefore, have it understood, in advance, that whatever theory may be assumed of the nature and structure of our Government, is assumed upon the common grounds of historical knowledge, and is assumed mainly as fixing the points from which I would survey the sins of the country. If true—and no man has a right to reject them, without being able to disprove them—my conclusions in referenee to our national guilt are irrefragably established. If not true, we must either deny that we are sinners, or must seek some other relations in which to ground the consciousness of sin. If that consciousness should be thoroughly grounded, the services of this day will not be in vain. I can truly say that my great aim is not to expound our complex institutions, but to awaken the national conscience to a sense of its responsibility before God. It is not to enlighten your minds, but to touch your hearts; not to plead the cause of States rights or Federal authority, but to bring you as penitents before the Supreme Judge. This is no common solemnity. The day has been set apart by the constituted authorities of this Commonwealth, by joint resolution of both branches of the Legislature, and proclaimed by the Chief Magistrate of the State, as a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer. South Carolina, therefore, as an organized political community, prostrates herself this day before God. It is a time of danger, of blasphemy and rebuke, and, imitating the example of Hezekiah, she rends her clothes, covers herself with sackcloth, and comes into the House of the Lord. The question is, how she should demean herself under these solemn circumstances. Every minister, this day, becomes her organ, and he should instruct the people as to the attitude which we should all assume in the presence of Jehovah. It is a day of solemn worship, in which the

State appears as a penitent, and lays her case before the Judge of all the earth.

The points to which I shall direct your attention, are, first, the spirit in which we should approach God, and second, the errand on which we should go.

I. As the individual, in coming to God, must believe that He is, and that He is the rewarder of them that diligently seek Him, so the State must be impressed with a profound sense of His all-pervading providence, and of its responsibility to Him, as the moral Ruler of the world. The powers that be are ordained of Him. From Him the magistrate receives his commission, and in His fear, he must use the sword as a terror to evil doers and a praise to them that do well. Civil government is an institute of Heaven, founded in the character of man as social and moral, and is designed to realize the idea of justice. Take away the notion of mutual rights and the corresponding notions of duty and obligation, and a commonwealth is no more conceivable among men than among brutes. As the State is essentially moral in its idea, it connects itself directly with the government of God. It is, indeed, the organ through which that government is administered in its relations to the highest interests of earth. A State, therefore, which does not recognize its dependence upon God, or which fails to apprehend, in its functions and offices, a commission from heaven, is false to the law of its own being. The moral finds its source and centre only in God. There can be no rights without responsibility, and responsibility is incomplete until it terminates in a supreme will. The earthly sanctions of the State, its rewards and punishments, are insufficient either for the punishment of vice or the encouragement of virtue, unless they connect themselves with the higher sanctions which religion discloses. If the State had to deal only with natures confessedly mortal; if its subjects were conscious of no other life than that which they bear from the cradle to the grave; if their prospect terminated

at death ; if they were only brutes of a more finished make, but equally destined to everlasting extinction, who does not see that the law would lose its terror, and obedience be stripped of its dignity. The moral nature of man is inseparably linked with immortality, and immortality as inseparably linked with religion. Among Pagan idolaters, the instinct of immortality, though not developed into a doctrine, nor realized as a fact in reflection, is yet the secret power which, in the spontaneous workings of the soul, gives efficacy to punishment, and energy to rewards. Man feels himself immortal, and this feeling, though operating blindly, colors his hopes and his fears. The State, therefore, which should undertake to accomplish the ends of its being, without taking into account the religious element in man, palsies its own arm. Subjects that have no religion are incapable of law. Rules of prudence they may institute; measures of precaution they may adopt; a routine of coercion and constraint they may establish; but laws they cannot have. They may be governed like a lunatic asylum; but where there is no nature which responds to the sentiment of duty, there is no nature which confesses the majesty of law. Every State, therefore, must have a religion, or it must cease to be a government of men. Hence no Commonwealth has ever existed without religious sanctions. "Whether true or false, sublime or ridiculous," says the author of the *Consulate and the Empire*, "man must have a religion. Every where, in all ages, in all countries, in ancient as in modern times, in civilized as well as in barbarian nations, we find him a worshipper at some altar, be it venerable, degraded, or blood-stained."

It is not only necessary that the State should have a religion; it is equally necessary, in order to an adequate fulfilment of its own idea, that it have the true religion. Truth is the only proper food of the soul, and though superstition and error may avail for a time as external restraints, they never generate an inward principle of obedience. They

serve as outward motives, but never become an inward life, and when the falsehood comes to be detected, the mind is apt to abandon itself to unrestrained licentiousness. The reaction is violent in proportion to the intensity of the previous delusion. The most formidable convulsions in States are those which have been consequent upon the detection of religious imposture. "When a religion," says McCosh, "waxes old in a country—when the circumstances which at first favored its formation or introduction have changed—when in an age of reason it is tried and found unreasonable—when in an age of learning it is discovered to be the product of the grossest ignorance—when in an age of levity it is felt to be too stern—then the infidel spirit takes courage, and, with a zeal in which there is a strange mixture of scowling revenge and light-hearted wantonness, of deep-set hatred and laughing levity, it proceeds to level all existing temples and altars, and erects no others in their room." The void which is created is soon filled with wantonness and violence. The State cannot be restored to order until it settles down upon some form of religion again. As the subjects of a State must have a religion in order to be truly obedient, and as it is the true religion alone which converts obedience into a living principle, it is obvious that a Commonwealth can no more be organized, which shall recognize all religions, than one which shall recognize none. The sanctions of its laws must have a centre of unity some where. To combine in the same government contradictory systems of faith, is as hopelessly impossible as to constitute into one State men of different races and languages. The Christian, the Pagan, Mohammedan; Jews, Infidels and Turks, cannot coalesce as organic elements in one body politic. The State must take its religious type from the doctrines, the precepts, and the institutions of one or the other of these parties.

When we insist upon the religious character of the State, we are not to be understood as recommending or favoring

a Church Establishment. To have a religion is one thing—to have a Church Establishment is another; and perhaps the most effectual way of extinguishing the religious life of a State is to confine the expression of it to the forms and peculiarities of a single sect. The Church and the State, as visible institutions, are entirely distinct, and neither can usurp the province of the other without injury to both. But religion, as a life, as an inward principle, though specially developed and fostered by the Church, extends its domain beyond the sphere of technical worship, touches all the relations of man, and constitutes the inspiration of every duty. The service of the Commonwealth becomes an act of piety to God. The State realizes its religious character through the religious character of its subjects; and a State is and ought to be Christian, because all its subjects are and ought to be determined by the principles of the Gospel. As every legislator is bound to be a Christian man, he has no right to vote for any laws which are inconsistent with the teachings of the Scriptures. He must carry his Christian conscience into the halls of legislation.

In conformity with these principles, we recognize Christianity to-day as the religion of our Commonwealth. Our standard of right is that eternal law which God proclaimed from Sinai, and which Jesus expounded on the Mount. We recognize our responsibility to Jesus Christ. He is head over all things to the Church, and the nation that will not serve Him is doomed to perish. Before men we are a free and sovereign State; before God we are dependent subjects; and one of the most cheering omens of the times is the heartiness with which this truth has been received. We are a Christian people, and a Christian Commonwealth. As on the one hand we are not Jews, Infidels or Turks, so on the other, we are not Presbyterians, Baptists, Episcopalians, or Methodists. Christianity, without distinction of sects, is the fountain of our national life. We accept

the Bible as the great moral charter by which our laws must be measured, and the Incarnate Redeemer as the Judge to whom we are responsible.

In contending that Christianity is the organic life of the State, we of course do not exclude from the privileges of citizens, nor from the protection of the laws, those who do not acknowledge the authority of Jesus. They do not cease to be men, because they are not Christians, and Christian principle exacts that their rights should be sacredly maintained by an institute which is founded in the idea of justice. As, moreover, the religion of the State realizes itself through the religious life of its subjects, it is not to be supported by arbitrary tests or by civil pains and disabilities. Religion is essentially free and spontaneous. It cannot be enacted as a law, nor enforced by authority. When the State protects its outward institutions, such as the sanctity of the Sabbath, it enjoins nothing which does violence to any man's conscience. It is only giving vent to the religious life of the people, without exacting from others what they feel it sinful to perform; and so long as freedom of conscience and the protection of their rights are secured to men, they have no reason to complain that they are not permitted to unsettle the principles upon which all law and order ultimately rest. As long as they are not required to profess what they do not believe, nor to do what their consciences condemn; as long as they are excluded from no privilege and deprived of no right, they cannot complain that the spirit and sanction of the laws are a standing protest against their want of sympathy with the prevailing type of national life. If Christianity be true, they ought certainly to be Christians. The claim of this religion, in contradistinction from every other, or from none at all, is founded only in its truth. If true, it must be authoritative, and the people who accept it as true would be traitors to their faith if they did not mould their institutions in conformity with its spirit. It is only as a

sanction, and not as a law, that we plead for its influence; and how a Christian people can have any other than Christian institutions, it surpasses our intelligence to compass. That the State should treat all religions with equal indifference, is to suppose that the subjects of the State can have a double life, flowing in parallel streams, which never approach nor touch—a life as citizens, and a life as men. It is to forget the essential unity of man, and the convergence of all the energies of his being to a religious centre. It is to forget that religion is the perfection of his nature, and that he realizes the idea of humanity in proportion as religion pervades his whole being. A godless State is, in fact, a contradiction in terms; and if we must have some god, or cease to be citizens because we have ceased to be men, who will hesitate between the God of the Bible and the absurd devices of human superstition and depravity?

It is, then, before the Supreme Jehovah that we prostrate ourselves to-day. We come as a Commonwealth ordained by Him. We come as His creatures and His subjects. The sword by which we have executed justice, we received from His hands. We believe that He is—that He is our God; that His favor is life, and His loving kindness better than life. We ascribe to His grace the institutions under which we have flourished. We trace to His hands the blessings which have distinguished our lot. Under Him the foundations of the State were laid, and to Him we owe whatsoever is valuable in our laws, healthful in our customs, or precious in our history. We come this day to acknowledge our dependence, swear our allegiance, and confess our responsibility. By Him we exist as a State, and to Him we must answer for the manner in which we have discharged our trust. *“God standeth in the congregation of the mighty. He judgeth among the gods.”*

II. Having explained the spirit in which we should approach God, let me call your attention, in the next place, to the ERRAND which brings us before Him this day—fast-

ing, humiliation, and prayer. These terms define the worship which we are expected to present. Fasting is the outward sign; penitence and prayer are the inward graces. In fasting, we relinquish for a season the bounties of Providence, in token of our conviction, that we have forfeited all claim to our daily bread. It is a symbolical confession that we deserve to be stripped of every gift, and left to perish in hunger, nakedness, and want. On occasions of solemn moment, and particularly when "manifestations of the Divine anger appear, as pestilence, war, and famine, the salutary custom of all ages has been for pastors to exhort the people to public fasting and extraordinary prayer." Through such a solemnity Nineveh was saved; and if we are equally penitent, who shall say that we may not also be delivered from the judgments which our sins have provoked? Fasting, apart from inward penitence, is an idle mockery. *Is it such a fast as I have chosen? a day for a man to afflict his soul? is it to bow down his head as a bulrush, and to spread sackcloth and ashes under him? wilt thou call this a fast and an acceptable day to the Lord? Is not this the fast that I have chosen? to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke? Is it not to deal thy bread to the hungry, and that thou bring the poor that are cast out to thy house? when thou seest the naked that thou cover him; and that thou hide not thyself from thine own flesh?* The great thing with us to-day is, to be impressed with a sense of our sins as a people; to confess them humbly before God; to deprecate His judgments, and to supplicate His favor. We are too apt to restrict the notion of sin in its proper sense to the sphere of the individual; to regard it as altogether private and personal, and not capable of being predicated of the mal-administration of the State. But if the State is a moral institute, responsible to God, and existing for moral and spiritual ends, it is certainly a subject capable of sin. It may endure, too, the penalty of sin,

either in its organic capacity, by national judgments, by war, pestilence, weakness, and dissolution, or in its individual subjects, whose offences as citizens are as distinctly transgressions as any other forms of iniquity, and enter into the grounds of the Divine dispensations towards them. The State exists under a law which defines its duty. It is a means to an end, which limits its powers and determines its functions. It is the realization of an idea. Like an individual, it may sin by defect in coming short of its duty, and sin by positive contradiction to it. It may fail to comprehend its vocation; it may arrogate too much, or claim too little. It may be wanting in public spirit, or it may give public spirit a wrong direction. It may subordinate the spiritual to the material, and, in encouraging the increase of national wealth, neglect to foster national greatness. In aspiring to be rich and increased in goods, it may forget that the real glory of a nation is to be free, intelligent, and virtuous. The power which it has received as an instrument of good, it may pervert into an engine of tyranny. It may disregard the welfare and prosperity of its subjects, and degenerate into a tool for the selfish purposes of unscrupulous rulers. It may seek to aggrandize factions, instead of promoting the well-being of the people. The State, too, as a moral person, stands in relations to other States, in consequence of which it may be guilty of bad faith, of inordinate ambition, of covetousness, rapacity, and selfishness. The same vices which degrade the individual among his fellows, may degrade a commonwealth among surrounding nations. It may be mean, voracious, insolent, extortionary. It may cringe to the strong, and oppress the weak. It may take unworthy advantages of the necessities of its neighbors, or make unworthy concessions for temporary purposes. The same laws regulate, and the same crimes disfigure, the intercourse of States with one another, which obtain in the case of individuals. The political relations of the one are precisely analogous to the

social relations of the other. The same standard of honor, of integrity and magnanimity which is incumbent upon their subjects, is equally binding upon the States themselves, and character ought to be as sacred among sovereign States as among private individuals.

The true light, therefore, in which national defects and transgressions should be contemplated, is formally that of sin against God. Their injustice to their people is treachery to Him, and their failure to comprehend or to seek to fulfil the end of their being, is contempt of the Divine authority. We take too low a view, when we regard their errors simply as impolitic; their real magnitude and enormity we can never apprehend until we see them in the light of sins.

It is to be feared that this notion of sin has not the hold which it should have of the public conscience. We are not accustomed to judge of the State by the same canons of responsibility which we apply to individuals. In some way or other, the notion of sovereignty, which only defines the relation of a State to earthly tribunals, affects our views of its relations to God; and, whilst we charge it with errors, with blunders, with unfaithfulness to its trust, and deplore the calamities which its misconduct brings upon its subjects as public evils, we lose sight of the still more solemn truth, that these aberrations are the actions of a moral agent, and must be answered for at the bar of God. The moral law is one, and the State is bound to do its duty, under the same sanctions which pertain to the individual. When the State fails, or transgresses, its offences are equally abominations in the sight of God. It is clearly idle to talk of national repentance, without the consciousness of national sin. This doctrine, therefore, I would impress upon you in every form of statement, that the misconduct of the State is rebellion against God, and that a nation which comes short of its destination, and is faithless to its trust, is stained with sin of the most malignant dye. God may endure it in patience

for a season, but it is loathsome and abominable in His eyes, and the day of reckoning will at last come. Sin must either be pardoned or punished, confessed and forsaken, or it will work death. Sin has been the ruin of every Empire that ever flourished and fell. Assyria, Persia, Greece, and Rome, have paid the penalties to the Divine law. The only alternative with States, as with their subjects, is, repent or perish. The first duty, therefore, which, as a Christian people, we should endeavor to discharge this day, is to confess our national sins with humility and penitence. We should endeavor to feel their magnitude and enormity, not as injuries to man, but as offences against the majesty of God. Our language should be that of David: *Against Thee, Thee only, have we sinned, and done this evil in thy sight.*

Another errand which it behooves us equally to prosecute to-day is, to seek Divine guidance and Divine strength for the future. *It is not in man that walketh to direct his steps,* and States are no more competent than individuals to discharge their duties without the grace of God. Let us endeavor to cherish a sense of our dependence, and aspire to the distinction of that happy people whose God is the Lord. It is a great thing to contemplate our civil duties in the light of obedience to Him; and when they are undertaken in the spirit of worship, they are likely to be performed in the spirit of faithfulness. If we are truly penitent, and truly sensible of our dependence upon God; if it is the reigning desire of our hearts to know His will, and our fixed purpose, in reliance on His strength, to do it, He may give us an answer of peace, He may bring light out of darkness, and extract safety from danger.

Having indicated the spirit in which we should approach God, and pointed out the purposes for which we should go, it remains that we apply the truth to our present circumstances, by signalizing the sins which it behooves us to confess, and by designating the blessings which it behooves us to implore. The conscience is never touched by vague

generalities; we must come to particulars; thus and thus hast thou done. The State appears as a penitent this day. She has, therefore, sins to confess. There is a burden upon her heart which must needs be relieved. What are these sins? What is this burden? The completeness of our answer to these questions will measure the extent and sincerity of our repentance.

To understand our sins, we must look at ourselves in a double light: first, as a member of this Confederacy, as part and parcel of the people of these United States; and, in the next place, as a particular Commonwealth, a perfect State in ourselves. As long as we are members of this Confederacy we cannot detach ourselves from a personal interest in the sins and transgressions of the whole people; and, though there may be offences in which we have had no actual participation, we are not at liberty to indulge in a self-righteous temper, nor to employ the language of recrimination and reproach. The spectacle of sin is always sad. The fall of none should be contemplated with exultation or with triumph. We should look upon the errors of our brethren with pity and with sorrow, and, as Daniel confessed, in humility and contrition, and with deep commiseration for their misery, the sins of his people, so we should endeavor this day to deplore the shortcomings of our common country, as a matter of personal distress to ourselves. When we come before God, we should endeavor to contemplate the moral aspects of the country in the light of His awful holiness. And the more profoundly we are impressed with the malignity of our national guilt, the deeper should be our concern for the transgressors themselves. Sinners cannot triumph over sinners. Those whose only plea is mercy to themselves, ought not to be unmerciful to others. Much more should we be filled with sorrow when the sins we deplore are likely to prove the ruin of a great nation. To behold a vast, imperial republic, like ours, bequeathed to us by a noble ancestry, conse-

crated by a noble history, the work of illustrious statesmen and patriots, falling a prey to national degeneracy and corruption, is enough to make angels weep, and should wring from our hearts tears of bitterness and blood. The sin must be enormous where the punishment is so fearful. In less than a century we have spoiled the legacy of our fathers. A Christian people, with Christian institutions, the envy and admiration of the world, have not lived to the age of pagan Greece. Surely, God has a controversy with us, and it becomes us to inquire, with all solemnity, into the cause of His fierce anger. The union, which our fathers designed to be perpetual, is on the verge of dissolution. A name once dear to our hearts, has become intolerable to entire States. Once admired, loved, almost adored, as the citadel and safeguard of freedom, it has become, in many minds, synonymous with oppression, with treachery, with falsehood, and with violence. The government to which we once invited the victims of tyranny from every part of the world, and under whose ample shield we gloried in promising them security and protection—that government has become hateful in the very regions in which it was once hailed with the greatest loyalty. Brother has risen up against brother, State against State; angry disputes and bitter criminations and recriminations abound, and the country stands upon the very brink of revolution. Surely, it is time to come to ourselves; to look our follies and our wickednesses in the face; time for every patriot to rend his garments, cover himself with sackcloth, and come into the house of the Lord. Let us deal faithfully this day; let us survey the sins of the land, not to accuse one another, but to humble ourselves under the mighty hand of God.

1. To appreciate the sins which attach to us in our unity as a confederated people, we must advert for a moment to the peculiar structure of our government. When we came out of the Revolution, it is admitted on all hands that we were separate and independent States. Each was sovereign

—that is, completely a nation in itself; but our fathers looked around them, and saw that the grounds of unity were as conspicuous as the elements of diversity. The people were of one blood, one language, one religion. They were, in short, one race. They surveyed the continent from north to south, from east to west, and its geography indicated that it ought to be the dwelling-place of a united population. While there were differences in soil, climate, and productions, that would naturally develop different types of industry, and give rise to different forms of interest, there were great connecting bonds in the mighty rivers which traversed the country, that as clearly signified that the diversity was not inconsistent with unity. The problem, accordingly, which the wisdom of our ancestors undertook to solve was, to harmonize this diversity with unity; to make the people, who were already many, at the same time, one. One nation, in the strict and proper sense, they could never become; that would be to absorb the diversity in unity. Many nations, in all the relations of sovereign States, they could not be; that would be to abolish the unity altogether. The problem was solved by a happy application of the federal principle. The diversity existed already in the many States which had just achieved their independence. These many States, in the exercise of their sovereignty, formed an alliance, which cemented them together in one body politic. This alliance was, in its principle, a treaty, and in its result, a government. In its principle it was a treaty, because it was a compact among sovereigns. In its result it was a government, because it created organs of political power which, under certain conditions, acted immediately upon the people of all the States, without the formal ratification of their own Legislatures, and in all foreign relations stood as the representative of their common sovereignty. It is obvious that the ultimate ground of the authority of federal legislation is the consent of the confederating States. The laws of

Congress bind me, only because South Carolina has consented that I should be bound. The rights of Congress are only the concessions of the sovereign States. This will appear from a moment's reflection. It is obvious that the States might have required that no measures of the Federal Government should be of force within their own borders, without the formal sanction of their own Legislatures. In that case, there could have been no dispute as to the ultimate ground of obedience. The difficulties of such an arrangement are too obvious to be enumerated, but how were these difficulties to be avoided? By surrendering the principle on which the authority of Congress depended, or by changing the mode of its application? To have surrendered the principle would have been to abjure their own sovereignty. There was evidently, then, only a change in the mode of its application. That change consisted in defining the conditions under which consent might be presumed beforehand. The Constitution of the United States, in its grants of power to Congress, is only a device by which a general description is given, in advance, of the kind of legislation that each State will allow to be obligatory on its own people. The provisions of the Constitution are really anticipations of the concurrence of the States. They are formal declarations to the Federal Legislature, that within such and such limits, you have our consent to bind our people. In this way our fathers organized a government that united us for all common purposes, and left us in our original diversity to prosecute our separate and local interests. Congress is, therefore, only the creature of the States, and acts only through them. It is their consent, their treaty, which gives to its enactments the validity of law. As the Federal Legislature was clearly designed to realize the unity of the people, its powers are restricted, from the very necessities of the case, to those points in which all the States have a common interest. The creature of a treaty, in which the contracting parties were all equal, it is mani-

festly the servant, and not the master, of the States. It is an agent, and not a principal.

If this view of the subject be correct, the Federal Government is preëminently a government whose very existence depends upon a scrupulous adherence to good faith. It requires the sternest integrity to work it. Its very life-blood is honor. Now, there are two respects in which it may fatally err. In the first place, Congress may transcend its powers, and thus be guilty of a breach of trust, and of disloyalty to its own masters. It may presume upon the consent of the States, where no consent has been given. It may forget that it is a servant, and aspire to be lord. It may forget that it is an agent, and arrogate to itself the rights and authority of the principal. When it surveys the extent of its jurisdiction, the amount of its patronage, and the weight of its influence abroad, it may become dazzled with the contemplation of its own greatness, and attribute to itself the light that is reflected upon it. Its one people it may construe into one nation, and, unmindful of its origin, treat the sovereignties which created it as dependent provinces. Treating upon a footing of equality with foreign Powers, it may insensibly ascribe to itself the authority of Kings and Emperors. All this is conceivable; to some extent it is inevitable, unless the most scrupulous integrity should reign in the Federal Councils. But to sin in any of these respects is fraud, and fraud connected with treason. In the next place, the States may break faith with one another. They may refuse to fulfil their engagements. They may pervert the Federal authorities to the accomplishment of selfish and sectional ends. They may undertake to make their common agent the minister of partial advantages, or they may use lawful powers for unlawful purposes. Here, too, in the relation of the States to each other, is wide scope for fraud.

In one, or in both these directions, we may look for instances of national transgression; and on this day, we

should solemnly review the history of the Republic, for the purpose of bringing our consciences before the tribunal of God. Perfidy, under all circumstances, is an aggravated sin; but when it brings in its train the destruction of institutions which have been the hope and admiration of the world; when it subverts the foundations of a great empire, scattering the seeds of dissension, bitterness and strife; when it arms house against house, and State against State, and converts a happy union into a scene of implacable and deadly feuds, language is hardly competent to describe the enormity of the guilt. The fraud which makes our government a failure, must darken the prospects of liberty throughout the world. No polity can be devised which shall perpetuate freedom among a people that are dead to honor and integrity. Liberty and virtue are twin sisters, and the best fabric in the world, however ingeniously framed, and curiously balanced, can be no security against the corroding influences of bad faith. Perfidy is always weakness; and a government whose basis is the faith of treaties, must inevitably perish before it. The combination of the federal principle with the sovereignty of States, is the only principle which can maintain free institutions upon a broad scale. This combination can secure freedom to a continent; it might even govern the world. The day of small States is passed, and as the federal principle is the only one which can guarantee freedom to extensive territories, the federal principle must constitute the hope of the human race. It was the glory of this country to have first applied it to the formation of an effective government, and, had we been faithful to our trust, a destiny was before us which it has never been the lot of any people to inherit. It was ours to redeem this continent, to spread freedom, civilization and religion through the whole length of the land. Geographically placed between Europe and Asia, we were, in some sense, the representatives of the human race. The

fortunes of the world were in our hand. We were a city set upon a hill, whose light was intended to shine upon every people and upon every land. To forego this destiny, to forfeit this inheritance, and that through bad faith, is an enormity of treason equalled only by the treachery of a Judas, who betrayed his master with a kiss. Favored as we have been, we can expect to perish by no common death. The judgment lingers not, and the damnation slumbers not, of the reprobates and traitors, who, for the wages of unrighteousness, have sapped the pillars and undermined the foundations of the stateliest temple of liberty the world ever beheld. Rebellion against God, and treason to man, are combined in the perfidy. The innocent may be spared, as Lot was delivered from the destruction of Sodom; but the guilty must perish with an aggravated doom. The first instances of transgression may seem slight and insignificant, but when they strike at the principle of good faith, like a puncture of the heart, they strike at the root of our national life. The Union was conceived in plighted faith, and can only be maintained by a complete redemption of the pledge. The moment faith is broken, the Union is dissolved. Entertaining these views of the radical relations of good faith to the success and stability of our government, I would impress upon the country the flagrant iniquity of dealing loosely with its covenants. It is here that our dangers are concentrated, and here we should look for the sins that have provoked the judgments of God. Here is the secret of our bitter strifes, our furious contention, our deadly animosities; and, should this Government be destined to fall, the epitaph which may be written on its tomb, is a memorial of broken faith.

The foregoing remarks are general, and designed to bring no railing accusation against any section of the country, but to excite every part of it to a faithful review of its dealings under the Constitution. There is one subject, however, in relation to which the non-slaveholding

States have not only broken faith, but have justified their course upon the plea of conscience. We allude to the subject of slavery. They have been reluctant to open the Territories to the introduction of slaves, and have refused to restore fugitives to their masters, and have vindicated themselves from blame by appealing to a higher law than the compacts of men. The doctrine of a higher law, properly interpreted and applied, we are far from repudiating. God is greater than man, and no human covenants can set aside or annul the supreme obligations of His will. But, in the present case, the plea is improperly applied. If it is wrong to countenance slavery by restoring fugitives to their masters, or by permitting it to enter into the Territories, then the true method is to abrogate the contract which requires both. We repent of sin by forsaking it, and the only way to undo a wicked bargain is to cancel it. If the non-slaveholding States cannot in conscience redeem their faith, they are bound in honor to take back their pledges, to withdraw from the Union, and to release their confederates from all the conditions of the contract. No other course can they pursue without sin. To swear to observe the Constitution, when the Constitution binds them to do what they believe to be wicked, is an oath which, whether broken or kept, cannot be taken without dishonor. To keep it, is to violate the conscience in the unlawful article. To break it, is to be guilty of perjury. The only escape from this dilemma is, not to take it at all.

But, in truth, even upon the supposition that slavery is immoral, there is nothing wrong in the oath to observe the Constitution. The responsibility of slavery is not upon the non-slaveholding States. It is not created by their laws, but by the laws of the slaveholding States; and all they do in the case of the fugitive from his master, is to remand him to the jurisdiction of the laws from which he has escaped. They have nothing to do with the justice or injustice of the laws themselves. They are simply required

to say that the accident of being on their soil shall not dissolve the relation between a subject and its government. The treaty existing among the States, in reference to this point, is precisely analogous to a treaty among foreign nations, requiring the surrender of criminals that have fled from justice. The country surrendering passes no judgment upon the merits of the case. It leaves the whole of the responsibility to the laws of the country claiming jurisdiction. All that it does is not to interpose and arrest the operation of those laws. Surely, there is nothing unrighteous in this; nothing unrighteous in refusing to screen a man from the authority of the code under which Providence has cast his lot. There is no obligation to do it without a treaty; but there is nothing inherently unlawful in making such a treaty, and in strictly adhering to it when made. The plea of conscience proceeds from a palpable misapprehension of the nature of the case.

The plea is still more flagrantly inadequate when applied to the exclusion of slavery from the Territories. All the States have confessedly an equal right of property in them. They are a joint possession. The citizens of any State may go there and take up their abode, and, without express contract to the contrary among the proprietors, they are at liberty to observe the customs of their own States. It is as if the land were distributed, and each State had a part. In that case, each State would evidently put its part under the jurisdiction of its own laws. The joint possession, to the extent of the partnership, places the Territory in the same relation to the laws of all the States. One has no more right to introduce its peculiarities than another, and without positive contract the peculiarities of none can be excluded. The case is as if a Christian and a Pagan people should acquire a common territory. Would it be competent for the Christian people, in the absence of a positive stipulation, to say to their Pagan neighbors, You shall not bring your idols into this land? You may come yourselves,

but you come only on condition that you renounce your worship? If there is any wrong, it is in making the treaty at first; but if Christians and Pagans can enter into treaties at all, there is no crime in observing them. If they can lawfully acquire joint possession of a soil, the Pagan has as much right to introduce his idols as the Christian his purer worship. In respect to the question of slavery, if there is wrong any where, it is in the union of slaveholding and non-slaveholding States in one confederacy; but, being confederate, there can be no just scruple as to the fulfillment of their contracts. It is a mistake to suppose that the North sanctions slavery by doing justice to the South. It leaves the whole responsibility of the institution where God has placed it, among the people of the South themselves. We do not ask the North to introduce it upon their own soil; we do not ask them to approve it; we do not ask them to speak a single word in its defence: we only ask them to execute in good faith the contract which has been solemnly ratified betwixt us. We ask them not to interfere with the jurisdiction of our own laws over our own subjects, nor with the free use of our own property upon our own soil. This is the head and front of our pretensions, and when these reasonable demands are met by the plea of conscience and the authority of a higher law, they must pardon our dullness, if we cannot understand that delicate sensibility to honor which makes no scruple of an oath that it does not mean to observe, and holds to the profit, without fulfilling the conditions, of the contract. When they ask to be released from their engagements, and, in token of their sincerity, are willing to release us from ours; when they are willing to abandon the Union rather than ensnare their consciences; when they abhor the wages, as sincerely as the deeds, of unrighteousness—then, and not till then, they may expect their plea to be admitted.

2. In the next place, we shall find ample ground of humiliation, if we consider the manner in which the organs

of Government have been perverted from their real design, and changed in their essential character. All our institutions are representative. We legislate by parliaments, we judge by courts, and we execute by officers appointed for the purpose. The people in their collective capacity do nothing but choose their representatives. They enact no laws; they conduct no trials; they execute no sentences. Now, what is the genius and spirit of a representative assembly? Is it to give expression to the popular will? Is it to find out and do what the people, if assembled in mass, would do? Is it simply a contrivance to avoid the inconveniences of large convocations, and bound to seek the same results which these convocations would be likely to effect? This doctrine I utterly and absolutely deny. Representatives are appointed, not to ascertain what the will of the people actually is, but what it ought to be. The people are not permitted to legislate *en masse*, because their passions and caprices are likely to prove stronger than reason and truth. Representation is a check upon themselves. Every State is bound to realize the idea of justice. This requires calm deliberation and sober thought. To provide for this deliberation, to protect themselves from their own prejudices and passions, and to cause the voice of reason to be heard, they retire from the scene, and leave the inquiry and decision of their duty to chosen men, in whose wisdom they have confidence. This is the true theory of parliamentary government. Courts are appointed to interpret the law, and officers to execute the decrees of the courts, in order that justice and not passion may rule in every trial. The supremacy of reason and justice is the supremacy of law and order. Contemplated in this light, parliamentary government is the most perfect under heaven. It avoids equally the extremes of the despotism of a single will, which is sure to terminate in tyranny, and of the still more hateful despotism of mobs, which is sure to terminate in anarchy. It gives rise to a free commonwealth. It aims

at the true and right, and truth and rectitude are the safeguards of freedom. Such is the genius of our own institutions. But how has the gold become dim, and the fine gold changed! Has the Congress of these United States fulfilled its high idea? Called together to deliberate, to discuss, to inquire after truth; bound to listen to no voice but the voice of wisdom and justice—has it always presented the spectacle of gravity, decorum, and candor, which we expect to behold in the Senate of a free people? What shall we say, when gold has usurped the authority of truth, when votes have been bought and sold, and the interests of a faction allowed to outweigh the rights and interests of a whole people? What shall we say, when blows have taken the place of argument, and our halls of legislation have been converted into an arena for the combats of fierce gladiators? What shall we say, when, instead of the language of calm deliberation, the representatives of the people have vied with each other in vituperation and abuse, and, when they have exhausted the dialect of Billingsgate, have rushed upon each other with the ferocity of tigers, or with the fury of the bulls of Bashan? The offence is rank, and smells to heaven. Such an awful prostitution of high functions can not take place with impunity. The hall which should have inscribed upon its portals *the scene of wisdom and of high debate*, cannot become a den of robbers, or a rendezvous for bullies and hectors, without provoking the just judgments of God. It is a lamentation, and shall be for a lamentation, that the Federal Legislature, which ought to have been a model of refined, impartial and courteous debate—a model to which we could always point with an honest pride, has made itself a scandal to a civilized people. The day of reckoning was obliged to come. The country is brought to the brink of dissolution.

The corruption is of the same kind when the tribunals of the law are set aside, and mobs usurp the jurisdiction of courts. There may be occasions when the estab-

lished order is unable to check a threatening evil. In such cases, the necessities of self-defence may justify society in falling back upon its primordial rights. But these occasions are rare. But when society assumes, without necessity, the functions of judges and magistrates, it is guilty of an abuse which, if not arrested, must end in anarchy. *There* only is security where the law is supreme; and the worst of all social evils is where the populace is stronger than the law—where the sentence of courts is annulled by the phrenzy of mobs, and the officers of justice are insulted and restrained in the execution of their functions.

In these respects, all of which resolve themselves into the abuse of the representative principle, we have national sins to confess. We have poisoned the springs of our government. We have given to faction what is due to truth. We have dethroned reason and justice, and made our legislation a miserable scramble for the interests of sections and parties. We have deified the people, making their will, as will, and not as reasonable and right, the supreme law; and they, in turn, have deified themselves, by assuming all the attributes of government, and exercising unlimited dominion. They have become at once legislators, judges, juries, and executioners. The last form of evil has been only occasional, but unless checked and repressed, it may strengthen and expand. In proportion as it increases, reverence for law and for the forms of law loses its power. The tendency to sink our institutions into a pure democracy has been steadily growing. We are rapidly losing even the notion of a representative, by merging it into that of a deputy; and it is but the natural product of this error, that Congress should be the battle-ground of conflicting wills, and that its sole inquiry should become: what says the voice of the majority? *Vox populi, vox Dei.*

I have said, I think, enough to show that in our federal relations we have reason to be humbled in the presence of God. Our Government is a noble one. Human wisdom

could not have devised a better. With all our unfaithfulness it has made us great and prosperous. It has won for us the homage and respect of the world ; and had we been faithful to its principles, the blessings it has already conferred upon us would be but the beginning of its triumphs. Could we continue a united people, united in heart as well as in form ; could the government be administered according to the real genius of our federal and representative institutions, imagination can hardly conceive the scene of prosperity, influence and glory which would dawn upon our children a hundred years hence. When we contemplate what we might become, and then look at the prospect which is now before us, we have reason to put our hands on our mouths, and our mouths in the dust, and to exclaim : *God be merciful to us sinners !* Let us weep for the country. Let us confess our own sins and the sins of the people. God may hear the cry of the penitent, and say to them, as He said to Moses, when he deplored the sins of his people, *I will make of thee a great nation.*

3. There are other forms of sin which, though not national in the sense that they pertain to the administration of the government, are national in the sense that they are widely diffused among the people : they enter into the grounds of the Divine controversy with us ; and, if not repented of and forsaken, must end in national calamities. Conspicuous among these is the sin of profaneness. The name of God is constantly on our lips, and if the frequency with which it is used were any sign of religion, ours might pass for the most devout people under heaven. We introduce it into every subject, and upon all occasions. A sentence is never complete without it. If we are earnest, it enlivens our discourse ; if we are angry, it affords a vent to our passions ; if we are merry, it quickens our enjoyments, and if we are sad, it relieves our misery. Like those particles in the Greek tongue, which to the philologist give a delicate turn to the meaning, but which to the common reader might be

removed without being missed, the name of God is indispensable in the vulgar dialect of the people, but it takes a practised ear to detect the shade which it gives to the sentence. Many persons would be dumb if they were not allowed to be profane. The only words which, as nimble servitors, are ready to obey their bidding, are the names of God and the awful terms in which He announces the final doom of the guilty. These are their vocabulary. Judging from the discourse which he is likely to hear in the streets, a stranger might infer that the name was all that we had left of God; that we were a nation of atheists, who had at last discovered that He was only a word, and, determined to make reprisals for the terrors with which superstition had clothed Him, we were degrading even the name by the lowest associations. That a puny mortal should thus trifle with the majesty of God, and make a jest of the Divine judgments, is a spectacle which may well astonish the angels, and ought to confound ourselves. Devils hate, but they dare not make light of God. It is only here upon earth, where the patience of God is as infinite as His being, that the name which fills heaven with reverence and hell with terror is an idle word. Profaneness naturally leads to licentiousness, by dissolving the sentiment of reverence.

Closely connected with levity in the use of the Divine name, is the profaneness which treats with contempt the positive institution of the Sabbath. Here the government is implicated in the sin. It encourages the desecration of the Lord's Day by the companies which carry its mails. The Sabbath, as an external institute, is absolutely essential to the maintenance and propagation of Christianity in the world, and until the Christian religion is disproved, and the supremacy of Christ set aside, no government on earth can annul it with impunity.

It is also characteristic of our people that they are self-sufficient and vainglorious, to a degree that makes them ridiculous. They love to boast, and they love to sacrifice

to their own drag and to burn incense to their own net. They feel themselves competent for every enterprise. They can scale heaven, weigh the earth, and measure the sea. Their own arms and their own right hand will get them the victory in every undertaking. Even the style of their conversation is grandiloquent. The hyperbole is their favorite figure, and the superlative their favorite degree of comparison. To hear their self-laudations, you would never dream that they acknowledged a Providence, or depended on any superior power. All this is the grossest atheism. The consequence of this self-sufficiency is a want of reverence for any thing. We honor neither God nor the king. We revile our rulers, and speak evil of dignities, with as little compunction as we profane the ordinances of religion. Nothing is great but ourselves. It is enough to indicate these types of sin, without dwelling upon them. The important thing is to feel that they are sins. They are so common that they cease to impress us, and in some of their aspects they are so grotesque, they provoke a smile more readily than a tear.

4. Having adverted to the sins which belong to us as members of the Confederacy, let us now turn to those which belong to us as a particular Commonwealth. I shall restrict myself to our dealings with the institution which has produced the present convulsions of the country, and brought us to the verge of ruin. That the relation betwixt the slave and his master is not inconsistent with the word of God, we have long since settled. Our consciences are not troubled, and have no reason to be troubled, on this score. We do not hold our slaves in bondage from remorseless considerations of interest. If I know the character of our people, I think I can safely say, that if they were persuaded of the essential immorality of slavery, they would not be backward in adopting measures for the ultimate abatement of the evil. We cherish the institution, not from avarice, but from principle. We look upon it as an element of strength,

and not of weakness, and confidently anticipate the time when the nations that now revile us would gladly change places with us. In its last analysis, slavery is nothing but an organization of labor, and an organization by virtue of which labor and capital are made to coincide. Under this scheme, labor can never be without employment, and the wealth of the country is pledged to feed and clothe it. Where labor is free, and the laborer not a part of the capital of the country, there are two causes constantly at work, which, in the excessive contrasts they produce, must end in agrarian revolutions and intolerable distress. The first is the tendency of capital to accumulate. Where it does not include the laborer as a part, it will employ only that labor which will yield the largest returns. It looks to itself, and not to the interest of the laborer. The other is the tendency of population to outstrip the demands for employment. The multiplication of laborers not only reduces wages to the lowest point, but leaves multitudes wholly unemployed. While the capitalist is accumulating his hoards, rolling in affluence and splendor, thousands that would work if they had the opportunity are doomed to perish of hunger. The most astonishing contrasts of poverty and riches are constantly increasing. Society is divided between princes and beggars. If labor is left free, how is this condition of things to be obviated? The government must either make provision to support people in idleness, or it must arrest the law of population and keep them from being born, or it must organize labor. Human beings cannot be expected to starve. There is a point at which they will rise in desperation against a social order which dooms them to nakedness and famine, whilst their lordly neighbor is clothed in purple and fine linen, and faring sumptuously every day. They will scorn the logic which makes it their duty to perish in the midst of plenty. Bread they must have, and bread they will have, though all the distinctions of property have to be abolished to provide it. The govern-

ment, therefore, must support them, or an agrarian revolution is inevitable. But shall it support them in idleness? Will the poor, who have to work for their living, consent to see others as stout and able as themselves clothed and fed like the lilies of the field, while they toil not, neither do they spin? Will not this be to give a premium to idleness? The government, then, must find them employment; but how shall this be done? On what principle shall labor be organized so as to make it certain that the laborer shall never be without employment, and employment adequate for his support? The only way in which it can be done, as a permanent arrangement, is by converting the laborer into capital; that is, by giving the employer a right of property in the labor employed; in other words, by slavery. The master must always find work for his slave, as well as food and raiment. The capital of the country, under this system, must always feed and clothe the country. There can be no pauperism, and no temptations to agrarianism. That non-slaveholding States will eventually have to organize labor, and to introduce something so like to slavery that it will be impossible to discriminate between them, or to suffer from the most violent and disastrous insurrections against the system which creates and perpetuates their misery, seems to be as certain as the tendencies in the laws of capital and population to produce the extremes of poverty and wealth. We do not envy them their social condition. With sanctimonious complacency they may affect to despise us, and to shun our society as they would shun the infection of a plague. They may say to us, *Stand by—we are holier than thou*; but the day of reckoning must come. As long as the demand for labor transcends the supply, all is well: capital and labor are mutual friends, and the country grows in wealth with mushroom rapidity. But when it is no longer capital asking for labor, but labor asking for capital; when it is no longer work seeking men, but men seeking work—then the tables are turned, and unemployed

labor and selfish capital stand face to face in deadly hostility. We desire to see no such state of things among ourselves, and we accept as a good and merciful constitution the organization of labor which Providence has given us in slavery. Like every human arrangement, it is liable to abuse; but in its idea, and in its ultimate influence upon the social system, it is wise and beneficent. We see in it a security for the rights of property and a safeguard against pauperism and idleness, which our traducers may yet live to wish had been engrafted upon their own institutions. The idle declamation about degrading men to the condition of chattels, and treating them as cows, oxen, or swine; the idea that they are regarded as tools and instruments, and not as beings possessed of immortal souls, betray a gross ignorance of the real nature of the relation. Slavery gives one man the right of property in the labor of another. The property of man in man is only the property of man in human toil. The laborer becomes capital, not because he is a thing, but because he is the exponent of a presumed amount of labor. This is the radical notion of the system, and all legislation upon it should be regulated by this fundamental idea.

The question now arises, Have we, as a people and a State, discharged our duty to our slaves? Is there not reason to apprehend that in some cases we have given occasion to the calumnies of our adversaries, by putting the defence of slavery upon grounds which make the slave a different kind of being from his master? Depend upon it, it is no light matter to deny the common brotherhood of humanity. The consequences are much graver than flippant speculators about the diversity of races are aware of. If the African is not of the same blood with ourselves, he has no lot nor part in the Gospel. The redemption of Jesus Christ extends only to those who are partakers of the same flesh and blood with Himself. The ground of His right to redeem is the participation, not of a like, but of a common

nature. Had the humanity of Jesus been miraculously created apart from connection with the human race, though it might in all respects have been precisely similar to ours, He could not, according to the Scriptures, have been our Redeemer. He must be able to call us brethren before He can impart to us His saving grace. No Christian man, therefore, can give any countenance to speculations which trace the negro to any other parent but Adam. If he is not descended from Adam, he has not the same flesh and blood with Jesus, and is therefore excluded from the possibility of salvation. Those who defend slavery upon the plea that the African is not of the same stock with ourselves, are aiming a fatal blow at the institution, by bringing it into conflict with the dearest doctrines of the Gospel. To arm the religious sentiment against it, is to destroy it. When the question at stake is, whether a large portion of mankind can be saved, we want some thing more than deductions from doubtful phenomena. Nothing but the Word of God can justify us in shutting the gates of mercy upon any portion of the race. The science, falsely so called, which proffers its aid upon such conditions, is such a friend to slavery as Joab to Amasa, who met him with the friendly greeting, *Art thou in health, my brother?* and stabbed him under the fifth rib. I am happy to say that such speculations have not sprung from slavery. They were not invented to justify it. They are the offspring of infidelity, a part of the process by which science has been endeavoring to convict Christianity of falsehood; and it is as idle to charge the responsibility of the doctrine about the diversity of species upon slaveholders, as to load them with the guilt of questioning the geological accuracy of Moses. Both are assaults of infidel science upon the records of our faith, and both have found their warmest advocates among the opponents of slavery. Our offence has been, that in some instances we have accepted and converted into a plea, the conclusions of this vain deceit. Let

us see to it that we give our revilers no handle against us; above all, that we make not God our enemy. Let us not repudiate our kindred with the poor brethren whom He has scattered among us, and entrusted to our guardianship and care. Let us receive them as bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh. Let us recognize them as having the same Father, the same Redeemer, and the same everlasting destiny.

Let us inquire, in the next place, whether we have rendered unto our servants that which is just and equal. Is our legislation in all respects in harmony with the idea of slavery? Are our laws such that we can heartily approve them in the presence of God? Have we sufficiently protected the person of the slave? Are our provisions adequate for giving him a fair and impartial trial when prosecuted for offences? Do we guard as we should his family relations? And, above all, have we furnished him with proper means of religious instruction? These and such questions we should endeavor to answer with the utmost solemnity and truth. We have come before the Lord as penitents. The people whom we hold in bondage are the occasion of all our troubles. We have been provoked by bitter and furious assailants to deal harshly with them, and it becomes us this day to review our history, and the history of our legislation, in the light of God's truth, and to abandon, with ingenuous sincerity, whatever our consciences can not sanction. Let not the taunts of our revilers shake us from our propriety. Let it be our first care to commend ourselves to God, and, if He be for us, what does it signify who is against us? Our slaves are a solemn trust, and while we have a right to use and direct their labor, we are bound to feed, clothe and protect them, to give them the comforts of this life, and to introduce them to the hopes of a blessed immortality. They are moral beings, and it will be found that in the culture of their moral nature we reap the largest reward from their service. The relation itself is

moral, and in the tender affections and endearing sympathies it evokes, it gives scope for the exercise of the most attractive graces of human character. Strange as it may sound to those who are not familiar with the system, slavery is a school of virtue, and no class of men have furnished sublimer instances of heroic devotion than slaves in their loyalty and love to their masters. We have seen them rejoice at the cradle of the infant, and weep at the bier of the dead; and there are few amongst us, perhaps, who have not drawn their nourishment from their generous breasts. Where the relations are so kindly, there is every motive of fidelity on our part. Let us apply with unflinching candor the golden rule of our Saviour. Have we rendered to our slaves what, if we were in their circumstances, we should think it right and just in them to render to us. We are not bound to render unto them what they may in fact desire. Such a rule would transmute morality into arbitrary caprice. But we are bound to render unto them what they have a right to desire: that is, we are bound to render unto them that which is just and equal. The Saviour requires us to exchange places, in order that we may appreciate what is just and equal, free from the benumbing influences which are likely to pervert the judgment when there is no personal interest in the decision. I need not say that it is our duty as a Commonwealth to develop all the capabilities of good which the relation of slavery contains. They have never yet been fully unfolded. We have had to attend so much to the outer defences, that we have not been in a condition to give full play to the energies of the inward life. This is the problem to which Christian statesmen should hereafter direct their efforts.

5. This day is a day of *prayer*, as well as of humiliation and confession. There are blessings which in our present circumstances we urgently need, and we should make them the burden of importunate supplications. The first is the grace of magnanimity, that our moderation may be known

unto all men. By moderation, I do not mean tameness and servility of spirit; and by magnanimity, I do not mean what Aristotle seems to understand by it—a consciousness of worth which feels itself entitled to great rewards. The true notion of it is, a just sense of what is due to the dignity of the State, and an humble reliance upon God to make it equal to every occasion. The mind that feels the responsibility of its spiritual endowments, and aims at the perfection of its nature in the consummation of an end which satisfies the fullness of its being, while it arrogates nothing of merit to itself, but ascribes all its capacities to the unmerited bounties of God; the mind that is conscious of what is due to mind, and intent upon fulfilling its own idea—is truly great; and the more thoroughly it is penetrated with this consciousness, the more deeply it is humbled under the conviction of its manifold shortcomings, and the more earnest in its cries for grace to enable it to win the prize. To know our true place in the universe, to feel that we are possessed of noble powers, and that we are bound to pursue an end that is worthy of them, is not pride, but sobriety of judgment. Pride emerges when we attribute to ourselves the excellence of our gifts; when we cherish a spirit of independence and self-sufficiency, and rob God of the glory which is due to His bounty. Humility is not a confession that mind is intrinsically little: it is only the conviction of its absolute dependence upon God, and of its relative nothingness when compared with Him. A Commonwealth is magnanimous when it comprehends the vocation of a State, when it rises to the dignity of its high functions, and seeks to cherish a spirit in harmony with the great moral purposes it was ordained to execute. A magnanimous State can not be the victim of petty passions. It is superior to rashness, to revenge, to irritation, and caprice. It has an ideal which it aims to exemplify; cultivates a mind upon a level with its calling, and, turning neither to the right nor to the left,

presses with undeviating step to the goal before it. It is calm, collected, self-possessed, resolved. It dares do all that may become a State. It will attempt nothing more; it will be content with nothing less. That we, as a Commonwealth, in the trying circumstances in which we are placed, may be able to exhibit this spectacle of magnanimity to the world; that we may command its admiration by the dignity and self-respect of our bearing, even though we should not secure its assent to the wisdom of our policy; that we may make all men see and feel that we are actuated by principle, and not by passion, should be a subject of our fervent supplications this day. Wisdom and courage are the inspiration of God.

In the next place, we should look to Him to raise up for us, as guides and leaders in the present emergency, men of counsel and understanding. Statesmen in the State, as Apostles in the Church, are special ministers of God. They arise at His bidding, and execute His behests. Moses and Joshua, Solon and Lycurgus, the Prince of Orange and Washington, were anointed and commissioned of Heaven for the work they so happily performed. To construct a Government of any kind, is a work of no ordinary magnitude; but the Government of a free people, with its complicated checks and balances, it is given only to the loftiest minds to be able to conceive, much less to create. If ever there was a time, since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, when the whole country needed the counsel and guidance of patriotic statesmen, it is now, when, under the lead of demagogues, factions and politicians, we have corrupted every principle of our polity, and brought the Government to the brink of dissolution. No human arm is equal to the crisis. No human eye can penetrate the future. Our only help is in God; from Him alone cometh our salvation. The highest proof of patriotism in the present conjuncture, is in penitence and humility to seek His favor, and if it is His purpose to redeem and save us, in answer

to our prayers, He will cause the men to stand forth, and the people to honor and accept them whom He has commissioned to conduct us through the wilderness. In the meantime, let us scrupulously resist every influence that is unfriendly to the influence of His Spirit. Let us mortify every thought, and subdue every passion, upon which we can not sincerely invoke His blessing. If we are to lay the foundations of a new empire, or to readjust the proportions of the old, the only pledge of permanent success is the Divine favor. Happy is that people, and that people alone, whose God is the Lord.

Finally, let us pray that our courage may be equal to every emergency. Even though our cause be just, and our course approved of Heaven, our path to victory may be through a baptism of blood. Liberty has its martyrs and confessors, as well as religion. The oak is rooted amid wintry storms. Great truths come to us at great cost, and the most impressive teachers of mankind are those who have sealed their lessons with their blood. Our State may suffer; she may suffer grievously; she may suffer long: Be it so: we shall love her the more tenderly and the more intensely, the more bitterly she suffers. It does not follow, even if she should be destined to fall, that her course was wrong, or her sufferings in vain. Thermopylæ was lost, but the moral power of Thermopylæ will continue as long as valor and freedom have a friend, and reverence for law is one of the noblest sentiments of the human soul. Let it be our great concern to know God's will. Let *right* and *duty* be our watchword; liberty, regulated by law, our goal; and, leaning upon the arm of everlasting strength, we shall achieve a name, whether we succeed or fail, that posterity will not willingly let die.

ARTICLE II.

VITAL FORCE.—BY J. McF. GASTON, M. D.

By the term vital force, I would convey the idea of capacity for action and endurance on the part of the physical organization, without reference to the activity or strength of the subject. In other words, a passive condition, with great susceptibility of sustaining impressions, but not manifested by the performance of acts. We might have an individual with giant powers of body, who could in strength of muscle equal the combined efforts of half a dozen other men, and yet either of them possess more vital force than he would manifest. To illustrate: let the strong man and his inferior be subjected to fasting, long continued fatigue, or to direct depletion, calculated to make a very decided impression, and the latter may exhibit a tolerance which the former does not, owing to the want of vital force. The weak man with great endurance thus outlives the strong man who is readily exhausted; and this element of difference constitutes the feature of the physical organism about which our inquiry is now concerned. It is in many respects obscure, but certainly has a reality which is appreciable, and hence proceeds the importance of investigating closely all the data connected with it. If all were clear and intelligible respecting this innate force, it would not be requisite to make any researches as to its qualities; but the very circumstance of obscurity which seems to present a barrier to progress, is the prime inducement for entering zealously into the work, with a view to obtain knowledge on the subject. If we never entered upon any undertaking which was not fully understood, of course no discovery could ever be made. The explorer who has a reasonable presumption in favor of the result which he expects to attain, is as truly useful to the cause of science as he who reexamines and

verifies the steps by which some great good has been secured. Let us not, therefore, be deterred from entering a field of investigation, because it has not been trodden before. We have sufficient evidence of the importance of the matter under consideration. The existence of this element is undoubted, but we need information as to its modes of manifestation, and the means by which its variations may be detected. These are the practical points of most consequence involved in the elucidation of the obscurity of vital phenomena; and while we observe effects, we may be able to deduce the causes of the phenomena.

The subject of longevity does not necessarily come under our cognizance in this inquiry, and yet may afford some hints to guide us in the investigation. Lord Temple remarks, in an essay written in the seventeenth century, "that the common ingredients of health and long life are great temperance, open air, easy labor, little care, simplicity of diet, rather fruits and plants than flesh, which easier corrupts, and water, which preserves the radical moisture without too much increasing the radical heat; whence sickness, decay, and death, proceed commonly from the one preying too fast upon the other, and at length wholly extinguishing it." "But weaker constitutions may last as long as the strong, if better preserved from accidents; and for one that ends by mere decay of nature or age, millions are intercepted by accidents from without or diseases within, by untimely deaths or decays, from the effects of excess and luxury, immoderate repletion or exercise, the preying of our minds upon our bodies by long passions or consuming cares, as well as those accidents which are called violent."

What was observed then is found to be true at the present time, and that distinction which he recognizes between the different modes of living, as imparting different degrees of strength, pertains to the element of vital force, about which we are now concerned. The individual who, from a prop-

erly regulated course of diet and exercise, and recreations of body and mind, gives health to his frame, and strength to his limbs, and buoyancy to his spirits, must thereby add to his vital capacity, and will be not only more likely to undergo exposure without suffering, but will be apt to attain to greater longevity than those who have been more tenderly raised. There is a process of annealing for the human frame, by which it is better fitted for the duties of life; and being thus less liable to decay, we may expect it to pass through more of those accidents without injury, and thus reach an old age in a sound condition.

The investigation which is here entered upon has reference not only to the normal powers of the physical organization, but to its capacities under the influence of the various agents which are likely to operate upon mankind in different climates and under different modes of living, as well as when subjected to different diseases. We can readily understand that the same disorder may not affect two persons of like physical development to an equal extent, and of course those of unlike organization may be acted upon very differently. But each will manifest a certain degree of effect from the presence of the disease, and each will sustain a depression of vital force by the progress of the malady, which will impair the various functions, and unfit the individual for active efforts of body or mind. Such we know to be the results of sickness, and what we wish to know is, the amount of this innate power which is present under the attack of the disease, so that if excessive it may be reduced, or if deficient it may be assisted, or still, again, if in due quantity, it may be undisturbed. The safe policy of letting well enough alone, is the most difficult proceeding in the experience of a practitioner, as he has the meddling prompting of lookers-on, and a disposition within his own breast to be doing something. A moral heroism is required to practice masterly inactivity with disease, which

few physicians will undertake to manifest at the present day.

The diagnostic indications of vital force in the human organization, are so little understood as to make the data which may illustrate this department of physical philosophy of great practical consequence. This has been a source of much difference in theory, and of much contrariety in practice, amongst the most prominent men, and some standard of strength in health and disease of the animal structure, is truly a desideratum with the medical profession. The sthenic and asthenic conditions of the system are generally recognized; but there is a great variety of intermediate degrees of strength, which are not distinguishable by the ordinary means of investigation; and, indeed, the symptoms connected with the extremes of either kind are sometimes involved in much obscurity, requiring tentative processes of practice prior to any definite or efficient measure of treatment. If medical men have to draw blood to ascertain whether bleeding is indicated, or give stimulants with a view of learning whether they are adapted to the condition of the system, most assuredly there is a deficiency of knowledge concerning those sthenoscopic signs which should afford the true basis of diagnosis. That such has been the course pursued by those most skilled in the profession, needs no proof here, and that the results have been unfavorable may be inferred from the nature of the case, going to illustrate that the course is contra-indicated; and just so much injury has been inflicted as we have proof against the continuance of the tentative measure. If blood has been drawn, in however small quantity, and leads to the conclusion that bleeding is not adapted to the condition of the subject, of course just so much detriment must ensue as the extent of the depletion. And again, if stimulants are administered, even in minute portions, and induce the conviction that farther use would not be suited to the state of the patient, there must be injury from the

quantity already taken, to the extent to which its effect has been observed. Thus, a prejudicial influence is likely to ensue whenever measures are resorted to as a test of their further use, or as a means of determining their fitness to the existing uncertainty. It is, consequently, a problem of great intricacy to be solved. That there is derangement of the powers of the organization can not be doubted, and yet what is the special nature of the disturbance we are unable to determine without risking further injury. Such is the dilemma in which the present knowledge of the dynamics of the human system places the practitioner of medicine; and it is with a hope of bringing some light to bear on this subject that our views are presented for the consideration of others. The want of some reliable data by which to determine the degree of strength of the physical organization, or the vital force of the system, is manifest from the works which have been written, attributing, on the one hand, all disorders to a deficiency of power or debility, and, on the other, recognizing over-action or excitement as the grand indication to be met. At the present time, there is not exhibited such a tendency to extremes in either direction, but the most acute and discriminating have thus far failed to get a satisfactory insight into the vital capacities of different individuals, and they are equally without a guide to the forces or powers of action of the human organization under the influence of disease. A subject may appear strong when the vital force is almost extinct, or, on the other hand, one may appear weak when there is an overpowering influence of the vital energies; and the various grades of one or the other, constitute a wide field for the study of this new and attractive science.

A number of elements enter into this investigation, and, while the vital phenomena which are associated with the living structure come under our cognizance, we must not overlook the properties of electricity, heat, and light, in connection with the human body.

The fascinating experiments of Reichenbach, who is a matter-of-fact philosopher, prove most conclusively that the human system, under some forms of nervous derangement, is endowed with electrical qualities which our senses are not ordinarily cognizant of; and that there are relations of the body to the great electrical endowments of the earth, which render certain positions with reference to the magnetic poles more comfortable than others. In this day of electrical influences, it will not be viewed as extravagant to state that every human frame constitutes an electrical machine of more or less potency, as the vital energy is more or less developed; and although it does not come within our province now to elucidate this phase of organization, it must be adduced as one of the indications which are to give us a clue to sthenoscopic signs. In examining different subjects in a state of health and disease, with the aid of magnets and other electrical appliances, the infirm are found to present susceptibilities to the influence of other bodies which are very remarkable within themselves, and calculated to afford an illustration of this mode of measuring the vital force of the subject.

The energy and vigor of different persons depends, to a greater or less extent, on their relative electrical endowments; and the capacity of one to exercise control over another, as in the exhibitions all have witnessed in illustration of animal magnetism, cannot be set aside as mere idle trickery, but must now be regarded as the manifestations of electrical influences, propagated from one to the other. The condition of the nervous system is known to be very much under the influence of electrical currents, and the muscular tissue contracts violently under similar circumstances; so that we must infer an influence of a less intense, but more constant kind to be attended with modifications of the organization through each day and night.

The idea of considering the relations of the human organization to heat is not new, and yet the particular appli-

cation of the facts which is here proposed, has not been made heretofore. All know that in fever the temperature of the body is increased, and it is alike familiar to all who have been in malarious regions, that in the chill of intermittents there is a very perceptible reduction of temperature. Health being taken as the normal standard of temperature, we may with propriety regard the increase of this as belonging to the sthenic state, and the decrease as resulting from an asthenic state of the system. Yet we have not in these conditions any specific reference to the vital capacity of the individual, and we must look further for an index to the powers of the organism. Those changes in the lungs which generate heat are very nearly allied to ordinary combustion, but there results from this chemico-vital process, an increment of power to the general organization, by the propagation of heat to every portion of the system. Certain articles of food are found to favor the generation of heat in the body, and such are resorted to in the colder climates to compensate for the low temperature of the surrounding atmosphere. One who should use the vegetable diet suited to a tropical climate, in the arctic region, would succumb to the depressing influence of cold much sooner than another who employed a diet of greasy animal food.

Thus the heat-generating elements of the organization have a mutual influence in modifying the vital force of the subject, and the considerations of internal and external temperature of the body are important features of this inquiry. The changes of the seasons, the alternations of temperature through the day and night, the sudden transitions from heated rooms to the open air, as well as the heated condition of the body from over-exertion and the chilling effect of suddenly cooling off, all have an influence on the healthy development of mankind, and must be considered in arriving at a correct conclusion as to the vital force of the organism.

If we take a plant which has been grown in a hot-house and expose it with one which has been grown in the open air, to a temperature above or below the ordinary state of the atmosphere, the former will be destroyed, while the latter may not be in the least injured. One has derived vital force from its previous gradual accommodation to the surrounding condition, while the other, though more luxuriant and beautiful, wants that stamina which is requisite to support it under the change of circumstances. So it is with men and women who have been kept too much in the same state of protection from the vicissitudes of temperature. They may look well and feel well, but they will not bear the ordeal of exposure and fatigue, for they are deficient in that power which belongs to healthy development.

In reference to light, the organism is entirely passive, and yet its role of influence is by no means unimportant. We know that in the vegetable kingdom the strength of plants depends very much on the amount of light which they receive during their growth. Let a twig spring up in some place where the atmosphere circulates freely, but no light can reach it, and it proves tender and weak, compared with one of the same stock which has been reared where the light was beaming upon it daily. Fruits and garden products which are secluded from light are not so large or well flavored as those raised in the open daylight.

The same principle is illustrated in the delicacy and want of stamina on the part of females or males of the human race, who live within doors and rarely see or feel the rays of the sun. The subject may be engaged in active labor, but there is a want of that nerve power which is imparted to those who are accustomed to go forth in the light of day and attend to the ordinary duties of life. There is a want of color, a softness of skin, and a flaccidity of fibre, which characterizes the in-door dweller; and this is in striking contrast to the ruddy hues, the firm texture, and the compact limbs, of the sturdy husbandman. We must, therefore,

conclude that light imparts vital force, and the evidence of such experience may be taken as a guarantee of the power of the system.

In an article in the "Sanatary Review," of London, for April, 1858, by Dr. F. J. Brown, it is remarked, that "Light is requisite to the color, firmness, strength, and vigor, of the body, and to the activity and cheerfulness of the mind. The more abundant the light, and the more direct that it is from the sun, the more decidedly are these good effects experienced. Light that is reflected has different properties from that which is direct. The actinic properties of sunlight are lost by reflection. Thus, light that is reflected from a wall has but little value, compared with that which shines into a room direct from the broad face of heaven. The direct rays of the sun, then, are necessary to bodily and mental vigor."

To be satisfied of the salutary effect of the rays of the sun on the physical organization, it is only necessary to compare those who have been raised in situations of exposure to the light of day with those who have passed their lives in avocations which confine them within doors; and to carry the contrast out, let the farmer, who has been accustomed to till the soil under the full and free influence of the light of the sun, be viewed in connection with the collier who has not known any other light than that of the dim miner's lamp, but who has exercised every portion of his frame in a way to develop the muscles and impart energy to his functions. History is scarcely required to aid common sense in coming to the conclusion that the farmer is in a more advantageous position for the development of all the powers of the system, and the element of greatest advantage is the light of the sun.

We quote from a journal of the day the following important observations:

While the importance of pure air and appropriate exercise to the healthful development of the body is receiving, in some quarters, that

attention which it justly demands, the importance of light as a sanatory and curative agent is scarcely thought of. In genteel life, dark rooms are only fashionable; a bleached skin is deemed the perfection of beauty; and gloves and veils must be worn out of doors, lest the sunlight should give a little darker hue to the marble-like tablet. But plants seek the sunlight, and without it become pale and sickly; and animals need it no less. In the years of cholera, it was invariably found that the deaths were most numerous in narrow streets and northern exposures, where the salutary beams of light had seldom shed their genial influence. Scrofula, and similar diseases, are found to be most prevalent in poor children living in confined and dark streets; while, on the other hand, exposure to the sun in the open air has been found one of the best means of restoring them to health. In countries where little covering is required for the body, cases of natural deformity are exceedingly rare; and an English physiologist has maintained, with a great array of facts in support of the position, that exposure to the sunlight is absolutely essential to the regular conformation of the body.

If, then, the light of day is essential to the full development of the human form, it becomes an imperative duty to construct our dwelling-houses, our schools, our workshops, and our churches, upon principles that will allow the life-giving element to have the fullest and the freest ingress, and to admit all the light that is consistent with a suitable protection from the direct rays of the sun.

Air, food, exercise, and sleep, are the four cardinal points of health, neither of which can be dispensed with entirely, nor can they be lessened beyond certain limits with safety. If we were called upon to determine which of the four can be most abstracted with the least detriment to the comfort and vigor of the individual, it would present a nice question in hygiene; and it may not be out of place to inquire somewhat into the facts which are available on this subject. Some have houses so constructed as to exclude, to the greatest extent practicable, the atmosphere which is intended to renovate the blood and remove effete matters from the surface of the body. Some reduce the allowance of food to what is barely requisite for sustenance of life, while others overload the stomach and arrest the process of digestion by taking crude articles into it. Some cease to make any exertion, or fail to bring into requisition the powers which they have, and remain in a state of stagnation from day to day, and from

week to week, until they almost lose the capacity for physical exertion. And, lastly, we find that some refrain from sleep, either by preoccupation of mind and body, or by inability to secure the influence of that sweet restorer of exhausted nature. The deprivation of either, to an extreme degree, would result in death; and, restricted as they frequently are under the circumstances above alluded to, we find the most unfavorable consequences to ensue. If an individual has not that supply of fresh air which is requisite for decarbonizing and re-oxygenizing the blood, it is not only the circulation that suffers, but every portion of the body being supplied with this vital fluid must in like manner sustain injury. There may be a deficiency of air by exclusion, or the atmosphere may be so vitiated by intermixture of noxious gases, as to render it unfit for its purposes; and in either case there is detriment to every organ of the system, but most especially to the lungs, which are the instruments of the respiratory function.

Food is, of course, essential to sustain the physical strength, and when it is abstracted, the nutriment is wanting which is ordinarily elaborated in the stomach and sent out through the lacteals to supply the want which is constantly creating a demand for it. If it is deficient in quantity, the strength must diminish, or if deteriorated in quality, the powers of the system must be affected in a corresponding ratio. If, again, there is an over-charge of articles suited to the organ, the process of digestion is suspended by the incapacity of the stomach for a task of such magnitude, and the articles become subject to the ordinary laws of fermentation, and soon decompose in the stomach.

Exercise is a comparative expression for activity and motion of the different parts of the corporeal machine. All must, in the ordinary daily affairs of life, even getting from bed and changing of posture, take some exercise; and, therefore, it is very seldom that we have an instance of one who ceases all action. But when the approach to a

state of rest is such, that only the wants of a necessary kind are supplied, it falls short of the requisition for a full development of the muscular organization and vigor.

Sleep is the most peculiar and mysterious want which is experienced by the human family. We can readily conceive that a person who is much fatigued requires a cessation from toil, but why in him a state of unconsciousness, as in sleep, is demanded, we are totally unable to conjecture. It is true, that simply to be quiet, in a favorable position for rest, affords great relief to a frame that is weary with work, but a far more refreshing influence is imparted by sleep. The body is so intimately linked with the mind, that it cannot repose completely unless the mental part is lulled into the unconsciousness of sleep. When the mind rests, the body receives the full benefit of exemption from its labors. Remarkable instances of protracted exertion prove that the body is capable of continued exercise for days together; and in like manner, we find that persons occasionally, under powerful excitement, pass days and nights without closing the eyes in sleep; but both are unusual conditions, under extraordinary circumstances. The rule for the one, as the other, is, that a periodic repose is demanded, and without this season of rest the general system most frequently suffers detriment, and the health declines. Some enjoy life with a much smaller proportion of sleep than others, and each is thus a law unto themselves, but it is rare that persons get on well with less sleep than six hours out of every twenty-four, and most persons will be better off to take eight hours. The division of time which seems most natural is eight hours to sleep, eight to work, and eight to recreation and eating, thus filling out the twenty-four hours. Habit certainly has a very great influence over the time which is required for sleep by different persons, and the same person at different periods of life, and it is not the longest sleep that is most refreshing. Indeed, it is a very striking fact, that some times a few

moments of unconsciousness seems to remove an oppressive drowsiness as effectually as a profound slumber of hours together. This seems almost like an electric effect, and we are strongly inclined to the opinion that the electrical condition of the nervous system undergoes a change suddenly under such circumstances.

Some portion of the twenty-four hours should always be devoted to sleep, but a difference of opinion, and a wide difference in practice, exists in our country, and it strikes us, as a matter of no little consequence, that correct views should be entertained as to the appropriate time for sleep. Dr. Franklin, in his notorious aphorism, announced that one hour of sleep before midnight is worth two after; and many have supposed that they had a confirmation of this course by a long habit of retiring early; but if the views of Reichenbach are taken for any thing more than the vagaries of his own mind, we must reconsider this matter, and look more philosophically into the states of the physical organization at the different periods of the night. According to the latter writer, the forces of the system are at the lowest point in the latter part of the night, and, as a matter of course, repose is most needed then. Our own observations on the powers of debilitated patients confirm the experiments of Reichenbach; and we would reverse the adage, and say that one hour of sleep after midnight is worth two before. If Franklin intended to convey the idea, that by retiring early mankind would secure two hours of sleep instead of one, then all is right; but if this is received as the expression of a philosophical opinion, we must demur to its correctness, and hold that this, like his corn-gruel diet for literary men, was among the mistakes of a great man.

The hour of retiring must vary in different seasons of the year, and a like variation should be observed as to the time of rising, but our impression is, that all difficulty is set aside in this matter by making the hour of leaving the bed

correspond throughout the year with that of day-light, and placing that of retiring eight hours in advance of this time. In illustration, we would say, at the equinoxes retire at 10 o'clock, P. M., and rise at 6 o'clock, A. M.; whereas, in the summer solstice, it would be advisable to retire at 9 o'clock, P. M., and rise at 5 o'clock, A. M. There is little doubt but this rule will be attended with more comfort, and lead to better results, in the healthfulness of young persons, than any other fixed regulation. We are not disposed to favor rising before the break of day, for reasons growing out of the nature of the thing itself, and for the more philosophical consideration, that the vital energies are not ascending until daylight. But from this time, there is a decided upward tendency of the powers of the healthy system, and every young person should be ready to welcome *aurora* when she breaks forth in her proud attire of brilliancy.

That these agents have their appropriate effects on the body, all will admit, but the particular modifications which are impressed by each upon different subjects, is yet to be definitely determined; and the manner in which they operate, as well as the channel through which their influence is manifested, demands careful and protracted observation. To assert that a state of things is associated with certain conditions, does not by any means establish the relation of cause and effect; and, even when assured that the one results from the other, there is a problem of vast consequence before us, to ascertain how the effect was produced by the cause; and without such knowledge, our collection of facts may be without any practical use. The investigation of the intermediate links by which results are brought about, becomes, in this point of view, very necessary for our understanding of the relations of the physical organization to the various agencies with which man is surrounded in life, and if we can establish the medium of influence in health, it will subserve our purpose in detecting the channel of action in disease.

Much has been written illustrative of the connection between residence and health; some localities are found salutary while others are attended with baneful results. We are accustomed to have the former attributed to pure air, and the latter to an atmosphere tainted with malaria or other terrestrial emanations.

But the question is presented for our solution as to how these effects are produced, and through what portion of the structure their first impression is made. We are accustomed to satisfy ourselves with the general statement, that absorption has conveyed the matter into the system and disease has ensued, which may be sufficient to warrant the application of remedies, but certainly fails to indicate the phenomena which are most essential to the medical philosopher. Peccant humors, invading solids and fluids of the body, were at one period held accountable for all the disorders to which man is liable, and it must be admitted that the *rational*e of disease, under the above generalization, is but little more satisfactory than this exploded notion. The day is past when a sweeping hypothesis will avail, without sufficient and authentic data to support it, and the physiologist or pathologist who would commend a theory, must sustain it by reference to facts. This is preëminently an age of experiments, and things which were formerly regarded as intangible and inappreciable, are now reduced to the test of physical explanation. The practical bearings of the exercise of the physical and intellectual operations, on the development of vital force, may serve to illustrate the importance of this subject, not only to the physiologist, but to the philosopher and moralist.

Man's physical constitution is such that its functions are only properly performed when the various parts of the organization are brought into their appropriate uses. The exact adaptation of the different parts of the frame to those purposes for which they are fitted, serves most efficiently to develop their individual powers, and to promote that

harmonious perfection which constitutes the symmetry of the whole. To be endowed with a capacity for performing certain acts, which are never executed, is like a deposit in bank, which may be drawn upon to the extent of the original fund, and, unless peradventure the bills should get below par, we may, a hundred years afterwards, avail ourselves of the same amount, and no more. But if this capacity is brought frequently into requisition, and kept in a state of activity, we may rather compare it to bank stock which yields an annual dividend, and eventually is worth more than the original cost.

The energetic use of the various organs of the body gives them a greater strength, and imparts a vigor and elasticity to the discharge of their functions, which is not observed in those which are seldom brought into action—the dividend in the former is larger, and the stock is above par, while the latter pay no profits, and by lapse of time deteriorate in value. To carry out the simile, we may decide readily the advantages of having a certain fund invested in stock over its being deposited; and in like manner we infer that an organ brought into constant and varied use will have advantages over one which is allowed to remain at rest.

Thus it is that vital force results from the proper employment of the different parts of the body, and the lesson which is here inculcated is eminently practical. The drone in society, the sluggard, or even the man of dignified ease, fails to fulfil his destiny as a human being, and we find all such, not only deficient in the physical characteristics of a true man, but deficient in those intellectual and moral attributes which designate the highest type of the race.

It is a peculiarly interesting thought, that a man or woman can not attain completeness of parts without that exercise which brings them into social relations with their fellows. We can not be within ourselves what we feel to be necessary for our personal comfort and well-being; but our ener-

gies must be put forth in the various channels of industry, and thus develop those innate powers which fit us for the duties of life.

With this general principle assumed, we will undertake to delineate, in the first place, the salutary influence of the normal exercise of the physical organs; secondly, the favorable effects of the activity of the intellectual and the emotional faculties, with the adverse influence of the abnormal or perverted exercise, and the want of use of both physical and mental organization. All will appreciate the importance of duly regulated bodily exercise to a healthy state of the physical system, and to make it available in the most efficient manner it must be conjoined with recreation and cheerful employment of the mind. The two are so intimately linked together, and have so much of influence reciprocally upon each other, that they must act harmoniously to develop the highest degree of energy in either, and to promote that vital force on which the continuous action of both depends.

While alternations of activity and repose are essential to the due maintenance of the relations between the nutrition and waste of the physical organism, we may readily infer that similar alternations in the condition of the intellectual and moral faculties are requisite for sustaining the proper tone of the mind, and that any very considerable departures from a fixed standard in either will be injurious to both. To determine what is the normal standard of physical exercise, it is requisite that the previous habits of the individual shall be considered. What would give fatigue in one case, would scarcely be recreation in another, owing to the fact that in the latter a much greater degree of exertion was made in the ordinary course of life than in the former. A ride in a buggy would be exercise for the former, while the energies of the latter require to be drawn out by some thing demanding the employment of the various muscles of the body, such as a ride on horseback at a rapid gait. Just the

same kind of distinction which is observed between an invalid, or one who is convalescent from sickness, and yet weak, and those of feeble powers, is perceptible between this latter class and those of robust powers. The tonicity of fibre, the muscular activity, and the nervous energy, which are imparted by an early resort to vigorous exercise, render the system intolerant of repose, and demand that activity to be continued to which the organism has become habituated by gradual and continuous physical exertion. For such a subject, then, we will not find any wear and tear in undertaking any of the ordinary duties of life, but the healthful condition will be thereby promoted, and without such employment the vigor will be impaired.

Thus it will be perceived that labor prepares the physical organization for undergoing a greater amount of active exertion, than those can bear who have led an indolent course; and the same rule holds, not only for the human being, but also for the lower orders of the animal creation. If a horse is raised very tenderly, he is not capable of doing the same work as one that has roughed it in the earlier years of existence, and been required to undergo a certain amount of active effort. A great practical mistake is frequently made in this particular by stock-raisers. Colts are kept in the stable or pasture, without that energetic exercise of their muscles which is requisite to develop the greatest power or the most elasticity, and the consequence is, when put to work, they do not bear heavy service as well as those of corresponding age which have been brought up to it. Exercise, to an extent which will draw out the capacities of the muscular system, is necessary for the development of the inferior animal, and we will find by investigation that it is quite as necessary to impart strength and elasticity to the human frame.

In claiming that power is proportionate to the use of the muscles, we are not to be understood as contending for gymnastic feats, which beget athletic power; but simply with

the intention to illustrate the fact of a healthy development of the capacities of the organism, by a due proportion of muscular activity, we here adduce the great increase of power over what is ordinarily observed, under a system of training in which the muscles are brought into frequent and energetic use. We are not concerned particularly to know how giants may be produced, but all are interested to learn by what process man may be fitted best for the duties which must necessarily devolve upon him; and it is our purpose, in adverting thus specially to physical exercise, to indicate its influence in developing and maintaining the vital force respecting which our inquiry is now instituted.

The fundamental doctrine which is applicable in all cases for exercise, may be briefly expressed by *activity without fatigue*. Whatever induces the energetic employment of the various parts of the frame, without resulting in exhaustion of their powers, will add to their capacity for action and endurance; and, on the other hand, if the effort is so great or so protracted as to produce great fatigue, prostration must be the consequence, and hence an impairment of their capacity must ensue. This rule is adapted to the feeble or robust, and may be acted upon with safety and advantage by all who desire to promote the highest degree of energy in the existing state of their physical organization. Bodily strength is not essential to health, and our sole object in resorting to exercise is to maintain the normal standard of vigor in the individual; or, in other words, to sustain the vital force of the system. Great physical power is not desirable to many, as they have no occasion, in the performance of their avocation in life, to expend any very great strength, but all demand a certain degree of vigor, and exercise to a greater or less extent is requisite to secure it. That is the normal standard which best subserves this end, and the greatest activity with the least fatigue will be attended with the best effect. It is not by simple continuation of action that the most satisfactory results are

observed, but by such variation of the action of a part, or alternation of action with other parts, as shall admit of that occasional repose which is essential for the due manifestation of the energy which is implanted in it. The unremitting use of a particular muscle, or set of muscles, for a considerable time, wearies not only the part, but affects in an unfavorable manner the entire system; whereas, a change of the muscle or muscles for others, without any intermission in the state of activity, affords relief locally and generally, and even serves to refresh and invigorate the entire system. This latter variation of action is the appropriate sphere of man's duty. If those engaged in any special branch of business wish to profit by relaxation, it is not necessary that their time should be spent in idleness, but, by a judicious change of the field of labor, the recreation may be rendered most advantageous. We would not, therefore, have those who may require rest from a particular occupation to lie down in listless repose; for by varying the channel through which their energies are brought into exercise, they may relieve the tension upon those organs and faculties which have been employed, and bring others into requisition, with a good effect, both with reference to the individual and to the great general plan of utility, which should characterize the associated duties of man.

When the work which regularly devolves upon a person in his appropriate business does not fully engross his time and attention, the intervals should not be squandered, but may be properly applied to some useful purpose disconnected with the regular employment, and thus give scope to the full development of both the physical and intellectual powers. All work and no play is thought to be oppressive, yet the work may be so varied as to leave no desire for play; and, instead of loafing and lounging about, all may pleasantly and at the same time usefully employ their time devoted to recreation.

In thus suggesting the greatest economy of time and

labor, it must be remembered that *rest* has also been enjoined as a requisite for the proper development of the physical powers, and unremitting attention to business is not compatible with the highest degree of vigor, even for a time, while the protraction of such labor must very soon completely prostrate the energies of both body and mind. It is not simply the repose which sleep bestows that is indicated, but there must be a certain portion of time during which work is suspended entirely, and absolute rest is granted to the whole system. A departure from this requisite of the physical organism will most assuredly lead to bad consequences, and those who consider their own permanent well-being must have seasons of relaxation, in which all active duties are suspended.

This great practical truth is especially exemplified in the fundamental arrangement of the Sabbath amongst Christian nations, and, while it displays most signally the wisdom of the Divine Lawgiver, it appeals to all mankind for a faithful observance of one day in seven as a day of rest from all toil and care. It would be an interesting and profitable work to ascertain the comparative energy of those people who observe the Sabbath strictly as a day of rest, and those who neglect this natural and moral injunction, either by a continuance of ordinary labor, or by engaging in active sports. Though not prepared to present statistics in verification of the position here taken, we are satisfied that the vigor and energy of those who observe this day as a season of repose are superior to those qualities amongst a people who fail to recognize the Sabbath.

It is not only a portion of each day that must be set apart for rest, but at certain intervals of time a period of rest is demanded by the organization of man, and this is, to a very great extent, supplied by the provision of the Christian Sabbath, setting apart the seventh day as a season of repose and communion with the great Source of our being. Quite a different end is gained by occasional holidays, which

serve the double purpose of recreation and social enjoyment; and while these objects are fit and proper on such occasions, they should not be confounded with the higher and holier purposes which God in his wisdom and goodness intends to subserve in the appointment of the Sabbath. If man is true to the requirements of his maker, God, he cannot be untrue to his own nature, and must adopt that course in life which will conduce most effectually to the maturity and completeness of his physical and mental development.

In this connection an inference may be appropriately made as to the management of that class whose province it is to labor from day to day. Those who are free to act for themselves may, of course, look to their own welfare, but in our Southern country it devolves upon the owners of slaves to consider what regulations will most conduce to their own interests, while at the same time the health and comfort of the slave is promoted. All know that a due supply of good, substantial food is requisite for the performance of a full share of work, and hence this is not likely to be neglected; but it is not so fully recognized that a respite from labor is, to a certain extent, necessary for the slave. Regular sleep, which has been so poetically styled "tired nature's sweet restorer," is, perhaps, more a requisite to the negro than to the white man; and those who have charge of large bodies of negroes should look particularly to those arrangements which shall secure comfortable repose. But, aside from this, there is a demand for rest during the day, which can not be disregarded without a deleterious effect on the constitutional stamina of the individual. The constant application of the attention and physical energies to any duty, though in itself light, becomes irksome by its continuance; and, even if a service is varied in a way to afford relief, there must still be some definite intermission of labor, to afford the system an opportunity to react. To have an adequate idea of the condition of the human organism under constant labor, it must be remembered that every effort of the

muscles is attended by a corresponding strain on the nervous system, while there is a waste of the materials of the body, in proportion to the duration or the intensity of the labor performed. As the nerves supply that energy and elasticity to the organization, which is essential to a proper exercise of the various functions, we are prepared to appreciate the bearing which deficient nerve-power would have upon the *vital force* of the subject; and it is, therefore, only necessary to adduce the fact of exhaustion of the nervous system by unremitting toil, to convince all of the importance attached to a regular period of rest during the day. This indication is practically fulfilled on most of our plantations, by setting apart an hour or two at noon for respite from work; and those who fail to give a due allowance of rest in this way, may expect to find the energies of their negroes flagging: they not only do less work, but in a less efficient manner, than others who are refreshed by complete exemption for a time from labor. If we perform our duty to slaves, they will perform their duty more efficiently to us.

The influence of the intellectual and emotional faculties in the development of vital force, has not been properly appreciated in the arrangements of our industrial class, and it is not understood how much of energy in the performance of a mere physical task depends upon the mind, nor is it duly considered how much control the will exercises over the capacities of the individual to undergo labor and resist the depressing effects of great exposure to heat or cold, and other deleterious agents.

Those who may feel any special interest in this branch of the subject are referred to a paper on the "Action and Reaction of Mind and Body," which appeared in the number of this Review for the month of October, 1853.

It will be perceived that the reciprocal influences of the physical and mental organs are frequently manifested in a very direct manner, and our object now is to point out the resultant of these different powers in producing vital force.

The effects of the proper exercise of the body on the health and vigor of the individual have been adverted to; and we are not without evidence of the corroborating effect of the duly regulated operations of the mind. Agreeable occupation of the intellectual faculties promotes the due performance of the physical functions, and thus contributes to that harmony between the nerves and blood-vessels which is essential to proper nutrition.

There is a life-giving energy connected with a vigorous action of the mind, and yet a certain degree of exhaustion of the nerve-power results from any protracted application of the intellect. The wear and tear from mental labor is not so direct as that from physical labor, and yet it is well defined, and constantly attends every mental effort. We may not experience this waste of material from any given exertion, nor does an individual muscular contraction make us aware of a loss of substance, but the persistent action in either case induces fatigue, and is accompanied by more or less loss of the elements of the body. A very simple illustration will suffice for the physical result: A person may raise a pound weight in the hand, with the arm extended at full length, and scarcely be conscious of the effect, but if it be retained in this position for a few minutes, it is evident that power must be exerted to maintain the extended arm, and no great while will elapse until the strength will yield to this slight weight, and the arm drop powerless to the side. So in the matter of vision—objects of small size are seen readily upon first directing the eye to them, but if it becomes necessary to keep the attention fixed for a long time, the view becomes less distinct, and ultimately the objects cease to be distinguished.

The same principle holds in reference to the use of the faculties of the mind, for a limited time, or for a protracted period. Indulging a casual thought on some subject seems not to tax the intellect, but if this thought is protracted into deep reflection, and continued for a length of time,

there is a consciousness of exhaustion resulting from it, and we feel that there has been a loss of power. It is through the brain and nervous system that the mind acts upon the functions of the body, and while the ordinary activity of the intellect is salutary, we must recognize the deleterious effects which ensue from too intense mental application. When the mind is employed actively, with such changes in its sphere of operations as to afford happy transitions of thought, there is no sense of fatigue or exhaustion for a considerable time, and yet eventually rest becomes a necessity, to afford relief to the jaded intellect. To observe the proper medium in the exercise of the mental powers, constitutes the most favorable condition for the manifestation of vital force; and the more employment the mind has, without leading to fatigue, the more vigor is imparted to the subject. There is a stimulus from mental activity which pervades every portion of the frame, and though there is a waste of material, it is more than replaced by the appropriation of new matter by the system. Digestion goes forward more rapidly under the influence of active thought, and assimilation is thus promoted. What is consumed in one direction is thus more than counterbalanced by the additions from the ingesta, and there is a decided advance in the elements of the organism. It therefore serves a good purpose as to the entire constitution of man, that the mind shall be cheerfully occupied in thought on various topics, and we have another exemplification of the adaptation of our faculties to the circumstances in which we are placed. Reason and judgment, when directed to some desirable object, are calculated to enhance the relations of man to his fellows, and at the same time to render him a more fit type of his race, by a normal development of all his capacities.

To draw forth the most benign influence of the mind, the emotional faculties must coöperate with it, and thus, by a congenial pursuit of the same end, impart tone to each

other, and instil life and elasticity into every portion of the organization. It is not the immediate action of an agent, so much as the ultimate effect of that action, that concerns us in the inquiry as to vital force, and, however we may appreciate talent in the intellectual man, we must have a due regard for the practical operation of mental exercise in advancing the standard of vitality, and imparting health and strength to man.

In fulfilling the task we have undertaken, the adverse effects on vital force by the abnormal action of the physical and mental organs, must yet be glanced at. There may be over-action or deficient action of either, leading to unfavorable results in the animal economy.

We see it recently stated that the young men in some of the English Universities, where boat-racing has become fashionable, are exhibiting indications of disease of the blood-vessels, and dilatation of the cavities of the heart, from the undue efforts which are put forth in rowing. This is but a single instance of the many which occur of injury by resorting to irregular and powerful efforts of the muscular system, by those who are not habituated to active labor from their youth. The claims of the gymnasium have been urged recently with much zeal in our own State; and if a systematic resort to this species of exercise is practiced in early life, there is a gradual adaptation of the system to it; but for young men who have not been accustomed to such violent efforts, we are satisfied it must be attended with injury. Students, who spend a great portion of their time inactive, can not fly so suddenly to the opposite extreme with impunity; and, though exercise is demanded, it should be regulated in accordance with the powers of the individual. There have come within our own personal observation several instances of students who have had acute attacks of sickness from over-exertion in gymnastic feats; and the exhaustion which frequently ensues from protracted efforts in this violent performance should warn young men against

excessive use of this species of recreation. As to the cultivation of those habits which shall give power and elasticity to the limbs, we have no objection to urge; and yet, the mode in which this is attempted in the gymnasium, is not always most successful in fitting the subject for the practical duties of life. To combine field-sports with the exercise of the various parts of the frame in the open air, is better suited to the physical and intellectual parts of man, than to shut him up in an enclosure where the appliances for wrenching and straining his muscles are so varied and numerous as in the regular gymnasium. This school of violence should not be entered by the feeble, or those predisposed to disease of vital organs; and, indeed, there are but few persons leading sedentary lives that can with safety indulge in these exercises. As the rule given for proper exercise was "activity without fatigue," we may put under prohibition all such practices as tend to interrupt the ordinary energy of the system, and hence condemn all sudden and violent agitation of the organization as hurtful. On the other hand, we are called upon to note the prejudicial effects of the cessation from action, or a material shortcoming from the ordinary standard of activity. It is a matter of common observation, that sedentary habits are deleterious to the health; and it is only requisite to consider the torpor of the various parts of the organism, resulting from inaction, to perceive how it must impair the vital energy of the system. The organs of locomotion are so connected with those concerned in the nutrition and development of the body, that the functions of the former can not be interrupted for any considerable period without modifying the operations of the various tissues and organs of the body. It is upon the joint operation of the various parts of the system that vital force depends; and if any portion ceases to perform its part, we may expect impairment of the powers of the whole. In the case of suspension of function on the part of any special organ, this is very manifest;

and we have but to view the normal condition of the organs of locomotion as action, to warrant the inference that a cessation to perform their duty is an abnormal condition, which is likely to induce a tendency to disorder in other parts. Thus, want of activity leads to a disordered action, resulting in disease of the organs of the body.

A branch of our subject, next in order, is the result of undue mental activity, or irregular emotional excitement, as regards the vital powers of the subject. Though of great practical consequence, this element of disturbance to the functions of the body has not been very fully presented in any treatise with which we are familiar, and it is now a source of regret that our space will only admit of the simple enunciation of the fact, that a large share of physical disorders proceed from the state of the mind. Every one has, perhaps, been able to refer derangements of the health to intellectual or emotional perturbation. Not only does exaltation of action lead to disturbance, but mental depression is a well-recognized source of trouble. The intensity of mental action is the one extreme leading to the impairment of vital force, while the absence of all exercise of the mind is the other extreme of evil import; and, between the two, we adopt the old adage, "It is better to wear out than to rust out." The great truth exemplified in this article is, that extremes impair the powers of the organism, while a properly regulated activity of all the elements which make up the physical and mental constitution, promotes that vital force upon which the health and comfort of man depends.

ARTICLE III.

THE MANNER OF ALTERING OUR DOCTRINAL STANDARDS.

The constitution of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America consists of four parts, pertaining respectively to doctrine, government, discipline and worship. We claim that all these formularies are scriptural, and hence are binding on the consciences of those associated together in the Presbyterian Church, in Christian and ministerial communion. But we do not consider them all scriptural in the same sense, nor binding in the same degree.

1st. The scheme of doctrine taught and symbolized in the Confession of Faith, and in the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, we hold to be the very system of faith revealed in the Bible for man's salvation. Hence, we require the office-bearers, but especially the authorized teachers of the Church, to receive them as the confession of their faith, adopting them, *ex animo*, in their plain and obvious sense, "as containing that system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures;" and the private members, in like manner, are under obligation to receive instruction therefrom, with that docility which becomes disciples in the school of Christ.

2d. The principles and rules of our government, discipline and worship, we hold to be derived from the Bible, either from its direct and positive precepts, or by good and necessary inference therefrom. While, therefore, we claim our Church order to be *jure divino*, in the sense that all the prerogatives, the officers and the ordinances of the Church are clearly ordained in the Scriptures, we do not hold that all the details of ecclesiastical regulation are given, but that much is left, in the practical administration of the Church, to human wisdom and prudence, in subordination

to the directions of the Divine word. Hence, we profess those parts of our Constitution pertaining to the order of the Church, in a very different sense from the confession we make in adopting our doctrinal formularies, since they necessarily contain, not only the principles of government, discipline and worship, which the Scriptures ordain, but, also, such prudential rules and regulations as the necessities of the Church have constrained her to enact. As these are, in good part, the mere product of human wisdom, instead of receiving and adopting them as we do the system of doctrine taught in the Confession, we are simply required to declare that we "approve of the government and discipline of the Presbyterian Church." So, also, the private member is under obligation to submit to his brethren placed over him in the Lord, in the due exercise thereof.

Before our present Constitution was formed, the standards of the Presbyterian Church were those of Westminster. By the adopting act of 1729, the Westminster Confession of Faith, together with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, were unanimously adopted by the Synod, with the exception of certain clauses relating to the civil magistrate. At the same time, they unanimously declared, that they judged "the Directory for Worship, Discipline and Government of the Church, commonly annexed to the Westminster Confession, to be agreeable in substance to the Word of God, and founded thereupon;" and enjoined its observance "as near as circumstances will allow and Christian prudence direct."

At the organization of the General Assembly as the supreme judicatory of the Church, in lieu of the old Synod of New York and Philadelphia, these formalities underwent various changes. The clauses of the Confession of Faith which had reference to the relation of the Church to the government, etc., were altered to their present form; a single phrase, on the same general subject, was omitted from

the Larger Catechism; the Shorter Catechism was adopted entire; and thus our doctrinal symbols were formed, being substantially and really those of Westminster. But, in the other parts of the Constitution, the changes were much greater. The Form of Government teaches the same principles of polity inculcated by the Westminster Directory; and, moreover, it enjoins in general the same practice; while but few sentences, if any, remain unaltered. The Westminster Directory of Government contained scarcely any thing beyond the statement of the principles of ecclesiastical regimen, according to the doctrine of Presbytery; while the standing rules of the Church, pertaining to order, were prescribed by the General Assembly of the Kirk, and were given in a digested form in the Collections of Stuart of Pardovan. The framers of our Form of Government have given in it an abridged statement of Presbyterian polity, according to the general principles common to the First and Second Books of Discipline and the Westminster Directory, together with a brief but comprehensive digest of such of the standing laws of the Kirk, preserved by Stuart of Pardovan from the Acts of the Scottish Assembly, as are required by our circumstances, but so altered as to be adapted to our necessities. The Book of Discipline and the Directory of Worship have both undergone great changes since 1788; but they have always taught the same principles embodied in the old Presbyterian standards of Scotland, and have enjoined the same rules of procedure and practice, with but slight variation.

The result of all this is, that whereas the Westminster Confession and Catechisms remain, at the end of more than two hundred years from their first adoption, the symbols of faith of our Church, with no alteration except that pertaining to the relation of the Church to the State, and to the rights and duties of the civil magistrate, the other portions of the Constitution have undergone frequent changes as to their external form, and many alterations as to the

standing rules of ecclesiastical action, while all along they have maintained the same great principles of government, discipline, and worship, summarily set forth in the Confession itself. Hence, moreover, there is a reverence felt for the Confession and Catechisms, in the mind of the Church, second only to that rendered to the Bible. This arises, partly from the circumstances of their preparation, and their great antiquity, giving the Church a strong assurance of their scriptural fidelity and sterling value; partly, because the Church recognizes in them the precious Gospel of everlasting life, since she finds a response to their heavenly teachings in the heart-felt experience of all her children; and partly, because they come to us freighted with illustrious recollections of a multitude, whom no man can number, who, triumphing in the living power of their saving doctrines during the ages that are past, have crossed the flood—even a noble army of the redeemed of earth, martyrs, professors, and confessors, who, by a steadfast faith or by a self-sacrificing zeal, or by heroic deeds, have witnessed a good profession, as, through much tribulation, they have entered into the kingdom of God, and have transmitted to us as a priceless inheritance this precious legacy. On the other hand, highly as we value the remaining parts of our Constitution, they can claim no such antiquity, they have undergone no such venerable experience, and they can boast no such host of glorified witnesses. Hence, whatever changes human experience may require in the rules of Church order, the alteration of the Confession of Faith and Catechisms never can be effected, until the Church herself is profoundly impressed with its absolute necessity, as a matter of fealty to her King and Head; and then it can only be done with great deliberation and deep solemnity.

In the history of our Church, on three or four different occasions, attempts have been made to obtain an alteration of the Confession of Faith, in the chapter on marriage; and we believe this is the only part in which there ever

has been any attempt to effect an alteration. At the last General Assembly, this effort was renewed by the presentation of a memorial on the subject, from the venerable Synod of Philadelphia, improperly called "the old mother Synod," by the distinguished brother who presented the memorial. "The old mother Synod of Philadelphia" was merged in the Synod of New York and Philadelphia; and of this latter body, not the Synod of Philadelphia, but the General Assembly, is the successor. Notwithstanding, it is one of the four original Synods formed at the organization of the General Assembly, venerable still for its age, but more venerable on account of its great size, and the weight of character belonging to it, from the ability, learning, experience, and age of very many of its respected members, whose praise is in all the churches. As the brother who had charge of the memorial on behalf of the Synod (Dr. Boardman) claimed for it a respectful hearing on account of the source whence it came, we shall treat that honored brother, and the venerable Synod which he represented, with the great respect of assigning at length our reasons for believing that they have chosen an unconstitutional method of accomplishing their purpose, whether their object be right or wrong—on which point we shall say nothing in this article.

I. It is certainly a question at once grave, serious and interesting, as to whether the doctrinal standards of our Church can be altered; and, if so, in what manner and to what extent. It has been seriously doubted, indeed, by some of our wisest and ablest divines, as to whether there is any power residing in our Church judicatories, or in the whole Church, in any imaginable way to make any change whatever in the doctrinal portions of the Constitution. This view is based on the fact that the profession of faith is of the nature of a religious covenant, and is of perpetual obligation. This certainly is a weighty difficulty, and very formidable, unless some provision can be found of equal

obligation with the Confession itself, by which it may be altered. It is very true that there is no provision made in the Constitution for changing or amending any doctrine or precept professed to be derived from the Word of God. The authority is limited to the alteration of "constitutional rules," those prudential regulations which human wisdom made, and, *per consequentiump*, may alter or amend. Take these formularies as we have them, and on their face they are as binding as these objecting brethren say they are, and unalterable, in the degree and for the reasons assigned. Nor is there any way of escape from this conclusion, as it seems to us, unless we find it in the act adopting our standards, and establishing the Constitution. If it provides any manner of effecting such alterations, that also becomes part of the covenant, and is as binding as any part of the Constitution, since it is the very instrument which originally gave, and still gives, vitality to the Constitution itself. This general principle, however, is liable to this limitation, that it cannot be so construed as to set aside the obligations assumed by Church officers, ministers, elders and deacons, at their ordination. For, since these obligations, by the authority of the Constitution, are imposed on them at their induction into office; and since, in the discharge of their public duties, they are always acting under the weight of these solemn vows; it is not morally possible to conceive of any change being effected in that faith of the Church which they have confessed and professed by solemn covenant; for the change can only be made by the votes of those who have solemnly sworn to maintain it, as it is. Here, then, is a difficulty of a very serious character, which, most certainly, must affect this question very materially. Church officers "receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this Church as containing that system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures." Now, no honest man can remain a minister, elder, or deacon, of the Presbyterian Church, after he ceases to believe that system of doctrine taught in

our standards. This is, in the highest sense, true of the minister; for, besides adopting the Confession of the Church, he promises, among his vows of ordination, "to be zealous and faithful in maintaining the truths of the Gospel, and the purity and peace of the Church," etc. What truths of the Gospel can this mean, more emphatically than those he had just confessed by the previous vow? Therefore, the idea of his attempting to effect an amendment of the standards so as to alter or modify any doctrine belonging to that system taught in them, or so as to make them teach some other system of faith, is simply absurd, in any moral or legal aspect of the case. Whatever change the provisions of the Constitution or the terms of the adopting act may authorize us to make in the phraseology of the Confession, so as to make it express more accurately, and with less liability of misconstruction, the doctrines contained in the system it was originally designed to teach, if this be possible; or, whatever additions we may feel ourselves justified in making to it, by way of testimony against the new errors ever springing up in a gainsaying world, if any shall ever be deemed needful; or, whatever changes we may attempt in any of those articles, sections or sentences, which are not necessarily included in that system, such as the extent of the law of incest, the rights and duties of civil magistrates, etc., certainly, it must be acknowledged that we can not, by any action or exercise of power, directly or indirectly affect the system of belief, or any doctrine thereof, taught in our symbols, embraced at our ordination, and embalmed in the faith of the Church. For, 1st. We would by the very act be guilty of most fearful perjury. 2dly. We would thereby absolve every Church officer from his ordination engagements to us; for our Confession would no longer be the one he had received and adopted, and sworn to maintain. And, 3dly. The act would free our Christian people from all obligations to us, such as they enter into at our installation; and would hence throw

the Church into anarchy. For their reception of us, in the pastoral relation, is consequent upon our public adoption of the Confession. But now, having changed our faith, and altered our symbols to make them correspond therewith, we would thus, by our own act, have destroyed the very basis of the covenant, and it would of course perish. Even the Constitution of the United States, in those amendments adopted as a declaration of rights, provides that no law shall ever be passed impairing the validity of contracts. If the civil covenants made among men pertaining to temporal things be so sacred as this, how solemn and binding do those religious covenants become, which are made to men, indeed, but before God, with regard to the things of His kingdom, and which are the more sacred because the obligation is wholly moral, resting entirely on pledged faith. Wherefore, there is not, and can not be, any authority existing any where, which has any moral right to do any act, or make any change, which shall affect or destroy the covenants made between the Church and her officers, between the Church and God's people, or between the officers and the people. Did the power even exist to make such changes as these, they would only be made with reference to the reception of ministers and members in the future: they could not, by any right, be made binding on those already connected with the Church; which again only shows the absurdity of any such claim of power.

Therefore, throughout this article, whenever we speak of the right to alter the doctrinal standards, we mean to be understood in the restricted sense which we have explained above. The covenant of ordination is such that it invests those who enter into it with certain great and invaluable rights, and also imposes on them, not only a faith, but an engagement faithfully to maintain it. This engagement is individual and personal, between the Church and every individual officer—not between the Church and her officers in the general. It can only be dissolved by the consent of

both parties; which consent, so far as the officers are concerned, must also be individual and personal. Hence, the engagements of ordination must be kept inviolate on the part of the Church. Therefore, the right of the Church to make any change in her standards, must be limited, *quoad hoc*. In this sense we desire to be understood in all we say in our subsequent pages.

II. Having thus given our views as to the limits of the discussion, it is necessary now to consider the state of the question.

The Constitution was adopted by the Synod of New York and Philadelphia in 1788, at the last meeting of that body. For several years that venerable Synod had been occupied in forming a permanent Constitution for the Church—with reference to its own dissolution. At this meeting the work was completed, and was finally ratified and adopted, in a minute which we copy in full, from Baird's Collection, first edition, page 10, as follows:

The Synod having fully considered the draught of the Form of Government and Discipline, did, on the review of the whole, and hereby do, ratify and adopt the same, as now altered and amended, as the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church in America; and order the same to be considered and strictly observed as the rule of their proceedings, by all the inferior jurisdictions belonging to the body. And they order that a correct copy be printed, and that the Westminster Confession of Faith, as now altered, be printed in full along with it, making a part of the Constitution.

Resolved, That the true intent and meaning of the above ratification by the Synod is, that the Form of Government and Discipline, and the Confession of Faith, as now ratified, is to continue to be our Constitution and the Confession of our Faith, unalterable; unless two-thirds of the Presbyteries under the care of the General Assembly shall propose alterations or amendments, and such alterations or amendments shall be agreed to and enacted by the General Assembly.

Subsequently, the following additional minute was adopted and recorded, viz:

The Synod, having now revised and corrected the draught of a Directory of Worship, did approve and ratify the same; and do hereby appoint the said Directory, as now amended, to be the Directory for

the Worship of God in the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. They also took into consideration the Westminster Larger and Shorter Catechisms; and, having made a small amendment of the Larger, did approve, and do hereby approve and ratify, the said Catechisms, as now agreed on, as the Catechisms of the Presbyterian Church in the said United States. And the Synod order, that the Directory and Catechisms be printed and bound up in the same volume with the Confession of Faith and the Form of Government and Discipline; and that the whole be considered as the standard of our doctrine, government, discipline, and worship, agreeably to the resolutions of the Synod, at their present session.

There could be no difficulty in the case, were this the only provision bearing on the subject. The plain and obvious meaning of the above is, that no alteration of the Constitution can be made, except on the petition of two-thirds of the Presbyteries, addressed to the General Assembly, and asking that body to do it. That is, all alterations are to be made by the Assembly, on the petition of two-thirds of the Presbyteries. But in the Constitution itself there was a provision which was early understood to apply to the prudential regulations contained in some parts of that instrument, and under which, in its original form, or as subsequently amended, all the changes heretofore effected in the Constitution have been made. We insert it as it originally stood in the first Form of Government, as follows, viz:

Before any overtures or regulations proposed by the General Assembly to be established as standing rules, shall be obligatory on the Churches, it shall be necessary to transmit them to all the Presbyteries, and to receive the returns of at least a majority of them in writing approving thereof.

Here, then, we have two laws which seem to conflict in their provisions. In the last Assembly, it was contended that this latter act had no reference, in the minds of the framers of our Constitution, to any of the provisions contained in the Constitution itself, but only to standing injunctions of the General Assembly; that it was taken from the "barrier act" of the Church of Scotland, which

had no reference to constitutional enactments, as it was said, but only to standing regulations prescribed by the General Assembly of the Kirk, under the general provisions of the Constitution; and that our rule being derived from it, must be understood as a simple limitation of the powers of the Assembly in reference to the same objects that the "barrier act" had in view. Hence, it was argued that the use which has been made of this article of our Form of Government was entirely an after-thought, occasioned by an oversight of the adopting act of the Constitution, which had been laid away among the manuscript records, and forgotten. On the other hand, it was contended that our article, although derived originally from the Scotch law, was inserted as an exception to the general law contained in the adopting act; that this latter act had reference to the great principles of the Church as to faith and order, whereas the former was designed to apply wholly to the rules of ecclesiastical procedure and practice contained in the Constitution; that since the faith of the Church is the very element of her life, no change was allowed to be made in the forms of it, or in the manner of expressing it, unless the necessity was so great that the Church herself required it at the hands of the Assembly, through a spontaneous petition from two-thirds of the Presbyteries—whereas, those ecclesiastical rules designed for the regulation of the proceedings of Church courts could be amended by a vote of a majority of the Presbyteries, on the recommendation of the Assembly; in fine, that the object of our fathers was to make the faith and principles of the Church stable, while matters of mere human prudence could be altered according to conveniency. This, then, is the position of the question, as it lies before us.

III. The important part which "the barrier act" of the Church of Scotland occupies in this discussion, makes it necessary for us to examine into its origin, history, and

use, from which it will be seen, we doubt not, that its great purpose has been misunderstood among us. The act, as quoted in Baird's Collection, is taken from the "Compendium of the Laws of the Church of Scotland." In that work the extract from the original act is not sufficiently extended to enable us to understand its true object. In Dr. Cook's edition of the "Styles, Procedure and Practice of the Church Courts of Scotland," we have a full statement of the matter. In that work, on page 266, we are told that "an overture and act anent novations" was passed by the Assembly in December, 1695, in the following words, viz :

The Assembly having heard an overture brought in from the Committee for overtures, that no new acts relating to the doctrine, worship or government of this Church, be made until they be first transmitted to the several Presbyteries of this national Church; which being considered, the General Assembly recommends it to the members of this Assembly to discourse upon the said overture with their respective Presbyteries, and that the next General Assembly may be more ripe to determine anent the conveniency thereof.

At the next Assembly, the result was, that the law, usually called "the barrier act," was passed, January 8, 1697, in the following words, viz :

The General Assembly, taking into their consideration the overture and act made in the last Assembly concerning innovations; and having heard the report of the several commissioners from Presbyteries, to whom the consideration of the same was recommended, in order to its being more ripely advised and determined in this Assembly; and considering the frequent practice of former Assemblies of this Church, and that it will mightily conduce to the exact obedience of the acts of Assemblies, that General Assemblies be very deliberate in making of the same, and that the whole Church have a previous knowledge thereof, and their opinion be had therein; and for preventing any sudden alteration or innovation, or other prejudice of the Church, in either doctrine, or worship, or discipline, or government thereof, now happily established; do therefore appoint, enact, and declare, That before any General Assembly of this Church shall pass acts which are to be binding rules and constitutions to the Church, the same acts be first proposed as overtures to the Assembly, and being by them passed as such, be remitted to the consideration of the several Presbyteries of this Church, and their opinions and consent reported by their commis-

sioners to the next General Assembly following, who may then pass the same into acts, if the more general opinion of the Church, thus had, agree thereto.

By carefully comparing this "barrier act" with our barrier article, already given, it will be seen that the Scotch barrier relates to "binding rules and constitutions," and had for its purpose to prevent "any sudden alteration or innovation, or other prejudice of the Church, in either doctrine, or worship, or disciple, or government;" whereas, our article relates simply to such "overtures or regulations" as are proposed as "standing rules." It will enable us to understand this matter of phraseology, and the relation of the one act to the other, to examine into the objects of the "barrier act," briefly, before proceeding to a consideration of our own article.

1. In the early days of the Reformed Church of Scotland—indeed, for more than a century, from the organization of the Church, in 1560, till the passage of the barrier act, in 1697—supreme authority, in all matters ecclesiastical, was exercised by the General Assembly. The Reformation itself was established by act of Parliament, on the basis of the Confession of Faith laid before them by the Protestant ministers appointed to prepare it. The first meeting of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, thus reformed, convened on the 20th of December, 1560. It was but small, only forty-four members, and only from six to twelve of them ministers.* By it the formulary known as the First Book of Discipline was prepared and enacted, which for many years maintained its position as the book of polity of that venerable Church, on the sole authority of the Assembly. It never was either adopted or established by act of Parliament.

In like manner, the Second Book of Discipline, the National Covenant, the Solemn League and Covenant, the

* Our authorities differ slightly as to those precise numbers.

Westminster Confession, Catechism and Directory of Government and Worship, etc., etc., all were enacted by the General Assembly, and were enforced on the Church by its supreme authority. Some of them, afterwards, received the civil sanction by act of Parliament; but, as ecclesiastical enactments, first and last, they rested for their authority on the act of the General Assembly ratifying and adopting them.

But it must not be inferred that the General Assembly was in the habit of exercising arbitrary authority, or of lording it over God's heritage. For, during nearly all this time, that body was composed of a very full representation of the whole Church. Stuart of Pardovan, in his *Collec-tions*, Book I., Title XV., section 3, says :

At the beginning of our Reformation, the Assembly did consist of those of the reformed religion, delegated from some shires and burghs where the reformed dwelt. The number of pastors was then so small that it did not exceed the fourth part of the meeting, as may be seen from their *sederunts*, in the copy of the MS. acts of Assemblies; and until the number of ministers did increase and multiply, it was at first a general meeting of them all; but thereafter they did empower and commission a few to represent them, who are thereupon only designed "the Commissioners of the General Assembly."

By the act of the English Parliament of 1645, the representation of elders was made twice as great as that of ministers, two elders being appointed for every minister; but the Scotch Directory of Government, printed in 1647, made the representation of ministers and elders equal. But further: Measures of great importance, after the General Assembly had ceased to be a collective, and had become a representative body, were never passed on, until the commissioners had an opportunity of consulting their constituents. For the Assembly of 1639, as we are informed by Dr. Cook, page 266, ordained as follows, viz:

That no innovation, which may disturb the peace of the Church and make division, be suddenly proposed and enacted; but so as the motion be first communicated to the several Synods, Presbyteries and Kirks,

that the matter may be approved by all at home, and commissioners may come well prepared, unanimously to conclude a solid deliberation upon these points in the General Assembly.

2. The immediate occasion or reason of the passage of the barrier act, so far as we can judge from the history of the case, was a change in the law of representation in the Assembly. In 1694, an act was passed which still regulates the matter in the Established Church, by which Presbyteries were allowed to delegate not less than a sixth part, nor more than a fifth part, of the ministry; and reducing the delegation of elders to about two-thirds of that of ministers. This was, doubtless, a great change in the Constitution of the Assembly. How the Assembly was constituted, during the troublous times after the Restoration, or under what law it was constituted after the Revolution, we are not able to learn from any authorities at hand. But, according to any of the previous rules on this subject, this act of 1694 must have caused a great diminution of the size of the Assembly, especially in its popular element. At the very next meeting of the Assembly after the passage of this act, and, of course, the first that met under the new basis of representation, the overture was introduced which became the forerunner of the barrier act, as already given. No reason is assigned for requesting the change proposed in the manner of enacting standing rules of general obligation; but we can clearly see a just jealousy of the rights of the Church, when left in the hands of so small a portion of her rulers.

3. Since the adoption of the barrier act, all fundamental laws and regulations of the Church have been submitted to its provisions. The very first exercise of the right of the Presbyteries, under this act, of which we can find any mention in our authorities, was in giving sanction to the "Forms of Process," in 1704, which are still in use in the Established Church of Scotland, though much modified. And we find that, under it, all such regulations as are given

in the Pardovan Collections, and in the "Styles, Procedure and Practice of the Church Courts," by Dr. Cook, are submitted to the Presbyteries before becoming binding rules. Those who may not have these books at hand to refer to, can understand the matter, when informed that, so far as they are applicable to our Church and country, these same regulations, or similar ones, are contained in the Form of Government, commencing about the eighth chapter, in the Book of Discipline, and in the Directory of Worship; but chiefly in the first of these.

Now, the true intent of this act can be ascertained by considering the evil it was designed to remedy, or the danger which it was expected to prevent, by observing the actual application of the rule in the practice of the Church; and by a careful examination of the language of the act itself, with these historical lights before us. We have seen, then, that the object of the act is, on the one hand, to prevent arbitrary and hasty legislation by the Assembly, making innovations in the doctrine and order of the Church; and, on the other, to secure the passage of only such "binding rules and constitutions" as might meet with the approval of a majority of the Church, as well as of the Assembly. We have, also, seen that under it such constitutional enactments have been passed as the directory of discipline of the Church, known in Scotland as the "Forms of Process," as well as all those regulations designed for the government of the Church and her judicatories, such as we have already described. Moreover, the overture of 1695, already quoted, which originated the "barrier act," was, "that no new acts relating to the doctrine, worship or government of this Church be made until they be first transmitted to the Presbyteries." Still further: The preamble to the act itself declares its great purpose to be, "for preventing any sudden alteration or innovation, or other prejudice of the Church, in either doctrine, or worship, or discipline, or government thereof, now happily

established." It may be that the "act of security," passed as the basis of the union between the kingdoms of England and Scotland, in 1706, in ratifying and establishing the Confession of Faith and the Presbyterian Form of Church Government, "to continue without any alteration to the people of this land in all succeeding generations," took away from the Church, as well as from the Parliament, the right to alter any of her accredited formularies; those included in the act of security being the Westminster standards, the Second Book of Discipline and the Forms of Process. But the Scotch Church have understood that act to be one protecting them from the encroachments of the State, and have never hesitated to make any changes in her forms of order which the conveniency of the Church demanded. It may be, moreover, that the Constitution of the Church of Scotland contains no provision for its own modification. But the power that made it could unmake it again. The whole of the formularies of that Church, except the Forms of Process, were enacted on the sole ecclesiastical authority of the General Assembly; and of course, having established them, it could also repeal or alter them. The very purpose of the "barrier act" was to take out of the hands of the General Assembly this high prerogative, and to lodge the decisive power in the Presbyteries. Now, the "barrier act" was passed several years before the union of the two kingdoms, and whatever may have been the effect of the "act of security," who can doubt, with all these facts before him, that the original design of the law was to throw a barrier around the Assembly, to protect the rights of the people in matters pertaining to faith and order? Heretofore the Assembly had exercised supreme authority on all these subjects. It had made and unmade confessions; it had established and supplanted books of discipline; it had set up and overturned directories for worship; it had enjoined the teachings of one catechism, only to set it aside to make room

for another, and thus the Assembly had claimed and exercised all Church power. This might all be well enough at first, when the Assembly was the real embodiment of the Church, all her ministers, and a large part of her eldership, being of her body. It might still do, while the representation of the Church was composed of the bulk of the ministers, with twice as many, or even as many, ruling elders. For, by means of these representatives, who by the canons of the Assembly were required to confer with their constituents on all fundamental matters, and especially on all innovations, the sense of the Church could be gathered, and the voice of the Assembly, when acting without civil restraint, was but the voice of the Church. But now, the case was changed. By the law of 1694, the Assembly was reduced to between one-sixth and one-fifth the clergy, with about two-thirds as many elders as ministers. It was time for the people to look after their rights, and secure the stability of their beloved Church, for which many of that generation had fought and bled under the banner of her covenants, and in the glorious defence of her faith and order. With their own blood and treasure freely poured out, and with the blood and treasure of their martyred fathers, the sons of the Covenanters had purchased them as their own priceless boon, and as the peerless inheritance of their children and their children's children. The General Assembly had more than once been corrupted and overcome by king-craft; and the potent influence of Scottish merks or English pounds sterling had been felt, when tulchan bishops lorded it over God's heritage, and Arminian pastors fleeced the flock. The General Assembly, through intimidation and corruption, had bartered away their Church, their religion, and their sacred all. Venality might again creep in—corruption might again canker in the General Assembly—but when all innovations had to be judged of by the Presbyteries, such a calamity could never befall them, until the nation itself had become corrupt.

The books before us give us no reason for the act in question. The reasons we have suggested are derived from the times, the circumstances, and the necessities of the Church. Every reader can judge for himself as to their validity. But, be the reasons of the act what they may, it has actually accomplished for the Church of Scotland all we have claimed for it; and now, during a period of more than one hundred and seventy years from its first passage, it has preserved the doctrine and order of the Kirk from innovation. To us its meaning and purpose are manifest.

IV. We now proceed to a consideration of our own barrier article. We have already copied it, as it originally stood in the Form of Government as first adopted. It is in this form we have to do with it at present. In its amended form it may be seen in Form of Government, chapter 12, section 6.

With us, as in like manner it had been the case in Scotland, the mother Presbytery first, and afterwards the mother Synod, was not only the supreme court, but exercised supreme ecclesiastical power. The adopting act of 1729 was the act of the Synod. It is true that it came up at more than one meeting, giving the members an opportunity of consulting with their people at home, as the Scottish commissioners under similar circumstances were required to do. But finally it was passed, without consulting the Presbyteries, and was enforced by the sole authority of Synod. But the Synod was composed of all the ministers of the Church, with an elder from every Session. The acts of the Synod were, therefore, really the acts of the Church. The Presbyteries sometimes objected to the proceedings of Synod, and remonstrated; but usually their difficulties were solved, and the power of the Synod was maintained as supreme.

At the formation of our Constitution, the same contingency happened which had also occurred in Scotland. The General Assembly, which was erected out of the ruins of

the old Synod, was no longer a convocation of all the ministers of the Church, with one elder from every congregation; but it was composed of delegates from the Presbyteries—ministers and elders being sent in equal numbers. Hence, in forming the Directory of Government, a barrier article was inserted, in imitation of the barrier act. We have already quoted them both, and now refer the reader to them. Their phraseology, as we have before observed, is very different, in an important respect. The Scotch act has reference to “binding rules and constitutions,” *i. e.*, to every kind of ecclesiastical enactment, whether fundamental, or only prudential. But our article had no application to fundamental enactments, but only to those “standing rules,” which are of the nature of “regulations,” which rest wholly on human wisdom, and are of a prudential nature. Among the Scotch, those enactments designated “binding rules,” in the barrier act, are usually called “the standing laws of the Church”—from whence we doubtless obtained our expression, “*standing* rules.” The right to amend our Constitution, in any of its fundamental articles, is not given in any part of the book itself, but it is given in the act adopting the Constitution, as already recited. So that our fathers seem to have separated the provisions of the barrier act; and, in the adopting act, to have inserted the provision pertaining to “constitutions;” while, in the barrier article, they have retained the provision concerning “binding rules.” Indeed, the very fact that there is a change of phraseology, gives strength to our position. It is conceded that our law was modified from the Scotch act. A variation of language would not have been adopted without a purpose. It is a settled principle of legal construction, that if a provision of one statute, whose construction has been determined and acted on, be inserted in another, the same construction must be given to it; but if the clause varies, it shows a different intention in the minds of the law-makers, unless it is manifest that the variation

was made in order by more precise language to give the construction attributed to the former statute. This common-sense rule makes it evident that there was a distinct purpose in omitting from our article the word "constitutions," found in the barrier act—that the framers of our article designed to omit from its operation every thing which, under that law, had gone under the name of "constitutions," in the minds of our Scottish brethren. So, also, the variation of language, from "binding rules" to "standing rules," was manifestly designed to give greater precision to the law. "Binding rules" is tautological; for all "rules" must be binding, although many of them are temporary. To adopt the phraseology, "standing laws," would open the way for misapprehension; for it might be construed to mean the whole Constitution. But the phraseology, "standing rules," was rightly chosen, since it was to those regulations which are of permanent and constitutional obligation the article was designed to apply.

The opinion was expressed, on the floor of the last General Assembly, that the original object of our article never was carried out; but that, without authority, yea, in direct violation of the adopting act of 1788, the article was so changed as to admit of the use now made of it. But if this article was based on the "barrier act," it must have referred to the same things, under the name of "standing rules," which the Scotch act called "binding rules," as we have just seen. We have already proved that in the usage of the Kirk it did apply to just such standing laws as are preserved by Pardovan and Cook. Now, our Form of Government was derived from two general sources. The portions pertaining to the doctrines of Church polity are abridged from the First and Second Books of Discipline and the Westminster Directory. The remaining chapters and sections are condensed from such of the standing laws of the Church found in the Pardovan Collections as were suited to our circumstances. Our books of discipline and worship,

also, were composed with the Scotch laws in hand, as any one will perceive who will take the trouble to compare our formularies with Stuart of Pardovan. If, then, the Scotch act had reference to such standing regulations as these, when it spoke of "binding rules," and if our article be taken from it, to what can its more precise language, "standing rules," apply, if not to such regulations?

Again: Early in the history of the General Assembly, there was a dispute as to the meaning of the phrase "standing rules," the nature of which seems now to be misunderstood. In recent discussions it has been taken for granted that the dispute was as to whether it meant constitutional rules, or those acts of the Assembly designed to carry out the provisions of the Constitution. But this is certainly an error. So far as the public records show, the dispute was as to whether it did not include the latter, *as well as* the former. We can find no question raised as to the right of the General Assembly to send down "overtures" to the Presbyteries, for the altering of any of the "regulations" contained among the "standing rules," in our formularies. But there was a party who desired to make the rule go further, and take in along with these all the injunctions of the General Assembly. This was the matter in controversy.

There is an ancient legal maxim, venerable even in the days of Lord Coke, "*Contemporanea expositio est fortissima in lege.*" It is, therefore, fortunate that this law early received a thorough investigation and a constitutional settlement; and this in two particulars: first, that it did not include rules outside of the Constitution; and, secondly, that it did include the standing rules contained in the Constitution.

The first of these points was determined by an authoritative decision of the General Assembly in 1799. The Assembly had passed a rule on the manner of receiving foreign ministers. The Presbytery of New York objected to it, among other reasons, as a contravention of the barrier

article. The Assembly, as quoted in Baird's Collection, first edition, page 23, replied as follows :

That the first reason assigned by the Presbytery of New York for their request, is founded on a misrepresentation of an ambiguous expression in the Constitution. The sixth section of the eleventh chapter is thus expressed : " Before any overtures or regulations proposed by the Assembly to be established as *standing rules*, shall be obligatory on the Churches, it shall be necessary to transmit them to all the Presbyteries, and to receive the returns of at least a majority of the Presbyteries, in writing, approving thereof." *Standing rules*, in this section, can refer only to one of the following objects : 1st. To articles of the Constitution, which, when once established, are unalterable by the General Assembly; or, 2d. To every rule or law enacted without any term of limitation expressed in the act. The latter meaning would draw after it consequences so extensive and injurious, as forbid the Assembly to give the section that interpretation. It would reduce this Assembly to a mere committee to prepare business upon which the Presbyteries might act. It would undo, with few exceptions, all the rules that have been established by this Assembly since its first institution, and would prevent it for ever from establishing any rule not limited by *the terms of the act* itself. Besides, *standing rules*, in the evident sense of the Constitution, can not be predicated of any acts made by the Assembly and repealable by it, because they are limited, in their very nature, to the duration of a year, if it please the Assembly to exert the power inherent in it at all times to alter or annul them, and they continue to be rules only by the Assembly's not using its power of repeal. The law in question is no otherwise a *standing rule* than all other laws repealable by this Assembly.

The next year, 1800, the Presbytery of Baltimore petitioned for the repeal of the same act to which the New York Presbytery had objected, until constitutionally enacted. The overture was rejected, "inasmuch as the Assembly consider the act referred to in the said overture as entirely constitutional."

In like manner, the other point, viz : that the article in question does apply to the "standing rules" contained in the Constitution, has been as authoritatively settled as the first. In 1799, the proposition was sent down to the Presbyteries to change the expression, "standing rules," into "constitutional rules," under the very authority contained in that article itself. No vote was recorded against sending

it down—no protest was entered—and no remonstrance came from any disaffected Presbytery.* The opposition was to limiting the provision to constitutional rules. The Presbytery of South Carolina expressed the opinion that it had “a principal relation to the mode or manner of altering or amending the Constitution;” but were opposed to changing the phraseology, manifestly because they were opposed to limiting it to constitutional rules. During the whole discussion, which only ended in 1805, when the change of phraseology was effected, the Assembly seem to have acted with a full and perfect conviction of their right to make changes under that clause; and, so far as the record shows, of this right there was no dispute. The meaning of no constitutional provision could be more clearly or authoritatively settled than this was; all parties consenting unto the exercise of the power as rightful, although a large minority disputed its propriety, and voted against it.

Nor was all this done in ignorance and forgetfulness of the adopting act of 1788. The subject seems to have been first broached in 1799, but it was not settled until 1805. But in 1800 the adopting act of 1788 was up for consideration, and an overture was offered and disposed of, as follows:

A motion was made and seconded, that the Assembly adopt the following resolution, viz:

Whereas, the Synod of New York and Philadelphia, at their sessions in the year 1788, after adopting the Constitution, made and recorded a resolution on the subject, which is conceived by some to be at variance with the Constitution, and by others to be of equal authority with the Constitution itself; therefore,

Resolved, That the Presbyteries instruct their commissioners to the next General Assembly on this subject, and authorize them to annul the said resolution, or to reconcile it with the Constitution.

After some discussion, the Assembly

Resolved, That it would be improper in the conclusion of the sessions, to determine an affair of such magnitude as the present appears

* “Qui tacet verbo et facto, ubi obloqui vel resistere potest ac debet, consentire videtur.”

to be; and that, therefore, it be recommended to the attention of the next General Assembly.—(See Baird's Collection, page 22.)

The subject was not resumed. We doubt not these proceedings grew out of the discussions on the petition from the Presbytery of Baltimore of that same year, alluded to above. However that may be, here we see that the whole subject was before the Church for five years before the first alterations of the Form of Government were effected. That action, therefore, could not have been had in ignorance of a law lying by in the manuscript records of the body and forgotten. This brings us,

V. To a consideration of the adopting act of 1788. Has it become obsolete, or is it still of binding force. On this subject we say,

1. That the adopting act of 1788 is the very basis of the Constitution of the Church—the very act which gives it vitality, and on which its authority rests. The Synod of New York and Philadelphia had been employed for several years in preparing the public formularies for the Church; but no vote was binding, no change was made in the accredited standards of faith and order—every thing remained as it was under the adopting act of 1729, until the passage of the act of 1788. By it the newly prepared standards were ratified and adopted as the Constitution of the Church, and were declared binding on the lower judicatories. This act, therefore, gave vitality to the Constitution itself—was the act which brought it into being.

2. It is still the law of the Church. It has never been repealed, no attempt has ever been made to repeal it. It is contended, that because it has never been acted on, in the history of the Church, it has become obsolete, and is no longer binding. But we answer, that non-user does not nullify legal enactments, much less fundamental or constitutional rights. "A statute cannot become obsolete by disuse, or by contrary usage, or any adjudication whatever," unless the legislative authority in which the power of

repeal resides, by subsequent legislation, treat it as though it had become obsolete. The Constitution of the United States gives Congress the power to determine the manner of choosing Representatives, and the time of the election of the electors of President. This power was never exercised until 1842. Did previous non-user render these laws null? The Constitution also gives Congress authority to appoint the times of the election of both Senators and Representatives, but that body has never exercised the power. Who will contend, therefore, that it does not exist? A constitutional right may lie in abeyance—but it does not therefore cease to exist. The moment there is occasion for its exercise, it is revived. On the other hand, a law passed in contravention of a fundamental enactment, is itself void, no matter how long it may have stood on the statute-book—at all events, this was good Old-School doctrine in 1837, and proved itself good law, before Judge Gibson, in 1839. The Plan of Union of 1801 had stood for thirty-six years; but it was repealed, and every thing done under it was declared null, because of its unconstitutionality. So the Assembly reasoned; and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania declared it good logic and sound law. In view of which facts, we acknowledge it sounded odd enough to hear learned divines, in the last Assembly, arguing that because a fundamental law had been lying in abeyance, it had thereby become obsolete and null. We thought such reasoning would have sounded much better in the New School Assembly, than in ours. But, moreover, the very purpose of the provision contained in the act of 1788, was to prevent a constant tinkering at the constitutional principles and established faith of the Church; to secure the Church against innovation in matters which were settled in her standards. Hence, it is, assuredly, a very marvellous argument against an enactment which was confessedly designed to secure stability in

the principles of the Church, that it has absolutely accomplished its purpose.

3. The law is unrepealable. This arises from the nature of the act. It is the act by which the Constitution was ratified, adopted, and established. Its repeal would be the repeal, also, of the Constitution, and would work the dissolution of the Church. We may, indeed, if we see proper, dissolve the Church in many ways; but we can not remain a Church and at the same time repeal the very law establishing the Constitution, and binding us together in Church communion. But it is asked, may not the power that made it unmake it again? How far this is true, in reference to vested rights, we need not discuss at present. For, even though we should grant the principle, it can meet with no available application here. For the body which passed the adopting act of 1788, in all that it did, was simply preparing to dissolve itself into its constituent elements, to meet no more for ever. The old Synod of New York and Philadelphia was composed, *de jure*, and putatively, of all the ministers and one ruling elder from every Session of the whole Presbyterian Church in the United States. The General Assembly is wholly unlike it, being entirely a representative, and not a collective, body. The original Synod, consisting of the body of the Church, assembled in the persons of her Divinely appointed rulers, dissolved itself, and can never meet again. The size of the Church and country forbid it; the Constitution makes no provision for it, but makes many against it; and the impossibility of the Church longer continuing to meet, as it had done, in General Synod, was the very cause of the adoption of the present Constitution.

4. The law has neither been buried nor forgotten. Two or three speakers told us this, in the last Assembly; but the records of the Church show them all to be mistaken; yea, that every change ever effected in our Book was made with this law fresh in the memory of the Church. The first

changes effected in our Form of Government were discussed from 1799 until 1805, when the vote of the Presbyteries was given confirming them. But in 1800 this act of 1788 was discussed by the Assembly; and an effort was made, by those who contended that the Constitution and it conflicted, to have the sense of the Presbyteries taken on the subject. The minute in the case we have already quoted. The next changes were made in 1821, being sent down to the Presbyteries in 1820. But the first Assembly's Digest was printed sufficiently early in 1820 to be lying on the table of the Assembly, and in the hands of the members, when that body met; and in it the act of 1788 is given in full, the important parts being printed in capital or italic letters. The third and last occasion on which any change was effected was in 1833. But in 1832, in answering the question, "Whether the Catechisms, Larger and Shorter, are to be considered as a portion of the standards of our Church, and are comprehended in the words, 'Confession of Faith of this Church?'" the Assembly refer to "the adopting act of our Confession," for the authority of the Catechisms as a part of our standards; and they quote the act almost entire. (See Baird's Collection, p. 17.) Finally, in 1843, a proposition was made to alter our Confession on "the marriage question;" which was referred to a committee, who, in 1844, reported; and among other things they declare that the act of 1788 is the law of the Church on the matter of changing the doctrinal standards. With all this before us, can we say that this act has ever been forgotten, or that it has become obsolete?

5. But suppose we agree that this law has become obsolete, and is no longer binding, what effect will that have on the right to make changes in our doctrinal standards? 1st. As the Constitution itself contains no clause which can be construed into a provision for altering any part of it professed to be derived from the word of God, the setting aside of the adopting act of 1788 would simply take away all

right of every kind to alter the articles of our faith. 2d. It would render the whole Constitution even more stable and binding than before; for the alteration of any of its doctrinal statements could only be effected by revolution, or an ecclesiastical *felo de se*; since any change would absolve every minister, ruling elder, and deacon, from his ordination engagements, as well as the private members from their allegiance.

VI. Here, then, we have two laws on the same general subject, enacted at the same time, and of equal obligation—the one contained in the Constitution itself, the other in the act adopting the Constitution and giving it being. This, however, would occasion no difficulty, were it not for that apparent conflict which seems to exist between their provisions. The question we now have to examine is as to whether this conflict be real, or only apparent; and whether there is any just method of reconciling their provisions. In considering these questions, it is safe for us to derive our hermeneutics from the courts of law and the bar, thus obtaining the aid of that noble profession, which had its origin in the glorious uncertainty of the law, occasioned by the imperfection of human legislation and human language; and whose chief occupation is the interpretation and construction of statutes, in order to the promotion of justice and the maintenance of our cherished rights.

That eminent jurist, Sir Wm. Blackstone, says, that “the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is, by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by *signs* the most natural and probable. And these signs are either the words, the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequence, or the spirit and reason of them all.” Moreover, in order to ascertain the intention of the legislature, the court may look to the object in view, the remedy intended to be afforded, and the mischief intended to be remedied. In view of these general principles, the object of which is to gain a knowledge of the

intent of the legislative power, the courts of law have established certain rules for the interpretation and construction of the statutes, which have been tested by experience, and sanctioned by the concurrent approbation of the English-speaking world. Such of these as are applicable to our present inquiry we insert below, as we derive them from the books. Those to which we have had access, in preparing this article, are Blackstone's Commentaries, Bouvier's edition of Bacon's Abridgment, and the United States Digest.

1st. Words are to be understood according to the *usus loquendi* at the time of the making of the statute. Hence, "where a word used in a statute has a fixed technical meaning, the legislature must be understood as employing it in that sense, unless there be something in the context which shows that it was intended to be used in a different sense."

2d. Statutes *in pari materia* are to be construed together, as though they were one law; and two statutes seemingly repugnant should be so construed that they shall both stand, and harmonize, if possible. This apparent conflict may be reconciled on any fair hypothesis, and vitality given to each, if it can be, and is necessary to conform to usages under it.

3d. If, from a view of the whole law, the intent is different from the literal import of some of its terms, the intent should prevail.

4th. If the language in different portions of the statute is inconsistent, it should be so construed as to be consistent with the leading objects of the statute.

These rules, thus given as they are acted on by courts of law, must commend themselves to the common sense of every reader. The object in every case is the same, to point out a way by which we may carry out the intention of the law in cases of obscurity, conflict, or doubt. It seems to us that the application of these rules will enable

us to escape from the apparent difficulty in the construction of our own laws, which have occasioned this article. Let us look at this point a little.

If we have been successful in what we have attempted, we have shown that our barrier article was originally inserted with reference to constitutional rules or regulations; that this construction of it was early given by an authoritative decision of the Assembly, and was ratified by a vote of the Presbyteries, changing the phraseology in accordance therewith; and that it has uniformly been acted on by the Church during her whole history. All these points may be considered settled; and hence the construction of that article of the Constitution can no longer be viewed as an open question. For, "where an old statute has received an early practical construction which, if it were *res integra*, it might be difficult to maintain, it will be adhered to, especially if great mischief would follow a contrary construction." So that, even though the construction given to our first barrier article be such that we could not maintain it now, we are compelled to adhere to it; because it was made by the proper authority, and has been practically carried out ever since; and the giving of a new or different construction to it would work great mischief, overturning many of the ecclesiastical regulations contained in the Constitution, and unsettling much of the action of our Church courts during the last sixty years. This, then, may be placed among the *res adjudicate*; and in our future proceedings the operation of the law ought to be in accordance with the construction it has thus received, and not in accordance with the meaning we might, at the first, have attached to the words. "*Interpretatio vim legis habitura est.*"

The case is different with the adopting act of 1788. It has never, as yet, been practically construed, since there has never been any occasion of acting on it. As the other article has had its meaning settled, the question arises, is there any method of interpretation or construction whereby

we can reconcile the provisions of the adopting act, with the construction given to the barrier article? Let us explore that act, and see whether the language employed gives us any insight into the intention of the Synod in adopting it. 1st. The books composing our Constitution are declared in that act to be adopted as "our Constitution, and the Confession of our *faith and practice*, unalterable," unless two-thirds of the Presbyteries petition for its alteration. The phrase, "faith and practice," has always been used in a specific sense by us. Thus, it is used in the question propounded at the ordination of our Church officers, as prescribed in the Form of Government, as follows: "Do you believe the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments to be the Word of God—the only infallible rule of *faith and practice*?" So, also, in the Form of Government, chapter 1, section 4, it is declared that "there is an inseparable connection between *faith and practice*, truth and duty." And in the seventh section of the same chapter, it is said, "that the Holy Scriptures are the only rule of faith and manners;" an equivalent expression. In the Confession of Faith, chapter 1, section 2, after giving the names of the canonical books of the Bible, it is said of them: "all which are given by inspiration of God, to be the rule of faith and life;" an expression, likewise, of equivalent import. Here, then, we have an expression in the adopting act which is always used in our formularies, and in the common speech of our ministers and people, with reference to the doctrines and duties enjoined in the Scriptures. When "peculiar phrases are made use of, it must be supposed that the legislature have in view the subject-matter about which such terms or phrases are commonly used." 2dly. The act in question declares our various formularies to be "our Constitution, and the *confession* of our faith and practice," etc. Now, the Church of God adopts nothing as the *confession* of her faith, which she does not believe to be directly or inferentially derived from the Holy Scriptures.

3dly. After ordering the Catechisms to be printed in the same volume with the Confession of Faith and Form of Government, the Synod resolved, "that the whole be considered as the *standard* of our doctrine, government and worship," etc. But the Bible is every where declared to be the only rule or standard of faith and practice. If, then, these formularies be our "standard," it is only because they are an embodiment of the teachings of the Scriptures on these various subjects. 4thly. The word "Constitution," which with us, in this land of popular sovereignty, protected by written constitutions, has acquired so definite a meaning, and always brings before our minds the idea of a written instrument, containing precise terms of agreement, was used very differently by our fathers, as it still is by our trans-atlantic brethren, who speak as confidently of the British Constitution, although unwritten, as we do of the Constitution of the United States, engrossed on parchment—yea, and the former seems destined to be the firmer and more enduring of the two. Possibly the framers of our Constitution, in imitation of the convention which had just formed a Constitution for the United States, may have given it the definite meaning which now we always attach to it. But we are of opinion this was not the case, or otherwise they would have employed a more uniform phraseology on the subject. Whereas, they use the terms, "confession," "standards" and "constitution," in this very act, almost interchangeably. Giving it, then, the sense attributed to it in the mother country, and in the "barrier act," our Constitution consists simply of those great principles of truth which the Church embraces in her faith, and illustrates in her practice, as they are embodied in her standards.

There is nothing forced in all this, as it seems to us, unless it may be deemed by any one that we have given an unjustifiable meaning to the word "Constitution," as employed in the act in question. Be that as it may, we

think no one can read over that act without seeing that its great object was to throw a protection around that faith and order of the Church which we Presbyterians believe to be derived from the Bible; to secure the Church against sudden innovation in her doctrines and polity. The language employed always looks towards matters of fundamental importance and scriptural obligation—to “faith and practice,” to the “confession” of our doctrines, and to the establishment of a “standard” for the Church in the four particulars of belief, and worship, and discipline, and polity. None of the terms employed in this act could be construed so as to conflict with the barrier article, had it been inserted as a limitation of the act, by way of a proviso. The fact that it is inserted in the place it properly belongs—*i. e.*, in the chapter defining the powers of the General Assembly—ought not to widen its meaning, or cause a conflict between it and the adopting act. Even if we acknowledge that there is not only an apparent but real conflict between it and the adopting act, the most that can be said is, that it is an exception to that act. The act is the general law, and the article is the particular exception. But since “*exceptio probat regulam*,” the main law must prevail in every case not expressly included within the exception.

VII. The construction we have contended for ought to prevail, because it accords with the nature of the subjects to which these laws apply. We hold that there is no equality in fact, nor in the eyes of the people, between the faith and order of the Church, in the principles thereof, on the one hand, and those rules and regulations prescribed for the conduct of ecclesiastical affairs, on the other.

1st. They are derived from different sources. Nothing can be a matter of faith which is not revealed by God. Creeds and confessions, and articles of belief, are all declarations of the conviction of those who adhere to them, as to what God has revealed to us, for our salvation, and for our orderly living as his followers, in Church fellowship. We

hold, then, that the doctrines of the Church, and the principles of its order, contained in our standards, are from God; and, hence, that they vary not. We may, indeed, err in deducting, interpreting, and declaring the Divine will; but God's revelation, rightly understood, is unchangeable. But the rules of ecclesiastical procedure, and the general regulations of the Church, are committed to earthen vessels; they originate in human wisdom and prudence—they are the product of human experience and necessity—and, of course, they ought to be changed, as the circumstances and the varying necessities of the Church may demand. The same rules and regulations are not applicable to all countries; nor are they suitable during all times in any one country.

2d. They are received by the Church in a different sense. We are required "sincerely to receive and adopt the Confession of Faith of this Church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures." The General Assembly of 1832 decided that, according to the adopting act of 1788, the expression, "confession of faith," had a wider meaning than we attribute to it as the name of the first part of the Constitution. Hence, in the question above, as given in our Book, the capital letters were not used, as they would be, were it a proper name. It is manifest that the adopting act, by the expression, "confession of our faith," meant to include the whole Constitution, in so far as doctrine is concerned. Indeed, the two words are used as synonymous: it is called "our Constitution and the Confession of our Faith." In accordance with this use of the words in that act, our Book has always been called "the Constitution of the Presbyterian Church," on the title-page; and the "Confession of Faith," as the endorsement, on the back of the bound volume. In this sense, then, we adopt the system of faith contained in our standards. On the other hand, we simply declare that we "approve of the government and discipline of the Presbyterian Church."

Not the principles of Church polity merely; for they are contained summarily in the Confession of Faith; and even if we limit the previous declaration to what is contained in that formulary, the doctrine of the Church, and its ordinances, with the powers and prerogatives of Church officers and judicatories, belong to the "system of doctrine" contained in it. We are, therefore, by this declaration, required to approve of the practical application of these principles, and the administration thereof, as prescribed in our standards. All of this is human in its origin and practice. We approve of it, believing that it is consistent with the Word of God; but not believing that no other regulations are allowable, or would answer the ends of the Church in the discharge of her great duties. In a word, what is scriptural we adopt; what is human and prudential, though designed to carry out the requirements of the Scriptures, we simply "*approve.*"

3d. The Church, during her whole history, has treated them differently. For more than two hundred years, the Church of Scotland has reverently preserved and constantly adhered to the Westminster standards, without alteration, and without any attempt to effect any change whatsoever. These standards, however, unlike ours, do not contain any of the ecclesiastical rules and regulations, such as we have included in ours. These last, however, have been with them the subject of constant change and amendment. So with us, the Westminster Confession of Faith, and all the doctrinal parts of our other standards, remain unchanged, at the end of more than seventy years from their first adoption; and but a single change was ever attempted, viz: in 1816. It failed, and, as to the manner of it, was utterly unconstitutional. But the standing rules contained in these formularies have met with several alterations, in the years 1805, 1821, and 1833, respectively. That these respective parts of our Constitution occupy a different position in the mind of the Church, is manifest from this

constant amending of the one, and the permanence and stability of the other.

4. They are revered in a different degree by the Church. The very statement of this point is all that is needed. Why need we argue that the Church loves her faith as she does not the mere regulations pertaining to ecclesiastical administration? The rules of Church action may be altered and amended so as to promote the conveniency of Church courts, the despatch of business, and the ends of discipline, a hundred times, as they have been, we suppose, in Scotland; and yet how few can tell that this has been done, or what effect does it produce on the Church, unless it be in its increased efficiency? But let one change be attempted in the great doctrines of grace, transmitted from generation to generation, in her Westminster Confession and Catechisms, and one universal wail of alarm, amidst a spontaneous shout of execration, would come up from every hill and dale and city, from hamlet and cottage and palace—from the whole heart of Scotland. Let a motion be made to dispense with ruling elders, and to appoint Episcopal moderators, and immediately the Banner of the Covenant would be once more unfurled to the breeze, and the descendants of the martyrs and reformers of the old Scotch Kirk would fight as valiantly for Christ's Crown to-day, as their fathers did when arrayed against popery, prelacy and independency, two hundred years ago. Go tell our own people that you are going to make some change in the size of the General Assembly, or in the law of representation, or in any regulation merely prudential, and, ten chances to one, they will not care a stiver about it; these are simple matters of Church action, which from the necessity of the case must be determined, in large part, with reference to the conveniency of the Church courts, or otherwise that of Church officers, and the people are willing they should determine for themselves. But go and tell them that you are about

to strike from the Confession of Faith any of the doctrines peculiar to our system, or to alter any of the leading principles of our polity, in favor of popery, prelacy, or Congregationalism, and you would soon discover that many a venerable Presbyterian lady would be ready to throw her footstool at the lug of the preacher who should dare to come into her beloved Presbyterian meeting-house with any of his idolatrous ceremonies and popish gear, and that the keys of many a house of worship would be turned against the intruder who should dare to come to them with these sham doctrines, instead of the old faith of their fathers, which they have been taught in their childhood by their now sainted parents, which they have believed unto the saving of their souls, and in the living power of which they mean to die. In short, rebellion would be rife in all our Churches; and it would be found that, if need be, Presbyterianism is still the stuff out of which martyrs are made.

Now, the construction we have placed on the two laws with reference to amending our Book, precisely corresponds with the relative importance of the various subjects to which they refer, as the Church at large esteems them. Whether or not we have given them the proper construction, some may doubt; but certainly the law on this subject ought to make as broad a difference as we have contended for between matters merely human, and those professedly based on the Divine Word.

VIII. The wisdom of the provision, thus interpreted, none can question. There is a natural division of the Constitution into two parts:

1st. There are those parts of it which relate to the faith of the Church, and to the principles of its organization, in the various books, chapters, and sections. These are by no means the property of the officers and judicatories of the Church; but every private member has as deep an interest in the preservation of them as any Church ruler, whether

minister or elder. These doctrines and principles enter into the very life of the Church, and take hold on the minds and hearts of her people, as the sheet-anchor of their hopes and the palladium of their rights. Every proposition for an alteration of these parts of our Constitution ought to come from those Church courts which can most nearly and correctly represent the popular will. As we have contended, the proposition for a change must originate with the Presbyteries; and the General Assembly has no power to act on the subject, until two-thirds of the Presbyteries concur in sending up a memorial to that body requesting it to take action. First of all, the Presbyteries must move on the subject. The Christian people of our communion must decide, in the first place, through their ministers and ruling elders. Or, if these begin agitating any questions of reform, their own people are the first who have a right to know it; and who would know it, under this rule. And whenever the people of our Presbyterian Church become so thoroughly satisfied that our standards need to be improved, by change of phraseology or otherwise, that two-thirds of our Presbyteries shall send up memorials to the General Assembly requesting the change, we shall agree that it be done. For then it will be certain that either our Constitution is wrong, or that the Church has become so estranged in doctrine that the minority ought to know it.

2dly. There are those parts which relate to the practical administration of ecclesiastical affairs. These receive comparatively but little attention from the people; who are willing to leave them to their rulers, without manifesting or feeling much interest in the question. The Church judicatories are more affected by them than the people; indeed, the people are only remotely affected by them at all, since all their own rights are preserved intact by the other law. It is hence very proper, and every way suitable, that changes in these respects should be proposed by the General Assembly, where their necessity can be best known.

Moreover, as no matter of faith and no principle of polity can be thus involved, it is right that the vote of a majority of the Presbyteries should be decisive.

Hence, according to our position, the faith and rights of the Church are preserved in the hands of the Presbyteries intact, and can never be touched by the General Assembly, until the courts below have acted. This secures the stability of the Church and the permanence of her Confession. No movement to change or amend her formularies can be successful, unless the feeling in its favor be deep-seated and wide-spread, and its manifestation be general and spontaneous.

But we must close. We have contended, throughout this article, that every movement for the amendment of the Confession of Faith, and the principles of our Church order, must originate with the Presbyteries; and that the General Assembly has no right to take any action on the subject, until it receives a petition or memorial from two-thirds of the Presbyteries, requesting it to do so. If, then, our respected brethren of the Synod of Philadelphia, or of any of its Presbyteries, are seriously of the opinion that the chapter on marriage needs amendment, let them procure the passage of a memorial suggesting the change they desire, through some Presbytery, and let that Presbytery send it to all the other Presbyteries for their concurrence. If two-thirds of the Presbyteries unite in the petition, and the General Assembly shall make the change, although we shall cast an earnest vote against it, we shall cheerfully submit, at all events, so long as no effort is made by our brethren to strike the principle in question from the Bible.

ARTICLE IV.

PRINCETON REVIEW, ART. VI., JULY, 1860.

When Milo was prosecuted for the murder of Clodius, Cicero appeared as his counsel, but the great orator was so intimidated by the turbulence of the crowd and the array of soldiers whom Pompey had introduced into the forum, that his presence of mind forsook him, and instead of the splendid defence which was expected from him, he made a miserable and disgraceful failure. His unfortunate client was condemned and sent into exile. Partly to soothe his wounded vanity, and partly as a token of sympathy with his friend, Cicero subsequently wrote out and transmitted to Milo the oration which he ought to have delivered, and which Milo congratulated himself was not delivered, as it would probably have saved him from banishment, and deprived him of the luxury of the luscious fish he was then enjoying at Marseilles.

Dr. Hodge, of course, was not intimidated in the last Assembly by any of the circumstances which frightened the Roman orator, and yet he certainly failed, as signally as Cicero, to deliver the kind of speech which was expected from him. Conscious of the fact, upon his return home, he retires to his study, reviews his ground, undertakes to retrieve his misfortunes, and the result is the article before us; which may, therefore, be accepted as a revised edition of the speech which he ought to have delivered. It is something worse than an effusion of mortification. It has the marks of a spiteful ebullition of resentment. Its distortions of our opinions are so persistent and perverse, that charity itself can hardly be persuaded that they are not wilful; and the personal insinuations are so ungenerous that it is impossible to attribute them to accident. The

want of candor and of manly fairness is so conspicuous that we hesitated, for a time, whether we ought to take any notice of an antagonist, who seemed to hold himself free from the most sacred obligations of refined and honorable controversy. We confess that the article gave us great pain. We have been the more wounded, because we have been taken by surprise. As soon as we had reason to believe that we had said any thing in the last Assembly personally offensive to Dr. Hodge, we made a public and cordial explanation. We were under the impression that our explanation had been accepted. We bade him farewell with nothing but feelings of personal kindness in our heart. During our absence from the country, we had occasion to pay more than one tribute to his worth, as a scholar, a teacher, and a divine, and we did it warmly and earnestly. We had no suspicion of the state of things in relation to ourselves that existed in his mind. It never entered our heads that while we were contributing to his great reputation, and deservedly great reputation, abroad, we were the object of little passions and resentments in his breast, at home, which, we think, reflect no honor upon the magnanimity of the man, to say nothing of the generosity of the Christian. In our estimate of the animus of this article, we have not relied upon our own judgment. We have been fortified by the opinions of brethren whose opinions we respect, some in this, and others in distant States, and they have all concurred in representing it as bearing upon its face the marks of being prompted by wounded pride and personal resentment.

However our personal relations to Dr. Hodge may be affected, nothing shall tempt us to do injustice to his real excellence. He is a scholar, "aye, a ripe and a good one," a critic and an expositor of preëminent abilities. His commentaries are an honor to the Church and to the country. In the departments suited to his genius, he has no superior. But there are departments to which he is not adapted.

Whether it be that Dr. Hodge has never been a pastor, and knows little of the actual working of our system, or whether his mind is of an order that refuses to deal with the practical and concrete, it so happens that he has never touched the questions connected with the nature and organization of the Church without being singularly unhappy. It would be invidious to mention illustrations. The article before us will furnish proof, without going beyond it.

In replying to it, we shall reduce our remarks to two general heads: I. Strictures upon Dr. Hodge's representation of the debate in the last Assembly; and, II. An examination of his revised theory of Presbyterianism.

I. Under the first head we shall consider three things: 1. His statement of the precise point at issue; 2. His charge that, in the conduct of the debate, we evaded the issue; and, 3. His review of our objections to the theory of Presbyterianism, which he broached in the Assembly.

1. As to the precise point at issue, Dr. Hodge is mistaken in supposing that we denied absolutely *all* discretion to the Church. We contended that, as a positive institution, with a written charter, she was confined to the express or implied teachings of the Word of God, the standard of her authority and rights; that, as in the sphere of doctrine she had no opinions, but a faith, so, in the sphere of practice, she had no expedients, but a law. Her power was solely ministerial and declarative. Her whole duty was to believe and obey. We, of course, insisted, in conformity with this view, that whatever is not commanded, expressly or implicitly, is unlawful. We repudiated the doctrine that whatever is not forbidden is allowable. According to our view, the law of the Church is the positive one of conformity with Scripture: according to the view which we condemned, it is the negative one of non-contradiction to Scripture. According to us, the Church, before she can move, must not only show that she is not prohibited; she must also show that she is actually commanded: she must produce a

warrant. Hence, we absolutely denied that she has any discretion in relations to things not commanded. She can proclaim no laws that Christ has not ordained, institute no ceremonies which He has not appointed, create no offices which He has not prescribed, and exact no obedience which He has not enjoined. She does not enter the wide domain which He has left indifferent, and by her authority bind the conscience where He has left it free.

But does it follow, from this, that she has absolutely no discretion at all? On the contrary, we distinctly and repeatedly asserted that, in the sphere of commanded things, she *had* a discretion—a discretion determined by the nature of the actions, and by the Divine principle that all things be done decently, in order. This assertion is found in the report of our speech on page 362 of the July number of this journal. It is implied in the report of the same speech in the *Princeton Review* of the same month. It is wrong, therefore, to say that we excluded “*all discretionary power*” in the Church. We only limited and defined it. We never denied that the Church has a right to fix the hours of public worship, the times and places of the meeting of her courts, the numbers of which they shall be composed, and the territories which each shall embrace. Our doctrine was precisely that of the Westminster Standards, of John Calvin, of John Owen, the Free Church of Scotland, and the noble army of Puritan martyrs and confessors. “The whole counsel of God,” say the Westminster divines, “concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture: unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or by traditions of men.”* This is clearly our doctrine of the law of positive conformity with Scripture as the measure

* Conf. Faith, chap. i., § 6.

of the Church's duty. Again: "God alone is lord of the conscience, and hath left us free from the doctrines and commandments of men which are in any thing contrary to His word, *or beside it*, in matters of faith or worship."* Here we are clearly taught that the silence of Scripture is as real a prohibition, as a positive injunction to abstain. Where God has not commanded, the Church has no jurisdiction. Now, as to the real nature of her discretion: "Nevertheless," says this venerable Formulary, in continuation of the section from which our first extract has been taken, "nevertheless, we acknowledge the inward illumination of the Spirit of God to be necessary for the saving understanding of such things as are revealed in the Word; and *there are some circumstances concerning the worship of God, and government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the Word, which are always to be observed.*" Here the discretion is limited to *some circumstances*, and those *common to human actions and societies*. Now, the question arises, What is the nature of these circumstances? A glance at the proof-texts on which the doctrine relies, enables us to answer. Circumstances are those concomitants of an action without which it either can not be done at all, or can not be done with decency and decorum. Public worship, for example, requires public assemblies, and in public assemblies people must appear in some costume, and assume some posture. Whether they shall shock common sentiment in their attire, or conform to common practice; whether they shall stand, sit, or lie, or whether each shall be at liberty to determine his own attitude—these are circumstances: they are necessary concomitants of the action, and the Church is at liberty to regulate them. Public assemblies, moreover, can not be held without fixing the time and place of meeting: these, too, are circumstances

* Conf. Faith, chap. xx., § 2.

which the Church is at liberty to regulate. Parliamentary assemblies can not transact their business with efficiency and dispatch—indeed, can not transact it decently at all, without committees. Committees, therefore, are circumstances common to parliamentary societies, which the Church, in her parliaments, is at liberty to appoint. All the details of our government in relation to the distribution of courts, the number necessary to constitute a quorum, the times of their meeting, the manner in which they shall be opened, all these, and such like, are circumstances, which, therefore, the Church has a perfect right to arrange. We must carefully distinguish between those circumstances which attend actions as actions, that is, without which the actions could not be, and those circumstances, which though not essential, are added as appendages. These last do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Church. She has no right to appoint them. They are circumstances in the sense that they do not belong to the substance of the act. They are not circumstances in the sense that they so surround it that they cannot be separated from it. A liturgy is a circumstance of this kind—as also the sign of the cross in baptism, and bowing at the name of Jesus. Owen notes the distinction.*

Calvin's view of the nature and limitation of the discretion of the Church, is exactly the same as that of the Westminster standards.†

“We have, therefore,” says Calvin, “a most excellent and sure mark to distinguish between these impious constitutions, (by which, as we have said, true religion is overthrown, and conscience subverted,) and the legitimate observances of the Church, if we remember that one of two things, or both together, are always intended, viz: That in the sacred Assembly of the faithful, all things may be done decently, and with becoming dignity; and that human society may be maintained in order by certain bonds, as it were, of moderation and humanity.” After explaining what he means by decency and order, Calvin proceeds to remark, that, “as there is here a danger, on the one hand, lest false bishops should thence derive a pretext for

* Vol. 19, p. 437.

† Inst. IV., X., 28, 31.

their impious and tyrannical laws, and on the other, lest some, too apt to take alarm, should, from fear of the above evil, leave no place for laws, however holy; it may here be proper to declare, that I approve of those human constitutions only which are founded on the authority of God, and derived from Scripture, and are, therefore, altogether Divine. Let us take, for example, the bending of the knee, which is made in public prayer. It is asked whether this is a human tradition, which any one is at liberty to repudiate or reject? I say that it is human, and that at the same time it is Divine. It is of God, inasmuch as it is a part of that decency, the care and observance of which is recommended by the Apostles; and it is of men, inasmuch as it especially determines what was indicated in general, rather than expounded. From this one example, we may judge what is to be thought of the whole class, viz: That the whole sum of righteousness, and all the parts of Divine worship, and every thing necessary to salvation, the Lord has faithfully comprehended, and clearly unfolded in His oracles, so that in them He alone is the only Master to be heard. But as in external discipline and ceremonies, He has not been pleased to prescribe every particular that we ought to observe (He foresaw that this depended on the nature of the times, and that one form would not suit all ages), in them we must have recourse to the general rules which He has given, employing them to test whatever the necessity of the Church may require to be enjoined for order and decency." Institutes, book IV., c. 10., § 28, 30.

The notion of Calvin, and our Confession of Faith, in other words, is briefly this: In public worship, indeed, in all commanded external actions, there are two elements, a fixed and a variable. The fixed element, involving the essence of the thing, is beyond the discretion of the Church. The variable, involving only the *circumstances* of the action, its separable accidents, may be changed, modified, or altered, according to the exigencies of the case. The rules of social intercourse and of grave assemblies in different countries vary. The Church accommodates her arrangements so as not to revolt the public sense of propriety. Where people recline at their meals, she would administer the Lord's Supper to communicants in a reclining attitude. Where they sit, she would change the mode.

Dr. Cunningham, the noble principal of the Free Church College at Edinburgh, and one of the first Divines of Europe, has not scrupled, amid the light of the nineteenth century, to teach the same doctrine:

Of the views generally held by the Reformers on the subject of the organization of the Church, there are two which have been always very offensive to men of a loose and latitudinarian tendency, viz: the alleged unlawfulness of introducing into the worship and government of the Church any thing which is not positively warranted by Scripture, and the permanent, binding obligation of a particular form of Church government. The second of these principles may be regarded, in one aspect of it, as comprehended in the first. But it may be proper to make a few observations upon them separately, in the order in which they have now been stated.

The Lutheran and Anglican sections of the Reformers held a somewhat looser view upon these subjects, than was approved of by Calvin. They generally held that the Church might warrantably introduce innovations into its government and worship, which might seem fitted to be useful, provided it could not be shewn that there was any thing in Scripture which expressly prohibited or discountenanced them, thus laying the *onus probandi*, in so far as Scripture is concerned, upon those who opposed the introduction of innovations. The Calvinistic section of the Reformers, following their great master, adopted a stricter rule, and were of opinion that there were sufficiently plain indications in Scripture itself, that it was Christ's mind and will that nothing should be introduced into the government and worship of the Church, unless a positive warrant for it could be found in Scripture. This principle was adopted and acted upon by the English Puritans and the Scottish Presbyterians; and we are persuaded that it is the only true and safe principle applicable to this matter.

The principle is, in a sense, a very wide and sweeping one. But it is purely prohibitory or exclusive; and the practical effect of it, if it were fully carried out, would just be to leave the Church in the condition in which it was left by the Apostles, in so far as we have any means of information; a result, surely, which need not be very alarming, except to those who think that they themselves have very superior powers for improving and adorning the Church by their invention. The principle ought to be understood in a common-sense way, and we ought to be satisfied with reasonable evidence of its truth. Those who dislike this principle, from whatever cause, usually try to run us into difficulties, by putting a very stringent construction upon it, and thereby giving it an appearance of absurdity, or by demanding an unreasonable amount of evidence to establish it. The principle must be interpreted and explained in the exercise of common sense. One obvious modification of it is suggested in the first chapter of the Westminster Confession, where it is acknowledged "that there are some circumstances, concerning the worship of God and government of the Church, common to human actions and societies, which are to be ordered by the light of nature and Christian prudence, according to the general rules of the Word, which are always to be observed." But even this distinction between things

and circumstances cannot always be applied very certainly; that is, cases have occurred in which there might be room for a difference of opinion, whether a proposed regulation or arrangement was a distinct thing in the way of innovation, or merely a circumstance attaching to an authorized thing, and requiring to be regulated. Difficulties and differences of opinions may arise about details, even when sound judgment and good sense are brought to bear upon the interpretation and application of the principles; but this affords no ground for denying or doubting the truth or soundness of the principle itself.—(Review of Principal Tulloch's *Leaders of the Reformation*, p. 28.)

These citations are sufficient to show that the doctrine which we advocated in the General Assembly, touching the power and discretion of the Church, so far from being "a peculiar theory of Presbyterianism," is the doctrine of our standards, the doctrine of the Prince of the Reformers, and the doctrine of the soundest exponents of Presbyterianism across the waters. If we have erred, we have no reason to be ashamed of our company.

Now, what is the counter doctrine of Dr. Hodge? He holds that, beyond the positive injunctions of Scripture, the Church has a wide discretion, determined only by its positive prohibitions; that the rules of Scripture are general and regulative, and not constitutive and prescriptive—that, consequently, the Church is not restricted to any one mode of organization, but may change her forms according to the exigencies of times and circumstances. "There are fixed laws assigned by God, according to which all healthful and normal development of the body is regulated. So it is with regard to the Church. There are fixed laws in the Bible, according to which all healthful development and action of the external Church are determined. But, as within the limits of the laws which control the development of the human body there is endless diversity among different races, adapting them to different climes and modes of living, so also in the Church. It is not tied down to one particular mode of organization and action, at all times and under all circumstances."—(P. 552.) So long as the Church keeps within the limits of these general laws, she may create

new offices, erect new courts, and ordain new organs and organizations, at pleasure. The limit of her discretion is the principle of non-contradiction to Scripture. She is not bound to produce a warrant, and "thus saith the Lord," for all she does. Nay, more, she has a right to delegate her powers. She is not obliged to exercise them "through officers and organs prescribed in the Scriptures." She is competent, if she chooses, to appoint a vicar—the opposite doctrine being an element of a "peculiar theory of Presbyterianism." These are astounding pretensions—they carry in their bosoms the deadly tyranny of prelacy and popery. Dr. Hodge maintains the very same principles, only a little more extravagantly, which were maintained by Hooker, in the third book of the Ecclesiastical Polity, and he parades the same objections against us which Hooker paraded against the Puritans of his day. We want the reader distinctly to apprehend the point at issue. It is not, as Dr. Hodge represents it, whether the Church has *any* discretion—that is conceded on both sides—but what is the measure or limit of that discretion. We hold it to be the *circumstances* connected with commanded duties, and hence affirm, that whatever is not enjoined is prohibited. He holds that it pertains to actions themselves, and maintains that whatever is not prohibited is lawful. We make the Church a ministerial agent, he, a confidential agent, of God. We hold that her organization is given—he holds that her organization is developed. He holds that any system which shall realize the parity of the clergy, the rights of the people, and the unity of the Church, is a *jure divino* government; we hold, that if these principles are realized in any other way except through Presbyters and Presbyteries, the government is not scriptural. It is not our purpose to argue the question here; we only propose to put the matter in dispute in a clear light.

There are two sophistical illusions, however, in relation to this subject, which it is due to truth that we should

dispel. It is commonly said that the essential principles of Church government are laid down in the Scriptures, but not the details. These are left to human prudence and discretion. The sentence is ambiguous. General principles are of two sorts, regulative or constitutive. Regulative principles define only ends to be aimed at, or conditions to be observed—constitutive principles determine the concrete forms in which the ends are to be realized. Regulative, express the spirit—constitutive, the form, of a government. It is a regulative principle, for example, that all governments should seek the good of their subjects; it is a constitutive principle that power should be lodged in the hands of such and such officers, and dispensed by such and such courts. Regulative principles define nothing as to the mode of their own exemplification—constitutive principles determine the elements of an actual polity. When, therefore, it is said that only the general principles of Church government are laid down in the Scripture, and not the details, if the allusion is to constitutive principles, the sentence is perfectly just—it conveys precisely the truth. The essential principles, in that case, mean nothing more nor less than the positive prescriptions of Scripture in relation to the office-bearers and the courts of the Church; the details mean those circumstances, common to human actions and societies, which it is confessedly within the province of the Church to regulate. If the allusion is to regulative principles, which prescribe the end without condescending to the means, which convey nothing definite as to the mode of concrete realization, then the proposition is certainly false—the Scriptures descend to what, in that case, would have to be considered as details. We signalize the ambiguity, in order that our readers may not be deceived by words. Dr. Hodge means by *general principles*, regulative laws. Presbyterian writers generally, mean what we have called constitutive principles. The circumstance, therefore, that any one limits the teaching of Scripture, as to Church

government, to general principles, to the exclusion of details, is no presumption that he agrees with Dr. Hodge. We have often done it, and expect often to do it again, but we always mean by general principles, those which are constitutive and prescriptive. We believe that the New Testament has put the permanent government of the Church in the hands of Presbyters, and of Presbyters alone, and that she has no power to create any other spiritual office—this is one general principle—prescriptive, and not simply regulative. We believe that the New Testament requires these Presbyters to constitute parliamentary assemblies, and that the power of rule is lodged in these courts—this is another general principle—also prescriptive, and not regulative, and the Church has no right to ordain any other spiritual court but a Presbytery. But when it comes to the actual constitution of these courts, the number of Presbyters that shall compose them, the territories embraced in their jurisdiction, the times and places of their meeting, these are details—circumstances without which the existence and action of the courts become impossible—and, as circumstances inseparable from the commanded duties, they are discretionary. Hence, this form of expression creates no manner of presumption against the doctrine which we have maintained. Upon Dr. Hodge's theory, we can have other spiritual officers beside those specifically designated in Scripture; we can have other courts beside those composed exclusively of Presbyters. As long as we do not violate the equality of the clergy, nor exclude the people, nor break the unity of the Church, we may organize as largely and as freely as the times may seem to demand.

The other illusion is, that our doctrine reduces the Church to something like Jewish bondage. Dr. Hodge affirms that "it makes the Gospel dispensation, designed for the whole world, more restricted and slavish than the Jewish, although it was designed for only one nation, and for a limited period."

(P. 518.) Other speakers in the Assembly indulged in the same idle declamation. The simple question is, What was the bondage of the Jewish dispensation? Did it consist in the subjection of the people to the Divine will? Was that their grievous and intolerable burden, that they were bound in all things to regulate their worship by the Divine Word? Is God's authority a yoke so heavy, that we sigh until we can throw it off? One would think that it was the great advantage of the Jews, that they knew their worship was acceptable, because it was prescribed. Moses evidently regarded it as a singular favor, that the Lord was nigh to them, and directed them in all their ways. He knew nothing of that freedom which counts every man a slave who is not permitted to walk in the light of his own eyes, and after the imagination of his own heart. Jewish bondage did not consist in the principle, that the positive revelation of God was the measure of duty—that was its light and its glory—but in the *nature of the things enjoined*. It was the minuteness and technicality of the ritual, the cumbersome routine of services, the endless rites and ceremonies—these constituted the yoke from which Christ delivered His people. He did not emancipate us from the guidance and authority of God; He did not legitimate any species of will-worship; but He prescribed a worship simple and unpretending, a worship in spirit and in truth. God's will is as much our law and our glory as it was to the Jews; but God's will now terminates upon easy and delightful services. Those who contend that all things must be done by a Divine warrant, can be charged with putting a yoke upon the necks of Christian people only upon the supposition, that the worship commanded in the Gospel is analogous to the worship of the law. The truth is, that the only worship which approaches to bondage is among those who hold the principle of Dr. Hodge. Prelacy and Popery have their ritual and their ceremonies; but Puritans, the world over, have been conspicuous for the simplicity of their

forms. They have stood fast in the freedom wherewith Christ hath made them free, and have cheerfully gone to the gibbet and the stake, rather than be entangled again in a yoke of ceremonial bondage.

Before we close this part of the subject, there is one statement of Dr. Hodge, in relation to the Puritans, so extraordinary that we must advert to it for a moment :

Dr. Thornwell told us that the Puritans rebelled against the doctrine that what is not forbidden in Scripture is allowable. It was against the theory of liberty of discretion, he said, our fathers raised their voices and their arms. We always had a different idea of the matter. We supposed that it was in resistance to this very doctrine of inferences they poured out their blood like water.—(P. 666.)

When we first read this remarkable passage, we rubbed our eyes, and thought we must be mistaken. It is so flagrantly untrue that we can not imagine how Dr. Hodge has been deceived. We have not been able to lay our hands upon a single Puritan Confession of Faith, nor a single Puritan writer, having occasion to allude to the subject, who has not explicitly taught that necessary inferences from Scripture are of equal authority with its express statements. The *principle of inference* they have unanimously affirmed. Our own Confession of Faith—and surely that is a Puritan document—does it, in a passage already cited. “The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for His own glory, man’s salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or, by good and necessary consequence, may be deduced from Scripture.” Without going into a paroxysm of quotations upon so plain a point, we shall content ourselves with a short extract from Neal, which shows that Dr. Hodge is not only out in this matter, but in several others pertaining to these illustrious men.

“It was agreed,” says the historian, in contrasting the court reformers and the Puritans, “it was agreed by all that the Holy Scriptures are a perfect rule of faith ; but the bishops and court reformers did not allow them a standard of discipline or Church government, but affirmed that our Saviour and His Apostles left it to the discretion of the civil

magistrate, in those places where Christianity should obtain, to accommodate the government of the Church to the policy of the State. But the Puritans apprehended the Holy Scriptures to be a standard of Church discipline as well as doctrine; at least, that nothing should be imposed as necessary but what was expressly contained in or derived from them by necessary consequence. * * * * The Puritans were for keeping close to the Scriptures in the main principles of Church government, and for admitting no Church officers and ordinances, but such as are appointed therein."—(Vol. I., pp. 101, 102, Tegg's edition. London: 1837.)

As to the Scotch Reformers, Hetherington* emphatically testifies that, "regarding the Sacred Scriptures as the supreme authority in all matters pertaining to religion, and the Lord Jesus Christ as the only Head and King of the Church, the Scottish Reformers deemed it reasonable to expect in the code of laws given by their Divine King enough to guide them in every thing relating to His kingdom. But, while they were men of undoubting faith, they were also men of strong intellect. Faith directed them to the Word of God, as their only and all-sufficient rule; but that Word bade them in understanding be men. They dared, therefore, to conclude that Divine authority might be rightfully claimed, not only for the direct statements contained in the Scriptures, but also for whatsoever could be deduced from Scripture by just and necessary inference. Taking Scripture truths as axiomatic principles and admitted premises, they boldly and manfully exercised their reason in tracing out the consequences involved in and flowing from these truths."

It is true that the Puritans discarded the kind of inferences which Dr. Hodge has mentioned. But the discarding of a false inference, and the discarding of the principle of inference, are two very different things. The best principles may be perversely applied. They discarded, also, Pelagian and Arminian interpretations of Scripture. Does it follow that they discarded the principle of interpreting Scripture at all? Because they denied that the command to be subject unto the higher powers taught the doctrine of passive obedience, does it follow that they also denied that the immateriality of God could be rightly inferred from the spirituality? It was only false inferences that they rejected, as they rejected, also, false interpretations; but legitimate inferences were as valid as legitimate expo-

* *Hist. Ch. Scot. I.*, p. xv., *Edin. Ed.*, 1848.

sitions. But how were men to judge of the soundness of an inference? Exactly as they judged of the soundness of an interpretation. Both were functions of the reason, enlightened by the Holy Ghost—men might err in either case, and in both they might reach the truth.

Dr. Hodge tells us, further, that the Puritans resisted the corruptions of worship introduced by the Prelatists, on the ground, that these corruptions rested only on inferences. History tells us that they resisted on the ground that they were not commanded in Scripture, and could not, therefore, be enjoined by any human authority. "The principle," we use the words of Neal,* "upon which the Bishops justified their severities against the Puritans, was the subjects' obligation to obey the laws of their country in all things indifferent, which are neither commanded nor forbidden by the law of God."

Dr. Hodge waxes warm and valiant as he contemplates the dangers of the doctrine of inferences. Dungeons and racks rise before his troubled imagination, and he is prepared to die like a hero, rather than yield an inch to the implied authority of God. "It was fetters forged from inferences our fathers broke, and we, their children, will never suffer them to be rewelded. There is as much difference between this extreme doctrine of Divine right, this idea that every thing is forbidden which is not commanded, as there is between this free and exultant Church of ours and the mummied forms of mediæval Christianity." This is really spirited—the only thing which it lacks is sense. The idea, that if the Church is restricted exclusively to the Divine Word, and to necessary deductions from it, if she is made a ministerial, and not a confidential, agent of God, she will become a tyrant and an oppressor, is so preposterously absurd, that a statement of the proposition is a sufficient refutation. Is the law of God tyranny? and

* Vol. I., p. 108.

does man become a slave by being bound to obey it? Is not obedience to God the very essence of liberty, and is not the Church most divinely free when she most perfectly fulfills His will? What is that has made this free, exultant Church of ours, but the sublime determination to hear no voice but the voice of the Master? and what made the mummied forms of mediæval Christianity, but the very principle of the Princeton Doctor, that the Church has a large discretion? She claimed the right to command where God had not spoken—she made void his law, and substituted her own authority and inventions. We love freedom as dearly as Dr. Hodge, and it is because we love the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, that we renounce and abhor the detestable principle of Prelatists, Popes, and loose Presbyterians, that whatever is not forbidden is lawful. The Church may be very wise, but God is wiser.

Dr. Hodge's imagination is haunted with the vision of swarms of inferences, like the locusts of Egypt, darkening and destroying the prosperity of the Church, if the principle of inference is allowed at all. But who is to make these inferences, and who has authority to bind them upon the conscience of the people? We have no Prelates, no Pope. We acknowledge no authority but the authority of God, sealed to our consciences by His own Spirit, speaking through His own Word, and dispensed through officers whom we have freely chosen. Who is to impose inferences which the Christian understanding repudiates? The Church, as a whole, must accept them before they can have the force of law, and if there is tyranny, the people are their own tyrants. Precisely the same kind of sophistry may be employed against all creeds and confessions. If we cannot *reason* from the Word of God without trespassing upon freedom of conscience, we cannot expound it. The instrument which we employ in both cases is the same, and he that begins with denying the authority of legitimate inferences, cannot stop short of renouncing all creeds.

Although our design has not been to argue the point in dispute betwixt Dr. Hodge and ourselves, yet we think that enough has been said, not only to indicate what that point really is, but what are also the *fontes solutionum*. We have marked the fallacies to which the Doctor has resorted, exposed the blunders into which he has fallen, and vindicated ourselves from the charge of being out of harmony with the great teachers of Presbyterian and Puritan Theology. We stand upon the principle that whatsoever is not commanded is forbidden. The Church, like the Government of the United States, is a positive institution, with positive grants of power, and whatever is not given is *withheld*.

The question concerning limits to the discretionary power of the Church, is the pivot upon which the question concerning the lawfulness of the Boards revolves. If she is restricted to the circumstantialia of commanded things, she must be able to show that Boards belong to this category, being evidently not commanded things themselves, or she must renounce the right to appoint them. Committees are obviously lawful, because they are circumstances common to all parliamentary bodies, and indispensable to their orderly and efficient conduct of business.

2. We come now to notice the charge of Dr. Hodge, that, in our reply to him, in the last Assembly, we evaded the only point which was properly at issue, and confined ourselves almost exclusively to attempting to prove that the brother from Princeton was no Presbyterian. It is a pity that we suffered our souls to be vexed about so personal a matter. The brother himself has saved us the trouble of any future concern. The article before us contains his matured opinions, and, as we shall soon have occasion to show, if he had written it for the express purpose of revolutionizing the Church, he could not more completely have contradicted her standards without renouncing the very name, Presbyterian. But to the point immediately in hand. Our reply, as to aim and purpose, was precisely what it should have

been, according to the rules of fair and honorable debate. It will be remembered that, in our opening speech, we had distinctly asserted that the question concerning the lawfulness of Boards resolved itself into another question, concerning the nature and organization of the Church—that the differences of opinion upon the one subject were only reflections of analogous differences upon the other. We proceeded to indicate two types of opinion in regard to the Constitution of the Church which he had reason to believe prevailed. According to one type, which we characterized as a strictly *jure divino* theory, God has given us a government, as truly as He has given us a doctrine. He has left nothing to human discretion but the circumstances, the things common to human actions and societies. According to the other, He has ordained government in general, but no one government in particular. He has laid down the laws—the regulative principles by which a government must be organized—but He has left it to human wisdom to make the organization, by determining the elements, and the mode of their combination. This class gave a large margin to the discretion of the Church. As the question concerning Boards is a question concerning the discretion of the Church, and as the question concerning the discretion of the Church is a question concerning the nature of her organization, the debate was obliged to turn upon the true theory of Church government. That became the first issue. Dr. Hodge, in his speech, accepted this issue, and accordingly levelled his batteries against our *jus divinum* scheme. He knew that if he could overthrow that, all went with it. In contrast, he developed his own scheme, a scheme upon which the Boards were perfectly defensible. In reply, we undertook to demolish his scheme, and to illustrate the superiority of our own. Where was there any evasion of the issue here? If the attempt to demolish his scheme is to be construed into the attempt to prove that he is no Presbyterian, then his attempt to

demolish ours was equally an assault upon us. We were compelled to show that his principles were not Presbyterian, or abandon the whole point in debate. No other course was left us. The real grief is, not that we evaded the issue, but that we stuck to it closely. The arrow went to the heart. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ?*

3. Let us now notice the Doctor's review of our objections to his scheme of Presbyterianism. That scheme, as detailed in the Assembly, and as now developed in the article before us, embraces four propositions: 1. The indwelling of the Spirit, as the source of the attributes and prerogatives of the Church; 2. The parity of the clergy; 3. The right of the people to take part in government; and, 4. The unity of the Church. Dr. Hodge represents us as having denied that the first proposition was true, and the other three *fundamental*. He is not precisely accurate in either statement. What we really assailed, was the unqualified dictum, that where the Spirit is, there is the Church. The Spirit may be in individuals, or in families, or in societies, without giving to them the attributes and prerogatives of the Church. It is universally true, that where the Spirit is *not*, *there* there is no Church, but it is not universally true, that where the Spirit is, *there* is the Church. Some thing beside the indwelling of the Holy Ghost is necessary to convert a collection of believers into a Church. A dozen men may meet for purposes of prayer, and Jesus may be present in His Spirit to bless them—they may meet stately and regularly—but all this does not make them a Church. There is an outward as well as an inward, order established by law—an organization, imposed by authority, which is the condition of the healthful development of life, but not the product of that life. The outward God has adjusted to the inward, as the body to the soul. Neither springs from the other—they coexist according to a preëstablished harmony. The Word reveals the outward—the Spirit imparts the inward. Spiritual

impulses do not *generate* the Church—they only *correspond* to it. The Church was made for them, as the world of sense was made for the body. The Spirit, as a principle of life, therefore, is not the *source* of the attributes and prerogatives of the Church. A society that claims to be the Church must show some thing more than the possession of the Spirit. The Reformers always pleaded some thing more in their own behalf. They always insisted that they had the *ministry* and *ordinances*, that is, in its main features, the external order, which Christ appointed. Without the Word, without the positive appointments of the King, without a constitution made to our hands, and adapted to our spiritual needs, we should have succeeded about as well in framing a Church, even with the help of regulative principles, from our spiritual life, as the soul would have succeeded in framing a body for itself. We never could have risen above the level of Quakerism. No body of men is a Church without the Spirit. That is admitted. Every body of men is a Church with the Spirit. That is a very different proposition. Against the proposition in its negative shape we have never uttered a syllable; we have had “no passing phase of thought” inconsistent with a cordial reception of it. We never denounced it as preposterous, under the exigencies of debate or any other exigencies, and we are willing, albeit no lawyer, to be held responsible for every thing we have said in relation to it. In its affirmative form, the proposition can not be maintained—in its negative form, it is the fundamental element of Evangelical religion. If Dr. Hodge can not see the difference, we commend him to the study of some good treatise of logic.

Again, the Doctor says that we denied that the parity of the clergy, the right of the people to participate in government, and the unity of the Church, are *fundamental* principles of Presbyterianism. This, also, is a mistake. Whatever may be our opinion on the subject, what we really

denied was, that these are *distinctive* principles of Presbyterianism. We maintained that, as far as we held them at all, they were principles which we held in common with others—they were generic, and not differential, attributes. This is very different from saying that they are not *fundamental*.

And here we may notice his singular defence of the definition of Presbyterianism, which he constructed out of these generic properties. These principles, he told us, constituted the true idea of Presbyterianism. We ridiculed, as utterly illogical and absurd, the notion of a definition in which there was nothing to distinguish the thing defined. This Dr. Hodge denounces as extraordinary logic. Are we, then, to understand him as saying, that a definition can put us in possession of an adequate notion of a subject, without any allusion to the properties which make it what it is, rather than any thing else? The design of the real definition of the logicians, as interpreted in the language of modern philosophy, is "to analyze a complex notion"—we use the words of Mansel—"into its component parts." These parts are some of them common, some special; but both must be considered, or the notion is only partially decomposed, and the subsequent synthesis must be incomplete. Dr. Hodge affirms that there are two modes of defining, one by genus and differentia, the other by enumeration of attributes. Did it not occur to him that these are precisely the same thing? The genus and differentia, taken together, constitute the *whole* of the properties. They are only a compendious method of enumeration. You may mention properties one by one, or you may group several together under a common name. If the name is understood, those properties which it expresses are, in fact, mentioned. What we objected to in Dr. Hodge was, not that he did not technically state the genus and differentia, but that he made no allusion to the differentia at all. He defined Presbyterianism only by those attributes which it

has in common with other systems. If the "merest tryo in logic can see the fallacy" of this objection, it is more than we can. To make the thing still more absurd, he gives us an example of definition by genus and specific difference, to show how complete a definition may be without the difference. "We may define man," says he, "to be a rational creature, invested with a material body. Should any professor of logic ridicule this definition, and say it includes nothing distinctive, he would only show his logic was in abeyance."—(P. 557.) We presume that no professor of logic is likely to object to this definition, as it contains the genus, rational creature, the differentia, a material body. It is true that the genus contains nothing distinctive. "God, angels and demons are all rational." Neither is a material body *characteristic*, but when beings are thought under the general notion of rationality, the possession or non-possession of a body does become differential and divisive. If, however, there were other rational beings besides men possessed of bodies, differing in shape and structure, the mere mention of a body, without reference to the distinctive form, would not be sufficient. A difference may consist of a single attribute, or of a collection of attributes, each of which, singly, may pertain to other subjects, but all of which exist no where else in combination. We presume that what Dr. Hodge means to censure in us, is not that we demanded a specific difference, but that we expected from a difference which was constituted by combination, that each element should itself be differential; in other words, that we took in a divided, what was only true in a compounded sense. If so, our error was, not that we laid down a wrong rule of definition, but that we misapprehended the definition which was actually given. The differentia was there—the three principles in combination—but we mistook it. This plea, however, can not be admitted. In the first place, Dr. Hodge announced his three principles *singly*, as the distinctive principles of our

Church. He called them *our great distinctive principles*. Each is ours, in the sense that all are. They do not distinguish us as a whole, that was an after-thought; but they distinguish us as individual elements. In the second place, the combination, as explained by Dr. Hodge, is admitted by no denomination under the sun. It is a trinity of his own making. In the third place, if these principles were all held by us, they would only express the *heads* under which our peculiarities might be considered, but not the peculiarities themselves. Every thing would depend upon the mode in which we realized them. The truth is, in the sense of Dr. Hodge, Presbyterianism is not specific, but generic. It does not describe a particular form of Government, but consists of principles which may be found in divers forms. Any scheme in which they were embodied would be as much entitled to the name as our own Divine system. Considered, therefore, as a definition of Presbyterianism, in the specific sense of one particular form of Government—the form, for example, of our own or the Scotch Church—Dr. Hodge's three principles must be condemned as a wretched failure. Our extraordinary logic, which the merest tryo is competent to expose, stands impregnable. The shifts and evasions of Dr. Hodge in defending his poor little progeny, remind one of the amusing story of the cracked kettle. In the first place, he did not mean to give a definition by genus and differentia. He had discovered a more excellent way. He can "individualize and complete" an idea without such ceremony. But the more excellent way turns out to be the old way, only a little lengthened. What then? Why, the Doctor faces about, and insists that he did give the real differentia, in his famous three principles. But upon examination, it appears that these three famous principles are categories in which the differentia may be sought, but which the Doctor has failed to find. What his next shift will be, we can not

imagine. Perhaps he will attempt to show that the Categories and Predicables are the same thing.

Dr. Hodge sets off our blunders in logic with a prelusive flourish about our extravagant pretensions to superior skill in the science. We would seem to have been prodigiously vain. It was kind, therefore, to expose our ignorance and humble our pride. We are deeply conscious that we are no better than we should be, but we should be sorry to have our brethren regard us in the light in which Dr. Hodge has been pleased to place us. The remarks were playfully made, and the anecdote to which they were an introduction was recited in a playful spirit, and from an innocent desire to mingle the gay with the grave in debate. Our words are not correctly reported by Dr. Hodge. They are given, with a single exception, exactly as we uttered them, in the July number of this Review. What we said was: "I have paid some little attention to logic. I once wrote a book which that good brother criticised in his Review, as having too much logic. I have dipped into Aristotle and several other masters of the science, and have probably the largest collection of works on the subject to be found in any private library in the whole country." This, surely, was not very bad. But if sportive remarks are to be construed in sober earnest and men are to be hung for jests, it is quite certain that no man's character is safe. And, since we have seen the use which Dr. Hodge has made of what was uttered in the presence of brethren, with the kindest feelings, and without, we can confidently say, the least emotion of arrogance, we have been impressed with the importance of Robert Hall's remark, that the imprudent should never come into company with the malicious. The harmless story which we told, and in which we did not mean to wound—we ourselves had taken no offence at Dr. Hodge's ridicule of our first speech—that harmless story has done all the mischief. The real interpretation to be put upon the gross and exag-

gerated picture which Dr. Hodge has contrived to make by converting pleasantry into sober earnest, is, that, as he was sore himself, he wanted a companion in his pains.

Dr. Hodge endeavors to show that his three principles involve, substantially, the same definition of Presbyterianism which was given by ourselves. That Presbyterianism may be referred to these *three heads*—as the powers of a government may be reduced to the heads, executive, judicial and legislative—whatever we may believe, we never denied. We only said that the vague generals did not “individualize and complete the idea.” They were no definition. No doubt gold may be found in the category of substance, but the definition of substance is not the definition of gold. Ours was a proper definition. It distinguished Presbyterianism from every other form of Church government. It explained the *mode*, which is our peculiarity, in which we accept and realize the three great principles. The government of the Church by parliamentary assemblies, composed of two classes of elders, and of elders only, and so arranged as to realize the visible unity of the whole Church, this is Presbyterianism. It contains our officers, Presbyters, ruling and teaching. It contains our courts, Presbyteries, rising in gradation until we reach the General Assembly, the representative parliament of the whole Church. It differences us from Congregationalism by our representative assemblies, and from Prelacy and Popery, not only by the assemblies, but by the officers of whom they are composed.

The reason of Dr. Hodge’s preference for his vague generalities is not far to seek. He holds that the Church is tied down to no particular mode of organization. She has a right to create new offices and appoint new organs, whenever she thinks it wise or expedient. He abhors the doctrine that whatever is not commanded is forbidden. He wants scope to play in. Now, our definition restricts the Church to one *mode* of organization. It ties her down to

one particular form of Church government, and to one particular order of officers. Such a government as *jure divino*, he cannot accept. But give him regulative principles only, and not prescriptive laws, he can change modes and forms at pleasure, and, so long as they are not repugnant to these principles, they are all Divine; not in the sense that God has appointed this rather than the other, but in the sense that they are all equally allowable. It is to give this latitude to human discretion, that he makes Presbyterianism a generic and not a specific thing. He accepts our theory as *Divine*, because he thinks that we are at liberty to apply his three principles in the form we have done; but any *other mode* in which they are realized would be equally Divine. The real point at issue, therefore, is, whether any particular form of Church government is prescribed in the Scripture. Not whether any regulative principles are there, but whether the elements and the mode of their combination are there. Do the Scriptures put all permanent Church power in the hands of Presbyters? Do the Scriptures recognize more than one class of Presbyters? Do they require that these Presbyters shall be organized into parliamentary assemblies? Do they exclude from these assemblies all who are not Presbyters? Do they restrict the Church to one kind of spiritual court? and do they define the powers with which these courts are entrusted? Is the whole system, with the exception of the circumstantial details, revealed in the Word of God, and bound upon the conscience by the authority of law? This is the real question. And, with all his parade about *jus divinum*, Dr. Hodge denies it to our system in the sense in which the fathers of Presbyterianism understood it. The whole head and front of our offending is, that we have exposed the laxity of his views.

II. We propose now to examine Dr. Hodge's theory of Presbyterianism, and test it by the authority of our standards and the most approved Presbyterian writers. The

points which we shall select are those in which we conceive he has departed from the faith. He professes to differ from us only in three things; 1. In relation to the office of ruling elders; 2. In relation to the nature of Church power, which he represents us as making joint and not several; and, 3. In relation to the measure and limit of the Church's discretion. Upon the second point, we shall soon see that he has fallen into error. The third does constitute an impassable gulf betwixt us. But that has been sufficiently adverted to in another part of this article. There remains, then, the office of ruling elder. But is that all that divides us? At the close of the discussion in the last Assembly, we had been led to believe that, with the exception of his letting down the doctrine of Divine right, and his dangerous theory of the discretion of the Church, this was all. And, in logical consistency, it is all, but this all includes immensely more than those apprehend, who look upon the question as simply one of words and names. His theory of the elder's office is grounded in a radically false view of the relations of the people to the government of the Church. This is his *πρώτον ψεύδος*. The denial of the Presbyterian character of the elder, follows as a legitimate consequence. We shall, therefore, discuss the theory in both aspects; its assumption touching the place of the people, and its conclusion touching the place of the elder.

1. Dr. Hodge lays it down among the fundamental principles of Presbyterianism, "*the right of the people to a substantive part in the government of the Church.*"—(P. 547.) "As to the right of the people to take part in the government of the Church, this also is a Divine right. This follows because the Spirit of God, who is the source of all power, dwells in the people, and not exclusively in the clergy; because we are commanded to submit ourselves to our brethren in the Lord; because the people are commanded to exercise this power, and are upbraided when

unfaithful or negligent in the discharge of this duty ; because the gift of governing or ruling is a permanent gift ; and because, in the New Testament, we find the brethren in the actual, recognized exercise of the authority in question, which was never disputed in the Church until the beginning of the dark ages."—(P. 555.) This is a capital argument for Independency. Here, it is plainly and unequivocally asserted, not that the people have a right to choose their rulers, but they have a right of rule themselves. They are as truly *rulers* as the *Presbyters*. The exercise of government is, indeed, distributed betwixt them and Presbyters. It is a joint business. A substantive part in government means, if it means any thing, a right to take part in the actual administration of discipline. The people, *qua* people, have a vote.

Is this Presbyterianism? What say our standards? "The Lord Jesus, as King and Head of His Church, hath therein appointed a government *in the hand of Church officers*, distinct from the civil magistrate." Not a word is said about the share of the people. The *whole* is put into the hands of *Church officers*. Again: "*to these officers* the keys of the kingdom of heaven are committed, by virtue whereof they have power respectively to retain and remit sins, to shut that kingdom against the impenitent, both by the Word and censures, and to open it unto penitent sinners, by the ministry of the Gospel, and by absolution from censures, as occasion shall require." * If the keys are exclusively in the hands of Church officers, and these keys represent the whole power of the Church, as exercised in teaching and discipline, the *clavis doctrinæ* and the *clavis regiminis*, we should like to know what is left to the people? But, to cut the matter short, we shall adduce a passage from a very admirable pamphlet of Principal Cunningham of Edinburgh, *clarum and venerabile nomen*, which saves us

* Conf. Faith, chapter 30, §§ 1, 2.

the trouble, in the references it makes, of appealing to any other witnesses. We beg the reader to weigh the extract with care.

The substance of Dr. Muir's whole argument, on the ground of which he has accused the great majority of the Church of "subverting," "violating," and "extinguishing an ordinance of Christ," when thrown into the form of a syllogism, is this :—

Christ has vested the exclusive power of governing and ruling the Church in ecclesiastical office-bearers.

To require the consent, or to give effect to the dissent, of the people in the settlement of ministers, is to assign to them a share in the government of the Church.

Ergo, the principle of the veto act is opposed to the appointment of Christ.

Now, Dr. Muir knows well enough that his opponents concede his major proposition, and deny the minor, and yet his main efforts are directed to this object of proving the major, which he does, by quotations from the standards of the Church, just as if the orthodoxy of his opponent had been liable to any suspicion, while he made no attempt to establish the minor, which we meet with a direct negative. It was the more necessary for him to establish the minor proposition by satisfactory evidence, because in past ages it has been maintained chiefly by Papists and Independents, and has been strenuously opposed by the ablest and most learned defenders of Presbytery, who have contended that even giving to the people the right of electing their ministers, a larger share of influence than the right of consenting or dissenting, did not imply that they had any share in the government of the Church. If the election of ministers by the people does not imply their ruling and governing in the Church, still less does their consenting to, or dissenting from, the nomination of another. Cardinal Bellarmine, the great champion of Popery, lays down the same principle as Dr. Muir, in arguing against the right of the Christian people. Bellarmine's doctrine upon the point is this : "Eligere pastores ad gubernationem et regimen pertinere certissimum est, non igitur populo convenit pastores eligere."—(de Clericis, c. vii., tom. II., p. 981.) Ames's answer, in full accordance with the views of Presbyterian divines, was this :—"Electio quamvis pertineat ad gubernationem et regimen constituendum, non tamen est actus regiminis aut gubernationis."—(Bellarminus Enervatus, tom. II., lib. III., p. 94.)

The same principle was brought forward for an opposite purpose, at the time of the Westminster Assembly, by the Independents. They argued in this way : Presbyterians admit that ministers ought to be settled upon the choice, or with the consent, of the people. This implies that the people have some share in the government of the Church, and, therefore, the Presbyterian doctrine, which excludes them from government, must be false. Now, it is manifest that the

essential medium of proof in this argument is just the very doctrine asserted by Bellarmine, and assumed by Dr. Muir, in arguing against the rights of the Christian people. How, then, did the ablest and most learned of our forefathers meet this argument of the Independents? Not by disclaiming the doctrine that ministers ought to be settled upon the choice, or with the consent, of the people, but by maintaining that this did not involve any exercise of government or jurisdiction on their part. They established, in opposition to the Independents, and in vindication of the Presbyterian principle about the government of the Church being vested in the office-bearers, the falsehood of the very doctrine on which Bellarmine and Dr. Muir found their opposition to the rights of the Christian people in the settlement of their ministers. Dr. Muir will find the proof of this in Gillespie's *Assertion of the Government of the Church of Scotland*, pp. 116 and 117; Baillie's *Dissuasive from the Errors of the Time*, part I., c. ix., pp. 194 and 195; Wood's *Refutation of Lookier*, part II., pp. 214 and 244; and when an attempt is made to answer their arguments, it will be time enough to enter upon the discussion. In the mean time, we take the liberty of declaring that Dr. Muir has presumed to condemn the majority of the Church as guilty of "violating and extinguishing an ordinance of Christ," while the charge rests solely upon a proposition, in support of which he has not produced one particle of evidence, which has hitherto been maintained only by Papists and Independents, and which has been strenuously opposed by the ablest and most learned defenders of Presbytery.—(Strictures on the Rev. Jas. Robertson's *Observations on the Veto Act*, pp. 23, 24. Edinburgh; 1840.)

Dr. Hodge can not extricate himself from his anti-Presbyterian position, by saying that he attributes the power of rule to the people only *in actu primo*. In that sense, *all* power, whether of rule or teaching, resides in the Church as a whole, without reference to the distinction between officers and people. Dr. Hodge himself admits it. "All power," says he, "is, *in sensu primo, in the people*."—(P. 547.) The life of the Church is one; officers are but the organs through which it is manifested, in acts of jurisdiction and instruction; and the acts of all officers, in consequence of this organic relation, are the acts of the Church. They are the *principium quo*; she is the *principium quod*. The power inheres in her; it is exercised by them. According to this doctrine, it is obvious that as to the exercise of power, her relation to ministers is precisely the same as her

relation to ruling elders. It is the *Church* that *preaches* through the one, as really as it is the *Church* that *rules* through the other. Ministers are her mouth, as elders are her hands. Both equally represent her, and both are nothing except as they represent her. In *actu primo*, it is nonsense to talk about the people having a *part* in the government, they have the *whole*. And so they have the whole inherent, radical, primary power of preaching and of dispensing the sacraments. All lawful acts of all lawful officers are acts of the Church, and they who hear the preacher or the Presbytery, hear the *Church*. The case is analogous to the motions of the human body. Vital power is not in the hands or the feet, it is in the whole body. But the exercise of that power, in walking or in writing, is confined to particular organs. The power is one, but its functions are manifold, and it has an organ appropriate to every function. This makes it an *organic* whole. So the Church has functions; these functions require appropriate organs; these organs are created by Christ, and the Church becomes an organic whole.

Now, according to Dr. Hodge, the people, as contradistinguished from the clergy, are *one* of the organs of government, or, if not a whole organ, a part of one. If they are not a hand, they are a finger. They have a *substantive part* in *government*, in a sense in which they do not have a substantive part in preaching or in dispensing the sacraments. Dr. Hodge divides the Church into two castes, with separate, and even antagonistic, interests; and government—although he repudiates the notion that all power is joint—is the joint product of two factors. The division is thoroughly Popish, though the use made of it is not. On the contrary, we contend that the Church is an indivisible unit, and that government is one of the forms in which it realizes its Divine life. The distinction between clergy and people—a distinction always offensive to Presbyterian ears—is not a distinction of parts into which a compound whole may be

divided, nor a distinction of ranks, like that of the peerage and commons, but a distinction of functions and relations in the same whole. It is a confusion of ideas upon this subject, which gives rise to Dr. Hodge's exaggerated picture of a clerical despotism.

Here, then, is Dr. Hodge's first great blunder. He makes the people, in *secundo actu*, rulers in the Church. He gives them a right, *as people*, to exercise power in acts of government. They and the clergy, as separate and distinct elements, like the vulgar and nobility in aristocratic States, constitute the Church, and each party has its separate rights and interests. There is a House of Lords and a House of Commons. And, instead of using the terms office-bearers, or Presbyters, or elders, all which denote the organic relation of the rulers to the Church, presenting them simply as the media of *exercising* power, he adopts clergy, which, from its Popish associations, is better suited to designate a privileged *rank* above the laity.

2. Setting out with this fundamental misconception, he has failed to seize the true idea of the elder's office. He looks upon it, in the first place, as a mere expedient by which the people appear, as a separate class, in our Church courts. The elder represents not the Church, as a whole, but a particular interest or party. This leads to a second error, by which a representative is merged into a deputy, and the elder becomes the mere factor of the people. Both errors spring from a radical misunderstanding of the genuine nature of representative, as distinguished from every other species of government.

(1.) That Dr. Hodge makes the elder the representative of the *people*, not in the general and scriptural sense of the *Church*, but in the restricted and contracted sense of a *class*, a *party*, in the Church, is evident from every line that he has written. In the extract from page 555, which we have already cited, it is the right of the people, as distinguished from the clergy, to take part in government, that

he is defending, and his first reason is, that the Spirit of God dwells in them, and not exclusively in the clergy. It is this right which they exercise through representatives, and these representatives are ruling elders. These elders are, consequently, the expedient by which the *people* appear in our Church courts. Through the ministers the clergy appear—through the elders the people appear.

(2.) If they are the *appearance* of the people, it is obvious that they are simple deputies. They are the people, in the same sense in which ministers are the clergy. They must, therefore, do what the people would do, say what the people would say, approve what the people would approve, and condemn what the people would condemn. We might say that they are the Commons, and the clergy the Peerage; but the illustration would fail in this respect, that the Commons in Parliament are not mere exponents of the will of their constituents. They have a higher and a nobler function. The whole worth of the office of ruling elder, in the eyes of Dr. Hodge, turns upon the fact that the "elder is a layman." It is this that "makes him a real power, a distinct element, in our system." This is what secures the Church against clerical despotism. The popular will has an exponent adequate to resist the clerical will. The whole argument is absurd, unless the elder is the *locum tenens*, the deputy of the people. What makes it decisively evident that this is Dr. Hodge's conception of the relation of the elder to the people, is the circumstance that he resolves the necessity of the office into the fact of the impossibility of the people appearing in mass, from their enormous multitude. He admits that in a single small congregation, it might be done, but on a large scale, as when the Church embraces a city, a province, or a kingdom, it is clearly impossible. *But for this impossibility*, there would be no need of elders. In consequence of this impossibility "the people must appear by their representatives, or not appear at all." If, therefore, the ruling elder is only the appearance of the

people, that is, if he is the whole people condensed into one man, he must be the mere organ of the people. Their will is his law.

(3.) Now, all this proceeds upon a fundamental error in relation to the nature of representative government. In it the people do not appear in *propria persona*, not because they *can not* appear, but because they *ought not* to appear. Mass meetings would make poor legislatures, and still poorer judges and magistrates. The end of all civil government is justice. To determine justice in concrete circumstances, and to secure it by fixed institutions and impartial laws, exacts wisdom and deliberation, and wisdom and deliberation exact a restraint upon human passions and prejudices. Parliamentary assemblies, consisting of chosen men, are a device through which the State seeks to ascertain the true and the right. They are a limitation or restraint upon the caprices, the passions, the prejudices, of the masses. For the same reason, the State administers the law through judges. Parliamentary assemblies, in most free States, are, themselves, checked by division into two chambers. The end is still the same: to guard against all the influences that might be unfriendly to the discovery and supreme authority of truth. These bodies are, therefore, the organs of the commonwealth, by which she seeks to realize the great idea of justice. They are not the exponents of the will, but of the wisdom, of the State.

In strictly representative governments, the people only choose their rulers—they never instruct them; or, if they do instruct them, they depart from the fundamental idea of the theory. When they wish to impeach them, or to throw them off, unless in cases of violent revolution, they still proceed through representative bodies.

Obedience to God is the end of the government of the Church. The design is to ascertain and enforce His law. The same necessity of deliberation, prudence, caution and wisdom obtains here as in civil affairs; and, therefore, the

Church, as a commonwealth, does all her legislative and judicial thinking through chosen men. Her assemblies are also checked by what is equivalent to two chambers. Her rulers are of different classes, in order that every variety of talent and intellectual habits may enter into her councils. These courts are organs through which the *Church*, and *the Church* as a whole, expounds and enforces the law of God; and every ruler is a man solemnly appointed to seek and execute the will of the Master. Our Church courts contain no deputies to utter a foregone conclusion—no exponents of the opinions and decrees of any set of men—but counsellors, senators, met to deliberate, to conclude, to decide.

From this view, it follows that the minister sustains precisely the same relation to the Church with the ruling elder. They are both representatives, not of an order or a class, but of the *Church* of God. Their duties in the Church courts are exactly the same. Both have to seek the Word from the mouth of the Lord, and to declare what they have received from Him. BOTH ARE CLERGYMEN AND BOTH ARE LAYMEN. Let us explain ourselves: for the explanation will detect an illusion which vitiates much of Dr. Hodge's article.

Clergy and laity are terms which, in the New Testament, are indiscriminately applied to all the *people* of God. About this there can be no question. In the New Testament sense, therefore, every minister is a layman, and every layman is a clergyman. In the common Protestant sense, the origin of which it is useless to trace, the terms express the distinction between the office-bearers of the Church and the people in their private capacity. A clergyman is a man clothed with the office of a Presbyter. Now, an office in a free government is not a *rank* or a *caste*. It is not an estate of the realm. It is simply a public trust. A man, therefore, does not cease to belong to the people by being chosen to office. The President of the United

States is still one of the people. The Representatives in Congress are still among the people. Our Judges and Senators are still a part of the people. Office makes a distinction in relations—the distinction between a private and a public man—but makes no distinction in person or in rank. Office-bearers are not an *order*, in the legal sense. If a clergyman, therefore, is only one of the people discharging a public trust—if to be a clergyman means nothing more than that an individual is not simply a *private* man—it is clearly a title as applicable to the ruling elder as to the minister, unless it should be denied that the ruling elder's is an office at all. To convey the idea that the distinctions induced by ordination are official, and not personal, our standards have studiously avoided the word clergy, which had been so much abused in the papacy, and substituted the more correct expressions, officers and office-bearers. If a man chooses arbitrarily to restrict the term clergyman to preachers, then, of course, the ruling elder is not a clergyman, for he is not a minister of the Gospel. But if taken to designate office-bearers, then it applies to all who are not in private relations. The only point about which we are solicitous is, that the relations of the ruling elder to the Church are precisely the same as those of the minister. They are both, in the same sense, though not to the same degree, representatives of the people, the Church. The minister represents her in rule and in preaching the Gospel and dispensing the sacraments. The ruling elder represents her only in rule. The extent of their representation is the only official difference betwixt them.

If ruling elders are not exclusively the representatives of the people, why are they said, in our standards, to be properly the representatives of the people? The answer is obvious, because they *are* so. But to conclude that because an attribute is properly predicated of one subject, it is denied of all others, would be most extraordinary logic. To say that

because man may be properly called mortal, therefore nothing else is, would be a most "lame and impotent conclusion." The Senators in our State Legislatures are as really representatives of the people, as the members of the other house, yet the latter alone are technically styled representatives. Nothing is more common than to limit the use of a general term, or convert an appellative into a proper name. In that way minister and pastor have become restricted to a particular office.

The reason of restricting the term representative of the people to the ruling elder, was probably this: To the English mind, that term conveyed the idea of a chosen ruler. Now, the elder was nothing but a chosen ruler, and as his office answered precisely to the sense of the term, in its popular use, the framers of our standards adopted it. They had the English Parliament before them, and the only chosen rulers it contained were the members of the House of Commons. And as they were commonly called the representatives of the people, the ruling elder, who discharged the same functions in the Church, received the same appellation. Ministers being some thing more than rulers, were distinguished by titles which, to the popular mind, would not convey this narrow idea.

Having now exposed Dr. Hodge's blunders in relation to the right of the people to a *substantive part* in the government of the Church, and his consequent blunder in relation to the nature of the ruling elder's office; having shown that all office-bearers sustain precisely the same relation to the people; that it is the Church that rules and teaches, and dispenses the sacraments through them; that they are all, without exception, her representatives, in different departments of her work—her organs, through which she moves and wills and thinks and acts—we proceed now to what will be an easy task, the official title of the ruling elder in the New Testament. Is he, or is he not, a *Presbyter*? This is not a question of mere names. The *Presbyter* is

the *only* officer into whose hands, as a permanent arrangement, God has put the government of His Church. He is the only *instrumentum quo* through which the Church can exercise the power of rule, which inherently resides in her. If, therefore, the ruling elder is not a Presbyterian, he is an intruder, a usurper, in the courts of the Lord's house. He has no business in any Presbytery. Man may put him there, but it is without the authority of God. It is, therefore, a vital question, so far as concerns his office. In answer to this question, Dr. Hodge denies, and we affirm. As in the present article we occupy the position of a respondent, we shall content ourselves with replying to the objections which the "brother from Princeton" has been able to present. Let us look first to the state of the question, and then to his arguments in the negative.

Dr. Hodge tells us, that the real question is, whether the ruling elder is a clergyman or a layman. This is a great mistake; for we regard him as both, and we regard the minister of the Gospel as both. They are both clergymen, and they are both laymen, and any theory which denies this is utterly popish and prelatical. What we presume Dr. Hodge means is, that the real question is, whether the ruling elder is a preacher, a minister of the Gospel, or not? But this has never been disputed. Although he repeatedly affirms that the theory which makes the ruling elder a Presbyterian makes him a preacher, we defy him to produce a single respectable writer who has ever confounded the functions of rule with teaching. He knows, or ought to know, that such a confusion has been persistently denied. We give the ruling elder no official right to dispense either the Word or the sacraments. There is, and never has been, any question upon that point. Dr. Hodge is out-and-out wrong, with the exception of the ordaining power, when he charges us with holding that ruling elders have as much right to "preach, ordain, and administer the sacraments," as ministers of the Gospel. What, then, is the question?

The real question is, whether the term *Presbyter* means teacher or ruler; and if ruler, whether it is generic or specific; that is, whether all rulers are of one class? We affirm that *Presbyter*, in the New Testament, means *chosen ruler*, and that these rulers are of two kinds, differenced from each other by the property of preaching or not preaching. Here lies the real point in dispute. Does *Presbyter*, in the New Testament, mean only a minister of the Gospel, one commissioned to dispense the Word and sacraments, or does it mean one who has been set apart to bear rule in the house of God, whether he preaches or not? In other words, is it the generic title of all spiritual office-bearers, whatever may be their special functions? If it is, the ruling elder is a *Presbyter*; if not, he is nothing. Now, Dr. Hodge maintains that *Presbyter* means only a minister of the Gospel; that a man who is not authorized to preach and administer the sacraments, has no right to this name as an official title.

Let us look at his arguments. He pleads, first, the doctrine and practice of all the Reformed Churches. All have regarded *Presbyter* as equivalent to preacher. There never was a more unaccountable blunder. Surely, the Church of Scotland is to be ranked among the Reformed Churches, and yet that Church teaches expressly that the term elder, as an official title, is generic, and includes two classes, one who do, and one who do not, teach. "The word elder in the Scripture," says the second Book of Discipline, Chap. VI., sometimes is the name of age, sometimes of office. When it is the name of an office, sometimes it is taken largely, comprehending as well the pastors and doctors, as them who are called seniors, or elders," that is, ruling elders. Again: "It is not necessary that all elders be also teachers of the Word. Albeit, the chief ought to be so, and so are worthy of double honor." The Presbyterian Church in Ireland, we suspect, may also be ranked among the Reformed Churches, yet its doctrine and practice are

directly contrary to the theory of Dr. Hodge. That Church divides elders into two classes, teaching and ruling, and makes each equally apostolic bishops.—(Constitution and Discipline of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland, §§ 3, 4.) This Church also requires that the ruling elder shall be ordained by prayer and the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery. (Chap. IV., § 2.) And in other Churches, where the ordination is by the minister alone, it is evidently by the minister as representing the parochial Presbytery.

But, to cut this matter of authority short, our own standards unambiguously affirm that the office of ruling elder “has been understood, by a *great part of the Protestant Reformed Churches*, to be designated in the Scriptures by the title of governments; and of those who rule well, but do not labor in the Word and doctrine. The reference is to 1 Tim., 5 : 17, and the allegation, consequently, is that a great part of the Protestant Reformed Churches has understood the official title, Presbyter, as including the ruling elder. What now becomes of Dr. Hodge’s assertion, that this is entirely contrary to the doctrine and practice of *all* the Reformed Churches? The Church of Scotland is against him; the Church in Ireland is against him, and our own standards are against him. What a proof of the reckless hardihood of his assertions! But the chapter of his misfortunes is not yet complete. He quotes Calvin, and quotes him in such a way as to make the impression that Calvin holds the same doctrine with himself. Calvin, indeed, held that the official Presbyters of the New Testament were bishops, but bishops and preachers are not synonymous terms. If Dr. Hodge means to say that Calvin did not regard the ruling elder as officially a Presbyter, he is in grievous error.

In commenting on James 5 : 15, he says :

“ I include here generally all those who presided over the Church; *for PASTORS WERE NOT ALONE CALLED PRESBYTERS OR ELDERS, BUT ALL THOSE WHO WERE CHOSEN FROM THE PEOPLE TO BE, AS IT*

WERE, CENSORS, TO PROTECT DISCIPLINE. For every Church had, as it were, its own Senate, chosen from men of weight and of proved integrity."

On 1 Pet. 5 : 1 : "By this name (Presbyters) he designates pastors and ALL THOSE WHO ARE APPOINTED FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE CHURCH."

On 1 Tim., 5 : 17, he observes, first, that "Elder is not a name of age, but of office," and then subsequently adds : "We may learn from this that there were at that time TWO KINDS OF ELDERS; for all were not ordained to teach. The words plainly mean, *that there were some who ruled well and honorably, but who did not hold the office of teachers.* And, indeed, there were chosen from among the people men of worth and of good character, who united with pastors in a common council and authority, administered the discipline of the Church, and were a kind of censors for the correction of morals."

1 Cor., 12 : 28 : "By *governments*, I understand elders, who had the charge of discipline. For the primitive Church had its Senate, for the purpose of keeping the people in propriety of deportment as Paul shows elsewhere, when he makes mention of TWO KINDS OF PRESBYTERS," cf. 1 Cor., 5 : 4.

So much for the doctor's first argument—the doctrine and practice of *all* the Reformed Churches. Now for the second argument. It is so rich, we give it in Dr. Hodge's own words : "In thus destroying the peculiarity of the office, its value is destroyed. It is precisely because the ruling elder is a layman, that he is a real power, a distinct element, in our system. The moment you dress him in canonicals, you destroy his power, and render him ridiculous. It is because he is not a clergyman, it is because he is one of the people, engaged in the ordinary business of life, separated from the professional class of ministers, that he is what he is in our Church courts."—(P. 560.)

If by layman is meant one of the people of God, we agree that every elder ought to be a layman, and should continue so to the end of life ; but we suspect that the qualification is not peculiar to him—that it is equally, perhaps more, important in the case of ministers. If by layman is meant a *private member* of the Church, then the importance of the office depends upon its being *no office* at all. But if by layman is meant one who is not a preacher of the Gospel.

then we accept the proposition. It is precisely what we contend for—that our spiritual rulers should be of two classes, distinguished from each other by their training, their pursuits, their daily associations, and their habits of thought. It is this variety of mental constitution and discipline which secures in our courts completeness of deliberation. Dr. Hodge says, that if you dress the ruling elder in canonicals, you make him ridiculous. We submit whether a Presbyterian *minister* would cut a much better figure in the same habiliments. But the illustration shows how deeply rooted in his mind is the Popish notion, that the clergy are not of the people—that they are some thing more than simple members of the Church clothed with office.

Dr. Hodge's third argument is the crowning glory of his logic. He has discovered that, if we make the ruling elder a clergyman, we reduce "the government of the Church to a clerical despotism." Let us now read officer or office-bearer in the place of clergyman—for they are the same thing—and then the position is, that a government administered by *officers* is an *official* despotism. We should like to know what government under the sun, upon these terms, can escape from the charge. How else it *can* be administered, we are wholly incompetent to understand! Is the government of the United States a despotism, because all power is exercised through representative assemblies and magistrates—through *officers*, chosen and installed, for the very purpose? We had always thought that it was a security for liberty to have an appropriate organ through which every department of power is exercised. The right of election connects these officers immediately with the people. But, says Dr. Hodge, the right of the people to choose their rulers does not keep their rulers from being despots, if the people exercise the functions of government only through these rulers. The illustration by which he commends this extraordinary thesis is still more marvellous. "If," says he, "according to the Constitution of

the United States, the President, Senators, Representatives, heads of departments, Judges, Marshals, all naval and military men holding commissions, in short, all officers, from the highest to the lowest, (except overseers of the poor,) must be clergymen, every one would see and feel that all power was in the hands of the clergy." And, on the same principle, if all the clergy were chosen from the class of shoemakers, it would put all the power of the Church into the hands of shoemakers. We should then have a despotism of cobblers. Dr. Hodge confounds, in the first place, the class from which an officer is chosen with the duties of the office—what the man was before his election, with what he becomes by virtue of his election. The President of the United States would have no other powers than he now has, whatever might have been his previous profession or pursuits. His office would be the same, whether he was previously a preacher or a rail-splitter. To limit eligibility to a single class of citizens, would be arbitrary and unjust. But this tyranny would not affect the duties of the office itself. He would rule only as President, and not as clergyman, doctor, or rail-splitter.

In the next place, Dr. Hodge overlooks the fact, that to make a man a clergyman is to do precisely the same thing in the Church which we do in the State, when we make a man a President, Senator, or Representative. The clergy are to the Church what these officers are to the State. If, now, we selected the clergy only from a single class—if none could be preachers but such and such professions in life—then we would do what Dr. Hodge's illustration supposes to be done in the State, when it limits the field of choice to the clergy alone. But there is no such restriction. The Church chooses her rulers from the whole body of her members. She cares nothing about their previous employments and occupations. The doors of the ministry are open to all that are qualified. This illustration, however, conclusively proves how thoroughly Popish the Doctor's

notions of the clergy are. It is an estate in the Church, and not simply *an office*.*

But, in the third place, the argument is utterly rotten, as despotism does not depend upon the instruments by which power is exercised, but upon the *nature of the power itself*. The essential idea of despotism is a government of *will*, in contradistinction from a government of *law and right*. If the Church made the *will* of its rulers law, no matter what those rulers might be called, the government would be a despotism. The right of choice would not be freedom. The slave might, indeed, choose his master, but he would be a slave still, and for the simple reason that *the nature of the master's power* is despotic. But when a government has a constitution, and a constitution which provides for the supremacy of law and right, then the government, no matter who administers it, is free. Our Presbyterian rulers have a Divine charter to go by, and their authority is purely ministerial—it is to execute the provisions of that charter. Their will, as mere will, has no place in the government—it is the law of God, which alone is supreme, and that law is perfect freedom. If the rulers of the Church transcend their commission, no one is bound to obey them, and the constitution of the Church makes abundant provision for holding them to a strict responsibility. They stand in the same relation to the Church that the rulers of the United States sustain to the people, and if the one government is free, the other can not be despotic. The ideal of

* Hence the common statement, that the government of the Presbyterian Church is aristocratic, is founded in error. If the choice of its officers were restricted to a single class of men, that class would then be an aristocracy, and the charge would be just. But, as there is no such restriction, the government is purely republican. It is no objection that the rulers hold their offices for life. In some of the States of the Federal Union the Judges are chosen for life, but that does not make them an order of nobility. As long as they are *chosen* to, and do not *inherit* their offices, or the right to be elected, they *are of the people*, and are distinguished from their brethren only as a public from a private man.

the freest, noblest government under heaven, which Milton so rapturously sketched, corresponds, without an exception, to our Presbyterian, representative republic.

It is true that we denounced Dr. Hodge's argument on this subject as *ad captandum*, and compared the logic which could deduce from the principles of a free representative republic a clerical despotism, to the logic of a hard-shell Baptist minister in Alabama, who found the destined prevalence of immersion in the simple statement, that the voice of the turtle shall be heard in the land. But we beg pardon of the hard-shell brother. His interpretation has the merit of ingenuity. Dr. Hodge's argument has only the merit of calling hard names. It was a vulgar appeal to the passions and prejudices associated with the notions of priestly supremacy. These associations have sprung from the abuses of Popery and Prelacy, and we are glad to see that, while the Doctor holds to their radical conception of the clergy, he is not prepared to develop and expand it into tyranny. Here he parts with his friends and allies.

Dr. Hodge says that, in the last extremity, * we ourselves disclaimed the new theory. If this means that we conceded that the ruling elder is not officially a Presbyterian, or that the term Presbyterian, as a title of office, does not include

* This "last extremity" of ours is amusing. The real state of the case was this: We were dealing out some pretty effective blows against Dr. Hodge's hybrid theory of Presbyterianism, when the Doctor, unable to contain himself, sprang to his feet in great excitement, as if the terrors of death were before him, and protested that he was of our way of thinking. In our simplicity, we verily thought that he was begging for quarter. We were sorry for him, and let him off.

Surprised, no doubt, upon his return home, to find himself alive, and certain that some one must have died in that hour of mortal agony, he quietly concludes that it was we, and proceeds to give our dying confession. We suppose that we must accept the statement, and in all future accounts of the scene imitate the Frenchman, who related to an English officer the story of a fatal duel in which he had been engaged. And what do you think, said he to the officer, was the result? Of course, was the reply, you killed your man. Oh, no! said the Frenchman, he killed me!

two classes, distinguished from each other by the possession or non-possession of the property of preaching, it is altogether a mistake. If it means, however, that we did not claim for the ruling elder the right of dispensing the Word and sacraments, it is true. We never held any such opinion. We have never been in any extremity which forced us to abandon what we never possessed. Dr. Hodge is willing to call the elder a *Presbyter*, in the sense in which Apostles are called deacons. But the point is, not as to what the Second Book of Discipline calls the common meaning of the word—in that sense, any old man is a *Presbyter*, and every believer is a deacon—but as to the official sense, the sense in which it expresses jurisdiction in the house of God. That is the sense upon which the question concerning the application of the title turns; and upon that question we have never had but one opinion.

If, after the specimens he has had, any blunders of Dr. Hodge could astonish the reader, he would open his eyes in amazement, when he hears the Doctor passionately affirm: "We do not differ from Dr. Miller as to the nature of the office of ruling elders." Oh, no! the only difference is about the method of proving it Divine! Let us see. Dr. Hodge says that the ruling elder is not a scriptural bishop. Dr. Miller affirms that he is. Dr. Hodge says that the ruling elder is only a layman. Dr. Miller affirms that he is also a clergyman. Dr. Hodge accepts the ordination of an elder by a single minister. Dr. Miller affirms that it should be by the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery. In what, then, do they agree? Echo answers, What. The pupil is evidently endeavoring to wipe out every trace of the master's instructions. And if Dr. Miller's theory shall continue to maintain its ground at Princeton, it will not be from any assistance at the hands of Dr. Hodge.

Let us hear Dr. Miller:

"Now it has been alleged," says he, "by the opponents of ruling elders, that to represent the Scriptures as holding forth TWO CLASSES of elders, one class as both teaching and ruling, and the other as ruling only, and consequently the latter as holding a station not exactly identical with the former, amounts to a virtual surrender of the argument (for the parity of the clergy) derived from the identity of bishop and Presbyter. This objection, however, is totally groundless. If we suppose elder, as used in Scripture, to be a generic term, comprehending all who bore rule in the Church; and if we consider the term bishop as also a generic term, including all who sustained the relation of official *inspectors* or *overseers* of a flock; then it is plain that all bishops were scriptural elders, and that all elders, whether both teachers and rulers, or rulers only, provided they were placed over a parish as *inspectors* or *overseers*, were scriptural bishops. Now this I have no doubt, was the fact."—(Essay on the Nature and Duties of the office of ruling elder. 1831; p. 68.)

Here we have *one order*, or *genus*, with two coördinate species, and the elder affirmed to be a scriptural bishop.

Again:

If this view of the nature and importance of the office before us be admitted, the question very naturally arises, whether it be correct to call this class of elders *lay* elders; or whether they have not such a strictly ecclesiastical character as should prevent the use of that language in speaking of them. This is one of the points in the present discussion, concerning which the writer of this essay frankly confesses that he has, in some measure, altered his opinion. Once he was disposed to confine the epithet *clerical* to teaching elders, and to designate those who ruled only, and did not teach, as *lay* elders. But more mature inquiry and reflection have led him, first to doubt the correctness of this opinion, and finally to persuade him, that, so far as the distinction between *clergy* and *laity* is proper at all, it ought not to be made the point of distinction between these two classes of elders; and that, when we speak of the one as *clergymen*, and the other as *laymen*, we are apt to convey an idea altogether erroneous, if not seriously mischievous.—(Essay, pp. 202, 203.)

As to the ordination of a ruling elder:

It seems to be a fundamental principle in every department, both of the natural and moral world, that every thing must be considered as capable of begetting its like. If this be so, does it not follow, as a plain dictate of common sense, that, in ordaining ruling elders, the members of the session already in office, should lay on hands with the pastor, in setting apart an additional member to the same office? In

other words, if there be such a body already in existence in the Church, THE HANDS OF THE PAROCHIAL PRESBYTERY ought to be laid on, in adding to its own number, and the right hand of fellowship given, at the close of the service, by each member of the session, to each of his newly-ordained brethren. This appears to me equally agreeable to reason and Scripture, and highly adapted to edification. And if there be no eldership already in the Church in which the ordination takes place, then the Presbytery, upon proper application being made to them, ought to appoint at least one minister, and two or more ruling elders, to attend at the time and place most convenient, to perform the ordination.—(*Ib.* p. 290.)

We have now reviewed all Dr. Hodge's objections to the theory which makes the ruling elder officially a Presbyter. He has not advanced a single argument which invalidates the position, that this term designates an order, or a genus, distributed into two species, whose divisive principle is the possession or non-possession of the property of preaching. The generic attributes of the species, in both cases, must be exactly the same. The genus is one, and that is what is meant by saying the order is one. The species themselves, of course, differ: otherwise they could not be species at all, and the difference is accurately signalized by the epithets teaching and ruling. Any other doctrine is stark Prelacy. If the ruling elder is a spiritual officer, and yet is not a coördinate species with the minister of the Gospel, there must be subordination. If not equal, one must be *higher* than the other. If they are not of the same *order*, then they are of *different* orders, and the parity of spiritual office-bearers is given to the winds. This is the legitimate conclusion of the whole matter, to convert Presbyterian ministers into prelates, and Presbyterian elders into their humble subjects.

We must advert to another point, which Dr. Hodge has signalized as a point of difference betwixt his theory and ours. He alleges that we teach "that all power in the Church is joint, and not several. That is, it can be exercised only by Church courts, and not in any case by individual officers."—(P. 547.) Now, the singular fact is, that,

in the whole course of the debate in the General Assembly, we never once adverted to the distinction in question. We carefully avoided it. It was another brother, a brother, we think, from Mississippi, who introduced it. We not only never taught ourselves that all power is joint, and not several, but we never heard of a single human being, on the face of the earth, who *did* teach it. We defy Dr. Hodge to produce an instance of a single writer, living or dead, who maintains any such nonsense. The very making of the distinction implies that *some* power is several. What *has* been taught, and justly and scripturally taught, is, that the power of *rule*, the *potestas jurisdictionis*, as it is called in the Second Book of Discipline of the Church of Scotland, as contradistinguished from the power of teaching, the *potestas ordinis*, is joint, and not several. But it has always been affirmed that the power of teaching is several, and not joint. There is, consequently, no difference betwixt Dr. Hodge and ourselves on this point. There is no difference in our Church upon it. There *is* a difference, however, upon another point connected with the distinction, but not involving the distinction itself, and that is, whether ordination belongs to the *potestas ordinis*, or the *potestas jurisdictionis*—whether, in other words, it is an exercise of joint or several power. Some have contended that it is a ministerial function; others have contended—ourselves among the number—that it is an act of government. But no one has ever maintained that *all* power is joint, and not several. What are we to think of a man who makes such reckless and sweeping assertions, without the slightest foundation in fact? How clear that truth has failed him, when he is compelled to resort to fiction!

Having now completed our examination of Dr. Hodge's revised scheme of Presbyterianism, we are prepared to sum up the result. In the first place, his persistent representation of the clergy as an estate in the Church, separate and distinct from the people, and his degradation of the office

of ruling elder to a lower order than that of the minister of the Word, are thoroughly *Prelatic*. To this extent, therefore, he is no Presbyterian. In the second place, his theory of the right of the people to a substantive part in the government of the Church—thus making them a second estate in the kingdom, and ascribing to them the functions of office-bearers—savours strongly of Independency. It has no smack of Presbyterianism. In the third place, his vague notions of the relations of the Spirit to the Church, taken in connection with his celebrated essay on the idea of the Church, has a striking affinity with Quakerism. His notion of the unity of the Church, as realized through the organization of its courts, is Presbyterian. He is, therefore, a little of every thing, and not much of any thing. His true position is that of an ecclesiastical eclectic. He looks out upon all sects with the eye of a philosopher, and as he does not feel himself tied down by the authority of Scripture to any one mode of organization, as he is quite at liberty to make new officers and organs, according to the exigencies of the times, so long as they do not contradict certain regulative principles, he selects what strikes him as good from all, and casts the bad away.

He comes short of a thorough Presbyterianism—1. By maintaining that the discretion of the Church is limited only by the express prohibitions of the Scripture. His motto is, whatsoever is not prohibited is lawful. The Church's motto is, whatsoever is not commanded is unlawful. 2. By making the people and the clergy two distinct estates, between whom the power of government is shared, and by whom it is jointly exercised; whereas, the Church makes the clergy to be only that portion of the people through whom she exercises the various functions of her spiritual ministry. 3. By making *two* orders of spiritual rulers, the Presbyter or bishop, and the ruling elder; whereas, the Church makes only *one* order, which she distributes into two classes, the teaching and the ruling

elder. 4. By making the ruling elder merely a deputy, to maintain the rights of a particular class; whereas, the Church makes him a representative, a chosen ruler, through whom she herself, and not a class, declares and executes the law of God. 5. By allowing the claim of a *jus divinum* only for regulative principles, and not for the mode of organizing the Church. 6. In order to afford freer latitude and scope for the exercise of discretion in creating new officers and courts, he absolutely repudiates the principle of inference, and denies that what is deduced from the Word of God, by good and necessary consequence, is of equal authority with its express statements. In all these points Dr. Hodge has departed from the faith of the Fathers. His doctrines in respect to them are not the doctrines of the Presbyterian Church. We have maintained no new, no peculiar, theory of Presbyterianism. We have shown that, in all the points enumerated, we are standing upon the ground occupied by the purest Presbyterian Confessors, and especially upon the ground of our own venerable standards.

To guard against the possibility of misconception, it may be well to say, that while we insist upon the Divine authority of Presbyterian Church Government, we are far from unchurching or breaking communion with any evangelical denomination. Government, though Divine, is subordinate to faith in the Gospel. The most precious bonds of communion are inward, and not outward, and those who give evidence that they have been accepted of Christ, we are no more at liberty to reject for defects in their government, than for defects in their creed. All Evangelical Churches, moreover, have the essentials of the visible institute of Christ; they have a ministry and ordinances; they have *some*, though not *all*, the officers that He has appointed; they exceed or come short of the complement of rulers, and fail in the details of arrangement. but as long as the Word, in its essential doctrines, is really preached, and the sacraments truly administered, they

are true Churches of the Lord Jesus Christ, and to be received to our communion and fellowship, as cordially as we receive the private believer who has not yet attained the full measure of knowledge. Our doctrines give no protection to bigotry. We are as consistent in our ecclesiastical fellowship, for example, with the Methodist Episcopal Church, while we reject their peculiar features of government as unlawful and unscriptural, as we are in our Christian fellowship with Methodist believers, while we reject, as grossly contradictory to Scripture, their Arminian creed. We, therefore, unchurch no sect that does not unchurch itself, by refusing to hold the Head. We can make the distinction between a defective and a perfect Church—between the essentials and the accidents of government.

While we admit that questions of government are subordinate in importance to questions of faith—mere trifles, compared with the great truths of the Gospel, as a scheme of salvation, it does not follow that they are of *no* value. Whatever God has thought proper to reveal, it becomes man to study. Every thing in its place, is a just maxim, but it by no means implies that comparatively small things are entitled to *no* place. Because Church government is not the great thing, it does not follow that it is nothing. We are as far removed from latitudinarianism as from bigotry. We wish to study the *whole* will of God, and we wish to give every thing precisely that prominence which He designs that it should occupy in His own Divine economy. None should be content with striving simply to save their souls; they should strive to be perfect in *all* the will of God. This obligation is an ample vindication of the repeated efforts we have made to explain and enforce the peculiarities of our Church's Divine polity, and to resist all schemes and contrivances in contradiction to the harmony of her system. She will yet awake to a full consciousness of herself. She will yet arise in the energy of a healthful life, and throw off the excrescences which circumstances

have gathered around her, and which are not truly of her. She will yet be brought freely to confess that her own wisdom is foolishness, and that her real glory is the strength and light of the Lord. She will take the Word as her sole guide, and renounce all human devices.

In relation to Boards, the subject which has provoked all this discussion, the Free Church of Scotland has led the way in the development of a sound and self-consistent Presbyterianism. At the last meeting of her venerable Assembly, she approved the very changes, in the construction of her Schemes, which were *quasi* Boards, that we, at the same time, were pressing upon the Assembly of our own Church. That Assembly has endorsed the principle, that these "Committees shall not hereafter appoint acting committees, nor consist of a greater number of members than the Assembly shall deem requisite for the efficient transaction of the matters committed to their care." The new arrangement could not, at once, be carried into effect, but the Board feature is to be entirely abolished, nothing is to be left but the Executive Committee, and the Assembly is to take the appointment of it in its own hands. This was done in an Assembly of which Robert Buchanan was Moderator, and William Cunningham a member—an Assembly, too, which devoted a whole day to the commemoration of the great principles of the Reformation. With such an inspiration, we do not marvel at the result. What, on this side of the water, is denounced as hair-splitting, is considered sound Presbyterianism by as enlightened an Assembly as ever sat in Scotland.

ARTICLE V.

PRESBYTERIAN AUTHORITIES ON THEORIES OF
THE ELDERSHIP.

Since the publication of our former article on this subject, a change, which is quite significant, has taken place in the attitude of our contemporary towards the discussion, and we, therefore, drop the title placed at the head of that article. Whatever the reviewer maintains we may no longer ascribe to the Review, for its editor now declares, peremptorily, that he will not be held responsible for his correspondent's views. This, we may venture to say, is a very unusual course on the part of the Repertory. "We expected one article of ordinary length," it says, but there were sent on "three much beyond the ordinary size." It intimates that "courtesy" alone prevented it from "cutting the matter short." The editor says certain things in the first number would not have appeared, had he seen it before it was printed, and that he "could not read the last one on account of the state of the manuscript." Then he publishes to the world the author's name, and says that he alone is to be held responsible for what he has written. The *courtesy* of this whole proceeding, it is not for us to comment upon; but we repeat, that we believe it a step unprecedented in the history of the Princeton Review, and that it has a significance which needs no explanation.

But can the Repertory escape altogether from responsibility to the Church, for the articles of its correspondent? It has given them currency by admitting them to its columns, and its half-way repudiation of them can now be no more satisfactory to the Church than to its correspondent himself. Such an organ as the Princeton Review ought to give no uncertain sound. The half-way repudiation of its

correspondent is, in the circumstances, either too much, or it is too little. The editor appears, himself, to think it too little. He seeks elsewhere (Bib. Rep., Oct., 1860, p. 770) to repudiate even the discussion itself, as some thing altogether "Southern" and not "Northern" at all. "So far as we know, no diversity of opinion on the subject has been avowed at the North, and almost every thing in our own pages on this subject, has been from a Southern source." Not only would the editor repudiate this particular discussion, but all discussions about Church government seem to be viewed by him with trembling apprehensions of bad consequences. "Our internal contests have been about doctrine. Now, as we are of one mind about doctrine, we are trying to fall out about forms." The doctrine of Church government, then, is a mere question about *forms*! Christ's right to rule His Church in His own way, is to be bowed out as a mere question of forms. "Since the organization of our Church (says the Repertory), there has scarcely been a word of controversy among Presbyterians about the principles of Presbyterianism." Then the Cumberland schism in the beginning of the century originated in no question respecting our principles about ordination! And the division of our Church in 1837, had nothing to do with any controversy about departure from Presbyterian polity, arising out of an unconstitutional plan of union with Congregationalists! And there was no controversy about Presbyterianism involved in the whole discussion of the rights and powers of ruling elders in the Assembly of 1843, and subsequently! And there has been no controversy about Presbyterianism in the whole discussion for so many years, about the right and duty of the Church to do her own Missionary work herself *first*, in distinction from *assisting* other bodies, viz: Congregational Boards, to do that work, and *secondly*, in distinction from *appointing* other bodies, viz: Presbyterian Boards, to do it! And there has been no controversy about Presbyterianism amongst us, in

all the discussion of the right of the Church, in her courts, to meddle with other matters than what are purely spiritual or ecclesiastical; as, for example, secular education, colonization, etc. To the contrary of what the Repertory asserts, we say that all along, from the beginning of our organization, there has been controversy in our Church upon Church questions. It has not generally been bitter or harsh, but it has been usually earnest, and it is now *only* earnest. We repel the charge, which is insinuated by the editor of the Repertory, that there is now a spirit of "denunciation" and "illiberality" amongst us. But let him not claim that there is "agreement amongst us in every thing pertaining to the authority, rights and functions of ruling elders, and the only difference is as to the method of proof," for it is not so. Witness his correspondents' articles, which he feels compelled to repudiate. Witness his own published views about the inherent powers of the clergy, as *clergy*; about the people's right, as the people, to a substantive part of the government; and about the *lay* character of ruling elders. The fact is beyond all doubt, that there are in our Church two kinds of Presbyterians—those who believe in their Church government, and those who do not believe in it. And amongst this latter class many of their brethren, and those very competent to pronounce, have long been compelled to rank both the late correspondent and the editor of the Repertory. It suits the latter to repudiate the former just now; but there is in this act no more justice than courtesy.

Having, in our last issue, reviewed the position of the Repertory's correspondent, so far as concerns the Scripture testimony on the subject of ruling elders, we propose now to examine some of the Presbyterian authorities by which it was attempted to fortify those positions.

But first, let it be considered what is the just and true value of any human authority in this argument.

Our standards declare that what they set forth is "the whole system of internal government of the Church, which Christ hath appointed, (Form of Government, Chap. I, Sect. III.); that Jesus Christ hath erected in this world a kingdom, which is his Church, (Chap. II., Sect. I.); hath appointed officers to preach and administer discipline, (Chap. I., Sect. III.); hath laid down, in Scripture, the character, qualifications and authority of these officers, (Chap. I., Sect. VI.); and that it is agreeable to Scripture that the Church be governed by congregational, presbyterial and synodical assemblies. (Chap. VIII., Sect. I.) And our Confession of Faith says: "The Lord Jesus, as King and Head of His Church, hath therein appointed a government in the hands of Church officers. (Chap. XXX., Sect. I.) Also, that the decrees and determinations (of synods, etc.,) if consonant to the Word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission, not only for their agreement with the Word, but also for the power whereby they are made, as being an ordinance of God, appointed thereunto in his Word.—(Chap. XXXI., Sect. II.) It is, therefore, the doctrine of our Book, that Presbyterian Church government is *jure divino*; and the ultimate appeal for all who have accepted the standards of our Church, must be the Scriptures. "All synods, since the Apostles, may err, and many have erred."—(Conf. of Faith, Chap. XXXI., Sect. III.) The question about them all is, whether they be "consonant with the Word of God," (*Ibidem*, Sect. II.) "The Holy Scriptures are the only rule of faith and manners."—(Form of Govt., Chap. I., Sect. VIII.)

Now, then, amongst Presbyterians, human authorities can only be of weight in such a question as Church government, in so far as they consist with, or as they explain and enforce, the Scripture doctrine. It will not be denied by any of us that the true doctrine of Church government, by bodies of rulers chosen by the people, was early corrupted, and gave way, nearly all over the Church, to Prelacy first,

and then to Popery—the necessary development of Prelacy. Hidden amongst the Bohemian brethren during their long night of persecution, it was at length brought forth to the gaze of an awakened and reformed Church by John Calvin. But the recovery of this lost doctrine, by Calvin, and by the Church through him, was effected gradually. To appeal, therefore, to Calvin, or to the First Book of Discipline, or to the Second Book, or to the Westminster Assembly, or to the Church of Scotland at any subsequent period, is to appeal to authorities, in themselves, necessarily, all of them, fallible—and some of them, from their position, possessed of only limited weight. The doctrine was lost for ages, and in Calvin's day, was not perfectly recovered, nor, perhaps, was it perfectly recovered in the days of Knox; for the First Book of Discipline seems to have retained a modified Prelacy in the office of Superintendents. It has even been asserted by Dr. George Cook, in his *History of the Church of Scotland*, that John Knox held “the liberal and rational doctrine, that no particular form of Church government is exclusively prescribed by Scripture, and that it is a question of expediency what form should, under all the circumstances of any one country, be adopted.” This, we must suppose, is simply the slander of a Moderate, for Knox himself, in his preface to the First Book of Discipline, exhorts that nothing be admitted “quhilk ye be not abile to improve by Godde's written and revealed Word.” And Row, in his “*Historie of the Kirk of Scotland*,” says “they took not their pattern from any Kirk in the world, no, not fra Geneva itself, but, laying God's Word before them, made Reformation thereto, both in doctrine first, and then in discipline.”—(P. 12.) Andrew Melville, however, (says Cook,) “placed the matter upon a very different and most alarming foundation. His object was to support the innovations which he sought to introduce by the authority of the Sacred Word. In short, he introduced that doctrine of the Divine right of forms of

ecclesiastical polity, which exerted in Scotland the malignant influence which might have been anticipated from it."—(Cook's Ch. of Scotland, Vol. I., pp. 249, 250.) Andrew Melville, receiving from Beza, at Geneva, ten years after Calvin's death, the idea that the Scriptures were directly hostile to Prelacy, had no sooner returned to Scotland, than he set himself to work to rid the Church of it. The Second Book of Discipline was the work of men guided and directed by him.* That book, appearing in 1581, twenty years after the First Book, contains a full and masterly exhibition of the Presbyterian doctrine of Church government. Its leading principles rest on the express authority of the Word of God. Its subordinate arrangements are supported by the general rules of Scripture. It is to-day a standard of the Church of Scotland in respect of Government and Discipline. Yet it recounts abuses which still existed and required removal. These relics of Prelacy and Popery remained in the Church of Scotland, notwithstanding all the efforts of Melville and his coadjutors to comply with Beza's earnest exhortation and prediction, that if they did not "root out entirely the human episcopacy, the most enormous abuses would follow."

* The Assembly of 1576, appointed "for making an overture of the policy and jurisdiction of the Kirk, and uttering the plain and simple meaning of the Assembly therein, the brethren undernamed to take pains, reason, confer, and deliberate gravely and circumspectly upon the heads of the said policy, and to report their opinions advisedly to the next Assembly, viz: James the Bishop of Glasgow, Andrew Melville, Andrew Hay, James Gregg, Patrick Adamson, David Cuninghame," and a good many others. They met, we are told by Calderwood, and also by James Melville, "in Mr. David Cuninghame's house, then sub-Deane of Glasgow and Deane of Facultis, a man of good accompt at that time. None was so franke in the caus as he. He moderat the reasoning, gatherit up the conclusiones, and putt all in writ and ordour to be reported to the Assemblie. But such was the sagacitie of Mr. Andrew Melville, that he deemed that neither he nor Mr. Patrick Adamson would prove freinds to the caus in the end. And so it proved indeed."—(Calderwood's Kirk of Scotland, Vol. III., pp. 363 and 368. Also, see Diary of James Melville, pp. 55 and 56.

King James, then a boy of fifteen, and his dissolute and avaricious favorites, Lennox and Arran, the former born and bred a Papist, the latter profane and vicious, and both hypocrites in their profession of the Presbyterian faith, favored the preservation of these prelatie elements in the Church. It gave them power to compel and bias its courts, and to secure to themselves the revenues of the larger benefices by those cringing sycophants, the *tulchan* bishops, so called in allusion to the Highland custom of placing a *tulchan*, or calf's skin stuffed with straw, before the cows, to make them give down their milk. "The *tulchan* bishop got the title, (says Calderwood,) but my Lord got the milk or commoditie." And what was the whole subsequent history of the Church of Scotland during all of James' reign, first in Scotland and then in England, but one continued struggle with royal knavery and prelatie treachery? Chiefly by means of men who had solemnly sworn to maintain Presbyterian Church government, were the five articles of Perth forcibly carried through the Assembly, by which the glaring innovations were perpetrated, of *kneeling at the communion*; *observance of holidays*; *Episcopal confirmation*; *private baptism*, and the *private dispensation of the Lord's supper*. Long was the 4th August, 1621, the day when these acts were ratified by the Lord High Commissioner, known in Scotland as THE BLACK SATURDAY; for at the moment when he rose to give the formal ratification, by touching the acts with the sceptre, a terrific storm of thunder and lightning, with hailstones of prodigious magnitude, and a perfect flood of rain, burst upon the city of Edinburgh, and imprisoned for an hour and a half the men who were committing treason against heaven's King, by subjecting His Church to a king on the earth. Calderwood says "the day was black with man's guilt, and with the frowns of heaven." Hetherington well observes that this whole transaction "shows that the greatest danger a Church has to encounter, is that arising from internal cor-

ruption. King James could not overthrow the Church of Scotland till he had gained some of its ministers and corrupted its courts ;” and that “in all the crafty despot’s measures, there was a strange tacit recognition of one of the leading principles which he sought to overthrow—the independent right of the Church to regulate its own procedure on its own authority—for every one of the distinctive acts by which Presbytery was overthrown and Prelacy introduced, was so contrived as to have its origin in some court or commission of the Church ; never first in a civil court.”

The same troubles, arising from the remains of Prelacy in the Church of Scotland, continued all through the reign of Charles I. The Church was allied to the State, and this gave opportunity and temptation to Scotch royalty—now transferred to the English throne—to seek the ecclesiastical assimilation of Scotland with England. The constant effort of Prelacy, all through Charles’ reign, was to conform the Scotch to the English Church government. Edinburgh itself was made a Bishoprict. Scotch prelates prepared the Book of Canons, with which Scotland was to be flooded, and which was subversive of the whole constitution of the Church of Scotland—and yet the claim was set up that all these Canons were taken from the acts of the General Assemblies held in former years. Then a Liturgy was prepared for the Presbyterians of Scotland, revised by Bishop Land’s own hand, and “letters of horning,” that is, of outlawry, were prepared against all ministers who should refuse to make use of it. By such measures as these was Presbyterian Scotland driven to renew her Covenant, and marshal her forces against her treacherous monarch. The great Assembly of that year, 1638, annuls all the corrupt Assemblies by which Prelacy had been introduced, viz: those of 1606, 1608, 1616, 1617, and 1618; condemns the five Articles of Perth, the Book of Canons, the Liturgy and Book of Ordination; and deposed the Prelates. This is well

called Scotland's SECOND REFORMATION—in which, as Hetherington says, not one principle was called into action that had not been either in active operation, or at least distinctly stated, in the first. The great principles of the Swiss Reformation had pierced into the very core of Scotland's heart, but their development had been obstructed by nobles and kings, who struggled, for selfish reasons, to substitute a totally uncongenial frame-work of government and discipline; or, rather, to revive again the old corrupt Church government, which, unfortunately, had never been altogether overthrown in the Scotch Church itself. Beza's predictions to Melville were being fulfilled.

If we pass over all the bloody and cruel efforts of persecuting Prelacy in the Church of Scotland to regain its power during the reign of Charles II., and come down to the Revolution of 1688, we shall see that, even under King William, there was supposed to be room to hope that the partial conformity in the Church of Scotland might be nursed into her consent, as a whole body, to receive a modified Episcopacy. Such a union between the two parts of his realm would have well suited William's State policy. Personally favorable to the Presbyterian polity, as well as a pious man, he yet did not regard any form of Church government of Divine authority, and so his idea was, that both Churches should abate somewhat of their distinctive peculiarities, and unite in some intermediate arrangement. He, therefore, delayed his recognition of Presbytery as the State religion of Scotland, and when he did consent to its establishment, it was, observes Hetherington, as being "agreeable to the Word of God," instead of "grounded upon the infallible truth of God's Word," the expression used by Knox at the first establishment of the Presbyterian Church. Thus did William pursue a course which both alienated and paralyzed his Presbyterian friends, to whom chiefly he owed the British crown. He had a Minister, Carstares, himself a Presbyterian, but one of that class who

do not understand the very essence of Presbyterian Church government, viz : "that Jesus Christ is the only Head and King of His Church." His Presbyterian light, like that of some of the great Doctors of Divinity in our own American Church, was but "cold reflected lunar light;" that of Knox Melville, Henderson, and the other leaders of the first and second Reformations, was "direct sunshine," for, as Hetherington draws the contrast, "he was a Presbyterian through education and by habit and for expediency, but they by the grace of God." Accordingly, the Restoration Settlement of the Church, under such a Minister of such a King, was defective. William's policy was Erastian. He was, also, earnest for the inclusion of the Prelatic clergy, as far as possible, in the Established Church of Scotland. He was, accordingly, most reluctant to consent to the abolition of patronage. The temporizing Carstares supported his master in this policy. Nor did the Church herself protest. The first, and several succeeding General Assemblies, complied with the King's policy, and received a considerable number of the Prelatic clergy into her bosom. Thus was sowed in the Church the seed out of which grew up Moderatism.

All parties now pursued a weak and temporizing policy, keeping back their ruling principles, but not abandoning them. One national Church of Scotland, including Prelatists and Presbyterians, was the aspiration and hope of all. The Cameronian Covenanters alone disdained all compromise of principle, and loudly censured the Church because she had accepted the revolution settlement without any recognition of the national covenants, and of the second Reformation, which those solemn bonds had so greatly aided to effect. William dies, and Queen Anne's reign witnesses the union of Scotland with England. The seat of Scottish government is removed to London. The Scotch nobility and gentry become familiar with the forms, ceremonies, want of discipline and Erastian subserviency of the Church of England. Early and persevering attempts are

made by the British legislature to alter the government of the Scotch Church, or at least reduce it to a state of complete political thralldom. Now is felt the damage done to that Church by the admission into her bosom of so many Prelatic curates, through weak compliance with William's pernicious policy. Cold friends without her bosom, and treacherous mercenaries within, were too much for the enfeebled Church. From this time forward, as her own Hetherington describes her, she is a declining and unfaithful Church. Patronage, which William had abolished, is now reimposed by Act of Parliament. The Moderates, under its influence, at once spring forward, as a dominant party. Erskine and his three friends make the first secession. Then follows the Relief secession, so called because the seceders declared they went out to get *relief* from the intolerable despotism of Patronage. The Moderates issue their manifesto, written by Principal Robertson, in which the ground is broadly taken that "the decisions of the General Assembly may neither be disputed nor disobeyed by inferior courts with impunity." They thus make Church power *lordly* and *magisterial*, instead of *ministerial*. The Evangelical party also put forth their manifesto, in which they declared the freedom of the individual conscience, and the right of Presbyteries to refuse to obey the Assembly, in the matter of settling a minister appointed by a patron not acceptable to the people.

The subsequent struggles of these conflicting views culminated in the exodus of the Free Church of Scotland. This has been well called THE THIRD REFORMATION of the Church of Scotland. She has asserted in that movement, faithfully and fully, the crown rights of the Redeemer. "Take from us the liberty of Assemblies, and take from us the Gospel," said John Knox. This is the principle for which the Church of Scotland had suffered so often, and suffered now again. But she never asserted faithfully that principle, but her sufferings were made to redound to her

benefit. In proportion as she has honored her king, He has always honored her. And in proportion as she has yielded that principle, has she always sunk into fatal spiritual lethargy. Of this, the long reign of Moderatism, with its fearful results to the Church and people of Scotland, and, on the contrary, the present prosperous condition of the Free Church, are eminent illustrations.

Now, if the lost doctrine of Church government was so long in being restored in Scotland, where it can not be said to be even yet perfectly restored now, since so large a portion of the Church there is still the creature of the State, is it not plain that testimony drawn from that source needs to be always carefully sifted? We want to know, when the appeal is made to the Church of Scotland, first, whether it is to the Free Church or to the Established Church; then, whether it is to this Established Church of Scotland in her good or bad times, that is, the times when she followed out the Scriptures, or the times when she did not. We may be expected to receive the judgment of her Assembly at one time, say in 1638, and to reject it at other times, say in 1606, 1608, 1616, 1617, 1618, or 1621. We may be expected to prefer her opinions when John Knox or Andrew Melville was her chief guide in obeying God's Word, rather than when she was guided by Carstares' temporising policy. As our private judgment of God's Word is what we go by, we must be expected to discriminate between different General Assemblies of the Church of Scotland, as we do between those of our own Church; as, say between the Assemblies of 1836 and of 1837, or between the Assembly of 1843, as to the elder question, and that of 1845, as to the question of Romish baptism. In a word, the authority of the Church of Scotland, or any other Church, has no weight whatever, except in so far as our private judgment of the Scriptures finds it therein sustained.

We submit now to the reader of what has recently appeared in the Repertory on "Theories of the Eldership," that this is not the idea of that writer in his numerous appeals "to the Church of Scotland and all the branches of the Presbyterian Church affiliated with it throughout the world." We ask the reader if he does not appeal to them as to so many authorities which, *in themselves*, have weight to settle this question. Does he not appeal to them very much as the Papist appeals to some council that settled and determined some article of faith? Nay, does he not appear to set great value upon the mere number of such testimonies which he is able to accumulate, piling them up one upon another, and all of them upon the heads of his antagonists, as if fain to bury them alive under the huge mass? But when these testimonies, thus accumulated, are taken up one by one, and examined, some of them are found perfectly irrelevant; many others incorrectly, yes, *unfairly*, quoted; and of the remainder, some are such as deserve no respect from us, and, perhaps, would receive none, did we but know them intimately. For an example of this sort: Who was Principal Hill? His testimony is more than once introduced by the Repertory's correspondent, with a great flourish, as though, of course, his very name must carry overwhelming influence. And no doubt, being so quoted, it has influence with many who do not happen to know what his position is in this controversy. Now, who, we again ask, was Principal Hill? He was the successor of Principal Robertson in the leadership of the Moderates of the Church of Scotland, and he was, accordingly, a bold and decided supporter of patronage in that Church. He was a supporter of those views which the best Presbyterians of Scotland have always struggled against; a supporter of the very principles which drove out the Free Church. Did not the writer of these articles in the Repertory, himself, once publicly laud to the skies the leaders of the Free Church in that noble exodus? And now does he quote a Moderate

like Principal Hill, in a controversy about Presbyterianism? It is well for him that he was writing for American Presbyterians and not for those of Scotland, where every true-hearted Presbyterian knows that Moderatism is essentially anti-Presbyterian and anti-scriptural, and where every intelligent one knows how to estimate the Church principles of Dr. Hill. But, let us ask the Repertory's correspondent if he never read the account of Dr. Hill's uniting with the other Moderates of the Assembly of 1796, to defeat the effort of the Evangelical men that year to engage the Church of Scotland in the work of Foreign Missions? We marvel that his own zeal for the cause of Foreign Missions—that sacred cause which consumed, to so large an extent, the vigorous portion of his own earnest ministry, and which now, in the decline of that ministry, is still so cherished and so dear to his heart—we wonder that his zealous devotion to that sacred cause did not compel him to refrain from dragging Principal Hill into this argument. Let us tell the reader (we write for ruling elders as well as ministers) that one of those Moderates, on that occasion, Mr. George Hamilton, minister of Gladsmuir, said, that “to spread abroad the knowledge of the Gospel among barbarous and heathen nations, seems to be highly preposterous, in as far as it anticipates, nay, it even reverses, the order of nature. Men must be polished and refined before they can be properly enlightened in religious truths. Philosophy and learning must, in the nature of things, take the precedence.” Then followed a glowing eulogium upon the “simple virtues of the untutored Indian.” He said, again: “when they shall be told that man is *saved not by good works, but by faith*, what will be the consequence?” At length, directing his attention to the idea of *collections for the aid of missions* (here, surely, we touch the very heart of the Repertory's correspondent, to whose immortal honor let us make a record of it, that he has done more, by God's blessing, to bring up the Church to some measure

of her duty in the matter of collections for Foreign Missions and other good causes, than any man we know)—directing his attention to this matter, Mr. Hamilton exclaimed: “For such improper conduct censure is too small a mark of disapprobation; it would, I doubt not, be a legal subject of penal prosecution.” Another of the Moderate party, Dr. Carlyle, of Inveresk, who had been quite ready to spend time and money in theatrical amusements, rose and said: “I have, on various occasions, during a period of almost half a century, had the honor of being a member of the General Assembly, yet this is the first time I remember to have heard such a proposition made, and I can not help also thinking it the worst time.” He, therefore, seconded Mr. Hamilton’s motion, that the overtures be immediately dismissed. Dr. Hill, like a real and true Moderate, made a cautious, plausible speech, evading the main topic, and concluding with a more guarded motion, admitting generally the propriety of aiding in the propagation of the Gospel, and recommending the promotion of Christianity at home, but disapproving the collections. David Boyle, Esq., Advocate, indulged in a furious philippic against Missionary Societies, as all of a political character, and dangerous to the peace of the community. Finally, the motions of Mr. Hamilton and Dr. Hill were combined, and carried by a majority of fourteen, the vote being fifty-eight to forty-four. “So well satisfied were the Moderates with the conduct of Mr. Hamilton (says Hetherington, from whom we get this account), and with his brilliant victory, that they soon afterwards honored him with the title of Doctor in Divinity, and elevated him to the Moderator’s chair, as a reward for his anti-missionary exertions.” And this is the party to which we are to be sent, and by this writer, of all our brethren, for instruction in the doctrine of the government of His Church, who said: “Go, preach to every creature.” And these anti-missionary General Assemblies of the established Church

of Scotland it is, that, of all others, are to teach us, and through this particular brother of ours, the true nature and genius of Presbyterianism !

It will now be felt, we think, by every reader, that there is necessarily great danger in any careless appeal to past authorities about Church government—that, in fact, the doctrine is now better understood in Scotland, by the Free Church, than it ever was understood in Scotland at any previous period—that it is better understood, on some points, by American Presbyterians, than any where else in the world; and that whoever would look backwards for light on the subject, must, in the first place, *look all the way back* to the Scriptures; and secondly, in looking at any particular point of the development of the doctrine, after it was exhumed by Calvin, and began again to be received into the Church's experience, he must always be ready to compare the positions assumed directly with God's Word, according to the best light of his own private judgment, enlightened by God's Spirit.

Having said these things as to the true and just value of all human authorities, and especially of the true and just value of the Church of Scotland, in this argument, let us refer to one of the famous testimonies of that Church, wherein most undoubtedly she does deliver herself according to the Word of God. Let us distinguish broadly between the dishonest utterances of many of her insincere and unpresbyterian ministers and General Assemblies, on the one hand, and on the other, this glorious deliverance of her early days, when, guided chiefly by Andrew Melville, she took her doctrine right from the Bible. Let us take up that SECOND BOOK OF DISCIPLINE, which was engrossed in the acts of the Assembly of 1581, and is still acknowledged as the chief standard of the Scottish Church, to see what it teaches respecting the ruling eldership. Of this book, McCrie says, (in his life of Melville, pp. 124, 125,) "It has secured the cordial and lasting

attachment of the people of Scotland; whenever it has been wrested from them by arbitrary violence, they have uniformly embraced the first favorable opportunity of demanding its restoration; and the principal secessions which have been made from the National Church have been stated, not in the way of dissent from its constitution, as in England, but in opposition to departures, real or alleged, from its original and genuine principles." Now, this book is one of the authorities of the Church of Scotland, which is repeatedly referred to by the Repertory's correspondent as sustaining his views. Let the reader judge of the correctness of his statements by the following quotations, bearing in mind that it is alleged:

1. That "this fundamental constitution of the Church of Scotland confines the term *Presbyter*, to ministers."

2. That it "discards imposition of hands in the ordination of ruling elders," and also makes them "incapable of the imposition of their hands in the ordination of ministers."

3. That it makes ruling elders to be, "not of the same order with ministers," but "only of the same order as the people, and having only the power which the people themselves might exercise;" in other words, that it makes them "*laymen*," and not high spiritual functionaries. And, also, that it makes their presence in the courts of the Church, "not necessary, like the presence of ministers."—(See *Princeton Review* April, 1860, p. 203; July, 1860, pp. 459, 462.)

Now, speaking of the office-bearers of the Church in general, the Second Book says:

There are four ordinarie functionis or offices in the Kirk of God, the office of the pastor, minister, or bishop; the doctor; the presbyter or eldar; and the deacon.—(Chap. II., sect. 10.)

Speaking in particular of the doctor, it says:

7. Ane of the twa ordinar and perpetuall functionis that travell in the Word is the office of the doctor, quha also may be callit prophet,

bisshop, eldar, catechizar, that is teicher of the catechisme and rudiments of religion.—(Chap. V., sect. 1.)

5. The doctor being an elder, as said is, sould assist the pastor in the government of the Kirk and concurre with the elders, his brethren, in all assemblies; by reason the interpretation of the word, quhilk is onlie judge in ecclesiasticall matters, is committit to his charge.—(Chap. V., sects. 1 and 5.)

Speaking of the elders and their office, it says :

1. The word eldar, in the Scripture, sumetyne is the name of age, sumetyne of office.

2. When it is the name of ane office, sumetyne it is taken largely, comprehending, als weill the Pastors and Doctors as them who are callit seniors or elders.

3. In this, our division, we call those elders whom the Apostles call presidents or governours.

4. Their office, as it is ordinar, so it is perpetuall, and always necessar in the Kirk of God.

5. The eldership is a spirituall function, as is the ministrie.

6. Eldaris anis lawfully callit to the office, and having gifts of God, meit to exercise the same, may not leive it again.

9 It is not necessar that all elders be also teichars of the Word, albeit the chief aucht to be sic, and swa ar worthie of double honour.

17. Their principall office is to hold assemblies with the pastors and doctors, who are also of their number, for establishing of gude order and execution of discipline. Unto the quhilks assemblies all persones ar subject that remain within their bounds.—(Chap. VI., sects. 1–6, 9, 17.)

Speaking of the elderships (or Presbyteries) and other assemblies, it says :

1. Elderschips and assemblies are commonly constitute of Pastors, Doctors, and sic as we commonlie call elders, that labour not in the Word and doctrine, of quhom, and of whais severall power hes bene spokin.

18. It pertaines to the elderschip to take heid that the Word of God be purely preichit within their bounds, the sacraments rightly ministrat, the discipline rightly maintenit, and the ecclesiasticall gudes uncorruptlie distributit.—(Chap. VII., sects. 1, 18.)

Speaking of the way in which “persons that beir ecclesiasticall functions ar admitted to their office,” it says :

6. This ordinar and outward calling hes twa parts, election and ordinatione.

7. Election is the chusing out of a person or persons maist able to the office that vaikes (is vacant), by the judgment of the eldership

and consent of the congregation to whom the person or person beis appointed.

11. Ordinatione is the separation and sanctifying of the persone appointit, to God and his Kirk, eftir he be weill tryit and fund qualifiet.

12. The ceremonies of ordinatione are fasting, earnest prayer, and imposition of the hands of the eldership.—(Chap. III., sects. 6, 7, 11, 12.)

Speaking again of the power of the elderships or Presbyteries, it says :

22. The power of election of them who beir ecclesiasticall charges perteines to this kynde of assemblie, within their awin bounds, being well erectit and constitute of many pastors and elders of sufficient abilitie.

23. By eldership is meant sic as are constitute of pastouris, doctouris, and sic as now ar callit eldaris.

24. By the like reason, their deposition, also, perteines to this kynde of assemblie, etc., etc.—(Chap. VII., sects. 22, 23, 24.)

We need not comment upon these extracts. They are a clear, as well as full and complete exhibition of the doctrine of the Second Book, upon the points in dispute between us and the Repertory's correspondent. The reader has only to compare carefully together these several articles, and he will plainly see in them that very theory of eldership now called "the new theory." The only difference is, that the Second Book makes a distinction in the office of teaching elder, between pastors and doctors, which is, perhaps, not borne out by the Scriptures, and accordingly may not now be accepted. But, with this exception, the Second Book of Discipline exactly presents to the reader what both the editor of the Repertory and his correspondent have had the temerity to denounce as "novel." There is held forth in this ancient document the Scripture doctrine of one order of elders, divided into two classes, of teaching and ruling elders. There is held forth here the Scripture doctrine that every Presbyter rules, while some Presbyters teach as well as rule; that the essence of the Presbyterate is the ruling function, while teaching is a superadded, and yet a more honorable one; that, accordingly, Presbyter does not

mean preacher, but strictly and properly sets forth the ruler; and that as a true scriptural and constitutional Presbyter, the ruling elder may take part in ordaining with the imposition of hands "all persons that beir ecclesiasticall functiones," precisely as it "pertaines to the eldership constitute of pastouris, doctouris, and sic as ar now callit eldaris, to depose them." The elder is the aboriginal Presbyter. All power of rule or discipline is in the hands of elderships. But the power of doctrine is in the hands of the individual teacher. Every ordained Preacher is also a Presbyter, but not every Presbyter is likewise a Preacher.

But, whilst we waive all extended comment upon these extracts, let the reader observe the curious use made of one portion of them by the Repertory's correspondent. That famous distinction, so much insisted on by him, between the *general*, the *large*, the *wide*, the *appellative*, sense of the title Presbyter, and its *official* application, is partly based on one portion of these extracts. The argument by which the distinction is proved to be there found, is a perfect gem of ratiocination. "When the word elder (says the Second Book) is the name of ane office, sumetyme it is taken largely, comprehending als weill the pastors and doctors as them who are callit seniors or elders;" that is to say, the term, strictly applied, refers to "them who are callit seniors," but it is "sumetyme largely taken as comprehending as weill the pastors and doctors." Thus speaks the Second Book. But the Repertory's correspondent, by a species of logic all his own, draws from this statement the following conclusion: "Thus plainly does this fundamental constitution of the Church of Scotland confine the term Presbyter (or elder, in its strict official sense) to ministers, and apply it only in its *large* sense to those representatives of the people, whose proper name is governor, or ruler."—(April, 1860, p. 203.) The Second Book says: "Presbyter, or elder, properly and strictly refers to the ruler, but largely it comprehends also the teacher." And the Repertory's correspondent con-

cludes that plainly the Book thus confines the term *Presbyter*, or *elder*, in its strict official sense, to ministers, and applies it only in its large sense to rulers! The *Repertory's* correspondent is from the *Emerald Isle*; he has a national right to the privilege of *blundering*, and we would not deny to him any of his rights. It is a serious thing, however, for a man to perpetrate a long series of blunders, through successive articles, when his own reputation, and that of the organ through which they are published, gives them so much currency all over the Church. In this aspect, we are grieved at the haste, the carelessness, the confusion, which characterize, in general, the statements of this correspondent of the *Princeton Review*. His readers are constantly liable to be misled by him. Individual opinions, and the standards of Churches, are not only appealed to as guides, oracles, having authority to settle the question; but they are also appealed to carelessly and blunderingly, and are frequently construed to prove, as in the instance just referred to, the very opposite of what they assert. We are well aware, of course, that all careful students must, sooner or later, make this discovery for themselves. No man, however great his influence, or exalted his position, can exhibit carelessness in stating, or partisan unscrupulousness in quoting, the opinions of others, without forfeiting, sooner or later, the confidence of his readers. We know how to be charitable to the faults of a writer's temperament. Yet it is due to our readers to declare the fact here referred to; it is due, also, to the truth we are defending, for that truth belongs not to us but to the Lord, who revealed it, and who has called us to its defence.

We have said nothing in this article respecting the just and true historical value of general references to the authority of the Church of Scotland, which is not admitted by the most distinguished Scotch Presbyterians now living. PRINCIPAL CUNNINGHAM, in a *Defence of the people's rights in the appointment of their ministers*, published in

1841, just two years before his views got their complete vindication in the exodus of the Free Church, said very much the same things. Indeed, he had a task very much like our own, though, alas! we have nothing like his ability to perform it. He was replying to "Observations on the Veto Act, by the Rev. James Robertson, minister of Ellon"—more recently, Dr. Robertson, Professor of Church History in Edinburgh University, and intelligence of whose decease on the 2d December, 1860, has just reached this country. This Dr. Robertson was, as early as 1841, one of the ablest leaders of the Moderate party, and wrote strongly in favor of patronage. Dr. Cunningham speaks of him as a "very voluminous writer, possessed of both talent and diligence." It was one of his "infirmities as a controversial writer, to be frequently boasting of the *demonstrative* character of the facts and arguments adduced by him." Nothing could be clearer or more conclusive than his heaped-up proofs—confidence and positiveness ran through all the superabundant mass. So full of boldness and hardihood was he in urging his opinions, that he scrupled not to allege in favor of intrusion, "the direct testimony of Andrew Melville himself," with "that, also, of Calvin and Beza." And he knew how, as well as any body our readers ever met with, "to introduce, with an extraordinary flourish of trumpets, his attempt to explain away the obvious and natural meaning of the Second Book of Discipline." "Fortunately (said he) for the complete and decisive resolution of the great constitutional principle of our ecclesiastical polity which the question at issue involves, the records of authentic history enable us to bring the testimony both of Andrew Melville and of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, to bear directly and conclusively upon the point before us." Patiently and laboriously Dr. Cunningham wades through his proofs, so confidently alleged, as through all the other irrelevant mass accumulated by his antagonist, and proves that Dr. Robertson, with all his

boastings, had not produced a particle of evidence, or any thing like evidence, to support his allegation respecting Melville, or Calvin, or Beza. Then, as to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, he shows that Mr. Robertson "can produce only a shuffling and fraudulent declaration of an unfaithful Assembly, which was notoriously corrupted by royal influence." Then does Dr. Cunningham quote Calderwood's memorable words respecting the Assembly of 1596: "Here end the sincere General Assemblies of the Kirk of Scotland." He adds, that "the corruption was gradual, and did not always advance with uniform progression; but no sound Presbyterian receives with much deference the statements of any Assembly after that of 1596, down to the famous Assembly of 1638." The Assembly at Perth, to which we alluded above, met in March, 1597, and was followed in May, of the same year, by another at Dundee. Both were corrupt Assemblies. Yet, with great triumph, Dr. Robertson had produced one of the "explanations" put forth by the corrupt Assembly at Dundee, of the articles agreed to at the corrupt Assembly at Perth, as "most important and altogether decisive of the meaning of the expression 'the consent of the people,' as that expression occurs in the Second Book of Discipline." But Dr. C. holds that the articles agreed to at Perth, and the explanations of them put forth at Dundee, were "just an exhibition of base shuffling, by a body of dishonest men who retained some regard for decency, but none for principle, and are entitled to no more respect, from honest Presbyterians, than the proceedings of those Assemblies which were held during the darkest period of Moderate domination." He holds that "the deliverance of such an Assembly as that at Dundee, should have no weight whatever with honest Presbyterians, in determining what was the doctrine of the Church and the import of the Second Book of Discipline."

From the Assembly of 1638, which brought in the second Reformation, down to the time of the glorious revolution of 1688, we have a period of just half a century, filled with the most interesting and stirring movements. The Covenanters, the Westminster Assembly, the death of Charles I., the rule of Cromwell, the restoration of the Stuarts to power, persecutions, oppressions, martyrdoms, fill up the record. Of the first twenty years after the Revolution, Dr. Cunningham says :

Upon the whole, the Church was, during this period, in a most efficient condition, and conferred most important benefits upon the country. But, about the time of the Restoration of patronage (under the reign of Anne, in 1712) the elements of spiritual corruption and decay began to work and to show themselves. The old, faithful ministers, who had endured the persecution, had gone to their rest; the corrupting influence of the Episcopalian conformists, who had been received into the Church, was extending itself; men of ability and activity, but of unsound principles, and destitute, apparently, of personal religion, were made Principals of Universities and Professors of Divinity; and this, combined with the exercise of patronage, restored by a Popish and Jacobitical faction, and exercised generally by an irreligious and profligate aristocracy, spread the leaven of iniquity, and thus paved the way for the ascendancy of the Moderate party. Under their reign, during the latter half of the last century, the preaching of sound doctrine and the practice of serious religion were discountenanced by the whole weight of ecclesiastical authority; every thing that a Christian Church ought to aim at was disregarded; the Church courts did their utmost to protect those accused of heresy and crime, and manifested as much indifference about the interests of morality, which they pretended to respect, as about the doctrines of the Gospel, which they avowedly despised. It would be well if the men of our own day were better acquainted with the real character and the fearful consequences of Moderation; and it would be an important service to the cause of truth and righteousness, if any one competent to the task would give us a history of the rise and progress, the decline and fall, of that anti-Christian system.

Elsewhere, he names as "the two leading elements of Moderate policy, subserviency to secular influence, and a desire of clerical domination." Let this last statement be carefully considered by our readers. Let them, also, pay attention to the following warnings of Dr. Cunningham to his own Church, which she took, and went out from the

Establishment—warnings which apply to our Church also, inasmuch as the rights of ruling elders are denied them in ordination of ministers :

It is as much the duty of the Church to aim at having the whole subject of the appointment of ministers brought into conformity with every intimation of God's will regarding it, as it is the duty of men in general to attend upon the means of grace ; and the Church has no more right to expect that Christ will give her pastors after His own heart, when the arrangements connected with their election and admission are not in accordance with His will, than men have to expect the communications of Divine grace when they have neglected the ordinances which God has appointed. Our ancestors understood this principle, for we find that the Assembly of 1644, in a letter to their commissioners at the Westminster Assembly, used these memorable words, which ought to be engraven on the hearts, and ought to influence the conduct, of all the members of our Church : "When the ordination and entry of ministers shall be conformable to the ordinance of God, there is to be expected a richer blessing shall be poured out from above, both of furniture and assistance upon themselves, and of success upon their labors."

These are the words of truth and soberness. They proceed from one who justly recognizes the arrangements of Church government as matters about which the Head of the Church has a definite will, which He has made known to us in the Scriptures. It is true, the people's right to choose their own minister is one question, and the nature and authority of the ruling elder's office is another. But it is hard to say which of the two is the more important. Surely, to deny that the elder's office is a high spiritual function—to assert that he is only a layman—that he is not a Presbyter—that he is not a full or a necessary member of the Church courts, like the "clergyman"—that he has not the right to take part in every act of the Presbytery of which he is a member—that he has not the right to lay on his hands in the ordination of the "clergy"—that that act is not the act of the Presbytery, but only of the ministers of the body,—that only ministers can make a minister—surely these, and other statements like these, look strongly to *clerical domination*,

and are of the spirit of Moderation. And, surely, the Prelatic ideas and hierarchical expressions about "the clergy" and "the laity," which are so rife among some of the leaders of our Church, show that it would be well for us, as well as the men of the Free Church, to understand more about the history of that anti-Christian system. Would that some one of our own brethren may adopt Dr. C.'s suggestion, and study and write out the history of Moderatism in the Church of Scotland. Let him begin with the earliest dawn of the Reformation in that country, viewing that as the unburying of the lost doctrine and order of Christ's Church. Let him trace the incomplete resurrection of the truth, as set forth in 1560, in the First Book of Discipline;—its fuller development in 1581, in the Second Book;—its vigorous life and action till the Assembly of Perth, in 1597, when the old Prelatic government again recovered strength and sway;—its feebleness until 1638, when it once more arose in its Divine beauty and power;—its struggles and difficulties down to 1688;—then its efficient influence till the revival of patronage in 1712;—the submission of the Church to that unrighteousness, because she had lost the martyr spirit of Knox and Melville, through the admission of so many Prelatic incumbents into her bosom;—the temporizing policy now practiced by the Prelatic majority of the Assembly, and the tyranny of that majority, resulting in the first Secession of 1734, and then in the Relief Secession of 1761;—the culmination of Moderate power in 1784, when the old protest against patronage, long a mere form by the Moderate Assemblies, was finally dropped, and when the most active managers in ecclesiastical affairs could with difficulty be restrained (says McCrie) from bringing forward a motion to discard the Confession of Faith, and all tests of orthodoxy;—and then the overthrow of Moderation, by the passage of the act on Calls (since generally known as the Veto Act), in May, 1834, just one hundred years after the Erskines and other Fathers of the Secession

appealed, for their own justification, to "the first free and reforming Assembly." Seven years after the termination of the reign of Moderation in the Church, her conflict with the State came to its crisis, and the Free Church went out. Let the writer of this history there close his account of the Moderates of the Church of Scotland.

We have one more quotation to make from Dr. Cunningham's pamphlet, showing the true historical value of all general references to the testimony of our mother Church :

The truth is, (says he) that the Reformers of the Continent, just like the Reformers of our own country, did not succeed in getting their views about the appointment of ministers adopted and acted upon by the civil authorities ; and, therefore, we are not to look to the civil law, *or to the actual practice*, which must have been somewhat affected by the state of the law, in order to ascertain what the judgment of these Churches, and of their founders, was ; while, at the same time, it is manifest that it is only the mature and deliberate judgment of the great Reformers which should possess the slightest weight, either in influencing our opinions, or in assisting us to ascertain the views of the Reformers of our own country.

We put into italics the words *actual practice*, to attract to them the reader's attention. We are not to look, according to Dr. C., to its actual practice, to ascertain what is the judgment of any Church, but we must resort to the constitution and standards of that Church. Actual practice is only to be resorted to where the language of a constitution is ambiguous, and then it furnishes nothing better than presumptive evidence as to the meaning of the terms employed. This is a well-ascertained principle in all interpretation of legal documents ; even the decisions of courts have been overruled, when opposed to the plain meaning of the words used. Laws have actually been acquiesced in and obeyed for long periods, and yet afterwards decided to be unconstitutional and void. Take the case of patronage in the Church of Scotland : it was against the fundamental principles of her constitution, and yet for a long period ministers presented by patrons were obtruded on her con-

gregations. So the *plan of union*, abolished as unconstitutional, in 1837, by our own Church, was adopted when many of the framers of our Constitution were yet living, and received their sanction, and that of the whole Church, for many years. These illustrations show plainly that no argument drawn from actual practice is good against the plain meaning of a constitution; no, not even though many of the very men who helped to frame it should subsequently acquiesce in the contrary practice. Because it is to be considered that these persons may so acquiesce through ignorance or inadvertence, or even unfaithfulness to the constitution.

Now let us apply this principle to the argument of the Repertory's correspondent, drawn from the actual practice of the Church of Scotland, as to the not laying on of hands by elders, or upon elders, in ordination. He quotes Walter Steuart, of Purdivan, as laying down "the law" of the Scottish Kirk to this effect. But Steuart, himself, rightly proposed his work, "not as the deed of the Church of Scotland, or of any judicatory therein, only in so far as what is collected or observed in it shall be found supported by their acts or universal customs." The authority of that excellent work just answers to that of Dr. Baird's very useful and valuable digest of the acts of our own General Assembly. It is no more and no less than a digest made by one man. The Repertory's correspondent can produce no such law in either the First or the Second Book of Discipline, which were, we believe, the only authoritative formularies of the Church about government, from 1560 down to the 10th February, 1645, when that Church accepted the propositions of the Westminster Assembly concerning Kirk government. We repeat, he can find no such law in either of those books. And, even when he goes to Purdivan's collections, he reads:

In the Assemblies of the Church, ruling elders have a right to reason and vote in all matters coming before them, even as ministers

have. For, to General Assemblies, their commissions bear them to the same power with pastors. Howbeit, by the practice of our Church, the execution of some degrees of the Church doth belong to the pastors only, such as the imposition of hands, etc., etc.—(Title 7th, § 9.)

It is, therefore, Purdivan's testimony, that in the courts of the Church the law gives elders the same power as pastors—only the *actual practice* was for them not to lay hands upon ministers.

Now let us see what was "the law" of these two Books of Discipline. The First Book says simply as follows:

And so publiclie befor the people sould they be placeit in their Kirk and joint to their flock at the desire of the samin; other ceremonies except fasting with prayer, *sic as laying on of hands, we judge not necessair in the institution of ministerie.*

We print in italics the words to which we desire the reader to give special heed. The First Book simply declared imposition of hands *not necessary* in any ordination at all, *whether of the minister or the elder*. The reaction against the superstitions of Rome was driving them to a simplicity more than scriptural. It is to be concluded, of course, that no ordination was with imposition of hands from 1560 down to the period of the Second Book.

Now, what was "the law," according to the Second Book? Let the reader refer above to pages 828, 829, and he will see that it declared the eldership to be a spiritual function, just as the ministry is; that a lawful call consisted of election and ordination; that the ceremonies of ordination are fasting, prayer and the imposition of the hands of the eldership; that the eldership or Presbytery was constituted of pastors and elders; that in that body was the power of election and deposing both ministers and elders, and that the election, ordination, and deposition of the ministers and of the elders were identical. The one was, just as much as the other, a high spiritual officer. Both were to be called and set apart in the same way, and with the same cere-

monies, and both had the same part to act in the calling, ordaining, and deposing of other persons.

Such, then, was "the law" of the Kirk, after the first twenty years of its history. Imposition of hands is no longer dreaded as superstitious, or declared to be not necessary. It is the right rule of ordination to all ecclesiastical offices. But how did it happen that, when restored by our forefathers to its true scriptural authority, it should after that be confined to ministers, not, indeed, in the law, but in the *practice*, of the Church? Our venerable and beloved preceptor in Church government, Dr. Miller, who advocates earnestly and unanswerably, in his work on the Ruling Elder, "the return of our Church to the scriptural example and the primitive usage" of the imposition of hands upon and by elders in ordination, but whose position on this point has been grievously misrepresented by the Repertory's correspondent, (see Repertory for July, 1860, pp. 457-459, and compare with Miller on the Ruling Elder, Chap. XIII.,) suggests, by way of explanation, that one mistake made by them led to another. They began by considering the office temporary—the First Book made it annual. Annually elected, it perhaps seemed incongruous that they should be ordained in the same way as the more permanent teachers. But the objection to this theory is, that the Second Book made elders perpetual, just as ministers, and yet the latter were under it ordained with imposition, and the former were not. Our own impression is, that there is no great difficulty in accounting for this discrepancy between the law and the actual practice of the Church. It is always difficult to change the practice of a people. The Church of Scotland began the use of the office by discouraging imposition of hands in all ordinations alike; afterwards, when they changed their law, it was difficult to get the practice altered conformably. Calderwood declares, in his *Altare Damascenum*, page 689, (and he lived from 1575 to 1650, including the whole period of the Second Book,) that

“many ministers amongst us are held to be lawful ministers, who yet have never received imposition of hands.” His original words will be found quoted in the note below. Now, this language seems to indicate that it was not easy to get even all ministerial ordinations made conformably to the new law, and what wonder is it that the elders were not generally ordained in the right and scriptural way?

But, speaking of CALDERWOOD, we are reminded that he, too, is one of the Presbyterian authorities which have been misquoted by the Repertory's correspondent, against the rights of the ruling elder. Yes, Calderwood, stout old David Calderwood, the author of “*Altare Damascenum, seu Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ Politia Ecclesiæ Scoticanæ obtrusa—The Altare of Damascus, or the Polity of the English Church obtruded on the Church of Scotland*”—that great storehouse of anti-Prelatic arguments, which never have been answered; the fearless and uncompromising Calderwood, the hater of Prelacy in all its forms, is made to favor these Prelatic notions of the Repertory's correspondent! And how is this done? It is done by misquoting and misrepresenting him. We can not believe this misrepresentation to be intentional. We rather choose to ascribe it to a native impetuosity of mind, which pauses not to scruple about the means of carrying the point at issue—a zeal for opinions which can see nothing unfavorable any where—a strength of will in debate, which forces every authority into its own service, even if violence has to be employed. Let the reader compare the quotation alleged to be from Calderwood, on page 459, Repertory for July, 1860, with what we here translate from his work, the original being placed below in the note. He will see, first, that words are forced into Calderwood's mouth which he did not use, and secondly, that a mere hypothetical passage is employed as if it were a positive statement, all the preceding language being suppressed in the quotation, which would have set forth the true opinions of Calderwood:

Similarly may be answered that which Tilenus says, that "there is no place for our Presbyters in that Presbytery which Paul speaks of in 1 Tim. 4 : 14, because we do not hold that the right of laying on hands can belong to lay elders; and that no one can assume this office without imposition of hands; right and the laws permit no layman to impose hands." That no one without the imposition of hands can take this office, is false. With us, many are legitimate ministers on whom hands were never imposed. Imposition of hands was held amongst us, from the beginning of the Reformation, to be a thing indifferent, as formerly Tilenus, himself, said.—(See p. 175.) Those who have invaded the Episcopates, urge this rite as necessary, because this is almost the only difference between the Bishop and the Presbyter, as says Bilson. It is false, likewise, that lay elders can not impose hands upon those who are to be ordained. "Right and the laws do not permit it," he says. By what right are they excluded? They are, thou sayest, *laymen*. Are they laymen because elected from the people? Then the Bishops, Presbyters, Deacons will be laymen, because they all are chosen from the people, or may be chosen; or are they laymen because they handle lay affairs in their ministry? This is false. They handle the affairs of God and of the Church. If the Formalists put Deacons into the category of Clergy, who are only the ministers of tables and of widows, how much more may Seniors, chosen from the people, and called with a legitimate calling, be put by us into the number of ecclesiastical administrators? As to the word *clergy*, in that sense, we do not employ it. The administration of the Seniors is sacred, and it is numbered amongst those administrations, or ministries, which God has established in the Church. But what if even *laymen*, as thou speakest, that is, private believers in the Church, can impose hands? In the dedication of the Levites, the children of Israel leaned with their hands upon the Levites themselves, (Numbers, viii : 10.) That was a familiar rite of the Hebrews in their inaugurations, which the Apostles adopted as a custom but did not transmute into a sacrament. See several things about the rite above, page 158, and the following pages, where we have proved that it was a simple familiar gesture of prayer with the Hebrews, a sign indicating a person not signifying or exhibiting grace; and so was not a sacrament. Moreover, the Formalists distinguish between the imposition of the hands of a teaching Presbyter and of a Bishop; and they say, which, nevertheless, is false, that the consecrating, and, therefore, creating imposition of hands belongs to the Bishop, but that the Presbyters impose hands only to signify consent. "In the Presbyters, imposition of hands is a sign of their good wishes, but in the Bishop, it is a sign of his ordaining," says Saravia.—(See above, p. 166). More correctly, we say the sign of imposing hands is common to teaching and ruling elders; and that, for the sake of signifying consent, the Seniors may likewise impose hands, if it shall seem necessary, but to dedicate and consecrate with prayers, is solely of the minister. They wish the Bishop to pronounce the benediction,

together with the imposition of hands, not the Presbyter; although, at the same time, he does lay on hands to signify consent and assistance in the prayers. I concede that only that imposition of hands is reserved to the pastor or teaching Presbyter, which is conjoined with prayers and benediction. In sign, nevertheless, of consent and assistance, the ruling Presbyters may also impose hands. They do not impose hands, because it is not necessary. Neither do all the co-Presbyters of one Presbytery impose, but several of them, or very few of them, in the name of the others. One, even, might do it in the name of all. Finally, if we should grant that it is a sacrament, and that of this sacrament the Pastor-Presbyters are the administrators, nevertheless, elders would not be excluded from the Presbytery of 1 Tim. iv : 14, on the ground that imposition of hands does not belong to them. For the imposition of hands might be called the imposition of the hands of the Presbytery, although not all and singular of the Presbytery should have the power of imposing hands. It suffices that the chief part of the Presbytery have this power. As the tribe of Levi were said to apply the perfume, when, nevertheless, that was permitted only to the priests. Nothing can Tilenus elicit against the function of ruling Presbyters from those three passages: Acts xx.; Titus i : 7; 1 Tim. iv : 14; nor by any interpretation drive us from the three places: 1 Tim. v : 17; Rom. vii : 7; and 1 Cor. ii; adduced for their establishment.—(*Altare Damascenum*, pp., 691, 692.)*

* Similiter respondetur ad illud, quod ait Tilenus, nullum locum esse Presbyteris nostris in Presbyterio cujus meminit Paulus, I. Timoth., 4 : 14, quid Laicis Senioribus *χειροθεσίας* jus communicandum non censemus. Et ut nemo munus hoc suscipere potest absque manuum impositione; neminem laicum eas cuique imponere fas et jura sinunt. Neminem absque impositione manuum munus hoc posse suscipere, falsum. Multi apud nos ministri sunt legitimi, quibus nunquam impositæ manus. Habita fuit impositio manuum apud nos à prima reformatione res adiaphora, sicut olim ipse Tilenus, vide page 175. Qui Episcopatus invaserunt, hunc ritum urgent ut necessarium, quid hæc unica pene differentia inter Episcopum et Presbyterum, ut ait Bilsonus. Falsum etiam, non posse Seniores Laicos manus imponere ordinandis. Fas et jura non sinunt, ait. Quo jure excluduntur? Sunt, inquis, Laici. An Laici quia ex populo delecti? Sic Episcopi, Presbyteri, Diaconi, erunt Laici; quia omnes ex populo delecti sunt, vel deligi possunt. An quia tractant laica in ministeris suo? Hoc falsum. Nam tractant negotia Jehovæ, et Ecclesiæ. Si Diaconos in Clericorum numerum referunt tui Formalistæ, qui mensarum et viduarum ministri tantum sunt; quanto magis nos Seniores ex plebe delectos et ordine legitimo vocatos in Administrationum Ecclesiasticorum numero recensebimus? Quod ad Cleri vocem, eo sensu non agnoscimus. Seniorum administratio est sacra, et numeratur inter administrationes seu Diaconias illas, quas in Ecclesia constituit Deus. Sed quid si Laici etiam, ut vocas, id est fideles et privati in Ecclesia manus

GEORGE GILLESPIE is another of the Presbyterian authorities to whom we may apply for a true commentary on both the law and the practice of the Church of Scotland, under the Second Book of Discipline, being one of her four commissioners to the Westminster Assembly, and a youth of extraordinary genius and learning. The Repertory's correspondent forces testimony to his views, even out of Gillespie's works. From his treatise entitled "Assertion of

imponere possunt. In dedicandis Levitis nitebantur filii Israelis manibus suis super Levitas ipsos.—(Numer. 8 : 10.) Familiaris fuit Hebræis iste ritus in inaugurationibus, quem usurparunt etiam Apostoli ex more, non mutarunt in sacramentum. Vide plura de hoc ritu supra (pag. 158 et seqq.) ubi probavimus fuisse simplicem gestum orantis Hebræis familiarem, signum indicans personam, non significans aut exhibens gratiam : et proinde non fuisse sacramentum. Præterea, distinguunt Formalistæ inter Impositionem Manuum Presbyteri docentis et Episcopi, et dicunt, quod tamen falsum, Episcopo competere impositionem manuum consecrationis et creationis ergo, Presbyteros imponere manus tantum ad consensum significandum. In Presbyteris impositio manuum est bene precantium signum, quod est in Episcopo ordinantis, inquit Saravia, vide supra, pag. 166. Rectius nos, signum impositionis manuum commune esse Presbyteris docentibus et gubernantibus ; et consensus significandi gratia posse Seniores etiam manus imponere, si necessarium videbitur : precibus verò dedicare et consecrare esse solius Ministri. Illi volunt Episcopum proferre benedictionem una cum impositione manuum, non Presbyterum etiamsi simul imponat manus ad significandum consensum et assistentiam in precibus. Ego Pastori seu Presbytero docenti illam tantum impositionem manuum reservatam concedo, quæ conjuncta est cum precibus et benedictione. In signum tamen consensus et assistentiæ possunt imponere manus etiam Presbyteri Gubernantes. Non imponunt, quia non est necessarium. Nec imponunt simul omnes unius Classis Sympresbyteri, sed plures aut pauciores aliorum nomine. Potest etiam unus nomine omnium. Denique, etsi daremus esse Sacramentum, et hujus sacramenti ministros esse Pastores Presbyteros, non tamen excludentur à Presbyterio, 1 Tim. 4 : 14, quia iis non convenit impositio manuum. Nam impositio manuum dici potest impositio manuum Presbyterii, etsi non omnes et singuli ex Presbyterio habent potestatem imponendi manus. Sufficit quod pars præcipua Presbyterii hanc potestatem habeat. Sicut Toribus Levi dicitur apponere suffitum, cum tamen solis Sacerdotibus id permissum fuerit. Nihil ex his tribus locis, Acts 20, Tit. 1 : 7 ; 1 Tim. 4 : 14 ; elicere potest Tilenus contra functionem Presbyterorum Gubernantium, nec ullo interpretamento a tribus locis adductis, 1 Tim. 5 : 17 ; Rom. 12 : 7 ; 1 Cor. 2 ; pro eorum prostasia nos depellere.—(Att. Dam., pp. 691, 692.)

the Government of the Church of Scotland," written expressly to explain and defend "the office of ruling elders, and the authority of Presbyters and Synods," (see Preface to the same,) the Repertory's correspondent endeavors to bring proof of the lay character of the elder. He culls out from two different chapters, Chap. IV. and Chap. XIII., some passages where, contending against the misrepresentations of Rome, Gillespie refers to ruling elders as "whom they call laics," and as held by the Protestants of Germany to be the peculiar "representatives of the people." Let the reader compare these passages in their true and proper connection, (they will be found without difficulty in Gillespie's short chapters,) with the quotations in the Repertory for July, 1860, pages 465, 466, and observe how Gillespie's testimony is thus tortured and twisted for the purpose of proving actually that "the lay character of ruling elders is fundamental to the Presbyterian system." Gillespie is thus *made to give* the great weight of his name to a *distinction he abhorred*. That he did abhor it, no person knows better than the writer, who thus unfairly quotes Gillespie against his own most cherished opinions. What good can ever come of controversy, if we may thus abuse the writings of the best and greatest men, long since lying in their graves, to the misguiding of inquirers and the misleading of the Church? On the very first page of the treatise in question, Gillespie says:

Before we come to speak particularly of those elders, of which our purpose is to treat, it is fit we should know them by their right name, lest we nickname and miscall them. Some reproachfully, others ignorantly, call them lay elders. But the distinction of the *clergy* and *laity* is Popish and anti-Christian, and they who have narrowly considered the records of ancient times, have noted this distinction as one of the grounds whence the mystery of iniquity had the beginning of it.

We take from Chap. XII. of this treatise, Gillespie's statement of the doctrine and practice of the Church in his time, respecting the ordination of elders:

Touching the first of these, it can not be denied but as election to the office, so ordination to the exercise thereof, is a thing common, both to preaching and ruling elders. Howbeit, in Scotland, imposition of hands is not used in the ordination of ruling elders, as it is in the ordination of preaching elders; yet this is not to be thought a defect in their ordination; for imposition of hands is not an act, but a sign of ordination, neither is it a necessary sign, but is left free; it is not, therefore, without reason that Calvin, Chemnitius, Gerhard, Bucanus, Junius, Bucer, and many other of our learned writers, yea, the Archbishop of Spalato, do all make a distinction betwixt the essential act of ordination and the external rite thereof, holding that ordination may be full, valid and complete, not only without the unction used in the Roman Church, but even without the laying on of hands used in the Reformed Churches. After the election of ruling elders, with the notice and consent of the whole Church, there followeth with us a public designation of the persons so elected, and an authoritative or protestative mission, ordination, or deputation of them unto their Presbyterial functions, together with public exhortation unto them, and prayer in the Church for them, which we conceive to be all that belongeth either to the essence or integrity of ordination. I mean not to condemn imposition of hands, nor any other convenient sign in the ordination of ruling elders, only I intend to justify our own form as sufficient.

RUTHERFORD'S authority is also pleaded by the Repository's correspondent, against the presbyterial rights of the ruling elder. No quotation is made from his writings, but his "Peaceable Plea," page 57, is referred to. There is nothing on that page which relates to the question. In the latter part of the volume we have the author's commentary on the doctrine and practice of the Church in his and Gillespie's time:

Ques. 5. How is it that your ruling elders doe not give imposition of hands, and blesse Pastors, when they are ordained, and so the lesser should blesse the greater? So the author of Survay. So D. Field.

Ans. 1. If they judicially consent to imposition of hands, it is sufficient.

2. There is no inconvenience that a ruling elder, as a part of the Presbytery, blesse one who is not yet a pastor, but to be ordained a pastor. For the ordainer, as he is such, is greater than the ordained.—(Peaceable Plea, p. 290.)

And for this cause one pastor of a single congregation not being able to ordaine a pastor (because it wanteth example in the Word of God) therefore a *colledge of Presbyters*, or a *Presbytery of pastors and elders*, who have power larger than a Session, even to excommunicate

and ordaine pastors, is necessary in the Church which ordaineth Timothy to be a pastor, and so may deprive and excommunicate him.—(*Ibid.* p. 321.)

The Presbytery and people meeting, some pastor, as Acts 1: 15, preacheth for the purpose in hand, as Peter doth here, v. 17, 18, 19. After sermon the pastor calleth him up before the congregation, and demandeth if he be willing to accept the charge, and he must testifie his consent, as Isaiah.—(Isa. 6: 8; Jer. 6: 7, 8; Acts 9: 20.) Then the pastor asketh the people's consent, which they testifie by their *χειροτονία*, the *lifting up of their hands*, as Acts 14: 23, and the man must please the whole multitude, as Acts 6: v. 5; Acts 1: 26. This being done, the pastor cometh downe out of the pulpit, and he, with the Presbytery, layeth their hands on his head and prayeth that God would blesse him, as the Apostles did, Acts 6: 6. The Apostles prayed and laid their hands on them, Acts 13: 3. They prayed and laid their hands on them, 1 Tim. 4: 14; 1 Tim. 5: 22. All being done, the eldership of the congregation give him the right hand of fellowship, as Gal. 2: 9. The action is closed with thanksgiving, as all grave actions should be, 1 Thess. 5: 18.

Let us pass to another Presbyterian authority, whom Rutherford and Gillespie both characterize as “the LEARNED VOETIUS.” He will give us the views of the Dutch Church during the period of the Second Book, for he was born in 1593, was Minister in Leyden till 1634, then became Professor of Divinity at Utrecht, and died in 1677. One of his two great works is his *Politica Ecclesiastica*, in four volumes, quarto.

The student of this controversy may find in that work (Vol. III., pp. 439–445,) a full discussion of all the difficulties, objections and glosses urged so earnestly and pertinaciously by the Repertory's correspondent against the testimony to the ruling elder's office, and authority drawn from 1 Tim. 5: 17—nay, the student will find several of them traced by Voetius up to the Papists and to the Socinian and Arminian Remonstrants, whom they better become than an orthodox Presbyterian divine, that takes Scripture submissively for his rule of faith.

The student will also find in Voetius (Vol. IV., p. 194,) a discussion of the objection that elders are laymen, which he ascribes to “Papists and some recent hierarchs in Eng-

land;" also (in Vol. III., p. 438,) an account of the good reason why Papists denied and denounced this order: "No wonder, for this order is out-and-out hostile to the Papal monarchy and the tyranny of Antichrist. This is the reason why every where they so violently rail at and make sport of it. *Ordinem hunc cane pejus et angue oderunt et fastidiunt*—they hate this order and loathe it more than a dog or a serpent." Further, he will find (in Vol. III., pp. 466 and 472,) how the author defends the office of the ruling elder against the jibes and sneers of the Remonstrants, with Grotius at their head—jibes and sneers at these rulers as "idiots, simpletons, ignorant," "men of low condition," "of the dregs of the people," as "useless;" as "usurping authority even over the ministers, so making a worse tyranny than that of Popes and Bishops;" as "causing anarchy and confusion every where in the Church;" as "mere annuals, or biennials, or triennials;" as "laic rustics wearing the seniors' cloke."

Voetius discusses, at great length, (Vol. I., pp. 461–466, and elsewhere) the question of the imposition of hands in ordinations. He quotes largely from many and various quarters, to the effect that it was not of the essence of ordination at all, but was a mere matter of indifference. With respect to this rite in ordination *by* and *of* elders, he says:

As to the imposition of hands, it is a rite plainly indifferent (as is elsewhere expressly taught against Papists) and consequently neither confers nor takes away any ministerial rank. Furthermore, by no jot or tittle of a letter of the Scripture can it be proved that it is wrong if elders, in the ordination of a minister, should join in the imposition of hands. We know that in the Papacy, also, it is held to be a great wickedness if a pastor or prebend, who is not a Bishop, or one man alone, should impose hands, with the Bishop, on the persons to be ordained, in the first place, because the order with them is a sacrament. But these are mere straws and human traditions. If any one wishes to observe this rite properly, it may be performed by one minister of the Word, alone; or by many ministers of the Word; or by ministers and elders; nevertheless, with this distinction, that the minister must act as the leader and administrator in the Word, and the prayers by which he dedicates and consecrates the person to be ordained; the

other ministers and elders for the testifying of consent and assistance in the prayers. Let them explain to me what was the laying on of hands of all Israel, in Numbers, viii: 10. But this whole thing, whatever it is, is a mere matter of indifference.—(Vol. III., p. 452.)*

Example 2. Presbyters are ordained by imposition of hands, but your elders are not so ordained.

Ans. 1. That rite plainly is of the nature of an accident; it may be present or absent. In many reformed Churches it is not adhered to in the ordination of ministers. But in the Churches of the Belgic exiles, or “of the dispersion,” elders are accustomed to be ordained with this rite, as may be seen in the ecclesiastical constitution of the London-Belgic Church, edited by Mieron, Chap. VI.—(Vol. III., p. 466.)†

Let this last statement be taken notice of by the Repertory’s correspondent, who seeks to make capital out of Dr. Miller’s acknowledgment, (inadvertently made whilst exploring this unscriptural omission,) that the Reformers “unanimously discarded imposition in the ordination of elders.” We say Dr. Miller inadvertently used the term *unanimously*, for he himself, not four pages further on in

* *Quod ad impositionem manuum, est ritus plane indifferens (ut alibi contra Pontificios ex professo docetur:) et consequenter, nec ponit, nec tollit gradum aliquem ministerii. Vide de eo supra part. I. lib. 2. tr. I. cap. 8. Deinde, nullo scripturæ apice probabitur, nefas esse, si seniores in confirmatione ministri una manus imponant. Scimus in Papatu etiam grande nefas haberi, si pastor seu parochus, qui non sit Episcopus, aut solus una cum Episcopo manus ordinandis imponat; imprimis quia ordo ipsis est sacramentum. Sed hæc meræ sunt stipulæ, et traditiones humanæ. Si hunc ritum observare quis velit, potest ab uno solo verbi ministro fieri; aut à pluribus verbi ministris; aut à ministris et senioribus: hac tamen cum distinctione, ut minister faciat tanquam antecedens et ministrans in verbo et precibus, quibus ordinandum dedicat et consecrat; reliqui ministri et seniores, ad testandum consensum et assistentiam in precibus. Explicent mihi, quæ fuerit χειροθεσία totius Israelis, Numeri 8: 10. Sed totum hic quidquid est merè est adia phorum.*

† *Instant. 2. Presbyteri ordinantur per impositionem manuum: at vestri seniores sic non ordinantur.*

Resp. I. Ritus ille plane accidentarius est; potest addesse aut abesse. In multis ecclesiis reformatis non adhibetur in confirmatione ministri. Vide infra lib. 3. tr. de vocatione ministrorum. Quin et seniores in ecclesiis Belgicis exulantibus seu εν τῇ διάσπορᾷ, solent hoc ritu confirmari: ut videre est in Constitut. ecclesiastic. Ecclesiæ Londino-Belgicæ à Microne editis c. 6.

the same treatise, (see *Ruling Elder*, p. 287,) referred to this very fact which Voetius mentions about the Belgic Churches in London. And here we will just take occasion to remark, that the *Repertory's* correspondent has run over a great deal of ground in his investigations of this question, but he would now profit, we are sure, by reviewing his studies. And amongst other things, which he certainly can not have understood, is this discussion of Dr. Miller, (*Ruling Elder*, pp. 282-293,) respecting the perfect right of the elder to be ordained just like the minister, with imposition of hands. Either the correspondent of the *Princeton Review* can not have understood Dr. Miller, or else he wilfully misrepresents his old instructor. We think the more charitable supposition is the former. And, therefore, we hope he will take no offence if we thus call his attention to this discussion, and recommend him carefully to read, mark, learn and inwardly digest the same.

There are just two more passages from this great Presbyterian authority, VOETIUS, which we must quote for the edification of the *Repertory's* correspondent, and of all others who, like him, hold Prelatic ideas about ordination.

The first passage defines ordination to be

A public declaration and testification by the ecclesiastical, or by the scholastic college, that the person is fit.—(Vol. III., p. 575.)

The second passage treats of the elder's authority in the courts.

Question 3d. Whether may the elders, with equal authority and number of votes with ministers, contribute and hold Presbyteries and Synods, and determine all things therein proposed, as our Ecclesiastical Constitutions have decreed? We answer affirmatively, nor can any reason be produced to the contrary; and we think that this operates strongly to prevent and avert far from us the pride, the oligarchy, the primacy, the tyranny of teachers, which, before now, has so miserably destroyed the Church.—(III., p. 475.)

What says the *Princeton Review* and its correspondent, to this view of the Reformed Church in Holland, as to the nature of ordination, the authority of ruling elders, and

especially as to their use for holding in check the pride and arrogance of "*the clergy?*"

We have thus considered the law of the Church of Scotland, from 1560 down to 1645, as set forth in her standards during that period, and we have compared it with her practice during the same time, as set forth in the writings of the men who were foremost actors in her history. We have seen that the practice did not correspond with the law, and we have seen that this is to be explained partly by the difficulty there always is found in changing the practice of any people, and partly by the prevalence of the idea that the whole matter was a matter of indifference. Comparing this law and this practice of the Church, both of them with the Bible, as we must do, we say, of course, that the law corresponded to the Scriptures, and the practice contradicted the Scriptures. For the Scriptures teach us that ministers, elders, and even deacons, were all ordained with the imposition of hands. Calvin understood this matter better than all the writers we have now been consulting, for he said (Inst., Lib. IV., Cap. III., § 16,) that "if the Spirit of God has not instituted any thing in the Church in vain, this ceremony of His appointment we shall not feel to be useless, provided it be not superstitiously abused." Our Scotch fathers, after the days of Melville, however, and with them Voetius, seem to have thought that they might neglect the rite. But this is the full extent to which they could go. The rights of the elder to complete equality with ministers in the courts; his right to full and complete ordination, himself; his right to do every thing in ordination, which any member of the court, as such, might do; these things they never once thought of denying. Now comes the Princeton Review, and through both its editor and its correspondent, pleads these Scotch Presbyterian authorities against the elder's rights. Those good old Presbyterians said the ceremony might be omitted; elders need not have hands laid on them, nor lay on their hands. But our new-

fashioned Presbyterian authorities say the elders must not and shall not have any part in this ceremony, for it belongs, every whit of it, to "the clergy." Let Presbyterians notice this, and remember the warning of Gillespie, about the beginnings of the mystery of iniquity.—(See above, p. 845.)

Let us now pass to the period of **THE WESTMINSTER ASSEMBLY**, and, in connection with this same question of the law and practice of the Scotch Church, let us examine the use made of this authority by the Repertory's correspondent.

Every body knows, and we have already in this article referred to it, that before the calling of the Westminster Assembly, the idea, in various forms, had begun to be extensively entertained, both by King and Parliament, and by Scotch Presbyterians, also, of uniting the three kingdoms together in a religious uniformity. It is also well known that in the struggle that was going on continually between the English Parliament and Charles I., the former was looking for the support of the Scotch army, should things proceed to an open rupture. As early as 1642, the Parliament signified to the Commission of the Assembly, immediately after the rising of the latter body, that they intended to call an Assembly of Divines, to deliberate upon the formation of such a Confession of Faith, Catechism, and Directory, as might lead to the desired uniformity, and requesting Commissioners to be appointed to that Assembly, on the part of the Scottish Church. The Westminster Assembly, however, did not meet till the next year. Meanwhile, circumstances of great public danger and alarm to the Protestants, both of England and Scotland, induced the General Assembly, in August, 1643, to frame that well-known bond of union between the two countries, called the **SOLEMN LEAGUE AND COVENANT**, written by Alexander Henderson, approved in the Assembly, and then sent to London, and there signed by the Parliament and by the

English Divines, already assembled at Westminster. The Scotch Church then also commissioned five ministers and three elders to go and assist their deliberations.

Three great parties existed in that Assembly: first, the Erastians, and secondly, the Independents; both of these small but able bodies of men, active, vehement, and the Independents especially, very pertinacious in maintaining their opinions. The third party was the largest—the English Presbyterians described by Hetherington as indifferently acquainted with the Presbyterian polity, having been accustomed always to the Prelatic form of Church government, so that the task of explaining and defending Presbytery devolved chiefly on the Scottish divines. The Assembly being divided between these three parties, what was the attitude of the body towards Prelacy? A number of strong Episcopalians had been summoned to attend, and several did appear, but they soon all left the body, one excepted, who afterwards gave offence, and was expelled. But all the English ministers in the body had been Episcopally ordained, and the Presbyterian portion of them, were at first not opposed to Episcopacy in all its forms. Their first object was not to overthrow the hierarchy, nor to set aside the thirty-nine articles, but to alter and improve both. In Church government they had no idea of going any further back for their principles of reform than to the *primitive* Church.

It is obvious that a body constituted of such materials must have been liable to severe inward struggles; and yet the struggle was not about points of theology, but only matters of Church government. It is said there was not one Arminian nor one Antinomian, in the Assembly, much less one Pelagian or Unitarian. Accordingly, they agreed, without much difficulty, upon their doctrinal standards. But as to Church government, it was, of course, to be expected that they would have great difficulty, and that, indeed, there could be no agreement, except by the utmost

moderation of opinions and of terms. A single point often occupied weeks of debate, chiefly between the Independents and Presbyterians. The subject of ordination was up for a whole year, and was frequently and warmly debated. The ruling elder occupied them, at one time, from the 22d November to the 8th December. "This order of Church officers (says Hetherington) was almost a novelty in England."—(Hist. Westm. Ass., p. 141.) Some of the leading Presbyterians, under their Episcopal prejudices, held that "there was no ruling Presbyter distinct from the preaching one."—(Lightfoot, p. 74.) The proposition that "ordination is only in the hands of the preaching Presbyters," was debated very warmly, but in conclusion, was laid aside for the present.—(P. 116.) Afterwards, it was voted that the preaching Presbyters, orderly associated, are those to whom the imposition of hands doth belong.—(P. 234.) This proposition was then objected to, as "excluding lay elders from imposition." "At last it was passed over, and the proof of it was fallen upon again, and cost a great deal of time and debate, and at last it was put to the question whether it should pass or no, and it came to a vote so dubitable, that we were put to our votes by standing up, and it was carried affirmatively."—(P. 239.) Reasons for this proposition, excluding elders from imposition, were called for. This one was offered: "That preaching Presbyters are to ordain, for that we find no ordination but by preaching Presbyters." Upon this reason, the debate "held long," but after "tugging," it was "voted negatively."—(P. 239.) On the same occasion, it was voted that "the power of ordering the whole work of ordination is in the whole Presbytery."—(P. 238.) And, also, afterwards it was passed that "A Presbytery consisteth of ministers of the Word, and such public officers as are agreeable to, and warranted by, the Word of God, to be Church governors, to join with ministers in the government of the Church."—(P. 243.) It was

voted to call these governors "Such as in the Reformed Churches are commonly called elders." Mr. Gillespie moved that "they be called ruling elders, but this prevailed not."—(P. 330.)

Now, the General Assembly of Scotland, in 1645, "being most desirous and solicitous of uniformity in Kirk government between these kingdoms, and considering that, as in former times there did, so hereafter there may arise, through the nearness of contagion, manifold mischiefs to this Kirk, from a corrupt form of government in the Kirk of England," did "agree to and approve the propositions of the Westminster Assembly touching Kirk government and ordination," and did "authorize the commissioners of the Assembly, who are to meet at Edinburgh, to agree to and conclude an uniformity between the Kirks," etc.—(See Acts of Gen. Ass. Ch. Scotland, Sess. 16, Feb. 10, 1645, post meridiem.)

Now, we submit, that in view of all the circumstances of this history, far too much is made by the Repertory's correspondent of the negative action of the Westminster Assembly respecting imposition of hands by elders, and then the approval of their propositions by the Church of Scotland. We have seen above how Gillespie, Rutherford, and other Scottish Presbyterians generally, of that time, regarded imposition as not of the essence of ordination. Hence, neither they nor their Church of Scotland, cared to insist upon it. They had got "other Church governors joined with ministers in constituting the Presbytery, and to this Presbytery given all the power of ordination;" and this they viewed as the whole substance. And they had weighty reasons of Church and State policy to reconcile them to any minor imperfections in the propositions of this English Assembly that was to unite England with their own country in one form of government substantially. The state of the question was, therefore, quite different as presented to them and as presented to us. Now, the ground

taken is, that this claim for elders to unite in imposition is a new thing; nay, never heard of before; that both the law and the uniform practice of the Church has always been for ministers alone to impose hands; that like begets like, only ministers can make a minister—ordination is above the elder's power; and, moreover, that they are mere laymen, their presence not necessary in a Church court, and their title to the very name of elder perfectly unsettled. And for a good deal of this miserable Prelatic stuff the authority of such a body as the Westminster Assembly, great and good, and thoroughly enlightened as to doctrinal theology, but not so enlightened nor orthodox as to Church government, is to be thrust upon us, to the over-riding the authority of Andrew Melville's Second Book of Discipline, that great Presbyterian platform of the Church, adopted in her purest and best days, when urged by no temptations of carnal wisdom or suggestions of State policy—nay, the authority of that mixed and doubtful Assembly is to be thrust upon us to the over-riding even of the Holy Scriptures themselves.

But there is yet another Presbyterian authority to which we must advert, in closing this article. We refer to the CONSTITUTION OF OUR OWN CHURCH, in what was lately the United States of America. That authority defines the Presbytery to consist of "all the ministers and one ruling elder from each congregation, in a certain district."—(Form of Gov't, Chap. X., § 2.) It declares this Presbytery has "power to ordain, install and judge ministers."—(Chap. X., § 8.) According to this Book, the presiding minister ordains "with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery."—(Chap. XV., § 12.) It is not said here, as in the Westminster Form, "the preaching Presbyters," but "the Presbytery." The First Book of Discipline said, ordination was to be with "fasting and prayer," and imposition was "not necessary." The Second Book said: "fasting, earnest prayer and imposition of hands of the eldership,"

and it said this eldership was constituted of "ministers and elders." The Westminster Form changed this, and said: "by imposition of hands and prayer, with fasting, by those preaching Presbyters to whom it doth belong." But our own Form changed this again, and says: "by prayer and with laying on of the hands of *the Presbytery*," and this Presbytery is the ministers of a district and one elder from each Church in the same. After the ordination, it says: "the minister who presides shall first, and afterwards, all the members of the Presbytery, in their order, take him by the right hand, saying in words to this purpose: 'We give you the right hand of fellowship, to take part of this ministry with us.'"—(Chap. XV., § 14.) Here, again, is a change of the Form used in Scotland; the provision, "all the *ministers* of the Presbytery," is changed for "all the *members* of the Presbytery."

All these changes are marked and significant. This is the judgment of the framers of our Constitution, with the various formularies adopted by the mother Church in Scotland, all before their eyes. The departure of the Westminster formulary from the principle of the Second Book, is, in its turn, departed from by our Constitution. Deliberately forsaking the Westminster standard, it goes back to the ground maintained in the Second Book. We say this is significant. But, against it all, here is an effort to bring in upon us the modified Church government of a formulary adopted by the mother Church at a time of great necessity, in the hope and expectation of great public advantages from a general uniformity to be established; and, still further, adopted when the question was in such a position as that it did not appear to concern any vital principle—adopted when it was distinctly understood as not affecting the full and complete Presbyterian authority and power of the ruling elder. Very different is the state of the question now, when those who appeal to the adoption of these standards by the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, do it

distinctly and expressly to establish their anti-Presbyterian notion, that the elder is only a layman, and not entitled even to the name, Presbyter.

But, clear and distinct as our standards are for the full rights of the elder in the ordination of ministers, they, themselves, are not altogether conformable to Scripture upon the other part of the elder's rights. They ought to require, as the Second Book requires, his own ordination to be by the parochial Presbytery, called the Session, and with imposition of their hands, according to the Apostolic rule and practice. We have seen that, in 1832, Dr. Miller published that he had long "deplored this omission."—(Ruling Elder, p. 282.) The Book, however, does not forbid the imposition of hands upon elders and deacons, although it does not require it. How could it have forbidden it, when the Apostles practiced it in both? The high Presbyterian authority of the Second Book would give sanction to any minister and session who should choose so to ordain the ruling elder. The high Presbyterian authority of Calderwood, Gillespie, Rutherford, Voetius, Samuel Miller, Robert J. Breckinridge, unite to authorize it, as, at the least, a thing indifferent and innocent; nay, more, as suitable and proper. The established practice of many, very many, of our sessions, is in favor of it. What is more than all, however, it has the sanction of the Word. But, while all this is certainly true, and is quite sufficient to justify (as against the negative testimony of our own Form) the elder's use, in all ordinations, of this power and this distinction, conferred by the Master on his office, it is denied by the Repertory's correspondent, and those who side with him, that he has any right to any share of this sacred ceremony! It has some sort of a sacramental virtue, and it belongs, all of it, to "*the clergy!*" Now it is this denial, and this ground of it, which gives the question so much importance, inasmuch as it constitutes a denial of the true nature of the eldership; degrades the ruler from the position of a

high spiritual functionary; makes him a mere stepping-stone for the exaltation of "the clergy;" a mere human expedient for purposes not consonant with the genius of Presbyterianism.

We had designed to examine the just and true historical value of Calvin's authority on this question. The exhausted condition of the reader's patience and of our space, unite to forbid. If the present discussion be received with favor by our readers, we may take up the subject in a future number of this journal.

The point we have sought to establish is, that any and all human authorities are of value upon theories of the eldership, only as they are sustained by the Word of God; and that Church government is of interest and importance, chiefly in the aspect of its being *jure divino*. We are not to hang our faith in this matter upon Princeton, nor Westminster; upon the General Assembly of our own Church, nor on that of the Kirk of Scotland; upon Melville, nor Knox, nor even John Calvin himself, but only on the Apostles. The only authoritative appeal to the past in this question, is the appeal which goes back to the very beginning, and cites the authority of the Church's sole Head and King.

ARTICLE VI.

THE STATE OF THE COUNTRY.

Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union; and the Ordinance of Secession. Printed by order of the Convention. Charleston: Evans & Cogswell, Printers to the Convention; pp. 13. 1860.

The Address of the People of South Carolina, Assembled in Convention, to the People of the Slaveholding States of the United States. Printed by order of the Convention. Charleston: Evans & Cogswell, Printers to the Convention; pp. 16. 1860.

Report on the Address of a portion of the Members of the General Assembly of Georgia. Printed by order of the Convention. Charleston: Evans & Cogswell, Printers to the Convention; pp. 6. 1860.

It is now universally known that, on the twentieth day of last December, the people of South Carolina, in Convention assembled, solemnly annulled the ordinance by which they became members of the Federal Union, entitled the United States of America, and resumed to themselves the exercise of all the powers which they had delegated to the Federal Congress. South Carolina has now become a separate and independent State. She takes her place as an equal among the other nations of the earth. This is certainly one of the most grave and important events of modern times. It involves the destiny of a continent, and through that continent, the fortunes of the human race. As it is a matter of the utmost moment that the rest of the world, and especially that the people of the United States, should understand the causes which have brought about this astounding result, we propose, in a short article,

and in a candid and dispassionate spirit, to explain them, and to make an appeal, both to the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States, touching their duty in the new and extraordinary aspect which affairs have assumed.

That there was a cause, and an adequate cause, might be presumed from the character of the Convention which passed the Ordinance of Secession, and the perfect unanimity with which it was done. That Convention was not a collection of demagogues and politicians. It was not a conclave of defeated place-hunters, who sought to avenge their disappointment by the ruin of their country. It was a body of sober, grave and venerable men, selected from every pursuit in life, and distinguished, most of them, in their respective spheres, by every quality which can command confidence and respect. It embraced the wisdom, moderation and integrity of the bench, the learning and prudence of the bar, and the eloquence and piety of the pulpit. It contained retired planters, scholars and gentlemen, who had stood aloof from the turmoil and ambition of public life, and were devoting an elegant leisure—*otium cum dignitate*—to the culture of their minds, and to quiet and unobtrusive schemes of Christian philanthropy. There were men in that Convention who were utterly incapable of low and selfish schemes; who, in the calm serenity of their judgments, were as unmoved by the waves of popular passion and excitement, as the everlasting granite by the billows that roll against it. There were men there who would have listened to no voice but what they believed to be the voice of reason, and would have bowed to no authority but what they believed to be the authority of God. There were men there who would not have been controlled by “uncertain opinion,” nor betrayed into “sudden counsels;” men who could act from nothing, in the noble language of Milton, “but from mature wisdom, deliberate virtue, and dear affection to the public good.” That Convention, in the character of its members, deserves

every syllable of the glowing panegyric which Milton has pronounced upon the immortal Parliament of England, which taught the nations of the earth that resistance to tyrants is obedience to God. Were it not invidious, we might single out names, which, wherever they are known, are regarded as synonymous with purity, probity, magnanimity and honor. It was a noble body, and all their proceedings were in harmony with their high character. In the midst of intense agitation and excitement, they were calm, cool, collected and self-possessed. They deliberated without passion, and concluded without rashness. They sat with closed doors, that the tumult of the populace might not invade the sobriety of their minds. If a stranger could have passed from the stirring scenes with which the streets of Charleston were alive, into the calm and quiet sanctuary of this venerable council, he would have been impressed with the awe and veneration which subdued the rude Gaul, when he first beheld in senatorial dignity the Conscript Fathers of Rome. That, in such a body, there was not a single voice against the Ordinance of Secession, that there was not only no dissent, but that the assent was cordial and thorough-going, is a strong presumption that the measure was justified by the clearest and sternest necessities of justice and of right. That such an assembly should have inaugurated and completed a radical revolution in all the external relations of the State, in the face of acknowledged dangers, and at the risk of enormous sacrifices, and should have done it gravely, soberly, dispassionately, deliberately, and yet have done it without cause, transcends all the measures of probability. Whatever else may be said of it, it certainly must be admitted that this solemn act of South Carolina was well considered.

In her estimate of the magnitude of the danger, she has been seconded by every other slaveholding State. While we are writing, the telegraphic wires announce what the

previous elections had prepared us to expect—that Florida, Alabama and Mississippi have followed her example. They also have become separate and independent States. Three other States have taken the incipient steps for the consummation of the same result. And the rest of the slaveholding States are hanging by a single thread to the Union—the slender thread of hope—that guarantees may be devised which shall yet secure to them their rights. But even they proclaim, that, without such guarantees, their wrongs are intolerable, and they will not longer endure them. Can any man believe that the secession of four sovereign States, under the most solemn circumstances, the determination of others to follow as soon as the constituted authorities can be called together, and the universal sentiment of all that the Constitution of the United States has been virtually repealed, and that every slaveholding State has just ground for secession—can any man believe that this is a factitious condition of the public mind of the South, produced by brawling politicians and disappointed demagogues, and not the calm, deliberate, profound utterance of a people who feel, in their inmost souls, that they have been deeply and flagrantly wronged? The presumption clearly is, that there is something in the attitude of the Government which portends danger and demands resistance. There must be a cause for this intense and pervading sense of injustice and of injury.

It has been suggested, by those who know as little of the people of the South as they do of the Constitution of their country, that all this ferment is nothing but the result of a mercenary spirit on the part of the cotton-growing States, fed by Utopian dreams of aggrandizement and wealth, to be realized under the auspices of free trade, in a separate Confederacy of their own. It has been gravely insinuated that they are willing to sell their faith for gold—that they have only made a pretext of recent events to accomplish a foregone scheme of deliberate treachery and fraud. That

there is not the slightest ground in any thing these States have ever said or done for this extraordinary slander, it is, of course, superfluous to add. The South has, indeed, complained of the unequal administration of the Government. Her best and purest statesmen have openly avowed the opinion, that, in consequence of the partial legislation of Congress, she has borne burdens, and experienced inconveniences, which have retarded her own prosperity, while they have largely contributed to develop the resources of the North. But grievances of this kind, unless greatly exaggerated, never would have led to the dissolution of the Union. They would have been resisted within it, or patiently borne until they could be lawfully redressed. So far from contending for an arbitrary right to dissolve the Union, or the right to dissolve it on merely technical grounds, the South sets so high a value on good faith, that she would never have dissolved it, for slight and temporary wrongs, even though they might involve such a violation, on the part of her confederates, of the terms of the compact, as released her from any further obligation of honor. It is, therefore, preposterous to say, that any dreams, however dazzling, of ambition and avarice, could have induced her to disregard her solemn engagements to her sister States, while they were faithfully fulfilling the conditions of the contract. We know the people of the South; and we can confidently affirm, that if they had been assured that all these golden visions could have been completely realized by setting up for themselves, as long as the Constitution of the United States continued to be sincerely observed, they would have spurned the temptation to purchase national greatness by perfidy. They would have preferred poverty, with honor, to the gain of the whole world by the loss of their integrity.

When it was perceived that the tendency of events was inevitably driving the South to disunion, a condition from which she at first recoiled with horror, then she began to

cast about for considerations to reconcile her to her destiny. Then, for the first time, was it maintained, that, instead of being a loser, she might be a gainer by the measure which the course of the Government was forcing upon her. It was alleged that good would spring from evil; that the prospect of independence was brighter and more cheering than her present condition—that she had much to anticipate, and little to dread, from the contemplated change. But these considerations were not invented to *justify* secession—they were only adduced as motives to reconcile the mind to its necessity. Apart from that necessity, they would have had as little weight in determining public opinion, as the small dust of the balance. We do not believe, when the present controversy began, that the advocates of what is called disunion *per se*, men who preferred a Southern Confederacy upon the grounds of its intrinsic superiority to the Constitutional Union of the United States, could have mustered a corporal's guard. The people of the South were loyal to the country, and if the country had been true to them, they would have been as ready to-day to defend its honor with their fortunes and their blood, as when they raised its triumphant flag upon the walls of Mexico.

It has also been asserted, as a ground of dissatisfaction with the present Government, and of desire to organize a separate Government of their own, that the cotton-growing States are intent upon reopening, as a means of fulfilling their magnificent visions of wealth, the African slave-trade. The agitation of this subject at the South has been grievously misunderstood. One extreme generates another. The violence of Northern abolitionists gave rise to a small party among ourselves, who were determined not to be outdone in extravagance. They wished to show that they could give a Rowland for an Oliver. Had abolitionists never denounced the domestic trade as plunder and robbery, not a whisper would ever have been breathed about disturbing

the peace of Africa. The men who were loudest in their denunciations of the Government had, with very few exceptions, no more desire to have the trade reopened than the rest of their countrymen; but they delighted in teasing their enemies. They took special satisfaction in providing hard nuts for abolitionists to crack. There were others, not at all in favor of the trade, who looked upon the law as unconstitutional which declared it to be piracy. But the great mass of the Southern people were content with the law as it stood. They were and are opposed to the trade—not because the traffic in slaves is immoral—that not a man among us believes—but because the traffic with Africa is *not* a traffic in slaves. It is a system of kidnapping and man-stealing, which is as abhorrent to the South as it is to the North; and we venture confidently to predict, that should a Southern Confederacy be formed, the African slave-trade is much more likely to be reopened by the old Government than the new. The conscience of the North will be less tender when it has no Southern sins to bewail, and idle ships will naturally look to the Government to help them in finding employment.

The real cause of the intense excitement of the South, is not vain dreams of national glory in a separate confederacy, nor the love of the filthy lucre of the African slave-trade; it is the profound conviction that the Constitution, in its relations to slavery, has been virtually repealed; that the Government has assumed a new and dangerous attitude upon this subject; that we have, in short, new terms of union submitted to our acceptance or rejection. Here lies the evil. The election of Lincoln, when properly interpreted, is nothing more nor less than a proposition to the South to consent to a Government, fundamentally different upon the question of slavery, from that which our fathers established. If this point can be made out, secession becomes not only a right, but a bounden duty. Morally, it is only the abrogation of the forms of a contract, when its

essential conditions have been abolished. Politically, it is a measure indispensable to the safety, if not to the very existence, of the South. It is needless to say that, in this issue, the personal character of Mr. Lincoln is not at all involved. There are no objections to him as a man, or as a citizen of the North. He is probably entitled, in the private relations of life, to all the commendations which his friends have bestowed upon him. We, at least, would be the last to detract from his personal worth. The issue has respect, not to the man, but to the principles upon which he is pledged to administer the Government, and which, we are significantly informed, are to be impressed upon it in all time to come. His election seals the triumph of those principles, and that triumph seals the subversion of the Constitution, in relation to a matter of paramount interest to the South.

This we shall proceed to show, by showing, first, the Constitutional attitude of the Government towards slavery, and then the attitude which, after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, it is to assume and maintain for ever:

I. What, now, is its Constitutional attitude? We affirm it to be *one of* ABSOLUTE INDIFFERENCE OR NEUTRALITY, with respect to all questions connected with the moral and political aspects of the subject. In the eye of the Constitution, slaveholding and non-slaveholding stand upon a footing of perfect equality. The slaveholding State and the slaveholding citizen are the same to it as the non-slaveholding. It protects both; it espouses the peculiarities of neither. It does not allow the North to say to the South, Your institutions are inferior to ours, and should be changed; neither does it allow the South to say to the North, You must accommodate yourselves to us. It says to both, Enjoy your own opinions upon your own soil, so that you do not interfere with the rights of each other. To me there is no difference betwixt you. Formed by parties whose divisive principle was this very subject of slavery, it

stands to reason, that the Constitution, without self-condemnation on the part of one or the other, could not have been made the patron of either. From the very nature of the case, its position must be one of complete impartiality. This is what the South means by equality in the Union, that the General Government shall make no difference betwixt its institutions and those of the North; that slaveholding shall be as good to it as non-slaveholding. In other words, the Government is the organ of neither party, but the common agent of both; and, as their common agent, has no right to pronounce an opinion as to the merits of their respective peculiarities. This, we contend, is the attitude fixed by the Constitution. The Government is neither pro nor anti slavery. It is simply neutral. Had it assumed any other attitude upon this subject, it never would have been accepted by the slaveholding States. When Mr. Pinckney could rise up in the Convention and declare, that "if slavery be wrong, it is justified by the example of all the world;" when he could boldly appeal to the unanimous testimony of ancient and modern times—to Greece and Rome, to France, Holland, and England, in vindication of its righteousness, it is not to be presumed that he ever would have joined in the construction of a Government which was authorized to pronounce and treat it as an evil! It is not to be presumed that the slaveholding States, unless they seriously aimed at the ultimate extinction of slavery, would have entered into an alliance which was confessedly to be turned against them. That they did not aim at the extinction of slavery, is clear from the pertinacity with which some of them clung to the continuance of the African slave-trade, until foreign supplies should be no longer demanded. When Georgia and South Carolina made it a *sine qua non* for entering the Union, that this traffic should be kept open for a season, to say that these States meditated the abolition of slavery, is grossly paradoxical. It is remarkable, too, that the time fixed for

the prohibition of this traffic, was a time within which the Representatives of those States were persuaded that the States themselves, if the question were left to them, would prohibit it. These States conceded to the Government the right to do, as their agent, only what they themselves would do, as sovereign communities, under the same circumstances. No presumption, therefore, of an attitude, on the part of the Constitution, hostile to slavery, can be deduced from the clause touching the African slave-trade. On the contrary, the presumption is, that, as the trade was kept open for a while—kept open, in fact, as long as the African supply was needed—the slaveholding States never meant to abolish the institution, and never could have consented to set the face of the Government against it. No doubt, the fathers of the Republic were, many of them, not all, opposed to slavery. But they had to frame a Government which should represent, not their personal and private opinions, but the interests of sovereign States. They had to adjust it to the institutions of South Carolina and Georgia, as well as those of New England. And they had the grace given them to impress upon it the only attitude which could conciliate and harmonize all parties—the attitude of perfect indifference.

This, at the same time, is the attitude of justice. We of the South have the same right to our opinions as the people of the North. They appear as true to us as theirs appear to them. We are as honest and sincere in forming and maintaining them. We unite to form a government. Upon what principle shall it be formed? Is it to be asked of us to renounce doctrines which we believe have come down to us from the earliest ages, and have the sanction of the oracles of God? Must we give up what we conscientiously believe to be the truth? The thing is absurd. The Government, in justice, can only say to both parties: I will protect you both, I will be the advocate of neither.

In order to exempt slavery from the operation of this plain principle of justice, it has been contended that the right of property in slaves is the creature of positive statute, and, consequently, of force only within the limits of the jurisdiction of the law; that it is a right not recognized by the Constitution of the United States, and, therefore, not to be protected where Congress is the local legislature. These two propositions contain every thing that has any show of reason for the extraordinary revolution which the recent election has consummated in the Government of the United States.

They are both gratuitous:

(1.) In the first place, slavery has never, in any country, so far as we know, arisen under the operation of statute law. It is not a municipal institution—it is not the arbitrary creature of the State, it has not sprung from the mere force of legislation. Law defines, modifies and regulates it, as it does every other species of property, but *law* never *created* it. The law found it in existence, and being in existence, the law subjects it to fixed rules. On the contrary, what is local and municipal, is the *abolition* of slavery. The States that are now non-slaveholding, have been made so by positive statute. Slavery exists, of course, in every nation in which it is not prohibited. It arose, in the progress of human events, from the operation of moral causes; it has been grounded by philosophers in moral maxims, it has always been held to be moral by the vast majority of the race. No age has been without it. From the first dawn of authentic history, until the present period, it has come down to us through all the course of ages. We find it among nomadic tribes, barbarian hordes, and civilized States. Wherever communities have been organized, and any rights of property have been recognized at all, there slavery is seen. If, therefore, there be any property which can be said to be founded in the common consent of the human race, it is the property in slaves. If there be any

property that can be called natural, in the sense that it spontaneously springs up in the history of the species, it is the property in slaves. If there be any property which is founded in principles of universal operation, it is the property in slaves. To say of an institution, whose history is thus the history of man, which has always and every where existed, that it is a local and municipal relation, is of "all absurdities the motliest, the merest word that ever fooled the ear from out the schoolman's jargon." Mankind may have been wrong—that is not the question. The point is, whether the *law* made slavery—whether it is the police regulation of limited localities, or whether it is a property founded in natural causes, and causes of universal operation. We say nothing as to the moral character of the causes. We insist only upon the fact that slavery is rooted in a common law, wider and more pervading than the common law of England—THE UNIVERSAL CUSTOM OF MANKIND.

If, therefore, slavery is not municipal, but natural, if it is abolition which is municipal and local, then, upon the avowed doctrines of our opponents, two things follow: 1st. That slavery goes of right, and as a matter of course, into every territory from which it is not excluded by positive statute; and, 2d. That Congress is competent to forbid the Northern States from impressing their local peculiarity of non-slaveholding upon the common soil of the Union. If the Republican argument is good for any thing, it goes the whole length of excluding for ever any additional non-slaveholding States from the Union. What would they think, if the South had taken any such extravagant ground as this? What would they have done, if the South had taken advantage of a numerical majority, to legislate them and their institutions for ever out of the common territory? Would they have *submitted*? Would they have glorified the Union, and yielded to the triumph of slavery? We know that they would not. They would have scorned the crotchet about municipal and local laws which divested them

of their dearest rights. Let them give the same measure to others which they expect from others. It is a noble maxim, commended by high authority—do as you would be done by.

The South has neither asked for, nor does she desire, any exclusive benefits. All she demands is, that as South, as slaveholding, she shall be put upon the same footing with the North, as non-slaveholding—that the Government shall not undertake to say, one kind of States is better than the other—that it shall have no preference as to the character, in this respect, of any future States to be added to the Union. Non-slaveholding may be superior to slaveholding, but it is not the place of the Government to say so; much less to assume the right of saying so upon a principle which, properly applied, requires it to say the very reverse.

There is another sense in which municipal is opposed to international, and in this sense, slavery is said to be municipal, because there is no obligation, by the law of nations, on the part of States in which slavery is prohibited, to respect within the limits of their own territory the rights of the foreign slaveholder. This is the doctrine laid down by Judge Story. No nation is bound to accord to a stranger a right of property which it refuses to its own subjects. We can not, therefore, demand from the Governments of France or England, or any other foreign power, whose policy and interests are opposed to slavery, the restoration of our fugitives from bondage. We are willing to concede, for the sake of argument, that the principle in question is an admitted principle of international law, though we are quite persuaded that it is contrary to the whole current of Continental authorities, and is intensely English. We doubt whether, even in England, it can be traced beyond the famous decision of Lord Mansfield, in the case of *Somerset*. But let us admit the principle. What then? The Constitution of the United States has expressly provided that this principle shall not apply within the limits of Fed-

eral jurisdiction. With reference to this country, it has abrogated the law; every State is bound to respect the right of the Southern master to his slave. The Constitution covers the whole territory of the Union, and throughout that territory has taken slavery, under the protection of law. However foreign nations may treat our fugitive slaves, the States of this Confederacy are bound to treat them as property, and to give them back to their lawful owners. How idle, therefore, to plead a principle of international law, which, in reference to the relations of the States of this Union, is formally abolished! Slavery is clearly a part of the municipal law of the United States; and the whole argument from the local character of the institution, falls to the ground. Slaveholding and non-slaveholding are both equally sectional, and both equally national.

(2.) As to the allegation that the Constitution nowhere recognizes the right of property in slaves, that is equally unfounded. We shall say nothing here of the decision of the Supreme Court, though that, one would think, is entitled to some consideration. We shall appeal to the Constitution itself, and if there is force in logic, we shall be able to make it appear that the right is not only recognized, but recognized with a philosophical accuracy and precision that seize only on the essential, and omit the variable and accidental. The subject, in the language of the Constitution, is transferred from the technicalities of law to the higher sphere of abstract and speculative morality. Morally considered, to what class does the slave belong? To the class of persons held to service. The two ideas that he is a person, and as a person, held to service, constitute the generic conception of slavery. How is his obligation to service fundamentally differenced from that of other laborers? By this, as one essential circumstance, that it is independent of the formalities of contract. Add the circumstance that it is for life, and you have a complete conception of the thing. You have the very definition, almost in his own words,

which a celebrated English philosopher gives of slavery: "I define slavery," says Dr. Paley, "to be an obligation to labor for the benefit of the master, without the contract or consent of the servant."*

Now, is such an obligation recognized in the Constitution of the United States? Are there persons spoken of in it, who are held to service by a claim so sacred that the Government allows them, however anxious they may be to do so, to dissolve it neither by stratagem nor force? If they run away, they must be remanded to those who are entitled to their labor, even if they escape to a territory whose local laws would otherwise protect them. If they appeal to force, the whole power of the Union may be brought to crush them. Can any man say that the Constitution does not here recognize a right to the labor and service of men, of persons, which springs from no stipulations of their own, is entirely independent of their own consent, and which can never be annulled by any efforts, whether clandestine or open, on their part? *This is slavery*—it is the very essence and core of the institution. That upon which the right of property terminates in the slave, is his service or labor. It is not his soul, not his person, not his moral and intellectual nature—it is his *labor*. This is the thing which is bought and sold in the market, and it is in consequence of the right to regulate, control and direct this, that the person comes under an obligation to obey. The ideas of a right on one side, and duty on the other, show that the slave, in this relation, is as truly a person as his master. The Constitution, therefore, does recognize and protect slavery, in every moral and ethical feature of it. The thing which, under that name, has commanded the approbation of mankind, is the very thing, among others analogous to it, included in the third clause of the second section of the fourth chapter of the Constitution. We see no way of getting round this argument. It is idle to say that slaves

* Moral Philos. III., c. 8.

are not referred to—it is equally idle to say that the right to their labor is not respected and guarded. Let this right be acknowledged in the territories, and we are not disposed to wring changes upon words. Let the Government permit the South to carry her persons held to service, without their consent, into the territories, and let the right to their labor be protected, and there would be no quarrel about slavery. It is unworthy of statesmen, in a matter of this sort, to quibble about legal technicalities. That the law of slaveholding States classes slaves among chattels, and speaks of them as marketable commodities, does not imply that, morally and ethically, they are not persons, nor that the property is in them, rather than in their toil. These same laws treat them in other respects as persons, and speak of their service as obedience or duty. The meaning of chattel is relative, and is to be restricted to the relation which it implies.

We are happy to find that the Supreme Court of the United States has fully confirmed the interpretation which we have given to this clause of the Constitution. In the case of *Prigg vs. the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*,* it was asserted by every Judge upon the Bench, that the design of the provision was “to secure to the citizens of the slaveholding States the complete right and title of ownership in their slaves, as property, in every State in the Union into which they might escape from the State where they were held in servitude.” These are the very words of Mr. Justice Story, in delivering the opinion of the Court. He went on to add: “The full recognition of this right and title was indispensable to the security of this species of property in all the slaveholding States; and, indeed, was so vital to the preservation of the domestic interests and institutions that it can not be doubted that it constituted a fundamental article, without the adoption of which the Union could not have been formed.” † Again: “We have said that the clause contains a positive and unqualified recog-

* 16 Peters, p. 539, *et seq.*

† *Ib.*, p. 611.

nition of the right of the owner in the slave." * Chief Justice Taney held: that, "by the national compact, this right of property is recognized as an existing right in every State of the Union." † Judge Thompson said: the Constitution "affirms, in the most unequivocal manner, the right of the master to the service of his slave, according to the laws of the State under which he is so held." ‡ Judge Wayne affirmed that all the Judges concurred "in the declaration that the provision in the Constitution was a compromise between the slaveholding and the non-slaveholding States, to secure to the former fugitive slaves as property." § "The paramount authority of this clause in the Constitution," says Judge Daniel, "to guarantee to the owner the right of property in his slave, and the absolute nullity of any State power, directly or indirectly, openly or covertly, aimed to impair that right, or to obstruct its enjoyment, I admit, nay, insist upon, to the fullest extent." ||

If now, the Constitution recognizes slaves as property, that is, as persons to whose labor and service the master has a right, then, upon what principle shall Congress undertake to abolish this right upon a territory, of which it is the local Legislature? It will not permit the slave to cancel it, because the service is due. Upon what ground can itself interpose between a man and his dues? Congress is as much the agent of the slaveholding as it is of the non-slaveholding States; and, as equally bound to protect both, and to hold the scales of justice even between them, it must guard the property of the one with the same care with which it guards the property of the other.

We have now refuted the postulates upon which the recent revolution in the Government is attempted to be justified. We have shown that slavery is not the creature of local and municipal law, and that the Constitution distinctly recognizes the right of the master to the labor or service of the slave; that is, the right of property in slaves.

* 16 Peters, 613. † *Ib.*, p. 628. ‡ *Ib.*, p. 634. § *Ib.*, p. 637. || *Ib.*, p. 165

There is no conceivable pretext, then, for saying that the Government should resist the circulation of this kind of property, more than any other. That question it must leave to the providence of God, and to the natural and moral laws by which its solution is conditioned. All that the Government can do, is to give fair play to both parties, the slaveholding and non-slaveholding States; protect the rights of both on their common soil, and as soon as a sovereign State emerges, to which the soil is henceforward to belong, remit the matter to its absolute discretion. This is justice—this is the impartiality which becomes the agent of a great people, divided by two such great interests.

That the rights of the South, *as slaveholding*—for it is in that relation only that she is politically a different section from the North—and the rights of the North, *as non-slaveholding*, are absolutely equal, is so plain a proposition, that one wonders at the pertinacity with which it has been denied. Here let us expose a sophism whose only force consists in a play upon words. It is alleged that the equality of the sections is not disturbed by the exclusion of slavery from the territories, because the Southern man may take with him all that the Northern man can take. The plain English of which is this: if the Southern man will consent to become *as a Northern man*, and renounce what distinguishes him as a *Southern man*, he may go into the territories. But if he insists upon remaining a *Southern man*, he must stay at home. The geography is only an accident in this matter. The Southern man, politically, is the slaveholder; the Northern man, politically, is the non-slaveholder. The rights of the South are the rights of the South as slaveholding; the rights of the North are the rights of the North as non-slaveholding. This is what makes the real difference betwixt the two sections. To exclude *slaveholding* is, therefore, to exclude the South. By the free-soil doctrine, therefore, she, as South, is utterly debarred from every foot of the soil, which belongs, of

right, as much to her as to her Northern confederates. The Constitution is made to treat her institutions as if they were a scandal and reproach. It becomes the patron of the North, and an enemy, instead of a protector, to her.

That this is the attitude which the Government is henceforward to assume, we shall now proceed to show :

(1.) In the first place, let it be distinctly understood, that we do not charge the great body of the Northern people, who have accomplished the recent revolution, with being abolitionists, in the strict and technical sense. We are willing to concede that they have no design, for the present, to interfere directly with slavery in the slaveholding States. We shall give them credit for an honest purpose, under Mr. Lincoln's administration, to execute, as far as the hostility of the States will let them, the provisions of the fugitive slave law. All this may be admitted, but it does not affect the real issue, nor mitigate the real danger. We know that there are various types of opinion at the North with reference to the moral aspects of slavery, and we have never apprehended that, under the Constitution as it stands, there was any likelihood of an attempt to interfere, by legislation, with our property on our own soil.

(2.) But, in the second place, it must likewise be conceded that the general, almost the universal, attitude of the Northern mind is one of hostility to slavery. Those who are not prepared to condemn it as a sin, nor to meddle with it where it is legally maintained, are yet opposed to it, as a natural and political evil, which every good man should desire to see extinguished. They all regard it as a calamity, an affliction, a misfortune. They regard it as an element of weakness, and as a draw-back upon the prosperity and glory of the country. They pity the South, as caught in the folds of a serpent, which is gradually squeezing out her life. And, even when they defend us from the reproach of sin in sustaining the relation, they make so many distinctions between the abstract notion of slavery

and the system of our own laws, that their defence would hardly avail to save us, if there were any power competent to hang and quarter us. We are sure that we do not misrepresent the general tone of Northern sentiment. It is one of *hostility* to slavery—it is one which, while it might not be willing to break faith, under the present administration, with respect to the express injunctions of the Constitution, is utterly and absolutely opposed to any further extension of the system.

(3.) In the third place, let it be distinctly understood that we have no complaint to make of the opinions of the North, considered simply as their opinions. They have a right, so far as human authority is concerned, to think as they please. The South has never asked them to approve of slavery, or to change their own institutions and to introduce it among themselves. The South has been willing to accord to them the most perfect and unrestricted right of private judgment.

(4.) But, in the fourth place, what we *do* complain of, and what we have a right to complain of, is that they should not be content with thinking their own thoughts themselves, but should undertake to make the *Government* think them likewise. We of the South have, also, certain thoughts concerning slavery, and we can not understand upon what principle the thinking of the South is totally excluded, and the thinking of the North made supreme. The Government is as much ours as theirs, and we can not see why, in a matter that vitally concerns ourselves, we shall be allowed to do no effective thinking at all. This is the grievance. The Government is made to take the type of Northern sentiment—it is animated, in its relations to slavery, by the Northern mind, and the South, henceforward, is no longer *of* the Government, but only *under* the Government. The extension of slavery, in obedience to Northern prejudice, is to be for ever arrested. Congress is to treat it as an evil, an element of political weakness, and to restrain its influ-

ence within the limits which now circumscribe it. All this because the *North thinks* so; while the South, an equal party to the Government, has quite other thoughts. And when we indignantly complain of this absolute suppression of all right to think in and through our own Government, upon a subject that involves our homes and our firesides, we are coolly reminded, that, as long as Congress does not usurp the rights of our own Legislatures, and abolish slavery on our own soil, nor harbor our fugitives when they attempt to escape from us, we have reason to be grateful for the indulgence accorded to us. The right to breathe is as much as we should venture to claim. You may exist, says free-soilism, as States, and manage your slaves at home—we will not abrogate your sovereignty. Your runaways we do not want, and we may occasionally send them back to you. But if you think you have a right to be heard at Washington upon this great subject, it is time that your presumption should be rebuked. The North is the thinking power—the soul of the Government. The life of the Government is Northern—not Southern; the type to be impressed upon all future States is Northern—not Southern. The North becomes the United States, and the South a subject province.

Now, we say that this is a state of things not to be borne. A free people can never consent to their own degradation. We say boldly, that the Government has no more right to adopt Northern thoughts on the subject of slavery than those of the South. It has no more right to presume that they are true. It has no right to arbitrate between them. It must treat them both with equal respect, and give them an equal chance. Upon no other footing can the South, with honor, remain in the Union. It is not to be endured for a moment, that fifteen sovereign States, embodying, in proportion to their population, as much intelligence, virtue, public spirit and patriotism, as any other people upon the globe, should be quietly reduced to zero, in a Government

which they framed for their own protection ! We put the question again to the North : If the tables were turned, and it was your thoughts, your life, your institutions, that the Government was henceforward to discountenance ; if non-slaveholding was hereafter to be prohibited in every territory, and the whole policy of the Government shaped by the principle that slavery is a blessing, would you endure it ? Would not your blood boil, and would you not call upon your hungry millions to come to the rescue ? And yet, this is precisely what you have done to us, and think we ought not to resist. You have made us ciphers, and are utterly amazed that we should claim to be any thing.

But, apart from the degradation which it inflicts upon the South, it may be asked, what real injury will result from putting the Government in an attitude of hostility to slavery ?

The answer is, in the first place, that it will certainly lead to the extinction of the system. You may destroy the oak as effectually by girdling it as by cutting it down. The North are well assured that if they can circumscribe the area of slavery, if they can surround it with a circle of non-slaveholding States, and prevent it from expanding, nothing more is required to secure its ultimate abolition. "Like the scorpion girt by fire," it will plunge its fangs into its own body, and perish. If, therefore, the South is not prepared to see her institutions surrounded by enemies, and wither and decay under these hostile influences, if she means to cherish and protect them, it is her bounden duty to resist the revolution which threatens them with ruin. The triumph of the principles which Mr. Lincoln is pledged to carry out, is the death-knell of slavery.

In the next place, the state of the Northern mind which has produced this revolution can not be expected to remain content with its present victory. It will hasten to other triumphs. The same spirit which has prevaricated with the express provisions of the Constitution, and resorted to ex-

pedients to evade the most sacred obligations, will not hesitate for a moment to change the Constitution when it finds itself in possession of the power. It will only be consistency to harmonize the fundamental law of the Government with its chosen policy, the real workings of its life. The same hostility to slavery which a numerical majority has impressed upon the Federal Legislature, it will not scruple to impress upon the Federal Constitution. If the South could be induced to submit to Lincoln, the time, we confidently predict, will come when all grounds of controversy will be removed in relation to fugitive slaves, by expunging the provision under which they are claimed. The principle is at work and enthroned in power, whose inevitable tendency is to secure this result. Let us crush the serpent in the egg.

From these considerations, it is obvious that nothing more nor less is at stake in this controversy than the very life of the South. The real question is, whether she shall be politically annihilated. We are not struggling for fleeting and temporary interests. We are struggling for our very being. And none know better than the Republican party itself, that if we submit to their new type of Government, our fate as slaveholding is for ever sealed. They have already exulted in the prospect of this glorious consummation. They boast that they have laid a mine which must ultimately explode in our utter ruin. They are singing songs of victory in advance, and are confidently anticipating the auspicious hour when they shall have nothing to do but to return to the field and bury the dead.

The sum of what we have said is briefly this: We have shown that the Constitutional attitude of the Government towards slavery is one of absolute neutrality or indifference in relation to the moral and political aspects of the subject. We have shown, in the next place, that it is hereafter to take an attitude of hostility; that it is to represent the opinions and feelings exclusively of the North; that it is to

become the Government of one section over another ; and that the South, as South, is to sustain no other relation to it but the duty of obedience..

This is a thorough and radical revolution. It makes a new Government—it proposes new and extraordinary terms of union. The old Government is as completely abolished as if the people of the United States had met in Convention and repealed the Constitution. It is frivolous to tell us that the change has been made through the forms of the Constitution. This is to add insult to injury. What signify forms, when the substance is gone? Of what value is the shell, when the kernel is extracted? Rights are *things*, and not words; and when the things are taken from us, it is no time to be nibbling at phrases. If a witness under oath designedly gives testimony, which, though literally true, conveys a false impression, is he not guilty of perjury? Is not his truth a lie? Temures kept the letter of his promise to the garrison of Sebastia, that if they would surrender, no blood should be shed, but did that save him from the scandal of treachery in burying them alive? No man objects to the legality of the process of Mr. Lincoln's election. The objection is to the legality of that to which he is elected. He has been chosen, not to administer, but to revolutionize, the Government. The very moment he goes into office, the Constitution of the United States, as touching the great question between North and South, is dead. The oath which makes him President, makes a new Union. The import of secession is simply the refusal, on the part of the South, to be parties to any such Union. She has not renounced, and if it had been permitted to stand, she never would have renounced, the Constitution which our fathers framed. She would have stood by it for ever. But, as the North have substantially abolished it, and, taking advantage of their numbers, have substituted another in its place, which dooms the South to perdition, surely she has a right to say she will enter into no such conspiracy. The Government

to which she consented was a Government under which she might hope to live. The new one presented in its place is one under which she can only die. Under these circumstances, we do not see how any man can question either the righteousness or the necessity of secession. The South is shut up to the duty of rejecting these new terms of Union. No people on earth, without judicial infatuation, can organize a Government to destroy them. It is too much to ask a man to sign his own death-warrant.

II. We wish to say a few words as to the policy of the slaveholding States in the present emergency.

We know it to be the fixed determination of them all not to acquiesce in the principles which have brought Mr. Lincoln into power. Several of them, however, have hesitated—and it is a sign of the scrupulous integrity of the South in maintaining her faith—whether the mere fact of his election, apart from any overt act of the Government, is itself a *casus belli*, and a sufficient reason for extreme measures of resistance. These States have, also, clung to the hope that there would yet be a returning sense of justice at the North, which shall give them satisfactory guarantees for the preservation of their rights, and restore peace without the necessity of schism. We respect the motives which have produced this hesitation. We have no sympathy with any taunting reflections upon the courage, magnanimity, public spirit or patriotism of such a Commonwealth as Virginia. The mother of Washington is not to be insulted, if, like her great hero, she takes counsel of moderation and prudence. We honor, too, the sentiment which makes it hard to give up the Union. It was a painful struggle to ourselves; the most painful struggle of our lives. There were precious memories and hallowed associations, connected with a glorious history, to which the heart can not bid farewell without a pang. Few men, in all the South, brought themselves to pronounce the word DISUNION, without sadness of heart. Some States have not yet been able to pronounce it.

But the tendency of events is irresistible. It is becoming every day clearer, that the people of the North hate slavery more than they love the Union, and they are developing this spirit in a form which must soon bring every slaveholding State within the ranks of secession. The evil day may be put off, but it must come. The country must be divided into two people, and the point which we wish now to press upon the whole South is, the importance of preparing, at once, for this consummation.

The slaveholding interest is one, and it seems to us clear that the slaveholding States ought speedily to be organized under one general Government. United, they are strong enough to maintain themselves against the world. They have the territory, the resources, the population, the public spirit, the institutions, which, under a genial and fostering Constitution, would soon enable them to become one of the first people upon the globe. And if the North shall have wisdom to see her true policy, two Governments upon this continent may work out the problem of human liberty more successfully than one. Let the two people maintain the closest alliance for defence against a foreign foe, or, at least, let them be agreed that no European power shall ever set foot on American soil, and that no type of government but the republican shall ever be tolerated here, and what is to hinder the fullest and freest developement of our noble institutions. The separation changes nothing but the external relations of the two sections. Such a dismemberment of the Union is not like the revolution of a State, where the internal system of government is subverted, where laws are suspended, and where anarchy reigns. The country might divide into two great nations to-morrow, without a jostle or a jar; the Government of each State might go on as regularly as before, the law be as supreme, and order as perfect, if the passions of the people could be kept from getting the better of their judgments. It is a great advantage in the form of our Confederacy, that a

radical revolution can take place without confusion, and without anarchy. Every State has a perfect internal system at work already, and that undergoes no change, except in adjusting it to its altered external relations. Now, given this system of States, with every element of a perfect Government in full and undisturbed operation, what is there in the circumstance of *one* Confederacy of *divided interests*, that shall secure a freer and safer developement than *two Confederacies*, each representing an *undivided* interest? Are not two homogeneous Unions stronger than one that is heterogeneous? Should not the life of a Government be one? We do not see, therefore, that any thing will be lost to freedom by the union of the South under a separate Government. She will carry into it every institution that she had before—her State Constitutions, her Legislatures, her Courts of Justice, her halls of learning—every thing that she now possesses. She will put these precious interests under a Government embodying every principle which gave value to the old one, and amply adequate to protect them. What will she lose of real freedom? We confess that we can not understand the declamation, that with the American Union, American institutions are gone. Each section of the Union will preserve them and cherish them. Every principle that has ever made us glorious, and made our Government a wonder, will abide with us. The sections, separately, will not be as formidable to foreign powers as before. That is all. But each section will be strong enough to protect itself, and both together can save this continent for republicanism for ever.

Indeed, it is likely that both Governments will be purer, in consequence of their mutual rivalry, and the diminution of the extent of their patronage. They will both cherish intensely the American feeling, both maintain the pride of American character, and both try to make their Governments at home what they would desire to have them appear

to be abroad. Once take away all pretext for meddling with one another's peculiar interests, and we do not see but that the magnificent visions of glory, which our imaginations have delighted to picture as the destiny of the Anglo-Saxon race on this North American continent, may yet be fully realized. They never can be, if we continue together, to bite and devour one another.

But, whether it be for weal or woe, the South has no election. She is driven to the wall, and the only question is, will she take care of herself in time? The sooner she can organize a general Government, the better. That will be a centre of unity, and, once combined, we are safe.

We can not close without saying a few words to the people of the North as to the policy which it becomes them to pursue. The whole question of peace or war is in their hands. The South is simply standing on the defensive, and has no notion of abandoning that attitude. Let the Northern people, then, seriously consider, and consider in the fear of God, how, under present circumstances, they can best conserve those great interests of freedom, of religion, and of order, which are equally dear to us both, and which they can fearfully jeopard. If their counsels incline to peace, the most friendly relations can speedily be restored, and the most favorable treaties entered into. We should feel ourselves the joint possessors of the continent, and should be drawn together by ties which unite no other people. We could, indeed, realize all the advantages of the Union, without any of its inconveniences. The cause of human liberty would not even be retarded, if the North can rise to a level with the exigencies of the occasion. If, on the other hand, their thoughts incline to war, we solemnly ask them what they expect to gain? What interest will be promoted? What end, worthy of a great people, will they be able to secure? They may gratify their bad passions, they may try to reek their resentment upon the seceding States, and they may inflict a large amount of

injury, disaster and suffering. But what have they gained? Shall a free people be governed by their passions? Suppose they should conquer us, what will they do with us? How will they hold us in subjection? How many garrisons, and how many men, and how much treasure, will it take to keep the South in order as a conquered province? and where are these resources to come from? After they have subdued us, the hardest part of their task will remain. They will have the wolf by the ears.

But, upon what grounds do they hope to conquer us? They know us well—they know our numbers—they know our spirit, and they know the value which we set upon our homes and firesides. We have fought for the glory of the Union, and the world admired us, but it was not such fighting as we shall do for our wives, our children, and our sacred honor. The very women of the South, like the Spartan matrons, will take hold of shield and buckler, and our boys at school will go to the field in all the determination of disciplined valor. Conquered we can never be. It would be madness to attempt it; and after years of blood and slaughter, the parties would be just where they began, except that they would have learned to hate one another with an intensity of hatred equalled only in hell. Freedom would suffer, religion would suffer, learning would suffer, every human interest would suffer, from such a war. But upon whose head would fall the responsibility? There can be but one answer. We solemnly believe that the South will be guiltless before the eyes of the Judge of all the earth. She has stood in her lot, and resisted aggression.

If the North could rise to the dignity of their present calling, this country would present to the world a spectacle of unparalleled grandeur. It would show how deeply the love of liberty and the influence of religion are rooted in our people, when a great empire can be divided without confusion, war, or disorder. Two great people united under one government differ upon a question of vital im-

portance to one. Neither can conscientiously give way. In the magnanimity of their souls, they say, let there be no strife between us, for we are brethren. The land is broad enough for us both. Let us part in peace, let us divide our common inheritance, adjust our common obligations, and, preserving, as a sacred treasure, our common principles, let each set up for himself, and let the Lord bless us both. A course like this, heroic, sublime, glorious, would be something altogether unexampled in the history of the world. It would be the wonder and astonishment of the nations. It would do more to command for American institutions the homage and respect of mankind, than all the armies and fleets of the Republic. It would be a victory more august and imposing than any which can be achieved by the thunder of cannon and the shock of battle.

Peace is the policy of both North and South. Let peace prevail, and nothing really valuable is lost. To save the Union is impossible. The thing for Christian men and patriots to aim at now, is to save the country from war. That will be a scourge and a curse. But the South will emerge from it free as she was before. She is the invaded party, and her institutions are likely to gain strength from the conflict. Can the North, as the invading party, be assured that she will not fall into the hands of a military despot? The whole question is with her, and we calmly await her decision. We prefer peace—but if war must come, we are prepared to meet it with unshaken confidence in the God of battles. We lament the wide-spread mischief it will do, the arrest it will put upon every holy enterprise of the Church, and upon all the interests of life; but the South can boldly say to the bleeding, distracted country,

“Shake not thy gory locks at me;
Thou canst not say I did it.”

ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

1. *Commentary on the Sermon on the Mount.* By Dr. A. THOLUCK. Translated from the fourth and enlarged edition. By the Rev. R. LUNDIN BROWN, M. A. Philadelphia: Smith & English. 1860; pp. 443, 8vo.

This is a new edition of an elaborate commentary which has been some years before the public, and was designed by the author to be as nearly exhaustive as possible. Much extraneous matter has been thrown out, and much that is new inserted, in the present edition. It is rich in its literature, not open to objection like the more doctrinal commentaries of this learned scholar, and will abundantly reward an attentive perusal.

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2. *Studies in Animal Life.* By GEORGE HENRY LEWES, author of "Life of Gæthe," etc. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860; pp. 146, 12mo.

The chief aim of this volume seems to be to rescue "the studies of the minuter and obscurer forms of life, which seldom attract attention," from the indifference and contempt with which they are often regarded. The author presents numerous examples, well fitted to excite a general desire to cultivate a more intimate acquaintance with his own favorite objects of study. The style is familiar and gossiping, evincing at times the influence of a misty sentimentalism, not to be wondered at, perhaps, in an ardent admirer and biographer of Gæthe. The reader will find

numerous episodes upon the classification of animals, the origin and fixity of species, the life of Cuvier, etc., besides that which pertains directly to the leading idea of the book.

Among the more recent publications of the Presbyterian Board, are the following :

3. *Work and Conflict; or, the Divine Life in its Progress, A Book of Facts and Histories.* By the Rev. JOHN KENNEDY, M. A., F. R. G. S. Revised by the Editor of the Board. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. pp. 396, 12mo.

The subject is one of acknowledged importance, the style of the author is smooth and lively, the illustrations from the lives of eminent Christians well selected, and handled with discrimination and judgment.

4. *The Rock of Ages, or Scripture Testimony to the One Eternal Godhead of The Father, and of The Son, and of The Holy Ghost.* By EDWARD HENRY BICKERSTETH, M. A., Incumbent of Christ's Church, Hamstead. A new and revised edition. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication, pp. 182, 8vo.

An excellent edition of a book which sets forth the Scriptural proof of the Trinity of persons in the one Godhead clearly, in the language of affectionate regard towards those who stumble at the doctrine, and with the aim of reaching the heart and conscience of him who reads it.

5. *Words of Wisdom illustrated and applied.* Being a sequel to "Little Words." pp. 285, 16mo.

Walter Stockton, or My Father's at the Helm. By E. LLEWELLYN, author of "Mary Humphrey," etc. pp. 230, 16mo.

Whispers from Dream-Land. By NELLIE GRAHAM, author of "Little Annie's First Thoughts about God." pp. 128, 16mo.

Aunt Carrie's Budget of Fireside Stories. By SARAH A. MYERS. pp. 174, 16mo.

Grandmama Wise, or Visits to Rose Cottage. pp. 192, 16mo.

The Holy Child, or The Early Years of our Lord Jesus Christ. By W. M. BLACKBURN. pp. 260, 16mo.

The Joyful Sufferer; A Memorial of Mrs. James E. —.

Elsie Lee, or Impatience Cured. By MARY GREY. pp. 83.

Paul Winslow, or Blessings in Disguise. pp. 107, 16mo.

The preceding are among the latest additions by our Presbyterian Board of Publication to their "Series for Youth." Our children need not seek elsewhere for books. The series is becoming more and more extensive, varied, and interesting to the young.

6. *Palissy, the Huguenot Potter. A True Tale.* By C. L. BRIGHTWELL. Philadelphia: Board of Publication. pp. 169, 12mo.

Palissy, the Potter, whom Dr. Lamartine calls "the patriarch of the workshop," was an artisan of incomparable skill, whose master-pieces in the "fictile art" adorn the collections of the Musée Royale, the Louvre and the Hôtel de Cheny; a true philosopher, though untaught in the Schools; a man of acute and ready wit; a Christian man of singular piety, who was not afraid to serve God amid the fires of bitter persecution. He was unable, in his old age, to seek safety in flight. Even the power of the king could not protect him from the cruelty of the Church of Rome. The last few years of his life were spent in the Bastille, where he died in the year 1589. This little volume is a pleasant story of his life, skillfully compiled from larger and more elaborate works.

7. *The Church—its Constitution and Government.* By the Rev. STUART MITCHELL. Board of Publication. pp. 132, 16mo.
8. *Am I a Christian? And how am I to know it?* Board of Publication. pp. 179.
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9. *The Life of Rev. Richard Knill, of St. Petersburg.* By Rev. CHARLES M. BIRRELL, of the Baptist Church, Liverpool, with a review of his character, by Rev. JOHN ANGELL JAMES. American Tract Society. pp. 358, 16mo.
10. *The Young Hop-Pickers.* By the late SARAH MARIA FRY. American Tract Society. pp. 85, 16mo.
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11. *The Lake Regions of Central Africa. A Picture of Exploration.* By RICHARD F. BURTON, Captain H. M. I. Army; Fellow and Gold Medalist of the Royal Geographical Society. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860; pp. 572, 8vo.

Capt. Burton penetrated the continent of Africa from a point opposite the Island of Zanzibar, on its eastern coast, to the distance of 955 miles, and explored the Tanganyika Lake, in lat. 3° to 8° south of the equator. The larger portion of this lake he sailed over. He has described with a graphic pen the annoyances he encountered from a sickly climate, from selfish, unscrupulous chiefs, and from the filthy, thieving, and miserable savages who were the companions of his travels. Like the journals of other recent travellers in Africa, it is an important contribution to the ethnography and geography of a continent, concerning the interior of which so little is known to the civilized world.

12. *Travels in the Regions of the Upper and Lower Amoor, and the Russian acquisitions on the Confines of India and China, with Adventures, etc.* By THOMAS WITLAM ATKINSON, F. G. S., and F. R. G. S. Author of "Oriental and Western Siberia." With a map and numerous illustrations. New York: Harpers. 1860; pp. 448, 8vo.

A description of a vast tract of country, constituting the valley of the Amoor, ceded by the Emperor of China to the Emperor of Russia in 1857. A country of inexhaustible mineral and agricultural wealth, capable of great improvement, and adding largely to the overgrown power of Russia.

13. "*My Novel.*" By PISISTRATUS CAXTON: or varieties in English Life. Library Edition. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1860; 2 vols., pp. 589, 585, 12mo.

The readers of Blackwood will recognize this story as an old acquaintance, that has beguiled many an hour with its good sense, humor, and practical philosophy. The most unobjectionable, perhaps, of all the writings of the gifted Sir E. Bulwer Lytton.

14. *Tom Brown at Oxford.* A Sequel to "School Days at Rugby." Part First. New York: Harpers. 1860; pp. 360, 12mo.

The success of "Tom Brown's School Days," will find readers for this description of the University life of the sons of the English gentry; a life too often, if we may judge from this volume, of extravagance, idleness and luxury, whose temptations some, endowed with a noble manliness of character, and rightly principled by early education, are able to resist, but in the midst of which, many suffer shipwreck.

15. *The Queens of Society.* By GRACE and PHILIP WHARTON. Illustrated by Charles Altamont Doyle and the Brothers Dalziel. New York: Harpers. 1860; pp. 488, 12mo.

Among these Queens of wit and talent, are the Duchess of Marlborough, Lady Morgan, Madame Récamier, Miss Landon, Madame DeStäel, and others, who have been famous in the world of letters, or in the Courts of Kings.

16. *The Four Georges. Sketches of Manners, Morals, Court and Town Life.* By W. M. THACKERAY. With illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers. pp. 241, 12mo.
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17. *Wheat and Tares.* New York: Harpers. pp. 280, 12mo.
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18. *Our Year. A Child's Book, in Prose and Verse.* By the author of "John Halifax, Gentleman." Illustrated by Clarence Dobell. New York: Harpers. 1860; pp. 297, 12mo.
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19. *A Course of Six Lectures on the Various Forces of Matter, and their relations to each other.* By MICHAEL FARADAY, D. C. L., F. R. S., etc. Delivered before a Juvenile auditory, at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, during the Christmas holidays of 1859-60. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1860; pp. 198, 12mo.

These lectures were especially intended for young persons, as will be seen from the title; but there are few grown-up children who can peruse them without decided interest and advantage. The topics, abstruse as they may be, are presented with charming simplicity and clearness. The

sprightliness and familiar style of the author are retained, as the lectures "are printed as they were spoken, *verbatim et literatim*."

20. *The Five Senses ; or, Gateways to Knowledge*. By GEO. WILSON, M. D., Regius Professor in the University of Edinburgh, etc. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860; pp. 139, 12mo.

We have here an animated and striking description of "the five entrance-ways of knowledge, which old John Bunyan quaintly styles Eye-gate, Ear-gate, Nose-gate, Mouth-gate, and Feel-gate." The author looks at them "mainly as ministers to the cultivation of the Intellect; and as ministers to the gratification of the perception of Beauty and its opposite." We cheerfully commend the little work to the favorable notice of our readers.

21. *A Sketch of the Life and Educational Labors of Philip Lindsley, D. D., late President of the University of Nashville*. By LEROY J. HALSEY, D. D., Professor in the Theological Seminary of the North-West, author of "Literary Attractions of the Bible," etc. Republished from Barnard's American Journal of Education for September. 1859; pp. 46, 8vo.

22. *Life Pictures from the Bible, or Illustrations of Scripture Character*. By LEROY J. HALSEY, D. D., author of "Literary Attractions of the Bible," etc. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication. pp. 460, 12mo.

The first of these is a beautiful tribute to one of the most ardent and energetic promoters of learning and education in the West, to whom the city of Nashville and the State of Tennessee are greatly indebted for their institutions for

the training of their youth. The other, from the same accomplished pen, portrays those characters held up to our view in the Scriptures, either as examples to be imitated, or as warnings against sin. It is a sequel to "The Literary Attractions of the Bible." If the one shows the immeasurable difference between it and all other books in the department of genius and taste, this, in like manner, shows it in the department of morals. The express object of the volume is to commend the Bible to the favorable attention of parents and teachers charged with the instruction of the young, and to our youth themselves.

23. *The Beautiful City, and the King of Glory.* By WOODBURY DAVIS. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1860; pp. 255, 12mo., price 75 cts.

The topics this volume presents were arranged as a series of studies for a Bible Class under the author's care. The hypothesis of the premillennial advent and personal reign of Christ on the earth for a thousand years, is the one adopted and set forth.

24. *Analysis of the Cartoons of Raphael.* New York: Charles B. Norton. 1860; pp. 141, 16mo.

A description of these celebrated paintings. The subjects are: I. Paul preaching at Athens. II. The charge to Peter. III. The death of Ananias. IV. Elymas, the Sorcerer, Struck with Blindness. V. The Miraculous Draught of Fishes. VI. Paul and Barnabas at Lystra. VII. The Beautiful Gate to the Temple.

The object of the above volume is to direct attention to these famous works of a great painter, line engravings of which will be furnished at reduced prices, by Charles B.

Norton, Irving Buildings, New York. The volume reached us after our last issue, or it would have been noticed earlier. The favorable time for subscription may now have passed.

25. *First Report of the Cotton Planters' Convention of Georgia, on the Agricultural Resources of Georgia.* By JOSEPH JONES, M. D., Chemist to the Cotton Planters' Convention, and Professor of Medical Chemistry in the Medical College of Georgia, at Augusta. Augusta, Ga.: Steam Press of Chronicle & Sentinel. 1860; pp. 319, 8vo.

26. *Agricultural Resources of Georgia. Address before the Cotton Planters' Convention of Georgia, at Macon, Dec. 13, 1860.* By the Same. pp. 13, 8vo.

Of the great industry, zeal and devotedness to his favorite pursuits, and his patriotic attachment to his native State, these pages of Dr. Jones are abundant evidence. To speak with authority of the many matters embraced in them, especially of the analysis of soils and fertilizers, requires more practical skill and scientific knowledge than we possess.

27. *Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, Major General U. S. A., and Governor of the State of Mississippi.* By J. F. H. CLAIBORNE. In two volumes. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1860; pp. 400, 392, 12mo.

A Southern book, though published at the North, about a Southern man, though born at the North. Gen. Quitman was a man to inspire universal respect. He had ours in a large degree. We recommend the book to our readers.

28. *Odd People, being a popular description of Singular Races of Man.* By Capt. MAYNE REID, author of the "Desert Home," the "Bush Boys," etc. With illustrations. New York: Harper & Brothers, Franklin Square. 1860; pp. 445, 16mo.

This is one of Capt. Reid's books. Having said this, we need add no more. The boys are his patrons. They do not care for any body's criticisms on their favorite author.

ARTICLE VIII.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

I. AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEWS.—CONTENTS.

- I. *Princeton Review*, October, 1860; Edited by Charles Hodge, D. D. Article I. The Logical Relations of Religion and Natural Science. II. The Law of Spiritual Growth. III. Horace Binney's Pamphlets. IV. Reason and Faith. V. Napoleon III. and the Papacy. VI. Theory of the Eldership (concluded). Short Notices.
- II. *Bibliotheca Sacra*, October, 1860. Article I. The Religion of Geology. II. The Aborigines of India. III. The Resurrection and its Concomitants, by Rev. E. Russell, D. D., East Randolph. IV. Did the Ancient Hebrews Believe in the Doctrine of Immortality? by Rev. S. Tuska. V. Comparative Phonology; or, the Phonetic System of the Indo-European Languages, by Benjamin W. Dwight, Clinton, N. Y. VI. A Journey to Neapolis and Philippi, by Horatio B. Hackett, D. D., Professor at Newton.
- III. *Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, October, 1860. Article I. The Arabs. II. Russia—Second Article. III. Schleiermacher, (translated from the German of Professor Baur, in the *Studien und Kritiken*.) IV. Duties of our Laymen. V. The New Rule of the American Home Missionary Society. VI. The Fathers of the Harrisburg Presbytery. Theological and Literary Intelligence.
- IV. *United Presbyterian Quarterly Review*, October, 1860. Article I. The Hebrew Servant, by Rev. Thomas Beveridge, D. D. II. The Bible and the School, by Rev. D. A. Wallace, D. D. III. The Eighth Psalm, by Rev. John T. Pressly, D. D. IV. Church and State, by Rev. Thomas Sproull, D. D. V. Niagara Falls—Its Relation to Chronology, by Professor Christy. VI. The Recent Syrian Massacres, by Rev. Robert A. Browne, A. M. VII. Tractarianism Traced to Its Sources, by Rev. James Harper, A. M. VIII. Examination of 2d Thess. iii. 6-14, and 1st Cor. v. 9-11, by Rev. David Macdill, D. D. IX. The First Assembly. X. Short Notices.

- V. *Theological and Literary Journal*, October, 1860; Edited by David N. Lord. Article I. Rawlinson's Bampton Lectures on the Truth of the Scripture Records. II. Dr. J. A. Alexander on Matthew xxiv. III. Memorial of Rev. John Richards, D. D. IV. The Fiji Mission. V. The Revelation, Daniel ii., respecting the Four Great Empires. VI. Designation and Exposition of the Figures in Isaiah, Chapters lviii. lix. and lx. VII. Literary and Critical Notices.
- VI. *New Englander*, November, 1860. Article I. The Divine Humanity of Christ. II. Frederick Perthes. III. Agriculture as a Profession; or Hints about Farming. IV. Modern Warfare; Its Science and Art. V. Dr. Alexander's Letters. VI. Primitive Evangelization and its Lessons. VII. The General Assembly and Coöperation. VIII. The Home Heathen, and How to reach them. IX. Palfrey's History of New England. X. Notices of Books,—over eighty in number.
- VII. *Evangelical Review*, October, 1860. Article I. Christian Liberty. II. Testimony of Jesus as to His Possession and Exercise of Miraculous Power. III. A Call to the Christian Ministry. IV. The Pleasures of Taste. V. Baccalaureate Address. VI. Baptismal Hymns. VII. The New Heavens and the New Earth. VIII. Opening Address before a Christian Association. IX. The Evangelical Mass and Romish Mass. X. Notices of New Publications.
- VIII. *Mercersburg Review*, October, 1860. Article I. The Fall and the Natural World, by the Rev. E. V. Gerhart, D. D., Lancaster, Pa. II. Strength and Beauty of the Sanctuary. III. Memoir of Dr. J. W. Alexander, by Prof. Edwin Emerson, Troy, N. Y. IV. Unlettered Learning, or a Plea for the Study of Things, by Wilberforce Nevins, A. M., Lancaster, Pa. V. The Literature of the Heidelberg Catechism, by the Rev. H. Harbaugh, D. D., Lancaster, Pa. VI. The Prospects of Christianity in Africa. VII. Recent Publications.
- IX. *Southern Baptist Review*, December, 1860. Article I. Review of Abbey's Baptismal Demonstrations. II. The Second Advent of Christ: Is it Premillennial. III. The Natural History of Presbyterian Defections from Evangelical Truth. IV. Fuller's Sermons. V. Baptism for Remission of Sins. VI. The Second Duty of a Believer in Christ. VII. The Ordinances. Eclectic Department—Exegesis of Romans vii. 17-25. Notices of New Publications.
- X. *Christian Review*, October, 1860. Article I. Are our Necessary Conceptions of God Reliable? II. Notes on the Mystics. III. On Preaching the Doctrine of Eternal Punishment. IV. Godwin's History of France. V. Art Education. VI. Missionary Attempts of the Jesuits in Japan. VII. Rational Cosmology. VIII. Notices of Books.
- XI. *Freewill Baptist Quarterly*, October, 1860. Article I. Moral Character—Its Origin and Difference, by Rev. A. N. McConoughey, Ellington, N. Y. II. The Position of the Methodist Episcopal Church on the Subject of American Slavery, by Rev. J. M. Woodmar, Racine, Wis. III. An Effective Ministry, by Rev. D. Mott, Lowell, Mass. IV. Christian Missions and Civilization, by Rev. J. L. Phillips, Prairie City, Ill. V. Æsthetic Culture, by Rev. W. H. Bowen, Blackstone, Mass. VI. Regeneration, by Rev. G. H. Ball, Whitestown, N. Y. VII. The Book of Job, by Rev. B. F. Hayes, Olneyville, R. I. VIII. Contemporary Literature.
- XII. *Quarterly Review of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South*, October 1860. Article I. Milton and his Recent Critics, by A. A. Lipscomb, D. D. II. Introduction of Children into the Church. III. Wordsworth, by Prof. A. B. Stark. IV. Dr. Alexander's Theory of Moral Agency. V. The Greek Tragic Drama. VI. Southern Standard of Education. VII. Job's War-Horse, by L. P. Olds. VIII. Brief Reviews. IX. Notes and Correspondence.

- XIII. *Methodist Quarterly Review*, October, 1860. Article I. John Ruskin, by Rev. Gilbert Haven, Cambridge, Mass. II. The Florida Maroons, by S. G. Arnold, Newark, Ohio. III. Party Politics, by Rev. J. Townley Crane, D. D., Haverstraw, New York. IV. Early Methodism within the bounds of the Old Genesee Conference, by Rev. Zachariah Paddock, D. D., Binghamton. V. Vittoria Colonna, by Mrs. Julia M. Olin, New York. VI. Wesley as a Man of Literature, by Rev. G. F. Playter, Frankford, C. W. VII. Exposition of the 8th Psalm, by Rev. Stephen M. Vail, D. D., Biblical Institute, Concord, N. H. VIII. The Lord's Supper, by Rev. Wm. H. Brisbane, Wilmington, Del. IX. Wesleyanism and Taylorism—Reply to the New Englander. X. Religious Intelligence. XI. Literary Intelligence. XII. Synopsis of the Quarterlies. XIII. Quarterly Book-Table.
- XIV. *DeBow's Review*, November, 1860. Article I. The South's Power of Self-Protection. II. Small Nations, by Geo. Fitzhugh, of Virginia. III. Fidelity of Slaves, by J. L. Reynolds, of South Carolina. IV. Catholicism, by Americus Featherstone, Esq., of Louisiana. V. Mr. Bancroft and the "Inner Light," by Geo. Fitzhugh, of Va. VI. Country Life. VII. "The Three Clerks." VIII. Southern Patronage to Southern Imports and Domestic Industry, by Wm. Gregg, of South Carolina. IX. Rights and Dignity of Minorities, by Python. X. African Colonization Unveiled, by Edmund Ruffin, of Virginia. XI. Mountain Scenery of North Carolina. Department of Agriculture. Department of Commerce. Editorial Notes and Miscellany.
- XV. *Home Circle*, December, 1860. L. D. Huston, Editor. Nashville, Tenn.: Southern Methodist Publishing House. General Articles. Poetry. Editorial Department.
- XVI. *Southern Episcopalian*, December, 1860. Edited by Rev. C. P. Gadsden and Rev. J. H. Elliott. Miscellaneous. Poetry. Editorial and Critical. Religious Intelligence.
- XVII. *The Pacific Expositor*, December, 1860; San Francisco, California. Rev. W. A. Scott, D. D., Editor.
- XVIII. *Journal of Prison Discipline*, October, 1860. Article I. Prisons Abroad. II. The United States Penitentiary. III. Schools of Reform. IV. The Little Street Beggar's Home. Brief Notices.

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- I. *Edinburgh Review*, October, 1860. Article I. Recent Geographical Researches. II. Memoirs of the Master of Sinclair. III. Max Müller's Ancient Sanscrit Literature. IV. Grotius and the Sources of International Law. V. The Churches of the Holy Land. VI. The Grand Remonstrance. VII. Scottish County Histories. VIII. Brain Difficulties. IX. The United States under Mr. Buchanan.
- II. *London Quarterly Review*, October, 1860. Article I. The Brazilian Empire. II. Deaconesses. III. Public School Education. IV. Wills and Will-Making, Ancient and Modern. V. Eliot's Novels. VI. Arrest of the Five Members by Charles the First. VII. Iron-Sides and Wooden Walls. VIII. Competitive Examinations.
- III. *Westminster Review*, October, 1860. Article I. Neo-Christianity. II. North American Indians. III. Robert Owen. IV. The Organization of Italy. V. The Antiquity of the Human Race. VI. Russia—Present and Future. VII. Our National Defences. VIII. Thackeray as a Novelist and Photographer. IX. Contemporary Literature.
- IV. *North British Review*, November, 1860. Article I. Modern Thought, its Progress and Consummation. II. The Disturbances in Syria. III. Leigh Hunt. IV. The Spanish Republics of South America. V. Province of Logic, and Recent British Logicians. VI. Lord Macaulay's

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 V. *Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine*, December, 1860. Contents: Iron-Clad Ships of War.—Part II. The Romance of Agostini.—Conclusion. A Visit to the Tribes of the Ryhanlu Turkmans. Theories of Food. Our only Danger in India. Social Science. Norman Sinclair: An Autobiography.—Part XI. Alexander Carlyle of Inveresk. Index.

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- II. *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 Décembre 1860: Paris. I. L'Irlande en 1860, ses Griets et sa Nationalité, par M. Jules de Lasteyrie. II. Histoire Naturelle de l'Homme.—Unité de l'Espèce Humaine, le Règne Humain, première partie, par M. A. de Quatrefages, de l'Académie des Sciences. III. L'Italie Depuis la paix de Villafranca.—I.—La Révolution Italienne et la Papauté, par M. Charles de Mazade. IV. De l'Esclavage aux États-Unis.—I.—Le Code Noir et les Esclaves, par M. Elisée Reclus. V. Les Finances et les Travaux Publics de l'Espagne, par M. Bailleux de Marisy. VI. La Lande-aux-jagueliers, Scènes et Récit du Bas-anjou, par M. Théodore Pavie. VII. Leibnitz et Hegel, d'après de Nouveaux Documents, par M. Émile Saisset. VIII. Portraits Poétiques.—Mme. Desbordes-Valmore et ses Poésies Posthumes, par M. Émile Montégut. IX. Chronique de la Quinzaine, Histoire Politique et Littéraire. X. *Revue Musicale*, par M. P. Scudo. XI. Bulletin Bibliographique.
- III. *Revue Chrétienne*, 15 Novembre, 1860: Paris. Sommaire: Quelques réflexions sur l'avenir de la religion.—Réponse à M. Renan—E. de Pressensé. Port-Royal (2e article)—Eug. Bersier. Un Aperçu sur Goethe. Un nouveau système de traduction des Évangiles—F. Dumur. Bulletin Bibliographique. *Revue* du mois.—Impuissance du parti catholique.—La crise intérieure de l'Église réformée de France.—La vraie solution de plus en plus généralement aperçue.—Une préface de Strauss—Une rectification importante.—Quelques faits religieux aux États-Unis—Eug. Bersier.
- IV. *Studien und Kritiken*, Jahrgang 1860 zweites Heft. 1. *Abhandlungen*: Rothe, zur Dogmatik. (Schluss.) II. *Gedanken und Bemerkungen*: 1. Buttman, krit. Beobachtungen über den Text des codex Vaticanus B. 2. Bodemeyer, Beleuchtung d. Abendmahlslehre des D. Keim. 3. Zyro, Erklärung von Matth. 11, 12. 4. Holtzmann, über Begriff und Inhalt der biblischen Einleitungswissenschaft. *Recension*: Anzeige einiger neuen, dem theosophischen Gebiet angehörigen Schriften; von Hamberger.

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