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SOUTHERN PRESBYTERIAN REVIEW.

NUMBER I.

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ARTICLE I.

A Presbyterian Clergyman looking for the Church. By one of three hundred. New York. Protestant Episcopal Sunday School Union. 1849.

This tract, which has recently fallen into our hands, has been before the public for some months, indeed for nearly a whole year, without receiving, that we know of, any notice from any of the *dissenting* reviews. The writer of it has probably been disappointed that this effort of his brain has not produced more commotion among Presbyterians ; or perhaps he has concluded, from their silence, that to him belongs the distinction of having produced one of the unanswerable tracts in favour of Episcopacy. An apology might seem to be due to our readers for noticing a publication which others have treated with such sovereign contempt, and which is in itself so little worthy of consideration, if we could make that apology without apparent discourtesy to the courteous and accomplished author. We must disclaim, however, any disposition on our part to contradict the general opinion as to the merits of this tract—an opinion made known by being *not* expressed ; and only affirm that it demands some notice on account of the subjects it discusses, whatever may be the moral character and intellectual abilities of the writer of it.

"One of three hundred" informs us that he is the son of a Presbyterian minister, and was himself, for several years, a minister in the New School branch of the Presbyterian Church; but that a few years since, having been convinced of and disgusted with the errors of the sect to which he was attached, he united himself with the Protestant Episcopal Church "escaped from the mazes of sectarianism, in its endless genealogies, into the genial bosom of *the church*." He congratulates himself greatly on his escape, and pities most profoundly "his numerous relatives," who "near and remote, with a single exception, are Presbyterians still," and all whom he has, doubtless, greatly out-stripped in spiritual attainments, since he has had access to means of grace of which they are unfortunately ignorant. This one of three hundred is one of a thousand, as to scholarship and intellectual ability—if we are permitted to judge of him by his estimate of himself: for he informs us, that while at Princeton, he was, "to an intense degree, a student," and "in the various departments of study not a whit behind the chiefest of his companions." He intimates to us that his mind has been greatly expanded since he left the theological school, for he assures us that while there, and for years after he left it, "he thought as a child," (of course comparing himself with himself,) but that now he has "become a man." Having been so extraordinary a youth, and having experienced so remarkable a developement of mind, since the period of his early manhood, it is fair to conclude that he is, at this time, something very wonderful as to intellectual abilities, unless he affords confirmation of the old saying, "soon ripe soon rotten." We presume, too, that he is also a man of unimpeached and unexceptionable moral character, although he has furnished us with one portion of his history that excites astonishment, if it does not beget suspicion. We are astonished at the fact we are about to state, we are even more astonished at his unblushing confession of it. "Seven years before he entered the Church, he submitted his children, although *secretly*, for fear of the synagogue and elders, to Episcopal baptism." It may be questioned whether such conduct can be reconciled with strict integrity. If "one of three hundred" believed the advantages of Episcopal baptism to be

so great, that he ought to obtain them by stealth, how could he conscientiously remain, for so long a period as seven years, out of a Church, the efficacy of whose ordinances he regarded as so peculiarly powerful? We are here perplexed to discover how a man of courage could be so much afraid of Presbyterian elders. Was he afraid that they would take his life? or was he afraid that they would reduce his salary? or did he fear the diminution of his popularity, through the influence of the eldership? We must be excused for saying that we cannot perceive how the sly and secret conduct alluded to, can be consistent with the possession of manly and honourable feelings, and it would not surprise us if this writer should be yet found guilty of affording aid and comfort to the Romish Church, while professing to be a Protestant Episcopalian.

"One of three hundred," would have us believe that he is a man of some considerable share of sensibility. He hesitated long before entering the Episcopal Church, lest "the guide of his youth, now old and stricken in years, should go down with sorrow to the grave, if he should hear that his son had abjured the religion of his ancestors." But we ask this writer, not why he should join the Episcopal church, but why with all his respect for the feelings of his venerable father, "now leaning with Jacob on his staff," he should write one of the most bitter and malignant invectives against Presbyterianism ever written. Shall we say that he has made pretensions to sensibility that he never possessed, or shall we say that he has lost all his sensibility, since he became an Episcopalian? As a man of delicacy of feeling ought he not to have spared his venerable father the pain of reading this abusive tract against "the religion of his ancestors," and if his conscience impelled him to write in advocacy of his new faith, might he not have written in a more temperate and respectful style?

It is a fact worthy of notice that three hundred persons from other denominations have entered the ministry of the Episcopal Church, so our writer states, and we have no means of disproving what he affirms on this subject. We are not informed how many of the three hundred had been ministers in other churches: we would

have been gratified to learn, if our author had deemed it expedient to furnish us with them, the names of all of the three hundred. We do not know why such prominence has been given to this fact, unless it be regarded as affording an argument for, or presumptive evidence of, the excellence and divine right of Episcopacy. But we know that Prelacy may be a human invention, notwithstanding the recent wonderful accessions to the ranks of its advocates. The popularity of a system of any sort is no conclusive proof of its truth. Men have often adopted the most erroneous and hurtful opinions, suddenly and in great numbers. Is Mohammed proved to have been a prophet of God, because hundreds and thousands were suddenly converted to Islamism? Is the system of Fourier proved to be wise and salutary and true, because hundreds have within a short time embraced it? do Episcopalians regard Presbyterianism of divine right because thousands of Episcopalians became Presbyterians in England in the seventeenth century? or is despotism to be approved, because Napoleon, in a very brief space of time, converted the people of republican France into the advocates of imperial power? The argument drawn from mere numbers cannot convince an honest mind, and is not often presented with an honest purpose, but with a view to influence the unprincipled men who like to be on the strong side.

Especially can we attach no importance to the opinions of the three hundred perverts to Episcopacy, unless we are convinced of the excellence of their characters, and the purity of the motives by which they have been influenced in embracing their newer faith. We are not well acquainted with the history of other churches as it has a bearing on our subject, but we can confidently affirm that very few of the men who have left the Presbyterian for the Episcopal ministry, have been distinguished for piety, learning or logical ability. Most of them have been young men of small influence and moderate talents and little experience. Many of them have left us perhaps for the very reason that they were not more highly esteemed among us; and perhaps their withdrawal from us might afford an argument for the excellence of Presbyterianism.

Our writer has not disclosed the motives that induced the three hundred to seek for repose in "the genial bosom of the church." It may be considered an act of imprudence on our part to inquire into the motives of men. But we shall endeavour to point out some of the probable inducements that have prevailed with many of the "three hundred," to abandon the religion of their ancestors for Episcopacy: and we think that it can be shown that many of them may have been influenced in their action by other considerations than a conviction of the moral superiority of the system of their adoption. We doubt not that a man may, from a conviction of duty, abandon another Protestant Church for the Episcopal. All history has shown that the mind of man is naturally prone to superstition, and it is equally certain, that men may be honest in their superstition; nor would it be reasonable to deny that a love of the superstitious may more certainly find its appropriate element and aliment in the Episcopal than in any other Church calling itself Protestant. There is a fascination to many minds in the forms and ceremonies connected with Episcopacy, in its religious pomp, and it is natural that men anxious to be religious, but ignorant of the righteousness of Christ, should seek for justification before God by means of ceremonial observances. We do not even deny that a man may, after careful investigation, come to the honest conclusion that the primitive form of government of the Christian Church was Episcopal. We are not so uncandid as to suppose that honest minds may not differ on this great question, for we know that plausible arguments may be adduced in favour of either side of it. The clamour that has of late years been made in favour of Episcopacy by its advocates has, probably, induced some to renounce a better faith. Weak minds have often been deluded and seduced by extravagant and exclusive pretensions. But we entertain the opinion, and we shall not shrink from the avowal of it, that the abandonment of other churches for the Episcopal Church by so many, cannot be accounted for by supposing that all were influenced by an honest conviction of the greater Scripturalness or the superior excellence of the church of their recent choice.

We affirm that we have a right to inquire into motives,

where the grave question is involved of the truth or falsehood of our religious opinions, and at the risque of being thought uncharitable by those who mistake the nature of true charity, we must express the conviction, that some have entered the Episcopal ministry from motives not altogether unselfish and not altogether such as our religion approves. There are more considerations of a worldly nature to incline men to the ministry of that than the ministry of any other Protestant Church. We know that we are venturing on a delicate subject, one that has perhaps never been publicly discussed, one that many might think unworthy of a discussion. But why should we suppress the truth? Why should we not give this subject a thorough sifting? Be not startled as we are undignified enough to say, that more persons from other denominations have connected themselves with the Episcopal Church from the persuasion that it is the *fashionable* Church, than because they regard it as the best or the only Church. We trust we should offend no one, should we make the admission that the Episcopal is the fashionable Church; we are very sure that we could not make an admission more pleasing to a large number of Episcopalians. But we cannot make this admission unqualifiedly, alas! the fashion of this world has crept into all our churches. The Episcopal Church has made pretensions to a higher degree of refinement, as compared with other churches, than it actually possesses. Episcopalians are not, in every place, in any sense the most highly cultivated portion of the population. It is true that the old aristocrats of the land, in the colonial days, were connected with the English establishment. But the descendants of the English gentry in this land are few in number; many of them have withdrawn from Episcopacy and many of them have lost the refinement that distinguished their ancestors. On the other hand the descendants of many of humble origin and Presbyterian faith in the old world, have, in this land of freedom, risen into the highest grade of intellectual and social culture, and yet adhere to the faith of their fathers. It is also true that many of the early Presbyterian emigrants to this land, whose descendants are still Presbyterian, were highly cultivated persons and from the most respected fami-

lies of the British realm. The Episcopal Church, according to report, has a membership of about sixty seven thousand ; it were pitiable indeed, therefore, if it contained all the cultivated people in the land ; especially if we subtract from the numbers those who are certainly not distinguished for refinement. The pretensions of Episcopalians to exclusive refinement are as ill-founded and presumptuous and ridiculous as their pretensions to exclusive church privileges. These last remarks we have made in passing. However many distinguished or fortunate by birth may be found among us, it does not become us to boast of the fact, and if Episcopalians wish to be called the aristocrats of the land, let them have the name, and let us be content to be known, as our fathers were in revolutionary days, as the friends of freedom and popular rights. After all that can be said, the Episcopal Church is regarded by many and in many places as the *fashionable* Church. The opinion that it is so, arises from the fact that it does actually embrace many persons of wealth and high social position, from the historic fact that it was once the established religion of a large portion of this country, and that a large number of its early members in this land were (anglice) of gentle blood, and from the further fact that it is now the Church of the English aristocracy and the British Queen. Its pompous ceremonies and loose discipline attach to it many of the votaries of fashion. Whether it has or has not more intelligence, more social refinement, or more piety than the Presbyterian Church, it certainly has more of the fashion of the world in proportion to its numbers, especially in our larger cities. It is on this account that many of equivocal social position, or who have risen suddenly in the world, seek to establish their social standing by union with it. To apply these remarks to the subject in hand—it sometimes happens that some of our young Presbyterian ministers are a little exquisite in their tastes, and a little fond of fashion, and may it not be, that they are vain and foolish enough to suppose that they can render themselves a little more genteel in the world's esteem by becoming Episcopalians? To be influenced by such motives is to pour contempt on their ancestry and family : it is to bastardize themselves. Does it need an argument to show that

men are moved by unworthy and unchristian motives, who connect themselves with any Church of Christ from the impulse of pride or ambition, or to obtain facilities for the gratification of their mere social tastes? To be offended at a church because its ceremonies are not splendid and gorgeous—and because its members are not the mighty and noble of the earth, is to be offended at the whole spirit of Christianity—to be offended at Christianity itself. It is to exhibit the worldly spirit of the French young lady who when she observed the splendour of a Popish procession, exclaimed, “how fine a religion is ours in comparison of the Huguenots.” The ancient Romans, when they saw Christianity in its primitive simplicity and plainness thought it (to use the language of Milton) “but a homely and yeomanly religion;” and we cannot but regard those as cherishing something of the spirit of Paganism, who would make religion a minister to their pride, and be ashamed of the Presbyterian Church because it is not surrounded by the adornments of a worldly splendour.

It may be that some persons have been attracted to the Episcopal Church by the beauty and splendour of its ritual, who were not conscious of any love of worldly fashion, and when they felt that their worldly respectability was too well established to need a connection with any ecclesiastical society to lean upon, and would have shuddered at the thought of desecrating religion, for the accomplishment of their secular ends. Some of our young ministers have probably sought the Episcopal Church because it has been said that in that Church a peculiar attention is paid to aesthetics—they have gone in search of the beautiful. Such have been men of finical taste, and superficial thought, destitute of robustness and manliness of mind. The beautiful is to be found in nature and in the scriptures, why go to the Episcopal Church for it? The beautiful is always connected with the true, and the most eminently beautiful is ever found in alliance with the profoundly true. Did Milton become an Episcopalian to admire the beautiful? Had Chalmers and Robert Hall no regard for aesthetics? The men we allude to are sincere; but they are guided by their tastes rather than their consciences, are men of sentiment rather

than piety, and esteem tinsel more than truth, and superficial beauty more than holiness. We doubt not "one of three hundred's" attachment to the Episcopal Church; but we cannot but suspect (and we judge entirely from what he has written,) that that attachment has as close an alliance with his taste as his conscience. The devotion that many feel for the "admirable liturgy," a devotion manifested often by persons who do not pretend to be Christians, is a homage paid rather to its literature than its religion—an admiration such as they might feel for any other work of art, for one of the master-pieces of Raphael or Michael Angelo.

May not some of the three hundred, that have entered the Episcopal ministry from other denominations, have gone in pursuit of more eligible charges, and with the expectation of acquiring greater influence than they could hope to possess among their former brethren? Judging from what we know of human nature, it is not unreasonable—it ought not to be considered uncharitable to suppose that some have been so influenced. A young man who finds himself not highly esteemed in the Presbyterian Church, may imagine that he has the kind, not to say the degree of talents, that will qualify him for success among Episcopalians, and thus feels strongly tempted to leave the Church of his fathers. An opinion prevails that a man may sustain himself with less effort in the Episcopal than the Presbyterian ministry—an opinion that we will not say we adopt, and yet it has doubtless exerted its influence. It ought not to be denied that the dissatisfied and disappointed ministers of other churches are pressingly invited and warmly welcomed to "the genial bosom of the Church." It is a notorious fact that Episcopalians are addicted to proselyting; and we cannot but regard the experience of our writer in this matter as singular, for he says, "If the fact be creditable to Episcopalians, I may record it to their praise that I never met with either layman or priest among them, who seemed so much as to care whether a wanderer should come into his fold or not." But does not every one know the *glorification*, the indecent exultation that is made in Episcopal papers over every pervert to "*the Church*?" Can this "one of three hundred" be ignorant that his new

brethren rejoice more over one proselyte than over ninety and nine that are safe in the fold? We cannot say that we "have never seen a Philip of Bethsaida who was ready to say, come and see." If Episcopalians have been active in the work of proselyting, it is not surprising that some young men of other churches, whose hopes have been disappointed, and whose feelings have been wounded by want of success, and who have been distanced and eclipsed by men whom they think their inferiors, in their old connexions, it is not strange that such should be won, if not by direct promises and flatteries, at least by the prospect of a cordial welcome to the Episcopal Church.

"One of three hundred" has not informed us how many have forsaken the *Presbyterian* Church for the Episcopal ministry. Since the subsidence of the agitations connected with and resulting from the division of 1837, very few, if any, Old School Presbyterian ministers have changed their faith. Most of the Episcopal acquisitions from our ranks were made during a period of conflict and convulsion in our Church. Some, doubtless, went out from among us, because they were lovers of peace and tranquillity, and destitute of the nerve necessary to encounter necessary controversy. Such are good men, and peace be with them! They fled from the storm—but it may yet be their lot to front the tempest. The Episcopal Church is threatened with an internal storm: and perhaps the flashing of the lightnings and the rolling of the billows are to be preferred to the pestilential stagnation of the air and waters. It has been thought that, during the agitations in our Church, some ministers, who, by *trimming*, by a hesitating and vacillating course, had lost the confidence of both parties, found a safe retreat from their difficulties beneath the sheltering wing of Episcopacy. Some ministers, whose doctrinal opinions were scarcely any where approved among Presbyterians, may have sought a habitation and a name in the Episcopal Church, because there a great variety of shades of doctrinal opinion is avowedly tolerated. We would, doubtless, have some strange and edifying disclosures if we could open the secret history of the heroic "three hundred"—this Spartan band of renegades.

Some of our own friends may condemn us for entering

into this severe analysis of motives. But we do not consider the command of Christ, "judge not," to forbid all inquiry into the causes and reasons of men's actions. It requires us to be candid, and we have endeavoured to be candid. An argument, such as that derived from the change made by the "three hundred," could not be answered without an inquiry into probable motives.

"One of three hundred" makes a long and laboured apology, designed chiefly for the satisfaction of his new brethren, for the sin of ever having been a Presbyterian. In the course of this apology, he gives us to understand that the converts from other churches, however cordially welcomed at first, are not treated with entire confidence by his new brethren. Listen to him. "The new convert has been regarded, sometimes, with a certain feeling of distrust; and attempts, that look like playing back into the hands of Dissenters, have been made, to make the period of probation, for those who have been dissenting ministers, so burdensome, as effectually to exclude them from the priesthood of the church." It may be that this writer has written this tract to remove distrust from himself. He does not curse and swear, as Peter did, to prove he was no Christian, but he deals in railing and vituperation to prove that he is a true churchman. Shall we wonder that other churches regard these men with distrust, when they cannot obtain the confidence of their own brethren? Is it hard if, after losing the esteem of those they have left, they cannot acquire the affection of those they have gone to? Many *dissenters* think with Robert Hall on this subject. Said Mr. Hall, "I can make every allowance, Sir, for a conscientious young man who has been educated a churchman; but I cannot conceive it possible for any youth, having been brought up a dissenter, seriously to decide in favour of the church, without having some sinister views." It is perfectly natural, too, that Episcopalians should look on these new converts with a degree of distrust. They think that they discover in them too great a zeal for ceremonies, and (as our writer assures us) that their tendency is Romeward. They cannot but suspect that disappointed aspirations have led them from the churches of their fathers; and, perhaps, they feel for them a degree of contempt because

they regard them as guilty of a species of treachery. It is asking a great deal of Episcopalians, to expect of them to cherish a very profound respect for a man who has written in a style so scurrilous against the religion of his fathers and friends, as has "one of three hundred." We doubt not that many, who have entered the Episcopal Church from other churches, have been bitterly disappointed. Our writer does not "forget the word of a friend, dropped by the way-side, a few hours before he received the grace of holy orders, that you will find human nature in the Church, as well as out of it: you must expect everywhere to meet with narrow minds and pent up hearts." What could "one of a hundred" expect to find in the Church but human nature? In the Episcopal ministry he has found, as he had found elsewhere, many pious and excellent men, some cautious men, a few aspiring young men and a few dogmatical and domineering old men. He has found, too, in the Episcopal ministry, some men of fine talents fitted and willing to occupy the prominent places in the Church of their birth and early education. In connexion with his apology, our author makes the following instructive statement—"take away those ministers at her altars who have been baptized or educated in dissent, and the Church in America will be left a widow indeed, with but little if any thing more than her thirds for her portion." What! is not the Episcopal Church able to raise up a ministry from among her own sons? Must she to sustain her ministry be constantly receiving subsidies from other churches? why is this, if the Church be so excellent and efficient? does not this fact afford us an argument against the whole system of Episcopal religion, as it actually exists? If the Episcopal church raises up so small a portion of her ministry, we can readily understand how she can afford inducements to the ministers of other churches to migrate into her communion. Just so, the southern country offers inducements to teachers of primary schools, born and educated in the north, to seek employment in the South, because the south fails to raise up school teachers in sufficient numbers to supply her wants. It is said, however, that the Episcopal market has become overstocked, the supply of ministers from abroad having become greater

than the demand at home. It is reported that hundreds of Episcopal ministers in this country are at present without employment.

Our writer displays a remarkable fondness for such terms as "the church," "dissenters," &c. In this respect he is like most Episcopal writers. These terms are not becoming the lips of an American. They are borrowed from England and presuppose a religious establishment. "The Church" in England means the Church established by law, and their "dissenters" are they who do not adhere to the state-religion. But we have no religious establishment, no state-church here. God forbid that a religious establishment ever should be erected on this soil of freedom! American Episcopalians ought to accommodate their nomenclature to the institutions under which they live. It may be replied that Episcopalians believe their's to be the only Church, and on that account call it the church. But is this true? Do not Episcopalians generally regard the Church of Rome as a Church of Christ, as part of the visible church? Nor can they say that, when they speak of the Church, they mean to include the Roman Catholic Church: they mean the Protestant Episcopal Church and no other. They are guilty, therefore, of a great abuse of terms.

"One of three hundred" seems to take great pleasure in calling other denominations of Christians, than the Episcopal, sects, and in charging them with the sin of schism. The Episcopal Church is, however, as really a sect as the Presbyterians. What is a sect? applying the term to Christians, most persons would, probably, say that it indicates a body of Christians, who have formed a separate communion, with a form of church government and ceremonies and doctrines differing from those of other Christians. But according to this definition, Episcopalians constitute a sect. They separated from the Church of Rome, adopting a form of government and ceremonies and doctrines in many respects different from her's. They separated from the rest of the Reformers. Among the ancient Jews the different sects were not formed into different communions, and the word signifying sect corresponded with our word party. If the word sect means nothing more than party, the Episcopal Church is emi-

nently sectarian, for she has always had in her bosom two parties—the high church and the low. Much is said of the sin of schism, and yet few persons have any definite notions of what it consists in. Schism does not consist in having a separate communion, else the Episcopal Church of this country would be schismatical, because it is a separate communion from the Episcopal Churches of Scotland and England. Doctrinal errors may constitute heresy, but not schism. Nor can it be proved that the adoption of a form of government different from those of other churches, is schism. Nor can it be proved that the adoption of a form of government different from that instituted by the Apostles, is schism. If that were the case, believing as we do, we would feel justified in calling Episcopalians schismatical. Christians are guilty of schism, when their affections are alienated from their brethren, whether they be in the same or in different ecclesiastical associations. In the only passage of the New Testament where the word schism is used (*schisma*) reference is had not to a separation from the church, but to jealousies existing in it. 1 Cor. xii. 25. Our writer seems to think that schism consists in denying the divine right of Episcopacy, but the Scriptures afford us no such definition of it. Men exhibit a sectarian schismatical spirit most plainly when they disown their Christian brethren, and refuse to have intercourse with them—when they cut themselves off from other Christians and cut other Christians off from them. We do not charge Episcopalians with being schismatical, because, at the reformation, they adopted a different form of church government from that approved by the great mass of their Protestant brethren, nor because this form of church government is not, as we believe, scriptural, nor because much doctrinal error prevails among them: but we do believe that it is more schismatical than any other of the great Protestant denominations in this land, because it has almost entirely cut itself off from all communion with other churches. Episcopalians more generally than the Christians of any other denomination (except the Baptists) refuse to participate with others in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. They unite with other denominations, but seldom, or in small numbers, in the accomplishment of objects of general

christian benevolence. They do (what the Baptists do not) generally and openly declare that the ministers of other churches have no authority to preach the gospel, and refuse to admit them into their pulpits, sometimes, because the canons of the church do not allow such admission, and sometimes because they do not believe it right in itself. We know that many Episcopalians have fraternal feelings towards their brethren of other denominations: these we do not call schismatical; but we are thinking now of Episcopalians generally, and of "one of three hundred" in particular.

Episcopacy is sometimes offered us as a cure for schism. In no sense is it such. It did not prevent the establishment of sects, in the first four centuries of the Christian era, if it existed then as has been pretended. Roman Catholic Episcopacy did not prevent a separation from the Church of Rome during the period of the Lutheran Reformation. English Episcopacy has not prevented the multiplication of sects in England, although backed by the civil power. Episcopacy has never prevented the multiplication of Christian denominations in the United States. Hear what archbishop Whateley has to say of the influence of the Episcopal high Church doctrine on schism. He says, "then as to the danger of schism, nothing can be more calculated to create or increase it, than to super-add to all the other sources of difference among Christians, those additional ones resulting from the theory we are considering. Besides all the divisions liable to arise as to the essential *doctrines* of Scripture, and to the most important points in any *system* of church government, schisms, the most difficult to be remedied, may be created from that theory from individual cases of alleged irregularity." Episcopalians are always complaining of the division of Christians into different denominations; let them disband, then, and make one sect less: this may be the more reasonably asked of them as they constitute a small sect in this country. We should be glad to see all Christians thinking the same things: but if all professing Christians would adhere to the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, and would love one another, and co-operate with each other in the work of the world's conversion, their division into different church organizations, slightly

differing from each other, (would not be, in our estimation, no evil, but) would not be so great an evil as many persons imagine it. If we regard schism as alienation of feeling among Christians, what, let us ask, has done more to produce it than the arrogant pretensions and exclusive practices of Episcopalians?

"One of three hundred" gives us a chapter on the uses and abuses of baptism, in which he complains that Presbyterians administer baptism to the children of only the pious. We see the policy of the writer in discussing this subject: we know that his view of it is popular, that it is especially agreeable to parents who are not members of any Christian Church. But as his argument for the promiscuous baptism of infants is based on the assumption of the truth of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, if that doctrine be false, his reasoning on the subject loses its force. "One of three hundred," affirms the doctrine of baptismal regeneration; we deny it. He has not endeavoured to prove, and we have no time to disprove it. We have nothing to say on this subject to those who believe in baptismal regeneration, but are satisfied that the usage of our Church in regard to this matter is expedient and scriptural. Baptism has taken the place of circumcision, and as circumcision could be properly administered only to those infants, whose parents were members of the Jewish Church, so we conclude that baptism can be administered only to those children whose parents are members of the Christian Church. Where the wife is unbelieving and the husband is also unbelieving, the child cannot have administered to it this sacrament of the Church (1 Cor vii. 14.) We believe that none but such as give credible evidence of piety ought to be, in adult age, admitted into the communion of the saints, and that the children of such only are the proper subjects of infant baptism. None but a pious person can make the promises made by those who, in the Presbyterian Church, present infants for baptism. Indeed none but a pious person can take the vows taken by those who in the Episcopal Church, present children for baptism. Can a man "renounce the devil and all his works, the vain pomp and glory of the world, with all covetous desires of the same, and the sinful desires of the flesh"—can he re-

nounce these for another, when he is unwilling to renounce them himself? Every one presenting a child for baptism, must, at least by implication, promise to bring up that child in the nurture and admonition of the Lord. Can any but a christian make such a promise? We might ask here, can any but a parent or a guardian or a master make such a promise? Can a sponsor who does not see his *god-child* once in a month? If we are not to regard the character of sponsors, why have them at all? If we are to regard their character, do we expect too much of them, when we demand that they should themselves sincerely value religion, and should sustain such a relation to the children whom they present for baptism, as enables them to superintend the education of those children? and this is all we ask in the Presbyterian Church. Is baptism a *charm*? Can it effect any thing, when it is performed without faith in the parent, or when it is not followed by religious education? The promise, made to parents in behalf of their children is made only to christian parents, "even as many as the Lord our God shall call." (Acts, 2. 39.) "One of three hundred" seems to think that all children should be baptised, without regard to the character of their parents; and so they should be, if baptism be regeneration, peaceably, if possible, and forcibly if not. We cannot, however, think that if an Episcopal minister should violently take a Jewish child into Trinity Church and baptise it without the consent of its parents, restoring it to them immediately, the child would ever derive any benefit from the rite. "One of three hundred" has somewhere spoken of Pelagianism as a dreadful heresy, as certainly it is, and yet accuses Presbyterians of more than Popish tyranny in withholding the precious sacrament of baptism "from millions of little ones, *all pure in heart*." If they are all pure in heart, they have no need of regeneration, and of course have no need of baptism, which our writer considers either regeneration itself or the certain means of it. The whole baptismal service of the Episcopal Church we regard as a reproach to Protestantism.

Our writer has given us an amusing chapter on the subject of the sacraments, in which he advances Puseyite opinions, and affirms that the confession of faith incul-

cates the same. To affirm that the Westminster divines did, or the Presbyterians of Scotland or of the Old School Presbyterian Church in the United States do entertain Romish views of the sacraments, is not merely false but absurd. Such an affirmation scarcely deserves a serious denial. In his chapter on the sacraments our discursive writer takes occasion to say some hard things against revivals of religion. He makes no distinction between genuine and spurious revivals, but abhors all equally and alike, telling us that it is by "discipling and baptising," that we ought to look for accessions to the Church. Many evangelical persons regard what are called revivals with caution and suspicion, because many unhallowed excitements have borne the name; and there are some persons who speak of revivals with contempt, because they are the enemies of spiritual religion. Badly conducted as great religious excitements usually are, they who are introduced into the Church by their means, do, as a general thing, give better evidence of piety than they who are confirmed into the Church because they can say the creed and the ten commandments—in other words the Methodist mode of admitting into the Church is less injurious to the interest of piety than the high Church mode. We like neither, but prefer that which is in use among Old School Presbyterians. We have not time and space to express ourselves fully on this subject. Perhaps a hint is sufficient to communicate our views as to this matter to our readers. "One of three hundred" ought to have been informed as to the opinions and feelings of Old School Presbyterians with respect to revivals—they welcome genuine ones, because they come from God; and at the same time, look to constant accessions in small numbers for the growth of the Church. Without running into any of the excesses that our writer condemns, in the use of the ordinary means of grace, our Church has greatly increased in numbers within the last ten years. We have confidence enough in God to believe that our Church will grow in numbers without either the aid of spurious religious excitements or resorting to the custom of receiving young persons into its communion, who give no evidence of a change of heart.

"One of three hundred" has a chapter on confirma-

tion, but as his arguments on this subject are neither new nor powerful, we shall not give them a special attention. As might be expected, he regards kneeling as the proper posture in which to receive the Lord's Supper, although he must be aware that that posture was introduced with the Popish doctrine of transubstantiation. He writes largely on the subject of discipline and excommunication, assailing other churches, we suppose, because he knows that the Episcopal Church is so open to attack on these subjects. He has written largely on the subject of liturgies, adducing some arguments in their favour, which, if they prove any thing, prove that Presbyterian ministers (and Episcopal too) ought not to be trusted with writing the sermons they preach, and ought to be required to preach the same sermons from sabbath to sabbath and year to year. He hates a prayer-meeting, at least one in which extemporaneous prayer is made. This looks a good deal strange in a man of piety.

The last chapter of our writer's tract is on the "downward tendencies" of dissent. In this chapter he endeavours to make the impression that all the non-Episcopal churches are falling into the most ruinous heresies and are threatened with the most speedy extinction. We beg leave to dissent from his opinion on the subject, regarding, as we do, the free Church of Scotland as quite as pure in doctrine as the Church of England, and the Old School Presbyterian Church in the United States as quite as free from heresy as the American Episcopal Church, and looking forward to many days of prosperity for both our own Church and the Scottish Kirk. Presbyterianism shall, doubtless, long survive even the fame of "One of three hundred," and shall, probably, live after prelacy and priestcraft, and every despotic government of the world, shall have perished and passed away.

We regard it as exceedingly unfair in our writer to hold Presbyterians responsible for all the errors of Unitarians and Universalists and Quakers and Mormons. We are no more responsible for these errors than are Episcopalians themselves. But even if all these heretics be classed along with us, we hesitate not to affirm that more sound doctrine and more true piety may be found among those Christians who approve the Presbyterian

than among those who adopt the Episcopal form of Church government. The Presbyterian Protestants of the Continent of Europe, with all their errors, if you take them in the mass, possess a far greater degree of the spirit of the Gospel than the Episcopal Roman Catholics, or the Greek Church. In England there is, beyond a doubt, as much piety existing among dissenters as in the established Church. Presbyterian Scotland is not inferior as regards piety to Episcopal Ireland. Alas, for the United States, if more than one half of its piety is to be found among Episcopalians, either Popish or Protestant. Not only do Presbyterians possess a greater degree of sound doctrine and sound piety than Episcopalians, but they are justly chargeable with a less degree of heresy. The amount of Unitarianism in the world is comparatively small. Even in Massachusetts—the strong-hold of this heresy, Unitarians are few in number compared with other sects who hold to the purity of the clergy. Heresies as fatal to the soul as Unitarianism, have been embraced by millions of Roman Catholic and Greek, and by some who call themselves Protestant Episcopalians.

Our writer asserts that history shows that the tendency of Presbyterianism has ever been downward. "But that which more than all other considerations, loosened the hold of my former creed on my confidence, was the historical fact, that it had been found, after long and fair experiment in every possible variety of circumstances, insufficient, in any one instance, to protect and preserve inviolate the faith." This argument is not new with "one of three hundred;" it is in the mouth of almost every Episcopalian. It is, however, a gross fallacy. It is not a fact that Presbyterianism has, in every possible variety of circumstances, proved itself insufficient to preserve inviolate the faith. The Churches of Scotland are the purest in the world. Nor is this in consequence of the influence of the British Parliament—since that legislature would be indifferent to the faith of the Scottish establishment, provided the union with the State remained unbroken, and since a large number of the Presbyterians of Scotland have had no connexion, for a century, with the established Church. The Presbyterian Church of Holland has kept the faith as inviolate as has the Epis-

copal Church of England. The Presbyterian Church of the United States is certainly and has ever been as sound and pure in doctrine as any Church in this land. All the Presbyterian Churches of the country—all that have had a form of Church government corresponding with that of the Church of Scotland—have kept the faith as inviolate as has the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States. The Old School Presbyterian Church has exhibited a zeal for the truth such as Episcopalians never manifested. So have the German Reformed, the Dutch Reformed, the Associate and Associate Reformed churches in this land; and whatever may be the errors of New School Presbyterians, they are, in the mass, far more sound in the faith than Episcopalians.

We do not deny that some Presbyterian Churches have swerved from the truth and abandoned the faith once delivered to the saints, but we do affirm that such defection does not disprove the excellence or the divine appointment of our system of church government. Presbyterianism is not of divine origin, it is said because the church of Geneva has become Unitarian. Then Christianity is not of divine origin, because Mohammedanism prevails in the land of Palestine. "Fifty thousand Presbyterians in Switzerland," says our writer, "deny the Lord and reject his word." Admit it. But tell us, how many millions of Episcopalians are idolaters—worship a woman as divine. Episcopalians tell us that Episcopacy existed in the primitive ages of christianity: it certainly prevailed throughout a large part of Europe during the fifth century, and yet the descendants of all the Episcopalians, then existing amounting to millions, had, before the sixteenth century, sunken into the grossest heresies, and even into idolatry. For every descendant of a Presbyterian that has become a Unitarian we can point you to thirty descendants of Episcopalians that have become idolaters. Who, then, has the advantage in this argument, and which system has the most downward tendency?

Every thing, that belongs to man, tends downward, and is upheld only by the direct interposition of divine providence and grace. Vital religion may become extinct under any form of church government, and when piety declines, men immediately embrace doctrinal error,

in one form or another. So the very churches that were planted by apostles, becoming lukewarm, soon became grossly heretical. Presbyterians have tended downwards, sometimes to Unitarianism, and sometimes to Puseyite Episcopacy. The very same motives which at one time impel Presbyterians to embrace Unitarianism, at another incline them to Episcopacy. Many of the very men who in Boston are Unitarians, would be found adhering to Episcopacy in Philadelphia or New York. Presbyterianism is a system too severely holy for the lovers of worldly pleasure, and such feeling the importance of embracing the christian religion in some form, care little what that form may be, so it be not very strict, so that their worldly pleasures are not interfered with. There are some striking points of resemblance between the Unitarian and the Episcopal Church. In both the preaching of the hard doctrines of christianity is, to a great degree, suppressed. Both fail to exhibit the Scriptural doctrine of regeneration with any offensive distinctness : and both allow great latitude to the lovers of worldly amusements. Unitarianism is, however, more gratifying to the pride of human reason ; while Episcopacy is more pleasing to the unsanctified imagination and tastes. We admit that when Presbyterians lose the spirit of piety, they are disposed to abandon their system of faith. But this proves the excellence of the system : it is so Scriptural and so holy, that unregenerate men and mere formalists cannot endure it.

We might speak of the downward tendencies of Episcopacy. For proof of these we refer you to the Greek and Romish Churches. Protestant Episcopacy, as it is called, has also had its downward tendencies. The Church of England possessed a higher degree of purity at the period of the Reformation than it could fully pretend to at any subsequent period. From that time until the reign of Charles the first it became gradually more corrupt, until, under the government of Archbishop Laud, it was found, (except the Puritans, who soon left it,) little better than the Church of Rome. Indeed the Church of England has always been tending downward, and but for the interference of the government, which interference was doubtless directed by providence, it would have

relapsed, before this period, into most of the worst errors of Romanism. It is our opinion that Oxford Tractarianism would have prevailed throughout the established Churches of England, had not the civil arm interposed to prevent a result so much to be deprecated both in a civil and religious point of view. As it is, Puseyism is extended widely and fastened deeply in the Church of England. The same system of heresies has been adopted by a very large number of American Episcopalians, and is evidently becoming more prevalent and popular in "the church" in this land. It is also true that, both in this country and Great Britain, many are leaving Episcopacy for Romanism. We scarcely open a religious newspaper without reading of some pervert from the Episcopal to the Roman Catholic Church. This is downward tendency with a vengeance. The Episcopal Church may be growing in numbers, but we doubt exceedingly whether its doctrinal purity is increasing.

The tendencies of the Presbyterian Church are, at this time, upward. We speak not merely of its increase in numerical strength, but of its advancement in doctrinal purity, (though its standards are unchanged) and in holiness. If it could have borne a favourable comparison with Episcopacy at any period since the reformation, much more can it now bear such a comparison. Never were the Presbyterian Churches of Scotland in a more vigorous and healthful condition. Think of the free Kirk, the soundest in the faith, the most liberal of all the churches. Think of the spirit of heroism and martyrdom she has lately displayed in her glorious exode. The Old School Presbyterian Church in the United States, possessing a numerical strength nearly three times as great as that of the Episcopal Church, is as sound in the faith and as strict in her discipline as any church in this land has ever been. New School Presbyterians, it is thought, are generally becoming more orthodox. Unitarianism is declining in Massachusetts, and every where almost in the country—we say this for the information of one of three hundred, not because we think that Unitarianism has any connexion with us. In Geneva and Germany, Presbyterians are rapidly becoming more evangelical and orthodox.

Our writer gives us a frightful picture of the doctrinal errors of his former New School brethren. For these errors we, as Old School men, are in no wise responsible. We have opposed them with earnestness. We disclaim them for ourselves. But we cannot perceive with what propriety an Episcopalian is so indignant at these errors. Do not multitudes of Episcopalians deny the doctrine of justification by faith alone? and are any New-School men guilty of a worse heresy than such denial implies? The Episcopal Church professes to tolerate, and does actually tolerate, in her communion doctrinal opinions of every shade and grade from high Calvinism to low Arminianism, and has no right, therefore, to be offended at the errors of the New School Presbyterians. We doubt not that there are many Episcopal Clergymen who do entertain New School opinions, and entertaining them, preach them. A number of our most heretical New School brethren have entered the Episcopal ministry, and we have not heard of their having renounced their heresies. We have heard high Calvinism and low Arminianism both preached in Episcopal pulpits. It amuses us to see an Episcopalian zealous for orthodoxy. Our writer professes, what we feel, great abhorrence for Socinianism, and yet he must know that Episcopal ministers are sometimes Socinians, as was the Rev. Thomas Scott for a number of years.

"One of three hundred" professes to think the Episcopal the most conservative of all churches. Conservative she may be in the sense that she has always aided, when she has had opportunity, in sustaining monarchical power, because she was organized for the very purpose of upholding that sort of power; but she is not conservative of liberty of opinion or of Republican institutions; neither is she conservative of the truth, as the errors of every sort with which she now abounds, most conclusively show. There is nothing in this world more eminently conservative than Scotch Presbyterianism. It is consistent in all its parts. It possesses emphatically stamina and strength. It imparts to those who are brought up under its influence, a robustness and firmness of principle, which they, who hate them, delight to call obstinacy, which has remained unmoved amid more than one

tempest of Episcopal persecution. Of all the Churches in this land, we regard the old school Presbyterian (and several others almost precisely like her) as the most decidedly conservative. No people combine more love of liberty, with respect for law, and more reverence for sacred truth, with liberality of feeling towards those who differ from them, than American Presbyterians.

Our writer sneers at the ruling Elders of the Presbyterian Church, and is especially disgusted with the part they have in the distribution of the bread and wine in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. We know of scarcely one more excellent and intelligent class of men in the country, than these same ruling Elders, although many of them are engaged in commerce, or to use our writer's word, are "tradesmen." [The Apostle Paul had a trade.] Can "one of three hundred" prove, from the Scriptures, that it is improper for a private member of the Church merely to convey from one communicant to another the sacramental bread and wine on which the Minister has implored God's blessing? The legislation of a Church is, however, a more important affair; and yet how often vestrymen of the Episcopal Church, who are irreligious and sometimes very profligate men, are delegates to Episcopal conventions, and take part in Episcopal legislation.

Our writer claims for Episcopacy every excellence: but if it be so excellent a thing, why has it not produced more marked, and more extensive, and more hallowed results? "By their fruits ye shall know them." The Episcopal denomination, compared with other religious denominations in this country, is small; that, however, constitutes no conclusive argument against the excellence of their system; nor are they superior in Christian graces to other denominations—less conformed to this world—less devoted to worldly passions and amusements; nor are they more liberal in their contributions to objects of Christian benevolence, or better instructed in the principles of our holy religion. We do not find that the Grace of God descends only on Episcopacy, as the dew was on the fleece of Gideon only, when it was dry upon all the earth beside.

It is not a question of much interest to the public, what may be the peculiar doctrinal opinions of the writer under

review; but he is to be regarded in this matter as the representative, probably, of a large class in the Episcopal Church. He is neither a Calvinist, nor an Arminian—neither new school nor old school. He is deeply impressed with the prerogatives and powers of the priesthood, and seems to us a warm advocate of what has been called “vicarious religion.” He abhors the Lutheran reformation—representing Luther himself as one of the links in the chain from Calvinism to Atheism. He says, “there is certainly a chain of hands, from Calvinism down to Atheism—Calvin reaching the hand to Luther, Luther to Arminius,” &c. How dare such a man call himself a Protestant?

If this article should seem to any to be too severe, let them bear in mind that we have been provoked to the free expression of our opinions, by the arrogant pretensions, and unfounded and injurious accusations of “one of three hundred,” and many like him. Presbyterians have long enough been deterred by a false delicacy, from expressing the whole truth in regard to the evil influences and tendencies of High Church Episcopacy. We now leave “one of three hundred,” to the oblivion which he deserves, and to which he is certainly destined.

ARTICLE II.

THE LIFE AND DEATH OF FRANCIS TURRETTIN.

A Funeral Oration, delivered by BENEDICT PICTET, at Geneva, on the 3d November, 1687. Translated by Rev. J. Jones Smyth, A. M.

“Quis non ad suos navigare festinans ventum prosperum cupidius optaret, ut velociter charos liceret amplecti? Patriam nostram Paradisum computamus, parentes nostros Patriarchas jam habere cœpimus: quid non properamus et currimus ut patriam nostram videre, ut parentes salutare possimus? Magnus illic nos charorum numerus expectat parentum, fratrum, filiorum, frequens nos et copiosa turba desiderat.”—*Cyprianus, Ser. de Mort.*

"Quorum nos vita propter amicitiae solatia delectabat, unde fieri potest ut eorum mors nullam nobis ingerat mæstitudinem? Quam qui prohibet, prohibeat si potest amica colloquia, interdicat amicabilem societatem, vel intercidat affectum omnium humanarum necessitudinum, vincula mentis immiti stupore dirumpat: aut sic eis utendum censeat, ut nulla ex eis animum dulcedo perfundat. Quod si fieri nullo modo potest, etiam hoc quo pacto futurum est, ut ejus nobis amara mors non sit, cujus dulcis est vita?"—*August. Lib. xix. de civ. Dei, cap. viii.*

FUNERAL ORATION.

Illustrious nobles, guardians and pillars of our Republic: August Rector of this School: venerable and renowned Pastors and Professors, brilliant ornaments of Geneva's Church and Academy: most noble, honourable and excellent visitors of every order: Students, Nazarites, dedicated to God, dearly beloved sons of the Prophets:

Words fail when the subject overpowers. A mighty impulse forces utterance, a mightier checks it. Light cares speak, heavy ones are dumb. Great sorrow never shows itself at once; its own intensity bars the way against the struggling words. When a nation's father dies, the blood, chilled by the mental shock, stagnates in every heart; as when the head of a family is taken off, a sorrowful silence, a speechless flood of tears, or a stifled murmuring lamentation, pervades the house. Thus our hall gives forth no sound, it manifests its sorrow by the awe of a sacred silence. Unutterable sadness has hitherto sealed the lips, and refused even the language of grief. But our voice can be stopped no longer,—no longer can we endure to cherish in secret the wounded heart.—The pain of my sorrow is too grievous to permit delay—its fires consume my very heart and life. It will be a relief to mingle my tears with those of others, and to communicate my unuttered grief. But what shall I say? or where begin? "Limited powers," as Jerome says, "cannot bear the load of weighty matters, and in attempting what is beyond their strength, they fail; so in proportion to the majesty of what ought to be said, is the confusion of him whose language falls beneath the grandeur of the subject." The mind is stunned,—the hand trembles,—the tongue falters, and when I attempt to force the words, my eyes are filled, my grief is renewed, and I am lost in

profoundest sorrow. Our Turretin is no more ! Alas !—

“Quis talia fando,
Temperet a lachrymis ?”

If, as we are told, it be some solace for sadness to speak of the birth, life and death of the deceased, let us then seek whatever alleviation this may afford to our grievous affliction ; and as the post of so great a man has come to be occupied by me—unfitted as I am—let us make *himself* the theme of our first lecture after the vacation. It was well and wisely ordained by the ancients, that the funerals of illustrious men, who had distinguished themselves by martial exploits, or the excellence of their pursuits, should not be solemnized in silence, but be accompanied by the honour of an eulogy from orators appointed for the purpose. Even in farthest India—India glowing with the beams of another sun,—the custom prevailed of the Chief Magistrates standing before the doors of the dead, and describing their character and life ; and who is ignorant of the provision of the laws of the twelve tables, which Cicero mentions ; and of the funeral dirge of the Greeks ? Corroding and envious time, indeed, crumbles and destroys the Mausolea of Barbaric workmanship, the Phrygian marbles, and monuments made of stone or brass ; but merited praise and published virtue—free from fortune’s changes,—endure forever.

If it were customary with us, as Jerome says, “for children, in the presence of the assembled citizens, to stand up and celebrate the praises of deceased parents, and, as with the touching power of a mournful song, to move the hearers to tears and groans ;” why might I not to-day perform this duty to my beloved uncle—yea my venerable father?—a duty which Gregory Nazianzen long ago performed for Basil and others, and Jerome for his friend ; a duty which, in modern days and among ourselves, was performed for the admirable Beza by the wise Lectius, the illustrious Fayus, and the learned Laurentius ; and for the venerable Goulart, by the celebrated Tronchin.

Let others lavish praises upon departed greatness, and flatter by the semblance of sorrow, or false encomiums ; whilst I proceed to pay this last, just tribute to a Minister of the highest merit—a teacher upon whom memory will ever most fondly dwell.

Favour me with your attention, most noble counsellors ; and him to whom you listened with such rapture when alive, hear still, though dead.

Favour me with your attention, Churches and Academies—radiant stars, of which Turretin was no small a part.

Favour me with your attention, all ye who are bowed down by this painful affliction. Do not expect from me an empty glare of words. The fresh and gaudy flowers of oratory; do not suit this mournful theme. Here grief is indeed allowable, where a public orphanage, as it were, is brought before the eyes of all. Let me, then, beg your indulgence, and bear with me, for I am better prepared to weep than speak.

Although, according to the saying of Seneca, “nobility does not consist in a hall filled with time-stained statues, for no one has lived for our glory, neither can we claim, as our own, that which has been before us;” yet, if family distinction has any influence in gaining reverence for exalted genius, all who know that Turretin’s ancestors filled the highest offices in the ancient republic of Lucca, will grant that he might have boasted of his noble extraction.

The first of the family that came to our shores, and made Geneva his abode, was *Francis Turretin*, the paternal grandfather of the deceased. About a century ago, he gave up all the comforts of his pleasant native land, and impelled by a holy zeal of professing the true religion and enjoying the blessing of the ardently wished for light of the Gospel, underwent many hardships, and finally settled in this city. He resided for some years in Antwerp, where he lived on terms of intimacy with the noble De Marnix. When that city was besieged by the Duke of Parma, he was compelled to fly at the risk of his life. He took refuge first in Geneva, and then in Zurich—the asylum, and, as it were, the home of learning and refinement, which were almost every where else proscribed. He spent five years in this city, and then returned to our Geneva, where he ended his days. He was a man of great integrity, purity and sincerity; true to his promise, and inflexibly firm to his word; a lover of sincere piety, and very liberal, not burying his money,

to use the language of Claudian, in darksome caves, or condemning his wealth to dungeons, but more bountiful than the rains of Heaven, he rejoiced in relieving the needy. Thus he laid up for his posterity a glory that will long outlive himself—more enduring than the universe, and which bids defiance to time's corroding tooth. Of him we may say, in the words of the Psalmist:

"He hath dispersed, he hath given to the poor; his righteousness endureth forever."—*Ps.* cxii. 9.

His son, Benedict Turretin, was the father of him, now a denizen of Heaven. Benedict was, in his day, the lover and ornament of Geneva—the brightest luminary of this Church and school—the mighty trumpeter and zealous champion of the truth. Of him we may, without hesitation, say what Gregory Nazianzen said of Athanasius, "In praising Athanasius, I shall praise virtue." Men of letters admired the inexhaustible profusion of his fertile genius, the wealth of his great learning, the amazing clearness of his mind, and the pledges of his powers, which, as a sacred bequest, he has left in his immortal writings, especially his learned work against Peter Coton, the wily Jesuit, who had assailed our version of the Bible, and consulted about the safety of Geneva, not the oak of Dodona, but the black tripod of Pluto; and, as Thuau says, ransacked the hidden things of darkness, with a curiosity worthy of a Theologian, to find out when the Calvinistic heresy would be extirpated, and other things which, that celebrated historian remarks, there was no hope of discovering, save from the father of lies. Over this opponent, Benedict gained some noble triumphs, and from him he bore off rich spoils—offerings to be laid at the feet of no mortal being.

In 1620 he was at the Synod of Ales, of which Peter du Moulin was President. Of Du Moulin, it is better for me not to say any thing, than say little, for France, Germany, Britain, Switzerland, Holland, all Europe, yea all Christendom, know how distinguished he was. In this Synod, the great Turretin gained and deserved the affection and admiration of all. You are not to suppose that he had devoted himself exclusively to the investigation of the arcana of Theology, for it were hard to say,—as

Jerome remarks of some one—whether men of learning would be more pleased with his vast secular scholarship, or his knowledge of the Scriptures. In this respect, he shone in the same illustrious roll with Tertullian, Arnobius, Victorinus, Ambrose, Boetius, Cassiodorus, Calvin, Beza, Danaus, and Junius. He was, universally, esteemed and praised for his gentle firmness, enlightened piety, salutary eloquence, and remarkable equanimity,—for that simplicity and wisdom which Christ recommended—for his holy toleration, and general desire of making peace—for a heavenlike holiness,—integrity and all-embracing kindness and generosity,—in a word, for every quality which, as you all know, Erasmus looked, but in vain, to find in Leo X.

He who had already made his name immortal, seemed to be worthy of many days; but Providence just barely let our world behold him. He had hardly entered his forty-third year, when he was seized with a malignant fever, which carried him off to an early grave, and tore him, as it were, from the very bowels of his country.—However, he left behind him living likenesses and representatives of himself. In 1616, he married a young lady of great worth and noble extraction—one endowed with all the graces of her sex, and sprung from the illustrious family of the Michaeli. By her,—besides daughters, who, thank God, are still alive, and of whom it is enough to say, that they are worthy of their parents,—he had several sons, of whom two survive, men illustrious for their integrity, piety and candour, of great experience and sound judgment. One of these was older, and the other younger than our loved and lost Francis. He was born October 17, 1623. In this year, died Philip de Mornay of Plessis, and Fra-Paolo of Venice, of the order of Servitæ. These men, to nobility of birth, added the splendour of their own virtues and scholarship. Thus, when one star sets in the western horizon, another rises in the opposite quarter of the heavens. In the same year, Pope Gregory XV. finished his career, and Francis Contarini succeeded Antoine Prioli as Prince of Venice. In this year, also, the Synod of Carentan was held; and the Church of Geneva, adopting the practice of the ancient Christians, began to use leavened bread in the Eucharist.

We admire the beam of the rising sun, and from the stalk and blade we form some opinion as to the coming harvest. From his earliest years, Turretin gave such indications of genius, as to render it easy to predict the eminence to which he was destined to attain. In him we have an instance that goes to corroborate the sentiment of a very sagacious writer, who, extolling the early qualities of the Emperor Probus, says: "No one ever became eminent in manhood, for any thing good or great, who had not, when a boy, been trained in the school of virtue, and given some manifestations of what was noble and distinguished." These scintillations of genius, these seeds of virtue, the venerable father of Francis, with his peculiar discernment, very clearly perceived. We are told that as death was drawing near, and the last breath, as it were, was hovering about his lips, our dear friend was brought to his bedside; and the holy man,—shall I say Prophet?—thus spake of him,—"This child is stamped with the seal of God." Thus Athanasius, even in childhood, furnished to the Bishop of Alexandria sufficient grounds for remarking that, in future years, he would become an eminent shepherd over the Lord's flock; and we read of Basil the Great, that, even in very early life, the fires of a vigorous intellect and holy piety so shone forth, every body said that long before his ordination, he was a Priest among Christians.

I do not intend to detain you by dwelling upon his early life and elementary studies; suffice it to say, that having passed through these successfully, he became an attendant upon the public lectures, and a student of philosophy. Of the happy talent he displayed in making that progress which gave promise of an abundant harvest, we have heard from those who were his fellow-students, and who, we rejoice, are yet spared to the Church. The most distinguished of these is the worthy and vigilant Charles a Furnis, now venerable with his locks of snow; remarkable for his genuine sincerity, patient endurance of toil, and profound erudition; whose eloquence, fluency and energy, we still admire whenever he ascends our pulpit. There was no portion of the field of letters that the now happy Turretin left untouched or untried. With an inquisitive curiosity he pried into every thing, and

while yet a youth, was pursuing his studies with a veteran's skill. Thus, by his zeal and energy, he was rising to the summit of fame, outstripping even the expectations of his friends, and proving by what he accomplished, that time itself is tardy compared with the mind's activity.

When he had successfully gone through his Philosophical course, he devoted himself entirely to Theology. In this science, he had the following eminent and celebrated teachers: *John Diodati*, the great Theologian, who, in the Synod of Dort,—the most famous Synod that had convened for many centuries—had as many witnesses and trumpeters of his learning, accurate judgment, and exalted genius, as he had hearers. In the convention of Saumur, also, he was so successful in calming the excited feelings of the members, that the Queen of France repeatedly desired to thank him in her own name. Princes and Potentates sought his friendship. And his work on the sacred text is, itself, a monument more lasting than brass. *Theodore Tronchin*, who also was so highly esteemed by the fathers of Dort, as to gain from them the reputation of being a consummate Theologian. It is not his least commendation, that he gained the friendship of the valiant Duke of Rohan. He was a bold defender of the truth, and wielded a keen and cutting pen against the Jesuit Coton. Happy Sage! over whom it was Geneva's rare but joyful privilege to rejoice up to an extreme old age, as an illustrious ornament of our profession, and beacon light to pious youth; and whom, as if growing young again, we have held, and still hold, in venerable regard, in the person of our Reverend brother Tronchin, the brightest star of the college. *Frederick Spanheim*, a teacher of the highest reputation,—a man whom none of his profession will cease to revere as long as the sun gives light, or the hosts of Heaven wheel round their appointed orbits,—the great glory of divines,—the wonder of Europe, and beloved of Heaven! Over his early death, the reformed world would still be weeping, if he had not left behind him such men as his sons, Ezekiel and Frederick,—the lights of literature,—the wonders of the age,—the Phœnixes of our times,—men whom no revolving cycle of time will be able to remove from their firm position, or expunge from the memory of the age. *Alexander*

Morus, the brilliant orator, whose eloquence could surpass the honeyed words of the Pylian Sage, and calm the ruthless rage of beasts of prey. He had such an affectionate regard for Turretin, that when the latter was under his care in 1644, and had maintained Theses "de necessaria Dei Gratia," (in 1640, he had, under the same teacher, defended Theses 'de Felicitate morali et politica,') he honoured him with some complimentary verses. I need say nothing of the proficiency he made under these distinguished preceptors; of this the world can judge. There is, however, one thing regarding him, that I may mention, viz: That his facility in acquiring any kind of knowledge was so great, as to give an air of probability to the foolish but amiable fancy of some philosophers, who assert, that to learn is only to remember; by the rare blessing of Heaven, he could learn more by making study, as it were, a mere pastime or secondary pursuit, than others could by persevering and excessive labour. This was what enabled him to lay up such a store of knowledge.

After spending some years in close study in the Academy at home, he became desirous of visiting and examining other schools abroad. On his departure, the venerable fathers of the Council bore testimony to his high and noble qualities. He went immediately to Leyden. This was then, and indeed is till this day, the home of learning and of science, the arena of philosophy,—the kind mother of the arts,—the luxuriant field of virtue, and fertile nursery of fruitful plants. In this seat of scientific and learned men, Turretin not only gained the commendation of its Theologians, but gave the whole Academy an opportunity of witnessing his erudition; for in the presence of the renowned Spanheim, he defended public theses on the *written word of God*. He sought the acquaintance and instruction of all who, in Holland, were illustrious for learning, eloquence and piety,—the venerable Polyander, the faultless Andrew Rivet, the matchless Salmasius, the admirable Heinsius, the famous Trigland, the celebrated Voet, the learned Hoornbeck, the erudite Hotto, Golius the linguist, the eloquent *Æmilius*, and other great men,—versed in all philosophy, human and divine—restorers of falling letters—champions of learn-

ing. On the public addresses and private conversation of such men, Turretin delighted to luxuriate. He was accustomed to call every house, where learning and virtue were not present, a wilderness. At Utrecht he beheld with wonder that most learned of women, the tenth of the Muses,—nature's last and highest effort in the female sex, Anna Maria a Schurman. He could find no words to express the praise of her boundless genius, great acquirements, and above all her piety; in which she at least equalled,—if not excelled—the Lætas, Eustochias, Furias, Paulas, Priscillas and Tellas; the sanctity of whose lives, adorned with all the advantages of learning, gave them a right to be classed with the priests and heralds of Christianity.

After travelling through Holland, and visiting all those whom learning and piety rendered illustrious, gathering on all sides something that he might use for the defence or establishment of Christianity, he turned his steps towards France. This kingdom had always been famous for eminent teachers; it was so, as early as the times of the Roman Emperors, Gratian, Valens and Valentinian; nor has it ever been without brave and eloquent men, as Jerome testifies, who used to say that no people equalled the French in literary pursuits. He first visited Paris, the metropolis, as it were, of Europe. This city, Francis I. reckoned as a province of France, and Lipsius used to call it the mother of schools. There lived in it, at that time, men above all praise, the high priests of literature, miracles of genius, wonders of learning,—Michael Falcar, John Mestrezat, Charles Drelincourt, John Daille, Edmund Albertini, and David Blondell—men whose great merits no lapse of years nor forgetful time will ever bury beneath the mists of oblivion.

Turretin lived in the family of the great Daille—a name I never mention without seeming to array a whole host of learned doctors. He won the affection of this learned man, as of others. All were amazed on witnessing in one so young, such loftiness of mind, energy and zeal—such strength of judgment and of memory, as well as other high mental qualities, and all conjoined with holiness of life, and sweetness of disposition. While in this august and powerful city, he did not confine his at-

tention to Theology alone, but under the direction of Peter Gassendi, he went through a course of Mathematics and Natural Philosophy. From this eminent Philosopher he learned,

*Quam variæ mundi partes, quo semine rerum
Foedere convenient discordia, lucis et umbræ
Tempora quis motus regat, æstum frigore mutet,
Obscuret Solis vultum Lunæque tenebris.*

After quitting Paris, he went to Saumur, and there attended the lectures of those great divines, Louis Capel, Moses Amyrald, and Joshua Place. He next visited Montaubon, where the illustrious Carolus and Garéssol—two chief ornaments of reformed Europe, were filling with high credit the chair of Theology. Thence he went to Nismes, a city famous for its monuments of antiquity, and remains and fragments of amazing beauty. Here Benedict Turretin had once filled the ministerial office; and here our blessed friend met with the venerable Calvus, who became very much attached to him, and was exceedingly reluctant to let him go; for “in you,” he said, “I look upon the express image of your dearly loved father.” Thus he made the tour of France; and wherever he visited, he left a name beloved, and redolent with sweets. At length, enriched with experience, learning and ardent piety, and laden with the learned spoils of France and Holland, he returned to his wished-for home, and all its pleasant associations.

The time had now come, when it became his duty to employ for the public good, the talents that had been entrusted to him; nor did he hesitate; he had scarcely trodden again his native soil, ere he was deemed worthy of the office of the holy ministry. This was in 1647. In 1648, he was admitted to a seat among the fathers of the venerable council, and installed a Pastor of this Church. He at the same time preached to the Italian congregation, for he could preach with equal ease and astonishing accuracy in French, Latin or Italian. As soon as his voice was heard in the pulpit, every one recognized his father, as if restored to life, and in Francis saluted Benedict. As often as he entered the sacred desk, so often, as if a second sun had arisen in our firmament, were the spirits of the people refreshed; and upon

him every eye was turned, and every ear was opened to that stream of eloquence which filled it with a sweetness so winning and persuasive, you would have said that he had been reared and educated in ancient Athens; so full of honey, yea of nectar, was every word that fell from his lips. His style was so rich and exuberant, that if any idea happened to escape some less attentive hearer, when first uttered, it could easily be caught again, presented in another form. Majesty and grace, dignity and gentleness, were so happily blended in his whole look and appearance, that he immediately commanded the reverence and affection of all who saw him. In the first years of his ministry at Geneva, he gained such a high reputation, that, in the year 1650, the most excellent fathers of the council repeatedly offered him the chair of Philosophy, which his modesty as often kept him from accepting.

The fame of Turretin was not confined within the narrow bounds of our Geneva. For when the church at Leyden was called to mourn the loss it sustained in the death of its Pastor, Aaron Morus, it sent him an invitation, saying, in the words of the Macedonian, "Come over, and help us." With the consent of both councils, he accepted this call, and was received by the people of Leyden with joyful looks and cordial welcomes.

It was fortunate for the congregation of Leyden that it thought of him. For the Church was at that time splitting into factions, and some elements of dissension were at work, when Turretin allayed the fermentation, and having calmed all disturbance brought it back to tranquillity and peace. He laboured in that city for the space of a year, with what success and satisfaction let the inhabitants testify. He would have remained longer if their wishes had been gratified. But our own school could not spare him any longer, and indeed, the good of the Church rendered his recall necessary; he therefore left Leyden. His departure caused as much grief and regret to the Church, as his arrival had joy and gladness. He reached his native soil in safety. He was immediately thought of as Professor in the Academy, in the place of the venerable Tronchin, whom age would no longer permit to lecture in public. Accordingly in 1653 he entered the Theological chair. Besides the celebrated

and saintly Tronchin, he had as colleagues the illustrious Antoine Leger, a great man—attached to letters—of accurate judgment—ardent piety, and profound learning; the Reverend Philip Mestrezat, the very worthy Dean of Faculty, who is far above my praise, and whose encomium I am obliged by his presence to suppress by an honorable silence.

On entering upon the duties of the office to which he was appointed, he delivered an inaugural address on the first verse of the epistle to the Hebrews, which received the applause of the whole assembly. He now devoted himself entirely to Theology and the affairs of the Church. Here the widest field is presented for expatiating in his praise as a Theologian, although, according to Gregory Nazianzen, it may be somewhat unjust to publish the praises of strangers, and suffer one's own kindred to be passed over in silence; yet in this instance, I would rather not speak, lest the eulogy of the nephew might only tarnish those qualities of the uncle which tower far too high for the tooth of detraction ever to reach. "Others' praises consist in mere words, but the reality of the deeds of the righteous is enough to set forth the preeminence of their merit." Let others tell of his great zeal in defending the kingdom of Christ and in subverting the tyranny of Anti-christ, as well as his great solicitude for the Church's well-being. Let others declare what strength and learning he manifested in expounding the Gospel of Christ, not feeding the minds of his hearers with the meretricious ornaments of oratory, but with solid doctrine, shunning with equal care a theatrical and bombastic, as a careless and unpolished style of speaking; for he was as anxious not to have his language overlaid with rhetorical flowers, as Jerome remarks, or to have it bubble up in froth and foam, as he was to have it sufficiently elevated and dignified. Let others bear testimony to the boldness with which he lashed the morals of the age, to his manifest freedom from that servile silence, which even Justinian, as well as the oracles of God, strictly charged such men against; to the mental vigour and deep feeling which he displayed, as he thundered against the prevailing forms of vice, when with many tears he urged all to repent: for his manner convinced every one that

he was stirred not by any fitful blaze of passion, but by a deep and fatherly affection for those against whom he inveighed, and by an ardent desire for the good of the public. Let the sons of the Prophets, yea the Prophets themselves, (for except three or four, there is scarcely a Pastor among us who has not enjoyed the benefit of his instruction and training,) set forth the ability and skill, with which he discharged the duties of the Theological chair—the activity of his mind—the clearness with which he unraveled what was involved—separated what was confused,—explained what was obscure,—solved important difficulties,—laid open the hiding places and retreats of sophists,—and detected the weak points and positions of his opponents. Pastors in Switzerland, France and Geneva gratefully look upon him as their teacher. I appeal to you all, and charge you to tell your children and your children's children, what kind of a teacher our blessed Turretin was. Oh that he were a teacher still.

If ever a temperate humble Theologian lived, Turretin was he. He knew that, as in times of old bounds and barriers were placed before the Israelites, where they were to approach the mountain; so fixed limits are set for us, and many things are withdrawn from our cognizance, which it hath pleased the Supreme Arbiter of all that we should not know here, but should expect to comprehend hereafter in Heaven. He searched with an untiring industry into the open things of Scripture, but never rushed with a daring rashness into what is hidden, and too high for earthly comprehension. He mourned deeply over the universal declension that wickedness and vice were producing,—to see that Christ's coat was rent,—that errors were on the increase,—that the faith of many wavered,—that the mysteries of Godliness were scoffed and carped at by cavilling men, and that Paul of Samosata, Photinus and Arius,—names inauspicious and disgraceful to Christianity, were as if restored to life. He wept tears of blood on hearing how many were infected with the poison of grovelling Atheism, or the contagion of a fast spreading Socinianism and Pelagianism. He admired, but scrutinized not, the secret things of God. He used to say that it was improper for earthly imbecility to seek after that which it could not comprehend, and the work of

foolish science to search deeper than God has been pleased to teach.

All who knew him well, knew that the very impress of the Christian virtues was enstamped on his whole life and character. He was not of the number of those whose language savors of heaven, but whose deeds are of the earth, and whose wisdom is showy and plausible, rather than real and true; but as his words, so were his deeds, and as his acts, such was his life. What Gregory Nazienzen said in praise of Athanasius is exactly applicable to Turretin, *υψηλος μεν τοις εργοις, ταπεινος δε φρονημασι*. His mind was as humble, as his life was sublime. He sought neither the notice nor the applause of the multitude. He was not, indeed, regardless of the esteem of the ingenuous and good, but he never courted it. He never wished to erect a monument for himself at the expense of others. In all he did, he looked not to his own glory, but to the public good, and the good of those to whose interest he had devoted himself; yea, he even became depressed in spirit, when he would happen to hear that others were proclaiming his praise. He was never carried off by that blind self-love, which often so obscures the mental vision of the learned, as to close their eyes to all that is erroneous in their own sentiments and writings, and to all that is true and beautiful in those of others; a self-love which makes them even admire their own blemishes, and cherish a sentiment not because it is true, but because it is their own. Such men, as Augustine forcibly remarks, "mete out charity, not according to the rule of Christ the Lord, but by the measure of their own feelings and affections." Turretin was totally devoid of vanity, and not aware of his own powers, had very humble thoughts of himself. No man ever knew him to abuse his authority; he always asked, never ordered, or with dictatorial haughtiness commanded any one. Angry and excited passions had no abode in his pure heart and gentle disposition. He very much disliked those fiery spirits which a spark easily ignites, and which when once kindled, blaze forth furiously; and the more you attempt to pacify them, the more vehemently do they storm and rage. He was no calumniator nor reviler; herein he differed much from Jerome, who, as we gather from the many and bit-

ter quarrels which he had with Rufinus, Presbyter of Aquileia, Vigilantius, Bishop of Spain, the monk Jovinian, and John, Bishop of Jerusalem, placed so little restraint upon his tongue, that there was no biting satire but it revelled in,—no cutting sarcasm but it sported with,—and no injustice that it refrained from. Turretin was an ardent lover of peace; for he knew that it did not behoove the ministers of grace and peace to become sons of Bellona, nor the trumpets of Zion to be turned into clarions of Mars. Nothing filled him with deeper sorrow than to know that brethren, regardless of the enemy at the gates, were waging a deadly warfare against each other.

He envied not another's prosperity, but rather beheld it with pleasure and satisfaction. No man could be kinder in all the duties of life, none more ready to promote the interests of others. He was at all times the ready defender of the widow and the orphan, the stranger and the needy. He was a real *orphan-supporter*; an office, which some Bishop of Citrum has observed, is peculiarly suited to ministers. His disposition was merciful and benevolent. He aided the poor with his counsel and his means. He was instant in relieving the needy, for he well knew that the value of relief is not to be computed by the amount given, but by the readiness and kindness of the giver; and that God looks, not so much at what we give, as at the disposition with which it is given. He gained for himself the love and affection of strangers; indeed, his house was the stranger's home. His conversation was always pleasant and profitable. He used to reckon that day lost, on which no one was benefitted by him; as Suetonius tells us Titus used to think, and a celebrated author says the same of Frederick I. He was industrious and laborious, and although always busy, yet never appeared to be fatigued; as if his physical powers were refreshed and invigorated by the very energy and activity of his mind.

"Diris ut ilex tonsa bipennibus,
Per damna, per cædes, ab ipso
Ducit opes animumque ferro."

This is not said for the purpose of praising the dead, for he stands in no need of my poor laudation, but that

you may be enabled to behold his likeness, as if he were alive: let what I have said stir us up to emulation.

As soon as he became Professor of Theology, the Rectorship of this Academy was entrusted to him; A. D. 1654. In discharging its duties, there are many who remember his fidelity in defending the rights of our Hall; and, at the same time, his mode of treating insubordinate youths. He held this office for several years, and, during his incumbency, frequently pronounced orations that were much celebrated. It was his invariable practice to choose a subject worthy a Theologian, and suited to his splendid audience. He discoursed to the great delight of his hearers, on the birth day of his school and Academy, on the elevation of Alexander VII. to the Pontificate; on the cordial concord and indissoluble union between virtue and truth; and on the prejudices which impede the harmony of Evangelical Christians.

When he was relieved from the burdens of this station, in 1661, another, quite as weighty, was laid upon him. For the resources of the Genevese not being sufficient to defray the expense of fortifying their city, they resolved to send a deputation to the most potent and exalted States General of the United Provinces. These had always been very favourably disposed towards Geneva. Our Senate considered that no more suitable commissioner could be selected than the worthy son of Benedict Turretin—who, forty years before, had been ambassador to the same people. Accordingly, he left home in May. At Basle he met with a cordial reception from the eminent men who shed a lustre on its University, especially from the Reverend and distinguished Gernler, who, to the end of life, was an intimate friend of Turretin; the celebrated Wetstein; the learned Schenawer; the illustrious Wollebius; the venerable Werenfels, that most vigilant Ecclesiastic and thorough Theologian, who now fills, with universal applause, the exalted station of President in the parent Church and Academy of Basle; and the celebrated Buxtorf. He proceeded thence directly to Holland. He used to revert, with grateful feelings, to the very kind manner in which he was received by the Nobles of the United Provinces, who presented him with a valuable gold chain and medal. He loved to relate the

gracious language and friendly manner with which his serene Highness, the Prince of Orange, the wonder of the world—the love and delight of mankind, condescended to meet him. His memory gladly dwelt upon the many marks of affection which he received from the learned men of Holland. That his mission was entirely successful, it is scarcely necessary for me to say, for these walls of ours speak loudly enough. I need not tell you, my hearers, what earnest attempts—what urgent entreaties—what tempting offers, were made by the churches, both of Leyden and the Hague, to procure his ministerial services; nor how urgently and repeatedly the University of Leyden solicited him to become a Professor, that it might shine with a fresh brilliancy; having to its other luminaries added Turretin, who was admired for his pure and devoted spirit—unostentatious learning—extraordinary integrity—various and recondite acquirements—clear and correct judgment—and courage ever active and undaunted in the defence and promulgation of the truth—the champion of orthodoxy, but the unrelenting foe of heterodoxy. All these efforts were fruitless. Turretin left Holland. His departure made the Dutch the sad admirers of his learning and virtues. However, they never forgot our Theologian; for, among his papers, we find several letters addressed to him by the wise and noble Burgersdicius, the chief ornament, not only of Leyden, but of Holland—the great son of a distinguished father, but greater by his own high offices, being a distinguished member of the illustrious and noble board of Trustees of the University, as well as the Council of Leyden.

In going to Holland, he went through Germany; but he returned by a different route. He wanted to re-visit Paris, and see again his celebrated Preceptors. Those of them who yet survived, wished very much to hear the Doctor whom once they heard as scholar. Turretin could not refuse their request. He accordingly preached twice to a very large congregation at Carentan—a congregation that I never think of without the greatest emotion. Then, for the first time, he got acquainted with the incomparable John Claude, the splendour and radiance of whose fame encircle and thrill through me. This man I dare not attempt either to praise or describe, the task is beyond my powers—the first line dazzles—the

pencil falls—my efforts relax, and the tremulous and unsteady eye cannot picture that which fascinates it.

At length he returned safely to the bosom of his long-wished for home. On his arrival, he was received with great affection by a large concourse of Nobles, colleagues and congratulating friends. The Academy mourning and prostrated at the blow it received in the death of its great and illustrious Professor, Antonie Leger, began to assume a more joyous aspect, and seemed to revive at the sight of Turretin.

He resumed, with renewed zeal, his former labours. In 1668, he was again made President of our Hall, and, at our anniversary, he preached, with his usual power and accustomed eloquence, on the safety of Geneva, and the vices and scandals of the church.

Marriage seemed now to be all that was wanting to fill up the measure of his honours and happiness. He began, therefore, to think about it, and soon made Elizabeth DeMasse the partner of his bed. By her, he had one daughter and three sons; of whom only one survives, and his steps, as he mounts the highest round of fame's lofty ladder, we eagerly watch, and for his success earnestly pray.

Before this date, he had given to the world some specimens of his talent, in works which futurity will not suffer to be buried in an inglorious oblivion. In 1644, he published a reply to the Papists, and a vindication of the truth of Protestantism against the cavils and calumnies of its opponents. In 1666, he put forth his disquisition on the satisfaction of Christ, in reply to Socinus and his heretical followers. In this year also, he wrote against the Papists, and at another time added the article on their reasoning in a circle, as well as his dissertation on the harmony of Paul and James, on the doctrine of Justification. In 1674, he set forth the Institutes of Theology. In this work he has clearly stated every question, and waged a most successful warfare without any shrinking or concealment. He hesitated long before consenting to its publication, for he knew that the greatest, both of ancient and modern Divines, had applied their time and talents to works of the same kind, and that the age was so inundated with controversial produc-

tions, that unless an author was willing to pander to the fastidious taste of readers by some enticing novelty, he would be likely to have but little reward for his labour. However, this work was so eagerly sought after, that he could no longer withhold it, and so permitted it to go to the press. The innumerable communications that he received from the most distinguished Theologians in all quarters, bear ample testimony to the favourable reception it met with from the learned. His correspondence extended to every one of whom he heard as being eminent in any portion of the domain of letters, so that by examining his library, you will find it to be an epitome of European literature. About this time he published his sermons, which are still extensively and profitably read. In 1687, he revised and enlarged his disquisitions on the necessity of our secession from the Romish Church, and the impossibility of any alliance with her; to these, he added ten Miscellaneous Dissertations. He had just commenced to revise the Institutes, and intended to enlarge and illustrate many parts of the work, when he became a citizen of heaven and an heir of immortality. Indeed, for several years, he was dying daily from the heavy affliction which his pious soul endured, on account of the persecutions and slaughter that beset the churches. For, to adopt what Gregory said of Basil, "when every body else looks only to the present, and exerts himself only for the preservation of his own property—as if, indeed, that were enough—and neither goes a step farther, nor is able to plan, or execute if planned, any thing great or noble; he, on the other hand, although in all other matters most gentle and forbearing, yet in the Churches' afflictions knew no limit, but with uplifted head, and ubiquitous gaze, took in every spot where the doctrine of Christ's salvation had penetrated; and when he heard that the vine of the Lord was laid waste, he gave neither sleep to his eyes nor slumber to his eyelids, but pined away with anxiety and care." And how often have we seen this holy man in public, as well as in private, bursting into tears when he heard of the terrible misfortunes of the Piedmontese brethren, and beheld the wretched remnant of them that escaped, like brands from the burning, from the inaccessible fastnesses of the moun-

tains, the hidden caves of the rocks, and foul, dark dungeons. How often were his cheeks bedewed with the gushing tear, when told of the grievous destiny of his French brethren, over whose mournful lot it is better that we should spread a veil, than by recounting renew our unutterable sorrow! How often, with deep groaning, has he exclaimed, "O Lord God of hosts, how long wilt thou be angry against the prayer of thy people?" &c. Ps. 80, 4 & ss.

These sighs and lamentations are known to thee, O thou Supreme. And they are known to you, too, my hearers, for often have ye listened to him, as with overflowing eyes, he mourned over their disasters. These are things I do not attempt to describe, but like the wise painter, whose genius told him it were better to throw a veil over that which the pencil never could depict, I leave the subject to your own imagination.

But the Almighty heard his lamentations, saw and wiped away his tears. And this brings us to the dread period in his career, wherein our Turretin neared with hasty strides the goal of our common mortality. Hitherto his health had been uniformly good, and his invariable equanimity had added strength to his fine physical constitution. I have rarely known him to be indisposed; at one time, indeed, from some cause or other, he had an attack of cholic, and three times he had some twinges of the gout. We hoped that he would reach a very old age; but, as it usually happens, the more thoroughly the mind is furnished with heaven-born decorations of learning and wisdom, the more speedily does the soul, cloyed with the things of earth, long for something more sublime; and the body soon sinks, when the spirit is completely worn out and exhausted. On the 26th of September he was confined to bed. On the morning of that day, he had risen very early, long before sun-rise, and written several letters to his friends; he had intended also, as he told me, to write others to those eminent theologians, whose names, so generally known, I cannot dismiss without a notice; Rev. J. H. Heideger, a shining light, not only of Switzerland, but of Europe; and the famous Peter Jurien, whose name it is sufficient to mention, a fearless advocate of the Reformation, and very

hammer of heretics. Between these great men and Turretin the closest intimacy and friendship always existed. On this day he had been engaged till about 10 o'clock in conversation with several friends, on various matters that pertained to the welfare of the Church of Christ. At this hour he was suddenly seized with the most excruciating pains. O happy man! whose last day found thee fighting the battles of the Lord. As soon as he was attacked, as if prescient of the future, he perceived that his end was at hand. He therefore wished his beloved sister to be apprized of his state. As soon as I heard of his illness, I hastened to him. When he saw me, he said that he ardently longed to be liberated from the prison house of the body; that his greatest trouble was, that the torture of his pain prevented him from praying to his Eternal Father as he wished to do; but still he knew the Redeemer in whom he had believed, and would believe as long as life remained; and that his soul panted only for Christ. His only prayer to God was, that he would pardon his sins, vouchsafe him strength to bear patiently his pain, and grant him a calm and peaceful entrance into immortality. The most skilful physicians were called in. Every remedy that science could suggest was used, if not for the removal, at least for the alleviation of his intolerable agony. He meanwhile was addressing the Eternal Dispenser of life and death in the words of the royal bard, "Hear my prayer, O Lord, give ear to my supplications: in thy faithfulness answer me, and in thy righteousness. And enter not into judgment with thy servant; for in thy sight shall no flesh living be justified." "O Christ, my Saviour, sprinkle my soul with thine own blood. Hear, O Father, the cries of that blood." At times he would repeat a portion of the 38th Psalm, which a few days before he had lectured upon in the Italian congregation: "O Lord rebuke me not in thy wrath: neither chasten me in thy hot displeasure. For thine arrows stick fast in me, and thy hand presseth me sore."

On the following day, the physicians were grieved to see that all their efforts were fruitless, and that from the torpor of the bowels and sinking of the system, the disease was making rapid progress. If they did not entirely despair of his recovery, yet hope now hung on a slender

thread. They were fluctuating between hope and fear as to the result. He, however, having a presentiment of what was coming, prepared himself for death. On seeing those around him bathed in tears, he said, why do you weep? The path of death must be trodden by all. The present state of existence is not life, but a store-house of evils,—a sea of cares,—an arena of griefs,—a hot bed of sorrow,—a living death. The life which I already enjoy, alone deserves the name of life. O when shall I get rid of this dwelling place of misery; this workshop of woes? when shall I cast off this body of death; and a freeman indeed, and, united to Christ, enter into the possession of true bliss?

On that day he conversed much with his only son, and in addition to various other charges, he solemnly enjoined upon him these four things:—a care for the Church of God, if he should ever be called to the holy ministry; love for the truth; humility, and charity. And as I stood by his bedside, he exhorted me most earnestly as to the Lord's work, and gave me many injunctions and commands, which are laid up in the store house of memory, never to be forgotten; but my feelings will not permit me now to speak of them. Towards evening his strength evidently gave way, still he said that he would not die that night,—that he would see the light of another day. We were all surprised at the patience with which he bore such pain; for when at any time a complaint would escape him in a somewhat querulous tone, he would immediately recollect himself, and in the midst of his agony would speak of the fatherly mercy of his God. At day break he felt that the time of his departure was at hand, "Now," he said, "the time has come, when I must leave you!" O dreadful bereavement! expect me not to dwell upon it,—my voice, choked with a flood of tears, forbids it. At this period arrived the illustrious Rector of this school, and beloved relative of the deceased, Michael Turretin—the worthy Professor of the oriental languages and ornament of the Hebrew chair, as well as a highly meritorious Pastor of this Church. To him he spoke very freely of his deep repentance, and said that he never doubted of the pardon of his sins, and the mercy of his Saviour; that to this mercy he now clung with all his soul and

implored God to call him up cleansed by the blood of his only begotten Son to the mansions of the blessed. He commended to his care the Church, the Academy and his son. He asked him to salute the venerable council in his name, and assure them that he died in that faith which he had always defended and publicly taught,—a faith which he has believed, does believe and will believe until the end; he begged him to exhort the brethren to lay aside all dissension, to quell every excited feeling, and with harmony of soul and zeal to carry on the work of the Lord, striving only for the truth, and never forgetting their common faith and name, rank, character and office; always mindful of their common mortality, and of the last great day, when each of them will have to render an account of his stewardship at the bar of Christ. He commended to the Rev. Mr. Bernard—an exile for Christ's sake, and a man whom the good ought to esteem—the wretched remnant of his own Church; and to us all, the care of the Church of Christ. He prayed fervently that God would bestow every blessing upon that active and faithful pastor, his cousin Marcus Michæli. His countenance now expressed triumph not death. Oh! methinks that even now I see the rays, not of faith and hope merely, but, if I may so say, of the glory that was soon to be revealed in him, shining in his countenance; and that my ears still hear those last words that breathed of heaven.

At seven o'clock, he began to sink, and the clay tabernacle to fall in pieces; he bade us all farwell, and heartily commended us to God. We were engaged in prayer, when the Rev. Pastor Bernard reminded him of the sermon which he last preached, on the day of the communion, from these words of Paul, "let us come boldly to the throne of grace;" he at once exclaimed, as if impatient of delay, "let us come, let us come." When with deep earnestness he had said this, death tranquil as sleep crept upon him, and without a struggle, or convulsion of a muscle, yea without one heaving of the breast, but like a lamp when the oil is burned out, or as a poppy when it bends its head to the gentle blast, did he calmly bow his neck to death.

Thus died this great man, just as he completed his

64th year. Thus was that noble pledge and trust which God, in his kindness, had lent to our world, reclaimed and taken back to His native Heaven. O happy thou, and wretched we! Thou, now freed from the body's mass, dost traverse all the heavenly orbs; now enrolled among the blessed choir of Heaven, dost despise all things human, and look down upon this globe of earth: thou hast gone from the place of mourning to that of unending happiness, from the prison-house of mortality to that life which is bounded by no limit of time or measure of bliss. We, on this ball of earth, still wander far from the mansions above—far from our native Heaven. Thou dost rest in the harbour of happiness; yea, all life's wanderings over, hast reached the port long prayed for with fervid aspirations: we, amid wrecks and rocks, are tossed about by dreadful storms; now tremulous with fear, now elate with hope. Peace unending blesses thee: a harassing life, that soon will terminate, crushes us. Death is to thee the end of toil, the consummation of victory, the gate of life, the avenue to perfect safety; not an exit, but a transit to eternity; not a destruction, but a change of being; not an annihilation, but a translation to honour, and a pathway to the crown. The life thou now enjoyest, is a certain safety, a safe tranquillity, a tranquil happiness, and a happy eternity. But the life we still live, is a life full of doubt and darkness and disaster; a life which humours swell, and pains diminish; which heats dry up, and winds sicken; which food enlarges, and fasting emaciates; which mirth relaxes, and sadness wastes away; which cares contract, and security dulls; which riches elate, and poverty depresses; which youth lifts up, age bends down, and infirmity breaks in pieces. Thou art commencing life, for thy death-day is thy birthday: we die daily, and yet die ever. Thou art exulting with God and His Holy Angels, every care banished, and every sorrow driven away: tears flow from our eyes, the moisture on our cheeks is never dry. O Father, Father, the chariots of Israel! Why am I left behind thee! It is death, yea, worse than death to live, deprived of thee. Shall I never again behold thy face, never again enjoy thy pleasant and learned conversation! Alas! my better part has gone! Weep, O Church, for never again will

you hear that voice which was wont to declare to you the whole counsel of God, that voice which brought relief to sin-sick souls, and consolation to the afflicted; which led the erring back to the right way, which strengthened the faltering, taught the ignorant, and confirmed the learned. That mouth, whence flowed the richest streams of eloquence, will no longer pour its words of heavenly wisdom upon our earth! Weep, ye sons of the Prophets! These walls will never again re-echo the silver sweetness of his voice! This chair has lost Turretin! And who am I, that I can occupy the place, and follow in the footsteps of so great a man? Suetonius has said of a deceased Emperor, who had an unworthy successor, that the successor made his death more severely felt. I fear much, that the same may be said of Turretin, whom I, a child in comparison, am destined to succeed. Let me entreat you, then, to assist me with your prayers, most excellent and noble hearers; unite your supplications to mine, that although I may be unable to tread with an equal step in the foot-prints he has left behind him, I may, at least, be enabled to walk in the same path.

May the Almighty grant that the falling of this star does not portend some disaster to our Church. O God Supreme, avert the inauspicious omen! O thou Founder and Upholder of this city, keep it ever safe and peaceful, the invincible theatre of thy power and goodness. May her government long flourish; may the pillars and grounds of her Church and school long endure. Let this hall, the seat of pure philosophy, the impregnable citadel of unalloyed truth, the home of pure spirits, the dwelling place of learned men, and the metropolis of literature, extend its fame and glory to the uttermost ends of the earth. Above all, let this Church be the uniform resting place of thy grace,—the temple of the ark of thy salvation. Thou hast taken away our Elijah, O send us many Elishas. Raise up, and render mighty with thine own strength, many advocates of the truth. Illumine with celestial light the hearts and understandings of both the teachers and the taught; and fill all with a burning love for wisdom and godliness!

And now, since we can no more enjoy the pleasant and lovely presence of Turretin, let this, my humble effort,

be his eulogy : and as we could not retain him in the flesh, let us cherish him in our memory ; as we no longer speak with, let us never forget to speak of him.

Farewell, Turretin, the loved and the lost ! most beloved and excellent man ! Farewell, thou soul called back to Heaven ! We all shall follow thee, each in his own order, as the fatal summons calls us hence.

ARTICLE III.

“Thirty-third Annual Report of the American Bible Society, May, 1849.”

It is sometimes as much as a man's reputation is worth, to call in question the wisdom or propriety of means, which have, for their object, some truly desirable end. It is so easy to construe any impeachment of the mode or means, into a seeming opposition to the end itself, that many good men prefer a silent acquiescence in things which they do not approve, to the hazard of being placed in a false position of hostility to an object which they earnestly desire. This danger is increased, and with it this reluctance to investigate, in proportion to the excellence of the object, towards which any means are directed. But, if besides aiming at the attainment of the most desirable end, the mode, or means, or movements, to be excepted against, are embraced in the established policy of some extended and powerful organization ; then his is, indeed, no enviable task. who feels constrained to call them in question. Though he may do it, in never so modest a form of enquiry or suggestion, yet will he have reason to remember his rash temerity, in having presumed “to move the wing, or open the mouth, or peep ;” or else he may bless himself that his obscurity or insignificance has been his protection.

Our age and country rejoices in the existence of certain great national Societies, founded in benevolence, associated in the minds of the pious with the most successful

modes of doing good, and which, by long years of usefulness, have attained to a position of controlling influence and power. They were wise and good men, by whom these institutions were founded. For the most part, they have been wise and good men who have conducted them. But they were men, and being but men, as many things do show, they were not and are not infallible. The wisdom and piety of those now at the head of these institutions, will appear by the manner in which they receive the suggestions of any one who can point out errors or defects, or dangers, either in their organizations or modes of conducting their business. Their position and influence is a sure and sufficient defence against the assaults of the meddlesome or the unfriendly. But let them not presume upon their power, and denounce, without evidence, as unfriendly or as meddlesome, all or any who honestly dissent from their proceedings, and give the reasons for their dissent. To do this, is the birthright of an American citizen, and it is one among the yet higher prerogatives of a citizen of Zion. And though he should be the humblest of all the hosts of Israel, who prompted by his desire, for the glory of God and the good of men, yet ventures also "to show his opinion;" let him not be counted as an enemy; let him not be stricken down by the overwhelming power of popular prejudice, as if he had put forth his hand, profanely, to touch the ark of God; but in the exercise of his right, let him be fairly heard, in publicly setting forth, whatever he conceives to be wrong in institutions which are amenable only to the public.

The magnitude and power of these institutions, render it the more incumbent, freely to canvass their proceedings. Though the creatures of the Church, yet so indirectly responsible to the Church, it is conceivable that they should ultimately acquire an influence which, however perverted in its application, the Church would not be able to withstand. With the capital which they already possess, and with the present ratio of increase to their incomes, how long would it take to render them self-acting and self-sustaining machines? Is it a new thing under the sun, for institutions, waxing strong, to become also arrogant and assuming? Has it not happened before, that agen-

cies which were originally designed only for good, have yet become the instruments of evil? All history shows that it is no disparagement to these institutions, or to those who conduct them, to contemplate this possibility. The possibility, indeed, creates no alarm in us, nor is it suggested to create alarm. But our confidence is based upon the right, and the untrammelled exercise of the right, to hold them amenable for any thing and every thing as far as may be necessary, at the tribunal of the public, the only tribunal at which they can be arraigned.

Now we put in this plea for our rights, because we think we have discovered an extreme sensibility in certain quarters, at any animadversions upon their great institutions. And unless we have mistaken the indications, this sensibility has not always been disconnected from a disposition to employ the *argumentum ad hominem*, in some of its most exceptionable forms. Now any such indications are not only in extremely bad taste, but in the highest degree impolitic. It will always be regarded as an unfavourable augury, when public functionaries are restive and impatient under public scrutiny. This is the very way to excite suspicion, and to provoke a far more rigorous and extended investigation. We easily waive the exercise of a right, which is freely conceded. But whoever, directly or indirectly, calls it in question, thereby gives ground to believe that he has some reason for his resistance. What was before a matter of choice, becomes now an imperative duty, and we give place to any claim to exemption from scrutiny, "no, not for an hour!" Let the agents and officers of our great institutions, then be patient, be courteous. And if their ears are not always regaled with the language of encomium and compliment, let it remind them that they are not *the only men*, neither will "wisdom die with them."

But we are told, "there is danger in raising any objections against the proceedings of these great benevolent Societies; they are so important, so useful; they are doing so excellent a work that we ought not to do any thing which can weaken, in the least, their hold upon the public confidence, lest we hinder their work." And we are *always* told that the *present time* is the most unfortunate of all, for any such animadversions. Since this is just

that crisis, in the state of the world, which requires their utmost efforts and efficiency."

To all this, it is a sufficient answer to say, that no Society ever yet found its usefulness impaired, by objections urged against any of its proceedings, which were right and defensible in themselves. And if they are not right, no contemplated good, however desirable, ought to be their protection. But the Societies of which we speak, have nothing to fear in this respect, unless, indeed, (what we would not insinuate,) their alarm should spring from conscious defects. They are not pigmies of yesterday, struggling for an equivocal existence. They are no new and unknown candidates for popular favour; too modest to assert their own claims, or too weak to survive the least imputation. The great ends which they contemplate, will not be abandoned, because certain reforms may be necessary in the mode of attaining them. The danger here is altogether on the other side. And it is that Societies which have grown powerful, and have gained a firm hold upon the public mind by the excellence of their objects, will become reckless of remonstrance and obstinate in policy, though that remonstrance be never so well founded, or that policy never so exceptionable. What, through their numberless agencies, their unlimited command and use of the press, and their extended patronage, might they not accomplish if disposed, in forming a public sentiment to suit themselves? They are amenable only to the public, and if disposed and successful in gaining over to their interests this only tribunal of appeal, at what other earthly tribunal can they be held, thereafter, responsible for any thing? There is too much squeamishness on this subject altogether. No public institution, sustained by public beneficence, is or ought to be exempt from public scrutiny. Our only security in regard to such institutions, and the best security for the institutions themselves, is in a full and open exhibition of all their affairs and proceedings, and in inviting, rather than repelling, any one who chooses freely and fully to canvass their proceedings.

Let it not be inferred from these remarks, that we have taken up the document before us, with any feelings of unkindness, or even of indifference, to the American Bible

Society, or to its truly noble work. Not the best friend of that institution, can more sincerely desire its success, or rejoice more heartily in its extended operations and usefulness. And whilst penning this article, with the design of freely expressing an opinion on certain points of policy, which we regard as exceptionable, we are actuated also by the hope of commending to the more cordial co-operation of the Churches, the great work of Bible distribution. By whomsoever it was first entertained, it was truly a grand conception which gave birth to a Bible Society; and far beyond any present conceptions, is the good which has been accomplished by these institutions. It is estimated in this report, that the whole number of Bibles now extant in the world, is not far from forty millions.—But of this number, more than three fourths have been issued by Bible Societies. In this work, the American Bible Society has well sustained its part, and within the thirty three years of its existence, has issued nearly one-sixth of the whole number. If the estimate, quoted above, is any where near the truth, it reveals to us a yet immense destitution of the word of God. For great as this number is, compared with that of those days, when copies were only multiplied by the tedious labours of the transcriber,—or yet with the times of the reformers, when only the libraries of the rich and the learned, could boast of their copies; yet when compared with the populations of the globe, for whom the Bible was designed, and who are perishing for lack of vision,—we may even say of the 40,000,000, as the Disciples said of the few loaves and fishes, “What are they among so many?” But withdraw from the circulation of the word of God, the thirty two millions of copies which have been issued by Bible Societies, and we should have a picture of destitution, yet more awfully appalling. Let the six millions, issued by the American Bible Society, be withdrawn from our own country, and it would be the withdrawal of the light of life, from thousands and tens of thousands of families. Without the Bible Society, private enterprize would, doubtless, have done much, and perhaps more than it has done in multiplying copies of the Scriptures, and competition would gradually have done its work in reducing the price. But it is too obvious to be questioned, that

through the instrumentality of this institution, the Bible has been cheapened to all, has been given to multitudes who, otherwise, would never have possessed it, and has been widely scattered in many tongues, on every continent and almost every island of the sea, and on the vast surface of the sea itself.

No well disposed mind can be indifferent to these results; no Christian can fail to rejoice in their attainment. But results, however glorious, only prove that the means have been adequate to the end achieved; not that those means have been the wisest, or even that they have been employed to the best advantage. It is a great thing to cross the broad Atlantic. But the Atlantic has been crossed in a Chinese Junk. No one would thence praise the Junk as a model of naval architecture, or as better suited to ocean navigation, than the splendid packet or the rapid steamer. It is equal folly to argue in favour of any institution, or its peculiar modes of operation, by an appeal to what it has accomplished, without taking into account, at the same time, the labour and capital which it has expended. It is highly gratifying, indeed, to sum up the results of thirty three years' labour of the American Bible Society, in so many millions of Bibles issued. But it would be yet more gratifying, and afford the only data for an intelligent estimate of its operations, if we had summed up for us also, the whole amount of capital and expenditure by which these results have been attained. As it is, we have only one side of the balance sheet, and though that shows a very handsome footing to our credit, yet the suspicion will return of a debit account, by no means so flattering. For aught that appears, we may, after all, have crossed the ocean in a Junk.

And here we take occasion to say, that whilst the report before us is voluminous, and contains much of very interesting information, yet it strikes us as strangely deficient in many important particulars. We find much that might as well have been omitted, and we look in vain for some things which we expected to find, and which we think ought to be there. What is the necessity or the use of printing every year some 70 pages double columns of names, of those who have been and are life members, &c.?

are published, and considering the vast number which are circulated, this must add materially to the expenses of a Society, which is every year in debt for paper, and the last year no less than \$31,553 64. If there is any necessity for publishing these lists, certainly, once in five or ten years should be sufficient. An institution that labours under pecuniary embarrassments, and puts forth such urgent appeals for pecuniary aid, ought certainly to study a most rigid economy. Considering the wants of the world, and the pressing need of every dollar, we could ourselves consent to spare, also, the ten to twenty pages of anniversary speeches, which of late years, have come in to swell these annual reports. If the saving in expenses, is not reason enough for pruning such excrescences, yet, by so doing, we should have room for detailed statements of other matters, vastly more important. Perhaps in the space thus occupied, we might have the minutes of the Board of Directors for the year. At least there might be spread out before the Society, many weighty matters of correspondence, and many grave subjects of debate, which have and do come before that Board, and to which there is not found the slightest allusion in the report.

Without intending the least reflection upon any one, we could wish also that the Treasurer's report were somewhat more full and particular. A Society which passes through the hands of its managers, between two and three hundred thousand dollars per annum, might we should say, afford more than one page out of 255 pages, for the annual exhibit of its expenditures and its assets. The grouping together of items, is carried to the last degree of condensation, and the meagre abstract is altogether about as satisfactory as it would have been in the following form :

American Bible Society,		In account with its Treasurer.	
1849, Cr.	By cash received,	- - - - -	\$252,214 84
	Dr. To cash paid,	- - - - -	252,134 52
Balance to new account,			\$ 80 32

If we cannot have sufficient details for estimates and calculations, we may as well have the whole amount in

a single line. Such grouping as this, only provokes whilst it baffles inquiry,—“Thirty travelling agents and salaries, and travelling expenses, and delegates to auxiliaries, \$20,480 96.” Some items run as high as \$70,000 00; and yet there are no specifications of time, quantity or quality of the article purchased. There is no opening for competition, to those who manufacture. There are no given facts upon which to base a calculation, and prove to an opponent that the money has been wisely and honestly expended. So far as their friends are concerned, it may be perfectly satisfactory to fall back upon the known and established character of the managers, as the security that all things have been properly conducted. But this will not satisfy others. This is not the right ground upon which to demand the confidence of the public. It may be said, and it has been said, and that by those who are no enemies to the cause, that in the mechanical and financial arrangements of the Society, there is a want of economy and foresight, which, in any private business, would ensure failure and ruin. To meet and to prevent any such intimations, requires a more full and ample detail of expenditures. Why may we not be informed how much Mr. A. Mr. B. and Mr. C. have received, and for what services performed, or for what material furnished? In a Society so extended, we know that every thing cannot be reported; but all important things can. And in a volume containing more than 150 pages of appendix matter, we confess to some surprise, that so little is.

In this connection, we may notice another point in which we regard the report as defective. It was customary in former years, to give a detailed and tabular view of the number and value of the gratuitous issues of the Society, and as late as 1848, we have the whole number of copies thus issued, distinctly stated, though their value is not given. But in the report before us, no such item appears. We have, indeed, a statement of books granted to seamen and boatmen, to the army, and to different missionary and other societies. But whether this is intended to cover all the gratuitous appropriations, we are not informed. And as the Parent Society proposes to take the work of distribution more into its own hands than form-

erly, we regret that the report of this item should grow less definite and distinct. In the absence of any thing to the contrary, we presume that the above statement covers the whole appropriation for the year. And proceeding upon this assumption, we find, after gathering up from several pages the scattered particulars, that the whole number of Bibles, gratuitously granted the past year, is, 8,147, and of Testaments, 23,717—making a total of 31,864 copies. In addition to this we will add 5,000 copies, to cover possible mistakes in the footing up, and the indefinite expression, “numerous other smaller grants.” We have, then, 36,864 copies, of which more than two thirds are Testaments, as the whole amount of gratuitous appropriation in books. This is less by 22,742 copies, than the same class of issues for the former year, and less by 6,509 copies, than those of 1830, when the receipts of the Society, from all sources, were a little over half their present amount.

We propose, now, to make a small calculation, which, we think, must discover one of two things, viz: either that the American Bible Society is a very expensive mode of supplying the destitute, or else that its reports give a very imperfect exhibition of its operations.

We assume, for the present, that the books *sold* pay for themselves. This is what is ordinarily understood, when an article is said to be sold “*at cost*.” Leaving, then, the receipts from the sales, to balance the expenses of the books sold, we may take the gratuitous receipts to set over against the grants of money and of books, thus:

The whole amount of funds gratuitously received is,	- - - - -	\$91,804 09
Deduct from this, grants of money,	- - - - -	11,188 54

Will leave for gratuitous issues,	- - - - -	\$80,615 55
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That is to say, with all the capital of buildings, engines, plates, presses, &c. which the Society has on hand, it has cost to furnish 36,864 books, of which more than two thirds are Testaments, the sum of \$80,615 55, which would be about \$2 18 per copy.

But it will be said, that all the salaries of agents and officers of the Society, must come out of the donation account. Take out, then, all the salaries reported, and

travelling expenses, amounting to \$29,387 61, this will still leave us \$51,230 94 to publish 36,864 books, or about \$1 37 per copy.

There are two ways by which to escape this conclusion, one is, to suppose that a large part of the donations have gone to increase the stock of books on hand, and the other is, that the books sold are not sold "*at cost.*"—If the first supposition is correct, then the disproportion between the gratuitous receipts and expenditures, would only be occasional, and would fluctuate to both sides of the account. What was added to the stock on hand, one year, would be so much available for distribution the next. But it is found by examining successive reports, that the same thing occurs every year to a greater or less extent. And at this present writing, we are informed that the depository is actually exhausted. We ought then, certainly to expect a report of immensely increased appropriations, for 1850.

That the books sold do not pay cost, may be true. But is cheapening the price the end which is contemplated in donations? Is it according to the expressed policy of the Society? What rule of appropriation is adopted, in deciding how much of the gratuitous receipts shall go to cheapen the article sold, and how much to put it in the hands of the destitute, "without money and without price?"

But adopting either or both of the foregoing suppositions, as the explanation of the disproportion between the gratuitous receipts and expenditures, yet the question still returns, is not this disproportion constantly too great? Let us see how it stands in three several reports, taken up indiscriminately.

1830. Gratuitous receipts,	- - -	\$74,652 86
" Gratuitous issues and grants,	- -	21,710 48
" Leaving an excess of receipts,		<hr/> \$52,942 38
1840. Gratuitous receipts,	- - -	\$48,030 49
" " issues and grants,	- -	16,183 17
" Leaving an excess of receipts,		<hr/> \$31,847 32

1843. Gratuitous receipts,	- - - -	\$65,244 80
" " issues and grants,	' - - -	26,168 63

" Leaving an excess of receipts, \$39,076 17

The past year would probably show a still greater excess, if we had the value of the gratuitous issues stated as formerly. Now we are greatly mistaken, if it is not generally understood by the donors that the money *given* to this Society is appropriated mainly to the gratuitous supply of the destitute in our own and foreign lands. But does it accord with the object of donation, that less than one half of the money given, is thus appropriated? Is there not some defect, either in the machinery, or in its management, when so large a share of the benevolence of the Church, is consumed in keeping it in motion? With the clear capital of buildings, presses, plates &c. the Society ought to be able, to distance all competition, in the style and prices of their books sold, if they received not another dollar of donation. Put such an establishment as the Bible House, with all its fixtures and property into the hands of the Harpers, for instance, free of cost, and with the same channels of sale, and we venture to say, they would make a comfortable business, of printing the same quantity and quality of books and at the same prices. Whatever may have been necessary at an earlier day, we submit, if it is not reasonable, at least, that, with the present accumulation of capital, the sales department of the concern should support itself. And yet we have seen, that though we charge to the donation account, all the salaries and travelling expenses of agents and secretaries, thus burdening that account, with far more than its share of the general expenses, we should still have a surplus, above the amount of gratuitous appropriations. But we believe it would promote Bible circulation, to make all the expenses of the Society, a tax upon the books sold, and let every dollar which is *given*, purchase a dollar's worth of books for gratuitous distribution, subject only to the expenses of the distribution. Then we should soon see how economically the publishing department is conducted, by a comparison of the Society's books and prices, with those of private enterprize. Then donors would know, that not a fraction, but the

whole of their donations, was appropriated to the supply of the needy and destitute. And indeed, the great demand of our times, is not for Bibles that may be sold cheap, (private enterprize here sometimes outstrips the Society,) but it is for Bibles that may be *given*, to those millions who are too poor; too ignorant, or too indifferent to buy. To be able to carry the word of God to the doors, and put it into the hands of the destitute, without price, to those who will not, or cannot buy; is of much higher consequence, than simply to cheapen its price, as an article of merchandize. Yet the more we study the operations of the American Bible Society, the more we are convinced, that its gratuitous distributions have not kept pace with the increase of its receipts.

We would respectfully offer a remark also, on the facility with which the managers of this, as of some other societies, contract debts. We find by the report of the auditing committee, that besides the obligations due to several auxiliaries, and the interest of which is to be paid in books,* the Society owed in May last, some \$50,000. A fraction of this (\$8,206 76,) was incurred in the purchase of the Bindery, and may therefore be considered as an extra item. But the great bulk of the debt seems to have come in the ordinary course of business. Now whilst stringent necessity may sometimes justify the Boards of our benevolent Societies, in pushing their operations beyond their means, yet we submit, whether the tendency and disposition to do this, is not becoming altogether too common. It sometimes looks like a matter of policy, as if to coerce the tardy benevolence of the Church. An "open door" is discovered and the Boards say, "we will go forward, and leave the responsibility of making good our indebtedness with the Churches." By especial efforts, the debt is at length paid, but scarcely have we time to rejoice over it, before the same thing is repeated. And we have heard this mode of proceeding justified, "It is the only way to bring out the money" said one, to whom it was complained of as an injurious policy. But is

* And that, by the way, is an arrangement which we do not quite understand. The constitution expressly requires all auxiliaries, as a condition of becoming such, to pay over all their surplus funds to the parent Society.

the policy which "brings out the money," always the best policy? Is it always right? The expenses of negotiating loans, and the interest upon them, are a heavy tax upon the legitimate income of a Society. Then experience should teach us, that extraordinary and spasmodic efforts are poorly adapted to promote "cheerful giving," and tend to diminish the flow of regular systematic benevolence; we think, moreover, that this policy is questionable in its moral aspect. The income of any Society dependent upon public benevolence, is of necessity liable to many contingencies, and therefore extremely fluctuating. To incur liabilities on the strength of these contingencies, is to run the risk of contracting debts which cannot be met. Again: the Boards of these Societies act not for themselves, but for others; and though appointed to manage and expend the funds which may be put into their hands, yet it may be doubted, if they have the right, to add, to those funds by involving the Society in debt. This question becomes more important, when we consider the property of the Society, as liable for its debts. That property is a trust, of a most sacred character; and no Board has a moral right, or ought to have the power of endangering it, by liabilities assumed on the strength of contingencies. The present debt of the Bible Society, may not give cause of alarm. But the policy to which we have adverted, is capable of indefinite abuse, and the question of principle involved, is certainly worthy of grave consideration.

It is not improbable that some of our previous calculations may be at fault, from the want of sufficient *data*. Should this prove to be the case, we shall not be the last to rejoice in the fact; though that fact will, itself, only illustrate and confirm all that we have said, of the necessity for a more distinct and detailed report of the Society's condition and operations.

We come now, however, to speak on a topic, concerning which, all the facts in the case are but too apparent; and we grieve to say it, that the American Bible Society, as a Society, is a *prayerless Institution*. That the Bible Society never prays at any of its meetings, is a fact which is probably not known to many of its constituents, and will, doubtless, strike many with surprise when it is

announced. And yet it is a fact which might be learned from any of its reports. That it is not more generally known and noticed, is because the opposite is almost universally taken for granted. An intelligent clergyman once rebuked the writer of this article for stating this fact, and would not be convinced that it was so, until he had examined the Reports. "What!" said the Editor of a religious newspaper, "the Bible Society does not pray! surely, you must be mistaken!" Would that we were mistaken! But the whole truth is not yet told. This is not a sin of mere neglect or oversight. The Society not only does not pray, but its managers have *deliberately and formally refused to admit prayer* into their meetings, when asked to introduce it. Once, at an extra meeting in Cincinnati, prayer was had. It is the only instance in thirty-three years, and, as we shall see presently, the managers have determined, as far as they can determine it, that this instance shall be the last. There is presented here a spectacle to the world; the occasion of grief and shame to the christian, but of triumph to the infidel; a Society claiming to be the parent and basis of all the other kindred institutions, and to have a peculiar sanctity, because it has to do with the word of God, and yet, never praying to the God of the word, but deliberately and constantly refusing obedience to one of the first duties which that word enjoins!

The question, of course, will naturally arise here, why is this? What is the reason or reasons assigned, for not only omitting, but refusing to pray in the meetings of this Society? We certainly would not charge it upon the managers, that they wantonly and wilfully exclude prayer, nor would the public believe such a charge if it were made. They, doubtless, have reasons which we are bound to suppose are at least satisfactory to themselves. But inasmuch as they have been pleased to give these reasons, in answer to a remonstrance upon this subject, we are at liberty to examine them, and enquire whether they are also satisfactory to their constituents. That we may do them full justice, they shall speak for themselves, in the following Report, which has appeared in the public papers.

"REPORT OF COMMITTEE.

Adopted by the Board of Managers of the American Bible Society, on opening the Meetings with Prayer.

"The subject referred by the Board, contained in a communication from the Newburgh Bible Society, namely: the opening our anniversary meetings with prayer, was taken up, and the following report is now submitted thereon.

"1st. It appears that the present mode of opening our anniversary meetings, is one which was deliberately adopted by the founders and early friends of the Society, in view of the circumstances in which they were placed, composed, as they were, of various religious denominations, accustomed to different forms of worship. For their successors now to alter the original mode is evidently improper, unless there is in it something intrinsically wrong, or a change is called for by the great body of the Society's constituents.

"2d. While other benevolent Societies, having different objects to accomplish, open their public meetings with prayer, or prayer and music, it seems an appropriate exercise for *this Institution*, whose simple design is to circulate the Holy Scriptures without note or comment, to commence with the devout reading of a portion of that *inspired truth* which they are endeavoring to spread throughout the world.

"That such an exercise is felt to be solemn, reverential and edifying, thousands can from experience testify; they view it, and cannot but view it as acceptable worship; particularly when the portion of Scripture read, as is often the case, abounds with confessions, petitions and thanksgivings.

"3d. While the mode of opening our public meetings has often been a topic of conversation among the friends of the Society, and while it is known that many would have no *personal* objection to add, on the occasion, audible prayer to the reading of the scriptures, yet few individuals have ever advised or expressed a desire, all thing considered, that such an addition should be made.

"The Committee, therefore, in view of the facts and circumstances thus set forth, *recommend* that our anniversary devotional exercise continue as heretofore."

We must suppose that this Report, carefully prepared and formally adopted, presents the case in the very best

aspect which the facts will admit. To think otherwise, would be greatly to disparage the Committee by whom it was prepared, and the Board by whom it was adopted. And yet we confess, that on first perusing it, the expressions came involuntarily to our lips: "Is that *all* that can be said?" "Have the managers no more to offer, in defence of a practice so extraordinary?" If we may judge from its effects upon ourselves, this Report is well adapted to leave the impression, that the cause is desperate, which, with so many and such able counsellors, is yet rested on so feeble a defence.

Before we examine particularly the reasons, (so called) which are here urged as conclusive, we may observe, that the Report speaks only of "anniversary meetings," a style calculated to mislead, as if *these* were the *only* meetings from which prayer was excluded. Whereas, it is objected to the practice of the Society, that *all* its meetings, and the meetings of its Board, and the meetings of its committees, and its sub-committees, are *all* begun, continued and ended, without an audible utterance of prayer. It is, emphatically, a prayerless Institution.

In justification of a practice which warrants this impeachment, three reasons are assigned in the Report.

1. The first is, that the present mode was adopted by the founders and early friends of the Society, and for their successors now to alter it, is said to be "evidently improper, unless there is in it something intrinsically wrong, or a change is called for by the great body of the Society's constituents."

Now, do the managers mean to insinuate here, that "the founders and early friends of the Society" made their practice in this respect, an unalterable rule for the Society? Did they incorporate it into the constitution? If so, in what article is it found?—in what printed document does it appear? But they did no such thing. They acted, "in view of their circumstances," as seemed best to themselves, and they left it to their successors to do the same. Their successors, moreover, *have* made a change, in the solitary instance before alluded to, and that without any call from "the great body of the Society's constituents," notwithstanding the "*evident impro-*

priety" alleged. "It appears," then, that the continuance or change of this mode, is entirely optional with the managers. They have taken the responsibility of altering it in one instance, and, without any imputation upon "the founders and early friends of the Society;" they may, for good reasons, alter it again. Their own practice at Cincinnati is the proof, that they so understand it, and the saving clause beginning at "unless," &c. is a formal concession of this point. The whole of their first reason for excluding prayer, amounts then to this—"such has been our practice, and we see no reason to change it." This first argument, therefore, settles nothing. It leaves the question open, as it was before, only devolving upon the friends of prayer the burden of proof, that there is, in the present practice of excluding it, "something intrinsically wrong." We accept the gage, and shall endeavour the proof, having first disposed of the other reasons given in the Report, which we now proceed to examine.

2. The second reason, assigned by the Board in justification of their practice, is somewhat remarkable. We have seldom met with a more illogical, inconclusive paragraph, formally and numerically set forth, as an argument on any subject. The sum of it is this—"it seems to the Board, an appropriate exercise to commence the meeting of a Bible Society by reading a portion of scripture;" "such an exercise is edifying, and may be considered as acceptable worship."

Has any one objected to the reading of the Scriptures at the meetings of the Society? If not, where is the necessity, and what is the force of this plea for that laudable exercise? The question is, ought the Bible Society to *pray* at its meetings? And the answer of the Board is, no! because we devoutly read a portion of Scripture, and find it very edifying!—If any one can appreciate the force of that reasoning, we certainly cannot. Will prayer hinder the reading of the Bible, or make it less devout and edifying? An Apostle has told us that all things are "sanctified by the word of God, *and prayer*." Is there any precept which requires the separation, in this case, of those two things which God has thus "joined

together?" If, in the reception and use of Providential blessings, we must employ the Scriptures as our rule and warrant, and prayer as our acknowledgment of obligation and dependence, is it not equally necessary to sanctify our efforts to do good, by the devout use of both? But if this second paragraph of the report has any bearing whatever upon the question at issue, it must be understood as implying that the "devout reading of a portion of inspired truth," is equivalent to and may supersede the duty of prayer. Are the managers of the Bible Society prepared to take that ground? Then we have a principle which may be equally applied to the worship of the family, the social circle, and the sanctuary. If this is a correct principle, the neglect of prayer may be justified under almost any circumstances. But is it a correct principle? Does not any child understand that the reading of the Scriptures and prayer, are two distinct exercises,—and that he who discharges the one duty, does not thereby discharge or become excused from the other? In his word, God speaks to us. In prayer, we speak to God; and though the language of Scripture may be used to almost any extent, in our approaches to the Throne of Grace, yet the simple utterance of Scripture language is not, therefore, prayer. The Scriptures are devoutly read in the sanctuary, yet the Minister does not say "let us pray" when he opens the Bible, but when he closes it.—Such an argument, as the one we are considering, could only have been employed by the Board, from the felt necessity of saying something, where there was very little to be said. No one disputes that the devout reading of the Bible, at the meetings of the Society, is "appropriate, solemn, reverential, and edifying." Yet no one will be satisfied with an argument which justifies the neglect of *one* duty, by pleading the practice of *another*. "These things ought ye to have done, and not to have left the other undone."

This second argument of the Board, leaves the question then, just where it found it, only, as it reveals to us the scarcity of arguments, and the weakness of the defense, by which the exclusion of prayer is justified.

3d. In the third and last paragraph of the report,

we are informed that "the mode of opening its public meetings has often been a topic of conversation among *the* friends of the society;" but that "few individuals have ever advised, or expressed a desire," that audible prayer should be added to the reading of the Scriptures.

If this statement was designed to leave the impression, that the subject had been under consideration by "the friends of the Society" at large, or by any considerable number of them, and they had decided against a change, it leaves a wrong impression, and does great injustice to "*the* friends of the Society." The conversations referred to, must have been altogether private and confidential, never before to have reached the public ear, always so sensitive to discussions of this sort. To what extent the question has been agitated openly, may be inferred from the facts which we have already given. And it is true beyond all doubt, that even now multitudes of the patrons of this Society, out of the City of New York, and even in that City, will yet have to learn, and will learn it with surprise and grief, that prayer is excluded from the meetings of the Bible Society. Have the managers taken any measures to ascertain the views of their constituents upon this subject? Have the auxiliaries been addressed by them, and have they objected to a change? Until this is done, it goes for nothing, as an argument against the change proposed, that so few have ever advised or expressed a desire for it.

But perhaps we ought to regard this paragraph as an intimation from the Board, that they are waiting for instructions from their constituents, and for the want of these are not prepared to introduce prayer. We are not aware that they have been instructed to *exclude* it, and that is certainly the greater responsibility. But if we are to understand them as waiting for, and ready to carry out the wishes of the Society at large, they will not blame, but thank us for this effort, to promote the expression of public sentiment.

Now, we would respectfully submit it to the friends and patrons of the Bible Society, if the reasons assigned in this report are sufficient to justify the total absence and exclusion of prayer, from the meetings of that Society! Will they consent that this shall be and continue,

a prayerless Institution, because, 1. It has always been so; 2. The scriptures are read at its meetings, and 3. So few have ever advised or expressed a desire for a change?

Having answered these arguments, we might here rest the discussion, until others are advanced. But as we desire to present the question in its true light, we will pause to consider also some other objections, which may perhaps be urged against the introduction of prayer, and then try to redeem our pledge, and show that its omission and exclusion has "in it something intrinsically wrong."

1. Possibly there may be some "strict constructionists," who would plead, that as the "sole object of the Society is the circulation of the Holy Scriptures without note or comment," the introduction of prayer at its meetings would be foreign to its object, and an infringement upon the broad and Catholic plan of its organization. The managers have been careful to remind us, in the above report, of this "simple design" of the Society, and they argue from thence the appropriateness of opening its meetings with the reading of a portion of Scripture. Now, as it seems to us, "the sole object" of the Society is itself a strong argument in favour of prayer. If it was a railroad company or any merely secular association, it would be in keeping with the practice of such associations to proceed in their business with a prayerless disregard of God. But for a Society claiming to be religious, and having for its "simple design" the circulation of the Bible, to restrain and refuse prayer, is an anomaly; it is an incongruity. The very work itself should prompt a public and audible and constant recognition of him, who is the author of the Bible, upon whom, we are dependant for all our success in efforts to do good, and who in his word has so plainly made prayer obligatory upon all. Nor can prayer be justly regarded as the slightest infringement upon the constitution, or original plan of the Society. For the attainment of its "sole object" various means are employed, and in the selection of these means much is left to the discretion of the Society and its managers. Prayer, certainly, is no where prohibited. If the Society are to do nothing but print and circulate Bibles, by what authority do they print reports, circulars

and monthly records; by what authority send delegates all over the country to attend ecclesiastical meetings; by what authority hold anniversaries at all, hear speeches, and print them? These are all regarded as judicious means, for the advancement of the "sole object." But the most efficient, and least objectionable of all means, is prayer!

2. But it is known that the American Bible Society includes among its members the adherents of many and varied forms of religious faith and worship. And difficulties have been anticipated from this source, which constitute, in fact, the main objection to the introduction of prayer at its meetings.

In considering this objection we ought not to lose sight of the general fact, that sectarian peculiarities are less observable in the prayers of men, than in any other form of religious expression; and when prayer has a distinct and definite object, such as the success of a common enterprise, in behalf of which it is offered, there is little danger that these peculiarities would be obtruded. But as this objection is, after all, the grand hinge of the question, we must examine it more particularly.

This Society is composed of those belonging to the great Presbyterian family, in all its branches; of Congregationalists; of Methodists; of Baptists, a few; of Episcopalians; of members of the Society of Friends; of Unitarians; and of Universalists.

Now of these different denominations, the four first mentioned, constituting the great body of the Society, have the same mode of worship, and have always freely united, each with others, at the throne of grace, in behalf of any common object.

The Episcopalians employ forms of devotion, but we have yet to learn that they are bound to the use of forms on all occasions. We certainly have heard some of the most eminent among them freely depart from their use. There is at least no canon, as we suppose, to prevent their hearing, and uniting with others in extempore prayer. Nor do we think that Presbyterians and others would refuse to hear and unite with them in devout petitions, even though they used a form, when called upon to open the meetings of this Society, by prayer. But that their

peculiar mode of worship need be no hindrance to prayer on such occasions, is evident, because it does not prevent their union and cooperation with other Societies in which prayer is had. Some of their most honoured names are found among the members of the Tract, Sunday School, and Seamen's Friend Societies, all of whom open their meetings with prayer. We take up a report of the Tract Society, and find among its officers no less than four Right Reverends of the Episcopal Church, and numerous "other Clergy." We turn to the Constitution of that Society, and find as follows :

"ART. IX. All meetings of the Society, of the Board of Directors, and of the Executive Committee, *shall be opened by prayer.*" This settles the question as it respects the Episcopalians. As to the Friends, the case is very similar. To what extent they are the patrons of the Bible society, we do not know. That they would, to any considerable extent, withdraw their patronage on the introduction of audible prayer at its meetings, we do not believe. They also belong, in many instances, to other Societies in which prayer is had.

There remain then the Unitarians, and the Universalists. If any objection is heard from either of them, it will not be on account of the mode, but the sentiments which may be uttered in prayer. Their peculiar views, however, are not more likely to be controverted in this exercise, than in those which are already had. The doctrine of the Trinity is as clearly recognized, in the Christian doxology, and the apostolic benediction, as it is likely to be in any prayer offered on these occasions. Nor would any such prayer be more at variance with the idea of Universal salvation, than an argument for Bible distribution, drawn from the fearful condition of *perishing souls*. But on the other hand, the peculiar doctrines of these denominations might beget scruples in some minds about uniting with them in prayer. These objectionable doctrines, we should say, were not more apt to appear in a prayer than in a speech. If Dr. Channing, or Hosea Ballou, had been called upon, thus to open a meeting of the Bible Society, it is extremely doubtful if the most orthodox man in the house would have been able to discover, from that exercise, that the one was a

Unitarian, and the other a Universalist. Tender consciences ought to be tenderly regarded. But it might give rise to a question, whether a conscience too susceptible to hear a short prayer, from one who was regarded as heretical, once in the course of several years, at the opening of the Bible Society's meetings, and yet felt no disquiet at *the absence of all prayer* on those occasions, was not tender in the wrong spot. This is on the supposition that members of these unevangelical bodies must of necessity be called upon to officiate in prayer. But whence is there any such necessity? Upon what ground can any man claim to lead the devotions of such a Society, any more than he can claim to act as its Secretary or President? It belongs to the Society to elect its own officers, and through its officers, to determine who shall represent it on public occasions. But let us take the very worst aspect of the case. Suppose it is necessary, in order to retain their connection with the Society, that Unitarians and Universalists should, in turn with others, lead the devotions of the Society, and that it is out of the question for other denominations to unite with them in prayer, what then? Why, then, we are brought, at once, to grapple with the question, whether our platform of unity is not too broad! And the discovery, that those who are united in a religious enterprize cannot unite in one of the first and simplest duties of religion, we think would go far towards settling that question in the affirmative. There is a modern Catholicism whose praises are often "said and sung" in anniversary speeches, which seeks to bring into the most intimate relations those having only the most remote affinities. But if the bonds of such a union are too weak to withstand the breath of prayer, let it not be baptized by the name of Christian Unity; and if its object is the advancement of the Redeemer's Kingdom, the sooner the flaxen cords are consumed by the flame of devotion, the better it will be. Men may talk of the Bible Society as "*the true Evangelical Alliance*" and "*the embodiment of Christian Union*," but these can only be regarded as "high sounding words of vanity," if that "embodiment" has no tongue to acknowledge God, and invoke his blessing; and if that "Alliance" is rent and broken by the

voice of prayer, as would be a tottering building by the explosion of a bomb.

We do not believe that the introduction of prayer, at the meetings of this Society, would be followed by the withdrawal of any denomination from it. But we maintain that, if such should be the case, Evangelical Christians ought to submit to this result, rather than restrain prayer before God. His favour is of more worth than the contributions which would thus be lost. The exclusion of prayer, we regard as the sacrifice of principle to a worldly policy. And we believe it will be found the sentiment of many, that with respect to religious objects, there is no room for them upon a platform, however broad, if prayer must be crowded off.

This sentiment, of course, implies that there is, in the exclusion of prayer, "something intrinsically wrong."—We come, then, at length, to the proofs of this proposition.

And we argue that such exclusion is wrong, 1st. Because it gives occasion to unbelief for reproach against the Bible itself. This book is circulated not as a system of political or moral philosophy, but as the word of God; a revelation of his will and our duty, and able to make us wise into salvation. But, says the infidel, the book is defective. It fails to teach us the way of an acceptable approach unto God by prayer, and the proof is, that the very Society which circulates this book cannot themselves so agree about this duty as to practise it. It is not necessary this objection should be unanswerable. It is enough, if it is plausible, and it certainly has sufficient force to be among the most effective of the specious sophistries, by which unbelief resists the truth of God. By refusing to pray, the Society thus puts weapons into the hands of the enemies of the Bible itself.

2d. We argue that the practice of the Society is wrong, because it thus throws the whole weight of its influence and example into the scale against prayer in other societies and assembles of men. No Christian can fail to rejoice at any disposition to recognize God and His government among men assembled for merely secular or scientific purposes. It is a gratifying fact, that prayer is so common in literary institutions, in conventions of every sort, and in the halls of legislation. It was a truly sublime

scene, when the venerable Franklin stood up in that convention which framed the Constitution of these United States, and appealing to the Bible for proofs of a superintending Providence, moved that prayers be had in that assembly, invoking the blessing of God upon their labours, and his guidance through the labyrinth of political theories. Prayer was introduced, notwithstanding the diversities of religious sentiment far beyond what can be found in any Bible Society ; and to its introduction we owe, perhaps, the fair fabric of our free institutions. Congress and most of the State Legislatures, still open their daily sessions with prayer. And the signs of the times portend that possibly a crisis is at hand, which will call as loudly for help and guidance from on high, as that which drew forth the noble speech of a Franklin. But so far as the example and influence of the Bible Society goes, it it would be found opposed to prayer, and might be urged with tremendous effect, by those small politicians who annually distinguish themselves in our halls of legislation, by their patriotic speeches against prayer. We do not see how grave Senators and Representatives, members and officers of the Bible Society, could answer an appeal to such a precedent, without condemning the prayerless practice of that Society.

3d. Again, the practice of the Society, in this respect, is wrong ; because it is the duty of every Society, professing to be guided by the principles of the Bible, and having for its object the advancement of the Redeemer's Kingdom, to acknowledge God, and invoke His blessing upon its efforts. It is the object and design of the word, to lead us to the God of the word. Truth is in order to holiness, yet the truth is impotent in itself to effect moral changes. The Bible teaches us to "set the Lord always before us." And never should we be more deeply and thoroughly impressed with a sense of his sovereignty and our dependence, than when we seek to bring men to the saving knowledge of the truth. The Bible will do us little good, if we rest in the simple possession of "the letter." It will do little good to others, if not accompanied by the blessing of the Spirit. Though copies were multiplied like the leaves of the forest, and scattered to the four winds of Heaven, yet, without the power and de-

monstration of the Spirit, it would be in vain. But if we truly desire this blessing on the word, the direction is plain: "In every thing by prayer and supplications, with thanksgiving, let your requests be made known unto God." This command is universal; this duty is obligatory, not only upon individuals, but upon societies and associations, as such. "God will be inquired of for all these things, by the house of Israel, to do it for them."—That private Christians pray, does not exonerate Societies from this duty, any more than it exonerates the Church in her collective capacity. "Whatsoever ye do in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Jesus, giving thanks to God and the Father by Him." But is this precept obeyed when Christians and Christian Ministers assemble, from time to time, to transact business pertaining to the Kingdom of Christ; when hundreds of thousands of dollars are annually expended in printing and circulating Bibles; and thousands are gathered in the house of God to speak and to hear about the Bible and its diffusion; and yet all without one word of audible prayer or thanksgiving to God? Is there not "something intrinsically wrong," in thus excluding Jehovah from any public recognition, in his own appointed way, in that work which is peculiarly his own?

4th. The tendency of this exclusion of prayer, to secularize the whole enterprize, and make it to be regarded, both by those engaged in it and by the public, as a mere matter of business, is another and not the least of the objections against this practice.

But we have already exceeded our limits, and must forbear.

The original error of the American Bible Society, in this respect, is probably to be ascribed to a too close imitation of the British and Foreign Bible Society. And the friends of prayer have cause to regret that the effort made a year ago, in that noble institution, to introduce prayer at its meetings, has not been successful. We trust that effort will not be abandoned, but will ultimately result in the desired change. Let us set the worthy example to our trans-atlantic brethren. Though they have, perhaps, greater difficulties to encounter than we, yet even their faint-hearted will be encouraged, and their strong

men will gird themselves to a new endeavour, under such a provocation to good works. Let the voice of prayer go up from the Bible house, and it will invest, with a new and peculiar interest, that building ; and crown, with unwonted success, the councils and labours of its committees. Let the voice of prayer be heard at our Bible anniversaries, and it will give new power to every argument, new urgency to every appeal, new zeal to every effort, and new life and meaning to every pious resolution.

ARTICLE IV.

EDUCATIONAL POLICY OF SOUTH CAROLINA.

Education is too often considered a mere convenience, a thing which may be possessed or not, without seriously affecting the subject. As we are incapable of appreciating blessings and privileges which we have never enjoyed, so we adapt ourselves, with astonishing facility, to a state of intellectual dearth ; unconscious of the sublimer pleasures of those who enjoy the sweets of the inner life. And if we descend to the more material advantages of learning, the same cause precludes the possibility of a right appreciation of the positive wants of our condition. There is a general acknowledgement, that a man is better prepared to discharge the duties of a citizen, when the mind is matured by experience, and enlightened by knowledge, than while it exists merely in a state of uncultivated inactivity. Yet we see men discharging the responsible duties of parents and citizens, without knowing that any qualifications are necessary for these responsibilities ; and we have become so habituated to this state of things, that some persons, though I hope but few, whose position and reputation would lead us to expect better things, seriously affirm that "it makes no difference, so long as the persons themselves are unconscious of the difference between knowledge and ignorance, stupidity and wisdom." Nay ! it is even intimated that *more* knowledge would

be injurious, as it might render its recipients discontented with their present state! The effects of knowledge, and the legitimate consequences of education, are not appreciated. There must be somewhat of knowledge abroad, before any system of education can be permanently established, or successfully executed. The State, communities, individuals, must be taught to know something of the advantages they lose by the unconscious omission of a single duty, before we can expect to see that duty properly attended to. The Free School System of South Carolina has never given satisfaction to the people. The sum expended, though ridiculously small in comparison with that contributed by other States, is a source of constant discontent on the part of many tax payers, while the inefficiency of the system provokes constant animadversions from those whose standard of excellence is rather considered the ideal than the practical. Much has been said and written upon this subject; but the middle ground of reform, without revolution, has scarcely been assumed in theory, and certainly not in practice.

The bars which have existed, and which continue to exist, to this desirable result, consist in the fundamental error which is entertained upon the subject.

The Free School with us, means a *poor school*; and the educational appropriation of the State, is considered a charitable fund: so that any complaints as to the insufficiency of the amount, is met with what is considered a very pertinent argument, that "paupers should receive a bounty, ever so small, with all thankfulness." This summary mode of dismissing a grave responsibility, is consequent to the belief, that all knowledge, beyond the simplest elements, is a mere convenience or luxury, which the State is not bound to confer upon her citizens. The influence of this belief upon the conduct and action of the needy, is as deleterious as it is false; for while part spurn the bounty as a degrading patronage, others accept it only with that listless indifference which uniformly attends a systematic charity.

The preference between savage and civilized life, is scarcely a debatable question, and yet it embraces all that can be said, *pro* or *con*, upon the education of the masses.

If we take away a knowledge of metals, the discovery of whose properties depends entirely upon scientific investigations, we are reduced at once to the rude implements and arts of the red man; and it can scarcely be conceived what misery would be entailed upon us, if only the present agricultural utensils were suddenly exchanged for the wooden plough and stone axe.

The plough, the shovel and the spade, though simple and common place tools, are, no less, the embodiment of scientific truths, than are the steam engine and the electric telegraph.

The expansive and liquifying properties of heat, the fusibility and ductility of the ore, with its almost infinite capacity of refinement, have contributed to render one of the rude elements of the very earth, one of the most prolific sources of wealth and comfort to mankind. And yet these same elements lay dormant for uncounted centuries, upon the very hearth stone of the late occupants of this continent.

If we could suddenly withdraw from mankind the knowledge of the power of steam, society would scarcely feel a less shock, than if the earth itself should cease its daily revolution, and becloud us in the gloom of perpetual night. Millions would necessarily perish with hunger and cold, whilst the survivors must lead a life of unwonted labor and toil, taxing all their powers and all their resources for a scanty subsistence.

The savage boiled water in his earthen pot for centuries, unconscious that the vapour which escaped, bore upon its wings more wealth and comfort than has ever existed in savage life, could it all be condensed into one single community, or one single age. The properties of light, and the motions of the heavenly bodies, were long admired and gazed upon, without leading to any thing more practical than a mysterious and probably elevated idolatry. Some thought all knowledge of them impossible, whilst others substituted the most arbitrary speculation in the place of science, and called themselves doctors and expounders of natural laws to man, when they had declared the sun, moon and stars to be endowed with rational souls, and to be percipients by sense!

Modern science has changed the whole theory respect-

ing the mysterious wonders of the night, and though their light and heat are mere fractions in the aggregate of that which sustains animal life, yet they are made to chime the times and the seasons with never failing accuracy, and to measure distance with a scrupulous precision. With the science of Astronomy, the mariner is at home upon the broad and pathless sea, and looks for his time and his position, upon the broad bright dial plate of Heaven; without the fear of delusion, or the possibility of error. Ships laden with luxuries for the rich, comforts and necessities for the poor, follow to their respective havens these mysterious guides, as if drawn by some secret power and irresistible influence. Take away a knowledge of Astronomy, and millions of wealth would sink to the bottom of the ocean; and that which is now the highway and thoroughfare of nations, would become an everlasting barrier to communication and intercourse between the families of the earth. Science and knowledge are real and powerful productive agents: every item, from the most common place fact to the most sublime and abstruse, is a part of the great investment for mankind, which is rendering a daily per cent. It is impossible to interrupt any of those laws upon which science is based, or to take away any of the fruits of its discovery, without deranging the whole system of society, from head to foot, from king to cottager. The odious epithet of utilitarianism is scarcely sufficient to hush the demands for learning, even if we consider it in a physical point of view only; but we do not mean to confine ourselves to that alone.

The pursuit of wealth, for its own sake, may be denounced as mean and grovelling, but wealth itself must be considered an important element of civilized society: indeed it is a necessary antecedent to all improvement and progress. One could not better indicate a savage taste, than by professing a preference for the rude arts instead of those more elevated and refined. The hut is among the first indications of a better taste, but the splendid mansion is the embodiment of a noble idea of a cultivated mind. Though all Christians acknowledge that the acceptableness of worship depends upon the sincerity with which it is offered, still few are so gross as to prefer

the rude encampment to the comfortable, and even splendid Churches of the city. The Israelites were accepted of God while they worshipped in the Tabernacle, but that Tabernacle was in the wilderness. When they were settled in the Promised Land, and began to be considered one of the nations of the earth, it pleased God to dwell in a temple made with hands, and to receive their gifts from an altar overlaid with gold. The Jews might have preserved their institution until their Deliverer should come, without the temple and without the golden altar; yet it was natural and right that an improved condition should be acknowledged by visible signs. Science needs and demands visible embodiment. It struggles until some developement is made; and when that developement is wealth, it matters not whether the embodiment be a splendid temple or a simple machine, whether it be the sublime work of Michael Angelo, Handel or Mozart, or the simple ballad of the wandering minstrel; whether it be a plough or a spade, a telescope or a magnetic telegraph, an invention or discovery in physics, or a truth in religion and morals; all are the interest from the common fund of mind and science, to which the whole human family, all the stockholders, have an equal right; and to whom the interest is intended to be of solid use, something necessary for them to use in working out their destiny—not one item is intended, so far as we can judge from analogy, for mere luxury.

If we turn to morals and religion, the same reasoning seems to forbid our striking out a single truth. It is in this department that education seems to be of the most essential importance. For with all the grandeur and emolument which learning could bestow, man would be poor indeed, without the culture and maturity of those seeds of the inner life with which every one finds himself possessed. There is a popular doctrine that morality is a relative term, which adjusts itself to the condition of man in every state. As this is a question which is to be settled at a distant period, and in another world, the absolute importance of establishing a standard, is considered highly questionable. The heathen, says this doctrine, cannot be judged by the same law with the Christian; and as we see around us those who are but little ele-

vated above heathenism, it is charitable at least, if not just, to presume that some degree of lenity or mitigation of the law, will be extended to them. If we could be sophistical enough to pursue this reasoning to its legitimate consequences, we could easily conclude that all this ado, about enlightening the world, is an act of learned cruelty, a wanton imposition upon the rest of mankind of the hard tribute which zealots themselves have to pay for their boasted superiority. If these heathen or semi-heathen were in a better condition, the laws of Society and public opinion would demand of them the adoption of a higher standard of moral excellence, and the State would expect a more rigid adherence to her statutes. But as they are, society demands nothing, and the State expects nothing; and to avoid the disagreeable necessity of rendering a man more culpable before God, and of imposing upon him greater exactions from man, it is thought advisable to let him rest in a state which, to say the least, he is content with, and which is uncertain in its final consequences. We have often heard of the luxury of doing good, but it has been reserved to modern lights to discover the luxury of doing evil.

The presumption of this reasoning is not only that we are the salt of the earth, but that this salt is either sufficient in quantity or quality to prevent total putrefaction. This latter fact, however, has never been ascertained; and the presumption from reason is, that God gave the same law and makes the same requisitions of all rational creatures; and His revealed will establishes this presumption of reason. If we grant that some discrimination will be finally made in the general judgment, this by no means implies the right in us to construct the platform upon which that discrimination is to be made. Natural religion is based upon the intellect, and its requisitions are coextensive with the powers of the mind. Man is certainly not fulfilling his moral destiny upon this basis, so long as the mind is uncultivated. If he is left to discover his duties to God and man by the dim light of reason, that reason should be trained to its utmost vigor, so that the character might be allowed to rest upon it, with the confiding recumbency of the Christian's faith. And this should be the case with individuals. We are not speak-

ing for the necessity of a learned caste. If a sound mind and cultivated intellect are necessary in the aggregate, they are necessary in the particulars. A learned State with an ignorant populace is an idea as propostitious as a wealthy State with a population of beggars. The right of private interpretation was the great doctrine set forth by the Reformation; and anything short of the ability to interpret the precepts and principles of morals, is religious beggary and moral destitution. To say that a little mind may employ many hands, may be true in physics,—or rather we might safely grant this in physics, without the risk of losing our cause. But, in morals, even upon the low supposition of natural religion, such a thought is absurd. Somewhat of mental strength is necessary to graft the truths, lessened and attenuated as they must be by interpreters and commentators, to say nothing of the right, nay duty, of private interpretations, and of the positive, absolute necessity of one's relying upon his understanding. Now if mental cultivation is necessary to man in a state of nature; if morals cannot be understood without the illumination of reason, under an uninspired dispensation; we have but to ask, what avails an inspiration, whose threats and promises, whose principles and precepts, are all engraven in mysterious and unintelligible characters, not one line of which is lit by any visible truth, or radiant with one speaking promise? "Go to the interpreters," you say. But suppose I misunderstand the interpreters,—“You are as well off as others, for the wisest sometimes err,” say you. Then are we all included, not only under sin, but under ignorance too, and there can be no moral distinction or difference arising from superior cultivation. A conclusion which I cannot adopt until I have considered a little more closely.

But it is conceived impossible so to educate society, that all shall act from an enlightened perception of truth; and so it may be. But an indefinite approximation to that perfection, is what is reasonably to be expected, and it is the duty of communities and States so to provide the means of education, that their citizens may be in a state of progress. It may be said that the world and society have existed, and *gotten along very well*,

for many centuries with a mere fraction of the inhabitants being educated. The learned have dictated to the ignorant their duties, and in some cases have been wisely obeyed; but when causes of difference have arisen, most disastrous have been the consequences, breaking forth in the wildest and most bloody revolutions. How much better for mankind, that all should have been swayed at all times by an enlightened reason, and cultivated feelings—in other words, that *all* should have been educated. The world and society existed many centuries, in profound ignorance of steam, the magnetic needle, electricity, and many of the useful arts. Many States were exalted to the loftiest pinnacle of glory and renown, famed alike for their grandeur and learning, whilst they could not be compared in either respect with many a modern village. Who would think of turning back to adopt the laws of life cherished and obeyed by the ancients, but would not rather ridicule their simple childishness? “We are the ancients, and those who have gone before us mere children.” Let this be so in morals, as well as physics. Do not say that we have steam and the telegraph, and are therefore satisfied. We must have a better, as well as a richer and more convenient world; morals must advance, and in this as well as other sciences. “No invention or discovery will ever be made, upon which the author can stand, and lift up his proud head and exclaim, I have found the last miracle of the miracle-working God!”

Education is in no case a mere luxury or convenience; it is absolutely essential to the physical and moral prosperity of a community; and we add further, that the intellectual wealth of a community consists in the aggregate of individual wealth. *A learned State with an ignorant population is preposterous.*

Thus much being said in behalf of individual cultivation, it is scarcely necessary to say that we consider it the duty of every State and community, thoroughly to educate their citizens,—to prepare them to use the investment of wisdom and experience which has been so long accumulating for them. Some efficient means should be adopted to bring education within the reach of every subject, that his mind may be enlightened to discover the

principles of life upon which he is compelled to act, that he may not be driven on as the brute beast to the blind discharge of the lofty functions of a citizen, without being capable of understanding the reasonableness or appreciating the advantages of compliance.

Has the present system of education in South Carolina the elements of so glorious a result? After a serious examination of the subject, and without any desire or inclination to confer indiscriminate blame upon what has been done, we must conclude that it has no such elements. The principles upon which the system is based, preclude the possibility of perfection; and its practical operation is hopelessly inefficient. In saying this, I do not mean to question the wisdom of its founder, for wisdom may consist in a judicious management of the circumstances. But the question for us to answer is, has the time not arrived when judicious changes may be wrought and modifications introduced, which may result in great practical good? We think it has.

The present system is avowedly charitable. The appropriation made by the State is intended for the poor, and the poor alone. And this objectionable feature is not so reprehensible from the fact that it is a charity, as from the additional fact that it is intended for *paupers*. Charitable institutions are not so obnoxious to the recipients, when the hand of the donor is concealed. Hence, those establishments which owe their existence to persons deceased, frequently succeed, and are the means of great usefulness. Permanent investments for the education of orphans, are living and speaking monuments of a great and noble idea, which had more than a transient existence in the mind of the donor. But these investments have the double advantage of bestowing good upon a comparatively unconscious subject, and of tendering it from a concealed hand. The bounty of the State is offered to grown men, to parents, from the authorized hand of the State, the commissioner. The circumstances and character of the recipient must necessarily undergo a scrutinizing investigation, in order to ascertain the justice and propriety of his claim; and we need not wonder, that pride, if not modesty, prevents many from making application, or even from putting themselves in the way

of having it offered to them. It is quite immaterial and impertinent to the question to say, that this is a foolish and unwise manifestation of dignity. The prejudice exists, and prevents success under the present arrangement. Our duty is with society as it exists, and not with an imaginary state of that society. Our poor are not in the condition of paupers, and they must not be treated as such. A pauper needs relief, needs to be sustained, and reclines upon relief for its own sake; he does not step upon it as upon firmer ground, from which to renew action. Our poor are not conscious of needing relief; and those who are seeking foothold for vigorous action, are too self-relying to accept charity; while those who do accept, on the other hand, treat it as most paupers do their income, with thankless indifference.

This is the effect of our system upon the poor; upon the persons for whom it is avowedly intended. This prominent charity-feature will forever prevent any extended good, not to mention perfection. But this feature has another deleterious effect which would prove fatal to success, even if the difficulty respecting acceptance could be obtained. Subjects of charity, paupers, have no right to prescribe, or even suggest, the quality or quantity of the gift to be bestowed. The State is not able to afford the means of complete education to all her subjects. She consequently adopts the principle of all charitable associations, whose object is relief, viz:—that the amount of good is to be measured by the number relieved. The fund being necessarily limited, the standard of excellence, if I may use such a word with respect to our schools, is measured by an economy, bordering on parsimony. The question is not what grade of schools shall be established, nor what capacity the teachers shall possess, but how many schools can be established, and who will undertake the business of teaching at the most reduced rates. The number being determined, they are, to all intents and purposes, left to the lowest bidder. Men who are idle and worthless are most apt to be out of business, and they naturally crowd, from the mere press of famine, under the scanty droppings from the miserable shed of charity. The numbers consume the supply, while good and competent teachers stand in the

market place all the day idle, saying "no man hath hired us." Reading and writing, it is supposed, can be taught by any one who can read and write, and why should a high price be paid for an educated gentleman to take charge of the education of youth, when all the *practicals* of an education could be secured at a cheaper rate? It is convenient to be able to read and write, and it is even useful to be able to calculate interest; and these branches compassing the whole idea of free school education, any expenditure reaching beyond these almost mechanical operations, is considered wanton extravagance, and its advocates visionary idealists. Pauperism is the basis of our system; *relief* is its object; and cheapness, which is often the very worst economy, is its ruling spirit. And, notwithstanding these facts, the complaint is almost universal, that so few persons are disposed to adopt teaching as a profession. Even persons who pay for the education of their children, constantly complain that they are so badly taught. And in these very conversations, which generally arise upon the employment of a new teacher, they are endeavoring to beat down the *contractor*, telling him that they have already offered him more than he could realize as a carpenter or plough-boy. It was once said by a distinguished educationist, that if teachers were wicked enough to desire revenge, they could reap it most effectually upon refractory boys, by allowing them to have their own way; and it really seems as if teachers had resolved upon this method of rebuking the stupidity and folly of these short sighted parents. They have left them to employ teachers at their own prices, to take charge of the education of youth, while they have adopted one of the *learned* professions; knowing, at the same time, that the amount of crime and disease which must necessarily ensue from a defective, if not vicious education, will ensure them a rich harvest of wealth, and a still more glorious one of fame and renown.

A low state of popular education and morals, is a poor starting point for progress and improvement. As in those critical cases in the practice of medicine, in which disease has so reduced the patient, as to prevent the use of strong remedies—stimulants and palliatives must be

tried alternately, until reaction takes place, affording capacity for legitimate remedies. Teachers must labour, not only in their schools, but in the parents' houses, bring to light the unseen or unacknowledged importance of learning upon the character and destiny of their offspring; teaching them to believe that education is more than a convenience, and learning more than a luxury. That they have not only a permanent and decided effect upon the physical comfort and respectability of men; but that they have, at the same time, a far-reaching and untold influence upon the moral destiny, both of men and nations, a computation of which can only be made in the everlasting balance of Eternity. Public opinion must be aroused. Conversation, lectures, the press, must all be enlisted in this cause. Let teachers magnify their office, and their office will magnify them, both in substance and honor. Let the importance of good morals and respectable citizenship be fairly understood and appreciated, and those persons who alone are capable of teaching will be employed to instil the requisite principles in the minds of the young. In proportion to the importance attached to the subject, will be the remuneration of its devotees; and in proportion to the remuneration, will rise the respectability of the class, both in character and intellectual capacity, until we shall see the *business* of teaching numbered among the *learned* professions.

It is easy to point out defects in any system, but difficult to suggest remedies; and when suggested, remedies are not easily applied. There is a proclivity in error, which adds force and weight to all its movements, and stubbornness in all its opposition to truth and reform. It is much easier to travel round in the beaten track, than to clear a new and more direct path. But notwithstanding all the generalities which may be urged in support of old establishments and tried institutions, we shall attempt to propose some changes, which we consider of essential importance in the improvement of our educational system.

And in order to meet the difficulties of a system at once expensive and poverty-stricken—too costly for the people and too parsimonious for the teacher—a system,

partial both in its application to numbers, and in the range of studies embraced, we propose specific taxation for the establishment and support of *Common Schools*. (We greatly prefer the name, Common School, to that of Poor or Free School.) We are aware that this has been proposed by other, and, perhaps, more experienced persons; but so far as their views have been examined, their main idea seems to have been, to improve the schools for the poor. So deeply seated is this notion of charity, that it pervades all schemes and propositions upon the subject. Every one professes to be interested in the cause of popular education, because every one wishes to be considered a charitable man. Taxation is odious; it is below par, on the stump and in the musterfield, and our political stock-jobbers are not desirous of making investments in such precarious capital. The whole labour of making this doctrine popular, rests upon those who are removed from the influence of the popular voice. But if it can be proved to be cheap and profitable, if the people can be induced to believe that their interest will be promoted by a system of taxation, our Statesmen, whose masters are the people, will not be long in imbibing lessons of practical wisdom upon the subject; and that zeal and talent which is now so lavishly bestowed upon the great questions, important crisis, and deplorable tendencies of the times, will be turned into the meaner channels of useful, practical, domestic legislation. That deep and profound interest, so often professed for the people upon the floor of our State House, will be ripened into action at home; and the mind of that dear constituency, for which so much dear regard is manifested, will be enlightened upon subjects in which they are really and personally interested. It is proposed to shew some of the advantages of specific taxation upon the character of our schools and teachers.

Our schools are distinctly divided into three classes; which division does not depend upon one single principle which should authorize a classification of schools. They are not primary, secondary, and high school, according to the progress and capacity of the pupils, but each school combines the elements of the three, with the sole distinction of *pay, less pay, and no pay*. The first class

comprises our best schools. The patronage of the rich in South Carolina, is sufficient to sustain institutions of the very highest order; and there is but one reflection which can mar the pride which all good citizens must feel in these establishments, and that is, the fact that they are not unfrequently reared upon the ruin of many excellent neighborhood schools, which, though not so imposing in numbers and display, might have afforded the means of education to a large circle of children, whose circumstances, not of poverty, but of mediocrity, have doomed them to obscurity and ignorance, if not to vice and misery. These institutions concentrate the wealth, talent, and influence of a large circle into a single locality, thus producing a decided effect for good. They insure a good education to a large number of those whose position will entitle them to influence. But the tuition fees of these establishments are, necessarily, high—beyond the reach, not only of the poor, but of the middle classes. So that all that light and beauty which they shed around them, do, not unfrequently, discover within their own precincts, objects of hopeless and helpless ignorance. We do not wish to be considered as finding fault with the founders and supporters of these institutions. They have grown up from the necessity of our circumstances, from the imperfect organization of our present educational system. They are the instruments of great good in elevating the standard of education throughout the State, but we cannot fail to see the defect, which has caused their establishment, and which their existence must, to some extent, increase.

The second class of schools is highly respectable; they are as good as the nature of circumstances will allow. The tuition is generally graded according to the means or wealth of the citizens; they are necessarily crowded, in order to afford an income sufficient to secure the services of a competent teacher, and there is a constant struggle, between the possibility of his living upon his quarterage upon the one hand, and of his sustaining the labour on the other. Having a large number of pupils, of all ages, and stages of advancement, his classes are multiplied to an indefinite number. Toil as he may, he finds his ability limited at least by time, and when the

closing day bids him cease from work, he not unfrequently leaves off, with the painful consciousness of having been compelled to hasten, when time and deliberation were essential to success. It is not surprising, that after a few years of this unsatisfactory drudgery, he should try some other profession. His successor is told, that the late principal was a very good teacher in some things, but that he neglected the English branches. He never taught Philosophy, Chemistry or History. Some children went the whole year without learning to read. But it is not remembered, that he had three or four Greek and Latin classes, besides others in Mathematics, Geography, Grammar, &c.—that these classes paid double the fee that was paid by the younger children; that the parents or trustees had never thought it necessary to furnish the academy with a single globe, map, or any article of apparatus, which would have been indispensable in teaching the very rudiments of the sciences. The defects in the teaching are remembered, but the difficulties, nay, impossibilities with which he had to contend, are forgotten, by all but himself. His remembrance of them causes him to congratulate himself upon the adoption of another profession.

But if these schools afforded the means of education to all classes of children, we might congratulate ourselves upon the prospect of final success. Time, and the gradual improvement in the condition of the people, would probably enable them to improve the character of these schools. But unfortunately the tuition fees are beyond the means of a large number of persons, who are, at the same time, not upon the list of paupers. These persons are reduced to the necessity of sending only a portion of their children, at a time, and *for a time*, which latter circumstance precludes the possibility of a thorough education. After a few years of alternate, nominal attendance upon school, these children find themselves men and women, in every respect, saving knowledge, wisdom and cultivation. In this imperfect state, scores of families are annually turned out upon society, to repeat the same process of propogating ignorance and bad morals. These schools do not afford the means of education to the middle classes. What is to become of the poor? It is scarcely necessary

to add anything to what has been already said respecting the position of this unfortunate class in our educational system.

We have said that our schools are not classed according to the age and advancement of pupils. The serious inconvenience to the teacher, and the great disadvantage in point of improvement to the pupils, are not the only serious objections to this arrangement. There are others of a high moral character, which every one at all acquainted with academical education, ought to be able fully to appreciate. It was a custom with the ancients, founded upon the soundest philosophy and the most enlarged experience, to educate children, as children, youth as youth, and young men as young men. They rose from the first to the second, from the second to the third rank, as they were respectively prepared, intellectually and morally. A child should speak as a child, and act as a child, that when he becomes a man he may put away childish things. But the present system with us causes children to speak like men in their nonage, and act like children in riper years. The older pupils have grown up under all the disadvantages of a system of discipline necessarily imperfect, while the younger, tender, impressible, and naturally imitative, consider it a virtue to ape and pattern all their vicious deformities. The vices of profanity, obscenity, vulgarity, and an affected indifference to the sacred precepts of religion and morality, are repeated and propagated through every school generation with fearful and distressing facility. These are the common and prevailing vices of the young; they begin in the school, become habits in youth, and tainting manhood, they pave the way to those crimes, which have wrung so many parents' hearts with grief, and sent their gray hairs with sorrow to the grave. How often has the wrong school, and improper associates, proved fatal to the peace and happiness of a whole family, by proving the ruin of one boy, who, had he been retained, but a few more years with his equals, might have acquired strength sufficient to give tone and direction to the impulses of his associates? Teachers can more easily discern and fully appreciate these perils, than can any parent, and they can reckon with a little

more accuracy, that economy which crowds pupils of all ages together, with that popular, but reckless maxim, "it is an ordeal he will have to pass through."

Classify the schools properly, and proper discipline can be enforced, and moral influence, adapted to the capacity of pupils, can be easily and seasonably resorted to.—Young men will laugh at the simplicity of that moral influence which is necessary for children, and children cannot understand that which is intended for their elders. The discipline adapted to the state of childhood, will be resisted by those who have early learned the precepts of manhood, though they may not yet have begun to act according to them.

Specific taxation for public schools, is a means by which these defects may be partially, if not wholly remedied. In the first place, there must be a common interest in the schools; and I know of no means more effectual, to bring about this state of feeling, than that of requiring every citizen to contribute a portion of his substance for the establishment and support of the school in that neighborhood in which his property happens to be located. All the corporate towns of the State could easily raise a fund by a tax upon the assessable property, sufficient to support a school of the very highest order. If the children were grouped together in these public schools, which should be open and entirely free to all citizens, both rich and poor, they could be classified upon reasonable principles, and instruction, both in books and morals, could be adapted to the capacity of the various classes. The talents and acquirements of highly educated teachers would not be wasted upon the elementary branches, which can be as well, if not better, taught by persons of ordinary acquirements. It is not the number of pupils which increases the labor of the teacher, so much as the number of classes. If it were possible for each teacher to select his pupils, he might increase his numbers to almost any extent, and still teach with more satisfaction to himself and profit to his pupils, than is possible under the present arrangement. Allow the schools to be classified, and the number of teachers will be diminished by at least one-third of their present number. As the numbers decrease, the pay will increase, and the character of those who

assume the teacher's office, will be consequently elevated. Fewer teachers, with a better income, would be a saving to the community; and the consequent elevation of the profession, would produce a moral and intellectual effect upon society, entirely beyond the bounds of calculation.

It is scarcely necessary to mention that one great defect in our Free School System, consists in the entire absence of any approach to gradation. Pauper establishments have this feature in common—they never contemplate elevation—it is all for relief. The private school system is encumbered with the same defect. The parent selects the school according to his means, and to whatever grade this consideration consigns the boy, to that he is doomed by an inexorable necessity. This fact quenches all noble emulation, and consigns the aspirations of many a noble mind to the contracted sphere of his father's competency. As soon as a boy finds himself at the head of his class, or the first in the school, he has nothing beyond to which he may look as the stimulus to new exertions, and reward of new victories. The middle classes have but little to aspire to, the poor have nothing. Mind, with which God has been pleased to endow man as a peculiar gift, representative of his own image, though immaterial, immortal, and of indefinite capacity, is, to all practical purposes, measured by the table of federal money; and men, called wise upon other subjects, gaze listlessly on, avowing a deep interest in the matter, but really regarding the present system of education as one of the necessary conventions of the present state of society. It is said that it was never intended that man should be equal, that the curse of God rests upon a portion of mankind, and it is impious to attempt to relieve it, or even to mitigate its severity. The curse of God has rested upon the whole human family, since the fall of Adam; but it was thought worthy of the Son of God, himself, to descend from Heaven to redeem us from that curse. The vengeance of God is truly a terrible thing, but when man sees fit to constitute himself the interpreter and executive of that vengeance, into how many channels of cruelty does he make the blood and substance of his fellow-man to flow. If God has cursed a man with poverty, is there reason in making that the badge of infamy, vice, and all

the ills which human nature is heir to? Natural misery is sufficient. Let us banish the whole host of artificial woes, with which society saddles itself, as if with an excess of cruelty. Let mind be placed, so far as practicable, upon equal privilege, and let the stock of each individual develope itself according to its powers; and it will go forth into the world, under the high sanction of its Creator, to relieve the severity of man's hard lot, and to mitigate the curse under which he groans.

It is suggested that common schools be established in the towns, because they would be more apt to succeed in densely populated communities. The example would, doubtless, be imitated by all the best neighborhoods. It should not be objected that this plan is partial, that it does not contemplate the education of the poor, throughout the country. The question is, would it not be much less partial than the present system? The towns have a perfect right to tax themselves, under their corporations, for improvements within their limits, and for what purpose could funds be better applied, than the education of the citizens? And we hope it will be remembered that this taxation would prove infinitely cheaper than the present system: that all the children both rich and poor, would be better educated, and for less money. The facilities for educating their children, would cause the poor to seek permanent mechanical business in the towns, instead of that precarious and half predatory existence which they now perpetrate, in what is poetically styled, their quiet home in the country. In the mean time, the present appropriation should be continued, to administer relief to those to whom nothing better can be offered. It should be remembered that this plan is not recommended for the benefit of the poor, but for the good of all. A grade of schools with proper classifications, would enable teachers to introduce more studies, and to afford such a variety as would annihilate the most stubborn and cruel of all difficulties, that of compelling boys to continue the prosecution of branches for which they have neither talents or tastes.

We do not desire to be understood as condemning the whole system of education in the State. The policy which the State has adopted, respecting the College, can-

not be too much admired. Though other States may boast of their schools, few can boast of a policy so wise and liberal as has been adopted by South Carolina, for sustaining a high standard of learning. The better class of citizens have every facility which wealth and liberality can afford. And sending out, annually, a large number of well educated gentlemen, the College continues to be a great luminary in our midst. The schools have shared largely in its influence, for many of her alumni are now sedulously devoting themselves to the business of teaching. If the schools can be so elevated as to command the services of those gentlemen permanently, if teaching can be made a profession rather than a business, we shall congratulate ourselves with having compassed our high and noble purpose without more ostentatious parade than was necessary to do the work. Let us have the public schools, and we promise to crowd our *Alma Mater* with students which she, ever true to herself, will return prepared to shed new light and influence upon her and the State at large; and under a system so deeply seated, and so eminently popular, we may expect a flood of intellectual light to pervade our State, only to be compared in effect to the meeting of the great tides of the ocean, which bears before its resistless current, every let, hindrance or impediment.

I cannot leave this subject without noticing an objection which is often urged against common schools. It is constantly urged, and with that peculiar absence of all reflection which characterizes those who exchange a popular cant, that these schools would be nurseries of vice—that the children of the better citizens would be contaminated by their association with those whose parents are gross and mean. If we could be induced to believe that the moral defect would be greater in a public school, where children of the same age and capacity are sent together, than that of a private school, where one profane or obscene boy (whatever may have been his opportunities and inducements to be otherwise,) may, like a plague spot, taint all those below him in age, we would be the last to propose a change so fatal, and so much to be deplored. We are not alarmists, nor has it ever been a pleasure to us to rob the humblest individual of any of

that complacency and satisfaction with which he may contemplate his condition or good fortune; but how often is it the sad and humiliating lot of the teacher to see manifested in those very boys, whose home education has been every thing that could be desired, the very worst feelings, principles and tendency. The truth is, that children are, by nature, alike; and it is the business of education to correct their evil tendencies. In order to do this, they should be placed in the most advantageous position—they cannot be worsted by being removed from an association with those whose superiority in age is only marked by superiority in vice.

But suppose all the objections against public schools, upon moral grounds to be valid. Is nothing due to society from the wise and good? Will this salt of the earth preserve the State, if it be kept garnered up to prevent its waste or deterioration? The same objections have been repeated in other communities, but have been wisely and seasonably met. The patrons of the private school plead the moral necessity of sustaining it, because they say some of the children in the public school are so addicted to profanity or obscenity, so prone to trickishness or to vulgar and mischievous habits, as to render a removal of their own children from such contaminating influences an obligatory precaution. But would such objectors bestow that guardian care, that parental watchfulness upon the common schools, which an institution so wide and deep-reaching in its influences, demands of all intelligent men, might not these repellent causes be mainly abolished? Reforms ought to be originated and carried forward by the intelligent portion of society; by those who can see most links in the chain of causes and effects; and that intelligence is false to its high trusts, which stands aloof from the labor of enlightning the ignorant and ameliorating the condition of the unfortunate. And what a vision must rise before the minds of all men, endued with the least glimmer of foresight, in the reflection, that after a few swift years, those children whose welfare they now discard, and whose associations they deprecate, will constitute more than five-sixths of the whole body of that community, of which their own children will be only a feeble minority, vulnerable at every point, and utterly inca-

pable of finding a hiding place for any earthly treasure, where the witness, the juror, and the voter, cannot reach and annihilate.

ARTICLE V.

REMARKS ON 1 COR: xv. 32.

The apostle devotes a preceding portion of this chapter to an exhibition of the consequences that would result from a well sustained denial of the resurrection of the body. He affirms, that if he and the Christians of Corinth had no good reasons to expect such an event, the means of grace would be entirely useless, their hope unfounded, and their sufferings in the present life would render them of all men most wretched and miserable. If no subsequent reward awaited Paul, why did he so fearlessly encounter the prejudices of the Jewish mind and the learning of heathen philosophers, and, passing through scenes at which our fortitude would recoil, endure with equanimity and patience the greatest perils by land and sea? "If after the manner of men I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me if the dead rise not?"

One who is at all familiar with the expressions of the apostle cannot fail to observe that he makes frequent allusions to the prevalent customs of Greeks and Romans. Among the latter it was common to conduct malefactors and criminals into their theatres and amphitheatres and condemn them to fight with lions, bears, tigers and elephants; for which every part of the Roman empire was industriously ransacked.* While thus engaged they were exposed to the gaze of large and excited assemblies. The wild animals, instigated to madness by the shouts and

* ——— Quodcunque tremendum est
Dentibus aut insigne jubis aut nobile cornu
Aut rigidum setis capitur, decus omne timorque
Sylvarum, non caule latent non mole resistunt. *Claudian.*

missive darts of spectators, attacked their combatants* so suddenly and fiercely that they were compelled to employ weapons of war in defence of their lives.

We are informed by Eusebins, that Attalus, a Christian, was led round the amphitheatre and exposed to the insults and violence of the multitude. There is a striking passage in Philo where, by the same strong imagery, Flaccus is represented deploring the public ignominy to which he was reduced.

From this sanguinary custom and its attendant trials, the apostle derives an impressive illustration of the sufferings to which the Christians of Palestine, and he himself, had submitted for the sake of the gospel. The former were made a gazing-stock and endured a great fight of afflictions,† and he says of himself, at Ephesus, *εθηριομαχησα*, I have fought with beasts.

The phrase *κατα ανθρωπον* is equivalent to the latin one, *humanitus loquendo*. It occurs in the epistle to the Galatians; "brethren, I speak after the manner of men:"‡ and in the first epistle to the Corinthians; "do I speak these things as a man?"||

As used in the present connexion it intimates that the succeeding words are to be understood in a figurative sense, and creates a strong probability that Paul did not actually contend with wild beasts at Ephesus. Besides this presumption, we shall state several facts which show the necessity of a metaphorical interpretation. The apostle was a Roman citizen, and it is improbable that he would be exposed to sufferings so cruel in a city where his parentage and privileges must have been known. Luke gives an account of the travels, labors and perils of Paul, but does not mention that he was really forced to fight with wild beasts. The apostle does not more fully explain, in any other epistle, what he here means; this is the only place where his fighting with beasts is distinctly mentioned. Had such an event occurred it would in all probability have been recorded and fully explained by both Luke and Paul. The apostle could not well have survived so great a trial; for those criminals who

* These were called, *bestiarii*.

† Heb. x. 32, 33.

‡ iii. 15.

|| ix. 8.

escaped without harm from the wild beasts were compelled to fight with men till they expired.

The scriptures abound in bold and striking figures. They often employ metaphors to denote the violent passions of wicked men and persecutors. The Psalmist said that his soul was among lions, even the sons of men, whose teeth are spears and arrows. He besought that God would break their teeth in their mouths; break out their great teeth, O God. Herod is called a fox. Hypocrites are called wolves in sheep's clothing. Rapacious and mercenary ministers are styled, wolves not sparing the flock. Paul uses a harsh metaphor to express the malice of his adversaries; beware of dogs. In his epistle to Titus, he describes the Cretans by a quotation from Epimenides, one of their own poets, who said, the Cretans are always liars, slow bellies, evil beasts *κακα θηρια*.

From this induction of facts it seems reasonable to infer that the apostle employed the strong phraseology, in the passage under consideration, for the purpose of conveying to the minds of the Corinthians an idea of the violence and ferocity of his adversaries at Ephesus. They were furious and fierce as untamed and enraged animals, and therefore, he compares his contest with them to the common theatrical conflict with wild beasts.

Similar expressions were used, by those who spoke and wrote in the Greek language, in regard to those that would not yield to arguments and evidence, to wicked persons and Satan himself.

Josephus calls Herod the great, a murderous wild beast. Theophylact says that Paul refers to his contest with the Jews and with Demetrius, for how did these differ from wild beasts? When Ignatius was carried from Syria to Rome, he says, he fought with wild beasts, both by sea and land, both night and day, being bound to ten leopards, that is to say, to such a band of soldiers. Theophylact calls a certain publican, a wicked beast. Lucian speaking of philosophers says of himself; I am not to fight with ordinary wild beasts but with men insolent and hard to be convinced. Another writer represents a certain city as composed of wild beasts, rather than men. Heraclitus says: The Ephesians are turned into beasts, because they slew one another. Clemens Alexandrinus

says ; you will escape the temptation of that wild beast (Satan) if your heart is pure and free from all blame.

Another argument, in favor of the figurative interpretation of the passage before us, may be drawn from the known character of the inhabitants of Ephesus. This city was the principal mart, as well as the metropolis, of the Proconsular Asia. It had a fine prospect to the west, of a lovely plain, covered with groves of tamarisk, and watered and embellished by the mazy windings of the Cayster. Pliny called it the ornament of Asia. According to Josephus, the Jews were very numerous there, and obtained the privileges of citizenship—as Ephesus was governed by its own laws. The entire population was not less than six hundred thousand souls. This city is supposed to have “first invented those obscure mystical spells or charms, by means of which people pretended to heal diseases and expel evil spirits.” Hence originated the *Εφεσια γραμματα* so often mentioned by the ancients. Indeed the inhabitants were so addicted to idolatry and the arts of magic that the prince of darkness would seem to have at one time established his throne there.* We learn from the Acts that, in consequence of the abundant labors and success of the apostle in this city, magical books, to the value of more than thirty thousand dollars, were burned by the converted Ephesians.

Ephesus was renowned on account of its famous temple of Diana—one of the seven wonders of the world. Pliny states that it was 425 feet in length, 220 in breadth, adorned with columns, each 60 feet high, and that 220 years elapsed during its construction.† Ctesiphon, Scopas and Praxiteles were employed in planning, sculpturing and adorning it with masterly performances.

The “great Diana of the Ephesians,” was a small statue of ebony, believed to have been sent down from heaven by Jupiter. This goddess was worshipped in the days of Isaiah and Jeremiah, under the name of Meni. But Ephesus was, beyond all other places, devoted to the worship of Diana ; and a considerable traffic was carried on there in making models of the temple, with the image of the goddess enshrined in them, which the silversmiths

* Eph. ii. 2.

† Lib. xxxvi. cap. 14.

sold to foreigners. This explains the clamor of the inhabitants on a certain occasion, "great is Diana of the Ephesians."

Now since the apostle reasoned with these idolatrous and superstitious men, (whose gain was increased by maintaining and propagating their opinions,) and discovered that they were not willing to yield but rather inclined to contend with and injure him; it is not strange that he should employ strong language whenever he referred to their disposition and conduct. They had a vehement zeal for their lucrative religion. But owing to the success of the gospel, they were likely to be deprived of employment and means of subsistence. The splendid temple and the magnificent apparatus with which Diana was worshipped, were about to sink into neglect and contempt; and they were so enraged that they seized the companions of Paul, (and would have taken Paul too, if they had met with him,) and ushered them into the theatre, intending to throw them to the wild beasts. This circumstance furnished the apostle with abundant evidence of their hatred to him, because he declaimed against idolatry, by which they were kept in employment and accumulated wealth. He had good reasons for using strong metaphors to express their ferocity and rage. To this contest with Demetrius, he doubtless alludes in the second epistle to the Corinthians. Describing a trouble which came to him in Asia, he says he was "pressed out of measure, above strength, insomuch that he even despaired of life." Some expositors have contended that the apostle certainly referred to that conflict, in the passage we are now considering. A little reflection, however, will show, that he could *not possibly* have alluded to that event in this place. The narrative by Luke states that Paul departed into Macedonia after the commotion excited by Demetrius;* whereas in this epistle he expresses his determination to remain at Ephesus till Pentecost.† This epistle must, therefore, have been written *before* that commotion. The apostle then did not refer to *that*, in the text before us; for it had not occurred when he wrote.‡ The question immediately presents it-

* Acts xx. 1.

† xvi. 8.

‡ The narrative by Luke says expressly that Paul was prevented by the

self, to what then does he refer? If all his sufferings were particularly recorded, and the time specified when they were borne, we might answer this question without delay. We have an account of only a small part of what he suffered.

While at Ephesus his temptations were great; his argumentations were protracted; and the reproaches he bore were heavy. The inhabitants, being idolaters, hated him, and, doubtless, persecuted him in many and different ways.

He was not ignorant of the devices and trials of Satan. When he was willing to do good, evil was present with him.

We might venture to assert, therefore, that the apostle Paul referred to all the trials and sufferings he endured at Ephesus for the sake of Christ, previous to the tumult excited by Demetrius. Prior to that event, he had laboured to convince the Ephesians by reason and scripture; he had found them in many cases, unyielding and obstinate; and he had suffered *for* them and *from* them.* These sufferings and trials he expresses by one strong and forcible word, which means I have fought with wild beasts.

If the apostle had not cherished a confident expectation of a happy resurrection and a glorious reward, how could he have endured such perils, and what advantages would they have secured for him? He might have properly adopted the creed, and copied the example, of Epicurian Philosophers. If there be no such revenue of bliss for the righteous in the eternal world, the inspired writers and our Saviour are imposters, and christian hope but a tantalizing dream. The sufferings of apostles and martyrs will meet with no recompense. Our devoted and pious relatives who have left us behind them, descended to the tomb with a false song in their mouth; and went to the door of heaven with a lie in their right hand. Their surviving friends can have no consolation; for, if there be no resurrection, they must sorrow as those

disciples from venturing into the theatre. There is no evidence that he fought with wild beasts on this occasion. See Acts xix. 30.

* Paul lived at Ephesus three years before he wrote this epistle.

that have no hope. Life and immortality have not been brought to light. Jesus is no longer a risen and exalted Saviour. He does not give repentance and remission of sins. His interceding breath is no longer spent in our behalf. The Holy Spirit ceases to illuminate the minds and subdue the wills of men. The entire machinery of human redemption is stopped. The gates of hell prevail against the church and her King. The whole race of Adam are not only condemned, but hopelessly and forever lost.

Such would be the legitimate but deplorable consequences, if the resurrection of the body were clearly disproved.

But this (blessed be God) is a heaven-born doctrine. Therefore, let us be steadfast, unmoveable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labour is *not in vain* in the Lord.

ARTICLE VI.

SLAVERY AND THE RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION OF THE COLOURED POPULATION.

On Sabbath evening, May 26th, a building erected under the supervision of the Second Presbyterian Church of the City of Charleston, for the religious instruction of coloured persons was, as we learn from the Southern Presbyterian, publicly dedicated, with appropriate services, to the worship of Almighty God. From the same paper we copy the following account of the origin, plan and present progress of the enterprize.—

“The Session and members of the Second Presbyterian Church were for a long time sensible of many defects in their plans for the religious instruction of the negroes. While they did not consider themselves peculiarly liable to the charge of neglecting their own colored members, they were nevertheless conscious that even in regard to those members their Church had failed to afford the kind of instruction necessary—instruction at once sound and thorough, simple and systematic, patient, care-

ful and persevering. At the same time they could not but feel that as a Christian Church situated in the midst of thousands of ignorant and irreligious blacks they were bound to exert themselves, not only on behalf of their own colored members, but of the whole negro population, so far as they were not provided with sound religious instruction. And in this view of the subject it was manifest that their Church did not furnish sufficient gallery accommodations.—In these circumstances, when one of themselves, providentially brought back to his native city from a foreign mission, proposed to employ his time in the religious instruction of the colored population, it was hailed with satisfaction by the 2nd Presbyterian Church. And on the 9th of May 1847, at a meeting of the congregation it was resolved without delay to erect a building for the express purpose of giving to the colored people sound and careful Religious Instruction. It is not their purpose to form a separate ecclesiastical organization. The servants who will meet with us for divine worship, and religious instruction, will not be a *church*, but a simple *congregation*. Those who may become church members will be received into the Second Presbyterian Church, by its Session, after careful examination, and remain always under the ecclesiastical watch and control of that body, This congregation therefore will be part and parcel of the Second Presbyterian Church.

The titles to the building they have erected will be vested in the corporation of the Second Presbyterian Church, as Trustees for the Session, and the Presbytery of Charleston, who are to have the appointment of the Ministers who from time to time may officiate therein. The Rev. J. B. Adger is at present laboring in this field with encouraging success, and we trust will be spared to gather from it a rich harvest of precious fruits. He has many peculiar qualifications and advantages for the work, which it would be hard to find in any other. The respectable congregation of colored persons he has already gathered we doubt not will now rapidly increase. He has established a Sunday-school which during the past year has been taught by some twenty or thirty white ladies and gentlemen, and average in attendance of about a hundred and fifty scholars.

The House of worship is in a simple Gothic style, and in the shape of a capital T—the transepts, or wings being appropriated to the use of white persons, and entered by separate doors. The building and arrangements are exceedingly neat and appropriate, and constitute another ornament added to the architecture of our city, by an artist we have before referred to, Mr. E. C. Jones.

The entire cost of this church including the lot and a small building in the rear used for Sunday-school purposes, will be about \$7,700; of this there are about \$1600 due over and above funds now in hand, and the aid of any of our readers to discharge this would be thankfully received, as it would be well bestowed. The Committee have not gone out of Charleston to solicit assistance, though generous friends abroad have kindly given it to some extent. It is a christian and a noble object, and must plead its own cause in every christian and generous heart."

We need not say that we rejoice at this statement. We rejoice not merely that a new house has been dedicated to the worship of God and the promulgation of the gospel; which always affords a just occasion of congratulation and delight, but that a building has been erected—erected in the metropolis of the State, and erected at this particular time, for the special benefit of those who are emphatically the poor of our land. When the scheme was first projected, opposition was very naturally excited to the separation of masters and servants in the solemn offices of religion, which its execution, to some extent, involved. It was felt to be desirable that the different classes of the community should meet together and experience the salutary influence upon their relations to each other, which the contemplation of their common relation to God was suited to exert. These considerations were not destitute of force, and they would have been entitled to prevail had it not been obvious, that the advantages of such promiscuous assemblies were dearly purchased by the exclusion of immense numbers of the coloured population from all adequate opportunities of religious instruction at all. The question was soon found to be partial separation, or a partial diffusion of the gospel among the slaves. An enlarged philanthropy prevailed over sentiment—and the completion of this structure is a declaration to the world—that neither apprehensions of safety to ourselves nor of injury to our servants—that neither mawkish sentimentalism nor absurd jealousy, shall deter us from providing the negro with the armour of salvation.

This triumph of Christian benevolence is the more illustrious as having taken place in a community which has been warned by experience to watch with jealous

care all combinations of the blacks. Religion has been so often the cloak of designing knaves—and religious assemblies so often prostituted to the unhallowed purposes of anarchy and crime, that good men began to apprehend that religion itself might be ultimately excluded as a measure of police. But the event recorded in the preceding extract is a publick proof that the good people of Charleston can be bribed by no temptations of interest or security to confound the abuse with the lawful uses of a thing—and that while they take every precaution which wisdom and prudence suggest to guard effectually against the one, they will not be driven into any mad crusade against the other. Bowing with reverence to the authority of God, and recognizing the obligation to communicate His will to the children of men, they are determined to make known His gospel, in its simplicity and purity, without any checks or hinderances but those which shall prevent religious conventions from being turned into conventions of crime. All they demand is that it shall be Christianity which is taught—the Christianity contained in the Bible, proclaimed by apostles and prophets, and sealed by the blood of a goodly company of martyrs and confessors. The name of J  sus is not a name for conspirators to conjure with—it carries no danger with it—the doctrines of Jesus are doctrines according to godliness, and our people, we rejoice to say, have refused under any pretext of expediency or policy, to league with Herod and Pontius Pilate, in an unholy combination against the anointed of the Lord. Time will show that they have acted wisely, and that this Church will prove a stronger fortress against insubordination and rebellion than weapons of brass or iron.

The juncture at which our fellow-citizens have been led to begin and carry out this undertaking—it is but just to say—affords a proof of their homage to religion, and a vindication of their own characters, as beautiful as they are conspicuous. The slaveholding States of this confederacy have been placed under the ban of the publick opinion of the civilized world. The philanthropy of Christendom seems to have concentrated its sympathies upon us. We have been denounced, with every epithet of vituperation and abuse, as conspirators against the dig-

nity of man—traitors to our race, and rebels against God. Overlooking, with a rare expansion of benevolence, the evils which press around their own doors, the vices and crimes and sufferings of their own neighbours and countrymen, the philanthropists of Europe and this country can find nothing worth weeping for, but the sufferings and degradation of the Southern slave, and nothing worth reviling but the avarice, inhumanity and cruelty of the Southern master, and nothing worth labouring to extirpate but the system which embodies these outrages and wrongs. So monstrous are the misrepresentations which ignorance, malice and fanaticism are constantly and assiduously propagating in regard to this relation among us, that if our names were not actually written under the pictures, we should never suspect that they were intended for us. In the grave discussions of philosophy—the solemn instructions of the pulpit—the light effusions of the poet—in popular assemblies and legislative halls—among all classes and conditions of men—we are held up to execration and contempt; and our society is shunned as scrupulously as if the taint of leprosy adhered to us. Even those who cannot find it in their hearts to join in the violent maledictions which zeal for humanity has piled upon us, never venture upon a plea of justification in our defence. They pity us—they lament our lot—admit that our case is bad, desperately bad—but then we are not so much to be blamed. They curse us in their sympathies.

This insane fury of philanthropy has not been content with speculating upon our degradation and wretchedness at a distance. It has aimed at stirring up insurrection in our midst. In the sacred names of religion and liberty, private efforts have been made to turn the hearts of servants against their masters; and public institutions, which the implied faith of the country should render only vehicles of convenience, have been treacherously converted into engines of sedition and organs of tumult. Outlaws from humanity, the Constitution of the country has been unable to protect us from the machinations of those who, according to the legitimate use of language, can be much more appropriately styled manstealers than ourselves.—At this moment the Union is shaken to its centre by the

prevalence of sentiment over reason and truth ; and the remarkable spectacle is exhibited of a people constrained in conscience to violate the faith of treaties, the solemnity of contracts, and the awful sanctity of an oath ; constrained in conscience to trample in the dust the plainest obligations of duty, rather than infringe the speculative rights of man. A spurious charity for a comparatively small class in the community, is dictating the subversion of the cherished institutions of our fathers and the hopes of the human race—the utter ruin of this vast imperial Republic, is to be achieved as a trophy to the progress of human developement.

That we should be passive spectators of these scenes of madness and confusion—that we should be indifferent to the condemnation of the civilized world, and especially to efforts to put in jeopardy our lives as well as our property, is not to be expected. The fear of good men among ourselves has been, that the natural exasperation which so much unmerited censure and such extraordinary interference with our affairs, have a tendency to produce, would provoke us to extremities resulting rather from the violence of resentment, than the dictates of prudence. Perhaps, at the first alarming indications of our moral position, in the estimate of the world, we indulged too much in the language of defiance, and permitted ourselves to yield to suggestions of policy which, in our calmer moments, neither the reason nor the conscience of the country should approve. It is useless to deny that we were tempted to resort to measures of legislation which, while they contribute nothing to our security, have given a pretext to the calumnies of our enemies, and embarrassed our defence in the hands of our friends. But we feel bound, in candour, to say that, under the extraordinary pressure which has been upon us, it is a matter of astonishment and of devout thanksgiving to God, that we have been able, in the regulation of our domestick institutions, to preserve so much moderation, prudence, humanity and caution. When the first explosion had passed off, we consented to plead our cause at the bar of the world—we looked more narrowly into the nature and organization of society—at the origin and extent of the rights of man—and feeling justified in our own conscien-

ces, and in the sight of God, we endeavoured to conduct ourselves with the dignity which a consciousness of rectitude inspires—and to deserve, if we cannot obtain, the confidence of mankind. That in the conduct of our plea, we have contributed our full proportion to the philosophy of government—that we have done much to expose the fallacies and dangers of prevailing theories in regard to the scope and purpose of political institutions—that we have been eminently conservative in our influence upon the spirit of the age, it seems to us cannot be decently denied. To say that we have run into no extravagancies in our defences of slavery—that we have not, like all controvertists, been perplexed with the ambiguity of terms, and betrayed by rashness into untenable positions, is to say that we are angels and not men. But the wonder is, that our excesses have not been greater and more disastrous. With infidelity on the one hand, suggesting a short reply to the indictment of the world, that our negroes are not of the same blood with ourselves—a plea which, if it had been admitted, would have justly drawn down the curse of God as well as the execrations of the race; with the dictates of a narrow expediency on the other, suggesting that our safety depended upon the depression and still lower degradation of the black race—with Scylla on the one side, and Charybdis on the other, the wonder is, that we have not been frightened from our propriety and driven to the adoption of more measures that would seem to justify the censures of our enemies.

The inception and successful progress of the enterprise of which the erection of this building is a proof, encourage the hope that we mean to maintain our moderation. It is a public testimony to our faith, that the negro is of one blood with ourselves—that he has sinned as we have, and that he has an equal interest with us in the great redemption. Science, falsely so called, may attempt to exclude him from the brotherhood of humanity. Men may be seeking eminence and distinction by arguments which link them with the brute—but the instinctive impulses of our nature, combined with the plainest declarations of the word of God, lead us to recognize in his form and lineaments—in his moral, religious and intellectual nature, the same humanity in which we glory as the image

of God. We are not ashamed to call him our brother.—The subjugation of the fears and jealousy, which a systematic misrepresentation of religion, on the part of our inveterate opposers, has had a tendency to produce, is a publick declaration to the world that, in our philosophy, right is the highest expediency, and obedience to God the firmest security of communities as well as individuals. We have not sought the protection of our property in the debasement of our species; we have not maintained our own interests in this world, by the deliberate sacrifice of the eternal interests of the thousands who look to us for the way of salvation. Under the infallible conviction—infallible because the offspring of the word of God—that he who walketh uprightly, walketh surely, we have endeavoured to carry out a plan which shall have the effect of rendering to our servants, in the most comprehensive sense, that which is just and equal. If others feel called to seduce them into grievous crime, and to ply them with instigations to insurrection and tumult, our firmest precautions against the threatened danger, shall be the faithful discharge of our duties, which, while it preserves a conscience void of offence towards God, conciliates the confidence and affections of man.

If God shall enable us to maintain the moderation and dignity which become us, and to set an example of faithfulness and diligence in the discharge of the duties which spring from the relation of master and servant, it will be an omen of good. It will be a signal proof that He has not condemned us, and a cheering token that in the vicissitudes of human affairs, truth will ultimately prevail, and we shall stand acquitted at the bar of the world. The agitations which are convulsing the kingdoms of Europe—the mad speculations of philosophers—the excesses of unchecked democracy, are working out some of the most difficult problems of political and social science; and when the tumult shall have subsided, and reason resumed her ascendancy, it will be found that the very principles upon which we have been accustomed to justify Southern slavery are the principles of regulated liberty—that in defending this institution we have really been upholding the civil interests of mankind—resisting alike the social anarchy of communism and the political anarchy of

licentiousness—that we have been supporting representative, republican government against the despotism of masses on the one hand, and the supremacy of a single will on the other.

God has not permitted such a remarkable phenomenon as the unanimity of the civilized world, in its execration of slavery, to take place without design. This great battle with the Abolitionists, has not been fought in vain.—The muster of such immense forces—the fury and bitterness of the conflict—the disparity in resources of the parties in the war—the conspicuousness—the unexampled conspicuousness of the event, have all been ordered for wise and beneficent results; and when the smoke shall have rolled away, it will be seen that a real progress has been made in the practical solution of the problems which produced the collision.

What disasters it will be necessary to pass through before the nations can be taught the lessons of providence—what lights shall be extinguished, and what horrors experienced, no human sagacity can foresee. But that the world is now the theatre of an extraordinary conflict of great principles—that the foundations of society are about to be explored to their depths—and the sources of social and political prosperity laid bare; that the questions in dispute involve all that is dear and precious to man on earth—the most superficial observer cannot fail to perceive. Experiment after experiment may be made—disaster succeed disaster, in carrying out the principles of an atheistic philosophy—until the nations, wearied and heart-sickened with changes without improvement, shall open their eyes to the real causes of their calamities, and learn the lessons which wisdom shall evolve from the events that have passed. Truth must triumph. God will vindicate the appointments of His Providence—and if our institutions are indeed consistent with righteousness and truth, we can calmly afford to bide our time—we can watch the storm which is beating furiously against us, without terror or dismay—we can receive the assault of the civilized world—trusting in Him who has all the elements at His command, and can save as easily by one as a thousand. If our principles are true, the world must come to them; and we can quietly appeal from the ver-

dict of existing generations, to the more impartial verdict of the men who shall have seen the issue of the struggle in which we are now involved. It is not the narrow question of abolitionism or of slavery—not simply whether we shall emancipate our negroes or not—the real question is the relations of man to society—of States to the individual, and of the individual to States; a question as broad as the interests of the human race.

These are the mighty questions which are shaking thrones to their centres—upheaving the masses like an earthquake, and rocking the solid pillars of this Union.— [The parties in this conflict are not merely abolitionists and slaveholders—they are atheists, socialists, communists, red republicans, jacobins, on the one side, and the friends of order and regulated freedom on the other. In one word, the world is the battle ground—Christianity and Atheism the combatants; and the progress of humanity the stake.] One party seems to regard society, with all its complicated interests, its divisions and subdivisions, as the machinery of man—which, as it has been invented and arranged by his ingenuity and skill, may be taken to pieces, reconstructed, altered or repaired, as experience shall indicate defects or confusion in the original plan. The other party beholds in it the ordinance of God; and contemplates “this little scene of human life,” as placed in the middle of a scheme, whose beginnings must be traced to the unfathomable depths of the past, and whose developement and completion must be sought in the still more unfathomable depths of the future—a scheme, as Butler expresses it, “not fixed, but progressive—every way incomprehensible”—in which, consequently, irregularity is the confession of our ignorance—disorder the proof of our blindness, and with which it is as awful temerity to tamper as to sport with the name of God.

It is a great lesson that, as the weakness of man can never make that straight which God hath made crooked, true wisdom consists in discharging the duties of every relation; and the true secret of progress, in the improvement and elevation which are gradually super-induced by this spirit.

The part, accordingly, which is assigned to us in the tu-

mult of the age, is the maintenance of the principles upon which the security of social order and the developement of humanity depends, in their application to the distinctive institutions which have provoked upon us the malediction of the world. The Apostle briefly sums up all that is incumbent, at the present crisis, upon the slaveholders of the South, in the pregnant text—masters give unto your servants that which is just and equal, knowing that ye also have a Master in Heaven. It would be an useless waste of time to spend many words in proving, that the servants contemplated by the Apostle were slaves. Finding it impossible to deny that slavery, as an existing element of society, is actually sanctioned by Christ and His Apostles, those who would preserve some show of consistency in their veneration of the Scriptures, and their condemnations of us, resolve the conduct of the founders of Christianity into motives of prudence and considerations of policy. While they admit that the letter of the Scriptures is distinctly and unambiguously in our favour, they maintain that their spirit is against us, and that our Saviour was content to leave the destruction of whatsoever was morally wrong in the social fabric, to the slow progress of changes in individual opinions, wrought by the silent influence of religion, rather than endanger the stability of governments by sudden and disastrous revolutions. “The Apostle does not,” says a learned commentator, “interfere with any established relations, however, as in the case of slavery, morally and politically wrong—but only enjoins the discharge of the duties which the very persons themselves recognized.” It is not for us to explain how the imputation of a defective morality can be reconciled with the great Protestant dogma, that the Bible is an adequate rule of faith and practice—or upon what principles slaveholders should be rejected from the fellowship of the Christian Church now, when Paul received them as brethren, and sanctioned the bondage in which they held their servants.

But it may be worth while to expose the confusion of ideas, from which this distinction, betwixt the letter and the spirit of the Gospel, has arisen, and which has been a source of serious perplexity, both to the defenders and the enemies of slavery. Many Christian men have been

led, in reference to this subject, to lend their sanction to principles which, in all other applications, they would reject with abhorrence, because they have felt that the genius and temper of Christianity were inconsistent with the genius and temper of slavery—while others, driven to the opposite extreme, from a faithful study of the letter, have been led to deny the principles which lie at the foundation of all human progress, and to assume an attitude in regard to human rights and liberty, which, in their abstract forms, can be characterized as little less than monstrous.

That is a desperate cause which is either incompatible with the general tone and spirit of christianity, or with the progress of true liberty, which is only another name for the social and political developement of man. If it can be shown that slavery contravenes the spirit of the gospel—that as a social relation it is essentially unfavourable to the cultivation and growth of the graces of the Spirit—that it is unfriendly to the developement of piety and to communion with God—or that it retards the onward progress of man—that it hinders the march of society to its destined goal, and contradicts that supremacy of justice, which is the soul of the State and the life-blood of freedom—if these propositions can be satisfactorily sustained, then it is self-condemned—religion and philanthropy alike require us to labour for its destruction, and every good man amongst us would feel bound to contribute to its removal; and even the voice of patriotism would demand that we should wipe from our country the foul reproach of standing in the way of the destined improvement of mankind.

The confusion upon this subject has arisen from a two-fold misapprehension—one in relation to the nature of the slavery tolerated in the letter of the Scriptures, and the other in relation to the spirit of Christianity itself.

It is common to describe slavery as the property of man in man—as the destruction of all human and personal rights, the absorption of the humanity of one individual into the will and power of another. “The very idea of a slave,” says Dr. Channing,* “is that he belongs

* Works, vol. ii. p. 17. 10th complete edition. Boston, 1849.

to another, that he is bound to live and labour for another, to be another's instrument, and to make another's will his habitual law, however adverse to his own." "We have thus," says he in another place, * "established the reality and sacredness of human rights, and that slavery is an infraction of these, is too plain to need any laboured proof. Slavery violates not one but all, and violates them not incidentally, but necessarily, systematically, from its very nature." In other words, in every system of slavery, from the operation of its inherent and essential principles, the slave ceases to be a person—a man—and becomes a mere instrument or thing. Dr. Channing does not charge this result upon the relation as it obtains under particular codes, or at particular times, or in particular places. He says, distinctly and emphatically, that it violates all human rights, *not incidentally* but *necessarily, systematically, from its very nature*. It belongs to the very essence of slavery to divest its victims of humanity.

"Slavery," says Professor Whewell, † "is contrary to the fundamental principles of morality. It neglects the great primary distinction of Persons and Things—converting a person into a thing, an object merely passive, without any recognized attributes of human nature. A slave is, in the eye of the State which stamps him with that character, not acknowledged as a man. His pleasures and pains, his wishes and desires, his needs and springs of action, his thoughts and feelings, are of no value whatever in the eye of the community. He is reduced to the level of the brutes. Even his crimes, as we have said, are not acknowledged as wrongs, lest it should be supposed that, as he may do a wrong, he may suffer one. And as there are for him no wrongs, because there are no rights—so there is for him nothing morally right—that is, as we have seen, nothing conformable to the Supreme Rule of Human Nature: for the Supreme Rule of his condition is the will of his master. He is thus divested of his moral nature, which is contrary to the great principle we have already laid down; that all men are moral beings; a principle which, we have seen, is one of the universal truths of morality, whether it be taken as a principle of Justice or of Humanity. It is a principle of Justice, de-

* Works, vol. ii. p. 46. 10th complete edition. Boston, 1849.

† Elements of Morality, vol. i. p. 372-3. American edition.

pending upon the participation of all in a common Humanity; it is a principle of Humanity as authoritative and cogent as the fundamental Idea of Justice."

If this be a just description of slavery, the wonder is, not that the civilized world is now indignant at its outrages and wrongs, but that it has been so slow in detecting its enormities, that mankind, for so many centuries, acquiesced in a system which contradicted every impulse of nature, every whisper of conscience, every dictate of religion—a system as monstrously unnatural as a general effort to walk upon the head or think with the feet. We have, however, no hesitation in saying, that whatever may be the technical language of the law, in relation to certain aspects in which slavery is contemplated, the ideas of personal rights and personal responsibility pervade the whole system. It is a relation of man to man—a form of civil society, of which persons are the only elements, and not a relation of man to things. Under the Roman code, in which more offensive language than that employed by ourselves was used in reference to the subject, the Apostles did not regard the personality of the slave as lost or swallowed up in the propriety of the master. They treat him as a man—possessed of certain rights, which it was injustice to disregard and make it the office of Christianity to protect these rights by the solemn sanctions of religion—to enforce upon masters the necessity, the moral obligation, of rendering to their bondmen that which is just and equal. Paul treats the services of slaves as *duties*—not like the toil of the ox or the ass—a labour extracted by the stringency of discipline—but a moral debt, in the payment of which they were rendering a homage to God. Servants, says he,* be obedient to them that are your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in singleness of your heart as unto Christ; not with eye-service, as men-pleasers, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart; with good will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to men; knowing that whatever good thing any man doeth, the same shall he receive of the Lord, whether he be bond or free. We need not say to those

* Ephes. iv. 5-9.

who are acquainted with the very elements of moral philosophy, that obedience, except as a figured term, can never be applied to any but rational, intelligent, responsible agents. It is a voluntary homage to law---implies moral obligation and a sense of duty, and can only, in the way of analogy, be affirmed of the instinctive submission of brutes, or the mechanical employment of instruments and things.*

The apostle not merely recognizes the moral agency of slaves in the phraseology which he uses, but treats them as possessed of conscience, reason and will---by the motives which he presses. He says to them in effect that their services to their masters are duties which they owe to God---that a moral character attaches to their works, and that they are the subjects of praise or blame according to the principles upon which their obedience is rendered. "The blind passivity of a corpse, or the mechanical subserviency of a tool," which Dr. Channing and Prof. Whewell regard as constituting the very essence of every system of slavery---precluding as it does every idea of merit or demerit, of approbation or of censure, never seems to have entered the head of the Apostle. He considered slavery as a social and political economy in which relations subsisted betwixt moral, intelligent, responsible beings, involving reciprocal rights and reciprocal obligations. There was a right to command on the one hand---an obligation to obey on the other. Both parties might be guilty of injustice and of wrong---the master might prostitute his power by tyranny, cruelty and iniquitous exac-

* "By a license of speech," says one who can be accused of no patronage to slavery---"by a license of speech---pardonable in cases where no consequences result from it---we employ the word so improperly as to say that the sculptor's chisel obeys his hand; but it would be an insufferable affectation, to use the abstract term *obedience*, in such instances, as if the tool were consciously fraught with a moral quality. Nor may we stretch the proprieties of speech so far, as to apply the abstract term even to the hand of the artist; the hand, it is true, obeys the mind; but how absurd would it be to commend the hand for its *obedience*; and scarcely less so to speak of the obedience of a well-trained horse; although, by an admissible analogy, we say he obeys the hand and leg of his rider. The fiery, yet obsequious animal, while yielding himself to the will of his rider, knows nothing of obedience, because his nature does not include that moral liberty, which is the source and soul of the virtue so named."---*Taylor's Loyola and Jesuitism*, p. 286.

tions—the servant might evade his duty from indolence, treachery or obstinate self-will. Religion held the scales of justice between them—and enforced fidelity upon each by the awful sanctions of eternity. This was clearly the aspect in which the Apostle contemplated the subject.

The state of things so graphically described and eloquently deplored by the great father of Unitarian Christianity in America, is a palpable impossibility. The constitution of the human mind is in flagrant contradiction to the absorption of the conscience, will and understanding of one man into the personality of another—it is a thing which cannot be conceived—and if it ever could take place, the termination of all responsibility on the part of the slave would render it ridiculous to labour for his spiritual improvement or attribute to him any other immortality than that which Indian fables ascribe to the dog as the faithful companion of his master. And yet upon this absurdity, that slavery divests its victims of humanity—that it degrades them from the rank of responsible and voluntary agents to the condition of tools or brutes—the whole philosophical argument against the morality of the system, as an existing institution—is founded. Moralists prove that man can hold no property in man—that the conscience, in other words, the moral and responsible agency of one person—for to this point the question is reduced—can never be owned by another—it is not an article of barter or exchange—the individual cannot transfer it from himself—and the system which attempts the impossibility is an outrage upon humanity. We cheerfully admit that no man can sell his soul to another—and if the transaction were possible, it would evidently be a most damning sin. “If suicide,” we use the words of one of the profoundest thinkers of the day,* “if suicide be a crime—and who but the atheist questions this—so would be the amputation of a limb for no surgical reason; and so would it be a crime and a frightful impiety, to swallow a drug for the purpose of effecting a paralysis of one side, or the extinction of a sense—of sight or of hearing. But is not man’s individual mind and conscience, with its voluntary convictions of truth and virtue, a faculty

* Taylor’s *Loyola and Jesuitism*, p. 289. Amer. edition.

and an element of human nature? is not the freedom of the will a sacred bestowment, which every responsible being has received from his maker? What shall a man accept in exchange, either for his soul, or for any one of its elementary prerogatives? Neither his soul, nor any of its powers is really at his disposal; for not only are these powers in themselves beyond all price; but if a price could be adduced that should be their equivalent in whole or in part, the offer could not be listened to—the proposal is a blasphemy, and it is a blasphemy in the intention, notwithstanding that such an intention could never actually be carried out.” We grant most cheerfully, and we make an admission in no way inconsistent with Southern slavery or the slavery sanctioned in the Bible, that though “the human soul may be lost, it cannot either be sold, or be made a gift of to another—that conscience may be bound or may be slaughtered; but cannot be transferred to another’s keeping—that moral responsibility, instead of being shifted entirely from one to another or instead of being shared between two—each taking a half, or a portion, is doubled, whenever it is attempted to be transferred, or to be deposited, or to be pawned.”*

The property of man in man—a fiction to which even the imagination cannot give consistency—is the miserable cant of those who would storm by prejudice what they cannot demolish by argument. We do not even pretend that the organs of the body can be said strictly to belong to another. The limbs and members of my servant are not mine but his—they are not tools and instruments which I can sport with at pleasure, but the sacred possessions of a human being, which cannot be invaded without the authority of law, and for the use of which he can never be divested of his responsibility to God.

If then slavery is not inconsistent with the existence of personal rights and of moral obligation, it may be asked in what does its peculiarity consist? What is it that makes a man a slave? We answer the obligation to labour for another, determined by the Providence of God, independently of the provisions of a contract. The right which the master has is a right, not to the *man* but to his

* Taylor’s Loyola and Jesuitism, p. 289.

labour—the duty which the slave owes is the service which, in conformity with this right, the master exacts. The essential difference betwixt free and slave-labour is that one is rendered in consequence of a contract—the other is rendered in consequence of a command. The labourers in each case are equally moral, equally responsible, equally men. But they work upon different principles.

It is strange that Channing and Whewell should have overlooked the essential distinction of this form of service, as it lies patent in the writings of philosophers who preceded them. The definition given by Paley, a man pre-eminently marked by perspicuity of thought and vigour of expression, is exactly the same in spirit with our own. In the actual condition of society, the intervention of a contract is not always a matter of very great moment, since it is not always a security to freedom of choice. The Providence of God marks out for the slave the precise services, in the lawful commands of the master, which it is the Divine will that he should render—the painful necessities of his case are often as stringent upon the free labourer, and determine, with as stern a mandate, what contracts he shall make. Neither can be said to select his employments. God allots to each his portion—places the one immediately under command—and leaves the other not unfrequently a petitioner for a master.

Whatever control the master has over the person of the slave is subsidiary to this right to his labour; what he sells is not the man, but the property in his services—true he chastises the man—but the punishments inflicted for disobedience are no more inconsistent with personal responsibilities than the punishments inflicted by the law for breaches of contract. On the contrary punishment in contradistinction from suffering, always implies responsibility, and a right which cannot be enforced is a right which society, as an organized community, has not yet acknowledged. The chastisements of slaves are accordingly no more entitled to awaken the indignation of loyal and faithful citizens—however pretended philanthropists may describe the horrors of the scourge and the lash—than the penalties, of disgrace, imprisonment or death, which all nations have inflicted upon crimes against the State. All that is necessary in any case is that the punishment should be *just*. Pain unrighteously inflicted is

cruelty—whether that cruelty springs from the tyranny of a single master or the tyranny of that greater master, the State. Whether adequate provisions shall be made to protect the slave from inhumanity and oppression—whether he shall be exempt from suffering except for disobedience and for crime, are questions to be decided by the law of the land; and in this matter the codes of different nations and of the same nation at different times have been various. Justice and religion require that such provisions should be made. It is no part of the essence of slavery, however, that the rights of the slave should be left to the caprice or to the interest of the master; and in the Southern States provisions are actually made—whether adequate or inadequate it is useless here to discuss—to protect him from want—cruelty and unlawful domination. Provisions are made which recognize the doctrine of the Apostle, that he is a subject of rights and that justice must be rendered to his claims. When slavery is pronounced to be essentially sinful, the argument cannot turn upon incidental circumstances of the system—upon the defective arrangement of the details—the inadequate securities which the law awards against the infringement of acknowledged rights—it must turn upon the nature of the relation itself, and must boldly attempt to prove that he ceases to be a man, who is under obligation, without the formalities of a contract, to labour under the direction and for the benefit of another. If such a position is inconsistent with the essential elements of humanity, then slavery is inhuman—if society, on the other hand, has distinctly recognized the contrary, as essential to good order, as in the case of children, apprentices, and criminals—then slavery is consistent with the rights of man and the pathetick declamation of abolitionists falls to the ground.

This view of the subject exposes the confusion, which obtains in most popular treatises of morals, of slavery with involuntary servitude. The service, in so far as it consists in the motions of the limbs or organs of the body, must be voluntary or it could not exist at all. If by voluntary be meant however, that which results from hearty consent and is accordingly rendered with cheerfulness, it is precisely the service which the law of God enjoins. Servants are exhorted to obey from considerations of duty—to make conscience of their tasks—with good will doing

service, as to the Lord and not to men. Whether, in point of fact, their service, in this sense, shall be voluntary, will depend upon their moral character. But the same may be said of free labour. There are other motives beside the lash that may drive men to toil--when they are far from toiling with cheerfulness or good will. Others groan under their burdens as well as slaves--and many a man who works by contract is doomed to an involuntary servitude, which he as thoroughly detests as the most faithless slave, who performs nothing but the painful drudgery of eye-service.

There is a moral bondage, the most galling and degrading species of servitude, in which he may be held, as with chains of brass, who scorns to call any man master on earth. Those who have most patiently studied the ends of government and the theory of political society, who are best prepared to solve the problems connected with the nature and extent of the individual restraints, which the security of publick order demands--those who have most profoundly investigated the whole question of civil and political liberty, may yet be slaves. They may submit to the sway of a fiercer and more cruel tyrant than any despot who ever wielded a sceptre on earth. Jesus answered them, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, whosoever committeth sin is the servant or slave of sin." This moral slavery, from which it was the professed object of their pretended philosophy to deliver men, was a subject of fruitful and eloquent declamation among the ancient moralists, philosophers and poets. "Who," says Seneca, "is not a slave. One is in bondage to lust--another to avarice--another to ambition--and all to fear." "No bondage," he adds, "is more grievous than that which is voluntary." "To be a slave to the passions," says Pythagoras, "is more grievous than to be a slave to tyrants." "Count no one free," says Plato, "who is intent on the indulgence of wicked passions. Such men serve more cruel masters than those who obtain their slaves by inheritance and purchase, with a right to enforce obedience. "All wicked men," says Cicero, "are slaves. If slavery be the obedience of a broken and an abject mind--deprived of the freedom of will--as indeed it is, who can deny that all frivolous, covetous, wicked men are slaves." "If you are subject

to the perturbations of fear—the tumult of corrupt desire, or the violence of anger, you endure,” says Claudian, “the yoke of bondage.” This slavery to sin is true slavery—it is that which degrades—which renders man unfit for the improvement of his nature, the society of angels, and the favour of God. The external circumstances in which men are placed—the number and variety of their civil and social privileges—the outward advantages of rank, birth, or fortune; these are not the things which enoble or depress us in the scale of excellence. The Monarch on his throne, with prostrate millions around him, may be little, mean, despicable in the sight of the holy and the good, while the poor slave, in his humble hovel, or on his pallet of straw, may possess a dignity and moral grandeur which assert his affinity with Heaven. There is a freedom which is the end and glory of man—the only freedom which the pen of inspiration has commended; and which, from its very nature, is independent of the decrees of Kings, or the mandates of States. It is *the* freedom which God approves—which Jesus bought by his blood, and the Holy Spirit effectually seals by His grace; the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free. It consists essentially in the dominion of rectitude—in the emancipation of the will from the power of sin—the release of the affections from the attractions of earth—the exemption of the understanding from the deceits of prejudice and error. It is a freedom which the *truth* of God brings with it—a freedom enjoyed by the martyr at the stake—a slave in his chains—a prisoner in his dungeon—as well as the King upon his throne. Independent of time or place, or the accidents of fortune, it is the *breath* of the soul as regenerated and redeemed; and can no more be torn from us than the atmosphere of Heaven can be restrained. If the Son shall make you free, you shall be free indeed. The ancient philosophers caught a glimpse of it when they declaimed upon virtue as the end and perfection of our being—Cicero almost seized it when he described him alone as possessed of freedom of will, who pursues rectitude, rejoices in duty, and regulates his conduct by wisdom and prudence. This freedom makes man truly a man; and it is precisely the assertion of this freedom—this dominion of rectitude—this supre-

macy of right, which the Apostle enjoins upon slaves---when he exhorts them to obey their masters in singleness of heart as unto Christ---to despise eye-service---but to do their work as in the eye of God. To obey under the influence of these motives, is to be slaves no longer. This is a *free* service---a service which God accepts as the loyal homage of the soul---and which proclaims them to be the Lord's freed-men, while they honour their masters on earth. Such slavery might be their glory---might fit them for thrones in the kingdom of God. So far was the Apostle, therefore, from regarding involuntary servitude, as the characteristick of slavery, that he condemns such servitude as a sin. He treats it as something that is abject, mean, despicable; but insists, on the other hand, that slavery dignifies and ennobles the servant, who obeys from the heart.

But while it may be admitted that slavery is not absolutely inconsistent with moral responsibility, nor the freedom of a moral agent, it may be asked whether the slave is not stripped of some of the rights which belong to him essentially as a man; and in this view, whether the relation is not incompatible with the spirit of the Gospel, which asserts and promotes the dignity and perfection of our race. In other words, whether there is not a limitation upon the moral freedom of the slave---whether his situation does not preclude him from discharging his *whole* duty as a man; and, therefore, whether the relation is not ultimately destructive of the full complement of human rights.

This question, it seems to us, comprises the whole moral difficulty of slavery; and it is at this point of the discussion, that the friends and enemies of the system are equally tempted to run into extravagance and excess; the one party denying the inestimable value of freedom; the other exaggerating the nature and extent of human rights, and both overlooking the real scope and purpose of the Gospel, in its relation to the present interests of man.

That the design of Christianity is to secure the perfection of the race, is obvious from all its arrangements; and that when this end shall have been consummated, slavery must cease to exist, is equally clear. This is only asserting that there will be no bondage in Heaven. Among

beings of the same nature, each relatively perfect, there can be no other inequalities than those which spring from superior endowments---the outward advantages of all must be of the same kind, though they may vary in degrees proportioned to the capacities of the individuals to enjoy them. If Adam had never sinned, and brought death into the world with all our woe, the bondage of man to man would never have been instituted ; and when the effects of transgression shall have been purged from the earth, and the new heavens and the new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness, given to the Saints, all bondage shall be abolished. In this sense slavery is inconsistent with the spirit of the Gospel, that it contemplates a state of things---an existing economy which it is the design of the Gospel to remove. Slavery is a part of the curse which sin has introduced into the world ; and stands in the same general relations to Christianity as poverty, sickness, disease or death. In other words, it is a relation which can only be conceived as taking place among fallen beings---tainted with a curse. It springs not from the nature of man as man, nor from the nature of society as such, but from the nature of man as sinful, and the nature of society as disordered.

Upon an earth radiant with the smile of Heaven, or in the Paradise of God, we can no more picture the figure of a slave, than we can picture the figures of the halt, the maimed, the lame, and the blind---we can no more fancy the existence of masters and tasks than we can dream of hospitals and beggars. These are the badges of a fallen world. That it is inconsistent with a perfect state---that it is not absolutely a good---a blessing---the most strenuous defender of slavery ought not to permit himself to deny ; and the devout believer in Revelation, would be mad to close his eyes to the fact, that the form in which it is first threatened, in the Bible, is as a punishment for crime. It is a natural evil which God has visited upon society, because man kept not his first estate, but fell, and under the Gospel, is turned, like all other natural evils, into the means of an effective, spiritual discipline. The Gospel does not propose to make our present state a *perfect* one---to make our earth a Heaven. Here is where the philanthropists mistake. They picture

to themselves imaginary models of a perfect commonwealth---they judge of good and evil, by the standard of such ideal schemes---they condemn whatever comes short of their conceptions, without reference to the circumstances which, after all, may make it relatively good. The sterility of the earth is, no doubt, in itself considered, an evil; but in its relations to man, who has lost his integrity, and to whom labour has become a burden, it is a needful stimulus of industry, and is so overruled into a blessing. The distinction of ranks in society, in the same way, is an evil; but in our fallen world, an absolute equality would be an absolute stagnation of all enterprise and industry. Good and evil, it should never be forgotten, are relative terms, and what may be good for one man may be an evil to another---or what is good at one time, may be hurtful to the same individual at another. It can be affirmed of no form of government, and of no condition in society, that it is absolutely the best or the worst; and in the inscrutable Providence of God, it is no doubt arranged, that the circumstances of individuals, and the social and political institutions of communities, are, upon the whole, those which are best adapted to the degree of their moral progress. The free citizen of England and America, could not endure the condition of African bondage---it would defeat his individual development. Neither could these nations endure the lifeless stagnation of Asiatick despotism. But the governments of Asia may be the only ones consistent with the moral developement of their people, and subjection to a master, the state in which the African is most effectually trained to the moral end of his being. When we consider the diversities in moral position, which sin has been the means of entailing upon the race, we may be justified in affirming that, relatively to some persons and to some times, slavery may be a good, or to speak more accurately, a condition, though founded in a curse from which the Providence of God extracts a blessing. We are not to judge of the institutions of the present, by the standard of the future life---we are not to confound the absolute and relative.---For aught that we know slavery may stand in somewhat the same relation to political society, in a world like ours, in which mortality stands to the human

body; and it may be as vain to think of extirpating it, as to think of giving man immortality upon earth. It may be, and perhaps is, in some of its forms, essential to an imperfect society; and it may be, and perhaps is, the purpose of God that it should be found among men, as long as the slime of the serpent is over the earth. Admit, then, that slavery is inconsistent with the spirit of the Gospel, as that spirit is to find its full developement in a state of glory---yet the conclusion, by no means, follows that it is inconsistent with the spirit of the Gospel, as that spirit operates among rebels and sinners, in a degraded world, and under a dispensation of grace. The real question is, whether it is incompatible with the spiritual prosperity of individuals, or the general progress and education of society. It is clearly the office of the Gospel to train men, by virtue of the discipline of temptation, hardship and evil, for a state of perfection and glory. Nothing is inconsistent with it which does not present obstacles to the practice of duty, which its own grace is inadequate to surmount. Whoever, therefore, would maintain that slavery is incompatible with the present relations of the Gospel to man, must maintain that it precludes him, by its very nature, from the discharge of some of the duties which the Gospel enjoins. It is nothing to the purpose to speak of it generally and vaguely as an evil---it must be shown to be an evil of that specific kind which necessitates the commission of sin, and the neglect of duty. Neither is it sufficient to say that it presents strong temptations to sin, in the violent motives which a master may press upon a slave, to execute unlawful commands. This can be affirmed of numberless other situations, in which none will contend that it is unlawful to be found. The question is---not whether it is the state most favourable to the offices of piety and virtue---but whether it is essentially incompatible with their exercise. This is the true issue.

The fundamental mistake of those who affirm slavery to be essentially sinful, is that the duties of all men are specifically the same. Though they do not state the proposition in so many words, and in its naked form would probably dissent from it, yet a little attention to their reasoning puts it beyond doubt, that this is the rad-

ical assumption upon which they proceed--all men are bound to do specifically the same things. As there are obviously duties of some men, in some relations, which cannot be practised by a slave--they infer that the institution strips him of his rights, and curtails the fair proportions of his humanity. The argument, fully and legitimately carried out, would condemn every arrangement of society which did not secure to all its members an absolute equality of position; it is the very spirit of socialism and communism.

The doctrine of the Bible, on the other hand, is that the specifick duties--the things actually required to be done, are as various as the circumstances in which men are placed. Moral perfection does not depend upon the number or variety of single acts, but upon the general habits of the soul. He is upright whose temper of mind is in conformity with the law, and whose prevailing disposition would always prompt him, in all the relations of life, to do what is right. There may be many right things which he may never be required to perform---but he is entitled to the praise of excellence if he cultivates a spirit which would lead him to perform them, if circumstances should ever make them his duty. The heart may be in full and perfect sympathy with the whole spirit of the law, where the moral training has been confined to comparatively a narrow circle of actual duties. He may be full of benevolence, who has never had the means or opportunity of costly alms to the poor---he may cherish the gentleness of a lamb who has received no injuries to be forgiven---no wrongs to be forgotten---and he may possess the patience of a martyr, or the fortitude of a hero, whose virtue has never been tried by severe suffering or danger. The circumstances in which men are placed in this sub-lunary state are exceedingly diversified, but there is probably no external condition, in which the actual discipline to which men are subjected, may not terminate in the temper of universal holiness. Some are tried in one way, some in another---some are required to do one set of things, some another---but the spirit of true obedience is universally the same--and the result of an effectual probation is, in every case, a moral sympathy with the moral perfections of God. The lesson is the same, however different the text-books from which it has been taught.

Now unless slavery is incompatible with the habitudes of holiness---unless it is inconsistent with the spirit of philanthropy or the spirit of piety---unless it furnishes no opportunities for obedience to the law, it is not inconsistent with the pursuit or attainment of the highest excellence. It is no abridgement of moral freedom; the slave may come from the probation of *his* circumstances as fully stamped with the image of God, as those who have enjoyed an easier lot---he may be as completely in unison with the spirit of universal rectitude, as if he had been trained on flowery beds of ease. Let him discharge his *whole* duty in the actual circumstances of his case, and he is entitled to the praise of a perfect and an upright man. The question with God is---not *what* he has done---but *how*---man looketh at the outward circumstances, but God looketh at the heart.

Hence those moralists are grievously in error, who have represented slavery as inconsistent with the full complement of human duty and as a consequent limitation upon the spiritual freedom of man, because there are duties which God has not connected with this condition of society. To maintain that the same things are universally obligatory, without regard to circumstances or relations, that what is exacted of one must necessarily be exacted from another, however different or even incongruous their outward states, is to confound the obligations of rulers and subjects, of parents and children, of guardians and wards, and to plunge the community into irretrievable confusion. All that can be affirmed is, that the same temper of universal rectitude is equally incumbent upon all, while it must be admitted, that the outward forms of its manifestation and expression must be determined by the relations which Providence has actually assigned to our state. The slave is to show his reverence for God---the freedom of his inward man---by a cheerful obedience to the lawful commands of his master---the master, his regard for one who is his master in heaven, by rendering to the slave that which is just and equal. The character of both is determined, in the sight of God, by the spirit which pervades their single acts, however the acts may differ in themselves.

If slavery is not essentially incompatible with the dis-

charge of the essential duties, as a spiritual service, it is not destructive of the essential rights of humanity. All political organizations, our enemies themselves being judges, are subservient to the interests of the individual. "A human being," says Dr. Channing,* in a passage to which we have no other objection than that it represents the perfection of the individual as the ultimate end of his existence, while the Scriptures represent it as a means to a higher and nobler end--the glory of God, "A human being is a member of the community, not as a limb is a member of the body, or as a wheel is a part of a machine, intended only to contribute to some general, joint result. He was created, not to be merged in the whole, as a drop in the ocean, or as a particle of sand on the sea-shore, and to aid only in composing a mass. He is an ultimate being, made for his own perfection as the highest end, made to maintain an individual existence, and to serve others only as far as consists with his own virtue and progress. Hitherto governments have tended greatly to obscure this importance of the individual, to depress him in his own eyes, to give him the idea of an outward interest more important than the invisible soul, and of an outward authority more sacred than the voice of God in his own secret conscience. Rulers have called the private man the property of the state, meaning generally by the state themselves, and thus the many have been immolated to the few, and have even believed that this was their highest destination. These views cannot be too earnestly withstood. Nothing seems to me so needful as to give to the mind the consciousness, which governments have done so much suppress, of its own separate worth. Let the individual feel, that through his immortality, he may concentrate in his own being a greater good than that of nations. Let him feel that he is placed in the community, not to part with his individuality, or to become a tool, but that he should find a sphere for his various powers, and a preparation for immortal glory. To me, the progress of society consists in nothing more than in bringing out the individual, in giving him a consciousness of his own being, and in quickening him to strengthen and elevate his own mind."

* Works, Vol. II. p. 77.

All this the grace of God, through the instrumentality of the gospel, may accomplish in the person of one, who is bound to labour under the direction and authority of another. The servant of men may be the freeman of the Lord. If his situation is compatible, as it confessedly is, with the achievement of the great end of his existence---if in the school of bondage he may be trained for the glorification and enjoyment of God, he is not divested of any of the rights which belong to him essentially *as man*. He may develope his moral and religious nature---the source and measure of all his rights---and must, consequently, retain every characteristick of essential humanity.

No proposition can be clearer than that the rights of man must be ultimately traced to his duties, and are nothing more than the obligations of his fellows to let him alone in the discharge of all the functions, and the enjoyment of all the blessings of his lot. Whatever puts an obstruction or hinderance to the complement of his duties is an encroachment upon the complement of his rights as a *man*. Whatever is incompatible with the exercise of his moral nature is destructive of the fundamental law of his being. But as the moral discipline of man is consistent with the greatest variety of external condition, it is consistent with the greatest variety of contingent rights---of rights which spring from peculiar circumstances and peculiar relations---and in the absence of which a man may still be a man. These cannot be treated as a fixed and invariable quantity. Dependent as they are upon our duties---which, in turn, are dependent upon our circumstances, they fluctuate with the gradations and progress of society---being wider or narrower according to the spheres in which we move. It is only by postulating duties for the slave which God has not enjoined on him---that any show of decency can be given to the declamations against the robbery and fraud which have incapacitated him to perform them. The slave has rights---all the rights which belong essentially to humanity, and without which his nature could not be human, nor his conduct susceptible of praise or blame. In the enjoyment of these rights religion demands that he should be protected.

But then there are rights which belong to men, in other situations, to which he is by no means entitled; the

rights of the citizen, for example, and the free member of the commonwealth. They are not his, for the simple reason that they are not essential, but contingent; they do not spring from humanity simply considered, for then they would belong to women and children—but from humanity in such and such relations.

As to the influence of slavery upon the advancement of society, there can be no doubt, if the government of God be moral, that the true progress of communities and States, as well as the highest interests of individuals, depend upon the fidelity with which the duties are discharged, in every condition of life. It is the great law of providential education; that to every one that hath shall be given and he shall have abundance; but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath. In this way the reign of universal justice is promoted, and wherever that obtains, the developement of the individual, which is the great end of all social and political institutions, must infallibly take place. The prosperity of the State at the same time, is secured, and secured, too, without the necessity of sudden changes or violent revolutions. It will be like the vigour of a healthful body, in which all the limbs and organs perform their appropriate functions, without collision or tumult, and its ascension to a high degree of moral elevation will be like the growth of such a body, silent and imperceptible, the natural result of the blessing of God upon the means He has appointed. Let masters and servants, each in their respective spheres, be impregnated with the principle of duty—let masters resolve to render unto their servants that which is just and equal, never transcending the legitimate bounds of their authority—and servants resolve to cherish sentiments of reverence for their masters according to the flesh—never falling short of the legitimate claims on their obedience, and the chief good of each, as individuals and as men, will be most surely promoted, while each will contribute an important share to the strength and stability of the commonwealth. The feet are as indispensable to the head as the head to the feet. The social fabrick is made up of divers ingredients, and the cement which binds them together in durability and unity is the cement of justice.

Beside the arguments drawn from considerations of justice and the essential rights of humanity, the incompatibility of slavery with the spirit and temper of the Gospel, is not unfrequently attempted to be made out, from the injunction of the Saviour to love our neighbour as ourselves, and to do unto others as we would have them do unto us. The principle, however, upon which the precept of universal benevolence is interpreted in this case, makes it the sanction of the grossest wickedness. If we are to regulate our conduct to others by the arbitrary expectations which, in their circumstances, our passions and selfishness might prompt us to indulge, there ceases to be any other standard of morality than caprice. The humour of every man becomes law. The judge could not condemn the criminal, nor the executioner behead him---the rich man could not claim his possessions nor the poor learn patience from their sufferings. If I am bound to emancipate my slave, because if the tables were turned and our situations reversed, I should covet this boon from him, I should be bound, upon the same principle, to promote my indigent neighbours around me, to an absolute equality with myself. That neither the Jews, in whose law the precept was first formally announced, nor the Apostles, to whom it was more fully expounded by the Saviour, ever applied it in the sense of the Abolitionists, is a strong presumption against their mode of interpretation. The truth is, it is nothing but the inculcation of *justice* from motives of love. Our Saviour directs us to do unto others what, in their situations, it would be right and reasonable in us to expect from them. We are to put ourselves in their situations, that we may duly weigh the circumstances of their case, and so be prepared to apply to it the principles of universal justice. We are to let no motives of indolence, ease or apathy prevent us from considering their condition. We are to take the same interest in them that we would take in ourselves---and are to extend to them the same protection of the Divine law which we would insist upon for ourselves. The rule then simply requires, in the case of slavery, that we should treat our slaves as we should feel that we had a right to be treated if we were slaves ourselves---it is only enforcing by benevolence the apostolick injunction---masters, give unto

your servants, that which is just and equal. Do right, in other words, as you would claim right.

The instances which are usually urged to prove that slavery is inconsistent with the rights of man, unfortunately for the argument, are not peculiar to slavery. They are incidents to poverty, wherever it prevails in a distressing form; and a wise system of legislation could much more easily detach them from the system of slavery than from the deep indigence which is sure to crush the labourer where a crowded population obtains. They are, at best, only abuses in the one case which might be corrected, while in the other, they seem to be inseparable elements.

Enough has been said to show that slavery is not repugnant to the spirit of the Gospel, in its present relations to our race. It is one of the conditions in which God is conducting the moral probation of man--a condition not incompatible with the highest moral freedom, the true glory of the race, and, therefore, not unfit for the moral and spiritual discipline which Christianity has instituted. It is one of the schools in which immortal spirits are trained for their final destiny. If it is attended with severer hardships, these hardships are compensated by fewer duties, and the very violence of its temptations gives dignity and lustre to its virtues. The slave may be fitted, in his humble, and if you please, degraded lot, for shining as a star in the firmament of heaven. In his narrow sphere, he may be cherishing and cultivating a spirit which shall render him meet for the society of angels and the everlasting enjoyment of God. The Christian beholds in him, not a tool, not a chattel, not a brute or thing--but an immortal spirit, assigned to a particular position in this world of wretchedness and sin, in which he is required to work out the destiny which attaches to him, in common with his fellows, as a man. He is an actor on the broad theatre of life--and as true merit depends not so much upon the part which is assigned, as upon the propriety and dignity with which it is sustained--so fidelity in this relation, may hereafter be as conspicuously rewarded, as fidelity in more exalted stations. Angels and God look not upon the outward state of man--the poverty, rags and wretchedness of one--the robes, diadems and crowns of ano-

ther, are nothing. True worth is the moral vesture of the soul. The spirit of obedience, the love of holiness, sympathy with God, these are the things which make men beautiful and glorious. This is true freedom---these are the things which shall endure and flourish with increasing lustre, when Thrones have crumbled in the dust and Republicks mouldered among the ruins of the past.

The important question among us is, that which relates to the discharge of our own duties as masters---what are the things which are just and equal that we are required to render to our slaves.

But before attending to this inquiry, it may be well to notice the popular argument against slavery, drawn from the fact, that as it must have begun in the perpetration of grievous wrong, no lapse of time can make it subsequently right. Prescription can never sanctify injustice. The answer turns upon the distinction between the wrong itself and the effects of the wrong. The criminal act, whatever it may have been, by which a man was reduced to the condition of bondage, can never cease to be otherwise than criminal, but the relations to which that act gave rise, may, themselves, be consistent with the will of God and the foundation of new and important duties. The relations of a man to his natural offspring, though wickedly formed, give rise to duties which would be ill-discharged by the destruction of the child. No doubt the principle upon which slavery has been most largely engrafted into society as an integral element of its complex constitution---the principle, that captivity in war gives a right to the life of a prisoner, for which his bondage is accepted in exchange, is not consistent with the truth of the case. But it was recognized as true for ages and generations---it was a step in the moral development of nations, and has laid the foundation of institutions and usages, which cannot now be disturbed with impunity, and in regard to which, our conduct must be regulated by the fact of their existence, and not by speculations upon the morality of their origin. Our world exhibits, every where, the traces of sin---and if we tolerate nothing but what we may expect to find in a state of perfection and holiness, we must leave this scene of sublunary distraction. The education of States is a slow process. Their

standards of rectitude slowly approximate the standard of God, and in their ages of infancy, ignorance and blindness, they establish many institutions upon false maxims, which cannot subsequently be extirpated without abandoning the whole of the real progress they have made, and reconstituting society afresh. These things, moreover, take place under the sleepless Providence of God, who is surely accomplishing His own great purposes, and who makes the wrath of man to praise Him, and restrains, at pleasure, the remainder of wrath.

In treating slavery as an existing institution, a fact involving most important moral relations, one of the prime duties of the State is to protect, by temporal legislation, the real rights of the slave. The moral sense of the country acknowledges them—the religion of the country, to a large extent, ensures their observance, but until they are defined by law and enforced by penalties, there is no adequate protection of them. They are in the category of imperfect and not of perfect rights. The effect of legal protection would be to counteract whatever tendencies slavery may be supposed to possess to produce servility and abjectness of mind. It would inspire a sense of personal responsibility—a certain degree of manliness and dignity of character, which would be, at once, a security to the master and an immense blessing to the slave. The meanness, cunning, hypocrisy, lying and theft, which accompany a sense of degradation, would give place to the opposite virtues, and there would be no foundation in our social relations for that slavery which Cicero defines—*obedientia fracti animi et abjecti, et arbitrio carentis suo*.

In the different systems of slavery, taken collectively, all the essential rights of humanity have been recognized by law—showing that there is nothing in the relation itself, inconsistent with this legal protection. The right to acquire knowledge—which is practically admitted by us, though legally denied, was fully recognized by the Romans, whose slaves were often the teachers of their children, and the scholars of the commonwealth. The right of the family was formally protected among the Spaniards; and the right to personal safety is largely protected by ourselves. But, without stopping to inquire in

what way temporal legislation may, most effectually, protect the rights of the slave, we hesitate not to affirm that one of the highest and most solemn obligations which rests upon the masters of the South, is to give to their servants, to the utmost extent of their ability, free access to the instructions and institutions of the Gospel. The injustice of denying to them food and raiment and shelter, against which the law effectually guards, is nothing to the injustice of defrauding them of that bread which cometh down from Heaven. Their labour is ours. From infancy to age, they attend on us—they greet our introduction into the world with smiles of joy, and lament our departure with a heartfelt sorrow; and every motive of humanity and religion exacts from us, that we should remunerate their services by putting within their reach, the means of securing a blessed immortality.—The meanest slave has, in him, a soul of priceless value, “No earthly or celestial language can exaggerate its worth. Thought, reason, conscience, the capacity of virtue, the capacity of Christian love—an immortal destiny, an intimate moral connection with God; here are attributes of our common humanity which reduce to insignificance all outward distinctions, and make every human being” a sublime, an awful object. That soul has sinned—it is under the curse of the Almighty, and nothing can save it from an intolerable hell but the redemption that is in Christ Jesus. They must hear this joyful sound or perish. For how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard, and how shall they hear without a preacher, and how shall they preach except they be sent? Our design in giving them the Gospel, is not to civilize them—not to change their social condition—not to exalt them into citizens or freemen—it is to save them. The Church contemplates them only as sinners, and she is straitened to declare unto them the unsearchable riches of Christ. She sees them as the poor of the land, under the lawful dominion of their masters; and she says to these masters, in the name and by the authority of God, give them what justice, benevolence, humanity would demand even for a stranger, an enemy, a persecutor—give them the Gospel, without which life will be a curse. Sweeten their toil—sanctify their lives—

hallow their deaths. The movement in Charleston is a proof that the call has not been wholly disregarded among us. We have begun a good work; and God grant that it may never cease until every slave in the land is brought under the tuition of Jesus of Nazareth. None need be afraid of His lessons. It was said of Him on earth, that He should not cry, nor lift up, nor cause His voice to be heard in the streets. He was no stirrer up of strife, nor mover of sedition. His "religion on the other hand, is the pillar of society, the safeguard of nations, the parent of social order, which alone has power to curb the fury of the passions, and secure to every one his rights; to the laborious, the reward of their industry; to the rich, the enjoyment of their wealth; to nobles, the preservation of their honours; and to princes, the stability of their thrones." Insurrection, anarchy and bloodshed—revolt against masters, or treason against States, were never learned in the school of Him, whose Apostles enjoined subjection to the magistrate, and obedience to all lawful authority, as characteristick duties of the faithful. Is any thing to be apprehended from the instructions of Him, in whose text-book it is recorded: "let as many servants as are under the yoke, count their masters worthy of all honour?" Christian knowledge inculcates contentment with our lot; and in bringing before us the tremendous realities of eternity, renders us comparatively indifferent to the inconveniences and hardships of time. It subdues those passions and prejudices, from which all real danger to the social economy springs. "Some have objected," says a splendid writer*, "to the instruction of the lower classes, from an apprehension that it would lift them above their sphere, make them dissatisfied with their station in life, and by impairing the habits of subordination, endanger the tranquillity of the State; an objection devoid surely of all force and validity. It is not easy to conceive in what manner instructing men in their duties can prompt them to neglect those duties, or how that enlargement of reason which enables them to comprehend the true grounds of authority, and the obligation to obedience, should indispose them to obey. The admirable mechan-

* Robert Hall. *Advantages of Knowledge to the lower classes.* Works, Vol. I. p. 202.

ism of society, together with that subordination of ranks which is essential to its subsistence, is surely not an elaborate imposture, which the exercise of reason will detect and expose. The objection we have stated, implies a reflection on the social order, equally impolitick, invidious and unjust. Nothing in reality renders legitimate governments so insecure as extreme ignorance in the people. It is this which yields them an easy prey to seduction—makes them the victims of prejudices and false alarms, and so ferocious withal, that their interference in a time of publick commotion, is more to be dreaded than the eruption of a volcano.”

Our highest security in these States, lies in the confidence and affection of our servants, and nothing will more effectually propitiate their regards than consistent efforts, upon our part, to promote their everlasting good. They will feel that those are not tyrants who are striving to bring them unto God; and they will be slow to cast off a system which has become associated in their minds with their dearest hopes and most precious consolations. Brutal ignorance is indeed to be dreaded—the only security against it, is physical force—it is the parent of ferocity, of rashness, of desperate enterprizes. But Christian knowledge softens and subdues. Christ Jesus in binding His subjects to God, binds them more closely to each other in the ties of confidence, fidelity and love. We would say, then, to our brethren of the South, go on in your present undertaking; and though our common enemies may continue to revile, you will be consolidating the elements of your social fabrick, so firmly and compactly, that it shall defy the storms of fanaticism, while the spectacle you will exhibit of union, sympathy and confidence, among the different orders of the community, will be a standing refutation of all their accusations against us. Go on in this noble enterprise, until every slave in our borders shall know of Jesus and the resurrection; and the blessing of God will attend you—and turn back that tide of indignation which the publick opinion of the world is endeavouring to roll upon you.—Go on in this career, and afford another illustration of what all experience has demonstrated, that Christianity is the cheap defence of every institution which contributes to the progress of man.

ARTICLE VII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *The Fathers and the Children. Two Sermons preached on Fast Day, April 6th, 1848, in the Second Presbyterian Church, Newburyport, Mass. by W. W. EELLS. Boston. Crocker & Brewster, 1848.*

The following remarks compose the author's preface. "These Sermons are presented to the public, not hastily, but with deliberation, and under a deep sense of duty. "Corruptions," says Cotton Mather, "will grow upon this land, and they will gain by silence. It will be so invidious to speak of them, that no one will dare do it, and the fate of Amyclac will be ours." In the present attempt to break this hurtful silence, had it been thought necessary, all the facts asserted, and the positions taken, might have been fortified by abundant public testimony from men of note. The doctrinal defections set forth have been taken from the notes of lectures delivered by a most popular professor of theology; while it is known, also, that the same views are wide extended.

"While argument and investigation are courted, it is not too much to ask, that every reader will have the candor to allow; that the writer may possess as warm a love for the home of his fathers, as burns in the bosom of any son of the Puritans, and may be as willing to do justice to its real virtues."

Mr. Eells' manner throughout these discourses strongly confirms his declaration that he gives them to the public under a deep sense of duty. He is profoundly serious, even to sadness. We should think no one could read these discourses without feeling that the writer is in earnest; and yet his earnestness is not of that description which vents itself in strong epithets. He is never objurgatory. His earnestness is in the thoughts and statements he presents and the feelings he manifests and excites. Himself a son of the Puritans, he seems overwhelmed with the sad conviction that the glory of New-England Theology is departed; and

writing so clearly and forcibly, yet so calmly and tenderly, he deepens this long-established conviction in our own minds, and we lay down his sermons with no feelings but those of the most solemn and painful character.

The preacher's text is Matt. iii. 9. "And think not to say within yourselves, we have Abraham to our father." He applies the Baptist's warning to the people of New-England. "While like the Jews of old we cease not to boast 'we have the Puritans to our fathers,' and pride ourselves in their character and their works, and count ourselves the favorites of heaven on their account, and look upon all the great mercies of God about us as secure through them, and say in our hearts, 'Our mountain stands strong, and we shall never be moved,' may it not be true after all, that we have forsaken the principles of our fathers, and are hastening to use up and to consume the blessing of God upon the land, for the father's sake."

"Are we following them as they followed Christ? Are we walking in the footsteps of their faith? Are we carrying out in their spirit the solemn and noble purposes, for which they became exiles from the dear land of their nativity, and sought these desolate and distant shores? * * For they had a purpose, clear and well defined. They were no "rabble rout," led by the spirit of reckless adventure to foreign shores. * * * They did not come here to find scope to discover truth, but to practice what they already knew. * * Here they came, with a high and solemn purpose. * * It was one which they counted worthy of all the sacrifices which they were called to make, and which sustained them under all their trials,—yea which caused them to wake the echoes among the woods and hills of this untried and hostile land, "with their hymns of lofty cheer."

"These were our fathers; and the foundation principle of all their conduct was their belief in the Bible as the word of God. * * It was not in ignorance, nor in credulity, that they received this word of God,—that, in all its teachings, it was as if Jehovah spake to them, with an audible voice out of heaven. They had heard all the oppositions of science falsely so called, and all the babblings of shallow, earthborn philosophy. They were not ignorant of the

doubts, the calumnies, and the sneers, which the wicked heart of man, and the malice of the evil one, have raised against this volume of eternal truth. They had probed all the reasonings, which some of their descendants foolishly rejoice in as newly discovered wisdom, and had found them but vanity and a lie. They had cast away, as the rubbish of iniquity, (antiquity?) what these their children gather up as hidden treasure. And in full view of all that art, and learning, and ingenuity could devise against the truth, they still held firmly, and wisely, and unwaveringly to this book, as God's word, which "holy men of old spake, and wrote, as they were moved by the Holy Ghost;"—so they held it, that they were ready to go to dungeons and to death, for the sake of what is here revealed. It was not to them the record of a revelation, made by fallible men, and so full of mistakes and errors. They did not so blaspheme the wisdom and the goodness of God. It was the revelation itself; all that the Lord our God saw necessary for us to know, to guide us through time, and to a happy eternity, written down by the pen of inspiration, supernaturally guided and directed by Jehovah himself, so that every part comes to us and to all men, with the authority of a "Thus saith the Lord," and is incapable of addition, or emendation or modification."

"Do we, their descendants, entertain and cherish this same deep and solemn reverence for the revealed will of God?"

"I know that, in answering this question, your minds will turn naturally to the multitudes of those descendants of the Puritans, who deny the inspiration of the Scriptures; and who have frittered away its holy teachings, each at his own will and pleasure, until, with most its authority is now no more than that of the latest French novel. It is a mournful thought, that these who thus cast away the Bible, and the God of the Bible, and lean to their own understandings;—who "wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived," are yet, as well as we, the descendants of the holy men of old; and that they too, in the pride of their heart, cease not to boast, "We have the Puritans to our fathers,"—and falsely to justify themselves by this, even when labouring to destroy the works of their fathers. These are no interlopers who have come in after time to pervert and to destroy. They have gone out of the bowels of the Church of Christ. Nor will it do to compare numbers with them, as the delusive practice of some is, and to be

satisfied because, perhaps, we are more numerous than they. It is not certain that this is the case. But, however this may be, when we stand as a people before God, to answer to the trust committed to us by our fathers, it becomes us to remember, in shame and self-abasement, that these are our brethren according to the flesh, and that their defection is so much dead loss to the cause of truth. They are the children of the patriarchs, and they have departed from God, and like Ephraim and Manasseh, they have set up their own king, and their own God, and have refused obedience to the Son of David."

The Bible is then set forth as the divine cure for all the moral evils of this world; and the Church as God's appointed agency for bringing this saving gospel home to the hearts of men. Mr. Eells strongly maintains that the Church has been recreant to her duty in leaving the education of her children so much to the State. He passes on from this point to develop what he considers the end of this beginning, and makes the following remarks on another very important question:

"Recognizing in every thing the great truth of man's depravity, and his entire dependence upon Divine aid, for all power to do good, our fathers sent all that were struggling with temptation, that would strive for virtue, and would resist evil, to the Lord Jehovah as their refuge, to the ordinances of the Church as their safety and their strength. This was their wisdom, that they strengthened themselves in the strength of Jehovah. They waged no silly crusades, in their own strength, against single sins, but they sought to plant in every breast, a deep fear of the Holy God,—to make each man feel that the eye of Jehovah was ever upon him. They sought to strengthen every man, that he might go alone, might depend upon no arm but that of the Almighty,—drawing strength from no associations, but those appointed of God, and most of all from the Church, and its ordinances of grace. All the moral influence needed in this world for any good work, they found, where God has placed it, in the Church, bearing the word of God, enjoying his present blessing, and the promise of final success.

"To those who hold not the binding authority of every word of the Lord Jehovah—what they may call the Church, is of no more weight than any other association of men. It is powerless to any benevolent work, because it has no definite object. They begin by supplementing the Church, by undertaking to do the work of the Redeemer, and of the Holy Spirit, in this one point, better

than the all-wise Jehovah can do it. And soon, this one object swells and magnifies before their distorted vision, until all other sins are lost sight of, and their standard on this single point of propriety or duty, becomes the measure of a perfect character before God and man. And the Church is set aside as an obsolete idea,—a decrepid and tottering organization that has outlived its time,—an almanac out of date."

The evils which are thus pointed out as existing in the land of the Puritans will no doubt strike our readers as very terrific. In these regions perhaps no similar abuses are to be witnessed. It is not to be denied, however, that many among us have adopted views and principles which may be carried out by their successors to all the results now actually witnessed in New England. The progress of error is downwards, and that always by a *facile descent*.

Having thus in the first sermon compared the practice of New-Englanders now with that of their fathers, Mr. E. proceeds in the second discourse to compare their *principles*. We quote :

"Thus, notwithstanding all the self-conceited and ignorant boasting, that we hear,—for ignorant it must be, if it is not something worse, even a wicked device to deceive,—notwithstanding the cry of puritan theology, from pulpits, and tracts, and pamphlets, and newspapers, and more aspiring periodicals, it is evident from our practice, that there is very little of true puritan theology amongst us. But we may leave these reasonings, and come to facts. In the first place, it is an undeniable fact, that very little doctrinal preaching of any kind is found in the pulpits of the present day, in this land of the Puritans.

"And in the second place, the popular theology of the day,—that which is held to an alarming extent, and is increasing almost unrebuked, and which bids fair soon to be universal,—is a direct contradiction, in every important point, to the theology and the doctrine of our fathers.

"By their definition of sin, they sweep off at once, the whole doctrine of original sin. "Sin," they say, "is voluntary action in view of known law." Sin is altogether action. The very idea of a sinful disposition, a depraved nature, a sinful propensity, is scouted and ridiculed as an absurdity.

"Besides this, the representative character of Adam, is utterly denied and derided. Nothing from his first sin reaches us as a penalty.

"They ridicule any imputation of the sin of Adam, or any thing like inherent sinfulness, or hereditary depravity. They

hold clearly that ability and obligation are always commensurate. Of course, then, such a thing as original sin, an unholy nature, a nature under the condemnation and curse of the law of God, is an absurdity. The very idea furnishes them with matter for profane revilings.

"Now these notions of the disease, shape and modify all notions of the remedy.

"Alas!—we are the children of the Puritans, who rested upon this mighty Saviour, and were strong in the Lord, and in the strength of his salvation;—and we boast that we have them to our fathers, but we have cast away the strongholds of their faith. I but echo the cry of these new system mongers, when I say that this doctrine of atonement, and this doctrine of justification, are almost wholly unknown among the descendants of the Puritans, in this the land of their prayers. And not only so, but men in high places in the Church, seem to find a malignant pleasure, first, in caricaturing these doctrines, and then in holding them up to derision and to contempt. All the plain declarations of holy writ,—all the blessed words of Paul and of Isaiah,—respecting the suretyship of Christ, they turn to metaphors and figures of speech. With them, *justice* had nothing to do with the sufferings of Christ; and these had no reference to the lawgiver, by way of appeasing or averting his wrath. The penalty of the law was not laid upon the Lord Jesus;—it stands yet unmet, and in full force; yea, against Abraham and the beloved disciple, in the Kingdom of Heaven. They deny also the sovereignty of grace, and hold that "in an important sense God is bound to save some of mankind." And the cross of Christ is a governmental expedient to prevent the evils of gratuitous forgiveness;—a device, in some way, to make it consistent for God to "evade" His own law, and to bestow favor upon those who "comply with such conditions as the interests of the universe demand." They set mercy against justice. And they send the soul, overburdened with the sense of guilt, and overwhelmed with a view of the awful holiness of Jehovah, up to this God, with the plea of his own faith and repentance, to ask for mercy at the expense of justice;—to ask the Holy One, that He will cast away His holiness, and justice, and truth, and receive them into favour.

"And it is forgiveness merely that they bid man hope for, or seek. The idea that the obedience of the Lord Jesus had any thing to do with our salvation,—was any part of his mediatorial work, they hold in the utmost abhorrence, and cover with bitter revilings. They, therefore, know nothing of full justification."

These paragraphs speak for themselves. We add no comments,

but would simply express our gratitude, that amidst the general defection the great Head of the Church still reserves in the land of the Puritans, a few ministers who are able to defend with clearness and with force the doctrines of grace.

2. *Pious Meditations and Devout Breathings.* By the Rev'd. JOSEPH HALL, D. D. Bishop of Norwich. Philadelphia. Presbyterian Board of Publication. Pp. 228, 18mo.

This volume embraces a portion of the practical writings of an eminent and godly prelate of the English Church. He was sent by James as one of the English deputies to the Synod of Dort, in 1618. Though he wrote largely in favour of Episcopacy, his piety and zeal caused him to be suspected of Puritanism, and he was subjected to much annoyance on this account. He afterwards suffered at the hands of the Parliament. While his controversial writings have ceased to attract notice, his "Contemplations," his "Enochismus or Treatise on Walking with God," and other pious treatises, have always been much and deservedly esteemed. His style has now the air of quaintness, but he has been called the Seneca of English Divines, from its purity and striking antithesis. The character of these meditations may be judged of from the following, on the Millenium:

"O BLESSED Saviour, what a strange variety of opinions do I find concerning thy thousand years' reign! What riddles are in that prophecy, which no human tongue can read! Where to fix the beginning of that marvellous millenary, and where the end; and what manner of reign it shall be, whether temporal or spiritual, on earth or in Heaven; these things undergo as many constructions, as there are pens that have undertaken it. Yet, when all is done, I see thine apostle speaks only of the souls of thy martyrs, reigning so long with thee; not of thy reigning on earth so long with those martyrs. How busy are the tongues of men, how are their brains taken up with the indeterminable construction of this enigmatical truth; when in the mean time, the care of thy spiritual reign in their hearts, is neglected. O my Sav-

iour, while others weary themselves with the disquisition of thy personal reign upon earth, for a thousand years, let it be the whole bent and study of my soul, to make sure my personal reign with thee in Heaven, to all eternity."

3. *The Kingdom of God : a discourse preached before the Synod of New Jersey, Oct. 17, 1849.* By CHARLES K. IMBRIE, *Pastor of the first Presbyterian Church, Rahway, N. J.* New York ; Franklin Knight, 1850. pp. 147, 18mo.

The preacher takes for his text, Dan. xii. 4, "But thou, O Daniel, shut up the words, and seal the book even unto the end : many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased." He maintains that this is the time of the end, that the knowledge spoken of is knowledge respecting the Kingdom of Christ, and that we are the very men who are to run to and fro and obtain this increased knowledge. Some of the points of this knowledge are, that in the conduct of the missionary work, we are to labour separately for the conversion of the Jews, and to give them the precedence in the work of missions, believing that they are to be restored to Palestine, and that the Gentiles are to come to their light, and Kings to the brightness of their rising ; that the kingdom for whose coming we pray, is not to be set up till the second personal appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ, when He shall reign in Mount Zion, and dwell in Jerusalem ; that till then the Church is to be a "witness bearing" Church, without any large prospect of the world's conversion, but rather with the prospect of increasing darkness till the King appears. Upon the appearing of Christ then, in person, is all our hope of the overthrow of error, and the complete spread of the Gospel in the world dependent. The sermon is earnest and spirited, honest and fearless, but it does not bring conviction to our minds of the justness of its conclusions, and the coincidence of its views with the general spirit of Scripture.

4. *Memoirs of the Life and Writings of Thos. Chalmers, D. D., L. L. D.* By his son-in-law, Rev. WILLIAM HANNA, L. L. D. In three volumes. Vol. 1, 12mo. pp. 514. Harper & Brothers, New York.

The world-wide reputation of Dr. Chalmers, and the stirring scenes, in the midst of which he closed his long and useful life, will secure for these volumes, as they are issued, a rapid sale, and an anxious perusal. The impatience of the reading public, has demanded the publication of these memoirs in instalments, as quickly as they can be prepared for the press. The present volume covers the infancy and youth of Dr. Chalmers, his entrance into public life, and the earlier years of his ministry, until he was transferred from the Parish of Kilmany to the Zion Church, Glasgow. The reader's attention is absorbed in the several topics which occupy this volume. The wild sportiveness of his boyhood—the first waking from its dormancy of that active mind which never afterwards knew a moment of repose—the passion for literary distinction, which came so near withdrawing from the pulpit, one of its most distinguished ornaments in modern times—his early antipathy to experimental religion, which a proud reason stigmatized as fanaticism—the long and fearful struggle which ensued upon his first conviction of sin, to achieve a perfect righteousness of his own—his cordial acceptance, at length, of the righteousness of Christ, and the accompanying transformation of his character, and the radical change in his previously cherished views—the copious extracts from his religious journal and his correspondence, interesting for their literature as well as for their piety—and the germination of that comprehensive interest in all the public concerns of our common Christianity, which was first drawn forth in the organization of the Bible Society, and in the first efforts to diffuse the Gospel throughout the world: all these points are fully developed, and quicken the reader's attention to the close of the volume.

It would be a work of supererogation to recommend these memoirs of a man so eminently admired as Dr. Chalmers; as a natural curiosity will persuade most men to form a nearer ac-

quaintance with him, through the medium of a faithful biography. We will wait with eager expectation for the remaining two volumes, which are promised to the world.

5. *Practical Sermons : to be read in families and social meetings.*
By ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER, D. D. *Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J.* Philadelphia : Presbyterian Board, 1850. pp. 571, 8vo.

This beautiful volume, just issued by the Board of Publication, and stereotyped by the generosity of those friends at whose suggestion it was prepared, embraces a series of thirty-seven sermons on the ordinary subjects of practical religion. Though he promises us neither "abstruse disquisitions, eloquent descriptions, nor startling novelties," it is a volume which will be hailed with great pleasure by all who have either listened to the simple and fervid eloquence of the venerated author in former days, or who have associated him with the piety, soundness, firmness and sobriety which, through so many years, have characterised the Presbyterian Church in these United States. Much of this is owing to our remoter predecessors, and much also to those valued men who, like the author of these discourses, have impressed their character upon the ministers of this generation, and are now, one after another, bidding us adieu, and joining the assembly of the first born in Heaven. The author informs us that this is probably his last literary work, and calls upon us to unite with him in prayer, that it may be useful in promoting evangelical and experimental religion, when his head shall lie beneath the clods of the valley ! We have not been able to read the entire volume, but the discourses which we have read, are characterized by fervent piety, and some of them by great tenderness of feeling, and beautiful simplicity. A portrait of the author is prefixed to the volume.

6. *Daily Bible Illustrations : being original readings for a year, on subjects from sacred history, biography, geography, antiquities and theology, especially designed for the family circle.* By JOHN KITTO, D. D., F. S. A. New York : Robert Carter & Brothers, 1850. 18mo. Vol. 1. *Antediluvians and Patriarchs*, pp. 407. Vol. 2. *Moses and the Judges*, pp. 241.

Though we find ourselves compelled to differ from the learned author of this work in a number of particulars, we can assure our readers that they will find these volumes, and we doubt not, those which are yet to follow, exceedingly rich in instruction, and suggestive of much on which the mind may profitably reflect. It is the fault of some of these books designed for practical reading, that, however useful to ordinary minds, they suggest little which is striking to one studious and well informed, and not meeting the wants of such a mind, the perusal of such books is not continued. But here is a work which proceeds from one who, especially in some departments of Biblical learning, is an accomplished scholar. Dr. Kitto's oriental travels, his long attention to Biblical illustration, and the extensive sources from which he is able to draw, peculiarly qualify him for this undertaking. His Pictorial Bible, and Cyclopædia of Biblical Literature, are evidences of his success, and monuments of his ability, and the present volumes will add to his well earned reputation.

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ARTICLE I.

PHILOSOPHY IN THE CHURCH.

Until within the last two centuries, the empire of philosophy, in the Christian Church, has been divided, almost exclusively, between Plato and Aristotle. A modified Platonism invaded the Church (much to its detriment,) in the second century, and maintained its ascendancy for the next three hundred years. In the disputes of the fifth century, the dialectics of Aristotle began to be studied; and during this and the two succeeding ages, each of the great Grecian leaders had his admirers and followers. From the eighth to the sixteenth centuries, the empire of Aristotle was almost universal. It was entirely so, if we except a portion of the monks, the mystics, and the early reformers. With these exceptions, the authority of the Stagirite remained unbroken, till it encountered, in the first half of the seventeenth century, the more popular systems of Bacon and Des Cartes.

In the year 1605, Lord Bacon published his *Chart of the Sciences*, and his new method of pursuing them. This was followed, after some years, by his *Novum Organum*; in both which he inculcated what has been called the *Inductive Philosophy*. He insisted that, in our endeavours to advance the Sciences, and more especially the Physical Sciences, our reasonings must all be grounded on *facts*, and that these must be ascertained by reiterated and well conducted experiments. This can hardly

be called the commencement of the inductive or experimental philosophy, but it was certainly a most important era in its history. It put the lovers of the physical sciences upon a new and safe course, which has since been pursued with the most splendid results.

Des Cartes professed, like Bacon, to found his philosophy on *facts*; but the facts from which he reasoned were sought, not by experiment in the outer world, but by a consciousness of what was passing within himself. He was conscious that he *thought*, and therefore that he *existed*. *Cogito, ergo sum*. He was conscious, too, of an *idea* of God,—an infinite and all perfect Being; and not knowing how he could have acquired such an idea, he regarded it as *innate*, implanted by God, and as proof positive of the Divine existence.

Assuming, then, the existence of God, and taking his stand upon it, he argued from this great fact, not only the reality of the outer world, according to the testimony of the senses, but the truth of those conclusions which reason forms in respect even to the exact sciences. All the certainty we can have in regard to matters such as these arises, he says, from the consideration that God formed our minds, and guides our reasonings, and gave us our external senses, and that an all-perfect Being would not deceive us.

Reasoning on such principles, it is obvious that the speculations of Des Cartes must flow in a very different channel from those of Bacon. The philosophy of the former was essentially metaphysical, while that of the latter was experimental. The experiments of Bacon kept him and his adherents upon the solid basis of facts; while the metaphysics of Des Cartes decoyed him away from this sure foundation, and left him to build, often, upon mere assumptions. For example; he undertook, not only to investigate the *properties* of matter and mind, but to penetrate into their very *natures*. The essence of matter, he tells us, is *extension*, and the essence of mind is *thought*. And as extension is the very essence of matter, it follows that there can be no space which is not occupied with matter. Hence, the material universe is an absolute *plenum*, and all motion of material bodies must be in *vortices* or *whirlpools*. Now admitting this to be very inge-

nious as a matter of theory, or assumption; still, the question arises, and it is a vital question in philosophy: Where is *the proof* of it? On what principles, whether of intuition or induction, can it be shown to be true?

The schools of Bacon and Des Cartes being thus established, each was destined to have its followers and advocates. The more respectable of the immediate followers of Bacon were Gassendi and Locke. Those of Des Cartes were Spinoza and Malebranche.

The modern German philosophy originated with Leibnitz, in the latter half of the seventeenth century. He pursued, in general, the metaphysical method, after the example of Des Cartes; though he united with it some of the peculiar principles of Locke. His aim was to render metaphysics an exact science, as much so as pure mathematics; hoping in this way to put an end to all disputes among not only philosophers, but theologians and moralists. But he erred, like Des Cartes, in drawing from his imagination, rather than from observation and consciousness, and in thus passing from the region of fact to that of fancy.

The elements of all things he denominated *monads*; of which, he says, there are four kinds: First, the self-existent *God*, the author and upholder of all other monads. The second class of monads consists of *finite spirits* and *human souls*. The third class are the *souls of brutes*; and the fourth are *unconscious, unthinking beings*, which still possess life, and the power of action, and are continually struggling to change their condition. Aggregates of monads of this lowest order constitute all material bodies. Every particle of matter is thus endued with life, and the broad distinction between mind and matter is virtually obliterated.

The very essence of a monad, according to Leibnitz, is *activity*,—a *conatus*, a *striving* to evolve multiplicity out of its unity. And if it be inquired, why these myriads of little struggling, striving atoms do not produce universal and inextricable confusion;—how it is, that each keeps its own place, and answers its original design; the difficulty is met by introducing another principle of the Leibnitzian philosophy, viz. that of a *pre-established harmony*. By a law of the original Monad, indelibly impressed

upon all the others, every finite monad is constrained *to conform to its relations*, or to do and suffer whatever its several relations require. Hence, there is, and must be, a perfect harmony in all the movements of this vast and complicated machinery.

It is not necessary to proceed further in explanation of this specious philosophy. Its principal advocate, after the death of Leibnitz, was Christian Wolfe, who reduced it to a system, and did more than even its author to commend it to the notice and acceptance of his countrymen. It was immensely popular in Germany for a time; but its fame and its influence have long since departed. It contributed its share, while it prevailed, towards deforming and corrupting the Lutheran Churches, and introducing that miserable Rationalism, by which the light of the Reformation in Germany has been so disastrously eclipsed.

Mr. Locke was a philosopher of the Baconian school, although in some of his fundamental assumptions he did not adhere to Bacon's rules. He exploded the doctrine of innate ideas, but adopted, without examination, the old *theory* of ideas, as being the forms or images of things. He held, too, that all our ideas are primarily of external origin. They come into the mind through the senses; but when received there, the mind has power to compare, arrange, and compound them, to make them the subjects of reflection, and to draw conclusions from them.

According to this, which is sometimes called the *sensuous* philosophy, the mind perceives *nothing but ideas*; and it was not long before some of its votaries began to doubt whether anything else really exists. How do we know, said Berkeley, that there is any external world, corresponding to the ideas which we entertain of it? As the mind takes cognizance only of ideas, it is mere assumption to suppose that anything else exists. Mr. Hume went even farther than this, and doubted the existence of mind, as well as of matter. We are conscious, indeed, of ideas and impressions, and this is all. How do we know that any thing more exists?

Another class of speculatists pushed out the sensuous philosophy in the opposite direction. Instead of idealism, they ran into a gross materialism. As all our ideas are of external, material origin, the conclusion is, that they are

themselves material, and that the mind which receives them is material also. We are conscious of nothing but external sensations and perceptions, and into these, all the phenomena of mind may be resolved.

In reasonings such as these, we have the germs of that gross materialism and atheism, which prevailed to some extent in England, but more in France, near the close of the last century.

To counteract these preverse tendencies of the sensuous philosophy, two systems were introduced almost at the same time; viz. that of the Scotch metaphysicians, under Dr. Reid, and that of the German transcendentalists, under Kant.

Reid, though a student and admirer of Locke, dissented from him in several important particulars; and, first, as to the *nature* of ideas. According to Reid, an idea is a *thought*, and not something thought of; a *perception* or *conception*, and not a thing perceived. The old theory of mental forms or images, which had come down from the earliest periods of Greek philosophy, and which Locke had accepted without investigation, Reid had the wisdom to discard. Then Reid dissented from that fundamental principle of Locke, that all our ideas are of *external* origin,—the results of sensation and reflection. He taught that a portion of them, and these too of the greatest importance to us, are of purely *internal* origin, and are apprehended by direct intuition, or by personal consciousness. Such are our ideas of space and time, of cause and effect, of right and wrong, of the soul, and of God. This fact with regard to the Scotch metaphysicians is not commonly admitted by transcendentalists. They would claim the whole honor of acknowledging ideas of this class. But surely, if they had read the works of Reid and Stewart, they could not deny the truth of what is above stated.

Again; Dr. Reid dissents from Locke, not only as to the nature and origin of our ideas, but as to the fact that the mind perceives *nothing but ideas*. He held that we perceive *external objects themselves*, and regarded it as a *primary truth*—as one of the plainest dictates of common sense, that the outer world *really exists*, as perceived by the external senses. Thus he cut up the idealism of

Berkeley, and the scepticism of Hume, and the materialism of Hobbes and Darwin, and the French philosophers, at the root.

I have said that the author of the German transcendental movement, which, like the system of Reid, was set on foot to counteract the sceptical tendencies of the sensuous philosophy, was Immanuel Kant. Kant himself says: "It was the hint given me by David Hume, which, many years ago, waked me from my dogmatic slumbers, and gave quite another direction to my researches in the field of speculative philosophy." The "dogmatic slumbers" in which Kant here represents himself as having reposed, were those of the Leibnitzian-Wolfian philosophy, to which, in younger life, he had been attached.

Kant divides his philosophy into two parts; the one *theoretical*, the other *practical*; the one relating to rational *knowledge*, the other to rational *practice*. Of the former he treats in that most obscure but elaborate of all his works, "The Critic of Pure Reason."

Kant regards the human mind as in possession of three distinct faculties: *sensation*, *understanding* and *reason*; the two former being common to us, in some measure, with the brutes; the latter belonging only to man. Sensation is a mere passive *receptivity* of the impressions made upon our senses by objects around us. It gives us no knowledge of the essential nature of these objects, but only of their phenomena, or appearances.

The understanding, unlike sensation, is an *active* power, and is occupied exclusively with those *appearances* which come to us through the bodily senses. Its whole office is to form conceptions and judgments as to these appearances. It classifies them under various categories, reduces them to genera and species, and assigns to them appropriate names. Kant does not hold, with Reid, that the understanding *perceives* external objects, or that it gives us any knowledge of them, beyond the mere fact of their existence. It is conversant only with *appearances*, *impressions*, which come to us through the senses. Hence, he leaves an open door to that very *idealism* and *scepticism* which he hoped to destroy;—a door, through which (as we shall see) his successors were quick to enter, and where they have rioted with a vengeance.

Again ; the understanding, being busied entirely with external phenomena, can produce no knowledge but what is *empirical*. It cannot so much as enter the sphere of *rational* or philosophical knowledge, and of course cannot enlarge it at all.

It belongs only to the *reason* to contemplate *supersensible* things ; as God, the soul, the world of spirits, necessary truths, good and evil, and the like. Nor can this faculty penetrate to the *nature* or the *essential properties* of its appropriate objects. It cannot prove the existence of God, or the immortality of the human soul. In our reasoning on such subjects, we run into perpetual contradictions and absurdities. We can prove one side of a proposition as well as another. This shows that we have passed beyond the proper boundaries of reason, where we may amuse ourselves with opinions and presumptions, but can never hope to arrive at truth.

The sceptical tendencies of Kant's *speculative* reason, he endeavours to remove by *practical* reason. He assumes here the existence of a *moral law*, to which the unbiassed feelings of all men give testimony. This supposes the existence of a Supreme Ruler or Lawgiver, who must be "*omnipotent*, to order all things in subserviency to the unity of the moral world ; *omniscient*, to know the inmost thoughts and purposes of creatures, and their moral deserts ; *omnipresent*, to secure the subserviency of all things to the interests of his moral kingdom ; and *eternal*, to conduct all events to their final issue." Practical reason infers, also, the existence of a future world, where those who have obeyed the moral law, and thus rendered themselves worthy of happiness, may be rewarded.

Such is a brief sketch (the briefest possible) of some of the leading points of the Kantian philosophy. It would seem from the account given, that practical reason is much more religiously disposed than speculative reason. The former can draw inferences, and rest in conclusions, at which the latter would stubbornly revolt. Indeed, it is generally supposed that the Critic of Practical Reason was an afterthought ; intended to remove objections, and to give the greater currency, to the larger and more elaborate work of the author. At best, however, the religion of Kant was of an easy, latitudinarian character. He

was not a believer in Divine revelation. "It is of no importance," he says, "whether our notions of God are correct theoretically. It is enough that we have a *subjective* knowledge of him, in the *idea of duty*."

The first of the transcendental leaders, who followed Kant, was John Theophilus Fichté, a Professor at Jena, who died in 1814. He was not content with those limitations of reason which Kant had prescribed, but undertook to pry into matters of which the latter affirms that we can have no knowledge.

Fichté's first philosophy was a system of pure subjective *idealism*, or more properly of *egoism*. "Nothing really exists but the *I*, and all our experience, and the external world as the object of that experience, is a creature of the *I*." It is just what we make it, in our conceptions, and no more. God, he said at this time, is the *moral order* of the universe. The *I* finds such a principle of moral order necessary; nor do we need any other God.

It is obvious that *the Deity*, with Fichté, (like every thing else without himself) could have no *real objective existence*. It was the mere creature of his own fancy. Hence, the consistency of that blasphemous annunciation which Madame de Stael assures us he made, at the close of one of his lectures; "In my next, I shall proceed to create God!!"

But Germany, at this period, was not prepared for such an annunciation. It might have been tolerated twenty years later, but was premature at the time when it was uttered. The philosopher was denounced as an atheist, and his works, or a portion of them, were prohibited and confiscated by order of Government.

As is usual in such cases, his abettors published appeals and apologies; and he undertook to improve upon his philosophy; as many think, he changed the ground of it entirely. Searching into the depths of his own consciousness, he discovered there, or thought that he did, *the idea* of a something higher than himself, greater than himself, from which self was derived, and on which it is dependent. He evolved, in short, the notion of one *ultimate, absolute existence*, from which all other existence flows. Still, he had no faith in the reality of an external

world, and his theology (if theology it could be called) was decidedly pantheistic. He now regarded human life and action, says his biographer, as "but the harmonious, although diversified, manifestation of the *one idea of universal being*; the self-revelation of the absolute; the infinitely varied forms under which God becomes manifest in the flesh."* His doctrine at this period, says Mr. Morrell, "had a close affinity with that of Spinoza. The only difference lay here: While Spinoza fixed his eye upon *substance*, and made *it* the absolute and infinite essence, of which all things existing are but different modes, Fichté regarded infinite reason, or the eternal mind, or the Divine idea, as the absolute, all-real, self-existent essence, which manifests itself alike in the subjective and the objective world. According to this view, whatever we experience within ourselves, and whatever we see without, are both alike the manifestations of one and the same absolute mind; not merely creations of his power, but modifications of his essence."†

The third of the leading transcendentalists of Germany in Schelling. The grand peculiarity of his philosophy is what has been called his doctrine of *identity*; because he maintains "the perfect identity of the *knowledge* of things, and the *things* themselves; or the entire coincidence of the ideal and real, the subjective and objective. It is also called the doctrine of *the all one*; because it maintains that the universe is God, and God the universe; or that God, developing himself in various forms, and according to general laws, is the only existence." It does not differ materially from the revised and reformed speculations of Fichté, or from the Pantheism of Spinoza.

The Rev. M. Hedge represents Schelling as "the *poet* of the transcendental movement, as Fichté is the *preacher*." "Both," he says, "endeavoured to construct a philosophy of the absolute. Both set out with the principle that there is but one Being, one substance. Fichté sought it in the conscious self; Schelling finds it in nature." "He holds that matter and spirit, the ideal and the real, subject and object, are identical. The absolute is neither ideal nor

* Smith's Life of Fichte, p. 136.

† History of Philosophy, p. 431.

real, but the *identity* of both. There is but one Being, who may be considered at once, or alternately, as either wholly ideal, or wholly real. God is the absolute identity of nature and thought, of matter and spirit. And this identity is not the cause of the universe, but the universe itself—a *God-universe*.*

This particular feature of Schelling's philosophy, absurd and senseless as it appears, we are told was eagerly adopted by vast numbers in Germany. Many, who did not follow him on other points, adopted the views which have been expressed, regarding them as shedding a flood of light, not only upon philosophy, but religion.

The philosophy of Schelling is substantially that of Coleridge, which only a few years ago was so much lauded by certain professors and ministers in our own country. The discussion in the *Biographia Literaria*, on the reciprocal relations of the *esse* and the *cogitare*, is a literal translation (and that, too, without acknowledgment) from the introduction to one of the works of Schelling. Coleridge also says: "In the philosophy of Schelling, I first found a *genial coincidence* with much that I had toiled out for myself, and a powerful assistance in what I had yet to do." "To me it will be happiness and honour enough, should I succeed in rendering this philosophy intelligible to my countrymen, and in the application of it to the most awful of subjects, for the most important of purposes."†

The last of the great speculative philosophers of Germany in Hegel. He was at first a follower of Schelling, but at length gradually deviated from him, and set up a school for himself. Both maintained the identity of God and the universe, and the perfect coincidence between objective and subjective knowledge; but Hegel transcended all who had gone before him, in the matter of idealism. The idealism of Fichté may be called subjective, and that of Schelling objective, but that of Hegel was *absolute*. He considered ideas or conceptions as the only realities of existence. By looking in upon itself, and analyzing its own conceptions, the mind arrives at all philosophical knowledge.

* Prose writers of Germany, p. 509. † Biog. Literaria, vol. i. pp. 95, 97.

Hegel, like those who preceded him, was a Pantheist, though he disowns the name. "With him," says Morell, "God is not a person, but *personality itself*;—the *universal* personality, which realizes itself in every human consciousness, as so many separate thoughts of one eternal mind. The *idea* we form of the absolute is, to Hegel, the absolute itself; its essential existence being synonymous with our conception of it. God is, with him, *the whole process of thought*, combining in itself the objective movement as seen in nature, with the subjective as seen in logic, and fully realizing itself only in the universal spirit of humanity."* According to this statement, the God of Hegel is a *process*, and not a being,—"*the whole process of human thought*;" or, as one of his followers expresses it, "*the eternal movement of the universal, ever raising itself to a subject.*" Menzel, in his history of German Literature, says: "Hegel makes no distinction between himself and God; but gives himself out for God." He charges Hegel with teaching that God first came to a clear consciousness of himself in "the philosopher who has the only right philosophy;" that is to say, *in him*.—Vol. i. p. 259.

It is admitted by all, that the speculations of Hegel are exceedingly obscure; so much so, as to be scarcely intelligible. He is said to have affirmed on his death bed, that but one man in Germany understood his philosophy, and that *he* did not. But whatever else may be doubtful, one thing is clear: The God of Hegel, is just no God at all. It is but a name, a figure of speech, and hardly that. Indeed, it would not be difficult to prove, and that too from his own concessions, that the God of Hegel is *nothing*. In his Encyclopedia he affirms that *something and nothing are the same*. He fears that the declaration may seem paradoxical, and that he may be charged with a want of seriousness in making it; yet he does make it, and repeat it: *Something and nothing are the same*. Hence, the *absolute*, of which so much is vaunted, is *nothing*. *God himself is nothing*.

It is among the first principles of Buddhism. "Nothing is the beginning and end of every thing that exists. All

* History of Philosophy, p. 473.

sprung from nothing at first, and to nothing all are destined to return." That we should have a second edition of Buddhism in Germany, in the nineteenth century; and that, too, as the apex and crown of a long series of transcendental speculations, was hardly to be expected;—but so it has come to pass.

Each of these great leaders in the transcendental movement has had his followers, who have participated more or less in their peculiarities, and in some instances have carried them out to even greater extravagances. Thus the followers of Schelling are pleasing themselves with the idea that "the time is coming, when, from our *direct intuition* of the Soul of the world, in its original essence, the whole theory and all the phenomena of creation shall be fully explained; that all experiment and observation may then be dispensed with; and natural philosophy find its completion in the deductions of reason." Among the extreme Hegelians, such as Strauss, Bruno, Bauer, and Feuerbach, pantheism has degenerated, as might be expected, into the barest atheism. "In imagining a Deity," says Feuerbach, "man is only deifying his own nature; and in worshipping a Deity, he is worshipping humanity."

Nor is the influence of transcendentalism confined to the *philosophers* of Germany. It has reached their poets, their theologians, their literature in its various branches, and even the common walks of life; so that, as Mrs. Austen says, "There is not a fairy tale of Tieck, not a song of Goethe, not a play of Schiller, not a criticism of Schlegel, not a description of Humboldt, in which the undercurrent of speculative philosophy is not visible."

Nor is this philosophy confined to Germany. Through the labors of Cousin, it has been propagated extensively in France. Through the influence of Coleridge, Carlyle, and others, it has been diffused, to some extent, in England. And from various sources, it has been poured upon this country. It is not indigenous to us. It is not *natural* to us. Still it is *here*—here in all its extravagance; and its influence is beginning to be felt. It is high time that Christians understood it, and that they were on their guard against it.

ARTICLE II.

REFLECTIONS UPON HEAVEN.

"And there was no more sea."—Rev. xxi. 1.

The imagery which is used in the Bible to represent Heaven, is of the most gorgeous and magnificent character. Especially is this true of those descriptions which we find in the Revelation of St. John. The language is adapted to our senses, and conveys the idea of a material abode, though composed of infinitely more refined and glorious elements, than the earth which we inhabit. It speaks of a city, which hath foundations, of a golden city, with walls of jasper, and gates of pearl, and streets of crystal. It speaks of a beautiful river flowing through it, and on its banks trees, laden with refreshing fruits; of the splendid illumination of the city, rendering needless the sunbeams—being flooded eternally with the light of God. It must be supposed that this language is highly metaphorical, and tinged with the hyperbole of oriental description, and yet we are far from supposing that it is not intended to convey to us some idea of heaven, such as we can appreciate and enjoy. It is not like God, to give his creatures signs, without meaning to signify something by them.

He does not adorn the pages of His word with pictures drawn by heavenly pencils, and coloured with celestial hues, merely that our mental vision may be enraptured with their beauty; but that they may teach a lesson to our souls. And it would not be surprising, if there were more of literalness in these gorgeous descriptions of the heavenly world, than most commentators are disposed to acknowledge. A late writer remarks, in a discourse on Heaven, that—"an unsophisticated mind will receive the impression that this imagery is *designed* to convey the idea of a glorious materialism in heaven." "What less" (he asks) "can be meant, by this solicitous grouping of all the most refined, precious, and brilliant material objects, apart and distinct from that portion of the description,

which obviously refers to what is *spiritual* in the celestial economy. And why should there not be material objects in that better country, corresponding in their exquisite forms, refined organization, and resplendent qualities, to the exalted capacities of contemplation and deep emotion which will characterize the inhabitants?" And we would ask, why will not spiritual bodies, such as the redeemed will wear, demand for the perfection of their happiness, an abode answering in its splendours to the higher susceptibilities of those bodies, yet in a manner analogous to the ministration of this present world to our present material organization?

In the vision of the banished Apostle, the new world which he saw, rising from the ruins of the old, was marked by one distinguishing characteristic. "There was no more sea."—Rev. xxi. i. Considering this in a literal sense, it would be a very striking peculiarity about the new world, one which would distinguish it more than any one physical characteristic from the old. For in this world, three-fourths of its surface is hidden under a wide waste of waters; and familiar as we are with this most common feature, in rill, lake, river, sea, and ocean, nothing could express to our minds a more astounding physical change in the earth, than to be told that "there was no more sea." Let us then take up this peculiarity of the heavenly world, and see, as we examine it, if we do not find great meaning in this figure, and great beauty, and comfort, and instruction, considered both in a literal and a metaphorical sense.

We will, then, in the first place, consider that the writer is describing his vision of heaven as of a material world, and endeavour to understand what is implied in a revelation of a world, "where there is no more sea." We must inquire, then, in pursuance of our purpose, what are the uses of the sea, now, in this state of things. In ascertaining its necessity and office, in this earth, we shall be able to understand something of a world where it is not needed or known. It is one office of the sea, then, to speak to man of its creator. "When man was first made"—says an old author, "Creation was his book, and God was his teacher. The elements were so many letters, which

when rightly understood and put together, the wisdom, power, and goodness of the great Creator, became legible to him."

In this vast volume, made up of such splendid characters, what a page is the sea! The ancient Psalmist as he looked upon the land and the ocean, and contemplated them as works of God, exclaimed with wonder and adoration.—"The earth is full of thy riches, so is this great and wide sea also." Those who have never beheld the ocean in its majesty, have never looked at the most wonderful and impressive page of nature's volume.

To stand upon the shore, and look upon the wide waste of waters stretching far away in the dim distance,—"that glorious mirror, in which the Almighty's form glasses itself in tempests;" boundless and sublime; conveys a most impressive lesson to the mind, of the immensity of that Being who formed the ocean, and who can take up the waters in the hollow of his hand.

And when the storm-king rides upon the billows, and that sight of mingled splendour and terror, the ocean in its rage, is before the eye—when the angry surges seem to swell to heaven, and break against the stars, or with crested head seem ready to sweep away the solid earth; when the huge ships are dashed into a thousand fragments in its relentless grasp,—and the roaring of its waters is the funeral dirge of the mariner, then does the awful voice of ocean speak of the power of Him who can lay his hand upon its mane, and say to its wildest raving,—"*Peace, be still.*"

And when we look at the ocean as the great reservoir from whence the vapours arise, which, condensed above us, return in gentle showers to fertilize, and bless the land; or as the source of deep springs, beneath the sea, which rising in vapor from subterranean recesses break forth into rivers, and streams, which winding through the fields go back again to sleep upon the bosom of the ocean, but in their passage have caused nature to put on a greener mantle, and exhale a sweeter fragrance; we are again taught the wisdom and goodness of that God who made the sea, and whose it is. Many are the lessons which man may learn from the ever varying pages of the sea.

He may learn how great is God, and he may learn how little is man. Aye, there is no place which so soon brings down the pride of the haughtiest, and dissipates the scorn of the unbeliever, and brings the infidel to his knees before his insulted God, as the stormy ocean. Tossed upon its raging billows, with but a frail plank between him and death, driven with headlong speed before the merciless blast, with no hope but in His power who rides upon the storm, and says to the tempests "thus far shall ye go, and no farther:" Man is taught that with all his boasted power, he is but a frail and helpless thing, before Him who can make the elements the ministers of his wrath, and sweep into destruction man's mightiest works with the breath of his nostrils.

"When thro' the torn sail the wild tempest is streaming,
When o'er the dark wave the red lightning is gleaming,
Nor hope lends a ray the poor seaman to cherish,
We fly to our Maker, Lord, save, or we perish."

Recognizing these as some of the lessons which the sea is adapted to teach man, here, we are at no loss to understand something of the character of that world where there is no sea. We see in it a revelation of the quickened powers, and acuter perceptions of the glorified inhabitants of that world, and that they will not need to be taught how great and glorious, how wise and good, God is, through such media as the works of nature. In this world, inhabiting, as we do, gross material forms, and receiving our impressions through the medium of the senses, we are dependent upon outward forms, and tangible things, for an idea of God, and the magnificent attributes of his character. These are indeed furnished us in rich profusion, in beauty and in variety. "The heavens declare his glory, and the firmament sheweth his handy work,"—but in that world, where there is no more sea, we shall study God not in his works, but in Himself, and we shall have spiritual powers more adequate than now, for such a splendid study. Rich as are the revelations made to an enlarged and liberal mind, of God, through the media of his works—though some may read volumes of his goodness and loveliness, and the harmonies of his character traced as with fairy pencils on a tiny rose leaf; yet

how much more exalted, and ennobling—and satisfying the communion with God, not through a gross and material medium, but as that of spirit with spirit, of soul with soul. You may read the pages of a favourite author, and seem to see his very soul laid open there, but while you find that his thoughts presented even through the lifeless pages of a volume have power to wake the deepest echoes within your bosom, you feel that in personal communion,—heart beating with heart, thought answering to thought, and feeling to feeling, there would be far greater satisfaction, and a deeper ministration to the wants of your spirit. Such communion will the enlarged and sanctified spirit have with God in that world where there is no more sea. It will not need then this medium of God. God himself will be there, and the perfected spirit will see,—“not as through a glass darkly, but face to face.” Beautiful indeed are pages of nature’s volume now, as they outspread around us. Rich especially is the page of the sea—that ever varying, ever eloquent scroll; splendid to weak and ignorant mortals are the revealings that the material creation makes of God; but the day is coming when this volume will be closed for man,—the page he studied in time will pass away when time shall be no more. And when eternity opens her more glorious volume, there will be no more sea.

More sublime truths, deeper revelations of God, a more intimate and satisfying spirit knowledge, will then be granted to the soul, from loftier sources than the works of creation.

This volume must be closed, but that opened in Heaven shall never be shut, and as eternity rolls along, new and magnificent lessons of the Infinite One will expand, and exalt, and satisfy the glorified soul, in that new world, where there is no more sea.

But let us consider another of the uses of the sea. Divided as the world is into different nations, each distinct in its history, laws, customs and government, and each naturally jealous of others, there needed to be some formidable barrier between them,—which should be an effectual check upon ambition, or a spirit of conquest or revenge. The interposition of wide oceans is such a barrier. It is impossible for a whole nation to cross the

trackless waste of waters to pour itself in overwhelming numbers upon a foreign shore, carrying fire and sword into the territory of a sister nation. The division of the world into different nations, is an arrangement characterized by that wisdom and goodness which distinguishes all the works and ways of God.

Were there but one government or organized society on earth, what a scene of gigantic oppression or misrule would exist; how much less progress would be made in all that exalts and embellishes civilized life. But the sea is indispensable to the division of nations. Even the tallest and ruggedest mountains, are not so impassable a barrier. But the sea is not only useful as a means of separation, among the nations of the earth, but it has a higher office as a great connecting link also. This may seem contradictory, but it is only so in appearance. The sea operates as a disconnecting medium to prevent nations from injuring each other, and also as a connecting medium for mutual profit. The ocean is now the broad highway, on which all nations are travelling to visit each other; becoming acquainted with each other's character, institutions, and forms of religion, interchanging ideas, softening prejudices, gaining and imparting knowledge, and contributing much to the general advancement of the race. Had the whole world been one continuous piece of land, how tardily would the progress of improvement be carried on. The nations far remote from each other, could have known nothing of each other's history, but through the medium of obscure tradition; there could be no commercial intercourse, on any enlarged scale. Nations would remain from century to century, with their habits, customs, pursuits, unchanged and fixed; the influence of one, more enlightened and advanced could not so easily have been exerted upon another. The sea is the great crucible, in which the jarring elements of the earth are brought into a state of fusion, and when the ocean has finally accomplished her office, all the nations will be brought into one great brotherhood, united in opinions, in principles of government, in science and literature, in every element of peace, order, harmony and greatness.*

I have said nothing of the influence which the sea is

* Moral uses of the sea," by Horace Bushnell.

to exert on the universal diffusion of pure religion. This influence has been made a distinct subject of prophecy itself. "Because the abundance of the sea shall be converted unto thee, the forces of the Gentiles will come unto thee." The ocean is now bearing on its waters to the most distant lands, the news of salvation. The missionary is going to tell the distant heathen of Christ who came to seek and to save them which were lost. The Bible is going to them,—to shed its benign and elevating influences on lands dark and wretched, in moral midnight and degradation. Commerce is beginning to awake to her high mission, as the handmaid of religion, and is preparing rapidly the way for the universal spread of Christianity. Every ship which crosses the waters, will soon be a holy ark, bearing the treasures of religion, to some far distant continent, or lonely isle,—and the distant tribes will shout with joy when they catch the first glimpse of her approaching sails. The office of the sea will not be accomplished until its winds and waves have borne the tidings of redemption to every clime, and cast the anchor of the Gospel—Hope, on every shore.

Such, then, being the office and uses of the sea, in this world, what are we to understand by that description of the new earth, which the apostle gives us in the revelation of his island vision. "And there was no more sea." We seem to read in these few words a splendid history of a fair creation, whose vast and numerous tribes need no separating barrier between each other, but, fused into one celestial and glorious brotherhood, rejoice in uninterrupted and harmonious proximity.

We seem to see a world where national jealousies, and sectional prejudices, and local variances, are all unknown; a world where there may be distinguishing characteristics among its myriads of inhabitants, where each nation and tribe may preserve its individuality, but where *selfishness* will be utterly unknown; where there will be "unity, without uniformity," and every heart,—from one end of that vast creation to the other, will beat in perfect unison in respect to the great principles of its administration, with every other heart. And is not this a glorious and beautiful thought? As we look over the pages of this world's history, how are they blotted and stained with the

sickening record of war and desolation ! The nations of the earth, instead of being united in one great brotherhood, each maintaining its own individual character—but like a circlet of jewels, blending into one brilliant whole—divided by national jealousies and feuds, and needing the mighty wastes of waters that flood the earth, as natural barriers to shield each from the aggressions of the other. In that new and better world, there is no such barrier, because none such is needed. Nation will not there lift up the sword against nation, but melted into one harmonious world, the sceptre which waves over them all, is the olive-branch of peace, and the fetters which bind them in an irrefragable alliance, are the tender, yet mighty, bonds of an eternal love. And in the revelation that in that new world, which is to be the home of the sainted children of God, there is no more sea, we read another beautiful lesson of heaven. No such medium of communication will be needed there.

Enlarged and perfected as will then be every faculty and power of the sanctified spirit and glorified body, distance and time will be annihilated, and the redeemed can traverse the heavenly worlds, as on the sunbeams. Despatched on some errand of mercy by the eternal Father, his angel messengers now take their flight to earth. On tireless pinions they have sped from their homes above, and over mountain and valley, over continent and ocean, they have travelled, out-speeding the lightning, on their mission of love. And such powers of locomotion will probably be attached to our spiritual bodies, that we shall be able, without taking note of time, to pass through all the heavenly worlds, and on never drooping wing, to traverse the outskirts of interminable space. No such tardy medium of communication will exist between distant provinces of the heavenly empire, as that with which earth is furnished in the broad highway of the ocean.

We deem it a wonderful thing, that in ten brief days our vessels can cross the ocean, and bring us tidings from the old world ; we are startled when messages from far distant friends come to us on the wings of the lightning ; but in that new world there will be no such thing as distance, and time itself will be no more. The annunciation that in the new earth there is “no more sea,” is a

revelation of the perfection of our being there, of a most expressive character.

Nor again, will the sea be needed in that better world as the highway of Christianity. It is one of God's great instruments here for the establishment of universal religion. In proportion, as by means of commerce, the remote and benighted nations are discovered, and brought under the influence of the more civilized and enlightened, will there be a weakening of native prejudices—a gradual clearing away of the mists of superstition, a destruction of the confidence of Pagan nations in their idol Gods; and then Christianity will enter, and take possession of the purged temple and the re-consecrated altar. The ocean is now becoming the great highway of the Lord. Pious sailors are becoming missionaries, for they can literally "go unto all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." The Bible and the religious tract go out with the bales of merchandize, to distant lands, and commerce is ministering to the spiritual, as well as temporal prosperity of our race. But in that new world, Christianity will need no such great highway as the sea. It will pervade every part of the celestial universe; every trite, and every soul, will be arrayed in the beauty of Holiness. The law of God will be the rule of every subject, and his smile, their eternal sunshine.

Such, then, are some of the lessons taught us in the annunciation of this text. Considered in a literal signification, it speaks to us of a world where God is fully known by all his creatures, in the splendour of his attributes, and the glory of his character, without the intervention of gross material works; and that though here, we can be conversant with the Almighty only through the works of His hand,—and his written word,—though here we behold him through a veil, and see him "as thro' a glass darkly,"—yet there the veil will be removed, and we having spiritual vision quick and strong, shall gaze full on the ineffable brightness, and "beholding as with open face the glory of the Lord, shall be changed into the same image, from glory to glory, as by the spirit of the Lord." It reveals to us, likewise, a world at peace, a great brotherhood of nations, bound to each other by the bonds of holy love. A world where war never obtrudes her grim visage, nor

man takes up arms against his brother man. A world of order, harmony and beauty ; a world of splendid progress, too, in all that exalts and adorns character and mind ; a world of pure and spotless holiness, where there is nothing impure or evil ; and of blessedness and glory, which eye hath not seen.

Such are some of the characteristics of that new world, revealed to the banished Apostle, of which he tells us that "*there was no more sea.*" We have thus far considered the language of the text in its literal signification. It is no less expressive and interesting considered as metaphorical or figurative. Much of our language expressive of feeling or passion, and different states of the mind, is borrowed from nature in her different states and phases. We speak of the sunshine of hope, and the night of despair, the light of joy, and the darkness of sorrow. Many of our expressions indicative of mental feeling and suffering, are drawn from the sea.

We speak of being tossed upon the billows of misfortune, and driven by the blasts of sorrow ; of riding upon the surges of affliction, of struggling in the deep waters of conflict and toil. We speak of the calm which succeeds the storm, and of the joy of casting anchor in the haven of peace. Perhaps no more impressive description could be given of one who is in sorrow, than to say he is tossed upon a sea of troubles. And who that has ever been out upon the ocean, does not recognize the truthfulness of the language of the Bible when it says—"The wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest." Now in whatever light in which we look upon the sea, as descriptive of certain mental states—the revelation of a world where there is no more sea, is full of beauty and of comfort. Applied to personal conflict of soul, it is so. The Christian is often tossed upon a sea of doubt and perplexity, his soul is not tranquil and serene, but is like the ocean in a storm ; he is exposed to the assaults of temptation, which like the storm-wind agitate his bosom, and rouse the billows within from their slumber.—Oh, then the revelation of a world where these doubts and perplexities and tossings and weary conflicts shall be done away—and the voice of a welcoming Jesus shall say to the waves of passion and the storms of temptation—"Peace, be still,"—is

full of joyful hope and comfort, and new elements of peace and blessedness are given to heaven, when he learns that it is a world "where there is no more sea."

And considered, too, in reference to the disclosure it makes of the freedom of the heavenly world from sorrow and affliction, it is a glorious revelation. We all know that this is a troublous world, full of sorrow and trial, that life is not a smooth and unruffled stream gliding gently along to sleep in calm beauty on eternity's ocean. We know that there are storms of sorrow, which rise from without ourselves. Poverty, disappointment, sickness, death—these are the storms to which every voyager on the sea of life is inevitably exposed—and they make it a troubled sea.

We have been tossed upon these waters—we have been assailed by the blasts of misfortune, sickness has racked our frame with anguish, death has torn from our embrace the friends we loved, and in all these circumstances of sorrow, our sea of life was troubled, and our bark, it may be, came near foundering; then if we saw in this part of the banished Apostle's vision of heaven, the annunciation that all poverty and disappointment and sickness and death, every source of sorrow was forever removed, then we must have derived peculiar refreshment and support from the revelation that in the new and better world "there was no more sea."

The last aspect in which we would at this time consider the sea as a metaphor, regards it as the emblem of parting—a separation. It was doubtless in this aspect that the exiled Apostle most frequently regarded it. Banished, by a cruel tyrant, from his home and friends, the watery walls of his island prison would most naturally suggest this idea to his mind. And when, agitated by the fury of the storm, they howled around his lonely dwelling, they seemed to speak of a separation from all he loved, and an impassable barrier against his return. And as he stood and gazed upon the wide waste of waters which surrounded him on every side, and left him a solitary prisoner in mid ocean, what revelation could be more cheering and uplifting to him than the vision of a new world, where there was no more sea? It spoke to him of a world where no such barrier rolled its dreary wastes between the soul

and its most cherished things; where tyrants had no power to separate kindred hearts, and where parting is no more known forever. And so to the believer; in every part of the world, whether island or mainland, this revelation of the new world is fitted to possess peculiar interest. When the waves of ocean roll between us and a much loved friend, we regard such a separation as the most to be dreaded of any which can occur in our earthly wanderings. When we are upon the same continent, though thousands of miles asunder, we do not seem to be so widely parted, as when the trackless ocean rolls between us. And when we bid farewell to a friend thus leaving us, there is a peculiar depth and tenderness in our parting benediction, when we remember the nature of the physical barrier which is henceforth to be between us. Many have thus gone from those who loved them, and have never returned; far, far away from home, wrapt in the sea-weed, they sleep on beds of coral, in the "dark unfathomed caves of ocean." So that the idea of the most dreaded form of separation, is naturally suggested by the sea. When we say of an absent friend.—"The ocean rolls between us," even the most indifferent listener recognizes the peculiarity of the separation. Death is often spoken of as a sea. And this is doubtless from the association of a long parting, connected with the ocean. The revelation, then, which the Apostle gives us of the new world, "where there is no more sea," is a revelation that in heaven parting is no more known forever. No separation there, among the loved and saved; an unbroken companionship of pure and perfect love, eternal as eternity! What a source of comfort is an annunciation like this, to those whose hearts have bled under the anguish of parting with those they love. We may have thought it strange that the Apostle should lay such stress upon this feature of the heavenly world; but when we behold it only in this aspect, and think of it as teaching only this, that there is no parting there, it is not a slight or unmeaning declaration. The partings of earth are such a gigantic source of anguish to human hearts, that to allay this suffering, by the announcement that these separations would be unknown in heaven, seemed worthy of a special revelation. And considering the ocean as the

most expressive symbol of separation, how magnificent the revelation, that in the new and better world "there was no more sea." And now, let this revelation be a source of comfort to the Christian. Tossed upon life's sea of conflict and toil and trouble, let him remember that there is a rest above, where the storms of earth are hushed and there is no more sea. By contemplating the rest of heaven as a real and certain thing, he will become strengthened for the labours of earth. Labor is of the earth, rest is in heaven. There is not a wave of trial or sorrow which breaks upon the shores of life, which is not bearing the Christian on to the haven above.—The discipline of this earthly state, like the flame of the furnace, purifies the believer, and refines and ripens him for heaven. And when the flame is kindled most fiercely—when the billows rise most terribly, let him remember that there is peace above, and no sea in the better world. Let him steer on, then, over the waters of life, by the beacon light of this revelation, and when his bark has at last crossed death's narrow sea, it shall be moored in eternal safety in the haven of rest. Let the sinner remember that there is no sea in heaven, but the tempest rages awfully in hell! There the wicked are like the troubled sea, when it cannot rest. Let him beware, then, of the course which he is now pursuing, for unless that course be changed, he will launch upon the ocean of eternity, only to drift forever, a shattered wreck, upon the raging billows of a sea of despair!

ARTICLE III.

FORM AND SPIRIT.

An Address, delivered before the Alumni, and the Society of Inquiry of Union Theological Seminary, Prince Edward, Va. June, 1850,

BY REV. S. J. P. ANDERSON,

OF NORFOLK, VIRGINIA.

The grand controversy of the present age, turns on the
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question, whether the efficacy of the Gospel depends chiefly on form or spirit. Various as are the parties into which the great company of Christ's professed followers is divided, this one test will array them under two banners, essentially opposite, and marshal them for a conflict which must be one of extermination. Of these two conflicting systems of religion, the one has its centre in the truth. The truth as it is in Jesus, is its sun. Around this, all revolves, and to this all is subordinated. It is essentially tolerant of diversities of form, where the truth is preserved and honoured. It has power of vision to pierce the drapery that enwraps and not unfrequently fetters the spirit; and joyfully recognizes and fraternizes with the life within. It loves and prizes the priceless jewel, whether found in the casket of lead, or silver, or gold. And when it goes out to find the true people of God—those who have made peace with him by covenant, it confines its search neither to cathedral, nor church, nor conventicle. It stands as reverently on the open heath, where humble forms are bending, and penitent hearts, untutored except by a sense of want, are sending forth to God, it may be in rudest speech, petitions for pardon and acceptance; as it does in the nave of some lofty architectural pile, where the solemn peal of the organ swells on the ear, and a dim religious light, streaming through stained and pictured windows, invites to devotion, and robed priests, in all the pageantry of the most imposing hierarchy, are making their vicarious approach to God. In short, it tears away the drapery whether of meagre poverty, or royal sumptuousness, and looks at the heart, to see if Jesus be enthroned there. Its ever recurring cry is "I would see Jesus." And where he is found its spirit rests in fraternal love, and assured hope.

The other system revolves around the form. It asks not simply is the truth held, but *how* it is held. Orders, rites, ceremonies, are the grand principles on which it rests the weightier matters of its law. And by a very natural consequence, one indeed which results from the laws of our being, this undue exaltation of the form, draws after it a corresponding depreciation of the spirit. The apotheosis of external religion, is the dethronement of the internal and the spiritual, and to a greater or less extent, this result is unvarying. Go where you will among the ad-

herents of this system, and you find a latitudinarian tolerance of diversities of doctrine, prevailing in exact proportion to the rigidity of the demand for uniformity of practice in the observances of religion. Not unfrequently this laxity of doctrine is boasted of, as an ornament, and trusted in as a secret of strength. You may believe what you will, within certain very broad and somewhat dimly defined limits, provided the loved and cherished form is observed. The very Church that, avowedly, so framed its declarations of truth as to comprehend well nigh all shades of theological opinion, even inviting to her bosom those who held some of the grand distinguishing principles of the great anti-christian apostacy, takes its position with unflinching firmness on the ground of rites and ceremonies, and cuts off from Church relationship, and valid ordinances, and abandons to the uncovenanted mercies of God, all who do not use her Shibboleth. She drowns the voice of admitted truth and piety, pleading for Christian recognition and fellowship, with the deafening cry "great is Diana of the Ephesians." Instead of seeking for the living spirit of Christianity, and recognizing it when found; this system of externalism is satisfied with the lifeless corpse, from which the animating spirit has fled, provided you give it

Before decay's effacing fingers

Have swept the lines where beauty lingers.

Instead of giving free scope to the spirit, allowing it to develop itself, controlled by no laws save those God has given, it forms an encrustation around it, compelling all its growth, if it grow at all, to a conformity to its fossil mould. In short its body is more a mummy than a man.

Now between these two rival systems every man must make his choice. He cannot serve God and Mammon. He cannot have two supreme tests of the Church. These systems are antagonistic, and every man must array himself with the one or the other. And the gathering with one, is scattering abroad so far as the other is concerned. If his system is distinctively ritual, the spirit must be neglected. Dethroned from its rightful sovereignty, it will be confined in the cruel bondage of a prescribed and unalterable mould; and there is great danger that it will pine away and die in its captivity. But if the spiritual element be regnant,

forms will not be despised as useless or cumbersome ; but they will be held in subordination to the truth, and if they attempt to bind and hinder its free exercise, they will be burst asunder, as will the cerements of the tomb when the life-giver shall bid the dead to come forth.

It cannot be denied that there is in our nature a strong tendency to formalism in religion. Formalism is, indeed, a compromise between conscience and the love of the world. The mind does not readily rest in infidelity ; and does not love God or holiness. The resultant of these two forces is often the adoption and strenuous advocacy of a form of religion, which is enough like the truth to appease the conscience, yet which has not life enough to conquer worldly-mindedness. And if this form of godliness can be decorated with a splendid and captivating drapery, which appeals to the imagination, and gratifies the taste, its reception is all the more welcome, and its power the more absolute. This tendency to exalt and rest in whatever appeals to the senses, is manifested in every part of the world, and in all ages of time. It stands boldly forth in all those systems of religion which man has devised for himself. And even a true religion has not unfrequently so degenerated, as to be given up to its sway. Thus it was that that system of truth given by God as the forerunner of Christianity had so yielded to this principle, that its most prominent advocates were chargable with having a form of godliness, but denying the power of it. And the Church of Christ, simple and spiritual as it is, has not escaped this malign influence. Her history tells too plainly that altars and crosses, vestments and genuflections, penances and pilgrimages, have usurped the place of, and driven into exile the humble and loving service of the heart. And thus men painfully earn a name to live while they are dead. And just in proportion as the spirit of Christianity has been suppressed the power of forms has augmented. The form of the cross is most frequently found where the doctrines of the cross are least known.

It is not strange, therefore, that our Lord so shaped his dispensation of truth as to come in violent conflict with this dangerous tendency of our nature. We are prepared to hear his declaration to the woman of Samaria, "Believe me, the hour cometh when ye shall neither in this moun-

tain nor yet in Jerusalem worship the Father. But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth." And in precise accordance with the truest wisdom, philosophical as well as religious, our Saviour established a system, which above all others the world has ever seen, was simple in its form. There must necessarily be a form of truth; for we are not purely spiritual beings. There must be an organized manifestation of our faith. Hence religion must have its sacred times and places, its ordinances and decent observances. But while this demand of our nature is fully met in the promulgation of the truth as it is in Jesus, care is taken that it shall not have unlimited sway. We have a visible organization of the Church, with its ordinances; baptism and the supper; and its government by bishops and elders. But lest these few and simple ordinances should assume too high a place in our esteem and confidence, we are reminded, both by precept and example, that they are but channels of grace, and not its authors—that to the worthy receiver alone, they become means of salvation. In short, that they have no inherent efficacy, and no indispensable connection with spiritual life, and that if need be, we can worship God acceptably without any or all of them. The external and the internal are combined, but each is kept in its proper place. "He that believeth and is baptised shall be saved." "If thou shalt believe in thy heart, and confess with thy mouth, the Lord Jesus, thou shalt be saved." "For with the heart, man believeth unto righteousness, and with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation."

In the Christian system form is the handmaid of spirit, and ministers to its ends, and is only valuable as it does so. When, therefore, the form assumes the prominent place, and becomes the end when the majestic temple with its heaven piercing pinnacles, and cloudlike dome, its splendid paraphernalia, and its imposing ritual, draw the eyes and the heart away from the truth to themselves, they become not only useless but prejudicial. They become at once usurpers of the place and rebels against the authority of the king of truth.

But the question may very naturally be asked, if these two elements of form and spirit belong naturally to the

Church ; are necessary to its integrity, and will be found in it during its most perfect state ; why are they so constantly antagonistic ? Why, especially, is it found so uniformly, that the external has gained the ascendancy over the internal ; as in the Greek and Roman Churches ? And I grieve to add, why are such melancholy evidences so frequently seen, of progression in the same direction in Protestant Churches ? The answer is easy. It is found in the alienation of our natures from God. The spiritual element is at best but imperfect in us. The light shineth in darkness, and the light must ever be fed with oil from above to shine at all. It requires a continual struggle for mastery to preserve spiritual religion in existence. On the contrary, a ritual religion is comparatively easy. It is easier to our nature and more flattering to our pride to build magnificent temples, and decorate them with all the wonders of art ; to make pilgrimages, endure penances, and give costly offerings, than to keep the heart as an undesecrated temple of the Holy Ghost, and make body and soul a living sacrifice to God, which is our spiritual service. It is easier to pray with the lips, than with the heart ; as the Pharisee, rather than as a Publican. It is by no means difficult to cry, Hail Master, and even to kiss the Son of God, whilst the blackest rebellion is ruling the heart. And consequently if the vital principle is not ever active, the descent to a mere formalism is easy and rapid. Little by little, the spiritual gives place to the ritual. Every contest is a victory to the latter ; till at length, instead of the glorious and lifegiving truth, we have but a sepulchre, where the truth lies buried—all white and resplendent, it may be, without ; but within full of rottenness, and dead men's bones.

This being the fact, and that it is, no philosophic student of human nature can deny, it will cause no surprise to find this leaven of evil working amongst us. Indeed it seems that this age has a special proclivity to formalism. The spiritual awakening of the reformation, which shook the venerable formalism of the Church, as the earthquake prostrates her gorgeous cathedrals in the dust, has partially subsided ; the age of the high principled puritans and covenanters has passed away ; and now the minds of men seem to be turning to the pompous ceremonial of an ex-

ternal religion. It is, however, but fair to admit that the spiritual element is capable of abuse. It has been and still is abused. It has developed the widely different, but equally noxious results of fanaticism and rationalism—the one rushing madly and destructively on after the false lights which gleam on its path way, and thus soon reaching anarchy and ruin; the other calmly elaborating a system of pure reason—subordinating revelation to its dogmas: and thus building up an intellectual system; beautiful indeed and brilliant as a palace of ice, which lifts its glancing pinnacles in the light, but just as cold and well nigh as transient. But these forms of error are effete. They decay, and wax old, and are ready to vanish away. Men demand a faith less wild and erratic than the one; and warmer and more lifelike than the other. And this sect is found in formalism.

The ceremonies of religion are beautified, to meet the demands of a cultivated taste—its edifices rise to heaven in architectural grandeur, and impress the beholders with reverential awe; its ordinances, few and simple as they came from their author, are multiplied, and a mysterious dignity and power are thrown around them. No longer symbols and seals, they assume a solemn and mysterious import. Baptism becomes regeneration; and the table of our Lord retires from the light that revelation throws around it, and in the dimness in which it is seen, becomes an awful altar of sacrifice, where the one offering of the lamb, that was slain for the sins of men, is blasphemously re-enacted, with daily frequency.

And this system, false and hollow as it is, is by no means inefficient. Would that it were so. It appeals to some of the most powerful elements of our nature. It addresses the poetical faculty, and lays hold on a cultivated taste. Music, and painting, and sculpture, and architecture, minister at its altars. It subsidizes “the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eye, and the pride of life;” and sends them forth to fight her battles. And those who are slain of them are many. Their melancholy trophies of conquest are seen on every side.

It requires no deep research to discover why this cannot be the religion of Christ—that it commends itself to different faculties of our nature, and gains its victories by

other agencies than those which Christ has used. All men have not a cultivated taste, but all men have souls to be saved. And therefore the benevolent author of our faith appealed not to the aesthetics, but to the clamorous wants of our fallen and alienated souls; asking for pardon and cleansing and reconciliation. It will not heal a dying soul to look on the fairest handiwork, not only of earth, but God's throne on high. Our Saviour had at his command all the resources of celestial magnificence. He could have come in a glory before which the sun would have grown dim, and the stars gone out in utter night. Twelve legions of angels might have been his resistless body guard. But had this been the case, men would have been drawn around him with unpurified hearts, and unsubdued wills. His kingdom would have been of this world. His conflict would have been that of power with power, and his victory, like that of an earthly conqueror, only on a grander scale, and with more magnificent results. Hence he chose to draw men around his standard, not by music, or painting, or sculpture, or architecture, nor by the pomp of an irresistible array, but by love for the sin-pardoner. Therefore his advent was humble, divested of the gaudy trappings of earthly splendour; and presenting an aspect that is often offensive to taste and pride. The coming of his kingdom was not with observation. He hath chosen the foolish things of the world, to confound the wise; and the weak things of the world, to confound the mighty; and base things of the world, and things which are despised, hath God chosen, yea and things which are not; to bring to nought things which are; that no flesh should glory in his presence. The religion of such a Saviour must always be uncongenial with earthly pomp. Its strength and life are power within. It does not scorn all ornament; it is not a naked or uncouth thing; but it keeps ornament and external attractiveness in their proper place; and that is a subordinate one. It laughs to scorn their claim to be considered the pillars of its throne. True religion does not derive its authentication, or its efficiency, from its accordance with the principles of a correct and cultivated taste. No. It comes to us as the truth of God for the salvation of men. Its weaponry of warfare is drawn from the truth. It sanctifies

by the truth. It does not attempt to convert men by pleasing the fancy, or gratifying the imagination. It will never essay the reconciliation of men to God, by statuary more exquisite than ever came from the chisel of Phidias, or pictures more glorious than the creations of Michael Angelo.

Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis,
Tempus eget,

is ever its language to such assistances, for such an end. And well may religion decline auxiliaries so contemptibly inadequate to the lofty ends for which it labours. They can never do the work needed. Were the ineffable glories of heaven's throne brought down to earth; were the pencil-work of God's presence chamber on high, seen in undimmed splendour, on every Church wall; were the magnificent array of worshippers seen by John in Patmos, witnessed in every religious assembly; they all combined would not awaken love in the heart and send holiness through the life. They might and would throw around the earthly sanctuary a glory and a brightness which would be no mean reflection of the true sanctuary above. But while men would gather to wonder and admire, and while their minds might be all clearness, and their imaginations filled with images well nigh seraphic; beneath all this would be the cold, dark, dead abstraction, of a rebellious heart. No. Nothing short of the outstretched arm of omnipotence, can recreate us after the divine image and fit us for the golden harp and palm of triumph.

Be it ever remembered that Christ might have, at a word, gathered more than all these auxiliaries about his faith, but he declined their aid; and the attempt to make them important agencies in the work of salvation, is not only a violation of Christ's sovereignty, but is akin to the device of Satan, who tempted him with "all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them."

And true to its origin, we find that the pure faith does not affiliate with such externals. The best ages of the Church have been least cumbered by them. Painting, with its blended colours; statuary, with its lifelike representations; music, with its voluptuous swell; and architecture, with its groined arches, and castellated towers, and its solemn aisles; and a scenic ritual, with its altars, and

crosses, and genuflections and posturemaking ; have been most frequently found in connection with a false faith. They are indeed the appropriate garb of a lie ; while they cumber the truth, as did the armour of Saul the youthful David.

And a reliance on such aid as an important agency in accomplishing its objects, is an unmistakeable badge of essential error. There are few ways in which Rome more strikingly exhibits her apostacy from Christ, than in her open and thus far honest avowal, of trust in the artistic beauty of pictures and images, as incitements to devotion.* But to illustrate this principle more clearly, let us take the description left us by a recent eye witness of a scene where all these agencies were brought into requisition with the greatest skill and in the highest perfection. "As seen from this position, nothing could surpass the picturesque beauty of the spectacle, especially at the moment of the elevation of the Host. The choir or chancel with its high altar was splendidly illuminated. The high priest with his assistants were before the altar in their most magnificent robes. Twelve youths from the college of the Propaganda Fide formed two lines connecting the corners or horns of the altar with the rails of the chancel. They were clothed entirely from head to foot in scarlet, and held gigantic candles of wax in their hands. These candles were above five feet long and not less than five or six inches in circumference ; and as the priest proceeded with the prayer of consecration, they all knelt, still and motionless as marble statues ; and as the priest elevated the Host they all gracefully drooped their heads, and slowly leaned forward their kneeling bodies, till they almost touched the ground, and bent their large candles all at the same instant, and with the most practiced regularity till every candle seemed to bow in union like things of life in devout adoration to the present and visible divinity. As the eye wandered at this moment from our little gallery, whence we could view the whole space of the Church, as it ranged from the splendid illumination of the high altar and rested on the officiating priest in robes of white silk damasked with the richest foliage of gold,

* Seymour's Mornings with the Jesuits, p. 108.

and then fell on the twelve youths in scarlet bowing gracefully to the earth with their gigantic candles, and then fell upon the aged pontiff, the claimant as vicar of Christ and anointed head of the Church on earth, and then looked on the long array of cardinals, those anointed princes of the Church, robed entirely in scarlet, and then strayed along the congregation, of which the ladies were clothed in black and veiled, the men were mostly in the same colour, while the Swiss guards were arranged among them, relieving the mass of black costume with the brilliant scarlet and yellow of their antique and peculiar uniform. As our eyes wandered over all this scene in this magnificent and noble Church, with its antique marbles and costly decorations, and its vaulted roof was filled with the sweetest and most beautiful music, we felt that we had never witnessed any thing at Rome in the way of a religious fete so perfect in its arrangements, so picturesque in its appearance, and in such good taste and perfect keeping in all its accompaniments. It was the perfection of a religious spectacle, and exhibited the good taste and worldly wisdom of the order of the Jesuits.*

But the full force of this illustration cannot be gathered unless we remember that this splendid and imposing performance was designed as a master argument for the conversion of the beholder to a faith which vaunted itself in such trappings. And does any one who has intelligently read one page of the oracles of God, or caught one spark of the true spirit of piety, need to be told that the religion of Jesus rests for its success on no such agencies, and that to urge on the ark of God by such means is to touch it with unholy hands? The spirit of piety is lost in such a profusion of decoration, and is smothered in the fumes of such clouds of incense. Does any one need be told that a man may join with intense relish and warmest enthusiasm in a pageant like this, with an ignorance of religion as profound as that of the Bedouin of the desert, who reins in his barb to pause and gaze on the glories of the rising or setting sun? There is no more religion in such a display, than in a magnificent storm, marshalling its clouds, volleying out its thunders, and sending forth its lightnings in

*Seymour's Mornings with the Jesuits, p. 147.

the heavens; or in a bannered host, which in mortal array, and streamers in the wind, and music in the breeze, marches with beauteous order, and disciplined tread, to the field of carnage and of death.

Having gone thus far in the way of general remark, the remainder of this discussion will be devoted to a consideration of some points of contrast between the religion of Form and that of Spirit. 1. And the first observation is that the one is a system of self-gratification, the other, one of self-denial. There is in every bosom a religious element, which demands exercise. And if you will give it a field of operation, without exacting humiliation of spirit and renunciation of self, it will go forth to the mighty task of working out salvation, with a sort of proud and confident humility; painful penances, great personal sacrifices, and the most onerous observances will be assumed, and will be proudly paraded as the good works of the Pharisee, and will be confidently trusted in, as reasons for acceptance before God. Men are ready now, as in the days of our Saviour on earth, to pay tithes, from their most valuable possessions, even to the mint, and anise, and cummin, and all manner of herbs, if they are allowed to omit the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith. These external performances are perfectly consistent, indeed readily harmonize, with a proud and self-confident spirit. And, therefore, to our corrupt nature they present a way of life comparatively easy.

When the master comes to demand that service which is his due, men with alacrity ask "shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first born for my transgression—the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?" But when the answer is "the sacrifices of God are a broken spirit," they turn away deeply disappointed, failing before the test. But the religion of spirit begins with the inner man. Not satisfied with observances, it demands truth in the inward parts. It does not refuse these external services: It is prepared to do and suffer in proof of its loyalty; but after all is done, it acknowledges its unprofitableness of service, and prompts its votaries to bend before the throne, and in the intensity of an earnest heart, cry "God be merciful to me a sinner."

2. Another point of contrast is found in the remark that one of these antagonistic claimants of human confidence, is a religion of principle, while the other is governed by impulse. The spring of the one is found in the love of the truth, which is as undying as the soul that feels it; that of the other is in the fancy or the imagination. The one has the immortality and unchangableness of truth in it—the other is subject to the fluctuations of impulse and emotion. There is a broad and important practical distinction between these two. There is a vast difference between making religion a thing of impulse, and the result of obedience to high and holy principle. Our glorious Lord lived and died from principle. Impulses of love would never have carried him through his mediatorial work. And it is important that his disciples should learn, that his service is not a paroxysm of joy, produced by a gratified taste, that has its sustenance in a gorgeous array, suited to the demands of this capricious faculty of our nature; but that it is a life, the implantation of a firm and uncompromising love for the truth; which exists and rules, as well when all the trappings of earthly grandeur are torn from her form, as when, clad in purple, she demands our homage from the throne of empire. And hence the religion of spirit gives to its votaries a power of bearing contempt and persecution that is not afforded by that of form. Spiritualism does not regard any sacrifice demanded, as too great for the truth. To her it is above all price; the very lifeblood of the heart. Her emblem is a hardy mountain plant, nursed amid stones; or that bush seen in the prophet's vision that was unconsumed amid the raging fire. And history fully sustains this high claim. As an illustration we point to the kindred and contiguous kingdoms of England and Scotland. In the one we are happy to admit there has ever been a leaven of spiritualism, and to this she owes all the stability that relieves and adorns her history. But this living principle has been overshadowed, and well nigh destroyed, by the supreme importance ascribed to forms. Orders and rituals, vestments and postures, have always occupied a commanding position in her system, and for these she has more than once shaken from her crown her brightest jewels. But Scotland, while she has cherished

her own simple, expressive, and apostolic forms of worship, and has cleaved to them when the faggot, and the trooper's lance, and the desolate mountain den were indissolubly associated with them; has ever, both in her creeds and her practice, subordinated form to spirit—the garb of the truth to the truth itself. And for the fruits of the two systems, look at their histories. The world knows them by heart. These things have not been done in a corner.

The English Church has been at once the creature and the play-thing of her rulers. She was first Romish and then Protestant under Henry the 8th, approached the very verge of Presbyterianism under Edward the 6th, was hurled back into the midnight gloom of the Papacy under the bloody Mary, and then came out into the twilight of prelacy under Elizabeth. And how signally is she now illustrating this same blind obedience to her rulers, and her supreme adherence to a form, where there is no corresponding spirit. Fostering in her bosom almost every variety of opinion, she still boasts of a oneness of form, and holds that up to the world with the infatuated hope that it will excite universal admiration and esteem. She has just declared by her highest authority, and that to be it remembered, a civil one, that her solemnly appointed and authorised teachers may proclaim that a child is regenerated, or that he is not regenerated in baptism, just as he sees fit. That is, between two systems of opinion, one of which is necessarily false, and if so ruinous, she does not determine—or to speak more accurately, she gives her authentication to both. And yet her best men—who are strictly evangelical—holding and preaching the truth, bow to such an establishment, and praise God that the truth which they hold is not utterly cast out of her bosom. How striking is the contrast presented by the Church of Scotland. The smiles and the frowns of royalty, the argument of logic, and that of pitiless persecution, have essayed in vain to drive her from that truth which she believes she has drawn from the word of God. She, too, has held the doctrine of a national Church establishment, and has enjoyed the benefits of perhaps the best the world has ever seen. But though prizing these advantages, she has never been willing to hold them at the price

of a sacrifice of truth. From time to time, when they have thought that truth invaded, her hardy sons have come out from under the shield of the State, and bared their breasts to the powers that be; rather than prove disloyal to truth. And recently, in the view of a wondering world, her best sons have willingly, aye joyfully, left their man-ses, churches, and adequate stipends, rather than compromise the rights of Christ's crown, and have come out to preach the unfettered truth, on the bleak heath, with a wintry sky for their canopy, or upon the debateable line that separates high and low water, or where this has been denied, on a boat, afloat on the heaving tide. Nothing but a love of truth has or can make such sacrifices. No other than a religion of spirit could have given a theme for that wonderful composition, the *Covenanter's Night Hymn and Prayer*. Lofty devotion to truth, and stern self-sacrifice for it, breathe in every line of it.

“Unholy change. The scorner's chair
Is now the seat of those that rule;
Tortures, and bonds, and death, the share
Of all, except the tyrants tool.
That faith, in which our fathers breathed,
And had their life—for which they died;
That priceless heirloom, they bequeathed
Their sons—our impious foes deride.

So we have left our homes behind,
And we have belted on the sword,
And we in solemn league have joined,
Yea covenanted with the Lord,
Never to seek those homes again,
Never to give the sword its sheath,
Until, our rights of faith remain
Unfettered, as the air we breathe.

O thou who rulest above the sky,
Begirt about with starry thrones,
Cast from the heaven of heavens thine eye,
Down on our wives and little ones—
From hallelujah's surging sound,
O for a moment turn thine ear,
The widow prostrate on the ground,
The famished orphans' cries to hear.

We have no hearth—the ashes lie
 In blackness where they brightly shone;
 We have no homes—the desert sky
 Our covering—earth our couch alone;
 We have no heritage—deprived
 Of these, we ask not such on earth;
 Our hearts are sealed; we seek in heaven,
 For heritage, and home, and hearth.

O Salem, city of the saints,
 And holy men made perfect, we
 Pant for thy gates, our spirits faint
 Thy glorious golden gates to see—
 To mark the rapture that inspires
 The ransomed and redeemed by grace,
 To listen to the seraphs' lyres,
 And meet the angels face to face.

Father in heaven, we turn not back,
 Though briars and thorns choke up the path;
 Rather the torture of the rack,
 Than tread the winepress of thy wrath.
 Let thunders crash, let torrents shower,
 Let whirlwinds churn the howling sea,
 What is the turmoil of an hour,
 To an eternal calm with thee."

The spirit of the other system finds a short but comprehensive delineation in one of the predictions of Jacob on his dying bed. "Issachar is a strong ass bowing down between two burdens; and he saw that rest was good, and the land that it was pleasant. And bowed his shoulder to bear and became a servant unto tribute."

3. We find another point of contrast in the fact that the one system is essentially catholic, and the other just as necessarily exclusive. An eminently spiritual system, regarding the truth as the most important, as the real life and soul of any organization, will recognize and welcome that truth wherever found, and in whatever garb. The ritual system, on the contrary, will pass contemptuously by the truth, even when confessedly existing in a high degree of perfection, and refuse to affiliate with it, unless it presents itself under a certain canonized and stereotyped form. And this is not a mere harmless theory, slum-

bering in the creeds of ritualists. It has come out more than once into bold and destructive activity, and is the settled policy on which action is had. No historian can fail to revert to a time when thousands of men, of acknowledged talents, learning, piety, orthodoxy, and zeal, and what is more, with the broad seal of heaven's authentication to their ambassadorship in their abundant success in winning souls to Christ—some of whom she was anxious to invest with her highest dignities and powers—were cast out from the bosom of a ritual Church, merely because they scrupled as to the shape or colour of an ecclesiastical garment, to the position proper in the reception of an ordinance, and to forms of worship generally. More than this, they were not only ejected, but they were hurled from their homes and flocks like outlaws, and denied the privilege of preaching the gospel to those who were anxious to hear, under the heaviest penalties of person and purse.

The opposite spirit cannot be better illustrated than by a quotation from one of these very ejected ministers. In Howe's sermon on the death of Queen Mary, he says, "It ought to be most remote from us to confine, in our narrow thoughts, sincere religion and godliness to a party distinguished by little things and most extra-essential thereto. Take we that great Apostle's document—I perceive that God is no respecter of persons; and what he said of nations, may not we as aptly say that of parties? They that fear God and work righteousness are accepted of him. Let us once learn to reckon substantial godliness a greater thing than the using or not using this or that ceremony. And account that faith, mercy, judgment and the love of God, are not to be passed over for as little things, as the tithing of mint, anise and cummin. I believe that there are few in the world, if they cast their eyes about them, but might truly say (what I thank God I have often thought,) that of all our parties that hold the substantials of religion, I have known some of far greater value than myself. Let the being a good Christian signify more with us than to belong to a-so or so-shaped or figured Church."

Indeed bigotry is the natural, and, unless a considerable degree of spirituality accompany it, the inevitable result

of formalism. If the mode of worship is supreme, then he who does not adopt it is to be denounced as a rebel against God. If the visible organization of Christ's Church partakes of the nature of essence ; then any body of believers, however pure in doctrine, or holy in practice, that does not conform to the pattern seen in the visions of these dreamers, does not constitute a part of the Church of Christ on earth at all. They have no ordinances, nor covenanted rights. They have no ecclesiastical standing, and are saved, if saved at all, as isolated persons, who believe in Christ—just as some solitary heathen who has learned and accepted the truth as it is in Jesus, and not as a member of the great and glorious company of God's preferred disciples—the body of Christ. With such persons the mode of your baptism, or the channel of your ordination, or the form of your Church government, or the want of a liturgy, is ecclesiastically an unpardonable sin—shuts you out of the visible Church—deprives you of all its life-giving ordinances, and abandons you, though possessing the piety, learning, and talents, of John Howe or Richard Baxter—to the uncovenanted mercies of God. And it requires but a full developement of this system to reach the point of persecution. In the agencies of spiritual religion, earthly pains and penalties have no place. They do not and cannot affect the inner man. Loaded with chains, in a cheerless dungeon, or blazing at the stake, the spirit that lives in the suffering victim defies the tyrant's power. But it is not so with formalism. Those external acts, which it exalts to such a preeminence in the plan of salvation, are the direct objects of earthly power. The tortures of the rack, the ignominy of the gibbet, the fires of the flaming fagot, may compel, however reluctantly it may be rendered, this external service. And on this system it is difficult to see why they may not be used as legitimate means of persuasion. If this bodily service is all important, and this conformity can be secured by bringing into play all the terrors of persecution, why not use them? Is it not far better that the body should suffer for a few fleeting months or years, than that the soul should pass on through all a hopeless eternity beneath the wrath of God? The inquisition, with all its heart sickening details, is the fruit of such logic. And here we may be pardoned

for pointing with pride to the stand which the Presbyterian Church has taken on this subject. No one can mistake her position. She has inscribed her recognition of sister Churches on her banner, and given it to every wind that blows. She loves her own simple, expressive, and apostolical forms of worship, and her republican and scriptural Church organization, but she does not attach her recognition to these externals, valuable as they are. Hear her voice: "The visible Church, which is also catholic or universal under the gospel, consists of *all* those throughout the world that profess the true religion, together with their children."

4. But again we remark of these two systems, that the one elevates, expands, and strengthens the mind, while the other dwarfs and emasculates it. Spiritualism sends out its votaries to seek after, and commune with, great principles of truth. Ritualism gropes amid the tombs of the past, for dead forms, and sets its followers to disputing in the twilight of medieval times, about the number and place of genuflections, or the shade and colour of a vestment, or the form and position of a piece of Church furniture.

It is difficult to express the feelings of contempt that arise in our minds, without overleaping the proprieties of the occasion, at a view of the puerile questions that formalists gravely discuss, and authoritatively determine. This point can be best illustrated by a precious morcean taken from a recent report of the New York Ecclesiological Society. Here we are told that "the Church of believers" is called "a spiritual house," therefore, the edifice (of a Church) symbolizes the Church of the faithful. They are called "living stones," therefore, the Church is built of stone. "We are fellow citizens of the saints," and "of the household of God," all being one family, and therefore, chancel and nave are both requisite for a complete Church. The building pointeth east, for there the sun of righteousness arose, and there he shall appear again, when he cometh to judgment. The tower is Christ, for "he is a strong tower for us against the enemy." The door is also Christ, for he said "I am the door." The font is close by the door, for by baptism we put on Christ, and "enter by the door, into the sheep fold." It is of stone, as is also

the altar, because "Christ is our rock," and he is "the stone cut out of the mountain." The pavement is humility, as David saith, "my soul cleaveth unto the ground," (*vul. adhaesit pavamenta anima mea.*) The great piers or pillars are apostles, for St. Paul says of Peter, James, and John, that "they seemed to be pillars." The windows are Holy Scripture, as saith the Psalmist "the entrance of thy words giveth light." The glass is stained and thus darkened, for here "we see through a glass darkly." The stars and angels in the roof are the heavenly host, for St. Paul speaks of "the whole family in heaven and earth" as one household. The chancel, arch and screen signify "the grave and gate of death" by which all must pass from the Church militant to the Church triumphant. The halls are the "rest that remains for the people of God." The sanctuary in the extreme east is adorned with the highest brilliance, for the New Jerusalem has "streets of gold, gates of pearl, and walls of twelve manner of precious stones." In addition we have a learned argument to show why the form of an octagon is the most proper to symbolize Baptismal Regeneration. It is with such puerile and contemptible trifling with Holy Scripture, that formalism amuses and deludes its votaries. Need I say that such a system emasculates the mind, robbing it of all that is free, generous, and expansive? And hence its results are most disastrous. If men believe it, they become superstitious. If they see through its hollowness and have no better system by which to judge, they readily conclude that all religion is a fable, and lapse into drear and cheerless infidelity.

5. The last remark we have to make is that the one system exalts God, the other exalts man—the one is the religion of Christ, the other the religion of the priest. These external ordinances, which formalism makes so important, come to us through the priest. They are dependant on his will. He is the indispensable channel of grace. No wonder, then, that the trembling formalist bows at the feet of his spiritual Lord. He can shut out from him the light of God's countenance. And hence formalism has ever been the fountain of ghostly tyranny. But spiritualism points to a God who seeth in secret, to whom all the workings of a penitent heart are fully known, and cheers

her votaries, by the declaration, that when the ordinances of the Church are unjustly withheld, they may safely appeal from a fallible to an infallible tribunal. And it is this very principle that has robbed ecclesiastical censures of their inordinate terror, and, more than any thing else, has thrown wide open the dungeons in which the prisoner has groaned. If, then, we wish to spread the spirit of freedom, and thus perpetuate those institutions which are identified with the best interests of the human race, disseminate a spiritual rather than a formal religion.

No one who attentively reads the signs of the times, can consider this discussion as unreasonable. The tendency of things, and the developements occurring in such rapid succession, that we have ceased to wonder at any thing, however absurd, call on the friends of truth to awake. Infidelity, open and avowed, has grown out of fashion. All men must have a religion. And true to its bias, corrupt nature will look out for that which is least burthensome, and most attractive and genteel—in short, that which is least unlike the world. We feel bound, therefore, in all earnestness to protest against this attractive, but false system of formalism. We do not charge it with inefficiency. We dare not despise it. He knows nothing of human nature who ventures to do so, and the result will amply punish him for his folly. It does lay hold on all minds that are not forearmed against it by the truth held in the love of it. For some minds it has a bewildering and irresistible fascination. Thus it is that it is dangerous. It is the beautiful bow of heavenly colouring, that arches our pathway, and lures us on. But its lovely colours are like those painted on the mist cloud, that goes up from the seething cauldron of Niagara—beautiful exceedingly—but decorating and hiding a precipice, over which to plunge is fatal. It lures to destruction.

ARTICLE IV.

CHRISTIANITY VINDICATED FROM THE CHARGE OF
FANATICISM.

There is no general charge under which it is more frequently attempted to smother Christianity, than that of fanaticism. The pre-eminent mysteriousness of the doctrines which she avows, towering far above the loftiest conception of human reason—and the inward and hidden experience of those who are brought under her power, penetrating far beneath the deepest consciousness of unregenerate men—both afford scope for the reckless and indiscriminate application of this term. The indefiniteness of the charge, moreover, facilitates the malicious or the unreflecting allegation of it, while it is rendered thereby the more difficult to be disproved. For those who rally to the defence of Christianity, are compelled to frame definitions and to make distinctions, which it is the policy of the accuser to becloud and to confound. It adds, too, no little to the grievance of this charge, that it not only prejudices the system, but throws a gratuitous and beforehand suspicion upon its advocates, as though unworthy of a hearing on their own behalf. Not only is a foregone conclusion reached before a single argument has been heard, but often the argument itself is barred a hearing, by the contempt with which his cause has attained the counsel.

It is not strange, therefore, that the ruthless cry of fanaticism, when boldly raised against the Gospel, should for a season bear it to the ground: that it should sweep away the most convincing arguments which can be addressed to the understanding, the most earnest appeals which can be made to the conscience, and the most passionate claims which can be urged upon the sympathies and affections of men. Truth has indeed little to fear eventually in the conflict with error; and Divine truth, as her whole history will show, is ever "mighty through God to the pulling down of strong holds." But truth, in order to this success, must gain admission to the human mind. If prejudice closes the ear against her demonstrations, error must lie secure in its fastnesses. All that truth

desires is, an open field and a revealed foe : she will prove herself immortal in every combat, and claim a decisive victory in every issue. It has, however, often been the lot of Christianity to meet with derision instead of refutation. She puts forth her claims in the most solemn and considerate tone ; but while advancing to her proofs, is met with the infuriate cry, "away with her ! what further need have we of witnesses ? behold now, we have heard her blasphemy." The very greatness of her pretensions serves often to foreclose that scrutiny which it should invite. Her proofs being ignored, she is at once convicted either of madness or folly, upon the mere face of the indictment.

A striking illustration of this is furnished in the history of the Apostle Paul. Assailed by a violent mob in the streets of Jerusalem, and in peril of his life, the Apostle is rescued and taken finally under the protection of the Roman soldiery. By his own appeal to Cæsar, he is at length sisted before a Roman tribunal, to make out his cause against Jewish accusers. His defence is little more than a lucid statement of his religious belief, and a clear showing of the correspondence between this and the original articles of the Jewish faith. These truths sounded, however, so strangely in the ear of a Pagan governor, that all investigation is forestalled. His mind closed itself against the strange and foreign doctrine of the resurrection from the dead : "understanding neither what he said, nor whereof he affirmed," and forgetful of the proprieties of his office, and of the courtesy due even to a prisoner on trial, Festus said with a loud voice, "Paul, thou art beside thyself ; much learning doth make thee mad." No ingenuous reader of the narrative, given in the book of Acts, can feel any other sentiment than that of admiration for the moral heroism of the great Apostle, aside from all sympathy with his religious views. He is pained at this wanton indignity put upon a man who, with unsurpassed courage and eloquence, had ventured to speak against the howlings of an enraged populace ; and who, now, with unequalled dignity and mildness, rebukes the insolence of judges who sit before him in their purple and their power. But those who believe Paul to be an inspired expounder of a Divine system, and

feel a concern that this bold calumny against the Gospel should be repelled, will not stop in simple admiration of the Apostle's heroism, but will listen with breathless attention to the defence which he shall set up against so desolating a charge. They will be apt to remember Christ's injunction and promise to His disciples, when they should be brought before Kings and rulers for His sake: "settle it in your hearts not to meditate before what ye shall answer, for I will give you a mouth and wisdom which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay or resist;" and in view of this, will be prone to consider Paul's reply as authenticated and patented for the use of the Church in every age. This reply evidently assumes that only two grounds exist upon which it is possible to construct and to maintain the charge of fanaticism against the Gospel; which are either *the falsity of its tenets*, or *the extravagance of its practices*. If Christianity speaks on the one hand, "the words of truth," and on the other hand, "the words of soberness," she is fairly acquitted of madness or frenzy: and she establishes a most reasonable and righteous claim upon the considerate attention of all mankind.

It only remains, then, for the Christian advocate to file the plea which is already provided to his hand. It is proposed, therefore, now, to conduct the defence of the Gospel, by simply expanding the twofold reply given by the Apostle. This article will thus naturally divide itself in two parts; the first of which will consider Christianity as a scheme of truth, and the second, as a rule of life and conduct.

In entering upon the first of these divisions, it may be expedient *in limine* to quiet the apprehensions of the reader, by disclaiming any design of treating either largely or systematically what are technically termed 'the Evidences.' We have no mental condenser which can possibly compress within the limits of a brief essay, the various and discursive subjects embraced in this department. To establish the canonicalness of the sacred books, to explain their inspiration, to track the whole line of historical testimony, to discuss the subject of miracles, and to unfold and apply the evidence of prophecy, would only carry the reader a long and fatiguing journey over

a hard and beaten path, though he should touch but the tops of the argument. Our object is rather to present a compendious and portable argument for the truth of Christianity, viewed as a system, and without entering into the explication or defence of its details. This object will be fully gained by presenting a few of the more general and obvious considerations, which are likely to occur most readily to a reflecting mind. Nor will it be a matter of regret, if these shall fall rather under the head of internal evidence—a species of evidence for which we confess a growing affection, inasmuch as it requires for its appreciation little apparatus beyond a clear and honest mind, and is thus suited to convince plain and unlettered men; and since it is the actual warranty of that implicit faith which the mass of believers repose in Christianity, as a divinely revealed system of truth.

1. The first of these broad proofs which we adduce is, that *the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion commend themselves to the moral sense of mankind so as to receive their immediate assent.* The necessary existence of God, His moral government over men, the holiness and immutability of His law, and the accountability of all intelligent creatures, are truths which must lie at the foundation of all religion. If there were no God, or if there were no intelligent beings beside Himself, the idea of religion would not be extant in the world. In the one case, there would be no object of worship; in the other, there would be no subject by whom it could be rendered. But if both exist, there must also be a law, answering to the nature of Deity, as a medium of intercourse between the two; serving as a revelation of the one, and defining the relations and duties of the other.—Now it is worthy of attention that these great principles of all religion are no sooner revealed to man than they are instantly received, and can never be discharged from his cognizance. However capable of proof by reason and argument, they are not dependent upon this proof for their reception and retention. They seem to shine by their own light, and are admitted upon the evidence they themselves afford of their own truth. Were it not so, it would be hard to see how men could be the religious beings they certainly are. This capacity for religion—this

conscious recognition of law, and sense of obligation—which is the grand characteristic distinguishing men from brutes—would cease to exist. It is not at all necessary, in order to account for the existence of religious notions among men, to fall back upon the now generally abandoned doctrine of innate ideas. It is only necessary to maintain, what none will deny, that men are endowed with those faculties necessary to constitute them moral beings; they are gifted with intellect and affections. All religious truth came at first by immediate and supernatural revelation. But there is an established congruity between the truths objectively revealed, and the mind which subjectively receives them. Dr. Chalmers very luminously distinguishes between “the power required for the discernment of a truth, and the power required for its discovery.” He says,* “a proposition which we could never have found our way to, we may, nevertheless, recognize as worthy of all credit and all acceptance, when stated and placed forward to our view. We have no light in ourselves which could lead to the disclosure of it; but when disclosed *ab extra*, there may be a light in ourselves by which to invest it in the characters of truth, and so to constrain the homage of our deep-felt convictions—not that light of evidence which could open for us a pathway to the objective, but a light of evidence struck out between the objective and the subjective—requiring, therefore, the presentation of the object by another, after which it is acknowledged and appropriated by ourselves as an article of faith.” When it is affirmed that men are, by nature, religious beings, it is not, therefore, implied that they have spontaneously originated the conceptions which they have; but only that they are constituted with such a capacity for religious impressions, that when Divine truth is revealed from Heaven, *it must be received*; and when received, is held with such tenacity as never again to be wholly dislodged from their minds. That such a congeniality is established between religious truth and the recipient mind, is proved by the fact, that those great doctrines which are the foundation of all religion, however perverted or overlaid, have never been extirpated

* Institutes of Theology, vol. 1, p. 248. Posthumous works, vol. 7.

from the world. For example : though men have "not liked to retain God in their knowledge," and have bowed down before Lords many and Gods many of their own creation, yet the great idea of a Supreme Deity has preserved its ascendancy through all the monstrous forms of human idolatry. The stupendous truth of an inspecting and controlling Providence, has imbedded itself in the mythology which consecrates every hill and grove and valley as the shrine of some local and tutelary Deity.—The supremacy of an original law, and the grim image of vindictive justice pursuing the transgressor, stand out to view in the horrible and cruel rites of the most ancient and hoary superstitions. Even the doctrines of redemption and the conversableness with men of a reconciled God, though dropped first as hints upon the human mind, have left their imperishable trace in all the traditions and legends of antiquity. They have more than kept themselves from erasure : they have passed down through all the creations of idolatry and heresy, the archetypes of those fables which constitute both the poetry and the religion of the heathen world. Dreadfully distorted through the refracting media of ignorance, prejudice and idolatry, through which they have come ; scarcely cognizable any more as truth ; rendered grotesque by the monstrous and silly additions which have been placed upon them : yet they exist, at once the caricature and the attestation of those fundamental truths which God at first communicated—and which no lapse of time, no darkness of Paganism, no inventions of Mythologists, and no denials of Atheists, have been able entirely to eradicate.

All this affords a strong *a priori* argument for the truth of Christianity. She engrosses these foundations of natural religion, and makes them the basis of her own more perfect system. She teaches them with greater clearness, enforces them with higher authority, and builds upon them a more enduring structure. Those truths which are more peculiarly her own, such as atonement and mediation, like the others, trace their lines with ineffaceable distinctness upon the tablet of the human mind. And can that system be spurious, whose fundamental articles men intuitively receive, as readily and as firmly as they receive the axioms of Mathematics, or the first principles

of natural science? These principles, which never become effete through age, which can neither be suppressed nor destroyed, stand forth as vouchers of the entire system which is simply developed from them.

2. A second general proof of the truth of Christianity is found in the fact, *that most of its leading doctrines are incomprehensible by human reason, and must, therefore, be above the reach of human invention.* The absolute Eternity of God, the subsistence of the Divine Essence in a threefold distinction of persons, the eternal generation of the Son, His incarnation and the union of two natures in His Mediatorial person, the personality of the Spirit and all His operations upon the hearts of men, the resurrection from the dead, and future retribution, may be singled as instances in point. Not one of these is any man able fully to explain. The longer they are pondered, the more must they be confessed "unsearchable—past finding out." They are received, however, firmly and without hesitation; received not as abstract propositions, having no concern with the life and practice of men, but as the foundation of all their conduct, and the pillars of their hope; received, too, simply upon the trust which is reposed in the testimony of Jehovah himself.—Now upon the supposition that Christianity is a revelation from God, the existence of such truths can be easily accounted for. Reason herself teaches that if the Infinite One condescends to reveal Himself to His creatures, there will be depths in this revelation altogether unfathomable by its short line. Reason staggers not at the announcement that "it is the glory of God to conceal a thing;" while faith cheerfully accedes to the facts revealed, when a Divine testimony is offered as the warrant. Neither philosophy nor religion will justify the protest of reason, founded upon its incompetency to compass the *modus* of a fact, provided the fact itself is attested by sufficient evidence. But upon the hypothesis that Christianity is an imposture, how can the existence of such mysterious doctrines be explained? If the Gospel is only "a cunningly devised fable," these essential principles are purely of human invention. Yet if so, how are they inexplicable? The law holds as true in the intellectual as in the material world, that no stream rises higher than its source:

what man invents, man surely shall be able to describe. It is easy to say religion owes its existence to priestcraft; yet this superficial explanation will not satisfy any but the most shallow and credulous of infidels. The question returns, whence came priesthood and priestcraft themselves? How sprung these strange and wonderful thoughts into the minds of those who call themselves priests? How explain the singular susceptibility in the race to ideas of this sort, that they should be immediately cognized as soon as they are distinctly unfolded from without? And how account for the extraordinary vitality of these doctrines, which refuse utterly to die out from the world, if they are only of mortal birth? It does not satisfy to go back a few links in a series, when it is so easy to overleap them all, and to demand an explanation of the very first in the entire chain; it is not enough to say that the world rests upon the back of the tortoise, while the tortoise itself rests upon——nothing!

We feel great pleasure in wresting from free-thinkers their grand argument drawn from the unfathomable mysteries of the Christian religion. We ask them to explain by what process of ratiocination did the inventor first arrive at the notion of God's social existence in a trinity of persons? From what premises did he start, and by what laws of thought was he conducted to the grand ideas of atonement and sacrifice by an incarnate Deity? What analogies or associations first suggested the cardinal doctrine of the new birth by the Holy Ghost, and by what *a priori* demonstration was the hint coined into an indubitable truth? Above all, how comes it to pass that since their first promulgation, the united reason of mankind has been equally unable to contradict and to explain them? Most surely the incomprehensible nature of these doctrines, so far from convicting Christianity of falsehood, affords the strongest conceivable presumption of its truth. They plainly do not lie within the orbit in which the human mind is appointed to move. Their home is in a higher sphere; and their existence on earth as mental phenomena, cannot be explained, unless they have been let down from the mind of God. If this be granted, then must their truth be also admitted; unless we are prepared to charge upon Him who is the truth, a wilful decep-

tion of his creatures. It strengthens, too, the argument, that these are not isolated truths, standing or falling alone; they are on the contrary thoroughly interwoven with the whole system of the gospel. The falsification of one must destroy the whole, and the verification of one must equally establish the entire scheme.

3. It is extremely pertinent to our general argument to observe now, that *the gospel is a closely compacted system; all the parts of it are homogenous and consolidated into one grand whole, being bound together by the strictest logical connexion.* This never was true, and never can be true, of any imposture. Every lie contains in itself the elements of its own refutation; and must be exceedingly short, if it does not break in two of its own weight. This lays the foundation of one of the most important processes for the elimination of truth in our courts of justice; and it rarely happens that a prevaricating witness does not, under a searching cross-examination, cancel his own depositions. At least this much may be affirmed; that no extensive and *original* system of error was ever framed, which could possibly hold together, when subjected to a rigid analysis. Like the monstrous image in the vision of the Babylonian monarch, its members are partly iron and partly clay, which no art can ever cement. The reason is obvious, truth is one. However it may lose itself in the distance of infinity, whither no human eye can ever follow it; or however wide may be the gaps which a too superficial finding has permitted to occur; it deposes as to realities which do co-exist in fact—hence its testimony can never be self-contradictory. But falsehood undertakes to speak of things which have not a substantive existence; and however in its inventions it may preserve verisimilitude in the broad, projecting features, it is hard for human wit to weave a consistent underplot which shall thoroughly line and protect the same.

Perhaps we shall be referred, in refutation of these positions, to existing systems of error, such as the Papacy, or Mahometanism. It is readily granted that these are gigantic systems, made up of many and closely homologated parts. It is freely admitted that they are both magnificent specimens of joinery, in which the pieces are dovetailed with consummate skill—as beautiful samples of Mo-

saic as human art ever furnished for the admiration of the world. But it is denied that they are *original* inventions. They were not hatched out, each from its own egg; and have not grown by inherent life to their present proportions. They are, on the contrary, from first to last, perversions of Christianity, and borrow their systematic form from this source. Exquisite skill, indeed, has been displayed in so distorting the separate features of Christianity as to be unique in their deformity, presenting the *vrai-semblance* of an original monster. But even this skill is inferior to that required for developing from a single conception in a human brain so symmetrical and systematic a scheme as either of these. If, then, the gospel be a fraud, so complicated and so extensive, it is impossible that it should not contradict itself—and the logical connexion of its multifarious parts, binding them into so grand and complete a whole, affords a triumphant vindication from the charge that it had its origin in the heated brain of an enthusiast.

4. Analogous to the foregoing is another general proof drawn from the fact that *this whole system is committed to writing; and this written record is authoritative, binding both as to faith and practice.* It is characteristic of fanaticism, in all its manifestations, that it lays claim to private revelations. The dreamer supposes himself to be closeted in intimate converse with Deity; and puts forth his extravagant fantasies as veritable disclosures of Infinite love and wisdom. Of course, those who are not favoured with the same high intercourse are incompetent to judge of these portentous revelations. There is no recognized standard to which they can be referred, and which shall be the test of those which are spurious. Thus fanaticism has the adroitness to lift itself not only above the shafts of criticism, but even above the most modest and reverential inquiry. It never defers to any authority aside from itself. Self-complacent in the enjoyment of its royal privilege of immediate access to the Great King, it wraps itself within the mantle of dogmatism, excommunicates at will all who question its prerogative, and revels in its own chartered licentiousness. Christianity, however, imposes precisely that restraint which fanaticism slips aside. It spreads before the world an inspired canon,

containing all that must be believed, all that must be felt, all that must be done. These authoritative scriptures invite the severest scrutiny of reason and offer to satisfy all its just demands, when it asks for their credentials. Indeed the Bible above all books has been the whetstone upon which criticism has sharpened its blade. In the school of the Gospel, no disciple is ever permitted to thrust away his text-book. He may not spin his thoughts into any propositions, nor weave his affections into any relations, upon which this record shall not sit in judgment. All articles believed, all sentiments cherished, and all actions achieved, are brought "to the law and to the testimony;" whoever abides not by their final award, becomes an excised apostate. It is obvious what a check is hereby imposed upon the wayward imagination of mankind, which a lawless fanaticism ever seeks to emancipate from control.

At first view, this circumstance may not seem to afford an "*experimentum crucis*" by which to distinguish Christianity from mere fanaticism; since so far as this argument goes, the Koran of the Arabian impostor, the *credenda* of Emanuel Swedenborg, and even the golden plates of the Mormon prophet, may be placed upon the same footing with the Bible. These, however, notwithstanding they are committed to record, are still private revelations. None but their respective authors enjoyed the gift of inspiration. There is no concurring testimony to vouch for the verity of these professed disclosures. But the Christian canon is composed of various books, written by inspired men who lived in separate countries and at distant intervals of time. The same spirit who in earlier days illuminated Moses and Job, in after years rested upon David and Solomon, upon Isaiah and Daniel. The succession of prophets was continued through Amos and Joel and others, to the close of the Old Testament record. After a suspension of four hundred years, the mantle of inspiration rested again upon Matthew and Luke, upon Peter and Paul and John. If these were all mad, then was there strange method in their madness. It is incredible that for the space of fifteen hundred years a conspiracy should have been perpetuated, and that with long intervals suspending the continuity of succession among

these impostors. If these were not impostors, but really inspired men holding separate intercourse with God, then do they vouch and verify each other. Their several books, which they have written, serve as checks upon all fanaticism in the record which they compose; precisely as this record in turn guaranties against fanaticism in those who submit to be taught and governed by its precepts. Verily "no prophecy of the scripture is of any private interpretation; for the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

5. We lay more stress upon the consideration which we next urge: that *Christianity gives exercise to every faculty of the soul, and employs them in the order in which they stood before it was disturbed by sin.* Man is known to be a moral being by the possession of certain powers which are necessary to accountability. "To moral agency belongs a moral *faculty*, or sense of good and evil, or of such thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishment; and a capacity which an agent has of being influenced by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty."* He must, in other words, possess an understanding with which to weigh propositions, to appreciate motives, and to form judgments; he must have affections capable of being excited for or against the objects proposed to them; he must have the power of deciding between different courses of action. It would well repay the effort of the reader, if he should here pause to mark how the Gospel does practically exercise all the powers of the human soul. What employment is given to the understanding in examining the evidences of the Christian faith, in comprehending its diversified statements, in estimating the force of arguments which are intended to influence human conduct! What exercise is given to the affections, when it calls upon us to love holiness, to hate sin, to fear God, and to hope in His mercy! What scope is afforded to the actings of the will, when it is summoned to abandon former courses, to refuse the evil and to choose

* Edwards on the Will. Works. Vol. II. p. 40.

the good ! In the simple exercise of faith in the Redeemer, how are we employed in remembering past sins, and in apprehending God's infinite grace ! How do we perceive, and think, and reason, and compare ! How do we hope, and fear, and confide, and rejoice ! How is the mind put through all its complex operations, and the heart agitated by the infinite variety of its emotions !

But the Gospel, when it is made "the savour of life unto life," does not simply give intense exercise to all the faculties which distinguish man as a moral being, but employs these in that precise order in which they relatively stood before the fall. We may well suppose that man in his more perfect state, when he came fresh from the hands of his maker, would exhibit something like uniformity in the operation of his several powers. Even in a well regulated machine, there must be a due subordination of the parts: much more must this subserviency of one faculty to another be discovered in man, the last of the creatures, and made in the image of God. Before sin was introduced with its disturbing influence, the understanding, as first in exercise, was the leading or directing faculty of the soul ;* the affections, as next in use, was the moving power ; and the will discharged an executive function, carrying out into choice and subsequent action the conclusions of the mind and the desires of the heart. Immediately upon the apostacy, this beautiful arrangement is subverted. The temptations which now assail us address themselves not in the first instance to the judgment, but to the corrupt affections. When these are entangled, the understanding is carried by special pleas which are set in full battery against it. This being gained over, and the unholy alliance formed, the enslaved will does the bidding of the conspirators. "Every man is tempted," says the apostle James, "when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed ; then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin ; and sin when it is finished bringeth forth death." But the Gospel, when it does its saving work upon the soul, reverses this order, going back to that which was established in man's primitive integrity. The first operation of the Holy Ghost is to enlighten the mind,

* See Owen on Indwelling Sin. Works. Vol. 13, pp. 71, 77, et alibi.

upon which He brings to bear the whole artillery of truth; He then purges the conscience, purifies the affections and subdues the will. That now is a singular imposture, which does not avail itself, for its wicked ends, of the confusion and darkness into which human nature was thrown, and which would render it a more easy prey. And more singular still, that its first office should be to repair the ruin of the soul, and restore its pristine integrity, thereby too surely defeating its own purpose of destruction.

Contrast with this the policy pursued by every scheme of fanaticism known in the history of mankind. With the uniformity of instinct, they invariably address themselves to one or other power of the soul, and always to those which have usurped an ascendancy over the reason. In some cases, the appeal is to the imagination, the most fickle and wayward of all the faculties; in other cases, the passions are enlisted. But in all cases alike, the understanding is dethroned from its seat of rule, and made subaltern to those powers which should be under its direction. Let this difference be carefully observed between Christianity and all the fanatical systems with which it is too often classed; let it be noted how they respectively seek to bring men under their control; and the contrast between the honesty of the one, and the sly craft of the other, will scarcely fail to impress a candid mind that they have no interests or features in common.

6. Similar in nature to the preceding is the last argument we offer for the truth of the Christian scheme: *that it carefully adjusts all the duties which grow out of the relations which men sustain in life.* It considers man first in his relations to God, and his religious obligations of course as supreme. It places man next in his various relations to his family, to his country, to the Church, and to the world; and specifies in their due subordination the duties of each. It provides formal precepts for his direction in all the situations and circumstances of life. Husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant, ruler and subject, all are taught their duties, and furnished with explicit rules for their guidance. The patriot, the citizen, the neighbour, the friend—all may draw from the sacred oracles rules of action which may safely be trusted. The rich and the poor, the sons of sorrow and of joy, the

wise and the ignorant—all are instructed with care in their reciprocal obligations; and precepts are afforded for the useful distribution of their sympathies and charities. Fanaticism, however, in all its forms, labors sedulously to take society apart at its joints. It brings the duties of men into perpetual collision; withdrawing some that are imperative, sinking out of view those that are important, and exalting to pre-eminence others that are subordinate. It makes one class, like Aaron's rod, swallow up all the rest. Denying or changing the relations in which men should stand to each other, it throws the world into endless strife and confusion. If, then, this be a characteristic sign of fanaticism, must not that system be acquitted of the charge, which fits man for all his duties, and regulates the same in their due proportion?

But without wiredrawing these proofs, let us here rest the defence of Christianity, so far as its truth is concerned. These general considerations, directed rather to the system taken as a unit than to the details which compose it, if they have had weight with the reader, will probably satisfy him that the first branch of Paul's famous reply to Festus is clearly substantiated. So far as the charge of fanaticism rests against the Gospel upon the alleged falsity of its tenets, it is rejoined on the Gospel's behalf that it speaks only the words of truth; and Paul may safely reclaim against the accusation of madness, though he avows himself a Christian before a heathen tribunal.

This charge is preferred against the Gospel upon another and distinct ground, viz, the alleged extravagance in the pretensions and practices of its professors; to which it is sufficient to reply that Christianity "speaks the words of soberness," as well as of truth. The Greek word σωφροσυνη, translated soberness, involves primarily the idea of moderation. It is compounded of two others, σαοσ and φρον, which indicate a sound judgment; that admirable balance of mind which enables men to strike every subject of all that is collateral and contingent, and to esteem every object according to its intrinsic value. A clear issue is, then, joined between the accusers and the advocates of Christianity; the charge is boldly tabled by the one, and is flatly denied by the other—let us attend to the replication of the parties.

There are three specifications under this general accusation: that Christians are extravagant, (1) in directing their affections too intensely or too exclusively towards God and Divine things; (2) in denying themselves to the pleasures and emoluments of this world, and living by faith of joys to come; (3) in their unwarrantable assumption of spiritual illumination and birth by the Holy Ghost, of mystical union with Christ the Redeemer, and of actual fellowship and communion with God as their father. The limits of this article, becoming narrower as we proceed, forbid any thing like a detailed reply to these specifications; and the reader as well as the writer must be content with a general answer, similar to that by which the preceding charge was met.

In relation to the first, it is instantly repelled when we consider *the infinite worthiness of the object loved*. We freely confess that the Gospel demands the whole heart for God; "thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, with all thy soul, with all thy strength, and with all thy mind." Obedience to this first and great commandment is the aim of every sincere Christian: and his deepest grief is provoked by a conscious shortcoming in what is no less a privilege than it is a duty. But it is obvious that mere intenseness of affection is not extravagance, unless this affection travels beyond the just claims of the object upon our regard. What blasphemer is bold enough to affirm this of the ever blessed God? Is he not "infinite in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth?" Is he not "glorious in holiness and fearful in praises," and his "name excellent in all the earth?" How, then, can the love of finite creatures transcend the measure of His worth? What language can describe the infinite love and admiration with which the persons of the Godhead mutually regard each other? And while Father, Son, and Spirit are indescribably happy in their reciprocal love, as they behold the glory of the divine nature in each, shall the small measures of admiration and praise which are returned by finite beings be deemed excessive, when they are lavished upon Him who is infinite? Let us apply a practical test: who ever brought the same accusation against the angels in heaven, or against "the spirits of just men made perfect?" and why

not? Do they not love the same Being with all the intenseness of which their more enlarged faculties and their more ample knowledge render them capable? Is it replied, that in heaven, as the world of glory, God makes such discoveries of his perfections, as command this homage of the whole soul? and who will undertake to say that God may not, and will not, make as large discoveries of his glory to the faith of his people on earth, as their present nature will admit? And if these should love and adore with all the ardor of seraphim before the throne on high, why should it be deemed more extravagant or fanatical in the one case than in the other?

Again, *the love of the whole soul is due to God for the blessings of Redemption.* Benefits conferred are a true foundation for love; and even heathen moralists have denounced ingratitude as the meanest of vices. If so, the extent of the benefit should be the measure of the love with which it is requited. This principle, applied to the case before us, excludes any supposition of extravagance in the love of saints. They have been delivered from the curse of a broken law, under which they were doomed to endure eternal pains. They have been exalted to joys and glories far surpassing those which were forfeited by transgression. These blessings, too, have been procured at a sacrifice which none but Jehovah himself was able to render; and of which not even a senate of angels, deliberating in solemn congress the means of man's salvation, could have formed the faintest conception. Such benefits as these, purchased at such a cost that if creatures could have conceived, it would have been blasphemy for them to propose it, have been lavished upon men, when no antecedent necessity existed to compel the Deity to such a manifestation of power and of love. When the value of the human soul shall have been computed, or when the pains of hell and the glories of heaven shall have been weighed in even scales, or when the free and infinite grace of God shall have been measured, then will the benefits of redemption be ascertained, and the consequent gratitude of the saints may perhaps be accurately graduated. But so long as these blessings pass beyond finite comprehension, just so long will the freest and largest love bestowed upon the Redeemer be exempt from the profane charge of extravagance.

We insist further upon *the entire consistency of supreme love to God with a subordinate love for subordinate objects*. If the former were exorbitant, it would encroach upon the latter. But the very terms of our proposition render such interference an absurdity. The subordinate, while it remains such, cannot encroach upon the supreme; nor can the supreme ever *exclude*, but must always *include*, the subordinate. Christianity, however jealous for the honor of God, will not cheapen itself to be put in rivalry with the world. It does not shut its followers up in cloisters, devoting them to a cold and ironhearted asceticism. It rather places them in the world, in the midst of all its duties and affections, which it consecrates to their enjoyment. It only demands that the inferior shall be held in inferior regard, while the supreme shall command the supreme homage of the soul. They do not interfere. The moon does not cease to revolve around the earth, because she must accompany the earth in a wider circuit round the sun. The great law of gravitation, which binds satellite and primary together in a common orbit, is the necessary condition upon which that satellite performs its secondary service to its own principal. In like manner, that supreme affection for God, which holds all perfect beings to His throne, secures that common harmony in which they move and love among themselves. No subordinate object is loved aright or loved safely, until it is loved with a subordinate attachment; and no scale exists for proportioning and distributing this love, until a supreme affection for the Infinite One takes possession of the soul, which is a constant standard by which all lower love may be compared and measured.

The defence, under the second specification, is similar to that under the first. It is indeed the confession of the Christian that "the life he lives in the flesh he lives by faith of the Son of God." His greatest anxiety, for which he cheerfully undergoes the mortifying discipline inflicted by his Father, is to become weaned from the world, and to "set his affections on things above." But what is there of folly or frenzy in all this? *It is justified by the relative value of temporal and eternal things*. Even the ungodly confess that this life offers no satisfying portion to the soul. The honors, the emoluments and the pleasures of

this world are but uncertain prizes for which to set our stakes. In the great lottery of life, the wheel of destiny, in its ceaseless revolution, turns out blanks to the far greater number. Of those who start out together upon the same career, how few reach the goal! And when these efforts have been crowned with anticipated success, what care and pain are required to retain the long-sought treasures! It needs a close and miserly grip to hold fast the slippery wealth which has been the fruit of so much toil; and the wreath of fame pricks with many a concealed thorn the uneasy brow which it adorns. What successful competitor for the premiums of this world ever confessed himself happy in their possession? A secret craving after something higher and more ennobling, accompanied with the consciousness of present discontent, infuses gall into all his draughts of earthly joy. The Christian poet sings of such an one:

Thus full of titles, flattery, honor, fame,
Beyond desire, beyond ambition full,—
He died—he died of what? Of wretchedness.
Drank every cup of joy, heard every trump
Of fame; drank early, deeply drank; drank draughts
That common millions might have quenched—then died
Of thirst, because there was no more to drink.*

But though these earthly acquisitions filled up the measure of human hopes and wishes, they all vanish at death, and leave their poor possessor a bankrupt at the last. Can these things be put in competition with the more satisfying and enduring realities of the eternal world? And if the eye of faith sees the difference between them with far greater clearness, shall it quail before the frown of reason, which must itself confess this world poor if set over against the world to come? As to the self-denial of holding aloof from worldly pleasure, it is forgotten on the one hand that in conversion the tastes are changed, calling for a corresponding change in the objects of pursuit; and on the other hand, that all rational and lawful pleasures, though they be not religious in their nature, the Christian enjoys with as keen a relish as others. Indeed, receiving them as tokens of his Heavenly Father's covenant love, and using them in the moderation which the Gospel enjoins,

* Course of Time. Book 4.

they are more highly flavoured to his palate than to another's. He eats his meat seasoned with grace; his wine is spiced with a more exquisite enjoyment.

Observe further, that however much the saint may be weaned from this world, and however heavenly minded he may become, *no earthly duty is disallowed or displaced by the spiritual.* The reverse is true. It becomes a religious duty with a godly man to fill up the entire circle of his earthly obligations; and his conscience takes as direct cognizance of these as of any others. Let the decision of this matter be remitted to candid observers everywhere. Who discharge punctually the duties of common life—who make conscience of the obligations which rest upon parents and children, upon masters and servants, and indeed upon all the relations in society—more than those Christians who most habitually live above the world and hold communion with heaven? There can be therefore, no want of discretion, no heat of fanaticism, in the most earnest desires that are felt by the saints to be crucified to the world.

The third specification will require a more elaborate attention before it is quite disposed of. It is drawn from the pretensions of Christians founded upon their own personal experience, upon what they have felt *within themselves* of the workings of divine power and grace. We feel no disposition to abate any thing from the matter of the charge, but are willing to set forward these pretensions in the strongest terms. It is true, then, that all real Christians do profess to have enjoyed the special illumination of the Holy Ghost; who teaches them not merely by the objective presentation of truth, but by an immediate subjective influence upon the mind itself, whereby it is enabled to see divine things in their true light; "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." They do profess to have been quickened into spiritual life from a state of spiritual death, by as radical and substantive a change as that experienced by the embryo when it is born into natural life; "except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." They do rejoice in the dwelling and presence within them of the Spirit of God,

whereby they are duly sanctified as "temples of the Holy Ghost:" "but ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you." They do profess to be really, though mystically, united with Christ their Redeemer and Head; a union *in law*, whereby is effected the reciprocal imputation of their sins to him for expiation, and of his righteousness to them for justification; a union *in fact*, whereby life and strength are daily communicated from Him, "of whose fulness they receive grace for grace;" and a union declared by the Saviour himself, "I am the vine, ye are the branches; he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit." They do profess further to hold constant, personal and intimate communion with God as their father, through the mediation of the Son, and by the assistance of the Spirit: "truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son, Jesus Christ."

Now against all these lofty professions, the rationalist enters the protest of his sneers. A derisive smile plays upon his face, while reading what he interprets as confessions under the indictment. Silly fools! he exclaims, to weave themselves the net with which they are to be caught. He asks for no stronger proof of fanaticism than is furnished in the language dropping from their lips. These extravagancies he regards either with scornful pity, as the gorgeous dreams of a diseased, or the insane ravings of a disordered, fancy; or else with malignant suspicion, as the arrogant and exclusive pretensions of knavish hypocrisy. He denounces them as experiences which never can be substantiated upon competent evidence, and being of such a nature that reason can form no conception of them. Let us see whether Christianity cannot lift up her calm face against this storm of rebuke and reproach: and whether she will not have the courage to hold the rationalist, in his overweening reliance upon his boasted reason, to the issues he has created.

The question before us is one simply of *fact*; and a great cloud of witnesses is at hand ready to give in their testimony. Their office is not to wrangle or explain, not to philosophize or reason; but simply to tell "what they have heard, what they have seen with their eyes, what they have looked upon, and their hands have handled, of

the word of life." The whole generation of the righteous now composing the militant Church of Christ on earth, and the whole "General Assembly and Church of the First-born, which are written in Heaven," stand forward to be interrogated. They depose clearly and firmly, we know there is such a thing as the new-birth, because *we ourselves* have been "quickened," who before were "dead in trespasses and sins." We know that the Holy Ghost does open the mind to the discovery of truth, because "He who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined into *our* hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the Glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." We know that the Holy Ghost does dwell in believers, because God "hath sent the Spirit of His Son into *our* hearts, crying, Abba, Father." We know that true believers are united to Christ, because "Christ is formed in *our* hearts, the hope of glory." We know there is spiritual fellowship between the saints and God, because "through Him (Christ) *we* have access, by one Spirit, unto the Father." Nor can the credibility of these witnesses be impugned. They are neither fools nor maniacs. In all the common avocations of life they exhibit the same forethought, the same moderation, the same judgment with others. In the expression of their religious convictions they exhibit the same coherence of thought, the same powers of reason, the same cool logic; and are always ready to "give a reason of the hope that is within them." The sincerity of their convictions is attested by the fact that upon the reality of these experiences they are willing to peril the interests of their souls—prepared to meet the tremendous decisions of the judgment day and the eternal destinies then to be awarded, upon the faith that they have actually felt all that they describe. It is a testimony corroborated likewise by the visible results which are seen to flow from what they profess to experience; a life of patience, of self-denial, of humility and of meekness; a sobriety of deportment, a devotion of soul, and an honesty of conduct, standing forth oftentimes in marked contrast with the turbulence and wickedness, lasciviousness and pride, which characterized them before the period of their sound conversion to God. It adds greatly also to the force of this testimony, that the witnesses who concur so remarkably in their depositions as to *the*

facts, should differ most widely among themselves upon the *mere science* of Christianity. They have not been bribed to give in a ready-made testimony; for their variations in opinion upon many minor points prove them to be at least independent and truthful witnesses; and the several schools into which they are divided, and the sometimes violent collisions between them, afford security against collusion and fraud among themselves. However variant their speculations may be upon the thousand questions which Christian theology propounds, there is an exact agreement in their statements of the facts of experimental religion.

Now we insist that this whole testimony shall be admitted to record; and that it shall be placed in the same scales in which evidence is weighed before human tribunals. It is the testimony of a mighty multitude, stretching from the beginning of time to the present moment; the testimony of witnesses unexceptionable for credibility, being found sober, judicious and wise in all the concerns of time; a testimony sealed with the blood of martyrs, and the diversified persecution of confessors; a testimony confirmed by lives answerable to the professions which are made; a testimony which not only bears no internal marks of collusion, but which excludes all supposition of fraud. In the name of candour and justice, how is this volume of testimony to be set aside; testimony given upon personal knowledge and experience of the facts involved? Will the prosecutor challenge the witnesses? Let him place his hand, then, upon the Lamb's book of life, and call before him every one whose name is there recorded. Beginning with those now alive upon the earth, he must challenge them in detail, one by one; for they are witnesses independent of each other, deposing not upon report, but upon their individual and experimental knowledge. He must show that all and singular, they are incompetent witnesses; either because from want of character their word is not to be received in evidence, or because from imbecility or aberration of mind they are incapable of knowing what they describe. Having disposed of these, he must next summon the generation of those who made their departure last to the world of glory; and by the same process destroy the credibility of each of these. He must thus ascend through succes-

sive generations of believers who, during six thousand years, have lived in this world of sin, until he shall arrive at the very first redeemed sinner. All the individuals, which compose this throng which no man can number, must be separately impeached. Not one shall be overlooked—not one survive this blasting arraignment; for that one, by his single testimony, will substantiate the facts he seeks to destroy. Nor is this all. He must satisfactorily account for certain prominent features in the personal history of all the saints. If he denies what they affirm, the new birth, it is incumbent upon him to explain that singular and sudden transformation of character, when they “were turned from the power of Satan unto God”—to explain how the lion came to put on the nature of the lamb—how the licentious came to be chaste; the profane, devout; the proud, humble; the lovers of pleasure, lovers of God. If he denies what they affirm, their union with Christ and the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, let him explain how these have been preserved blameless and without rebuke in the midst of a crooked and perverse generation—how it is, that walking upon pitch they have kept their garments unspotted—how it is, that in the midst of temptations and snares, with earthly appetites and instincts, they have “lived soberly, righteously, and godly,” “making no provision to the flesh to fulfil the lusts thereof.” If he denies what they affirm, the illumination of the Holy Ghost, let him explain how upon the mysterious doctrines of grace they have reached such unshaken certainty of their truth, that in the agonies of death, surrounded by weeping friends, when earthly ties are rending, they can chant the song of victory, and with a beam of heaven in their souls enter into its glory. Every effect must have a cause. Upon the Christian hypothesis these effects are referred to causes adequate to their production. But if the existence of these causes is denied, the objector will not surely be so unreasonable as to leave the matter without an explanation; at least, he cannot expect us to remit so far the demands of a sound philosophy, when it challenges the solution of these facts. It is needless to say that these just demands are made in vain. The herculean task of destroying thus in detail the witnesses for experimental religion has never been undertaken; nor, if attempted, could it possibly be achieved.

The rationalist must therefore take a shorter route. He will probably affirm that nothing of all this ever fell within his own experience, nor within the experience of myriads besides himself—that it is at best but the experience of a very small fragment of the great family of mankind. Granted; but shall the negative experience of one man thrust aside the positive testimony of another man? It is assumed in this, that the experiences of all men perfectly coincide; an assumption in itself positively absurd, and notoriously contradicted by observation of a thousand particulars every day of our lives. The King of Siam—to appropriate an illustration of Dr. Campbell's in reply to similar reasoning on the part of Mr. Hume—the king of Siam never saw ice; but shall he not believe the testimony of those who *have* seen it? It may be true that ice was never seen within the tropics; but how shall this disprove its existence at the poles? Testimony is given upon certain facts which lie within the *exclusive* experience of the witnesses who depose; and their testimony is set aside upon the ground that this experience is not *universal*—a thing not affirmed by the witnesses, but on the contrary explicitly denied. If Christians affirmed that all men were born again, their testimony would be contradicted by the negative experience of those who never were subjects of this great change—nay, it would be a declaration which they are incompetent to make, since, from the nature of this birth, it can be certainly known only by the immediate subjects of it. But when they simply affirm that *they themselves* have been born again, this may be true in perfect consistency with the fact that millions of other men are still spiritually dead. And the fact that some, nay, that even *one* has felt this change, clearly establishes that there is such a thing as a renovation of nature. If the rationalist should rejoin, I believe upon testimony what I never myself experienced, in all cases where an intrinsic probability exists in favour of the thing deposed, or where certain analogies afford a presumption of its truth, or when laws, whose operation I have never witnessed, exist, competent to bring it about—even this shift shall not avail him. Had he been content to occupy a neutral position, neither affirming nor denying the facts in question, his scepticism, in defiance of this vast

array of positive testimony, would still be deemed unreasonable—but we should not feel called upon to disturb the indifference in which he reposes. It is one thing, however, to doubt; and another thing, to deny. It is one thing, to be unconvinced by evidence; and another, to contravene evidence—one thing, to be sceptical, and another, to be antagonistic. The rationalist has thrown himself into the position of an assailant. He has denounced all this experience of the Christian world as spurious and fanatical. He denies the facts reported; and denies, because it is impossible they should be true. He is compelled, therefore, to make good this position. Let him understand his own posture in this controversy: Christianity affirms certain facts, and undertakes to substantiate the same by precisely that kind of evidence which facts require—the testimony of a large body of unexceptionable witnesses, who speak from personal and experimental acquaintance with them. The rationalist flouts these witnesses and rejects their testimony, upon the broad ground of its intrinsic improbability. That improbability, we admit, would justify hesitation; it might provoke a scrutiny proportionally strict; it might perhaps palliate scepticism. But it is not sufficient to exclude all testimony; it does not justify the rejection of all evidence. Before this can be tolerated, the rationalist is bound to show by a rigorous *a priori* demonstration, not its improbability merely, but its utter *impossibility*. We hold him, then, distinctly to this issue. He shall not decline it: we have pulled at our end of the rope, he shall pull at his. If it be found in the end that he “has digged a pit into the midst whereof he has fallen himself,” he has only suffered the fate that awaits all the opposers of truth.

Upon each of these alleged facts of Christian experience, he has imposed upon himself the tremendous task of establishing the negative. How will he succeed in showing that the Holy Ghost either cannot, or does not, create the soul anew in the image of Christ? Is there any limit to His power? Did He not, at the first, create man in the image of God, in “knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness?” What is there more difficult in restoring that holiness, after it has been lost? Can he not accomplish this work, too, without contravening any of those laws of our spir-

itual economy, which were appointed and ordained by Himself? Should the ability of this Divine person to effect this change upon the human soul be admitted, can the rationalist, with all his resources of argument, prove it to be antecedently impossible that He *will* exercise that power? Admit that the wilful loss of holiness on the part of man, extinguishes all his title to this gracious interposition of the Holy Spirit; admit that this loss even creates a presumption that it will never be restored—the rationalist has undertaken to show that it is *impossible* the Spirit should purpose to restore it, and nothing short of this will satisfy us. Will he undertake to fathom the counsels of the Most High? Does he know so perfectly the ends to be answered by the moral government of God, that he can oracularly declare what is proper, and what is not proper, to be done by this infinite and free Spirit? “Who knoweth the mind of the Lord; or being his counsellor, hath taught Him?”

Try the matter, again, in relation to the Spirit's special illumination of the mind. We say nothing here of the almighty power of this Divine Agent, and of the blasphemy or folly of attempting to restrict Him in its exercise. But we call attention to the intercourse maintained between man and man, by means of words and symbols. Certain figures presented to the eye, or certain sounds addressed to the ear, put others in complete possession of the thoughts and sentiments which swell our own bosoms. Simply by the aid of these conventional signs, as the media of intercourse, we pour our whole souls into the souls of others, awakening the same thoughts and emotions in them. We are able to play upon the sympathies and affections of our fellow-men, as a skilful musician would draw sweet tones from a well-tuned instrument. The whole procedure is deeply mysterious; we know the fact abundantly well, but who can explain the manner in which the ideas we wish to convey are conducted—so to speak, telegraphed to the distant mind? If we, then, have power, by a few intervening symbols, to impress our thoughts upon other minds, what shall hinder the Almighty Spirit from impressing His thoughts upon the mind without this machinery of signs? Does the removal of the symbols so increase the mystery that it is ren-

dered thereby incredible? If it were not a matter of experience with us, would not the first report, or rather, we should say in that case, the first conception of human intercourse by means of written or spoken words, seem to be equally incredible? Are we to limit all intercourse between pure spirits, by the laws which govern the peculiar economy under which men are placed? Does the rationalist so well understand the nature of spirits, and the whole economy of their existence and intercourse, that he may safely dogmatize as he does? Simply withdraw from our conceptions the conventional signs necessary to human fellowship, and we have at once the Holy Ghost impressing truth directly and nakedly upon the mind. Only suppose Him farther to stimulate and quicken that mind enfeebled by sin, to remove the veil of darkness in which it is enshrouded, and by an immediate exercise of power to render that mind congenial with the truth, and we have made out the subjective influence of the Holy Ghost upon the natural understanding by which it is empowered with a spiritual discernment. We are far from pretending to explain the mode of any of the Spirit's operations; for we know not how he quickens the mind, nor how he puts it in unison with truth, nor how he brings this truth into contact with the mind, without the use of symbols—all this is wrapt in profoundest mystery. But we do insist that with the inexplicable phenomenon before him, of human intercourse by means of signs, and in his state of ignorance as to the nature and power of spiritual beings, it is impossible for the sceptic to demonstrate either the impossibility, or even the antecedent improbability, of a direct impression of divine truth upon the minds of men, such as the Christian professes in his special illumination by the Holy Ghost.

If the rationalist is not too much fatigued with the difficulties in which he is already entangled, we will present him with another. The Holy Scriptures expressly affirm the same truths embraced within the confessions of the Saints. Of this fact, the passages cited in preceding paragraphs furnish sufficient proof. Now, all the authority which belongs to the sacred oracles, as "given by inspiration of God," goes to accredit these particular statements made in them. Before these declarations can

be impugned, the credit of the entire canon must be destroyed. The infidel must cancel all the evidence of inspiration furnished by prophecy, all the evidence furnished by miracles, all the internal evidence furnished by its own pages, all the evidence furnished from historical testimony. Until this is done, the Bible remains the book of God, and speaks His truths. If, like the everlasting mountains which still lift their heads upon which a thousand storms have burst, the Bible is still impregnable against the assaults of infidels, then upon the same basis rest all these particular truths. Over this wall of rock must the rationalist climb—nay, this wall of rock must he first demolish, before he can touch the experience of the Church, or deny the testimony which she gives upon the faith of that experience.

This reminds us of another circumstance, which should have influence in redeeming experimental religion from the charge of fanaticism. It is that a foundation is laid for it all in the doctrines of the Bible. Take, for example, the believer's union with Christ, and his fellowship thereby with God. How shall a finite being be united with one who is infinite? How shall a depraved being be united with one who is holy? How shall an accountable being exercise his moral agency in effecting the union? The answer to the first question is found in the incarnation of the Son of God, and that work which He wrought "in the days of His flesh." He "took not upon Him the nature of angels, but the seed of Abraham." As incarnate, he became the covenant representative and head of all the elect, discharged their obligations to God's justice, and removed every legal obstruction to their union with himself. The answer to the second question is found in Christ's mediatorial right to bestow the Holy Spirit upon "as many as were given Him," and in that Spirit's saving work upon their hearts. According to the terms of the covenant of grace, the Son purchased the right to send the Holy Ghost; by His intercessory pleadings He sues out before the Father the recognition of this right; and then in the exercise of His royal prerogative, He deposes that Spirit who makes the sinners holy. The answer to the third question is found in the act of faith, reposed by the believer in the person, offices and work

of the Saviour. The power to believe being bestowed, and the Spirit abiding in the heart to quicken to its exercise, this power is exerted in spontaneous actings of faith in Jesus. Thus the two, who were before apart standing upon opposite poles, are brought together, and by reciprocal bonds are united: the bond of the Spirit, passing from Christ bringing the sinner to Himself; and the bond of faith, passing from the believer, appropriating and embracing the Redeemer, making them one forever.

So again, the new birth experienced by the Christian has its foundation in the whole doctrine of the Spirit. The work of regeneration and sanctification, is the concluding part of the scheme of salvation. It presupposes a large and various work that has gone before. All the offices committed in the plan of redemption to the Father and the Son must be fulfilled, before there is any basis for the Spirit's operations upon the souls of men. How exactly does this distribution of functions tally with the order of subsistence between the persons of the Godhead. The Father, who is the first person, has a function assigned to Him which is initiatory to all that follows.—The Son, who is the second person and the only begotten of the Father, discharges functions whose validity turns upon the Father's seal affixed to His commission, and His formal and public acceptance of the work done under the same. And the Holy Ghost, who is the third person and eternally proceeding from the Father and the Son, comes to the discharge of his offices upon a joint commission from the two. As He is the last in the order of subsistence, so His work completes the salvation, which is devised and executed in common by the three. There is likewise a beautiful analogy between the location of the Spirit's work in the new and spiritual creation, to that which He performed in the original and material creation. "Whereas," says Dr. Owen, "the order of operations among the distinct persons, depends upon the order of their subsistence; the concluding, completing and perfecting acts are ascribed to the Holy Ghost; hence they are also the most hidden and mysterious. The beginning of divine operations is assigned to the Father; the subsisting, establishing and upholding of all things, is as-

cribed to the Son ; and the finishing of all these works is ascribed to the Holy Ghost." *

We must be content with merely suggesting hints upon a topic which admits of wide expansion. The reader will perceive, however, from what has been said, a striking correspondence between the objective in Scripture, and the subjective in experience. The doctrines of revelation constitute the mould in which all true Christian experience is run: "Ye have obeyed from the heart that form (*τυπον*) of doctrine which was delivered you." These doctrines may be compared to a seal, and the emotions and affections of Christian experience, to the impressions made by this seal upon the waxen tablet of the soul ; and so perfect is this correspondence, that not a single exercise of true religious feeling can be mentioned, for which its appropriate mould may not be found in some given doctrine of the Scriptures. Now, can this coincidence be accidental ? Is there not furnished here a concealed evidence of the truth and reality of Christian experience ? Must not the author of the one be the author of the other ? and while Christian doctrine comes from God, how can the answering exercises of the believer be deemed spurious and imaginary ?

In bringing to a close this defence of experimental religion, we beg to be indulged in a single remark upon the *exclusiveness* of the pretensions which we have been considering ; since it is a feature so odious to many. The charge is admitted to a certain degree. Christians do certainly lay claim to divine influences and to an elevated communion with God, which are denied to multitudes of others. It is freely conceded, also, that in this particular there is a vague resemblance between the Gospel and the systems of fanaticism which have obtained footing in the world ; since fanatics of every class do assume to be, more than others, the special favorites of Heaven, and to enjoy a confidential intercourse with Deity in the abundance of their private revelations. But there is this characteristic difference between them. The exclusive pretensions of fanaticism having no foundation in truth, always exert an injurious influence upon the character

* Owen on the Holy Ghost. Edition of the Board, ch. 4.

and conduct, which cannot be detected in genuine religion. The fanatic believes himself selected from other men, to be the depositary of Heaven's secrets. This fancy naturally begets a feeling of self-consequence and pride; then contrasting himself with those who are not elevated to the same dignity and privilege, he easily passes into a haughty contempt for those less favored than himself. Wrapped in his self-complacency, he comes down from his lofty communion with a superior power, and says with haughty arrogance to the herd and rabble of mankind, "Stand by, for I am holier than ye." Jealous of his own pre-eminence, he wishes to share it with none, and riots in the selfish monopoly of his own advantages. It requires no large knowledge of the weakness and obliquity of poor human nature, to understand how these feelings give way at last to a malignant hatred of those whom at first he only despised. — Isaac Taylor, in his work on fanaticism, describes the fanatic as "not simply a misanthrope—he does not move like a venomous reptile, lurking in a crevice or winding silent through the grass, but soars in mid-heaven as a fiery-flying serpent, and looks down from on high upon whom he hates." * When were such effects ever produced by genuine Christianity? Is not its practical influence always to "cast down high thoughts," to abase the Christian in the dust before God, and to fill him with a sense of his own vileness? Is it not true that the humility of the soul is deepest in the moments of loftiest communion with God? When most it enjoys the assurance of the divine favour, it is most meek, most penitent, and most patient. Is there any disposition on the part of true Christians to monopolize all spiritual blessings? Or, is not the language always on their lips, "come with us, and we will do you good?" Is not the very essence of the Christian religion

* Fanaticism, p. 60. This author goes much farther than we do in making the malignant element enter into the essence of fanaticism; his definition of it being "enthusiasm inflamed by hatred." "The religion of the fanatic," in his view, "may be reduced to three capital articles, viz: 1, a deference to malignant invisible power; 2, the natural consequence of such a deference, rancorous contempt or detestation of the mass of mankind, as religiously cursed and aominable; 3, the belief of corrupt favouritism on the part of invisible powers towards a sect or particular class of men."—P. 54.

love? Is not the first commandment, "thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart," and is not the second like unto it, "thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself?" Is not the Church of the Redeemer charged with the high commission to extend the knowledge of salvation to all mankind? and is there not sincere grief in the hearts of the righteous that so few give heed to their cordial entreaties? We leave the reader to answer these interrogatories, and to find in that answer a refutation of the charge of fanaticism, upon the ground that Christianity is exclusive in its character, conferring its benefits by a very narrow and partial distribution.

We take our leave now of the opponents, with whom we have measured arguments, with a single admonitory word. Christianity is not, at this time of day, to be laughed out of countenance. Of all the enemies who assail her, she has least of fear and most of pity for scoffers; who can so far let down their own self-respect, as to mock at her truths, and to scout her testimony. She would regard it, too, as the easiest of all her achievements, to turn the tables upon her foes, to convict of the most reckless fanaticism those who admit there is a God, yet live as atheists; who admit they have a soul, yet live only for the body; who admit this world to be an empty show, yet are engrossed with its baubles; who admit an eternity to come, yet make no provisions for its awful retributions. Let this caution suffice; lest she should become an accuser instead of an apologist. Those who are arraigned before her tribunal, never escape through the meshes of a defective logic.

ARTICLE V.

THE LANGUAGES OF SOUTHERN EUROPE.

BY V. H. MANGET.

Before we show the analogy of these languages with the Latin, which is our principal object, it may be well to speak of their origin, and the languages which preceded them on the soil they occupy.

Two languages were spoken in Gaul at the time of its invasion by the Romans: the Celtic in the North, and the Greek in the South. The latter was there introduced by a colony of Phœceans, who about 600 years before Christ settled on the southern coast of the Mediterranean, founded Marseilles and extended throughout Southern Gaul their sway, customs and language. But when the Romans conquered Gaul, their colonies and laws gave the pre-eminence to the Latin tongue; and when the Franks succeeded them, the Christian religion, which these invaders embraced, confirmed that pre-eminence. The Latin was the language of the palace, the cloister, the tribunal and the school. It gave to Gaul many writers, such as Ausonius, Salvianus, Sidonius, Appollinaris, Sulpicius, Severus, etc.

It must not be thought, however, that the conquered people ceased to speak their primitive language, although Gibbon maintains that Latin was spoken universally throughout Gaul. Schlegel affirms that at the time of the invasion of the barbarians, Latin, and Latin alone, was spoken in that country, as far as the borders of the Rhine.

But if we consult history and the Fathers of the Church, we shall find it was only introduced by a gradual change, and that its introduction did not prevent the use of the Celtic or of the Greek. Did those writers content themselves with saying, that in the 4th century Latin was the language of all educated people throughout Gaul, that might be easily granted; but to say that Latin and Latin alone was used in Gaul at the time of the invasion of the barbarians, is in contradiction to history. The first invasion of the Romans occurred about 120 years before Christ,

but Gaul was not entirely conquered till 50 years before the Christian era.

Julius Cæsar says that the inhabitants of Gaul used Greek characters. Strabo, who lived in the 1st century, tells us that these characters were still used in judicial and civil records. In the 2d century St. Irenæus, bishop of Lyons, wrote in Greek his work against the heretics, and says that, living among the Celtic, he is obliged to have recourse to their language, in order to instruct those from among them who had become Christians. It must be borne in mind that Lyons was a *Roman colony*. In the 3d century, we learn from the jurist Ulpianus that certain acts written in Greek, Latin and Celtic, were recognised as valid in the tribunals.

St. Jerome assures us that in the 4th century they still spoke three languages in Marseilles; Latin, Greek and Celtic. According to that father, the Celtic was spoken at that time in Treves with as much purity as ever.

From the Latin writer Sulpicius Severus, bishop of Bourges, we learn that the Celtic was still used in the province of Le Berry, in the 5th century. In that same century, it seems that the Celtic alone was spoken by the common people of Auvergne. The nobility of Clermont, a city of that province, had just adopted the Latin, and it was only owing to the birth and education in that city, of Edicius, son of the emperor Avitus. In a letter that Sidonius Appollinaris, bishop of that city, addresses to that young prince, that writer reminds him that his birth had conducted there learned men, remarkable in all kinds of science, in order to concur in his education; that the nobility of Clermont, profiting by their sojourn, had abandoned the Celtic to learn the Latin. Proofs could be given to shew that the Celtic was not abandoned even in the 11th century, but it would carry us too far from our present object.

From what precedes, it may be seen that, so far from the Latin being universally spoken throughout Gaul in the 4th century, it was not even used by the nobility in some parts of Gaul; that is, if we may credit the fathers of the Church, and the Latin writers of that time.

Sixty years after the first colonization of the Romans in Gaul, the Latin began already to change, according to

Cicero; and the later Latin writers and the fathers of the Church tell us that the alteration of the Latin continued more and more in the following ages, so much so that in the 5th century the grammarian Festus says that Latin was so much changed that one could hardly recognise some parts which compose it. It is more than probable that the Latin was never spoken by the people of some provinces, except after it had become what is called "*Lingua Rustica*," in which ministers were finally obliged to preach in order to be understood by their hearers; and it can hardly be expected that where the Latin was at first introduced by the Romans, it ever was correctly spoken by the common people. The Frank invasion hastened still more its corruption. From this vitiated latinity and the jargons which the common people spoke, were formed those diversified patois still in use in some of the French provinces. Each province had its own idiom; and it must be presumed, that these different idioms must have disputed among themselves the pre-eminence in a kingdom which the feudal system had divided into many sovereignties.

The language of France, however, could be divided into two principal idioms, called *Romanzo*, that of the North, spoken North of the Loire, and which finally became the French language, and that of the South, spoken South of the Loire, and called the *Provençal*. It was in these two idioms that the romances of chivalry and the little poems of the time were written. The Northern idiom produced the *Trouveres*, and the Southern, the *Troubadours*. The poetry of these was of a sprightly and animated tone, called "*gay ciencia*," the merry science. The *Troubadours* cultivated it with success, and spread its glory all over Europe.

Had the *Provençal* prevailed, it would have given to the French the eclat of the Spanish and Italian languages; but the South, without capital and King, was obliged to yield to the North, and the influence of the Northern *Romanzo* was increased together with that of the crown. But although the court and nation had adopted it, the Church, Parliament and University still rejected it, and it was only officially recognized as a legitimate language in the 16th century. It is very remarkable that the

French language, from its very origin, should have recommended itself to the taste, and attracted the attention of Europe. In the beginning of the 13th century, an Italian writer, Brunetto Latini, the preceptor of Dante, preferred it to his own language, and composed in French a work entitled, *Tesoretto*, and gives the following excuse: If any body should ask why we write this book in *Romanzo*, according to the French patois, since we are Italian, I would tell him that it is for two reasons, 1st, because we are in France; 2dly, because the French is more agreeable and usual than any other language.* Under Louis the 14th, it became the universal language of the higher classes and men of science all over Europe. It was under him that it acquired that ease, clearness and precision, which makes it the first language of Europe. It was then that it also acquired that refinement and elegance, which made it the medium of conversation and epistolary intercourse in the European courts and diplomacy.

In a word, the position of France, its political constitution, the influence of its climate, the genius of its writers, the happy disposition of its inhabitants, all these things have more or less contributed to render its language so popular. It is studied all over Europe, and in many places is required as a regular branch of education, even in common schools.

We are proud to say that this country is not wanting in this respect. City and country schools are supplied, when possible, with French teachers. In many schools, and in all the colleges of any standing, with which we are acquainted, with the exception, we are sorry to add, of that so liberally endowed by this State, French is required as a regular study. We should like to show the importance, not to say the necessity, of the study of the French language, but our time does not allow us to do so at present. Before, however, we conclude these remarks, we hope we may be excused for giving two extracts, one from a letter of a former and learned President of the S. C. C., addressed to Governor Butler; the other taken from a piece published in the Palmetto State Ban-

* Sordello a Lombard and several of his countrymen followed the example of Brunetto.

ner, December 1846, and entitled, "a plea for the cultivation of modern languages." We not only cite these extracts as testimonies of the worth and importance of the French language, but also as an earnest remonstrance against that singular indifference, which has failed, hitherto, to endow a chair of modern languages in that institution.

After saying that the French is as indispensable as some other studies he mentions, the writer proceeds thus:

"How often has a professorship of modern languages been pressed on the attention of the trustees and the Legislature in vain! Is there a gentleman in Europe ignorant of French? Can you go into a company of merchants in England, where that language is not familiar at the dinner table,—where it is not a matter of surprise that any foreigner should be ignorant of it? Can a mathematician, a physician, a well-bred lawyer dispense with French? Are not our old reporters in French? Our ancient laws in French? Are Valin and Emerigon, and the ordonnances de la Marine, or the works of Pothier, or the French arrangement of the Institute, the Pandects, the Codes, and their Commentators useless? Would a lawyer be the worse for some slight knowledge of these works?"

But we send ministers and ambassadors abroad: never from the *sole* and exclusive motive of competence. They are all party-men; paid by an outfit and a two years' salary. A man may perhaps be forgiven for ignorance of Russian: but the court language of Prussia, and Austria, is French. Of all our ambassadors sent to France, I know of none that were competent in knowledge of the language but Mr. Gallatin. Two of our ambassadors to the French court were so deplorably ignorant of the common phrases, that Buonaparte complained of their incompetence. Is it not horrible?"

The writer in the Banner, says:

"Knowledge is crude if it does not assimilate to what it is intended to nourish and invigorate. But we would apply these remarks to things strictly useful—to what tends to aid and advance us, in imparting that which is of practical benefit. Steam navigation and railroads are causing nations to mingle into one. What, then, is the condition of the individual who carries not with him the means of communicating with the people whom he visits? Business, pleasure, health, the desire of information, may set him down, this week at Vienna, the next at Paris, the next at Rome, or Madrid. *One* language adopted by general consent among the polite and educated of continental Europe, will make him at home at every one of these capitals. I speak

here of the FRENCH. It is the language of diplomacy, of scientific communication, of courtesy. It was in this language, a few days ago, that Leverrier, whose name, (notwithstanding the present invidious attempts of vain-glorious islanders to rob him of this honor,) will be identified with the object of discovery, communicated with a German of Berlin.

It is indeed extraordinary that the cultivation of modern languages, especially of the French and Castilian, has not claimed the attention of Colleges South of the Potomac. May not this be given as one among the reasons why so few Southern men are willing, whatever may be their qualifications in other respects, to accept diplomatic agencies on the continent of Europe? If we look back to periods anterior and subsequent to our Revolutionary struggle, it was not always so. The names of Laurens, Rutledge, Pinckney, Davie and Legare, need here only be given."

The first inhabitants of Spain mentioned by historians, were the Iberi. The Celtæ having invaded that country, settled in the northern districts, and in some places formed with the Iberi but one nation, under the name of Celtiberi.

The beauty, fertility, rich mines and sea ports of Spain, seem to have attracted the attention of the early navigators. It was successively invaded and colonized by the Phœnicians, Rhodians, Phocians and Carthagenians, who introduced their different dialects. These idioms, under the dominion of the Romans, gave place to the Latin, which soon got the pre-eminence, except in the Basque provinces, where the Cantabrian was always, and is still spoken. Rome is indebted to Spain for some of her most distinguished men. The Emperors, Hadrian and Trojan, were born in Italica, now old Seville. Spain gave also birth to the great orator Quinctilian, to the two Senecas, and to the two poets, Lucan and Martial.

In the beginning of the 5th century, the invasion of Spain by the Suevi, Alans and Vandals took place. The invaders were soon followed by the Visigoths, who, having been vanquished at Poitiers by Clovis, and having lost their dominions in Gaul, passed into Spain, expelled the Alans and Vandals, and after many battles, obliged the Suevi to acknowledge their superiority.

The several dialects spoken before the colonization of Spain by the Romans, and the invasions of the Barbarians, especially that of the Visigoths, in the 5th century,

had, on the Latin language, the same effect that the invasion of the Franks had in Gaul. The Goths, like the Franks, had adopted the language of the natives, and the introduction among them of the Christian religion, confirmed the predominance of the Latin. But they soon corrupted that language, which was changed, as in Gaul, into a *Romanzo* dialect.

The next invaders of Spain were the Saracens, who wrested from the Goths the whole of Spain, with the exception of the mountainous district of Asturias, whither the Christians fled for refuge. The Moors having treated generously the inhabitants, these soon adopted the language of their conquerors, and the Moorish dialect was spoken every where, except in the Asturias. Profiting by the divisions among their enemies, the Goths attempted and succeeded, little by little, to seize on some towns in the mountains, founded small kingdoms, and finally, after 800 years of almost uninterrupted warfare, put an end to the dominion of the Moors in Spain. During all this time, the Spanish *Romanzo* gained ground, with the victories of the people; but the Moorish dialect had taken so deep a root in Spain, that 200 years after Toledo had been wrested from the infidel, the Arabic was still spoken in that city, in preference to the Castilian; and after the taking of Seville, it was necessary to translate the Gospel, in order to instruct the inhabitants of that city, who had entirely forgotten both their religion and language.

Spain had as many dialects as States, but they could be divided into four principal ones, in the 12th century: the Galician, which developed itself into the Portuguese; the Castilian, spoken in the two Castiles and Leon; the Cantabrian, used in the Basque provinces; and the Catalanian, which was almost the same as the Provençal.—The language of the Troubadours would have been better named Catalanian than Provençal, for it was in the palace of the Counts of Barcelona that it was perfected, when these Princes became Counts of Provence. The Provençal idiom enriched itself with Catalanian terms and expressions. The Provençal historians, Bouche and Pitton, do not hesitate to attribute to the Catalanian Princes the poetical taste of the Provençals, and the renown

of their Troubadours. This beautiful language is still spoken, but with some change, in the South of France, and in Spain from Figuieras to Murcia. It is the language of Sardinia and the Balearic Isles, and the basis of the Piedmontese. This language, the poets of which had made it the delight of all civilized Europe, is now abandoned by all educated people, as ridiculous and vulgar.

The Castilian dialect became the language of Spain, as the Northern Romanzo of Gaul had become that of France. Its influence increased with that of the crown. The Castilian monarchy being the most powerful and the richest, its court and capital being the most brilliant, attracted the attention of the rest of Spain. The Courtiers, and nobility drawn to Madrid by their interest, believed it necessary to learn the language of Castile. Even the Arragonese and Catalans, so proud and so fond of their language, so beautiful and so rich, abandoned it for the Castilian. At the time that Spain was at the height of her power, her language was also spoken at the courts of Vienna, Bavaria, Bruxelles, Naples and Milan, and even in France, at the time of the League, and under Louis 13th. But the fall of the language followed that of the Spanish greatness. It would not have been so sudden, however, had its literature been able to feed the avidity of the minds waking up on all sides. But the magnificence of the language, like the national pride, hid a real poverty. The majesty of the pronunciation, also, is bombastic; one would be tempted to believe that in Spanish, there cannot be any familiarity in conversation, no effusion of friendship, no liberty in common intercourse, and that love is an adoration. Charles the 5th, who spoke almost all the languages of Europe, used to say, with more point than reverence, "We should speak to God in Spanish, Italian to ladies, French to men, German to soldiers, English to geese, Hungarian to horses, and Bohemian to the Devil." We will finish this article on the Spanish, by giving the two principal reasons which prevented the progress of Spanish literature.

The first cause is, the almost uninterrupted war of the Spaniards with the Moors, for 700 or 800 years that these remained in Spain. If there ever was any suspension of

arms between them, the time was spent either in making preparations to renew the struggle with more fury than ever, and to fall unawares on one another, or to defend themselves in case of attack. The Spanish poets were for the most part of noble birth. The Cid was one of the most successful Generals Spain ever produced. Garcilasso, Don Alonza de Ercilla, Cervantes, Lope de Vega, and the celebrated Calderon, distinguished themselves in the career of arms. In order to follow two professions so hard and so different, one must certainly be born at the same time a poet and a warrior.

The other great cause was, the institution of the execrable and infernal tribunal of the Inquisition. Sismondi thus speaks on this subject: "This institution, after having committed to the flames all the Jews and Moors who had not embraced the Catholic religion, turned its watchful eyes on the Spaniards themselves. At or after the time of the Reformation, all those who attempted to introduce religious controversies, or even those who were in favor of it, were burnt without mercy. Everybody terrified anxiously avoided all metaphysical studies and religious speculations, and with them they abandoned every intellectual pursuit." The Spanish were reduced to so abject a state of subjection by the priests, they were kept by them in so degrading a state of bondage, that we doubt whether it could be said of them, what Voltaire said of the Italians: "The Italians fear to think, the French dare but half think, and the English fly even to Heaven, because their wings are not cut."

Our time being very limited, and fearing we have already trespassed too much on the patience of our readers, we will be as brief as possible on the Portuguese and Italian languages.

The history of the Portugal is almost the same as that of Spain, until the 12th century. This country was, like the rest of the Peninsular, inhabited at first by the Iberians and the Celtæ, and invaded by the Phœnicians, Carthaginians, Romans and the Germanic tribes; it shared in the general devastation, and was finally subdued by the Saracens. As it was wrested from the infidel, it became dependent on Spanish Counts, until about the middle of the 12th century, when Alfonso caused himself to be proclaimed king, after a great victory.

From that time Portugal was independent, except between 1580 and 1641, when it fell again under the power of Spain.

The Portuguese language bears a great resemblance to the Spanish. It was formed from the Galician, which it resembles still so much, that the uneducated people of both countries understand one another. At first the Portuguese and Castilian poets wrote equally in either language. The Portuguese is, however, different from the Spanish, in its structure, and especially in its pronunciation, which is very difficult for a foreigner, except a Frenchman, on account of the nasal sounds with which it abounds, and which are like those of the French. It is not so rich as the Castilian, but it is more concise, easy and simple, and is its superior as a conversational language. The separation of Portugal from Spain, their wars and little intercourse, and especially the care and efforts of the Portuguese writers to prevent the introduction of Castilian words, contributed to make their language different. The Portuguese language is spoken in some parts of Asia, and on the coast of Africa, in Madeira, in the Azores and in Brazil. The Portuguese literature, although complete, is far from being rich, for the very same reasons which prevented the progress of the Spanish literature. Laying aside the utility of that language in relation to commerce, for a scholar fond of languages it would be worth the trouble of learning it to read in the original the *Lusiad* of the great epic poet Camoens.

The Latin language, radiating from one common centre, became not only the language of all Italy, but also successively of the whole Roman empire. Whenever Rome conquered a new country, she there established colonies, and her own laws, and thus soon gave pre-eminence to her language. The Latin, however, spoken by the common people, especially in the provinces remote from Rome, was not the language of Cicero. Their idioms were numerous, and became more so, and more corrupted, by the invasion of the Barbarians. This may account for all the different dialects spoken at this time by the Italians.

Under the weak successors of Charlemagne, Italy was divided into numerous Principalities and States. Even

the principal towns, as they rose in population and wealth, became independent. This could not be done without innumerable quarrels and civil wars. Unwilling or unable, from their internal divisions, to form, conformably to the example of Greece, a federative republic, these independent States were alternately invaded by the Germans, the Spaniards and French. All these circumstances could but retard the formation and the progress of a common language for Italy.

What is called the Italian language, is the written language. It is spoken only in Tuscany and in Rome.—These are the only places where it is spoken with purity, and even now it is not yet decided if the Tuscan be preferable to the Roman, or the Roman to the Tuscan.—It is, however, generally granted, that in Tuscany, and especially in Florence, the seat of the famous Academy of La Crusca, the Italian is spoken with the greatest purity, but that the Roman pronunciation is the best. Hence the saying: "*Lingua Toscana in bocca Romana*," so it would seem, that to speak Italian purely, and pronounce it correctly, one should unite to the sweetness of the Roman pronunciation, the purity of expression for which the Tuscans, and especially the Florentines, are distinguished. Almost all the Italian States have a living idiom or dialect spoken, both by uneducated and the educated people, among themselves. The latter class, however, speak the Tuscan, which they learn as a branch of education.

The principal dialects are, on the North: the Milanese, the Venetian, the Mantuan, the Piedmontese, the Genoese and the Bolognese. In the South: the Neapolitan, the Silician, and the Sardinian. All these different dialects, which can still be subdivided, have produced many and very good writers.

How is it that the written language did not make more progress?

It is because the Popes always spoke and wrote in Latin; because this language was used in the Republics, at court, in the writings, and in the documents of Italy; and the Tuscan was, and is still, even now, called "*Lingua Volgare*." They still speak Latin in schools, in preference to the mother tongue. It is in that language that they still publish the acts of Academies, many treatises on

philosophy, on physic, on the mathematics, and almost all the arts and sciences. The poverty of the Italian language cannot be given, however, as an excuse, for it is as rich and copious as the Latin, of which it has preserved the beauties, to which it has annexed its own, and in some instances, it may claim superiority over the Latin. When Dante undertook to write, he hesitated long between the Tuscan and the Latin. He saw no court of any respectability speaking the Italian, nor any important book written in it, and according to his own account, there were, in his own time, fourteen dialects in use. These were even still subdivided, and almost every town of any size had its own jargon. He saw also, that his language was far from having in the South of Europe, the eclat of the Provençal, which had then attained its highest degree of cultivation, and he thought, with his age, that immortality was attached to the Latin alone. He could not resist the temptation of writing, and at one time designed to write all his works in this language. He had even begun his poem "*dell'Inferno*" in that tongue. It thus commenced :

"*Infera regna canam, medium, imumque tribunal ;*"

but encouraged by his friends, he was ashamed to abandon his own language. He took out of every Patois what was good and regular, and formed for himself a regular language. Petrarch and Boccaccio, like Dante, could not either resist the temptation of writing in Latin. The former wrote 12 or 15 of his works in that language. The contrary, however, of what they expected, took place. Their Latin works are forgotten, and their names live only in their mother-tongue. We make these general remarks upon the Southern Languages of Europe, as introductory to the analogy which we intend in the next number to present somewhat at length, between them, the English and the Latin.

ARTICLE VI.

THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS—AN ANTI-UNITARIAN ARGUMENT.

When we duly consider the extreme fallacy of many opinions which have been boldly advanced and tenaciously maintained, and also the number of adherents which, nevertheless, they have gained, we are disposed to conclude that nothing is too absurd for the human mind to believe. But, however credulous the mass of mankind may be, they will always demand some species of evidence before they yield a cordial assent. On account of ignorance or prepossessions, some will be satisfied with but little evidence, whilst those who are intelligent and unbiassed will require a still greater amount. While many will believe without examination the report or dictum of a distinguished leader, the sober and reflecting portion of any community will demand, previous to their belief, stubborn facts and weighty reasons. It is invariably expected that such facts and reasons will be exhibited in a satisfactory manner, by those who attempt to establish a new religion and commend it to the favorable regard and unsuspecting faith of the multitude. These individuals must adduce a valid authority and irrefragable proofs in behalf of the doctrines which they maintain, before they can be successful in winning the assent of the intellects and hearts of men. They are expected to perform miracles of some description, and thus to display, in a palpable manner, their ability to suspend or counteract the progress of things according to the laws of nature. In consequence of these feelings and expectations of the human heart, those persons who have desired to effect a moral revolution in the world, have almost universally appealed for confirmation of their authority, to a real or pretended performance of miraculous works. In profane history we meet with accounts of the miracles of Aristeas, of Pythagoras, Alexander of Pontus, of Vespasian and Apolloneus Tyanens. We might also mention the miracles which have been ascribed to the Romish Church ; those of Loyola, founder of the order of the

Jesuits ; and Francis Xavier, the Apostle of the Indies ; those said to be performed at the tomb of Abbe de Paris, and those recorded by Cardinal de Retz, as having been wrought at Saragossa.

As the Christian religion is also based on miracles, and as infidels, remarkable for ingenuity and disingenuousness, have endeavoured to invalidate these by placing them on an equality with those we have cited, it is highly important for the Christian to distinguish between genuine miracles and those which are counterfeit, to examine with care the claims of his religion, so that instead of being unsettled and tossed by every wind, he may be firmly established in the faith.

By a single declaration the Apostle Paul has made the truth and success of Christianity to depend on the truth or falsehood of a single proposition—Jesus has risen from the dead. “If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain.” If this doctrine be true, the Christian religion is true, and will succeed and flourish to the end of time ; if false, the Christian religion is false, and must eventually wither and die under the curse of a Holy God. Since the religion of Christ is founded on His resurrection, and since it promises eternal salvation to all its believers, we may safely assert that the doctrine now under consideration is the most interesting and important subject that has ever engaged the attention of any mind. It is a miraculous work according to its profession, and one which, if genuine, (as we hope to prove,) is accompanied by strong obligations on the impenitent, and with consolation and joy to believers. The important question at this point is, did Jesus actually rise from the dead ?

It is universally conceded by Jews, infidels and Christians, that Christ was crucified on Friday and was buried, and on the morning of the third day, (according to the Jewish method of computing time,) His body could not be found. There are only three conceivable ways in which His body could have been taken away. It must have been removed either by the Jews, or by the Disciples of Christ, or it must have been raised by Divine and Almighty Power.

I. That the Jews did not remove it, is evident from

their disposition and obligations to prevent such an occurrence. They had no desire to perform any act which might induce others to believe that Christ had risen. Instead of crowning Him with honour and glory, they wished to cover Him and His cause with contempt and shame. They went to the governor and besought him to appoint a band of sixty Roman soldiers to guard the sealed sepulchre, lest He might verify His prediction that He would revive and rise. Their minds were also influenced by fear. They were too much afraid of the combined anger and power of the officers and populace to engage in such a transaction. Well did they know if the body were found in their possession, they would be punished with great severity—to the full extent of the law. It is impossible to adduce any motives which could have influenced the Jews to seize and remove the body of Christ; but on the contrary, they had every inducement to prevent them from doing it. The strongest passions of human nature were effectual barriers to their performing this act. They hated Christ and His doctrines; and they feared the power of Roman soldiers, and the severity of Roman punishment.

II. So soon as the morning of the third day dawned on the city, it disclosed the fact that the body of Christ had been taken from the sepulchre. Although it had been carefully sealed and guarded through the night by a band of vigilant soldiers; yet the object of their care and watchfulness had mysteriously disappeared, and by the most active efforts could not be recovered. The penalty due from the Roman law to these soldiers, was death. That they might be released from this dread penalty, the chief priests assembled with the elders, and having taken counsel bribed the soldiers to propagate the report that whilst they were asleep the Disciples of Christ came and stole His body. Let us for a moment consider the credibility of this statement. It appears, from a collation and comparison of the narratives of the Evangelists, that the minds of the Disciples were, at this time, in a state of agitation and alarm. They were the chosen followers of the Nazarene, whom the wicked Jews had crucified. In consequence of their connection with Him, they were in hourly expectation of being arrested and put to death.

They voluntarily confined themselves to a solitary chamber, for fear of being crucified or stoned. One of them when interrogated by a maid about his relation to Christ, trembled in her presence, and through fear denied, with solemn oaths, that he had any knowledge of Him whatever. It was natural and fair to infer that if their head and leader had been ignominiously killed, a similar punishment awaited all His followers; and, therefore, they were afraid to acknowledge their connection with Him. Every one who is acquainted with the effects of fear on the mental and physical powers of man, must clearly perceive that the Disciples of Christ were not in a suitable or favorable condition for opposing by force the prejudice and power of the Jews, and removing the body from the tomb. But even admitting that they were, then, inspired with unusual courage, we contend they were too few in number to undertake so difficult and arduous a work with any reasonable prospect of success. They could not successfully resist the authority of Pilate and of the Sanhedrim, nor brave the danger of being detected and slain by soldiers, from whom they had just before escaped in great precipitation. The great annual festival, the passover, was celebrated at that time, and there were more than a million of Jews in the city, many of whom, doubtless, spent the night in the open air. The moon was full, and the night must have been comparatively bright. The sepulchre in which Christ was laid was just without the wall and exposed to the view of those who were passing. These attendant circumstances, when properly considered, render it extremely improbable that the Disciples of Jesus removed His body. Moreover it is unreasonable to suppose that a band of Roman soldiers would sleep at their post. When we consider the solemn instructions and charges which they received, and the severe punishment which they knew would certainly be inflicted if they failed to comply, we cannot believe that *one* of them would sleep, much less *all* at the same time. They must have been either asleep or awake. If they were awake, they would not permit the body to be removed; if they were asleep, how did they know whether it was the Disciples that removed it or some other persons? Taking for granted that the guard were asleep,

(which we by no means admit,) the noise that would have necessarily attended the removal of the stone, and taking the body from the tomb, would have been sufficient to awake them from their slumber. The appearances of order and regularity in the distribution of the grave-clothes, are utterly inconsistent with the supposition that a theft had been committed. Thieves would have been in a violent haste, and the napkin and other parts of the funeral costume would have been misplaced and scattered, instead of being calmly folded together and laid in their appropriate places. The words of the Christian poet Sedulius, on this subject, are worthy of being transcribed and translated,—

Say, impious band of hireling keepers, say
If, as ye dare assert, His followers stole
Christ's sacred body from the guarded tomb,
Whose funeral garb is this which lies within?
Could venturous thieves have thought it best to waste
The time in slow unloosing of the bands,
Nor bear away the corpse in grave-clothes wrapped?
A long delay like this ill favours theft;
If theft were here, for likelier had it been
To take away the corpse and clothes and all.

From these considerations, it is proper to conclude that the disciples could not have removed the body of Christ without being detected, and also that they actually did not remove it. This conclusion derives great strength from the fact, that although the Jews arraigned the disciples before their civil tribunals, for preaching and working miracles in the name of Christ, yet they never charged them with stealing his body, nor inflicted punishment on them for doing what they reported they had done. He who considers this subject attentively, cannot fail to believe, that if the body of the Saviour had been stolen by his followers, the theft would have been ferretted out, the body would have been produced, and the thieves subjected to severe punishment for their crime.

III. Having shown that neither the Jews nor the disciples of Christ removed his body from the sepulchre, we might, without further delay, proceed to prove the truth of our last proposition—that Christ was raised by a divine and almighty power—did not the wicked and unbelieving heart of man retort that the apostles were deceived themselves, and were engaged in the work of palming a

fraud and an imposition on others. Taking up the former proposition, we remark that it is very improbable that the apostles were deceived. It is capable of the clearest demonstration that our senses, when in a sound condition, and when circumstances are favorable to their proper exercise, will never deceive us. We are so constituted that we are obliged, and it is our duty, to believe the testimony of our senses. Were we now to see ice remain unmelted in fire, raised to the boiling point, (212° Fhr.,) we would be bound to believe it, however marvellous and unprecedented it may be. Instead of rejecting what was contrary to general and individual experience, as did Mr. Hume, we would unhesitatingly believe it as soon as we saw it with our eyes. The fact would then be of such a nature that we would be regarded as competent judges. Now we believe that the apostles were not deceived in regard to the resurrection of Christ, because the fact was of such a character that they were competent judges whether it was so or not. There are certain indications and marks by which we know men to be *men*. The colour, the speech, the motions and actions, are indices by which we may recognize men, or distinguish one man from another. If a person were admitted to the bosom of our family, and ate and conversed and walked with us, we would know that he was a human being, although he may have been an entire stranger up to that time. The facts of the case are before our senses and our minds, and we are as competent judges of them as Newton, Locke, or Aristotle could be. If it should afterwards be proved, that this man was killed and buried, before we saw him, the discovery would not, in the least degree, impair the credibility of the statement, derived from the evidence of our senses, that he was a *living man* when we knew him.

It is plain to every careful reader of the Bible, that the Apostles of Christ associated with Him, and they knew His appearance, His speech, His motions and His actions. After he rose, they had ample opportunity of seeing and knowing that he was alive. They had the same opportunities of knowing that He was alive, that we have of knowing that our friends, with whom we associate, are living. They could not have been deceived. Again:

The Apostles were not only competent, but they were also unprejudiced judges of the fact in question. They were not so full of enthusiasm as to believe and propagate a story, of the truth of which they had not obtained sufficient evidence. Enthusiasm may properly be defined to be a certain persuasion of the truth of information, supposed to be derived from God, relying on internal suggestions and feelings, and not relying on facts or arguments. So far from relying on an undefinable feeling in the heart, the Apostles boldly appealed to facts and to arguments of the strongest character. On this subject there is no need of giving the proof, as it may be read on almost every page of the New Testament. It is a well known trait of enthusiasts, to speak of their leader in high-wrought expressions of panegyric, and laud him to the skies, as being a paragon of perfection. It is also their custom to speak of their own excellencies, like the Pharisee of old, and boast of their fancied superiority to others. In neither of these practices do the Apostles indulge. It is true that the Apostle Paul does appear to boast and glory, in one passage of his writings, but he magnifies his office; and all that he advances in behalf of himself, tends to establish his character as an Apostle, in opposition to judaizing teachers, who had entered the bounds of the Corinthian Church, and were endeavoring to seduce them from their primitive faith. He then pronounces boasting to be folly, and says in the same connection, that not he who commendeth himself is approved, but he whom the Lord commendeth. The Evangelists record their own mistakes and weaknesses. We observe, again, that the Apostles were unprejudiced judges, because the resurrection of Christ contradicted their previous belief and prejudices. At the very time He was predicting His sufferings, death and resurrection, one of the Apostles rebuked Him, saying: This shall not be unto thee.— They all firmly believed that He had come to deliver them from oppression and bondage, and restore their nation to its primitive glory and renown. They could not understand nor brook the idea of His suffering, and dying a shameful death.

They were slow of heart to believe. In consequence of this, they would not yield their assent till they were

convinced by facts which could not be denied, and evidence that could not be controverted. One of the Disciples said he would not believe until he had put his finger on the nail prints, and his hand in the wounded side of the Saviour. He and others were soon forced to believe, by evidence of their senses. During the forty days that elapsed between the resurrection and ascension of Christ, He appeared to His Disciples eleven times; and He appeared, too, in daylight, when there could be no occasion for an ocular delusion. While on this subject, we may remark, once for all, that all the extraordinary and inexplicable things, actually testified, in which optical illusions may be supposed to have taken place, have invariably existed, if they existed at all, to the view of one person only. "No instance can be mentioned in which two unexceptionable witnesses have testified to the same illusion, at the same time, concerning the same thing."* Far more improbable is it, that three persons should thus experience the same illusion. When we increase this number to eleven, the improbability becomes incalculable; and when to five hundred, it transcends all limit. Christ's appearances to his disciples, after His resurrection, are as follows: He appeared to Mary Magdalene alone; to the women on their return from the sepulchre; to the two Disciples on their way to Emmaus; to Simon Peter alone; to the Disciples assembled in Jerusalem, Thomas being absent; to all the Disciples, eight days after, Thomas being with them; to seven Disciples at the sea of Tiberias, while fishing; to the eleven Disciples on a certain mountain of Galilee; to more than 500 brethren; to James, by himself; and lastly, to all the Apostles, on the day of His ascension on Mount Olivet.

If we believe the Apostles were men capable of exercising their senses, we must also believe that they had as good evidence that Jesus was possessed of life, as we have that any of our friends are now alive. It is impossible that they, with such evidence before them, could have been deceived. 2dly, Neither did they deceive others by palming on them a fraud and an imposition.—That we may take a proper view of the evidence of this

* Dr. Dwight.

fact, we remark, in the first place, that the Apostles who witnessed and testify these things, were men of probity and virtue. Their integrity and fidelity to the cause of Christ, were manifested in an undoubted manner, by their renunciation of themselves and the world, and by their preaching unpopular doctrines in the face of stripes, imprisonment and death. They were not only followers of Christ in the sense of being His companions, but we maintain they were now believers in Him as the Messiah and Saviour. Those who possess such a faith, receiving and resting in Christ, have undergone a change of heart. Now if the Apostles were truly converted men, followers of a Holy Saviour, it is scarcely probable that they would form an agreement to fabricate and give currency to a known, deliberate and wilful falsehood. Their consciences would not suffer them to do it. They knew the penalty incurred by false swearing was very severe; and they well knew that they would be detected in their perjury. When any report obtains circulation, it first gains the assent of the influential and popular. When it receives the imprimatur of the honorable and learned, it will then become current as genuine coin. But the Disciples of Jesus were neither learned nor honorable. They had not sufficient honor and reputation to enable them to *practice a deception and propagate a falsehood* among the people.

When an action is past, it sometimes becomes our duty to inquire into the motives which prompted its performance. We cannot divine what motives could have induced the Disciples to say that Jesus had risen, if he did not rise. No gold was offered to *them* as an inducement—no honours were promised as reward—no privileges were to be conferred on *them* as a compensation to their consciences for crimson perjury. On the other hand, they could expect nothing but bonds and scourging and martyrdom. To acknowledge the crucified Jesus, was equivalent, with the Jews, to confiscation of property, excommunication from the synagogue, and hopeless exile from Jewish society. Most heartily and cruelly would they persecute a man for being a Christian. If they would thus treat a man for being a believer in Jesus, with how much more severity would they punish those whom they

might detect in palming on them a notorious falsehood in regard to His resurrection. We may readily conceive that a jury and a judge might be bribed by worldly considerations, to render a mild verdict or mitigate a sentence already passed. We can see how a body of witnesses may be suborned, and swear to a falsehood on the Book of God. Gold and silver may perform wonders in this way. But how a number of persons could be induced to tell and adhere to a wilful falsehood, by such considerations as these, viz : they must be despised and contemned ; they must be excommunicated, imprisoned and put to death—we cannot understand. They could have no reasonable prospect of convincing the Jews in the city that Christ had risen, if he had not. If they had gone to other lands, they would have found Jews there also, who, by incessant communication with Jerúsalem, could easily discern whether they told the truth or not.

IV. Having shown that the Disciples were neither deceived themselves, nor instruments in deceiving others, we proceed to advance a few positive arguments in behalf of the fact of Christ's resurrection.

The Apostles were neither deceived, nor did they deceive others, because the fact was *real*.

The Jews possessed ample means for disproving it had it been untrue ; but they could not deny it. If the Apostles had commenced their labors in some distant country, and had there asserted this fact, there would have been some ground for a denial and rejection of it ; but they began at Jerusalem, (in the very place where it occurred,) to preach Jesus and His resurrection : so that the matter might be examined and sifted, and disproved if untrue. During the lapse of 1800 years, this fact has been believed by the Christian Church. There have been a Celsus and a Porphyry, a Voltaire and a Hume, and a host of infidels, noted for ingenuity and sophistry ; yet they have not been able to gainsay or disprove the resurrection of Jesus. In the bosom of the Church there have been Judases and Julians, yet after their apostacy, they have not disclosed one secret which can shake the foundation on which this fact is built. It remains immovable, because it is founded on a rock. When errors arise and creep into the Church, they are exploded before the

expiration of many centuries; but the doctrine of the resurrection of Christ having stood the test of eighteen hundred years, is yet believed by the Christian, and triumphantly maintained by reasons and arguments. This fact was not only not denied, but it was actually believed by the Sanhedrim and the Jews. The council must have believed it, or they would have charged the Disciples with the reported theft, and punished them accordingly. On the day of Pentecost, we learn, three thousand Jews were converted and believed the Gospel. The Apostles went into various quarters of the world and preached that Jesus, the crucified one, had risen from the dead, and their preaching was accompanied by the saving and sanctifying influences of the Holy Spirit; and we are well assured that God would neither smile with favor on a falsehood, nor prosper the work of wilful deceivers.

The Resurrection of Jesus is, therefore, established on the safe platform of evidence and truth. It is a miracle of the most sublime and stupendous character; since it declares with power, that he is the Son of God, according to the Spirit of Holiness. When all the criteria of miracles are rigidly applied to this, it will be found to be genuine. The following criteria have been used to distinguish real from pretended miracles. A miracle to be genuine must have an important end, worthy of its author; must be instantaneously and publicly performed; must be sensible and easy to be observed; must be independent of second causes;—some outward actions must be constantly performed in memory of the fact, and such actions and observances must be instituted at the very time when the event took place, and afterwards continued without interruption.* The reader can easily make an application of these criterias to the miracle under consideration.†

But if Jesus was raised solely by the power of His Father, we could not strictly infer any thing more than that the Father approved His work. All the righteous are to be raised from their graves; yet we cannot prove

* Leslie's Short and Easy Method with the Deist, and Professor Claparede's Considerations of Miracles of the Gospel.

† The Christian Sabbath is a monument of Christ's Resurrection.

by that fact merely that they will then be possessed of Divinity. If the Father, independently of the inherent energy and power of Jesus, raised Him from the dead, He may have risen just as any of the righteous will rise on the last day ; He may, after all, be nothing but a mere man, so far as this fact is concerned. But if we can establish the position that while the Father concurred* with the Resurrection of the Son, and stamped it with the seal of His approbation, the Son arose by His own energy and power ; we shall, then, have proved Him to be Divine by this act, and entitled to honour and worship equally with the Father. Before Jesus had endured sorrows in His soul, and painful sufferings in His flesh, He told the Jews that if they would destroy the temple of His body, He would rebuild it in three days.† On another occasion, He attributed to Himself the right and power to take His life again as well as to lay it down.‡ The Apostle Paul contends that Christ was declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Spirit of Holiness, by the Resurrection from the dead.¶ It is necessary (if we follow the rules of strict interpretation and construction) to understand the Apostle as teaching the active Resurrection of Jesus, that by His own proper power of Divinity He raised Himself. This power is denoted by the expression, *κατα πνευμα αγιωσωνης* ; which is proved, by reference to parallel passages, to mean His Divine nature.§ The same thing is also proved by the antithesis. The Apostle had said that Christ was the Son of David, *κατα σαρκα*, according to His human nature. The other member of the antithesis comes in very appropriately ; declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the Divine nature, by the Resurrection from the dead.

Our Saviour ascribes to Himself the same power which is exercised by the Father, and says : As the Father raiseth up the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will.¶ In another place He says, I am the Resurrection and the Life,** where the ab-

* The Apostle (1 Cor. 6, 2) speaks of Saints judging the world. His meaning is, that when Christ judges the world they will concur, and approve His acquittal of the righteous and condemnation of the wicked.

† John, 2 : 19.

‡ John, 10 : 18.

¶ Rom. 1 : 4.

§ 1 Peter, 3 : 18 ; 1 Tim. 3 : 16 ; Mark, 2 : 8.

¶ John, 5 : 21.

** John, 11 : 25.

stract, put for the concrete, indicates that He Himself is the principal cause of Resurrection and fountain of life, and in giving life to others, furnishes abundant evidence of His qualification and power to raise and give life to Himself.

The Apostle calls Him the first born from the dead,* which means that Jesus had and performed by natural right and power, what others possess and perform only by the benefits of adoption. Whilst believers are raised in consequence of their union with Christ, He rose from the grave by His own energy and power, and was the first who did thus rise. It is true that the Resurrection of Christ is frequently ascribed to the Father;† but it does not follow that it cannot be properly attributed to the Son, because whatsoever the Father doeth, the Son doeth likewise;‡ and as Resurrection is a work *ad extra*, it ought to be ascribed to the three persons of the Trinity conjointly. Yet there is always a peculiar reason why this work is attributed to the Father who, as a judge, delivered Jesus to death, and by His act of Resurrection, in which He concurred, set Him at liberty that He might visibly declare His full satisfaction with what Christ had accomplished in His Mediatorial character. But when the Scriptures speak of the vocation and Divinity of Christ, they uniformly ascribe His Resurrection to Himself. From the foregoing discussion we may educe the following inferences:

1. According to this view of the doctrine, the system of Socinians and Arians must fall to the ground. If none but God can raise the dead, and if Christ rose by His own power, Christ must be God. This conclusion, we know, has been resisted by Socinians in every age. They have called this doctrine a ridiculous, absurd, and impossible thing;§ and have styled it a remarkable error.¶—But their disbelief will not render it the less true. To the Christian the removal of the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ from His creed, would appear as dangerous as

* Col. 1: 18.

† Rom. 6: 4. Acts, 2: 24.—13: 30. Ephe. 1: 19, 20.

‡ John, 5: 19.

§ Hanc doctrinam ridiculam, absurdam, et impossibilem.—Socinus Disp. de Unius Filii Dei existentia.

¶ Insignem errorem.—Catech. Rago. cap. 2.

the removal of the sun from the planetary system would appear to the eye of the Astronomer.

2. If Jesus rose from the dead, the Gospel is no lucrative fable, but a message of truth as well as good news. The faith of the Christian is not in vain; neither are the faithful labours of ministers of Christ. The private Christian may confidently trust in that Saviour who was delivered for our offences, raised again for our justification, and who ever liveth to make intercession for us; while His ambassadors may firmly rely on the same truths, together with the promise that He will be with them in their official character, always even to the end of the world. The dark valley of the shadow of death will be illuminated with beams of Heavenly light, and their souls introduced by a convoy of Angels into the bright temple of the new Jerusalem. And their bodies, though reduced to original dust and trampled by the heedless tread of the living, will be raised by His Almighty arm when the trump of the Archangel shall sound. Their beauty will never be marred by the finger of decay, nor fade before the power of disease and despair; but ever fresh and blooming they shall spend a whole eternity in the service of their risen and immortal Saviour.

ARTICLE VII.

THE GENUINENESS OF THE PENTATEUCH.

1. *Dissertations on the Genuineness of the Pentateuch.* By Dr. E. W. HENGSTENBERG, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin. Translated from the German, by J. E. Ryland: 2 vols. 8vo. pp. 462. 562. T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh: MDCCCXLVII.
2. *Historisch-kritische Forschungen ueber die Bildung, das Zeitalter und den Plan der fuenf Buecher Mose's, nebst einer beurtheilenden Einleitung und einer genauen Charakteristik der hebraeischen Sagen und Mythen.* Von ANTON THEODOR HARTMANN, Professor

- der Theologie in Rostock* : 8vo. pp. 817. Rostock und Guestrow, 1831.
3. *Introduction to the Old Testament.* By JOHN JAHN. Translated by Samuel H. Turner, D. D. New York, 1827.
 6. *Lectures on the Four Last Books of the Pentateuch.* By the late Rev. RICHARD GRAVES, D. D., Dean of Armagh, Prof. of Divinity in Trinity College, Dublin: 4th edition. Dublin, 1831. pp. 486, 8vo.
 7. *Spinoza Opera, Vol. Prius. Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.* Cap. viii. Jenae, 1802.
 8. *Campegii Vitringa Observationes Sacrae, Lib 1.—Cap. iv.* Amstelodami, 1727.
 9. *The Evidences of the Genuineness of the Gospels.* By ANDREWS NORTON. Cambridge, 1844. Vol. II. Note D.
 10. *Academical Lectures on the Jewish Scriptures and Antiquities.* By JOHN GORHAM PALFREY, D. D., Prof. of Bib. Lit. in the University of Cambridge: 2 vols. 8vo. Boston, 1838.
 11. *The Connection between Geology and the Pentateuch: in a Letter to Prof. SILLIMAN, from THOMAS COOPER, M. D. To which is added the Defence of Dr. Cooper before the Trustees of the South Carolina College.* Columbia, 1833.
 12. *Two Lectures, &c.* By JOSIAH C. NOTT, M. D. of Mobile, Alabama. New York, 1849.
 13. *Considerations respecting the Genuineness of the Pentateuch, with special reference to a pamphlet entitled "The Connection between Geology and the Pentateuch: by Thomas Cooper, M. D."* By ROBERT MEANS, A. M. of Fairfield District, S. C. Columbia, 1834.

Our readers will not expect us to review in form, the long list of books which we have thus arranged before them. We have placed them here because they lie at our hand, and are the chief sources whence we shall draw what we have to say on the subject before us.—The Dissertations of Hengstenberg are an able refutation of what has been advanced in Germany, in opposition to the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch, and are characterized

by the diligence and laborious detail which mark the scholars of his nation, and by a solid practical sense, a quick discernment of the point at which those whom he opposes have departed from the truth; and an uncompromising spirit towards all views which will impugn the inspiration and veracity of the Scriptures. Only now and then do we find him affected by the speculative spirit of his nation, of whom it has been said that Providence has given to the English nation the dominion of the seas, to the French the dominion of the land, and that nought is left for the German but the possession of the clouds. And yet we would recognize, under any English dress, the volumes of Hengstenberg as a German book. No one can follow him on the same side, without being largely indebted to him, as he has doubtless been, in some measure, to his predecessors.

Hartmann belongs to the opposition. He maintains the impracticable opinion that the law came into existence in separate portions, some of them as late as the exile. But he does not concern himself to show how these portions were brought together into their present form, and has little anxiety as to the effect his views may have upon the reception of the Scriptures as the Divine and infallible rule of faith. We suppose, indeed, that this doctrine of the Lutheran Church can hardly be held by him in any true and honest sense.

Jahn, among the German scholars, is one of the earliest advocates of the genuineness, and Rosenmueler in his prolegomena and his notes has contended for it, though with exceeding low views of Inspiration.

DeWette finds "no ground and no evidence to show that the books of the Pentateuch were composed by Moses." He has carried out the "Document Hypothesis" to its extreme issues.

The lectures of Dean Graves were written in answer to the objections of Paine and the earlier skeptics, and are an able argument for the authenticity and truth of the four last books of Moses. The appendix, too, embraces answers to Le Clerc, Dr. Geddes, and De Wette.

We refer to Spinoza, as he was one of the earliest who objected to the Mosaic origin of these writings; advancing indeed most of the objections which will be considered in

this article ; and also to Vitranga as the earliest Christian Theologian who, with the highest views of the divine origin of the entire scriptures, maintained the pre-existence of documents from which Genesis was composed.

The two next works emanated from the Divinity School of Harvard University, Professor Norton contending that the Pentateuch was compiled from written documents and oral traditions, by some one who held the highest authority in the new state, after the restoration from the Babylonish captivity, and Professor Palfrey maintaining the Mosaic origin. The pamphlet of Dr. Cooper attacking the Pentateuch, appeared in Columbia some eighteen years ago, and the lectures of Dr. Nott have already been the subject of animadversion in our pages.

The reply of Rev. Mr. Means to Dr. Cooper, meets the arguments of that skeptical writer with decision and ability, and was an earnest of further service which he would have rendered to the Church, had he not been called away in the midst of his days.

In the efforts we have before made to defend the Unity of the human race, we have been more influenced by a desire to maintain the credibility and plenary inspiration of the scriptures than by any other motive. How violently these have been attacked by certain recent advocates for a diversity of races is obvious to every one who has read the late arguments on this subject.

Among the matters of controversy which have unexpectedly been brought forward in this connection, is the genuineness of the Pentateuch as a writing of Moses, and its entire truthfulness and credibility as a history, a certain proof that it was regarded as teaching the Unity of the human family. There is no portion of the sacred scriptures whose claims have, for various reasons, been more contested ; and the literature of these controversies already amounts to many volumes, to read and master which requires no little time and patience. We refer those who are curious to know who have written on this subject to the note appended, which has been compiled from Hartmann, Havernick, and Hengstenberg.

The interest and zeal which have been manifested in these attacks on one side, and in the defence on the other,

will not be a subject of wonder to those who are properly informed of the relation the five books of Moses bear to the rest of scripture, and indeed to the whole of revealed religion. The rejection of these books of the Old Testament brings in its train the rejection of the books of the New Testament; the rejection of Moses, the rejection of Christ. "Had ye believed Moses, ye would have believed me, for he *wrote* of me. But if ye believe not his *writings*, how shall ye believe my *words*." These are the recorded words of Christ and should have been a warning to all the impugnors of the genuineness and credibility of the Pentateuch, that in denying the authorship of the books Christ ascribes to Moses, they either deny *his* veracity, or the truthfulness of the record the New Testament presents of his sayings, or the divinity of his mission altogether. The ancients correctly understood the true importance of the Mosaic writings. "Let us pass on," says Theodoret, "to Moses, the ocean of Theology, from which, to speak poetically, are all its rivers and all its seas.*"

"The Wolfenbutler Fragmentist," says Hengstenberg, "regarded the whole of the sacred history as a compact phalanx, and proceeded on the supposition that the disproof of the passage through the Red Sea, involved that of the resurrection of Christ, and the disproof of the resurrection that of the passage through the Red Sea. Bauer wrote a *mythology* of the Old and New Testament. De Wette avows that the principles of mythical interpretation carried by him through the Pentateuch must of necessity also be applied to the New Testament. The critical treatment to which Strauss subjected the gospels, is so completely like that employed by De Wette on the Pentateuch, that we can scarcely see how it is possible to abandon the one and yet wish to retain the other."

Our own country affords us now and then melancholy evidence that a false principle applied to the earliest scriptures is carried through to the latest, and that if these books are disparaged and regarded as unworthy of confidence, those of Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, and Paul will be brought under the same condemnation.

Were we disposed to present at this time a positive ar-

* Opp. iv. 749.

gument in favour of the Pentateuch as a writing of Moses, we would attempt to show that there is nothing in the common supposition of its authorship in itself improbable; that the style of the book itself points it out as belonging to the earliest literature of the Jews; that the internal evidence shows Moses to be the author, and is incompatible with any other hypothesis; that the whole religion and government of the Jews from the Exodus till now has been regulated by it; that it directly claims to have been written by Moses; that in the writings of Christians and Jews, embracing the apostles and the founder of Christianity himself, and the prophets of the ancient covenant, there is a distinct line of testimony referring it to Moses; that with this testimony all Pagan antiquity, so far as it speaks to the point at all, concurs; and that all the hypotheses which make the Pentateuch a more recent work are wholly untenable.

The *onus probandi* lies on the side of the impugnors and not of the maintainers of the genuineness. Past ages have been satisfied with ascribing the book to Moses, and we propose now to consider the validity of those arguments which have been urged to the contrary.

Among the opponents of the genuineness we should, however, state, there is not a uniformity of opinion. Some deny it wholly; some deny it, brief portions excepted. To the first class belong De Wette, Hartmann, Von Bohlen, Vatke, and Professor Norton of Cambridge. Others admit the Mosaic origin of various important portions of the Pentateuch. Such was the opinion which Eichorn, perhaps, came to maintain who at first contended for the genuineness throughout. The same views have been advanced by Staudlin and Herbst. Most of these writers also hold that whatever in the Pentateuch is beyond the ordinary course of nature is of a mythical character, and may or may not have a historical basis.





1. One of the arguments to disprove the genuineness of the Pentateuch as a writing of Moses is the non-existence of Alphabetic writing at so early a period. "Not till the period of the Judges," says Hartmann, "when they reposed in their fortunately won possessions, were they able to advance in the path of civilization, and obtain from their diligent neighbours the precious gift of the art of writing."

Von Bohlen and Vatke still more strongly make the same assertions. The latter affirms that writing was unknown in the age of Homer. Others who admit the existence among the Egyptians of the hieroglyphic, contend that as yet they possessed no Alphabetic writing and that none other than this was suited to the purpose of writing so extensive a book as the Pentateuch. This argument was put forth by Voltaire, found an advocate in Hartmann and others, and has been more recently brought forward by Dr. Nott. As it was our intention to revert to this subject again when commenting on the lectures of this latter writer, we now state that his genealogy of Alphabetic writing, after Pauthier, is as follows: First, Hieroglyphic writing; second, the Hieratic; third, the Demotic or Enchorial, a purely alphabetic writing. The kind, then, to which a writing belongs, may serve to determine its antiquity. All these stages are discoverable in the Egyptian writing, which consists, as the monuments show, and the ancients testify, of these three kinds. The Phœnicians first borrowed this writing from the Egyptians.

"From Phœnicia or Chaldea it passed to the Hebrews and Greeks; to the Hebrews during the captivity at Babylon, from whence they brought the Phœnician or Chaldean alphabet, which had its origin in Egypt, together with the Chaldean or Phœnician language, which Esdras the scribe and Hebrew high-priest used for the revision or rewriting the Bible, as the Jews themselves declare. And, in fact, the Hebrew character, such as it is preserved to our day, has the strongest resemblances to the different Phœnician alphabets published for nearly a century, as the language of the Bible has the greatest affinity, not to say identity, with the language of the Phœnician inscriptions discovered down to the present day. It passed to the Greeks with Cadmus and others"—*Lectt.* p. 105.

"These conclusions, then, which are the most reasonable that can be formed in the present state of *facts*, if confirmed by future investigations, will accord perfectly with exegetical criticism, which proves that the Pentateuch was not written by Moses fifteen hundred years before Christ; in fact, that nothing antedates the school of Esdras. Unless Egyptian hieroglyphics or hieratic characters were employed, no one could have written any part of the Bible before the age of Solomon, or about one thousand years before Christ, if then!"—*Ibid.* p. 111.

We have no objection to the supposition that writing is

a human invention and not a matter of direct revelation. It certainly existed before the giving of the law. We have no objection to the theory that Alphabetic writing originated from the pictorial or hieroglyphic. There is every reason to believe that the first mode of representing things was by pictures; and that *one* of the earliest senses of such a word as *γραφειν* was *to paint*. The very names of Hebrew letters are the names of natural objects. It was a step which it did not require men, who were no barbarians, ages to take, to pass from the hieroglyphic to a phonetic alphabet. It was easy to analyze words into the simple sounds heard in the name of the object which the picture represented. It was easy to take  or , the rude outline of the head of an ox, for the first sound heard in *Aleph* the name of an ox, and this is plainly the A of modern alphabets. It was easy to take  or , the rude form of the eye, for the first sound in *Ayin*, the word for eye, and this is the probable origin of the O both of the ancient and modern writing. In the same way the rude outline of waves was taken for the first sound in *Mayim*, water, and thus originated the M. Whether these were the actual forms of the Hebrew alphabet so early as Moses, we are not permitted by *history* to say, but we do not deem it improbable. The arts were cultivated, iron was wrought and music invented before the flood. The art of writing could not be far off. Man did not come from the hands of his creator a savage, and doomed to toil for ages before he could rise in knowledge and art. His development was early. And it is as probable that Mizraim, the son of Ham, carried the art of writing to Egypt as that it originated there. If it existed there, Moses, learned in all the wisdom of Egypt, was acquainted with it. But, says Dr. Nott, "we know positively that no alphabet existed in this country for a long time after his epoch." And yet in the next sentence he says "the only character possessed by the Egyptians were the hieroglyphic mingled with the *phonetic*." And what were the *phonetic* but alphabetic characters. Alphabetic characters did exist, then, in the days of Moses, in Egypt. He himself also admits p. 105, that there are strong reasons for supposing that the Phœnicians possessed an alphabet as early as Moses,

though it differed then from the Samaritan and square letter. Now what was the Phœnician language? It was the Hebrew language, with scarce a dialectic difference. If the Hebrew-speaking Phœnicians possessed an alphabet in Moses' day, why not the Hebrew-speaking Moses himself. The fact that the Chaldee square letter was introduced among the Jews after Ezra no more proves that they had not an alphabetic character before, than the introduction of the Roman letter among the English, and the present cursive Greek alphabet in the writing of Greek, proves that there was no alphabetic character in England till within the last two hundred years, or among the Greeks till the 10th century. It is perfectly vain to plead the defective nature of the Cadmean alphabet. The 16 letters which belonged to it, Plin. vii. 56, or even fifteen, are sufficient to spell any Greek or Hebrew word. The art of writing was known in the days of Job,* and when Joshua subjugated Canaan he took Debir, whose original name was Kirjath Sepher, *City of Books*, or Kirjath Saanah, *City of Letters*, and whose name Debir is equivalent to the Greek *λογος*.† How long must letters have been cultivated, before a town could become so great an emporium of learning as to receive the name "City of Books," or "City of Letters?" Dr. Nott says, "We find *embalmed Hebrews* in Egypt, yet not a trace of *Alphabetic* writing, much less of any *Hebrew* letters." We have already said the Phonetic hieroglyphics are alphabetic. We now say there are Hebrew letters found in Egypt, as may be seen in the fac similes of Gesenius' *Monumenta Phœnicia*, from No. LXXI. *a.* to LXXV. *b.* inclusive, which if not as old as Moses, may yet be as old as the "embalmed Hebrews" of which he speaks. The Pentateuch, also, itself continually speaks of writing as being in existence in the days of Moses, and if the whole is not a complete and bare faced forgery throughout, without *any* basis of truth, which not even all its opposers affirm, it

* Job xix. 23, 31, 35. Hales makes Job to have lived 200 years before the Exode.

† Josh. xv. 49. Judg. i. 11. The LXX. translate *πολις γραμματεων*, the Targum Kirjath Arke, City of Archives. See Bochart Canaan, II. c 17, and Keil Commentar ueber Josua, X. 38, and Bertheau Das Buch der Richter, p. 20.

must at least be admitted that it gives the view of the writer and his age as to the existence of alphabetic writing in the days of Moses. Thus in Exodus xvii. 14. The Lord said unto Moses, "Write this for a memorial in a book," xxiv. 4. And Moses wrote all the words of the Lord. This writing of the law, as Hengstenberg remarks, belongs to the solemnization of the transaction. In Numb. xxxiii. 2, it is said "Moses wrote their goings out" i.e. their stations "by the commandment of the Lord," xvii. 2. Moses took twelve rods according to the house of their fathers, and wrote every man's name upon his rod. Deut. xxxi. 19. "Now therefore write the song for you, and teach it the children of Israel," xviii. 18, 19. The future king also, when he should sit upon his throne, was to write him a copy of this law in a book. The name too of the Egyptian priests *hhartummim*, scribes, clerks, from *hheret*, a style, indicates the wide spread of the art of writing, at least in Egypt. See Gen. xli. 8, 14. Exod. vii. 11, 22. viii. 3, 14, 15. ix. 11. They were directed also to write the words which Moses commanded them that day, upon the posts of their houses and their gates. Deut. vi. 9. Moses summoned seventy men of the elders of the people, *in writing*, Num. xi. 24, 26, but Eldad and Medad were not of them that were *written*. The inscription on the mitre and breast plate of the high priest, the "book of life" spoken of by Moses, the writing of bills of divorcement by the disaffected husband, the writing by the priest of the curse upon the adulteress, the inscribing of the law upon the stones of Mt. Ebal, will occur to all who are familiar with these books. These notices indicate a wide diffusion of the art of writing among the Hebrews in the Mosaic age, which is what we might expect from the wide diffusion of this art among the Egyptians. Mr. Gliddon, too, decides for the existence of alphabetic or phonetic signs 1000 years before Moses, and for the existence in Egypt of royal and national libraries cotemporary with, if not *prior* to his epoch; that the god Thoth was termed at so early a day as that, "the President of the Library," the "Lord of the divine writings;" and the goddess Saffk, "Lady of Letters."*

* Ancient Egypt, pp. 13, 14. Since writing the above, we see that Mr.
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And if search had been made in that direction, Lepsius would have been found declaring that he met with papyrus rolls pictured on the monuments of the 12th dynasty, the last but one of the old kingdom, and the stylus and inkstand on those of the fourth, and in the fifth century of the period of Menes. *Bunsen would have been found adding that we can trace the monumental writing a century higher, and that however it may damage preconceived opinions, the genuine Egyptian writing, consisting of hieroglyphics and phonetic, i. e. alphabetic characters, existed in its essential parts at least as early as Menes; that it began with the regular register of the Egyptian kings is the universal tradition of antiquity, and that there is no tradition which is better confirmed.†

"Several kinds of alphabetic writing were in existence in Asia from the earliest times," says Wm. Von Humboldt. "The transition from hieroglyphic to alphabetic writing,

Gliddon (*Ethnological Journal* No. IX. p. 401.) has revoked his opinion. He has not informed us what he will do with his *facts*. The oscillations of the Egyptologists do not surprise us. The sunshine of truth will ere long explode many a theory which is pompously paraded before the world. We have not forgotten the scene in Boston a short time since, which we now quote from "the Presbyterian," of July 29, and which we have not seen contradicted.

"*Mr. Gliddon and the Mummy.*—The very peculiar and disagreeable predicament in which Mr. Gliddon was placed before a Boston audience, has already been made known to our readers. By special request, he agreed to unroll one of his Egyptian mummies, and to decypher the hieroglyphics which might be found connected with it. The mummy was, accordingly, submitted to the select audience, and the hieroglyphics, (Mr. Gliddon being interpreter,) very fully revealed that the subject was a young Egyptian woman, the daughter of a dignitary. This was very satisfactory to the wonder-loving and curious audience; but, when the various wrappings were unwound, lo! the buried and disinterred one was a robust man, and not a delicate female. This was an important error, for the occurrence of which Mr. Gliddon had no very plausible explanation. We advert to this subject again for a single purpose. Mr. Gliddon, who professes to be entirely at home among Egyptian antiquities, belongs, if we mistake not, to a school of philosophers who take peculiar pleasure in discrediting the Mosaic account of the creation. As he reads the Egyptian monuments, he finds that they go back far beyond the date ascribed by Moses for the creation of the world. Now we would respectfully ask him if he be not mistaken? Is it not possible he has made an error of a thousand or two years in his hieroglyphic readings? If Mr. Gliddon persists in his interpretation, and is very positive as to the accuracy of his statements, that the world is much older than the Bible says it is, then we shall be under the painful necessity of reminding him of—the mummy.

* Todtenbuch der Eyppter. s. 17.

† Ægypten's Stelle—Theil I. p. 33.

we find," says Gesenius, "very early among the Egyptians, at least 2000 years B. C." "In accordance with these historical premises, it is in the highest degree probable, that some Phœnician, connected in very ancient times with the neighboring Egyptians, invented his own alphabet, new and altogether more convenient and practical. Rejecting the hieroglyphics and their innumerable characters, he selected simply twenty-two signs for the twenty-two consonant sounds of his language." This discovery Gesenius believes to have been made somewhere near the time of the shepherd kings in Egypt, which Wilkinson supposes to have been before Joseph was carried there by the Midianite merchants.* "Whatever," says Ewald, "may be the primitive Semitic people, to whom half of the civilized world are indebted for this inestimable gift, (the gift of writing,) so much cannot be mistaken, that it appears in history as a possession of a Semitic people long before the times of Moses." "It appears to us not only probable, but rather certain that the earliest historians of Israel found already in existence a multitude of historical works of the kindred tribes."† And Schlosser remarks, that the composition of the four first books of Moses, "was rendered more easy and natural since Moses was educated in Egypt, where every thing, even law-suits, was carried on in writing, since among the Phœnicians he had found characters for the tones of his own language, and even had appointed a multitude of scribes in the country, who, partly to assist the police, partly on account of the disputes respecting the boundaries of lands, were obliged to write down the genealogies, and to note any remarkable changes."‡ "The Egyptians on one side," says Olshansen, "the Hebrews and Phœnicians on the other, we find at a time which extends back of all sure chronology, in possession of an alphabet, which has one and the same extraordinary principle to denote the sound. For this purpose an object was represented or pictured, whose name, in the various spoken languages of Egypt or the Semitic tribes, begins with this sound."§

* Grammar Ed. 13th, App.

† Geschichte des Volkes Israel.

‡ See Hengstenberg Genuineness, I. p. 12.

§ See other authorities quoted by Hengstenberg on the Genuineness of

We think these considerations, and the decisions of these various scholars, outweigh, *ex abundanti*, the objections of the opponents of the Pentateuch. That Moses *could* write the Pentateuch," says Hasse, "is beyond controversy." "Possibly," says Fritzche, "Moses was farther advanced in the art of writing than Cadmus."

2. Another argument against the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch, is the alledged want of suitable writing materials at so early an age.

First, it is argued that the words used in the early languages for the act of writing, indicate that it was first performed on some hard substance, as on stone, in which the letters had to be cut with the chisel or the graver. Γραφω χαρασσω, & γραω, and the Hebrew words *kathabh*, *kharat*, *be'er sa'phar*, all signify *to engrave, to cut in, to scratch*, and indicate that stone was the earliest material for writing. Again, it is argued from the slow improvement of the arts, that the more portable, flexible, and convenient materials were slowly discovered; and, thirdly, that hard substances were employed for writing, is said to be evident from the testimony of the books of Job and of Joshua, and from the Pentateuch itself.

The argument from the meaning of the words, Hengstenberg disposes of, by denying that this is their earliest signification. The words γραφω and *kathabh*, are the only ones properly applied to writing, and *to write* is their true and primary meaning. We cannot follow him in his philological argument. To us the most of these words sound like onomatopées, and are an imitation of the sound made by the instrument used in writing, as it passes rapidly over the material written upon, as we sometimes speak with a view to the sound so made, of "the *scrape* of a pen." If this be the origin of the words, they as easily express the sound of the *style* indenting a palm leaf, of the pencil upon the slate, of the pen or reed upon parchment or papyrus, as of the chisel or graver upon stone or metal. As to the slow improvement of the arts, we know that necessity quickens invention. The art of writing was of great and general interest, and we believe with the Count de Caylus, that "as soon as writing was found

the Pentateuch, and by Prof. B. B. Edwards in *Biblioth. Sacra*, 1845, p. 380—387.

out, it was laid on every thing which could receive it." We can hardly conceive of writing becoming any object, if it must be confined to inscriptions on rocks and metallic substances. Both writers and readers would certainly be few, so long as there was no more facile material than these. Nor indeed in our view, could writing ever come into use, or be at all perfected, unless portable and convenient materials were adopted. The supposition that writing was not used at first, as now, for familiar communication or popular instruction, but for the transmission of important knowledge to future times, does not meet the case, for such an application of the art of writing could only be thought of when it had been long in use, and its great utility and adaptation to such a purpose universally acknowledged. There are sufficient notices of the perfection it was believed to have attained, in the earliest books of the Bible. The signet ring of Judah is mentioned, Gen. xxxviii: 18, 25; and that this bore an inscription is more than probable. The onyx stones on the Ephod of Aaron were engraved "with the work of an engraver in stone, like the engraving of a signet."

This engraving of gems is one of the highest works of art, requiring great precision and skill, and indicating that, even at this day, writing had been long cultivated and had reached its perfection. The instance referred to also, is one connected with the solemn rites of their religion, respecting which a falsehood, if it were stated, were easily detected, and would be at once exposed.

Let it be granted that the surface of rocks was used to receive inscriptions in the days of Moses, and that inscriptions were made on stone. This also is the case in modern times. The Dighton rock is supposed by many to record the discovery of this country by the Icelanders, in the opening of the eleventh century. Hannibal cut an inscription on the Alpine rocks, celebrating his famous passage of the Alps, and the Chinese have adopted the same method, in modern times, of recording on the face of rocks those things they would desire to perpetuate.

These modern facts would invalidate the reasoning which is adduced to show that rock was the earliest material for writing, and that none other existed in the days of Moses. The fact is, that stone and metal were used

in that day, as now, for monumental purposes, or for the record of those important matters which it was desired to perpetuate in the memories of men. When parchment and papyrus were already in use, the Greeks engraved their *laws* on triangular tables of brass called *Cyrbes*, *κυρβεῖς*, and the laws of Solon, and sometimes those of the XII Tables, were inscribed on planks of durable wood. Hence the expression of Horace *Leges incidere ligno*.—Traces of the same usage, it appears to us, may be found in the Hebrew verb *hhakak*, which, while it primarily means *to cut in, to hew in*, in its derived or metaphorical signification, means *to decree, or enact laws*, its derivative *hhekek*, signifies a *decree or law*, and the participle *mehokek*, a *law-giver*.

Besides wooden tablets covered with wax, or otherwise, used by the Greeks and Romans, which we know the Hebrews to have used at a later day,* there were abundance of other materials they might have employed.—There was the byssus, or “fine linen,” of which the garments of the priests, and the covering of the tabernacle, were made, and which was used for mummy cloths by the Egyptians, as the microscope of Mr. Bauer has determined. They might have availed themselves of this, in lieu of a better material, and the Hebrews, as well as other nations of antiquity, have had their *libros linteos*. A writing of this kind has been found in the hand of an Egyptian mummy.

Another material accessible to the Hebrews, was the skins of animals, prepared either as parchment, vellum, or tanned as soft leather. Parchment is often ascribed to Eumenes, as its inventor, who lived 200 years before Christ. But Herodotus tells us the Ionians wrote on sheep and goat skins from the earliest period. Eumenes only improved the manufacture, and introduced it into general use instead of paper, made from papyrus, whose export had been prohibited by the reigning Ptolemy. This manufacture of leather existed among the Hebrews in the days of Moses. In Exod. xxvi: 14, we read that ram skins dyed red, were used as a covering of the tabernacle, and the adaptation of such a material to the purpose

* Is. viii. 1: xxx. 8. Hab. ii. 2. 2 Esdras, xiv. 24.

of writing, is not a matter of doubt. Dr. Buchanan, in 1806, obtained a roll, written on soft, flexible goat skins, dyed red, containing most of the Hebrew Scriptures, from a synagogue of the Black Jews in the interior of India. It is one of the rules of the Jews contained in the Mishnah, that the law can only be written on polished skins, of clean beasts, which would seem to indicate this as the material on which it was first written. The curse against the adulteress was to be written in a book, and then washed with the bitter water, which would imply a material different from paper, and which would not be destroyed by the action of water.

Another substance which could have been used, was paper from the papyrus, a plant mentioned in Exod. ii : 3, as the material of the ark, or boat in which Moses was exposed when an infant, and Is. viii : 2, as the material of the skiffs used by the swift ambassadors of Ethiopia. Paper from the papyrus, is of easy manufacture. Pliny is wrong in saying that it was not used before Alexander the Great. Papyri are in existence of the remote Pharaonic period. Wilkinson speaks of papyri of the age of Cheops, Champollion of papyrus rolls of the date of Sesostris the Great, and Heeren of papyrus rolls found in the catacombs of Thebes, of unknown antiquity.

It is sufficient for us to show that there were materials which Moses could have used other than stone. But we believe there are few readers who will not admit that the book so often referred to in the Pentateuch, the *sepher* of the Hebrew, was something else than a writing on wood, stone, or metallic plates.

With what face one could assert in view of these facts, that "the best mode known to Moses, was to write on stones covered with soft plaister; and that this mode of writing was recommended to the Israelites, and was practised by Joshua at the recommendation of Moses," we cannot comprehend. "To write out the Pentateuch in the way recommended by Moses," says the same author, "would have taken all the stones of Mount Horeb."*

In relation to the transaction thus referred to, there are various opinions. The direction to Joshua to write the

* Dr. Cooper's Geology and the Pentateuch, pp. 35, 36.

law upon plaistered stones, may be found in Deut. xxvii : 2, 8, and its fulfilment in Josh. 8 : 32. Dr. Kennicott, and after him Adam Clarke, supposed the letters were *in relievo*, and the plaister fitted up the intervals between them, to protect them from abrasion. Michaelis and Rosenmueller, that the device fallen upon by Sostratus, the architect of Pharos, was adopted by Moses, that of cutting the characters in stone, and covering the whole with plaister, that when this should fall off, in future times, the inscription might be discovered and produce the greater effect. Mr. Means, in his answer to Dr. Cooper, suggests that the inscription was to be on an altar, constructed of unhewn stones, and that the plaister was used to obtain a smooth surface, to receive the inscription, because if a tool of iron were raised on an altar of stone, it would be regarded as polluted. See Exodus xx : 25. The Egyptians, too, were accustomed to cover stone walls, when the material was too coarse for inscriptions and paintings, with mortar, on which the sculptures or paintings were wrought, and yet it would hardly be plead that they had no other material than this on which to write. Few interpreters have believed the whole Pentateuch so written. Cornelius a Lapide supposed the whole of Deuteronomy inscribed : Seb. Munster, Stendel and Clarius, an extract from the law ; Grotius, Kennicott, and Hasse, the curses and blessings of Deuteronomy, 27 : Vater, Hengstenberg, and Maurer, the second law, or the repetition of the law, Dent. iv, 44 : 26, 29 ; and Maurer, Hengstenberg and Keil, think the writing was more for effect, to convey the impression that these laws should be written on the heart and practised in the life, rather than for the purpose of transmission to future ages.

In reviewing these facts, we are sure, if objections to the Mosaic origin of the Pentateuch are based on the absence of suitable writing material in his day, they must fall to the ground. For the first writing of the Koran, the materials were most unsuitable. It was written on fragments of leather and hide, on palm leaves, on flat white stones, and on the shoulder-blades of sheep. And yet the Koran is larger than the Pentateuch.

3. The language of the Pentateuch has furnished an-

other objection to its genuineness. It differs so little from the later Hebrew, for example, that of the period of David, that it cannot have been written, it is alledged, in the days of Moses, which was at least 500 years before. But we cannot judge of ancient oriental idioms, by the variableness of the modern tongues of civilized Europe. The permanence of the manners and customs of the Orientals extends also to their language. There is hardly greater difference between the style of David and of Jeremiah, although the Hebrew literature was disturbed by foreign influences in later times, than there is between that of the Pentateuch and that of the Davidic age. An influential literature, especially a sacred one, has a great power to keep language permanent. The writings of Confucius, 550 years B. C., and those of a commentator upon them, written 1500 years after, are said to differ very little, except that the original is more concise. The Koran of Mohammed, Luther's translation of the Bible, and in some degree our English version, have tended to fix the Arabic, the German and the English languages. Yet the Hebrew has its golden, its silver, and its iron ages. And as we would not, judging from the style, refer the poems of Homer to the age of Demosthenes, the orations of Demosthenes to the times of Origen, or the commentaries of Origen to the days of Lascaris, so we would not refer the five books of Moses to the times of David, nor the Psalms of which David is the author to the times of Malachi.* The style of the Pentateuch betrays its antiquity. It abounds in Archaisms, in words and forms not in use so late as the time of David. Some of these are noted by Rosenmueler in his *Prolegomena* to the Pentateuch. "Many words and phrases," says Jahn, "occur in the Pentateuch which are peculiar to it, and many peculiar to later books are never found in it; many also which are common in the Pentateuch, are elsewhere of rare occurrence, and the contrary." Of these different sorts of words and phrases, Jahn collected more than two hundred.† We are unable, both from the want of proper type and space, to enter more fully into this subject, but it is

* Bp. Marsh *Authenticity of the Five Books of Moses vindicated*, pp. 6, 7

† *Introduction to O. T.*, translated by Turner, p. 178.

sufficiently plain, that the language of the Pentateuch, when compared with that of the other Hebrew writings, exhibits marks of a higher antiquity. We may seek, therefore, among the historic personages of the earliest age of Hebrew literature, for the probable author of these ancient writings, and whom shall we find so likely to have composed them, as their reputed author, Moses?

4. Again, it is objected that the Pentateuch is a compilation, made up out of the writings of various persons, and put together by some one, long subsequent to Moses. That it is devoid of unity—a cento, composed of scraps of various authors, exhibiting frequent repetitions and manifest diversities of style.

This objection must be first resolved into its several particulars. It is possible that it should be in part a compilation, and yet that the compiler should be Moses himself. It is in Genesis that the chief evidences of compilation are alleged to be found. And so long ago as Vitringa the opinion was maintained that Moses availed himself, as Luke did in the composition of his gospel, of pre-existing documents. The proof of this Vitringa brings forward in his *Observationes Sacrae* L. 1. iv. Then arose the question as to the sources whence the Pentateuch was drawn. The opinion advanced by Otman, that the pyramids and other monuments of Egypt were among these sources, has not met with much favour. Some have supposed that he availed himself of the traditions which were in existence, and which in consequence of the great age of the earliest men were handed down with great correctness, seven persons only intervening between Adam and Moses. The idea that written documents, as the genealogical tablets of families, and other early records, were the sources, in whole or part, of the book of Genesis has approved itself to many.*

These writings may have themselves been inspired, or if adopted, and wrought over by one possessing inspiration; would have received the sanction as far as adopted, of the Holy Spirit under whom he acted.

* So Vitringa, Richard Simon, LeClerc, Calmet, Bishop Gleig, Professor Turner. "Doubtless," says this latter writer, "he availed himself of documents and other sources of information previously existing, and agreeably to Hebrew usage he retained the very phraseology of these documents so far as was consistent with his main object." *Comp. to Genesis*, p. 24.

The hypothesis of different documents was carried to a great extreme by the physician Astruc, who professed to find in Genesis the traces of 12 different documents. Eichhorn pruned away this theory and reduced the documents to two. Ilgen contended for three. Vater came forward with the "fragment hypothesis," which maintains that the book of Genesis is comprised of a multitude of disjointed fragments. To this theory De Wette lent the weight of his talents, and it was in its turn extensively adopted. It was attacked by Sack, violently shaken by Ewald, and has been abandoned by many of its former adherents.

The arguments brought forward to sustain these theories are evidently insufficient. In the first place the alleged repetitions may be explained as well, or better without the hypothesis. Some of them are merely the variations of phraseology which are found in all writers; some are a mere resumption of the narrative on again recurring to it after the thread has been broken by a more full dilata-tion of a particular matter; some are for the purpose of enforcement, according to an obvious usage among the Hebrews when there is a desire to give an intensive view of something important; and others for the sake of greater clearness and perspicuity, or to prepare the way for other topics about to be introduced.

Again, the recurrence of the title, "These are the generations of the heavens and the earth." *Sepher toledoth ha-Adham*, "The book of the generations of Adam." *Tholedhoth Beni Noah*, "The generations of the sons of Noah." *Tholedhoth Shem*, "The generations of Shem," &c. although regarded by many as the indubitable titles of the different documents compiled,* may be merely the titles of the several sections of the book, not set forth distinctly, as is the custom in modern writing and printing, from the body of the text. While, therefore, they may be the titles of different documents, it is quite as natural to suppose that they are intended either as the heads of sections, or premonitions, to attract the attention of the reader to the matter in hand.

But the chief argument for the different documents, and also for the fragment hypothesis, is the different names of

* So Vitringa.

God used in different parts. Thus they speak of the Elohim document, the Jehovah document, and the Jehovah-Elohim document, the Elohistie fragments, the Jehovistic, and the Jehovah-Elohistie. In Gen. i.—ii : 3. The name of God is Elohim in the Hebrew, for which our translators have given the usual name of Deity, viz. *God*. In Gen. ii. 4.—iii. 24, the name is Jehovah Elohim, for which we have in the English version *Lord God*, in this following the Vulgate and Septuagint. In iv. 1—26, the name is Jehovah, in our version *Lord*. The same change of the Divine names, the advocates of the document and fragment hypothesis have attempted to trace throughout the Pentateuch, and accordingly assign the several portions to several original documents from which they affirm them to have been compiled.

There has arisen, therefore, an enquiry among the advocates of the genuineness, as to the signification of these Divine names, and the reason of their use, that by this means these hypotheses may be tested. A very full examination of this subject may be found in the work of Hengstenberg, and a very comprehensive and judicious view of the argument also in the introduction to Turner on Genesis.

Hermogenes, Tertullian, and Augustine had perceived that there is a difference in these Divine names, and that *Dominus* marks a more special relation than *Deus* and *Chrysostom* acknowledged that there was a reason for the change of the Divine names, but the former of these striving to illustrate the difference from the Latin and Greek names of the version before them, failed to perceive their true meaning.

“ During the middle ages as might be expected, the investigation was carried no further by Christian scholars. An obstacle, indeed, lay in their way, which remained there for centuries. First of all, PETER LOMBARD (*Sentent. l. i., dist. 2*) asserted that the plural form of the name *Elohim* was to be explained by the plurality of persons in the Divine essence. This view, which was recommended by an appearance of credibility, soon obtained universal acceptance, which was only partially, and for a short time, interrupted by the opposition of such men as *Calvin*, *Mercer*, *Pareus*, *Drusius*, *Bellarmino* (compare the proof in Buxtorf, *de nomm. dei Hebraicis* in his *Dissertatt.*, p. 270). As long

as it lasted, nothing else could be done. By means of it, *Elohim* from being the most general indefinite appellation of the Deity, was changed into the most definite and special; from being the lowest name, it became the highest. Henceforth the relation between Jehovah and Elohim was distorted and inverted.

"But if we turn to the Jewish scholars of the middle ages, we find among them, in reference to the ground-work of the investigation,—the determination of the relation between Jehovah and Elohim,—some highly valuable remarks."—*Hengstenberg*, *l. pp.* 215, 216.

The Rabbi Judah Hallevi, (*the Levite*), the author of the book *Cosri*, in the 12th century, surprises us by the discriminating views he presents as to the true force of these divine names. The plural form *Elohim* he regards as being intended to oppose idolaters, who, personifying the powers of nature, call each by the name *Eloah*, and all together, *Elohim*, having no respect to that supreme power from whom all these powers proceed. In opposition to these, the name Elohim was given to the one true God. It is the most general name of Deity, distinguishing him only as to the fulness of his power, without reference to his moral qualities, to his personality, and the relation he sustains to men. "Where God has given witness of himself, and is truly known, another name is added to *Elohim*—the name *Jehovah*, peculiar to the people who received his revelation and his covenant. The name *Jehovah* is the *nomen proprium* of God, expressing the inmost nucleus of his essence, and is only intelligible where God has come forth out of himself, laid open the recesses of his heart, and has permitted his creatures to behold them, so that, instead of an obscure, undefined being, of whom thus much only is known and affirmed, that he is powerful, that he is immense; he here exhibits himself the most personal of all persons, the most characteristic of all characters. The sense of the name *Elohim* can be apprehended by reason, because the understanding teaches that the world has a governor and director. But what is understood by *Jehovah*, cannot be apprehended by ratiocination, but only by that prophetic vision by which man is, as it were, separated from his own species, and approximates to the species of angels, and another spirit enters into him." Maimonides also says: "all the names of God are derived from his works except

only *Jehovah*, which is the *nomen dei proprium*." Moreh Nebhochim, p. 106. Abarbanel also acknowledges this difference in the signification of these names of Deity.

It is now very plain, if these names of Deity are of different signification, that there may be reasons why one and the same writer should introduce them into his discourse, why when the more general is most suited either to the subject in hand, or to his own state of mind, he should use it, or when the particular is best suited to express his views, he should either introduce it by itself, or in connection with the more generic designation.

Astruc, however, proceeded on the hypothesis, that there was no internal difference in these names which could have induced one and the same writer to use them, and that the remarkable interchange of these names in different paragraphs or sections of these books, indicated different authors, extracts of whose writings were subsequently brought together by some unknown hand. And when this theory was set forth by the genius of Eichorn, it obtained a wide currency among the scholars of Germany, whence it has passed over to those of other countries.

This theory has been successively attacked by Sack, Ewald and Ranke, who have pointed out a difference in the divine names, as the reason of the variation in their use, and have likewise shown the essential unity of the five books of Moses. But no one has entered into the subject of this difference so thoroughly as Hengstenberg. He first takes up the origin of the name *Jehovah*. We cannot follow him in those investigations by which he has shown that it neither has an Egyptian nor a Phœnician origin, that no traces of the name are found in China, for which some have contended, and that there is no connection between the *Jovis* of the Latins and the *Jehovah* of the Hebrews; the original form of *Jovis* being *Diovis*, from *Zeus Διος*. Being of purely Hebrew derivation, it must be traced to the verb of existence *havah*, in the *kal* of which the proximate form is found. Its original pronunciation could not, therefore, have been *Jehovah*, but must have been *Jahaveh*, or *Jahveh*.^{*} And since the future is often used in the signification of the present

^{*} So also Havernick.

tense, *Jehovah*, *He who is to be*, (i. e. *forever*,) is equivalent to THE BEING, i. e. THE ABSOLUTE BEING. Immutability is therefore suggested by the name *Jehovah*. Mal. iii, 6. "I am *Jehovah*, I change not." Rev. i:4. "Which is, and which was, and which is to come;" Heb. xiii, 8. "The same yesterday, to-day, and forever," are paraphrases of this name.

As to the other name of God, *Elohim*, it is derived from a root *alah*, lost from the Hebrew, but preserved in the Arabic, which signifies *to adore* or *worship*. *Eloah*, therefore, signifies *the object of worship*, *venerandus*, *the Worshipful*. The great invisible who inspires with awe and dread. This is all which the name in itself expresses. And as to the reason of the plural form of the word: 1. The Rabbins have resolved it as a simple plural of majesty; 2. Peter Lombard and many who have followed him, have regarded it as involving the mystery of the Trinity; 3. Le Clerc, Herder, De Wette and Hartmann, have conjectured that it came from polytheism, from which they suppose the religion of the Jews originated, a theory which is contrary to all history: 4. that it comes from the idiom of the Hebrew, by which the plural is used in abstract nouns, to denote the quintessence of the separate individuals, or in individual nouns, to denote that the individual concentrates in himself the sum of all that quality or assemblage of qualities which the name suggests.

According to this last view, which is the true one, the use of the plural in *Elohim*, says Hengstenberg, "answers the same purpose which is elsewhere accomplished, by an accumulation of divine names, as in Joshua xxii. 22. "*Jehovah*, God of God, *Jehovah* God of Gods," the thrice holy, in Is. vi. 3, and the "God of Gods and Lord of Lords," Deut. x. 17. It calls the attention to the infinite riches, and the inexhaustible fulness contained in one Divine Being, so that though men may imagine innumerable Gods, and invest them with perfections, yet all these are contained in the one *Elohim*." "While the plural is in some respects more comprehensive than the singular *Eloah*, it is also lowering." "It could not, with propriety, be employed in a name of God, which, like

Jehovah, is intended to express the innermost being of God, the essence of his personality." *

That these names are significant, and used in accordance with their signification, the whole analogy in respect to names, establishes. Especially in the early Scriptures, they are significant, and seem to be given by some overruling influence from God. Eve, *the life-imparters*; Cain, *the acquisition*; Abel, *vanity*; Seth, *the appointed*; Noah, *the rest-giver*, are all instances in point. And it agrees, therefore, with the general analogy, that these names should be used in accordance with their signification.—When God, therefore, is spoken of in Genesis 1, as the great Creator, the name *Elohim*, implying his superiority over all creatures, is used. To those persons who never go beyond the creative act of God, to whom all his other acts are, as if they had never been, this name suffices. "To them God remains a distant God: they know only of the *Elohim*; this is shown by their partiality for the most vague designations of God—the *Deity*, *Heaven*, *Omnipotence*, *Providence*, &c.; and by their dread of all names which express God's personality, and indicate the absolute dependence of all existences upon him."

In the second section, chap. ii. 4—iii, instead of the ordinary name of God, *Jehovah-Elohim* is used, and *Elohim* is only retained where it is necessary.

"We here take the first step in the transition from ELOHIM to JEHOVAH. We are here met by the living, personal, self-revealing, holy God. He appears as the loving preserver of mankind, as the director of moral life, commanding and forbidding, as the author of punishment, as the opener of the prospect that reaches to the final consummation. Had the author merely had in view those who had attained to a firm and clear knowledge of the relation of ELOHIM to JEHOVAH, he would have been satisfied with using the name JEHOVAH alone. But since it was rather his design to lead into the depths of the relation

* "The idea of Elohim sinks to the lowest point in 1 Sam. xxvii. 13, where the witch of Endor says to Samuel: "I see Elohim ascending out of the earth." Here nothing remains but the vague notion of an unearthly, superhuman power, which the woman beheld entering into the sensible world in one appearance. How much those who have not correctly understood the fundamental nature of Elohim, are at a loss on this passage, may be seen in the remarks upon it by Kimchi, Grotius and Seb. Schmid."—Hengstenberg, I. p. 273.

of JEHOVAH and ELOHIM, the transition from ELOHIM to JEHOVAH simply, appeared to him as too precipitate. He feared a misunderstanding—feared that man might regard that God who held converse so humanly with man, as personally different from the Creator of heaven and earth, as a mere subordinate God and Mediator. In this section, therefore, he uses JEHOVAH ELOHIM in combination, in order that in the sequel where JEHOVAH occurs, the ELOHIM manifested in him may be acknowledged, and where ELOHIM occurs, that the JEHOVAH concealed in him might also be acknowledged.”—Heng. I. p. 315.

“The master-stroke of the Tempter’s policy was then, and is still now, to change JEHOVAH into ELOHIM—the living, holy God, into a *nescio quod numen*: (with what vagueness the term ELOHIM is used by the serpent, is shown by the expression, “Ye shall be as ELOHIM;” ye shall be raised to an unearthly nature and dignity.) Having done this, and not before, he could venture upon deluding them with a downright falsehood. JEHOVAH is not a man that he should lie. The woman should have employed the name JEHOVAH as an impenetrable shield, to repel the fiery darts of the Wicked One. The use of the name ELOHIM (that this is not to be accounted for from ignorance of the name JEHOVAH is proved by ch. iv. 1) was the beginning of her fall. First, there was a depression and obscuration of the religious sentiment; then the tree appeared good to eat, and pleasant to the eye—God died in the soul, and sin became alive.” p. 317.

In the section beginning with chapter iv., the name Jehovah is prominent. The presentation of the offerings and all religious services, depend on the recognition of a God revealed as a rewarder and finisher. “Cain went out from the presence of *Jehovah*.” ‘Jehovah’s presence, the revelation of the living and personal God, was confined to the Church. Out of Eden there was only *Elohim*.’ It were as unsuitable to represent him as going from the presence of *Elohim*, as it would have been for Jacob to say, ‘truly *Elohim* is in this place;’ or, for it to be said of Jonah: ‘Jonah rose up to flee unto Tarshish, from the presence of *Elohim*. And in verse 26: “Then began men to call upon the name of *Jehovah*.” The phrase does not denote every kind of calling upon God, but the solemn calling on God in a consecrated place, in church fellowship. In Psalm xix. we see the same usage, verse 2, “The Heavens declare the glory of *El*.” But in

verse 8. "The law of *Jehovah* is perfect; converting the soul; the testimony of *Jehovah* is sure making wise the simple." First, the glories of the God of nature are described, then the grace and mercy of the God of revelation.

This contrast between the names of God, Hengstenberg endeavors to illustrate throughout the Pentateuch, whenever they occur, and maintains that the peculiar meaning of the names, is the reason in each instance of their use. But, as we should naturally expect, he fails to make these reasons appear in a multitude of instances. The interchange of these names is very frequent in some portions of these books, and the reason of their interchange oftentimes not apparent. And although the theory is undoubtedly true, that these names do differ in meaning, and that the difference in their meaning is the true ground in a multitude of instances, why one was used rather than the other, yet in many other instances the reason appears to have been, the avoidance of monotony and sameness, and in many other cases, some association in the mind now undiscoverable by us. As the names of Christ, *Son of God*, and *Son of Man*, were given, the one because of his connection with God, the Father, and the other, because of his connection with man, the creature; or as the name *Jesus* denotes *Jehovah* the Saviour, and *Christ*, the anointed king; and yet we cannot tell in each particular instance, why one name rather than the other is used, so is it here. And yet so much as this is apparent, that from the variation in the names of God in Genesis, and the subsequent books of the Pentateuch, a difference of authorship can by no means be established. And this famous argument thus falls to the ground.

As to the charge of a want of unity: In the first place, there is all the unity in these books we could expect.—The great length to which this topic has already extended itself, prevents our drawing out the plan of the writer of the Pentateuch in detail. Whoever will devote his attention to it, will perceive this plan, and the interdependence of one part of these books upon the others. The wonderful connection, and perfect unity of principle and design pervading the books, will be most convincing. And yet while this unity of general design is sufficient—

ly apparent, we perceive that the book still has, if we may so speak, a fragmentary structure. It consists of a great number of historical narratives, each often having its own distinct conclusion or preceded by its own peculiar title. The order of the narrative is often interrupted and the style unequal. The introductory portion gives those events of the most ancient history which tend to prepare the way for the subsequent legislation, as the worship of one God, the sacrifices of the Patriarchs, the delivery from Egypt. Those incidents are related which give rise to the laws. The laws are recorded in the order of their promulgation, and repeated or explained when in the lapse of time they were forgotten or perverted. And in Deuteronomy the writer is evidently an aged man, who was alive to the faults of the people who had grown up beneath his eye. He addresses them as one would who had been accustomed to command, as one who had led them up out of Egypt and established their peculiar form of government. He addresses himself to a people who had seen and experienced what he related, and speaks with the freedom, boldness and affection of one who had lived long on terms of intimacy with them. In the midst of this people he stands warning and exhorting them, recalling to their memory the past, republishing the laws which he had before communicated, and anticipating, with prophetic spirit, their future destiny.

All this coincides entirely with the situation and character of Moses. He was a man oppressed with weighty cares and engagements. He was overwhelmed with the charge of a nation breaking away from oppressive bondage, headstrong, difficult to please; such a nation he was leading out of the land of their task-masters, through the deserts of Arabia, to the land of their forefathers. The writings of such a man would be fragmentary, though not in the sense which the advocates of "the fragment hypothesis" intend, and perhaps the pens of the scribes would sometimes aid him, in preparing copies of public documents, and of genealogical tablets, to be inserted in his history. It would be just what we would expect, if the train of the narrative were sometimes interrupted, if historical statements should, if we may so speak, *overlap* one another, and if formal conclusions and new commence-

ments and titles should often appear. Moses was a legislator recording, as it occurred, his own inspired legislation. *Such was the author of this book.* A compiler of the Mosaic laws would have *codified* them and digested them under different heads. He would not have repeated, he would not have changed them. He would not have related them in connection with the events which were the occasions of their enactment. It is Moses, the busy leader of the Jewish nation, whom we hear speaking in the earlier books; and in the last, it is this same Moses worn out with toil, whom we hear repeating the same laws, and inveighing with severity against their infraction. Whatever, therefore, there is in these books of inequality of style, whatever of repetition, and whatever of fragmentary structure, is wholly consistent with the Mosaic authorship, and an argument for it and not against it.

5. A fifth objection to the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch springs from the alleged indications that the author intended to make himself known as a different individual from Moses. It is said that the writer speaks of Moses as a third person, and uses of him language of praise and approbation such as no writer would use of himself.

The mere use of the third person cannot be seriously alleged against Moses as the writer, by any one who considers how frequently this method is resorted to by men who give an account of things in which they themselves bore a conspicuous part. How often has it been adopted by military writers, giving the history of their own campaigns. And in ancient times the examples of the same method are patent to all. Cæsar's commentaries on the Gallic war, Xenophon's *Anabasis* and *Memorabilia* of Socrates are cases in point, from classic literature, and the gospels of Matthew and John in the New Testament scriptures and the books of Ezra, Nehemiah and Daniel in the Old. And when a historian attempts a history of his own times, if he has taken a prominent part in public affairs, he becomes a historic personage himself, and faithfulness would seem to suggest that he should be spoken of even by his own pen as others are spoken of. Moses, moreover, wrote under divine inspiration. It was important to the world, and it was the will of the Holy Spirit, that he should be described even by his own pen as the other patriarchs were described.

The passage Num. xii. 8. "Now the man Moses was very meek, above all the men that were upon the face of the earth," and that in Exod. vi. 26, 27. "These are that Aaron and Moses, to whom the Lord said, bring the children of Israel from the land of Egypt according to their armies. These are they which spake to Pharaoh, king of Egypt, to bring out the children of Israel; these are that Moses and Aaron;"—these passages are confidently brought forth to prove that the writer of these books was some one other than Moses.

In relation to the first of these passages, some defenders of the genuineness have allowed that it was inserted in the book of Numbers by a later hand, and this probably by some inspired man, as Joshua or Ezra. Others have insisted on the meaning *harrassed* instead of *meek*, as being equally true to the original and more accordant with the context. And others still, admitting the ordinary translation as most probable, have seen in it nothing at war with the supposition that Moses is the writer. He had been deeply wounded, grieved, and insulted by Miriam and Aaron, not only as to his public character, but in a private way well suited to disturb his domestic peace. Any other person would have been filled with resentment and have stood aloof even from his own flesh. But he, Moses, was very meek and free from resentment. The Holy Spirit who inspired him to record his own delinquencies and shame, inspired him also to speak of this the cause of his patience under so great an injury. He was accused of arrogance and usurpation, but he was far from it, the pattern of meekness. In like manner He who spoke as never man spake, says, "learn of me for I am meek and lowly of heart." And either of these solutions disposes of the difficulty which the words occasion.

The other passage, "These are that Aaron and Moses," cannot have been inserted to show who were the persons by whom the deliverance from Egypt was effected. This was known to all, small and great, and could not be forgotten. It was rather designed to shew the importance of the genealogy there inserted, and to show too why this genealogy was inserted at all and in that place.

6. And finally, it is alleged that in the Pentateuch are found traces of a later age than that of Moses.

It is impossible for us now to consider all these. The more important must serve as an example of the rest.

In Gen. xii. 6, it is said, "The Canaanite was then in the land" and in xiii. 7. "And the Canaanite and Perizzite dwelled then in the land." These passages, it is maintained, could only be written after the expulsion of these tribes by Joshua, and therefore were not written by Moses. Some have met the difficulty by supposing that the original dwelling of these tribes was on the Red Sea, and that the writer affirms that they had already migrated to the region where Abraham was. Others, as Hengstenberg, that the first mention of these tribes is to show how destitute and forlorn Abraham, the possessor of the promise, was, that he owned not a foot of land, and that the better portions were already occupied by the Canaanites. And, in the last instance, the presence of the Canaanite and Perizzite showed more strongly how Abraham and Lot were hemmed in, and how unfortunate the dissensions between them were, in the presence of numerous and hostile tribes. Again, it is alleged that the city of Hebron, Gen. xiii. 18, xxxiii. 2; Num. xiii. 2, 3, did not receive this name till after the death of Moses. See Josh. xiv. 15, xv. 13. But it is plain that Hebron was the original name, that the city was afterwards called after Arba, a noted man among the Anakim, and the name Hebron was subsequently restored by the Israelites. The writer of the book of Joshua affirms that the place which had been called Kirjath Arba, was now called Hebron, but does not affirm that Hebron was not its original name. It is plain from Gen. xxxv. 27, that it bore also the name of Mamre, in the days of Abraham, but neither of these temporary names permanently displaced the original.

It is affirmed that the name Dan, Gen. xiv. 14, is post-Mosaic. Its early name, Josh. xix. 47, Judges xviii. 29, was Laish or Leshem, and it is also alleged that it was not called Dan till it was captured by the Danites in the days of Joshua. Some of the advocates of the genuineness have resorted to "the spirit of prophecy," which is supposed to have enabled Moses to anticipate the name, others have conjectured that the hand of a later prophet who substituted the more modern for the more ancient name in the writings of Moses here appears. Others contend,

with more probability, that there were two towns of the same name, one Dan-Jaan, 2 Sam. xxiv. 6, the other Dan-Laish, and that it is the first which is spoken of in the books of Moses, and which was, at that time, called Dan; and the last, which had conferred upon it this name after the conquest, which is spoken of in Joshua and Judges

Another of these difficulties is presented in the following quotation from Dr. Nott, quoted by him, from Munk.

"In chapter xxxii. of Numbers, verses 34—38. mention is made of a number of towns built by the tribes of Gad and Reuben. Moses being dead a short time after the conquest of the country which he gave to these two tribes, could not have witnessed the construction of these towns. In the same chapter, verse 41, the *villages of Jair* are mentioned, thus called after Jair, a descendant of Manasseh. Deuteronomy, chap iii verse 14, says that they are so called *to this day*, which leaves the inference that the author was not a cotemporary of the building of the villages; but what augments the difficulty is, that according to Judges (chap. x. verse 4) the name *villages of Jair* is derived from the *Judge Jair* who inhabited the country of Gilead. How could the author of the book of Judges be ignorant of what the books of Moses say of the origin of this name? Thus the existence of the villages of Jair, in the time of Moses, becomes very problematical, and Moses could not have written the two passages of Numbers and Deuteronomy."

In reference to this we remark, in the first place, that there is nothing said of the building of "the villages of Jair," but only of their conquest; in the second place that the conquest and settlement of the trans-Jordanic country was made in the life time of Moses; that the conquest was in the first incursion of the Israelites into the territory of Bashan; that the temporary settlement of their families would occupy no very long time; that the phrase "unto this day" while it refers to past time and may refer to the *distant* past, does also not unfrequently refer to a *nearer* past,* Comp. Josh. xxii. 3 xxiii. 9 That names given to places do not always hold. It was proper to remark that the name Havoith-Jair given to the towns assigned to Jair, now after some months was still retained,

* So the Latin *Usque hodie*. A phrase of this kind becomes stereotyped and hackneyed, and loses a part of the force it originally had.

that Jair still held possession of them, and that they had not been wrested from his hands. And what is more natural than the supposition that the Jair in the days of Moses may have transmitted his honorable name (*the illustrious*,) to his descendant. It was common with the Hebrews, as it is with the moderns, to name children, even for generations, after a parent or illustrious ancestor. With the new fortunes and honours of the family in the person of Jair the eighth judge of Israel, the ancient name Havoth Jair, towns of Jair, which still belonged to this family, as their domain, acquired a new currency.

The author speaks of "the other side Jordan."—"These be the words which Moses spake unto all Israel on the other side Jordan."—Deut. i. 1 ; iii. 8. These indicate, it is said, a writer different from Moses who lived in Palestine after the conquest. The difficulty was noted by Aben-Ezra, is urged by Spinoza, Hartmann, Dr. Cooper and all the opponents of the Mosaic origin. But it is evident that the Hebrew term *be'eber* sometime means, by usage, *on this side*, and sometimes *on the other side* of the Jordan, or rather it *refers* now to countries on the one side, and now to countries on the other side. But in how many instances have the terms *on this side* and *on the other side*, in different languages, come to have a standing geographical signification. Transalpine and Cisalpine Gaul, the Trans-Danubian and Cis-Danubian provinces, Hither and Further India, are familiar examples. So in the Scriptures, both Hebrew and Greek, the Trans-Jordanic and Cis-Jordanic country are spoken of in a similar way, and have been from the earliest times. The name *Peraea* for the land beyond the Jordan, is a more modern designation signifying the same thing. An English or an American Missionary might write us from the Burman Empire, and refer familiarly to it as *India beyond the Ganges*. Again, forgetting this ancient geographical designation and referring only to his own local position, he might speak of the same country as the region *this side* the Ganges. Precisely the same usage exists in scripture, and the phrase, therefore, is no proof that the writer using it was on the west side of the Jordan.

The iron bedstead of Og, king of Bashan, Deut. iii. 11, has furnished material for another of these objections.

His iron bed-stead would not have been described, and it would not have been circumstantially mentioned as being in Rabbath of the children of Ammon by Moses. The facts would all be known to the men of that day. There was no necessity of referring to such a voucher of Og's extraordinary size. But it must be remembered that Moses wrote for posterity, and not for his contemporaries alone; that his object was to show the greatness of the conquered enemy, and to magnify that divine intervention which secured the victory. And as to the dimensions stated, men of gigantic proportions have existed in modern times, bedsteads are always longer and broader than the men who sleep upon them, and something, we may well suppose, was added by the gigantic king from motives of ostentation.

We pass by all other alleged anachronisms in the Pentateuch to notice Gen. xxxvi. 31. "And these are the kings that reigned in the land of Edom, before there reigned any king over the children of Israel."

There are those who from this passage and Deut. xvii. insist that the Pentateuch could not have been written till after the times of David, when kings were actually reigning "over the children of Israel." But the establishment of a kingly government was not an accident, which was unforeseen and unprovided for. In the promise to Jacob, Gen. xxxv. 11, it said, "a nation and a company of nations shall be of thee; and *kings* shall come out of thy loins." So also Gen. xvii. 6, 16. The erection of a kingdom was a necessary step in the developement of the divine plan respecting the people. The kings were to be the precursors and types of the Messiah, on his mediatorial throne, as the priesthood were to be his types in the sacerdotal office. The words "before there reigned," &c. may be a gloss inserted by a later hand. If so, as perhaps most of the defenders of the Pentateuch regard it, it can furnish no objection against the genuineness of the book at large. Yet it will always be evident that to a prophet like Moses, under the illumination of the spirit, future things may be referred to with the same certainty as the past, and the fulfilment of the prophecy be as much regarded by the mind, as the prophecy itself.

But we are compelled to bring this article abruptly to a

close. The Pentateuch has in all ages, except by those few men who have of late opposed it, been acknowledged to be the writing of Moses. Unmistakeable traces of it may be found in the books of Joshua, Judges, and Kings, in the prophecies of Hosea and Amos, and in other parts of the Old Testament, plainly showing that the existence of that book preceded the composition of these. No period can be fixed upon for writing of the Pentateuch if it is assumed to be a forgery. Nor can we reconcile such a supposition with the inspiration of Christ and the Apostles, who continually quote the Pentateuch as "the words," "the writing," "the law of Moses." These are points which we would be glad to expand and establish. There are others, also, belonging to the subject, of equal importance, which we must at present omit to notice. We are fully conscious that those even which we have touched upon, might have been treated with greater completeness and fulness, and if opportunity shall serve, the subject may be resumed hereafter.

NOTE TO PAGE 259.

The controversy respecting the composition of the Pentateuch, is by no means of recent origin. The early Gnostics, Manichæans and Nazarenes are said to have doubted its Mosaic origin. But Prof. Palfrey has shown that these were dogmatical difficulties arising out of their peculiar notions, rather than objections to its Mosaic origin. *Lect. vol. i. p. 78, et seq.* Isaac Ben Jasos, in the beginning of the eleventh century, put forth some obscure objections to its genuineness. But it was not until the 12th century that the voice of doubt, respecting its authorship, was fully heard. Aben-Ezra, who wrote in this century, pointed out a number of passages as written by a later hand than that of Moses, but without intending to impugn the authority of the Pentateuch as a genuine production of the Jewish lawgiver, nor indeed any portion of it as an inspired writing.

*Andrew Masius** also, in the latter part of the 16th century,

*In his Commentary on Joshua xix. 47.

suggested that the particular portions of the five books of Moses were brought together by Ezra or some other inspired man, who lived long subsequent to Moses.

Thomas Hobbes, the celebrated English Deist, in his *Leviathan*, published in London in 1651, advances the opinion that the Pentateuch takes its name from Moses, because he was the principal actor in the events recorded in these writings, and not because he wrote them. He believed, however, that those portions of which it is expressly asserted in the book itself that Moses wrote them, and the law as contained in Deut. from the xith to xxviith chaps. are the composition of the Jewish lawgiver.

Isaac Peyrere, in 1655, author of the theory of the *Praeadamites*, believed that the Pentateuch was compiled from journals left by Moses, and from documents which existed before him, from which Moses made out a chronicle of events reaching down to his own times. The first compilation was "the Book of the Wars of the Lord," and this was the foundation of the book of Numbers. Deuteronomy he supposed was not composed until after the times of David.

Benedict Spinoza, a learned but skeptical Jew, and author of the modern Pantheistic System, in his *Tractat. Theol. Polem.* Hamburg, 1670, was the first who entirely denied to the Pentateuch a Mosaic origin. He maintained that Deuteronomy was the earliest of the historical books of the O. T. and maintains that this and all the other historical books were written by Ezra. The same opinion was expressed by *Anthony Van Dale* in his dissertation *De Origine et Progressu Idololatriæ*, published at Amsterdam in 1796.

Richard Simon,* a learned writer of the Roman Church in 1678, conjectured that the *substance* of the Pentateuch was derived from Moses, *i. e.* that Moses wrote the Laws, that public Scribes appointed by him kept a daily record of public transactions, that from these a compilation was made by some Scribe or Prophet, at a later day, in that form in which the Pentateuch now appears.

Le Clerc,† a Dutch Divine in 1685, conjectured that the Pentateuch was the work of the Priest sent by the King of Babylon to Samaria, to instruct the colonists who had been settled there, in the Mosaic form of religion.‡ *Le Clerc* lived to retract this opinion.

One hundred years after *Le Clerc*, *J. G. Hasse*, a German,

* *Histoire Critique du Vieux Testament*. Rotterdam, 1685; Dupin on the Canon, vol. i. page 61, 62. † *Le Clerc*, *Sentimens de quelques Theologiens de Hollande*, &c. Amsterd. 1681. ‡ See 2 Kings, xvii. 27 seq.

conjectured that the Pentateuch was composed in the Babylonish captivity. But he, like his predecessor Le Clerc, retracted his opinion. Fulda maintained that some parts were derived from Moses, but that the whole was first reduced to order in the times of David. Nachtigal, that the five books were compiled from many old collections during the exile, perhaps by Jeremiah.* Staudlin,† that much of the Pentateuch is later than the days of the Jewish Legislator; that the book has either been composed at a later period, or has been greatly interpolated by a later hand. Bauer, that the Pentateuch cannot be older than David.‡ Vater, that Deuteronomy is later than David, and that the whole was not brought into its present form until the time of Ezra || De Wette is of the opinion that the five books of Moses were composed, substantially, some time between the reign of David and the Babylonish captivity; but received their present form after the exile.¶ Augusti agrees substantially with De Wette.¶ Berthold supposes that the Pentateuch was brought into the form in which we have it by Samuel and that the copy written by him was the copy found by Hilkiah, the Priest in the days of Joshua. Hartmann supposes that all excepting the registers of names, and of the encampments of the Israelites, and the ten commandments, were composed between the reign of David and the Exile.* Herbst of Tübingen, believes the materials genuine, but supposes them to have been first brought together by Ezra and the one hundred and twenty elders who composed the Great Synagogue.† Gesenius, that Genesis, Exodus, and Numbers, contain many portions which belong in the days of the Prophets. but that Deuteronomy was composed after the captivity, at which time the whole Pentateuch first received its present form ‡ Schumann makes Ezra the author. Ammon supposes the Pentateuch was planned by Moses, continued down to Solomon, forgotten in the season of idolatry, rediscovered under Josiah; retouched and edited under the name of Moses. Pustkuchen,|| Hoffman of Jena,§ Ilgen, Gramberg. Staehelin, Von Bohlen, Vatke, and Tuch, follow on the same side.

* Neue Versuch, &c. Helmstadt, 1796. † Geschichte der christliche Sittenlehre, Göttingen, 1799. ‡ Entwurf einer hist. kritisch. Einleit. in die Schrift. d. Alt. Test. Nürnberg, 1806. || Abhandlung ueber Mose und die Verfasser d. Pent. Halle, 1805 § Beitragen zur Einleit. in das Alt. Test. Halle, 1806, 1807. ¶ Grundriss einer hist. krit. Einleit. in's alt. Test. Leipzig, 1806.

* Linguist. Einleit. u. s. w. Bremen, 1818, and Hist. krit. Forschungen ueber d. fünf Bücher Mose's, Rostock, 1831. † Observat. quaedam de Pent. quatuor libr. poster. auctore et editore in the Commentationes Theologicæ, Lips. 1825. ‡ Geschichte der Heb. Sprache und Schrift, Leipz, 1817, also Commentatio de Pent. Samar. Halae, 1815. || Urgeschichte der Menschheit, Lemgo, 1821. § In a periodical at Leipzig, 1822.

On the other, and in favor of the genuineness of the Pentateuch as a writing of Moses, are found Mansveldt,* Kuper,† Daniel Hu-
et,‡ Le Clerc in his later and maturer writings,|| Du Pin, Bol-
ville,§ Heidegger, Carpzov, Herman Witsius¶ in his *Miscellanea Sacra*, John Dav. Michaelis in his *Einleit. in Schrift. des A. Bundes*,* Jerusalem in his *Letters on the Mosaic Writings*,† the celebrated Eichorn,‡ Eckermann,|| Jahn § Kelle,¶ Kritzsch,* Kanne,† Griesinger,‡ Scheibel of Breslau,|| E. F. C. Ro-
emueler,§ De Luc,¶ Krummacher,* Hagel,† Pfister,‡ Ranke, Hengstenberg, Drechsler, Havernick, Bleek, Koenig, and Sack; Pástoret|| and Salvador,§ in France; and Graves,¶ Horne,* and Marsh,† in England; and Schacht,‡ Woerman,|| Pareau,§ and Muntinghe,¶ in Holland; and Mr. Means, Prof. Stowe, and Prof. B. B. Edwards, in America.

In addition to these, the great body of theologians of all countries, have been convinced that the Pentateuch is none other than the genuine production of the Jewish Legislator; and that the fact is as clearly proved by tradition, as we have any right to expect in relation to a book of such high antiquity.

Those who have impugned the genuineness of the Pentateuch, have been men whose theories have predisposed them to overlook the evidence in its favor. A large portion of these have

* Regneri a Mansvelt. *adv. Theologo-Politicum*, Amstel. 1674. † *Ar-
cana Atheismi*, Rotterdam, 1676. ‡ *Demonstratio Evangelica*, Lips. 1703.
|| *Dissertat. III. de Scriptore Pentateuchi Mose*, prefixed to his *Comm. Am-
stelod.* 1696. § *Reponse au Livre intit. Sentimens, &c.* Rotterdam, 1686.—
¶ *Miscellanea Sacra*, Lugdun, Batav. 1736.

* Hamburg, 1787. † Braunschweig, 1783. ‡ *Versuch einer Beleuchtung
d. Geschichte des jud. und Christ. Bibelkanon's*, Halle, 1792. || *Theol.
Beiträgen Altona*, 1796. § *Jahn's Einleitung*. Vienna, 1803. Translated
by Prof. Turner of New York. ¶ In a work published at Freyburg, 1811,
1812

* *Prüfung der Gründe mit welchen die Ächtheit der Bücher Mose's be-
stritten worden ist*, Leipz. 1814. † *Biblische Untersuchungen*, Erlangen,
1819. ‡ *Ueber den Pentateuch*. Stuttgart, 1806. || *Untersuchungen ueber
Bibel*, Breslau, 1816. § In the third edition of his *Commentaries*, Leipzig,
1821. ¶ *Grundsätze der Theologiæ, Theodiceæ, und Moral.*

* *Paragraphen zu der heiligen Geschichte*, Berlin, 1818. † *Apologie des
Moses*, Sulzbach, 1828. ‡ *Gedanken und Betrachtungen ueber die fünf Bu-
cher Mosis*, 1826. || *Aistoire de la Legislation*, Paris, 1822. § *Loi de Moise*,
Paris, 1822. ¶ *Lectures on the Pentateuch*, London, 1808.

* *Introduction, &c.* † *Authenticity of the five books of Moses vindicated.*
‡ *Animadversiones ad Antiq. Heb. Traj. ad Rhen.* 1810. || *Commentatio
de libr. Vet. Foed. præstantia Traj. ad Rhen.* 1821. § *Commentatio de im-
mortalitatis, ac vitæ futuræ notitiis*, Daventriæ, 1807. Also *Instit. Interp.*
Traj. ad Rhen. 1822. ¶ *Brevis expositio critices Vet. Fœderis*, Gronin-
gæ, 1827.

been infidels, as Spinoza, Volney,* Voltaire, Hobbes, the author of the Wolfenbuttel Fragments, and others. The rest have mostly been men who, with Gesenius, Berthold, and De Wette, have no belief in the Scriptures as a book penned by Inspiration.

ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *A Sermon on Election, by FRANCIS BOWMAN, Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Greensborough, Ga.*
2. *The Doctrine of Election, stated, defended and applied, in three discourses, by Rev. E. P. ROGERS, Pastor of First Presbyterian Church, Augusta, Ga., with an Introductory Essay by Rev. THOMAS SMYTH, D. D., Charleston, S. C., 12 mo. pp. 104.*

We are presented here with a series of discourses on an important and often assailed doctrine of the Scriptures; which, though drawn from the same text, is viewed in different aspects by their respective authors.

The sermon of Mr. Bowman, which comes in the modest dress of a pamphlet, aims not so much to vindicate the doctrine, as to show its accordance with the Scriptures, and with the general experience of all true Christians. He says: "My design is not so much to prove the truth of this glorious doctrine, as it is to illustrate the meaning of it, and to show that there is a substantial agreement respecting it, among all truly evangelical Christians." This agreement he affirms in the following language: "True believers in Christ, however, have, in every age, held it with unyield-

* Volney supposes that the Pentateuch contains some things written by Moses, but that the compilation is the joint labour of Hilkiyah the Priest, Jeremiah the Prophet, Shaphan the Scribe and Achbor, King Josiah superintending and giving his aid. That the book was compiled to afford encouragement to the Jews in their conflicts with the nations around them.

ing firmness. It is *now* held in spirit and substance, if not in word and form, by every truly Evangelical Church in the world." This broad proposition he does not establish by a careful comparison of the confessions of all branches of the Christian Church; but taking the Presbyterian and Methodist as standing furthest apart in relation to this topic, he shows that even the articles of the latter embody doctrines from which this of Election must be deduced by logical consequence. The stress of the argument is laid, however, upon the substantial, if not formal, recognition of this truth in the prayers and recorded experience of all sincere Christians. It is refreshing, amidst the din of theological strife in the world, to believe that all regenerate persons must and do agree, upon the great Scripture facts which underlie all genuine religious experience, however they may draw apart in the scientific explanation of them; and that amidst great diversities of sentiment, there is communion of heart among the people of God; which, however, would be far stronger and more exhilarating, could they be brought to see eye to eye.

The discourses of Mr. Rogers, which compose a small duodecimo volume, take a wider range; not confined, like the preceding, to one aspect of the subject, they aim to cover the entire ground. The arrangement of topics is natural and easy. The first sermon gives the statement and proofs of the doctrine, in copious citations from Scripture: The second is devoted to the removal of objections, which charge this doctrine with being derogatory to God, in regard to His justice, His goodness and His truth; and with being discouraging to man—in that it extinguishes the sense of responsibility, discourages effort, and impinges upon man's freedom as a moral agent. The third discourse considers the practical uses and glorious character of the doctrine impugned.

The author does not aim, in these discourses, to enter profoundly into the philosophy of his subject. Being prepared for the pulpit, they are evidently designed for the popular ear; as shown in the studious avoidance of metaphysical speculations, and the free use of simple and obvious illustrations. The prominent characteristics of a popular sermon are found in them; a clear and simple

style, which only occasionally becomes ornate, and a copious reference to Scriptural proofs. Like the discourses of Dr. Boardman, recently issued in a small volume, by the Board of Publication, and which these in their plan closely resemble, this book is well adapted for general circulation; and while it adds nothing to the stock of knowledge upon the subject discussed, may be largely useful in diffusing, through common minds, what is already known.

3. *God sovereign and Man free: or the Doctrine of Divine Foreordination and Man's Free Agency, stated, illustrated and proved, from the Scriptures.* By N. L. RICE, D. D., *Pastor of Central Presbyterian Church, Cincinnati*, 12 mo. pp. 225.

From the eclat which Dr. Rice has gained as a controversialist, we took up this little book, with the expectation of going to the very heart of a thorny subject. It is, however, rather popular than profound; designed, we judge, to carry the mass to a few safe conclusions, rather than to put a close student in possession of the subject as a whole. The discussion, however, if it lacks power and piquancy, has one admirable feature, that of being conducted in a most kind and conciliatory spirit. Selecting as his opponents Arminians of the most liberal and evangelical views, of whom Mr. Watson may be taken as the type, Dr. Rice simply attempts to show, that all the difficulties which they urge against Foreordination, lie equally against other doctrines which they strenuously assert. The work is divided into two parts: the first being devoted to the general subject of Predestination, showing that this does not interfere with the spontaneity of human actions; and the second, to the special consideration of the doctrine of Election, in which it is vindicated from the usual charges.

That Foreordination does not "destroy the free agency of man," nor "strike at the foundations of morality," the author shows by a practical argument, the lives of those who in all ages have held it. Those who most strenuously resisted the corruption of the

Church in the 4th century, those who were witnesses for truth and godliness during the world's dark ages, and those who were instrumental in the great Reformation, were all Calvinistic. Moreover, these doctrines have never been associated with fundamental error, but, on the contrary, those who have apostatized from the fundamental doctrines of Christianity, usually make the denial of these their point of departure. He further proves, that Arminians usually admit the doctrine of a special Providence, and goes on to show, that God, in His Providence, is simply fulfilling His purposes; and that those purposes must be eternal. He proves that the freedom of human actions is not cancelled, by numerous illustrations taken from Scripture; as in the case of Cyrus and the crucifixion of the Lord. A very good idea may be obtained of the nature of the argument pursued in the first division of this book, by the following extracts:

"I insist, and am prepared to prove that the difficulty lies, not against the points on which Arminians differ from us, but against those in reference to which they agree with us. That a mere purpose existing in the Divine Mind, not yet revealed or acted out, cannot interfere with the free agency of any one, is self-evident; for it brings no force of any kind to bear upon the mind. It is equally clear, that the mere certainty of a future event does not impair the freedom of those by whose agency it will be brought to pass. * * * On this point, as we have seen. Rev. Richard Watson precisely agrees with us. If, then, the free agency of men is destroyed, this is done not by the Divine purposes abstractly considered, nor by the certainty of the events decreed, *but by the influences by which those purposes are fulfilled.* But all the purposes of God concerning men, are fulfilled either by His particular providence or by the renewing and sanctifying influence of the Holy Spirit. The question, therefore, concerning the consistency of Divine Decrees and Free Agency, as already remarked, resolves itself into the two following questions, viz: 1. Can God exercise over men a particular providence without interfering with their freedom? 2. Can he renew and sanctify the hearts of men without impairing their liberty? The first of these questions Rev. John Wesley, the father of Methodism, answers in the affirmative, as we have already shown, strongly insisting upon the doctrine of a providence over all men and things. And Rev. Richard Watson contends for the renewing influence of the Holy Spirit. Precisely at this point the difficulty occurs. Let any

one explain to me, how a particular providence and a divine influence on the hearts of men are consistent with free agency, and I pledge myself to explain how the doctrine of divine purposes is consistent with free agency. * * * The difficulty is not concerning *the divine purposes*, but concerning a *particular providence and divine influence* on the hearts of men. But Arminians, at least many of them, hold both these doctrines. The difficulty, therefore, arises not about points on which they differ from us, but concerning Divine providence and Divine influence, in reference to the existence of which they agree with us."

In the second division, which is devoted to a discussion of the doctrine of Election, the same mode of argument is pursued: that of pushing the impugnors of this doctrine who yet admit the total depravity of men, the necessity of regeneration by the Holy Spirit, and a particular Providence, to very uncomfortable conclusions—conclusions from which they would recoil with as much horror as any genuine Calvinist; though it be at the expense of much logical consistency.

This book of Dr. Rice's, though it lacks the spice and point of Annan's *Difficulties of Methodism*, deserves with that a very free circulation. This argument in both is very much the same, and is well adapted to edify believers, and to convince gainsayers.

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4. *Letters of the Rev. SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, Professor of Divinity at St. Andrews, with a sketch of his life.* By Rev. A. A. BONAR, author of the *Memoir of Robert Murray McCheyne*. Robert Carter & Brothers, New York, 1850, 8vo. pp. 554.

No publishing house in this country, excluding of course all reference to Denominational Boards of Publication, deserves more the thanks of the religious world, than the Carters. The books issuing from their press, show that they aim to publish books not merely that will sell, but such as will be useful. If they hold fast to this principle, they will accomplish vast good, and will receive the benedictions of many whose souls, instrumentally, they have

feasted. We bid them God-speed, especially in their labors to reproduce the standard theology and religious literature of past generations; of which they have given another specimen in the volume placed at the head of this notice.

It is unnecessary to eulogize the writings of a man who to this day, in Scotland and elsewhere, is known as "the holy Rutherford;" a man whose very dreams were of Christ, and the compend of whom life is thus given: "He is *always* praying, *always* preaching, *always* visiting the sick, *always* catechizing, *always* writing and studying." The familiar letters of such a man will have an unction in them, more than compensating to the pious reader for any occasional offence against good taste, in pushing delicate allusions and metaphors to an extreme, and in the profuse application of endearing epithets to the Divine Redeemer. In connexion with this criticism, which we have ventured to suggest, it is pleasant to notice that the fault springs from what is unquestionably one of the most delightful features of Rutherford's experience, and the discovery of which adds so sweet a charm to these letters. He realized, beyond most of the Saints of God in his day or in ours, his practical, abiding union with a personal and living Saviour. All Christians cherish this truth with the most devout gratitude; but it does not embody itself equally in the conscious experience of all, nor express itself so fully in their daily language. Few Christians, perhaps, would venture to speak of their afflictions, endeared for the cause of Christ, with exactly the same simplicity and frankness—"but Christ and I can bear it." Perhaps with few is there such a living consciousness of this union, as would render them free in the utterance of just such a sentence. This unquestionably occasioned those outbreaks of passionate love to the Redeemer, which he lavishes upon Him in terms which seem to those of a lower devotional tone, too endearing to be entirely reverential. Upon almost every page of this volume, will be found some pious sentiment, wrapt up tightly in terse, pithy language, which drops into the heart; and sounding down into the depths of our Christian experience, wakens many a responding echo.

In its perusal, we have been constrained to admire the ways in

which God "makes the wrath of man to praise Him." Cruel men shut up good John Bunyan in his cage, that he might not preach to the men of Bedford: and lo! that wonderful dream which, like a faithful mirror, reflects the struggles and the joys of the Christian heart in all the diversified phrases of his experience. So too, "the wrath of man" made Samuel Rutherford a prisoner for Christ in Aberdeen, that he might not speak to the single congregation of Ainsworth: and lo! these two hundred years, he has been speaking, as a familiar friend, in these different languages, to the people of the most high God.

We wish that every reader of this notice would procure these letters. They may safely possess a work which was one of Cecil's classics, and of which Richard Baxter said: "Hold off the Bible, such a book the world never saw." It is not a book they will even read, ever satisfied afterwards with its title looking down upon them from a book shelf, but a book which, from its epistolary form, can be taken up at any hour, and whose precious contents will often tempt them to snatch a hasty repast. To the enterprising publishers we say, while your hand is upon Samuel Rutherford, why can you not give to the American public his "Lex, Rex," and his "Due Right of Presbytery;" books seldom seen in this country, but in the libraries of the curious.

5. *Annual Report of the Board of Missions of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, presented to the General Assembly, May, 1850.*
6. *Thirty-first Annual Report of the Board of Education of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, presented to the General Assembly, May, 1850.*

We notice these interesting and elaborate Reports of two of the Boards of the Church, to assist in calling attention to the important and growing labours of the Presbyterian denomination in these two departments. The sudden accession of large territories made within a year or two past to our national domain, renders the Home

Mission service peculiarly imposing; and it is needful to inquire with what efficiency our branch of the Christian Church is addressing herself to the heavy responsibility of meeting these growing demands. The educational movements of the Church, likewise, covering, as they now undertake to do, the whole circle of instruction, from the primary school to the University, must exert a vast influence, whether for good or ill, upon the entire country. The latter of these Reports embodies some suggestions towards improving the plans of the Board of Education, which were submitted to the last Assembly; but which were referred for consideration and action, to the next Assembly. We have no space in a brief notice to consider these suggestions, but content ourselves in calling attention to them, as they will be brought forward to be discussed and determined by the congregated wisdom of the entire Church.

7. *The Psalms translated and explained*, by J. A. ALEXANDER, Professor in the Theological Seminary, at Princeton, vol. 1 and 2, New York, 1850.

Prof. Alexander has an established reputation as a scholar, especially in all those studies which fit one to interpret the sacred scriptures. Whatever he publishes, therefore, in this department, stands in no need of the recommendation of any to give it currency. He has proved himself an able interpreter of the Bible in one of its most difficult books, and his present effort will not diminish his well-earned reputation. He entitles it himself, an amplified translation of the Psalms, and informs us that while he often differs from Hengstenberg, his exposition yet rests on the masterly commentary of that writer as its basis. Many topics which would find a place in a critical introduction to the Psalms, or in a more extended commentary, he tells us he has omitted, and however acceptable these topics would be to the scholar, and however much we might desire to see them handled by Prof. Alexander, these volumes will doubtless be more profitable to the general reader, that these more protracted discussions are avoided. The

comments are brief, and embrace first, a literal translation of each phrase, and then an expansion, paraphrase, or explanation of the translation, the words of the original being but occasionally introduced.

8. *The Life of Luther, with special reference to its earlier period and the opening scenes of the Reformation.* By BARNA SEARS, D. D., Philadelphia, American Sunday School Union, 486 pp. 12 mo.

This is a book of special interest, not only to our youthful readers, but to all who admire the great reformer, and would desire to trace the incidents of his early history. Prof. Sears has enjoyed rare opportunities of obtaining the knowledge requisite for the preparation of this volume, and has spared no pains in executing the work he had undertaken. We cannot withhold our testimony to the merit of his performance. It makes us familiar beyond any thing we have ever read, with the domestic and social state in which Luther was reared and lived—the places, methods, stages, and extent of his education; the growth of his character, and progressive formation of his opinions; his struggles, conflicts, contests and sufferings. The book is one of the most valuable and probably the most costly, of the Society's issues. It is got up in good taste, with initials, vignettes, maps and plates, all having an antiquarian interest, and appropriately illustrating the text. We hope the sale and usefulness of the volume will leave the Society without any regret at the expense incurred in its publication.

9. *Prejudice and its antidote. An address delivered before the East Alabama Presbyterian High School, on the occasion of its second Anniversary.* By Rev. W. T. HAMILTON, D. D., of Mobile, Alabama. Philadelphia, 1850.

10. *The testimony of Science to the truth of the Bible. An Address delivered before the Bible Society of the University of Virginia, Jan. 27, 1850. By the Rev. B. M. SMITH, Pastor of the Staunton Presbyterian Church, Charlottesville, 1850.*

These productions of our esteemed brethren belong to a class of writings becoming numerous among us, which the exigencies of our literary institutions are calling into existence. The anniversaries of these institutions furnish favorable occasions for impressing upon the minds of our youth, and of the intelligent audiences assembled, those lessons of wisdom, which the forming age of the one or the prevailing temptations of the other, may seem to demand. The first of these addresses is an able presentation from the pen of an eloquent writer of the power of prejudice, and its cure, viz: advancing knowledge, and thorough, free research, which is recommended as producing enlargement and liberality of mind, modesty, boldness and tenacity of opinion, when the truth has been once found—comprehensiveness of views, and decision of character. The last leads the author across the various objections which criticism, ethnography, archæology, chronology and the natural history of man, have presented to the truth of the Bible, and gives him an opportunity to show, as he does with effect, how all these branches of knowledge, as they have been matured, have more and more lent their aid to the support of revelation. Many of Dr. Hamilton's illustrations of the value of extensive research, are gathered from the same soil, and the two addresses have this much in common.

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11. *Conscience and the Constitution, with remarks on the recent Speech of the Hon. DANIEL WEBSTER, on the subject of slavery. By M. STUART, lately Professor in the Theological Seminary at Andover. Δουλος εκληθης, μη σοι μελετω. Paul. Boston. 1850. pp. 199. .*

We can forgive, at least in part, what Prof. Stuart says of us, for the wholesome castigation which he has administered to the

Abolitionists and Wilmot Proviso mischief-makers of his own region. He has exposed their perversions of scripture and not a few of their false political positions, and visited them with severe but merited rebuke. When we of the South have offered a scripture argument in defence of slavery as an existing, and, with us, an unavoidable institution, the people of the North, with a holy horror, like Christian in the Pilgrim Progress, have thrust their fingers in their ears that they might not hear, and closed their eyes that they might not see. They have read the Bible with other eyes than the men of the South. They have never seemed to understand that the word servant in the scriptures, save only where it is an honourable designation, as servant of God or of the king, always means a slave, that the parable of the talents, and many illustrations of Christ himself and of Paul, as to our religious duties, are borrowed from the institution of slavery and the right of the master to the labour and all the profits of the labour of the slave, and that the doing of that which is just and equal on the part of the master toward his servant, has no respect to any thing else than the comforts and care he should bestow upon him in his condition as his slave. Every word the scriptures speak, of oppression and of blood, they apply, with a quick instinct, to us "the cruel and bloodthirsty holders of slaves," when slaves were held, we do not doubt, by the very prophets who uttered these threatenings of God, and these slaves waited around them in their houses, loosed their sandals, and laboured for them in the field. The doctrines of the Abolitionists are a tissue of absurdities, baseless in reason, without a shadow of support in God's word, nay in the very teeth of scripture, incapable of any application to the evils of the social state, and, carried out into their results, subversive of civil society itself. In spite of certain mistakes and errors which we could mention, and of false issues made with us, we are glad that Professor Stuart has had the good sense, the patriotism, and the courage to stand forward and rebuke this madness which has well nigh rent the tribes of our political Israel asunder. His pamphlet has fallen like a bomb shell, into the camp of our and our country's worst enemies.

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ARTICLE I.

EDUCATION.

Inaugural Address, delivered in the Hall of the House of Representatives, Columbia, before the Teachers' Association of South Carolina, December 3d, 1850. By THOMAS CURTIS, D. D., President.

Gentlemen and Fellow-Teachers:

IN preparing, as you have desired me, something in the nature of an Inaugural, on assuming your Chair, I have found myself in the common difficulties of a small mind handling a large subject. By leaving me the whole field of our common pursuits, as Teachers, to explore, you have given one portion of my poor faculties an unusual chance of chasing others of them to death: or, at the best, you have placed me in the old logical position of a certain animal, which no man would wish to connect, *eo nomine*, with himself,—and the two bundles of hay. So that if I nibble right and left, with little profit to any one but myself—here at the Science and there at the Art of Education; sometimes at Education at large, and sometimes at the discipline of our schools; now at the minds we have to direct, and now at the difficulty of engaging them to mind us, or how *we* shall direct them—you, gentlemen, must share with me, at least, the responsibility of an ill-spent hour! I shall only demonstrate to you that of which I am well convinced,—how much abler a President you may at any time find among yourselves.

What a mighty word is Education! What a breadth and depth of meaning is in it! What projectile force and power! There is no other of greater importance to either Teachers or the taught. How many other words are contained within its range! Birth and its privileges; parentage and its influences; liberty and its peerless blessings—property; reason, science; morality, piety; with all their inestimable advantages. Education, properly understood, we say, takes them all within its scope. One might almost adopt, respecting it, the exclamation of Holy Writ: “Blessed are the people that know the *joyful sound!*” Nothing, certainly, is a real—that is, a realized good, to him who altogether wants a good education!

This is happily a term whose etymology sustains and pervades its modern usage. High born, for we find it used by Cicero as well as by Virgil, by Terence and by Seneca, it has not outlived, like many off-shoots of nobility, the honors of its birth. As if it contained something at once too deep and too delicate to be transfused into various languages, we have rather transferred than translated it into modern tongues. Milton, Locke and Addison use it precisely in the intellectual sense of the great Roman orators, to lead out or draw forth the mind; while Robert Boyle, a prince (a Locke, at least,) among natural philosophers, uses it in the literal sense of “the *eduction* of substantial forms,” and “the *eductive* powers of matter.” I advert to this etymology of the term, chiefly because it suggests a division of such observations as I shall have the honor to make to you; or this twofold question—in Education, we have—

I. To lead out—*what?* And

II. To lead out—*where, or whither?*

Having answered which, I may venture a few thoughts on the Discipline of Education; respecting which, if I am betrayed into a little warmth of expression, I shall be offering, you may remember, (as a great writer once said, in apologizing for the freedom of the press,) an eulogium *on a dead friend*.

1. *WHAT is it we have to lead out?* We must perceive that our success in all education; our difficulties at the beginning; our encouragements or disappointments, as we proceed; and every degree of credit or honor we can ex-

pect, as a result, must depend on the materials—and therefore on our estimate of the materials, with which we work. If I attempt to draw out lead into a wire, however far I may extend the process, I shall have only leaden wire; if gold, wire of gold. Take, for instance, Female Education. Some have contended for the mental inferiority of the sex. Woman's mind is as a different kind of metal, beside the golden mind of man! All lead, do what you will! Try it, in small masses or large; experiment upon it, hot or cold; in the frozen atmosphere of rebuke and discouragement, or warmed, melted by kindest sympathies and kindling hopes, brought nigh. Still, with some, and some otherwise discerning folk, too, it is nothing but lead! Weighty, to be sure, in sufficient quantity, fusible and ductile, rather remarkably—and capable, without much art, of a dull polish: but, after all, an inferior, baser metal, and, for every high and noble use, comparatively worthless. So has thought the Grecian sage, the Mohammedan mufti, and the Jewish rabbin, for ages. (To this day, in some synagogues, wives and daughters, I believe, must not worship on the same floor with husbands and sons.) So think still, perhaps, three-fourths of mankind! All the learned classes of China, for instance, and they have pretensions to learning! Dr. Johnson, you know, once insisted, in a memorable argument, on the *moral* inferiority of women; until a lady, who would neither take nor give him "quarter," brought him again and again, with growling reluctance, into the field, and finally drove him from it. "I never saw the mighty lion," whispered Boswell, "so chafed before." One might be more successfully positive, I presume to add, that, as to this moral inferiority, he was *wrong*, than that the asserters of the perfect equality of the sexes, as to strength of mind, *are right*. The truth is, that the whole human mind is fine gold; but it requires an artist of more skill than has been supposed, to work it into jewelry, and to bring each specimen out to the best advantage. I, of course, should not be indisposed to add something further on the subject of Female Education; but it would interfere with my general plan, and lead me beyond the limits of your patience. I shall dismiss it, with one remark. The *French*, who still claim, according to M. Guizot, to be at the head of civilization and its progress, have cer-

tainly gone before us, and all Europe, here. They have not, with Philadelphia, opened a Medical College for the sex; nor have they opened the regular courses of instruction at the celebrated college of the Sorbonne to female students; but they have instituted a regular Board of Examination there, for women, before whom appear, in the month of August, annually, from 140 to 150 young ladies and widows, who submit to a very strict investigation of their progress in Literature and Science, and to whom, as a recommendation to their employment as Teachers, diplomas and other honors are awarded. Three Inspectors of the University, two Catholic priests, one Protestant clergyman, and a Rabbi—and three Lady Inspectresses, attend this examination. I do not know that it would disgrace either our literature or our gallantry, if hereafter a similar adjunct to our State College should be proposed.

We have a human mind, then, in the case of both sexes, to lead or draw out. I shall not exhibit the Sectarian in metaphysics, or on any other point, I trust, to-day. The obtrusion, upon his equals, of what any man may feel to be his *peculiar* views on such a subject (and on such an occasion) as this, I hold to be somewhat, in a logical sense at least, impertinent. He is often supposed to speak for, or in the name of, his constituents; and because they may tolerate the exhibition of his crotchets, he is apt to flatter himself that they endorse them. My observations, then, will be general, and of no exclusive school. I shall not at all attempt, certainly, to lead you into a modern school, which, in the language of its chief advocate, M. Cousin, assumes to furnish (we wonder how so able a man could write such a sentence) "*the absolute explanation of everything.*"

But we have a human mind to lead out—not that of an angel, unfallen or fallen. That of an intelligent being of high order, but not the highest; of great imperfections and faults, but not those of the worst possible character. I speak at once to a point, in the experience of us all: for that which is by Revelation more fully ascertained to us, I hold to be discernible, in the entire outline, by intelligent observation. Here is a being of noble powers and capacities, but they are slowly developed; and their *limits* I find a first duty both to remember and to teach. If in any-

thing the science of mind has advanced of late years, it has been in the knowledge and practical acknowledgment of these limits. As the existence of man here, in connection with what we find *he is*, argues that he will exist hereafter, so the very excellence of his mental nature argues the probability of higher excellence, even in this universe of creatures. It is not an angel we have to teach, nor angelic powers to lead or draw out, in any stage of our work as Teachers—powers of high distinction, but not thus high.

On the other hand, we find in him mental and moral discrepancies, imperfections, faults—crime. There is the perpetual conflict between reason and sense, which even heathen moralists lament. Plato's satire upon some perfectionists of his day, will apply to the optimists with regard to young people whom we occasionally meet with in our own. "If," says he, in his *Meno*, "children were ($\phi\acute{o}\sigma\epsilon\iota$) by nature good, it were only necessary to shut them up to keep them good;" in other words, why educate them at all? We have a faulty being to teach and control: just inasmuch as he is committed to us to educate—to *govern*. We may imagine him better in any or every respect than he is, in which case we shall not sufficiently control what is bad; we may imagine him worse, until we only contribute to making him so. It is neither the powers of a pure nor those of a fallen angel, we have to educe; those of a being prone only to good, nor those of one of unmixed and unmitigated evil character; or of whom we ought, at any time, morally to despair.

Then we have, by the very name of our undertaking, to lead, draw out, or guide; not to create, extort or drive forth, either as a whole, or in part, these latent powers of his; *not* to

Tear ope the blushing bud to make a flower.

And here I take a stand between two extremes. The one an ancient, the other a modern mistake, I submit. Looking back through rigid Rome to semi-barbarous Sparta, we perceive the iron hand of mere authority attempting to accomplish everything in Education, (so called) *by* anything but educative methods. All is seizure, rough and reckless tearing forth such powers of the young mind, as

public or domestic leaders chose to appropriate to building up the supposed interests of the State, or the fortunes of a family—a kind of Cæsarean operation, not resorted to as the undesired exception, but as the rule, in every case of the mental birth of a citizen. In nothing was Nature consulted, much less waited upon; there was no hope, because no faith, in her developements. The young citizen must be compressed, or tortured, to a given model; shortened to the size of the procrustean bed, or stretched and elongated, until the energies of his mind were broken or dislocated. Relics of this dictation to Nature, substituted for the congenial guidance of nature, have been to a late date found in the scholastic polity of Europe; may be found, perhaps, in that of Prussia at this day. Instruction and its means are mistaken for Education and its issues. But how many men can instruct that cannot educate! Instruction is not education. “You may make a mere *drench*” of the former, as I have read; “and find as much difficulty in opening a mule’s mouth for it, as that of the best horse in your stable.” This is one extreme. Another is, for the pupil to be master of the teacher and all his plans; or for youth to be so consulted on the entire scheme and details of their education, as that, not only what is necessary in most cases, and indispensable in some, is alike disregarded, but that only which ignorance appreciates as the suitable knowledge, and that which idleness or obstinacy may dictate as alone desirable, is chosen; and the education (miscalled) is conducted on the *minimum* of instruction; or as little as possible to pass the pupil off as educated. Here is the other extreme. Nothing as it might and should be is educed in the one case, because the mind’s own vigor and capacity are not consulted—there is no faith in mind, properly so called. Nothing in the other, because the powers that were born into this world to be led, restrain or refuse all guidance.

The whole intellect, weak or powerful, must be subjected to the happier medium method. As in the structure of the corporeal powers there is a happy similarity, a physical identity, to a large extent, in the bodies of mankind, so is there a general similarity between the mental powers and faculties; and what the pathology of *dissection* is to the young anatomist, a sound mental and moral

philosophy must be to the young Teacher—*based*, of course, *on this similarity*. Every where do we find the same great bones and sinews of the mind; the same processes of sustenance and circulation in thought and moral feelings: and we must study the mental frame-work as it is, and as it works—not forgetting two things. That we are not commissioned to improve, but to develope *it*; and that we have not the anatomist's advantage of studying a whole quiet, if dead, subject. We cannot examine it in every part or as a whole, *ad libitum*, and while at rest. The mental economy is only presented to us in an active, working state; one faculty (so called) acting upon and blending into another and another's functions, perpetually. The mind was never subject to dissection. Its indivisibility is its glory, its energy, its best natural hope and foreshadowing of immortality. You may distinguish, then, in their operations, but you cannot divide, its operative powers. The dissection-knife *here* (where you have none but living subjects to act upon) has inflicted many a mortal wound. We are not warranted, as I find, to assume that the mental powers are, or are *not*, in fact, separate functions, in the usual acceptation of that term, and therefore we act and speak best, as Dr. Abercrombie has well remarked—simply, of their “operations on a given series of facts.” We are “the ministers,” as Lord Bacon long ago said, “of the mental nature,” we find—“not the masters; the interpreters, not the legislators,” *here*.

Yet one of these faculties or functions may be more active, and demand more attention in one pupil than another. In one young person, how strong is the memory; in another, how weak! How rapid the conceptive, how dull the abstractive powers, of another! One is all imagination; another,

“A Daniel come to—*judgment!*”

I contend for an intelligent and penetrating analysis of these peculiarities in the powers of our pupils—so far as the extent of our superintendence of them will permit. Nay, further, that the mind of each pupil is, in itself, a distinct study, on which an angel might be well engaged for all the time ordinarily allotted to its education; and yet, that there is an indestructible, impenetrable unity in

the nature of all mind—so that, after the ablest analysis, we shall find its functions interpenetrating and beautifully blending with each other. *E pluribus unum!* Now the science of Education, gentlemen, is so thoroughly to know, as to lead out, to the best advantage, this wondrous unity, a human mind, *as an unit*—and yet with a masterly (and not an ordinary Master's) respect to each of its distinct powers. And thus much for my first enquiry: *What* we have, in Education, to lead out.

2. My second enquiry, To lead out [the mind] *where*, or *whither?* may be said, I think, to embrace the whole Art of Education.

We shall be all agreed, and every one of our patrons in public or private institutions will agree with us, that USEFULNESS, personal and social, is the obvious goal to which, in every form of Education, we must attempt to lead the mind. That this is our watch-word, and pole-star; the culminating point of effort, in which *all* its lines are to blend, if not to terminate. But what is the meaning here of usefulness? As diversified, clearly, as the features of the human countenance, the idiosyncrasies of the mind, or the prospects and probable fortunes of life. It is greatly varied, too, by the different stages or periods of life. That is useful at its commencement, which is soon no longer so; that is valuable, as a pursuit or attainment, in middle life, of which we lose all the relish, and can be made in no way conscious of the utility, as we approach "the bourne from which no traveller returns."

To come to something practical. We may adopt, (as to usefulness) safely and primarily, with our pupils, the words of no common observer, respecting wisdom. "If thou be useful, thou shalt be useful to thyself." The first object of a judicious leading out of the mind, is to strengthen and enlarge its own power; and men may well be divided about what are the studies that most conduce to this: but all elementary branches in language, in mathematics, in history, and in philosophy, are surely meant to bear upon this point. Some are carried far beyond what is elementary, in very celebrated seats of learning, for this object chiefly, if not solely—as the higher Mathematics in the education of the English clergy. A Regius professor of Divinity, now a bishop of the Episcopal Church, thus

toiled his upward way (as he told me) into the Lucasian professorship of Mathematics in the University of Cambridge (a chair once filled by Sir Isaac Newton,)—while, *perhaps*, he could not read a chapter in the Hebrew Bible. Other high officers in that University (which, without being considerable mathematicians, they could not be,) have avowed an equal deficiency in the knowledge of the original Scriptures. Such cases supply this reflection. That while the direct usefulness of the Mathematics, in acuminating and strengthening a man's powers of mind, may be admitted, the path of a common sense economy of those powers would be, to select such means and measures of doing this, as might better bear on *future* usefulness. In the first of these cases, the man or the logician, at the best, was improved and strengthened, while the theologian was weakened, or left unfurnished: the sword of the metaphysician sharpened, (for the mathematics may well be accorded that title,) while that of God's word was laid aside, with the chance, when it was wanted, of being found pointless or rusty. To lead out the young clergyman's mind into the mere Mathematician's chair, as a terminus, (especially when you remember what months and years of his prime may be consumed to reach it,) would seem but the counter-part of leading the mere carpenter into the pulpit. The mathematical exclusiveness of such a training of the Clergy, seems, moreover, to make Education what it never should be thought—an end of life, and not a means. "To live is not to learn," as a French writer has well said, "but to apply."

Our views of usefulness, therefore, as an object of Education, must not be one-sided. They should bear, assuredly, upon what is probable as to the whole of future life. And these examples, from high quarters, bear upon what is applicable to Common Schools, and every grade of education between them and the College. *That* is the true art of Education which secures in it the greatest measure of *adaptedness* to the claims of after life. Your well-ordered and experienced minds, gentlemen, will suggest a hundred illustrations of this sentiment.

To confine myself, as in this Address I must, to general observations, the basis of an useful Education, bearing on the learned professions, seems happily *common* to them

all. All must have a foundation in those principles of Grammar which are universal; and these will be found as conveniently, at least, I venture to opine, (with perhaps the obsolete prejudices of a grammar-school boy,) in the Latin Grammar, as anywhere. Hence, may you teach, undoubtedly, the entire substance of the English Grammar, while you are teaching the Latin; although the converse is not true: and hence the policy, if sound learning is worth sowing broadcast over a land, of the phrase "Grammar Schools," in England, being legally held to mean a school where the Latin Grammar *must* be taught. All the professions need the rudiments, at least, of mathematical learning, not only to strengthen the mind, but while *meum* and *tuum* shall be words whose meaning no man may forget—a liberal foundation in history; and more of natural philosophy than is usually obtained in schools. At the well-conducted Academy, then, I hold, that which has any pretensions to prepare youth for College, these common and indispensable foundations of professional learning may be laid. And there would I lay them solidly—those foundation principles of *all* liberal education, that should give a young man, as well as his parents, *the means* of rationally choosing a profession. *The ignoramus has no such means.* A profession may be chosen for us and by us, far too early. Too lightly chosen it must have been, *wherever* it is lightly abandoned—*where* lawyers would sometimes induce one to suppose the world was indeed "without law," so anxious are they to be found *not* expounding the past, but clothed with the powers of *new*, legislation; *where* neither mercantile nor idle and dandy physicians are rare; and where *merely* professional and wholly incompetent clergymen are found, perhaps, in equal numbers. All these cases argue, I contend, the precocious choice of a profession, somewhere: the boy, perhaps, consulted, until he fetters and makes boyish the conduct of the man for half his life; or ignorance choosing all it will be taught, (a choice not confined to boys,) until it learns nothing. I wholly approve and applaud the liberty of choice in young men, at the right period; I only contend that it should be a later period than it often is. I would not heed a child crying for the moon; nor trust the chariot of Phœbus to any Phæton.*

* A note to this will be found at the end of this Address.

Therefore is it, that I recommend to your *investigation*, gentlemen, a considerable improvement, as I regard it, lately proposed to the Corporation of Brown University—an improvement in that *next stage* of a superior education, at which a young man may be expected to choose his profession, with some competent knowledge of what he decides upon; and *so* to determine as to persevere. It offers a happy medium between the extremely conservative and the ultra progressive economy of a College. At the Prussian gymnasia not above a third of the time is now occupied with the studies that in former years occupied the whole.

Dr. Wayland has examined personally and with care the English system, too much, clearly, (and especially for this country) in the first of these extremes, and that of the early colleges of the United States: those which matured not only profound theologians, but those jurists and statesmen who did intellectual battle with the ablest men of the mother country, at the Revolution, and obtained the memorable eulogy of Chatham, with regard to their first State papers. "We certainly," as the president of Brown remarks, "have no reason to be ashamed of the early colleges of this country." It is with no love of innovation, then, nor without great respect for earlier methods, that he proposes an important change. For the very progress of Science may become a clog upon the wheels of Education! It has so operated, he shows, as to introduce "a high-pressure system" in the northern colleges, by which, for the last 20 years, more has been attempted to be done in a given time than can satisfactorily be accomplished. In the most celebrated College of New England, the undergraduate course embraces Latin, Greek and Mathematics, (comprising Geometry, Algebra, Plane and Spherical Trigonometry, and Analytical Geometry,) Ancient and Modern History, Chemistry, Rhetoric, French, Psychology, Ethics, Physics, Logic, Botany, Political Economy, the Evidences of Religion, Constitution of the United States, Mineralogy, Geology, and German or Spanish, or an equivalent; together with Essays to be written in several of these departments, and instruction in Elocution.

He represents the effect of this system, which he evidently depicts from the life. The student, when a work-

ing man, working wearily ; studying, not from the love of his study, but to accomplish his task. He turns, mechanically, from one text-book to another ; his own powers all monopolized by the mere acquisition of what is before him, and having no free play. He "crams" for recitation or examination, and when this last is over his work is done, and how willingly does he forget half or more of what he has studied ! It gave him no pleasure, has yielded him no fruit ; and he gladly dismisses it from his thoughts.

Dr. W. suggests, 1. The abandonment of any fixed term of years for the entire collegiate course. Let the time allotted to each particular study be determined by its own nature ; and every student be allowed, within given limits, to take a greater or less number, as he may choose. But, 2. Every course of instruction, once commenced, should be continued until completed. 3. Every student, seeking a degree, should sustain, as now, an honorable examination in prescribed studies ; no student, however, being under any obligation to proceed to a degree, unless he choose. 4. Every student should be entitled to a certificate of such progress as he may have made in any course.

And now he proposes a pretty liberal bill of fare ; respecting which, I would only say (especially as to the latter part,) there is still the objection of some northern tables—*fast feeding*. Latin, Greek, Modern Languages, and the pure Mathematics, occupy, respectively, two years each ; Mechanics, Optics and Astronomy, a course of one year and a half ; Chemistry, Physiology and Geology, one year and a half ; the English Language and Rhetoric, one year ; Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, one year ; Political Economy and History, one *term* each. Courses of instruction in the science of Teaching, in Agriculture, on the application of Science, generally, and particularly of Chemistry, to the arts ; and in the science of Law, are also proposed to be given, without a limit of time for them being fixed.

The primary object has been, we are told, to provide in College not merely for the learned, but for "*the productive*" professions ; not for a restricted class, or a few classes, but for all. Some courses will be abridged or abolished, others amplified, or substitutes introduced, in the working of the plan. It is further proposed to make the professors in each

department depend largely, perhaps chiefly, for remuneration, on the fees of their class.

Too little time, certainly, is here given to some important studies. History, (all history, apparently,) but one term; Moral and Intellectual Philosophy, one term! and the whole English Language and Elocution (the classic tongue of Christianity and Civil Liberty,) one year only! While of the evidences of our Religion, not the less national, I hope, because not established by human laws—no distinct notice whatever is taken. My friend must have forgotten the touch of Wordsworth's pencil, respecting an University, as the place

Where Science, leagued with *holier* Truth,
Guards the sacred heart of youth.

But sufficiently valuable, I presume to think, are *many* of his alterations, to demand the cordial examination of all superior Teachers.

And here, as we are on the point of usefulness, while I would not consume your time with common-places—if you would lead out a people, and not a populace, to the ballot-box; and *if*, in any emergency hereafter, you must have recourse to self-defence in arms—remember the complaint of the greatest victim of disappointed ambition—"I never could make France a people;" and oh! lead the whole of your white population to well-taught *Common Schools*. Let them know *for what* the founders of this great Commonwealth strove, and how they obtained it; not by the brute force, merely, of the hireling soldier, but by the untiring efforts, in all ranks, of the soldier-citizen. I blushed for South Carolina, (and more for their superiors in station than for them,) when I heard of one-half of the returning Palmetto regiment not being able to write their names! Take it as a fact of authentic history, I would say to her Legislators, that mere animal bravery in a populace, is, in the long run, *recuperative*—it falls back upon the State, whose main reliance it is; and takes back to its own use the energies it may first yield to you. How fell the ancient Republics; how, in modern times, Napoleon? And why stands France at this moment on the verge of an unknown and probably a bloody future struggle? He who knew her best, of all modern men, has told you, in the words I have already quoted. *France is not yet a people*. Ob-

serve, it was neither in the ancient nor modern case—a total ignorance in all ranks of the principles of government that can be alleged. The ancients could quote home authorities on the science of Politics, (a Plato and an Aristotle,) of whom we are yet proud to learn. It was the *kind of foundation* on which the fabric of government rested. This was unstable as water; because never “based deep enough in the mental and moral improvement of the *common mind*.”

Society at the broad base of the pyramid *must be* no longer base in other senses. You must pour in a flood of mental and moral light *there*; it must not play merely upon the edges of society, so to speak; on a *few* prominent materials, only, and not on *the many*—or, as it has been well said, “it will be like the northern lights when the sun is set—sufficient to attract to you the curiosity of the world,” but never offering any well-founded hopes of the permanence of civil institutions. Never, perhaps, were these lessons of history more important to be heeded by any State on earth, than by South Carolina at this juncture. There is a conservative power in the general diffusion of knowledge which has rarely been believed—never sufficiently acted upon.

I arrive now at a topic of yet higher interest, toward which all real education of a being like man, must invariably lead—his moral and religious developement. You must conduct him through a mental to a moral self-knowledge, as a first lesson of morals, and one of the best and last of a sound philosophy: the apex of the pyramid, pointing to the

First Good, first Perfect, and first Fair!

The twofold union of all sound reasoning or Mental Philosophy with Morals, and of all sound Morals with Religion, is *the* capital Truth of Education; and we shall see, I trust, before we close, that while we meet with controverted points all the way, (for what great truth or excellent principle has not been matter of controversy?) this does not involve, necessarily, any sectarian views of our Holy Religion, particularly as a part of Education.

And here I find the views of Bishop Butler, so distinguished for their profoundness, and those of Abercrombie, as remarkable for their simplicity, uniting, in a leading

point, the *supremacy* of Conscience. The Education that does not lead out the mind of its pupils straight to her throne, is worse than none; while a thorough acquaintance with *that faculty*, its mental and moral connections and claims, its obscurations and practical imperfections; together with the means of its enlightenment and full efficiency—offer a salient point, whence the judicious teacher may lead to and secure the best end of Education. As Sir James Mackintosh says, truly, this doctrine of “Conscience, the superior of the whole man,” is far older than either of the writers I have named—and was, perhaps, what the ancients generally, “but *confusedly* aimed” at, “when they laid it down that Virtue consisted in following Nature:” especially if Seneca may expound his predecessors—“Whatever nature does, God does.” But oh! that Abercrombie had been the Secretary of the cloudy Bishop! Which of us that has attempted to break through his luminous clouds, as guides of the young, will not subscribe to another opinion of Macintosh’s—“No thinker so great was ever so bad a writer.” Gentlemen, if any one of you could give his days and nights to thinning away these clouds into good modern English, it would be a task in which all degrees of success would be too glorious to suffer much of partial failure to be any disgrace. I commend it your best minds!

This *work upon* that book, (his “Analogy,”) by the bye—working with the book and toward the book, is our more direct and present subject. And it may well introduce what I humbly conceive we can do in Education, as to Morals and Religion; and what we cannot do. We can clear the forest of great hindrances; enclose the field; plough it well; and prepare it for valuable *first* crops: some of which, in decided moral and religious personal character, we may have the happiness to see. But we may not wisely confound the School and the Church. We cannot, I think, undertake much of the spade-husbandry of religion; or do much in the way of gardening in the former: this pertains to the Church. In the entirely public institutions of the land, the high and otherwise useful walls of denominational distinctions *may not* be erected. Rarely, as I submit, in the best private Academies, that solicit public patronage. Therefore am I not an advocate for dividing the

country between what have been called Denominational Schools. You cannot do this and secure the best of assistant talent; *unless* each denomination is to act on the supposition of itself, alone, containing it: and I see many objections to sharpening up young minds with the arguments for party creeds—*when* so much common ground is presented by all orthodox denominations, on which they may be trained for God and heaven. (Of course there are peculiar circumstances that may dictate a particular course; and freely can I accord to others to determine what they are.) That common ground I take to be *what* Bishop Butler every where so well presents or implies; and which he may very well be held to endorse for us. I would lead *up* to him; and in the School and Recitation room be very well contented there to finish. It embraces an ample extent of *preparatory* Moral Studies, in which we shall all use the books, of course, with which we are most familiar—which are best accredited to us by what we find they *can do*: and in the able and conscientious Teacher's hand, how often will the most homely and overlooked volume, like David's stones of the brook, be of far more practical service than the royal armor untried, or the weapons of a Goliath!

One thing I may be permitted to add here, as the result of conscientious observation through a long life—the manner in which I am struck by the *uniformity* of the best opinions in morals. Dr. Paley and Mr. Locke, very great names I cannot forget, have argued for an opposite conclusion; and the former to such an extent, as almost to exclude a real conscience, or moral sense, from the functions of the mind. But this is when that popular writer is arguing for a philosophical system. On a more important occasion, when he is discharging the high office of the Christian Preacher, what does he himself say? “Our own conscience is to be our guide in all things.” “It is through the whisperings of conscience that the Spirit (of God) speaks.” But I place by the side of these names, in the argument *ad verecundiam*, one at least of equal or superior general learning, Grotius, sustained by the approval of a more acute metaphysician than Paley—Sir James Mackintosh. “He,” (Grotius) says this last writer, “quotes historians, poets and orators in abundance, as witnesses, whose

conspiring testimony (mightily strengthened and confirmed by their discordance in almost every other subject) is a conclusive proof of the unanimity of the whole human race on the great rules of duty and the fundamental principles of morals." I know no greater argument for the existence, and, in a qualified sense, for the Inspiration of Conscience. St. Paul has an appeal to it in the "*Whatsoever things are true, honest, just,*" &c., of one of his Epistles. Its philosophical connection with the highest views of religion is well put by various writers: by none so briefly, yet satisfactorily, as by Butler, in a volume not so well known as his "*Analogy.*" "Goodness is the immediate object of [every intelligent being's] love." What is goodness we learn through the medium of our own moral nature, assisted by Revelation and every kind of light within our reach. "In a Being who is to be perfectly loved, goodness must be the simple, actuating principle."

"The highest and only adequate object of our affection is perfect goodness. This, therefore, we are to love with all our heart, with all our soul and with all our strength." "We should refer ourselves implicitly to Him and cast ourselves entirely upon Him. The whole attention of life should be, to obey His commands." Every valuable Moral principle, as it has been well remarked, is thus presupposed, before a solid step can be made in Religion. And thus I close such response as I have to offer to my second Enquiry. '*Whither*' a good Education is '*to lead*' the mind? *To usefulness*, we say; in the sense of craning up one's own powers to their greatest strength and best advantage, and in the sense of *Adaptedness* to the future prospects of life; to a sound basis of *Learning* for any of the professions, and to proper materials for the choice of a profession; to a broad and practical survey of the *Natural Sciences*, to *Morality*, to *Piety*, and to *God*!

I have ventured to promise something on the Discipline of Education. This, of course, must be modified by the extent to which young people are placed under our charge. That of the School or Recitation room, is one thing; that of the young person domesticated with us, another; that of a large public or collegiate establishment, a third and very different thing. We speak of making all discipline parental; but this can only be possible, so far as we are

clothed with parental powers, qualified by parental feelings; and where these last are genuine, can they be transferred? *This* is an enquiry to be borne in mind. On the other hand, and for the honor of our profession, I claim another fact or two to be remembered. *Real* Educators, of youth fairly entrusted to them—will and do imbibe, continually, something more than many a parent's interest, in diligent and well principled pupils; while such pupils will return occasionally, something only short, but still short, of a natural filial attachment. The advantage is, then, where it should be, greatly on that kind of pupils' side.

I take the axiom of my old friend, Mr. Coleridge, to be true as any one in Euclid. "The perfection of discipline in a school is the *maximum* of watchfulness, with the *minimum* of punishment." There is no error in it; but a great defect. It assumes that discipline is mainly conversant with faults or crime. So do most definitions of this important matter. But why? Discipline might thus be shown to be no part of Education. For would you educe, *per se*—lead out, or train up, faults? Discipline should be the practical part (as distinguished from the literal teaching) of making a *discipulus*, or disciple. Not the mere combat of evil with evil. This is a miserable and a mischeivous view of it; but in words of great 'pith and moment' even here it is—"Overcoming evil with good." It is the art of bringing out and fostering all good impulses and motives, so as to overcome all bad ones. Cowper has put this matter more correctly than the later poet, when he says, of the Discipline of "ancient" (and in many respects, stricter) "days:"

The occupation dearest to his heart,
Was to encourage goodness.

And that he could thus so far prevail, that

Learning grew
Beneath his care, a thriving, vigorous plant,
The mind was well informed, the passions held
Subordinate, and diligence was choice.

The penal part of his task was the exception, and its methods gentle.

If e'en it chanced, as sometimes chance it must,
That one among the many, overleaped
The limits of control, his gentle eye,

Grew stern, and darted a severe rebuke;
 His frown was full of terror, and his voice
 Shook the delinquent with such fits of awe,
 As left him not, till penitence had won
 Lost favor back again.

Mr. Abbott, in his *Teacher*, mentions a practical case of such discipline; in his manner of rebuking a boy for swearing. The passage is familiar, I do not doubt, to many of my auditors; and concludes, "The question is, do you wish to abandon this habit or not? If you do, all is well. I shall immediately forget all the past, and will do all I can to help you to resist and overcome temptation. But all *I can do is only to help you.*" A preceding observation is worth something. "The man who is accustomed to scold, storm and punish with unsparing severity every transgression, under the influence of irritation and anger, must not expect that *he* can win over his pupils to confidence in *him*, and to the principles of duty, by a word."

And yet the discipline of a School or College must be as various, we are free to admit, as its various dispositions—in proportion to its size, as various as that of any army under heaven. The general impression of observant minds, is, that is *has been* too rigid, and that *it is* too lax; or that speaking locally, there are many remains of its undue severity in Europe—some in England, more in Prussia, and an almost total forgetfulness of its just claims (except at West Point) in this Union:—in other words, that the former is the European extreme, the latter, the American. One practical remark may be here permitted and will afford matter of useful reflection. The English schools where the old rigor is retained, are those of the higher classes; those where the sons of Noblemen and of rich Commoners are trained for College, and *these Schools* (Winchester, Eton, Westminster and Harrow, to-wit:) are those of the highest classical attainments. On the walls of the School room in the first of them, are the memorable lines still seen,

Aut disce, aut discede!
 Manet sors tertia—*cadi*!

May I say, given in spirit, if loosely enough, by Lord Byron?

Oh! ye who teach the ingenuous youth of nations,
 Holland, France, England, Germany and Spain!

I pray you flog them upon all occasions ;
It mends their manners, never mind their pain.*

If we go back to the times of Alfred, one of the Founders of Winchester, we shall find a tragical legend of ancient discipline. One of *his* tutors, Johannes Scotus, called also Evigena, from the place of his birth, in Ireland, was afterwards a Schoolmaster of so much rigor that his pupils rose against him in rebellion, and wounded him mortally with their knives.

I thought the other day, that the Winchester motto was about to become appropriate in Boston—where “thirty-one Schoolmasters” ask the Secretary of the Massachusetts Board of Education, “Upon what shall School Discipline be based?” and reply, “We answer, unhesitatingly, upon *authority* as a starting point. As the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom,” (our Northern friends, forgetting what a volume of wisdom there is in that word fear,) “so is the fear of *the law*, the beginning of political wisdom. We object, then,” they continue, “to the idea that the relation of a pupil to his Teacher is one of affection first, and then duty. We would reverse the terms. True obedience does not voluntarily comply with a request, but implicitly yields to command. Obedience recognises the existence of abstract authority.” There is much more in this strain. “Kindness cannot supply the place of *authority*, nor gratitude that of submission.” “He, the ruler, governs to teach obedience. The governed, on his part, is *not* from sympathy, and affection, and harmony of opinion, to obey the individual, but the authority residing in him, rather.” All this we think as fallacious in principle, as it is despotic in tone. The fear of the Lord should be filial, as will be that of every efficient Teacher: and one thing is it to fear *God*, a personal and paternal Being, and another to fear any *law*. If the Teacher’s task is parental, affection assuredly comes first as a motive; or how does the true mother “teach the” youngest “ideas how to shoot?” Nor do we govern to teach obedience, but *vice versa*; and *both* are but means in Education to create a sympathy with us on the part of

*Had his Lordship not been born a Lord, (or at least had he not become one in his teens) and been himself subject, under the eye of a good parent, to thrice the Discipline he ever knew, it has often seemed to us, that he might have made a far happier and better man.

our pupils, in the estimate of its objects, and to produce that very harmony of feelings and opinion in regard to them which these sages seem to despise. Dr. Busby's ghost, could it be consulted, would almost blush at the arbitrary principles here avowed.

Mr. Horace Mann, we think, (much as we differ with him on other topics,) has exhibited the exact truth here. "I would by no means be understood to express the opinion, that in the present state of society, punishment, and even corporal punishment, can be dispensed with, by all teachers, in all schools, and with regard to all scholars.— Order is emphatically the first law of a schoolroom. Order must be preserved, because it is a prerequisite to every thing else that is desirable. If a school cannot be continued with order, it should not be continued without it, but discontinued. *After* all motives of duty, of affection, of the love of knowledge, and of good repute have been faithfully tried, and tried in vain, I see not why this "strange work" may not be admitted into the human as into the divine government. Nor will it do to prohibit the exercise of this power altogether because it is sometimes abused. The remedy for abuse is not prohibition, but discretion. This, however, is certain, that when a teacher preserves order and secures progress, the *minimum* of punishment shows the maximum of qualification."*

We may well suppose that great improvements have been made in the Boston Grammar Schools, within the last eight years. I would therefore make use of a Report of the Committee authorised by the Legislature to look into their state, in 1842, rather as containing some useful hints to *ourselves*, than as any description of their present state. At that time the committee had "forced upon them the impression that a too great reliance was placed upon going through the *mere routine of studies and books*, and giving to the scholars only that which is laid down and absolutely required." They speak of "those pupils who enjoy the advantage of having an instructor whose mind is well furnished with general knowledge, and who embraces every occasion to impart this knowledge," as very different in their acquirements from "those whose instructor contents

*Fifth Report of Massachusetts Board of Education.

himself with *the page* before him ;” and of the former kind of teacher being rather to be “hoped for” at that time, “than generally seen” in those Schools—adding this remarkable observation, “*If* they were obliged to give up *all hope* of *this* description, they would be almost led to the recommendation of some cast iron moulds, which shall turn out a given number of words in a day, that so the machinery of the schools might be perfect throughout.” They then particularize, that in the study of Grammar, of Geography, and of History, there seemed to be little “understanding of the *terms* used ;” that “the *whole subject* was a land of darkness ;”—the knowledge “for the most part, verbal ;” so that with regard to a connected series of facts—except you struck upon the one first in order, as you might strike upon—“a row of bricks, one of which set in motion,” you could not get the rest to follow. Yet the salary of these Masters was at that time, \$1,500—but this is not an occasion for pursuing these details.

Discipline should be mild, but firm ; various as the dispositions submitted to it, but uniform, steady ; transparent, as to its motives, to the intelligent child, upwards ; but far-seeing and far-reaching in its final designs. It should be a counterpart of high, judicial excellence : grave, patient, tranquil, exact, ready ; profound in knowledge and of *perfect* impartiality.* Mr. Mann is in a sentimental extreme when he says, “punishment is never inflicted in the right spirit when it is not more painful to him who imposes than to him who receives it.” But we believe that where *temper* in the Teacher presides over its measure, it will excite a reciprocal evil of temper, sufficient to destroy its usefulness ; that its influences as they “affect the whole moral nature, must be calculated in reference to the whole ;” and hence that it is a subject that can never be satisfactorily “discussed alone.”

Our growth—the characteristic *product* of the country—has been said to be *man*. May it be that of good men ! We emulate the great in history, the skilful in art, the brave in arms ! May we more than emulate the people an Alfred or a Henry IV. of France would have formed.

*See a character of the late Chief Justice Tindal, Blackwood's Mag. Oct., 1850.

The former urged upon his bishops that "useful books might be translated so that *all* could understand them," and directed his *first* attention, we are told, to the general diffusion of knowledge. Alas! that we must go back so far for our best model rulers—in this respect; and that the people of modern times (looking particularly at some European developments) seem to stoop so much in character, as they ascend the hill of power! Great truth, too, is there certainly in the observation, that while men were formerly worse than their principles—the principles are now often worse than the men. And *this* is what Education, under God's blessing, has to cure.

"Nor have we far to seek," in the words of a departed sage, "for whatever it is most important that we should find. The wisdom from above has not ceased for us.—*The principles of the oracles of God* are still uttered before the altar;—oracles which we may consult without cost;—before an altar where no sacrifice is required, but of the vices that unman us; no victims, but the unclean and animal passions which we have suffered to house within us; the spiritual sloth, or goat, or fox, or hog, which lays waste the vineyard which God has fenced and planted for himself."

* NOTE TO PAGE 314.—I would submit, as a model of a modern classical Education, the example of the truly great and good, if somewhat erratic, Dr. ARNOLD, of Rugby. "His scholarship," says his Biographer, "was chiefly displayed in his power of extempore translation into English. This he had possessed in a remarkable degree from the time that he was a boy at Winchester, where the practice of reading the whole passage from Greek or Latin into good English, without construing each particular sentence word by word, had been much encouraged by Dr. Gabell, and in his youthful vacations during his Oxford course he used to enliven the sick-bed of his sister Susannah by the readiness with which, in the evenings, he would sit by her side, and translate book after book of the history of Herodotus. So essential did he consider this method to a sound study of the classics, that he published an elaborate defence of it in the Quarterly Journal of Education; and when delivering his Modern History lectures at Oxford, where he much lamented the prevalence of the opposite system, he could not resist the temptation of protesting against it, with no other excuse for introducing the subject than the mention of the Latin style of the middle age historians. In itself, he looked upon it as the only means of really entering into the spirit of the ancient authors; and requiring, as he did besides, that the translation should be made into idiomatic English, and if possible, into that style of English which most corresponded to the period or the subject of the Greek or Latin writer in question, he considered it further as an excellent exercise in the principles of taste and in the knowledge and use of the English language, no less than of those of Greece and Rome."

As a stimulus to young clergymen, and a hint to meddlers with the Sacred Text, I venture to subjoin an extract from the private letter of a distinguished critical friend. "I have been forty years in my work, and am just now *beginning* to feel that when I read the Hebrew or Greek, I can take the ideas as it were in a vernacular way, and without the aid of Commentary. But such are the helps now, that one needs not half that time to get where I begin to feel that I am. Just as I am prepared to begin my work, I am past the usual boundary of human life, and must abandon the hope of doing much. But I had for 15 years no adequate tools to work with, and as these are now provided, a shorter journey will bring others where I am."

Enoch Ford

ARTICLE II.

OBJECTIONS TO THE GERMAN TRANSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

In the last number of this Review, I gave a brief sketch of the history of philosophy in the christian church, closing with a notice of the *German Transcendental Philosophy*. I now propose to offer some objections to this philosophy.

1. My first objection is, its *acknowledged obscurity*. A system of philosophy, designed to instruct and benefit the world, should be made plain and intelligible. Or if the subjects treated are abstruse and recondite—too much so to be made plain to common minds—we have a right to demand that they be made as plain as possible. It has been said that a revelation which cannot be understood, is no revelation. And so a philosophy which cannot be understood, is no philosophy. At least, it is none to the learner.

For a long course of years there has been a complaint, from both friends and enemies, of the almost impenetrable obscurity of the transcendental philosophy. Of the works of Kant, Dugald Stewart says: "I must fairly acknowledge that, although I have frequently attempted to read them, in the Latin edition, printed at Leipsic, I have always been forced to abandon the undertaking in despair; partly, from the scholastic barbarism of the style, and partly, from my utter inability to unriddle the author's meaning."

During the life of Kant, his scholars, we are told, often quarreled about the meaning of his works; and when they appealed to him, he would say: "I meant what I said; and at the age of four score, I have something else to do, than to write a commentary on my own works."

Schubre, one of the ablest expounders of Kant, affirms that, in his time (1791), "the diction of his master still remained a hieroglyphic to the public." Herder characterises the critic of Pure Reason as "transcendental mist,—a fog of fine spun verbiage, calculated, by means of dialectical sorcery, to confound the very implement of reason, namely, language." In the year 1798, the venerable Klopstock said thus to Coleridge: "The works of Kant are to me utterly incomprehensible. I have been often pestered by the Kantians, but am not in the habit of arguing with them. My custom is to produce the book, and point to a passage, begging of them that they would explain it. This they ordinarily attempt to do, by substituting their own ideas. I do not want, I say, a statement of your own ideas, but an explanation of the passage before us. In this way, I generally bring the dispute to an immediate conclusion."

Nor does the charge of obscurity rest against Kant alone. Of Hegel, Dr. Murdock says: "He is the most unintelligible writer I ever read. Even the most acute German philosophers complain of his style, as being not only very harsh and dry, but so extremely obscure that they cannot fully understand him. Although abundantly warned on this point, I had the temerity to take up his Encyclopedia, and read it attentively from beginning to end, and some parts of it a second, a third, and even a fourth time, comparing it often with his Logic, vainly hoping to get some idea of that logical analysis, which he tells us is the basis of all philosophy. But after a fortnight's hard study, I was nearly as ignorant of the whole process, and of every part of it, as when I first sat down to examine it. I could understand only here and there a detached thought."*

Of the transcendental philosophers generally, Mr. Morrell acknowledges, that their works do not admit of being translated into English. "The mere translation of any of the writings of Hegel, or Schelling, or even of Kant him-

*Sketches, p. 120.

self, into English, would prove entirely unintelligible to the mass of English readers."

Of the works of these men, Prof. Norton says: "In proportion as any one is accustomed to think clearly and reason consecutively, so will he be the more struck with their uncertain meaning, or the absence of meaning, the inconsistency of thought, and the want, or the inconsequence, of the reasoning. It has even been made a matter of boasting by the disciples of the school, that these speculations are to be understood only by minds of a peculiar cast, prepared for their reception."*

2. My second objection to the transcendental philosophy is, that *it rests on no fixed and sure foundations*. Hence it is fluctuating, self-contradictory, and conveys no certainty or satisfaction to reasonable minds. It professes, indeed, to exclude all doubtful materials, and promises to lead its votaries along, by a sure, scientific, *a priori* process, to the most important results. And so it begins, not with ascertained facts and principles, but with the very *essences of things*—the essence of God, of mind, of nature, of all things. But what can we know, in our present state, of the *essences* of things? We can know somewhat of their properties and attributes; and from these we infer the existence of a substratum or essence. But what this essence is, we have no means of knowing. And the Germans, notwithstanding all their researches, have proved themselves to be as ignorant as others. For no two of them can agree as to the precise *nature* of God, of themselves, or the universe. How then can they be expected to agree in the conclusions which they draw from such a source? Hence, we find them ever conflicting with one another. And not only so, the same writer is often found in conflict with himself. The different hypotheses,—being builded, not upon sand, but upon thin air,—cannot possibly stand any longer than they are held up; and so they tumble in quick succession, each being succeeded by another, as baseless and as transitory as itself. In the language of Dr. Chalmers, "these speculations so conflict and alternate with each other,—so float and disappear, at turns, in the whirlpool of debate,—so pass onward from hand to hand in successive and ever-

*So true is the remark of Goethe respecting his countrymen: "The Germans have the gift of rendering the sciences inaccessible."

shifting transmutations, from the transcendentalism of Kant to the idealism of Fichté, and thence to the still loftier empiricism of Schelling, and thence to the mysticism of Jacobi, and thence to the nihilism of Hegel ; that no wonder the poor follower, bewildered and lost in the turmoil of a thousand controversies, and in utter despair of aught like settlement or repose, should be tempted to cast the whole theme, with all its corollaries and cognate doctrines, away."

The same cause, which renders these doctrines uncertain and self-contradictory, renders them also, in many instances, utterly *senseless*. Take, for example, Schelling's notable thesis of *identity*,—"the perfect identity of the subjective knowledge of things, and the things themselves." I know that I sit in a chair—that I hold a pen in my hand—that I am writing at a table. Now my *knowledge* of these facts, and the *facts* themselves, according to Schelling, are the same ! My knowledge that I sit, and my sitting, are the same ! My knowledge that I write, and my writing, are the same ! Who but a German would ever propound dogmas such as these ; which, as one says, "set all common sense at defiance ?" And who but the Germans, and "*the Germanized*," would ever listen to them when propounded, and profess to be instructed and enraptured by them ? "The Germans of the transcendental school complain, that we of the Anglo Saxon race are dull, terrestrial, and shallow. *Their* defect is equally unfortunate ; for not one of them has the faculty," so far as developements have yet proceeded, "of descrying an absurdity. The grossest and most drivelling nonsense which could be expressed in words, would, to a transcendentalist, exhibit nothing ridiculous ; more probably it would seem august."*

3. My third objection to the transcendental philosophy is, that it proceeds on a *false mental analysis* ; or that it does not truly represent the faculties and operations of the human mind. Take, for example, the distinction recognized by all the Germans, and by all those who sympathize with them—between the *understanding* and the *reason* (Verstand and Vernunft.) The understanding, they tell us, has to do with our sensations, and with truths (if there be any such) relating to the external world. But

*See Princeton Review, vol. xi. p. 87.

reason is the higher faculty, by which we become acquainted with spiritual, supersensible objects, and necessary truths. Is this distinction a valid one? Is there any foundation for it in the constitution and operations of our minds? I think not. All truth is of the same general nature, whether relating to the phenomenal or the spiritual world—to external or internal realities. We need *some* faculty to apprehend this truth, and to make us acquainted with it. We have such a faculty in what is commonly called the *understanding* or *intellect*. Do we need more than one faculty for this purpose? Or is there any reason to believe that God has endowed us with more than one?

If we need one perceptive faculty to make us acquainted with external things, and another to acquaint us with internal realities; then why not one corresponding to each of the several classes of objects in the outer and the inner worlds? Why not one to perceive objects of sight, and another to perceive objects of touch, and others to perceive odours, flavors, and sounds? Why not one to perceive moral truth, and another mathematical truth, and another metaphysical truth, and still another to acquaint us with religious truth? Hugh Victor said that, in addition to sensation, understanding, and reason, we need a fourth capacity (*Mens*) to enable us to apprehend the Supreme Being. I see not but we need four as much as three, and twenty as much as four.

Another point, in which the scheme of the transcendentalists conflicts with a true mental philosophy, lies in their ascribing too much to *intuition* and *consciousness*. It is the province of intuition to make us acquainted with primary truths—those about which there can be no dispute—which do not need or admit of proof. Consciousness is the knowledge which the mind necessarily has of its own existence, and, to some extent, of its powers and exercises.

But the limits *here* set to the respective provinces of intuition and consciousness by no means satisfy the transcendentalists. By the one or the other of these methods,—which they in general confound, and which they frequently call by the higher name of inspiration,—they profess to come to the knowledge of God, and of all spiritual truth. “With Shelling,” for example, “the great organ of

philosophy is *intellectual intuition*, by means of which faculty he supposes we have an immediate knowledge of *the Absolute*. This intellectual intuition is a kind of higher and spiritual sense, through which we feel the presence of the Infinite, within us and around us. It enables us to gaze, at once, by the eye of the mind, upon the Eternal Principle itself."

In the following passage from Dr. Rœthe, we have presented the same method of knowing God. "God is as immediately certain to me, as myself; because self-consciousness cannot complete itself in me without the Divine consciousness. Indeed, God is to me *more* immediately certain than myself; for, in the light of my Divine consciousness, my self-consciousness first truly realizes itself.—God is to me the *immediately and absolutely certain*; and I become first truly certain of myself, by means of my certainty of God."

Cousin professes to have arrived at the direct apperception of God and of religious truth, by searching for it in the recesses of his own consciousness. "At a depth," he says, "to which Kant never descended, under the apparent relativity and subjectivity of necessary principles, I have succeeded in seizing and analyzing the instantaneous but veritable fact of *the spontaneous apperception of truth*; an apperception which, not immediately reflecting itself, passes unperceived in the depths of the consciousness."

Mr. Foxton, a transcendentalist of the church of England, has much to say in the same strain. He talks of "a deep *insight*,"—of a "faith, not in dead histories, but in living realities—a revelation to our innermost nature."—"The inspired man," he says, "is one whose outward life derives all its radiance from *the light within him*. He walks through stony places, by the light of his own soul, and stumbles not."

The "intuitional consciousness" is at the foundation of Mr. Morell's elaborate, but most unsatisfactory, treatise on "the Philosophy of Religion." And the same is true of the transcendentalists of our own country. With them, reason (in the common acceptance of the term) is nothing. Scripture (except as men are inspired to understand it) is nothing. Logic is even worse than nothing. But insight,

intuition, consciousness, inspiration—these are the only sources of knowledge, at least with regard to moral and spiritual subjects.

Now this, we insist, is not only enlarging, beyond all measure, the proper sphere of intuition and consciousness, but it is inverting and confounding the method of knowledge. It is imposing upon consciousness an office which it never did, and never can, discharge; while it is leaving the proper office and work of consciousness vacated. I am conscious of a *belief* in the inspiration of the Scriptures; but I am not directly conscious of their inspiration. I am conscious, also, of a *belief* in God; but of the Divine existence, I am not conscious; nor was any other being ever conscious of it, but God himself. In the language of Dr. Chalmers, “ere we know of a knowledge, that knowledge must exist, or have been already formed. And so when our consciousness takes cognisance of any belief regarding things apart from the mind, that belief must be anterior to the cognisance which consciousness takes of it; and, therefore, it is a belief generated by *some other faculty*, and not resting on the authority of consciousness at all.”

4. I object, again, to the transcendental philosophy, that it is little better than a system of *philosophical scepticism*. To counteract the sceptical tendencies of the sensuous philosophy, was that which moved Kant to enter upon his transcendental speculations. And yet, strange to say, these speculations plunged him and his successors, directly and most thoroughly, into the same evils which he hoped to cure.

One of the most important philosophical distinctions, is that between matter and spirit, body and soul. We know nothing about either matter or spirit, except from their properties. But as their properties are wholly distinct, exhibiting no likeness or approximation the one to the other, we infer that they are distinct in their very natures. And this conclusion, so clearly authenticated by reason, is in strict accordance with the teachings of Scripture. A marked distinction is kept up every where in the Book of God, between the *σώμα* and the *πνεῦμα*, the *body* which “returns to the earth as it was, and the *spirit* which returns unto God who gave it.”

A confounding of this obvious distinction must be of dis-

astrous influence, not only in point of speculation, but in a *moral* and *religious* view. And it matters little, so far as results are concerned, which way the distinction shall be abolished; whether every thing is to be resolved into matter, or into spirit. The former error may be the grosser; but the latter will be the more subtle and insinuating, and in its influence may be the more hurtful.

Now it is an obvious fact, that the whole tendency of German philosophy, from first to last, has been to confound and annihilate this important distinction. This work commenced in the *monads* of Leibnitz,—all of the same essential nature, though not all endowed with the same degree of intelligence; all living, acting beings, and of course *all spirit*. Kant believed in the existence of an outer world, though he professed to know almost nothing about it. The tendency of his speculations was to merge every thing in the spiritual. And this tendency has been fully realized in his successors. With scarcely a dissenting voice, they abjure the objective, the sensuous, the material, and know no world except the ideal. "The idea of matter," says Morell, who is but the echo of the Germans, "is the most dark, indefinite, unmeaning of all ideas." "Power, acting unconsciously, blindly, is matter; power, raised to intelligence and volition, is spirit. *The substratum of both is identical*; but there exists in their inward nature determinations which result in phenomenal differences." "The universe, in this light, appears far more simple, harmonious, and beautiful, than in any other. Instead of a dualism, encumbered with metaphysical paradox, we have an homogeneous creation."* A cogent reason this, for annihilating the distinction between matter and spirit, and representing both as in nature the same.

Another point of philosophical scepticism, intimately connected with that now considered, relates to the existence of the *external world*, as testified to by our bodily senses. Kant himself professes to know nothing of the external world, beyond its bare existence. All else is but an appearance, a picture, and this existing only in the mind. According to the philosophy of Kant, the outer world stands to us in the same relation that the little objects in a kaleidoscope do to the eye. There *must be ob-*

*Hist. of Philosophy, p. 333.

jects there, else there would be no appearances. But the appearances which these objects assume, as the instrument is moved round, have *no objective reality*. They are merely what the eye and the instrument make them. And thus it is with the diversified phenomena of external existence.

The followers of Kant were not for leaving the philosophy of the outer world just where he did. They were for removing the little objects out of the kaleidoscope, and having *appearances, pictures* merely. Reinhold thought that Kant had assumed too readily the truth of our sense-perceptions, and suggested the necessity of stepping back, and investigating the matter more thoroughly. Schulze did not absolutely deny the existence of surrounding objects, but only affirmed that this could not be proved. But with these writers, all scruple on the subject seems to have passed away. Fichté, Schelling, Hegel, and their numerous followers, deny altogether the truth of our sense-perceptions. With them, the objective is nothing, the subjective every thing. Ideas, appearances, conceptions, these are the only objects in existence. The world of sense is just what we make it in our conceptions, and no more.

Now this error may seem to some persons a very little matter—one rather to be laughed at, than seriously opposed. But neither in itself, nor in its consequences, is the error in question to be regarded as a slight one. It is of a very serious nature. The first verse of the Bible announces the creation of the heavens and the earth—the existence of an outer, material universe. It is of some importance whether we receive or reject this primeval revelation. God has furnished us with our external senses—the means of becoming acquainted with the outer world. It is of some importance for us to determine whether he has dealt truthfully with us in this matter, or whether he has meant perpetually to deceive us. Our own bodies belong to the material creation; and it is of importance for us to know whether we really have any bodies; whether what we call the body is a fiction or a reality. Our blessed Saviour is said in the Scriptures to have had a body, in which he lived, labored, suffered, and died; in which he rose from the dead, and ascended into the heavens. Shall we say, with the ancient Gnostics, and with modern

transcendentalists, that his body was not an objective reality; or shall we receive the revelation as true?

5. The *philosophical* scepticism, of which I have spoken, stands directly connected with *religious* scepticism. And this brings me to my fifth objection to the transcendental philosophy; it leads to *scepticism in religion*; and worse than this, to *infidelity* and *atheism*.

What is *God*, as set before us in this philosophy? Kant does not seem to know what he is, or to care what. It cannot be proved by pure reason, that there is any God. In his practical reason, he assumes the existence of a *moral law*, and consequently of a Lawgiver and Judge. Still, he thinks "it of no importance whether our notions of God are theoretically correct. It is enough that we have a subjective knowledge of him in the idea of duty."

The God of Fichté is "the moral order of the universe." The God of Schelling is "the universe itself." The God of Hegel is "the whole process of human thought;" and as though this was making too much of God, he decides again that "*God is nothing*." With some of these philosophers, the doctrine of God is pantheism;* with others, it is the basest Atheism. In his "Essence of Christianity," Feuerbach argues directly against the existence of God. "This doctrine is the mere invention of our reason. Man collects whatever is most excellent in himself, and attributes these qualities to an imaginary being, whom he calls God. It is not, then, God who has created man, but man has created God. Man has detached the noblest part of his soul, assigned it to a separate existence, and called it, in turn, Brumha, Jupiter, Apollo, Jehovah, Jesus." "The best service for the world is to rid it of all religions. The more God has been exalted, the more miserable man has become. Man is robbed, to enrich his fancied divinity. Away with these notions, the sources of so many hatreds and crimes. Away with a belief in invisible beings, who have no reality but in ourselves."

It may be interesting to inquire, what these philosophers think of Christ; for the most of them still bear the name

*Heine said, in 1835, "Germany is at present the fertile soil of Pantheism. That is the religion of all our greatest thinkers, of all our best artists. You do not hear it spoken of, but every one knows it. *Pantheism is the public secret of Germany*. We have, in fact, outgrown Deism."

of Christian. Where in the scale of existence do they place the Saviour? And I reply, *almost anywhere*, to suit their convenience. Some say, with Strauss, that there is not, and never was, any *personal* Christ; that the Christ of history is but an *ideal* personage—the hero of the Christian myths. Others say, with Theodore Parker, that Christ is but a man like ourselves; the greatest man, perhaps, that has ever lived, though not so great as may be anticipated in future years. Others still say, as do many of the Germans, that Christ is *Divine*. These men have no difficulty in subscribing to the Divinity of Christ. Every human being is Divine. Christ was truly “God manifest in the flesh;” and so was Schelling, so was Hegel, so is every thing which partakes of flesh and blood.

The treatment which *the Bible* has received, and is receiving, from the rationalists, the allegorists, the transcendentalists of Germany, should forever consign them to the rank of infidels. Not only is its inspiration denied, and its authority placed on the same level with that of the Shastres and the Koran, but the most profane attempts are continually made to pervert its meaning, and turn it into fable. One tells us that “the prophets delivered the offspring of their own brains, as Divine revelation.” Another says, “the narrations in the New Testament, true or false, are only suited for ignorant, uncultivated minds, who cannot enter into the evidence of natural religion.” A third speaks of St. John’s portion of the New Testament as “inconsistent with itself, and made up of allegories.” A fourth glories in having given “a little light to St. Paul’s darkness,” a darkness, he thinks, “industriously affected.” A fifth represents Joshua’s account of “the conquest of Canaan as fictitious;” the books of Samuel as “containing a multitude of falsehoods;” and Daniel as “full of stories, contrived or exaggerated by superstition.” A sixth insists that “God could not have required of Abraham so horrible a crime as the offering up of his son, and that there can be no palliation or excuse for this pretended command of the Deity.” A seventh thinks that the song of the angels at the birth of Christ was but the night-scream of some Bethlehemite, who was out with a lantern, on purpose, perhaps, to frighten the shepherds. An eighth explains the effusion of the Spirit on the day of Pentecost as an electric gust, and the effects

which followed as enthusiasm. A ninth suggests that Peter stabbed Ananias, "which," says he, "does not at all disagree with the vehement and easily exasperated temper of Peter." A tenth teaches that "the Pentateuch was composed about the time of the captivity;" that the "Jewish ritual was of gradual formation, accessions being made to it by superstition;" and that "the books of Chronicles—which are filled with scraps and inconsistencies—were foisted into the canon by some of the priesthood, who wished to exalt their own order."

I might extend this list of quotations to almost any length; but enough, surely, has been said to sustain, against the transcendental teachers of Germany, the charge of infidelity.

6. My last objection to the transcendental system grows out of its ruinous *practical* influence. The nature of this influence may be inferred from the doctrines which the system teaches, or (more properly) which it denies. It denies, as we have seen, a personal God, and thus takes away the fear of God. It denies the Divine authority of the holy Scriptures, and of all those stirring, sanctifying truths which the Scriptures reveal. It denies the personal immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments. It denies, also, the freedom of the will, and, (like its opposite, materialism) issues in *fate*. "The mechanical theory of the French Atheists, and the ideal theory of the transcendentalists, arrive, in this view, though by different routes, at much the same conclusion. And though each brings with it somewhat of the dust of the road over which it has come, there is not much to choose between them. The one is, indeed, more *refined* and *spiritual* than the other. We hear less of the working and grinding of the machinery. It is an abstract, an ideal mechanism to which it subjects us; still, it is a *mechanism*. All things are moved on by a resistless destiny. Even God is no more than a creative force, which could not but pass into act. And every man is but the exponent of some pre-existing necessity."

Speaking of this system of idealism, Mr. Morell says: "Human freedom entirely vanishes under its shadow.—The man is but the mirror of the Absolute; his consciousness must ever roll onward by the fixed law of all being;

his personality is sunk in the Infinite; he can never be aught but what he really is. Moral obligation must here perish, because freedom is annihilated; and the law of progress being fixed, man becomes irresponsible. This conclusion," adds Morell, "is one against which no logical finesse can ever save us."*

With such views as to the necessity of human existence and action, it is obvious that the transcendentalist can have no proper conceptions of sin. "Sin is a part of the necessary evolution of the Divine principle. Or rather—in any such sense as can affect the conscience,—there is no *evil* in sin. There is *no sin*. The poet Schefer says, expressly, "that all which we regard as sin is *necessary*, and therefore *good*; and may, to other intelligences, appear most lovely."

And if there is no evil in sin, then there is no reason why it should be repented of, or *punished*. *Is it punished?* Has it ever been punished, or will it be? The results of our actions, indeed, are not all alike. Some are painful, some agreeable. But aside from natural, necessary results, there is no such thing as reward or punishment. There is not, and never was, a *penal* infliction in the universe. There is no personal sovereign, no righteous God and Judge to inflict it.

Entertaining principles such as these, we are not surprised to hear some of the transcendental doctors uttering themselves in language like the following: "Humanity is always in the right. Every thing which exists, through the concurrence of humanity, is right. It has its apology in its existence." "Success is the criterion of moral excellence. In every battle that has ever been fought, the victorious party was the better, and therefore victorious. The vanquished party deserved to be vanquished. Our sympathy and applause should ever be on the side of the victor, for his is the better cause."†

Among the evil results of the transcendental philosophy is *intellectual and spiritual pride*. This is a kind of knowledge which "puffeth up." It leads those who embrace it to fancy themselves exceedingly profound and

* History of Philosophy, p. 476. † Cousin's Introduction, pp. 282, 309.

wise. They boast of progress,* and think themselves far in advance of all the rest of the world. This feeling of the *young* and *would-be* transcendentalists is admirably hit off by a late writer in the Edinburgh Review. "There are thousands of youths in our day, to whom every thing settled is a sham, an unreality; who tell us that the world stands in need of a great prophet, a seer, a true priest, a large soul, a godlike soul,—who shall dive into the depths of the human consciousness, and whose utterances shall rouse the human mind from the cheats and frauds which have every where been practised on its simplicity. They tell us that all that has been believed hitherto, in regard to philosophy and religion, has been believed on empirical grounds, and that the old answers to difficulties will do no longer. They shake their sage heads at such men as Clarke, Paley, and Butler, and declare that such arguments as theirs will not satisfy *them*." "Sometimes the spirit of unbelief puts on an air of sentimental *regret*, at its own inconvenient profundity. Many a worthy youth tells us he almost wishes he *could* believe. He admires the moral grandeur, the ethical beauty of many parts of Christianity; he condescends to *patronize* Jesus Christ, and thinks him a very great man, worthy of comparison with Mahomet, Luther, Napoleon, and other heroes. He even admits the happiness of a simple, childlike faith, it produces such content of mind. But, alas! *he* cannot believe; his intellect is not satisfied; he has revolved the matter too profoundly to be thus taken in. He *must*, he supposes, (and he sighs while he says it,) bear the penalty of a too restless intellect, and a too speculative genius. He knows all the usual arguments which satisfied such men as Pascal, and Butler, and Bacon, and Newton; but they will do no longer. More tremendous difficulties have suggested themselves to his mind, and far different answers are required now."

*Lichtenberg, a witty German philosopher, speaking of *progress*, says: "Our world will yet grow so refined, that it will be just as ridiculous to believe in a God as it now is to believe in *ghosts*. And then, after a while, the world will grow more refined still; and so it will go on, with great rapidity, to the utmost summit of refinement. Having attained the pinnacle, the judgment of the wise will be reversed; and knowledge will change itself for the last time. Then—and this will be the end—then shall we believe in *nothing but ghosts*. We shall ourselves be as God. We shall know that *essence or existence* is and can be nothing—but a *phantom*."

It is evident, from the feeling here developed, that the new philosophy, notwithstanding its absurdities and its blasphemies, has still much to recommend it. "It has a side for all classes of men. For the contemplative and the devout, it has its mysticism, its vagueness, its vastness. For the poet, too, it has its enchantments; as it gives consciousness and life to every thing, and makes all things expressive of one infinite, endless mind. For the proud, no Circe ever mingled half so intoxicating a cup. Ye shall be *as* gods, said the arch tempter, six thousand years ago. *Ye are God*, he now whispers into willing ears. For the vain and frivolous, it has charms scarcely to be resisted. It gives them an easy greatness. They have only to talk of the *me*, and the *not me*, of the heights of the absolute, and the profundities of the human consciousness; and they are beyond the depth of all ordinary men. For the pleasure loving and the sensual, this philosophy is a perfect heaven. It legitimates and dignifies all their enjoyments. It makes self-indulgence religion. It forbids all remorse and fear."

That a system so manifold as this, which has a chamber of imagery for every vain imagination, should find advocates and friends, is not a matter of surprise. But with all its fascinations, it fails to satisfy the soul. It fails to sustain even its votaries under affliction; and when support of some kind is most needed, it leaves them to sink away in darkness. There is something intensely affecting in the following confession of Fichté, with which I propose to end this discussion. I commend it to the consideration of all readers, whose hearts incline them towards this specious but delusive philosophy.

"There is absolutely nothing permanent, either without me, or within me, but only an unceasing change. I know absolutely nothing of any existence, not even my own. I myself know nothing, and am nothing. *Images* there are—they constitute all that apparently exists; images that pass and vanish, with nought to witness their transition; that consist, in fact, of the images of images, without significance or aim. I am myself one of these images; nay, I am not even so much, but only a confused image of images. All reality is converted into a marvellous dream, without a life to dream of, or a mind to dream—into a dream, made up only of a dream of itself. Perception is a

dream ; and *thought*, the source of all the existence and all the reality which I imagine to myself of *my* existence, my power, and my destination, is the *dream of that dream*."

ARTICLE III.

THE VARIETY OF SHAKSPEARE.

The Works of William Shakspeare.

The highest tribute to the genius of Shakspeare is the unceasing reproduction of his works, in every variety of form and price, from the sumptuous volume that glitters on the parlor table to the humble one that lies thumbed and worn with use in the cottage window. This shows that publishers, who know what will sell, rely unhesitatingly on the demand for the works of the great English Bard. Many works of genius and real interest, produced since the Bard of Avon came forth to claim the world's ear, have been submerged and lost in the great deluge which the press has poured upon us, or have turned aside from the main current and are resting in the quiet eddies of antiquarian libraries, while his plays are still borne on the crest of the proudest wave.

But our readers need not be alarmed by the apprehension that we are about to enter on a formal criticism of this writer. This has been done so frequently, and in such a variety of ways, that were we to attempt it we should fear the charge of being at once pedantic and presumptuous. Our purpose is no more ambitious than to present a single trait of Shakspeare's genius, which, unless we are mistaken, has not been developed by his critics and commentators. We refer to the almost boundless variety of his imagery, even when it is drawn from the same natural object. In doing this we will be compelled to introduce a larger number of extracts than is usual in such an article. But this will be far from an objection. A young divine once had for hearers two persons of rather critical turn of mind. As they walked home together, one said to the other—"Our young preacher gave us a good many quota-

tions from Young, Blair and Milton to-day." "Yes," said the other, "and they were by no means the worst parts of his discourse." This anecdote cheers us on in our work, for we are satisfied that if our readers find nothing new and good in our remarks, they cannot fail of much that is old and good in our quotations, and we shall feel no mortification if they agree in saying "the old is better."

Nothing is more common than for writers to fall into a stereotyped form of describing natural objects. Their figures meet us as old and well remembered friends. The chances are greatly in favor of the morn being always "rosy," or the twilight always "dewy" or "gray." Even the genius of Milton did not lift him entirely above this evidence of poverty of phraseology. In two beautiful descriptions of dawn, in his *Paradise Lost*, the same element is prominent in each. In Book fifth, he says:

"Now morn, her rosy steps in the eastern clime
Advancing, sowed the earth with orient pearl."

In Book sixth, he writes:

——"till morn,
Waked by the circling hours, with rosy hand
Unbarred the gates of light."

Of course, every poet describes the morning. We will not be surprised, therefore, to find it a favorite with Shakspeare. He uses it with great frequency. But here we notice the very trait to which we wish to call the reader's attention. Each time the figure appears on the stage it is so varied as to be really a new thing. Even when the same feature reappears, (which is but very rarely,) it is so combined as to possess the grace and interest of novelty. And in this Shakspeare has but followed nature, which is always varying. No landscape presents the same aspect a second time. Its colors and shapes are ever standing in new and more beautiful combinations. The sea is not the same. At one time it is a giant, sleeping and smiling in its sleep—the pulsations of whose mighty heart send its waves in gentle murmurs to the echoing shore. And then it is, like that giant, thoroughly aroused—in Titan rebellion lifting its vast and resistless waves towards heaven. It is ever changing from the gloom and terror of the tempest through all the variations that lead to the laughing gladness of sunshine and calm. Now what Shakspeare has

done is to catch this ever-varying aspect, and eternize it in his writings. He was pre-eminently a close observer of nature. And he wrote far more objectively than subjectively. He oftener tells what appearance the scene presented to the beholder than what effect it produced on him.

Another cause of this infinite variety is to be found in the fact that he seems to have thrown his own intellect into the individualities of the characters he describes, so that they see and hear and speak as they would have done if endowed with his genius. He therefore saw nature from as many points of view and through as many media as there were characters described. And when the object and the subject were thus ever changing, even the unflagging variety of Shakspeare does not surprise us.

But our readers may think that we are putting philosophy before fact. We will therefore proceed to give the grounds on which this criticism has been based, and let them philosophize for themselves at will. We have already intimated that Shakspeare's descriptions of morning will illustrate the trait of which we speak. And we now exhibit the *materiel* of our judgment. The first quotation is from the *Tempest*, where Prospero describes the dissolution of the spell which he had thrown over Gonzalo, Sebastian and others.

"The charm dissolves apace;
And as the morning steals upon the night,
Melting the darkness, so their rising senses
Begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle
Their clearer reason."

The next from king Richard the Second, where the proud and confident monarch likens his appearance before his enemies to the terrifying influence of the rising sun on thieves and robbers.

"But when, from under this terrestrial ball,
He fires the proud tops of the eastern pines,
And darts his light through every guilty hole,
Then murders, treasons, and detested sins,
The cloak of night being pluck'd from off their backs,
Stand bare and naked, trembling at themselves."

It is worthy of remark, by the way, that this is a scriptural figure. Job says, of certain sinners, "For the morning is to them even as the shadow of death: if one know them, they are in the terrors of the shadow of death."

In the same play York describes the appearance of Richard thus :

"See, see, king Richard doth himself appear,
As doth the blushing discontented sun
From out the fiery portal of the east,
When he perceives the envious clouds are bent
To dim his glory, and to stain the track
Of his bright passage to the occident."

Again, in the third part of king Henry VI. :

"See, how the morning opes her golden gates,
And takes her farewell of the glorious sun!
How well resembles it the prime of youth,
Trimm'd like a younker, prancing to his love."

Here again the biblical reader will discover evidences of Shakspeare's indebtedness to the book of God. "In them hath he set a tabernacle for the sun, which is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run a race."

In a later part of the same play we find these lines :

"And when the morning sun shall raise his car
Above the border of this horizon."

This, unless we are mistaken, is the only instance in which our author seems to have been influenced by the stale, classic image of Phœbus and his car.

Stanly, in Richard III., thus describes the opening day :

"The silent hours steal on,
And flaky darkness breaks within the east."

Still a new aspect is given to the birth of day, in Julius Cæsar. Cinna says to Casca,

"O, pardon, sir, it doth; and yon grey lines,
That fret the clouds, are messengers of day."

In Hamlet, Horatio says :

"But, look, the morn, in russet mantle clad,
Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastern hill."

A few gems from Romeo and Juliet will close our selections on this subject.

Benvoli. Madam, an hour before the worshipp'd sun
Peer'd forth the golden window of the east."

Lady Montague, in replying to the observation of which this is the beginning, gives us another dash of Shakspeare's pencil, in his grand picture of dawn :

"But all so soon as the all cheering sun
Should in the furthest east begin to draw
The shady curtains from Aurora's bed,
Away from light steals home my heavy son."

But now Friar Laurence gives us his portraiture :

"The grey-ey'd morn smiles on the frowning night,
Checkering the eastern clouds with streaks of light;
And flecked darkness like a drunkard reels
From forth day's pathway, made by Titan's wheels."

But the most exquisite gem of all is found in the scene of the lovers parting—where regret at its coming, and an acute sensibility to the loveliness of the dawn, are curiously yet beautifully blended.

Romeo. It was the lark, the herald of the morn,
No nightingale: look, love, what envious streaks
Do lace the severing clouds in yonder east;
Night's candles are burnt out, and jocund day
Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain tops;
I must be gone and live, or stay and die."

So far as we remember, these are all the descriptions that Shakspeare gives us of dawn. Now look back over them, and mark their variety. In such a number of descriptions, it is worthy of note that no one image returns upon us. And there is, in fact, the reproduction of but two epithets—"envious" and "golden," which occur each a second time. But then they are used for purposes so different, and appear in such new combinations, as to give no offence to the most fastidious ear.

Shakspeare and Milton have both described evening as well as morning; and while the palm of beauty is certainly due to Milton, that of variety falls, as usual, to Shakspeare's share. Every reader will at once recur to the celebrated passage in the fourth book of *Paradise Lost*:

"Now came still evening on, and twilight gray
Had in her sober livery all things clad."

This is surpassingly beautiful. But perhaps the most prominent feature of the picture meets us again in *Comus*—thus illustrating the point of comparison which we make between these great poets—the greatest, perhaps, the world has ever seen.

"They left me then, when the gray-hooded even,
Like a sad votarist in palmer's weed,
Rose from the hindmost wheels of Phœbus' wain."

Turn we now to the great dramatist, and though the exquisite loveliness of these passages is wanting, yet we find a variety to which they can lay no claim. When Titinius is in the play of Julius Cæsar describing the death of Cassius, he exclaims :

“O, setting sun!
As in thy red rays thou dost sink to night,
So in his red blood Cassius’ day is set.”

Then in Richard III. sunset is thus portrayed :

“The weary sun hath made a golden set,
And, by the bright track of his fiery ear,
Gives token of a goodly day to-morrow.”

But where what may be called the staple of the figure does not present the endless variety of eve or morn, and even by its simplicity seems to forbid it, yet in Shakspeare’s delineations it at once appears. On two noted occasions he uses a tree as supplying the material of his trope. One is in Cymbeline :

“Then was I as a tree,
Whose boughs did bend with fruit : but in one night,
A storm, or robbery, call it what you will,
Shook down my mellow hangings, nay, my leaves,
And left me bare to weather.”

The other is found in Woolsey’s farewell advice to Cromwell—the sigh of a great heart, in bursting, which has echoed through the world.

“This is the state of man : to-day he puts forth
The tender leaves of hope, to-morrow blossoms,
And bears his blushing honors thick upon him :
The third day, comes a frost, a killing frost ;
And, when he thinks, good easy man, full surely
His greatness is a ripening—nips his root,
And then he falls, as I do.”

Now these two remarkable passages are as independent and have as much freshness as if the trope were derived from entirely different objects in nature. And there is no air of studied care about these passages, as if the writer had painfully avoided sameness in his pictures. We have no idea that he thought of the matter at all. This prodigal richness of imagery seems to have been spontaneous. In each case the circumstances suggested the image, and gave it its appropriate coloring ; and as these were ever varying, so is the language.

These remarks will suffice for the illustration of our theme so far as it concerns the description of external objects. But the same copious richness is observable in Shakspeare's delineations of the passions and powers of the mind. Take, for instance, love, as painted by him, and the ever-varying hues of evening are not more changeable or beautiful, than those with which his magic pencil adorns it. We have the highly refined, yet still sensuous love of Romeo and Juliet—the pure and lofty affection, blended with admiration and esteem, of Brutus for Portia—the mere beastly lust of that “irregulous devil,” Cloten—the true womanly devotion and self-forgetfulness of Imogen, and the caricature of the passion in Falstaff. In short, he describes the fickle God in terms as changeable as his own moods. How does every true husband's heart leap in response to Brutus' protestation to his noble Portia,

“You are my true and honorable wife,
As dear to me as are the ruddy drops
That visit this sad heart.”

Then, in Cleopatra and Anthony, it is the wild and tumultuous passion overleaping all restraints of interest or decency—which scorns the effort of words to tell it, and looks upon the possibility of its being reckoned as a beggary—which invests its object in fabulous attributes of glory and excellency—which impatiently welcomes death as the means of rejoining it. Then, in striking contrast, we have the bluff, honest advances of Henry V. to Catharine :

“If I might buffet for my love, or bound my horse for her favors, I could lay on like a butcher and sit like a jackanapes, never off—but I cannot look greenly nor gasp out my eloquence, nor I have no cunning in protestation; only downright oaths, which I never use till urged, nor never break for urging. I speak to thee plain soldier. If thou canst love me for this, take me; if not, to say to thee, I shall die, is true; but for thy love,—no! yet, I love thee too.”

Again, it forgets all faults and refuses to perceive blemishes.

“All frantic;
Sees Helen's beauty in a brow of Egypt.”

It cannot bear separation—absence is death.

“I am undone; there is no living, none,
If Bertram be away.”

Hopelessness of gaining the object does not quench the passion. Though distant as some “bright particular star,”

the loved is cherished still. When hopeless it lives still in silence, and

“ Lets concealment, like a worm i’ the bud,
Feed on the damask cheek.”

But after all, Rosalind, in “As you like it,” tells us that it is not so dangerous, or at least, fatal, as one would suppose.

“The poor world is almost six thousand years old, and in all this time there was not any man died in his own person, videlicet, in a love-cause. Troilus had his brains dashed out with a Grecian club; yet he did what he could to die before; and he is one of the patterns of love. Leander, he would have lived many a fair year, though Hero had turned nun, if it had not been for a hot midsummer night; for good youth, he went but forth to wash him in the Hellespont, and being taken with the cramp was drowned; and the foolish chroniclers of the age found it was—Hero of Sestos. But these are all lies; men have died from time to time and worms have eaten them, but not for love.”

Then it makes one capricious, so that he is satisfied with nothing.

“ O spirit of love, how quick and pert art thou,
That notwithstanding thy capacity
Receiveth as the sea, nought enters there
Of what validity and pitch soever
But falls into abatement and low price;
Even in a minute, so full of shapes is fancy,
That it alone is high—fantastical.”

Then the passion is a thing to be deprecated and avoided.

“ To be in love when scorn is bought with groans,
Coy looks with heart-sore sighs, one fading moment’s myrth
With twenty watchful, weary, tedious nights,
If haply won, perhaps a hapless gain;
If lost, why then a grievous labor won,
However, but a folly bought with wit,
Or else a wit by folly vanquished.”

After this, it will not surprise us to find the course of true love described as a brawling brook, with its whirlpools, and eddies and falls—one, in short, whose current never does run smooth. And then it has

“ The uncertain glory of an April day,
Which now shows all the glory of the sun,
And by and by a cloud takes all away.”

At one time it is a thing to be scoffed at and jeered, and its power renounced; and then

“ Love’s a mighty lord,
And hath so humbled me, as I confess,
There is no wo to his correction;

Nor to his service no such joy on earth.
 Now, no discourse, except it be of love;
 Now can I break my fast, dine, sup, and sleep,
 Upon the naked name of love?"

And yet, if we are to believe Shakspeare, this love is not such pleasant food after all.

"Sweet love, I see changing his property,
 Turns to the sourest and most deadly hate."

But then in its Protean diversity it takes another form, or rather, forms of annoyance,

"Love is a smoke raised with the fume of sighs,
 Being urged, a fire sparkling in lover's eyes;
 Being vexed, a sea nourished with lover's tears."

And then, as if out of all patience with it, he adds:

"What is it else? a madness most discreet;
 A choking gall and a preserving sweet."

And love can change its object, too, as well as vex its subject.

"Holy Saint Francis! what a change is here;
 Is Rosaline, whom thou didst love so dear,
 So soon forsaken? Young men's love then lies
 Not truly in their hearts, but in their eyes.
 Jesu Maria! what a deal of brine
 Hath washed thy sallow cheeks for Rosaline;
 The sun not yet thy sighs from heaven clears;
 Thy old groans ring yet in my ancient ears,
 So here upon thy cheek the stain doth sit,
 Of an old tear that is not washed off yet."

But our catalogue of varieties on this subject would be incomplete without Moth's sage advice how to win love.

"Humor it with turning up your eye-lids; sing a note and sigh a note; sometime through your throat as if you swallowed love with singing love; sometime through the nose, as if you snuffed up love by smelling love; with your hat pent-house-like, over the shop of your eyes, with your arms crossed—like a rabbit on a spit; or your hands in your pocket, like a man after the old painting; and keep not long in one tune but a snip and away."

Lest we grow wearisome, however, we will conclude by giving what may be called Shakspeare's Pathology or Diagnosis of Love:

Rosalind. "My uncle taught me how to know a man in love. A lean cheek, a blue eye, and sunken—a beard neglected. Then your hose should be ungartered, your bonnet unbanded, your sleeve unbuttoned, your shoe untied, and every thing about you demonstrating a careless desolation."

We must not forget that Speed tries his hand at the same picture.

Valentine. "Why how know you that I am in love?"

Speed. "Marry, by these special works: First, you have learned to wreath your arms, like a male-content to relish a love song like a robin-red-breast; o walk alone like one that had the pestilence; to sigh like a school-boy that had lost his A. B. C.; to weep like a young wench that had buried her grandam; to fast like one that takes diet; to watch like one that fears robbing; to speak puling like a beggar at Hallowmas. You were wont, when you laughed, to crow like a cock; when you walked to walk like one of the lions; when you fasted it was presently after dinner; when you looked sadly it was for want of money; and now, you are metamorphosed with a mistress, that when I look on you, I can hardly think you are my master."

Biron presents the matter in a new light. It is the patient's description of his own symptoms:

"I will not love; if I do hang me; i'faith I will not. O but her eyes—by this light, but for her eye, I would not love her; yes, for her two eyes: Well, I do nothing in the world but lie and lie in my throat. By heaven, I do love, and it hath taught me to rhyme and to be melancholy."

And now we end the matter by Rosalind's solemn sentence on the whole thing:

"Love is merely a madness, and I tell you, deserves as well a dark house and a whip, as madmen do; and the reason why they are not so punished and curded is, that the lunacy is so ordinary that the whippers are in love too."

But it is not merely in the delineation of what may be called the lighter passions of the human mind that the exuberance of Shakspeare's genius is displayed. He strikes with a masters hand those chords of the soul which vibrate the deepest notes of woe, which our mysterious nature can give forth. For instance, he is the greatest writer in any language on the faculty of conscience. Unconsciously it may be has given the world a high moral and religious discourse on this strangely terrible part of our constitution, before which the most vivid pictures even of our theologians and preachers suffer in comparison. How striking, and yet how concise, is Hamlet's display of its fearful agency when he says in his soliloquy,

"Thus conscience does make cowards of us all."

And the language of his mother, when he has aroused her moral nature to its work, sounds like the shriek of a lost soul in reviewing, per force, its evil deeds.

"O Hamlet, speak no more,
Thou turnest mine eyes into my very soul

And there I see such blaek and grained spots
As will not leave their tinct."

Of course, the still more guilty King is not to go unwhipped of Justice even in this life. His speech is so long that we would not quote it but for the opinion that if one has read it a score of times, yet another perusal will give a still more vivid conception of its awful majesty.

"O, my offence is rank, it smells to heaven;
It hath the primal eldest curse upon't,
A brother's murder!—Pray can I not,
Though inclination be as sharp as will;
My stronger guilt defeats my strong intent;
And, like a man to double business bound,
I stand in pause where I shall first begin,
And both neglect. What if this cursed hand
Were thicker than itself with brother's blood?
Is there not rain enough in the sweet heavens,
To wash it white as snow? Whereto serves mercy,
But to confront the visage of offence?
And what's in prayer, but this two-fold force,—
To be forestalled, ere we come to fall,
Or pardon'd, being down? Then I'll look up;
My fault is past. But, O, what form of prayer
Can serve my turn? Forgive me my foul murder!—
That cannot be; since I am still possess'd
Of those effects for which I did the murder,
My crown, mine own ambition, and my queen.
May one be pardon'd, and retain the offence?
In the corrupted currents of this world,
Offence's gilded hand may shove by justice;
And oft 'tis seen, the wicked prize itself
Buys out the law: But 'tis not so above:
There is no shuffling, there the action lies
In his true nature; and we ourselves compell'd,
Even to the teeth and forehead of our faults,
To give in evidence. What then? what rests?
Try what repentance can: What can it not?
Yet what can it, when one can not repent?
O wretched state! O bosom, black as death!
O limed soul; that struggling to be free,
Art more engag'd!"

We can only refer to the last speech of Buckingham in the 5th Act of Richard the III.—to King Richard's dream in the 3rd Scene of the same Act, and to his interpretation of a cloudy day which ushered in the battle, which is in the same Scene. In the second part of Henry VI., we have this passage:

"What stronger breast-plate than a heart untainted;
Thrice is he armed that has his quarrel just,
And he but naked, though locked up in steel,
Whose conscience with injustice is corrupted."

And in close connection this picture of a sinner's death-bed :

"Cardinal Beaufort is at point of death.
For suddenly a grievous sickness took him
That makes him gasp, and stare, and catch the air,
Blaspheming God and cursing men on earth.
Sometimes he talks as if Duke Humphrey's ghost
Were by his side ; sometimes he calls the king
And whispers to his pillow as to him,
The secrets of his over charged soul."

And then the monitor in the bosom of Alonzo, in the tempest, gives to all nature's elements a tongue and speech.

"O it is monstrous, monstrous,
Methought the billows spoke and told me of it;
The winds did sing it to me; and the thunder,
That deep and dreadful organ-pipe, pronounced
The name of Prosper; it did bass my trespass,
Therefore, my son i'the ooze is bedded."

The remorse of a servant who has deserted a good master in the day of adversity, is painted in the soliloquy of Enobarbus in *Anthony and Cleopatra*, A. 4, Sc. 9 : "The heaviness and guilt" within the bosom of Jachimo "takes off his manhood," and a "heavy conscience" makes him an easy prey to his enemy. But all things considered, perhaps the most complete delineation of the vengeance that conscience takes for sin, is found in *Macbeth*. The very thought of his sin when first presented, appalls him :

"That suggestion
Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair,
And make my sealed heart knock at my ribs
Against the use of nature."

The temptation grown familiar, is soon found settling into a plan. But even when deliberating, conscience is faithful and comes to warn him of the consequences of what he is about to do,

"But in these cases
We still have judgment here; that we but teach
Bloody instructions, which being taught return
To plague the inventor. This evenhanded justice
Commends the ingredients of our poisoned chalice
To our own lips."

A yet more powerful warning meets him on the threshold of his crime. The solemn shades of night are around him and he is alone, but for his purposes of sin.

"Is this a dagger that I see before me,
The handle toward my hand? Come let me clutch thee,

I have thee not, and yet I see thee still ;
 Art thou not, false vision, sensible
 To feeling as to sight ? or art thou but
 A dagger of the mind ; a false creation
 Proceeding from the heat oppressed brain ?
 I see thee yet in form as palpable
 As this which now I draw,
 Thou marshallst me the way that I was going,
 And such an instrument I was to use.
 Mine eyes are made the fools o' the other senses
 Or else worth all the rest. I see thee still ;
 And on thy blade and dudgeon gouts of blood,
 Which was not so before. There's no such thing,
It is the bloody business, which informs
Thus to mine eyes."

Though thus warned he goes on in the path of sin, for a crown glitters before him. But when the deed is done his abused conscience asserts and vindicates its outraged authority.

"I have done the deed. *Didst thou not hear a noise ?*
 Methought I heard a voice cry, *sleep no more ;*
 Macbeth does murder sleep, *the innocent sleep."*

And when urged to return for but a moment, to the scene of his foul wrong, he cowers before his conscience. It has made him a coward ;

"I'll go no more,
 I am afraid to think what I have done,
 Look on 't again, I dare not."

His companion, however, though of the gentler sex, is made of sterner stuff. She scoffs at his fears, as idle and childish.

Infirm of purpose !
 Give me the daggers. The sleeping and the dead
 Are but as pictures : 'tis the eye of childhood
 That fears a painted devil."

In the absence of his wife the work of retribution begins.

"What hands are these. Ha ! they pluck out mine eyes,
 Will all great Neptune's ocean wash this blood
 Clean from my hand ? No, this my hand will rather
 The multitudinous seas incarnardine
 Making the green-one red."

One short line reveals the hell within his bosom,

"Wake Duncan with thy knocking. *I would thou couldst."*

The station, lofty though it be, which he has gained by his crime, cannot soothe him. At the festal board—surround-

ed by his friends, his sin finds him out. The ghost of murdered Banquo thrusts itself into his seat at table, and the agony of his soul finds vent in the self-condemning protestation :

"Thou canst not say I did it; never shake
Thy gory locks at me."

But Lady Macbeth soon finds, heroine as she is, that she has awaked an avenger within her before which her iron firmness quails, and that mocks at her exorcisms. She rises from her bed where remembered guilt will not let her repose, and appears washing the hands whose tinct of blood conscience keeps ever bright.

"Yet here's a spot.—Out, damned spot! Out, I say!"

(Her regal spirit struggles heroically with the avenger—but succumbs at last.)

"One! Two; Why then 'tis time to do it: Hell is murky!—Fie, my Lord, fie! A soldier, and afeard? What need we fear who knows it, when none can call our power to account? Yet *who would have thought the old man had so much blood in him.*—What, will these hands never be clean? No more o'that, my Lord, no more o'that: you mar all with this starting.—Here's the smell of the blood still: All the perfumes of Arabia will not sweeten this little hand. Oh! oh! oh!—Wash your hands, put on your night-gown; Look not so pale: I tell you yet again, Banquo's buried; he can not come out of his grave."

And here the curtain falls on her. We witness no more of the deadly strife of her lofty spirit with the horrors of remorse. But an additional picture of horror is given by the consultation of Macbeth and the Physician, which but partially draws the curtain from her chamber of terrors—leaving the heated imagination to do the rest, ranging at will over the whole machinery of punishment that can be brought to bear on human guilt.

Doctor. Not so sick, my Lord,
As she is troubled with thick coming fancies
That keep her from her rest.

Macbeth. Cure her of that:
Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased,
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow;
Raze out the written troubles of the brain;
And with some sweet oblivions antidote
Cleanse the stuffed bosom of the perilous stuff
Which weighs upon the heart?"

In these passages Shakspeare develops the dread philosophy of conscience. We have not time or space to dwell

on the various forms of speech he uses in his delineation. Our readers can do that for themselves. Suffice it to say he has used the whole diapason of the heart, in his solemn dirge "of wrath and woe and punishment."

One would think that a mind so full of all that is terrible in this faculty would have no room for any other than a serious view of it. This mistake, however, will be corrected by a reference to the serio-comic dialogue of the two murderers, in Act 1, Scene 4, of *Richard III.* And true to his custom of giving every view of a theme—Shakspeare furnishes us the broad farce of the subject in *Launcelot Gobbo's dilemma* in the merchant of Venice, Act 2, Sc. 2.

ARTICLE IV.

THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

1. *The Unity of the Human Races.* By the Rev. THOMAS SMYTH, DD.; pp. 404, 12mo. New York, GEORGE P. PUTNAM, 1850.
2. *The doctrine of the Unity of the Human Race, Examined on the Principles of Science.* By JOHN BACHMAN, DD., Charleston, S. C., 1850.
3. *The Charleston Medical Journal*, March, 1850, Art. 7; May, Art. 10; July, Art. 9; September, Art. 6; *Letters between JOHN BACHMAN, DD. and SAMUEL GEORGE MORTON, M. D., on the hybridity of animals.*
4. *The Races of Eden, and their Geographical distribution.* By CHARLES PICKERING, M. D.
5. *The Races of Men: A Fragment*, by ROBERT KNOX, M. D.
6. *The Christian Examiner and Religious Miscellany.* March, 1850, and July, 1850; on *the Geographical Distribution of Animals and The Diversity of Origin of the Human Races.* By Prof. LOUIS AGASSIZ.
7. *The New Englander.* Nov. 1850, Art. 5. New Haven, Connecticut.

8. *The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review*, Oct., 1850, Art. 6. *Philadelphia.*

We would be very much pleased to see, by some competent hand, a complete history of the controversies which have been had between science and religion. As friends of the Bible, we would have no fears for the results of a full and candid narrative of its conflicts with those who, in every age, have assailed it with the weapons of human philosophies. In such a history we would, of course, expect to find that its advocates had sometimes been guilty of grievous errors, and even egregious follies; but much oftener would it be seen that its enemies had covered themselves with shame; while in every case the final glory would evidently rest upon the word of God, which liveth and abideth forever. One consequence of such a narrative would probably be to prevent hereafter the frequent resurrection of Galileo's ghost to frighten away profane and meddling theologians from the purlieus of laboratories and lecture rooms. This, it is true, would deprive some sciolists, and even some *savans*, of a convenient resource when fact and argument fail them; but we cannot say we would be sorry for this. The poor priests who persecuted that famous astronomer, doubtless made a great blunder; but we think they have sufficiently atoned for it in the derision and rebukes which the scientific world has been careful, with untiring diligence, for two centuries, to inflict upon them. It is rather too much to hold the theologians of every church, of every age, of every country, through all coming time, responsible for the folly of ignorant Roman priests, in an ignorant age. To conjure up the shade of the dead philosopher establishes no fact of science, substantiates no crude induction, answers no opposing argument. To remind us of the bigotry of popish monks in the early dawn of science is no reply to the reasoning of enlightened men, taught from the cradle to think for themselves, and to love all truth as they love its glorious Author, God himself. It would amount to just as much to refer to the opposition of a "medicine man" among the savages to the propagation of knowledge among the victims of his jugglery.—And yet, no minister of religion, any where, can venture to subject the hasty hypotheses of scientific inquirers to the

tests of a rigid examination, but the name of Galileo will be invoked to shame or alarm him into silence. From the grave professor in his lecture room, to the village sciolist scribbling for a country newspaper, it will be used to rebuke his presumption, or to foil the power of his argument. Distinguished men, like Prof. Agassiz, will recall it, and it will be spouted in his face by the green graduates of the Academy.

If there is any force in an appeal to the ignorance and bigotry of past ages, a complete history of the conflicts between religion and pretended science would turn it with overwhelming power against the latter; and the Italian priests who proclaimed it heresy to affirm the revolution of the earth, would be forgotten amid the crowd of more stupid, more fanatical, more enormous bigots in the ranks of infidelity. Galileo would be left to rest in peace, and theologians be permitted freely to investigate the claims of scientific inductions on the world's belief.

We have not been surprised at all by the clamor and complaint which have been raised in various quarters, against the participation of theologians in the recent discussion of the origin and unity of the human races. They are used to such things, however; and they know how to treat them, as christians and as scholars. Insinuations are made against their competency to discuss the question, and it is plainly hinted that any thing they may have to say is not worth the trouble of hearing. As to their ability to investigate this subject, they are willing to let the world judge; but they are not to be hushed into silence by a sneer, and the vain assumption of superiority. It is their privilege, if they choose, to discuss any and all subjects, and their own risk, if they do so unworthily. The logic and learning they may display in the discussion, if deficient, is a fair subject for exposure by their opponents; but they cannot be swept from the field of debate by a proud look of contempt. And their antagonists may find to their cost, that they are too well practised in dialectics, to venture upon the contest without knowing the metal of their weapons, and having well measured the resources of their opponents.

The advocates of a diversity of origin of the human race complain also, that "the insulting epithet of infidel," is ap-

plied to them "by certain divines." It is much when that epithet is regarded by the world as insulting. It argues a prevailing reverence for the precious Bible, which is truly gratifying, and a promising advance on the times when men gloried in that name. But we question very much whether some who repel it, know exactly what constitutes an infidel. We do not doubt Prof. Agassiz, or any other, believes in the religion of the Bible, *as he understands it*. Let him extract a system from the Bible for himself, and call that Christianity, and doubtless he is not an infidel. In the same way Thomas Paine was a good believer, a sincere christian. Now the "divines" claim to know what is the religion of the Bible, what are infidel views, and what constitutes an infidel, and they will not hesitate to declare the fact, if any man betrays his ignorance in these respects. If the prince of science adopts theories which impugn the essential tenets of the Bible, it will not do for him to say he understands it better than the "divines," or to be offended if they tell him his views are infidel. They may use his own language and tell him, if the Gospel contradicts his theories they cannot help it. It is not their business to reconcile them; they must not be required to modify the truth of God to make it square with his hypothesis, and to avoid convicting him of infidelity. It is too late to say that amid the conflicting doctrines of theologians on the subject, there is no received system which constitutes Christianity, the rejection of which is infidelity. There is such a system, admitted and well defined, which has been received in all ages by those who have embraced the Gospel, experienced its power, enjoyed its hopes, lived by its precepts, and exhibited its fruits. And if any man not knowing what that system is, adopts views incompatible with it, we cannot help it, he is an infidel.

It is also charged against the theologians that they are opposed to free inquiry, and unwilling to have the question fully and fairly investigated, lest their craft should be in danger. It is pretty plainly hinted, that having a secret suspicion the result would be against them, they are afraid to have the matter sifted to the bottom; and hence endeavor, by the charge of infidelity, to put down a free discussion. This accusation is usually vented with a bitterness which betrays its source. It is doubtless a very

unpleasant thing to many, that the citadel of truth is guarded by watchful protectors who stand prepared to defend it against any and every aggressor. Men who cordially hate the true system of Christianity, cordially hate all who repel their assaults upon it; and when argument cannot be met by argument, it is convenient, and not altogether unnatural, to meet it by some such murmur about free discussion. And there is nothing surprising in the fact that when the shallow and sophistical theories of vain and self-confident men are examined and exposed, they should be vexed into senseless complaints, and be tempted to opprobrious accusations. It is very annoying, after having spent time and labor in building up a favorite hypothesis, and with happy self-congratulation published it to the world, for stern and unsparing truth to pronounce and prove it vain and worthless. It would be extremely pleasant to range at will through the wilds of speculation, unchecked and unchastised, and to construct here, and there, and every where, fantastic and flimsy imaginations, and name them "truth." But if this is what is meant by "free inquiry," the "divines" avow themselves opposed to it.—Wherever they meet such free discussion they will put it down by whatever weapons of learning, and logic, and invincible, immortal truth, they may be able to command. If other men are free to publish and defend errors and false doctrines, they claim freedom to combat them by the legitimate instruments of better knowledge, and stronger arguments; and if they use the sword of the Spirit, the eternal word of God, let their opponents turn its edge if they can, but let them not weakly cry out "persecution." Every man who loves truth and loves his kind, if he finds a dangerous error running loose about the world will strangle it if he can, as he would a mad-dog, no matter whose name is written on its collar. We subscribe to the sentiment of Coleridge: "as far as opinions and not motives are concerned, principles and not men, I am neither tolerant, nor wish to be regarded as such. As much as I love my fellowmen, so much and no more, will I be intolerant of their heresies and unbelief. And I will honor and hold out the hand of fellowship to every individual who is equally intolerant of what he conceives as such in me."

It is an unjust and unfounded insinuation, to intimate

that our Protestant theologians are opposed to or afraid of free, and full, and fair inquiry on any or all subjects.—They wish it, they invite it, they demand it, they will assist in it. This is just what they are doing on this subject. The right and duty of free inquiry is one of the distinctive principles of Protestantism. We vindicate a religion of conviction against a religion of authority; and it is to the everlasting honor of theologians that they were the first to break the shackles from the human mind, and make good its right to think, to examine, to believe for itself, as God alone may give it light. They themselves unbound the spirit of philosophy, and bade it walk the earth free as the angels of heaven. But while they cheerfully accord free discussion to the opponents of revelation, they claim it for its friends. They will never surrender the privilege of subjecting the theories of science to the severest scrutiny of truth, and they will fearlessly announce the fact if that scrutiny discover them to be fallacious and unfounded.—They are not afraid of inquiry. There is nothing in their own convictions to make them shrink from it. There is nothing in the experience of the past to cause them to fear it. If the philosophers can prove the Bible false, let them do it. None will accept the demonstration more promptly than theologians themselves. They will welcome *truth*, come whence, or where, or how it may—only this every true man will insist upon, that not heated sciolists and heady empirics, no, nor gray haired masters in science, nor sage and honored Professors, shall impose on us their crude and hasty deductions, or their old dogmata, because they are clear affirmations of *their* wisdom. We will question their teachings until they are *proved*. We will take the web of their philosophy to pieces, and try every thread of it, and if we find it rotten we will break it; or if we detect the filling in of human folly, we will take it out; or if we find knots tied by the cunning hand of man, we will loose them, and tell the world of it.

If there is any truth which Science itself teaches us, it is that we should distrust the conclusions of its students, and beware how we rashly accept their hasty, confident and dogmatic assertions. Its history is full of exploded theories and interminable mistakes. In fact the great labor

of each generation of philosophers, is to overthrow the doctrines of the one before it. Some new fact is now and then discovered which upsets the received theory, and requires another to be constructed, to be in its turn, in like manner, demolished. (The origin of geological science has been traced to the discovery at Verona, of a large number of shells embedded in the earth. They attracted the notice of the learned men of the times, and gave rise to discussions of such warmth and interest that the subject has never been laid aside, and has grown up to the modern Geology. But what puerile conceits were defended by the philosophers of that day, respecting those shells! Some maintained they were the result of certain fatty matter, set in fermentation by the natural heat of the earth. Others insisted they were nothing but stones which had received a peculiar form from the stars. The celebrated anatomist, Fallopio, taught that they were produced by "the tumultuary movements of the Earth;" that [the elephant tusks were only earthly concretions, and the vases and other pottery of the Monte Testaceo were "sports of nature to mock the works of man." A Professor of Anatomy, at Basil, pronounced the bones of an elephant to have been those of a giant, nineteen feet high; and in England similar bones were regarded as those of the fallen angels. These examples teach us, not that the wise men of the past were fools,—they were not,—he who thinks them so, convicts himself of the charge,—but the uncertainty of scientific theories, the inherent fallibility of the human mind, and the necessity of caution how we assert or accept the hypotheses of philosophers. We laugh at the past; The future may laugh at us. And many conclusions of science now affirmed with heat and violence, may, in after times, be discarded as the assertions of ignorance and folly. In every generation, the world has to throw aside as false and worthless, what a former age taught and believed as true and good. Even within the compass of every few years, some grand discovery is announced to the world, and a brilliant theory built upon it, which, before the world has well heard of it, some rival philosopher proves a fancy and a falsehood. A few years ago a naturalist announced the discovery of a fossil serpent, near a hundred feet long. The crumbling bones were carefully collected and arranged, and

there lay, evidently, the monster skeleton snake, head, vertebræ, tail, complete. Another naturalist stepped into the exhibition room, scrutinized the nicely fitted fossils, (as the divines do the theories of the philosophers,) declared it was no snake at all, and proved it.—Not long since, a human bone was found, under peculiar circumstances, near the Mississippi river. It was paraded as proof that men have existed on the Earth for tens of thousands of years. That old bone became far more famous than its original owner ever was. It was known and talked about by all the *savants* of Europe and America. After awhile an English Geologist came over, hunted it up, went to the place of discovery, examined carefully the facts, and pronounced it the bone of an Indian, who died not more than a few hundred years ago. But this same Englishman cannot return without giving, himself, an illustration of the ridiculous premises from which many of his profession derive the most important conclusions. Having ascertained the quantity of earthy matter in a gallon of water from the Mississippi river, and estimated the amount of water discharged in a given time by that stream, he constructed, on these data, an immense theory as to the time required to form the delta at its mouth, how long the great river had been flowing there, and the age of this continent. It requires no scientific study to see the fallacy of such reasoning. We know that no ingenuity can make a pyramid stand upon its apex.

Take another example of the way in which the wise men delude themselves, and try to delude others, from another department of learned research : We extract it from the proceedings of the New York Historical Society.

“The celebrated *Ruin*, at Newport, R. I., has been the subject of much speculation at home and abroad ; and the traveller, on his first visit to that delightful watering place, looks down upon it with no little interest from the windows of the Atlantic Hotel, as it stands alone in the midst of the enclosed park or paddock, in front of that edifice. Among the common people it is spoken of familiarly as the “old wind-mill,” and certainly to the outward view it has, in every respect, the appearance of a stone wind-mill. It is built of the stone found on the spot, of a circular form, and of the same altitude with the (wooden) wind-mills still frequent in and around Newport. The Island, as is well known, has no streams affording water power. The only point in the structure which

could give rise to a question, is the fact that it rests upon eight rude pillars or abutments, connected by arches.

"It is, perhaps, this circumstance that has given rise to so much learned speculation among the scholars of Denmark, who have had faith to see in this structure the remains of a settlement or post of the Northmen, who (as they suppose) must have visited the spot long before the discovery of America by Columbus.

"The architecture of the Scandinavian regions has been investigated in search of parallel structures, but without much success. It certainly strikes one as singular that, if it belonged to the Northmen, there should be no other traces of them on all our coasts.—And further, if the structure were a fortified dwelling, it is too small to accommodate more than a very few persons, and yet too massive for so few persons to build; and if (as some say) it was for religious purposes, this is contradicted by the fireplace and other conveniences of a partial dwelling.—But to apply here the similar remarks of the poet Gray, a single line of historic record is worth a whole cart-load of speculation. Such a record exists. In the will of Governor Benedict Arnold, which was executed in 1676, in speaking of his burial, he directs that his body shall be buried in a certain plat of ground, "on the line or path leading from my house to my stone-built wind-mill." From this it follows, that the structure was then a wind-mill belonging to the Governor; and was distinguished from surrounding wind-mills, by being built of stone. No other one of stone now exists, or is known to have existed."

This interesting statement makes havoc of the pleasant speculations of the Denmark scholars. But it does not reach to them alone. It begets suspicion of the truth of many other theories, and shows us how other important conclusions may owe all their force to our ignorance of some very simple fact. It proves not only the value of historic records, but teaches that the traditions of the common people are entitled to more respect than the learned are accustomed to show them.

But our scientific men not only eat up one another, but often devour themselves. As an instance, we will only refer to the recent case of Mr. Gliddon and his *mummy*. It would be cruel to press it. We cannot forbear, however, from quoting the following extract from the November No. of the *Southern Quarterly Review*, written by a friend and admirer of Mr. Gliddon. The writer is reviewing an Article which appeared in this Review on the Scripture Chro-

nology, and after quoting from it a paragraph in which reference is made to the works of Champollion, Figeac, Rossellini, Leemans and Mr. Gliddon, goes on to say :

“ This paragraph would certainly create an innocent smile, in the year 1850, should it meet the eye of any one of the authorities alluded to. The reader is doubtless aware, that it is only about twenty-five years since Champollion and his school had made sufficient advance in Egyptian hieroglyphics to *commence* decyphering the monuments in which chronology had been so long locked up; that every year has been adding important facts to our knowledge; and that it is only *five* years since the celebrated Prussian Commission, with Lepsius at its head, returned from Egypt, with some three thousand new inscriptions. Is it not extraordinary that the reviewer, in the face of such notorious facts, has had the boldness to go back to *old books and old editions*, published *ten or fifteen years ago*, which are now *entirely superseded?* ”

We wish the Article from which this extract is taken, had a name to it which would give it force. But we doubt not the most distinguished “Egyptologists” would subscribe to it. If these authors themselves repudiate the positions they took a few years ago, and would indulge an innocent smile at the simplicity of the man who should dare to refer to them, no one else will probably sustain them. And we would ask, “is it not extraordinary” that we should be required to place any confidence in the results of scientific enquiry, when in the course of “ten or fifteen years,” they become old, entirely superseded, and rejected by their own authors? Grand discoveries and most important conclusions founded on them, are announced to the world, affecting long established opinions, and before we are well advised what they are, we are told they are worthless, and called on to receive new facts and another theory. Our answer is, we will wait ten or fifteen years longer. If we accept what you offer us to-day, to-morrow you may put on an innocent smile at our weakness, and we prefer not to be laughed at. While your opinions are afflicted with a St. Vitus’s dance we beg to be excused from following their motions.

If this is the way things go, the friends of revelation might rest from their labors to defend the Bible against the attacks of pretended learning and science. Its impugnors would do the work for them. We would be justified in

quietly waiting until the scholars and philosophers had completed their investigations, were it not for the mischief their errors might effect in the meantime, and for the danger lest they might stick fast and finally in some pernicious mistake, did not the meddlesome "divines" drive them out of it.

It should not be forgotten that no *fact* in any department of human knowledge has yet been discovered even in appearance contradictory of the statements of the Bible. It is the *reasoning* of men on facts which conflicts with it—the theories and hypotheses which they adopt to explain the facts. So far as *descriptive* science is concerned, it has presented nothing at variance with the holy scriptures. It is *speculative* science which has ventured on this daring enterprise. For instance, there is nothing in the mere facts of the various strata and fossils of the earth described in Geology, which contradicts the inspired statements of the Bible. It is the inferences and deductions of men from these facts, as to the age of the world, which seemed to contradict them. Again, there is nothing in the actual diversity of the human races contrary to the assertions of the scriptures. It notices and affirms this diversity. But when men *infer* from this diversity a separate origin for the different races, and adopt this as their *theory* to account for it, then they, and not the facts,—their inference—their theory, come in collision with the sacred record.—We would be the last to say aught against the value of the inductive philosophy, but we must insist on having its rules and principles most rigidly adhered to. It is the great instrument of thought and of progress in knowledge. But it is not to be denied that it often betrays its followers into hasty and erroneous conclusions. We can never be confident and certain of its results until we are certain our induction is derived from a full view of *all* the facts connected with the subject. If there is one fact unknown or overlooked, our reasoning, though apparently just, may be in truth, grossly false and erroneous. It has been well said, by, we believe, a distinguished man of this State, that ninety-nine facts may make a lie, and we may need the hundredth to arrive at the truth. Now when all the facts bearing on Geology, Ethnography, and "Egyptology," and their related sciences, are collected and digested, it is possible we may ar-

rive at some sure and stable conclusions. And even then, there may have been facts obliterated by the hand of time, or of man, which if known would entirely change our inductions. But while every year is bringing to light new facts of the most important character, and all these sciences are yet in the embryonic state, and the theories of the most learned investigators become old and exploded in ten or fifteen years, we shall hold our faith in suspense. We will accept all well authenticated facts most implicitly: all inferences and reasonings from them, we will endeavor to treat as they deserve.

There is a most important distinction to be made among the various departments of scientific research, which is too often forgotten. In some of the sciences it is practicable to subject a theory to the test of experiment, and to verify it or refute it by actual experience. Thus it is in Chemistry, Natural Philosophy, and Mathematics. If any rash speculator hazards a wild hypothesis in these subjects, his folly can be immediately exposed. Or if a probable theory cannot, from the state of the science, be at once tested, it is held only as an hypothesis which is not believed, but used only as a guide to further investigation. Hence these branches of learning have made the most wonderful and certain progress. But it is not so in Geology, Pæleontology, Ethnology, and "Egyptology," but to a very limited extent. In these the most venturesome speculation may be indulged, and there is no means of testing its value by any actual experiment. The wildest fancy may expatiate at large, with no fear of ignominious exposure. A few observations are made, over a limited field, a few facts ascertained, and straightway the mind, "fancy free," penetrates the profound mysteries of nature, and imagination, having "ample room and verge enough," creates causes by which every effect is explained. Many inquirers, ignorant of the first principles of logic, knowing nothing of the laws which govern the processes of truth and safe investigation, and having none of the requisites for an observer, boldly draw deductions which are untenable, and think they have explained a phenomenon, given to the world a truth—when they have merely vented an unsubstantial speculation. It is of this evil Bacon speaks, in his "Advancement of learning;" the root of this evil, as of all oth-

ers, is this—that men, in their contemplations of nature, are accustomed to make too timely a departure and too remote a recess from experience and particulars, and have yielded and resigned themselves over to the fumes of their own fancies and popular argumentations.”

No man the sun shines upon, “yield and resign themselves over to the fumes of their own fancies,” with more alacrity and resolution than those who reject the statements of the Bible on account of pretended demonstrations of reason and science. Men, in whom the mere mention of that holy book “creates an innocent smile,” believed in the nonsense of mesmerism, swallowed the famous moon hoax, revered phrenology, and applauded the “vestiges of creation.” They often remind us of the remark of Charles II. on the learned skeptic, Vossius. The celebrated freethinker was repeating some incredible stories of the Chinese, when the king, turning to those about him, said—“this learned man is a very strange person—he believes every thing but the Bible.” This marvellous facility of faith, which infidels exhibit about every thing except the word of God, is aptly illustrated in the following remarks, by an anonymous writer. Some skeptical writer had used the following language respecting the various explanations of the notorious Rochester “knockings:”

“‘Toe joints’ and inanimate ‘water falls’ may sufficiently account for this intelligence to satisfy that class of minds who will greedily swallow monstrous fish stories, and tales involving the suspension of nature’s unchangeable laws, said to have occurred some two thousand years ago; but stronger minds require stronger mental food. I want a better explanation.”

“Now here is a man whose mind is, in his own conceit, so ‘strong’ that he cannot believe the miracles of Jesus Christ; and yet he seems to have no difficulty in believing in the Rochester knockings: who cannot admit the explanations which resolve these knockings into the ordinary operation of ‘nature’s unchangeable laws,’ or into sheer imposture, and yet has no difficulty in explaining in these ways the miracles of Christ. This is but one of the numberless instances of the credulity of unbelievers. Their minds are too ‘strong’ to believe a miracle possible on the banks of the Jordan; but any nine days’ wonder may pass for a miracle on the banks of the Genesee. They are quite too philosophical to admit the inspiration of Isaiah and Paul; but they gulp down with all greediness the revelations of Davis.”

“Lord Herbert presents a striking example of this usual credulity of unbelievers. After he had written his famous work against revelation, he was doubtful as to the propriety of publishing it. ‘I took,’ says he, ‘my book in my hand, and kneeling devoutly on my knees, said these words: ‘O, thou eternal God, author of the light which now shines upon me, and giver of all inward illuminations, I do beseech thee, of thy infinite goodness, to pardon a greater request than a sinner ought to make. I am not satisfied enough whether I shall publish this book. If it be for thy glory, I beseech thee to give me some sign from heaven; if not, I shall suppress it.’ I had no sooner spoken these words, but a loud, though yet gentle noise came from the heavens, (for it was like nothing on earth,) which did so comfort and cheer me, that I took my petition as granted, and that I had the sign demanded.” Here is a man publishing a book denying miracles, and yet in his inmost heart unquestionably believing that he had, for its publication, the sanction of a miracle; publishing a book against revelation, the main argument of which is founded on the alleged improbability of God’s revealing himself to some of his creatures, and not to all, and yet believing that God had made a special revelation to himself; denying all miracles, and yet believing that in the year of our Lord 1624, and the year of the world 5628, God did for the first time reveal himself by miracle to Edward, Lord Herbert; and the grand crisis in the world’s affairs which demanded this unprecedented intervention of God’s miraculous power, was the publication of his treatise on “*Truth*, as distinguished from *Divine Revelation*.”

The spirit and tactics of skeptical science have received many rich illustrations in the discussions which have been held on the subject of the publications mentioned at the head of this article. But we do not wish to convey the impression that the controversy respecting the origin of the human races is between infidels and believers alone. On the Christian side of the argument is the vast majority of naturalists and scientific men of all countries and classes. It is only a few persons at the present time who openly maintain the diversity of the origin of men. None of them are of any high reputation in the world of science except Professor Agassiz; and his distinction has been acquired chiefly in the lower departments of animal life, and most of all, we believe, in investigations of fossil fishes. We think it will be admitted on all hands that, so far, the friends of the Bible doctrine have nothing to regret in this

discussion. This is plainly confirmed by the fact that their opponents have shifted their attack so often from one position to another, and are now evidently on the last ground they can find to stand upon. The question is simply whether all the varieties of men have descended from one original pair, or from several—whether God created in the beginning only one man and one woman, or more. The holy Scriptures unequivocally teach that all the diversified varieties of the human family have descended from one pair, created by the power of the Almighty. Against this truth was first opposed the so-called theory of developement, first brought into notice, we believe, by Oken and Geoffroy, on the continent of Europe, and afterwards made conspicuous in England and the United States, by a work with the title “*Vestiges of Creation.*” This monstrous speculation supposed the material elements of the world existed from eternity, or were created by God, endued with certain inherent laws and forces. In the natural operation of these laws and forces, they produced vegetable life, plants and trees. From vegetable life was developed animal life in its lowest and most imperfect forms. From these last, in the course of natural progress, fishes were produced; fishes produced birds; birds produced quadrupeds; and quadrupeds produced *men!* This stupendous absurdity, this colossal folly, was defended with a wonderful array of facts and science and argument, and was of course heartily welcomed by skeptical sciolists. It was scarcely put to silence by the power of the truth, when the opponents of the Bible doctrine assumed the ground that the different races of men are separate and distinct species. And in order to prove this position, they maintained that the offspring of the white and black races are *hybrids*. To sustain this, “they first endeavored to show that mulattoes are sterile; then that they are prolific only with one or the other of the original species; and finally, that the hybrid race soon died out.” (Dr. Bachman.) Driven by the stress of facts from each of these positions in succession, they next attempted to prove that hybrids between other species of animals are prolific, and can perpetuate their kind. Dr. Morton, who had attained distinction in other branches of scientific inquiry, maintained this ground with zeal and industry, if not with ability. But

Dr. Bachman has met his arguments with an examination so particular, patient, and powerful, that they are no longer tenable. It would be infatuation to maintain any longer that the offspring of distinct species are prolific, and therefore that the white and black races of men are of different species. Hence the position is now taken that all the different varieties of men are *one* species, but having different origins and descending from various primeval pairs. Plainly, the argument is on its last legs. We hope soon to announce its final and utter prostration. The development theory may be considered as abandoned by all, except mere dreamers in science. The doctrine of distinct species among mankind is in like manner surrendered, except by those whose little notoriety has been acquired by maintaining it. Under this theory the sterility of the offspring of the different races was first maintained: that has been easily disproved. Then it was affirmed that such progeny is fertile only with one or other of the original races: that has been plainly refuted. Then it was asserted that the hybrid race, left to propagate among themselves, soon became extinct: that also has been shown to be a mistake. Then, the case being desperate, precisely opposite ground was taken, and it was contended that hybrids between different species of other animals are permanently prolific, and so may be between the asserted human species: this has been likewise utterly and most triumphantly confuted. And so the whole doctrine of specific differences in the races of men has gone by the board.

It should be kept in mind that the doctrine of the specific and original unity of the human races stands in this controversy in a strictly defensive position, and that therefore the *onus probandi* rests upon its opponents. It has occupied the position of an admitted and established truth, received by the almost unanimous consent of the religious and scientific world. It lies, therefore, with those who attack it, to show good cause why it should be rejected. All that can be required of its advocates, by the admitted laws of reasoning, is to show that the arguments offered for its rejection are not sufficient. He who calls on the world to discard a long established opinion, must make out the evidence of its error. The burden of proof rests on him, and he will be held to the duty of producing the most

satisfactory and irrefragable evidence. The world, whose opinions he attacks, are, on the other hand, bound only to show that the proofs he offers are not sufficient to require them to renounce their old belief. So the matter stands in this discussion. The admitted opinion is, that all the races of men are of one species and origin. If any deny this, they must produce such evidence of its untruth as shall necessarily constrain our submission. Now what is the evidence offered? The sum and substance of it is simply the great diversity which exists between the different races of men. This, it is argued, proves that these races *cannot possibly* have proceeded from the same primeval parentage. The argument must affirm an impossibility in the case. For if it is confessed that, notwithstanding these diversities, it is yet possible that they may have sprung up in the offspring of the same parents, the argument fails: there is no necessary reason why the world should abandon its old opinion. That impossibility, we may affirm with all confidence, has not been made out, and with equal assurance we say it cannot be, from any known laws of physiology. When it is attempted to be proved, by the general principle that "like begets like," the answer is, that is true as to *specific* resemblances; but within the limits of the species, if we may so speak, like begets endless varieties. Unless, therefore, these diversities prove the different races of men to be distinct species, which they do not, the impossibility of their appearing in the offspring of one original pair, fails to be established. On the other hand, if it is conceded that all the diversified races of mankind are of one species, as we hold it no assumption now to affirm has been demonstrated, then we maintain that the possibility of such physical varieties as exist having been developed in the descendants of the same primeval parents, necessarily follows. To admit the unity of species is to admit that there may have been a unity of origin. And if all the races of men *may* have sprung from one origin, the world is not required to discard its belief that they *did*, unless positive and direct testimony can be adduced that they did not. Is there any testimony to this effect? It is affirmed there is, and Prof. Agassiz undertakes to present it. He does not find it in history, or in monumental structures, or even in vague traditions. It

consists solely in an asserted analogy found in the distribution of the lower animal creation, and the present diffusion of the races of men. He says that if we take a view of the general surface of the earth, we will find it divided into certain circumscribed localities, each inhabited by a peculiar group of the lower animals, and by its peculiar race of men. Now the argument runs, that each group of animals must have been originally created within the locality where we find it; and therefore the presumption is, by analogy, that each race of men was, in like manner, originally created on the locality where it exists. This, if we understand it, is the sum and substance of his reasoning. It will be at once perceived that the analogy fails utterly, unless he can point to examples in which animals *of the same species* are found existing in separate localities, so disconnected that we cannot probably account for their transportation from one to the other, and are therefore obliged to suppose separate creations. For if it be admitted that all the races of men are of one species, the analogy will not hold, unless it can be established that animals of one and the same species must have been originally created in distinct and different local ranges. The Professor accordingly makes a feeble attempt to prove this, in which he has been most triumphantly answered. He has not pointed out one instance of the same species of animals existing in two distinct localities, in which it is not perfectly easy, by well-known and undeniable facts, to account for their transportation from one to the other. But as it is not our design to enter into the details of this discussion, we must refer our readers for the facts which illustrate this and other points, to the publications named at the head of our article. The general analogy, asserted by Professor A., breaks down most hopelessly in several other respects. Naturalists have found great difficulty in classifying the various races of men under any well marked divisions; and in defining with any accuracy the local limits of such races as are determined. There is no agreement among them as to the number of the distinct races, their specifications running from three up to eleven, and even more. It is, moreover, an unquestionable fact, that different races are found intermingled within the same zoological province. Tribes of men entirely distinct, again, occupy separate por-

tions of a locality which contains the same group of animals throughout. And the same race is found extended over several distinct zoological territories. A remarkable instance of this is seen in North and South America. Between the Arctic zone and Cape Horn, Professor A. himself enumerates four separate botanical and zoological provinces, each containing its peculiar species of plants and animals. And yet, over this whole extensive region, and through all these distinct provinces, one and the same race of men were found to exist. The American Indian is acknowledged to be the same from the Arctic circle to the southern extremity of the continent. The destructive bearing of this fact on his analogy, the Professor passes over with perfect silence. Did he really forget it, or was it convenient to ignore it? Another important fact is, that tribes of people are found in widely separated and unconnected, and unlike localities, having vast territories and other nations intervening between them, who are proved, by their form, feature, language, customs and traditions, to be of the same race. This is utterly at variance with the analogy, and would confound it, if it were not in confusion before. The truth is, that no race of men are indigenous in the localities where they now exist. The records of the historical races prove them immigrants into the regions they now occupy; and the traditions of all who are not too debased to have preserved memory of their origin, establish the same truth. The migratory character of man is entirely overlooked in Professor Agassiz's analogy; but being remembered, renders it null and void. However it may have been at first, the attempt to locate the human races as original and indigenous in the regions where they now exist, can appear only as the desperate effort of an advocate driven to extremity, or as the ill-considered speculation of a philosopher who has ventured beyond his sphere.

Prof. Agassiz, while controverting the identity of the origin of all men, strenuously maintains something which he calls the "essential unity of mankind." We have given particular attention to that part of his essay in which he discusses this unity: but can make nothing of it more than a similarity of nature, physical, intellectual, and moral. Indeed, he enumerates the two elements of it as consisting in, first, a similar physical constitution, and secondly, simi-

lar moral and mental endowments. He illustrates it by the general resemblances which exist among the different species of the beasts of prey, both in their physical constitution and in their natural dispositions, which clearly "show that they constitute a natural unity in creation, and distinguish them from any other division of the animal kingdom:—and again, by the similarities between the different species of the genus cat, of the deer, and in the vegetable world, of the pines, oaks, and birches. There is a certain unity subsisting between all the various kinds under these classes, binding them all together; and yet no one affirms that the panther and the tiger sprung from the same original. Hence it is argued that a community of origin for men may be denied, and their unity affirmed.—Now we submit that unity implies something more than resemblance, and that the marks which guide the naturalist in grouping together classes and genera of animals, do not contain the principles of that sublime thought—the oneness of mankind. The unity of a family, or of a nation, does not consist in any similarities between its individual members. Another element must be added before that idea is created. If unity is founded on resemblances, by widening or narrowing their extent, we may embrace in it any class of beings. We may have a unity between man and the beasts, of precisely the same sort, and we should like to know how far the similarity must extend to create the unity—*united* does not mean having a resemblance. Prof. A. illustrates his idea by the case of "individuals whose studies, whose calling in life, have developed in them the same faculties, the same feelings," between whom "relations spring up" which by far outweigh the natural bonds of a common parentage. If that be true, yet what are those relations? They may be of sympathy, affection, friendship, but not of *unity*. They are so many similar things brought together, and fitting closely and clingingly to one another, but they are not *one thing*. He lays great stress on the higher and far more important unity of a similar intellectual and moral nature. On this ground there would be a more perfect unity between a great good man and an angel, than between the same man and the most stupid and debased of his fellow men. But is it so? Does any man feel it to be so, unless he has first

adopted the opinion that his fellow man is of a different original race? However it may be with a few individuals, in whom natural sympathies have been smothered by education and habits, the truth is the instincts of nature demand a physical connection in order to the recognition of unity. The nearer that connection, the more strongly is the bond of unity felt. As it becomes more remote, the feeling is weakened. If it is entirely destroyed, the recognition of unity will perish. Let it become the sentiment of the masses, in whom natural instincts are strong and active, that all men are not of one blood, and men of another race will be to them men no longer—not of their kind, not one of them, not one with them.

It is often and over affirmed that the Bible was not intended to teach natural science, and this is thought sufficient reason that its statements should not be brought into scientific discussions. It must be entirely ignored until the question in debate is settled. Now it is true, that to teach natural science, is no part of its design, but is equally true, that in connection with its design, it affirms facts intimately connected with science. For example, it declares the world to have been created out of nothing by the power of God, and that it will be finally destroyed. And if scientific men should attempt to prove that the world has always existed, and will exist forever, it would not do to say the Bible has nothing to do with it. It cannot be denied that the Scriptures were intended to teach *the science of man's moral relations*. And it is equally true that they teach that his moral relations are intimately connected with his physical relations. One of the grandest and most difficult questions of religion, as to the introduction and universal prevalence of moral evil among men, they solve by the doctrine of their descent from one original pair.—The method of a sinner's salvation is intimately connected with the same truth, by the relations of the Saviour the Gospel proclaims to the same race who sprang from those primeval parents. It is not a mere isolated text here and there which affirms the one origin of the human races.—This doctrine underlies the entire system of religion taught in the Bible. It is assumed and taken for granted, through the whole of it. It enters into the very body of the scheme of truth it teaches; and to take it out, is to rend to pieces

the entire structure. It involves the introduction of sin and evil, the origin of depravity and death among men, the plan of redemption by Christ, the diffusion of christianity through the world, the dearest earthly blessings and the eternal hopes of the greater part of mankind, and the brotherhood, the sympathies, the reciprocal rights, duties and relations of humanity. It is therefore a contest for life with christianity. She must make good her ground here, or surrender at discretion. She has lost nothing yet, and, if we may judge from the past and present progress of this discussion, she may even now take up her song of triumph and celebrate her victory.

We have not attempted to enter into the merits of the question under discussion. We suppose those who feel a particular interest in it, will not fail to seek a fuller acquaintance with it than could be given in this article.— Our design is to call attention to the more recent publications on the subject, and to record the present progress of the discussion.

The work of Dr. Smyth has been received with high encomiums, both in this country and in Europe, where it is about to be republished. It cannot fail to enhance his well earned reputation for extensive research and varied reading. The reader will find in it a mass of novel and striking facts of the most interesting character, gathered out of the stores of a rich library, and from all departments of learning, and presented, not in the dry and heavy style usual in learned disquisitions, but in a clear, lively, and entertaining manner. We could have wished some alterations in the arrangements of the materials, and occasionally more compactness in the argumentation; but it furnishes the most ample means for the reader to construct an argument for himself, and directs him to the best sources for further investigations. Our pleasure in reading the volume has been diminished by the conviction that the labors of the author in its preparation were one chief means of inducing the malady which has for a time exiled him from his home, his friends, his church, and his indefatigable efforts in the cause of truth and righteousness.

Dr. Bachman's volume we have before introduced to our readers, but would again commend it to their attention, as a production of no ordinary interest and value. Rich in

the fruits of long and careful investigation of the subjects on which it treats, and abounding in new and important facts, gathered by personal observation and experiment, presented in a simple style, and with the utmost candor, it is as entertaining to the general reader as it is instructive to the scientific student. We have no hesitation in affirming that it will settle, to the satisfaction of every unbiassed mind, the specific unity of the human races, and answer all objections to that doctrine drawn from their physical varieties. We cannot help regarding it a special providence that Dr. Bachman's attention was so early and so long directed to the subjects on which he writes. During many years, he was being prepared for the service he has done the cause of truth, and now, just in the nick of time, he has come forth, fully equipped, for its defence. His example furnishes a powerful answer to the objections which have sometimes been made against such of our ministers as have inclination and opportunity for the purpose, devoting their attention to scientific inquiries. It is all important that some of them should do so, and where it can be done without neglecting more important duties, we would give them every encouragement. We understand that Dr. B. is preparing a new edition of his work, to be rendered more complete by further facts and arguments in his possession. We earnestly hope it may be so, in the sure expectation that another broadside from his "heavy artillery" will make final work of the remnants of arguments left by the first.

We would also invite particular attention to the pleasant discussion between Dr. Bachman and Dr. Morton, held in the Charleston Medical Journal. Were we not moved by a feeling of pity for the latter, we would say more of this than we intend. But if our readers would see a complete, utter and perfectly irretrievable demolition of an antagonist, accomplished in the most amiable spirit, and with consummate ease and skill, we commend them to a perusal of those papers. If Dr. Morton's reputation as a naturalist survives them, it is harder to kill characters of that species than we imagined.

Dr. Pickering's work we have not had time fully to examine. The author was one of the scientific corps, attached to our late National Exploring Expedition, for which he

was selected, on account of his high attainments in natural history. The course of that expedition afforded valuable opportunities for observation, and he has since extended and perfected his inquiries. The results are embodied in the volume before us, and cannot fail to be of very great value. He writes with the caution and moderation of true science, and his opinions will carry with them no little weight. So far as we have looked into his work, he expresses no final and decided opinion as to the unity of the human races. He says, however, "there is, I conceive, no middle ground between the admission of eleven distinct species in the human family, and their reduction to one." One view which he advances, is of the highest interest and importance. He identifies the American Indians with the Mongolian, and partly with the Malayan races, and observes, "I think it could be shown on zoological grounds alone, that the human family is foreign to the American continent."

The work of Dr. Knox, we hardly know how to characterize. He claims to be a descendant of John Knox, of holy and immortal memory. But if we might argue from moral and intellectual diversities, to those which are physical, he alone would prove that nature can produce the most monstrous deviations in the line of a progeny. Respect for his great kinsman would lead us to speak gently of him, but truth requires us to say he is a radical in politics, an infidel in religion, a smatterer in science, and a perfect simpleton in argument. He calls his production "a fragment"—he should have used the plural, for it certainly presents a most unparalleled collection of disjointed, jumbled, heterogeneous fractions. The text of his discourse, and the idea which seems to lead him through all his mad vagaries, is that "Race is every thing." And yet it is difficult to say what his doctrine is. He both advocates and opposes every one with which we are acquainted.—His hand is against every man, but most against himself. He controverts on one page what he affirms on another, and in the same sentence, furnishes material for his own refutation.

We have referred also, to two articles in contemporary Reviews, as both well written, and worthy the attention of the reader. They are particularly directed to an exam-

ination of Prof. Agassiz's views, and attacking them on different grounds for the most part, effect together their complete refutation. The article in the *New Englander* meets the Professor on the scientific platform, and in a clear, condensed, well arranged, and conclusive discussion, effects the annihilation of that fiction he called an analogy. We indulge a sanguine hope that if any one ventures to refer to that analogy, some ten or fifteen years hence, Prof. A. will put on an innocent smile.

ARTICLE V.

JOHN FOSTER.

The Life and Correspondence of John Foster : Edited by J. E. RYLAND. In Two Volumes. New York : Wiley & Putnam.

The early part of the present century was illustrated by the labors of several men of rare genius and excellence, amongst the Baptists of England. Ryland, Fuller, Carey, Hall, Hughes and Foster were cotemporaries. Though differing considerably in age, they were still at the same time on the stage of action ; and in intimately related ways, were co-operating in the great work of defending the principles, enforcing the claims and diffusing the influences of evangelical piety. While some of these eminent men shone with unrivalled lustre in the Pulpit, others were engaged with the consecration of great powers, in giving the Gospel to the destitute, or quietly striving to relieve the Christian Religion from the misconceptions and abuses under which it labored, through the opposition of malignant foes, or the mistaken zeal of indiscreet friends. It is not our design to institute comparisons amongst them, and seek to settle their respective claims to a pre-eminent admiration. Some of them excelled in intellect, others in goodness, others in active usefulness ; all are entitled to our high respect, and when contemplated together may justly excite emotions of

gratitude to God, that He gave to the modern Church such a constellation of worthies. In the language of the noble-minded and large-hearted Chalmers—"let it never be forgotten of the Particular Baptists of England, that they form the denomination of Fuller and Carey and Ryland and Hall and Foster." And certainly Baptists should never forget nor be feebly affected by the remembrance, that these names adorn their annals.

One of the most interesting characters, and certainly by far the most perplexing in their list of Baptist worthies, is John Foster, who survived all the rest, and but a few years since went to the grave. He was distinguished by idiosyncracies of moral and mental constitution, that will always make him a very inviting and difficult study for the critic. Happily for us, he is, to a considerable extent, his own biographer. In the Letters which he left, and which have been judiciously compiled by Mr. J. E. Ryland, we have furnished us the means of acquiring a tolerably clear insight into his character. The most attractive, and by far the most satisfactory kind of biography, is that which is thus composed. A man's letters written to his intimate acquaintances, on common-place subjects, without any restraint imposed by the suspicion that they are to meet the public eye, and exposing freely his every-day thoughts, opinions, feelings and purposes, must of necessity give us a more complete and exact knowledge of him, than can be acquired from the most graphic delineations of even impartial friendship. The Correspondence of Cowper, Byron, Lamb, and other distinguished men, has introduced us to a familiar acquaintance with them, and informed us of the minute elements of their mental and moral being. In like manner the Letters of Foster, extending in their range over half a century, and addressed to a considerable variety of persons on a great variety of topics, place their writer before us not in distinct outline simply, but in the warmth and color and activity of a living and individual man. A rapid sketch of the more important events in Foster's life, will naturally and almost necessarily preface our observations on his character and excerpts from his correspondence. For the facts embraced in this sketch, we are, of course, indebted to the volumes before us.

John Foster was born of worthy and pious Baptist pa-

rents, in the Parish of Halifax, England, September 17, 1770. Until his fourteenth year, he assisted his parents in their humble vocation of weaving. He was, however, an indifferent weaver, and submitted with undisguised repugnance to manual operations. He felt the disgust of conscious genius at such toil, and "had no idea of being permanently employed in handicraft." While residing with his parents, he managed, in an irregular manner, to read a good deal, confining his attention almost exclusively to English Literature.

At seventeen years of age he made a profession of Religion, and joined a Baptist Church under the charge of the excellent Dr. Fawcett. Shortly after his connexion with the Church, he concluded to dedicate his powers to the Christian Ministry and entered Brearly Hall, a school in which Dr. Fawcett, besides giving classical instruction to youth, directed the Theological studies of a few candidates for the Ministry. Here he had access to a considerable Library, of which he made industrious use. After spending about three years at Brearly, he was admitted a Student into the Baptist College at Bristol. He remained here about a year, enjoying the valuable instruction of the Rev. Joseph Hughes, with whom he contracted an intimate friendship which nothing but death interrupted, and which proved one of the greatest blessings of his life.

On leaving Bristol, Foster went to Newcastle-On-Tyne, and engaged in preaching to a small Church. He remained in this place only three months. He next removed to Dublin, where he took the charge of a small Baptist Society worshipping in Swift's Alley. "The congregation," says he, "was small when I commenced, and almost nothing when I voluntarily closed." His next attempt at Pastoral service was made in Chichester, where, although he applied himself with much more assiduity to his work, preaching three times even, on the Sabbath, he found little encouragement to prosecute his labors. He remained in Chichester about two years and a half. In 1800 he took up his abode at Dwonend, near Bristol, where he preached regularly at a small Chapel and resided four years. It was while settled here that he began to indulge ideas of authorship.

In 1804, in consequence chiefly of the high recommen-

dation of Robert Hall, he was invited to take charge of a Church at Frome, to which he preached, with slightly more flattering success, for two years. At the expiration of this term of service, he was compelled to resign his charge on account of a painful complaint in the neck. It was during his residence at Frome that he gave to the world the celebrated Essays, on which his reputation as an Author is mainly based. Here too, he began that course of Literary toil from which he derived his bread, and in which he was chiefly occupied during the remainder of his life—we mean Review-writing. In one year after his resignation of his Pastoral office, he contributed thirteen articles to the *Eclectic Review*, a Journal devoted to "Spiritual Christianity" and the advocacy of liberal views on social and political questions. He continued to write for this periodical until near his death.

In 1808 he accomplished a cherished wish of his heart, whose fulfilment had been long deferred in consequence of the *res angusta domi*, by uniting himself in marriage with Miss Maria Snooke. She was a woman of superior mental endowments and rare excellencies of heart, and was in every way fitted to contribute greatly to Foster's happiness.

After another unsuccessful attempt at preaching in Downend, he came deliberately to the conclusion never again to engage in regular ministerial service, and henceforth his labors as a preacher were only occasional.

The year 1826 was darkened by a domestic calamity of the most afflictive character, the death of his only son, John, a youth of promise and of amiable disposition. The quiet tenor of Foster's life and labors was not again signally disturbed until 1832, when his accomplished and highly-prized companion was removed by death; a calamity from which he seemed never fully to recover. He survived her about ten years, all the while lamenting his loss and preparing to follow her to the world of spirits. During these ten years his most loved and trusted friends were constantly dropping away. Hall had already gone—Hughes, Coles, Anderson and others soon followed, and left Foster nearly desolate. In 1843 his turn came, and with the dignity and composure of a Christian, he resigned himself to the divine appointment, having reached the advanced age of something over three score and ten.—

Amongst the utterances that he made in his last illness, were these words : "*trust in Christ—trust in Christ.*"

In turning from Foster's rather uneventful life to Foster himself, we cannot say that a somewhat attentive perusal of the volumes before us, has inspired us with anything like a very affectionate and enthusiastic regard for him as a man. As exhibited to us in his correspondence, he commands our admiration and esteem, without winning our heart. He seems to us to have been a strange being, a good deal out of joint in society, considerably censorious in spirit, misanthropic in temper, and singular in his principles. He was not eccentric, perhaps, in the ordinary acceptation of that epithet ; he was rather consistently and uniformly peculiar ; with thoughts and principles and feelings, lying a good deal out of the ordinary plane of humanity. Of this there is abundant evidence furnished in his letters, and of this he seems to have been, at times, thoroughly conscious. From early childhood, even when not twelve years of age, he had, to use his own language, "a painful sense of an awkward but entire individuality." He was peculiarly retiring in his disposition, and marked by a pensiveness closely allied to settled melancholy. He was characterized by a timidity, a shrinking from society, that amounted to "infinite shyness." "Solitude," he says in one of his letters, "is my paradise." Again he gives expression to his feelings in this affecting manner : "'Tis thus I am ever repelled from every point of religious confraternity, and doomed, still doomed a melancholy monad, a weeping solitaire. Oh world ! how from thy every quarter blows a gale, wintry, cold and bleak, to the heart that would expand !" While sitting in church during an evening service, the following were his reflections : "Most emphatic feeling of my individuality—my insulated existence—except that close and interminable connexion, from the very necessity of existence, with the Deity. To the continent of Human Nature, I am a small *island* near its coast ; to the Divine Existence I am a small *peninsula*." It is exceedingly unfortunate for a man to be thus dissociated from his race. We can perhaps scarcely blame him for being not even a peninsula in his connexion with human nature, but it is at the same time almost impossible for us to love one whose habitual feelings and sympathies are so little

in unison with those of the universal brotherhood to which he belongs. If a man thus constituted is not responsible for his peculiarities, no more are we blame-worthy, in withholding from him a fond regard.

Closely connected with this *individuality*, or perhaps rather in part forming it, was the strikingly *subjective* disposition of Foster's mind. Whatever was objective and formal and visible, with the almost single exception of the works of nature, interested him but little. He was intensely spiritual in his affections, thoughts and opinions. He dwelt habitually, not amongst external objects; he seemed engaged, not with the visible and tangible and real, but with the invisible, the intangible, and, if not with the unreal, at least with the shadowy and unknowable. Hence he held in such disesteem several important doctrines and revelations of Christianity. Hence he was given to speculations, especially upon subjects of peculiar and forbidding mystery. Hughes described him, when a young man, as one "whose speculations habitually hovered over an undefined void, and fed upon a vexatious disappointment, their own creation." Hence, too, he was surprisingly superstitious for so strong-minded a man.

Foster's disposition "to hover over an undefined void," and fondness for mystery, are strikingly illustrated in his feelings in reference to death. His anxiety about this tremendous event, that may well engage the deepest attention of every thoughtful mind, seemed to partake more of curiosity than terror. He longed to pry into eternity, and seemed absolutely impatient to burst the barrier that separated him from the spirit world, and converse with its mighty secrets. When any of his friends died he tried to follow them in their viewless flight, and wearied himself in conjectures about their mode of existence, their employments and associations. He thus writes to Hughes, who was stretched upon his dying bed, and his letters abound with passages of a similar character. "But oh! my dear friend, whither is it that you are going? Where is it that you will be a few short weeks or days hence? I have affecting cause to think and to wonder concerning that unseen world; to desire, were it permitted to mortals one glimpse of that mysterious economy, to ask innumerable questions to which there is no answer—what is the man-

ner of existence—of employment—of society—of remembrance—of anticipation of all the surrounding revelations to our departed friends? How striking to think that *she*, (referring to his wife,) so long and so recently with me here, so beloved, but now so totally withdrawn and absent, that she experimentally knows all that I am in vain inquiring!" "*They don't come back to tell us!*" was his mournful and almost insurgent exclamation, when he lost a friend. All these sombre musings upon the dire catastrophe that terminates our earthly career, are, no doubt, natural, but their constant and almost affectionate indulgence by Foster, illustrates the speculative tenor of his mind, as it contributed somewhat to unfit him for a life of the most active usefulness.

His striking individuality was exhibited on the death of his wife. Writing of her burial, he says: "If conventional usages did not come obstinately in the way, my infinite preference would be, that the last office should be performed at the midnight hour, in perfect silence, and with no attendants besides the parties immediately interested. What have a number of gazing, indifferent spectators to do with my loss, or my demeanor, or feeling regarding it?" Greatly to his satisfaction, the neighboring inhabitants, who had become acquainted with his feelings, stayed away from the funeral.

The religious opinions of Foster were such as harmonized with the peculiarities of character, which we have barely indicated. It may be difficult to determine with great precision what those opinions were, inasmuch as they changed somewhat as he advanced in life. Still, enough is recorded in these volumes, respecting his views of Christian doctrine, to excite both our gratitude and our regret. He is usually denominated, and so we have styled him, a Baptist. And unquestionably his notions of Church organization and Church ordinances coincided much more fully with those of Baptists, than any other body of Christians; though we see little evidence that his attachments for their principles were strong. We have said already that the peculiarly subjective tendency of his mind led him to regard very lightly all that was formal and ceremonial in religion. Making all allowance for this consideration, it is still remarkable that he never administered, nor in ma-

ture life saw administered, the ordinance of baptism. He even had doubts in reference to its perpetuity.

His notions of the Church were still more latitudinarian. While in Ireland, he thus wrote: "It is vain to wish what would exactly gratify me—the power of building a meeting of my own, and, without being controlled by any man, and without even the existence of what is called a *Church*, of preaching *gratis* to all that choose to hear." At a later period he speaks of "obtaining plenty of confirmation, if he had needed it, of his old opinion, that churches are useless and mischievous institutions, and the sooner they are dissolved, the better." And again, in still stronger terms: "I have long felt an utter loathing of what bears the general denomination of the Church. * * * My wish would be little less than the dissolution of all church institutions, of all orders and shapes; that religion might be set free, as a grand spiritual and moral element, no longer clogged, perverted and prostituted by corporation forms and principles." We will not stop to comment on these bold and dangerous assertions. It is enough, we think, to have pointed out the source in his mental constitution, from which they obviously sprang.

On the same grounds he was opposed to the ordination of ministers, pronouncing it "a relic of hierarchy, a poor apeing of a ceremony, which was consistent in an established ecclesiastical order." It is a fact, that is worth recording just here, that Hall, in early life, held the same sentiments on this point, and was, indeed, never ordained. Having gone thus far, we must go further, and state, in justice to Hall, that, when asked, in after years, why he did not submit to ordination, he replied, in his own emphatic way, "*because I was a fool, sir.*"

So intense was Foster's abomination of every thing merely sacerdotal, that he would not, at one time at least, wear a black coat, and preached in colored clothes, just to show his contempt of a cleric garb.

His theology was of the same doubtful and unsatisfactory character with the opinions above detailed. At one time he avowed that, though no Socinian, he was "in doubt between the Arian and orthodox doctrines, not without some inclination to the latter." On this vital point, however, there is reason to believe that his sentiments sub-

sequently became more consistent with Scripture teaching. He often affirmed himself, in all the great particulars that compose that system of faith, a Calvinist. "The greatest part of my views," he writes, "are accurately Calvinistic." And again: "While I cannot but condemn the circle and the spell of any denomination, *as a party of systematics professing a monopoly of truth*, I hold accurately the leading points of the Calvinistic faith; as the corruption of human nature, the necessity of a divine power to change it, irresistible grace, the influence of the Spirit, the doctrine of the atonement in its most extensive and emphatic sense, final perseverance," &c. &c.

Upon one important article of this system, it is now well known that he departed widely from the common orthodox belief—we refer to the doctrine of future punishment. The rejection of this doctrine, in its generally accepted form, he avowed early in life, and reiterated frequently afterwards. In his famous letter to a "young minister," he has set forth at large, and in the strongest manner possible, it would seem, the reasons for his divergence from common views on this subject. He distinctly admits future punishment, and declares that there is "a force in scripture expressions upon this point, at which we may well tremble. On *no* allowable interpretation, do they signify less than a very protracted duration and formidable severity." It is the eternity of this punishment that he denies. It is easy to see from this very letter, how Foster came to this denial. He confesses that he had not very carefully investigated the subject. "I have, perhaps, been too content, to let an opinion or impression, admitted in early life, dispense with protracted inquiry and various reading." It was not, too, he acknowledges, upon the declarations of scripture, but upon what he denominates the *moral* argument, that he based his sentiments—"the argument which comes in the stupendous idea of eternity." In our judgment, there is a moral argument on the other side of very conclusive force, which has often been presented, and which should have pressed upon Foster's mind. But it is especially the confessed oblivion of God's word, in which he formed and maintained his peculiar opinions, that we condemn. It was but another fruit of that daring spirit of speculation, to which he surrendered his great

powers, and which conducted him to the very brink of ruin. The characteristic inclination and comprehensive evil of his spirit, was a disposition to sound the unfathomable, and scrutinize the invisible, and measure the immeasurable. He delighted to hang over the giddy heights of mystery, and look far down into the abyss beneath, until he exclaimed in mingled awe and rapture, "oh! how dizzy 'tis, to look so low!" He wished to leave nothing for faith, and was disposed to question or reject all that did not come within the short range of human reason. Foster clearly tended with a most hazardous inclination towards scepticism, and the wonder is, that indulging the inclination as he did, he was not precipitated into the vortex of Infidelity. It is an emphatic testimony to the truth of the Christian religion, that such a man should say, "one of the very few things that appear to me not doubtful, is the truth of christianity in general."

That Foster was a genuine christian, notwithstanding all the painful revelations respecting his doctrinal views made in these volumes, we still cannot question. His piety was not of the most pleasing and attractive cast; it was not so mature and practical as that of his friend and mentor, Hughes, nor so genial and serene as that of Hall, in his latter days. It partook, of necessity, somewhat of the sombreness of his character, and was tinged by the peculiarity and fluctuating state of his religious opinions; but after all, it was sincere and strong. It purified his heart, governed his life, and furnished him with heavenly consolations in seasons of affliction. He gave pleasing evidence of a change of heart when he united with the church, and we have a very full conviction, other considerations aside, that nothing but an experience of the power of divine grace, could have curbed his restless and adventurous spirit into a submission of his mind to the teachings of the Bible "in general." Scattered all through his letters and journals, are sentiments that breathe the soul of humble and affectionate piety. His habitual and exclusive reliance upon Jesus Christ as a Saviour, is most refreshing, dotting with green and brightening with light from Heaven, the gloomy thoughts and dangerous speculations with which the writings, that reveal his interior life, abound. On completing his sixty-third year, he uses this language:

"I deeply deplore, not having lived to worthier purpose, both for myself and others; and earnestly hope and pray, that whatever of life remains, may be employed much more faithfully to the great end of existence. But with this self-condemning review, and with nothing but an uncertain and possibly small remainder of life in prospect, how emphatically oppressive would be the conscious situation, if there were not that great propitiation, that redeeming sacrifice, to rest upon for pardon and final safety." "My friend (he writes to Hughes,) feels in this concluding day of his sojourn on earth, the infinite value of that blessed faith which confides alone in the great sacrifice for sin—the sole medium of pardon and reconciliation, and the ground of immortal hope; this has always been to you the very vitality of the Christian religion; and it is so—it is emphatically so—to me also." Again, he asks: "what would become of a poor sinful soul, but for that blessed, all-comprehensive sacrifice, and that intercession at the right hand of the Majesty on high?" Foster was a man of prayer; a friend of missions, in his own individual way, he earnestly desired to be useful in the world, and we cannot doubt that he now holds converse in a happier state, with the pious friends who cheered him in the pilgrimage of life.

If any of our observations have left the impression that Foster's was properly an unamiable character, we have done great injustice to his memory. His excellencies were numerous and striking, and are abundantly exhibited in these volumes of his correspondence. He was an intensely honest man, despising not merely all confessed fraud, but equally the tricks and stratagems, to which good men sometimes fancy themselves at liberty to resort, in helping on a valuable cause. His candor was extreme almost, and led him to make such disclosures of his innermost thoughts and feelings, as may present him in a more unfavorable aspect than he really wore. He was a severe self-critic, and seemed to take a sort of delight in opening all the dark caverns in his heart, to the inspection of his intimate friends. Few men, it will be confessed, could bear such a test as this.

While there was a vein of misanthropic sentiment marking many of his opinions and actions, he was, on the other hand, a philanthropist of the most generous and expansive

order. His heart was deeply affected by the wretched condition of his race, and he ardently desired to do something for the amelioration of its condition. All his sympathies were with the common people, and he could not be repelled from them by the disgusting ignorance and brutality which characterize the masses of England. In Politics he was a Radical, and his prolonged practice of village preaching, shows how much his christian sympathies and affections ran in the line of his political principles.

It remains for us, in prosecuting this attempt to give our readers some idea of this eminent man, to refer to the order of Foster's intellect. Of the possession of genius he was justly conscious. "Genius," he grandly said to Hughes, "hails its few brothers with a most fraternal warmth;" and he knew that he belonged to that high brotherhood. It is sufficiently apparent that nothing but great powers of mind could have enabled him to work his way up to the eminence which he attained in the Republic of letters.—His early advantages, as already seen, were meager. He read comparatively little until late in life, and though passionately fond of books, he was very slightly indebted to them for the reputation which he won. His mind was distinguished for the comprehensiveness of its reach, and the strength of its grasp. All its operations gave unmistakeable evidence of power. Foster did no weak things; all his works, even his most carelessly written letters, bear the impress of a superior intellect.

He was a profound and independent thinker. He went, or at least attempted to go, to the bottom of any subject, and examine and discuss it in its last elements. He never skimmed the surface. His power of analysis was extraordinary, and his discriminations of distinctions and differences very nice and exact. "I like my mind," said he, "for its *necessity* of seeking the abstraction of any subject"—and well he might. Had he been early disciplined and directed into that field, he would have made no common Metaphysician.

He was entirely independent of men, and all ancestral trammels, in his reasonings and investigations. *Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri*, was his true motto. With a boldness that often became rashness, it may be, but still with a boldness and self-reliance, such as generally command re-

spect, and indicate the possession of uncommon abilities, he did his own thinking, very little concerning himself about the opinions of others. Originality was a very marked characteristic of his mind. He took new and forcible views of subjects. He was dissatisfied with saying common truths in a common way, and sought to invest, and succeeded in the attempt, hackneyed topics, with novelty and interest. As a preacher, he could not bear to reiterate from the pulpit tame common places, and he made it a particular study to give freshness to all his sermons.

His imagination was one of his most striking powers.—It was not perhaps remarkably affluent; its combinations were not easy and natural, but it had the strength and intenseness of character, that belonged to his whole mental constitution. His was not the “imperial fancy” of Burke or Hall, that soared like an eagle towards the sun, and rejoicing in the conscious strength of its pinions, revelled amidst the glories of the Empyrean; but the wonder-working and creative faculty was still unquestionably his, and its conceptions and creations were vivid and majestic.—His imagination was greatly enriched in its resources, by his fondness for nature and the care with which he gathered from her ample store-house, images and illustrations. When he travelled, or walked abroad for recreation, a beautiful reflection of the sky in the water, a rainbow scene, birds, flowers and trees, a grasshopper or butterfly, ever would arrest his attention, and he would charge his imagination to retain forever these sights and objects. “Sweet Nature! I have conversed with her with inexpressible luxury; I have almost worshipped her”—was his loving apostrophe to this goddess of his idolatry. In the quiet of his study, all these stores, so carefully collected, were turned to valuable account, and made to hang the drapery of grace around his colossal thoughts and conceptions.

Great and varied as are the powers of Foster's mind, it is singular that its operations were tediously and painfully slow. His works cost him an infinite amount of labor. He never threw anything off in the heat of excitement; but whatever came from his pen, was the result of prolonged and careful elaboration. Especially did he labor upon his style. No one ever more faithfully practiced the Horatian maxim, *Sæpe stilum veritas*. It is really

painful to read his description of the toils which were required, to bring his more considerable works to anything like a perfection, that satisfied the demands of his own taste. He thus writes of the labors to which he was subjected in revising his essays, preparatory to their going to a second edition. "I have been excessively busy this, and many days past. If you ask, busy about what? I answer, mending and botching up bad sentences, paragraphs, and pages. That book that I published, had at least five thousand faults; and two or three thousand, I have felt it necessary to try and mend." Of writing, he says, "it is an employment in which I am inconceivably slow. * * * You would be surprised if I were to tell you what a length of time and labor it cost me, to write any given part of the small volumes already printed." We cannot help exclaiming, would that several of our more modern book-makers were afflicted with a similar difficulty, in the business of composition! The world would be a great gainer by their sufferings.

This careful and painful elaboration, gave Foster's style a somewhat stiff, hard and artificial character. It wants ease and grace; of this he was conscious. "I wish it was possible to attain more ease and simplicity," he says, in one of his letters. With these abatements, it is, however, a style possessing remarkable excellencies, strong, condensed, nervous, and characterized by "an exquisite precision of language," worthy of all admiration. It contains no useless words, and every word conveys the exact idea in the mind of the writer. Although not suitable for a model, (as we do not believe any style is,) it can still be studied to immense advantage, by all who are ambitious to excel in writing. It frequently arrests our attention, by combinations of words, that leave us wondering, how language could be constructed to convey so much meaning in so short a space. The writings of Foster abound, too, with passages of almost transcendent splendor and power. Nothing would be easier than to present specimens of a sublime eloquence, taken from any of his works. Indeed, there are few authors in our language, from whose productions so many striking sayings, fine thoughts, aphorisms, and passages worthy of being treasured in the memory, can be collected. We perceive that such a compilation has been made by

the Rev. W. W. Everts, of New York; and though we have not seen the work, we venture to pronounce it one of surpassing value.

Foster's style of character did not fit him for epistolary writing, and while his letters will always be read with interest by the few, they will never, like the letters of Cowper and Lamb, be generally popular.

As a Preacher, we have already said that Foster signally failed. At every place in which he ministered, he had the mortification of seeing his congregation diminishing, his church decaying, and his labors fruitless. His confessions on this subject are made with a characteristic candor and *naivete*, that excite at once our admiration and pity. His small success, as a Preacher, is easily accounted for. His peculiar habits of thinking; his very attempts to explore subjects to the bottom; his utter disgust at all common-place statements of familiar truths; his style, particularly unsuited to the Pulpit; his known singularity of doctrinal opinion; his want of a warm evangelical spirit, to give *unction* to his preaching—these circumstances indicate clearly the secret of his uniform disappointment in the ministry.

It is deeply to be regretted that so much of Foster's life was spent in the mere drudgery of writing Reviews. That he did good service in this important department of Literary and Religious labor, we do not doubt; as little do we doubt, that he could have done much better service, by giving himself to a different sphere of exertion. We cannot help feeling sorrow, that such a genius has left so few contributions to the permanent and standard Literature of the world. His essays will be read with admiration and profit, as long as there are minds and hearts to appreciate whatever is excellent and instructive in human composition. It has been well said, that no young man should regard his education as at all complete, who has not carefully perused these almost incomparable productions. Foster was at one time busily engaged in writing an Essay on the Improvement of Time, and was earnestly urged by Hughes to complete it; but, for some unknown cause, the work was never finished. Had his design been carried out, it may be safely asserted, that this important subject would have

been treated in a style that would have commanded nearly universal attention, and produced the happiest results.

We cannot forbear, though it involves a slight divergence from our original purpose, to treat our readers to an extract or two, showing Foster's estimate of Robert Hall. It is always interesting to learn the opinions of one genius respecting another cotemporary genius. Frequently in these volumes, Foster has occasion to refer to the great orator whose name sheds such a lustre upon the Baptist Pulpit. After a visit to Bristol, he writes as follows:—"The great attraction at Bristol, was the preaching of Mr. Hall. * * The last sermon I heard him preach, which dwelt much on the topic of *living in vain*, made a more powerful impression on my mind than, I think, any one I ever heard. And this was not simply from its being, unquestionably, the most eloquent sermon that I ever heard, or probably ever shall hear, but from the solemn and alarming truth which it urged and pressed on the conscience, with the force of a tempest. I suppose every intelligent person has the impression, in hearing him, that he surpasses every other preacher, probably, in the whole world. * * * He has no tricks of art and oratory, no studied gesticulations, no ranting, no pompous declamation. His eloquence is the mighty power of spirit throwing out a rapid series of thoughts—explanatory, argumentative, brilliant, pathetic, or sublime—sometimes all these together." On Hall's decease, he used this striking language: "That memory will never vanish from the minds of those who have heard his preaching or his conversation. * * As a preacher, his like or equal will come no more." He gave it again as his deliberate conviction, that Hall "might have produced half a dozen, or half a score of volumes of sermons, which would have been the foremost set of sermons in our language." This will be acknowledged competent testimony to the ability of one whose reputation is, of necessity, measurably traditionary.

Some critics have ventured to put Foster above Hall in point of intellect, and assign him the loftiest position among the great men of the denomination to which he belonged. We cannot so judge. In several points, they were alike. Both were independent and original thinkers, ac-

customed to call no man master. Foster had perhaps more naked power of mind, but Hall had more of the inspiration of genius. Foster made more show of argument, but Hall saw by intuition, and stated great conclusions without going through the slow process of argumentation. What was labor for Foster, was sport for Hall. If Foster dug deeper into a subject, Hall excelled him in scaling its summits. Hall had more taste, more judgment, more practical wisdom than Foster. Foster's intellect reminds us of an Egyptian temple, with its sphinxes and hieroglyphics and sepulchral gloom, but presenting here and there, the foreign adornment of a Corinthian column, with its rich and flowery capital.

Hall's mind appears to us, like some Grecian temple, faultless in its proportions and severely chaste in its beauty. Or, to change the figure, in thinking of Foster's mind, we compare it to a river, deep, full and rapid, but broken by cataracts, and pouring its troubled waters through a wild and picturesque region. On the other hand, we liken Hall's mind to a river, equally deep and full, flowing amidst scenes in which art and nature mingle their beauties, mirroring on its calm surface the blue heavens above, and the fields of waving grain along its borders, and floating on its ample bosom the argosies that carry plenty to distant lands.

ARTICLE VI.

"ANCIENT AND SCRIPTURE CHRONOLOGY."

The Southern Quarterly Review, Nov. 1850.

We have not known whether it were advisable to notice, in the way of reply, the article of Dr. Nott in the Southern Quarterly Review, in which he comments, with less of compliment than scorn, on the strictures we felt it our duty to make as to the views he has lately published to the world. Many of our wisest friends thought his book unworthy of an answer. But as religious jour-

nalists, we were hardly justified in keeping silence, when these skeptical doubts, however often refuted, were anew thrust forth. Especially, when the ever-varying form human science, in its struggles to advance beyond the attainments of yesterday, while its new researches are yet unfinished, and its decisions premature, seems to conflict with the statements of Divine Revelation, does it appear right to question its decisions, and to compel it to substantiate whatever it commands us to believe. Christianity, which wrestled successfully with Celsus, Porphyry, Julian, and the Antonines of an earlier day, with D'Alembert, Condorcet, and Voltaire in a later, cannot fear either the philosophers or the scholars of the present times. And as Dr. Nott assures us that he feels "as if he were doing God's service as well as man's in killing off such commentators as we are," we are not unwilling to show him that the breath of life yet remains within us; that his pharmacy was at fault, and that he must administer a more deadly potion, before his patient sleeps quietly the sleep of death. For the high reputation which the Doctor's labors hitherto have earned him, in this wide department of Natural History, Theology, Antiquities, Chronology and Biblical Literature, we refer him to the Princeton Review, and to the estimate formed of his title to be heard on these topics, (if we are not mistaken as to the authorship of the article,) by one of the ripest scholars this country has.

Among the many errors of which Dr. Nott thinks us guilty, is the statement respecting Strauss, that "he left his country, per-force, for his country's good," the truthfulness of which he doubts! The facts of the case, as we have learned them, were these. At the time he published his life of Jesus, he occupied the post of Repetent in the Theological Seminary of Tubingen, and was lecturer on philosophy in the University. The publication of this book cost him his place as a public teacher in Germany. The ministers of the Prussian Government would have forbidden the publication of his work in Prussia, but for the interference of Neander. It was after this that he was appointed to a professorship at Zurich, in Switzerland, but the people of that canton, indignant at the outrage offered to their religious feelings, rose in a body against him, and compelled him to resign his office, and leave the country.

A pension was offered him of a thousand francs a year, in lieu of his professorship, to which he had been duly elected. On this, having married an opera dancer, he was living at Stuttgard in the year 1844, as a retired gentleman and scholar. It was with a knowledge of these facts, that the statement to which Dr. Nott refers was made, facts which most of our readers will believe to be a sufficient justification of our language. Strauss is unquestionably a man of great ability, and therefore, (but that his day is passing away,) capable of doing much mischief. That he is tolerant, one may well believe, but that *that* is a "*christian-like toleration*" which sympathises with every error, which denies coolly the genuineness of the gospels, the reality of the miracles they record, and allows them scarcely any basis of historic truth, sounds very strangely to *truly* Christian ears. It may be that Dr. Nott may think Strauss "better able to judge whether his system be right or wrong than we;" so he may think of Voltaire's ability to judge of *his* system, but this we know, that we are not yet prepared in this country to learn that the gospels are but a collection of religious legends and mythic stories, gathered from the conjectures, imaginations, hopes and wishes of the unknown authors. Nor yet do we think such a man fit to be quoted on a question of criticism.*

The views he has adopted oblige him to make the most of all seeming discrepancies in the evangelical narratives, rather than enquire whether the narrations of these witnesses, like the testimony of witnesses in a court of justice, may be harmonized with one another.

We are happy to know that Professor Stuart, whom Dr. Nott often quotes with respect, has the same views of Strauss that we have, and that he would oppose with the same decision which we have manifested, and on all the points on which we have spoken, the extraordinary assumptions of Dr. Nott. This we deem ourselves justified in saying, as our studies in this department of knowledge were first commenced under his instructions, and his opinions on these points, as on all others, have ever been most freely expressed. From this quarter Dr. Nott certainly could expect nothing but decided condemnation.

* We recommend to Dr. Nott, Dr. Ebrard's Critique on Strauss, and especially his Recipe for writing a Life of Jesus like that of Dr. David Fr. Strauss, a part of which may be seen in the Bibliotheca Sacra.

Dr. Nott argues with us to show that there has never been more than a slender knowledge of the Hebrew language and literature, from the captivity, we suppose, till the nineteenth century. He says, in closing his remarks on this topic, that he "is really ashamed at having to argue with a Theological professor on a point like this;" that "Bunsen, Lepsius, Birch, Lance, Cohen, and other philologists of our day, would not be as much astounded as we, at the assertion that there is *more Hebrew learning in the nineteenth century than there has been at any time for two thousand years.*" Truly thankful are we for all the aid in understanding that noble tongue in which David and the prophets sung, furnished by the combined labours of the scholars of modern times, and deeply are we impressed with the value of their labours. We cheerfully admit the progress which has been made, in explaining the philosophy of this language, and in solving many things less well understood among Christians of an earlier day. But if Dr. Nott is right, we are really not "posted up,"—to use a favorite expression of his,—in this department of Hebrew Literature, though it has been more or less a study of ours for a full quarter of a century. We had not understood that Bunsen, Lepsius, and Birch, with all their eminent acquirements, "had attained unto the first three" in this department. We did not know "that *the language* of the ten tribes" who were carried away into captivity in the eighth century B. C. "is lost." We heretofore, in our ignorance, supposed it was the Hebrew tongue which these tribes spoke in common with the rest of their Jewish brethren, and which we still have in the writings of the Old Testament. Nor did we know that the Jews have *always* since the destruction of their temple in the year seventy, "been without good seminaries of learning, without libraries, without peace, quiet, and other requisites for deep philological studies." We have read of the famous schools of Tiberias, Caesarea, and Jabneh, in Palestine, of those of Naardea, Sora and Pumbeditha in Babylon, and that of Cordova in Spain, all of them seats of Jewish learning after the fall of Jerusalem. And if the interpretations and discussions of these schools abound in puerilities, there is the most abundant evidence in the punctuation system itself of the Hebrew Bible, how deeply versed the scholars who devised it were, in the ancient

and noble language of their fathers, and how much our best scholars may yet learn from their labours. We did not know till Dr. Nott informed us, that there were no Hebrew grammars nor lexicons previous to the eighteenth century. Among the Jewish writers we are able to name the Rabbins—Saadiah, Chiug, Aben Ezra, Kimchi, and Elias Levita, of the tenth, eleventh, thirteenth, and sixteenth centuries; and among Christian writers Pellican, Reuchlin, Munster, the Buxtorfs, Glass, Alting, Danz, Wachsmuth and Cappel in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth. Of Lexicographers, we can name after Saadiah, Ben Saruk, Abulwalid, Ben Karish, Parchon, and Kimchi, among the Jews, and Munster, Buxtorf, Forster, and others among the christian scholars during the same period of time.

Though we are very sensible of the progress which modern scholars are making in Hebrew studies; yet very few of them equal, for example, the Buxtorfs of an earlier day; and all the accumulation of manuscripts, study of the cognate dialects, and books of travels in eastern countries, cannot give to the moderns greater facilities than were enjoyed by those earlier Jews, from whom all these manuscripts proceeded, who lived and were reared in those same eastern climes, and to whom these cognate dialects—the Syriac, Chaldee, and Arabic,—were their own vernacular tongues. We have said these things substantially before, and repeat them, not because they are especially relevant to the main points in controversy between us, but in self-defence, and to show Dr. Nott that it is not safe for him to march with so proud and rampant a stride over territory with which he is so little acquainted.

Dr. Nott reproaches us with retailing the old tradition about Tyrian sailors circumnavigating Africa, which we mentioned to show the extent to which the world was known to the ancients, and the probable intercourse which existed in early times, beyond what we are informed of by the historians and geographers of Greece and Rome, saying that "Anthon, Lardner, and every authority, treats it as a fable." The Dr. is quite too fast. Herodotus, who relates the story in his *Melpomene*, believed it. The only thing to him incredible, was that in sailing round Libya, "they should have had the sun on their right hand," which

must necessarily have been the case, and is, says Larcher, "an evidence to the truth of a voyage which, without this, might have been doubted." "While we admit," says Heeren, "the navigation of the ancients to have been always carried along the coast, we must be cautious how we attribute to it the degree of imperfection so liberally assigned it by many. It is certain that a coasting navigation is not only subject to greater difficulties and dangers than any other, but has the property, in consequence, of forming at all times, the most expert seamen. The very position of the three continents of the ancient world, precluded the possibility of fixing any limits to navigation.—Without attempting at present to draw any general inference from these observations, we may at least be convinced that it is a very unfounded proceeding to assert that the accounts we possess of the distant voyages of these nations along the coasts of Europe and Africa, and even of the circumnavigation of the latter, are fabulous, merely because they do not coincide with our own preconceived notions of the unskillfulness of ancient mariners."* Maj. Rennell, too, a very able writer, in his Geographical system of Herodotus, maintains the same.† So, also, Murray, Enc. of Geography, I. ps. 9, 10, and Bochart, a more learned author still.‡

Dr. N., in his peculiar style of compliment, says of us, "when the reviewer comes to the geography—Ethiopia, Cush, &c—of the Bible, he dives into such a heterogeneous mass of learning, that we cannot pretend to follow him. Like the cuttle-fish, he so blackens the water behind him, as effectually to baffle all pursuit." We are not sorry at this confession. When men have set out on a pilgrimage in the path of error, determined to pursue it, nothing so perplexes and obscures their perceptions as the shedding of light around them. They will not come to that light lest their deeds should be reproved. They are ever putting darkness for light, and light for darkness. The belated traveller in the dim and uncertain star-light may pur-

* Hist. of the Carthaginians. Introd : p. xciv.

† The Geographical system of Herodotus examined and explained, by Jas. Rennell, Fellow of the Royal Societies of London and Edinburg; late Mayor of Engineers, and Surveyor General in Bengal, §. §. xxiv., xxv, pp. 672—718.

‡ Canaan, L. I, C. 36.

sue a mistaken course for a long time, in perfect confidence that he is right, and when the sun arises and discloses to him the true nature of his position, may be thrown into unspeakable confusion. We are glad to know that our geographical and ethnological facts and conclusions, have been received with special approbation by the most competent scholars. They have been republished in most of our religious papers, without knowing, perhaps, their origin, from the appendix of Dr. Smyth's work on the Unity of the Race, and are quoted with approbation by the able Reviewer of Prof. Agassiz, in the Biblical Repertory. And we again ask, "If the KHEM of the monuments, is the Ham of the scriptures, and the KANANA of the monuments, is the Canaan of the scriptures, why is not the monumental KUSH the Cush of the Bible, extending westward over Central Africa, and including the negro race?" "It can hardly be necessary," says our cotemporary, the Princeton Review, "to reply to the feeble remonstrance of Mr. Gliddon, against the contribution he accidentally made to the cause of truth, by alleging that the Cush of the monuments is not the Cush of the scriptures. "Let," says the Reviewer, "Prof. A. and his friend answer the question," (viz, the one we had asked "why, &c") "if they can; and when they have made a show of reasoning upon the negative of the question, we may have something further to say."

Such a casual contribution is also made by Dr. Nott, in his note on p. 421, of the Southern Quarterly Review, where he says:

"The hieroglyphical designation KESH, applied exclusively to *African* races, as *distinct* from the Egyptians, has been found by Lepsius, as far back as the monuments of the 6th dynasty, B. C. 3000. There can be no doubt that this term is applied to Negroes, and is one of the evidences of the early distinctions of races."

Be it so. We repeat the argument; adding the following list of scripture names and nations found on the monuments, which might, even in the present state of Egyptian research, be greatly increased.

N'H'RAIN,-----Naharain.
I'B'SHI,-----Jebusi.

AM'LKI,	Amalekite.
REKA,	Reka, 1 Chron. iv, 12.
'RM'N'N,	Hermonim.
KANANA,	Canaan.
ZUSI	Zuzi—the Zuzite.
TS'R	Tsor—Tyre.
BASH'N	Bashan.
AMOR	Amor. Gen. 10: 16.
H'D'SH	Hadasha.
H'T'N	Hittin—the Hittites.
'TSIRDoN	Tsidon—Zidon.
ZUSIM	Zuzim.
PHLSTI	Philisti.
R'BA	Rabba.
SH'L'M	Shalem.
M'N'S'S	Manasses.
BARNAM	Barnea, originally Barneam.
N'H'SH	Nahash.
AILON	Shunem.
BTHSHRN	Hepherim—Hepherites.
M'HANMI	Mahanaim.
H'PH'R'M	Beth-Haran.
SHN'M	Ailon.
M'GDO	Megiddo.
ETHR	Ether.
IOUDH MLK,	Judah Melek, the King of Judah.
HNM	Hinnom.
PTR	Pethor.
KIGALI	Kir Gallim.
EBRON	Hebron.
LEMANON	Lebanon.
KHEM	Ham.

Now the Cush of Scripture evidently peopled some considerable part of Asia, and especially of South Arabia; and passing across the straits of Babel-mandel, or the waters and regions adjacent, spread themselves over Nubia, and, as we have reason to believe, over the regions of Central Africa. The earliest notice of the dark complexion of the Cushites in the Scriptures, is found in Jeremiah. "Can the Cushite change his skin, or the leopard his spots?" That the Jews in very early times associated duskiness with the complexion of the Cushites, is plain, from the Targum on Canticles 1: 5, "I am black, but comely," &c.

"When the house of Israel made the calf," says the Targum, "their faces became black, like the faces of those daughters of Cush which dwell in the tabernacles of Kedar." The dark citron is called, in the Talmudic books, the Cushite citron; and dark wine, Cushite wine. Now, if all the names above, taken from the monuments commemorating the conquests of Sethos, Sesostris and Rameses, indicate, as they plainly do, nations and places mentioned in the Bible, again we ask, why is not the Cush of the monuments the Cush of the Bible, who was the son of Ham, who was the son of Noah, who was the descendant of Adam? And if this be so, the theory of Dr. Nott and Professor Agassiz, that Adam was the father of only the Caucasian race, is as false in history as it is contrary to the whole tenor of the divine word; and the monuments themselves bear concurrent testimony with Scripture to establish the derivation of all varieties from a common ancestor.

But Doctor Nott's incredulity is peculiarly awakened at what he calls our "desperate shifts" to account for the population of the earth.

Judging from his italics and his notes of interrogation and admiration, we suppose him to have doubted whether Havah, Eve, the *life imparter*, was a fruitful vine, whether Cain was a married man at 129 years of age, though we read shortly afterwards of his daughters, and again of his sons; and whether, when the Creator designed to people the earth, his providence *could* have arranged for this end, so that no hindrance should oppose. If he believes in a creation by Almighty power, he seems to believe that this power has either *expended* itself in the creative act, or stands aloof from the frame of nature when brought into existence; and neither quickens, furthers, nor directs and controls those second causes whose action he has once made to commence. In other words, he believes not in that government of God over all his works, which we designate by the brief term, Divine Providence, and which is the foundation of all piety and worship. If he admits this government, then he must admit that he who disposes all events could have prevented the occurrence, in any great degree, of that state of things which limits, in these days, the population of the earth.

Let us consider, then, some of the facts which the industry of men has accumulated on this point. And first, facts to show the tardiness with which population increases under some circumstances, and the rapidity under others. England doubled its population, before the middle of the 18th century, but once in 370 years. Since that time, in 70 years. Scotland doubles in 120 years, France in 150 years, the Netherlands in 75 years, Denmark in 50 years, Russia in 49 years, the United States of America in $23\frac{1}{2}$ years. Some particular districts in 15 years, without any increase from immigration. "According to a table of Euler, the period of doubling will be only 12 years and four-fifths.* And these proportions are said to be not only possible suppositions, but have actually occurred for short periods in more countries than one. Sir William Petty supposes a doubling possible in so short a time as ten years.† Again, on the other hand, population is often stationary in a country, or retrograde. A striking instance is exhibited in the Sandwich Islands at the present time, whose population has been constantly decreasing since the discovery of these islands by European navigators.

If we look at particular examples, we find multitudes of families doubling their numbers in the lapse of a very short time; and if we judge only from these examples, $8\frac{1}{2}$ years would be the natural period of doubling. In fruitful marriages it is not unfrequently the case that every 16 or 17 months one is added to the family; and in some cases, for a length of time, one every year. Extraordinary cases, such as the following, are also on record:

"In 1775, Jacob Kirilo, a Russian, was the father of 57 children by one wife, all of whom were living. The wife had, four times, four children at a birth; seven times, three children; and ten times, twins. He married a second wife, who had once three children at a birth, and six times twins. Fenol Wassillewitz, of Selijah, had a first wife who four times had four children; seven times, three; sixteen times, twins, making 27 times in all. It is said to be verified by official documents, that on the 27th of February, 1782, this man had 87 children, of whom 83 were living."

* The tables of Euler are calculated on the supposition that the births are to the deaths as 3 to 1.

† Malthus on Pop., I., 7; II., 50. Sumner on the Creation, II., p. 123.

We relate these facts as we find them.* From them all we gather that there is, at times, and under favorable circumstances, a wonderful power of procreation in the human race, and at other times this power is either diminished, or meets with such hindrances that population increases but slowly, or in particular communities retrogrades, and even approaches, and perhaps reaches, at times, the point of utter extinction.

There are but two theories which we have met with on this subject. 1. The Malthusian, which has found much favour, notwithstanding the strenuous opposition it has encountered, and has, we believe, maintained its ground, in the opinion of the most judicious men. To be within bounds, Malthus has assumed that the period in which population will double itself, under the instinctive principles of our nature, is about 25 years; that it will go on doubling itself in a geometrical ratio until it overtakes the means of subsistence. That the means of subsistence increasing only in an arithmetical ratio, or as the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and population as the figures 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, this would, under these circumstances, be checked, and diminish as the difficulties of subsistence should increase. The hindrances to population are, — 1. moral restraint; 2. vice; 3. misery. 2. The other theory is, that human population is guided and controlled by the divine will, and that the law of fecundity varies with the varying circumstances of society, at the pleasure of the Almighty.

Now there are three periods in Scripture history in which the infidel impugnors of the Bible have sought either to overthrow its chronology, or its statements in respect to the numbers of mankind then in existence. The period before the flood, the period immediately after, and the period during which the Jews were resident in Egypt. In relation to each of these, Dr. Nott has made difficulties with the Scripture chronology. We have supposed that

* Our immediate source of information, as to these two last remarkable items, is Sharon Turner's *Sacred History of the World*, Vol. III., pp. 81, 82. We have not the means of verifying them. The present census of the United States is bringing to light some remarkable facts. "It was recently stated that in Carroll County (Georgia,) 54 sets of twins were found by the census takers. The gentleman appointed to take the census of Abbeville District, in this State, reports 93 sets of twins. One couple are the parents of 4 sets, and three couple 2.

if ever population increased rapidly, it was in these ages of the world's history, when Providence had high ends to accomplish, when God had promised the rapid increase of mankind,* commanded them to be fruitful and multiply, and given them, at least in the earliest of these periods, a life reaching on towards a thousand years in duration, itself an evidence of astonishing vigour of physical constitution, and of proof against those innumerable influences which in these years abbreviate the life of man, and attenuate his strength. Dr. Nott looks with incredulity on all this, but to our minds it lies on the face of the inspired narrative itself. The skeptical doubt of those who scoffingly asked, "Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation," he bears back over the track of time, and asks, where is the evidence of Divine intervention in days that are past? We believe that he did so far interfere in those remote ages that at least this more rapid increase of the human family, which has occasionally since occurred in individual instances, did then, perhaps, generally prevail. We are not alone in these suppositions, nor are the calculations, to which we have referred in our former pages, new to the world. The older chronologists were given to these calculations; and though we see no necessity for carrying them out with so strong a hand as they did, we shall here bring forward some of them, as examples of what has been done.

"Though we should suppose," says Stackhouse, quoting from Saurin, "that Adam and Eve had no other children than Cain and Abel, in the year of the world 128, which, (as the best chronologers agree) was the time of Abel's murder; yet as it must be allowed, that they had daughters married with these two sons, we require no more than the descendants of these two children, to make a considerable number of men upon the earth in the said year 128. For, supposing them to have been married in

* Jacob, in his prophetic blessings pronounced upon the sons of Joseph, promised that they should multiply as fishes increase, in the midst of the land. And it is recorded of the Israelites in Egypt, that they were fruitful and increased like fishes, and multiplied and became mighty beyond measure, and the land was filled with them. Gen. 48: 16, Exod. 1: 7, in the original Hebrew.

the 19th year of the world, they might easily have had each of them eight children, some males, some females, in the 25th year. In the 50th year, there might proceed from them, in a direct line, 64 persons; in the 74th year, there would be 582; in the 98th, 4096; and in the 122nd year, they would amount to 32,768. If to these we add the other children, descended from Cain and Abel, their children, and the children of their children, we shall have in the aforesaid 122d year, 421,164 men, capable of generation, without ever reckoning the women, both old and young, and such children as are under the age of 17 years.*

This will be regarded as an extravagant calculation, but it will serve to show what views have been taken of the possible amount of the Antediluvian population by others than ourselves. But the rate of increase of the tribe of Judah in Egypt, supposing they resided there 215 years, as is the belief of most chronologers, would give a population of over 200,000 in the 129th year of the world. And yet the age men attained before the flood would naturally give a more rapid rate of increase, than after men ceased living such protracted lives.

As to the post-diluvians, the computations are many. All of them are designed to show what might have been, but how far this rapid increase really existed can only be gathered from the words of Scripture itself. We subjoin the computations of Petavius and of Bishop Cumberland.

<i>No. of Sons born according to Petavius.</i>		<i>Bishop Cumberland's calculation.</i>	
Year of the Flood.		Year after Flood.	
8,.....	8		Couples born in the first
31,.....	64		vicennium after the flood;
54,.....	512		and the couples which de-
77,.....	4,096		scended from them.
100,.....	32,768	20,.....	30
123,.....	262,144	60,.....	300
146,.....	2,097,152	100,.....	3,000
169,.....	16,777,216	140,.....	30,000
192,.....	134,217,728	180,.....	300,000
215,.....	1,073,742,824	220,.....	3,000,000
238,.....	8,589,934,592	260,.....	30,000,000
291,.....	68,719,476,736	300,.....	300,000,000
284,.....	549,755,813,888	340,.....	3,000,000,000
	628,292,358,728		3,333,333,330

* Stackhouse Hist. of the Bib. I. p. 134.

The table of Petavius exhibits the male progeny of only one son of Noah ; another son he supposes in his calculation to furnish females, and the third will have as many descendants as either of the others. So that the progeny of the whole, supposing Noah himself to have no sons after the flood, would be three times these numbers. Bishop Cumberland's calculation "assumes that every child shall live 40 years at least, and that every young man and woman shall marry when twenty years of age, and shall become the parents of 20 children in the next 20 years." Usher too is of the opinion, that supposing an unusual fecundity, such however as has in some rare instances been exhibited in comparatively modern times, in the 102d year after the flood mankind might have increased to 388,605 males and as many females.* The computation has been carried to a still greater height by Temporarius.†

These are among the older writers upon Chronology, the latest of them having written more than 100 years ago. The numbers to which their calculations reach will strike every one with surprise. And we do not see that they are required by any thing which is mentioned in the sacred volume.

The following is extracted from the very able work of Henry Finnes Clinton Esq. "*Fasti Hellenici*" published at Oxford in 1834. After showing by a deduction of particular facts at what period of life the age of puberty commenced with the patriarchs, he proceeds thus :

"From these facts it may be inferred that in the patriarchal times the age of puberty was the same as at present, although the duration of life was longer. If this be so, it is not difficult to trace the increase of population in the first generations after the flood. In the present state of mankind it is calculated that the numbers of a people under favourable circumstances may be doubled in ten years. It has been proved by other calculators that the numbers have actually doubled in periods of 12 4-5 years for short periods. It is acknowledged that in parts of North America the people have doubled their numbers in 15 years. The Israelites in Egypt doubled their numbers in periods of something less than 15 years. Now the first families after the flood were placed in circumstances more favourable to rapid

* See Chron. Sac. c. 5.

† Stillingfleet Origines Sacrae B. III. C. IV.

increase than in any other period of mankind. They were not gradually emerging from barbarism, but possessed all the arts and civilization of the antediluvian world. They had unoccupied land before them, and their lives were extended to 500, 400, and 200 years. If we assume, then, that the population doubled itself in periods of twelve years, the population of the earth, beginning from six parents, would in 276 years arrive at more than fifty millions of persons, and in 300 years would amount to two hundred millions*. If we take only the actual rate of increase which we know to have occurred in Egypt, and suppose 15 years to be the period of doubling, still the numbers of mankind would attain fifty millions in 345 years, and would reach two hundred millions in 375 years from the flood. I think the former calculation the most probable; but even in the latter case the numbers of mankind would have reached two hundred millions in the 24th year of the life of *Abraham*."

So also Browne, in his *Ordo Saeculorum*.

"In 120 years after the Creation the earth may have had a considerable population. It agrees with this view, that Cain after the birth of his son *built a city*. We will suppose then, that the great event in reference to which Peleg has his name occurred about the middle of his life, *i. e.* about 220 years after the flood. Hereafter we shall have occasion to point out an interesting fact connected with this hypothesis: At present I have but to remark that the interval here supposed between the dispersion of nations and the Call of Abraham is amply sufficient for the growth of populous nations and the foundation of considerable empires. For in 100 years from the Flood, the population

* "Six persons were the parents of mankind; for the age of *Noah* and the silence of the sacred historian make it probable that *Noah* had no children after the flood. But taking 6 as the element of our calculation, we arrive by an arithmetical progression in 18 periods at 1,572,864; in 20 periods at 6,291,456; in 23 periods at 50,331,648; in 25, at 201,326,692. But, the period of doubling being computed at twelve years, 18 periods would make 216 years, 20 would amount to 240 years, 23 to 276, and 25 would be completed in 300 years. It is plain, then, that the population of the earth might have been 200,000,000 fifty years before the birth of *Abraham*, by the shorter computation. It may perhaps be said that the periods of doubling might proceed at the rate of twelve years to a certain point, perhaps to 23 periods; but that then the progress would be checked, and the numbers remain nearly stationary or slowly advancing; as the Israelites in 215 years multiplied to 2,500,000 persons, but during the 40 years in the wilderness their numbers remained stationary at that point. This check, however, upon the impulse of population was provided against by the dispersion of mankind. After that dispersion, the periods of increase would proceed at the same rate as before among the families of mankind who occupied new countries."—pp. 394, 395.

would have grown from 3 males to 400, if it doubled its numbers but once in 14 years. In the second century, since all the males who lived in the first century were still in the vigour of life, the term of doubling cannot have been more than half what it was in the former century. Hence at the end of this century the population might number 400 \times 2-14 or about 205,000 males; and at the 220th year, it would number, at the same rate, more than 7 times as much, or a million and a half of males. These dispersed over the world, and still living on an average 200 years each, are abundantly sufficient to have overspread the territory of the most ancient nations with a numerous and civilized population in the course of about 200 years from that time. For it is to be remembered that the antediluvian arts of civilization were of course preserved among the descendants of Noah."—p. 328.

These may serve as specimens of the computations which have been made of the possible numbers of mankind in the early ages of the world. Those of Petavius and Bishop Cumberland will call forth the admiration of Dr. N. far more than the statements of our former article, and can only be true in case our earliest progenitors surpassed in fecundity what is usual in modern times, and in case their marriages were uniformly fruitful. There is a computation by Whiston, in his *Chronology*, in which he exhibits the possible population of the world from the flood down to the period in which he wrote, whose results are less surprising. In this table the intervals of doubling increase in length down to the times of David, from which onward he supposed the earth might double its population once in 400 years. Even at this rate he makes the population of the earth, in his own day, 4,100 years after the flood, to be 4,294,967,296, which he believes to be its true population at the time he wrote, and a proof that the short chronology of the Hebrew Text is the true one, since that of the Septuagint would have reached, on these data, a far larger amount. The following is Whiston's Table.

<i>Number of man- kind.</i>	<i>Years after the Flood.</i>	<i>Years of Doubling</i>	<i>Number of man- kind.</i>	<i>Years after the Flood.</i>	<i>Years of Doubling.</i>
16	4	4	524,288	475	65
38	9	8	1,048,576	545	70
64	15	6	2,097,152	620	75
128	23	8	4,194,304	700	80
256	35	12	8,388,608	800	100
512	50	15	16,777,216	1,000	100
1,024	70	20	33,554,432	1,300	300

2,048	95	25	67,108,864	1,700	400
4,096	125	30	134,217,728	2,100	400
8,192	160	25	268,435,456	2,500	400
16,384	200	40	536,870,912	2,900	400
32,768	245	45	1,073,741,824	3,300	400
65,536	295	50	2,147,483,648	3,700	400
131,072	350	55	4,294,967,296	4,100	400
262,144	410	50			

This table makes the population of the world at this present time 4 times too great. If he had kept his periods of doubling at 15 years for a season in the earlier part, and then gradually increased their periods in length until a certain time, when the earth should have reached about its present population, and then been satisfied to let his figures remain unchanged, his table would have been much nearer the probable truth.

Bedford, in his tables, makes the population of the earth 141 years after the flood, over 20 years of age, to be 584,902, and the population of the world, making a large allowance for deaths, to have been 641,123,088 at the birth of Abraham.*

The opinions of men will be various as to these calculations. Some of them will be regarded as very extravagant. But we presume it will be admitted that the increase of population is exceedingly various at different times, and that unless we adopt the theory of Professor Agassiz, that men were created in swarms, like bees, there was a more rapid increase in earlier times than in the middle periods of the world's history. Men would multiply on the earth at a rate not very likely to fulfil their Creator's command, if they doubled but once in 400 years at first, and it must have required vast cycles of time before a population sufficient to make the smallest city or commonwealth could arise. And yet, after the earth should have been adequately peopled, if we adopt even the longer periods for the reduplication of the earth's population, the results will be far too great when carried out into the later cycles of history. Should mankind have increased from the flood, uniformly, only according to the Malthusian law, doubling as the population has done in the United States of America, once in 25 years, and beginning at the flood with but 6 persons, it would have reached in 1325 years, 54,043,192,528,445,952

* Scripture Chronology, p. 210.

persons. If it should have doubled only once in 60 years, the population of the world, eight years before the birth of Christ, would have been 3,274,985,472.*

It is very plain, therefore, that whatever may have been the rapidity with which mankind multiplied at first, there have been causes operating to diminish this increase, or the globe would not have been able to contain its inhabitants. One was the gradual shortening of human life after the deluge. This effect, which was accomplished by the intervention of Divine Providence, will be best understood by the following table which we have taken from Whiston, exhibiting the ages of men mentioned in Scripture, from Noah to David.

Gen. xi: 10, 11.	Shem,	600			{ Amram,	137
12, 13.	Arphaxad,	438			Segub about	137
14, 15.	Salah,	433	Exod. vi: 20.		Izhar "	137
16, 17.	Heber,	464			Pallu "	137
18, 19.	Phaleg,	239			Jochebed "	137
20, 21.	Reu,	239			Miriam "	130
22, 23.	Serug,	230			Aaron	123
24, 25.	Nahor,	148	Num. xxxiii: 39,		Moses	120
32.	Terah,	205	Deut. xxxiv: 7.		Korah "	125
xxv: 7.	{ Abraham,	175			Dathan "	125
xxiii: 1.	{ Sarah,	127			Abiram "	125
xxxv: 28.	{ Isaac,	180	Josh. xxiv: 29.		Joshua	110
xxv: 17.	{ Ishmael,	137			Rahab "	135
xlvi: 28.	Jacob,	147			Booz "	125
l: 26.	{ Joseph,	110	1 Sam. iv: 15.		Obed "	110
Exod. vi: 16.	{ Levi,	130			Eli	98
18.	{ Kohath,	133			Jesse "	95
Job. i: 1, 4.	{ Hesron about	133	2 Sam. xix: 32.		Barzillai above	80
xlii: 16.	{ Job "	180†	v: 4.		David	70

The populousness of the nations of antiquity, and the vast armies which sometimes met in the shock of battle, as recorded in ancient authors, has been a subject of great surprise to many readers of history. These calculations will show that there may have been no exaggeration in the statement of the ancients on this point. Yet population must at length, in all countries, have pressed on the means of subsistence, and have been diminished by the restraints poverty and hardship put upon marriage, as well as by desolating wars and diseases, and by the diminished vigour of the human frame, of which the abbreviation of human life was, in the earlier ages, a striking result.

* Sharon Turner's Sacred Hist. of the World, III., 83.

† Universal History, I., pp. 360-364.

After all we have now said, we leave the facts with any candid reader. The extremest of the preceding calculations we deem wholly unnecessary to meet the demands of Scripture history. We have shown in our former article, that the cities spoken of as built by Cain and Nimrod, were but the commencement of "*great cities*," for the word in its original meaning demands no more, and the kingdoms were but the beginnings of the great kingdoms existing in the days of Moses. We have exhibited these tables; at the same time we are fully aware, that "the law of population is fluctuating in the present age of the world, and is affected by a thousand circumstances which such calculations cannot embrace." "That we cannot calculate now, nor even guess at, the probable produce of any marriage."* And yet it is still true that there is even now a general rate of increase often developing itself, and that God "may have made his laws of population more active than he intended they should afterwards be, in the first generations after the deluge."†

Whatever, therefore, may be thought of the preceding calculations in their details, we believe we have shown that, under the superintending Providence of God, and without miracle, since it is plainly within the *possibilities*, at least, of nature, the world may have been sufficiently populous in the days of Abraham, (whom Dr. N. places 60 years too early, even by the Hebrew Chronology,‡) to meet all the exigencies of Biblical history. We say it may have been so. We have no need to prove it *was* so. The men who wrote, claim to have spoken under a Divine commission and impulse, and the miracles they wrought, and the prophecies they uttered, substantiate their testimony. And if Dr. N. affirms that it is unphilosophical to believe their testimony, he makes philosophy a teacher and not a learner, he affirms that what God, in his Providence, does not do in one age, he did not do in another.—We are willing to stand with Bacon, Locke and Newton, firmly believing in the record of the Scriptures, and let

* Kitto, Antediluvians and Patriarchs.

† Turner's Sacred History of the World.

‡ Abraham was born 352 years after the flood, not 292 years. He was the youngest and not the eldest son of Terah.—Comp. Gen. ii. 26 and 32, with xii. 4.

Dr. N. if he so chuses, stand with Voltaire, D'Alembert, and that right royal Philosopher, Thomas Paine, an opposer of the Scriptures.

Dr. N. fairly *triumphs* in our ignorance as to Chinese history, and especially our want of acquaintance with the "greatest Chinese scholar of the age," M. G. Pauthier. He gives us then, for our special instruction, an abstract of Pauthier's great work, rightly judging that in this barbarian spot, it is impossible to obtain *any* knowledge concerning the empire of the celestials. True, there are some few clergymen residing in China, one "*Rev. Mr. Medhurst*," wholly unknown to fame, one *Rev. Mr. Williams*, one *Rev. Mr. Gutzlaff*, one *Rev. Dr. Milne*, one *Rev. Dr. Morrisson*, &c. &c. True, some of them have written books on China, have translated the scriptures into Chinese, have prepared grammars and dictionaries of the Chinese language, have been employed by the British government as the most competent men to aid them in their intercourse with the Chinese authorities, have spent a long life in Chinese studies upon the soil of China itself. But they are all naught. The great Pauthier, whom with Bunsen, Lepsius, Lanci, &c.; we must study before we can know any thing about the antiquity of alphabetic writing, he alone can give us any true knowledge respecting China.

Now we have run through the book of Pauthier, one of the volumes of L'Univers, with much interest. It is an admirable popular digest of the information respecting China, which may be found, for substance, in many other works, mostly of an earlier date. There is very little else in it on chronology, than is found in the great work of Du Halde, the English translation of which dates in 1738, in the works of Pere Mailla, P. Amiot, P. Gaubil, and other Jesuit missionaries in China, whose authority can be no higher, save as their opportunities may have been greater, than that of the protestant missionaries of the present day. With the very complete work of Du Halde before us, with the Chinese history, and the China Opened of Gutzlaff, the Middle Kingdom of Williams, the Description of China by Davis, and the book of Medhurst, we are tolerably well prepared to judge of the merits of the Chinese chronology. We see not wherein the division of the Chinese history into the "ante-historic, the semi-historic, and the historic," is

at all superior to that of P. Premare into "the *fabulous, uncertain, and sure*," which he takes from the Chinese themselves, all before Fohi *fabulous*; to Che-Le-Wang *uncertain*; below this *sure*. The chronological history compiled by Confucius, who was born B. C. 552, has been known to the European world, through the translation of Gaubil, more than a century, and the chronological table, at the end of Pauthier, was printed at Pekin, in 1767, and the translation sent to Paris by P. Amiot shortly after.—The chronology of the Chinese, therefore, is nothing new. It has been before the minds of chronologists, and has been treated by them in connection with that of Scripture, for more than 100 years.

Let us now compare the reasoning by which Dr. Nott attempts to show that we end by confuting ourself. Quoting from us, "In the days of Yaou, their first King, answering *perhaps* to Noah, a great inundation occurred, the sky falling on the earth and destroying the race of men. The date of this inundation is *fixed by Medhurst from native documents*, at 2296 B. C., and the beginning of Yaou's reign, at B. C. 2356. These dates accord then with those of the Hebrew Text. If we assume the septuagint chronology, and Pauthier's statement, five or six hundred years is no brief period," &c.

"Here then," says Dr. N., "the Reviewer carries back Chinese records to 2356 B. C!" How so? Did we say, or does Medhurst say that these documents *themselves* are of so ancient a date? On the contrary, Gutzlaff, one of the most competent Chinese scholars of the present day, says, "the first Chinese writer appeared in the last part (half?) of the Chow dynasty," i. e. not till the days of Confucius and his immediate predecessors, or nearly 1000 years after Moses. Whatever preceded, has utterly perished, except as preserved by Confucius. And of the best of his works, Gutzlaff speaks in the following language: "We have had frequent occasion to mention the Shoo-king, which, in our opinion, is the best work of Confucius. It is a collection of old traditions which Confucius put in order, to give them the shape of history. To teach moral lessons appears to be the great aim of this work. We find long speeches, which neither tradition nor even records could have preserved." They are, moreover, so

similar in character, that we suspect Confucius to be the author of them all.

"We should not omit," says Dr. N., "the following precious quotation, which our reviewer gives from Medhurst:"

"It is evident that *Pwan-koo*, the first man, according to the fabulous records of the Chinese, who acted at the separation of heaven and earth, could not have been long before *Fuh-he* perhaps a thousand years—certainly not ten thousand; and the time of *Fuh-he* must have been very near *Yaou* and *Shun*, perhaps a hundred years—certainly not a thousand. No scholar should decline a thorough inquiry."

"Now, our reviewer," continues Dr. N., "did not comprehend one idea in this paragraph, or he certainly *would have declined* entering into the inquiry. The reader will call to mind that the reviewer has fixed the reign of *YAOU* at the year 2356 B. C., (which he tells us accords with the Hebrew Text!) next *Pwan-koo*, he cuts down to one thousand before *Fuh-he*, and the latter to one hundred before *Yaou*; add these together, and we have 3456 B. C., or about two hundred years beyond the Septuagint date of the flood!*"

First we remark on this quotation from Medhurst, that it is given by him from the Chinese historian Fung-Chow. And, secondly, we ask, did *Dr. N.* have any true idea of what this passage means? Does he not know that *Pwan-koo* is the *Adam* of the Chinese? Could he not see it himself in the very extract? Let him *now* make his calculations. To 2356 B. C. add 100 and 1000, and you have, according to Fung-Chow, 3456 B. C. for the *creation* of *Adam*, or 548 years later than the much abused chronology of Archbishop Usher gives, for the existence of man upon the earth! Still further, if the beginning of *Yaou's* reign is dated at 2356 B. C., and *Yaou* is Noah, then as Noah, according to Moses, was born 600 years before the flood, his birth reaches to 2888 B. C., or 190 years before the date of *Hoangti*, according to Pauthier.†

* "The state of China," says the reviewer, "can only be erected into an argument against revelation by a prejudiced or unreflecting mind." When he throws up stones he should be careful to "stand from under."

† If Dr. Nott wishes to know more about *Pwan-koo*, who, besides being the first of mortals, seems to have been endowed almost with divine powers, he may find an edifying print of him in Williams' Middle Kingdom, as he is engaged in chiselling out, with ponderous blows, from the mountain cliff,

Well may we add, in the words of Dr. Nott, "After the exposure of blunders such as these, we cannot think of imposing on the reader," &c. And again, "When he throws up stones, he should be careful to 'stand from under.'"

Dr. N. seems also to be opposed to the great ages of the earliest men. As the earliest reigns of the Chinese emperors were very long, Hoangti reigning 101 years, Yaou 102 years,* *he* would be willing to cut down these two reigns, and perhaps some of the rest, which will reduce the Chinese chronology still further.

Many writers on chronology make Fohi to be cotemporary with Noah, or rather the Noah of the scriptures, and find a conformity in the chronology on the supposition that some of the sovereigns or princes were cotemporary with each other.

In reading the Chinese annals we are impressed with the idea that many modern inventions and institutions are ascribed to their ancient kings, and that the old and the more recent, the fabulous and the true, are strangely commingled. So also Gutzlaff, "Under the Tang dynasty, Sze-machin, a descendant of Sze-ma-tzeen, perceived the defects of Chinese history. The Chinese monarchy was not sufficiently ancient, and he added, with great dexterity, the reigns of Fohi and Shin-nung to the list of emperors who reigned antecedent to Yaou." "The primary end of history is to record facts with impartiality, fidelity and accuracy. This rule is as applicable to the Chinese as any other nation. The want of veracity, however, is a lamentable defect in the Chinese character; and the indispensable necessity of praising a patron, greatly abates the love of truth. For order and connection their histories are

the various objects of the material world, and the various animals that inhabit the earth. Or he may consult Gutzlaff's "China Opened," I., p. 299, where he will find another version, and will learn that when Pwan-koo died, "the air of his body was metamorphosed into wind and clouds, his voice into thunder, his left eye became the sun, the right the moon, the various members of his body the four poles, and five high mountains, his blood and fluids rivers and streams, his sinews and arteries were changed into land, the flesh was transmuted into acres, the hair into stars, the skin and down into plants, the teeth and bones into minerals, the marrow into precious stones, the sweat into rain, and the vermin adhering to his body were transformed into men!"

* Yaou was 108 years old at his death; Hoangti 113.

conspicuous. Not satisfied with giving the known date of events from months to years, and continuing in this uniform course through the whole, they supply, by their ingenuity, the precise time, when it is unknown." The process, which is thus described by Gutzlaff, might be applied to the history of the ante and post-diluvian patriarchs. A wonderful heap of tradition or conjecture is found in the Jewish and Mohamedan writers, and many discoveries in science, and inventions in arts and letters, are in these ascribed to them respectively. It only needs some Confucius or Szemazeen to elaborate them, and some college of Hanlin to invent specific dates, and we shall have an ancient-modern history of the antediluvian and post-diluvian patriarchs altogether as credible as that of China, and ascribe the armillary sphere of Pauthier's 4th plate to Enoch, the 7th from Adam, with the same propriety, as the Chinese historians have ascribed it to Chun, the 7th from Pwankoo; both being, in these traditions, respectively, the parents of astronomical science, and both being at the same remove, in genealogical descent, from the first man.

Dr. N., after recommending us to pay some attention to the Sanscrit language, in which we are willing, at any time, to compare notes with him, wisely declines entering into a discussion of the chronology of India. The antiquity which has been claimed for the Hindoo astronomy and literature, has been shown by some of the most competent scholars of Europe to be wholly absurd. The Dr. cannot have read Bentley's able work on Hindoo astronomy, nor been familiar with the fact, that, according to him, the *true* date of the creation, in the *Hindoo* books, is 2252 B. C., about the period of the Mosaic flood. Their earliest and rudest attempts at astronomical system, go back to about 1400 B. C., a date later than that of the patriarch Job, who, also, seems not unacquainted with the starry heavens. But it was not till the 6th century of our Era, that they removed the date of the creation to the immense distance of 1,972,947,101 years B. C. Prof. Maskylene, of the royal Observatory, D'Lambre, LaLande, LaPlace, Cuvier, Heeren, and others, coincide with these views.—And Klaproth says, "The astronomical tables of the Hindoos, to which has been attributed a prodigious antiquity,

have been constructed in the seventh age of the vulgar era, and have been subsequently carried back by calculation, to an anterior epoch."*

We have carefully anew considered what is written on the Mound builders, by Squier and Davis. The arguments for their antiquity, adduced by these authors, are drawn from the time required for the subsidence of rivers, for the growth of forest, for the decay of skeletons, and for the disappearance of a strongly marked race of men, from the locality where these mounds are found. "We are compelled," say these authors, in view of these facts, "to assign them no inconsiderable antiquity." We presume all will agree to the modest conclusion which is thus expressed. But when their reasoning is pressed into an argument against Moses, evidently wholly contrary to the intentions of these authors, it is well to give it a moment's consideration. We have often directed our attention to these terraced rivers, as one is led to do, who has ever lived in their vicinity, and have considered whether the waters which now flow in their beds, or the inundations to which they are *now* subject, could ever have caused the present appearance of their banks. And however it may be with some streams, we have always been obliged to conclude that such effects could never have followed from so inadequate causes. We have referred them rather to diluvial action, and to the successive diminishing and subsidence of these streams after the water had abated, and as one obstacle after another was worn away. Whether the lower terrace of the Scioto has been formed by the later and ordinary action of the river, we of course cannot judge. But that these earth works were built on the very margins of the rivers on which they are found, we must regard as by no means certain. The objects, views, and intentions of the builders are matters of conjecture. All, therefore, which is said of the time it must have taken for the river to have worn itself to a lower level, makes on our minds, little impression. Let us have something firm to stand upon when the attempt is made to overthrow a miraculously attested revelation. Be it that it takes "600 or 800" years for trees to attain the size of those which cover these mounds; be

* Bentley's Hindoo astronomy, pp. 76, 77, and Preface xxiv.

it that the remnants of an earlier growth lie rotting around, and that they are not fallen trees of the same growth; be it that it takes "ten times fifty years," before a complete assimilation with the adjoining forest is effected, although no one can tell whether the whole region was not covered with forest together; be it that a time must be allowed for the works to have been used and then deserted before the forest invaded them. And 800 *plus* 800 *plus* (50 \times 10) *plus* 500, equal 2600.* Now deduct this sum from the 4139 years, which have elapsed since the flood. There remain 1539 years. Again, let it be that in the barrows of the ancient Britons, skeletons are found entire and well preserved, although possessing an antiquity of at least 1800 years, and that in these mounds the skeletons are quite decayed.—What is 1800 or 2000 years to the 4139 years since the flood? Again, we say, we see no traces of an objection to the Mosaic chronology in the book of Squier and Davis. We think that any "charitable reader," *could* see that the authors of "Ancient Monuments of the Valley of the Mississippi," had no idea of ascribing an antiquity to the mound builders which would *conflict with the Mosaic chronology*.

Dr. N. closes his defence and replication by bringing forward anew, the authority of Mr. Gliddon, in 1841, against Mr. Gliddon in 1842, (a change of opinion we had ourselves noticed, Pres. Review, vol. iv, p. 266) of Lepsius, Bunsen, Birch, Baruchi, Hinks, Lesseur, Leemans, Henry, Backh, Ampere, Vyse, Ronge, and of Baron Humboldt, in favour of an antiquity for Egypt, utterly inconsistent with the chronology of the Bible. He also reproaches us for going back to Champollion Figeac, Rossellini and Leemans, and to books published 10 or 15 years ago. Five years make a wonderful difference in these Egyptian studies! We can well believe it! Five years is one fifth part of the lifetime of this infant science, which has just now, Dr. Nott informs us, attained the venerable age of 25

* Within this period of time, is also to be included the formation of the lower terrace of the Scioto, if it is to be ascribed to the ordinary action of the river itself. For by the supposition of the authors, it was formed since the erection and abandonment of these works, and during the time in which the invasion of the forest has taken place. The above calculation embraces, therefore, all the elements on which the conclusion of the authors was founded.

years ! How replete it must have become with wisdom ! How ample in its store of facts ! How certain and satisfactory in its decisions and judgments ! We have read of other sciences and branches of knowledge which have matured slowly, though they have had fewer difficulties than this, and thousands of votaries and co-labourers ; whose first beginnings were exceedingly imperfect, and which have only been developed after a long lapse of years. In these sciences, research and opinion has often set for long periods in a wrong direction, and names of influence have committed themselves to these immature decisions. But in this age of steam and lightning, a science can be born in a day. Even, as one would suppose, in its swaddling clothes, it can give the lie to prophets and apostles, and set at naught the testimony of Christ himself. It can vapour, and strut, and ridicule, can sneer and scoff, and pluck the beards of venerable men without mercy or stint.

We cannot enter now into a discussion of the Egyptian Chronology. To do so would require much time, much study and patience, both on the part of writer and reader. For many reasons, some of which we have before mentioned, we do not regard the long chronology of Bunsen and Lepsius as resting on any safe and indubitable grounds. But until this chronology is *demonstrated*, that of the scriptures, with all the claims these writings have on our faith, must be considered as unimpeached. You have to prove the Egyptian chronology by a mathematical demonstration, and that there is no possibility that it should be erroneous, before it can truly come into collision with the scriptures. Who has yet so demonstrated it ? Lepsius and Bunsen may so think, but have they proved it ? Have they proved that the names in the royal cartouches are all names of kings actually ruling ? that they ruled successively to each other ? that they are not the names of cotemporaries in any instance, and that Manetho's dynasties were never cotemporary ?

Dr. N. blames us for an appearance of hesitation between the Hebrew and Septuagint chronology, for standing up for the general faithfulness of the Hebrew Text, and yet allowing that the chronology either of the Hebrew or of the Septuagint, or of both, has been altered with design. We did understand Dr. Nott to impeach the integrity of the

Hebrew Text in general; especially that of the Pentateuch, or we should not have been so earnest in our defence of it. But we admit that the comparison of Hebrew manuscripts of itself only proves the substantial accuracy of the transcription of that text for the last 600 or 800 years. For, strange to say, the MSS. of the Greek Testament are more ancient than those of the Hebrew Bible, none of which ascend above the 10th or 12th century. But a candid comparison of the Hebrew Text with the quotations in the fathers and the Talmud, with the Targums, and the New Testament, prove its substantial accuracy up to a far higher period. Augustine, in his book *De Civitate Dei*, notices and discusses these two systems of chronology, in the same way as do writers of the present day.* But we presume that in the transcription of ancient books the majority of scholars admit a greater liability to mistake in numbers than in any thing else; and this, from the habit existing at various times, of expressing them by alphabetic letters, which in some instances greatly resemble each other, rather than by words fully written out. The search all this while is after the true original text, as it came from the hand of the writer. Where this is found, it is binding on the believer in the scriptures. Now which are the original numbers in the lives of the patriarchs? Those of the Hebrew or those of the 70? The Hebrew, have always said the larger portion of learned men, because, in the first place, this text is in the original tongue; and, in the second, is, in general, in other things, most to be relied on. Those of the 70, say others, and among them also very eminent men, because they accord with those of Josephus, were followed by the early fathers, and this version was sanctioned by being quoted in the New Testament. The subject is, in its own nature, too considerable and complicated for us to enter upon now. But the impression of those who favor the Hebrew Chronology is, that either the chronology of the 70 has been designedly altered to accommodate it to the chronology of Egypt, in which country that translation was made, or, that having fallen into some confusion in the process of transcribing the text, it was adjusted by the Egyptian standard. If this were so, let it be remem-

*Lib. XV., ch. viii. ix. x.

bered, as we have before stated, that the monuments were before the eyes of every Egyptian Jew, and the hieroglyphics then in constant use. There were hundreds of acute and intelligent Rabbins, who had read the tablet of Abydos and every record of antiquity Egypt possessed. The opportunities of a Champollion, a Bunsen, and a Lepsius were nothing in comparison with the opportunities they enjoyed. How strange, if this chronology be an adaptation to that of Egypt, that it should have stopped 2000 or 3000 years short of the Egyptian limit. If it be an adaptation, it doubtless was conformed to all the pretensions to antiquity which were admitted by the savans of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and shows the true Egyptian Chronology of that day. For of what use to go part of the way, and not go all? If, then, the Egyptologists of this day have shot beyond the Septuagint period of the flood in their researches, is it not possible and probable that they are more extravagant than the scholars of Ptolemy Philadelphus themselves?

We do not see that our table of cranial capacity, digested with much care from Tiedeman, need be the subject of so much felicitation to Dr. Nott. It has been an argument with the men of his side, that the negro brain was so inferior to that of the Caucasian in size, that he could not have come from the same original root. It is, indeed, with Dr. N. himself, one of the arguments to show that the negro could not have descended from Adam, who, he maintains, was the father of the Caucasian alone. The table shows that the average of the brains of the Asiatic Caucasians is below that of the negro. Yet among these Asiatic Caucasians are the finest and most perfectly developed specimens of this variety of men. We allude to the Circassians, Georgians and Persians. Indeed the lowest in the scale of cranial capacity of all mankind are the Hindoos and ancient Peruvians. But the monuments of South America attest the intellectual vigour of the one, and the records of Braminical learning and science the genius of the other. A very simple though not very scientific method of testing the size of the head, and the relation it bears to intellect, may be found at the shop of every honest hatter. He will tell you that among the smallest heads in town will oftentimes be found the highest intellectual vigour. And it will, perhaps, be ascertained, on examination, that there are

white men falling below the Ethiopian average of cranial capacity, who are among the most intellectual men of the communities in which they live. Are these white men also descended from a different ancestry from those of heavier brains and inferior sense?

But these controversies between man and man, so far as they are personal conflicts, are of little importance to the world at large. In conclusion, we are not conscious of any material error in our former article. The extract from Wiseman was not sufficiently weighed, but we see no reason to modify any main position. And if there should still be any error detected in our statements or reasoning, we beg it may be remembered that these minor errors affect not the great truths we have sought to substantiate. Our hope is that the author, whose positions we have called in question, may live to be otherwise minded towards divine revelation; that he may yet see that the scriptures and their doctrines are the hope of the human race, and that he may build again that which he has sought to destroy.

ARTICLE VII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. BLUNT's *Coincidences*, and PALEY's *Horae Paulinae*. Complete in one volume, 8vo. pp. 622. Robert Carter and Brothers, N. Y. 1851.

Neither of these works, here presented together, needs to be introduced to the public. Dr. Paley, with the perspicuity peculiar to his style, traced the coincidences between the Epistolary and Historical books of the New Testament. Mr. Blunt, Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, undertook, by the same mode of argument, to establish, in three separate treatises, "the veracity of the books of Moses," "the veracity of the Historical Scriptures of the Old Testament," and "the veracity of the Gospels and Acts." These three books he afterwards reduced to uniform shape and pre-

sented in a single volume, styled "the undesigned coincidences in the writings, both of the Old and New Testaments, an argument of their veracity." It is this work which the Carters have, in this volume, coupled with the older and more original work of Dr. Paley; giving the argument complete for the truth of the sacred writings, as drawn from incidental allusions and lurking coincidences. On this account, it will be to the Theological student the most convenient edition of both these works; and cannot but find its way into every well-furnished Christian Library, supplying an important link in the chain of historical evidence for the truth of the sacred records.

2. *The Spiritual Garden; or Traits of Christian character delineated*, by HAMILTON, BURDER & MCCHEYNE, 18mo. Pres. Board of Publication.

This little book, as its title imports, is written to improve the heart. The larger portion of it is from the pen of Rev. James Hamilton; in which he spiritualizes the vine, the cedar, the palm, the olive, and from the characteristics of these plants, illustrates the graces which should adorn the believer. The government of the thoughts and of the tongue, by Rev. Dr. Barder, and a solemn appeal to parents, by Rev. R. M. McCheyne, complete the collection of tracts in this volume.

3. *Bethany; or the Sickness, Death and Resurrection of Lazarus*. By Rev. R. M. MCCHEYNE, 18mo. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

4. *The Redeemer's Legacy; or Peace from the Saviour's Hands and Side*. By Rev. W. J. MCCORD, 18mo. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

Two little works upon experimental religion. The first, from the pen of the pious McCheyne, consists of a practical exposition

of the eleventh chapter of John's Gospel. The second is an exposition of the words of Christ, "Peace I leave with you." The nature of this peace is set forth—the terms upon which it is given—its influence in bringing comfort and support to the soul—the obligations which its possession imposes—and the connexion subsisting between this peace, and the sufferings and death of Christ. The work is simple, and well adapted for those for whose benefit the Preface tells us it was prepared; those who "desire the sincere milk of the word, that they may grow thereby."

5. *A Dialogue between a Presbyterian and a "Friend."* 18mo. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

This is a well sustained dialogue, on some of the points in controversy between the Quakers and ourselves; as for example, the temporal support of the ministry—the sacraments of the Church, Baptism and the Lord's Supper—the singing of Psalms and Hymns, &c. The argument is upon these topics, brief and pertinent; in each case being cut short, by an appeal to the decisions of Scripture.

6. *Prize Essays on the Temporal advantages of the Sabbath, considered in relation to the working classes; containing, Heaven's Antidote to the curse of labour, the Torch of Time, and the Pearl of days.* 12mo. pp. 232. Presbyterian Board of Publication.

These Essays are the productions of working men, called forth by the prizes offered in England, by the friends of the Sabbath. They have been reproduced in this country, and we are glad to see one channel opened, for their wide diffusion, through our Board of Publication. We have read only the first, which is truly a remarkable production, considering its authorship. It is written with a richness and force of illustration, as well as with an earnestness of tone, which will ensure a perusal to the end, from all

who may take it up. The style is, indeed, far from being chaste, and in other respects, is open to criticism. But criticism is disarmed, before one who has never enjoyed the discipline of long study; and who has redeemed the intervals of leisure for such mental culture as this essay exhibits.

The Sabbath is of preeminent value to the working classes; and they will be more disposed to receive the demonstration of this, from one of themselves. The sympathy which breathes throughout the essay we have read, for the masses, and the knowledge which it reveals of their wants, show that it was a happy suggestion, to provoke advocates for the Sabbath, to rise from their own ranks. We trust that this is only the beginning of an agitation, which will not rest, till all classes shall enjoy a weekly vacation from toil, and consecrate the precious hours of the Sabbath to intellectual and moral improvement.

7. *Memories of the life and writings of THOMAS CHALMERS, D. D. L. L. D. By his Son-in-law, Rev. W. HANNA, L. L. D. In three volumes. Vol. 2d. 12mo. pp. 547. Harper & Brothers, New York, 1851.*

This volume conducts the reader over a large and busy portion of Dr. Chalmer's life, from the commencement of his labors in the Tron Church, Glasgow, to his inauguration as Professor of Moral Philosophy, in the University of St. Andrews. It describes the remarkable distinction which he acquired as a pulpit orator, and which was advanced to the highest elevation, by his astronomical discourses; which were so attractive as to fill the Tron Church with a crowded and attentive audience, in the busiest hours of a week-day. It unfolds the untiring and successful energy of his pastoral labors, in visiting every family in a Parish containing no fewer than twelve thousand souls. It portrays the zeal which marked all his efforts, to introduce into the city of Glasgow, the parochial system which prevailed through all the country parishes

of Scotland; and the astonishing control which he gained over the minds of others, so as to provide himself with a competent number of assistants, in a complicated and tedious system of pauper management. The labors of Dr. Chalmers, after being transferred to the Parish of St Johns, and the disclosures made concerning the working classes of the large cities of Europe, form to us the most interesting portion of this volume—revealing the insecurity of society, when population begins to trench closely upon the means of subsistence—and the need of moral means to provide against the evils and perils of such a condition of society. We wait with eagerness for the third, and last volume, which will give the more peaceful and literary portion of his history, and will unfold his vast influence, in leading the great Free Church movement.

8. *The Death and Funeral Ceremonies of JOHN CALDWELL CALHOUN, containing the Speeches, Reports and other documents connected therewith; the Oration of the Hon. R. B. RHETT, before the Legislature, &c. &c. Published by order of the Legislature. 8vo., pp. 168. A. S. Johnston, Columbia, S. C., 1850.*

A proof is furnished in this large pamphlet of the intense affection felt by the State of South Carolina, for the memory of their great Statesman, J. C. Calhoun. All the documents connected with his death and the funeral honors paid to him, are here collected and published at the expense of the State. They were read with deepest interest at the time many of them appeared in the public prints; but collected into one volume, they give a complete history of an event, which threw a whole nation into mourning. The addresses made in the Senate Chamber and House of Representatives, by the great men with whom he had been so long associated in counsel—and the long and interesting oration of Mr. Rhett, before the State Legislature, all deserve to be rescued from oblivion; and there is no one who will not rejoice to see them entered among the Chronicles of the State.

9. *Two years in Upper India.* By JOHN C. LOWRIE, one of the Secretaries of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1850. pp. 276, 12mo.

This volume gives an interesting account of those leadings of Providence, which occasioned the location of the first missions of our Board in upper India. None can peruse it without being satisfied of the wisdom of the choice made by our early missionaries to that country. It was a region filled with a numerous, and in some respects, a superior population, was a field unoccupied by other missions, and though more difficult of access than lower India, is a healthier region, and affords a resort to the mountains, in case of failure of health in any members of the missions. The death of Mrs. Lowrie, the illness and death of Mr. Reed, the subsequent failure of Mr. Lowrie's health, and the necessity of his speedy return to this country, were all severe discouragements to the Mission and the Church, but by the good providence of God, the mission is now most auspiciously established, and exhibits the workings of our form of government, in its adaption to Christian missions. There are now ten stations in Upper India, occupied by about sixty American and Hindoo laborers; among them are 24 Ordained Ministers, two of whom are of native birth, 20 native catechists, teachers, and readers, 200 native communicants, and about 1200 children in the schools. Three Presbyteries have been constituted, which form the Synod of Northern India, under the General Assembly of these United States.

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10. *The Soldier of the Cross; A practical exposition of Ephesians vi. 10—18.* By the Rev. JOHN LEYBURN, D. D. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1851, pp. 339, 12mo.

A pleasant and profitable treatise on the Christian Warfare. Its main topics are, The Enemy; The Evil Day of the Conflict; The Girdle of Truth; The Breastplate of Righteousness; The

Sandals of Service; The Shield of Faith; The Helmet of Hope; The Sword of the Word; The Spirit for the Warfare; The Victory; and The Call to Arms. The topics are handled with much simplicity, appropriateness, and piety, and find their way to the heart. The book, too, is printed in superior style, and its fine, clear type, is refreshing to the eye.

11. *Daily Bible Illustrations*: By JOHN KITTO, D. D., F. S. A. Volume 2d., *Moses and the Judges*. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1850. pp. 440. 18mo.

We have already expressed our admiration of this series by Kitto. We know of no living author so well fitted to excel in precisely this species of composition. Nothing in the way of oriental manners, geography, or antiquities, which can illustrate the scriptures, escapes him. Withal, there is an air of freshness about the work which is pleasing. Easy illustration, rather than profound discussion, characterises the book, and this is just what the reader expects, and is suited to his mood of mind, as he takes it in hand.

12. *A brief treatise on the Canon and Interpretation of the Holy Scriptures; for the special use of Junior Theological Students: but intended, also, for private Christians in general*. By ALEX. McCLELLAND, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary at New Brunswick. Second Edition, enlarged. New York: Carters. 1850. pp. 230.

This is not a book to sleep over. Our theological students, if they do not find it profound, nor always well considered, will at least, admit it to be facetious. Whether the faces of the Professor's students are long or broad; whether his Lecture room resounds with merriment or weeping, and how he manages to maintain his own dignity, at this distance we would not venture

to say. It may be doubted, too, whether, in sweeping away the cobwebs that have gathered in the Gothic halls of sacred literature, he has not injured some few things which should have been preserved. On matters of taste and propriety, we could make some sharp remarks, but the old rule, *De gustibus non*, admonishes us to forbear. He paints *a la Hogarth*, and his little book may stand on the same shelf with Jortin's remarks, and Erasmus's *Encomium Moriae*. It may possibly furnish a fragment or two for the next volume of the *Amenities of Literature*.

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13. *The Parables of Jesus, explained and illustrated*, by FREDERICK GUSTAV LISCO, Minister of St. Gertrand Church, Berlin. Translated from the German, by the Rev. P. FAIRBAIRN, Minister of Salton. Philadelphia: Daniels & Smith. 1850, pp. 406.

Another book on the Parables of our Lord, which, if not as profound and scholarlike as the excellent work of Trench, is yet welcome to us as coming from a different quarter. Not the least valuable portions of it are the frequent extracts it contains from the Postils of Luther, the commentaries of Calvin, and the Gnomon of Bengel, books not in the hands of every reader.

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14. *The principles of Geology explained, and viewed in their relations to Revealed and natural Religion*. By Rev. DAVID KING, LL. D. Glasgow. With notes and an appendix, by JOHN SCOULER, M. D., F. L. S., Prof. of Nat. Hist. to the Royal Society, Dublin. New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1851. 220 pp. 18mo.

This is another attempt to show the harmony existing between Geology and Scripture. It proceeds on the supposition that the first verse in Genesis asserts the original creation of all things by God, while the second describes the condition of the globe when

He began to fit it up for the abode of man. This theory was held by Justin Martyr, Basil, Origen, Theodoret, and Augustine of old, and has been revived in these times in view of the difficulties geology presents to the ordinary interpretation. Dr. Chalmers, as early as 1804, had reached the conclusion that the Bible has nothing to say of the antiquity of the globe, but only of the antiquity of the species. To some, the translation by Dathe, of the two first verses of Genesis, has commended itself as substantially true to the original, and accordant with modern science. "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Then the earth became without form and void, an abyss enveloped in thick darkness, when the Spirit of God brooded on the face of the waters," &c. In the interval which is supposed to have occurred between the original creation of verse 1, and the refitting of our globe, of vs. 2, et seq., there were various geological formations and various creations of the inferior animals. The book combats briefly, but decisively, the theory of the author of "the vestiges of creation," and is enriched with valuable notes and additions, by Prof. Scouler. As a brief view of this hypothesis, and of a wide and important subject, we commend it to the attention of the reader.

15. *The Method of the Divine Government, Physical and Moral.* By Rev. JAMES MCCOSH, A. M. *Second Edition.* Edinburgh: Sutherland & Knox. London: Simpkin, Marshall & Co. MDCCCL.

We received this book too late to do any thing more in the present Number than express our opinion of its general merits, and present a condensed statement of the subjects of which it treats. We regard it as one of the first productions of the age—equal to Butler's Analogy in depth and compass of thought, and surpassing it in just views of all that relates to man's ruin and redemption. The author's design is thus indicated by himself:

"A great number of works, distinguished for learning and ability, have been written in our age, to demonstrate the existence of

God, and illustrate such perfections of his nature as his power, his benevolence, and his wisdom. But while these treatises have established to the satisfaction of every mind capable of conviction that a God exists, and that he is possessed of a certain class of attributes, the most of them do not exhibit, and do scarcely profess to exhibit, to our view the complete character of God. Such works as Paley's *Natural Theology* and the *Bridgewater Essays*, show that we are surrounded by works characterized by skill, power, and goodness, to which no limit can be set. But these treatises stop short at this point, (the works of Dr. Chalmers being always exceptions,) and leave us, amidst a huge mass of facts and laws, with but a very vague and undefined idea, after all, of the moral and spiritual attributes and personal character of the Supreme Being.

Now, in this work we would endeavour, in all humility, to follow out the inquiry which still allures onward the mind which is panting after the knowledge of the truth, and we would ask, what is the view which these works give of the character of God, morally considered, and of the relation in which he stands to his intelligent creatures, as their Governor and their Judge?

In the prosecution of this investigation, we must enter a field which has not been traversed at all by the ordinary writers on natural theology. In the able works to which reference has been made, the attention of the writers has been very much confined to a few, and these, we must take the liberty of saying, among the most limited of the departments of the kingdom of God. Certain works and laws of God have been separately considered, and a legitimate inference drawn from them; but meanwhile there has been no inquiry into their wonderful combination and grand results—into that ordering and marshalling of these works and laws in their reference to man, which constitute what we call the providence of God. It is as if a person, inspecting an ingenious machine, were to look at the separate wheels and cylinders and mechanical powers in operation, and yet pay no regard to the relation of the separate parts and powers one to another, to the unity and product of the combined machinery. Natural theologians have drawn the proper inference from the particular laws and nice adaptations of part to part to which their attention has been called; but they have not studied the general combinations, or the grand results in the providence of God; and the view which they have given of the character of God is contracted, because their field of observation is narrow and confined. Enlarging the sphere of vision, and viewing the separate machinery as combined in God's providence, we hope to rise to a fuller and more complete concep-

tion of the character of God, than can possibly be attained by those whose attention has been confined to isolated fragments and particular laws, such as fall under the eye of the physical inquirer, or of the theologians who use the materials which physical research has furnished.

There is nothing wonderful in the circumstance that the theologians of nature have not, in their researches, seen the higher moral qualities of God; for they could not expect to find any traces of them in the territories which they have visited. When we wish to ascertain the moral character of a fellow-man, we look to something else than his mere works of mechanical and intellectual skill. These can exhibit nothing but those qualities from which they have sprung—the ability of the hand or of the understanding; and when we are bent on knowing his character, we inquire into the use which he makes of his talents, and of the products and results of them, and generally into his conduct towards other beings, towards God and towards man. Our natural theologians have acquired about as enlarged and accurate a view of the higher perfections of the Divine Being, as they might obtain of the moral and religious character of an architect, by inspecting the building which he had planned; of an artisan, by examining the watch constructed by him; or of a husbandman, by walking over the field which he has cultivated. A visit paid to the workshop of an ingenious mechanic, may bring under our notice all the qualities of the fine workman; but meanwhile, we have no materials to guide us in forming an idea of his kindness or his integrity, his temperance or his godliness. In order to discover whether he possesses these qualities, we must inquire into the use which he makes of the fruits of his ingenuity; we must follow him into the busy market and the social circle, into his family and his closet. Now, if we would discover the infinitely glorious moral perfections of the Supreme Being, we must in like manner enter other regions than those into which the mere classifier of the laws of nature would conduct us. In investigating the laws of inanimate nature, we may expect to find—and we do find—innumerable traces of lofty intelligence; in examining the different parts of the animal frame, we may hope to find marks—and we discover them in abundance—of that benevolence which makes the possessor delight in the happiness of sentient being; but if we would discover the justice and holiness of God, and the qualities which distinguish the righteous and benevolent Governor, we must look to the bearing of his works and dispensations on the state and character of man. It is by the help of these wonders of God's providence that we must seek to rise to the contemplation of, and belief in, the higher

wonders of his character. 'For in this mass of nature,' says Sir Thomas Brown, 'there is a set of things that carry in their front, though not in capital letters, yet in stenography and short-hand characters, something of divinity, which to wiser reasons serve as luminaries in the abyss of knowledge, and to judicious beliefs as scales and roundles to mount the pinnacles and highest pieces of divinity.'* It is our object in this work to develope such a 'set of things,' for the purpose at once of guiding the intellect, and exalting the faith towards the highest perfections of the divine character, so far as they can be discovered by the somewhat dim and flickering light which nature furnishes.

In conducting this inquiry, we shall find ourselves in the midst of a topic of most momentous import, but from which modern scientific men have generally drawn back, as if they felt unable or unwilling to grapple with it, because too high for their understanding to rise to it, or too humbling to their pride to stoop down to it. The subject referred to is the relation in which God stands towards man. Our literati and secular philosophers are, in general, willing to acknowledge that a God exists; but they have very confused and ill-assorted ideas as to the relation in which he stands towards the human race. Yet surely this latter subject is not inferior in philosophical interest or practical importance to the other, or indeed to any other. The character of God cannot well be understood by us till we consider it in its relation to man. How do I stand in reference to that Being, of whose greatness and goodness I profess to entertain such lofty ideas? How does He stand affected towards me? We know not if the settlement of the question of the existence of God be to us of greater moment than the settlement of this other question, What is the relation in which we stand to Him? This is certain, that the settlement of the one question should instantly lead to the settlement of the other; and the inquirer has stopped half-way, and has acquired little that is truly valuable, till he pursue his researches into this second field, which lies contiguous to the other.

This second inquiry must bring under our special notice and consideration the character of man—not, it is true, metaphysically or analytically, or in all its aspects, but in its bearings towards God. The consideration of the nature of man, and more particularly of his moral qualities, will again conduct us upward to the contemplation of the rectitude or the moral excellence of God. It is by placing the two together, the character of God and the character of man, as it were, in juxtaposition, the one over against the other, that we can best understand both. This relation of God

* Religio Medici, sect. xii.

and man, the one towards the other, is the department of Divine and human knowledge in which, in our humble opinion, this generation has most need to be instructed.

We live in an age which boasts of its light and knowledge; but it may be doubted how far those who are most disposed to be vain-glorious have, after all, very deep or comprehensive views of the character of the Deity. We laugh at the narrow and superstitious views entertained of God by savage nations, and in the darker ages of the history of the world; but perhaps we might be as profitably employed in inquiring whether we have ourselves attained to ideas that are correct and adequate.

In this, or indeed in any age, there are comparatively few disposed absolutely to deny the existence of a superior or a supreme Being. We would not say that the idea of, and belief in, the existence of God are innate in, or connate with, the human soul; but they are the natural result of the exercise of the human faculties and intuitions in the circumstances in which man is placed. Degraded though man be, he shrinks from Atheism with almost as strong an aversion as he does from annihilation. Mankind cannot be brought to believe that there are not traces in the world of something higher than blind fate and the freaks of chance. Their felt weakness, their very pride, cannot brook the thought of there being no presiding power to overlook their destiny. There are, besides, certain periods of helplessness in every man's life, when the soothing accents of human affection cannot be found, or what is worse, can afford no comfort; and then the heart, whatever may be the sophistries in which the reason is warped, will insist on believing that there is a God who sympathizes with us and pities us. Rather than abandon the thought that some Being above nature is interested in them, mankind will assume that the heavenly bodies have some mysterious communication with the earth; that the sun goes round the whole globe just to see their actions; that there are planets presiding over their birth and determining their life and death; or they will people the woods and the darkness of night with spirits, and reckon the breezes their whispers of communication regarding us, and the storms the expression of their indignation against those who have offended them. If for ever without a companion, man would sometimes prefer an unpleasant one; and on a like principle, he would worship a god supposed to be possessed of many hideous qualities, rather than be driven to regard this universe as a blank and uninhabited void.

But while man is led naturally to believe in God, he is not led so naturally to entertain just and spiritual conceptions of his character. It is a fact that almost all nations have retained some idea of a god, but it is also a fact, explain it as we please, that all na-

tions have fallen into the most unworthy conceptions of his nature and connection with the human race. We believe the second of these facts to be the natural result of man's character as much as the other. False religions, appearing in every age and nation, have assumed forms as varied as the tastes and prejudices, as the habits and manners of mankind, or as the climates in which they lived, but all tending to darken and degrade the purity of the Divine nature.

Man must have a god; but he forms his own god, and he makes it a god after his own image. Instead of forming his own character after the likeness of God, he would fashion a god after his own likeness. It appears that at a very early age in the history of the world there was a tendency to carnalize the Divine character, by representing it in symbol;—in brute symbol, as among the ancient Egyptians; in the more glorious of the inanimate works of God, as among the Persians; and in images of man's own construction, as among the majority of nations. The very beauty of the works of God stole away men's minds from the author, and they lifted up an eye, first of reverence and then of worship, to the sun and moon and host of heaven, considered by the philosophers as emanations of Deity, and by the multitude as the Deities themselves. Others were more impressed with the heroic and the ancient, and deified the heroes of by-gone ages, the renowned warriors of their country, the promoters of the arts and sciences. So strong was this desire to bring down celestial things to the level of terrestrial things, that in the Egyptian mythology heaven was merely a celestial Egypt, watered by a celestial Nile, lightened by a celestial sun, and divided into the same number of gnomes as the earthly country, and each of these the peculiar residence of the God worshipped in the corresponding district of the terrestrial Egypt. Error as it advanced grew in waywardness and strength, till, in the ages of Homer and Hesiod, the prevailing religions of Europe became completely anthropomorphic, and Mars was just the embodiment of the popular admiration of warlike achievement, and Venus that of the popular conception of love. So complete at length did this adaptation to human nature become, that thieves had their patron god in Mercury, and the Thugs had divinities who were pleased with the murders which they committed.

The Greek philosopher, Xenophanes, ridiculing this anthropomorphic spirit, was in the way of referring satirically to the Ethiopians, who represented their gods with flat noses, and as of a black color, and to the Thracians, who gave them blue eyes and ruddy complexions. It may be doubted, however, whether the philosophers themselves rose above this natural tendency. The Stoic divinities are just a personification of the stern method of the Stoic

character; and the idle, pleasure-loving gods of the Epicureans, are the expression of the tastes and desires of the votaries of that philosophy.

In ancient Judea, and in certain modern nations, the people have been kept from falling into such errors, by what professes to be a revelation from heaven. What philosophy never could have effected, so far as the great body of the people is concerned, has been accomplished by what appeared to the subtle Greek as foolishness. In our own country, the light of heaven has been let in upon the dark groves where our forefathers offered human sacrifices, and all ghostly terrors have vanished before it. But error has not always disappeared when it has changed its forms. While the old body remains, it can suit its dress to the fashion of the time and place. Our hearts would now revolt at the very idea of bowing the knee to an idol, chiselled by Phidias himself. With minds enlarged by extended knowledge, we choose rather to exalt the character of God; for the more elevated he is, the less is our pride offended by being obliged to pay him honor. But while the popular conception of his character never omits these his physical attributes of power, omnipresence, and eternity, it is a question worthy of being put and answered, whether it does not leave out other qualities equally essential to his nature, such as holiness, righteousness and grace—that is, undeserved mercy bestowed in consistency with justice. We fear that there is something repulsive to many in these phrases; no, not in the phrases themselves, (whatever John Foster may say to the contrary, when he speaks of the offensiveness of evangelical language to literary men,) but in the very ideas which these words embody, and which cannot be expressed in all their depth of meaning by any others. While man wishes to believe that there is a God, he does not feel any delight in contemplating a God of infinite purity; and the mind turns away from the view, as the eye does from the full splendor of the noonday sun. It thus happens, that while mankind do wish that there is a God, they do not wish to believe in the living and true God. They love to dwell on an existing God, but they do not love the contemplation of the actually existing God. Driven by these opposing impulses—now by the one and now by the other—the religious history of the world is a very vacillating as well as a very melancholy one. Man is ever fondly clinging to the idea of a God; and ever endeavoring, at the same time, to bring that idea into accordance with his own wishes, his narrow interests and character. The religious history of mankind may be summed up in this—that it is a continually repeated attempt to adapt the character of God to those who feel that they cannot do without him.

It is worthy of being inquired, whether this strong tendency of

our nature may not be at work in this present age, as it has been operating in all past ages ; and whether our literary and scientific men are not holding forth to themselves and to the popular view the Divine Being, shorn of some of the brightest of his perfections, because too dazzling to their eyes : whether the God adored by some be not as different from the truly existing God, as the gods of the heathens were : be not, in short, the creature of men's imagination, just as truly as the images worshipped in idolatrous nations are the workmanship of men's hands ?

Taking a wider range than the writers on natural theology are wont to do, and embracing within our view a larger field, we hope to rise, by means of the very works of God, to a grander and more elevated conception of the Divine character than those have attained who look to mere physical facts and laws. Nor will we disguise, from the very commencement of this Treatise, that we expect to establish, by a large induction, that the views given by the works of God of the character of their maker and governor, do most thoroughly harmonize with the doctrines contained in that book, which professes to be a revelation of God's will to man."

The work, in conformity with this design, is divided into four Books. The first takes a general view of the Divine Government as fitted to throw light on the character of God. The second contains a particular inquiry into the method of the Divine Government in the physical world. The third treats of the principles of the human mind through which God governs mankind, and the fourth discusses the harmony of natural and revealed religion. In the first book the author devotes particular attention to five classes of phenomena, either entirely overlooked, or inadequately discussed in most of the popular treatises of Natural Theology, the consideration of which is yet indispensable to any just appreciation of the character of God. Two of these are presented at least more especially by the providence of God ; other two by the human soul, and more particularly by its moral qualities : and an intermediate one, by the combined view of both.

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| I. The providence of God presents us with— | { | 1. Extensive suffering, bodily and mental.
2. Restraints and penalties laid on man. |
| II. The soul of man, in its relation to God, shows us— | { | 3. God at a distance from man.
4. Man at a distance from God.
5. A schism in the human soul. |

The Second Book is subdivided into three chapters : the first

treating of general laws, or the principle of order—the second, of Providence, or the principle of special adaption—the third, of the relation of the providence of God to the character of man. These chapters are rich in thought, and contain a triumphant refutation of every system of physical philosophy which would dispense with a God as assential to the origin and conduct of the world. The author explains very clearly the different acceptations in which the phrase “laws of nature” may be used, and shows the necessity of special adjustments of matter in order to the production of general results. There are doctrines laid down in this portion of the book to which we are not prepared to yield our full assent. It at least admits of question whether the author has sustained the proposition that the properties of matter, when the required adjustments obtain, possess an inherent activity—whether they are strictly *virtues* or *powers*. Why not regard the adjustments as the conditions which precede the operation of the Divine power?

The Third Book is to us the most interesting portion of the volume. The views which it presents of man's moral constitution come nearer to our own than those of any other writer. The analysis of conscience is a masterly essay. We cannot say, however, that the author has thrown much light upon that *quæstio vexatissimo*—liberty and necessity. His attempt to reconcile the two schemes, which we cannot but believe to be contradictory, and therefore exclusive of each other, is as complete a failure as the attempt to reconcile the philosophy of rationalism with that of common sense. Still, the whole of this portion of the volume is profoundly interesting. It was the part to which we ourselves first turned, and it is certainly the part which we shall hereafter most frequently peruse. It furnishes the best refutation that we have ever met with of the objections to the doctrine of total depravity, drawn from the workings of man's essential and indestructible moral nature; and the clearest proof, that to approve virtue, is not to be virtuous; to condemn vice, is consistent both with the love and practice of it.

The Fourth Book shows that Nature and Revelation concur in the impressions which they give of the Divine character, and that the provisions of the Gospel are precisely adapted to the moral necessities of man.

This work is eminently seasonable. In contrast with the meagre imitations of the German Neologists, which shallow thinkers are content to accept as profound speculations, it is refreshing to read a work so distinguished for originality and soundness of thinking. We congratulate the American public that an American edition has already been published. The Carters, of New York, with the instinct for the pure and sound and healthful in religion and literature which has always distinguished them, have placed it within the reach of all who have a taste for such speculations. They themselves are Scotchmen, and they cannot but feel some degree of national pride in pointing to such a monument of the proverbial talent of their countrymen for metaphysical research.

16. *Evils of Disunion: A Discourse, delivered on Thanksgiving Day, Dec. 12th, 1850. By ROBERT DAVIDSON, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, New Brunswick, N. J. J. Terhune & Son. 1850. pp. 15.*
17. *The American Union: A Discourse, delivered on Thursday, Dec. 12th, 1850, the day of the annual Thanksgiving in Pennsylvania, and repeated on Sunday, Dec. 15th, in the Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. By HENRY A. BOARDMAN, D. D. Third Thousand. Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo & Co., successors to Grigg, Elliott & Co. 1851. pp. 56.*
18. *The American Citizen. A Discourse on the nature and extent of our religious subjection to the Government under which we live; including an inquiry into the scriptural authority of that provision of the Constitution of the United States which requires the surrender of fugitive slaves. Delivered in the Rutgers Street Presbyterian Church, in the City of New York, on Thanksgiving Day, Dec. 12th, 1850, and afterwards, at their request, as a Lecture before the Young Men's Associations of Albany and Waterford, N. Y., on January*

14th and 15th, 1851. By JOHN M. KREBS, D. D. *New York: Charles Scribner, 145 Nassau Street, and 36 Park Row.* 1851. pp. 40.

19. "*The Higher Law*," in its application to the *Fugitive Slave Bill*. A Sermon on the duties men owe to God and to Governments. Delivered at the Central Presbyterian Church on Thanksgiving Day. By JOHN C. LORD, D. D., (Pastor of said Church,) author of *Lectures on Government and Civilization*. Buffalo: George H. Derby & Co. 1851. pp. 32.
20. A Sermon on the duty of Citizens with respect to the *Fugitive Slave Law*. By G. F. KITTELL, of the Methodist Episcopal Society, Poughkeepsie. White Plains, N. Y.: Eastern State Journal Print. 1851. pp. 20.

It is not our design to criticise the sermons enumerated above. They are all able, bold and manly, and though some of them contain sentiments to which we cannot subscribe, yet the general spirit of all of them meets our most cordial approbation. We sympathize with our brethren at the North in their laudable and Christian efforts to arrest an agitation which aims alike at the destruction of the Government and the subversion of religion. At the present crisis a perilous responsibility rests upon the non-slaveholding States of this Union. It is for them to say whether the conditions of our Federal Compact shall be faithfully observed, and the Union preserved in its integrity, or whether the Southern States shall be driven, in vindication of their rights, their honour and their safety, to organize a distinct Government for themselves. We believe it to be in the power of the North to save the country. The South demands nothing but justice. She simply insists that the Federal Government shall not take sides on the question of Slavery. It must not attempt either to repress or to spread it. The Constitution is a solemn compact between the States, and the powers delegated in it to the General Government cannot, without the grossest ill-faith, be prostituted to the injury or destruction of the peculiar institutions of any of the parties. The

Constitution knows no difference betwixt slaveholding and non-slaveholding States; and neither Congress nor the Executive possesses a shadow of right to take any steps that shall have the effect of determining whether new territories, the common property of all the States, shall or shall not exclude slavery, when they are prepared to be admitted into the Union. What their relation to this subject shall be, is a question that must be left to the Providence of God. The soil should be kept open to any emigrants from any section of the Confederacy. The constitutional provisions in reference to the admission of new States should be carefully observed; and when they are complied with, it must be left to the people of the territories to frame their constitution for themselves. If these principles had been adhered to in the past legislation of Congress, there would have been no agitation now in the Southern States of the Union. What they complain of is, that the influence of the Government is turned against them—that instead of preserving the absolute neutrality which it is bound in good faith to maintain, it takes sides with one section of the Union to the injury of the other, and perverts its trust to cripple and circumscribe the institution of Slavery. The North pleads its conscientious convictions that slavery is wrong, and ought to be curtailed and abolished. Free-Soilism falls back upon conscience, and protests that it cannot, without sinning against God, leave it an open question whether this prodigious evil shall be extended or not. We cheerfully concede that there is a higher law than the law of man, and that when human legislation contravenes the authority of God, it should not be permitted to bind the conscience. If slavery is necessarily a sin, no statutes or ordinances of earth can make it right, and no human enactments can make it obligatory to sanction or sustain it. But then it would be the duty of the Northern States, entertaining this opinion, to dissolve the Union themselves. They are criminal in remaining parties to a contract which, in their judgment, is a snare to their consciences. If they cannot, consistently with their convictions of duty, maintain the neutrality which the Federal Constitution requires—if they cannot, in other words, observe the conditions which they have voluntarily agreed to observe, they ought, in all frankness and candour,

to withdraw from the contract, and openly proclaim that it is at an end with them. They are certainly entitled to their opinions upon this or any other subject. But they are not at liberty to make a treaty which they believe to be sinful, and to enjoy its advantages without complying with the stipulated terms. We are glad that a movement has been made at the North to exhibit, in its true light, the relation of the General Government to slavery. Fanaticism may be relentless, but the body of the people, we trust, will be brought to see and feel that good faith requires them either to withdraw from the Union themselves or to observe the provisions of the Constitution. Sober reflection must convince them that whether slavery be right or wrong, they are not responsible for its diffusion through the territories. These territories accrue to us under the Union and the Constitution. The North possesses no power over them as the North—as non-slaveholding States, but only as members of the Confederacy; and if the terms of the Confederacy are such as to deny to them the power of interfering with this subject, their consciences should not be pressed for not doing what they have no right to do. They must also see that there is really no guilt in making a contract which, at the utmost, only leaves them stripped of a power, of which it found them destitute. If they had *surrendered* the right to exclude slavery from these regions, their minds might be troubled. But they never had it, and the Constitution simply leaves them as they were. The North, therefore, should not feel itself burdened in the slightest degree with the guilt of this sin. Much less should it undertake to wield an influence which it has acquired under and by virtue of the Constitution to subvert the purposes of the Constitution itself. We would affectionately urge, therefore, upon our Northern brethren the necessity and duty of allaying this agitation. If they love the Union, let them cherish the Constitution of our fathers. They deplore the dangers which threaten it: let them see to it, that, so far as they are concerned, these dangers are averted. Let the abolitionists and free-soilers be rebuked, and peace and harmony will be restored to the country.

For ourselves we confess that we cannot calmly contemplate the probability of such an event as the dissolution of this great con-

federacy. That it can be broken up without strong convulsions, without dangers and disasters on all sides, we do not believe to be possible. The contentions of brothers are like the bars of a castle—when once the elements begin to dissolve, no human calculation can determine where the process shall stop. There is no natural reason why there should be only two confederations—a northern and southern—any more than three or a dozen. Let the South draw off—why not the West also—why not the States in the valley of the Mississippi form a separate confederacy, and California still another? It may be easy in our closets to speculate upon the policy which the interests involved would dictate—but when masses are set in motion and innovations are begun, all experience shows that passion and not reason rules the day. The destruction of a settled order, of old and tried institutions, is like the upheaving of an earthquake. The forces at work are tremendous, but no one can predict their course or results, until their fury has subsided. We have always associated the idea of a high and glorious vocation with the planting of this Republic. We have thought that we could trace the finger of God in every stage of its history. We have looked upon it as destined to be a blessing to mankind. Placed between Europe and Asia, in the very centre of the earth, with the two great oceans of the globe acknowledging its dominion, entering upon its career at the very period of the history of the world most eminently adapted to accelerate its progress and to diffuse its influence, it seems to us to be commissioned from the skies, as the Apostle of civilization, liberty and Christianity to all the race of man. We cannot relinquish the idea of this lofty mission—we HAVE BEEN called to it; and if in our folly and wickedness we refuse to walk worthily of it, we may righteously expect, in addition to the ordinary disasters of revolution, the extraordinary retributions of God. Ours will be no common punishment, as it will be no common sin, if instead of obeying the command which requires us to be a blessing to the world, we exhaust our resources and waste our advantages in biting and devouring each other. We cannot sympathize with the light and flippant tone in which the question of the value of the Union is too often approached, as if it were a mere question of ordinary politicks. To our minds it is the most serious, solemn and momentous that can be asked in connec-

tion with the earthly interests of man. To dissolve this Union is to jeopard all that our fathers gained, and to cover in midnight darkness the prospects and destiny of our own posterity. We tremble at the thought—and if it must perish, we freely confess that our tears shall bedew its grave; and our hopes for liberty and man be buried with it.

But the Union is the creature of the Constitution. The destruction of one is and must be sooner or later the destruction of the other. The guilt of dissolving it must rest upon those who trample the Constitution in the dust.

There are two quarters from which the Confederacy is at present threatened—but threatened on very different grounds. The first is from those who are opposed to slavery, and would prostitute the powers of the general government to their own fanatical ends. They repudiate the Constitution as conniving at sin—and their exasperation has risen to the height of actual rebellion in consequence of the law passed at the last session of Congress, for the recovery of fugitive slaves. These men are confessed conspirators against the government—they strike at that which gives it its very life, the Constitution of the land. The other party consists of those who believe that the Constitution has been systematical-ly violated by the non-slaveholding States—that the contract which made the Union has been broken—and that there is not only no obligation any longer to adhere to it, but that the danger of further aggresssions is so great that it is a duty to withdraw from it.

In reference to the opposition from these quarters, we have a few remarks to make. We would say first to the North, that she owes it to mankind to see that all just ground of complaint, as far as she is concerned, is removed. If she has thrown obstructions in the way of faithfully carrying out the provisions of the Constitution; if she has, in any degree, broken her faith, posterity will not acquit her of undervaluing the Union, however loudly she may vociferate its praise. To love the Union is to love the Constitution. Let her see to it that no stipulations of the charter are disregarded by her—or if they have been heretofore, let her be prompt to retrace her steps. This would be manly, noble, heroic. It would be a patriotism for which she would never suffer

Let her not poise herself upon her power—good faith is a surer safe-guard.

We would say to the South that her first movement should be to restore the Constitution to its supremacy. We do not think that it is wisdom suddenly to destroy a government, because it has been perverted. If good in itself, if the evils are abuses and not essential elements of the system, the effort to rectify and cure is worthy of an experiment. What surgeon would amputate a limb until he was convinced that it was the last resort? To our minds the dissolution of the Union is the last desperate remedy for the disorders of the government. Until all other probable expedients have failed, we cannot be justified in the eyes of God or of the race, in demolishing a fabric which Providence contributed so conspicuously to rear, which is hallowed by a thousand associations, cemented by illustrious blood, a temple of liberty in which our fathers worshipped, and which all nations have honoured. Let us never pull it down, until it has become utterly unclean, and freedom is driven from its sanctuary. The pollutions of the money-changers and traders can be cleansed—we may be able to upset their tables and to drive them out—and may still make the edifice what it was originally designed to be. Patience and effort in restoring the government to what it should be, is not *submission* to wrong—it is *resistance*—the resistance which wisdom justifies and conscience will approve. The attempt to heal a disease is not acquiescence in its progress. If the Union of the Constitution is, indeed, glorious, as all confess that it is, it is not slavish timidity—it is the real love of liberty, which prompts us to labour for its preservation, until our labours shall be found to be hopeless. When we are driven to despair of the Republic, and not till then, shall we be justified in withdrawing. As to the charge of pusillanimous tameness to which such a policy may subject us, we can only reply in the words of Thucydides.

“As for that slowness and dilatoriness with which you have heard yourselves upbraided, they flow from those institutions of our ancestors, which teach us, in public as in private life, to be modest, prudent and just.”

From this same noble speech which this prince of historians puts in the mouth of Archidamus, we would commend to the young and impetuous, who are naturally much more inclined to follow the counsel of Sthenelaidus, the following salutary caution :

“ If any spur us on by panegyric to perilous adventures, disapproved by our judgment, we are little moved with their flattery ; nor if any one were to stimulate us by reproach, would indignation be at all more likely to make us alter our determination. By this orderly sedateness we are both brave in combat, and prudent in counsel.”

But while we would make every effort which wisdom and patriotism would demand, to save the Constitution and the Union, we are free to confess, that when the issue is forced upon us of submitting to a government, hopelessly perverted from its ends, and aiming at the destruction of our own interests, it will be our duty, as it is our right, to provide for ourselves. The continual agitation of the slavery question must sooner or later bring matters to this issue. The Southern States will not abandon their institutions. This is certain as fate. Their patience is now almost exhausted, and unless their constitutional rights are respected, they will set up for themselves. This Union must fall, and they will lift up their hands to heaven and declare that they are clear of its blood. The guilt of the long train of untold evils that must follow the catastrophe, they will honestly believe rests not upon them. God grant that our country may be saved—that the North and the South may be brought to meet in harmony and peace, upon the common ground of our glorious Constitution—that a common ancestry, a common history, a common language, a common religion, may do their office in cementing them together, and binding them in the indissoluble bonds of truth, justice, and fraternal love.

We have but a single word further to add, and that is a protest against the policy which our own beloved State seems intent upon pursuing. Single-handed secession, which is understood to be the aim of the measures now in progress, however it might be justified in a crisis in which the Federal Government had become openly pledged to the extinction of slavery, under the present circumstances of our country is recommended by not a single consideration that we are able to discover, of wisdom, patriotism or honour. No mas-

ter-mind among those who are driving us to this issue, has yet arisen to throw a particle of light upon the thick darkness which shrouds the future, and covers the consequences of this tremendous step. They all tell us *how* we may secede, but not one has told us, not one can tell us, where we shall next find ourselves. No one has yet explained to us how the institution of slavery will be more efficiently protected, by making us and our children aliens upon this broad continent, than it is by the flag of the Republic. Shall we be more exempt from Northern fanaticism, when every check is removed from its machinations and contrivances—from British interference, when we have nothing to lean on but our own arms? Will slavery be safer, when South Carolina can throw no shield but her own around the institution, than when the Constitution protects us? We confess that we cannot see how we shall gain in security from the prostration of the Union. A single State, like South Carolina, standing out alone, in the midst of a mighty nation, can only exist by sufferance.

But it is said she will not be alone. The other States, identified with her in interests, will join with her in action. But what if the other Southern States should happen to believe that their interests are better promoted by the old Union, than by a new alliance with South Carolina? They must judge for themselves, and if they should happen to have a judgment of this sort, where shall we then be? Would it not be wise, at least, to have some better proof than our own conjectures that they will sustain us? They might leave us alone; and in that contingency, who can say that our condition would be enviable. We should then have a National government to maintain—an extensive Post office establishment to organize—an army—a navy—foreign ambassadors, and all the appendages of independent States, to keep up. Has any one calculated our resources for these things? and does any man believe that our population would stick to us for ten years, after their passions had subsided, under the grinding system of taxation which it would be necessary to institute? Then, again, we must be fully prepared for war, which is a business less of arms than expense. Touching the United States in so many points as we must necessarily do, however pacific the disposition of the Fe-

deral Government might be towards us, hostilities would inevitably arise from our diplomatic relations to the other States, and that speedily and suddenly. These are matters which ought to be well considered before we resolve upon so important a step as single-handed secession. The truth is, we can see nothing in the measure but defeat and disaster—insecurity to slavery—oppression to ourselves—ruin to the State. There are other aspects in which the question might be treated—but in every aspect of it we feel bound to express our solemn conviction that, neither before God nor man, can we justify ourselves for the fearful hazard of forfeiting all our blessings, and all our influence for good, by a hasty leap in the dark. We speak earnestly on the subject, because we feel strongly. There may be great boldness in the enterprise, but it should be remembered, as Lord Bacon has well expressed it, that boldness is blind, wherefore it is ill in counsel, but good in execution. For in counsel it is good to see dangers, in execution not to see them except they be very great. Certainly when we cannot see our way, we should go softly. From present appearances we think it likely that South Carolina will secede alone. We expect to bear our full proportion of the consequent evils. We are not only in the State, but of the State, and we have no thought but that of sharing her fortunes. If we were disposed, we are rather too heavily encumbered to flee from the storm. Others may be noisy for revolution, whose armour is light enough to admit of an easy transportation; who have come to us from abroad, and who can as easily depart. But for ourselves, we are linked to South Carolina, for weal or woe. As long as our voice can be heard, we shall endeavour to avert calamity—but if what we regard as rash counsels finally prevail, we have made up our mind, as God shall give us grace, to take what comes.

21. *America Discovered. A Poem. In twelve books. By an American. New York: Printed by John F. Trow. 1850.*

The following is the author's Analysis of his work :

“ IN the following poem, our world is supposed to be under the

ministry of angels. These heavenly hierarchs meet among the mountains of Chili, in South America, about the year 1450, to deliberate on the best mode of making known this continent to Europeans. The result of these deliberations is, that two of their number, Abdah and Habdiel, are delegated to spread the matter before the throne of the Eternal. In their journey through space, they light on two worlds, the one fallen, but not redeemed; the other unfallen. They afterwards reach the place of their destination, are entertained by Hallan, a former acquaintance, have interviews with Abraham, Adam, etc., and are finally admitted to the presence of the Son of God, where they obtain their petition. On their return, Abdah is appointed to suggest the matter to Columbus, then a youth at the college of Pavia, and also to superintend him in all his changes to the final consummation of the enterprise. He first appears to the youthful Genoese while musing on the banks of the Tesino, in the character of a Swiss shepherd. The suggestion makes the student restless; he longs to go to sea; is opposed by Ella, his betrothed; argues her into acquiescence; her tragical death; his voyage described to the foot of Italy. He coasts along the shores of Greece and the islands of the Ægean. A Turkish ship is taken, in which is found a Genoese captain, who relates to them the capture of Constantinople. He is shipwrecked afterwards on the coast of Portugal, where his Guardian Angel appears to him a second time, and encourages him to persevere. His marriage to Dona Felipa of Lisbon, described. His prospects with John failing, upon the death of his wife, he enters Spain, where in great poverty he and his son are entertained at the Convent of Perez de Marchena, who advises him to lay the subject before the Spanish sovereigns. He comes before them at Cordova; they are absorbed in war with the Moors, but recommend him to the college of Salamanca. He finally, through the agency of the Queen, obtains his end and sails on the voyage. The parting scene, the ocean, the landing, etc., described. In the last Book Columbus is presented in prison, where Abdah appears to him for the last time, and assures him of an immortality of fame; reveals to him the real greatness of his discovery; sketches the history of the continent to the present time; predicts the future, and gives a glowing description of the North American Republic."

We have left this book till the last; we know not why, unless it be a distrust of our own ability to judge of a poetical performance, and a degree of apprehension that our free remarks might give pain to its estimable author. The world visits with severest

censure him who aims at poetry, and fails to produce it. A man may write a book in humble prose, and if it passes not the ordeal of criticism, be little worse for the effort. But if he attempts to ascend into the empyrean on poetic wing, and is dragged to the earth by his own leaden and sluggish soul, he is not soon forgiven. True poetry is one of the highest products of genius. Nor is it easy to tell how much, even in this utilitarian age, it has done to quicken the intellect, mould the taste, and polish language, the vehicle of thought. Homer and Milton have done more for man, hard as it is for us Americans to believe it, than Arkwright, Watt, and Fulton. In proportion to the exalted nature of this species of writing, are we offended by any infelicity, inaccuracy, or meanness, in the outward expression. The true poet we expect to be a man of refined sensibilities and chastened taste. The orator or the rude prosaist may be easily forgiven for ill chosen words, but we are disposed to claim of the poet that he should be perfect. In our earliest readings, therefore, of the book before us, we marked with our pencil, not a few words, which seemed to us ill chosen and now and then a false rhythm, or oft repeated figure.—To our thoughts the angels seemed too human—their assemblies, and the mode of proceeding in them, too much like our conventions and deliberative bodies, on this vulgar earth, and their intercourse in heaven, with its glorious inhabitants, too like the social and domestic visits of this sublunary sphere.

But when we have enquired with ourselves, whether there are not beyond these, marks of true genius, that invention which gives to the poet his distinctive name, that enthusiasm and fire which possess his soul, and that flowing and measured harmony in which his utterances are given forth, we are constrained to acknowledge that these also exist, now in a higher and now in a lower degree throughout the work. There are blemishes which we could greatly desire did not appear. Yet, when we remember the harassing labours, and still more harassing corporeal sufferings amid which these stanzas have either been produced or perfected, we feel that we owe some measure of indulgence to the writer. Better would it have been to have removed these, and to have

heightened the merits of the poem by still renewed labour and thought ; but the feeble tenure which the author holds of life, has doubtless made him desire to launch forth his little book thus early upon the world. We bespeak for it a candid perusal. The versification is smooth and free ; there are passages in it now swelling into grandeur, and now marked with tenderness and beauty.

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ARTICLE I.

THE PLENARY INSPIRATION OF THE SCRIPTURES.

1. *Theopneusty, or the Plenary Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures.* By S. R. L. GAUSSEN, Prof. of Theology in Geneva, Switzerland. Translated by EDWARD NORRIS KIRK: Fourth American, from the second French edition, enlarged and improved by the author. New York: John S. Taylor, 143 Nassau-st. 1850.
2. Chapter vi. *Philosophy of Religion.* By J. D. MORELL, A. M., author of the *History of Modern Philosophy, etc.* New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1849.

In an article on the United States, in the October number of the Edinburgh Review, a writer to whom our country appears to contain only New England and an *outside-barbarian* territory, among many anti-slavery and some rationalistic utterances, well and truly says, that "*the question which lies at the root of all dogmatic Theology is the AUTHORITY OF THE LETTER OF SCRIPTURE.*" And there are many indications of the interest which that question is exciting on both sides of the Atlantic. The appearance of the fourth American from the second French edition of Gausсен's work, is one of these indications. Another is, that even the literary Reviews of the day are discussing it. The Edinburgh devotes to it some paragraphs in the article above named.

The last Westminster also, in a disquisition on Septenary Institutions, which affects to be learned, but is simply pedantic,—a mere jackdaw decked out with a peacock's tail,—declares that “the early books of the Old Testament abound with misapprehensions of the meaning of Ancient Astronomical and Chronological emblems,” and with “imaginative interpretations and misrenderings of hieroglyphical records;”—that the Pentateuch is a “miscellaneous collection of fragmentary records,” a “compilation of old documents interspersed with narrations founded on oral traditions;” that “the story of the Serpent reads like one of the numerous myths which arose out of the zodiacal emblems;” that “the story of Joshua, and the sun and moon, is one of the whimsical mistakes in the progress of the change from the pictorial hieroglyphic to the phonetic mode of writing;” and that, in fact, “Christ himself denied the infallibility of the Jewish Scriptures,” and was nailed to the cross in great part on account of this “infidelity,” as it was considered by the “zealots” of that as well as of this period! Such are the sentiments of the Westminster,—the *spirit* of it appears in the following extract, which we quote just to remind the reader how truthfully Robert Hall delineated the *ferocity* of modern infidelity :

“The days of sanguinary codes have gone by. Opinion is in favour of the total abolition of the penalty of death, excepting for murder, which we call the greatest of all crimes. But the crime of depriving a fellow-creature of life, is not the offence of greatest magnitude of which any human being can be guilty.—If capital punishments be allowable for that, then would death without mercy—the death of the Mosaic law, death by stoning—be the appropriate penalty, not of Sabbath breaking, but of trafficking in superstition,—trading in man's weakness, and with his loftiest aspirations,—converting his instincts of awe and reverence for the wonderful and admirable, into abject terrors; his most sacred emotions of grief, his solemn moments of parting on the confines of eternity, his very hopes of immortality, into implements of a craft, a source of income, a miserable instrument of popularity and power; and the object attained, endeavouring to perpetuate it, by proclaiming the infallibility of creeds and canons, persecuting those who question it as infidels to God, resisting the extension of knowledge among the masses, or rendering it exclusive and nominal, and thus seeking to crush the human

mind under the wheels of the modern Juggernaut of conventional idolatry."

The Christian Ministry maintaining the obligation of the Sabbath and the infallibility of God's word, are here described as guiltier than murderers; hanging is too good for them; they ought to be stoned to death!

We turn to the Edinburgh Reviewer, who talks of the disengenuous timidity of "our religious teachers." He says, "The clergy of almost all sects are afraid of it," (that is, of the question of the authority due to the letter of Scripture,) "and the students of nature intent only upon facts which God has revealed to our senses, have to fight their way against the self-same religious prejudice which consigned Galileo to his dungeon." Geology, however, he thinks, has vanquished "the opening verses of Genesis," and "the text, it is now admitted, is not conclusive against physical demonstration." "Is it conclusive (he asks) against moral induction and metaphysical enquiry? Let a layman put that question, and an awful silence is the least forbidding answer he will receive." We beg our friends, the Philosophers, to give up this cry of our hostility to enquiry and research. It is only wasting time and distracting the attention of enquirers. Let us have, instead, their strongest arguments; and these charges, already so often repeated, will, if just, demonstrate themselves in our replies. If they find one Protestant Minister of any sect lipping a word against free enquiry, we will help the Philosophers in quoting his words to his disgrace. We are as willing, to say the least, as our adversaries can be, to observe the rule which is quoted by this Reviewer from the farewell charge of the Puritan Pastor Robinson, to his people at Leyden, before they set sail in the *May Flower*: "be ready to receive whatever truth shall be made known to you from the written word of God." "That is, indeed, (as the Reviewer says) a rule for all times," and we doubt not "it will outlive all the systems in the world," excepting that very one which itself confirms and supports. It is for our opponents an unfortunate allusion which the Reviewer makes to this rule. That is a rule as good *for all men* as it is good "for all times;" and we commend it to the Reviewer and his party. If they admit the text to be God's *written word*, we ask them

how can that text be otherwise than conclusive against mere "moral induction and metaphysical enquiry." The Bible either is or is not infallibly true. If it be not, let us scout it as a fraud and fable, not to be believed at all because it has set up these false claims. But if, on the contrary, the Bible be infallibly true, then it must be conclusive against all opposing morals, and all opposing metaphysics.

The infidelity of the eighteenth century was bold enough to take the consistent position of rejecting, with ribald scorn and furious hate, the claims of Scripture.—But, as has been well said, "The undying instincts of virtue, the unceasing voices of conscience, and the inevitable needs of human life, in all its passages of sadness and sin, arose in constant and unanswerable protest against this grinning and ghastly mockery of that which meets all the demands of the human soul." And, therefore, infidelity now takes this new and less repulsive form. It admits that Christianity is no imposture, but "a true life," "a genuine manifestation of the religious spirit," and that the Bible is God's inspired word. But then, Christianity, profoundly thankful for these compliments, must let all her claims not weigh one feather against those of the youngest sister in the circle of the sciences. And the Bible must be a thing of wax to be shaped at will by any Philosopher, or school of Philosophers, who may have, by "metaphysical enquiry or moral induction," established a new theory. And the "student of nature," as soon as he discovers new facts, *from which he draws conclusions* subversive of the authority of Scripture, must have not only his facts, but also his conclusions, too, received and accepted, or else he becomes another persecuted Galileo! In the name of Science, we protest against this profane abuse of her name and influence! Let these noisy votaries of hers go forward in their investigations! But let them be careful how they overthrow her kingdom by setting science against herself! The elucidation and arrangement of the Evidences of Christianity have employed much of her time and strength. She has demonstrated the Scriptures to be the revealed word of God, by arguments which never have been successfully withstood.—She has proved, on testimony which human reason cannot

but receive, that Jesus Christ and His Apostles were witnesses sent from God. Having done this, she has accomplished a grand and noble task, and the results of it should meet with neither open nor covert hostility from any true lover of Science. Having accomplished this work, Science has no more to do with the *authority* of Scripture, but only with its *interpretation*. She resigns her first position and Faith steps in, seats herself at the feet of Jesus, and meekly learns of Him and His inspired servants. Then it becomes accordant with the *strictest philosophy* and the *purest science* to receive any doctrine as *proved*, for which there can be found in Scripture, a "Thus saith the Lord." The immortal rule of Robinson then prevails; and then, if seeming contradictions arise between these old and any new elaborations of Science, every son of hers eschews all proud and rash haste, and takes full time to examine and compare. Truth always must and always will be harmonious.

We have said, the admission that Christianity is true and the Bible inspired, accompanied by the subjugation of Scripture to any inferences of Geologists or any theories of Philosophers, moral or metaphysical, is but a new form of infidelity. We do not charge that *the men* who adopt these loose views of inspiration, are all infidels; but we do affirm that their *theories*, fairly carried out, can stop nowhere short of infidelity. For the Scriptures *claim to be inspired* as to their very words, and to deny this one claim of the Bible, is to falsify it entirely; while any attempt to *explain away* this claim, so often and so distinctly made, is to demoralize our very faith! Accordingly, any observer can perceive that among those who receive these loose views of inspiration, there are to be found all kinds of unbelievers. The theory is so loose, that even Deists of every grade may receive it. They can easily admit that the writers of the Bible, some of them always, and all of them sometimes, were inspired, just in the same sense as Homer and Shakspeare; and it will cost them little to acknowledge further, that the inspiration of the Scriptures was *in a higher degree* than that of either Homer or Shakspeare, or of any other men that ever lived. It suits the temper of our times and the present relations of unbelief and Christianity to make these admissions. The bitterest ene-

my of every peculiar truth in the Christian scheme may make them, for, making them all, he yields just nothing, being still at liberty to except to any statement of these inspired men which does not quadrate with his opinions. Let the eloquent pen of the ready writer advocating these new views of inspiration, discourse therefore, ever so charmingly about the "intuitional consciousness" of the sacred writers being "supernaturally elevated to an extraordinary power and susceptibility;"* let it describe in the most musical strains "their inward nature" as being "so perfectly harmonized to the Divine; so freed from the distorting influences of prejudice, passion and sin; so simply recipient of the Divine ideas, circumambient around it; so responsive in all its strings to the breath of Heaven, that truth leaves an impress upon it, which answers perfectly to its objective reality;" he has, in all this, we conceive, made no acknowledgment of essential truth on the subject of inspiration. And when he proceeds, still in the same eloquent strain, to say that the New Testament Scriptures were written "to retain *so far as possible* the bright impressions of Apostolic men, after they should have passed away to their eternal rest," we are forced to set down all his acknowledgments of the *inspired Writers* as just so many denials of the *inspired Writings*.

We have in this last sentence indicated the two schools, into which, doubtless, may be divided all opinions at this day on the question of inspiration. And the two writers whose names stand at the head of this article may be regarded as champions of these respective schools.

M. Gaussen is Professor of Theology in the Evangelical Institution of Geneva, Switzerland. His work, of course, presents to the English reader of it the inevitable defects of a translation. The Rev. E. N. Kirk, who has given it the dress it wears among us, is doubtless an accomplished French scholar, and has executed his task with faithfulness and ability. Still the book shews much of that stiffness, that abruptness, that unnaturalness in air and gait and manner, which always marks the stranger in a strange land. In this respect the work of Morell has the greatest possible advantage. Its author is not only an

* Morell, page 149.

Englishman of disciplined and powerful mind, but he writes in an enchanting style. His thoughts, both in this and his preceding work, "The History of Philosophy," flow out in an unbroken stream of beautiful and clear expressions. The very title of Gaussen's work gives it an *outré* appearance. It is called *Theopneusty*, and the author himself, in his preface, expresses some dread lest this title, though derived from the Greek terms for *Inspiration of God*, and itself for a long time used by the Germans, should occasion in some minds a prejudice against the book, as too scientific to be popular, and too little popular to be useful. But we take on us to promise every reader of Gaussen both the highest profit and the highest pleasure, if he will but open Mr. Kirk's translation with the expectation that he is about to converse with a vivacious Frenchman, or rather that he is about to hear one lecture very eloquently and ably in our language.

Gaussen does not write for the disciples of Porphyry, Voltaire or Rousseau. He judges, as we do, that the question of *Plenary Inspiration* properly belongs only to believers in the truth of Christianity. He would doubtless fully agree with Coleridge that an inquirer, especially a sceptical one, should not be met with the dogma that the whole Bible is infallible. There is a preliminary question, and if that be settled against the Scriptures, there is no room at all for this one about the nature and extent of inspiration. For if the Bible be false, what need is there to prove that the very words, as well as the thoughts, originated with man and not with God. If the Apostles and Prophets were deceivers, who cares whether their claim to inspiration extended to the form, as well as the substance of their writings? The only reasonable and philosophical course would then be, to throw away the whole production as worthless and wicked.

Again, Gaussen treats the question of *Plenary Inspiration* as being purely a question of Revelation—that is, not that reason does not support Revelation in favour of it, but that as believers in the Bible are alone prepared to examine it, so the testimony of the Bible alone can ever decide it. It is admitted on all hands, that there are some doctrines of Christianity which human reason never could have discovered, and which therefore never could have been known

but from the Bible. For example, the doctrine of the Trinity;—whether we believe it or not, we all admit, *Theologians of every school admit*, that it is purely a question of Revelation, because it respects a point, about which we do not naturally know any thing. So, whatever be the opinions on other points, held by any man who calls himself a Christian, only the Bible can decide his belief respecting Plenary Inspiration. For from the very nature of the case, we cannot reason *a priori* on such a question. How could we tell, before having *satisfactory testimony* on the subject, that a given book was or was not dictated by the Divine Being? And what testimony could be satisfactory on the subject, short of the witness of God himself? For who could know, except God should miraculously make it known, that He had granted such dictation to a writer? Admitting, then, as do all professed Christians, that the Apostles and Prophets were the true and miraculously accredited messengers of God, if they have not told us that God dictated the very words of their writings, how can we ever expect to be certified that He did so? And if, on the contrary, they, being the true and miraculously accredited messengers of God, have said that their writings are the very words of God, then how dare we deny or doubt it?

The stand-point, then, from which Gaussen views the subject of Inspiration, is this: The first teachers of Christianity assert that their writings are plenary inspired, without explaining the mode by which the Spirit of God influenced their minds, and without distinguishing in what parts, if any, He influenced them more, and in what part less directly and positively. Being satisfied with the irrefragable proofs which demonstrate that these men came from God, he believes implicitly what they declare about the inspiration of their writings, without presuming to explain any more than they explain it. His single object then is to enquire, and he does it after a truly philosophic method, whether those who receive the Bible as a true book, are not bound to receive it as also an inspired book; and whether, receiving it as an inspired book, they are not bound to receive it as also a book plenary inspired,—that is, as being absolutely the very word of God from beginning to end.

But in saying that the Bible is God's word, our author *does not exclude man from the authorship of it, in a certain sense.*

"Every word of the Bible (he remarks) is as really from man as it is from God. In a certain sense, the Epistle to the Romans is entirely a letter from Paul; and in a still higher sense, the Epistle to the Romans is entirely a letter from God. Pascal might have dictated one of his provincial letters to a mechanic of Clermont, and another to the Abbess of Port Royal. Would the first have been any less Pascalian than the other? Surely not. The great Newton, when he desired to transmit his wonderful discoveries to the world, might have procured some child in Cambridge to write the fortieth, and some servant of his college to write the forty-first proposition of his immortal Principia, whilst he dictated the other pages to Barrow and Gregory. Should we thence have possessed, in any less degree, the discoveries of his genius and the mathematical reasonings which were to exhibit all the movements of the universe under the same law? Would the entire work have been any less Newton's? Surely not. Perhaps, at the same time, some man of leisure might have felt some interest in ascertaining the emotions of these two great men, or the simple thought of that child, or the honest prejudices of that servant, while their four pens, alike docile, were tracing the Latin sentences which were dictated to them. You may have been told that the two last, even when writing, were roving in their imaginations in the gardens of the city, or in the court yards of Trinity College; whilst the two professors, entering with lively transports into all the thoughts of their friend, and soaring in his sublime flight, like the eaglets upon their mother's back, were plunging with him into the higher regions of science, borne along and aloft upon his powerful wings, and sailing enchanted in the new and boundless space which he had opened to them. Yet, you may have been told that, among the lines thus dictated, there are some which neither the child nor even the professors were able to comprehend. What do I care for these details, you would have replied. I will not spend my time upon them; it is the book, Newton's book I want to study. Its preface, its title, its first line, its last line, all its theorems, easy or difficult, understood or not understood, are from the same author; and that is sufficient for me. Whoever the writers may have been, and at whatever different elevations their thoughts may have ranged, their faithful and superintended hands traced alike the thoughts of their master upon the same paper; and I can there always study, with an equal confidence, in the very words of his

genius, the mathematical principles of Newton's Philosophy. Such is the fact of Theopneusty; the divine power, in causing the Holy Scriptures to be written by inspired men, has almost uniformly put in operation their understandings, their wills, their memories and all their individualities, as we shall presently shew.

"It is thus that God, who would make known to his elect, in an eternal book, the spiritual principles of the divine philosophy, has dictated its pages, during sixteen centuries, to priests, kings, warriors, shepherds, tax-gatherers, fishermen, scribes and tent makers. Its first line, its last line, all its instructions, understood or not understood, are from the same author; and that is sufficient for us. Whoever the writers may have been, and whatever their circumstances, their impressions, or their understanding of the book; they have all written with a faithful, superintended hand, on the same scroll, under the dictation of the same master, to whom a thousand years are as one day; such is the origin of the Bible. I will not waste my time in vain questions; I will study the book. It is the word of Moses, the word of Amos, the word of John, the word of Paul; but it is the mind of God and the word of God." (Theopneusty, pp. 39-41.)

The comparison made by Gaussen, in this extract, of the sacred writers to four supposed amanuenses of Newton, of course does not apply in all points. No illustration ever does. It is obvious to object to this illustration, that whereas Barrow and Gregory, and the child and servant, above supposed, would all write in one and the same Latin style—that is, in the one style of Newton; on the contrary, each one of the sacred writers has impressed his own individuality on his own particular productions. Now, so far from denying this fact, Gaussen declares that, it is with profound gratitude, with ever increasing admiration, he regards "this living, real, dramatic, human character, infused so powerfully and so charmingly into every part of the book of God. Yes, here it is, the phraseology, the stamp, the accent of a Moses; there of a St. John; here of an Isaiah; there of an Amos; here of a Daniel or St. Peter; there of a Nehemiah; there of a St. Paul," (page 53.) "We perceive that the composition of each book has depended greatly, both for its matter and its form, upon the peculiar circumstances and turn of its author. Their memory has full play, their imaginations are exercised, their affections are drawn out, all their being is employed, and their moral physiognomy is clearly portrayed in their

writings," (page 50.) But "what bearing (he asks) has the absence or the presence of the writer's affections on the fact of Theopneusty? Cannot God alike employ them or dispense with them? He who could make a statue speak, can he not make even an infant speak as he pleases?" (page 54.) He demands of those who say that any given passage is in the style of Moses, or of Luke, of Ezekiel, or of John, and therefore cannot be in that of God, if they would undertake to tell us what is the peculiar style of God, and what the precise accent of the Holy Ghost? (p. 55.) He reminds the objector how the sovereign action of God, in no one field of its exercise, excludes the employment of second causes. In the field of creation he gives us plants by the combined employment of all the elements; in the field of Providence, he combines millions of human wills alternately intelligent and submissive, or ignorant and rebellious. It is just so in the field of prophecy, and even in that of miracles—the Red Sea is divided by Moses' rod, the blind man's sight is restored by clay. And in the field of redemption, too, he converts a soul by the truth. Why, then, should it not be so also in the field of revelation? "Why, when he sends his word, should he not place it in the understanding, in the heart, and in the life of his servants, as he puts it upon their lips? Why should he not associate their personality with that which they reveal to us? Why should not their sentiments, their history, their experiences, make part of their Theopneusty?" (p. 57.)

We refer to one more of the various answers of our author to this objection, because whatever some may think of it, we find it exceedingly delightful. He takes the ground that this human personality, to be found in the Scriptures, so far from being a stain, impresses a divine beauty on the sacred page.

"Admirable word of my God! it has been made human in its way, like the Eternal Word! It is divine, but full of humanity. It is God who thus speaks to us, but it is also man; it is man, but it is also God." (p. 66.)

"With what a powerful charm the Scriptures, by this abundance of humanity, and by all this personality which clothes their divinity, remind us that the Lord of our souls, whose touching voice they are, himself bears a human heart upon the throne of

God, although seated in the highest places, where the Angels can serve and adore him! By this, too, they present to us not only this double character of variety and unity which at once so embellishes and distinguishes all the other works of God, as Creator of the heavens and the earth, but also that union of familiarity and authority, of sympathy and grandeur, of practical detail and mysterious majesty, of humanity and divinity, which we recognize in all the dispensations of the same God, as the Redeemer and Shepherd of his Church." (p. 67.)

"Domestic scenes, avowals of the conscience, secret effusions of prayer, travels, proverbs, revelations of the depths of the heart, the holy career of a child of God, weaknesses unveiled, falls, revivings, intimate experiences, parables, familiar letters, theological treatises, sacred commentaries on some ancient Scripture, national chronicles, military pageants, political censuses, descriptions of God, portraits of Angels, celestial visions, practical counsels, rules of life, solutions of cases of conscience, judgments of the Lord, sacred songs, predictions of the future, accounts of the days which preceded our creation, sublime odes, inimitable poetry; all this is found in turn, and all this is there exposed to our view, in a variety full of charm, and in a whole, whose majesty is captivating as that of a temple.

"It is thus the Bible must, from its first page to its last, associate, with its majestic unity, the indefinable charm of an instruction, human, familiar, sympathizing, personal, and with a drama of forty centuries." (page 70.)

"But mark, at the same time, the peculiar unity, and the numberless and profound harmonies in this immense variety! Under all these forms it is always the same truth; always man lost, and God the Saviour; always the first Adam, with his race leaving Eden and losing life, and the second Adam, with his people re-entering Paradise, and finding again the tree of life; always the same appeal, in a thousand tones, 'Oh heart of man, return to thy God; for thy God pardons. Thou art in the abyss; come up from it; a Saviour has descended into it—he gives holiness and life!'" (p. 71.)

In this manner Gaussen readily accounts for that free and unaffected individuality of manner which characterizes all parts of the Bible, and distinguishes the production of every individual writer. Thus also, he wipes out, as with a sponge, all the vain and dangerous speculations which many have indulged respecting the different degrees of inspiration belonging to different parts of the Bible. Some things, stated by every writer, may indeed have

been within the knowledge of his own mind, without the Spirit's express dictation, as some other things stated by every writer, were certainly beyond their own knowledge. Even as it said the prophets did not understand their own prophecies ; (1 Peter 1, xi.) but it concerns us not at all to discover or point out any of these differences, for the Bible does not point them out. The witnesses sent from God, on this subject, equally include all the Scriptures, and all parts of the Scriptures, under the one category of God inspired.

Another qualification of the statement that the whole Bible is God's word, which Gaussen and all other advocates of the doctrine of plenary inspiration unite in making, is this obvious one: that *not every word in the book is according to the mind of God, or is approved by God.* The Bible presents us with many sayings of wicked men, and even of the Devil ; of course these are not God's words, but they are recorded by the inspiration of God. So, too, of the many improper expressions and sinful actions of good men, recorded by the spirit of God.

Another obviously necessary qualification of the doctrine before us, is, that when we say the Scriptures are divinely inspired throughout, *we do not speak of translations or copies, but of the original writings.* For the Almighty to direct the pens of the sacred writers is one thing, and it is quite another for him to guide, infallibly, the pens of all in every age who may copy or translate or quote the Bible. It requires very little reflection, as Haldane observes, to perceive how pernicious would be such a continued miraculous interference on God's part.

The degree of correctness, however, which characterizes the existing Scriptures of the old and new Testaments, translated and copied from the beginning till now, as no other writings ever were or ever will be, is absolutely amazing. The very men who used to say of what use is a primitive text, dictated by God, if the present MSS. of that text present 150,000 variations, have acknowledged that they can no longer urge this objection against the text on the ground of the absolute insignificance of these variations. "Michaelis remarks that they have ceased to hope any thing from these critical researches, at first earnestly recommended by them, because they expected dis-

coveries which no one has made," (Tome ii, p. 266.) The learned rationalist, Eichorn, himself, also acknowledges (Einleitung 2 Th. S. 700,) that the different readings of the Hebrew MSS. collected by Dr. Kennicott, offer scarcely sufficient compensation for the labor they cost," (p. 88). The most Herculean labors undergone during the last half of the last century, by Mill, Bengel, Wettstein, Griesbach, and others, in the diligent collation of all the MSS., and the equally diligent and laborious continuations of these investigations by Nolan, Matthei, Lawrence, Hug, and Scholz, have established this result: that of the 7,459 verses of the New Testament, there are scarcely *ten verses* where the existing differences (chiefly in *letters*) have the least importance.

As the learned Bentley said, in his *Phileleutherus Lipsiensis*: "the real text is competently exact indeed, even in the worst MSS. now extant, nor is one article of faith or moral precept either perverted or lost in them, chuse as awkwardly as you can, chuse by design the worst out of the whole lump of readings." (Phil. Lip. pp. 68, 69.)

While therefore the Plenary Inspiration of every chapter, verse and word of the Bible is asserted, the advocates of this doctrine do not assert *the exclusion of man from the writing of any one verse of Scripture*; they do not assert *the truth or goodness of all the sentiments expressed in Scripture*; they do not assert *the immaculate purity of any copy or the infallible accuracy of any translation of scripture*. And moreover, they do not, in discussing this question, undertake to prove *the inspiration of the writers of Scripture*. Whether *the men* were, or were not always inspired, is a different question; that before us concerns only *the books*. The conduct of the Apostles, the thoughts and feelings of the Apostles or Prophets, may have been chargeable with error; but their written words, contained in the Old and New Testaments, are the words of God.

Such is the old, the primitive doctrine of Plenary Inspiration. It is a doctrine denied in the early Christian times only by the Gnostics, the Manicheans, and the Anomians; in the fifth century by Theodore, of Mopsuesta, himself condemned by the fifth general council as a Pelagian; and in the seventh century, by the Arabian impostor. Mr. Morrell's astounding statement that the early Christians did

not receive this doctrine, is just one of those blunders which the best scholars will sometimes allow themselves to make. He brings to us, on the other hand, a theory which the modern Germans have but reproduced from the Rabbins of the 13th century. Gaussen (p. 334) quoting from Rudelbach, says that Maimonides taught that "prophecy is not the exclusive product of the action of the Holy Spirit; but that just as when the *intellectus agens* (the intellectual influence in man) associates itself more intimately with the *reason*, it gives birth to the *secta sapientum speculatorum*; and just, as when it operates on the *imagination*, there arises from this the *secta politicorum legislatorum, divinatorum, and præstigatorum*;" so likewise, when this superior principle exerts its influence in a more perfect manner, and at once on these two faculties of the soul, it produces the *secta prophetarum*. These, it will be acknowledged, are very much like some of the positions of Morell. It was the Hebrew Spanish Doctor who also taught our modern philosophers to distinguish several degrees of inspiration. "Maimonides sometimes numbered eight, sometimes eleven. Joseph Albo reduced them to four, and Abarbanel to three." In this manner inspiration is allowed by one phase of the modern theory to the evidently moral and religious parts of the Scripture, but is denied to everything in the Bible which may appear to concern only scientific or historical truth. As if it comported with the glory of the Almighty that He should produce (to use Bp. Van Mildert's expression) "a motley composition of divers colors, half human, half divine!" Or as if it comported with the wisdom or goodness of God so to mix up fallible elements with his word as to destroy all binding power in it over any rational creature's belief, and thus to make it of no practical value whatever. With equal *unreasonableness*, another phase of the rationalistic theory, in modern times, seeks to improve on the old doctrine, by distinguishing between the thoughts and the words of Scripture, admitting the first, and denying the second to be inspired. God always gave the thoughts, say the advocates of this explanation but not always the words. The Scripture, however, tells us God gave the words always, but not always the thoughts. The sacred writers may have sometimes had the thoughts themselves, without any direct and

immediate communication from God ; as, for example, on *common subjects* ; or sometimes they may not have had them at all ; as for example, when the Prophets spoke *what they themselves understood not*. But as to the words, they were always given, says the Bible : "All the scripture or writing (which of course is made up of words and letters,) is given by inspiration of God." And yet the Rationalists object that they cannot conceive how the Holy Spirit could have dictated the very words of men who wrote in such different styles. As if it were any easier to explain how he could have furnished so many different minds their varying thoughts and conceptions of the same truth. Or, as if it were not evident that, for the just expression of any given sentiments, a proper selection of words is of the utmost importance. Or, as if it were in the power of man ever to think long without the aid of language. As if the effort to form any train or combination of ideas, without at least a mental employment of words, must not soon convince any man that thought, without words, is, for us, necessarily indistinct and confused.

"Many of the essential signs of truth," therefore (as Mr. Kirk remarks in his preface to the first edition of Gaussen,) distinguish the old and primitive doctrine from this confused rabbinical theory, "vascillating," as it does, "in a misty indefiniteness between an inspiration of the men and of their writings ;" of their thoughts and of their words ; of their declarations on one and on another class of subjects. The old doctrine is "simple ; it is precise ; it comes directly to the book as an existence, as a thing, and says of it, this is inspired, all inspired, all equally so, all infallible."

But it will be asked, how does this agree with one of the qualifications of the doctrine stated by yourselves above ? How does it accord with your not asserting the immaculate purity of any copy, or the infallible accuracy of any translation of the Scriptures ? We think it very easy to find a satisfactory reply. As for errors of copyists, enough has been said above, and we need not repeat. But as to the fallibility of translators, we can readily admit it ; for the admission affects, not in the least, the foundations of our faith. Is not the divine text of the original always

at hand, by which any errors of translators may be corrected? After two centuries, can we not correct King James' translation; after three centuries, that of Luther; after fourteen centuries, that of Jerome? And whosoever cannot himself read the original, may always find some impartial scholar to translate it for him. And he may thus multiply translations until there shall not remain any doubt that he comprehends the original as surely as if he were a Hebrew or a Greek; because every new translation would diminish his uncertainty until it should vanish completely. To use, with some alterations, a beautiful illustration of Gaussen, on page 78, if a Calcutta boy, early brought to this country, and having quite forgot his native Bengalee, should receive a letter by some Eastern messenger from his dying father, full of communications of the utmost importance to him, and all of it either written down by his father's own hand, or else dictated word for word by him, would it seem to that youth a point of no importance whether this letter were or were not his father's, simply because he must get it translated to him? Repeated and independent translations would soon make him infallibly acquainted with the contents of the letter; and if he were only certain that it was really the *production in full* of his father's mind, he could soon be certified of being in complete possession of his father's dying wishes. But instead of a fallible translation of an infallible original, take the supposition of our adversaries—an original not infallible! The sacred writer had given to him only thoughts, not words; and he has sometimes expressed these thoughts incorrectly! Where, in that case, are to be found any means of correcting his errors? None such exist. The error is not reparable by length of time, or carefulness of comparison, or depth of research. Ours then becomes the case of a Hindoo boy not possessing, as before supposed, a letter, certainly his father's very words, but a letter in the words of a stranger, merely narrating, and that perhaps very incorrectly, what the dying father said. If this be indeed a true representation of the inspiration of the Bible, then, instead of having our doubts of the translation shut up in a narrow field, and that a field ever narrowing still more as new translations are made, or varying copies collated, "where shall we stop (a Gaussen demands) in our suppo-

sition of errors?" And we may well adopt his answer: "I do not know." The Apostles were ignorant, I must say; they were unlettered; they were Jews; they had popular prejudices; they Judaized; they Platonized; * * * I know not where to stop. I should begin with Locke, and I should finish with Strauss. I should first deny the personality of Satan, as a rabbinical prejudice, and I should finish by denying that of Christ, as another prejudice. Between these two terms, in consequence of the ignorance to which the Apostles were exposed, I should come, like so many others, to admit, notwithstanding the letter of the Bible, and with the Bible in my hand, that there is no corruption in man, no personality in the Holy Spirit, no deity in Jesus Christ, no expiation in his blood, no resurrection of the body, no eternal punishment, no wrath of God, no Devil, no miracles, no damned, no hell.

Accordingly Gaussen believes, and so do we, that it is infidelity to say that errors of Philosophy or History have been or can be pointed out in the Bible. Gaussen regards the Bible, and so do we, as *one book*, the whole of which must be relinquished, if a falsehood of any kind can be proved against any part of it, as originally delivered. So far from regarding Christianity as not depending on the gospels—the new theory on this subject—our author regards it, and so do we, as depending even on the books of Moses, the oldest in the volume. We say (and this, notwithstanding Morell's declaration that the old doctrine has been generally abandoned, is the prevalent Christian opinion both in this country and Great Britain,) that if the Pentateuch really did utter one philosophical or one historical untruth, then the whole volume of inspiration must be rejected. It is nothing but an insult to the majesty of the God-inspired word, to say that its errors in philosophy do not affect its claims to infallibility in morals, because *it was not intended to teach the former*. With all its high and lofty pretensions, the Bible cannot be sustained by any such excuses. How long would the Bible be admitted by these very parties as any authority whatever even in morals, were this excuse of theirs, for its errors in other departments, once admitted? And would those who make this excuse for the Bible, take the same kindly (as Carson well asks) if made for themselves? Would they like it if,

in a court of justice, the lawyer on whose side their testimony had been given, should, while urging their evidence as credible on one point, still admit that they had uttered, on oath, many falsehoods, but offer as an excuse that these falsehoods had no relation whatever to the subject then before the Court?

Having made these explanatory and qualifying observations on the doctrine of Plenary Inspiration, we will proceed, without further delay, to substantiate what we have just said respecting the high and holy pretensions of the Bible—pretensions which, in our judgment, leave no middle ground between the Christian doctrine of Plenary Inspiration and absolute Infidelity.

We point our readers, then, to that declaration of the Apostle Paul, in 2 Tim. iii. 16. "All scripture is given by inspiration of God." The Greek is *pasa graphe*—*all the writing*, or *every writing*. What does he refer to? Consult the context. He reminds Timothy, in the 15th verse, how from a child he had known the Scriptures—in Greek *ta iera grammata*—*the holy letters or writings*. The Scriptures here referred to were, of course, the Jewish Scriptures, the very same books which we now possess in our Hebrew Bibles, and which every Jew knew, and could enumerate by their names; and the Apostle evidently declares that these well-known books are not only inspired, but that *all the writing* in them is so, and the *very letters sacred and holy*.

This plain testimony of the Apostle it is sought to get rid of, by nibbling at the text. But we might allow the proposed emendation, and the text would still, by plain implication, teach what now it positively asserts. Our opponents would have Paul say, "All scripture given by inspiration is profitable," &c. Now, as it is admitted, the writings referred to in the 15th and in the 16th verses are the same books, the only difference we can perceive between the old text and this new and amended text is, that the old *asserts* and the new *assumes* all Scripture to be by inspiration of God. Our adversaries are welcome to the difference. We believe any thing Paul assumes to be true, as readily as any thing he asserts to be true.

Who was Paul? It is historically demonstrable that he had been a learned despiser and cruel persecutor of the

Christians; that he was converted by the miraculous appearance of Christ to him; and that he suffered even unto death for the testimony which he afterwards bore. Having listened, then, to what this very reliable witness said of the Plenary Inspiration of the Jewish Scriptures, we will now hear him respecting that of his own writings. Let the reader bear in mind that this Paul is a witness whose veracity is not questionable—we have agreed to believe whatever he declares—we are arguing with professed believers and not unbelievers in the truthfulness of the Apostles.

Paul then speaks respecting his own inspiration, after this manner: "If any man think himself to be a prophet or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord." (1 Cor. xiv. 37.) "Which things also we speak not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." (1 Cor. ii. 13.) "He therefore that despiseth, despiseth not man, but God, who also hath given unto us his Holy Spirit." (1 Thess. iv. 8.) "For this cause also thank we God without ceasing, because when ye received the word of God which ye heard of us, ye received it not as the word of men, but as it is in truth, the word of God, which effectually worketh also in you that believe." (1 Thess. ii. 13.)

Hear next what the Apostle Peter says, respecting the Old Testament prophets: "Of which salvation the prophets have inquired and searched diligently, who prophesied of the grace that should come unto you; searching what or what manner of time the spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glory that should follow. Unto whom it was revealed, that not unto themselves, but unto us they did minister the things which are now reported unto you, by them that have preached the gospel unto you, with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven; which things the angels desire to look into." (1 Peter, i. 10—12.)

The Inspiration of these prophets, according to this Apostle, extended so strictly to their very words, that sometimes they did not even know themselves precisely what the spirit of Christ in them did signify, and accordingly, with pious zeal, they searched into his meaning, as we are commanded now to search into it.

Hear another testimony from the Apostle Peter: "Knowing this first, that no prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation. For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." (2 Pet. i. 20, 21.)

Here notice —

1. This passage refers to *written* revelations—prophecy of the *Scripture*.

2. That those who gave them are called holy men of God.

3. That *never* (*ou pote*) did any one of these writings come by the impulse or government of the *will of man*.

4. That the holy men who wrote them were *impelled* or *borne along* by the Holy Ghost. (See Gaussen, p. 346.)

Now let us see how this Apostle refers to the epistles of Paul: "Even as our beloved brother Paul also, according to the wisdom given him, hath written unto you; as also in *all his epistles*, speaking in them of these things, in which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do *also the other Scriptures*, unto their own destruction." (2 Pet. iii. 15, 16.)

Here, according to the Apostle Peter, Paul's writings must stand on the same platform of a full, verbal Inspiration with *the other Scriptures*, which Peter says were written and spoken according to the *motions* of the *Holy Ghost*.

But hear Peter's claim for himself and the other Apostles: "That ye may be mindful of the words which were spoken before by the holy prophets, and of the commandments of us, the Apostles of the Lord and Saviour." (2 Peter, iii. 2.)

Thus the commandments of the Apostles are put on the same level of Plenary Inspiration with the words spoken before by the Prophets!

In the book of Revelation the Apostle John also claims in solemn language the fullest verbal Inspiration. "If any man add to, or take from *the words* of this Book, God shall add its plagues to him and take away his part out of the book of life." (Rev. xxii. 18, 19.)

But that full verbal inspiration which the Apostles claim for themselves, we find their Master expressly promising to them. "The Holy Ghost shall teach you all things." (John xiv. 26.) "The Spirit of truth shall guide you into

all truth." (John xvi. 13.) Repeatedly he promises them immediate inspiration in their most critical and trying times. Thus he puts them on the same platform with prophets. And *they* even claim and rightly claim to be *more* than prophets. "God hath set some in the Church *first Apostles, secondarily prophets.*" (1 Cor. xii. 28.) The Apostles' writings then are as truly "prophecy of the Scripture" as Moses and the Prophets and the Psalms, (see Luke xxiv. 44) and all their authors may say with Paul, "Christ speaketh by me." (2 Cor. xiii. 3.)

These are but a small specimen of the testimonies of Scripture to its own Plenary Inspiration. Gaussen presents many others. Of this portion of his work we commend especially to the reader's attention section v. of chapter vi. in which he argues from the *examples of the Apostles and of their Master* that all the words of the Holy books are given by God. The example which he refers to is their example whenever they quote the Scriptures. They quote it as every word of it divine. "With religious assurance the Apostles often insist on a single word to deduce from it the most serious consequences and the most fundamental doctrines." Paul, as our author shews by many references, whenever he has occasion to quote from the Old Testament, "pauses at the least expression; with confident expectation of the Church's submission, he there points out the employment of one particular *word* in preference to any other, and seems to press out each bit of the passage between his hands even to its last drop of meaning." p. 381. It is true indeed that modern philosophy contemns all such arguments as puerile and absurd, but such was nevertheless the manner in which divinely-attested men behaved themselves towards the Old Testament. And even Christ appears to have had these very impressions respecting the Inspiration of the Bible. He seems to have held to that same doctrine which is now sneered at as a "stiff and *mechanical*" theory, for he has employed continually the same appeal we make to the *very words* of the text. The force of his arguments often turn upon a single word. He declares (Matt. v. 18, and Luke xxi. 33) most solemnly, that the Heavens and the Earth shall pass away sooner than one iota of the Old Testament or of his own words. From his cradle to his

tomb, in the temple with the Doctors, in the desert with the Devil, and in the synagogue with the Pharisees, he is constantly bringing proofs of what he says, from the Scriptures of the Old Testament. On the very cross, twice he has them in his dying lips, and one of these quotations was the comparatively unimportant word "I thirst," which nevertheless must needs be spoken by him on purpose to fulfil the Scriptures. And when he rises from the dead, in the few and hasty interviews he holds with his disciples, it is still, and even more than ever, *the Scriptures of the Old Testament* he is holding up before them. On the way to Emmaus, he makes the heart of two of them burn while opening to them the Scriptures, he expounds the things written in *all* those books concerning himself (Luke xxiv. 27); and again in the upper chamber, when they are all together, he opens their understanding that they might understand the Scriptures, even the books of Moses (now so much despised) and the Prophets and Psalms. (Luke xxiv. 44, 45.) This topic of our Lord's reverential regard for the Old Testament Scriptures, Gausson illustrates (see pp. 383-398) in a manner exceedingly forcible and impressive. We sympathize with him in the personal experience he avows of the strength of this particular argument for Plenary Inspiration:—"Nothing has produced in our soul so intimate and powerful a confidence in the entire theopneusty of the Scriptures." (p. 380.) And when we see "the Eternal Wisdom, the Uncreated Word, the Judge of Judges" thus yielding the authority of a law upon him "to a word, a single word, whether of a song or of a historical book," how dreadful then appears the daring and rash impiety of such expressions as we quoted in the beginning of this article from the Westminster Review. Even the more guarded language of Morell is in this contrast distressing to us in the highest degree. His language may be more decent than that of the Reviewer just named, it is certainly more elegant; but the meaning it conveys is in no degree less derogatory to the Majesty of the Scriptures. And we quote, therefore, as applicable even to him, these solemn and eloquent passages of our author:

"We tremble, when we have followed with our eyes the Son of Man, commanding the elements, stilling the tempests, and burst-

ing the sepulchre, whilst filled with so profound a respect for the sacred volume, he declared that he was to return one day to judge; from this book, the living and the dead; we tremble, and our heart bleeds, when afterwards crossing the threshold of a Rationalist Academy, we there see seated in his professoral chair, a poor mortal, a learned, miserable sinner, a responsible soul, handling, without reverence, the word of his God; when we follow him accomplishing this wretched task before young men eager for instruction; as future guides of an entire people capable of so much good, if you lead them to the high places of faith, and of so much evil, if you train them to the contempt of those Scriptures which they are one day to preach! With what peremptory decision they exhibit the phantasmagoria of their hypotheses; they retrench, they add, they commend, they condemn; they pity the simplicity, which, reading the Bible as Jesus Christ reads it, attaches itself, like him, to all the words, and can find no error in the word of God; they decide what interpolations or what retrenchments, (which Jesus Christ never suspected,) the holy Scriptures must have undergone; they purify the chapters which they have not understood; they point out mistakes in them, reasonings badly conducted or badly concluded, prejudices, imprudencies, vulgar errors! * * * * * Either Jesus Christ exaggerated and reasoned badly when he thus quoted the Scriptures, or these imprudent and unhappy men ignorantly blaspheme their majesty. * * * * * Alas! in a few years these professors and their pupils will be sleeping in the same tomb; they must wither like the grass; but then not a tittle of this divine book shall have passed away; and as surely as the Bible is truth, and as it has changed the face of the world, so surely shall we see the Son of Man returning upon the clouds of Heaven, and judging, by this eternal word, the secret thoughts of men." Rom. ii. 16; John xii. 48, Matt. xxv. 31.

The discussion we have been pursuing of the testimony borne by our Saviour to the Inspiration of the Bible, brings to mind the position taken recently by an Episcopal clergyman of this State, relative to the question of Christ's sanctioning the Pentateuch. And it accords with the plan on which we set out, to notice this writer's position on this particular question, inasmuch as he ranks himself on the side of Morell respecting Inspiration, and indeed, in his advertisement, "earnestly recommends the *Philosophy of Religion* to all who wish to see most of the topics discussed" by himself, "handled with great ability—and masterly logic."

We refer to "*Philosophic Theology*" by the Rev. Mr. Miles of Charleston, a work published by Russel and noticed at the time of its appearance in this Review. It has found, notwithstanding our honest condemnation of its Rationalistic tendencies, many admirers in this country, and the great Neander himself, a short time before his decease, wrote and published a very complimentary notice of it in a Berlin Magazine. Some of our newspapers, republishing this notice of *Philosophic Theology*, spoke of Neander as having maintained "a firm stand against the Rationalists," the object being to represent Neander as a *standard authority* among opposers of Neology. All we have to say on this point is *non tali auxilio, nec istis defensoribus*. The genus *Rationalist* embraces many species. With us it is no question, upon which of two points the great German's encomiums of "*Philosophic Theology*" shed most light—Mr. Miles' orthodoxy or his own heterodoxy. Simply as a merited compliment to the abilities of our countryman, however, we are as proud of Neander's letter as any of the other friends of Mr. Miles can be.

To proceed then with what we have to say upon the one point of Mr. M's position respecting our Saviour's testimony to Moses, we find him thus expressing himself on p. 205 "Geology has fought its battle; the question of the Unity of the race is now fighting its; and other questions of authenticity, genuineness, antiquity, chronology and history will have to fight theirs." Among these other questions of "authenticity and genuineness," which will yet have to be battled, he puts the questions (we think a good deal battled long ago) whether Moses wrote the Pentateuch, and whether it is an Inspired book. And in a long and labored note to the sentence we have just quoted above, (see Appendix, p. 229) he endeavors to shew that Christ has not given his sanction to the prevalent doctrine on either of these points. Mr. Miles admits that "if Christ did sanction the Pentateuch as an inspired book, and as the work of Moses it must certainly be so;" also that "if Christ was mistaken in that respect, it would be futile to argue his divinity further." Thus far we agree with him fully. He proceeds: "But on the other hand, if Christ did not express an opinion respecting the Pentateuch; or if he so expressed an opinion as to imply that it was not inspired

or written by Moses ; or if he only alluded to it as a received sacred book of the Jews, without expressing any opinion as to whether it was inspired or not, or by whom written ; or if he implied that the book contained elements of a revelation to the Jews, but that it was of no importance who wrote it ; or if he referred to it for the sake only of an *argumentum ad hominem*, and in view of his own revelation did not deem it important to express any opinion about the Pentateuch ; in any of these cases, it is evident that the Pentateuch has nothing to do with Christianity, or with the claims and character of Christ." Mr. Miles does not tell us which of these numerous hypotheses he adopts. But he proceeds to explain away several of the passages in which Christ has been generally supposed to give his sanction to Moses and the Pentateuch. We mean no offence, but we must characterize these exegetical remarks of Mr. M. as Magee did those of Priestley on the words *Christ died for us*. "They furnish a striking specimen of the metaphysical ingenuity with which the *Rational* expositor of the present day are able to extricate themselves from the shackles of Scripture language." We must say again, as Magee then said, that "no form of expression whatever would be proof against this species of criticism." The five books were held by every Jew to be *God's word*, and were constantly referred to under the titles of *Moses and the Law* ; and in these circumstances whenever Christ appealed to Moses or the Law, in proof of any doctrine, he could not be understood by the people as appealing otherwise than as to God's word, and as to an Inspired authority. To have appealed to them, having any other thought in his mind, would not have been *honest*. What is fairly necessary therefore, to make out Christ's sanction of Moses or of the Pentateuch, is not as Mr. Miles appears to suppose, that we should produce a passage wherein the Lord Jesus shall say expressly, that *Moses is the author* of the five books ; or shall say expressly that *the five books are Inspired*. If we find him quoting from "*Moses*" it is almost the same as for him to say that *Moses wrote the five books*—and if we find him quoting from "*the Law*" in proof of any doctrine, it may be held equivalent to his declaring the five books Inspired. We regard it as a fundamental principle of interpretation

that a critic must well consider circumstances and occasions. Mr. Miles we think leaves these altogether out of view in his exegetical labours on the passages he refers to. Just think of his dismissing one of these (Luke xxiv. 27th, and he should have joined with it the 44th verse also) with this single remark, "Nothing more is implied than that there were prophecies of Moses recorded!" It was when Jesus talked with the two going to Emmaus, and made their hearts burn as he opened to them the Scriptures. He goes through all the prophets, "*beginning with Moses*," and that same evening again he opens the understanding of all the band gathered together, with his exposition of the things respecting himself to be found in "the Psalms and Prophets, and Moses." How many of the types and shadows of the law and the dreams and visions of the Patriarch's which had foreshadowed himself, he doubtless shewed to them that evening for the first time in their true light! And this, Mr. Miles would have us believe, was in no important sense or degree a sanction by Christ of Moses or of his five books!

As to the quotations from the Pentateuch by Christ, in his mysterious conflict with the tempter, Mr. M. says "our Saviour evidently employed them as an *argumentum ad hominem* by repelling Satan's temptations based upon quotations from the Old Testament, with quotations from the same authority to which the tempter had appealed." There is some mistake here in point of *fact*. Satan did not make *quotations*, but only *a single quotation* from the Old Testament; nor did Satan appeal *first* to the Scriptures. His was the endeavor to repel (and the vain endeavor to repel) our Lord's reference to God's word. The case stands therefore as it did before Mr. Miles wrote this criticism. Our Lord in that grand conflict as second Adam and our head, with him who overcame our first head and forefather, did upon each renewed assault of the adversary go to the word of God,—Yes! and no where but *to the Pentateuch* itself, for a weapon of defence! But, of course, the errors of fact being admitted and corrected, there will be no difficulty in devising some new explanation of the case, which will do away with the force of our Lord's resorting so constantly, in his time of pressure and difficulty, to that one divine Magazine of Spiritual arms!

Mr. Miles says, respecting John v. 46, 47, that "it is evident our Lord did not intend, in these words, to express an opinion respecting the Pentateuch, but to apply to the Jews an argument based upon what they themselves admitted as authority." But let us look at the context. Our Lord is arguing with the Jews respecting his own claims, and he makes his appeal *first* to John the Baptist's testimony respecting him (verse 32); then *secondly*, to the testimony of his own works (verse 36); and *thirdly*, to that of his Father (verse 37). He proceeds to explain how his Father had testified to him—namely, in his *word*, and he calls on them (verse 39) to "search the Scriptures" for that testimony. "In them ye think ye have eternal life, (said he,) and ye will not come to me that ye might have life." Having thus charged upon them their indifference to, as well as their ignorance of, the very Scriptures on which they relied for salvation, he refers more particularly to one portion of the Scriptures, for which they professed special regard and veneration. "Do not think that I will accuse you to the Father; there is one that accuseth you, even Moses, in whom you trust." (v. 45.) Their "trusting in Moses" (that is, in the Pentateuch,) corresponds to their "thinking" of the Scriptures generally, that they "had eternal life in them." But he proceeds to tell them why Moses would accuse them; viz., for their not believing sincerely, but only nominally, in his five books. "For if ye had believed Moses ye would have believed me, for he wrote of me. But if ye believe not his writings, how can ye believe my words?" (verses 46, 47.) Here it is declared with emphasis that, if a man believe not in Moses' writings, he cannot believe Christ's words. To us it appears that this is sanctioning Moses in the strongest manner; for it is Christ's refusing to consider any disbeliever in the written words of Moses (contained in five well-known books,) as in any sense a believer in his own spoken words. The force of the passage is just this: that if the Jews, then present before him, were true believers in Moses, (that is, in the Pentateuch,) they would believe in him, for Moses in his five books wrote about him; but that they really did not believe in the Pentateuch, *which they ought to believe in*, and for not believing in which, *they should be accused by those divine writings before his father*; and that, so

long as they withheld their full belief from the very words written down in the five books, it was impossible they should believe any word he might himself speak. Thus he *stakes even his own credibility itself* on the absolute and entire credibility of the writings of the Jewish legislator.

Mr. Miles, in commencing his remarks on this class of passages, implies that he has given his attention to *all of them*. With very little searching we have found four to which he makes no reference. One is, "For all the prophets and the law prophesied until John." (Matt. xi. 13.) Here the law, that is, the five books of Moses, is called *prophetical* by our Lord, and he puts it in the same category with Isaiah, Jeremiah, &c. If the Pentateuch, then, is given up, they must be given up likewise.

Another passage is Mark vii. 9—13, where Christ charges the Pharisees with rejecting the *commandment of God*, and for proof, quotes, as a *saying of Moses*, the precept which they had rendered null and void. His language is, "Full well ye reject the *commandment of God* by your tradition; *for Moses said*, Honour thy father and mother, but ye say," and then he quotes their tradition, and concludes, "making *the word of God* of none effect." Now is it to be supposed that Christ, who even rebuked the Jews on account of their excessive veneration for Moses' person, would have employed this free alternation of the terms "*commandment of God*," "*saying of Moses*," "*word of God*," if he had not wished to leave room for our inferring that, as Moses was God's mouth-piece in giving the ten commandments, so also whatever other sayings Moses in his five books claimed to deliver as from God, were indeed the very words of God?

Another passage is, what Christ makes Abraham say: "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead." (Luke xvi. 31.) Here again Moses, or the Pentateuch, is ranked with the prophets, and his testimony is declared to be as complete on the subjects of sin and repentance, and also as competent in regard to the future punishment of the wicked and the necessity of a holy life, as could be that of an express messenger from the world of spirits.

The fourth passage not noticed by Mr. Miles, is this:

"It is easier for heaven and earth to pass than for one tittle of the law to fail." (Luke xvi. 17.) Be it that *the law* here refers both to the law and the prophets, which he had mentioned in the verse preceding. The greater includes the less. If the whole Jewish law or Old Testament be here sanctioned by Christ, then the Pentateuch, which was part of it, is sanctioned by him. If Christ said, every jot of the whole Old Testament is firmer than the heavens, then he said the same thing of every word of the five books of Moses.

Having thus stated, and as we suppose, established the primitive doctrine of Verbal or Plenary Inspiration, we will now place in contrast with it the opposite theory as it is presented in Mr. Morell's chapter on Inspiration. "The Philosophy of Religion, by J. D. Morell," (his vi. chapter included) has already been reviewed in our pages; but the great importance of the subject, and the established popularity of the writer, all justify us in again calling attention to the fallacies employed by him in his discussion of this point. The position maintained by Morell, is the very opposite of that which Gaussen holds. With him the sacred writers were inspired, and not the sacred writings. Indeed, by a whole previous chapter on Revelation, he labours to prepare the way for his peculiar definition of Inspiration, according to which *it never can be predicated of a writing*, but only of its author. "For a Revelation, at all to exist, (says Mr. Morell) there must be an intelligent being on the one hand, adapted to receive it, and there must be on the other hand a process by which this same intelligent being becomes cognizant of certain facts or ideas," (p. 128, Appleton's edition.) On the next page, he characterizes this process as *not logical*, that is *not by means of definition or explanation from the lips of another*, but *intuitional*, that is "by a direct and immediate gazing upon it;" and also declares, on the page following, that "the idea of Revelation is universally considered to imply this direct presentation from God to the mind." Accordingly, when he comes to treat of Inspiration, he sets out with these principles as so many *data*. "All Revelation, as we showed, implies two conditions: it implies, namely, an intelligible object presented, and a given power of recipiency in the subject; and in popular language, when speaking of the

manifestation of Christianity to the world, we confine the term Revelation to the former of these two conditions, and appropriate the word Inspiration to designate the latter," p. 147. Of course, with this definition of Inspiration, he comes naturally enough to the conclusion, that it is "in no sense mechanical but purely dynamical," p. 148. It is something not to be predicated of any machine, or of any writing, or other merely material existence. It can only be predicated of an intelligence, it ascribes to such an intelligent being a certain elevation of his mental and moral powers. The truth made known is Revelation, but Inspiration cannot characterize that truth, either as spoken or written; but from the very nature of it can belong only to the mind of him who receives the truth. Now, of course, we allow our author the common privilege of defining the sense in which he employs terms; but his statement that this is the "*popular*" use or the "*universal*" understanding of the terms he uses, we must just put along side of his other astounding declaration about the early Christians not believing in Plenary Inspiration.

Such being Morell's theory of Inspiration, in distinction from the primitive doctrine as upheld by Gaussen, we pause here to ask, of what possible use, on his principles, can the sacred writings be to us? The old doctrine makes them plenarily inspired, and so, an infallible guide; but Morell teaches us that "the idea of a revelation, implies a case of intelligence in which the whole result lies beyond the reach of the logical understanding," p. 130, that is, a case in which we do not "arrive at truth *mediately*, by definition or explanation from the lips of another," p. 129. He teaches us that the sacred writers had their intuitional consciousness supernaturally elevated, so as to perceive directly, and gaze immediately upon the truth; but they have passed away to their eternal rest, and behind them remain some documents written "in order to represent, and so far as possible to retain the bright impressions of these Apostolic men," p. 160. If, then, we cannot receive *mediately*, by definition or explanation, from their lips, the truth revealed to them, of what use is it to us? Did our author merely intend to say that even after an infallible guide is put into our hands, we require our minds to be illuminated by the spirit in order to understand the spirit-

ual truths revealed therein, he would be only asserting a well-known doctrine of Christianity. The necessity of divine teaching, by the Holy Ghost, in order that a blinded heart should receive the things which cannot be naturally discerned by man, is no greater difficulty attached to the doctrine of Plenary Inspiration, than the necessity there obviously exists for God's word, written by Apostles and Prophets, to be translated into our language, and the art of spelling and reading it, so translated, to be communicated to us. The necessity under which we may be lying, of a second gift from God, to render a first gift available, is no proof that he has not made us the first gift. But this is not at all the meaning of our author; he is not content to repeat what Apostles before him said respecting the natural blindness of the human heart. His position is this bold one, that Inspiration is in no sense mechanical, and cannot be predicated of any writing or other lifeless object. He maintains that the very idea of Inspiration implies intelligent powers to be elevated. Inspiration is purely dynamical. It belongs only to the writers, and does not belong to their writings. One question therefore returns, of what use is it to us now that those writers are dead? or of what use, indeed, would it be if they were alive? They could do nothing towards furnishing us a revelation, for that can never be done by any logical means. It is purely an *intuitional* affair, in which God works immediately upon the mind. Of course, therefore, according to this theory, God directly enlightens all who are enlightened, *without the use of any of those logical forms which the Bible contains*, and consequently the Bible is of no use! Morell's argument would make us all to be, what Neander tells us Mr. Miles is, "far from Bibolity."

Our author proceeds to discuss the question of Plenary Inspiration under three aspects:

I. The first is, that aspect of the subject in which it stands related to *Miracles*. He manages this topic with great delicacy, making no attack on the proof we are accustomed to derive from miracles in favor of the credibility of the Apostles. His new definition of Inspiration being received, there is no need of any such attack, and thus he is smoothly carried over what would otherwise be an insuperable difficulty. All he has to do with miracles is, as

he says, "to show that they have nothing to do immediately with Inspiration," p. 149. He merely desires to have it understood that there is not any "new or supernatural capacity presupposed by Inspiration," it being merely the "supernatural elevation of a natural faculty." Accordingly his whole effort here is simply to adduce some cases of men having miraculous powers, who were yet not inspired; and of men, on the other hand, who were inspired without having miraculous powers; and from these facts to draw the general conclusion that "the one gift was not necessarily connected with the other; that miracles, while they evinced a divine commission, did not prove the infallibility of the agent as a teacher; that they were, in fact, separate arrangements of Providence, one demanding extraordinary physical power, the other a mental and moral enlightenment," p. 150.

How does it happen, we must be permitted to ask, that Mr. Morell so entirely mistakes "the place in the picture" which is assigned to miracles by believers in the old doctrine? It has never been pretended, so far as we know, that they *necessarily and always* prove an agent to be inspired, but only prove him such *if he claims* to be inspired. They have been considered as proving the worker of them *a true witness*, provided at the same time that the doctrines to which he gave testimony commended themselves to the conscience as good and true.* And accordingly we have been accustomed to view the testimony of the Apostles to their own Inspiration as receivable testimony. And we will insist upon it, this argument stands firm. If it be historically demonstrable that the Apostles wrought miracles, then that is one of the clear and decisive proofs that they came from God; and then we must believe them when they tell us that their writings are God's words.

II. In the *second place*, our author considers the old doctrine, as it supposes, "a special dictation of the actual words inscribed on the sacred page, distinct from the religious enlightenment of the writer." (p. 151.) Here he enters with boldness into the controversy, and maintains the writers *versus* the writings. He says the old view of the case has been "generally abandoned by the thoughtful in the

* See Trench's Preliminary Essay.

present day"—which plainly shows what reputation we are securing for ourselves by this present labour. He proceeds to state *four considerations* as against the doctrine.

The *first* is the want of any "*positive evidence* of such verbal dictation having been granted." We merely point the reader to the Scriptures quoted by us above. He goes on to object that the "supposition of its existence would demand a twofold kind of Inspiration, each kind entirely distinct from the other." We reply, it is our author who supposes a second kind; Inspiration, in our sense of the word, (that Inspiration which is predicable of the writings) having always been received among Christians. He admits that "the Apostles were inspired to teach orally," but says "we have the most positive evidence of this commission not extending to their very words." We would be glad to have had him produce this evidence, but he did not attempt it. We think his reasoning throughout this paragraph not only weak, but *suicidal*. His position is to question, if not to deny, the Inspiration of the Apostles as to their writings, but to admit it in a general sense as to their oral instructions. And yet he refers to Peter as having orally taught a specific error which was certainly of great importance. Surely this is killing to his own theory; for it would convict Peter of a grievous oral error, and shows that his "intuitional faculty," his "inward nature," was (*not*) so "perfectly harmonized to the divine; so freed from the distorting influences of prejudice, passion and sin; so simply recipient of the divine ideas circumambient around it; so responsive in all its strings to the breath of heaven, that truth left upon it an impress answering perfectly to its objective reality!" It happens, however, as we stated in a previous article, that Morell has here fallen into a small error of fact. Peter did not, so far as we are told, *teach* any thing *orally* on the occasion referred to; his dissimulation was in point of *conduct*.

The *second* consideration which our author produces as hostile to the old doctrine, is "the *distinctive style* maintained by such writer." (p. 152.) But is it any more incredible that God should *speak* in different human styles, than that he should *act* by instruments of different appearances and natures—that he should *destroy*, for example, by fire, by water, by famine, by disease? If the same

God acts in these, why may not the same God speak in those? But we retort this objection upon our author; he admits that the Apostles were inspired to teach orally, (p. 151) and does he mean to say that their tones of voice, their idioms and forms of expression, and their manner of gesticulation, were always identical?

The *third* consideration is a very singular one, as coming from a philosophic reasoner. It is that Plenary Inspiration "tends to diminish our view of the moral and religious qualifications of the writers, by elevating the mere mechanical influence into supremacy. In proportion as we possess a higher idea of the scriptural enlightenment of the Apostles, in that proportion we feel that there was less need of any such verbal dictation as we are now considering." (p. 152.) And what of that? we ask. *If our doctrine be true, there is no room and no use for your theory*—that is a strange kind of argument to prove our doctrine false! Suppose we should retort: this new theory diminishes our regard for the writings as infallible, by elevating into supremacy the mere personal enlightenment of the writers. Morell proceeds to say, (borrowing, for his first few words here, the pencil of a caricaturist,) "the writers of the Bible on this theory might have been mere tools or instruments, their minds need not have been inspired at all; on the contrary, if they were fitted as holy and inspired men to comprehend and propagate Christianity, they were also fitted to describe it either in oral or written symbols." We reply, if the author has any positive evidence that the minds of the Apostles were supernaturally elevated in the manner he asserts, let him produce it, or let him enjoy it unproduced, and welcome! *We* are taught by men sent from God that the Bible is a book divine, and we intend to stand fast in this doctrine. If it be in the way of this new theory, we cannot help it. If it even lowers the writers, as men, more than the new theory, while it more exalts the writings, as God's word, we only perceive in that fact a new analogical proof of the truth of the doctrine; for herein Christianity has been always the reverse of Philosophy—the latter always has glorified man, to the dishonor of God, but it is the very genius and design of the former to put God on the throne and man in the dust.

As to the Apostles, because holy and inspired men, being "fitted to set forth Christianity in oral or written symbols," how can our author so say, if that cannot be Revelation which is received "by explanation from the lips of another?" (p. 129.)

His *next and last* consideration Mr. Morell shall state in full. "Fourthly, 'The *positive* evidence against this theory—evidence which, to a thoughtful mind, amounts to a moral demonstration—lies here, that even if we suppose the letter of the Scripture to have been actually dictated, yet that alone would never have served as a revelation of Christianity to mankind, or obviated the necessity of an appeal from the letter to the spirit of the whole system.

* * The letter of the Scripture has to be illuminated by the spirit of truth before it affords to any one a full manifestation of Christianity, in its essence and its power; while, in proportion to the varied spiritual condition of the reader, the conceptions attached to the mere words are almost infinitely diversified.'" (p. 152.)

What does the reader think of this, as the "positive evidence," and *all* the positive evidence for this theory which Morell is able to produce against the plain and repeated statements of the sacred writings? Is it *evidence*, indeed, of any kind? Is it any thing more than *argument*? And as merely an argument, does it not better deserve to be called *negative* than *positive*? For it is simply this, that an infallible written Revelation would not be sufficient of itself for all our purposes! It is merely this, that the Bible is not infallible, because it cannot do the work of the Holy Spirit!

Mr. Morell proceeds, under this head of positive evidence against Plenary Inspiration, to say that "the letter alone, in fact, never has secured the unity of the Church." But this fact has no force in the present controversy. The old doctrine is, that the Bible is God's word throughout—the books, the words, the letters. And this author objects that the letter never has secured unity. Can he show that the Bible was designed or expected by God to secure unity? If he replies affirmatively, we ask again, is not this saying that God has failed in his design? Is it not one thing for God to give an infallible standard, and quite another for God to make all the readers or receivers of it infallibly cor-

rect in their opinions or belief? Does not the very giving of a rule presuppose that there will be deficiency and deflection to be evidenced when comparison shall be made with that rule? Is it not derogatory to the philosophical character of our author that he should thus imply the non-existence of a rule, from the very necessity and use of it?

But this argument of Mr. Morell, so feeble a shaft in his hand against us, we can send back with force against himself. He says the Bible is inspired as to the spirit but not as to the letter of it. Well, we ask him if the *spirit* has secured that unity which the *letter* has not secured? That unity does not exist, and if this fact disproves our doctrine, it equally affects his theory. He says "the unity we so much yearn after, comes only through the developement of the religious life." We ask again, where has there ever been any such developement producing any such unity? He tells us "the awakened religious consciousness of true believers as the real and essential revelation—the sole basis of Christian unity—the appeal to which we all in the end practically repair." We deny that this is the appeal we all practically make. And we ask him to tell us where we are to find that awakened consciousness of true believers, and how we are to get at it?

III. In *the third place* Mr. Morell considers that form of the old doctrine "which asserts a distinct commission in reference to the authorship of each one of the sacred books." (p. 154.) There is no difference that we can perceive, as was said in our former article, between this form of the doctrine and the one under which he has just considered it. It appears to have been introduced in this way merely that the writer might conveniently bring in the old worn-out objections to the canon, based upon our admitted ignorance of the dates and authors of some of the divine books. But we have no need to produce a distinct commission given to any of the sacred writers—nor yet, to discuss any questions of the mixed or single authorship of the Pentateuch, or of the date of the production of Job. Mr. Morell and ourselves are agreed that the books are authentic and genuine; if so, they contain the claims of miracle-workers to have written those books by the Spirit, and this settles the question in dispute. Most of the difficulties which occupy pp. 155–159 fall therefore to the ground. We have

nothing to do with them, nor has Mr. Morell, nor any one else. They only arise from his commencing his enquiries at the wrong end of the subject. In the investigation of the claims of the Bible, he should not begin with the Pentateuch, but with the New Testament. The argument runs thus: It is historically demonstrable that Jesus rose from the dead and that his Apostles wrought miracles. This makes him, and this makes them, to be true witnesses. They declare their writings inspired, and they declare the Old Testament also inspired. Therefore the whole Bible is inspired. Here is a short method with the chief part of Mr. Morell's difficulties on these four and a half pages.

But we would ask our author, suppose a distinct commission were claimed by each writer, how would that claim alter Morell's judgment of the case? Such a claim would get its value from the same historical testimony which we and our Rationalistic friends appear to estimate so differently. And such a claim, however plainly worded, would of course have no greater value in their eyes and present no greater barriers to their critical ingenuity, than any other sentence now to be found in the Bible.

Having viewed the doctrine of Plenary Inspiration in these three aspects, Mr. Morell offers three remarks in confirmation of his own views. *The first* is that they alone "give full *consistency* to the *progressive* character of the Scripture morality." Some of his observations on this head are very painful to our minds. We shall make no comments, however, but refer the reader to what appears on pages 314 and 315 of the third volume of this Review.

His second remark is that his view "alone gives a satisfactory explanation of the minor discrepancies to be found in the sacred writings." On this subject we refer to three admirable sections in Gaussen's work; sections v. vi. and vii. of his second chapter; in which all the alleged errors of reasoning or doctrine, errors in the narration, and errors in Natural Philosophy, are examined with candour and with great ability.

His third and last remark is that his theory "alone explains the formation of the Canon of Scripture and the facts connected with it." Upon this he observes that "with few exceptions there is not an entire book in the whole of the Old Testament with respect to which we can

determine with complete accuracy, who was the author,—when it was written,—at what time received into the Canon of Scripture, and on what special grounds.” And he asks “Now under such circumstances as these, how are we to stand forth and maintain the inspiration of the Jewish writings on the hypothesis either that they were all dictated by the Spirit of God, or written by express commission from Heaven?” p. 168.

We have produced the testimony of the New Testament writers to the inspiration of the Jewish Scriptures, and if Mr. Morell or any one else cannot *on their authority* stand forth and maintain the divine character of the Old Testament, because forsooth he does not know the dates and authors of some of the books, we are prepared to find him setting no great value upon the Canonical claim of the Christian Scriptures either. And accordingly upon the New Testament Canon our author speaks in a similar strain. He represents the whole affair as one of great uncertainty. Now, upon this point, we have simply to remark, that it is not every mind which is competent to appreciate the argument by which the Canon of Scripture, as now constituted, is maintained. That our author should find any difficulty with that argument is of course to be ascribed to no mental deficiency in him. But that he should impugn an argument of the force and yet refinement of which he must be sensible, we may justly set down as a pregnant indication of the true and real *animus* of the new theory. Our author knows perfectly well how the simple fact that we are arguing about books written eighteen centuries ago, or written thousands of years ago, diminishes the quantity but increases the force of the proofs we have to furnish. He knows very well how the testimony of contemporaries or almost-contemporaries is all that can bear on such a question, and he knows how satisfactory is the nature of this sort of evidence. He knows how while a thousand difficulties and objections can easily be raised among posterity in such a case, a thousand replies to each objection and each difficulty could no doubt have been produced by contemporary receivers of the books, and therefore he knows how philosophical and how rational it is to rely with confidence upon the verdict given by the

early Church in favour of the New Testament Canon as now constituted.

The only other observation we shall offer upon Mr. Morell's views is, that he concludes his argument, as well he might, with admitting, nay drawing out a parallel between inspiration and genius !

We turn back to Gaussen, and close our article by furnishing the reader a specimen of the manner in which he treats the objection to Plenary Inspiration from the insignificance of some of the details entered into by the sacred writers. We choose to hear him on the cloak Paul left at Troas.

"In his youth, he was already eminent, a favorite of princes, admired of all ; but now he has left every thing for Christ. It is now thirty years and more, that he has been poor, in labours more than the others, in wounds more than they, in prison oftener ; five times he had received of the Jews forty stripes save one ; thrice was he beaten with rods ; once he was stoned ; thrice he suffered shipwreck ; often in journeyings ; in perils upon the sea, in perils in the city, in perils in the desert, in watchings oft, in hunger and in thirst, in cold and nakedness. Hear him now ; behold him advanced in age ; he is in his last prison ; he is at Rome ; he is expecting his sentence of death ; he has fought the good fight ; he has finished his course, he has kept the faith ; but he is cold, winter is coming on, and he is poorly clad ! Buried in a dungeon of the Mamertine prisons, he is so much despised, that even all the Christians of Rome are ashamed of him, and that at his first appearing, no man was willing to befriend him. Yet, he had received, ten years before, while a prisoner at Rome, and loaded with chains, at least some money from the Philippians ; who, knowing his sufferings, united together in their indigence, to send him some succor. But now, behold him forsaken ; no one but St. Luke is with him ; all have abandoned him ; winter is approaching. He would need a cloak ; he has left his own, two hundred leagues off, at the house of Carpus in Troas ; and no one in the cold prisons of Rome would lend him one. Has he not then left every thing, with joy, for Christ ; has he not esteemed all the glory of this world as dross that he might win Christ : and does he not suffer all things cheerfully for the elects' sake ? We were ourselves at Rome, last year, in a hotel, on a rainy day, in the beginning of November. Chilled by the piercing dampness of the cold, evening air, we had a vivid conception of the holy Apostle in the subterranean dungeons of the capitol, dictating the last of his letters, regretting the absence of his

cloak, and entreating Timothy to bring it to him before the winter!

"Who would then take from the inspired Epistles so striking and pathetic a feature? Does not the Holy Spirit carry you to the prison of Paul, to astonish you with this tender self-renunciation and this sublime poverty; just too, as he shewed you, with your own eyes, his charity, sometime before, when he made him write in his letter to the Philippians: 'I weep in writing to you, because there are many among you, who mind earthly things, whose end is destruction?' Do you not seem to see him in his prison, loaded with chains, while he is writing, and tears are falling upon his parchment? And does it not seem to you that you behold that poor body, to-day miserably clothed, suffering and benumbed; to-morrow beheaded and dragged to the Tiber, in expectation of the day when the earth shall give up her dead, and the sea the dead which are in it; and when Christ shall transform our vile bodies, to make them like unto his glorious body? And if these details are beautiful, think you they are not also useful? And if they are already useful to him who reads them as a simple historical truth, what will they not become to him who believes in their Theopneusty, and who says to himself: 'Oh my soul, these words are written by Paul; but it is thy God who addresses them to thee?' Who can tell the force and consolation, which, by their very familiarity and naturalness, they have for eighteen centuries conveyed into dungeons and huts? Who can count the poor and the martyrs, to whom such passages have given encouragement, example and joy? We just now remember, in Switzerland, the Pastor Juret, to whom a coverlet was refused, twenty years ago, in the prisons of the Canton de Vaud. We remember that Jerome of Prague, shut up for three hundred and forty days in the dungeons of Constance, at the bottom of a dark and loathsome tower, and going out only to appear before his murderers. Nor have we forgotten the holy Bishop Hooper, quitting his dark and dismal dungeon, with wretched clothes and a borrowed cloak, to go to the scaffold, supported upon a staff, and bowed by the sciatica. Venerable brethren, happy martyrs; doubtless you then remembered your brother Paul, shut up in the prison of Rome, suffering from cold and nakedness, asking for his cloak! Ah! unfortunate he, who does not see the sublime humanity, the tender grandeur, the foreseeing and divine sympathy, the depth and the charm of such a mode of teaching! But still more unfortunate perhaps he, who declares it human, because he does not comprehend it. * * * * *

* * * * * We should adore that tender condescension, which,

stooping even to our weakness, is pleased, not only to reveal to us the highest thoughts of heaven in the simplest language of earth, but also to offer them to us under forms so living, so dramatic, so penetrating, often compressing them, in order to render them more intelligible, within the narrow space of a single verse.

"It is then thus, that St. Paul, by these words thrown at hazard even into the last commission of a familiar letter, casts for us a rapid flood of light over his ministry, and discovers to us by a word, the entire life of an Apostle; as a single flash of lightning in the evening, illuminates in an instant, all the tops of our Alps; and as persons sometimes show you all their soul by a single look." (pp. 239, 243.)

ARTICLE II.

MATTHEW XXII. 29.

"Jesus answered and said unto them, Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God."

The triumphal entry of Jesus into Jerusalem, amid the shouts and hosannahs of the multitude; his authoritative purgation of the Temple, and his prophetic denunciations of the impending judgments of God against the Jewish Commonwealth, had roused the resentment of the Jewish authorities against him to the utmost pitch. They determined, by some means, to bring about his death. The fear of the people prevented them from open violence. They, consequently, resort to stratagem, that they might find some ground of accusation against him, which should have the effect of turning the current of popular favour into a tide of indignation, and give them a pretext, for consummating, without danger to themselves, their murderous design. The only expedient they could think of was an effort to entangle him in his talk. The Pharisees, accordingly, sent out some of their disciples with the Herodians, who proposed to him a question, so adroitly framed, that answer it as he might, it seemed impossible to avoid giving offence, either to the people, or the partizans of Cæsar. "What thinkest thou? Is it lawful to give tribute unto Cæsar, or

not?" "But Jesus perceived their wickedness and said, Why tempt ye me, ye hypocrites? Shew me the tribute money. And they brought unto him a penny. And he saith unto them, Whose is this image and superscription? They say unto him, Cæsar's. Then saith he unto them, Render therefore unto Cæsar the things which are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's." This answer put them completely to silence, as it turned their own traditions against them, and made them settle the question for themselves, without committing him to any principle which could justly give offence. The Pharisees being thus taken in their own craftiness, the Sadducees assailed him, with the design, it would seem, to convict him of ignorance, and in that way, to destroy his reputation as a prophet. This sect denied the reality of a future state, "they say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit." They accordingly propounded a question which, to their minds, involved the popular faith, the faith, too, which they knew that Jesus held, in inextricable confusion. Proceeding upon the gratuitous assumption, that if men are to exist after death, the future life will be, in all respects, analogous to the present, a continuation, or rather, resumption of present relations and affinities, they could not comprehend how the conflicting rights and interests of earth could be harmoniously adjusted hereafter. It was a case which might obviously happen under the Jewish Law and in full accordance with the Divine will, that the same woman might be successively the wife of seven husbands. In the resurrection the rights of all would seem to be equal, and if each should insist upon his claim, no scheme could be devised of settling the dispute. Under this state of the controversy, we may well imagine the air of confidence with which the Sadducees approached the Saviour and put to him the question: "Therefore in the resurrection, whose wife shall she be of the seven, for they all had her?" Little did they dream that the tables would be turned against them, and their boasted wisdom made to seem but folly: that an answer, so complete and satisfactory as that contained in the text, could be returned to their question—much less that the very Moses in whom they trusted could be made to bear witness against them and establish the truths which they denied. Jesus answered and said unto them, "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the

power of God. For in the resurrection, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the angels of God in heaven." The hypothesis, in other words, upon which your argument proceeds, and from which it derives all its consistency, is gratuitous and false. You have assumed that the future state is to be, in all respects, analogous to the present—that the world after death is to be, on a broader scale, a reproduction of this sublunary scene. In this you are mistaken. "For in the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven." But however difficult it may be to reconcile the doctrine of the resurrection with your preconceived opinions, and however incompatible it may seem to you with the general tenor of the Scriptures, it is clearly taught in the Bible—even in that part of it which you have represented as indirectly denying it—"But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead but of the living."

Whether modern commentators have hit the true point of our Saviour's reply or not, or whether it is possible, without larger acquaintance with the state of Jewish opinion, to apprehend its pertinency or not, are questions which I am not concerned at present to discuss. It is enough that it was felt to be conclusive at the time, both by those who assailed him and those who stood by and witnessed the rencontre—so conclusive that the multitude could not repress the expression of their astonishment, or rather, admiration and delight. "And when the multitude heard this they were astonished at his doctrine." The important thing with us is to fix our attention upon the principles involved in the discussion. We shall find them, if I am not greatly mistaken, reappearing at every stage in the history of the church. There is nothing new under the sun. This little scene at Jerusalem, in which the great founder of Christianity vindicates the fundamental doctrine of all religion, whether natural or revealed, from the ignorant and captious objections of a conceited and arrogant group of skepticks, may be taken as a type, or miniature picture of all the great battles which revelation has had to fight from that day to this, and of those other battles through

which it must yet pass until the final triumph of the Son of Man. It is true the Sadducees did not professedly reject revelation—they admitted the Divine authority of Moses and the prophets—they conceded the inspiration of the whole Jewish canon.* But there is no difference in principle betwixt rejecting a revelation wholly and absolutely on the ground of objectionable doctrines, and denying that such doctrines can by possibility be taught in an admitted revelation. It is precisely the same thing to say the book is Divine and therefore the doctrine cannot be there, and to say that the doctrine *is* there, and therefore the book cannot be Divine. He who would exclude the doctrine upon the ground that, from its intrinsic incredibility, it cannot be revealed, would exclude the revelation which professedly contained it. The Sadducees may, accordingly, be taken as the type of all who deny the possibility of any revelation, or the possibility that any particular doctrines are revealed, from measures of natural probability. They are alike the representatives of rationalists in the Church who admit the Divine authority of the Bible in general, while they deny the Divine authority of every thing in it which makes it of real value, and of rationalists out of the church who treat all claims to inspiration as contradictory and absurd and look upon prophets and apostles in the same light in which Festus contemplated Paul.

The opposition of the Sadducees, so far as it can be gathered from the Scriptures, to the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, arose from a perverse application of the laws of intrinsic probability to questions which depended upon testimony. They judged of the future by the present, and made the experience of this life the measure of possibility to the next. If it had been a question naturally suggested in the course of their speculations, or had been presented simply as a problem of philosophy to be solved by reason, they would have had no alternative but to apply the standard of intrinsic probability. As contradistinguished from instinctive beliefs, and necessary deductions from them, likeness or analogy is always the measure of inherent probability. We can judge of the unknown only by its resemblance to the known. No fact, which is

* Bucher, vol. II. p. 721. Pearson, *Vindicat. Ignat.* Pt. I. c. 7.

not intuitively given, or logically contained in one that is, can authenticate itself in any other way but by its correspondence to experience. The inlets of knowledge, however, are not restricted within this narrow compass. There are other measures of credibility beside the intrinsic and inherent; events can be known through other channels beside themselves. There is a credibility, arising from extrinsic considerations, considerations utterly independent of the nature and character of the phenomena themselves, which, in many cases, is found to counterbalance the strongest antecedent presumptions. Testimony is a real source of knowledge, as real as experience. It is indeed the means through which the experience of the world becomes accumulated—the channel which conducts the waters of the past into the streams of the present, and without which all intelligent communications betwixt rational creatures must be hopelessly cut off.

In all cases of testimony, in which the laws which regulate and determine its credibility are complied with, the limit of belief is no longer analogy or experience, but the will and omnipotence of God. The only instance in which it can be set aside is that in which it involves palpable contradictions. This is the doctrine of our Saviour in the text. "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God." Nothing, in other words, is essentially incapable of being Scripture, which it is within the compass of omnipotence to make true. Whatever *can* be, *may* be, and hence the only species of internal argument which can be successfully employed against the authenticity of competent testimony is that which convicts it of contradictions to itself, or what is known to be true, and so places it beyond the province of Divine power. Possibility is always a sufficient answer to objections.

The error of the Sadducees, accordingly, was not that, in a matter dependent upon intrinsic considerations, they reasoned from what *is* to what is *likely* to be, but that, in a matter professedly of testimony, and that, too, the testimony of God, they virtually asserted that He *could* not depart from the uniform course of their experience. The unknown must be analogous to the known—what shall be a counterpart of what is.

This fundamental postulate of the Sadducee has been

pushed, in modern times, to the extreme of denying that there can be any such thing as a direct testimony from God. Every thing supernatural is excluded from the range of credibility—so that Divine truths can never be measured by any other standard but that of inherent probability. They must either prove themselves, or they can never be commended to our reason. It is, therefore, a question of immense importance, nothing less than the destinies of Christianity being involved in it, whether or not God *can* stand to man in the attitude of a *witness to truth*. The whole system of evangelical religion is a system of *authority*. It includes a series of stupendous facts, a development of purposes, plans and operations upon the part of God, which, from the nature of the case, never could be known, unless He should choose to communicate them. There are no lines of ratiocination, there are no measures of experience, there is no range of intuition, which could authenticate to us the sublime mysteries of the Gospel. What elevation of consciousness, or what intensity of moral and spiritual enthusiasm, could ever ascertain to us the appointment of a great mediator, on the part of Heaven's high chancery, to bring in an everlasting righteousness, and to open the kingdom of Heaven to all believers? Sense, indeed, might tell us that a babe was born in Bethlehem, but how shall we know that Mary's infant, wrapped in swaddling clothes, and laid in a manger, was the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace? Sense might tell us that this same infant, when he had come to years, was a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, that he was poor and houseless, that while the foxes had holes and the birds of the air had nests, he had not where to lay his head. Experience might testify that he died a death of agony and shame, the victim of a nation's vengeance and a nation's hate. But how shall we learn that the griefs which he bore were our griefs, the sorrows he carried were our sorrows—that he was wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities? How are we to reach the secret meaning in the mind of God of all that series of events which make up the biography of Jesus? These are things which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, and which never could enter into the heart of man by the natural processes of thought. They are deep things of

God, which none can know in themselves, but His own eternal Spirit; and unless He has revealed them, they are and can be to us little better than sick men's dreams. They must be known by a *Divine Testimony*, or they cannot be known at all. The question, then, is one of incalculable importance: Can God be a witness of truth to man? Can He declare to other intelligent creatures facts which *He* knows, as one man can communicate knowledge to another? What we mean by the inspiration of the Scriptures is, that they are the word of God, in a sense analogous to that in which the recorded deposition of a witness, in any case of human testimony, is *his* word. We do not mean that God has enabled men to reason out and discover for themselves truths which, without His assistance, they never could have compassed, but that He himself has informed them of the facts, and demands their faith upon the ground of His supreme veracity. They are to believe because *He says* the things are true, and not because they can *see* them to be so. This is the grand question betwixt the rationalists and the Church—whether there can be a Divine testimony—whether religion is a matter of authority or deduction—of reason or of faith.

It would be obviously impossible to show, by any direct processes of argument, that there is any thing in the mode of the Divine existence, which precludes the Deity from holding intercourse with His creatures, analogous to that which they hold with each other. We can perceive nothing in the nature of things which would lead us to suppose that God could not converse with man.

Analogy, on the contrary, would suggest that, as persons can here communicate with each other—as they can be rendered conscious of each other's existence—as they can feel the presence of one another, and interchange thoughts and emotions, the same thing might be affirmed of God. It is certainly incumbent upon the rationalist to show how God is precluded from a privilege which, so far as we know, pertains to all other personal existences. Capacity of society and converse seems to be involved in the very nature of personality, and it cannot be demonstrated that there is any thing more incomprehensible in the case of a Divine than of a human testimony. How one man knows that another man, another intelligence is before him—how he

reads the thoughts and enters into the emotions of another being, are problems as profoundly inscrutable as how a man shall know that God talks with him, and imparts to him truths which neither sense nor reason could discover. It deserves farther to be considered, that as all worship involves a direct address of the creature to the Deity, as man must *talk* to God as well as obey His laws, must love and confide in Him, as well as tremble before Him—it deserves to be considered how all this is practicable, if the communications are all to be confined to the feebleness party. Religion necessarily supposes some species of communion with the object of worship, some *sense* of God; and if this is possible, I see not why the correspondence may not be extended into full consistency with the analogy of human intercourse. Certain it is that the moral nature of man, which leads him to converse with God, has in all ages induced him to hope and expect that God would converse with him. Every age has had its pretensions to Divine revelations—there have always been seers and prophets. Many have been false—have had nothing intrinsic or extrinsic to recommend them, and yet they have succeeded in gaining a temporary credit, because they addressed themselves to the natural belief that a revelation would indeed be given. Whence this natural expectation, whence this easy credulity, if the very conception of a direct communication from God involved a contradiction and absurdity?

Arguments of this sort are certainly not without their weight. They never have been and they never can be answered in the way of direct refutation. The approved method is to set them aside by the sweeping application of the principle upon which the Sadducees set aside the resurrection of the dead. Revelation and its proofs are equally supernatural, and whatever is supernatural must be false. "No just notion of the true nature of history," says Strauss, "is possible, without a perception of the inviolability of the chain of finite causes, and of the impossibility of miracles." The first negative canon, which this remarkable author prescribes, for distinguishing betwixt the historical and fabulous, is "when the narration is irreconcilable with the known and universal laws, which govern the course of events." He affirms that "according to these laws, agreeing with all just philosophical conceptions, and all credible

experience, the absolute cause never disturbs the chain of secondary causes by single arbitrary acts of interposition, but rather manifests itself in the production of the aggregate of finite causalties, and of their reciprocal action." In opposition to this desolating doctrine, I shall undertake to set, in a clear light, the principle inculcated by our Saviour in the text, that in all cases of competent testimony, where the witnesses have honestly related their own convictions, and where they could not be deceived as to the facts, possibility is the sole natural limit to belief. We are bound to believe, upon competent testimony, what is not *demonstrably impossible*. The application of this law to all other cases of antecedent improbability but the supernatural will hardly be questioned, and I shall therefore discuss it with special reference to miracles.

It would seem to be a self-evident proposition, that whatever is, and is, at the same time, adapted to our cognitive faculties, is capable of being known. No doubt but that man is a little creature, and that there are and forever will remain things, locked up in the bosom of omniscience, which his slender capacities are unfitted to comprehend. But, then, there are other things, to which his faculties are unquestionably adjusted—which are not only cognizable in themselves, but cognizable by him. All that is necessary in reference to these is, that they should stand in the proper relation to the mind. When this condition is fulfilled, knowledge must necessarily take place. If an object be visible, and is placed before the eye in a sound and healthful condition of the organ, it must be seen—if a sound exist, and is in the right relation to the ear, it must be heard. Let us now take a supernatural fact—such as the raising of Lazarus from the dead, as recorded in the Gospel of John. There is not a single circumstance connected with that event which lies beyond the cognizance of our faculties. Every thing that occurred could be judged of by our senses. That he was dead, that he was buried, that the process of putrefaction had begun—that he actually came from the grave at the voice of Jesus, bound hand and foot in his grave-clothes, and that he subsequently took his part in human society, as a living man, are phenomena which no more transcend the cognitive faculties of man than the simplest circumstances of ordinary experience. I am not

now vindicating the reality of this miracle—that is not necessary to the argument in hand. All that I contend for is, that if it had been a fact, or if any other real instance of the kind should ever take place, there would be nothing in the nature of the events, considered as mere phenomena, which would place them beyond the grasp of our instruments of knowledge. They would be capable of being known by those who might be present at the scene—capable of being known according to the same laws which regulate cognition in reference to all sensible appearances. Our senses would become the vouchers of the fact, and the constitution of our nature our warrant for crediting our senses.

The skeptic himself will admit that if the first facts submitted to our experience were miraculous, there could be no antecedent presumption against them—and that we should be bound to receive them with the same unquestioning credence with which a child receives the earliest report of its senses. This admission concedes all that we now contend for—the possibility of such a relation of the facts to our faculties as to give rise to knowledge—such a connection betwixt the subject and object as to produce, according to the laws of mind, real cognition. This being granted, the question next arises, does the standard of intrinsic probability, which experience furnishes in analogy, destroy this connection? Does the constitutional belief, developed in experience, that like antecedents are invariably followed by like consequents, preclude us from believing, subsequent to experience, what we should be compelled, by the essential structure of our nature, to believe antecedent to experience? Does analogy force a man to say that he does not see what, if it were removed, he would be bound to say that he *does* see?

To maintain the affirmative is to annihilate the possibility of knowledge. The indispensable condition of all knowledge is, the veracity of consciousness. We have the same guarantee for the sensible phenomena, which are out of the analogy of experience, as for those phenomena from which that experience has been developed. If, now, consciousness cannot be credited in one case, it can be credited in none—*falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus*. If we cannot believe it after experience, it must be

a liar and a cheat, and we can have no grounds for believing it prior to experience. Universal skepticism becomes the dictate of wisdom, and the impossibility of truth the only maxim of philosophy. Consciousness must be believed on its own account, or it cannot be believed at all; and, if believed on its own account, it is equally a guarantee for every class of facts, whether supernatural or natural. To argue backwards, from a standard furnished by consciousness, to the mendacity of consciousness, in any given case, is to make it contradict itself, and thus demonstrate itself to be utterly unworthy of credit. There is no alternative betwixt admitting that, when a supernatural phenomenon is vouched for by consciousness, it is known, and, therefore, exists—or admitting that no phenomenon whatever can be known. This knowledge rests upon the same ultimate authority with all other knowledge.

But it may be asked, is not the belief of the uniformity of nature a datum of consciousness, and does not the hypothesis of miracles equally make consciousness contradict itself? By no means. There is no real contradiction in the case. The datum of consciousness, as truly given, is that, under the same circumstances, the same antecedent will invariably be followed by the same consequents. It is not that when the antecedent is given, the consequent will invariably appear, but that it will appear, if the conditions, upon which the operation of its cause depends, are fulfilled. Cases constantly happen in which the antecedent is prevented from putting forth its efficacy—it is held in check by a power superiour to itself. “Continually we behold, in the world around us, lower laws held in restraint by higher—mechanic by dymanic, chemical by vital, physical by moral—yet we say not, when the lower thus gives place to higher, that there was any violation of law, that anything contrary to nature came to pass: rather we acknowledge the law of a greater freedom swallowing up the law of a lesser. Thus, when I lift my arm, the law of gravitation is not, as far as my arm is concerned, denied, or annihilated: it exists as much as ever; but is held in suspense by the higher law of my will. The chemical laws which would bring about decay in animal substances, still subsist, even when they are hemmed in and hindered by the salt which keeps these substances

from corruption.”* When the consequents, therefore, in any given case, are not such as we should previously have expected, the natural inference is, not that our senses are mendacious, and that the facts are not what consciousness represents them to be, but that the antecedents have been modified or counteracted by the operation of some other cause. The conditions upon which their connection with their sequences depends do not obtain. The facts, as given by the senses, must be taken, and the explanation of the variety is a legitimate problem of the reason.

Suppose, for example, that a man, uninstructed in physical science, should visit the Temple of Mecca, and behold the coffin of Mahomet, if the story be true, unsustained by any visible support, suspended in the air, would it be his duty to believe that, because all experience testifies that heavy bodies, left to themselves, fall to the ground, therefore the phenomenon, as given by his senses, in the present case, must be a delusion?—or would it not rather be the natural inference, as he could not possibly doubt what he saw,—that the coffin was *not* left to itself—that, though inscrutable to him, there must be *some* cause which counteracted and held in check the operation of gravity. “In order,” says Mill, in one of the most valuable works which has been published in the present century,† “that any alleged fact should be contradictory to a law of causation, the allegation must be, not simply that the cause existed, without being followed by the effect, for that would be no uncommon occurrence, but that this happened in the absence of any adequate counteracting cause. Now, in the case of an alleged miracle, the assertion is the exact opposite of this. It is, that the effect was defeated, not in the absence, but in consequence of a counteracting cause, namely, a direct interposition of an act of the will of some being who has power over nature, and, in particular, of a being whose will having originally endowed all the causes with the powers by which they produce their effects, may well be supposed able to counteract them. A miracle, as was justly remarked by Brown, is no contradiction to the law of cause and effect; it is a new effect, supposed to be produced by the introduction of a new cause.” A man is, accordingly, in no case, permit-

* Trench, on Miracles.

† Mill's System of Logic.

ted to call into question the veracity of his senses ; he is to admit what he sees, and what he cannot but see, and, when the phenomena lie beyond the range of ordinary experience, it is the dictate of philosophy to seek for a cause which is adequate to produce the effect. This is what the laws of his nature require him to do.

It is obvious, from these considerations, that, if sensible miracles can exist, they can be *known* ; and, if they can be known by those under the cognizance of whose senses they immediately fall, they can be proved to others through the medium of human testimony. The celebrated argument of Mr. Hume, against this proposition, proceeds upon a false assumption as to the nature of the law by which testimony authenticates a fact. He forgets that the credibility of testimony is in itself—not in the object for which it vouches : it must be believed on its own account, and not that of the phenomena asserted. In all reasoning upon this subject, the principle of cause and effect lies at the basis of the process. A witness, strictly speaking, only puts us in possession of the convictions of his own mind, and the circumstances under which those convictions were produced. These convictions are an effect for which the constitution of our nature prompts us to seek an adequate cause ; and, where no other satisfactory solution can be given, but the reality of the facts, to which the witness himself ascribes his impressions, then we admit the existence of the facts. But, if any other satisfactory cause can be assigned, the testimony should not command our assent. There is room for hesitation and doubt. If a man, for example, afflicted with the jaundice, should testify that the walls of a room were yellow, we might be fully persuaded of the sincerity of his own belief ; but, as a cause, in the diseased condition of his organs, could be assigned, apart from the reality of the fact, we should not feel bound to receive his statement. Two questions, consequently, must always arise in estimating the value of testimony. The first respects the sincerity of the witnesses—do they or do they not express the real impressions that have been made upon their own minds ? This may be called the fundamental condition of testimony—without it, the statements of a witness cannot properly be called testimony at all. The second, respects the cause of these convictions—are there any known principles, which,

under the circumstances in which the witnesses were placed, can account for their belief, without an admission of the fact to which they themselves ascribe it? When we are satisfied upon these two points—that the witnesses are sincere, and that no causes apart from the reality of the facts, can be assigned in the case, then the testimony is entitled to be received without hesitation. The presumption is always in favor of the cause actually assigned, until the contrary can be established. If this be the law of testimony, it is evident that the intrinsic probability of phenomena does not directly affect their credibility. What is inherently probable, may be proved upon slighter testimony than what is antecedently unlikely—not that additional credibility is imparted to the testimony—but additional credibility is imparted to the phenomena—there being two separate and independent sources of proof. The testimony is still credible only upon its own grounds. In the case, accordingly, of sensible miracles, in which the witnesses give unimpeachable proofs of the sincerity of their own belief, it is incumbent upon the skeptic to show how this belief was produced, under the circumstances in which the witnesses were placed, before he is at liberty to set aside the facts. He must show “how the witnesses came to believe so and so,” if there were no foundation in reality. The testimony must be accounted for and explained, or the miracle must be admitted through the operation of the same law which authenticates testimony in every other case. It is an idle evasion to say that men sometimes lie: no doubt there are many lies, and many liars in the world. But we are not speaking of a case in which men fabricate a story, giving utterance to statements which they do not themselves believe. That is not properly a case of testimony. We are speaking of instances in which the witness *honestly* believes what he says; and, surely, there are criteria by which sincerity can be satisfactorily established. With respect to such instances, we affirm that there can be but two suppositions—either the witness was deceived, or the facts were real. The question of the credibility of the testimony turns upon the likelihood of delusion in the case; and, where it is one in which the delusion cannot be affirmed without affirming at the same time, the mendacity

of the senses, the miracle is proved, or no such thing as extrinsic proof exists on the face of the earth.

But it may be contended that although testimony has its own laws, and must be judged of by them, yet, in the case of miracles, there is a contest of opposite probabilities—the extrinsic, arising from testimony in their favor—and the intrinsic, arising from analogy, against them, and that our belief should be determined by the preponderating evidence, which must always be the intrinsic, in consequence of its concurrence with general experience. The fallacy here consists in supposing that these two probabilities are directed to the same point. The truth is, the internal probability amounts only to this, that the same antecedents, under the conditions indispensable to their operation, will produce the same effects. The external is, that in the given case, the necessary conditions were not fulfilled. There is, consequently, no collision, and the law of testimony is left in undisturbed operation. It is clear that Mr. Hume would never have thought of constructing his celebrated argument against the credibility of miracles, if he had not previously believed that miracles were phenomena which could never authenticate themselves—that they were, in their own nature, incapable of being known. This is the conclusion which he really aimed to establish, under the disguise of his deceitful ratiocinations—the conclusion which legitimately flows from his premises, and a consistent element of that general system of skepticism which he undertook to rear, by setting our faculties at war with each other and making the data of consciousness contradictory, either in themselves or their logical results. If he had believed miracles to be cognizable, he would, perhaps, have had no hesitation in admitting, that what a man would be authorized to receive upon the testimony of his own senses, he would be equally authorized to receive upon the testimony of the senses of other men. What is cognizable by others—all having the same essential constitution—is cognizable by us through them. We see with their eyes, and hear with their ears. The only case in which the intrinsic and extrinsic probabilities come into direct collision, is that in which the alleged fact involves a contradiction, and is,

therefore, impossible. In all other cases, testimony simply gives us a new effect.

The skepticism of Mr. Hume, and the disciples of the same school, it is almost needless to observe, is in fatal contradiction to the whole genius and spirit of the inductive philosophy. Observers, not masters—interpreters, not legislators, of nature—we are to employ our faculties, and implicitly receive whatever, in their sound and healthful condition, they report to be true. We are not to make phenomena, but to study those which God has submitted to our consciousness. If antecedent presumptions should be allowed to prevail, the extraordinary, as contradistinguished from the facts of every-day life, the new, the strange, the uncommon—the *mirabile* any more than the *miraculum*—never could be established. To make a limited and uniform experience the measure of existence is to deny that experience itself is progressive, and to reduce all ages and generations to a heartless stagnation of science. The spirit of modern philosophy revolts against this bondage. It has long since ceased to wonder—long since learned to recognize every thing as credible which is not impossible—it explores every region of nature, every department of existence—its excursions are for facts—it asks for nothing but a sufficient extrinsic probability; and, when this is furnished, it proceeds with its great work of digesting them into order, tracing out their correspondencies and resemblances, referring them to general laws, and giving them their place in the ever-widening circle of science. When they are stubborn and intractable, standing out in insulation and independence, and refusing to be marshalled into systems, they are still retained, as phenomena yet to be accounted for, and salutary mementoes of human ignorance. But no man of science, in the present day, would ever think of rejecting a fact because it was strange or unaccountable. The principle is universally recognized that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamed of in our philosophy. If Hume's laws were the law of philosophy, where would have been the sciences of chemistry, of galvanism, electricity, geology and magnetism? With what face could the palaeontologist come out with his startling disclosures of the memorials of extinct generations and

perished races of animals? What would be said of aerial iron and stones?—and where would have been that sublimest of all theories, the Copernican theory of the heavens? The philosopher is one who regards everything, or nothing, as a wonder.

The remarks of Butler are not only philosophically just, but worthy of Bacon himself, when he asserts that miracles must not be compared to common natural events, or to events which, though uncommon, are similar to what we daily experience, but to the extraordinary phenomena of nature. It is nothing worth to say that these extraordinary phenomena may be subsequently explained, in the way in which physical philosophers account for events. That was not known, when they were first authenticated to consciousness. They had to be believed, before they could be explained. Miracles, too, when we reach a higher pinnacle of knowledge, may appear to be as natural as the wonders of physicks. The conclusion, then, would seem to be established, that as the will of God is the sole measure of existence, so the power of God, or the possibility of the event, is the sole limit to the credibility of testimony.

The only question, therefore, which remains to be discussed—is whether miracles are possible. And as all who admit a God who is not himself the victim of fate, nor identical with the universe He has made, will readily acknowledge the physical possibility of supernatural events, the form in which the question deserves to be discussed, is, whether we have any reason to believe that God; in fact, never will disturb the settled progress of events. Is it inconsistent with any of the perfections of His character?

A miracle differs from an ordinary phenomenon, not in the power which is necessary to produce it, but in the conditions under which that power is exerted. “The grass growing, the seed springing, the sun rising” are as much the results of the will and omnipotence of God, as “the water made wine, the sick healed, the blind restored to vision,” or the dead raised to life. The distinction betwixt the miracle and ordinary events is not, that in the one case God is the agent, and, in the other, He is not, but that in the one case, His agency is conducted in conformity with general laws, and in the other it is not. In the course of nature, appearances take place according to a fixed order,

there is an established succession of antecedents and consequents, of causes and effects. Changes never occur in material substances but by virtue of properties in consequence of which, when the proper adjustments take place, they can act upon each other. But God gave the substances these properties, preserves them in being and concurs in all their operations. Without His will, which is only another name for His power, they could neither be, nor act. Indeed it may be doubted whether general laws, even when employed to express the active properties of matter are any thing more than compendious statements of facts which the Deity, under certain conditions, uniformly produces. It may be doubted whether the only efficient agent in the Universe be not the Almighty himself. But in the miracle, the power of God is exerted independently of general laws. "An extraordinary divine causality belongs to them. The unresting activity of God, which at other times hides and conceals itself behind the veil of what we term natural laws, does in the miracle unveil itself; it steps out from its concealment and the hand which works is laid bare." According to this distinction the question before us is whether the Almighty, after having once put forth an extraordinary exercise of power in the creation of the Universe and the arrangement and adjustment of all the substances which compose it, has forever restricted His subsequent operation to the analogy of the laws He has established. The only philosophical argument which I have ever seen alleged against the subsequent freedom of the Deity, proceeds upon an hypothesis, in relation to the nature of the universe, which has always appeared to me to have more poetry than truth. It represents it as an organic whole, whose unity is preserved by a regular series of separate developements concurring in a common result. This seems to be the notion, if he had any, which Strauss intended to convey, when he said—"since our idea of God requires an immediate, and our idea of the world, a mediate Divine operation; and since the idea of combination of the two species of action is inadmissible; nothing remains for us but to regard them both as so permanently and immoveably united, that the operation of God on the world continues for ever and every where twofold, both immediate and mediate; which comes just to this, that it is neither

of the two, or this distinction loses its value." The universe, in conformity with what I take to be the meaning of this passage, is not unfrequently represented as a living organism, the properties of matter being strictly analogous to vital forces, the developement of which is like the growth of an animal body. This view, I am sorry to say, disfigures that masterly work, the *Cosmos* of Humboldt. The design of his introductory remarks, is "not solely to draw attention to the importance and greatness of the physical history of the universe, for in the present day these are too well understood to be contested, but likewise to prove how, without detriment to the stability of special studies, we may be enabled to generalize our ideas by concentrating them in one common focus, and thus arrive at a point of view from which all the organisms and forces of nature may be seen as one living, active whole, animated by one sole impulse."

This scheme, so far as the question of miracles is concerned, differs nothing from the old mechanical theory of the universe. According to that hypothesis the world was a machine, constructed by the Deity and subjected to the operation of general laws which were to preserve and regulate its motions. According to this, it is an animal, endued with vital energies which secure its developement and growth. In that case, God stood aloof as a passive spectator to contemplate the operations and results of His workmanship, or if He interfered it was only to keep the machine agoing; in this He stands aloot in the same way with something more of admiration at His skill, or only interferes to keep the animal alive. The argument against miracles in either case is that the order and unity are broken.

When we consider the immensity of the universe, and the magnitude and extent of that government, physical and moral, which God has been conducting, from the beginning, over all His creatures, whether material or intelligent, the conclusion forces itself upon us, that the plan of the universe is a point upon which we have not the faculties to dogmatize. The idea of comprehending all things in their causes and relations has sprung from that philosophy which sneering at the induction of experience, as nothing more than empirical pretensions, has undertaken

to ascend to the fountain of universal being, and thence surveying existence in itself, and in its relation, to unveil to us the nature of the Deity, and explain, from first to last, the derivation of all created things. True science, on the other hand, aspiring only to a relative knowledge of existence, instead of futile and abortive attempts to construct a universe, or to fix the *το παν* as a positive element of consciousness, takes its stand, in conformity with the sublime maxim of Bacon, as the minister, not the master, the interpreter, not the legislator of nature. Professing its incompetence to pronounce beforehand what kinds of creatures the Almighty should have made, and what kinds of laws the Almighty should have established, and what kinds of agency He himself should continue to put forth, it is content to study the phenomena presented to it, in order to discover what God has wrought. Without presuming to determine what *must* be, it humbly and patiently inquires what *is*. The spirit of true philosophy is much more a confession of ignorance than a boast of knowledge. Newton exhibited it, when after all his splendid discoveries, he compared himself to a child who had gathered up a few pebbles upon the sea shore, while the great ocean of truth lay undiscovered before him. Laplace exhibited it, when he spoke of the immensity of nature, and human science as but a point; and Butler was a living example of it, in the uniform modesty of his confessions and the caution and meekness of his researches. Shall man, the creature of yesterday, whose mother is corruption and whose sister is the worm, who at best can only touch, in his widest excursions, the hem of Jehovah's garment, shall man undertake to counsel the Holy One as to the plan He shall pursue? Is it not intolerable arrogance in a creature, whose senses are restricted to a point, who is confessedly incompetent to declare what ends it may be the design of the Deity to accomplish in creation and providence, who cannot explain to us why the world has sprung into being at all with its rich variety of scenery, vegetation and life, who is unable to tell the meaning of this little scene in the midst of which he is placed, is it not intolerable arrogance in him, to talk of comprehending the height and depth, the length and breadth of that Eternal purpose, which began to be unfolded, when creation was evoked from emptiness and the

silence and solitude of vacancy were broken by the songs of angels bursting into light, and which shall go on unfolding, in larger and fuller proportions, through the boundless cycles of eternity? Our true position is in the dust. We are of yesterday and know nothing. This plan of God, it is high as heaven, what can we know—deep as hell, what can we do? Our ignorance upon this subject is a full and sufficient answer to the folly and presumption of those who confidently assert that its order would be broken and its unity disturbed by the direct interposition of Omnipotence? Who told these philosophers that the plan itself does not contemplate interventions of the kind? Who has assured them that He, who knew the end from the beginning, has not projected the scheme of His government upon a scale, which included the occasional exhibition of Himself in the direct exercise of power? Who has taught them that miracles are an invasion, instead of an integral portion, of the Divine administration? It is frivolous to answer objections which proceed upon the infinitely absurd supposition that we know the *whole* of the case.

But though the idea of a universe as a living, self-developing organism cannot be sustained, though the unity of nature is nothing but the harmony of Divine operations, and creation and providence only expressions of the Divine decrees, though the whole case is one which confessedly transcends our faculties, yet something we can know, and that something creates a positive presumption in favour of miracles. We know that God has erected a moral government over men, and that this sublunary state, whatever other ends it may be designed to accomplish, is a theatre for human education and improvement. We cannot resist the impression that the earth was made for man and not man for the earth. He is master here below. This earth is a school in which God is training him for a higher and nobler state. If the end, consequently, of the present constitution and course of nature can be helped forward by occasional interpositions of the Deity, in forms and circumstances which compel us to recognize His hand, the order of the world is preserved and not broken. When the pantheist "charges the miracle with resting on a false assumption of the position which man occupies in the universe, as flattering the notion that nature is to serve him, he not to

bow to nature, it is most true that it does rest on this assumption. But this is only a change would tell *against* it, supposing that true, which, so far from being truth, is, indeed, its first great falsehood of all, namely the substitution of a God of nature, in the place of a God of men." Admit the supremacy of God's moral government, and there is nothing which commends itself more strongly to the natural expectations of men than that He shall teach His creatures what was necessary to their happiness according to the exigencies of their case. Miraculous interventions have, according, been a part of the creed of humanity from the fall to the present hour.

But laying speculation aside, the researches of modern science are rapidly exploding the prejudices which pantheism, on the one hand, and a blind devotion to the supremacy of laws on the other, have created and upheld against all extraordinary interventions of God. The appearances of our globe are said to be utterly inexplicable upon any hypothesis which does not recognize the fact that the plan of creation was so framed from the beginning as to include, at successive periods, the direct agency of the Deity. The earth proclaims, from her hills and dales, her rocks, mountains and caverns, that she was not originally made and placed in subjection to laws which themselves have subsequently brought her to her present posture. She has not developed herself into her present form, nor peopled herself with her present inhabitants. That science which, at its early dawn, was hailed as the handmaid of infidelity and skepticism, and which may yet have a controversy with the records of our faith, not entirely adjusted, has turned the whole strength of its resources against the fundamental principle of rationalism. It has broken the charm which our limited experience had made so powerful against miracles, and has presented the physical government of God in a light which positively turns analogy in favor of the supernatural. The geologist begins with miracles—every epoch in his science repeats the number, and the whole earth to his mind is vocal with the name. He finds their history wherever he turns, and he would as soon think of doubting the testimony of sense as the inference which the phenomena bear upon their face. Future generations will wonder that in the nineteenth century men gravely dis-

puted whether God could interpose, in the direct exercise of His power, in the world He has made. The miracle, a century hence, will be made as credible as any common fact. Let the earth be explored—let its physical history be traced—and a mighty voice will come to us, from the tombs of its perished races, testifying, in a thousand instances, to the miraculous hand of God. Geology and the Bible must kiss and embrace each other, and this youngest daughter of science will be found, like the eastern magi, bringing her votive offerings to the cradle of the Prince of peace. The earth can never turn traitor to its God, and its stones have already begun to cry out against those who attempted to extract from them a lesson of infidelity or atheism.

The case of Christian miracles is strikingly analogous to those with which Geology presents us in the physical government of God. Christianity is a new creation—the production of a new order of things, from the chaos and ruin of the Fall. All beginnings must be extraordinary. A fact so stupendous as the incarnation of the Deity, and His personal appearance in a world which He came to renovate and redeem, could not be without some visible attestations. Behold, says he, I come to make all things new. “He came,” says the eloquent author of the history of the Reformation, “to create a new world, new heavens and a new earth. He came to achieve a spiritual creation, no less wonderful than the visible creation. Who, then, will be astonished that God displayed His power when He came to create, and that He acted directly and not according to certain laws which He had made, when He came to form something entirely new, and had not yet been subjected to any rule or law? I am not astonished that, at the first creation, God said, Let there be light, and there was light. I am not astonished that, at the sound of His mighty voice, the earth produced its fountains, the trees sprang forth and bore fruit, and the waters, the earth and the air produced living creatures in abundance. Neither do I wonder that when, in the second creation, that voice which created the heavens and the earth was again heard, the blind recovered their sight, the maimed walked, the deaf heard, the winds and the waves were calmed, the water was turned into wine, and five barley loaves and

two fishes, being multiplied, at the hands of the Being who formed the world, with all its productions and its treasures, were sufficient to nourish five thousand persons." The great miracle is God *manifest* in the flesh, and all the other prodigies recorded in the Gospels are just the species of phenomena we should have expected when He was present on the mysterious errand of His grace. They are consistent parts of the scheme, and are brought into full and perfect analogy with the undoubted miracles which the earth reveals to the investigations of science.

Whatever presumptions may operate against mere prodigies, without aim or end, cannot be brought to bear against miracles, intended to confirm religion, and much less a religion whose fundamental doctrine would exact them as a matter of course. Under no circumstances impossible—under these they are actually credible.

We have now proved that miracles can exist—that the only natural limit to the credibility of testimony does not obtain in their case, and that consequently they should be admitted as readily as any other facts, when they are duly authenticated by evidence. That the testimony is sufficient in the case of Christian miracles, no one would ever have dreamed of doubting, who acknowledges the possibility of the supernatural at all. Rationalism has never fairly encountered the historical facts in the case. It has sweepingly asserted that the phenomena could not have been as they are represented to have been, and then proceeds to explain the narrative according to this arbitrary hypothesis. But if the facts *could*, indeed, have been precisely what the sacred writers have affirmed, there is no presumption which sets aside their testimony. The miracles were wrought.

What, then? The inspiration of the Scriptures, in the sense which makes them a real testimony of God, is unanswerably established. I am far from asserting that miracles are so connected, in the nature of things, with a Divine commission, that, wherever they are proved to exist, inspiration must be admitted as a necessary inference. There is no logical connection that the human mind is capable of tracing between the supernatural communication of power and the supernatural communication of knowledge. It is certainly conceivable that one might be able to heal the

sick and raise the dead, who could neither predict future contingencies nor speak with the authority of God. But the proposition which I maintain is this: that wherever a man professes to be charged with a Divine message, and appeals to miracles as the proof of his commission, the miracles, in that case, are conclusive of the point. They are the great seals of Heaven which authenticate his claim, and establish his right to be believed. The reason is obvious. The antecedent presumption against the pretension to work miracles is precisely the same as the antecedent presumption against his pretensions to inspiration. When he actually performs the miracle, he removes that presumption against his veracity—his testimony stands clear of all suspicion—there is rather additional presumption in its favour. The miracle is a specimen of that intimacy of connection with the Deity, which inspiration supposes, and on account of which it is inherently improbable. In addition to this, as the power of all creatures over nature is nothing but a skilful obedience to her laws, none can work, apart from those laws, but the Almighty himself. It is a great mistake to suppose that devils, angels, or men, without a special interposition of the Deity, can produce effects independently of the properties of matter, or the laws which regulate the universe. They may reach the mirabile, but never the miraculum. They may, through superior knowledge, effect combinations and invent machinery, which, to the ignorant and uneducated, may produce effects that shall appear to transcend the capabilities of a creature, but they never can rise above nor dispense with the laws they have mastered. God, then, alone can perform a real miracle. When, then, a man professes to have a commission from Him, and appeals, in proof, to a phenomenon which none but God could achieve, it is contrary to all our notions of the Divine character, that God should aid him in a lie. He affirms that God is with him, and God responds to the declaration by manifesting His presence. Can we suspect that He would thus countenance deceit?

If miracles, therefore, pledge the Divine veracity to the truth of a man's own statements when he appeals to them, the inspiration of the Scriptures may be easily confirmed. Apostles and prophets professed to speak according to the motions of the Holy Ghost. The words which they uttered

and the records which they wrote, they ascribed to Him who alone can search the deep things of God, and impart something of the Divine omniscience to the feeble capacities of man. God confirmed their testimony by signs and wonders. He set His own seal to the truth of their declarations, and the Bible is, accordingly, what they have represented it to be, or they have palmed a lie upon the world, and God was a party to the fraud. We have, then, in the Scriptures, a *Divine Testimony*—the word of God, which liveth and abideth forever.

I have been earnest in insisting on the credibility of miracles, from a painful and growing apprehension that some of the worst forms of rationalism are likely to get a footing among us. The scheme of interpretation which was begun by Eichhorn and completed by Paulus, which, while it retains the historical facts of the New Testament, attempts to reduce the miracles to natural phenomena, has died out in the land of its birth. The natural and supernatural are so inseparably blended in the sacred narratives that one cannot be abandoned without the surrender of the other. Neither is it likely that the system which succeeded it, and which has drawn able defenders to its standard, and in which the historical books of the New Testament are treated as myths and legendary stories, "the halo of glory with which the infant church gradually, and without any purpose of deceit, clothed its founder and its head," it is not at all likely that this system will ever prevail among us. When we deny the authenticity of the Scriptures, we shall turn scoffers at once. But there is a school agreeing with the naturalist and mythical interpreters in rejecting every thing supernatural, and particularly the personal union of two natures in Christ—which yet undertakes to find a foundation in fact for a real redemption and for a real Christ. And as it rejects the authority of the Scriptures, the question arises, how shall we know who Christ is, and what he has done? The answer is characteristic: We are not, with the Protestant, to appeal to the authority of Scripture, nor with the Catholic to the authority of the Church. We are to plunge into the depths of Christian consciousness, to study the effects which have been wrought in believers by their connection and sympathy with the Christian community, and from these effects ascend to the

causes which produced them in the living power of an original example. The feelings of believers are the sole standard of religious truth—this is the Bible, the law and the testimony of Eclectic Rationalists. In their own souls is the only history of Christ recorded which is worthy of credit. We ask in vain how feeling becomes a voucher for fact? Why an ideal example may not have the same effect as a real one?—and how it happens, if the supernatural must be rejected, that the beginning is more perfect than the end? It is for the sake of such wretched speculations that we are modestly asked to close our Bibles, and to listen to the dreams of transcendentalists and visionaries. And why these schemes? Why has the testimony of antiquity to the historical authenticity of the Sacred Scriptures been set aside? Why are they represented as a collection of legendary stories, invented as the drapery of religious enthusiasm? Why has a Divine testimony been denied, and a religion of authority and faith sneered at and scouted? Only because these High Priests of nature have determined, in their wisdom, that a miracle is impossible. To this crotchet of a conceited and pantheistic philosophy we are to sacrifice a system which is as glorious to God as it is precious to man. We are to give up the mystery that God was manifest in the flesh—we are to trample on the blood of Jesus as an unmeaning thing—renounce as a dream his intercession for us at God's right hand, and consign to the folly and superstition of Pharisees and Galileans the sublime hopes connected with the resurrection of the dead! My brethren!—shall we do it? Never, while there is a sin to be pardoned, a grave to be feared, a hell to be dreaded, a God to be met—never. The blood of Jesus is too unspeakably precious, the hopes of the Gospel too unspeakably glorious, to be abandoned and despised for the mystical rhapsodies of the darkest philosophy that ever puzzled the earth. Jesus and the resurrection I know; but to these speculatists and sophists I may say—who are ye?

But it is time to bring these remarks to a close, and I shall do it in a brief application to yourselves. You will perceive, if my reasoning has been conclusive, that the ground on which the doctrines and statements of the Scriptures are to be received is extrinsick, and not intrin-

sick probability. It is the witness we credit, and not the inherent credibility of the truth. The argument of the Bible is a brief one—the mouth of the Lord hath spoken; and if in the case of human testimony, the only natural limit to belief is the limit of possibility, *a fortiori*, in the case of a Divine testimony, we are implicitly to receive whatever does not involve a contradiction. It is upon this principle that we find the word of God uniformly commending that faith as the strongest and most excellent, which, in the midst of objections that analogy could not answer, boldly entrenched itself in the power of God.—Abraham is a conspicuous example. The command to sacrifice his son, while the continued existence of that son was evidently indispensable to the fulfilment of the promise, that Isaac should have a seed, numberless as the stars of Heaven, or the sands upon the seashore, was well fitted to stagger his reason. The difficulty was one which no principles of analogy could surmount; and yet the Patriarch triumphantly fell back upon the omnipotence of God—being fully persuaded that what the Almighty had promised, He was able also to perform. Paul, too, when pressed with the difficulties which, upon the principles of nature, beset the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead, cut the knot by a similar appeal to the almightiness of God: “Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you that God should raise the dead?” My young friends, follow these examples. Believe God at all hazards—this is the highest reason—and you may rest assured that the Divine power will always be the guarantee of the Divine veracity. Hath He said, and shall He not perform it? Hath He spoken, and shall He not make it good? Stagger not through unbelief, until you encounter an impossibility.

In the next place, remember, I beseech you, that faith in miracles, or even in the Divine authority of Christianity, is not faith in Christ. It is to be feared that too many, who have zealously defended the miracles of nature, have yet been a stranger to the nobler miracle of grace. Jesus is presented to us distinctively as a Saviour, and it will avail nothing to admit that His claims are worthy of credit, while we refuse to entrust to Him the salvation of the soul. The faith which communicates redemption is

not in a record about Christ, but in Christ Himself. It is an eye which sees His glory— a ear which hears His voice—a heart which feels His preciousness—a life which obeys His commands. We must be in Christ—we must die with Him and rise with Him, if we ever hope to reign with Him. This faith is no offspring of nature,—it is the production of God's Holy Spirit—it is Heaven's own gift; and if we would indeed be saved, we should give no rest to our eyes, nor slumber to our eyelids, until we have found Him, of whom the Scriptures are only a testimony. To this faith, my friends, during your whole course in College, I have assiduously endeavoured to bring you—I have argued, entreated, expostulated and warned; and my heart trembles within me, as the terrible suggestion occurs to me, that some of you, too many of you, are leaving these walls without it, and may yet die in your sins. Let my voice, I beseech you, still ring in your ears, when you leave these scenes. As you encounter the allurements and temptations of the world, think of that friend who has often—amid sickness, exhaustion and despondency, pointed you to the Lamb—that Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world. Think of that friend, not personally, though he would love to be remembered in your affections, but of his counsels, his labours, and prayers; and God may yet permit me, after many days, to find the bread which I have cast upon the waters.

Finally, my brethren, let me beseech you to make the Bible your habitual study. I feel that there is a peculiar propriety in my addressing you in this strain, as you did me the honour to make a striking manifestation of your regard by the present of this splendid copy of the Scriptures. This book is, in some sort, a sign betwixt you and me. You are about to enter into life amidst troublous scenes. Dark clouds are gathering in the atmosphere, and our country is calling on us to stand by her side in the dangers which beset her. Depend upon it that the loftiest patriotism is that which is inspired by the precepts of the Bible. My firm conviction is that the commotions which are agitating the nations and people of the present day—the angry strifes of conflicting parties and sects in the political world—will never be hushed until the authority of the Bible is permitted to supersede the vain speculations

of man. We can never hope to roll back the tide of fanaticism, which is setting not merely against our institutions, but against all that stimulates industry and secures property, until we oppose the rock of Christianity against the heaving billows. The spirit of radicalism which is abroad in the earth is the legitimate fruit of pantheism. It sprang from the schools of philosophy, and the havock and desolation which it every where threatens to scatter among existing institutions, can be successfully resisted, only by the principles of that Book, which is "the pillar of society, the safeguard of nations, the parent of social order, which alone has power to curb the fury of the passions, and secure to every one his rights; to the laborious, the reward of their industry, to the rich, the enjoyment of their wealth, to nobles the preservation of their honours and to princes the stability of their thrones." Go then, my friends, with the Bible in your hands and the doctrines of the Bible in your hearts, and your country may well bid you welcome to the scenes in which you must mingle—go forth as Christian patriots and may the God of nations go with you.—Farewell.

ARTICLE III.

THE FREE GRACE OF GOD AND THE FREE WILL OF MAN.

The following is a translation from the Latin, of a part of a Treatise with the above title, written in England in the latter part of the sixteenth century, by William Perkins, one of the old Puritan Divines.*

* Wm. Perkins was born in 1558, educated at Cambridge, where he became fellow of his College, and also a parish priest. He died in 1602, aged 44. In early life he was profane, prodigal and given to intemperance; but when reformed, he became eminent for piety and an exemplary life.

He was a Puritan, and as such repeatedly persecuted: was strictly Calvinistic, a very popular and faithful preacher, and a voluminous writer. His works, which were printed at Geneva, 1603, in three vol. fol. have been much read and admired, on the continent.

See Brook's *Lives of the Puritans*, vol. II. p. 129, &c.

Murdock's *Ed. Mosheim's Ch. Hist.* vol. III. p. 220, note 79.

It was translated from the English into Latin by Wolfgang Mayer, pastor of the church of Basle, and printed at Oppenheim in 1610. Whether it is still to be met with in its original dress we are not informed.†

It is in the form of a discourse upon Matt. xxiii. 37, 38. But in the parts we have extracted, we have for the most part omitted all reference to the text, and whatever was not immediately connected with the progress of the discussion; it forms a neat, terse and concise treatise, (*solida et succincta tractatio.*)

It is a fine specimen of the theological and metaphysical writings of the old puritan divines; and touches admirably on some points with which we all need to be familiar; they are coming round for discussion in every generation. The great controversy is, whether God's will, or man's, is "the maker of immortal fates." Whether the maker of the heavens and the earth should be permitted to rule his own universe of mind, as well as of matter; or whether man shall mount the throne, and his will give law to Deity.

There is all the difference between the Arminian and the Calvinistic schemes on this subject, that there is between the old theory of the universe, which put the earth in the centre, and made the sun and moon and planets move around it; and the modern one, that makes the sun the great swivel of the whole celestial machinery. The former makes God dependent on his own creatures, the latter makes all creatures subject to the will of their Creator, who doeth his pleasure among the armies of heaven, and also among the inhabitants of the earth. Like an old weapon that has done effective service once, and then has lain in concealment two hundred years, and afterward is burnished and brought out to use, so the reasoning of Wm. Perkins has not lost its force to combat the errors of this day.

As far as respects the will in general, it is nothing else than the faculty which the mind has of choosing, or not choosing, of selecting, rejecting, or suspending its action, depending on reason. By faculty, I mean an ability or created power; and which is found in both men and angels: but is in God only by analogy and resemblance.

The reason is, that the will of God is not properly distinguished from his essence or Deity, but is in reality his essence, or Deity. This is not the case in a rational crea-

† It is, but very rarely to be met with; and on this account, as well as for the intrinsic value of the article, and the permanent interest of the subject discussed, we publish the translation sent us.—Eds. S. P. R.

ture, for in it, essence and will are two distinct things. For the essence of a rational creature is one thing, and its will is another.

In the next place, I say, that it is the faculty of choosing or not choosing, of selecting or refusing, or suspending action; because to choose, not to choose, to select, to reject, or to suspend, that is neither to choose nor refuse, are the proper acts of the will, by which it is known and distinguished.

In the last place, I remark, that that faculty depends on reason, for it is only found in beings that possess reason, as God, angels and men. And because, though it may be opposed to right reason, it cannot be altogether without that faculty. When a man knows and approves what is good, yet does what is opposed to it, this happens for the reason that it seems best to him to make that opposite thing a good. And in every act of the will there are two things involved; reason, which inclines, and choice which agrees or disagrees. Thus we see what the will is in general.

And in order that this may appear still more clearly, the inseparable property of the will must be taken into the account, without which the will cannot subsist or be a will. For it has its own property, which is liberty. And this is freedom from all constraint or compulsion, but not from all necessity. I say compulsion, for compulsion or constraint, and will, are directly opposed to each other: and where compulsion comes, there the will ceases; and the will constrained is unwillingness. Nevertheless will and necessity do not reciprocally destroy each other. God, by an absolute necessity, wills many things, as the eternal generation of the Son, the procession of the Holy Spirit, the administration of justice, and other things of that kind; and he wills them with most perfect freedom. Good angels choose their own happiness, the execution of justice, and indeed of necessity; for they cannot choose to sin, or to live in misery: yet they choose all these things most freely.

Yea, the necessity of not sinning is the glory, ornament or beauty of the will; for he who so does good, that he cannot sin, practises virtue more freely than he who can either perform good or evil. When the condition of the creature is such, that of his own accord, and voluntarily,

he serves God, and is unable not to serve him, then, at length, our liberty is perfect and complete.

Again, by the fall of the first man liberty of will is joined with the necessity of sinning. For it is enslaved to sin.

* * * * We must not suppose therefore that such a liberty belongs to the will as is free from all necessity.

In order that this may appear more clearly, we will explain the [different] kinds of necessity. One kind of necessity is simple or absolute, when a thing cannot be otherwise: so we say that God is, that He is just, &c.

This necessity does not consist with the will of the creature, but well agrees with the Divine. For in God an absolute necessity of holiness and goodness is joined with absolute freedom of will.

Another kind of necessity is that of constraint or compulsion, which takes away the liberty and consent of the will. Finally, there is another of infallibility, or consequence, when from a supposed antecedent something necessarily follows; as for instance from the decree and determinate counsel of God. This, and liberty of will can agree. Since in the performance of a voluntary action, it is sufficient if it proceed from the judgment, and have its origin in the will, though in other respects it be regarded as depending upon the Divine will and unchangeable necessity.

The certainty of the Divine decree does not at all destroy the consent of the human will, but rather directs, gently inclines, or draws it forth. But what is entirely repugnant to the liberty of the will is constraint; for it removes consent altogether.

Liberty of will consists in a double faculty.

The first is, that when of itself it chooses anything, it can also on the other hand refuse the same; in the schools this is called the liberty of contradiction.

The second is, that when it chooses anything, it can choose another, or the contrary; for instance, when God chose to create the world, he could refuse it; and when he chose the creation of one, he could have chosen to create many more. And this is called the liberty of contrariety.

The will in this liberty differs in the first place from the inclinations and tendencies of natural agents, which always develope themselves in the same way. Place fuel on the

fire, it immediately burns, nor can it avoid burning. Cast a stone into the air, immediately it falls, and cannot fail to fall.

In the second place, the will in this liberty is separated from the appetites of brute animals. For sense is easily led; and in choosing or refusing, always observes the same order.

The sheep avoids the wolf; and all sheep, always and every where do the same; nor can they do otherwise. *

* * When the beast in the field makes choice of one herb and rejects another, there is a species of liberty, but not true freedom, for what it once chooses or rejects, it always does in the same way. Thus far of the nature of the will in general; and now I prepare myself for the work before me.

And in the first place, I must speak of the will of Christ. He said, Matt. xxiii. 27, "I would;" as there are two natures in Christ, so there are two wills; one of his Deity, the other of his humanity. Some understand these words as pertaining to the will of his humanity. For they think that he spoke here as the minister of circumcision, and consequently as a man. This indeed I regard as true, but it is not satisfactory. For what he chose, to wit, the collecting and gathering together of the Jews, was begun and finished by the ministry of the prophets, long before his incarnation. Wherefore, in my judgment, the Divine, or the will of the Divinity, which is also that of the Father, and of the Holy Spirit, is chiefly to be understood.

This will is one and the same as God himself; yet can be distinguished in this manner; it is either His will of good pleasure, or His revealed will. (*Beneplaciti vel signi.*)

The truth of this distinction can be observed in princes and kings, who wear the image of God. A king determines with himself as he pleases, what shall be done in the kingdom, and what not. This is his will. Again, as occasion requires, he reveals to his subjects some part of his secret purpose; this also is his will. So the good pleasure of God, or what He pleases in himself, and His declaring, or revealing of it to the creature, in whole or in part, is His will.

Mention is made of the first will, in Eph. i. v., where Paul says to the Ephesians, that they were predestinated

according to the good pleasure of His will. And in order that this may be rightly understood by us, I offer our points.

1. First, what is it? I reply that this will is the purpose or decree of God, according to His counsel. For in it these two agree, His counsel, and His decree. His counsel views most perfectly all things and their causes. His decree decides what ought to be done, and what ought not to be done; and bounds it according to His eternal counsel. Yet so that His counsel is by no means the rule to His will. For there is nothing greater than His will, and even His counsel is according to His will, which is goodness itself. And so His counsel is called by Paul, the counsel of His will. Eph. i, xi. He says, "God works all things after the counsel of His own will," because His counsel follows His will. The matter is not so with man: for in him counsel directs and governs the will; but in God counsel follows the will, and His counsel is according to His will.

2. The second thing which is here to be observed in the Divine will, is the absolute power by which He is master of all that He chooses, willing of Himself whatever He wills, when He will, and how He will, without any dependence on another. This is signified by that parable, Matt. xx. 15, "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?"

And it is said by Paul, Rom. ix. 15, quoting Moses, "I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy:" and teaching us that we are subject to the good pleasure of God, as clay to the will of the potter. This admonishes us that, when we think or speak of the works or judgments of God, we should think and speak soberly and modestly, with admiration and reverence; not daring to inquire into the reason of them; or thinking too hardly of them; or bearing them too grievously, if they do not at all square with our reason; that it is sufficient for us to know that God has full and supreme power in His will; that He decides according to His good pleasure, and that His will is good.

3. The third thing which we must consider in this will of God is, that it is the origin and first cause of all things, without exception, and of their motions and actions. It is their origin in two ways: 1. By reason of the existence of

things; 2. In respect to their goodness. That all things in kind owe their existence to the Divine will, as the prime efficient cause, I will show, by the following reasons.

The power of God is such, that nothing which He does not choose, or which is altogether opposed to His will, can be done. Whatever, therefore, comes to pass, comes to pass for the reason that entirely or in part He wills it. The head of a family, or a wise general, who has all things under him, permits nothing to be done without his permission, and in the best defended fortifications will have some place left for himself; nor does any thing prevent what he desires but his own weakness, which is not found in the majesty of God.

By His unchangeable prescience God foresees all things about to be: and so by his immutable will He chooses their existence; for the prescience of God depends upon His will. Not because He foresees future things do they happen; but because they are about to happen according to His will, for that reason He foresees them.

There is indeed in God a knowledge of things possible to be, although they never come into being; and this precedes His decree: yet the certain knowledge of future things follows the will and determination of God.

To proceed farther: What God altogether chooses to be, that He causes to be. For His will is operative, nor separate from His power, but distinct from it: and His willing any thing is doing it. Therefore it pleases the Holy Spirit to express the Divine will by word, or operative command. *In the beginning God said let this or that be, and it was:* this word of command was His will. Again, *man lives by every word of God:* that is, by all that God appoints for our sustenance. Things depend for their being either on themselves, or upon some other one, or upon the will of God; if they depend for their being on themselves, they are Gods; if upon some other besides, and without God, that also must, of necessity, be God. It remains, therefore, that all things and actions in the whole universe, where actions come into account, obtain their being by dependence on God as the supreme cause, or cause of causes. * * * *

2. Besides, the Divine will is the origin of the goodness of things. For a thing is not first good, and then God

chooses it; but God first chooses it, and it becomes good: this is so plainly true I shall not delay upon it.

Here, perhaps, you will ask, whence evil in the creature, namely, sin, has its source or origin? I reply that it came to pass by the will of the creature falling into apostacy, not by the will of God: yet that it did not come to pass without the will of God. For although properly He does not will sin, because He hates it, yet He wills its being in the world. For in respect to the Divine purpose it is a good thing that there should be evil. But the being or existence of sin, God wills not positively—that is, not because He chooses to cause or produce it, or to give it being; but negatively by abandonment, for He chooses to desert the creature, and not to hinder the existence of evil when He is able: and so evil, not prevented, happens indeed by permission.

And because God foresaw that in His eternal counsel, and yet would not prevent it when He could; in fact, He willed its existence in the world.

4. The fourth thing to be observed concerning God's will of good pleasure is, that as that will is concealed or hidden from us, it is not the rule of our faith or practice. Deut. xxix. 29, Moses says, "hidden things belong unto God, but the things that are revealed belong to us and our children."

Hence it follows, that we, in our choices, can differ from that will of God before it is made known to us, without sin, if due submission is added. Paul wished, on account of his apostolical commission, to preach the Gospel in Asia and Bythinia, but God was unwilling: for the Spirit is said to have withstood him. Yet in this Paul did not sin.

One good can differ from another: and what creatures sometimes choose without sin, God, by his most just will of good pleasure, chooses otherwise; 1 Sam. xvi. 1. Samuel prayed for Saul, otherwise than the secret good pleasure of God was; but when the Divine decree was revealed to him, he ceased to pray.

Wherefore many are to be reprov'd who reason thus: If it is the will of God that I shall be saved, however I may live hereafter, that will be done: I will live, therefore, as I please. They make the secret will of God the rule of their lives, which is not proper to be done; for the revealed will of God is the law, and the only rule of faith and practice.

Thus far of the will of good pleasure. * * * * *

The will of God, which is said to be revealed, (*signi*) is when He makes known some part or portion of His will of good pleasure, as far as is for the good of the creature, and the declaration of His justice or mercy. This revealed will is not properly the will of God, as that of the good pleasure is, for it is the effect of the latter; yet notwithstanding it can be truly so called. For as the effect of anger without passion is called anger in God, so the sign and signification of His will can be called will.

This will is explained at one time more clearly, at another more obscurely.

1. It is set forth more clearly in three ways: first, by His word; second, by His permission; third, by His operation.

1. His word is His will. For so St. Paul says, Romans xii. 2, "Prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of God."

And it is not His decree or will of good pleasure, but His revealed will, which He makes to declare and explain what is pleasing and acceptable to God; what is our duty; what He requires of us, if we have an ardent desire to gain eternal life. For this reason, both the law and the Gospel, and all the commands, prohibitions, and promises, and their threatenings, are God's revealed will. For by the commands is signified what we must do; by the prohibitions, what we must leave undone; by the promises, what good we must do; by the threatenings, what punishment is due to sin.

Moreover, through the word, its office and dispensation, is His revealed will; for, by that, God declares His good pleasure concerning the salvation of men.

2. The Divine permission is also His revealed will, for it shows that He is unwilling to hinder the existence of the thing permitted, and, consequently, what is permitted will happen.

3. Each operation, or work of God, signifies what He wills to be done, and what must come to pass; for, when anything is done, we know what it is, and what the good pleasure of God was, since nothing can happen without His will.

II. When the revealed will is made known more obscurely, this takes place, because some things which per-

tain to that will are concealed. And, on account of this concealment it is, that there should seem to be in appearance an opposition between His revealed will and His will of good pleasure, when in reality there is none. But the end for which God so obscurely signifies and sets forth his good pleasure, is not to injure or deceive, but to promote the good of the creature.

Threefold examples of this kind occur in the sacred Scriptures. The first of all is, when God proposes some command to men, but conceals the end of it from them; for there are three ends of the Divine precepts.

1. Obedience when God wills what He has commanded to be done, precisely and exactly according to the command.

2. Proof, or trial, when He commands not what He wills absolutely to be done, but only intends to put to the proof the faith of the creature.

3. Conviction, when, by commanding, he proposes to convince his creature of disobedience. So, sometimes, parents teach their children what must be done; sometimes they command what they do not intend to be done, but only that so they think or intend to put to the proof the affection or the duty of their children; and, sometimes, one directs another only for the purpose of conviction, as, when the creditor says to his debtor, who has become bankrupt, "pay the debt," which yet he never expects, and which, perhaps, he intends to forgive. Therefore the Divine commands are of three kinds: precepts of obedience, as are those of the moral law; precepts of trial, or probation; and, finally, precepts of conviction. When, then, in any command, the revealed will is intended, but the object of the command is hidden or concealed, the good pleasure of God is signified more obscurely.

Gen. xxii. 2, 10, God commanded Abraham, "Offer thine only son, Isaac," only for the purpose to prove him. And this end was concealed till Abraham prepared himself for the work; for then an Angel of the Lord restrained him, saying "Now I know that thou fearest God." And that command, "offer Isaac," appeared directly opposed to the will and good pleasure, or the decree of God; for, as was plain from the event, Isaac was not to

be slain: therefore, it had been decreed by God that Isaac should not be slain.

You will say, then, how did it come to pass that God should order that which is plainly repugnant to his decree? I reply that there is an appearance of discrepancy, in order that the object of the command might be concealed, but yet, in reality, there is no opposition. As it was the decree of God that Isaac should not be sacrificed, so it was also that Abraham, in offering Isaac, should be tried; and, with this very decree, the command admirably agrees—for the precept was not so much for absolute obedience as for proof, and so it was a means well adapted to carry out the Divine decree.

Ex. viii. 1. God commanded Pharaoh, by Moses, to let the people go; yet the secret purpose and good pleasure of God was, that he should not let them go. There is some discrepancy here in appearance, but none in reality. Since it was also the decree of God that Pharaoh should be convicted of rebellion and hardness of heart. For this purpose, he issued this command; for, properly, and according to the intention of God, it was a precept of conviction. Although, so far as he was concerned, it was the duty of Pharaoh to receive that command, as one to which obedience was to be rendered.

This doctrine is a just defence for the public preaching of the word. Some think that men are deceived by it, because in it all, without exception, are directed to repent and believe, when yet no grace is given to that end. But they trifle. For the command to repent and believe, though, as to the object that the minister proposes to himself, has this end in view, to wit, the salvation of all, yet, in the intention and purpose of God, it has various. For, to those who are ordained to eternal life, it is a precept of obedience; because God will strengthen them to the performance of it: to others, it is a command and trial, or conviction—that the sin of unbelievers may be laid open to them, and all excuse removed.

So, then, when faith is commanded, but the gift of faith not conferred, God by no means sports with men, but convinces and reproves them of their unbelief, and that justly.

A second example of his revealed will, more obscurely

made known, is when God offers his promises, yet not at all explains the exception, or condition of them, Gen i. 28. He promised Adam and Eve the government of all the beasts of the field, "Have dominion over the fish of the seas, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth." And of Jerusalem, God said, (Ps. cxxxii. 13, 14.) "This is my rest forever." These promises have no place at this day; yet there is no disagreement to the will of God, because these promises are to be understood with exception, "unless ye revolt from me and provoke me to anger with your sins."

The third example is, when God declares his threatenings, but suppresses their exceptions and conditions. Judges x. 13, Jehovah says, "I will not deliver you any more;" yet it was his good pleasure to deliver them again and again. Ex. xxxii. 10, God threatened that he would consume the Israelites: He said to them, "Let me alone, that my wrath may wax hot against them, and that I may consume them;" yet, moved by the prayers of Moses, he spared them. In the same manner he threatened the Ninevites that he would destroy them within forty days, (Jon. iii. 4,) "yet forty days and Ninneveh shall be overthrown;" yet he spared it, so that it was not overthrown.

We are not here to dream either of any change, or of any falsity in God, since all threats denounced come to be understood with this limitation, "unless ye repent and turn to me." But he withholds this exception in order to strike greater fear and terror into the consciences of men, and so prepare them for true repentance. Isa. xxxviii. 1, The Lord, by the prophet, said to Hezekiah, "Set thy house in order, for thou shalt die and not live;" yet he lived afterwards fifteen years. Here God suppresses his good pleasure, in prolonging and extending the days of Hezekiah, and makes known what was about to come to pass, so far as nature and his own support were concerned.

In all these examples, far be it from us to suspect any fraud or deception in God. For he does not, after the manner of hypocrites, say one thing and mean another; but conceals a part of his will and expresses a part: nor does he do this after the manner of impostors, to the injury and detriment of any, but for the good of men. * * *

In Matt. xxiii. 37, 38, the words "I would have gather-

ed," &c., are not at all to be understood of the divine decree, but of his revealed will, and especially of the ministry of the word; for, when God sent his word to Jerusalem by his prophets, he signified by it his good pleasure, and that it was his will that they should be collected and converted.

And he is said to will the conversion of the Jews by his word in two ways:

1. Because he approves it as good in itself, and as agreeable to his goodness and mercy.

2. Because he commands and requires of them their duty, and whatever is necessary to their salvation.

Perhaps some one will say it is too hard for God to command the Jews to do what they are altogether unable to do, and then complain that they are not gathered. And that a master might as well command his servant to carry a mountain on his shoulders, and complain that it was not done.

I reply, if a master could give his servant power and strength to carry a mountain, and so had in reality given, and if, by his own fault, the servant had lost or mispent that strength, the master could, notwithstanding, command him, and complain if his order was not executed. And so the matter is with God; for he gave to all men, in our first parents, grace to perform any of his commands.

We have incurred the loss of this grace in them; nor, of ourselves, can we even ask it of God, who, in his part, is not bound to restore it again to us. By the best right, therefore, he requires of us conversion to him, although we are utterly incapable of it.

If we compare this place with Isa. vi. x., they seem to be inconsistent with one another. For here Christ says, "I would have gathered you;" but there, "harden them lest they be collected and converted;" God seems therefore to will, and not to will one and the same thing. I reply that there is one entire will in God, yet He does not will all things alike, but in different respects He wills, and does not will one and the same thing. He willed the conversion of Jerusalem; as far as he approved of it, as good in itself, so far He commanded it, and exhorted men to it; and gave them all the external means of conversion. But He did not will it in so far as he did not decree efficacious-

ly to cause it. For God approves and can require many things which nevertheless, for good reasons, best known to Himself, He does not will. He approved of the confirmation of the fallen angels as good in itself, yet He did not will to confirm them. A judge moved by pity would save the life of a criminal, but yet also at the same time he chooses the execution of justice by his death. In the same way sometimes, God chooses by His revealed will, what He does not choose by the will of his good pleasure.

From what we have said we learn,

I. That where God raises up the ministry of His word, He signifies by that, His good pleasure, that men should be brought to salvation. The prophet Isaiah, xlix. 22, says that the preaching of the Gospel is a standard lifted up, so that all nations may assemble to it. * * *

II. We may notice that the rebellion of the Jews was against the revealed will of Christ, when He said, "I would, ye would not." And hence it follows, that this revealed, and not that secret will, is the rule of our obedience; and therefore, whenever God makes known to us His will and pleasure, it is our duty to submit, and yield ourselves in obedience to Him.

But as we have said, He signifies His will in three ways; by commands and prohibitions, by His permission, and finally by His operation. When He commands, therefore, we must conduct accordingly; when He prohibits, obedience must be rendered; when He permits any evil it must be borne with equanimity: finally when He causes, or produces any thing, He makes known His good pleasure and must be obeyed.

We are commanded to say, "thy will be done;" and this is not only that will which is revealed in His word, but also that which is disclosed by some event. For when anything happens, it so comes to pass, because it was the will of God.

And this doctrine of the revealed will, must of necessity be the foundation and support of our patience and consolation: for when anything happens, the will of God is exercised about it, and He has signified His good pleasure. For instance, when some man is killed, the Divine will is exercised and fulfilled concerning his life, and He has signified his good pleasure concerning his death. In all cir-

cumstances, our minds are to be strengthened and supported by this consideration.

III. Hence, it is plain, what disposition ought to be in all ministers and teachers of the word. They ought to lay aside all private considerations of gain, advantage, or praise, and to apply themselves and their ministry to this end, to bring the people to God. For whatever is the intention of the master, in any business, the same ought to be that of the servant. But these words define and explain the mind of the Master, "How often would I have gathered you."

ARTICLE IV.

God in Christ. Three Discourses, delivered at New Haven, Cambridge and Andover, with a Preliminary Dissertation on Language. By HORACE BUSHNELL. Hartford: Brown and Parsons. 1849.

Talleyrand is reported to have said, that "language was invented not to convey, but to conceal thought." This celebrated dictum of the wily diplomatist must yield in intensity, if not in pomp of paradox, to the theory of language propounded by Mr. Bushnell, in his Preliminary Dissertation. Both seem to hold that language was an invention, and not an original endowment of man: both are agreed that it does not *convey* thought: and if the doctrines of these "Discourses" be not what the Church of Jesus Christ has, in all the periods of its history, pronounced to be damnable heresy, the effect of language, whatever we may say of the design and tendency, is certainly, in the opinion of both, to *conceal* thought. Dr. Bushnell, however, goes one step further than the brilliant but unprincipled Frenchman, and asserts not merely that language was invented not to convey, but that it *cannot* convey thought, however honest the intention of those who employ it. It is afflicted with a constitutional debility, which will always insure its breaking down under the burden of the lightest spiritual idea.

In order to illustrate his theory, he entertains us with a hypothetical account of the powers of language-making, which, so far as the objects of the material universe are concerned in it, does not differ much from the descriptions of other fanciful philologists who have contributed to aggravate the curse of Babel. Nor does he differ very widely from other dreamers of the same school, in his history of the process by which the names of external and material objects were, in the course of time, transferred to the department of spirit, and employed to express the informations of consciousness and reflection. But he contends that the earthly, material dregs of their original associations, still cleave to the words, even after they have been promoted to the higher sphere and the nobler functions of the spiritual world. Like Plato's ghosts of wicked men, they were so long submerged in material things, that, even when disembodied, they are not free from the admixture of earthy particles, and the law of gravity is still in force against them. This circumstance creates a sad necessity for men—that of always being mistaken in their notions of the meaning of words, when those words stand for spiritual objects or conceptions. There is nothing material in spiritual ideas; but alas for us, the terms, which we employ to denote them, contain, from the necessity of the case, material elements; the problem we have to solve is not only perplexed and complicated by the presence of unknown quantities, but vitiated by the intrusion of quantities positively false. The very term spirit now smacks of the laboratory. It denotes a substance which the chemist uses to heat his retorts; and in its original and higher acceptation, it stands for a more ethereal substance, which profane science has demonstrated to be composed chiefly of so vulgar an element as carbonic acid gas. What, then, are we to do with such dangerous instruments of thought? Is there no remedy? Must we abandon ourselves to a fatal necessity of error in that department of investigation, in the results of which we are most deeply and lastingly interested? Dr. Bushnell shall answer these questions for us (p. 55):

“Since all words, but such as relate to necessary truths, are inexact representations of thought, mere types or analogies, or where the types are lost beyond recovery, only proximate expressions of the thoughts named: it follows that language will be ever trying

to mend its own deficiencies, by multiplying its forms of representation. As, too, the words made use of generally carry something false with them, as well as something true, associating form with the truths represented, when really there is no form; it will also be necessary, on this account, to multiply words or figures, and thus to present the subject on opposite sides or many sides. Thus, as form battles form, and one form neutralizes another, all the insufficiencies of words are filled out, the contrarieties liquidated, and the mind settles into a full and just apprehension of the pure spiritual truth. Accordingly, we never come so near to a truly well rounded view of any truth, as when it is offered paradoxically; that is, under contradictions; that is, under two or more dictions, which, taken as dictions, are contrary one to the other. Hence the marvellous vivacity and power of that famous representation of Pascal: 'What a chimera, then, is man! what a novelty! what a chaos! what a subject of contradiction! A judge of every thing, and yet a feeble worm of the earth; the depositary of truth, and yet a mere heap of uncertainty; the glory and the outcast of the universe. If he boasts, I humble him; if he humbles himself, I boast of him: and always contradict him, till he is brought to comprehend that he is an incomprehensible monster.'

Now, this is all very fine; but the question will arise, in the mind of every thinking man, what has it to do with Mr. Bushnell's theory? If we were asked, why are we bound by the law of God, would it be proper to answer "the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles?" The noble passage from Pascal, and the still nobler passage from Paul, (2 Cor. vi. 8, 10,) are examples of highly-wrought rhetorical descriptions of human nature and human life. But what have they to do with Dr. Bushnell's theory of language? We ask him a question in metaphysics, and he answers us by a lecture on antithesis, illustrated by examples. The *essential* deceptiveness of words is one thing; the propensity of employing antithesis, in an address to the *imagination*, is quite another thing. As to the logical understanding's acquiring more accurate knowledge of ideas and relations by antithesis, than by simple, unadorned propositions, we had always supposed that sober men, in imparting instruction, abstained from the use of that and other highly rhetorical methods of *impressing* truth, till they were satisfied that the truth was *logically apprehended*. How common is it,

in the use of such figures, to sacrifice truth to point? If taken as a didactic statement, in which light Dr. Bushnell would seem to have us regard it, the fine paragraph from Pascal cannot be exonerated from this charge, or, at least, from the charge of exaggeration. But, taken as it was intended to be taken by the splendid genius who conceived it, it is faultless.

The truth is, that this theory of contradiction is framed to serve a turn. The author tells us, that it will afford "the true conception of the Incarnation and the Trinity." The precious doctrines of the Bible are to be converted into figures of speech, and hence this laborious attempt to confound things that differ. But of this more hereafter.

The juxta-position of Dr. Bushnell's principles and examples may be accounted for by his possession of a faculty of "poetic insight" (as he calls it), which relieves him of the burden imposed upon ordinary mortals—the

* The following extract from the Preliminary Dissertation will show that the author's "contra-dictions" are not merely opposite "dictions" in spiritual equilibrium, but what plain people would call *contradictions* in the old-fashioned sense: "So far from suffering even the least consciousness of constraint, or oppression, under any creed, I have been readier to accept as great a number as fell in my way; for, when they are subjected to the deepest chemistry of thought, that which descends to the point of relationship between the power of the truth and its interior formless nature, they become, thereupon, so elastic, and run so freely into each other, that one seldom need have any difficulty in accepting as many as are offered him. He may regard them only as a kind of battle-door of words, blow answering to blow, while the reality of the play, viz., *exercise*, is the same, whichever side of the room is taken, and whether the stroke is given by the right hand or the left."—P. 82. Truly we may say of this doctor of divinity, as has been said of those who can believe the contradictory formularies of the Church of England, that he must be blessed with extraordinary powers of digestion, if he escapes dyspepsia after so miscellaneous a feast. The pompous inanities of German Transcendentalism have been profanely compared with the speech of the clown in "Twelfth Night," (A. 4, 8, 2,) "As the old hermit of Prague, that never saw pen and ink, very wittily said to a neice of King Gorboduc, 'That, that is, is; so I, being master parson, am master parson; for what is that, but that?—and is, but is?'" But Dr. Bushnell, in prosecuting the brilliant career of discovery on which he has entered, has advanced one step beyond the old hermit, and ascertained that is, is not—is, and that is not—that: the *das Ich* is *das nicht—Ich*. In his understanding, truth and falsehood embrace and kiss each other; nay, the twain become one flesh. This is a "higher unity" with a vengeance! This "chemistry of thought" is a wonderful science: it has accomplished for thought what the old alchemists, after all their laborious experiments, could never do for matter. But, seriously, is it not almost incredible, even with the evidence before our eyes, that the understanding of a grown man can be capable of such drivelling folly?

burden of logical thinking. He stands upon an eminence, which, though it may appear to us toiling in the vale below, to be surrounded with clouds and mists, is, really, far above the floating vapours which shade our mundane atmosphere; and, from that eminence, he has an intuitive inspection of eternal and necessary realities. We are very much disposed to envy him the possession of this singular felicity, but, as we are unfortunately without it, we are often compelled to employ the humble faculty of *deduction*, and to grope our way back to intuitive principles and fundamental laws of belief, by very long and tortuous threads. We think it hard, however, in an author, that, instead of bearing his honors meekly, and commiserating our unhappy condition, he should rail as he does against logic. He has no use for it, it is true; but we have. A man with sound legs will not abuse crutches, simply because he has personally no use for them: there *are* lame men, and they ought not to be too severely censured, if they attempt to achieve locomotion in the best way they can. He will not acknowledge that God can teach *him* any thing:* but

* "What, then, it may be asked, is the real and legitimate use of words when applied to moral subjects? For we cannot dispense with them, and it is uncomfortable to hold them in universal skepticism, as being only instruments of error. Words, then, I answer, are legitimately used as the signs of thought to be expressed. They do not literally convey, or pass over a thought out of one mind into another, as we commonly speak of doing. They are only hints or images, held up before the mind of another, to put *him* on generating or reproducing the same thought; which *he can do only as he has the same personal contents, or the generative power out of which to bring the thought required.*"—P. 45, 46. This is, substantially, the doctrine defended by Mr. Morell and others, that it is impossible for God Himself to give us a logical Revelation, or, to use their own term, a "Theology." It is very much like the doctrine of the Meno of Plato—all our knowledge is "*reminiscence*" merely. God presents us with words, but they are only hints, which awaken the dormant contents of the reason: He "*stirs up our pure minds by way of remembrance,*" but imparts no new knowledge. Is it not marvellous that these men have not perceived the difference between *ideas* and *relations*? It is no doubt true that the use of names, in the intercourse of mind with mind, implies that the ideas exist, in a greater or less degree of clearness, both in him who communicates, and in him who receives. But the knowledge mainly consists in the *relations* of the persons, things, or ideas denoted by the terms. The ancients had an idea of a Supreme Being, of the material universe, of creation. But the relations among these ideas, expressed in the proposition, "God created the heavens and the earth," they never recognized, except to deny: the general principle being "*ex nihilo, nil fit.*" Our philosophers neglect to discriminate between truths which are simply expressive of existence, and truths which express relations among

we are disposed more and more every day to acknowledge the ignorance of poor human nature, and to admire that Socratic modesty which prompts a man to confess that he knows nothing. The "οὐκ οἶδα σαφῶς" of the Athenian Philosopher will be sought in vain in the oracular utterances of the German School: they are gods; it is only in their minds that God comes to a consciousness of His personality: they are able to make a universe out of their own brains, as a spider spins its web from its own bowels. But we confess that we are men and have not such power as this; that it is necessary for us to compare, to analyse, to arrange, to deduce, to dig for truth as for hid treasures, and, after we have obtained the precious ore, to smelt it, to separate the pure metal from the earthy admixture: in short, that we are groping our way in a dark world, and are anxious to hear the voice of God amid the gloom, saying unto us, "This is the way, walk ye in it." And we hope Dr. Bushnell and other Illuminati will pardon us for saying, that it is unkind in them, it betrays a want of magnanimity, to laugh at or to abuse us, because we are destitute, and that too without any fault of our own, of that lofty instrument of knowledge which they possess, and are compelled, in the absence of it, to employ such an antiquated utensil as logic. Let them enjoy to the utmost the distinction of free access into the inner sanctuary of the "pure reason," or "poetic insight," or "intuitional consciousness;" but let them not insult the less

existing objects. They also confound the perception of "concrete realities" by the "intuitional consciousness," (the process being analagous to that of external perception by the senses,) with the apprehension of what are called necessary or universal truths, by the same faculty. According to the first view, it would be as absurd to attempt to give a man an idea of God, who had not the idea already, as it would be to attempt to give a man born blind an idea of color. . . . Dr. Bushnell does, indeed, admit that there is such a thing as inspiration, but it seems to be very much like Mr. Morell's; and both have probably obtained it from the German masters. He tells us, (P. 350, et seq.) that it is a great mistake to suppose that inspiration has ceased, and leaves us to infer that while the tripod continues in Hartford, it will be unreasonable to attach any peculiar importance to the inspiration of Paul or Peter. Truly, any mortal who will thread his way through the sinuosities of this book, will be satisfied that if we have not the inspiration, we have, at least, the contortions of the Sybil. Note, that we have used the term *idea*, in the above remarks, sometimes as equivalent to *object*. In one acceptation of the term, a relation is an *idea*. See some excellent observations on this subject in Mill's System of Logic, B. 1, c. 2.

happy destiny of those who are doomed to tread the court of the Gentiles, "the logical understanding."*

It will be readily imagined by our readers, from the preceding remarks, that it is not our purpose to attempt a review of the "Discourses" themselves. The Preliminary Dissertation has so awed us, that we cannot go further without trembling. If such be the portico, what must the temple be? We shall not invade the retirement of the Seer, where he gazes, in solitary rapture, on the unconditioned, the absolute and the infinite. In truth, we do not know that we understand him: we have only learned the language of men, and know nothing of the dialect of those who dwell amidst the clouds which hang around the summit of Olympus. So that there is danger of our misrepresenting him. To us, the first discourse seems an odd mixture of Sabellianism and Pantheism; but, perhaps, if cast into the alembic which our author has furnished, and subjected to the powerful agencies of the "chemistry of thought," it may turn out, after all, to be a doctrine with which Spinoza would feel no sympathy, and which can look the damnatory clauses of the Athanasian creed calmly in the face. To us, the second discourse appears to be a sweeping besom of destruction to all the hopes of man, founded upon the atonement of Jesus Christ—an utter impudent mockery of the cries of agony which burst from a world groaning under the curse of the Almighty—taking away from us the precious *work* of our Lord and Saviour, as his first discourse does His *Person*. He speaks of a *subjective* atonement; but, as we have not been endowed with the faculty of "poetic insight," we must acknowledge our inability to comprehend any such thing, unless, done into English, it means the effect of the atonement in the hearts of men. His *objective* atonement is not a sacrifice—no! no! It is not exactly a myth—for the death was a *real* death—but a something which might embody and realize our subjectivity: just as the brilliant creations of the poet's fancy have obtained, though airy nothings, a local habitation and a name, by the pencil of the painter and the chisel

* This image is borrowed from an article on Morell, in the Westminster Review for April, 1847, in which the writer handles the nonsense of our Teutonic brethren with very little politeness.

of the sculptor. We say that a painting is *beautiful*, but we all know that beauty is not an attribute of the painting, but of the percipient mind; but it gratifies our importunate appetite for objectivity to refer the quality to the painting, instead of regarding it as an affection of ourselves. So the atonement is *in us*; but we speak of it as being in the history of Christ—we refer it to something objective. Most people who read the Bible suppose that Christ came into the world *in order* to make a sacrifice for sin—was born *in order* that He might die. But this is their ignorance. The death of Christ was only an incident which occurred in the discharge of His commission, as the death of Alexander, in the full tide of successful war, was. He did not go to Asia for the purpose of dying; neither did Christ come into the world for that purpose: it was a misfortune, which happened to them in prosecuting their benevolent designs, just as a monk of St. Bernard might perish among the snows of the Alps, in searching for the benighted travellers, who were the objects of his kindly solicitude.* He denies the *penal* character of the sufferings and death of Jesus; and, this being denied, we care not what he asserts concerning the atonement. If Christ did not die under the curse, all our hopes are vain. We are yet in our sins, and the majesty of the law must be vindicated in our own persons: the Gospel is a mockery, and the preachers of it worse than fools.†

But we must check ourselves. Perhaps our author means just the contrary of all this, for he tells us that language cannot convey thought. It may be the purest orthodoxy of the Westminster Confession. Some of our readers may be able to judge what his views of the atonement really are, from the fact that they furnished a platform (as he tells us‡) on which Protestants, Philosophers and Papists can stand amicably together! We have

* See p.p. 201, *et seq.*

† A distinguished New England scholar is reported to have said, when he abandoned the ministry for other pursuits, that "preaching was a small business." We cordially agree with him. Upon *his* principles (he was a Unitarian), preaching the New Testament is the smallest and meanest of all businesses, in which an *honest* man can engage.

‡ See pp. 268, *et seq.* The philosophers, to whom he chiefly refers, are the Unitarians, whom he seems much more anxious to conciliate than any other class.

heard of authors who could "bespeak all reverence for that fancy of Justin and others, that the 'ass and the colt' for which Christ sent his disciples, are to be interpreted severally of the 'Jewish and the Gentile believers,' and *also* attach much weight to that of Origen, who *rather* expounds them of 'the Old and the New Testaments.'" But Dr. Bushnell is determined to let none be before him in the race of absurdity.

The third and last "Discourse," in this extraordinary collection, is on "Dogma and Spirit." In the language of men, we should say that this discourse is a very earnest assault on creeds and confessions—a very pathetic plea for the glorious liberty of thinking and believing one thing to-day and another to-morrow, and for the associated privilege of writing one thing on one page and contradicting it on the next. The objection is not to *creeds*, but to a *creed*, as will be seen from a citation in a preceding note. Provided there are more than one, the author's *cacoethes credendi* is agreeably soothed, though, we suppose, it can never be satisfied but by a universal syntagma, or rather *congeries, confessionum*. "He has been readier," he tells us, "to accept as many creeds as fell in his way." The only damning sin is to believe anything *in particular*.

And here we close our notice of the book as such; for we suspect that our readers are as weary as ourselves. The author is a man of great power, unquestionably: there are many eloquent sentences in his book; he uses, with great point and force, the phraseology of spiritual religion. We will add that we have no reason to suspect his *sincerity*: his mind seems to have been in great distress through doubt, and he thinks that in the theories of these discourses he has found rest and peace. He is very naturally anxious that others, who have been in the same afflictions, should share in his consolations, and, therefore, presents them with this "*Ductor Dubitantium*." But we are amazed beyond our power to express, that a man in his senses should regard such stuff as affording an adequate foundation of hope to dying men; that he can have the hardihood to say, while acknowledging, in form, the Divine authority of the Scriptures, that Paul does not reason in his Epistles, or, if he does intend to reason, his reasoning is inconclusive; that the illative particles which

occur so frequently in his writings are only the remnants of the discipline of Gamaliel, which he had not been able to throw off,* and many other things as outrageously absurd, and yet imagine that he is a sort of Star of Bethlehem, whose only office and design is to lead men to the Saviour of the world. We must say that we have never met with an instance of stranger hallucination in the annals of Christian literature, unless it be the case of the madman, in the time of Tertullian, who imagined himself to be the Holy Ghost.

These "Discourses" furnish melancholy evidence of the progress of infidel principles in the church. The time was when the denial of the *Divine authority* of the Scriptures was a distinguishing badge of the enemies of Christianity: but that time has passed. The devil has changed his tactics. He is still aiming at the same great end; still bent upon persuading men to prefer the farthing candle of their own reason to the sun-light of Divine revelation: but he employs a different method of address. The "logical understanding," or what uninitiated and un-

* "True, there is a power of reasoning, or argumentation about him (Paul), and he abounds in illatives, piling "for" upon "for" in constant succession. But, if he is narrowly watched, it will be seen that this is only a dialectic form that had settled on his language, under his old theologic discipline, previous to his conversion; for every man gets a language constructed early in life, which nothing can change afterwards. * * * Besides, it will be clear, on examination, that his illatives often miscarry, when taken as mere instruments or terms of logic, while, if we conceive him rushing on through so many "fors" and parenthesis, which belong to his old Pharisaic culture, and serve as a continuous warp of connections to his speech—now become the vehicle or channel, not for the modes of Rabbi Gamaliel, but for a stream of Christian fire—what before seemed to wear a look of inconsequence, assumes a post of amazing energy, and he becomes the fullest, heartiest and most irresistible of all the inspired writers of the Christian Scriptures."—pp. 75-6.

We had thought of commending to the perusal and study of our author, the celebrated chapter in Dr. Campbell's Rhetoric, in which the question, "how a man may write nonsense without knowing it," is ingeniously discussed and answered. But we fear that it would be far more suitable to recommend to him the concluding chapter of the first part of Hume's Treatise on Human Nature, in which the subtle philosopher describes the state of mind into which his speculations had brought him, a description which we were scarcely able to read without tears. A melancholy example of the danger of trifling with the truth and of abusing those faculties which God has given us for its investigation! It is not at all strange, that after a man has reached the conclusion, that all knowledge is equal to zero, he should be anxious to persuade himself, that suicide is an innocent thing, a mere "divesting of a little blood from its ordinary channel." Upon the principles of such a philosophy, the condition of an oyster is far preferable to that of a man; the

sophisticated mortals call the "reason," was his great weapon, before the star of cant arose above the horizon of philosophical speculation. Men sat in judgment upon the evidence and upon the subject matter of the documents which professed to be the word of God. They proceeded upon the supposition that the record meant what the received canons of interpretation compelled them to conclude *was meant*. They knew nothing of the science of hermineutical chemistry, which has been the source of so many splendid discoveries in our own day. The meaning of the record being ascertained, they brought it face to face with the logical judgments of the understanding, and decided either that it was was no new substantive addition to their stock of knowledge, or that it was con-

oyster has no power of thought, and cannot know the misery of thinking which is doomed to hopeless uncertainty in all its conclusions, the misery of aspirations after truth which *must* be disappointed. Dr. Bushnell differs, it is true, from Mr. Hume. The one is brought to a negative of all belief, to absolute Pyrrhonism, by contradictions in nature: the other is brought to a negation of all disbelief, by *his theory* of contradictions in Theology. But we may rest assured, that Mr. Hume's conclusion is more logical than Dr. Bushnell's. The rule of logic, that "contradictories can never be both true or both false," is a rule which will hold, till the structure of the human understanding has been entirely subverted. Two and two make four, and two and two make five, are propositions which can never be both true. There is no "depth of consciousness" (unless there be a deep lower than the *lowest*, as the "poetic insight" of Milton hints that there is,) in which they can meet in *unity*. This we believe to be the insinictive and irresistible judgment of any sound understanding; and, therefore, it is our solemn conviction, that the tendency of the "discourses on God in Christ," is as mischievous as that of the "Treatise on Human Nature." It may be well enough for the doctors of the Church of Rome to teach that contradictions may be both true, for their doctrines require such a notion for their defence; but it is a shame for one who professes to be a champion of the Protestant cause, and of the rights of the human mind, (his system indeed needs it, but he ought not to hold a system which needs it,) to perpetrate such an outrage upon common sense. The distinction which he makes between kinds of truth, as absolute or relative, necessary or contingent, is a just distinction, but it does not help his case. A contradiction is a contradiction, (we hope he will not object to this statement,) and though it may be more readily detected in one class of ideas than in another, its nature is not changed. "No lie is of the truth."—1 John, ii. 21.

We deeply regret to see this theory of contradictions propounded, in another form, by Dr. Park of Andover, in his "Theology of the Intellect and Theology of the Feelings." We should not be surprised, if some future historian of opinions, should treat of these different systems in a chapter entitled, "On the Art of Lying made Easy." Such a historian would deserve more respect for his judgment than for his charity. We do not say that these gentlemen are not honest: we judge no man: but we do say, and are ready to maintain it, that their principles make havoc of all fair-dealing amongst men.

trary to what they knew to be true, or that it was incomprehensible, and that, in any or all aspects of the case, it could not be the word of God. There was something bold, frank, manly in that species of infidelity. The challenge was given to the friends of Christianity to meet its enemies on the field of argument: they met, and the issue of the controversy is very impressively proclaimed by the change in the mode of conducting the war. Satan has now entrenched himself behind fortifications which are impregnable against all the engines of the logical understanding. The enemies of the Gospel have refused to be tried by the rules of logic, agreeably to the custom of offenders generally, renouncing the jurisdiction of the court whose verdict, they are certain, will be against them. They have taken refuge in a power of the mind, called the "pure reason," "intuitional consciousness," "poetic insight," &c. (for, like other things of questionable moral character, it goes under more names than one), which takes cognizance of spiritual realities, immediately and directly, as the eye does of color, or the ear of sound, or the taste of beauty in works of art. To make a logical objection to any of their doctrines would imply the absurdity of the enthusiastic mathematician, who, when coming out of the theatre, was asked by his companion how he liked the performance, and replied, "I do not see what it *proved*." They disdain to argue with us: for, argue as you will with a man born blind as to the true notion of scarlet, he will obstinately persist that it is like the sound of a trumpet. They can only pity us, and we can only bewail our misery, that nature should thus have curtailed us of our fair proportions, and left us without a faculty so necessary to our comfort here and our blessedness hereafter.

This species of infidelity does not deny the inspiration of the Scriptures: it denies the inspiration of no man; on the contrary, it affirms the inspiration of all men. This wonder-working faculty may lie dormant: it is actually dormant in the whole human race, except in a few highly favored individuals, such as Paul, Peter, John, Schleiermacher, Bushnell, Morell and others. It may exist in a great variety of degrees. Some, with the eye in a fine frenzy rolling, only see the *shapes* of things unknown:

others, aroused to a higher energy of the intuitive faculty, see things unknown with no shape at all, or a shadow of a shape, or a very doubtful shape, like that of Milton's Death. When the faculty is excited, it becomes a powerful telescope, analyzing appearances, which, to those in whom it lies dormant, are mere nebulous lights, into clusters of brilliant suns. But we all have it, if we did but know it. Such being the case, there is no impropriety in infidels of this stamp becoming preachers of the Gospel. And thus Satan gives the finishing touch to his policy; the serpent tracks his slimy way into the very pulpits of our churches; and Christ and his apostles, if they cannot be satisfied with places in the Pantheon alongside of the preachers themselves, are either violently ejected, or bowed, with the blandest courtesy, to the door. Infidels of this sort are more dangerous than those of the class of Herbert of Cherbury, because they are in the church, and because they do not, like him, openly reject the divine authority of the Scriptures, or pretend to a peculiar supernatural revelation made by God to themselves. They use the language of spiritual religion, and appeal to the experience of men, to their intuitional consciousness or poetical insight, not to the Scriptures, for the truth of what they say. Religion comes to be regarded merely as a work of art, intended to accomplish its effects by impressions upon the imagination, not by convincing the understanding, or arousing the conscience. Whatever pleases is truth, whatever excites displeasure or disgust is falsehood, or rather there ceases to be any inquiry as to what is truth. If the question is ever asked, "What is truth?" it is asked in the spirit of Pontius Pilate, and, like him, the inquirer does not wait for an answer.*

* It would occupy too much space, to make quotations large enough to justify our representation of Dr. Bushnell's views on this point. He himself warns us, at the outset, that a man is not to be judged by single passages from his works, but that the impression is to be received from them as a whole: and this is specially true, he says, of a "many-sided writer," (that is, in the language of men, a writer who frequently contradicts himself,) who is never "able to stand in harmony before himself, (such is the nature of language,) save by an act of internal construction favourable to himself, and preservative of his *mental unity*." * * * Therefore every writer, not manifestly actuated by a malignant or evil spirit, is entitled to this indulgence. The mind must be offered up to him, for the time, with a certain degree of sympathy. [That is, in plain English, we must, as the Oxford Apostles re-

Now let us look at the consequences of this doctrine. If the sensibilities of men are made the criterion of truth, the Gospel will cease to be the Gospel, good news of *salvation*. Where there is no *loss*, there can be no *salvation*: where there is no sense of loss, there can be no sense of the need of salvation. But what does the "poetical insight" pronounce concerning the doctrine of loss or damnation? It cannot see deep enough to see it. Hell is no suggestion of the "pure reason." It is not recognized by the "intuitional consciousness." It shocks the tastes and sensibilities of inspired preachers and philosophers. It is, therefore, the dream of a morbid fancy, a nursery tale of horror, suited to quiet refractory children, but utterly beneath the notice of a full-grown man, who has ascended to an eminence from which he gazes directly and immediately upon the soul, the universe and God. If they refer to it at all, it is for poetical effect, and then the reference is, more to an unreal, imaginary hell, like that of the *Paradise Lost*, in which the devils are heroes in misfortune, nobly struggling for their rights, against the tyranny of power, than the hell of the Scriptures, whose fires have been kindled by the breath of God's justice, to consume the transgressors of law, overwhelmed with merited shame and everlasting

commend, "maintain before we have proved, and believe before we examine."] It must draw itself into the same position; take his constructions *feel* out, so to speak, his meanings, [truly, it is a darkness of Egypt, that may be *felt*,] and keep him, as far as may be, in a form of *general* consistency, [a labour of Hercules.] Then, having endeavoured thus, and for a sufficient length of time, to reproduce him or his thought, that is, to make a realization of him, some proper judgment may be formed in regard to the soundness of his doctrine."—p. 89. "They (human teachers) may be obscure, not from weakness only, which, certainly, is most frequent, but quite as truly by reason of their exceeding breadth, and the *piercing vigor of their insight*."—p. 91.

Our readers, we think, will now excuse us from quoting: for they would hardly have the patience to read the whole book in a note. We fear, that even after reading the whole volume, they would not be able, unless they should be so fortunate as to possess this "piercing vigour of insight," to see down into that "depth of consciousness," where truth and falsehood lay aside their hostility, and lovingly embrace each other, in "mental unity."—For the statements of the text, therefore, we refer generally to that part of the second discourse, which has the running caption at the head of the page, "Religion as in Art," from page 250 to 255, with the preceding pages from page 246.

As to the infidel tendencies of his principles, it is a very significant fact (if it be true, as stated in the public prints,) that his work is about to be published by an infidel book establishment in London.

contempt. Hell, as implying the *curse* of God, comes, in this way, to be placed in the expurgatory index of pulpit ministrations. This is not a fancy sketch. A writer in the Westminster Review, the organ of the Radical Party in Great Britain, (April, 1850,) in an article on the Church of England, ascribes the insufficiency of that establishment to the fact, as one cause, that its creed is behind the age, and its doctrines have become obsolete. One of these obsolete doctrines is that of a penal doom, threatened against impenitent offenders, in another world. In proof that this doctrine does not form a part of the current, popular faith, and therefore ought not to be taught, he alleges the acceptance in which the term salvation is commonly held: "A meaning," he says, "far different from the historical definition of divines, is currently given to the word *salvation*—a word, however, which, after every softening, is not sincerely congenial with the highest religion of the time. Its direct opposition to *damnation* is very much lost: and instead of denoting mere rescue from a penal doom, it is accepted as an expression for personal *union with God*, spiritual *perfectness of character*; or without reference to any penal alternative, the simple *attainment of a blessed and immortal state*." (The italics are the author's own.) The cold-blooded indifference with which this assertion is made, an assertion which stultifies the Bible, and makes it, indeed, a bundle of old wives' fables, unworthy the respect of a masculine understanding, is calculated to fill every sober mind with the most melancholy reflections. "Salvation, a word which, after every softening, is not sincerely congenial with the highest religion of the time!" The highest religion of the time, basing its pretensions to be so considered upon the repudiation of that doctrine which constitutes the discriminating characteristic of the Christian Religion! Paul was "not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ," because it was "the power of God unto *salvation*." When the angels descended to earth to announce the tidings of the birth of Jesus, it was not the advent merely of an illustrious prophet or a mighty king that filled them with rapture, but the advent of *Jesus*, Jehovah the *Saviour*. "Unto you there is born this day a *Saviour*, who is Christ the Lord." The proclamation which the Saviour put into the mouth of all his apostles was—"He

that believeth shall be *saved*: he that believeth not shall be *damned*." And yet, in the "highest religion" of the year eighteen hundred and fifty, there is nothing sincerely congenial with the idea of "*salvation*," and "the direct opposition of that term to *damnation*, is very much lost!"

Some simple people might conclude that this man is an infidel. But their simplicity misleads them. It is true that he not only laughs at the notion of a penal doom, but speaks contemptuously of the Mosaic cosmogony, and of the unity of the human race, and of other plain statements of the record. But he is not an infidel—he does not deny the inspiration of the Scriptures. He has only been a follower of Bushnell, and performing, under his direction, experiments in the "chemistry of thought," neutralizing and "liquidating contrarieties." The whole article bears evidence of the author's recent perusal of the "Discourses on God in Christ," and of his having been (to use his master's phrases) "drawn into the same position," "taken his constructions," "felt out his meanings," "reproduced him and his thought," and "made a realization of him." In the very paragraph from which the above citation is taken, the poetical theory of religion is formally announced.*

Such is one very natural consequence of the poetical or artistic theory. Men dislike to think of hell, even as a fancy. The most skilful and finished painting of the horrors of the damned will not please: admiration for the artist is lost in the terror inspired by the subject of his pencil. Some few men of sombre imaginations might be found, who could be charmed with the "*Inferno*" upon canvas: but the great majority of amateurs would much prefer a gallery, furnished exclusively from the descriptions of the Poet of the "*Seasons*." Hence, artistic preachers must say nothing about it, and, when once thoroughly *ignored*, it

* The reviewer quotes some long passages from Dr. Bushnell's book, on the subject *atonement*, with his cordial approbation. He is no fool, and is able to see that such a sentence of approbation is not at all inconsistent with the assertion, that "*salvation*, after every softening, is not sincerely congenial with the highest religion of the time." With the usual recklessness or ignorance of the English, when matters and things in America are concerned, he styles Dr. Bushnell an "orthodox divine," and a "Presbyterian Clergyman." As to his orthodoxy we say nothing—that depends upon the standard of comparison; but we most earnestly protest against his being called a "*Presbyterian*."

will cease to be beloved or feared, and all inquiry about *salvation* will cease.*

Another consequence of this view of religion, is the loss of a sense of responsibility for opinions. If judgments are to be framed upon *evidence*, a man is responsible for the state of mind, whether candid or otherwise, with which he examines the evidence: but in matters of mere taste and sensibility, it is different. We usually regard the absence of refined taste or delicate sensibility, as a misfortune rather than a crime. But if objective religion be a work of art, and we are to judge of it, as we do of a painting; then we are not responsible for our judgments. There is no moral element at all in the process. Let us hear Dr. Bushnell, as to the effect upon his own sense of responsibility: "As regards the views presented," says he, "I seem to have had only about the same agency in forming them, that I have in preparing the blood I circulate, and the anatomic frame I occupy. They are not my choice, or invention, so much as a necessary growth, whose process I can hardly trace myself, and now, in giving them to the public, I seem only to have about the same kind of option left me, that I have in the matter of appearing in corporal manifestation myself,—about the same anxiety, I will add, concerning the unfavourable judgments to be encountered; for though a man's opinions are of vastly greater moment than his looks, yet, if he is equally simple in them, as in his growth, and equally subject to his law, he is responsible only in the same degree, and ought not, in fact, to suffer any greater concern about their reception, than about the judgments passed upon his person."—pp. 97, 98.

We make no comments on this passage, but only quote the solemn words of the Son of God: "He that *believeth* not shall be damned." "If ye *believe* not that I am He, ye shall die in your sins." God grant that the opinions of these "Discourses" may not be laid to the author's charge!

But our author thinks that he finds his theory in the second chapter of the second epistle to the Corinthians:

* Men do not argue or feel so absurdly, when their own temporal interests are concerned. The gibbet, the penitentiary and the officers of police, no doubt, shock the sensibilities of thieves and assassins, but they are not abolished on that account, nor do they prove to be unreal bugbears to the transgressors of the law.

and as he does not often refer so specifically and particularly to the law and the testimony, it may be well to notice the passage. That chapter contains, certainly, a very strong assertion of the necessity of the Spirit's illumination, in order that the truth may be effectually understood. But we cannot see how it subserves Dr. Bushnell's purpose, except upon the supposition that the subject under consideration is the necessity of *inspiration*, and that this inspiration is given, though in different degrees, to all who are to understand spiritual things. We cannot admit that *he* is inspired, or that his notion of inspiration is a just one: and, therefore, must be allowed to say that this noble passage of the logical, scholastic apostle of the Gentiles, has nothing, as it appears to us, to do with his theory. It is not a gift of the Spirit bestowed upon a man to see what he pleases independently of the record, or to see what suits his tastes *in* the record: but a gift by which his understanding may apprehend the truth, and the heart feel the goodness and sweetness, of the things revealed in the word. Faith contains two elements, a conviction of the understanding and a sympathy of the heart: and the Spirit alone can produce either effectually. It appears to us that the doctrine of the "Discourses" makes the "spirit of a man" the judge of the things of God, which Paul says cannot be. We can refer our author to two places of the New Testament which seem to give more support to his *æstheticism* than the one upon which he mainly relies. They are Phil. i. 9, and Heb. v. 14. The word rendered "judgment," by our translators in the first, is *æsthesis* (αἰσθησις): the word rendered "senses," in the second, is *æstheteria* (αἰσθητηρια). And the Apostle seems to teach that there is a faculty for the apprehension of spiritual truth, analogous to the senses for the perception of external objects. But this is nothing more than the faculty of spiritual discernment of the chapter in second Corinthians: an illuminated and sanctified mind interpreting the logical revelation which God has given, with a tacit reference to the rapidity of its operation, a rapidity which is the natural result of "exercise" and which makes the faculty to resemble an instinct or taste. In cases where the record does not speak expressly or by necessary implication, the spiritual nature of a believer will often indicate to him the

will of God. "Be not conformed to this world; but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that *ye may prove what is that good and acceptable and perfect will of God.*" (Rom. xii. 2.) But this is the poles apart from the power contended for by our modern philosophers. It pretends to no vision of transcendental concrete realities; it is simply the power of judging, from our past familiarity with a person's character and opinions, and our sympathy with him, what his opinion would be in a given case, in reference to which we had never heard him express an opinion. In another form, it is the old maxim, "a sound heart is the best casuist."

We have greatly exceeded the limits which we had assigned to ourselves for the notice of these "Discourses," and conclude with expressing our earnest hope that the spirit of this Luciferian Philosophy may extend no farther in the ministry of the church. Satan fell into condemnation, through pride (probably) of understanding. The stress of the temptation by which Adam fell and brought death into the world and all our woe, was in the imagined virtue of the fruit, "to make one wise." It was listening to the suggestions of intellectual ambition, instead of following, with the simplicity of a child, the word of the Lord, which ruined him and ruined us in him. These great swelling words of vanity are rebuked even by the Pagan sages, and betray the shallowness of the thinking from which they spring. Sure we are, they are the words neither of truth nor soberness. They are not the Gospel of Jesus Christ; they are more like the ravings of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Christ crucified, Christ *made a curse* for us, Christ magnifying the law and making it honourable, Christ rising again for our justification and making perpetual intercession for us, Christ the Alpha and the Omega, the beginning and the end, the first and the last, the all and in all; this is "the wisdom of God and the power of God to salvation." It is the exhibition of sovereign grace in Him, a grace bestowed freely, without money and without price; a grace which fixed upon the sinner before he was born and had done either good or evil; a grace which disdains commixture not only with human merit, but with human works; which lays the foundation and brings out the topstone; which imparts, developes and

completes the principle of spiritual life—it is the exhibition of sovereign grace like this, which brings the penitent prodigals of mankind back to their Father's house, with the confession, "We have sinned."

[NOTE.—As we have spoken in terms of some severity, of Dr. Park's discourse, in a note to the preceding article, we deem it just to add, that since the article was written, we have read a pamphlet of the author, containing forty-eight pages of remarks upon the strictures of the Biblical Repertory upon the Sermon. We are rejoiced to find that he holds more truth than we supposed, and a great deal more truth than the Doctor of Hartford. We, of course, receive the author's exposition of the leading design and main doctrines of the sermon, and the *dexterity* of his defence cannot be too highly applauded. "*Si Pergama dextra*," &c. But we must say, that our opinion of the tendencies of the performance, remains unchanged. It is not fair to charge a man with inferences which he repudiates: but it is always fair to show, if we can, that such and such consequences do flow from his doctrines, and therefore that the doctrine is not true. It is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the mathematicians. One of the criteria which Dr. Park himself lays down in his last pamphlet, to discriminate between the true and the false, is "the *moral tendency* of a doctrine." To this test, we are perfectly willing to submit the "Discourses on God in Christ," and "The Theology of the Intellect and the Theology of the Feelings."]

ARTICLE V.

JOHN HOWARD.

John Howard, and The Prison World of Europe. From Original and Authentic Documents. By HEPWORTH DIXON. *With an Introductory Essay by* RICHARD W. DICKENSON, D. D. New York: Robert Carter and Brothers. 1850.

The father of profane history sets forth his object, in committing to writing his researches into the annals of the past, in these words: "That the things done by men might not be forgotten in the lapse of time, and the great and wonderful deeds of Greeks and barbarians remain unsung." If deeds, which can be traced back to a selfish ambition as their principle, which have caused their authors

to be regarded as objects of terror by those who lived in their day, and to be looked upon in all ages by the wise and the good as the scourges of mankind, are worthy of record, much more those that have their spring in a benevolence almost godlike, and which have lessened the misery and increased the happiness of man.

The social system, like the animal frame, is subject to various disorders. The seeds of evil are sown in one age, find a soil adapted to their nature, in which they are slowly developed, until at last they yield an abundant harvest, which is reaped by some distant generation—or, like the seed in the hands of the mummy, they find some secure resting-place, until some social change or civil commotion throws them into a proper condition for growth, and then they yield their increase. It is not often that the diseases of the social system attract the attention of even the friends of man, during their progress: it is only when they become inveterate and intolerable that a remedy is thought of. Then some one, fitted by previous training for a great work, is brought upon the stage, and plays the part of a physician to the social body, or the body itself, by a violent, convulsive effort, frees itself from the evil. The disorders of our colonial system found a physician in a Washington, and a remedy in the Revolution; the evils which oppressed France, and which were the growth of ages, partially worked themselves out in the reign of terror, and in the wars which succeeded; the plague spot of modern civilization, the African slave trade, was exposed to the gaze of the good by a Wilberforce, and in a measure cured by British legislation, and the right application of British resources; so the vast evils, which had become inveterate in the whole system of prison discipline, were searched out, described, and prescribed for by a Howard.

The book, whose title is given at the head of this article, is one of the most interesting and attractive among the many issues of the press; and one which was much needed to make us acquainted with a man who is well entitled to take rank among the greatest benefactors of mankind. The author, in his preface, says:

“Few men, even of the well-read, know anything of the details of Howard’s career. Beyond the vague notion that he was a very good man, who went about the world dispensing blessings,

it is surprising how little is popularly known of a man whose name is so often found on good mens' tongues. * * * *

"There are two works only of any mark or note on the subject: the view of his life and character, by Dr. Aikin, and the memoirs by Baldwin Brown. The first is of undoubted value and authenticity, but it is a mere essay, written in haste, and issued to serve a temporary purpose. The second is voluminous enough, and of good authority; but it is at the same time insufferably dull. Few have read it, and few can read it. * * * * Thirty years ago it was published. The book is becoming scarce, and it is never likely to be re-printed. The brief notices which we have in Cyclopædias are miserably meagre and inexact."

The author gives evidence throughout his book that he had attained to a just appreciation of the character of Howard, and that his mind was imbued with a profound admiration for him: qualities absolutely necessary to constitute a good biographer. We propose to make a free use of the materials and facts he has so industriously gathered, in the sketch which we shall give of Howard, in the following pages of this article.

Before Howard appeared upon the stage and began his labors in behalf of the inmates of jails and prisons, some investigations had been made by a benevolent association in London, and by a committee of the British Parliament, into the condition of those abodes of criminals and debtors in the metropolis, and in regard to the administration of discipline. The paper published by the former contained only suggestions and plans for the correction of the crying evils existing in those establishments, yet enough is said incidentally to give the mind a glimpse of a dark and dismal picture. The report of the latter brought to light facts which filled the nation with amazement and horror. Yet no well-digested plan was recommended to Parliament, or enacted by it to remedy these evils, and to remove this stain upon the humanity of the British nation. Only some trivial alterations were proposed, when a thorough overhauling of the system, and a radical change in all its features, were imperiously demanded.

To give an idea of the state of the prisons in the British metropolis, a few facts will suffice. Jails were generally farmed out to their keepers at certain rates. The privilege of keeping the Fleet Prison, for instance, was pur-

chased for the sum of five thousand pounds sterling. The keepers made their outlay yield a profitable return, by levying fees and fines upon their prisoners, and by the sale of food and drink, and various luxuries of life. Being, as a class, hard-hearted and avaricious, and having the prisoners in their power, they pushed their demands to the extent of exorbitancy, and exacted them with a merciless severity. Debtors were generally confined with criminals, and treated with equal inhumanity. Persons of all ages and sexes were crowded into the same apartments. The older criminals corrupted the younger. The prisoners lived in idleness, were allowed to gamble, and permitted the use of intoxicating liquors to an extent which was limited only by their ability to purchase them. No provision was made for their religious instruction. The scenes enacted in these dens, from dawn almost to dawn, beggars all description.

The Marshalsea was a prison, in which debtors of the poorer classes, and pirates, were confined. The jail was under the charge of the deputy marshal of the king's household, who farmed out the fees, the victualling and lodgings of the prisoners to various parties, from whom he received ample consideration. These, in their turns, had underlings, to whom was sold the privilege of plundering the unfortunate beings who were placed under their charge. A man might be sent to this prison for a shilling, which would soon be increased to forty by legal expenses. When he first entered, he was required to pay garnish, which was a bowl of punch for the prisoners. If he had no money, he was seized and rudely stripped of his garments, which were pawned to raise the necessary sum. Then he had to choose his side, to wit, either the master's side, where he would have to pay the most exorbitant prices for bedding, board and drink; or the common side, where he would have to fare as he could, on the supplies afforded by such charity as the cupidity of officials would allow to be applied to their legitimate purposes. Those who chose the master's side afforded the means out of which the jailers paid themselves and supported the expenses of the establishment. These unfortunate beings were exposed, without hope of redress, or power to resist, to all the arts of these adepts in extortion and oppression.

A committee of Parliament reported that "the common side of this prison is enclosed with a brick wall, and in it are confined three hundred and thirty prisoners. They are divided off into particular wards, in which they are locked up during the night. In George's Ward, a room sixteen feet by fourteen, and eight feet high, sometimes forty, and never less than thirty-two persons are confined. The surface of the room is not sufficient to contain that number when laid down, so that one-half are hung up in hammocks, while the other lie on the floor under them. The air is so wasted by the number of persons who breathe in that narrow compass, that it is not sufficient to keep them from stifling, several having, in the heat of summer, perished for want of air." Cases were given, with much particularity, in which the most outrageous cruelties were wantonly practised on the persons of unfortunate debtors, and even an instance in which the torture, which is said to be unknown to British law, was inflicted in mere sport by the jailer and his assistants. As no attention was paid to the cleanliness or ventilation of the courts and wards—as the food of the prisoners was scanty and of a mean quality—as they were not compelled to labor, and were crowded into narrow apartments, the jails and prisons were hot-beds of pestilential disorders—the jail fever was an almost constant visitor, and raged, at times, with frightful virulence. In fine, before the time of Howard, it was not a recognised principle that society was under any obligation to take care of the health, to consult the physical comfort, to attend to the morals, or attempt the reformation of those who, either by misfortune or crime, became the inmates of jails and prisons: the hapless beings were cast out of the pale of humanity. Such was the state of things in regard to prison discipline, when Howard began his labours of reform.

Howard's father was a London merchant, who, having amassed a competency, retired from business. He possessed a small patrimonial estate near the little village of Cardington, which afterwards became celebrated as the residence of his son. It is very remarkable that neither the time or place of the birth of a man of Howard's fame, and coming, too, so recently upon the stage of action, should be known. Each of the four years, viz., 1724,

1725, 1726 and 1727, is asserted to be the year of his birth. Four towns, too, contend for the honor of being his birth-place—Hackney, Engfield, Clapton and Cardington. In the inscription on his statue, in St. Paul's, it is recorded that he was born at Hackney, in the County of Middlesex, on the 2nd day of September, 1726. Howard's father was a puritan, and dissenter, and sent his son to schools kept by those of his own way of thinking. Young Howard was never distinguished at school for the brightness of his parts, or the extent of his attainments. In after life, he was not remarkable for his scholarship. His style of writing was rugged and uncouth, and his sentences were often even ungrammatical. After completing his academical course, he was bound apprentice to a mercantile firm in London, his father intending that he should pursue the same calling as himself. Here he acquired those habits of industry, order and economy, and that practical turn of mind which so distinguished him in his after career, and enabled him to accomplish so much in a short life, and with limited means. During his apprenticeship, his father died, leaving him the bulk of his property, and, at the same time, making a becoming provision for his only daughter. The elder Howard was a Puritan of the old school, governed his household with patriarchal simplicity and authority, and brought up his children according to the strictest principles of his sect. This training had its influence in moulding the character of Howard, and it was a far different one from that which men are accustomed to regard as being the necessary product of such an education.

After the death of his father, Howard abandoned the calling, which had been chosen for him, because it was not agreeable to his taste, and threatened to impair his health. Soon after cancelling his indentures, to benefit his health, and to gratify his thirst for knowledge, and his curiosity to see strange countries, with the consent and approval of his guardians, he made the tour of Europe, at that time considered necessary by the gentry and nobility of Britain to complete the education, and to give the finishing touch to the manners of their sons. Having come to man's estate, he settled, for the benefit of his health, which still continued delicate, at Stoke Newington. Here, having

been nursed with great tenderness and care by his landlady, a widow, during a very serious fit of illness, on his recovery, impelled by a sense of gratitude, and doubtless also, by a sincere admiration for the sterling qualities of the lady, he offered himself to her in marriage. His age was 25; hers, 52; she was moreover destitute of beauty and wealth, and had been afflicted for twenty years with ill health. The lady seriously refused his proposal, and urged those objections, which the disparity of age and circumstances suggested, but Howard was resolute, and carried his point. She died in the third year of their marriage, and contrary to the usual experience in such cases, and probably the predictions of many at the time, their union while it lasted, was happy. Howard's second wife was Henrietta Leeds, daughter of Edward Leeds of Croxton, sergeant at law. This marriage was in every way more suitable, according to received ideas upon that subject, both on account of the age of the lady and her condition in life.

Howard after his second marriage determined to settle on his patrimonial estate, at Cardington. No expense was spared in refitting, enlarging and furnishing his mansion, and in laying out, improving and adorning the grounds around it, so that his home possessed all the attractions of comfort, elegance and beauty. Soon after settling down in this Eden, his attention was directed to the condition of the peasantry on his estate. Cardington is described as being at that time one of the most miserable villages in England; the habitations of its people were mere huts, "dirty, ill built, ill drained, badly lighted and watered." The people were "wretchedly poor, ignorant, vicious, turbulent and dirty; the gentry idle, frivolous, fashionable and ignorant of the great truth, that property has its duties, as well as its rights." Howard determined to set about a work of reformation, and he began it by pulling down the miserable buildings in which the cottagers dwelt, and putting up neat and airy houses in a healthy locality, which were let at the same rent as the huts. He excluded the incorrigibly vicious from his new village, by requiring as conditions of residence, habits of industry, temperance and observance of the Sabbath. The observance of these conditions was carefully looked after, yet in enforcing the *religious* part of them, Howard abstained from interfering

with the sectarian attachments and prejudices of his tenantry. In the next place, he established schools with competent teachers, in which the children were carefully instructed in the elementary branches of education, and in such things as would make them more useful members of society. In a few years, the results of his efforts began to be seen in the improved physical, social and moral condition of the people; and Cardington became as noted for its appearance of comfort and thrift, the orderly conduct and morality of its villagers, as it was before for its wretchedness, idleness, rioting and vice. The influence of Howard's example on the neighbouring landholders was great, as soon became evident by the improved condition of the tenantry on their estates.

This great revolution was brought about only by much labor, and at a great expense. Howard shrunk from neither. One of his principles was, that he was bound to live for the good of his fellow creatures; and another, that he had no right to hoard up his superfluous wealth. If at the end of the year his income exceeded his expenditure, instead of making a profitable investment of the surplus, he expended it judiciously in charities, or in carrying out some scheme for the good of man. He found in his wife one who gave him hearty and efficient co-operation in all his benevolent plans, and who made some extraordinary sacrifices to forward them.

Soon after the death of his first wife, Howard, to relieve his heart from the weight of sorrow and sense of desolation that oppressed him, determined on a voyage to Lisbon, which was then lying in ruins from the terrible earthquake of 1755. Rumors of the sufferings of the survivors had reached England, and the philanthropist hastened thither to give what relief he could. France and England were at that time at war, and the vessel in which Howard sailed was captured by a French privateer. Being regarded as prisoners of war, he and his companions were, according to the custom of the times, treated with great barbarity. Before the vessel reached the harbor of Brest, they were kept without food and drink, for forty hours. After being landed, they were cast into a dark, damp and filthy dungeon, and there kept many hours longer without nourishment. At last a leg of mutton was brought and cast down

among them, as flesh is cast to beasts in a menagerie. From this prison, Howard was removed to another for confining prisoners of war, and subsequently, was allowed to reside at Carpaix, on parole. By personal experience and observation in these various places, he obtained correct knowledge of the hardships and sufferings to which captives taken in war were exposed. He says: "I gained ample evidence of prisoners' being treated with such barbarity, that many hundreds had perished, and that thirty-six were buried in a hole at Dinan in one day." Howard's bearing and behaviour while a prisoner, made a favourable impression on his keepers. The jailer granted him unusual favours; the man with whom he lived while on parole, lodged, fed, clothed and supplied him with money on his simple promise of repayment; and at last he was set at liberty, and allowed to return to England, on the condition that if he failed to secure a suitable exchange, he would instantly return to France. The exchange was obtained, but in the joy of his deliverance from captivity, he did not forget his fellow captives. He instantly set to work through the proper channels to secure their liberation, and succeeded. Not satisfied with this, he made such representations to the proper authorities, as to direct their attention to the miseries endured by prisoners of war generally, and some relief was secured.

This incident had its influence in directing the aim of Howard's life. When by the death of his second wife his home was made desolate, and a great void was left in his heart, his large and active mind naturally looked around for some relief, when probably the circumstances of his imprisonment, the sufferings he had endured, and the scenes of misery he had witnessed, suggested the great thought of his life. Other scenes and circumstances ripened it into a purpose, and shaped it into a plan.

After his return from a tour on the continent, which he took to recruit his health, and if possible by a change of scene to alleviate his sorrow on account of the death of his wife, he received the appointment of sheriff for the county of Bedford. In accepting this appointment, he shewed a peculiar trait of character. Dissenters were excluded from all offices under government, except on condition of partaking of the sacrament according to the ritual of the Eng-

lish Church, and of going through certain other formalities, to all of which they were conscientiously opposed. If any dissenter accepted and entered upon the duties of an office, without going through these formalities, he made himself liable to a fine of five hundred pounds, a large part of which went to the informer; he was disqualified from holding forever any the most insignificant office in church or state, from suing or prosecuting any one at law, however grievous the injury received, or gross the violation of his rights, or from being guardian to a child, executor of a will or administrator on an estate. Howard could not, and would not take the tests, yet he determined to accept the office, and brave the consequences. No man ever arose to inform against or prosecute him.

The jail of the county of Bedford, where Bunyan was confined for twelve long years for preaching the word of God, and where he composed his immortal Pilgrim, opens the first scene in the drama of Howard's life-work. In his work on the state of prisons, he remarks in substance:

"The distress of prisoners came immediately under my notice, while I was sheriff of the county of Bedford; and the circumstance which excited me to activity in their behalf, was the seeing some who, by the verdict of juries, were declared *not* guilty; some on whom the grand jury did not find such an appearance of guilt as subjected them to a trial; and some whose prosecutors did not appear against them, after having been confined for months, dragged back to jail and locked up again until they could pay sundry fees to the jailer, the clerk of assize," &c.

In order to redress this grievance, he made application to the justices for a salary to be paid to the jailer in lieu of his fees. The justices wanted a precedent for such a course, and in searching for a precedent from county to county, and in looking into the jails, he learned something of the evils which prevailed in the prison system of England. From this time, he fully entered upon his great work. He travelled over nearly every county in England, and examined every house of correction, jail and prison, of whose existence he had information. From England he passed into Scotland, and then he took a journey into Ireland, penetrating every where into the receptacles of crime. He gathered a vast body of facts relating to the construction of jails, their interior arrangement, the sys-

tem of treatment adopted, and in general the whole economy of these establishments. His investigations brought to light very many cases of aggravated wrong inflicted under color of law, or by the tyranny of jailers, and instances almost as numerous as prisoners of dreadful and unnecessary suffering. It seemed as if the jails were constructed and built with a view of permitting the prisoners to have as little light and as small a measure of fresh air as the human system could possibly require, of exposing them to as much cold in winter, and heat in summer; of accumulating around them as much filth, and of subjecting them to as many physical discomforts and evils as the nature of man could endure. The prison for criminals in York Castle, is thus described:

"Its Court was small and without water, the pump being ingeniously placed on the outside of the palisades; water had consequently to be carried in by the servants of the establishment; a *circumstance* which sufficiently accounts for the filthiness of the place. Considering the very imperfect means for ventilation then known, the cells were terribly small, being only seven and a half feet long, six and a half feet wide, and eight and a half feet high, that is, each cell containing four hundred and fourteen cubic feet of air, being less than thirty-six hours consumption for a single individual; in addition to which, they were close and dark—having only a hole of about four inches by eight over the door, or half a dozen perforations, an inch or so in diameter, by which the scanty and poisoned air of the narrow passages, serving to divide the cells, might enter, if it could. Yet in these dungeons, three human beings were commonly locked up for the night, which, in winter, lasted from fourteen to sixteen hours."

In Howard's notices of visits to jails and prisons, we frequently find such short memoranda as these:

"The whole is dirty, and has not been whitewashed for many years; no Court, no water, no sewer, no straw."

The prisoners in these dismal places, often complained of being almost suffocated, and would beg to be taken out that they might breathe a little fresh air; some could not see, or breathe freely, or stand—one wretch said he would rather be gibbeted at once, than to be confined in his cell. The jail fever was an almost constant visitor to these dens of misery, and swept off scores and hundreds of their wretched inmates monthly. The jail accommodations

provided for debtors, were little, if any, better than those for criminals—such memoranda, made during visits to these prisons, as these occur :

“No chimney, earth floor very damp. The door had not been opened for four weeks when I went in; and then the keeper began to clear away the dirt. There was one debtor who seemed to have been robust, but was grown pale with ten weeks close confinement, with little food which he had from his brother, who was poor and had a family. The dampness of the room, with but little straw, had obliged him (he spoke it with sorrow) to send for the bed on which some of his children lay.”

Of another prisoner, he writes thus :

“The debtors have no Court, their free wards in the low jail are two damp, unhealthy rooms, ten feet four inches square.—They are never suffered to go out of these except to chapel, and not always to that. * * * * Common side debtors, whom I saw eating boiled bread and water, told me that this was the only nourishment some had lived upon for nearly twelve months.”

Having explored the jails and prisons of England, the philanthropist passed over to the Continent, and visited and explored the principal prisons of nearly every country of note in Europe. The prison system of the Continent, was far superior, in almost every respect, to that of England. The prisons were constructed, in the main, with a view to the comfort of prisoners—space, air and light were afforded—greater attention was paid to cleanliness—prisoners of different ages and sexes were kept apart—above all, in many places, criminals were kept at hard labour, and some system adopted for their reformation. Nevertheless there were some exceptions. He found various prisons on the Continent that would well bear comparison with the worst in England. His main object in all these tours of inspection was to collect facts, but wherever he went he relieved the wants and lightened the miseries of the captive, by private charity to the extent of his means, and by representations to magistrates and Kings.

While Howard was in Paris he tried to gain admission into the Bastille, a huge pile erected for the confinement of state prisoners, but this privilege was forbidden by law to any. He made application to the civil authorities: failing in this, he used the influence of the British Ambassador to secure the favor from the higher powers, but all in vain.

Unwilling to leave Paris without gaining a glimpse of this celebrated prison, he would loiter around it for hours, hoping that some chance would turn up and afford him an entrance. "At last, one day he presented himself at the outer gate, rung the bell loudly, and, on its being opened by the officer in charge, boldly stepped in, passed the sentry, walked coolly through a file of guards who were on duty, and advanced as far as he could, that is, to the great draw-bridge in the inner court. While standing there, contemplating the dismal structure, an officer ran up to him, greatly surprised and agitated at the sight of a stranger in that place, and as his manner appeared portentous and suspicious, the philanthropist thought it prudent to retreat on the instant, which he did, repassing the guard, who were mute with astonishment at his strange temerity, and thus regain the freedom which few ever saw again after having once crossed that fatal threshold." He afterwards, with great difficulty, procured a copy of a pamphlet, written and published by a prisoner, who had been confined in the Bastille, which gave a minute account of its interior structure. This pamphlet had been interdicted and suppressed by the government, and as many of the copies of the edition that was printed as they could lay their hands on, were bought up and destroyed. Howard caused it to be translated and published. For this, and his attempt to gain admission into the Bastille, the French government never forgave him. While traveling in Spain he tried to get a sight of the interior of the inquisition, but was only permitted to visit and inspect a few of its rooms, where every thing was made to appear to the best advantage. Its deep and dark mysteries were carefully concealed from his view.

Having thus gathered an immense mass of facts relating to the state of jails and prisons in England and on the Continent, he reduced them to order, and published them in a volume, bearing the title of "State of Prisons." The book made a deep impression, and was received with universal favor, not only on account of its intrinsic merits, and its strange revelations and details, but on account of the name of Howard, which had now become celebrated throughout England and Europe. The result was, that measures were adopted by Parliament for correcting, to

some extent, the abuses, and remedying the evils of the prevailing system. We are not, however, to judge of Howard's labors by their immediate results. All the reforms and improvements in the system of prison discipline, which render that which at present obtains so greatly superior to that which then existed, are to be traced up to him.

During Howard's tour of inspection through Italy, in sailing from Civita Vecchia to Leghorn, the vessel in which he had taken passage was overtaken by a violent storm. They were exposed to its fury during the whole day, and were in imminent danger of foundering. As night, however, set in, they were carried into a harbor off one of the islands of the Tuscan coast. They were overjoyed at their escape, and were preparing to land, but a rumour had preceded them that the place from which they had sailed was infected with the plague, and the inhabitants of the town refused to receive them. They anchored off the town for the night. The next morning they put to sea again; the storm had not subsided. For another day they were driven about by the winds and waves. Towards evening they found themselves upon the African coast, and again attempting to land, were forbidden by the Turks who inhabited that region, for fear of contagion. Resting near the shore for the night, they were again compelled in the morning to venture out to sea, and for another day and night they were exposed to the violence of the tempest. At last, coming in sight of the island of Gorgona, and casting their anchor until the dawn, they were kindly received and hospitably cared for by the governor. This incident had its influence in directing Howard's attention to another object of benevolent effort: the investigation of the causes of the plague which then raged periodically in various cities of Turkey and other places lying along the coast of the Mediterranean, the laws of quarantine, and the regulations adopted in the lazarettos established at those ports which had a commercial intercourse with the cities of the plague. Having formed the purpose, he was not long in carrying it into execution. He requested some medical friends to draw up a set of queries in relation to the plague, which he proposed to submit to physicians who had acquired a practical knowledge of the pestilence from a residence in the infected cities. He determined to

visit the principal places where lazarettos were established, and then to journey on to Smyrna and Constantinople, the head quarters of the plague, there to make personally his observations upon it. There was a lazaretto at Marseilles, which he purposed first to inspect; but the French government, remembering his attempt to enter the Bastille, and the publication of the pamphlet, refused to grant him permission to set his foot upon the soil of France. The French Ambassador was ordered to watch his motions, and report them to the Court.

Howard was not to be balked in his purpose. Disguising himself, and assuming a feigned name, he at great risk, and after several narrow escapes from the police, who were on the alert and in pursuit of him, reached Marseilles by the way of Paris. There, going to the house of a friend, he was met by him on the threshold, with the words, "Ha! Mr. Howard, I have always been happy to see you until now; leave France as quick as you can; I know they are searching for you in all directions." But Howard was not to be frightened from his design. He determined, at all risks, to stay at Marseilles until he had explored the lazaretto. Though admission was denied to all, even natives, Howard secured an entrance, inspected and obtained drawings of the lazaretto. After this, he visited, in succession, Nice, Genoa, Leghorn, Rome, Naples and Valetta. Thence he sailed to Smyrna, where the pestilence was subsiding. From Smyrna he journeyed to Constantinople, where it was raging with great violence. He received an invitation to take up his abode with the British Ambassador, but having determined to visit in person the infected districts and pest houses, and fearful of communicating the contagion, he declined his hospitality. He sought and obtained lodgings in the house of a fearless physician, of whose skill he might avail himself, should he be seized with the plague. His visits to the infected parts of the city and to the pest houses exposed him to fearful dangers, and brought before him such scenes of horror as he had never before witnessed. He penetrated to places where the contagion was so intensely concentrated, and wrought so fatally, that physician, dragoman and guide alike refused to follow him. He himself seemed invulnerable to the shafts of the destroyer. Sometimes after breathing the tainted air

of the rooms in which the sick and dying lay, he would feel the languor and headache, which are the precursors of the plague; but an hour's exercise in the fresh air would relieve him. The fact that Howard visited with impunity places where others would have perished, and an incident—his healing the daughter of a powerful and wealthy Turk, and refusing the princely present urged upon him by the grateful father—invested his character in the eyes of the Moslems with a mysterious and superhuman interest. Howard owed his escape from contagion on this and other occasions to his simple and abstemious mode of living, and to some precautions used at the time.

Having finished his perilous mission at Constantinople, he remembered that he had received all his information in regard to the interior life in the Lazaretto at second hand; he, therefore, resolved to become an inmate of one, for the period usually marked out for quarantine, and thus to know, from sight and experience, its secrets. In order to this, he took passage from Smyrna to Venice, in a vessel with a foul bill of health. In relation to this heroic resolution, his biographer remarks, "Perhaps not more than once before has such a sacrifice of self been seen; and then it was made by one who knew nothing of humanity, save its virtues. While on their voyage, they were come down upon and attacked with great fury by a Barbary corsair. The Venetian sailors, knowing that a hapless captivity awaited them, if they should be taken, fought desperately. Howard had never been in actual conflict before, yet he displayed a courage and coolness which would have done honor to the veteran of many bloody fields. The vessel owed its deliverance to his self-possession. There was but one canon on board. Of this he took the command; and, having loaded it almost to the muzzle with nails and spikes, and other things of the kind, he waited coolly until the enemy came within point blank range, and then fired his piece, with terrible effect, into her crowded decks. The corsair sheared off, and made all sail away from his antagonist. Howard learnt, after the fright was over, that the captain had resolved to blow up his vessel in case the Turk had boarded him, preferring death to slavery! At last, they arrived at Venice; and, being in the very worst class of the suspected, Howard was

placed in rigorous quarantine for forty days, and subjected to miseries, privations and perils which were dreadful to endure. While in the Lazaretto, two letters which he received from England added heavily to his burden. The one informed him of an effort on the part of his friends to raise funds to erect a statue to his honor. Large subscriptions had been made, and the scheme was near its completion. The other told him of the vicious excesses of his son, hinting at their true cause, his insanity. He instantly wrote home to his friends, thanking them for their kind intentions, but forbidding them to proceed in the most decided and peremptory manner. It was with great difficulty that he could induce them to desist. He could put a stop to this well-meant but ill-judged scheme, but he could do nothing to arrest the mental and moral disorder of his child. In the meanwhile, in a dreadful state of suspense as to his son, he was compelled to pass many weary days and nights "in a pest house, confined to his apartments, breathing an atmosphere loaded with an intolerable jail-like stench, consumed with fever, and suffering with a burning pain across his temples; and yet, in the midst of his sufferings, he was not forgetful of others. In a letter to his bailiff, or steward, dated from his prison, he gives minute directions in relation to the comforts of his cottagers, the management of his schools, and the distribution of rewards to the deserving, and large charities to the poor. After being released from his long and trying confinement, his health was so shattered, that he was compelled to travel for some weeks on the Continent to recruit. His system, however, never recovered from the shock it received during his imprisonment in the Lazaretto. After a while, he hastened back to England, reached Cardington, and found his son a maniac.

After the death of Howard, an attempt was made to fix a blot upon his memory, on account of alleged ill-treatment of his son. It was hinted, in "*The Gentleman's Magazine*," in an obituary notice of the philanthropist, that his harsh treatment of his child was the remote cause of his insanity. To this hint an incident was added, greatly exaggerated in some respects, and untrue in others. This slander has been repeated in every sketch of the philanthropist, with considerable additions. The incident, which

has been made such a handle of, was this: Howard, while walking in the garden with his little son, was called out to see a gentleman. He took his son, and placed him in his summer, or garden house; and, fearing that he might get out and do some mischief, locked the door. He was kept longer than he expected. On his return, forgetting where he had left the child, he asked the gardener where he was, and was pointed to the house. He went in and found the boy asleep where he had been left. This incident was told thus, "that Howard had once locked up his son for *several hours* in a solitary place, put the key in his pocket, and gone off to Bedford, leaving him there till he returned at night." One is reminded by this of the story of the three black crows.

In relation to his general treatment of his child, Howard had his own notions of rearing and educating children, which greatly differed from those generally entertained in the world. These notions he carried out as long as his child was under his own eye. The facts, however, as stated at large by his biographer, prove that while he was firm and decided in his course, yet, at the same time, he was the gentlest and most affectionate of fathers.

Young Howard's insanity is to be traced up to his own vicious excesses. He was left in charge of a servant, in whom his father had the greatest confidence. When a mere youth, while his father lived in London, he was in the habit, accompanied and encouraged by this servant, of leaving the house at night, after his father had retired to rest and suspected nothing, going to drinking and gambling houses and brothels, and indulging, without stint or measure, in every species of dissipation and debauchery. He kept up the same course in Edinburgh, where he was sent to school, and there contracted an incurable disease. He plunged into the same excesses at Cambridge, and there symptoms of insanity began to show themselves. His insanity proved to be incurable, and he died a maniac nine years after his father's decease.

The result of Howard's investigations in regard to Lazarettos and the plague, was a book, entitled, "Lazarettos of Europe." At the conclusion of that work, he expressed his intention of revisiting some of the countries, through which he had passed and of journeying yet further into

the East, to complete what he had left unfinished. His concluding words will shew the principle on which he acted. "Should it please God to cut off my life in the prosecution of this design, let not my conduct be uncandidly imputed to rashness, or enthusiasm, but to a serious, deliberate conviction, that I am pursuing the path of duty; and to a sincere desire of being made an instrument of more extensive usefulness to my fellow creatures, than could be expected in the narrow circle of a retired life."

This journey was his last, and when he set out on it, he had a presentiment that he would never return. He arranged his affairs and took a solemn and affecting leave of his numerous and attached friends. Reaching Amsterdam, he travelled slowly from thence through Germany and Prussia, into the dominions of the Czarina. Here his attention was arrested by the misery, and great loss of life, resulting from the military system of the country. Great numbers of recruits were yearly required for the army; these were gathered from all parts of the empire, marched over bad roads for great distances, ill clothed and ill fed; hundreds fell sick by the way, and dropped down from exhaustion and were either left to die of starvation, or conveyed to wretched hospitals, where disease generally put an end to their sufferings. He laid up these and like facts for future action. At last he arrived at Cherson, in which place much of the rank and fashion of Russia were gathered, principally from the army, which was then in winter quarters, waiting for the spring to recommence military operations against the Turks. A pestilential disorder broke out among the gay crowds; Howard whose reputation as a physician, in such cases, was very great, was entreated to visit and prescribe for a young lady of rank, who had been attacked. He complied with the request, and left word that if his patient should improve, he should be sent for; a letter was sent but miscarried, and did not reach him for eight days. With a faint hope of saving her life, he started off to see her in a chilly, stormy night, and was compelled to ride on horse back a great part of the way, and at last reached the house drenched with rain, and benumbed with cold. He found his patient dying, and while he ministered at her bedside took the contagion. In a few days, he was taken ill, had recourse to the usual

remedies, but without effect. The physician of the favourite of Catherine was sent to prescribe for him, and to use his utmost skill to save him. His disease would not yield to remedies, and rapidly grew worse. During the intervals of his disorder, and in view of death, he penned the following lines in his diary. "May I not look on present difficulties, or think of future ones in this world—as I am only a pilgrim, and wayfaring man, that tarries but a night. * * * * I am faint and low, yet I trust in the right way—pursuing, though too apt to forget, my Almighty Friend and God. * * * * Lord leave me not to my own wisdom which is folly, nor to my own strength, which is weakness. Help me to glorify thee on earth, and to finish the work which thou givest me to do, and to thy name alone be all the praise." He died four days after. Just before his death, he designated the spot where he wished to be buried, to an English friend in the service of the Czarina, and charged him in these words, "As you value your old friend, suffer no pomp to be used at my funeral; let no monument, or monumental inscription be made to mark where I am laid; but lay me quietly in the earth, place a sun dial over my grave, and let me be forgotten." The news of his death produced a profound impression in England, and all over the Continent of Europe.

Thus in a distant land ended the pilgrimage, of one, who for disinterestedness, and self-devotion, for a large and self-sacrificing benevolence, for his utter disregard of all those considerations by which ordinary men are influenced, and for the extent and results of his labours in the cause of humanity, was without an equal among the sons of men. His memory was embalmed in the recollections of the unfortunate debtors, whose liberty he purchased; of the afflicted, whose sufferings he had relieved; and of unpitied outcasts whose condition he had improved; and while one is left among men to love the noble, the true, and the good, the name of John Howard will not be forgotten.

ARTICLE VI.

Notes on the Miracles of our Lord. By RICHARD
CHENEVIX TRENCH. D. Appleton & Co.
New York. 8vo. p. 375.

The writings of Mr. Trench constitute one of the most important and interesting additions to scriptural Hermeneutics with which the present age has been favoured. He has very wisely adopted a custom which is becoming more and more popular—that of directing his attention to the exposition of particular parts of the sacred record, and instead of spreading his investigations over the whole field of God's word, which indeed no one man can fully occupy, he has combined his powers on a very small part. And it seems to us that only thus are we to get a thoroughly critical commentary on the Scriptures, by combining the labours of men who have faithfully and learnedly examined but minute fragments of the stupendous whole. It is by the division of labour, and the combination of results, that we are to see what we have not yet seen—a complete commentary on the Bible.

And we think that no one who has read his notes on the parables and miracles, will fail to conclude that in a remarkable degree our author is eminently qualified for the work which he has undertaken. He brings to his difficult but most important task, German learning and English good sense, with a very general acquaintance with the interpretations of the fathers: the whole governed and tempered by a truly christian reverence for the Inspired Book. Indeed his reference to patristic lore is so frequent and so reverential, that many of his readers will be disposed to think that he ascribes too much importance to what the great and good men of the church have said.

But this, if it exists, is a fault that can well be pardoned for its very rarity, in an age which has so little reverence for authority as this.

But it is not our purpose to criticise his works generally, but to call attention to that, the title of which heads our page. But we cannot pass on to our self-imposed task without commending the union of patient and learned and critical with *practical* exposition, which characterises all his

publications. We never thought that there was a necessity for a divorce of critical accuracy, from a practical application of truth; and a perusal of Alexander's admirable commentary on the Psalms has greatly tended to confirm our opinion.

Before entering on an examination of the particular miracles of our Lord, our author occupies about one fourth of his handsome octavo, in discussing important preliminary matters—on the settlement of which depends in a great degree the character and value of the work, and the nature of the results that are to be reached. The first chapter is devoted to the names of the miracles. The second is headed "the Miracles and Nature," in which we are treated to a discussion of the relation between the laws of nature and miraculous interventions. And here the distinction is not in the fact that the one is wonderful as an exhibition of divine power, and the other not. It would be exceedingly difficult to show that there is a greater display of omnipotence in darkening the sun at the crucifixion, and causing the dead to rise—than in causing that sun to rise upon us with its daily light, or in the constant production of members of the human family. "The seed that multiplies in the furrow, is as marvellous as the bread that multiplied in Christ's hands." There is certainly a wide difference between them—in that, one is common and familiar; and the other, uncommon and startling. But the rising of the sun for the first time, if accomplished in confirmation of a truth, would be a miraculous attestation, which none would be inclined to dispute. All nature in its complicated evolutions and developements, is a manifestation of the mighty power of God—"My Father worketh hitherto and I work." There is no conflict then between natural and miraculous operations. They come from the same source. The object only is different. The one is designed to subserve the ordinary ends of being—the other, to accomplish some special purpose. It cannot be too earnestly insisted on that a miracle is not "*contra naturam*"—but only "*præter*" or "*supra naturam*." And in defending this proposition, we sweep away a very large portion of the infidel's objections to the doctrine of miracles. This is remarkably true of Spinoza's assault on the miracles. A miracle is not strictly any thing *unnatural* or *disorderly*, but

is the result of a higher law superseding the ordinary, and which is only manifested at rare intervals and for specific purposes. But for a full and satisfactory exposition of this question, we must refer to the pages of the work before us.

Chapter 3rd takes up "the authority of the miracle." But as we think that our author here stands on unsound and dangerous ground we prefer to postpone our observations on this point to the concluding part of this review—when we can consider what he says at some length—in connexion with chapter 6th and last on "the apologetic worth of the miracles." The 4th chapter is one of special interest, as it enters on a field but little trodden by authors in common use. It compares the miracles of the New Testament with those of the Old—then with those of the Apocryphal Gospels, and the later, or ecclesiastical miracles. Chapter 5 examines the Jewish, Heathen, Pantheistic, (Spinoza,) skeptical, (Hume,) Schleirmacherian, Rationalistic, (Paulus,) and the Historico-critical, (Woolston, Straus,) attacks on the miracles. His discussion here is remarkable for its great fairness and clearness, and considering the necessary conciseness, its conclusiveness. The way is thus cleared for a satisfactory consideration of the wonderful works of our Lord in detail, on which our author enters with the zest of a brave critic, and with the reverence of an humble and earnest believer.

But following him no further, we pause to discuss the only prominent question in his work on which we feel disposed to do battle with him—that is, what does a miracle prove? what is its value as testimony? And here we do feel bound to break a lance (albeit at our peril) with so redoubted a champion, in defence of sound principles of interpretation and a proper reverence for the declarations of our Lord. If we understand him, (and one who writes as he does cannot well be misunderstood,) he thinks that a miracle proves little or nothing—that it is little, if anything, more than a startling appeal to the attention—the herald's trumpet call, that ushers in the final appeal to the moral sense that sits enthroned in solemn and final judicial authority in the breast of man.

The reader may ask, why one who puts the testimony of miracles so low, should write a work of such learning

and research on them. But this is a question we are not bound to answer, nor could we if we would. We refer the querist to the author for an answer.

That this is the author's view, is easily proved. The inconclusiveness of miraculous testimony runs like a thread of error through the whole production, otherwise so faultless and valuable.

On page 42, in speaking of the miracles of the apocryphal gospels, he says that they are "instructive only as making us strongly to feel, more strongly than but for these examples we might have felt, how needful it is that there should be other factors besides power for producing a true miracle; that wisdom and love must be there also." From this it would seem to follow that, however strong an evidence of omnipotence any given work might exhibit, yet we would be justified in rejecting it, if that which is attested did not come up to *our* standard of "wisdom and love." This is very like the insane affirmation of the Arminian, who said Calvinism could not be proved; that if the Bible witnessed in its favor, then the witness was false, and unworthy of credit. Again, on page 46, he says, in giving the marks of true miracles, that "they must not be seals and witnesses to aught which the conscience, enlightened by the Word and Spirit of God—whereunto is the ultimate appeal, and which stands above the miracle, and not beneath it—protests against as untrue." Here he strangely forgets that miracles were employed as proofs of what the Word of God is, and what the Spirit does teach. That the men who came as God's ambassadors to us, appealed to their miracles as seals and authentications of what they taught. This form of argument might be of use to us, now that the canon of Scripture is ascertained, and the mind of the Spirit known—but certainly, to use this principle in reference to those miracles which were wrought by Christ and the Apostles, as proofs of what the Word of God was—is nothing less than reasoning in a circle. Then on page 76 he likens the miracles, considered apart from the truth they attest, to seals torn away from the document to which they were attached. But here his figure is as bad as his logic. A seal, found apart from its document, would prove something was attested—and the question would be, to what was it affixed? That ascertained, all is settled. We would

not be at liberty to look into the document before accrediting the seal. All we could ask would be, was the seal affixed by proper authority? So when a clearly ascertained miracle bears witness to any proposition, it is man's duty to believe, and not to judge.

But the presentation of the author's hypothesis is, as we might expect, to be found mainly in the 3d and 6th chapters, where the question is formally discussed. His first argument—that miracles cannot be taken as conclusive evidence—is, that running along with the whole line of the true, there is a parallel succession of the false and spurious, or, as he calls them, Satan's "caricatures of the holiest," and alludes to the doings of Pharaoh's magicians as an instance. But we have yet to learn that counterfeits, even when most skilfully executed, are able to take away the authority and the value of the true. Indeed the contrary has grown into a proverb—that false coin proves the existence and the worth of the genuine. That there are imitations, calls on us for greater care in scrutinizing before we accredit what claims our confidence, but certainly cannot take away the value of the true when ascertained. The fact that Satan tries "*lying wonders*," will compel us to see to it that we do not yield our confidence without patient and earnest examination. But we do not see that it is operative further than this. And it is not unreasonable to suppose that there will always be found *in the works themselves* indices which will point to their origin. At least so the magicians seem to have thought, for on beholding God's works, as wrought by Moses, they said to their master, "This is the finger of God." In relation to this case of Pharaoh, one thing is certain. God required him to believe in Moses' mission, and punished him for not believing. Now what was the evidence on which that belief and obedience was demanded? Why miracles, and nothing more. And surely God would not demand faith and submission, under such trying circumstances, on any other testimony than that which was perfectly sufficient and conclusive. And this could not be the case if the things done by the magicians were miraculous. But when we see that they were mere feats of jugglery, as they manifestly were, and might have been detected as such, we can readily understand why Pharaoh

was guilty and punishable in his unbelief. What his wise men did has been rivalled, if not surpassed, by modern Egyptian charmers, and by practitioners of sleight-of-hand in our own country.

The same is manifestly true of those pretended miracles, that Infidels have adduced as offsets to those of the Bible. Let any impartial man read the accounts we have of Apollonius of Tyana, and he will at once perceive how feeble the evidence of his vaunted wonders ever having occurred is, and how much room for deception there was, even if their existence be admitted. Even Celsus, the great forerunner of the blasphemers of God's holy Gospel, did not believe that his were real miracles. He only used them as convenient in his argument with Christians. Origen, in his work, (*Con. Cel.*) charges him with not crediting them.

But our author appeals, (very strangely, we think,) in the second place, to the well-known fact that the miracles did not always produce conviction. He says Christ raised a man from the dead: here was the same outward fact for all: but how diverse the results—some believed, and some went and told the Pharisees. Now this argument amounts to this proposition—that cannot be sufficient and conclusive testimony, which does not force its way to universal acceptance. But this sweeps away all testimony—for any amount of evidence will be rejected by one who is wilfully and obstinately blind. The Word of God strongly affirms this truth: "If they believe not Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead." If they are bent on unbelief, they will reject even this, the highest evidence that can be given them. But it seems to us that the question may be settled by a reference to Scripture. If Christ appeals to his miracles as ultimate and conclusive evidence, then there is no room for doubt. And that he does this repeatedly, we hesitate not to affirm. "If I had not done among them the works that none other man did, they had not had sin: but now they have both seen and hated both me and my Father." (*John xv. 24.*) Well may Pascal remark, on this very passage—"It follows, then, that he regarded his miracles as an infallible proof of his doctrine, and that the Jews were bound by them to believe him. And indeed it was these

miracles especially that made their unbelief criminal." (Pascal's Thoughts on Religion.) "Then answered the Jews, and said unto him, What sign shewest thou unto us, seeing thou doest these things? Jesus answered and said unto them, Destroy this temple, (his body,) and in three days I will raise it up." (John ii. 18.) Here he appeals to his resurrection as affording all the evidence that the Jews asked. "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me." (John x. 25.) In the 10th and 11th verses of the 14th chapter of the same Gospel, Christ makes this declaration: "Believest thou not that I am in the Father and the Father in me? The words that I speak unto you I speak not of myself: but the Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works. Believe me that I am in the Father and the Father in me, or else believe me for the very *work's sake*."

But a still more remarkable passage is found in Matthew xii. 22—32. Christ had cast out a devil, and the Jews ascribed it to a league with Beelzebub, the prince of devils. His answer tells tremendously on the question before us. He declares that the ascription of a miracle to aught else than the Spirit of God, is the sin against the Holy Ghost. But it may be said that our Saviour in this case falls in with the doctrine of the author, and appeals to the consciousness of truth and propriety in the minds of his hearers. We think, however, that his answer is an *argumentum ad hominem*. It would have availed him nothing to have maintained that devils could not do the miracles they had witnessed; for they manifestly believed that they could, as is proved by an abundance of testimony. The argument he used was good against them, and was indeed the only one suited to the circumstances. But it is plain that Christ regarded miracles as conclusive testimony, for when the multitude immediately asked from him "a sign from heaven," he refused it, and told them that no other signs than those they had seen should be given them, save that of his own resurrection. And as this was not to occur for some time, he plainly implied that for the present they had evidence enough.

And Nicodemus fully assents to the validity of just this sort of proof: "We know that thou art a teacher, come from God; for no man can do the things that thou doest,

except God be with him." Here again Pascal observes: "He did not judge of the miracles by the doctrine, but of the doctrine by the miracles. So that even though the doctrine was suspected, as that of Jesus Christ might be, by Nicodemus, because it seemed to threaten with destruction the traditions of the Pharisees, yet, if there were clear and evident miracles on its side, the evidence for the miracle ought to carry it against any apparent difficulty in respect to the doctrine. This rule has its foundation in the indubitable principle that God cannot lead into error."

This passage fully evinces that the Jews regarded miracles as a necessary and sufficient proof of the Messiahship. See also Neander's *Life of Christ*, p. 133, and on the general subject, p. 138.

Additional scriptural evidence of the ground we take will be found, by reference to Mark xvi. 20, Acts xiv. 3, Heb. ii. 4, 2 Cor. xii. 12, and in many other places of Scripture that might be mentioned. The very names given to miracles in Scripture are significant. They are called "powers," intimating that nothing but Almighty power can accomplish them; "*works*" for the same reason, and "signs," of what?—"that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins."

And the interpretation given by our author is, we think, liable to the gravest objection on the ground that it casts an imputation on the character of the Deity. Is it consistent with well established ideas of God—that He, a wise, powerful, holy and good being—should permit an evil power to seal a lie with a manifest and real miracle, and thus lead his creatures into error to their own undoing? The pious mind shrinks from such a conclusion, except in the solitary case of punishment by judicial blindness, which is by no means the ground taken by the advocates of this theory.

Reason seems to affirm that a real miracle is never effected without a divine interposition. Certainly, admitting that evil spirits have the natural power to work miracles, they could never exercise it without God's permissive decree, and the moral difficulty that this permission—some might call it connivance—would involve, has already been stated. But our author tells us that we must judge of the truth or falsehood of the doctrine attested, whether it is

worthy of God. Then after all, the miracle is nothing more than an exclamation mark to attract attention, and the court of adjudication is in the moral sense. The rule of ultimate appeal is within our own bosoms. Now we maintain, that of all rules this is the most uncertain and fallacious. We are not pure beings—else this principle would not be so absurd and dangerous. Our moral nature is in ruins. We see through stained glass. Each man views the question presented through the medium of his own prejudices and passions. There would be as many standards of truth as judges, and that standard in each case would be ever changing. One might as well take the hues of a dying dolphin as the standard of a given colour. This doctrine makes revelation come from within, rather than without: from the heart, instead of from God.

But we may be asked, does not the Apostle assume some such rule of judgment, when he says to the Galatians, "But though we or an angel from heaven preach any other Gospel than that we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." To this we answer, that this is a mere supposition, which does not at all imply the real occurrence of the contingency suggested, but the contrary. Such a form of implying the impossibility of a thing is very common, and is not liable to be misunderstood. It is very certain, that neither Paul nor an angel from heaven would ever be disposed or permitted to preach another gospel. And to trouble ourselves as to what was to be done in case they did, would be about as wise as to discuss most gravely and earnestly, what we would do with the larks, if the sky should fall and we should catch them.

It is worthy of note, in this whole discussion, that the question is not what would be the rule of judgment, if miracle were arrayed against miracle. This would be the case if a miracle worker were now to arise, teaching something contrary to the Gospel, which has already been confirmed by the same sort of evidence. This we maintain can never occur. The real question is, and this is the one which was submitted to those who saw the wonders of our Lord, what is the authority of a miracle when performed in attestation of a declaration, in reference to which there is no conflicting testimony of the same kind? And we maintain that in this we are spontaneously led to believe,

and that this disposition is sanctioned by reason and confirmed by Scripture.

But, says the objector, suppose a miracle were wrought to prove that two and two make five. Here again, we say that we prefer waiting till the case occurs, or there is some likelihood of its occurrence, before we settle the terms of adjustment. But it may well be observed, that this case, supposing it to occur, presents a very different question from that which we have been discussing. The subject of the relation of numbers is one directly before us, and within the scope of our faculties, and where there is no disturbing bias, so that as far as we can see, we can settle the question as well as an angel. But it is not so in religion. Here the subject is beyond our range. It is revelation. We are corrupt—see through a false and deceptive medium. Men vary about all moral truths, but there is no variation about mathematical propositions such as that mentioned. But this question excepted, we heartily commend this work to a general circulation.

Before closing, however, it may be as well to observe, that Mr. Trench exalts the internal evidences of revelation to the depreciation of the external. He does indeed deny this, but we think that the impression made on his readers will be that in reproving those who relied solely on miracles for the establishment of revelation, he commits the same fault he condemns, although in a contrary direction. He relies, almost or quite, entirely on the internal evidence. And if we mistake not, this is the manifest tendency of most modern apologists. But the truth is, that both these pleas are erroneous. All the various sources of evidence are important. One class being best suited to one temper of mind—another falling in most readily with a different. The man who would sneer at the testimony of the Christian's consciousness and call it fanaticism, may be overwhelmed by the argument from miracles. All the sources of evidence are independent, and may be so considered—though of course they support each other when viewed in combination as a harmonious whole.

ARTICLE VII.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. *Home Influence: a Tale for Mothers and Daughters.* By GRACE AGUILAR. 12mo. pp. 411. New edition. Harper & Brothers, N. Y. 1850.
2. *The Mother's Recompense: a Sequel to Home Influence.* By GRACE AGUILAR. 12mo. pp. 449. D. Appleton & Co., N. Y. 1851.

In the introduction to the former of these works, we learn that the author composed these pleasing tales in early youth, and was cut off by death before they could be revised. There are not wanting, in the books themselves, many proofs of haste in completion, and of the immaturity of genius; while yet they disclose a high degree of talent—considerable power of discrimination in selecting and in diversifying the characters introduced, and no small invention in weaving a plot which shall fully and consistently delineate them.

We notice these works, though works of fiction, because they were written with a higher design than simply to amuse. The object in both is to illustrate the influence of Home in forming the characters of children; and many valuable hints are thrown out to parents and guardians respecting the education of such. We have risen from the perusal of these tales, more deeply impressed with the responsibility which attaches to the training of youth; with the necessity of making the characters of those committed to us subjects of earnest study; and with the importance of digesting carefully a system of education, and settling the principles upon which it shall be conducted; and the injury of leaving such a matter to be shaped by the impulses and caprices of every hour.

As these books will be much read, we feel bound to enter a caveat against the portraiture of religion which they give. The

strictly religious characters—even those whose office it is to expound it—are moralists of a high grade, and nothing more; they are good by the force of their own earnest and persevering endeavours, and through the agency of a wholesome influence which has been exerted upon them. Nothing is said about a change of heart—nothing of the Spirit's agency in turning man from sin to holiness—nothing, save one or two vague references, of the atonement of Christ by which the sinner is reconciled to God—nothing of pardon, save as it may be affected by simple repentance and reformation. In short, the religion presented to view does not rise above the baldest Deism; and, if the Scriptures are quoted, it is with the same spirit in which one might cite the writings of Epictetus.

3. *Responses from the Sacred Oracles; or, the Past in the Present.*
By RICHARD W. DICKINSON, D. D., author of "*Religion Teaching by Example; or, Scenes from Sacred History*," etc.
12mo. pp. 430. Robert Carter & Brothers, N. Y. 1851.

Our previous acquaintance with Dr. Dickinson, as a writer, led us to take up this volume with pleasing anticipations, which have not been disappointed. Characters are selected from the Scriptures, which may be considered as types of those which are reproduced in every age of the world: the Inspired History given of these shows the estimate placed by God upon them; and thus we have "responses from the Sacred Oracles," in relation to similar cases in modern times.

The work is, of necessity, fragmentitious. The author throws himself freely upon the course of thought suggested by each topic, and finds ample room for practical reflections. Occasionally he stumbles upon questions of some theological importance; and his treatment of these, though not scientific, nor thorough, betrays a mind well stored with knowledge. The work is popular in its cast, and full of instruction and direction to the general reader.

4. *An Earnest Search for Truth: in a series of Letters to Cumberland Presbyterians, addressed to a Father.* By L. A. LOWRY. With an introduction by REV. ASHBEL G. FAIRCHILD, D. D. 18mo. pp. 160. John D. Thorpe, Cincinnati. 1851.

The author of these letters was born and educated in the Cumberland Church, into the ministry of which he was duly initiated, and put in charge of one of their most important stations. Becoming dissatisfied with the incoherence of the doctrinal creed of his church, an inquiring and truth-loving spirit led him, after lengthened investigation, to take refuge in the Calvinistic faith. The reader cannot but sympathise with the author during his painful search for that "middle way" between Arminianism and Calvinism, which is put forth as the distinctive feature of Cumberlandism. It is made to appear that the only result of the experiment made by that church is, the practical abandonment of the few Calvinistic principles professedly retained, and a lapse into many of the most pernicious errors of the Arminians. Some of the letters are written with a broad humour, which surprises the reader, in the midst of his gravity, into laughter.

The leading idea of the book is, to show the logical connexion between the different articles of the Calvinistic faith—that its fundamental axioms being admitted, all its doctrines are drawn along in that admission by necessary deduction. It is, therefore, useful in exposing the tendency of Arminian errors in other churches besides the Cumberland.

5. *The Foot Prints of the Creator: or, the Asterolepis of Stromness.* By HUGH MILLER, author of "*The Old Red Landstown*," etc. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. 337.

This writer is, we presume, well known to most of our readers as the editor of the "*Witness*," the organ of the Free Church of Scotland. When that body, with Dr. Chalmers at their head, were about to separate from the Established Church, Hugh Miller's

letter to Lord Brougham induced that body to select him to conduct their principal metropolitan newspaper; and, in that very able journal, much of the Foot-Prints appeared, originally, as editorial articles.

The work was published, a few years ago, illustrated by fifty-eight admirable (most of them original) wood-cuts; and, having passed through three foreign editions, it was re-published, last year, by Gould, Kendall & Lincoln, Boston.

Its purely scientific parts abound in new, striking and important facts, most of them discovered by Mr. Miller; and their publication added much to his deservedly high reputation as a profound, though self-taught naturalist, possessed of rare powers of observation and generalization.

The style of the work is pure, clear and vivid; its descriptions of phenomena are simple, graphic and vigorous; and its refutations of error, and defences of truth, though generally calm, sometimes even playful, are often impressive and eloquent. And the facility with which Mr. Miller embellishes, with gems of fancy, wit, and literature, his most profound scientific investigations, and acute philosophic reasonings, even earnest defences of Revelation, against the assaults of infidelity, imparts to his work an interest—an attractiveness—rarely found in the productions of scientific men. The chief value of the Foot-Prints is, however, the triumphant success with which it exposes and refutes the development hypothesis of Lamark, Oken, and the “*Vestiges of Creation*.”

Till a very recent period, many reviled geology as a mass of ingenious hypotheses, and some even denounced its cultivators as enemies to Revelation. These objections to the science have been, in a great degree, abandoned, rather, perhaps, from a conviction that its facts and principles, though they require assent to the high antiquity of the earth as a planet, are yet not at all inconsistent with the Mosaic account, literally interpreted, of the creation of man and of existing animals and plants, than from a clear perception and just appreciation of the religious use, which can be made of geological phenomena. Mr. Miller has, in the work before us, shown that the facts and principles of his favorite science can be employed as most efficient means of demolishing the seemingly scientific strongholds of infidelity.